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A Priori

"A priori" **is a term used to identify a type of knowledge which is obtained independently of experience. A proposition is known *a priori* if when judged true or false one does not refer to experience. "*A priorism*" is a philosophical position maintaining that our minds gain knowledge independently of experience through innate ideas or mental faculties. The term *a priori* is distinguished from *a posteriori*, which means knowledge gained through the senses and experience. These are the two most common ways in which philosophers argue that humans acquire knowledge.**

For Aristotle, "a priori" referred to something which was prior to something else. By "prior" he meant that some thing's existence was caused by the existence of another. Aristotle argued that to have knowledge of a prior thing, then, was to have knowledge of a causal relationship. He argued that we can establish a causal relationship between things through syllogistic logic. Descartes used the term "a priori" in his quest for the foundation of all knowledge. For Descartes, knowledge of our own existence was a priori because (a) denying it leads to a contradiction, and (b) we do not need to rely on our experiences to ponder our existence.

Kant believed that *a priori* truths could be found in the two areas; mathematics and the categories which organize the material of experience and science. Kant divided *a priori* truths into two categories: the synthetic and the analytic. Traditionally, mathematical propositions were seen as both analytic and a priori. Kant, however, classifies both mathematics and the categories as synthetic a priori. Math is synthetic *a priori* because it depends on the pure intuitions of the elements of time and space. Kant argued time and space were central intuitions to mathematical knowledge, and were thus the reasons for his grouping mathematical truths in the synthetic a priori. Our categories are identified as synthetic *a priori* because denying them does not lead to a contradiction. On the other hand, these categories are central to experience. Kant used the example of causality, in the "Second Analogy" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, to demonstrate that the concept of an "event" having a "cause" must be connected before we can give apply either notion. This connection can only be a synthetic one, since it is not tautological.

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Abortion

MAIN ETHICAL ISSUES. The applied ethical issue of abortion involves a consideration of the reasons for or against terminating the life of a fetus. Much has been written on the issue of abortion both in the popular press and in the philosophical literature. The debate focuses on two distinct issues: (1) whether a human fetus has a right to life, and, if so, (2) whether the rights of the mother ever override the fetus's right. Often the issues are discussed independently of each other. Discussion of the first issue, regarding a fetus's right to life, usually draws on the concept of moral personhood. A being is a morally significant person when it is a rights holder, and we are under moral obligation to that being. For example, I am a morally significant person and am entitled to the right to life, which others have a moral duty to acknowledge. The problem for moral theorists is to establish a criterion that explains why I am a morally significant person, and a fly or a worm is not a morally significant person.

Some religious philosophers suggest that we are morally significant persons at the moment of conception. Nonreligious criteria include, when we first take the human form (in the fourth month of pregnancy), when our organs become differentiated, and when the fetus can survive outside the womb (both around the seventh month of pregnancy). Some philosophers suggest more general criteria such as when a being is self-aware or rational. These criteria are not exhibited until an infant is one or two years old. The criterion of personhood selected has decisive implications on the morality of abortion. If personhood is conferred on a being at the moment of conception, then, all things considered, aborting a fetus is immoral. On the other hand, if we select a criterion such as self-awareness, then, all things considered, aborting a fetus is not immoral. The challenge is in providing reasons in support of one criterion over another.

But even if we all could agree on a criterion of personhood, such as the moment of conception, the abortion debate would not be over. For, questions arise about whether the mother's right of self-determination overrides the rights of the fetus. It is the mother's body that is affected by the pregnancy, and it is her emotional and social life that will be drastically altered for at least the next nine months and beyond. These factors carry at least some weight. Other potentially overriding factors complicate the rights of the fetus, such as whether the pregnancy resulted from rape, or contraception failure. Arguments are required from both camps to establish the relative weight of these factors.

Historically, attitudes about abortion and the moral status of a fetus have fluctuated. Aristotle endorses abortion when writing that "when couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation" (*Politics*, 7:16). The Hippocratic Oath states "Nor will I give a woman a pessary to procure abortion." The Jewish Talmud, compiled around 600 CE, holds that "an embryo is a limb of its mother" [Hulin 58a] and for the first forty days after conception, the embryo is "simply water" [Yevamot 69b]. A fetus's life is of equal importance to

that of the mother's only "once its head has emerged (from her body)"[Mishna Oholot 7:6].

Medieval theologians address the question of the moral status of a fetus by examining whether the fetus has a human soul. Aquinas held that the fetus only gradually acquires a human soul, and in the early stages of pregnancy is not technically human. The basis for Aquinas's view is a position called *hylomorphism*, that is, that the human soul can only exist in a distinctly human body. For example, a wooden chair cannot have a human soul. God, then, does not implant the human soul in a fetus until it that fetus takes a distinctly human form. Aquinas believed that this happened at about 40 days for males and 80 days for females. Scholars speculate that the difference was based on the point at which male and female sex organs could be observed in miscarriages. The implication is that one does not kill a human by aborting a fetus prior to the point at which it obtains a soul. In the selection below, Aquinas describes the process by which a fetus acquires a distinctly human soul. Following Aristotle's tripartite division of the soul, Aquinas argues that the fetus first has only the vegetative soul, which allows it to take in nutrition. For Aquinas, the fetus gets this directly from the father's semen, which follows the natural mechanism by which life produces more life. Next, the fetus develops a sensitive soul, which allows it to have sensations. Finally, though a special act of creation, God implants the intellectual soul in the fetus, which supercedes and perfects the previous two souls. The intellectual soul is what makes the fetus human.

During the Renaissance and modern period of philosophy, philosophers did not discuss the topic of abortion in detail. However, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), John Locke implies that it "is part of the worship of God, not to kill another man; not to know more women than one; not to procure abortion; not to expose their children; not" (*Essay*, 1:2:19).

MARQUIS'S CRITIQUE OF ABORTION. In one of the most influential contemporary critiques of abortion,"Why Abortion is Immoral" (1989), University of Kansas philosophy professor Don Marquis argues that killing in general is wrong because it deprives an individual of a future which contains value. Most abortions, therefore, are fundamentally immoral since they deprive fetuses of a future containing value. Marquis addresses only the first of the above two issues, and concludes that a human fetus has a right to life at the moment of conception. Marquis begins by noting the pitfalls of both the traditional pro-life and pro-choice arguments on this issue. Pro-life arguments begin noting facts, such as the fact that fetuses look like babies and already have their complete genetic codes. As supportive arguments they note that it is wrong in principle to kill a human being. The problem, Marquis argues, is that it is not clear that a fetus qualifies as a human *being* (as opposed to a mere human growth, such as a cluster of cancer cells). By contrast, typical pro-choice arguments begin with facts, such as the fact that fetuses are not rational or social creatures. As supportive arguments they note that, in principle, it is wrong to kill only rational and morally significant persons. The problem here, Marquis argues, is that infants are also nonrational, thus, in principle, killing infants would be permissible on this view. Both pro-life and pro-choice arguments flounder since they appeal to biological and psychological criteria of moral personhood. Marquis attempts to bypass this problem by isolating the specific criterion which makes all killing wrong.

In general, killing is wrong because it deprives a being of its future. For example, I recognize that Jones will have a future similar to my own, containing experiences of great value. To deprive Jones of this is immoral. Marquis believes that the success of his theory hinges on whether his account of wrongful killing fits our intuitions, and whether it is superior to rival accounts of wrongful killing. In support of his criterion, he argues that killing generally is believed to be among the worst crimes

since it deprives the victim of more than perhaps any other crime. Also, people dying of AIDS or cancer report that their main tragedy is being deprived of a future. He notes four points as further evidence that his criterion is consistent with our intuitions. First, unlike many pro-life criteria, his criterion applies not only to human life, but to theoretically possible extra-terrestrial life as well. Second, in keeping with the intuitions of some animal rights advocates, his criterion may apply to higher animals. Third, in keeping with the intuitions of defenders of mercy-killing, his criterion does not rule out euthanasia. Finally, unlike many pro-choice criteria, his criterion makes infanticide wrong. Having established his general criterion of wrongful killing, Marquis concludes that abortion is clearly wrong since it deprives a fetus of a value-filled future (which would be a future similar to our own). He cautions that his argument establishes only the *prima facie* wrongness of abortion, thereby allowing that there may be overriding circumstances.

Marquis again notes that his criterion of wrongful killing will succeed only if rival criteria fail. Turning to the rival criteria, he begins by criticizing a view he calls the *desire account*: killing is wrong since it deprives us of our desire to live. For Marquis, this criterion fails since it implies that it is permissible to kill people who lost their desire to live. Also, this criteria fails to recognize that the goodness of life rests in our valuable experiences, not in the desire itself. He also finds problems with a view he calls the *discontinuation account*: killing is wrong since it discontinues the experiences of the victim. This criterion fails, though, since if Jones's life right now is bad (although his future will be good), then killing Jones right now would be permissible.

Critics of Marquis might argue that it is not enough for the fetus to merely have a value-filled future. It must have an *interest* in its future before it can have a right to it. For example, some might argue that the fetus must be able to *value* its future. Marquis responds that this condition fails since it would make it permissible to kill someone in despair who no longer valued her life. Michael Tooley has suggested that a being must have the capacity to *care about* its continued existence. Marquis argues that, even when we are unconscious and unable to care about *anything*, we still retain certain rights. Finally, Marquis addresses a possible counter-example which the issue of contraception might pose to his criterion. For, if killing is wrong because it deprives a future, then contraception would also be wrong since it deprives a future. This counter example fails, though, since it would be arbitrary to select a single victim from among an egg and millions of sperm.

THOMSON'S DEFENSE OF ABORTION. In "A Defense of Abortion," Massachusetts Institute of Technology philosophy professor Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that, even if we grant that fetuses have a fundamental right to life, in many cases the rights of the mother override the rights of a fetus. Accordingly, abortions are permissible in cases of rape, life-threatening pregnancies, and contraception failure. For the sake of argument, Thomson grants the initial contention made by Marquis and others that the fetus has a right to life at the moment of conception, even though she does not personally believe that a fetus has rights. She comments that, for critics this is all that is needed to establish the immorality of abortion. However, Thomson explains, it is not self-evident that the fetus's right to life will always outweigh the mother's right to self-determination. She makes her point with the following illustration. Imagine that you wake up one morning and find that you have been kidnapped, taken to a hospital, and a famous violist has been attached to your circulatory system. You are told that the violinist was ill and, in an emergency decision, you were selected to be the host because only you had the compatible blood-type. The violinist will recover in nine months, but will die if disconnected from you before then. Clearly, Thomson argues, you are not morally required to continue being the host. This, she believes, parallels the situation of

pregnancy by rape, and situations where the mother has to spend nine months in bed.

Thomson next examines an extreme anti-abortion view which maintains that abortion is impermissible even to save the mother's life. The rationale behind this view is that the child is innocent, and killing the child would be active; on the other hand, letting the mother die would be passive. Thomson criticizes that additional premises are needed to get to the conclusion that killing the child is murder; but when formulated, such premises are not universally acceptable. For example, it is an overstatement to say that directly killing an innocent person is always and absolutely impermissible. She concludes that abortion is justified if the mother's life is in danger. She then criticizes a modified extreme view: abortion is permissible to save the mother's life, but a third party cannot perform the abortion, since the third party must be impartial. Thomson criticizes that impartiality here is an illusion since the mother *owns* her body, and thus has first rights; a particular bystander may not feel justified in intervening, but some authority will be justified in performing the abortion.

Thomson continues by examining the notion of the right to life, and what it implies. Some have suggested that the right to life is the right to be given the bare minimum of what one needs for continued existence. She replies that if I need "the touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow" to survive, I have no right to that. Some have also suggested that the right to life means that one has the right not to be killed. This is inadequate, though, since frequently dilemmas arise when one innocent life must be selected over another. Finally, she suggests that the right to life means that one has the right not to be killed *unjustly*. Thus, if abortion is wrong, it needs to be shown that it is unjust killing. In cases of rape and where the mother's life is in danger, this cannot be shown.

Regarding abortion in non-life threatening and non-rape cases, the critic argues that when a woman voluntarily has sex, and accidentally gets pregnant, she is partially responsible; and this partial responsibility gives the fetus a right to her body. Thomson replies that if reasonable contraception precautions are taken, then the woman does not give the fetus a right to her body. Thus, abortion will be wrong only in those cases where pregnancy is intentional.

Returning to rape cases, Thomson notes that the fetus's right to life would not be any stronger if the pregnancy lasted only one hour. Although the mother would be callous for not bringing the pregnancy to term, she would still be in her rights. She concludes by noting the unfair demands that society places on women by making them bring unintentional pregnancies to term. In no other area of social conduct are people required to be such good Samaritans. It will not help the critic to argue that the mother has a special responsibility which issues from her role as a mother. For Thomson, a person does not have a special responsibility unless it has been assumed by that person.

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The Academy

Philosophical institution founded by Plato, which advocated skepticism in succeeding generations.

The Academy (*Academia* was originally a public garden or grove in the suburbs of Athens, about six stadia from the city, named from Academus or Hecademus, who left it to the citizens for gymnastics (Paus. i. 29). It was surrounded with a wall by Hipparchus, adorned with statues, temples, and sepulchres of illustrious men; planted with olive and plane trees, and watered by the Cephisus. The olive-trees, according to Athenian fables, were reared from layers taken from the sacred olive in the Erechtheum, and afforded the oil given as a prize to victors at the Panathenean festival. The Academy suffered severely during the siege of Athens by Sylla, many trees being cut down to supply timber for machines of war.Few retreats could be more favorable to philosophy and the Muses. Within this enclosure Plato possessed, as part of his patrimony, a small garden, in which he opened a school for the reception of those inclined to attend his instructions. Hence arose the Academic sect, and hence the term Academy has descended to our times. The name *Academia* is frequently used in philosophical writings, especially in Cicero, as indicative of the Academic sect.

Sextus Empiricus enumerates five divisions of the followers of Plato. He makes Plato founder of the first Academy, Aresilaus of the second, Carneades of the third, Philo and Charmides of the fourth, Antiochus of the fifth. Cicero recognizes only two Academies, the Old and the New, and makes the latter commence as above with Arcesilaus. In enumerating those of the old Academy, he begins, not with Plato, but Democritus, and gives them in the following order: Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Socrates, Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, and Crantor. In the New, or Younger, he mentions Arcesilaus, Lacydes, Evander, Hegesinus, Carneades, Clitomachus, and Philo (*Acad. Quaest.* iv. 5). If we follow the distinction laid down by Diogenes, and alluded to above, the Old Academy will consist of those followers of Plato who taught the doctrine of their master without mixture or corruption; the Middle will embrace those who, by certain innovations in the manner of philosophizing, in some measure receded from the Platonic system without entirely deserting it; while the New will begin with those who relinquished the more questionable tenets of Arcesilaus, and restored, in come measure, the declining reputation of the Platonic school.

Views of the New Academy. The New Academy begins with Carnades (i.e. the Third Academy for Diogenes) and was largely skeptical in its teachings. They denied the possibility of aiming at absolute truth or at any certain criterion of truth. Carneades argued that if there were any such criterion it must exist in reason or sensation or conception; but as reason depends on conception and this in turn on sensation, and as we have no means of deciding whether our sensations really correspond to the objects that produce them, the basis of all knowledge is always uncertain. Hence, all that we can attain to is a high degree of probability, which we must accept as the nearest possible approximation to the truth. The New Academy teaching represents the spirit

of an age when religion was decaying, and philosophy itself, losing its earnest and serious spirit, was becoming merely a vehicle for rhetoric and dialectical ingenuity. Cicero's speculative philosophy was in the main in accord with the teachings of Carneades, looking rather to the probable (*illud probabile*) than to certain truth (see his *Academica*).

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Active Powers

In 18th and 19th century Scottish common sense philosophy, the term "active powers" refers to the capacities of impulse and desire which lead to or determine human action. It is distinguished from intellectual powers which involve the capacities of reasoning, judging and conceiving.

The distinction is derived from Aristotle's analysis of the capacities or powers of living beings into nutrition, appetite, perception, movement, and reason. Of these, reason is held to be peculiar to humans. However, in humans, appetite (including desire, sensuous impulse, and will) partakes of reason in the sense of being able to obey it. For Aristotle, the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues rests on the distinction between appetitive and purely rational functions of humans. Aristotle's fivefold distinction of powers was adopted by Aquinas, but he discussed in detail only the intellectual and appetitive powers - the latter including desire and will.

Thomas Reid gave currency to this dual division in the late 18th century, especially in his two books *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785) and *Essays on the Active Powers of Man*(1788). Under the heading of "active powers" Reid further distinguished the will from principles of action, the latter of which included (1) mechanical principles of instinct and habit, (2) animal principles such as appetite and desire, (3) and rational principles such as duty and rectitude.

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Aenesidemus (1st Cn. CE.)

Aenesidemus was a philosopher of the school of skepticism. He was born at Gnossus in Crete, but lived at Alexandria and flourished shortly after Cicero. Aenesidemus revived the skepticism which had been silenced in the Academy, with the view of making it assist in re-introducing the doctrines of Heraclitus. For, in order to show that everything has its contrary, we must first prove that opposite appearances are presented in one and the same thing to each individual. To strengthen the cause of skepticism, he pushed its limits and defended the ten tropes or modes of skepticism -- techniques or arguments to show that judgment must be withheld on any issue. Although Diogenes Laertius attributes the ten modes to Pyrrho, it is likely that they owe their existence to Aenesidemus. Extracts of the ten modes are found in Photius (*cod.* 212).

Briefly, the ten modes are as follows: (1) The feelings and perceptions of all living beings differ. (2) People have physical and mental differences, which make things appear different to them. (3) The different senses give different impressions of things. (4) Our perceptions depend on our physical and intellectual conditions at the time of perception. (5) Things appear different in different positions, and at different distances. (6) Perception is never direct, but always through a medium. For example, we see things through the air. (7) Things appear different according to variations in their quantity, color, motion, and temperature. (8) A thing impresses us differently when it is familiar and when it is unfamiliar. (9) All supposed knowledge is predication. All predicates give us only the relation of things to other things or to ourselves; they never tell us what the thing in itself is. (10) The opinions and customs of people are different in different countries.

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Affection

In the history of ethics, the term "affection" referred to a subset of emotions which were frequently designated as being less violent and less sensuous than "passions". St. Augustine, as quoted and adopted by Aquinas, says, "Those mental states (motus animi) which the Greeks call *pathe*, and Cicero calls *perturbationes*, are by some called *affectus* or *affectiones* by others, keeping to the literal rendering of the Greek *passiones*" (S.T. II.i.Q.22). This equivalence of *passio* and *affectus* is still found in Descartes. There is an alternative use in Spinoza, by whom the term *affectus* is made to cover purely rational sentiments (*Ethics*, III. 58 ff). And this alternative application is characteristic of the British moralists, in whose writings the word "affection" occurs frequently. Shaftesbury uses it in the widest sense above. But other writers draw a distinction between affection and passion. For example, Hutcheson does so on the ground that affection does not necessarily involve uneasiness, although passion does. Price distinguishes between the two because of the distinct presence of a sensuous element in passion, which also indicates greater vehemence. According to Gay, passion is the "pleasure or pain arising from the prospect of future pleasure or pain," and affection is "the desire consequent thereupon" (*Dissertation*). Reid defines affections as the "various principles of action in man, which have persons for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature, our being well or ill affected to some person, or, at least, to some animated being" (*Active Powers*, Essay 3, Part 2, ch. 3-5). This usage is followed by Sidgwick.

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Anarchism

Anarchism as a doctrine of political philosophy maintains that every form of government is harmful, and that the individual should be absolutely free to act as he things proper. Godwin's *Political Justice* (1793) is the first modern expression of this view insofar as the ultimate goal of political progress is "the dissolution of political government, of that brute engine, which has been the only perennial spring of the vices of mankind (Bk. 5, Ch. 24, end).

The growth of modern anarchism may be dated from the writings of Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), particularly his principal work, *The Philosophy of Misery* (1846. Himself a laborer, Proudhon expressed the misery of his class which, foreshadowing communism, he attributed to capitalist competition and monopoly. No satisfactory state of things was attainable, he thought, until the laborer received the whole produce of his labor. However, he looked for the remedy in unlimited individual freedom, not in state control.

The next major proponent of anarchism was the German schoolmaster, Caspar Schmidt (1806-1856) who wrote under the pseudonym Max Stirner in his work *The Individual and his Property* (1864). Schmidt rejected not only all existing authorities, both secular and religious, but every idea, such as God or humanity, which tended to limit the absolute self-determination of the individual. "I derive all right and justification from myself alone; for I am entitled to everything which I have power to take or to do." For several years anarchism appeared to be on the decline, and was not a political force. The revival of anarchism, and the fullest development of it are the product of 19th century revolutionaries. Of noble birth, and at first an officer in the Russian army, Michael Bakunin (1814-1896)maintained that anarchy was the only tolerable state of humans. For him, the destruction of all existing laws, institutions, and beliefs was indeed our principal duty. Bakunin's writings, though numerous, are fragmentary.

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Anaxagoras (500-428 BCE.)

Anaxagoras was a Greek philosopher of Clazomenae in Asia Minor, born about 500 BCE. Aristotle describes him to have been older than Empedocles, but to come 'after him in his works'. It is not clear whether this means that he wrote later than Empedocles or that he was inferior to him in his achievements. From a noble family, but wishing to devote himself entirely to science, he gave up his property to his relatives, and removed to Athens, where he lived in intimacy with Pericles. Shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War he was charged by the political opponents of Pericles with impiety, that is, with denying the gods recognized by the State. Though acquitted through his friend's influence, he felt compelled to emigrate to Lampsacus, where he died soon after, aged seventy-two. He not only had the honor of giving philosophy a home at Athens, where it flourished for a thousand years, but he was the first philosopher who introduced a spiritual principle which gives matter life and form. He laid down his doctrine in a prose work, "On Nature," written in the Ionic dialect, of which only fragments are preserved.

Like Empedocles, he started from the Parmenidean account of 'what is'. Also like Empedocles, Anaxagoras postulated a plurality of independent elements which he called 'seeds'. They are the ultimate elements of combination and are indivisible, imperishable *primordia* of infinite number, and differing in shape, color, and taste. Later writers referred to the seeds as *omoiomereia* (from an expression of Aristotle), meaning particles of like kind with each other and with the whole that is made up of them. They were not, however, the 'four roots', fire, air, earth, and water; on the contrary, these were compounds. Empedocles had supposed that bone, for instance, could be explained as a compound of the elements in a certain proportion, but this did not satisfy Anaxagoras. He pointed out that from bread and water arose hair, veins, 'arteries', flesh, muscles, bones, and the rest, and he asked 'How can hair be made of what is not hair, and flesh of what is not flesh?' (fr. 10). These words read like a direct criticism of Empedocles.

Anaxagoras had been an adherent of 'the philosophy of Anaximines', and he kept as close to it as he could in the details of his cosmology. He could not say that everything was 'air' more or less rarefied or condense, for that view had been destroyed by Parmenides. If the world was to be explained at all, an original plurality must be admitted. He therefore substituted for the primary 'air' a state of the world in which 'all things were together, infinite both in quantity and in smallness' (fr. 1). This is explained to mean that the original mass was infinitely divisible, but that, however far division was carried, every part of it would still contain all 'things', and would in that respect be just like the whole. That is the very opposite of the doctrine of 'elements', which seems to be expressly denied by the dictum that 'the things that are in one world are not separated from one another or cut off with a hatchet' (fr. 8). Everything has 'portions' of everything else in it.

But if that were all, we should be no nearer an explanation of the world than before; for there would be nothing to distinguish one 'seed' from another. The answer to this is that, though each thing has a 'portion' of everything in it, however minutely it may be divided, some have more of

one thing and others more of another. This was to be seen already in the original undifferentiated mass where 'all things were together'; for there the portions of air and 'aether' (by which words Anaxagoras means fire) were far more numerous than the others, and therefore the whole had the appearance of air and 'aether'. Anaxagoras could not say it actually was air, as Anaximenes had done, because he had discovered for himself or learned from Empedocles the separate corporeal existence of atmospheric air. We have some references to the experiments by which he demonstrated this. He used inflated skins for the purpose. The effort to depart as little as possible from the doctrine of Anaximenes is nevertheless apparent.

We see, then, that the differences which exist in the world as we know it are to be explained by the varying proportions in which the portions are mingled. 'Everything is called that of which it has most in it', though, as a matter of fact, it has everything in it. Snow, for instance, is black as well as white, but we call it white because the white so far exceeds the black. As was natural, the 'things' Anaxagoras chiefly thought of as contained in each 'seed' were the traditional opposites, hot and cold, wet and dry, and so forth. It is of these he is expressly speaking when he says that 'the things in one world are not cut off from one another with a hatchet' (fr. 8). Empedocles had made each of these four opposites a 'root' by itself; each of the 'seeds' of Anaxagoras contains them all. In this way he thought he could explain nutrition and growth; for it is clear that the product of a number of 'seeds' might present quite a different proportion of the opposites than any one of them if they were taken severally.

The other problem, that of the source of motion, still remains. How are we to pass from the state of the world when all things were together to the manifold reality we know? Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras looked to the microcosm for a suggestion as to the source of motion, but he found one such source sufficient for his purpose. He called it Mind (nous) -- pure, passionless reason. It is the source of motion as well as of knowledge in us. He did not, however, succeed in forming the conception of an incorporeal force. Mind, as the cause of motion, is a sort of 'fluid'. It is 'the thinnest of all things' (fr. 12), and, above all, it is 'unmixed', that is to say, it has no portions of other things in it, and this is what gives it the 'mastery', that is, the power both of knowing and of moving other things. Further, it enters into some things and not into others, and that explains the distinction between the animate and the inanimate. At first the seeds lay mingled without order; but *nous* set the unarranged matter into motion, and thereby created out of chaos an orderly world. The way in which it separates and orders things is by producing a rotatory motion, which begins at the center and spreads further and further. That is really all Anaxagoras had to say about it. Like a true Ionian he tried to give a mechanical explanation of everything he could, and, when once he had got the rotatory motion started, he could leave that to order the rest of the world.

Though Empedocles had distinguished Love and Strife as the causes of mixture and separation from the four elements which are mixed and separated, he continued to call them all 'gods' in the sense with which we are now familiar, and he gave the name also to the Sphere in which they were all mixed together. Anaxagoras seems to have taken the stop of calling only the source of motion 'god'. In that sense and to that extent it is not incorrect to call him the founder of theism. On the other hand, it seems to have been precisely for this that his contemporaries called him an atheist. In his desire to exalt Nous, he seems to have followed the lead of Xenophanes in denying the divinity of everything else, and his statements about the sun and the moon are usually mentioned in connection with the charge of irreligion brought against him, though we cannot tell now what that referred to, or whether the charge was well founded or not. We can only say that Pericles shared

the secular spirit of the Ionians, and it is quite conceivable that his immediate circle may have offended the religious susceptibilities of old-fashioned Athenians by ridiculing ceremonies which were still sacred in their eyes.

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Anaxarchus (4th cn. BCE.)

Anaxarchus was a philosopher of Abdera, from the school of Democritus, who flourished about the 110th Olympiad. He is remembered for having lived with Alexander and enjoyed his confidence. When Alexander was torn with regret for having killed his faithful Clitus, Anaxarchus said, "kings, like the gods, could do no wrong." Anaxarchus was addicted to pleasure. It was because of this (and not because of the apathy and tranquillity of his life) that he obtained the surname of "the Fortunate." Cicero relates a story that Anaxarchus was pounded to death in an iron mortar by Nicocreon, king of Cyprus, in revenge for the advice which he gave to Alexander, to serve up the head of that prince at an entertainment.

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Anaximander (611-547 BCE.)

Anaximander was a Greek philosopher of Miletus, born 611 BCE., and hence a younger contemporary of Thales and Pherecydes. He lived at the court of Polycrates of Samos, and died 547. He wrote a prose work in the Ionic dialect of which on fragment survives. Anaximander thought it unnecessary to fix upon air, water, or fire as the original and primary form of body. He preferred to represent it simply as a boundless something from which all things arise and to which they all return again. He was struck by a fact which dominated all subsequent physical theory among the Greeks, namely, that the world presents us with a series of opposites, of which the most primary are hot and cold, wet and dry. If we look at things from this point of view, it is more natural to speak of the opposites as being 'separated out' from a mass which is as yet undifferentiated than it is to make any one of the opposites the primary substance. Anaximander argued that Thales made the wet too important at the expense of the dry. Some such thought, at any rate, appears to underlie the few words of the solitary fragment of his writing that has been preserved. He said that things 'give satisfaction and reparation to one another for their injustice, as is appointed according to the ordering of time.' This conception of justice and injustice recurs more than once in Ionic natural philosophy, and always in the same connection. It refers to the encroachment of one opposite or 'element' upon another.

The formation of the world is due to the 'separating out' of the opposites. Anaximander's view of the earth is a curious mixture of scientific intuition and primitive theory. On the one hand, the earth does not rest on anything, but swings free in space. The reason he gave was that there is nothing to make it fall in one direction rather than in another. He inferred this because his system was incompatible with the assumption of an absolute up and down. On the other hand, though, he gives the earth a shape intermediate between the disc of Thales and the sphere of the Pythagoreans. He regarded it as a short cylinder 'like the drum of a pillar'. With regard to living beings, Anaximander held that all life came from the sea, and that the present forms of animals were the result of adaptation to a fresh environment. It is possible that some of this biological theories were grotesque in detail, but it is certain that his method was thoroughly scientific. He was much impressed by the observation of certain sharks or dogfish, and evidently regarded them as an intermediary between fishes and land animals. His proof that man must have been descended from an animal of another species has a curiously modern ring. The young of the human species require a prolonged period of nursing, while those of other species soon find their food for themselves. If, then, man had always been as he is now he could never have survived.

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Anaximenes (d. 502 BCE.)

Anaximenes was a Greek philosopher of Miletus, a younger contemporary and pupil of Anaximander, who died about 502. He was not a great original genius like Anaximander, and in some respects his cosmology falls far short of his predecessor's. His title to remembrance is based on his discovery of the formula which for the first time made the Milesian theory coherent: of rarefaction and condensation. He regarded 'air' -- the air we breathe, but also that which thickens into mist and water -- as the primary form of body; it holds an intermediate stage between water and fire. Thus, his theory resembles that of Thales. On the other hand, he thought of this air as boundless and as containing an infinite number of worlds, in this respect following Anaximander. The solitary fragment quoted form his work shows that he was influenced by the analogy of the microcosm and the macrocosm. 'As our soul,' he says, 'which is air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world.' The world is thought of as breathing or inhaling air from the boundless mass outside it. This air he spoke of as a 'god'.

It is maintained that the Milesian cosmology was based on the primitive and popular theory of 'the four elements'. However, the scientific conception of an 'element' did not exist at this date. We shall see later that this was due to Empedocles, and it is only the place that the old quaternion of Fire, Air, Earth, and Water occupied in his system (and afterwards in that of Aristotle) that has led to these being called 'the four elements'. It is an unfortunate confusion, but it is very difficult to avoid it, and we must continue to use the word 'element' in two senses which have very little to do with one another. The spirit of Ionian civilization had been thoroughly secular, and this was one of the causes that favored the rise of science. The Milesian school came to an end with the fall of Miletus in 494 BC, but 'The Philosophy of Anaximenes', as it was called, continued to be taught in other Ionian cities.

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Animal Rights

The applied ethical issue of animal rights involves a consideration of the moral status of nonhuman animals, and to what extent that status impacts on an animal's right to life or to be free from pain. Advocates of animal rights frequently begin their discussions noting the suffering that humans routinely inflict on animals. Experimenting on live animals is an integral part of the biological sciences. Government regulations require that industries use animals as test cases for determining the toxicity levels of drugs, cosmetics, cleaners, and other industrial and household products. In commercial animal agriculture, cows, pigs, and chickens are raised and slaughtered in deplorable conditions. In his book *Animal Liberation* (1975) Peter Singer describes in graphic detail the conditions that calves are subjected to in veal production. For 15 weeks, calves are confined to tiny stalls that restrict their movement so their muscles will not become tough, and thus reduce the value of their meat. "The narrow stalls and their slatted wooden floors are a serious source of discomfort for the calves. The inability to turn around is frustrating. When he lies down, the calf must lie hunched up, sitting almost on top of his legs.... A stall too narrow to turn around in is also too narrow to groom comfortably in; and calves have an innate desire to twist their heads around and groom themselves with their tongues." Calves are also prevented from fulfilling other innate drives, such as contact with their mothers, and to take in roughage and chew cud. "Calves kept in this manner are unhappy and unhealthy animals." One in ten calves do not survive the fifteen weeks.

Examples such as this suggest the need to examine our moral responsibility toward animals. Theories of the moral status of animals fall into two main groups: those advocating indirect obligations toward animals, and those advocating direct obligation s toward animals.

INDIRECT DUTIES TO ANIMALS. Philosophers from past centuries typically held that our obligations toward animals are only indirect, and derived from purely human interests. For these philosophers, animals are unconscious biological organisms that operate by brute instinct, and only appear to be capable of experiencing pain. Aquinas argues that God established a hierarchy of life forms in nature so that the lower forms may be killed and eaten by the higher forms. Specifically, plants are to be killed by animals for food, and animals are to be killed by humans for food. For Aquinas, animals lack reason and exhibit motion "by a kind of natural impulse." This indicates that they "are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others." Aquinas explains that animals are the property of humans and, as personal property, it may be wrong to harm someone else's animal. Malebranche offered the theological argument that all suffering is a consequence of Adam's sin and, since animals are not descended from Adam, then they cannot feel pain.

Rene Descartes argues that animals are only biological automata - or robots - which lack minds and souls. Descartes argues that there are two possible sources of motion in the physical world: mind and purely mechanical force. Although our human motion is activated by mind, animal motion is activated by purely mechanical force. Descartes warns that we may be tempted to ascribe animal motion to mental causes because animals have body parts that look like ours, and animals sometimes act in ways that look

like ours. However, Descartes insists that we should not be misled by these superficial similarities with humans. Even parts of human biology are purely mechanical, and Descartes points out, even humans can create human-looking machines that move merely by mechanical force. Descartes believes that the strongest reason for denying animals minds is the fact that animals do not engage in sophisticated language, which is the prime indicator of rationality.

Immanuel Kant argues that we do not have direct duties towards animals, but only indirect ones. Similar to Descartes' reasoning, Kant points out that animals are not self-conscious. Similar to Aquinas, Kant believes that animals are put here for human purposes. Kant recognizes, though, that how we treat animals has an impact on how we treat fellow humans - towards whom we have direct duties. For example, it is wrong to torture animals, not for the animal's sake, but because this desensitizes people towards suffering which they may then inflict on another person. For Kant, then, the obligation toward animals is indirect since it derives from human interests alone.

DIRECT DUTIES TO ANIMALS. Against the views of Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant, more recent philosophers have argued that animals have a direct moral standing, and therefore should not be inflicted with pain for their own sake, and not merely for the sake of how this affects humans. On this view, many animals are clearly conscious and capable of experiencing pleasure and pain. This fact alone entitles them to a direct moral standing, at least in that capacity. Classical utilitarianism in particular maintains that moral actions are those that promote the greatest amount pleasure and the least amount of pain. Since animals experience pleasure and pain, then their interests count directly in the tally. This is the position advocated by Singer in his book Animal Liberation cited above.

The expression "animal rights" is often used symbolically by those who believe we have a direct obligation to prevent animal suffering. However, *The Case for Animal Rights* Tom Regan takes this expression literally and argues that the key moral rights of higher animals are the same as those moral rights of humans. For Regan, some higher animals are like humans insofar as they have preferences, beliefs, expectations. These characteristics designate that such animals have intrinsic worth and therefore have the same fundamental rights to life that humnas do. He argues that the problem with current attitudes is that they view animals as resources, and not as beings with inherent value. Regan rejects theories of indirect obligation towards animals which maintain that animals are not capable of feeling pleasure and pain. He also challenges social contract theory which holds that, even though animals feel pain, human pain is the only pain that is morally significant. For, direct obligations apply only to those who contract into a moral system, and this requires understanding the nature of the contract. Morality is like a club you can join, only if you know the rules of the club. And, since animals cannot understand the rules of the club, they cannot be members and thus cannot have a direct moral standing. Animals such as dogs and cats have a special place in the hearts of club members, so these animals acquire an indirect moral standing. But, other animals such as rats are not cared about so their moral standing is virtually non-existent. Regan criticizes contractarianism since, in theory, it could make morality into a highly selective club, and exclude members on the basis of gender, race, religion, or any other arbitrary factor. For Regan, even Rawls's contractarianism excludes people who do not have a sense of justice.

Regan also criticizes some accounts of direct duties toward animals since, in his view, they do not go far enough. The utilitarian view, noted above, fails on two accounts. First, utilitarinism is concerned only with the desires of a being (such as the desire for pleasure). But it takes no regard for the inherent worth of these beings (human or animal). Second, Regan cites the classic problem of utilitarianism that it would be morally permissible to arbitrarily make an individual suffer for the benefit of the greater good. For Regan, the best theory of morality will be one that grants rights to all beings who have inherent worth. This prevents morality from becoming an exclusive club (as in contractarianism), and does not allow

individuals to be exploited on behalf of the greater good (as in utilitarianism. Regan explains that a being has inherent worth when it is a subject of a life; that is, the being has preferences, beliefs, feelings, recollections, and expectations. Many animals exhibit these features and therefore have inherent worth and are rights holders. Regan criticizes alternative criteria of inherent worth. To say that only intelligent beings have inherent worth will exclude infants and mentally impared people, which is inadequate. To say that only homo sapiens have inherent value is a form of bigotry which we may call speciesism. Regan concludes by noting that the animal rights movement should be seen as part of the human rights movement. Also, on his theory, no animal experimentation or commercial animal agriculture is morally permissible.

In opposition to animal rights advocates such as Regan, in his essay "Do Animals Have Rights" Tibor R. Machan argues that animals cannot be moral agents since no moral demands can possibly be made of them. Machan attacks all theories that extend direct obligations to animals, including both Regan's view and the utilitarian view. He notes two reasons for why some believe that animals have rights. First, following Darwin, it has been argued that humans and animals differ only in degree, not in kind. Thus, it is improper to draw a clear line between humans as rights-holders, and animals as nonrights-holders. Machan argues we are justified in using animals for our human purposes since we are more important than animals (although not uniquely important). Machan notes that within nature there is a scale of importance, where animals are more important than rocks. Further, at each level in nature, there are distinct criteria that make some members of that species better than others. For example, an oak that resists disease is better than an oak which does not. A carnivore with claws is better than it would be without claws. Distinctly moral criteria enter only when we reach the human level. For, only humans are judged better or worse on moral criteria. For Machan, our fundamental human task is to succeed as human beings, which requires that we learn. Learning, in turn, often involves using animals, as with animal experiments in the field of medicine.

Machan next discusses the nature of moral rights, why humans have them, and why animals do not. For Machan, rights come from the capacity to make moral choices and the need to exhibit morally responsible behavior. For example, we have rights to life, liberty and property since these are central to the task of acting with moral responsibility. For, rights provide us with a clear area of personal jurisdiction where our authority to act is respected and protected. However, in the animal world, there is no notion of moral responsibility, hence there is no basis for animal rights. Machan addresses a potential criticism at this point. For, Bernard Rollin argues that some animals exhibit behavior that is similar to moral responsibility. For example, elephants feed injured members of their species. Thus, for Rollin, there is no clear distinction between human and nonhuman animals. Machan responds by noting, along with Mortimer Adler, that even within evolutionary theory, species distinctions are not blurry: there are "genetically isolated populations where interbreeding is impossible. Machan's point is that, given the rigid distinction between the human species and other species, the notion of moral responsibility is a distinctly human notion, and therefore is not found in animal societies (in spite of superficial similarities). There is, then, no room for the notion of animal rights.

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Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109)

LIFE. The father of medieval scholasticism and one of the most eminent of English prelates was born at Aost Piedmont in 1033. Anselm died at Canterbury, England on April 21, 1109. While a boy he wished to be a monk, but his father forbade it. When he was about twenty-three Anselm left home to live in Burgundy and France. After three years he went to Bec in Normandy where his celebrated countryman, Lanfranc, was prior. Here he became a monk (1060). He succeeded Lanfranc as prior in 1063, and became abbot in 1078. The abbey had possessions in England, which called Anselm frequently to that country. He was the general choice for archbishop of Canterbury when Lanfranc died (1089). However, the king, William Rufus, preferred to keep the office vacant, and apply its revenues to his own use. In 1093 William fell ill and, literally forced Anselm to receive an appointment at his hands. He was consecrated December 4 of that year. The next four years witnessed a continual struggle between king and archbishop over money matters, rights, and privileges. Anselm wished to carry his case to Rome, and in 1097, with much difficulty, obtained permission from the king to go. At Rome he was honored and flattered, but he obtained little practical help in his struggle with the king. He returned to England as soon is he heard of the death of William in 1100. But a difficulty arose over lay investiture and homage from clerics for their benefices. Thought a mild and meek man, Anselm had adopted the Gregorian views of the relation between Church and State, and adhered to them with the steadiness of conscientious conviction. The king, though inclined to be conciliatory, was equally firm from motives of self-interest. He had a high regard for Anselm, always treated him with much consideration, and personal relations between them were generally friendly. Nevertheless there was much vexatious disputing, several fruitless embassies were sent to Rome, and Anselm himself went thither in 1103, remaining abroad till 1106. His quarrel with the king was settled by compromise in 1107 and the brief remaining period of his life was peaceful. He was canonized in 1494.

PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS. As a metaphysician Anselm was a realist, and one of his earliest works, *De fide Trinitatis,* was an attack on the doctrine of the Trinity as expounded by the nominalist Roscelin. His most celebrated works are the *Monologium* and *Proslogium,* both aiming to prove the existence and nature of God. The *Cur deus homo*, in which he develops views of atonement and satisfaction which are still held by orthodox theologians. The two first named were written at Bec. The last was begun in England " in great tribulation of heart," and finished at Schiavi, a mountain villaffe of Apulia, where Anselm enjoyed a few months of rest in 1098. His meditations and prayers are edifying and often highly impressive. In the Monologium he argues that from the idea of being there follows the idea of a highest and absolute, i.e. self-existent Being, from which all other being derives its existences revival of the ancient cosmological argument.

In the *Proslogium* the idea of the perfect being-" than which nothing greater can be thought "-cannot be separated from its existence. For if the idea of the perfect Being, thus present in consciousness, lacked existence, a still more perfect Being could be thought, of which existence would be a necessary metaphysical predicate, and thus the most perfect Being would be the

absolutely Real. In its most simple form, this first version of the ontological argument is as follows:

1. **The term "God" is defined as the greatest conceivable being**
2. **Real existence (existence in reality) is greater than mere existence in the understanding**
3. **Therefore, God must exist in reality, not just in the understanding.**

Anselm's main intuition is that the greatest possible being has every attribute which could make it great or good. Existence in reality is one such attribute. Anselm's actual argument is more complex than this, and is often reconstructed as a reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity). Reductio arguments have two parts: a target argument, and a concluding argument which reduces the target argument to absurdity. His argument begins with some general assumptions which include the idea that (a) God exists in the understanding (b) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. The first assumption simply means that we understand and can consistently think about the concept of God (whereas we could not think about the concept of a square circle, for instance). The second means that a real x is greater than an imaginary or merely conceived x (e.g. a real $100 is greater than an imaginary $100). Gaunilo, a contemporary monk of Anselm, wrote an attack on Anselm's argument titled "on behalf of the fool." He offers several criticisms, the most well known is a parody on Anselm's argument in which he proves the existence of the greatest possible island. If we replaced "an island than which none greater can be conceived" for "something than which nothing greater can be conceived" then we would prove the existence of that island. Gaunilo's point was that we could prove the existence of almost anything using Anselm's style of argument. The ontological argument is therefore unsound.

THEOLOGY. The key to Anselm's theory of the Atonement was the idea of "satisfaction." In justice to himself and to the creation, God, whose honor had suffered injury by man's sin, must react against it either by punishing men, or, since he was merciful, the death of the God-man, which will more than compensate for the injury to his honor, on the ground of which lie forgives sin. Incidental features of his theory are 1) sin as a violation of a private relation between God and man, 2) the interaction of the divine righteousness and grace, and 3) the necessity of a representative suffering. In the Reformed doctrine, sin and the Atonement took on more of a public character, the active obedience of Christ was also emphasized, and the representative relation of Christ to the law brought to the front. In the seventeenth century the forensic and penal justice of God came into prominence. Christ was conceived of as suffering the punishment of our sin,-a complete equivalent of the punishment which we must have suffered, -on the ground of which our guilt and punishment are pardoned. In the following century, Owen held that the sufferings of Christ for sinners were not tantident but idein. In more recent discussions along this line, Hodge maintains that Christ suffered neither the kind nor degree of that which sinners must have suffered, but any kind and degree of suffering which is judicially inflicted in satisfaction of justice and law. There has indeed been no theory of the work of Christ which has not conceived of it is a satisfaction. Even the so-called moral influence theories center in this idea. It is therefore evident how fundamental is the idea of satisfaction presented by Anselm. Only it must be observed first that in the evolution of the Christian doctrine of salvation the particular way in which the satisfaction was realized has been differently conceived; and secondly, if the forgiveness of sin in Jesus Christ takes place only when the ethical nature of God is satisfied, the special form in which the satisfaction is accomplished is of subordinate importance. In one class of views-the representative or juridical-the satisfaction was conditioned on a unique and isolated divine-human deed-the death or the life and death of Christ; in the other theories, the satisfaction is threefold in

the expression of the divine good-will, through the life and death of Christ, in the initial response of sinners to forgiving grace, and in the final bringing of all souls to perfect union with the Father.

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Antisthenes (440-370 BCE.)

Antisthenes was an Athenian philosopher and founder of the Cynic sect. Antisthenes was born in Athens about 440 BCE. of a Phrygian or Thracian mother, and thus was only a half citizen. In his youth he was engaged in military exploits, and acquired fame by the valor which he displayed in the battle of Tanagra. His first studies were under the direction of the sophist Gorgias, who instructed him in rhetoric. Soon growing dissatisfied with the futile labours of this school, he sought for more substantial wisdom from Socrates. Captivated by the doctrine and the manner of his new master, he prevailed upon many young men, who had been his fellow-students under Gorgias, to accompany him. So great was his ardor for moral wisdom, that, though he lived at the Piraeus, he came daily to Athens to listen to Socrates. While he was a disciple of Socrates, he exhibited a severity of manners by his unkept dress. He frequently appeared in a threadbare and ragged cloak. An anecdote relates that Socrates, remarked that Anthisthenes took pains to expose, rather than to conceal the tattered state of his dress, and said to him, "Why so ostentatious? Through your rags I see your vanity." After the death of Socrates in 339 BCE. Antisthenes established a school in the only gymnasium open to half-Athenian descent. The place was called Cynosarges, hence his followers bore the name "Cynics". It is also argued that the followers were called Cynics from the habits of the school, which, to the more refined Athenians, appeared those of dogs rather than of men. Towards the close of his life, the gloomy cast increased to such a degree as to become troublesome to his friends, and the object of ridicule to his enemies. He lived to the age of seventy. Antisthenes wrote many books, of which none are extant except two declamations under the names of Ajax and Ulysses (although their genuiness is disputed).

Teaching. Like Socrates, he regarded virtue as necessary -- indeed, alone sufficient -- for happiness, and to be a branch of knowledge that could be taught, and that once acquired could not be lost. Its essence consists in freedom from wants by the avoidance of evil (by evil meaning pleasure and desire). Regarding his religious views, Antisthenes maintained that, in the universe, everything is regulated by a divine intelligence, from design, so to benefit the good person who is the friend of God. For the sage shall possess all things. This doctrine was connected with his ethical views, by indicating the physical conditions of a happy life. However, it led him to declare that there is but one natural God, but many popular deities; that God cannot be known or recognized in any form or figure, since he is like nothing on earth. Hence undoubtedly arose his allegorical explanation of mythology.

In addition to his precepts, he also taught by example. He wore no other garment than a coarse cloak, did not cut his beard, and carried a sack and staff like a wandering beggar. This was meant as an expression of opposition to the gradually increasing luxury of the age, intending to bring men back to their original simplicity in life and manners. Antisthenes appears to have been carried to excess in his virtuous zeal against the luxury, although the accounts which have come down to us respecting him may be exaggerated. In any case, his contention with the tendency of his age

brought negative reaction from his contemporaries. Indeed, his school met with so little encouragement, that, in annoyance, he drove away the few scholars he had. Diogenes of Sinope, who resembled him in character, is said to have been the only one that remained with him to his death.

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Applied Ethics

Applied ethics is the branch of ethics which consists of the analysis of specific, controversial moral issues such as abortion, animal rights, and euthanasia. In recent years applied ethical issues have been subdivided into convenient groups such as medical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, sexual ethics, and social ethics. Generally speaking, two features are necessary for an issue to be considered an "applied ethical issue." First, the issue needs to be controversial in the sense that there are significant groups of people both for and against the issue at hand. The issue of drive-by shooting, for example, is not an applied ethical issue, since virtually everyone agrees that this practice is grossly immoral. By contrast, the issue of g un control would be an applied ethical issue since there are significant groups of people both for and against gun control.

The second requirement for in issue to be an applied ethical issue is that it must be a distinctly moral issue. On any given day, the media presents us with an array of sensitive issues such as affirmative action policies, gays in the military, invol untary commitment of the mentally impaired, capitalistic vs. socialistic business practices, public vs. private health care systems, or energy conservation. Although all of these issues are controversial and have an important impact on society, they are n ot all moral issues. Some are only issues of social policy. The aim of social policy is to help make a given society run efficiently by devising conventions, such as traffic laws, tax laws, and zoning codes. Moral issues, by contrast, concern more univers ally obligatory practices, such as our duty to avoid lying, and are not confined to individual societies. Frequently, issues of social policy and morality overlap, as with murder which is both socially prohibited and immoral. However, the two groups of is sues are often distinct. For example, many people would argue that sexual promiscuity is immoral, but may not feel that there should be social policies regulating sexual conduct, or laws punishing us for promiscuity. Similarly, some social policies forbid residents in certain neighborhoods from having yard sales. But, so long as the neighbors are not offended, there is nothing immoral in itself about a resident having a yard sale in one of these neighborhoods. Thus, to qualify as an applied ethical issue, the issue must be more than one of mere social policy: it must be morally relevant as well.

In theory, resolving particular applied ethical issues should be easy. With the issue of abortion, for example, we would simply determine its morality by consulting our normative principle of choice, such as act-utilitarianism. If a given abortion pr oduces greater benefit than disbenefit, then, according to act-utilitarianism it would be morally acceptable to have the abortion. Unfortunately, there are perhaps hundreds of rival normative principles from which to choose, many of which yield opposite c onclusions. Thus, the stalemate in normative ethics between conflicting theories prevents us from using a single decisive procedure for determining the morality of an issue. The solution to this stalemate is to consult several representative normative pri nciples on a given issue and see where the weight of the evidence lies.

NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES USED IN APPLIED ETHICAL DISCUSSIONS. Arriving at a short

list of representative normative principles is itself a challenging task. The principles selected must not be too narrowly focused, such as a version of act-egoism which mi ght focus only on an action's short-term benefit. The principles must also be seen as having merit by people on both side of an applied ethical issue. For this reason, principles which appeal to our duty to God are not usually cited since this would have no impact on a nonbeliever engaged in the debate. The following principles are the ones most commonly appealed to in applied ethical discussions:

- **Personal benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneficial consequences for the individual in question.**
- **Social benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneficial consequences for society.**
- **Principle of benevolence: help those in need.**
- **Principle of paternalism: assist others in pursuing their best interests when they cannot do so themselves.**
- **Principle of harm: do not harm others.**
- **Principle of honesty: do not deceive others.**
- **Principle of lawfulness: do not violate the law.**
- **Principle of autonomy: acknowledge a person's freedom over his/her actions or physical body.**
- **Principle of justice: acknowledge a person's right to due process, fair compensation for harm done, and fair distribution of benefits.**
- **Rights: acknowledge a person's rights to life, information, privacy, free expression, and safety.**

The above principles represent the spectrum of traditional normative principles and are derived from specific consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories. The first two principles, personal benefit and social benefit, are consequentialist sin ce they appeal to the consequences of an action as it affects the individual or society. The remaining principles are non-consequentialist and derive from duty-based and rights-based theories. The principles of benevolence, paternalism, harm, honesty, and lawfulness derive from non-consequentialist duties we have toward others. The principles of autonomy, justice, and the various rights derive from non-consequentialist moral rights.

An example will help illustrate the function of these principles in an applied ethical discussion. In 1982 a couple from Bloomington, Indiana gave birth to a severely retarded baby. The infant, known as Baby Doe, also had its stomach disconnected fro m its throat and was thus unable to receive nourishment. Although this stomach deformity was correctable through surgery, the couple did not want to raise a severely retarded child and therefore chose to deny surgery, food, and water for the infant. Local courts supported the parents' decision, and six days later Baby Doe died. Should corrective surgery have been performed for Baby Doe? Arguments in favor of corrective surgery derive from the infant's right to life and the principle of paternalism which s tipulates that we should pursue the best interests of others when they are incapable of doing so themselves. Arguments against corrective surgery derive from the personal and social disbenefit which would result from such surgery. If Baby Doe survived, it s quality of life would have been poor and in any case it probably would have died at an early age. Also, from the parent's perspective, Baby Doe's survival would have been a significant emotional and financial burden.

When examining both sides of the iss ue, the parents and the courts concluded that the arguments against surgery were stronger than the arguments for surgery. First, foregoing surgery appeared to be in the best interests of the infant given the poor quality of life it would endure. Second, t he status of Baby Doe's right to life was not clear given the severity of the infant's mental impairment. For, to possess moral rights, it takes more than merely having a human body: certain cognitive functions must also be present. The issue here involve s what is often referred to as moral personhood, and is central to many applied ethical discussions.

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Apprehension

The term "apprehension" in the history of philosophy refers to the intellectual action or process by which a relatively simple object is understood, grasped, or brought before the mind.

In Aristotle's theory of the types of knowledge, stress is laid on the view that only judgments are properly true and false, while thought (nous), on precisely its highest levels, deals with objects which it is possible either to grasp directly, or to grasp not at all, but which it is impossible any longer to grasp falsely, or to misjudge, when one knows them. This act of attaining direct acquaintance with truth Aristotle metaphorically calls "apprehension", a touching, or direct contact with truth. Aristotle himself compares it to seeing. The term "apprehension," in scholastic usage, is a translation of the Aristotelian term. But the term has been from the outset of its usage extended to apply to various sorts of direct or simple knowledge, or knowledge involving acquaintance with objects, as opposed to complex, indirect, or discursive knowledge. The Aristotelian contrast between the knowledge capable of truth or falsity and the simple knowledge or apprehension incapable of truth or falsity has indeed been frequently retained, at least by more technical usage. But apprehension, even in case of such retention, has meant very frequently not higher grades of intuition, but rather sensory knowledge, or presentation, too simple to be a matter of truth or falsity. And other usage has abandoned altogether the contrast with judgment or belief, so that an apprehension becomes merely a comparatively simple cognition.

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Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

LIFE. The birth-year of Thomas Aquinas is commonly given as 1227, but he was probably born early in 1225 at his father's castle of Roccasecea (75 m. e.s.e. of Rome) in Neapolitan territory. He died at the monastery of Fossanova, one mile from Sonnino (64 m. s.e. of Rome), Mar. 7, 1274. His father was Count Landulf of an old high-born south Italian family, and his mother was Countess Theodora of Theate, of noble Norman descent. In his fifth year he was sent for his early education to the monastery of Monte Cassino, where his father's brother Sinibald was abbot. Later he studied in Naples. Probably in 1243 he determined to enter the Dominican order; but on the way to Rome he was seized by his brothers and brought back to his parents at the castle of S. Giovanni, where he was held a captive for a year or two and besieged with prayers, threats, and even sensual temptation to make him relinquish his purpose. Finally the family yielded and the order sent Thomas to Cologne to study under Albertus Magnus, where he arrived probably toward the end of 1244. He accompanied Albertus to Paris in 1245, remained there with his teacher, continuing his studies for three years, and followed Albertus at the latter's return to Cologne in 1248. For several years longer he remained with the famous philosopher of scholasticism, presumably teaching. This long association of Thomas with the great polyhistor was the most important influence in his development; it made him a comprehensive scholar and won him permanently for the Aristotelian method. In 1252 probably Thomas went to Paris for the master's degree, which he found some difficulty in attaining owing to attacks, at that time on the mendicant orders. Ultimately, however, he received the degree and entered ceremoniously Upon his office of teaching in 1257; he taught in Paris for several years and there wrote certain of his works and began others. In 1259 he was present at an important chapter of his order at Valenciennes, At the solicitation of Pope Urban IV. (therefore not before the latter part of 1261), he took up his residence in Rome. In 1269-71 he was again active in Paris. In 1272 the provincial chapter at Florence empowered him to found a new *studium generale* at such place as he should choose, and he selected Naples. Early in 1274 the pope directed Mm to attend the Council of Lyons and he undertook the journey, although he was far from well. On the way he stopped at the castle of a niece and there became seriously ill. He wished to end his days in a monastery and not being able to reach a house of the, Dominicans he was carried to the Cistercian Fossanova. There, first, after his death, his remains were preserved.

WRITINGS. The writings of Thomas may be classified as, (1) exegetical, homiletical, and liturgical; (2) dogmatic, apologetic, and ethical; and (3) philosophical. Among the genuine works of the first class were: Commentaries on Job (1261-65); on Psalms, according to some a *reportatum*, or report of oral deliverances furnished by his companion Raynaldus; on Isaiah; the *Catena aurea*, which is a running commentary on the four Gospels, constructed on numerous citations from the Fathers; probably a Commentary on Canticles, and on Jeremiah; and wholly or partly *reportata*, on John, on Matthew, and on the epistles of Paul, including, according to one authority, Hebrews i.-x. Thomas prepared for Urban IV., *Officium de corpore Christi* (1264); and the following works may be either genuine or *reportata*: *Expositio angelicce salutationis*; *Tractatus de decem praeceptis*;

***Orationis dominico expositio; Sermones pro dominicis diebus et pro sanctorum solemnitatibus*; *Sermones de angelis, and Sermones de quadragesima*. Of his sermons only manipulated copies are extant. In the second division were*: In quatitor sententiarum libros,* of his first Paris sojourn; *Questiones disputatce*, written at Paris and Rome; *Questiones quodlibetales duodecini*; *Summa catholicce fidei contra gentiles* (1261-C,4); and *the Summa theologioe*. To the dogmatic works belong also certain commentaries, as follows*: Expositio in librum beati Dionysii de divinis nominibits*; *Expositiones primoe et secundce*; In *Boethii libros de hebdomadibus*; and *Proeclare quoestiones super librum Boethii de trinitate*. A large number of *opuscitla* also belonged to this group. Of philosophical writings there are cataloged thirteen commentaries on Aristotle, besides numerous philosophical *opuscula* of which fourteen are classed as genuine.**

SUMMA PART I: GOD. The greatest work of Thomas was the *Summa* and it is the fullest presentation of his views. He worked on it from the time of Clement IV. (after 1265) until the end of his life. When he died he had reached question ninety of part iii., on the subject of penance. What was lacking, was afterward added from the fourth book of his commentary on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard as a *supplementum*, which is not found in manuscripts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Summa consists of three parts. Part i. treats of God, who is the " first cause, himself uncaused *" (primum movens immobile*) and as such existent only in act (*actu*), that is pure actuality without potentiality and, therefore, without corporeality. His essence is *actus purus et perfectus*. This follows from the fivefold proof for the existence of God; namely, there must be a first mover, unmoved, a first cause in the chain of causes, an absolutely necessary being, an absolutely perfect being, and a rational designer. In this connection the thoughts of the unity, infinity, unchangeableness, and goodness of the highest being are deduced. The spiritual being of God is further defined as thinking and willing. His knowledge is absolutely perfect since he knows himself and all things as appointed by him. Since every knowing being strives after the thing known as end, will is implied in knowing. Inasmuch as God knows himself as the perfect good, he wills himself as end. But in that everything is willed by God, everything is brought by the divine will to himself in the relation of means to end. Therein God wills good to every being which exists, that is he loves it; and, therefore, love is the fundamental relation of God to the world. If the divine love be thought of simply as act of will, it exists for every creature in like measure: but if the good assured by love to the individual be thought of, it exists for different beings in various degrees. In so far as the loving God gives to every being what it needs in relation practical reason," affording the idea of the moral law of nature, so important in medieval ethics.

SUMMA PART II.: ETHICS. The first part of the Summa is summed up in the thought that God governs the world as the universal first cause. God sways the intellect in that he gives the power to know aid impresses the *species intelligibiles* on the mind, and he ways the will in that he holds the good before it as aim, and creates the *virtus volendi*. To will is nothing else than a certain inclination toward the object of the volition which is the universal good. God works all in all, but so that things also themselves exert their proper efficiency. Here the Areopagitic ideas of the graduated effects of created things play their part in Thomas's thought. The second part of the Summa (two parts, *prima secundae* and *secundae, secunda*) follows this complex of ideas. Its theme is man's striving after the highest end, which is the blessedness of the *visio beata*. Here Thomas develops his system of ethics, which has its root in Aristotle. In a chain of acts of will man strives for the highest end. They are free acts in so far as man has in himself the knowledge of their end and therein the principle of action. In that the will wills the end, it wills also the appropriate means, chooses freely and completes the consensus. Whether the act be good or evil depends on the

end. The "human reason" pronounces judgment concerning the character of the end, it is, therefore, the law for action. Human acts, however, are meritorious in so far as they promote the purpose of God and his honor. By repeating a good action man acquires a moral habit or a quality which enables him to do the good gladly and easily. This is true, however, only of the intellectual and moral virtues, which Thomas treats after the mariner of Aristotle; the theological virtues are imparted by God to man as a " disposition," from which the acts here proceed, but while they strengthen, they do not form it. The " disposition " of evil is the opposite alternative. An act becomes evil through deviation from the reason and the divine moral law. Therefore, sin involves two factors: its substance or matter is lust; in form, however, it is deviation from the divine law. Sin has its origin in the will, which decides, against the reason, for a changeable good." Since, however, the will also moves the other powers of man, sin has its seat in these too. By choosing such a lower good as end, the will is misled by self-love, so that this works as cause in every sin. God is not the cause of sin, since, on the contrary, he draws all things to himself. But from another side God is the cause of all things, so he is efficacious also in sin as *-ctio but not as *ens*. The devil is not directly the cause of sin, but he incites by working on the imagination and the sensuous impulse of man, as men or things may also do. Sin is original. Adam's first sin passes upon himself and all the succeeding race; because he is the head of the human race and "by virtue of procreation human nature is transmitted and along with nature its infection." The powers of generation are, therefore, designated especially as "infected." The thought is involved here by the fact that Thomas, like the other to the whole, he is just: in so far as he thereby does away with misery, he is merciful. In every work of God both justice and mercy are united and, indeed, his justice always presupposes his mercy, since he owes no one anything and gives more bountifully than is due. As God rules in the world, the "plan of the order of things" preexists in him; i.e., his providence and the exercise of it in his government are what condition as cause everything which comes to pass in the world. Hence follows predestination: from eternity some are destined to eternal life, while as concerns others "he permits some to fall short of that end." Reprobation, however, is more than mere foreknowledge; it is the "will of permitting anyone to fall into sin and incur the penalty of condemnation for sin." The effect of predestination is grace. Since God is the first cause of everything, he is the cause of even the free acts of men through predestination. Determinism is deeply grounded in the system of Thomas; things with their source of becoming in God are ordered from eternity as means for the realization of his end in himself. On moral grounds Thomas advocates freedom energetically; but, with his premises, he can have in mind only the psychological form of self-motivation. Nothing in the world is accidental or free, although it may appear so in reference to the proximate cause. From this point of view miracles become necessary in themselves and are to be considered merely as inexplicable to man. From the point of view of the first cause all is unchangeable; although from the limited point of view of the secondary cause miracles may be spoken of. In his doctrine of the Trinity Thomas starts from the Augustinian system. Since God has only the functions of thinking and willing, only two *processiones* can be asserted from the Father. But these establish definite relations of the persons of the Trinity one to another. The relations must be conceived as real and not as merely ideal; for, as with creatures relations arise through certain accidents, since in God there is no accident but all is substance, it follows that " the relation really existing in God is the same as the essence according to the thing." From another side, however, the relations as real must be really distinguished one from another. Therefore, three persons are to be affirmed in God. Man stands opposite to God; he consists of soul and body. The " intellectual soul" consists of intellect and will. Furthermore the soul is the absolutely indivisible form of man; it is immaterial substance, but not one and the same in all men (as the Averrhoists assumed). The soul's power of knowing has

two sides; a passive (the *intellectus possibilis*) and an active (the *intellectus agens*). It is the capacity to form concepts and to abstract the mind's images (species) from the objects perceived by sense. But since what the intellect abstracts from individual things is a universal, the mind knows the universal primarily and directly, and knows the singular only indirectly by virtue of a certain reflection. As certain principles are immanent in the mind for its speculative activity, so also a " special disposition of works," or the *synderesis* (rudiment of conscience), is inborn in the scholastics, held to creationism, therefore taught that the souls are created by God. Two things according to Thomas constituted man's righteousness in paradise-the *justitia originalis* or the harmony of all man's powers before they were blighted by desire, and the possession of the *gratia gratum faciens* (the continuous indwelling power of good). Both are lost through original sin, which in form is the " loss of original righteousness." The consequence of this loss is the disorder and maiming of man's nature, which shows itself in " ignorance, malice, moral weakness, and especially in *concupiscentia*, which is the material principle of original sin." The course of thought here is as follows: when the first man transgressed the order of his nature appointed by nature and grace, he, and with him the human race, lost this order. This negative state is the essence of original sin. From it follow an impairment and perversion of human nature in which thenceforth lower aims rule contrary to nature and release the lower element in man. Since sin is contrary to the divine order, it is guilt, and subject to punishment. Guilt and punishment correspond to each other; and since the "apostasy from the invariable good which is infinite," fulfilled by man, is unending, it merits everlasting punishment.

But God works even in sinners to draw them to the end by " instructing through the law and aiding by grace." The law is the " precept of the practical reason." As the moral law of nature, it is the participation of the reason in the all-determining eternal reason." But since man falls short in his appropriation of this law of reason, there is need of a "divine law." And since the law applies to many complicated relations, the practical dispositions of the human law must be laid down. The divine law consists of an old and a new. In so far as the old divine law contains the moral law of nature it is universally valid; what there is in it, however, beyond this is valid only for the Jews. The new law is " primarily grace itself " and so a " law given within," " a gift superadded to nature by grace," but not a " written law." In this sense, as sacramental grace, the new law justifies. It contains, however, an "ordering" of external and internal conduct, and so regarded is, as a matter of course, identical with both the old law and the law of nature. The *consilia* show how one may attain the end "better and more expediently" by full renunciation of worldly goods. Since man is sinner and creature, he needs grace to reach the final end. The" first cause " alone is able to reclaim him to the " final end." This is true after the fall, although it was needful before. Grace is, on one side, "the free act of God," and, on the other side, the effect of this act, the *gratia infusa* or *gratia creata*, a *habitus infusus* which is instilled into the "essence of the soul," "a certain gift of disposition, something supernatural proceeding from God into man." Grace is a supernatural ethical character created in man by God, which comprises in itself all good, both faith and love. Justification by grace comprises four elements: "the infusion of grace, the influencing of free will toward God through faith, the influencing of free will respecting sin, and the remission of sins." It is a "transmutation of the human soul, " and takes place "instantaneously." A creative act of God enters, which, however, executes itself as a spiritual motive in a psychological form corresponding to the nature of man. Semi-pelagian tendencies are far removed from Thomas. In that man is created anew he believes and loves, and now sin is forgiven. Then begins good conduct; grace is the "beginning of meritorious works." Thomas conceives of merit in the Augustinian sense: God gives

the reward for that toward which he himself gives the power. Man can never of himself deserve the *prima gratia*, nor *meritum de congruo* (by natural ability). After thus stating the principles of morality, in *the secunda secundoe* Thomas comes to a minute exposition of his ethics according to the scheme of the virtues. The conceptions of faith and love are of mush significance in the complete system of Thomas. Man strives toward the highest good with the will or through love. But since the end must first be " apprehended in the intellect," knowledge of the end to be loved must precede love; " because the will can not strive after God in perfect love unless the intellect have true faith toward him." Inasmuch as this truth which is to be known is practical it first incites the will, which then brings the reason to " assent." But since, furthermore, the good in question is transcendent and inaccessible to man by himself, it requires the infusion of a supernatural " capacity " or " disposition " to make man capable of faith as well as love. Accordingly the object of both faith and love is God, involving also the entire complex of truths and commandments which God reveals, in so far as they in fact relate to God and lead to him. Thus faith becomes recognition of the teachings and precepts of the Scriptures and the Church (" the first subjection of man to God is by faith"). The object of faith comes to completion only in love ("by love is the act of faith accomplished and formed")

THE SUMMA PART III: CHRIST. The way which leads to God is Christ: and Christ is the theme of part iii. It can not be asserted that the incarnation was absolutely necessary, "since God in his omnipotent power could have repaired human nature in many other ways": but it was the most suitable way both for the purpose of instruction and of satisfaction. The *Unio* between the Logos and the human nature is a " relation " between the divine and the human nature which comes about by both natures being brought together in the one person of the Logos. An incarnation can be spoken of only in the sense that the human nature began to be in the eternal hypostasis of the divine nature. So Christ is *unum* since his human nature lacks the hypostasis. The person of the Logos, accordingly, has assumed the impersonal human nature, and in such way that the assumption of the soul became the means for the assumption of the body. This union with the human soul is the *gratia unionis* which leads to the impartation of the *gratia habitualis* from the Logos to the human nature. Thereby all human potentialities are made perfect in Jesus. Besides the perfections given by the vision of God, which Jesus enjoyed from the beginning, he receives all others by the *gratia habitualis*. In so far, however, as it is the limited human nature which receives these perfections, they are finite. This holds both of the knowledge and the will of Christ. The Logos impresses the *species intelligibiles* of all created things on the soul, but the *intellectus agens* transforms them gradually into the impressions of sense. On another side the soul of Christ works miracles only as instrument of the Logos, since omnipotence in no way appertains to this human soul in itself. Furthermore, Christ's human nature partook of imperfections, on the one side to make his true humanity evident, on another side because he would bear the general consequences of sin for humanity. Christ experienced suffering, but blessedness reigned in his soul, which, however, did not extend to his body. Concerning redemption, Thomas teaches that Christ is to be regarded as redeemer after his human nature but in such way that the human nature produces divine effects as organ of divinity. The one side of the work of redemption consists herein, that Christ as head of humanity imparts perfection and virtue to his members. He is the teacher and example of humanity; his whole life and suffering as well as his work after he is exalted serve this end. The love wrought hereby in men effects, according to Luke vii. 47, the forgiveness of sins.

This is the first course of thought., Then follows a second complex of thoughts which has the idea of satisfaction as its center. To be sure, God as the highest being could forgive sins without

satisfaction; but because his justice and mercy could be best revealed through satisfaction he chose this way. As little, however, as satisfaction is necessary in itself, so little does it offer an equivalent, in a correct sense, for guilt; it is rather a " super-abundant satisfaction," since on account of the divine subject in Christ in a certain sense his suffering and activity are infinite. With this thought the strict logical deduction of Anselm's theory is given up. Christ's suffering bore personal character in that it proceeded out of love and obedience." It was an offering brought to God, which as personal act had the character of merit. Thereby Christ " merited " salvation for men. As Christ, exalted, still influences men, so does he still work in their behalf continually in heaven through the intercession (*interpellatio*). In this way Christ as head of humanity effects the forgiveness of their sins, their reconciliation with God, their immunity from punishment, deliverance from the devil, and the opening of heaven's gate. But inasmuch as all these benefits are already offered through the inner operation of the love of Christ, Thomas has combined the theories of Anselm and Abelard by joining the one to the other.

THE SACRAMENTS. The doctrine of the sacraments follows the Christology; for the sacraments " have efficacy from the incarnate Word himself." The sacraments are signs, which, however, not only signify sanctification but also effect it. That they bring spiritual gifts in sensuous form, moreover, is inevitable because of the sensuous nature of man. The *res sensibles* are the matter, the words of institution the form of the *sacranieits*. Contrary to the Franciscan view that the sacraments are mere symbol, whose efficacy God accompanies with a directly following creative act in the soul, Thomas holds it not unfit to say with Hugo of St. Victor that "a sacrament contains grace," or to teach of the sacraments that they "cause grace." The difficulty of a sensuous thing producing a creative effect, Thomas attempts to remove by a distinction between the causa principalis et instrumentalism God as the principal cause works through the sensuous thing as the means ordained by him for his end. "Just as instrumental power is acquired by the instrument from this, that it is moved by the principal agent, so also the sacrament obtains spiritual Power from the benediction of Christ and the application of the minister to the use of the sacrament. There is spiritual power in the sacraments in so far as they have been ordained by God for a spiritual effect." And this spiritual power remains in the sensuous thing until it has attained its purpose. At the same time Thomas distinguished the *gratia sacramentalis* from the *gratia virtutum et donorum,* in that the former in general perfects the essence and the powers of the soul, and the latter in particular brings to pass necessary spiritual effects for the Christian life. Later this distinction was ignored. In a single statement the effect of the sacraments is to infuse justifying grace into men. What Christ effects is achieved through the sacraments. Christ's humanity was the instrument for the operation of his divinity; the sacraments are the instruments through which this operation of Christ's humanity passes over to men. Christ's humanity served his divinity as *instrumentum conjuncture,* like the hand: the sacraments are instruments separate, like a staff; the former can use the latter, as the hand can use a staff. Of Thomas' eschatology, according to the commentary on the " Sentences," only a brief account can here be given. Everlasting blessedness consists for Thomas in the vision of God: and this vision consists not in an abstraction or in a mental image supernatural produced, but the divine substance itself is beheld, and in such manner that God himself becomes immediately the form of the beholding intellect; that is, God is the object of the vision and at the same time causes the vision. The perfection of the blessed also demands that the body be restored to the soul as something to be made perfect by it. Since blessedness consist in Operation it is made more perfect in that the soul has a definite *opcralio* with the body, although the peculiar act of blessedness (i.e., the vision of God) has nothing to do with the body.

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Aristotle (384-322 BCE.)

Life. **Aristotle was born in 384 BCE. at Stagirus, a Greek colony and seaport on the coast of Thrace. His father Nichomachus was court physician to King Amyntas of Macedonia, and from this began Aristotle's long association with the Macedonian Court, which considerably influenced his life. While he was still a boy his father died. At age 17 his guardian, Proxenus, sent him to Athens, the intellectual center of the world, to complete his education. He joined the Academy and studied under Plato, attending his lectures for a period of twenty years. In the later years of his association with Plato and the Academy he began to lecture on his own account, especially on the subject of rhetoric. At the death of Plato in 347, the pre-eminent ability of Aristotle would seem to have designated him to succeed to the leadership of the Academy. But his divergence from Plato's teaching was too great to make this possible, and Plato's nephew Speusippus was chosen instead. At the invitation of his friend Hermeas, ruler of Atarneus and Assos in Mysia, Aristotle left for his court. He stayed three year and, while there, married Pythias, the niece of the King. In later life he was married a second time to a woman named Herpyllis, who bore him a son, Nichomachus. At the end of three years Hermeas was overtaken by the Persians, and Aristotle went to Mytilene. At the invitation of Philip of Macedonia he became the tutor of his 13 year old son Alexander (later world conqueror); he did this for the next five years. Both Philip and Alexander appear to have paid Aristotle high honor, and there were stories that Aristotle was supplied by the Macedonian court, not only with funds for teaching, but also with thousands of slaves to collect specimens for his studies in natural science. These stories are probably false and certainly exaggerated.**

Upon the death of Philip, Alexander succeeded to the kingship and prepared for his subsequent conquests. Aristotle's work being finished, he returned to Athens, which he had not visited since the death of Plato. He found the Platonic school flourishing under Xenocrates, and Platonism the dominant philosophy of Athens. He thus set up his own school at a place called the Lyceum. When teaching at the Lyceum, Aristotle had a habit of walking about as he discoursed. It was in connection with this that his followers became known in later years as the *peripatetics*, meaning "to walk about." For the next thirteen years he devoted his energies to his teaching and composing his philosophical treatises. He is said to have given two kinds of lectures: the more detailed discussions in the morning for an inner circle of advanced students, and the popular discourses in the evening for the general body of lovers of knowledge. At the sudden death of Alexander in 323 BCE., the pro-Macedonian government in Athens was overthrown, and a general reaction occurred against anything Macedonian. A charge of impiety was trumped up against him. To escape prosecution he fled to Chalcis in Euboea so that (Aristotle says) "The Athenians might not have another opportunity of sinning against philosophy as they had already done in the person of Socrates." In the first year of his residence at Chalcis he complained of a stomach illness and died in 322 BCE.

Writings. It is reported that Aristotle's writings were held by his student Theophrastus, who had succeeded Aristotle in leadership of the Peripatetic School. Theophrastus's library passed to his pupil Neleus. To protect the books from theft, Neleus's heirs concealed them in a vault, where they were damaged somewhat by dampness, moths and worms. In this hiding place they were discovered about 100 BCE by Apellicon, a rich book lover, and brought to Athens. They were later taken to Rome after the capture of Athens by Sulla in 86 BCE. In Rome they soon attracted the attention of scholars, and the new edition of them gave fresh impetus to the study of Aristotle and of philosophy in general. This collection is the basis of the works of Aristotle that we have today. Strangely, the list of Aristotle's works given by Diogenes Laertius does not contain any of these treatises. It is possible that Diogenes' list is that of forgeries compiled at a time when the real works were lost to sight.

The works of Aristotle fall under three headings: (1) dialogues and other works of a popular character; (2) collections of facts and material from scientific treatment; and (3) systematic works. Among his writings of a popular nature the only one which we possess of any consequence is the interesting tract *On the Polity of the Athenians*. The works on the second group include 200 titles, most in fragments, collected by Aristotle's school and used as research. Some may have been done at the time of Aristotle's successor Theophrastus. Included in this group are constitutions of 158 Greek states. The systematic treatises of the third group are marked by a plainness of style, with none of the golden flow of language which the ancients praised in Aristotle. This may be due to the fact that these works were not, in most cases, published by Aristotle himself or during his lifetime, but were edited after his death from unfinished manuscripts. Until Werner Jaeger (1912) it was assumed that Aristotle's writings presented a systematic account of his views. Jaeger argues for an early, middle and late period (genetic approach), where the early period follows Plato's theory of forms and soul, the middle rejects Plato, and the later period (which includes most of his treatises) is more empirically oriented. Aristotle's systematic treatises may be grouped in several division:

- Logic
    1. Categories (10 classifications of terms)
    2. On Interpretation (propositions, truth, modality)
    3. Prior Analytics (syllogistic logic)
    4. Posterior Analytics (scientific method and syllogism)
    5. Topics (rules for effective arguments and debate)
    6. On Sophistical Refutations (informal fallacies)
- Physical works
    1. Physics (explains change, motion, void, time)
    2. On the Heavens (structure of heaven, earth, elements)
    3. On Generation (through combining material constituents)
    4. Meteorologics (origin of comets, weather, disasters)
- Psychological works
    1. On the Soul (explains faculties, senses, mind, imagination)
    2. On Memory, Reminiscence, Dreams, and Prophesying
- Works on natural history

1. **History of Animals (physical/mental qualities, habits)**
2. **On the parts of Animals**
3. **On the Movement of Animals**
4. **On the Progression of Animals**
5. **On the Generation of Animals**
6. **Minor treatises**
7. **Problems**

- **Philosophical works**
  1. **Metaphysics (substance, cause, form, potentiality)**
  2. **Nicomachean Ethics (soul, happiness, virtue, friendship)**
  3. **Eudemain Ethics**
  4. **Magna Moralia**
  5. **Politics (best states, utopias, constitutions, revolutions)**
  6. **Rhetoric (elements of forensic and political debate)**
  7. **Poetics (tragedy, epic poetry)**

Logic. **Aristotle's writings on the general subject of logic were grouped by the later Peripatetics under the name *Organon,* or instrument. From their perspective, logic and reasoning was the chief preparatory instrument of scientific investigation. Aristotle himself, however, uses the term "logic" as equivalent to verbal reasoning. The *Categories* of Aristotle are classifications of individual words (as opposed to propositions), and include the following ten: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, condition, action, passion. They seem to be arranged according to the order of the questions we would ask in gaining knowledge of an object. For example, we ask, first, what a thing is, then how great it is, next of what kind it is. Substance is always regarded as the most important of these. Substances are further divided into first and second: first substances are *individual* objects; second substances are the *species* in which first substances or individuals inhere.**

Notions when isolated do not in themselves express either truth or falsehood: it is only with the combination of ideas in a proposition that truth and falsity are possible. The elements of such a proposition are the noun substantive and the verb. The combination of words gives rise to rational speech and thought, conveys a meaning both in its parts and as a whole. Such thought may take many forms, but logic considers only *demonstrative* forms which express truth and falsehood. The truth or falsity of propositions is determined by their agreement or disagreement with the facts they represent. Thus propositions are either affirmative or negative, each of which again may be either universal or particular or undesignated. A definition, for Aristotle is a statement of the essential character of a subject, and involves both the genus and the difference. To get at a true definition we must find out those qualities within the genus which taken separately are wider than the subject to be defined, but taken together are precisely equal to it. For example, "prime" "odd" and "number" are each wider than "triplet" (i.e., a collection of any three items, such as three rocks); but taken together they are just equal to it. The genus definition must be formed so that no species is left out. Having determined the genus and species, we must next find the points of similarity in the species separately and then consider the common characteristics of different species. Definitions may be imperfect by (1) being obscure, (2) by being too wide, or (3) by not

stating the essential and fundamental attributes. Obscurity may arise from the use of equivocal expressions, of metaphorical phrases, or of eccentric words. The heart of Aristotle's logic is the syllogism, the classic example of which is as follows: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal. The syllogistic form of logical argumentation dominated logic for 2,000 years.

Metaphysics. Aristotle's editors gave the name "Metaphysics" to his works on *first philosophy*, either because they went *beyond* or followed *after* his physical investigations. Aristotle begins by sketching the history of philosophy. For Aristotle, philosophy arose historically after basic necessities were secured. It grew out of a feeling of curiosity and wonder, to which religious myth gave only provisional satisfaction. The earliest speculators (i.e. Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander) were philosophers of nature. The Pythagoreans succeeded these with mathematical abstractions. The level of pure thought was reached partly in the Eleatic philosophers (such as Parmenides) and Anaxagoras, but more completely in the work of Socrates. Socrates' contribution was the expression of general conceptions in the form of definitions, which he arrived at by induction and analogy. For Aristotle, the subject of metaphysics deals with the first principles of scientific knowledge and the ultimate conditions of all existence. More specifically, it deals with existence in its most fundamental state (i.e. being *as* being), and the essential attributes of existence. This can be contrasted with mathematics which deals with existence in terms of lines or angles, and not existence as it is in itself. In its universal character, metaphysics superficially resembles dialectics and sophistry. However, it differs from dialectics which is tentative, and it differs from sophistry which is a pretence of knowledge without the reality.

The axioms of science fall under the consideration of the metaphysician insofar as they are properties of *all* existence. Aristotle argues that there are a handful of universal truths. Against the followers of Heraclitus and Protagoras, Aristotle defends both the laws of contradiction, and that of excluded middle. He does this by showing that their denial is suicidal. Carried out to its logical consequences, the denial of these laws would lead to the sameness of all facts and all assertions. It would also result in an indifference in conduct. As the science of being *as* being, the leading question of Aristotle's metaphysics is, What is meant by the real or true substance? Plato tried to solve the same question by positing a universal and invariable element of knowledge and existence -- the forms -- as the only real permanent besides the changing phenomena of the senses. Aristotle attacks Plato's theory of the forms on three different grounds.

First, Aristotle argues, forms are powerless to explain *changes* of things and a thing's ultimate extinction. Forms are not causes of movement and alteration in the physical objects of sensation. *Second*, forms are equally incompetent to explain how we arrive at *knowledge* of particular things. For, to have knowledge of a particular object, it must be knowledge of the substance which is *in* that things. However, the forms place knowledge outside of particular things. Further, to suppose that we know particular things better by adding on their general conceptions of their forms, is about as absurd as to imagine that we can count numbers better by multiplying them. Finally, if forms were needed to explain our knowledge of particular objects, then forms must be used to explain our knowledge of objects of art; however, Platonists do not recognize such forms. The *third* ground of attack is that the forms simply cannot explain the *existence* of particular objects. Plato contends that forms do not exist *in* the particular objects which partake in the forms. However, that substance of a particular thing cannot be separated from the thing itself. Further, aside from the jargon of "participation," Plato does not explain the relation between forms and particular

things. In reality, it is merely metaphorical to describe the forms as patterns of things; for, what is a genus to one object is a species to a higher class, the same idea will have to be both a form and a particular thing at the same time. Finally, on Plato's account of the forms, we must imagine an intermediate link between the form and the particular object, and so on *ad infinitum*: there must always be a "third man" between the individual man and the form of man.

For Aristotle, the form is not something outside the object, but rather *in* the varied phenomena of sense. Real substance, or true being, is not the abstract form, but rather the *concrete* individual thing. Unfortunately, Aristotle's theory of substance is not altogether consistent with itself. In the *Categories* the notion of substance tends to be nominalistic (i.e., substance is a concept we apply to things). In the *Metaphysics*, though, it frequently inclines towards realism (i.e., substance has a real existence in itself). We are also struck by the apparent contradiction in his claims that science deals with universal concepts, and substance is declared to be an individual. In any case, substance is for him a merging of matter into form. The term "matter" is used by Aristotle in four overlapping senses. *First*, it is the underlying structure of changes, particularly changes of growth and of decay. *Secondly*, it is the potential which has implicitly the capacity to develop into reality. *Thirdly*, it is a kind of stuff without specific qualities and so is indeterminate and contingent. *Fourthly*, it is identical with form when it takes on a form in its actualized and final phase.

The development of potentiality to actuality is one of the most important aspects of Aristotle's philosophy. It was intended to solve the difficulties which earlier thinkers had raised with reference to the beginnings of existence and the relations of the one and many. The actual vs. potential state of things is explained in terms of the causes which act on things. There are four causes:

1. **Material cause, or the elements *out of which* an object is created;**
2. **Efficient cause, or the means *by which* it is created;**
3. **Formal cause, or the expression of *what* it is;**
4. **Final cause, or the end *for which* it is.**

Take, for example, a bronze statue. Its material cause is the bronze itself. Its efficient cause is the sculptor, insofar has he forces the bronze into shape. The formal cause is the idea of the completed statue. The final cause is the idea of the statue as it *prompts* the sculptor to act on the bronze. The final cause tends to be the same as the formal cause, and both of these can be subsumed by the efficient cause. Of the four, it is the formal and final which is the most important, and which most truly gives the explanation of an object. The final end (purpose, or teleology) of a thing is realized in the full perfection of the object itself, not in our conception of it. Final cause is thus internal to the nature of the object itself, and not something we subjectively impose on it.

God to Aristotle is the first of all substances, the necessary first source of movement who is himself unmoved. God is a being with everlasting life, and perfect blessedness, engaged in never-ending contemplation.

Philosophy of Nature.

Aristotle sees the universe as a scale lying between the two extremes: form without matter is on one end, and matter without form is on the other end. The passage of matter into form must be shown in its various stages in the world of nature. To do this is the object of Aristotle's physics, or philosophy of nature. It is important to keep in mind that the passage from form to matter within nature is a movement towards ends or purposes. Everything in nature

has its end and function, and nothing is without its purpose. Everywhere we find evidences of design and rational plan. No doctrine of physics can ignore the fundamental notions of motion, space, and time. Motion is the passage of matter into form, and it is of four kinds: (1) motion which affects the substance of a thing, particularly its beginning and its ending; (2) motion which brings about changes in quality; (3) motion which brings about changes in quantity, by increasing it and decreasing it; and (4) motion which brings about locomotion, or change of place. Of these the last is the most fundamental and important.

Aristotle rejects the definition of space as the void. Empty space is an impossibility. Hence, too, he disagrees with the view of Plato and the Pythagoreans that the elements are composed of geometrical figures. Space is defined as the limit of the surrounding body towards what is surrounded. Time is defined as the measure of motion in regard to what is earlier and later. it thus depends for its existence upon motion. If there where no change in the universe, there would be no time. Since it is the measuring or counting of motion, it also depends for its existence on a counting mind. If there were no mind to count, there could be no time. As to the infinite divisibility of space and time, and the paradoxes proposed by Zeno, Aristotle argues that space and time are potentially divisible *ad infinitum*, but are not actually so divided.

After these preliminaries, Aristotle passes to the main subject of physics, the scale of being. The first thing to notice about this scale is that it is a scale of values. What is higher on the scale of being is of more worth, because the principle of form is more advanced in it. Species on this scale are eternally fixed in their place, and cannot evolve over time. The higher items on the scale are also more organized. Further, the lower items are inorganic and the higher are organic. The principle which gives internal organization to the higher or organic items on the scale of being is life, or what he calls the soul of the organism. Even the human soul is nothing but the organization of the body. Plants are the lowest forms of life on the scale, and their souls contain a nutritive element by which it preserves itself. Animals are above plants on the scale, and their souls contain an appetitive feature which allows them to have sensations, desires, and thus gives them the ability to move. The scale of being proceeds from animals to humans. The human soul shares the nutritive element with plants, and the appetitive element with animals, but also has a rational element which is distinctively our own. The details of the appetitive and rational aspects of the soul are described in the following two sections.

The Soul and Psychology.

***Soul* is defined by Aristotle as the perfect expression or realization of a natural body. From this definition it follows that there is a close connection between psychological states, and physiological processes. Body and soul are unified in the same way that wax and an impression stamped on it are unified. Metaphysicians before Aristotle discussed the soul abstractly without any regard to the bodily environment; this, Aristotle believes, was a mistake. At the same time, Aristotle regards the soul or mind not as the product of the physiological conditions of the body, but as the *truth* of the body -- the substance in which only the bodily conditions gain their real meaning.**

The soul manifests its activity in certain "faculties" or "parts" which correspond with the stages of biological development, and are the faculties of nutrition (peculiar to plants), that of movement (peculiar to animals), and that of reason (peculiar to humans). These faculties resemble mathematical figures in which the higher includes the lower, and must be understood not as like actual physical parts, but like such *aspects* as convex and concave which we distinguish in the same line. The mind remains throughout a unity: and it is absurd to speak of it, as Plato did, as desiring

with one part and feeling anger with another. Sense perception is a faculty of receiving the forms of outward objects independently of the matter of which they are composed, just as the wax takes on the figure of the seal without the gold or other metal of which the seal is composed. As the subject of impression, perception involves a movement and a kind of qualitative change; but perception is not merely a passive or receptive affection. It in turn acts, and, *distinguishing* between the qualities of outward things, becomes "a movement of the soul through the medium of the body."

The objects of the senses may be either (1) special, (such as color is the special object of sight, and sound of hearing), (2) common, or apprehended by several senses in combination (such as motion or figure), or (3) incidental or inferential (such as when from the immediate sensation of white we come to know a person or *object* which is white). There are five special senses. Of these, touch is the must rudimentary, hearing the most instructive, and sight the most ennobling. The organ in these senses never acts directly , but is affected by some medium such as air. Even touch, which seems to act by actual contact, probably involves some vehicle of communication. For Aristotle, the heart is the common or central sense organ. It recognizes the common qualities which are involved in all particular objects of sensation. It is, first, the sense which brings us a consciousness of sensation. Secondly, in one act before the mind, it holds up the objects of our knowledge and enables us to distinguish between the reports of different senses.

Aristotle defines the imagination as "the movement which results upon an actual sensation." In other words, it is the process by which an impression of the senses is pictured and retained before the mind, and is accordingly the basis of memory. The representative pictures which it provides form the materials of reason. Illusions and dreams are both alike due to an excitement in the organ of sense similar to that which would be caused by the actual presence of the sensible phenomenon. Memory is defined as the permanent possession of the sensuous picture as a copy which represents the object of which it is a picture. Recollection, or the calling back to mind the residue of memory, depends on the laws which regulate the association of our ideas. We trace the associations by starting with the thought of the object present to us, then considering what is similar, contrary or contiguous.

Reason is the source of the first principles of knowledge. Reason is opposed to the sense insofar as sensations are restricted and individual, and thought is free and universal. Also, while the senses deals with the concrete and material aspect of phenomena, reason deals with the abstract and ideal aspects. But while reason is in itself the source of general ideas, it is so only potentially. For, it arrives at them only by a process of development in which it gradually clothes sense in thought, and unifies and interprets sense-presentations. This work of reason in thinking beings suggests the question: How can immaterial thought come to receive material things? It is only possible in virtue of some *community* between thought and things. Aristotle recognizes an active reason which *makes* objects of thought. This is distinguished from passive reason which receives, combines and compares the objects of thought. Active reason makes the world intelligible, and bestows on the materials of knowledge those ideas or categories which make them accessible to thought. This is just as the sun communicates to material objects that light, without which color would be invisible, and sight would have no object. Hence reason is the constant support of an intelligible world. While assigning reason to the soul of humans, Aristotle describes it as coming from without, and almost seems to identify it with God as the eternal and omnipresent thinker. Even in humans, in short, reason realizes something of the essential characteristic of absolute thought -- the unity of thought as subject with thought as object.

Ethics. **Ethics, as viewed by Aristotle, is an attempt to find out our chief end or highest good: an end which he maintains is really final. Though many ends of life are only means to further ends, our aspirations and desires must have some final object or pursuit. Such a chief end is universally called happiness. But people mean such different things by the expression that he finds it necessary to discuss the nature of it for himself. For starters, happiness must be based on human nature, and must begin from the facts of personal experience. Thus, happiness cannot be found in any abstract or ideal notion, like Plato's self-existing good. It must be something practical an human. It must then be found in the work and life which is unique to humans. But this is neither the vegetative life we share with plants nor the sensitive existence which we share with animals. It follows therefore that true happiness lies in the active life of a rational being or in a perfect realization and outworking of the true soul and self, continued throughout a lifetime.**

Aristotle expands his notion of happiness through an analysis of the human soul which structures and animates a living human organism. The parts of the soul are divided as follows:

	Calculative -- Intellectual Virtue
Rational	
	Appetitive -- Moral Virtue
Irrational	
	Vegetative -- Nutritional Virtue

The human soul has an irrational element which is shared with the animals, and a rational element which is distinctly human. The most primitive irrational element is the vegetative faculty which is responsible for nutrition and growth. An organism which does this well may be said to have a nutritional virtue. The second tier of the soul is the appetitive faculty which is responsible for our emotions and desires (such as joy, grief, hope and fear). This faculty is both rational and irrational. It is irrational since even animals experience desires. However, it is also rational since humans have the distinct ability to control these desires with the help of reason. The human ability to properly control these desires is called moral virtue, and is the focus of morality. Aristotle notes that there is a purely rational part of the soul, the calculative, which is responsible for the human ability to contemplate, reason logically, and formulate scientific principles. The mastery of these abilities is called intellectual virtue.

Aristotle continues by making several general points about the nature of moral virtues (i.e. desire-regulating virtues). First, he argues that the ability to regulate our desires is not instinctive, but learned and is the outcome of both teaching and practice. Second, he notes that if we regulate our desires either too much or too little, then we create problems. As an analogy, Aristotle comments that, either "excess or deficiency of gymnastic exercise is fatal to strength." Third, he argues that desire-regulating virtues are character traits, and are not to be understood as either emotions or mental faculties.

The core of Aristotle's account of moral virtue is his doctrine of the mean. According to this doctrine, moral virtues are desire-regulating character traits which are at a mean between more extreme character traits (or vices). For example, in response to the natural emotion of fear, we should develop the virtuous character trait of courage. If we develop an excessive character trait by curbing fear too much, then we are said to be rash, which is a vice. If, on the other extreme, we develop a deficient character trait by curbing fear too little, then we are said to be cowardly, which

is also a vice. The virtue of courage, then, lies at the mean between the excessive extreme of rashness, and the deficient extreme of cowardice. Aristotle is quick to point out that the virtuous mean is not a strict mathematical mean between two extremes. For example, if eating 100 apples is too many, and eating zero apples is too little, this does not imply that we should eat 50 apples, which is the mathematical mean. Instead, the mean is rationally determined, based on the relative merits of the situation. That is, it is "as a prudent man would determine it." He concludes that it is difficult to live the virtuous life primarily because it is often difficult to find the mean between the extremes.

Most moral virtues, and not just courage, are to be understood as falling at the mean between two accompanying vices. His list may be represented by the following table:

Vice of Deficiency	Virtuous Mean	Vice of Excess
Cowardice	Courage	Rashness
Insensibility	Temperance	Intemperance
Illiberality	Liberality	Prodigality
Pettiness	Munificence	Vulgarity
Humble-mindedness	High-mindedness	Vaingloriness
Want of Ambition	Right Ambition	Over-ambition
Spiritlessness	Good Temper	Irascibility
Surliness	Friendly Civility	Obsequiousness
Ironical Depreciation	Sincerity	Boastfulness
Boorishness	Wittiness	Buffoonery
Shamelessness	Modesty	Bashfulness
Callousness	Just Resentment	Spitefulness

The prominent virtue of this list is high-mindedness, which, as being a kind of ideal self-respect, is regarded as the crown of all the other virtues, depending on them for its existence, and itself in turn tending to intensify their force. The list seems to be more a deduction from the formula than a statement of the facts on which the formula itself depends, and Aristotle accordingly finds language frequently inadequate to express the states of excess or defect which his theory involves (for example in dealing with the virtue of ambition). Throughout the list he insists on the "autonomy of will" as indispensable to virtue: courage for instance is only really worthy of the name when done from a love of honor and duty: munificence again becomes vulgarity when it is not exercised from a love of what is right and beautiful, but for displaying wealth.

Justice is used both in a general and in a special sense. In its general sense it is equivalent to the observance of law. As such it is the same thing as virtue, differing only insofar as virtue exercises the disposition simply in the abstract, and justice applies it in dealings with people. Particular justice displays itself in two forms. First, *distributive justice* hands out honors and rewards according to the merits of the recipients. Second, *corrective justice* takes no account of the position of the parties concerned, but simply secures equality between the two by taking away from the advantage of the one and adding it to the disadvantage of the other. Strictly speaking, distributive and corrective justice are more than mere retaliation and reciprocity. However, in concrete situations of civil life, retaliation and reciprocity is an adequate formula since such circumstances

involve money, depending on a relation between producer and consumer. Since absolute justice is abstract in nature, in the real world it must be supplemented with equity, which corrects and modifies the laws of justice where it falls short. Thus, morality requires a standard which will not only regulate the inadequacies of absolute justice but be also an idea of moral progress.

This idea of morality is given by the faculty of moral insight. The truly good person is at the same time a person of perfect insight, and a person of perfect insight is also perfectly good. Our idea of the ultimate end of moral action is developed through habitual experience, and this gradually frames itself out of particular perceptions. It is the job of reason to apprehend and organize these particular perceptions. However, moral action is never the result of a mere act of the understanding, nor is it the result of a simple desire which views objects merely as things which produce pain or pleasure. We start with a rational conception of what is advantageous, but this conception is in itself powerless without the natural impulse which will give it strength. The will or purpose implied by morality is thus either reason stimulated to act by desire, or desire guided and controlled by understanding. These factors then motivate the willful action. Freedom of the will is a factor with both virtuous choices and vicious choices. Actions are involuntary only when another person forces our action, or if we are ignorant of important details in actions. Actions are voluntary when the originating cause of action (either virtuous or vicious) lies in ourselves.

Moral weakness of the will results in someone does what is wrong, knowing that it is right, and yet follows his desire against reason. For Aristotle, this condition is not a myth, as Socrates supposed it was. The problem is a matter of conflicting moral principles. Moral action may be represented as a syllogism in which a general principle of morality forms the first (i.e. major) premise, while the particular application is the second (i.e. minor) premise. The conclusion, though, which is arrived at through speculation, is not always carried out in practice. The moral syllogism is not simply a matter of logic, but involves psychological drives and desires. Desires can lead to a minor premise being applied to one rather than another of two major premises existing in the agent's mind. Animals, on the other hand, cannot be called weak willed or incontinent since such a conflict of principles is not possible with them.

Pleasure is not to be identified with Good. Pleasure is found in the consciousness of free spontaneous action. It is an invisible experience, like vision, and is always present when a perfect organ acts upon a perfect object. Pleasures accordingly differ in kind, varying along with the different value of the functions of which they are the expression. They are determined ultimately by the judgment of "the good person." Our chief end is the perfect development of our true nature; it thus must be particularly found in the realization of our highest faculty, that is, reason. It is this in fact which constitutes our personality, and we would not be pursuing our own life, but the life of some lower being, if we followed any other aim. Self-love accordingly may be said to be the highest law of morals, because while such self-love may be understood as the selfishness which gratifies a person's lower nature, it may also be, and is rightly, the love of that higher and rational nature which constitutes each person's true self. Such a life of thought is further recommended as that which is most pleasant, most self-sufficient, most continuous, and most consonant with our purpose. It is also that which is most akin to the life of God: for God cannot be conceived as practising the ordinary moral virtues and must therefore find his happiness in contemplation.

Friendship is an indispensable aid in framing for ourselves the higher moral life; if not itself a virtue, it is at least associated with virtue, and it proves itself of service in almost all conditions of our existence. Such results, however, are to be derived not from the worldly friendships of utility or pleasure, but only from those which are founded on virtue. The true friend is in fact a second

self, and the true moral value of friendship lies in the fact that the friend presents to us a mirror of good actions, and so intensifies our consciousness and our appreciation of life.

Politics. **Aristotle does not regard politics as a separate science from ethics, but as the completion, and almost a verification of it. The moral ideal in political administration is only a different aspect of that which also applies to individual happiness. Humans are by nature social beings, and the possession of rational speech (logos) in itself leads us to social union. The state is a development from the family through the village community, an offshoot of the family. Formed originally for the satisfaction of natural wants, it exists afterwards for moral ends and for the promotion of the higher life. The state in fact is no mere local union for the prevention of wrong doing, and the convenience of exchange. It is also no mere institution for the protection of goods and property. It is a genuine moral organization for advancing the development of humans.**

The family, which is chronologically prior to the state, involves a series of relations between husband and wife, parent and child, master and slave. Aristotle regards the slave as a piece of live property having no existence except in relation to his master. Slavery is a natural institution because there is a ruling and a subject class among people related to each other as soul to body; however, we must distinguish between those who are slaves by nature, and those who have become slaves merely by war and conquest. Household management involves the acquisition of riches, but must be distinguished from money-making for its own sake. Wealth is everything whose value can be measured by money; but it is the use rather than the possession of commodities which constitutes riches.

Financial exchange first involved bartering. However, with the difficulties of transmission between countries widely separated from each other, money as a currency arose. At first it was merely a specific amount of weighted or measured metal. Afterwards it received a stamp to mark the amount. Demand is the real standard of value. Currency, therefore, is merely a convention which represents the demand; it stands between the producer and the recipient and secures fairness. Usury is an unnatural and reprehensible use of money.

The communal ownership of wives and property as sketched by Plato in the *Republic* rests on a false conception of political society. For, the state is not a homogeneous unity, as Plato believed, but rather is made up of dissimilar elements. The classification of constitutions is based on the fact that government may be exercised either for the good of the governed or of the governing, and may be either concentrated in one person or shared by a few or by the many. There are thus three true forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy, and constitutional republic. The perverted forms of these are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. The difference between the last two is not that democracy is a government of the many, and oligarchy of the few; instead, democracy is the state of the poor, and oligarchy of the rich. Considered in the abstract, these six states stand in the following order of preference: monarchy, aristocracy, constitutional republic, democracy, oligarchy, tyranny. But though with a perfect person monarchy would be the highest form of government, the absence of such people puts it practically out of consideration. Similarly, true aristocracy is hardly ever found in its uncorrupted form. It is in the constitution that the good person and the good citizen coincide. Ideal preferences aside, then, the constitutional republic is regarded as the best *attainable* form of government, especially as it secures that predominance of a large middle class, which is the chief basis of permanence in any state. With the spread of population, democracy is likely to become the general form of government.

Which is the best state is a question that cannot be directly answered. Different races are suited for different forms of government, and the question which meets the politician is not so much what is abstractly the best state, but what is the best state under existing circumstances. Generally, however, the best state will enable anyone to act in the best and live in the happiest manner. To serve this end the ideal state should be neither too great nor too small, but simply self-sufficient. It should occupy a favorable position towards land and sea and consist of citizens gifted with the spirit of the northern nations, and the intelligence of the Asiatic nations. It should further take particular care to exclude from government all those engaged in trade and commerce; "the best state will not make the "working man" a citizen; it should provide support religious worship; it should secure morality through the educational influences of law and early training. Law, for Aristotle, is the outward expression of the moral ideal without the bias of human feeling. It is thus no mere agreement or convention, but a moral force coextensive with all virtue. Since it is universal in its character, it requires modification and adaptation to particular circumstances through equity.

Education should be guided by legislation to make it correspond with the results of psychological analysis, and follow the gradual development of the bodily and mental faculties. Children should during their earliest years be carefully protected from all injurious associations, and be introduced to such amusements as will prepare them for the serious duties of life. Their literary education should begin in their seventh year, and continue to their twenty-first year. This period is divided into two courses of training, one from age seven to puberty, and the other from puberty to age twenty-one. Such education should not be left to private enterprise, but should be undertaken by the state. There are four main branches of education: reading and writing, Gymnastics, music, and painting. They should not be studied to achieve a specific aim, but in the liberal spirit which creates true freemen. Thus, for example, gymnastics should not be pursued by itself exclusively, or it will result in a harsh savage type of character. Painting must not be studied merely to prevent people from being cheated in pictures, but to make them attend to physical beauty. Music must not be studied merely for amusement, but for the moral influence which it exerts on the feelings. Indeed all true education is, as Plato saw, a training of our sympathies so that we may love and hate in a right manner.

Art. **Art is defined by Aristotle as the realization in external form of a true idea, and is traced back to that natural love of imitation which characterizes humans, and to the pleasure which we feel in recognizing likenesses. Art however is not limited to mere copying. It idealizes nature and completes its deficiencies: it seeks to grasp the universal type in the individual phenomenon. The distinction therefore between poetic art and history is not that the one uses meter, and the other does not. The distinction is that while history is limited to what has actually happened, poetry depicts things in their universal character. And, therefore, "poetry is more philosophical and more elevated than history." Such imitation may represent people either as better or as worse than people usually are, or it may neither go beyond nor fall below the average standard. Comedy is the imitation of the worse examples of humanity, understood however not in the sense of absolute badness, but only in so far as what is low and ignoble enters into what is laughable and comic.**

Tragedy, on the other hand, is the representation of a serious or meaningful, rounded or finished, and more or less extended or far-reaching action -- a representation which is effected by action and not mere narration. It is fitted by portraying events which excite fear and pity in the mind of the observer to purify or purge these feelings and extend and regulate their sympathy. It is thus a

homeopathic curing of the passions. Insofar as art in general universalizes particular events, tragedy, in depicting passionate and critical situations, takes the observer outside the selfish and individual standpoint, and views them in connection with the general lot of human beings. This is similar to Aristotle's explanation of the use of orgiastic music in the worship of Bacchas and other deities: it affords an outlet for religious fervor and thus steadies one's religious sentiments.

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Aristotle on Motion and its Place in Nature

INTRODUCTION

Aristotle defines motion, by which he means change of any kind, as the actuality of a potentiality as such (or as movable, or as a potentiality - *Physics* 201a 10-11, 27-29, b 4-5.) The definition is a conjunction of two terms which normally contradict each other, along with, in Greek, a qualifying clause which seems to make the contradiction inescapable. Yet St. Thomas Aquinas called it the only possible way to define motion by what is prior to and better known than motion. At the opposite extreme is the young Descartes, who in the first book he wrote announced that while everyone knows what motion is, no one understands Aristotle's definition of it. According to Descartes, "motion . . . is nothing more than the action by which any body passes from one place to another" (Principles II, 24). The use of the word "passes" makes this definition an obvious circle; Descartes might just as well have called motion the action by which a thing moves. But the important part of Descartes' definition is the words "nothing more than," by which he asserts that motion is susceptible of no definition which is not circular, as one might say "the color red is just the color red," to mean that the term is not reducible to some modification of a wave, or analyzable in any other way. There must be ultimate terms of discourse, or there would be no definitions, and indeed no thought. The point is not that one cannot construct a non-circular definition of such a term, one claimed to be properly irreducible, but that one ought not to do so. The true atoms of discourse are those things which can be explained only by means of things less known than themselves. If motion is such an ultimate term, then to define it by means of anything but synonyms is willfully to choose to dwell in a realm of darkness, at the sacrifice of the understanding which is naturally ours in the form of "good sense" or ordinary common sense.

Descartes' treatment of motion is explicitly anti-Aristotelian and his definition of motion is deliberately circular. The Cartesian physics is rooted in a disagreement with Aristotle about what the best-known things are, and about where thought should take its beginnings. There is, however, a long tradition of interpretation and translation of Aristotle's definition of motion, beginning at least five hundred years before Descartes and dominating discussions of Aristotle today, which seeks to have things both ways. An unusually clear instance of this attitude is found in the following sentence from a medieval Arabic commentary: "Motion is a first entelechy of that which is in potentiality, insofar as it is in potentiality, and if you prefer you may say that it is a transition from potentiality to actuality." You will recognize the first of these two statements presented as equivalent as a translation of Aristotle's definition, and the second as a circular definition of the same type as that of Descartes. Motion is an entelechy; motion is a transition The strangeness of the word "entelechy" masks the contradiction between these two claims. We must achieve an understanding of Aristotle's word *entelecheia*, the heart of his definition of motion, in order to see that what it says cannot be said just as well by such a word as "transition."

ENERGEIA AND *ENTELECHIA*

The word *entelecheia* was invented by Aristotle, but never defined by him. It is at the heart not only of his definition of motion, but of all his thought. Its meaning is the most knowable in itself of all possible objects of the intellect. There is no starting point from which we can descend to put together the cements of its meaning. We can come to an understanding of *entelecheia* only by an ascent from what is intrinsically less knowable than it, indeed knowable only through it, but more known because more familiar to us. We have a number of resources by which to begin such an ascent, drawing upon the linguistic elements out of which Aristotle constructed the word, and upon the fact that he uses the word *energeia* as a synonym, or all but a synonym, for *entelecheia*.

The root of *energeia* is *ergon*—deed, work, or act—from which comes the adjective *energon* used in ordinary speech to mean active, busy, or at work. *Energeia* is formed by the addition of a noun ending to the adjective *energon*; we might construct the word “at-work-ness” from Anglo-Saxon roots to translate *energeia* into English, or use the more euphonious periphrastic expression, “being-at-work.” If we are careful to remember how we got there, we could alternatively use Latin roots to make the word "actuality" to translate *energeia*. The problem with this alternative is that the word "actuality" already belongs to the English language, and has a life of its own which seems to be at variance with the simple sense of being active. By the actuality of a thing, we mean not its being-in-action but its being what it is. For example, I recently saw a picture of a fish with an effective means of camouflage: it looks like a rock but it is *actually* a fish. I don't seem to be talking about any activity when I attribute an actuality to that thing, completely at rest at the bottom of the ocean. But according to Aristotle, to be something always means to be at work in a certain way. In the case of the fish at rest, its actuality is the activity of metabolism, the work by which it is constantly transforming material from its environment into parts of itself and losing material from itself into its environment, the activity by which the fish maintains itself as a fish and as just the fish it is, and which ceases only when the fish ceases to be. Any static state which has any determinate character can only exist as the outcome of a continuous expenditure of effort, maintaining the state as it is. Thus even the rock, at rest next to the fish, is in activity: to be a rock is to strain to be at the center of the universe, and thus to be in motion unless constrained otherwise, as the rock in our example is constrained by the large quantity of earth already gathered around the center of the universe. A rock at rest at the center is at work maintaining its place, against the counter-tendency of all the earth to *dis*place it. The center of the universe is determined only by the common innate activity of rocks and other kinds of earth. Nothing *is* which is not somehow in action, maintaining itself either as the

whole it is, or as a part of some whole. A rock is inorganic only when regarded in isolation from the universe as a whole which is an organized whole just as blood considered by itself could not be called alive yet is only blood insofar as it contributes to the maintenance of some organized body. No existing rock can fail to contribute to the hierarchical organization of the universe; I can therefore call any existing rock an actual rock.

Energeia, then, always means the being-at-work of some definite, specific something; the rock cannot undergo metabolism, and once the fish does no more than fall to earth and remain there it is no longer a fish. The material and organization of a thing determine a specific capacity or potentiality for activity with respect to which the corresponding activity has the character of an end (*telos*). Aristotle says "the act is an end and the being-at-work is the act and since *energeia* is named from the *ergon* it also extends to the being-at-an-end (*entelecheia*)" (*Metaphysics* 1050a 21-23). The word *entelecheia* has a structure parallel to that of *energeia*. From the root word *telos*, meaning end, comes the adjective *enteles*, used in ordinary speech to mean complete, perfect, or full-grown. But while *energeia*, being-at-work, is made from the adjective meaning at work and a noun ending, *entelecheia* is made from the adjective meaning complete and the verb *exein*. Thus if we translate *entelecheia* as "completeness" or "perfection" the contribution the meaning of *exein* makes to the term is not evident. I would suggest that Aristotle uses *exein* for two reasons which lead to the same conclusion: First, one of the common meanings of *exein* is "to be" in the sense of to remain, to stay, or to keep in some condition specified by a preceding adverb as in the idioms *kalos exei*, "things are going well," or *kakos exei*, "things are going badly." It means "to be" in the sense of to continue to be. This is only one of several possible meanings of *exein*, but there is a second fact which makes it likely that it is the meaning which would strike the ear of a Greek-speaking person of Aristotle's time. There was then in ordinary use the word *endelecheia*, differing from Aristotle's word *entelecheia* only by a delta in place of the tau. *Endelecheia* means continuity or persistence. As one would expect, there was a good deal of confusion in ancient times between the invented and undefined term *entelecheia* and the familiar word *endelecheia*. The use of the pun for the serious philosophic purpose of saying at once two things for whose union the language has no word was a frequent literary device of Aristotle's teacher Plato. In this striking instance, Aristotle seems to have imitated the playful style of his teacher in constructing the most important term in his technical vocabulary. The addition of *exein* to *enteles*, through the joint action of the meaning of the suffix and the sound of the whole, superimposes upon the sense of "completeness" that of continuity. *Entelecheia* means continuing in a state of completeness, or being at an end which is of such a nature that it is only possible to be there by means of the continual expenditure of the effort required to stay there. Just as *energeia* extends to *entelecheia* because it is the activity which makes a thing what it is, *entelecheia* extends to *energeia* because it is the end or perfection which has being only in, through, and during activity. For the remainder of this entry, the word "actuality" translates both *energeia* and *entelecheia*, and by actuality I shall mean just that area of overlap between being-at-work and being-at-an-end which expresses what it means to be something determinate. The words *energeia* and *entelecheia* have very different meanings, but function as synonyms because the world is such that things have identities, belong to species, act for ends, and form material into enduring organized wholes. The word actuality as thus used is very close in meaning to the word life, with the exception that it is broader in meaning, carrying no necessary implication of mortality.

THE STANDARD ACCOUNT OF ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF MOTION

We embarked on this quest for the meaning of *entelecheia* in order to decide whether the phrase "transition to actuality" could ever properly render it. The answer is now obviously "no." An actuality is

something ongoing, but only the ongoing activity of maintaining a state of completeness or perfection already reached; the transition into such a state always lacks and progressively approaches the perfected character which an actuality always has. A dog is not a puppy: the one is, among other things, capable of generating puppies and giving protection, while the other is incapable of generation and in need of protection. We might have trouble deciding exactly when the puppy has ceased to be a puppy and become a dog— at the age of one year, for example, it will probably be fully grown and capable of reproducing, but still awkward in its movements and puppyish in its attitudes—but in any respect in which it has become a dog it has ceased to be a puppy.

But our concern was to understand what motion is, and it is obviously the puppy which is in motion, since it is growing toward maturity, while the dog is not in motion in that respect, since its activity has ceased to produce change and become wholly directed toward self-maintenance. If the same thing cannot be in the same respect both an actuality and a transition to actuality, it is clearly the *transition* that motion is, and the actuality that it isn't. It seems that Descartes is right and Aristotle is wrong. Of course it is possible that Aristotle meant what Descartes said, but simply used the wrong word, that he called motion an *entelecheia* three times, at the beginning, middle, and end of his explanation of what motion is, when he really meant not *entelecheia* but the transition or passage to *entelecheia*. Now, this suggestion would be laughable if it were not what almost everyone who addresses the question today believes. Sir David Ross, certainly the most massively qualified authority on Aristotle of those who have lived in our century and written in our language, the man who supervised the Oxford University Press's forty-five year project of translating all the works of Aristotle into English, in a commentary, on Aristotle's definition of motion, writes: "*entelecheia* must here mean 'actualization,' not 'actuality'; it is the passage to actuality that is *kinesis*" (*Physics, text with commentary*, London, 1936, p. 359). In another book, his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Ross makes it clear that he regards the meaning *entelecheia* has in every use Aristotle makes of it everywhere *but* in the definition of motion as being not only other than but incompatible with the meaning "actualization." In view of that fact, Ross' decision that "*entelecheia* must here mean 'actualization'" is a desperate one, indicating a despair of understanding Aristotle out of his own mouth. It is not translation or interpretation but plastic surgery.

Ross' full account of motion as actualization (*Aristotle*, New York, 1966, pp. 81-82) cites no passages from Aristotle, and no authorities, but patiently explains that motion is motion and cannot, therefore, be an actuality. There are authorities he could have cited, including Moses Maimonides, the twelfth century Jewish philosopher who sought to reconcile Aristotle's philosophy with the Old Testament and Talmud, and who defined motion as "the transition from potentiality to actuality," and the most famous Aristotelian commentator of all time, Averroes, the twelfth century Spanish Moslem thinker, who called motion a passage from non-being to actuality and complete reality. In each case the circular definition is chosen in preference to the one which seems laden with contradictions. A circular statement, to the extent that it is circular, is at least not false, and can as a whole have some content: Descartes' definition amounts to saying "whatever motion is, it is possible only with respect to place," and that of Averroes, Maimonides, and Ross amounts to saying "whatever motion is, it results always in an actuality." An accurate rendering of Aristotle's definition would amount to saying (a) that motion is rest, and (b) that a potentiality, which must be, at a minimum, a privation of actuality, is at the same time that actuality of which it is the lack. There has been one major commentator on Aristotle who was prepared to take seriously and to make sense of both these claims.

THOMAS' ACCOUNT OF ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF MOTION

St. Thomas Aquinas, in his interpretation of Aristotle's definition of motion, (*Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*, London, 1963, pp. 136-137), observes two principles: (1) that Aristotle meant what he wrote, and (2) that what Aristotle wrote is worth the effort of understanding. Writing a century after Maimonides and Averroes, Thomas disposes of their approach to defining motion with few words: it is not Aristotle's definition and it is an error. A passage, a transition, an actualization, an actualizing, or any of the more complex substantives to which translators have resorted which incorporate in some more or less disguised form some progressive sense united to the meaning of actuality, all have in common that they denote a kind of motion. *If* motion can be defined, then to rest content with explaining motion as a kind of motion is certainly to err; even if one is to reject Aristotle's definition on fundamental philosophical grounds, as Descartes was to do, the first step must be to see what it means. And Thomas explains clearly and simply a sense in which Aristotle's definition is both free of contradiction and genuinely a definition of motion. One must simply see that the growing puppy *is* a dog, that the half formed lump of bronze on which the sculptor is working *is* a statue of Hermes, that the tepid water on the fire *is* hot; what it *means* to say that the puppy is growing, the bronze is being worked, or the water is being heated, is that each is not just the complex of characteristics it possesses right now; in each case, something that the thing is not yet, already belongs to it as that toward which it is, right now, ordered. To say that something is in motion is just to say that it is *both* what it is already and something else that it isn't yet. What else do we mean by saying that the puppy is growing, rather than remaining what it is, that the bronze under the sculptor's hand is in a different condition from the identically shaped lump of bronze he has discarded, or that the water is not just tepid but being heated? Motion is the mode in which the future belongs to the present, is the present absence of just those particular absent things which are about to be.

Thomas discusses in detail the example of the water being heated. Assume it to have started cold, and to have been heated so far to room temperature. The heat it now has, which has replaced the potentiality it previously had to be just that hot, belongs to it in actuality. The capacity it has to be still hotter belongs to it in potentiality. To the extent that it is actually hot it has been moved; to the extent that it is not yet as hot as it is going to be, it is not yet moved. The motion is just *the joint presence of potentiality and actuality with respect to same thing*, in this case heat.

In Thomas' version of Aristotle's definition one can see the alternative to Descartes' approach to physics. Since Descartes regards motion as ultimate and given, his physics will give no account of motion itself, but describe the transient static configurations through which the moving things pass. By Thomas' account, motion is not ultimate but is a consequence of the way in which present states of things are ordered toward other actualities which do not belong to them. One could build on such an account a physics of forces, that is, of those directed potentialities which cause a thing to move, to pass over from the actuality it possesses to another which it lacks but to which it is ordered. Motion will thus not have to be understood as the mysterious departure of things from rest, which alone can be described, but as the outcome of the action upon one another of divergent and conflicting innate tendencies of things. Rest will be the anomaly, since things will be understood as so constituted by nature as to pass over of themselves into certain states of activity, but states of rest will be explainable as dynamic states of balance among things with opposed tendencies. Leibniz, who criticized Descartes' physics and invented a science of dynamics, explicitly acknowledged his debt to Aristotle (see, e.g., *Specimen Dynamicum*), whose doctrine of *entelecheia* he regarded himself as restoring in a modified form. From Leibniz we derive our current notions of potential and kinetic energy, whose very names, pointing to the actuality which is potential and the actuality which is motion, preserve the Thomistic resolutions of the two

paradoxes in Aristotle's definition of motion.

THE LIMITS OF THOMAS' ACCOUNT

But though the modern science of dynamics can be seen in germ in St. Thomas' discussion of motion, it can be seen also to reveal difficulties in Thomas' conclusions. According to Thomas, actuality and potentiality do not exclude one another but co-exist as motion. To the extent that an actuality is also a potentiality it is a motion, and to the extent that an actuality is a motion it is a potentiality. The two seeming contradictions cancel each other in the dynamic actuality of the present state which is determined by its own future. But are not potential and kinetic energy two different things? The rock which I hold six feet above the ground has been actually moved identically to the rock which I have thrown six feet above the ground, and at that distance each strains identically to fall to earth; but the one is falling and the other isn't. How can the description which is common to both, when one is moving and the other is at rest, be an account of what motion is? It seems that everything which Thomas says about the tepid water which is being heated can be said also of the tepid water which has been removed from the fire. Each is a coincidence of a certain actuality of heat with a further potentiality to the same heat. What does it mean to say that the water on the fire has, right now, an order to further heat which the water off the fire lacks? If we say that the fire is acting on the one and not on the other in such a way as to disturb its present state, we have begged the question and returned to the position of presupposing motion to explain motion. Thomas' account of Aristotle's definition of motion, though immeasurably superior to that of Sir David Ross as interpretation, and far more sophisticated as an approach to and specification of the conditions an account of motion would have to meet, seems ultimately subject to the same circularity. Maimonides, Averroes, and Ross fail to say how motion differs from rest. Thomas fails to say how any given motion differs from a corresponding state of balanced tension, or of strain and constraint.

The strength of Thomas' interpretation of the definition of motion comes from his taking every word seriously. When Ross discusses Aristotle's definition, he gives no indication of why the *he toiouton*, or "insofar as it is such," clause should have been included. By Thomas' account, motion is the actuality of any potentiality which is nevertheless still a potentiality. It is the actuality which has not canceled its corresponding potentiality but exists along with it. Motion then is the actuality of any potentiality insofar as it is still a potentiality. This is the formula which applies equally well to the dynamic state of rest and the dynamic state of motion. We shall try to advance our understanding by being still more careful about the meaning of the pronoun *he*.

Thomas' account of the meaning of Aristotle's definition forces him to construe the grammar of the definition in such a way that the clause introduced by the dative singular feminine relative pronoun *he* has as its antecedent, in two cases, the neuter participle *tou ontos*, and in the third, the neuter substantive adjective *tou dunatou*. It is true that this particular feminine relative pronoun often had an adverbial sense to which its gender was irrelevant, but in the three statements of the definition of motion there is no verb but *estin*. If the clause is understood adverbially, then, the sentence must mean something like: if motion is a potentiality, it is the actuality of a potentiality. Whatever that might mean, it could at any rate not be a definition of motion. Thus the clause must be understood adjectivally, and Thomas must make the relative pronoun dependent upon a word with which it does not agree in gender. He makes the sentence say that motion is the actuality of the potentiality in which there is yet potentiality. Reading the pronoun as dependent upon the feminine noun *entelecheia* with which it does agree, we find the sentence saying that motion is the actuality *as which* it is a potentiality of the potentiality, or the actuality *as* a potentiality

of the potentiality.

FACING THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF MOTION

This reading of the definition implies that potentialities exist in two ways, that it is possible to *be* a potentiality, yet not be an *actual* potentiality. I said at the beginning of this entry that Aristotle's definition of motion was made by putting together two terms, actuality and potentiality, which normally contradict each other. Thomas resolved the contradiction by arguing that in every motion actuality and potentiality are mixed or blended, that the condition of becoming-hot of the water is just the simultaneous presence in the same water of some actuality of heat and some remaining potentiality of heat. I also said earlier that there was a qualifying clause in Aristotle's definition which seemed to intensify, rather than relieve, the contradiction. I was referring to the *he toiouton*, or *he kineton*, or *he dunaton*, which appears in each version of the definition, and which, being as I have claimed grammatically dependent on *entelecheia*, signifies something the very actuality of which is potentiality. The Thomistic blend of actuality and potentiality has the characteristic that, to the extent that it is actual it is not potential and to the extent that it is potential it is not actual; the hotter the water is, the less is it potentially hot, and the cooler it is, the less is it actually, the more potentially, hot.

The most serious defect in Saint Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's definition is that, like Ross' interpretation, it broadens, dilutes, cheapens, and trivializes the meaning of the word *entelecheia*. An immediate implication of the interpretations of both Thomas and Ross is that whatever happens to be the case right now is an *entelecheia*, as though being at 70 degrees Fahrenheit were an end determined by the nature of water, or as though something which is intrinsically so unstable as the instantaneous position of an arrow in flight deserved to be described by the word which Aristotle everywhere else reserves for complex organized states which persist, which hold out in being against internal and external causes tending to destroy them.

Aristotle's definition of motion applies to any and every motion: the pencil falling to the floor, the white pages in the book turning yellow, the glue in the binding of the book being eaten by insects. Maimonides, Averroes, and Ross, who say that motion is always a transition or passage from potentiality to actuality, must call the being-on-the-floor of the pencil, the being-yellow of the pages, and the crumbled condition of the binding of the book actualities. Thomas, who says that motion is constituted at any moment by the joint presence of actuality and potentiality, is in a still worse position: he must call every position of the pencil on the way to the floor, every color of the pages on the way to being yellow, and every loss of a crumb from the binding an actuality. If these are actualities, then it is no wonder that philosophers such as Descartes rejected Aristotle's account of motion as a useless redundancy, saying no more than that whatever changes, changes into that into which it changes.

We know however that the things Aristotle called *actualities* are limited in number, and constitute the world in its ordered finitude rather than in its random particularity. The actuality of the adult horse is one, although horses are many and all different from each other. Books and pencils are not actualities at all, even though they are organized wholes, since their organizations are products of human art, and they maintain themselves not as books and pencils but only as earth. Even the organized content of a book, such as that of the first three chapters of Book Three of Aristotle's *Physics*, does not exist as an actuality, since it is only the new labor of each new reader that gives being to that content, in this case a very difficult labor. By this strict test, the only actualities in the world, that is, the only things which, by their own innate tendencies, maintain themselves in being as organized wholes, seem to be the animals and

plants, the ever-the-same orbits of the ever-moving planets, and the universe as a whole. But Aristotle has said that every motion is an *entelecheia*; if we choose not to trivialize the meaning of *entelecheia* to make it applicable to motion, we must deepen our understanding of motion to make it applicable to the meaning of *entelecheia*.

WHAT MOTION IS

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle argues that if there is a distinction between potentiality and actuality at all, there must be a distinction between two kinds of potentiality. The man with sight, but with his eyes closed, differs from the blind man, although neither is seeing. The first man has the capacity to see, which the second man lacks. There are then potentialities as well as actualities in the world. But when the first man opens his eyes, has he lost the capacity to see? Obviously not; while he is seeing, his capacity to see is no longer merely a potentiality, but is a potentiality which has been put to work. The potentiality to see exists sometimes as active or at-work, and sometimes as inactive or latent. But this example seems to get us no closer to understanding motion, since seeing is just one of those activities which is not a motion. Let us consider, then, a man's capacity to walk across the room. When he is sitting or standing or lying still, his capacity to walk is latent, like the sight of the man with his eyes closed; that capacity nevertheless has real being, distinguishing the man in question from a man who is crippled to the extent of having lost all potentiality to walk. When the man is walking across the room, his capacity to walk has been put to work. But while he is walking, what has happened to his capacity to *be* at the other side of the room, which was also latent before he began to walk? It too is a potentiality which has been put to work by the act of walking. Once he has reached the other side of the room, his potentiality to be there has been actualized in Ross' sense of the term, but while he is walking, his potentiality to be on the other side of the room is not merely latent, and is not yet canceled by, an actuality in the weak sense, the so-called actuality of being on that other side of the room; *while he is walking his potentiality to be on the other side of the room is actual just as a potentiality*. The actuality of the potentiality to be on the other side of the room, as just that potentiality, is nothing more nor less than the walking across the room.

A similar analysis will apply to any motion whatever. The growth of the puppy is not the actualization of its potentiality to be a dog, but the actuality of that potentiality as a potentiality. The falling of the pencil is the actuality of its potentiality to be on the floor, in actuality as just that: as a *potentiality* to be on the floor. In each case the motion is just the potentiality *qua* actual and the actuality *qua* potential. And the sense we thus give to the word *entelecheia* is not at odds with its other uses: a motion is like an animal in that it remains completely and exactly what it is through time. My walking across the room is no more a motion as the last step is being taken than at any earlier point. Every motion is a complex whole, an enduring unity which organizes distinct parts, such as the various positions through which the falling pencil passes. As parts of the motion of the pencil, these positions, though distinct, function identically in the ordered continuity determined by the potentiality of the pencil to be on the floor. Things have being to the extent that they are or are part of determinate wholes, so that to be means to be something, and change has being because it always is or is part of some determinate potentiality, at work and manifest in the world as change.

ZENO’S PARADOXES AND ARISTOTLE’S DEFINITION OF MOTION

I shall close be considering the application of Aristotle's account of motion to two paradoxes famous in antiquity. Zeno argued in various ways that there is no motion. According to one of his arguments, the arrow in flight is always in some one place, therefore always at rest, and therefore never in motion. We

can deduce from Aristotle's definition that Zeno has made the same error, technically called the fallacy of composition, as one who would argue that no animal is alive since its head, when cut off, is not alive, its blood, when drawn out, is not alive, its bones, when removed are not alive, and so on with each part in turn. The second paradox is one attributed to Heracleitus, and taken as proving that there is nothing but motion, that is, no identity, in the world. The saying goes that one cannot step into the same river twice. If the river flows, how can it continue to be itself? But the flux of the river, like the flight of the arrow, is an actuality of just the kind Aristotle formulates in his definition of motion. The river is always the same, *as a river*, precisely because it is never the same as water. To be a river is to be the always identical actuality of the potentiality of water to be in the sea.

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[Contributor's note: This entry is the text of a talk given in 1975. After it was published, I learned of an article by L. A. Kosman, "Aristotle’s Definition of Motion," published in 1969 in the journal *Phronesis*. Kosman interprets the definition in substantially the same way, utilizing examples of kinds of *entelecheia* given by Aristotle in *On the Soul*, and thus succeeds in bypassing the inadequate translations of the word. In 1995 Rutgers University Press published my translation of Aristotle's *Physics*, in which *entelecheia* is most often translated as being-at-work-staying-itself. -JS]

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Artificial Intelligence

As a theory in the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence (or AI) is the view that human cognitive mental states can be duplicated in computing machinery. Accordingly, an intelligent system is nothing but an information processing system. Discussions of AI commonly draw a distinction between weak and strong AI. Weak AI holds that suitably programmed machines can simulate human cognition. Strong AI, by contrast, maintains that suitably programmed machines are capable of cognitive mental states. The weak claim is unproblematic, since a machine which merely simulates human cognition need not have conscious mental states. It is the strong claim, though, that has generated the most discussion, since this does entail that a computer can have cognitive mental states. In addition to the weak/strong distinction, it is also helpful to distinguish between other related notions. First, cognitive *simulation* is when a device such as a computer simply has the same the same input and output as a human. Second, cognitive *replication* occurs when the same internal causal relations are involved in a computational device as compared with a human brain. Third, cognitive *emulation* occurs when a computational device has the same causal relations *and* is made of the same stuff as a human brain. This condition clearly precludes silicon-based computing machines from emulating human cognition. Proponents of weak AI commit themselves only to the first condition, namely cognitive simulation. Proponents of strong AI, by contrast, commit themselves to the second condition, namely cognitive replication, but not the third condition.

Proponents of strong AI are split between two camps: (a) classical computationalists, and (b) connectionists. According to classical computationalism, computer intelligence involves central processing units operating on symbolic representations. That is, information in the form of symbols is processed serially (one datum after another) through a central processing unit. Daniel Dennett, a key proponent of classical computationalism, holds to a top-down progressive decomposition of mental activity. That is, more complex systems break down into more simple ones, which end in binary on-off switches. There is no homunculi, or tiny person inside a cognitive system which does the thinking. Several criticisms have been launched against the classical computationalist position. First, Dennett's theory, in particular, shows only that digital computers do not have homunculi. It is less clear that human cognition can be broken down into such subsystems. Second, there is no evidence for saying that cognition *is* computational in its structure, rather than saying that it is *like* computation. Since we do not find computational systems in the natural world, it is more safe to presume that human thinking is only *like* computational processes. Third, human cognition seems to involves a global understanding of one's environment, and this is not so of computational processes. Given these problems, critics contend that human thinking seems to be functionally different than digital or serial programming.

The other school of strong AI is connectionism which contends that cognition is distributed across a number of neural nets, or interconnective nodes. On this view, there is no central processing unit, symbols are not as important, and information is diverse and redundant. Perhaps most

importantly, it is consistent with what we know about neurological arrangement. Unlike computational devices, devices made in the neural net fashion can execute commonsense tasks, recognize patterns efficiently, and learn. For example, by presenting a device with a series of male and female pictures, the device picks up on patterns and can correctly identify new pictures as male or female. In spite of these advantages, several criticisms have been launched against connectionism. First, in teaching the device to recognize patterns, it takes too many training sessions, sometimes numbering in the thousands. Human children, by contrast, learn to recognize some patterns after a single exposure. Second, critics point out that neural net devices are not good at rule-based processing higher level reasoning, such as learning language. These tasks are better accomplished by symbolic computation in serial computers. A third criticism is offered by Fodor who maintains that connectionism is presented with a dilemma concerning mental representation;

1. **Mental representation is cognitive**
2. **If it is cognitive, then it is systematic (e.g., picking out one color or shape over another)**
3. **If it is systematic, then it is syntactic, like language, and consequently, it is algorithmic**
4. **However, if it is syntactic, then it is just the same old computationalism**
5. **If it is not syntactic, then it is not true cognition**

But connectionists may defend themselves against Fodor's attack in at least two ways. First, they may object to premise two and claim that cognitive representation is not systematic, but, instead, is pictorial or holistic. Second, connectionists can point out that the same dilemma applies to human cognition. Since, presumably, we would want to deny (4) and (5) as pertains to humans, then we must reject the reasoning that leads to it.

The most well known attack on strong AI, whether classical or connectionist, is John Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment. Searle's target is a computer program which allegedly interprets stories the way humans can by reading between the lines and drawing inferences about events in the story which we draw from our life experience. Proponents of strong AI say that the program in question (1) understands stories, and (2) explains human ability to understand stories (i.e., provides the sufficient conditions for "understanding"). In response, Searle offers the following thought experiment. Suppose that a non-Chinese speaking person is put in a room and given three sets of Chinese characters (a script, a story, and questions about the story). He also receives a set of rules in English which allow him to correlate the three sets of characters with each other (i.e., a program). Although the man does not know the meaning of the Chinese symbols, he gets so good at manipulating symbols that from the outside no one can tell if he is Chinese or not Chinese. For Searle, this goes against both of the above two claims of strong AI. Critics of Searle contend that the Chinese Room thought experiment does not offer a systematic exposition of the problems with strong AI, but instead is more like an expression of a religious conviction which the believer immediately "sees" and the disbeliever does not see.

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Augustine (354-430)

EARLY YEARS. Augustine is the first ecclesiastical author the whole course of whose development can be clearly traced, as well as the first in whose case we are able to determine the exact period covered by his career, to the very day. He informs us himself that he was born at Thagaste (Tagaste; now Suk Arras), in proconsular Numidia, Nov. 13, 354; he died at Hippo Regius (just south of the modern Bona) Aug. 28, 430. [Both Suk Arras and Bona are in the present Algeria, the first 60 m. W. by s. and the second 65 m. w. of Tunis, the ancient Carthage.] His father Patricius, as a member of the council, belonged to the influential classes of the place; he was, however, in straitened circumstances, and seems to have had nothing remarkable either in mental equipment or in character, but to have been a lively, sensual, hot-tempered person, entirely taken up with his worldly concerns, and unfriendly to Christianity until the close of his life; he became a catechumen shortly before Augustine reached his sixteenth year (369-370). To his mother Monnica (so the manuscripts write her name, not Monica; b. 331, d. 387) Augustine later believed that he owed what lie became. But though she was evidently an honorable, loving, self-sacrificing, and able woman, she was not always the ideal of a Christian mother that tradition has made her appear. Her religion in earlier life has traces of formality and worldliness about it; her ambition for her son seems at first to have had little moral earnestness and she regretted his Manicheanism more than she did his early sensuality. It seems to have been through Ambrose and Augustine that she attained the mature personal piety with which she left the world. Of Augustine as a boy his parents were intensely proud. He received his first education at Thagaste, learning, to read and write, as well as the rudiments of Greek and Latin literature, from teachers who followed the old traditional pagan methods. He seems to have had no systematic instruction in the Christian faith at this period, and though enrolled among the catechumens, apparently was near baptism only when an illness and his own boyish desire made it temporarily probable.

His father, delighted with his son's progress in his studies, sent him first to the neighboring Madaura, and then to Carthage, some two days' journey away. A year's enforced idleness, while the means for this more expensive schooling were being accumulated, proved a time of moral deterioration; but we must be on our guard against forming our conception of Augustine's vicious living from the Conlessiones alone. To speak, as Mommsen does, of " frantic dissipation " is to attach too much weight to his own penitent expressions of self-reproach. Looking back as a bishop, he naturally regarded his whole life up to the " conversion " which led to his baptism as a period of wandering from the right way; but not long after this conversion, he judged differently, and found, from one point of view, the turning point of his career in his taking up philosophy -in his nineteenth year. This view of his early life, which may be traced also in the Confessiones, is probably nearer the truth than the popular conception of a youth sunk in all kinds of immorality. When he began the study of rhetoric at Carthage, it is true that (in company with comrades whose ideas of pleasure were probably much more gross than his) he drank of the cup of sensual pleasure. But his ambition prevented him from allowing his dissipations to interfere with his studies. His son

Adeodatus was born in the summer of 372, and it was probably the mother of this child whose charms enthralled him soon after his arrival at Carthage about the end of 370. But he remained faithful to her until about 385, and the grief which he felt at parting from her shows what the relation had been. In the view of the civilization of that period, such a monogamous union was distinguished from a formal marriage only by certain legal restrictions, in addition to the informality of its beginning and the possibility of a voluntary dissolution. Even the Church was slow to condemn such unions absolutely, and Monnica seems to have received the child and his mother publicly at Thagaste. In any case Augustine was known to Carthage not as a roysterer but as a quiet honorable student. He was, however, internally dissatisfied with his life. The Hortensius of Cicero, now lost with the exception of a few fragments, made a deep impression on him. To know the truth was henceforth his deepest wish. About the time when the contrast between his ideals and his actual life became intolerable, he learned to conceive of Christianity as the one religion which could lead him to the attainment of his ideal. But his pride of intellect held him back from embracing it earnestly; the Scriptures could not bear comparison with Cicero; he sought for wisdom, not for]Jumble submission to authority.

MANICHEAN AND NEOPLATONIST PERIOD. In this frame of mind he was ready to be affected by the Manichean propaganda which was then actively carried on in Africa, without apparently being much hindered by the imperial edict against assemblies of the sect. Two things especially attracted him to the Manicheans: they felt at liberty to criticize the Scriptures, particularly the Old Testament, with perfect freedom; and they held chastity and self-denial in honor. The former fitted in with the impression which the Bible had made on Augustine himself; the latter corresponded closely to his mood at the time. The prayer which he tells us he had in his heart then, " Lord, give me chastity and temperance, but not now," may be taken as the formula which represents the attitude of many of the Manichean auditores. Among these Augustine was classed during his nineteenth year; but he went no further, though he held firmly to Manicheanism for nine years, during which he endeavored to convert all his friends, scorned the sacraments of the Church, and held frequent disputations with catholic believers.

Having finished his studies, he returned to Thagaste and began to teach grammar, living in the house of Romanianus, a prominent citizen who had been of much service to him since his father's death, and whom he converted to Manicheanism. Monnica deeply grieved at her son's heresy, forbade him her house, until reassured by a vision that promised his restoration. She comforted herself also by the word of a certain bishop (probably of Thagaste) that "the child of so many tears could not be lost." He seems to have spent little more than a year in Thagaste, when the desire for a wider field, together with the death of a dear friend, moved him to return to Carthage as a teacher of rhetoric.

The next period was a time of diligent study, and produced (about the end of 380) the treatise, long since lost, *De pulchro et apto*. Meanwhile the hold of Manicheanism on him was loosening. Its feeble cosmology and metaphysics had long since failed to satisfy him, and the astrological superstitions springing from the credulity of its disciples offended his reason. The members of the sect, unwilling to lose him, had great hopes from a meeting with their leader Faustus of Mileve; but when he came to Carthage in the autumn of 382, he too proved disappointing, and Augustine ceased to be at heart a Manichean. He was not yet, however, prepared to put anything in the place of the doctrine he had held, and remained in outward communion with his former associates while he pursued his search for truth. Soon after his Manichean convictions had broken down, he left Carthage for Rome, partly, it would seem, to escape the preponderating influence of his mother on a mind which

craved perfect freedom of investigation. Here he was brought more than ever, by obligations of friendship and gratitude, into close association with Manicheans, of whom there were many in Rome, not merely auditores but *perfecti* or fully initiated members. This did not last long, however, for the prefect Symmachus sent him to Milan, certainly before the beginning of 385, in answer to a request for a professor of rhetoric.

The change of residence completed Augustine's separation from Manicheanism. He listened to the preaching of Ambrose and by it was made acquainted with the allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures and the weakness of the Manichean Biblical criticism, but he was not yet ready to accept catholic Christianity. His mind was still under the influence of the skeptical philosophy of the later Academy. This was the least satisfactory stage in his mental development, though his external circumstances were increasingly favorable. He had his mother again with him now, and shared a house and garden with her and his devoted friends Alypius and Nebridius, who had followed him to Milan; his assured social position is shown also by the fact that, in deference to his mother's entreaties, he was formally betrothed to a woman of suitable station. As a catechumen of the Church, he listened regularly to the sermons of Ambrose. The bishop, though as yet he knew nothing of Augustine's internal struggles, had welcomed him in the friendliest manner both for his own and for Monnica's sake. Yet Augustine was attracted only by Ambrose's eloquence, not by his faith; now he agreed, and now he questioned. Morally his life was perhaps at its lowest point. On his betrothal, he had put away the mother of his son; but neither the grief which he felt at this parting nor regard for his future wife, who was as yet too young for marriage, prevented him from taking a new concubine for the two intervening years. Sensuality, however, began to pall upon him, little a s he cared to struggle against it. His idealism was by no means dead; he told Romanian, who came to Milan at this time on business, that he wished lie could live altogether in accordance with the dictates of philosophy; and a plan was even made for the foundation of a community retired from the world, which should live entirely for the pursuit of truth. With this project his intention of marriage and his ambition interfered, and Augustine was further off than ever from peace of mind.

In his thirty-first year he was strongly attracted to Neoplatonism by the logic of his development. The idealistic character of this philosophy awoke unbounded enthusiasm, and he was attracted to it also by its exposition of pure intellectual being and of the origin of evil. These doctrines brought him closer to the Church, though he did not yet grasp the full significance of its central doctrine of the personality of Jesus Christ. In his earlier writings he names this acquaintance with the Neoplatonic teaching and its relation to Christianity as the turning-point of his life, though in the Confessiones it appears only as a statue on the long, road of error. The truth, as it may be established by a careful comparison of his earlier and later writings, is that his idealism had been distinctly strengthened by Neoplatonism, which had at the same time revealed his own, will, and not a *natura altera* in him, as the subject of his baser desires. This made the conflict between ideal and actual in his life more unbearable than ever. Yet his sensual desires were still so strong that it seemed impossible for him to break away from them.

CONVERSION AND ORDINATION. Help came in a curious way. A countryman of his, Pontitianus, visited him and told him things which he had never heard about the monastic life and the wonderful conquests over self which had been won under its inspiration. Augustine's pride was touched; that the unlearned should take the kingdom of heaven by violence, while he with all his learning was still held captive by the flesh, seemed unworthy of him. When Pontitianus had gone, with a few vehement words to Alypius, he went hastily with him into the garden to fight out this

new problem. Then followed the scene so often described. Overcome by his conflicting emotions he left Alypius and threw himself down under a fig-tree in tears. From a neighboring house came a child's voice repeating again and again the simple words Tolle, lege, " Take up and read." It seemed to him a heavenly indication; he picked up the copy of St. Paul's epistles which he had left where he and Alypius had been sitting, and opened at Romans xiii. When he came to the words, " Let us walk honestly as in the day; not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness," it seemed to Mm that a decisive message had been sent to his own soul, and his resolve was taken. Alypius found a word for himself a few lines further, " Him that is weak in the faith receive ye;" and together they went into the house to bring the good news to Monnica. This was at the end of the summer of 386.

Augustine, intent on breaking wholly with his old life, gave up his position, and wrote to Ambrose to ask for baptism. The months which intervened between that summer and the Easter of the following year, at which, according to the early custom, he intended to receive the sacrament, were spent in delightful calm at a country-house, put at his disposal by one of his friends, at Cassisiacum (Casciago, 47 m. n. by w. of Alilan). Here Monnica Alypius, Adeodatus, and some of his pupils kept him company, and he still lectured on Vergil to them and held philosophic discussions. The whole party returned to Milan before Easter (387), and Augustine, with Alypius and Adeodatus, was baptized. Plans were then made for returning to Africa; but these were upset by the death of Monnica, which took place at Ostia as they were preparing to cross the sea, and has been described by her devoted son in one of the most tender and beautiful passages of the Conlessiones. Augustine remained at least another year in Italy, apparently in Rome, living the same quiet life which he had led at Cassisiacum, studying and writing, in company with his countryman Evodius, later bishop of Uzalis. Here, where he had been most closely associated with the Manicheans, his literary warfare with them naturally began; and he was also writing on free will, though this book was only finished at Hippo in 391. In the autumn of 388, passing through Carthage, he returned to Thagaste, a far different man from the Augustine who had left it five years before. Alypius was still with him, and also Adeodatus, who died young, we do not know when or where. Here Augustine and his friends again took up a quiet, though not yet in any sense a monastic, life in common, and pursued their favorite studies. About the beginning of 391, having found a friend in Hippo to help in the foundation of what he calls a monastery, he sold his inheritance, and was ordained presbyter in response to a general demand, though not without misgivings on his own part.

The years which he spent in the presbyterate (391-395) are the last of his formative period. The very earliest works which fall within the time of his episcopate show us the fully developed theologian of whose special teaching we think when we speak of Augustinianism. There is little externally noteworthy in these four years. He took up active work not later than the Easter of 391, when we find him preaching to the candidates for baptism. The plans for a monastic community which had brought him to Hippo were now realized. In a garden given for the purpose by the bishop, Valerius, he founded his monastery, which seems to have been the first in Africa, and is of especial significance because it maintained a clerical school and thus made a connecting link between monasticis and the secular clergy. Other details of this period are that he appealed to Aurelius, bishop of Carthage, to suppress the custom of holding banquets and entertainments in the churches, and by 395 had succeeded, through his courageous eloquence, in abolishing it in Hippo; that in 392 a public disputation took place between him and a Manichean presbyter of Hippo, Fortunatus; that his treatise De fide et symbols was prepared to be read before the council held at Hippo October 8, 393; and that after that he was in Carthage for a while, perhaps in

connection with the synod held there in 394.

LATER YEARS. The intellectual interests of these four years are more easily determined, principally concerned as they are with the Manichean controversy, and producing the treatises *De utilitate credendi* (391), *De duabus animabus contra Manichaos* (first half of 392), and *Contra Adimantum* (394 or 395). His activity against the Donatists also begins in this period, but he is still more occupied with the Manicheans, both from the recollections of his own past and from his increasing knowledge of Scripture, which appears, together with a stronger hold on the Church's teaching, in the works just named, and even more in others of this period, such as his expositions of the Sermon on the Mount and of the Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians. Full as the writings of this epoeli are, however, of Biblical phrases and terms,-grace and the law, predestination, vocation, justification, regeneration-a reader who is thoroughly acquainted with Neoplatonism will detect Augustine's aid love of it in a Christian dress in not a few places. He has entered so far into St. Paul's teaching that humanity as a whole appears to him a *massa peccati* or *peccatorum*, which, if left to itself, that is, without the grace of God, must inevitably perish. However much we are here reminded of the later Augustine, it is clear that he still held the belief that the free will of man could decide his own destiny. He knew some who saw in Romans ix an unconditional predestination which took away the freedom of the will; but he was still convinced that this was not the Church's teaching. His opinion on this point did not change till after he was a bishop.

The more widely known Augustine became, the more Valerius, the bishop of Hippo, was afraid of losing him on the first vacancy of some neighboring see, and desired to fix him permanently in Hippo by making him coadjutor-bishop,-a desire in which the people ardently concurred. Augustine was strongly opposed to the project, though possibly neither he nor Valerius knew that it might be held to be a violation of the eighth canon of Niema, which forbade in its last clause " two bishops in one city "; and the primate of Numidia, Megalius of Calama, seems to have raised difficulties which sprang at least partly from a personal lack of confidence. But Valerius carried his plan through, and not long before Christmas, 395, Augustine was consecrated by Megalius. It is not known when Valerius died; but it makes little difference, since for the rest of his life he left the administration more and more in the hands of his assistant. Space forbids any attempt to trace events of his later life; and in what remains to be said, biographical interest must be largely our guide. We know a considerable number of events in Augustine's episcopal life which can be surely placed-the so-called third and eighth synods of Carthage in 397 and 403, at which, as at those still to be mentioned, he was certainly present; the disputation with the Manichean Felix at Hippo in 404; the eleventh synod of Carthage in 407; the conference with the Donatists in Carthage, 411; the synod of Mileve, 416; the African general council at Carthage, 418; the journey to Caesarea in Mauretania and the disputation with the Donatist bishop there, 418; another general council in Carthage, 419; and finally the consecration of Eraclius as his assistant in 426.

ANTI-MANICHEANISM. AND PELAGIAN WRITINGS. His special and direct opposition to Manicheanism did not last a great while after his consecration. About 397 he wrote a *tractate Contra epistolam [Manichcet] quam vocant fundamenti*; in the *De agone christiano,* written about the same time, and in the *Confessiones,* a little later, numerous anti-Manichean expressions occur. After this, however, he only attacked the Manicheans on some special occasion, as when, about 400, on the request of his "brethren," he wrote a detailed rejoinder to Faustus, a Manichean bishop, or made the treatise *De natura boni* out of his discussions with Felix; a little later, also, the letter of the Manichean Secundinus gave him occasion to write Contra Secundinum, which, in spite of its comparative brevity, he regarded as the best of his writings on this subject. In the succeeding

period, lie was much more occupied with anti-Donatist polemics, which in their turn were forced to take second place by the emergence of the Pelagian controversy.

It has been thought that Augustine's anti-Pelagian teaching grew out of his conception of the Church and its sacraments as a means of salvation; and attention was called to the fact that before the Pelagian controversy this aspect of the Church had, through the struggle with the Donatists, assumed special importance in his mind. But this conception should be denied. It is quite true that in 395 Augustine's views on sin and grace, freedom and predestination, were not what they afterward came to be. But the new trend was given to them before the time of his anti-Donatist activity, and so before he could have heard anything of Pelagius. What we call Augustinianism was not a reaction against Pelagianism; it would be much truer to say that the latter was a reaction against Augustine's views. He himself names the beginning of his episcopate as the turning-point. Accordingly, in the first thing which he wrote after his consecration, the *De diversis gucestionibus ad Simplicianum* (396 or 397), we come already upon the new conception. In no other of his writings do we see as plainly the gradual attainment of conviction on any point; as he himself says in the *Retractationes*, he was laboring for the free choice of the will of man, but the grace of God won the day. So completely was it won, that we might set forth the specifically Augustinian teaching on grace, as against the Pelagians and the Massilians, by a series of quotations taken wholly from this treatise. It is true that much of his later teaching is still undeveloped here; the question of predestination (though the word is used) does not really come up; he is not clear as to the term " election"; and nothing is said of the " gift of perseverance." But what we get on these points later is nothing but the logical consequence of that which is expressed here, and so we have the actual genesis of Augustine's predestinarian teaching under our eyes. It is determined by no reference to the question of infant baptism -- still less by any considerations connected with the conception of the Church. The impulse comes directly from Scripture, with the help, it is true, of those exegetical thoughts which he mentioned earlier as those of others and not his own. To be sure, Paul alone can not explain this doctrine of grace; this is evident from the fact that the very definition of grace is non-Pauline. Grace is for Augustine, both now and later, not the *misericordia peccata* condonans of the Reformers, as justification is not the alteration of the relation to God accomplished by means of the *accipere remissionem*. Grace is rather the misericordia which displays itself in the divine *inspiratio* and justification is *justum* or *pium fieri* as a result of this. We may even say that this grace is an *interne illuminatio* such as a study of Augustine's Neoplatonism enables us easily to understand, which restores the connection with the divine *bonum esse*. He had long been convinced that " not only the greatest but also the smallest good things can not be, except from him from whom are all good things, that is, from God;" and it might well seem to him to follow from this that faith, which is certainly a good thing, could proceed from the operation of God alone. This explains the idea that grace works like a law of nature, drawing the human will to God with a divine omnipotence. Of course this Neoplatonic coloring must not be exaggerated; it is more consistent with itself in his earlier writings than in the later, and he would never have arrived at his predestinarian teaching without the New Testament. With this knowledge, we are in a position to estimate the force of a difficulty which now confronted Augustine for the first time, but never afterward left him, and which has been present in the Roman Catholic teaching even down to the Councils of Trent and the Vitican. If faith depends upon an action of our own, solicited but not caused by vocation, it can only save a man when, *per fidem gratiam accipiens*, he becomes one who not merely believes in God but loves him also. But if faith has been already inspired by grace, and if, while the Scripture speaks of justification by faith, it is held (in accordance with the

definition of grace) that justification follows upon the *infitsio caritatis,* -then either the conception of the faith which is God-inspired must pass its fluctuating boundaries and, approach nearer to that of caritas, or the conception of faith which is unconnected with caritas will render the fact of its inspiration unintelligible and justification by faith impossible. Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings set forth this doctrine of grace more clearly in some points, such as the terms " election," " predestination," " the gift of perseverance," and also more logically; but space forbids us to show this here, as the part taken in this controversy by Augustine is so fully detailed elsewhere.

ACTIVITY AGAINST DONATISM. In order to arrive at a decision as to what influence the Donatist controversy had upon Augustine's intellectual development, it is necessary to see how long and how intensely he was concerned with it. We have seen that even before he was a bishop he was defending the catholic Church against the Donatists; and after his consecration he took part directly or indirectly in all the important discussions of the matter, some of which have been already mentioned, and defended the cause of the Church in letters and sermons as well as in his more formal polemical writings. The first of these which belongs to the period of his episcopate, *Contra partem Donati,* has been lost; about 400 he wrote the two cognate treatises *Contra epistulam Parmeniani* (the Donatist bishop of Carthage) and *De baptismo contra Donatistas*. He was considered by the schismatics as their chief antagonist, and was obliged to defend himself against a libelous attack on their part in a rejoinder now lost. From the years 401 and 402 we have the reply to the Donatist bishop of Cirta, *Contra epistulam Petiliani*, and also the *Epistula ad catholicos de unitate ecclesioe*. The conflict was now reaching its most acute stage. After the Carthaginian synod of 403 had made preparations for a decisive debate with the Donatists, and the latter had declined to fall in with the plan, the bitterness on both sides increased. Another synod at Carthage the following year decided that the emperor should be asked for penal laws against the Donatists. Honorius granted the request; but the employment of force in matters of belief brought up a new point of discord between the two sides. When these laws were abrogated (409), the plan of a joint conference was tried once more in June, 411, under imperial authority, nearly 300 bishops being present from each side, with Augustine and Aurelius of Carthage as the chief representatives of the Catholic cause. In the following year, the Donatists proving insubordinate, Honorius issued a new and severer edict against them, which proved the beginning of the end for the schism. For these years from 405 to 412 we have twenty-one extant letters of Augustine's bearing on the controversy, and there were eight formal treatises, but four of these are lost. Those which we still have are: *Contra Cresconium grammaticum* (about 406*); De unico baptismio* (about 410 or 411), in answer to a work of the same name by Petilian; the brief report of the conference (end of 411); and the *Liber contra Donatistas post collationem* (probably 412).

DEVELOPMENT OF HIS VIEWS. The earliest of the extant works against the Donatists present the same views of the Church and its sacraments which Augustine developed later. The principles which he represented in this conflict are merely those which, in a simpler form, had either appeared in the anti-Donatist polemics before his time or had been part of his own earlier belief. What he did was to formulate them with more dogmatic precision,. and to permeate the ordinary controversial theses with his own deep thoughts on *unitas, caritas,* and *inspiratio gratice* in the Church, thoughts which again trace their origin back to his Neoplatonic foundations. In the course of the conflict he changed his, opinion about the methods to be employed; he had at first been opposed to the employment of force, but later came to the " Compel them to come in " point of view. It may well be doubted, however, if the practical struggle with the schismatics had as much to do with Augustine's development as has been supposed. Far more weight must be attached to the

fact that Augustine had become a presbyter and a bishop of the catholic Church, and as such worked continually deeper into the ecclesiastical habit of thought. This was not hard for the son of Monnica and the reverent admirer of Ambrose. His position as a bishop may fairly be said to be the only determining factor in his later views besides his Neoplatonist foundation, his earnest study of the Scripture, and the predestinarian conception of grace which he got from this. Everything else is merely secondary. Thus we find Augustine practically complete by the beginning of his episcopate-about the time when he wrote the Confessiones. It would be too much to say that his development stood still after that; the Biblical and ecclesiastical coloring of his thoughts becomes more and more visible and even vivid; but such development as this is no more significant than the effect of the years seen upon a strong face; in fact, it is even less observable here-for while the characteristic features of his spiritual mind stand out more sharply as time goes on with Augustine, his mental force shows scarcely a sign of age at seventy. His health was uncertain after 386, and his body aged before the time; on Sept. 26, 426, he solemnly designated Eraclius (or Heraclius) as his successor, though without consecrating him bishop, and transferred to him such a portion of his duties as was possible. But his intellectual vigor remained unabated to the end. We see him, as Prosper depicts him in his chronicle, " answering the books of Julian in the very end of his days, while the on-rushing Vandals were at the gates, and gloriously persevering in the defense of Christian grace." In the third month of the siege of Hippo by the barbarian invaders, lie fell ill of a fever and, after lingering more than ten days, died Aug. 28, 430. He was able to read on his sick-bed; he had the Penitential Psalms placed upon the wall of his room where he could see them. Meditating upon them, he fulfilled what he had often said before, that even Christians revered for the sanctity of their lives, even presbyters, ought not to leave the world without fitting thoughts of penitence.

MISCELLANEOUS WORKS. Of works not yet mentioned, those written after 395 and named in the Retractationes, may be classified under three heads-exegetical works; minor dogmatic, polemical, and practical treatises; and a separate class containing four more extensive works of special importance. The earliest of the minor treatises *is De catechizandis rudibus* (about 400), interesting for its connection with the history of catechetical instruction and for many other reasons. A brief enumeration of the others will suffice; they are: *De opera monachorum* (about 400); *De bono conjugali and De sancta virginitate* (about 401), both directed against Jovinian's depreciation of virginity; *De deviation damonum* (between 406 and 411); *De fide et operibus* (413), a completion of the argument in the *De spiritu et litera*, useful for a study of the difference between the Augustinian and the Lutheran doctrines of grace; *De cura pro mortuis*, interesting as showing his attitude toward superstition within the Church; and a few others of less interest. We come now to the four works which have deserved placing in a special category. One is the *De doctrina christiana* (begun about 397, finished 426), important as giving his theory of scriptural interpretation and homiletics; another is *the Enchiridion de fide, spe, et caritate* (about 421), noteworthy as an attempt at a systematic collocation of his thoughts. There remain the two doctrinal masterpieces, the *De trinitate* (probably begun about 400 and finished about 416) and the *De civitate Dei* (begun about 413, finished about 426). The last-named, beginning with an apologetic purpose, takes on later the form of a history of the City of God from its beginnings,

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Francis Bacon (1516-1626)

LIFE. Francis Bacon was born in London on January 22, 1561, at York House off the Strand. He was the younger of two sons of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal under Queen Elizabeth I. Bacon had a virtual dualistic upbringing. His mother was a zealous Puritan. Bacon's father hoped Francis would become a diplomat and taught him the ways of a courtier.

In 1573, Bacon entered Trinity College, Cambridge and studied there until 1575. His father died when Bacon was eighteen and, because Bacon was the youngest, he remained virtually penniless. The only way he saw for a poor man to get out and establish himself, both financially and socially, was to study law. In 1576, Bacon was admitted as a senior governor of Gray's Inn, an institution for legal education. He became one of the leading lawyers in England, thus earning the queen's notice. In 1584, at the age of twenty-three, he established a seat for himself in the House of Commons. While in position to obtain the office of attorney general to Queen Elizabeth, he criticized a taxation policy in Parliament. This event destroyed any chance he might have had for the position under Elizabeth. Bacon's closest friend was the Earl of Essex, who, unlike Bacon, was looked upon with favor by the queen. Bacon used the Earl to help regain the status necessary to gain the position of attorney general. However, this plan did not work, and Essex also fell out of her favor. The Earl was accused of going against the queen's orders, brought to trial and eventually to the scaffold, with Bacon as prosecutor. Bacon later defended his own actions in "An Apology in Certain Imputation Concerning the late Earl of Essex."

With the death of Elizabeth and the succession of James I, Bacon was established as solicitor general. He later achieved attorney general, and eventually took over his father's old position of the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal. Bacon rose in rank again when a long time rival, Sir Edward Coke, was removed from his position after refusing to force a confession out of a prisoner and pronounce him guilty. In 1602, Bacon was knighted, and in 1605 he married Alice Barnham, the daughter of a London alderman. He rose through various posts in the public service until he reached the Lord Chancellorship in 1618. Later that year, at the age of fifty-seven, he was established as Baron Verulam. In 1621, he was made Viscount St. Albans. That same year, he was charged with accepting bribes, tried and found guilty. His offices were taken from him and he was sentenced to: a fine of ,40,000, imprisonment during the king's pleasure, expatriation from parliament and coming within twelve miles of the court. Feeling utter disgrace, he went into retirement and devoted the remainder of his life to study and literary work. The parliamentary sentence, however, was not imposed, and King James I practically remitted his fine. In 1622, Bacon was allowed to come to London and, eventually, to kiss the king's hand.

In March 1626, Bacon bought a chicken in order to see how long its flesh could be preserved by stuffing it with snow. He caught cold and went to stay at the Earl of Arundel's house nearby. Bacon preferred the nobleman's best room, where there was a damp bed, to a more modest room in which there was a dry bed. On April 9, 1626, due to complications arising from bronchitis, Francis

Bacon died at Highgate, in the Earl of Arundel's house.

NOVUM ORGANUM. During his years of political service, Francis Bacon published a collection of essays and several works on reorganizing the natural sciences. The most important of the latter was the *Novum Organum,* written in 1620. The title is taken from Aristotle's *Organum,* meaning "logical works", and accordingly signals a radical departure from the traditional method of scientific inquiry. This work, along with the rest of his published and unpublished philosophical writings, can be seen as part of his grandiose plan to reorganize the sciences. This reorganization involved a projected, and largely unfinished, six-part work entitled *Instauratio*. The plan involved:

1. **A new division of the sciences,**
2. **A new method of scientific inquiry,**
3. **A collection of scientific observations and facts,**
4. **Examples of the new method,**
5. **Philosophical precursors to the new philosophy, and**
6. **The new philosophy itself resulting from the application of the new method.**

The *Novum Organum,* a work which may be viewed as a preliminary of division two of the *Instauratio*, is divided into two parts. The first part, Book I, deals with the need for an inductive system, and the second, Book II, deals with the applications of such a method.

In Book I, Bacon grounds the human understanding in observation and experience which leads to a harsh rejection of the popular Aristotelian a priori, deductive method. The alternative he proposes is an *a posteriori,* inductive approach.

Bacon's idea of such an approach is made metaphorically in one of his aphorisms (XCV). Commonly used symbols for understanding nature are those of the ant and spider. The ant experiments by collecting and using. This method symbolizes the human tendency to use facts without clearly understanding them. The spider, on the other hand, does not experiment but produces webs from its own substance, symbolizing the tendency to formulate ideas and facts by thought alone. The method for understanding nature Bacon holds to be the most significant is that of the bee which gathers the pollen of the flower, changes it through its own efforts, and then uses it. According to Bacon, we must observe and collect experiences, analyze exactly what we know, then act on the most reliable facts.

Bacon also distinguishes between the *Anticipation of Nature* and the *Interpretation of Nature*. Few reasons exist for believing in the *Anticipations*. They are generalizations which are easily believed. The *Interpretations* are based on various data which enables one to master things. The *Interpretations* are not easily accepted, but are clearly the most stable method of analyzing nature.

One of the most important of Bacon's beliefs, and the one for which he was most widely known, is his idea of the *Four Idols*. These Idols are what he believes to be the primary hindrance to our efforts in studying nature. The first are the *Idols of the Tribe*. These have their foundation in human nature. Humans falsely assume their perceptions are based on universals when in fact their perceptions are based purely on individual views. The second are *The Idols of the Cave*. These are distinguished from the *Idols of the Tribe* and deal with the individual, for every person perceives things by means of his own individual nature. One's personality and experiences make them see things in ways which they may not be. The third are *The Idols of the Marketplace*. These Idols deal with the language of people. Because of the errancy in choosing which words to use in order to convey a certain meaning, one may express the wrong idea to another. The fourth are *The Idols of*

***the Theatre*. These Idols deal with the dogmas of all philosophies. What is already established and believed to be true may not be. One cannot be biased toward any popular belief system.**

In Book II, Bacon describes the part of his method involved with gathering facts. Aristotle contended that science involves the discovery of a phenomenon's causes. For example, to understand the nature of heat, we must discover the causes of heat. For Aristotle, this process involves uncovering all four of its causes: formal, material, efficient, and final. In spite of Bacon's harsh rejection of Aristotle's deductive syllogism, Bacon follows Aristotle by seeing science as the discovery of causes, and, specifically, formal causes. According to Bacon, the formal causes of a thing (that is to say, its "forms") are its physical properties. For example, the form of heat is the violent, irregular motion of particles. Thus, by discovering this form of heat, we reveal the scientific nature of heat itself. For Bacon a good set of rules of scientific method will reveal the forms of a thing. He notes four things that we should expect from a good set of such rules. First, it will not deceive him; second, it will not tie him down to any particular mode of operation; third, it leads to action; and fourth it will lead to the discovery of the necessary and sufficient conditions of a given nature (such as heat). The forms, then, are just those necessary and sufficient conditions (such as violent, irregular motion of particles).

Having maintained the job of science is to uncover a thing's forms, Bacon finally explains the inductive method by which this uncovering is performed. Bacon's specific inductive methodology is presented in what he describes as the three "Tables of Comparative Instances" which involve presence, absence, and degrees. The "Table of Presence" (agreement) involves examining instances in which the same phenomena are present, and noting what other circumstances are in common. For example, to understand the forms involved with heat, we examine all hot things and see what circumstance is in common, such as irregular motion of particles. The second table, the "Table of Absence," involves examining instances in which a phenomenon is absent, and noting what circumstances are in common. Thus, to understand heat, for example, we must also examine a list of cold things and discern what features are irrelevant to the production of heat, such as density. Finally, the "Table of Degrees" involves examining instances in which a phenomenon is present in varying degrees, noting what circumstances also vary. For example, to understand heat we must observe things at different temperatures and note what circumstances are present in varying degrees, such as varying speeds in the irregular motion of particles. By constructing the three "Tables of Comparable Instances" we eliminate irrelevant properties, such as density, and pinpoint the essential properties, such as the irregular motion of particles. This, according to Bacon, is true induction. Bacon recognized that we cannot examine an endless number of instances for the three tables. At some point we must stop and survey the instances so far. This review he calls the "first vintage."

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The Bakhtin Circle

The Bakhtin Circle was a contemporary school of Russian thought which centered on the work of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895-1975). The circle addressed the social and cultural issues posed by the Russian Revolution and its degeneration into the Stalin dictatorship in philosophical terms. Their work focused on the centrality of questions of signification in social life in general and artistic creation in particular, examining the way in which language registered the conflicts between social groups. The key views of the circle are that linguistic production is essentially *dialogic*, formed in the process of social interaction and that this leads to the iteraction of different social values being registered in terms of reaccentuation of the speech of others. While the ruling stratum tries to posit a single discourse as exemplary, the subaltern classes are inclined to subvert this *monologic* closure. In the sphere of literature, poetry and the epic represent the centripetal forces within the cultural arena while the novel is the structurally elaborated expression of popular *ideologiekritik*. Members of the circle included Matvei Isaevich Kagan (1889-1937); Pavel Nikolaevich Medvedev (1891-1938); Lev Vasilievich Pumpianskii (1891-1940); Ivan Ivanovich Sollertinskii (1902-1944); Valentin Nikolaevich Voloshinov (1895-1936) and others.

M.M. Bakhtin and his circle began meeting in the Belorussian towns of Nevel and Vitebsk in 1918 before moving to Leningrad in 1924. Their group meetings were terminated due to the arrest of many of the group in 1929. From this time until his death in 1975, Bakhtin continued to work on the topics which had occupied his group, living in internal exile first in Kustanai (Kazakhstan, 1930-36), Savelovo (about 100 km from Moscow, 1937-45), Saransk (Mordovia, 1936-7, 1945-69) and finally moving in 1969 to Moscow, where he died at the age of eighty. In Saransk Bakhtin worked at the Mordov Pedagogical Institute (now University) until retirement in 1961.

The Bakhtin circle is reputed to have been initiated by Kagan on his return from Germany, where he had studied philosophy in Leipzig, Berlin and Marburg. He had been a pupil of the founder of Marburg Neo-Kantianism Herman Cohen and had attended lectures by Ernst Cassirer. Kagan established a 'Kantian Seminar' at which various philosophical, religious and cultural issues were discussed. Kagan was a Jewish intellectual who had been a member of the Social Democratic Party (the precursor of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) and he may have been attracted to Cohen's philosophy for its supposed affinity with Marxism (Cohen regarded his ethical philosophy as completely compatible with that of Marx), while rejecting the atheism of Russian Communism. Whatever the truth of the matter, the members of the circle did not restrict themselves to academic philosophy but became closely involved in the radical cultural activities of the time, activities which became more intense with the movement of the group to Vitebsk, where many important avant-garde artists such as Malevich and Chagall had settled to avoid the privations of the Civil War. One of the group, Pavel Medvedev, a graduate in law from Petrograd University, became rector of the Vitebsk Proletarian University, editing the town's cultural journal *Iskusstvo* (Art) to which he and Voloshinov contributed articles, while Bakhtin and Pumpianskii both gave public lectures on a variety of philosophical and cultural topics, student notes from which have been

published recently. Pumpianskii, it is known, never finished his studies at Petrograd university, while it is doubtful whether Bakhtin had any formal higher education at all despite his claims, now disproven, to have graduated from the same University in 1918. It seems that Bakhtin attempted to gain acceptance in academic circles by adopting aspects of his older brother's biography. Nikolai Bakhtin had a solid classical education from his German governess and graduated from Petrograd University, where he had been a pupil of the renowned classicist F.F. Zelinskii. Bakhtin had therefore been exposed to philosophical ideas since his youth. After Nikolai's departure for the Crimea, and Mikhail's move to Nevel, it seems that Kagan took the place of his brother as unofficial mentor, having an important influence on Bakhtin's philosophy in a new and exciting cultural environment, although the two friends went their separate ways in 1921, the year Bakhtin married.

Kagan, however, moved to take up a teaching position at the newly established provincial university in Orel in 1921. While there he published the only sustained piece of philosophy to be published by a member of the group before the late 1920s entitled '*Kak vozmozhna istoria*'(How Is History Possible) in 1922. The same year he produced an obituary of Hermann Cohen in which he stressed the historical and sociological aspects of Cohen's philosophy and wrote other unpublished works. 1922 also saw the publication of Pumpianskii's paper '*Dostoevskii i antichnost´*' (Dostoevskii and Antiquity), a theme that was to recur in Bakhtin's work for many years. While Bakhtin himself did not publish any substantial work until 1929, he was clearly working on matters related to Neo-Kantian philosophy and the problem of authorship at this time. Bakhtin's earliest published work is the two page '*Iskusstvo i otvetstvennost´*' (Art and Answerability) from 1919 and fragments of a larger project on moral philosophy written between 1920 and 1924, now usually referred to as *K filosofii postupka* (Towards a Philosophy of the Act).

Most of the group's significant work was produced after their move to Leningrad in 1924. It seems that there the group became acutely aware of the challenge posed by Saussurean linguistics and its development in the work of the Formalists. Thus there emerges a new awareness of the importance of the philosophy of language in philosophy and poetics. The most significant work on the philosophy of language was published in the period 1926-1930 by Voloshinov: a series of articles and a book entitled *Marksizm i filosofia iazyka* (Marxism and the Philosophy of Language) (1929). Medvedev, who had been put in charge of the archive of the symbolist poet Aleksandr Blok, participated in the vigorous discussions between Marxist and formalist literary theorists with a series of articles and a book, *Formal´lnyi metod v literaturovedenii* (The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship) (1928) and the first book-length study of Blok's work. Voloshinov also published an article and a book (1925, 1926) on the debate which raged around Freudianism at the time. In 1929 Bakhtin produced the first edition of his famous monograph *Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo* (Problems of Dostoevskii's Work), but many other works dating from 1924-9 remained unpublished and usually unfinished. Among these was a critical essay on formalism called '*Problema soderzheniia i formy v slovesnom khudozhestvennom tvorchestve*' (The Problem of Content, Material and Form in Verbal Artistic Creation) (1924) and a book length study called 'Avtor i geroi v esteticheskoi deiatel´nosti' (Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity) (1924-7).

Since the 1970s the works published under the names of Voloshinov and Medvedev have often been ascribed to Bakhtin, who neither consented nor objected. A voluminous, ideologically motivated, often bad-tempered and largely futile body of literature has grown up to contest the issue one way or another, but since there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the published authors were not responsible for the texts which bear their names, there seems no real case to answer. It seems much

more likely that the materials were written as a result of lively group discussions around these issues, which group members wrote up according to their own perspectives afterwards. There are clearly many philosophical, ideological and stylistic discrepancies which, despite the presence of certain parallels and points of agreement, suggest these very different works were largely the work of different authors. In accordance with Bakhtin's own philosophy, it seems logical to treat them as rejoinders in ongoing dialogues between group members on the one hand and between the group and other contemporary thinkers on the other.

The sharp deterioration in the situation of unorthodox intellectuals in the Soviet Union at the end of 1928 effectively broke the Bakhtin circle up. Bakhtin, whose health had already begun to deteriorate, was arrested, presumably because of his connection with the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical society, and was sentenced to ten years on the Solovetskii Islands. After vigorous intercession by Bakhtin's friends, a favourable review of his Dostoevskii book by Commissar of Enlightenment Lunacharskii and a personal appeal by Maksim Gor´kii, this was commuted to six years exile in Kazakhstan. With the tightening of censorship at the time, very little was published by Voloshinov, while Medvedev published a book on theories of authorship *V laboratorii pisatelia* (In the Laboratory of the Writer) in 1933 and a new version of the Formalism study, revised to fit in more closely with the ideological requirements of the time, in 1934. Medvedev was appointed full professor at the Leningrad Historico-Philological Institute but was arrested and disappeared during the terror of 1938. Voloshinov worked at the Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad until 1934 when he contracted tuberculosis. He died in a sanitorium two year later leaving unfinished a translation of the first volume of Ernst Cassirer's *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,* a book which is of considerable importance in the work of the circle. Kagan died of angina in 1937 after working as editor of an encyclopedic atlas of energy resources in the Soviet Union for many years. Pumpianskii pursued a successful career as Professor of Literature at Leningrad University, but published only short articles and introductions to works of Russian authors, most notably Turgenev. Sollertinskii joined the Leningrad Philharmonic in 1927 as a lecturer, but soon established himself as one of the leading Soviet musicologists, producing over two hundred articles, books and reviews. He died of a heart attack, probably resulting from the privations of the Leningrad blockade, in 1944.

While in Kazakhstan Bakhtin began work on his now famous theory of the novel which resulted in the now famous articles *Slovo v romane* (Discourse in the Novel) (1934-5)*, Iz predystorii romannogo slovo* (From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse) (1940), *Epos i roman* (Epic and Novel) (1941), *Formy vremeni i khronotopa v romane* (Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel) (1937-8). Between 1936 and 1938 he completed a book on the *Bildungsroman* and its significance in the history of realism which was lost when the publishing house at which the manuscript was lying awaiting publication was destroyed in the early days of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Voluminous, most still unpublished, preparatory material still exists, although part is lost, allegedly because Bakhtin used it for cigarette papers during the wartime paper shortage. Bakhtin's exceptional productiveness at this time is further accentuated when one considers that one of his legs was amputated in February 1938. He had suffered from inflammation of the bone marrow, osteomyelitis, for many years, which gave him a lot of pain, high temperatures, and often confined him to bed for weeks on end. This had been a factor in the appeals of his friends and acquaintances for clemency when he was internally exiled, a factor that may well have saved his life. This did not, however, prevent him from presenting a now famous doctoral thesis on Rabelais to the Gor´kii Institute of World Literature in 1940. The work proved extremely controversial in

the hostile ideological climate of the time and it was not until 1951 that Bakhtin was eventually granted the qualification of *kandidat*. It was not published in book form until 1965.

The period between the completion of the Rabelais study and the second edition of the Dostoevskii study in 1963 is perhaps the least well known of Bakhtin's life in terms of work produced. This has been recently (1996) rectified with the publication of archival materials from this period, when Bakhtin was working as a lecturer at the Mordov Pedagogical Institute. The most substantial work dating from this period is *Problema rechevykh zhanrov* (The Problem of Speech Genres) which was most likely produced in response to the reorganisation of Soviet linguistics in the wake of Stalin's article *Marksizm i voprosy iazykoznaniia* (Marxism and Questions of Linguistics) of 1953. Many other fragments exist from this time, including notes for a planned article about Maiakovskii and more methodological comments on the study of the novel.

In the more liberal atmosphere of the so-called 'thaw' following Khruschev's accession, Bakhtin's work on Dostoevskii came to the attention of a group of younger scholars led by Vadim Kozhinov who, upon finding out that he was still alive, contacted Bakhtin and tried to convince him to republish the 1929 Dostoevskii book. After some initial hesitation, Bakhtin responded by significantly expanding and fundamentally altering the overall project. It was accepted for publication in September 1963 and received a generally favourable reception. Publication of the Rabelais study, newly edited for purposes of acceptability (mainly the toning down of scatology and an analysis of a speech by Lenin) followed soon after. As Bakhtin's health continued to decline, he was taken to hospital in Moscow in 1969 and in May 1970 he and his wife, who died a year later, were moved into an old people's home just outside Moscow. Bakhtin continued to work until just before his death in 1975, producing work of a mainly methodological character.

Since Bakhtin's death, several collections of his work have appeared in Russian and many translations have followed. English language translations have been appearing since 1968, although the quality of translation and systematicity of publication has been uneven. Up to ten different translators have published work by a writer whose terminology is very specific, often rendering key concepts in a variety of different ways. This has exacerbated problems of interpretation and questions of theoretical heritage, especially since there is a quite sharp distinction between works written before and after the 1929 Dostoevskii study. Another problem has been the questions of authorship of the Bakhtin circle and the extent to which a Marxist vocabulary in the works of Voloshinov and Medvedev should be taken at face value. Those, for example, who argue Bakhtin was the author of these works also tend to argue that the vocabulary is mere 'window dressing' to facilitate publication, while those who support the authenticity of the original publications also tend to take the Marxist arguments seriously. As a result writers about Bakhtin have tended to choose one period of Bakhtin's career and treat it as definitive, a practice which has produced a variety of divergent versions of 'Bakhtinian' thought. The recent appearance of the first volume of a collected works in Russian might help to overcome the problems which have dogged Bakhtin studies.

THE EARLY WORKS 1919-1927. The work of the Bakhtin Circle should be regarded as a philosophy of culture. Questions which seem to be of very specific relevance such as the modality of author-hero relations actually involve questions of a much more general nature encompassing the value-laden relations between subject and object, subjects and other subjects. The phenomenological arguments presented by the young Bakhtin are directed against the abstractions of rationalist philosophy and contemporary positivism. He draws much of his conceptual structure from the work of the Marburg School (most notably Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), Paul Natorp

(1854-1924) and Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950)) and German phenomenologists such as Max Scheler (1874-1928) and Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936). However, it is particularly difficult to trace the precise influence of these writers because Bakhtin was notoriously inconsistent in crediting his sources and was not averse to copying whole passages which he had translated from German into Russian in his works without reference to the original. This has led many commentators either to guess at influences on the young Bakhtin or to credit him with the invention of a philosophical vocabulary almost from nothing. However, recent archival work by Brian Poole has uncovered notebooks in which Bakhtin made copious notes from various German idealist philosophers which give us a better idea both of the sources of his ideas and the originality of the philosophical work which resulted from his fusion of disparate ideas.

The ideas of the Marburg School were undoubtedly filtered to Bakhtin through the works of Matvei Kagan on his return from Germany at the end of the First World War. In his obituary of Cohen Kagan stressed the religious, messianic aspects of the former's philosophy, which emerges in his later work. For the late Cohen, 'the unity of objective being, as an unending large process of the unity of being and concept demands the unending small unity of the singular individuum.... The whole problem of religion is contained in the problem of the individuum as in the question of God'. The continual relationship between the individuum and God is the absolute element of subjectivity and is the unity of monotheism. The individual does not combine with God but continually relates to God. This has social significance, for religion grows out of ethics: 'the religion of the unity of humanity is monotheism.... Religion is everywhere, in all regions of culture.... Religion itself is philosophy'. Problems of intersubjectivity must be related to questions of historical development: 'in our opinion, the problem of individual relationships, the problem of subjective consciousness, ontological subjectivity can be based on the pathos of the individual condition of the struggle of the historical life of culture, the person and humanity'. Kagan stresses the parallels between Cohen's ethics and the traditions of Russian populism, a factor which recurs later in Bakhtin's career when the novel becomes linked with a populist political process. (M. Kagan, *German Kogen*, 1922) The unity of the individual is dependent on the unity of the people and this is in turn dependent on the unity of God.

Whatever the difficulties of tracing his more immediate precursors there is no doubt that Bakhtin's philosophical project maintained a fundamental connection with the traditions of Enlightenment aesthetics and with Kantianism in particular. As for Kant, the aesthetic is distinguished by its 'disinterestedness', the uncoupling of purposiveness from representation of the end. Where Kant concentrated on aesthetic judgement, however, Bakhtin was interested in aesthetic *activity* which can help to establish a mode of reciprocal intersubjective relationships necessary to produce an intimate unity of individuals whose specificity is in no way endangered. This project, which remains constant throughout his work, adopts various forms. The aesthetic is the realm where now detached from the 'open event of being' and 'finalised' by virtue of the author's 'exteriority' (*vnenakhodimost´*), the value-laden essence of the hero's deed is manifested. If the hero's activity were not objectified by the author then he or she would remain in some perpetual stream of consciousness, completely oblivious to the wider significance of those deeds. However, in order to visualise the meaningful nature of those deeds, the author must also have an insight into the subjective world of the hero, his or her horizon, sphere of views and interests (*krugozor*). Only the appropriate mode of empathy and objectification can produce the sort of productive whole Bakhtin envisages.

Several problems arise from this model. The first is that Bakhtin seems to want to use the

author-hero model as a reciprocal principle within society and as a model of relations in literary composition. In the first model authors and heroes change their roles constantly, the unique perspective of each subject allows the objectification of others except oneself, who is objectified by others. Although the concept hardly appears in the early works, from 1928 onwards *dialogue* becomes the model of such interactions: one gains an awareness of one's own place within the whole through dialogue, which helps to bestow an awareness on others at the same time. A very pleasant model as long as relationships remain equal. Yet the author-hero model also assumes a fundamental inequality in that the hero of a work can never have a reciprocal vantage point from which to objectify the author and thus the creator. There is a crucial difference between a person-to-person and a person-to-God relationship which Bakhtin's model seems to obscure.

Furthermore, Bakhtin's model of the unique perspective of each author/hero, which is drawn from the Kantian model of an individual consciousness bearing a-priori categories encountering and giving form to the manifold of sense impressions, is seriously compromised when one admits a socio-linguistic dimension into the equation. This happens in Voloshinov's 1926 article on discourse in life and poetry. The alternative adopted by Voloshinov foregrounds the *intonational* dimension of language which manifests the unique evaluative connections between subject and object. Language enmeshed within everyday practical activity is extracted, or liberated, from its connection with the 'open event of being' by the author who then reflects upon it, from his or her own unique vantage point, manifesting its total intonational meaning. The hero's language is *alien* to the author and therefore ripe for objectification; the crucial category is the latter's exteriority. Stress on this intonational dimension allows the encounter of the two consciousnesses to be spoken about in phenomenological rather than linguistic terms and therefore allows Bakhtin to counter what he calls 'theoreticism', the tendency to consider the inner meaning of an action and its historical specificity in isolation from each other. This might include Hegel's tendency to view the particular incident as meaningful only as an instance of the unfolding of reason, Husserl's sublation of inter-subjective relations in transcendental subjectivity or the positivistic assumption that categorisation of a phenomenon is sufficient to explain that phenomenon.

The distinctively Bakhtinian approach to language only really begins to emerge in Voloshinov's 1926 essay *Slovo v zhizni i slovo v poezii: k voprosam sotsiologicheskoi poetiki* (Discourse in Life and Discourse in Poetry: Questions of Sociological Poetics), written during his postgraduate studies at the Institute of Material, Artistic and Verbal Culture in Leningrad where L.P. Iakubinskii, the pioneer of the study of dialogic speech, was among his advisers. This work, which has been seen as the earliest example of pragmatics by more than one commentator, is the first work of the circle to be presented as an explicitly Marxist text. The author attempts to define the aesthetic as a specific form of social interaction characterised by its 'completion by the creation of the artistic work and by its continual recreations in cocreative perception and it does not require any other objectifications'. In the artistic work unspoken social evaluations are 'condensed' and determine artistic form. The deeper structural features of a particular social interaction are made manifest in a successful artistic work; as Voloshinov puts it, 'form should be a convincing evaluation of the content' (*Bakhtin School Papers* ed. Shukman, Colchester 1983 p.9, 19, 20). The early Bakhtinian phenomenology is now recast in terms of discursive interaction, with a specifically sociological frame of reference.

Another of Voloshinov's projects was a critical response to incipient psychoanalysis and contemporary attempts to attempt a fusion of Marxism and Freudianism. In 1927 he published his first book called *Freidizm: Kriticheskii ocherk* (Freudianism a Critical Sketch), which continued the

theme of an earlier article from 1925 *Po tu storonu sotsial´nogo* (Just Beyond the Social) in which Freud was accused of a biological reductionism and subjectivism quite alien to the spirit of Marxism. Leaning upon a sociological analysis of language and culture, Voloshinov stresses that intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity as such and that all meaning production and thus repression of meanings are socio-ideological rather than individual and biological as Freud supposed. It must be noted, however, that Voloshinov does not pay any attention to Freud's later work on cultural phenomena and thus presents a rather one-sided view of contemporary psychology. Furthermore, Freudianism is treated as a manifestation of 'bourgeois decay' very much in the spirit of the later Lukács. This indicates a turning towards a more Hegelian approach to questions of cultural and philosophical development, while the recasting of the Freudian *superego* in terms of the repression of unofficial ideologies by an official ideology anticipates one of the central themes that would occupy Bakhtin in the 1930s and 1940s.

THE CONCLUDING WORKS OF THE BAKHTIN CIRCLE 1928-1929. In the late 1920s the sociological and linguistic turn signalled by Voloshinov's article on discourse had begun to form into a distinct school of thought in which language was the index of social relations and embodiment of ideological worldview. While Voloshinov's linguistic studies were undoubtedly crucial to this reorientation, one of the central influences on the group at the time was the work of Ernst Cassirer, whose ground-breaking *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (3 Vols) was published between 1923 and 1929. One of Voloshinov's unfinished projects, which he began while at University, was a translation of the first volume of Cassirer's work on language. This volume marked the culmination of Cassirer's move away from Marburg Neo-Kantianism to a Hegelian rectification of Kant. Adopting Hegel's dialectical orientation, evolutionary approach to human knowledge and existence and concentration of the totality of human activities, Cassirer sought to overcome the exclusivity of the Kantian focus on mankind's rational thought processes. At the same time, however, Cassirer strove to resist the Hegelian subsumption of all realms of the human spirit into the Absolute by retaining the Kantian distinction between the 'languages' of the human spirit. To this end Cassirer drew upon Herder and von Humboldt's identification of thought and signification, viewing the 'symbolic function' as the common element to all areas of knowledge, but which took a specific form in each of them. The truth, agreed Cassirer and Hegel, is whole, but the former understood this to mean that each of the perspectives offered by various symbolic forms is equally valid and must be progressively 'unfolded' so as to fully articulate itself. This formulation, as we shall see, had a far reaching effect on the later work of Bakhtin, but there are signs of its influence almost immediately in the work of the group.

In 1928 P.N. Medvedev published a book-length critique of Russian Formalism. This work begins with a definition of literary scholarship as 'one branch of the study of ideologies', a study which 'embraces all areas of man's ideological creativity'. Medvedev goes on to argue that while Marxism has established the bases of such a study, including its relationship to economic factors, the study of 'the distinctive features and qualitative individuality of each of the branches of ideological creation - science, art, ethics, religion, etc. - is still in the embryonic stage' (p.3). Despite the replacement of 'symbolic forms' with 'branches of ideological creation' the continuity of approach is clear. Where Cassirer sought to examine the symbolic function as 'a factor which recurs in each basic cultural form but in no two takes exactly the same shape' (vol. 1, p.84), Medvedev sought to investigate the 'sociological laws of development' which can be found in each 'branch' of 'ideological creation' but which manifests itself in specific ways. This sociological adaption of Cassirer's work was to feature largely in Bakhtin's work from the 1930s and 1940s, where, as Poole has demonstrated, many

unattributed passages from the former's work appear in Russian translation within the body of the latter's work. Medvedev felt that the Formalists were correct in attempting to define the specific features of literary creation but fundamentally mistaken in the positivistic approach they took towards literary *devices* which tended to efface the ideological, meaning-bearing and thus sociological aspect of literary form. In conclusion Medvedev recommended that the formalists be treated respectfully and seriously, even if their fundamental premises were erroneous. Marxist criticism, he argued, should value Formalism as an object of serious criticism through which the bases of the former can be clarified.

While subjecting the Russian Formalists to intense criticism on the basis of their partisan alliance with the Futurist movement and their sharing its tendency towards a nihilistic destruction of meaning, Medvedev particularly praised Western 'formalist art scholarship' such as the work of Hildebrand, Wölfflin and Worringer. These theorists were important for the development of the Bakhtin circle because they treated changes of artistic forms and styles as changes of 'artistic volition', i.e. having ideological significance. Worringer saw art history to be marked by an alternation of naturalism (empathy) and abstraction (estrangement) which correlated to the harmony or otherwise in the relationship of man and his environment. While formal and evaluative aspects are not identical, they do tend to maintain a close affiliation and this, Medvedev concluded, can be applied to literary form as well as visual art. This particular chapter, along with some shorter extracts of the book were omitted from the second edition of the book published with the title *Formalizm I formalisty* (Formalism and the Formalists) in 1934. By this time a tolerant attitude towards the Formalists or Western scholarship was not permitted, and thus an additional and extremely hostile chapter called 'The Collapse of Formalism' was included. Earlier writers on the Bakhtin Circle tended to ascribe the first edition to Bakhtin and the second to Medvedev, but it is clear that the body of the second edition is an expurgated version of the first.

Medvedev's formulation was carried over into Bakhtin's now famous study *Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo* (Problems of Dostoevskii's Work) published in 1929. Here the great nineteenth-century novelist's own verbally affirmed and often reactionary ideology is downplayed in favour of his 'form-shaping ideology' which is seen to be imbued with a profoundly democratic spirit. Bakhtin attacks those critics, such as Engelgardt, who characterised Dostoevskii's creative method as Hegelian. In such a scheme two positions struggle for ascendancy but are transformed into a synthesis at the end; however, according to Bakhtin, there is no merging of voices into a final, authoritative voice as in the Hegelian absolute. Dostoevskii does not present an abstract dialectic but an unmerged *dialogue* of voices, each given equal rights. Bakhtin follows the nineteenth-century German novelist and critic Otto Ludwig in terming this type of dialogue 'polyphonic dialogue', which allows Cassirer's insistence on a plurality of cultural forms to be extended to a plurality of discourses in society and the novel. In the course of Dostoevskii's novels, argues Bakhtin, very much in the spirit of Cassirer, the worldviews of Dostoevskii's heroes 'unfold', presenting their own unique perspective upon the world. The novelist does not, as is the case with Tolstoi, submerge all positions beneath a single authoritative perspective, but allows the voice of the narrator to reside beside the voices of the characters, bestowing no greater authority on that voice than on any of the others. Voices intersect and interact, mutually illuminating their ideological structures, potentialities, biases and limitations.

Bakhtin's early phenomenology is now translated into discursive terms. Where Bakhtin was initially concerned with intersubjective relations and the modality of authorial and heroic interaction, this is now examined in terms of the way in which one language encounters another,

reporting and modifying the utterance by reaccentuating it. Modes of interaction range from stylisation to explicit parody, which Bakhtin spends a considerable proportion of the book cataloguing. As only the later edition of the book (1963) has been published in English, there is a tendency to confuse the chronology of the emergence of Bakhtin's key concepts. It should be noted that there is no reflection on carnival or on the Menippean Satire in the first edition of the Dostoevskii study. These features only emerged in the next decade in relation to the history of the novel as a genre. The first edition of the Dostoevskii study is a monograph on the work of the famous novelist in terms which in many respects embody the poetics of a significant portion of contemporary 'fellow-traveller' writing. When considered in its historical context, the Dostoevskii study can be seen as a sort of rearguard defence of liberality in the cultural arena against the encroachment of political control. The book was published on the eve of the destructive RAPP dictatorship, when bellicose advocates of 'proletarian culture' were granted free reign by the newly victorious Stalinist leadership of the Soviet Communist Party. Formal experimentation and an inadequately tendentious narrative position was branded as reactionary, while Bakhtin's work defended the presentation of a plurality of perspectives free from 'monologic' closure. The formal characteristics of a work were themselves of ideological significance, but the reactionary tendency was in the imposition of a unitary perspective on a varied community of opinion.

The semiotic dimension of the new orientation of the Bakhtin Circle was developed at the same time by Voloshinov. In a series of articles between 1928 and 1930 punctuated by the appearance of the book-length *Marksizm i filosofiia iazyka* (Marxism and the Philosophy of Language) in 1929 (2nd edition 1930) Voloshinov published an analysis of the relationship between language and ideology unsurpassed for several decades. Voloshinov examines two contemporary accounts of language, what he calls 'abstract objectivism', whose leading exponent is Saussure, and 'individualistic subjectivism', developed from the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt by the romantic idealists Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) and Karl Vossler (1872-1942). Voloshinov argues that the two trends derive from rationalism and romanticism respectively and share both the strengths and weaknesses of those movements. While the former identifies the systematic and social character of language it mistakes the 'system of self-identical forms' for the source of language usage in society; it abstracts language from the concrete historical context of its utilisation (Bakhtin's 'theoreticism'); the part is examined at the expense of the whole; the individual linguistic element is treated as a 'thing' at the expense of the dynamics of speech; a unity of word meaning is assumed to the neglect of the multiplicity of meaning and accent and language is treated as a ready-made system whose developments are aberrations. The latter trend is correct in viewing language as a continuous generative process and asserting that this process is meaningful, but fundamentally wrong in identifying the laws of that creation with those of individual psychology, viewing the generative process as analogous with art and treating the system of signs as an inert crust of the creative process. These partial insights, Voloshinov argues that a stable system of linguistic signs is merely a scientific abstraction; the generative process of language is implemented in the social-verbal interaction of speakers; the laws of language generation are sociological laws; although linguistic and artistic creativity do not coincide, this creativity must be understood in relation to the ideological meanings and values that fill language and that the structure of each concrete utterance is a sociological structure.

Several commentators have noted how Voloshinov's approach to language anticipates many of the criticisms of linguistic philosophy levelled by present day Poststructuralists, but does so without invoking the relativism of much of the latter or the nullity of Derrida's '*hors texte*'. Voloshinov

firmly establishes the sign-bound nature of consciousness and the shifting nature of the language system, but instead of viewing the subject as fragmented by the reality of difference, he poses each utterance to be a microcosm of social conflict. This allows sociological structure and the plurality of discourse to be correlated according to a unitary historical development. In this sense Voloshinov's critique bears a strong resemblance to the Italian Communist leader Antonio Gramsci's account of hegemony in his *Prison Notebooks*. Like Voloshinov and Bakhtin, Gramsci drew upon the work of Croce and Vossler and Matteo Bartoli's Saussurean 'spatial linguistics', and combined it with a Hegelian reading of Marxism. As we have seen, however, Voloshinov was heavily influenced by the work of Cassirer, whose admiration for the work of von Humboldt, the founder of generative linguistics, was substantial. Voloshinov's critique thus tended towards the romantic pole of language study rather than taking up the equidistant position he claimed in his study. This can be seen in the tendency to see social groups as collective subjects rather than institutionally defined collectives and such assertions as those which suggest the meaning of a word is 'totally determined' by its context. What Voloshinov effectively does is to supplement Humboldt's recognition of individual and national linguistic variability with a sociological dimension. Humboldt's 'inner-form' of language is recast as the relationality of discourse, *dialogism*. Abandoning the Marxist distinction between base and superstructure, Voloshinov follows Cassirer and Hegel in seeing the variety of linguistic forms as expressions of a single essence. It is significant that Gramsci, who adopted a consistently pragmatist epistemology followed the same course and emerged with startlingly similar formulations.

This suggests that the relations between the work of the Bakhtin school and Marxism are ones which are complex and worthy of close scrutiny. Those who have tried to set up a Chinese wall between the two tendencies or who have tried to identify them, have consistently failed to do justice to this philosophical dialogue. Some have even gone so far as to see the work of the group as fundamentally anti-Hegelian, a charge which collapses as soon as one traces the use of terminology in the works from the late 1920s.

BAKHTIN AND THE THEORY OF THE NOVEL 1933-1941. The shift in Bakhtin's thought from Kant towards Hegel is nowhere clearer than in his central works on the novel. This can be seen in the new centrality Bakhtin grants to the *history* of literature to which Kant had been largely indifferent. As if to stress his indebtedness to German idealism, Bakhtin adopts all of the characteristics of the novel as a genre catalogued by Goethe, Schlegel and Hegel with little modification and traces how the 'essence' of the genre 'appears' over a course of time. The development of the novel is described in a way distinctly reminiscent of Cassirer's 'symbolic forms' which unfold to present their unique view of the world which is itself a modified version of Hegel's characterisation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the representation of 'appearing knowledge'. At the same time, however, the novel adopts many of the features of the role of Hegel's philosophy in its Cassireran guise as the philosophy of culture. Such a philosophy, argued Cassirer, does not attempt to go behind the various image worlds created by the human spirit but 'to understand and elucidate their basic formative principle' (*The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms vol. 1, Language* p.113). The novel, according to the scheme developed by Bakhtin, elucidates this principle with regard both to other literary genres and socio-ideological discourses. The old idealist formulation of the novel's imperative that it be a 'full and comprehensive reflection of its era' is reformulated as 'the novel must represent all the ideological voices of its era... all the era's languages that have any claim to being significant' (411). The novel is a symbolic form, but a specific one in which the 'basic formative principle' of symbolic forms becomes visible. The socially stratified national

language, *heteroglossia* in itself, becomes heteroglossia *for-itself* rather as thought perceives itself as its own object at the climax of Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

The novel, for Bakhtin, uncovers the formative principle of discourse, its relationality, dialogism, without presenting some final *absolute* language of truth such as that which constitutes Hegelian conceptualism. The novel develops into something akin to a '*visio intellectualis* of the sort Cassirer found in the work of Nicholas Cusanus. This is a whole which includes all various viewpoints in its accidentiality and necessity, 'the thing seen and the manner and direction of the seeing' (Cassirer *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy* 1963, p.32). No individual perspective is adequate to the whole in itself, for only the concrete totality of perspectives can present the whole:

> **Languages of heteroglossia, like mirrors that face each other, each of which in its own way reflects a little piece, a tiny corner of the world, force us to guess at and grasp behind their inter-reflecting aspects for a world that is broader, more multi-levelled and multi-horizoned than would be available to one language, one mirror. (Bakhtin *Voprosy literatury i estetiki* pp.225-26)**

While this aspect of Bakhtin's theory of the novel is most likely based on the philosophy of Cassirer, who developed his work as a defence of liberal values in the context of an increasingly chauvinistic atmosphere in Weimar Germany, a different political slant becomes markedly more apparent in Bakhtin's work of the 1930s. The novelist now becomes the heir of an anti-authoritarian popular cultural strategy to deflate the pretensions of the official language and ideology and institute a popular-collective learning process. The antecedent of this strategy is not German bourgeois liberalism but Russian populism (*narodnichestvo*). Thus the dialectic of mythical and critical symbolic forms which Cassirer outlined in his philosophy now becomes fused with a dialectic of official and popular socio-cultural forces. On one side stand the forces of cultural centralisation and stabilisation: the 'official strata', unitary language, the literary canon and so on. On the other side stands the decentralising influence of popular culture: popular festivity and collective ridicule, literary parody, and the anti-canonic novel. The rise of the novel is correlated with the collapse of antique unity and the breaking down of cultural boundaries. Where the official culture developed a canon of poetic genres which posited a rarified language in opposition to the common spoken language, presented a monolithically serious worldview and epic accounts of a golden age and heroic beginnings, the novel parodies these features, ridiculing the official culture's claims to universal validity and the ossified conventionality of canonic forms and language.

The novel is thus a literary expression of a whole socio-cultural process, but this process is rather too broad to be incorporated under the label Bakhtin gives to it without considerable problems with regard to conceptual accuracy. The adjective *poetic* becomes shorthand for the whole complex of institutional and cultural forms which can be included on the side of officialdom. Thus *poetic* denotes both a type of discourse used in artistic texts and a hierarchical relation between discourses which constitutes the hegemonic relationships of an unequal society. Correspondingly, *novelistic* describes both the character of a genre, multi-accented artistic discourse, and an anti-authoritarian relationship between discourses. Another pair of terms which is often used interchangeably with these two is *monologic* and *dialogic*. The former denotes a mono-accentual type of discourse *and* an authoritarian stance towards another discourse. The latter describes a multi-accentual discourse, the relationality of discourse, and an orientation on a monologic discourse which seeks to reveal the ideological structure lurking behind surface appearances. The ground between formal and political terms shifts before the reader, who is constantly reminded of

the institutional co-ordinates for all discursive phenomena but is never presented with a sociological account of those co-ordinates. This might be explained both by the ideological restrictions placed on any writer in Stalin's Russia and by the idealist frame of Bakhtin's own theory. This ambiguity has allowed very different interpretations of Bakhtin's work to be drawn, ranging from a tendency to reduce the whole argument to one of artistic forms, leading to a liberalistic formal criticism and attempts to correlate Bakhtin's argument with the institutional forms of modern capitalist society. Bakhtin's work has thus become a battleground between (mainly American) liberal academics and (mainly British) anti-Stalinist Marxists.

In its classical phase, Russian populism was, according to Walicki, 'opposed to the "abstract intellectualism" of those revolutionaries who tried to teach the peasants, to impose on them the ideals of Western socialism, instead of learning what were their real needs and acting in the name of such interests and ideals of which the peasants had already become aware'. Yet it also suggested an opposition to those Second International Marxists who argued that capitalism was an unavoidable stage in the development of Russia (*The Controversy Over Capitalism* 1989 p.3). In one sense, then, it was a political ideology compatible with Third International Marxism, but in another it sought to reverse the hegemony of intellectuals over 'the people'. Bakhtin's *poet* is a hegemonic intellectual whose language relates in an authoritative fashion to the discourse of the masses, while the *novelist* aims to break and indeed reverse that hegemonic relationship. In Bakhtin's formulation, the locus of critical forces of culture is *the people*, while the mythological forces of culture emerge from the official stratum.

Many of the central works on the novel were at least partially written in response to the theory of the novel developed by Georg Lukács. Bakhtin had begun to translate Lukács' *Theory of the Novel* in the 1920s but abandoned the project upon learning that Lukács no longer liked the book but in the 1930s, when Lukács accommodated to the Stalin regime and essentially became a *right Hegelian*, his theory of the novel became canonical. Bakhtin agreed with Lukács that the novel represented the 'essence of the age' and that irony constituted a central factor of the novelistic method, but rejected the latter's assertion that unless the novel revealed the thread of rationality running through a seemingly anarchic world, i.e. presented an authoritative perspective, the author had succumbed to bourgeois decadence. Modernist formal experimentation and the dominance of parody in modernist literature Lukács found to be a reflection of 'bourgeois decay', while Bakhtin strove to reveal its popular-democratic roots. The novel should not be seen as a compensation for the restlessness of contemporary society, uncovering the assured road to progress, but the embodiment of the dynamic forces that could shape society in a popular-democratic fashion. Thus where Lukács championed epic closure, Bakhtin highlighted novelistic openendedness; where Lukács advocated a strong narrative presence, Bakhtin advocated the maximalisation of multilingual intersection and the testing of discourse. Bakhtin takes a stance against Lukács; *dialogism* becomes analogous to Hegel's *Geist*, both describing the social whole and standing in judgement over those eras in which the dialogic imperative is not realised.

CARNIVAL, HISTORY AND POPULAR CULTURE: RABELAIS, GOETHE AND DOSTOEVSKII AS PHILOSOPHERS. The high point of Bakhtin's populism can be seen in his now famous 1965 study of Rabelais and the heavily revised second edition of the 1929 Dostoevskii book (1963). The former had been composed as Bakhtin's doctoral dissertation which had been written in the late 1930s but was only prepared for publication when he emerged from obscurity in the 1960s. *Tvorchestvo Fransua Rable i narodnaia kul´tura srednevekov´ia i renessansa* (The work of François Rabelais and the Popular Culture of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance) is a

remarkable work. Bakhtin concentrates on the collapse of the strict hierarchies Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance by looking at the way in which ancient modes of living and working collectively, in accordance with the rhythms of nature, re-emerge in the forms of popular culture opposed to official culture. In *Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo* (Problems of Dostoevskii's Poetics) Bakhtin summarises the essence of the question thus:

> **It could be said (with certain reservations, of course) that a person of the Middle Ages lived, as it were, *two lives*: one that was the *official* life, monolithically serious and gloomy, subjugated to a strict hierarchical order, full of terror, dogmatism, reverence and piety; the other was the *life of the carnival square*, free and unrestricted, full of ambivalent laughter, blasphemy, the profanation of everything sacred, full of debasing and obscenities, familiar contact with everyone and everything. Both these lives were legitimate, but separated by strict temporal boundaries. (p.129-30)**

The activities of the carnival square: collective ridicule of officialdom, inversion of hierarchy, violations of decorum and proportion, celebration of bodily excess and so on embody, for Bakhtin, an implicit popular conception of the world. This conception is not, however, able to become ideologically elaborated until the radical laughter of the square entered into the 'world of great literature' (Rabelais p.96). The novel of Rabelais is seen as the epitome of this process of breaking down the rigid, hierarchical world of the Middle Ages and the birth of the modern era. Rabelais is much more than a novelist for Bakhtin: his work embodies a whole new philosophy of history, in which the world is viewed in the process of becoming. The grotesque is the image of this becoming, the boundaries between person and person, person and thing, are erased as the individual merges with the people and the whole cosmos. As the individual body is transcended, the biological body is negated and the 'body of historical, progressing mankind' moves to the centre of the system of images. In the carnival focus on death and rebirth the individual body dies, but the body of the people lives and grows, biological life ends but historical life continues.

The carnivalesque becomes a set of image-borne strategies for destabilising the official worldview. In a recently published article written for inclusion in the Soviet *Literaturnaia entsiklopediia* (Literary Encyclopaedia) in 1940, Bakhtin defines the satirical attitude as the 'image-borne negation' of contemporary actuality as inadequacy, which contains within itself a positive moment in which an improved actuality is affirmed. This affirmed actuality is the historical necessity implicit in contemporary actuality and which is implied by the grotesque image. The grotesque, argues Bakhtin, 'discloses the potentiality of an entirely different world, of another order, another way of life. It leads man out of the confines of the apparent (false) unity, of the indisputable and stable' (Rabelais p.48). The grotesque image of the body, as an image which reveals incomplete metamorphosis no longer represents itself, it represents what Hegel called the 'universal dialectic of life'.

The Renaissance birth of the historical world led to a new development in the Enlightenment. Where Rabelais was presented as the high point of Renaissance literary and philosophical development, the Enlightenment reaches one of its high points in the work of Goethe. The process dispersing the 'residue of otherworldly cohesion and mythical unity' was completed at this time, helping 'reality to gather itself together and condense into the visible whole of a new world' (*Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* p.45). The Enlightenment, argues Bakhtin in a section which draws heavily on Cassirer (the corresponding passage is *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* p.197), should no longer be considered an a-historical era, but 'an epoch of great awakening of a sense of time, above all ... in nature and human life' (p.26). But, argues Bakhtin 'this process of preparing

for the disclosure of historical time took place more rapidly, completely, and profoundly in *literary creativity* than in the abstract philosophical, ideological views of Enlightenment thinkers' (p.26). Goethe's imagination was fundamentally *chronotopic*, he visualised time in space:

> **Time and space merge ... into an inseparable unity ... a definite and absolutely concrete locality serves at the starting point for the creative imagination... this is a piece of human history, historical time condensed into space. Therefore the plot (sum of depicted events) and the characters ... are like those creative forces that formulated and humanised this landscape, they made it a speaking vestige of the movement of history (historical time), and, to a certain degree, predetermined its subsequent course as well, or like those creative forces a given locality needs in order to organise and continue the historical process embodied in it. (p.49)**

Goethe wanted to 'bring together and unite the present, past and future with the ring of necessity' (p.39), to make the present creative. Like Rabelais, Goethe was as much a philosopher as a writer.

The same pattern of analysis shapes the 1963 version of the Dostoevskii study. Here Dostoevskii is no longer treated, as in the 1929 version, as a totally original innovator, but as the heir to a tradition rooted in popular culture. The novelist stood poised at the threshold of a new era, as the rigidly hierarchical Russian Empire was poised to give way to the catastrophic arrival of capitalist anarchy and ultimately revolution. Dostoevskii thus intersected with the threshold poetics of carnival at a different stage in its development, he sought to present the voices of his era in a 'pure simultaneity' unrivalled since Dante. In contradistinction to that of Goethe this *chronotope* was one of visualising relations in terms of space not time and this leads to a philosophical bent that is distinctly messianic:

> **Only such things as can conceivably be linked at a single point in time are essential and are incorporated into Dostoevskii's world; such things can be carried over into eternity, for in eternity, according to Dostoevskii, all is simultaneous, everything coexists.... Thus there is no causality in Dostoevskii's novels, no genesis, no explanations based on the past, on the influences of the environment or of upbringing and so forth. Every act a character commits is in the present, and in this sense is not predetermined; it is conceived of and represented by the author as free. (p.29)**

The roots of such a conception lie in carnival and, according to Bakhtin, in the carnivalised philosophical dialogues that constituted the Menippean Satire. This philosophico-literary genre reaches a new stage in Dostoevskii's work, where the roots of the novel as a genre stands out particularly clearly. One of those roots was the Socratic Dialogue, which was overwhelmed by the monologic Aristotelian treatise, but which continued to lead a subterranean life in the non-canonical minor satirical genres and then became a constitutive element of the novel form and, implicitly, literary modernism. This accounts for its philosophical importance

BAKHTIN'S LAST WORKS. In his last years Bakhtin returned to the methodological questions that had preoccupied his earlier years, though now with a rather different perspective. This began with his work on speech genres in the 1950s, though apart from this study, did not yield any sustained texts until the 1970s. Bakhtin now began to stress the dialogic character of all study in the 'human sciences', the fact that one needs to deal with another 'I' who can speak for and about his or herself in a fundamentally different way than with an inanimate and voiceless object. To this end he sought to differentiate his position from that of incipient Soviet structuralism, which adopted the 'abstract objectivist' approach to language and the constitution of the subject.

Bakhtin's approach to subjectivity is dialogic, referring to the exchange of utterances rather than narrowly linguistic, and this extends to the analysis of texts which are always intertextual, meeting and illuminating each other. Just as texts have genres, 'definite and relatively stable typical *forms of construction of the whole*' so too does speech. Thus the boundaries between complex genres such as those commonly regarded as literary and other less formalised genres should be seen as porous and flexible, allowing a dialogue of genres as well as styles.

CONCLUSION. The work of the Bakhtin circle is multifaceted and extremely pertinent to contemporary philosophical concerns. Yet their work moves beyond philosophy narrowly defined to encompass anthropology, literary studies, historiography and political theory. The vicissitudes of intellectual life in the Soviet Union have complicated assessment of the work of the circle, as has the way in which the works have been published and translated in recent years. On top of this, the works of the group have been read into a theoretical position framed by present-day concerns over poststructuralism and the fate of the subject in modern philosophy. A proper historical assessment of the work of the Bakhtin Circle will be much aided by the publication of Bakhtin's Complete Works which will appear over the next few years. This will hopefully be followed by a harmonised English translation which will facilitate an informed assessment in the English speaking world.

The work of the Bakhtin Circle are currently being published in a seven-volume Russian edition. Details of Russian and English language editions as well as a considerable amount of secondary material is available at the The Bakhtin Centre Web Site.

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Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794)

LIFE. Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) was born the eldest son in an aristocratic family and educated at a Jesuit school. In his mid twenties Beccaria became close friends with Pietro and Alessandro Verri, two brothers who formed an intellectual circle called "the academy of fists" which focused on reforming the criminal justice system. Through this group Beccaria became acquainted with French and British political philosophers, such as Hobbes, Hume, Diderot, Helvetius, Montesquieu, and Hume. At the encouragement of Pietro, Beccaria wrote *On Crimes and Punishments* (1764). Some background information was provided by Pietro, who was in the process of authoring a text on the history of torture, and Alessandro was an official at a Milan prison had first hand experience of the prison's appalling conditions. The brief work relentlessly protests against torture to obtain confessions, secret accusations, the arbitrary discretionary power of judges, the inconsistency and inequality of sentencing, using personal connections to get a lighter sentence, and the use of capital punishment for serious and even minor offenses. Almost immediately, the work was translated into French and English and went through several editions. Philosophers of the time hailed it, and several European emperors vowed to follow it. With great hesitation, Beccaria acted on an invitation to Paris to meet the great thinkers of the day. A chronically shy person, Beccaria made a poor impression at Paris and returned to Milan after three weeks. Beccaria continued to gain official recognition and held several nominal political positions in Italy. Separated from the invaluable input from his friends, though, he failed to produce another text of equal importance. Outside Italy, an unfounded myth grew that Beccaria's literary silence owed to Italian restrictions on free expression.

ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS. Editions of Beccaria's text follow two distinct arrangements of the material: that by Beccaria himself, and that by French translator Andre Morellet (1765) who imposed a more systematic order to Beccaria's original text. Beccaria opens his work describing the great need for reform in the criminal justice system, and he observes how few studies there are on the subject of such reform. Throughout his work, Beccaria develops his position by appealing to two key philosophical theories: social contract and utility. Concerning the social contract, Beccaria argues that punishment is justified only to defend the social contract and to ensure that everyone will be motivated to abide by it. Concerning utility (perhaps influenced by Helvetius), Beccaria argues that the method of punishment selected should be that which serves the greatest public good.

Contemporary political philosophers distinguish between two principle theories of justifying punishment. First, the retributive approach maintains that punishment should be equal to the harm done, either literally an eye for an eye, or more figuratively which allows for alternative forms of compensation. The retributive approach tends to be retaliatory and vengeance-oriented. The second approach is utilitarian which maintains that punishment should increase the total amount of happiness in the world. This often involves punishment as a means of reforming the criminal, incapacitating him from repeating his crime, and deterring others. Beccaria clearly takes

a utilitarian stance. For Beccaria, the purpose of punishment is to create a better society, not revenge. Punishment serves to deter others from committing crimes, and to prevent the criminal from repeating his crime.

Beccaria argues that Punishment should be swift since this has the greatest deterrence value. He defends his view about the swiftness of punishment by appealing to the theory of the association of ideas (developed most notably by David Hume and David Hartley). According to associationists, if we know the rules by which the mind connects together two different ideas (such as the ideas of crime and punishment), then we can strengthen their association. For Beccaria when a punishment quickly follows a crime, then the two ideas of "crime" and "punishment" will be more quickly associated in a person's mind. Also, the link between a crime and a punishment is stronger if the punishment is somehow related to the crime. Given the fact that the swiftness of punishment has the greatest impact on deterring others, Beccaria argues that there is no justification for severe punishments. In time we will naturally grow accustomed to increases in severity of punishment, and, thus, the initial increase in severity will lose its effect. There are limits both to how much torment we can endure, and also how much we can inflict.

Beccaria touches on an array of criminal justice practices, recommending reform. For example, he argues that dueling can be eliminated if laws protected a person from insults to his honor. Laws against suicide are ineffective, and thus should be eliminated, leaving punishment of suicide to God. Bounty hunting should not be permitted since it incites people to be immoral and shows a weakness in the government. He argues that laws should be clear in defining crimes so that judges do not interpret the law, but only decide whether a law has been broken. Punishments should be in degree to the severity of the crime. Treason is the worst crime since it harms the social contract. This is followed by violence against a person or his property, and, finally, by public disruption. Crimes against property should be punished by fines. The best ways to prevent crimes are to enact clear and simple laws, reward virtue, and improve education.

AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. In *On Crimes and Punishments* Beccaria presents one of the first sustained critiques of the use of capital punishment. Briefly, his position is that capital punishment is not necessary to deter, and long term imprisonment is a more powerful deterrent since execution is transient. He starts by describing the connection between the social contract and our right to life. Locke argued that people forfeit their right to life when they initiate a state of war with other people. Beccaria disagrees. Following Hobbes, Beccaria believes that, in the social contract, we negotiate away only the minimal number of rights necessary to bring about peace. Thus, people hold onto their right to life, and do not hand this over to the public good. Given the fact that capital punishment cannot be justified by Locke's reasoning, Beccaria argues that the only other justification is that it is either necessary or useful for public good. He contests both of these claims. For Beccaria, history shows that capital punishment fails to deter determined criminals. What we know about human nature also suggests that it has minimal deterrence value. A steady example over a long period of time is more effective in creating moral habits than is a single shocking example of an execution. Beccaria argues that perpetual slavery is a more effective deterrent than capital punishment. Since we should choose the least severe punishment which accomplishes our purpose (i.e., deterrence), then perpetual slavery is the preferred mode of punishment for the worst crimes. From the spectator's perspective, observing perpetual slavery will have a more lasting impression than capital punishment. Perpetual slavery will also seem more terrible from the vantage of the spectator, than from the criminal himself. Beccaria explains the psychology of the criminal who wishes to return to the state of nature in view of the gross inequity

between the rich and the poor. Again, perpetual slavery is the best deterrence against this motivation. Beccaria argues further that the death penalty in fact has bad effects on society by reducing their sensitivity to human suffering. Potential criminals see it as one more method of perpetuating tyranny. Although capital punishment is practiced in most countries, it is still an error which in time will become rare. He urges rulers to adopt his stance against capital punishment, and predicts that this will give them a lasting fame as peacemakers.

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Behaviorism

Behaviorism is a theory in the philosophy of mind which maintains that talk of mental events should be translated into talk about observable behavior. Behaviorism parts company with dualistic traditions which hold that mind is a distinct substance from material bodies. Further, behaviorism resists attempts to define mental expressions such as "pain" in reference to introspective reports by the subject. There are different degrees of behaviorist conviction which are often described as *hard* and *soft* behaviorism. Hard behaviorism is an ontological position that immaterial minds do not exist. Soft behaviorism is the view that mental events (whether an immaterial mind exists or not) cannot be characterized independently from overt physical behaviors. There may be mental states, but methodologically scientists can explain everything without referring to mental states. Related to soft behaviorism is what is sometimes called *methodological* behaviorism, the view that the behaviorist approach is used for instrumental purposes, but mental life consists of more than behavior.

In addition to these distinctions, there are three separate schools of behaviorist thought which represent its philosophical development, particularly in the first half of the 20th century. *Psychological* or *scientific* behaviorism was championed by psychologist J. B. Watson who wanted make to psychology follow the "hard sciences" by only dealing with publicly observable features of human activity. For Watson, a true scientific account of the mind is one which rests on publicly observable stimuli and responses. The term "behavior" refers to the way in which such stimuli and responses interact. B.F. Skinner contributed to psychological behaviorism by conducting experiments which linked behaviors with many of the terms commonly use to describe mental states.

Behaviorism took a decidedly philosophical turn with logical positivists such as Carnap, Hempel, and Ayer who argued that meaningful terms about mental states must trace back to some verifiable behavior. This follows directly from the logical positivist principle of verifiability which holds that only empirically verifiable statements are meaningful. Indeed, the meaning of a statement *is* its method of verifiability. The behaviorism of logical positivism declined with the logical positivist movement itself and its problematic principle of verification.

The most philosophically important type of behaviorism, often called *logical* or *philosophical* behaviorism, is associated with Gilbert Ryle in his book, *The Concept of the Mind* (1949). Ryle begins with a critique of Cartesian dualism, which he characterizes as the ghost in the machine dogma. According to this dogma, publicly observable events are inseparably linked with physical bodies; by contrast, private events are inseparably linked with spiritual minds. For Ryle, this dogma commits a category mistake by placing "mind" in a category of "privateness" to which it does not belong. Instead, mental terms refer to the way people do things, not to private spiritual states. Ryle argues that, with the exception of pain, all of our mental states can be analyzed through our behavior, and he denies that our mental states reflect anything more than a

predictable way of acting. For instance, the belief that "it is sunny" does not correspond to any immaterial thing in one's mind. That particular belief only describes dispositions to behave in certain ways, such as wearing suntan lotion, sunbathing, and saying "it's sunny."

Central to Ryle's account is the notion of a *disposition*. A disposition in general can be illustrated in the tendency of glass is to break. Human dispositions are expressed in the form of conditional (if-then) statements. For example, the disposition of Jones to be hungry might be expressed in the following complex conditional: IF Jones has food set before him, and it is not poisoned, and the situation is socially appropriate ... THEN Jones will eat the food. Ryle explains that the description must remain open (as represented in the ellipses above) since, for complex creatures and complex dispositions, we will never have the complete list of conditions relevant to the disposition. Most importantly, inner states are not causally relevant to explaining dispositions. Thus, to name a mental event is to make a prediction about a person's behavior given dispositions to behave in certain ways.

Behaviorism is open to several criticisms. First, we commonsensically think that mental events such as pain, seeing bright light, or hearing a song all involve more than predicted behavior. To an extent, Ryle recognizes this in the case of pain. Second, by restricting their analysis of mental events to only stimuli and dispositional responses, behaviorism may be engaged in overkill. In reacting against flaws of Cartesian dualism, other more moderate – yet thoroughly materialistic -- alternatives are available for explaining mental states. These include linking mental states with neural activity (i.e., identity theory), or explaining a given mental state in terms of its causal relation to other inner states (i.e., functionalism).

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Belief

Belief is the acceptance of something as true, or thinking that something could be true. There are two distinct notions of belief: belief in x, and belief that x. Regarding *belief in*, we can *believe in* the existence, truth, or value of something, or believe in something that we think ought to be. The notion of *believe in* is usually used to designate believe in good things. For example, we believe in Jones's cheery attitude but not his selfishness. Philosophers are principally concerned with *belief that*, and describe this as doxastic belief. This kind of belief is one of several types propositional attitudes; others are thinking that x, wishing that x, and feeling that x.

There are limits to propositions in which we can believe. It is questionable as to whether an individual can believe contradictions, such as "that p exists and also that p does not exist at the same time." It is also uncertain whether a person can believe something that she knows is false or thinks is improbable. To study belief is to study its connections with long-term dispositions, actions, and inner experiences, not just the short-term idea that a person claims to accept. Other issues with belief concern how far belief is voluntary, and whether a person has a moral duty to believe certain things.

William James argued that acceptance of truth sometimes requires an act of the will which goes beyond what the facts present and is based on feelings. Belief in divine revelation is an example of this type. Ortega y Gasset thought of belief as the power behind ideas insofar as ideas need to be founded in pre-rational belief. Together, ideas and belief make *vital reason.* In contrast to this approach, William Crawford argues that one must not accept something unless all evidence supports it.

The theological use of the term *belief* is the closest to its common usage. A theologian distinguishes between two different meanings. The first is more like an opinion, which is belief in the probably of something. The second is the belief in the certainty of something. Catholic theologians distinguish between explicit and implicit belief. When someone believes a truth that she *knows*, the belief is explicit; when she believes the consequences of a truth which she cannot know, the belief becomes implicit.

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Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)

LIFE. A leading theorist in Anglo-American philosophy of law and one of the 'founders' of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham was born in Houndsditch, in London, on 15 February 1748. He was the son and grandson of attorneys, and his early family life was coloured by a mix of pious superstition (on his mother's side) and Enlightenment rationalism (from his father). Bentham lived during a time of major social, political and economic change. The 'industrial revolution,' with the massive economic and social shifts that it brought in its wake, the rise of the middle class, revolutions in France and America--all were reflected in Bentham's reflections on existing institutions. In 1760 Bentham entered Queen's College, Oxford and, upon graduation in 1764, studied law at Lincoln's Inn. Though qualified to practice law, he never did so. Instead, he devoted most of his life to writing on matters of legal reform--though, curiously, he made little effort to publish much of what he wrote.

Bentham spent his time in intense study, often writing some eight to twelve hours a day. While most of his best known work deals with theoretical questions in law, Bentham was an active polemicist and he was engaged for some time in developing projects that proposed various 'practical' ideas for the reform of social institutions. Although his work came to have an important influence on political philosophy, Bentham did not write any single text gave the essential principles of his views on this topic. His most important theoretical work is the *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), in which much of his moral theory--which he said reflected 'the greatest happiness principle'--is described and developed.

In 1781, Bentham became associated with the Earl of Shelburne and, through him, came into contact with a number of the leading Whig politicians and lawyers. Although his work was admired by some, at the time Bentham's ideas were still largely unappreciated. In 1785, he briefly joined his brother Samuel, in Russia, where he pursued his writing with even more than his usual intensity, and devised a plan for the now infamous 'Panopticon'- -a model prison where all prisoners would be observable by (unseen) guards at all times--a project which he had hoped would interest the Czarina Catherine the Great. After his return to England in 1788, and for some 20 years thereafter, Bentham pursued--fruitlessly and at great expense--the idea of the panopticon. Fortunately, an inheritance received in 1796 provided him with financial stability. By the late 1790s, Bentham's theoretical work came to have a more significant place in political reform. Still, his influence was, arguably, still greater on the continent. (Bentham was made an honorary citizen of the fledgling French Republic in 1792 and his *The Theory of Legislation* was published first, in French, by his Swiss disciple, Etienne Dumont, in 1802.)

The precise extent of Bentham's influence in British politics has been a matter of some debate. While he attacked both Tory and Whig policies, both the Reform bill of 1832 (promoted by Bentham's disciple, Lord Henry Brougham) and later reforms in the century (such as the secret ballot, advocated by Bentham's friend, George Grote, who was elected to parliament in 1832) reflected Benthamite concerns. The impact of Bentham's ideas goes further still. Contemporary

philosophical and economic vocabulary (e.g., 'international,' 'maximize,' 'minimize,' and 'codification') is indebted to Bentham's proclivity for inventing terms and, among his other disciples were James Mill, and his son, John (who was responsible for an early edition of some of Bentham's manuscripts), as well as the legal theorist, John Austin.

At his death in London, on 6 June 1832, Bentham left literally tens of thousands of manuscript pages--some of which was work only sketched out, but all of which he hoped would be prepared for publication. He also left a large estate--used to finance the newly-established University College, London (for those individuals excluded from university education--i.e., non-conformists, Catholics and Jews)--and his cadaver which, *per* his instructions, was dissected, embalmed, dressed, and placed in a chair, and resides in a cabinet in a corridor of the main building of University College to this day. The Bentham Project, set up in the early 1960s at University College, has, as its aim, the publishing of a definitive, scholarly edition of Bentham's works and correspondence.

METHOD. Influenced by the '*philosophes*' of the Enlightenment (such as Beccaria, Helvétius, Diderot, D'Alembert, and Voltaire), but also by Locke and Hume, Bentham's work combined an empiricist approach with a rationalism that emphasized conceptual clarity and deductive argument. Locke's influence was primarily as the author of the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*--and Bentham saw in him a model of one who emphasised the importance of reason over custom and tradition and who insisted on precision in the use of terms. Hume's influence was not so much on Bentham's method as on his account of the underlying principles of psychological associationism and on his articulation of the principle of utility which was then still often annexed to theological views.

Bentham's analytical and empirical method is especially obvious when one looks at some of his main criticisms of the law and of moral and political discourse in general. His principal target was the presence of 'fictions'--in particular, legal fictions. On his view, to consider any part or aspect of a thing in abstraction from that thing, was to run the risk of confusion or cause positive deceit. While, in some cases, such 'fictional' terms such as 'relation,' 'right,' 'power,' and 'possession' were of some use, in many cases their original warrant had been forgotten, so that they survived as the product of either prejudice or inattention. In those cases where the terms could be 'cashed out' in terms of the properties of real things, they could continue to be used but, otherwise, they were to be abandoned. Still, Bentham hoped to eliminate legal fictions as far as possible from the law--including the legal fiction that there was some original contract that explained why there was any law at all. He thought that, at the very least, clarifications and justifications could be given that avoided the use of such terms.

HUMAN NATURE. For Bentham, morals and legislation can be described scientifically, but such a description requires an account of human nature. Just as nature is explained through reference to the laws of physics, so human behaviour can be explained by reference to the two primary motives of pleasure and pain; this is the theory of psychological hedonism.

There is, Bentham admits, no direct proof of such an analysis of human motivation--though he holds that it is clear that, in acting, all people implicitly refer to it. At the beginning of the *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Bentham writes that "[n]ature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the

standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it". From this we see that, for Bentham, pleasure and pain serve not only as explanations for action, but also define one's good. It is, in short, on the basis of pleasures and pains, which can exist only in individuals, that Bentham thought one could construct a calculus of value.

Related to this fundamental hedonism is a view of the individual as exhibiting a natural rational self-interest-- a psychological egoism. In his "Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy," (1833) Mill cites Bentham's *The Book of Fallacies* (London: Hunt, 1824, pp. 392-3) that "[i]n *every* human breast... self-regarding interest is predominant over social interest; each person's own individual interest over the interests of all other persons taken together." Fundamental to the nature and activity of individuals, then, is their own well-being, and reason--as a natural capability of the person--is considered to be subservient to this end.

Bentham believed that the nature of the human person can be adequately described without mention of social relationships. To begin with, the idea of "relation" is but a "fictitious entity", though necessary for 'convenience of discourse.' And, more specifically, he remarks that "the community is a fictitious body," and it is but "the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it". Thus, the extension of the term 'individual' is, in the main, no greater and no less than the biological entity. Bentham's view, then, is that the individual--the basic unit of the social sphere--is an "atom" and there is no 'self' or 'individual' greater than the human individual. A person's relations with others--even if important--are not essential and describe nothing that is, strictly speaking, necessary to its being what it is.

Finally, the picture of the human person presented by Bentham is based on a psychological associationism indebted to David Hartley and David Hume; Bentham's analysis of 'habit' (which is essential to his understanding of society and, especially, political society) particularly reflects associationist presuppositions. On this view, pleasure and pain are objective states and can be measured in terms of their intensity, duration, certainty, proximity, fecundity and purity. This allows, then, both for an objective determination of an activity or state and for a comparison with others.

Bentham's understanding of human nature reveals, in short, not only a psychological and ontological, but a moral, individualism where, to extend the critique of utilitarianism made by Graeme Duncan and John Gray, ("The Left Against Mill," in *New Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism*, Eds. Wesley E. Cooper, Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten, 1979) "the individual human being is conceived as the source of values and as himself the supreme value."

MORAL PHILOSOPHY. As Elie Halévy notes, there are three principal characteristics of which constitute the basis of Bentham's moral and political philosophy: the greatest happiness principle, universal egoism and the artificial identification of one's interests with those of others. Though these characteristics are present throughout his work, they are particularly evident in the *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, where Bentham is concerned with articulating rational principles that would provide a basis, and guide, for legal, social and moral reform.

To begin with, Bentham's moral philosophy reflects what he calls at different times 'the greatest happiness principle' or 'the principle of utility'--a term which he borrows from Hume. In adverting

to this principle, however, he was not referring to just the usefulness of things or actions, but to the extent to which these things or actions promote the general happiness. Specifically, then, what is morally obligatory is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, happiness being determined by reference to the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. Thus, Bentham writes, "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness." And Bentham emphasises that this applies to "every action whatsoever." That which does not maximize the greatest happiness (such as an act of pure ascetic sacrifice) is, therefore, morally wrong. (Unlike some of the previous attempts at articulating a universal hedonism, Bentham's approach is thoroughly naturalistic.)

Bentham's moral philosophy, then, clearly reflects his psychological view that the primary motivators in human beings are pleasure and pain. Bentham admits that his version of the principle of utility is something that does not admit of direct proof--but he notes that this is not a problem as some explanatory principles do not admit of any such proof, and all explanation must start somewhere. But this, by itself, does not explain why another's happiness--or the general happiness--should count. And, in fact, he provides a number of suggestions that could serve as answers to the question of why we should be concerned with the happiness of others.

First, Bentham says, the principle of utility is something to which individuals, in acting, refer either explicitly or implicitly--and this is something that can be ascertained and confirmed by simple observation. Indeed, Bentham held that all existing systems of morality can be "reduced to the principles of sympathy and antipathy"--which is precisely that which defines utility. A second argument found in Bentham is that, if pleasure is the good, then it is good irrespective of whose pleasure it is. Thus, a moral injunction to pursue or maximize pleasure has force independently of the specific interests of the person acting. Bentham also suggests that individuals would reasonably seek the general happiness simply because the interests of others are inextricably bound up with their own--though he recognised that this is something that is easy for individuals to ignore. Nevertheless, Bentham envisages a solution to this as well. Specifically, he proposes that making this identification of interests obvious and, when necessary, bringing diverse interests together, would be the responsibility of the legislator.

Finally, there are, Bentham held, advantages to a moral philosophy based on a principle of utility. To begin with, the principle of utility is (compared to other moral principles) clear, allows for objective and disinterested public discussion, and enables decisions to be made where there seem to be conflicts of (*prima facie*) legitimate interests. Moreover, in calculating the pleasures and pains involved in carrying out a course of action-- the 'hedonic calculus'--there is a fundamental commitment to human equality. The principle of utility presupposes that 'one man is worth just the same as another man' and so there is a guarantee that, in calculating the greatest happiness "each person is to count for one and no one for more than one."

For Bentham, then, there was no inconsistency between his psychological hedonism and egoism, and the greatest happiness principle. Thus, moral philosophy or ethics can be simply described as "the art of directing men's action to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view".

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. Bentham was regarded as the central figure of a group of intellectuals called, by Elie Halévy, "the philosophic radicals"; both J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer can be counted among the 'spiritual descendants' of this group. While it would be too strong to claim that the ideas of the philosophic radicals reflected a common political theory, it is nevertheless correct to say that they agreed that many of the social problems of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England were due to an antiquated legal system and to the control of the economy by a hereditary landed gentry opposed to modern capitalist institutions. As discussed in the preceding section, for Bentham, the principles that govern morals also govern politics and law, and political reform required a clear understanding of human nature. While he develops a number of principles already present in Anglo-Saxon political philosophy, he breaks with that tradition in significant ways.

In his earliest work, *A Fragment on Government* (1776) (an excerpt from a longer work published only in 1928 as *Comment on Blackstone's Commentaries*), Bentham attacked the legal theory of Sir William Blackstone. Bentham's target was, primarily, Blackstone's defense of tradition in law. Bentham advocated the rational revision of the legal system, a restructuring of the process of determining responsibility and of punishment and a more extensive freedom of contract. This, he believed, would favour not only the development of the community, but the personal development of the individual.

Bentham's attack on Blackstone targeted more than the latter's use of tradition, however. Against Blackstone and against a number of earlier thinkers, including Locke, Bentham repudiated many of the concepts underlying their political philosophies, such as natural right, state of nature, and 'social contract'. Bentham's work, then, attempted to outline positive alternatives to the preceding 'traditionalisms.' Not only did he work to reform and restructure existing institutions but he promoted broader suffrage and self (i.e., representative) government.

Law, Liberty and Government: The notion of liberty present in Bentham's account is what is now generally referred to as 'negative' liberty--freedom from external restraint or compulsion. Bentham says that "[l]iberty is the absence of restraint" and, so, to the extent that one is not hindered by others, one has liberty and is 'free'. Bentham denies that liberty is 'natural' (in the sense of existing 'prior to' social life and as thereby imposing limits on the state) or that there is an *a priori* sphere of liberty in which the individual is sovereign. In fact, Bentham holds that people have always lived in society, and so there can be no state of nature (though he does distinguish between political society and 'natural society') and no 'social contract' (a notion which he held was not only unhistorical but pernicious). Nevertheless, he does note that there is an important distinction between one's public and private life that has morally significant consequences, and he holds that liberty is a good--that, even though it is not something that is a fundamental value, it reflects the greatest happiness principle.

Correlative with this account of liberty, Bentham (as Hobbes before him) viewed law as 'negative.' Given that pleasure and pain are fundamental to--indeed, provide--the standard of value for Bentham, liberty, because 'pleasant', was a good and its restriction, because 'painful', was an evil. Law, which is by its very nature a restriction of liberty and painful to those whose freedom is restricted, is a *prima facie* evil. It is only so far as control by the state is limited that the individual is free. Law is, Bentham recognized, necessary to social order and good laws are clearly essential to good government. Indeed, perhaps more than Locke, Bentham saw the positive role to be played by law and government, particularly in achieving community well-being. To the extent that law advances and protects one's economic and personal goods, and that what government there is, is

self- government, law reflects the interests of the individual.

Unlike many earlier thinkers, Bentham held that law is not rooted in a 'natural law' but is simply a command an expression of the will of the sovereign. (This account of law, later developed by Austin, is characteristic of legal positivism.) Thus, a law that commands morally questionable or morally evil actions, or that is not based on consent, is still 'law.'

Rights: Bentham's views on rights are, perhaps, best known through the attacks on the concept of 'natural rights' that appear throughout his work. These criticisms are especially developed in his *Anarchical Fallacies* (a polemical attack on the declarations of rights issued in France during the French Revolution), written between 1791 and 1795, but not published until 1816, in French. Bentham's criticisms here are rooted in his understanding of the nature of law. Rights are created by the law, and law is simply a command of the sovereign. The existence of law and rights, therefore, requires government. Rights are also usually (though not necessarily) correlative with duties determined by the law and, as in Hobbes, are either those which the law explicitly gives us, or those where, within a legal system, the law is silent. The view that there could be rights, not based on sovereign command, and which pre-exist the establishment of government, is rejected.

According to Bentham, then, the term 'natural right' is a "perversion of language." It is "ambiguous," "sentimental" and "figurative" and it has anarchical consequences. At best, such a 'right' may tell us what we ought to do; it cannot serve as a legal restriction on what we can or cannot do. The term 'natural right' is ambiguous, Bentham says, because it suggests that there are general rights--that is, rights over no specific object--so that one would have a claim on whatever one chooses. The effect of exercising such a universal, natural 'right' would be to extinguish the right altogether, since "what is every man's right is no man's right." No legal system could function with such a broad conception of rights. Thus, there cannot be any general rights in the sense suggested by the French declarations.

The notion of 'natural rights' is, moreover, figurative. Properly speaking, there are no rights anterior to government. The assumption of the existence of such rights, Bentham says, seems to be derived from the theory of the social contract. Here, individuals form a society and choose a government through the alienation of certain of their `rights'. But such a doctrine is not only unhistorical, according to Bentham, it does not even serve as a useful fiction to explain the origin of political authority. Governments arise by habit or by force and, for contracts (and, specifically, some 'original contract') to bind, there must already be a government in place to enforce them .

Finally, the idea of a natural right is "anarchical." Such a right, Bentham claims, entails a freedom from all restraint and, in particular, from all legal restraint. Since a natural right would be anterior to law, it could not be limited by law and, since human beings are motivated by self interest, if everyone had such freedom, the result would be pure anarchy. To have a right in any meaningful sense entails that others cannot legitimately interfere with one's rights, and this implies that rights must be capable of enforcement. Such restriction, as noted earlier, is the province of the law.

Bentham concludes, therefore, that the term "[n]atural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,--nonsense upon stilts." Rights--what Bentham calls "real" rights--then, are fundamentally legal rights. All rights must be legal and specific (that is, having both a specific object and subject). They ought to be made because of their conduciveness to "the general mass of felicity" and, correlatively, when their abolition would be to the advantage of society, rights ought to be abolished. So far as rights exist in law, they are protected; outside of law,

they are at best "reasons for wishing there were such things as rights." While Bentham's essays against natural rights are largely polemical, many of his objections continue to be influential in contemporary political philosophy.

Nevertheless, Bentham did not dismiss talk of rights altogether. There are some services that are essential to the happiness of human beings and that cannot be left to others to fulfill as they see fit, and so these individuals must be compelled, on pain of punishment, to fulfill them. They must, in other words, respect the rights of others. Thus, although Bentham was generally suspicious of the concept of 'right,' he does allow that the term is useful and, in such work as *A General View of a Complete Code of Laws*, he enumerates a large number of rights. While the meaning he assigns to these 'rights' is largely stipulative rather than descriptive, they clearly reflect principles defended throughout his work.

There has been some debate over the extent to which the rights that Bentham defends are based on, or reducible to, duties or obligations, whether he can consistently maintain that such duties or obligations are based on the principle of utility, and whether the existence of what Bentham calls 'permissive rights'--rights one has where the law is silent--is consistent with his general utilitarian view. (This latter point has been discussed at length by H.L.A. Hart and David Lyons.)

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George Berkeley (1685-1753)

Life and Writings. **Berkeley was born at Dysert Castle, near Thomastown, Ireland, on March 12, 1685. He studied at Trinity College Dublin and received a B.A. (1704), M.A. and fellow (1707). He filled various college offices includ ing tutor, Junior Dean, and Junior Greek Lecturer. He lived there in an atmosphere "charged with the elements of reaction against traditional scholasticism in physics and metaphysics." His *Philosophical Commentaries* (first printed in 1871 under the title *Common-Place Book*) was written from time to time during his undergraduate years as a kind of scrapbook of thoughts. The work indicates the great formative influence of Locke's *Essay* which was a text book at Trinity College, and appear s to have excited Berkeley to independent critical activity. In 1709 he published an *Essay toward a New Theory of Vision*, an examination of visual consciousness to prove that it affords no ground for belief in the reality of the objects apparently seen. In 1710 appeared a *Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, which presents the theory of idealism, for which he is best remembered.**

Berkeley took holy orders, and, in 1713, he left Dublin, went to London and formed acquaintances. The same year he published *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, a popularized and lively account of the theory of idealism as appears in his *Principles*. He visited continental Europe in 1713-14 and again in 1716-20. During this period he did little literary work. Although he made some progress with the second part of his *Principles*, the manuscript was lost in his travels and the work was never resumed. His Latin treatise *De motu* was written as he was on his way home and published in 1721. Back in England, he became concerned with what he witnessed as a nationwide decline in religion, decay of public spirit, and corrupt ion of manners. The result was his *Essay towards preventing the ruin of Great Britain,* published anonymously in 1721. That same year he returned to Ireland, earned his B.D. and D.D. (1721), and again filled college offices including Divinity Lectur er, Senior Lecturer, Hebrew Lecturer, Proctor, Dean of Dromore, and Dean of Derry.

He now became devoted to a plan of establishing a college in the Bermuda Islands, went to London to further the project in 1724, and in 1725 published *A Proposal for the Better Supplying of Churches in our Foreign Plantations, and for converting t he savage Americans to Christianity by a college to be erected in the Summer Islands, otherwise called the Isles of Bermuda*. By his enthusiasm and persuasiveness, he won many expressions of sympathy, and came to believe that the government would suppo rt the plan. In September 1728, he sailed for America and landed at Newport, Rhode Island. On arrival he bought a farm near Newport and built a house which he called "Whitehall" after the English palace. The shoreline, about a mile from the house, had a cleft in the rocks which became a retreat for writing and reflection. He helped found a philosophical society at Newport and preached there in Trinity Church, a old wooden structure. He influenced Reverend Samuel Johnson, episcopal missionary and later fi rst president of Columbia College, New York. The new world affected Berkeley's imagination and led to a set of *Verses on the prospect*

***of planting arts and learning in America*.**

Three years of waiting on funding for his project convinced him that his hopes were futile, and in February 1732 he returned to London. He published immediately *Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher*, the result of his studies in America. It is a polemic against deists whom he identifies with atheists, and designates as "minute philosophers" because of their inability to take large views of things. In 1733 appeared his *Theory of Vision, or Visual Language Vindicated and Explained*. In the f ollowing year he published *The Analyst*, in which he criticized the positions of the new mathematics which, in his view, were connected with a materialistic conception of the world. This bold attempt to carry the war into the enemy's country prompte d many pamphlets in response. In 1734 he was made bishop of Cloyne. After this, his literary work was divided between questions of social reform and religious reflection. His concern for reform is represented in *The Querist* (1735). Other writings e xpress his faith in tar-water as a universal medicine, specifically his *Siris, a Chain of Philosophical Reflections, and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-water* (1744), in which he also revises his earlier views of idealism. Berkeley lived wi th his family in Cloyne until 1752, when he went to Oxford to end his days with his son, a senior student at Christ Church.

Early Views. **Berkeley's principal metaphysical position is idealism: nothing, including material objects, exists apart from perception; external objects are ultimately collections of ideas and sensations. From his earliest writin gs in the *Philosophical Commentaries*, Berkeley's idealism is evident. There he refers to his doctrine of "the immaterial hypothesis". Only persons exist: "all other things are not so much existences as manners of the existence of persons." He antic ipates that "a mighty sect of men will oppose me," that he will be called young, and upstart, a pretender, vain; but his confidence is not shaken: "Newton begs his principles; I demonstrate mine."**

In his earliest publications, he did not openly reveal his idealism to the world. *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* deals with one point only: the relation between the objects of sight and those of touch. William Molyneux had once set th e problem to Locke, whether a man born blind, if he recovered his sight, would be able by sight alone to distinguish from one another a cube and a sphere, with both which he had been previously acquainted by touch. Molyneux answered his own question negat ively, and Locke agreed with his answer. Berkeley also agreed with them about the answer, but for a more fundamental reason. If extension is an idea common to sight and touch (as Locke held), then visible squareness must be the same as, or have something in common with, tangible squareness. In virtue of this, the man born blind, so soon as he is made to see, should be able to distinguish between a visible square and a visible circle, and to identify this distinction with the distinction between the square and the circle already known by touch. if he is unable to do so, it is because there is nothing in common between the visible object and the tangible. And this is Berkeley's view. "The objects of sight and touch," he says, "make, if I may so say, two set s of ideas which are widely different from each other.... A man born blind, being made to see, would at first have no idea of distance by sight: the sun and stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearer, would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in h is mind.

Much of the *Essay* is devoted to explaining the apparent immediateness with which the distance of an object is seen. But the essence of the whole consists in two propositions: (1) that the object (or ideas) of sight have nothing in common with the objects of touch, and (2) that the connection of sight and touch is "arbitrary" and learned by experience only. The connection is arbitrary; but it

is regular and constant. What we see suggests to us what we may expect to touch and handle. The whole v isible world -- as was further enforced in his *Theory of Vision or Visual Language* -- consists of a set of signs which, like a language, have for their purpose to convey a meaning; though, like the words in a language, they neither resemble nor cau se that meaning, nor have any necessary connection with it. In using sight to guide our movements we interpret the language of God.

***The Principles* and *The Three Dialogues*. Berkeley's early theory of idealism -- the version now associated with his name -- is found in his *Principles of Human Knowledge*, and *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*. In both of these Berkeley argues that no existence is conceivable (and therefore not possible) which is not either conscious spirit or the ideas (i.e. objects) of which such spirit is conscious. Locke affirmed secondary and primar y qualities of the material world. Secondary qualities, including color and taste, do not exist apart from sensations; primary qualities exist irrespective of our knowledge. Berkeley denies this distinction, and holds that external objects exist only as t hey are perceived by a subject. Thus, the mind produces ideas, and these ideas are things; to *be*, then, is to be *perceived*. There are, however, two classes of ideas: (1) the less regular and coherent, arising in the imagination, and (2) the more vivid and permanent, learned by experience "imprinted on the senses by the Author of nature" which are the real things. According to Berkeley, matter is not an objective reality but a composition of sensible qualities existing in the mind. "No object exists apart from the mind; mind is therefore the deepest reality; it is the *prius*, both in thought and existence, if for a moment we assume the popular distinction between the two."**

Locke had attributed our ignorance of the real essence of things to the imperfection of our human faculties. He accounted for the limitations of our knowledge by reference to the practical uses which it is intended to serve and for which, in spite of its theoretical inadequacy, is entirely sufficient. In Berkeley's judgment it is not the defect of our faculties, but our misuse of them that is the cause of our ignorance of reality.

> **It is said the faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the support and pleasure of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things.... But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them.... Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowled ge, are entirely owing to ourselves. We have first raised a dust, and then complain we cannot see. (*Principles*, Introduction, Sections 2, and 3).**

For Berkeley, the great obstacle to knowledge is the misuse of words, particularly the substitution of words for ideas. It is "the mist and veil of words" that has chiefly obscured from us the true nature of reality. All our ideas are really particular an d concrete; it is only because we have been content to accept words in place of ideas that we have imagined the possibility of "abstract" general ideas. Locke himself is the victim of such verbalism and abstraction; for what else is his "material substanc e" but an abstract idea, or a mere word which represents no idea at all?

Berkeley's discussion of abstract ideas in the Introduction to the *Principles* is calculated to refute Locke. For Locke, an idea is "whatsoever is the *object* of the understanding when a man thinks;

hence the term expresses "whatever is meant by *phantasm, notion, species,* or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." For Berkeley, "idea" means an objected presented to the senses, or represented in imagination. An abstract idea, t herefore, is a contradiction in terms, since it is equivalent to an abstract image. It is impossible to imagine color in general, or a triangle which is neither equilateral, isosceles, or scalenon. While all ideas are, in themselves, particular, an idea m ay acquire generality by being used to represent other particular ideas or the element common to a number of particular ideas.

> **It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which i fully agree. But then it does not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in the manner premised -- *universality* , so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature *particular*, are *rendered universal*. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, it is supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a triangle: which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an *id ea* of a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilineal triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal. (*Principles*, Introduction, Sect. 15)**

It is not part of Berkeley's polemical purpose in the discussion of abstract ideas to develop the realistic implications of his position, or to show how it is that an idea, in itself particular, is qualified to represent other particular ideas of the same class. The abstract terms which he is concerned to invalidate are *merely* general. Of these the best example is Locke's abstract "matter", from which all particular, and therefore all general qualities have been removed.

The reality of all external things, then, consists in the particular sensations from which they derive their names, and by which they are distinguished from one another; think away these particular ideas, and the idea of the thing vanishes with them. And if it be objected that Matter must still be postulated as the *substratum* or support of the qualities, Berkeley retorts with the question, What can be the support of ideas or sensations but percipient mind? The thing is nothing but the sum of i ts qualities; what is true of each of these qualities is true of their sum. The thing itself, so far as we can intelligently speak of it, depends for its existence upon percipient mind.

Existence of Self, Other Minds, and God.

In the *Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous* Berkeley anticipates Hume's criticism that the same objection which Berkeley has urged against the existence of material substance are applicable to his own conception of spiritual substance:

> **You acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no *idea* of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You a dmit nevertheless that there is a spiritual Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act consistently, you must either ad mit Matter or**

> **reject Spirit. What say you to this?**

Berkeley's answer is that the cases differ in two all-important respects. First, the notion of matter, as the unthinking support of ideas, is "repugnant" or self contradictory, whereas "it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subj ect of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them." Secondly, while "I have no reason for disbelieving the existence of Matter," "the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflexion." Hylas still objects :

> **Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that *you* are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words ar e not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in *spiritual Substance* than in *material Substance*, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.**

Berkeley's reply, in the person of Philonous, is as follows:

> **How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that *I myself* am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, will,s and operates about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, p erceive both colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a s piritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is th erefore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.**

In the second place, Berkeley finds in Spirit the only real cause or power. In this case also we have no "idea", but a "notion":

> **Such is the nature of Spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth.... I find I can excite ideas in my mid at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than *willing*, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy.... Thus much is certain and grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words. (*Principle s*, Sects. 27, 28)**

Similarly, the existence of other finite spirits is at least a probable inference, "if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational beli ef of Matter." The most convincing ground of belief in the existence of our fellow-men is their speaking to us, and we have the same ground for believing in the existence of God, who speaks to us in the universal sense-symbolism of Nature. The test of rea lity is externality, in the sense that the ideas are produced in our minds by no activity of our own, but by another Spirit, and produced in such a constant and uniform manner that, arbitrary as the connection between them is, we learn to predict what wil l actually happen, and find that we are living in a world that is identical with, in the sense of similar to, that of our fellow humans.The significant and interpretable character of the ideas presented to us in sense-experience points to

reason, as well as will, in its Author. The permanence and continuity that characterize our changing experience find their explanation in the reasonable constancy of the divine Will which is actively present in it all. The world is a constant creation; the infinite Spir it is ever speaking to the spirits of men.

Later Idealism: *Siris.* **Thirty-five years after the *Essay on Vision,* in the comparative quite and seclusion of his later years at Cloyne, he found time and opportunity to "weigh and revise" his earlier views. The uni on of his practical and speculative interests is illustrated in his final work, *Siris: a Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-water and divers other subjects connected together and arising one from another.* The work is more like a series of unconnected notes, such as we find in the youthful *Philosophical Commentaries,* than a sustained philosophical argument, and it is often difficult to separate Berkeley's own views from the mass of quotations and all usions to older writers with which its pages are crowded. Its primary concern is with the body and its ills, but its ultimate concern is with the soul.**

> **If the lute be not well tuned, the musician fails of his harmony. And, in our present condition, the operations of the mind so far depend on the right tone or good condition of its instrument, that anything which greatly contributes to preserve or recover the health of the Body is well worth the attention of the mind. These considerations have moved me to communicate to the public, the salutary virtues of Tar-water; to which I thought myself indispensably obliged by the duty every man owes to mankind. And , as effects are linked with their causes, my thoughts on this low but useful theme led to farther inquires, and those on to others; remote perhaps and speculative, but I hope not altogether useless or unentertaining.**

Living, he says, "in a remote corner among poor neighbours who for want of a regular physician have often recourse to me, I have had frequent opportunities of trial". The result of these trials of its virtues was the conviction that he had found in this s imple drug the panacea for all the bodily ills of humans. The purpose of the book is at once to describe the nature of this panacea and to develop the metaphysical and religions reflections which are suggested by the marvellous properties of a thing appar ently, and in itself, so simple and so "low".

In *Siris* Berkeley moves more in the direction of Platonic idealism than that which is seen in his *Principles* (which followed the Lockean heritage of the origin of knowledge from our senses). We find accordingly a new critique of the sen ses and a new exaltation of purely intellectual insight. Sense is only the first and lowest step in the ascent of the soul from the world to God, the meanest link in the Golden Chain that unites the finite to the infinite Spirit.

> **The perceptions of sense are gross; but even in the sense there is a difference. Though harmony and proportion are not objects of sense, yet the eye and the ear are organs which offer to the mind such materials by means whereof she may apprehend both the one and the other. By experiments of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of the soul; and from them, whether by a gradual evolution or ascent, we arrive at the highest. Sense supplies images to memory. These become subjects for fancy to wo rk upon. Reason considers and judges of the imaginations. And these acts of reason become new objects to the understanding. In this scale, each lower faculty is a step that leads to one above it. And the uppermost naturally leads to the Deity; which**

> **is ra ther the object of intellectual knowledge than even of the discursive faculty, not to mention the sensitive. There runs a Chain throughout the whole system of beings. In this Chain one link drags another. The meanest things are connected with the highest. (Sect. 303)**

The extreme links of this Chain are the "grossly sensible" and the "purely intelligible". His earlier distinction between the idea and the notion is now developed into the contrast between *phenomena* or *appearances* on the one hand and Ideas (in the Platonic sense) or Reality on the other. The senses, instead of being regarded as the medium of the self-revelation of the divine Spirit to the human, are condemned as veiling the divine Reality from our spirits. The mind is "depressed by the heavi ness of the animal nature to which it is chained"; we are "oppressed and overwhelmed by the senses," the world of which is a "region of darkness and dreams". Our senses at first beset and overbear our mind. Until intellect begins to dawn and cast a ray on this shadowy scene, our sensible appearances are all in all and we look no farther for realities or causes. We then perceive the "true principle of unity, identity and existence. Those beings that before seemed to constitute the whole of Being, upon taki ng an intellectual view of things, prove to be but fleeting phantoms" (Sect. 249)

While Berkeley's earlier view of reality, so far at least as the external world is concerned, was expressed in the statement that *the being of things is their perception,* the view which we find in *Siris* might rather be expressed in the statement that "the being of things is their conception". Reality, being rationally constituted, can be apprehended only by intellect or reason. "We know a thing when we understand it; and we understand it when we can interpret or tell what it signifies. Strictly, the sense knows nothing. We perceive indeed sounds by hearing, and characters by sight.But we are not therefore said to understand them" (Sect. 253).

> **As understanding perceiveth not, that is, doth not hear or see, or feel, so sense knoweth not: and although the mind may use both sense and fancy, as means whereby to arrive at knowledge, yet sense or soul, so far forth as sensitive, knoweth not: and alth ough the mind may use both sense and fancy, as a means whereby to arrive at knowledge, yet sense or soul, so far forth as sensitive, knoweth nothing. (Sect. 305)**

In such passages as these we see how Berkeley's center of speculative interests has changed from the world of the senses to that of intellect or reason, and yet how closely his later Idealism is related to his earlier doctrine of Immaterialism; how the on e is rather a development than a negation of the other. Even in the *Principles* he had insisted upon the interpretability of the data of sensation, upon their symbolic or significant character, as the feature which makes possible science, on the one hand, and the practical conduct of life. Even in the *Principles* he had insisted upon the necessity of supplementing the "idea" with the "notion", the perceptual with the conceptual apprehension of reality, holding that only through such notions ca n we apprehend relations or penetrate to spiritual substance and true causes. But his early doctrine of Immaterialism, or of the sensational character of external reality, has lost interest for him, in view of the higher truth, which now preoccupies him, of the rational constitution of the universe. In a new and deeper sense he now holds that God speaks to humans, not merely in the simple language of Vision and of Sense, but in the deeper and more intimate communication of the divine with the human Reason .

Ethics. Scholars often contend that there is no real connection between Berkeley's metaphysical position and anything he says on the subject of ethics. However, Berkeley has himself suggested that his war against abstractions migh t have been carried into the sphere of ethics as well as into that of natural philosophy and of metaphysics:

> What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewi se a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words stand fro general notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality difficult and th e study thereof of less use to mankind. And in effect one may make a great progress in school-ethics without ever being the wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave himself in the affairs of life more to the advantage or himself or his neighbo urs than he did before. (Principles, Sect. 100)

Berkeley never carried out the hint here conveyed of a reform of the science of ethics on his own lines of thought about external reality. However, in the discourse on *Passive Obedience*, directed against Locke's view of sovereignty in the *Treati se of Civil Government*, he investigates the relation of our duty to the sovereign to "the principles of the Law of Nature". Here he develops the analogy between moral laws and the laws of divine government of Nature. Also, the Third Dialogue of *Alc iphron or the Minute Philosopher* is devoted to the question of the nature of virtue, and is directed against Shaftesbury's theory. While the discussion is vitiated by misrepresentation of his opponent's position, it supplies interesting suggestions as to Berkeley's ethical views.

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Berlin Circle

Group of philosophers and scientists who gathered round Hans Reichenbach in late 1920s. Among its members were H. Reichenbach, K. Grelling, C. G. Hempel, D. Hilbert, R. von Mises. Berlin Circle -- its name was Die Gesellschaft für empirische Philosophie (Society for empirical philosophy) -- joined up with the Vienna Circle; together they published the journal *Erkenntnis* edit by R. Carnap and H. Reichenbach, and organized several congresses on scientific philosophy, the first of which held in Prague in 1929.

Members of Berlin Circle were particularly active in analyzing contemporary physics, especially the theory of relativity, and in developing the frequency interpretation of the probability. After the rise of Nazism, several of them emigrated from Germany. Reichenbach moved to Turkey in 1933 and to USA in 1938; Hempel to Belgium in 1934 and to USA in 1939; Grelling was killed in a concentration camp. Hence the Berlin Circle was dispersed.

See also Hempel, Reichenbach, Logical positivism.

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Best Reasons Morality

The "Best Reasons" approach to moral decision making advocates a rational search for the best reasons for or against a course of action. Moral reasoning, then, parallels legal reasoning which involves collecting relevant facts, weighing arguments on both sides of the issue, and then judging. Accordingly, this view of ethics is often called the best reasons approach. Advocates of this position are Stephen Toulmin in Reason in Ethics (1950), Kurt Baier in The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Et hics (1958), and James Rachels in Elements of Moral Philosophy (1993).

BAIER'S FORMULATION. The heart of Baier's position is presented in Chapter three of The Moral Point of View, titled "The Best Thing to Do." In this chapter, Baier explains that morality involves an answer to the question, "What shall I do." The answe r we give to this question is the course of action which is supported by the best reasons. Baier begins by criticizing rival interpretations of the role of reason in morality. He attacks the noncognitivist view that moral pronouncements are simply command s or orders. Instead, Baier argues that the moral question, "What shall I do?" is request for information, and not a request for orders. Baier also attacks Aristotle's account of moral reasoning, which maintains that moral reasoning involves calculating t he best means of attaining our ultimate highest good. For Baier, the moral question, "What shall I do?" requests a decision about which specific goal or good I should pursue, and not a request for the best means of attaining an ultimate goal. Plato's acco unt of a rational and intuitive moral faculty is attacked, since there is no such faculty and, strictly speaking, such a faculty would only involve a blind intuition, and not thinking through an issue. Hume's restrictive account of moral reasoning (which involves merely calculating consequences) is also attacked. Baier also considers the view of C.L. Stevenson, that moral reasoning merely means believing in certain facts which give us a desire to act. Stevenson's view fails since it improperly restricts t he notion of reason to that of desire.

For Baier, then, moral reasoning involves two features: surveying the facts, and weighing the facts. Errors of moral reasoning can occur in both of these steps: we may make mistakes in our initial survey, and we may not locate the correct considerati ons when weighing the facts. When weighing the facts, Baier notes that we typically appeal to moral principles, such as self-interest, pleasure, law and religion. Some of these principles have greater weight than others. He concludes noting that the moral conclusion we arrive at is only presumptively valid, pending future deliberations.

In theory, the advantage of Baier's approach is that we are not required to either devise or systematize lists of normative principles. We simply weigh the supporting principles and explanations as they are relevant to the moral choice under consideration. However, the best reasons approach does assume that the principles we offer have validity -- otherwise it would make no sense to appeal to them when justifying our choice of action. If we then ask why these principles have validity, we must we fall back on either consequentialist or non-consequentialist explanations. Thus, the best reasons approach may only be a disguised -- and less systematized --

consequentialist or non-consequentialist normative theory.

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Henry St. John Bolingbroke(1678-1751)

LIFE. Henry St. John Bolingbroke was born in Battersea in 1678. He was educated at Eton and Oxford, after which he traveled about two years on the continent. In 1700, shortly after his return, he married the daughter of Sir Henry Winchcomb, from whom he soon separated. Up to this period, he was chiefly known for his extreme dissipation but, after entering parliament in 1701, he devoted himself to politics, joined the Tory party, and soon made himself prominent as an orator. In 1704 he was made secretary of war and retained this office until 1708 when the Whigs came into power, after which he retired from politics and applied himself to study. After resignation, Bolingbroke retained great influence as the queen's favorite counselor. On the fall of the Whig party in 1710, he was made secretary of state for foreign affairs. In 1712, he was called to the house of lords by the title of Viscount Bolingbroke and in 1713, against the wishes of nearly the entire nation, concluded the peace of Utrecht. Having previously quarreled with his old friend Harley, now the Earl of Oxford and his most powerful rival, he contrived his dismissal in July 1714. Bolingbroke immediately proceeded to form a strong Jacobite ministry in accordance with the well-known inclinations of his royal mistress, whose death a few days after threw into disorder his dangerous and unprincipled schemes. The accession of George I was a deathblow to Bolingbroke's political prospects, on August 28 he was deposed from office, in March 1715 he fled to France and, in August 1715 he was attainted. For some time he held the office of secretary of state to the Pretender, but his restless and ambitious spirit yearned for the 'large excitement' of English politics. Bolingbroke's efforts to obtain a pardon were not successful and he retired to a small estate which he had purchased near Orleans. In 1718 his first wife died and, in 1720, he married the rich widow of the Marquis de Vilette.

A prudent use of this lady's wealth enabled him to return to England in September 1724. His property was restored to him, but he was never permitted to take his seat in parliament. He therefore removed himself to his villa at Dawley, near Uxbridge, where he occasionally enjoyed the society of Swift, Pope, and others of his old friends with whom he had corresponded in his exile. It was at Dawley where Bolingbroke diversified his moral and metaphysical studies by his attacks on the ministry in his periodical the *Craftsman*, in which the letters forming his *Dissertation on Parties* first appeared. In 1735, finding his political hopes clouded forever, he went back to France and continued to live there until 1742. During his second residence abroad, he wrote his *Letters on the Study of History* in which he violently attacked the Christian religion. He died on October 1, 1751, after a long illness. His talents were brilliant and versatile; his style of writing was polished and eloquent; but his fatal lack of sincerity and honest purpose, and the low and unscrupulous ambition which made him scramble for power with a selfish indifference to national security, hindered him from looking wisely and deeply into any question. His philosophical theories are not profound, nor his conclusions solid, while his criticism of passing history is worthless.

PHILOSOPHY. Bolingbroke's philosophical writings were mostly unprinted until after his death, when David Mallet published a five-volume collection of Bolingbroke's works. The philosophical

portions of this collection display his dependence on Locke, who Bolingbroke acknowledged as his "master." Using Locke's ideas and his own, Bolingbroke attempts to explain how one attains knowledge and what its limits are, as well as asserting his own beliefs about God and religion. In doing so, he makes virulent attacks on previous philosophers such as Plato, Malebranche, and Berkley.

Following Locke, Bolingbroke distinguishes between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection. Borrowing further from Locke, he calls these "simple ideas" and says they are the materials out of which complex ideas are made. He goes on to say that although one may not understand the process by which objects produce sensory perceptions, one can know they do so. Likewise, one may not know how the will causes action, such as the movement of an arm, but this does not hinder one from knowing it is the will which causes it. He presents these beliefs as clear and obvious and in no need of being questioned. Bolingbroke gives less power, than does Locke, to the mind concerning its ability to combine ideas within itself, putting this power in nature instead. Bolingbroke also maintains that nature (the observable world) serves as a reliable guide, and error comes when one uses one's faculties out of accordance with nature.

Bolingbroke is known for being a Deist. He asserts there is a God, and proving this by reason is possible. However, this God is not at all like humans, and Bolingbroke speaks of anthropomorphism with contempt. Instead, he says God is so dissimilar to human beings, the distance between them is unimaginable and no comparison between the two is possible. Bolingbroke uses the cosmological argument to demonstrate there is a God, but goes on to assert that this God is omnipotent and omniscient and always does what is best. (Bolingbroke even claims this is the best of all possible worlds.) In order to defend his view of God's transcendence, Bolingbroke says that while one can be certain God knows everything, one can never comprehend the way in which He knows things, and goes as far as to say God's manner of knowing cannot be understood by human beings. God's morality is equally beyond human understanding. Our moral values are based solely on our existence as social beings who cannot live lives of isolation or follow a path of pure selfishness. These morals can be discovered by reason. While they arise out of the nature of things created by God, they are in no way indicative of a divine sense of morality. God created the world, and the nature of the world determines morality. However, this nature does not reflect the character or nature of God.

Bolingbroke states Christianity was originally a "complete" and "very plain system of religion," was actually no more than the "natural religion," and Jesus did not teach anything more than could be discovered by reason. Bolingbroke expresses regret that Christian teachings did not remain at their initial, simple level, and wishes they had never been corrupted by such systems as Platonism, which he regards as the product of mere imagination. His understanding of religion furthermore denies the validity of prayer by insisting one could not come into contact with one's deity, denigrates the importance of the crucifixion in Christianity, and suggests one cannot know whether or not there is a soul which survives the death of the body.

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Joseph Butler (1692-1752)

LIFE. Joseph Butler was born into a Presbyterian family at Wantage. He attended a dissenting academy, but then converted to the Church of England intent on an ecclesiastical career. Butler expressed distaste for Oxford's intellectual conventions while a student at Oriel College; he preferred the newer styles of thought, especially those of Locke, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, leading Hume to characterize Butler as one of those "who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public." . Butler benefited from the support of Samuel Clarke and the Talbot family.

In 1719, Butler was appointed to his first job, preacher to the Rolls Chapel in Chancery Lane, London. Butler's anonymous letters to Clarke had been published in 1716, but a selection of his Rolls sermons (1726) was the first work published under his name. These sermons are still widely read and have held the attention of secular philosophers more than any other sermons in history. Butler moved north and became rector of Stanhope in 1725. Only at this point is his life documented in any detail, and his tenure is remembered mainly for the *Analogy of Religion* (1736). Soon after publication of that work, Butler became Bishop of Bristol. Queen Caroline had died urging his preferment, but Bristol was one of the poorest sees, and Butler expressed some displeasure in accepting it. Once Butler became dean of St. Paul's in 1740, he was able to use that income to support his work in Bristol. In 1750, not long before his death, Butler was elevated to Durham, one of the richest bishoprics. The tradition that Butler declined the See of Canterbury was conclusively discredited by Norman Sykes (1936), but continues to be repeated uncritically in many reference works. Butler's famous encounter with John Wesley has only recently be reconstructed in as full detail as seems possible given the state of the surviving evidence, and we are now left with little hope of ever knowing what their actual relationship was. They disagreed, certainly, on Wesley's right to preach without a license, and on this point Butler seems entirely in the right, but Butler may have supported Wesley more than he opposed him, and Wesley seems entirely sincere in his praise of the *Analogy*.

Butler has become an icon of a highly intellectualized, even rarefied, theology, "wafted in a cloud of metaphysics," as Horace Walpole said. Ironically, Butler refused as a matter of principle to write speculative works or to pursue curiosity. All his writings were directly related to the performance of his duties at the time or to career advancement. From the Rolls sermons on, all his works are devoted to pastoral philosophy.

A pastoral philosopher gives philosophically persuasive arguments for seeing life in a particular way when such a seeing-as may have a decisive effect on practice. Butler had little interest in and only occasionally practices natural theology in the scholastic sense; his intent is rather defensive, to answer those who claim that morals and religion, as conventionally understood, may be safely disregarded. Butler tried to show, as a refutation of the practice of his day (as he perceived it) that morals and religion are natural extensions of the common way of life usually taken for granted,

and thus that those who would dispense with them bear a burden of proof they are unable to discharge. In arguing that morals and religion are favored by a presumption already acknowledged in ordinary life, Butler employs many types of appeal, at least some of which would be fallacious if used in an attempted demonstrative argument. Butler's philosophy possesses a unity often neglected by those who read him selectively.

The totality of his work addresses the questions: why be moral? why be religious? and which morality?, which religion?

HUMAN NATURE AS MADE FOR VIRTUE. Butler's argument for morality, found primarily in his sermons, is an attempt to show that morality is a matter of following human nature. To develop this argument, he introduces the notions of nature and of a system. There are, he says, various parts to human nature, and they are arranged hierarchically. The fact that human nature is hierarchically ordered is not what makes us manifestly adapted to virtue, rather it is that what Butler calls conscience is at the top of this hierarchy. Butler does sometimes refer to the conscience as the voice of God, but contrary to what is sometimes alleged, he never relies on divine authority in asserting the supremacy, the universality or the reliability of conscience. Butler clearly believes in the autonomy of the conscience as a secular organ of knowledge.

Whether the conscience judges principles, actions or persons is not clear, perhaps deliberately since such distinctions are of no practical significance. What Butler is concerned to show is that to dismiss morality is in effect to dismiss our own nature, and therefore absurd. As to which morality we are to follow, Butler seems to have in mind the common core of civilized standards. He stresses the degree of agreement and reliability of conscience without denying some differences remain. All that is required for his argument to go through is that the opponent accept in practice that conscience is the supreme authority in human nature and that we ought not to disregard our own nature.

The most significant recent challenge to Butler's moral theory is by Nicholas Sturgeon (1976), a reply to which appears in Stephen Darwall (1995).

Besides the appeal to the rank of conscience, Butler offered many other observations in his attempt to show that we are made for, i.e., especially suited to, virtue. In his famous refutation of Hobbes, one of them, he shows that benevolence is as much a part of human nature as self-love. Butler also shows how various other aspects of human nature are adapted to virtue, sometimes in surprising ways, for example, that resentment is needed to balance benevolence. He also deals forthrightly with self-deception. Only three of the fifteen sermons deal with explicitly religious themes: the sermons on the love of God and the sermon on ignorance.

HUMAN LIFE AS IN THE PRESENCE OF GOD. Butler's views on our knowledge of God are among the most frequently misstated aspects of his philosophy. Lewis White Beck's exposition (1937) of this neglected aspect of Butler's philosophy has itself been generally neglected, and both friends and foes frequently assert that Butler "assumed" that God exists. Butler never assumes the existence of God, rather, at least after his exchange with Clarke, he takes it as granted that God's existence can be and has been proved to the satisfaction of those who were party to the discussion in his time. The charge, frequently repeated since the mid-nineteenth century, that Butler's position is reversible once an opponent refuses to grant God's existence is therefore groundless. Butler does not expound any proof of God's existence, a fact that makes his identification with Cleanthes in Hume's *Dialogues* problematic, but he does endorse many such proofs, using common names rather than citing specific texts. The sermons on the love of God are rarely read today, but

they provide abundant evidence that Butler's God is not some remote deity who created the world and then lost interest in it. On the contrary, the difference that God makes to us is the difference that a lively sense of God's presence makes.

THIS LIFE AS A PRELUDE TO A FUTURE LIFE. Butler considered the expectation of a future life to be the foundation of all our hopes and fears. He does not state exactly why this is so, and most commentators have concluded that he is referring to hopes and fears regarding what will happen to us as individuals when we die. Such an intention would be contrary to Butler's general line of thought. More consonant with what Butler does say is the Platonic point that one cannot truly benefit by acting viciously and then escaping punishment. Since that is what appears to happen in this world, appearances must be denied. Secondly, and here Butler would agree with Hume, in this world there is an appearance that the superintendence of the universe is not entirely just. Given the three logical options (1) the universe is ultimately unjust, (2) contrary to appearances, this world is somehow just and (3) the universe is just, but only when viewed more broadly than we are able to see now, Butler thinks there are good practical reasons for accepting the third in practice.

The first chapter of the *Analogy* is devoted to the argument that what little we know of the nature of death is insufficient to warrant an assurance that death is the end of us, and when we lack sufficient warrant for acting on the presumption of a change, we must act on the presumption of continuance. The recurrent objection, offered by such otherwise sympathetic readers as Swinburne, is that in the physical destruction of the body, we do have sufficient warrant. Chisholm (1986) has proposed a counter to this criticism.

Butler appends to his discussion of a future life a brief essay on personal identity, and this is the only part of the *Analogy* widely read today. That it is read independently is perhaps just as well since it is difficult to see how it is related to the general argument. Butler says he needs to answer objections to personal identity continuing after death, which he certainly must do, but the view that he proposes to refute is Locke's, and Locke seemed not to see that his theory personal identity presented a problem for expectation of a future life. Locke's theory was that memory is constitutive of personal identity, and even if Butler is right in his objection to Locke's theory, he certainly needs personal memories to be retained since they are presupposed by his theory of rewards and punishments after death.

THE WORLD AS A MORAL ORDER. Butler's work is directed mainly against sceptics and those inclined toward scepticism and as an aid for those who propose to argue with sceptics. The general motivation for his work is to overcome intellectual embarrassment at accepting the received systems of morals and religion. To succeed, Butler most present a case that is plausible if not fully probative, and he must do so without resorting to an overly reductive account of morals and religion. Butler's strategy is to naturalize morals and religion. Although generally scorning scholastic methods, Butler does accept the ontological proof of God's existence, the appeal to the unity and simplicity of the soul and the distinction of natural and revealed religion. The fundamental doctrine of natural religion is the efficacy of morals, that the categories of virtue and vice already discussed in terms of human nature, have application to the larger world of nature. To some, fortune and misfortune in this world seem not to be correlated with any moral scheme, but with numerous examples, Butler shows that the world as we ordinarily experience it does have the appearance of a moral order.

Butler takes up two objections: the possibility that the doctrine of necessity is true and the familiar

problem of evil. With regard to necessity, he argues that even if such is the case, we are in no position to live in accord with necessity since we cannot see our own or others actions as entirely necessitated. Butler's approach to the problem of evil is to appeal to human ignorance, a principal theme in various aspects of his work. What Butler must show is that we do not know of the actual occurrence of any event such that it could not be part of a just world. Since he does appeal to our ignorance, Butler cannot be said to have produced a theodicy, a justification of the ways of God to us, but his strategy may show a greater intellectual integrity, and may be sufficient for his purposes.

THE CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES AS A REVELATION. Butler's treatment of revealed religion is less satisfactory, since he had only a partial understanding of modern biblical criticism. Butler does insist on treating the Bible like any other book for critical purposes, and he maintains that if any biblical teaching appears immoral or contrary to what we know by our natural faculties, that alone is sufficient reason for seeking another interpretation of the scripture. The point of a revelation is to supplement natural knowledge, not to overrule it. Far from compromising the role of religion, this view is entailed by the fact that nature, natural knowledge and revelation all have a common source in God. It is only in the second part of his *Analogy* that Butler argues against the deists. The characterization of his work as on the whole a reply to the deists is entirely a modern invention and is not found anywhere in the first century of reactions.

Only one chapter of the *Analogy* is devoted to the "Christian evidences" of miracles and prophecy, and even there Butler confines himself to some judicious remarks on the logical character of the arguments, especially with regard to miracles. In general, Butler presents revelation as wholly consistent with, but also genuinely supplemental of, natural knowledge. Hume says he castrated his Treatise out of regards for Butler, but based on the texts that survive, there is no reason to think Hume would have gotten the better of the argument. Charles Babbage eventually showed why Hume had no valid objection to Butler.

Unfortunately, Butler's account of scripture is entirely two-dimensional. He does not doubt the point that scripture was written in terms properly applicable to a previous state of society, but he has little sense of the canonical books themselves being redactions of a multitude of oral and literary traditions and sources.

PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AS MORAL AGENTS. In the six sermons preserved from the years he served as the Bishop of Bristol, Butler defends the moral nature of various philanthropic and political institutions of his day, and in his Charge to the Clergy at Durham, he presents a concise rationale for the Church.

BUTLER'S INFLUENCE. Ernest Mossner (1936) is still the most useful survey of Butler's influence. Mossner claims that Butler was widely read in his own time, but his evidence may be insufficient to convince some. However that may be, there is no doubt that by the late eighteenth century Butler was widely read in Scottish universities, and from the early nineteenth century at Oxford, Cambridge and many American colleges, perhaps especially because the Scottish influence was so strong in America. Butler's work impressed Hume and Wesley, and Reid, Smith and Hartley considered themselves butlerians. Butler was a great favorite of the Tractarians, but the association with them may have worked against his ultimate influence in England, especially since Newman attributed his own conversion to the Roman Church to his study of Butler. S. T. Coleridge was among the first to urge study of the sermons and to disparage the *Analogy*. The decline of interest in the *Analogy* in the late nineteenth century has never been satisfactorily

explained, but Leslie Stephen's critical work was especially influential.

The editions most frequently cited today appeared only after wide interest in Butler's *Analogy* had evaporated. The total editions are sometimes said to be countless, but this is true only in the sense that there are no agreed criteria for individuating editions. The numerous ancillary essays and study guides are still useful as evidence of how Butler was studied and understood. At its height, Butler's influence cut across protestant denominational lines and party differences in the Church of England, but serious interest in the *Analogy* is now concentrated among certain Anglican writers.

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The best modern edition of Butler's works is J.H. Bernard's, but it is a modernized text, as of 1900, and contains errors. Serious readers may consult the original editions, now available on microfilm.

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Edward Caird (1835-1908)

Scottish philosopher of the latter half of the nineteenth century, Edward Caird was one of the key figures of the idealist movement that dominated British philosophy from 1870 until the mid 1920s. Best known for his studies of Kant and Hegel, Caird exercised a strong influence on the 'second generation' of idealists, such as John Watson and Bernard Bosanquet. During his long and productive life, Caird was active in university and local politics and in educational and social reform. In his two series of Gifford lectures, he developed an important ‘evolutionary' account of religion.

Edward Caird was born in Greenock, Scotland, on March 23, 1835. A younger brother of the theologian John Caird (1820-1898), Edward began his studies at the University of Glasgow (which he briefly abandoned due to ill health), later moving to Balliol College, Oxford, from which he graduated in 1863. Following his graduation, he became Tutor at Merton College, Oxford (1864-1866), but soon left for the Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow (1866-1893). There, in addition to carrying out his academic duties, Caird was active in university and local politics, and was responsible for establishing the study of political sciences at the University. Following the death of Benjamin Jowett (1817-1893), Caird returned to Oxford, where he served as Master of Balliol College until 1907. He was a founding fellow of the British Academy (1902), a corresponding member of the French Academy, and held honorary doctorates from the Universities of St Andrews (1883), Oxford (1891), Cambridge (1898) and Wales (1902).

Along with T.H. Green (1836-1882), Caird was one of the first generation of 'British idealists,' whose philosophical work was largely in reaction to the then-dominant empiricist and associationist views of Alexander Bain (1818-1903) and J.S. Mill. He had, however, an ability of literary expression which Green did not possess; he was also more inclined to discuss questions by the method of tracing the historical development of the ideas involved. But while Green died at the early age of 47, Caird enjoyed a relatively long and productive life. It is, in part, for this reason that he exercised such a strong influence--particularly on the relation of philosophy and religion--on later idealists such as John Watson (1847-1939) and Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923). Though often considered to be 'Hegelian,' Caird was arguably more profoundly influenced by Kant--though he was far from an uncritical reader.

Caird's first major work was *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant* (1877), focussing on the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*. It was superseded in 1889 by *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (two volumes) in which Caird wished to show the relation of the three Critiques and the continuity in the movement of Kant's thought. In general, Caird was convinced that, though Kant had inaugurated a new era in philosophy with his attempt to integrate the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*, he failed to carry out this task fully. It was here that Caird's idealism took over. In these volumes on Kant, Caird sought "to display in the very argument of the great metaphysician, who was supposed to have cut the world in two with a hatchet, an almost involuntary but continuous and inevitable regression towards objective organic unity." Thus, he argued that "Kantian

philosophy is only a first stage, though of course a necessary stage, in the transition of philosophy to higher forms of Idealism." (1877, p. 667)

A sympathetic exposition of Hegel's philosophy is contained in his monograph on *Hegel* (1883) and, in 1885, his *Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte* (based on a collection of articles that had been previously published in the magazine, *Contemporary Review*) appeared. In these two works, Caird critically interprets these authors on lines of his own. Concerning Comte, for example, Caird writes that there cannot be a 'religion of Humanity' that is not, at the same time, a religion of God. In his treatment of Hegel, as of Kant, Caird's purpose was to show that there is a center of unity to which the mind must come back out of all differences, however varied and alien in appearance. The analysis was preliminary to reconstruction.

Caird's way of philosophizing differed from that of many of his contemporaries. It was consistently and even obtrusively constructive. According to Caird, "the true manner of honoring a thinker is to force oneself to understand him from his own point of view," and only then "to submit his ideas to as objective an examination as possible." Thus, he seized on the truths contained in the authors with whom he dealt, and was only incidentally concerned with their errors. One of the results of this, however, was that Caird's own views are often to be found only indirectly--that is, in his exposition and commentary of the views of others.

Like many other idealists, such as D.G. Ritchie (1853-1903), Caird was concerned to show the relation of evolutionary theory to the development of thought and culture. His first set of Gifford lectures, *The Evolution of Religion* (2 volumes, 1893), deals less than his other works with an exposition of the views of other philosophers. These lectures focussed on the possibility of a science of religion and the nature of religion from Greek times, but were especially centered on the development of the Christian faith through to the Reformation. Caird shows the spiritual sense of humanity as at first dominated by the object, but constrained by its own abstractions to swing around so as to fall under the sway of the subject.

In 1904 Caird's second set of Gifford lectures, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, appeared. Here, he provides again an evolutionary account of religious conceptions (e.g., the idea of the good, the soul, God, and the relation of God to humanity) toward a 'reflective religion' or theology. The story of Greek philosophy, which Caird considered mainly (but not exclusively) in its relation to theology, was carried from Plato through Aristotle, the Stoics, and Philo, to Plotinus and--in the final lecture--to Christian theology and St. Augustine.

In general, Caird's views on religion were importantly related to his understanding of ethics, and Caird borrows from Hegel (and Goethe) the ethical idea of self sacrifice, or 'dying to live,' which was to have an important role in the work of Bosanquet. Caird consistently emphasized the importance of religion, and that a genuine metaphysics must be able to provide an account of it.

Like many of the British idealists, Caird had a strong interest in classical literature. In his two volumes of *Essays on Literature and Philosophy* (1892), he brought together critical essays on Goethe, Rousseau, Carlyle, Dante and Wordsworth, with a discussion (in Volume II) of Cartesianism (Descartes, Malbranche and Spinoza) and metaphysics.

Caird's politics were generally liberal and progressive. He supported the education of women, opposed the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and, like Green, was involved in the 'university settlement' programs--particularly in Glasgow and in London--where recent university graduates and professionals

attempted to narrow the gap between social classes by living and working among and with the poor.

In 1907, Caird resigned his position as Master of Balliol, and died the following year on November 1. He is buried in St Sepulchre's Cemetery, Oxford, alongside Jowett and Green.

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revised by William Sweet

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Capital Punishment

The applied ethics issue of capital punishment involves determining whether the execution of criminals is ever justified, and, if so under what circumstances it is permissible. Philosophical defenses of capital punishment typically draw from more general discussions of punishment. The issue of *corrective justice* in legal philosophy distinguishes between two principal theories of punishment: utilitarian and retributive. Accordingly, defenses of capital punishment are usually either utilitarian or retributive in nature. By contrast, most criticisms of capital punishment seek to expose flaws in popular justifications of capital punishment. Thus, in the absence of any good reason for executing a criminal, the critic of capital punishment concludes that the criminal should be allowed to live.

UTILITARIAN ARGUMENTS CONCERNING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. Perhaps the most common defenses of capital punishment are on utilitarian grounds. For utilitarians, punishment in general is justified only insofar as it creates a greater balance of happiness vs. unhappiness. From the utilitarian perspective, then, capital punishment is justified if it (1) prevents the criminal from repeating his crime; or (2) deters crime by discouraging would-be offenders. For, both of these contribute to a greater balance of happiness in society. There are several immediate problems with this line of reasoning. First, the burden of proof is on the defender of capital punishment to show that the same effects could not be accomplished with less severe punishment, such as life imprisonment. This is especially pertinent since the goal of utilitarianism is to reduce as much unhappiness as possible and this entails imposing the least severe of two possible punishments when everything else is equal. Italian political theorist Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) argues this point in *On Crimes and Punishment* (1764), one of the first systematic critiques of capital punishment from the utilitarian point of view. According to Beccaria, capital punishment is not necessary to deter, and long term imprisonment is a more powerful deterrent since execution is transient.

A second and more basic problem with utilitarian defenses of capital punishment involves the fact gathering process. Since the utilitarian is making a factual claim about the beneficial social consequences of capital punishment, then his claim should be backed by empirical evidence. In the absence of such reliable empirical evidence, the utilitarian position must be dismissed, as is the case with any unverified factual claim. "Empirical evidence" in general is of two varieties: anecdotal evidence and scientific evidence. Anecdotal evidence involves isolated observations which appear to correlate two states of affairs, which, in this case, would be (a) capital punishment, and (b) improved social conditions. Given the gravity of the issue at stake with capital punishment, namely, people's lives, anecdotal evidence is an insufficient ground for establishing a causal connection between capital punishment and improved social conditions. Instead, scientific studies are needed. Several studies have been conducted in the past few decades regarding such a connection, but, unfortunately, the methodology used on social questions of this nature is

necessarily imprecise. Ideally, a truly scientific study of the question would involve a comparison between two otherwise identical societies in which capital punishment was not used in the control group but was used in the test group. The problem, though, is that it is a practical impossibility to isolate two otherwise identical societies upon which to conduct the study. An almost endless variety of differing factors in the respective groups will make the results inconclusive. Not surprisingly, the recently conducted empirical studies in fact draw conflicting conclusions. This basic problem in the fact gathering process not only applies to the utilitarian defender of capital punishment, but also to the utilitarian critic of capital punishment who might, for example, argue that society benefits more from life imprisonment sentences.

A third problem with utilitarian justifications of punishment, as pointed out by contemporary political philosopher Adam Bedeau, concerns the ratio of innocent lives saved per execution. Perhaps, in the best possible situation, executing five of the most dangerous convicts will result in saving five innocent lives in the future. As the number of executions increases, however, the number of innocent lives saved will not increase proportionally. Eventually, it may take one thousand additional executions to save only one additional innocent life. So, eventually it must be determined how many executions justify the saving of one innocent life. This, though, is virtually impossible to determine, yet utilitarians need this information to successfully calculate the overall social benefit of capital punishment.

Finally, critics of capital punishment sometimes argue on utilitarian grounds that the expense involving executions is substantially greater than the cost of life imprisonment. The costs of appeals and legal counseling are the principal expenses. Thus, the extra financial burden of capital punishment contributes to a greater balance of unhappiness vs. happiness. There are three problems with this argument. First, such financial calculations typically do not take into account that much of the legal counseling for death row inmates is *pro bono* which does not cost the taxpayer. Second, even if this is a true description of the cost of capital punishment in the United States and other developed countries, it is not representative of the cost of criminal executions world wide. Indeed, one might reasonably expect that in many developing countries executions are substantially cheaper than life imprisonment costs. Assuming that critics of capital punishment object to its practice in any country, this argument not only lacks universal application, but might in fact be used as an argument in favor of capital punishment in countries with less expensive appeals processes. Finally, even if executing criminals is more costly than life imprisonment, it is not immediately obvious that the extra expense either contributes to a greater balance of social unhappiness or even tips the balance towards unhappiness. Society may actually be pleased with, or at least content with, the value it is getting for its capital punishment dollar.

RETRIBUTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. The retributive notion of punishment in general is that (a) as a foundational matter of justice, criminals deserve punishment, and (b) punishment should be equal to the harm done. In determining what counts as "punishment equal to harm," theorists further distinguish between two types of retributive punishment. First, *lex talionis* retribution involves punishment in kind and is commonly expressed in the expression "an eye for an eye." Second, *lex salica* retribution involves punishment through compensation, and the harm inflicted can be repaired by payment or atonement. Historically, capital punishment is most often associated *lex talionis* retribution. One of the most early written statements of capital punishment from the *lex talionis* or "eye for an eye" perspective is from the 18th century BCE Babylonian *Law of Hammurabi*:

> **If a builder builds a house for someone, and does not construct it properly, and the**

> **house which he built falls in and kills its owner, then that builder shall be put to death. If it kills the son of the owner, then the son of that builder shall be put to death.**

Critics of classic *lex talionis*-oriented capital punishment point out several problems with this view. First, as a practical matter, *lex talionis* retribution cannot be uniformly applied to every harm committed. The second sentence in the above quote from the *Law of Hammurabi* shows the inherent absurdity of consistent application: "If it [i.e., a collapsed house] kills the son of the owner, then the son of the builder shall be put to death." Second, as a strict formula of retribution, *lex talionis* punishment may even be inadequate. For example, if a terrorist or mass murderer kills ten people, then taking his single life is technically not punishment in kind. Third, foundational beliefs in general have the unfortunate consequence of appearing arbitrary. If a belief in *lex talionis* retribution is foundational, then, by definition, it cannot be defended by appealing to a prior set of reasons. The arbitrary nature of this is particularly clear when we see that there is an alternative retributive view of punishment which is equally foundational, yet which does not require capital punishment, namely *lex salica* retribution. Finally, critics of capital punishment argue that the true basis of retributive justifications of capital punishment is not at all foundational, but instead rooted in psychological feelings of vengeance. Even if we grant that vengeance is a natural human emotion, critics argue that it is an impulse which should be tempered, just as we do natural feelings of fear, lust, and greed. Laws about punishment, then, should not be grounded in our extreme feelings, but should instead be based on our more tempered ones. When we moderate our natural feelings of vengeance, there should be little inclination to execute criminals.

Immanual Kant offered an alternative retributive justification of capital punishment which is not rooted in vengeance. Instead, for Kant, capital punishment is based on the idea that every person is a valuable and worthy of respect because of their ability to make rational and free choices. The murder, too, is worthy of respect; we, thus, show him respect by treating him the same way he declares that people are to be treated. Accordingly, we execute the murderer. A key problem with Kant's justification of capital punishment is that it tells us what to do with only ideally rational killers, although many killers are not rational.

OTHER ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. **Some standard arguments for capital punishment do not fall neatly into either the retributive or utilitarian categories. For example, John Locke's famous defense of capital punishment has both a retributive and utilitarian component. Locke argued that a person forfeits his rights when committing even minor crimes. Once rights are forfeited, Locke justifies punishment for two reasons: (1) from the retributive side, criminals deserve punishment, and, (2) from the utilitarian side, punishment is needed to protect our society by deterring crime through example. Thus, society may punish the criminal any way it deems necessary so to set an example for other would-be criminals. This includes taking away his life. Under the influence of Locke's theory of the forfeiture of rights, English law had some 200 capital offenses by 1800. Critics of Locke argue that there are alternatives to his assumption that criminals forfeit their right to life. It may be, instead, that criminals forfeit other rights (such as freedom to travel), yet the right to life is simply not forfeitable. Beccaria, for example, argued that people did not sacrifice their rights to life when entering into the social contract.**

Another defense of capital punishment is based on an analogy that capital punishment is to the political body just as self-defense is to the individual. The reasoning is that, in dangerous circumstances, the individual is justified in protecting himself by self-defense with deadly force.

Since society (or the political body) is like a large person, society, too, is justified in using deadly force through capital punishment. However, for this analogy to be a successful, it must parallel the accepted principle that self-defense with deadly force is justified only when there is no alternative open to us (such as fleeing). This means we must see whether any alternative to capital punishment is open (such as long term imprisonment). Further, the self-defense with deadly force is grounded in the moral right of self-preservation. However, only people, properly speaking, have moral rights; abstract entities and institutions such as governing bodies do not. Consequently, the analogy between capital punishment and self-defense fails it a basic level.

DIRECT ATTACKS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. As noted, most arguments against capital punishment are based on exposing flaws in defenses of capital punishment. However, some are more direct attacks, such as that capital punishment should be abolished since it is undignified, inhumane, or contrary to love. Corporal punishment, such as flogging, and extreme types of capital punishment, such as burning at the stake, are no longer accepted practices because of their indignity. By parity of reasoning, capital punishment should be abolished too. However, even if we grant that capital punishment violates our duty to treat people with dignity, humanity, and love, that alone may not be a sufficient reason for abolishing the practice. Dignity, humanity and love are foundational moral goods and as such are *prima facie* in nature. That is, they are each morally binding on face value until a stronger duty emerges with which it conflicts, thereby creating a moral dilemma. Defenders of capital punishment argue that retributive justice is one such conflicting duty. For, even though we are duty bound to acknowledge a criminal's dignity, the duty of retribution is also present and is in fact outweighs the other duties.

A second direct attack on the practice of capital punishment is that, at least at present, it is virtually impossible to apply death sentences fairly. People on death row are typically poor and thus could not afford the best defense at their initial trial. They are also predominately Afro-American or Hispanic which raises larger issues of racial inequality in the US. As ethnic minorities, they are also likely to receive more strict judgments from juries than their white counterparts who commit the same crime. These considerations recently prompted a US Supreme Court Justice to change his own views on capital punishment and reject the practice. In addition to problems of class bias, the practice of capital punishment is further tainted by the tragic fact that innocent people are sometimes executed. Eliminating capital punishment not only prevents their wrongful execution, but gives them more time to to clear their names and return to society.

See also Beccaria.

James Fieser

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Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970)

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LIFE. Carnap wrote an intellectual autobiography published in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, ed. by Paul Arthur Schillp, La Salle, Ill. : Open Court Pub. Co., 1963. That autobiography is the main source of the following biographical notes.

Rudolf Carnap was born on May 18, 1891, in Ronsdorf, Germany. In 1898, after his father's death, his family moved to Barmen, where Carnap studied at the *Gymnasium*. During the years between 1910 and 1914 he studied philosophy, physics and mathematics at the University of Jena and Freiburg. Among his teachers was neo-Kantian philosopher Bruno Bauch, with whom he studied Kantian philosophy. In his intellectual autobiography, Carnap remembers that *The Critique of Pure Reason* was carefully discussed through a whole year. Carnap was especially interested in the Kantian theory of space. In 1910, Carnap attended Gottlob Frege's lectures on logic (Frege was professor of mathematics at Jena). Carnap attended a second course by Frege in 1913 - there were only three students at that course - and a third course in 1914. During those courses, Frege explained his system of logic and some applications in mathematics. However, during those years, Carnap was mainly interested in physics; in 1913 he planned to write his dissertation on a problem of experimental physics, namely thermionic emission. World War I frustrated the project. Carnap served at the front until 1917, when he was moved to Berlin. There he studied the theory of relativity. At the time, Albert Einstein was professor of physics at the University of Berlin.

After the war, Carnap sketched a dissertation on an axiomatic system for the physical theory of space and time. He submitted the draft to physicist Max Wien, director of the Institute of Physics at the University of Jena, and to Bruno Bauch. Both found the work interesting, but Wien told

Carnap the dissertation was pertinent to philosophy, not to physics, while Bauch said it was relevant to physics. Eventually, in 1921, Carnap wrote his dissertation under the direction of Bauch. His work dealt with the theory of space from a philosophical point of view. The work - entitled *Der Raum* (*Space*) - is evidently influenced by Kantian philosophy. *Der Raum* was published in 1922 in a supplemental issue of *Kant-Studien*.

Carnap's first works were concerned with the foundations of physics; he wrote essays on causality and the theory of space-time. In 1923 he met Hans Reichenbach at a conference on philosophy held at Erlangen. Reichenbach introduced him to Moritz Schlick, professor of the theory of inductive science at Vienna. Carnap visited Schlick - and the Vienna Circle - in 1925. The following year he moved to Vienna and became assistant professor at the University of Vienna. He took part in the Vienna Circle's meetings, where he met Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Kurt Gödel and, in 1926, Ludwig Wittgenstein; he also met Karl Popper. He became one of the leading members of the Vienna Circle - and, of course, of logical positivism - and, in 1929, he wrote, with Hahn and Neurath, the manifesto of the Circle. In 1928 Carnap published *The Logical Structure of the World*, in which he developed a formal version of empiricism: according to him, all scientific terms are definable by means of a phenomenalistic language. The great merit of that work is the rigor with which Carnap developed his theory. In the same year he published *Pseudoproblems in Philosophy*, in which he asserted that many alleged philosophical problems are meaningless. In 1929 the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Circle - the latter was founded in 1928 by Reichenbach - organized the First Conference on Epistemology, held in Prague. In 1930, Carnap and Reichenbach founded the journal *Erkenntnis*. In the same year Carnap met Tarski, who was developing his semantical theory of truth. Carnap was also interested in mathematical logic and wrote a manual of logic, entitled *Abriss der Logistik* (1929).

In 1931, Carnap moved to Prague, where he became professor of natural philosophy at the German University. In those years, his most important contribution to logic was *The Logical Syntax of Language* (1934). In 1933, Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany; two years later - in 1935 - Carnap moved to the United States, helped by Charles Morris and Willard Van Orman Quine, whom he had met in Prague in 1934. He became an American citizen in 1941.

In the years between 1936 and 1952, he was a professor at the University of Chicago (during 1940-41 he was a visiting professor at Harvard University); in 1952-54 he was a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton and, from 1954, professor at the University of California at Los Angeles.

In the 1940s, stimulated by Tarskian model theory, Carnap became interested in semantics. During those years he wrote several books on semantics: *Introduction to Semantics* (1942), *Formalization of Logic* (1943), *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic* (1947). In *Meaning and Necessity*, Carnap used semantics to explain modalities. Afterwards he thought about the structure of scientific theories: his main interests were (i) to give an account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements and (ii) to give a suitable formulation of the verifiability principle, that is, to find a criterion of significance appropriate to scientific language. Two other important works are "Meaning postulates" (1952) and "Observation Language and Theoretical Language" (1958). The latter states Carnap's definitive view on the analytic-synthetic distinction. "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts" (1958) is an attempt to give a tentative definition of a criterion of significance for scientific language. Carnap was also interested in formal

logic (*Introduction to Symbolic Logic*, 1954) and in inductive logic (*Logical Foundations of Probability*, 1950; *The Continuum of Inductive Methods*, 1952). *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, ed. by Paul Arthur Schillp, was published in 1963; and *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*, ed. by Martin Gardner, was published in 1966. Carnap was working on the theory of inductive logic when he died on September 14, 1970, at Santa Monica, California.

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THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES. A scientific theory - in Carnap's opinion - is an interpreted axiomatic formal system. It consists of:

- **a formal language, including logical and non-logical terms;**
- **a set of logical-mathematical axioms and rules of inference;**
- **a set of non-logical axioms, expressing the empirical portion of the theory;**
- **a set of meaning postulates, stating the meaning of non-logical terms; they formalize the analytic truths of the theory;**
- **a set of rules of correspondence; they give an empirical interpretation of the theory.**

Note that the set of meaning postulates and the set of rules of correspondence may be included in the set of non-logical axioms, i.e., it is not necessary that meaning postulates and rules of correspondence be explicitly stated. Indeed, meaning postulates and rules of correspondence usually are not explicitly distinguished from non-logical axioms; only one set of axioms is formulated and one of the main purposes of the philosophy of science is to show the difference between the various kinds of statements. Now I shall examine Carnap's view on different constituents of a theory.

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THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES. The language consists of (i) a set of symbols and (ii) effective rules that determine whether a sequence of symbols is a well-formed formula, i.e., correct with respect to syntax. Among the symbols of the language of a scientific theory are logical and non-logical terms. The set of logical terms contains both logical symbols, e.g., connectives and quantifiers, and mathematical symbols, e.g., numbers, derivatives, and integrals. Non-logical terms are symbols denoting physical entities or properties or relations, e.g., 'blue', 'cold', 'more warm than', 'proton', 'electromagnetic field'. Non-logical terms are divided into observational terms and theoretical terms. Formulas are divided into: (i) logical statements, which do not contain non-logical terms; (ii) observational statements, which contain observational terms but no theoretical terms; (iii) purely theoretical statements, which contain theoretical terms but no observational terms and (iv) rules of correspondence, which contain both observational and theoretical terms.

Classification of statements in a scientific language

type of statement	observational terms	theoretical terms
logical statements	No	No
observational statements	Yes	No
purely theoretical statements	No	Yes
rules of correspondence	Yes	Yes

The observational language contains only logical and observational statements; the theoretical language contains logical and theoretical statements and rules of correspondence.

The distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms is a main principle of logical positivism; Carnap's view on scientific theories depends on this distinction. In his book *Philosophical Foundations of Physics* (1966), Carnap bases the distinction between observational and theoretical terms on the distinction between two kinds of scientific laws, namely empirical laws and theoretical laws.

An empirical law deals with objects or properties that can be observed or measured by means of simple procedures. Empirical laws can receive a direct confirmation by empirical observations. That is, they can be justified by observations of facts, and can be thought to be an inductive generalization of such observations. This kind of law can explain and forecast facts; it deals with facts and joins facts to facts. Ideally, an empirical law which deals with measurable physical quantities, can be discovered by means of measuring such quantities in suitable cases and then interpolating a simple curve between the measured values. For example, a physicist could measure the volume V, the temperature T and the pressure P of a gas in diverse experiments, and he could find the law PV=RT, for a suitable constant R.

On the contrary, a theoretical law is concerned with objects or properties we cannot observe or measure but we can only infer from direct observations. There is no way of justifying a theoretical law by means of direct observation, and theoretical laws are not inductive generalizations: they are hypotheses that go far beyond the experience. While an empirical law can explain and forecast facts, a theoretical law can explain and forecast empirical laws. The method of justifying a theoretical law is indirect: a scientist does not test the law itself, but he tests the empirical laws that are among its consequences.

The distinction between empirical and theoretical laws entails the distinction between observational and theoretical properties, and thus also the distinction between observational and theoretical terms. Carnap admits that the distinction is not always clear and the line of demarcation between the two kinds of terms is often arbitrary. To some extent, the distinction between observational and theoretical terms is similar to the distinction between macro-events, which are characterized by physical quantities that are constant in a large portion of space and time, and micro-events, where physical quantities change rapidly in space or time. However, in many situations, the distinction between observational and theoretical terms is clear; for example, the laws that deal with the pressure, the volume and the temperature of a gas are empirical laws and the corresponding terms are observational, while the laws of quantum mechanics are theoretical.

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ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC. One of the main principles of the logical empiricism is the disintegration of the synthetic a priori. All statements can be divided into two classes: analytic a priori statements and synthetic a posteriori statements. Thus synthetic a priori statements do not exist. Now I shall briefly trace the history of Carnap's efforts to give a precise definition of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.

In his book *The Logical Syntax of Language*, published in 1934, Carnap studies a formal language which can express classical mathematics and scientific theories. For example, classical physics can be formulated in that language. When Carnap published *The Logical Syntax of Language*, Gödel had already published (in 1931) his work on the incompleteness of mathematics; thus Carnap was aware of the substantial difference between the two concepts of *proof* and *consequence*: some statements, in spite of being a logical consequence of the axioms of mathematics, are not provable by means of these axioms. The English version of Tarski's essay on semantics was published in 1935 (the Polish original was published in 1933); so Carnap did not know the logical theory of the semantics of a formal language. These circumstances explain the fact that Carnap, in *The Logical Syntax of Language*, gives a purely syntactic formulation of the concept of logical consequence (after the publication of Tarski's essay, the notion of logical consequence is regarded as a semantic concepts and is defined by means of model theory). However, Carnap defines a new rule of inference, now called the *omega*-rule, but formerly called the Carnap rule:

> **from premises A(1), A(2), ... , A(n), A(n+1) ,... we can infer the conclusion (*x*)A*x***

Carnap defines the notion of *logical consequence*: a statement A is a logical consequence of a set S of statements if and only if there is a proof of A based on the set S; it is admissible to use the *omega*-rule in the proof of A. The definition of the notion of *provable* is: a statement A is provable by means of a set S of statements if and only if there is a proof of A based on the set S, but the *omega*-rule is not admissible in the proof of A. Note that a formal system which admits the use of the *omega*-rule is complete, that is Gödel's incompleteness theorem does not apply to such formal systems.

Finally, Carnap defines some kinds of statements: (i) a statement is L-true if and only if is a logical consequence of the empty set of statements; (ii) a statement is L-false if and only if all statements are a logical consequence of it; (iii) a statement is analytic if and only if is L-true or L-false; (iv) a statement is synthetic if and only if is not analytic. Carnap thus defines analytic statements as logically determined statements: their truth depends on logical rules of inference and is independent of experience. That is, analytic statements are a priori; on the contrary, synthetic statements are a posteriori, because they are not logically determined.

In *Testability and Meaning* (1936), Carnap gave a very similar definition. A statement is analytic if and only if it is logically true; is self-contradictory if and only if it is logically false; otherwise the statement is synthetic. Note the fact that Carnap, in *Testability and Meaning*, used the notion of true and false; that is, he used semantic notions.

***Meaning and Necessity* was published in 1947. In this work Carnap gave a similar definition. He first defines the notion of L-true (a statement is L-true if its truth depends on semantic rules) and then defines the notion of L-false (a statements if L-false if its negation is L-true). A statement is L-determined if it is L-true or L-false; analytic statements are L-determined, while synthetic statements are not L-determined. This definition is very similar to the definition Carnap gives in *The Logical Syntax of Language*; however, in *The Logical Syntax of Language* Carnap uses only syntactic concepts, while in *Meaning and Necessity* he uses semantic concepts.**

In 1951, the American philosopher Quine published the article "Two dogmas of empiricism," in which Quine criticizes the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. As a consequence of Quine's criticism, Carnap partially changed his point of view on this problem. Carnap's reply to

Quine was first expressed in "Meaning postulates" (1952), in which Carnap suggests that analytic statements are those which are derivable from a set of appropriate sentences that he called meaning postulates - those sentences define the meaning of non logical terms; thus the set of analytic statements is not equal to the set of logically true statements. Afterwards he wrote "Observation language and theoretical language" (1958), in which he expressed a general method of determining a set of meaning postulates for the language of a scientific theory. Carnap expressed the very same method also in his reply to Carl Gustav Hempel in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap* (1963), and subsequently in *Philosophical Foundations of Physics* (1966). Now I briefly explain Carnap's method. Suppose the number of non-logical axioms is finite; let T be the conjunction of all purely theoretical axioms, let C be the conjunction of all correspondence postulates and let TC be the conjunction of T and C. The theory is equivalent to the single axiom TC. Carnap formulates the following problems: how can we find two statements, say A and R, so that A expresses the analytic portion of the theory (i.e., all consequences of A are analytic) while R expresses the empirical portion (i.e., all consequences of R are synthetic)? The empirical content of the theory is formulated by means of a Ramsey sentence, named after Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903-1930), English philosopher, who discovered it. A Ramsey sentence is built by means of the following instructions:

1. **Replace every theoretical term in TC with a variable.**
2. **Add at the beginning of the sentence an appropriate number of existential quantifiers.**

Look at the following example. Let $TC(O_1,..,O_n,T_1,...,T_m)$ be the conjunction of T and C; in TC there are observational terms $O_1...O_n$ and theoretical terms $T_1...T_m$. The Ramsey sentence (R) is

$$EX_1...EX_m\ TC(O_1,...,O_n,X_1,...,X_m)$$

Every observational statement which is derivable from TC is also derivable from R and vice versa; that is, R expresses exactly the empirical portion of the theory. Carnap proposes the statement R -> TC as the only meaning postulate; this statement is known as the Carnap sentence. Note that every empirical statement which is derivable from the Carnap sentence is logically true, and thus the Carnap sentence lacks empirical consequences. So - according to Carnap - a statement is analytic if it is derivable from the Carnap sentence; otherwise the statement is synthetic. I list the requirements of Carnap's method: (i) non-logical axioms must be explicitly stated, (ii) the number of non-logical axioms must be finite and (iii) observational terms must be clearly distinguished from theoretical terms. **(Return to Contents.)**

MEANING AND VERIFIABILITY. Perhaps the most famous tenet of the logical empiricism is the *verifiability principle*, according to which *a synthetic statement is meaningful only if it is verifiable*. It is very interesting to trace Carnap's effort to give a logical formulation of this principle. In *The Logical Structure of the World* (1928) Carnap asserts that a statement is meaningful only if every non-logical term is explicitly definable by means of a very restricted phenomenalistic language. A few years later, Carnap realized that this thesis is untenable; a phenomenalistic language is too poor to define physical concepts. Thus he choose an objective language ("thing language") as the basic language; in this language every primitive term is a physical term. All other terms (biological, psychological, cultural) must be defined by means of basic terms. Carnap also realized that an explicit definition is often impossible. There are dispositional concepts, which can be introduced by means of reduction sentences. For example, if A, B, C and D are observational terms and Q is a dispositional concept, then

(*x*)[A*x* --> (B*x* --> Q*x*)]

(*x*)[C*x* --> (D*x* --> ~Q*x*)]

are reduction sentences for Q. In *Testability and Meaning* (1936) Carnap gives an account of the new verifiability principle: *all terms must be reducible, by means of definitions or reduction sentences, to the observational language*. This principle was proved inadequate: K. R. Popper proved not only that some metaphysical terms can be reduced to the observational language, so they fulfil Carnap's requirements, but also that some genuine physical concepts are forbidden by Carnap's version of the verifiability principle. Carnap acknowledged that criticism. In "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts" (1956) Carnap gives a new criterion of significance. The definition is rather involved, so I will mention only the main philosophical properties of Carnap's new principle. First of all, the significance of a term becomes a relative concept: a term is meaningful with respect to a given theory and a given language. *The meaning of a concept thus depends on the theory in which that concept is used* - this is a very important modification in empiricism's theory of meaning. Secondly, Carnap explicitly acknowledges that some theoretical terms can be not reduced to the observational language: they acquire an empirical meaning by means of the links with other theoretical terms which are reducible. Thirdly, Carnap realizes that the principle of operationalism is too restrictive. The operationalism was formulated by Nobel-prize-winning American physicist Percy Williams Bridgman (1882-1961) in his book *The Logic of Modern Physics* (1927). According to Bridgman, every physical concept is defined by the operations a physicist uses to apply it. Bridgman asserted that the curvature of space-time, a concept used by Einstein in his general theory of relativity, is meaningless, because it is not definable by means of operations. However, Bridgman subsequently changed his philosophical point of view, and he admitted there is an indirect connection with observations. Perhaps moved by Popper's criticism, or moved by the unreasonable consequence of a strict operationalism (the exclusion of Einstein's theory of curvature of space-time from legitimate physics), Carnap changed his earlier point of view and freely admitted a very indirect connection between theoretical terms and the observational language.

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PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC. A variety of interpretations of probability have been proposed:

- **Classical interpretation. The probability of an event is the ratio of the favorable outcomes to the possible outcomes. Example: a die is cast; the event is "the score is five"; there are six outcomes and only one favorable; thus the probability of "the score is five" is one sixth.**
- **Axiomatic interpretation. The probability is whatever fulfils the axioms of the theory of probability. In the early 1930s, the Russian mathematician Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov (1903-1987) formulated the first axiomatic system for probability.**
- **Frequency interpretation, which is now the favourite interpretation in empirical science. The probability of an event in a sequence of events is the limit of the relative frequency of that event. Example: throw a die several times and record the scores; the relative frequency of "the score is five" is about one sixth; the limit of the relative frequency is exactly one sixth.**
- **Probability as a degree of confirmation, supported by Carnap and by students of inductive logic. The probability of a statement is the degree of confirmation the empirical evidence gives to the statement. Example: the statement "the score is five" receives a partial**

confirmation by the evidence; its degree of confirmation is one sixth.

- **Subjective interpretation. The probability is a measure of the degree of belief. A special case is the theory that the probability is a fair betting quotient - this interpretation was supported by Carnap. Example: suppose you bet that the score would be five; you bet a dollar and, if you win, you will receive six dollars: this is a fair bet.**
- **Propensity interpretation, due to K. R. Popper. The probability of an event is an objective property of the event. Example: the physical properties of a die [the die is homogeneous; it has six sides; on every side there is a different number between one and six; etc] explain the fact that the limit of the relative frequency of "the score is five" is one sixth.**

Carnap devoted himself to giving an account of the probability as a degree of confirmation. The technical details of Carnap's works are very involved, so I shall only mention the most philosophically significant consequences of his research. He asserted that the probability of a statement, with respect to a given body of evidence, is a logical relation between the statement and the evidence. Thus it is necessary to build an inductive logic; that is, a logic which studies the logical relations between statements and evidence. The inductive logic would give us a mathematical method of evaluating the reliability of an hypothesis; therefore the inductive logic would give an answer to the problem raised by David Hume's analysis of induction. Of course, we cannot be sure that an hypothesis is true; but we can evaluate its degree of confirmation and we can thus compare alternative theories.

In spite of the abundance of logical and mathematical methods Carnap used in his own research on the inductive logic, he was not able to formulate a theory of the inductive confirmation of scientific laws. In fact, in Carnap's inductive logic, *the degree of confirmation of every universal law is always zero*.

Carnap tried to employ the physical-mathematical theory of thermodynamics entropy to develop a comprehensive theory of the inductive logic, but his plan remained in a sketchy state. His works on entropy were published posthumously.

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MODAL LOGIC AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. The following table, which is an adaptation of a similar table Carnap used in *Meaning and Necessity*, shows the relations between modal properties such as *necessary*, *impossible*, and logical properties such as *L-true*, *L-false*, *analytic*, *synthetic*. The symbol N means "necessarily", so that Np means "necessarily p".

Modal and logical properties of statements

Modalities	Formalization	Logical status
p is necessary	Np	L-true, analytic
p is impossible	N~p	L-false, contradictory
p is contingent	~N*p* & ~N~p	Factual, synthetic
p is not necessary	~Np	Not L-true
p is possible	~N~p	Not L-false
p is not contingent	Np v N~p	L-determined, not synthetic

Carnap identifies the necessity of a statement p with its logical truth: a statement is necessary if and only if it is logically true. Thus modal properties can be defined by means of the usual logical properties of statements, Carnap asserts. Np, i.e., "necessarily p", is true if and only if p is logically true. He defines the possibility of p as "it is not necessary that not p". That is, "possibly p" is defined as ~N~p. The impossibility of p means that p is logically false. I stress that, in Carnap's opinion, every modal concept is definable by means of logical properties of statements so that modal concepts are explicable from a classical point of view (classical means "using classical logic", e.g., first order logic). Note that Carnap was aware of the fact that the symbol N is definable in the meta-language, not in the object language. Np means "p is logically true", and the last statement belongs to the meta-language; thus N is not explicitly definable in the language of a formal logic, and we cannot eliminate the term N (more precisely, we can define N only by means of another modal symbol we assume as a primitive symbol, so that at least one modal symbol is required among the primitive symbols).

Carnap's formulation of modal logic is very important from a historical point of view. Carnap gave the first semantic analysis of a modal logic, using Tarskian model theory to explain the conditions in which "necessarily p" is true. Carnap also solved the problem of the meaning of the statement (*x*)N[A*x*], where A*x* is a sentence in which the individual variable *x* occurs. Carnap showed that (*x*)N[A*x*] is equivalent to N[(*x*)A*x*] or, more precisely, he proved we can assume that equivalence without contradictions.

From a more general philosophical point of view, Carnap believes that modalities do not require a new conceptual framework; a semantic logic of language can explain the modal concepts.

The method Carnap uses in explaining modalities is a typical example of Carnap's philosophical analysis. Another interesting example is the explanation of *belief-sentences* which Carnap gave in *Meaning and necessity*. Carnap asserts that two sentences have the same *extension* if they are equivalent, i.e., if they are both true or both false. On the other hand, two sentences have the same *intension* if they are logically equivalent, i.e., their equivalence is due to the semantic rules of the language. Let A be a sentence in which another sentence occurs, say p. A is called "extensional with respect to p" if and only if the truth of A does not change if we substitute the sentence p with an equivalent sentence q. A is called "intensional with respect to p" if and only if (i) A is not extensional with respect to p and (ii) the truth of A does not change if we substitute the sentence p with a logically equivalent sentence q. Look at the following examples, due to Carnap.

- **First example. The sentence AvB is extensional with respect to both A and B; we can substitute A and B with equivalent sentences and the truth value of AvB does not change.**
- **Second example. Suppose A is true but not L-true; therefore the sentences Av~A and A are equivalent (both are true) and, of course, they are not L-equivalent. The sentence N(Av~A) is true and the sentence N(A) is false; thus N(A) is not extensional with respect to A. On the contrary, if C is a sentence L-equivalent to Av~A, then N(Av~A) and N(C) are both true: N(A) is intensional with respect to A.**

There are sentences which are neither extensional not intensional; for example, belief-sentences. Carnap's example is "John believes that D". Suppose that "John believes that D" is true; let A be a sentence equivalent to D and let B be a sentence L-equivalent to D. It is possible that the sentences "John believes that A" and "John believes that B" are false. In fact, John can believe that a sentence is true but he can believe that a logically equivalent sentence is false. To explain

belief-sentences, Carnap defines the notion of *intensional isomorphism*. Roughly speaking, two sentences are intensionally isomorphic if and only if their corresponding elements are L-equivalent. In the belief-sentence "John believes that D" we can substitute D with an intensionally isomorphic sentence C.

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PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS. The first and the last of the books Carnap published during his life are concerned with the philosophy of physics; they are respectively the dissertation written for his doctorate (*Der Raum*, 1921, published in the following year in a supplemental issue of *Kant-Studien*) and *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*, ed. by Martin Gardner, 1966. In 1977, *Two Essays on Entropy*, ed. by Abner Shimony, was published posthumously.

***Der Raum* deals with the philosophy of space. Carnap recognizes the difference between three kinds of theories of space: formal, physical and intuitive space. Formal space is analytic a priori; it is concerned with the formal properties of the space, that is with those properties which are a logical consequence of a definite set of axioms. Physical space is synthetic a posteriori; it is the object of natural science, and we can know its structure only by means of experience. Intuitive space is synthetic a priori, and is known via a priori intuition. According to Carnap, the distinction between three different kinds of space is similar to the distinction between three different aspects of geometry: projective, metric and topological geometry, respectively.**

Some aspects of *Der Raum* are very interesting. First of all, Carnap accepts a neo-Kantian philosophical point of view. Intuitive space, with its synthetic a priori character, is a concession to Kantian philosophy. Secondly, in this work Carnap uses the methods of mathematical logic; for example, the characterization of the intuitive space is given by means of Hilbert's axioms for topology. Thirdly, the distinction between formal and physical space is similar to the distinction between mathematical and physical geometry; this distinction, proposed by Hans Reichenbach during those years, was later accepted by Carnap and became the official position of the logical empiricism on the philosophy of space.

Carnap also developed a formal system for space-time topology. He asserted (1925) that space relations are based on the causal propagation of a signal, while the causal propagation itself is based on the time order.

***Philosophical Foundations of Physics* is a survey on many aspects of the philosophy of physics; it is an excerpt from Carnap's university lessons. Some theories expressed there are not due to Carnap, but they belong to the common heritage of logical empiricism. This book is very clear and easy to understand. It employs few logical and mathematical formulas, and it is rich in examples. The following is a brief list of the subjects it deals with.**

- **The structure of scientific explanation: deductive and probabilistic explanation.**
- **Philosophical and physical significance of non-Euclidean geometry; the theory of space in the general theory of relativity. Carnap argues against Kantian philosophy, especially against the synthetic a priori, and against conventionalism. He gives a clear explanation of the main properties of non-Euclidean geometry.**
- **Determinism and quantum physics.**
- **The nature of scientific language. Carnap deals with (i) the distinction between observational**

and theoretical terms, (ii) the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements and (iii) quantitative concepts.

As an example of the content of *Philosophical Foundations of Physics* I shall briefly examine Carnap's thought on scientific explanation. Carnap accepts the classical theory due to Carl Gustav Hempel. The following example of Carnap's explains the general structure of a scientific explanation:

(*x*)(P*x* --> Q*x*)
P*a*
Q*a*

where the first statement is a scientific law, the second is a description of the initial conditions and the third is the description of the event we want to explain. The last statement is a logical consequence of the first and the second, which are the premises of the explanation. A scientific explanation is thus a logical derivation of an appropriate statement from a set of premises, which state the general laws and the initial conditions. According to Carnap, there is another kind of scientific explanation, probabilistic explanation, in which at least one universal law is not a deterministic law, but a probabilistic law. An example - due to Carnap - is:

fr(Q,P) = 0.8
P*a*
Q*a*

where the first sentence means "the relative frequency of Q with respect to P is 0.8". Qa is not a logical consequence of the premises; therefore this kind of explanation determines only a certain degree of confirmation for the event we want to explain.

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CARNAP'S HERITAGE. Carnap's works have raised many debates. A large number of articles is devoted to a careful examination of his thought, sometimes criticizing his point of view, sometimes in defense of his philosophy. I shall mention some researches dealing with developments of Carnap's philosophy.

With respect to the analytic-synthetic distinction, Ryszard Wojcicki and Marian Przelecki - two Polish logicians - formulated a semantic definition of the distinction between analytic and synthetic; they proved Carnap sentence is the weakest meaning postulate, i.e., every meaning postulate entails the Carnap sentence. Therefore the set of analytic statements which are a logical consequence of the Carnap sentence is the smallest set of analytic statements. Wojcicki and Przelecki's research is independent of the distinction between observational and theoretical terms, i.e., their suggested definition also works in a purely theoretical language. The requirement of a finite number of non-logical axioms is also removed.

The tentative definition of meaningfulness that Carnap proposed in "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts" was proved to be untenable. See, for example, David Kaplan, "Significance and Analyticity" in *Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist* or Marco Mondadori's introduction to *Analiticità, Significanza, Induzione*, in which Mondadori suggests a possible correction of Carnap's definition.

With respect to inductive logic, I mention only Jaakko Hintikka's generalization of Carnap's

continuum of inductive methods. In Carnap's inductive logic, the probability of every universal law is always zero. Hintikka succeeded in formulating an inductive logic in which universal laws can obtain a positive degree of confirmation.

In *Meaning and Necessity*, 1947, Carnap was the first logician to use a semantic method to explain modalities. However, he used Tarskian model theory, so that every model of the language is an admissible model. In 1972 the American philosopher Saul Kripke was able to prove that a full semantics of modalities can be attainable by means of *possible-worlds semantics*. According to Kripke, not all possible models are admissible. You can read J. Hintikka's essay "Carnap's heritage in logical semantics" in *Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist*, which explains that Carnap came extremely close to possible-worlds semantics but was not able to go beyond classical model theory.

I must stress that the *omega*-rule, which Carnap proposed in *The Logical Syntax of Language*, is now widespreadly used in metamathematical research - usually very involved - on many different subjects.

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Mauro Murzi

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Carneades (213-129 BCE.)

A philosopher of Cyrene in Africa, founder of a sect called the Third or New Academy. The Athenians sent him with Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic, as ambassador to Rome, BCE. 155. Of the three, Carneades excelled in vehement and rapid speaking ability; Critolaus excelled in correctness and elegance, and Diogenes in the simplicity and modesty. Carneades attracted the attention by the subtlety of his reasoning and the fluency of his language. Before Galba and Cato the Censor, he harangued with great variety of thought and copiousness of diction in praise of justice. The next day, to establish his doctrine of the uncertainty of human knowledge, he undertook to refute all his former arguments. Many were captivated by his eloquence. However, Cato, apprehensive lest the Roman youth should lose their military character in the pursuit of Grecian learning, persuaded the Senate to send back these philosophers, without delay, to their own schools. Carneades obtained such high reputation at home that other philosophers, when they had dismissed their scholars, frequently came to hear him. He died in BCE. 129.

Carneades is usually considered the greatest of the Academic skeptics. It was the doctrine of the New Academy that the senses, the understanding, and the imagination frequently deceive us, and therefore can not be infallible judges of truth; however, we infer appearances of truth or probabilities from the impression which we perceive to be produced on the mind by means of the senses. Carneades added nothing essentially new to their conclusions. However, his destructive criticisms acted like a battering-ram not only upon Stoicism, but upon all established philosophies. He maintained that these do not always correspond to the real nature of things, and that there is no infallible method of determining when they are true or false, and consequently that they afford no certain criterion of truth. As examples of his thoughts may be mentioned the two following. First, nothing can ever be proved. For the conclusion must be proved by premises, which in turn require proof, and so *ad infinitum*. Secondly, it is impossible to know whether our ideas of an object are true, that is, whether they resemble the object itself. To do so would involve getting outside our own minds. We know nothing of the object except our idea of it, and therefore we cannot compare the original and the copy, since we can see only the copy. Nevertheless, with respect to the conduct of life, Carneades held that probable appearances are a sufficient guide, because it is unreasonable that some degree of credit should not be allowed to those witnesses who commonly give a true report. He maintained that all the knowledge the human mind is capable of attaining is not science, but opinion.

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Categorical Imperative

18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) presents a criterion of moral obligation, which he calls the categorical imperative. Kant's account of morality fits squarely into the deontological tradition and is found in three principal books: *The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1798). Kant's writings indicate that he was aware of the moral traditions that went before him, such as virtue theory which bases morality on good character traits, and consequentialist accounts which base morality solely on the consequences of actions. In all of his ethical writings, Kant rejects these traditional theories of morality and argues instead that moral actions are based on a "supreme principle of morality" which is objective, rational, and freely chosen: the categorical imperative. Kant's clearest account of the categorical imperative is in the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

In Section one of the *Foundations*, Kant argues against traditional criteria of morality, and explains why the categorical imperative can be the only possible standard of moral obligation. He begins with a general account of willful decisions. The function of the human will is to select one course of action from among several possible courses of action (for example, my choice to watch television right now instead of going jogging). Our specific willful decisions are influenced by several factors, such as laziness, immediate emotional gratification, or what is best in the long run. Kant argues that in moral matters the will is ideally influenced only by rational considerations, and not by subjective considerations such as one's emotions. This is because morality involves what is necessary for us to do (e.g., you must be benevolent), and only rational considerations can produce necessity. The rational consideration which influences the will must be a single principle of obligation, for only principles can be purely rational considerations. Also, the principle must be a command (or imperative) since morality involves a command for us to perform a particular action. Finally, the principle cannot be one that appeals to the consequences of an action, such as the joy I would receive from watching television; for, appeals to consequences involve emotional considerations. The only principle which fulfills these requirements is the categorical imperative which dictates the universalizability of our actions: "act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Morality, then, consists of choosing only those actions that conform to the categorical imperative.

In Section two, Kant explains key terms, presents different formulations of the categorical imperative, and illustrates the categorical imperative with examples of specific immoral acts. He begins by distinguishing between types of imperatives. Imperatives in general are commands that dictate a particular course of action, such as "you shall clean your room." Hypothetical imperatives are commands that depend on my preference for a particular end, and are stated in conditional form, such as, "If I want to lose weight, then I should eat less." In this case, the command to eat less hinges on my previous preference to lose weight. There are two types of hypothetical imperatives. Problematic-hypothetical imperatives involve rules of skill based on preferences that vary from person to person (such as "If you want to be a doctor then you should go to medical school"). Assertoric-hypothetical imperatives, by

contrast, involve rules of prudence based on the preference everyone has to be happy (such as, "If you want to be happy, then you should go skydiving"). None of these hypothetical imperatives, however, are moral imperatives, since the command is based on subjective considerations that are not absolute. A categorical imperative, by contrast, is an absolute command, such as "you shall treat people with respect," which is not based on subjective considerations. Thus, the supreme principle of morality is a categorical imperative since it is not conditional upon one's preferences.

Kant continues by describing the sources of the above types of imperatives. His discussion uses four technical terms:

> Analytic propositions: propositions that are true by definition, such as "All wives are women."
>
> Synthetic propositions: propositions that are not true by definition, such as "Jones is bald."
>
> *A posteriori* knowledge: knowledge attained through the five senses, such as the fact that the door is brown.
>
> *A priori* knowledge: intuitive knowledge attained without use of the senses, such as 2+2=4.

Kant argues that problematic-hypothetical imperatives are analytic or true by definition, such as, "If you want to be a doctor, then you should go to medical school." Assertoric-hypothetical imperatives are less clear since the concept of happiness varies so greatly, as in the statement, "If you want to be happy, then you should go skydiving." However, Kant believes that even this statement is true by definition since if we fully understand happiness, we will also know the means to happiness. Finally, categorical imperatives are synthetic a priori, since the statement "you shall treat people with respect," is not true by definition, and is not known by means of the senses. Kant's point is that the categorical imperative involves a unique type of knowledge that is intuitive, yet informative.

In view of this background, Kant presents the single categorical imperative of morality: *act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law*. Although there is only one categorical imperative, Kant argues that there can be four formulations of this principle:

> The Formula of the Law of Nature: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature."
>
> The Formula of the End Itself: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."
>
> The Formula of Autonomy: "So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxims."
>
> The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: "So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends."

According to Kant, each of these four formulations will produce the same conclusion regarding the morality of any particular action. Thus, each of these formulas offers a step by step procedure for determining the morality of any particular action

The formula of the law of nature tells us to take a particular action, construe it as a general maxim, then see if it can be willed consistently as a law of nature. If it can be willed consistently, then the action is moral. If not, then it is immoral. To illustrate the categorical imperative, Kant uses four examples that

cover the range of morally significant situations which arise. These examples include committing suicide, making false promises, failing to develop one’s abilities, and refusing to be charitable. In each case, the action is deemed immoral since a contradiction arises when trying to will the maxim as a law of nature. The formula of the end itself is more straight forward: a given action is morally correct if when performing that action we do not use people as a means to achieve some further benefit, but instead treat people as something which is intrinsically valuable. Again, Kant illustrates this principle with the above four examples, and in each case performing the action would involve treating a person as a means, and not an end.

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Category

The term "category" comes from the Greek word *kategoria*, which is derived from *kata* ("against") and *agoreuein* ("to assert"). In Philosophy, the term means ultimate or fundamental divisions or kinds. Several schemes of categories have been offered in the history of philosophy. These schemes are sometimes descriptions of different kinds of things. At other times, they are different ways of thinking or talking about things in the world. To say that two things belong to completely different categories is to say that they have literally nothing in common, and we cannot apply the same descriptions to both unless we speak metaphorically.

Aristotle was the first to use the term category in philosophy. He adapted "categoria" from the legal language, which meant "accusation," and used it to mean that which is asserted about something. Aristotle distinguished between several types of categories including kind, quality, quantity or size, relation, location, time or date, action, and undergoing. For Kant, a category is any of the twelve forms or relating principles of the understanding, constituting necessary conditions of experience. Kant sought to derive an exhaustive list of pure forms of the understanding from the forms of judgment in the traditional logic: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. His list comprises three of each.

Hegel meant by categories the ideas which explain reality. He used a triad principle and generated around 272 categories. But Hegel also stated that categories were many and their exact number cannot be determined until the system of reality is completely explained. He thus marks a shift in the meaning of "category" as simply any basic notion, concept, or principle in a system of philosophy. Pierce held that categories are the most general terms into which experience can be divided. They reflect three types of predicates or relations, and his three main categories are "firstness," "secondness," and "thirdness." These terms stand for "monadic," "dyadic," and "polyadic" respectively.

Whitehead returned to a more traditional notion of "category" and elaborated a set of 37 categories under whose terms it should be possible to explain all experience. For Ryle categories are indefinitely numerous and unordered. The totality of categories is not in a principle an infinite hierarchy of types. According to him there are no mistakes that are strictly category-mistakes. Today the word "category" is used by most philosophers, if at all, to mean any supposedly ultimate type without making in convention as to what type it is.

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The Chinese Room Argument

The Chinese room argument - John Searle's (1980a) thought experiment and associated (1984) derivation - is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers *do* or at least *can* (someday might) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: *brains cause minds*, and *syntax doesn't suffice for semantics*. Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to Searle, "the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind, rather the appropriately programmed computer really *is* a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to *understand* and have other cognitive states" (1980a, p. 417). Searle contrasts "strong AI" to "weak AI". According to weak AI, according to Searle, computers just *simulate* thought, their seeming understanding isn't real (just as-if) understanding, their seeming calculation as-if calculation, etc.; nevertheless, computer simulation is useful for *studying* the mind (as for studying the weather and other things).

The Chinese Room Thought Experiment. Against "strong AI," Searle (1980a) asks you to imagine yourself a monolingual English speaker "locked in a room, and given a large batch of Chinese writing" plus "a second batch of Chinese script" and "a set of rules" in English "for correlating the second batch with the first batch." The rules "correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of formal symbols"; "formal" (or "syntactic") meaning you "can identify the symbols entirely by their shapes." A third batch of Chinese symbols and more instructions in English enable you "to correlate elements of this third batch with elements of the first two batches" and instruct you, thereby, "to give back certain sorts of Chinese symbols with certain sorts of shapes in response." *Those giving you the symbols* "call the first batch 'a script' [a data structure with natural language processing applications], "they call the second batch 'a story', and they call the third batch 'questions'; the symbols you give back "they call . . . 'answers to the questions'"; "the set of rules in English . . . they call 'the program'": *you yourself* know none of this. Nevertheless, you "get so good at following the instructions" that "from the point of view of someone outside the room" your responses are "absolutely indistinguishable from those of Chinese speakers." Just by looking at your answers, nobody can tell you "don't speak a word of Chinese." Producing answers "by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols," it seems "[a]s far as the Chinese is concerned," you "simply behave like a computer"; specifically, like a computer running Schank and Abelson's (1977) "Script Applier Mechanism" story understanding program (SAM), which Searle's takes for his example. But in imagining *himself* to be the person in the room, Searle thinks it's "quite obvious . . . I do not understand a word of the Chinese stories. I have inputs and outputs that are indistinguishable from those of the native Chinese speaker, and I can have any formal program you like, but I still understand nothing." "For the same reasons," Searle concludes, "Schank's computer understands nothing of any stories" since "the computer has

nothing more than I have in the case where I understand nothing" (1980a, p. 418). Furthermore, since in the thought experiment "nothing . . . depends on the details of Schank's programs," the same "would apply to any [computer] simulation" of any "human mental phenomenon" (1980a, p. 417); that's all it would be, simulation. Contrary to "strong AI", then, no matter how intelligent-seeming a computer *behaves* and no matter what *programming* makes it behave that way, since the symbols it processes are meaningless (lack semantics) *to it*, it's not really intelligent. It's not actually thinking. Its internal states and processes, being purely *syntactic*, lack semantics (meaning); so, it doesn't really have *intentional* (i.e., meaningful) *mental states*.

Replies and Rejoinders. **Having laid out the example and drawn the aforesaid conclusion, Searle considers several replies offered when he "had the occasion to present this example to a number of workers in artificial intelligence" (1980a, p. 419). Searle offers rejoinders to these various replies.**

The Systems Reply **suggests that the Chinese room example encourages us to focus on the wrong agent: the thought experiment encourages us to mistake the would-be subject-possessed-of-mental-states for the person in the room. The systems reply grants that "the *individual who is locked in the room* does not understand the story" but maintains that "he is merely part of a whole system, and the *system* does understand the story" (1980a, p. 419: my emphases). Searle's main rejoinder to this is to "let the individual internalize all . . . of the system" by memorizing the rules and script and doing the lookups and other operations in their head. "All the same," Searle maintains, "he understands nothing of the Chinese, and . . . neither does the system, because there isn't anything in the system that isn't in him. If he doesn't understand then there is no way the system could understand because the system is just part of him" (1980a, p. 420). Searle also insists the systems reply would have the absurd consequence that "mind is everywhere." For instance, "there is a level of description at which my stomach does information processing" there being "nothing to prevent [describers] from treating the input and output of my digestive organs as information if they so desire." Besides, Searle contends, it's just ridiculous to say "that while [the] person doesn't understand Chinese, somehow the conjunction of that person and bits of paper might" (1980a, p. 420).**

The Robot Reply **- along lines favored by contemporary causal theories of reference - suggests what prevents the person in the Chinese room from attaching meanings to (and thus presents them from understanding) the Chinese ciphers is the sensory-motoric disconnection of the ciphers from the realities they are supposed to represent: to promote the "symbol" manipulation to genuine understanding, according to this causal-theoretic line of thought, the manipulation needs to be grounded in the outside world via the agent's causal relations to the things to which the ciphers, *as symbols*, apply. If we "put a computer inside a robot" so as to "operate the robot in such a way that the robot does something very much like perceiving, walking, moving about," however, then the "robot would," according to this line of thought, "unlike Schank's computer, have genuine understanding and other mental states" (1980a, p. 420). Against the Robot Reply Searle maintains "the same experiment applies" with only slight modification. Put the room, with Searle in it, inside the robot; imagine "some of the Chinese symbols come from a television camera attached to the robot" and that "other Chinese symbols that [Searle is] giving out serve to make the motors inside the robot move the robot's legs or arms." Still, Searle asserts, "I don't understand anything except the rules for symbol manipulation." He explains, "by instantiating the program I have no [mental]**

states of the relevant [meaningful, or intentional] type. All I do is follow formal instructions about manipulating formal symbols." Searle also charges that the robot reply "tacitly concedes that cognition is not solely a matter of formal symbol manipulation" after all, as "strong AI" supposes, since it "adds a set of causal relation[s] to the outside world" (1980a, p. 420).

The Brain Simulator Reply **asks us to imagine that the program implemented by the computer (or the person in the room) "doesn't represent information that we have about the world, such as the information in Schank's scripts, but simulates the actual sequence of neuron firings at the synapses of a Chinese speaker when he understands stories in Chinese and gives answers to them." Surely then "we would have to say that the machine understood the stories"; or else we would "also have to deny that native Chinese speakers understood the stories" since "[a]t the level of the synapses" there would be no difference between "the program of the computer and the program of the Chinese brain" (1980a, p. 420). Against this, Searle insists, "even getting this close to the operation of the brain is still not sufficient to produce understanding" as may be seen from the following variation on the Chinese room scenario. Instead of shuffling symbols, we "have the man operate an elaborate set of water pipes with valves connecting them." Given some Chinese symbols as input, the program now tells the man "which valves he has to turn off and on. Each water connection corresponds to synapse in the Chinese brain, and the whole system is rigged so that after . . . turning on all the right faucets, the Chinese answer pops out at the output end of the series of pipes." Yet, Searle thinks, obviously, "the man certainly doesn't understand Chinese, and neither do the water pipes." "The problem with the brain simulator," as Searle diagnoses it, is that it simulates "only the formal structure of the sequence of neuron firings": the insufficiency of this formal structure for producing meaning and mental states "is shown by the water pipe example" (1980a, p. 421).**

The Combination Reply **supposes all of the above: a computer lodged in a robot running a brain simulation program, considered as a unified system. Surely, now, "we would have to ascribe intentionality to the system" (1980a, p. 421). Searle responds, in effect, that since none of these replies, taken alone, has any tendency to overthrow his thought experimental result, neither do all of them taken together: zero times three is naught. Though it would be "rational and indeed irresistible," he concedes, "to accept the hypothesis that the robot had intentionality, as long as we knew nothing more about it" the acceptance would be simply based on the assumption that "if the robot looks and behaves sufficiently like us then we would suppose, until proven otherwise, that it must have mental states like ours that cause and are expressed by its behavior." However, "[i]f we knew independently how to account for its behavior without such assumptions," as with computers, "we would not attribute intentionality to it, especially if we knew it had a formal program" (1980a, p. 421).**

The Other Minds Reply **reminds us that how we "know other people understand Chinese or anything else" is "by their behavior." Consequently, "if the computer can pass the behavioral tests as well" as a person, then "if you are going to attribute cognition to other people you must in principle also attribute it to computers" (1980a, p. 421). Searle responds that this misses the point: it's "not. . .** ***how I know*** **that other people have cognitive states, but rather** ***what it is*** **that I am attributing when I attribute cognitive states to them. The thrust of the argument is that it couldn't be just computational processes and their output because the computational processes and their output can exist without the cognitive state" (1980a, p. 420-421: my emphases).**

The Many Mansions Reply **suggests that even if Searle is right in his suggestion that programming cannot suffice to cause computers to have intentionality and cognitive states, other means besides**

programming might be devised such that computers may be imbued with whatever does suffice for intentionality by these other means. This too, Searle says, misses the point: it "trivializes the project of Strong AI by redefining it as whatever artificially produces and explains cognition" abandoning "the original claim made on behalf of artificial intelligence" that "mental processes are computational processes over formally defined elements." If AI is not identified with that "precise, well defined thesis," Searle says, "my objections no longer apply because there is no longer a testable hypothesis for them to apply to" (1980a, p. 422).

Searle's "Derivation from Axioms." Besides the Chinese room thought experiment, Searle's more recent presentations of the Chinese room argument feature - with minor variations of wording and in the ordering of the premises - a formal "derivation from axioms" (1989, p. 701). The derivation, according to Searle's 1990 formulation proceeds from the following three axioms (1990, p. 27):

> **(A1) Programs are formal (syntactic).**
> **(A2) Minds have mental contents (semantics).**
> **(A3) Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics.**

to the conclusion:

> **(C1) Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds.**

Searle then adds a fourth axiom (p. 29):

> **(A4) Brains cause minds.**

from which we are supposed to "immediately derive, trivially" the conclusion:

> **(C2) Any other system capable of causing minds would have to have causal powers (at least) equivalent to those of brains.**

whence we are supposed to derive the further conclusions:

> **(C3) Any artifact that produced mental phenomena, any artificial brain, would have to be able to duplicate the specific causal powers of brains, and it could not do that just by running a formal program.**
> **(C4) The way that human brains actually produce mental phenomena cannot be solely by virtue of running a computer program.**

On the usual understanding, the Chinese room experiment subserves this derivation by "shoring up axiom 3" (Churchland & Churchland 1990, p. 34).

Continuing Dispute. To call the Chinese room controversial would be an understatement. Beginning with objections published along with Searle's original (1980a) presentation, opinions have drastically divided, not only about whether the Chinese room argument is cogent; but, among those who think it is, as to why it is; and, among those who think it is not, as to why not. This discussion includes several noteworthy threads.

Initial Objections & Replies to the Chinese room argument besides filing new briefs on behalf of many of the forenamed replies(e.g., Fodor 1980 on behalf of "the Robot Reply") take, notably, two tacks. One tack, taken by Daniel Dennett (1980), among others, decries the dualistic tendencies discernible, for instance, in Searle's methodological maxim "always insist on the first-person point of view" (Searle 1980b, p. 451). Another tack notices that the symbols Searle-in-the-room processes are *not* meaningless ciphers, they're Chinese inscriptions. So they *are* meaningful; and so is Searle's processing of them in the room; whether he knows it or not. In reply to this second sort of objection, Searle insists that what's at issue here is *intrinsic intentionality* in contrast to the merely *derived intentionality* of inscriptions and other linguistic signs. Whatever meaning Searle-in-the-room's computation might derive from the meaning of the Chinese symbols which he processes will not be intrinsic to the process or the processor but "observer relative," existing only in the minds of beholders such as the native Chinese speakers outside the room. "Observer-relative ascriptions of intentionality are always dependent on the intrinsic intentionality of the observers" (Searle 1980b, pp. 451-452). The nub of the experiment, according to Searle's attempted clarification, then, is this: "instantiating a program could not be constitutive of intentionality, because it would be possible for an agent [e.g., Searle-in-the-room] to instantiate the program and still not have the *right kind* of intentionality" (Searle 1980b, pp. 450-451: my emphasis); the *intrinsic* kind. Though Searle unapologetically identifies *intrinsic* intentionality with *conscious* intentionality, still he resists Dennett's and others' imputations of dualism. Given that what it is we're attributing in attributing mental states is conscious intentionality, Searle maintains, insistence on the "first-person point of view" is warranted; because "the ontology of the mind is a first-person ontology": "the mind consists of qualia [subjective conscious experiences] . . . right down to the ground" (1992, p. 20). This thesis of Ontological Subjectivity, as Searle calls it in more recent work, is *not*, he insists, some dualistic invocation of discredited "Cartesian apparatus" (Searle 1992, p. xii), as his critics charge; it simply reaffirms commonsensical intuitions that behavioristic views and their functionalistic progeny have, for too long, highhandedly, dismissed. This commonsense identification of thought with consciousness, Searle maintains, is readily reconcilable with thoroughgoing physicalism when we conceive of consciousness as both caused by and realized in underlying brain processes. Identification of thought with consciousness along these lines, Searle insists, is not dualism; it might more aptly be styled monist interactionism (1980b, p. 455-456) or (as he now prefers) "biological naturalism" (1992, p. 1).

The Connectionist Reply (as it might be called) is set forth - along with a recapitulation of the Chinese room argument and a rejoinder by Searle - by Paul and Patricia Churchland in a 1990 *Scientific American* piece. The Churchlands criticize the crucial third "axiom" of Searle's "derivation" by attacking his would-be supporting thought experimental result. This putative result, they contend, gets much if not all of its plausibility from the lack of neurophysiological verisimilitude in the thought-experimental setup. Instead of imagining Searle working alone with his pad of paper and lookup table, like the Central Processing Unit of a serial architecture machine, the Churchlands invite us to imagine a more brainlike *connectionist* architecture. Imagine Searle-in-the-room, then, to be just one of very many agents, all working in parallel, each doing their own small bit of processing (like the many neurons of the brain). Since Searle-in-the-room, in this revised scenario, does only a very small portion of the total computational job of generating sensible Chinese replies in response to Chinese input, *naturally* he himself does not comprehend the whole process; so we should hardly expect *him* to grasp or to be conscious of the meanings of the communications he is involved, in such a minor way, in

processing. Searle counters that this Connectionist Reply - incorporating, as it does, elements of both systems and brain-simulator replies - can, like these predecessors, be decisively defeated by appropriately tweaking the thought-experimental scenario. Imagine, if you will, a Chinese gymnasium, with many monolingual English speakers working in parallel, producing output indistinguishable from that of native Chinese speakers: each follows their own (more limited) set of instructions in English. Still, Searle insists, obviously, none of these *individuals* understands; and neither does the whole company of them collectively. It's intuitively utterly obvious, Searle maintains, that no one and nothing in the revised "Chinese gym" experiment understands a word of Chinese either individually or collectively. Both individually and collectively, nothing is being done in the Chinese gym except meaningless syntactic manipulations from which intentionality and consequently meaningful thought could not conceivably arise.

Summary Analysis. **Searle's Chinese Room experiment parodies the Turing test, a test for artificial intelligence proposed by Alan Turing (1950) and echoing René Descartes' suggested means for distinguishing thinking souls from unthinking automata. Since "it is not conceivable," Descartes says, that a machine "should produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as even the dullest of men can do" (1637, Part V), whatever *has* such ability evidently thinks. Turing embodies this conversation criterion in a would-be experimental test of machine intelligence; in effect, a "blind" interview. Not knowing which is which, a human interviewer addresses questions, on the one hand, to a computer, and, on the other, to a human being. If, after a decent interval, the questioner is unable to tell which interviewee is the computer on the basis of their answers, then, Turing concludes, we would be well warranted in concluding that the computer, like the person, actually thinks. Restricting himself to the epistemological claim that under the envisaged circumstances attribution of thought to the computer is *warranted,* Turing himself hazards no metaphysical guesses as to *what thought is* - proposing no definition or no conjecture as to the essential nature thereof. Nevertheless, his would-be experimental apparatus can be used to characterize the main competing metaphysical hypotheses here in terms their answers to the question of what else or what instead, if anything, is required to guarantee that intelligent-seeming behavior really is intelligent or evinces thought. Roughly speaking, we have four sorts of hypotheses here on offer. Behavioristic hypotheses deny that *anything* besides *acting* intelligent is required. Dualistic hypotheses hold that, besides (or instead of) intelligent-seeming behavior, thought requires having the right subjective conscious experiences. Identity theoretic hypotheses hold it to be essential that the intelligent-seeming performances proceed from the right underlying neurophysiological states. Functionalistic hypotheses hold that the intelligent-seeming behavior must be produced by the right procedures or computations.**

The Chinese experiment, then, can be seen to take aim at Behaviorism and Functionalism as a would-be counterexample to both. Searle-in-the-room behaves as if he understands Chinese; yet doesn't understand: so, contrary to Behaviorism, acting (as-if) intelligent does not suffice for being so; something else is required. But, contrary to Functionalism this something else is not - or at least, not just - a matter of by what underlying procedures (or programming) the intelligent-seeming behavior is brought about: Searle-in-the-room, according to the thought-experiment, may be implementing whatever program you please, yet still be lacking the mental state (e.g., understanding Chinese) that his behavior would seem to evidence. Thus, Searle

claims, Behaviorism and Functionalism are utterly refuted by this experiment; leaving dualistic and identity theoretic hypotheses in control of the field. Searle's own hypothesis of Biological Naturalism may be characterized sympathetically as an attempt to wed - or unsympathetically as an attempt to waffle between - the remaining dualistic and identity-theoretic alternatives.

Postscript. **Debate over the Chinese room thought experiment - while generating considerable heat - has proven inconclusive. To the Chinese room's champions - as to Searle himself - the experiment and allied argument have often seemed so obviously cogent and decisively victorious that doubts professed by naysayers have seemed discreditable and disingenuous attempts to salvage "strong AI" at all costs. To the argument's detractors, on the other hand, the Chinese room has seemed more like "religious diatribe against AI, masquerading as a serious scientific argument" (Hofstadter 1980, p. 433) than a serious objection. Though I am with the masquerade party, a full dress criticism is, perhaps, out of place here (see Hauser 1993 and Hauser forthcoming). I offer, instead, the following (hopefully, not too tendentious) observations about the Chinese room and its neighborhood.**

(1) Though Searle himself has consistently (since 1984) fronted the formal "derivation from axioms," general discussion continues to focus mainly on Searle's striking thought experiment. This is unfortunate, I think. Since intuitions about the experiment seem irremediably at loggerheads, perhaps closer attention to the *derivation* could shed some light on vagaries of the argument (see Hauser forthcoming).

(2) The Chinese room experiment, as Searle himself notices, is akin to "arbitrary realization" scenarios of the sort suggested first, perhaps, by Joseph Weizenbaum (1976, Ch. 2), who "shows in detail how to construct a computer using a roll of toilet paper and a pile of small stones" (Searle 1980a, p. 423). Such scenarios are also marshaled against Functionalism (and Behaviorism *en passant*) by others, perhaps most famously, by Ned Block (1978). Arbitrary realizations imagine would-be AI-programs to be implemented in outlandish ways: *collective implementations* (e.g., by the population of China coordinating their efforts via two-way radio communications), imagine programs implemented by groups; *Rube Goldberg implementations* (e.g., Searle's water pipes or Weizenbaum's toilet paper roll and stones), imagine programs implemented bizarrely, in "the wrong stuff." Such scenarios aim to provoke intuitions that no such thing - no such collective or no such ridiculous contraption - could possibly be possessed of mental states. This, together with the premise - generally conceded by Functionalists - that programs might *well be* so *implemented*, yields the conclusion that computation, the "right programming" does not suffice for thought; the programming must be implemented in "the right stuff." Searle concludes similarly that what the Chinese room experiment shows is that "[w]hat matters about brain operations is not the formal shadow cast by the sequences of synapses but rather the actual properties of the synapses" (1980, p. 422), their "specific biochemistry" (1980, p. 424).

(3) Among those sympathetic to the Chinese room, it is mainly its negative claims - not Searle's positive doctrine - that garner assent. The positive doctrine - "biological naturalism," is either confused (waffling between identity theory and dualism) or else it *just is* identity theory or dualism.

(4) Since Searle argues against identity theory, on independent grounds, elsewhere (e.g., 1992, Ch. 5); and since he acknowledges the possibility that some "specific biochemistry" different than ours might suffice to produce conscious experiences and consequently intentionality (in Martians, say),

and speaks unabashedly of "ontological subjectivity" (see, e.g., Searle 1992, p. 100); it seems most natural to construe Searle's positive doctrine as basically dualistic, specifically as a species of "property dualism" such as Thomas Nagel (1974, 1986) and Frank Jackson (1982) espouse. Nevertheless, Searle frequently and vigorously protests that he is not *any* sort of dualist. Perhaps he protests *too much*.

(5) If Searle's positive views *are* basically dualistic - as many believe - then the usual objections to dualism apply, other-minds troubles among them; so, the "other-minds" reply can hardly be said to "miss the point". Indeed, since the question of whether computers (can) think *just is* an other-minds question, if other minds questions "miss the point" it's hard to see how the Chinese room speaks to the issue of whether computers really (can) think at all.

(6) Confusion on the preceding point is fueled by Searle's seemingly equivocal use of the phrase "strong AI" to mean, on the one hand, *computers really do think*, and on the other hand, *thought is essentially just computation*. Even if thought is not essentially just computation, computers (even present-day ones), nevertheless, might really think. That their behavior seems to *evince* thought is why there is a problem about AI in the first place; and if Searle's argument merely discountenances theoretic or metaphysical identification of thought with computation, the behavioral evidence - and consequently Turing's point - remains unscathed. Since computers seem, on the face of things, to think, the conclusion that the essential nonidentity of thought with computation would seem to warrant is that whatever else thought essentially is, computers *have this too*; not, as Searle maintains, that computers' seeming thought-like performances are *bogus*. Alternately put, equivocation on "Strong AI" invalidates the would-be dilemma that Searle's intitial contrast of "Strong AI" to "Weak AI" seems to pose:

> Strong AI (they really do think) or Weak AI (it's just simulation).
> Not Strong AI (by the Chinese room argument).
> *Therefore,* Weak AI.

To show that *thought is not just computation* (what the Chinese room -- if it shows anything -- shows) is not to show that *computers' intelligent seeming performances are not real thought* (as the "strong" "weak" dichotomy suggests) .

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Chrysippus (c. 280-207)

Chrysippus was a Stoic philosopher of Soli in Cilicia Campestris. He moved to Athens, and became a disciple of Cleanthes, the successor of Zeno. He was equally distinguished for his natural abilities and industry and rarely went a day without writing 500 lines. He wrote several hundred volumes, of which three hundred were on logical subjects, borrowing largely from others. With the Stoics in general, he maintained that the world was God, or a universal effusion of his spirit, and that the superior part of this spirit, which consisted in mind and reason, was the common nature of things, containing the whole and every part of it. Sometimes he speaks of God as the power of fate and the necessary chain of events. Sometimes he calls him fire. Other times he deifies the fluid parts of nature, such as water and air, or he deifies the earth, sun, moon, a d stars and the universe as a whole. To too he deifies those who have obtained immortality. He was fond of the syllogistic figure *sorities* in arguing, which is hence called by Persius "the heap of Chrysippus." His discourses contain more curiosities and distinctions than solid arguments.

In disputation, in which he spent the greatest part of his life, he displayed a degree of confidence which bordered on audacity. He often said to his preceptor, "Give me doctrines, and I will find arguments to support them." Once he was asked to advise an instructor for a someone's son. His response was "Me; for if I thought any philosopher excelled me, I would myself become his pupil." He showed contempt for distinctions of rank and, unlike other philosophers, would never honor princes or other important people by dedicating his works to them. Through his vehemence he made many adversaries, particularly among the Academic and Epicurean philosophers. Even his friends in the Stoic school complained that, in the heat of dispute, while the absurdity or obscurity of his opponent's views, he would become so illogical as to give his opponents an advantage over him. It was also a common practice with Chrysippus to take the opposite sides of the same question, and thus furnish his opponent with weapons which might easily be turned against himself as occasion offered. Carneades, who was one of his most able and skillful opponents, frequently used this circumstance and refuted Chrysippus by convicting him of inconsistency. Of his writings (reported to have been 700 in all), nothing remains except a few fragments which are preserved in the works of Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, and Aulus Gellius.

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Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE.)

LIFE. Cicero is credited with being the greatest of the Roman orators. He was born at Arpinum, the native place of Marius, 106 BCE., the same year which gave birth to Pompey the Great. His family was ancient, and of equestrian rank, but had never taken part in public affairs at Rome, though both his father and grandfather were persons of consideration in the part of Italy in which they resided. His father determined to educate his two sons, Marcus and Quintus, on an enlarged and liberal plan, and to fit them for the prospect of public employment, which his own weak state of health incapacitated him from seeking. One of his earliest masters was the poet Archias, whom he defended afterwards. Soon after he assumed the toga virilis, he was placed tinder the care of Scaevola, the celebrated lawyer, whom he introduces in several of his philosophical dialogues. Cicero took the opportunity of serving a campaign under the consul Pompeitis Strabo, father of Pompey the Great. He returned to the study of philosophy tinder Philo the Academic. But his chief attention was reserved for oratory, to which he applied himself with the assistance of Molo, the ablest rhetorician of the day. Diodotus the Stoic also exercised him in the argumentative subtleties for which the disciples of Zeno were known.

Cicero was the first Roman who found his way to the highest dignities of the State with no other recommendation than his powers of eloquence and his merits as a civil magistrate. The first case of importance which he undertook was the defense of Roscius Amerintis, in which he distinguished himself by his courageous defense, of his client, who had been accused of parricide, by Chrysogonus, a favorite of Stilia's. This obliging him, however, according to Plutarch, to leave Rome from Prudential motives, the power of Sulla being at that time paramount, he traveled for two years under pretense of his health. At Athens he met with Pomponius Atticus, whom he had formerly known at school, and attended the lectures of Antiochus, who, under the name of an Academic, taught the dogmatic doctrines of Plato and the Stoics. Though Cicero at first evinced considerable dislike, for his philosophical views, be seems afterwards to have adopted the sentiments of the Old Academy, which they much resembled, and not until late in life to have. relapsed into the skeptical tenets of his earlier instructor Philo.

After visiting the principal philosophers and rhetoricians of Asia, he returned at the age of thirty to Rome, so strengthened that he soon eclipsed in speaking all his competitors for public favor. Five years after his quaestorship Cicero was elected aedile. After the customary interval of two years, he was returned at the head of the list as praetor, and now made his first appearance on the Rostra in support of the Manilian law. At the expiration of his praetorship, he refused to accept a foreign province, the usual reward of that position. Instead, he sought the consulship. His consulate was succeeded by the return of Pompey from the East, and the establishment of the First Triumvirate. This disappointed his hopes of political greatness, and he resumed forensic and literary occupations. After four years, he was involved in a scandal that resulted in his voluntary exile. He later returned from exile, and five years later held command of the government of Cilicia. He resigned his command, and returned to Italy. With the assassination of Caesar, he hoped to

regain political influence, but Antony took Caesar's place, and Cicero favored Octavianus instead. This association proved disadvantageous, and, after several attempts at escape, he was captured and assassinated. His head and hands were cut off, and carried to Rome and displayed at the Rostra.

PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS. The treatise *De Legibus* has reached us in an imperfect state, only three books remaining, and these disfigured by numerous chasms that cannot be supplied. It traces the philosophic principles of jurisprudence to their remotest sources, sets forth a body of laws conformable to Cicero's idea of a well-regulated State, and is supposed to have treated in the books that are lost of the executive power of magistrates and the rights of roman citizens. The treatise *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* is written after the manner of Aristotle, and discusses the chief good and the chief evil (*summum bonum et summum malum*); in it Cicero explains the several opinions entertained on this subject by the philosophers of antiquity. The *Academicae Quaestiones* relates to the Academic philosophy, whose tenets Cicero himself had embraced. It is in account and defense of the doctrines of the Academy. In the *Tusculanae Disputationes,* five books are devoted to as many different questions of philosophy, bearing the most strongly on the practice of life, and involving topics the most essential to human happiness. The Paradoxa contains a defense of six paradoxes of the stoics. The work *De Natura Deorum,* in three books, examines the various theories of the Greeks and Romans on the nature of the gods, to which the treatise *De Divinatione* may be seen as a supplement. The essay De Officiis, on moral duties, has sometimes been called the Roman *Whole Duty of Man*; the dialogues *De Senectute* and *De Amicitia* have been regarded as among the most highly finished performances of which any language can boast. We have to lament the loss of the treatises *De Consolatione, De Gloria,* and the one entitled *Hortensius,* in which last Cicero undertook the defense of learning and philosophy, and left to his illustrious competitor the task of arraigning them. It was this book which first led St. Augustine to the study of Christian philosophy and the doctrines of Christianity. The treatise *De Republica* has been in part rescued from the destroying hand of time by the labors of Mai. Except the works *De Inventions* and *De Oratore*, this was the earliest of Cicero's literary productions. It written in 53 BCE, just before its author set out for his proconsular government in Cilicia. He was then 53. The object and spirit of the work were highly patriotic. He wished to bring the constitution back to its first principles by an impression expositive of its theory; to inflame his contemporaries with the love of virtue by portraying the character of their ancestors in its primeval purity; and while he was raising, a monument to all future ages of what Rome had been, to inculcate upon his own times what it ought till to be. We know it to have been his original purpose to make it a voluminous Work, for he expressly tells his brother that it was to be extended to nine books.

PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS. Cicero, as a philosophers belongs to the New Academy. It has been disputed whether be was really attached to this system, or had merely resorted to it as being the best adapted for furnishing, him with oratorical arguments suited to all occasions. At first its adoption was subsidiary to his other plans. But, towards the conclusion of his life, when lie no longer maintained the place he was ,wont to hold in the Senate or the Forum, and when philosophy formed the occupation "with which," to quote his own words, "life was just tolerable, and without which it would have been intolerable," he doubtless became convinced that the principles of the Now Academy, illustrated as they had been by Carneades and Philo, formed the soundest system which had descended to mankind from the schools of Athens. The attachment, however, of Cicero to the Academic philosophy was free from the exclusive spirit of sectarianism, and hence it did not prevent his extracting from other systems what lie found in them conformable to virtue and

reason. His ethical principles, in particular, appear eclectic, having been in a great measure formed from the opinions of the Stoics. Of most of the Greek sects he speaks with respect and esteem. For the Epicureans alone he seems, not withstanding his friendship for Atticus, to have entertained a decided aversion and contempt. The general purpose of Cicero' philosophical works was rather to give a history of the ancient philosophy, than dogmatically to inculcate opinions of his own. It was his great aim to explain to his follow-citizens, in their own language, whatever the sages of Greece had taught on the most important subjects, in order to enlarge their minds and reform their morals. His peculiar merit as a philosophical writer lay in his luminous and popular exposition of the leading principles and disputes of the ancient schools, and no works transmitted from antiquity present so concise and comprehensive a view of the opinions of the Greek philosophers. The most obvious peculiarity of Cicero's philosophical writings is their form of dialogue.

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Cleanthes (331-232 BCE.)

Cleanthes was a Stoic philosopher of Assus in Lydia, and a disciple of Zeno of Citium. After the death of Zeno he presided over his school. He was originally a wrestler, and in this capacity he visited Athens, where he became acquainted with philosophy. Although he possessed no more than four *drachma*, he was determined to put himself under the an eminent philosopher. His first master was Crates, the Academic. He afterward became Zeno's disciple and an advocate of his doctrines. By night he drew water as a common laborer in the public gardens so that he would have leisure to attend lectures in the daytime. The Athenian citizens observed that, although he appeared strong and healthy, he had no visible means of subsistence; they then summoned him before the Areopagas, according to the custom of the city, to give an account of his manner of living. He then produced the gardener for whom he drew water, and a woman for whom he ground meal, as witnesses to prove that he lived by the labor of his hands. The judges of the court were struck with such admiration of his conduct, that they ordered ten *minae* to be paid him out of the public treasury. Zeno, however, did not allow him to accept it. Antigonus afterward presented him with three thousand *minae*. From the manner in which this philosopher supported himself, he was called "the well drawer." For many years he was so poor that he was compelled to take notes on Zeno's lectures on shells and bones, since he could not afford to buy better materials. He remained, however, a pupil of Zeno for nineteen years.

His natural faculties were slow. But resolution and perseverance enabled him to overcome all difficulties. At last he became so complete a master of Stoicism that he was perfectly qualified to succeed Zeno. His fellow disciples often ridiculed him for his dullness by calling him an ass. However, his answer was, that if he were an ass he was the better able to bear the weight of Zeno's doctrine. He wrote much, but none of his writings remain except a hymn to Jupiter. After his death, the Roman senate erected a statue in honor of him at Assus. It is said that he starved himself to death in his 99th year.

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Cognitive Relativism

Cognitive relativism asserts the relativity of truth. On the other hand, moral relativism asserts the relativity of morality. Because of the close connections between the concept of truth and concepts such as rationality and knowledge, cognitive relativism is often taken to encompass, or imply, the relativity of both rationality and knowledge. The framework, or standpoint, to which truth is relativized is usually understood to be a conceptual scheme. This may be the conceptual scheme of an entire culture or period; or it may be conceived more narrowly as the theoretical framework of a particular community: for example, quantum physicists, or Southern Baptists. Like other forms of relativism, cognitive relativism denies that any of these standpoints enjoy a uniquely privileged status. None of them offer a 'God's eye point of view', or represent the standpoint dictated to us by objective standards of rationality.

Cognitive relativism, like many other forms of relativism, is often said to have been first put forward by the ancient sophists, particularly Protagoras, who began his work 'Truth' with the famous statement: ''Man is the measure of all things--of things that are, that they are, of things that are not that they are not.' But with the possible exception of the sophists, few philosophers in the Western tradition have espoused any form of cognitive relativism until relatively recent times. Most assumed that there is some standpoint--for example, that of God--in relation to which our judgements are definitively true or false.

In the nineteenth century this assumption came to be seriously questioned by a small number of important thinkers, most notably Nietzsche and William James. In the twentieth century a relativistic view of truth, although it still provokes vituperative responses from anti-relativists, has undeniably gained many more adherents; indeed, it has become almost commonplace in some philosophical circles. The reasons for this development are diverse. They include:

> i) the example offered by relativistic views of moral standards, views which gained in popularity as knowledge of other cultures was extended;
>
> ii) growing awareness, also due to research in anthropology and linguistics, that people in different cultures view the world through radically different conceptual frameworks;
>
> iii) the working out of the full implications of Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' in metaphysics, according to which the objects of our knowledge are shaped by the categories through which we cognize them;
>
> iv) in continental philosophy, the implications--intended or otherwise--of Hegel's historicism, Marx's theory of ideology, and Nietzsche's perspectivism;
>
> v) in English-speaking philosophy, the critique of the positivist philosophy of science, the problems posed by the ideal of objectivity or neutrality in the social sciences, and the impact of discoveries in psychology concerning the interpretation of data.

Relativistic views of truth have received further impetus from or found expression in the works of many widely read twentieth century thinkers such as the later Wittgenstein, Quine, Kuhn, Winch, Goodman, Rorty, Gadamer, Foucault, and Derrida.

Cognitive relativists do not simply assert the different cultures or communities have different views about which beliefs are true; no-one disputes that. Nor do they merely claim that different communities operate with different epistemic norms--i.e. criteria of truth and standards of rationality. That, too, seems to be obvious. The controversial claim at the heart of cognitive relativism is that no one set of epistemic norms is metaphysically privileged over any other. This is the claim which non-relativists reject, arguing, on the contrary, that some epistemic norms--for example, those employed by modern science--enjoy a special status in virtue of which they can serve as objective, universally valid, criteria of truth and rationality. Relativists respond to this argument by challenging their opponents to prove the superiority of the epistemic norms they favour. In reply, anti-relativists commonly argue that the success of certain norms in practice--for example, the success of modern science in enabling us to manipulate the world--constitutes a proof that these norms are not just social conventions but really do help us decide which of our judgements are objectively true.

The standard objection to cognitive relativism is that it is self-refuting. If I assert that all judgements are only true relative to some non-privileged standpoint, the objection runs, I am implicitly claiming that this judgement--i.e. the thesis of relativism--is true in some non-relativistic sense. The usual rejoinder by relativists to this objection is a denial that they have to commit themselves to any non-relativistic notion of truth. It is possible, they say, to advance a claim and hold it to be true relative to a given set of norms, without committing oneself to the view that it is true, or that the norms in question are valid, in some further, non-relativistic sense.

A related objection is that the relativist, by his or her own lights, must concede that from some points of view relativism will appear false. Moreover, since no standpoint is uniquely privileged, these standpoints, and the views they encompass or imply, are equally worthy of our respect. The relativist must therefore hold that relativism is both true and false. To this the relativists can reply that while relativism may indeed be false from certain perspectives, these are not perspectives that consistent relativists will be committed to. In fact, they will argue, of those who accept the major paradigm shifts that have characterized philosophy over the last two centuries, relativists can claim to be the most consistent, since they alone accept the full implications of these shifts for our notions of truth and rationality.

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Consequentialism

"Consequentialism" refers to a class of normative moral theories which maintain that an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable. Thus, correct moral conduct is determined solely by a cost-benefit analysis of an action's consequences. Consequentialism requires that we first tally both the good and bad consequences of an action; we then determine whether the total good consequences outweigh the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action is morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper. Consequentialist theories are also called teleological theories, from the Greek word telos, or end, since the end result of the action is the sole determining factor of its morality.

Most versions of consequentialism are more precisely formulated than the general principle above. In particular, contending consequentialist theories specify which consequences for affected groups of people are relevant. Three subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:

- **Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable only to the agent performing the action.**
- **Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the agent.**
- **Utilitarianism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone.**

Advocates of all three views often defended their theories by appealing to certain human instincts. Proponents of ethical egoism appeal a psychological principle of motivation called psychological egoism. Psychological egoism states that all human actions, with no exception, are ultimately motivated by selfish interests. This, they argue, is an unalterable fact of human nature. Egoists argue further that moral obligation must operate within the confines of our human makeup (we clearly cannot be expected to perform actions beyond our abilities). The conclusion they draw, then, is that ethical egoism is the only possible criterion for ethical judgment since it alone recognizes our completely selfish motivations. But, ethical altruism makes a similar appeal to human nature. Altruists reject the theory of psychological egoism and argue instead that humans are instinctively benevolent. And instinctive benevolence, they argue, is the feature of our human nature which is the basis of our altruistic moral obligations. Finally, utilitarianism suggests a mediation between our selfish and altruistic ideals. Some utilitarians argue that our public and private lives are so entwined, that when we pursue our selfish interests, we are at the same time pursing the interests of others. J.S. Mill also argued that, although humans are selfish, we also have an instinctive feeling of unity which helps expand our private interests.

Unfortunately, all of these appeals to instinctive motives fail, for there is no way to empirically establish whether human nature is instinctively selfish, benevolent, or some mixture of the two. All three consequentialist theories can be evaluated from the standpoint of our common moral

intuitions. Problems are immediately revealed with ethical egoism. According to ethical egoism, acts of lying, stealing, and even killing would be morally permissible so long as (1) the agent benefited, and (2) he was not caught. But, it is clearly contrary to our common notions of morality to call such acts "moral." Ethical altruism also clashes with our common moral intuitions since most believe that one's own interests should count for at least something. Finally, problems arise with utilitarianism because of its emphasis on public benefit. According to utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong to waste time on leisure activities such as watching television, since our time could be spent in ways which produced a greater social benefit, such as charity work.

Finally, all of the above versions of consequentialism leave open the possibility that a heinous action, such as torture or slavery, could be morally permissible if its benefits outweighed its disbenefits. However, our common moral intuitions tell us that such actions are unjust regardless of the beneficial consequences produced. Consequentialism, then, appears to be flawed at its very root since justice can be dispensed with if it produces the appropriate benefits. In view of the above problems, consequentialist principles have been modified to bring these theories more in line with our common moral intuitions. This is especially so with utilitarianism.

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Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688)

Member of seventeenth century school of philosophers known as the "Cambridge Platonists"; b. at Aller, in Somersetshire (12 m. s.w. of. Wells), 1617; d. at Cambridge June 26, 1688. He entered Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in 1632, and, after taking his M.A. degree in 1639, became fellow and tutor of the college. In 1642 he entered the lists against the Catholic party with his first published work, *A Discourse concerning the True Nature of the Lord's Supper*, which he considers to be that of a "feast upon a sacrifice," analogous to the feasts which followed the legal sacrifices among the Jews; not itself sacrificium, but, in Tertullian's language, participatio sacrificii. Soon after he published The Union of Christ and the Church; in a Shadow, in which he attempted to vindicate what he thought Protestants had too much lost sight of, the higher meaning of marriage. Young as he was, he had already mastered all the main sources of philosophy, medieval as well as classical, and quotes freely from the Neoplatonists and Cabalists, as well as from such modern Platonists as Vives and Pico della Mirandola . In 1644 he was appointed master of Clare Hall by the Parliamentary visitors, and a year later was made regius professor of Hebrew, a position which his knowledge of Jewish literature and antiquities made congenial to him. It seems that he thought of leaving Cambridge in 1651, but the election to the mastership of Christ's College in 1654 settled him there anew. In spite of his close relations with the Commonwealth government, he was undisturbed at the Restoration, and was even presented in 1662 to the rectory of Ashwell in Herefordshire by Sheldon, archbishop of Canterbury, and made a prebendary of Gloucester in 1678. Academic and philosophic labors occupied the remainder of his life. Alarmed by the tendencies of the irreligious and deistic writers of the time, especially Hobbes, he essayed to meet them by a counter-philosophy which should go to the depth of human thought and belief. The most important part of what in his conception was intended to constitute one great whole was *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, finished in 1671 but not published until 1678. Its full importance was not recognized until after its author's death; Le Clerc published extracts from it in 1703, and attracted to it the attention of Continental thinkers; in 1706 an abridged edition was published in London by Wise; and in 1733 a Latin version appeared with notes of his own, reproduced in the London edition of 1845. In this great treatise Cudworth combated the atheistic hypothesis.

He planned to set forth, against various forms of fatalism which appeared to him inconsistent with the true order of the universe, three great principles which should sum up religious and moral truth. These were (1) the reality of a supreme divine intelligence and a spiritual world, against the atomistic materialism of Democritus and Epicurus; (2) the eternal reality of moral ideas against the medieval Nominalists and their successors; and (3) the reality of moral freedom and responsibility in man against all pantheistic naturalism and stoicism. Of these the Intellectual System deals formally with the first only. To the later parts belong the *Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality*, posthumously published by Bishop Chandler in 1731, and the *Treatise on Free Will*, ed. Allen, 1838, as well as some two thousand folio pages of manuscript still lying in the

British Museum. As a philosopher he was not a pure Platonist; in metaphysics, indeed, he followed Plato and the Neoplatonists, but in natural philosophy the Atomists, and in that of religion Lord Herbert of Cherbury. His theological standpoint was determined partly by his philosophy, partly by the circumstances of his time. He asserted the necessity of revealed religion, but saw in philosophy a divine illumination. Averse from partisan strife, he held a middle course between the rigid High-churchmanship of the school of Laud and Independent fanaticism, combining the recognition, with the former, of the rightfulness of an ecclesiastical constitution and an order of worship, and with the latter of the necessity of inner light and an unswerving devotion to ethical ideals.

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Richard Cumberland (1631-1718)

Laws of Nature. Cumberland's best known work is *De Legibus Naturae* (1672), the title-page of profess to "consider and refute... the elements of Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy, as well Moral as Civil." It puts forward a doctrine of morality which is based on the law of nature, and this is accompanied by a running criticism of Hobbes's views. Cumberland looks upon the law of nature as capable of being inferred from observation of physical and mental phenomena (themselves due to the will of God), and at the same time as pointing out the "action of a rational agent which will chiefly promote the common good."

He attacks the neo-Platonists, and the theory of innate ideas as a Platonic error:

> **The *Platonists,* indeed, clear up this Difficulty in an easier manner, by the Supposition of *innate ideas,* as well of the Laws of Nature themselves, as of those Matters about which they are conservant; but, truly, I have not been so happy as to learn the Laws of Nature in so short a way. Nor seems it to me well advised, to build the Doctrine of *natural Religion* and *Morality* upon an *Hypothesis,* which has been by the *generality of Philosophers* as well *Heathen* as *Christian,* and *can never be proved* against the *Epicureans,* with whom is our chief controversy. [Introduction, Sect. 5]**

Laws of Nature, in this ethical reference, are defined by him as "propositions of unchangeable Truth, which direct our voluntary Actions about choosing Good and Evil; and impose an Obligation to external actions even without civil Laws, and laying aside all Considerations of those compacts which constitute civil government" (Ch. 1, p. 39).

He defines 'Good' as "that which preserves, or enlarges and perfects, the Faculties of any one thing, or of several" (Ch. 2, p. 165). It follows that the Law of Nature prescribes those actions which "will chiefly promote the common Good, and by which only the entire Happiness of particular Persons can be obtained" (Ch. 5, p. 189). He also includes both happiness and perfection, or development of faculty, as inseparable elements in the Good. He is particularly concerned with the determination of the form of conduct which will lead to the attainment of this end; and his conclusion is that the best method of securing it is that of benevolence, or regard for the common good, as opposed to selfish preoccupation with our own individual interests. "The greatest Benevolence of every rational Agent towards all, forms the happiness state of every, and of all the Benevolent, as far as is in their Power; and is necessarily requisite to the happiest State which they can attain, and therefore the common Good is the supreme Law" (Ch. 1). This endeavor to promote the common good "includes our Love of God, and of all Mankind, who are the Parts of this System. God, indeed, is the principal Part; Men the subordinate: A benevolence toward both includes Piety and Humanity, that is, both Tables of the Law of Nature" (Introduction, Sect. 15, p. 20).

He repeatedly points out that the common good includes our own, as one of its parts; but it must be sought only as a part, in subordination to the whole. Cumberland's confidence in the perfect coincidence of virtue, or benevolence, and individual happiness ultimately depends upon his

doctrine of the divine sanctions of the Laws of Nature. But his main interest in the ethical question is to insist, against Hobbes, upon the "naturalness" of the law of benevolence and the inherent unreasonableness of separating the individual and his good from the system of rational beings of which he is in reality only a part, and with whose good his own is inseparably bound up. Thus, he thinks that the "rules of life" are as plain as the "art of numbering," and the following propositions are laid down as necessarily true: (1) "that the good of all rational beings is greater than the like good of any part of that aggregate body, that is, that it is truly the greatest good"; (2) "that in promoting the good of this whole aggregate, the good of individuals is contained and promoted"; and (3) "that the good of every particular part requires the introducing and settling of distinct property in such things, and such services of rational agents, as contribute to the common happiness."

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Damon (5th Cn. BCE.)

Damon was a 5th century BCE. Pythagorean philosopher of Syracuse. Damon was a close friend to Phintias the Pythagorean. Dionysius, the tyrant, having condemned Phintias to death for conspiring against him, Phintias begged that leave might be allowed him to go for a short period to a neighboring place, in order to arrange some family affairs, and offered to leave one of his friends in the hands of Dionysius as a pledge for his return by an appointed time, and who would be willing, in case Phintias broke his word, to die in his stead. Dionysius, skeptical as to the existence of such friendship, and prompted by curiosity, assented to the arrangement, and Damon took the place of Phintias. The day appointed for the return of Phintias arrived, and the public expectation was highly excited as to the probable issue of this singular affair. The day drew to a close; no Phintias came; and Damon was in the act of being led to execution, when, of a sudden, the absent friend, who had been detained by unforeseen and unavoidable obstacles, presented himself to the eyes of the admiring crowd and saved the life of Damon. Dionysius was so much struck by this instance of true attachment that he pardoned Phintias, and entreated the two to allow him to share their friendship (Val. Max. iv. 7; Plut. *De Amic Mult.*).

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Donald Davidson (b. 1917)

LIFE AND INFLUENCES. **Donald Davidson, one of the most significant philosophers of the XX century, was born 6 March, 1917 in Springfield, Massachusetts. He studied English, Comparative Literature and Classics in his undergraduate years at Harvard. In his sophomore year at Harvard, Davidson attended two classes that made a lasting impression on him. These two classes on philosophy were taught by Alfred North Whitehead in the last year of his career. Davidson was then accepted to graduate studies in philosophy at Harvard, where his teacher was Willard Van Orman Quine. Quine set Davidson on a course in philosophy quite different from that of Whitehead. Subsequently, Davidson did his dissertation on Plato's *Philebus***

According to Davidson, "The central thesis that emerged was that when Plato had reworked the theory of ideas as a consequence of the explorations and criticisms of the *Parmenides, Sophist, Theaetetus,* and *Politicus*, he realized that the theory could no longer be deployed as a main support of an ethical position, as it had been developed in the *Republic* and elsewhere." Davidson's dissertation topic is mentioned only *in passim* in most encyclopedia entries. This is unfortunate, for one can see the development of Davidson's philosophical method in his dissertation. More important, one can trace Davidson's epistemological position back to Plato's.

Davidson's most profound influences on contemporary philosophy stem from his philosophy of mind and action. However, Davidson's philosophical positions in action theory and philosophy of mind are intrinsically tied into his work on the semantics of natural languages. I will treat these in turn. Davidson's apprenticeship in philosophy took place in a very different intellectual milieu than that of today. The middle of the century was dominated, at least in the Anglo-American philosophical community, by Logical Positivism. Davidson recalls that he got through graduate school at Harvard by reading an anthology of Logical Positivism by Feigl and Sellars. Logical positivism emerged in the Austro-Hungarian empire early in this century. Influenced by the logicist project of Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege on the one hand, and profound advances in science on the other, the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle turned to physics as a model of theoretical discourse and considered sensory experiences fundamental. Although Logical Positivism was not entirely a unified movement, one principle was more or less shared by major philosophers of that bent. This principle, known as the *Verification Principle*, states that the meaning of sentences can be accounted for in terms of experiences that would verify them. Logical Positivism also placed hopes in reductionism: the reduction of all special sciences to physics, and of all meaningful statements to reports about sensory experiences. In his famous paper, *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, Davidson's teacher Quine challenged two central tenets of logical positivism: reductionism and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Davidson has been greatly influenced by Logical Positivism, but self-admittedly took up Quine's project and continued to challenge certain basic precepts. In fact, in his own paper, *On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme*, Davidson does away with what he considers the third and last dogma of empiricism: the

dogma of the dualism of scheme and reality.

I will examine in detail two leading motifs in Donald Davidson's philosophy. One has to do with the fact that mental phenomena resist being "captured in the nomological net of physical theory." In the first section I will parse Davidson's argument for the rejection of strict psychophysical and psychological laws. The other motif concerns the problem of analyzing the explanatory force of agent's reasons for his actions. It is Davidson's contention that reason explanation is a form of causal explanation. The second part deals with the latter claim

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ANOMALISM OF THE MENTAL. Simply put, "anomalism of the mental" amounts to the claim that the mental is not governed by laws as we usual understand them. In Davidson's own words:

> **There are no *strict deterministic* laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained (the Anomalism of the Mental).**

In developing his position, Davidson attempts to retain his materialism while at the same time avoid a reductionism, which generally has been held to have followed from materialism. When Davidson asserts that there can be no laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained, he has two different types of laws in mind. In the first type of law, an attempt is made to link mental states and events with physical states and events, and to try to explain the former on the basis of the latter. Davidson spends much of his effort in *Mental Events* showing the impossibility of such psychophysical laws. In the second type of law, there is an attempt to formulate strict deterministic laws linking mental states and events to other mental states and events. Davidson denies the possibility of such psychological laws as well. Davidson's latter claim amounts to the rejection of the science of psychology *tout court*.

In arguing against the possibility of psychophysical laws, Davidson has in mind the following kinds of laws:

> **(BL) x (x is in M iff x is in P)**

where M denotes some mental state or event and P denotes some physical state or event. The laws of the above kind are known as bridging laws. A stronger version of a bridging law claims identity of properties from different theoretical discourses. A weaker version claims only that whenever an object instantiates one property it instantiates the other. An important distinction between *laws* and *generalizations* must be made before we proceed any further. There has been general agreement among philosophers (Davidson included) that a law is distinguished from a mere generalization by the following features:

1. **A law must support counterfactual claims. A law of the form "All A are B," for instance, is said to sustain the claim that if any arbitrary x were an A, it would also be B.**
2. **It must be capable of confirmation by observable instances.**

To illustrate the difference between generalizations that happen to be true, and laws, consider the following story (adopted from Jaegwon Kim). All objects in a fixed domain (for instance all objects in my room) are either blue or red. In addition, all of the above objects are considered either edible or inedible. By some coincidence it so happens that all red objects in my room are edible. This allows us to form a true generalization about this fixed domain:

1. **if x is red then x is edible.**

It is obvious that (G) does not support counterfactual conditionals. For instance (G) does not allow us to infer of some green object (say a copy of Davidson's *Essays on Actions and Events*) that if it were red it would be edible. Davidson is quite explicit that his attack is aimed at psychophysical *laws* not at true psychophysical generalizations:

> **The thesis is rather that the mental is nomologically irreducible: there may be true general statements relating the mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not lawlike (in a strong sense to be described). If by absurdly remote chance we were to stumble on a nonstochastic true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than roughly true.**

Following this view, it is important to keep in mind the fact that whether any given psychophysical generalization is true is a contingent empirical matter. As we will see later, it is an *a priori* matter that no such generalization can be a law.

The core idea of Davidson's argument against possibility of psychophysical laws can be found in the following passage:

> **Nomological statements bring together predicates that we know a priori are made for each other - know, that is, independently of knowing whether the evidence supports a connection between them.**

If we can know *a priori* when the predicates *are* made for each other then we can know by the same token when they *aren't*. Davidson finds that it is an *a priori* truth that mental and physical predicates are not made for each other. The structure of the argument is the following:

1. **Both mental and physical phenomena have distinct sets of features characteristic of their own domains, but incompatible with each other.**
2. **Bridging laws linking properties from two distinct theoretical discourses (in this case mental and physical) would transmit properties from one discourse to another, which in case of mental and physical phenomena would lead into incoherence.**
3. **Therefore, there could be no psychophysical laws linking mental and physical phenomena.**

    According to Davidson, the paradigmatic criterion of the mental events is their susceptibility to the description "in terms of vocabulary of propositional attitudes." Propositional attitudes or intentional states as they are sometimes called are various cognitive attitudes (that of hope, fear, desire, etc.) that one and the same person or different people can have toward the same proposition. For instance you and I can bear different cognitive attitudes toward the proposition 'Snow is white.' I might hope that snow is white, whereas you might simply believe that it is, etc. The proposition itself, viz., that snow is white, towards which one has an attitude is said to give the content to one's mental state.

    Propositional attitudes have certain features (or are constrained by certain principles) that distinguish them from physical states and events. Davidson's theory of propositional attitudes is guided by conclusions drawn from the project of Radical Interpretation. Imagine that you have encountered a group of people in an unfamiliar land who display what appear to be shared verbal and non-verbal behavior. Assigning meaning to their actions (of which linguistic utterances is a subclass) is the task of Radical Interpretation. The principles and techniques we would apply in the above described situation are not unlike the principles and techniques we commonly apply in interpretation of other people's actions and utterances

whose language we share. Radical interpretation, according to Davidson, is guided by normative principles and must proceed holistically.

> **This method is intended to solve the problem of the interdependence of belief and meaning by holding belief constant as far as possible while solving for meaning. This is accomplished by assigning truth conditions to alien sentences that make native speakers right when plausibly possible, according, of course to our own view of what is right.**

These general normative principles that guide the task of radical interpretation, and therefore constrain the task of attribution of propositional attitudes, are principles like 'don't believe an open contradiction,' or 'if you believe that *p* and *q* then believe that p.' It is important to keep in mind the fact that intentional states are capable of justifying other intentional states. In physical theory the movement of one ball is explained by the movement of the other. Having a belief that pressing on a lever will stop the flow of water doesn't just explain my action of stopping the flow of water. This belief (together with the desire to stop the flow of water)also justifies my action in the sense that it makes it reasonable in the light of the above belief. More on this in the second part of my paper. Davidson is explicit that it is a part of what it *is* for something to be a propositional attitude (like a belief) that it be subject to these normative principles. This makes these principles *a priori* and necessary constitutive of the concept of propositional attitudes. In contrast our knowledge of things physical is *a posteriori* and contingent in nature.

So far I have spent time explaining the normative character of the mental. I also mentioned that the interpretation must proceed holistically:

> **There is no assigning beliefs to a person one by one on the basis of his verbal behavior, his choices, or other local signs no matter how plain and evident, for we make sense of particular beliefs only as they cohere with other beliefs, with preferences, with intention, hopes, fears, expectation, and the rest.**

It can be seen from the above remark that mental is holistic in a sense that the attribution of each individual mental state to another person must be made against the background of attribution of other mental states. In addition, the attribution to an agent of the entire system of propositional attitudes is further constrained by considerations that involve maximization of coherence and rationality.

Davidson is quite aware of the fact that holism and interdependence are common to physical theory. In physical theory such *a priori* facts as the transitivity of 'longer than' is what makes physical measurements possible. Thus, the physical realm is also characterized by the *a priori* laws constitutive of our conception of the physical. What sets the realms of the mental and the physical apart is the disparate commitments of each realm. Rationality and the governing normative principles are essential characteristics of the mental. Thus, the absence of rationality and normative principles is a characteristic of the physical. If there were bridging laws we would find that the characteristics of the mental that have "no echo in physical theory" would be transmitted to the physical and *vice versa*. In the first of the above scenarios we would have to apply the Principle of Charity with its rule of maximization of coherence and rationality to the physical, which, according to Davidson, is plain absurd. In the second scenario we would have the principles governing the attribution of the mental be

preempted by the merely physical constraints. This happens for the following reason. If there *were* bridging laws of the type (BL), then neural states of the brain would be nomologically coextensive with certain intentional states. But neural states (being theoretical states of physical theory) are governed by conditions of attribution that in turn are regulated by the constitutive rules of the physical theory. Thus, constitutive rules of the mental are ignored in this scenario. Davidson concludes that:

> There are no strict psychophysical law because of the disparate commitments of the mental and physical schemes. It is a feature of physical reality that physical change can be explained by laws that connect it with other changes and conditions physically described. It is a feature of the mental that the attribution of mental phenomena must be responsible to the background of reasons, beliefs, and intentions of the individual. There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence.

It is important for Davidson to note that the mental does have its own laws, for instance, the laws of rational decision making. The crucial difference between such laws and the laws that could be counted as psychophysical is the difference between the *normative* character of the former and the *predictive* power of the latter. When anomalism of the mental denies the existence of psychophysical and psychological laws, the sense of 'law' is taken to involve strict nomological predictions and explanations of behavior. Thus, normative 'laws' are quite compatible with anomalism of the mental. The question of whether Davidson's notion of what constitutes a "law" has merit or a wide following is beyond of the scope of this paper.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, the claim of the anomalism of the mental consists of two subsidiary claims. Thus far we have considered the support for the claim that there are no *psychophysical* laws. Davidson also defends the claim that there could be no precise *psychological* laws, i.e. there are no precise laws that relate mental states and events to other mental states and events. The argument for this claim can be found in 'Psychology as Philosophy.' As the title suggests, Davidson intends to contrast the claim that psychology is more like philosophy with the claim that it is more like science and then refute the latter claim. One point deserves special attention before we proceed to the exegesis of Davidson's argument against psychological laws. Actions, although undeniably physical under some descriptions, are considered to be mental by Davidson. This is so because, when we state which *action* someone is performing versus merely describing the *physical movement* his body is undergoing, we are contributing to our interpretation of him and interpretation, as we have seen, is guided by certain normative constraints. Thus, the laws that could relate an agent's mental states to his actions would count as psychological laws.

The gist of the argument against psychological laws can be found in the following passage:

> It is an error to compare truism like 'If a man wants to eat an acorn omelette, then he generally will if the opportunity exists and no other desire overrides' with a law that says how fast a body will fall in a vacuum. It is an error, because in the latter case, but not the former, we can tell in advance whether the condition holds, and we know what allowance to make if it doesn't.

If the above truism were a psychological law, then for the antecedent to obtain, the agent must want to eat an acorn omelette. But our knowledge of an agent's desires crucially

depends upon our attribution of *other* mental states to him. In addition, knowing his action subsequent to his desire will help us interpret whether the agent had the desire in the first place. Thus both the antecedent and the consequent of the supposed psychological law are related to each other through the holism of interpretation.

What is needed in the case of action, if we are to predict on the basis of desires and beliefs, is a quantitative calculus that brings all relevant beliefs and desires into the picture. There is no hope of refining the simple pattern of explanation on the basis of reasons into such a calculus.

Since no such hope exists, any psychological generalization purporting to be law must rely upon generous escape clauses such as 'if no other desire overrides,' *ceteris paribus*, etc. The necessity of such failsafe clauses is dictated by the fact that for Davidson there is no "underlying mental reality whose laws we can study in abstraction from the normative and holistic perspectives of interpretation."

CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ACTION. Actions, according to Davidson, are events. Events, in his ontology, are particular dated occurrences; the essential feature of which is susceptibility to redescription. In order to admit an entity into one's ontology, one must specify the conditions of individuation for that entity. On Davidson's view:

> **[E]vents are identical if and only if they have exactly the same causes and effects. This criterion may seem to have an air of circularity about it, but if there is circularity it certainly is not formal. For the criterion is simply this: where *x* and *y* are events,**
>
> **(*x* = *y* if and only if ((*z*) (*z* caused *x* *z* caused *y*) and (*z*) (*x* caused *z* *y* caused *z*)).**

It is important to keep in mind that for an event to be an action, the event must be describable in a specific way. Actions are events that people perform *with intentions and for reasons*. One and the same action can be specified as intentional under some description and as purely physical under other description. But in order to be an action an event must have at least one description under which it is specified as intentional. The above requirement for an action hinges on the larger distinction between specifying the whole of an event with wholly specifying it. The distinction comes up in the context of discussion of causation and causal explanation:

> **The salient point that emerges so far is that we must distinguish firmly between causes and the features we hit on for describing them, and hence between the question whether a statement says truly that one event caused another and the further question whether the events are characterized in such a way that we can deduce, or otherwise infer, from laws or other causal lore, that the relation was causal.**

In the case of one event causing another, any description that *picks out* the right event specifies the whole of the cause. Some descriptions, of course, will be richer in the information they disclose about an event. This richness should not effect in any way how much of a cause they refer to. The story is quite different when it comes to what Davidson calls 'the further question' of causal explanation. Causal explanations are by their very

nature attempts to explain events in terms of the causes of these events. But, according to Davidson, causal *explanations* are, in addition, sensitive to how the events in question are described. For instance, the two descriptions 'Jack's walking in the room' and 'Jack's stomping in the room' may refer to the same event that caused Jill to wake up. However the latter may serve as a causal explanation of Jill's waking up, whereas the former may not.

One of Davidson's major contributions to philosophy of action is his claim that reason explanation is a form of causal explanation. In order to understand Davidson's claims that reasons are the causes of the actions they are reasons for and that reason explanation is a form of causal explanation, we must understand how on his view causal explanation works.

There have been two opposing approaches taken to a theory of causal explanation. One theory that takes its roots in Hume's position that (arguably) states that wherever there is a causal relation between two distinct events *a* and *b* there must be a law relating two types of events *A* and *B* that the events in question instantiate. This position has been further developed in the middle of the twentieth century by Carl Hempel into a deductive-nomological theory (DN from now on). According to DN, an event *E* is causally explained just in case the statement asserting the occurrence of *E* deductively follows from

1. **the statement asserting the occurrence of its cause *C* , and**
2. **the statement of some general causal law *L*.**

The opponents of the DN model argue that one can judge that an event *a* caused an event *b* without knowing the laws that these events instantiate. Davidson contends that the opposition between the opponents and the champions of the DN model is more apparent than real. The solution to the conflict depends on the distinction between events and their descriptions:

> **Causality and identity are relations between individual events no matter how described. But laws are linguistic; and so events can instantiate laws, and hence be explained or predicted in the light of laws, only as those events are described in one or the other way.**

In short, Davidson lends his support to the principle of Nomological Character of Causality. This principle "says that when events are related as cause and effect, they have descriptions that instantiate a law. It doesn't say that every true singular statement of causality instantiates a law." It is worth noting that Davidson accepts this principle on faith, as many commentators have pointed out. Unlike David Hume, who accepted the principle because his analysis of the nature of causation as a constant conjunction required it, Davidson disavows analyzing the nature of causation itself. His goal, explicitly stated, is to provide an analysis of the logical form of causal statements.

We can now turn to the question of the causal explanation of action. I will briefly discuss Davidson's impetus for his claim that reason explanation must be a form of causal explanation. Davidson's opponents (the anti-causalists) on the explanation of actions claimed that reason explanation is different in *kind* from causal explanation. There are two main types of arguments for the anti-causalist position: *methodological* and *conceptual*. Anti-causalists, who relied on methodological arguments for their position, claimed that a DN model that relies on the concept of *lawful regularity* has a place only in the physical

sciences. By contrast, the primary constraint placed on explanation in the social sciences is a *normative* one. Thus, lawful regularities relating reasons to actions would be simply irrelevant to explanation in social sciences according to anti-causalists.

Conceptual arguments are meant to establish the stronger claim that reasons cannot in principle be causes. One (more plausible) argument of the conceptual variety rests on the assumption that "the presence of a reason cannot be ascertained independently of the occurrence of the action it rationalizes." This, presumably, leads to the disparate evidential commitments of the causal explanation and reason explanation. Davidson himself appears to advocate the above point in the passage quoted above. Thus, all arguments against the causalist position, including the ones briefly mentioned above, revolve around the normative constraints placed on the explanation of the mental.

In short, an explanation of an agent's action can be considered adequate only if it shows the action in question to be reasonable against the background of agent's beliefs and desires. This latter condition together with the truth condition, which states that propositional attitudes a rationalization attributes to an agent must be true, form the necessary conditions for the *justification model* of explanation. Davidson considers the above conditions necessary but not sufficient. The deficiency of the justification model is explained by drawing attention to the distinction between having *a* reason for an action and having *the* reason why one performs an action. For *a* reason to be *the* reason why one performs an action the reason must cause the action. For example, I have *a* reason to turn on the television, say, to watch my favorite TV show. But this is not *the* reason why I turned the television. This is because the above reason did not cause me to turn on the television. As Davidson puts it,

> [S]omething essential has certainly been left out, for a person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it.

In my case *the* reason for me to turn the television was the fact that I wanted it to keep me company. Thus, one reason, (viz., to keep me company) was the *cause* of my action while the other reason (viz., to watch my favorite show) wasn't. Davidson continues

> Of course, we can include this idea too in justification; but then the notion of justification becomes as dark as the notion of reason until we can account for the force of that 'because'.

The mere possibility that a person acted on the basis of one reason when s/he possesses two or more presents an insurmountable obstacle. The anti-causalist has no way of accounting for the force of the 'because' in the rationalization. Thus, the justification model is silent on what would count as the correct rationalization. The only solution, according to Davidson, is to view the efficacious reasons (the ones that account for the correct rationalization) as causes of action. This leaves us, according to Davidson, with only one alternative to justificationalism, viz., the view that reason explanation is a species of causal explanation.

Vladimir Kalugin

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

English Deism

LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY. The beginnings of English Deism appear in the seventeenth century. Its main principles are to be found in the writings of Lord Herbert of Cherbury (d. 1648), who devoted the latter part of a life spent in a military and diplomatic career to a search for a standard and a guide in the conflicts of creeds and systems. He was a friend of Grotius, Casaubon, and Gassendi, and during a long sojourn in France made himself acquainted with the thought of Montaigne, of Bodin, and especially of Charron. His works are: *De Veritate* (Paris, 1624); Cherbury. *De religions Gentilium errorumque apud eos causes* (London, 1645); and two minor treatises, *De cause errorum* and *De religions laici*. The first work advances a theory of knowledge based upon the recognition of innate universal characteristics on the object perceived, and rigidly opposed to knowledge supernatural in its origin and determinable in only by strife and conflict. The second work lays down the common marks by which religious truth is recognized. These are (1) a belief in the existence of the Deity, (2) the obligation to reverence such a power, (3) the identification of worship with practical morality, (4) the obligation to repent of sin and to abandon it, and, (5) divine recompense in this world and the next. These five essentials (the so-called "Five Articles" of the English Deists) constitute the nucleus of all religions and of Christianity in its primitive, uncorrupted form. The variations between positive religions are explained as due partly to the allegorization of nature, partly to self-deception, the workings of imagination, and priestly guile.

Herbert's influence disappeared in the storms of the Puritan Revolution, and Deism found the most important impetus supplied to its progress in ecclesiastical circles. The learning of the Renaissance had served to incline the clergy of the Establishment to a moderate rational theology, and in the conflict between Puritans and Anglicans, and between Roman Catholics and Protestants, it became common to invoke Reason as arbiter. Later Deists could appeal to the arguments of leading theologians, as well as to those of the Cambridge Platonists, who, in their conflict against the sensualism of Hobbes, exalted the authority of moral intuitions. The Revolution served to intensify the growing feeling against what was arbitrary in religion, and emphasized the demand for subjective independence in the field of reason and the need of unity in the realm of practical morality.

HOBBES AND OTHERS. Rejection of theological supernaturalism stands out as the most conspicuous characteristic in Hobbes's philosophical writings (d. 1679), which were inspired by the teachings of the new mathematical and natural sciences. The different religions are explained as the product of human fear interpreting natural phenomena in anthropomorphic form, or, in their higher aspects, as the outcome of reflection on causal relation in the universe. Miracles and revelations are in themselves improbable, and may be most easily explained as the imaginings of the ignorant. Positive religion is the creation of the State, and the sovereign justly possesses unconditional power to enforce its prescriptions, for only in this way can religious strife be avoided. Between religion thus naturally explained and a prophetic and Christian revelation

Hobbes, nevertheless, attempted to mediate; he mentions as the means that might lead to such a reconciliation the rational interpretation of miracles, the differentiation between the inner moral sense of Scripture and mere figurative expression, and the historical criticisms of Biblical sources. The entire apparatus of Rationalism is here to be found, limited only in its application. Further, Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (1670) and Bayle's *Dictionnaire* (1695-97) were effective in shaping the character of Deism. Of no small importance, also, was the rise of a literature of comparative religion and the publication of ethnographical studies and works of travel. China, Arabia, Egypt, Persia, India, and primal regions, were brought within the horizon of religious investigation. Philosophy, beginning with Locke's theory of knowledge, and natural science, with Newton's theory of gravitation, contributed to the opposition with which theological dogma was confronted. Yet their attitude was not one of hostility to religions which they sought rather to utilize for the purpose of establishing the desired universal standard of truth. Newton and Boyle succeeded in reconciling the creed of the Church with their mechanical metaphysics; and this union remained characteristic of England, so that even men like Priestley and Hartley did not shrink from supporting their materialistic theories by theological arguments. We have here the blending of a sensualistic epistemology, a mechanical-teleological metaphysics, a historical criticism, and an *a prioristic* ethics whose product in the shape of natural religion was destined first to undermine Christianity, then to compete with it, and finally to supplant it.

CHARLES BLOUNT. These various tendencies could not show themselves fully under the ecclesiastical restraint of the Restoration, yet they appear clearly enough in the writings of Charles Blount (d. 1693), usually placed second to Herbert in the lists of Deists. Like his predecessor, Blount dwells on the conflict between rival religions, and finds a standard of adjustment in a fusion of Herbert's theory of universal characteristics with Hobbes's prescription by the State. Like Hobbes and Spinoza, he touches serious problems of Biblical criticism at this early date. Freedom from prejudice is his boast; he asserts the supernatural character of Christianity on the basis of its miracles, after he has already rendered them dubious by parallels with non-Christian miracles. His works were: *Anima mundi* (London, 1679), *Great is Diana of the Ephesians* (1680), and *The Two First Books of Philostratus concerning the Life of Apollonius Tyaneus*, published in English with notes (1680).

JOHN LOCKE. The Revolution of 1688, the establishment of the freedom of the press in 1694, the political favor that was bestowed on the new tendencies in theology, in opposition to the stricter Anglicanism which was tainted with Stuart partizanship, were conditions favorable to the development of the seed that had already been planted. Parallel with the liberalization of orthodox dogma, there ran a more radical development with the attainment of a standard for the testing of the contents of revelation. Of surpassing importance in this direction was the influence and work of John Locke (d. 1704), who, in the field of theology, found his starting point, like most prominent thinkers of the age, in the conflict of systems, doctrines, and practices. Out of his reflections on the data of experience he developed a mechanical-teleological metaphysics and an empirical-utilitarian ethics, the latter agreeing, with the old idea of *lex naturae* in that ethical experience merely confirms the connection established by a teleological government of the universe between certain acts and their consequences. In spite of his supernaturalist tendencies, Locke nevertheless maintained, in his *Letters on Toleration* (1689-92), that only rational demonstration, and not compulsion or mere assertion, can establish the validity of revelation. In the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690) he had investigated the conception of revelation from the epistemological standpoint, and laid down the criteria by which the true revelation is to be

distinguished from other doctrines which claim such authority. Strict proof of the formal character of revelation must be adduced; the tradition which communicates it to us must be fully accredited by both external and internal evidence; and its content must be shown to correspond with rational metaphysics and ethics. Revelation is revelation; but, after it is once given, it may be shown *a posteriori* to be rational, i.e., capable of being deduced from the premises of our reason. Only where this is possible is there a presumption in favor of the purely mysterious parts of revelation. Where these criteria are disregarded the way is open to the excesses of sects and priesthoods by which religion, the differentia of reasoning man, has often made him appear less rational than the beasts. Locke advances therefore the remarkable conception of a revelation that reveals only the reasonable and the universally cognizable. The practical consequences of the thesis are deduced in *his Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures* (1695), which aims at the termination of religious strife through the recovery of the truths of primitive, rational Christianity. From the Gospels and the Acts, as distinguished from the Epistles, he elicits as the fundamental Christian truths the doctrine of the messiahship of Jesus and that of the kingdom of God. Inseparably connected with these are the recognition of Jesus as ruler of this kingdom, forgiveness of sins, and subjection to the moral law of the. kingdom. This law is identical with the ethical portion of the law of Moses, which in its turn corresponds to *the lex naturae or rationis*. The Gospel is but the divine summary and exposition of the law of nature, and it is the advantage of Christianity over pagan creeds and philosophies that it offers this law of nature intelligibly, with divine authority, and free from merely ceremonial sacerdotalism. To do this it requires the aid of a supernatural revelation, whose message is attainable through reason also, but only in an imperfect way.

TOLAND, COLLINS, AND OTHERS. Deducing the full consequences of Locke's theory, John Toland (d. 1722), in his *Christianity not Mysterious* (1696), maintained that the content of revelation must neither contradict nor transcend the dictates of reason. Revelation is not the basis of truth, but only a " means of information " by which man may arrive at knowledge, the sanction for which must be found in reason. Primitive Christianity knew nothing of mystery, whose sources are Judaic and Greek, and the original Christian use of the word *mysterium* conveyed no idea of that which transcended reason. The basis is thus laid for the critical study of early Christianity. Further problems of Biblical criticism and the distinction between the diverse parties in primitive Christianity are advanced in Toland's *Amyntor* (1699) *and Nazarenus ; or Jewish, Gentile and illahometan Christianity* (1718). In like manner, Anthony Collins (d. 1729), in his *Discourse of Freethinking* (1713), developed the consequences of Locke's propositions. Revelation depends for its sanction upon its agreement with reason, and what is contrary to reason is not revelation. Practical morality is independent of dogma, which, on the contrary, has been the cause of much evil in the history of the world. Christ and the Apostles, the prototypes. of the freethinkers, never made use of supernatural authority, but confined themselves to simple, rational demonstration. Collins's work elicited numerous replies; but none really made answer to his main thesis. After remaining silent for eleven years, Collins renewed the contest with a contribution on prophecy and miracles. Setting out from Locke's proposition that revelation was truth sanctioned by reason, he found it a simple step to reject prophecy and miracles as non-essential characteristics of religion, amounting at most to mere didactic devices. The mathematician William Whiston (d. 1752) gave a new impulse to the controversy by the publication of *The True Text* (1722), in which the lack of real concordance between the New Testament interpretation of Old Testament prophecies is pointed out, and the prevailing allegorical method of reconciling such differences summarily rejected. The

present form of the Old Testament is characterized as a forgery perpetrated by the Jews, and an attempt is made by Whiston to restore the original text. Collins, in his *Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion* (1724), agreed with Whiston as to the discrepancies between the two Testaments, but defended the allegorical method of interpretation. Thomas Woolston (d. 1733) came to the support of Collins in this controversy over the Biblical prophecies; and when his opponents shifted their appeal from the prophecies to the miraculous acts of Jesus he applied his destructive allegorical method to those also, in his *Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour* (1727-30).

MATTHEW TINDAL. Matthew Tindal (d. 1733), in his dialogue *Christianity as Old as the Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature* (1730), produced the standard text-book of Deism. Proceeding from Locke's proposition of the identity of the truths of revelation with those of reason, he adduces a new array of arguments in support of that position. The goodness of God, the vast extent of the earth, the long duration of human life on earth render it improbable that only to Jews and Christians was vouchsafed the favor of perceiving truth. We now have brought in the classic example of the three hundred million Chinese who surely could not all be excluded from the truth, and Confucianism begins to be extolled against much that is repugnant and harsh in the Mosaic law. Christianity, to be the truth, must find the substance in all religions; it must be as old as creation. The doctrines of the fall and of original sin can not stand, since it is irrational to believe in the exclusion from the truth of the vast majority of humanity. Tindal's position is orthodox to the extent that Judaism and Christianity are acknowledged as revelations, though revelations only of the *lex naturae*, which is identified with natural religion, the primitive, uncorrupted faith, consisting in "the practise of morality in obedience to the will of God." An echo of the teachings of Tindal is found in Thomas Chubb (d. 1747), whose *True Gospel of Jesus Christ* (1738) attempts to prove that what Jesus sought to teach his followers was but natural morality, or the law of nature.

MORGAN, ANNET, AND MIDDLETON. Thomas Morgan (d. 1743) continued Tindal's argument on its historical side in *The Moral Philosopher* (1737-40),displaying much originality in tracing the development of heathen religions, as well as of Judaism and Christianity. Abandoning the old method of deriving specific religions from priestly deception, he explains their rise through the gradual supplanting of the one God of the law of nature by a crowd of divinities connected with definite natural phenomena. The legislation of Moses, under Egyptian influences, imposed a rigid and nationally restricted form upon the *lex naturae*, and the Jewish ritual and ceremonial is in essence a purely political institution. Full revelation of the law of nature came with Christ, who gave to the world in concentrated form the truth that had already been revealed to Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, and Plato. The protagonist of this divinely revealed truth after Christ was Paul, who, in his form of expression, indeed, was compelled to make concessions to the influence of Judaism, and in whom, therefore, much is to be taken figuratively. Peter, on the other hand, and the author of the Apocalypse misunderstood the import of the revelation of Christ and corrupted it in the spirit of Messianic Judaism. Persecution forced the two tendencies into union in the Catholic Church, and the Reformation has only partially succeeded in separating them. Morgan's argument results, therefore, in the rejection of the formerly assumed identity between the law of Moses and the *lex naturm*, and the restriction of the latter, in the fullness of revelation, to Christianity. His conclusions were denied by William Warburton in *The Divine Legation of Moses* (1738-41). When the Christian apologists substituted for the argument from miracles the argument from personal witness and the credibility of Biblical evidence, Peter Annet (d. 1769), in his *Resurrection of Jesus*

(1744), assailed the validity of such evidence, and first advanced the hypothesis of the illusory. death of Jesus, suggesting also that possibly Paul should be regarded as the founder of a new religion. In *Supernaturals Examined* (1747) Annet roundly denies the possibility of miracles. Conyers Middleton (d. 1750) in his later writings sought to bridge over the gulf between sacred and profane history, and to test them equally by the same method. His *Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers* (1748) demonstrates that the belief in miracles is common to primitive Christianity and heathen creeds, and that it developed to great proportions in the later life of the Church,, so that one is then confronted with an endless succession of miracle to which belongs the same degree of credibility that the apologists attributed to the miracles of the Bible. Though special reference to the New Testament was omitted, Middleton propounded a question to answer which no serious attempt was mad when he asked why credence should be granted to one faith that is denied to another.

SHAFTESBURY, MANDEVILLE, DODWELL, BOLINGBROKE. The Deistic controversy died out in England about the middle of the eighteenth century. The Deistic literature had exhausted its stock of materials, while its tenets had never obtained a strong hold on the people. The cold, inflexible, rational supernaturalism of Paley (d. 1805) was considered as the final settlement of these long conflicts. From the beginning, however, there had been a class of critics, representatives of the old Renaissance spirit, and inimical, therefore, to the Stoic and Christian ethics, who had only partially shared the views of the Deists, and in some ways had advanced to a position far beyond them. Shaftesbury (d. 1713), in opposition to the utilitarian and supernaturalist ethics of Locke and Clarke, developed the conception of a strictly autonomous moral code having its basis in a moral instinct in man whose end is to bring individual and society to harmonious self-perfection. Bernard Mandeville (1733) adopted the Epicureanism of Hobbes and Gassendi, studied moral problems in the skeptical spirit of Montaigne and La Rochefoucauld, gave the preference to Bayle over the Deists, and developed empiricism into a sort of Agnosticism. He criticized the prevailing morality as a more conventional lie. Christianity-which the Deists had wished, while reforming, to maintain-he declared impossible, not only as a religion, but as a system of morality. His *Free Thought on Religion* (1720) has caused him to be included in the ranks of the Deists; but his real position is brought out in the *Fable of the Bees* (1714). Henry Dodwell (d. 1711), *in Christianity not Founded on Argument* (1742), attempted to demonstrate the invalidity of the rationalistic basis for Christian truth constructed by the Deists, from the very nature of the religious impulse, which, being opposed to rational argumentation, calls for the support of tradition and mystery, and finds fascination in the attitude of credo quia absurdum. The only proof proceeds from a mystic inner enlightenment; logical demonstrations like those of Clarke or the Boyle lectures are only destructive of religion. Bolingbroke (d. 1751) voices the French influence in a capricious and dilettante manner. Despising all religions as the product of enthusiasm, fraud, and superstition, he nevertheless concedes to real Christianity the possession of moral and rational truth; an advocate of freedom of thought, he supports an established church in the interest of the State and of public morals (*Letters on the Study and Use of History* 1752; *Essays*, 1753).

HUME'S INFLUENCE. Far greater is the influence of David Hume (d. 1776), who summarized the Deistic criticism and raised it to the level of modern scientific method by emancipating it from the conception of a deity conceived through the reason and by abandoning its characteristic interpretation of history. He separates Locke's theory of knowledge from its connection with a scheme of mechanical teleology and confines the human mind within the realm of sense perception. Beginning then with the crudest factors of experience and not with a religious and ethical norm, he

traces the development of systems of religion, ethics, and philosophy in an ascending course through the ages. He thus overthrow the Deistic philosophy of religion while lie developed their critical method to the extent of making it the starting-point for the English positivist philosophy of religion. Distinguishing between the metaphysical problem of the idea of God and the historical problem of the rise of religions, lie denied the possibility of attaining a knowledge of deity through the reason, and explained religion as arising from the misconception or arbitrary misinterpretation of experience (*Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, written in 1751, but not published till 1779; *Natural History of Religion*, 1757). Against the justification of religion by other means than rational Hume directs his celebrated critique of miracles, in which to the possibility of miraculous occurrences he opposes the possibility of error on the part of the observer or historian. Human experience, affected by ignorance, fancy, and the imaginings of fear and hope, explains sufficiently the growth of religion. Hume's contemporaries failed to recognize the portentous transformation which he had effected in the character of Deism. The Scottish "common-sense school " saved for a time the old natural theology and the theological argument from miracles to revelation; but in reality Hume's skeptical method, continued by Hamilton and united to French Positivism by Mill and Browne, became, in connection with modern ethnology and anthropology, the basis of a psychological philosophy of religion in which the data of outward experience are the main factors (Evolutionism, Positivism, Agnosticism, Tylor, Spencer, Lubbock, Andrew Lang). In so far as Hume's influence prevailed among his contemporaries, it may be said to have amalgamated with that of Voltaire; the "infidels," as they were now called, were Voltairians. Most prominent among them was Gibbon (d. 1794), whose *Decline and Fall* offers the first dignified pragmatic treatment of the rise of Christianity. The fundamental principles of Deism became tinged in the nineteenth century with skepticism, pessimism, or pantheism, but the conceptions of natural religion retained largely their old character.

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French Deism

With other English influences Deism entered France, where, however, only its materialistic and revolutionary phases were seized upon, to the exclusion of that religiosity which had never been lost in England. French Deism stood outside of theology. The English writers who came to exercise the greatest influence were Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Pope, Bolingbroke, and Hume. Of the true Deists only Collins, the most critical and the least theological, became prominent.

VOLTAIRE. Voltaire (d. 1778) embraced the conception of natural religion with ardor, and entered into a polemics against intolerance in Church and State relations as well as against the philosophy of the Church and the prevailing religious Cartesianism (*Essai sur les mmurs et l'esprit des nations*, 1754-58*; Dictionnaire philosophique*, 1764). He derived his natural philosophy from Newton and Clarke, his theory of knowledge and his ideas on toleration from Locke, the main principles of his ethics from Shaftesbury, his critical method and the conception of natural religion from the Deists. All phenomena are explained historically by the interaction between man and his environment, and all things are governed by God acting only in accordance with natural laws. Natural morality and religion are not entirely innate ideas, but rather simple and universally prevalent conditions standing in need of development and following a course that leads through errors arising from ignorance and fear to an ultimate standard truth which is characterized as the "fruit of the cultivated reason." Deism is thereby emptied of all religious content and restricted to the field of morals and rational metaphysics.

All that is essentially characteristic of human nature is the same everywhere; all that depends on custom varies. The chief influences for changes in the human mind are climate, government, religion, and in opposition to these one should seek to arrive at the underlying, undiversified unity. "Dogma leads to fanaticism and strife; morality everywhere inspires harmony." The rise of positive religions may be studied psychologically in children and savages. Fear and ignorance of the law of nature are the primary causes; the parallel growth of social groups and the need of authority cooperate. In China alone natural religion has escaped this pernicious development. India be came the home of theological speculation, and influenced the religions of the West, of which the most important was Judaism as the parent of Christianity and Islam. Moses was a shrewd politician; the prophets were enthusiasts like the dervishes, or else epileptics; Jesus was a visionary like the founder of the Quakers, and his religion received life only through its union with Platonism. Voltaire's conception of the evolution of history entered deep into European thought. By the side of the party of the juste milieu and of good sense," of which Voltaire is the most prominent representative, there arose a school which carried the doctrines of mechanism and sensualism to their furthest consequences. and evolved a philosophy of materialism.

ENCYCLOPEDISTS. The Encyclopedists removed from Deism the great factor of natural religion, retaining only its critical method as applied to the history of religion. The head of this school was Denis Diderot (d. 1784), and its great organ of expression was the *Encyclopedie*. The

state censorship, however, compelled the projectors to call to their aid a number of contributors of conservative views and to bring their skeptical method to the task of defending the compromise between reason and revelation. In this spirit the main religious topics were treated, but by a subtle infusion of the spirit of Bayle and the expedient of cross-references from these articles to topics which might be handled with greater freedom, Diderot succeeded in supplying the desired corrective. It was the circle of Holbach (d. 1789) that dared to apply the most extreme consequences of materialism to religious questions. Helvetius (d. 1771) prepared the way with his *De l'esprit* (17,58), in which he expounded a materialistic psychology and ethics. Their moral theories, deriving though they did from Hobbes and Hume, lost all connection with the position of Deism, which became for them a mere armory of weapons for the destruction of all religion with its consequences, intolerance and moral corruption. Holbach is undoubtedly the author of the *Systeme de la nature*, which appeared in 1770 as the work of Mirabaud. The *Systeme* is not original in ascribing the beginnings of religion to human hope and fear and to ignorance of the laws of nature. Fraud, ambition, and unhealthy enthusiasm have made use of it as a means of political and social influence and have succeeded in crystallizing its primitive emotions into positive creeds, within which animistic tendencies have been developed and subtilized into systems of metaphysics and theology -- the sources of irrational intolerance. From Holbach and his circle, and from the cognate group of the Encyclopedists, proceeded the so-called ideological school, who held the main problem of philosophy to be the analysis of the mental conceptions aroused by sensations from the material world (Condorcet, Naigeon, Garat, Volney, Dupuis, Saint-Lambert, Laplace, Cabinis, De Tracy, J. B. Say, Benjamin Constant, Bichat, Lamarck, Saint-Simon, Thurot, Stendhal). Out of this school, in turn, developed the positivism of Comte.

ROUSSEAU. J. J. Rousseau (d. 1778) gave quite a different tendency to Deism. Accepting in the main the sensualism of Locke and the metaphysics of Clarke and Newton, he maintains after the manner of Shaftesbury and Diderot a belief in inborn moral instincts which he distinguishes as " sentiments " from mere acquired ideas; he is true to the position of Deism in connecting this moral "sentiment " with a belief in God, and he protests against the separation between the two which the skepticism of Diderot had brought about. He was influenced by Richardson, as well as by Locke. "Sentiment " becomes the basis of a metaphysical system built up out of the data of experience under the influence of the Deistic philosophy, but redeemed from formalism by constant reference to sentimentality and emotion as the principal sources of religion. The nature of religion is not dogmatic but moralistic, practical, and emotional. Rousseau, therefore, finds the essence of religion, not (like Voltaire) in the cultivated intellect, but in the naive and disinterested understanding of the uncultured. Conscious, rational progress in civilization, no less than supernaturalism in Church and State, is an outcome of the fall, when the will chose intellectual progress in preference to simple felicity. With Rousseau natural religion takes on a new meaning; "nature" is no longer universality or rationality in the cosmic order, in contrast to special supernatural and positive phenomena, but primitive simplicity and sincerity, in contrast to artificiality and studied reflection. In his scheme of the rise of religions he gets out from the common standpoint of the discrepancies and contradictions prevailing among historic creeds. Yet positive religion to him is not so much the product of ignorance and fear as the corruption of the original instinct through the selfishness of man, who has erected rigid creeds that he might arrogate to himself unwarranted privilege or escape the obligations of natural morality., Something of the true religion is to be found in every faith, and of all creeds Christianity has retained the greatest measure of the original truth, and the purest morality. So sublime and yet so

simple does Rousseau find the Gospel that he can scarcely believe it the work of men. Its irrational elements he attributes to misconception on the part of the followers of Jesus and especially of Paul, who had no personal communication with him. It was natural that between the advocate of such views and the party of the materialists strife should rise, and in fact Rousseau's religious influence in France was slight. On the rising German idealism, however, he exercised a great influence.

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Democritus (460-370 BCE.)

Democritus was born at Abdera, about 460 BCE, although according to some 490. His father was from a noble family and of great wealth, and contributed largely towards the entertainment of the army of Xerxes on his return to Asia. As a reward for this service the Persian monarch gave and other Abderites presents and left among them several Magi. Democritus, according to Diogenes Laertius, was instructed by these Magi in astronomy and theology. After the death of his father he travel in search of wisdom, and devoted is inheritance to this purpose, amounting to one hundred talents. He is said to have visited Egypt, Ethiopia, Persia, and India. Whether, in the course of his travels, he visited Athens or studied under Anaxagoras is uncertain. During some part of his life he was instructed in Pythagoreanism, and was a disciple of Leucippus. After several years of traveling, Democritus returned to Abdera, with no means of subsistence. His brother Damosis, however, took him in. According to the law of Abdera, whoever wasted his patrimony would be deprived of the rites of burial. Democritus, hoping to avoid this disgrace, gave public lectures. Petronius relates that he was acquainted with the virtues of herbs, plants, and stones, and that he spent his life in making experiments upon natural bodies. He acquired fame with his knowledge of natural phenomena, and predicted changes in the weather. He used this ability to make people believe that he could predict future events. They not only viewed him as something more than mortal, but even proposed to put him in control of their public affairs. He preferred a contemplative to an active life, and therefore declined these public honors and passed the remainder of his days in solitude.

Credit cannot be given to the tale that Democritus spent his leisure hours in chemical researches after the philosopher's stone -- the dream of a later age; or to the story of his conversation with Hippocrates concerning Democritus's supposed madness, as based on spurious letters. Democritus has been commonly known as "The Laughing Philosopher," and it is gravely related by Seneca that he never appeared in public with out expressing his contempt of human follies while laughing. Accordingly, we find that among his fellow-citizens he had the name of "the mocker". He died at more than a hundred years of age. It is said that from then on he spent his days and nights in caverns and sepulchers, and that, in order to master his intellectual faculties, he blinded himself with burning glass. This story, however, is discredited by the writers who mention it insofar as they say he wrote books and dissected animals, neither of which could be done well without eyes.

Democritus expanded the atomic theory of Leucippus. He maintained the impossibility of dividing things *ad infinitum*. From the difficulty of assigning a beginning of time, he argued the eternity of existing nature, of void space, and of motion. He supposed the atoms, which are originally similar, to be impenetrable and have a density proportionate to their volume. All motions are the result of active and passive affection. He drew a distinction between primary motion and its secondary effects, that is, impulse and reaction. This is the basis of the law of necessity, by which all things in nature are ruled. The worlds which we see -- with all their properties of immensity, resemblance, and dissimilitude -- result from the endless multiplicity of falling atoms. The human soul consists of

globular atoms of fire, which impart movement to the body. Maintaining his atomic theory throughout, Democritus introduced the hypothesis of images or idols (*eidola*), a kind of emanation from external objects, which make an impression on our senses, and from the influence of which he deduced sensation (*aesthesis*) and thought (*noesis*). He distinguished between a rude, imperfect, and therefore false perception and a true one. In the same manner, consistent with this theory, he accounted for the popular notions of Deity; partly through our incapacity to understand fully the phenomena of which we are witnesses, and partly from the impressions communicated by certain beings (*eidola*) of enormous stature and resembling the human figure which inhabit the air. We know these from dreams and the causes of divination. He carried his theory into practical philosophy also, laying down that happiness consisted in an even temperament. From this he deduced his moral principles and prudential maxims. It was from Democritus that Epicurus borrowed the principal features of his philosophy.

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Demonax (2nd Cn. CE.)

Demonax was a philosopher of the second century CE. who tried to revive the philosophy of the Cynic School. Born in Cyprus, Demonax went to Athens, where he became so popular that people vied with on another in presenting him with food, and even the young children gave him great quantities of fruit. Much less austere than Diogenes, whom he took as his philosophic model, he nevertheless rebuked vice unsparingly, and was charged with neglecting the Eleusinian Mysteries, to which he replied: "If the mysteries are bad, no one should be initiated; and if they are good, they ought to be open to everyone." He was fried of Epictetus, who once rebuked him for not marrying, but was silenced by Demonax, who said, "Very well; give me one of your daughters for a wife" -- Epictetus being himself a bachelor. Demonax lived to be nearly a hundred, and on his death was buried with great magnificence. See the *Demonax* of Lucian, in which the character of the philosopher is painted in glowing colors.

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René Descartes (1596-1650)

LIFE. Descartes was educated at a Jesuit college which was firmly grounded in the scholastic tradition. After furthering his education in Paris, he enlisted in the Dutch and, later, the Bavarian militaries. In 1629 Descartes moved to Holland where he lived in seclusion for 20 years, changing his residence frequently to preserve his privacy. During this period he produced the writings upon which his fame rests. His studies were first restricted to science, and only later did he explore metaphysics. In 1649, Descartes moved to Stockholm at the request of Queen Christina of Sweden who employed him as a philosophy tutor. Christina scheduled the lectures at 5 A.M. The early hours and harsh climate took their toll on Descartes's already weakened condition. He died shortly after in 1650. During his life, Descartes's fame rose to such an extent that many Catholics believed he would be a candidate for sainthood. As his body was transported from Sweden back to France, anxious relic collectors along the path removed pieces of his body. By the time his body reached France, it was considerably reduced in size.

Descartes' philosophy developed in the context of the key features of Renaissance and early modern philosophy. Like the humanists, he rejected religious authority in the quest for scientific and philosophical knowledge. For Descartes, reason was both the foundation and guide for pursuing truth. Although Descartes was a devout Catholic, he was also influenced by the Reformation's challenge to Church authority, particularly the challenge against medieval Aristotelianism. He was an active participant in the scientific revolution in both scientific method and in particular discoveries. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Descartes reacted strongly against the Renaissance resurgence of ancient Greek skepticism. Thus, we find in Descartes' writings a relentless pursuit of absolute certainty.

DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD. Descartes' first discussion of scientific method is in an unfinished work of 1628 titled *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*. The first 12 of the planned 36 rules deal with the general aspects of his proposed methodology, and are considered early versions of principles which made their way into his later writings. In 1633 Descartes prepared for publication a work on physics called *Le Monde* which defended a heliocentric view of the universe. That same year the Catholic Church condemned Galileo's Dialogue (1632). Descartes did not think Galileo's views were prejudicial to religion and he worried that his own views might be censured. Thus he suspended publication of it. In 1637 Descartes published a collection of essays titled *Optics, Meterology, and Geometry*. Prefaced to these essays was a work titled "Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences." Most of the "Discourse" was written before the 1633 condemnation of Galileo's *Dialogue*. However, he later added a concluding section which explained that he insisted on publishing, in spite of political risks. The simple reason was that he counted on the public to help confirm his scientific theories. In the Discourse, Descartes offers a method of inquiry quite different from Bacon's. Whereas Bacon advocated induction, Descartes insists on a more deductive approach.

Most of the *Discourse* is autobiographical insofar as it traces Descartes intellectual development and how his method assisted him in his investigations. Descartes realized that he needed to reject much of the teachings of his youth. This raised the question as to exactly how he should proceed in replacing old theories with new ones. He found his answer by observing how old parts of cities are replaced with the new. The more elegant cities are those which are methodically built from scratch, not those which continually renovate old sections.

Descartes explains that he had learned a variety of methodological approaches in a variety of disciplines. They all had limits, though. Syllogistic logic, he believes, only communicates what we already know. Geometry and algebra are either too abstract in nature for practical application, or too restricted to the shapes of bodies. However, he believed that a more condensed and universal list of methodological rules was better than a lengthy and varied list.

The first of these was to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be so; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments, and to accept in them nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it.

The second was to divide up each of the difficulties which I examined into as many parts as possible, and as seemed requisite in order that it might be resolved in the best manner possible.

The third was to carry on my reflections in due order, commencing with objects that were the most simple and easy to understand, in order to rise little by little, or by degrees, to knowledge of the most complex, assuming an order, even if a fictitious one, among those which do not follow a natural sequence relatively to one another.

The last was in all cases to make enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I should be certain of having omitted nothing. Descartes commentator S.V. Keeling argues that Descartes' method, as expressed in the above rules, rests on three mental operations: intuition, deduction, and enumeration. These three abilities constitute our human reason. Intuition involves directly apprehending the simplest components (or "simple natures") of a subject matter. Deduction is not syllogistic, but a process of inferring necessary relations between simple natures. Enumeration is a process of review which we use when deductions become so long that we risk error due to a faulty memory. Descartes realized that he needed a provisional set of moral guidelines to carry him through the transition. He presents four such rules: (1) obey the laws of his country and adhere to his faith in God, (2) to be consistent in following positions, even if they seem doubtful, (3) change his desires rather than the order of the world, (4) to choose the best occupation he could (i.e., that of a philosopher). Accordingly, vowing to live as a spectator rather than an actor, he traveled for a year, then lived in Holland for eight years where he had no relatives and was free from political turmoil. Descartes continues discussing metaphysical issues which he developed more fully in the *Meditations*. Although Descartes' method had its advocates, it was also criticized by his contemporaries, such as the mathematician Pierre de Fermat, and ultimately dismissed. Leibniz says that Descartes' rules amount to saying "take what you need, and do what you should, and you will get what you want."

THE MEDITATIONS.

Descartes' most famous and influential philosophical writing is his *Meditations*. The full title of the work is *Meditations on the First Philosophy: In Which the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Mind and Body are Demonstrated.* The work was first published in 1641 in Latin and as

was translated into French in the following year by the Duc de Luynes. Descartes was so pleased with the French translation that he made some additions and endorsed it for later publication. Descartes passed a manuscript of his *Meditations* onto his friend, Father Mersenne, who solicited comments from fellow scholars, including Thomas Hobbes. The comments were returned to Descartes. These, along with his lengthy replies -- several times longer than the *Meditations* themselves -- were included in the second published edition of the *Meditations* (1642).

DEDICATION. Descartes dedicates the *Meditations* to the faculty of the Sorbonne, which was the divinity school of the University of Paris. For centuries, the Sorbonne was center of Catholic theology. By dedicating his work to the Sorbonne faculty, Descartes' was announcing that his philosophy was consistent with traditional Catholic theology. Descartes was a devout Catholic and had no desire to offend the Church. Nevertheless, he believed that Aristotelianism had no place in the new scientific age. Cautioned by the fate of Galileo, Descartes proposed his new theories diplomatically. In his Principles of Philosophy, for example, he cautiously suggests a theory of the solar system similar to Galileo's. he expresses his hope that his theory could "be used in Christian teaching without contradicting the text of Aristotle." Descartes announces at the opening that there are two driving issues behind the *Meditations*: proving the existence of God and the immortality of the soul through natural reason. One would expect divinity school faculty to approve of this plan. However, it is not entirely that these issues are his chief concern in the *Meditations*. Descartes discusses the importance that the Sorbonne faculty themselves place on rational proofs. Descartes continues by noting how skeptics view the immortality of the soul and the Catholic church's official reaction to such skepticism. Descartes stresses the importance of rationally demonstrating the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. He also notes that he intends to follow the method of investigation proposed in his Discourse on the Method. According to Descartes, geometricians rarely show the falsehood of accepted truths and demonstrations. By contrast, philosophers typically show the falsehood of contentions without venturing to explore truth. Descartes closes the dedication pleading with the faculty of the Sorbonne that their support and influence is necessary for the *Meditations* to be seen as a successful refutation of skepticism.

MEDITATION 1. Descartes opens his *Meditations* indicating his desire to have only true beliefs. One way to accomplish this is to doubt everything he has learned that might be suspect of error. He does not intend to doubt the truth of every specific idea that comes into his head, but, instead to undermine the foundations of his views. The main assumption he brings under suspicion is the reliability of sensory information. Descartes proposes to systematically follow a process of doubt. The doubt is not a simply common sense one, though, as when I doubt whether black cats are harbingers of bad luck. Instead, his doubting process is philosophical one, and sometimes called "hyperbolic" (or exaggerated) doubt where he proposes to doubt anything which has some reason to doubt. The goal of this doubting process is to arrive at a list of beliefs which are certain and indubitably true. It thus may be viewed as a systematic doubting experiment. The experiment consists of articulating several reasons by which sensory information can be brought into question. When he presents the last of these reasons, there are virtually no items of knowledge he can have confidence in.

Much of Descartes argumentation rests on a distinction which, later in the history of philosophy, became known as that between primary and secondary qualities. Briefly, we look at an apple and perceive qualities of redness, sweet smell, roundness, and singularity. Descartes recognized that the qualities of redness and sweet smell do not really belong to the apple. Instead these qualities exist only in the mind of an observer, and are then imposed onto the apple. These have been

traditionally called secondary qualities. By contrast, the qualities of roundness and singularity belong to the apple itself, and are not products of the observer's mind. These have been termed primary qualities. For Descartes, secondary qualities arise from what he calls "objects of the senses," and primary qualities from "objects of mathematics." The following illustrates the connection:

```
               |    Objects   Qualities
_____________________________________________________________
     Secondary |    objects        hardness, heat,
               |    of        light, odor, color,
               |    senses         taste, sound
               |
     Primary        |    objects        quantity, shape
               |    of        time, magnitude,
               |    mathematics
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An apple would be a secondary object, or object of the senses, when we consider only its secondary qualities of redness and sweet smell. On the other hand an apple is a primary object, or object of mathematics, when we consider only its primary qualities of shape and singularity (quantity). The root of the primary/secondary distinction is the attribute of extension (or existence in space). All primary qualities are features which necessarily belong to extended objects. All secondary qualities, by contrast, do not necessarily belong to extended objects and, thus, are spectator dependent. In view of this primary/secondary distinction, when Descartes doubts the reliability of his senses, he must find reason to doubt both his primary and secondary perceptions.

Descartes begins his systematic doubting experiment by pointing out an obvious credibility problem with our senses: optical illusions. Descartes begins doubting the reliability of his senses by noting that we perceive distant objects to be much smaller than they really are. This, though, is somewhat trivial, and does not undermine the general reliability of the senses. Continuing his doubting experiment, Descartes suggests the possibility that he his dreaming. This, though, only brings into question the existence of objects of the senses (i.e., secondary qualities), and does not affect objects of mathematics (i.e., primary qualities). Taking his doubts further, Descartes initially speculates that God is deceiving him about all of the things which he believes or perceives, including primary objects (even mathematics). Suggesting that God is a deceiver, though causes

him problems, though, because according to traditional Christian theology, infinite goodness is one of God's necessary attributes. If backed into a corner, some might deny God's existence rather than admit that he is the cause of deception. With God out of the picture, though, Descartes argues that he would be even more vulnerable to deception. This takes him into a discussion of skepticism, and he reflects on how far astray his doubts may take him, and to what extent they are justified. Discussions of skepticism during the modern period often drew a distinction between speculative and actional skepticism. A speculative skeptic merely uncovers theoretical problems, and an actional skeptic continues by recommending a course of action. With religious beliefs in particular, actional skepticism was viewed as more dangerous as it might recommend that act as though there were no God. However, Descartes only proposes theoretical doubt. In any event, he revises his doubt so not to run counter to traditional Christian belief and, accordingly, proposes that an evil genius (and not God) deceives him.

MEDITATION 2. Descartes opens Meditation Two by describing the extent of his doubt. Virtually every item of knowledge he previously believed is subject to some kind of doubt for reasons given in the previous meditation. The ancient Greek engineer Archimedes said "give me a fulcrum and a firm point, and I alone can move the earth." Analogously, Descartes believes that if he finds on indubitable truth, then this will be the foundation of a true philosophical system. That point is his existence: "I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it." Even an evil genius cannot deceive him in this matter. In his *Discourse on the Method*, Descartes summarizes his line of reasoning in the famous phrase, "I think, therefore I am" (or in Latin, "cogito ergo sum"). Descartes borrowed this strategy from Augustine's attempt to refute skepticism in his own day. Augustine writes, "On none of these points do I fear the arguments of the skeptics of the Academy who say: what if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I am. For he who does not exist cannot be deceived. And if I am deceived, by this same token I am" (City of God, 11:26). Critics of Descartes question exactly what kind of inference Descartes is making in his contention that "I think *therefore* I am." Descartes himself helps clarify this in his reply to the "Second Set of Objections" to his *Meditations*. In these Objections, the critic contends that all demonstrative knowledge depends on God, which isn't proven until Meditation three; but, Descartes deduces his existence in Meditation two. Descartes replies that the cogito is not deduced, but is recognized by a simple act of mental vision.

Once Descartes recognizes the indubitable truth that he exists, he then attempts to further his knowledge by discovering the type of thing he is. Trying to understand what he is, Descartes recalls Aristotle's definition of a human as a rational animal. This is unsatisfactory since this requires investigating into the notions of "rational" and "animal." Continuing his quest for identity, he recalls a more general view he previously had of his identity, which is that he is composed of both body and soul. He can't refer to himself as a thing which has a body, though, since this involves sensory perception. According to classical philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, the key attributes of the soul involve eating, movement, and sensation. He can't claim to have these attributes of the soul since this involves a body which, knowledge of which, in turn, is based on the senses. Descartes continues examining other theories of human existence and attributes about himself which he can imagine. Descartes concludes that the attribute of thinking is the only quality which he can justifiably claim at this point. But he is quick to point out that thinking is the only attribute about which he is sure -- not that thinking is the only attribute which he has. Nevertheless, this is the starting point of a radical ontological distinction which carries Descartes through his *Meditations*. That distinction is between thinking substance (res cogitans) and extended

substance (res extensa). The two substances are mutually exclusive. A thinking substance is nonphysical or spiritual in nature, and an extended substance is physical, but not capable of consciousness or thought. For Descartes, a thinking thing is "a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels."

Note Descartes' general strategy for adding to his knowledge. He is first concerned with the issue of personal identity, and will only much later address the issue of external objects (in Meditation Six). He then anticipates the criticism that he is going about his investigation backwards. For, it seems that knowledge of external objects is more obvious and distinct than knowledge of personal identity. Everyone knows what an apple is (an external object), but few people can properly answer the question "who am I" (an issue of personal identity). Thus, it seems that Descartes should tackle the easier problem of external objects first. Descartes does not agree that he proceeding in a backwards fashion, and argues that our personal identity is actually more clear and fundamental than perception of external objects. He makes his case by comparing our perceptions of a piece of wax at two times: once while the wax is in a solid state, and later after the wax has been melted by a fire. In arguing that knowledge of the mental realm precedes knowledge of the material realm, Descartes argues that our senses alone cannot inform us of the continuity of the two states of the wax since none of the qualities remains the same. The continuity of the wax cannot be established though the faculty of the imagination either, since we could imagine an infinite variety of changes the wax could go through. Descartes concludes that the continuity of the wax is established neither by sight, nor touch, nor imagination, but by an act of the mind alone. He considers possible criticisms to his conclusion that we understand the physical world through an act of the mind. In common language we claim that we "see" the same wax in its two states (as opposed to "mentally intuit" the same wax in its two states). Thus, common language seems to suggest that the continuity of the wax is a function of "seeing" (i.e., the senses). When I look out the window, I conclude that we see people crossing the road. All that appears to my senses, though, is clothing. He considers again whether we understand the physical world through the senses and imagination together. Even if Descartes is wrong and we understand the wax through our senses or our imagination, he argues that mental events are still prior to sensations. For, even if he erroneously judges that the wax exists through sight or imagination, this presupposes that he himself exists.

In the Dedication, Descartes argues that one of the two main objectives of the *Meditations* is to prove the immortality of the soul. Interestingly, Descartes scarcely addresses this issue in the *Meditations*. His most complete discussion of the subject appears here in the Synopsis to Meditation Two. He begins his discussion by describing when the issue of immortality should be addressed in the order of his investigation. One factor in establishing the immortality of the soul is showing that the soul is composed of an indestructible and unalterable substance. Although the material substance of the human body is in general indestructible, the composition of the body is alterable. Thus, it is not eternal. The spiritual substance of the human mind in general is also indestructible. Our minds also change when we have different perceptions. Using Aristotle's terminology, these changes are accidental, though, and not essential.

MEDITATION 3. Descartes notes that when he contemplates on the certainty of his existence, he knows the truth of his existence clearly and distinctly. He proposes a general rule: everything he perceives clearly and distinctly is true. Descartes would like to use this general rule and show both the existence of external objects and the truth of mathematics. For, to differing degrees, both of these are vivid concepts. Unfortunately, knowledge of external objects does not rise to the level of

clarity and distinctness. Sensory judgments about the external world at first seemed vivid, but later proved to be questionable. By contrast, mathematical judgments are perceived clearly and distinctly. However, an obstacle remain: God may be deceiving him irrespective of how clearly and distinctly he perceives mathematical truths. To put the general rule of clarity and distinctness on sound footing, Descartes must (a) prove God's existence, and then (b) show that God is not a deceiver.

In constructing his argument for God's existence, Descartes makes several prefatory comments about the nature and content of human thought. He begins outlining the various types of thoughts we have, which include ideas, thoughts, volitions and judgments. Only judgments have a truth value, and most deception comes from judgments about ideas. There are three kinds of ideas: fictitious (invented), adventitious (from external objects), and innate (inborn). A final prefatory issue concerns the adventitious ideas (that is, ideas of external objects). Are they really produced by external objects as they seem to be? One reason why we believe adventitious ideas have their origin in physical objects (as opposed to being mere fictions of the mind) is because we are taught this by nature. Descartes believes that nature teaches us in an unabsolute sense (that is, by a spontaneous impulse) that adventitious ideas are caused by external objects. We trust natural impulses, though, since they often lead us astray, such as with moral intuitions. Another reason why we believe adventitious ideas have their origin in external objects is that these ideas are independent of our will or volitions. We may not rely on this reason, though, since we may have an unknown mental faculty which produces such ideas against our will. Descartes next argues that even if adventitious ideas were caused by external objects, an idea may in no way resemble the object causing it. How does he illustrate this problem with our two ideas of the sun? Descartes concludes that only a "blind impulse" makes us believe that adventitious ideas correspond to real physical objects.

Since adventitious ideas have no clear basis in external objects, then Descartes cannot attempt to prove God's existence through a posteriori arguments (that is, arguments based on our perception of external objects). For example, he cannot argue for God's existence based on apparent design in the world, since he cannot trust his adventitious ideas of design. However, there is another path open to him. He may simply examine the content of his ideas, ignoring their connection with external objects. In his words, he will consider his ideas as merely "modes of thought." When we view ideas merely as modes of thought, some seem more perfect or complex than others. In Descartes' terminology, a more perfect or complex idea has greater objective reality than a less perfect or complex idea. For example, ideas of eternal substance, such as God, have more perfection than ideas of finite substance, such as trees or dogs.

Descartes next discusses a principle of causality: "there must be as much in the total efficient cause as there is in the effect of that same cause." That is, there must be as much in any cause as there is in its effect. For example, if an object has 5 units of heat, then its cause must have at least 5 units of heat. This principle has been traditionally called the principle of sufficient reason, and he believes that we know this innately. Descartes argues that the principle of sufficient reason applies to ideas as well as to physical objects. That is, an idea with a moderate amount of objective reality (let's say, with five units of complexity) must be produced by something with at least that much objective reality (five or more units of complexity). Based on the principle of sufficient reason as it applies to ideas, Descartes believes that there are important conclusions we can draw about the origin of specific ideas. Descartes believe that his ideas of people, animals or angels could have arisen from within himself since they can arise from ideas of himself. He continues discussing the origins of

ideas of physical objects, particularly regarding their secondary and primary qualities. He believes that his ideas of light, colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and heat (that is, secondary qualities) need no explanation outside of himself. Primary qualities too, such as substance, duration, and number, may also be explained by the idea of himself.

Finally, Descartes considers the idea of God which is in his mind. This idea is that of "an infinite and independent substance." More to the point, he has in his mind an idea of infinite perfection. This requires an explanation beyond himself, and that explanation must have as much objective reality as the initial idea of infinite perfection. This, then, is his proof for God's existence:

1. We have an idea of infinite perfection.
2. The idea we have of ourselves entails finitude and imperfection.
3. There must be as much reality in the cause of any idea as in the idea itself (the principle of sufficient reason).
4. Therefore, the idea we have of infinite perfection originated from a being with infinite perfection, and this being is God.

Once proving God's existence, Descartes addresses three possible criticisms of his argument. Each of these possible criticisms suggests that our idea of infinite perfection need not be caused by God himself. A first possible criticism is based on Descartes assumption that we initially possess an idea of the infinite, and that our idea of the finite consists of the negation of our idea of the infinite. A critic might argue that the opposite is the case: we have an initial idea of the finite and our idea of the infinite is its negation. In this case, we could be the cause of infinite perfection by (a) taking the idea of finite imperfection from ourselves, and (b) negating this idea. Thus, for Descartes' proof to be successful, he needs to show that we initially possess an idea of the infinite. And, Descartes contends that we initially possess the idea of the infinite. A second possible criticism is that the idea of infinite perfection is "materially false and can therefore be from nothing." More simply, the suggestion is that the idea of infinite perfection is an incoherent concept, and needs no explanation beyond itself. However, Descartes argues that the notion of infinite perfection is clear and distinct in the highest degree, and thus requires an explanation. A third possible criticism is that perhaps we are potentially infinitely perfect, and thus produced the idea of infinite perfection from our hidden potential. Descartes gives three replies to this third criticism. First, if his potential perfection can be actualized only gradually (through a gradual increase in knowledge), this implies that he is finite. And, if he is a finite being, he could not produce the idea of infinite perfection. Second, he argues that even if his knowledge would increase gradually over an infinite amount of time, at no point would he have infinite knowledge. Third, he argues that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a merely potential being.

Since Descartes has proven his own existence and the existence of God, he now finds it appropriate to show that God was the cause of his existence. He shows this through the process of elimination, arguing that he could not be produced by (a) himself, (b) a finite cause less perfect than God, (c) by several partial causes, or (d) by his parents. God is the only possible cause for his existence. Descartes gives two replies to the suggestion that he was derived from himself. His first reply is that if he caused himself, then he would be God since he would give himself every perfection he could. Descartes' second reply is based on the fact that he exists over time. Each of the parts and moments of his existence depends on others. He then asks whether "I have some power through which I can bring it about that I myself, who now am, will also exist a little later?" He answers that he does not have the power in himself for duration, so he doesn't have the power for creation

either. Another suggestion is that he was caused by a finite cause less perfect than God. He responds noting that this finite cause would have to possess the idea of infinite perfection too, hence we need to inquire into its cause as well. Another suggestion is that he was created by several partial causes. This fails, though, since the concept of infinite perfection is unified, so the cause of it must be unified. Finally, he addresses the suggestion that he was caused by his parents. Although his parents may be the cause of his body, they are not the cause of his thinking existence insofar as he has an idea of infinite perfection. Descartes concludes that God must be the cause of him, and that God innately implanted the idea of infinite perfection in him.

Descartes closes Meditation Three arguing that as God's creation, it is highly believable that God made him in his image, and that he understands God reflectively, just as he understands himself. He concludes that God is not a deceiver since deception is an imperfection, and God is infinite perfection.

MEDITATION 4. At the close of the Third Meditation, Descartes has arrived at all of the fundamental principles he needs in his quest for truth: (1) he exists (a foundational fact which is indubitable), (2) God exists and is not a deceiver, and (3) clarity and distinctness are reliable indicators of truth. Descartes' goal is to show that we can rely on our senses to at least some degree. Meditations IV and V do not contribute directly to this goal. Meditation IV explains the source of human error and argues that God is not responsible for our mistakes. Descartes' concept of "error" is broad, referring to any mistaken judgment whatever. This includes assertions, predictions, ethical judgments, or judgments leading to an action. Descartes begins his quest for the origin of error by considering several theories which he ultimately rejects. He first considers whether God could be the cause of his error. He quickly rejects this, though, since God is not a deceiver. He next considers the possibility that human error results from his faculty of judgment. This makes sense since he sees himself as finite, existing on a middle rung of the great chain of being between God and nothing. Thus, error would seem to be a defect which we can blame on our faculty of judgment. However, it unsatisfactory to say that human error results from his faculty of judgment since a perfect God would not would not place an imperfect faculty in him. Descartes is puzzled that God could have made him such that he would never err, yet he clearly does err, and he suggests that maybe he can never know God's purpose in allowing us to err, since the wisdom of God is above human intellect. However, he concludes that we should examine God's in creation as a whole, not just his purpose in creating me personally in a manner that involves error.

After rejecting the above suggestions, Descartes considers the specific faculties involved when we make mistakes: the understanding and the will. He can find no reason to hold either of these faculties individually responsible for error. Our reason cannot be faulted since although knowledge is limited, the intellectual faculty of judgment itself has no error. The faculty of the will itself does not produce error since the will is a perfect faculty, and, indeed, is as perfect as God's (God's is only greater in terms of power, knowledge, and affected objects). He briefly discusses the free nature of our will. Even when strong motives incline us toward one direction, we choose all the more freely in that direction. Freedom is at its lowest when no motive moves me more in one direction than in another

Descartes considers a final view that error results when we extend our will beyond our knowledge. This, he believes, is the true explanation. According to Descartes, our will often becomes indifferent (or lazy) and accidentally extends beyond the bounds of our knowledge. He stresses that we should abstain from willing when we have insufficient knowledge. As an example, he explains that at this stage in his investigation he doesn't know whether his essential qualities include mind, body, or

both. Hence, he abstains from any willful judgment on this issue. In this and similar cases, he believes that proper use of freedom requires us to abstain from willful judgment. Suppose, though, that, by chance, we stumble upon some truth beyond the scope of our knowledge. For Descartes, it is still improper to use the will in this manner since I know clearly and distinctly that full knowledge ought to precede volition.

Descartes next argues that even though God created us, God is not responsible for errors that we make. He considers several possible criticisms against God's role. One might first criticize God for giving us limited knowledge. However, finitude is my essence, and this involves limited knowledge (God was not required to make me infinite). Second, one might criticize God for allowing us to extend our will beyond our knowledge. In reply, Descartes argues that God merely allows us to make erroneous willful judgments, but does not cause us to make them. Third, one might also criticize God for not more actively preventing me from erring. For example, God could have given me clear and distinct perception of everything I would ever need to know. Alternatively, God could have impressed more firmly on my memory the importance of not extending my will beyond my knowledge. However, although this would make me more perfect, when I view the goodness of the whole universe, God may have some need for me to be a less perfect being. Descartes argues that we don't need God to impress more firmly on our memories the importance of restraining the will. By developing the right habits, we can do this ourselves. Through practice, I can develop such habits when I remember previous circumstances in which I over-extended my will

MEDITATION 5. In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes presents another argument for God's existence. Like the argument in Meditation III, Descartes' argument here does not appeal to sensory information (such as natural design). Instead, it is based on the content of his thoughts. The proof in this Meditation follows Anselm's ontological argument. He begins Meditation Five noting that he can imagine an array of two and three dimensional shapes. Some of these, like triangles, portray such clear and distinct attributes which necessarily belong to them. Since from the mere idea of a triangle one can deduce necessary attributes of a triangle, in the same way, from the mere idea of God (that is, a supremely perfect being) we can arrive at necessary attributes that belong to him. Put more precisely, Descartes' proof of God is this:

1. **I have an idea of a supremely perfect being**
2. **The idea of this being necessarily entails every perfection**
3. **Existence is a perfection**
4. **Therefore, the idea of a supremely perfect being entails existence (that is, a supremely perfect being exists)**

Descartes next anticipates three possible objections to his argument. A first objection to Descartes' proof is God can be thought of as not existing. That is, we can separate his existence from his essential attributes. Since, according to the critic, we can conceive of God as not existing, then existence is not a necessary attribute of this idea. Descartes replies that we cannot separate God's existence from his essential attributes when we carefully consider this idea. A second objection to Descartes' proof is that even though a necessary attribute of a mountain is that it be adjacent to a valley, it doesn't follow that any mountains or valleys exist. In the same way, even though the concept of supremely perfect being necessarily possesses certain attributes, it doesn't follow that this being exists. Descartes replies that this misses the analogy; existence is essential to God, just as having wings is essential to a winged horse.

A third criticism of Descartes' proof is that if we don't bother considering the idea of a supremely

perfect being, then we won't be forced into asserting that existence is one of his perfections. Descartes replies that as often as we consider the idea, we need to give it existence. Descartes argues that not only does the idea of God necessarily include existence, but the initial idea of God itself is innate. Unlike elaborate proofs in geometry, Descartes argues that it is quite easy to understand that existence is a necessary attribute of a supremely perfect being.

Descartes argues that absolute knowledge of anything, including geometry, depends on a prior knowledge of God. Suppose we are analyzing an elaborate geometrical proof. While all of the ideas are fresh in our minds, we can see that the proof is sound. However, as time passes, the details of the proof are no longer in our minds, and we might then doubt the soundness of our proof. But, even if we forget the details of a proof, we can still rely on our established conclusion insofar as each step was perceived clearly and distinctly. Since God is not a deceiver, then we can trust that all we perceive clearly and distinctly is necessarily true. Hence, the certainty and truth of every science depends on knowledge of the true God

MEDITATION 6. At this point in the *Meditations*, Descartes has obtained certainty about a variety of topics: his existence, his essence, the causal principle, God's existence, that God made him, that God is not a deceiver, that clarity and distinctness are indicators of truth, that he has a free will, the source of error, and that God is the source of confidence in elaborate proofs. Descartes sets two aims in Meditation VI: first, to show the existence of material objects, and, second, to show that mind is distinct from body.

Recalling the distinction made earlier between primary objects of perception (objects of mathematics) and secondary objects of perception (objects of the senses), Descartes investigates whether material objects exist by asking two questions: (1) do primary objects exist? and (2) do secondary objects exist? In answering the first question, Descartes draws on a distinction between imagining primary objects and conceiving of primary objects. He notes that he conceives of primary objects (such as triangles) clearly and distinctly, but this in no way means that such objects actually exist. It only means that they might exist since the idea contains no contradiction. In addition to conceiving of primary objects, though, Descartes says that he can imagine many primary objects as well. Descartes continues by illustrating the difference between conception and imagination. We can, for example, intellectually conceive of a chiliagon (a thousand sided figure) although we cannot imagine one (i.e., visually picture one in our minds). There is another distinction between conception and imagination: conception is a necessary attribute of humans, and imagination is not. Since we can conceive of primary objects, then such objects *possibly* exist. Since we can also imagine these objects, then such objects probably exist, yet we cannot say for sure whether they do exist.

Failing to attain certainty about the existence of primary material objects, Descartes turns his attention to secondary material objects. Since his notion of secondary objects rests on his faculty of secondary perception (which still might only be an illusion) he needs to explore this faculty. He does this by giving a summary of the first three Meditations, noting what conclusions he has already arrived at about secondary perception. He recalls first that he had a naive confidence in his senses (secondary perception) by which he perceived the different parts of his body, different emotional and physiological appetites, and various secondary qualities in objects such as heat and color. He next recalls how he gradually lost all confidence in the reliability of these secondary perceptions. There were three steps to this doubting process. First, we are misguided by optical illusions. Second, our perceptions may be dream states, and, third, God might be deceiving us. He recalls that external sensations seem to arise from a source outside of himself, since such sensations

don't depend on his will. However, he might have a faculty which is the source of external sensations and not know it. Descartes recalls how he attained certainty that God would not deceive him about his clear and distinct ideas. One such idea concerns the identity as a thinking thing. Even though he may have a body, his true identity is that of a thinking thing alone and, indeed, his mind could exist without his body. This is because (a) he see clearly and distinctly that he is a thinking unextended thing, and (b) he has a distinct idea of his body as an extended unthinking thing. He argues that humans are spirits which occupy a mechanical body, and that the essential attributes of humans are exclusively attributes of the spirit (such as thinking, willing and conceiving) which do not involve the body at all. Attributes, such as sense perception, movement, and appetite require a body, are attributes of our body and not of our spirit and, hence, do not comprise our essence.

Descartes continues explaining that we are designed with several mental faculties which are responsible for various ways of thinking. He is most concerned here with the passive faculty of perception, that is, a the ability of receiving and recognizing the ideas of sensible things. This implies that there is an active source of these ideas, either inside or outside of him. That is, if I passively (or non-willfully) perceive a rock in front of me, then there is some active source feeding me that perception. Descartes sees only three possible explanations of that active source: the perceptions are actively produced by either himself, God, or external objects. He eliminates the first two options and concludes that external objects are the active source of such perceptions.

1. **I know clearly and distinctly that there is in me a passive faculty which receives perceptions from an active source**
2. **This active source of perception is either me, God, or external objects**
3. **I am not that active source since such perceptions are not willfully produced and does not involve thinking (my true essence)**
4. **God does not implants ideas of perception in me since this would be deception**
5. **Therefore, external objects are the active source of perceptions**

For Descartes, (d) above is the crucial premise to his argument. Why does he believe that perceptions are not implanted in him by God? The answer is that, first, Descartes has no faculty by which he could know if such perceptions are implanted by God. Second, he has a strong inclination to believe that secondary perceptions are the result of secondary external objects. Third, Descartes argues that it would be deception on God's part if God (a) permitted Descartes to erroneously believe perceptions are caused by objects and (b) did not give him a faculty to know that such notions are actually caused by God. Descartes has here expanded on the notion of God not being a deceiver. In Meditation Three, God's quality of non-deception was commissive in that a perfect God could not commit any act which would deceive. Here, however, Descartes argues that a perfect God cannot omit any preventative measures which would help Descartes understand the truth. God's non-deception, then, is also omissive. This commissive/omissive distinction is similar to the notion of sins of commission (such as the direct stabbing of an innocent person) and sins of omission (such as refusing to rescue a person from drowning). Descartes maintains, then, that a non-deceptive God can perform neither deceptions of commission, nor deceptions of omission.

Even though Descartes is confident that such perceptions result from external objects, he still has reservations about the reliability of this sense perception. Descartes addresses the issue by looking at the somewhat ambiguous manner in which nature teaches him about external objects. In the most general sense, natural teachings are any dispositions implanted in us by God. In its more

particular sense, natural teachings are the complexus of all things which God has given me. He explains that some things nature teaches us are true and important. The three important truths which nature teaches us are (1) I have a body i need of food, (2) mind and body are connected, and (3) there are external bodies or objects. These truths of nature all hinge on the fact that we are composed of both a mind and body. Descartes continues that although some things nature teaches are true, other natural teachings may be false. Four such things are (1) unperceived space is a vacuum, (2) the idea of heat resembles some external state of affairs, (3) perceived colors resemble external colors, and (4) bitter tastes resemble external things.

Descartes now has a problem: some things nature teaches us are true, yet some things nature teaches us may be false. His solution is to distinguish between the various ways that nature can teach us something. As noted, all natural teachings are dispositions given to us by God. One subset of natural teachings pertain only to the mind, and these are clear and distinct. The subject matter of such teachings involves purely mental concepts, such as "what is done cannot be undone." When nature teaches us in this manner, there is no question about the truth of the matter. A second subset of natural teachings pertain only to the body. Descartes does not deal with these. Yet a third subset pertains to the relation between our minds and bodies. These truths are a little more obscure and can be misinterpreted. All of the natural teachings noted above are of this mind/body type. The false ones, then, are simply misinterpretations. He examines more carefully the above apparent natural teachings which are false, and explains what is really going on. For example, with pain which is caused from heat, it is true that something in heat excites pain, but I can't say that something resembling pain resides in heat. He believes that the ultimate source of error here is that we have conflicting signals about what we should pursue or avoid.

Descartes anticipates a criticism which compares a sick person who improperly perceives things to a poorly designed clock which gives the wrong time. God, thus, would be at fault for poorly designing humans. He dismisses this line of reasoning, though, since it imposes an artificial order on the body by forcing a comparison with clocks. Descartes argues that there are four sources of error which are inherently tied to the structure of our physical bodies. The first of these stems from the fact that the mind and body are distinct, in particular, the mind is unified and the body is divisible The second results from the fact that the mind does not receive impressions directly from all parts of the body. The third arises from the fact that there are long nerves going to and from the brain. If we poke one of these at any place, we will have the same sensation. Finally, some bodily feelings are deceptive insofar as they give us exaggerated or misdirected sensations. These, though, are present for the benefit of self-preservation. From these four reasons, Descartes concludes that the construction of our bodies subject us to error. However, he believes that we can counteract this problem and ultimately have confidence in our bodily perceptions. First, Descartes notes that bodily errors are not haphazard, but have a kind of mechanical logic. He concedes that our bodies often mislead us when we are sick. However, this is better than the alternative possibility that we think we are well when we are infact sick. Insofar as our memory has us connect the present to the past, we can counter the misleading effects of bodily perceptions and can ultimately rely on his senses.

Descartes further restores confidence in bodily perceptions by setting aside the possibility that he is dreaming. When we are awake, our memories unite the events of our lives; when we are dreaming, memory cannot connect our dreams together.

PREFACE TO THE READER. Descartes opened the *Meditations* with a Preface. However, since the content of the preface depends on arguments in the *Meditations* proper, it will be discussed

here. In his earlier Discourse on the Method (1637), Descartes also discusses the existence of God and the nature of the human soul. He explains that the earlier discussion in the Discourse was intentionally brief. The Discourse was published in French, as opposed to Latin, and thus available to common readers. Accordignly, he toned down the arguments to keep "feeble minded" people from following its course. The *Meditations*, by contrast, were written in Latin and not intended for the casual reader.

In the Discourse, Descartes requested that his readers point out errors in his reasoning. He presents and responds to two of the more important criticisms made. Although the objections are aimed at the Discourse, they can also be related to the line of reasoning in the *Meditations*. In Meditation Two, Descartes notes that thinking is the only quality which he can claim to possess. In Meditation Six, he states more strongly that thinking is the only quality which the soul possesses. The former is an epistemological claim, and the latter is an ontological claim. Descartes' critics point out that the second claim cannot be inferred from the first. Descartes believes that in the *Meditations* he is sufficiently justified in concluding that the essence of the soul is thinking (an ontological claim) given that thinking is the only attribute which he knows he has (an epistemological claim). However, he claims that his intention in the Discourse was to merely make the epistemological claim. The second objection again applies to the reasoning in the Discourse, but can also be related to the *Meditations*. In Meditation Three Descartes proves God's existence based on the fact that he has an idea of infinite perfection in his mind. The critic contends that he can't have an infinitely complex idea since it must be limited by our own finitude. In response, Descartes argues that there are two sense of "idea". The first is an act of my understanding; this, he concedes, is finite. However, the second is the thinking which is represented by the act of my understanding; this, though, can be infinite.

OTHER ASPECTS OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY

THE PINEAL GLAND. As seen in Meditation Six, Descartes believes that humans are composed of two distinct parts: a physical body which moves about in the physical world, and a nonphysical or spiritual mind which does the thinking. This dualism presents a problem for Descartes insofar as an explanation is needed as to how our minds and bodies interact in their separate realms. For example, when my hand touches something hot, this sensation is registered in my mind. Also, if my mind decides to remove my hand, this decision must be transferred to my body, which results in motor activity. Thus, Descartes needs an explanation of both sensory and motor communication between our spirit minds and physical bodies. He offers such an explaination in Part One of *The Passions of the Soul* (1649): the pineal gland in the brain is the gateway between the two realms. He notes that there are two standard accounts of how the body and soul are connected: through the heart, and through the whole brain. He rejects these and suggests that the point of interaction is the pineal gland. This is because it is a single gland in the center of the brain, which unites our doubled sensory perceptions (e.g. two eyes). With sensory perception, information transferred to the pineal gland through animal spirits, blood, and nerves. With motor commands, the gland is moved by the soul, and thrusts the animal spirits towards the pores of the brain, and onto the nerves.

THE AUTOMATISM OF ANIMALS. Descartes believed that, on earth, only humans have a dual spirit/body nature. Non-human animals have only bodies and are essentially automaton or biological robots which behave according to their internal biological programs. Thus, they do not think, even though they behave in ways which we might mistakenly take to reflect conscious

thought. Descartes' view was patently rejected by many of his contemporaries. In his article on Rorarius in the Historical and Critical Dictionary (1692), Bayle presents a long list of criticisms against Descartes' theory. Even today Descartes' view is the object of ridicule by animal rights advocates. Descartes' reasoning is presented in a letter to Henry More. He argues that there are two sources of motion in organisms. The first is mechanical and bodily and involves the physiological mechanism of animal spirits. The second is mind or soul which is incorporeal. Descartes believes that the mental cause of motion does not apply to animals, and that all of their behavior can be explained by mechanical and bodily events. The common reason for holding that animals think is that they have sensory organs like humans. However, Descartes offers several reasons for not ascribing thinking to animals. First, we acknowledge that lower animals (such as bugs) move only by mechanics. Recognizing this makes it easier to see why this is so of higher animals as well. Second, our own human bodies move without thought, such as when we are in convulsions. Third, we can create machines which move. His main argument, though, is that animals have no true language. Interestingly, Descartes claims that he is not denying life or feeling to animals, but only thought:

> **It must, however, be observed that I speak of the thought of animals, not of their life, nor of their sensation. For I do not deny the life of any animal when making it consist solely in the warmth of the heart. I do not refuse to them feeling even, in so far as it depends only on the bodily organs. Thus, my opinion is not so cruel to animals as it is favorable to humans. I speak to those who are not committed to the extravagant position of Pythagoras, who held people under suspicion of a crime those who ate or killed animals**

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John Dewey (1859-1952)

Life and Works

John Dewey was born on October 20, 1859, the third of four sons born to Archibald Sprague Dewey and Lucina Artemesia Rich of Burlington, Vermont. The eldest sibling died in infancy, but the three surviving brothers attended the public school and the University of Vermont in Burlington with John. While at the University of Vermont, Dewey was exposed to evolutionary theory through the teaching of G.H. Perkins and *Lessons in Elementary Physiology,* a text by T.H. Huxley, the famous English evolutionist. The theory of natural selection continued to have a life-long impact upon Dewey's thought, suggesting the barrenness of static models of nature, and the importance of focusing on the interaction between the human organism and its environment when considering questions of psychology and the theory of knowledge. The formal teaching in philosophy at the University of Vermont was confined for the most part to the school of Scottish realism, a school of thought that Dewey soon rejected, but his close contact both before and after graduation with his teacher of philosophy, H.A.P. Torrey, a learned scholar with broader philosophical interests and sympathies, was later accounted by Dewey himself as "decisive" to his philosophical development.

After graduation in 1879, Dewey taught high school for two years, during which the idea of pursuing a career in philosophy took hold. With this nascent ambition in mind, he sent a philosophical essay to W.T. Harris, then editor of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy,* and the most prominent of the St. Louis Hegelians. Harris's acceptance of the essay gave Dewey the confirmation he needed of his promise as a philosopher. With this encouragement he traveled to Baltimore to enroll as a graduate student at Johns Hopkins University.

At Johns Hopkins Dewey came under the tutelage of two powerful and engaging intellects who were to have a lasting influence on him. George Sylvester Morris, a German-trained Hegelian philosopher, exposed Dewey to the organic model of nature characteristic of German idealism. G. Stanley Hall, one of the most prominent American experimental psychologists at the time, provided Dewey with an appreciation of the power of scientific methodology as applied to the human sciences. The confluence of these viewpoints propelled Dewey's early thought, and established the general tenor of his ideas throughout his philosophical career.

Upon obtaining his doctorate in 1884, Dewey accepted a teaching post at the University of Michigan, a post he was to hold for ten years, with the exception of a year at the University of Minnesota in 1888. While at Michigan Dewey wrote his first two books: *Psychology* (1887), and *Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding* (1888). Both works expressed Dewey's early committment to Hegelian idealism, while the *Psychology* explored the synthesis between this idealism and experimental science that Dewey was then attempting to effect. At Michigan Dewey

also met one of his important philosophical collaborators, James Hayden Tufts, with whom he would later author *Ethics* (1908; revised ed. 1932).

In 1894, Dewey followed Tufts to the recently founded University of Chicago. It was during his years at Chicago that Dewey's early idealism gave way to an empirically based theory of knowledge that was in concert with the then developing American school of thought known as pragmatism. This change in view finally coalesced into a series of four essays entitled collectively "Thought and its Subject-Matter," which was published along with a number of other essays by Dewey's colleagues and students at Chicago under the title *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903). Dewey also founded and directed a laboratory school at Chicago, where he was afforded an opportunity to apply directly his developing ideas on pedagogical method. This experience provided the material for his first major work on education, *The School and Society* (1899).

Disagreements with the administration over the status of the Laboratory School led to Dewey's resignation from his post at Chicago in 1904. His philosophical reputation now secured, he was quickly invited to join the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University. Dewey spent the rest of his professional life at Columbia. Now in New York, located in the midst of the Northeastern universities that housed many of the brightest minds of American philosophy, Dewey developed close contacts with many philosophers working from divergent points of view, an intellectually stimulating atmosphere which served to nurture and enrich his thought.

During his first decade at Columbia Dewey wrote a great number of articles in the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, many of which were published in two important books: *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought* (1910) and *Essays in Experimental Logic* (1916). His interest in educational theory also continued during these years, fostered by his work at Teachers College at Columbia. This led to the publication of *How We Think* (1910; revised ed. 1933), an application of his theory of knowledge to education, and *Democracy and Education* (1916) perhaps his most important work in the field.

During his years at Columbia Dewey's reputation grew not only as a leading philosopher and educational theorist, but also in the public mind as an important commentator on contemporary issues, the latter due to his frequent contributions to popular magazines such as *The New Republic* and *Nation* as well as his ongoing political involvement in a variety of causes, such as women's suffrage and the unionization of teachers. One outcome of this fame was numerous invitations to lecture in both academic and popular venues. Many of his most significant writings during these years were the result of such lectures, including *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920), *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), *Experience and Nature* (1925), *The Public and its Problems* (1927), and *The Quest for Certainty* (1929).

Dewey's retirement from active teaching in 1930 did not curtail his activity either as a public figure or productive philosopher. Of special note in his public life was his participation in the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Against Leon Trotsky at the Moscow Trial, which exposed Stalin's political machinations behind the Moscow trials of the mid-1930s, and his defense of fellow philosopher Bertrand Russell against an attempt by conservatives to remove him from his chair at the College of the City of New York in 1940. A primary focus of Dewey's philosophical pursuits during the 1930s was the preparation of a final formulation of his logical theory, published as *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* in 1938. Dewey's other significant works during his retirement years include *Art as Experience* (1934), *A Common Faith* (1934), *Freedom and Culture* (1939), *Theory of Valuation* (1939), and *Knowing and the Known* (1949), the last coauthored with

Arthur F. Bentley. Dewey continued to work vigorously throughout his retirement until his death on June 2, 1952, at the age of ninety-two.

Theory of Knowledge

The central focus of Dewey's philosophical interests throughout his career was what has been traditionally called "epistemology," or the "theory of knowledge." It is indicative, however, of Dewey's critical stance toward past efforts in this area that he expressly rejected the term "epistemology," preferring the "theory of inquiry" or "experimental logic" as more representative of his own approach.

In Dewey's view, traditional epistemologies, whether rationalist or empiricist, had drawn too stark a distinction between thought, the domain of knowledge, and the world of fact to which thought purportedly referred: thought was believed to exist apart from the world, epistemically as the object of immediate awareness, ontologically as the unique aspect of the self. The committment of modern rationalism, stemming from Descartes, to a doctrine of innate ideas, ideas constituted from birth in the very nature of the mind itself, had effected this dichotomy; but the modern empiricists, beginning with Locke, had done the same just as markedly by their committment to an introspective methodology and a representational theory of ideas. The resulting view makes a mystery of the relevance of thought to the world: if thought constitutes a domain that stands apart from the world, how can its accuracy as an account of the world ever be established? For Dewey a new model, rejecting traditional presumptions, was wanting, a model that Dewey endeavored to develop and refine throughout his years of writing and reflection.

In his early writings on these issues, such as "Is Logic a Dualistic Science?" (1890) and "The Present Position of Logical Theory" (1891), Dewey offered a solution to epistemological issues mainly along the lines of his early acceptance of Hegelian idealism: the world of fact does not stand apart from thought, but is itself defined within thought as its objective manifestation. But during the succeeding decade Dewey gradually came to reject this solution as confused and inadequate.

A number of influences have bearing on Dewey's change of view. For one, Hegelian idealism was not conducive to accommodating the methodologies and results of experimental science which he accepted and admired. Dewey himself had attempted to effect such an accommodation between experimental psychology and idealism in his early *Psychology* (1887), but the publication of William James' *Principles of Psychology* (1891), written from a more thoroughgoing naturalistic stance, suggested the superfluity of idealist principles in the treatment of the subject.

Second, Darwin's theory of natural selection suggested in a more particular way the form which a naturalistic approach to the theory of knowledge should take. Darwin's theory had renounced supernatural explanations of the origins of species by accounting for the morphology of living organisms as a product of a natural, temporal process of the adaptation of lineages of organisms to their environments, environments which, Darwin understood, were significantly determined by the organisms that occupied them. The key to the naturalistic account of species was a consideration of the complex interrelationships between organisms and environments. In a similar way, Dewey came to believe that a productive, naturalistic approach to the theory of knowledge must begin with a consideration of the development of knowledge as an adaptive human response to

environing conditions aimed at an active restructuring of these conditions. Unlike traditional approaches in the theory of knowledge, which saw thought as a subjective primitive out of which knowledge was composed, Dewey's approach understood thought genetically, as the product of the interaction between organism and environment, and knowledge as having practical instrumentality in the guidance and control of that interaction. Thus Dewey adopted the term "instrumentalism" as a descriptive appellation for his new approach.

Dewey's first significant application of this new naturalistic understanding was offered in his seminal article "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" (1896). In this article, Dewey argued that the dominant conception of the reflex arc in the psychology of his day, which was thought to begin with the passive stimulation of the organism, causing a conscious act of awareness eventuating in a response, was a carry-over of the old, and errant, mind-body dualism. Dewey argued for an alternative view: the organism interacts with the world through self-guided activity that coordinates and integrates sensory and motor responses. The implication for the theory of knowledge was clear: the world is not passively perceived and thereby known; active manipulation of the environment is involved integrally in the process of learning from the start.

Dewey first applied this interactive naturalism in an explicit manner to the theory of knowledge in his four introductory essays in *Studies in Logical Theory*. Dewey identified the view expressed in *Studies* with the school of pragmatism, crediting William James as its progenitor. James, for his part, in an article appearing in the *Psychological Bulletin*, proclaimed the work as the expression of a new school of thought, acknowledging its originality.

A detailed genetic analysis of the process of inquiry was Dewey's signal contribution to *Studies*. Dewey distinguished three phases of the process. It begins with the *problematic situation*, a situation where instinctive or habitual responses of the human organism to the environment are inadequate for the continuation of ongoing activity in pursuit of the fulfillment of needs and desires. Dewey stressed in *Studies* and subsequent writings that the uncertainty of the problematic situation is not inherently cognitive, but practical and existential. Cognitive elements enter into the process as a response to precognitive maladjustment.

The second phase of the process involves the isolation of the data or subject matter which defines the parameters within which the reconstruction of the initiating situation must be addressed. In the third, reflective phase of the process, the cognitive elements of inquiry (ideas, suppositions, theories, etc.) are entertained as hypothetical solutions to the originating impediment of the problematic situation, the implications of which are pursued in the abstract. The final test of the adequacy of these solutions comes with their employment in action. If a reconstruction of the antecedent situation conducive to fluid activity is achieved, then the solution no longer retains the character of the hypothetical that marks cognitive thought; rather, it becomes a part of the existential circumstances of human life.

The error of modern epistemologists, as Dewey saw it, was that they isolated the reflective stages of this process, and hypostatized the elements of those stages (sensations, ideas, etc.) into pre-existing constituents of a subjective mind in their search for an incorrigible foundation of knowledge. For Dewey, the hypostatization was as groundless as the search for incorrigibility was barren. Rejecting foundationalism, Dewey accepted the fallibilism that was characteristic of the school of pragmatism: the view that any proposition accepted as an item of knowledge has this status only provisionally, contingent upon its adequacy in providing a coherent understanding of the world as the basis for human action.

Dewey defended this general outline of the process of inquiry throughout his long career, insisting that it was the only proper way to understand the means by which we attain knowledge, whether it be the commonsense knowledge that guides the ordinary affairs of our lives, or the sophisticated knowledge arising from scientific inquiry. The latter is only distinguished from the former by the precision of its methods for controlling data, and the refinement of its hypotheses. In his writings in the theory of inquiry subsequent to *Studies,* Dewey endeavored to develop and deepen instrumentalism by considering a number of central issues of traditional epistemology from its perspective, and responding to some of the more trenchant criticisms of the view.

One traditional question that Dewey addressed in a series of essays between 1906 and 1909 was that of the meaning of truth. Dewey at that time considered the pragmatic theory of truth as central to the pragmatic school of thought, and vigorously defended its viability. Both Dewey and William James, in his book *Pragmatism* (1907), argued that the traditional correspondence theory of truth, according to which the true idea is one that agrees or corresponds to reality, only begs the question of what the "agreement" or "correspondence" of idea with reality is. Dewey and James maintained that an idea agrees with reality, and is therefore true, if and only if it is successfully employed in human action in pursuit of human goals and interests, that is, if it leads to the resolution of a problematic situation in Dewey's terms. The pragmatic theory of truth met with strong opposition among its critics, perhaps most notably from the British logician and philosopher Bertrand Russell. Dewey later began to suspect that the issues surrounding the conditions of truth, as well as knowledge, were hopelessly obscured by the accretion of traditional, and in his view misguided, meanings to the terms, resulting in confusing ambiguity. He later abandoned these terms in favor of "warranted assertiblity" to describe the distinctive property of ideas that results from successful inquiry.

One of the most important developments of his later writings in the theory of knowledge was the application of the principles of instrumentalism to the traditional conceptions and formal apparatus of logical theory. Dewey made significant headway in this endeavor in his lengthy introduction to *Essays in Experimental Logic*, but the project reached full fruition in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*.

The basis of Dewey's discussion in the *Logic* is the continuity of intelligent inquiry with the adaptive responses of prehuman organisms to their environments in circumstances that check efficient activity in the fulfillment of organic needs. What is distinctive about intelligent inquiry is that it is facilitated by the use of language, which allows, by its symbolic meanings and implicatory relationships, the hypothetical rehearsal of adaptive behaviors before their employment under actual, prevailing conditions for the purpose of resolving problematic situations. Logical form, the specialized subject matter of traditional logic, owes its genesis not to rational intuition, as had often been assumed by logicians, but due to its functional value in (1) managing factual evidence pertaining to the problematic situation that elicits inquiry, and (2) controlling the procedures involved in the conceptualized entertainment of hypothetical solutions. As Dewey puts it, "logical forms accrue to subject-matter when the latter is subjected to controlled inquiry."

From this new perspective, Dewey reconsiders many of the topics of traditional logic, such as the distinction between deductive and inductive inference, propositional form, and the nature of logical necessity. One important outcome of this work was a new theory of propositions. Traditional views in logic had held that the logical import of propositions is defined wholly by their syntactical form (e.g., "All As are Bs," "Some Bs are Cs"). In contrast, Dewey maintained that statements of identical propositional form can play significantly different functional roles in the process of

inquiry. Thus in keeping with his distinction between the factual and conceptual elements of inquiry, he replaced the accepted distinctions between universal, particular, and singular propositions based on syntactical meaning with a distinction between existential and ideational propositions, a distinction that largely cuts across traditional classifications. The same general approach is taken throughout the work: the aim is to offer functional analyses of logical principles and techniques that exhibit their operative utility in the process of inquiry as Dewey understood it.

The breadth of topics treated and the depth and continuity of the discussion of these topics mark the *Logic* as Dewey's decisive statement in logical theory. The recognition of the work's importance within the philosophical community of the time can be gauged by the fact that the *Journal of Philosophy*, the most prominent American journal in the field, dedicated an entire issue to a discussion of the work, including contributions by such philosophical luminaries as C. I. Lewis of Harvard University, and Ernest Nagel, Dewey's colleague at Columbia University. Although many of his critics did question, and continue to question, the assumptions of his approach, one that is certainly unique in the development of twentieth century logical theory, there is no doubt that the work was and continues to be an important contribution to the field.

Metaphysics

Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics first took shape in articles that he wrote during the decade after the publication of *Studies in Logical Theory*, a period when he was attempting to elucidate the implications of instrumentalism. Dewey disagreed with William James's assessment that pragmatic principles were metaphysically neutral. (He discusses this disagreement in "What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical," published in 1908.) Dewey's view was based in part on an assessment of the motivations behind traditional metaphysics: a central aim of the metaphysical tradition had been the discovery of an immutable cognitive object that could serve as a foundation for knowledge. The pragmatic theory, by showing that knowledge is a product of an activity directed to the fulfillment of human purposes, and that a true (or warranted) belief is known to be such by the consequences of its employment rather than by any psychological or ontological foundations, rendered this longstanding aim of metaphysics, in Dewey's view, moot, and opened the door to renewed metaphysical discussion grounded firmly on an empirical basis.

Dewey begins to define the general form that an empirical metaphysics should take in a number of articles, including "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism" (1905) and "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?" (1908). In the former article, Dewey asserts that things experienced empirically "are what they are experienced as." Dewey uses as an example a noise heard in a darkened room that is initially experienced as fearsome. Subsequent inquiry (e.g., turning on the lights and looking about) reveals that the noise was caused by a shade tapping against a window, and thus innocuous. But the subsequent inquiry, Dewey argues, does not change the initial status of the noise: it was experienced as fearsome, and in fact *was* fearsome. The point stems from the naturalistic roots of Dewey's logic. Our experience of the world is constituted by our interrelationship with it, a relationship that is imbued with practical import. The initial fearsomeness of the noise is the experiential correlate of the uncertain, problematic character of the situation, an uncertainty that is not merely subjective or mental, but a product of the potential inadequacy of previously established modes of behavior to deal effectively with the pragmatic

demands of present circumstances. The subsequent inquiry does not, therefore, uncover a reality (the innocuousness of the noise) underlying a mere appearance (its fearsomeness), but by settling the demands of the situation, it effects a change in the interdynamics of the organism-environment relationship of the initial situation--a change in reality.

There are two important implications of this line of thought that distinguish it from the metaphysical tradition. First, although inquiry is aimed at resolving the precarious and confusing aspects of experience to provide a stable basis for action, this does not imply the unreality of the unstable and contingent, nor justify its relegation to the status of mere appearance. Thus, for example, the usefulness and reliability of utilizing certain stable features of things encountered in our experience as a basis for classification does not justify according ultimate reality to essences or Platonic forms any more than, as rationalist metaphysicians in the modern era have thought, the similar usefulness of mathematical reasoning in understanding natural processes justifies the conclusion that the world can be exhaustively defined mathematically.

Second, the fact that the meanings we attribute to natural events might change in any particular in the future as renewed inquiries lead to more adequate understandings of natural events (as was implied by Dewey's fallibilism) does not entail that our experience of the world at any given time may as a whole be errant. Thus the implicit scepticism that underlies the representational theory of ideas and raises questions concerning the veracity of perceptual experience as such is unwarranted. Dewey stresses the point that sensations, hypotheses, ideas, etc., come into play to mediate our encounter with the world only in the context of active inquiry. Once inquiry is successful in resolving a problematic situation, mediatory sensations and ideas, as Dewey says, "drop out; and things are present to the agent in the most naively realistic fashion."

These contentions positioned Dewey's metaphysics within the territory of a naive realism, and in a number of his articles, such as "The Realism of Pragmatism" (1905), "Brief Studies in Realism" (1911), and "The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem" (1915), it is this view that Dewey expressly avows (a view that he carefully distinguishes from what he calls "presentational realism," which he attributes to a number of the other realists of his day). Opposing narrowminded positions that would accord full ontological status only to certain, typically the most stable or reliable, aspects of experience, Dewey argues for a position that recognizes the real significance of the multifarious richness of human experience.

Dewey offered a fuller statement of his metaphysics in 1925, with the publication of one of his most significant philosophical works, *Experience and Nature*. In the introductory chapter, Dewey stresses a familiar theme from his earlier writings: that previous metaphysicians, guided by unavowed biases for those aspects of experience that are relatively stable and secure, have illicitly reified these biases into narrow ontological presumptions, such as the temporal identity of substance, or the ultimate reality of forms or essences. Dewey finds this procedure so pervasive in the history of thought that he calls it simply *the* philosophic fallacy, and signals his intention to eschew the disastrous consequences of this approach by offering a descriptive account of all of the various generic features of human experience, whatever their character.

Dewey begins with the observation that the world as we experience it both individually and collectively is an admixture of the precarious, the transitory and contingent aspect of things, and the stable, the patterned regularity of natural processes that allows for prediction and human intervention. Honest metaphysical description must take into account both of these elements of experience. Dewey endeavors to do this by an event ontology. The world, rather than being

comprised of things or, in more traditional terms, substances, is comprised of happenings or occurrences that admit of both episodic uniqueness and general, structured order. Intrinsically events have an ineffable qualitative character by which they are immediately enjoyed or suffered, thus providing the basis for experienced value and aesthetic appreciation. Extrinsically events are connected to one another by patterns of change and development; any given event arises out of determinant prior conditions and leads to probable consequences. The patterns of these temporal processes is the proper subject matter of human knowledge--we know the world in terms of causal laws and mathematical relationships--but the instrumental value of understanding and controlling them should not blind us to the immediate, qualitative aspect of events; indeed, the value of scientific understanding is most significantly realized in the facility it affords for controlling the circumstances under which immediate enjoyments may be realized.

It is in terms of the distinction between qualitative immediacy and the structured order of events that Dewey understands the general pattern of human life and action. This understanding is captured by James' suggestive metaphor that human experience consists of an alternation of flights and perchings, an alternation of concentrated effort directed toward the achievement of foreseen aims, what Dewey calls "ends-in- view," with the fruition of effort in the immediate satisfaction of "consummatory experience." Dewey's insistence that human life follows the patterns of nature, as a part of nature, is the core tenet of his naturalistic outlook.

Dewey also addresses the social aspect of human experience facilitated by symbolic activity, particularly that of language. For Dewey the question of the nature of social relationships is a significant matter not only for social theory, but metaphysics as well, for it is from collective human activity, and specifically the development of shared meanings that govern this activity, that the mind arises. Thus rather than understanding the mind as a primitive and individual human endowment, and a precondition of conscious and intentional action, as was typical in the philosophical tradition since Descartes, Dewey offers a genetic analysis of mind as an emerging aspect of cooperative activity mediated by linguistic communication. Consciousness, in turn, is not to be understood as a domain of private awareness, but rather as the fulcrum point of the organism's readjustment to the challenge of novel conditions where the meanings and attitudes that formulate habitual behavioral responses to the environment fail to be adequate. Thus Dewey offers in the better part of a number of chapters of *Experience and Nature* a response to the traditional mind-body problem of the metaphysical tradition, a response that understands the mind as an emergent issue of natural processes, more particularly the web of interactive relationships between human beings and the world in which they live.

Ethical and Social Theory

Dewey's mature thought in ethics and social theory is not only intimately linked to the theory of knowledge in its founding conceptual framework and naturalistic standpoint, but also complementary to it in its emphasis on the social dimension of inquiry both in its processes and its consequences. In fact, it would be reasonable to claim that Dewey's theory of inquiry cannot be fully understood either in the meaning of its central tenets or the significance of its originality without considering how it applies to social aims and values, the central concern of his ethical and social theory.

Dewey rejected the atomistic understanding of society of the Hobbesian social contract theory, according to which the social, cooperative aspect of human life was grounded in the logically prior and fully articulated rational interests of individuals. Dewey's claim in *Experience and Nature* that the collection of meanings that constitute the mind have a social origin expresses the basic contention, one that he maintained throughout his career, that the human individual is a social being from the start, and that individual satisfaction and achievement can be realized only within the context of social habits and institutions that promote it.

Moral and social problems, for Dewey, are concerned with the guidance of human action to the achievement of socially defined ends that are productive of a satisfying life for individuals within the social context. Regarding the nature of what constitutes a satisfying life, Dewey was intentionally vague, out of his conviction that specific ends or goods can be defined only in particular socio-historical contexts. In the *Ethics* (1932) he speaks of the ends simply as the cultivation of interests in goods that recommend themselves in the light of calm reflection. In other works, such as *Human Nature and Conduct* and *Art as Experience*, he speaks of (1) the harmonizing of experience (the resolution of conflicts of habit and interest both within the individual and within society), (2) the release from tedium in favor of the enjoyment of variety and creative action, and (3) the expansion of meaning (the enrichment of the individual's appreciation of his or her circumstances within human culture and the world at large). The attunement of individual efforts to the promotion of these social ends constitutes, for Dewey, the central issue of ethical concern of the individual; the collective means for their realization is the paramount question of political policy.

Conceived in this manner, the appropriate method for solving moral and social questions is the same as that required for solving questions concerning matters of fact: an empirical method that is tied to an examination of problematic situations, the gathering of relevant facts, and the imaginative consideration of possible solutions that, when utilized, bring about a reconstruction and resolution of the original situations. Dewey, throughout his ethical and social writings, stressed the need for an open-ended, flexible, and experimental approach to problems of practice aimed at the determination of the conditions for the attainment of human goods and a critical examination of the consequences of means adopted to promote them, an approach that he called the "method of intelligence."

The central focus of Dewey's criticism of the tradition of ethical thought is its tendency to seek solutions to moral and social problems in dogmatic principles and simplistic criteria which in his view were incapable of dealing effectively with the changing requirements of human events. In *Reconstruction of Philosophy* and *The Quest for Certainty*, Dewey located the motivation of traditional dogmatic approaches in philosophy in the forlorn hope for security in an uncertain world, forlorn because the conservatism of these approaches has the effect of inhibiting the intelligent adaptation of human practice to the ineluctable changes in the physical and social environment. Ideals and values must be evaluated with respect to their social consequences, either as inhibitors or as valuable instruments for social progress, and Dewey argues that philosophy, because of the breadth of its concern and its critical approach, can play a crucial role in this evaluation.

In large part, then, Dewey's ideas in ethics and social theory were programmatic rather than substantive, defining the direction that he believed human thought and action must take in order to identify the conditions that promote the human good in its fullest sense, rather than specifying

particular formulae or principles for individual and social action. He studiously avoided participating in what he regarded as the unfortunate practice of previous moral philosophers of offering general rules that legislate universal standards of conduct. But there are strong suggestions in a number of his works of basic ethical and social positions. In *Human Nature and Conduct* Dewey approaches ethical inquiry through an analysis of human character informed by the principles of scientific psychology. The analysis is reminiscent of Aristotelian ethics, concentrating on the central role of habit in formulating the dispositions of action that comprise character, and the importance of reflective intelligence as a means of modifying habits and controlling disruptive desires and impulses in the pursuit of worthwhile ends.

The social condition for the flexible adaptation that Dewey believed was crucial for human advancement is a democratic form of life, not instituted merely by democratic forms of governance, but by the inculcation of democratic habits of cooperation and public spiritedness, productive of an organized, self-conscious community of individuals responding to society's needs by experimental and inventive, rather than dogmatic, means. The development of these democratic habits, Dewey argues in *School and Society* and *Democracy and Education,* must begin in the earliest years of a child's educational experience. Dewey rejected the notion that a child's education should be viewed as merely a preparation for civil life, during which disjoint facts and ideas are conveyed by the teacher and memorized by the student only to be utilized later on. The school should rather be viewed as an extension of civil society and continuous with it, and the student encouraged to operate as a member of a community, actively pursuing interests in cooperation with others. It is by a process of self-directed learning, guided by the cultural resources provided by teachers, that Dewey believed a child is best prepared for the demands of responsible membership within the democratic community.

Aesthetics

Dewey's one significant treatment of aesthetic theory is offered in *Art as Experience*, a book that was based on the William James Lectures that he delivered at Harvard University in 1931. The book stands out as a diversion into uncommon philosophical territory for Dewey, adumbrated only by a somewhat sketchy and tangential treatment of art in one chapter of *Experience and Nature*. The unique status of the work in Dewey's corpus evoked some criticism from Dewey's followers, most notably Stephen Pepper, who believed that it marked an unfortunate departure from the naturalistic standpoint of his instrumentalism, and a return to the idealistic viewpoints of his youth. On close reading, however, *Art as Experience* reveals a considerable continuity of Dewey's views on art with the main themes of his previous philosophical work, while offering an important and useful extension of those themes. Dewey had always stressed the importance of recognizing the significance and integrity of all aspects of human experience. His repeated complaint against the partiality and bias of the philosophical tradition expresses this theme. Consistent with this theme, Dewey took account of qualitative immediacy in *Experience and Nature,* and incorporated it into his view of the developmental nature of experience, for it is in the enjoyment of the immediacy of an integration and harmonization of meanings, in the "consummatory phase" of experience that, in Dewey's view, the fruition of the readaptation of the individual with environment is realized. These central themes are enriched and deepened in *Art as Experience,* making it one of Dewey's

most significant works.

The roots of aesthetic experience lie, Dewey argues, in commonplace experience, in the consummatory experiences that are ubiquitous in the course of human life. There is no legitimacy to the conceit cherished by some art enthusiasts that aesthetic enjoyment is the privileged endowment of the few. Whenever there is a coalesence into an immediately enjoyed qualitative unity of meanings and values drawn from previous experience and present circumstances, life then takes on an aesthetic quality--what Dewey called having "*an* experience." Nor is the creative work of the artist, in its broad parameters, unique. The process of intelligent use of materials and the imaginative development of possible solutions to problems issuing in a reconstruction of experience that affords immediate satisfaction, the process found in the creative work of artists, is also to be found in all intelligent and creative human activity. What distinguishes artistic creation is the relative stress laid upon the immediate enjoyment of unified qualitative complexity as the rationalizing aim of the activity itself, and the ability of the artist to achieve this aim by marshalling and refining the massive resources of human life, meanings, and values.

The senses play a key role in artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation. Dewey, however, argues against the view, stemming historically from the sensationalistic empiricism of David Hume, that interprets the content of sense experience simply in terms of the traditionally codified list of sense qualities, such as color, odor, texture, etc., divorced from the funded meanings of past experience. It is not only the sensible qualities present in the physical media the artist uses, but the wealth of meaning that attaches to these qualities, that constitute the material that is refined and unified in the process of artistic expression. The artist concentrates, clarifies, and vivifies these meanings in the artwork. The unifying element in this process is emotion--not the emotion of raw passion and outburst, but emotion that is reflected upon and used as a guide to the overall character of the artwork. Although Dewey insisted that emotion is not the significant content of the work of art, he clearly understands it to be the crucial tool of the artist's creative activity.

Dewey repeatedly returns in *Art as Experience* to a familiar theme of his critical reflections upon the history of ideas, namely that a distinction too strongly drawn too often sacrifices accuracy of account for a misguided simplicity. Two applications of this theme are worth mentioning here. Dewey rejects the sharp distinction often made in aesthetics between the matter and the form of an artwork. What Dewey objected to was the implicit suggestion that matter and form stand side by side, as it were, in the artwork as distinct and precisely distinguishable elements. For Dewey, form is better understood in a dynamic sense as the coordination and adjustment of the qualities and associated meanings that are integrated within the artwork.

A second misguided distinction that Dewey rejects is that between the artist as the active creator and the audience as the passive recipient of art. This distinction artificially truncates the artistic process by in effect suggesting that the process ends with the final artifact of the artist's creativity. Dewey argues that, to the contrary, the process is barren without the agency of the appreciator, whose active assimilation of the artist's work requires a recapitulation of many of the same processes of discrimination, comparison, and integration that are present in the artist's initial work, but now guided by the artist's perception and skill. Dewey underscores the point by distinguishing between the "art product," the painting, sculpture, etc., created by the artist, and the "work of art" proper, which is only realized through the active engagement of an astute audience.

Ever concerned with the interrelationships between the various domains of human activity and

concern, Dewey ends *Art as Experience* with a chapter devoted to the social implications of the arts. Art is a product of culture, and it is through art that the people of a given culture express the significance of their lives, as well as their hopes and ideals. Because art has its roots in the consummatory values experienced in the course of human life, its values have an affinity to commonplace values, an affinity that accords to art a critical office in relation to prevailing social conditions. Insofar as the possibility for a meaningful and satisfying life disclosed in the values embodied in art are not realized in the lives of the members of a society, the social relationships that preclude this realization are condemned. Dewey's specific target in this chapter was the conditions of workers in industrialized society, conditions which force upon the worker the performance of repetitive tasks that are devoid of personal interest and afford no satisfaction in personal accomplishment. The degree to which this critical function of art is ignored is a further indication of what Dewey regarded as the unfortunate distancing of the arts from the common pursuits and interests of ordinary life. The realization of art's social function requires the closure of this bifurcation.

Critical Reception and Influence

Dewey's philosophical work received varied responses from his philosophical colleagues during his lifetime. There were many philosophers who saw his work, as Dewey himself understood it, as a genuine attempt to apply the principles of an empirical naturalism to the perennial questions of philosophy, providing a beneficial clarification of issues and the concepts used to address them. Dewey's critics, however, often expressed the opinion that his views were more confusing than clarifying, and that they appeared to be more akin to idealism than the scientifically based naturalism Dewey expressly avowed. Notable in this connection are Dewey's disputes concerning the relation of the knowing subject to known objects with the realists Bertrand Russell, A. O. Lovejoy, and Evander Bradley McGilvery. Whereas these philosophers argued that the object of knowledge must be understood as existing apart from the knowing subject, setting the truth conditions for propositions, Dewey defended the view that things understood as isolated from any relationship with the human organism could not be objects of knowledge at all.

Dewey was sensitive and responsive to the criticisms brought against his views. He often attributed them to misinterpretations based on the traditional, philosophical connotations that some of his readers would attach to his terminology. This was clearly a fair assessment with respect to some of his critics. To take one example, Dewey used the term "experience," found throughout his philosophical writings, to denote the broad context of the human organism's interrelationship with its environment, not the domain of human thought alone, as some of his critics read him to mean. Dewey's concern for clarity of expression motivated efforts in his later writings to revise his terminology. Thus, for example, he later substituted "transaction" for his earlier "interaction" to denote the relationship between organism and environment, since the former better suggested a dynamic interdependence between the two, and in a new introduction to *Experience and Nature,* never published during his lifetime, he offered the term "culture" as an alternative to "experience." Late in his career he attempted a more sweeping revision of philosophical terminology in *Knowing and the Known,* written in collaboration with Arthur F. Bentley.

The influence of Dewey's work, along with that of the pragmatic school of thought itself, although

considerable in the first few decades of the twentieth century, was gradually eclipsed during the middle part of the century as other philosophical methods, such as those of the analytic school in England and America and phenomenology in continental Europe, grew to ascendency. Recent trends in philosophy, however, leading to the dissolution of these rigid paradigms, have led to approaches that continue and expand on the themes of Dewey's work. W. V. O. Quine's project of naturalizing epistemology works upon naturalistic presumptions anticipated in Dewey's own naturalistic theory of inquiry. The social dimension and function of belief systems, explored by Dewey and other pragmatists, has received renewed attention by such writers as Richard Rorty and Jrgen Habermas. American phenomenologists such as Sandra Rosenthal and James Edie have considered the affinities of phenomenology and pragmatism. The renewed openness and pluralism of recent philosophical discussion has meant a renewed interest in Dewey's philosophy, an interest that promises to continue for some time to come.

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Richard Field

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Denis Diderot (1713-1784)

Denis Diderot was the most prominent of the French Encyclopedists. He was educated by the Jesuits, and, refusing to enter one of the learned professions, was turned adrift by his father and came to Paris, where he lived from hand to mouth for a time. Gradually, however, he became recognized as one of the most powerful writers of the day. His first independent work was the *Essai sur le merite et la vertu* (1745). As one of the editors of the *Dictionnaire de medecine* (6 vols., Paris, 1746), he gained valuable experience in encyclopedic system. His *Pensees philosophiques* (The Hague, 1746), in which he attacked both atheism and the received Christianity, was burned by order of the Parliament of Paris.

In the circle of the leaders of the Enlightenment, Diderot's name became known especially by his *Lettre sur les aveugles* (London, 1749), which supported Locke's theory of knowledge. He attacked the conventional morality of the day, with the result (to which possibly an allusion to the mistress of a minister contributed) that he was imprisoned at Vincennes for three months. He was released by the influence of Voltaire's friend Mme. du Chatelet, and thenceforth was in close relation with the leaders of revolutionary thought. He had made very little pecuniary profit out of the *Encyclopedie*, and Grimm appealed on his behalf to Catherine of Russia, who in 1765 bought his library, allowing him the use of the books as long as he lived, and assigning him a yearly salary which a little later she paid him for fifty years in advance.

In 1773 she summoned him to St. Petersburg with Grimm to converse with him in person. On his return he lived until his death in a house provided by her, in comparative retirement but in unceasing labor on the undertakings of his party, writing (according to Grimm) two-thirds of Raynal's famous *Histoire philosophique*, and contributing some of the most rhetorical pages to Helvetius's De l'esprit and Holbach's *Systeme de la nature Systeme social*, and *Alorale universelle*. His numerous writings include the most varied forms of literary effort, from inept licentious tales and comedies which pointed away from the stiff classical style of the French drama and strongly influenced Lessing, to the most daring ethical and metaphysical speculations. Like his famous contemporary Samuel Johnson, he is said to have been more effective as a talker than as a writer; and his mental qualifications were rather those of a stimulating force than of a reasoned philosopher. His position gradually changed from theism to deism, then to materialism, and finally rested in a pantheistic sensualism In Sainte-Beuve's phrase, he was " the first great writer who belonged wholly and undividedly to modern democratic society," and his attacks on the political system of France were among the most potent causes of tile Revolution.

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Diogenes Laertius (3rd cn. CE.)

Diogenes Laertius, native of Laerte in Cilicia, was a biographer of ancient Greek philosophers. His *Lives of the Philosophers* (*Philosophoi Biol*), in ten books, is still extant an is an important source of information on the development of Greek philosophy. The period when he lived is not exactly known, but it is supposed to have been during the reigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla. Diogenes is thought to have belonged to the Epicurean School. He divides all the Greek philosophers into two classes: those of the Ionic and those of the Italic school. He derives the first from Anaximander, the second from Pythagoras. After Socrates, he divides the Ionian philosophers into three branches: (a) Plato and the Academics, down to Clitomachus; (b) the Cynics, down to Chrysippus; (c) Aristotle and Theophrastus. The series of Italic philosophers consists, after Pythagoras, of the following: Telanges, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Leucippus, Democritus, and others down to Epicurus. The first seven books are devoted to the Ionic philosophers; the last three treat of the Italic school.

The work of Diogenes is a crude contribution towards the history of philosophy. It contains a brief account of the lives, doctrines, and sayings of most persons who have been called philosophers; and though the author is limited in his philosophical abilities and assessment of the various schools, the book is valuable as a collection of facts, which we could not have learned form any other source, and is entertaining as a sort of *pot-pourri* on the subject. The article on Epicurus is especially valuable, as containing some original letters of that philosopher, which comprise a summary of the Epicurean doctrines.

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Diogenes of Apollonia (6th cn. BCE.)

Diogenes was a native of Apollonia in Crete, who was a pupil of Anaximenes and contemporary with Anaxagoras. Schleiermecher, however, affirms, from the internal evidence of the fragments of the two philosophers, that Diogenes preceded Anaxagoras. But Diogenes might have written before Anaxagoras and yet have been his junior, as we know was the case with Empedocles. Diogenes followed Anaximines in making air the primal element of all things; but he carried his views further, and regarded the universe as issuing from an intelligent principle, by which it was at once vivified and ordered, a rational as well as sensitive soul, but still without recognizing any distinction between matter and mind. Diogenes wrote several books on Cosmology *Peri Phuseos*.

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Diogenes of Sinope (4th cn. BCE.)

Diogenes was a Cynic philosopher of Sinope. His father, Icesias, a banker, was convicted of debasing the public coin, and was obliged to leave the country; or, according to another account, his father and himself were charged with this offense, and the former was thrown into prison, while the son escaped and went to Athens. Here he attached himself, as a disciple, to Antisthenes, who was at the head of the Cynics. Antisthenes at first refused to admit him into his house and even struck him with a stick. Diogenes calmly bore the rebuke and said, "Strike me, Antisthenes, but you will never find a stick sufficiently hard to remove me from your presence, while you speak anything worth hearing." The philosopher was so much pleased with this reply that he at once admitted him among his scholars. Diogenes fully adopted the principles and character of his master. Renouncing every other object of ambition, he distinguished himself by his contempt of riches and honors and by his invectives against luxury. He wore a coarse cloak, carried a wallet and a staff, made the porticoes and other public places his habitation, and depended upon casual contributions for his daily bread. He asked a friend to procure him a cell to live in; when there was a delay, he took up abode in a *pithos*, or large tub, in the Metroum. It is probable, however, that this was only a temporary expression of indignation and contempt, and that he did not make it the settled place of his residence. This famous "tub" is indeed celebrated by Juvenal; it is also ridiculed by Lucian and mentioned by Seneca. But no notice is taken of this by other ancient writers who have mentioned this philosopher.

It cannot be doubted, however, that Diogenes practiced self-control and a most rigid abstinence -- exposing himself to the utmost extremes of heat and cold and living upon the simplest diet, casually supplied by the hand of charity. In his old age, sailing to Aegina, he was taken by pirates and carried to Crete, where he was exposed to sale in the public market. When the auctioneer asked him what he could do, he said, "I can govern men; therefore sell me to one who wants a master." Xeniades, a wealthy Corinthian, happening at that instant to pass by, was struck with the singularity of his reply and purchased him. On their arrival at Corinth, Xeniades gave him his freedom and committed to him the education of his children and the direction of his domestic concerns. Diogenes executed this trust with so much judgment and fidelity that Xeniades used to say that the gods had sent a good genius to his house.

During his residence at Corinth, an interview between him and Alexander is said to have taken place. Plutarch relates that Alexander, when at Corinth, receiving the congratulations of all ranks on being appointed to command the army of the Greeks against the Persians, missed Diogenes among the number, with whose character he was acquainted. Curious to see the one who exhibited such haughty independence of spirit, Alexander went in search of him and found him sitting in his tub in the sun. "I am Alexander the Great," said the monarch. "And I am Diogenes the Cynic," replied the philosopher. Alexander then requested that he would inform him what service he could render him. "Stand from between me and the sun," said the Cynic. Alexander, struck with the reply, said to his friends, who were ridiculing the whimsical singularity of the philosopher, "If I

were not Alexander, I should wish to be Diogenes." This story is too good to be omitted, but there are several circumstances which in some degree diminish its credibility. It supposes Diogenes to have lived in his tub at Corinth, whereas it is certain that he lived there in the house of Xeniades, and that, if he had ever dwelt in a tub, he left it behind him at Athens. Alexander, moreover, was at this time scarcely twenty years old, and could not call himself Alexander the Great, for he did not receive this title till his Persian and Indian expedition, after which he never returned to Greece; yet the whole transaction represents him as elated with the pride of conquest. Diogenes probably was visited by Alexander, when the latter held the general assembly of the Greeks at Corinth, and was received by him with rudeness and incivility, which may have given rise to the whole story. The philosopher at this time would have been about seventy years of age.

Various accounts are given concerning the manner and time of his death. It seems most probable that he died at Corinth, of mere decay, in the ninetieth year of his age and in the 114th Olympiad. A column of Parian marble, terminating in the figure of a dog, was raised over his tomb. His fellow-townsmen of Sinope also erected brazen statues in memory of the philosopher. Diogenes left behind him no system of philosophy. After the example of his school, he was more attentive to practical than to theoretical wisdom.

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Divine Command Theory

The divine command theory is the view that moral actions are those which conform to God's will. Charity, for example, is morally proper because God endorses it, and murder is wrong because God condemns it. There are both normative and metaethical versions of this theory. The normative version is proposes a test for determining whether any action is right or wrong: if it conforms to God's will, it is morally permissible, if it does not, then it is impermissible. As a normative theory, the divine command theory is difficult to maintain given the epistemological problems of accessing the will of God. The metaethical version simply makes the factual claim that God's will is the foundation of morality. Here, the content of God's will does not have to be explored.

As a metaethical theory, there are three ways that the divine command theory can be understood. The weakest version claims only that, within certain religious communities, the meaning of the statement, "charity is good," is that God wills us to be charitable. This version has only limited implications. Although it may represent the views of a particular religious group, it has no bearing on what those outside that group mean by the statement "charity is good." A stronger version of the divine command theory concedes that charity is morally good in and of itself, but that God's will provides us with the motivation to be charitable. On this view, only the religious believer has the motivation to be moral. Theoretically, unbelievers could also act morally, but it would only be by accident since unbelievers would lack the motivation for consistent moral behavior. The strongest version of the divine command theory states that morality is a creation of God's will. According to this view, charity is good because God has willed that charity is good. The claim here is not about what particular communities mean by the word "good" or what motivations people have to be good. Instead, the claim is that moral conduct is identical to the conduct which God commands of us. This final version of the divine command theory is the most controversial, and has been criticized from several angles.

GENERAL CRITICISMS. During the Enlightenment, the divine command theory fell under attack from two distinct camps. One group argued that moral standards, like mathematical truths, are eternal and fixed in the nature of universe. Philosophers such as Samuel Clarke argued that moral values can be intuitively perceived and, again, like mathematical truths, can be understood by any rational being. Since God is a rational being, then God, too, endorses these eternal standards of morality. However, God's mere acceptance of moral standards in no way creates them, and in that sense is no different than a human's acceptance of moral standards. A second group argued that moral standards are fundamentally human-based, and are neither fixed in the nature of the universe, nor in the will of God. For example, Thomas Hobbes argued that moral standards are necessary human conventions which keep us out of a perpetual state of war. Others, such as Hume and Mill, argued that they are based on human instinct. In either case, God's will is irrelevant to ethical standards.

A more recent times, the divine command theory has been attacked on two principle grounds.

First, if morality is a dictate of God's will, then it is conceivable that God could choose to reverse the present state of morality and thus make evil actions moral. That is, God could make murder or stealing morally permissible if he chose. The theologian's reply to this possibility is that God would not reverse the moral standards he has created since God himself is infinitely good, and God would not will anything which is contrary to his own good nature. This reply, however, leads to the second problem with the divine command theory. If moral goodness is merely a creation of God's will, then the phrase "God is good" becomes meaningless. For, by definition, "God is good" would simply mean that God's nature is in accord with what he wills. Since there are no pre-existing moral restrictions to what God can will, then even if God was malicious, he would be good. Clearly, this makes nonsense of the notion of goodness.

QUINN'S DEFENSE. There has recently been a revived interest in divine command theory, particularly defending it against criticisms which have accumulated over the decades. In his essay, "The primacy of God's Will in Christian Ethics," Philip Quinn goes on the offensive and presents three arguments for why the divine command theory should be accepted by traditional theistic. Quinn concedes that his arguments will not carry weight for those outside the theistic traditions. Nevertheless, his arguments show the reasons which might incline a theist to adopt the divine command theory. Quinn's first argument is derived from what has been called the "immoralities of the patriarchs." In the Hebrew Bible, several of the Hebrew patriarchs are presented as committing seemingly immoral acts at God's command. Following the lead of medieval theologians, Quinn argues that these stories illustrate that moral standards are indeed creations of God. In these cases, God is temporarily revoking previously established moral standards for special purposes.

Quinn's second argument is distinctly Christian and draws from Jesus' command that we should love everyone. For Quinn, this is not merely an endorsement of a pre-existing standard of morality, since it is contrary to human nature to love everyone. It is in fact a new standard which was created by God's pronouncement. Quinn's third argument derives from the notion of divine sovereignty. Traditional theism holds that God is sovereign and in complete control of the universe. If this is so, then it seems that God is in control of moral standards, and, thus, the creator of moral standards. A problem occurs, though, when determining how far God's control extends. Michael Loux, for example, argues that God is absolutely sovereign and that if God happened to believe unconditionally that 2+2=3, then that would make 2+2=3. Quinn argues that this interpretation leads to absurd conclusions, and is therefore unacceptable. Nevertheless, the theist should accept as strong a version of sovereignty as possible (barring absurdity). A more narrow and more acceptable version of sovereignty is one where God is in control over moral standards, but not over math or logic. This bypasses the absurdities of absolute sovereignty. On this more narrow view, if God unconditionally believes specific moral standards, then this makes them so. Given that there is a connection between what God believes and what God wills, then this narrow version of sovereignty entails that moral standards are creations of God's will.

NIELSEN'S CRITICISMS. In "God and the Basis of Morality," Kai Nielsen presents several arguments showing that morality is not at all founded on the commands of God. Nielsen begins by presenting the classic dilemma of theological morality, as appears in Plato's dialog, The Euthyphro. Plato argues that there are two ways to see the relation between God and morality: (1) God creates the standards of morality, or (2) God himself is subject to standards of morality which are independent of him. Traditionally, each of these options are seen to have unfavorable consequences. If God creates morality, then God could make murder or stealing morally

permissible if he chose. If, on the other hand, God is subject to external standards of morality, then he loses some of his greatness. Nielsen presents six arguments which show that the second of these two options is by far the most preferable.

Nielsen's first argument is that merely commanding something does not make it moral. For example, if professor Jones commands her students to by a book, this does not make it morally right to buy that book. Nielsen begins his second argument noting that defenders of divine command theory often say that we are to find God's moral commands in scripture. But, according to Nielsen, this requires a prior conception of morality to judge that a certain text is indeed revelation. And this prior conception of morality must be independent of God and God's revelation. Third, it does not help the divine command theory to argue that the statement "God is good" is true by definition (the same way that "wives are women" is true by definition). For, the terms "God" and "good" are not identical, and to understand that statement we need a prior understanding of moral goodness which is independent of God. The same problems occur when we stipulate that the statement "God is absolute goodness" is true by definition. Fourth, the believer's choice to worship God indicates that the believer is using an independent standard of goodness by which she deems God worthy of worship. This also applies if the believer claims through faith alone that she believes God is worthy of worship. According to Nielsen, the believer's actual behavior shows that she is in fact appealing to an independent standard of goodness.

Nielsen's fifth criticism is an attack on the argument from divine sovereignty. The believer will argue that God created everything which exists, and this includes moral standards. But, according to Nielsen, it is logically impossible for God to create morality. For, technically, morality does not involve what exists (or is the case) but only what ought to be the case. Suppose, for example, that the universe was completely empty of any existing thing except yourself. You could still talk conditionally about what should or should not be done if someone was starving or drowning. Finally, Nielsen argues that the burden of proof is on the divine command theorist to show that there can be no morality if God does not exist. And this the believer cannot do. The believer may argue that a world without God is lonely, full of despair, without purpose, and without hope of immortality. Nielsen counters that life would still have particular purposes, such as the joys of music, and that life after death is only a myth which should be rejected in any event.

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Dualism

The term "Dualism" was originally coined by Thomas Hyde around the beginning of the eighteenth century. As a metaphysical theory, dualism states that the world is made up of two elemental categories which are incommensurable. This includes distinctions between mind and body, good and evil, universal and particular, and phenomena and noumena. Dualism contends you must have both of the two components in question, rather than one or the other. In contrast to dualism two other philosophical positions concerned with the number of substances: monism and pluralism. Monism is the view that there is one elemental whereas pluralism maintains that there are many things which constitute the world.

A major problem faced by dualists is the inability to resolve the rift created between the two opposing elements. Typically the motivation for resolving conflicts between these two realms is to make the world more understandable. For instance, how is the interaction between mind and body explained? Descartes, for example, claimed that the pineal gland is the point of contact between the bodily and spiritual realm. The inability to rectify these two realms has inclined some to adopt monism. Science, for example, offers a monistic account of reality (physicalism) which eliminates the mental altogether. removes any problems of relatedness between mind and body by eliminating the spritual all together. Mental events are reduced to brain states, thus leaving only the bodily realm, thus monism.

Attempts have also been made to resolve the tension within mind/body dualism rather than eliminate either of the two components. Parallelism contends that the mind and body interact independently of one another. Thus having separate existences, they have no causal connection and have no interaction. Epiphenomenalism contends there is only a one-way causal connection from the body to the mind, but none from the mind to the body. Consciousness is just a byproduct of the body, much like smoke from a steam engine train.

Ryle and Smart try to minimize the mind/body gap by reducing long-term mental events, such as beliefs, to behavior, thus leaving only short-term mental events, such as pain. Others attempt to salvage dualist theories by switching elements within the mind or body. Rorty resolves the mind/body dualist problem by pointing out that it is only a conflict about privileged access (i.e., the mind part) vs. public access (i.e., the body part). The only gap we have from this distinction is epistemological rather than ontological. For Rorty we cannot know anything more than this simple distinction.

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Duties and Deontological Ethics

A duty is a moral obligation that an agent has towards another person, such as the duty not to lie. Etymologically, duties are actions that are *due* to someone else, such as paying money that one owes to a creditor. In a broader sense, duties are simply actions that are morally manditory. Medieval philosophers such as Aquinas argued that we have specific duties or obligations to avoid committing specific sins. Since sins such as theft are absolute, then our duty to avoid stealing is also absolute, irrespective of any good consequences that might arise from particular acts of theft. From the 17th to the 19th centuries, many philosophers held the normative theory that moral conduct is that which follows a specific list of duties. These theories are also called *deontological* theories, from the Greek word *deon*, or duty, since they emphasize foundational duties or obligations. We find one of the first clear indications of this view in *The Law of War and Peace* (1625) by Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). For Grotius, our ultimate duties are fixed features of the universe, which even God cannot change, and comprise the chief obligations of natural law. Some moral theorists at the time based their list of duties on traditional lists of virtues.

TRADITIONAL DUTY THEORY. In *On the Law of Nature and of Nations* (1672), German philosopher Samual Pufendorf (1632-1694) refined three particular components of duty theory. First, Pufendorf adopts a position that scholars now call "the correlativity of rights and duties." On this view, every right that I have implies a duty on your part to respect my right. For example, if I have a right to own my car, then you have a duty not to steal my car. From a moral standpoint, Pufendorf believed that duties were more important than rights. Second, Pufendorf distinguished between perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties are obligations that are precisely defined, and dictate our proper conduct everywhere at all times, such as the duty not to steal. Imperfect duties, by contrast, such as the duty to be charitable, are not fixed, but open as to when and how we perform this duty. Third, Pufendorf provided a detailed categorization of all duties into three main groups: duties to God, duties to oneself, and duties to others. In the selection below, from The Duty of Man and Citizen (1673), Pufendorf argues that duties to others are the most foundational of the three, since this most immediately follows the mandate of natural law that we are to be sociable. Concerning our duties towards God, he argues that there are two kinds: (1) a theoretical duty to know the existence and nature of God, and (2) a practical duty to both inwardly and outwardly worship God. Concerning our duties towards oneself, these are also of two sorts: (1) duties of the soul, which involve developing one's skills and talents, and (2) duties of the body, which involve not harming our bodies such as through gluttony or drunkenness, and not killing oneself. Concerning our duties towards others, Pufendorf divides these between absolute duties, which are universally binding on people, and conditional duties, which are the result of contracts between people. Absolute duties are of three sorts: (1) avoid wronging others; (2) treat people as equals, and (3) promote the good of others. Conditional duties are far reaching and involve every aspect of social contracts and agreements. The first of these is to keep one's promises.

Pufendorf's division of moral duties quickly became a standard tool among moral theoriests for determining moral conduct. For example, Hume opens his essay "On Suicide" with the statement that "If

suicide be criminal, it must be a transgression of our duty either to God, our neighbour, or ourselves." German philosophers, such as Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and Alexander Gottleib Baumgarten (1714-1762), followed Pufendorf's key distinctions. Philosophers at this time also distinguished between direct duties and indirect duties. For example, I have a direct duty to show you respect, since you are immediately entitled to respect. By contrast, I have only an indirect duty to be respectful to the bodies of dead people; the dead person himself has no immediate entitlement to respect, but acting disrespectfully towards a corpse will negatively impact the living relatives of the dead person.

Problems with Traditional Duty Theory. One problem with traditional duty-based ethics involves the list of prescribed duties. What was self-evident in the 17th and 18th centuries seems less self-evident today. The existence and nature of God are more widely questioned now, hence it is speculation to claim that we have a set of duties toward God. Advocates of personal liberty question the traditional duties to ourselves. For example, the right to suicide is now widely defended, and the right to self-rule implies that I can let my faculties and abilities deteriorate if I so choose. Finally, many of the traditional duties to others have also been under fire. Defenders of personal liberty question our duties of benevolence, such as charity, and political duties, such as public spirit. For some, the traditional list of self-evident duties needs to be reduced to one: the duty to not harm others.

Another problem with traditional duty theory is that there is no clear procedure for resolving conflicts between duties. Suppose I am placed in a situation where I must choose between feeding myself to avoid starvation, or feeding my neighbor to keep her from starving. Consequentialist theories provide a clear formula for resolving this conflict: the morally correct choice is the one which produces the greatest benefit (either to myself, or to society at large). Traditional duty theory, by contrast, does not offer a procedure for determining which obligation is primary. Without such a procedure, it is inadequate in its present form.

KANT AND ROSS. German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) draws on duty theory both in his early *Lectures on Ethics* (1780), and also in his later and more systematic ethical writings: *The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1798). In many of these ethical writings, Kant adopts the distinction between perfect/imperfect duties and direct/indirect duties. He also endorses the distinction between duties to oneself and duties to others, although he sees the traditional duties to God as more of a matter natural religion and less of a matter ethics. Kant further refines the notion of duty by arguing that moral actions are ultimately based on a single, "supreme principle of morality" which is objective, rational, and freely chosen: the categorical imperative. Although the categorical imperative is a single principle, Kant gives four formulations of it:

- The Formula of the Law of Nature: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature."
- The Formula of the End Itself: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."
- The Formula of Autonomy: "So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxims."
- The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: "So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends."

In the 19th century, Pufendorf's traditional view of duties fell into decline. German philosophers

followed Kant, and British philosophers gravitated towards utilitarianism, which offered a completely different account of the nature of moral obligation. The last serious attempt to revive duty-based ethics is W.D. Ross's *The Right and the Good* (1930). Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts, Ross argues that our duties are "part of the fundamental nature of the universe." Accordingly, Ross falls into the deontological (or nonconsequentialist) camp of ethicists. Ross believes that when we reflect on our actual moral convictions they reveal the following set of duties:

- Fidelity: the duty to keep promises
- Reparation: the duty to compensate others when we harm them
- Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us
- Justice: the duty to recognize merit
- Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions of others
- Self-improvement: the duty to improve our virtue and intelligence
- Nonmaleficence: the duty to not injure others

Although some of these duties are the same as those of traditional duty-based ethics, such as beneficence and self-improvement, Ross does not include duties to God, self-preservation, or political duties. By appealing to our actual moral convictions, Ross attempts to address the problem of including principles that are not duties by our standards today. This list is not complete, Ross argues, but he believes that at least some of these are self-evidently true.

He also addresses the problem of choosing between conflicting moral duties. For Ross, the above duties are prima facie (Latin for first appearance) insofar as we are under obligation unless a stronger duty shows up. If I am torn between two conflicting actions, such as preventing myself from starving or a neighbor from starving, I am under obligation to follow only the strongest of the two duties. Ross argues that there is no obvious priority among the principles, hence it will not necessarily be clear which is the stronger duty. To choose between conflicting duties, we must use our own insight on a case by case basis. For critics, the weakness in Ross's theory is that it rests too heavily on spontaneous moral intuition. We are given neither a definitive list of duties, nor a clear procedure for prioritizing our duties. Thus, only an immediate moral intuition will tell us both our possible duties and our primary obligation in the situation at hand.

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Glossary of Terms in Eastern Philosophy

Amida: The most famous of the Celestial Buddhas in Mahayana Buddhism, who instituted a heavenly Buddha-Land called the Pure Land.

Analects (*Lun Yu*): Literally "digested conversations," the most reliable of all collections of Confucius's teachings, and one of the Four Books (*shu*) of Confucianism; the principal themes include humanity (*jen*), social custom (*li*), the superior person (*chun-tzu*), filial obedience (*hsiao*), the rectification of names (*cheng ming*), and good government.

Arhat: Literally "the worthy," Theravada Buddhist term referring to the ideal Buddhist who devotes himself full time to his individual achievement of nirvana.

Aryan: Light skinned migrating people, perhaps from Europe, who settled in India around 1500 BCE and instituted Vedic Hinduism.

Asoka: 3rd century king of India's Mauryan Dynasty who converted to Buddhism and helped its advance.

Asvaghosa: (1) 2nd century CE author of the *Life of Buddha* (*Buddhacarita*); (2) 5th century CE author of the *Awakening of Faith* (*Sraddhotpada-sastra*).

Atman-Brhaman: The notion of the Self-God in Brahmanic and Vedanta Hinduism which maintains that our true inner self is identical to the all pervasive God.

Awakening of Faith (*Sraddhotpada-sastra*): Mahayana Buddhist text of the 5th or 6th centuries CE by an otherwise unknown figure named Asvaghosha; the work which emphasizes ultimate reality as suchness (*tathata*).

Bhagavad Gita: Literally song of God, short philosophical dialog within the Hindu Mahabharata epic which discusses the Atman-Brahman and the ways of achieving liberation.

Bhagavata Purana: Most famous of the 18 major Puranas of Bhakti Hinduism; focusing on Krishna/Vishnu, the work synthesizes various Hindu traditions and presents a theistic version of monistic Vedanta.

Bhakti Hinduism: Devotional movement within Hinduism beginning around 300 CE which emphasizes the gods of the Trimurti.

Bodhisattva: Literally "enlightened being", ideal saint in Mahayana Buddhism who postpones his own enlightenment to assist others on their spiritual journey.

Brahma: Creator God of the Trimurti in Bhakti Hinduism.

Brahman: Hindu notion of the all-pervasive God who is identical to the self within us, especially as described in the *Upanishads* and Vedanta.

brahman: The notion of sacrificial power in Vedic Hinduism which was controlled by priests.

Brahmanism: Reform movement within Hinduism from 1000 BCE to 300 CE which de-emphasizes priestly sacrificial rites and emphasizes the notion of the Atman-Brahman (Self-God).

Brahmin: Priestly caste of people in Hinduism's caste system.

Buddha: literally "englightened one," Buddhist term which variously refers to Gautama Siddhartha, or any enlightened person. In Mahayana Buddhism the term may denote, an enlightened person who is a step higher than the Bodhisattva, a celestial Buddha, or ultimate reality itself.

Buddhaghosa: fourth century CE Buddhist philosopher and author of *The Path of Purity* (*Visuddhimagga*), among the most important texts in Theravada Buddhism written after the Pali Canon.

Buddha-Lands: In Mahayana Buddhism, heavenly realms instituted by Celestial Buddhas to which the devoted go after death; the most famous Pure Land is that of the Amida.

Buddha-Nature (*buddhata*): In Mahayana Buddhism, undifferientiated absolute existence behind all appearances, functionally the same as nirvana, emptiness, suchness, and the Eternal Buddha.

Buddhi: "Intellect"; in Samkya Hinduism *buddhi* is the first and most important manifestation of *prakriti* (physical nature).

Buddhism: Religion founded in India by Gautama Siddhartha (563-483 BCE) which stresses the four noble truths; Buddhism's main two main divisions are the Theravada and Mahayana schools.

Caste System (*jati*): Hereditary and hierarchical structuring of social groups within Hinduism traditionally including four castes (*varnas*): Priests (Brahmins), warriors (Ksatriyas), artisans (*Vaisyas*), and servants (*Sudras*).

Celestial Bodhisattva (*mahasattvas*): In Mahayana Buddhism, a heavenly or god-like Bodhisattva, similar to (and perhaps one step under) the Celestial Buddhas, the most famous of which is Avalokitesvara; showing devotion to Celestial Bodhisattvas results in them assisting us in our quest for enlightenment.

Celestial Buddha (*sambhogakaya*): in Mahayana Buddhism's Triple Body (*trikaya*) theory, these are heavenly or god-like Buddhas, the most famous of which is Amita; by showing devotion to Celestial Buddhas they assist us in our quest for enlightenment.

Celestial Masters: Sect of Religious Taoism formed by Chang Tao Ling in the 2nd century CE which holds that divine rulers reward and punish us based on our good and evil actions.

Ch'an: School of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism (Zen in Japan), founded by a legendary figure named Bodhidharma (470-543 CE), the key philosophical text of which is the *Platform Sutra* of Hui-neng; all sub-schools of Ch'an emphasize experience over doctrine, and the practice of seated meditation. The Rinsai school also emphasizes the koan system.

Ch'i: literally "breath," important philosophical term of varied meaning throughout Chinese history;

early Chinese writings see it as a physiological principle of vital energy, whereas Neo-Confucian writers such as Chu Hsi see it as a metaphysical principal of material force in contrast with structural form (*li*).

Chou Tun-i (1017-1073): Founder of Neo-Confucianism whose short work *Explanation on the Diagram of the Great Ultimate* describes how all things emerged from the Great Ultimate by means of its yang activity and yin inactivity.

Chu Hsi (1130-1200): Most influential Neo-Confucian philosopher whose interpretation of Confucianism became the standard view until the 20th century; for Chu, the "investigation of things" involves knowledge of the structural form (*li*) of the universe, as distinct from the material force of the universt (*ch'i*).

Chuang-Tzu (369-286 BCE): Second of the great Taoist philosophers, attributed with composing the first portion of the text titled the *Chuang-Tzu*; using colorful stories, the text describes the notions of the Tao, non-action, non-mind, transformation, and freedom artificial social constraints.

Citta: "Ordinary consciousness" in Hindu Yoga, as contrasted with *purusha* (our inner transcendent self).

Confucianism: Religious and philosophical system of China based on the teachings of Confucius which emphasizes social values such as filial obedience, custom, and governing by way of example.

Confucius (551-479 BCE): Latinized name for Kung Fu-tzu, Chinese founder of Confucianism whose sayings are preserved in the *Analects*.

Darsanas: Formal systems of emancipation in Hinduism from the 7th century CE and on; the six traditional schools are, Samkya, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Yoga, and Vedanta.

Dependent Origin (*paticca-samuppada*): Buddhist doctrine that everything that occurs in the world is the result of prior causes. All mental events, appearances, and external events arise from previous events. The various causal chains culminate in suffering (*dukkha*). Only nirvana is not subject to such causal interactions.

Desire (*tanha, trishna*): Second noble truth of Buddhism which designates that suffering results from craving sensory and mental objects.

Devi Bhagavata Purana: Composed around the 15th century, one of the major *Puranas* of Bhakti Hinduism which focuses on the Goddess Devi, they mythological wife of Shiva; the text is central to proponents of Shaktsm

Dharma: in Hinduism, social duty including the caste system and four stages of life (*asramana*). In Buddhism, *dharma* refers to the teachings of Buddha.

Dharmasastras: "Law books" in Hinduism such as the *Law of Manu* which mandate social duties (*dharma*).

Divination: An attempt to understand communication from the dead by means of various signs; the *I Ching*, one of the Five Classics of Confucianism, is the most noted of these in popular Chinese belief systems.

Doctrine of the Mean (*Chung Yung*): philosophical section from the *Book of Rites* which advocates

maintaining a mental state of equilibrium between extreme emotions; it is one of the Four Books (*shu*) of Confucianism.

Dravidian: Original dark skinned inhabitants of India's Indus Valley civilization from 3500-1500 BCE.

Eightfold Path: Fourth noble truth of Buddhism, also called the "middle path," which includes proper cultivation of the following: views, aims, speech, conduct, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and contemplation.

Emptiness (*sunyata*): Central notion in Mahayana Buddhism that ultimate reality is not discoverable; the term is functionally the same as nirvana, Buddha-nature, suchness, and the Eternal Buddha.

Eternal Buddha (*dharmakaya*): In Mahayana Buddhism's Triple Body (*trikaya*) theory, the Eternal Buddha is undifferientiated absolute existence behind all appearances, and functionally the same as nirvana, emptiness, Buddha-nature, and suchness.

Filial Obedience (*hsiao*): Central Confucian concept designating respect for elders.

Five Classics (*ching*): 12th century CE designation for five early Chinese classical texts which were purportedly compiled by Confucius; they are The *Book of Changes* (*I Ching*), *Book of History* (*Shu Ching*), *Book of Poetry* (*Shih Ching*), *Record of Rites* (*Li Chi*), *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Ch'un Ch'iu*).

Five Elements (*wu-hsing*): Five principal substances in Chinese thought, which are wood, fire, earth, metal, and water.

Five Relationships: Traditional Confucian superior-subordinate social relationships between (1) father and son, (2) elder brother and younger brother, (3) husband and wife, (4) elder friend and junior friend, and (5) ruler and subject.

Four Books (*shu*): 12th century CE designation for four early Confucian philosophical writings; they are the *The Analects* (*Lun Yu*), (2) *The Great Learning* (*Ta Hsueh*), *The Doctrine of the Mean* (*Chung Yung*), *The Mencius* (*Meng-tzu*).

Four Goals of Life (*purusharthas*): Ideal aims of life in Hindu social duty (dharma), including pleasure (*kama*), success (*artha*), right conduct (*dharma*), and liberation (*moksha*).

Four Noble Truths: central doctrine of Buddhism which contends that (1) life is suffering, (2) suffering comes from desire, (3) extinguishing desire (nirvana) ends suffering, and (4) desire is extinguished through the eightfold path (or the middle way).

Four Stages of Life (*asramana*): Hindu social duty (*dharma*) designating four ideal life stages: student (*brahmacarin*), householder (*grihashta*), forest dweller (*vanaprastha*), and ascetic (sannysin).

Gautama: Family name of Gautama Siddhartha (563-483 BCE), known as "The Buddha" and founder of Buddhism.

Good Government: View in the Confucian *Analects* that rulers should rule by setting a moral example which the whole country will follow.

Great Learning (*Ta Hsio*): Short philosophical section from the *Book of Rites* which states that a ruler's virtuous conduct will be transferred down the social hierarchy to the people; it is one of the Four Books

(*shu*) of Confucianism.

Great Ultimate (*t'ai-chi*): Main productive force of the universe as described in the *I Ching* and developed by Neo-Confucianism.

Gunas: Literally "strands"; three essential features of *prakriti* (our physical nature) in the Samkya school of Hinduism; the three *gunas* are consciousness (*sattva*), activity (*rajas*), and inactivity (*tamas*).

Han Dynasty: Period in Chinese history from 206 BCE- 220 CE during which time Confucianism became the dominant religion.

Hinayana: "Little raft" school of Buddhism as so named by their Mahayana Buddhist rivals; the school later changed its name to "Theravada."

Hindu: General term designating the religion of India and its various movements including Vedic Hinduism, Brahmanism, and Bhakti Hinduism.

Hsuan-tsang (596-664 CE): Chinese Mahayana philosopher who followed the Yogacara School, thus founding in China the School of Consciousness-Only (*Fa-hsiang*).

Hsun-Tzu (298-238 BCE): Early skeptical Confucian philosopher who argued that all events are in accord with natural law, and that humans are by nature selfish; his writings are collected in a work titled *The Hsun-Tzu*.

Hui-neng (638-713 CE): Sixth and final Chinese Patriarch of Ch'an Buddhism whose life and teachings are presented in the *Platform Sutra* (*Liu-tsu-ta-shih Fa-pao-t'an-ching*).

Humanity (*jen*): Central Confucian concept advocating benevolent action towards people.

I Ching: Literally "Book of Changes," a book of written oracles associated with 64 abstract figures; one of the Five Classics of Confucianism.

Identity of Opposites: Taoist notion of the *Chuang-Tzu* that opposing descriptions of things are relative and in fact point to a single underlying reality.

Investigation of Things: Concept in the *Great Learning* which prompts moral conduct which, in turn, culminates in social happiness; Neo-Confucianist Chu Hsi identified this with a study of structural form (*li*), in contrast to Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang Ming who identified it with the study of mind and its innate knowledge.

Isvarakrsna: 4th century CE founder of the Hindu school of Samkya; author of *Samkhyakarika* (literally "Verses on the Samkhya").

Karma Yoga: Sub-school of Hindu Yoga which advocates becoming indifferent to the consequences of one's actions, thereby disassociating oneself from one's ordinary consciousness

Karma, law of: Hindu view that the good and bad consequences of one's actions affect one's status in future lives (*samsara*)

Karma: "Action" in Hinduism and Buddhism, often associated with the doctrine of karma.

Ko Hung (280-340 CE): Author of the Religious Taoist text *Book of the Master who Embraces*

Simplicity (Pao-p'u-tzu) which describes various techniques for attaining immortality.

Koan System: Instruction technique of the Rinsai school of Zen Buddhism in which a master poses a series of koans to his students over a period of several years.

Koan: Paradoxical question posed by Zen masters using the koan system, such as "what is the sound of one hand clapping?"

Krishna: Legendary Hindu figure in the Bhagavad Gita who is said to be a human incarnation of the god Vishnu.

Kuo Hsiang (d. 312 CE): Neo-Taoist philosopher who emphasized that the Tao is non-existence, and things arise from nature (*t'ien*).

Lankavatra Sutra: 4th century CE Mahayana Buddhist text of the Yogacara school which is most noted for its lengthy discussion of nirvana in Chapter 8.

Lao-Tzu: Legendary founder of Taoism and author of the *Tao Te Ching*, who is said to have been an older contemporary of Confucius.

Li: Important philosophical term of varied meaning throughout Confucian history; Early Confucian writings depict *li* as ceremonial formality; Neo-Confucian writers such as Chu Hsi see it as a metaphysical principal of structural form, which is in contrast with material force (*ch'i*).

Lieh-Tzu (c. 450-375 BCE): Early Taoist philosopher of whom almost nothing is known; a third century CE text by the name *Lieh-Tzu* is pseudonymously attributed to him which emphasizes the certainty of our annihilation, resigning oneself to fate, and avoiding all effort in life.

Lotus Sutra (*saddharma-pundarika*): An early Mahayana Buddhist text (composed between 100 BCE and 200 CE) which emphasizes the means-to-ends ability (*upaya*).

Lu Hsiang-Shan (1139-1193): Neo-Confucian philosopher and founder of the School of Mind; Lu argued that knowledge of the world and morals is inntate to our minds, and that there is only one universal mind.

Mahayana: "Large raft" school of Buddhism which sees religion as a group effort, emphasizes the role of the Bodhisattva, sees nirvana as the same state as the ordinary realm of life and death, and describes ultimate reality as emptiness, suchness and Buddha-nature.

Manu, Law of (*Manava Dharmasastra*): Most famous of the Hindu codes of law (*Dharmasastras*), written about 200 BCE.

Mara: Hindu god of pestilence, better known as the tempter who tried to foil Buddha's attainment of enlightenment

Material Force (*ch'i*): Neo-Confucian term used by writers such as Chu Hsi who see it as a metaphysical principal in contrast with structural form (*li*).

Maya: Hindu term coined by Advaita Vedanta to refer to the illusory or deceptive nature of the world which prompts us to make distinctions.

Mencius (390-305 BCE): Latinized name for Meng-tzu, the most important Confucian writer after Confucius; Mencius emphisized the importance of humanity (*jen*) and righteousness (*i*), and argued that human nature is essentially good. His writings, the *Mencius*, are one of the Four Books (*shu*) of Confucianism.

Middle Path (*majjhimapatipada*): Central doctrine taught by Buddha concerning the avoidance of extremes as a means of attaining enlightenment; early Buddhist writings associate the Middle Path with the Eightfold Path.

Middle Path School (*madhyamika*): Indian school of Mayanana Buddhism founded by Nagarjuna in the 2nd century CE, emphasizing the emptiness of all things, including nirvana and the ordinary world of life and death; the school continued in China as the School of Consciousness-Only (*Fa-hsiang*).

Moksha: "Release"; Hindu notion of the ending of the cycle of reincarnation (*samsara*); also associated with the highest stage of religious awareness and Yoga meditation.

Mo-Tzu (480-390 BCE): Early Chinese philosopher and founder of Mohism who criticized Confucianism for being too ritualistic and socially passive; Mo-tzu argued that, to ward off social chaos, we should love everyone as a matter of self-interest.

Nagarjuna (c. 150-250 CE): Founder of the Middle Path School of Mahayana Buddhism, and author of the *Treatise on the Fundamentals of the Middle Path* (*Mulamadhyamakakarika*), which emphasizes the emptiness of all things.

Neo-Confucianism: Broad Confucian movement beginning in the 11th century CE which developed metaphysical doctrines at times borrowing from Buddhism and Taoism; founded by Chou Tun-i, other leading Neo-Confucianists were Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan, and Wang Yang Ming.

Neo-Taoism: Movement within Philosophical Taoism during the 3rd and 4th centuries CE which drew from Confucianism; leading proponents are Wang Pi, Ho Yen, Hsiang Hsiu and Kuo Hsiang.

Neti Neti: Literally, "not this, not this"; famous Hindu expression from the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* which indicates that the Atman cannot be identified with this or that particular physical thing.

Nirvana: Literally "to extinguish," highest state of existence in Buddhism; in Theravada Buddhism nirvana is a realm beyond ordinary consciousness, and in Mahayana Buddhism nirvana is the same empty realm as ordinary conscious existence.

No Self (*anatta*): Buddhist doctrine that we have not unified and individual self, but only a fluctuating series of material and conscious states (*skandhas*). No self is one of the Three Marks of Existence (*ti-lakkhana*) in Buddhism.

Non-Action (*wu-wei*): Taoist position that we should avoid all unnatural action and act passively and spontaneously.

Non-Mind (*wu-tsin*): Taoist position that we should eliminate knowledge to allow us to live spontaneously.

Pali Canon: the oldest sacred collection of Buddhist writings from the 3rd-1st centuries BCE, written in the Pali language, and comprising three main divisions: the "Basket of Discipline" (Vinaya Pitaka), the

"Basket of Discourses" (Sutta Pitaka), and the "Basket of Ultimate Doctrine" (Abhidhamma Pitaka).

Paramita: Literally "perfections"; Mahayana Buddhism notes 10 perfections of the ideal bodhisattva: giving (*dana*), morality (*sila*), patience (*ksanti*), vigor (*virya*), contemplation (*dhyana*), wisdom (*prajna*), means-to-ends ability (*upaya*), resolution (*pranidhana*), strength (*bala*), and knowledge (*jnana*).

Patanjali: Unknown Hindu figure from the 4th-6th centuries CE, and author of the *Yoga Sutra* which describes eight steps to meditation.

Perfection of Wisdom (*prajnaparamita*): In Mahayana Buddhism, an early collection of writings beginning about 100 BCE which focuses on the importance of wisdom among the ten ideal perfections (*paramitas*); emphasizing the notion of emptiness (*sunyata*), the most famous of these works are the *Diamond Cutter Sutra* (*vajracchedika-prajnaparaita*) and the *Heart Sutra* (*prajnaparamita-hydaya*).

Period of 100 Philosophers: period of philosophical creativity in reaction to China's warring states period (403-221 BCE), later classed into six schools: Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, Yin and Yang School, Logicians, and Legalism.

Philosophical Taoism (*tao-chia*): Early non-religious direction of Taoism as found in the *Tao Te Ching*, the *Chuang-Tzu*, the *Lieh-Tzu*, Neo-Taoism.

Prajna: Literally, "wisdom", one of the ten perfections (*paramitas*) of Mahayana Buddhism; this wisdom is usually seen as an understanding of the emptiness of all things.

Prakriti: Notion of our physical nature in the Samkya and Yoga systems of Hinduism; contrasted with *purusha* (inner transcendent self).

Pratyekabuddha: The isolated practitioner of Theravada Buddhism who seeks enlightenment outside of a formal monastic setting; by contrast, the Arhat seeks enlightenment within a formal monastic setting.

Purana: Devotional literature of Bhakti Hinduism, the most famous of which is the *Bhagavata Purana* which describes the life of Krishna; there are 18 authoritative "great" *Puranas*, and 18 authoritative "minor" *Puranas*.

Pure Land Buddhism: School of Mahayana Buddhism founded in China by Tao-cho (562-645 CE) which emphasizes devotion to Amida, the Celestial Buddha who founded a heavenly Buddha-Land called the Pure Land which awaits his followers upon their deaths.

Purusha: Notion of one's inner transcendent self in the Samkya and Yoga systems of Hinduism; contrasted with *prakriti* (our physical nature) which hides our inner self.

Questions of King Milinda (*Milindapanha*): Important Theravada Buddhist philosophical text written about 100 CE in the Pali language; the issues discussed include the self, karma, and reincarnation.

Ramanuja: 11th century CE Hindu founder of *Visista-advaita* Vedanta (qualified monistic Vedanta) who maintains that God himself is composed of parts; individual souls and the physical world comprise the body of God.

Rectification of Names (*cheng ming*): Central Confucian concept involving the correct use of language such that words and actions conform to reality.

Religious Taoism (*Tao-chiao*): Later development within the Taoist tradition which emphasized techniques of attaining physical immortality in this life.

Return (*fu, fan*): Taoist notion that all things follow a natural process by which they grow from the Tao, and then disintegrate into the Tao.

Samadhi: "without support"; the highest stage of meditation in Hinduism's school of Raja Yoga.

Samkya: One of the six Hindu systems of emancipation (Darsanas) which emphasizes a distinction between *purusha* (our inner transcendent self) and *prakriti* (our physical nature).

Samsara: Hindu notion of reincarnation in which one's present life is followed by a series of new lives in new physical bodies.

Sangha: General term referring to religious communities in India; in Buddhism the *Sangha* refers either more narrowly to the monastic communites, or more broadly to the Buddhist community consisting of the both lay and monastic practitioners.

Sankara (788-820 CE): Hindu founder of Advaita Vedanta, a monistic (or nondual) interpretation of Vedanta philosophy; Sankara emphasizes the unity of the individual self and the larger world; the deceptive (*maya*) nature of the world prompts us to erroneously distinguish the two.

Sanskrit: Ancient Indo-European language in which the classic texts of Hinduism are written.

Satori: Term for "enlightenment" in Zen Buddhism.

School of Mind (*Hsin-Hsueh*): Idealist-oriented Neo-Confucian school founded by Lu Hsiang-Shan which emphasized innate knowledge of the mind.

School of Structural Form (*Li-Hsueh*): Rationalist-oriented Neo-Confucianist school founded by Chu Hsi which emphasized understanding the structural form (li) behind things.

Seated Meditation (*zazen*): Zen Buddhist practice of sitting and meditating on ordinary conscious experience for long periods of time.

Seng-chao (384-414 CE): Chinese Mahayana philosopher who followed the Middle Path School of Nagarjuna.

Shakti: Hindu notion of creative power, associated with the Goddess Devi, wife of Shiva.

Shaktism: Hindu tradition which focuses on the creative power (*shakti*) of the Goddess Devi, wife of Shiva.

Shiva: destroyer God of the Trimurti in Bhakti Hinduism.

Siddhartha: First name of Gautama Siddhartha (563-483 BCE), known as "The Buddha" and founder of Buddhism.

Skandhas: Literally "heaps," sometimes translated as "aggregates" or "components"; in Buddhism, there are five *skandhas* which shape our human perception of things: matter, sensation, perception, predisposition, and consciousness.

Social Custom (*li*): Central Confucian concept advocating effortless adherence to social norms and performance of social rituals.

Ssu-ma Ch'ien: Author of classic Chinese historical text titled *Historical Records* (c. 100 BCE) which contains brief accounts of Confucius, Lao-tzu, and Chuang-tzu.

Structural Form (*li*): Neo-Confucian term used by writers such as Chu Hsi who see it as a metaphysical principal in contrast with material force (*ch'i*).

Suchness (*tathata*): Mahayana Buddhist notion of ultimate reality which designates existence as it is in itself, as opposed to how it appears to us; the term is functionally the same as nirvana, Buddha-nature, emptiness, and the Eternal Buddha.

Suffering (*dukkha*): First noble truth of Buddhism which designates a state of anguish that results from clinging or grasping (*tanha, trishna*). Suffering is one of the Three Marks of Existence (*ti-lakkhana*) in Buddhism.

Summit of Nothingness (*wu-chi*): Taoist concept of the realm of nonexistence from which all things emerge and then return (*fu*); Neo-Confucianists such as Chou Tun-i and Chu Hsi identified the Summit of Nothingness with the Great Ultimate (*t'ai-chi*).

Superior Person (*chun-tzu*): Central Confucian concept designating the ideal human who personifies the highest moral attributes.

Tao Te Ching: Literally, "The Way and its Power"; oldest and most important text in Taoism which emphasizes living according to the Tao, the virtuous power (*te*) we attain from the Tao, the return of everything to Tao, and the principles of non-action, non-mind.

Taoism: Chinese movement originating in the warring states period which advocates following the Tao and living in harmony with nature; "Philosophical Taoism" and "Religious Taoism" are its two principal approaches.

Tat Tvam Asi: Literally "you are that"; Hindu expression in the *Chandogya Upanishads* indicating that the individual person is identical with the universal Brahman.

Tathagata: Literally, "thus gone," an honorary title used by Buddha in reference to himself, perhaps indicating that he has "gone before" others on the path of enlightenment.

The Record of Rites (*Li Chi*): One of the Five Classics of Confucianism, an anthology of rules of dancing, music, ancestor worship, and imperial sacrifices; it contains philosophical discussions on cosmology, yin and yang, the five elements, and the five relationships.

Theravada: Literally "way of the elders," later designation for the Hinayana school of Buddhism which sees religion as an individual effort, emphasizes the role of the Arhat, sees nirvana as distinct from ordinary existence, and de-emphasizes metaphysical speculations.

Three Jewels (*tiratana*): The three most precious things in Buddhism, namely, the Buddha, the law (*dharma*), and the Buddhist community (*sangha*)

Three Marks of Existence (*ti-lakkhana*): Buddhist designation for three aspects of human physical existence: suffering (*dukkha*), impermanence (*anicca*), and no self (*anatta*).

T'ien: Chinese term for "heaven" used in philosophical Neo-Confucianist and Neo-Taoist discussions to mean "nature"

T'ien-t'ai: School of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism (Tendai in Japan), founded by Chih-I (538-597 CE); the school follows the Yogacara doctrine of absolute mind and proposes that three thousand realms of the phenomenal world are contained in a single thought.

Transformation (*hua*): Taoist notion in the Chuang-Tzu that everything in nature involves transformation from one state to another.

Treatise on Actions and their Rewards (*T'ai-shang Kan-ying P'ien*): 10th century text of Religious Taoism which maintains that people lose longevity in proportion to their evil deeds.

Trimurrti: Trimorphic view of God in Bhakti Hinduism consisting of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva.

Tripitika: Literally "three baskets", another name for the Buddhist Pali Canon.

Triple Body (*trikaya*): In Mahayana Buddhism, the notion of three levels or "bodies" of Buddha's existence: (a) the Eternal Buddhas of the Body of Dharma (*dharmakaya*), (2) human incarnations in the Body of Transformation (*nirmanakaya*), and (3) Celestial Buddhas in the Body of Bliss (*sambhogakaya*).

Upanishads: 108 philosophical texts of Brahmanic Hinduism composed between 800-500 BCE which emphasize the notion of the Atman-Brahman.

Upaya: "Means-to-ends ability," or "useful means," one of the ten perfections (*paramitas*) of Mahayana Buddhism; *upaya* typically involves the use of differing (and sometimes inferior) approaches to enlightenment.

Vedanta: Literally "end of the Vedas"; one of Hinduism's formal schools of emancipation (*darsanas*) which draws heavily on the *Upanishads* and the *Brahma Sutras* and the doctrine of the Atman Brahman; its two main sub-schools are Sankara's *Advaita* Vedanta (monistic Vedanta) and Ramanuja's *Visista-advaita* Vedanta (qualified monistic Vedanta).

Vedas: Hindu sacred texts of the Aryan invaders written between 1500-800 BCE which includes the Rig-Veda, Sama-Veda, Yajur-Veda, and Arth-Veda.

Vedic Hinduism: Religion of the India's Aryan invaders (1500-800 BCE), the sacred text of which is the Vedas

Vishnu: The preserver God of the Trimurti in Bhakti Hinduism who is said to have human incarnations (*avitars*).

Wang Yang Ming (1472-1529): Philosopher and statesman, and leading proponent of the Neo-Confucianist School of Mind; Wang argued that all knowledge is innate to our minds, and that knowledge and actions are co-related.

Warring States Period: period social and political unrest in China's history from 403-221 BCE in reaction to which China's classical philosophy emerged.

Way of Supreme Peace (*t'ai-p'ing tao*): Messianic sect of Religious Taoism founded by Chang Chueh (d. 184 CE) which emphasized based formal fasting ceremonies (*chai*) involving ritual healing and

public confession of fault.

Yang Chu (c. 450 BCE): Early Chinese philosopher who emphasized self-preservation and may have inspired Taoist notions about the evils of society.

Yang Chu Chapter: Famous chapter in the *Leih-Tzu* text arguing that we should enjoy the pleasures of life while we can since death is certain.

Yin and Yang: negative (female) and postive (male) complementary forces of the universe central to Chinese thought since perhaps as early as 1,000 BCE.

Yoga: Hindu meditative practices; the formal school of Yoga developed in the middle ages contains seven sub-schools: Jnana Yoga (knowldge), Karma Yoga (action), Bhakti Yoga (devotion), Mantra Yoga (sounds), Laya Yoga (dissolution), Hatha Yoga (postures, breathing), and Raja Yoga (meditation).

Yogacara School: Idealist school of Mahayana Buddhism founded in the 4th century CE by two brothers, Asanga and Vasubandhu; the school maintains that ultimate realty is an undiffernentiated mind; eight kinds of mental consciousness are responsible for our erroneous perceptions of an external world and differientiated self.

Zen: Japanese name for the Chinese school of Ch'an Buddhism. (See Ch'an).

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Meister Eckhart (1260-1328)

Meister Eckhart, as he is generally called, Dominican and mystic, was a man almost forgotten after the middle of the fifteenth century until Franz von Baader in the first half of the nineteenth century revived his memory. Since then he has been highly praised. But Denifle again passed a somewhat derogatory judgment upon him on the basis of newly discovered Latin writings; inasmuch as Denifle has published but a small part of these writings his opinion cannot be too implicitly accepted. This article will attempt merely to give accredited facts and indicate the present state of the questions.

LIFE. The long controverted question concerning the locality of Eckhart's origin has been settled by Denifle, who states that he was born at Hochheim, a village 8 miles north of Gotha. The year of his birth was probably 1260, and he joined the Dominicans at Erfurt. The lighter studies he no doubt followed at Cologne. Later he was prior at Erfurt and provincial of Thuringia. In 1300 he was sent to Paris to lecture and take the academical degrees, and remained there till 1303. In the latter year he returned to Erfurt, and was made provincial for Saxony, a province which reached at that time from the Netherlands to Livonia. Complaints made against him and the provincial of Teutonia at the general chapter held in Paris in 1306 concerning irregularities among the ternaries, must have been trivial, because the general, Aymeric, appointed him in the following year his vicar-general for Bohemia with full power to set the demoralized monasteries there in order. In 1311 Eckhart was appointed by the general chapter of Naples as teacher at Paris. Then follows a long period of which it is known only that he spent part of the time at Strasburg (cf. *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Strassburg*, iii. 236). A passage in a chronicle of the year 1320, extant in manuscript (cf. Preger, i. 352-399), speaks of a prior Eckhart at Frankfort who was suspected of heresy, and some have referred this to Meister Eckhart; but it is highly improbable that a man under suspicion of heresy would have been appointed teacher in one of the most famous schools of the order.

Eckhart next appears as teacher at Cologne, and the archbishop, Hermann von Virneburg, accused him of heresy before the pope. But Nicholas of Strasburg , to whom the pope had given the temporary charge of the Dominican monasteries in Germany, exonerated him. The archbishop, however, pressed his charoes ao-ainst Eckhart and against Nicholas before his own court. The former now denied the competency of the archiepiscopal inquisition and demanded *litterce dimissorix* (*apostoli*) for an appeal to the pope (cf. the document in Preger, i. 471; more accurately in *ALKG*, ii. 627 sqq.). On Feb. 13, 1327, he stated in his protest, which was read publicly, that he had always detested everything wrong, and should anything of the kind be found in his writings, he now retracts. Of the further progress of the case there is no information, except that John XXII. issued a bull (*In agro dominico*), Mar. 27, 1329, in which a series of statements from Eckhart is characterized as heretical; another as suspected of heresy (the bull is given complete in *ALKG*, ii. 636-640). At the close it is stated that Eckhart recanted before his death everything which he had falsely taught, by subjecting himself and his writing to the decision of the apostolic see. By this is no

doubt meant the statement of Feb. 13, 1327; and it may be inferred that Eckhart's death, concerning which no information exists, took place shortly after that event. In 1328 the general chapter of the order at Toulouse decided to proceed against preachers who "endeavor to preach subtle things which not only do (not) advance morals, but easily lead the people into error." Eckhart's disciples were admonished to be more cautious, but nevertheless they cherished the memory of their master.

WORKS. For centuries none of Eckhart's writings were known except a number of sermons, found in the old editions of Tauler's sermons, published by Kachelouen (Leipsic, 1498) and by Adam Petri (Basel, 1521 and 1522). In 1857 Franz Pfeiffer in the second volume of his *Deutsche Mystiker* (Stuttgart), which is wholly devoted to Eckhart, added considerable manuscript material. Pfeiffer was followed by others, especially Franz Jostes, *Meister Eckhart und seine Junger, ungedruckte Texte zur Geschichte der deutschen Mystik* (*Collectanea Friburgensia*, iv., Freiburg, 1895). But some pieces are of doubtful genuineness, and the tradition concerning others is very unsatisfactory. It was a great surprise when in 1880 and 1886 H. Denifle discovered at Erfurt and Cues two manuscripts with Latin works of Eckhart, the existence of which Nicholas of Cusa and Trittenheim had indeed mentioned, but which had since then been considered lost. There can be no doubt as to their genuineness, but thus far only the (comparatively extensive) specimens which Denifle had published (in *ALKG*, ii.) are known. The extant writings appear to be only parts of a very large work, the *Opus tripartitum*, which, to judge from the prologue in the first part treated of more than 1,000 propositions, in the second part debated a number of special questions, and in the third part, first expounded Biblical texts (*opus sermonum*) and afterward explained the books of the Bible in their order with special reference to the important passages. Entirely unknown at present are the contents of the more important manuscript of Cues, especially the exposition of the Gospel of John, which may contain information on many things.

VIEW OF GOD. As has already been stated it is impossible to give at present a final decision on Eckhart's world of ideas. Nevertheless an attempt may be made to delineate his fundamental thoughts, based upon the material at hand. The great need of man is that his soul be united with God; for this a knowledge of God and his relation to the world, a knowledge of the soul and the way which it must go, are necessary. Eckhart does not doubt that such knowledge is given in the traditional faith of the Church, but it is not sufficient for one who is longing for salvation. He must attain to it with his own understanding. Eckhart accordingly does not move and live in ecclesiastical tradition after the manner of Bernard of Clairvaux or Hugo of St. Victor; in his thinking on the highest questions he is independent and in this way he arrives at views which do not harmonize with the teaching of the Church, without, however, as far as can be seen, being conscious of any opposition. The last and highest object of thinking is the Deity, i.e. the divine entity as distinguished from the persons, yet Eckhart often uses "God" in the sense of "Deity," where his thought does not call for accurate definitions (but cf., on the other hand, 180, 14; 181, 7). The Deity is absolute being without distinction of place or manner (*ALKG*, ii. 439-440). No predicate derived from finite being is applicable to the Deity; but this is therefore not mere negation or emptiness. Rather is finite being, as such, negation; and the Deity, as the negation of finite being, is the negation of negation, i.e. the absolute fulness of being (322, 131 539, 10-27). Dionysius wrongly states: God is not, he is rather a nonentity. When in other passages (82, 26; 182, 31; 500, 27) Eckhart himself designates God as non-existent, he only means that he has none of the characteristics of finite existence. The same apparent contradiction is found, where Eckhart on the one hand calls God absolute being, and on the other denies that he is a being (319, 4; 659, 1); but he

reconciles the two views (268-269). The same is the case with occasional seemingly paradoxical expressions, e.g. that God is not good, etc. (269, 18; 318, 35-319, 3). The essential elements of finite things are present in God, but in an exalted degree and in a manner that can not be comprehended by man (322, 20; 540, 2-7).

TRINITARIAN PROCESS. The absolute, unqualified being of the Deity Eckhart also calls unnatured nature. This unnatured nature, however, manifests itself in the natured nature, the three persons. The Trinity is the self-revelation of the Deity (540, 31; 390,12-22). In it God comprises himself. Accordingly, Eckhart attributes to the Father a sort of genesis; only the Deity is absolutely without any progression and reposes everlastingly in itself. The Father was made through himself (534, 17). This self-revelation of God Eckhart designates as a cognition, a speaking, or a demeanor. The Father perceives the whole fulness of the Deity (6,S); or, what is the same, he speaks a single word, which comprises everything (70, 25). He procreates the Son (284, 12); for the Father is father only through the Son. The Son, however, is in everything like the Father, only that he procreates not,(337, 3). The essence of the Father is also that of the Son, and the essence in both is no other than that of the Deity. From the pleasure and love which both have for each other springs the Holy Ghost (497, 26). Eckhart leaves no doubt that the entire trinitarian process must not be conceived of as a temporal one, but as a process extending throughout eternity (254, 10). Preger thought that Eckhart's distinction between Deity and God should be interpreted as a distinction between potentiality and actuality. To this interpretation Denifle (*ALKG*, ii. 453 sqq.) has strongly objected and cited Eckhart's Latin writings, in which he, with Thomas Aquinas and others, designates God as *actus purus*, thus excluding all potentiality. Denifle is right, in that Eckhart does not consciously and deliberately make any such distinction; but it can not be denied that his conception leads to it. Especially significant is Eckhart's explanation in 175, 7 sqq. where he tries to illustrate the relation between the fatherhood as it is determined in the Deity and the paternity of the person of the Father by the relation between the maternity peculiar to the Virgin as such, and the maternity which she acquires by bearing. But this is exactly the relation of potentiality and actuality (cf. also the peculiar passage 193, 33). It must be admitted that Eckhart here expresses two views which can not be harmonized with one another, though the second is not fully developed. Eckhart had a wealth of ingenious ideas, but he was unable to systematize them.

GOD IN CREATION. The self-manifestation of God in the Trinity is followed by his manifestation in his creatures. Everything in them that is truly real is God's eternal being; but God's being does not manifest itself thus in its entire fulness (101, 34; 173, 26; 503, 26). In this antithesis may be expressed the relation of Eckhart's philosophy to pantheism, both as regards similarities and differences. According to Eckhart God's creatures have not, as Thomas Aquinas held, merely ideal preexistence in God, i.e. their conceptual essence (*essential quidditas*) coming from the divine intelligence, but their existence (*esse*) being foreign to the divine being. Rather is the true being of the creatures immanent in the divine being. On the other hand, every peculiarity distinguishing, creatures from each other is something negative; and in this sense it is said that the creatures are a mere nothing. Should God withdraw from his creatures his being, they would disappear as the shadow on the wall disappears when the wall is removed (31, 2). This perishable being is the creature confined within the limits of space and time (87, 49). On the other hand, every creature, considered according to its true entity, is eternal. It is obvious that this necessarily involves a modification of the idea of creation. Even Augustine and the Schoolmen felt this difficulty. While they did not, like Eckhart connect the existence of the world with the being of God they did consider it unallowable to attribute to God any temporary activity. Albert the Great tried to avoid

the difficulty with the sentence, "God created all things from eternity, but things were not created from eternity"; but this is more easily said than conceived. According to the bull of 1329 (p. 2), Eckhart asserted that "it may be conceded that the world was from eternity." It is impossible here to investigate this view further; but reference must be made to the close relation into which Eckhart brings the process of the Trinity and the genesis, or progress, of the world, both of the real and the ideal world (76, 52; 254, 16; 284, 12; cf. *Com. in Genes*., *ALKG*, ii. 553, 13-17).

RELATION OF THE SOUL TO GOD. The unqualified Deity, the Trinity (birth of the Son or of the Eternal 117ord), and the creation of the world are to him three immediate moments, which follow each other in conceptual, not temporal sequence. All creatures have part in the divine essence; but this is true of the soul in a higher degree. In the irrational creature there is something of God; but in the soul God is divine (230, 26; 2,31, 4). Though God speaks his word in all creatures, only rational creatures can preserve it (479, 19). In other words, in the soul, where he has his resting-place, God is subjective, while in the rest of creation he is merely objective. The soul is an image of God, in so far as its chief powers, memory, reason, and will, answer to the divine persons (319, 1). This accords with the view of Augustine. Just as there is the absolute Deity, which is superior to the persons of the Godhead, so in the soul there is something that is superior to its own powers. This is the innermost background of the soul, which Eckhart frequently calls a "spark," or "little spark." In its real nature this basis of the soul is one with the Deity (66, 2). When Eckhart sometimes speaks of it as uncreated (286, 16; 311, 6), and then again as created, this does not involve a contradiction. While, on the one hand, it rests eternally in the Deity, on the other it entered into the temporal existence of the soul, i.e. was made or created through grace. But it is not in this original unity with God that the soul finds its perfection and bliss. As it has a subjective being, it must turn to God, in order that the essential principle implanted in it may be truly realized. It is not enough that it was made by God; God must come and be in it. But this has taken place without hindrance only in the human soul of Christ (67, 12). For all other souls sin is an obstacle.

SIN AND REDEMPTION. But wherein does sin consist? Not in the finiteness, which is never removed from the soul (3S7, 3; 500, 1 1), but in the direction of the will toward the finite and its pleasure therein (476, 19; 674, 17). The possibility of sin, however, is based in finiteness, taken together with the free will of the creature. If it is the destiny of the soul to be the resting-place of God, then the direction of the will toward the finite makes this impossible; and it is this that constitutes sin. Redemption, therefore, can tale place only when the creature makes room in his soul for the work of God; and the condition for that is the turning away from the finite. For God is ever ready to work in the soul, provided he is not hindered and the soul is susceptible to his influence (27, 25; 283, 23; 33, 29; 479, 31). The inner separation from everything casual, sensual, earthly and the yielding to the work of God in the heart,-that is the seclusion or tranquillity of which Eckhart speaks again and again. For him this is the basis of all piety. But what is it that God accomplishes in the soul? This can be stated in a word: the birth of the son. As the soul is an image of the Deity, if it is to fulfil its destiny, then that process by which the deity develops into the three persons must take place in it. The father procreates in the soul the son (44, 28; 175, 15-20; 479, 10; 13, 12). This takes place during the life of the soul in time; and, too, not merely at a particular moment, but rather continuously and repeatedly. This is not merely a copy or analogon of that inner divine process, but is in truth that very process itself, by which it becomes, through grace, what the Son of God is by nature (433, 32; 382, 7; 377, 17). From this view of Eckhart's follow a number of the most strikino, statements in which the soul is made to share in the attributes and

works of God, including the creation (119, 28-40; 267, 4; 283, 37-284, 7). However, according to Eckhart, a complete fusion of the soul with the Deity never takes place (387, 3). He also opposes the doctrine of Apocatastasis (65, 20; 402, 34; 470, 22).

PLACE OF CHRIST. According to Eckhart sin is not the real cause of the incarnation (591, 34). God wished rather to receive the nature of things through grace in time just as he had them by nature in eternity in himself (574, 34). Just as a man occupies a central position in the world, since he leads all creatures back to God, so Christ stands in the center of humanity (180, 7; 390, 37.) The same thought is found in Maximus the Confessor and Erigena, but whence did Eckhart get it? Even at the creation of the first man Christ was already the end in view (250, 23); and now after the fact of sin, Christ stands likewise in the center of redemption. After the fall all creatures worked together to produce a man who should restore the harmony (497, 11). This took place when Mary resigned herself so completely to the divine word that the eternal word could assume human nature in her. However, this temporal birth of the son is again included in his eternal birth as a moment of the same (391, 20). And now God is to be born in us. In his human life Jesus becomes a pattern for man; and in all tl-iat he did and experienced, above all in his passion and death there is an overwhelming power that draws man to God (218-219) and brings about in us that which first took place in Christ, who alone is the way to the father (241, 17).

ETHICS. Whatever one may think of Eckhart's philosophical and dogmatic speculations, his ethical view, at any rate, is of rare purity and sublimity. The inner position of man, the disposition of the heart, is for him the main thing (56, 39; 297, 11; 444, S; 560, 43) and with him this is not a result of reflection. One feels that it comes from the core of his personality; and no doubt this was the principal reason for the deep impression his sermons made. He speaks little of church ceremonies. For him outward penances have only a limited value. That man inwardly turn to God and be led by him,-that is the main purpose of Eckhart's exhortations. Let no one think because this or that great saint has done and suffered many things, that he should imitate him. God gives to each his task, and leaves every one on his way (560 sqq. 177, 26-35). No one can express the fact more definitely than does Eckhart, that it is not works that justify man, but that man must first be righteous in order to do righteous works. Nor does he recommend that one flee from the world, but flee from oneself, from selfishness, and self-will. Otherwise one finds as little peace in the cell as outside of it. Though he sees in suffering the most effective and most valuable means of inner purification, still lie does not mean that one should seek sufferings of his own choosing, but only bear patiently whatever God imposes. He recognizes that it is natural for one to be affected either pleasantly or unpleasantly by the various sense-impressions; but in the innermost depths of the soul one must hold fast to God and allow himself to be moved by nothing (52, 1; 427, 22). It need hardly be added that he regards highly works of charity. Even supreme rapture should not prevent one from rendering a service to the poor. It is noteworthy that, in the ninth sermon, he puts Alartha, higher than Mary, though by a strange misinterpretation of the text. While Mary enjoyed only the sweetness of the Lord, being yet a learner, Martha had passed this stage. She stood firm in the substance, and no work hindered her, but every work helped her to blessedness. Future investigations will presumably make possible a more accurate estimate of the importance of Eckhart; but it is hardly possible that they will overthrow the verdict of Suso and Tauler concerning him.

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Eclecticism

"Eclecticism" is a name given to a group of ancient philosophers who, from the existing philosophical beliefs, tried to select the doctrines that seemed to them most reasonable, and out of these constructed a new system (see Diogenes Laertius, 21). The name was first generally used in the first century BCE. Stoicism and Epicureanism had made the search for pure truth subordinate to the attainment of practical virtue and happiness. Skepticism had denied that pure truth was possible to discover. Eclecticism sought to reach by selection the highest possible degree of probability, in the despair of attaining to what is absolutely true. In Greek philosophy, the best known Eclectics were the Stoics Panaetius (150 BCE.) and Posidonius (75 BCE.). The New Academic, Carnaedes (155 BCE.), and Philo of Larissa (75 BCE.). Among the Romans, Cicero, whose cast of mind made him always doubtful and uncertain of his own attitude, was thoroughly eclectic, uniting the Peripatetic, Stoic, and New Academic doctrines, and seeking the probable (*illud probabile*). The same general line was followed by Varro, and in the next century the Stoic Seneca propounded a philosophical system largely based on eclecticism.

In the late period of Greek philosophy there appears an eclectic system consisting of a compromise between the Neo-Pythagoreans and the various Platonic sects. Still another school is that of Philo Iudaeus, who at Alexandria, in the first century CE. interpreted the Old Testament allegorically, and tried to harmonize it with selected doctrines of Greek philosophy. Neo-Platonism, the last product of Greek speculation, was also a fusion of Greek philosophy with eastern religion. Its chief representatives were Plotinus (230 CE.), Porphyrius (275 CE.), Iamblichus (300 CE.), and Proclus (450 CE.). The desire of this school was to attain right relations between God and humans, and was thus religious.

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Egoism

In ethics egoism entails that the individual self is either the motivating moral force and is, or should, be the end of moral action.

Egoism divides into both a positive and normative ethic. The positive ethic views egoism as a factual description of human affairs, that is people are motivated by their own interests and desires. The normative ethic is that they should be so motivated.

Positivist egoism: Psychological Egoism

The positivist egoist, whose theory is called psychological egoism, offers an explanation of human affairs, in effect a description of human nature, which he or she believes to be wholly self-centred and self-motivated. In its strong form the theory asserts that people *always* act in their own interests, even though they may disguise their motivation with references to helping others or doing their duty.

Opponents exploit counter-factual evidence to criticize the theory-surely, they claim, there is a host of evidence supporting altruistic or duty-bound actions that cannot be said to engage the self-interest of the agent? Psychological egoists may then attempt to question the ultimate motive of acting benevolently towards others; they may retort that seemingly altruistic behavior necessarily has a self-interested component, that if the individual were not to offer aid to a stranger, he or she may feel guilty or may look bad in front of a peer group. At this point psychological egoism's validity turns on the question of moral motivation. But since motivation is inherently private (an agent could be lying to him or herself or to others about the original motive), the theory shifts from a theoretical description of human nature, one that can be put to observational testing, to an assumption about human nature. It moves beyond the possibility of empirical verification and the possibility of empirical negation (since motives are private), and therefore it becomes a closed theory. A closed theory is a theory that rejects competing theories on its own terms and is non-verifiable and non-falsifiable. If psychological egoism is reduced to an assumption concerning human nature, then it follows that it is just as valid to hold a competing theory of human motivation, psychological altruism for example. Psychological altruism holds that all human action is necessarily other centred and other motivated. A parallel analysis of psychological altruism results in opposing conclusions to psychological egoism, and again arguably the theory is just as closed as psychological egoism. If both theories can be validly maintained, it follows that the soundness of either or both must be questioned.

A weak version of psychological egoism accepts the possibility of altruistic or benevolent behavior, but maintains that whenever a choice is made it is by definition the action that the agent wants to do at that point. A wants to help the poor, therefore A is acting egoistically; if A ran into a burning building to save a kitten, it must be the case that A *wanted* to save the kitten. Defining all motivations as what the agent wants to do remains problematic: logically the theory becomes tautologous and therefore empty of providing a useful, descriptive meaning of motivation. It says that we are motivated to do what we are motivated to do. Besides which, if helping others is what A wants to do, then to what extent can A be continued to be called an egoist?

David Hume in his *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (Appendix II-Of Self Love) offers six rebuttals of psychological egoism (the 'selfish hypothesis'). Firstly, it opposes such obvious moral sentiments that engage in a concern and motivation for others such as love, friendship, compassion, and gratitude. Secondly, psychological egoism attempts to reduce human motivation to a single cause, which is a 'fruitless' task-the "love of *simplicity*…has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy." Thirdly, it is evident that animals act benevolently towards one another, and if it is admitted that animals can act altruistically then how can it be denied in humans? Fourthly, the

concepts we use to describe benevolent behavior cannot be meaningless; sometimes the agent obviously does not have a personal interest in the fortune of another, yet will wish him well. Any attempt to create an imaginary interest, as the psychological egoist attempts, will prove futile. Fifthly, Hume asserts that we have prior motivations to self-interest; we may have, for example, a predisposition towards vanity, fame, or vengeance that transcends any benefit to the agent. Finally, even if psychological egoism were true, there are a sufficient number of dispositions to generate a wide possibility of moral actions, allowing one person to be called vicious and another humane, and the latter is to be preferred over the former.

Normative Egoism-Rational Egoism

The second variant of egoism is normative in that it stipulates the agent ought to promote the self above other values. This theory does not attempt to describe human nature, but asserts how people ought to behave. It comes in two general forms: rational egoism and ethical egoism.

Rational egoism claims that the promotion of one's own interests is always in accordance with reason. In the strong version not only is it rational to pursue one's own interests, it is also irrational not to pursue them. In the weak version, it is rational to pursue one's own interests but there may be occasions when not pursuing them is not necessarily irrational.

A problem with rational egoism is that reason may dictate that one's own interests should not govern one's actions. At this point the possibility of conflicting reasons in a society need not be evoked, but it can be claimed that reason may invoke an impartiality clause, demanding that in a certain situation, one's interests should not be furthered. For example, consider a free-rider situation. In marking students' papers, a teacher may reasonably argue that to offer inflated grades is to make his life easier, for marking otherwise would incur negative feedback from students, having to spend time counselling on writing skills, etc.; it is even foreseeable that inflating grades may never have negative consequences, for he could free-ride on the tougher marking of the rest of the department or university and not worry about the negative consequences of a diminished reputation. However, impartiality considerations demand an alternative course-reasonably it is not right to change grades to make life easier. Here self-interest conflicts with reason.

In a different scenario, game theory points to a possible logical flaw in rational egoism by offering an example in which the pursuit of self-interest results in both agents being made worse off. This is famously described in the Prisoner's Dilemma.

		Prisoner B	
		Confess	Don't confess
Prisoner A	Confess	5,5	½,10
	Don't Confess	10,½	2,2

From the table, two suspects are individually offered different sentences. A, for example, is offered 5 years in prison if he confesses and is told that if his partner doesn't confess he will be given 6 months in jail and his partner 10 years. If he refuses to confess, then A faces 10 years in prison if his partner does confess, but both would only serve two years in prison if they both do not confess. The dominating pay-off strategy is for both to confess, whilst an agreement between A and B not to confess would result in the better solution for the two; however, the incentive is to squeal, in which case

both will serve the non-optimal solution of 5 years each.

Whilst the Prisoner's Dilemma offers a mathematical reason why self-interested action could lead to a socially non-optimal, and unstable, equilibrium, it can be countered that the nature of the game pre-empts other possibilities. The sentences are fixed, the choices are fixed; whilst this applies to the two prisoners, it is not obvious that every-day life generates such limited and limiting choices.

Normative Egoism: Ethical Egoism

Ethical egoism is the theory that the promotion of one's own good is in accordance with morality. In the strong version it is held that it is always moral to promote one's own good and it is never moral not to promote it. In the weak version, it claims that whilst it is always moral to promote one's good, it is not necessarily never moral not to do so-that is, there may be conditions in which the avoidance of personal interest may be a moral action.

In the imaginary construction of a world inhabited by a single being, it is possible that the pursuit of morality is the same as the pursuit of self-interest. What is good for the agent is the same as what is in the agent's interests. Arguably, there could never arise an occasion when the agent ought not to pursue self-interest in favor of another morality. Whilst it is possible for the creature to lament previous choices as not conducive to self-interest (enjoying the pleasures of swimming all day and not spending necessary time producing food), the mistake is not a moral mistake but a mistake of identifying self-interest. Presumably this lonely creature will begin to comprehend the distinctions between short and long run interests. However, it can be countered that in this world duties still apply; (Kantian) duties are those actions reason dictates ought to be pursued regardless of any gain or loss to the self or others. The deontologist asserts another moral sphere, namely impartial duties, which ought to be pursued. The problem with complicating the creature's world with duties, is defining an impartial task in a purely subjective world. Impartiality, it can be retorted, can only exist where there are competing selves, otherwise the attempt to be impartial in judging one's actions is a redundant exercise.

If we move away from the imaginary construct of a single being's world, ethical egoism comes under fire from more pertinent arguments. In complying with ethical egoism, the individual aims at his or her own greatest good. Ignoring a definition of the good for the present, it may justly be argued that pursuing one's own greatest good can conflict with another's pursuit, thus creating a situation of conflict. In a typical example, a young person may see his greatest good in murdering his rich uncle to inherit his millions. It is the rich uncle's greatest good to continue enjoying his money, as he sees fit. Accordingly conflict is an inherent problem of ethical egoism, and the model seemingly does not possess a conflict resolution system. With the additional premise of living in society, ethical egoism has much to respond to. Obviously there are situations when two people's greatest goods, their own self-interests, will conflict, and a solution to such dilemmas is a necessary element of any theory attempting to provide an ethical system.

The first resolution proceeds from a state of nature examination. If, in the wilderness, two people simultaneously come across the only source of drinkable water a dilemma arises if both make a claim to it. With no recourse to arbitration they must either accept an equal share of the water, which would comply with rational egoism (i.e., it is in the interests of both to share, for both may enjoy the water and each other's company, and if the water is inexhaustible, neither can gain from monopolising the source), but a critic can maintain that it is not necessarily in compliance with ethical egoism. Arguably, the critic continues, the two have no possible resolution and must therefore fight for the water. This is often the line taken against egoism, that it results in insoluble conflict that implies or necessitates a resort to force. The proffered resolution is therefore an acceptance of the might is right principle, that the stronger will take possession and thereby gains proprietary rights. But ethical egoism does not have to logically result in a Darwinian struggle between the strong and the weak; the two could co-operate (as rational egoism would require) and thereby both could mutually benefit. Against the critic's pessimism, the ethical egoist can retort that each can recognize that their greatest interests are served more through co-operation than conflict.

A second resolution to seemingly intractably moral dilemmas concerns the fears of critics that ethical egoists could logically pursue their interests at the cost of others. This however is a misreading of ethical egoism and an attempt to re-insert the might is right premise and thereby chastise the theory on the basis of a straw-man argument. In the case of the rich uncle and the greedy nephew, it is not the case that the nephew would act ethically by killing his uncle. The confusion results from conflating ethics with personal gain and criticising personal gain from another ethical standpoint that condemns murder. A counter-argument is that personal gain logically cannot be in one's best interests

if it entails doing harm to another: doing harm to another is to accept the principle of doing harm to others as being ethical (i.e., equating to one's own best interests), whereas reflection on the principle shows it to be illogical on universalist criteria. If the nephew were to attempt to do harm to further his interests, he would find that his uncle, or others, would do harm in return, and the argument returns to the conclusion of the first resolution: either accept the principle of might is right (which in most cases would be evidentially contrary to one's best interests) or accept that co-operation with others is a more successful approach to improving one's interests.

A third resolution entails the insertion of another standard-rights. This incorporates the conclusions of the first two resolutions by stating that there is an ethical framework that can logically be extrapolated from ethical egoism. Rights incorporate boundaries to behavior that reason or experience has shown to be contrary to the pursuit of self-interest. However, the logical extrapolation is the difficult bit. Whilst it is facile to argue that the greedy nephew does not have a right to claim his uncle's money, because it is not his but his uncle's, and that it is wrong to aggress against the person of another because that person has a legitimate right to live in peace (thus providing the substance of conflict-resolution for ethical egoism), the problem lies in the intellectual arguments required to substantiate the claims for the existence of rights and that they are somehow intricately connected to the pursuit of individual's greatest good.

Conditional Egoism

A final type of egoism is ethically conditional egoism, that is, egoism is morally acceptable or right if it leads to morally acceptable ends. For example, self-interested behavior can be accepted and applauded if it leads to the betterment of society as a whole; the ultimate test rests not on acting self-interestedly but on whether society is improved as a result. A famous example of this kind of thinking is from Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, in which Smith outlined the public benefits resulting from self-interested behavior (borrowing a theory from the earlier writer Bernard Mandeville and his *Fable of the Bees*). Smith wrote: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages." *Wealth of Nations*, I.ii.2.

As Smith himself admits, if egoistic behavior lends itself to society's detriment then it ought to be stopped. The theory of conditional egoism is thus dependent on a superior moral goal such as being in the common interest, the public good.

To conclude, whilst psychological egoism is fraught with the logical problem of collapsing to a closed theory and hence being one assumption that could validly be accepted as describing human motivation and morality, normative egoist theories engage in a philosophically more intriguing dialogue with protractors. Having evaluated some the theories' merits and demerits, it must be remembered that egoism is one normative model; it is opposed by altruistic theories that claim other people's interests should count for more than the individual's, and deontological theories that claim that neither self-interest nor the interests of others should partake in moral discourse and action.

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Emanation

DEFINITION AND DISTINCTIONS. The concept of emanation is that all derived or secondary things proceed or flow from the more primary. It is distinguished from the doctrine of creation by its elimination of a definite will in the first cause, from which all things are made to emanate according to natural laws and without conscious volition. It differs from the theory of formation at the hands of a supreme artisan who finds his matter ready to his hand, in teaching that all things, whether actually or only apparently material, flow from the primal principle. Unlike evolution, again, which includes the entire principle of the world, material and spiritual, in the process of development, emanation holds to the immutability of the first principle as to both quality and quantity, and also in the tendency of the development evolution implying one which goes from less to more perfect, while emanation involves a series of descending stages.

HINDU, ZOROASTRIAN, AND GREEK PHASES. In the Upanishads of the Veda several passages which point, if obscurely, to this doctrine. One frequently quoted passage asserts that "From this Atman originated space, and from space the wind, and from the wind the fire, and from fire water, and from water the earth, and from the earth plants, and from plants food, and from food the seed of man, and from the seed of man himself." This, however, does not clearly assert an emanation, but merely marks the stages of descent that separate man from the Atman. Attempts have often been made to derive the Gnostic doctrine of emanation from the Zoroastrian Avesta, but with doubtful success. Even if we may assume another higher power antecedent to the two hostile powers set forth in this dualistic system and comprising them both, still the independence of these two, as well as of the angels or half-divine beings who surround them, is not clearly asserted as owing to their emanation from the primal principle. In the ancient Egyptian religion, in which polytheism early appeared, there is no question of either emanation or evolution. In Greek philosophy emanations (aporrhoiai) occur at an early period, as in Empedocles, who accounts for sensual perceptions as emanations or effluxes proceeding from the objects perceived. Similarly Democritus spoke of effluxes of atoms from the thing perceived, by which images (eidola) are produced, which strike our senses. But these views do not come under the general head of emanation, since they do not touch the origin of the atoms. Nor does the teaching of the Hylozoists, like Heraclitus, with his doctrine of the transformation of all things into fire, and then of fire into all other things. The same is true of the Stoics; some of the later ones, like Marcus Aurelius, speak of the soul as an aporrhoia of God, but this means a part of God, not an emanation from an undiminished source. The first real mention of the doctrine in Greek or Hellenistic philosophy is in the Wisdom of Solomon, where wisdom is described as " the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence (aporrhoia) flowing from the glory of the Almighty." These and the following expressions may, indeed, be poetical, not involving a personification of wisdom apart from the Godhead; but the way in which wisdom is spoken of throughout the book makes for the conception of an independent cosmic power which is an efflux from the Godhead.

PHILO AND EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. The doctrine of emanation is a little more

explicit in Philo, though he does not teach it clearly and consciously, still less purely and logically. It assumes its most definite form for Greek philosophy in the works of the Neoplatonists -- though their speculations are largely derived from the Gnostic mythological systems of Basilides and Valentinus, in which emanation played a prominent part. According to Basilides, a whole series of eons emanated in successive stages from the unbegotten Father; and the Valentinians spoke of the primal essence as "throwing off " (*proballein*), without diminution, that which was derived from it. In the Neoplatonist system, the highest principle, the One, overflows without a conscious act, merely by a law of its nature, losing nothing of its fullness and this process has no end in time. It goes from more perfect to less perfect, and the ineffable Unity is the source of all plurality. The *Nous* (intellect), the first stage in the process, thinks, and thus from it emanate the soul and the *logos* (word). So the process goes on until the lowest stage is reached in essenceless matter. The notion of emanation was frequently used by the early Christian writers in the attempt to express the relation of the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father. The idea is similarly used by Athenagoras, Origen, and Arnobius- Tertullian even ventures to employ the Valentinian term *probola* for the relation of the Son to the Father, while repudiating the separation which Valentinus had taught between his eons. In the final establishment of the Trinitarian doctrine the idea of emanation undoubtedly played a part, as in the emphasis laid upon the Son's being " begotten, not made " (Nicene Creed), and the " procession" of the Holy Ghost; but the idea of descent to imperfection is lacking.

PSEUDO DIONYSIUS, SCHOLASTIC, AND MYSTIC DOCTRINE. A common misunderstanding regards Dionysius the Areopagite as of importance in the history of the doctrine of emanation. He does teach an efflux from God; but the heavenly hierarchy, with its various grades of perfection, does not arise by an emanation of one from the other; all have their origin directly from God, or the Highest Good. Erigena, referring much of his doctrine to Dionysius, makes use of a kind of creation which resembles the Neoplatonist emanation. His world of *causoe primordiales* is eternal, though not with God's eternity, but eternally created by or proceeding from God. Creation is a process through these to the visible and invisible creatures; it too is eternal; God is in the creation, and the creation in God. From Erigena the custom passed over to scholasticism of considering creation as a sort of emanation; but in the passage of Thomas Aquinas most frequently quoted in this connection (I., qu. xlv., art. 1) the specific character of emanation is so weakened as to be perceptible only in the fact that he does not draw a sharp dividing line between God and his powers and the world. In the mystics, despite their connection with scholasticism, the doctrine of emanation can scarcely be discovered in its pure form. But in the Jewish Cabala the emanationistic origin of the world is distinctly taught; the connection with Christian Gnosticism, with the Neoplatonists, and with Dionysius is evident. With the founders of modern metaphysics, Descartes and Spinoza, emanation plays no prominent part; but the logicians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries make use of the term *causa emanative* in contradistinction to *causa activa*. It is also found in Leibniz's conception of the relation between God and single monads; God is the primal unity, the monas primitive, which produces the created and derived monads.

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Empedocles (fl. 450 BCE.)

LIFE. Empedocles was a citizen of Agrigentum in Sicily. His date is roughly fixed for us by the well-attested fact that he went to Thourioi shortly after its foundation in 444/3 BCE. He was, therefore, contemporary with the meridian splendor of the Periclean age at Athens, and he must have met Herodotus and Protagoras at Thourioi. He was distinguished not only as a philosopher, but also for his knowledge of natural history and medicine, and as a poet and statesman. After the death of his father Meto, who was a wealthy citizen of Agrigentum, he acquired great weight among his fellow-citizens by espousing the popular party and favoring democratic measures. His consequence in the State became at length so great that he ventured to assume several of the distinctions of royalty, particularly a purple robe, a golden girdle, a Delphic crown, and a train of attendants. He combined scientific study with a mystical religion of the Orphic type, but he differed from Pythagoras in the direction his scientific inquires took, focusing on medicine, rather than mathematics. That accounts for the physiological interest that arks his speculations. The skill which he possessed in medicine and natural philosophy allowed him to perform many wonders, which he passed upon the multitude for miracles. He pretended to drive away noxious winds from his country and thereby put a stop to epidemic diseases. He is said to have checked, by the power of music, the madness of a young man who was threatening his enemy with instant death; to have restored a woman to life who had lain breathless thirty days; and to have done many other things, equally astonishing, after the manner of Pythagoras. Because of all this he was an object of universal admiration. Besides medical skill Empedocles possessed poetical talents. The fragments of his verses are scattered throughout the ancient writers; and Fabricius is of opinion that he was the real author of those ancient fragments which bear the name of the "Golden Verses of Pythagoras," and may be found printed at the end of Gottling's edition of Hesiod. His principal works were a didactic poem on Nature (Peri Phuseos), and another entitled Katharmoi, which seems to have recommended virtuous conduct as a means of averting disease. Gorgias of Leontini, the well-known orator, known as the "the Nihilist," was his pupil, from where it may seem reasonable to infer that Empedocles was a master of the art of eloquence. According to the common account he threw himself into the burning crater of Aetna, in order that the manner of his death might not be known, and that he might afterwards pass for a god; but the secret was discovered by means of one of his brazen sandals, which was thrown out from the mountain in a subsequent eruption of the volcano. This story is rejected, however, as fictitious by Strabo and other writers. According to Aristotle he died at sixty years of age.

PHILOSOPHY. His views in philosophy are variously given. By some he is called a Pythagorean, in consequence of a resemblance of doctrine in a few unessential points. But the principles of his theory evidently show that he belongs to the Eleatic School. He unreservedly accepts the doctrine of Parmenides that *what is* is uncreated and indestructible, and he only escapes from the further conclusions of the Eleatic by introducing the theory of elements or *roots*. Of these he assumed four -- fire, air, earth, and water, -- and in some respects this was a return to primitive views which the

Milesians had already left behind them. It must be noticed, however, that Empedocles discovered that what we call atmospheric air was a body, and was quite distinct from empty space on the one hand or from vapor or mist on the other. This he did by means of an experiment with the water-clock. He showed that air could keep water out of a vessel, and that the water could only enter as the air escaped.

Besides these four 'roots', Empedocles postulated something called *Love* (philia) to explain the attraction of different forms of matter, and of something called *Strife* (neikos) to account for their separation. He speaks of these quite distinctly as bodies. We start with something like the sphere of Parmenides, in which the four elements are mingled in a sort of solution by Love, while Strife surrounds the sphere on the outside. When Strife begins to enter the Sphere, Love is driven towards its center, and the four elements are gradually separated from one another. That is clearly an adaptation of the old idea of the world breathing. Empedocles also held, however, that respiration depended on the systole and diastole of the heart, and therefore we find that, as soon as Strife has penetrated to the lowest (or most central) part of the sphere, and Love is confined to the very middle of it, the reverse process begins. Love expands and Strife is driven outwards, passing out of the Sphere once more in proportion as Love occupies more and more of it. In fact, Love and Strife are to the world what blood and air are to the body.

Empedocles taught that originally All was one, a God eternal and at rest; a sphere and a mixture (sphairos, migma), without a vacuum, in which the elements of things were held together in indistinguishable confusion by love, the primal force which unites the like to like. In a portion of this whole, however, or, as he expresses it, in the members of the Deity, strife, the force which binds like to unlike, prevailed, and gave the elements a tendency to separate themselves, whereby the first became perceptible as such, although the separation was not so complete but that each contained portions of the others. Hence arose the multiplicity of things. The origin of organic life was ascribed to the increasing action of Strife. At the beginning of this world there were undifferentiated living masses, which were gradually differentiated, the fittest surviving. Empedocles also described how mortal beings arose in the period when Love was gaining the master, and when everything happened in just the opposite way to what we see in our world. In that case, the limbs and organs first arose in separation, and were then joined together at haphazard, so that monsters were produced, 'oxen with heads of men and men with heads of oxen.' This strange picture of a reversed evolution may possible have been suggested by the Egyptian monuments. But, as the forces of love and hate are constantly acting upon each other for generation or destruction, the present condition of things cannot persist forever, and the world which, properly, is not the All, but only the ordered part of it, will again be reduced to a chaotic unity, out of which a new system will be formed, and so on forever. There is no real destruction of anything, but only a change of combinations.

A world of perishable things such as we know can only exist when both Love and Strife are in the world. There will, therefore, be two births and two passings away of mortal things, one when Love is increasing and all the elements are coming together into one, the other when Strife is re-entering the Sphere and the elements are being separated once more. The elements alone are everlasting; the particular things we know are unstable compounds, which come into being as the elements 'run through one another' in one direction or another. They are mortal or perishable just because they have no substance of their own; only the 'four roots' have that. There is, therefore, no end to their death and destruction. Their birth is a mixture and their death is but the separation of what has been mixed. Nothing is imperishable but fire, air, earth and water, with the two forces of Love and

Strife.

Of the elements (which he seems to have been the first to describe as four distinct species of matter), fire, as the rarest and most powerful, he held to be the chief, and consequently, the soul of all sentient and intellectual beings which issue from the central fire, or soul of the world. The soul migrates through animal and vegetable bodies in atonement for some guilt committed in its disembodied state when it is a demon, of which he supposed that an infinite number existed. The seat of a demon, when in a human body, is the blood. Closely connected with this view of the objects of knowledge was his theory of human knowledge. In the impure separation of the elements it is only the predominant one that the senses can apprehend; and, consequently, though man can know all the elements of the whole singly, he is unable to see them in their perfect unity, wherein consists their truth. Empedocles therefore rejects the testimony of the sensed, and maintains that pure intellect alone can arrive at a knowledge of the truth. This is the attribute of the Deity, for man cannot overlook the work of love in all its extent; and the true unity is open only to itself. Hence he was led to distinguish between the world as presented to our senses (kosmos aisthetos) and its type, the intellectual world (kosmos noetos). Lucretius, who praises Empedocles highly even while criticizing his philosophy, appears to have taken him as a model. (Cf. Lucret. i. 716 foll.).

We have little information as to how Empedocles explained the constitution of particular things. He regarded the four elements, which could be combined in an indefinite number of portions, as adequate to explain them all, and he referred in this connection to the great variety painters can produce with only four pigments. He saw, however, that some combinations are possible, while others are not. Water mixes easily with wine, but not with oil.

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British Empiricism

"British Empiricism" refers to the 18th century philosophical movement in Great Britain which maintained that all knowledge comes from experience. Continental Rationalists maintained that knowledge comes from foundational concepts known intuitively through reason, such as innate ideas. Other concepts are then deductively drawn from these. British Empiricists staunchly rejected the theory of innate ideas and argued that knowledge is based on both sense experience and internal mental experiences, such as emotions and self-reflection. 18th century British Empiricists took their cue from Francis Bacon who, in the very first aphorism of his New Organon, hails the primacy of experience, particularly the observation of nature:

> Humans, who are the servants and interpreters of nature, can act and understand no further than they have observed in either the operation or the contemplation of the method and order of nature.

Although British Empiricists disavowed innate ideas, in favor of ideas from experience, it is important to note that the Empiricists did not reject the notion of instinct or innateness in general. Indeed, we have inborn propensities which regulate our bodily functions, produce emotions, and even direct our thinking. What Empiricists deny, though, is that we are born with detailed, picture-like, concepts of God, causality, and even mathematics.

Like Bacon, British Empiricists also moved away from deductive proofs and used an inductive method of arguing which was more conducive to the data of experience. In spite of their advocacy of inductive argumentation, though, British Empiricists still made wide use of deductive arguments. Commenting on the use of induction in the history of philosophy, 19th century Scottish philosopher James McCosh argues that induction is more representative of later Scottish philosophy than it is of earlier British Empiricism, specifically that of Locke:

> It cannot be denied that Locke does proceed very largely in the way of observation; but it is a curious circumstance that he nowhere professes to follow the method of induction; and his great work may be summarily represented as an attempt to establish by internal facts the preconceived theory, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. To the Scottish school belongs the merit of being the first, avowedly and knowingly, to follow the inductive method, and to employ it systematically in psychological investigation.

Three principal philosophers are associated with British Empiricism: John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. Occasionally 19th century philosopher J.S. Mill is added to this list. But even restricting the British Empiricist movement to the above figures is somewhat misleading. Until the rise of English idealism around 1850, all British philosophy after Locke bears the marks of his empiricism. More than any other philosopher, Locke was cited as an authority by philosophers, philosophical theologians, and political thinkers. Indeed, the lengthy article on

"metaphysics" in the first edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1773) is essentially a summary of Locke.

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Encyclopedists

"Encyclopedists" is the name usually applied to the group of French philosophers and men of letters who collaborated in the production of the famous *Encyclopedie*, or were in sympathy with its principles. The work was planned by Denis Diderot, and was announced as a *Dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts, et des metiers*. The intention was to provide a complete alphabetical treatment of the whole field of human knowledge from the standpoint of the "Enlightenment". The contributors included a number of remarkable men. First in importance, acting with Diderot on equal terms, was D'Alembert. A large part of the work was done by the Chevalier de Jaucourt, a man of encyclopedic learning. When he died in 1755, Montesquieu left behind an unfinished article on "Taste." Voltaire wrote some articles, and constantly advised on the development of the plan. Roussear contributed articles on music, but ultimately quarreled with the editors, whose plan was so different from his. Turgot wrote on economic subjects, and in the latter part of the work Haller, the physiologist, and Conddorcet were engaged.

The first volume appeared in 1751, the second in the following January, and immediately excited the antagonism of the Church and the conservatives. On February 12, 1752, the two volumes were suppressed by the Council, as containing maxims contrary to royal authority and to religion. Further publication was suspended for eighteen months, but from 1753 to 1757 it went on without interruption. After the seventh volume, the forces of conservatism rallied to a fresh attack. The sale of the volumes already printed; as well as the printing of any more, was forbidden. Diderot, however, made his plans to continue privately to prepare the remaining volumes. D'Alembert withdrew, but Diderot toiled on and completed the work (28 volumes, Paris, 1751-72). Andre Franois Lebreton acquired a large interest in the undertaking and all the contributions were set up as they were written, but when Diderot had corrected the last proof, Lebreton and his foreman, without informing his partners, secretly cut out such parts from each articles as he thought too radical or likely to give offense. In this way many of the best articles were mutilated, and to prevent the restoration of the eliminated matter, Lebreton burned the original manuscripts. Subsequently a supplement was published (5 volumes, Amsterdam, Paris, 1776-77), also an index (2 volumes, 17880).

The *Encyclopedie* was both a repository of information and a polemical arsenal. It was an idea of the editors that if civilization should by entirely destroyed, mankind might turn to their volumes to learn to reconstruct it. No other collection of general information so large and so useful was then in existence. Yet mere learning was not what lay nearest to the hearts of Diderot and his fellows; the prided themselves even more on the firm and bold philosophy of some of the writers. The metaphysics is founded chiefly on Locke, who "may be said to have created metaphysics as Newton created physics," by reducing the science to "what in fact should be the experimental physics of the soul." Beyond this there is little unity of opinion, though the same spirit rules throughout. It includes a prejudice in favor of democracy, as the ideal form of government, and the worship of theoretical equality, but contempt for the populace, "which discern"; the reduction of religion to

sentiments of morality and benevolence, and great dislike for its minister, especially the religious orders. By its generous professions of philosophic tolerance, and apparent acquiescence in what for the moment it was too weak to overpower, the philosophic school won a hearing for doctrines which were essentially subversive of the established order of things in both Church and State, and prepared the way for overt revolution.

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Environmental Ethics

Environmental ethics is a topic of applied ethics which examines the moral basis of environmental responsibility. In these environmentally conscious times, virtually everyone agrees that we need to be environmentally responsible. Toxic waste contaminates ground water, oil spills destroy shore lines, fossil fuels produce carbon dioxide thus adding to the greenhouse effect, and use of fluorocarbon gasses depletes the earth's protecting ozone layer. The goal of environmental ethics, then, is not to convince us that we should be concerned about the environment -- most of us already are. Instead, environmental ethics focuses on the moral foundation of environmental responsibility, and how far this responsibility extends. There are three distinct theories of moral responsibility to the environment. Although each supports environmental responsibility, their approaches are radically different.

The first of these theories is anthropocentric, or human centered. Environmental anthropocentrism is the view that all environmental responsibility is derived from human interests alone. The assumption here is that only human beings are morally significant persons and have a direct moral standing. Since the environment is crucial to human well-being and human survival, then we have an indirect duty towards the environment, that is, a duty which is derived from human interests. This involves the duty to assure that the earth remains environmentally hospitable for supporting human life, and that its beauty and resources are preserved so human life on earth continues to be pleasant. Some have argued that our indirect environmental duties derive both from the immediate benefit which living people receive from the environment, and the benefit that future generations of people will receive. But, critics have maintained that since future generations of people do not yet exist, then, strictly speaking, they cannot have rights any more than a dead person can have rights. Nevertheless, both parties to this dispute acknowledge that environmental concern derives solely from human interests.

A second general approach to environmental responsibility is an extension of the strong animal rights view discussed in the previous section. If at least some animals qualify as morally significant persons, then our responsibility toward the environment also hinges on the environmental interests of these animals. On this view, then, environmental responsibility derives from the interest of all morally significant persons, which includes both humans and at least some animals. Like anthropocentrism, though, environmental obligation is still indirect. The third and most radical approach to environmental responsibility, called eco-centrism, maintains that the environment deserves direct moral consideration, and not one which is merely derived from human (and animal) interests. The terminology used in the literature to express this direct responsibility is varied. It is suggested that the environment has direct rights, that it qualifies for moral personhood, that it is deserving of a direct duty, and that it has inherent worth. Common to all of these claims is the position that the environment by itself is on a moral par with humans.

LEOPOLD'S ECOCENTRISM. The position of ecocentrism is the view advocated by Aldo

Leopold in his highly influential essay "The Land Ethic" (1949), Leopold begins his essay explaining that morality has evolved over the millennia. The earliest notions of morality regulated conduct between individuals, as reflected in the Ten Commandments. Later notions regulated conduct between an individual and society, as reflected in the Golden Rule. Leopold argues that we are on the brink of a new advancement in morality which regulates conduct between humans and the environment, which he calls the land ethic. For all three of these phases in the evolution of ethics, the main premise of morality is that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. For Leopold, "The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land." This involves a radical shift in how humans perceive themselves in relation to the environment. Originally we saw ourselves as conquerors of the land. Now we need to see ourselves as members of a community which also includes the land. The role of conqueror is self-defeating, for it assumes that the conqueror knows all. Yet, clearly, we do not know all of the inner complexities of the environment. Leopold illustrates this by noting how human history has been altered by specific changes we have imposed on the environment.

Leopold attacks the current attitudes about environmental responsibility. One approach is that of current conservation education. For Leopold, this is merely a propaganda campaign which ultimately supports the position that environmental responsibility should be guided by what is financially beneficial for individual farmers and land owners. He provides an example of this from his own state of Wisconsin. What is needed, Leopold argues, is the development of an ecological conscience which will give rise to a land ethic. The main problem with economic-based approaches is that most species have no economic value. In the past, conservationists would invent economic values for specific plants or animals so that they would be given consideration. In spite of the good intentions of these conservationists, Leopold argues, this completely misses the point since these species deserve consideration "as a matter of biotic right." It also does not address the problem to simply make it the government's responsibility to protect these species. For, many of these ecosystems are in private lands which the government cannot control.

To help us develop a proper ecological conscience, Leopold argues that we need a specific mental image to focus on. He offers the image of the land pyramid. The land pyramid is the class of all food chains, where the higher levels depend on everything beneath it. From bottom to top, the basic layers of the pyramid are those of soil, plants, insects, insect eating animals, omnivores, and carnivores. Humans fall into the omnivore category along with raccoons and bears. Leopold explains that there is a continuous and upward flow of food energy in the pyramid, and that obstructions to the flow of energy at any level will damage the whole. Some geographical regions of the world, such as Europe and Japan, have been able to sustain human imposed environmental changes without damage. But other regions of the world have been less fortunate.

Leopold argues that in all areas of environmental conservation (forestry, wildlife, and agriculture) two distinct mindsets will become apparent. Some will see the land in terms of commodity production, which perpetuates the role of humans as conquerors. However, others will understand the land more broadly, where humans are but citizens of the land. The greatest obstacle toward achieving a land ethic, then, is the economic mindset. Leopold concludes by offering a principle which brings into focus the broader ethical concerns of the environment: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."

PROBLEMS WITH ECOCENTRISM. Although ecocentrism is bold and even inspirational in its

advocacy of environmental obligation, it is open to several criticisms, both in its consequentialist and nonconsequentialist formulations. Leopold's principle (in the previous paragraph) is a consequentialist formulation since the rightness of an action depends on how its consequences benefit the environment. However, as an act-consequentialist moral principle it must be rejected since it will not give rise to traditional rules of morality (such as prohibitions against stealing). It also fails as a rule-consequentialist principle since some traditional moral rules (such as those against stealing) may be logically inconsistent with the ultimate goal of environmental well-being. Thus, eco-centrism will only make sense as a non-consequentialist principle, particularly as a prima facie duty-based principle.

The challenge of duty-based eco-centrism, though, is to explain how conflicts are to be resolved between human-centered duties, and environment-centered duties. Different principles of resolution have been offered. Callicott suggests that, in cases of conflict, human-centered duties will always have priority over environment-centered duties. But his solution fails since many environment-centered duties actually outweigh human-centered duties. Heffernan suggests that, in principle, survival interests of humans outweigh non-survival interests of the environment. This fails, though, since counter examples illustrate that some non-survival human interests outweigh the survival interests of minor ecosystems. An adequate duty-based approach to environmental obligation requires prioritizing environmental duties according to a ranked importance of the various ecosystems in question. Conflicts between prioritized environmental and human duties, then, can only be resolved on a case by case basis. This, it seems, is the only version of normative eco-centrism which is even plausible.

However, at this stage eco-centrism is irrelevant to the entire normative process. For, the eco-centric and anthropocentric approaches will produce exactly the same list of prioritized environmental duties, and will resolve duties between human-centered and environment-centered duties with exactly the same outcome. Although eco-centrism fails as a normative theory, eco-centrism may have merit as a way of expressing emotional outrage at environmental damage and demanding change.

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Epictetus (c.55-c.135 CE.)

Epictetus was an eminent Stoic philosopher, born as a slave at Hieropolis in Phyrgia in 55 CE. The names of his parents are unknown; neither do we know how he was brought to Rome. But in Rome he was for some time a slave to Epaphroditus, a freedman of Nero, who had been one of his body-guards. Origen relates an anecdote about Epictetus which, if true, illustrates the fortitude of Epictetus, and also that Epaphroditus was a most cruel master. Epictetus, when his master was twisting his leg one day, smiled and quietly said, "You will break it"; and when he did break it, only observed, "Did I not tell you that you would do so?" It is not known how or when Epictetus managed to gain his freedom, but he could not have been still a slave when he left Rome because of an edict against philosophers at that time. This event, the only one in his life the date of which can be assigned, is said to have taken place in 89 CE., in the eighth year of Domitian's reign. Epictetus then retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, and it is a question whether he ever returned to Rome. The chief ground for believing that he did is a statement of Spartianus (*Hadr.*16), that Epictetus lived on terms of intimacy with the emperor Hadrian. It is true that his discourses contain frequent references to Nicopolis, and no internal evidence that they were delivered in Rome. However, this is not sufficient to overthrow the testimony of Spartianus. It is not known when he died. Suidas says that he lived till the reign of Marcus Aurelius, yet the authority or Aulus Gellius is strong on the other side. He, writing during the reign of the first Antonine, speaks of Epictetus, in two places, as being dead (*Noct. Att.* ii. 8; xvii. 19).

Epictetus led a life of exemplary contentment, simplicity, and virtue, practicing the morality which he taught. He lived in a small hut for a long while, with no other furniture than a bed and a lamp, and without an attendant. He benevolently adopted a child whom a friend had been compelled by poverty to give up; he also hired a nurse to look after the child. Epictetus was the most dominant teacher of Stoicism during the period of the Roman Empire. His lessons were principally, if not solely, directed to practical morality. His favorite maxim, and that into which he resolved all practical morality, was "bear and forbear," (*anexou kai apexou*). He appears to have differed from the Stoics on the subject of suicide, which he condemned. We are told by Arrian, in his Preface to the *Discourses*, that he was a powerful and inspiring lecturer; and, according to Origen (*c. Cels.* 7,*ad. init.*), his style was superior to that of Plato. It is a proof of the estimation in which Epictetus was held, that on his death, his lamp was purchased by an admirer for 3000 drachmas (several thousand dollars by today's standards). Though it is said by Suidas that Epictetus wrote much, there is good reason to believe that he himself wrote nothing. His *Discourses* were taken down by his pupil Arrian, and published after his death in eight books, of which four remain. Arrian also compiled the *Euchiridion* or "manual," an abstract of the teaching of his master, and wrote a life of Epictetus, which is lost. Some fragments have been preserved, however, by Stobaeus. Simplicius has also left an eclectic commentary on his doctrine.

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Epicurus (342-270 BCE.)

LIFE. Epicurus was born in the year 342 BCE. on the island of Samos, to where father had gone from Athens, in 352 BCE., among 2000 colonists then sent out by the Athenians. Yet he was an Athenian by right, belonging to the deme Gargettus and to the tribe Aegels. His father Neocles is said to have been a school-master, and his mother Chaeristrata to have practiced arts of magic, in which it was afterwards made a charge against Epicurus that, when he was young, he assisted her (Diog. Lagrt. x. 4). Having passed his early years in Samoa and Teos, he went to Athens at the age of eighteen. He had begun to study philosophy when only fourteen, from a desire to understand Hesiod's description of chaos, which the teachers to whom he had applied had failed to satisfy. In Samos he is said to have received lessons from Pamphilus, a follower of Plato (Cic. N. D. i. 26). On the occasion of this his first visit to Athens, Epicurus stayed there for a very short time. He left it in consequence of the measures taken by Perdiccas after the death of Alexander the Great, and went to Colophon to join his father. In 310 BCE., he went to Mitylene, where he set up a school. Staying only one year at this latter place, he next proceeded to Lampsacus, where he taught for four years. He returned to Athens in the year 306 BCE., and now founded the school which ever after was named from him the Epicurean. He purchased a garden (*Khpoi Epikoupou*) for eighty miuae (about $1450), in which he lived with his disciples and deliver his lectures, and henceforth remained in Athens, with the exception only of two or three visits to his friends in Asia Minor.

The period at which Epicurus opened his school was peculiarly favorable. In place of the simplicity of the Socratic doctrine, nothing now remained but the subtlety and affectation of Stoicism, the unnatural severity of the Cynics, or the debasing doctrine of indulgence taught and practiced by the followers of Aristippus. Hence the popularity of his school. Epicurus is said by Diogenes Laertius (x. 9) to have had so many pupils that even whole cities could not contain them. Hearers came to him from distant places; and while men often deserted other schools to join that of Epicurus, there were only two instances, at most, of Epicurus being deserted for any other teacher. Epicurus and his pupils lived together in the garden of which we have spoken, in a state of friendship, which, as it is usually represented, could not be surpassed. They did not put their property together since such a plan implied mutual distrust. The friendship subsisting between Epicurus and his pupils is commemorated by Cicero (De Fin. i. 20). In this garden, too, they lived in the most frugal and decorous manner though it was the delight of the enemies of Epicurus to represent it differently, and though Timocrates, who had once been his pupil and had abandoned him, spread such gossip as that Epicurus used to vomit twice a day after a excessive eating and that prostitutes were inmates of the garden. An inscription over the gate of the garden told him who might be disposed to enter that barley cakes and water would be the fare provided for him (Sen. Ep. 31); and such was the chastity of Epicurus that one of his principal opponents, Chrysippus, endeavored to account for it, so as to deny him any merit, by saying that he was without passions (Stob. Serm. 117). Epicurus remained unmarried, in order that he might be able to prosecute philosophy without interruption. His most attached friends and pupils were Herniachus of

Mitylene, whom he appointed by will to succeed him as master of the school; Metrodorus, who wrote several books in defense of his system; and polyaenus. Epicurus' three brothers, Neocles, Chaeredemus, and Aristobulus, also followed his philosophy, as also one of his servants, Mys, whom at his death be made free. Besides the garden in Athens, from which the followers of Epicurus, in succeeding time, came to be named "the philosophers of the garden " (Juiv. Sat. xiii. 122; xiv. 319), Epicurus possessed a house in Melite, a village near Athens, to which be used often to retire with his friends. He died from a stone in the bladder in 270 BCE, at the age of 72, and had then been settled in Athens as a teacher for thirty-six years.

On his death be left this house, together with the garden, to Hermachus, as head of the school, to be left by him again to whoever might be his successor. The Epicurean school was carried on, after Hermachus, by Polystratus and many others, concerning whom nothing is known; and the doctrines which Epicurus had taught underwent few modifications. When introduced among the Romans, these doctrines, though very much opposed at first, were yet adopted by many distinguished men, as Lucretius, Atticus, and Horace. Under the emperors, Pliny the Younger and Lucian of Sainosata were noted Epictireaus.

Our chief sources of information respecting the doctrines of Epicurus are the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius and the poem of Lucretius, De Berunt Natura. Information is also furnished by the writings of Cicero, especially the De Finibus and the De Natura Deorum; by those of Seneca, and by the treatise of Plutarch, "Against Colotes." Epicurus, according to Diogenes Laertius, was a more voluminous writer having written as many as 300 volumes, in all of which he is said to have studiously avoided making quotations. All that now remains of his works are the philosophical letters and principal doctrines contained in the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius, and parts of two books of his treatise on Nature which were discovered at Herculaneum.

PHYSICS AND ETHICS. In physics Epicurus trod pretty closely in the footsteps of Democritus; so much so, indeed, that he was accused of taking his atomic cosmology from that philosopher without acknowledgment. He made very few unimportant alterations. According to Epicurus, as also to Democritus and Leucippus before him, the universe consists of two parts, matter (*soma*) and space, or vacuum (*to kenon*), in which matter exists and moves; and all matter, of every kind and form, is reducible to certain indivisible particles or atoms (*atomoi*), which are eternal. These atoms, moving, according to a natural tendency, straight downward, and also obliquely, have thereby come to form the different bodies which are found in the world, and which differ in kind and shape, according as the atoms are differently placed in respect to one another. It is clear that, in this system, a creator is dispensed with; and indeed Epicurus, here again following Democritus, set about to prove, in an a priori way, that this creator could not exist, inasmuch as nothing could arise out of nothing, any more than it could utterly perish and becoming nothing. The atoms have existed always, and always will exist; and all the various physical phenomena are brought about, from time to time, by their various motions. The soul itself is made of a finer and more subtle kind of atoms, which, when the body dies and decays, separate and are dissipated. The various processes of sense are explained on the principles of materialism. From the surfaces of all objects continually flow thin, filmy images of things (*eidola*), which, by impact on the organism, cause the phenomena of vision, hearing, etc.

In his ethical teachings, Epicurus set out with the two facts that people are susceptible of pleasure and pain and that he seeks the one and avoids the other, Epicurus declared that it is a person's duty to endeavor to increase to the utmost his pleasures and diminish to the utmost his pains-choosing that which tends to pleasure rather than that which tends to pain, and that which

tends to a greater pleasure or to a lesser pain rather than that which tends respectively to a lesser pleasure or a greater pain. He used the terms pleasure and pain in the most comprehensive way, as including pleasure and pain of both mind and body; and esteemed the pleasures and pains of the mind as incomparably greater than those of the body. The highest pleasure, then, is peace of mind (*atapaxia*, *aponia*), and this comes from phronesis or the ability to decide what line of conduct will best secure true happiness. Death, he says, is not to be feared, for " where we are, death is not; and where death is, we are not."

CRITICISMS. The charges brought against Epicurus are that he superseded all religious principles by dismissing the gods from the care of the world; that if be acknowledged their existence, it was only in conformity to popular prejudice, since, according to his system, nothing exists in nature but material atoms; that he showed great insolence and vanity in the disrespect with which lie treated the memory of former philosophers and the characters and persons of his contemporaries; and that both he and his disciples were addicted to the grossest sensuality. With respect to this first charge, it certainly admits of no refutation. The doctrine of Epicurus concerning nature militated directly against the agency of a Supreme Being in the formation and government of the world, and his misconceptions with respect to mechanical motion and the nature of divine happiness led him to divest the Deity of some of his primary attributes. It is not true, however, that he entirely denied the existence of superior powers. Cicero charges him, with inconsistency in having written books concerning piety and the reverence due to the gods, and in maintaining that the gods ought to be worshipped, while be asserted that they had no concern in human affairs. That there was an inconsistency in this is obvious. But Epicurus professed that the universal prevalence of the ideas of gods was sufficient to prove that they existed; and, thinking it necessary to derive these ideas, like all other ideas, from sensations, be imagined that the gods were beings of human form and made known to men by the customary emanations. He believed that these gods were eternal and supremely happy, living in the intermundane spaces (*metakosmia*) in a state of quiet, and meddling not with the affairs of the world. He contended that they were to be worshipped on account of the excellence of their nature, and not because they could do men either good or harm (Cic. N. D. i. 41; Sen. Ben. iv. 19).

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Erasmus (1466-1536)

LIFE. Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus, Dutch humanist and theologian, was born at Rotterdam, Holland, October 27, probably 1466. He died at Basel, Switzerland, on July 12, 1536. Information about his family and his early life comes from a few meager accounts he himself wrote or suggested at a somewhat advanced age, and from the many vague references which appear in his writings at all periods of his life. It appears he was born out of wedlock, but was well cared for by his parents until their early death. He received the best education open to a young man of his day in a series of monastic or semi-monastic schools. In light of later experience, he presents his early education as a long conspiracy to force him into the monastic life, but for this there exists no other evidence. He was admitted to the priesthood and took the monastic vows in 1492, but there is no record he ever exercised the priestly functions. Ironically, monasticism was one of the chief objects of attack in his lifelong assault upon what he saw as the faults of the Roman Catholic Church.

In 1495, Erasmus went to study theology at the University of Paris, then the chief seat of the later scholastic learning. Erasmus, however, found life at the university distasteful and soon departed. The chief centers of his activity from then on were Paris, France; Louvain, Belgium; Basel, Switzerland; and various parts of England. His residences in England were fruitful in the making of lifelong friendships with Thomas More, John Colet, Thomas Linacre, and William Grocynthe, leaders of English thought in the days of Henry VIII. For a time he held an honorable position as Lady Margaret professor of divinity at Cambridge, and was also offered many positions of honor and profit in the academic world. He declined all of them on one pretext or another because he apparently preferred the less certain rewards of independent literary activity. He lived three years in Italy, from 1506-09. Part of this time was spent in connection with the publishing house of Aldus Manutius at Venice, but otherwise he was far less active in association with Italian scholars than might have been expected. In Belgium, Erasmus was exposed to the petty criticism of men nearer to him in blood and political connections, but hostile to all the principles of literary and religious progress to which he was devoting his life. This lack of sympathy, which he represented as persecution, caused him to seek refuge in the more congenial atmosphere of Basel. Under the shelter of Swiss hospitality he could express himself with freedom and was always surrounded by devoted friends. It was in Basal that for many years he associated with the great publisher Froben. Also during this time, Erasmus, having been told by the church to return to the monastery, sought and received a dispensation from Pope Leo X which granted him the privilege of remaining in the world.

Erasmus was one of the most prominent and vocal scholars of his age, and was known throughout Europe. He was involved most notably in discussions concerning the state of the church. He felt called upon to use his learning in a purification of the doctrine and in a liberalizing of the institutions of Christianity. He began as a scholar, trying to free the methods of scholarship from the rigidity and formalism of medieval traditions, but was not satisfied with this. He conceived of himself as, above all else, a preacher of righteousness, and was convinced that what was needed to

regenerate Europe was sound learning, applied frankly and fearlessly to the administration of public affairs in Church and State. It is this conviction that gives unity and consistency to a life which, at first sight, seems to have been full of fatal contradictions. Erasmus was a marked individual, holding himself aloof from all entangling obligations; yet he was, in a singularly true sense, the center of the literary movement of his time. In his correspondence, he put himself in touch with more than five hundred men of the highest importance in the world of politics and of thought, and his advice on all kinds of subjects was eagerly sought, and readily followed.

At the close of his life, Erasmus found himself at odds with both the great parties in the battle over the Protestant Reformation. His last years were embittered by controversies with men toward whom he was drawn by many ties of taste and sympathy. When the city of Basel was definitely and officially "reformed" by Protestants in 1529, Erasmus gave up his residence there and settled in the imperial town of Freiburg-im-Breisgau. It would seem as if he found it easier to maintain his neutrality under Roman Catholic than under Protestant conditions. His literary activity continued without much abatement, chiefly on the lines of religious and didactic composition. For unknown reasons, Erasmus was eventually drawn once again to Basel in 1535, after an absence of six years. Here, in the midst of the group of Protestant scholars who had long been his truest friends, and, so far as is known, without relations of any sort with the Roman Catholic Church, he died. Throughout the entirety of his life he had never been called to account for his opinions by any official authority of the dominant Church. The attacks upon him were by private persons, and his protectors had always been men of the highest standing. After his death, in the zeal of the Roman Catholic reaction, his writings were honored with a distinguished place on the Index of prohibited books, and his name has generally had an evil sound in Roman Catholic ears. The extraordinary popularity of his books, however, has been shown in the immense number of editions and translations that have appeared from the sixteenth century until now, and in the undiminished interest excited by his elusive but fascinating personality.

WRITINGS. Erasmus has been most widely known for his critical and satirical writings, such as the *Praise of Folly* (Paris, 1509) and many of the Colloquia, which appeared at intervals from 1500 on. These appeal to a wider audience and deal with matters of wider human interest. Yet their author seems to have regarded them as the trifles of his intellectual product, the play of his leisure hours. His more serious writings begin early with the Enchiridion Alilitis Christioni, the *Manual (or Dagger) of the Christian Gentleman* (1503). In this little volume Erasmus outlines the views of the normal Christian life which he was to spend the rest of his days in elaborating. The key-note of it all is sincerity. The chief evil of the day, he says, is formalism, a respect for traditions, a regard for what other people think essential, but never a thought of what the true teaching of Christ may be. The remedy is for every man to ask himself at each point: what is the essential thing? and to do this without fear. Forms are not in themselves evil. It is only when they hide or quench the spirit that they are to be dreaded. In his examination of the special dangers of formalism, Erasmus pays his respects to monasticism, saint-worship, war, the spirit of class, the foibles of " society," in the fashion which was to make his later reputation as a satirist, but the main impression of the Enchiridion is distinctly that of a sermon. A companion piece to the Enchiridion is the *Institutio Principis Christiani* (Basel, 1516), written as advice to the young king Charles of Spain, later the emperor Charles V. Here Erasmus applies the same general principles of honor and sincerity to the special functions of the Prince, whom he represents throughout as the servant of the people. While in England Erasmus began the systematic examination of manuscripts of the New Testament to prepare for a new edition and Latin translation. This edition was published by

Froben of Basel in 1516 and was the basis of most of the scientific study of the Bible during the Reformation period It was the first attempt on the part of a competent and liberal-minded scholar to ascertain what the writers of the New Testament had actually said. Erasmus dedicated his work to Pope Leo X. as a patron of learning, to whom such an application of scholarship to religion must be welcome, and he justly regarded this work as his chief service to the cause of a sound Christianity. Immediately after he began the publication of his Paraphrases of the New Testament, a popular presentation of the contents of the several books. These, like all the writing of Erasmus, were in Latin, but they were at once translated into the common languages of the European peoples, a process which received the hearty approval of Erasmus himself.

IN PRAISE OF FOLLY. While visiting fellow humanist Thomas More in 1509, he composed *In Praise of Folly* (Encomium Moriae), his most famous and controversial work. Modeled after Lucian's classic Charon, the essay is written as an oratory delivered by the personification of Folly, in which Folly ironically praises foolish activities of the day. Included are attacks on superstitious religious practices, uncritical theories held by traditional scientists, and the vanity of Church leaders. Erasmus attacks superstitious folk beliefs in ghosts and goblins as well as Christian rituals involving prayers to the saints. One such superstition involved the sale of indulgence certificates by the Catholic church. An indulgence is a remission punishment for a sin which reduces the time which a person spends in purgatory. To raise money for lavish building projects, Popes authorized the sale of indulgence certificates which could remit punishment for either living people or the souls of the dead currently in purgatory. Erasmus continues satirizing an array of people and occupations, including peasants, poets, rhetoricians, layers and narrow-minded natural scientists. He turns to members of his own vocation: those who have taken monastic vows. They are neither religious nor monastic, and are too preoccupied with ritual. Although they take vows of poverty, they nevertheless make a of money through begging. Pulling no punches, Erasmus attacks the behavior of church leaders at the highest levels. The bishops live like princes. He argues that their true function would be evident if they noted the symbolism of their attire. Their vestments represent a blameless life; their forked miter hats represent knowledge of the Old and New Testaments; their gloves represent freedom from contact with worldly business; their staff represents caring for their flock; the cross carried before them in processions represents victory over all earthly affections. The word "bishop" signifies that they are to labor, care, and trouble. Although cardinals are successors of the apostles, they too neglect their true function also represented by their attire. For example, the upper white garment signifies the remarkable and singular integrity of life. If they focused on their true responsibilities, they would not want to have the job. Popes take the place of Christ, and should try to imitate Christ's life, specifically his poverty, labor, doctrine, cross, and contempt of life. However, they seem to be more concerned with financial gain.

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REFORMATION. The outbreak of the Lutheran movement in the year following the publication of the New Testament brought the severest test of Erasmus's personal and scholarly character. It made the issue between European society and the Roman Church system so clear that no man could quite escape the summons to range himself on one side or the other of the great debate. Erasmus, at the height of his literary fame, was inevitably called upon to take sides, but partisanship in any issue which he was not at liberty himself to define was foreign equally to his nature and his habits. In all his criticism of clerical follies and abuses he had always carefully hedged himself about with protests that he was not attacking church institutions themselves and had no enmity toward the persons of churchmen. The world had laughed at his

satire, but only a few obstinate reactionaries had seriously interfered with his activities. He had a right to believe that his work so far had commended itself to the best minds and also to the dominant powers in the religious world. There can be no doubt that Erasmus was in sympathy with the main points in the Lutheran criticism of the Church. For Luther personally he had and expressed the greatest respect, and Luther always spoke with admiration of his superior learning. Luther would have gone to great lengths in securing his cooperation in a work which seemed only the natural outcome of his own. When Erasmus hesitated or refused this seemed to the upright and downright Luther a mean avoidance of responsibility explicable only as cowardice or unsteadiness of purpose, and this has generally been the Protestant judgment of later days. On the other hand the Roman Catholic party was equally desirous of holding on to the services of a man who had so often declared his loyalty to the principles it was trying, to maintain, and his half-heartedness in declaring himself now brought upon him naturally the suspicion of disloyalty from this side. Recent judgments of Erasmus, however, have shown how consistent with all his previous practice his attitude toward the Reformation really was. The evils he had combated were either those of form, such as had long been a subject of derision by all sensible men, or they were evils of a kind that could be cured only by a long and slow regeneration in the moral and spiritual life of Europe. Get rid of the absurdities, restore learning, to its rights, insist upon a sound practical piety, and all these evils would disappear: this was the program of the " Erasmian Reformation." No one could question its soundness or its desirability. Its fatal lack was that it failed to offer any tangible method of applying these principles to the existing church system. This kind of reform had been tried long enough, and men were impatient of further delay. When Erasmus was charged-and very justly-with having " laid the egg that Luther hatched " he half admitted the truth of the charge, but said he had expected quite another kind of a bird.

In their early correspondence Luther expressed in unmeasured terms his admiration for all Erasmus had done in the cause of a sound and reasonable Christianity, and exhorted him now to put the seal upon his work by definitely casting in his lot with the Lutheran party. Erasmus replied with many expressions of regard, but declined to commit himself to any party attitude. His argument was that to do so would endanger his position as a leader in the movement for pure scholarship which he regarded as his real work in life. Only through that position as an independent scholar could he hope to influence the reform of religion. The constructive value of Luther's work was mainly in furnishing a new doctrinal basis for the hitherto scattered attempts at reform. In reviving the half forgotten principle of the Augustinian theology Luther had furnished the needed impulse to that personal interest in religion which is the essence of Protestantism. This was precisely what Erasmus could not approve. He dreaded any change in the doctrine of the Church and believed that there was room enough within existing formulas for the kind of reform he valued most. Twice in the course of the great discussion he allowed himself to enter the field of doctrinal controversy, a field foreign alike to his nature and his previous practice. One of the topics formally treated by him was the freedom of the will, the crucial point in the whole Augustinian system. In his *De libero arbitrio* (1524), he analyzes with great cleverness and in perfect good temper the Lutheran exaggeration, as it seemed to him, of the obvious limitations upon human freedom. As Ms habit was, he lays down both sides of the argument and shows that each had its element of truth. His position was practically that which the Church had always taken in its dealing with the problem of sin: that Man was bound to sin, but that after all he had a right to the forgiving mercy of God, if only he would seek this through the means offered him by the Church itself. It was an easy-going Semi-Pelagianism, humane in its practice, but opening the way to those

very laxities and perversions which Erasmus and the Reformers alike were combating. The " Diatribe," clever as it was, could not lead men to any definite action, and this was precisely its merit to the Erasmians and its offense to the Lutherans.

DOCTRINE OF THE EUCHARIST. As the popular response to the Lutheran summons become more marked and more widely spread, the social disorders which Erasmus dreaded began to appear. The Peasants' War, the Anabaptist disturbances in Germany and in the Low Countries, iconoclasm and radicalism everywhere, seemed to confirm all his gloomy predictions. If this were to be the outcome of reform, he could only be thankful he had kept out of it. On the other hand, he was being ever more bitterly accused of having started the whole " tragedy." In Switzerland he was especially exposed to criticism through his association with men there who were more than suspected of extreme rationalistic doctrines. On this side the test question was naturally the doctrine of the sacraments, and the crux of this question was the observance of the Eucharist. Partly to clear himself of suspicion and partly in response to demands that lie should write something in defense of Catholic doctrine, he published in 1530 a new edition of the orthodox treatise of Algerus against the heretic Berengar of Tours in the eleventh century. He added a dedication in which he affirms positively his belief in the reality of the body of Christ after consecration in the Eucharist, but admits that the precise form in which this mystery ought to be expressed is t matter on which very diverse opinions have been held by good men. Enough, however, for the mass of Christians that the Church prescribes the doctrine and the usages that embody it, while the refinements of speculation about it may safely be left to the philosophers. Here and there in many vehement utterances on this subject Erasmus lays down the principle, quite unworthy of his genius and his position of influence: that a man may properly have two opinions on religious subjects, one for himself and his intimate friends and another for the public. The anti--

were, as Erasmus says, quoting him as holding views about the Eucharist quite similar to their own. He denies this with great heat, but in his denial betrays the fact that he had in private conversation gone just ,is far toward a rational view of the doctrine of the Eucharist as he could without a positive formulation in words. Naturally here, ,is in the case of free will, lie could not command the approval of the Church he was trying to placate.

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Ethics

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INTRODUCTION. The field of ethics, also called moral philosophy, involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior. Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. *Metaethics* investigates where our ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Are they merely social inventions? Do they involve more than expressions of our individual emotions? Metaethical answers to these questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the will of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves. *Normative ethics* involves a more practical task, which is to arrive at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. Should I borrow my roommate's car without first asking him? Should I steal food to support my starving family? Ideally, these moral questions could be immediately answered by consulting the moral guidelines provided by normative theories. Finally, *applied ethics* involves examining specific controversial issues, such as abortion, infanticide, animal rights, environmental concerns, homosexuality, capital punishment, or nuclear war. By using the conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics, discussions in applied ethics try to resolve these controversial issues.

The lines of distinction between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics are often blurry. For example, the issue of abortion is an applied ethical topic since it involves a specific type of controversial behavior. But it also depends on more general normative principles, such as the right of self-rule and the right to life, which are litmus tests for determining the morality of that procedure. The issue also rests on metaethical issues such as, "where do rights come from?" and "what kind of beings have rights?"

METAETHICS. The term "meta" means *after* or *beyond*, and, consequently, the notion of metaethics involves a removed, or bird's eye view of the entire project of ethics. We may define metaethics as the study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts. When compared to normative ethics and applied ethics, the field of metaethics is the least precisely defined area of moral philosophy. Three issues, though, are prominent: (1) *metaphysical* issues concerning whether morality exists independently of humans; (2) *psychological* issues concerning what motivates us to be moral; and (3) *linguistic* issues concerning the meaning of key ethical terms.

Metaphysical Issues in Metaethics. "Metaphysics" is the study of the kinds of things that exist in the universe. Some things in the universe are made of physical stuff, such as rocks, and perhaps other things are nonphysical in nature, such as thoughts, spirits, and gods. The metaphysical component of metaethics involves discovering specifically whether moral values are eternal truths that exist in a spirit-like realm, or simply human conventions. *Moral realism* is the view that moral principles have an objective foundation, and are not based on subjective human convention. There are two main types of moral realism. The first is commonly associated with Plato and is inspired by the field of mathematics. When we look at numbers and mathematical relations, such as 1+1=2, they seem to be timeless concepts that never change, and apply everywhere in the universe. Humans do not invent numbers, and humans ca not alter them. Plato explained the eternal character of mathematics by stating that they are *abstract entities* that exist in a spirit-like realm. He noted that moral values also are absolute truths and thus are also abstract, spirit-like entities. In this sense, for Plato, moral values as spiritual *objects*. Medieval philosophers commonly grouped all moral principles together under the heading of "eternal law" which were also frequently seen as spirit-like objects. 17th century British philosopher Samuel Clarke described them as spirit-like *relationships* rather than spirit-like objects. In either case, though, they exist in a sprit-like realm.

A second type of moral realism is that moral values are *divine commands* issuing from God's will. Sometimes called *voluntarism*, this view was inspired by the Judeo-Christian notion of an all-powerful God who is in control of everything. God simply wills things, and they become reality. He wills the physical world into existence, he wills human life into existence and, similarly, he wills all moral values into existence. Proponents of this view, such as medieval philosopher William of Ockham, believe that God wills moral principles, such as "murder is wrong," and these exist in God's mind as commands. God informs humans of these commands by implanting us with moral intuitions or revealing these commands in scripture.

The opposite view of moral realism is called *moral skepticism*, which denies any objective status of moral values. Technically moral skeptics do not reject moral values themselves. They simply deny that moral values exist as spirit-like objects, or as divine commands in the mind of God. Moral skepticism is closely associated with a position called *moral relativism*, which is the view that moral standards are grounded in social approval. With some moral values, social approval seems to vary from culture to culture. For example, in Mainland China, abortion is recognized as an important tool for population control. In the Republic of Ireland, though, abortions are not readily available even when the life of a mother is at risk. Other moral values are more fixed from culture to culture, such as prohibitions against stealing. Even these, though, are grounded in social approval insofar as similar social needs give rise to similar moral rules.

Psychological Issues in Metaethics. A second area of metaethics involves the psychological basis of our moral actions, particularly, understanding what motivates humans to be moral. Moral philosophers commonly ask the general question, "Why be moral?" A variety of answers may be given. We act morally to avoid punishment, to gain praise, to attain happiness, to be dignified, or to fit in with society. Moral psychology looks beneath the surface of these answers and attempts to identify the internal psychological factors that are ultimately responsible for moral motivation. As soon as philosophers began dissecting the human psyche and cataloging various human mental faculties, philosophers also tried linking many of these with moral motivation. Four especially noteworthy areas of moral psychology will be noted here in chronological order. First, an early theory of moral psychology was that our sense of

right and wrong was a product of a rational ability called *practical wisdom*. According to ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, our faculty of practical wisdom intuitively grasps our ultimate purpose in life and tells us the best way to achieve happiness. Medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas held that a related faculty called *synderesis* feeds us an intuition of our moral obligation. For Aquinas, when God created us as rational creatures, he gave us this faculty so we could tap into a special realm of moral truths.

A second area of moral psychology concerns the inherent selfishness of humans. 17th century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes held that many, if not all, of our actions are prompted by selfish desires. Even if an action seems selfless, such as donating to charity, there are still selfish causes for this, such as experiencing power over other people. This view is called *psychological egoism* and maintains that self-oriented interests ultimately motivate all human actions, with no exception. Closely related to psychological egoism is a view called *psychological hedonism* which is the view that *pleasure* is the driving force behind all of our actions. 18th century British philosopher Joseph Butler agreed that instinctive selfishness and pleasure prompt much of our conduct. However, Butler argued that we also have an inherent psychological capacity to show benevolence to others. This view is called *psychological altruism* and maintains that at least some of our actions are motivated by instinctive benevolence.

A third area of moral psychology involves a dispute concerning the role of reason in motivating moral actions. 18th century British philosopher David Hume championed the view that only emotions can motivate people to act morally. Purely rationally considerations have no influence on actions. In Hume's words, "reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions." 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant took an opposing stance. Although emotional factors do influence our conduct, we should resist this kind of sway. Instead, true moral action is motivated only by reason when it is free from emotions and desires. A recent rationalist approach, offered by Kurt Baier, focuses more broadly on the reasoning and argumentation process that takes place when making moral choices. All of our moral choices are, or at least can be, backed by some reason or justification. If I claim that it is wrong to steal someone's lawn furniture, then I should be able to justify my claim with some kind of argument. For example, I could argue that stealing Smith's lawn furniture is wrong since this would upset her, violate her ownership rights, or put the thief at risk of getting caught. According to Baier, then, proper moral decision making involves giving the best reasons in support of one course of action versus another.

Finally, since the middle of the 19th century, the field of psychology split off from philosophy and discussion of moral psychology was affected by this change. Philosophers by and large avoided references to psycho-physiological functions. Psychologists all but abandoned exploring moral psychology. A recent exception in the field of psychology is Lawrence Kohlberg's attempt to trace the development of moral thinking in adolescents and young adults. Kohlberg (1927-1987) presented his subjects with a series of moral dilemmas, such as whether it is permissible to steal food to feed one's starving family. He then noted the reasoning his subjects used in justifying their particular decisions. Kohlberg concluded that there are five levels of moral development that young people go through. In the first stage, starting at about age ten, people avoid breaking moral rules to avoid punishment. In the second stage, people follow moral rules only when it is to their advantage. In the third stage, starting about age 17, people try to live up to what is expected of them in small social groups, such as families. In the fourth stage, people fulfill the expectations of larger social groups, such as obeying laws that keep society together. In the fifth and final stage, starting at about age 24, people are guided by both absolute and relative moral principles; they follow these for altruistic reasons, though, and not because of what

they might gain individually. According to Kohlberg, few people ever reach this level.

Linguistic Issues in Metaethics. A large part of morality involves assessing people's conduct and pronouncing judgments, such as "Ted is a good person," "Bob did the right thing," and "We should all donate to charity." When we make these assessments, we rely on key terms such as "good," "right," "ought," and "should." In the early 20th century, British and American philosophers argued that if we want to fully understand morality, we must analyze the meaning of the key moral terms we use. Dozens of books appeared which minutely analyzed the nuances of these words. Today this somewhat tedious approach has lost much of its appeal. However, these discussions brought to light several aspects of moral judgments that philosophers previously overlooked. Sometimes we use language to *describe* things, such as "the door is brown." Other times we use language to *accomplish* something, such as "get away from that hot stove!" This is also the case with moral utterances such as "We should all donate to charity" which (a) attempts to *describe* the notion of charity, and (b) also attempts to *accomplish* something, such as motivate us to donate to charity.

The descriptive component of ethical statements is called its *cognitive meaning*. For example, if I say, "We should all donate to charity," I am describing charity as a good thing. I might also be describing charity as the kind of act that makes people happy, or that increases the quantity of pleasure in the world, or that God endorses, or that conforms with universal truth. In all of these cases, I am linking the notion of charity with some moral quality. Some of these qualities are *natural* in the sense that they are part of the physical world, such as human experiences of happiness or pleasure. Other qualities are *nonnatural* in the sense that they are more spirit-like, such as being endorsed by God or conforming to universal truth. In either case, though, I am describing charity by linking it with some quality.

The accomplishment-oriented component of ethical statements is called its *noncognitive meaning*. For example, if I say, "We should all donate to charity," I am trying to accomplish at least two things. First, I am trying to get you to donate to charity and I am essentially giving the command, "Donate to charity, Mr.!" Philosophers call this the *prescriptive* element in the sense that I am prescribing some specific behavior. Secondly, I am expressing my personal feelings of approval about charitable donations and I am in essence saying "Hooray for charity!" This is the *emotive* element insofar as I am expressing my emotions about some specific behavior.

Ethical judgments, such as "We should all donate to charity," then, are mixtures of both descriptive (cognitive) and accomplishment-oriented (noncognitive) components. Philosopher R.M. Hare (b. 1919) argued that the descriptive component of ethical statements changes depending on our philosophical and religious perspective. For example, a religious believer might describe charity as something that God endorses. An atheist, though, would describe charity differently. However, Hare argues, the accomplishment-oriented component of ethical judgments is the same for *everyone*. For example, when the religious believer and atheist both say, "We should all donate to charity" they both encourage others to be charitable and express their personal approval of charity. For Hare, then, the accomplishment-oriented component is the primary meaning of moral utterences, and the descriptive component is secondary.

NORMATIVE ETHICS. Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic example of a normative principle: We should do to others what we would want others to do to us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong for me to steal her car. Since I would

want people to feed me if I was starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using this same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible action is right or wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it would also be wrong for me to lie to, harass, victimize, assault, or kill others. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that establishes a *single principle* against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories focus on a *set* of foundational principles, such as moral rights to life, liberty, and happiness.

The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only *one* ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles. Unfortunately, philosophers do not agree about what precisely that criterion is. Over the centuries, hundreds of theories have been offered, each claiming to be the ultimate guide. Proponents of these theories also devote much time to rejecting rival theories. For example, most normative ethicists reject the Golden Rule in the above form. If I am a masochist then, according to the Golden Rule, it is morally permissible for me to inflict pain on other people. But inflicting pain on others is clearly wrong, hence the Golden Rule fails as the ultimate criterion of morality. In spite of the quantity of normative theories available for consideration, many theories involve common strategies that we can classify. Three strategies will be noted here: (1) virtue theory, (2) deontological theories, and (3) consequentialist theories.

Virtue Theory. Many philosophers believe that morality consists of following precisely defined rules of conduct, such as "don't kill," or "don't steal." Presumably, I must learn these rules, and then make sure each of my actions live up to the rules. Virtue theorists, however, place less emphasis on learning rules, and instead stress the importance of developing *good habits of character*, such as benevolence. Once I've acquired benevolence, for example, I will then habitually act in a benevolent manner. Historically, virtue theory is the oldest normative tradition in Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Plato emphasized four virtues in particular, which were later called *cardinal virtues*: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. Other important virtues are fortitude, generosity, self-respect, good temper, and sincerity. In addition to advocating good habits of character, virtue theorists hold that we should avoid acquiring bad character traits, or *vices*, such as cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity. Virtue theory emphasizes moral education since virtuous character traits are developed in one's youth. Adults, therefore, are responsible for instilling virtues in the young.

Aristotle gave the first systematic expression to virtue theory in his *Nichomachean Ethics*. Aristotle sees virtues as good habits that we acquire, which regulate our emotions. For example, in response to my natural feelings of fear, I should develop the virtue of courage which allows me to be firm when facing danger. Analyzing 11 specific virtues, Aristotle argues that most virtues fall at a mean between more extreme character traits. With courage, for example, if I do not have enough courage, I develop the disposition of cowardice, which is a vice. If I have too much courage I develop the disposition of rashness which is also a vice. According to Aristotle, it is not an easy task to find the perfect mean between extreme character traits. In fact, we need assistance from our reason to do this. After Aristotle, medieval theologians supplemented Greek theories of virtue with three Christian virtues, or *theological virtues*: faith, hope, and charity. Interest in virtue theory continued through the middle ages and declined in the 19th century with the rise of alternative moral theories below.

Deontological (Duty) Theories. Many of us feel that there are clear obligations we have as human beings, such as to care for our children, and to not commit murder. Deontological theories base morality on specific, foundational principles of obligation. These theories are called *deontological* theories, from the Greek word *deon*, or duty, given the foundational nature of our duty or obligation. They are also

sometimes called *nonconsequentialist* since these principles are obligatory, irrespective of the consequences of that might follow from our actions. For example, it is wrong to abandon care for our children even if it results in some great benefit. There are four leading types of deontological theories.

The first is *duty theory* championed by Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf. By the 17th century, virtue theorists listed nearly one hundred virtuous character traits that a good person should acquire. Grotius and Pufendorf viewed these as lists of obligations to which we are all duty-bound through laws of nature. They classified these duties under three headings: duties to God, duties to oneself, and duties to others. Duties to God include honoring him, serving him, and praying to him. Duties to oneself include preserving one's life, pursuing happiness, and developing one's talents. Duties to others fall into three groups. First, there are family duties which involve honoring our parents, and caring for spouses and children. Second, there are social duties which involve not harming others, keeping promises, and benevolence. Third, there are political duties that involve obedience to the laws, and public spirit. Based on these duties it would be wrong, for example, for us to skip worship services, to commit suicide, or steal from others. The morality of all actions, then, is determined in reference to these duties. For almost 200 years, duty theory dominated normative ethical theories.

A second deontological theory is *rights theory*. According to rights theorists, these are rights that all people naturally have, and the rest of us are obligated to acknowledge. 17th century British philosopher John Locke argued that the laws of nature mandate that we should not harm anyone's life, health, liberty or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural rights, given to us by God. Following Locke's lead, US Declaration of Independence authored by Thomas Jefferson recognizes three foundational rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Jefferson and others maintained that we deduce other more specific rights from these, including the rights of property, movement, speech, and religious expression. There are four features traditionally associated with moral rights. First, rights are *natural* insofar as they are not invented or created by governments. Second, they are *universal* insofar as they do not change from country to country. Third, they are *equal* in the sense that rights are the same for all people, irrespective of gender, race, or handicap. Fourth, they are *inalienable* which means that I ca not hand over my rights to another person, such as by selling myself into slavery.

A third deontological theory is that of the *categorical imperative* as developed by the18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Influenced by Grotius and Pufendorf, Kant agreed that we have moral duties to oneself and others, such as developing one's talents, and keeping our promises to others. However, Kant argued that there is a more foundational principle of duty that encompasses our particular duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of reason that he calls the "categorical imperative." Kant gives at least four versions of the categorical imperative, but one is especially direct: Treat people as an end, and never as a means to an end. That is, we should always treat people with dignity, and never use them as mere instruments. For Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent value of that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally correct since this acknowledges the inherent value of the recipient. By contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end whenever we treat that person as a tool to achieve something else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my neighbor's lawn furniture since I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness. The categorical imperative also regulates the morality of actions that affect us individually. Suicide, for example, would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my misery. Kant believes that the morality of all actions can be determined by appealing to this single principle of duty.

A fourth deontological theory is a recent revision of duty theory by British philosopher W.D. Ross, which emphasizes *prima facie* duties. Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts, Ross argues that our duties are "part of the fundamental nature of the universe." However, Ross's list of duties is much shorter which he believes reflects our actual moral convictions:

- Fidelity: the duty to keep promises
- Reparation: the duty to compensate others when we harm them
- Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us
- Justice: the duty to recognize merit
- Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions of others
- Self-improvement: the duty to improve our virtue and intelligence
- Nonmaleficence: the duty to not injure others

Although some of these duties are the same as those of traditional duty theory, such as beneficence and self-improvement, Ross does not include duties to God, self-preservation, or political duties. This list is not complete, Ross argues, but he believes that at least some of these are self-evidently true. Ross recognizes that situations will arise when we must choose between two conflicting duties. In a classic example, suppose I borrow my neighbor's gun and promise to return it when he asks for it. One day, in a fit of rage, my neighbor pounds on my door and asks for the gun so that he can take vengeance on someone. On the one hand, the duty of fidelity obligates me to return the gun; on the other hand, the duty of nonmaleficence obligates me to avoid injuring others and thus not return the gun. According to Ross, I will intuitively know which of these duties is my *actual* duty, and which is my apparent or *prima facie* duty. In this case, my duty of nonmaleficence emerges as my actual duty and I should not return the gun.

Consequentialist (Teleological) Theories. It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing the consequences of our actions. According to consequentialist normative theories, correct moral conduct is determined *solely* by a cost-benefit analysis of an action's consequences:

- *Consequentialism:* An action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable.

Consequentialist normative principles require that we first tally both the good and bad consequences of an action. Second, we then determine whether the total good consequences outweigh the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action is morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper. Consequentialist theories are also called *teleological* theories, from the Greek word *telos,* or end, since the end result of the action is the sole determining factor of its morality.

Consequentialist theories first became popular in the 18th century by philosophers who wanted a quick way to morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather than by appealing to gut intuitions or long lists of questionable duties. In fact, the most attractive feature of consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable consequences of an action. Most versions of consequentialism are more precisely formulated than the general principle above. In particular, competing consequentialist theories specify which consequences for affected groups of people are relevant. Three subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:

- *Ethical Egoism:* an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more

favorable than unfavorable *only to the agent* performing the action.

Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable *to everyone except the agent*.

Utilitarianism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable *to everyone*.

All three of these theories focus on the consequences of actions for different groups of people. But, like all normative theories, the above three theories are rivals of each other. They also yield different conclusions. Consider the following example. A woman was traveling through a developing country when she witnessed a car in front of her run off the road and roll over several times. She asked the hired driver to pull over to assist but, to her surprise, the driver accelerated nervously past the scene. A few miles down the road the driver explained that in his country if someone assists an accident victim, then the police often hold the assisting person responsible for the accident itself. If the victim dies, then the assisting person could be held responsible for the death. The driver continued explaining that road accident victims are therefore usually left unattended and often die from exposure to the country's harsh desert conditions.On the principle of ethical egoism, the woman in this illustration would only be concerned with the consequences of her attempted assistance as *she* would be affected. Clearly, the decision to drive on would be the morally proper choice. On the principle of ethical altruism, she would be concerned only with the consequences of her action as *others* are affected, particularly the accident victim. Tallying only those consequences reveals that assisting the victim would be the morally correct choice, irrespective of the negative consequences that result for her. On the principle of utilitarianism, she must consider the consequences for both herself and the victim. The outcome here is less clear, and the woman would need to precisely calculate the overall benefit versus disbenefit of her action.

Types of Utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) presented one of the earliest fully developed systems of utilitarianism. Two features of Bentham's theory are noteworty. First, Bentham proposed that we tally the consequences of each action we perform and thereby determine on a case by case basis whether an action is morally right or wrong. This aspect of Bentham's theory is known as *act-utilitiarianism*. Second, Bentham also proposed that we tally the pleasure and pain which results from our actions. For Bentham, pleasure and pain are the only consequences that matter in determining whether our conduct is moral. This aspect of Bentham's theory is known as *hedonistic utilitarianism*. Critics point out limitations in both of these aspects.

First, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong to waste time on leisure activities such as watching television, since our time could be spent in ways that produced a greater social benefit, such as charity work. But prohibiting leisure activities doesn't seem reasonable. More significantly, according to act-utilitarianism, specific acts of torture or slavery would be morally permissible if the social benefit of these actions outweighed the disbenefit. A revised version of utilitarianism called *rule-utilitarianism* addresses these propblems. According to rule-utilitarianism, a behavioral code or rule is morally right if the consequences of adopting that rule are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone. Unlike act utilitarianism, which weighes the consequences of each particular action, rule-utilitarianism offers a litmus test only for the morality of moral rules, such as "stealing is wrong." Adopting a rule against theft clearly has more favorable consequences than unfavorable consequences for everyone. The same is true for moral rules against lying or murdering. Rule-utilitarianism, then, offers a three-tiered method for judging conduct. A particular action, such as stealing my neighbor's lawn furniture, is judged wrong

since it violates a moral rule against theft. In turn, the rule against theft is morally binding because adopting this rule produces favorable consequences for everyone. J.S. Mill's version of utilitarianism is rule-oriented.

Second, according to hedonistic utilitiarianism, pleasurable consequences are the only factors that matter, morally speaking. This, though, seems too restrictive since it ignores other morally significant consequences which are not necessarily pleasing or painful. For example, acts which foster loyalty and friendship are valued, yet they are not always pleasing. In response to this problem, G.E. Moore proposed *ideal utilitarianism*, which involves tallying any consequence that we intuitively recognize as good or bad (and not simply as pleasurable or painful). Also, R.M. Hare proposed *preference utilitarianism*, which involves tallying any conseqence that fulfills our preferences.

Social Contract Theory. In addition to ethical egoism, ethical altruism, and utilitarianism, as defined above, we also find an egoistic consequentialist strategy in social contract theory. Thomas Hobbes argued that, for purely selfish reasons, the agent is better off living in a world with moral rules than one without moral rules. For without moral rules, we are subject to the whims of other people's selfish interests. Our property, our families, and even our lives are at continual risk. Selfishness alone will therefore motivate each agent to adopt a basic set of rules which will allow for a civilized community. Not surprisingly, these rules would include prohibitions against lying, stealing and killing. However, these rules will ensure safety for each agent only if the rules are enforced. As selfish creatures, each of us would plunder our neighbors' property once their guards were down. Each agent would then be at risk from his neighbor. Therefore, for selfish reasons alone, we devise a means of enforcing these rules: we create a policing agency which punishes us if we violate these rules.

APPLIED ETHICS. Applied ethics is the branch of ethics that consists of the analysis of specific, controversial moral issues such as abortion, animal rights, and euthanasia. Medical ethics focuses on a range of issues that arise in clinical health care settings. Health care workers are in an unusual position of continually dealing with life and death situations. It is not surprising, then, that medical ethics issues are more extreme and diverse than other areas of applied ethics. Prenatal issues arise about the morality of surrogate mothering, genetic manipulation of fetuses, the status of unused frozen embryos, and abortion. Other issues arise about patient rights and physician's responsibilities, such as the confidentiality of the patient's records and the physician's responsibility to tell the truth to dying patients. The AIDS crisis has raised the specific issues of the mandatory screening of all patients for AIDS, and whether physicians can refuse to treat AIDS patients. Additional issues concern medical experimentation on humans, the morality of involuntary commitment, and the rights of the mentally retarded. Finally, end of life issues arise about the morality of suicide, the justifiability of suicide intervention, physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia.

The field of business ethics examines moral controversies that commonly arise in the business world. These include the social responsibilities of capitalist business practices, the moral status of corporate entities, deceptive advertising, insider trading, basic employee rights, job discrimination, affirmative action, whether drug testing violates privacy, and whistle blowing. Issues in environmental ethics often overlaps with business and medical issues. These include the rights of animals, the morality of animal experimentation, preserving endangered species, pollution control, management of environmental resources, whether ecosystems are entitled to direct moral consideration, and our obligation to future generations. Controversial issues of sexual morality include monogamy vs. polygamy, sexual relations

without love, homosexual relations, and extramarital affairs. Finally, there are issues of social morality, which examine capital punishment, nuclear war, gun control, suicide, recreational use of drugs, welfare rights, and racism.

SEE ALSO: Applied ethics, animal rights, best reasons morality, categorical imperative, consequentialism, divine command theory, duties, environmental ethics, euthanasia, feminist ethics, moral dilemmas, moral luck, moral rationalism, moral realism, moral relativism, moral skepticism, natural law, naturalistic fallacy, nogcognitivism, original position, moral personhood, prima facie duties, rights theory, rule utilitarianism, social contract, suicide, synderesis, virtue theory

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Euclides (c. 430-360 BCE.)

Euclides was a native of Megara, and founder of the Megarian or Eristic sect. He applied himself early to the study of philosophy, and learned from the writings of Parmenides the art of disputation. Hearing of the fame of Socrates, Euclides moved to Athens and became a devoted student for many years. Because of an enmity between Athenians and Megarians, a decree was passed which forbid any Megarian from entering Athens under the penalty of death. Euclides moved twenty miles out of Athens, and would sneak into the city at night for instruction, dressed as a woman in a long cloak and veil. He frequently became involved in business disputes in civil courts. Socrates, who despised forensic contests, expressed dissatisfaction with Euclides for his fondness for controversy. It is likely that this provoked a separation between Euclides and Socrates, for after this Euclides was the head of a school in Megara which taught the art of disputation. Debates were conducted with so much vehemence among his pupils, that Timon said of Euclides that he carried the madness of contention from Athens of Megara (*Diog. Laert,* 6:22). Nevertheless, his restraint is attested to in a story about a quarrel he had with his brother. His brother charged, "Let me perish if do not have revenge on you." To this Euclides replied, "And let *me* perish if I don not subdue your resentment by forbearance, and make you love me as much as ever." In disputes Euclides was averse to the analogical method of reasoning, and judged that legitimate argumentation consists in deducing fair conclusions from acknowledge premises.

His position was a combination of Socraticism and Eleaticism. Virtue is knowledge, but knowledge of what? It is here that the Eleatic influence became visible. With Parmenides, the Megarics believed in the one Absolute being. All multiplicity, all motion, are illusory. The world of sense has in it no true reality. Only Being is. If virtue is knowledge, therefore, it can only be the knowledge of this Being. If the essential concept of Socrates was the Good, and the essential concept of Parmenides Being, Euclides now combined the two. Thus, according to Cicero, he defined the "supreme good" as that which is always the same. The Good is identified with Being. Being, the One, God, Intelligence, providence, the Good, divinity, are merely different names for the same thing. Becoming, the many, evil, are the names of its opposite, not-being. Multiplicity is thus identified with evil, and both are declared illusory. Evil has no real existence. The good alone truly is. The various virtues, as benevolence, temperance, prudence, are merely different names for the one virtue, knowledge of being. It is said that when Euclides was asked his opinion concerning the gods, he replied, "I know nothing more of them than this, that they hate inquisitive persons."

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Euthanasia

The applied ethical issue of euthanasia, or mercy killing, concerns whether it is morally permissible for a third party, such as a physician, to end the life of a terminally ill patient who is in intense pain.

The euthanasia controversy is part of a larger issue concerning the right to die. Staunch defenders of personal liberty argue that all of us are morally entitled to end our lives when we see fit. Thus, according to these people, suicide is in principle morally permissible. For health care workers, the issue of the right to die is most prominent when a patient in their care (1) is terminally ill, (2) is in intense pain, and (3) voluntarily chooses to end his life to escape prolonged suffering. In these cases, there are several theoretical options open to the health care worker. First, the worker can ignore the patient's request and care can continue as usual. Second, the worker can discontinue providing life-sustaining treatment to the patient, and thus allow him to die more quickly. This option is called passive euthanasia since it brings on death through nonintervention. Third, the health care worker can provide the patient with the means of taking his own life, such as a lethal dose of a drug. This practice is called assisted suicide, since it is the patient, and not technically the health care worker, who administers the drug. Finally, the health care worker can take active measures to end the patient's life, such as by directly administering a lethal dose of a drug. This practice is called active euthanasia since the health care worker's action is the direct cause of the patient's death. Active euthanasia is the most controversial of the four options and is currently illegal in the United States. However, several right to die organizations are lobbying for the laws against active euthanasia to change.

Two additional concepts are relevant to the discussion of euthanasia. First, voluntary euthanasia refers to mercy killing that takes place with the explicit and voluntary consent of the patient, either verbally or in a written document such as a living will. Second, nonvoluntary euthanasia refers to the mercy killing of a patient who is unconscious, comatose, or otherwise unable to explicitly make his intentions known. In these cases it is often family members who make the request. It is important not to confuse nonvoluntary mercy killing with involuntary mercy killing. The latter would be done against the wishes of the patient and would clearly count as murder.

Like the moral issues surrounding suicide, the problem of euthanasia has a long history of philosophical discussion. On the whole, ancient Greek thinkers seem to have favored euthanasia, even though they opposed suicide. An exception is is Hippocrates (460-370 BCE), the ancient Greek physician, who in his famous oath states that "I will not prescribe a deadly drug to please someone, nor give advice that may cause his death." The entire oath is presented below, which places emphasis on the value of preserving life and in putting the good of patients above the private interests of physicians. These two aspects of the oath make it an important creed for many heath care workers today. In medieval times, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim philosophers opposed active euthanasia, although the Christian Church has always accepted passive euthanasia.

During the Renaissance, English humanist Thomas More (1478-1535) defended Euthanasia in book Utopia (1516). More describes in idealic terms the function of hospitals. Hospital workers watch after patients with tender care and do everything in their power to cure ills. However, when a patient has a torturous and incurable illness, the patient has the option to die, either through starvation or opium. In New Atlantis (1627), British philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626) writes that physicians are "not only to restore the health, but to mitigate pain and dolours; and not only when such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair and easy passage."

One of the most cited contemporarly discussions on the subject of euthanasia is "Active and Passive Euthanasia" (1975) by University of Alabama philosophy professor James Rachels. Rachels argues that there is no moral difference between actively killing a patient and passively allowing the patient to die. Thus, it is less cruel for physicians to use active procedures of mercy killing. Rachels argues that, from a strictly moral standpoint, there is no difference between passive and active euthanasia. He begins by noting that the AMA prohibits active euthanasia, yet allows passive euthanasia. He offers two arguments for why physicians should place passive euthanasia in the same category as active euthanasia. First, techniques of passive euthanasia prolong the suffering of the patient, for it takes longer to passively allow the patient to die than it would if active measures were taken. In the mean time, the patient is in unbearable pain. Since in either case the decision has been made to bring on an early death, it is cruel to adopt the longer procedure. Second, Rachels argues that the passive euthanasia distinction encourages physicians to make life and death decisions on irrelevant grounds. For example, Down's syndrome infants often have correctable congenital defects; but decisions are made to forego corrective surgery (and thus let the infant die) because the parents do not want a child with Down's syndrome. The active-passive euthanasia distinction merely encourages these groundless decisions.

Rachels observes that people think that actively killing someone is morally worse than passively letting someone die. However, they do not differ since both have the same outcome: the death of the patient on humanitarian grounds. The difference between the two is accentuated because we frequently hear of terrible cases of active killings, but not of passive killings. Rachels anticipates two criticisms to his argument. First, it may be objected that, with passive euthanasia techniques, the physician does not have to do anything to bring on the patient's death. Rachels replies that letting the patient die involves performing an action by not performing other actions (similar to the act of insulting someone by not shaking their hand). Second, it may be objected that Rachels's point is only of academic interest since, in point of fact, active euthanasia is illegal. Rachels replies that physicians should nevertheless be aware that the law is forcing on them an indefensible moral doctrine.

In "Active and Passive Euthanasia: An Impertinent Distinction?" (1977), Thomas Sullivan argues that no intentional mercy killing (active or passive) is morally permissible. However, extraordinary means of prolonging life may be discontinued even though the patient's death may be foreseen. Sullivan argues that Rachels's example of the Down's syndrome infant is misleading, since most doctors would perform corrective surgery since it would be clearly wrong to let the infant die. Further, most reflective people will agree with Rachels that there is no moral distinction between killing someone and allowing someone to die. According to Sullivan, Rachels's biggest mistake is that he misunderstands the position of the AMA. The AMA maintains that all intentional mercy killing is wrong, either active or passive. Although extraordinary procedures for prolonging life may be discontinued for terminally ill patients, these procedures are ones that are both

inconvenient and ineffective for the patient. If death occurs more quickly by discontinuing extraordinary procedures, it is only a byproduct. In short, to aim at death (either actively or passively) is always wrong, but it is not wrong to merely foresee death when discontinuing extraordinary procedures.

In a rejoinder essay, "More Impertinent Distinctions and a Defense of Active Euthanasia" (1978), Rachels responds to Sullivan's charges. Rachels begins noting that Catholic thinkers, such as Sullivan, typically oppose mercy killing. However, Sullivan himself concedes that it is sometimes pointless to prolong the dying process. Rachels focuses on two specific points made by Sullivan. First, Sullivan argues that it is important for the physician to have the correct intention (insofar as it is immoral to aim at the death of a patient, but not immoral to foresee his death). Rachels counters that the physician's intention is irrelevant to whether the act is right or wrong. For, suppose two physicians perform identical acts of withholding treatment, with one physician aiming at the death of the patient, and the other only foreseeing it. Since the acts are identical, one cannot be judged right and the other wrong. Second, Sullivan argues that physicians are justified only in withholding extraordinary procedures. However, Rachels argues, to determine whether a given procedure is ordinary or extraordinary, we must first determine whether the patient's life should be prolonged.

Rachels continues by offering several arguments in favor of the moral permissibility of active euthanasia. The first is an argument from mercy. He begins by describing a classic case where a person named Jack is terminally ill and in unbearable pain. Jack's condition alone is a compelling reason for the permissibility of active mercy killing. A more formal utilitarian version of this argument is that active euthanasia is morally permissible since it produces the greatest happiness. Critics have traditionally attacked utilitarianism for focusing too heavily on happiness, and not enough on other intrinsic goods, such as justice and rights. Accordingly, Rachels offers a revised utilitarian version: active euthanasia is permissible since it promotes the best interests of everyone (such as Jack, Jack's wife, and the hospital staff). Rachels also argues that the golden rule supports active euthanasia insofar as we would want others to put us out of our misery if we were in a situation like Jack's. A more formal version of this argument is based on Kant's categorical imperative ("act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law"). The categorical imperative supports active euthanasia since no one would willfully universalize a rule which condemns people to unbearable pain before death. Rachels closes noting an irony: the golden rule supports active euthanasia, yet the Catholic church has traditionally opposed it.

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Evolution

ANCIENT GREEK VIEWS. Evolution is not so much a modern discovery as some of its advocates would have us believe. It made its appearance early in Greek philosophy, and maintained its position more or less, with the most diverse modifications, and frequently confused with the idea of emanation, until the close of ancient thought. The Greeks had, it is true, no term exactly equivalent to " evolution"; but when Thales asserts that all things originated from water; when Anaximenes calls air the principle of all things, regarding the subsequent process as a thinning or thickening, they must have considered individual beings and the phenomenal world as, a result of evolution, even if they did not carry the process out in detail. Anaximander is often regarded as a precursor of the modem theory of development. He deduces living beings, in a gradual development, from moisture under the influence of warmth, and suggests the view that men originated from animals of another sort, since if they had come into existence as human beings, needing fostering care for a long time, they would not have been able to maintain their existence. In Empedocles, as in Epicurus and Lucretius, who follow in Hs footsteps, there are rudimentary suggestions of the Darwinian theory in its broader sense; and here too, as with Darwin, the mechanical principle comes in; the process is adapted to a certain end by a sort of natural selection, without regarding nature as deliberately forming its results for these ends.

If the mechanical view is to be found in these philosophers, the teleological occurs in Heraclitus, who conceives the process as a rational development, in accordance with the Logos and names steps of the process, as from igneous air to water, and thence to earth. The Stoics followed Heraclitus in the main lines of their physics. The primal principle is, as with him, igneous air. only that this is named God by them with much greater definiteness. The Godhead has life in itself, and develops into the universe, differentiating primarily into two kinds of elements the finer or active, and the coarser or passive. Formation or development goes on continuously, under the impulse of the formative principle, by whatever name it is known, until all is once more dissolved by the *ekpyrosis* into the fundamental principle, and the whole process begins over again. Their conception of the process as analogous to the development of the seed finds special expression in their term of *logos spermatikos*. In one point the Stoics differ essentially from Heraclitus. With them the whole process is accomplished according to certain ends indwelling in the Godhead, which is a provident, careful intelligence, while no providence is assumed in Heraclitus.

Empedocles asserts definitely that the sphairos, as the full reconciliation of opposites, is opposed, as the superior, to the individual beings brought into existence by hatred, which are then once more united by love to the primal essence, the interchange of world-periods thus continuing indefinitely. Development is to be found also in the atomistic philosopher Democritus; in a purely mechanical manner without any purpose, bodies come into existence out of atoms, and ultimately entire worlds appear and disappear from and to eternity. Like his predecessors, Deinocritus, deduces organic beings from what is inorganic-moist earth or slime.

Development, as well as the process of becoming, in general, was denied by the Eleatic philosophers. Their doctrine, diametrically opposed to the older thoroughgoing evolutionism, had its influence in determining the acceptance of unchangeable ideas, or forms, by Plato and Aristotle. Though Plato reproduces the doctrine of Heraclitus as to the flux of all things in the phenomenal world, he denies any continuous change in the world of ideas. Change is permanent only in so far as the eternal forms stamp themselves upon individual objects. Though this, as a rule, takes place but imperfectly, the stubborn mass is so far affected that all works out as far as possible for the best. The demiurge willed that all should become as far as possible like himself; and so the world finally becomes beautiful and perfect. Here we have a development, though the principle which has the most real existence does not change; the forms, or archetypal ideas, remain eternally what they are.

In Aristotle also the forms are the real existences, working in matter but eternally remaining the same, at once the motive cause and the effectual end of all things. Here the idea of evolution is clearer than in Plato, especially for the physical world, which is wholly dominated by purpose. The transition from lifeless to living matter is a gradual one, so that the dividing-line between them is scarcely perceptible. Next to lifeless matter comes the vegetable kingdom, which seems, compared with the inorganic, to have life, but appears lifeless compared with the organic. The transition from plants to animals is again a gradual one. The lowest organisms originate from the primeval slime, or from animal differentiation; there is a continual progression from simple, undeveloped types to the higher and more perfect. As the highest stage, the end and aim of the whole process, man appears; all lower forms are merely unsuccessful attempts to produce him. The ape is a transitional stage between man and other viviparous animals. If development has so important a work in Aristotle's physics, it is not less important in his metaphysics. The whole transition from potentiality to actuality (from *dynamis* to *entelecheia*) is nothing but a transition from the lower to the higher, everything striving to assimilate itself to the absolutely perfect, to the Divine. Thus Aristotle, like Plato, regards the entire order of the universe as a sort of deification. But the part played in the development by the Godhead, the absolutely immaterial form, is less than that of the forms which operate in matter, since, being already everything,, it is incapable of becoming anything else. Thus Aristotle, despite his evolutionistic notions, does not take the view of a thoroughgoing evolutionist as regards the universe; nor do the Neoplatonists, whose highest principle remains wholly unchanged, though all things emanate from it.

MEDIEVAL VIEWS. The idea of evolution was not particularly dominant in patristic and scholastic theology and philosophy, both on account of the dualism which runs through them as an echo of Plato and Aristotle, and on account of the generally accepted Christian theory of creation. However, evolution is not generally denied; and with Augustine (*De civitate dei*, xv. 1) it is taken as the basis for a philosophy of history. Erigena and some of his followers seem to teach a sort of evolution. The issue of finite beings from God is called *analysis* or *resolution* in contrast to the *reverse* or *deification* the return to God, who once more assimilates all things. God himself, although denominated the beginning, middle, and end, all in all remains unmixed in his own essence, transcendent though immanent in the world. The teaching of. Nicholas of Cusa is similar to Erigena's, though a certain amount of Pythagoreanism comes in here. The world exhibits explicitly what the Godhead implicitly contains; the world is an animated, ordered whole, in which God is everywhere present. Since God embraces all things in himself, he, unites all opposites: he is the *complicatio omnium contradictoriorum*. The idea of evolution thus appears in Nicholas in a rather pantheistic form, but it is not logically carried out.

In spite of some obscurities in his conception of the world Giordano Bruno is a little clearer. According to him God is the immanent first cause in the universe; there is no difference between matter and form; matter, which includes in itself forms and ends, is the source of all becoming and of all actuality. The infinite ether which fills infinite space conceals within itself the nucleus of all things, and they proceed from it according to determinate laws, yet in a teleological manner. Thus the worlds originate not by an arbitrary act, but by an inner necessity of the divine nature. They are *natura naturata,* as distinguished from the operative nature of God, natitra naturans, which is present in all thin-S as the being- of all that is, the beauty of all that is fair. As in the Stoic teaching, with which Bruno's philosophy has much in common, the conception of evolution comes out clearly both for physics and metaphysics.

IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY. Leibniz attempted to reconcile the mechanical-physical and the teleological views, after Descartes, in his *Principia philosophitce,* excluding all purpose, had explained nature both lifeless and living, as mere mechanism. It is right, however, to point out that Descartes had a metaphysics above his physics, in which the conception of God took an important place, and that thus the mechanical notion of evolution did not really include everything. In Leibnitz the principles of mechanics and physics are dependent upon the direction of a supreme intelligence, without which they would be inexplicable to us. Only by such a preliminary assumption are we able to recognize that one ordered thing follows upon another continuously. It is in this sense that the law of continuity is to be understood, which is of such great importance in Leibnitz. At bottom it is the same as the law of ordered development. The genera of all beings follow continuously one upon another, and between the main classes, as between animals and vegetables, there must be a continuous sequence of intermediate beings. Here again, however, evolution is not taught in its most thorough form, since the divine monad, of God, does not come into the world but transcends it.

Among the German philosophers of the eighteenth century Herder must be mentioned first of the pioneers of modern evolutionism. He lays down the doctrine of a continuous development in the unity of nature from inorganic to organic, from the stone to the plant, from the plant to the animal, and from the animal to man. As nature develops according to fixed laws and natural conditions, so does history, which is only a continuation of the process of nature. Both nature and history labor to educate man in perfect humanity; but as this is seldom attained, a future life is suggested. Lessing had dwelt on the education of the human race as a development to the higher and more perfect. It is only recently that the significance of Herder, in regard to the conception and treatment of historic development, has been adequately recognized. Goethe also followed out the idea of evolution in his zoological and botanical investigations, with his theory of the metamorphosis of plants and his endeavor to discover unity in different organisms.

IN GERMAN IDEALISM. Kant is also often mentioned as having been an early teacher of the modern theory of descent. It is true he considers the analogy of the forms which he finds in various classes of organisms a ground for supposing that they may have come originally from a common source. He calls the hypothesis that specifically different being have originated one from the other "a daring adventure of the reason." But he entertains the thought that in a later epoch "an orang-outang or a chimpanzee may develop the organs which serve for walking, grasping objects, and speaking-in short, that lie may evolve the structure of man, with an organ for the use of reason, which shall gradually develop itself by social culture." Here, indeed, important ideas of Darwin were anticipated; but Kant's critical system was such that development could have no predominant place in it.

The idea of evolution came out more strongly in his German idealistic successors, especially in Schelling, who regarded nature as a preliminary stage to mind, and the process of physical development as continuing in history. The unconscious productions of nature are only unsuccessful attempts to reflect itself; lifeless nature is an immature intelligence, so that in its phenomena an intelligent character appears only unconsciously. Its highest aim, that, of becoming an object to itself, is only attained in the highest and last reflection-in man, or in what we call reason, through which for the first time nature returns perfectly upon itself. All stages of nature are connected by a common life, and show in their development a conclusive unity. The course of history as a whole must be conceived as offering a gradually progressive revelation of the Absolute. For this he names three periods-that of fate, that of nature, and that of providence, of which we are now in the second. Schelling's followers carried the idea of development somewhat further than their master. This is true especially of Oken, who conceives natural science as the science of the eternal transformation of God into the world, of the dissolution of the Absolute into plurality, and of its continuous further operation in this plurality. The development is continued through the vegetable and animal kingdoms up to man, who in his art and science and polity completely establishes the will of nature. Oken, it is true, conceived man as the sole object of all animal development, so that the lower stages are only abortive attempts to produce him-a theory afterward controverted by Ernst von Baer and Cuvier, the former of whom, standing somewhat in opposition to Darwin, is of great interest to the student of the history of the theory of evolution.

Some evolutionistic ideas are found in Krause and Schleiermacher; but Hegel, with his absolute idealism, is a more notable representative of them. In his system philosophy is the science of the Absolute, of the absolute reason developing or unfolding itself. Reason develops itself first in the abstract element of thought, then expresses itself externally in nature, and finally returns from this externalization into itself in mind. As Heraclitus had taught eternal becoming, so Hegel, who avowedly accepted all the propositions of the Ephesian philosopher in his logic, taught eternal proceeding. The difference between the Greek and the German was that the former believed in the flux of matter, of fire transmuting itself by degrees into all things, and in nature as the sole existence, outside of which there was nothing; while the latter conceived the abstract idea or reason as that which really is or becomes, and nature as only a necessary but transient phase in the process of development. With Heraclitus evolution meant the return of all things into the primal principle followed by a new world-development; with Hegel it was an eternal process of thought, giving no answer to the question as to the end of historical development.

DARWIN'S VIEW. While Heraclitus had laid down his doctrine of eternal becoming rather by intuition than on the ground of experience, and the entire evolutionary process of Hegel had been expressly conceived as based on pure thought, Darwin's epoch-making doctrine rested upon a vast mass of ascertained facts. He was, of course, not the first to lay down the origin of species one from another as a formal doctrine. Besides those predecessors of his to whom allusion has already been made, two others may be mentioned here: his father, Erasmus Darwin, who emphasized organic variability; and still more Lamarck, who denied the immutability of species and forms, and claimed to have demonstrated by observation the gradual development of the animal kingdom. What is new in Charles Darwin is not his theory of descent, but its confirmation by the theory of natural selection and the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence. Thus a result is brought about which corresponds as far as possible to a rational end in a purely mechanical process, without any cooperation of teleological principles, without any innate tendency in the organisms to proceed to a higher stage. This theory postulates in the later organisms deviations from the earlier

ones; and that these deviations, in so far as they are improvements, perpetuate themselves and become generic marks of differentiation. This, however, imports a difficulty, since the origin of the first of these deviations is inexplicable. The differentia of mankind, whom Darwin, led by the force of analogy, deduces from a species of apes, consists in intellect and moral qualities, but comes into existence only by degrees. The moral sensibilities develop from the original social impulse innate in man; this impulse is an effort to secure not so much individual happiness as the general welfare.

It would be impossible to name here all those who, in different countries, have followed in Darwin's footsteps, first in the biological field and then in those of psychology, ethics, sociology, and religion. They have carried his teaching further in several directions, modifying it to some extent and making it fruitful, while positivism has not seldom come into alliance with it. In Germany Ernst Haeckel must be mentioned with his biogenetic law, according to which the development of the individual is an epitome of the history of the race, and with his less securely grounded notion of the world-ether as a creative deity. In France Alfred Fouillee worked out a theory of idea-forces, a combination of Platonic idealism with English (though not specifically Darwinian) evolutionism. Marie-Jean Guyau understood by evolution a life led according to the fundamental law that the most intensive life is also the most extensive. He develops his ethics altogether from the facts of the social existence of mankind, and his religion is a universal sociomorphism, the feeling of the unity of man with the entire cosmos.

SPENCER'S VIEW. The most careful and thorough development of the whole system took place in England. For a long time it was represented principally by the work of Herbert Spencer, who had come out for the principle of evolution even before the publication of *Darwin's Origin of Species*. He carries the idea through the whole range of philosophy in his great *System of Synthetic Philosophy* and undertakes to show that development is the highest law of all nature, not merely of the organic. As the foundation of ill that exists, though itself unknowable and only revealing itself in material and mental forms, he places a power, the Absolute, of which we have but an indefinite conception. The individual processes of the world of phenomena are classed under the head of evolution, or extension of movement, with which integration of matter, union into a single whole, is connected, and dissolution or absorption of movement, which includes disintegration of matter, the breaking of connection. Both processes go on simultaneously, and include the history of every existence which we can perceive. In the course of their development the organisms incorporate matter with themselves; the plant grows by taking into itself elements which have previously existed in the form of gases, and the animal by assimilating elements found in plants and in other animals. The same sort of integration is observed in social organisms, as when nomadic families unite into a tribe, or subjects under a prince, and princes under a king. In like manner integration is evident in the development of language, of art, and of science, especially philosophy. But as the individuals unite into a whole, a strongly marked differentiation goes on at the same time, as in the distinction between the surface and the interior of the earth, or between various climates. Natural selection is not considered necessary to account for varying species, but gradual conditions of life create them. The aim of the development is to show a condition of perfect balance in the whole; when this is attained, the development, in virtue of the continuous operation of external powers, passes into dissolution. Those epochs of development and of dissolution follow alternately upon each other. This view of Spencer suggests the *hodos ano* and *hodos kato* of Heraclitus, and his flowing back of individual things into the primal principle.

Similar principles are carried out not only for organic phenomena but also for mental and social; and on the basis of the theory of evolution a remarkable combination of intuitionism and

empiricism is achieved. In his principles of sociology Spencer lays down the laws of hyperorganic evolution, and gives the various stages of human customs and especially of religious ideas, deducing all religion much too one-sidedly from ancestor-worship. The belief in an immortal " second self " is explained by such phenomena as shadows and echoes. The notion of gods is suppose to arise from the idea of a ghostly life after death. In his *Principles of Ethics* he attempts a similar compromise between intuitionism and empiricism, deducing the consciousness of duty from innumerable accumulated experiences. The compelling element in moral actions, originally arising from fear of religious, civil, or social punishment, disappears with the development of true morality. There is no permanent opposition between egoism and altruism, but the latter develops simultaneously with the former.

Spencer's ethical principles were fruitfully modified, especially by Sir Leslie Stephen and S. Alexander, though with constant adherence to the idea of development. While the doctrine of evolution in Huxley and Tyndall is associated with agnosticism, and thus freed from all connection with metaphysics, as indeed was the case with Spencer, in spite of his recognition of the Absolute as the necessary basis for religion and for thought, in another direction an attempt was made to combine evolutionism closely with a metaphysics in which the idea of God was prominent. Thus the evolution theory of Clifford and Romanes led them to a thoroughgoing monism, and that of J. M. F. Schiller to pluralism. According to the last-named a personal deity, limited in power, exists side by side with a multitude of intellectual beings, who existed before the formation of the world in a chaotic state as absolutely isolated individuals. The process of world formation begins with the decision of the divine Spirit to bring a harmony of the cosmos out of these many existences. Though Spencer's influence in philosophical development was not so great in Germany as in England, the idea of development has continued in recent years to exert no little power. Space forbids more than a mention of Lotze's teleological idealism; Von Harttmann's absolute monism, in which the goal of the teleological development of the universe is the reversion of the will into not-willing; Wundt's metaphysics of the will, according to which the world is a development, an eternal becoming, in which nature is a preliminary stage to mind; and Nietzsche's individualism, the final point of which is the development of the superman.

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Experience

The term "experience" refers to information obtained externally by means of the senses or internally through emotion. The term a posteriori is often used interchangeably with experience. An individual gains experience both through second hand reports of testimonies from others, and from first hand acquaintance. A single impression at a distinct moment in time is not itself an experience; instead experience involves a series of events from the past which are actual in one's memory and are included in a present situation. Experience is often divided between the internal and external. Internal experience is related to an individual's own mental events, while external experience is thought to be distinct an individual's consciousness. However, this distinction is confusing because some experiences can fall into both categories, such as aesthetic experiences.

To say that an individual experiences an object presupposes that the object really exists. However, philosophers use "experience" to refer only to how an event relates to a person.

Plato disliked the notion of experience since it is only a step to understanding universals. Further, it is unreliable because the observer can be deceived by the senses, such as when an observer sees railroad tracks that seem to cross when in reality they are always parallel to one another. This suggests that experience is a product of the mind and that part of an experience can be subject to misinterpretation or interference. This occurs even when an individual does not invent an experience or deliberately change it.

An immediate and interrupted experience is referred to as the "given." There is disagreement as to the characteristics of the given. Three main theories are that (1) it is private, (2) that an experience is reduced to its most basic element, and (3) that it cannot be improved upon. These are not sufficient conditions for givenness, but they are necessary. The problem with the given is understanding the dividing line between inference and actual experience. Direct realists claim that there is no difference between immediate experience and interpreted experience: things are exactly as they appear to us. Therefore, to the direct realist, there is no problem of knowledge. William James used the term "Empiriocriticism" to define the given without assumptions. Both James and F.H. Bradley hold that immediate experience is a combination of feelings and sensations in which a subject/object distinction has not even begun.

Empiricists typically resist describing experience as purely mental. However, secondary qualities such as color, taste, and sound involve some individual mental interpretation. Rationalists claim that developed experience comes from the mind *a priori* instead of through interpretation of the given. It is only through logic that the mind can understand the experience. Kant takes a middle position maintaining that experience is a synthesis of the given and the made (interpreted experience).

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Theories of Explanation

This article focuses on the way, within the philosophy of science, thinking about explanation has changed over the last 50 years. It begins by discussing the philosophical concerns that gave rise to the first theory of explanation. It then discusses this theory -- the deductive-nomological model -- and standard criticisms of it, followed by an examination of attempts to amend, extend or replace this model. This article particularly emphasizes the extent to which these later developments reflect the priorities and presuppositions of different philosophical traditions. This article emphasizes the most general aspects of explanation. There are many important aspects of explanation that it does not cover. Notably, it does not discuss the relation between the different types of explanation - e.g., teleological , functional, reductive, psychological, and historical explanation -- that are employed in various branches of human inquiry.

Introduction

Most people, philosophers included, think of explanation in terms of causation. Very roughly, to explain an event or phenomenon is to identify its cause. The nature of causation is one of the perennial problems of philosophy, so on the basis of this connection one might reasonably attempt to trace thinking about the nature of explanation to antiquity. (Among the ancients, for example, Aristotle's theory of causation is plausibly regarded as a theory of explanation.) But the idea that the concept of explanation warrants independent analysis really did not begin to take hold until the 20th century. Generally, this change occurred as the result of the linguistic turn in philosophy. More specifically, it was the result of philosophers of science attempting to understand the nature of modern theoretical science.

Of particular concern were theories that posited the existence of unobservable entities and processes (e.g., atoms, fields, genes, etc.). These posed a dilemma. On the one hand, the staunch empiricist had to reject unobservable entities as a matter of principle; on the other hand, theories that appealed to unobservables were clearly producing revolutionary results. A way was needed to characterize the obvious value of these theories without abandoning the empiricist principles deemed central to scientific rationality.

In this context it became common to distinguish between the literal truth of a theory and its power to explain observable phenomena. Although the distinction between truth and explanatory power is important, it is susceptible to multiple interpretations, and this remains a source of confusion even today. The problem is this: In philosophy the terms "truth" and "explanation" have both realist and epistemic interpretations. On a realist interpretation the truth and explanatory power of a theory are matters of the correspondence of language with an external reality. A theory that is both true and explanatory gives us insight into the causal structure of the world. On an epistemic interpretation, however, these terms express only the power of a theory to order our experience. A true and explanatory theory orders our experience to a greater degree than a false non-explanatory one. Hence, someone who denies that scientific theories are explanatory in the realist sense of the term may or may not be denying that they are explanatory in the epistemic sense. Conversely, someone who asserts that scientific theories are explanatory in the epistemic sense may or may not be claiming that they are explanatory in the realist sense. The failure to distinguish these senses of "explanation" can and does foster disagreements that are purely semantic in nature.

One common way of employing the distinction between truth and explanation is to say that theories that refer to unobservable entities may explain the phenomena, but they are not literally true. A second way is to say that these theories are true, but they do not really explain the phenomena. Although these statements are superficially contradictory, they can both be made in support of the same basic view of the nature of scientific theories. This, it is now easy to see, is because the terms 'truth' and 'explanation' are being used differently in each statement. In the first, 'explanation' is being used epistemically and 'truth' realistically; in the second, 'explanation' is being used realistically and 'truth' epistemically. But both statements are saying roughly the same thing, namely, that a scientific theory may be accepted as having a certain epistemic value without necessarily accepting that the unobservable entities it refers to

actually exist. (This view is known as anti-realism.) One early 20th century philosopher scientist, Pierre Duhem, expressed himself according to the latter interpretation when he claimed:

A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws. ([1906] 1962: p7)

Duhem claimed that:

> **To explain is to strip the reality of the appearances covering it like a veil, in order to see the bare reality itself. (op.cit.: p19)**

Explanation was the task of metaphysics, not science. Science, according to Duhem, does not comprehend reality, but only gives order to appearance. However, the subsequent rise of analytic philosophy and, in particular, logical positivism made Duhem's acceptance of classical metaphysics unpopular. The conviction grew that, far from being explanatory, metaphysics was meaningless insofar as it issued claims that had no implications for experience. By the time Carl Hempel (who, as a logical positivist, was still fundamentally an anti-realist about unobservable entities) articulated the first real theory of explanation (1948) the explanatory power of science could be stipulated.

To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question "Why?" rather than only the question "What?", is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially scientific research, in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948: p8)

For Hempel, answering the question "Why?" did not, as for Duhem, involve an appeal to a reality beyond all experience. Hempel employs the epistemic sense of explanation. For him the question "Why?" was an expression of the need to gain predictive control over our future experiences, and the value of a scientific theory was to be measured in terms of its capacity to produce this result.

Hempel's Theory of Explanation

According to Hempel, an explanation is:

> **...an argument to the effect that the phenomenon to be explained ...was to be expected in virtue of certain explanatory facts. (1965 p. 336)**

Hempel claimed that there are two types of explanation, what he called 'deductive-nomological' (DN) and 'inductive-statistical' (IS) respectively." Both IS and DN arguments have the same structure. Their premises each contain statements of two types: (1) initial conditions C, and (2) law-like generalizations L. In each, the conclusion is the event E to be explained:

> **C1, C2, C3,...Cn**
>
> **L1, L2, L3,...Ln**
>
> **-----------------------**
>
> **E**

The only difference between the two is that the laws in a DN explanation are universal generalizations, whereas the laws in IS explanations have the form of statistical generalizations. An example of a DN explanation containing one initial condition and one law-like generalization is:

> **C. The infant's cells have three copies of chromosome 21.**
>
> **L. Any infant whose cells have three copies of chromosome 21 has Down's Syndrome.**
>
> **---**
>
> **E. The infant has Down's Syndrome.**

An example of an IS explanation is:

C. The man's brain was deprived of oxygen for five continuous minutes.

L. Almost anyone whose brain is deprived of oxygen for five continuous minutes will sustain brain damage.

--

E. The man has brain damage.

For Hempel, DN explanations were always to be preferred to IS explanations. There were two reasons for this.

First, the deductive relationship between premises and conclusion maximized the predictive value of the explanation. Hempel accepted IS arguments as explanatory just to the extent that they approximated DN explanations by conferring a high probability on the event to be explained.

Second, Hempel understood the concept of explanation as something that should be understood fundamentally in terms of logical form. True premises are, of course, essential to something being a good DN explanation, but to qualify as a DN explanation (what he sometimes called a potential DN explanation) an argument need only exhibit the deductive-nomological structure. (This requirement placed Hempel squarely within the logical positivist tradition, which was committed to analyzing all of the epistemically significant concepts of science in logical terms.) There is, however, no corresponding concept of a potential IS explanation. Unlike DN explanations, the inductive character of IS explanations means that the relation between premises and conclusion can always be undermined by the addition of new information. (For example, the probability of brain damage, given that a man is deprived of oxygen for 7 minutes, is lowered somewhat by the information that the man spent this time at the bottom of a very cold lake.) Consequently, it is always possible that a proposed IS explanation, even if the premises are true, would fail to predict the fact in question, and thus have no explanatory significance for the case at hand.

Standard Criticisms of Hempel's Theory of Explanation

Hempel's dissatisfaction with statistical explanation was at odds with modern science, for which the explanatory use of statistics had become indispensable. Moreover, Hempel's requirement that IS explanations approximate the predictive power of DN explanations has the counterintuitive implication that for inherently low probability events no explanations are possible. For example, since smoking two packs of cigarettes a day for 40 years does not actually make it probable that a person will contract lung cancer, it follows from Hempel's theory that a statistical law about smoking will not be involved in an IS explanation of the occurrence of lung cancer. Hempel's view might be defended here by claiming that when our theories do not allow us to predict a phenomenon with a high degree of accuracy, it is because we have incomplete knowledge of the initial conditions. However, this seems to require us to base a theory of explanation on the now dubious metaphysical position that all events have determinate causes.

Another important criticism of Hempel's theory is that many DN arguments with true premises do not appear to be explanatory. Wesley Salmon raised the problem of relevance with the following example:

C1. Butch takes birth control pills.

C2: Butch is a man.

L: No man who takes birth control pills becomes pregnant.

--

E: Butch has not become pregnant.

Unfortunately, this reasoning qualifies as explanatory on Hempel's theory despite the fact that the premises seem to be explanatorily irrelevant to the conclusion.

Sylvain Bromberger raised the problem of asymmetry by pointing out that, while on Hempel's model one can explain the period of a pendulum in terms of the length of the pendulum together with the law of simple periodic motion, one can just as easily explain the length of a pendulum in terms of its period in accord with the same law. Our intuitions tell us that

the first is explanatory, but the second is not. The same point is made by the following example:

> **C: The barometer is falling rapidly.**
>
> **L: Whenever the barometer falls rapidly, a storm is approaching.**
>
> **---**
>
> **E: A storm is approaching.**

While the falling barometer is a trustworthy indicator of an approaching storm, it is counterintuitive to say that the barometer explains the occurrence of the storm. Rather, it is the approaching storm that explains the falling barometer.

These two problems, relevance and asymmetry, expose the difficulty of developing a theory of explanation that makes no reference to causal relations. Reference to causal relations is not an option for Hempel, however, since causation heads the anti-realist's list of metaphysically suspect concepts. It would also undermine his view that explanation should be understood as an epistemic rather than a metaphysical relationship. Hempel's response to these problems was that they raise purely pragmatic issues. His model countenances many explanations that prove to be useless, but whether an explanation has any practical value is not, in Hempel's view, something that can be determined by philosophical analysis. This is a perfectly cogent reply, but it has not generally been regarded as an adequate one. Virtually all subsequent attempts to improve upon Hempel's theory accept the above criticisms as legitimate.

As noted above, Hempel's model requires that an explanation make use of at least one law-like generalization. This presents another sort of problem for the DN model. Hempel was careful to distinguish law-like generalizations from accidental generalizations. The latter are generalizations that may be true, but not in virtue of any law of nature. (E.g., "All of my shirts are stained with coffee" may be true, but it is- I hope- just an accidental fact, not a law of nature.) Although the idea that explanation consists in subsuming events under natural laws has wide appeal in the philosophy of science, it is doubtful whether this requirement can be made consistent with Hempel's epistemic view of explanation. The reason is simply that no one has ever articulated an epistemically sound criterion for distinguishing between law-like generalizations and accidental generalizations. This is essentially just Hume's problem of induction, viz., that no finite number of observations can justify the claim that a regularity in nature is due to an natural necessity. In the absence of such a criterion, Hempel's model seems to violate the spirit of the epistemic view of explanation, as well as the idea that explanation can be understood in purely logical terms.

Contemporary Developments in the Theory of Explanation

Contemporary developments in the theory of explanation in many ways reflect the fragmented state of analytic philosophy since the decline of logical positivism. In this article we will look briefly at examples of how explanation has been conceived within the following five traditions: (1) Causal Realism, (2) Constructive Empiricism, (3) Ordinary Language Philosophy, (4) Cognitive Science and (5) Naturalism and Scientific Realism.

(1) Explanation and Causal Realism

With the decline of logical positivism and the gathering success of modern theoretical science, philosophers began to regard continued skepticism about the reality of unobservable entities and processes as pointless. Different varieties of realism were articulated and against this background several different causal theories of explanation were developed. The idea behind them is the ordinary intuition noted at the beginning of this essay: to explain is to attribute a cause. Michael Scriven argued this point with notable force:

Let us take a case where we can be sure beyond any reasonable doubt that we have a correct explanation. As you reach for the dictionary, your knee catches the edge of the table and thus turns over the ink bottle, the contents of which proceed to run over the table's edge and ruin the carpet. If you are subsequently asked to explain how the carpet was damaged you have a complete explanation. You did it by knocking over the ink. The certainty of this explanation is primeval...This capacity for identifying causes is learnt, is better developed in some people than in others, can be tested, and is the basis for what we call judgements. (1959a: p. 456)

Wesley Salmon's causal theory of explanation is perhaps the most influential developed within the realist tradition. Salmon had earlier developed a fundamentally epistemic view according to which an explanation is a list of statistically relevant factors. However he later rejected this, and any epistemic theory, as inadequate. His reason was that all epistemic theories are incapable of showing how explanations produce scientific understanding. This is because scientific understanding is not only a matter of having justified beliefs about the future. Salmon now insists that even a Laplacean Demon whose knowledge of the laws and initial conditions of the universe were so precise and complete as to issue in perfect predictive knowledge would lack scientific understanding. Specifically, he would lack the concepts of causal relevance and causal asymmetry and he could not distinguish between true causal processes and pseudoprocesses. (As an example of the latter, consider the beam of a search light as it describes an arc through the sky. The movement of the beam is a pseudoprocess since earlier stages of the beam do not cause later stages. By contrast, the electrical generation of the light itself, and the movement of the lamp housing are true causal processes.)

Salmon defends his causal realism by rejecting the Humean conception of causation as linked chains of events, and by attempting to articulate an epistemologically sound theory of continuous causal processes and causal interactions to replace it. The theory itself is detailed and does not lend itself to compression. It reads not so much as an analysis of the term 'explanation' as a set of instructions for producing an explanation of a particular phenomenon or event. One begins by compiling a list of statistically relevant factors and analyzing the list by a variety of methods. The procedure terminates in the creation of causal models of these statistical relationships and empirical testing to determine which of these models is best supported by the evidence.

Insofar as Salmon's theory insists that an adequate explanation has not been achieved until the fundamental causal mechanisms of a phenomenon have been articulated, it is deeply reductionistic. It is not clear, for example, how Salmon's model of explanation could ever generate meaningful explanations of mental events, which supervene on, but do not seem to be reducible to a unique set of causal relationships. Salmon's theory is also similar to Hempel's in at least one sense, and that is that both champion ideal forms of explanation, rather than anything that scientists or ordinary people are likely to achieve in the workaday world. This type of theorizing clearly has its place, but it has also been criticized by those who see explanation primarily as a form of communication between individuals. On this view, simplicity and ease of communication are not merely pragmatic, but essential to the creation of human understanding.

(2) Explanation and Constructive Empiricism

In his book *The Scientific Image* (1980) Bas van Fraassen produced an influential defense of anti-realism. Terming his view "constructive empiricism" van Fraassen claimed that theoretical science was properly construed as a creative process of model construction rather than one of discovering truths about the unobservable world. While avoiding the fatal excesses of logical positivism he argued strongly against the realistic interpretation of theoretical terms, claiming that contemporary scientific realism is predicated on a dire misunderstanding of the nature of explanation. (See "Naturalism and Scientific Realism" below). In support of his constructive empiricism van Fraassen produced an epistemic theory of explanation that draws on the logic of why-questions and draws on a Bayesian interpretation of probability.

Like Hempel, van Fraassen seeks to explicate explanation as a purely logical concept. However, the logical relation is not that of premises to conclusion, but one of question to answer. Following Bromberger, van Fraassen characterizes explanation as an answer to a why-question. Why-questions, for him, are essentially contrastive. That is, they always, implicitly or explicitly, ask: Why Pk, rather than some set of alternatives X=<P1...Pn>? Why-questions also implicitly stipulate a relevance relation R, which is the explanatory relation (e.g., causation) any answer must bear to the ordered pair <Pk,X>.

van Frassen follows Hempel in addressing explanatory asymmetry and explanatory relevance as pragmatic issues. However, van Fraassen's question-answering model makes this view a bit more intuitive. The relevance relation is defined by the interests of the person posing the question. For example, an individual who asks for an explanation of an airline accident in terms of the human decisions that led to it can not be forced to accept an explanation solely in terms of the weather. van Fraassen deals with the problem of explanatory asymmetry by showing that this, too, is a function of context. For example, most people would say that bad weather explains plane crashes, but plane crashes don't explain bad weather. However, there are conditions (e.g., unstable atmospheric conditions, an airplane carrying highly explosive cargo) that could combine to supply the latter explanation with an appropriate context.

van Fraassen's model also avoids Hempel's problematic requirement of high probability for IS explanation. For van Fraassen, an answer will be potentially explanatory if it "favors" Pk over all the other members of the contrast class. This means roughly that the answer must confer greater probability on Pk than on any other Pi. It does not require that Pk actually be probable, or even that the probability of Pk be raised as a result of the answer, since favoring can actually result from an answer that lowers the probability of all other Pi relative to Pk. For van Fraassen, the essential tool for calculating the explanatory value of a theory is Bayes' Rule, which allows one to calculate the probability of a particular event relative to a set of background asssumptions and some new information. From a Bayesian point of view, the rationality of a belief is relative to a set of background assumptions which are not themselves the subject of evaluation. van Fraassen's theory of explanation is therefore deeply subjectivist: what counts as a good explanation for one person may not count as a good explanation for another, since their background assumptions may differ.

van Fraassen's pragmatic account of explanation buttresses his anti-realist position, by showing that when properly analyzed there is nothing about the concept of explanation that demands a realistic interpretation of causal processes or unobservables. van Fraassen does not make the positivist mistake of claiming that talk of such things is metaphysical nonsense. He claims only that a full appreciation of science does not depend on a realistic interpretation. His pragmatism also offers an alternative account of Salmon's Laplacean Demon. van Fraassen agrees with Salmon that an individual with perfect knowledge of the laws and initial conditions of the universe lacks something, but what he lacks is not objective knowledge of the difference between causal processes and pseudo processes. Rather, he simply lacks the human interests that make causation a useful concept.

(3) Explanation and Ordinary Language Philosophy

Although van Fraassen's theory of explanation is based on the view that explanation is a process of communication, he still chooses to explicate the concept of explanation as a logical relationship between question and answer, rather than as a communicative relationship between two individuals. Ordinary Language Philosophy tends to emphasize this latter quality, rejecting traditional epistemology and metaphysics and focussing on the requirements of effective communication. For this school, philosophical problems do not arise because ordinary language is defective, but because we are in some way ignoring the communicative function of language. Consequently, the point of ordinary language analysis is not to improve upon ordinary usage by clarifying the meanings of terms for use in some ideal vocabulary, but rather to bring the full ordinary meanings of the terms to light.

Within this tradition Peter Achinstein (1983) developed an illocutionary theory of explanation. Like Salmon, Achinstein characterizes explanation as the pursuit of understanding. He defines the act of explanation as the attempt by one person to produce understanding in another by answering a certain kind of question in a certain kind of way. Achinstein rejects Salmon's narrow association of understanding with causation, as well as van Fraassen's analysis in terms of why-questions. For Achinstein there are many different kinds of questions that we ordinarily regard as attempts to gain understanding (e.g., who-, what-, when-, and where-questions) and it follows that the act of answering any of these is properly regarded as an act of explanation.

According to Achinstein's theory S (a person) explains q (an interrogative expressing some question Q) by uttering u only if:

S utters u with the intention that his utterance of u render q understandable by producing the knowledge of the proposition expressed by u that it is a correct answer to Q. (1983: p.13)

Achinstein's approach is an interesting departure from the types of theory discussed above in that it draws freely both on the concept of intention as well as the irreducibly causal notion of "producing knowledge." This move clearly can not be countenanced by someone who sees explanation as a fundamentally logical concept. Even the causal realist who believes that explanations make essential reference to causes does not construe explanation itself in causal terms. Indeed, Achinstein's approach is so different from theories that we have discussed so far that it might be best construed as addressing a very different question. Whereas traditional theories have attempted to explicate the logic of explanation, Achinstein's theory may be best understood as an attempt to describe the process of explanation itself.

Like van Fraassen's theory, Achinstein's theory is deeply pragmatic. He stipulates that all explanations are given relative to a set of instructions (cf. van Fraassen's relevance relations) and indicates that these instructions are ultimately determined by the individual asking the question. So, for example, a person who ask for an explanation why the electrical power in the house has gone out implicitly instructs that the question be answered in a way that would be relevant to the

goal of turning the electricity back on. An answer that explained the absence of an electrical current in scientific terms, say by reference to Maxwell's equations, would be inappropriate in this case.

Achinstein attempts to avoid van Fraassen's subjectivism, by identifying understanding with knowledge that a certain kind of proposition is true. These, he calls "content giving propositions" which are to be contrasted with propositions that have no real cognitive significance. For example, Achinstein would want to rule out as non-explanatory, answers to questions that are purely tautological, such as: Mr. Pheeper died because Mr. Pheeper ceased to live. Achinstein also counts as non explanatory the scientifically correct answer to a question like: What is the speed of light in a vacuum? For him 186,000 miles/ second is not explanatory because, as it stands, it is just an incomprehensibly large number offering no basis of comparison with velocities that are cognitively significant. This does not mean that speed of light in a vacuum can not be explained. For example, a more cognitively significant answer to the above question might be that light can travel 7 1/2 times around the earth in one second. (Thanks to Professor Norman Swartz for this example)

One of the main difficulties with Achinstein's theory is that the idea of a content-giving proposition remains too vague. His refusal to narrow the list of questions that qualify as requests for explanation makes it very difficult to identify any interesting property that an act of explanation must have in order to produce understanding. Moreover, Achinstein's theory suffers from epistemological problems of its own. His theory of explanation makes essential reference to the intention to produce a certain kind of knowledge-state, but it is unclear from what Achinstein says how a knowledge state can be the result of an illocutionary act simpliciter. Certainly, such acts can produce beliefs, but not all beliefs so produced will count as knowledge, and Achinstein's theory does not distinguish between the kinds of explanatory acts that are likely to result in such knowledge, and the kinds that will not.

(4) Explanation and Cognitive Science

While explanation may be fruitfully regarded as an act of communication, still another departure from the standard relational analysis is to think of explaining as a purely cognitive activity, and an explanation as a certain kind of mental representation that results from or aids in this activity. Considered in this way, explaining (sometimes called 'abduction') is a universal phenomenon. It may be conscious, deliberative, and explicitly propositional in nature, but it may also be unconscious, instinctive, and involve no explicit propositional knowledge whatsoever. For example: a father, hearing a high-pitched wail coming from the next room, rushes to his daughter's aid. Whether he reacted instinctively, or on the basis of an explicit inference, we can say that the father's behavior was the result of his having explained the wailing sound as the cry of his daughter.

From this perspective the term 'explanation' is neither a metalogical nor a metaphysical relation. Rather, the term has been given a theoretical status and an explanatory function of its own; i.e., we explain a person's behavior by reference to the fact that he is in possession of an explanation. Put differently, 'explanation' has been subsumed into the theoretical vocabulary of science (with explanation itself being one of the problematic unobservables) an understanding of which was the very purpose of the theory of explanation in the first place.

Cognitive science is a diverse discipline and there are many different ways of approaching the concept of explanation within it. One major rift within the discipline concerns the question whether "folk psychology" with its reference to mental entities like intentions, beliefs and desires is fundamentally sound. Cognitive scientists in the artificial intelligence (AI) tradition argue that it is sound, and that the task of cognitive science is to develop a theory that preserves the basic integrity of belief-desire explanation. On this view, explaining is a process of belief revision, and explanatory understanding is understood by reference to the set of beliefs that result from that process. Cognitive scientists in the neuroscience tradition, in contrast, argue that folk psychology is not explanatory at all: in its completed state all reference to beliefs and desires will be eliminated from the vocabulary of cognitive science in favor of a vocabulary that allows us to explain behavior by reference to models of neural activity. On this view explaining is a fundamentally neurological process, and explanatory understanding is understood by reference to activation patterns within a neural network.

One popular approach that incorporates aspects of both traditional AI and neuroscience makes use of the idea of a mental model (cf. Holland et al. [1986]) Mental models are internal representations that occur as a result of the activation of some part of a network of condition-action (or if-then) type rules. These rules are clustered in such a way that when a certain number of conditions becomes active, some action results. For example, here is a small cluster of rules that a simple cognitive system might use to distinguish different types of small furry mammals in a backyard environment.

(i) If <large, scurries, meows> then <cat>.

(ii) If <small, scurries, squeaks> then <rat>.

(iii) If <small, hops, chirps> then <squirrel>.

(iv) If <squirrel or rat> then <flees>.

(v) If <cat> then <approaches>.

A mental model of a squirrel, then, can be described as an activation of rule (iii).

A key concept within the mental models framework is that of a default hierarchy. A set of rules such as those above, state a standard set of default conditions. When these are met, a set of expectations is generated. For example, the activation of rule (iii) generates expectations of type (iv). However, a viable representational system must be able to revise prior rule activations when expectations are contradicted by future experience. In the mental models framework, this is achieved by incorporating a hierarchy of rules below the default condition with more specific conditions at lower levels of the model whose actions will defeat default expectations. For example, default rule (iii) might be defeated by another rule as follows:

3. Level 1: If <small, hops, chirps> then <squirrel>.

Level 2: If <flies> then <bird>.

In other words, a system that identifies a small, hopping chirping animal as a squirrel generates a set of expectations about its future behavior. If these expectations are contradicted by, for example, the putative squirrel flying, then the system will descend to a lower level of the hierarchy thereby allowing the system to reclassify the object as a bird.

Although this is just a cursory characterization of the mental models framework it is enough to show how explanation can be handled within it. In this context it is natural to think of explanation as a process that is triggered by a predictive failure. Essentially, when the expectations activated at Level 1 of the default hierarchy fail, the system searches lower levels of the hierarchy to find out why. If the above example were formulated in explicitly propositional terms, we would say that the failure of Level 1 expectations generated the question: Why did the animal, which I previously identified as a squirrel, fly? The answer supplied at level 2 is: Because the animal is not a squirrel, but a bird. Of course, Level 2 rules produce their own set of expectations, which must themselves be corroborated with future experience or defeated by future explanations. Clearly, the above example is a rudimentary form of explanation. Any viable system must incorporate learning algorithms which allow it to modify both the content and structure of the default hierarchy when its expectations are repeatedly undermined by experience. This will necessarily involve the ability to generalize over past experiences and activate entirely new rules at every level of the default hierarchy.

One can reasonably doubt whether philosophical questions about the nature of explanation are addressed by defining and ultimately engineering systems capable of explanatory cognition. To the extent that these questions are understood in purely normative terms, they obviously arise in regard to systems built by humans with at least as much force as they arise for humans themselves. In defense of the cognitive science approach, however, one might assert that the simple philosophical question "What is explanation?" is not well-formed. If we accept some form of epistemic relativity, the proper form of such a question is always "What is explanation in cognitive system S?" Hence, doubts about the significance of explanatory cognition in some system S are best expressed as doubts about whether system S-type explanation models human cognition accurately enough to have any real significance for human beings.

(5) Explanation, Naturalism and Scientific Realism

Historically, naturalism is associated with the inclination to reject any kind of explanation of natural phenomena that makes essential reference to unnatural phenomena. Insofar as this view is understood simply as the rejection of *supernatural* phenomena (e.g. the actions of gods, irreducibly spiritual substances, etc.) it is uncontroversial within the philosophy of science. However, when it is understood to entail the rejection of irreducibly *non-natural* properties, (i.e., the normative properties of 'rightness' and 'wrongness' that we appeal to in making evaluative judgments about human thought and behavior), it is deeply problematic. The problem is just that the aim of the philosophy of science has always been to establish an *a priori* basis for making precisely these evaluative judgments about scientific inquiry itself. If they can not be made, then it follows that the goals of philosophical inquiry have been badly misconceived.

Most contemporary naturalists do not regard this as an insurmountable problem. Rather, they just reject the idea that

philosophical inquiry can occur from a vantage point outside of science, and they deny that evaluative judgments we make about scientific reasoning and scientific concepts have any *a priori* status. Put differently, they think philosophical inquiry should be seens as a very abstract form of scientific inquiry, and they see the normative aspirations of philosophers as something that must be achieved by using the very tools and methods that philosophers have traditionally sought to justify.

The relevance of naturalism to the theory of explanation can be understood briefly as follows. Naturalism undermines the idea that knowledge is prior to understanding. If it is true that there will never be an inductive logic that can provide an *a priori* basis for calling an observed regularity a natural law, then there is, in fact, no independent way of establishing what is the case prior to understanding why it is the case. Because of this, some naturalists (e.g., Sellars) have suggested a different way of thinking about the epistemic significance of explanation. The idea, basically, is that explanation is not something that occurs on the basis of pre-confirmed truths. Rather, successful explanation is actually part of the process of confirmation itself:

Our aim [is] to manipulate the three basic components of a world picture: (a) observed objects and events, (b) unobserved objects and events, (c) nomological connections, so as to achieve a maximum of 'explanatory coherence'. In this reshuffle no item is sacred. (Sellars, 1962: p356)

Many naturalists have since embraced this idea of "inference to the best explanation" (IBE) as a fundamental principle of scientific reasoning. Moreover, they have put this principle to work as an argument for realism. Briefly, the idea is that if we treat the claim that unobservable entities exist as a scientific hypothesis, then it can be seen as providing an explanation of the success of theories that employ them: viz., the theories are successful because they are (approximately) true. Anti-realism, by contrast, can provide no such explanation; on this view theories that make reference to unobservables are not literally true and so the success of scientific theories remains mysterious. It should be noted here that scientific realism has a very different flavor from the more foundational form of realism discussed above. Traditional realists do not think of realism as a scientific hypothesis, but as an independent metaphysical thesis.

Although IBE has won many converts in recent years it is deeply problematic precisely because of the way it employs the concept of explanation. While most people find IBE to be intuitively plausible, the fact remains that no theory of explanation discussed above can make sense of the idea that we accept a claim on the basis of its explanatory power. Rather, every such view stipulates as a condition of having explanatory power at all that a statement must be true or well-confirmed. Moreover, van Fraassen has argued that even if we can make sense of IBE, it remains a highly dubious principle of inductive inference. The reason is that "inference to the best explanation" really can only mean "inference to the best explanation given to date". We are unable to compare proposed explanations to others that no one has yet thought of, and for this reason the property of being the best explanation can not be an objective measure of the likelihood that it is true.

One way of responding to these criticisms is to observe that Sellars' concept of explanatory coherence is based on a view about the nature of understanding that simply eludes the standard models of explanation. According to this view an explanation increases our understanding, not simply by being the correct answer to a particular question, but by increasing the coherence of our entire belief system. This view has been developed in the context of traditional epistemology (Harman, Lehrer) as well as the philosophy of science (Thagard, Kitcher). In the latter context, the terms "explanatory unification" and "consilience" have been introduced to promote the idea that good explanations necessarily tend to produce a more unified body of knowledge. Although traditionalists will insist that there is no *a priori* basis for thinking that a unified or coherent set of beliefs is more likely to be true, (counterexamples are, in fact, easy to produce) this misses the point that most naturalists reject the possibility of establishing IBE, or any other inductive principle, on purely *a priori* grounds.

The Current State of the Theory of Explanation

This brief summary may leave the reader with the impression that philosophers are hopelessly divided on the nature of explanation, but this is not really the case. Most philosophers of science would agree that our understanding of explanation is far better now than it was in 1948 when Hempel and Oppenheim published "Studies in the Logic of Explanation." While it serves expository purposes to represent the DN model and each of its successors as fatally flawed, this should not obscure the fact that these theories have brought real advances in understanding which succeeding models are required to preserve. At this point, fundamental disagreements on the nature of explanation fall into one of two

categories. First, there are metaphysical disagreements. Realists and anti-realists continue to differ over what sort of ontological commitments one makes in accepting an explanation. Second, there are metaphilosophical disagreements. Naturalists and nonnaturalists remain at odds concerning the relevance of scientific inquiry (viz., inquiry into the way scientists, ordinary people and computers actually think) to a philosophical theory of explanation. These disputes are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Fortunately, however, the significance of further research into the logical and cognitive structure of explanation does not depend on their outcome.

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External World

In philosophical discussions, the external world is the realm of objects outside and independent of an independent self. The external world can only be examined and known through sensory perceptions. It is presumed that the eternal world is a unified system, mirroring our unified perceptions. Skeptics argue that our knowledge is limited to our perceptions, thus there is no knowledge of this external world itself.

There are three traditional accounts of our perception of the external world. Direct realism, says that the physical world is as it is perceived. Representationalism holds that the external world causes our experiences, and that the object being perceived cannot exist outside of how it is perceived. For Russell, that nothing in the external world we perceive is what it seems. Phenomenalism is the view that all we know are phenomena, and we know nothing of the external things causing the phenomena.

For Hobbes the external world involves both the external movement of objects and the internal movements within the perceiver. Any change in these movements corresponds to an interaction, thus perception. Locke, Berkeley, and Mill held that sensations of the external world cannot be selected by the perceiver; only our ideas spawned from those perceptions can be selected and controlled.

The ability to comprehend the external world involves the ability to interpret, distinguish, and relate what seems to be singular things or, at least, singular groups of things. Comprehending the external world is a process of forming interconnections between these singular things.

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Feminist Ethics

In recent years feminist thinkers have challenged traditional models of thinking in most academic disciplines. Feminists argue that conventional paradigms are male-oriented insofar as they are devised by men and are dominated by a male emphasis on systems of inflexible rules. Further, these paradigms are often self-serving for men and subversive to the interests of women. The term "feminist ethics" refers to a wide group feminist-related moral issues. One such issue involves the social and political oppression of women as has occurred during much of human history. Male philosophers have often argued that women are subordinate to men intellectually, socially, and even morally. For example, in Book 5 of *Émile* (1762), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), argued that women serve mainly a supportive function in the lives of men and, accordingly, the education of women should reflect that function:

> A woman's education must therefore be planned in relation to man. To be pleasing in his sight, to win his respect and love, to train him in childhood, to tend him in manhood, to counsel and console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these are the duties of woman for all time, and this is what she should be taught while she is young. The further we depart from this principle, the further we shall be from our goal, and all our precepts will fail to secure her happiness or our own. [*Émile*, (London, 1911) p. 393]

Although views like Rousseau's are largely rejected today even by men, feminists point out that women continue to be oppressed as seen in the fact that men still occupy the top positions in politics, business, and finance. The goal of feminist ethics, on this view, is to create a plan or ideology that will end the social and political oppression of women.

A second central issue of feminist ethics focuses on two claims: (1) traditional morality is male-centered, and (2) there is a unique female perspective of the world that can be shaped into a value theory. Traditional morality is male-centered since it is modeled after practices that have been traditionally male-dominated, such as acquiring property, engaging in business contracts, and governing societies. The rigid systems of rules required for trade and government were then taken as models for the creation of equally rigid systems of moral rules, such as lists of rights and duties. Women, by contrast, have traditionally had a nurturing role by raising children and overseeing domestic life. These tasks require less rule following, and more spontaneous and creative action. Using the woman's experience as a model for moral theory, then, the basis of morality would be spontaneously caring for others as would be appropriate in each unique circumstance. On this model, the agent becomes part of the situation and acts caringly within that context. This stands in contrast to male-modeled morality where the agent is a mechanical actor who performs his required duty, but can remain distanced from and unaffected by the situation. A care-based approach to morality, as it is sometimes called, is offered by feminist ethicists as either a replacement for or a supplement to traditional male-modeled moral systems.

In her landmark book *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), British political philosopher Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) attacks traditional male preconceptions of the nature and social role of women. Reason, she argues, "loudly demands justice for one-half of the human race." According to Wollstonecraft, male writers such as Rousseau imply that women are incapable of acquiring true moral virtue since women are intellectually inferior to men. Wollstonecraft concedes that women commonly portray intellectual inferiority since they are educated from childhood to be timid slaves, which supposedly make them more alluring for men. The solution, for Wollstonecraft, is to educate women to develop their rational abilities. Since the development of moral virtue is a function of reason, then, as rational beings, women can fully participate in moral virtue.

Wollstonecraft held that morality is the same for both men and women, given the fact that morality is a function of reason. However, many contemporary feminist philosophers advocate a uniquely female conception of morality. In "Ethics from the Stand Point of Women" (1990), Nel Noddings argues that an ethic of care is a quest for new virtues based on traditional women's practices, even when these practices are abandoned. Noddings recognizes that, traditional philosophers believed that women were morally inferior to men, and that female goodness fundamentally involved obedience, industry, silence, and service. She argues, though, that these traditional female roles as nurturers can be shaped into an ethic of care. The central features of care include the Christian notion of agape love, and emphasizes needs over rights, and love over duty. For Noddings, gender-free morality may be impossible. Men invent the criteria of what constitutes an adequate moral theory and, so female discourse on the subject may be handicapped. The entire discussion of care itself would not have arisen if women did not initiate it. Although men might criticize that genderized ethics cannot attain universality, Noddings responds that feminists cannot be accused of genderizing ethics since ethics already is genderized. In fleshing out the essence of care, Noddings proposes that we look at traditional caring roles of women, cooking, teaching, nursing, and childhood education. Even though many of these tasks are exploitive, they require virtues or character traits that are commonly overlooked. Most searches for virtues follow Aristotle's model, which derives from the elite class, as opposed to slaves and women. However, according to Noddings we must look to everyday experience to find practices that may be deemed virtuous.

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James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864)

Life and Writings. James Frederick Ferrier was born in Edinburgh on June 16, 1808, the son of John Ferrier, writer to the signet. Ferrier was educated by the Reverend H. Duncan, at the manse of Ruthwell, Dumfriesshire; and afterwards at Edinburgh High School, and under Dr. Charles Parr Burney, son of Dr. Charles Burney (1757-1817), at Greenwich. He was at the university of Edinburgh from 1825-1827, and then became a fellow-commoner of Magdalen College, Oxford, where he graduated BA. in 1831. He formed in the same year the acquaintance of Sir William Hamilton, whose influence upon him was very great, and for whose personal character and services to speculation he expresses the highest reverence. For years together he was almost daily in Hamilton's company for hours. In 1832 he became an advocate, but apparently never practiced. His metaphysical tastes, stimulated by Hamilton's influence, led him to spend some months at Heidelberg in 1834, in order to study German philosophy. He was on intimate terms with his aunt, Miss Ferrier, and his uncle, John Wilson, and in 1837 married his cousin, Margaret Anne, eldest daughter of John Wilson. He became a contributor to *Blackwood's Magazine*." He there wrote an article on Coleridge's plagiarisms in 1840. His first metaphysical publication was a series of papers, reprinted in his *Remains*, called "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness," in *Blackwood's Magazine* for 1838 and 1839.

In 1842 he was appointed professor of civil history in the university of Edinburgh; and in 1844-5 he lectured as William Hamilton's substitute. In 1845 he was elected professor of moral philosophy and political economy at St. Andrews. He was a candidate for the professorship of moral philosophy, resigned by Wilson in 1852, and for the professorship of logic and metaphysics vacated by Hamilton's death in 1856. But he was unsuccessful on both occasions, and continued at St. Andrews until his death. His chief work, the *Institutes of Metaphysic*, was published in 1854. The theory which it upholds had been already expounded to his class. It reached a second edition in 1856. In the same year he replied to his critics in a vigorous pamphlet called *Scottish Philosophy, the Old and New*, which, with certain omissions, is published as an "Appendix to the Institutes" in his *Remains*. He thought that the misunderstandings of his previous exposition had told against his candidature for the chair of metaphysics. Ferrier devoted himself to his professorial duties at St. Andrews; wrote and carefully rewrote his lectures, and lived chiefly in his study. He could seldom be persuaded to leave St. Andrews even for a brief excursion. An attack of angina pectoris in November 1861 weakened him permanently, though he continued to labor, and gave lectures in his own house. Renewed attacks followed in 1863, and he died at St. Andrews on June 11, 1864. After his death his minor publications were collected and published together along with a series of lectures as *Lectures on Greek Philosophy and other philosophical remains* (1866).

Philosophy. **Ferrier provides the earliest, and in some ways the most impressive, statement of absolute idealism in English philosophy. As an historian of philosophy Ferrier did not pretend to exceptional research; but he had an ability to give a living presentation of their views. The history of philosophy was, for him, no mere record of discarded systems but "philosophy itself taking its time." He was a sympathetic student of the German philosophers, banned by his friend Hamilton. It is difficult to trace any direct influence of Hegel upon his own doctrine, and indeed he said that he could not understand Hegel. But both his earlier and his later writings have an affinity with Fichte -- especially in their central doctrine: the stress laid on self-consciousness, and its distinction from the "mental states" with which the psychologist is concerned. This doctrine connects him with Berkeley also. He was one of the first to appreciate the true nature of Berkeley's thought, as not a mere transition-stage between Locke and Hume, but as a discovery of the spiritual nature of reality.**

In an essay on "Berkeley and Idealism," published in 1842, perhaps Ferrier's most perfect piece of philosophical writing, he signalizes both the essential truth and the essential defect in a theory which was at the time much less understood than it is now. Berkeley, he says, "certainly was the first to stamp the indelible impress of his powerful understanding on those principles of our nature, which, since his time, have brightened into imperishable truths in the light of genuine speculation. His genius was the first to swell the current of that mighty stream of tendency towards which all modern meditation flows, the great gulf-stream of Absolute Idealism." The element o peculiar value in Berkeley's speculation is its concreteness, its faithfulness to reality.

> **The peculiar endowment by which Berkeley was distinguished, far beyond almost every philosopher who has succeeded him, was the eye he had *for facts*, and the singular pertinacity with which he refused to be dislodged from his hold upon them. . . . No man ever delighted less to expatiate in the regions of the occult, the abstract, the impalpable, the fanciful, and the unknown. His heart and soul clung with inseparable tenacity to the concrete realties of the universe; and with an eye uninfluenced by spurious theories, and unperverted by false knowledge, he saw directly into the very life of things.**

His theory needs only to be widened, and thus corrected, to provide the true explanation of which philosophy is in search. How this is to be done, is more clearly stated in the *Institutes*.

> **He saw that something subjective was a necessary and inseparable part of every object of cognition. But instead of maintaining that it was the ego or oneself which clove inseparably to all that could be known, and that this element must be thought of along with all that is thought of, he rather held that it was the senses, or our perceptive modes of cognition, which clove inseparably to all that could be known, and that these required to be thought of along with all that could be thought of. These, just as much as the ego, were held by him to be the subjective part of the total synthesis of cognition which could not by any possibility be discounted. Hence the unsatisfactory character of his ontology, which, when tried by the test of a rigorous logic, will be found to invest the Deity -- the supreme mind, the infinite ego, which the terms of his system necessarily compel him to place in synthesis with all things -- with human modes of apprehension, with such senses as belong to man -- and to invest Him with these, not as a matter of contingency, but as a matter these, not as a matter of necessity. Our only safety lies in the consideration -- a consideration which is a sound, indeed inevitable**

> **logical inference -- that our sensitive modes of apprehension are mere contingent elements and conditions of cognition; and that the ego or subject alone enters, of necessity, into the composition of everything which any intelligence can know.**

Although there are occasional references to Kant in Ferrier's works, he develops his theory through a continuous criticism of Reid, on the one hand, and of Hamilton, on the other. Reid is, for him, the representative of Psychology or the "science of the human mind," and therefore, despite his own protestations to the contrary, of "Representationism." Hamilton is the representative of Agnosticism, or the doctrine of the unknowableness of the Absolute Reality. Against the former view, he argues that we have a direct knowledge of Reality, both material and spiritual; against the latter, he formulates his "agnoiology" or "theory of ignorance," to prove that the "ignorance" of which Hamilton would convict the human mind is not properly called ignorance or defect, but is simply that repudiation of the unintelligible or self-contradictory which is the essential characteristic of intelligence, rather than a defect peculiar to the human mind.

The fundamental error of Psychology is the acceptance of sensation, or the "state of consciousness," as the original datum of knowledge, the consequence being that the inference to the existence of the object, as well as to the subject, is more or less uncertain. As a matter of fact, the subject and the object are inseparable. "Matter *per se*" is never the object of knowledge; what we perceive is always "Matter *mecum*." The elementary fact of knowledge is not matter, but the perception of matter, or the subject as conscious of the object, either subjective or objective. Mere "phenomena" never exist; what exists is always phenomenal to a self or subject. If we define "substance" as that which is capable of existing, or of being conceived, alone and independently, then the conscious self, that is, the subject as conscious of an object, is substance, and can be known. The ego cannot know objects without knowing itself along with them; it cannot know itself except along with objects. It is because the psychologists have ignored the conscious, or rather the self-conscious self, which is present in all knowledge, that they have been unable to escape the conclusion that all we know is "ideas" or "phenomena" which represent, and may misrepresent, the object or substantial reality.

For the refutation of the Hamiltonian doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, Ferrier formulated what he regarded as an entirely original "theory of ignorance." Ignorance, he holds, presupposes the possibility of knowledge; we can be ignorant only of that which it is possible for us to know. It is not a defect, but a merit of knowledge not to know that which cannot be known because it is the unintelligible or the self-contradictory. Now we have seen that subject and object, or mind and matter, *per se*, are both alike unknowable in this sense; since they are never presented in consciousness alone but always together, it follows that they cannot be represented or thought in separation from one another. It is of such an inconceivable or unintelligible reality that Hamilton proclaims that ignorance is inevitable; he might as well proclaim the unknowableness of Nothing, or of Nonsense. It is the glory, rather than the humiliation, of intelligence to repudiate the unintelligible or self-contradictory.

On the basis of this "epistemology" and "agnoiology" Ferrier proceeds to construct his "ontology." Self-conscious mind, the ultimate element in knowledge, is also the ultimate element in existence. Repudiating the errors of subjective idealism, he finds himself compelled to accept absolute or objective idealism. The individual ego, along with the universe of his thought, is not independent. "The only *independent* universe which any mind or ego can think of is the universe in synthesis with some *other* mind or ego." And since *one* such other mind is sufficient to account for the universe of our experience, we are warranted in inferring that there is only one. Ferrier thus

summarizes the argument which yields "this theistic conclusion":

> **Speculation shows us that the universe, by itself, is the contradictory; that it is incapable of self-subsistency, that it can exist only *cum alio*, that all true and cogitable and non-contradictory existence is a synthesis of the subjective and the objective; and *then* we are compelled, by the most stringent necessity of thinking, to conceive a supreme intelligence as the ground and essence of the Universal Whole. Thus the postulation of the Deity is not only permissible, it is unavoidable. Every mind thinks, and *must* think of God (however little conscious it may be of the operation which it is performing), whenever it thinks of anything as lying beyond all human observation, or as subsisting in the absence or annihilation of all finite intelligences.**

The ethical implications of such an idealism are strikingly suggested in the *Philosophy of Consciousness*, where the parallelism between the functions of self-consciousness in the intellectual and in the moral spheres is made clear, and it is shown that "just as all perception originates in the antagonism between consciousness and our sensations, so all morality originates in the antagonism between consciousness and the passions, desires, or inclinations of the natural man." It is in this refusal to accept the guidance of the natural passions and inclinations, this "direct antithesis" of the "I" to the "natural man," that our moral freedom consists. What is this supreme act by which man asserts his supremacy over nature, within and without himself?

> **What is it but the act of consciousness, the act of becoming "I," the act of placing *ourselves* in the room which sensation and passion have been made to vacate? This act may be obscure in the extreme, but still it is an act of the most *practical* kind, both in itself and in its results. . . . For what act can be more vitally practical than the act by which we realize our existence as free personal beings? and what act can be attended by a more practical result than the act by which we look our passions in the face, and, in the very act of looking at them, *look them down*?**

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Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1797-1879)

German philosopher, son of Johann Gottlieb Fichte b. at Jena July 18, 1797- d. at Stuttgart Aug. 8, 1879. He was for many years a gymnasial professor at Saarbrucken and Dusseldorf, and then professor of philosophy at Bonn 1836-42 (ordinary professor after 1840), and at Tubingen 1842-63. In 1863 he retired from the university and soon afterward settled in Stuttgart. He edited his father's works, founded and edited the *Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und spekulative Theologie*, and was a prolfic writer on philosophy. In metaphysics his position was that of a mediator between the two conflicting views represented by Hegel and Herbart, and, too, in the interest of theology. His great aim was to secure a philosophical basis for the personality of God. Taking the monadology of Leibniz as the model of a system embracing unity in plurality and plurality in unity, he sought to fuse extreme spiritualistic monism and extreme pluralistic realism into what he called concrete theism. The more important of his independent works are, *Beitrdge zur Charakteristik der rteuern Philosophie* (Sulzbach, 1829; 2d ed., completely rewritten, 1841); *Religion und Philosophie* (Heidelberg, 1834*); Die speculative Theologie* (3 parts, 1846); *System der Ethik* (2 vols., Leipsic, 1850-53); *Anthropologie* (18-56); *Vermischte Schriften* (2 vols., 1869); *Die theistische Weltansicht und ihre Berechtigung* (1873); and *Der neuere Spiritualismus* (1878).

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)



Johann Gottlieb Fichte is one of the major figures in German philosophy in the period between Kant and Hegel. Initially considered one of Kant's most talented followers, Fichte developed his own system of transcendental idealism, the *Wissenschaftslehre*, which sought to work out in great detail Kant's insight that finite rational beings such as ourselves are to be interpreted in terms of both theoretical and practical reason. Through technical philosophical works and popular writings Fichte exercised great influence over his contemporaries, especially during his years at the University of Jena. His influence waned towards the end of his life, and Hegel's subsequent dominance in German philosophy relegated Fichte to the status of a transitional figure whose thought helped to explain the development of German idealism from Kant's Critical philosophy to Hegel's philosophy of Spirit. Today, however, Fichte is rightly seen as an important philosopher in his own right, as a thinker who carried on the Kantian legacy of transcendental philosophy in a highly original form.

Section Headings:

Fichte's Beginnings (1762-1794)

(a) Early life

Fichte was born on May 19, 1762 to a family of ribbon makers. Early in life he impressed everyone with his great intelligence, but his parents were too poor to pay for his schooling. Through the patronage of a local nobleman, he was able to attend the Pforta school, which prepared students for a university education, and then the universities of Jena and Leipzig. Unfortunately, little is known about this period of Fichte's life, but we do know that he intended to obtain a degree in theology, and that he had to break off his studies for financial reasons around 1784, without obtaining a degree of any sort. Several years of earning his living as an itinerant tutor ensued, during which time he met his future wife, Johanna Rahn, while living in Zurich.

In the summer of 1790, while living in Leipzig and once again in financial distress, Fichte agreed to tutor a university student in the Kantian philosophy, about which he knew very little at the time. His immersion in Kant's writings, according to his own testimony, revolutionized his thinking and changed his life, turning him away from a deterministic view of the world at odds with human freedom towards the doctrines of the Critical philosophy and its reconciliation of freedom and determinism.

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(b) Fichte's sudden rise to prominence

More wandering and frustration followed. Fichte decided to travel to Königsberg to meet Kant himself, and on July 4, 1791 the disciple had his first interview with the master. Unfortunately for Fichte, things did not go well, and Kant was not especially impressed by his visitor. In order to prove his expertise in the Critical philosophy, Fichte quickly composed a manuscript on the relation of the Critical philosophy to the question of divine revelation, an issue that Kant had yet to consider. This time, Kant was justifiably impressed by the results and arranged for his own publisher to bring out the work, which appeared in 1792 under the title *An Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation*.

In this fledgling effort Fichte adhered to many of Kant's claims about religion by extending them to concept of revelation. In particular, he took over Kant's idea that all religious belief must ultimately withstand critical scrutiny if it is to make a legitimate claim on us. For Fichte, any alleged revelation of

God's activity in the world must pass a moral test: namely, no immoral command or action, i.e., nothing that violates the moral law, can be attributed to Him. Although Fichte himself did not explicitly criticize Christianity by appealing to this test, such a restriction on the content of a possible revelation, if consistently imposed, would overturn most aspects of orthodox Christian belief: including, for example, the doctrine of original sin, which states that everyone is born guilty as a result of Adam and Eve's disobedience in the Garden of Eden. This piece of Christian theology, which is said to be grounded in the revelations contained in the Bible, is hardly compatible with the ordinary view of justice that Kant and Fichte took to be underwritten by the moral law, and that maintains that we are not guilty for crimes or transgressions that we did not commit. Attentive readers should have instantly gleaned Fichte's radical views from the placid Kantian prose.

For reasons that are still mysterious, Fichte's name and preface were omitted from the first edition of *An Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation*, and thus the book, which displayed an extensive and subtle appreciation of Kant's thought, was taken to be the work of Kant himself. Once it became known that Fichte was the author, he instantly became a philosophical figure of importance; no one whose work had been mistaken for Kant's, however briefly, could be rightfully denied fame and celebrity in the German philosophical world.

Fichte continued working as a tutor while attempting to reformulate his philosophical insights of recent years into his own system. He also anonymously published two political works, "Reclamation of the Freedom of Thought from the Princes of Europe, Who Have Oppressed It Until Now" and *Contribution to the Rectification of the Public's Judgment of the French Revolution*. It became widely known that he was their author; and so from the very beginning of his public career, he was identified with radical causes and views. In October 1793 he married his fiancee, and shortly thereafter unexpectedly received a call from the University of Jena to take over the chair in philosophy that Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823), a well-known exponent and interpreter of the Kantian philosophy, had recently vacated. Fichte arrived in Jena in May 1794.

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The Jena Period (1794-1799)

(a) Fichte's philosophical vocation

In his years at Jena, which lasted until 1799, Fichte published the works that established his lasting reputation as one of the major figures in the German philosophical tradition. Fichte never exclusively saw himself as an academic philosopher addressing the typical audience of fellow philosophers, university colleagues, and students. Instead, he considered himself a scholar with a wider role to play beyond the confines of academia, a view eloquently expressed in "Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation," which were delivered to an overflowing lecture hall shortly after his much anticipated arrival in Jena. One of the tasks of philosophy, according to these lectures, is to offer rational guidance towards the ends that are most appropriate for a free and harmonious society. The particular role of the scholar – that is, of individuals such as Fichte himself, regardless of their particular academic discipline – is to be a teacher of mankind and a superintendent of its never-ending progress towards perfection.

Throughout his career Fichte alternated between composing philosophical works for scholars and students of philosophy and popular works for the general public. This desire to communicate to the wider

public – to bridge the gap, so to speak, between theory and praxis – inspired his writings from the start. In fact, Fichte's passion for the education of society as a whole should be seen as a necessary consequence of his philosophical system, which continues the Kantian tradition of placing philosophy in the service of enlightenment, the eventual liberation of mankind from its self-imposed immaturity, i.e., its willing refusal to think for itself, and thus its responsibility for failing to act independently of the guidance of external authority.

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(b) Fichte's system, the *Wissenschaftslehre*

Fichte called his philosophical system the *Wissenschaftslehre*. The usual English translations of this term as "science of knowledge," "doctrine of science," or "theory of science" can be misleading, since today these phrases carry connotations that can be excessively theoretical or too reminiscent of the natural sciences. Therefore, many English-language commentators and translators prefer to use the German term as the untranslated proper name that designates Fichte' s system as a whole. Another source of confusion is that Fichte's book from 1794/5, *Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre*, is sometimes simply referred to as the *Wissenschaftslehre*. Strictly speaking, this is incorrect, since this work, as its title indicates, was meant as the foundations of the system as a whole; the other parts of the system were to be written later. Much of Fichte's work in the remainder of the Jena period attempted to complete the system as it was envisioned in the *Foundations* of 1794/5.

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(c) Background to the *Wissenschaftslehre*

Before moving to Jena, and while he was living in the house of his father-in-law in Zurich, Fichte wrote two short works that presaged much of the *Wissenschaftslehre* that he devoted the rest of his life to developing. The first of these was a review of a skeptical critique of Kantian philosophy in general and Reinhold's so-called *Elementarphilosophie* ("The Philosophy of Elements") in particular. The work under review, an anonymously published polemic called *Aenesidemus*, which was later discovered to have been written by Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833), and which appeared in 1792, greatly influenced Fichte, causing him to revise many of his views, but without leading him to abandon Reinhold's concept of philosophy as rigorous science, an interpretation of the nature of philosophy that demanded that philosophical principles be systematically deduced from a single, foundational principle known with apodictic certainty.

Reinhold had argued that this first principle was what he called the "principle of consciousness," namely, the proposition that "in consciousness representation is distinguished through the subject from both object and subject and is related to both." From this principle Reinhold attempted to deduce the contents of Kant's Critical philosophy. He claimed that the principle of consciousness was a reflectively known fact of consciousness, and argued that it could lend credence to various Kantian views, including the distinction between the faculties of sensibility and understanding and the existence of things in themselves. Schulze countered along Humean lines by offering skeptical objections against the legitimacy of Kant's (and thus Reinhold's) concept of the thing in itself (construed as the causal origin of our representations) and by arguing that the principle of consciousness was neither a fundamental principle (since it was subject to the laws of logic, in that it had to be free of contradiction) nor one known with apodictic certainty (since it originated in merely empirical reflection on the contents of

consciousness, which reflection Schulze, following David Hume, persuasively argued could not yield a principle grounded on indubitable evidence).

Fichte, to his consternation, found himself in agreement with much of Schulze's critique. Although he was still eager to support the Kantian system, Fichte, as a result of reading Schulze, came to the conclusion that the Critical philosophy needed new foundations. Yet the search for new foundations, in Fichte's mind, was never equivalent to a repudiation of the Kantian philosophy: as Fichte would frequently claim, he remained true to the spirit, if not the letter, of Kant's thought. His review of Schulze's *Aenesidemus* provides one tantalizing hint about how he would subsequently attempt to remain within the spirit of Kant's thought while attempting to reconstruct it from the ground up: philosophy, he says, must begin with a first principle, as Reinhold maintained, but not with one that expresses a mere fact, a *Tatsache*; instead, it must begin with a fact/act, a *Tathandlung*, that is not known empirically, but rather with self-evident certainty. The meaning and purpose of this new first principle would not become clear to his readers until the publication of the *Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre* in 1794/5.

In addition to his review of the Schulze book, and still prior to his arrival in Jena, Fichte sketched out the nature and methodology of the *Wissenschaftslehre* in an essay entitled "Concerning the Concept of the *Wissenschaftslehre*," which was intended to prepare his expectant audience for his classes and lectures. Here Fichte sets out his conception of philosophy as the science of science, i.e., as *Wissenschaftslehre*. The *Wissenschaftslehre* is devoted to establishing the foundation of individual sciences such as geometry, whose first principle is said to be the task of limiting space in accordance with a rule. Thus the *Wissenschaftslehre* seeks to justify the cognitive task of the science of geometry, i.e., its systematic efforts at spatial construction in the form of theorems validly deduced from axioms known with self-evident certainty. The *Wissenschaftslehre*, which itself is a science in need of a first principle, is said to be grounded on the *Tathandlung* first mentioned in the *Aenesidemus* review. The precise nature of this fact/act, from which the *Wissenschaftslehre* is supposed to begin, is much debated, even today. Yet it is the essential core of the Jena *Wissenschaftslehre* in general, and of the *Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre* from 1794/5 in particular.

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(d) *Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre* 1794/5

In the *Foundations* Fichte expresses the content of the *Tathandlung* in its most general form as "the I simply posits itself." Fichte is suggesting that the self, which he typically refers to as "the I," is not merely a static thing with fixed properties, but rather a self-producing process; yet if it is a self-producing process, then it must be free, since in some as yet unspecified fashion it owes its existence to nothing but itself. This admittedly obscure starting point is subject to much scrutiny and qualification as the *Wissenschaftslehre* proceeds. In more modern language, and as a first approximation of its meaning, we can understand the *Tathandlung* as expressing the concept of a rational agent that constantly interprets itself in light of standards that it imposes on itself, in both the theoretical and practical realms, in its efforts to determine what it ought to believe and how it ought to act. (Fichte's indebtedness to the Kantian notion of autonomy in the form of self-imposed lawfulness should be obvious to anyone familiar with the Critical philosophy.)

Given the difficulty of the notion, unfortunately, Fichte's *Tathandlung* has perplexed his readers from its first appearance. The principle of the self-positing I was initially interpreted along the lines of Berkeley's idealism, and thus as claiming that the world as a whole was somehow the product of an infinite mind.

This interpretation is surely mistaken, even if one can occasionally find passages that seem to support it. More important, though, is the question of the epistemic status of the principle. Is it known with the self-evident certainty that Fichte, following Reinhold, claims must ground any attempt at systematic knowledge? And how does it serve as a basis for deducing the rest of the *Wissenschaftslehre*?

Fichte's method is usually said to be phenomenological, restricting itself to what we can discover by means of reflection. Yet Fichte does not claim that we simply *find* the fully formed *Tathandlung* residing somewhere in our self-consciousness; instead, we *construct* it in order to explain ourselves to ourselves, to render intelligible to ourselves our normative nature as finite rational agents. Thus the requisite reflection is not empirical but transcendental, i.e., a postulate adopted for philosophical purposes. That is, the principle is presupposed as true in order to account for the conditions for the possibility of our ordinary experience. Such a procedure leaves open the possibility of an alternative account of our experience, which Fichte claims can take only one form. Either, he says, we can begin (as he does) with the I as the ground of all possible experience, or we can begin with the thing in itself outside of our experience. This dilemma, as he puts it, is the choice between idealism and dogmatism. The former is transcendental philosophy; the latter, a naturalistic approach to experience that explains it solely in causal terms. The choice between the two, as Fichte famously said in the first introduction to the *Wissenschaftslehre* from 1797, depends on the kind of person one is, since they are mutually exclusive yet equally possible approaches.

If such a choice between starting points is possible, however, then the principle of the self-positing I lacks the self-evident certainty that Fichte attributed to it in his earlier essay on the concept of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. There are, in fact, those who do not find it at all self-evident, namely, the dogmatists. Fichte clearly thinks that they are mistaken in their dogmatism, yet he offers no direct refutation of their position, claiming only that they cannot demonstrate what they hope to demonstrate, namely, that the ground of all experience lies solely in objects existing independently of the I. The dogmatist position, Fichte implies, ignores the normative aspects of our experience, e.g., warranted and unwarranted belief, correct and incorrect action, and thus attempts to account for our experience entirely in terms of our causal interaction with the world around us. Presumably, however, someone who begins with a disavowal of normativity, as the dogmatists do (since that is the kind of person they are), can never be brought to agree with the idealists. There is thus an argumentative impasse between the two camps.

Fichte's remarks about systematic form and certainty in "Concerning the Concept of the *Wissenschaftslehre*" give the impression that he intends to demonstrate the entirety of the *Wissenschaftslehre* from the principle of the self-positing I through a chain of logical inferences that merely set out the implications of the initial principle in such a way that the certainty of the first principle is transferred to the claims inferred from it. (The method of Spinoza's *Ethics* comes to mind, but this time with only a single premise from which to begin the proofs.) Yet this hardly seems to be Fichte's true method, since he constantly introduces new concepts that cannot be plausibly interpreted as the logical consequences of the previous ones. In other words, the deductions in the *Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre* are more than merely analytical explications of the consequences of the original premise. Instead, they both articulate and refine the initial principle of the self-positing I in accordance with the demands made on the idealist who is attempting to clarify the nature of the self-positing I by means of reflection.

Once Fichte postulates the self-positing I as the explanatory ground of all experience, he begins to complicate the web of concepts required to make sense of this initial postulate, thereby carrying out the

aforementioned construction of the self-positing I. The I posits itself insofar as it is aware of itself, not only as an object but also as a subject, and finds itself subject to normative constraints in both the theoretical and practical realms, e.g., that it must be free of contradiction and that there must be adequate reasons for what it believes and does. Furthermore, the I posits itself as free, since these constraints are ones that it imposes on itself. Next, by means of further reflection, the I discovers a difference between "representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity" and "representations accompanied by a feeling a freedom" – that is, a difference between representations of what purports to be a objective world existing apart from our representations of it and representations that are merely the product of our own mental activity. To recognize this distinction in our representations, however, is to posit a distinction between the I and the not-I, i.e., the self and whatever exists independently of it. In other words, the I posits itself as limited by something other than itself, even though it also initially posits itself as free.

The nature of this limitation is made increasingly more complex through further acts of reflection. First, the I posits a check, an *Anstoß*, on its practical activity, in that it encounters resistance to its will when it acts in the world. This check is then developed into more refined forms of limitation: sensations, intuitions, and concepts, all united in the experience of the things of the natural world, i.e., the spatio-temporal realm ruled by causal laws. Moreover, this world is found to contain other finite rational beings. They too are free yet limited, and the recognition of their freedom places further constraints on our activity. In this way the I posits the moral law and restricts its treatment of others to actions that are consistent with respect for their freedom. Thus, by the end of Fichte's deductions, the I posits itself as free yet limited by natural necessity and the moral law: its freedom becomes an infinite task in which it seeks to make the world around itself entirely compliant with its will, but only by doing so in an appropriately moral fashion that allows other free beings to do the same for themselves.

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(e) Working out the *Wissenschaftslehre* and the end of the Jena period

Fichte's writings during the rest of the Jena period sought to fill out and refine the entire system. The *Foundations of Natural Right Based on the Wissenschaftslehre* (1796/7) and *The System of Ethical Theory Based on the Wissenschaftslehre* (1798) concern themselves with political philosophy and moral philosophy, respectively. The task of the former work is to characterize the legitimate constraints that can be placed on individual freedom in order to produce a community of maximally free individuals who simultaneously respect the freedom of others. The task of the latter work is to characterize the specific duties of rational agents who freely produce objects and actions in the pursuit of their goals. These duties follow from our general obligation to determine ourselves freely, i.e., from the categorical imperative.

Besides filling out projected portions of the system, Fichte also began to revise the foundations themselves. Since he considered the mode of presentation of the *Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre* unsatisfactory, he began drawing up a new version in his lectures, which were given three times between 1796 and 1799, but which he never managed to publish during his lifetime. These lectures, which in many respects are superior to the *Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre*, were published posthumously and are now known as the *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo*.

Prior to publishing any systematic presentation of his philosophy of religion, Fichte became embroiled in what is now known as the *Atheismusstreit*, the atheism controversy. In an essay from 1798 entitled "On the Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World" Fichte argued that religious belief could be legitimate only insofar as it arose from properly moral considerations – a view clearly indebted to his

book on revelation from 1792. Furthermore, he claimed that God has no existence apart from the moral world order. (This second view was also an old one, initially suggested in the *Aenesidemus* review.) Neither view was orthodox at the time, and so Fichte was accused of atheism and ultimately forced to leave Jena.

Two open letters, both from 1799 and written by philosophers whom Fichte fervently admired, compounded his troubles. First, Kant disavowed the *Wissenschaftslehre* for mistakenly having tried to infer substantive philosophical knowledge from logic alone. Such an inference, he claimed, was impossible, since logic abstracted from the content of knowledge and thus could not produce a new object of knowledge. Second, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi accused the *Wissenschaftslehre* of nihilism: that is, of producing reality out of mere mental representations, and thus in effect from nothingness. Whether or not these criticisms were just (and Fichte certainly denied that they were), they further damaged Fichte's philosophical reputation.

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The Berlin Period (1800-1814)

(a) The eclipse of Fichte's career

In 1800 Fichte settled in Berlin and continued his work through private lectures and publishing new works, since on his arrival there was no university in the city. The Berlin years, while productive, represent a decline in Fichte's fortunes, since he never regained the degree of influence among philosophers that he had enjoyed during the Jena years, although he remained a popular author among non-philosophers. His first publication was a popular presentation of the *Wissenschaftslehre* designed to answer his critics on the question of atheism. Known as *The Vocation of Man*, it appeared in 1800 and is probably Fichte's greatest literary production. (It seems, though this is never explicitly stated anywhere in the book, that much of it was inspired by the personally stinging critique of Jacobi's open letter.)

Fichte continued to revise the *Wissenschaftslehre*, yet he published very little from these renewed efforts to perfect his system, primarily for fear of being misunderstood as he had been during the Jena years. His reluctance to publish gave his contemporaries the false impression that Fichte was more or less finished as an original philosopher. Except for a cryptic outline that appeared in 1810, his Berlin lectures on the *Wissenschaftslehre*, of which there are numerous versions, only appeared posthumously. In these manuscripts Fichte typically speaks of the absolute and its appearances, i.e., a philosophically suitable stand-in for a more traditional notion of God and the community of finite rational beings whose existence is grounded in the absolute. As a result, Fichte is sometimes said to have taken a religious turn in the Berlin period.

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(b) Popular writings from the Berlin period

In 1806 Fichte published two lecture series that were well-received by his contemporary audience. The first, *The Characteristics of the Present Age*, employs the *Wissenschaftslehre* for the purposes of the philosophy of history. According to Fichte, there are five stages of history in which the human race progresses from the rule of instinct to the rule of reason. The present age, he says, is the third age, an epoch of liberation from instinct and external authority, out of which humanity will ultimately progress until it makes itself and the world it inhabits into a fully self-conscious representative of the life of

reason. The second, *The Way Towards the Blessed Life*, which is sometimes said to be a mystical work, treats of morality and religion in a popular format.

Another famous series of lectures, *Addresses to the German Nation*, given in 1808 during the French occupation, was intended as a continuation of *The Characteristics of the Present Age*, but exclusively for a German audience. Here Fichte envisions a new form of national education that would enable the German nation, not yet in existence, to reach the fifth and final age outlined in the earlier lecture series. Once again, Fichte demonstrated his interest in larger matters, and in a manner perfectly consistent with his earlier insistence from the Jena period that the scholar has a cultural role to play.

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(c) Fichte's return to the university and his final years

When the newly founded Prussian university in Berlin opened in 1810, Fichte was made the head of the philosophy faculty; and in 1811 he was elected the first rector of the university. He continued his philosophical work until the very end of his life, lecturing on the *Wissenschaftslehre* and writing on political philosophy and other subjects. When the War of Liberation broke out in 1813, Fichte canceled his lectures and joined the militia. His wife Johanna, who was serving as a volunteer nurse in a military hospital, contracted a life-threatening fever. She recovered, but Fichte succumbed to the same infection. He died of his illness on January 29, 1814.

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Conclusion

Although Fichte's importance for the history of German philosophy is undisputed, the nature of his legacy is still very much debated. He has sometimes been seen as a mere transitional figure between Kant and Hegel, as little more than a philosophical stepping stone along Spirit's path to absolute knowledge. This understanding of Fichte was encouraged by Hegel himself, and no doubt for self-serving reasons. Nowadays, however, Fichte is studied more and more for his own sake, in particular for his theory of subjectivity, i.e., the theory of the self-positing I, which is rightly seen as a sophisticated elaboration of Kant's claim that finite rational agents must interpret themselves in both theoretical and practical terms. The level of detail that Fichte provides on these matters far exceeds that found in Kant's writings. This fact alone would make Fichte's work worthy of our attention. Yet perhaps the most persuasive testament to Fichte's greatness as a philosopher is to be found in his relentless willingness to begin again, to start the *Wissenschaftslehre* anew, and never to rest content with any prior formulation of his thought. Although this leaves his readers perpetually dissatisfied and desirous of a definitive statement of his views, Fichte, true to his publically declared vocation, makes them into better philosophers through his own example of restless striving for the truth.

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Wissenschaftslehre, and thus perhaps the best place to begin in the English secondary literature.)

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Internet Resources

- Fichte's Home in Jena
- Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
- North American Fichte Society
- Peter Suber's essay "A Case Study in *Ad Hominem* Arguments: Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*"
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
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The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)



Sigmund Freud, physiologist, medical doctor, psychologist and father of psychoanalysis, is generally recognised as one of the most influential and authoritative thinkers of the twentieth century. Working initially in close collaboration with Joseph Breuer, Freud elaborated the theory that the mind is a complex energy-system, the structural investigation of which is proper province of psychology. He articulated and refined the concepts of the unconscious, of infantile sexuality, of repression, and proposed a tri-partite account of the mind's structure, all as part of a radically new conceptual and therapeutic frame of reference for the understanding of human psychological development and the treatment of abnormal mental conditions. Notwithstanding the multiple manifestations of psychoanalysis as it exists today, it can in almost all fundamental respects be traced directly back to Freud's original work. Further, Freud's innovative treatment of human actions, dreams, and indeed of cultural artefacts as invariably possessing implicit symbolic significance has proven to be extraordinarily fecund, and has had massive implications for a wide variety of fields, including anthropology, semiotics, and artistic creativity and appreciation in addition to psychology. However, Freud's most important and frequently re-iterated claim, that with psychoanalysis he had invented a new science of the mind, remains the subject of much critical debate and controversy.

Section Headings:

Life

Freud was born in Frieberg, Moravia in 1856, but when he was four years old his family moved to Vienna, where Freud was to live and work until the last year of his life. In 1937 the Nazis annexed Austria, and Freud, who was Jewish, was allowed to leave for England. For these reasons, it was above all with the city of Vienna that Freud's name was destined to be deeply associated for posterity, founding as he did what was to become known as the 'first Viennese school' of psychoanalysis, from which, it is fair to say, psychoanalysis as a movement and all subsequent developments in this field flowed. The scope of Freud's interests, and of his professional training, was very broad - he always considered himself first and foremost a scientist, endeavouring to extend the compass of human knowledge, and to this end (rather than to the practice of medicine) he enrolled at the medical school at the University of Vienna in 1873. He concentrated initially on biology, doing research in physiology for six years under the great German scientist Ernst Brücke, who was director of the Physiology Laboratory at the University, thereafter specialising in neurology. He received his medical degree in 1881, and having become engaged to be married in 1882, he rather reluctantly took up more secure and financially rewarding work as a doctor at Vienna General Hospital. Shortly after his marriage in 1886 - which was extremely happy, and gave Freud six children, the youngest of whom, Anna, was herself to become a distinguished psychoanalyst - Freud set up a private practice in the treatment of psychological disorders, which gave him much of the clinical material on which he based his theories and his pioneering techniques.

In 1885-86 Freud spent the greater part of a year in Paris, where he was deeply impressed by the work of the French neurologist Jean Charcot, who was at that time using hypnotism to treat hysteria and other abnormal mental conditions. When he returned to Vienna, Freud experimented with hypnosis, but found that its beneficial effects did not last. At this point he decided to adopt instead a method suggested by the work of an older Viennese colleague and friend, Josef Breuer, who had discovered that when he encouraged a hysterical patient to talk uninhibitedly about the earliest occurrences of the symptoms, the latter sometimes gradually abated. Working with Breuer, Freud formulated and developed the idea that many neuroses (phobias, hysterical paralyses and pains, some forms of paranoia, etc.) had their origins in deeply traumatic experiences which had occurred in the past life of the patient but which were now forgotten, hidden from consciousness; the treatment was to enable the patient to recall the experience to consciousness, to confront it in a deep way both intellectually and emotionally, and in thus discharging it, to remove the underlying psychological causes of the neurotic symptoms. This technique, and the theory from which it is derived, was given its classical expression in *Studies in Hysteria*, jointly published by Freud and Breuer in 1895.

Shortly thereafter, however, Breuer, found that he could not agree with what he regarded as the excessive emphasis which Freud placed upon the sexual origins and content of neuroses, and the two parted company, with Freud continuing to work alone to develop and refine the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. In 1900, after a protracted period of self-analysis, he published *The Interpretation of Dreams*, which is generally regarded as his greatest work, and this was followed in 1901 by *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, and in 1905 by *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. Freud's psychoanalytic theory was initially not well received - when its existence was acknowledged at all it was usually by people who were, as Breuer had foreseen, scandalised by the emphasis placed on sexuality by Freud - and it was not until 1908, when the first International Psychoanalytical Congress was held at Salzburg, that Freud's importance began to be generally recognised. This was greatly facilitated in 1909, when he was invited to give a course of lectures in the United States, which were to form the basis of his 1916 book *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*. From this point on Freud's reputation and fame grew enormously, and he continued to write prolifically until his death, producing in all more than twenty volumes of theoretical works and clinical studies. He was also not adverse to critically revising his views, or to making fundamental alterations to his most basic principles when he considered that the scientific evidence demanded it - this was most clearly evidenced by his advancement of a completely new tripartite (*id*, *ego*, and *super-ego*) model of the mind in his 1923 work *The Ego and the Id*. He was initially greatly heartened by attracting followers of the intellectual calibre of Adler and Jung, and was correspondingly disappointed personally when they both went on to found rival schools of psychoanalysis - thus giving rise to the first two of many schisms in the movement - but he knew that such disagreement over basic principles had been part of the early development of every new science. After a life of remarkable vigour and creative productivity, he died of cancer while exiled in England in 1939.

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Backdrop to his Thought

Although a highly original thinker, Freud was also deeply influenced by a number diverse factors which overlapped and interconnected with each other to shape the development of his thought. As indicated above, both Charcot and Breuer had a direct and immediate impact upon him, but some of the other factors, though no less important than these, were of a rather different nature. First of all, Freud himself was very much a Freudian - his father had two sons by a previous marriage, Emmanuel and Philip, and the young Freud often played with Philip's son John, who was his own age. Freud's own self-analysis - which forms the core of his masterpiece *The Interpretation of Dreams* - originated in the emotional crisis which he suffered on the death of his father, and the series of dreams to which this gave rise. This analysis revealed to him that the love and admiration which he had felt for his father were mixed with very contrasting feelings of shame and hate (such a mixed attitude he termed 'ambivalence'). Particularly revealing was his discovery that he had often fantasised as a youth that his half-brother Philip (who was of an age with his mother) was really his father, and certain other signs convinced him of the deep underlying meaning of this fantasy - that he had wished his real father dead, because he was his rival for his mother's affections. This was to become the personal (though by no means exclusive) basis for his theory of the Oedipus complex.

Secondly, and at a more general level, account must be taken of the contemporary scientific climate in which Freud lived and worked. In most respects, the towering scientific figure of nineteenth century science was Charles Darwin, who had published his revolutionary *Origin of Species* when Freud was four years old. The evolutionary doctrine radically altered the prevailing conception of man - whereas before man had been seen as a being different in nature to the members of the animal kingdom by virtue of his possession of an immortal soul, he was now seen as being part of the natural order, different from non-human animals only in degree of structural complexity. This made it possible and plausible, for the first time, to treat man as an object of scientific investigation, and to conceive of the vast and varied range of human behaviour, and the motivational causes from which it springs, as being amenable in principle to scientific explanation. Much of the creative work done in a whole variety of diverse scientific fields over the next century was to be inspired by, and derive sustenance from, this new world-view, which Freud, with his enormous esteem for science, accepted implicitly.

An even more important influence on Freud, however, came from the field of physics. The second 50 years of the nineteenth century saw monumental advances in contemporary physics, which were largely initiated by the formulation of the principle of the conservation of energy by Helmholz. This principle states, in effect, that the total amount of energy in any given physical system is always constant, that energy quanta can be changed but not annihilated, and consequently that when energy is moved from one part of the system it must reappear in another part. The progressive application of this principle led to the monumental discoveries in the fields of thermodynamics, electromagneticism, and nuclear physics which, with their associated technologies, have so comprehensively transformed the contemporary world. As we have seen, when he first came to the University of Vienna Freud worked under the direction of Ernst Brücke, who in 1874 published a book setting out the view that all living organisms, including the human

one, are essentially energy-systems to which, no less than to inanimate objects, the principle of the conservation of energy applies. Freud, who had great admiration and respect for Brücke, quickly adopted this new 'dynamic physiology' with enthusiasm. From there it was but a short conceptual step - but one which Freud was the first to take, and on which his claim to fame is largely grounded - to the view that there is such a thing as 'psychic energy', that the *human personality* is also an energy-system, and that it is the function of psychology to investigate the modifications, transmissions, and conversions of 'psychic energy' within the personality which shape and determine it. This latter conception is the very cornerstone of Freud's psychoanalytic theory.

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The Theory of the Unconscious

Freud's theory of the unconscious, then, is highly deterministic, a fact which, given the nature of nineteenth century science, should not be surprising. Freud was arguably the first thinker to apply deterministic principles systematically to the sphere of the mental, and to hold that the broad spectrum of human behaviour is explicable only in terms of the (usually hidden) mental processes or states which determine it. Thus, instead of treating the behaviour of the neurotic as being causally inexplicable - which had been the prevailing approach for centuries - Freud insisted, on the contrary, on treating it as behaviour for which is meaningful to seek *an explanation* by searching for *causes* in terms of the mental states of the individual concerned. Hence the significance which he attributed to slips of the tongue or pen, obsessive behaviour, and dreams - all, he held, are determined by hidden causes in the person's mind, and so they reveal in covert form what would otherwise not be known at all. This suggests the view that freedom of the will is, if not completely an illusion, certainly more tightly circumscribed than is commonly believed, for it follows from this that whenever we make a choice we are governed by hidden mental processes of which we are unaware and over which we have no control.

The postulate that there *are* such things as unconscious mental states at all is a direct function of Freud's determinism, his reasoning here being simply that the principle of causality *requires* that such mental states should exist, for it is evident that there is frequently nothing in the conscious mind which can be said to cause neurotic or other behaviour. An 'unconscious' mental process or event, for Freud, is not one which merely happens to be out of consciousness at a given time, but is rather one which *cannot*, except through protracted psychoanalysis, be brought to the forefront of consciousness. The postulation of such unconscious mental states entails, of course, that the mind is not, and cannot be, identified with consciousness or that which can be an object of consciousness - to employ a much-used analogy, it is rather structurally akin to an iceberg, the bulk of it lying below the surface, exerting a dynamic and determining influence upon the part which is amenable to direct inspection, the conscious mind.

Deeply associated with this view of the mind is Freud's account of the instincts or drives. The instincts, for Freud, are the principal motivating forces in the mental realm, and as such they 'energise' the mind in all of its functions. There are, he held, an indefinitely large number of such instincts, but these can be reduced to a small number of basic ones, which he grouped into two broad generic categories, *Eros* (the life instinct), which covers all the self-preserving and erotic

instincts, and *Thanatos* (the death instinct), which covers all the instincts towards aggression, self-destruction, and cruelty. Thus it is a mistake to interpret Freud as asserting that *all* human actions spring from motivations which are sexual in their origin, since those which derive from Thanatos are not sexually motivated - indeed, Thanatos is the irrational urge to destroy the source of all sexual energy in the annihilation of the self. Having said that, it is undeniably true that Freud gave sexual drives an importance and centrality in human life, human actions, and human behaviour which was new (and to many, shocking), arguing as he does both that the sexual drives exist and can be discerned in children from birth (the theory of infantile sexuality), and that sexual energy (*libido*) is the single most important motivating force in adult life. However, even here a crucial qualification has to be added - Freud effectively redefined the term 'sexuality' here to make it cover *any form of pleasure* which is or can be derived from the body. Thus his theory of the instincts or drives is essentially that the human being is energised or driven from birth by the desire to acquire and enhance bodily pleasure.

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Infantile Sexuality

Freud's theory of infantile sexuality must be seen as an integral part of a broader developmental theory of human personality. This had its origins in, and was a generalisation of, Breuer's earlier discovery that traumatic childhood events could have devastating negative effects upon the adult individual, and took the form of the general thesis that early childhood sexual experiences were the crucial factors in the determination of the adult personality. From his account of the instincts or drives it followed that from the moment of birth the infant is driven in his actions by the desire for bodily/sexual pleasure, where this is seen by Freud in almost mechanical terms as the desire to release mental energy. Initially, infants gain such release, and derive such pleasure, through the act of sucking, and Freud accordingly terms this the 'oral' stage of development. This is followed by a stage in which the locus of pleasure or energy release is the anus, particularly in the act of defecation, and this is accordingly termed the 'anal' stage. Then the young child develops an interest in its sexual organs as a site of pleasure (the 'phallic' stage), and develops a deep sexual attraction for the parent of the opposite sex, and a hatred of the parent of the same sex (the 'Oedipus complex'). This, however, gives rise to (socially derived) feelings of guilt in the child, who recognises that it can never supplant the stronger parent. In the case of a male, it also puts the child at risk, which he perceives - if he persists in pursuing the sexual attraction for his mother, he may be harmed by the father; specifically, he comes to fear that he may be castrated. This is termed '*castration anxiety*'. Both the attraction for the mother and the hatred are usually repressed, and the child usually resolves the conflict of the Oedipus complex by coming to identify with the parent of the same sex. This happens at the age of five, whereupon the child enters a 'latency' period, in which sexual motivations become much less pronounced. This lasts until puberty, when mature genital development begins, and the pleasure drive refocuses around the genital area.

This, Freud believed, is the sequence or progression implicit in *normal* human development, and it is to be observed that at the infant level the instinctual attempts to satisfy the pleasure drive are frequently checked by parental control and social coercion. The developmental process, then, is for

the child essentially a movement through a series of *conflicts*, the successful resolution of which is crucial to adult mental health. Many mental illnesses, particularly hysteria, Freud held, can be traced back to unresolved conflicts experienced at this stage, or to events which otherwise disrupt the normal pattern of infantile development. For example, homosexuality is seen by some Freudians as resulting from a failure to resolve the conflicts of the Oedipus complex, particularly a failure to identify with the parent of the same sex; the obsessive concern with washing and personal hygiene which characterises the behaviour of some neurotics is seen as resulting from unresolved conflicts/repressions occurring at the anal stage.

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Neuroses and The Structure of the Mind

Freud's account of the unconscious, and the psychoanalytic therapy associated with it, is best illustrated by his famous tripartite model of the structure of the mind or personality (although, as we have seen, he did not formulate this until 1923), which has many points of similarity with the account of the mind offered by Plato over 2,000 years earlier. The theory is termed 'tripartite' simply because, again like Plato, Freud distinguished three structural elements within the mind, which he called *id*, *ego*, and *super-ego*. The *id* is that part of the mind in which are situated the instinctual sexual drives which require satisfaction; the *super-ego* is that part which contains the 'conscience', viz. socially-acquired control mechanisms (usually imparted in the first instance by the parents) which have been internalised; while the *ego* is the conscious self created by the dynamic tensions and interactions between the *id* and the *super-ego*, which has the task of reconciling their conflicting demands with the requirements of external reality. It is in this sense that the mind is to be understood as a dynamic energy-system. All objects of consciousness reside in the *ego*, the contents of the *id* belong permanently to the unconscious mind, while the *super-ego* is an unconscious screening-mechanism which seeks to limit the blind pleasure-seeking drives of the *id* by the imposition of restrictive rules. There is some debate as to how literally Freud intended this model to be taken (he appears to have taken it extremely literally himself), but it is important to note that what is being offered here is indeed *a theoretical model*, rather than a description of an observable object, which functions as a frame of reference to explain the link between early childhood experience and the mature adult (normal or dysfunctional) personality.

Freud also followed Plato in his account of the nature of mental health or psychological well-being, which he saw as the establishment of a harmonious relationship between the three elements which constitute the mind. If the external world offers no scope for the satisfaction of the *id's* pleasure drives, or, more commonly, if the satisfaction of some or all of these drives would indeed transgress the moral sanctions laid down by the *super-ego*, then an inner conflict occurs in the mind between its constituent parts or elements - failure to resolve this can lead to later neurosis. A key concept introduced here by Freud is that the mind possesses a number of 'defence mechanisms' to attempt to prevent conflicts from becoming too acute, such as *repression* (pushing conflicts back into the unconscious), *sublimation* (channelling the sexual drives into the achievement socially acceptable goals, in art, science, poetry, etc.), *fixation* (the failure to progress beyond one of the developmental stages), and *regression* (a return to the behaviour characteristic of one of the stages).

Of these, repression is the most important, and Freud's account of this is as follows: when a person experiences an instinctual impulse to behave in a manner which the *super-ego* deems to be reprehensible (e.g. a strong erotic impulse on the part of the child towards the parent of the opposite sex), then it is possible for the mind push it away, to *repress* it into the unconscious. Repression is thus one of the central defence mechanisms by which the ego seeks to avoid internal conflict and pain, and to reconcile reality with the demands of both *id* and *super-ego*. As such it is completely normal and an integral part of the developmental process through which every child must pass on the way to adulthood. However, the repressed instinctual drive, as an energy-form, is not and cannot be *destroyed* when it is repressed - it continues to exist intact in the unconscious, from where it exerts a determining force upon the conscious mind, and can give rise to the dysfunctional behaviour characteristic of neuroses. This is one reason why dreams and slips of the tongue possess such a strong symbolic significance for Freud, and why their analysis became such a key part of his treatment - they represent instances in which the vigilance of the *super-ego* is relaxed, and when the repressed drives are accordingly able to present themselves to the conscious mind in a transmuted form. The difference between 'normal' repression and the kind of repression which results in neurotic illness is one of *degree*, not of kind - the compulsive behaviour of the neurotic is itself a behavioural manifestation of an instinctual drive repressed in childhood. Such behavioural symptoms are highly irrational (and may even be perceived as such by the neurotic), but are completely beyond the control of the subject, because they are driven by the now unconscious repressed impulse. Freud positioned the key repressions, for both the normal individual and the neurotic, in the first five years of childhood, and, of course, held them to be essentially sexual in nature - as we have seen, repressions which disrupt the process of infantile sexual development in particular, he held, lead to a strong tendency to later neurosis in adult life. The task of psychoanalysis as a therapy is to find the repressions which are causing the neurotic symptoms by delving into the unconscious mind of the subject, and by bringing them to the forefront of consciousness, to allow the ego to confront them directly and thus to discharge them.

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Psychoanalysis as a Therapy

Freud's account of the sexual genesis and nature of neuroses led him naturally to develop a clinical treatment for treating such disorders. This has become so influential today that when people speak of 'psychoanalysis' they frequently refer exclusively to the clinical treatment; however, the term properly designates both the clinical treatment and the theory which underlies it. The aim of the method may be stated simply in general terms - to re-establish a harmonious relationship between the three elements which constitute the mind by excavating and resolving unconscious repressed conflicts. The actual method of treatment pioneered by Freud grew out of Breuer's earlier discovery, mentioned above, that when a hysterical patient was encouraged to talk freely about the earliest occurrences of her symptoms and fantasies, the symptoms began to abate, and were eliminated entirely she was induced to remember the initial trauma which occasioned them. Turning away from his early attempts to explore the unconscious through hypnosis, Freud further developed this 'talking cure', acting on the assumption that the repressed conflicts were buried in the deepest recesses of the unconscious mind. Accordingly, he got his patients to relax in a position in which they were deprived of strong sensory stimulation, even of keen awareness of the presence

of the analyst (hence the famous use of the couch, with the analyst virtually silent and out of sight), and then encouraged them to speak freely and uninhibitedly, preferably without forethought, in the belief that he could thereby discern the unconscious forces lying behind what was said. This is the method of 'free-association', the rationale for which is similar to that involved in the analysis of dreams - in both cases the *super-ego* is to some degree disarmed, its efficiency as a screening mechanism is moderated, and material is allowed to filter through to the conscious *ego* which would otherwise be completely repressed. The process is necessarily a difficult and protracted one, and it is therefore one of the primary tasks of the analyst to help the patient to recognise, and to overcome, his own natural resistances, which may exhibit themselves as hostility towards the analyst. However, Freud always took the occurrence of resistance as a sign that he was on the right track in his assessment of the underlying unconscious causes of the patient's condition. The patient's dreams are of particular interest, for reasons which we have already partly seen. Taking it that the *super-ego* functioned less effectively in sleep, as in free association, Freud made a distinction between the *manifest* content of a dream (what the dream appeared to be about on the surface) and its *latent* content (the unconscious, repressed desires or wishes which are its real object). The correct interpretation of the patient's dreams, slips of tongue, free-associations, and responses to carefully selected questions leads the analyst to a point where he can locate the unconscious repressions producing the neurotic symptoms, invariably in terms of the patient's passage through the sexual developmental process, the manner in which the conflicts implicit in this process were handled, and the libidinal content of his family relationships. To effect a cure, he must facilitate the patient himself to become conscious of unresolved conflicts buried in the deep recesses of the unconscious mind, and to confront and engage with them directly.

In this sense, then, the object of psychoanalytic treatment may be said to be a form of self-understanding - once this is acquired, it is largely up to the patient, in consultation with the analyst, to determine how he shall handle this newly-acquired understanding of the unconscious forces which motivate him. One possibility, mentioned above, is the channelling of the sexual energy into the achievement of social, artistic or scientific goals - this is sublimation, which Freud saw as the motivating force behind most great cultural achievements. Another would be the conscious, rational control of the formerly repressed drives - this is suppression. Yet another would be the decision that it is the *super-ego*, and the social constraints which inform it, which are at fault, in which case the patient may decide in the end to satisfy the instinctual drives. But in all cases the cure is effected essentially by a kind of catharsis or purgation - a *release* of the pent-up psychic energy, the constriction of which was the basic cause of the neurotic illness.

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Critical Evaluation of Freud

It should be evident from the foregoing why psychoanalysis in general, and Freud in particular, have exerted such a strong influence upon the popular imagination in the Western World over the past 90 years or so, and why both the theory and practice of psychoanalysis should remain the object of a great deal of controversy. In fact, the controversy which exists in relation to Freud is more heated and multi-faceted than that relating to virtually any other recent thinker (a possible exception being Darwin), with criticisms ranging from the contention that Freud's theory was

generated by logical confusions arising out of his alleged long-standing addiction to cocaine (Cf. Thornton, E.M. *Freud and Cocaine: The Freudian Fallacy*) to the view that he made an important, but grim, empirical discovery, which he knowingly suppressed in favour of the theory of the unconscious, knowing that the latter would be more acceptable socially (Cf. Masson, J. *The Assault on Truth*).

It should be emphasised here that Freud's genius is not (generally) in doubt, but the precise nature of his achievement is still the source of much debate. The supporters and followers of Freud (and Jung and Adler) are noted for the zeal and enthusiasm with which they espouse the doctrines of the master, to the point where many of the detractors of the movement see it as a kind of secular religion, requiring as it does an initiation process in which the aspiring psychoanalyst must himself first be analysed. In this way, it is often alleged, the unquestioning acceptance of a set of ideological principles becomes a necessary precondition for acceptance into the movement - as with most religious groupings. In reply, the exponents and supporters of psychoanalysis frequently analyse the motivations of their critics in terms of the very theory which those critics reject. And so the debate goes on.

Here we will confine ourselves to: (a) the evaluation of Freud's claim that his theory is a scientific one, (b) the question of the theory's coherence, (c) the dispute concerning what, if anything, Freud really discovered, and (d) the question of the efficacy of psychoanalysis as a treatment for neurotic illnesses.

(a) The Claim to Scientific Status

This is a crucially important issue, since Freud not alone saw himself first and foremost as a pioneering scientist, but repeatedly asserted that the significance of psychoanalysis is that it is a *new science*, incorporating a new scientific method of dealing with the mind and with mental illness. And there can be no doubt but that this has been the chief attraction of the theory for most of its advocates since then - on the face of it, it has the appearance of being, not just a scientific theory, but an enormously *strong* scientific theory, with the capacity to accommodate, and explain, every possible form of human behaviour. However, it is precisely this latter which, for many commentators, undermines its claim to scientific status. On the question of what makes a theory a genuinely scientific one, Karl Popper's criterion of demarcation, as it is called, has now gained very general acceptance: viz. that every genuine scientific theory must be testable, and therefore *falsifiable*, at least in principle - in other words, if a theory is incompatible with *possible* observations it is scientific; conversely, a theory which is compatible with *all* possible observations is unscientific (Cf. Popper, K. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*). Thus the principle of the conservation of energy, which influenced Freud so greatly, is a scientific one, because it is falsifiable - the discovery of a physical system in which the total amount of energy was not constant would conclusively show it to be false. And it is argued that nothing of the kind is possible with respect to Freud's theory - if, in relation to it, the question is asked: 'What does this theory imply which, if false, would show the whole theory to be false?', the answer is 'nothing', the theory is compatible with *every possible* state of affairs - it cannot be falsified by anything, since it purports to explain everything. Hence it is concluded that the theory is not scientific, and while this does not,

as some critics claim, rob it of all value, it certainly diminishes its intellectual status, as that was and is projected by its strongest advocates, including Freud himself.

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(b) The Coherence of the Theory

A related (but perhaps more serious) point is that the coherence of the theory is, at the very least, questionable. What is attractive about the theory, even to the layman, is that it seems to offer us long sought-after, and much needed, *causal explanations* for conditions which have been a source of a great deal of human misery. The thesis that neuroses are caused by unconscious conflicts buried deep in the unconscious mind in the form of repressed libidinal energy would appear to offer us, at last, an insight in the causal mechanism underlying these abnormal psychological conditions as they are expressed in human behaviour, and further show us how they are related to the psychology of the 'normal' person. However, even this is questionable, and is a matter of much dispute. In general, when it is said that an event X causes another event Y to happen, both X and Y are, and must be, *independently identifiable*. It is true that this is not always a simple process, as in science causes are sometimes unobservable (sub-atomic particles, radio and electromagnetic waves, molecular structures, etc.), but in these latter cases there are clear 'correspondence rules' connecting the unobservable causes with observable phenomena. The difficulty with Freud's theory is that it offers us entities (repressed unconscious conflicts, for example) which are said to be the unobservable causes of certain forms of behaviour, but there are *no* correspondence rules for these alleged causes - they cannot be identified *except* by reference to the behaviour which they are said to cause (i.e. the analyst does not demonstratively assert: '*This* is the unconscious cause, and *that* is its behavioural effect'; he asserts: '*This* is the behaviour, therefore its unconscious cause *must* exist'). And this does raise serious doubts as to whether Freud's theory offers us genuine causal explanations at all.

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(c) Freud's Discovery?

At a less theoretical, but no less critical level, it has been alleged that Freud did make a genuine discovery, which he was initially prepared to reveal to the world, but the response which he encountered was so ferociously hostile that he masked his findings, and offered his theory of the unconscious in its place (Cf. Masson, J. *The Assault on Truth*). What he discovered, it has been suggested, was the extreme prevalence of child sexual abuse, particularly of young girls (the *vast* majority of hysterics are women), even in respectable nineteenth century Vienna. He did in fact offer an early 'seduction theory' of neuroses, which met with fierce animosity, and which he quickly withdrew, and replaced with theory of the unconscious. As one contemporary Freudian commentator explains it, Freud's change of mind on this issue came about as follows:

> **Questions concerning the traumas suffered by his patients seemed to reveal [to Freud]**

> **that Viennese girls were extraordinarily often seduced in very early childhood by older male relatives; doubt about the actual occurrence of these seductions was soon replaced by certainty that it was descriptions about childhood fantasy that were being offered. (MacIntyre).**

In this way, it is suggested, the theory of the Oedipus complex was generated.

This statement begs a number of questions, not least, what does the expression 'extraordinarily often' mean in this context? By what *standard* is this being judged? The answer can only be: by the standard of what we generally believe - or would like to believe - to be the case. But the contention of some of Freud's critics here is that his patients were not recalling childhood *fantasie*s, but traumatic events in their childhood which were all too *real,* and that he had stumbled upon, and knowingly suppressed, the fact that the level of child sexual abuse in society is much higher than is generally believed or acknowledged. If this contention is true - and it must at least be contemplated seriously - then this is undoubtedly the most serious criticism that Freud and his followers have to face.

Further, this particular point has taken on an added, and even more controversial significance in recent years with the willingness of some contemporary Freudians to *combine* the theory of repression *with* an acceptance of the wide-spread social prevalence of child sexual abuse. The result has been that, in the United States and Britain in particular, many thousands of people have emerged from analysis with 'recovered memories' of alleged childhood sexual abuse by their parents, memories which, it is suggested, were hitherto repressed. On this basis, parents have been accused and repudiated, and whole families divided or destroyed. Unsurprisingly, this in turn has given rise to a systematic backlash, in which organisations of accused parents, seeing themselves as the true victims of what they term 'False Memory Syndrome', have denounced all such memory-claims as falsidical, the direct product of a belief in what they see as the myth of repression. (Cf. Pendergast, M. *Victims of Memory*). In this way, the concept of repression, which Freud himself termed 'the foundation stone upon which the structure of psychoanalysis rests', has come in for more widespread critical scrutiny than ever before. Here, the fact that, unlike some of his contemporary followers, Freud did not himself ever countenance the extension of the concept of repression to cover actual child sexual abuse, and the fact that we are not necessarily forced to choose between the views that all 'recovered memories' are either veridical or falsidical, are, perhaps understandably, frequently lost sight of in the extreme heat generated by this debate.

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(d) The Efficacy of Psychoanalytic Therapy

On this question, the situation is equally complex. For one thing, it does not follow that if Freud's theory is unscientific, or even false, that it cannot provide us with a basis for the beneficial treatment of neurotic illness, for the relationship between a theory's truth or falsity and its utility-value is far from being an isomorphic one. (The theory upon which the use of leeches to bleed patients in eighteenth century medicine was based was quite spurious, but patients did sometimes actually benefit from the treatment!). And of course even a true theory might be badly

applied, leading to negative consequences. One of the problems here is that is difficulty to specify what counts as a *cure* for a neurotic illness, as distinct, say, from a mere alleviation of the symptoms. In general, however, the efficiency of a given method of treatment is usually clinically measured by means of a 'control group' - the proportion of patients suffering from a given disorder who are cured by treatment X is measured by comparison with those cured by other treatments, or by no treatment at all. Such clinical tests as have been conducted indicate that the proportion of patients who have benefited from psychoanalytic treatment does not diverge significantly from the proportion who recover spontaneously or as a result of other forms of intervention in the control groups used. So the question of the therapeutic effectiveness of psychoanalysis remains an open and controversial one.

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- **From the Freud Archives: The latest information on the Rescheduled Freud Show, direct from the Library of Congress**
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Functionalism

Functionalism is a theory in the philosophy of mind which, most simply, holds that mental states are functional states. Specifically, mental states are understood by their relations to (a) their sensory stimulation or input, (b) other inner states, and (c) their behavior effects. Suppose, for example, I experience pain by placing my hand too close to a hot stove. My pain is understood in reference to (a) the physical stimulation I receive from the hot stove, (b) its causal impact on other mental states I have, such as worry, and (c) behavioral effects I exhibit, such as saying "ouch". The most distinctive feature of functionalism is that it implies that human mental states are not restricted to human biological systems, such as brains. Non-biological systems which exhibit the same functional relationships as humans do, such as systems of computer chips, can be said to have the same mental state. As such, mental states are not based on the intrinsic properties of the mental state in question, such as the stuff it is made of. The same state may be shared by things with different physical makeups, thereby distinguishing between the role which a mental state plays, and the occupant in which the state exists. The hardware/software distinction, borrowed from computer science, is a useful metaphor to explain the difference between the bodily occupant and mental event experienced. Although functionalists associate themselves with materialistic monism (that is, the view that only material things exist), there is a dualism lurking beneath the surface. For, since any given mental state cannot be reduced to the physical mechanism which produces it (whether neurological or silicon-based), then mental states must be something more than the merely physical.

Functionalism may be contrasted both to behaviorism and identity theory in its account of mental events. Behaviorism defines mental events solely in relation to sensory input and behavioral output. Unfortunately, this includes any input/output device, such as a mousetrap, to which we would not want to attribute mental states. However, in addition to input and output relations, functionalism also acknowledges causal relations with other internal mental states, which mousetraps do not exhibit (such as the mental state of worry). Identity theory restricts mental events to brain activity. Functionalism, by contrast, acknowledges that mental events may be instantiated in systems or machines other than brains.

There are several different types of functionalism, each based on different models; these include Turing machine functionalism, causal theory of mind, and teleological (homuncular) functionalism. Turing machine functionalism, proposed by Hilary Putnam, uses as its model a special theoretical mechanical device (the Turing machine). Most succinctly, the machine (a) receives input, (b) carries out the instructions of the input program, (c) changes its internal state, and (d) produces an appropriate output based on the input and instructions. A pop machine, for example, shows these features insofar as it has instructions on various acceptable inputs with various associated behavioral outputs. Based on this model, Putnam argues that humans are probablistic automatons.

A second type of functionalism, defended by David Armstrong and David Lewis, involves a causal theory of mind. Mental states are defined by a common sense understanding of the situations in which they appear and the behavior that is elicited. In his essay "Mad Pain and Martian Pain", Lewis hypothesizes about two kinds of beings which experience pain differently than normal humans. In the case of mad pain, the subject experiences pain when doing moderate exercise on an empty stomach; further it improves his concentration for mathematical reasoning. Martian pain, by contrast, takes place in a Martain organism constructed of hydrolic hardware rather than neurons. Lewis''s point is that pain is associated only contingently with either its causes (as in mad pain) or its physical realization (as in Martian pain). We cannot specify *a priori* its causal role or physical realization.

A third type of functionalism, associated with William G. Lycan and Daniel Dennett, breaks mental states down into a hierarchy resembling that of a large corporation. This includes cooperating units, sub-units, sub-sub-units, and so on, until a neurological level is reached which simply reduces to a series of on-off switches. On this view, the pattern of on-off switches can be instantiated in a variety of non-biological mechanisms, such as computers.

The main problem with all types of functionalism is that they approach mental states in a purely relational way. One criticism focuses on a hypothetical situation in which someone perceives an inverted light spectrum. For example, person A perceives red when person B perceives green. Although they both function precisely the same with regard to input, related internal states, and behavior, they clearly have different *qualitative* mental states (qualia). However, a functionalist might reply to this charge maintaining that what is central to functionalism is how people discriminate between colors, not their qualia. A second criticism of functionalism hypothesizes that if we could create an android which is functionally the same as a human, but lacks qualia, then functionalism would be incomplete or false. To this the functionalist might respond that we should be able to make an android out of some physical stuff which has qualia (since its type of constituent physical stuff should not make a difference). A third criticism is that functionalism is too narrow (or chauvinistic) in the kinds of things that are capable of having mental states. Specifically, functionalism seems to be dependent on physicalism, insofar as only physical things (biological, silicon, etc.) can house functional mental states. This leaves out non-physical mental beings, such as disembodied spirits.

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Galileo (1564-1642)

Galileo, Italian physicist and astronomer, was born at Pisa February 15, 1564 and died at Arcetri, near Florence, January 8, 1642. In 1581 he entered the University of Pisa to study medicine and the Aristotelian philosophy, but soon abandoned medicine for mathematics and physical science. In 1585 he left the university and went to Florence to study under Otilio Ricci. He was professor of mathematics at Pisa 1589-91, and at Padua 1592-1610, lecturing there to crowds of enthusiastic pupils from all over Europe. In 1610 Cosmo II, grand duke of Tuscany, appointed him philosopher and mathematician at the Florentine court, thus relieving him of all academic routine and enabling him to devote himself entirely to his scientific investigations.

Galileo's opposition to the Ptolemaic cosmology first brought him under the suspicion of the Inquisition in 1611, though he continued his investigations and publicly defended the Copernican system. In a letter to Ms friend Father Castelli, dated Dec. 21, 1613, he maintained that the theologian, instead of trying to restrict scientific investigation on Biblical grounds, should make it his business to reconcile the phraseology of the Bible with the results of science. In 1615 a copy of this letter was produced before the Inquisition, with the result that the following year Galileo was warned by the pope to desist from his heretical teachings on the pain of imprisonment. In 1632 he again drew the attention of the Inquisition by publishing a defense of the Copernican system. After a long and wearisome trial he was condemned on June 22, 1633, solemnly to abjure his scientific creed on bended knees. This he did under threats of torture; but whether he was actually put to the torture is still a mooted question. He was also sentenced to indeterminate imprisonment, but this was soon commuted to residence at Sienna, and the following December he was allowed to return to his villa at Arcetri, though he remained under the surveillance of the Inquisition. In 1637 he became totally blind.

Galileo's chief contributions to science are his formulation of the laws governing failing bodies, the invention of the telescope, the discovery of the isochronism of the pendulum, and numerous astronomical discoveries, including the phases of Venus, four satellites of Jupiter, and the spots on the sun. His works were stricken from the Index in 1835. The most important are *The System of the World, in Four Dialogues* (Florence, 1632); and *Mathematical Discourses and demonstrations touching two new Sciences* (Leyden, 1638).

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German Idealism

The Movement Characterized. The term "German Idealism" refers to a phase of intellectual life that had its origin in the Enlightenment as modified by German conditions. English and French representatives of the Enlightenment, giving precedence to sensation, had become empiricists and skeptics. They viewed the world as a great machine, adopted hedonism as their ethics, and interpreted history from a subjective-critical point of view. The situation in Germany was just the reverse. There thought was given precedence over sensation, and, instead of empiricism, idealism was dominant. Ethics was based on norms of universal validity, instead of on individual whim. History was interpreted genetically as a rational process; and in place of the mechanical conception of the world, an organic or dynamic view was substituted. Nature was seen to be spiritual, as well as spatial, and was interpreted teleologically. In the hands of Jacobi and Kant, Hume's skepticism became the weapon that destroyed the influence of empiricism and thus paved the way for idealism. For the Germans, at least, Rousseau's radicalism brought into question the value of the culture-ideals of the Enlightenment, and impelled them to seek the basis of culture in the creative power of the mind. For the philosopher German idealism usually means the philosophy of Kant and his immediate followers, while for the historian of literature it may seem little more than the personality of Goethe; and it is not usual to characterize the literary aspect of the movement as neo-humanism. However, there is a unity in the movement that cannot be ignored. All its varied manifestations, whether in science, philosophy, literature, art, or social life, are properly treated under the title *German Idealism*

Leibniz and the Pietists. Several factors contributed to the peculiarly independent character of the Enlightenment in Germany. Most notable was the influence of Liebniz and that of the Pietists. Leibniz was an essentially religious personality, and in transplanting the spirit of the Enlightenment into Germany he gave it that distinctively ethical and religious flavor which became characteristic of German Idealism. It was he who was chiefly instrumental in substituting the mechanical view of nature with a teleological one. He transformed the atoms of the materialists into monads, or psychical entities, and substituted for natural law his theory of preestablished harmony. He asserted the absolute worth of the individual against the destructive monistic pantheism of Spinoza, and saw in the progress of history a movement of the monads towards some divine end. On the one hand, he made the development of materialism and skepticism impossible in Germany, and, on the other hand, he brought about the teleological explanation of the history of the universe as a whole. The teleological and idealistic tendencies of Leibniz were strengthened through Pietism; Klopstock, Herder, Jacobi, Goethe, and Jean Paul, all betray in their works the Pietistic influence.

Kant's Transcedentalism. **The conceptual framework of German Idealism was provided by Immanuel Kant who was the first to reconcile the conflicting empirical and rationalistic elements of the prevailing dogmatic philosophy. With one stroke he secured for mind priority over nature, and yet without endangering the validity of the principles of scientific investigation. By giving the primacy to practical reason, he placed religion and ethics on a sure footing and broke the ban of rationalism. In the first instance Kant's work was purely epistemological. He made it particularly his problem to rescue natural science from the (epistemological) skepticism of Hume, and then to rescue religion from nationalism. Kant demolished the rationalistic arguments of Anselm, Descartes, and others, for the existence of God. Science is valid, but it has to do only with phenomena. This phenomenal world, however, is produced *a priori* by the activity of consciousness, reacting on that external reality whose eternal nature cannot be known. The constancy of experience is accounted for by the very fact that the world as we know it is only the sum total of phenomena. This becomes the basis of the universal validity of certain principles of explanation. Space and time, and the categories of the understanding are subjective and thus ideal. Taken together they form a mold in which we shape the impressions coming from the unknowable, transcendent reality. Thus, the principles of science and the laws of nature are universally valid because they are in the subject, not in the object. Knowledge of ultimate reality comes through the practical reason, particularly through the *a priori* moral law in us. Kant's idea of inner freedom became the inspiration of the creative genius. The phase of German Idealism manifested in the art and poetry of the period has been called aesthetic-ethical idealism. The leaders of this artistic movement, who really popularized idealism and made it a part of the life of the time, were not intent on solving the old philosophical problems. For conceptual thought they substituted the creative imagination.**

Lessing, Herder, and Others. **Klopstock and Wieland mark the turning-point toward idealsm. However, their contemporary, Lessing, was the first representative of the movement to liberate himself completely from conventional theology and all that was arbitrary and external in German culture and find in the inner aesthetic and ethical development of the mind the ideal to be followed. Idealism in the sense in which the word is here used became even more effective in the work of Herder. His break with the Enlightenment was complete. In his large application of the idealistic method to the interpretation of science, art, and history, he practically reformed all the intellectual sciences. He, too, proceeded from an analysis of the poetic and artistic impulse, and in the creative activity of the mind he found the key to ethics, aesthetics, and religion. From this subjective, or idealistic, view-point he saw the panorama of history as a spiritualistic development. If Lessing's great work was to introduce idealism into aesthetics, particularly the aesthetics of dramatic poetry, Herder's greatest service to the idealistic cause was his application of idealism, as a method, to the interpretation of history. What Wieland, Lessing, and others had done for poetic art, this Winckelmann did for plastic art. He too found in the conception of the free creative mind the basis of ethics, aesthetics, and religion.**

Goethe, Schiller, and Others. **The great representatives of the idealistic type mind in German poetry were Goethe, and Schiller. Against the exclusive claims of the aesthetic view of nature, and a morality essentially classical, Goethe emphasizes the moral and religious worth of the individual, thus approaching the ethical teachings of Kant. Schiller combined the epistemology of Kant with the pantheism of Goethe. With him aesthetic values were the chief types of intellectual**

norms. Thus, his ethics and religion might be regarded as a phase of aesthetics. However, the aesthetic harmony that he found in the universe had an impact on his ethical and religious nature; despite his aesthetic view-point, he must be classed with Kant and Fichte as one of the great moral teachers of Germany. Schiller's only consistent follower was Willhelm von Humboldt, who was instrumental in bringing about the Neo-Humanistic reform, on the basis of the new aesthetic-ethical culture. Jean Paul was a representative of the anti-classical type of idealism.

Early Views of Fichte and Schelling.

The basis of the aesthetic-ethical movement was Kant transcendental idealism. But while Kant made the idealistic position secure, he had not accounted for the reality of the world of nature, with all that it means to the poet as the expression of some divine purpose. To get at the bottom of the matter, it was felt that human consciousness as a starting-point would have to be abandoned and an absolute consciousness posited. From this reality of absolute consciousness, then, individual consciousness could be deduced in a manner, analogous to that employed by Kant. The first to attempt such a comprehensive solution of the problem was Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Starting from Kant's idealistic position he tried to overcome the dualism involved in Kant's doctrine of a (thing in itself) by bringing this mysterious reality into consciousness. To do this he dropped the Kantian distinction between practical and theoretical reason, and conceived of the absolute mind, or ego, as moral reason. In his view all existence is psychical, and the human mind is only a manifestation of the absolute ego. Thus, the last trace of an unknowable transcendent reality is obliterated. The absolute ego has divided itself into a large number of relative egos, and through these it is moving progressively toward its own destiny. The core of reality lies in human personality, in the finite mind, but this is caught up in an endless process of development; Hence, to transcend his own consciousness and explain the progress of history, with reference to the past and future, the philosopher must look at existence from the point of view of the absolute ego. In this way Fichte developed his subjective realism, bringing this scheme of idealistic evolution every phase of human experience. Under his treatment, ethics, sociology, aesthetics, and religion become a part of the history of the Absolute. He overcame the dualism between individual mind and nature by dissolving both individual nature and mind. Schelling, starting from the Kant-Fichte point of view, extended the conception of the Absolute to objective nature. His system may be characterized as a sort of spiritualized pantheism. The world is a continuous process from inorganic unconscious nature to organic conscious nature, and then from organic nature back to inorganic nature. While in humans the Absolute reaches consciousness, nature remains essentially objective, but not in a materialistic sense. Nature, for Schelling, is a system of spiritual forces similar to the monads of Leibniz. Schelling worked out his so - called *Identitatsphilosophie* by extending to absolute consciousness the view that in consciousness subject and object are identical. The sum total of existence then becomes the Absolute as perceived by itself. Naturally, all distinctions and qualities, which are created by a finite relational consciousness, disappear in a self-contemplation of the Absolute by itself, and existence becomes neutral. If Fichte had interpreted existence ethically, Schelling interprets it aesthetically. While with Fichte the Absolute distributes itself in finite minds in order to work out its own moral development, with Schelling the Absolute comes to consciousness in humans in order that we may enjoy the aesthetic contemplation of the unity of mind and nature, the identity of mind with its sensuous content.

Romanticism. The immediate result of the metaphysical systems of Fichte and Schelling was a revival of poetic production and criticism known as Romanticism, which sprang from the school of Goethe and Schiller. The union of poetry with the metaphysical or religious view of life became a recognized principle of art; and it was this combination that secured for idealism the final triumph over the narrow naturalism and rationalism of the Enlightenment. Romanticism brought to light the connection of poetry with Christianity. Just as Schiller had taken Kant's epistemology as a basis for the explanation of the relation of aesthetics to ethics, so now the Kantian position was used to explain the relation of religion to aesthetics. Thus, from Kant's idealism came a new analysis of religion, illuminating with a new light the problems of culture. Romanticism gave depth to the historical view and dissolved into thin air those time-worn conceptions of a "law of nature," "common sense," and innate norms of the reason; this was just as the Enlightenment had formerly disposed of the idea of a supernatural, ecclesiastical norm, which rested on these conceptions. The leading spirits in the romantic movement were the two Schlegels, though Fichte, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Schelling, Novalis, and many others took a part in it. Out of Romanticism sprang a new impulse for systematic thinking; and through the political catastrophes of the time and the moral earnestness of the intellectual leaders, idealistic speculation was forced to apply its norms to practical social problems.

Later Views of Fichte and Schelling. The first to feel the pressure of the realistic-historical problems were the founders of metaphysical idealism, Fichte and Schelling. Both betray the influence of Schleiermacher. Realizing the inadequacy of their philosophy to meet practical needs, they now sought an ethical and religious ideal which should unify the concrete content of spiritual life and at the same time be a necessary deduction from the metaphysical background of existence. Fichte retained his idea of the moral state as the consummation of the historical process. However, he no longer considered this state merely as a postulate of progressive freedom, but as a concrete civilized state, in which all members of society share in the blessings of religion, morality, and art. In this remodeled view of Fichte, religion is dominant; for he finds that only religious faith makes possible the realization of the moral idea, and thus the reality of the external world. The world is ethical. It is religious faith that gives an ultimate aim to ethical conduct, that makes possible a union of the empirical ego with its metaphysical basis, that is, God. His ethics is thus deprived of its formal character as an endless progress and given a definite aim. This ethical and religious view necessitates a modification of his metaphysics. The background of empirical consciousness is no longer an endless progression of the Absolute, but a fixed and unchanging divine being. In this being the empirical ego has its origin, and through ethical conduct it returns to its source. Similarly, in view of moral and aesthetic needs, Schelling was forced to change his views. In applying the principle of identity, he destroyed the variety of existence, and thus its reality. In describing the universe as a quality-less *neutrum* he had only caricatured the Absolute. His philosophy disagreed with every phase of experience. Just as Fichte, so Schelling sought in religion the key to the origin and destiny of humans. The phenomenal world takes its rise in the absolute, self-determined will of God. Because of its origin, the phenomenal world necessarily works its way back up to God again. This movement back to God is a religious process, through mythology, or natural religion, up to Christianity, at which stage the union of man with God takes place. Thus, Christianity, whose dogmas are interpreted evolutionistically by Schelling, becomes the end and purpose of history; and it is upon Christianity that ethics, politics, and aesthetics are to be based.

Hegel's System. If Fichte and Schelling tried to find the purpose of existence in some concrete content (such as the moral state or the Christian religion, deducing this concept from the conception of God), Hegel solved the problem by a systematic exploitation of the conception of evolution, which with him was both a constituent and a teleological principle. The conception had been variously and obscurely employed by Leibniz, Lessing, Kant, Herder, Goethe, Schiller, and F. Schlegel. Then, on the basis of Kant's transcendental deduction, Fichte and Schelling interpreted the process of development in a purely idealistic manner as the unconscious opposition of the Absolute to itself; this further entailed the conscious and gradual removal of this opposition by self-absorption, the double process following necessarily from the very nature of mind. Hegel makes the impulse of the absolute mind a gradual and self-determined process, by which the Absolute lifts itself from mere possibility and actuality to conscious, free, and necessary possession. Viewed *sub specie aeternitatis* the whole process is timeless, and only to a finite mind does it appear as an endless procession in time and space. However, it is just in this finite view that the ethical, aesthetic and religious character of Hegel's philosophy manifests itself. In the finite consciousness there is a separation of the natural, the actual, and the empirical from the spiritual, the free, and the necessary. In the unity reached by overcoming this divorce of the finite from the infinite lies religious blessedness, perfect beauty, and moral freedom. Every phase and stage of this inner teleological development is necessary to the life of the Absolute, and all variety in finite experience is preserved in the higher unity. Nothing is lost. Instead of being an undifferentiated substance, or a qualityless *neutrum*, the Absolute is the living, vital reality that manifests itself in human experience. This reality is spiritual , and the guiding principle of its upward movement is the fulfillment of its own divine purpose, which is religious, ethical, aesthetic. Religion and ethics are thus a necessary product of the self-explication of the Absolute, or God.

Schleiermacher. The religious turn that idealistic metaphysics had taken was due to the influence of Schleiermacher, the most specifically religious of all the great philosophers. In his own system he made use of the religious consciousness in an original and striking manner to solve the practical and theoretical problems growing out of Kant's critical philosophy. In the field of ethics he was the most conspicuous exponent of German idealism. What Hegel had deduced from the Absolute by his application of the conception of development, Schleiermacher, following the critical method of Kant, sought to attain by an analysis of empirical consciousness. In its theoretical attitude toward being, consciousness is receptive and seeks to combine the data of sense into the highest possible conceptual unity; in its practical attitude consciousness is active and transfers the aim of reason from the world of sense to the world of conscious freedom. However, in both cases thought and being always remain separate for the finite understanding. On the other hand, that essential unity of reality which makes possible any relation of thought to being, such as volition to being, is present in religious feeling. While Hegel had employed a deductive, dialectical method to show that all being is in God, Schleiermacher reached this unity by an inductive process, which was guided by feeling, instead of by pure reason. Instead of starting with a timeless and spaceless Absolute, he started with the phenomenal world. His task was to analyze the reason that dominates the actual world of history, to bring to light its various purposes, combine them into a totality representing the absolute divine purpose of the universe, the *summum bonum*, and to show that the power to realize this ideal lies in religious consciousness. Schleiermacher's practical religious interests now took him into the field of theology.

Herbart. Herbart stuck even more closely to the Kantian view-point, but, like other followers of Kant, he sought to eliminate the conception of an unknowable reality, and press forward to the ultimate nature of things. He adopted Kant's analysis of consciousness, but in a psychological sense, and found that the transcendental reality consists of a plurality of simple substances. These he called "reals." They are psychical in nature and analogous to the monads of Leibniz. Through their relations to one another and to human consciousness the phenomenal world is brought into existence; and from their teleological cooperation Herbart deduces a divine, creative intelligence, analogous to the *monad-monadum* of Leibniz, thus opposing sharply current poetic naturalism and Spinozism. Herbart's practical and social philosophy, which is based on the judgments of the soul as to the relations of the "reals" to each other, particularly on judgments expressing like or dislike, also tends toward rationalism. On account of the method employed here, Herbart calls the result aesthetics, to which he subordinates ethics. In his view the ideal society would be one based on the insight and activity of the educated, and on the rational education of youth, and realizing in its organization the natural and fundamental ethical ideas. Herbart thus became not only a reformer of psychology, but of pedagogy as well.

Schopenhauer The last great representative of German Idealism in systematic philosophy was Schopenhauer. While with him the phenomenal world is idea (that is, existing only as a subject idea) its objective basis is not a "thing in itself" as Kant taught, but a universal will. This Schopenhauer interprets as a blind, illogical, aimless impulse, without any original ethical tendency whatsoever. Through the blind impulse of this world-will arises human intelligence and the phenomenal world. History loses all teleological significance and becomes an irrational and endless progression. Ethics, therefore, as the philosophy of the ultimate purpose of the world can only proclaim the aimlessness of the cosmic process and seek to put an end to it by stilling the will. This quietizing of the will is effected by recognizing the aimlessness of the process and resigning oneself to it completely. For these teachings, Schopenhauer found a support in Buddhism, which was then just becoming known in the West. He was bitter in his hatred of the theism of Judaism, which for him exhibited selfishness and sensuality, and was the root of all deceptive theism. The pure Christianity of Christ he regarded as a sort of mystical quietism. Though his metaphysical work, *De Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, appeared as early as 1819, his teachings found no popular reception till after the wane of Hegel's influence in Germany.

Idealism in the Positive Sciences. The effects of this idealistic development are apparent in the positive sciences no less than in metaphysics. In accord with the idea of the oneness of the world, the natural sciences have been given a subordinate position, or else reduced to natural philosophy. The new spirit is manifested even more clearly in the historical sciences, where the genetic method is everywhere employed and individual facts are treated in relation to the whole development. For instance, the historian of literature or art now seeks to bring the facts with which he is dealing into relation with other phases of life and thus grasp the life and ideals of a nation as a whole. Similarly, the philologist is no longer satisfied with the study of one language, but seeks to correlate it with kindred tongues and reconstruct the inner life of the people. Even in the field of jurisprudence the genetic method has been adopted and particular stress laid on the development of common law. The effect of this idealistic movement may also be observed in theology. Here deistic efforts to base Christianity on a general theory of religion have been replaced by a more penetrating psychological analysis, together with a genetic view of religious history. It should be

added, though, that repeated and earnest attempts have been made to rescue the core of Christianity from the general flux of history and give to it a fixed character. Since it is in the universities, chiefly, that the sciences are cultivated, naturally the universities were reorganized in conformity to the changed ideals. It was in the University of Jena that German Idealism got its first foothold. From here the new educational ideal went to the newly established universities of Berlin, Heidelberg, Bonn, Breslau, and Munich, and into the secondary schools.

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Western Philosophical Concepts of God

ANCIENT AND EARLY MEDIEVAL. Plato viewed as the highest of all things the good that was above all being and all knowledge, identified it with the divine nous, and attempted to raise the human spirit into the realm of ideas, into a likeness with the Godhead; which taught men to rise to the highest by a process of abstraction disregarding particulars and grasping at universals, and conceived the good of which it spoke not in a strictly ethical sense, but as, after all, the most utterly abstract and indefinable, entirely eluding all attempts at positive description. Neoplatonism went the furthest in this conception of the divine transcendence; God, the absolute One, was, according to Plotinus, elevated not only above all being, but also above all reason and rational activity. He did not, however, attempt to attain to this abstract highest good by reasoning or logical abstraction, but by an immediate contact between God and the soul in a state of ecstasy.

This tendency was shared by a school of thought within Judaism itself, whose influence upon Christian theology was considerable. The more Jewish speculation, as was the case especially at Alexandria, rose above an anthropomorphic idea of God to a spiritual conception, the more abstract the latter became. In this connection Platonism was the principal one of the Greek philosophical systems toward w c this Jewish theology maintained a receptive attitude. According to Philo, God is to on, " that which is " par excellence, and this being is rather the most universal of all than the supreme good with which Plato identified the divine; all that can be said is that God is, without defining the nature of his being. Between God and the world a middle place is attributed by Philo to the Logos (in the sense of ratio, not at all in the Johannine sense), as the principle of diversity and the summary of the ideas and powers operating the world.

When the Gnostics attempted to construct a great system of higher knowledge from a Christian standpoint, through assimilating various Greek and Oriental elements, and worked the facts of the Christian revelation into their fantastic speculation on general metaphysical and cosmic problems, this abstract Godhead became an obscure background for their system; according to the Valentinian doctrine, it was the primal beginning of all things, with eternal silence (sige) for a companion.

In the development of the Church's doctrine with Justin and the succeeding apologists, and still more with the Alexandrian school, the transcendental nature of God was emphasized, while the Scriptures and the 'religious conscience of Christendom still permitted the contemplation of him as a personal and loving Spirit. Theology did not at first proceed to a systematic and logical explanation of the idea of God with reference to these different aspects. Where philosophical and strictly scientific thought was active, as with the Alexandrians, the element of negation and abstraction got the upper hand. God is, especially with Origen, the simple Being with attributes, exalted above nous and ousia, and at the same time the Father, eternally begetting the Logos and touching the world through the Logos. In opposition to this developed a Judaistic and popular conception of God which leaned to the, anthropomorphic, and also a view like Tertuilian's' which,

under the influence of Stoic philosophy, felt obliged to connect with all realities, and thus also with God, the idea of a tangible substance. In this direction Dionysius the Areopagite finally proceeded to a really Neoplatonist theology, with an inexpressible God who is above all categories, both positive and negative, and thus is neither Being nor Not-being; who permits that which is to emanate from himself in a descending scale coming down to things perceived by the senses, but is unable to reveal his eternal truth in this emanation. With this doctrine is conconnected, after the Neoplatonist model, an inner union with God, an ecstatic elevation of the soul which resigns itself to the process into the obscure depth of the Godhead. The ethical conception of God and redemption thus gives place to a physical one, just as the emanation of all things from God was described as a physical process; and as soon as speculation attempts to descend from the hidden God to finite and personal life, this physical view connects itself with the abstract metaphysical.

In the West there was long a lack of scientific and speculative discussion of the idea of God. Augustine, the most significant name in Western theology, sets forth the conception of God as a self-conscious personal being which fitted in with his doctrine of the Trinity; but as his own development had led him through Platonism, the influence of that philosophy is found in the idea of God which he developed systematically and handed down. He conceives God as the unity of ideas, of abstract perfections, of the normal types of being, thinking, and acting; as simple essential in which will, knowledge, and being are one and the same. The fundamentally determinant factor in the conception of God by the Augustinian theology is thus pure being in general.

LATER MEDIEVAL. Scotus Erigena, who gave Dionysius the Areopagite to Western theology, though Augustine was not without influence upon him, fully accepted the notion of God as the absolute Inconceivable, above all affirmation and Erigena. all negation, distinguishing from him a world to which divine ideas and primal forms belong. He emphasizes the other side of this view-that true existence belongs to God alone, so that, in so far as anything exists in the universe, God is the essence of it; a practical pantheism, in spite of his attempting to enforce a creative activity on the part of God. The influence of this pantheistic view on medieval theology was a limited one; Amalric of Bena , with his proposition that God was all things, was its main disciple.

In accordance with its fundamental character, scholasticism attempted to reduce the idea of God into the categories which related to the laws of thought, to being, in general, and to the world. It began by adapting the Aristotelian terms to its own purposes. God, or absolute being, was to Aristotle the *primum mobile*, regarded thus from the standpoint of causation and not of mere being, and also a thinking subject. The ideas and prototypes of the finite are accordingly to be found in God, who is the final Cause. God, in Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, is not the essential being of things, but he is their *esse effective et exemplariter*, their *primum movens*, and their *causa finalis*. Aristotelian, again, is the definition of God's own nature, that be is, as a thinking subject, *actus purus*, pure, absolute energy, without the distinction found in finite beings between potentiality and actuality. In opposition to Thomas, Duns Scotus emphasized in his conception of God the *primum ens* and *primum movens*, the element of will and free causation. The arbitrary nature of the will of God, taught by him, was raised by Ockham to the most important element of his teaching about God. Upon this abstract conception of the will of God as arbitrary and unconditioned depend the questions (so characteristic of scholasticism from Abelard down) as to whether all things are possible to God.

About the end of the thirteenth century, by the side of the logical reasonings of scholasticism, there arose the mystical theology of Eckhart, which attempted to bring the Absolute near to the hearts of men as the object of an immediate intuition dependent upon complete self-surrender. The

Neoplatonic conception of the Absolute is here pushed to its extreme, and Dionysius has more influence than Thomas Aquinas. The view of God's relation to the world is almost pantheistic, unless it may be rather called acosmistic, regarding the finite as naught. This is Eckhart's teaching, although at the same time he speaks of a creation of the world and of a Son in whom God expresses himself and creates. This God is regarded as goodness and love, communicating himself in a way, but not to separate and independent images of his own being; rather, he possesses and loves himself in all things, and the surrender to him is passivity and self-annihilation. The ruling ideas of this view were moderated by the practical German mystics and found in this form a wide currency. On the other hand, pantheistic heretics, such as the Brethren of the Free Spirit combined antinomian principles with the doctrine that God was all things and that the Christian united with God was perfect as God.

MODERN GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS. The independent metaphysical systems of the philosophers, which embraced God and the world, did not at first make any profound impression on the thought of theologians. Spinoza's pantheism was by its very nature excluded from consideration; but the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff, with its conception of God as a supremely perfect, personal Being, in whom all possible realities were embraced in their highest form, and with its demonstration of God's existence, offered itself as a friend to Christian doctrine, and was widely influential. In so far, however, as the theologians adopted any of its conclusions, it was with little clearness of insight or independent thought as to the relation of these metaphysical concepts to the Christian faith or as to their own validity.

A new epoch in German philosophy, with which theology had and still has to reckon, came in with Kant. Confidence in the arguments by which God's existence had been proved and defined was at least shaken by his criticism, which, however, energetically asserted the firm foundation of moral consciousness, and so led up to God by a new way, in postulating the existence of a deity for the establishment of the harmony required by the moral consciousness between the moral dignity of the subjects and their happiness based upon the adaptation of nature to their ends. Fichte was led from this standpoint to a God who is not personal, but represents the moral order of the universe, believing in which we are to act as duty requires, without question as to the results.

But for a time the most successful and apparently the most dangerous to Christian theology was a pantheistic philosophical conception of God which took for its foundation the idea of an Absolute raised above subject and object, above thinking and being; which explained and claimed to deduce all truth as the necessary self -development of this idea. With Schelling this pantheism is still in embryo, and finally comes back (in his "philosophy of revelation ") to the recognition of the divine personality, with an attempt to construct it speculatively. In a great piece of constructive work the philosophy of Hegel undertook to show how this Absolute is first pure being, identical with not-being; how then, in the form of externalization or becoming other, it comes to be nature or descends to nature; and finally, in the finite spirit, resumes itself into itself, comes to itself, becomes self-conscious, and thus now for the first time takes on the form of personality. For Christian theology the special importance of this teaching, was its claim to have taken what Christian doctrine had comprehended only in a limited way of God, the divine Personality, the Incarnation, etc., and to have expressed it according to its real content and to the laws of thought.

The conservative Hegelians still maintained that God, in himself and apart from the creation of the world and the origin of human personality, was to be considered as a self-conscious spirit or personality, and thus offered positive support to the Christian doctrine of God and his revelation of himself. But the Hegelian principles were more logically carried out by the opposite wing of the

party, especially by David Friedrich Strauss (in his Christliche Glaubenslehre, Tubingen, 1840) in the strongest antithesis to the Christian doctrine of a personal God, of Christ as the only Son of God and the God-Man, and of a personal ethical relation between God and man. Some other philosophers, however, who may be classed in general under the head of the modern speculative idealism, have, in their speculations on the Absolute as actually present in the universe, retained a belief in the personality of God.

The realist philosopher Herbart, who recognized a personal God not through speculations on the Absolute and the finite, but on the basis of moral consciousness and teleology, yet defined little about him, and what he has to say on this subject never attracted much attention among theologians. The Hegelian pantheistic " absolute idealism," once widely prevalent, did not long retain its domination. Its place was taken first in many, quarters, as with Strauss, by an atheistic materialism; Hegel had made the universal abstract into God, and when men abandoned their belief in this and in its power to produce results, they gave up their belief in God with it. Among the post-Hegelian philosophers the most important for the present subject is Lotze, with his defense and confirmation of the idea of a personal God, going back in the most independent way both to Herbart and to idealism, both to Spinoza and Leibniz. Christian theology can, of course, only protest against the peculiar pantheism of Schopenhauer, which is really much older than he, but never before attained wide currency, and against that of Von Hartmann. The significance for the doctrine of God of the newer philosophical undertakings which are characterized by an empiricist-realist tendency, and based on epistemology and criticism is found not so much in their definite expressions about God-they do not as a rule consider him an object of scientific expression, even when they allow him to be a necessary object of faith-as in the impulse which they give to critical investigation of religious belief and perception in general.

Theology, at least German theology, before Schleiermacher showed but little understanding of and interest in the problems regarding a proper conception and confirmation of the doctrine of God which had been laid before it in this development of philosophy beginning with Kant. This is especially true of its attitude toward Kant himself and not only of the supranaturalists who were suspicious of any exaltation of the natural reason, but also of the rationalists, who still had a superficial devotion to the Enlightenment and to Wolffian philosophy. In Schleiermacher's teaching about God, however, the results of a devout and immediate consciousness were combined with philosophical postulates. In his mind the place of all the so-called proofs of the existence of God is completely supplied by the recognition that the feeling of absolute dependence involved in the devout Christian consciousness is a universal element of life; in this consciousness he finds the explanation of the source of this feeling of dependence, i.e., of God, as being love, by which the divine nature communicates itself. For his reasoned philosophical speculation, however, on the human spirit and universal being, the idea of God is nothing but the idea of the absolute unity of the ideal and the real, which in the world exist as opposites. (Compare Schelling's philosophy of identity, unlike which, however, Schleiermacher acknowledges the impossibility of a speculative deduction of opposites from an original identity; and the teaching of Spinoza, whose conception of God, however, as the one substance he does not share.) Thus God and the universe are to him correlatives, but not identical-God is unity without plurality, the universe plurality without unity; and this God is apprehended by man's feeling, just as man's feeling apprehends the unity of ideal and real.

MODERN BRITISH AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS. In Great Britain and America the idea of God has undergone many vicissitudes. In the period of Deism , 1650-1800, the doctrine of God

was profoundly affected by certain modern questions which were already emerging: the scientific view of nature as a unity, the denial of the principle of external authority, the right and sufficiency of reason, and the ethical as compared with the religious value of life. The deists yielded to none of their contemporaries in affirming that God was personal, the cause of the fixed providential order of the world, and of the moral order with its rewards and punishments both here and hereafter. The cosmological was the only theistic argument. God's wisdom and power were expressed neither in supernatural revelation nor in miracle. His nature was perfectly apprehensible to man's reason. He was, however, absolutely transcendent, i.e., not merely distinct from but removed from the world, an absentee God. This process of thought reached its negative skeptical result in David Hume; the being of God could be proved neither by rational considerations nor by the prevailing sensationalist theory of knowledge. Outside of the deists, the demonstration of the being and attributes of God by Samuel Clarke was thoroughly representative of the time. Something must have existed from eternity, of an independent, unchangeable nature, self-existent, absolutely inconceivable by us, necessarily everlasting, infinite, omnipotent, one and unique, intelligent and free, infinitely powerful, wise, good, and just, possessing the moral attributes required for governing the world. Bishop Butler (Analogy of Religion) held as firmly as the deists the transcendence of God, and if he made less of the cosmic, ethical, and mysterious than of the redemptive side of the divine nature, this is to be referred not to his underestimate of the redemptive purpose of God, but to the immediate aim of his apologetic. Accepting the fundamental tenet of Matthew Tindal , i.e., the identity of natural and revealed religion, he shows that the mysteries of revealed religion are not more inexplicable than the facts of universal human experience. Thus he seeks to open a door for God's activity in revelation-prophecy, miracles, and redemption A new tendency in the idea of God appears in William Paley. The proof of the existence and attributes of the deity is teleological. Nature is a contrivance of which God is the immediate creator. The celebrated Bridgewater Treatises follow in the same path, proving the wisdom, power, and goodness of God from geology, chemistry, astronomy, the animal world, the human body, and the inner world of consciousness. Chalmers sharply distinguishes between natural and revealed theology, as offering two sources for the knowledge of God. In this entire great movement of thought, therefore, God is conceived as transcendent. God and the world are presented in a thoroughly dualistic fashion. God is the immediate and instantaneous creator of the world as a mechanism. The principal divine attributes are wisdom and power; goodness is affirmed, but appears to be secondary: its hour has not yet come.

In America during the same period Jonathan Edwards is the chief representative of the idea of God. His doctrine centers in that of absolute sovereignty. God is a personal being, glorious, transcendent. The world has in him its absolute source, and proceeds from him as an emanation, or by continuous creation, or by perpetual energizing thought. As motive for the creation, he added to the common view-the declarative glory of God-that of the happiness of the creature. On the basis of causative predestination he maintains divine foreknowledge of human choice-a theory pushed to extreme limits by later writers, Samuel Hopkins and Nathanael Emmons. His doctrine of the divine transcendence was qualified by a thorough-going mysticism, a Christian experience characterized by a profound consciousness of the immediate presence, goodness, and glory of God. His conception of the ethical nature of God contained an antinomy -which he never resolved; the Being who showed surpassing grace to the elect and bestowed unnumbered common favors on the nonelect in this life, would, the instant after death, withdraw from the latter every vestige of good and henceforth pour out upon them the infinite and eternal fury of his wrath. Edwards' doctrine of

God and its implications later underwent, however, serious modifications. In the circle which recognized him as leader, his son reports that no less than ten improvements had been made, some of which, e.g. concerning the atonement, directly affected the idea of God. Predestination was affirmed, but, instead of proceeding from an inscrutable will, following Leibniz, rested on divine foreknowledge of all possible worlds and included the purpose to realize this, the best of all possible worlds (A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology*, New York, 1900; S. Harris, *God, the Creator and Lord of All*, ib., 1896). The atonement was conceived as sufficient but 'not efficient for all (C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Philadelphia, 1865), or, on the other hand, as expressing the sincere purpose of God to redeem all sinners (A. E. Park, The Atonement; Introductory Essay, Boston, 1859). Divine sovereignty was roundly affirmed; for some it contained the secret of a double decree, for others it offered a convincing basis for the larger hope.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS. During the nineteenth century a new movement appeared in English thought. Sir William Hamilton held that God was the absolute, the unconditioned, the cause of all (Philosophy of the Unconditioned, in Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1829). But since all thinking is to condition, and to condition the unconditioned is self-contradictory, God is both unknown and unknowable. Following in the same path H. L. Alansel (Limits of Religious Thought, London, 1867) found here the secret by which to maintain the mysteries of the faith of the church in the Trinity, the incarnation, the atonement, and other beliefs. Revelation was therefore required to supplement men's ignorance and to communicate what-human intelligence was unable to discover. Hence the dogmas concerning God which had been found repugnant or opaque to reason were philosophically reinstated and became once more authoritative for faith. In his System of Synthetic Philosophy Herbert Spencer (First Principles, London, 1860-62) maintains on the one hand an ultimate reality which is the postulate of theism, the absolute datum of consciousness, and on the other hand by reason of the limitations of knowledge a total human incapacity to assign any attributes to this utterly inscrutable power. In accordance with his doctrine of evolution he holds that this ultimate reality is an infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed, the same which wells up in the human consciousness. He is neither materialistic nor atheistic. This reality is not personal according to the human type, but may be super-personal. Religion is the feeling of awe in relation to this inscrutable and mysterious power. With an aim not unlike that of Herbert Spencer, Matthew Arnold sought to reconcile the conflicting claims of religion, agnosticism, evolution, and history, by substituting for the traditional personal God the " Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." Side by side with this movement appeared another led by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, based upon a spiritual philosophy, which found in the moral nature a revelation of God (*Aids to Reflexion*, London, 1825). This has borne fruit in many directions: in the great poets, Wordsworth, Tennyson, Browning; in preachers like Cardinal Newman, Dean Stanley, John Tulloch, Frederick William Robertson, and Charles Kingsley; in philosophical writers, as John Frederic Denison Maurice and James Martineau. The idea of God is taken out of dogma and the category of the schools and set in relation to life, the quickening source of ideals and of all individual and social advance. Religious thought in America has fully shared in these later tendencies in Great Britain, as may be seen by reference to John Fiske, *Idea of God* (Boston, 1886), unfolding the implications of Spencer's thought, and, reflecting the spirit of Coleridge, William Ellery Channing, *Works* (6 vols., Boston, 1848), W. G. T. Stead, " Introductory Essay " to Coleridge's *Works* (New York, 1884), and Horace Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, and Sermons (in Centenary edition of his Works, New York, 1903). An idea of God based on idealism, represented in Great Britain by John Caird, Philosophy of Religion (London,

1881), Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Religion* (ib. 1893), in Canada by John Watson, *God's Message to the Human Soul* (New York, 1907), has received impressive statement by Josiah Royce, *The Conception of God* (ib., 1897), and *The World and the Individual* (2 vols., 1899-1901). God is a being who possesses all logical possible knowledge, insight, wisdom. This includes omnipotence, self-consciousness, self-possession, goodness, perfection, peace. Thus this being possesses absolute thought and absolute experience, both completely organized. The absolute experience is related to human experience as an organic whole to its integral fragments. This idea of God which centers in omniscience does not intend to obscure either the ethical qualities or the proper personality of the absolute.

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Gorgias (483-378)

Life. **A Greek sophist and rhetorician, known as "the Nihilist," a native of Leontini in Sicily. In BCE. 427, when already advanced in years, he came to Athens on an embassy from his native city, to implore aid against the Syracusans. The finished style of his speaking excited general admiration. He was successful in the object of his mission, and immediately returned home; but he soon came back to Athens, which he made his headquarters, traveling through Greece, like the other sophists, and winning much popularity and profit from a large number of disciples. He declined to assume the name of sophist, preferring that of rhetorician. He professed not to teach virtue, but the art of persuasion; in other words, to give his disciples such absolute readiness in speaking, that they should be able to convince their hearers independently of any knowledge of the subject. He did not found his instruction on any definite rhetorical system, but gave his pupils standard passages of literature to learn by heart and imitate, practicing them in the application of rhetorical figures. He appeared in person, on various occasions, at Delphi, Olympia, and Athens, with model speeches which he afterwards published. It must be remembered that it was Gorgias who transplanted rhetoric to Greece, and who helped to diffuse the Attic dialect as the literary language of prose. There remain two works ascribed to him, but not genuine -- the so-called *Apology of Palamedes*, and the *Encomium on Helen*. He survived Socrates, who died in 399, and ended his days at Larissa in Thessaly in his hundred and fifth year.**

Philosophy. **Gorgias's nihilistic philosophy was expressed in his work, *On Nature, or the Non-existent*, the title of which suggests the sophistical love of paradox. The text survives only in summary form in Sextus Empiricus, and Aristotle's *On Melissus, Xeonphanes, and Gorgias*. His position is summed up in three propositions: (a) Nothing exists; (b) If anything existed, it could not be known; (c) If anything did exit, and could be known, it could not be communicated. For proof of the first proposition, "nothing exists," Gorgias attached himself to the school of the Eleatics, especially to Zeno. Zeno taught that in all multiplicity and motion, that is to say, in all existence, there are irreconcilable contradictions. Zeno was in no sense a sceptic, though. He did not seek for contradictions in things for the sake of contradictions, but in order to support the positive thesis of Parmenides, that only being exists, and that becoming is not at all. Zeno, therefore, is to be regarded as a constructive, and not merely a destructive, thinker. But it is obvious that by emphasizing only the negative element in Zeno's philosophy, it is possible to use his antinomies as powerful weapons in the cause of skepticism and nihilism. And it was in this way that Gorgias made use of the dialectic of Zeno. Since all existence is self-contradictory, it follows hat nothing exists. He also made use of the famous argument of Parmenides regarding the origin of being. If anything is, said Gorgias, it must have had a beginning. Its being must have arisen either from being, or from not-being. If it arose from being, there is no beginning. If it arose from not-being, this is impossible, since something cannot arise out of nothing. Therefore nothing exists.**

The second proposition of Gorgias, that if anything exists it cannot be known, is part and parcel of the whole Sophistic tendency of thought, which identifies knowledge with sense-perception, and ignores the rational element. Since sense-impressions differ in different people, and even in the same person, the object as it is in itself cannot be known. The third proposition follows from the same identification of knowledge with sensation, since sensation is what cannot be communicated.

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Greek Philosophy

Presocratics. **Our western philosophical tradition began in ancient Greece in the 6th century BCE. The first philosophers are called "Presocratics" which designates that they came before Socrates. The Presocratics were from eithe r the eastern or western regions of the Greek world. Athens -- home of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle -- is in the central Greek region and was late in joining the philosophical game. The Presocratic's most distinguishing feature is emphasis on questions o f physics; indeed, Aristotle refers to them as "Investigators of Nature". Their scientific interests included mathematics, astronomy, biology. As the first philosophers, though, they emphasized the rational unity of things, and rejected mythological expla nations of the world. Only fragments of the original writings of the presocratics survive, in some cases merely a single sentence. The knowledge we have of them derives from accounts of early philosophers, such as Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphy sics, The Opinions of the Physicists* by Aristotle's pupil Theophratus, and Simplicius an Neoplatonist who compiled existing quotes.**

The first group of Presocratic philosophers were from Ionia. Its people were naturally inclined to a physical or sensualist view, and the Ionian philosophers sought the material principle (*arche*) of things, and the mode of their origin and disappearance. Thales of Miletus (about BCE. 640) is reputed the father of Greek philosophy. He declared water to be the basis of all things. Next came Anaximander of Miletus (about B. C. 611-547), the first writer on philosophy. He assumed as the first principle an undefined substance (*to apeiron*) without qualities, out of which the primary opposites, hot and cold, moist and dry, became differentiated. His countryman and younger contemporary, Anaximenes, took for his principle air, conceiving it as modified, by thickening and thinning, into fire, wind, clouds, water, and earth. Heraclitus of Ephesus (about BCE. 535-475) assumed as the principle of substance aetherial fire (*logos*). From fire all things originate, and return to it again by a never-resting process of development. All things, therefore, are in a perpetual flux (*panta rei*).

Philosophy was first brought into connection with practical life by Pythagoras of Samos (about 582-504), from whom it received its name: "the love of wisdom". Regarding the world as perfect harmony, dependent on number, he aimed at inducing humankind likewise to lead a harmonious life. His doctrine was adopted and extended by a large following of Pythagoreans, including Damon, especially in Lower Italy.

That country was also the home of Eleatic doctrine of the One, called after the town of Elea, the headquarters of the school. It was founded by Xenophanes of Colophon (born about 570), the father of pantheism, who declared God to be the eternal unity, permeating the universe, and governing it by his thought. His great disciple, Parmenides of Elea (born about 511), affirmed the one unchanging existence to be alone true and capable of being conceived, and multitude and

change to be an appearance without reality. This doctrine was defended by his younger countryman Zeno in a polemic against the common opinion, which sees in things multitude, becoming, and change. Empedocles of Agrigentum (born 492) appears to have been partly in agreement with the Eleatic School, partly in opposition to it. On the one hand, he maintained the unchangeable nature of substance; on the other, he supposes a plurality of such substances -- i. e. the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire. Of these the world is built up, by the agency of two ideal principles as motive forces -- viz., love as the cause of union, strife as the cause of separation.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (born about BCE. 500) also maintained the existence of an ordering principle as well as a material substance, and while regarding the latter as an infinite multitude of imperishable primary elements, qualitatively distinguished, he conceived divine reason or Mind (*nous*) as ordering them. He referred all generation and disappearance to mixture and resolution respectively. To him belongs the credit of first establishing philosophy at Athens, in which city it reached its highest development, and continued to have its home for one thousand years without intermission. The first explicitly materialistic system was formed by Leucippus (fifth century BCE.) and his pupil Democritus of Abdera (born about BCE. 460). This was the doctrine of atoms -- small primary bodies infinite in number, indivisible and imperishable, qualitatively similar, but distinguished by their shapes. Falling eternally through the infinite void, they collide and unite, thus generating existence, and forming objects which differ in accordance with the varieties, in number, size, shape, and arrangement, of the atoms which compose them.

The efforts of all these earlier philosophers had been directed somewhat exclusively to the investigation of the ultimate basis and essential nature of the external world. Hence their conceptions of human knowledge, arising out of their theories as to the constitution of things, had been no less various. The Eleatics, for example, had been compelled to deny the existence of any objective truth, since to the world of sense, with its multitude and change, they allowed only a phenomenal existence. This inconsistency led to the position taken up by the class of persons known as Sophists that all thought rests solely on the apprehensions of these senses and on subjective impression, and that therefore we have no other standards of action than convention for the individual. Specializing in rhetoric, the Sophists were more professional educators than philosophers. They flourished as a result of a special need for at that time for Greek education. Prominent Sophists include Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus.

Socrates and his Followers.

A new period of philosophy opens with the Athenian Socrates (469-399). Like the Sophists, he rejected entirely the physical speculations in which his predecessors had indulged, and made the subjective thoughts and opinions of men his starting-point; but whereas it was the thoughts of and opinions of the individual that the Sophists took for the standard, Socrates tried to extract from the common intelligence of humankind an objective rule of practical life. For this purpose he employed the two forms of philosophical inquiry of which he is the inventor, induction and definition. Such a standard he saw in knowledge, by which term he understood the cognition in thought of the true concept of an object, and identified it with virtue; that is to say, such action as proceeds from clear cognition of the concept appropriate to the circumstances. Thus, although Socrates did not himself succeed in establishing a genuine ethical principle, he is nevertheless the founder of ethics, as he is also of dialectic, the method of the highest speculative thought.

Of Socrates' numerous disciples many either added nothing to his doctrine, or developed it in a

one-sided manner, by confining themselves exclusively wither to dialectic or to ethics. Thus the Athenian Xenophon contented himself, in a series of writings, with exhibiting the portrait of his master to the best of his comprehension, and added nothing original. The Megarian School, founded by Euclides of Megara, devoted themselves almost entirely to dialectic investigation of the one Good. Stilpo of Megara became the most distinguished member of the school. Ethics predominated both with the Cynics and Cyrenaics, although their positions were in direct opposition. Antisthenes of Athens, the founder of the Cynics, conceived the highest good to be the virtue which spurns every enjoyment. Cynicism continued in Greece with Menippus and on to Roman times through the efforts of Demonax and others. Aristippus of Cyrene, the founder of the Cyrenaics, considered pleasure to be the sole end in life, and regarded virtue as a good only in so far as it contributed to pleasure.

Plato. **Both aspects of the genius of Socrates were first united in Plato of Athens (428-348), who also combined with them all the principles established by earlier philosophers, in so far as they had been legitimate, and developed the whole of this material into the unity of a comprehensive system. The groundwork of Plato's scheme, though nowhere expressly stated by him, is the threefold division of philosophy into dialectic, ethics, and physics; its central point is the theory of forms. This theory is a combination of the Eleatic doctrine of the One with Heraclitus's theory of a perpetual flux and with the Socratic method of concepts. The multitude of objects of sense, being involved in perpetual change, are thereby deprived of all genuine existence. The only true being in them is founded upon the forms, the eternal, unchangeable (independent of all that is accidental, and therefore perfect) types, of which the particular objects of sense are imperfect copies. The quantity of the forms is defined by the number of universal concepts which can be derived from the particular objects of sense.**

The highest form is that of the Good, which is the ultimate basis of the rest, and the first cause of being and knowledge. Apprehensions derived from the impression of sense can never give us the knowledge of true being -- i.e. of the forms. It can only be obtained by the soul's activity within itself, apart from the troubles and disturbances of sense; that is to say, by the exercise of reason. Dialectic, as the instrument in this process, leading us to knowledge of the ideas, and finally of the highest idea of the Good, is the first of sciences (*scientia scientiarum*). In physics, Plato adhered (though not without original modifications) to the views of the Pythagoreans, making Nature a harmonic unity in multiplicity. His ethics are founded throughout on the Socratic; with him, too, virtue is knowledge, the cognition of the supreme form of the Good. And since in this cognition the three parts of the soul -- cognitive, spirited, and appetitive -- all have their share, we get the three virtues: Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance or Continence. The bond which unites the other virtues is the virtue of Justice, by which each several part of the soul is confined to the performance of its proper function.

The school founded by Plato, called the Academy (from the name of the grove of the Attic hero Academus where he used to deliver his lectures) continued for long after. In regard to the main tendencies of its members, it was divided into the three periods of the Old, Middle, and New Academy. The chief personages in the first of these were Speusippus (son of Plato's sister), who succeeded him as the head of the school (till 339), and Xenocrates of Chalcedon (till 314). Both of them sought to fuse Pythagorean speculations on number with Plato's theory of ideas. The two other Academies were still further removed from the specific doctrines of Plato, and advocated

skepticism.

Aristotle. The most important among Plato's disciples is Aristotle of Stagira (384-322), who shares with his master the title of the greatest philosopher of antiquity. But whereas Plato had sought to elucidate and explain things from the supra-sensual standpoint of the forms, his pupil preferred to start from the facts given us by experience. Philosophy to him meant science, and its aim was the recognition of the purpose in all things. Hence he establishes the ultimate grounds of things inductively -- that is to say, by *a posteriori* conclusions from a number of facts to a universal. In the series of works collected under the name of *Organon*, Aristotle sets forth, almost in a final form, the laws by which the human understanding effects conclusions from the particular to the knowledge of the universal.

Like Plato, he recognizes the true being of things in their concepts, but denies any separate existence of the concept apart from the particular objects of sense. They are inseparable as matter and form. In matter and form, Aristotle sees the fundamental principles of being. Matter is the basis of all that exists; it comprises the potentiality of everything, but of itself is not actually anything. A determinate thing only comes into being when the potentiality in matter is converted into actuality. This is effected by form, inherent in the unified object and the completion of the potentiality latent in the matter. Although it has no existence apart form the particulars, yet, in rank and estimation, form stands first; it is of its own nature the most knowable, the only true object of knowledge. For matter without any form cannot exist, but the essential definitions of a common form, in which are included the particular objects may be separated from matter. Form and matter are relative terms, and the lower form constitutes the matter of a higher (e.g. body, soul, reason). This series culminates in pure, immaterial form, the Deity, the origin of all motion, and therefore of the generation of actual form out of potential matter.

All motion takes place in space and time; for space is the potentiality, time the measure of the motion. Living beings are those which have in them a moving principle, or soul. In plants the function of soul is nutrition (including reproduction); in animals, nutrition and sensation; in men, nutrition, sensation, and intellectual activity. The perfect form of the human soul is reason separated from all connection with the body, hence fulfilling its activity without the help of any corporeal organ, and so imperishable. By reason the apprehensions, which are formed in the soul by external sense-impressions, and may be true or false, are converted into knowledge. For reason alone can attain to truth either in cognition or action. Impulse towards the good is a part of human nature, and on this is founded virtue; for Aristotle does not, with Plato, regard virtue as knowledge pure and simple, but as founded on nature, habit, and reason. Of the particular virtues (of which there are as many as there are contingencies in life), each is the apprehension, by means of reason, of the proper mean between two extremes which are not virtues -- e.g. courage is the mean between cowardice and foolhardiness. The end of human activity, or the highest good, is happiness, or perfect and reasonable activity in a perfect life. To this, however, external goods are more of less necessary conditions.

The followers of Aristotle, known as Peripatetics (Theophrastus of Lesbos, Eudemus of Rhodes, Strato of Lampsacus, etc.), to a great extent abandoned metaphysical speculation, some in favor of natural science, others of a more popular treatment of ethics, introducing many changes into the Aristotelian doctrine in a naturalistic direction. A return to the views of the founder first appears among the later Peripatetics, who did good service as expositors of Aristotle's works. Peripatetic

School tended to make philosophy the exclusive property of the learned class, thereby depriving it of its power to benefit a wider circle. This soon produced a negative reaction, and philosophers returned to the practical standpoint of Socratic ethics. The speculations of the learned were only admitted in philosophy where immediately serviceable for ethics. The chief consideration was how to popularize doctrines, and to provide the individual, in a time of general confusion and dissolution, with a fixed moral basis for practical life.

Stoicism. Such were the aims of Stoicism, founded by Athens about 310 by Zeno of Citium (in Cyprus), and brought to fuller systematic form by his successors a heads of the school, Cleanthes of Assos, and especially Chrysippus of Soli, who died about 206. Important Stoic writers of the Roman period include Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Their doctrines contained little that was new, seeking rather to give a practical application to the dogmas which they took ready-made from previous systems. With them philosophy is the science of the principles on which the moral life ought to be founded. The only allowable effort is towards the attainment of knowledge of human and divine things, in order to thereby regulate life. The method to lead men to true knowledge is provided by logic; physics embraces the doctrines as to the nature and organization of the universe; ethics draws from them its conclusions for practical life. Regarding Stoic logic, all knowledge originates in the real impressions of things on the senses, which the soul, being at birth a blank slate, receives in the form of presentations. These presentations, when confirmed by repeated experience, are syllogistically developed by the understanding into concepts. The test of their truth is the convincing or persuasive force with which they impress themselves upon the soul.

In physics the foundation of the Stoic doctrine was the dogma that all true being is corporeal. Within the corporeal they recognized two principles, matter and force -- that is, the material, and the Deity (*logos*, order, fate) permeating and informing it. Ultimately, however, the two are identical. There is nothing in the world with any independent existence: all is bound together by an unalterable chain of causation. The agreement of human action with the law of nature, of the human will with the divine will, or life according to nature, is Virtue, the chief good and highest end in life. It is essentially one, the particular or cardinal virtues of Plato being only different aspects of it; it is completely sufficient for happiness, and incapable of any differences of degree. All good actions are absolutely equal in merit, and so are all bad actions. All that lies between virtue and vice is neither good nor bad; at most, it is distinguished as preferable, undesirable, or absolutely indifferent. Virtue is fully possessed only by the wise man, who is no way inferior in worth to Zeus; he is lord over his own life, and may end it by his own free choice. In general, the prominent characteristic of Stoic philosophy is moral heroism, often verging on asceticism.

Epicureanism. The same goal which was aimed at in Stoicism was also approached, from a diametrically opposite position, in the system founded about the same time by Epicurus, of the deme Gargettus in Attica (342-268), who brought it to completion himself. Epicureanism, like Stoicism, is connected with previous systems. Like Stoicism, it is also practical in its ends, proposing to find in reason and knowledge the secret of a happy life, and admitting abstruse learning only where it serves the ends of practical wisdom. Hence, logic (called by Epicurus (*kanonikon*), or the doctrine of canons of truth) is made entirely subservient to physics, physics to ethics. The standards of knowledge and canons of truth in theoretical matters are the impressions of the senses, which are true and indisputable, together with the presentations formed from such

impressions, and opinions extending beyond those impressions, in so far as they are supported or not contradicted by the evidence of the senses. In practical questions the feelings of pleasure and pain are the tests. Epicurus's physics, in which he follows in essentials the materialistic system of Democritus, are intended to refer all phenomena to a natural cause, in order that a knowledge of nature may set men free from the bondage of disquieting superstitions.

In ethics he followed within certain limits the Cyrenaic doctrine, conceiving the highest good to be happiness, and happiness to be found in pleasure, to which the natural impulses of every being are directed. But the aim is not with him, as it is with the Cyrenaics, the pleasure of the moment, but the enduring condition of pleasure, which, in its essence, is freedom from the greatest of evils, pain. Pleasures and pains are, however, distinguished not merely in degree, but in kind. The renunciation of a pleasure or endurance of a pain is often a means to a greater pleasure; and since pleasures of sense are subordinate to the pleasures of the soul, the undisturbed peace of the soul is a higher good than the freedom of the body from pain. Virtue is desirable not for itself, but for the sake of pleasure of soul, which it secures by freeing men from trouble and fear and moderating their passions and appetites. The cardinal virtue is wisdom, which is shown by true insight in calculation the consequences of our actions as regards pleasure or pain.

Skepticism. The practical tendency of Stoicism and Epicureanism, seen in the search for happiness, is also apparent in the Skeptical School founded by Pyrrho of Elis (about 365-275). Pyrrho disputes the possibility of attaining truth by sensory apprehension, reason, or the two combined, and thence infers the necessity of total suspension of judgment on things. Thus can we attain release from all bondage to theories, a condition which is followed, like a shadow, by that imperturbable state of mind which is the foundation of true happiness. Pyrrho's immediate disciple was Timon. Pyrrho's doctrine was adopted by the Middle and New Academies (see above), represented by Arcesilaus of Pitane (316-241) and Carneades of Cyrene (214-129) respectively. Both attacked the Stoics for asserting a criterion of truth in our knowledge; although their views were indeed skeptical, they seem to have considered that what they were maintaining was a genuine tenet of Socrates and Plato.

The latest Academics, such as Antiochus of Ascalon (about 80 BCE.), fused with Platonism certain Peripatetic and many Stoic dogmas, thus making way for Eclecticism, to which all later antiquity tended after Greek philosophy had spread itself over the Roman world. Roman philosophy, thus, becomes an extension of the Greek tradition. After the Christian era Pythagoreanism, in a resuscitated form, again takes its place among the more important systems. Pyrrhonian skepticism was also re-introduced by Aenesidemus, and developed further by Sextus Empiricus. But the preeminence of this period belongs to Platonism, which is notably represented in the works of Plutarch of Chaeronea and the physician Galen.

Neoplatonism. The closing period of Greek philosophy is marked in the third century CE. by the establishment of Neoplatonism in Rome. Its founder was Plotinus of Lycopolis in Egypt (205-270) and its emphasis is a scientific philosophy of religion, in which the doctrine of Plato is fused with the most important elements in the Aristotelian and Stoic systems and with Eastern speculations. At the summit of existences stands the One or the Good, as the source of all things. It emanates from itself, as if from the reflection of its own being, reason, wherein is contained the infinite store of ideas. Soul, the copy of the reason, is emanated by and contained in it, as reason is

in the One, and, by informing matter in itself non-existence, constitutes bodies whose existence is contained in soul. Nature, therefore, is a whole, endowed with life and soul. Soul, being chained to matter, longs to escape from the bondage of the body and return to its original source. In virtue and philosophic thought soul had the power to elevate itself above the reason into a state of ecstasy, where it can behold, or ascend up to, that one good primary Being whom reason cannot know. To attain this union with the Good, or God, is the true function of humans, to whom the external world should be absolutely indifferent.

Plotinus's most important disciple, the Syrian Porphyrius, contented himself with popularizing his master's doctrine. But the school if Iamblichus, a disciple of Porphyrius, effected a change in the position of Neoplatonism, which now took up the cause of polytheism against Christianity, and adopted for this purpose every conceivable form of superstition, especially those of the East. Foiled in the attempt to resuscitate the old beliefs, its supporters then turned with fresh ardor to scientific work, and especially to the study of Plato and Aristotle, in the interpretation of whose works they rendered great services. The last home of philosophy was at Athens, where Proclus (411-485) sought to reduce to a kind of system the whole mass of philosophic tradition, until in 529 CE, the teaching of philosophy at Athens was forbidden by Justinian.

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William Hamilton (1788-1856)

LIFE AND WRITINGS. Scottish philosopher, born at Glasgow March 8, 1788, died. at Edinburgh May 6, 1856. He studied first in Glasgow University, where his father had been professor of anatomy and botany; took a course in medicine at the University of Edinburgh in 1806-07; and in May, 1807, entered Balliol College, Oxford (B.A., 1811; M.A., 1814), where he concentrated upon classics and philosophy and gained the reputation of being the most learned Aristotelian in the university. In 1813 he settled in Edinburgh as an advocate, though he never secured a large practice. In 1820 he established his claim to the baronetcy of Preston, and was thenceforth known as Sir William. In the same year he defeated for the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh by John Wilson (Christopher North), but was elected to the professorship of civil history in 1821. About 1826 he took up the study of phrenology, and in 1826 and 1827 he read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh several papers antagonistic to the alleged science. He made his reputation as a philosopher by a series of articles that began to appear in the Edinburgh Review in 1829. In 1836 he was elected to the chair of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, and held the position till his death. In 1843 he contributed to the lively ecclesiastical controversy of the time by publishing a pamphlet against the principle of non-intrusion. He was answered by William Cunningham. In July, 1844, he suffered a stroke of paralysis, which made him practically an invalid for the rest of his life.

Hamilton's principal works are: *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform* (London, 1852), containing his articles published in the *Edinburgh Review*; *Notes and Dissertations*, published with his edition of *T. Reid's Works* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1846-63); and his *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic* (ed. H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch, 4 vols., 1859-60), of which an abridgment of the metaphysical portion (vols. i. and ii.) was edited by F. Bowen (Boston, 1870).

PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS. Hamilton was an exponent of the Scottish common-sense philosophy and a conspicuous defender and expounder of Thomas Reid, Position in though under the influence of Kant he went beyond the traditions of the common-sense school, combining with a naive realism a theory of the relativity of knowledge. His psychology, while marking an advance on the work of Reid and Stewart, was of the " faculty " variety and has now been largely superseded by other views. His contribution to logic was the now well-known theory of the quantification of the predicate, by which he became the forerunner of the present algebraic school of logicians.

It is his law of the conditioned, with his correlative philosophy of the unconditioned, which comes into nearest relation with theology. This law is " that all that is conceivable in thought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, can not both be true, but of which, as mutually contradictory, one must be true. . . . The law of the mind, that the conceivable is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable, I call the law of the conditioned." This involved his position as to tile Infinite-that the Infinite is " incognizable and inconceivable." This doctrine on its philosophic side is a protest against Kant's skeptical result affirming that reason lands in hopeless

contradictions; on its theological side it proclaims the impossibility of knowing the Absolute Being. Only by taking first the philosophic aspect can we correctly interpret its theological relations. Kant had made a priori elements only forms of the mind; and accordingly, the ideas of self, the universe, and God, became only regulative of our intellectual procedure, and in no sense guaranties of truth. Accordingly, Kant has dwelt on " the self-contradiction of seemingly dogmatical cognitions (the cum antithesi) in none of which we can discover any decided superiority." These were, that the world had a beginning, that it had not; that every composite substance consists of simple parts, that no composite thing does consist of simple parts; that causality according to the laws of nature is not the only causality operating to originate the world, that there is no other causality; that there is an absolutely necessary being, that there is not any such being. Hamilton's object was to maintain that such contradictions are not the product of reason, but of an attempt to press reason beyond its proper limits. If, then, we allow that the conceivable is only of the relative and bounded, we recognize at once that the so-called antinomies of reason are the result of attempts to push reason beyond its own province, to make our conceptions the measure of existence, attempting to bring the incomprehensible within the limits of comprehension.

Thus far a real service was rendered by Hamilton in criticizing the skeptical side of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. He estimated this result so highly as to say of it, " if I have done anything meritorious in philosophy, it is in the attempt to explain the phenomena of these contradictions." At this point Hamilton ranks Reid superior to Kant; the former ending in certainty, the latter in uncertainty. But there remain for Hamilton's philosophy the questions: If we escape contradiction by refusing to attempt to draw the inconceivable within the limits of conception, what is the source of certainty as to the infinite? How are knowledge and thought related to the existence and attributes of the Infinite Being? Here Hamilton is entangled in the perplexity of affirming that to be certain which is yet unknowable. That there is an Absolute Being, source of all finite existence, is, according to him, a certainty; but that we can have any knowledge of the fact is by him denied. Reid had maintained the existence of the Supreme Being as a necessary truth; and Hamilton affirms that the divine existence is at least a natural inference; but he nevertheless holds that the Deity can not be known by us. This is with him an application of the law of the conditioned-a conclusion inevitable under admission that all knowledge implies the relative, the antithesis of subject and object. This doctrine of ignorance was developed by H. L. Mansel, and eagerly embraced by the experientialists, J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer. This gave an impulse to Agnosticism, the influence of which must be largely credited to Kant, who reduced the a priori to a form of mental procedure, and to Hamilton, who rejected Kant's view, yet regarded -- the absolute as incognizable. However, while insisting that " the infinite God can not by us, in the present limitation of our faculties, be comprehended or conceived," Hamilton adds that "faith-belief is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond our knowledge."

See also William Hamilton in McCosh's The Scottish Philosophy

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Hedonism

Philosophers commonly distinguish between psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. Psychological hedonism is the view that humans are psychologically constructed in such a way that we exclusively desire pleasure. Ethical hedonism is the view that our fundamental moral obligation is to maximize pleasure or happiness. Ethical hedonism is most associated with the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (342-270 BCE.) who taught that our life's goal should be to minimize pain and maximize pleasure. In fact, all of our actions should have that aim:

> We recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. [Letter to Menoeceus]

In *A Letter to Menoeceus* - one of his few surviving fragments - Epicurus gives advice on how to decrease life's pains, and explains the nature of pleasure. As to decreasing life's pain, Epicurus explains how we can reduce the psychological anguish that results from fearing the gods and fearing death. Concerning the nature of pleasure, Epicurus explains that at least some pleasures are rooted in natural and, as a rule, every pain is bad and should be avoided, and every pleasure is good and should be preferred. However, there is delicate relation between pain and pleasure. Every pain we have is bad, and we should minimize pain when possible. However, sometimes simply minimizing life's pains is sufficient to attain happiness, and we need to go a step further and actively increase pleasure. He argues that we should not pursue every possible pleasure, such as when they produce more pain. Also, argues that the fewer desires we have, the easier it will be to experience happiness.

During the middle ages, Christian philosophers largely denounced Epicurean hedonism, which they believed was inconsistent with the Christian emphasis on avoiding sin, doing God's will, and developing the Christian virtues of faith, hope and charity. Reniassance philosophers such as Erasmus (1466-1536) revived hedonism and argued that its emphasis on pleasure was in fact compatible with God's wish for humans to be happy. In his famous work *Utopia* (1516), British philosopher Thomas More (1478-1535) explains that "the chief part of a person's happiness consists of pleasure." Like Erasmus, More defends hedonism on religious grounds and argues that, not only did God design us to be happy, but that uses our desire for happiness to motivate us to behave morally. More importantly More distinguishes between pleasures of the mind, and pleasures of the body. He also argues that we should pursue pleasures that are more naturally grounded, so that we do not become preoccupied with artificial luxuries. In the 18th century, the moral theme of pleasure and happiness was more systematically explored by Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747) and David Hume (1711-1776), whose theories were precursors to utilitarianism.

SEE ALSO: consequentialism, egoism, ethics, rule utilitarianism, utilitarianism

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St. Louis Hegelians

The common name given to a group of amateur philosophers founded and led by William Torrey Harris (1835-1909) and Henry Conrad Brokmeyer (1828-1906). Harris, a New Englander born in Connecticut and educated at Yale, first became acquainted with idealism through the Transcendentalists, mainly from his attendance in 1857 at the Orphic Seer's Conversations of Amos Bronson Alcott (1799-1888). The experience inspired Harris to leave Yale before obtaining a degree, and set off west to St. Louis to seek his vocation. Initially he took a position teaching shorthand in the St. Louis Public Schools, but he quickly advanced through the system, eventually becoming Superintendent of Schools, a position he held from 1867 to 1880. Brokmeyer was a Prussian immigrant who arrived in New York as a young man of sixteen. Bold and restless in temperament, he made his way westward, acquiring a small fortune by running a shoe factory in Mississippi. Desiring to further his education, he abandoned his business pursuits to enter Georgetown University in Kentucky, but his quarrelsome character led to his departure for Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island, only to leave that institution as well after a heated debate with President Wayland. The venture to New England, however, did give him an exposure to Transcendentalism, which inspired him, like Harris, once again to head west--first to the back country of Warren County Missouri, where he expended his energy in a close study of German thought, particularly Hegel, and then, in 1856, to St. Louis.

It was there that Harris and Brokmeyer met in 1858 at the St. Louis Mercantile Library, where Harris was offering a public lecture. Brokmeyer convinced Harris of the significance of Hegel's system, and its relevance to the historical trends of American society. They immediately joined forces, attracting a number of other youthful followers with intellectual ambitions, many of whom were, like Harris, teachers in the public schools. The nascent Hegelian movement was temporarily stalled when Brokmeyer went off to serve as a Colonel in the Union Army during the Civil War, but it rebounded in full force upon his return with the formation of the St. Louis Philosophical Society in 1866, and the launching of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy,* the official organ of the Society, in 1867.

Brokmeyer was the acknowledged intellectual leader of the movement. He published little, but his charismatic personality, quixotic meliorism, and extraordinary skills in argument and debate, consistently employed in the application of Hegelian dialectical logic, established his status as the framer of the ideals and aims of the movement. The manuscript of his translation of Hegel's *Logic*, although never published, became the theoretical text of the group, copied and distributed not only in St. Louis, but to sympathetic thinkers in other parts of the United States. Harris was, more than any other, the movement's public voice and organizing genius. He edited the *Journal,* contributing many of its articles himself. He also orchestrated a number of attempts to bring about a rapprochement between the western and New England idealists, first by inviting Alcott, Harris's former mentor, and Ralph Waldo Emerson to St. Louis, later by his participation in the formation of the Concord School of Philosophy, a summer school headed by Alcott that merged the two

groups within its faculty. (Harris taught for all nine of the sessions of the Concord School's existence, from 1879 to 1887, and his disquisitions on Hegel became the most popular of the faculty's offerings.) But although these efforts furthered the influence of the St. Louisians, they were not, because of philosophical differences, wholly successful.

Even though Harris and Brokmeyer were first inspired to philosophical pursuits by the Transcendentalists, the thought of the St. Louis group was distinguished from the latter by its greater concentration on philosophical understanding guided by Hegelian method, without the literary and theological concerns of the New England movement, and a greater stress on social responsibility and reform. The emerging views of the various members of the group varied somewhat in details, but they shared a common conviction in the relevance of a Hegelian social philosophy, inspired mainly by Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* and *The Philosophy of History*, to the problems and challenges facing the American society of their day, and the importance of education as a means of effecting necessary social change. Brokmeyer insisted on the necessity that thought issue in practical action directed to the social good, and the St. Louisians took this imperative to heart. The emphasis on education is evident in the pages of their journal, which were largely dedicated to the dissemination of European idealism, either through translations of Hegel and other German writers or summations of their work. They also shared a common enthusiasm for the prospects of their home city, divining by a clever but highly questionable use of the Hegelian dialectic what they believed to be historical forces that would propel St. Louis into an era of cultural supremacy in American society.

Gradually the group dissolved during the 1870s and 1880s as the core members of the group struck out on their own to pursue separate interests and aims. Characteristically, education and moral advancement were the themes of many of these individual pursuits. Denton Snider (1841-1925), a central figure within the movement who eventually became its historian, set upon a course of freelance teaching and lecturing as well as pursuing literary ambitions. In addition to offering lectures throughout the eastern and midwestern United States, including the Concord School, he founded or played a leading role in the operation of a number of visionary educational projects, such as the Communal University in Chicago and later St. Louis, the Chicago Kindergarten College, and the Goethe School in Milwaukee. Thomas Davidson (1840-1900), another key player in the original St. Louis movement, established the Breadwinner's College in New York City, a school devoted to the education of the working class, and later established a summer school at his home in Glenmore, New York.

The theme is echoed in the careers of the St. Louis movement's founders, Harris and Brokmeyer, during and after the dissipation of the movement itself. During his years as Superintendent of Schools in St. Louis, Harris was a strong proponent for the advancement of public education in Missouri. After his involvement at the Concord School he was appointed the United States Commissioner of Education in 1889. Brokmeyer entered the political arena in Missouri, and played a key role in the state's Constitutional Convention of 1875, which established a legal guarantee of education for all between the ages of six and twenty. Brokmeyer eventually served a term as Lieutenant Governor of the state, and acting Governor during 1876 and 1877, but when his political prospects turned against him, he returned to the wilderness life in numerous sojourns to the west. For a time he lived with the Creek Indians in Oklahoma. In 1896 he settled back in St. Louis, returning to a quiet life of scholarship and reflection until his death in 1906.

Despite the fact that the members of the group produced an extraordinary output of published

writing, both in their journal and independently, the movement's ideas had little lasting influence on American philosophy, due in large part to the orthodoxy of their Hegelianism, which was soon overshadowed by the emerging naturalism of American thought during the first decades of the twentieth century. The one exception was George H. Howison (1834-1916), who came under the influence of the group while teaching mathematics at Washington University in St. Louis. Howison later settled in Berkeley, California, and developed a pluralistic form of idealism that survived as the twentieth century school of thought known as Personalism. The most significant contribution of the group to American thought was their journal, which offered a much needed vehicle for the publication of the early work of some of the most prominent figures of the next generation of American philosophy, such as John Dewey, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Josiah Royce. In fact, Harris's encouragement when a young John Dewey timidly submitted his first philosophical essay for publication was crucial in the budding philosopher's decision to continue his studies. Although the ideas of the movement had little enduring influence, the St. Louis Hegelians represent an important chapter in the history of American philosophical thought and the developing relationship between intellectual and popular culture in the nineteenth century.

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Richard Field

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Claude Adrien Helvetius (1715-1771)

French philosopher; born in Paris January, 1715; died there Dec. 26, 1771. He studied at the College Louis-le Grand, and in 1738 received the lucrative post of farmer-general, which, however, he soon exchanged for the position of chamberlain to the queen. Tiring of the idle and dissipated life of the court, he married in 1751, and retired to a small estate at Vore, in Perche, where he devoted himself chiefly to philosophical studies. He visited England in 1764, and the following year he went to Germany, where he was received with distinction by Frederick II. He was one of the Encyclopedists, and held the skeptical and materialistic views common to that school of philosophy. His principal works are: *De l'esprit* (Paris, 1758; Eng. transl., *De l'Esprit: or, Essays on the Mind*, London, 1759), which, condemned by the Sorbonne and publicly burned at Paris, was translated into most European languages, and read more than any other book of the time; and the posthumous *De l'homme, de ses facultes intellectuelles et de son Mucation* (2 vols., London, 1772; Eng. transl., *A Treatise on Man; his Intellectual Faculties and his Education*, 2 vols.).

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Carl Gustav Hempel (1905 - 1997)

Contents.

LIFE. One of the leading member of logical positivism, he was born in Orianenburg, Germany, in 1905.
Between March 17 and 24, 1982, Hempel gave an interview to Richard Nolan; the text of that interview was published for the first time in 1988 in Italian translation (Hempel, 'Autobiografia intellettuale' in *Oltre il positivismo logico*, Armando : Rome, Italy : 1988). This interview is the main source of the following biographical notes.

Hempel studied at the Realgymnasium at Berlin and, in 1923, he was admitted at the University of Gottingen where he studied mathematics with David Hilbert and Edmund Landau and symbolic logic with Heinrich Behmann. Hempel was very impressed with Hilbert's program of proving the consistency of mathematics by means of elementary methods; he also studied philosophy, but he found mathematical logic more interesting than traditional logic. The same year he moved to the University of Heidelberg, where he studied mathematics, physics and philosophy. From 1924 Hempel studied at Berlin, where he meet Reichenbach who introduced him to the Berlin Circle. Hempel attended Reichenbach's courses on mathematical logic, the philosophy of space and time, the theory of probability. He studied physics with Max Planck and logic with von Neumann. In 1929 Hempel took part in the first congress on scientific philosophy organized by logical positivists. He meet Carnap and -- very impressed by Carnap -- moved to Vienna where he attended three courses with Carnap, Schlick and Waismann, and took part to the meetings of the Vienna Circle. In the same years Hempel qualified as teacher in the secondary school and eventually, in 1934, he gained the doctorate in philosophy at Berlin, with a dissertation on the theory of probability. In the same year he emigrated to Belgium, with the help of a friend of Reichenbach, Paul Oppenheim (Reichenbach introduced Hempel to Oppenheim in 1930). Two years later Hempel and Oppenheim published the book *Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik* on the logical theory of classifier, comparative and metric scientific concepts. In 1937 Hempel was invited -- with the help of Carnap -- at the University of Chicago as Research Associate in Philosophy. After an another brief period in Belgium, Hempel emigrated to USA in 1939. He taught in New York, at the City College (1939-1940) and at the Queens College (1940-1948). In those years he was interested in the theory of confirmation and explanation, and published several articles on that subject -- 'A purely

syntactical definition of confirmation' in *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 8, 1943; 'Studies in the logic of confirmation' in *Mind*, 54, 1945; 'A definition of Degree of confirmation' (with P. Oppenheim) in *Philosophy of science*, 12, 1945; 'A note on the paradoxes of confirmation' in *Mind*, 55, 1946; 'Studies in the logic of explanation' (with P. Oppenheim) in *Philosophy of science*, 15, 1948. Between 1948 and 1955 Hempel taught at Yale University. His work *Fundamentals of concept formation in empirical science* was published in 1952 in the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*. From 1955 he taught at the University of Princeton. *Aspects of scientific explanation* and *Philosophy of natural science* were published in 1965 and 1966 respectively. After the pensionable age he continued in teaching at Berkley, Irvine, Jerusalem and, from 1976 to 1985, at Pittsburgh. In the meantime, his philosophical perspective was changing and he detached from logical positivism -- 'The meaning of theoretical terms: a critique of the standard empiricist construal' in *Logic, methodology and philosophy of science IV* (ed. by Patrick Suppes), 1973; 'Valuation and objectivity in science' in *Phisycs, philosophy and psychoanalysis* (ed. by R.S. Cohen and L. Laudan), 1983; 'Provisoes: a problem concerning the inferential function of scientific theories' in *Erkenntnis*, 28, 1988. However, he remained affectionately joined to logical positivism: in 1975 he undertook the editorship (with W. Stegmüller and W.K. Essler) of the new series of the journal *Erkenntnis*. Hempel died November 9, 1997, in Princeton Township, New Jersey.

SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION. Hempel and Oppenheim's essay 'Studies in the logic of explanation', published in volume 15 of the journal *Philosophy of science*, gave an account of the deductive-nomological explanation. A scientific explanation of a fact is a deduction of a statement (called the *explanandum*) that describes the fact we want to explain; the premises (called the *explanans*) are scientific laws and suitable initial conditions. For an explanation to be acceptable, the explans must be true.

According to deductive-nomological model, the explanation of a fact is thus reduced to a logical relationship between statements: the explanandum is a consequence of the explanans. This is a common method in the philosophy of logical positivism. Pragmatic aspects of explanation are not token into consideration. Another feature is that an explanation requires scientific laws; facts are explained when they are subsumed under laws. So the question arise about the nature of a scientific law. According to Hempel and Oppenheim, a *fundamental theory* is defined as a true statement whose quantifiers are not removable (ie a fundamental theory is not equivalent to a statement without quantifiers), and which do not contain individual constants. Every generalized statement which is a logical consequence of a fundamental theory is a *derived theory*. The underlying idea for this definition is that a scientific theory deals with general properties expressed by universal statements. References to specific space-time regions or to individual things are not allowed. For example, Newton laws are true for all bodies in every time in every space. But there are laws (eg the original Kepler laws) that are valid under limited conditions and refer to specific objects, like the Sun and its planets. Therefore there is a distinction between a fundamental theory, which is universal without restrictions, and a derived theory that can contain a reference to individual objects. Note that it is required that theories are true; implicitly, this means that scientific laws are not tools to make predictions, but they are genuine statements that describe the world -- a realistic point of view.

There is another intriguing characteristic of Hempel-Oppenheim model, that is explanation and prediction have exactly the same logical structure: an explanation can be used to forecast and a forecast is a valid explanation. Finally, deductive-nomological model accounts also for the

explanation of laws: in that circumstance, the explanandum is a scientific law and can be proved with the help of other scientific laws.

***Aspect of scientific explanation*, published in 1965, faces the problem of inductive explanation, in which the explanans includes statistical laws. According to Hempel, in such kind of explanation the explanans gives only a high degree of probability to the explanandum, which is not a logical consequence of the premises. The following is a very simple example.**

> **The relative frequency of P with respect to Q is *r***
> **The object *a* belongs to P**
> **--**
> **Thus *a* belongs to Q**

The conclusion "*a* belongs to Q" is not sure, for it is not a logical consequence of the two premises. According to Hempel, this explanation gives a degree of probability *r* to the conclusion. Note that the inductive explanation requires a covering law: the fact is explained by means of scientific laws. But now the laws are not deterministic; statistical laws are admissible. However, in many respects the inductive explanation is similar to the deductive explanation.

- **Both deductive and inductive explanation are nomological ones, ie they require universal laws.**
- **The relevant fact is the logical relation between explanans and explanandum: in deductive explanation the latter is a logical consequence of the former, while in inductive explanation the relationship is an inductive one. But in either the model, only logical aspects are relevant: pragmatic features are not token in account.**
- **The symmetry between explanation and prediction is preserved.**
- **The explanans must be true.**

PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION. During his researches on confirmation, Hempel formulated the so-called paradoxes of confirmation. Hempel's paradoxes are a straightforward consequence of the following apparently harmless principles:

- **the statement (*x*)(R*x* --> B*x*) is supported by the statement (R*a* & B*a*)**
- **if P_1 and P_2 are logically equivalent statements and O_1 confirms P_1, then O_1 also supports P_2.**

Hence (~R*a* & ~B*a*), which confirms (*x*)(~B*x* --> ~R*x*), also supports (*x*)(R*x* --> B*x*). Now suppose R*x* means "*x* is a raven" and B*x* means "*x* is black". Therefore "*a* isn't a raven and isn't black" confirms "all ravens are black". That is, the observation of a red fish supports the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Note that also the statement (*x*)((~R*x* v R*x*) --> (~R*x* v B*x*)) is equivalent to (*x*)(R*x* --> B*x*); thus (~R*a* v B*a*) supports "all ravens are black" and hence the observation of whatever thing which is not a raven (tennis-ball, paper, elephant, red herring) supports "all ravens are black".

CONCEPT FORMATION IN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE. In his monograph *Fundamentals of concept formation in empirical science* (1952) Hempel describes the methods according to which physical quantities are defined. I shall briefly summarize the results of Hempel's research. I employ the very same example used by Hempel: the measurement of mass.

An equal-armed balance is used to determine when two bodies have the same mass and when the mass of a body is greater than the mass of the other. Two bodies have the same mass if, when they are on the pans, the balance remains in equilibrium. If a pan goes down and the other up, then the body in the lowest pan has a greater mass. From a logical point of view, this procedure defines two relations, say E and G, so that

- **E(*a*,*b*) if and only if *a* and *b* have the same mass;**
- **G(*a*,*b*) if and only if the mass of *a* is greater that the mass of *b*.**

The relations E and G satisfy the following conditions:

1. **E is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation.**
2. **G is an irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive relation.**
3. **E and G are mutually exclusive, ie if E(*a*,*b*) then not G(*a*,*b*).**
4. **for every *a* and *b*, one and only one of the following assertions is true:**

    E(*a*,*b*)   G(*a*,*b*)   G(*b*,*a*)

Relations E and G thus define a partial order.

The second step consists in defining a function m which satisfies the following three conditions.

5. **A suitable prototype is chosen, whose mass is one kilogram.**
6. **If E(*a*,*b*) then m(*a*)=m(*b*).**
7. **It is defined an operation, say ©, which combines two bodies *a* and *b*, so that**

    m(*a* © *b*) = m(*a*) + m(*b*)

Conditions (1)-(7) describe not only the measurement of mass but also of length, of time and of every extensive physical quantity (a quantity is called *extensive* if there is an operation which combines the objects according to condition 7, otherwise it is called *intensive*; for example temperature is intensive).

THE LATE HEMPEL. In 'The meaning of theoretical terms', 1973, Hempel criticizes an aspect of logical positivism's theory of science: the distinction between observational and theoretical terms and the related problem about the meaning of theoretical terms. According to Hempel, there is an implicit assumption in neopositivist analysis of science, that is the meaning of theoretical terms can be explained by means of linguistic methods. Therefore the very problem is how can be determined a set of statements that gives a meaning to theoretical terms. Hempel analyzes the various theories proposed by logical positivism.

According to Schlick, the meaning of theoretical concepts is determined by the axioms of the theory; that axioms thus play the role of implicit definitions. Therefore theoretical terms must be interpreted in a way that makes the theory true. But according to such interpretation -- Hempel objects -- a scientific theory is always true, for it is true by convention, and thus every scientific theory is a priori true. This is a prove -- Hempel says -- that Schlick's interpretation of the meaning of theoretical terms is not tenable. Also the thesis which asserts that the meaning of a theoretical term depends on the theory in which that term is used is, according to Hempel, untenable.

Another solution to the problem of the meaning of theoretical terms is based on the rules of

correspondence (also known as meaning postulates). They are statements in which observational and theoretical terms occur. Theoretical terms thus gain a partial interpretation by means of observational terms. Hempel raises two objections to this theory. First of all, he asserts that observational concepts do not exist. When a scientific theory introduces new theoretical terms, they are linked with other old theoretical terms that usually belong to another already consolidated scientific theory. Therefore the interpretation of new theoretical terms is not based on observational terms but it is given by other theoretical terms that, in a sense, are more familiar than the new ones. The second objection is about the conventional nature of rules of correspondence. A meaning postulate defines the meaning of a concept and therefore, from a logical point of view, it must be true. But every statement in a scientific theory is falsifiable, and thus there is not any scientific statement which is beyond the jurisdiction of the experience. So also a meaning postulate can be false; hence it is not conventional and thus it does not define the meaning of a concept but it is a genuine physical hypothesis. So meaning postulate do not exist.

'Provisoes: a problem concerning the inferential function of scientific theories' published in *Erkenntnis*, 1988, criticizes another aspect of logical positivism's theory of science: the deductive nature of scientific theories. It is very interesting that a philosopher who is famous for his deductive model of scientific explanation moved a criticism to the deductive model of science. At least this fact shows the open views of Hempel. He argues that it is impossible to derive observational statements from a scientific theory. For example, Newton's theory of gravitation cannot determine the position of planets, even if the initial conditions are known, for Newton's theory deals with the gravitational force, and thus the theory cannot forecast the influences exerted by other kinds of force. In other words, Newton's theory requires an explicit assumption -- a provisoe, according to Hempel -- which assures that the planets are subjected only to the gravitational force. Without such hypothesis it is impossible to apply the theory to the study of planetary motion. But this assumption does not belong to the theory. Therefore the position of planets is not determined by the theory, but it is implied by the theory *plus* appropriate assumptions. Accordingly, not only observational statements are not entailed by the theory, but also there are no deductive links between observational statements. Hence it is impossible that an observational statement is a logical consequence of a theory (unless the statement is logically true). This fact has very important outcomes.

One of them is that the empirical content of a theory does not exist. Neopositivists defined it as the class of observational statements implied by the theory; but this class is an empty set.

Another consequence is that theoretical terms are not removable from a scientific theory. Known methods employed to accomplish this task assert that, for every theory T, it is possible to find a theory T* without theoretical terms so that an observational statement O is a consequence of T* if and only if it is a consequence of T. Thus it is possible to eliminate theoretical terms from T without loss of deductive power. But -- Hempel argues -- no observational statement O is derivable from T, so that T* lacks empirical consequence.

Suppose T is a falsifiable theory; therefore there is an observational statement O so that ~O --> ~T. Hence T --> ~O; so T entails an observational statement ~O. But no observational statement is a consequence of T. Thus the theory T is not falsifiable. The consequence is that every theory is not falsifiable. (Note: Hempel's argument is evidently wrong, for according to Popper the negation of an observational statement usually is not an observational statement).

Finally, the interpretation of science due to instrumentalism is not tenable. According to such interpretation, scientific theories are rules of inference, that is they are prescriptions according to which observational statements are derived. Hempel's analysis shows that these alleged rules of inference are indeed void.

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Heraclitus (535-475 BCE.)

Heraclitus was a Presocratic Greek philosopher of Ephesus, who lived about BCE. 535-475. The date of Heraclitus is roughly fixed by his reference in the past tense to Hekataios, Pythagoras, and Xenophanes (fr. 16), and by the fact that Parmenides appears to allude to him in turn (fr. 6). This means that he wrote early in the fifth century BCE. He was an Ephesian noble, and had a sovereign contempt for the mass of mankind. He lived during the time of the first Persian domination over his native city. As one of the last of the family of Androclus, the descendant of Codrus, who had founded the colony of Ephesus, Heraclitus had certain honorary regal privileges, which he renounced in favor of his brother. He likewise declined an invitation of King Darius to visit his court. He was an adherent of the aristocracy, and when, after the defeat of the Persians, the democratic party came into power, he withdrew in ill-humor to a secluded estate in the country, and gave himself up entirely to his studies. In his later years he wrote a philosophical treatise, which he deposited in the temple of Artemis, making it a condition that it should not be published till after his death. He was buried in the marketplace of Ephesus, and for several centuries later the Ephesians continued to engrave his image on their coins.

His great work "On Nature" (*peri phuseos*), in three books, was written in the Ionian dialect, and is the oldest monument of Greek prose. Considerable fragments of it have come down to us. The language is bold, harsh, and figurative; the style is so careless that the syntactical relations of the words are often hard to perceive; and the thoughts are profound. All this made Heraclitus so difficult a writer that he went in antiquity by the name "the Obscure" (*skoteinos*), and Lucretius attacks him on the ground (i. 638-644). From his gloomy view of life he is often called "the Weeping Philosopher," as Democritus is known as "the Laughing Philosopher." It is above all in dealing with Heraclitus that we are made to feel the importance of personality in shaping systems of philosophy. But it was not only the common run of men that Heraclitus despised; he had not even a good word for any of his predecessors. He agrees, of course, with Xenophanes in criticizing Homer, but Xenophanes himself falls under an equal condemnation. In a remarkable fragment (fr. 16) he mentions him along with Hesiod, Pythagoras, and Hekataois as an instance of the truth that much learning does not teach men to think. The researches of Pythagoras, by which we are to understand his harmonic and arithmetical discoveries, are rejected with special emphasis (fr. 17). Wisdom is not a knowledge of many things; it is the clear knowledge of one thing only, and this Heraclitus describes, in true prophetic style, as his Logos (word/fire), which is 'true evermore', though men cannot understand it even when it is told to them (fr. 2). Perfect knowledge is only given to the gods, but a progress in knowledge is possible to men. We must try, then, to discover, what Heraclitus meant by his Logos, the thing he felt he had been born to say, whether anyone would listen to him or not.

As fire is the primary form of reality, the process of combustion is the key both to human life and to that of the world. It is a process that never rests; for a flame must always be fed by fresh exhalations as fuel, and it is always turning into vapor or smoke. The steadiness of the flame

depends on the 'measures' of fuel kindled and the 'measures' of fire extinguished in smoke remaining constant. Now the world is 'an everliving fire' (fr. 20), and therefore there will be an unceasing process of eternal flux (*panta pei*). For Hereclitus, *everything* is in this process of flux, and nothing therefore, not even the world in its momentary form, nor the gods themselves, can escape final destruction. That will apply to the world at large (macrocosm) and also to the soul of humans (microcosm). Concerning the larger world, 'You cannot step twice into the same river' (fr. 41); concerning the human soul, it is just as true that 'we are and are not' at any given moment. As fire changes continually into water and then into earth, so earth changes back to water and water again to fire. The world, therefore, arose from fire, and in alternating periods is resolved again into fire, to form itself anew out of this element. The division of unified things into a multiplicity of opposing phenomena is "the way downwards," and is the consequence of a war and a strife. Harmony and peace lead back to unity by "the way upwards." Nature is constantly dividing and uniting herself, so that the multiplicity of opposites does not destroy the unity of the whole.

A glance at the fragments will show that the thought of Heraclitus was dominated by the opposition of sleeping and waking, life and death, and that this seemed to him the key to the traditional Milesian problem of the opposites, hot and cold, wet and dry. He finds these opposites both at the level of the human soul and the larger cosmos. At the human level, the soul is only fully alive when it is awake, and that sleep is really a stage between life and death. If we look next at the macrocosm, we shall see the explanation is the same. Night and day, summer and winter, alternate in the same way as sleep and waking, life and death, and here too it is clear that the explanation is to be found in the successive advance of the wet and the dry, the cold and the hot. The existence of these opposites depends only on the difference of the motion on "the way upwards" from that on "the way downwards"; all things, therefore, are at once identical and not identical. The principle of the universe is "becoming," which implies that everything is and, at the same time, is not, so far as the same relation is concerned. 'The way up and the way down', which are 'one and the same' (fr. 69) are also the same for the microcosm and the macrocosm. Fire, water, earth is the way down, and earth, water, fire is the way up. And these two ways are forever being traversed in opposite directions at once, so that everything really consists of two parts, one part traveling up and the other traveling down.

Paradoxically the everlasting fire of the world which creates its flux, also secures its stability. For the same 'measures' of fire are always being kindled and going out (fr. 20). It is impossible for fire to consume its nourishment without at the same time giving back what it has consumed already. It is a process of eternal 'exchange' like that of gold for wares and wares for gold (fr. 22); and 'the sun will not exceed his measures; if he does, the Erinyes, the auxiliaries of Justice, will find him out' (fr. 29). For all this strife is really justice (fr. 22), not injustice, as Anaximander had supposed, and 'War is the father of all things' (fr. 44). It is just this opposite tension that keeps things together, like that of the string in the bow and the lyre (fr. 45), and though it is a hidden attunement, it is better than any open one (fr. 47). For all his condemnations of Pythagoras, Heraclitus cannot get away from the tuned string.

With all his originality, Heraclitus remains an Ionian. In a sense, Heraclitus substituted fire for the 'air' of Anaximenes, who in turn had substituted 'air' for the water of Thales. Also, Hereclitus' notion of flux is a development of that Anaximenes' notion of rarefaction and condensation. Although Hereclitus has a doctrine of the soul, his fire-soul is as little personal as the breath-soul of Anaximenes. Some fragments superficially appear to assert the immortality of the individual soul. But, when we examine them, we see they cannot bear this interpretation. Soul is only immortal in

so far as it is part of the everliving fire which is the life of the world. Seeing that the soul of every man is in constant flux like his body, what meaning can immortality have? It is not only true that we cannot step twice into the same river, but also that we are not the same for two successive instants. That is just the side of his doctrine that struck contemporaries most forcibly, and Epicharmos already made fun of it by putting it as an argument into the mouth of a debtor who did not wish to pay. How could he be liable, seeing he is not the same man that contracted the debt?

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Edward Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648)

Life. Edward Herbert, was born at Eyton in Shropshire on March 3, 1583. He is the representative of a branch of the noble Welsh family of that name, and the elder brother of George Herbert the poet. He matriculated at University College, Oxford, in 1595, married in 1599, and continued to reside at Oxford till about 1600, when he removed to London. He was made a Knight of the Bath soon after the accession of King James. From 1608 to 1618 he spent most of his time on the continent as a soldier of fortune, occasionally seeking the company of scholars in the intervals of his campaigns, chases, or duels. In 1619 he was appointed ambassador at Paris; after his recall in 1624 King James rewarded him with an Irish peerage. He was created an English peer as Baron Herbert of Cherbury in 1629. The civil war found him unprepared for decision; but he ultimately saved his property by siding with the parliament. He died in London on 20 August 1648.

Writings. His works were historical, literary, and philosophical. His account of the Duke of Buckingham's expedition an his history of Henry VIII were written with a view to royal favor. The latter was published in 1649; a Latin version of the former appeared in 1658, the English original not till 1860. His literary works -- poems and autobiography -- are of higher merit. His poems were published by his son in 1665, and his autobiography was first printed by Horace Walpole in 1764. His philosophical works give him a distinct place in the history of thought. His greatest work, *De Veritate*, was, he tells us, begun in England and "formed there in all its principal parts.." Hugo Grotius, to whom he submitted the manuscript, advised its publication; but it was not till this advice had been sanctioned (as he thought) by a sign from heaven that he had the work printed (Paris, 1624). To the third edition (London, 1645) he added a short treatise *De Causis Errorum*, a dissertation entitled *Religio Laici*, and an *Appendix ad Sacerdotes*. In 1663 appeared his *De Religione Gentilium* -- a treatise on what is now called comparative religion. A popular account of his views on religion was published in 1768 under the title ; although the external evidence is incomplete, it may have been from his pen.

Truth. Herbert does not stand in the front rank of speculative thinkers; but his claims as a philosopher are worthy of note. Like Francis Bacon he was occupied with the question of method; and his inquiry went deeper, though it was less effective upon philosophical opinion. Bacon investigated the criteria and canons of evidence, whereas Herbert sought to determine the nature and standard of truth. Descartes soon afterwards referred to the question and put it aside, saying of Herbert: "he examines what truth is; for myself, I have never doubted about it, as it seems to me to be a notion so transcendentally clear that it is impossible to ignore it" (letter of Oct. 16, 1639). The problem which Herbert put before himself concerned the conditions of knowledge; and it has bearing upon later thought, though it arises out of traditional views. In the end of the following century Kant said that his own new point of view was due to discarding the belief that "all our cognitions must conform to objects," which had been "hitherto assumed." This was, indeed the prevailing doctrine. Perception was held to be a "passio mentis" produced by the activity of the

object which impressed its image (or, to use the term which Descartes and Locke made familiar, an idea) upon the mind. this view was rejected by Herbert as decidedly as by Kant, though he did not anticipate the Kantian revolution by assuming that "objects must conform to our cognition."

The distinction between mind and body had not yet been sharpened and turned into antagonism by the Cartesian dualism. Man is a complex of mind and body, and, according to Herbert, all that is passive in him is body (*De Veritate*, 3rd ed., p. 72). -- though body itself is not purely passive. Mind, however, is never passive. It acts but is not acted upon (*ibid*. p. 95). Things do not act upon it but are put within the sphere of its operation (*ibid*. p. 95). Nevertheless, it requires an occasion, or the presence of objects, to awaken its activity, even in its highest operations (*ibid*. p. 91). Herbert's expressions are not quite consistent, for this awakening of mental activity is itself an effect upon mind; but perhaps he might have defended his doctrine by appealing to the harmony which exists between faculty and object. For in this lies his fundamental conception -- different alike from the traditional view that cognition must conform to objects, and from the Kantian view that objects must conform to cognition. the mental faculty supplies a form analogous to the object as it exists (*ibid*. p. 97); the object, again,, neither undergoes an alteration of nature nor produces one, but only enters, as it were, into the faculty's range of view. The whole process is only intelligible on the supposition of a harmony between the world and the human mind. In this harmony the human body, fashioned out of the material of the external world and containing the sense-apparatus which lead to the "inner court" of consciousness, forms the bond of union.

Herbert's doctrine of the nature of truth rests on this conception of harmony. "Truth," he says, "is a certain harmony between objects and their analogous faculties" (*ibid*. p. 68). Four kinds or degrees of truth are distinguished by him: truth of the thing; truth of appearance; truth of concept; and truth of intellect. These seem to be arranged in an ascending scale. The first does not exclude the others; the last includes all the preceding, being the 'conformity' of the several 'conformities' they involve. The conditions of truth are also made to explain the possibility of error, for the causes of error lie in the intermediate stages between the thing and the intellect. The root of all error is in confusion -- in the inappropriate connection of faculty and object -- and it is for the intellect to expose the inappropriate connection and so to dissipate the error.

The doctrine arrived at is summed up in seven propositions (*ibid*. pp. 8-12); and all these hinge upon the postulate that mind corresponds with things not only in their general nature but in all their differences of kind, generic and specific. Every object is cognate to some mental power or faculty, and to every difference in the object there corresponds a different faculty. Herbert attempts no account of nature, and his psychology is only introduced in the interests of his doctrine of truth; but it is clear that there cannot be fewer faculties than there are differences of things. A faculty is defined as any internal force which unfolds a different mode of apprehension (*sensus*) to a different object (*ibid*. p. 30); and faculties are spoken of as *radii animae*, which perceive objects, or rather the image given out by objects, in accordance with mutual analogy. These images may be conveyed by the same sense-apparatus and yet be apprehended by different faculties, as is the case with figure and motion (*ibid*. p. 78). Hence countless faculties; but their very multiplicity suggests that Herbert cannot have attributed to them the same degree of independence as did the 'faculty-pschologists' of a recent generation. They may be said to be simply modes of mental operation; and mind operates differently as different kinds of objects are brought before it, showing always an aspect of its cognitive power analogous to the object.

Reflecting upon the various modes of mental activity, we may arrange these faculties into four classes: natural instinct, internal sense, external sense, and discourse or reasoning. These are not

separate powers; and, although Herbert may have sometimes spoken of them as such, another doctrine may be found in his writings. According to this doctrine all mental faculty is regarded as informed in less or greater measure by the intellect, which is itself a manifestation in humans of the universal divine providence. "Our mind," he says, "is the highest image and type of the divinity, and hence whatever is true or good in us exists in supreme degree in God. Following out this opinion, we believe that the divine image has also communicated itself to the body. but, as in the propagation of light there is growing loss of distinctness as it gets farther from its source, so that divine image, which shines clearly in our living and free unity, first communicates itself to natural instinct or the common reason of its providence, then extends to the numberless internal and external faculties (analogous to particular objects), closes into shade and body, and sometimes seems as it were to retreat into matter itself" (*ibid*. p. 78).

The name 'natural instinct' is badly chosen; but it is not difficult to see what Herbert means by it. In particular, it is the home of those 'common notions' (as he calls them) which may be said to underlie all experience and to belong to the nature of intelligence itself. Some of these common notions are formed without any assistance from discourse or the ratiocinative faculty; others are only perfected by the aid of discourse. The former class is distinguished by certain tests or marks. Some of these tests are logical (such as independence, certainty, and necessity); others are psychological (such as priority in time and universality). but it is the last-named mark or "universal consent" that is made by him "the highest rule of natural instinct (*ibid*. p. 60), and "the highest criterion of truth" (*ibid*. p. 39).

This appeal to universal consent makes Herbert a precursor of the philosophy of Common Sense, and lays him open to the criticism urged by Locke that there are no truths which can satisfy the test, there being nothing so certain or so generally known that it has not been ignored or denied by some. Herbert made little if any use of the tests by which he might have shown that certain common notions are presupposed in the constitution of experience, and thus failed to carry out the theory of knowledge of which at times he had a clear view.

Deism. The common notions are practical as well as theoretical -- yield the first principles of morals as well as those of science. but he attempted no complete account of them and limited his investigation o the common notions of religion. To this portion of his work his direct influence as a thinker is chiefly due, for it determined the scope and character of the English Deistical movement. The common notions of religion are, he holds, the following: (1) that there is a supreme Deity; (2) that this Deity ought to be worshipped; (3) that virtue combined with piety is the chief part of divine worship; (4) that men should repent of their sins and turn from them; (5) that reward and punishment follow from the goodness and justice of God, both in this life and after it. These five articles contain the whole doctrine of the true catholic church, that is to say, of the religion of reason. They also formed the primitive religion before the people "gave ear to the covetous and crafty sacerdotal order." What is contrary to the 'five points' is contrary to reason and therefore false; what is beyond reason but not contrary to it may be revealed: but the record of a revelation is not itself revelation but tradition; and the truth of a tradition depends upon the narrator and can never be more than probable.

A separate work -- *De Religione Gentilium* -- was devoted to the verification of these results on the field of what is now called comparative religion. In respect of this work the claim may be justly made for Herbert that he was one of the first -- if not the first -- to make a systematic effort after a comparative study of religions. but he had no idea of the historical development of belief, and he

looked upon all actual religions -- in so far as they went beyond his five articles -- as simply corruptions of the pure and primitive rational worship.

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Hippias (5th cn. BCE.)

A Greek sophist of Elis and a contemporary of Socrates. He taught in the towns of Greece, especially at Athens. He had the advantage of a prodigious memory, and was deeply versed in all the learning of his day. He attempted literature in every form which was then extant. He also made the first attempt in the composition of dialogues. In the two Platonic dialogues named after him (*Hippias Major* and *Hippias Minor*), he is represented as excessively vain and arrogant.

Hippias is chiefly memorable for his efforts in the direction of universality. He was the enemy of all specialization, and appeared at Olmpia gorgeously attired in a costume entirely of his own making down to the ring on his finger. He was prepared to lecture to anyone on anything, from astronomy to ancient history. Such a man had need of a good memory, and we know that he invented a system of mnemonics. There was a more serious side to his character, however. This was the age when people were still optimistic of squaring the circle by a geometrical construction. The lunules of Hippocrates of Chios belong to it, and Hippias, the universal genius, could not be left behind here. He invented the curve still known as the quadratix, which would solve the problem if it could be mechanically described. Hippias appears to have originated the idea of natural law as the foundation of morality, distinguishing nature from the arbitrary conventions or fashions, differing according to the different times or regions in which they arise, imposed by arbitrary human enactment, and often unwillingly obeyed. He held that there is an element of right common to the laws of all countries and constituting their essential basis. He held also that the good and wise of all countries are naturally akin and should regard one another as citizens of a single state. This idea was subsequently developed by the Cynic and still more by the Stoic schools, passing from the latter to the jurists, in whose hands it became the great instrument fro converting roman law into a legislation for a people.

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Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)

EARLY LIFE. Thomas Hobbes was born at Westport, adjoining Malmesbury in Wiltshire, on April 5, 1588. His father, the vicar of the parish (so John Aubery tells us), "was one of the ignorant Sir Johns of Queen Elizabeth's time, could only read the prayers of the church and the homilies, and valued not learning, as not knowing the sweetness of it" (Letters written by eminent persons. . .and Lives of eminent men, 1813). Hobbes led a sheltered and leisured life. His education was provided for by an uncle, a solid tradesman and alderman of Malmesbury. He was already a good Latin and Greek scholar when, not yet fifteen, he was sent to Magdalen Hall, Oxford. On leaving Oxford, in 1608, he became companion to the eldest son of Lord Cavendish of Hardwicke (afterwards created Earl of Devonshire), and his connection with the Cavendish family lasted (although not without interruptions) till his death.

Three times in his life, Hobbes traveled on the continent with a pupil. His first journey was begun in 1610, and in it he visited France, Germany, and Italy, learning the French and Italian languages, and gaining experience, but not yet conscious of his life's work. On his return (the date is uncertain), he settled down with his young lord at Hardwick an din London. His secretarial duties were light, and he set himself to become a scholar. To this period, belongs his acquaintance with Bacon, Herbert of Cherbury, Ben Johnson, and other leading men of the time.

Hobbes's pupil and friend died in 1628, two years after the death of the first earl; his son and successor was a boy of eleven; his widow did not need the services of a secretary; and, for a time, there was no place in the household for Hobbes. In 1629, he left for the continent again with a new pupil, returning from this second journey in 1631 to take charge of the young earl's education. "He was forty years old before he looked on geometry, which happened accidentally; being in a gentleman's library in. . . Euclid's Elements lay open. About this time also, or soon afterwards, his philosophical views began to take shape. Among his manuscripts there is a *Short Tract on First Principles* (*Elements Of Law*, ed. Toonies, 1889, pp. 193-210), which has been conjectured to belong to the year 1630. It shows the author so much impressed by his reading of Euclid as to adopt the geometrical form (soon afterwards used by Descartes) for the expression of his argument.

When Hobbes made his third visit to the continent, which lasted from 1634 to 1637 and on which he was accompanied by the young Earl of Devonshire, he is found taking his place among philosophers. At Paris, he was an intimate of Mersenne, who was the center of a scientific circle that included Descartes and Gassendi; and at Florence he held discourse with Galileo. After his return to England he wrote, with a view to publication, a sketch of his new theory, to which he gave the title *Elements of Law natural and politic*. The treatise was never published by Hobbes, nor did it appear as a connected whole until 1889, although in 1650, probably with his consent, its first thirteen chapters were issued with the title *Human Nature*, and the remainder of the volume as a separate work *De Corpore Politico*. In November 1640, when the Long Parliament began to show signs of activity threatening civil war, Hobbes was "the first of all that fled" to France; he thus describes himself as a "man of feminine courage". He remained in France for the next 11 years. By his influence, Hobbes was appointed to teach mathematics to Charles, Prince of Wales, who

arrived in Paris in 1646. Of greater interest is another literary correspondence which followed close upon his arrival in Paris. Mersenne was then collecting the opinions of scholars on the forthcoming treatise by Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, and in January 1641, Hobbes's objections were ready and forwarded to his great contemporary in Holland. These, with the replies of Descartes, afterwards appeared as the third set of *Objectiones* when the treatise was published. Further communications followed on the *Dioptrique* which had appeared along with the famous *Discours de la methode* in 1637. Descartes did not discover the identity of his two critics; but he did not approve of either. To Descartes, mend was the primal certainty and independent of material reality. Hobbes, on the other hand, had already fixed on motion as the fundamental fact, and his originality consisted in his attempt to use it for the explanation not of nature only, but also of mind and society. Two or three years after his correspondence with Descartes, Hobbes contributed a summary of his views on physics and a *Tractatus Opticus* to works published by Mersenne.

LATER LIFE AND WRITINGS. At least by the beginning of his residence in Paris in 1640, Hobbes had matured the plan for his own philosophical work. It was to consist of three treatises, dealing respectively with matter or body, with human nature, and with society. It was his intention, he says, to have dealt with these subjects in this order, but his country "was boiling hot with questions concerning the rights of dominion, and the obedience due from subjects, the true forerunners of an approaching war," and this cause, as he said, "ripened and plucked from me this third part" of the system--the book *De Cive*, published at Paris in 1642. When stable government seemed to have been re-established by the Commonwealth, he had it published in London, in an English version from his own hand, as *Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society*. The same year, 1651, saw the publication, also in London, of his greatest work, *Leviathan*, and his own return to England, which now promised a sager shelter to the philosopher than France, where he feared the clergy and was no longer in favor with the remnant of the exiled English court.

The last twenty-eight years of Hobbes's long life were spent in England; and there he soon returned to the house of his old pupil the Earl of Devonshire, who had preceded him in submitting to the Commonwealth and like him welcomed the king on his return. For a year or two after his home-coming, Hobbes resided in London, busied with the completion of his philosophical system, the long-delayed first part of which, *De Corpore*, appeared in 1655, and the second part, *De Homine*, in 1656. The latter work contains little or nothing of importance that Hobbes had not said already; but the former deals with the logical, mathematical, and physical principles which were to serve as foundation for the imposing structure he had built. In 1654, the tract *Of Liberty and Necessity*, which he had written eight years before in reply to the bishop Bramhall's arguments, was published by some person unnamed into whose hands it had fallen. Not suspecting Hobbes's innocence in the matter of the publication, Bramhall replied with some heat on the personal question and much fullness on the matter in hand in the following year; and this led to Hobbes's elaborate defense is *The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance*, published in 1656.

A bill aimed at blasphemous literature passed the Commons in January 1667, and *Leviathan* was one of two books mentioned in it. The bill never passed both houses; but Hobbes was seriously frightened. He is said to have become more regular at church and communion. He also studied the law of heresy, and wrote a short treatise on the subject, proving that there was no court by which he could be judged. But he was not permitted to excite the public conscience by further publications on matters of religion. A Latin translation of *Leviathan* (containing a new appendix

bringing its theology into line with the Nicene creed) was issued at Amsterdam in 1668. Other works, however, dating from the same year, were kept back--the tract on *Heresy*, the answer to Bramhall's attack on *Leviathan*, and *Behemoth: the History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England*. About the same time was written his *Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England*. His *Historia Ecclesiastica*, in elegiac verse, dates from about his eightieth year. When he was eighty-four, he wrote his autobiography in Latin verse. In 1673, he published a translation in rhymed quatrains of four books of the *Odyssey*; and he had completed both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* when, in 1675, he left London for the last time. Thereafter he lived with the Cavendish family at one of their seats in Derbyshire. He died at Hardwick on December 4, 1679.

THE STATE OF NATURE. In his brief introduction to the *Leviathan*, Hobbes describes the state as an organism analogous to a large person. He shows how each part of the state parallels the function of the parts of the human body. He notes that the first part of his project is to describe human nature, insofar as humans are the creators of the state. To this end, he advises that we look into ourselves to see the nature of humanity in general. Hobbes argues that, in the absence of social condition, every action we perform, no matter how charitable or benevolent, is done for reasons which are ultimately self-serving. For example, when I donate to charity, I am actually taking delight in demonstrating my powers. In its most extreme form, this view of human nature has since been termed psychological egoism. Hobbes believes that any account of human action, including morality, must be consistent with the fact that we are all self-serving. In this chapter. Hobbes speculates how selfish people would behave in a state of nature, prior to the formation of any government He begins noting that humans are essentially equal, both mentally and physically, insofar as even the weakest person has the strength to kill the strongest. Given our equal standing, Hobbes continues noting how we are situations in nature make us naturally prone to quarrel. There are three natural causes of quarrel among people: competition for limited supplies of material possessions, distrust of one another, and glory insofar as people remain hostile to preserve their powerful reputation. Given the natural causes of quarrel, Hobbes concludes that the natural condition of humans is a state of perpetual war of all against all, where no morality exists, and everyone lives in constant fear:

> **In such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of people, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.**

Hobbes continues offering proofs that the state of nature would be as brutal as he describes. We see signs of this in the mistrust we show of others in our daily lives. In countries which have yet to be civilized people treat are barbaric to each other. Finally, in the absence of international law, strong countries pray on the weakness of weak countries. Humans have three motivations for ending this state of war: the fear of death, the desire to have an adequate living, and the hope to attain this through one's labor. Nevertheless, until the state of war ends, each person has a right to everything, including another person's life.

LAWS OF NATURE. In articulating the peace-securing process, Hobbes draws on the language of the natural law tradition of morality, which was then championed by Dutch politician Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). According to Grotius, all particular moral principles derive from immutable

principles of reason. Since these moral mandates are fixed in nature, they are thus called "laws of nature." By using the jargon of natural law theory, Hobbes is suggesting that, from human self-interest and social agreement alone, one can derive the same kinds of laws which Grotius believes are immutably fixed in nature. Throughout his discussion of morality, Hobbes continually re-defines traditional moral terms (such as right, liberty, contract, and justice) in ways which reflects his account of self-interest and social agreement. For Grotius and other natural law theorists, a law of nature is an unchangeable truth which establishes proper conduct. Hobbes defines a law of nature as follows:

> **A Law of Nature (lex naturalis) is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a person is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or takes away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved.**

Hobbes continues by listing specific laws of nature all of which aim at preserving a person's life. Hobbes's first three Laws of Nature are the most important since they establish the overall framework for putting an end to the state of nature. Given our desire to get out of the state of nature, and thereby preserve our lives, Hobbes concludes that we should seek peace. This becomes his first law of nature:

> **"That every person ought to endeavor peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war; the first branch of which rule contains the first and fundamental Law of Nature, which is, To seek peace and follow it; the second, the sum of the right of nature, which is, By all means we can, to defend ourselves.**

The reasonableness of seeking peace, indicated by the first law, immediately suggests a second law of nature, which is that we mutually divest ourselves of certain rights (such as the right to take another person's life) so to achieve peace:

> **That a person be willing, when others are so too (as far-forth as for peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary), to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other people, as he would allow other people against himself.**

The mutual transferring of these rights is called a contract and is the basis of the notion of moral obligation and duty. For example, I agree to give up my right to steal from you, if you give up your right to steal from me. We have then transferred these rights to each other and thereby become obligated to not steal from each other. From selfish reasons alone, we are both motivated to mutually transfer these and other rights, since this will end the dreaded state of war between us. Hobbes continues by discussing the validity of certain contracts. For example, contracts made in the state of nature are not generally binding, for, if I fear that you will violate your part of the bargain, then no true agreement can be reached. No contracts can be made with animals since animals cannot understand an agreement. Most significantly, I cannot contract to give up my right to self-defense since self-defense (or self-preservation) is my sole motive for entering into any contract.

OTHER LAWS OF NATURE. Hobbes derives his laws of nature deductively, modeled after the type reasoning used in geometry. That is, from a set of general principles, more specific principles are logically derived. Hobbes's general principles are (1) that people pursue only their own self-interest, (2) the equality of people, (3) the causes of quarrel, (4) the natural condition of war,

and (5) the motivations for peace. From these he derives the above two laws, along with at least 13 others. Simply making contracts will not in and of itself secure peace. We also need to keep the contracts we make, and this is Hobbes's third law of nature. Hobbes notes a fundamental problem underlying all contracts: as selfish people, each of us will have an incentive to violate a contract when it serves our best interests. For example, it is in the mutual best interests of Jones and myself to agree to not steal from each other. However, it is also in my best interests to break this contract and steal from Jones if I can get away with it. And, what complicates matters more, Jones is also aware of this fact. Thus, it seems that no contract can ever get off the ground. This is accomplished by giving unlimited power to a political sovereign who will punish us if we violate our contracts. Again, it is for purely selfish reasons (i.e. ending the state of nature) that I agree to set up a policing power which will punish me.

As noted, Hobbes's first three Laws of Nature establish the overall framework for putting an end to the state of nature. The remaining laws give content to the earlier ones by describing more precisely the kinds of contracts which will preserve peace. For example, the fourth law is to show Gratitude toward those who comply with contracts. Otherwise people will regret that they complied when someone is ungrateful. Similarly, the fifth law is that we should be accommodating to the interests of society. For, if we quarrel over every minor issue, then this will interrupt the peace process. Briefly, here are the remaining laws: (6) cautious pardoning of those who commit past offenses; (7) the purpose of punishment is to correct the offender, not "an eye for an eye" retribution; (8) avoid direct or indirect signs of hatred or contempt of another; (9) avoid pride; (10) retain only those rights which you would acknowledge in others; (11) be equitable (impartial); (12) share in common that which cannot be divided, such as rivers; (13) items which cannot be divided or enjoyed in common should be assigned by lot; (14) mediators of peace should have safe conduct; (15) Resolve disputes through an arbitrator. Hobbes explains that there are other possible laws which are less important, such as those against drunkenness, which tends to the destruction of particular people. At the close of Chapter 15 Hobbes states that morality consists entirely of these Laws of Nature which are arrived at though social contract. Contrary to Aristotle's account of virtue ethics, Hobbes adds that moral virtues are relevant to ethical theory only insofar as they promote peace. Outside of this function, virtues have no moral significance.

GOVERNMENTS. Hobbes continues in Chapter 17 that to ensure contracts (and peace) power must be given to one person, or one assembly. We do this by saying, implicitly or explicitly, "I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this person, or to this assembly of people, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner." His definition of a commonwealth, then, is this: "One person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants on with another, have mad themselves every on the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense" This person is called a "sovereign." He continues that there are two ways of establishing a commonwealth: through acquisition (force), or through institution (agreement). In Chapter 18 Hobbes lists the rights of rights of sovereigns. They are, (1) Subjects owe him sole loyalty; (2) Subjects cannot be freed from their obligation; (3) Dissenters must consent with the majority in declaring a sovereign; (4) Sovereign cannot be unjust or injure any subject; (5) The sovereign cannot be put to death; (6) The right to censor doctrines repugnant to peace; (7) Legislative power of prescribing rules; (8) Judicial power of deciding all controversies; (9) Make war and peace with other nations; (10) Choose counselors; (11) Power of reward and punishment; (12) Power of all civil appointments, including the militia. In Chapter 19 he discusses the kinds of governments that

can be instituted. The three main forms are monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. He argues that monarchy is best for several reasons. Monarch's interests are the same as the people's. He will receive better counsel since he can select experts and get advice in private. His policies will be more consistent. Finally, there is less chance of a civil war since the monarch cannot disagree with himself.

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Shadworth Hodgson (1832-1912)

Shadworth Hodgson's life was an example of rare devotion to philosophy. He had no profession and filled no public office, but spent his time in systematic reflection and writing; and his long life gave him the opportunity of reviewing, confirming, and improving upon his first thoughts. There were two periods in his activity. In the former of these he published three books: *Time and Space* in 1865, *The Theory of Practice* in 1870, and *The Philosophy of Reflection* in 1878. Shortly thereafter he was instrumental in founding 'the Aristotelian Society for the systematic study of philosophy,' and he remained its president for fourteen years. This led to contact with other minds who looked at the same subjects from different points of view. He read many papers to the society, which were published in pamphlet form and in its *Proceedings*, and he built up his own system afresh in the light of familiar criticism. It took final form in *The Metaphysic of Experience*, a work of four volumes published in 1898.

As an analysis of experience, Hodgson's philosophy falls into line with a characteristic English tradition. It agrees with this tradition also in taking the simple feeling as the ultimate datum of experience. But, even here, and wherever there is experience, there is a distinction to be drawn--not the traditional distinction between subject and object, but that between consciousness and its object. There are always two aspects in any bit of experience--that of the object itself or the objective aspect, and that of the awareness of it or the subjective aspect; and these two are connected by the relation of knowledge. The sciences are concerned with the objective aspect only; philosophy has to deal with the subjective aspect, or the conscious process which is fundamental and common to all the various objects. Beyond this conscious reference there is nothing. The *mirage* of absolute existence, wholly apart from knowledge, is a common-sense prejudice. Consciousness is commensurate with being; all existence has a subjective aspect. But this doctrine, he holds, is misinterpreted when mind and body are supposed to interact or when mental and bodily facts are regarded as parallel aspects of the same substance. In psychology Hodgson may be called a materialist, unfit as that name would be to describe his final philosophical attitude. Ideas do not determine one another, nor does desire cause volition; the only real condition known to us is matter. And yet matter itself is a composite existence; it can be analyzed into empirical precepts; and therefore it is itself conditioned by something which is not material: the very term *existence* implies relativity to some sort of consciousness or other. This is the conclusion of the general analysis of experience. Of the unseen world which lies beyond the material part of the world we cannot, he contends, have any speculative knowledge. But the ethical judgment and our own moral nature bring us into practical relation with that unseen world and thus permit a positive, although not a speculative, knowledge of it. In this way, in the final issue of his philosophy as well as in its fundamental positions, Hodgson regards himself as correcting and completing the work of Kant.

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Humanism

The exact point in time when the term "Humanism" was first adopted is unknown. It is, however, certain that Italy and the re-adopting of Latin letters as the staple of human culture were responsible for the name of Humanists. *Literoe humaniores* was an expression coined in reference to the classic literature of Rome and the imitation and reproduction of its literary forms in the new learning; this was in contrast to and against the *Literoe sacroe* of scholasticism. In the time of Ario sto, Erasmus, and Luther's beginnings, the term *umanisa* was in effect an equivalent to the terms "classicist " or " classical scholar."

ITALIAN HUMANISM. Dante had an admiration for ancient letters. At first, he intended to compose his great epic in Latin verse. Petrarch considered his *Africa* a fair effort to reproduce *Vergil*. In the exordium of his chief work Petrarc h appeals to the Heliconian Sisters as well as to Jesus Christ, Savior of the world. He also reviews the epics of Homer (although he never learned Greek), Statius, and Lucan. He was overwhelmed with the friendships of many prestigous men of his day, a mong whom Cardinal Stephen Colonna was prominent. Petrarch is the pathfinder as well as the measure of the new movement. He idealized the classical world. His classicist consciousness and his Christian consciousness are revealed in his writings. Th e experiences of life constantly evoke in him classic parallels, reminiscences, associations. Julius Caesar, Papirius Cursor, are *nostri*, "our people"; Pyrrhus, Hannibal, Massinissa are *externi*, "foreigners." His epistles provide the b est revelation of his soul. Of course, the craving for pure Latinity and the elevation of such practical power of imitation and reproduction involved an artificiality of which neither Petrarch nor his successors were aware. Boccaccio was not only a hu manist, but he, with appalling directness, revealed the emancipation of the flesh as one of the unmistakable trends of the new movement. Both he and Poggio, Valla, Beccadelli, Enea Silvio dei Piccolomini (in his youth) show that the hatred of the cle rical class instigated literary composition. At the same time in the caricatures of foulness which these leaders of the new learning loved to draw, there is no moral indignation, but clearly like satyrs they themselves relish these things. For this reason the Humanists of Italy, as such, were not at all concerned in the efforts for a reformation of the church as attempted in the councils of Constance or of Basel. Poggio, apostolic secretary, came to Constance with the corrupt pope John XXIII., bu t spent most of his time in ransacking the libraries of Swiss monasteries for Latin codices. The defense of Jerome of Prague before the Council reminded him of Cato of Utica. His correspondent Lionardo Bruni at Florence warns him to be more circumsp ect in his praise of a heretic. In the Curia itself a semipagan spirit was bred by the Humanists. In 1447 Parentucelli, an enthusiast for codices, became pope as Nicholas V. On Easter, the eminent humanist Filelfo wrote to him from Milan to congratul ate him on his elevation. Filelfo expressed a general satisfaction of scholars, citing also the *humanitas* of Christ himself, as well as writing somewhat hypocritically of *fucata gentilium . . . sapientia*. Some time later, in 1453, Filel fo personally appeared at the papal court. Nicholas kept the vile "Satyrae" of the humanist until he had perused them, and gave Filelfo a purse of 500 ducats when he departed.

Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini ascended the papal throne in 1458 as Pius II., another humanist pope.

CHARACTER OF THE MOVEMENT. A very clear view of the Humanistic movement may be gained from the writings of the biographer and beneficiary of Leo X., Paul Giovio (Jovius). In his *Elogia* (Antwerp,1557) he presents a gallery of literary scholar s, beginning with Dante, and including Petrarch, Boccaccio, Bruni, Poggo, Beceadelli (the pornographic poet), Valla, Filelfo, Platina, the Greeks Emanuel Chrysoloras, Cardinal Bessarion, Trapezuntius the Cretan, Theodorus Gaza, Argyropulos, Chalcondyla s, Musurus of Crete, and Lasearis. Also, he gives us Lorenzo de'Medici, Ermolao Barbaro, Politian, Pico di Mirandola, and even Savonarola. But Savonarola's attacks on Pope Alexander VI., father of Cesare and Lucrezia, are treated as treason and felon y. The Platonic academy of Ficinus at Florence had certainly no power to regenerate the political and moral corruption of its patron Lorenzo. Bibienna, the favorite of Leo X., was witty at banquets; at Leo's court this cardinal produced his lascivio us comedy, "Colandra," because Terence was too grave. Even Thomas More and Reuchlin are included. Among the latter's academic friends were the anonymous composers of the satiric *Epistoloe obscurorum virorum*-the flail of the new learning swung ag ainst the old. The Italian Humanists were not concerned in the reformatory movements of the fifteenth century. They drifted into a palpable paganism or semipaganism, curiously illustrated in the verse, e.g., of Politian, especially his Greek verse, a nd of him even the lax Giovio writes: "he was a man of unseemly morals. "They all more or less emphasized "*vera virtus*" by which they meant "true excellence," the self-wrought development of human faculties and powers. Still they knew how to ma intain friendly relations with those higher clerics who had resources with which to patronize the new learning. They often accepted clerical preferment, as did Gievio, who became bishop of Nocera. Often the Latin verse of their youth proved very awkw ard when they entered upon their benefices. All were more interested "in viewing the early monuments of sensual enjoyment" than in study of the New Testament. As they greatly exceeded the corruption of the clergy in their own conduct, they could not take any practical interest in any spiritual or theological reformation. In all the correspondence of Filelfo, extending from 1428 to 1462, there is but once or twice a slight (deistic) utterance of spiritual concern, when, in the siege of Milan by Fr ancesco Sforza, 1449, the ducal city endured terrible sufferings. Jacob Burckhardt says of the Humanists that they were demoralized by their reproduction of Latin verse. But why did they delve in Ovid, Catullus, and the like with steady predilection? A t best a mild deism or pantheism may be perceived in their more serious writings. Greek, on the whole, was a rare attainment among them, reproductive ostentation limited most of them to Latin.

ERASMUS. Erasmus of Rotterdam in his person and career marks the point where the "new learning" had arrived at the parting of the ways. He felt an affinity for Lucian; his *Encomium Morioe*, a vitriolic satire, dealt not gently with clerical corruption. He edited the New Testament and dedicated it to Leo X. He had no desire to abandon the old Church, considering the bounties and pensions which he received were all derived from princes or clerics who adhered to the papacy. He pretended th at he could not read the German writings of Luther. Erasmus wrote that "Luther's movement was not connected with learning," and, at the same time he wrote to Pope Hadrian VI.: "I could find a hundred passages where St. Paul seems to teach the doctri nes which they condemn in Luther. "Other utterances show his unwillingness to serve the Reformation or to be held responsible for any part of it: I have written nothing which can be laid hold of against the established orders. . . . I would rather see things left as they are than to see a revolution which may lead to one knows not what. Others may be martyrs, if they like. I aspire to no such honor. . . . I

care nothing what is done to Luther, but I care for peace. . . . If you must take a s ide, take the side which is most in favor." His keen sense of actual dependencies in the movement of things led him to see situations and realities with wonderful clearness; but his genius, like that of many scholars, was essentially negative. When he was fifty-one, not long before 1517, he wrote to Fabricius at Basel: "My chief fear is that with the revival of Greek literature there may be a revival of paganism. There are Christians who are Christians but in name, and are Gentiles at heart." In the fall of 1525, when central Germany had been affected by the Peasants' War, he wrote: "You remember Reuchlin. The conflict was raging between the Muses and their enemies, when up sprang Luther, and the object thenceforward was to entangle the f riends of literature in the Lutheran business, so as to destroy both them and him together."

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David Hume (1711-1776)

LIFE AND WRITINGS. David Hume was born in 1711 to a moderately wealthy family from Berwickshire Scotland, near Edinburgh. His background was politically Whiggish and religiously Calvinistic. As a child he faithfully attended the local Church of Scotland pastored by his uncle. Hume was educated by his widowed mother until he left for the University of Edinburgh at the age of eleven. His letters describe how as a young student he took religion seriously and obediently followed a list of moral guidelines taken from *The Whole Duty of Man*, a popular Calvinistic devotional.

Leaving the University of Edinburgh at around age fifteen to pursue his education privately, he was encouraged to consider a career in law, but his interests turned to philosophy. During these years of private study he began raising serious questions about religion, as he recounts in the following letter:

> **Tis not long ago that I burn'd an old Manuscript Book, wrote before I was twenty; which contain'd, Page after Page, the gradual Progress of my Thoughts on that head [i.e. religious belief]. It begun with an anxious Search after Arguments, to confirm the common Opinion: Doubts stole in, dissipated, return'd, were again dissipated, return'd again.**

Although his manuscript book was destroyed, several pages of Hume's study notes survive from his early twenties. These show a preoccupation with the subjects of proof of God's existence and atheism, particularly as he read on these topics in classical Greek and Latin texts and in Pierre Bayle's skeptical *Historical and Critical Dictionary*. During these years of private study, some of which was in France, Hume composed his three-volume *Treatise of Human Nature*, which was published anonymously in two installments before he was thirty (1739, 1740). The *Treatise* explores several philosophical topics such as space, time, causality, external objects, the passions, free will, and morality, offering original and often skeptical appraisals of these notions. Although religious belief is not the subject of any specific section of the *Treatise*, it is a recurring theme. Book I of the *Treatise* was unfavorably reviewed in the *History of the Works of the Learned* with a succession of sarcastic comments. Although scholars today recognize it as a philosophical masterpiece, Hume was disappointed with the minimal interest his book spawned.

In 1741 and 1742 Hume published his two-volume *Essays, Moral and Political*. The essays were written in a popular style and met with better success than the *Treatise*. In 1744-1745 Hume was a candidate for the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. The position was to be vacated by John Pringle, and the leading candidates were Hume and William Cleghorn. The Edinburgh Town Council was responsible for electing a replacement. Critics opposed Hume by condemning his anti-religious writings. Chief among the critics was clergyman William Wishart (d. 1752), the Principal of the University of Edinburgh. Lists of allegedly dangerous propositions from Hume's Treatise circulated, presumably penned by Wishart. In the face of such strong opposition, the Edinburgh Town Council consulted the Edinburgh ministers. Hoping to win over the clergy, Hume composed a point by point reply to the circulating lists of dangerous propositions. It was

published as *A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh*. The clergy were not dissuaded, and 12 of the 15 ministers voted against Hume. Hume quickly withdrew his candidacy. In 1745 Hume accepted an invitation from General St Clair to attend him as secretary. He wore the uniform of an officer, and accompanied the general on an expedition against Canada (which ended in an incursion on the coast of France) and to an embassy post in the courts of Vienna and Turin.

In 1748 he added to the above collection an essay titled "Of National Characters." In a lengthy footnote to this piece, Hume attacks the character of the clergy, accusing this profession of being motivated by ambition, conceit, and revenge. This footnote became a favorite target of attack by the clergy. Given the success of his *Essays*, Hume was convinced that the poor reception of his *Treatise* was caused by its style rather than by its content. In 1748 he published his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, a more popular rendition of Book I of his *Treatise*. The *Enquiry* also includes two sections not found in the *Treatise* and which contain fairly direct attacks on religious belief: "Of Miracles" and a dialogue titled "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State."

In 1751 Hume published his *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, which recasts in a very different form parts of Book III of his *Treatise*. Although this work does not attack religion directly, it does so indirectly by establishing a system of morality on utility and human sentiments alone, and without appeal to divine moral commands. Critics such as James Balfour criticized Hume's theory for being Godless. However, by the end of the century Hume was recognized as the founder of the moral theory of utility. Utilitarian political theorist Jeremy Bentham acknowledges Hume's direct influence upon him. The same year Hume also published his *Political Discourses*, which drew immediate praise and influenced economic thinkers such as Adam Smith, Godwin, and Thomas Malthus.

In 1751-1752 Hume sought a philosophy chair at the University of Glasgow, and was again unsuccessful. In 1752 Hume's employment as librarian of the Advocate's Library in Edinburgh provided him with the resources to pursue his interest in history. There he wrote much of his highly successful six-volume *History of England* (published from 1754 to 1762). The first volume was unfavorably received, partially for its defense of Charles I, and partially for two sections which attack Christianity. In one passage Hume notes that the first Protestant reformers were fanatical or "inflamed with the highest *enthusiasm*" in their opposition to Roman Catholic domination. In the second passage he labels Roman Catholicism a superstition which "like all other species of superstition... rouses the vain fears of unhappy mortals." The most vocal attack against Hume's *History* came from Daniel MacQueen in his 300 page *Letters on Mr. Hume's History*. MacQueen combs through Hume's first volume of the *History*, exposing all the allegedly "loose and irreligious sneers" Hume makes against Christianity. Ultimately, this negative response led Hume to delete the two controversial passages from succeeding editions of the *History*.

At about this time Hume also wrote his two most substantial works on religion: *The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* and *The Natural History of Religion*. The *Natural History* appeared in 1757, but, on the advice of friends who wished to steer Hume away from religious controversy, the *Dialogues* remained unpublished until 1779, three years after his death. The *Natural History* aroused controversy even before it was made public. In 1756 a volume of Hume's essays titled *Five Dissertations* was printed and ready for distribution. The essays included (1) "The Natural History of Religion," (2) "Of the Passions," (3) "Of Tragedy," (4) "Of Suicide," and (5) "Of the Immortality of the Soul." The latter two essays made direct attacks on common religious doctrines by defending a person's moral right to commit suicide and by criticizing the idea of life after death.

Early copies were passed around, and someone of influence threatened to prosecute Hume's publisher if the book was distributed as is. The printed copies of *Five Dissertations* were then physically altered, with a new essay "Of the Standard of Taste" inserted in place of the two removed essays. Hume also took this opportunity to alter two particularly offending paragraphs in the *Natural History*. The essays were then bound with the new title *Four Dissertations* and distributed in January, 1757.

In the years following *Four Dissertations*, Hume completed his last major literary work, *The History of England*. In 1763, at age 50, Hume was invited to accompany the Earl of Hertford to the embassy to Paris, with a near prospect of being his secretary. He eventually accepted, and remarks at the reception he received in Paris "from men and women of all ranks and stations." returned to Edinburgh in 1766. Among these was Jean Jacques Rousseau who in 1766 was ordered out of Switzerland by the government in Berne. Hume offered Rousseau refuge in England and secured him a government pension. In England, Rousseau became suspicious of plots, and publicly charged Hume with conspiring to ruin his character, under the appearance of helping him. Hume published a pamphlet defending his actions and was exonerated. Another secretary appointment took him away from 1767-1768. Returning again to Edinburgh, his remaining years were spent revising and refining his published works, and socializing with friends in Edinburgh's intellectual circles. In 1776, at age 65, he died from an internal disorder which had plagued him for many months.

After his death, Hume's name took on new significance as several of his previously unpublished works appeared. The first was a brief autobiography, *My Own Life*, which many have praised as the best short autobiography in English. Even this unpretentious work aroused religious controversy. As Hume's friends, Adam Smith and S.J. Pratt, published affectionate eulogies describing how he died with no concern for an afterlife, religious critics responded by condemning this unjustifiable admiration of Hume's infidelity. Two years later, in 1779, Hume's *Dialogues* appeared. Again, the response was mixed. Admirers of Hume considered it a masterfully written work, while religious critics branded it as dangerous to religion. Finally, in 1782, Hume's two suppressed essays on suicide and immortality were published. Their reception was almost unanimously negative.

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The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)

Edmund Husserl, a leader of the German phenomenological movement, taught at Göttingen from 1901 until 1916, and then at Freiburg im Breisgau from 1916 to 1928. This article presents (A) his biography; (B) various strategies for interpreting his phenomenology; and (c) a survey of his major works.

BIOGRAPHY. Edmund Husserl was born April 8, 1859, into a Jewish family in the town of Prossnitz in Moravia, then a part of the Austrian Empire. Although there was a Jewish technical school in the town, Edmund's father, a clothing merchant, had the means and the inclination to send the boy away to Vienna at the age of 10 to begin his German classical education in the Realgymnasium of the capital. A year later, in 1870, Edmund transferred to the Staatsgymnasium in Olmütz, closer to home. He was remembered there as a mediocre student who nevertheless loved mathematics and science, "of blond and pale complexion, but of good appetite." He graduated in 1876 and went to Leipzig for university studies.

At Leipzig Husserl studied mathematics, physics, and philosophy, and he was particularly intrigued with astronomy and optics. After two years he went to Berlin in 1878 for further studies in mathematics. He completed that work in Vienna, 1881-83, and received the doctorate with a dissertation on the theory of the calculus of variations. He was 24. Husserl briefly held an academic post in Berlin, then returned again to Vienna in 1884 and was able to attend Franz Brentano's lectures in philosophy.

In 1886 he went to Halle, where he studied psychology and wrote his Habilitationsschrift on the concept of number. He also was baptized. The next year he became Privatdozent at Halle and married a woman from the Prossnitz Jewish community, Malvine Charlotte Steinscheider, who was baptized before the wedding. The couple had three children. They remained at Halle until 1901, and Husserl wrote his important early books there. The Habilitationsschrift was reworked into the first part of *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, published in 1891. The two volumes of *Logische Untersuchungen* came out in 1900 and 1901.

In 1901 Husserl joined the faculty at Göttingen, where he taught for 16 years and where he worked out the definitive formulations of his phenomenology that are presented in *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy)*. The first volume of *Ideen* appeared in the first volume of Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* in 1913. Then the world war disrupted the circle of Husserl's younger colleagues, and Wolfgang Husserl, his son, died at Verdun. Husserl observed a year of mourning and kept silence professionally during that time.

However Husserl accepted appointment in 1916 to a professorship at Freiburg im Breisgau, a position from which he would retire in 1928. At Freiburg Husserl continued to work on manuscripts that would be published after his death as volumes two and three of the *Ideen*, as well as on many other projects. His retirement from teaching in 1928 did not slow the pace of his

phenomenological research. But his last years were saddened by the escalation of National Socialism's racist policies against Jews. He died of pleurisy in 1938, on Good Friday, reportedly as a Christian.

Most commentators, therefore, recognize three periods in Husserl's career: the work at Halle, Göttingen, and Freiburg, respectively. Some argue that one or another of these periods ought to be taken as definitive and used as the interpretive key to unlock the others. But such an approach highlights disjunctions in Husserl's thought while neglecting the significant continuities. Important strands of Husserl's philosophy have their beginning long before his academic career commenced.

The community into which Husserl was born, Prossnitz, was a center of talmudic learning whose yeshiva had produced or welcomed a number of famous rabbis during the two centuries before Husserl's birth. This scholarly activity was supported by the industries of textile and clothing manufacture, through which Prossnitz's Jews had enhanced the prosperity of the region. Jews and Germans were minorities in the town and appear to have comprised its middle class. Their interests were naturally allied against those of the Slavic majority. (For example, the census of 1900 counted 1,680 Jews among the town's 24,000 inhabitants, according to *The Jewish Encyclopedia*.) In the ethnically diverse town, several dialects were spoken, and the language of the Husserl home probably was Yiddish.

The Jewish community of Prossnitz had established a technical school in 1843, and it became a public school for all the town's children in 1869--one year before young Edmund Husserl was sent off to Vienna's Realgymnasium. 1868 was also a year when civic authorities called for reform of Jewish education at all levels throughout Moravia. These developments reflect a movement toward modernization and integration after centuries of enforced segregation and legal restriction of Jewish life.

Prossnitz was the second-largest Jewish community in Moravia, with 328 families. *Exactly* 328 families; it could have no more, because of the quota established by the Bohemian *Familianten Gesetz* in 1787. The Jewish population was controlled through marriage licenses. Civil law set specific economic, age, and educational requirements; but in addition, the license could be granted only after a death freed up one of the allotted 328 slots. In effect, only first sons could hope to marry. Others had to emigrate if they wanted to have families of their own. This population-control policy was enforced until 1849, ten years before Edmund Husserl's birth. The requirement that Jews obtain special marriage licenses remained in effect until late in 1859, some months after Edmund's birth.

But Edmund Husserl's childhood was spent during an era of liberalization for Prossnitz's Jews. He received an elite secular education and probably made his father quite proud. At that period, gymnasia provided separate religious instruction for Christian boys and Jewish boys. Edmund's Jewish education would have continued in that context and in the language of secular culture, High German. He could hear and read the Bible in that modern language as well, for in the nineteenth century a wave of new translations into the language of German culture was spawned by Moses Mendelssohn's groundbreaking work. (Mendelssohn's 1783 translation into High German was printed in Hebrew characters, phonetically, to make it easy to read.) Some of these editions were lavishly illustrated for display in bourgeois homes like Edmund's, and most took into account the findings of recent historical and philological science. But during Edmund's childhood, translating the Hebrew Bible was still a controversial issue. Some educational leaders in the Jewish community warned that it would undermine Hebrew learning among the young. Hebrew learning was

evidently not prized by a father who would send his son to the capital to study Greek and Latin at the age when boys traditionally were sent down the street to learn Hebrew and Torah. To complicate the picture, in 1870 when Edmund was eleven, a new rabbi came to serve the Prossnitz community.

One may surmise, then, that Edmund Husserl came by his knowledge of the Bible through his classical secular education, not his religious tradition. It was of a piece with the German cultural heritage for him. It was a source of literary allusions, and in later life he could compare himself to Moses and to Sisyphus with equal ease.

Literary allusions, along with fragments of correspondence, are all that remain to us for the reconstruction of what Husserl may have felt about himself and his work. There is no autobiography *per se*. But there are retrospective texts. One of the most illuminating is the brief introduction that Husserl prepared for the 1931 publication in English of the first book of *Ideen*, originally brought out in 1913.

Now in his seventies, Husserl complains that most readers have misunderstood his life's work. When he undertakes to reformulate what phenomenology is and what he has accomplished, however, he writes from a vantage point that he did not have some two decades earlier. Husserl becomes, in effect, a critic and interpreter of his own work, which he describes with a sustained metaphor. He portrays himself as an explorer who has opened the way into new territory so that others may conquer, map, and farm it. Of himself, Husserl writes:

> "(H)e who for decades did not speculate about a new Atlantis but instead actually journeyed in the trackless wilderness of a new continent and undertook the virgin cultivation of some of its areas will not allow himself to be deterred in any way by the rejection of geographers who judge his reports according to their habitual ways of experiencing and thinking and thereby excuse themselves from the pain of undertaking travels in the new land" (422)

Here is another example of this characterization:

> I can see spread out before me the endlessly open plains of true philosophy, the 'promised land', though its thorough cultivation will come after me" (429)

By means of this spatial, geographical metaphor of crossing over into the "new land," Husserl conveys something of the adventure and pioneer courage that should accompany phenomenological work. This science is related to "a new field of experience, exclusively its own, the field of 'transcendental subjectivity'," and it offers "a method of access to the transcendental-phenomenological sphere" (408). Husserl is the "first explorer" (419) of this marvelous place.

HOW TO INTERPRET HUSSERL'S TEXTS. Husserl had already employed the spatial metaphor in the 1913 text, although without explicit reference to himself as explorer. In chapter I-1 of *Ideen I* he had distinguished states of affairs (*Sachverhaltnis*) from essences (*Wesen*) by assigning them to two "spheres": the factual or material, and the formal or eidetic, respectively. These spheres are connected only by the mind's ability to pass *between* them as easily as moving around *within* either of them; they do not connect on their own, as it were. That is, no causality obtains between them. "Movement between" and "movement within" are of course further elaborations upon the spatial metaphor, and serve to designate the ability of consciousness to flow along, concentrate itself, linger, combine, focus, or disperse as it will. Such acts of consciousness belong to these spheres. They are worldly. They are "psychological."

Husserl's task is to get *from* those spheres *into* another "field" that is quite unlike them. It will be the sphere of absolute consciousness, consciousness when it isn't going anywhere. As the title of chapter II-3 puts it, this will be "The Region of Pure Consciousness." You can't "go there" with consciousness; instead you have to let the worldly go away and then inhabit what's left. This is the import of the infamous fantasy that opens paragraph 33: "*(W)as kann als Sein noch setzbar sein, wenn das Weltall, das All der Realität eingeklammert bleibt?*" (In Kersten's paraphrase: "What can remain, if the whole world, including ourselves with all our *cogitare*, is excluded?" [63])

Now, it's quite curious that Husserl should choose the spatial metaphor to introduce and induce his phenomenological reduction. This metaphor invites confusion for anyone familiar with Descartes--who after all named spatial extension as the substantial attribute of material being. None of Husserl's "spheres" is literally extended, in the Cartesian sense; yet all are coextensive (coincident) with material being--inasmuch as there's literally *nowhere else* besides the material universe where they could be. Why then should Husserl choose such an incongruous and counterproductive metaphor? A different metaphor (such as "fabric" or "organism," for example) could have conveyed the notions of coherence, separation, and access that Husserl intended. What is distinctive about the spatial metaphor, however, is that it connotes exploration and conquest. If transcendental consciousness is a promised land, then you need a Moses to lead you toward it. You need Husserl. When Husserl remarks, in the 1931 Introduction, that he can look down across that land that he has discovered, but that others will enter, this is a literary allusion to the figure of Moses, who led his people to Canaan, "the promised land," but did not lead them into it (Deuteronomy 34).

If these allusions from 1931 can be taken as a thumbnail self- portrait, still one must remember that it was sketched during Husserl's retirement. But Husserl's thought grew and changed throughout his long career. In his maturity, the philosopher joined his readers in producing commentary upon his youthful work. The three phases of Husserl's career--Halle, Göttingen, and Freiburg--invite facile divisions, and decisive turning points have been suggested within each of those periods. (The survival of nearly 45,000 pages of stenographic notes from Husserl's teaching and his private researches has fueled disputes about when he might have had the first glimmer of a thought that led to a lecture comment that led to a paragraph that found its way into a book published long after the man's papers and ashes were shelved in Louvain!)

Husserl himself insisted that the threads of continuity throughout the evolution of his thought were more significant than any false starts that later had to be repudiated. It seems well to grant him this point. Yet on two issues one must take seriously the critical discussion arising from disjunctions in Husserl's thought: (a) the question whether to characterize Husserl as realist or idealist, and (b) the question of which stage of Husserl's evolution--if any--should be taken as the definitive version through which all other versions are to be read. Husserl himself, writing as his own critic later in life, took a position on each of those issues. On (a), he insisted that he was and always had meant to be a transcendental idealist. On (b), he claimed competence to correct the insights of 1887, 1900, and 1913 with the insights of the 1920's and 1930's. Thus the mature Husserl would wish to erase the impression that his early work resolved the realism-idealism conundrum in favor of realism, and that it did so in fidelity to an insight already expressed in his earliest work on number.

Various punctuations of Husserl's career by time, place, and predominant question have been suggested by commentators (for example, Kockelmans 1967: 17-23; Ricoeur 1967: 3-12; Biemel 1970; and Bell 1990). Husserl's phenomenology developed gradually, but there were several

relatively sudden turns and several stalls. Two examples suffice to illustrate. While at Halle shortly after the publication of *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, Husserl distanced himself from his recent efforts to establish mathematical and logical principles upon the psychological operations of the mind--a project that he later termed "psychologism." Many commentators have characterized this as an abrupt turn made in response to Frege's effective criticism of *Philosophie der Arithmetik*. However Mohanty (1982: 13), who examines the Frege-Husserl correspondence along with other documentary evidence, concludes to the contrary, that:

> the seeds of development of Husserl's philosophy from the *Philosophie der Arithmetik* to the *Prolegomena* [i.e., the first volume of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1900] were immanent to his own thinking, so that the hypothesis of a traumatic effect of Frege's 1894 review of his book and a consequent reversal of his mode of thinking is not only uncalled for but also unsubstantiated by the available evidence.

Mohanty, then, provides ample warrant for a reading of Husserl that pursues threads of continuity between his early mathematical work and the breakthrough to phenomenology while at Halle.

In a second example of a supposed disjuncture in Husserl's development, there has been discussion of whether he changed his stance from realism to idealism between Göttingen and Freiburg. On the one hand, Eugen Fink (1933) and many others see a consistent evolution of transcendental idealism from the work published in *Ideen I* onward. They tend either to dismiss the earlier works as if they were merely youthful failures, or forcibly to harmonize the realist passages with Husserl's later positions. Husserl himself endorsed such a reading. On the other hand, those who studied with Husserl at Göttingen insist that his work at that time had validity and integrity in its own right. His former student Edith Stein (1932: 44-45) remarks that Husserl's disciples were surprised at the idealistic passages in *Ideen*, and she calls Fink a latecomer to Husserl's phenomenology. One of Stein's contemporaries among Husserl students, Roman Ingarden (1962: 159), says that:

> the idealistic tendencies apparent in volume I of the *Ideen* had been opposed by his disciples when the work was being studied during the seminars at Göttingen and . . . his disciples pointed out many passages in the *Ideen* which seemed to contain direct arguments against his idealism.

Subsequently Ingarden presented arguments, based on both the text of *Logische Untersuchungen* and his conversations with Husserl, in support of the view that Husserl originally espoused a realist standpoint but later abandoned it (Ingarden 1975: 4-8). Further discussion of the issue is to be found in Kockelmans (1967: 418-449) and in Van de Pitte (1981: 36-42)--who suggests that the discrepancy will vanish if one reads Husserl's idealism as an epistemological or methodological approach to a metaphysically real world.

For his own part, Husserl (1931: 418-9) claimed that his transcendental idealism had advanced altogether beyond ordinary idealism, beyond realism, and beyond the very distinction between them. He denied that he ever had held a realist position:

> . . . I still consider, as I did before, every form of the usual philosophical realism nonsensical in principle, no less so than that idealism which it sets itself up against in its arguments and which it "refutes." [Phenomenological reduction] is a piece of pure self- reflection, exhibiting the most original evident facts; moreover, if it brings into view in them the outlines of idealism . .. it is still anything but a party to the usual debates bewteen idealism and realism. . . .

Husserl argued that transcendental-phenomenological idealism did not deny the actual existence of the real world, but sought instead to clarify the *sense* of this world (which everyone accepts) *as actually existing*.

Thus Husserl joins the company of those who read his work "backwards," from the standpoint of Freiburg, interpreting the earliest work in light of the transcendental idealism of the latest. This reading grants no validity to the earlier work in its own right. It sets Husserl against Kant, and phenomenology's thoroughgoing idealism against Kantian critical idealism. Fink, in his detailed response to neo- Kantians' readings of Husserl's phenomenology (1932), scolds them for even addressing arguments made in Husserl's 1900-1 and 1913 publications--for Fink contends that those positions now must be assimilated to Husserl's later formulations. The extreme hermeneutical implications of this stance come clear in Fink's delineation of the threefold paradox entailed in reading Husserl's phenomenology: (1) It is inevitably misunderstood if the reader has not first cultivated the transcendental attitude; yet that attitude arises from the reading. (2) The words necessarily miss their meaning, and fail to refer effectively to the pre-worldly realm of transcendental subjectivity, since all available words are worldly. (3) Phenomenology goes to a realm beyond logic, individuation, and determination, which ordinarily structure understanding. In this extreme form, then, the Freiburg reading of Husserl's work is a locked door for the newcomer who is trying to get acquainted with Husserl's phenomenology.

Fortunately, there are other hermeneutical options. A second group of commentators read Husserl "forward" from his intellectual beginnings at Vienna and Halle. The early work in mathematics and logic continues to attract the interest of Analytic philosophers. They are among those who argue that Husserl's concern with numbers and logical reasoning, stimulated by the Kantian challenge, fructified in the prescription of eidetic and, eventually, phenomenological reductions.

Besides reading Husserl from Halle "forward" or from Freiburg "backward," there is yet a third option. One may base one's reading upon the Göttingen period and upon questions involving the genesis of the *Ideen*, as the keystone in the arch of Husserl's development. This is the stance suggested by Ingarden, who considered Husserl's later transcendentalism a big mistake, and by Stein, whose own subsequent works unfold the implications of the realism and personalism embraced by Husserl at that period. On this view the world, lost by Kant, is won back for science.

The problems of oneness and unity occupied Husserl throughout all the phases of his philosophical development: his earliest work on number and logic, his pre-war realist descriptive phenomenology, and his idealist transcendental phenomenology. His philosophy in some respects parallels the emergence of modern psychology, with whose tenets it should not be confused. The following are his major works.

"ÜBER DEN BEGRIFF DER ZAHL" ("ON THE CONCEPT OF NUMBER," 1887). Husserl's Habilitationsschrift is subtitled "psychological analyses," and it addresses the question how we recognize manyness within a group. Husserl remarks that the common definition of number--that number is a multiplicity of units--leaves two key questions unanswered: "What is 'multiplicity'? And what is 'unity'?" It is the former question, multiplicity, that occupies his attention throughout the essay. However the latter question, unity, haunts the discussion and refuses to be ignored.

Husserl locates the origin of multiplicity in the activity of combining, which he takes to be a psychological process. After much consideration he identifies this activity as synthesis, or the gathering of items into a set. He notices then that synthetic unities are of two kinds. Either the relationship through which the multiple items belong to the one set *is a content of* the mental

representation of those items (right in there alongside them as another item that can be attended to and counted), or it is not there. In the former case, the unity is physical. Otherwise it is psychical, stemming from the unifying mental act that sets the contents into the relationship.

Having made that distinction between natural or physical unity, and arbitrary or imposed unity, Husserl then goes on to contrast these varieties of synthetic oneness with something else entirely: unsynthesized unity. His example is a rose, whose so-called parts are continuous and come apart only for the examining mind.

> **"In order to note the uniting relations in such a whole, analysis is necessary. If, for example, we are dealing with the representational whole which we call 'a rose,' we get at its various parts successively, by means of analysis: the leaves, the stem.... Each part is thrown into relief by a distinct act of noticing, and is steadily held *together with* those parts already segregated" (114).**

Ironically, Husserl has struck gold while mining coal, and doesn't quite recognize what he's got hold of. His description of *non*synthesized unity comes almost as a byproduct of his attempt to differentiate physical or real collective combination from psychic combination. He writes:

> **"... these combining relations present themselves as, so to speak, a certain 'more,' in contrast to the mere totality, which appears merely to seize upon its parts, but not really to *unite* them [because they're already united, independently of the mind!].... In the totality there is a lack of any intuitive unification, *as* that sort of unification so clearly manifests itself in the metaphysical or continuous whole" (114).**

Husserl has succeeded in distinguishing between natural and artificially synthesized wholes, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, those totalities that are known as having been accomplished neither by natural aggregation nor by mental combination. The unity of such wholes is known to be real, even though it admits of subsequent mental analysis or physical dissection.

Again ironically, in his concluding discussion of "number" Husserl neglects to notice the number one even as he employs it to illustrate how combination works. Substituting the term "and" for the term "collective combination," Husserl remarks:

> **"(T)otality or multiplicity *in abstracto* is nothing other than 'something or other', and 'something or other', and 'something or other', etc.; or, more briefly, one thing, and one thing, and one thing, etc. Thus we see that the concept of the multiplicity contains, besides the concept of collective combination, only the concept *something*. Now this most general of all concepts is, as to its origin and content, easily analyzed" (116).**

Husserl terms the concept *something* the most general concept. It stands for any object--real or unreal, physical or psychical--upon which we reflect. Thus he says that multiplicity as a concept arises out of the indetermination of the et-cetera that allows the series of "one and one and one and ..." to go however far you like.

Yet an objection must be registered concerning what Husserl has found but not noticed. Multiplicity is but *relatively* undetermined; ultimately, multiplicity is in fact determined, or reined in, by one itself. This happens at three points. (a) One is the starting point of the counting series. Every number except the first number is a multiplicity; therefore the set of natural numbers is greater (by one!) than the set of multiplicities. (b) One determines the unit of counting. Only *one* something at a time gets counted. The *and*'s must be put in between *one*'s. (c) Although the series can stop anywhere, nevertheless it has to stop at one single place, not at several places. Every

number is one distinct number.

Husserl, however, tries to produce the concept number by suppressing what he has taken to be the absolute indetermination of the *something*-series. This is how he gets determinate multiplicity, which he equates with number. In other words, the *and*'s are the main ingredient for making numbers Husserl-style. This is incorrect, of course, but it is incorrect in an interesting way. For example, to make the number five, you would need four *and*'s. To come up with those four *and*'s, you would have to count them out; but before you could count to four, you would need three *and*'s with which to make that four. But... there's a regression back to one. The number five is four and's, *and* five one's.

The maddening difficulty of focusing upon combination eventually will have a happy outcome, which Husserl did not see in 1887. The truly interesting problem is one, the prime ingredient in numbers and the determiner whose own determination was to become Husserl's guiding quest.

***LOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN* (*LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS*, 1900-01). With the turn of the century, Husserl's attention turned from *and* to *one*; that is, away from the mental activity of combining, and toward that which is reliably there to be combined. He wanted to show that mental activity is not the source of the latter. Chapter 8 of LU I exposes and refutes the three premises or "prejudices" of psychologism. In short, "psychologism" for Husserl is the error of collapsing the normative or regulative discipline of logic down onto the merely descriptive discipline of psychology. It would make mental operations (such as combination) the source of their own regulation. The "should" of logic, that utter necessity inhering in logical inference, would become no more than the "is" or facticity of our customary thinking processes, empirically described.**

Husserl's formulation and refutation of the three psychologistic premises is wickedly clever, but cannot be treated in detail here. (See # 43-49 of LU I.) One example must suffice. Psychologism, Husserl charges, would place logical inferences on the same plane with mental operations (# 44), and this would make even mathematics into a branch of psychology (# 45). Indeed, math and logic do have structures that are isomorphic to those of mental operations, such as combination and distinction. But given that similarity, how then would one distinguish the *regulation* of any of these processes from the *description* of it? Under psychologism, there's no way. But Husserl makes the distinction in a way that also shows how regulation (i.e., the laws of logic) comes from elsewhere than the plane of mental activity.

And he does this by virtue of *one*. In # 46 Husserl agrees with his opponents that arithmetical operations occur in patterns that refer back to mental acts for their origin and also for their meaning. However, there's a difference between them as well. Mental acts transpire in time: they begin and end, and they can be repeated and individually counted. Numbers, in contrast, are timeless. While they can be represented in mental acts, this representation is not a fresh production of the number but rather an instantiation of its form. There is only *one* five. Any time we count five things, it isn't a production of a new five but merely a *deja vu* for the same old five, eternal five. We can't count numbers themselves, for there's only *one* of each. (A similar argument is made in #22 of *Ideas I*.)

The same goes for logic, Husserl says. Concepts comprising the laws of pure logic can have no empirical range. Their range or sphere is ideal singulars, not mental generalizations from multiple instantiations. The operators of logic are other than those mental acts that happen to share the same names: "and," "not," "is," "or," "implies," "may," "must," "should." Psychologically, there can be many factual acts of combining, negating, etc. Logically, there is only one "and," one

"not," etc. Husserl concedes here, as he did for arithmetic, that the logical operators take their origin and meaning from the mental acts. This accounts for the equivocal character of logical terms, which refer both to ideal singulars, and to mental states and acts. But if you fail to notice this equivocation, you become ensnared in psychologism, losing the possibility of pure logic and unified science.

The danger of equivocation extends over judgments as well. On the one hand, we can count multiple apperceptive events of affirmation, occurring psychologically, which proceed in time, begin and end, and recur as often as we like, in happenings that can be distinguished one from another. On the other hand, the judgment thus reached remains the same throughout each act accessing it. It seems to persist and to be called back for encore appearances; it seems even to have pre-existed its first appearance to me (# 47). In this latter sense, the judgment is not the same as the mental act that reaches it. Moreover, the truth of the judgment is neither equivalent to nor dependent upon the psychological experience of clear evidence that accompanies the mental act embracing it. Husserl easily shows this by recalling that in both logic and arithmetic, there are truths that have never been entertained in any human consciousness, and indeed could never be humanly conceived (# 50). (Cases of truth without the possibility of psychological evidence would include the computation of very large numbers, and decisions about membership in sets that are uncountably large. The arithmetical and logical operations connected with such determinations could never be "done" by a human mind or a computer. Their truth cannot be "factual.")

The number one, then, has become Husserl's touchstone for discriminating between psychological processes and logical laws. It is his reality detector. What is psychological (or empirical) comes on in discrete individual instances--ones--and you can examine their edges. What is logical (or ideal) comes on as a seamless oceanic unity without temporal edges, reliably persisting even when not attended to. Husserl's sensitivity to the modes of unity, first expressed in the Habilitationsschrift and developed in LU, provides the launching pad for transcendental phenomenology.

***IDEEN I* (*IDEAS I*, 1913). What launches transcendental phenomenology is the recognition that those modes of unity correlate with each other and with a third mode of unity, in ways that are tantalizingly asymmetrical. These three onenesses are: the factual unity of things and states of affairs, the eidetic unity of essences, and the living unity of consciousness as it flows along in a stream of experiences. Each has, and exhibits, its own distinctive kind of identity and persistence. Factual and essential unities give objects to the straightforward regard of consciousness, entering it as items of experience, each in its distinctive way; but consciousness can also deflect its regard back onto these enterings and discover its own unity, which is unlike either of theirs.**

The possibility of this complex correlation is provided by the "principle of principles": that intuitions come on to us with distinctive boundary-conditions that we can accept as sources insuring the correctness of our knowledge of them. Or in Husserl's formulation:

> **"... that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its "personal" actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there" (44).**

The different kinds of unities have different kinds of edges, and these give away what kind of a unity each of them is going to be. But it's easy to miss the differences. That happens in the natural attitude, Husserl says, when all the objects of consciousness are taken as if they were factual items. Husserl complains that even his *Logische Untersuchungen* have been misunderstood as advocating

just this error of "Platonic realism," by those who read into his use of the term "object" the implication that, through a perverse hypostatization, every thought turns into a thing (# 22). On the contrary, he says, the eidetic reduction, operative already in LU, empowers him to differentiate between how essences appear, and how cases appear.

Now with *Ideen I*, this distinction is sketched in beautiful detail. You can tell when the object occupying your consciousness is a physical thing, because things don't give themselves to you all at once. What you get instead is a perspective inviting you to move around to the other side to perceive some more of the thing. All the while the thing keeps its unity to itself, as the reference point of all the angles it gives to you, and out of which you must reproduce or copy or simulate the unified thing as you conceive it. But in conceiving, you don't have to put an "and" between two separate perceptions, the north face of a building and the south face, in order to yield the perception of the building as if it were a sum. These different views are given to you as continuous, as views of *one* thing.

Husserl terms this "shading off" or adumbration. (The notion of off-shading is reminiscent of a multiple-exposure photograph that captures successive phases of a movement in a single frame. Such photos were being seen for the first time at the turn of the century. Husserl also mentions new media such as the stereoscope and the cinema.) In contrast, essences give themselves to you all at once. Their boundaries are not sides, but rather laws entailing the characteristic necessities and possibilities of kinds of things (more about which below). The unity of any particular essence coheres within that determinate outermost boundary which free imaginative variations of possible cases must not exceed if they are to remain cases of this particular kind. Essential unity is centripetal, so to speak.

Then are those other unities--the ones presenting themselves as extended or factual--to be termed centrifugal, inasmuch as each spins off appearances in all directions from an inaccessible center? No, for their off-shading appears contextualized, as a foreground; and even as we focus upon the foreground it pulls its background into readiness for perception as soon as attention may shift to it. Every *one* is surrounded by a halo of *and*'s, and beyond that are other somethings, seemingly without end. Whatever is extended is inexorably connected to whatever else is extended. (This last formulation, by the way, is an instance of an eidetic law. But the shift of attention that brings this essential rule into view is an eidetic reduction, and it wrenches us away from our naive attention to instances of things naturally appearing, under consideration here.) Every perception "motivates" another, stretching on toward expanding horizons.

The shift to the transcendental attitude--that is, the phenomenological or transcendental reduction--brings to Husserl's notice a third kind of unity, which discloses the off-shading of things in a startling new way. We notice now that what is adumbrated is spatial, but the adumbration itself is not spatial. It arises in consciousness. "*Abschattung ist Erlebnis*" (95), while what is adumbrated, *das Abgeschattete*, has to be something spatial. The off-shading of things is at the same time the streaming of conscious life. Peculiarly, the giving off of partial perceptibilities (by the thing) coincides with the taking up of partial perceptions (by streaming consciousness). Which one is doing the shading? Agency cannot be imputed absolutely to either side.

But on the "side" of consciousness, as it were, we now recognize that we are dealing with more than a progression of life-bites strung together in series with *and*'s. The stream of conscious life is not a sum or aggregate; nor is it a generalization. That is, it exhibits a unity unlike either the *sachverhaltig* unity of a factual case or the *eidetisch* unity of an essence. Husserl must account for

that unity, which he calls an ego, *Ich*.

Moreover, and of paramount significance, with the benefit of the transcendental reduction it can now be told that these three kinds of unities themselves are not connected merely in series, with *and*'s combining them, as if they were three discrete somethings. Their relationship is vastly more subtle. In order to understand it, through reduction we try to isolate unity from what accounts for unity. (We are not looking for something "prior to" unity -- such as some "cause" of unity --, because we can't have priority without having the number one, and oneness is just what is in question.)

Isolating oneness from the live experience-stream means removing the individual subject (you or me or Napoleon or whomever) from consideration. What is left, says Husserl, is transcendental subjectivity, "the pure act-process with its own essence" ("*das reine Akterlebnis mit seinem eigenen Wesen*"). (Paradoxically, we can see, right here in this formulation, that the reduction has not at all done away with essence, with states of affairs, or even with identity. We still have *Eigenheit* and *Wesen*, set in relation within a sentence. But these are now supposedly purified.) Husserl likens this de-individualized ego to a ray (# 92) or glance (# 101). Characteristically (or essentially) it has two poles or directions: the noematic and the noetic (from Greek terms *noema* and *noesis*, indicating what is thought and the act of thinking, respectively).

Husserl's discussion of "noetic-noematic structures" fails in its attempt to show how the ego reaches and secures both the unity of the known object, and the unity of the knowing subject. But it fails in a spectacular starburst of insight. Husserl notices that the mental stream has its own distinctive kind of adumbrations or continuities, which are more complex than those discussed above, the relatively simple off-shaded appearings of spatial objects in perception. Beyond that simple sort of off-shading, consciousness can also turn back on itself and reflect upon its own intending acts, or on any component thereof. The stream meanders among spatial objects, but can also at whim objectify aspects of its own acts of intending, and consider them. This yields a thick layering of possible objects (# 97). For example, here are some noemata that might enter the live experience stream: pencils ... writing ... German verbs ... the frustration of strong verbs ... Ulrike ... memories in general ... the unreliability of memory ... components of perceptions ... the advisability of analyzing perceptions into their components ... the smell of popcorn wafting into the study ... the effort to resist distractions ... and so forth.

Some of these arise directly from things, while others arise as objectifications of what was inherent a moment ago in the very act of knowing, the noesis. How can we tell the difference? Husserl answers that you can tell when the ego-beam has penetrated through to the bottom of the stack of noemata, so to speak, and has gotten ahold of a thing itself, because at that point, all the aspects of the thing are known immanently--really--in the act of perceiving as being contained in the sense of the thing (# 98). For example, you know popcorn itself when you are perceiving the taste of butter and salt. (You do not know popcorn when you read this sentence; instead, you are reflecting on what it is to know popcorn, and popcorn's qualities are not given immanently within your object. But then while tasting popcorn, saltiness was given immanently but not objectified.)

Husserl rightly points out that we are able to slide up and down the pole of the ego-beam at will, moving now toward the thing, now away from it to consider the act of knowing and its modalities. For example, noematically I can consider a certain cat who probably exists, but then I can turn back noetically to assess the degree of certitude that characterizes my consideration of that selfsame cat as existing (# 105). Now if we were to slide down to the point where all modalities are

behind us on the noetic side of the pole, and if there we were to face the object, we would get the pure sense of the object in which its unity is given.

In # 102 Husserl claims that this can happen, and that we can indeed slide far enough toward the object that the unity of the noema will be known as not having been imposed by the act of knowing. At that point, all of its qualities supposedly will be given immanently, really, contained in the perception rather than in the secondary conscious act that may grasp it a split-second later. Its sense will have been captured as something known with certainty to comprise its qualities, without the interference of a synthetic conscious act. (If this worked, it would effectively ensure the objectivity of knowledge, and would win the day for realism against idealism.) Husserl writes:

> **"The noematic objects ... are unities transcendent to, but evidentially intended to in, the mental process. But if that is the case, then characteristics, which arise *in* [those unities] for consciousness and which are seized upon as *their* properties in focusing the regard on them, cannot possibly be regarded as really inherent moments of the mental process" (248-249).**

Rather, they inhere in the object's sense, and subsequently are lifted out for analysis in the mental process.

The ambitiousness of this claim is matched by that of another, which has to do with the opposite end of the ego-pole. In # 108 Husserl says that we can also shinny far enough up the ego-pole that we can capture the affirming noesis in its purity. All the modalities will have been loaded over onto the side of the noema, and the no_sis will be a believing affirmation, pure and simple: an unqualified yes. Thus Husserl insists that there is a crucial difference between (a) being validly negated and (b) not-being. For example, he would distinguish (a) denying correctly that my spayed cat has a kitten, from (b) affirming that the kitten of my spayed cat is a non-entity. With (a), the negativity inheres in the noesis, which has not yet been purified of all modality; but with (b), the noesis would be pure affirmation (# 104).

How correct is Husserl's argument? We must grant that whatever makes this particular kitten impossible inheres elsewhere than in my knowing about it, for my denying something can't make it go away. Furthermore, there's nothing to prevent my forcing myself to think positively the thought of the kitten that my cat never had. Such a noetic posture is at least conceivable. However, its mere *possibility* is not enough to accomplish Husserl's purpose. Husserl needs to show that this pure affirming belief *really is done*, somewhere somehow, in the toughest case, the case of an intrinsically impossible entity such as the kitten of a spayed cat. (That is, has anyone succeeded in recapturing that magic moment of purely affirming noesis with regard to an intrinsically impossible object? And if so, how would one go about certifying the accomplishment?)

Unfortunately, neither end of the ego-ray connects as Husserl had hoped. At the noetic pole, the purely affirming ego eludes the grasp of consciousness; so does the pure sense of the thing itself, at the noematic pole. These terms may remain as ideal asymptotes toward which the ego-ray continually points while continually falling short. The successful recovery of the connection between knowing and reality awaits another strategy, to be mounted by Husserl in the posthumously published second volume of *Ideen*.

***IDEEN II* (*IDEAS II*). The second volume of Husserl's *Ideen* (publication withheld until 1952) is the work of many hands. Husserl was dissatisfied with it and did not publish it. The first draft was written very rapidly in 1912, immediately after the manuscript of the first volume was completed. Husserl added material in 1915, and turned it over for editing to his assistant Edith Stein, who had**

come with him to Freiburg from Gottingen. Stein transcribed the work from Husserl's shorthand in 1916. He gave her further material, and in 1918 she produced a collation arranged and titled as at present: the constitution of material nature, of animal nature, and of the cultural world. But Husserl's phenomenology was evolving, and the manuscript did not suit him. Another assistant, Ludwig Landgrebe, worked on it 1923-25, and Husserl himself edited it in again 1928. It finally came out posthumously.

If the pursuit of unity had guided Husserl like a north star from his earliest writing on through the discovery and first articulation of phenomenology, then in *Ideen II* that star becomes obscured by "light pollution" from numerous more recent and competing insights. Without access to the manuscripts, it is impossible to know with precision how that came about. In portions of the text as we have it, the concern with unity remains a significant factor.

However, other portions seem to go against the grain of key insights from the first volume and the earlier works. For example, in LU and *Ideen I*, the material sphere had comprised states of affairs; that is, facts or cases such as could be expressed in logical propositions. There were indeed "things" in there, such as roses, yet the emphasis was upon the factual scenarios into which these things figured. By contrast, in *Ideen II* "material nature" is populated with substantial items, and the fact they are embedded in circumstances has to be additionally stipulated, almost as an afterthought (# 15c). By the same token, in the earlier work the eidetic sphere had comprised the forms of logical propositions and the rules of inference. While there were indeed "essences" entailed there, nevertheless the emphasis fell upon the lawful patterns of thinking about being. By contrast, in *Ideen II* "animal nature" is populated by psychic items whose unity is analogous to that of physical things yet whose active engagement with the latter can hardly be explained.

This shift matters, because judgments and perceptions reach unity in quite different ways. To certify that one selfsame *proposition* (e.g., that the cat is on the mat) returns to our consciousness on several occasions is quite a different task than to certify that one selfsame *substantial entity* (e.g., this mat-loving cat) returns to our sight every afternoon. Husserl's early discoveries about unity had to do with judgment, and they were based upon the lived difference between synthetic judgments and analytic judgments. His ambitions then were not primarily metaphysical or epistemological. Moreover, it is relatively easy to "feel" the difference among three sorts of judgment: (a) a synthetic judgment that arbitrarily groups several items together, (b) a synthetic judgment that groups things in recognition of some characteristic that all share independently of the judgment, and (c) a judgment that the unity imputed to a thing is not owing to judgment at all. The distinction among these judgment-forms was already established in the Habilitationsschrift. However the task undertaken in *Ideen II* is forcibly to transpose that distinction onto perception, and so to come up with a general test for certifying when knowledge is genuinely in touch with reality.

This project is set in motion in # 9, where new terminology is introduced for the threefold distinction first made in "*Begriff der Zahl*." (However, now that the transcendental reduction is presupposed, the arrow of causality should be removed. There can be only correlation or its absence.) BZ's "psychic relation" now becomes "categorial synthesis," in which perception serendipitously collects disparate items into one group, for no special reason intrinsic to the items. BZ's "content relation" (or "physical relation") becomes "aesthetic synthesis" (or "sensuous synthesis"), in which perception recognizes some intrinsic reason for grouping these items and finds itself constrained to do so by something other than mere whim. And BZ's uncomposed unity (e.g., "that rose there") becomes the "pure sense-object."

In BZ, "synthesis" meant a combining judgment: a judgment that erected a set of things with many members. A set with one member--that is, a unified thing--obviously needed no synthesizing judgment to set it up. In *Ideen II*, however, "synthesis" means a perception that, while receiving multiple impressions (the off-shadings or *Abschattungen*), composes an object out of them. But this object is a unity, not a group; in fact, it is what Husserl would earlier have called an *uncomposed* unity. In other words aesthetic synthesis--operating now over partial views, not discrete items--finds that it has a reason for referring those multiple impressions to one object, even though the unity of the thing never gives itself directly to consciousness. What is that reason? This question is enticing, because Husserl is tantalizingly close here to describing a way in which the real unity of things is available for knowledge.

Husserl works on this question in # 15b, where "the spatial body is a synthetic unity of a manifold of strata of 'sensuous appearances' of different senses" (42-43). The spatially extended thing is a unity drawing together all the experiences we have had of it, and summoning us toward further experiences of it through sight and touch and our other senses. It achieves its unity as a spatial location, which seems not to depend upon whether or not it is actually perceived.

However, Husserl cautions, this unity alone is insufficient to validate itself. He writes:

> **"(W)e have first taken the body as independent of all causal conditioning, i.e., merely as a unity which presents itself visually or tactually, through multiplicities of sensations, as endowed with an inner content of characteristic features.... But in what we have said, it is also implied that under the presupposition referred to (namely, that we take the thing outside of the nexuses in which it is a thing) we do not find, as we carry out experiences, any possibility for deciding, in a way that exhibits, whether the experienced material thing is actual or whether we are subject to mere illusion and are experiencing a mere phantom" (43).**

Thus, reality is not guaranteed for an isolated item, even when it seems to be giving us a reason to take it as the unified core attracting its manifold appearings to one hub of reference. The central location of the thing is dependent upon its real circumstances, as Husserl goes on to say in # 15c. The reality of "one" depends on "others"; i.e., on thing-connection. The thing is what it is in relation to its surroundings. This becomes apparent when things move and change, for their changes must correlate coherently with reciprocal changes in the things next to them.

Such co-variance is what certifies reality--or materiality, which Husserl seems to equate with it. In # 15c, reality means substantial causality. Within the webwork of material things, everything affects everything else. The real is the causal. Co-variance across the material realm, then, is what certifies the oneness and reality of that realm (# 15e).

Animated bodies also connect in the webwork of material things (# 13). Each of them is a center of appearings, a *one*, just as every other thing is. However, unlike soulless bodies, each animal is also a *zero*. It lives at a point of origination. The animal body bears the zero-point of orientation for the pure ego (61), as its absolute "here" (135, 166). Arithmetically, this is a stunning contrast. Every "something" whatsoever is either a *one* or a *one-and-one-and-etc*. But the animated body, *in addition* to being just one of those somethings, is also the one who is zero: the one from whom the counting starts, the one who chooses whether and where it is appropriate to insert the *and*'s.

But any series that is initiated by/at/in the living body is counted off nonarbitrarily. Such series go in order; they are "motivated." This is owing to the movement of the body itself within the material web. The body's own kinesthetic sense will coordinate with the corresponding changes in

sensory perceptions as it navigates among things. Thus, the zero shifts position in relation to the other unified centers to which perceptions accrue; but as it does so, the series of their appearings change in a regular way (63).

What about counting zero's? Are they multiple; are there many human bodies? Husserl declines to pursue this avenue of approach into the problem of other minds and human community. Intersubjectivity will treated instead as an *implication* of the reality of the material world, not a *precondition* for it. The multiplicity of bodies is taken up only on page 83, where it is admitted that the foregoing analysis has been framed on the assumption that there would be only one, "solipsistic," point-zero in reality. Belatedly, other bodies now are brought into the picture--but not because they are necessary for its unity, or because they have been apprehended among the realities presenting to consciousness. The others are brought in because they are required for the full unification of the thing in reality, whether that thing is one of the physical bodies or my very own live body. To be is to be describable (87). Reality for the thing entails a possibility of appearing to anyone at all. Being counted from one zero-point is not enough for the real thing. To count, it needs the possibility of being counted from multiple directions.

> **The thing is a rule of appearances. That means that the thing is a reality as a unity of a manifold of appearances connected according to rules. Moreover, this unity is an intersubjective one.... The physicalistic thing is *intersubjectively* common in that it has validity for all individuals who stand in possible communion with us (91-92).**

To be real, the thing must count as a place or location, a center, independently of any particular point of origin. Yet what grants reality to the thing is not some consensus reached by observers. Indeed, the thing may look entirely different to different observers; however, its reality constrains all to agree that, at least, "it is there." Oddly, then, the real thing is another kind of zero, for its barest reality consists in its being an empty place-holder (91-93).

Finally, Husserl makes unity a synonym for the philosophical term "substance" as traditionally meant. For example, he says that both the soul and the body are unities, so that an analogy obtains between psychic unity and material unity (129, 131). Oneness becomes the ontological form that determines substantial reality (133). The pure ego is *one* with respect to an individual stream of consciousness, that is, before the transcendental reduction has de-individuated the latter (117); however the pure ego is insubstantial and *not one* whenever the reduction is in effect (128).

And so Husserl's quest for unity splinters and spends itself out by diverting into many contradictory projects pursued by the many unharmonized voices of *Ideen II*. Although the manuscript remained unpublished, it was made available for consultation by a number of Husserl's younger colleagues. Among the last publication of Husserl's lifetime was the *Cartesian Meditations* of 1931, in which he addressed the apparent solipsism of his transcendental phenomenology. That work itself was undergoing a comprehensive reworking in partnership with Husserl's assistant Eugen Fink during the years before Husserl's death in 1938.

HUSSERL'S PUBLISHED WORKS: Husserl's publications and his extensive *Nachlass* are being brought out in a multi-volume critical edition entitled *Husserliana - Edmund Husserl, Gesammelte Werke*, from Nijhoff in The Hague. The major works published during Husserl's lifetime are the following:

> ***Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen*, 1887.**
>
> ***Philosophie der Arithmetik. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen*, 1891.**

Logische Untersuchungen. Erste Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, 1900; reprinted 1913.

Logische Untersuchungen. Zweite Teil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, 1901; second edition 1913 (for part one); second edition 1921 (for part two).

"Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," _Logos_ 1 (1911) 289-341.

Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, 1913.

"Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins," _Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung_ 9 (1928), 367-498.

"Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft," _Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung_ 10 (1929) 1-298.

Méditations cartésiennes, 1931.

"Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie," _Philosophia_ 1 (1936) 77-176.

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Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895)

Thomas Henry Huxley, the distinguished zoologist and advocate of Darwinism, madeseveral incursions into philosophy. From his youth he had studied its problems unsystematically; he had a way of going straight to the point in any discussion; and, judged by a literary standard, he was a great master of expository and argumentative prose. Apart from his special work in science, he had an important influence upon English thought through his numerous addresses and essays on the topics of science, philosophy, religion, and politics. Among the most important of his papers relevant here are those entitled 'The Physical Basis of Life' (1868), and 'On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata' (1874), along with a monograph on Hume (1879) and the Romanes lecture *Ethics and Evolution* (1893). Huxley is credited with the invention of the term 'agnosticism' to describe his philosophical position: it expresses his attitude towards certain traditional questions without giving any clear delimitation of the frontiers of the knowable. He regards consciousness as a collateral effect of certain physical causes, and only an effect--never also a cause. But, on the other hand, he holds that matter is only a symbol, and that all physical phenomena can be analyzed into states of consciousness. This leaves mental facts in the peculiar position of being collateral effects of something that, after all, is only a symbol for a mental fact; and the contradiction is left without remark.

His contributions to ethics are still more remarkable. In a paper entitled 'Science and Morals' (1888), he concluded that the safety of morality lay "in a real and living belief in that fixed order of nature which sends social disorganization on the track of immorality." His Romanes lecture reveals a different tone. In it the moral order is contrasted with the cosmic order; evolution shows constant struggle; instead of looking to it for moral guidance, he "repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence." He saw that the facts of historical process did not constitute validity for moral conduct; and his plain language compelled other to see the same truth. But he exaggerated the opposition between them and did not leave room for the influence of moral ideas as a factor in the historical process.

Another man of science, William Kingdon Clifford, professor of mathematics in London, dealt in occasional essays with some central points in the theory of knowledge, ethics, and religion. In these essays he aimed at an interpretation of life in the light of the new science. There was insight as well as courage in all he wrote, and it was conveyed in a brilliant style. But his work was cut short by his early death in 1879, and his contributions to philosophy remain suggestions only.

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Identity Theory

Identity theory is a position in the philosophy of mind which maintains that mental states and brain activities are identical, though viewed from two perspectives. Identity theory is a form of monistic materialism, insofar as it maintains that mind is essentially material in nature. As such, it is an alternative to classical dualism which holds that minds and mental events are made of a spiritual substance which is distinct from one's material body. Identity theory was developed to address the short comings of behaviorism, which maintains that mental terms designate dispositions to behave in certain ways. The key difference is that behaviorism denies mental states (focusing instead on only observable behavior); identity theory, by contrast, acknowledges mental states but identifies them with brain activity. Further, whereas behaviorism is usually seen as a semantic theory about the meaning of terms, identity theory is a scientific claim about mental states and brain activities themselves.

Three principal types of identity theory have been proposed. The first, associated with J.J.C. Smart, and sometimes called brain process materialism, is that sensations are identical with brain processes. A second version, called central state materi alism, and associated with David Armstrong, is that mental states are identical with states of the brain and central nervous system. A third and more subtle version, offered by Herbert Feigl, is that certain neuro-physiological terms denote certain mental terms. Following Frege's distinction between sense and reference, Feigl argues that the terms differ in meaning, but their referents are the same. This is similar to how the terms "morning star" and "evening star" both have different meanings, yet refer to the same object, namely venus. Insofar as identity theory (especially Feigl's account) proposes an identity of referents, rather than an identity of meanings, it follows Leibniz's law of identity. This law states that that two things are identical only if they have all properties in common and is symbolically represented as follows: (x)(y) [(x = y) > (F) (Fx = Fy)]. Accordingly, criticisms of identity theory follow Leibniz's law.

One possible criticism against identity theory is that mental events and brain activity are not identical since we know some things about the one, but not about the other. For example, I immediately experience a variety of memories, yet I do not know where memories are stored in my brain. However, this kind of equal knowledge is not necessary for identity. For example, we can safely say that the vice president of the United States and the president of the US. Senate both denote the same thing. However, we may know some things about the role of the vice president, but nothing of the role of the president of the Senate.

Other criticisms are more problematic. Perhaps the most common criticism of identity theory is that mental descriptions and material descriptions are not identical since there are still the three points which distinguish them: localizability in space , objective observability, and intentionality. That is, by Leibniz's Law, properties asserted about one described term (e.g., I am in pain) can also be asserted about the other term (e.g., activated C-fibers). However, these features apply to only

one of the descriptions and not the other. Jerome Shaffer offers the following line of reasoning for the issue of localizability in space:

1. **Brain processes are spatial events (have location)**
2. **Sensations are not spatial**
3. **The rules of identity maintain that what is true of one side of the equation must be true of the other side**
4. **Therefore the two cannot be identical**

The same argument applies to the feature of objective observability which is a feature of brain processes, and not experienced sensations. By contrast, intentional states (or attitudes about a thing), such as believing F, assuming F, fearing F, apply to mental events, and not to material brain activity. Similarly, it is appropriate for me to describe my experience of a pain as sharp or shooting, although it is not appropriate to talk about brain processes as sharp or shooting. In response, identity theorists argue that these problems are linguistic inconveniences which can be remedied with new language conventions. Perhaps someday language of sensation will follow a spatial model, particularly as we learn more about brain states.

A third criticism maintains points out that identity theorists seek to reduce mental descriptions to material descriptions, and thereby eliminate mental descriptions. For example, the mental description "I am in pain" would be eliminated in place of a material description "C-fibers are activated." The problem is that Leibniz's law does not permit the elimination of either of the descriptions. This is evident by seeing that x and y can be reversed in the above formula and still mean the same thing. More intuitively, both descriptions in Leibniz's law must be seen as permanent, otherwise, this would lead to a slippery slope of other identity claims which eliminate terms which we do not want to eliminate. For example, suppose that I identify a given chair as concentration of microparticles. Although my two description ("chair" and "concentration of microparticles") refer to the same object, I do not want to eliminate either description; both serve their own purpose in their own context. Thus, identity theorists are not entitled to use the notion of identity alone as a justification for eliminating mental descriptions in favor of material descriptions.

A fourth criticism is that identity theory is chauvinistic: it restricts mental events to biological systems. However, the possibility is open that nonbiological systems, such as computers, can exhibit mental consciousness. This criticism is especial ly appropriate to "type physicalists" who hold that mental activity takes place in only biological types of organisms. This is opposed to token physicalists, who hold that biological systems are only one kind of system which can have mental activity. The criticism of chauvinism has been especially decisive in redirecting discussions in the philosophy of mind away from identity theory and toward functionalism. For, according to functionalism, the kinds of cause-effect relationships which produce mental eve nts in biological systems may also be instantiated in nonbiological systems.

A final revision of identity theory is worthy of mentioning. The above account of identity theory may be described as *translation* identity theory insofar as mental descriptions are translated into biological descriptions. An alternative versio n, as presented by Rorty and Feyerabend, is called *disappearance* identity theory. On this view, mental talk is eliminated and replaced with talk about brain activity (e.g. c-fibers). Indeed, talk of all mental phenomenon is eliminated similar to ta lk of ghosts or demon possession. This version does not follow Leibniz's law, and thus is not susceptible to the above problems associated with it. However, disappearance identity theory is not really an

identity **theory, per se. Instead, it is more like eliminative materialism, as offered by Patricia Churchland, which holds that there are no such things as conscious mental phenomenon, and we should eliminate all mental references. For Churchland, mentalese descriptions are like talk of ghosts which should be done away with. As such, disappearance identity theory it is susceptible to the problems associated with that view. The principle problem here is that mental states such as pain do not seem to be on the same level as ghosts, and are not easily eliminated.**

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Interventionism

The theory of interventionism examines the nature and justifications of interfering with another polity or choices made by individuals. Interventionism is characterized by the use or threat of force or coercion to alter a political or cultural situation nominally outside the intervenor's moral or political jurisdiction. It commonly deals with a government's interventions in other governments' affairs--and is thus an aspect of political philosophy, but it can also be extended to interventions in others' cultures, religions, lifestyles, and economic activities--and thus can fit into applied ethics, covering such issues as paternalism, imperialism, and topics in business, medical, and environmental ethics.

A note on methodological considerations

The context of interventionism requires an epistemological consideration. A methodological individualist will argue that it involves interventions in the lives of individuals; that essentially it does not matter whether the individuals are part of one's political entity or belonging to another--interventionism applies solely to individuals. A methodological holist on the other hand will identify the object of interventionism as groups--cultural, political, religious, national, and so on. Whilst the methodological individualist will focus on issues that infringe or attempt to alter individuals' rights or choices, the holist will draw attention to issues affecting groups and their identities. Methodological compatibilism holds that interventions do affect individual rights or choices but individuals also identify themselves with groups who can also be separately affected by interference. For example, demanding that all female bank employees wear blue dresses affects the individual's choice of clothes in the workplace but also interferes with the banking corporation's right to determine its own standard of dress.

What does interventionism deal with?

Beyond epistemological considerations interventionism commonly deals with the justifications of governments to interfere in (a) the lives of its own civilian population--domestic interventions, and (b) the activities of other nations--foreign interventions. In the case of domestic interventionism that apparatus is the police force (or the army acting as a domestic policing force as with the British army in Northern Ireland 1969-date); in the case of international interventionism it is the army. In either scenario interventionism implies the potential or actual use of coercion.

Reasoning or persuading another group of people that a chosen policy, or a certain tradition, is wrong either morally (given a certain standard) or on consequentialist considerations (the policy will not achieve what it's meant to achieve) are not examples of interventionism. Reasoning includes all forms of rhetoric, example, persuasion, exhortation, counseling, discourse, and so on. The other group changes policy or tradition only if it desires --is persuaded-- to change. They do so voluntarily. On the other hand, it may be claimed that in attempting to persuade others to change their minds is a form of interventionism. But this definition then becomes too broad to be of use--merely speaking to another or judging their behavior in the absence of any threats, coercion, or force, cannot be termed

interventionist, for its goal is not to interfere but to explain possible choices.

Breaking diplomatic relations also does not imply the use of force and hence is not a form of interventionism. This is an essentially peaceful attempt to alter another government's actions in effect by removing acknowledgement of its international political status.

Voluntary decisions on the part of a people may change a nation's values. Trading in goods and ideas can change a society, yet such changes should not, for the most part, be deemed interventionist. Changes in culture and language that result from the voluntary decisions of many individuals cannot be tied to any form of interventionism, for the policy of interventionism is a policy of threatening or using coercion or force of some description. Whether such examples exist is hard to ascertain, for commonly the expansion of freedom of trade that has led to an exchange of ideas and hence of cultures is historically almost universally connected with imperialist policies that do aim at explicit forms of intervention. Following World War Two (1939-45) when Western imperialism dwindled as a political value, it can be argued that various societies (e.g., Taiwan, Malaysia) voluntarily took up what are referred to as 'Western values' through the influence of non-violent commercial ventures. However, critics may point out that previous military interventions could be considered as necessary precursors to changes in the culture of the people.

Coercion is a form of interventionism. Coercion implies offering choices that normally would not be accepted, but which leave the individual to choose the option preferred by the coercer, or by default one that is less acceptable. For example: if a knife is held to your throat and you are given the option to hand over your car keys or die, you are being coerced; if a government demands that you open up your borders to a free trade in opium or face armed conflict (China, Opium Wars with Britain) your nation is being coerced.

Domestic interventions entail restricting the choices of individuals or groups or altering their activities through legislative coercion. Limiting freedom of speech or trade, restricting occupational access to certain religious groups, or enforcing the draft are examples of interventions in the choices of individuals or groups, while increasing beer taxes are examples of altering choices through legislative frameworks; failure to comply may incur penalties.

On the international level, interventionist activities involve threatening, coercing, or forcing another group or nation to alter its behavior or change its government or policies. International interventionism can incorporate direct activities such as the use or threat of war, as well as indirect activities such as assassination, subversion, and economic embargoes of all descriptions (complete or partial blockades, transport restrictions, etc.).

General goals of international interventionism include attempting to change: governments (e.g., Iran, 1979); people's expectations of governmental activities; general attitudes of just conduct not held as appropriate in the wider international community (e.g., South African Apartheid). Specific goals can include changing a state apparatus or its personnel (the government), to remove a particular statesperson or group, to change specific or general policies, to alter cultural or political beliefs, or even to alter patterns of economic and population distributions.

Arguments for interventionism

Utilitarian or consequentialist prescriptions are open-ended: they could support interventions either generally or in particular circumstances, depending on expected results. Other positions offer more principled cases for interventionism, for example on epistemological grounds, political realism or rights analyses.

Epistemological reasons

Intervening can be justified on grounds of the government possessing better knowledge than individual agents, or from paternalistic reasons, which presume the target agents are incapable of making informed choices themselves. To that extent, governments may legislate a range of programs from ensuring that people take out adequate insurance or invest sufficiently into pensions to requiring health checks or continued education; or economic interventions could be justified on the grounds that economic agents (investors, corporations, banks) do not act in the long term interest of the nation, whereas civil servants who are deemed above the profit motive can take the longer view (as held by John Maynard Keynes 1883-1946, for example).

Political realism

Political realism is defined by the primacy of national interest in international affairs. This can be viewed as either a moral duty or as a description of the ruling state of affairs. Policy prescriptions involve pursuing interventions as they benefit the national interest. The theory implies that states should be left alone to seek and to defend their own interests. In the realist tradition, of which there are many shades, such supporters include Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes.

Political realism offers a broad interventionist doctrine that can justify intervening for reasons of economic profit as well as for balance of power considerations. The history of the British Empire provides many examples of both justifications (Cf. its interventions in European politics in the War of the Spanish Succession 1702-13 and the War of the Austrian Succession 1740-8), whilst post-war US foreign policy offers more recent case studies (Vietnam War 1961-73 and the Gulf War 1990-91). It is captured by Thucydides' description of the Pelopennesian War, that it was Spartan "fear of Athenian growth" that caused the war. Realists often invoke consequentialist concerns regarding the developing international state of affairs--that should the foreign power to grow unchecked, a war would ensue, or economic resource bases would be lost, or an invasion could occur. The Schlieffen Plan, prior to the First World War (1914-18) is another useful example of balance of power considerations.

Political realism assumes that interests are to be maintained through the exercise of power, and that the world is characterized by competing power bases (nation states [Hegel], for example, or classes [Marx]). Political realism is essence reduces to the ethical principle that might is right.

Rights theories

Some claim that rights only pertain to individuals, and that nations and governments only acquire any rights or privileges by virtue of the civilians giving them power. Rights theorists thus argue that individual rights supersede or 'trump' the rights or privileges of governments. On this basis, interventions in support of rights are morally justifiable. For example, if a foreign government tyrannizes its civilians, an intervention to support their rights can be justified, for the moral status of rights does not end at political borders. However, what needs to be considered is at what point do rights violations justify an intervention, or would an intervention do more harm than good? Second is the argument from hypocrisy--can a nation be justified in intervening in another's affairs when it does not have a clean slate of its own? Finally, given that rights are being violated, is a government guilty of moral failure if it fails to intervene, and if so, is that moral failure a failure of its duty or of virtuous behavior?

Non-interventionist doctrines

Non-interventionism is the theory that one does not have any moral justification in intervening in others' affairs. On a rights based analysis, or from Kantian considerations of duty, this may be

considered an absolutist prohibition on the grounds that it either violates others' rights to freedom or respect due them as individual moral entities. Consequentialists may infer from evidence that interventionism is always counter-productive and should not be practiced. In contemporary ethical analysis, a rule utilitarian may claim that since interventions never work (an empirical, testable hypothesis), ethical considerations aimed at maximizing the greatest good for the greatest number should employ non-interventionism on principle. However, act utilitarians may agree that historically interventions have not worked, but that does not mean that they will not in a future situation, and hence non-interventionism should not be held categorically.

As a political-economical doctrine, non-interventionism includes the economic doctrine of laissez-faire, which holds that governments should not intervene in the economic activities of individuals or corporations. Some thinkers, notably Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) have extended the doctrine to moral issues too, arguing, for example, that intervening in the plight of the poor only makes their condition worse by creating an atmosphere of dependency, rather than leaving them to independently struggle and find their own values. Other supporters of the economic laissez-faire doctrine do not go as far as Spencer; Friedrich von Hayek argues (Constitution of Liberty, 1956) that governments do have responsibilities to the poor resulting from their duty to provide a general framework to ensure the smooth operation of the free market system.

On a broader view, non-interventionism is applied by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty; he claims that responsibility to others only goes so far as ensuring they know of the dangers that may befall them, but does not extend to actually physically restraining those who would knowingly injure themselves. In the international sphere, Mill ("Notes on Intervention" Collected Works) argues for a policy of self-determination: that other people be allowed to make their own mistakes, and hence forge their own paths to freedom; intervening paternalistically on their behalf will not be conducive to their learning the value of freedom in its own right. Such a stance can be used in a variety of issues including freedom of press and expression. For example, John Milton in Areopagitica argues: "And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play on the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?"

Legal positivism and non-interventionism

In the international sphere, legal positivists are commonly non-interventionists. Legal positivists, following Christian Wolff (1679-1754), argue that nation states possess absolute rights to political sovereignty and territorial integrity, which implies that national borders be inviolable. Wolff writes: "Nations are regarded as individual free persons living in a state of nature. For they consist of a multitude of men united into a state. Therefore since states are regarded as individual free persons living in a state of nature, nations must also be regarded in relation to each other as individual free persons living in a state of nature." (Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum Trans. Joseph Drake. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1934, §2, p.9) The positivist theory of international relations implies that interventions would violate international borders; this position itself resolves into an absolutist doctrine that deems interventions should never be condoned and more pragmatic positions that permit some exceptions to the rule.

Positivist exceptions to non-interventionism emanate from humanitarian considerations that overwhelm nominally sacrosanct national borders, if the target state is violating basic human rights to such an extent that it can no longer be deemed a proper representative of its people. The type of interventionism supported depends on the theory of the state entertained.

If governments are viewed as instrumental institutions that exist to uphold the domestic rights of civilians, then a violation of its remit can warrant an intervention on behalf of the citizens. Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars (1977) entertains this position, arguing that only in extreme cases of rights violations "that shock the moral conscience of mankind" (p.107), can interventions be supported. He gives the examples of genocide, mass murder or enslavement. Rights violations above this level, he implies, are not grounds for interventionism (e.g., removal of free movement, freedom of the press, etc).

A Hobbesian case for interventionism can be maintained by those who consider governments the sole and proper moral and legal authorities. Hobbes claims that individuals give up the rights that they possess in the state of nature (except the right of self-preservation) to the state (the 'Leviathan'). He argues the State should be obeyed, even it is acting quite tyrannically, for the alternative --and the greater evil-- is the state of war in which justice and morality do not hold. However, if a state acts to takes its civilians into the state of nature by governing incompetently or unjustly then the people have a right to form a new state. This allows the legal positivist to condone interventions where governments have obviously failed in their obligations and have brought war to the people through their ineptitude.

The third possible justification for the positivist is when a supra-legal body legislates in favor of an intervention. For example, the United Nations has the jurisdiction to pass a resolution of intervention, but it does not condone unilateral interventions. Positivists draw parallels here between governments arbitrating in domestic disputes and a world body acting to dissolve international disputes.

Isolationism

Isolationism is the political doctrine of non-involvement in foreign affairs. The state, it is argued, should confine its activities to its own jurisdiction, and therefore, what happens abroad is of no concern. Isolationism can be argued from a consequentialist perspective: that getting involved would only make matters (whatever those matters are) worse; or from an intrinsicist perspective similar to the legal positivist case, that national jurisdiction (and hence moral and political concerns) ends at the political borders.

Economic interventionism

Government intervention in the economy was noted above. Whilst the effects and the principles are the subject matter of economics, philosophers can fruitfully examine the nature of the epistemological arguments used in the debates which involve considerations of methodological individualism versus holism, and a-priori versus a-posteriori reasoning.

Alex Moseley

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Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819)

German philosopher; born at Dusseldorf January. 25,1743; died at Munich March. 10, 1819. He studied at Frankfort and Geneva, and in 1764 became the head of his father's business in Dusseldorf. After his appointment to the council for the duchies of Julich and Berg in 1772 he devoted himself entirely to literature and philosophy. His house at Pempelfort, near Dusseldorf, became the meeting-place of distinguished literary men. Among his more intimate friends were Wieland, Hamann, Herder, Lessing, and Goethe. On account of the political agitation of the time he went to Holstein in 1794. During the next ten years he resided chiefly at Wandsbeek, Hamburg, and Eutin. In 1804 he accepted a call to Munich in connection with the proposed Academy of Sciences there. He was president of the academy from its opening in 1807 till 1812. His writings are characterized by poetic fancy and religious sentiment rather than by logical necessity. He held that the understanding can only join and disjoin given facts, without explaining them, and that knowledge deduced in this way is conditioned and relatively unimportant, being always related to a background of existence which forever remains beyond abstract thinking. All demonstrable knowledge, therefore, is relative and conditioned; it does not touch the ultimate nature of things. The faculty by which we grasp ultimate facts is not the understanding, but faith, which Jacobi identified with reason. It was Jacobi who first pointed out the fatal contradiction involved in Kant's application of the category of causality to the *Ding an Sich*. His doctrine of the relativity of knowledge was later exploited by Sir William Hamilton. Jacobi's principal works are the two philosophical novels, *Woldmwr* (2 vols., Flensburg, 1779) and *Eduard Allwills Briefsamlung* (Breslau, 1781); Ueber die Lehre der Spinoza (1785; enlarged ed., 1789*); Dazid Hunw fiber den Glauben, oder Ide-alis;nus und Realismus* (1787), containing his criticism of Kant*; Ueber das Unternehmen des Kritizismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen* (Hamburg, 1801); and *Von den gottlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung* (Leipsic, 1811), which was directed against Schelling. During his last years Jacobi was employed in collecting and editing his *Werke* (6 vols., Leipsic, 1812-24). His *Auserlesener Briefwechsel* was edited by F. Roth (2 vols., 1825-27).

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Just War Theory

Just war theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought. The justification can be either theoretical or historical. The theoretical aspect is concerned with ethically justifying war and forms of warfare. The historical aspect, or the "just war tradition" deals with the historical body of rules or agreements applied (or at least existing) in various wars across the ages. For instance international agreements such as the Geneva and Hague conventions are historical rules aimed at limiting certain kinds of warfare. It is the role of ethics to examine these institutional agreements for their philosophical coherence as well as to inquire into whether aspects of the conventions ought to be changed.

Historically, the just war tradition--a set of mutually agreed rules of combat--commonly evolves between two similar enemies. When enemies differ greatly because of different religious beliefs, race, or language, war conventions have rarely been applied. It is only when the enemy is seen to be a people with whom one will do business in the following peace that tacit or explicit rules are formed for how wars should be fought and who they should involve. In part the motivation is seen to be mutually beneficial--it is preferable to remove any underhand tactics or weapons that may provoke an indefinite series of vengeance acts. Nonetheless, it has been the concern of the majority of just war theorists that such asymmetrical morality should be denounced, and that the rules of war should apply to all equally. That is just war theory should be universal.

The just war tradition is as old as warfare itself. Early records of collective fighting indicate that some moral considerations were used by warriors. They may have involved consideration of women and children or the treatment of prisoners. Commonly they invoked considerations of honour: some acts in war have always been deemed dishonourable, whilst others have been deemed honourable. Whilst the specifics of what is honourable differ with time and place, the very fact of one moral virtue has been sufficient to infuse warfare with moral concerns.

The just war theory also has a long history. Whilst parts of the Bible hint at ethical behavior in war and concepts of just cause, the most systematic exposition is given by Saint Thomas Aquinas. In the *Summa Theologicae* Aquinas presents the general outline of what becomes the just war theory. He discusses not only the justification of war, but also the kinds of activity that are permissible in war. Aquinas's thoughts become the model for later Scholastics and Jurists to expand. The most important of these are: Francisco de Vitoria (1548-1617), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1704), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), and Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767). In the twentieth century it has undergone a revival mainly in response to the invention of nuclear weaponry and American involvement in the Vietnam war. The most important contemporary texts include Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977), Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill *The Ethics of War* (1979), Richard Norman *Ethics, Killing, and War* (1995), as well as seminal articles by Thomas Nagel "War and Massacre", Elizabeth Anscombe

"War and Murder", and a host of others, commonly found in the journals *Ethics* or *The Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs*.

Against the just war (*justum bellum*) are those of a skeptical persuasion who do not believe that morality can or should exist in war. There are various positions against the need or the possibility of morality in war. Generally, consequentialists and act utilitarians may claim that if victory is sought then all methods should be employed to ensure it is gained at a minimum of expense and time. Arguments from 'military necessity' are of this type: for example, to defeat Germany in World War II, it was deemed necessary to bomb civilian centers, or in the US Civil War, for General Sherman to burn Atlanta. However, intrinsicists may also decree that no morality can exist in the state of war, for they may claim it can only exist in a peaceful situation in which recourse exists to conflict resolving institutions. Or intrinsicists may claim that possessing a just cause (the argument from righteousness) is a sufficient condition for pursuing whatever means are necessary to gain a victory or to punish an enemy. A different skeptical argument, one advanced by Michael Walzer, is that the invention of nuclear weapons alter war so much that our notions of morality--and hence just war theories--become redundant. However, against Walzer, it can be reasonably argued that although such weapons change the nature of warfare they do not dissolve the need to consider their use within a moral framework.

Whilst sceptical positions may be derived from consequentialist and intrinsicist positions, they need not be. Consequentialists can argue that there are long term benefits to having a war convention. For example, by fighting cleanly, both sides can be sure that the war does not escalate, thus reducing the probability of creating an incessant war of counter-revenges. Intrinsicists can argue that certain spheres of life ought never to be targeted in war: for example, hospitals and densely populated suburbs. The inherent problem with both ethical models is that they become either vague or restrictive when it comes to war. Consequentialism is an open-ended model, highly vulnerable to pressing military needs to adhere to any code of conduct in war: if more will be gained from breaking the rules than will be lost, the consequentialist cannot but demur to military necessity. On the other hand, intrinsicism can be so restrictive that it permits no flexibility in war: whether it entails a Kantian thesis of respecting others or a classical rights position, intrinsicism produces an inflexible model that would restrain warrior's actions to the targeting of permissible targets only. In principle such a prescription is commendable, yet the nature of war is not so clean cut when military targets can be hidden amongst civilian centers.

Against these two ethical positions, just war theory offers a series of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework for war. From the just war (*justum bellum*) tradition, theorists distinguish between the rules that govern the justice of war (*jus ad bellum*) from those that govern just and fair conduct in war (*jus in bello*). The two are by no means mutually exclusive, but they offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted nor too restrictive. The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines in particular wars or situations.

THE *JUS AD BELLUM* CONVENTION

The principles of the justice of war are commonly held to be: having just cause, being declared by a proper authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and the end being proportional to the means used. One can immediately detect that the principles are not wholly intrinsicist nor consequentialist--they invoke the concerns of both models. Whilst this

provides just war theory with the advantage of flexibility, the lack of a strict ethical framework means that the principles themselves are open to broad interpretations. Examining each in turn draws attention to the relevant problems.

Possessing just cause is the first and arguably the most important condition of *jus ad bellum*. Most theorists hold that initiating acts of aggression is unjust and gives a group a just cause to defend itself. But unless 'aggression' is defined, this proscription rather open-ended. For example, just cause resulting from an act of aggression can ostensibly be responses to a physical injury (e.g., a violation of territory), an insult (an aggression against national honor), a trade embargo (an aggression against economic activity), or even to a neighbor's prosperity (a violation of social justice). The onus is then on the just war theorist to provide a consistent and sound account of what is meant by just cause. Whilst not going into the reasons of why the other explanations do not offer a useful condition of just cause, the consensus is that an initiation of physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted. Self-defense against physical aggression, therefore, is putatively the only sufficient reason for just cause. Nonetheless, the principle of self-defense can be extrapolated to anticipate probable acts of aggression, as well as in assisting others against an oppressive government or from another external threat (interventionism). Therefore, it is commonly held that aggressive war is only permissible if its purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already committed (e.g., to pursue and punish an aggressor), or to pre-empt an anticipated attack.

The notion of proper authority seems to be resolved for most of the theorists, who claim it obviously resides in the sovereign power of the state. But the concept of sovereignty raises a plethora of issues to consider here. If a government is just, i.e., it is accountable and does not rule arbitrarily, then giving the officers of the state the right to declare war is reasonable. However, the more removed from a proper and just form a government is, the more reasonable it is that its sovereignty disintegrates. A historical example can elucidate the problem: when Nazi Germany invaded France in 1940 it set up the Vichy puppet regime. What allegiance did the people of France under its rule owe to its precepts and rules? A Hobbesian rendition of almost absolute allegiance to the state entails that resistance is wrong; whereas a Lockean or instrumentalist conception of the state entails that a poorly accountable, inept, or corrupt regime possesses no sovereignty, and the right of declaring war (to defend themselves against the government or from a foreign power) is wholly justifiable. The notion of proper authority therefore requires thinking about what is meant by sovereignty, what is meant by the state, and what is the proper relationship between a people and its government.

The possession of right intention is ostensibly less problematic. The general thrust of the concept being that a nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest or aggrandizement. Putatively, a just war cannot be considered to be just if reasons of national interest are paramount or overwhelm the pretext of fighting aggression. However, possessing right intention masks many philosophical problems. According to Kant, possessing good intent constitutes the only condition of moral activity, regardless of the consequences envisioned or caused, and regardless, or even in spite, of any self interest in the action the agent may have. The extreme intrinsicism of Kant can be criticized on various grounds, the most pertinent here being the value of self-interest itself. At what point does right intention separate itself from self-interest? On the one hand, if the only method to secure peace is to annex a belligerent neighbor's territory, political aggrandizement is intimately connected with the proper intention of maintaining the peace. On the other hand, a nation may possess just cause to defend an oppressed group, and may

rightly argue that the proper intention is to secure their freedom, yet such a war may justly be deemed too expensive or too difficult to wage; i.e., it is not ultimately in their self-interest to fight the just war. On that account, some may demand that national interest is paramount: only if waging war on behalf of freedom is also complemented by the securing of economic or other military interests should a nation commit its troops. The issue of intention raises the concern of practicalities as well as consequences, both of which should be considered before declaring war.

The next principle is that of reasonable success. This is another necessary condition for waging just war, but again is insufficient by itself. Given just cause and right intention, the just war theory asserts that there must be a reasonable probability of success. The principle of reasonable success is consequentialist in that the costs and benefits of a campaign must be calculated. However, the concept of weighing benefits poses moral as well as practical problems as evinced in the following questions. Should one not go to the aid of a people or declare war if there is no conceivable chance of success? Is it right to comply with aggression because the costs of not complying are too prohibitive? Is it not sometimes morally necessary to stand up to a bullying larger force, as the Finns did when Russia invaded in 1940, for the sake of national self-esteem? Besides, posturing for defense may sometimes make aggression itself too costly, even for a much stronger side. However, the thrust of the principle of reasonable success emphasizes that human life and economic resources should not be wasted in what would obviously be an uneven match. For a nation threatened by invasion, other forms of retaliation or defense may be available, such as civil disobedience, or even forming alliances with other small nations to equalize the odds. Historically, many nations have overcome the probability of defeat: the fight may seem hopeless, but a charismatic leader or rousing speech can sometimes be enough to stir a people into fighting with all their will. Winston Churchill offered the British nation some of the finest of war's rhetoric when it was threatened with defeat and invasion by Nazi Germany in 1940. For example: "Let us therefore brace ourselves to do our duty, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Commonwealth and its Empire lasts for a thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest hour.'" …And "What is our aim?…Victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival." (Speeches to Parliament, 1940).

The final guide of *jus ad bellum,* is that the desired end should be proportional to the means used. This principle overlaps into the moral guidelines of how a war should be fought, namely the principles of *jus in bello*. With regards to just cause, a policy of war requires a goal, and that goal must be proportional to the other principles of just cause. Whilst this commonly entails the minimizing of war's destruction, it can also invoke general balance of power considerations. For example, if nation A invades a land belonging to the people of nation B, then B has just cause to take the land back. According to the principle of proportionality, B's counter-attack must not invoke a disproportionate response: it should aim to retrieve its land. That goal may be tempered with attaining assurances that no further invasion will take place. But for B to invade and annex regions of A is nominally a disproportionate response, unless (controversially) that is the only method for securing guarantees of no future reprisals. For B to invade and annex A and then to continue to invade neutral neighboring nations on the grounds that their territory would provide a useful defense against other threats is even more unsustainable.

On the whole the principles offered by *jus ad bellum* are useful guidelines. Philosophically however they invoke a plethora of problems by either their independent vagueness or by mutually inconsistent results. They are nonetheless a useful starting point for ethics and remain a pressing

concern for statesmen and women.

THE PRINCIPLES OF *JUS IN BELLO*

The rules of just conduct fall under the two broad principles of discrimination and proportionality. The principle of discrimination concerns who are legitimate targets in war, whilst the principle of proportionality concerns how much force is morally appropriate. One strong implication of being a separate topic of analysis for just war theorists, is that a nation fighting an unjust cause may still fight justly, or vice verse. A third principle can be added to the traditional two, namely the principle of responsibility, which demands an examination of where responsibility lies in war.

In waging war it is considered unfair and unjust to attack indiscriminately, since non-combatants or innocents are deemed to stand outside the field of war proper. Immunity from war can be reasoned from the fact that their existence and activity is not part of the essence of war, which is killing combatants. Since killing itself is highly problematic, the just war theorist has to proffer a reason why combatants become legitimate targets in the first place, and whether their status alters if they are fighting a just or unjust war. Firstly, a theorist may hold that being trained and/or armed constitutes a sufficient threat to combatants on the other side. Voluntarists may invoke the boxing ring analogy: punching another individual is not morally supportable in a civilized community, but those who voluntarily enter the boxing ring renounce their right not to be hit. Similarly, those who join an army renounce their rights not to be targeted in war; the rights of non-combatants (civilians, or 'innocents') remain intact and therefore they cannot be justly attacked. Others, avoiding a rights analysis, may argue that those who join the army (or who have even been pressed into conscription) come to terms with being a target, and hence their own deaths. This is argued for example by Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill in *The Ethics of War* (1979). However, since civilians can just as readily come to terms with their own deaths, their argument is not sufficient to defend the principle of discrimination. Rights based analyses are more productive, especially those that focus on the renouncing of rights by combatants by virtue of their war status, leaving a sphere of immunity for civilians.

Warfare sometimes unavoidably involves civilians. Whilst the principle of discrimination argues for their immunity from war, the practicalities of war provoke the need for a different model. The doctrine of double effect offers a justification for killing civilians in war, so long as their deaths are not intended but are accidental. Targeting a military establishment in the middle of a city is permissible according to the doctrine of double effect, for the target is legitimate. Civilian casualties are a foreseeable but accidental effect. Whilst the doctrine provides a useful justification of 'collateral damage' to civilians, it raises a number of issues concerning the justification of foreseeable breaches of immunity, as well as the balance to strike between military objectives and civilian casualties.

Another problem arises in defining who is a combatant and who is not. Usually combatants carry arms openly, but guerrillas disguise themselves as civilians. Michael Walzer, in his *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977) claims that the lack of identification does not give a government the right to kill indiscriminately--the onus is on the government to identify the combatants. Others have argued that the nature of modern warfare dissolves the possibility of discrimination. Civilians are just as necessary causal conditions for the war machine as are combatants, therefore, they claim, there is no moral distinction in targeting an armed combatant and a civilian involved in arming or feeding

the combatant. The distinction is, however, not closed by the nature of modern economies, since a combatant still remains a very different entity from a non-combatant, if not for the simple reason that the former is presently armed (and hence has renounced rights or is prepared to die, or is a threat), whilst the civilian is not. On the other hand, it can be argued that being a civilian does not necessarily mean that one is not a threat and hence not a legitimate target. If Mr Smith is the only individual in the nation to possess the correct combination that will detonate a device, then he becomes not only causally efficacious in the firing of a weapon of war, but also morally responsible; reasonably he also becomes a legitimate military target. His job effectively militarizes his status. The underlying issues that ethical analysis must deal with involve the logical nature of an individual's complicity, or aiding and abetting the war machine, with greater weight being imposed on those logically closer than those logically further from the war machine in their work. At a deeper level, one can consider the role that civilians play in supporting an unjust war; to what extent are they morally culpable, and if they are culpable to some extent, does that mean they may become legitimate targets? This invokes the issue of collective versus individuality responsibility that is in itself a complex topic.

The second principle of just conduct is that any offence should remain strictly proportional to the objective desired. This principle overlaps with the proportionality principle of just cause, but it is distinct enough to consider it in its own light. Proportionality for *jus in bello* requires tempering the extent and violence of warfare to minimise destruction and casualties. It is broadly utilitarian in that it seeks to minimize overall suffering, but it can also be understood from other moral perspectives, for instance, from harboring good will to all (Kantian ethics), or acting virtuously (Aristotelian ethics). Whilst the consideration of discrimination focuses on who is a legitimate target of war, the principle of proportionality deals with what kind of force is morally permissible. In fighting a just war in which only military targets are attacked, it is still possible to breach morality by employing disproportionate force against an enemy. Whilst the earlier theoreticians, such as Thomas Aquinas, invoked the Christian concepts of charity and mercy, modern theorists may invoke either consequentialist or intrinsicist prescriptions, both are which remain problematic as the foregoing discussions have noted. However, it does not seem morally reasonable to completely gun down a barely armed belligerent tribe. At the battle of Omdurman in the Sudan, six machine gunners killed thousands of dervishes--the gunners may have been in the right to defend themselves, but the principle of proportionality demands that a battle ends before it becomes a massacre. Similarly, following the battle of Culloden, Cumberland ordered "No Quarter", which was not only a breach of the principle of discrimination, for his troops were permitted to kill the wounded as well as supporting civilians, but also a breach of the principle of proportionality, since the battle had been won, and the Jacobite cause effectively defeated on the battle field.

The principles of proportionality and discrimination aim to temper war's violence and range. They are complemented by other considerations that are not taken up in the traditional exposition of *jus in bello*, especially the issue of responsibility.

***Jus in bello* requires that the agents of war be held responsible for their actions. This ties in their actions to morality generally. Some, such as Saint Augustine argues against this assertion: "who is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals." Those who act according to a divine command, or even God's laws as enacted by the state and who put wicked men to death "have by no means violated the commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill.'"**

Whilst this issue is connected to the concepts of just cause, it does not follow that individuals waging a just, or unjust war, should be absolved of breaching the principles of just conduct. Readily it can be accepted that soldiers killing other soldiers is part of the nature of warfare, but when soldiers turn their weapons against non-combatants, or pursue their enemy beyond what is reasonable, then they are no longer committing legitimate acts of war but acts of murder. The principle of responsibility re-asserts the burden of abiding by rules in times of peace on those acting in war. The issues that arise from this principle include the morality of obeying orders (for example, when one knows those orders to be immoral), as well as the status of ignorance (not knowing of the effects of one's actions).

The foregoing has described the main tenets of the just war theory, as well as some of the problems that it entails. The theory bridges theoretical and applied ethics, since it demands an adherence, or at least a consideration of meta-ethical conditions and models, as well as prompting concern for the practicalities of war. A few of those practicalities have been mentioned here. Other areas of interest are: hostages, innocent threats, international blockades, sieges, the use of weapons of mass destruction or of anti-personnel weapons (e.g., land mines), and interventionism.

Alex Moseley

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Justification

"Justification" is a term used in both ethics and epistemology. In ethics it deals with determining right actions and appropriate beliefs. In epistemology, justification is the central component to knowledge as justified true belief.

As a component of knowledge, the concept of justification excludes beliefs arrived at through guesses or hunches since proper argumentation is built into our notion of knowledge. However, William James conceived of a type of justification (with reference to the belief in God) as the "will to believe." This concept does not involve empirical evidence or logical argumentation. When reason is neutral, it allows that one can be justified in belief through private evidence, such as the desire to know whether God exists.

Although one cannot have knowledge of a belief without justification, at the same time, one can be justified in believing something which is false. For example, if someone were sitting in an apartment with no windows and heard the meteorologist say that it was raining in their town, then we could say that belief was justified. The resident even hears noises which sounded like water drops falling outside, but it is a neighbor watering the flowers. Here is a set of extraordinary reasons for a justified belief that it is raining. However, it may be false that it is raining. Thus, justification is many times simply being able to give adequate reasons for a belief. This, though can lead us to false conclusions from mistaken beliefs or self deception.

Determining what counts as adequate reasons is an obstacle to providing justification. This process of reason giving can be viewed as argumentation in four major forms: inductive, deductive, conclusive, and *prima facie*. Inductive and deductive justification involve evidence and logical evaluation. In a conclusive argument, reasons are analyzed by asking if another rational human would have the same belief given the same reasons. *prima facie* argumentation is a process of giving several reasons for believing something and choosing the most important one.

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- Kant, Immanuel -- Metaphysics

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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Metaphysics



Immanuel Kant is one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy. His contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement that followed him. This portion of the encyclopedia entry will focus on his metaphysics and epistemology in one of his most important works, *The Critique of Pure Reason*. (All references will be to the A (1781) and B(1787) edition pages in Werner Pluhar's translation. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996.) A large part of Kant's work addresses the question "What can we know?" The answer, if it can be stated simply, is that our knowledge is constrained to mathematics and the science of the natural, empirical world. It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind's access to the empirical realm of space and time.

Historical Background to Kant

In order to understand Kant's position, we must understand the philosophical background that he was reacting to. First, I will present a brief overview of his predecessor's positions with a brief statement of Kant's objections, then I will return to a more detailed exposition of Kant's arguments. There are two major historical movements in the early modern period of philosophy that had a significant impact on Kant: Empiricism and Rationalism. Kant argues that both the method and the content of these philosophers' arguments contain serious flaws. A central epistemological problem for philosophers in both movements was determining how we can escape from within the confines of the human mind and the immediately knowable content of our own thoughts to acquire knowledge of the world outside of us. The Empiricists sought to accomplish this through the senses and *a posteriori* reasoning. The Rationalists attempted to use *a priori* reasoning to build the necessary bridge. A posteriori reasoning depends upon experience or contingent events in the world to provide us with information. That "Bill Clinton is president of the United States in 1999," for example, is something that I can know only through experience; I cannot determine this to be true through an analysis of the concepts of "president" or "Bill Clinton." A priori reasoning, in contrast, does not depend upon experience to inform it. The concept "bachelor" logically entails the ideas of an unmarried, adult, human male without my needing to conduct a survey of bachelors and men who are unmarried. Kant believed that this twofold distinction in kinds of knowledge was inadequate to the task of understanding metaphysics for reasons we will discuss in a moment.

Empiricism

Empiricists, such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, argued that human knowledge originates in our sensations. Locke, for instance, was a representative realist about the external world and placed great confidence in the ability of the senses to inform us of the properties that empirical objects really have in themselves. Locke had also argued that the mind is a blank slate, or a *tabula rasa,* that becomes populated with ideas by its interactions with the world. Experience teaches us everything, including concepts of relationship, identity, causation, and so on. Kant argues that the blank slate model of the mind is insufficient to explain the beliefs about objects that we have; some components of our beliefs must be brought by the mind to experience.

Berkeley's strict phenomenalism, in contrast to Locke, raised questions about the inference from the character of our sensations to conclusions about the real properties of mind-independent objects. Since the human mind is strictly limited to the senses for its input, Berkeley argued, it has no independent means by which to verify the accuracy of the match between sensations and the properties that objects possess in themselves. In fact, Berkeley rejected the very idea of mind-independent objects on the grounds that a mind is, by its nature, incapable of possessing an idea of such a thing. Hence, in Kant's terms, Berkeley was a material idealist. To the material idealist, knowledge of material objects is ideal or unachievable, not real. For Berkeley, mind-independent material objects are impossible and unknowable. In our sense experience we only have access to our mental representations, not to objects themselves. Berkeley argues that our judgments about objects are really judgments about these mental representations alone, not the substance

that gives rise to them. In the **Refutation of Material Idealism**, Kant argues that material idealism is actually incompatible with a position that Berkeley held, namely that we are capable of making judgments about our experience.

David Hume pursued Berkeley's empirical line of inquiry even further, calling into question even more of our common sense beliefs about the source and support of our sense perceptions. Hume maintains that we cannot provide a priori or a posteriori justifications for a number of our beliefs like, "Objects and subjects persist identically over time," or "Every event must have a cause." In Hume's hands, it becomes clear that empiricism cannot give us an epistemological justification for the claims about objects, subjects, and causes that we took to be most obvious and certain about the world.

Kant expresses deep dissatisfaction with the idealistic and seemingly skeptical results of the empirical lines of inquiry. In each case, Kant gives a number of arguments to show that Locke's, Berkeley's, and Hume's empiricist positions are untenable because they necessarily presupposes the very claims they set out to disprove. In fact, any coherent account of how we perform even the most rudimentary mental acts of self-awareness and making judgments about objects must presuppose these claims, Kant argues. Hence, while Kant is sympathetic with many parts of empiricism, ultimately it cannot be a satisfactory account of our experience of the world.

Rationalism

The Rationalists, principally Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, approached the problems of human knowledge from another angle. They hoped to escape the epistemological confines of the mind by constructing knowledge of the external world, the self, the soul, God, ethics, and science out of the simplest, indubitable ideas possessed innately by the mind. Leibniz in particular, thought that the world was knowable a priori, through an analysis of ideas and derivations done through logic. Supersensible knowledge, the Rationalists argued, can be achieved by means of reason. Descartes believed that certain truths, that "if I am thinking, I exist," for example, are invulnerable to the most pernicious skepticism. Armed with the knowledge of his own existence, Descartes hoped to build a foundation for all knowledge.

Kant's **Refutation of Material Idealism** works against Descartes' project as well as Berkeley's. Descartes believed that he could infer the existence of objects in space outside of him based on his awareness of his own existence coupled with an argument that God exists and is not deceiving him about the evidence of his senses. Kant argues in the Refutation chapter that knowledge of external objects cannot be inferential. Rather, the capacity to be aware of one's own existence in Descartes' famous *cogito* argument already presupposes that existence of objects in space and time outside of me.

Kant had also come to doubt the claims of the Rationalists because of what he called **Antinomies**, or contradictory, but validly proven pairs of claims that reason is compelled toward. From the basic principles that the Rationalists held, it is possible, Kant argues, to prove conflicting claims like, "The world has a beginning in time and is limited as regards space," and "The world has no beginning, and no limits in space." (A 426/B 454) Kant claims that antinomies like this one reveal fundamental methodological and metaphysical mistakes in the rationalist project. The contradictory claims could both be proven because they both shared the mistaken metaphysical assumption that we can have knowledge of things as they are in themselves, independent of the conditions of our experience of them.

The Antinomies can be resolved, Kant argues, if we understand the proper function and domain of the various faculties that contribute to produce knowledge. We must recognize that we cannot know things as they are in themselves and that our knowledge is subject to the conditions of our experience. The Rationalist project was doomed to failure because it did not take note of the contribution that our faculty of reason makes to our experience of objects. Their a priori analysis of our ideas could inform us about the content of our ideas, but it could not give a coherent demonstration of metaphysical truths about the external world, the self, the soul, God, and so on.

Kant's Answers to his Predecessors

Kant's answer to the problems generated by the two traditions mentioned above changed the face of philosophy. First, Kant argued that that old division between *a priori* truths and *a posteriori* truths employed by both camps was insufficient to describe the sort of metaphysical claims that were under dispute. An analysis of knowledge also requires a distinction between **synthetic** and **analytic** truths. In an analytic claim**,** the predicate is contained within the subject. In the claim, "Every body occupies space," the property of occupying space is revealed in an analysis of what it means to be a body. The subject of a synthetic claim, however, does not contain the predicate. In, "This tree is 120 feet tall," the concepts are synthesized or brought together to form a new claim that is not contained in any of the individual concepts. The Empiricists had not been able to prove **synthetic a priori** claims like "Every event must have a cause," because they had conflated "synthetic" and "a posteriori" as well as "analytic" and "a priori." Then they had assumed that the two resulting categories were exhaustive. A synthetic a priori claim, Kant argues, is one that must be true without

appealing to experience, yet the predicate is not logically contained within the subject, so it is no surprise that the Empiricists failed to produce the sought after justification. The Rationalists had similarly conflated the four terms and mistakenly proceeded as if claims like, "The self is a simple substance," could be proven analytically and a priori.

Synthetic a priori claims, Kant argues, demand an entirely different kind of proof than those required for analytic, a priori claims or synthetic, a posteriori claims. Indications for how to proceed, Kant says, can be found in the examples of synthetic a priori claims in natural science and mathematics, specifically geometry. Claims like Newton's, "the quantity of matter is always preserved," and the geometer's claim, "the angles of a triangle always add up to 180 degrees" are known a priori, but they cannot be known merely from an analysis of the concepts of matter or triangle. We must "go outside and beyond the concept. . . joining to it a priori in thought something which I have not thought in it." (B 18) A synthetic a priori claim constructs upon and adds to what is contained analytically in a concept without appealing to experience. So if we are to solve the problems generated by Empiricism and Rationalism, the central question of metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason* reduces to "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" (19) If we can answer that question, then we can determine the possibility, legitimacy, and range of all metaphysical claims.

Kant's Copernican Revolution: Mind Making Nature

Kant's answer to the question is complicated, but his conclusion is that a number of synthetic a priori claims, like those from geometry and the natural sciences, are true because of the structure of the mind that knows them. "Every event must have a cause" cannot be proven by experience, but experience is impossible without it because it describes the way the mind must necessarily order its representations. We can understand Kant's argument again by considering his predecessors. According to the Rationalist and Empiricist traditions, the mind is passive either because it finds itself possessing innate, well-formed ideas ready for analysis, or because it receives ideas of objects into a kind of empty theater, or blank slate. Kant's crucial insight here is to argue that experience of a world as we have it is only possible if the mind provides a systematic structuring of its representations. This structuring is below the level of, or logically prior to, the mental representations that the Empiricists and Rationalists analyzed. Their epistemological and metaphysical theories could not adequately explain the sort of judgments or experience we have because they only considered the results of the mind's interaction with the world, not the nature of the mind's contribution. Kant's methodological innovation was to employ what he calls a **transcendental argument** to prove synthetic a priori claims. Typically, a transcendental argument attempts to prove a conclusion about the necessary structure of knowledge on the basis of an incontrovertible mental act. Kant argues in the **Refutation of Material Idealism** that "There are objects that exist in space and time outside of me," (B 274) which cannot be proven by a priori or a posteriori methods, is a necessary condition of the possibility of being aware of one's own existence. It would not be possible to be aware of myself as existing, he says, without presupposing the existing of something permanent outside of me to distinguish myself from. I am aware of myself as existing. Therefore, there is something permanent outside of me.

This argument is one of many transcendental arguments that Kant gives that focuses on the contribution that the mind itself makes to its experience. These arguments lead Kant to conclude that the Empiricists' assertion that experience is the source of all our ideas. It must be the mind's structuring, Kant argues, that makes experience possible. If there are features of experience that the mind brings to objects rather than given to the mind by objects, that would explain why they are indispensable to experience but unsubstantiated in it. And that would explain why we can give a transcendental argument for the necessity of these features. Kant thought that Berkeley and Hume identified at least part of the mind's a priori contribution to experience with the list of claims that they said were unsubstantiated on empirical grounds: "Every event must have a cause," "There are mind-independent objects that persist over time," and "Identical subjects persist over time." The empiricist project must be incomplete since these claims are necessarily presupposed in our judgments, a point Berkeley and Hume failed to see. So, Kant argues that a philosophical investigation into the nature of the external world must be as much an inquiry into the features and activity of the mind that knows it.

The idea that the mind plays an active role in structuring reality is so familiar to us now that it is difficult for us to see what a pivotal insight this was for Kant. He was well aware of the idea's power to overturn the philosophical worldviews of his contemporaries and predecessors, however. He even somewhat immodestly likens his situation to that of Copernicus in revolutionizing our worldview. On the Lockean view, mental content is given to the mind by the objects in the world. Their properties migrate into the mind, revealing the true nature of objects. Kant says, "Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects" (B xvi). But that approach cannot explain why some claims like, "every event must have a cause," are a priori true. Similarly, Copernicus recognized that the movement of the stars cannot be explained by making them revolve around the observer; it is the observer that must be revolving. Analogously, Kant argued that we must reformulate the way we think about our relationship to objects. It is the mind itself which gives objects at least some of their characteristics because they must conform to its structure and conceptual capacities. Thus, the mind's active role in helping to create a world that is experiencable must put it at the center of our philosophical investigations. The appropriate starting place for any philosophical inquiry into knowledge, Kant decides, is with the mind that can have that knowledge.

Kant's critical turn toward the mind of the knower is ambitious and challenging. Kant has rejected the dogmatic metaphysics of the Rationalists that promises supersensible knowledge. And he has argued that Empiricism faces serious limitations. His transcendental method will allow him to analyze the metaphysical requirements of the empirical method without venturing into speculative and ungrounded metaphysics. In this context, determining the "transcendental" components of knowledge means determining, "all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*." (A 12/B 25)

The project of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is also challenging because in the analysis of the mind's transcendental contributions to experience we must employ the mind, the only tool we have, to investigate the mind. We must use the faculties of knowledge to determine the limits of knowledge, so Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is both a critique that takes pure reason as its subject matter, and a critique that is conducted by pure reason.

Kant's argument that the mind makes an a priori contribution to experiences should not be mistaken for an argument like the Rationalists' that the mind possesses innate ideas like, "God is a perfect being." Kant rejects the claim that there are complete propositions like this one etched on the fabric of the mind. He argues that the mind provides a formal structuring that allows for the conjoining of concepts into judgments, but that structuring itself has no content. The mind is devoid of content until interaction with the world actuates these formal constraints. The mind possesses a priori templates for judgments, not a priori judgments.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism

With Kant's claim that the mind of the knower makes an active contribution to experience of objects before us, we are in a better position to understand **transcendental idealism**. Kant's arguments are designed to show the limitations of our knowledge. The Rationalists believed that we could possess metaphysical knowledge about God, souls, substance, and so; they believed such knowledge was transcendentally real. Kant argues, however, that we cannot have knowledge of the realm beyond the empirical. That is, transcendental knowledge is ideal, not real, for minds like ours. Kant identifies two a priori sources of these constraints. The mind has a receptive capacity, or the **sensibility**, and the mind possesses a conceptual capacity, or the **understanding.**

In the **Transcendental Aesthetic** section of the *Critique*, Kant argues that sensibility is the understanding's means of accessing objects. The reason synthetic a priori judgments are possible in geometry, Kant argues, is that space is an a priori form of sensibility. That is, we can know the claims of geometry with a priori certainty (which we do) only if experiencing objects in space is the necessary mode of our experience. Kant also argues that we cannot experience objects without being able to represent them spatially. It is impossible to grasp an object as an object unless we delineate the region of space it occupies. Without a spatial representation, our sensations are undifferentiated and we cannot ascribe properties to particular objects. Time, Kant argues, is also necessary as a form or condition of our intuitions of objects. The idea of time itself cannot be gathered from experience because succession and simultaneity of objects, the phenomena that would indicate the passage of time, would be impossible to represent if we did not already possess the capacity to represent objects in time.

Another way to understand Kant's point here is that it is impossible for us to have any experience of objects that are not in time and space. Furthermore, space and time themselves cannot be perceived directly, so they must be the form by which experience of objects is had. A consciousness that apprehends objects directly, as they are in themselves and not by means of space and time, is possible--God, Kant says, has a purely intuitive consciousness--but our apprehension of objects is always mediated by the conditions of sensibility. Any discursive or concept using consciousness (A 230/B 283) like ours must apprehend objects as occupying a region of space and persisting for some duration of time.

Subjecting sensations to the a priori conditions of space and time is not sufficient to make judging objects possible. Kant argues that the understanding must provide the concepts, which are rules for identifying what is common or universal in different representations.(A 106) He says, "without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind." (B 75) Locke's mistake was believing that our sensible apprehensions of objects are thinkable and reveal the properties of the objects themselves. In the **Analytic of Concepts** section of the *Critique*, Kant argues that in order to think about the input from sensibility, sensations must conform to the conceptual structure that the mind has available to it. By applying concepts, the understanding takes the particulars that are given in sensation and identifies what is common and general about them. A concept of "shelter" for instance, allows me to identify what is common in particular representations of a house, a tent, and a cave.

The empiricist might object at this point by insisting that such concepts do arise from experience, raising questions about Kant's claim that the mind brings an a priori conceptual structure to the world. Indeed, concepts like "shelter" do arise partly from experience. But Kant raises a more fundamental issue. An empirical derivation is not sufficient to explain all of our concepts. As we have seen, Hume argued, and Kant accepts, that we cannot empirically derive our concepts of causation, substance, self, identity, and so forth. What Hume had failed to see, Kant argues, is that even the possibility of making judgments about objects, to which Hume would assent,

presupposes the possession of these fundamental concepts. Hume had argued for a sort of associationism to explain how we arrive at causal beliefs. My idea of a moving cue ball, becomes associated with my idea of the eight ball that is struck and falls into the pocket. Under the right circumstances, repeated impressions of the second following the first produces a belief in me that the first *causes* the second.

The problem that Kant points out is that a Humean association of ideas already presupposes that we can conceive of identical, persistent objects that have regular, predictable, causal behavior. And being able to conceive of objects in this rich sense presupposes that the mind makes several a priori contributions. I must be able to separate the objects from each other in my sensations, and from my sensations of myself. I must be able to attribute properties to the objects. I must be able to conceive of an external world with its own course of events that is separate from the stream of perceptions in my consciousness. These components of experience cannot be found in experience because they constitute it. The mind's a priori conceptual contribution to experience can be enumerated by a special set of concepts that make all other empirical concepts and judgments possible. These concepts cannot be experienced directly; they are only manifest as the form which particular judgments of objects take. Kant believes that formal logic has already revealed what the fundamental categories of thought are. The special set of concepts is Kant's **Table of Categories**, which are taken mostly from Aristotle with a few revisions:

Of Quantity

Unity

Plurality

Totality

Of Quality

Reality

Negation

Limitation

Of Relation

Inherence and Subsistence

Causality and Dependence

Community

Of Modality

Possibility-Impossibility

Existence-Nonexistence

Necessity-Contingency

While Kant does not give a formal derivation of it, he believes that this is the complete and necessary list of the a priori contributions that the understanding brings to its judgments of the world. Every judgment that the understanding can make must fall under the table of categories. And subsuming spatiotemporal sensations under the formal structure of the categories makes judgments, and ultimately knowledge, of empirical objects possible.

Since objects can only be experienced spatiotemporally, the only application of concepts that yields knowledge is to the empirical, spatiotemporal world. Beyond that realm, there can be no sensations of objects for the understanding to judge, rightly or wrongly. Since intuitions of the physical world are lacking when we speculate about what lies beyond, metaphysical knowledge, or knowledge of the world outside the physical, is impossible. Claiming to have knowledge from the application of concepts beyond the bounds of sensation results in the empty and illusory **transcendent metaphysics** of Rationalism that Kant reacts against.

It should be pointed out, however, that Kant is not endorsing an idealism about objects like Berkeley's. That is, Kant does not believe that material objects are unknowable or impossible. While Kant is a transcendental idealist--he believes the nature of objects as they are in themselves is unknowable to us--knowledge of appearances is nevertheless possible. As noted above, in The Refutation of Material Idealism, Kant argues that the ordinary self-consciousness that Berkeley and Descartes would grant implies "the existence of objects in space outside me." (B 275) Consciousness of myself would not be possible if I were not able to make determinant judgments about objects that exist outside of me and have states that are independent of the of my inner experience. Another way to put the point is to say that the fact that the mind of the knower makes the a priori contribution does not mean that space and time or the categories are mere figments of the imagination. Kant is an **empirical realist** about the world we experience; we can know objects as they appear to us. He gives a robust defense of science and the study of the natural world from his argument about the mind's role in making nature. All discursive, rational beings must conceive of the physical world as spatially and temporally unified, he argues. And the table of categories is derived from the most basic, universal forms of logical inference, Kant believes. Therefore, it

must be shared by all rational beings. So those beings also share judgments of an intersubjective, unified, public realm of empirical objects. Hence, objective knowledge of the scientific or natural world is possible. Indeed, Kant believes that the examples of Newton and Galileo show it is actual. So Berkeley's claims that we do not know objects outside of us and that such knowledge is impossible are both mistaken.

In conjunction with his analysis of the possibility of knowing empirical objects, Kant gives an analysis of the knowing subject that has sometimes been called his **transcendental psychology**. Much of Kant's argument can be seen as subjective, not because of variations from mind to mind, but because the source of necessity and universality is in the mind of the knowing subject, not in objects themselves. Kant draws several conclusions about what is necessarily true of any consciousness that employs the faculties of sensibility and understanding to produce empirical judgments. As we have seen, a mind that employs concepts must have a receptive faculty that provides the content of judgments. Space and time are the necessary forms of apprehension for the receptive faculty. The mind that has experience must also have a faculty of combination or **synthesis**, the **imagination** for Kant, that apprehends the data of sense, reproduces it for the understanding, and recognizes their features according to the conceptual framework provided by the categories. The mind must also have a faculty of **understanding** that provides empirical concepts and the categories for judgment. The various faculties that make judgment possible must be unified into one mind. And it must be identical over time if it is going to apply its concepts to objects over time. Kant here addresses Hume's famous assertion that introspection reveals nothing more than a bundle of sensations that we group together and call the self. Judgments would not be possible, Kant maintains, if the mind that senses is not the same as the mind that possesses the forms of sensibility. And that mind must be the same as the mind that employs the table of categories, that contributes empirical concepts to judgment, and that synthesizes the whole into knowledge of a unified, empirical world. So the fact that we can empirically judge proves, contra Hume, that the mind cannot be a mere bundle of disparate introspected sensations. In his works on ethics Kant will also argue that this mind is the source of spontaneous, free, and moral action. Kant believes that all the threads of his transcendental philosophy come together in this "highest point" which he calls the **transcendental unity of apperception.**

Kant's Analytic of Principles

We have seen the progressive stages of Kant's analysis of the faculties of the mind which reveals the transcendental structuring of experience performed by these faculties. First, in his analysis of **sensibility**, he argues for the necessarily spatiotemporal character of sensation. Then Kant analyzes the **understanding**, the faculty that applies concepts to sensory experience. He concludes that the categories provide a necessary, foundational template for our concepts to map onto our experience. In addition to providing these transcendental concepts, the understanding also is the source of ordinary empirical concepts that make judgments about objects possible. The understanding provides concepts as the rules for identifying the properties in our representations.

Kant's next concern is with the faculty of judgment, "If understanding as such is explicated as our power of rules, then the power of judgment is the ability to subsume under rules, i.e., to distinguish whether something does or does not fall under a given rule." (A 132/B 172). The next stage in Kant's project will be to analyze the formal or transcendental features of experience that enable judgment, if there are any such features besides what the previous stages have identified. The cognitive power of judgment does have a transcendental structure. Kant argues that there are a number of principles that must necessarily be true of experience in order for judgment to be possible. Kant's analysis of judgment and the arguments for these principles are contained in his **Analytic of Principles**.

Within the Analytic, Kant first addresses the challenge of subsuming particular sensations under general categories in the **Schematism** section. *Transcendental schemata*, Kant argues, allow us to identify the homogeneous features picked out by concepts from the heterogeneous content of our sensations. Judgment is only possible if the mind can recognize the components in the diverse and disorganized data of sense that make those sensations an instance of a concept or concepts. A schema makes it possible, for instance, to subsume the concrete and particular sensations of an Airedale, a Chihuahua, and a Labrador all under the more abstract concept "dog."

The full extent of Kant's Copernican revolution becomes even more clear in the rest of the Analytic of Principles. That is, the role of the mind in making nature is not limited to space, time, and the categories. In the Analytic of Principles, Kant argues that even the necessary conformity of objects to natural law arises from the mind. Thus far, Kant's transcendental method has permitted him to reveal the a priori components of sensations, the a priori concepts. In the sections titled the Axioms, Anticipations, Analogies, and Postulates, he argues that there are a priori judgments that must necessarily govern all appearances of objects. These judgments are a function of the table of categories' role in determining all possible judgments, so the four sections map onto the four headings of that table. I include all of the a priori judgments, or principles, here to illustrate the earlier claims about Kant's empirical realism, and to show the intimate relationship Kant saw between his project and that of the natural sciences:

Axioms of Intuition

All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.

Anticipations of Perception

In all appearances the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree.

Analogies of Experience

In all variations by appearances substance is permanent, and its quantum in nature is neither increased nor decreased.

All changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect.

All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction.

Postulates of Empirical Thought

What agrees (in terms of intuition and concepts) with the formal conditions of experience is possible.

What coheres with the material conditions of experience (with sensation) is actual.

That whose coherence with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary (exists necessarily)

Kant's Dialectic

The discussion of Kant's metaphysics and epistemology so far (including the Analytic of Principles)has been confined primarily to the section of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that Kant calls the **Transcendental Analytic**. The purpose of the Analytic, we are told, is "the rarely attempted dissection of the power of the understanding itself." (A 65/B 90). Kant's project has been to develop the full argument for his theory about the mind's contribution to knowledge of the world. Once that theory is in place, we are in a position to see the errors that are caused by transgressions of the boundaries to knowledge established by Kant's transcendental idealism and empirical realism. Kant calls judgments that pretend to have knowledge beyond these boundaries and that even require us to tear down the limits that he has placed on knowledge, **transcendent judgments.** The **Transcendental Dialectic** section of the book is devoted to uncovering the illusion of knowledge created by transcendent judgments and explaining why the temptation to believe them persists. Kant argues that the proper functioning of the faculties of sensibility and the understanding combine to draw reason, or the cognitive power of inference, inexorably into mistakes. The faculty of reason naturally seeks the highest ground of unconditional unity. It seeks to unify and subsume all particular experiences under higher and higher principles of knowledge. But sensibility cannot by its nature provide the intuitions that would make knowledge of the highest principles and of things as they are in themselves possible. Nevertheless, reason, in its function as the faculty of inference, inevitably draws conclusions about what lies beyond the boundaries of sensibility. The unfolding of this conflict between the faculties reveals more about the mind's relationship to the world it seeks to know and the possibility of a science of metaphysics.

Kant believes that Aristotle's logic of the **syllogism** captures the logic employed by reason. The resulting mistakes from the inevitable

conflict between sensibility and reason reflect the logic of Aristotle's **syllogism.** Corresponding to the three basic kinds of syllogism are three dialectic mistakes or illusions of transcendent knowledge that cannot be real. Kant's discussion of these three classes of mistakes are contained in the **Paralogisms,** the **Antinomies,** and the **Ideals of Reason**. The Dialectic explains the illusions of reason in these sections. But since the illusions arise from the structure of our faculties, they will not cease to have their influence on our minds any more than we can prevent the moon from seeming larger when it is on the horizon than when it is overhead. (A 297/B 354).

In the **Paralogisms**, Kant argues that a failure to recognize the difference between appearances and things in themselves, particularly in the case of the introspected self, lead us into transcendent error. Kant argues against several conclusions encouraged by Descartes and the rational psychologists, who believed they could build human knowledge from the "I think" of the *cogito* argument. From the "I think" of self-awareness we can infer, they maintain, that the self or soul is 1) simple, 2) immaterial, 3) an identical substance and 4) that we perceive it directly, in contrast to external objects whose existence is merely possible. That is, the rational psychologists claimed to have knowledge of the self as transcendentally real. Kant believes that it is impossible to demonstrate any of these four claims, and that the mistaken claims to knowledge stem from a failure to see the real nature of our apprehension of the "I." Reason cannot fail to apply the categories to its judgments of the self, and that application gives rise to these four conclusions about the self that correspond roughly to the four headings in the table of categories. But to take the self as an object of knowledge here is to pretend to have knowledge of the self as it is in itself, not as it appears to us. Our representation of the "I" itself is empty. It is subject to the condition of inner sense, time, but not the condition of outer sense, space, so it cannot be a proper object of knowledge. It can be *thought* through concepts, but without the commensurate *spatial* and temporal intuitions, it cannot be known. Each of the four paralogisms explains the categorical structure of reason that led the rational psychologists to mistake the self as it appears to us for the self as it is in itself.

We have already mentioned the **Antinomies**, in which Kant analyzes the methodological problems of the Rationalist project. Kant sees the Antinomies as the unresolved dialogue between skepticism and dogmatism about knowledge of the world. There are four antinomies, again corresponding to the four headings of the table of categories, that are generated by reason's attempts to achieve complete knowledge of the realm beyond the empirical. Each antinomy has a thesis and an antithesis, both of which can be validly proven, and since each makes a claim that is beyond the grasp of spatiotemporal sensation, neither can be confirmed or denied by experience. The First Antinomy argues both that the world has a beginning in time and space, and no beginning in time and space. The Second Antinomy's arguments are that every composite substance is made of simple parts and that nothing is composed of simple parts. The Third Antinomy's thesis is that agents like ourselves have freedom and its antithesis is that they do not. The Fourth Antinomy contains arguments both for and against the existence of a necessary being in the world. The seemingly irreconcilable claims of the Antinomies can only be resolved by seeing them as the product of the conflict of the faculties and by recognizing the proper sphere of our knowledge in each case. In each of them, the idea of "absolute totality, which holds only as a condition of things in themselves, has been applied to appearances" (A 506/B534).

The result of Kant' analysis of the Antinomies is that we can reject both claims of the first two and accept both claims of the last two, if we understand their proper domains. In the first Antinomy, the world as it appears to us is neither finite since we can always inquire about its beginning or end, nor is it infinite because finite beings like ourselves cannot cognize an infinite whole. As an empirical object, Kant argues, it is indefinitely constructible for our minds. As it is in itself, independent of the conditions of our thought, should not be identified as finite or infinite since both are categorial conditions of our thought. Kant's resolution of the third Antinomy (A 445/B 473) clarifies his position on freedom. He considers the two competing hypotheses of speculative metaphysics that there are different types of causality in the world: 1) there are natural causes which are themselves governed by the laws of nature as well as uncaused causes like ourselves that can act freely, or 2) the causal laws of nature entirely govern the world including our actions. The conflict between these contrary claims can be resolved, Kant argues, by taking his critical turn and recognizing that it is impossible for any cause to be thought of as uncaused itself in the realm of space and time. But reason, in trying to understand the ground of all things, strives to unify its knowledge beyond the empirical realm. The empirical world, considered by itself, cannot provide us with ultimate reasons. So if we do not assume a first or free cause we cannot completely explain causal series in the world. So for the Third Antinomy, as for all of the Antinomies, the domain of the Thesis is the intellectual, rational, noumenal world. The domain of the Antithesis is the spatiotemporal world.

The Ideas of Reason

The faculty of reason has two employments. For the most part, we have engaged in an analysis of theoretical reason which has determined the limits and requirements of the employment of the faculty of reason to obtain knowledge. Theoretical reason, Kant says, makes it possible to cognize what is. But reason has its practical employment in determining what ought to be as well. (A 633/B 661) This distinction roughly corresponds to the two philosophical enterprises of metaphysics and ethics. Reason's practical use is manifest in the regulative function of certain concepts that we must think with regard to the world, even though we can have no knowledge of them.

Kant believes that, "Human reason is by its nature architectonic." (A 474/B 502). That is, reason thinks of all cognitions as belonging to a unified and organized system. Reason is our faculty of making inferences and of identifying the grounds behind every truth. It allows us to move from the particular and contingent to the global and universal. I infer that "Caius is mortal" from the fact that "Caius is a man" and the universal claim, "All men are mortal." In this fashion, reason seeks higher and higher levels of generality in order to explain the way things are. In a different kind of example, the biologist's classification of every living thing into a kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species, illustrates reason's ambition to subsume the world into an ordered, unified system. The entire empirical world, Kant argues, must be conceived of by reason as causally necessitated (as we saw in the Analogies). We must connect, "one state with a previous state upon which the state follows according to a rule." Each cause, and each cause's cause, and each additional ascending cause must itself have a cause. Reason generates this hierarchy that combines to provide the mind with a conception of a whole system of nature. Kant believes that it is part of the function of reason to strive for a complete, determinate understanding of the natural world. But our analysis of theoretical reason has made it clear that we can never have knowledge of the totality of things because we cannot have the requisite sensations of the totality, hence one of the necessary conditions of knowledge is not met. Nevertheless, reason seeks a state of rest from the regression of conditioned, empirical judgments in some unconditioned ground that can complete the series (A 584/B 612). Reason's structure pushes us to accept certain *ideas of reason* that allow completion of its striving for unity. We must assume the ideas of **God, freedom,** and **immortality**, Kant says, not as objects of knowledge, but as practical necessities for the employment of reason in the realm where we can have knowledge. By denying the possibility of knowledge of these ideas, yet arguing for their role in the system of reason, Kant had to, "annul knowledge in order to make room for faith." (B xxx).

Kant's Ethics

It is rare for a philosopher in any era to make a significant impact on any single topic in philosophy. For a philosopher to impact as many different areas as Kant did is extraordinary. His ethical theory has been as, if not more, influential than his work in epistemology and metaphysics. Most of Kant's work on ethics is presented in two works. *The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) is Kant's "search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality." In *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1787) Kant attempts to unify his account of practical reason with his work in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant is the primary proponent in history of what is called deontological ethics. Deontology is the study of duty. On Kant's view, the sole feature that gives an action moral worth is not the outcome that is achieved by the action, but the motive that is behind the action. The categorical imperative is Kant's famous statement of this duty: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

Reason and Freedom

For Kant, as we have seen, the drive for total, systematic knowledge in reason can only be fulfilled with assumptions that empirical observation cannot support. The metaphysical facts about the ultimate nature of things in themselves must remain a mystery to us because of the spatiotemporal constraints on sensibility. When we think about the nature of things in themselves or the ultimate ground of the empirical world, Kant has argued that we are still constrained to think through the categories, we cannot think otherwise, but we can have no knowledge because sensation provides our concepts with no content. So, reason is put at odds with itself because it is constrained by the limits of its transcendental structure, but it seeks to have complete knowledge that would take it beyond those limits.

Freedom plays a central role in Kant's ethics because the possibility of moral judgments presupposes it. Freedom is an idea of reason that serves an indispensable practical function. Without the assumption of freedom, reason cannot act. If we think of ourselves as completely causally determined, and not as uncaused causes ourselves, then any attempt to conceive of a rule that prescribes the means by which some end can be achieved is pointless. I cannot both think of myself as entirely subject to causal law and as being able to act according to the conception of a principle that gives guidance to my will. We cannot help but think of our actions as the result of an uncaused cause if we are to act at all and employ reason to accomplish ends and understand the world.

So reason has an unavoidable interest in thinking of itself as free. That is, theoretical reason cannot demonstrate freedom, but practical reason must assume for the purpose of action. Having the ability to make judgments and apply reason puts us outside that system of causally necessitated events. "Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act--without, i.e., needing to be preceded by another cause by means of which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection," Kant says. (A 533/B 561) In its intellectual domain, reason must think of itself as free.

It is dissatisfying that he cannot demonstrate freedom, nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that we must think of ourselves as free. In a sense, Kant is agreeing with the common sense view that how I choose to act makes a difference in how I actually act. Even if it

were possible to give a predictive empirical account of why I act as I do, say on the grounds of a functionalist psychological theory, those considerations would mean nothing to me in my deliberations. When I make a decision about what to do, about which car to buy, for instance, the mechanism at work in my nervous system makes no difference *to me*. I still have to peruse *Consumer Reports*, consider my options, reflect on my needs, and decide on the basis of the application of general principles. My first person perspective is unavoidable, hence the deliberative, intellectual process of choice is unavoidable.

The Duality of the Human Situation

The question of moral action is not an issue for two classes of beings, according to Kant. The animal consciousness, the purely sensuous being, is entirely subject to causal determination. It is part of the causal chains of the empirical world, but not an originator of causes the way humans are. Hence, rightness or wrongness, as concepts that apply to situations one has control over, do not apply. We do not morally fault the lion for killing the gazelle, or even for killing its own young. The actions of a purely rational being, by contrast, are in perfect accord with moral principles, Kant says. There is nothing in such a being's nature to make it falter. Its will always conforms with the dictates of reason. Humans are between the two worlds. We are both sensible and intellectual, as was pointed out in the discussion of the first *Critique*. We are neither wholly determined to act by natural impulse, nor are we free of non-rational impulse. Hence we need rules of conduct. We need, and reason is compelled to provide, a principle that declares how we ought to act when it is in our power to choose

Since we find ourselves in the situation of possessing reason, being able to act according to our own conception of rules, there is a special burden on us. Other creatures are *acted upon* by the world. But having the ability to choose the principle to guide our actions makes us *actors*. We must exercise our will and our reason to act. Will is the capacity to act according to the principles provided by reason. Reason assumes freedom and conceives of principles of action in order to function.

Two problems face us however. First, we are not wholly rational beings, so we are liable to succumb to our non-rational impulses. Second, even when we exercise our reason fully, we often cannot know which action is the best. The fact that we can choose between alternate courses of actions (we are not determined to act by instinct or reason) introduces the possibility that there can be better or worse ways of achieving our ends and better or worse ends, depending upon the criteria we adopt. The presence of two different kinds of object in the world adds another dimension, a moral dimension, to our deliberations. Roughly speaking, we can divide the world into beings with reason and will like ourselves and things that lack those faculties. We can think of these classes of things as ends-in-themselves and mere means-to-ends, respectively. Ends-in-themselves are autonomous beings with their own agendas; failing to recognize their capacity to determine their own actions would be to thwart their freedom and undermine reason itself. When we reflect on alternative courses of action, means-to-ends, things like buildings, rocks, and trees, deserve no special status in our deliberations about what goals we should have and what means we use to achieve them. The class of ends-in-themselves, reasoning agents like ourselves, however, do have a special status in our considerations about what goals we should have and the means we employ to accomplish them. Moral actions, for Kant, are actions where reason leads, rather than follows, and actions where we must take other beings that act according to their own conception of the law, into account.

The Good Will

The will, Kant says, is the faculty of acting according to a conception of law. When we act, whether or not we achieve what we intend with our actions is often beyond our control, so the morality of our actions does not depend upon their outcome. What we can control, however, is the will behind the action. That is, we can will to act according to one law rather than another. The morality of an action, therefore, must be assessed in terms of the motivation behind it. If two people, Smith and Jones, perform the same act, from the same conception of the law, but events beyond Smith's control prevent her from achieving her goal, Smith is not less praiseworthy for not succeeding. We must consider them on equal moral ground in terms of the will behind their actions.

The only thing that is good without qualification is the good will, Kant says. All other candidates for an intrinsic good have problems, Kant argues. Courage, health, and wealth can all be used for ill purposes, Kant argues, and therefore cannot be intrinsically good. Happiness is not intrinsically good because even being worthy of happiness, Kant says, requires that one possess a good will. The good will is the only unconditional good despite all encroachments. Misfortune may render someone incapable of achieving her goals, for instance, but the goodness of her will remains.

Goodness cannot arise from acting on impulse or natural inclination, even if impulse coincides with duty. It can only arise from conceiving of one's actions in a certain way. A shopkeeper, Kant says, might do what is in accord with duty and not overcharge a child. Kant argues, "it is not sufficient to do that which should be morally good that it conform to the law; it must be done for the sake of the law." (*Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *Akademie pagination* 390) There is a clear moral difference between the shopkeeper that does it for his own advantage to keep from offending other customers and the shopkeeper who does it from duty and

the principle of honesty.(*Ibid.*, 398) Likewise, in another of Kant's carefully studied examples, the kind act of the person who overcomes a natural lack of sympathy for other people out of respect for duty has moral worth, whereas the same kind act of the person who naturally takes pleasure in spreading joy does not. A person's moral worth cannot be dependent upon what nature endowed them with accidentally. The selfishly motivated shopkeeper and the naturally kind person both act on equally subjective and accidental grounds. What matters to morality is that the actor think about their actions in the right manner.

We might be tempted to think that the motivation that makes an action good is having a positive goal--to make people happy, or to provide some benefit. But that is not the right sort of motive, Kant says. No outcome, should we achieve it, can be unconditionally good. Fortune can be misused, what we thought would induce benefit might actually bring harm, and happiness might be undeserved. Hoping to achieve some particular end, no matter how beneficial it may seem, is not purely and unconditionally good. It is not the effect or even the intended effect that bestows moral character on an action. All intended effects "could be brought about through other causes and would not require the will of a rational being, while the highest and unconditional good can be found only in such a will." (*Ibid.*, 401) It is the possession of a rationally guided will that adds a moral dimension to one's acts. So it is the recognition and appreciation of duty itself that must drive our actions.

Duty

What is the duty that is to motivate our actions and to give them moral value? Kant distinguishes two kinds of law produced by reason. Given some end we wish to achieve, reason can provide a **hypothetical imperative**, or rule of action for achieving that end. A hypothetical imperative says that *if* you wish to buy a new car, *then* you must determine what sort of cars are available for purchase. Conceiving of a means to achieve some desired end is by far the most common employment of reason. But Kant has shown that the acceptable conception of the moral law cannot be merely hypothetical. Our actions cannot be moral on the ground of some conditional purpose or goal. Morality requires an unconditional statement of one's duty.

And in fact, reason produces an absolute statement of moral action. The moral imperative is unconditional; that is, its imperative force is not tempered by the conditional "*if* I want to achieve some end, *then* do X." It simply states, do X. Kant believes that reason dictates a **categorical imperative** for moral action. He gives at least three formulations of the Categorical Imperative.

1. "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (*Ibid.*, 422)
2. "Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature." (*Ibid*)
3. Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." (*Ibid.*, 429)

What are Kant's arguments for the Categorical Imperative? First, consider an example. Consider the person who needs to borrow money and is considering making a false promise to pay it back. The maxim that could be invoked is, "when I need of money, borrow it, promising to repay it, even though I do not intend to." But when we apply the universality test to this maxim it becomes clear that if everyone were to act in this fashion, the institution of promising itself would be undermined. The borrower makes a promise, willing that there be no such thing as promises. Thus such an action fails the universality test.

The argument for the first formulation of the categorical imperative can be thought of this way. We have seen that in order to be good, we must remove inclination and the consideration of any particular goal from our motivation to act. The act cannot be good if it arises from subjective impulse. Nor can it be good because it seeks after some particular goal which might not attain the good we seek or could come about through happenstance. We must abstract away from all hoped for effects. If we remove all subjectivity and particularity from motivation we are only left with will to universality. The question "what rule determines what I ought to do in this situation?" becomes "what rule ought to universally guide action?" What we must do in any situation of moral choice is act according to a maxim that we would will everyone to act according to.

The second version of the Categorical Imperative invokes Kant's conception of nature and draws on the first *Critique*. In the earlier discussion of nature, we saw that the mind necessarily structures nature. And reason, in its seeking of ever higher grounds of explanation, strives to achieve unified knowledge of nature. A guide for us in moral matters is to think of what would not be possible to will universally. Maxims that fail the test of the categorical imperative generate a contradiction. Laws of nature cannot be contradictory. So if a maxim cannot be willed to be a law of nature, it is not moral.

The third version of the categorical imperative ties Kant's whole moral theory together. Insofar as they possess a rational will, people are set off in the natural order of things. They are not merely subject to the forces that act upon them; they are not merely means to ends. They are ends in themselves. All means to an end have a merely conditional worth because they are valuable only for achieving something else. The possessor of a rational will, however, is the only thing with unconditional worth. The possession of rationality puts all beings on the same footing, "every other rational being thinks of his existence by means of the same rational ground which holds also for myself; thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible

to derive all laws of the will." (*Ibid.*, 429)

Kant's Criticisms of Utilitarianism

Kant's criticisms of utilitarianism have become famous enough to warrant some separate discussion. Utilitarian moral theories evaluate the moral worth of action on the basis of happiness that is produced by an action. Whatever produces the most happiness in the most people is the moral course of action. Kant has an insightful objection to moral evaluations of this sort. The essence of the objection is that utilitarian theories actually devalue the individuals it is supposed to benefit. If we allow utilitarian calculations to motivate our actions, we are allowing the valuation of one person's welfare and interests in terms of what good they can be used for. It would be possible, for instance, to justify sacrificing one individual for the benefits of others if the utilitarian calculations promise more benefit. Doing so would be the worst example of treating someone utterly as a means and not as an end in themselves.

Another way to consider his objection is to note that utilitarian theories are driven by the merely contingent inclination in humans for pleasure and happiness, not by the universal moral law dictated by reason. To act in pursuit of happiness is arbitrary and subjective, and is no more moral than acting on the basis of greed, or selfishness. All three emanate from subjective, non-rational grounds. The danger of utilitarianism lies in its embracing of baser instincts, while rejecting the indispensable role of reason and freedom in our actions.

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Philosophy of Law

Philosophers of law are concerned with providing a general philosophical analysis of law and legal institutions. Issues in legal philosophy range from abstract conceptual questions about the nature of law and legal systems to normative questions about the relation between law and morality and the justification for various legal institutions. Topics in legal philosophy tend to be more abstract than related topics in political philosophy and applied ethics. For example, whereas the question of how properly to interpret the U.S. Constitution belongs to democratic theory and hence falls under the heading of political philosophy, the analysis of legal interpretation falls under the heading of legal philosophy. Likewise, whereas the question of whether capital punishment is morally permissible falls under the heading of applied ethics, the question of whether the institution of punishment can be justified falls under the heading of legal philosophy. Topics in legal philosophy fall roughly into three categories: analytic jurisprudence, normative jurisprudence, and critical theories of law.

I. **Analytic Jurisprudence**

The principal objective of analytic jurisprudence has traditionally been to provide an account of what distinguishes law as a system of norms from other systems of norms, such as ethical norms. As John Austin describes the project, analytic jurisprudence seeks "the essence or nature which is common to all laws that are properly so called" (Austin 1995, p. 11). Accordingly, analytic jurisprudence is concerned with providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of law that distinguishes law from non-law in every possible world.

While this task is usually interpreted as an attempt to analyze the concepts of law and legal system, there is some confusion as to both the value and character of conceptual analysis in philosophy of law. As Brian Leiter (1998) points out, philosophy of law is one of the few philosophical disciplines that takes conceptual analysis as its principal concern; most other areas in philosophy have taken a naturalistic turn, incorporating the tools and methods of the sciences. To clarify the role of conceptual analysis in law, Brian Bix (1995) distinguishes a number of different purposes that can be served by conceptual claims: (1) to track linguistic usage; (2) to stipulate meanings; (3) to explain what is important or essential about a class of objects; and (4) to establish an evaluative test for the concept-word. Bix takes conceptual analysis in law to be primarily concerned with (3) and (4).

In any event, conceptual analysis of law remains an important, if controversial, project in contemporary legal theory. Conceptual theories of law can be divided into two main headings: those that affirm there is a conceptual relation between law and morality and those that deny that there is such a relation. Nevertheless, Ronald Dworkin's view is often characterized as a third theory partly because it is not clear where he stands on the question of whether there is a conceptual relation between law and morality.

I.1. **Natural Law Theory**

All forms of natural law theory subscribe to the Overlap Thesis, which asserts that there is a necessary relation between the concepts of law and morality. According to this view, then, the concept of law

cannot be fully articulated without some reference to moral notions. Though the Overlap Thesis may seem unambiguous, there are a number of different ways in which it can be interpreted.

The strongest form of the Overlap Thesis underlies the classical naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone. As Blackstone describes the thesis, "This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original" (1979, p. 41). In this passage, Blackstone articulates the two claims that constitute the theoretical core of classical naturalism: 1) there can be no legally valid standards that conflict with the natural law; and 2) all valid laws derive what force and authority they have from the natural law. On this view, to paraphrase Augustine, an unjust law is no law at all.

Related to Blackstone's classical naturalism is the neo-naturalism of John Finnis (1980). Finnis believes that the naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone should not be construed as a conceptual account of the existence conditions for law. According to Finnis (see also Bix, 1996), the classical naturalists were not concerned with giving a conceptual account of legal validity; rather they were concerned with explaining the moral force of law: "the principles of natural law explain the obligatory force (in the fullest sense of 'obligation') of positive laws, even when those laws cannot be deduced from those principles" (Finnis 1980, pp. 23-24). On Finnis's view of the Overlap Thesis, the essential function of law is to provide a justification for state coercion. Accordingly, an unjust law can be legally valid, but cannot provide an adequate justification for use of the state coercive power and is hence not obligatory in the fullest sense; thus, an unjust law fails to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law. An unjust law, on this view, is legally binding, but is not fully law.

Lon Fuller (1964) rejects the idea that there are necessary moral constraints on the content of law. On Fuller's view, law is necessarily subject to a *procedural* morality consisting of eight principles: (P1) the rules must be expressed in general terms; (P2) the rules must be publicly promulgated; (P3) the rules must be prospective in effect; (P4) the rules must be expressed in understandable terms; (P5) the rules must be consistent with one another; (P6) the rules must not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties; (P7) the rules must not be changed so frequently that the subject cannot rely on them; and (P8) the rules must be administered in a manner consistent with their wording.

On Fuller's view, no system of rules that fails minimally to satisfy these principles of legality can achieve law's essential purpose of achieving social order through the use of rules that guide behavior. A system of rules that fails to satisfy (P2) or (P4), for example, cannot guide behavior because people will not be able to determine what the rules require. Accordingly, Fuller concludes that his eight principles are "internal" to law in the sense that they are built into the existence conditions for law: "A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all" (1964, p. 39).

I.2 **Legal Positivism**

Opposed to all forms of naturalism is legal positivism, which is roughly constituted by three theoretical commitments: the Social Fact Thesis, the Conventionality Thesis, and the Separability Thesis. The Social Fact Thesis (which is also known as the Pedigree Thesis) asserts that it is a necessary truth that legal validity is ultimately a function of certain kinds of social facts. The Conventionality Thesis emphasizes law's conventional nature, claiming that the social facts giving rise to legal validity are authoritative in virtue of some kind of social convention. The Separability Thesis, at the most general level, simply denies naturalism's Overlap Thesis; according to the Separability Thesis, there is no conceptual overlap

between the notions of law and morality.

I.2.1 The Conventionality Thesis

According to the Conventionality Thesis, it is a conceptual truth about law that legal validity can ultimately be explained in terms of criteria that are authoritative in virtue of some kind of social convention. Thus, for example, H.L.A. Hart (1996) believes the criteria of legal validity are contained in a rule of recognition that sets forth rules for creating, changing, and adjudicating law. On Hart's view, the rule of recognition is authoritative in virtue of a convention among officials to regard its criteria as standards that govern their behavior as officials. While Joseph Raz does not appear to endorse Hart's view about a master rule of recognition containing the criteria of validity, he also believes the validity criteria are authoritative only in virtue of a convention among officials.

I.2.2 The Social Fact Thesis

The Social Fact Thesis asserts that legal validity is a function of certain social facts. Borrowing heavily from Jeremy Bentham, John Austin (1995) argues that the principal distinguishing feature of a legal system is the presence of a sovereign who is habitually obeyed by most people in the society, but not in the habit of obeying any determinate human superior. On Austin's view, a rule R is legally valid (i.e., is a law) in a society S if and only if R is commanded by the sovereign in S and is backed up with the threat of a sanction. The relevant social fact that confers validity, on Austin's view, is promulgation by a sovereign willing to impose a sanction for noncompliance.

Hart takes a different view of the Social Fact Thesis. Hart believes that Austin's theory accounts, at most, for one kind of rule: primary rules that require or prohibit certain kinds of behavior. On Hart's view, Austin overlooked the presence of other primary rules that confer upon citizens the power to create, modify, and extinguish rights and obligations in other persons. As Hart points out, the rules governing the creation of contracts and wills cannot plausibly be characterized as restrictions on freedom that are backed by the threat of a sanction.

Most importantly, however, Hart argues Austin overlooks the existence of secondary meta-rules that have as their subject matter the primary rules themselves and distinguish full-blown legal systems from primitive systems of law:

> [Secondary rules] may all be said to be on a different level from the primary rules, for they are all *about* such rules; in the sense that while primary rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must or must not do, these secondary rules are all concerned with the primary rules themselves. They specify the way in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined (Hart 1994, p. 92).

Hart distinguishes three types of secondary rules that mark the transition from primitive forms of law to full-blown legal systems: (1) the rule of recognition, which "specif[ies] some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts" (Hart 1994, p. 92); (2) the rule of change, which enables a society to add, remove, and modify valid rules; and (3) the rule of adjudication, which provides a mechanism for determining whether a valid rule has been violated. On Hart's view, then, every society with a full-blown legal system necessarily has a rule of recognition that articulates criteria for legal validity that include provisions for making, changing and adjudicating law. Law is, to use Hart's famous phrase, "the union of primary and secondary rules" (Hart 1994, p. 107).

According to Hart's view of the Social Fact Thesis, then, a proposition P is legally valid in a society S if

and only if it satisfies the criteria of validity contained in a rule of recognition that is binding in S. As we have seen, the Conventionality Thesis implies that a rule of recognition is binding in S only if there is a social convention among officials to treat it as defining standards of official behavior. Thus, on Hart's view, "[the] rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials" (Hart 1994, p. 113).

I.2.3 The Separability Thesis

The final thesis comprising the foundation of legal positivism is the Separability Thesis. In its most general form, the Separability Thesis asserts that law and morality are conceptually distinct. This abstract formulation can be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, Klaus Füßer (1996) interprets it as making a meta-level claim that the definition of law must be entirely free of moral notions. This interpretation implies that any reference to moral considerations in defining the related notions of law, legal validity, and legal system is inconsistent with the Separability Thesis.

More commonly, the Separability Thesis is interpreted as making only an object-level claim about the existence conditions for legal validity. As Hart describes it, the Separability Thesis is no more than the "simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so" (Hart 1994, pp. 181-82). Insofar as the object-level interpretation of the Separability Thesis denies it is a necessary truth that there are moral constraints on legal validity, it implies the existence of a possible legal system in which there are no moral constraints on legal validity.

Though all positivists agree there are possible legal systems without moral constraints on legal validity, there are conflicting views on whether there are possible legal systems *with* such constraints. According to inclusive positivism (also known as incorporationism and soft positivism), it is possible for a society's rule of recognition to incorporate moral constraints on the content of law. Prominent inclusive positivists include Jules Coleman and Hart, who maintains that "the rule of recognition may incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantive values ... such as the Sixteenth or Nineteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution respecting the establishment of religion or abridgements of the right to vote" (Hart 1994, p. 250).

In contrast, exclusive positivism (also called hard positivism) denies that a legal system can incorporate moral constraints on legal validity. Exclusive positivists like Raz (1979) subscribe to the Source Thesis, according to which the existence and content of law can always be determined by reference to its sources without recourse to moral argument. On this view, the sources of law include both the circumstances of its promulgation and relevant interpretative materials, such as court cases involving its application.

I.3 **Ronald Dworkin's Third Theory**

Ronald Dworkin rejects positivism's Social Fact Thesis on the ground that there are some legal standards the authority of which cannot be explained in terms of social facts. In deciding hard cases, for example, judges often invoke moral principles that Dworkin believes do not derive their *legal* authority from the social criteria of legality contained in a rule of recognition (Dworkin 1977, p. 40). Nevertheless, since judges are bound to consider such principles when relevant, they must be characterized as law. Thus, Dworkin concludes, "if we treat principles as law we must reject the positivists' first tenet, that the law of a community is distinguished from other social standards by some test in the form of a master rule" (Dworkin 1977, p. 44).

Dworkin believes adjudication is and should be interpretive: "judges should decide hard cases by interpreting the political structure of their community in the following, perhaps special way: by trying to

find the best *justification* they can find, in principles of political morality, for the structure as a whole, from the most profound constitutional rules and arrangements to the details of, for example, the private law of tort or contract" (Dworkin 1982, p. 165). There are, then, two elements of a successful interpretation. First, since an interpretation is successful insofar as it justifies the particular practices of a particular society, the interpretation must *fit* with those practices in the sense that it coheres with existing legal materials defining the practices. Second, since an interpretation provides a *moral justification* for those practices, it must present them in the best possible moral light. Thus, Dworkin argues, a judge should strive to interpret a case in roughly the following way:

> A thoughtful judge might establish for himself, for example, a rough "threshold" of fit which any interpretation of data must meet in order to be "acceptable" on the dimension of fit, and then suppose that if more than one interpretation of some part of the law meets this threshold, the choice among these should be made, not through further and more precise comparisons between the two along that dimension, but by choosing the interpretation which is "substantively" better, that is, which better promotes the political ideals he thinks correct (Dworkin 1982, p. 171).

Accordingly, on Dworkin's view, the legal authority of a binding principle derives from the contribution it makes to the best moral justification for a society's legal practices considered as a whole. Thus, a legal principle maximally contributes to such a justification if and only if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the principle coheres with existing legal materials; and (2) the principle is the most morally attractive standard that satisfies (1). The correct legal principle is the one that makes the law the moral best it can be.

In later writings, Dworkin expands the scope of his "constructivist" view beyond adjudication to encompass the realm of legal theory. Dworkin distinguishes conversational interpretation from artistic/creative interpretation and argues that the task of interpreting a social practice is more like artistic interpretation:

> The most familiar occasion of interpretation … is conversation. We interpret the sounds or marks another person makes in order to decide what he has said…. Artistic interpretation is yet another: critics interpret poems and plays and paintings in order to defend some view of their meaning or theme or point. The form of interpretation we are studying-the interpretation of a social practice-is like artistic interpretation in this way: both aim to interpret something created by people as an entity distinct from them, rather than what people say, as in conversational interpretation" (Dworkin 1986, p. 50).

Artistic interpretation, like judicial interpretation, is constrained by the dimensions of fit and justification: "constructive interpretation is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong" (Dworkin 1986, p. 52).

On Dworkin's view, the point of any general theory of law is to interpret a very complex set of related social practices that are "created by people as an entity distinct from them"; for this reason, Dworkin believes the project of putting together a general theory of law is inherently constructivist:

> General theories of law … must be abstract because they aim to interpret the main point and structure of legal practice, not some particular part or department of it. But for all their abstraction, they are constructive interpretations: they try to show legal practice as a whole in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best justification of that practice. So no firm line divides jurisprudence from adjudication or any

> other aspect of legal practice (Dworkin 1986, p. 90).

Indeed, so tight is the relation between jurisprudence and adjudication, according to Dworkin, that jurisprudence is no more than the most general part of adjudication; thus, Dworkin concludes, "any judge's opinion is itself a piece of legal philosophy" (Dworkin 1986, p. 90).

Accordingly, Dworkin rejects not only positivism's Social Fact Thesis, but also what he takes to be its underlying presuppositions about legal theory. Hart distinguishes two perspectives from which a set of legal practices can be understood. A legal practice can be understood from the "internal" point of view of the person who accepts that practice as providing legitimate guides to conduct, as well as from the "external" point of view of the observer who wishes to understand the practice but does not accept it as being authoritative or legitimate.

Hart understands his theory of law to be both descriptive and general in the sense that it provides an account of fundamental features common to all legal systems-which presupposes a point of view that is external to all legal systems. For this reason, he regards his project as "a radically different enterprise from Dworkin's conception of legal theory (or 'jurisprudence' as he often terms it) as in part evaluative and justificatory and as 'addressed to a particular legal culture', which is usually the theorist's own and in Dworkin's case is that of Anglo-American law" (Hart 1994, p. 240).

These remarks show Hart believes Dworkin's theoretical objectives are fundamentally different from those of positivism, which, as a theory of analytic jurisprudence, is largely concerned with conceptual analysis. For his part, Dworkin conceives his work as conceptual but not in the same sense that Hart regards his work:

> We all-at least all lawyers-share a concept of law and of legal right, and we contest different conceptions of that concept. Positivism defends a particular conception, and I have tried to defend a competing conception. We disagree about what legal rights are in much the same way as we philosophers who argue about justice disagree about what justice is. I concentrate on the details of a particular legal system with which I am especially familiar, not simply to show that positivism provides a poor account of that system, but to show that positivism provides a poor conception of the concept of a legal right (Dworkin 1977, 351-52).

These differences between Hart and Dworkin have led many legal philosophers, most recently Bix (1996), to suspect that they are not really taking inconsistent positions at all. Accordingly, there remains an issue as to whether Dworkin's work should be construed as falling under the rubric of analytic jurisprudence.

II. **Normative Jurisprudence**

II.1 **Freedom and the Limits of Legitimate Law**

Laws limit human autonomy by restricting freedom. Criminal laws, for example, remove certain behaviors from the range of behavioral options by penalizing them with imprisonment and, in some cases, death. Likewise, civil laws require people to take certain precautions not to injure others and to honor their contracts. Given that human autonomy deserves *prima facie* moral respect, the question arises as to what are the limits of the state's legitimate authority to restrict the freedom of its citizens.

John Stuart Mill provides the classic liberal answer in the form of the harm principle: "[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either

physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant…. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign" (Mill 1906, pp. 12-13). While Mill left the notion of harm underdeveloped, he is most frequently taken to mean only physical harms and more extreme forms of psychological harm.

Though Mill's view-or something like it-enjoys currency among the public, it has generated considerable controversy among philosophers of law and political philosophers. Many philosophers believe that Mill understates the limits of legitimate state authority over the individual, claiming that law may be used to enforce morality, to protect the individual from herself, and in some cases to protect individuals from offensive behavior.

II.1.1 *Legal Moralism*

Legal moralism is the view that the law can legitimately be used to prohibit behaviors that conflict with society's collective moral judgments even when those behaviors do not result in physical or psychological harm to others. According to this view, a person's freedom can legitimately be restricted simply because it conflicts with society's collective morality; thus, legal moralism implies that it is permissible for the state to use its coercive power to enforce society's collective morality.

The most famous legal moralist is Patrick Devlin, who argues that a shared morality is essential to the existence of a society:

> [I]f men and women try to create a society in which there is no fundamental agreement about good and evil they will fail; if, having based it on common agreement, the agreement goes, the society will disintegrate. For society is not something that is kept together physically; it is held by the invisible bonds of common thought. If the bonds were too far relaxed the members would drift apart. A common morality is part of the bondage. The bondage is part of the price of society; and mankind, which needs society, must pay its price. (Devlin 1965, p. 10).

Insofar as human beings cannot lead a meaningful existence outside of society, it follows, on Devlin's view, that the law can be used to preserve the shared morality as a means of preserving society itself.

H.L.A. Hart (1963) points out that Devlin overstates the extent to which preservation of a shared morality is necessary to the continuing existence of a society. Devlin attempts to conclude from the necessity of a shared social morality that it is permissible for the state to legislate sexual morality (in particular, to legislate against same-sex sexual relations), but Hart argues it is implausible to think that "deviation from accepted sexual morality, even by adults in private, is something which, like treason, threatens the existence of society" (Hart 1963, p. 50). While enforcement of certain social norms protecting life, safety, and property are likely essential to the existence of a society, a society can survive a diversity of behavior in many other areas of moral concern-as is evidenced by the controversies in the U.S. surrounding abortion and homosexuality.

II.1.2 *Legal Paternalism*

Legal paternalism is the view that it is permissible for the state to legislate against what Mill calls self-regarding actions when necessary to prevent individuals from inflicting physical or severe emotional harm on *themselves*. As Gerald Dworkin describes it, a paternalist interference is an "interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced" (G. Dworkin 1972, p. 65). Thus, for example, a law requiring use of a helmet when riding a motorcycle is a paternalistic interference insofar as it is justified by concerns for the safety of the rider.

Dworkin argues that Mill's view that a person "cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it

will be better for him" (Mill 1906, p. 13) precludes paternalistic legislation to which fully rational individuals would agree. According to Dworkin, there are goods, such as health and education, that any rational person needs to pursue her own good-no matter how that good is conceived. Thus, Dworkin concludes, the attainment of these basic goods can legitimately be promoted in certain circumstances by using the state's coercive force.

Dworkin offers a hypothetical consent justification for his limited legal paternalism. On his view, there are a number of different situations in which fully rational adults would consent to paternalistic restrictions on freedom. For example, Dworkin believes a fully rational adult would consent to paternalistic restrictions to protect her from making decisions that are "far-reaching, potentially dangerous and irreversible" (G. Dworkin 1972, p. 80). Nevertheless, he argues that there are limits to legitimate paternalism: (1) the state must show that the behavior governed by the proposed restriction involves the sort of harm that a rational person would want to avoid; (2) on the calculations of a fully rational person, the potential harm outweighs the benefits of the relevant behavior; and (3) the proposed restriction is the least restrictive alternative for protecting against the harm.

II.1.3 *The Offense Principle*

Joel Feinberg believes the harm principle does not provide sufficient protection against the wrongful behaviors of others, as it is inconsistent with many criminal prohibitions we take for granted as being justified. If the only legitimate use of the state coercive force is to protect people from harm caused by others, then statutes prohibiting public sex are impermissible because public sex might be offensive but it does not cause harm (in the Millian sense) to others.

Accordingly, Feinberg argues the harm principle must be augmented by the offense principle, which he defines as follows: "It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would probably be an effective way of preventing serious offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor, and that it is probably a necessary means to that end" (Feinberg 1985). By 'offense,' Feinberg intends a subjective and objective element: the subjective element consists in the experience of an unpleasant mental state (e.g., shame, disgust, anxiety, embarrassment); the objective element consists in the existence of a wrongful cause of such a mental state.

II.2 **The Obligation to Obey Law**

Natural law critics of positivism (e.g., Fuller 1958) frequently complain that if positivism is correct, there cannot be a moral obligation to obey the law qua law. As Feinberg (1979) puts the point:

> The positivist account of legal validity … is hard to reconcile with the [claim] … that valid law as such, no matter what its content, deserves our respect and general fidelity. Even if valid law is bad law, we have some obligation to obey it simply because it is law. But how can this be so if a law's validity has nothing to do with its content?

The idea is this: if what is essential to law is just that there exist specified recipes for making law, then there cannot be a moral obligation to obey a rule *simply because it is the law*.

Contemporary positivists, for the most part, accept the idea that positivism is inconsistent with an obligation to obey law qua law (cf. Himma 1998), but argue that the mere status of a norm as law cannot give rise to any moral obligation to obey that norm. While there might be a moral obligation to obey a particular law because of its moral content (e.g., laws prohibiting murder) or because it solves a coordination problem (e.g., laws requiring people to drive on the right side of the road), the mere fact that a rule is law does not provide a moral reason for doing what the law requires.

Indeed, arguments for the existence of even a *prima facie* obligation to obey law (i.e., an obligation that

can be outweighed by competing obligations) have largely been unsuccessful. Arguments in favor of an obligation to obey the law roughly fall into four categories: (1) arguments from gratitude; (2) arguments from fair play; (3) arguments from implied consent; and (4) arguments from general utility.

The argument from gratitude begins with the observation that all persons, even those who are worst off, derive some benefit from the state's enforcement of the law. On this view, a person who accepts benefits from another person thereby incurs a duty of gratitude towards the benefactor. And the only plausible way to discharge this duty towards the government is to obey its laws. Nevertheless, as M.B.E. Smith points out (1973, p. 953), "if someone confers benefits on me without any consideration of whether I want them, and if he does this in order to advance some purpose other than promotion of my particular welfare, I have no obligation to be grateful towards him." Since the state does not give citizens a choice with respect to such benefits, the mere enjoyment of them cannot give rise to a duty of gratitude.

John Rawls (1964) argues that there is a moral obligation to obey law qua law in societies in which there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of social cooperation. What gives rise to a moral obligation to obey law qua law in such societies is a duty of fair play: fairness requires obedience of persons who intentionally accept the benefits made available in a society organized around a just scheme of mutually beneficial cooperation. There are a couple of problems here. First, Rawls's argument does not establish the existence of a content-independent obligation to obey law; the obligation arises only in those societies that institutionalize a just scheme of social cooperation. Second, even in such societies, citizens are not presented with a genuine option to refuse those benefits. For example, I cannot avoid the benefits of laws ensuring clean air. But accepting benefits one is not in a position to refuse cannot give rise to an obligation of fair play.

The argument from consent grounds an obligation to obey law on some sort of implied promise. As is readily evident, we can voluntarily assume obligations by consenting to them or making a promise. Of course, most citizens never explicitly promise or consent to obey the laws; for this reason, proponents of this argument attempt to infer consent from such considerations as continued residence and acceptance of benefits from the state. Nevertheless, acceptance of benefits one cannot decline no more implies consent to obey law than it does duties of fair play or gratitude. Moreover, the prohibitive difficulties associated with emigration preclude an inference of consent from continued residence.

Finally, the argument from general utility grounds the duty to obey the law in the consequences of universal disobedience. Since, according to this argument, the consequences of general disobedience would be catastrophic, it is wrong for any individual to disobey the law; for no person may disobey the law unless everyone may do so. In response, Smith points out that this strategy of argument leads to absurdities: "We will have to maintain, for example, that there is a prima facie obligation not to eat dinner at five o'clock, for if everyone did so, certain essential services could not be maintained" (Smith 1973, p. 966).

II.3 **The Justification of Punishment**

Punishment is unique among putatively legitimate acts in that its point is to inflict discomfort on the recipient; an act that is incapable of causing a person minimal discomfort cannot be characterized as a punishment. In most contexts, the commission of an act for the purpose of inflicting discomfort is morally problematic because of its resemblance to torture. For this reason, institutional punishment requires a moral justification sufficient to distinguish it from other practices of purposely inflicting discomfort on other people.

Justifications for punishment typically take five forms: (1) retributive; (2) deterrence; (3) preventive; (4) rehabilitative; and (5) restitutionary. According to the retributive justification, what justifies punishing a

person is that she committed an offense that deserves the punishment. On this view, it is morally appropriate that a person who has committed a wrongful act should suffer in proportion to the magnitude of her wrongdoing. The problem, however, is that the mere fact that someone is deserving of punishment does not imply it is morally permissible for the state to administer punishment; it would be wrong for me, for example, to punish someone else's child even though her behavior might deserve it.

In contrast to the retributivist theories that look back to a person's prior wrongful act as justification for punishment, utilitarian theories look forward to the beneficial consequences of punishing a person. There are three main lines of utilitarian reasoning. According to the deterrence justification, punishment of a wrongdoer is justified by the socially beneficial effects that it has on other persons. On this view, punishment deters wrongdoing by persons who would otherwise commit wrongful acts. The problem with the deterrence theory is that it justifies punishment of one person on the strength of the effects that it has on other persons. The idea that it is permissible to deliberately inflict discomfort on one person because doing so may have beneficial effects on the behavior of other persons appears inconsistent with the Kantian principle that it is wrong to use people as mere means.

The preventive justification argues that incarcerating a person for wrongful acts is justified insofar as it prevents that person from committing wrongful acts against society during the period of incarceration. The rehabilitative justification argues that punishment is justified in virtue of the effect that it has on the moral character of the offender. Each of these justifications suffers from the same flaw: prevention of crime and rehabilitation of the offender can be achieved without the deliberate infliction of discomfort that constitutes punishment. For example, prevention of crime might require detaining the offender, but it does not require detention in an environment that is as unpleasant as those typically found in prisons.

The restitutionary justification focuses on the effect of the offender's wrongful act on the victim. Other theories of punishment conceptualize the wrongful act as an offense against society; the restitutionary theory sees wrongdoing as an offense against the victim. Thus, on this view, the principal purpose of punishment must be to make the victim whole to the extent that this can be done: "The point is not that the offender deserves to suffer; it is rather that the offended party desires compensation" (Barnett 1977, p. 289). Accordingly, a criminal convicted of wrongdoing should be sentenced to compensate her victim in proportion to the victim's loss. The problem with the restitutionary theory is that it fails to distinguish between compensation and punishment. Compensatory objectives focus on the victim, while punitive objectives focus on the offender.

III. **Critical Theories of Law**

III.1 **Legal Realism**

The legal realist movement was inspired by John Chipman Gray and Oliver Wendall Holmes and reached its apex in the 1920s and 30s through the work of Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, and Felix Cohen. The realists eschewed the conceptual approach of the positivists and naturalists in favor of an empirical analysis that sought to show how practicing judges *really* decide cases (see Leiter 1998). The realists were deeply skeptical of the ascendant notion that judicial legislation is a rarity. While not entirely rejecting the idea that judges can be constrained by rules, the realists maintained that judges create new law through the exercise of lawmaking discretion considerably more often than is commonly supposed. On their view, judicial decision is guided far more frequently by political and moral intuitions about the facts of the case (instead of by legal rules) than theories like positivism and naturalism acknowledge.

As an historical matter, legal realism arose in response to legal formalism, a particular model of legal

reasoning that assimilates legal reasoning to syllogistic reasoning. According to the formalist model, the legal outcome (i.e., the holding) logically follows from the legal rule (major premise) and a statement of the relevant facts (minor premise). Realists believe that formalism understates judicial lawmaking abilities insofar as it represents legal outcomes as *entailed* syllogistically by applicable rules and facts. For if legal outcomes are logically implied by propositions that bind judges, it follows that judges lack legal authority to reach conflicting outcomes.

Legal realism can roughly be characterized by the following claims: (1) the class of available legal materials is insufficient to logically entail a unique legal outcome in most cases worth litigating at the appellate level (the Local Indeterminacy Thesis); (2) in such cases, judges make new law in deciding legal disputes through the exercise of a lawmaking discretion (the Discretion Thesis); and (3) judicial decisions in indeterminate cases are influenced by the judge's political and moral convictions-and not by legal considerations. Though (3) is logically independent of (1) and (2), (1) seems to imply (2): insofar as judges decide legally indeterminate cases, they must be creating new law.

It is worth noting the relations between legal realism, formalism, and positivism. While formalism is often thought to be entailed by positivism, it turns out that legal realism is not only consistent with positivism, but also presupposes the truth of all three of positivism's core theses. Indeed, the realist acknowledges that law is essentially the product of official activity, but believes that judicial lawmaking occurs more frequently than is commonly assumed. But the idea that law is essentially the product of official activity presupposes the truth of positivism's Conventionality, Social Fact, and Separability Theses. Though the preoccupations of the realists were empirical (i.e., attempting to identify the psychological and sociological factors influencing judicial decision-making), their implicit conceptual commitments were decidedly positivistic in flavor.

III.2 **Critical Legal Studies**

The critical legal studies (CLS) movement attempts to expand the radical aspects of legal realism into a Marxist critique of mainstream liberal jurisprudence. CLS theorists believe the realists understate the extent of indeterminacy; whereas the realists believe that indeterminacy is local in the sense that it is confined to a certain class of cases, CLS theorists argue that law is radically (or globally) indeterminate in the sense that the class of available legal materials rarely, if ever, logically/causally entails a unique outcome.

CLS theorists emphasize the role of ideology in shaping the content of the law. On this view, the content of the law in liberal democracies necessarily reflects "ideological struggles among social factions in which competing conceptions of justice, goodness, and social and political life get compromised, truncated, vitiated, and adjusted" (Altman 1986, p. 221). The inevitable outcome of such struggles, on this view, is a profound inconsistency permeating the deepest layers of the law. It is this pervasive inconsistency that gives rise to radical indeterminacy in the law. For insofar as the law is inconsistent, a judge can justify any of a number of conflicting outcomes.

At the heart of the CLS critique of liberal jurisprudence is the idea that radical indeterminacy is inconsistent with liberal conceptions of legitimacy. According to these traditional liberal conceptions, the province of judges is to interpret, and not make, the law. For, on this view, democratic ideals imply that lawmaking must be left to legislators who, unlike appointed judges, are accountable to the electorate. But if law is radically indeterminate, then judges nearly always decide cases by making new law, which is inconsistent with liberal conceptions of the legitimate sources of lawmaking authority.

III.3. **Law and Economics**

The law and economics movement argues for the value of economic analysis in the law both as a

description about how courts and legislators do behave and as a prescription for how such officials should behave. The legal economists, led by Richard Posner, argue that the content of many areas of the common law can be explained in terms of its tendency to maximize preferences:

> [M]any areas of law, especially the great common law fields of property, torts, crimes, and contracts, bear the stamp of economic reasoning. It is not a refutation that few judicial opinions contain explicit references to economic concepts. Often the true grounds of decision are concealed rather than illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of judicial opinions. Indeed, legal education consists primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface to find those grounds, many of which may turn out to have an economic character (Posner 1992, p. 23).

Posner subscribes to the so-called efficiency theory of the common law, according to which "the common law is best (not perfectly) explained as a system for maximizing the wealth of society" (Posner 1992, p. 23).

More influential than Posner's descriptive claims is his normative view that law should strive to maximize wealth. According to Posner, the proper goal of the statutory and common law is to promote wealth maximization, which can best be done by facilitating the mechanisms of the free market. Posner's normative view combines elements of utilitarian analysis with a Kantian respect for autonomy. On the utilitarian side, markets tend to maximize wealth and the satisfaction of preferences. In a market transaction with no third-party effects, wealth is increased because all parties are made better off by the transaction-otherwise there would be no incentive to consummate the transaction-and no one is made worse off.

On the Kantian side, the law should facilitate market transactions because market transactions best reflect autonomous judgments about the value of individual preferences. At least ideally, individuals express and realize their preferences through mutually consensual market transactions consummated from positions of equal bargaining power. Thus, market transactions tend, ideally, to be both efficient (because they tend to maximize wealth without harmful third-party effects) and just (because all parties are consenting).

III.4 **Outsider Jurisprudence**

So-called outsider jurisprudence is concerned with providing an analysis of the ways in which law is structured to promote the interests of white males and to exclude females and persons of color. For example, one principal objective of feminist jurisprudence is to show how patriarchal assumptions have shaped the content of laws in a wide variety of areas: property, contract, criminal law, constitutional law, and the law of civil rights. Additionally, feminist scholars challenge traditional ideals of judicial decision-making according to which judges decide legal disputes by applying neutral rules in an impartial and objective fashion. Feminists have, of course, always questioned whether it is possible for judges to achieve an objective and impartial perspective, but now question whether the traditional model is even desirable.

Critical race theory is likewise concerned to point up the way in which assumptions of white supremacy have shaped the content of the law at the expense of persons of color. Additionally, critical race theorists show how the experience, concerns, values, and perspectives of persons of color are systematically excluded from mainstream discourse among practicing lawyers, judges, and legislators. Finally, such theorists attempt to show how assumptions about race are built into most liberal theories of law.

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Laws of Nature

Laws of Nature are to be distinguished both from Scientific Laws and from Natural Laws (as invoked in legal or ethical theories [see Natural Laws]). Neither Scientific Laws nor Natural Laws will be discussed in this article. This article explores issues in contemporary metaphysics -- not in ethical theory, not in legal theory, and not in the philosophy of science. Within metaphysics, there are two competing theories of Laws of Nature. On one account - the Regularity Theory - Laws of Nature are statements of the uniformities (regularities) in the world, i.e. are mere descriptions of the way the world is. On the other account - the Necessitarian Theory - Laws of Nature are the 'principles' which govern the natural phenomena of the world, i.e. the natural world 'obeys' the Laws of Nature. This seemingly innocuous difference marks one of the most profound gulfs within contemporary philosophy, and has quite unexpected, and wide-ranging, implications. Below is an outline of the topics discussed in the article:

Laws of Nature vs. Laws of Science

In 1959, at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Sciences, Michael Scriven read a paper that implicitly distinguished between Laws of Nature and Laws of Science. Laws of Science (what he at that time called "physical laws") – with few exceptions – are inaccurate, are at best approximations of the truth, and are of limited range of application. The theme has since been picked up and advanced by Nancy Cartwright.

If *scientific* laws are inaccurate, then – presumably – there must be some *other* laws (statements, propositions, principles), doubtless more complex, which *are* accurate, which are not approximation to the truth but are literally true.

When, for example, generations of philosophers have agonized over whether physical determinism precludes the existence of free will (e.g. Honderich), they have been concerned with these latter laws, the laws of nature itself.

It is the explication of these latter laws, the Laws of Nature, that is the topic of this article. We will not here be examining the 'approximate truths' of science. Thus, to cite just one example, the controversy over whether scientific laws are (merely) *instruments* lies outside the topic of this article.

The Two Principal Views

Theories as to the features of Laws of Nature fall into two, quite distinct, schools: the Humeans (or Neo-Humeans) on the one side, the Necessitarians on the other.

Regularity

Recent scholarship (e.g. that of J. Wright and of Beauchamp and Rosenberg) makes a convincing case that the received view as to what David Hume offered as an explication of the concept of *law of nature* was quite mistaken, indeed the very opposite of what Hume was arguing. What, historically, until late in the Twentieth Century, was called the "Humean" account of Laws of Nature was a misnomer. Hume himself was no 'Humean' as regards laws of nature. Hume, it turns out, was a Necessitarian – i.e. believed that laws of nature are in some sense 'necessary' (although of course not *logically* necessary). His

legendary skepticism was *epistemological*. He was concerned, indeed even baffled, how our knowledge of physical necessity could arise. What, in experience, accounted for the origin of the idea? What, in experience, provided evidence of the existence of the property? He could find nothing that played such a role.

Yet, in spite of his epistemological skepticism, he persisted in his belief that laws of nature *are* (physical) necessities. So as not to perpetuate the historical error as to what "Humean" properly connotes, I will abandon that term altogether and will adopt the relatively unproblematical term "Regularity" in its stead. At the very least, the **Regularists'** Theory of Laws of Nature denies that Laws of Nature are 'physically necessary'. There is no physical necessity, either in laws or in nature itself. There is no intermediate state between logical necessity on the one hand and sheer contingency on the other.

Necessitarianism

Necessitarians, in contrast, argue that there *is* physical (or as they sometimes call it "nomic" or "nomological") necessity. They offer two different accounts. According to some Necessitarians, physical necessity is a property of the Laws of Nature (along with truth, universality, etc.); according to other Necessitarians, physical necessity inheres in the very woof and warp (the stuff and structure) of the universe.

Thus, for example, on the first of these two Necessitarian theories, electrons will bear the electrical charge -1.6×10^{-19} Coulombs because there is a Law of Nature to that effect, and the universe conforms to, or is 'governed' by, this physically necessary (i.e. nomological) principle (along with a number of others, of course).

On the second of the two Necessitarian theories, the 'necessity' of an electron's bearing this particular electrical charge 'resides' in the electron itself. It is of the very 'nature' of an electron, by necessity, to have this particular electrical charge. On this latter account, the statement "All electrons bear a charge of -1.6×10^{-19} Coulombs" is a Law of Nature because it correctly (veridically) describes a physical necessity in the world.[1]

Shared Elements in the Competing Theories

Regularists and Necessitarians agree as to five conditions necessary for a statement's being a Law of Nature.

Laws of Nature

1.	are factual truths, not logical ones;	"The boiling point of sulfur is 444.6° Celsius" expresses a factual truth. "Every number has a double" expresses a logical truth.
2.	are true for every time and every place in the universe;	There are no laws of nature that hold just for the planet earth (or the Andromeda Galaxy, for that matter), nor are there any that hold just for the Eighteenth Century or just for the Mesozoic Era.
3.	contain no proper names;	Laws of nature may contain general concepts, such as "mass", "color", "aptitude", "capital", "diabetes", "return on investments", etc.; but may not contain such terms as "the Fraser River", "the planet Earth", "$59.22", "June 18, 1935", "IBM", etc.
4.	are universal or statistical claims; and	"(All pure) copper conducts electricity" expresses a law of nature. But "Stars exist" (although true) does not express a law of nature: it is neither a universal nor a statistical claim.
5.	are conditional claims, not categorical ones.	Categorical claims which are equivalent to conditional claims (e.g. "There are no perpetual motion machines of the first kind" which is equivalent to "If anything is a perpetual motion machine then it is not of the first kind") are candidates for lawfulness.[2] Categorical claims (e.g., again, "There are stars") which are not equivalent to conditionals are not candidates for lawfulness. Note: Laws of physics which are expressed mathematically are taken to be elliptical for conditional truths. For example, the law "$m_v = m_o/(1 - v^2/c^2)^{½}$ " is to be read as equivalent to "for any massy object, if its velocity is v, then its mass [m_v] is equal to its rest mass [m_o] divided by ..."

Are these five conditions *jointly sufficient* for a proposition's being a Law of Nature? Regularists say "yes"; Necessitarians, "no".

The Case for Necessitarianism

Necessitarians lay claim to a number of examples which, they say, can be explicated only by positing a sixth necessary condition for laws of nature, viz. by positing natural (physical /nomic /nomological) necessity.

Accidental Truths vs. Laws of Nature

Moas (a large flightless bird that lived in New Zealand) have been extinct for more than a century. We can assume (this example is Popper's [*The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Appendix *x]) that some one of them (we needn't know which one) was the oldest Moa ever to have lived. Suppose it died at the age of *n* years. Thus the statement "No moa lives beyond the age of *n* years" is **true** (where "lives" is being used as a tenseless verb). Moreover this statement satisfies all the other necessary conditions specified above.

But, Necessitarians will argue, the statement "No moa lives beyond the age of *n* years" is not a law of nature. It is counterintuitive to believe that such a statement could be on the same (metaphysical) footing as "No perpetual motion machine of the first kind exists", or, citing another example, "No object having mass is accelerated beyond the speed of light". The latter statements are bona fide laws of nature; the former a mere 'accidental' truth. The difference lies in the (alleged) fact that the latter two cases (about perpetual motion machines and about massy objects) are physically necessary truths; the former (about moas) is a mere accidental truth. To use Popper's terminology, genuine laws of nature "forbid" certain things to happen; accidental truths do not. Suppose the oldest moa – we'll call him Ludwig – died, of an intestinal infection, at the age of (let's say) 12 years. (I haven't any idea what the average life span of moas was. It's irrelevant for our purposes.) Now suppose that Ludwig had a younger brother, Johann, hatched from the same clutch of eggs, one hour later than Ludwig himself. Poor Johann – he was shot by a hunter 10 minutes before Ludwig died of his illness. But, surely, had Johann not been shot, he would have lived to a greater age than Ludwig. Unlike his (very slightly) older brother, Johann was in perfect health. Johann was well on his way to surviving Ludwig; it's just that a hunter dispatched him prematurely. His death was a misfortune; it was not mandated by a law of nature.

False Existentials

False existential statements of the sort "Some silver burns at -22° Celsius" and "There is a river of cola" are logically equivalent to statements satisfying all of the five necessary conditions specified above. If those conditions were to constitute a set of *sufficient* conditions for a statement's being a law of nature, then the statement "No river is constituted of cola" would be a law of nature.[3]

The oddity goes even more deeply. Given that what it is to be physically impossible is to be logically inconsistent with a law of nature, then every false existential statement of the sort "Some S is P" or "There is an S that is a P" would turn out to be, not just false, but physically impossible.

But surely the statement "There is a river of cola", although false, is *not* physically impossible. There *could* be such a river. It would merely require a colossal accident (such as befell Boston in 1912 when a huge vat of molasses ruptured), or the foolish waste of a great deal of money.

If "there is a river of cola" is not to be regarded as physically impossible, then some one or more further conditions must be added to the set of necessary conditions for lawfulness. Physical necessity would seem to be that needed further condition.

Doom vs. Failure

Suppose (1) that Earth is the only planet in the universe to have supported intelligent life; and (2) that all life on Earth perished in 1900 when the earth was struck by a meteor 10,000 km in diameter. Clearly, under those conditions, the Wright Brothers would never have flown their plane at Kitty Hawk. Even though tinkerers and engineers had been trying for centuries to build a heavier-than-air motorized flying machine, everyone had failed to produce one. But their failure was *merely* failure; these projects were not doomed. Yet, if the universe had had the slightly different history just described, the statement "there is a heavier-than-air motorized flying machine" would turn out to be physically impossible; hence the project was *doomed*. But, Necessitarians will argue, not all projects that fail are doomed. Some are doomed, e.g. any attempt to accelerate a massy object beyond the speed of light, or, e.g. to build a perpetual motion machine of the first kind. Again, just as in the case of accidental truths and lawful truths, we do not want to collapse the distinction between doom and failure. Some projects are *doomed*; others are *mere failures*. The distinction warrants being preserved, and that requires positing physical necessity (and – what is the other side of the same coin – physical impossibility).

The Case for Regularity

With the dawning of the modern, scientific, age came the growing realization of an extensive sublime order in nature. To be sure, humankind has always known that there is *some* order in the natural world – e.g. the tides rise and fall, the moon has four phases, virgins have no children, water slakes thirst, and persons grow older, not younger. But until the rise of modern science, no one suspected the sweep of this order. The worldview of the West has changed radically since the Renaissance. From a world which seemed mostly chaotic, there emerged an unsuspected underlying *order*, an order revealed by physics, chemistry, biology, economics, sociology, psychology, neuroscience, geology, evolutionary theory, pharmacology, epidemiology, etc.

And so, alongside the older metaphysical question, "Why is there anything, rather than nothing?", there arises the newer question, "Why is the world orderly, rather than chaotic?" How can one explain the existence of this pervasive order? What accounts for it?

Naturalizing Philosophy

Even as recently as the Eighteenth Century, we find philosophers (e.g. Montesquieu) explicitly attributing the order in nature to the hand of God, more specifically to His having imposed physical laws on nature in much the same way as He imposed moral laws on human beings. There was one essential difference, however. Human beings – it was alleged – are 'free' to break (act contrary to) God's moral laws; but neither human beings nor the other parts of creation are free to break God's physical laws.

In the Twentieth Century virtually all scientists and philosophers have abandoned theistic elements in their accounts of the Laws of Nature. But to a very great extent – so say the Regularists – the Necessitarians have merely replaced God with Physical Necessity. The Necessitarians' nontheistic view of Laws of Nature surreptitiously preserves the older prescriptivist view of Laws of Nature, viz. as *dictates* or *edicts* to the natural universe, edicts which – unlike moral laws or legislated ones – no one, and no thing, has the ability to violate.

Regularists reject this view of the world. Regularists eschew a view of Laws of Nature which would make of them inviolable edicts imposed on the universe. Such a view, Regularists claim, is simply a holdover from a theistic view. It is time, they insist, to adopt a thoroughly naturalistic philosophy of science, one which is not only purged of the hand of God, but is also purged of its unempirical latter-day surrogate, viz. nomological necessity. The difference is, perhaps, highlighted most strongly in Necessitarians saying that the Laws of Nature *govern* the world; while Regularists insist that Laws of Nature do no more or less than correctly *describe* the world.

Revisiting Physical Impossibility

Doubtless the strongest objection Necessitarians level against Regularists is that the latter's theory obliterates the distinction between laws of nature (e.g. "No massy object is accelerated beyond the speed of light") and accidental generalizations (e.g. "No Moa lives more than *n* years"). Thus, on the Regularists' account, there is a virtually limitless number of Laws of Nature. (Necessitarians, in contrast, typically operate with a view that there are only a very small number, a mere handful, of Laws of Nature, that these are the 'most fundamental' laws of physics, and that all other natural laws are *logical* consequences of [i.e. 'reducible to'] these basic laws. I will not further pursue the issue of reductivism in this article.)

What is allegedly wrong with there being no distinction between accidental generalizations and 'genuine' Laws of Nature? Just this (say the Necessitarians): if there is a virtually limitless number of Laws of Nature, then (as we have seen above) every false existential statement turns out to be *physically impossible* and (again) the distinction between (mere) failure and doom is obliterated.

How can Regularists reply to this seemingly devastating attack, issuing as it does from deeply entrenched philosophical intuitions?

Regularists will defend their theory against this particular objection by arguing that the expression "physically impossible" has different *meanings* in the two theories: there is a common, or shared, meaning of this expression in both theories, but there is an additional feature in the Necessitarians'

account that is wholly absent in the Regularists'.

The common (i.e. shared) meaning in "physically impossible" is "inconsistent with a Law of Nature". That is, anything that is inconsistent with a Law of Nature is "physically impossible". (On a prescriptivist account of Laws of Nature, one would say Laws of Nature "rule out" certain events and states-of-affairs.)

On both accounts – Necessitarianism and Regularity – what is physically impossible never, ever, occurs – not in the past, not at present, not in the future, not here, and not anywhere else.

But on the Necessitarians' account, there is something *more* to a physically impossible event's nonoccurrence and something more to a physically impossible state-of-affair's nonexistence. What is physically impossible is not merely nonoccurrent or nonexistent. These events and states-of-affairs simply *could not* occur or exist. There is, then, in the Necessitarians' account, a ***modal*** element that is entirely lacking in the Regularists' theory. When Necessitarians say of a claim – e.g. that someone has built a perpetual motion machine of the first kind – that it is physically impossible, they intend to be understood as claiming that not only is the situation described timelessly and universally false, it is so *because* it is *nomically* impossible.

In contrast, when Regularists say that some situation is physically impossible – e.g. that there is a river of cola – they are claiming no more and no less than that there is no such river, past, present, future, here, or elsewhere. There is no *nomic* dimension to their claim. They are not making the modal claim that there *could not be* such a river; they are making simply the *factual* (nonmodal) claim that there timelessly *is no* such river. (Further reading: 'The' Modal Fallacy.)

According to Regularists, the concept of *physical impossibility* is nothing but a special case of the concept of timeless falsity. It is only when one imports from other theories (Necessitarianism, Prescriptivism, etc.) a different, modal, meaning of the expression, that paradox seems to ensue. Understand the ambiguity of the expression, and especially its nonmodal character in the Regularity theory, and the objection that the Necessitarians level is seen to miss its mark.

(There is an allied residual problem with the foundations of Necessitarianism. Some recent authors [e.g. Armstrong and Carroll] have written books attempting to explicate the concept of nomicity. But they confess to being unable to explicate the concept, and they ultimately resort to treating it as an *unanalyzable* base on which to erect a theory of physical lawfulness.)

Regularity and Explanation

Another philosophical intuition that has prompted the belief in Necessitarianism has been the belief that to explain why one event occurred rather than another, one must argue that the occurring event 'had to happen' given the laws of nature and antecedent conditions. In a nutshell, the belief is that laws of nature can be used to *explain* the occurrence of events, accidental generalizations – 'mere truths devoid of nomic force' – can not be so utilized.

The heyday of the dispute over this issue was the 1940s and 50s. It sputtered out, in more or less an

intellectual standoff, by the late 60s. Again, philosophical intuitions and differences run very deep. Regularists will argue that we can explain events very well indeed, thank you, in terms of vaguely circumscribed generalities; we do not usually invoke true generalities, let alone true generalities that are assumed to be nomically necessary. In short, we can, and indeed **do** several times each day, explain events without supposing that the principles we cite are in any sense *necessary*. Regularists will point to the fact that human beings had, for thousands of years, been successfully explaining some events in their environment (e.g. that the casting cracked because it had been cooled down too quickly) without even having the *concept* of nomicity, much less being able to cite any nomologically necessary universal generalizations.

Necessitarianism, on this view, then, is seen to dovetail with a certain – highly controversial – view of the nature of explanation itself, viz. that one can explain the occurrence of an event only when one is in a position to cite a generalization which is nomologically necessary. Few philosophers are now prepared to persist with this view of explanation, but many still retain the belief that there are such things as nomologically necessary truths. Regularists regard this belief as superfluous.

Problems with Necessitarianism I – Its Inverting the Truth-making Relation

Religious skeptics – had they lived in a society where they might have escaped torture for asking the question – might have wondered why (/how) the world molds itself to God's will. God, on the Prescriptivist view of Laws of Nature, commanded the world to be certain ways, e.g. it was God's will (a law of nature that He laid down) that all electrons should have a charge of -1.6×10^{-19} Coulombs. But how is all of this supposed to play out? How, exactly, is it that electrons *do* have this particular charge? It is a mighty strange, and unempirical, science that ultimately rests on an unintelligible power of a/the deity.

Twentieth-century Necessitarianism has dropped God from its picture of the world. Physical necessity has assumed God's role: the universe conforms to (the dictates of? / the secret, hidden, force of? / the inexplicable mystical power of?) physical laws. God does not 'drive' the universe; physical laws do.

But **how**? How could such a thing be possible? The very posit lies beyond (far beyond) the ability of science to uncover. It is the transmuted remnant of a supernatural theory, one which science, emphatically, does not need.

There is another, less polemical, way of making the same point.

Although there are problems aplenty in Tarski's theory of truth (i.e. the semantic theory of truth, also called the "correspondence theory of truth"), it is the best theory we have. Its core concept is that statements (or propositions) are true if they describe the world the way it is, and they are false otherwise. Put metaphorically, we can say that truth flows to propositions from the way the world is. Propositions 'take their truth' from the world; they do not impose their truth on the world. If two days before an election, Tom says "Sylvia will win", and two days after the election, Marcus says, "Sylvia won", then whether these statements are true or false depends on whether or not Sylvia is elected. If she is, both

statements are true; if she is not, then both statements are false. But the truth or falsity of those statements does not bring about her winning (or losing), or cause her to win (or lose), the election. Whether she wins or loses is up to the voters, not to certain statements.

Necessitarians – unwittingly perhaps – turn the semantic theory of truth on its head. Instead of having propositions taking their truth from the way the world is, they argue that certain propositions – namely the laws of nature – impose truth on the world.

The Tarskian truth-making relation is between events or state-of-affairs on the one hand and properties of abstract entities (propositions) on the other. As difficult as it may be to absorb such a concept, it is far more difficult to view a truth-making relationship the 'other way round'. Necessitarianism requires that one imagine that a certain privileged class of propositions impose their truth on events and states of affairs. Not only is this monumental oddity of Necessitarianism hardly ever noticed, no one – so far as I know – has ever tried to offer a theory as to its nature.

Problems with Necessitarianism II – Its Unempiricalness

Eighteenth-century empiricists (Hume most especially) wondered where, in experience, there was anything that prompted the concept of physical necessity. Experience, it would seem, provides at best only data about how the world *is*, not how it *must be*, i.e. experience provides data concerning regularity, not (physical) necessity. Hume's best answer, and it is clearly inadequate, lay in a habit of mind.

Twentieth-century empiricists are far more concerned with the justification of our concepts than with their origins. So the question has now evolved to "what evidence exists that warrants a belief in a physical necessity beyond the observed and posited regularities in nature?"

A number of Necessitarians (see, for example, von Wright) have tried to describe experiments whose outcomes would justify a belief in physical necessity. But these thought-experiments are impotent. At best – as Hume clearly had seen – any such experiment could show no more than a pervasive regularity in nature; none could demonstrate that such a regularity flowed from an underlying necessity.

The Regularists' Trump Card – The Dissolution of the Problem of Free Will and Determinism

In the Regularity theory, the knotted problem of free will vs. determinism is solved (or better, 'dissolved') so thoroughly that it cannot coherently even be posed.

On the Regularists' view, there simply is no problem of free will. We make choices – some trivial, such as to buy a newspaper; others, rather more consequential, such as to buy a home, or to get married, or to go to university, etc. – but these choices are not forced upon us by the laws of nature. Indeed, it is the other way round. Laws of nature are (a subclass of the) true descriptions of the world. Whatever happens in the world, there are true descriptions of those events. It's true that you cannot 'violate' a law of nature, but that's not because the laws of nature 'force' you to behave in some certain way. It is rather that

whatever you do, there is a true description of what you have done. You certainly don't get to choose the laws that describe the charge on an electron or the properties of hydrogen and oxygen that explain their combining to form water. But you do get to choose a great many other laws. How do you do that? Simply by doing whatever you do in fact do.

For example, if you were to choose(!) to raise your arm, then there would be a timelessly true universal description (let's call it "D_{4729}") of what you have done. If, however, you were to choose not to raise your arm, then there would be a (different) timelessly true universal description (we can call it "D_{5322}") of what you did (and D_{4729} would be timelessly false).

Contrary to the Necessitarians' claim – that the laws of nature are not of our choosing – Regularists argue that a very great many laws of nature **are** of our choosing. But it's not that you reflect on choosing the laws. You don't wake up in the morning and ask yourself "Which laws of nature will I create today?" No, it's rather that you ask yourself, "What will I do today?", and in choosing to do some things rather than others, your actions – i.e. your choices – make certain propositions (including some universal statements containing no proper names) true and other propositions false.

A good example embodying the Regularists' view can be found in the proposition, attributed to Sir Thomas Gresham (1519?-1579) but already known earlier, called – not surprisingly – "Gresham's Law":

> [Gresham's Law is] the theory holding that if two kinds of money in circulation have the same denominational value but different intrinsic values, the money with higher intrinsic value will be hoarded and eventually driven out of circulation by the money with lesser intrinsic value.

In effect what this 'law' states is that 'bad money drives out good'. For example, in countries where the governments begin issuing vast amounts of paper money, that money becomes next-to-worthless and people hoard 'good' money, e.g. gold and silver coins, that is, 'good' money ceases to circulate.

Why, when paper money becomes virtually worthless, do people hoard gold? Because gold retains its economic value – it can be used in emergencies to purchase food, clothing, flight (if need be), medicine, etc., even when 'bad' paper money will likely not be able to be so used. People do not hoard gold under such circumstances because Gresham's 'Law' forces them to do so. Gresham's 'Law' is purely descriptive (not prescriptive) and illustrates well the point Regularists insist upon: namely, that laws of economics are not causal agents – they do not force the world to be some particular way rather than another. (Notice, too, how this non-nomological 'Law' works perfectly adequately in explaining persons' behavior. Citing regularities can, and does, explain the way the world is. One does not need to posit an underlying, inaccessible, nomicity.)

The manner in which we regard Gresham's 'Law' ought, Regularists suggest, to be the way we regard all laws of nature. The laws of physics and chemistry are no different than the laws of economics. All laws of nature – of physics, of chemistry, of biology, of economics, of psychology, of sociology, etc. – are nothing more, nor anything less, than (a certain subclass of) true propositions.

Persons who believe that there is a problem reconciling the existence of free will and determinism have turned upside down the relationship between laws of nature on the one side and events and states of

affairs on the other. It is not that laws of nature govern the world. We are not 'forced' to choose one action rather than another. It is quite the other way round: we choose, and the laws of nature accommodate themselves to our choice. If I choose to wear a brown shirt, then it is *true* that I do so; and if instead I were to choose to wear a blue shirt, then it would be true that I wear a blue shirt. In neither case would my choosing be 'forced' by the truth of the proposition that describes my action. And the same semantic principle applies even if the proposition truly describing my choice is a universal proposition rather than a singular one.

To make the claim even more pointedly: it is only because Necessitarianism tacitly adopts an anti-semantic theory of truth that the supposed problem of free will vs. determinism even arises. Adopt a thoroughgoing Regularist theory and the problem evaporates.

Statistical Laws

Many, perhaps most, of workaday *scientific laws* (recall the first section above) are statistical generalizations – e.g. the scientific claims (explanatory principles) of psychology, economics, meteorology, ecology, epidemiology, etc.

But can the underlying, the 'real', Laws of Nature itself be statistical?

With occasional reluctance, especially early in the Twentieth Century, physicists came to allow that at least some laws of nature really are statistical, e.g. laws such as "the half-life of radium is 1,600 years" which is a shorthand way of saying "in any sample of radium, 50% of the radium atoms will radioactively decay within a period of 1,600 years".

Regularists take the prospect (indeed the existence) of statistical laws of nature in stride. On the Regularists' account, statistical laws of nature – whether in areas studied by physicists or by economists or by pharmacologists – pose no intellectual or theoretical challenges whatsoever. Just as deterministic (i.e. exceptionless) laws are descriptions of the world, not prescriptions or disguised prescriptions, so too are statistical laws.

Necessitarians, however, frequently have severe problems in accommodating the notion of statistical laws of nature. What sort of metaphysical 'mechanism' could manifest itself in statistical generalities? Could there be such a thing as stochastic nomicity? Popper grappled with this problem and proposed what he came to call "the propensity theory of probability". On his view, each radium atom, for example, would have its 'own'(?) 50% propensity to decay within the next 1,600 years. Popper really did see the problem that statistical laws pose for Necessitarianism, but his solution has won few, if any, other subscribers. To Regularists, such solutions appear as evidence of the unworkability and the dispensability of Necessitarianism. They are the sure sign of a theory that is very much in trouble.

Is the Order in the Universe a Cosmic Coincidence?

An important subtext in the dispute between Necessitarians and Regularists concerns the very concepts we need to 'make sense' of the universe.

For Regularists, the way-the-world-is is the rock bottom of their intellectual reconstruction. They have reconciled themselves to, and embraced, the ultimately inexplicable *contingency* of the universe.

But for Necessitarians, the way-the-world-is cannot be the rock bottom. For after all – they will insist – there has to be some reason, some explanation, why the world is as it is and is not some other way. It can't simply be, for example, that all electrons, the trillions upon trillions of them, just happen to all bear the identical electrical charge as one another – that would be a cosmic coincidence of an unimaginable improbability. No, this is no coincidence. The identity of electrical charge comes about because there is a law of nature to the effect that electrons have this charge. Laws of nature 'drive' the world. The laws of physics which, for example, describe the behavior of diffraction gratings (see Harrison) were true from time immemorial and it is because of those laws that diffraction gratings, when they came to be engineered in modern times, have the peculiar properties they do.

Regularists will retort that the supposed explanatory advantage of Necessitarianism is illusory. Physical necessity – nomicity if you will – is as idle and unempirical a notion as was Locke's posit of a material substratum. Locke's notion fell into deserved disuse simply because it did no useful work in science. It was a superfluous notion. (The case is not unlike modern arguments that minds are convenient fictions, the product of 'folk' psychology.)

At some point explanations must come to an end. Regularists place that stopping point at the way-the-world-is. Necessitarians place it one, inaccessible, step beyond, at the way-the-world-must-be.

The divide between Necessitarians and Regularists remains as deep as any in philosophy. Neither side has conceived a theory which accommodates all our familiar, and deeply rooted, historically-informed beliefs about the nature of the world. To adopt either theory is to give up one or more strong beliefs about the nature of the world. And there simply do not seem to be any other theories in the offing. While these two theories are clearly logical contraries, they are – for the foreseeable future – also exhaustive of the alternatives.

Notes

1. Throughout this article, the term "world" is used to refer to the entire universe, past, present, and future, to whatever is near and whatever is far, and to whatever is known of that universe and what is unknown. The term is never used here to refer to just the planet Earth.

   Clearly, one presupposition of this article is that the world (i.e. the universe) is not much of our

making. Given the sheer size of the universe, our human effect on it is infinitesimal. The world is not mind-constructed. The world is some one particular way, although it remains a struggle to figure out what that way is. [Return]

2. A perpetual motion machine *of the first kind* is a hypothetical machine in which no energy is required for performing work. [Return]

3. *In detail* – The statement "There is a river of cola" is an existential affirmative statement (a classical so-called **I**-proposition). Its contradictory (or better, among its contradictories) is the statement "No river is constituted of cola" (a classical so-called **E**-proposition). Now, given that "There is a river of cola" is, ex hypothesi, timelessly *false*, then the universal negative proposition, "No river is constituted of cola", is timelessly *true*. But since the latter satisfies all five of the necessary conditions specified (above) for being a law of nature, it would turn out to be a law of nature. [Return]

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Legal Positivism

Legal positivism is a conceptual theory emphasizing the conventional nature of law. Its foundation consists in the pedigree thesis and separability thesis, which jointly assert that law is manufactured according to certain social conventions. Also associated with positivism is the view, called the discretion thesis, that judges make new law in deciding cases not falling clearly under a legal rule. As an historical matter, positivism arose in opposition to classical natural law theory, according to which there are necessary moral constraints on the content of law. The word 'positivism' was probably first used to draw attention to the idea that law is "positive" or "posited," as opposed to being "natural" in the sense of being derived from natural law or morality.

Contents

The Pedigree Thesis. The pedigree thesis asserts that legal validity is a function of certain social facts. Borrowing heavily from Jeremy Bentham, John Austin argues that the principal distinguishing feature of a legal system is the presence of a sovereign who is habitually obeyed by most people in the society, but not in the habit of obeying any determinate human superior (Austin 1995, p. 166). On Austin's view, a rule R is legally valid (i.e., is a law) in a society S if and only if R is commanded by the sovereign in S and is backed up with the threat of a sanction. The severity of the threatened sanction is irrelevant; any general sovereign imperative supported by a threat of even the smallest harm is a law.

Austin's command theory of law is vulnerable to a number of criticisms. One problem is that there appears to be no identifiable sovereign in democratic societies. In the United States, for example, the ultimate political power seems to belong to the people, who elect lawmakers to represent their interests. Elected lawmakers have the power to coerce behavior but are regarded as servants of the people and not as repositories of sovereign power. The voting population, on the other hand, seems to be the repository of ultimate political authority yet lacks the immediate power to coerce behavior. Thus, in democracies like that of the United States, the ultimate political authority and the power to coerce behavior seem to reside in different entities.

A second problem has to do with Austin's view that the sovereign lawmaking authority is incapable of legal limitation. On Austin's view, a sovereign cannot be legally constrained because no person (or body of persons) can coerce herself (or itself). Since constitutional provisions limit the authority of the legislative body to make laws, Austin is forced to argue that what we refer to as constitutional law is really not law at all; rather, it is principally a matter of "positive morality" (Austin 1977, p. 107).

Austin's view is difficult to reconcile with constitutional law in the United States. Courts regard the procedural and substantive provisions of the constitution as constraints on legal validity. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that "an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." (*Norton v. Shelby County*, 118 U.S. 425 (1886)). Moreover, these constraints purport to be legal constraints: the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution states that "[t]his Constitution ... shall be the supreme *Law* of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby."

The most influential criticisms of Austin's version of the pedigree thesis, however, owe to H. L. A. Hart's seminal work, *The Concept of Law*. Hart points out that Austin's theory provides, at best, a partial account of legal validity because it focuses on one kind of rule, namely that which requires citizens "to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not" (Hart 1994, p. 81). While every legal system must contain so-called primary rules that regulate citizen behavior, Hart believes a system consisting entirely of the kind of liberty restrictions found in the criminal law is, at best, a rudimentary or primitive legal system.

On Hart's view, Austin's emphasis on coercive force leads him to overlook the presence of a second kind of primary rule that confers upon citizens the power to create, modify, and extinguish rights and obligations in other persons. As Hart points out, the rules governing the creation of contracts and wills cannot plausibly be characterized as restrictions on freedom that are backed by the threat of a sanction. These rules empower persons to structure their legal relations within the coercive framework of the law-a feature that Hart correctly regards as one of "law's greatest contributions to social life." The operation of power-conferring primary rules, according to Hart, indicates the presence of a more sophisticated system for regulating behavior.

But what ultimately distinguishes societies with full-blown systems of law from those with only rudimentary or primitive forms of law is that the former have, in addition to first-order primary rules, secondary meta-rules that have as their subject matter the primary rules themselves:

> [Secondary rules] may all be said to be on a different level from the primary rules, for they are all *about* such rules; in the sense that while primary rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must or must not do, these secondary rules are all concerned with the primary rules themselves. They specify the way in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined (Hart 1994, p. 92).

Hart distinguishes three types of secondary rules that mark the transition from primitive forms of law to full-blown legal systems: (1) the rule of recognition, which "specif[ies] some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts" (Hart 1994, p. 92); (2) the rule of change, which enables a society to add, remove, and modify valid rules; and (3) the rule of adjudication, which provides a mechanism for determining whether a valid rule has been violated. On Hart's view, then, every society with a full-blown legal system necessarily has a rule of recognition that articulates criteria for legal validity that include provisions for making, changing and adjudicating law. Law is, to use Hart's

famous phrase, "the union of primary and secondary rules" (Hart 1994, p. 107). Austin theory fails, on Hart's view, because it fails to acknowledge the importance of secondary rules in manufacturing legal validity.

Hart also finds fault with Austin's view that legal obligation is essentially coercive. According to Hart, there is no difference between the Austinian sovereign who governs by coercing behavior and the gunman who orders someone to hand over her money. In both cases, the subject can plausibly be characterized as being "obliged" to comply with the commands, but not as being "duty-bound" or "obligated" to do so (Hart 1994, p. 80). On Hart's view, the application of coercive force alone can never give rise to an obligation-legal or otherwise.

Legal rules are obligatory, according to Hart, because people accept them as standards that justify criticism and, in extreme cases, punishment of deviations:

> What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and that this should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), demands for conformity, and in acknowledgements that such criticism and demands are justified, all of which find their characteristic expression in the normative terminology of 'ought', 'must', and 'should', and 'right' and 'wrong' (Hart 1994, p. 56).

The subject who reflectively accepts the rule as providing a standard that justifies criticism of deviations is said to take "the internal point of view" towards it.

On Hart's view, it would be too much to require that the bulk of the population accept the rule of recognition as the ultimate criteria for legal validity: "the reality of the situation is that a great proportion of ordinary citizens-perhaps a majority-have no general conception of the legal structure or its criteria of validity" (Hart 1994, p. 111). Instead, Hart argues that what is necessary to the existence of a legal system is that the majority of officials take the internal point of view towards the rule of recognition and its criteria of validity. All that is required of citizens is that they generally obey the primary rules that are legally valid according to the rule of recognition.

Thus, on Hart's view, there are two minimum conditions sufficient and necessary for the existence of a legal system: "On the one hand those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials" (Hart 1994, p. 113).

Hart's view is vulnerable to the same criticism that he levels against Austin. Hart rejects Austin's view because the institutional application of coercive force can no more give rise to an obligation than can the application of coercive force by a gunman. But the situation is no different if the gunman takes the internal point of view towards his authority to make such a threat. Despite the gunman's belief that he is entitled to make the threat, the victim is obliged, but not obligated, to comply with the gunman's orders. The gunman's behavior is no less coercive because he believes he is entitled to make the threat.

And likewise for a minimal legal system where only the officials of the legal system take the internal point of view towards the rule of recognition that endows them with authority to make, execute, adjudicate, and enforce the rules. The mere presence of a belief in the officials that they are entitled to make law cannot give rise to an obligation in other people to comply with their enactments any more than the presence of a belief on the part of a gunman that he is entitled to issue orders gives rise to an obligation in the victim to comply with those orders. Hart's minimal legal system is no less coercive than Austin's legal system.

The Separability Thesis. The second thesis comprising the foundation of legal positivism is the separability thesis. In its most general form, the separability thesis asserts that law and morality are conceptually distinct. This abstract formulation can be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, Klaus Füßer (1996) interprets it as making a meta-level claim that the definition of law must be entirely free of moral notions. This interpretation implies that any reference to moral considerations in defining the related notions of law, legal validity, and legal system is inconsistent with the separability thesis.

More commonly, the separability thesis is interpreted as making only an object-level claim about the existence conditions for legal validity. As H.L.A. Hart describes it, the separability thesis is no more than the "simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so" (Hart 1994, pp. 181-82). Insofar as the object-level interpretation of the separability thesis denies it is a necessary truth that there are moral constraints on legal validity, it implies the existence of a possible legal system in which there are no moral constraints on legal validity.

Though all positivists agree there are possible legal systems without moral constraints on legal validity, there are conflicting views on whether there are possible legal systems with such constraints. According to inclusive positivism (also known as incorporationism and soft positivism), it is possible for a society's rule of recognition to incorporate moral constraints on the content of law. Prominent inclusive positivists include Jules Coleman and H.L.A. Hart, who maintains that "the rule of recognition may incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantive values ... such as the Sixteenth or Nineteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution respecting the establishment of religion or abridgements of the right to vote" (Hart 1994, p. 250).

In contrast, exclusive positivism (also called hard positivism) denies that a legal system can incorporate moral constraints on legal validity. Exclusive positivists like Joseph Raz (1979, p. 47) subscribe to the source thesis, according to which the existence and content of law can always be determined by reference to its sources without recourse to moral argument. On this view, the sources of law include both the circumstances of its promulgation and relevant interpretative materials, such as court cases involving its application.

At first glance, exclusive positivism may seem difficult to reconcile with what appear to be moral criteria of legal validity in legal systems like that of the United States. For example, the Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Likewise, the First Amendment prohibits laws abridging the right of free speech. Taken at face value, these amendments seem to make moral standards part of the conditions for legal validity.

Exclusive positivists argue that such amendments can require judges to consider moral standards in certain circumstances, but cannot incorporate those standards into the law. When a judge makes reference to moral considerations in deciding a case, she necessarily creates new law on an issue-and this is so even when the law directs her to consider moral considerations, as the Bill of Rights does in certain circumstances. On this view, all law is settled law and questions of settled law can be resolved without recourse to moral arguments:

> The law on a question is settled when legally binding sources provide its solution. In such cases judges are typically said to apply the law, and since it is source-based, its application involves technical, legal skills in reasoning from those sources and does not call for moral acumen. If a legal question is not answered by standards deriving from legal sources then it lacks a legal answer-the law on such questions is unsettled. In deciding such cases courts

> inevitably break new (legal) ground and their decision develops the law.... Naturally, their decisions in such cases rely at least partly on moral and other extra-legal considerations (Raz 1979, pp. 49-50).

If the judge can resolve an issue involving the First Amendment merely by applying past court decisions, then the issue is settled by the law; if not, then the issue is unsettled. Insofar as the judge looks to controversial moral standards to resolve the issue, she is going beyond the law because the mere presence of controversy about the law implies that it is indeterminate. Thus, on Raz's view, references to moral language in the law, at most, direct judges to consider moral requirements in resolving certain unsettled questions of law. They cannot incorporate moral requirements into the law.

The Discretion Thesis. A third thesis commonly associated with positivism is the discretion thesis, according to which judges decide difficult cases by making new law in the exercise of discretion. Ronald Dworkin describes this thesis as follows:

> The set of these valid legal rules is exhaustive of 'the law', so that if someone's case is not clearly covered by such a rule . . . then that case cannot be decided by 'applying the law.' It must be decided by some official, like a judge, 'exercising his discretion,' which means reaching beyond the law for some other sort of standard to guide him in manufacturing a fresh legal rule or supplementing an old one (Dworkin 1977, p. 17).

On this view, a judge cannot decide a case that does not fall clearly under a valid rule by interpreting or applying the law; she must decide the case by creating or promulgating a law that did not exist prior to the adjudication. Thus, the discretion thesis implies that judges are empowered with a quasi-legislative lawmaking authority in cases that cannot be decided merely by applying law.

Though often associated with positivism, the discretion thesis does not belong to positivism's theoretical core. The pedigree and separability theses purport to be conceptual claims that are true of every possible legal system. These two claims jointly assert that, in every possible legal system, propositions of law are valid in virtue of having been manufactured according to some set of social conventions. On this view, there are no moral constraints on the content of law that hold in every possible legal system.

But many positivists regard the discretion thesis as a contingent claim that is true of some, but not all, possible legal systems. Hart, for example, believes there will inevitably arise cases that do not fall clearly under a rule, but concedes a rule of recognition could deny judges discretion to make law in such cases by requiring judges "to disclaim jurisdiction or to refer the points not regulated by the existing law to the legislature to decide" (Hart 1994, p. 272). Indeed, Hart's inclusive positivism allows him to hold that a rule of recognition could require judges to decide cases in precisely the manner that Dworkin advocates (Hart 1994, p. 263; and see Section IV-2, *infra*). Thus, at least for inclusive positivists like Hart, the discretion thesis makes a different kind of claim than the conceptual claims that form positivism's theoretical core (Himma 1999).

Moreover, the discretion thesis is consistent with some forms of natural law theory. According to Blackstone's classical naturalism, conformity with the natural law is a necessary condition for legal validity in every possible legal system. But insofar as the natural law is incomplete, there will inevitably arise issues that have multiple outcomes consistent with the natural law. Since none of the relevant outcomes in such cases offend the natural law, there is nothing in the assumption of necessary moral constraints on the content of law, in and of itself, that precludes Blackstone from endorsing the discretion thesis in such cases. Of course, if Blackstone believes the natural law contains a principle denying discretion to judges, then *that* commitment is inconsistent with the discretion thesis. But the assertion

there are necessary constraints on the content of law, in and of itself, is consistent with the discretion thesis, even construed as a conceptual claim, as long as there are cases to which the natural law is indifferent.

In any event, Dworkin distinguishes three different senses in which a judge might be said to have discretion: (1) a judge has discretion when she exercises judgment in applying a legal standard to a particular case; (2) a judge has discretion when her decision is not subject to reversal by any other authority; and (3) a judge has discretion when her decision is not bound by any legal standards.

According to Dworkin, positivism's discretion thesis is committed to the third sense of discretion, which he refers to as strong discretion. On Dworkin's view, the thesis that judges have discretion only in the sense that they exercise judgment is trivially true, while the thesis that judges have discretion in the sense that their decisions are not subject to being reversed by a higher authority is false. Even the Supreme Court can be reversed by Congress or by constitutional amendment. Thus, on Dworkin's view, the discretion thesis implies that judges have discretion to decide hard cases by what amounts to an act of legislation because the judge is not bound by any legal standards.

Thus construed, the discretion thesis is inconsistent with ordinary legal practice. Even in the most difficult of cases where there is no clearly applicable law, lawyers do not ask that the judge decide the relevant issue by making new law. Each lawyer cites cases favorable to her client's position and argues that the judge is bound by those cases to decide in her client's favor. As a practical matter, lawyers rarely, if ever, concede there are no legal standards governing a case and ask the judge to legislate in the exercise of discretion.

Nevertheless, the problem with Dworkin's analysis is that it falsely presupposes an official cannot make new law unless there are no legal standards constraining the official's decision. Indeed, lawmaking authorities in legal systems like the U.S. never have what Dworkin describes as strong discretion. Even the legislative decisions of Congress, the highest legislative authority in the nation, are always constrained by constitutional standards. For example, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress cannot enact a law that sets one speed limit for male drivers on interstate highways and another for female drivers.

For his part, Hart concedes that judicial lawmaking authority is limited in two respects: "not only are the judge's powers subject to many constraints *narrowing his choice* from which a legislature may be quite free, but since the judge's powers are exercised only to dispose of particular instant cases he cannot use these to introduce large-scale reforms or new codes" (Hart 1994, p. 273). What explains the judge's discretion to make new law in a given case, on Hart's view, is not the absence of legal standards constraining her decision; rather it is the absence of legal standards that dictate a uniquely correct answer to the case. The judge cannot decide such a case merely by applying existing law because there is more than one available outcome that coheres with existing law. In such instances, it is impossible to render a substantive decision (as opposed to simply referring the matter back to the legislature) without creating new law.

The discretion thesis is vulnerable to one powerful objection. Insofar as a judge decides a difficult case by making new law in the exercise of discretion, the case is being decided on the basis of a law that did not exist at the time the dispute arose. If, for example, a judge awards damages to a plaintiff by making new law in the exercise of discretion, it follows that she has held the defendant liable under a law that did not exist at the time the dispute arose. And, as Dworkin points out, it seems patently unfair to deprive a defendant of property for behavior that did not give rise to liability at the time the behavior occurred.

Nevertheless, Dworkin's view fares no better on this count. While Dworkin acknowledges the existence

of difficult cases that do not fall clearly under a rule, he believes they are not resolved by an exercise of judicial discretion. On Dworkin's view, there is always a right answer to such cases implicit in the pre-existing law. Of course, it sometimes takes a judge of Herculean intellectual ability to discern what the right answer is, but it is always there to be found in pre-existing law. Since the right answer to even hard legal disputes is always part of pre-existing law, Dworkin believes that a judge can take property from a defendant in a hard case without unfairness (Dworkin 1977, pp. 87-130).

But if fairness precludes taking property from a defendant under a law that did not exist at the time of the relevant behavior, it also precludes taking property from a defendant under a law that did not give reasonable notice that the relevant behavior gives rise to liability. Due process and fundamental fairness require reasonable notice of which behaviors give rise to liability. As long as Dworkin acknowledges the existence of cases so difficult that only the best of judges can solve them, his theory is vulnerable to the same charge of unfairness that he levels at t he discretion thesis.

Classic Criticisms of Positivism

Fuller's Internal Morality of Law. In *The Morality of Law*, Lon L. Fuller argues that law is subject to an internal morality consisting of eight principles: (P1) the rules must be expressed in general terms; (P2) the rules must be publicly promulgated; (P3) the rules must be (for the most part) prospective in effect; (P4) the rules must be expressed in understandable terms; (P5) the rules must be consistent with one another; (P6) the rules must not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties; (P7) the rules must not be changed so frequently that the subject cannot rely on them; and (P8) the rules must be administered in a manner consistent with their wording (Fuller 1964, p. 39).

On Fuller's view, no system of rules that fails minimally to satisfy these principles of legality can achieve law's essential purpose of achieving social order through the use of rules that guide behavior. A system of rules that fails to satisfy (P2) or (P4), for example, cannot guide behavior because people will not be able to determine what the rules require. Accordingly, Fuller concludes that his eight principles are "internal" to law in the sense that they are built into the existence conditions for law: "A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all" (Fuller 1964, p. 39).

These internal principles constitute a morality, according to Fuller, because law necessarily has positive moral value in two respects: (1) law conduces to a state of social order and (2) does so by respecting human autonomy because rules *guide* behavior. Since no system of rules can achieve these morally valuable objectives without minimally complying with the principles of legality, it follows, on Fuller's view, that they constitute a morality. Since these moral principles are built into the existence conditions for law, they are internal and hence represent a conceptual connection between law and morality that is inconsistent with the separability thesis.

Hart responds by denying Fuller's claim that the principles of legality constitute an internal morality; on Hart's view, Fuller confuses the notions of morality and efficacy:

> [T]he author's insistence on classifying these principles of legality as a "morality" is a source of confusion both for him and his readers.... [T]he crucial objection to the designation of these principles of good legal craftsmanship as morality, in spite of the qualification "inner," is that it perpetrates a confusion between two notions that it is vital to hold apart: the notions of purposive activity and morality. Poisoning is no doubt a purposive activity, and reflections on its purpose may show that it has its internal principles. ("Avoid poisons however lethal if they cause the victim to vomit"....) But to call these principles of

> the poisoner's art "the morality of poisoning" would simply blur the distinction between the notion of efficiency for a purpose and those final judgments about activities and purposes with which morality in its various forms is concerned (Hart 1965, pp. 1285-86).

On Hart's view, all actions, including virtuous acts like lawmaking and impermissible acts like poisoning, have their own internal standards of efficacy. But insofar as such standards of efficacy conflict with morality, as they do in the case of poisoning, it follows that they are distinct from moral standards. Thus, while Hart concedes that something like Fuller's eight principles are built into the existence conditions for law, he concludes that they do not constitute a conceptual connection between law and morality.

Unfortunately, Hart's response overlooks the fact that most of Fuller's eight principles double as moral ideals of fairness. For example, public promulgation in understandable terms may be a necessary condition for efficacy, but it is also a moral ideal; it is morally objectionable for a state to enforce rules that have not been publicly promulgated in terms reasonably calculated to give notice of what is required. Similarly, we take it for granted that it is wrong for a state to enact retroactive rules, inconsistent rules, and rules that require what is impossible. Poisoning may have its internal standards of efficacy, but such standards are distinguishable from the principles of legality in that they conflict with moral ideals.

Nevertheless, Fuller's principles operate internally, not as moral ideals, but merely as principles of efficacy. As Fuller would likely acknowledge, the existence of a legal system is consistent with considerable divergence from the principles of legality. Legal standards, for example, are necessarily promulgated in general terms that inevitably give rise to problems of vagueness. And officials all too often fail to administer the laws in a fair and even-handed manner-even in the best of legal systems. These divergences may always be *prima facie* objectionable, but they are inconsistent with a legal system only when they render a legal system incapable of performing its essential function of guiding behavior. Insofar as these principles are built into the existence conditions for law, it is because they operate as efficacy conditions-and not because they function as moral ideals.

Fuller's jurisprudential legacy, however, should not be underestimated. While positivists have long acknowledged that law's essential purpose is to guide behavior through rules (e.g., John Austin writes that "[a] law ... may be defined as a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him" Austin 1977, p. 5), they have not always appreciated the implications of this purpose. Fuller's lasting contribution to the theory of law was to flesh out these implications in the form of his principles of legality.

Positivism and Legal Principles. Dworkin argues that, in deciding hard cases, judges often invoke legal principles that do not derive their authority from an official act of promulgation (Dworkin 1977, p. 40). These principles, Dworkin believes, must be characterized as law because judges are bound to consider them when relevant. But if unpromulgated legal principles constitute law, then it is false, *contra* the pedigree thesis, that a proposition of law is valid only in virtue of having been formally promulgated.

According to Dworkin, principles and rules differ in the kind of guidance they provide to judges:

> Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision.... But this is not the way principles operate.... [A principle] states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision (Dworkin 1977, pp. 24-25).

On Dworkin's view, conflicting principles provide competing reasons that must be weighed according to the importance of the respective values they express. Thus, rules are distinguishable from principles in

two related respects: (1) rules necessitate, where principles only suggest, a particular outcome; and (2) principles have, where rules lack, the dimension of weight.

Dworkin cites the case of *Riggs v. Palmer* as representative of how judges use principles to decide hard cases. In *Riggs*, the court considered the question of whether a murderer could take under the will of his victim. At the time the case was decided, neither the statutes nor the case law governing wills expressly prohibited a murderer from taking under his victim's will. Despite this, the court declined to award the defendant his gift under the will on the ground that it would be wrong to allow him to profit from such a grievous wrong. On Dworkin's view, the court decided the case by citing "the principle that no man may profit from his own wrong as a background standard against which to read the statute of wills and in this way justified a new interpretation of that statute" (Dworkin 1977, p. 29).

The positivist might respond that when the *Riggs* court considered this principle, it was reaching beyond the law to extralegal standards in the exercise of judicial discretion. But Dworkin points out that the *Riggs* judges would "rightfully" have been criticized had they failed to consider this principle; if it were merely an extralegal standard, there would be no rightful grounds to criticize a failure to consider it (Dworkin 1977, p. 35). Accordingly, Dworkin concludes that the best explanation for the propriety of such criticism is that principles are part of the law.

Further, Dworkin maintains that the legal authority of standards like the *Riggs* principle cannot derive from promulgation in accordance with purely formal requirements: "[e]ven though principles draw support from the official acts of legal institutions, they do not have a simple or direct enough connection with these acts to frame that connection in terms of criteria specified by some ultimate master rule of recognition" (Dworkin 1977, p. 41). Unlike legal rules, legal principles lack a canonical form and hence cannot be explained by formal promulgation.

On Dworkin's view, the legal authority of a binding principle derives from the contribution it makes to the best moral justification for a society's legal practices considered as a whole. According to Dworkin, a legal principle maximally contributes to such a justification if and only if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the principle coheres with existing legal materials; and (2) the principle is the most morally attractive standard that satisfies (1). The correct legal principle is the one that makes the law the moral best it can be. Thus, Dworkin concludes, "if we treat principles as law we must reject the positivists' first tenet, that the law of a community is distinguished from other social standards by some test in the form of a master rule" (Dworkin 1977, p. 44).

In response, positivists concede that there are legal principles, but argue that their authority as law can be explained in terms of the conventions contained in the rule of recognition:

> Legal principles, like other laws, can be enacted or repealed by legislatures and administrative authorities. They can also become legally binding through establishment by the courts. Many legal systems recognize that both rules and principles can be made into law or lose their status as law through precedent (Raz 1972, p. 848).

According to this view, legal principles are like legal rules in that both derive their authority under the rule of recognition from the official acts of courts and legislatures. If the *Riggs* principle that no person shall profit from her own wrong has legal authority, it is because that principle was either declared by a court in the course of adjudicating a dispute or formally promulgated by the appropriate legislative body.

Further, inclusive positivists argue that Dworkin's account of principles is itself consistent with the pedigree thesis. As Hart puts it, "this interpretative test seems not to be an alternative to a criterion provided by a rule of recognition, but ... only a complex 'soft-positivist' form of such a criterion

identifying principles by their content not by their pedigree" (Hart 1994, p. 263). The idea, familiar from Section II, is that a rule of recognition can incorporate content-based constraints on legal validity, even those rooted ultimately in morality.

The Semantic Sting. In *Law's Empire,* Dworkin distinguishes two kinds of disagreement legal practitioners can have about the law. Lawyers can agree on the criteria a rule must satisfy to be legally valid, but disagree on whether those criteria are satisfied by a particular rule. For example, two lawyers might agree that a rule is valid if enacted by the state legislature, but disagree on whether the rule at issue was actually enacted by the state legislature. Such disagreements are empirical in nature and hence pose no theoretical difficulties for positivism.

There is, however, a second kind of disagreement that Dworkin believes is inconsistent with positivism. Lawyers often agree on the facts about a rule's creation, but disagree on whether those facts are sufficient to endow the rule with legal authority. Such disagreement is considerably deeper than empirical disagreement as it concerns the criteria for legal validity-which, according to positivism, are exhausted by the rule of recognition. Dworkin calls this second kind of disagreement theoretical disagreement about the law.

Theoretical disagreement, on Dworkin's view, is inconsistent with the pedigree thesis because the pedigree thesis explains the concept of law in terms of shared criteria for creating, changing and adjudicating law:

> If legal argument is mainly or even partly about [the properties that make a proposition legally valid], then lawyers cannot all be using the same factual criteria for deciding when propositions of law are true and false. Their arguments would be mainly or partly about which criteria they should use. So the project of the semantic theories, the project of digging out shared rules from a careful study of what lawyers say and do, would be doomed to fail (Dworkin 1986, p. 43).

If lawyers disagree about the criteria of legal validity, then the grounds of legal validity cannot be exhausted by the shared criteria contained in a rule of recognition. The semantic sting, then, implies that there must be more to the concept of legal validity than can be explained by promulgation in accordance with shared criteria embodied in a rule of recognition.

The semantic sting resembles one of Dworkin's earlier criticisms of Hart's pedigree thesis. Hart believes that the rule of recognition is a social rule and is hence constituted by the conforming behavior of people who also accept the rule as a ground for criticizing deviations. Like all social rules, then, the rule of recognition has an external and internal aspect. The external aspect of the rule of recognition consists in general obedience to those rules satisfying its criteria of validity; the internal aspect is constituted by its acceptance as a public standard of official behavior. Hart believes it is this double aspect of the rule of recognition that accounts for its normativity and enables him to distinguish his theory from Austin's view of law as a system of coercive commands. For, as Hart points out, a purely coercive command can oblige, but never obligate, a person to comply (see Section I, *supra*).

Dworkin argues that this feature of Hart's theory commits him to the claim that there cannot be any disagreement about the content of rule of recognition:

> Hart's qualification ... that the rule of recognition may be uncertain at particular points ... undermines [his theory].... If judges are in fact divided about what they must do if a subsequent Parliament tries to repeal an entrenched rule, then it is not uncertain whether any social rule [of recognition] governs that decision; on the contrary, it is certain that none does

> (Dworkin 1977, pp. 61-62).

On Dworkin's view, the requirements of a social rule cannot be uncertain since a social rule is constituted by acceptance and conforming behavior by most people in the relevant group: "two people whose rules differ ... cannot be appealing to the same social rule, and at least one of them cannot be appealing to any social rule at all" (Dworkin 1977, p. 55).

Jules Coleman responds that if the rule of recognition is a social rule, then Hart's view implies there must be general agreement among the officials of a legal system about what standards constitute the rule of recognition, but it does not imply there cannot be disagreement as to what those standards require in any given instance:

> The controversy among judges does not arise over the content of the rule of recognition itself. It arises over which norms satisfy the standards set forth in it. The divergence in behavior among officials as exemplified in their identifying different standards as legal ones does not establish their failure to accept the same rule of recognition. On the contrary, judges accept the same truth conditions for propositions of law.... They disagree about which propositions satisfy those conditions (Coleman 1982, p. 156).

Coleman, then, distinguishes two kinds of disagreement practitioners can have about the rule of recognition: (1) disagreement about what standards constitute the rule of recognition; and (2) disagreement about what propositions satisfy those standards. On Coleman's view, Hart's analysis of social rules implies only that (1) is impossible.

Under the U.S. rule of recognition, for example, a federal statute is legally valid if and only if it has been enacted in accordance with the procedural requirements described in the body of the Constitution and is consistent with the first fourteen amendments. Since, on Hart's view, the U.S. rule of recognition is a social rule, U.S. officials must agree on the procedures the federal government must follow in enacting law, the set of sentences constituting the first fourteen amendments, and the requirement that federal enactments be consistent with those amendments.

But Hart's view of social rules does not imply there cannot be any disagreement about whether a given enactment is consistent with the first fourteen amendments. Legal practitioners can and do disagree on what Hart calls penumbral (or borderline) issues regarding the various amendments. While every competent practitioner in the U.S. would agree, for example, that torturing a person to induce a confession violates the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, there is considerable disagreement about whether compelling a defendant to undergo a psychiatric examination for the purpose of increasing her sentence also violates that right. On Coleman's view, there is nothing in Hart's analysis of social rules that precludes such borderline disagreements about whether a practice is consistent with the Fifth Amendment.

Despite its resemblance to this earlier criticism, Dworkin's semantic sting argument takes aim at a deeper target. The semantic sting targets all so-called semantic theories of law that articulate the concept of law in terms of "shared rules ... that set out criteria that supply the word's meaning" (Dworkin 1986, p. 31). Thus, while the earlier criticism is directed at Hart's extraneous account of social rules, the semantic sting is directed at what Dworkin takes to be the very heart of positivism's theoretical core, namely, the claim that there are shared criteria that exhaust the conditions for the correct application of the concept of law.

At the root of the problem with semantic theories, on Dworkin's view, is a flawed theory of what makes disagreement possible. According to Dworkin, semantic theories mistakenly assume that meaningful disagreement is impossible unless "we all accept and follow the same criteria for deciding when our

claims are sound, even if we cannot state exactly, as a philosopher might hope to do, what these criteria are" (Dworkin 1986, p. 45). On this flawed assumption, two people whose concepts of law differ cannot be disagreeing about the same thing.

Perhaps with Coleman's response to his earlier criticism in mind, Dworkin concedes that semantic theories are consistent with theoretical disagreements about borderline or penumbral cases: "people do sometimes speak at cross-purposes in the way the borderline defense describes" (Dworkin 1986, p. 41). But Dworkin denies semantic theories are consistent with theoretical disagreement about pivotal (or core) cases:

> [According to semantic theories, y]ou and I can sensibly discuss how many books I have on my shelf, for example, only if we both agree, at least roughly, about what a book is. We can disagree over borderline cases: I may call something a slim book that you would call a pamphlet. But we cannot disagree over what I called pivotal cases. If you do not count my copy of *Moby-Dick* as a book because in your view novels are not books, any disagreement is bound to be senseless (Dworkin 1986, p. 45).

The problem, on Dworkin's view, is that many difficult appellate cases like *Riggs* involve theoretical disagreement about pivotal cases:

> The various judges who argued about our sample cases did not think they were defending marginal or borderline claims. Their disagreements about legislation and precedent were fundamental; their arguments showed that they disagreed not only about whether Elmer should have his inheritance, but about why any legislative act, even traffic codes and rates of taxation, impose the rights and obligations everyone agrees they do.... They disagreed about what makes a proposition of law true not just at the margin but in the core as well (Dworkin 1986, pp. 42-43).

On Dworkin's view, the judges in *Riggs* were not having a borderline dispute about some accepted criterion for the application of the concept of law. Rather, they were having a disagreement about the status of some putatively fundamental criterion itself: the majority believed, while the dissent denied, that courts have power to modify unambiguous legislative enactments.

Accordingly, theoretical disagreement about pivotal cases like *Riggs* is inconsistent with semantic theories of law, on Dworkin's view, because it shows that shared criteria do not exhaust the proper conditions for the application of the concept of law. For the majority and dissenting judges in *Riggs* were having a sensible disagreement about law even though it centered on a pivotal case involving the criteria of legal validity. Thus, Dworkin concludes, the concept of law cannot be explained by so-called criterial semantics.

In response, Hart denies both that his theory is a semantic theory and that it assumes such an account of what makes disagreement possible:

> [N]othing in my book or in anything else I have written supports [a semantic account] of my theory. Thus, my doctrine that developed municipal legal systems contain a rule of recognition specifying the criteria for the identification of the laws which courts have to apply may be mistaken, but I nowhere base this doctrine on the mistaken idea that it is part of the meaning of the word 'law' that there should be such a rule of recognition in all legal systems, or on the even more mistaken idea that if the criteria for the identification of the grounds of law were not uncontroversially fixed, 'law' would mean different things to different people (Hart 1994, p. 246).

Instead, Hart argues that his theory of law is "a descriptive account of the distinctive features of law in general as a complex social phenomenon" (Hart 1994, p. 246). Hart presents his theory, not as an account of how people apply the concept of law, but rather as an account of what distinguishes systems of law from other systems of social rules. On Hart's view, it is the presence of a rule of recognition establishing criteria of validity that distinguishes law from other systems of social rules. Thus, according to Hart, Dworkin's criticism fails because it mischaracterizes positivism as providing a criterial explanation of the concept of law.

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The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Metaphysics

SECTIONS:

1. Life

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig, Germany, on July 1, 1646. He was the son of a professor moral philosophy, and after university study in Leipzig and elsewhere, it would have been natural for him to go into academia. Instead, he began a life of professional service to noblemen, primarily the dukes of Hanover (Georg Ludwig became George I of England in 1714, two years before Leibniz's death). His professional duties were various, such as official historian and legal advisor. Above all, he was required to (or allowed to) travel widely, meeting many of the foremost intellectuals in Europe - of particularly formative importance were the astronomer, mathematician and physicist Huygens, and the philosopher Spinoza.

Leibniz was one of the great polymaths of the modern world. Moreover, a list of his significant contributions is almost as long as the list of his activities. As an engineer he worked on calculating machines, clocks and even mining machinery. As a librarian he more or less invented the modern idea of cataloguing. As a mathematician he not only produced ground-breaking work in what is now called topology, but came up with the calculus independently of (though a few years later) than Newton, and his

notation has become the standard. In logic, he worked on binary systems among numerous other areas. As a physicist he made advances in mechanics, specifically the theory of momentum. He also made contributions to linguistics, history, aesthetics and political theory.

Leibniz's curiosity and genius ranged widely, but one of the most constant of his concerns was to bring about reconciliation by emphasizing the truths that lay in both of even the most contradictory positions. Throughout his life, he hoped that his work on philosophy (as well as his work as a diplomat) would form the basis of a theology capable of reuniting the Church, divided since the Reformation in the 16th Century. Similarly, he was willing to engage with, and borrow ideas from, the materialists as well as the Cartesians, the Aristotelians as well as the most modern scientists. It is quite ironic, then, that he was partial cause of a dispute between British and Continental mathematicians concerning who was first to the calculus (and who might have plagiarised who). This dispute slowed down the advance of mathematics in Europe for over a century.

However, the great variety of his work meant that, sadly, he completed few of his ambitious projects. For our purposes here, this means above all that Leibniz's rich and complex philosophy has to be gathered primarily from a large set of quite short manuscripts, many fragmentary and unpublished, as well has his vast correspondence. The last section of this entry gives bibliographical details of several editions of Leibniz's work.

Partly because of the above fact, a major controversy in Leibniz scholarship is the question of where to begin. Insofar as Leibniz is a logician, it is tempting to begin with his conception of truth (and, indeed, this will be our starting point). But insofar as Leibniz is a metaphysician, it is equally tempting to begin with his account of the nature of reality and in particular substance. Less common, but perhaps equally likely starting points might lie in Leibniz the mathematician, the theologian or the physicist. These controversies, however, already contain a lesson: to an important degree *it doesn't matter*. So integrated were his various philosophical interests - so tightly laced together into a *system* - that one ought to be able to begin anywhere and reconstruct the whole. Or at least Leibniz evidently thought so, since very often we find him using an idea from one part of his philosophy to concisely prove something in an apparently quite distant philosophical region. Likewise, just this systematic nature often makes 'getting into' Leibniz the most difficult step, because every idea seems to rely upon the others.

(Note: this entry will not be dealing with Leibniz's work on, for example, aesthetics, political philosophy, or [except incidentally] physics. Also, Leibniz 'mature' metaphysical career spanned over thirty years. During this period, it would be surprising if some of his basic ideas did not change. Remarkably, however, the broad outline of his philosophy does remain constant. Therefore, in this entry we will predominately taking the broad view.)

2. The Idea of Truth

Leibniz the logician would have us ask a seductively simple question: what is truth? It will turn out to be the case that a conception of what truth is has important consequences for a conception of what reality in general is, and how it is to be understood at its most profound level. Common-sensically, we say that a proposition is true when its content is adequate to the situation in the world to which it refers. So: 'the sky is grey' is true if and only if the thing out there in the world we call the sky is actually the colour we call grey at the time the proposition is stated. This, however, gets us into problems about the

relationship of language to the world, and what this 'adequacy' consists in. (Problems both sceptics and pragmatists are only too fond of drawing our attention to.)

Leibniz says that we can bypass all that, at least for the moment. Truth is simply a proposition in which the predicate is contained in the subject. The predicate is what is asserted; the subject is what is asserted about. So, formally speaking, Leibniz says, all true propositions can be expressed: 'subject is predicate'. This is not an idea unique to Leibniz by any means - what is unique is the single-mindedness with which he pursues the consequences of such an idea of truth. (See e.g. 'Correspondence with Arnauld', letter of July 14, 1686.)

This idea of truth seems straight-forward enough for what we now commonly call *analytic* propositions, such as 'Blue is a colour', which has nothing to do with the world, but is simply part of a definition of blue. The notion of colour is part of the notion of blue. Similarly, 'A = A', which is a basic logical truth. The predicate is not just contained in the subject, it *is* the subject. But Leibniz says that this 'being contained' is 'implicitly' or 'virtually' the case with other truths. ('Primary Truths', 'The Nature of Truth'.) Take the statement 'Peter is ill'. Usually, we take this proposition to be true only because it refers to a real world in which Peter is, in fact, ill. But Leibniz will analyse this as follows: if we knew everything there was to know about Peter, that is, if we had a *complete concept* of Peter, we would also know (among many other things) that he is ill at the moment. Therefore, the statement 'Peter is ill' is true not *primarily* because of some reference to the world, but in the first instance because we or someone has the concept of Peter, which is the subject of the proposition, and that concept contains (as a predicate) his being ill. Of course, it may be the case that we *happen to know* that Peter was ill *because* we refer to the world (perhaps we see him cough repeatedly). But the fact that we find out about Peter in this way does not make the statement that 'Peter is ill' true and thus a piece of knowledge because of that reference. We must distinguish the concept of truth from pragmatic or methodological issues of how we happen to find out about that truth, or what we can do with the truth. The latter are completely irrelevant to the question of what is truth (or knowledge) in itself.

Leibniz also wants to claim that a statement is true for all time - that is, whenever the statement is made. So, the statement 'Peter is ill (on January 1st, 1999)' was true in the year 1998 (although neither we, nor Peter, knows it yet) as well as in the year 2000 (although we and Peter may have forgotten about the illness by then). It was also true a million years ago, and will be true a million years from now, although it is very unlikely that anyone will actually *know* this truth at those times.

Leibniz's own example was Julius Caesar (*Discourse on Metaphysics,* §13). He writes,

> *For if some person were capable of completing the whole demonstration by means of which he could prove this connection of the subject (which is Caesar) with the predicate (which is his successful enterprise* [winning the battle of Pharsalus, etc.]*), he would then show that the future dictatorship of Caesar had its foundation in his notion or nature, that a reason can be found there why he resolved to cross the Rubicon rather than stop, and why he won rather than lost the day at Pharsalus...*

But there are several further ideas Leibniz introduces in this passage which we need to explore. What is meant by 'completing the whole demonstration'? Or by something having a 'foundation', or by 'a reason can be found'?

3. Sufficient Reason

As we have just seen, for any proposition truth is defined in the same way: the predicate contained in the subject. It only takes a little thought to realise that for any one subject (like Peter, or Caesar), the number of predicates which are true of it will be infinite (or at least very large!), for they must include every last thing Peter or Caesar did or will do, and also everything that did or will ever *happen to them*. Why do all these predicates come together in the one subject? It could be that the predicates are a quite arbitrary or random collection. Leibniz does not believe this - and it is certainly not how we normally think. Rather, we normally think that one predicate or set of predicates explains another. For example, Peter's coming into contact with a virus explains his illness. Or, Caesar's ambition and boldness explains why he decided to cross the Rubicon. So, many (at least) of the predicates that are true of a subject 'hang together' as a network of explanations.

Leibniz goes further still: for *every* predicate that is true of a subject, there will be a set of other true predicates which constitute a *sufficient reason* for its being true. This he calls 'the principle of sufficient reason'. This is why he uses words like 'foundation' and 'reason' in the quotation above. Unless this were true, Leibniz feels, the universe would not make any sense, and science and philosophy both would be impossible (see, e.g. *New Essays on Human Understanding*, preface, p. 66). Moreover, it would impossible to account for a basic notion like *identity* unless there were a sufficient reason why I (with my particular properties now) am identical with that 'me' who existed a week ago (and had such different properties). ('Remarks on Arnauld's Letter...', May 1686)

This idea of sufficient reason accounts for why Leibniz talks about about 'completing the whole demonstration'. If the *complete concept* of the subject (all of its true predicates) together constitutes a complete network of explanation, then these explanations can be followed forwards and backwards, at least in principle. That is, someone could *deduce* Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon from a full picture of his previous predicates; or, working backwards, deduce from a full picture of those predicates true of Caesar at his death the reasons why he won the battle of Pharsalus. The 'whole demonstration', then, would be a revelation of the logical structure of the network of explanations that make Caesar who he is.

At least in principle! Clearly, this is not something that you or I can do. Human minds are not subtle and capacious enough for a task which may be infinite. Still, in our more limited way, we happily talk about 'personalities', 'characters', and causes or reasons for things. The quotation from Leibniz given above continues:

> ... [he who completed the whole demonstration would then show] *that it was rational and therefore definite that this would happen, but not that it is necessary in itself, or that the contrary implies a contradiction.*

These qualifications are very important for Leibniz. It was often suggested by Leibniz's contemporaries (and is still being suggested!) that his idea of the sufficient reason of all the predicates of a subject meant that everything true of a subject is *necessarily* true. This might entail that Caesar did not 'choose' to cross the Rubicon, but that he was acting in a determined manner, like a machine. In other words, Leibniz seems to be denying anything like *free will*. We will return to the free will problem below, but for the moment, a few observations.

First, Leibniz claims that Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon is not necessary in the sense that 'A is A' is necessary. Because while 'A is not A' is a contradiction, Caesar's deciding not to cross the Rubicon does

not imply a contradiction. To be sure, history would have been different - even Caesar would have been different - but there is no contradiction in that strong sense. Caesar's properties are not *logically necessary*.

Second, any truth about Caesar - indeed, the whole complete concept of Caesar - is not 'necessary in itself'. Caesar is Caesar, but nothing about Caesar in himself proves that Caesar *has to be*. By contrast, 'A is A' doesn't need any other explanation for its truth. So, while every property of Caesar is explained by some other property of Caesar, no property explains why it is true that 'Caesar existed'. Caesar is not *necessary being*.

It remains a strenuously debated issue in Leibniz scholarship what the exact nature of these distinctions is, whether he is justified in making them, and - even if justified - do they yield the results he claims in the area of free will. We will add more detail to this account, but the existence of this debate should be kept in mind throughout.

4. Substance, briefly.

At this point, we must turn from a conception of truth to a conception of substance - a subject which has been just out of sight in the above. We will not deal with Leibniz's full philosophy of substance until section 8. For the moment, we have only to observe that, for humans (though not for God), complete concepts are always concepts 'of' existing substances - that is, 'of' really existing things. Leibniz writes:

> *Now it is obvious that* all true predication has some foundation in the nature of things*, and when a proposition is not identical, that is to say when the predicate is not expressly included in the subject, it must be virtually included in it.* [...] *This being so, we can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is* to have a notion so complete *that it is sufficient to include, and to allow the deduction of, all the predicates of the subject to which that notion is attributed.* [*Discourse on Metaphysics*, §8, my emphasis]

To be the individual substance Caesar, then, is to be such as to have a notion which includes everything that can truthfully be predicated of the subject 'Caesar'. We might say that substance means a complete concept made real; and a complete concept means a real substance 'expressed' or 'perceived' in thought. Moreover, just as for any one predicate, the complete concept contains other predicates which explain that predicate - so, for any given property of a substance, the complete individual substance will itself be the explanation for that property. Caesar chose to cross the Rubicon for many complex reasons, but they all boil down to this: that was the kind of man Caesar was.


As we shall see below, Leibniz has much more to say about substance - but he claims that it all follows from this insight. However, the exact relationship Leibniz intended between the logical idea of a complete concept, and the metaphysical idea of a substance is still hotly debated in Leibniz scholarship.

5. Necessary Being

The complete concept of Caesar cannot explain itself in its entirety; expressed ontologically, this means that Caesar himself provides no explanation of why Caesar should have existed at all - Caesar is *contingent being*. By 'contingent' is meant something that could have been otherwise; that is, here, something that could have not existed at all. The principle of sufficient reason, if we accept it, must not only apply to each predicate in the complete concept of a subject. But also it must apply to the concept

itself in its entirety as the concept of an *existing* thing. Why should this substance exist, rather than some other substance, or nothing at all? What explains Caesar? Possibly other complete substances, such as his parents; and they in turn are explained by still others.

But the entire course of the universe, the total aggregate of substances across space and time are one and all contingent. There are other possible things, to be sure; but there are also other possible *universes* that could have existed but did not. The totality of contingent things themselves do not explain themselves. Here again, the principle of sufficient reason applies. There must be, Leibniz insists, something *outside the totality of contingent things* which explains them, something which is itself necessary and therefore requires no explanation other than itself. Note that we are not assuming an origin or beginning in any sense. Even if time stretched infinitely into the past, there would still be no explanation for the total course of things.



The properties of every monad in the universe, just like the properties within any one monad, are all interconnected in a vast network of explanation, according to the law of sufficient reason. But what is the reason for the whole set of monads – what explains the existence and nature of the universe itself?

This forms a proof for the existence of God. (*Monadology* §37-9, 'A Specimen of Discoveries') In fact, it is a version of the third of the cosmological arguments given by St Thomas Aquinas - and subject to many of the same difficulties. One might, for example, object in a Kantian vein that the concept of explanation, rightly demanded of all individual contingent beings, is applied beyond its proper sphere in demanding an explanation of the *totality* of contingent beings. But Leibniz might well counter that this object assumes a whole theory of the 'proper spheres' of concepts.

God, then, is the necessary being which constitutes the explanation of contingent being, why the universe is this way rather than any other. For the moment, God's necessity is the only thing we know about such being. (We, with Leibniz, say 'God', although there is not much religious or theological about this bare metaphysical concept.) God as a being may be necessary, but if the contingent universe were simply a

random or arbitrary act of God, then God would not constitute the required explanation of all things. In other words, God must not only be necessary, but also *the source of the intelligibility of all things*. It must be possible, therefore, to inquire into the reasons God had for 'authorising' or allowing this, rather than any other, universe to be the one that actually exists. And if God is to be the explanation of the intelligibility of the universe, then God must have 'access' to that intelligibility, such that God could be said to know what it is that is being allowed to exist - that is, God must have the ability to grasp complete concepts, and to see at once the 'whole demonstration' we talked about above. God so far is therefore (i) necessary being, (ii) the explanation of the universe, and (iii) the infinite intelligence.

Here Leibniz famously brings in the notion of perfection. (See e.g. 'A Specimen of Discoveries') We have to try to imagine God, outside of time, contemplating the infinite universe that 'he' is going to - not create - but *allow* to be actual and sustain in existence. In the mind of God are an infinite number of infinitely complex complete concepts, all considered as possibly existent substances, with none having any particular 'right' to exist. There is just one constraint on this decision: it must not violate the other basic principle of Leibniz's: non-contradiction. In other words, each substance may 'individually' be possible, but they must all be possible together - the universe forming a vast, integrated *system*. For example, God could not create a universe in which there were *both* more sheep than cows *and* more cows than sheep. God could choose a universe in which there is the greatest possible quantity of pizza; or in which everything is purple; or whatever. God, however, chooses the universe that is the *most perfect*, and this principle of perfection is not surprising since it is most consummate with the idea of God as an infinite being. To choose any other less perfect universe would be to choose a lesser universe. Thus, the existing world is the best of all possible worlds. (This claim, and its apparent implications were very effectively and famously satirised by Voltaire in his *Candide*. Note also that Leibniz is often taken as an ancestor of modern possible worlds semantics; however, it is undeniable that at least the context and purpose of Leibniz's notion of a possible universe was very different.) The theological consequences of this Leibniz explores at, for example, the end of the 'Discourse on Metaphysics'. (There may be a difficult theological implication: must God be thought of as *constrained*, first by the concept of perfection, and then by the systemic nature of his creation? Leibniz attempts, for example in the 'Correspondence with Arnauld' for example, to escape this conclusion.)

To try to understand further this notion of perfection, Leibniz tries out several concepts in various writings: notions of the best, the beautiful, the simply compossible, greatest variety or the greatest quantity of essence. The last of these is the explanation he keeps coming back to: perfection simply means the greatest quantity of essence, which is to say the greatest richness and variety in each substance, compatible with the least number of basic laws, so as to exhibit an intelligible order that is 'distinctly thinkable' in the variety ('A Resume of Metaphysics'; there is a relationship to the Medieval, and particularly Augustine, notion of 'plenitude'). Leibniz seems to understand this principle as just self-evident. It certainly seems to be a big jump to this aesthetic/moral/wise God from the ontological conception of God deduced above. Although Leibniz may have a point in arguing that it would be absurd in some sense for an infinite being to choose anything other than an infinitely rich and thus perfect universe. And he finds this aesthetic observed also throughout nature: that nature forms tend towards a maximum of variety compatible with orderliness. Never the less, contemporary philosophers generally find Leibniz's thought to be rather confused and even 'unphilosophical' at this point.

6. Problems of freedom, sin and evil.

But all this may cause more problems than it solves. If the complete concept of any being - such as a human being - is known for all time, and was chosen by God for existence. then is such a human being free in any sense. And if not, then what nonsense is made of the idea of morality or of sin? Further, it seems possible that what we mean by 'freedom' is that the outcome is not predictable, in the way that the operation of a washing machine, or of the addition of two numbers, is predictable. Why for example should God punish Adam and Eve for sinning when they clearly had no free choice - since God knew in advance (predicted - indeed *made it happen*) that they were going to sin?

To clear this up, Leibniz needs to distinguish between several ways in which things might be determined in advance. Whatever is determined is clearly true. Truth, however, come in several varieties. (Much of the following is taken from the set of distinctions Leibniz makes in 'Necessary and Contingent Truths'; Leibniz makes similar but rarely identical sets of distinctions in a variety of texts.)

1. Truths of Essence. These come in two varieties:
   - Primary or original truth: such as the law of non-contradiction.
   - Eternal or metaphysical or geometrical truths: laws of arithmetic or geometry, for example, which Leibniz claims can be reduced by a finite process of argumentation and substitution of definitions to primary truth. These are valid of *all possible universes*.
2. Truths of Existence or of Fact or of 'hypothesis'. Here, arguably, Leibniz sees four varieties:
   - 'Absolutely Universal' - those truths definitive of this universe as being the most perfect universe. Leibniz writes: 'Indeed, I think that in this series of things there are certain propositions which are true with absolute universality, and which cannot be violated even by a miracle.' ('Necessary and Contingent Truths')
   - Universal-physical truths: the laws of physics, and other such efficient causes, for example. The truths which hold universally of all substances in this, but *not* in all possible, universes - but which also could, in principle, be violated by a miracle, in accordance with overall divine providence.
   - 'Individual' metaphysical truths: truths about the properties of individual substances, where those properties follow indeed from the complete concept and thus are apparent to God, but do not follow any 'subordinate universal laws'. Deduction of such truths is available to no being, no matter how perfect or perceptive, other than God.

Only truths of essence can be 'necessary' absolutely and strictly speaking. All other truths, such as the actions of Caesar are only 'hypothetically' necessary - that is, only on the hypothesis that a universe exists as it is, with beings such as these in it. (See 'Discourse on Metaphysics' §13 and 'Correspondence with Arnauld', April 12th, 1686.) My actions are, therefore, not necessary by definition (regardless at this point of which type of 'truth of existence' they fall under). Thus the concept of me 'inclines without necessitating' (e.g. 'Discourse on Metaphysics' §30). Leibniz further writes:

> *For speaking absolutely, our will is in a state of indifference*, in so far as indifference is opposed to necessity, *and it has the power to do otherwise, or to suspend its action altogether, both alternatives being and remaining possible.* [...] *It is true, however, and indeed it is certain from all eternity, that a particular soul will not make use of this power on such and such an occasion.*

> *But whose fault is that? Does it have anyone to blame but itself?* ('Discourse on Metaphysics', §30, my emphasis)

By this 'indifference', Leibniz means a 'physical' indifference - that is to say, there is no universal-physical truth, as defined above, which governs human action. For Leibniz, that means that human action is further freed: the will has the power to suspend its action with respect to the physical sequence of efficient causes - but also even with respect to what would otherwise be seen as a decisive final cause. 'For they [free or intelligent substances] are not bound by any certain subordinate laws of the universe, but act as it were by a private miracle' ('Necessary and Contingent Truths'). Minds are different from mechanical causes. (As we shall see below, Leibniz goes against the trend of 17th and 18th century thought by reintroducing the Aristotelian and Scholastic notion of a final cause and, indeed, substantial forms.) Although Leibniz occasionally uses the analogy of a machine to describe the soul, the kinds of forces and causes operative in the former are simply inapplicable to the latter. Thus, if by individual free choice we mean: individual action that cannot be known in advance by even an infinitely subtle application of the laws of physics, chemistry, or biology - then we have free choice in that sense too.

Leibniz also here and there offers the following additional arguments for his particular conception of human free will:

1. Freedom as 'unpredictability' might be taken to mean freedom as an act uncaused. But this makes no sense, for free choice is not randomness. My free act has a cause - namely, me. Why should we complain when the individual concept of 'me' intrinsically determines what I do? Is this not what is meant by freedom? That I am the source of my action, and not anyone or anything else?

2. A necessary ignorance of future is practically, perhaps even logically, equivalent to freedom. As we know, grasping the full explanation of any predicate that lies in the complete concept is an infinite task. To help illustrate the distinction between contingent and necessary truths, Leibniz makes a famous analogy with the incommensurability of any whole number or fraction with a 'surd' (for example, the square root of two, the value of which cannot be represented numerically by any finite series of numbers.) For finite human minds, that incommensurability is a positive fact, just like contingency - no matter that for God neither 'calculation' is impossible, or even more difficult. Thus contingent truths can in principle be known from all time, but necessarily not by a human being. (See e.g. 'On Freedom'.) Leibniz writes: 'Instead of wondering about what you cannot know and what can tell you nothing, act according to your duty, which you do know.' ('Discourse on Metaphysics', §30) (It should be pointed out that this is somewhat more than an analogy, since it is closely related to the kinds of problems infinitesimal calculus was designed to deal with - and Leibniz takes the possibility of a calculus as having real metaphysical implications.)

3. A famous scholastic debate concerned the so-called 'Sloth Syllogism.' If everything is fated, the argument goes, then whatever action I 'do' will or will not happen whether or not I will it, therefore I need will nothing at all. I can just be a sloth, and let the universe happen. Leibniz thinks this is absurd - indeed, immoral. Individual will (what I will) matters. If I am the kind of person who is a sloth, then (everything else being the same) the course of my life will indeed be quite different than if I am the kind of person (like Caesar) who takes events by the scruff of the neck.

4. What many philosophers mean by 'contingent' is that an individual predicate 'could have been' different, and everything else the same. For Leibniz, this is impossible. To change one predicate means

to alter the *whole* complete concept/substance, and *with it the whole universe*. Leibniz thus claims that philosophers of a more radical sense of freedom do not take seriously the extent to which the universe is an *integrated network* of explanations, and that this in turn has implications for the idea of contingency. (See the discussion of Adam in Leibniz's letter to Landgraf Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, April 12, 1686.) Thus contingent events, even my free acts, must be part of the perfection of the universe - but that does not mean that all contingent events are so in the same way.

Any remaining objections to this idea are because we have a metaphysically incoherent idea of what freedom means, Leibniz claims. There is no question that Leibniz introduced a spirited and powerful position into the age-old philosophical debate concerning free will. Whose position is 'metaphysically incoherent', however, remains under debate, as we noted already above.

Leibniz's approach to the classic problem of evil is similar. If God is good, and the creator (or 'author') of the best possible universe, then why is the world full of pain and sin? Leibniz wants to claim that this apparent paradox is no real problem. His replies are to be found spread over many texts. Here, very briefly, are three: (i) We only see a small fraction of the universe. To judge it full of misery on this small fraction is presumptuous. Just as the true design - or indeed, *any* design - of a painting is not visible from viewing a small corner of it, so the proper order of the universe exceeds our ability to judge it. (ii) The best possible universe does not mean *no* evil, but that *less* overall evil is impossible. (iii) Similarly to the previous argument, and in the best Neo-Platonist tradition, Leibniz claims that evil and sin are *negations* of positive reality. All created beings are limitations and imperfect; therefore evil and sin are necessary for created beings. ('Discourse on Metaphysics', §30)

7. Space, Time and Indiscernibles

Between 1715 and 1716, at the request of Caroline, Princess of Wales, a series of long letters passed between Leibniz and the English physicist, theologian, and friend of Newton, Samuel Clarke. It is generally assumed that Newton had a hand in Clarke's end of the correspondence. They were published in Germany and in England soon after the correspondence ceased and became one of the most widely read philosophical books of the 18th Century. Leibniz and Clarke had several topics of debate: the nature of God's interaction with the created world, the nature of miracles, vacua, gravity and the nature of space and time. Although Leibniz had written about space and time previously, this correspondence is unique for its sustained and detailed account of this aspect of his philosophy. It is also worth pointing out that Leibniz (and after him Kant) continues a long tradition of philosophising about space and time from the point of view of space - as if the two were always in a strict analogy. It is only rarely that Leibniz deals in any interesting way with time on its own - we shall return to this in section 10.

Newton, and after him Clarke, argued that space and time must be absolute (that is, fixed 'background' constants) and in some sense really existence substances in their own right (at least, this was Leibniz's reading of Newton). The key argument is often called the 'bucket' argument. When an object moves, there must be some way of deciding upon a frame of reference for that motion. With linear motion, the frame does not matter (as far as the mathematics are concerned, it does not matter if the boat is moving away from the shore, or the shore is moving away from the boat); even linear acceleration (changing velocity but not direction) can be accounted for from various frames of reference. However, acceleration in a curve (to take Newton's example, water forced by the sides of a bucket to swirl in a circle, and thus to rise up the sides of the bucket), could only have one frame of reference. For the water


rising against the sides of the bucket can be understood if the water is moving within a stationary universe, but makes no sense if the water is stationary and the universe is spinning. Such curved acceleration requires the postulation of absolute space which makes possible fixed and unique frames of reference. (Similar problems made Einstein's General Theory of Relativity so much more mathematically complicated than the Special Theory.)

Leibniz has a completely different understanding of space and time.

Leibniz first of all finds the idea that space and time might be substances or substance-like absurd. (e.g. 'Correspondence with Clarke', Leibniz's Fourth Paper, §8ff) An empty space would be a substance with no properties; it will be a substance that even God cannot modify or destroy. But Leibniz's most famous arguments lay in a different direction.

Let us return to sufficient reason. This law claims that every thing which happens has, at least in principle, an explanation of why it happened, and why this way rather than that. Every question 'why' has in principle an answer. From this principle, together with non-contradiction, Leibniz believes, follows a third: the *principle of the identity of indiscernibles*. Leibniz is fond of talking about leaves as an example. Two leaves often look absolutely identical. But, he argues, if 'two' things are alike in every respect, *then they are the same object, and not two things at all*. So, it must be the case that no two leaves are ever exactly alike.

But why should this be the case? For if they were in every way the same, but actually different, then there would be no sufficient reason (i.e. no possible explanation) why the first is where (and when) it is, and the second is where (and when) it is, and not the other way around. If, then, we posit the possible existence of two identical things (things that differ in number only. That is, we can count them, but that is all), then we also posit the existence of an absurd universe, one in which the principle of sufficient reason is not universally true. Leibniz often expresses this in terms of God. That is, if two things were identical, there would be for God no sufficient reason for choosing to put one in the first place, and the second in the second place. (Leibniz's argument relates to a scholastic debate centred around the colourful concept of 'Buridan's Ass'.)



If space is real separately from substances, then two substances can be indiscernibles and be in different locations – this entails a paradox. But, if space is a 'projection' of internal properties of substances, then two apparently indiscernible substances are really different by virtue of those properties which are perceived as spatial relations.

The same, however, can be said about empty space. Two portions of empty space are indiscernible, and therefore, according to Leibniz, they must be identical. But if space is to be real - or even an absolute framework for motion - then this clearly cannot be the case. Again, on the Newton/ Clarke account, Leibniz argues, it would make sense to ask why the whole universe was created *here* instead of two meters *that-a-way*. But since these two universes are indiscernible, the question 'why' cannot make sense. This should be understood as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Newtonian position.

That is the negative portion of Leibniz's argument. But what does all this say about space? For Leibniz, the location of an object is not a property of an independent space, but a property of the located object itself - and also of every other object relative to it. This means that an object here can indeed be different from an object located elsewhere simply by virtue of its different location - because that location is a real property of it. That is, space and time are internal features of the complete concepts of things, and not extrinsic. Let us go back to the two identical leaves. All of their properties are the same, except that they are in different locations. But that fact alone makes them completely different substances. To swap them while the rest of the universe wasn't looking would not be just to move things in an indifferent space, but would be to *change the things themselves*. If the leaf were located elsewhere, it would be a different leaf. A change of location is a change in the object itself. Similarly, with location in time.

This has two implications. First, that there is *no absolute location in either space or time,* location is always the situation of an object or event relative to other objects and events. Secondly, space and time are not in themselves real, are not substances. Space and time are ideal. Space and time are just ways

(metaphysically illegitimate ways) of perceiving certain virtual relations between substances. They are 'phenomena'; that is, in an important sense illusions - although they are illusions that are well-founded upon the internal properties of substances. Thus 'illusion' and 'science' are fully compatible. For God, who can grasp all at once the complete concept, there is not only no space but also no temptation of an illusion of space. Leibniz uses the analogy of the experience of a building as opposed to its blueprint, its overall design. (E.g. 'Correspondence with Arnauld', April 12th, 1686, *Monadology* §57) It is sometimes convenient to think of space and time as something 'out there', but this convenience must not be confused with reality. Space is nothing but the order of co-existent objects; time nothing but the order of successive events. This is usually called a *relational theory* of space and time.

Space and time, then, are the hypostatisations of ideal relations - which are real insofar as they symbolize real differences in substances; but illusions to the extent that (i) we take space or time as a thing in itself, or (ii) we believe spatial/temporal relations to be irreducibly exterior to substances, or (iii) we take extension or duration to be a real or even fundamental property of substances.

This raises a serious logical problem for Leibniz. Above, we talked about truth as the containedness of a predicate in a subject. This seemed acceptable, perhaps, for propositions such as 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' or 'Peter is ill'. But what about 'This leaf is *to the left of* that leaf'. That proposition involves not one subject, but three (the two leaves, and whatever is occupying the point-of-view from which the one is 'to the left'). Leibniz has to argue that all *relational predicates* are in fact reducible to 'internal' properties of each of the three substances. This includes time, as well as relations such as 'the sister of' or 'is angry at'. But can *all* relations be so reduced, at least without radically deforming their sense? Modern logicians often see this as the major flaw in Leibniz's logic and, by extension, in his metaphysics.

Take the analogy of a virtual reality computer. What we see on the screen (or in the specially designed VR headset) is the illusion of space and time. Within the computer's memory are just numbers (and ultimately mere binary information) linked together. These numbers describe in an *essentially non-spatial and temporal way* a virtual space and time, within which things can 'be', 'move' and 'do things'. For example, in the computer's memory might be stored the number seven, corresponding to a bird. This in turn is linked to four further numbers representing three dimensions of space and one of time - that is, the bird's position. Suppose further the computer contains also the number one, corresponding to me, the viewer - and again linked to four further numbers for my position, plus another three giving the direction in which my virtual eyes are looking. The bird appears in my headset, then, when the fourth number associated with the bird is the same as my fourth number (we are together in time), and when the first three numbers of the bird (its position in virtual space) are in a certain algebraic relation to the number representing my position and point of view. Space and time are reduced to non-spatial and non-temporal numbers. For Leibniz, God in this analogy apprehends these numbers *as numbers*, rather than through their 'translation' into space and time. Leibniz is the first philosopher of virtual reality.

So how does Leibniz respond to the Newtonian 'bucket' argument? Leibniz thinks this is no problem, although philosophers certainly still debate the issue. He believes that we have simply to provide a rule for the reduction of relations. For linear motion the virtual relation is reducible to either or both the object and the universe around it. For non-linear motion, we must posit a rule such that the relation is not symmetrically reducible to either of the subjects (bucket, or universe around it). Rather, non-linear

motion is assigned only when, and precisely to the extent that, the one subject shows the effects of the motion. That is, the motion is a property of the water, if the water shows the effects. ('Correspondence with Clarke', Leibniz's Fifth Paper, §53) Perhaps it seems strange that the laws of nature should be different for linear as opposed to non-linear motion. It sounds like an *arbitrary* new law of nature, but Leibniz might respond that it is no more arbitrary that any other law of nature - just that we have become so used to the illusion of space that we are not used to thinking in these terms.

8. Substance as monad.

We are now, finally, ready to get a picture of what Leibniz thinks the universe is really like. It is a strange, and strangely compelling, place. Around the end of the Seventeenth Century, Leibniz famously began to use the word '*monad*' as his name for substance. 'Monad' means that which is one, has no parts and is therefore indivisible. These are the fundamental existing things, Leibniz thinks - his theory of monads is meant to be a superior alternative to the theory of atoms that was becoming very popular in natural philosophy. Leibniz has many reasons for distinguishing monads from atoms - the easiest to understand is perhaps that while atoms are meant to be the smallest unit of extension out of which all larger extended things are built, monads are unrelated to extension (remember, space is an illusion).

We must begin to understand what a monad is by beginning from the idea of a complete concept. As we said above, a substance/ monad is that reality which the complete concept represents. A complete concept contains within itself all the predicates that are true of the subject of which it is the concept, and these predicates are related by sufficient reasons into a vast single network of explanation. So, relatedly, the monad must not only exhibit properties, but contain within itself 'virtually' or 'potentially' all the properties it will exhibit in the future, and also contain the 'trace' of all the properties it did exhibit in the past. In Leibniz's extraordinary phrase, found frequently in his later work, the monad is 'pregnant' with the future and 'laden' with the past. (e.g. *Monadology* §22) All these properties are 'folded' up within the monad, and they unfold when and as they have sufficient reason to do so. (e.g. *Monadology* §61) The network of explanation is indivisible - to divide it would either leave some predicates without a sufficient reason, or merely separate two substances that never belonged together in the first place. Correspondingly, the monad is one, 'simple' and indivisible.

Just as in the analysis of space and time we discovered that all relational predicates are actually interior predicates of some complete concept, so the monad's properties will include all of its 'relations' to every other monad in the universe. A monad, then, is self-sufficient. Having all these properties within itself, it doesn't 'need' to be actually related to or influenced by another other monad. Leibniz writes:

> *So if I were capable of considering distinctly everything which is happening or appearing to me now, I would be able to see in it everything which will ever happen or appear to me for all time. And it would not be prevented, and would still happen to me, even if everything outside me were destroyed, so long as there remained only God and me.* ('Discourse on Metaphysics', §14)

The monad that is me, for example, 'expresses' (but as an internal property of it) the fact that I now see various words on a computer screen. Normally, we would think of this as a cause and effect relation - the screen produces light which causes nerve impulses in my eyes, etc. But all this would happen irrespective of the actual existence of the screen! Therefore, just like space and time, cause and effect is a 'well-founded' illusion. We say that one thing (A) causes another (B) when the virtual relation between them is more clearly and simply expressed in A than in B. But metaphysically, it makes no

difference which way around we understand the relation, because the relation itself is not real. Leibniz writes:

> *Thus, in strict metaphysical precision, we have no more reason to say that the ship pushes the water to produce this large number of circles ... than to say that the water is caused to produce all these circles and that it causes the ship to move accordingly.* ('Draft letter to Arnauld', 8th December 1686)

Leibniz goes on to insist that the first direction of explanation is much simpler, since the second would involve leaping directly to the action of God to explain the extraordinary action of so many individual bits of water. But that simplicity is hardly the same as truth.

So, instead of cause and effect being the basic agency of change, Leibniz is offering a theory of *pre-established harmony* to understand the apparently inter-related behaviour of things. Consider the common analogy of two clocks. The two clocks are on different sides of a room and both keep good time. Now, someone who didn't know how clocks work might suspect that one was the master clock and it *caused* the other clock to always follow it. When two things behave in corresponding ways, then we often assume (without any real evidence) that there is causation happening. But another person who knew about clocks would explain that the two clocks have no influence one on the other, but rather that they have a common cause (for example, in the last person to set and wind them). Since then, they have been independently running, not causing each other. On Leibniz's view, every monad is like a clock, behaving spontaneously in the way that it does, independently of other monads, but never the less tied into the others through the common reason: God and his vast conception of the perfect universe. (We must be careful, however, not to take this mechanical image of a clock too literally. Not all monads are explicable in terms of physical, efficient causes.) Leibniz has another extraordinary set of phrases for this: every monad 'expresses' every other, as if it were a 'mirror' of the universe, but no monad has a 'window' through which it could actually receive or supply causal influences. Relatedly, since a monad cannot be influenced, there is no way for a monad to be born or destroyed (except by God through a miracle - defined as something outside the natural course of events). All monads are eternal. (It is fair to say that Leibniz's attempt to account for what happens to 'souls' before the birth of body, and after its death, lead him to some colourful but rather strained speculations.)

Everything we perceive around us which is a unified being must be a single monad. Everything else is a composite of many monads. My coffee cup, for example, is made of many monads (an infinite number, actually). In everyday life, we tend to call it a single thing only because the monads all act together. My soul, however, and the soul of every other living thing, is a single monad which 'controls' a composite body. Leibniz thus says that at least for living things we must posit *substantial forms*, as *the principle of the unity* of certain living composites. (The term is derived from Aristotle: that which structures and governs the changes of mere matter in order to make a thing what it is. See e.g. 'A New System of Nature'.) My soul, a monad otherwise like any other monad, thus becomes the substantial form of my otherwise merely aggregate body.

9. Implications of Conceiving Substances as Monads

We will examine briefly four important implications of Leibniz's account of substance. First, the distinction between metaphysical truth and phenomenal description. Second, the idea of 'little perceptions'. Third, the infinitely composite nature of all body. Fourth, innate ideas.

I. Leibniz has to posit a distinction between levels or 'spheres' ('Discourse on Metaphysics', §10). The 'metaphysical' level is what is actually happening with monads (no causality, no space, no time at least as ordinarily understood, each monad spontaneously unfolding according to the kind of thing that it is). The 'phenomenal' or descriptive level is what appears to be happening because of our finite, imperfect minds (things cause one another, in space and time). Science's object is the latter, which is an illusion, but in which nothing happens that is not based upon what really happens in the metaphysical level (the illusion is 'well-founded'). Therefore, the laws of physics are perfectly correct, as a *description*. (Berkeley will borrow this idea (see especially his 'De Motu'); Kant will produce a highly original version of it.) Indeed, Leibniz believes, following Descartes and many other materialists, that all such laws are *mechanical* in nature, exclusively involving the interaction of momenta and masses. Thus his accusation that Newton's idea of gravity is merely 'occult'. Whereas, at the metaphysical level, no account of reality could be *less* mechanical! Not surprisingly, then, Leibniz's own contributions to physical science were in the fields of the theory of momentum, and engineering.

A serious error would arise only if we took the 'objects' of our science (matter, motion, space, time, etc.) as if they were real in themselves. Consider the following analogy: in monitoring a nation's economy, it is sometimes convenient to speak of a 'retail price index', which is a way of keeping track of the average change in the prices of millions of items. But there is nothing for sale anywhere which costs just that amount. As a measure it works well - provided we don't take it literally! Science, in order to be possible for finite minds, involves that kind of simplification or 'abbreviation' ('Letter to Arnauld', 30th April, 1687).

II. That the monad is the 'mirror' of the whole universe entails that my soul will actually have an infinite number and complexity of perceptions. Obviously, however, I do not apperceive - am not conscious of - all these '*little perceptions*'. Perception then does not mean apperception - Leibniz argues that this is a major error on Descartes' part. Leibniz is one of the first philosophers to have analysed the importance of that which is 'unconscious' in our mental lives. Further, where I am conscious of some perception, it will be of a blurred *composite* perception. Leibniz's analogy is of the roar of the waves of the beach - the sound is in fact made up of a vast number of individual sounds of droplets of water smacking into something else. For Leibniz, little perceptions are an important philosophical insight: First and foremost, this relates to one of Leibniz's main general principles, the *principle of continuity*. Nature, Leibniz claims, 'never makes leaps' (*New Essays On Human Understanding*, 56). This follows, Leibniz believes, from the principle of sufficient reason together with the idea of the perfection of the universe consisting of something like plenitude. But the idea of little perceptions allows Leibniz to account for how such continuity actually happens even in everyday circumstances. The principle of continuity is very important for Leibniz's physics (see 'Specimen Dynamicum') - and as we shall see turns up in Leibniz's account of change in the monad.

Second, little perceptions explain the acquisition of innumerable minor habits and customs, which make up a huge part of our distinctiveness as individual personalities. Such habits accumulate continuously and gradually, rather than all at once like decisions, and thus completely bypass the conscious will. Further, these little perceptions account for our pre-conscious connection with the world. For Leibniz, our relation with the world is not one just of knowledge, or of apperceived sensation. Our relation with the world is richer than either of these, a kind of background feeling of being-a-part-of - thus a thorough-going scepticism, however plausible at a logical level, is ultimately absurd. Finally, for Leibniz, his idea of little perceptions gives a phenomenal (rather than metaphysical) account for the impossibility of real indiscernibles: there will always be differences in the petite perceptions of otherwise

very similar monads. The differences may not be observable at the moment, but will 'unfold in the fulness of time' into a discernible difference (*New Essays*, 245-6).

III. As we saw above, what we perceive at the phenomenal level as bodies (my body, my coffee cup) are actually composites of monads. Actually, such bodies must be made of an infinite number of other inanimate as well as animated monads. This follows from the universe being the most perfect possible, which as we saw seems to mean the richest in controlled complexity, in 'plenitude'. Leibniz argues that it would be a great waste of possible perfection to only allow living beings to have bodies at that particular level of aggregation with which we are phenomenally familiar. Leibniz was understandably impressed by the different levels of magnitude being revealed by relatively recently invented instruments like the microscope and telescope. Leibniz writes:

> *Every portion of matter can be thought of as a garden full of plants, or as a pond full of fish. But every branch of the plant, every part of the animal, and every drop of its vital fluids, is another such garden, or another such pool.* [...] *Thus there is no uncultivated ground in the universe; nothing barren, nothing dead.* (*Monadology*, §67,69)

(Not for a moment denying the extraordinary sublimity of such an image, but Leibniz is often accused of making rather too much of an inadequate and half-baked conception of the infinite.)


Further, the particular monads making up my body are constantly changing as I breath in and out, shed skin, etc. - although not all at one. The substantial form is thus a unified explanation of bodily form and function. A mere chunk of stuff has, of course, an explanation, but not a unified one - not in one monad, the soul. Leibniz thus posits a four-way division of the types of monads: humans, animals, plants, matter. All have perceptions, in the sense that they have internal properties that 'express' external relations; the first three have substantial forms, and thus appetition; the first two have memory; only the first has reason. (See *Monadology* §18-19,29)

IV. An innate idea is any idea which is intrinsic to the mind rather than arriving in some way from outside it. During this period in philosophy, innate ideas tended to be opposed to the thorough-going empiricism of Locke. Like Descartes before him - and for many of the same reasons - Leibniz found it necessary to posit the existence of innate ideas. Now, at the metaphysical level, since monads have no 'windows', it must be the case that *all* ideas are innate. That is to say, an idea in my monad/ soul is just another property of that monad, which happens according to an entirely internal explanation represented by the complete concept. But at the phenomenal level, it is certainly the case that many ideas are *represented as* arriving through my senses. In general, at least any relation in space or time will appear in this way.

Thus, one could imagine Leibniz being a thorough-going empiricist at the phenomenal level of description. This would amount to the claim that the metaphysically true innateness of all ideas is epistemologically useless information. Leibniz finds it necessary, therefore, to advance the following arguments in favour of phenomenally innate ideas:

(i) Some ideas are characterised by universal necessity. Such as ideas in geometry, logic, metaphysics, morality, and theology. It is impossible to derive universal necessity from experience. (This argument is hardly new to Leibniz!) (ii) An innate idea need not be an idea consciously possessed (because of 'little perceptions' for example). An innate idea can be potential, as an inclination of reason, as a rigid distortion in Locke's *tabula rasa*. (Here, Leibniz provides the famous analogy of the veins in the marble

prior to the sculptor's work.) It requires 'attention' (especially in the form of philosophical thinking) to bring to explicit consciousness the operation, and to clarify the content, of these innate ideas. (iii) The possibility of foreseeing an event that is not similar to (and thus merely an associated repetition of) a past event. By using rational principles of physics, for example, we can analyse a situation and predict the outcome of all the masses and forces - even though we have never experienced a similar situation or outcome. This, Leibniz says, is the privilege of humans over animals ('brutes'), who only have the 'shadow' of reason, because they can only move from one idea to another by association of similars. (See Leibniz's joke about empiricists at *Monadology* §28) Leibniz's most extensive discussion of innate ideas, not surprisingly, is in the *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*.



Metaphysically, all properties of monads are 'internal' or 'innate' – but many exist as 'expressions' of relations to other monads.

Thus, at the phenomenal level, Leibniz can distinguish between innate and empirical ideas. An empirical idea would be a property of my monad which itself expresses a relation to some other substance, or which arises from another internal property which was the expression of an external substance. Although the difference empirical/innate is in fact an illusion, it does make a difference, for example to the methodology of the sciences. This is similar to the distinction made above between the idea of truth (as the containedness of the predicate in the subject), and the pragmatic/methodological issue of how we come to know that truth. The latter is not irrelevant, except to the foundation and definition of truth.

10. Activity and Time

Correlate to the inter-connectedness of predicates in the complete concept is an *active power* in the monad, which thus always acts out its predicates spontaneously. Predicates are, to use a fascinating metaphor of Leibniz's, 'folded up' within the monad. In later writings such as the 'Monadology', Leibniz describes this using the Aristotelian/Medieval idea of *entelechy*: the becoming actual or achievement of a potential. This word is derived from the idea of perfections. What becomes actual strives to finish or perfect the potential, to realise the complete concept, to unfold itself perfectly as what it is in its

entirety. This active power is the essence of the monad. (Leibniz has several different names for this property (or closely related properties) of monads: entelechy, active power, *conatus* or *nisus* (effort/striving, or urge/desire), primary force, internal principle of change, and even light (in 'On the Principle of Indiscernibles').)

This activity is not just a property of human souls, but of all monads. This inner activity must mean not only being the source of action, but also being affected (passivity), and of resisting (inertia). As we saw above, what we call 'passivity' is just a more complex and subtle form of activity. Both my activity and my resistance, of course, follow from my complete concept, and are expressed in phenomena as causes and as effects. Change in a monad is the intelligible, constantly and continuously (recalling here the principle of continuity discussed above) unfolding being of a thing, from itself, to itself. 'Intelligible' means: (i) according to sufficient reason, not random or chaotic; and (ii) acting as if designed or purposed, as if *alive* - thus Leibniz's contribution to the philosophical tradition of 'vitalism'.

It is important to understand that this is not just a power to act, conceived as separable from the action and its result. Rather, Leibniz insists that we must understand that power together with (i) the sufficient reason of that power; (ii) the determination of the action at a certain time and in a certain way; (iii) together with all the results of the action, first as the merely potential and then as the actual. (See 'On the Principle of Indiscernibles', and *Monadology* §11-15) We are not, therefore, to understand a sequence of states, the individual bits of which are even ideally separable (except as a object of mere description for science), nor a sequence of causes and effects, again understood to be ideally separable (as if you could have had the cause without the effect). All this follows from the complete concept, the predicates of which are connected in one concept. Each 'state' therefore contains the definite trace of all the past, and is (in Leibniz's famous phrase) 'pregnant' with all the future.

But time too is an illusion, just like space. How are we to understand change without time? The important question is: what conception of time are we talking about? Just like space, Leibniz is objecting to any conception of time which is *exterior* to the objects that are normally said to be 'in' time (time as an exterior framework, a dimension). Also, he objects to time as mere chronology, to a conception of time as a sequence of 'now' points that are ideally separable from one another (not essentially continuous), and are countable and orderable separately from any thing being 'in' them (abstract).

However, in discussing relational properties above, and in particular Leibniz's response to the Newton/Clarke argument about non-linear motion, we found that 'space' was in a sense preserved as a set of *rules* about the representative properties of monads. Here, too, but in a more profound way, 'time' is preserved immanently to the monad. The active principle of change we have been discussing above is immanent to monads, and no one state can be separated from all the others - without completely altering the thing in question into a thing that never changes, that has only the one state for all eternity. For Leibniz, the past and future are no more disconnected - in fact less - from the present than 'here' is from 'there'. Both distinctions are illusions - but temporal relations in a substance form an explanatory, intelligible sequence of a self-same thing. The principle of change becomes an original, internal and active power of the thing constantly becoming the thing that it is, as the spontaneous happening and internal principle of the particular order of things which make up that substance. Substances unfold, become the things God always knew them to be, in a time that is *nothing other than* precisely that becoming.

Time, then, has three levels: (i) the atemporality or eternality of God; (ii) the continuous immanent becoming-itself of the monad as *entelechy*; (iii) time as the external framework of a chronology of 'nows'. The difference between (ii) and (iii) was opened up by our account of the internal principle of change. The real difference between the necessary being of God, and the contingent, created finitude of human being, is the difference between a (i) and (ii).

11. Influences.

Leibniz mathematics - in parallel to Newton's - made a real difference to European science in the 18th century. Other than that, however, his contributions as for example engineer or logician were quickly forgotten, and had to be re-invented elsewhere later.

However, Leibniz's metaphysics was highly influential, renewing the Cartesian project of rational metaphysics, and bequeathing a set of problems and approaches that had a huge impact on much of 18th century philosophy. Kant above all would have been unthinkable without Leibniz's philosophy - especially the accounts of space and time, of sufficient reason, of the distinction between phenomenal and metaphysical reality, and his approach to the problem of freedom, not to mention Leibniz's largely welcoming attitude toward British empiricism. Rarely did Kant agree with his great predecessor - indeed, rendering the whole Cartesian/ Leibnizian approach conceptually impossible - but the influence was never the less necessary. After Kant, Leibniz was more often than not a mine of individual fascinating ideas, rather than a systematic philosopher, ideas appearing (in greatly modified forms) in for example Hegelian idealism, romanticism and Bergson.

In the 20th century, Leibniz has been widely studied by Anglo-American 'analytic' philosophy as a great logician who made significant contributions to, for example, the theory of identity and modal logic. In Continental European philosophy, Leibniz has perhaps been less commonly treated as a great predecessor, although fascinating texts by Heidegger and, much later, by Deleuze, show the continuing fertility of his philosophical ideas.

12. Editions of Leibniz

As noted above, Leibniz did not publish much in his lifetime which fits our familiar description of a philosophy book. Much was published, however, shortly after his death. But there remained for the dedication of future editors a huge estate of short papers, letters and drafts of letters, and notes. The standard edition of the works of Leibniz is the Akademie-Verlag of Berlin. The most comprehensive collection of these in English - together with some published material - is to be found in Leibniz. *Philosophical Papers and Letters*. Translated and Edited by Loemker. 2 Volumes. University of Chicago Press, 1956. The text has gone through subsequent editions and is now published (or *should* be) by Kluwer.

There are several good, inexpensive and readily available shorter anthologies of key texts:

- *Philosophical Essays*. Edited and Translated by Ariew and Graber. Hackett, 1989.
- *Philosophical Texts*. Translated by Francks and Woolhouse. Oxford University Press, 1998.
- *Philosophical Writings*. Edited by Parkinson. Translated by Morris and Parkinson. Everyman, 1973.

Finally, there are editions in English of more specialised selections, the longer texts, and correspondences of Leibniz. These include:

- *The Correspondence with Clarke*. Edited by Alexander. Manchester University Press, 1956.
- *The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence*. Edited and Translated by Mason. Manchester University Press, 1967.
- *Logical Papers*. Ed. and Trans. Parkinson. Oxford, 1966.
- *The Political Writings of Leibniz*. Ed. and Trans., Riley. Cambridge, 1972.
- *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*. Edited and Translated by Remnant and Bennett. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- *Theodicy*. Edited by Farrer. Translated by Huggard. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951.

In the above text I have given references as precisely as possible compatible with the reader finding the passages in which soever edition they may be printed. For similar reasons I have tried always to quote and reference to texts available in more than one form in English.

Dr. Douglas Burnham, Staffordshire University

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Leucippus (fifth century BCE.)

Leucippus was the founder of Atomism. We know next to nothing about his life, and his book appears to have been incorporated in the collected works of Democritus. No writer subsequent to Theophrastos seems to have been able to distinguish his teaching from that of his more famous disciple. Indeed his very existence has been denied, though on wholly insufficient grounds.

Aristotle gives a clear and intelligible account of the way Leucippus' theory arose. It originated from Parmenides' denial of the void, from which the impossibility of multiplicity and motion had been deduced. Leucippus supposed himself to have discovered a theory which would avoid this consequence. He admitted that there could be no motion if there was no void, and he inferred that it was wrong to identify the void with the non-existent. Leucippus was the first philosopher to affirm, with a full consciousness of what he was doing, the existence of empty space. The Pythagorean void had been more or less identified with 'air', but the void of Leucippus was really a vacuum.

Besides space there was body, and to this Leucippus ascribed all the characteristics of Parmenides notion of the real. The assumption of empty space, however, made it possible to affirm that there was an infinite number of such reals, invisible because of their smallness, but each possessing all the marks of the Parmenidean One, and in particular each indivisible like it. These moved in the empty space, and their combinations can give rise to the things we perceive with the senses. Pluralism was at least stated in a logical and coherent way. Democritus compared the motions of the atoms of the soul to that of the motes in the sunbeam which dart hither and thither in all directions even when there is no wind, and we may fairly assume that he regarded the original motion of the other atoms in much the same way.

The atoms are not mathematically indivisible like the Pythagorean monads, but they are physically indivisible because there is no empty space in them. Theoretically, then, there is no reason why an atom should not be as large as a world. Such an atom would be much the same thing as the Sphere of Parmenides, were it not for the empty space outside it and the plurality of worlds. As a matter of fact, however, all atoms are invisible. That does not mean, of course, that they are all the same size; for there is room for an infinite variety of sizes below the limit of the minimum visible. Leucippus explained the phenomenon of weight from the size of the atoms and their combustions, but he did not regard weight itself as a primary property of bodies. Aristotle distinctly says that none of his predecessors had said anything of absolute weight and lightness, but only of relative weight and lightness, and Epicurus was the first to ascribe weight to atoms. Weight for the earlier atomists is only a secondary phenomenon arising, in a manner to be explained, from excess of magnitude. It will be observed that in this respect the early atomists were far more scientific than Epicurus and even than Aristotle. The conception of absolute weight has no place in science, and it is really one of the most striking illustrations of the true scientific instinct of the Greek philosophers that no one before Aristotle ever made use of it, which Plato expressly rejected it.

The first effect of the motion of the atoms is that the larger atoms are retarded, not because they are 'heavy', but because they are more exposed to impact than the smaller. In particular, atoms of an irregular shape become entangled with one another and form groups of atoms, which are still more exposed to impact and consequent retardation. The smallest and roundest atoms, on the other hand, preserve their original motions best, and these are the atoms of which fire is composed. In an infinite void in which an infinite number of atoms of countless shapes and sizes are constantly impinging upon one another in all directions, there will be an infinite number of places where a vortex motion is set up by their impact. when this happens, we have the beginning of a world. It is not correct to ascribe this to chance, as later writers do. It follows necessarily from the presuppositions of the system. The solitary fragment of Leucippus we possess is to the effect that 'Naught happens for nothing, but all thins from a ground (*logos*) and of necessity'.

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Liar Paradox

The Liar Paradox is an argument that arrives at a contradiction by reasoning about a Liar Sentence. The most familiar Liar Sentence is the following self-referential sentence:

> **(1) This sentence is false.**

Experts in the field of philosophical logic have never agreed on the way out of the trouble despite 2,300 years of attention. Here is the trouble--a sketch of the Liar Argument that reveals the contradiction:

> **If (1) is true, then (1) is false. On the other hand, if (1) is false, then it is true to say (1) is false, but because the Liar Sentence is saying precisely that (namely that it is false) (1) is true. So (1) is true if and only if it is false. Since (1) is one or the other, it is both.**

The argument depends upon a few more assumptions and steps, but these are apparently as uncontroversial as those above.

The contradictory result throws us into the lion's den of semantic incoherence. For example, the Liar Sentence can be put to devious uses. In the late medieval period, Buridan did this with the following proof of the existence of God. It uses the pair of sentences:

> **God exists.**
> **None of the sentences in this pair is true.**

The only consistent way to assign truth values, that is, to have these two sentence be either true or false, requires making "God exists" be true. So, Buridan has 'proved' that God does exist.

The Liar Paradox has been discussed continually in philosophy since the middle of the 4th century BCE. The most ancient attribution is to Eubulides of Miletus. He said, "A man says that he is lying. Is what he says true or false?" An ancient gravestone on the Greek Island of Cos was reported by Athenaeus to contain this poem about the paradox:

O Stranger: Philetas of Cos am I,
'Twas the Liar who made me die,
And the bad nights caused thereby.

Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor, wrote three papyrus rolls about the Liar Paradox, and the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus wrote six, but their contents are lost in the sands of time. In the New Testament of the Bible, Saint Paul warned, "One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said the Cretans are always liars." Paul, however, gave no indication he recognized anything paradoxical about the Cretan's remark.

There are many versions of the Paradox in addition to Buridan's and the Liar generated from (1).

Some liar paradoxes begin with sets of two or more sentences:

> **The following sentence is true.**
> **The previous sentence is false.**

The Strengthened Liar Paradox begins with the Strengthened Liar Sentence

> **This sentence is not true.**

This version is called "Strengthened" because it does not use the concept of falsehood and because some promising solutions to (1) fail completely when faced with the Strengthened Liar. So, finding one's way out of the Strengthened Liar is the acid test of a successful solution. There are also Contingent Liars which depend upon what occurs in the empirical world. Suppose that the last sentence in today's edition of *The New York Times* newspaper is:

> **The last sentence in tomorrow's edition of *The New York Times* newspaper is true.**

Was that sentence grammatical? Was it meaningful? Was it true or false, even if we don't know which at the moment? The common sense answers are "yes" to all these questions. Perhaps we should not retain those intuitive answers tomorrow when the *Times*'s presses print a newspaper whose last sentence is

> **The last sentence in yesterday's edition of *The New York Times* newspaper is not true.**

If we adopt the metaphor of a paradox as being an argument which starts from the home of seemingly true assumptions and which travels down the garden path of seemingly valid steps into the den of a contradiction, then a solution to the paradox has to find something wrong with the home, find something wrong with the garden path, or find a way to live within the den. Less metaphorically, the main kinds of ways out of the Paradox are the following: Forget it; we can live with the problem. The Liar Sentence isn't grammatical. The Liar Sentence isn't meaningful. The Liar Sentence is grammatical and meaningful but isn't true or false. There is some other error in one of the steps of the argument that leads to the contradiction. The Liar Sentence is both true and false. Two philosophers might take one of these ways out but for very different reasons, and they might offer different changes in our naive system of beliefs and concepts in order to take this way out.

To put the Paradox in perspective, it is essential to appreciate why such an apparently trivial problem in fact is a deep problem. Suppose we ask the larger question: What is truth? As a question about what are the significant paths of life to be followed or the significant things to know in order to have the best grasp on reality, the question is just too difficult, and also too vague, to be a center of attention for the analytical philosophers of the present age. However, as a question asking simply for general characteristics of all true sentences, the question is more amenable to solution. Nevertheless, it is still a very difficult one. For instance, in the attempt to generally characterize the grounds of validity of a true sentence, that is, in the attempt to characterize *why* a true sentence is true, philosophers have created several ingenious, and alluring theories: the correspondence theory of truth, the coherence theory of truth, and the pragmatic theory of truth, among others. Yet none of these has produced any detailed theory. At best, each is still at the stage of being a suggestive, but uncompelling, metaphor.

More progress on answering the question "What is truth?" will be had by concentrating not on why a sentence is true, but on what other sentences are true when a sentence is true. By

concentrating this way on truth's logical liaisons, Aristotle offered what many philosophers consider to be a partially correct answer to our question about truth. Stripped of its overtones suggesting a correspondence theory of truth, Aristotle proposed what is essentially sentence (T):

> **(T) A declarative sentence is true if and only if what it says is so.**

If pairs of quotation marks serve to name a sentence, then (T) requires that "It is snowing" be true just in case it is snowing. Similarly, if the sentence about snow were named with the number 88 inside a pair of parentheses, then (88) would be true just in case it is snowing. What could be less controversial? Unfortunately, this seemingly correct, but trivial response to our question is neither obviously correct nor trivial; and the resolution of the difficulty is still an open problem in philosophical logic. Why is that? The brief answer is that it leads to the Liar Paradox. The longer answer refers to Tarski's Undefinability Theorem of 1936.

We began this discussion with a mere sketch of the Liar argument using sentence (1). To provide the details, we need (T) plus the following assumptions that also are apparently acceptable:

> **(2) Any declarative sentence "S" says that S.**
>
> **(3) The Liar Sentence, (1), is a legitimate declarative sentence.**
>
> **(4) A declarative sentence is either true or else false.**
>
> **(5) The usual naming convention holds so that**
>
> > **the phrase "This sentence" in (1) refers to (1), and**
> >
> > **(1) = "This sentence is false".**

Tarski added precision to convention (T) and these other assumptions by focussing not on English directly but on a classical formal language capable of expressing arithmetic. Here the difficulties became much clearer; and, very surprisingly, he was able to prove that the assumptions lead to semantic incoherence. Tarski pointed out that the crucial assumption is (3). For there to be a legitimate Liar Sentence in the language, there must be a definable notion of "is true" which holds for the true sentences and fails to hold for the other sentences. If there were such a 'global truth predicate,' then the predicate "is a false sentence" would also be definable and [here is where we need the power of arithmetic] a Liar Sentence would exist. But if so, then from (T), (2), (3), (4) and (5) [but not (1) because the Liar Sentence is not an assumption in the Liar Argument], one could deduce a contradiction. Tarski's deduction is a formal analog of the Liar Argument. The contradictory result tells us that the argument began with a false assumption. Because (T), (2), (4), and (5) are essential to what we call a "classical formal language," the mistaken assumption is (3), and the only possible problem here is the assumption that the global truth predicate "is a true sentence" can be defined. So, Tarski has proved that truth is not definable in a classical language--thus the name "Undefinability Theorem." Tarski's theorem establishes that classically interpreted languages capable of expressing arithmetic cannot contain a global truth predicate. A language containing its own global truth predicate is said to be semantically closed. Tarski's Theorem implies that classical formal languages with the power to express arithmetic cannot be semantically closed. This suggests that English itself may not be semantically closed, or, if English *is* closed, then it is self-contradictory. This shocking result indicates to some that our thought about our thoughts is incoherent. That's the conclusion Tarski himself reached, so he quit trying to find

the coherent structure underlying natural languages and concentrated on developing systems of formal languages that did not allow the deduction of the contradiction. Most other philosophers of logic have not drawn Tarski's pessimiistic conclusion.

For these optimists, there are four main detailed and coherent ways out.

> **(1) The Liar Sentence is meaningless, so the Liar argument can't even get started because its main assumption (that the Liar Sentence exists or is meaningful) is faulty. Natural language is incoherent, and its underlying sensible structure is that of an infinite hierarchy of levels. Because the Liar Sentence would have to reside on more than one level simultaneously, it's not really a meaningful sentence. This way out of the paradox is taken by Russell in his ramified theory of types and, following Tarski, by Quine in his hierarchy of meta-languages. For Russell, the referential phrase "This sentence" in (1) is the culprit because the phrase is not allowed to refer to the sentence in which the phrase itself occurs. For Quine, instead, the culprit is the phrase "is false" in (1) because the phrase must be satisfied by sentences in a language lower in the hierarchy and not by the very sentence in which the phrase occurs.**
>
> **(2) Kripke, on the other hand, *retains* the intuition that the Liar Sentence is meaningful, but argues that it is neither true nor false. It lacks a truth value as does the odd sentence "The present king of France is bald." He rejects the infinite hierarchy of meta-languages underlying English in favor of one formal object language having a hierarchy of partial interpretations, one of which (his lowest fixed-point) assigns an interpretation to all the basic (atomic) predicates of the language except for the truth predicate. The truth predicate is the only partial predicate, and the formal analog of the Liar Sentence is assigned neither the value True nor the value False in the fixed point. Under the fixed point interpretation of the formal language that is the coherent structure within English, the language satisfies Tarski's Convention (T); both S and "S"-is-true have the same truth conditions for any sentence S.**
>
> **(3) The third way out says the Liar Sentence is meaningful and is true or else false, but one step of the argument in the Liar Paradox is incorrect (the move from the falsehood of the Liar Sentence to its truth). Prior, following the informal suggestions of Buridan and Peirce, takes this way out and concludes that the Liar Sentence is simply false.**
>
> **(4) A fourth and more radical way out of the paradox is to argue that semantic incoherence is not necessarily caused by letting the Liar Sentence be both true and false. This solution embraces the contradiction, then tries to limit the damage that is ordinarily a consequence of that embrace. This way out of the paradox uses a paraconsistent logic.**

Although there are many suggestions for how to deal with the Liar Paradox, most are never developed to the point of giving a formal, symbolic theory. Some give philosophical arguments for why this or that conceptual reform is plausible as a way out of paradox, but then don't show that their ideas can be carried through in a rigorous way. Usually it appears that a formal treatment won't be successful. Some other solutions require changes in formalisms so that one or another formal analog of the Liar Paradox's argument fails, but then they give no philosophical argument to back up their formal changes. A decent theory of truth showing the way out of the Liar Paradox

requires both a coherent formalism (or at least a systematic theory of some sort) and a philosophical justification backing it up. The point of the philosophical justification is an unveiling of some hitherto unnoticed or unaccepted rule of language for all sentences of some category which has been violated by the argument of the paradox. It is to the credit of Russell, Quine, and Kripke that they provide a philosophical justification for their solutions while also providing a formal treatment in symbolic logic that shows in detail both the character and implications of their proposed solution. Kripke's elegant and careful treatment of (1) stumbles on the Strengthened Liar and reveals why it deserves its name. The theories of Russell-Tarski-Quine do 'solve' the Strengthened Liar. In the formal, symbolic tradition, other important researchers in the last quarter of the 20th century are Barwise, Burge, Etchemendy, Gupta, Herzberger, McGee, Routley, Skyrms, van Fraassen, and Yablo. Martin and Woodruff created the same solution as Kripke, though a few months earlier. Dowden and Priest first showed how to embrace contradiction.

Principal solutions to the Liar Paradox all have a common approach, the "systematic approach." The solutions agree that the Liar Paradox represents a serious challenge to our understanding the logic of natural language, and they agree that we must go back and *systematically* reform or clarify some of our original beliefs in order to solve the paradox. The solution must be presented systematically and be backed up by an argument about the general character of our language. In short, there must be both systematic evasion and systematic explanation. Also, when it comes to developing this systematic approach, the goal of establishing a logical basis for a consistent semantics of natural language is much more important than the goal of explaining the naive way most speakers use the terms "true" and "not true." As Vann McGee expresses this point, "The problem of giving voice to our preanalytic intuitions about truth is comparatively less important, just as understanding popular misconceptions about space and time is comparatively less important than understanding the actual geometry of space-time."

This 'systematic approach' has been seriously challenged by Wittgenstein. He says one should try to overcome ''the superstitious fear and dread of mathematicians in the face of a contradiction." The proper way to respond to any paradox is by an ad hoc reaction and not by any systematic treatment designed to cure both it plus any future ills. Symptomatic relief is sufficient. It may appear legitimate, at first, to admit that the Liar Sentence is meaningful and also that it is true or false, but the Liar Paradox shows that one should retract this admission and either just not use the Liar Sentence in any arguments, or say it is not really a sentence, or at least say it is not one that is either true or false. Wittgenstein is not particularly concerned with which choice is made. And, whichever choice is made, it needn't be backed up by any theory that shows how to systematically incorporate the choice. He treats the whole situation cavalierly and unsystematically. After all, he says, the language can't really *be* incoherent because we've been successfully using it all along, so why all this "fear and dread"?

P. F. Strawson has argued that the proper way out of the Liar Paradox is to re-examine how the term "truth" is really used by speakers. When we say some proposition is true, we aren't making a statement about the proposition. We are not ascribing a property to the proposition--such as the property of correspondence, or coherence, or usefulness. When we call a proposition "true" we are approving it, or praising it, or admitting it, or condoning it. We are performing an action. Similarly, when we say to our sister, "I promise to pay you fifty dollars," we aren't ascribing some property to the proposition, "I pay you fifty dollars." Rather, we are performing the act of promising. For Strawson, when speakers utter the Liar Sentence, they are attempting to praise

something that isn't there, as if they were saying "Ditto" when no one has spoken. The person who utters the Liar Sentence is making a pointless utterance. The Sentence is grammatical but it's not a proposition and so is not something from which a contradiction can be derived.

The most serious challenges to Strawson's solution have attempted to show that this general analysis of truth is incorrect. If we say, "I hope what she will say is true," I am not performing the act of praising what she says; I don't even know what she will say.

Some of the solutions to the Liar Paradox require a revision in classical logic, the formal logic in which sentences of a formal language have exactly two possible truth values (TRUE, FALSE), and in which the usual rules of inference allow one to deduce anything from an inconsistent set of assumptions. Kripke's revision uses a 3-valued logic with the truth values TRUE, FALSE and NEITHER. Some logicians argue that classical logic is not the incumbent which must remain in office unless an opponent can dislodge it, although this is gospel for other philosophers of logic (probably because of the remarkable success of two-valued logic in expressing most of modern mathematical inference). Instead, the office has always been vacant for natural language.

Other philosophers object to revising classical logic merely to find a way out of the Paradox. They say that philosophers shouldn't build their theories by attending to the queer cases. There are more pressing problems in the philosophy of logic and language than finding a solution to the Paradox, so any treatment of it should wait until these problems have a solution. From the future resulting theory which solves those problems, one could hope to deduce a solution to the Liar Paradox. However, for those who believe the Paradox is not a minor problem but one deserving of immediate attention, there can be no waiting around until the other problems of language are solved independently. Perhaps the investigation of the Liar Paradox will even affect the solutions to these other problems.

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For an essay on the Liar Paradox that provides more of an introduction to the area while not presupposing a strong background in symbolic logic, the author recommends the article below by Benson Mates, the first chapter of the Barwise-Etchemendy book, and then chapter 9 of the Kirkham book. The rest of this bibliography is a list of contributions to research on the Liar Paradox, and nearly all items require the reader to have significant familiarity with the techniques of symbolic logic.

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Ancient Greek and Roman Libraries

ANCIENT GREEK LIBRARIES. The large libraries of the Assyrian and Egyptian monarchs were unknown to the Greeks till the time of the Ptolemies. We do indeed hear of a library formed by Pisistratus, which Aulus Gellius calls "the first public library"; of another by Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos; and among private collectors we hear of Nicocrates of Cyprus, Euclid the Archon, Euripides, Euthydemus, and Aristotle. But it was the Meacedonian rulers of Alexandria who first created a public library on a large scale. Ptolemy Philadelphus collected books from all parts of Greece and Asia, the large number of which he deposited in the Museum, a building in the Bruchium quarter of Alexandria, and the rest in the Serapeum. Zenodotus was the first librarian, after him Callimachus (who made a catalog called the *Pinakes*, then Eratosthenes, then Apollonius, and then Aristophanes. the number of volumes in the two libraries seems to have been between 500,000 and 600,000. Books in foreign languages were brought to Alexandria and translated for the purpose of being placed in the library, and the Septuagint version of the Old Testament is said to have been made in this way. Galen tells us that the autograph original copies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides were procured for the library. This priceless collection suffered considerably in the siege of Alexandria by Julius Caesar, in the destruction of the Bruchium quarter by Aurelian (273 CE.), and by the edict of Theodosius for the destruction of the Serapeum (389 CE.), until it was finally destroyed by the Arabs (640 CE.). A rival library to that at Alexandria was started by the kings of Pergamus, but was transported to Egypt by Antony, who made a present of its 200,000 volumes to Cleopatra. By the second or first century B.C. there seem to have been libraries in most Greek towns.

ANCIENT ROMAN LIBRARIES. The first public library in Rome was that founded by Asinius Pollio, and was in the Atrium Libertatis on the Aventine. Julius Caesar had projected a grand Greek and Latin library, and had commissioned Varro to take measures for the establishment of it; but the scheme was prevented by his death. The library of Pollio was followed by that of Augustus in the Temple of Apollo on the Palatine Hill, another, the Bibliotheca Octaviana (so called from Augustus's sister Octavia), forming part of the Porticus Octavia. There were also libraries on the Capitol, in the Temple of Peace founded by Vespasian, in the palace of Tiberius, besides the Ulpian Library (so called after its founder, Trajan), which was the most famous. This library was attached by Diocletian, as an ornament, to his *thermae*. Private collections of books were made at Rome soon after the Second Punic War, sometimes from the spoils of Grecian or Eastern conquest. Thus Aemilius Paulus brought to Rome the library of Perseus, king of Macedonia; Sulla, that of Apellicon of Teos; Lucullus, the extensive one of the kings of Pontus, to which he gave the public free access. The zeal of Cicero, Atticus, Varro, and others in increasing their libraries is well known. Serenus Sammonicus possessed a library of 62,000 books.

Towards the end of the Republic it became, in fact, the fashion to have a room elegantly furnished as a library, and reserved for that purpose. However ignorant or unstudious a person might be, it was fashionable to appear learned by having a library, though he might never even read the titles

of the books. Seneca condemns the rage for mere book-collecting, and rallies those who were more pleased with the outside than the inside. Lucian wrote a separate piece to expose this common folly. We read of provincial libraries at Milan, Comum, Tibur, and Patrae. A library generally had an eastern aspect. In Herculaneum a library, fully furnished, has been discovered. Round the walls, it had cases containing the books in rolls, and a rectangular case occupied the center of the room: these cases were numbered. It was a very small room -- so small that a person by stretching out his arms could touch both sides of it; yet it contained 1700 rolls. The cases were called either *armaria, loculamenta, foruli,*or *nidi*. Asinius Pollio had set the fashion in his public library of adorning the room with the portraits and busts of celebrated men, as well as statues o Minerva and the Muses. This example was soon followed in the private libraries of the rich. The *librarii a bibliotheca* or *bibliothecarii*, who had charge of the libraries, were usually slaves or freedmen.

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John Locke (1632-1704)

Life. John Locke was born at Wrington, a village in Somerset, on August 29, 1632. He was the son of a country solicitor and small landowner who, when the civil war broke out, served as a captain of horse in the parliamentary army. "I no sooner perceived myself in the world than I found myself in a storm," he wrote long afterwards, during the lull in the storm which followed the king's return. But political unrest does not seem to have seriously disturbed the course of his education. He entered Westminster school in 1646, and passed to Christ Church, Oxford, as a junior student, in 1652; and he had a home there (though absent from it for long periods) for more than thirty years -- till deprived of his studentship by royal mandate in 1684. The official studies of the university were uncongenial to him; he would have preferred to have learned philosophy from Descartes instead of from Aristotle; but evidently he satisfied the authorities, for he was elected to a senior studentship in 1659, and, in the three or four years following, he took part in the tutorial work of the college. At one time he seems to have thought of the clerical profession as a possible career; but he declined an offer of preferment in 1666, and in the same year obtained a dispensation which enabled him to hold his studentship without taking orders. About the same time we hear of his interest in experimental science, and he was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1668. Little is known of his early medical studies. He cannot have followed the regular course, for he was unable to obtain the degree of doctor of medicine. It was not till 1674 that he graduated as bachelor of medicine. In the following January his position in Christ Church was regularized by his appointment to one of the two medical studentships of the college.

His knowledge of medicine and occasional practice of the art led, in 1666, to an acquaintance with Lord Ashley (afterwards, from 1672, Earl of Shaftesbury). The acquaintance, begun accidentally, had an immediate effect on Locke's career. Without serving his connection with Oxford, he became a member of Shaftesbury's household, and seems soon to have been looked upon as indispensable in all matters domestic and political. He saved the statesman's life by a skillful operation, arranged a suitable marriage for his heir, attended the lady in her confinement, and directed the nursing and education of her son -- afterwards famous as the author of *Characteristics*. He assisted Shaftesbury also in public business, commercial and political, and followed him into the government service. When Shaftesbury was made lord chancellor in 1672, Locke became his secretary for presentations to benefices, and, in the following year, was made secretary to the board of trade. In 1675 his official life came to an end for the time with the fall of his chief.

Locke's health, always delicate, suffered from the London climate. When released from the cares of office, he left England in search of health. Ten years earlier he had his first experience of foreign travel and of public employment, as secretary to Sir Walter Vane, ambassador to the Elector of Brandenburg during the first Dutch war. On his return to England, early in 1666, he declined an offer of further service in Spain, and settled again in Oxford, but was soon induced by Shaftesbury to spend a great part of his time in London. On his release from office in 1675 he sought milder air in the south of France, made leisurely journeys, and settled down for many months at Montpellier. The journal which he kept at this period is full of minute descriptions of places and customs and

institutions. It contains also a record of many of the reflections that afterwards took shape in the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. he returned to England in 1679, when his patron had again a short spell of office. He does not seem to have been concerned in Shaftesbury's later schemes; but suspicion naturally fell upon him, and he found it prudent to take refuge in Holland. This he did in August 1683, less than a year after the flight and death of Shaftesbury. Even in Holland for some time he was not safe from danger of arrest at the instance of the English government; he moved from town to town, lived under an assumed name, and visited his friends by stealth. His residence in Holland brought political occupations with it, among the men who were preparing the English revolution. it had at least equal value in the leisure which it gave him for literary work and in the friendships which it offered. In particular, he formed a close intimacy with Philip van Limbroch, the leader of the Remonstrant clergy, and the scholar and liberal theologian to whom *Epistola de Tolerantia* was dedicated. This letter was completed in 1685, though not published at the time; and, before he left for England, in February 1689, the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* seems to have attained its final form, and an abstract of it was published in Leclerc's *Bibliotheque universelle* in 1688.

The new government recognized his services to the cause of freedom by the offer of the post of ambassador either at Berlin or at Vienna. But Locke was no place hunter; he was solicitous also on account of his health; his earlier experience of Germany led him to fear the "cold air" and "warm drinking"; and the high office was declined. But he served less important offices at home. He was made commissioner of appeals in May 1689, and, from 1696 to 1700, he was a commissioner of trade and plantations at a salary of L1000 a year. Although official duties called him to town for protracted periods, he was able to fix his residence in the country. In 1691 he was persuaded to make his permanent home at Oates in Essex, in the house of Francis and Lady Masham. Lady Masham was a daughter of Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist; Lock had manifested a growing sympathy with his type of liberal theology; intellectual affinity increased his friendship with the family at Oates; and he continued to live with them till his death on October 28, 1704.

Writings. **With the exception of the abstract of the *Essay* and other less important contributions to the *Bibliotheque universelle*, Locke had not published anything before his return to England in 1689; and by this time he was in his fifty-seventh year. But many years of reflection and preparation made him ready at that time to publish books in rapid succession. In March 1689 his *Epistola de Tolerantia* was published in Holland; an English translation of the same, by William Popple, appeared later in the same year, and in a corrected edition in 1690. The controversy which followed this work led, on Locke's part, to the publication of a *Second Letter* (1690), and then a *Third Letter* (1692). In February 1690 the book entitled *Two Treatises of Government* was published, and in March of the same year appeared the long expected *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, on which he had been at work intermittently since 1671. it met with immediate success, and led to a voluminous literature of attack and reply; young fellows of colleges tried to introduce it at the universities, and heads of houses sat in conclave to devise means for its suppression. To one of his critics Locke replied at length. This was Edward Stillingfleet, bishop of Worcester, who, in his *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity* (1696), had attacked the new philosophy. It was the theological consequences which were drawn from the doctrines of the *Essay*, not so much by Locke himself as by Toland, in his *Christianity not Mysterious*, that the bishop had chiefly in view; in philosophy for its own sake he does not seem to have been interested. But his criticism drew attention to one of the least satisfactory (if also one of the most suggestive) doctrines**

of the *Essay* -- its explanation of the idea of substance; and discredit was thrown on the "new way of ideas" in general. In January 1697 Locke replied in *A Letter to the Bishop of Worcester*. Stillingfleet answered this in May; and Locke was ready with a second letter in August. Stillingfleet replied in 1698, and Locke's lengthy third letter appeared in 1699. The bishop's death, later in the same year, put an end to the controversy. The second edition of the *Essay* was published in 1694, the third in 1695, and the fourth in 1700. The second and fourth editions contained important additions. An abridgement of it appeared in 1696, by John Wynne, fellow of Jesus College, Oxford; it was translated into Latin and into French soon after the appearance of the fourth edition. The later editions contain many modifications due to the author's correspondence with William Molyneux, of Trinity College, Dublin, a devoted disciple, for whom Locke had a worm friendship. Other correspondents and visitors to Oates during these years were Isaac Newton and Anthony Collins, a young squire of the neighborhood, who afterwards made his mark in the intellectual controversies of the time.

Other interests also occupied Locke during the years following the publication of his great work. The financial difficulties of the new government led in 1691 to his publication of *Some Considerations of the Consequences of Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of Money*, and of *Further Considerations* on the latter question, four years later. In 1693 he published *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, a work founded on letters written to a friend, and in 1695 appeared *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, and later *A Vindication* of the same against certain objections; and this was followed by a second vindication two years afterwards. Locke's religious interest had always been strongly marked, and, in he later years of his life, much of his tie was given to theology. Among the writings of his which were published after his death are commentaries on the Pauline epistles, and a *Discourse on Miracles*, as well as a fragment of a *Fourth Letter for Toleration*. The posthumously published writings include further *An Examination of Father Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing all things in God, Remarks on Some of Mr Norris's Books*, and -- most important of all -- the small treatise on *The Conduct of the Understanding* which had been originally designed as a chapter of the *Essay*.

Plan of the *Essay*. **Locke's greatest philosophical contribution is his *Essay*, and we have his own account of the origin of that work. In the winter of 1670, five or six friends were conversing in his room, probably in London. The topic was the "principles of morality and revealed religion," but difficulties arose and no progress was made. Then, he goes on to say, "it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course, and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with." At the request of his friends, Locke agreed to set down his thoughts on this question at their next meeting, and he expected that a single sheet of paper would suffice for the purpose. Little did he realize the magnitude of the issue which he raised, and that it would occupy his leisure for nearly twenty years.**

Locke's interest centers on traditional philosophical topics: the nature of the self, the world, God, and the grounds of our knowledge of them. We reach these questions only in the fourth and last book of the *Essay*. The first three books are preliminary, though they have, and Locke saw that they had, an importance of their own. His introductory sentence makes this plain:

> **Since it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the**

> eye, while it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

Locke will not "meddle with the physical consideration of the mind"; he has no theory about its essence or its relation to the body; at the same time, he has no doubt that, if due pains be taken, the understanding can be studied like anything else: we can observe its object and the ways in which it operates upon them. The *Essay* is divided into four books; the first is a polemic against the doctrine of innate principles and ideas. The second deals with ideas, the third with words, and the fourth with knowledge.

Ideas in General. All the objects of the understanding are described as *ideas*, and ideas are spoken of as being in the mind (Intro. 2; Bk. 2:1:5; Bk. 2:8:8). Locke's first problem, therefore, is to trace the origin and history of ideas, and the ways in which the understanding operates upon them, in order that he may be able to see what knowledge is and how far it reaches. This wide use of the term "idea" is inherited from Descartes. The contemporary term which corresponds with it most nearly is "presentation". But presentation is, strictly, only one variety of Locke's idea, which includes also representation and image, perception, and concept or notion. His usage of the term thus differs so widely from the old Platonic meaning that the danger of confusion between them is not great. It suited the author's purpose also from being a familiar word in ordinary discourse as well as in the language of philosophers. Herein, however, lays danger from which he did not escape. In common usage "idea" carries with it a suggestion of contrast with reality; this is not supposed in Locke's use.

In the first book of the *Essay*, on the subject of innate ideas, Locke points to the variety of human experience, and to the difficulty of forming general and abstract ideas, and he ridicules the view that any such ideas can be antecedent to experience. All the parts of our knowledge, he insists, have the same rank and the same history regarding their origin in experience. It is in its most extreme form that the doctrine of innate ideas is attacked; but he cannot seen any middle ground between that extreme doctrine and his own view that all ideas have their origin in experience. Indeed, it is difficult to determine against whom the argument is directed. But when we note Locke's polemical interest in the question, and remember the significance for him of the empirical origin of all the elements of human knowledge, we can be content to see in it an earnest protest against the principle of authority, a vindication of our right to examine critically all the so-called "principles" of human knowledge.

Locke wishes to avoid any presupposition about matter, or mind, or their relation. It is not difficult to see that the notions which he has expelled often re-enter. But the peculiar value of his approach consists in his attempt to keep clear of them. He begins neither with ind nor matter, but with ideas. Their existence needs no proof: "everyone is conscious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others." His first inquiry is "how they come into the mind"; has next business is to show that they constitute the whole material of our knowledge. In his answer to the former question we discover the influence of traditional philosophy, or rather of ordinary common sense views of existence, upon his views. All our ideas, he says, come from experience. The

mind has no innate ideas, but it has innate faculties: it perceives, remembers, and combines the ideas that come to it from without; it also desires, deliberates, and wills; and these mental activities are themselves the source of a new class of ideas. Experience is therefore twofold. Our observation may be employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds. The former is the source of most of the ideas which we have, and, as it depends "wholly upon our senses," is called "sensation." The latter is a source of ideas which "every man has wholly in himself," and it might be called "*internal* sense"; to it he gives the name "reflection."

Simple and Complex Ideas. **There are no innate ideas "stamped upon the mind" from birth; and yet impressions of sense are not the only source of knowledge: "The mind furnishes the understanding with ideas" (Bk. 2:1:5). No distinction is implied here between "mind" and "understanding", so that the sentence might run, "the mind furnishes itself with ideas." As to what these ideas are, we are not left in doubt: they are "ideas of its own operations." When the mind acts, it has an idea of its action, that is, it is self-conscious, and, as such, is assumed to be an original source of our knowledge. Hume and Condilac both refused to admit reflection as an original source of ideas, and both, accordingly, found that they had to face the problem of tracing the growth of self-consciousness out of a succession of sensations. According to Locke, reflection is an original, rather than an independent, source of ideas. Without sensation mind would have nothing to operate upon, and therefore could have no ideas of its operations. It is "when he first has any sensation" that "a man begins to have any ideas" (Bk. 2:1:23). The operations of the mind are not themselves produced by sensation, but sensation is required to give the mind material for working on.**

The ideas which sensation gives "enter by the senses simple and unmixed" (Bk. 2:2:1); they stand in need of the activity of mind to bind them into the complex unities required for knowledge. The complex ideas of substance, modes, and relations are all the product of the combining and abstracting activity of mind operating upon simple ideas, which have been given, without any connection, by sensation or reflection. Locke's account of knowledge thus has two sides. On the one side, all the material of knowledge is traced to the simple idea. On the other side, the processes which transform this crude material into knowledge are activities of mind which themselves cannot be reduced to ideas. Locke's metaphors of the *tabula rasa*, "white paper" (Bk. 2:2:1), and "dark room" misled his critics and suggested to some of his followers a theory very different from his own. The metaphors only illustrate what he had in hand at the moment. Without experience, no characters are written on the "tablets" of the mind; except through the "windows" of sensation and reflection, no light enters the understanding. No ideas are innate; and there is no source of new simple ideas other than those two. But knowledge involves relations, and relations are the work of the mind; it requires complex ideas, and complex ideas are mental formations. Simple ideas do not, of themselves, enter into relation and form complex ideas. Locke does not, like Hobbes before him and Hume and Condillac after him, look to some unexplained natural attraction of idea for idea as bringing about these formations. Indeed, his treatment of "the association of ideas" is an afterthought, and did not appear in the earlier editions of the *Essay*.

Starting from the simple ideas which we get from sensation, or from observing mental operations as they take place, Locke has two things to explain: the universal element, that is, the general conceptions with which knowledge is concerned or which it implies; and the reference to reality which it claims. With the former problem Locke deals at great length; and the general method of his exposition is clear enough. Complex ideas arise from simple ideas by the processes of

combination and abstraction carried out by the mind. It would be unfair to expect completeness from his enterprise: but it cannot be denied that his intricate and subtle discussions left many problems unsolved. Indeed, this is one of his great merits. He raised questions in such a way as to provoke further enquiry. Principles such as the causal relation, apart from which knowledge of nature would be impossible, are quietly taken for granted, often without any enquiry into the grounds for assuming them. Further, the difficulty of accounting for universals is unduly simplified by describing certain products as simple ideas, although thought has obviously been at work upon them.

In this connection an important inconsistency becomes apparent in his account of the primary data of experience. It is, indeed, impossible even to name the mere particular -- the "this, here, and now" of sense -- without giving it a flavor of generality. But, at the outset, Locke tries to get as near it as possible. Simple ideas (of sensation) are exemplified by yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, and so forth (Bk. 2:1:3). But, towards the end of the second book (Bk. 2:21:75), a very different list is given: extension, solidity, and mobility (from sensation); perceptivity and motivity (from reflection); and existence, duration, and number (from both sensation and reflection). These are said to be "our original ideas," and the rest to be "derived" form or to "depend" on them. It is difficult to compare the two lists, instance by instance; but one example may be taken. According to the first list, *hard* is a simple idea; according to the second list, *solidity* is the original (and therefore simple) idea, and *hard* will be derived from it and depend on it. It is clear that, in making the former list, Lock was trying to get back to the primary data of our individual experience; whereas, in the second list, he is rather thinking of the objective reality on which our experience depends and which, he assumes, it reveals. But he does not observe the difference. He seems to forget his view that the original of all knowledge is to be found in the particular, in something "simple and unmixed." Thus he says without hesitation, "If any one asks me, *what this solidity is*, I send him to the senses to inform him. Let him put a flint of a football between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know" (Bk. 2:4:4). But he will not know without going a long way beyond the simple idea. The simple ideas in the case are certain muscular and tactual sensations; and he interprets these by other means (including knowledge of external objects and his own organism) when he says that the flint or the football is solid.

His doctrine of modes is also affected by this same inattention of the fact that a simple idea must be really simple. Thus he holds that "space and extension" is a simple idea given both by sight and by touch (Bk. 2:4). One would expect, therefore, that the original and simple idea of space would be the particular patch seen at any moment or the particular "feel" of the exploring limb. But we are told that "each idea of any different distance, or space, is a simple mode" or the idea of space (Bk. 2:8:4). Here again the simple idea is generalized. He professes to begin with the mere particulars of external and internal sense, and to show how knowledge -- which is necessarily general -- is evolved from them. But, in doing so, he assumes a general or universal element as already given in the simple idea.

Having gone so far, he might almost have been expected to take a further step and treat the perceptions of particular things as modes of the simple idea *substance*. But this he does not do. Substance is an idea regarding which he was in earnest with his own fundamental theory (however, he was perplexed about the origin of the idea of "substance in general" as well as of the ideas of "particular sorts of substances; Bk. 2:23:2-3). He admits that substance is a complex idea; that is to say, it is formed by the mind's action out of simple ideas. Now, this idea of substance marks the difference between having sensations and perceiving things. Its importance, therefore, is clear; but

there is no clearness in explaining it. We are told that there is a "supposed or confused idea of substance" to which are joined, for example, "the simple idea of a dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility and fusibility," and, as a result, "we have the idea of *lead*."

A difficulty might have been avoided if substance could have been interpreted as simply the combination by the understanding of white, hard, etc., or some similar cluster of ideas of sensation. But it was not Locke's way thus to ignore facts. He sees that something more is needed than these ideas of sensation. They are only *joined to* "the supposed or confused idea of substance," which is there and "always the first and chief" (Bk. 2:12:6). He holds to it that the idea is a complex idea and so mad by the mind; but he is entirely at a loss to account for the materials out of which it is made. We cannot imagine how simple ideas can subsist by themselves, and so "we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist," and this we call substance. In one place, he even vacillates between the assertions that we have no clear idea of substance and that we have no idea of it at all " (Bk. 1:3:19). It is "a supposition of he knows not what." This uncertainty, as will appear presently, throws its shadow over our whole knowledge of nature.

Primary and Secondary Qualities.

The "new way of ideas" is thus hard put to it in accounting for the universal element in knowledge; it has even greater difficulties to face in defending the reality of knowledge. And, in the latter case, the author does not see the difficulties so clearly. His view is that the simple idea is the test and standard of reality. Whatever the mind contributes to our ideas removes them further from the reality of things; in becoming general, knowledge loses touch with things. But not all simple ideas carry with them the same significance for reality. Colours, smells, tastes, sounds, and the like are simple ideas, yet nothing resembles them in the bodies themselves; but, owing to a certain bulk, figure, and motion of their insensible parts, bodies have "a power to produce those sensations in us." These, therefore, as called "secondary qualities of bodies." On the other hand, "solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number" are also held by Locke to be simple ideas; and these are resemblances of qualities in body; "their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves"; accordingly, they are "primary qualities of bodies." In this way, by implication if not expressly, Locke severs, instead of establishing, the connection between simple ideas and reality. The only ideas which can make good their claim to be regarded as simple ideas have nothing resembling them in things. Other ideas, no doubt, are said to resemble bodily qualities (an assertion for which no proof is given and none is possible); but these ideas have only a doubtful claim to rank as simple ideas. Locke's prevailing tendency is to identify reality with the simple idea, but he sometimes comes close to the opposite view that the reference to reality is the work of thought.

Knowledge of Mathematics, Ethics, the Self, and God.

In the fourth book of his *Essay* Locke applies the results of the earlier books to determine the nature and extent of knowledge. As ideas are the sole immediate objects of the mind, knowledge can be nothing else than "the perception of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, or any of our ideas." This agreement or disagreement is said to be of four sorts: identity or diversity; relation; co-existence or necessary connection; real existence. Each of these kinds of knowledge raises its own questions; but, broadly speaking, one distinction may be taken as fundamental. In the same paragraph in which he restricts knowledge to the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, he admits one kind of knowledge which goes beyond the ideas themselves to the significance which they have for real existence. When the reference does not go beyond the ideas "in the mind,"

the problems that arise are of one order; when there is a further reference to real things, another problem arises.

Locke also distinguishes between two degrees of knowledge: intuition and demonstration. In the former case, the agreement or disagreement is immediately perceived; in the latter, it is perceived through the mediation of a third idea, but each step in the demonstration is itself an intuition, the agreement or disagreement between the two ideas compared being immediately perceived. He believes that mathematics and ethics are demonstrable. When ideas are together in the mind, we can discover their relation to one another; so long as they are not taken to represent archetypes outside the mind, there is no obstacle to certainty of knowledge. "All relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded on, those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection" (Bk. 2:28:18). but "general and certain truths, are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas" (Bk. 4:12:7). In this way Locke vindicates the certainty of mathematics: although instructive, the science is merely idea, and its propositions do not hold of things outside the mind. He thinks also that "morality is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics." But, in spite of the request of his friend Molyneux, he never set out his ethic doctrine in detail. In Book II he reduced moral good and evil to pleasure and pain which -- as reward and punishment -- come to us from some lawgiver; thus they point to a source outside the mind. But his ground for maintaining the demonstrative character of morality is that moral ideas are "mixed modes," and therefore mental products, so that their "precise real essence ... may be perfectly known." He ventures upon two examples only of this demonstrative morality; and neither of them is more than verbal or gives any information about good or evil. Yet the doctrine is significant as showing the influence upon Locke of another type of demonstrative thought.

Thus, knowledge of mathematics and ethics may be firmly establish, particularly as these subjects involve relations between ideas, and thus make no claims about matters of real existence. When it comes to knowledge of real existence, though, ultimately there are only two certainties: the existence of ourselves (by intuition) and that of God (by demonstration).

Concerning the self, Locke agrees with Descartes that the existence of the self is implied in every state of consciousness. Every element of our experience, every idea of which we are conscious, is a certificate of our own existence, as the subject of that experience:

> As for *our own existence*, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to em than my own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I have ascertain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I *call doubt*.

However, Locke fails to point out how the self can be an idea and thus belong to the material of knowledge. An idea of the self cannot come from sensation; and the simple ideas of reflection are all of mental operations, and not of the subject or agent of these operations. On the other hand, when he had occasion to discuss personal identity, he followed his new way of idea, and made it depend on memory.

Concerning God's existence, his proof is a cosmological-type argument. From the certainty of our own existence that of the existence of God immediately follows. A person knows intuitively that he

is "something that actually exists." Next a person knows with intuitive certainty, that "bare *nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles.*" it is, therefore, "an evident demonstration, that *from eternity there has been something*. And since all the powers of all beings must be traced to this eternal Being, it follows that it is the most powerful, as well as the most knowing, that is, God. Eternal ind alone can produce "thinking, perceiving beings, such as we find ourselves to be" (Bk. 4:10). Locke here assumes, without question, the validity of the causal principle even beyond the range of possible experience.

Sensitive Knowledge of the External World.

Below the rank of knowledge proper (intuitive and demonstrative), Locke recognizes a third degree of knowledge, not strictly entitled to the name. This is our sensitive apprehension of external things, or of real objects other than ourselves and God:

> **These two, viz. intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of our *knowledge*; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but *faith* or *opinion*, but not knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is, indeed, another perception of the mind, employed about *the particular existence of finite beings without us*, which, going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of *knowledge*. There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds: this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds; whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses. (Bk. 4:14)**

Does not the very definition of knowledge, as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas with one another, preclude the perception of the agreement of ideas with non-ideal reality?

Locke's argument for the objective validity of sensitive knowledge consists of several considerations. First, he urges, our ideas of sensation differ from those of memory and imagination, that is from *mere* ideas, in being produced in us without any action of our own, and therefore "must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind, in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to." They,

> **carry with them all he conformity which is intended; or which our state requires: for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses. (Bk. 4:4:4)**

Secondly, pleasure or pain often accompanies the sensation, and is absent from the idea as it recurs in memory or imagination; and "this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be" (Bk. 4:2:14). Thirdly, our several senses assist one another's testimony, and thus enable us to predict our sensational experience. On these grounds Locke concludes that,

> **the certainty of things existing *in rerum natura* when we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs.**

> For, our faculties being suited no to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the use of life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us. (Bk. 4:2:14)

The certainty which Locke attributes to sensitive knowledge is thus seen to be practical, rather than theoretical; and it is impossible to distinguish this degree of knowledge from the belief or opinion which results from a balance of probabilities rather than from certain perception.

But even granting that our sensitive apprehensions of external reality possesses the certainty which is the characteristic of knowledge, as distinguished from mere opinion, we must observe within how very narrow limits it is confined:

> When our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something *at that time* really exist without us, which doth affect our senses, and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties, and actually produce that idea which we then perceive: and we cannot so far distrust their testimony, as to doubt that such *collections* of simple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be united together, do really exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects that do then effect them, and no further. (Bk. 4:11:9)

We cannot demonstrate the necessity of the co-existence of those ideas which constitute the modes or qualities of substances; we cannot perceive their "necessary connexion or repugnancy." The connection between the secondary and the primary qualities remains inexplicable. "And therefore there are very few general propositions to be made concerning substances, which carry with them undoubted certainty" (Bk. 4:6:76). "Our knowledge in all these inquires reaches very little further than our experience" (Bk. 4:3:13-14). Beyond the strict warrant of experience, or the testimony of our senses, we may venture upon "opinion" or "judgment" as to the co-existence of the qualities of substances, but we cannot strictly "know". "Possibly inquisitive and observing men may, by strength of judgment, penetrate further, and, on probabilities taken from wary observation, and hints well laid together, often guess right at what experience has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to opinion, and had not that certainty which is requisite to knowledge" (Bk. 4:6:13)

Locke finds himself compelled, therefore, to conclude that the so-called "science" of which Bacon had talked so proudly, and of whose achievements he had himself spoken so respectfully in the opening pages of the *Essay*, is not, in the strict sense, science at all; that, in his own words, there can be "no science of bodies." It is vain to search for the "forms" of the various material substances, or to seek to verify "the corpuscularian hypothesis" as to the connection of the primary and the secondary qualities of things. "I am apt to doubt that, how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, *scientifical* will still be out of our reach.... *Certainty* and *demonstration* are things we must not, in these matters, pretend to" (Bk. 4:3:26).

If we cannot attain to a science of bodies, still less can we expect "scientifical" understanding of spirits. Spiritual substance is, as we have seen, as unknown as material substance; and Locke finds additional reasons for limiting our knowledge in this sphere.

> If we are at a loss in respect of the powers and operations of bodies, I think it is easy to

> conclude we are much more in the dark in reference to spirits; whereof we naturally have no ideas but what we draw from that of our own, by reflecting on the operations of our own souls within us, as far as they come within our observation. But how inconsiderable rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongst those various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings; and how far short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim and seraphim, and infinite sorts of spirits above us, is what by a transient hint in another place I have offered to my reader's consideration.

Judgment. The closing chapters of Book IV of the *Essay* are devoted to a consideration of that kind of apprehension of reality which Locke calls "judgment," as distinguished from "knowledge." "The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be hand, is *judgment*: whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree; or, which is the same, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs" (Bk 4:19:1-2). So-called "scientific" truths being generally of this kind, one would have expected Locke to give here some account of the procedure of inductive science, some directions for the careful and methodical study of the facts, and cautions against the temptations to hasty and unwarranted generalization, such as we find in Bacon's *Novum Organum*. But instead of this, he contents himself with general observations on the degrees of assent, on reason (and syllogism), on faith and reason, on "enthusiasm," and on wrong assent, or error. The treatment of, that is to say, is limited to general considerations regarding the function of faith and the relations of faith and reason as guides of the human mind.

What is especially significant here is Locke's refusal to oppose faith and reason in the fashion of Bacon and Hobbes, and his refusal to accept any authority which cannot vindicate itself through reason. Even in his insistence upon the necessity of supplementing our knowledge by faith, Locke emphasized the use of reason:

> Faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his maker.... (Bk. 4:27:24)

Locke is at one with the rationalist theologians of his century in their antagonism to an "enthusiasm" which would substitute for the insight of reason and of rational faith, the so called "revelation" of private experience. Against such a view, he insists upon the necessity of judging revelation by reason: "God when he makes the prophet does not unmake the man. He leaves all his faculties in the natural state, to enable him to judge of his inspirations, whether they be of *divine* original or no.... *Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything*" (Bk. 4:19:14).

Yet reason clearly limits the field of its own insight; it is only reasonable to believe where we cannot know and yet must act. However, as morality and religion cannot be compassed by reason, such knowledge must be supplemented by faith if we are to fulfill our divine destiny. This is the point of view, not only of the closing chapters of the *Essay*, but of his *Resonableness of Christianity* (1695). The aim of this treatise is to recall men from the contentions of the theological schools to the simplicity of the gospel as the rule of human life.:

> The writers and wranglers in religion fill it with niceties, and dress it up with notions,

> which they make necessary and fundamental parts of it; as if there were no way into the church, but through the academy or lyceum. The greatest part of mankind have not leisure for learning and logic, and superfine distinctions of the schools.

What people need is not intellectual insight or theological dogma, but practical guidance. Locke seems less confident than he was in the *Essay* of the possibility of a rational science of morals. "It should seem, by the little that has hitherto been done in it, that it is too hard a task for unassisted reason to establish morality, in all its parts, upon its true foundation, with a clear and convincing light.... It is plain, in fact, that human reason unassisted failed men in its great and proper business of morality."

Two Treatises of Government. In *Two Treatises of Government* he has two purposes in view: to refute the doctrine of the divine and absolute right of the Monarch, as it had been put forward by Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha*, and to establish a theory which would reconcile the liberty of the citizen with political order. The criticism of Filmer in the first *Treatise* is complete. His theory of the absolute sovereignty of Adam, and so of kings as Adam's heirs, has lost all interest; and Locke's argument has been only too effective: his exhaustive reply to so absurd a thesis becomes itself wearisome. Although there is little direct reference to Hobbes, Locke seems to have had Hobbes in mind when he argued that the doctrine of absolute monarchy leaves sovereign and subjects in the state of nature towards one another. The constructive doctrines which are elaborated in the second treatise became the basis of social and political philosophy for generations. Labor is the origin and justification of property; contract or consent is the ground of government and fixes its limits. Behind both doctrines lies the idea of the independence of the individual person. The state of nature knows no government; but in it, as in political society, men are subject to the moral law, which is the law of God. Men are born free and equal in rights. Whatever a man "mixes his labour with" is his to use. Or, at least, this was so in the primitive condition of human life in which there was enough for all and "the whole earth was America." Locke sees that, when men have multiplied and land has become scarce, rules are needed beyond those which the moral law or law of nature supplies. But the origin of government is traced not to this economic necessity, but to another cause. The moral law is always valid, but it is not always kept. In the state of nature all men equally have the right to punish transgressors: civil society originates when, for the better administration of the law, men agree to delegate this function to certain officers. Thus government is instituted by a "social contract"; its powers are limited, and they involve reciprocal obligations; moreover, they can be modified or rescinded by the authority which conferred them. Locke's theory is thus no more historical than Hobbes's. It is a rendering of the facts of constitutional government in terms of thought, and it served its purpose as a justification of the Revolution settlement in accordance with the ideas of the time.

Economic Writings. Locke's writings on economic subjects do not rank in importance with his treatises on government. They deal with particular questions raised by the necessities of the political situation. No attempt had yet been made to isolate the fact of wealth and make it the subject of a special science. The direction of industry and commerce was held to be part of the statesman's duty; but, in the seventeenth century, it began to be carried out with less thoroughness than before; and at the same time new problems were opened up by the growth of the national life. The American colonies, the enterprise of the East India Company, the planting of Ireland, the commercial rivalry with Holland and withy France, as well as questions regarding the rate of

interest and the currency, occupied the attention of a crowd of writers in the second half of the century. Locke's own contributions were occasioned be the financial problems which faced the new government after the revolution. His reflections on the rate of interest show the growing disfavor with which appeals for state interference were beginning to be met. He points out the obstacles to trade that are caused when the rate of interest is fixed by law, and he argues in favor of freedom for what he calls, in words which suggest Adam Smith, "the natural interest of money." Money "turns the wheels of trade"; therefore its course should not be stopped. At the same time, he holds no general brief against the interference of the state in matters of commerce; nor is the language of the mercantilist foreign to him. Riches consist in plenty of gold and silver, for these command all the conveniences of life. Now, "in a country not furnished with mines, there are but two ways of growing rich, either conquest or commerce." For us commerce is the only way; and Locke condemns "the amazing politics of some late reigns" which had "let in other competitors with us for the sea." In the concluding portion of *Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money* (1691), Locke laid stress on the importance of a uniform and stable measure of values; four years later, in his *Further Considerations* he defended his view against the proposals involving a depreciation of the standard, which William Lowndes, secretary of the treasury, had set forth in *An Essay for the amendment of the silver coins* (1695).

Letters on Religious Toleration.

Locke's plea for toleration in matters of belief has become classical. His *Common-Place Book* shows that his mind was clear on the subject more than twenty years before the publication of his first *Letter*. The topic, indeed, was in the air all through his life, and affected him nearly. When he was a scholar at Westminster, the powers of the civil magistrate in religious matters were the subject of heated discussion between Presbyterians and independents in the assembly of divines that held its sessions within a stone's throw of his dormitory; and, when he entered Christ Church, John Owen, a leader of the independents, had been recently appointed to the deanery. There had been many arguments for toleration before this time, but they had come from the weaker party in the state. Thus Jeremy Taylor's *Liberty of Prophesying* appeared in 1646, when the fortunes of his side had suffered a decline. For Owen the credit has been claimed that he was the first who argued for toleration "when his party was uppermost." He was called upon to preach before the House of Commons on January 31, 1649, and performed the task without making any reference to the tragic event of the previous day; but to the published sermon he appended a remarkable discussion on toleration. Owen did not take such high ground as Milton did, ten years later, in his *Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes* -- affirming that "it is not lawful for any power on earth to compel in matters of religion." He abounds in distinctions, and indeed his position calls for some subtlety. He holds that the civil magistrate has duties to the church, and that he ought to give facilities and protection to its ministers, not merely as citizens but as preachers of "the truth"; on the other hand he argues that civil or corporeal penalties are inappropriate as punishments for offences which are purely spiritual.

The position ultimately adopted by Locke is not altogether the same as this. He was never an ardent puritan; he had as little taste for elaborate theologies as he had for scholastic systems of philosophy; and his earliest attempt at a theory of toleration was connected with the view that in religion, "articles in speculative opinions [should] be few and large, and ceremonies in worship few and easy." The doctrines which he held to be necessary for salvation would have seemed to John Owen a meager and pitiful creed. And he had a narrower view also of the functions of the state.

"The business of laws," he says,

> **is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth, and of every particular man's goods and person. And so it ought to be. For truth certainly would do well enough, if she were once left to shift for herself. She seldom has received, and I fear never will receive, much assistance from the power of great men, to whom she is but rarely known, and more rarely welcome. She is not taught by laws, nor has she any need of force, to procure her entrance into the minds of men. Errors, indeed, prevail by the assistance of foreign and borrowed succors. But if truth makes not her way into the understanding by her own light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her.**

A church, according to Locke, is "a free and voluntary society"; its purpose is the public worship of God; the value of worship depends on the faith that inspires it: "all the life and power of true religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind;" and these matters are entirely outside the jurisdiction of the civil magistrate. Locke therefore (to use later language) was a voluntary in religion, as he was an individualist on questions of state interference. There is an exception, however, to his doctrine of the freedom of the individual in religious matters. The toleration extended to all others is denied to papists and to atheists; and his inconsistency in this respect has been often and severely criticized. But it is clear that Locke made the exception not for religious reasons but on grounds of state policy. He looked upon the Roman Catholic as dangerous to the public peace because he professed allegiance to a foreign prince; and the atheist was excluded because, on Locke's view, the existence of the state depends upon a contract, and the obligation of the contract, as of all moral law, depends upon the divine will.

Theological Writings. Locke's theological writings exhibit the characteristic qualities which his other works have rendered familiar. The traditions of theologians are set aside in them much as philosophical tradition was discarded in the *Essay*. He will search the Scriptures for religious doctrine just as he turned to experience for his philosophy, and he follows a method equally straightforward. Locke does not raise questions of Biblical criticism, such as Hobbes had already suggested and some of his own followers put forward soon afterwards; and the conclusions at which he arrives are in harmony with the Christian faith, if without the fulness of current doctrine. At the same time, his work belongs to the history of liberal theology and is intimately connected with the deism which followed; it treats religion like any other subject, and interprets the Bible like any other book; and, in his view of the nature of religion, he tends to describe it as if it consisted almost entirely in an attitude of intellectual belief -- a tendency which became more prominent in the course of the eighteenth century.

Educational Writings. Locke's *Thoughts concerning Education* and his *Conduct of the Understanding* occupy an important place in the history of educational theory, though only a scanty reference can be made to them here. The subject had a right to prominence in his thought. The stress he laid n experience in the growth of mind led him to magnify, perhaps overmuch, the power of education. He held that "the minds of children [are] as easily turned, this way or that, as water itself." He underrated innate differences: "we are born with faculties and powers, capable almost of anything;" and, "as it is in the body, so it is in the mind, practice makes it what it is." Along with this view went a profound conviction of the importance of education, and of the breadth of its aim. It has to fit men for life -- for the world, rather than for the university. Instruction in knowledge does not exhaust it; it is essentially a training of character.

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The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Logical Positivism

(Also known as logical empiricism, logical neopositivism, neopositivism). School of philosophy risen in Austria and Germany during 1920s, primarily concerned with the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. Among its members were Moritz Schlick, founder of the Vienna Circle, Rudolf Carnap, the leading figure of logical positivism, Hans Reichenbach, founder of the Berlin Circle, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Kurt Grelling, Hans Hahn, Carl Gustav Hempel, Victor Kraft, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann.

Logical positivists denied the soundness of metaphysics and traditional philosophy; they asserted that many philosophical problems are indeed meaningless. During 1930s the most important representatives of logical positivism emigrated to USA, where they influenced American philosophy. Until 1950s logical positivism was the leading philosophy of science; today its influence persists especially in the way of doing philosophy, in the great attention given to the analysis of scientific thought and in the definitely acquired results of the technical researches on formal logic and the theory of probability.

CONTENTS.

The following paragraph (*The main philosophical tenets of logical positivism*) explains the fundamental principles of logical positivism, namely the verifiability principle and its consequence, the logical structure of scientific theories and the meaning of probability. The paragraph *Biographical notes* gives essential information about the life of Feigl, Frank, Grelling, Hahn, Neurath, Schlick and Waismann, with some neopositivist's philosophical ideas that, for sake of exposition, did not find room in the principal text. There are three separate articles about Carnap, Hempel and Reichenbach. The historical development of logical positivism is outlined in three paragraphs: *Before the logical positivism*, which deals with the main influences that were exerted on the rising logical positivism; *Early researches in Europe* and *The American period*, whose titles are self-explanatory. Finally, the influences exerted by logical positivism on English, French, Italian, Polish and Scandinavian philosophy are sketched out in the paragraph *Influences on European philosophy*.

THE MAIN PHILOSOPHICAL TENETS OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM. According to logical positivism, there are only two sources of knowledge: logical reasoning and empirical experience. The former is analytic a priori, while the latter is synthetic a posteriori; hence synthetic a priori does not exist.

> **The fundamental thesis of modern empiricism consists in denying the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge.**
> **(H. Hahn, O. Neurath, R. Carnap, *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis*, 1929).**

Logical knowledge includes mathematics, which is reducible to formal logic. Empirical knowledge includes physics, biology, psychology, etc. Experience is the only judge of scientific theories; however, logical positivists were aware that scientific knowledge does not exclusively rise from the experience: scientific theories are genuine hypotheses that go beyond the experience.

> **It is not possible to establish a logically durable building on verifications [a verification is an observational statement about immediate perception], for they are already vanished when the building begins. If they were, with respect to time, at the beginning of the knowledge, then they would be logically useless. On the contrary, there is a great difference when they are at the end of the process: with their help the test is performed... From a logical point of view, nothing depends on them: they are not premises but a firm end point.**
> **(M. Schlick, '&Uumlber das Fundament der Erkenntnis', in *Erkenntnis*, 4, 1934).**

A statement is meaningful if and only if it can be proved true or false, at least in principle, by means of the experience -- this assertion is called the verifiability principle. The meaning of a statement is its method of verification; that is we know the meaning of a statement if we know the conditions under which the statement is true or false.

> **When are we sure that the meaning of a question is clear? Obviously if and only if we are able to exactly describe the conditions in which it is possible to answer yes, or, respectively, the conditions in which it is necessary to answer with a no. The meaning of a question is thus defined only through the specification of those conditions...**
> **The definition of the circumstances under which a statement is true is perfectly *equivalent* to the definition of its meaning.**
> **... a statement has a meaning if and only if the fact that it is true makes a verifiable difference.**
> **(M. Schlick, 'Positivismus und Realismus' in *Erkenntnis*, 3, 1932).**

Metaphysical statements are thus forbidden: they are meaningless. Also the traditional philosophy is indeed meaningless, and the only role of philosophy is the clarification of the meaning of statements.

> **Philosophy is the activity by means of which the meaning of statements is clarified and defined.**
> **(M. Schlick, 'Die Wende der Philosophie' in *Erkenntnis*, 1, 1930).**

A scientific theory is an axiomatic system that obtains an empirical interpretation through appropriate statements called rules of correspondence, which establish a correlation between real objects (or real processes) and the abstract concepts of the theory. The language of a theory includes two kinds of terms: observational and theoretical. The statements of a theory are divided

in two groups: analytic and synthetic. Observational terms denote objects or properties that can be directly observed or measured, while theoretical terms denote objects or properties we cannot observe or measure but we can only infer from direct observations. Analytic statements are a priori and their truth is based on the rules of the language; on the contrary, synthetic statements depend on experience, and their truth can be acknowledged only by means of the experience. This conception about the structure of scientific theories is perhaps the most durable philosophical principle of the logical positivism. It was proposed by H. Reichenbach and R. Carnap -- see H. Reichenbach, *Philosophie der Raum-Zeit Lehre*, 1928 (English translation: *The philosophy of space and time*, 1958) and R. Carnap, 'Testability and meaning' in *Philosophy of science*, 3, 1936 and 4, 1937 -- and was supported by C. G. Hempel, *Fundamentals of concept formation in empirical science*, 1952; R. B. Braithwaite, *Scientific explanation*, 1953; E. Nagel, *The structure of science*, 1961; R. Carnap, *Philosophical foundations of physics*, 1966; M. Ruse, *Philosophy of biology*, 1971. Its main points are:

- **the distinction between observational and theoretical terms**
- **the distinction between synthetic and analytic statements**
- **the distinction between theoretical axioms and rules of correspondence**
- **the deductive nature of scientific theories**

These four points are linked together. Rules of correspondence give an empirical meaning to theoretical terms and are analytic, while theoretical axioms express the observational portion of the theory and are synthetic. A theory must be a deductive systems; otherwise, a formal distinction between the various kinds of sentences and terms is impossible.

The distinction between observational and theoretical terms depends on the verifiability principle. A statement is meaningful only if it is verifiable; but, in scientific theories, there are many statements which are not verifiable -- for example, assertions dealing with quantum particles or relativistic gravitational fields. These statements are too abstract for a direct test; strictly speaking, they are meaningless. To avoid such a consequence, two different approaches were proposed. According to Schlick, the principles of a scientific theory are not statements, but rules of inference; hence the problem of their meaning does not arise ('Die Kausalität in der gegenwärtigen Physik' in *Die Naturwissenschaften*, 19, 1931). The other solution was proposed by Neurath: the terms which belong to the abstract language of a scientific theory are explicitly definable in a restricted language whose terms describe directly observable objects ('Physikalismus' in *Scientia*, 50, 1931). So a distinction between observational and theoretical terms arose. But soon Carnap realized that theoretical terms are not definable by observational ones. In a first time, he proposed a partial reducibility of theoretical to observational terms ('Testability and meaning', in *Philosophy of science*, 3, 1936 and 4, 1937). Later, it was supposed that all theoretical terms were removable from a scientific theory. This hypothesis was supported by two outcomes of formal logic: Craig theorem and Ramsey statement.

Craig theorem is an unquestionable result of formal logic. Let A and B be two set of statements, so that B is a logical consequence of A. Craig proved that (i) there is a set C of statements whose terms are common to A and B, (ii) C is a logical consequence of A and (iii) B is a logical consequence of C. Therefore, if A is the set of axioms of a scientific theory and B is the set of observational statements implied by A, then there is a set C, whose terms are common to A and B and thus they are the observational terms which occur in the axioms, so that C entails B and is a

consequence of A. According to Craig theorem, it is possible to translate a scientific theory in a purely observational language without any loss of deductive power.

Ramsey sentence, named after English philosopher Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903-1930), was used by Carnap for dividing the axioms of a theory in two sets, say A and R, so that R contains only observational terms and expresses the empirical portion of the theory, while A is analytic and defines the meaning of theoretical terms (see Carnap for a full explanation).

Given a theory T, it is thus possible to build a theory T* without theoretical terms so that T and T* are equivalent with respect to observational statements, that is every observational statement O is a logical consequence of T if and only if is a logical consequence of T*.

While the analysis of relationships between the two kinds of terms began the object of many logical and philosophical studies, the distinction itself was criticized. According to Popper all scientific concepts are theoretical, for every assertion not only entails hypotheses but also is hypothetical, that is not sure and always falsifiable. Quine ('Two dogmas of empiricism' in *The Philosophical Review*, 60, 1951) criticized both observational-theoretical and analytic-synthetic distinction. Hempel ('The theoretician's dilemma' in *Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science*, II, 1958) noted that the theory T* without theoretical terms, in spite of the equivalence (with respect to the observational language) to the original theory T, is not useful as T. In fact, from an inductive point of view, T and T* are very different. Usually the original theory T suggests certain relations between its concepts, while in T* these concepts are forbidden. The discovery of laws is almost impossible in T*, while it is a natural consequence in T. Moreover, while the number of the axioms of T usually is finite, Craig theorem does not assure us of the existence of a theory T* with a finite number of axioms. So T* is almost useless. Theoretical terms are thus necessary in science.

Hempel's work 'The meaning of theoretical terms' in *Logic, methodology and philosophy of science IV*, 1973, includes a new criticism of the observational-theoretical distinction. The two main points of Hempel's analysis are:

- **Observational terms do not exist. It is only possible a distinction between terms used in a given theory and new terms employed for the first time in a new scientific theory. For example, Bohr's atomic theory includes terms like quantum numbers, quantum jump, steady state, and explains spectra described with the help of wavelength. Now wavelength is an 'old term' while quantum number is a 'new term'. Thus the abstract concepts of atomic theory are linked with other abstract (but already given) concepts.**
- **The meaning of theoretical terms is not defined by analytic statements which are true by convention. In fact, every statement is subject to empirical tests. In a scientific theory there is no room for 'true by convention'.**

In *Philosophical foundations of physics*, 1966, Carnap proposed a slightly different approach to observational-theoretical distinction. Now the starting-point is the difference between empirical and theoretical laws. It is possible to directly confirm (or disprove) an empirical law, while a theoretical law can be tested only through the empirical laws that are among its consequences. Moreover, an empirical law explains facts while a theoretical law explains empirical laws. Thus there are three levels:

1. **Empirical facts.**
2. **Simple generalizations we can directly test: empirical laws. They explain facts and are**

employed to forecast facts.
3. General principles we can use to explain empirical laws: theoretical laws.

Empirical laws include observational terms, while theoretical terms occur in theoretical laws.

The distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is another consequence of the verifiability principle and it is linked with the observational-theoretical as well as axioms-rules of correspondence distinction. According to the verifiability principle, an alleged synthetic a priori statement does not have a meaning; thus there are only two kinds of assertions: synthetic a posteriori and analytic a priori. First of all, what is the role of analytic sentences in a scientific theory? Only two possibilities are allowed: an analytic statement is a logical-mathematical theorem (thus it has no empirical significance) or it is a convention that defines the meaning of theoretical terms. Really, the solution to the problem about the meaning of theoretical terms that Carnap proposed ('Beobacthungssprache und theoretische Sprache' in *Dialectica*, 12, 1958; English translation 'Observation language and theoretical language' in *Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist*, 1975) was based on the analytic-synthetic distinction. Carnap's method (i) explains the meaning of theoretical terms and their relationships with observational concepts, (ii) gives a method for separating synthetic and analytic sentences and (iii) gives a method for dividing theoretical axioms from rules of correspondence. Roughly speaking:

- A syntactic characterization of the rules of correspondence was given: if A is the conjunction of all axioms and R is the Ramsey sentence, that R-->A is the only rule of correspondence (R-->A is called Carnap sentence).
- Analytic statements are logical consequence of Carnap sentence.
- Synthetic statements are logical consequence of Ramsey sentence.

There is an explicit assumption in logical positivism's analysis of science: a theory is a deductive system. This means that pragmatic aspects are not considered. Moreover, neopositivism was not interested in the real process of discovering, but it was concerned with the rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge, that is it dealt with logical (formal) relationships between statements in a given theory. According to logical positivism, there is not any method of discovering, and therefore a scientist can propose every hypothesis he prefers; only logical relationships between the hypothesis and the given empirical evidence are relevant. But there were some problems with this conception of science. First of all, the relation between empirical experience and theoretical principles is not a deductive one: observational statements do not imply theoretical axioms. Carnap argues that the relation is explicable with the help of the inductive logic. So we now must speak about inductive logic and probability.

There were two different theories about probability proposed by neopositivists:

- Frequency interpretation: the probability is the limit of a frequency. This theory is the preferred one in modern science and was formulated by Reichenbach and von Mises.
- Logical interpretation: the probability is the degree of confirmation a statement receives from a given set of other statements. Carnap, Hempel and Waismann were supporters of this hypothesis.

According to Reichenbach and von Mises, the meaning of a statement like 'the probability of P given Q is *r*' is that the limit of the relative frequency of objects P in the set of objects Q is *r*. That is, in a large sample of the set Q -- say *m* objects Q, where *m* is great -- there are *n* objects P, and

$\lim(n/m)=r$, where m tends to infinity. Therefore Reichenbach asserted that a statement about the probability of a single event is meaningless.

Waismann proposed a logical interpretation of probability in his work 'Logische Analyse des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs' in *Erkenntnis*, 1, 1930. His starting-point is Wittgenstein's interpretation of probability. According to Waismann, we have to use the theory of probability when we do not know whether a proposition is true or false. In that circumstance, we can study the logical relationships between the statements that express our knowledge and we can determine their relative probability. Hence a probability is a mathematical measure of a logical relationship between propositions. What is the role of frequency in the logical interpretation? First of all, it is possible that we know so little about a physical condition that we can determine the probability only a posteriori by means of the frequency. Therefore the relative frequency and the logical probability are obviously equal. In other circumstances, we can predict the probability through our knowledge of the relevant conditions and physical laws. In such situation, the frequency is used to verify the forecast.

Carnap was very interested in the problem about the probability of a single event. According to his interpretation the statement 'the probability that this single object P were Q is *r*' is a genuine statement. Its meaning is 'the statement "this single object P is Q" has a degree of confirmation *r*'. When $r=1$, the statement is true; when $r=0$ the statement is false; otherwise the statement has a certain portion of truth. Thus inductive logic, which is the study of logical relationships between statements whose degree of confirmation is different from 0 and 1, is an extension of classical logic and it is analytic, ie formal. So, according to Carnap, inductive logic explains the relationship between observational and theoretical statements. However, there is a great difficulty in that theory. The degree of confirmation of every universal law is always 0, for a universal law is a statement about a possibly infinite number of objects while every sample is finite. Hence the degree of confirmation of every scientific law with respect to every given experience is always 0. Another difficulty arose when Hempel formulated the so-called paradoxes of confirmation, according to which every universal law is supported by an apparently irrelevant evidence; for example, 'all ravens are black' is confirmed by the observation of a white shoe (see Hempel for further details).

Another consequence of the verifiability principle is that statements about ethical principles are neither true nor false; they are expressions of feeling (this theory is called noncognitivism). Therefore a theory of ethics is impossible. But if ethics is meaningless, a question rises: what is the origin of ethical principles? Among neopositivists, Schlick was the most interested in ethics; he endeavoured to give an account of ethics which was compatible with neopositivist philosophy. According to Schlick, ethics is a descriptive scientific theory. A man always prefers those conditions that do not produce pain or produce pleasure; thus, in a first time, good is whatever that gives pleasure and no pain. Good is thus equivalent to beneficial. Man's actions are caused by a wish to benefit himself. So the first ethical impulse is an egoistic one. But the motivations to act are not static: they are subjected to the natural evolution and selection. In a society, it is possible that an altruistic way of action is more beneficial that a purely egoistic one. So there is a contrast between the very first impulse, which suggests an egoistic behaviour, and the tendency to act generated by the evolution, which suggests a social behaviour. This is the origin of ethical principles.

BEFORE THE LOGICAL POSITIVISM. What are the main philosophical and scientific outcomes

that influenced the rise of logical positivism?

First of all, the theory of relativity exerted a great influence on logical positivism. Einstein's analysis of the empirical meaning of scientific concepts gave rise to the verifiability principle. The first published work on the special theory of relativity (Einstein's article 'Elektrodynamik bewegter K&oumlrper' in *Annalen der Physik*, 17, 1905) begins with a discussion on simultaneity and length which is one of the most rigorous application of the verifiability principle -- about twenty years before Schlick's formulation. Moreover, the first Carnap's work was an essay about the theory of space published in 1922; Reichenbach attended Einstein's lectures on the theory of relativity at Berlin in 1917 and wrote in 1920s four books on that theory; Schlick wrote in 1915 and 1917 two essays on relativity.

Another great influence on logical positivism was exerted by the development of formal logic. Carnap attended three courses on logic under the direction of G. Frege, the father of modern logic; from a philosophical point of view, Frege asserted that all arithmetic statements are analytic a priori, and thus he denied the existence of synthetic a priori statements in arithmetic -- note that for Frege geometry is synthetic a priori, because it is not reducible to logic; therefore, in Frege's opinion, analytic statements are those that are logically true. K. G&oumldel, the logician who proved the completeness of first order logic and the incompleteness of arithmetic, was a member of the Vienna Circle. Logical positivism had extensive contacts with the group of Polish logicians who developed several branches of contemporary logic. Polish philosophy was greatly influenced by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), who studied at Vienna and taught at Lwow; he is the founder of Polish analytic philosophy. He taught to several Polish philosophers and logicians; among them were:

- **Jan Lukasiewicz (1878-1956), who developed both the algebra of logic and a many-valued propositional calculus, which influenced Carnap's inductive logic (which was proposed as an extension of classical logic dealing with infinite-valued truth function) and Reichenbach's interpretation of quantum physics, in which Reichenbach employed a three-valued propositional calculus.**
- **Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939), who was interested in the logical antinomies.**
- **Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890-1963), who taught philosophy of language, epistemology and logic.**
- **Tadeusz Kotarbinski (1886-1981), who asserted that many alleged philosophical problems in fact are scientific problems, that is they are the object of empirical science and not of philosophy, which deals with logical and ethical problems only.**

Lukasiewicz and Ajdukiewicz published several essays in *Erkenntnis*, the journal of the logical positivism, edit by Carnap and Reichenbach. Alfred Tarski (1902-1983), who developed the theory of semantics in a formal language, took part to the congresses on scientific philosophy organized by Vienna and Berlin Circle; he greatly influenced Carnap's philosophy of language -- in a first time, Carnap was interested in logical syntax but, after the publication of Tarski's works, he turned to semantics.

Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano (1858-1932) indirectly influenced the logical researches of neopositivists. He developed a logical symbolism adopted by Russell, now widely used. He proposed five axioms as a definition of the set of natural numbers. G&oumldel proved the incompleteness

theorem with respect to Peano's axiomatization.

Bertrand Russell's (1872-1970) mathematical logic exerted a major influence on logical positivism. Russell asserted the analytic character of the whole mathematics; he endeavoured to prove this assumption in his works *Principles of mathematics*, 1903, and *Principia mathematica*, 1910-13 (the last written with A. N. Whitehead). *Principia mathematica* is a skilful application of logic to mathematics, which gave rise to endless philosophical and technical researches.

Ernst Mach (1838-1916) -- physicist and philosopher, he taught physics at the University of Prague and theory of inductive science at Vienna -- is often regarded as a great source of inspiration to logical positivism (the official name of the Vienna Circle was Verein Ernst Mach, ie Ernst Mach Association). He was a radical empiricist, critized the absolute theory of space and time, published a philosophical and historical analysis of classical mechanics, and formulated the principle of economy of thought, according to which scientific theories are useful tools to make predictions, but they do not reflect an objective and independent reality. Mach's influence on early logical positivism is unquestionable. However, I will remark upon some differences between Mach and logical positivism.
Mach was an anti-realist: there is nothing but our sensations; on these grounds, he never accepted the reality of atoms. This extreme anti-realism was not congenial to logical positivists. Schlick, at least in the first stage of his philosophical development, was a realist: science give us a true description of an external world; he professed his admiration for Mach, but also asserted that Machian anti-realism was too extreme and did not correctly depict the real activity of scientists. According to Carnap, the whole question is about preferred mode of speech -- it is a question about language. In fact -- said Carnap -- realism and anti-realism are meaningless; obviously scientific theories are useful tools, but their language includes true or false genuine statements. It must be noted that Schlick, under the influence of Wittgestein's *Tractatus*, eventually asserted that only statements without quantifiers are meaningful and thus scientific laws are not statements, but they are rules of inference, prescriptions to make forecasts -- so Schlick partially rejected his realism and accepted an interpretation of scientific laws similar to Machian economy of thought.

> **The fundamental thesis of modern empiricism consists in denying the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge.**
> **(H. Hahn, O. Neurath, R. Carnap, *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis*, 1929).**

This statement shows the attitude of logical positivism towards Kantian philosophy. However, Kant was regarded as the last traditional philosopher interested in epistemology who, at the same time, had a scientific competence. Neopositivists dedicated several pages to disprove the Kantian theory of space and time, while nothing was said about such a philosopher as Hegel -- it is symptomatic of the importance they attributed to Kant. Among Reichenbach's teachers was neokantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer -- who wrote an essay on the theory of relativity in 1921 and on quantum physics in 1936 -- while Carnap wrote his dissertation under the direction of neokantian Bruno Bauer.

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* exerted a great influence on Vienna Circle; many meetings were dedicated to a punctual analysis of that work. Not all neopositivists' reactions to *Tractatus* were positive: according to Neurath it was full of metaphysics. Carnap (in his Autobiography published in *The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*) said that Wittgenstein's influence on

Vienna Circle was overestimated. Moreover, Wittgenstein did not take part to Vienna Circle's discussions; there were separate meetings between him, Schlick, Carnap and Waismann, but soon Carnap was not admitted to those meetings. Wittgenstein's influence is evident in the formulation of the verifiability principle. See for example Proposition 4.024 of *Tractatus*, where Wittgenstein asserts that we understand a proposition when we know what happens if it is true and compare with Schlick's assertion 'The definition of the circumstances under which a statement is true is perfectly *equivalent* to the definition of its meaning'. Wittgenstein influenced also the interpretation of probability. He asserted that every statement is a truth function of its atomic statements; for example, (A v B) is a statement whose truth depends on the truth of its atomic components A and B, according to the following truth-table.

A	B	A v B
T	T	T
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	F

Now suppose we know (A v B) is true and we want to know whether A is true. In the first, second and third row of the truth-table (A v B) is true. In two of those rows A is true too. So there is a probability 2/3 that A is true. That is, the probability of A given (A v B) is 2/3. The probability is thus a logical relation between two statements. It is very simple to find the probability of a statement P with respect to another statement Q. First of all, we write the truth-table of Q and count the rows where Q is true; suppose they are *m*. Among them, we count the rows where P is true, say *n*. The probability of P with respect to Q is thus *n*/*m*. This theory was accepted and used by Waismann ('Logische Analyse des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs' in *Erkenntnis*, 1, 1930). Waismann's work gave rise to an intense discussion with the Berlin Circle whose members -- namely von Mises and Reichenbach -- supported a frequency interpretation. Note also that this procedure is suitable only when the statements are not universal, that is P and Q must be statements without quantifiers. Really in *Tractatus* Wittgenstein argued that only simple propositions without quantifiers are meaningful. This point influenced Schlick's analysis of scientific laws.

**EARLY RESEARCHES IN EUROPE. A very important year in the history of the logical positivism was 1922: in that year Schlick moved from Prague to Vienna, where he held the chair of theory of inductive science. At that time, Schlick had already published several philosophical works which heralded the new philosophical point of view: *Raum und Zeit in der gegenwärtingen Physik*, 1917 (English translation: *Space and time in contemporary physics*, 1920) and *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*, 1918 (English translation: *General theory of knowledge*, 1974); also Reichenbach had already published *Relativitatstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori*, 1920 (English translation: *The theory of relativity and a priori knowledge*, 1965), a philosophical analysis of the theory of relativity against Kantian philosophy. Moreover, Hahn, Frank and Neurath had begun their meetings on philosophy of science in 1907. Why was the coming of Schlick in Vienna so important?
Schlick soon organized a discussion group and established relations with other philosophers of science and so the Vienna Circle took shape. Schlick called Carnap to Vienna and in 1926 Carnap became assistant professor under Schlick. Vienna Circle joined up with Berlin Circle (a similar group of philosophers of science that gathered round Reichenbach). Vienna Circle took many**

initiatives: among them, the publication of two series dedicated to the new philosophy of science; the journal *Erkenntnis*; the organization of several congresses on epistemology and philosophy of science.

Between 1924 and 1936 (in that year Schlick was murdered) there were many philosophical outcomes which gave shape to logical positivism. The verifiability principle was formulated; metaphysics was ruled out as not verifiable. Reichenbach published extensive analyses on the theory of relativity. Carnap was primarily interested in logical analysis of science, and he gave the first logical formulation of the verifiability principle. Wittgestein's *Tractatus* was discussed in Vienna Circle's meetings. Other philosophers were attracted by the new movement: Hempel studied with Reichenbach, Schlick and Carnap; Italian philosopher Geymonat went to Vienna and studied with Schlick and Carnap; American philosophers were interested in logical positivism; Morris and Quine went to Prague to meet Carnap; Polish logicians Ajdukiewicz and Lukasiewicz contributed essays to *Erkenntnis*; Popper published his *Logik der Forschung* in Vienna Circle's series.

In early 1930s logical positivism was an influential philosophical movement, known in USA and Europe; its members taught in many European universities and one of them (Feigl) in an American university. Logical positivism was not only interested in pure philosophical research, but also in political and educational activity. The ideas of its members were progressive, liberal and sometimes socialist. But in 1933 Hitler became Chancellor of Germany; Nazism was hostile towards neopositivism. In few years, many logical positivists were forced to emigrate; two of them (Schlick and Grelling) were murdered. USA became the new home for Carnap, Feigl, Frank, G&oumldel, Hempel and Reichenbach, while Neurath and Waismann sought refuge in England.

THE AMERICAN PERIOD. The spread of logical positivism in USA became in early 1930s. In 1929 and in 1932 Schlick was Visiting Professor at Stanford, while Feigl emigrated to USA in 1930, where he became lecturer (1931) and professor (1933) at the University of Iowa and afterwards at the University of Minnesota (1940). In 1932 the American Philosophical Association organized a discussion on the philosophy of logical positivism. In the same years several articles about logical positivism were published in American philosophical journals; among them were:

- **E. Nagel, 'Nature and convention' in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 26, 1929, in which Nagel discussed Reichenbach's interpretation of the theory of relativity.**
- **S. Hook, 'Personal impression of contemporary German philosophy' in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 27, 1930, a favourable report on logical positivism.**
- **A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl, 'Logical positivism. A new movement in European philosophy' in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 28, 1931.**
- **C. I. Lewis, 'Experience and meaning' in *The Philosophical Review*, 43, 1934, a critical article on the verifiability principle.**
- **M. Schlick, 'Meaning and verification' in *The Philosophical Review*, 45, 1936, a reply to Lewis.**

In 1936 Schlick was murdered by a Nazi student at the University of Vienna. Between 1936 and 1940 several German and Austrian philosophers emigrated to USA: Carnap moved in 1936 to the University of Chicago, Reichenbach in 1938 to UCLA, Frank in 1938 (he became professor at Harvard University in 1939), Hempel in 1939 (City College of New York and in 1940 Queens

College), G&oumldel in 1940 (Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton).

Logical positivists found a favourable terrain in USA. They established solid relationships with American pragmatism; particularly Charles Morris took part to several neopositivist's projects. One of them was the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,* primarily promoted by Neurath. Although the original project was never fully realized, many works were indeed published.

For an analysis of the outcomes of logical positivists' researches, you can view Carnap, Hempel and Reichenbach; they were the most active and influential representatives of logical positivism. Now I shall briefly precise some lines of research.

Roughly speaking, there were four different fields of interest.

- **Philosophy of physics, mainly performed by Reichenbach and Frank. The former wrote about theory of relativity, quantum physics, philosophy of time; the latter wrote a biography of Einstein and an analysis of the theory of relativity.**
- **Theory of probability and inductive logic, a field in which Carnap made many works.**
- **Logical analysis of the structure of a scientific theory and its language. There were works of Hempel and Oppheneim on scientific explanation and confirmation; of Hempel and Carnap about concept formation in empirical science; a strenuous defence of the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic statements, due to Carnap, who also proposed several formal versions of the verifiability principle. General treatises were published by Braithwaite, Carnap, Hempel, Nagel.**
- **Finally, Carnap wrote several works on both classical and modal logic and about semantics.**

INFLUENCES ON EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY. I have already depicted the relations between logical positivism and Polish philosophy; I must say that Polish philosophy greatly influenced logical positivism. In twentieth century, Polish philosophers were very interested in logical problems; their works contributed to the development of several branches of logic, such as semantics and many-valued logic. Polish logicians analyzed logical aspects of neopositivist philosophy. Marian Przelecki's work *The logic of empirical theories*, 1969, is a good example of such studies. In her work, Przelecki examined the logical structure of theories and proposed a semantic model of a formalized language suitable for a scientific theory. She used a relatively simple extension of Tarskian classical semantics. In her theory not all statements are true or false: a proposition can be indeterminate, that is neither true nor false (but the law of excluded middle is always true). Therefore there is at least a statement, say P, so that (i) P is not true; (ii) P is not false and (iii) Pv~P is true. A very interesting property of Przelecki's semantics is the following one. Let Ax be the set of axioms of a scientific theory and suppose that Ax is finite; let A be the conjunction of all statements in Ax. It is possible that A is false even if every statement in Ax is not false (ie, the conjunction of a finite number of assertions can be false even if every assertion is not false). This property is very useful in explaining a well-known situation: when a theory is proved false, it is often very difficult to determine the wrong axiom. Another outcome of Przelecki's theory is a semantic characterization of the rules of correspondence. It was proved that Carnap sentence is the weakest rule of correspondence, but it is not the only possible one. For example, suppose the following two statements are the only axioms in Ax:

$(x)(O_1x \dashrightarrow T_1x)$, $(x)(O_2x \dashrightarrow \sim T_1x)$

O_1, O_2 are observational terms and T_1 is a theoretical term. Every one of the following statements is an admissible rule of correspondence:

$(x)[(O_1x \vee O_2x) \dashrightarrow (T_1x \leftarrow\!\!\dashrightarrow O_1x)]$
$(x)[\sim(O_1x \,\&\, O_2x) \dashrightarrow ((O_1x \vee O_2x) \dashrightarrow (T_1x \leftarrow\!\!\dashrightarrow O_1x))]$
$(x)\sim(O_1x \,\&\, O_2x) \dashrightarrow (x)[(O_1x \vee O_2x) \dashrightarrow (T_1x \leftarrow\!\!\dashrightarrow O_1x)]$

The last statement is logically equivalent to Carnap sentence. Finally, a sentence S is analytic if and only if it is a logical consequence of the set of rules of correspondence; S is contradictory if and only if ~S is analytic; S is synthetic if and only if it is neither analytic nor synthetic.

English philosopher Alfred Jules Ayer (1910-1989) played an important role in the spreading of logical positivism. His work *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1936, gained an immediate success. In that book, Ayer completely accepted both the verifiability principle and the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements; hence he asserted that metaphysical sentences are meaningless. A direct influence was exerted by Waismann and Neurath who emigrated in England in 1937 and 1940 respectively. Waismann taught at Cambridge and, from 1939 to 1959, at Oxford, where he taught philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. During this period Waismann was very interested in the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

Relations between Italian philosophy and neopositivism arose in the early stages of logical positivism. Italian mathematician and philosopher of science Federigo Enriques (1871-1946) took part to the congresses on scientific philosophy and collaborated on the *International Encyclopedia*; Neurath and Carnap contributed articles to the journal *Scientia* edit by Enriques. In 1934 Ludovico Geymonat (1908-1991) published a work on logical positivism: *La nuova filosofia della natura in Germania*. Geymonat had the opportunity to study with Schlick, Reichenbach, Carnap and Waismann; later he held the first chair in Italy of philosophy of science (1956). However, the interest of Italian philosophy on logical positivism was primarily directed towards historical researches. Francesco Barone distinguished himself by his work *Il neopositivismo logico*, 1953, a detailed and up to date historical and philosophical analysis of logical positivism, that deserves mention for it focuses attention not only on Vienna Circle but also on the American period of logical positivism and on some philosophers sometimes forgotten (even now it is not impossible to find valuable dictionaries of philosophy that identify logical positivism with the Vienna Circle).

French philosophy was marginally interested in logical positivism. Charles E. Vouillemin translated several neopositivist's works and, in 1935, published *La logique de la science et l'ecole de Vienne*, a book in which he examined the philosophy of the Vienna Circle. Luis Rougier (1889-1982) gave reports about logical positivism ('Une philosophie nouvelle: l'empirisme logique' in *Reveu de Paris*, 63, 1935), collaborated on the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* and contributed works to *Erkenntnis*.

As early as 1930 Scandinavian philosophers were interested in logical positivism. Two of them, Swedish Ake Petzäll (1901-1957) and Finnish Eino Kaila (1890-1958), employed for the first time the expression 'logical neopositivism' for denoting the new philosophical movements (A. Petzäll, *Der logistische Neupositivismus*, 1930 and E. Kaila, 'Der logistische Neupositivismus' in *Annales Universitatis Aboensis*, ser. B, 13, 1930). Petzäll was mainly influenced by the Vienna Circle and in

1930-31 he went to Vienna, where he took part to Vienna Circle's meetings. Later (1935) he founded a new journal, *Theoria*, published in G&oumlteborg; in that journal Hempel published his very first description of the paradoxes of confirmation ('Le probl&egraveme de la v&eacuterité', 3, 1937). Eino Kaila published in 1939 a work pervaded by the principles of logical positivism (*The human knowledge*, in Finnish). He taught philosophy at the University of Helsinki. Among his students was George Henrik von Wright (b. 1916) who published a study about logical positivism (*The logical empiricism*, 1943, in Finnish). Wright contributed to the development of both modal and deontic logic. Finnish Jaakko Hintikka (b. 1929) -- among his teachers was Wright -- pursued Carnap's studies on inductive logic. Hintikka's article 'A two-dimensional continuum of inductive methods' in *Aspects of inductive logic* (ed. by J. Hintikka and P. Suppes), North Holland Pub. Co., 1966, extended the methods Carnap used in *The continuum of inductive methods*, 1952. Roughly speaking, Carnap defined a system of inductive logic in which there is a one-to-one correspondence between the function that gives the degree of confirmation of a statement and the function that gives the estimated relative frequency. The exact relationship between these two functions depends on only one parameter Carnap called *lambda*; it can assume all real values between 0 and infinity (thus the system is a continuum of inductive methods). Every value of *lambda* defines a different methods for evaluating the degree of confirmation. However, the probability of an universal law is always 0. Hintikka added a second parameter he called *alfa* so that the system became a two-dimensional continuum. When *alfa* = infinity Hintikka's system is identical with Carnap's one-dimensional system. Otherwise the two-dimensional system gives a reasonable degree of probability to universal laws even in an infinite universe.

Danish philosopher Joergen Joergensen (1894-1969) very actively collaborated with neopositivists. After Hanh's death (1934) he became an editor of the Vienna Circle's series *Einheitswissenchaft*; later he collaborated on the *International Encyclopedia* to which he contributed the essay *The development of logical empiricism*, 1951.

Finally, it must be noted that logical positivism played a very important role in the development of contemporary philosophy not only for its philosophical principles, but also for its editorial and organizational activities. It is not superfluous to remember that Popper and Kuhn published their most known and seminal works in neopositivist's series. This fact do not prove that Popper and Kuhn were neopositivists; but it shows the broad-mindedness, the kindly disposition and the lasting influence of logical positivism.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES.

Rudolf Carnap (1891 - 1970). See Carnap.

Herbert Feigl (Reichenberg, Austria, but now in Czech, 1902 - 1988). Philosopher of science. In 1921 he studied physics and chemistry at the University of Munich and in 1922 moved to Vienna, where he was an early member of the Vienna Circle. At Vienna he studied mathematics, philosophy, physics and psychology, and received his degree in philosophy in 1927. In 1929 he met K. R. Popper whose ideas he found interesting, so he encouraged Popper to write a book which became the *Logik der Forschung*. In 1930 Feigl emigrated to USA. His article (written with A. E. Blumberg) 'Logical positivism. A new movement in European philosophy' in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 28, 1931, was one of the first reports on logical positivism published in USA and promoted the spread of logical positivism. Between 1931 and 1940 he taught at the University of

Iowa and from 1940 at the University of Minnesota, where in 1953 he founded the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, the oldest center for philosophy of science in the World. Between 1966 and 1973 he was president of the Institute of the Unity of Science.
Feigl supported a materialistic theory of mind -- the identity theory of mind -- according to which mental events are identical with states in the brain ('The mind-body problem in the development of logical positivism' in *Revue International de la Philosophie*, 4, 1950; 'The Mental and the Physical' in *Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science*, II, 1958).

Philipp Frank (Vienna 1884 - Cambridge, Mass. 1966). Physicist and philosopher of science. He studied at Gottingen with David Hilbert and Felix Klein and at Vienna, where he received (1907) his degree in physics under the direction of Ludwig Boltzmann. In the same year Hahn, Frank and Neurath began their meetings in a Viennese café, where they discussed about the new philosophy of science and epistemology -- Mach, Poincaré, Duhem. In 1912 he held the chair of theoretical physics at the German University of Prague. Frank was an editor of series *Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung* and *Einheitswissenschaft*. He moved to USA in 1938 where he taught physics and philosophy of science at Harvard University. His work *Foundations of physics* was published in 1946 in the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*. From 1949 to 1966 he was president of the Institute of the Unity of Science. He wrote several essays on philosophy of physics: *Between physics and philosophy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1941; *Einstein: his life and time*, New York, 1953; *Relativity: a richer truth*, Boston, 1950.

Kurt Grelling (1886 - ?). Logician and philosopher. He was a victim of Nazist persecution and it is supposed that he died with his wife in Auschwitz concentration camp during 1942, although it has been also reported that Grelling was killed in 1941 at the border between France and Spain while he was trying to escape in Spain. Hempel remembers that Oppenheim made every effort to allow Grelling to immigrate in USA but -- according to Hempel -- immigration officials were perplexed by an alleged Grelling's propensity towards Communism; so there was a delay that was fatal to Grelling, who was captured in France and killed in a Polish concentration camp. The episode is reported in Hempel, 'Autobiografia intellettuale' in *Oltre il positivismo logico*, Armando : Rome, 1988 (this essay is the text of an interview Hempel gave to Richard Noland in 1982, published for the first time in Italian translation in 1988).
Grelling was a teacher in secondary school and was interested in logical problems. A semantic paradox is named after him, the Grelling's paradox, formulated in 1908 by Grelling and Leonard Nelson. There are some words which have the property they express; for example 'short' is short. Those words are called autological. The other words are called heterological; for example, 'long' is an heterological word -- it is not long. Now the question is whether 'heterological' is heterological. If yes, then 'heterological' is by definition an autological word and thus it is not heterological. If no, then 'heterological' has the property it designate and therefore it is heterological. Thus, 'heterological' is heterological if and only if it is not heterological.
Grelling collaborated with G&oumldel and in 1936 he published an article in which he defended G&oumldel's theorem of incompleteness against an erroneous interpretation, according to which G&oumldel's theorem is indeed a paradox like Russell's paradox ('Gibt es eine G&oumldelsche Antinomie?' in *Theoria*, 3, 1936). Grelling was also interested in the analysis of scientific explanation and in Gestalt approach.

Hans Hahn (Vienna 1879 - Vienna 1934). Mathematician and philosopher, co-author of the manifesto of the Vienna Circle. He received his degree in mathematics in 1902; afterwards he

studied under the direction of Boltzamm in Vienna and Hilbert, Klein, Minkowski in Gottingen. In 1905 he taught mathematics at Innsbruck and in 1909 at the University of Vienna. In 1907 Hahn, Frank and Neurath began their meetings on philosophy. Later, in 1922, they arranged to bring Schlick to the University of Vienna. After the First World War -- during which he taught in Bonn -- Hahn returned to the University of Vienna (1921). He held courses on the symbolic logic, the foundations of mathematics and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*; one of the students who attended Hahn's courses was K. R. Popper, who found his lectures very interesting and of perfect clarity. Another his student was Kurt G&oumldel, who wrote his dissertation, in which he proved the completeness of first order logic, under Hahn's direction. Hahn was and editor of the series *Einheitswissenschaft*.

Carl Gustav Hempel (1905 - 1997). See Hempel.

Otto Neurath (Vienna 1882 - Oxford 1945). Philosopher and sociologist. He played an important role in the development of logical positivism; very active, he took part to the meetings with Frank and Hahn from 1907, arranged -- with Hahn and Frank -- to bring Schlick to the University of Vienna in 1922, was a co-author of the manifesto of the Vienna Circle (it is supposed that Neurath was indeed the principal author), planned and directed the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, was an editor of the journal *Erkentnnis* and of the series *Einheitswissenchaft*, founded and directed the International Foundation for Visual Education. Neurath studied economy, sociology and philosophy at the University of Vienna and at the University of Berlin. In 1919 he was member of the government of the socialist republic of Bavaria; he was imprisoned and prosecuted, but he managed to escape in Vienna, where was director of a museum from 1924 to 1934. In that year Neurath emigrated to Holland and in 1940 he moved to England, where he died in 1945.
Neurath proposed a linguistic theory of science, according to which scientific statements are not judged by means of the empirical evidence, but they are verified with respect to all other statements: true is thus replaced with coherence.

> **When a statement is formulated, it is checked against the totality of existing statements. If it agrees with them, it is accepted; otherwise, it is marked as not true ... there is no other criterion of truth.**
> **('Physikalismus', in *Scientia*, 50, 1931).**

According to Neurath, the unity of science is attainable through the unity of language. Neurath regarded the language of physics as the only legitimate and objective language which completely avoids the problems (eg solipsism) generated by a phenomenalistic language (it is evident a criticism to the methodological solipsism Carnap used in his *Der logische Aufbau der Welte*). In the language of science there is no room for ethical terms (ethics is meaningless). But also psychological concepts are forbidden; we must substitute them with physical concepts.
Neurath also proposed an international picture language, the Isotype (*International picture language, the first rules of Isotype*, London, 1936; *Basic by Isotype*, London, 1937; *Modern man in the making*, London, 1939). This visual language was based on a combination of charts, graphics, diagrams, maps. The original project of the *International Encyclopedia* included a never realized Visual Thesaurus in several volumes written in Isotype. Now we can fully appreciate the utility of a visual representation based on graphics, icons, etc; thus we can also appreciate Neurath's prophetic intuition of an international visual language.

Hans Reichenbach (1891 - 1953). See Reichenbach.

Moritz Schlick (Berlin 1882 - Vienna 1936). Physicist and philosopher. He studied at the University of Losanna, Heidelberg and Vienna, where he received his degree in physics with a dissertation written under the direction of Max Planck. Between 1911 and 1917 he taught at the University of Rostock. In those years Schlick was interested in the theory of relativity; he wrote 'Die philosophische Bedeutung der Relativitätsprinzip' in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 159, 1915; *Raum und Zeit in der gegenwärtingen Physik*, Berlin, 1917 (English translation: *Space and time in contemporary physics*, 1920). In 1918 he published *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre* (English translation: *General theory of knowledge*, 1974). With the help of Frank, Hahn and Neurath, in 1922 Schlick moved to the University of Vienna, where he held the chair of theory of inductive science. Schlick organized a discussion group known as the Vienna Circle. He was an editor of the series published by the Vienna Circle *Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung*. In 1929 and 1932 he was Visiting Professor at Stanford University; he was the herald of the philosophy of logical positivism in USA. The American journal *Philosophical Review* hosted an interesting exchange of opinions between American philosopher C. I. Lewis and Schlick on the verifiability principle (C. I. Lewis, 'Experience and meaning', 1934; M. Schlick, 'Meaning and verification', 1936). In 1929, the manifesto of the Vienna Circle, written by Hahn, Neurath and Carnap, was dedicated to Schlick; in 1930 the first article published in the new journal *Erkenntnis* was Schlick's *Die Wende der Philosophie*.

Schlick was killed in the University of Vienna by a Nazi sympathizer student on June 22 1936. Schlick can be regarded as the father of logical positivism, both for his organizational skills and for his philosophical ideas. He formulated the verifiability principle.

According to Schlick, scientific laws are not genuine statements, for they are not completely verifiable; they are rules employed to make predictions. The only criterion for justifying scientific laws is the reliability of forecasts; causal laws express nothing but the possibility to make a prediction. Quantum physics has proved -- Schlick asserted -- that there is a limit to such a possibility. That limitation is not due to a failure of human knowledge or to an interference the human observer cause on the physical system. If quantum mechanics proves the impossibility of a simultaneous measurement of position and momentum, therefore -- according to Schlick -- simultaneous position and momentum do not exist.

Schlick criticized Neurath's linguistic theory of science. According to Schlick, science is not characterized by the internal coherence: scientific statements must be tested with respect to the given experience.

Friedrich Waismann (1896 - Oxford 1959). Philosopher. He studied mathematics and philosophy at Vienna and in 1929 became assistant to Schlick. He was one of the few members of the Vienna Circle admitted to the meetings with Wittgenstein. Waismann recorded several conversations whose text was published posthumously in F. Waismann, *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, 1967 (English translation *Wittgenstein and the Vienna circle : conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann*, New York : Barnes & Noble Books, 1979). Waismann proposed a logical interpretation of probability inspired by Wittgenstein in his work 'Logische Analyse des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs' (*Erkenntnis*, 1, 1930). In 1936 he published his only book *Einführung in das mathematische Denken*, about the philosophy of mathematics. He emigrated to England in 1937, where he taught philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science at Cambridge and, from 1940, at Oxford. In England he contributed to the development of analytic philosophy. Posthumously was published *The principles of linguistic philosophy*, Oxford, 1965, an exposition to the philosophy of the late Wittgestein.

The only book he published during his life dealt with the interpretation of mathematics. Waismann criticized both logicism and formalism. Logicism argues that all mathematical truths are logical truths and it is based on Frege and Russell definition of natural numbers: a natural number is the class of all equinumerable classes. According to Waismann, this definition introduces an element of contingency in mathematics, thus disturbing its a priori character. Moreover, formal logic is by no means a privileged calculus to which all mathematics is reducible. Logic itself is a part of mathematics. Waismann also rejected the formalistic interpretation, because it is not interested with the meaning of mathematical concepts. For formalism, a natural number is whatever fulfils the axioms of mathematics. But this approach neglects a very important problem, that is the question whether the axioms of mathematics identify the natural number we really employ. The solution consists in the study of the role that natural numbers play in ordinary language (note the evident analogy with Wittgestein's assertion that meaning is use).

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Mauro Murzi

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Peter Lombard (1095-1160)

LIFE. Peter Lombard, a scholastic theologian of the twelfth century, was commonly known as "the Lombard" after his birthplace which actually was probably Novara. It is expected that he then moved to Lombardy approximately after his birth in 1105-1110 CE He died in Paris, France about 1160 (1164). Although his family was poor, he found powerful patrons such as St. Bernard, that enabled him to gain a higher education at Bologna, then at Reims in France, and finally in Paris. In Paris, Peter taught theology in the cathedral school of Notre Dame, and it was there he found the time to produce the works discussed later in this article. Their dates can be only approximately fixed. The most famous of them, the *Libri quatuor sententiarum* , was probably composed between 1147 and 1150, although it may be placed as late as 1155. Nothing is certainly known of his later life except that be became bishop of Paris in 1159. According to Walter of St. Victor, a hostile witness, Peter obtained the office by simony; the more usual story is that Philip, younger brother of Louis VII. and archdeacon of Paris, was elected but declined in favor of Peter, his teacher. The date of his death can not be determined with certainty. The ancient epitaph in the church of St. Marcel at Paris assigns it to 1164, but the figures seem to be a later addition. The demonstrable fact that Maurice of Sully was bishop before the end of 1160 seems conclusive against it, although it is possible that in that year he resigned his see and lived three or four years longer.

THE *SENTENCES*. The historic importance of Peter Lombard rests on his *Sentences* and the position taken by them in medieval philosophy. The earlier dogmatic theologians, such as Isidore of Seville, Alcuin, and Paschasius Radbert, had attempted to establish the doctrine of the Church from Bible texts and quotations from the Fathers. In the eleventh century this method gave place to dialectical and speculative working over of the traditional dogmas. Peter Lombard came into the field at a time when the now methods and their dialectical artifices were still exposed to wide-spread objection, but when the thirst for knowledge was exceedingly keen. One text-book after another was being published, the majority of them either issuing from the school of Abelard, or in some degree inspired by him. Of these works the greatest influence was attained by that of Peter, which was, for the time, an admirable compendium of theological knowledge. It is written under the influence preeminently of Abelard, Hugo of St. Victor, and the *Decretum* of Gratian. Whether Peter had himself seen the early writers whom he cites is frequently uncertain. Peter was a man of wide reading, but the works of the Fathers had been used again and again in long catent of "sentences " which rendered it unnecessary to go to the original treatises. As to his contemporaries, whom he knew thoroughly, he shows the influence of Abelard in his whole method and in countless details, while preserving a critical attitude toward his most pronounced peculiarities. On the other hand, he follows Hugo very closely and often textually, though here also with a tendency to avoid the purely speculative elements. For his sacramental doctrine, Gratian is very useful, especially through the quotations adduced by him and his legal attitude toward these questions.

ANALYSIS OF THE *SENTENCES*. The first book of the " Sentences ", deals, principally from a

cosmological standpoint, with the evidences for the existence of God. For the doctrine of the Trinity he appeals to the analogies used since Augustine. However, he denies that any real knowledge of the doctrine can be obtained from these analogies without positive revelation and faith, and emphasizing the fact that human speech cannot give a satisfactory account of the nature of God. Joachim of Flore asserted that Peter changed the Trinity into a quaternity, and the charge was investigated at the Lateran Council of 1215. The basis of this charge was the manner in which he distinguished the divine substance from the three persons. Lombard asserted, as a realist, the substantive reality of this common substance. Joachim accused him of adding this substance to the three persons, but Innocent III. and the council decided that he was perfectly orthodox. The relation between the prescience of God and events is conceived in such a way that neither that which happens is the actual ground of the foreknowledge nor the latter of the former, but each is to the other a *causa sine qua non* . Predestination is thus, as a divine election, the preparation of grace and the foreknowledge and preparation of the blessings of God, through which man is justified. There is no such thing as merit antecedent to grace, not even in the sense that man can merit not to be cast away. The omnipotence of God consists in this, that he does what he wills and suffers nothing. A distinction is made between the absolute uncaused will of God, which is always accomplished, and what may be called his will in a loose sense. To the *signa beneplaciti* , the signs of the latter, including commands, prohibitions, counsels, operations, permissions, results do not always correspond-" for God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, yet did not will it to be done."

The second book of the *Sentences* deals with creation and the doctrine of the angels. Peter, following Hugo, considers the " image " and " likeness " of God as distinct, but does not decide for any of the three explanations of this distinction which he quotes. He rejects the traducianist theory of the origin of the human soul. He calls the will free, inasmuch as it " has power to desire and choose, without coercion or necessity, what it has decreed on grounds of reason," but he denies Abelard's theory that the moral character of an act depends on the will of the doer. Of some importance is the strong emphasis laid upon the actually sinful character of the nature derived from Adam, in conjunction with the condemnation of Abelard's proposition that " we inherit from Adam not guilt but penalty." In regard to grace he shows some independent thought, which had its influence on later teaching. Grace (*gratia operans*) is a power (*virtus*) which frees and heals the will, enabling it to perform good and meritorious works. Of grace and the will, grace is the more important. The third book deals with Christology, reproducing the traditional orthodox conceptions, but showing some influence from Abelard. One portion of this discussion brought him into suspicion of Nihilianism. He was accused by John of Cornwall and Walter of St. Victor, and more than one council took up the question without reaching a conclusion. The charge of Nestorianisn, which Gerhoh of Reichersberg brought against the Christology of his time, was made also against the Lombard. In regard to the atonement, he endeavored both to follow out the accepted system of his day and to make use of suggestions from Abelard. Christ merited glorification by his life, and by his death man's entrance into Paradise, his liberation from sin and its penalty and from the power of the devil. Christ as man is a perfect and sufficient sacrifice to achieve reconciliation, through the revelation of God's love made in his death; " the death of Christ then justifies us, when by it love is awakened in our hearts." Further, Christ sets man free from eternal punishment *relaxando debitum*; but to set man free from the temporal punishment, which is remitted in baptism and mitigated by penance, " the penances laid upon those who repent by the Church would not suffice unless the penalty borne by Christ were added to release us."

There is a lack of clearness about this whole subject; the ideas of Abelard (Anselm is not noticed) show themselves now and again through all the effort to preserve the objective notion of the work of redemption.

The fourth book deals with the sacraments. Here Peter follows Hugo and the *Decretum* of Gratian; and his teaching was of great significance for the later development. He was probably the first to make a distinct classification of seven and only seven sacraments; he laid down the dogmatic questions to be discussed under the head of each, and he introduced matter from church law into his discussion of the sacramental dogma. In regard to the Eucharist, he speaks of the " conversion " of one substance into the other, without defining any further, and denies both the symbolic view and the consubstantiation taught by some followers of Berengar. In his doctrine of penance he follows Abelard in seeking theoretical justification for the change which by this time had taken place in the practice.

In spite of the cautious objectivity of the whole treatment, some of the propositions laid down in the "Sentences " were considered erroneous in after years. Walter of St. Victor asserts that at the Lateran council of 1179 it was proposed to condemn the *Sentences* but other matters prevented a discussion of the proposal. From the middle of the thirteenth century the University of Paris refused its assent to eight propositions, of a highly technical character, it is true, and Bonaventure declined to press them. Others were afterward added; but these objections did not interfere with the general popularity of the work, which had increased to such an extent by Roger Bacon's time (1267) that he could complain that lectures on it had forced those on Scriptural subjects into the background. Besides the " Sentences," other extant works of Peter Lombard are Commentarius in psalmos Davidicos and Collectanea in omnes D. Paitli epistolas both collections, in the manner of medieval Catenae, of quotations from patristic and early medieval theologians, with occasional independent remarks. A few unpublished manuscripts, some of them of doubtful authenticity, remain in various places. Of these the most important for a complete knowledge of the author are two manuscripts, one early thirteenth century, the other fourteenth, in the Bibliotheque Nationale at Paris, containing twenty-five festival sermons representing. a moderate type of medieval mystical theology, dominated by allegorical exegesis, but making some excellent practical points.

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Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-1881)

German philosopher; born at Bautzen (31 m. e.n.e. of Dresden), Saxony, May 21, 1817; died at Berlin July 1, 1881. He studied philosophy and medicine at the University of Leipsic, taking degrees in both subjects, and became extraordinary professor of philosophy there in 1842. He was called to Gottingenin 1844, and to Berlin in 1881, but here he was able to lecture only a part of one semester. Lotze was one of the most influential philosophers of the second half of the nineteenth century, and he has man followers, particularly among theologians. This is explained by the fact that in his speculation ethical and religious needs come into their full rights. His philosophy represents a reaction against the ideological pantheism of Hegel, which seemed to sacrifice all individuality and variety in existence to a formal and abstract scheme of development. Lotze characterized his philosophical standpoint as teleological idealism, and he regarded ethics as the starting-point of metaphysics. While enforcing the mechanical view of nature, he sought to show that mechanism, the relation of cause and effect, is incomprehensible, except as the realization of a world of moral ideas. Thus, each causal series becomes at the same time a teleological series. Lotze worked out this reconciliation of mechanism and teleology by combining with the monads of Leibniz the absolute substance of Spinoza, in which individual things (monads) are grounded, and through whose all-inclusive unity interrelation is possible. Some of Lotze's more important works are: *Metaphysik* (Leipsic, 1841); *Logik* (1843); *Medizinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele* (1852); *Mikrokosmus. Ideen zur Naturge8chichte und Geschichte der Menschheit* (3 vols., 185"4; Eng. transl., 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1885), his principal work; *Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland* (Munich, 1868); and the unfinished *System der Philosophie* (vol. i., *Logik*, Leipsic, 1874; vol. ii., *Metaphysik*, 1879; Eng. transl. of both, 2 parts, Oxford, 1884). After Lotze's death appeared *Diktate*, notes from his lectures on the various philosophical disciplines (8 parts, Leipsic, 1882-84; Eng. transl. by G. T. Ladd, *Outline*, 6 vols., Boston, 1884-1887); also *Kleine Schriften* (3 vols., Leipsic, 1885-1894).

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Philosophy of Love

Philosophy of Love: Introduction

The philosophical treatment of love transcends a variety of sub-disciplines including epistemology, metaphysics, religion, human nature, politics and ethics. Often statements or arguments concerning love, its nature and role in human life for example, connect to one or all the central theories of philosophy, and is often compared with, or examined in the context of, the philosophies of sex and gender. The task of a philosophy of love is to present the appropriate issues in a cogent manner, drawing on relevant theories of human nature, desire, ethics, and so on. This brief introduction examines the nature of love and some of the ethical and political ramifications.

The Nature of Love: *Eros*, *Philia, and Agape*.

The philosophical discussion regarding love logically begins with questions concerning its nature. This implies that love has a 'nature', a proposition that some may oppose arguing that love is conceptually irrational, in the sense that it cannot be described in rational or meaningful propositions. For such critics, who are presenting a metaphysical and epistemological argument, love may be an ejection of emotions that defy rational examination; on the other hand, some languages, such as Papuan do not even admit the concept, which negates the possibility of a philosophical examination. In English, the word 'love', which is derived from Germanic forms of the Sanskrit *lubh* (desire), is broadly defined and hence imprecise, which generates first order problems of definition and meaning, which are resolved to some extent by the reference to the Greek terms, *eros*, *philia*, and *agape*.

Eros

The term *eros* (Greek *erasthai*) is used to refer to that part of love constituting a passionate, intense desire for something, it is often referred to as a sexual desire, hence the modern notion of 'erotic' (Greek *erotikos*). In Plato's writings however, *eros* is held to be a common desire that seeks transcendental beauty-the particular beauty of an individual reminds us of true beauty that exists in the world of Forms or Ideas (*Phaedrus* 249E: "he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it." Trans. Jowett). The Platonic-Socratic position maintains that the love we generate for beauty on this earth can never be truly satisfied until we die; but in the meantime we should aspire beyond the particular stimulating image in front of us to the contemplation of beauty in itself.

The implication of the Platonic theory of *eros* is that ideal beauty, which is reflected in the particular images of beauty we find, becomes interchangeable across people and things, ideas, and art: to love is to love the Platonic form of beauty-not a particular individual, but the element they posses of true (Ideal) beauty. Reciprocity is not necessary to Plato's view of love, for the desire is for the object (of Beauty),

than for, say, the company of another and shared values and pursuits.

Many in the Platonic vein of philosophy hold that love is an intrinsically higher value than appetitive or physical desire. Physical desire, they note, is held in common with the animal kingdom and hence of a lower order of reaction and stimulus than a rationally induced love, i.e., a love produced by rational discourse and exploration of ideas, which in turn defines the pursuit of Ideal beauty. Accordingly, the physical love of an object, an idea, or a person in itself is not be a proper form of love, love being a reflection of that part of the object, idea, or person, that partakes in Ideal beauty.

Philia

In contrast to the desiring and passionate yearning of *eros*, *philia* entails a fondness and appreciation of the other. For the Greeks, the term *philia* incorporated not just friendship, but also loyalties to family and *polis*-one's political community, job, or discipline. *Philia* for another may be motivated, as Aristotle explains in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VIII, for the agent's sake or for the other's own sake. The motivational distinctions are derived from love for another because the friendship is wholly useful as in the case of business contacts, or because their character and values are pleasing (with the implication that if those attractive habits change, so too does the friendship), or for the other in who they are in themselves, regardless of one's interests in the matter. The English concept of friendship roughly captures Aristotle's notion of *philia*, as he writes: "things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done…" (*Rhetoric*, II. 4, trans. Rhys Roberts).

Aristotle elaborates on the kinds of things we seek in proper friendship, suggesting that the proper basis for *philia* is objective: those who share our dispositions, who bear no grudges, who seek what we do, who are temperate, and just, who admire us appropriately as we admire them, and so on. *Philia* could not emanate from those who are quarrelsome, gossips, aggressive in manner and personality, who are unjust, and so on. The best characters, it follows, may produce the best kind of friendship and hence love: indeed, how to be a good character worthy of *philia* is the theme of the *Nicomachaen Ethics*. The most rational man is he who would be the happiest, and he, therefore, who is capable of the best form of friendship, which between two "who are good, and alike in virtue" is rare (*NE*, VIII.4 trans. Ross). We can surmise that love between such equals-Aristotle's rational and happy men-would be perfect, with circles of diminishing quality for those who are morally removed from the best. He characterizes such love as "a sort of excess of feeling". (*NE*, VIII.6)

Friendships of a lesser quality may also be based on the pleasure or utility that is derived from another's company. A business friendship is based on utility--on mutual reciprocity of similar business interests; once the business is at an end, then the friendship dissolves. Similarly with those friendships based on the pleasure that is derived from the other's company, which is not a pleasure enjoyed for who the other person is in himself, but in the flow of pleasure from his actions or humour.

The first condition for the highest form Aristotelian love is that a man loves himself. Without an egoistic basis, he cannot extend sympathy and affection to others (*NE*, IX.8). Such self-love is not hedonistic, or glorified, depending on the pursuit of immediate pleasures or the adulation of the crowd, it is instead a reflection of his pursuit of the noble and virtuous, which culminate in the pursuit of the reflective life. Friendship with others is required "since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions…to live pleasantly…sharing in discussion and thought" as is appropriate for the virtuous man and his friend (*NE*, IX.9). The morally virtuous man deserves in turn the love of those below him; he is not obliged to give an equal love in return, which implies that the Aristotelian concept of love is elitist or perfectionist: "In

all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved than he loves." (*NE*, VIII, 7,). Reciprocity, although not necessarily equal, is a condition of Aristotelian love and friendship, although parental love can involve a one-sided fondness.

Agape

Agape refers to the paternal love of God for man and for man for God but is extended to include a brotherly love for all humanity. (The Hebrew *ahev* has a slightly wider semantic range than *agape*). *Agape* arguably draws on elements from both *eros* and *philia* in that it seeks a perfect kind of love that is at once a fondness, a transcending of the particular, and a passion without the necessity of reciprocity. The concept is expanded on in the Judaic-Christian tradition of loving God: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might" (Deuteronomy 6:5) and loving "thy neighbour as thyself" (Leviticus 19:18). The love of God requires absolute devotion that is reminiscent of Plato's love of Beauty (and Christian translators of Plato such as St Augustine employed the connections), which involves an *erotic* passion, awe, and desire that transcends earthly cares and obstacles. Aquinas, on the other hand, picked up on the Aristotelian theories of friendship and love to proclaim God as the most rational being and hence the most deserving of one's love, respect, and considerations.

The universalist command to "love thy neighbor as thyself" refers the subject to those surrounding him, whom he should love unilaterally if necessary. The command employs the logic of mutual reciprocity, and hints at an Aristotelian basis that the subject should love himself in some appropriate manner: for awkward results would ensue if he loved himself in a particularly inappropriate, perverted manner! (Philosophers can debate the nature of 'self-love' implied in this-from the Aristotelian notion that self-love is necessary for any kind of inter-personal love, to the condemnation of egoism and the impoverished examples that pride and self-glorification from which to base one's love of another. St Augustine relinquishes the debate--he claims that no command is needed for a man to love himself (*De bono viduitatis*, xxi.) Analogous to the logic of "it is better to give than to receive", the universalism of *agape* requires an initial invocation from someone: in a reversal of the Aristotelian position, the onus for the Christian is on the morally superior to extend love to others. Nonetheless, the command also entails an egalitarian love-hence the Christian code to "love thy enemies" (Matthew 5:44-45). Such love transcends any perfectionist or aristocratic notions that some are (or should be) more loveable than others. *Agape* finds echoes in the ethics of Kant and Kierkegaard, who assert the moral importance of giving impartial respect or love to another person *qua* human being in the abstract.

However, loving one's neighbor impartially (James 2:9) invokes serious ethical concerns, especially if the neighbor ostensibly does not warrant love. Debate thus begins on what elements of a neighbor's conduct should be included in *agape*, and which should be excluded. Early Christians asked whether the principle applied only to disciples of Christ or to all. The impartialists won the debate asserting that the neighbor's humanity provides the primary condition of being loved; nonetheless his actions may require a second order of criticisms, for the logic of brotherly love implies that it is a moral improvement on brotherly hate. For metaphysical dualists, loving the soul rather than the neighbor's body or deeds provides a useful escape clause-or in turn the justification for penalizing the other's body for sin and moral transgressions, while releasing the proper object of love-the soul-from its secular torments. For Christian pacifists, "turning the other cheek" to aggression and violence implies a hope that the aggressor will eventually learn to comprehend the higher values of peace, forgiveness, and a love for humanity.

The universalism of *agape* runs counter to the partialism of Aristotle and poses a variety of ethical implications. Aquinas admits a partialism in love towards those we are related while maintaining that we should be charitable to all, whereas others such as Kierkegaard insist on impartiality. Recently, LaFallotte has noted that to love those one is partial towards is not necessarily a negation of the impartiality principle, for impartialism could admit loving those closer to one as an impartial principle, and, employing Aristotle's conception of self-love, iterates that loving others requires an intimacy that can only be gained from being partially intimate ("Personal Relations", *Blackwell Companion to Ethics*). Others would claim that the concept of universal love, of loving all equally, is not only impracticable, but logically empty-Aristotle, for example, argues: "One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with them, just as one cannot be in love with many people at once (for love is a sort of excess of feeling, and it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one person)" (*NE*, VIII.6).

The Nature of Love: further conceptual considerations.

Presuming love has a nature, it should be, to some extent at least, describable within the concepts of language. But what is meant by an appropriate language of description may be as philosophically beguiling as love itself. Such considerations invoke the philosophy of language, of the relevance and appropriateness of meanings, but they also provide the analysis of 'love' with its first principles. Does it exist and if so, is it knowable, comprehensible, and describable? Love may be knowable and comprehensible to others, as understood in the phrases, "I am in love", "I love you", but what 'love' means in these sentences may not be analyzed further: that is, the concept 'love' is irreducible-an axiomatic, or self-evident, state of affairs that warrants no further intellectual intrusion, an apodictic category perhaps, that a Kantian may recognize.

The epistemology of love asks how we may know love, how we may understand it, whether it is possible or plausible to make statements about others or ourselves being in love (which touches on the philosophical issue of private knowledge versus public behavior). Again, the epistemology of love is intimately connected to the philosophy of language and theories of the emotions. If love is purely an emotional condition, it is plausible to argue that it remains a private phenomenon incapable of being accessed by others, except through an expression of language, and language may be a poor indicator of an emotional state both for the listener and the subject. Emotivists would hold that a statement such as "I am in love" is irreducible to other statements because it is a nonpropositional utterance, hence its veracity is beyond examination. Phenomenologists may similarly present love as a non-cognitive phenomenon. Scheler, for example, toys with Plato's Ideal love, which is cognitive, claiming: "love itself…bringing about the continuous emergence of ever-higher value in the object--just as if it were streaming out from the object of its own accord, without any exertion (even of wishing) on the part of the lover. (*The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. Heath). The lover is passive before the beloved.

The claim that 'love' cannot be examined is different from that claiming 'love' *should* not be subject to examination-that it should be put or left beyond the mind's reach, out of a dutiful respect for its mysteriousness, its awesome, divine, or romantic nature. But if it is agreed that there is such a thing as 'love' conceptually speaking, when people present statements concerning love, or admonitions such as "she should show more love", then a philosophical examination seems appropriate: is it synonymous with certain patterns of behavior, of inflections in the voice or manner, or by the apparent pursuit and

protection of a particular value ("Look at how he dotes upon his flowers-he must love them")?

If love does possesses 'a nature' which is identifiable by some means-a personal expression, a discernible pattern of behavior, or other activity, it can still be asked whether that nature can be *properly* understood by humanity. Love may have a nature, yet we may not possess the proper intellectual capacity to understand it-accordingly, we may gain glimpses perhaps of its essence-as Socrates argues in *The Symposium*, but its true nature being forever beyond humanity's intellectual grasp. Accordingly, love may be partially described, or hinted at, in a dialectic or analytical exposition of the concept but never understood in itself. Love may therefore become an epiphenomenal entity, generated by human action in loving, but never grasped by the mind or language. Love may be so described as a Platonic Form, belonging to the higher realm of transcendental concepts that mortals can barely conceive of in their purity, catching only glimpses of the Forms' conceptual shadows that logic and reason unveil or disclose.

Another view, again derived from Platonic philosophy, may permit love to be understood by certain people and not others. This invokes a hierarchical epistemology, that only the initiated, the experienced, the philosophical, or the poetical or musical, may gain insights into its nature. On one level this admits that only the experienced can know its nature, which is putatively true of any experience, but it also may imply a social division of understanding-that only philosopher kings may know true love. On the first implication, those who do not feel or experience love are incapable (unless initiated through rite, dialectical philosophy, artistic processes, and so on) of comprehending its nature, whereas the second implication suggests (though this is not a logically necessary inference) that the non-initiated, or those incapable of understanding, feel only physical desire and not 'love'. Accordingly, 'love' belongs either to the higher faculties of all, understanding of which requires being educated in some manner or form, or it belongs to the higher echelons of society-to a priestly, philosophical, or artistic, poetic class. The uninitiated, the incapable, or the young and inexperienced-those who are not romantic troubadours-are doomed only to feel physical desire. This separating of love from physical desire has further implications concerning the nature of romantic love.

The Nature of Love: Romantic Love

Romantic love is deemed to be of a higher metaphysical and ethical status than sexual or physical attractiveness alone. The idea of romantic love initially stems from the Platonic tradition that love is a desire for beauty-a value that transcends the particularities of the physical body. For Plato, the love of beauty culminates in the love of philosophy, the subject that pursues the highest capacity of men's thinking. The romantic love of knights and damsels emerged in the early medieval ages (11th Century France, *fine amour*) a philosophical echo of both Platonic and Aristotelian love and literally a derivative of the Roman poet, Ovid and his *Ars Amatoria*. Romantic love theoretically was not to be consummated, for such love was transcendental motivated by a deep respect for the lady; however, it was to be actively pursued in chivalric deeds rather than contemplated-which is in contrast to Ovid's persistent sensual pursuit of conquests!

Modern romantic love returns to Aristotle's version of the special love two people find in each other's virtues-one soul and two bodies, as he poetically puts it. It is deemed to be of a higher status, ethically, aesthetically, and even metaphysically than the love that behaviourists or physicalists describe.

The Nature of Love: Physical, emotional, spiritual

Some may hold that love *is* physical, i.e., that love is nothing but a physical response to another whom the agent feels physically attracted to. Accordingly, the action of loving encompasses a broad range of behaviour including caring, listening, attending to, preferring to others, and so on. (This would be proposed by behaviourists). Others (physicalists, geneticists) reduce all examinations of love to the physical motivation of the sexual impulse-the simple sexual instinct that is shared with all complex living entities, which may, in humans, be directed consciously, sub-consciously or pre-rationally toward a potential mate or object of sexual gratification.

Physical determinists, those who believe the world to entirely physical and that every event has a prior (physical cause), consider love to be an extension of the chemical-biological constituents of the human creature and be explicable according to such processes. In this vein, geneticists may invoke the theory that the genes (an individual's DNA) form the determining criteria in any sexual or putative romantic choice, especially in choosing a mate. However, a problem for those who claim that love is reducible to the physical attractiveness of a potential mate, or to the blood ties of family and kin which forge bonds of filial love, is that it does not capture the affections between those who cannot or wish not to reproduce-that is, physicalism or determinism ignores the possibility of romantic, ideational love-it may explain *eros*, but not *philia* or *agape*.

Behaviourism, which stems from the theory of the mind and asserts a rejection of Cartesian dualism between mind and body, entails that love is a series of actions and preferences which is thereby observable to oneself and others. The behaviourist theory that love is observable (according to the recognisable behavioural constraints corresponding to acts of love) suggests also that it is theoretically quantifiable: that A acts in a certain way (actions X,Y,Z) around B, more so than he does around C, suggests that he 'loves' B more than C. The problem with the behaviourist vision of love is that it is susceptible to the poignant criticism that a person's actions need not express their inner state or emotions-A may be a very good actor. Radical behaviourists, such as B F Skinner, claim that observable and unobservable behaviour such as mental states can be examined from the behaviourist framework, in terms of the laws of conditioning. On this view, that one falls in love may go unrecognised by the casual observer, but the act of being in love can be examined by what events or conditions led to the agent's believing she was in love: this may include the theory that being in love is an overtly strong reaction to a set of highly positive conditions in the behaviour or presence of another.

Expressionist love is similar to behaviourism in that love is considered an expression of a state of affairs towards a beloved, which may be communicated through language (words, poetry, music) or behaviour (bringing flowers, giving up a kidney, diving into the proverbial burning building), but which is a reflection of an internal, emotional state, rather than an exhibition of physical responses to stimuli. Others in this vein may claim love to be a spiritual response, the recognition of a soul that completes one's own soul, or complements or augments it. The spiritualist vision of love incorporates mystical as well as traditional romantic notions of love, but rejects the behaviorist or physicalist explanations.

Those who consider love to be an aesthetic response would hold that love is knowable through the emotional and conscious feeling it provokes yet which cannot perhaps be captured in rational or descriptive language: it is instead to be captured, as far as that is possible, by metaphor or by music.

Love: Ethics and Politics.

The ethical aspects in love involve the moral appropriateness of loving, and the forms it should or should not take. The subject area raises such questions as: is it ethically acceptable to love an object, or to love oneself? Is love to oneself or to another a duty? Should the ethically minded person aim to love all people equally? Is partial love morally acceptable or permissible (i.e., not right, but excusable)? Should love only involve those with whom the agent can have a meaningful relationship? Should love aim to transcend sexual desire or physical appearances? May notions of romantic, sexual love apply to same sex couples? Some of the subject area naturally spills into the ethics of sex, which deals with the appropriateness of sexual activity, reproduction, hetero and homosexual activity, and so on.

In the area of political philosophy, love can be studied from a variety of perspectives. For example, some may see love as an instantiation of social dominance by one group (males) over another (females), in which the socially constructed language and etiquette of love is designed to empower men and disempower women. On this theory, love is a product of patriarchy, and acts analogously to Marx's view of religion (the opiate of the people) that love is the opiate of women. The implication is that were they to shrug off the language and notions of 'love', 'being in love', 'loving someone', and so on, they would be empowered. The theory is often attractive to feminists and marxists, who view social relations (and the entire panoply of culture, language, politics, institutions) as reflecting deeper social structures that divide people into classes, sexes, and races.

This article has touched on some of the main elements of the philosophy of love. It reaches into many philosophical fields, notably theories of human nature, the self, and of the mind. The language of love, as it is found in other languages as well as in English, is similarly broad and deserves more attention.

Alex Moseley

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Lucretius (98-55 BCE.)

Titus Lucretius Carus was a Roman poet and philosopher who was born probably in BC 98 or 96; the year is uncertain. Of his birthplace and parentage nothing is known. Jerome is authority for the statement that he was made insane by a love-philter, and finally committed suicide, having composed some books in the intervals of his madness. According to Donatus, he died on the same day that Vergil assumed the *toga virilis* -- October 15, BC 55. His writings, however, possesses a unity and continuity inconsistent with the tradition that it was composed "in lucid intervals." It is possible, though, that the story of the poet's insanity and self-destruction may reflect some tragic event of his life. The legend of the madness of Lucretius was elaborated by Tennyson in a well-known poem.

Lucretius left one work, the *De Rerum Natura*, a didactic poem in six books containing nearly 7,500 hexameter lines. The purpose of the poem is to set forth the Epicurean system of philosophy, particularly those portions dealing with the origin of the world and the operations of natural forces. The poet's aim in writing was, as he tells us, to free men's minds from the baneful influence of superstition and of the belief in the hereafter, to which he attributed the greater portion of the fears and troubles of life. He tried to explain how, without the direction or intervention of supernatural agencies in any degree, all natural phenomena may be accounted for. In Book I, he lays down as fundamental truths the propositions that nothing can come from nothing, and that to nothing no one returns. The universe is made up of matter and void, or space. It has no center; for matter exists in infinite quantity, and space is without limit. Matter is composed of atoms, which are inconceivably minute, perfectly solid, and indestructible. Book II is devoted to an elaborate discussion of the atoms, treating their movements, shapes, and combinations. Sensation and feeling are declared to be an accident of atomic combination, a result of the coming together of atoms of certain shapes in certain ways.

The subject of the third book is the mind and soul, which, according to the poet, are inseparably united and of material nature, being composed of the finest and roundest atoms. He offers several proofs that the soul perishes at the same time with the body. Book IV deals with the phenomena of sense-perception. From the surface of all objects, thin films of matter are continually flying off, preserving the general outline of that from which they come. These impinge upon our senses, and perception is an immediate result. Yet in the adaptation of the senses to their functions, there is no evidence of design, no sign of creative intelligence. The fifth book sets forth the perishable nature of the world, its formation from a fortuitous concourse of atoms, the origin of life by spontaneous generation, the preservation of animal life in accordance with the law of the survival of the fittest, and the development of man in civilization out of a condition of brutish savagery. In Book VI, the poet attempts to explain the natural phenomena which seem most terrible and inexplicable, particularly thunder and lighting, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, the changes of the Nile, and the power of the magnet. The poem ends abruptly with a description of the plague at Athens, and was evidently given to the world before it had received the final recession of the author.

In the matter of the poem, Lucretius followed closely the teachings of Epicurus, whom he revered as guide and master. With a truly Roman spirit, he laid more emphasis upon the region of law in the universe than his teacher; but he made no contribution in the way of doctrine to the Epicurean system. Whether he intended to bring his work to a close with a presentation of the ethical views of Epicurus it is impossible to determine; but numerous references show that in these, also, the poet was fully in sympathy with his master. The form of the *De Rerum Natura* was perhaps suggested by that of the poem of Empedocles, *On Nature*. The thought and manner of expression reveal the influence of several Greek poets besides Empedocles (notably Homer and Euripides), and of the early Roman poets (particularly Eunius), as well as of Cicero's *Aratea*. Yet the poem throughout bears the stamp of a marked individuality. Believing deeply himself in the mission of Epicureanism as a cure-all for human ills, Lucretius proclaimed its teachings with an almost religious fervor. Previous to his time, this system of philosophy had received only scanty treatment in Latin, that, too, in barbarous prose. From the multitude of its technical details and the absence of a supernatural element, it seemed incapable of poetic handling. Nevertheless, Lucretius succeeded not only in presenting the main features of Epicurean physics and psychology with admirable clearness, but even in clothing them with a highly poetic form. There are, indeed, passages of unequal merit, and now and then the lack of the poet's finishing touches becomes unpleasantly apparent; yet from beginning to end, the poem carries the reader along with a kind of epic movement and interest.

The existing manuscripts of Lucretius are all derived from a single archetype, which has long since disappeared. From this at least three copies were made. One of these, a beautiful folio of the ninth century, is now at Leyden (called A by Munro). Another was the parent of the quarto MS. of the tenth century (B), also at Leyden, and of two others of which there are considerable fragments at Copenhagen and Vienna. The third copy was taken by Poggio to Italy in the fifteenth century, and became the ancestor of the numerous Italian MSS. Of the *De Rerum Natura*.

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Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)

The first great political philosopher of the Renaissance was Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527). His famous treatise, The Prince, stands apart from all other political writings of the period insofar as it focus on the practical problems a monarch faces in staying in power, rather than more speculative issues explaining the foundation of political authority. As such, it is an expression of realpolitik, that is, governmental policy based on retaining power rather than pursuing ideals.

LIFE. Machiavelli was born in Florence, Italy at a time when the country was in political upheaval . Italy was divided between four dominant city-states, and each of these was continually at the mercy of the stronger foreign governments of Europe. Since 1434 Florence was ruled by the wealthy Medici family. Their rule was temporarily interrupted by a reform movement, begun in 1494, in which the young Machiavelli became an important diplomat. When the Medici family regained power in 1512 with the help of Spanish troops, Machiavelli was tortured and removed from public life. For the next 10 years he devoted himself to writing history, political philosophy, and even plays. He ultimately gained favor with the Medici family and was called back to public duty for the last two years of his life. Machiavelli's greatest work is The Prince, written in 1513 and published after his death in 1532. The work immediately provoked controversy and was soon condemned by Pope Clement VIII. Its main theme is that princes should retain absolute control of their territories, and they should use any means of expediency to accomplish this end, including deceit. Scholars struggle over interpreting Machiavelli's precise point. In several section Machiavelli praises Caesar Borgia, a Spanish aristocrat who became a notorious and much despised tyrant of the Romagna region of northern Italy. During Machiavelli's early years as a diplomat, he was in contact with Borgia and witnessed Borgia's rule first hand. Does Machiavelli hold up Borgia as the model prince? Some readers initially saw The Prince as a satire on absolute rulers such as Borgia, which showed the repugnance of arbitrary power (thereby implying the importance of liberty). However, this theory fell apart when, in 1810, a letter by Machiavelli was discovered in which he reveals that he wrote The Prince to endear himself to the ruling Medici family in Florence. To liberate Italy from the influence of foreign governments, Machiavelli explains that strong indigenous governments are important, even if they are absolutist.

THE PRINCE. Machiavelli opens *The Prince* describing the two principal types of governments: monarchies and republics. His focus in The Prince is on monarchies. The most controversial aspects of Machiavelli's analysis emerge in the middle chapters of his work. In Chapter 15 he proposes to describe the truth about surviving as a monarch, rather than recommending lofty moral ideals. He describes those virtues which, on face value, we think a prince should possess. He concludes that some "virtues" will lead to a prince's destruction, whereas some "vices" allow him to survive. Indeed, the virtues which we commonly praise in people might lead to his downfall. In chapter 16 he notes that we commonly think that it is best for a prince to have a reputation of being generous. However, if his generosity is done in secret, no one will know about it and he will be thought to be greedy. If it is done openly, then he risks going broke to maintain his reputation.

He will then extort more money from his subjects and thus be hated. For Machiavelli, it is best for a prince to have a reputation for being stingy. Machiavelli anticipates examples one might give of generous monarchs who have been successful. He concludes that generosity should only be shown to soldiers with goods taken from a pillaged enemy city. In Chapter 17 he argues that it is better for a prince to be severe when punishing people rather than merciful. Severity through death sentences affects only a few, but it deters crimes which affects many. Further, he argues, it is better to be feared than to be loved. However, the prince should avoid being hated, which he can easily accomplish by not confiscating the property of his subjects: "people more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their inheritance." In Chapter 18, perhaps the most controversial section of The Prince, Machiavelli argues that the prince should know how to be deceitful when it suits his purpose. When the prince needs to be deceitful, though, he must not appear that way. Indeed he must always exhibit five virtues in particular: mercy, honesty, humaneness, uprightness, and religiousness. In Chapter 19 Machiavelli argues that the prince must avoid doing things which will cause him to be hated. This is accomplished by not confiscating property, and not appearing greedy or wishy-washy. In fact, the best way to avoid being overthrown is to avoid being hated.

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Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715)

LIFE. The most influential and original of the Cartesian philosophers was Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715). Deformed and sickly, Malebranche was born in Paris and from his childhood preferred solitude. He studied theology at the Sorbonne, and at age 22 entered the Congregation of the Oratory where he spent the rest of his life in seclusion. He was ordained in 1664 and the same year became acquainted with Descartes' Treatise on Man, an unfinished work which explores the relation between the human mind and body. He subsequently devoted his studies to Cartesian philosophy and science and four years later published his greatest work, *The Search After Truth* (*De la Recherche de la vérité,* 3 vol. 1674-1675). In response to theological criticisms of this work he soon after published his *Treatise of Nature and Grace* (*Traité de la nature et de la grâce,* 1680) which attempts to reconcile God's power, knowledge, and goodness with the evil in the world. This work embroiled him in even more controversy, particularly with French Bishop Jacques Bénigne Bossuet and French theologian Antoine Arnauld. Malebranche's other philosophical writings include *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion* (*Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion,* 1688), a work in fourteen dialogs which more informally covers much of the ground in his *Search after Truth,* and *A Treatise of Morality* (*Traité de morale,* 1683). In 1699 he was elected to the Académie des Sciences for his scientific writings. Near the end of his life, similarities between his views of God and those of Spinoza led to accusations that he followed Spinoza's heretical system. He defended himself against these charges in various letters and writings.

Two aspects of Malebranche's philosophy have been especially influential in the history of philosophy: (1) that we see all things through God, and (2) occasionalism. Both of these doctrines are discussed below. As to the first of these, Malebranche was concerned with explaining how our minds get perceptual images of external objects. His final answer to the question is that, within himself, God contains images of all external things, and God implants these ideas in our mind at the appropriate time. Thus, we see external objects by viewing their images as they reside in God.

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF HOW WE SEE THINGS. Malebranche's principal discussion of his notion of seeing all things through God occurs in *The Search after Truth,* Book 3, part. 2, chapters 1-6. He begins by setting out the problem he wishes to address, namely, the notion of "idea." We do not have direct access to the external objects, but only have ideas (or perceptions) which presumably resemble those objects. He defines "idea" as "the immediate object, or the nearest thing to the mind when it perceives anything." A central problem in modern philosophy concerned the connection between our perceptions and the external objects which supposedly produce our perceptions. For example, if I perceive a red ball in front of me, I may be tempted to assume that the object in front of me has exactly the properties as I perceive them (such as a particular shade of red). This view is called *direct realism,* and Malebranche immediately dismisses this theory. Instead, for Malebranche, ideas in some way represent the object in question. This view is called *representative realism.* Accordingly, when Malebranche uses the word "idea" he restricts its meaning to mental perceptions which represent or copy some original thing.

Malebranche divides mental perceptions into the following groups:

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                                  Internal
        Mental Perceptions <                         Spiritual
                                  External <
                                                     Material
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Mental perceptions in general are either internally produced or externally produced. Our internal mental perceptions (such as emotions) are not themselves ideas, since they do not copy or represent anything (unlike our idea-perceptions of external objects which in fact represent those objects). Properly speaking, then, ideas constitute our externally produced mental perceptions. Even here, though, there is an exception. Malebranche sees that some mental perceptions may be produced from an external spiritual source, such as telepathy, and thus do not represent or copy anything. At least in theory, some mental perceptions may be directly caused by an external spiritual source and would not involve any representative ideas. Malebranche's principal concern, though, is with mental perceptions caused by an external material source. These, he argues, necessarily are given to us as ideas which represent or copy the original object.

Let us grant Malebranche's initial point that the ideas of external things are only representations or copied images of the original object in question. The next question for Malebranche, then, is how we acquire these copied images of the original. Malebranche considers five possible theories of how represented ideas are fed to us. Through a process of elimination he concludes that we receive these ideas of external things from God who discloses them to us as he sees fit. The first possibility considered by Malebranche is that ideas of objects are fed to us by the objects themselves. He considers this theory as explained by Medieval philosophers who followed Aristotle, namely, the theory of emitted species. On this view, some kind of species or sense data particles are emitted by objects which carry the object's image to our senses. Malebranche rejects this view for three reasons. The first problem with this view is that the species particles themselves must be physical. However, at the same time, we must concede that they all are reduced to the size of a tiny (perhaps infinitely small) point. This is because at any point in space, we can see an infinite number of objects. The second problem with this view is that the same object produces species of different sizes depending on how close we are to the object. This is particularly problematic since it is difficult to conceive how this can be done in any single instant of time. The third problem is that the same species must be emitted by the different objects, yet we perceive them differently. Explain Malebranche's examples comparing a the side of a real cube with a picture of a parallelogram.

The second theory which Malebranche attacks is that objects make some kind of impression on our senses, and from these impressions we by ourselves form the ideas which represent the object. Since, on this theory, the initial impression does not resemble the object, then we ourselves have the power to create the idea which does resemble the object. The initial problem Malebranche sees with this theory is that ideas are spiritual in nature, and we are ascribing to ourselves the power of creating something spiritual out of nothing. Some people try to gloss over the issue by saying that it is not true creation since we are actually starting with something (i.e. the physical impressions of the object). Malebranche rejects such attempts to evade the real issue and he emphasizes all the more that this theory gives us the power to create something out of nothing. To illustrate his point, he argues that it is more difficult to create an angel out of stone than to create an angel from nothing. For, we can't make an angel from stone since they are of a different sort. Further, even if

we did have the power to create something from nothing, we still could not create an idea of an object. This would require some prior access to that object to accurately depict it. Malebranche continues that even if we did have the power to create something from nothing, we still could not create an idea of an object. This would require some prior access to that object to accurately depict it.

Malebranche considers a possible defense that we naturally have some kind of confused ideas of things, and it is from these confused ideas that we develop the more distinct ideas which more accurately resemble the original object. Thus, we do not actually create our accurate ideas, but merely develop them. He rejects this view, though, since the naturally implanted idea would have to be distinct, otherwise it would be useless in helping us form an accurate idea. And, if the naturally implanted idea was distinct, we would not need to develop another idea from it. Malebranche notes a second possible defense: we conceive of something, such as a square, through our pure intellect, and then develop a visual image of it through our imagination. Again Malebranche has problems with this view since the imagined image is not an exact copy of the first. He concludes this part of the discussion by noting why people erroneously believe that the human mind has the power to create ideas. First, people observe that when they will to think about a certain idea, such as the idea of an elephant, then the image of an elephant appears. Since the act of willing and the emergence of the idea are correlated, they erroneously assume that the will causes the idea. Logicians refer to this error as the fallacy of false cause. It is this tendency to ascribe false causes to things which results in superstitions.

The third explanation of the origin of ideas which Malebranche attacks is that all ideas of the external world were innately implanted in our minds when we were created by God, and we merely recall these ideas. He argues that this theory would require an infinite number ideas, each with an infinite number of variations. God would not adopt this approach if there is an easier way to accomplish the same task. A second problem with this theory concerns how the soul could decide to pick out a given idea to represent a given object when we look at it. Malebranche turns to the fourth explanation of the origin of ideas. On this view, the human soul is of such a superior nature, that it contains within itself the spiritual nature of external things themselves (which are inferior). Ideas of external things, then, are copies of the spiritual nature of those things as they exist within our own souls. Malebranche replies that the above theory can only apply to God insofar as God created the external world. As creator, God made the world based on a set of ideas he had of all the world's creatures and objects. These ideas are part of God's nature, and, thus, God sees within himself the existence and nature of all the things he created. By contrast, humans are limited, and we do not contain within ourselves the existence and nature of all things. He argues that our limited nature prevents us from having the existence and nature of all other things within ourselves. To illustrate our limitations, he examines the human conception of infinity and explains that we perceive infinity, but don't comprehend it. He argues further that the ideas we have of external things clearly depend on something other than ourselves. First, ideas of things do not depend on our wills. Second, when we have hallucinations, these don't even correspond to anything real.

SEEING ALL THINGS THROUGH GOD. Given the failure of the above four theories, Malebranche argues that we obtain ideas of external things by viewing them within God himself. For, God houses ideas of all external things, and, by his own choosing, allows us to see those ideas. This theory rests on the contention that spiritual entities reside in God. Malebranche maintains this for two reasons. First, as indicated above, as creator, God must have the ideas or blueprints of

all things. Second, all spirits (and spiritual things such as ideas) dwell within God, just as all physical things dwell in space. Malebranche offers several proofs of his theory that we get ideas of external objects by viewing those ideas in God. He still is troubled, though, by the second rejected theory above (that God innately planted ideas of external things in our minds) and he sees this as the principal rival to his own theory. His first defense of his own theory, then, is that it is a more efficient explanation than that offered by the rival theory. He rejects the theory of innately implanted ideas of external things because it is less efficient than Malebranche's own theory. He illustrates God's efficiency by describing the variety of things which God created out of extension alone (i.e. out of physical substance alone). Given that we obtain ideas of external things by viewing them through God, this does not mean that we actually can see the inner nature of God himself. God's nature is simple, and the ideas of things we see in God are complex.

A second argument for Malebranche's own theory is that it highlights God's sovereignty more than the alternative theory. His third argument is based on how we acquire abstract or general ideas, such as the universal notion of a triangle. General ideas are initially formed in God, and we access these through God. He argues that we cannot conceive of universal abstract ideas unless we saw all beings included in one, which we as humans cannot do on our own accord. Unlike humans, God can direct the mind in a wide range of different manners We, then, access these ideas through God. Using the abstract idea of "the infinite" as a starting point, Malebranche gives a variation of Descartes' proof of God's existence in Meditation 3. For Descartes, we have an innate idea of infinite perfection which must have been implanted in us by an infinitely perfect being (i.e., God). Malebranche's argument is as follows:

1. We have a concept of infinite being
2. We do not comprehend "infinite being" in the way in which ideas copy objects
3. Our comprehension of infinite being results from a union or direct acquaintance with God himself
4. Therefore, God exists

It is from the idea of infinite being, with which we are directly acquainted, that we form our ideas of finite beings. Specifically, we *reduce* our notion of infinite being to make it finite.

Malebranche turns to his final proof that we see all things in God. Since God creates all things for his own purpose, then as human creatures we cannot perceive anything without seeing God in those things. This is obviously that case when considering that all our love (or desire) is directed toward God. However, we see God especially when we consider necessary truths, such as those of mathematics and ethics. Malebranche cites Augustine who argues that we see God in the *ideas* behind truths. For Malebranche, though, we see God in the truths themselves. In addition to eternal truths, we also know all facts about the physical world by viewing them in God. When we see all things in God, though, it is not as if we ourselves are sensing them in God. Instead, God actively places these ideas in us by making the appropriate physiological modifications in our souls. God, thus, is the source of all ideas including facts about the physical world, necessary truths (such as 2+2=4), and moral truths (such as that we must love good). The manner in which God gives us these ideas, though, differs. Ideas of necessary truths, for example, come from a union or direct acquaintance with God himself.

Malebranche concludes that this is the most probable of all the theories of how we acquire ideas of objects. He also notes how it makes God actively involved in all causal relations which we are part of. He continues in Chapter Seven outlining the various ways we know things. We know God

through himself. We know bodies through the ideas which God gives us of them. We know our own souls through consciousness and inner sensation. Finally, we know other people's minds only through conjecture, based on their resemblance to ourselves.

OCCASIONALISM. Occasionalism is the view that God is the principal force behind all causal events. For example, when a baseball bat strikes a baseball, God is the actual cause of the motion of the baseball. The bat is merely the occasional or incidental cause which signals God to actually move the ball. Hints of this position are first found in Descartes' Principles on Philosophy 2:36. In defending the view that "God is the Primary Cause of Motion." Descartes argues as follows:

> **[The cause of motion in nature] is in fact twofold: first, there is the universal and primary cause -- the general cause of all the motions in the world. And second, there is the particular cause which produces in an individual piece of matter some motion which it previously lacked. Now as far as the general cause is concerned, it seems clear to me that this is no other than God himself. In the beginning in his omnipotence he created matter, along with its motion and rest. And now, merely by his regular concurrence, he preserves the same amount of motion and rest in the material universe as he put there in the beginning. ... Thus, God imparted various motions to the parts of matter when he first created them, and he now preserves all this matter in the same way, and by the same process by which he originally created it. And it follows from what we have said that this fact alone makes it most reasonable to think that God likewise always preserves the same quantity of motion in matter.**

Descartes' argument above is this:

1. **God first imparted things with motion at creation.**
2. **God preserves or maintains the existence of things after creation.**
3. **The act of preservation is indistinguishable from the act of creation (Meditation 3)**
4. **Thus, God continually imparts motion to things.**

What Descartes hinted at, his followers articulated more precisely. French historian and Cartesian philosopher Geraud de Cordemoy (d. 1684) drew a distinction between the "true cause" of an event, which is God, and its "occasional cause," such as the bat striking the ball. Malebranche further developed Cordemoy's reasoning and produced the definitive defense of the theory of occasionalism. His defense appears in the following selections from *The Search after Truth*, Book 6, part 2, chapter 3, titled, "Of the Most Dangerous Error in Philosophy; Of the Ancients."

Malebranche begins explaining how ancient philosophers postulated metaphysical entities as the basis of causal force. He refutes this position by pushing it to the point of absurdity. His first observation about their contention is that if something has causal power, it is to some degree divine. He continues his reduction to absurdity noting that anything with such power is superior to us and entitled to be worshipped. Following the logic of the ancient philosophers, then, it make some kind of sense to worship the sun as the sovereign divinity in view of the sun's causal power over nature. Having rejected the ancient conception of the source of causation, Malebranche argues that God is the true cause of all motion. His argument is as follows:

1. **Only physical bodies and spirits exist**
2. **Physical bodies cannot causally move things themselves**
3. **Therefore, only spirits can causally move things**

4. **Finite minds cannot causally move things**
5. **God, who is infinitely perfect, can causally move things.**
6. **Therefore, only God can causally move things**

Malebranche offers two arguments in defense of premise (d) above. First, we cannot be the cause of moving our arms (for example) since we do not understand how this is done. Second, it is incomprehensible that we should be the true cause of moving our arms since we see no necessary connection between our will and our movement. However, there is a necessary connection between God as cause, and such movement. For Malebranche, God's power *is* his will. God, then, is the true cause of all motion. The natural causes we see around us are what he calls occasional or incidental causes. Just as God is the true cause of all physical motion, Malebranche continues explaining that God is also the true cause of all mental events which are nonphysical. He argues specifically that God is the true cause of human sensation and bodily motion. Suppose, for example, I wish to move my arm. My task is to will this event. This becomes the cue for God to physically move my arm through physiological causes. For reasons of efficiency, God would not give us (or an angel) that kind of power to be the true cause since this would involve two wills: God's and the angels.

Malebranche offers additional arguments showing why God must be the true cause of bodily motion, even if our wills are involved too. First, if God would make someone move contrary to his desire, the person's desire would clearly be only the occasional cause, and not the true cause. Second, if God make a person's will the true cause of an event, then, in acts of creation and destruction, the person's will would be the true cause of this as well. This is especially absurd when considering non-human decisions in which the wills of animals and even the natural dispositions of matter may be present along with God's will. These, clearly, are not the true causes of the resulting motion, creation, or destruction. Third, if God could give such power to people, animals or matter, he would be making them into gods, which God cannot do. For Malebranche, superstitions and Godless beliefs resulted from the failure to recognize God as the true cause of all. Just as proper religion teaches us that there is only one true God, proper philosophy teaches us that there is only one true cause of everything.

REACTIONS TO MALEBRANCHE. During the modern period of philosophy, Malebranche's theory was examined both by Berkeley and Hume. Although they ultimately rejected Malebranche's views, they nevertheless used Malebranche's reasoning as a model for constructing their own arguments. In *Three Dialogues*, Berkeley considers Malebranche's view that we see all things through God and that that God is responsible for providing human souls with ideas. As Berkeley interprets Malebranche, our immaterial souls cannot directly encounter or perceive material things. God, though, is pure spirit and can encounter both the material and immaterial. Thus, we see all things through God. In the Dialogue Two, Philonous replies by using Ockham's razor: there is no real need for the external material world, hence the material world would be a useless creation. Philonous does recognize a similarity between Malebranche's view and Philonous's (i.e., Berkeley's) idealism: God feeds perceptions directly into the minds of the agent. However, Philonous notes several points of dissimilarity:

> **He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and, know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine.**

Later in Dialogue Two, Hylas considers Malebranche's theory that the presence of matter is the occasion at which God excites ideas in our minds. Philonous responds that God's power alone can account for these ideas without the crutch of material things.

Malebranche is also prominently discussed in Hume's groundbreaking chapter "Of the Idea of Necessary Connection" in the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. In that Chapter, Hume is on a quest for a reflective experience of a human mental operation which can serve as the foundation of an idea of causal power (i.e., necessary connection). He considers four possible candidates, two of which are relevant to Malebranche. The first is the hypothesis that we have an experience of control over the production of our thoughts. For example, if I wish to think about an idea of an elephant, then the image of an elephant appears in my mind. As seen above, Malebranche rejected the contention that we have such an ability without God's help. Hume, too, rejects this view for his own reasons. Nevertheless, by citing this hypothesis, it is evident that Hume used Malebranche's discussion above as a model for investigating the nature of causal power.


The other relevant hypothesis which Hume considers is Malebranche's occasionalism. Specifically, an occasionalist could claim that the idea of necessary connection is produced from the feeling we have when we experience God as the active force in all cause-effect relations. Hume explains that the motivation behind the occasionalist hypothesis was to preserve as much of God's power as possible. For Malebranche, then, God exemplifies greater power if he himself is the active force in all causal relations. Hume disagrees with Malebranche on this point: "It argues surely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures than to produce everything by his own immediate volition."

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George Herbert Mead (1863-1931)



George Herbert Mead is a major figure in the history of American philosophy, one of the founders of Pragmatism along with Peirce, James, Tufts, and Dewey. He published numerous papers during his lifetime and, following his death, several of his students produced four books in his name from Mead's unpublished (and even unfinished) notes and manuscripts, from students' notes, and from stenographic records of some of his courses at the University of Chicago. Through his teaching, writing, and posthumous publications, Mead has exercised a significant influence in 20th century social theory, among both philosophers and social scientists. In particular, Mead's theory of the emergence of mind and self out of the social process of significant communication has become the foundation of the symbolic interactionist school of sociology and social psychology. In addition to his well- known and widely appreciated social philosophy, Mead's thought includes significant contributions to the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of science, philosophical anthropology, the philosophy of history, and "process philosophy." Both John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead considered Mead a thinker of the highest order.

Section Headings:

Life

George Herbert Mead was born in South Hadley, Massachusetts, on February 27, 1863, and he died in Chicago, Illinois, on April 26, 1931. He was the second child of Hiram Mead (d. 1881), a Congregationalist minister and pastor of the South Hadley Congregational Church, and Elizabeth Storrs Billings (1832-1917). George Herbert's older sister, Alice, was born in 1859. In 1870, the family moved to Oberlin, Ohio, where Hiram Mead became professor of homiletics at the Oberlin Theological Seminary, a position he held until his death in 1881. After her husband's death, Elizabeth Storrs Billings Mead taught for two years at Oberlin College and subsequently, from 1890 to 1900, served as president of Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Massachusetts.

George Herbert Mead entered Oberlin College in 1879 at the age of sixteen and graduated with a BA degree in 1883. While at Oberlin, Mead and his best friend, Henry Northrup Castle, became enthusiastic students of literature, poetry, and history, and staunch opponents of supernaturalism. In literature, Mead was especially interested in Wordsworth, Shelley, Carlyle, Shakespeare, Keats, and Milton; and in history, he concentrated on the writings of Macauley, Buckle, and Motley. Mead published an article on Charles Lamb in the 1882-3 issue of the *Oberlin Review* (15-16).

Upon graduating from Oberlin in 1883, Mead took a grade school teaching job, which, however, lasted only four months. Mead was let go because of the way in which he handled discipline problems: he would simply dismiss uninterested and disruptive students from his class and send them home.

From the end of 1883 through the summer of 1887, Mead was a surveyor with the Wisconsin Central Rail Road Company. He worked on the project that resulted in the eleven- hundred mile railroad line that ran from Minneapolis, Minnesota, to Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, and which connected there with the Canadian Pacific railroad line.

Mead earned his MA degree in philosophy at Harvard University during the 1887-1888 academic year.

While majoring in philosophy, he also studied psychology, Greek, Latin, German, and French. Among his philosophy professors were George H. Palmer (1842-1933) and Josiah Royce (1855-1916). During this time, Mead was most influenced by Royce's Romanticism and idealism.

Since Mead was later to become one of the major figures in the American Pragmatist movement, it is interesting that, while at Harvard, he did not study under William James (1842-1910) (although he lived in James's home as tutor to the James children).

In the summer of 1888, Mead's friend, Henry Castle and his sister, Helen, had traveled to Europe and had settled temporarily in Leipzig, Germany. Later, in the early fall of 1888, Mead, too, went to Leipzig in order to pursue a Ph.D. degree in philosophy and physiological psychology. During the 1888-1889 academic year at the University of Leipzig, Mead became strongly interested in Darwinism and studied with Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924) (two major founders of experimental psychology). On Hall's recommendation, Mead transferred to the University of Berlin in the spring of 1889, where he concentrated on the study of physiological psychology and economic theory.

While Mead and his friends, the Castles, were staying in Leipzig, a romance between Mead and Helen Castle developed, and they were subsequently married in Berlin on October 1, 1891. Prior to George and Helen's marriage, Henry Castle had married Frieda Stechner of Leipzig, and Henry and his bride had returned to Cambridge, Massachusetts, where Henry continued his studies in law at Harvard.

Mead's work on his Ph.D. degree was interrupted in the spring of 1891 by the offer of an instructorship in philosophy and psychology at the University of Michigan. This was to replace James Hayden Tufts (1862-1942), who was leaving Michigan in order to complete his Ph.D. degree at the University of Freiburg. Mead took the job and never thereafter resumed his own Ph.D. studies

Mead worked at the University of Michigan from the fall of 1891 through the spring of 1894. He taught both philosophy and psychology. At Michigan, he became acquainted with and influenced by the work of sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929), psychologist Alfred Lloyd, and philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952). Mead and Dewey became close personal and intellectual friends, finding much common ground in their interests in philosophy and psychology. In those days, the lines between philosophy and psychology were not sharply drawn, and Mead was to teach and do research in psychology throughout his career (mostly social psychology after 1910).

George and Helen Mead's only child, Henry Castle Albert Mead, was born in Ann Arbor in 1892. When the boy grew up, he became a physician and married Irene Tufts (James Hayden Tufts' daughter), a psychiatrist.

In 1892, having completed his Ph.D. work at Freiburg, James Hayden Tufts received an administrative appointment at the newly-created University of Chicago to help its founding president, William Rainey Harper, organize the new university (which opened in the fall of 1892). The University of Chicago was organized around three main departments: Semitics, chaired by J.M. Powis Smith; Classics, chaired by Paul Shorey; and Philosophy, chaired by John Dewey as of 1894. Dewey was recommended for that position by Tufts, and Dewey agreed to move from the University of Michigan to the University of Chicago provided that his friend and colleague, George Herbert Mead, was given a position as assistant professor in the Chicago philosophy department.

Thus, the University of Chicago became the new center of American Pragmatism (which had earlier originated with Charles Sanders Peirce [1839-1914] and William James at Harvard). The "Chicago

Pragmatists" were led by Tufts, Dewey, and Mead. Dewey left Chicago for Columbia University in 1904, leaving Tufts and Mead as the major spokesmen for the Pragmatist movement in Chicago.

Mead spent the rest of his life in Chicago. He was assistant professor of philosophy from 1894-1902; associate professor from 1902-1907; and full professor from 1907 until his death in 1931. During those years, Mead made substantial contributions in both social psychology and philosophy. Mead's major contribution to the field of social psychology was his attempt to show how the human self arises in the process of social interaction, especially by way of linguistic communication ("symbolic interaction"). In philosophy, as already mentioned, Mead was one of the major American Pragmatists. As such, he pursued and furthered the Pragmatist program and developed his own distinctive philosophical outlook centered around the concepts of sociality and temporality (see below).

Mrs. Helen Castle Mead died on December 25, 1929. George Mead was hit hard by her passing and gradually became ill himself. John Dewey arranged for Mead's appointment as a professor in the philosophy department at Columbia University as of the 1931-1932 academic year, but before he could take up that appointment, Mead died in Chicago on April 26, 1931.

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Writings

During his more-than-40-year career, Mead thought deeply, wrote almost constantly, and published numerous articles and book reviews in philosophy and psychology. However, he never published a book. After his death, several of his students edited four volumes from stenographic records of his social psychology course at the University of Chicago, from Mead's lecture notes, and from Mead's numerous unpublished papers. The four books are *The Philosophy of the Present* (1932), edited by Arthur E. Murphy; *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934), edited by Charles W. Morris; *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (1936), edited by Merritt H. Moore; and *The Philosophy of the Act* (1938), Mead's Carus Lectures of 1930, edited by Charles W. Morris.

Notable among Mead's published papers are the following: "Suggestions Towards a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines" (1900); "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning" (1910); "What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose" (1910); "The Mechanism of Social Consciousness" (1912); "The Social Self" (1913); "Scientific Method and the Individual Thinker" (1917); "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol" (1922); "The Genesis of Self and Social Control" (1925); "The Objective Reality of Perspectives" (1926);"The Nature of the Past" (1929); and "The Philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey in Their American Setting" (1929). Twenty-five of Mead's most notable published articles have been collected in *Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead*, edited by Andrew J. Reck (Bobbs-Merrill, The Liberal Arts Press, 1964).

Most of Mead's writings and much of the secondary literature thereon are listed in the Bibliography, below.

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Social Theory

Communication and Mind

In *Mind, Self and Society* (1934), Mead describes how the individual mind and self arises out of the social process. Instead of approaching human experience in terms of individual psychology, Mead analyzes experience from the "standpoint of communication as essential to the social order." Individual psychology, for Mead, is intelligible only in terms of social processes. The "development of the individual's self, and of his self- consciousness within the field of his experience" is preeminently social. For Mead, the social process is prior to the structures and processes of individual experience.

Mind, according to Mead, arises within the social process of communication and cannot be understood apart from that process. The communicational process involves two phases: (1) the "conversation of gestures" and (2) language, or the "conversation of significant gestures." Both phases presuppose a social context within which two or more individuals are in interaction with one another.

Mead introduces the idea of the "conversation of gestures" with his famous example of the dog-fight:

> Dogs approaching each other in hostile attitude carry on such a language of gestures. They walk around each other, growling and snapping, and waiting for the opportunity to attack . . . . (*Mind, Self and Society* 14) The act of each dog becomes the stimulus to the other dog for his response. There is then a relationship between these two; and as the act is responded to by the other dog, it, in turn, undergoes change. The very fact that the dog is ready to attack another becomes a stimulus to the other dog to change his own position or his own attitude. He has no sooner done this than the change of attitude in the second dog in turn causes the first dog to change his attitude. We have here a conversation of gestures. *They are not, however, gestures in the sense that they are significant*. We do not assume that the dog says to himself, "If the animal comes from this direction he is going to spring at my throat and I will turn in such a way." What does take place is an actual change in his own position due to the direction of the approach of the other dog. (*Mind, Self and Society* 42-43, emphasis added).

In the conversation of gestures, communication takes place without an awareness on the part of the individual of the response that her gesture elicits in others; and since the individual is unaware of the reactions of others to her gestures, she is unable to respond to her own gestures from the standpoint of others. The individual participant in the conversation of gestures is communicating, but she does not *know* that she is communicating. The conversation of gestures, that is, is *unconscious* communication.

It is, however, out of the conversation of gestures that language, or conscious communication, emerges. Mead's theory of communication is evolutionary: communication develops from more or less primitive toward more or less advanced forms of social interaction. In the human world, language supersedes (but does not abolish) the conversation of gestures and marks the transition from non-significant to significant interaction.

Language, in Mead's view, is communication through *significant symbols*. A significant symbol is a gesture (usually a vocal gesture) that calls out in the individual making the gesture the same (i.e., functionally identical) response that is called out in others to whom the gesture is directed (*Mind, Self*

and Society 47).

Significant communication may also be defined as the comprehension by the individual of the *meaning* of her gestures. Mead describes the communicational process as a social act since it necessarily requires at least two individuals in interaction with one another. It is within this act that meaning arises. The act of communication has a triadic structure consisting of the following components: (1) an initiating gesture on the part of an individual; (2) a response to that gesture by a second individual; and (3) the result of the action initiated by the first gesture (*Mind, Self and Society* 76, 81). There is no meaning independent of the interactive participation of two or more individuals in the act of communication.

Of course, the individual can anticipate the responses of others and can therefore consciously and intentionally make gestures that will bring out appropriate responses in others. This form of communication is quite different from that which takes place in the conversation of gestures, for in the latter there is no possibility of the conscious structuring and control of the communicational act.

Consciousness of meaning is that which permits the individual to respond to her own gestures as the other responds. A gesture, then, is an action that implies a *re*action. The reaction is the meaning of the gesture and points toward the result (the "intentionality") of the action initiated by the gesture. Gestures "become significant symbols when they implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed [intended] to arouse, in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed" (*Mind, Self and Society* 47). For example, "You ask somebody to bring a visitor a chair. You arouse the tendency to get the chair in the other, but if he is slow to act, you get the chair yourself. The response to the gesture is the doing of a certain thing, and you arouse that same tendency in yourself" (*Mind, Self and Society* 67). At this stage, the conversation of gestures is transformed into a conversation of significant symbols.

There is a certain ambiguity in Mead's use of the terms "meaning" and "significance." The question is, can a gesture be meaningful without being significant? But, if the meaning of a gesture is the response to that gesture, then there is meaning in the (non-significant) conversation of gestures -- the second dog, after all, responds to the gestures of the first dog in the dog- fight and vice-versa.

However, it is the conversation of *significant symbols* that is the foundation of Mead's theory of mind. "Only in terms of gestures as significant symbols is the existence of mind or intelligence possible; for only in terms of gestures which are significant symbols can thinking -- which is simply an internalized or implicit conversation of the individual with himself by means of such gestures -- take place" (*Mind, Self and Society* 47). Mind, then, is a form of participation in an interpersonal (i.e., social) process; it is the result of taking the attitudes of others toward one's own gestures (or conduct in general). Mind, in brief, is the use of significant symbols.

The essence of Mead's so-called "social behaviorism" is his view that mind is an emergent out of the interaction of organic individuals in a social matrix. Mind is not a substance located in some transcendent realm, nor is it merely a series of events that takes place within the human physiological structure. Mead therefore rejects the traditional view of the mind as a substance separate from the body as well as the behavioristic attempt to account for mind solely in terms of physiology or neurology. Mead agrees with the behaviorists that we can explain mind behaviorally if we deny its existence as a substantial entity and view it instead as a natural function of human organisms. But it is neither possible nor desirable to deny the existence of mind altogether. The physiological organism is a necessary but not sufficient condition of mental behavior (*Mind, Self and Society* 139). Without the peculiar character of the human central

nervous system, internalization by the individual of the process of significant communication would not be possible; but without the social process of conversational behavior, there would be no significant symbols for the individual to internalize.

The emergence of mind is contingent upon interaction between the human organism and its social environment; it is through participation in the social act of communication that the individual realizes her (physiological and neurological) potential for significantly symbolic behavior (i.e., thought). Mind, in Mead's terms, is the individualized focus of the communicational process -- it is *linguistic behavior* on the part of the individual. There is, then, no "mind or thought without language;" and language (the content of mind) "is only a development and product of social interaction" (*Mind, Self and Society* 191-192). Thus, mind is not reducible to the neurophysiology of the organic individual, but is an emergent in "the dynamic, ongoing social process" that constitutes human experience (*Mind, Self and Society* 7).

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Action

For Mead, mind arises out of the social act of communication. Mead's concept of the social act is relevant, not only to his theory of mind, but to all facets of his social philosophy. His theory of "mind, self, and society" is, in effect, a philosophy of the act from the standpoint of a social process involving the interaction of many individuals, just as his theory of knowledge and value is a philosophy of the act from the standpoint of the experiencing individual in interaction with an environment.

There are two models of the act in Mead's general philosophy: (1) the model of *the act-as-such*, i.e., organic activity in general (which is elaborated in *The Philosophy of the Act*), and (2) the model of *the social act*, i.e., social activity, which is a special case of organic activity and which is of particular (although not exclusive) relevance in the interpretation of human experience. The relation between the "social process of behavior" and the "social environment" is "analogous" to the relation between the "individual organism" and the "physical-biological environment" (*Mind, Self and Society* 130).

The Act-As-Such

In his analysis of the act-as-such (i.e., organic activity), Mead speaks of the act as *determining* "the relation between the individual and the environment" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 364). Reality, according to Mead, is a field of situations. "These situations are fundamentally characterized by the relation of an organic individual to his environment or world. The world, things, and the individual are what they are because of this relation [between the individual and his world]" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 215). It is by way of the act that the relation between the individual and his world is defined and developed.

Mead describes the act as developing in four stages: (1) the stage of *impulse*, upon which the organic individual responds to "problematic situations" in his experience (e.g., the intrusion of an enemy into the individual's field of existence); (2) the stage of *perception*, upon which the individual defines and analyzes his problem (e.g., the direction of the enemy's attack is sensed, and a path leading in the opposite direction is selected as an avenue of escape); (3) the stage of *manipulation*, upon which action is taken with reference to the individual's perceptual appraisal of the problematic situation (e.g., the individual runs off along the path and away from his enemy); and (4) the stage of *consummation*, upon which the encountered difficulty is resolved and the continuity of organic existence re- established (e.g., the individual escapes his enemy and returns to his ordinary affairs) (*The Philosophy of the Act* 3-25).]

What is of interest in this description is that the individual is not merely a passive recipient of external, environmental influences, but is capable of taking action with reference to such influences; he reconstructs his relation to his environment through selective perception and through the use or manipulation of the objects selected in perception (e.g., the path of escape mentioned above). The objects in the environment are, so to speak, created through the activity of the organic individual: the path along which the individual escapes was not "there" (in his thoughts or perceptions) until the individual needed a path of escape. Reality is not simply "out there," independent of the organic individual, but is the outcome of the dynamic interrelation of organism and environment. Perception, according to Mead, is a relation between organism and object. Perception is not, then, something that occurs *in* the organism, but is an objective relation between the organism and its environment; and the perceptual object is not an entity *out there*, independent of the organism, but is one pole of the interactive perceptual process (*The Philosophy of the Act* 81).

Objects of perception arise within the individual's attempt to solve problems that have emerged in his experience, problems that are, in an important sense, determined by the individual himself. The character of the individual's environment is predetermined by the individual's sensory capacities. The environment, then, is what it is in relation to a sensuous and selective organic individual; and things, or objects, "are what they are in the relationship between the individual and his environment, and this relationship is that of conduct [i.e., action]" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 218).

The Social Act

While the social act is analogous to the act-as-such, the above-described model of "individual biological activity" (*Mind, Self and Society* 130) will not suffice as an analysis of social experience. The "social organism" is not an organic individual, but "a social group of individual organisms" (*Mind, Self and Society* 130). The human individual, then, is a member of a social organism, and his acts must be viewed in the context of social acts that involve other individuals. Society is not a collection of preexisting atomic individuals (as suggested, for example, by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau), but rather a processual whole within which individuals define themselves through participation in social acts. The acts of the individual are, according to Mead, aspects of acts that are trans- individual. "For social psychology, the whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts" (*Mind, Self and Society* 7). Thus, the social act is a "dynamic whole," a "complex organic process," within which the individual is situated, and it is within this situation that individual acts are possible and have meaning.

Mead defines the *social act* in relation to the *social object*. The social act is a collective act involving the participation of two or more individuals; and the social object is a collective object having a common meaning for each participant in the act. There are many kinds of social acts, some very simple, some very complex. These range from the (relatively) simple interaction of two individuals (e.g., in dancing, in love-making, or in a game of handball), to rather more complex acts involving more than two individuals (e.g., a play, a religious ritual, a hunting expedition), to still more complex acts carried on in the form of social organizations and institutions (e.g., law- enforcement, education, economic exchange). The life of a society consists in the aggregate of such social acts.

It is by way of the social act that persons in society create their reality. The objects of the social world (common objects such as clothes, furniture, tools, as well as scientific objects such as atoms and electrons) are what they are as a result of being defined and utilized within the matrix of specific social

acts. Thus, an animal skin becomes a coat in the experience of people (e.g., barbarians or pretenders to aristocracy) engaged in the social act of covering and/or adorning their bodies; and the electron is introduced (as a hypothetical object) in the scientific community's project of investigating the ultimate nature of physical reality.

Communication through significant symbols is that which renders the intelligent organization of social acts possible. Significant communication, as stated earlier, involves the comprehension of meaning, i.e., the taking of the attitude of others toward one's own gestures. Significant communication among individuals creates a world of common (symbolic) meanings within which further and deliberate social acts are possible. The specifically human social act, in other words, is rooted in the act of significant communication and is, in fact, ordered by the conversation of significant symbols.

In addition to its role in the organization of the social act, significant communication is also fundamentally involved in the creation of social objects. For it is by way of significant symbols that humans indicate to one another the object relevant to their collective acts. For example, suppose that a group of people has decided on a trip to the zoo. One of the group offers to drive the others in his car; and the others respond by following the driver to his vehicle. The car has thus become an object for all members of the group, and they all make use of it to get to the zoo. Prior to this particular project of going to the zoo, the car did not have the specific significance that it takes on in becoming instrumental in the zoo-trip. The car was, no doubt, an object in some other social act prior to its incorporation into the zoo-trip; but prior to that incorporation, it was not specifically and explicitly a means of transportation to the zoo. Whatever it was, however, would be determined by its role in some social act (e.g., the owner's project of getting to work each day, etc.). It is perhaps needless to point out that the decision to go to the zoo, as well as the decision to use the car in question as a means of transportation, was made through a conversation involving significant symbols. The significant symbol functions here to indicate "some object or other within the field of social behavior, an object of common interest to all the individuals involved in the given social act thus directed toward or upon that object" (*Mind, Self and Society* 46). The reality that humans experience is, for Mead, very largely socially constructed in a process mediated and facilitated by the use of significant symbols.

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Self and Other

The Self as Social Emergent

The self, like the mind, is a social emergent. This social conception of the self, Mead argues, entails that individual selves are the products of social interaction and not the (logical or biological) preconditions of that interaction. Mead contrasts his social theory of the self with individualistic theories of the self (i.e., theories that presuppose the priority of selves to social process). "The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process" (*Mind, Self and Society* 135). Mead's model of society is an organic model in which individuals are related to the social process as bodily parts are related to bodies.

The self is a reflective process -- i.e., "it is an object to itself." For Mead, it is the reflexivity of the self that "distinguishes it from other objects and from the body." For the body and other objects are not objects to themselves as the self is.

> It is perfectly true that the eye can see the foot, but it does not see the body as a whole. We cannot see our backs; we can feel certain portions of them, if we are agile, but we cannot get an experience of our whole body. There are, of course, experiences which are somewhat vague and difficult of location, but the bodily experiences are for us organized about a self. The foot and hand belong to the self. We can see our feet, especially if we look at them from the wrong end of an opera glass, as strange things which we have difficulty in recognizing as our own. The parts of the body are quite distinguishable from the self. We can lose parts of the body without any serious invasion of the self. The mere ability to experience different parts of the body is not different from the experience of a table. The table presents a different feel from what the hand does when one hand feels another, but it is an experience of something with which we come definitely into contact. The body does not experience itself as a whole, in the sense in which the self in some way enters into the experience of the self (*Mind, Self and Society* 136).

It is, moreover, this reflexivity of the self that distinguishes human from animal consciousness (*Mind, Self and Society*, fn., 137). Mead points out two uses of the term "consciousness": (1) "consciousness" may denote "a certain feeling consciousness" which is the outcome of an organism's sensitivity to its environment (in this sense, animals, in so far as they act with reference to events in their environments, are conscious); and (2) "consciousness" may refer to a form of awareness "which always has, implicitly at least, the reference to an 'I' in it" (i.e., the term "consciousness" may mean *self*- consciousness) (*Mind, Self and Society* 165). It is the second use of the term "consciousness" that is appropriate to the discussion of human consciousness. While there is a form of pre-reflective consciousness that refers to the "bare thereness of the world," it is reflective (or self-) consciousness that characterizes human awareness. The pre-reflective world is a world in which the self is absent (*Mind, Self and Society* 135-136).

Self-consciousness, then, involves the objectification of the self. In the mode of self- consciousness, the "individual enters as such into his own experience . . . as an object" (*Mind, Self and Society* 225). *How is this objectification of the self possible?* The individual, according to Mead, "can enter as an object [to himself] only on the basis of social relations and interactions, only by means of his experiential transactions with other individuals in an organized social environment" (*Mind, Self and Society* 225). Self-consciousness is the result of a process in which the individual takes the attitudes of others toward herself, in which she attempts to view herself from the standpoint of others. The self-as-object arises out of the individual's experience of other selves outside of herself. The objectified self is an emergent within the social structures and processes of human intersubjectivity.

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Symbolic Interaction and the Emergence of the Self

Mead's account of the social emergence of the self is developed further through an elucidation of three forms of inter-subjective activity: *language*, *play*, and *the game*. These forms of "symbolic interaction" (i.e., social interactions that take place via shared symbols such as words, definitions, roles, gestures, rituals, etc.) are the major paradigms in Mead's theory of socialization and are the basic social processes that render the reflexive objectification of the self possible.

Language, as we have seen, is communication via "significant symbols," and it is through significant communication that the individual is able to take the attitudes of others toward herself. Language is not

only a "necessary mechanism" of mind, but also the primary social foundation of the self:

> I know of no other form of behavior than the linguistic in which the individual is an object to himself . . . (*Mind, Self and Society* 142). When a self does appear it always involves an experience of another; there could not be an experience of a self simply by itself. The plant or the lower animal reacts to its environment, but there is no experience of a self . . . . When the response of the other becomes an essential part in the experience or conduct of the individual; when taking the attitude of the other becomes an essential part in his behavior -- then the individual appears in his own experience as a self; and until this happens he does not appear as a self (*Mind, Self and Society* 195).

Within the linguistic act, the individual takes the role of the other, i.e., responds to her own gestures in terms of the symbolized attitudes of others. This "process of taking the role of the other" within the process of symbolic interaction is the primal form of self-objectification and is essential to self-realization (*Mind, Self and Society* 160-161).

It ought to be clear, then, that the self-as-object of which Mead speaks is not an object in a mechanistic, billiard ball world of external relations, but rather it is a basic structure of human experience that arises in response to other persons in an organic social-symbolic world of internal (and inter- subjective) relations. This becomes even clearer in Mead's interpretation of playing and gaming. In playing and gaming, as in linguistic activity, the key to the generation of self-consciousness is the process of role-playing." In play, the child takes the role of another and acts *as though* she *were* the other (e.g., mother, doctor, nurse, Indian, and countless other symbolized roles). This form of role-playing involves a single role at a time. Thus, the other which comes into the child's experience in play is a "specific other" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 169).

The game involves a more complex form of role-playing than that involved in play. In the game, the individual is required to internalize, not merely the character of a single and specific other, but the roles of *all* others who are involved with him in the game. He must, moreover, comprehend the rules of the game which condition the various roles (*Mind, Self and Society* 151). This configuration of roles-organized-according-to- rules brings the attitudes of all participants together to form a symbolized unity: this unity is the "generalized other" (*Mind, Self and Society* 154). The generalized other is "an organized and generalized attitude" (*Mind, Self and Society* 195) with reference to which the individual defines her own conduct. When the individual can view herself from the standpoint of the generalized other, "self- consciousness in the full sense of the term" is attained.

The game, then, is the stage of the social process at which the individual attains selfhood. One of Mead's most outstanding contributions to the development of critical social theory is his analysis of games. Mead elucidates the full social and psychological significance of game-playing and the extent to which the game functions as an instrument of social control. The following passage contains a remarkable piece of analysis:

> What goes on in the game goes on in the life of the child all the time. He is continually taking the attitudes of those about him, especially the roles of those who in some sense control him and on whom he depends. He gets the function of the process in an abstract way at first. It goes over from the play into the game in a real sense. *He has to play the game*. The morale of the game takes hold of the child more than the larger morale of the whole community. The child passes into the game and the game expresses a social situation in

> which he can completely enter; *its morale may have a greater hold on him than that of the family to which he belongs or the community in which he lives*. There are all sorts of social organizations, some of which are fairly lasting, some temporary, into which the child is entering, *and he is playing a sort of social game in them*. It is a period in which he likes "to belong," and he gets into organizations which come into existence and pass out of existence. *He becomes a something which can function in the organized whole*, and thus tends to determine himself in his relationship with the group to which he belongs. That process is one which is a striking stage in the development of the child's morale. It constitutes him a self-conscious member of the community to which he belongs (*Mind, Self and Society* 160, emphasis added).

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The "Me" and the "I"

Although the self is a product of socio-symbolic interaction, it is not merely a passive reflection of the generalized other. The individual's response to the social world is active; she *decides* what she will do *in the light of* the attitudes of others; but her conduct is not mechanically determined by such attitudinal structures. There are, it would appear, two phases (or poles) of the self: (1) that phase which reflects the attitude of the generalized other and (2) that phase which *responds to* the attitude of the generalized other. Here, Mead distinguishes between the "me" and the "I." The "me" is the social self, and the "I" is a response to the "me" (*Mind, Self and Society* 178). "The 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes" (*Mind, Self and Society* 175). Mead defines the "me" as "a conventional, habitual individual," and the "I" as the "novel reply" of the individual to the generalized other (*Mind, Self and Society* 197). There is a dialectical relationship between society and the individual; and this dialectic is enacted on the intra-psychic level in terms of the polarity of the "me" and the "I." The "me" is the internalization of roles which derive from such symbolic processes as linguistic interaction, playing, and gaming; whereas the "I" is a "creative response" to the symbolized structures of the "me" (i.e., to the generalized other).

Although the "I" is not an object of immediate experience, it is, in a sense, knowable (i.e., objectifiable). The "I" is apprehended in memory; but in the memory image, the "I" is no longer a pure subject, but "a subject that is now an object of observation" (*Selected Writings* 142). We can understand the structural and functional significance of the "I," but we cannot observe it directly -- it appears only *ex post facto*. We *remember* the responses of the "I" to the "me;" and this is as close as we can get to a concrete knowledge of the "I." The objectification of the "I" is possible only through an awareness of the past; but the objectified "I" is never the subject of present experience. "If you ask, then, where directly in your own experience the 'I' comes in, the answer is that it comes in as a historical figure" (*Mind, Self and Society* 174).

The "I" appears as a symbolized object in our consciousness of our past actions, but then it has become part of the "me." The "me" is, in a sense, that phase of the self that represents the past (i.e., the already-established generalized other). The "I," which is a response to the "me," represents action in a present (i.e., "that which is actually going on, taking place") and implies the restructuring of the "me" in a future. After the "I" has acted, "we can catch it in our memory and place it in terms of that which we have done," but it is now (in the newly emerged present) an aspect of the restructured "me" (*Mind, Self and Society* 204, 203).

Because of the temporal-historical dimension of the self, the character of the "I" is determinable only *after* it has occurred; the "I" is not, therefore, subject to predetermination. Particular acts of the "I" become aspects of the "me" in the sense that they are objectified through memory; but the "I" as such is not contained in the "me."

The human individual exists in a social situation and responds to that situation. The situation has a particular character, but this character does not completely determine the response of the individual; there seem to be alternative courses of action. The individual must select a course of action (and even a decision to do "nothing" is a response to the situation) and act accordingly, but the course of action she selects is not dictated by the situation. It is this indeterminacy of response that "gives the sense of freedom, of initiative" (*Mind, Self and Society* 177). The action of the "I" is revealed only in the action itself; specific prediction of the action of the "I" is not possible. The individual is determined to respond, but the specific character of her response is not fully determined. The individual's responses are *conditioned*, but not determined by the situation in which she acts (*Mind, Self and Society* 210-211). Human freedom is conditioned freedom.

Thus, the "I" and the "me" exist in dynamic relation to one another. The human personality (or self) arises in a social situation. This situation structures the "me" by means of inter-subjective symbolic processes (language, gestures, play, games, etc.), and the active organism, as it continues to develop, must respond to its situation and to its "me." This response of the active organism is the "I."

The individual takes the attitude of the "me" or the attitude of the "I" according to situations in which she finds herself. For Mead, "both aspects of the 'I' and the 'me' are essential to the self in its full expression" (*Mind, Self and Society* 199). Both community and individual autonomy are necessary to identity. The "I" is process breaking through structure. The "me" is a necessary symbolic structure which renders the action of the "I" possible, and "without this structure of things, the life of the self would become impossible" (*Mind, Self and Society* 214).

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The Dialectic of Self and Other

The self arises when the individual takes the attitude of the generalized other toward herself. This "internalization" of the generalized other occurs through the individual's participation in the conversation of significant symbols (i.e., language) and in other socialization processes (e.g., play and games). The self, then, is of great value to organized society: the internalization of the conversation of significant symbols and of other interactional symbolic structures allows for "the superior co-ordination" of "society as a whole," and for the "increased efficiency of the individual as a member of the group" (*Mind, Self and Society* 179). The generalized other (internalized in the "me") is a major instrument of social control; it is the mechanism by which the community gains control "over the conduct of its individual members" (*Mind, Self and Society* 155)."Social control," in Mead's words, "is the expression of the 'me' over against the expression of the 'I'" (*Mind, Self and Society* 210).

The genesis of the self in social process is thus a condition of social control. The self is a social emergent that supports the cohesion of the group; individual will is harmonized, by means of a socially defined and symbolized "reality," with social goals and values. "In so far as there are social acts," writes Mead, "there are social objects, and I take it that social control is bringing the act of the individual into relation with this social object" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 191). Thus, there are two dimensions of Mead's theory of

internalization: (1) the internalization of the attitudes of others toward oneself and toward one another (i.e., internalization of the interpersonal process); and (2) the internalization of the attitudes of others "toward the various phases or aspects of the common social activity or set of social undertakings in which, as members of an organized society or social group, they are all engaged" (*Mind, Self and Society* 154-155).

The self, then, has reference, not only to others, but to social projects and goals, and it is by means of the socialization process (i.e., the internalization of the generalized other through language, play, and the game) that the individual is brought to "assume the attitudes of those in the group who are involved with him in his social activities" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 192). By learning to speak, gesture, and play in "appropriate" ways, the individual is brought into line with the accepted symbolized roles and rules of the social process. The self is therefore one of the most subtle and effective instruments of social control.

For Mead, however, social control has its limits. One of these limits is the phenomenon of the "I," as described in the preceding section. Another limit to social control is presented in Mead's description of specific social relations. This description has important consequences regarding the way in which the concept of the generalized other is to be applied in social analysis.

The self emerges out of "a special set of social relations with all the other individuals" involved in a given set of social projects (*Mind, Self and Society* 156-157). The self is always a reflection of specific social relations that are themselves founded on the specific mode of activity of the group in question. The concept of property, for example, presupposes a community with certain kinds of responses; the idea of property has specific social and historical foundations and symbolizes the interests and values of specific social groups.

Mead delineates two types of social groups in civilized communities. There are, on the one hand, "concrete social classes or subgroups" in which "individual members are directly related to one another." On the other hand, there are "abstract social classes or subgroups" in which "individual members are related to one another only more or less indirectly, and which only more or less indirectly function as social units, but which afford unlimited possibilities for the widening and ramifying and enriching of the social relations among all the individual members of the given society as an organized and unified whole" (*Mind, Self and Society* 157). Such abstract social groups provide the opportunity for a radical extension of the "definite social relations" which constitute the individual's sense of self and which structure her conduct.

Human society, then, contains a multiplicity of generalized others. The individual is capable of holding membership in different groups, both simultaneously and serially, and may therefore relate herself to different generalized others at different times; or she may extend her conception of the generalized other by identifying herself with a "larger" community than the one in which she has hitherto been involved (e.g., she may come to view herself as a member of a nation rather than as a member of a tribe). The self is not confined within the limits of any one generalized other. It is true that the self arises through the internalization of the generalized attitudes of others, but there is, it would appear, no absolute limit to the individual's capacity to encompass new others within the dynamic structure of the self. This makes strict and total social control difficult if not impossible.

Mead's description of social relations also has interesting implications vis- a-vis the sociological problem of the relation between consensus and conflict in society. It is clear that both consensus and conflict are significant dimensions of social process; and in Mead's view, the problem is not to decide *either* for a

consensus model of society *or* for a conflict model, but to describe as directly as possible the function of both consensus and conflict in human social life.

There are two models of consensus-conflict relation in Mead's analysis of social relations. These may be schematized as follows:

1. Intra-Group Consensus -- Extra-Group Conflict
2. Intra-Group Conflict -- Extra-Group Consensus

In the first model, the members of a given group are united in opposition to another group which is characterized as the "common enemy" of all members of the first group. Mead points out that the idea of a common enemy is central in much of human social organization and that it is frequently the major reference-point of intra-group consensus. For example, a great many human organizations derive their *raison d'etre* and their sense of solidarity from the existence (or putative existence) of the "enemy" (communists, atheists, infidels, fascist pigs, religious "fanatics," liberals, conservatives, or whatever). The generalized other of such an organization is formed in opposition to the generalized other of the enemy. The individual is "with" the members of her group and "against" members of the enemy group.

Mead's second model, that of intra-group conflict and extra-group consensus, is employed in his description of the process in which the individual reacts *against* her own group. The individual opposes her group by appealing to a "higher sort of community" that she holds to be superior to her own. She may do this by appealing to the past (e.g., she may ground her criticism of the bureaucratic state in a conception of "Jeffersonian Democracy"), or by appealing to the future (e.g., she may point to the ideal of "all mankind," of the universal community, an ideal that has the future as its ever-receding reference point). Thus, intra-group conflict is carried on in terms of an extra-group consensus, even if the consensus is merely assumed or posited. This model presupposes Mead's conception of the multiplicity of generalized others, i.e., the field within which conflicts are possible. It is also true that the individual can criticize her group only in so far as she can symbolize to herself the generalized other of that group; otherwise she would have nothing to criticize, nor would she have the motivation to do so. It is in this sense that social criticism presupposes social- symbolic process and a social self capable of symbolic reflexive activity.

In addition to the above-described models of consensus-conflict relation, Mead also points out an explicitly temporal interaction between consensus and conflict. Human conflicts often lead to resolutions that create new forms of consensus. Thus, when such conflicts occur, they can lead to whole "reconstructions of the particular social situations" that are the contexts of the conflicts (e.g., a war between two nations may be followed by new political alignments in which the two warring nations become allies). Such reconstructions of society are effected by the minds of individuals in conflict and constitute enlargements of the social whole.

An interesting consequence of Mead's analysis of social conflict is that the reconstruction of society will entail the reconstruction of the self. This aspect of the social dynamic is particularly clear in terms of Mead's concept of intra-group conflict and his description of the dialectic of the "me" and the "I." As pointed out earlier, the "I" is an emergent response to the generalized other; and the "me" is that phase of the self that represents the social situation within which the individual must operate. Thus, the critical capacity of the self takes form in the "I" and has two dimensions: (1) explicit self- criticism (aimed at the "me") is implicit social criticism; and (2) explicit social criticism is implicit self- criticism. For example, the criticism of one's own moral principles is also the criticism of the morality of one's social world, for

personal morality is rooted in social morality. Conversely, the criticism of the morality of one's society raises questions concerning one's own moral role in the social situation.

Since self and society are dialectical poles of a single process, change in one pole will result in change in the other pole. It would appear that social reconstructions are effected by individuals (or groups of individuals) who find themselves in conflict with a given society; and once the reconstruction is accomplished, the new social situation generates far-reaching changes in the personality structures of the individuals involved in that situation." In short," writes Mead, "social reconstruction and self or personality reconstruction are the two sides of a single process -- the process of human social evolution" (*Mind, Self and Society* 309).

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The Temporal Structure of Human Existence

The temporal structure of human existence, according to Mead, can be described in terms of the concepts of *emergence*, *sociality*, and *freedom*.

Emergence and Temporality

What is the ground of the temporality of human experience? Temporal structure, according to Mead, arises with the appearance of novel or "emergent" events in experience. The emergent event is an unexpected disruption of continuity, an inhibition of passage. The emergent, in other words, constitutes a problem for human action, a problem *to be* overcome. The emergent event, which arises in a present, establishes a barrier between present and future; emergence is an inhibition of (individual and collective) conduct, a disharmony that projects experience into a *distant* future in which harmony may be re-instituted. The initial temporal structure of human time-consciousness lies in the separation of present and future by the emergent event. The actor, blocked in his activity, confronts the emergent problem in his present and looks to the future as the field of potential resolution of conflict. The future is a temporally, and frequently spatially, distant realm to be reached through intelligent action. Human action is action-in-time.

Mead argues out that, without inhibition of activity and without the distance created by the inhibition, there can be no experience of time. Further, Mead believes that, without the rupture of continuity, there can be no experience at all. Experience presupposes change as well as permanence. Without disruption, "there would be merely the passage of events" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 346), and mere passage does not constitute change. Passage is pure continuity without interruption (a phenomenon of which humans, with the possible exception of a few mystics, have precious little experience). Change arises with a departure from continuity. Change does not, however, involve the total obliteration of continuity -- there must be a "persisting non-passing content" against which an emergent event is experienced as a change (*The Philosophy of the Act* 330-331).

Experience begins with the problematic. Continuity itself cannot be experienced unless it is broken; that is, continuity is not an object of awareness unless it becomes problematic, and continuity becomes problematic as a result of the emergence of discontinuous events. Hence, continuity and discontinuity (emergence) are not contradictories, but dialectical polarities (mutually dependent levels of reality) that

generate experience itself. "The now is contrasted with a then and implies that a background which is irrelevant to the difference between them has been secured within which the now and the then may appear. There must be banks within which the stream of time may flow" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 161).

Emergence, then, is a fundamental condition of experience, and the experience of the emergent is the experience of temporality. Emergence sunders present and future and is thereby an occasion for action. Action, moreover, occurs *in time*; the human act is infected with time -- it *aims* at the future. Human action is teleological. Discontinuity, therefore, and not continuity (in the sense of mere duration or passage), is the foundation of time-experience (and of experience itself). The emergent event constitutes time, i.e., creates the necessity of time.

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The Function of the Past in Human Experience

The emergent event is not only a problem for ongoing activity: it also constitutes a problem for rationality. Reason, according to Mead, is the search for causal continuity in experience and, in fact, must presuppose such continuity in its attempt to construct a coherent account of reality. Reason must assume that all natural events can be reduced to conditions that make the events possible. But the emergent event presents itself as discontinuous, as a disruption without conditions.

It is by means of the *reconstruction* of the past that the discontinuous event becomes continuous in experience: "The character of the past is that it connects what is unconnected in the merging of one present into another" ("The Nature of the Past" [1929], in *Selected Writings* 351). The emergent event, when placed within a reconstructed past, is a determined event; but since this past was reconstructed from the perspective of the emergent event, the emergent event is also a *determining* event (*The Philosophy of the Present* 15). The emergent event itself indicates the continuities within which the event may be viewed as continuous. There is, then, no question of predicting the emergent, for it is, by definition and also experientially, unpredictable; but once the emergent appears in experience, it may be placed within a continuity dictated by its own character. Determination of the emergent is *retrospective* determination.

Mead's conception of time entails a drastic revision of the idea of the irrevocability of the past. The past is "both irrevocable and revocable" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 2). There is no sense in the idea of an independent or "real" past, for the past is always formulated in the light of the emerging present. It is necessary to continually reformulate the past from the point of view of the newly emergent situation. For example, the movement for the liberation of African-Americans has led to the discovery of the American black's cultural past. "Black (or African-American) History" is, in effect, a function of the emergence of the civil rights movement in the late 1940s and early 1950s and the subsequent development of that movement. As far as most Americans were hitherto concerned, there simply was no history of the American black -- there was only a history of white Europeans, which included the history of slavery in America.

There can be no finality in historical accounts. The past is irrevocable in the sense that *something* has happened; but *what has happened* (i.e., the essence of the past) is always open to question and reinterpretation. Further, the irrevocability of the past "is found in the extension of the necessity with which what has just happened conditions what is emerging in the future" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 3). Irrevocability is a characteristic of the past only in relation to the demands of a present looking into

the future. That is to say that even the sense that *something has happened* arises out of a situation in which an emergent event has appeared as a problem.

Like Edmund Husserl, Mead conceives of human consciousness as *intentional* in its structure and orientation: the world of conscious experience is "intended," "meant," "constituted," "constructed" by consciousness. Thus, objectivity can have *meaning* only within the domain of the subject, the realm of consciousness. It is not that the *existence* of the objective world is constituted by consciousness, but that the *meaning* of that world is so constituted. In Husserlian language, the *existence* of the objective world is *transcendent*, i.e., independent of consciousness; but the *meaning* of the objective world is *immanent*, i.e., dependent on consciousness. In Mead's "phenomenology" of historical experience, then, the past may be said to possess an objective existence, but the *meaning* of the past is constituted or constructed according to the intentional concerns of historical thought. The meaning of the past ("what has happened") is defined by an historical consciousness that is rooted in a present and that is opening upon a newly emergent future.

History is founded on human action in response to emergent events. Action is an attempt to adjust to changes that emerge in experience; the telos of the act is the re-establishment of a sundered continuity. Since the past is instrumental in the re-establishment of continuity, the adjustment to the emergent requires the creation of history. "By looking into the future," Mead observes, "society acquired a history" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 494). And the future- orientation of history entails that every new discovery, every new project, will alter our picture of the past.

Although Mead discounts the possibility of a transcendent past (i.e., a past independent of any present), he does not deny the possibility of validity in historical accounts. An historical account will be valid or correct, not absolutely, but *in relation to* a specific emergent context. Accounts of the past "become valid in interpreting [the world] in so far as they present a history of becoming in [the world] leading up to that which is becoming today . . . . " (*The Philosophy of the Present* 9). Historical thought is valid in so far as it renders change intelligible and permits the continuation of activity. An appeal to an absolutely correct account of the past is not only impossible, but also irrelevant to the actual conduct of historical inquiry. A meaningful past is a *usable* past.

Historians are, to be sure, concerned with the *truth* of historical accounts, i.e., with the "objectivity" of the past. The historical conscience seeks to reconstruct the past on the basis of evidence and to present an accurate interpretation of the data of history. Mead's point is that all such reconstructions and interpretations of the past are grounded in a present that is opening into a future and that the time-conditioned nature and interests of historical thought made the construction of a purely "objective" historical account impossible. Historical consciousness is "subjective" in the sense that it aims at an interpretation of the past that will be humanly *meaningful* in the present and in the foreseeable future. Thus, for Mead, historical inquiry is the imaginative-but-honest, intelligent-and-intelligible reconstruction and interpretation of the human past on the basis of all available and relevant evidence. Above all, the historian seeks to define the *meaning* of the human past and, in that way, to make a contribution to humanity's search for an overall understanding of human existence.

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Sociality and Time

The emergent event, then, is basic to Mead's theory of time. The emergent event is a becoming, an unexpected occurrence "which in its relation to other events gives structure to time" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 21). But what is the ontological status of emergence? What is its relation to the general structure of reality? The possibility of emergence is grounded in Mead's conception of the relatedness, the "sociality," of natural processes.

Mead's philosophy arises from a fundamental ecological vision of the world, a vision of the world containing a multiplicity of related systems (e.g., the bee system and the flower system, which together form the bee-flower system). Nature is a system of systems or relationships; it is not a collection of particles or fragments which are actually separate. Distinctions, for Mead, are abstractions within fields of activity; and all natural objects (animate or inanimate) exist within systems apart from which the existence of the objects themselves is unthinkable.

The sense of the organic body arises with reference to "external" objects; and these external objects in turn derive their character from their relation to an organic individual. The body-object and the physical object arise with reference to each other, and it is this relationship, in Mead's view, that constitutes the reality of each referent. "It is over against the surfaces of other things that the outside of the organism arises in experience, and then the experiences of the organism which are not in such contacts become the inside of the organism. It is a process in which the organism is bounded, and other things are bounded as well" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 160). Similarly, the resistance of the object to organic pressure is, in effect, the *activity* of the object; and this activity becomes the "inside" of the object. The inside of the object, moreover, is not a projection from the organism, but is *there* in the relation between the organism and thing (see *The Philosophy of the Present* 122-124, 131, 136). The relation between organism and object, then, is a *social* relation (*The Philosophy of the Act* 109-110).

Thus, the relation between a natural object (or event) and the system within which it exists is not unidirectional. The character of the object, on the one hand, is determined by its membership in a system; but, on the other hand, the character of the system is determined by the activity of the object (or event). There is a mutual determination of object and system, organism and environment, percipient event and consentient set (*The Philosophy of the Act* 330).

While this mutuality of individual and system is characteristic of all natural processes, Mead is particularly concerned with the biological realm and lays great emphasis on the interdependence and interaction of organism and environment. Whereas the environment provides the conditions within which the acts of the organism emerge as possibilities, it is the activity of the organism that transforms the character of the environment. Thus, "an animal with the power of digesting and assimilating what could not before be digested and assimilated is the condition for the appearance of food in his environment" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 334). In this respect, "what the individual is determines what the character of his environment will be" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 338).

The relation of organism and environment is not static, but dynamic. The activities of the environment alter the organism, and the activities of the organism alter the environment. The organism-environment relation is, moreover, complex rather than simple. The environment of any organism contains a multiplicity of processes, perspectives, systems, any one of which may become a factor in the organism's field of activity. The ability of the organism to act with reference to a multiplicity of situations is an example of the sociality of natural events. And it is by virtue of this sociality, this "capacity of being

several things at once" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 49), that the organism is able to encounter novel occurrences.

By moving from one system to another, the organism confronts unfamiliar and unexpected situations which, because of their novelty, constitute problems of adjustment for the organism. These emergent situations are possible given the multiplicity of natural processes and given the ability of natural events (e.g., organisms) to occupy several systems at once. A bee, for example, is capable of relating to other bees, to flowers, to bears, to little boys, albeit with various attitudes. But sociality is not restricted to animate events. A mountain may be simultaneously an aspect of geography, part of a landscape, an object of religious veneration, the dialectical pole of a valley, and so forth. The capacity of sociality is a universal character of nature.

There are, then, two modes of sociality: (1) Sociality characterizes the "process of readjustment" by which an organism incorporates an emergent event into its ongoing experience. This sociality in passage, which is "given in immediate relation of the past and present," constitutes *the temporal mode of sociality* (*The Philosophy of the Present* 51). (2) A natural event is social, not only by virtue of its dynamic relationship with newly emergent situations, but also by virtue of its simultaneous membership in different systems *at any given instant*. In any given present, "the location of the object in one system places it in the others as well" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 63). The object is social, not merely in terms of its temporal relations, but also in terms of its relations with other objects in an instantaneous field. This mode of sociality constitutes the emergent event; that is, the state of a system at a given instant is the social reality within which emergent events occur, and it is this reality that must be adjusted to the exigencies of time. Thus, the principle of sociality is the ontological foundation of Mead's concept of emergence: sociality is the ground of the possibility of emergence as well as the basis on which emergent events are incorporated into the structure of ongoing experience.

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Temporality and the Problem of Freedom

When Mead's theory of the self is placed in the context of his description of the temporality of human existence, it is possible to construct an account, not only of the reality of human freedom, but also of the conditions that give rise to the experience of *loss* of freedom.

Mead grounds his analysis of human consciousness in the social process of communication and, on that foundation, makes "the other" an integral part of self- understanding. The world in which the self lives, then, is an inter- subjective and interactive world -- a "populated world" containing, not only the individual self, but also other persons. Intersubjectivity is to be explained in terms of that "meeting of minds" which occurs in conversation, learning, reading, and thinking (*The Philosophy of the Act* 52-53). It is on the basis of such socio-symbolic interactions between individuals, and by means of the conceptual symbols of the communicational process, that the mind and the self come into existence.

The human world is also temporally structured, and the temporality of experience, Mead argues, is a flow that is primarily *present*. The past is part of my experience *now*, and the projected future is also part of my experience *now*. There is hardly a moment when, turning to the temporality of my life, I do not find myself existing in the *now*. Thus, it would appear that whatever *is* for me, *is now*; and, needless to say, whatever is *of importance* or whatever is *meaningful* for me, is of importance or is meaningful *now*. This is true even if that which is important and meaningful for me is located in the "past" or in the "future."

Existential time is *time lived in the now*. My existence is rooted in a "living present," and it is within this "living present" that my life unfolds and discloses itself. Thus, to gain full contact with oneself, it is necessary to focus one's consciousness on the present and to appropriate that present (that "existential situation") as one's own.

This "philosophy of the present" need not lead to a careless, "live only for today" attitude. Our past is always with us (in the form of memory, history, tradition, etc.), and it provides a context for the "living present." We live "in the present," but also "out of the past;" and *to live well now*, we cannot afford to "forget" the past. A fully meaningful human existence must be "lived now," but with continual reference to the past: we must continue to affirm "that which has been good," and we must work to eliminate or to avoid "that which has been bad." Moreover, a full human existence must be lived, not only in-the-present-out-of-the-past, but also in- the-present-toward-the-future. The human present opens toward the future. "Today" must always be lived with a concern for "tomorrow," for we are continually moving toward the future, whether we like it or not. Further, we are "called" into this future, toward ever new possibilities; and we must, if we wish to live well, develop a "right mindfulness" which orients our present- centered consciousness toward the possibilities and challenges of the impending future. But we must "live now" with reference to both past and future.

The self, as we have seen, is characterized in part by its activity (the "I") in response to its world, and *how* the individual is active with respect to his world is through his choices and his awareness of his choices. The individual experiences himself as having choices, or as being confronted with situations which require choices on his part. He does not (ordinarily) experience himself as being controlled by the world. The world presents obstacles to him, and yet he experiences himself as being able to respond to these obstacles in a variety (even though a finite variety) of ways.

One loses one's freedom, even one's selfhood, when one is unaware of one's choices or when one refuses to face the fact that one *has* choices. From the standpoint of Mead's description of the temporality of action and his emphasis on the importance of problematic situations in human experience, emergencies or "crises" in one's life are of the utmost existential significance. I am a being that exists *in relation to* a world. As such, it is essential that I experience myself as "in harmony with" the world; and if this proves difficult or impossible, then I am thrown into a "crisis," i.e., I am threatened with *separation* (Greek, *krisis*) from the world; and separation from the world, from the standpoint of a being- in-the-world, is tantamount to non- being. It is in this context that the loss of one's freedom, the experience of lost autonomy, becomes a real possibility. Encountering a crisis in the process of life, the individual may well experience himself as paralyzed, as "stuck" in his situation, as patient rather than as agent of change. But it is also the case that the experience of crisis may lead to a deepened sense of one's active involvement in the temporal unfolding of life. From Mead's point of view, a crisis is a "crucial time" or a turning-point in individual existence: negatively, it is a threat to the individual's continuity in and with his world; positively, it is an opportunity to redefine, broaden, and deepen the individual's sense of self and of the world to which the self is ontologically related.

Thus, it would appear that crises may in fact undermine the sense of freedom of choice; and yet, it is also true that crises constitute opportunities for the exercise of freedom since such "breaks" or discontinuities in our experience demand that we make decisions as to what we are "going to do now." In this way, break-*downs* might be viewed as break- *throughs*. Freedom denied on one level of experience is rediscovered at another. One must lose oneself in order to find oneself.

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Perception and Reflection: Mead's Theory of Perspectives

Mead's concept of sociality, as we have seen, implies a vision of reality as situational, or perspectival. A perspective is "the world in its relationship to the individual and the individual in his relationship to the world" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 115). A perspective, then, is a situation in which a percipient event (or individual) exists with reference to a consentient set (or environment) and in which a consentient set exists with reference to a percipient event. There are, obviously, many such situations (or perspectives). These are not, in Mead's view, imperfect representations of "an absolute reality" that transcends all particular situations. On the contrary, "these situations are the reality" which is the world (*The Philosophy of the Act* 215).

Distance Experience

For Mead, perceptual objects arise within the act and are instrumental in the consummation of the act. At the perceptual stage of the act, these objects are *distant* from the perceiving individual: they are "over there;" they are "not here" and "not now." The distance is both spatial and temporal. Such objects invite the perceiving individual to act with reference to them, to "make contact" with them. Thus, Mead speaks of perceptual objects as "plans of action" that "control" the "action of the individual" (*The Philosophy of the* Present 176 and *The Philosophy of the Act* 262). Distance experience implies contact experience. Perception leads on to manipulation.

The readiness of the individual to make contact with distant objects is what Mead calls a "terminal attitude." Terminal attitudes "are beginnings of the contact response that will be made to the object when the object is reached" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 161). Such attitudes "are those which, if carried out into overt action, would lead to movements which, if persevered in, would overcome the distances and bring the objects into the manipulatory sphere" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 171). A terminal attitude, then, is an implicit manipulation of a distant object; it stands at the beginning of the act and is an intellectual-and-emotional posture in terms of which the individual encounters the world. As present in the beginning of the act, the terminal attitude contains the later stages of the act in the sense that perception implies manipulation and in the sense that manipulation is aimed at the resolution of a problem. In terminal attitudes, all stages of the act interpenetrate.

Within the act, then, there is a tendency on the part of the perceiving individual to approach distant objects in terms of the "values of the manipulatory sphere." Distant objects are perceived "with the dimensions they would have if they were brought within the field in which we could both handle and see them" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 170-171). For example, a distant shape is *seen* as being palpable, as having a certain size and weight, as having such and such a texture, and so forth. In perception, the manipulatory area is extended, and the distant object becomes hypothetically a contact object.

In immediate perceptual experience, the distant object is in the future. Contact with the distant object is implicit, i.e., *anticipated*. "The percept," according to Mead, "is there as a promise" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 103). In so far as the act of perception involves terminal attitudes, the promise (or futurity) of the distant object is "collapsed" into a hypothetical "now" in which the perceiving individual and the

perceptual object exist simultaneously. The temporal distance between individual and object is thus suspended; this suspension of time permits alternative (and perhaps conflicting) contact reactions to the object to be "tested" in imagination. Thus, the act may be "completed" in abstraction before it is completed in fact. In this sense, "the percept is a collapsed act" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 128).

The contemporaneity of individual and distant object is an abstraction within the act. In the collapsed act, time is abstracted from space "for the purposes of our conduct" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 177). Prior to actual manipulation, the perceiving individual anticipates a variety of ways in which a given object *might* be manipulated. This implicit testing of alternative responses to the distant object is the essence of reflective conduct. The actual futurity of the distant object is suspended, and the object is treated *as though* it were present in the manipulatory area. The time of the collapsed act, therefore, is an abstracted time that involves "the experience of inhibited action in which the goal is present as achieved through the individual assuming the attitude of contact response, and thus leaving the events that should elapse between the beginning and the end of the act present only in their abstracted character as passing" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 232).

Thus, in the abstracted time of the collapsed act, "certain objects cease to be events, cease to pass as they are in reality passing and in their permanence become the conditions of our action, and events take place with reference to them" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 177). The perceiving individual's terminal attitudes constitute an anticipatory contact experience in which the futurity of distant objects is reduced to an abstract contemporaneity. This reduction of futurity, we have seen, is instrumental in the reflective conduct of the acting individual.

In perception, then, distant objects are reduced to the manipulatory area and become (hypothetically) contact objects. "The fundamentals of perception are the spatio temporal distances of objects lying outside the manipulatory area and the readiness of the organism to act toward them as they will be if they come within the manipulatory area" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 104). Perception involves the assumption of contact qualities in the distant object. The object is removed from its actual temporal position and is incorporated in a "permanent" space which is actually the space "of the manipulatory area, hypothetically extended" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 185). The object, which is actually spatio- temporally distant, becomes, hypothetically and for the purposes of reflective conduct, spatio- temporally *present*: it is, in the perceiving individual's assumption of the contact attitude, both "here" and "now."

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Perspectives

Early modern accounts of perception, in an attempt to ground the theories and methods of modern science in a philosophical framework, made a distinction between the "primary" and "secondary" qualities of objects. Galileo articulated the latter distinction as follows:

> I feel myself impelled by the necessity, as soon as I conceive a piece of matter or corporeal substance, of conceiving that in its own nature it is bounded and figured in such and such a figure, that in relation to others it is either large or small, that it is in this or that place, in this or that time, that it is in motion or remains at rest . . . , that it is single, few or many; in short by no imagination can a body be separated from such conditions: but that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, sounding or mute, of a pleasant or unpleasant odour, I do not perceive my mind forced to acknowledge it necessarily accompanied by such conditions; so if the

> senses are not the escorts, perhaps the reason or the imagination by itself would never have arrived at them. Hence I think that these tastes, odours, colors, etc., on the side of the object in which they seem to exist, are nothing but mere names, but hold their residence solely in the sensitive body; so that if the animal were removed, every such quality would be abolished and annihilated (quoted by E.A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* [Doubleday, 1932], 85-86).

Another way of putting this is to say that the *primary qualities* of an object are those which are subject to precise mathematical calculation, whereas the *secondary qualities* of the object are those which are rooted in the sensibility of the perceiving organism and which are therefore not "objectively" quantifiable. The primary qualities (number, position, extension, bulk, and so forth) are *there* in the object, but the secondary qualities are *subjective* reactions to the object on the part of the sensitive organism. A corollary of this doctrine is that the primary qualities, because they are objective, are more "knowable" than are the subjective secondary qualities.

A serious breakdown in the theory of primary and secondary qualities appeared in the critical epistemology of George Berkeley. According to Berkeley, whatever we know of objects, we know on the basis of perception. The primary as well as the secondary qualities of objects are apprehended in sensation. Moreover, primary qualities are never perceived except in conjunction with secondary qualities. Both primary and secondary qualities, therefore, are derived from perception and are ideas "in the mind." When we "know" the primary qualities of an object, what we "know" are "our own ideas and sensations." Thus, Berkeley calls into question the "objectivity" of the primary qualities; these qualities, it would appear, are as dependent upon a perceiving organism as are secondary qualities. The outcome of Berkeley's radical subjectivism (which reaches its apogee in the skepticism of Hume) is an epistemological crisis in which the "knowability" of the external world is rendered problematic.

Mead's account of distance experience offers a description of the experiential basis of the separation of primary and secondary qualities. In the exigencies of action, we have seen, there is a tendency on the part of the acting individual to reduce distant objects to the contact area. "It is this collapsing of the act," according to Mead, "which is responsible for the so- called subjective nature of the secondary qualities . . . [of] objects" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 121). The contact characters of the object become the main focus within the act, while the distance characters are bracketed out (i.e., held in suspension or ignored for the time being). For the purposes of conduct, "the reality of what we see is what we can handle" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 105). In Mead's analysis of perception, the distinction between distance and contact characters is roughly equivalent to the traditional distinction between secondary and primary qualities, respectively. For Mead, however, the distance characters of an object are not "subjective," but are as objective as the contact characters. Distance characters (such as color, sound, odor, and taste) are *there* in the act; they appear in the transition from impulse to perception and are present even in manipulation: "In the manipulatory area one actually handles the colored, odorous, sounding, sapid object. The distance characters seem to be no longer distant, and the object answers to a collapsed act" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 121).

Mead's theory of perspectives is, in effect, an attempt to make clear the objective intentionality of perceptual experience. In Mead's relational conception of biological existence, there is a mutual determination of organism and environment; the character of the organism determines the environment, just as the character of the environment determines the organism.

In his opposition to outright environmental determinism, Mead points out that the sensitivity, selectivity, and organizational capacities of organisms are sources of the control of the environment by the form. On the human level, for example, we find the phenomenon of *attention*. The human being selects her stimuli and thereby organizes the field within which she acts. Attention, then, is characterized by its selectivity and organizing tendency. "Here we have the organism as acting and deter mining its environment. It is not simply a set of passive senses played upon by the stimuli that come from without. The organism goes out and determines what it is going to respond to, and organizes the world" (*Mind, Self and Society* 25). Attention is the foundation of human intelligence; it is the capacity of attention that gives us control over our experience and conduct. Attention is one of the elements of human freedom.

The relation between organism and environment is, in a word, *inter*active. The perceptual object arises within this interactive matrix and is "determined by its reference to some percipient event, or individual, in a consentient set" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 166). In other words, perceptual objects are perspectively determined, and perspectives are determined by perceiving individuals.

> Even when we consider only sense data, the object is clearly a function of the whole situation whose perspective is determined by the individual. There are peculiarities in the objects which depend upon the individual as an organism and the spatio-temporal position of the individual. It is one of the important results of the modern doctrine of relativity that we are forced to recognize that we cannot account for these peculiarities by stating the individual in terms of his environment. (*The Philosophy of the Act* 224).

The perceiving individual cannot be explained in terms of the so-called external world, since that individual is a necessary condition of the appearance of that world.

Mead thus abandons, on the basis of his interpretation of relativity theory, the object of Newtonian physics. But in addition to denying the concrete existence of independent objects, he also denies the existence of the independent psyche. There is nothing subjective about perceptual experience. If objects exist with reference to the perceiving individual, it is also true that the perceiving individual exists with reference to objects. The qualities of objects (distance as well as contact qualities) exist in the relation between the perceiving individual and the world. The so-called secondary sensuous qualities, therefore, are objectively present in the individual-world matrix; sensuous characters *are there* in a given perspective on reality.

In actual perceptual experience, the object is objectively present in relation to the individual. Whereas the relation between the world and the perceiving individual led Berkeley to a radical subjectification of experience, Mead's relationism leads him to an equally radical *objectification* of experience.

Perspectives, in Mead's view, are objectively real. Perspectives are "there in nature," and natural reality is the overall "organization of perspectives." There is, so far as we can directly *know*, no natural reality beyond the organization of perspectives, no noumena, no independent "world of physical particles in absolute space and time" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 163). The cosmos is nature stratified into a multiplicity of perspectives, all of which are interrelated. Perspectival stratifications of nature "are not only there in nature but they are the only forms of nature that are there" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 171).

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The Scientific Object

Mead distinguishes two main types of perspective: (1) the perceptual perspective and (2) the reflective perspective. A *perceptual perspective* is rooted in the space-time world in which action is unreflective. This is the world of immediate perceptual experience. A *reflective perspective* is a response to the world of perceptual perspectives. The perspectives of fig trees and wasps are, from the standpoint of the trees and wasps (hypothetically considered), perceptually independent, except for certain points of intersection (i.e., actual contacts). "But in the reflective perspective of the man who plants the fig trees and insures the presence of the wasps, both life-histories run their courses, and their intersection provides a dimension from which their interconnection maintains their species" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 185). Reflectively, the fig tree perspective and the wasp perspective form a single perspective "that includes the perspectives of both" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 184). The world of reflective perspectives is the world of reflective thought and action, the world of distance experience and the world of scientific inquiry. It is within the reflective perspective that the hypothetical objects of the collapsed act arise. Since Mead's conception of distance experience has been discussed earlier, the present analysis will concentrate on the emergence of the scientific object in reflective experience.

Corresponding to the two types of perspective outlined above are two attitudes toward the perceptual objects which arise in experience. There is, first, and corresponding to the perceptual perspective, "the attitude of immediate experience," which is grounded in "the world that is there" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 14). *The world that is there* (a phrase Mead uses over and over again) includes our own acts, our own bodies, and our own psychological responses to the things that emerge in our ongoing activity. Perceptual objects, in *the world that is there*, are what they appear to be in their relation to the perceiving individual.

The second attitude toward perceptual objects is that of "reflective analysis," which attempts to set forth the preconditions of perceptual experience. This attitude corresponds to the reflective perspective. It is through reflective analysis of perceptual objects that scientific objects are constructed. Examples of scientific objects are the Newtonian notions of absolute space and absolute time, the concept of the world at an instant (absolute simultaneity), the notion of "ultimate elements" (atoms, electrons, particles), and so on. Such objects, according to Mead, are hypothetical abstractions which arise in the scientific attempt to explain the world of immediate experience. "The whole tendency of the natural sciences, as exhibited especially in physics and chemistry, is to replace the objects of immediate experience by hypothetical objects which lie beyond the range of possible experience" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 291). Scientific objects are not objects of experience. Science accounts for the perceptible in terms of the non-perceptible (and often the *im*perceptible).

There is a danger in the reflective analysis of *the world that is there*, namely, the reification of scientific objects and the subjectification of perceptual objects. That is, it is possible to conceive of the perceptual world as a product of organic sensitivity (including human consciousness) while the world of scientific objects is "conceived of as entirely independent of perceiving individuals" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 284- 285). According to Mead, this formulation of the relation between scientific objects and perceptual objects is "entirely uncritical" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 19). The alleged separation of scientific and perceptual objects leads to a "bifurcated nature" in which experience is cut off from reality through the dualism of primary and secondary qualities. Mead's critique of the latter doctrine, discussed above, reveals that "the organism is a part of the physical world we are explaining" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 21). and that the perceptual object, with all of its qualities, is objectively there in the relation between

organism and world. The scientific object, moreover, has ultimate reference to the perceptual world. The act of reflective analysis within which the scientific object arises presupposes *the world that is there* in perceptual experience. Scientific objects are abstractions within the reflective act and are, in effect, attempts to account for the objects of perceptual experience. And it is to *the world that is there* that the scientist must go to confirm or disconfirm the hypothetical objects of scientific theory.

Reflective analysis thus arises within and presupposes an unreflective world of immediate experience. And it is this immediate world "which is the final test of the reality of scientific hypotheses as well as the test of the truth of all our ideas and suppositions" (*Mind, Self and Society* 352). In *Mind, Self and Society*, Mead refers to the unreflective world as the world of the "biologic individual." "The term," he points out,

> refers to the individual in an attitude and at a moment in which the impulses sustain an unfractured relation with the objects around him . . . . I have termed it "biologic" because the term lays emphasis on the living reality which may be distinguished from reflection. *A later reflection turns back upon it* and endeavors to present the complete interrelationship between the world and the individual in terms of physical stimuli and biological mechanisms [scientific objects]; the actual experience did not take place in this [hypothetical] form but in the form of unsophisticated reality (*Mind, Self and Society* 352, 353, emphasis added).

The world that is there is prior to the reflective world of scientific theory. The reification of scientific objects at the expense of perceptual experience is, in Mead's view, the product of an "uncritical scientific imagination" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 21).

Mead's analysis of the scientific object is an attempt to establish the actual relation between reflective analysis and perceptual experience. His aim is to demonstrate the objective reality of the perceptual world. He does not, however, deny the reality of scientific objects. Scientific objects are hypothetical objects which are real in so far as they render the experiential world intelligible and controllable. Harold N. Lee, in discussing Mead's philosophy, points out that "the task of science is to understand the world we live in and to enable us to act intelligently within it; it is not to construct a new and artificial world except in so far as the artificial picture aids in understanding and controlling the world we live in. *The artificial picture is not be substituted for the world*" (Lee 56, emphasis added). Scientific knowledge is not final, but hypothetical; and the reality of scientific objects is, therefore, hypothetical rather than absolute.

Reflective conduct takes place with reference to problems that emerge in *the world that is there*, and the construction of scientific objects is aimed at solving these problems. Problematic situations occur *within the world that is there*; it is not the entire world of experience that becomes problematic, but only aspects of that world. And while the scientific attitude is "ready to question everything," it does not "question everything at once" (*Selected Writings* 200). "The scientist," according to Mead, "always deals with an *actual* problem;" he does not question "the whole world of meaning," but only that part of the world which has come into conflict with accepted doctrine. The unquestioned aspects of the world "form the necessary field without which no conflict can arise." "The possible calling in question of any content, whatever it may be, means always that there is left a field of unquestioned reality" (*Selected Writings* 205). It is to this field of unquestioned reality that the scientist returns to test his reconstructed theory. "The world of the scientist is always there as one in which reconstruction is taking place with continual shifting of problems, but as *a real world* within which the problems arise" (*Selected Writings* 206,

emphasis added).

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Philosophy of History

The Nature of History

History, according to Mead, is the collective time of the social act. Historical thought arises in response to emergent events (crises, new situations, unexpected disruptions) that are confronted in community life. Mead's general description of experiential time holds with reference to the time of historical experience: the continuity of experience is rendered problematic by the emergent event; present and future are cut off from each other, and the past (both in terms of its content and of its meaning) is called into question; the past is reconstructed in such a way that the emergent event is seen as continuous with the past. In this manner, the present difficulty becomes intelligible, and the emergent discontinuity of experience is potentially resolvable. Historical thought is a reconstruction of a communal past in an attempt to understand the nature and significance of a communal present and a (potential) communal future. Historical accounts are never final since historical thought continually restates the past in terms of newly emergent situations in a present that opens upon a future.

Human life is an ongoing process that is temporally structured. The existential present, the "now" within which we act, is dynamic and implies a past and a future. The notion of the world at an instant (the knife-edge present) is, according to Mead, an abstraction within the act which may be instrumental in the pursuit of consummation; but as a description of concrete experience, the knife-edge present is a *specious* present. The specious present is not the actual present of ongoing experience. The present, in Mead's words, "is something that is happening, going on" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 300). "Our experience is always a passing experience, and . . . this passing experience always involves an extension into other experiences. It is what has just happened, what is going on, what is just appearing in the future, that gives to our experience its peculiar character. It is never an experience just at an instant. There is no such thing as the experience of a bare instant as such" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 299). Human experience is fundamentally dynamic, and human life is built on a temporal foundation.

The emergent event is the foundation of novelty in experience. This novelty is characteristic, not only of the present, but also of the past and future. The future, on the one hand, lies beyond the emergent present; and the novelty of the future takes the form of the unexpected. The emergent event creates a future that comes to us as a surprise. The past, on the other hand, must be reinterpreted in the light of the emergent event; the result of such reinterpretation is nothing less than a *new past*. Consciousness of the past develops in response to emergent events that alter our sense of temporal relationships.

> We find that each generation has a different history, that it is a part of the apparatus of each generation to reconstruct its history. A different Caesar crosses the Rubicon not only with each author but with each generation. That is, as we look back over the past, it is a different past. The experience is something like that of a person climbing a mountain. As he looks back over the terrain he has covered, it presents a continually different picture. So the past is

> continually changing as we look at it from the point of view of different authors, different generations. It is not simply the future [and present] which is novel, then; the past is also novel (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 116-117).

History is the reconstruction of the past in response to a new present that opens toward a new future. This emphasis on the novelty of human experience pervades Mead's thought. Science, according to Mead, thrives on novelty. Scientific inquiry is, in essence, a response to exceptions to laws. While science, on the one hand, defines knowledge as "finding uniformities, finding rules, laws" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 270), it also, on the other hand, seeks to upset all uniformities, rules, and laws through the quest for novelty. Scientific inquiry arises out of the conflict between what was expected to happen and what actually happens; contradictions in experience are the starting- points for the scientific reconstruction of knowledge (Mead, *Selected Writings* 188).

Science, for Mead, is a continual reconstruction of our conception of the world in response to novel situations. Mead's slogan for science is, "The law is dead; long live the law!" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 286). Science is a form of human existence, a way of moving with the changes that emerge before us. Science is essentially "a method, a way of understanding the world" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 288).

History is the science of the human past. Historical inquiry presents the past "on the basis of actual documents and their interpretation in terms of historical criticism" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 448). But the historical past, as we have seen, is not independent of present and future. Historical inquiry, like scientific inquiry in general, takes place in a present that has become problematic through the occurrence of an emergent event. An ancient village is unearthed in Asia Minor, and the rise of human civilization is suddenly pushed back five thousand years in time; the demand on the part of African-Americans for liberty and identity leads to a revaluation of black culture in terms of its historical roots.

In Mead's conception of historical method, the past is *in* the present and becomes meaningful *in* the present. As Tonness has suggested, the past is not "a metaphysical reality accessible to present activity," but an "epistemological reference system" which gives coherence to the emerging present (606). Historical thought reconstructs the past continually in an attempt to reveal the cognitive significance of present and future.

It is not only the content of the past that is subject to change. Past events have *meanings* that are also changed as novel events emerge in ongoing experience. The meaning of past events is determined by the relation of those events to a present. The elucidation of such meaning is the task of historical thought and inquiry. An historical account, as we have seen, is true to the extent that the present is rendered coherent by reference to past events. Historical thought reinterprets the past in terms of the present. But this reinterpretation is not capricious. The historical past arises in the reexamination and representation of *evidence*. Historical accounts must be *documented*. No historical account, however, is final. The meaning of the past is always open to question; any given interpretation of the past may be criticized from the standpoint of a different interpretation.

Historical truth, in Mead's view, is *relative* truth. The meaning of the past changes as present slides into present (*The Philosophy of the Present* 9) and as different individuals and groups are confronted with new situations that demand a temporal reintegration of experience. A new present suggests a new future and demands a new past. This interdependence of past, present, and future is the essential character of

human temporality and of historical consciousness.

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History and Self- Consciousness

In *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Mead offers the Romantic movement of the late 18th and 19th centuries as an example of the present and future orientation of human inquiries into the past. Mead's description of the Romantics' reconstruction of self-consciousness on the basis of a reconstructed past is a concrete illustration of his conception of historical consciousness as developing with reference to a problematic present. The Romantic historians and philosophers, confronted with the disruption of experience, which was the result of the early modern revolutionary period, turned to the medieval past in an effort to redefine the historical and cultural identity of European man. The major characteristic of Romantic thought, according to Mead, was an attempt to redefine European self-consciousness through the re-appropriation of the historical past. "It was the essence of the Romantic movement to return to the past from the point of view of the self-consciousness of the Romantic period, to become aware of itself in terms of the past" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 447-448). The European had been cut off from his past by the political and cultural revolutions of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries; and in the post-revolutionary world of the early 19th century, the Romantic movement represented the European quest for a reconstructed identity. It was history that provided the basis for this reconstruction.

The Revolt of Reason Against Authority

The idea of rationality has played a central role in modern social theory. The revolt against arbitrary authority "came on the basis of a description of human nature as having in it a rational principle from which authority could proceed" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 12). Thus, the aim of modern social theory has been to root social institutions in human nature rather than in divine providence. The doctrine of the rights of man and the idea of the social contract, for example, were brought together by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau in an effort to ground political order in a purely human world. Society was conceived as a voluntary association of individuals; and the aim of this association was the preservation of natural rights to such goods as life, liberty, and property. Social authority, then, was derived from the individuals who had contracted to live together and to pursue certain human goals. This analysis of society was at the root of the revolutionary social criticism of the eighteenth century.

> When men came to conceive the order of society as flowing from the rational character of society itself; when they came to criticize institutions from the point of view of their immediate function in preserving order, and criticized that order from the point of view of its purpose and function; when they approached the study of the state from the point of view of political science; then, of course, they found themselves in opposition to the medieval attitude which accepted its institutions as given by God to the church (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 13-14).

But the outcome of "the revolution," according to Mead, was not what the philosophers of the age of reason had expected. The institutions of the medieval past (e.g., monarchy, theocracy, economic feudalism) were either eliminated or severely limited in their scope and power. But the new regime

contained reactionary elements of its own. The victorious bourgeoisie began to build a new class society based on the dialectic of capital and labor; and in this new society, the rights of man came to be conceived in terms of the successful struggle for economic power (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 223). Each man came to be viewed as "an economic unit," and the freedom of man became the freedom to compete for profits in the market (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 217).

The initial effects of the rise of capitalist society were disastrous for the working classes. "When labor was brought into the factory centers, there sprang up great cities in which men and women lived in almost impossible conditions. And there sprang up factories built around the machine in which men, women, and children worked under ever so hideous conditions" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 206). This situation was rationalized by an ideology that defined human rights in terms of economic competition and that "regarded industry as that which provided the morale of a laborer community" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 207).

Under such conditions, the rights and liberties for which "the revolution" had been fought became more ideological than real. It was only after the subsequent rise of the trade union and socialist movements that the contradiction between ideology and reality began to be transcended.

While "the revolution" was at least partially fulfilled in England and America, it was, from the standpoint of the early nineteenth century, a total failure on the European continent. The French Revolution deteriorated into a period of political terror that laid the foundation for the emergence of Napoleon's imperialism. The ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity proved inadequate as bases for a fully rational society.

These ideals, in Mead's view, are politically naive. The concept of freedom is *negative*; it is a demand "that the individual shall be free from restraint" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 22). In the actual political world, where there is a conflict of wills, the concept of freedom falls into contradiction with itself. The freedom of one individual or group often infringes upon the freedom of another individual or group (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 22).

The concept of equality, which demands that "each person shall have . . . the same political [and perhaps economic] standing as every other person" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 23), is also far removed from the actual conditions of political and economic life. According to Mead, any society is a complex organization of many individuals and groups. These individuals and groups possess varying degrees of power and prestige. Given this situation, the concept of equality is at most an ideal to be pursued; but it is not a description of what goes on the in the concrete social world.

Similarly, the ideal of fraternity, the idea of the comradeship of all humanity, is "much too vague to be made the basis for the organization of the state." The concept of fraternity ignores the fact that, all too often, "people have to depend upon their sense of hostility to other persons in order to identify themselves with their own group" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 24).

The ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity are, from Mead's standpoint, *abstract* ideals that could not survive the post-revolutionary struggles for political supremacy and the control of property.

The Romantic movement emerged in the aftermath of the failure of "the revolution." "There came a sense of defeat, after the breakdown of the Revolution, after the failure to organize a society on the basis of liberty, equality, and fraternity. And it is out of this sense of defeat that a new movement arose, a

movement which in general terms passes under the title of 'romanticism'" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 57). The failure of "the revolution" left Europe in confusion. The European's ties to his medieval past had been severed, but his revolutionary hopes had not been realized. He was caught between two worlds. He could not be sure of his identity. His sense of self was in crisis. The Romantic movement was an attempt to overcome this crisis by returning to and reconstructing the European past. Romanticism, then, was an effort to reestablish the continuity between the past, present, and future of European culture.

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Romantic Self-Consciousness

The Romantic conception of the self was an outgrowth of Kant's critique of associationism. "What took place in the Romantic period along a philosophical line was to take this [the?] transcendental unity of apperception, which was for Kant a bare logical function, together with the postulation of the self which we could not possibly know but which Kant said we could not help assuming, and compose them into the new romantic self" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 67). The Romantic self, however, was not conceived of as transcendental. The Romantics did not "postulate" the self; they *asserted* it "as something which is directly given in experience" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 86). The Romantics agreed with Kant that the self is the basis of all knowledge and judgment. But while the Kantian self had been developed as a regulative concept in the attempt to render experience intelligible, the Romantic self was held to be actually constitutive of experience. The Romantics, Mead argues, established "the existence of our self as the primary fact. That is what we insist upon. That is what gives the standard to values. In that situation the self puts itself forward as its ultimate reality" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 62). Thus, for the Romantics, knowledge of the self was not only possible, but was viewed as the highest form of knowledge.

At the heart of the Romantic preoccupation with self-consciousness was the question of the relation between subject and object. This question, we have seen, is also a central concern in Mead's ontology and epistemology. Philosophically, the Romantic analysis of the subject- object relation arose in relation to what Mead calls "the age-old problem of knowledge: How can one get any assurance that that which appears in our cognitive experience is real?" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 80). The early modern revolt of reason against authority had ended in a skepticism which, Mead writes, "shattered all the statements, all the doctrines, of the medieval philosophy. It had even torn to pieces the philosophy of the Renaissance. It had [with Hume's analysis of causation] shattered the natural structure of the world which the Renaissance science had presented in such simplicity and yet such majesty, that causal structure that led Kant to say that there were two things that overwhelmed him, the starry heavens above and the moral law within" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 80). The Romantics were reacting against this skeptical attitude. They approached the problem of knowledge from the standpoint of the self. The self, for the Romantics, was the pre-condition of experience; and experience, therefore, including the experience of objects, was to be understood in relation to the self. The epistemological problem of Romantic philosophy was to assimilate the not-self to the self, to encompass the objective world within the subjective world, to make the universe- at-large an intimate part of self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness, as was pointed out above, operates in the "reflexive mode." In self- consciousness, the self appears as both subject and object. We can be conscious of our consciousness. Mead points out that this reflexivity of consciousness is the foundation of Descartes' affirmation of the existence of the

self. But Romantic self-consciousness goes beyond the Cartesian *cogito* in observing that "the self does not exist except in relation to something else" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 74). Self implies not-self; subject implies object. For every subject, there is an object; and for every object, there is a subject. "There cannot be one without the other" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 78).

The latter insight of Romantic thought is reflected, in a different form, in Mead's doctrine of perspectives. The Romantic view of the object as a constitutive element in experience marks a movement away from Cartesian subjectivism and toward the objectification of experience that occurs in Mead's perspectivism. "For Descartes, I am conscious and therefore exist; for the romanticist, I am conscious of myself and therefore this self, of which I am conscious, exists and with it the objects it knows. The object of knowledge, in this mode at least, is given as there with the same assurance that the thinker is given in the action of thought" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 83).

Romanticism, then, as Mead presents it, is not an extreme subjectivism. "The romantic attitude is rather the externalizing of the self. One projects one's self into the world, sees the world through the guise, the veil, of one's own emotions. That is the essential feature of the Romantic attitude" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 75). The world exists in relation to the self; but the world is (objectively) *there* as a necessary structure of human experience. Self and not-self, subject and object, are not contradictories, but dialectical polarities.

Another aspect of Romantic self-consciousness is the view that the self is a dynamic process. The polarity of self and not-self is not a static structure, but an ongoing relationship, "something that is going on" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 88)."The very existence of the self," Mead writes,

> implies a not-self; it implies a not-self which can be identified with the self. You have seen that the term "self" is a reflexive affair. It involves an attitude of separation of the self from itself. Both subject and object are involved in the self in order that it may exist. The self must be identified, in some sense, with the not-self. It must be able to come back at itself from the outside. The process, then, as involved in the self is the subject-object process, a process within which both of these phases of experience lie, a process in which these different phases can be identified with each other -- not necessarily as the same phase but at least as expressions of the same process (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 88).

The upshot of this point of view, according to Mead, is an activist or pragmatic conception of mind and knowledge. Knowing is a process involving the interaction of self and not-self. Knowledge is a result of a process in which the self takes action with reference to the not-self, in which the not-self is appropriated by the self. In this analysis of the Romantic epistemology, the germ of Mead's own "philosophy of the act" is apparent. The interaction of self and not-self is the foundation, not only of our knowledge of the world, but also of our knowledge of the self. Self-consciousness requires the objectification of the self. The Romantic elucidation of the polarity of self and not-self makes self-objectification (and therefore self- consciousness) theoretically comprehensible. In action toward the not-self, self-discovery becomes possible.

The world, according to Mead, "is organized only in so far as one acts in it. Its meaning lies in the conduct of the individual; and when one has built up his world as such a field of action, then he realizes himself as the individual who carried out that action. That is the only way in which he can achieve a self. One does not get at himself simply by turning upon himself the eye of introspection. One realizes himself

in what he does, in the ends which he sets up, and in the means he takes to accomplish those ends" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 90). The world is a field of action. In this field, there are tasks to be accomplished; and it is through the accomplishing of tasks, through the appropriation of the not-self by the self, that the self is enlarged and actualized.

Thus, in Mead's analysis, philosophical Romanticism provides a theoretical description of the conditions under which self-consciousness is possible. The fundamental condition of self-consciousness, as we have seen, is self- objectification. However, for Mead, the basic process of self-objectification takes place in interpersonal experience. "We have to realize ourselves by taking the role of another, playing the part of another, taking the attitude of the community toward ourselves, continually seeing ourselves as others see us, regarding ourselves from the standpoint of those about us. This is not the self- consciousness that goes with awkwardness and uneasiness. It is the assured recognition of one's own position, one's social relations, that comes from being able to take the attitude of others toward ourselves" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 95). This interpretation of self- consciousness, which is the essence of Mead's theory of the self, has its roots in the Romantic analysis of the relation between self and not-self.

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History and Romantic Self-Consciousness

There is a close connection between historical consciousness and self- consciousness in Romantic thought. The Romantic movement arose out of the failure of the bourgeois revolution. The hopes of the age of reason had not been realized, and the European was faced with a crisis in his sense of historical identity. Romantic consciousness, Mead argues, was a "discouraged" consciousness. In reaction to a disappointing present, the Romantics looked back to the Middle Ages for a model of life that carried with it a certain security. But the bourgeois revolution, for all its failures, had created a new concept of the individual. Post- revolutionary man "looked at himself as having his own rights, regarded himself as having his own feet to stand on." In the Romantic period, European man experienced himself as an individual. "This gave him a certain independence which he did not have before; it gave him a certain self- consciousness that he never had before" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 59-61). Thus,

> Europe discovered the medieval period in the Romantic period . . . ; but it also discovered itself. In fact, it discovered itself first. Furthermore, it discovered the apparatus by means of which this self-discovery was possible. The self belongs to the reflexive mode. One senses the self only in so far as the self assumes the role of another so that it becomes both subject and object in the same experience. This is the thing of great importance in this whole historical movement (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 63).

The Romantic view of the Middle Ages, then, arose with reference to a problematic present and constituted an attempt on the part of European man to reconstruct the continuity of his experience. This reconstruction of historical time -- which is, as suggested above, a collective time -- resulted in the creation of a new sense of collective identity. The Romantic conception of the medieval past developed as an effort to redefine the self. European man had, in a sense, lost his self, and he turned to history in an attempt to recapture his sense of continuity. "What the Romantic period revealed, then, was not simply a past, but a past as the point of view from which to come back upon the self. One has to grow into the attitude of the other, come back to the self, to realize the self . . . . " (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 60).

Romanticism, in Mead's view, "is a reconstruction of the self through the self's assuming the roles of the great figures of the past" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 62). In placing oneself at the standpoint of others in the past, one can view oneself in a new light. Here, Mead reveals still another form of experience -- historical experience -- in which the self might be objectified. "That is, the self looked back at is own past as it found it in history. It looked back at it and gave the past a new form as that out of which it had sprung. It put itself back into the past. It lived over again the adventures and achievements of those old heroes with an interest which children have for the lives of their parents -- taking their roles and realizing not only the past but the present itself in that process" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 69). In the Romantic search for the "historical connections" between past and present, a new past was created, and, with it, a new sense of "how the present had grown out of the past" emerged. History, viewed from the standpoint of Romantic self-consciousness, became the description of "an organized past" which rendered the problematic present of the Romantic period intelligible. Romantic self- consciousness turned to the past, reconstructed the past, and made the past one of the main foundations of the self. Romantic self-consciousness was thereby expanded and deepened through historical consciousness. We might say that the Romantic movement reconstructed western self-consciousness through a reconstruction of western historical consciousness.

The bourgeois revolution had sundered the connection between the past and present of early 19th century Europe and had left the future in question. It was the task of the Romantic movement to redefine European self- consciousness by way of a reconstruction of the continuity of historical time. In so doing, the Romantic movement revealed the present-directedness and future- directedness of historical consciousness and developed, by the way, an historically significant conception of the self as rooted in the experience of time.

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History and the Idea of the Future

The idea of evolution is central in Mead's philosophy. For Mead, experience is fundamentally processual and temporal. Experience is the undergoing of change. Mead's entire ontology is an expression of evolutionary thinking. His concept of reality-as- process is ecological in structure and dynamic in content. Nature is a system of systems, a multiplicity of "transacting" fields and centers of activity. The relation between organism and environment (percipient event and consentient set) is mutual and dynamic. Both organism and environment are active: the activity of the organism alters the environment, and the activity of the environment alters the organism. There is no way of separating the two in reality, no way of telling which is primary and which secondary. Thus, Mead's employment of the concept of evolution is an aspect of his attempt to avoid the behavioristic and environmentalist determinism that would regard the organism as passive and as subject to the caprices of nature.

History as Evolution

Mead's concept of evolution is stated in social terms. In Mead's ontology, the entire realm of nature is described as social. The ontological principle of sociality is a fundamentally evolutionary concept that describes reality as a process in which percipient events adjust to new situations and adapt themselves to a variety of consentient sets.

Mind, as an emergent in the social act of communication, "lies inside of a process of conduct"

(*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 345) and is temporally structured. Reflective intelligence is the peculiarly human way of overcoming the conflicts in experience; it is called into play when action is inhibited, and it has reference to a future situation in which the inhibition is overcome (*Mind*, *Self and Society* 90). And since, as we have seen, the reconstruction of the past is an important element in the temporal organization of human action, historical consciousness becomes a significant instrument in the human evolutionary process. Historical thought redefines the present in terms of a reinterpreted and reconstructed past and thereby facilitates passage into the future.

Human existence, then, is described by Mead in terms of evolution, temporality, and historicity. Human life involves a constant reconstruction of reality with reference to changing conditions and newly emergent situations. This process of evolutionary reconstruction, according to Mead, is evident in institutional change. The historical consciousness fostered by the Romantic movement has permitted us to view human institutions as "structures which arose in a process, and which simply expressed that process at a certain moment" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 149). For Mead, the ideas of process and structure do not exclude each other, but are related dialectically in actual historical developments. Historical thought, then, becomes one way of getting into "the structure, the movement, the current of the process" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 149).

Historical consciousness is a way of comprehending change. But it is also a way of fostering change; that is, by comprehending the direction of historical change, one can place oneself within a given current of change and pursue the historical success of that current. In this way, the historically minded individual or group can contribute to the development of new structures within the process of time. This, as Mead points out, is a way of "carrying over revolution into evolution" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 149).

Mead's conception of historical consciousness is rooted in his view of intelligence as the reconstruction of human experience in response to "new situations." As has been shown earlier, Mead views the novel event as the basis of intelligent conduct. "If there were no new situations, our conduct would be entirely habitual . . . . Conscious beings are those that are continually adjusting themselves, using their past experience, reconstructing their methods of conduct . . . . That is what intelligence consists in, not in finding out once and for all what the order of nature is and then acting in certain prescribed forms, but rather in continual readjustment" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 290). The historical resort to the past has reference to new situations that emerge in a present and that suggest a future. Human thought, including historical consciousness, is a confrontation with novelty and is aimed at passing from a problematic present to a non-problematic future. And the past is called in and reconstructed in relation to this project of coming to grips with the novelty of experience. "When what emerges is novel, the explanation of this novelty is sought in an order of events in the past which was not previously recognized" (Mead, "Relative Space-Time and Simultaneity" 529). Historical consciousness, as we have seen in the case of the Romantic movement, is instrumental in redefining and maintaining the temporal continuity of human experience.

Novelty, for Mead, is the foundation of consciousness, intelligence, and the freedom of conduct; it is the ground of human experience. "As far as experience is concerned, if everything novel were abandoned, experience itself would cease" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 290). Human experience is temporal, and, as such, it "involves the continual appearance of that which is new." Thus, "we are always advancing into a future which is different from the past" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 290). The future is open, and in acting toward the future, man becomes an active

agent in the formulation of his own existence.

Although reality always exists in a present, the telos of this reality is to be found in the future. In Mead's view, the future is a factor, perhaps the main factor, in directing our conduct. It is the nature of intelligent conduct to be future-directed. "We are moving on, in the very nature of the case, in a process in which the past is moving into the present and into the future" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 509).

Human-directedness-toward-the-future is the foundation of freedom. The mechanistic view of the world is inadequate as an account of freedom; in fact, mechanism, since it denies the possibility of final causes and attempts to explain everything in terms of efficient causes, must deny the possibility of freedom. And yet, the "essence of conduct" is that "it is directed toward goals, ends which, while not yet actual, are operative in the determination of the directions which conduct shall take" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 317).

Goals, unlike efficient causes, are selected by the organism; and our selection of goals is not explicable (or predictable) on the basis of efficient causes. Thus, "the interpenetration of experience does go into the future. The essence of reality involves the future as essential to itself . . . . The coming of the future into our conduct is the very nature of our freedom" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 317).

Human action is action toward the future. The past does not determine (although it does condition) human conduct; it is, rather, human conduct that determines the past. Human action takes place in a present that opens on the future, and it is in terms of the emergent present and impending future that the content and meaning of the past are determined. Human acts are teleological rather than mechanical. Thus, as Strauss indicates, Mead's evolutionism permits him "to challenge mechanical conceptions of action and the world and to restate problems of autonomy, freedom and innovation in evolutionary and social rather than mechanistic and individualistic terms" (xviii).

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The Ideal of History

Although Mead describes human existence as evolving toward an open future that cannot be prefigured with any finality, he does not ignore the fact that there are ideals that are operative in directing human action. "Cognizant of social realities and wary of utopian panaceas, [writes Reck,] resorting to the method of science in questions of morality rather than to authoritative religions or traditional customs, aware that men consist of impulses and instincts as well as of intelligence, Mead nevertheless discerned that there are ideal ends that operate as standards and goals for human conduct" ("Introduction" xl). That many of the ideal ends humans have pursued have been naive (i.e., at odds with the realities of social and political life) is clear in Mead's criticism of the notions of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Attempts to convert such ideals into realities have often met with frustration in the ironies of history. It is for this reason that Mead argues that ideal ends, in some sense, must be grounded in historical reality; otherwise they become either fanciful wishes or mere ideological and rhetorical pronouncements.

Of the many ideals that have influenced human conduct, Mead selects one for special consideration: the ideal of the *universal community*. This ideal has appeared time and again in the history of human thought and is, in Mead's view, "the ideal or ultimate goal of human social progress" (*Mind, Self and Society* 310). The ideal of the universal community is, then, the ideal of history. According to this ideal, the goal

of history is the establishment of "a society in which everyone is going to recognize the interests of everyone else," a society "in which the golden rule is to be the rule of conduct, that is, a society in which everyone is to make the interests of others his own interest" (*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* 362). The vision of the universal community is, in fact, the basis of the philosophy of history as a distinctive form of thought. "A philosophy of history arose as soon as men conceived that society was moving toward the realization of triumphant ends in some great far-off event. It became necessary to relate present conduct and transient values to the ultimate values toward which creation moved" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 504). This is the eschatological vision that is at the root of the historical conceptions of St. Paul, St. Augustine, Hegel, Marx, Herbert Spencer, and as we shall see, of Mead himself.

The ideal of the universal community is, however, "an abstraction" in as much as it is not actualized in the concrete world. In the life of the realities of political and social conflict (e.g., the conflict between private and public interests), the ideal of the universal community stands outside of history. And yet, this ideal is, in a sense, an *historical* ideal; that is, the ideal of the universal community, although not *explicit* in history, is, according to Mead, *implicit* in the historical process. The ideal is, on the one hand, operative in the hopes of mankind, and, on the other hand, it is potentially present in certain concrete historical forces. Among these historical forces, Mead finds three of particular importance: (1) the universal religions; (2) universal economic processes; and (3) the process of communication.

Both economic processes and universal religions tend toward a universal community. Religious and economic attitudes tend potentially toward "a social organization which goes beyond the actual structure in which individuals find themselves involved" (*Mind, Self and Society* 290). Commerce and love are both potentially universalizing ideas, and both have been significant factors in the development of human societies. The forces of exchange and love know no boundaries; all men are included (although abstractly) in the community of exchange and love. Although the religious attitude is a more profound form of identifying with others, the economic process, precisely because of its relative superficiality, "can travel more rapidly and make possible easier communication." "It is important to recognize," Mead writes, that these religious and economic developments toward a universal community are "going on in history" (*Mind, Self and Society* 296-197). That is, the movement toward a universal community is an immanent process and not merely an abstract idea. Human history seems to imply a universal community.

A third historical force that implies universality is the process of communication, to which Mead devotes so much of his attention in his various works. Language, as we have seen, is the matrix of social coordination. A linguistic gesture is an action which implies a response from another and which is dependent for its meaning on that response. The process of communication is a way of gesturing toward others, a way of transcending oneself, a way of taking the role of another. The linguistic act both presupposes and implies a human community of unspecified and unlimited extension.

"Language," according to Mead, "provides a universal community which is something like the economic community" (*Mind, Self and Society* 283). It is through significant communication that the individual is able to generalize her experience to include the experiences of others. The world of "thought and reason" that emerges out of the social act of communication is, almost by definition, transpersonal and therefore verges toward the universal. Social organization and social interaction require a commonality of meaning, a "universe of discourse," within which individual acts can take on significance (*Mind, Self and Society* 89-90). The process of significant communication is the source of this universe of discourse.

It is Mead's contention that "the thought world" created in significant communication constitutes the widest of human communities to date. The group "defined by the logical universe of discourse" is that which is the most general of all human groups -- the one that "claims the largest number of individual members." This group is based on "the universal functioning of gestures as significant symbols in the general human social process of communication" (*Mind, Self and Society* 157-158). This universalizing tendency of language comes closer to the realization of the ideal community than do the religious and economic attitudes. These latter, moreover, actually presuppose the communicational process: religion and economics organize themselves as social acts on the basis of communication.

Mead thus states the ideal of history in primarily communicational terms:

> The human social ideal . . . is the attainment of a universal human society in which all human individuals would possess a perfected social intelligence, such that all social meanings would each be similarly reflected in their respective individual consciousnesses -- such that the meanings of any one individual's acts or gestures (as realized by him and expressed in the structure of his self, through his ability to take the social attitudes of other individuals toward himself and toward their common social ends or purposes) would be the same for any other individual whatever who responded to them(*Mind, Self and Society* 310).

Mead's vision seems to imply a society of many personalities (*Mind, Self and Society* 324-325) in perfect communication with one another. Every person would be capable of putting herself into the place of every other person. Such a system of perfect communication, in which the meanings of all symbols are fully transparent, would realize the ideal of a universal human community.

Mead recognizes, of course, how far we are from realizing the universal community. Our religions, our economic systems, and our communicational processes are severely limited. At present, these historical forces separate us as much as they unite us. All three, for example, are conditioned by another historical force which has a fragmenting rather than a universalizing effect on modern culture, namely, nationalism (see Mead, *Selected Writings* 355- 370). Mead points out that "the limitation of social organization is found in the inability of individuals to place themselves in the perspectives of others, to take their points of view" (*The Philosophy of the Present* 165). This limitation is far from overcome in contemporary life. And "the ideal human society cannot exist as long as it is impossible for individuals to enter into the attitudes of those whom they are affecting in the performance of their particular functions" (*Mind, Self and Society* 328). Contemporary culture is a world culture; we all affect each other politically, culturally, economically. Nonetheless, "the actual society in which universality can get its expression has not risen" (*Mind, Self and Society* 267).

But it is also true that the ideal of the universal community is present by implication in our religions, in our economic systems, and in our communicational acts. The ideal is there as a directive in human history. It implies an evolution toward an ideal goal and informs our conduct accordingly.

Mead's social idealism is not utopian, but historical. The ideal of history, the ideal of the universal community, is "an ideal of method, not of program. It indicates direction, not destination" (*The Philosophy of the Act* 519). And in so far as this ideal informs our actual conduct in the historical world, it is a *concrete* rather than an abstract universal (*The Philosophy of the Act* 518-519). The ideal of history is both transcendent and immanent; it is rooted in the past and present, but leads into the future which is always awaiting realization.

Historical thought, then, for Mead, is instrumental in the evolution of human society. It is through the constant reconstruction of experience that human intelligence and human society are expanded. Mead's evolutionary conception of human history is clearly a progressive notion which he seeks to document throughout his writings. There is implicit in human history a tendency toward a larger and larger sense of community. The ultimate formulation of this historical tendency is found in the ideal of the universal community. This ideal is not purely abstract (i.e., extra-historical), but is rooted in actual historical forces such as the universal religions, modern economic forces, and the human communicational process. According to Mead, it is this ideal of the universal community that informs the human evolutionary process and that indicates the implicit direction or teleology of history.

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The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Menippus (fl. 250 BCE.)

Greek philosopher of Gadara in Syria, who flourished about 250 BCE.

Menippus, an adherent of the Cynic School of philosophy, was born at Sinope in Asia Minor, but his family was originally from Gadara, in Palestine. According to Diogenes Laertius, he was at first a slave, but afterward obtained his freedom by purchase, and eventually succeeded, by dint of money, in obtaining citizenship at Thebes. Here he pursued the employment of a money lender, and obtained from this the title "one who lends money at daily interest". Having been defrauded, and having lost, in consequence, all his property, he hung himself in despair. Menippus was the author of several works, now completely lost; they satirized the follies of human kind, especially of philosophers, in a sarcastic tone Among other productions, he wrote a piece entitled "The Sale of Diogenes," and another called "Necromancy". They were a medley of prose and verse, and became models for the satirical works of Varro (hence called *Saturae Menippeae*. It is suggested that the Necromancy inspired an imitator of Lucian to compose the "Menippus, or Oracle of the Dead," which is found among the works of the native of Samosata.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

Life and Writings. **John Stuart Mill was born in London on May 20, 1806, and was the eldest of son of James Mill. He was educated entirely by his father, James Mill, and was deliberately shielded from association with other boys of his age. From his earliest years, he was subjected to a rigid system of intellectual discipline. As a result of this system, according to his own account, he believed this gave him an advantage of a quarter of a century over his contemporaries. Mill recognized, in later life, that his father's system had the fault of appealing to the intellect only and that the culture of his practical and emotional life had been neglected, while his physical health was probably undermined by the strenuous labor exacted from him. James Mill's method seems to have been designed to make his son's mind a first-rate thinking machine, so that the boy might become a prophet of the utilitarian gospel. He had no doubts at the outset of his career. On reading Bentham (this was when he was fifteen or sixteen) the feeling rushed upon him "that all previous moralists were superseded." The principle of the utility, he says, understood and applied as it was by Bentham, "gave unity to my conception of things. I now had opinions; a creed, a doctrine, a philosophy; in one among the best senses of the word, a religion; the inculcation and diffusion of which could be made the principle outward purpose of a life." Soon afterwards he formed a small *Utilitarian Society*, and, for some few years, he was one of "a small knot of young men" who adopted his father's philosophical and political views "with youthful fanaticism." A position under his father in the India Office had secured him against the misfortune of having to depend on literary work for his livelihood; and he found that office-work left him ample leisure for the pursuit of his wider interests.**

He was already coming to be looked upon as a leader of thought when, in his twenty-first year, the mental crisis occurred which is described in his *Autobiography*. This crisis was a result of the severe strain, physical and mental, to which he had been subjected from his earliest years. He was "in a dull state of nerves;" the objects of his life for which he had been trained and for which he had worked lost their charm; he had "no delight in virtue, or the general good, but also just as little in anything else;" a constant habit of analysis had dried up the fountains of feeling within him. After many months of despair he found, accidentally, that the capacity for emotion was not dead, and "the cloud gradually drew off". Another important factor in his life was Mrs. Taylor, who co-authored pieces with him. He maintained a close relationship with her for many years while she was married. When her husband died, Mill married her in 1851. His work in connection with the literary journals was enormous. He wrote articles almost without number and on an endless variety of subjects (philosophical, political, economic, social). They began with *The Westminster Review* and extended to other magazinesespecially *The London Review* and, afterwards, *The London and Westminster Review*. They were valuable as enabling us to trace the development of his opinions, the growth of his views in philosophy, and the gradual modification of his radicalism in politics.

His first great intellectual work was his *System of Logic, R atiocinative and Inductive*, which appeared in 1843. This was followed, in due course by his *Essays on some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy* (1844), and *Principles of Political Economy* (1848). In 1859 appeared his little treatise *On Liberty*, and his *Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform*. His *Considerations on Representative Government* belongs to the year 1860; and in 1863 (after first appearing in magazine form) came his *Utilitarianism*. In the Parliament of 1865-68, he sat as Radical member for Westminister. He advocated three major things in the House of Commonswomen suffrage, the interests of the laboring classes, and land reform in Ireland. In 1865, came his *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*; in 1867, his Rectorial *Inaugural Address* at St. Andrews University, on the value of culture; in 1868, his pamphlet on *England and Ireland*; and in 1869, his treatise on *The Subjection of Women*. Also in 1869, his edition of his father's *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* was published. Mill died at Avignon in 1873. After his death were published his *Autobiography* (1873) and *Three Essays on Religion: Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism* (1874), written between 1830 and 1870.

Early Writings. **Mill's widened intellectual sympathies were shown by his reviews of Tennyson's poems and of Carlyle's *French Revolution* in 1835 and 1837. The articles on Bentham and on Coleridge, published in 1838 and 1840 respectively, disclose his modified philosophical outlook and the exact measure of his new mental independence. From the position now occupied, he did not seriously depart throughout the strenuous literary work of his mature years. The influence of the new spirit, which he identified with the thinking of Coleridge, did not noticeable develop further; if anything, perhaps, his later writings adhered more nearly to the traditional views than might have been anticipated from some indications in his early articles on Bentham and Coleridge.**

These two articles provide the key for understanding Mill's own thought. He looks upon Bentham as a great constructive genius who had first brought light and system into regions formally chaotic. No finer nor more just appreciation of Bentham's work has ever been written. Mill agrees with Bentham's fundamental principle and approves his method. Bentham made morals and politics scientific, but his knowledge of life was limited. "It is wholly empirical and the empiricism of one who has had little experience." The deeper things of life did not touch him; all the subtler workings of mind and its environment were hidden from his view. It is significant that Mill assumes that, for light on these deeper and subtler aspects of life, we must go not to other writers of the empirical tradition, but to thinkers of an entirely different school. He disagrees with the latter fundamentally in the systematic presentation of their viewswhether these be defended by the easy appeal to intuition or by the more elaborate methods of Schelling or Hegel. What we really get from them are half-lightsglimpses, often fitful and always imperfect, into aspects of truth not seen at all by their opponents. Coleridge represented this type of thought. He had not Bentham's great constructive faculties; but he had insight in regions where Bentham's vision failed, and he appreciated, what Bentham almost entirely overlooked, the significance of historical tradition.

The ideas which Mill derived from the writings of Coleridge, or from his association with younger men who had been influenced by Coleridge, did not bring about any fundamental change in his philosophical standpoint, we can trace their effect. He seems conscious that the analysis which satisfied other followers of Bentham is imperfect, and that difficulties remain which they are unable to solve and cannot even see.

System of Logic. Mill's *System of Logic* was published in 1843, and ran through many editions. The third (1850) and the eighth (1872) editions, especially, were thoroughly revised and supplemented with new and controversial material. It is his only systematic philosophical treatise. In spite of Hobbe's treatise, and of the suggestive discussions in the third book of Locke's *Essay*, the greater English philosophers almost seem to have conspired to neglect the theory of logic. Logic kept its place as an academic study, but on traditional lines; Aristotle was supposed to have said the last word on it, and that last word was enshrined in scholastic manuals. English thought, however, was beginning to emerge from this stage. Richard Whately had written a text-book, *Elements of Logic* (1826), which gave considerable impetus to the study, and Hamilton's more comprehensive researches had begun. Mill first worked out his theory of terms, propositions, and the syllogism; he then set the book aside for five years. When he returned to it and focused on the inductive process, he found material John Herschel's *Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy* (1830), and William Whewell's *History of the Inductive Sciences* (1837). After his theory of induction was substantially complete, he became acquainted with, and derived stimulus and assistance from, the first two volumes of Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (1830). These were the chief influences on his work.

The reputation of Mill's *Logic* was largely due to his analysis of inductive proof. He provided the empirical sciences with a set of formula and criteria which might serve the same purpose for them as the time-worn formulae of the syllogism had served for arguments that proceeded from general principles. Mill's work is not merely a logic in the limited sense of that term which had become customary in England. It is also a theory of knowledge such as Locke and Hume provide. Mill's account is made more precise by its reference to the question of proof or evidence. Mill formulates five guiding methods of inductionthe method of agreement, that of difference, the joint or double method of agreement and difference, the method of residues, and that of concomitant variations. The common feature of these methods, the one real method of scientific inquiry, is that of elimination. All the other methods are thus subordinate to the method of difference. Here we have a case of the occurrence of the phenomenon under investigation and a case of its nonoccurrence, these cases having every circumstance in common, save one, that one occurring only in the former; and we are warranted in concluding that this circumstance, in which alone the two cases differ, is either the cause or a necessary part of the cause of the phenomenon.

It is only in the simpler cases of casual connection, however, that we can apply these direct methods of observation and experiment. In the more complex cases, we have to employ the *inductive method,* which consists of three operations: induction, ratiocination or deduction, and verification.

> To the Deductive Method, thus characterized in its three constituent partsInduction, Ratiocination, and Verificationthe human mind is indebted for its most conspicuous triumphs in the investigation of nature. To it we owe all the theories by which vast and complicated phenomena are embraced under a few simple laws, which, considered as the laws of those great phenomena, could never have been detected by their direct study. (*Logic,* Book III. Chapter XI. Section 3).

We deduce the law or cause of a complex effect from the laws of the separate causes whose concurrence gives rise to it. For example, "the mechanical and the organized body and the medium in which it subsists, together with the peculiar vital laws of the different tissues constituting the organic structure," afford the clue to "the laws on which the phenomena of life depend" (*Logic,*

III. XI. I). But these "laws of the different causes" must first be ascertained by direct induction, and finally verified, as comparison with the facts of the case. Thus the entire process is based on induction.

> **To warrant reliance on the general conclusions arrived at by deduction, these conclusions must be found, on careful comparison, to accord with the results of direct observation wherever it can be had. . . Thus it was very reasonably deemed an essential requisite of any true theory of the causes of the celestial motions, that it should lead by deduction to Kepler's laws; which, accordingly, the Newtonian theory did. (*Ibid*, III. XI. 3).**

The validity of the entire inductive process is thus clearly seen to depend upon the validity of its underlying assumption, the law of causation itself. Assuming that every phenomenon has a cause, or invariable and unconditional antecedent, we investigate the problem of causation in detail. Is this fundamental assumption itself valid? Mill cannot avail himself of the theory that the *law of universal causation* is an intuition of reason or an a *priori* and transcendental principle. For him the only possible view is that

> **the belief we entertain in the university, throughout nature, of the law of cause and effect, is itself an instance of induction. . . We arrive at this universal law by generalization from many laws of inferior generality. We should never have had the notion of causation (in the philosophical meaning of the term) as a condition of all phenomena, unless many cases of causation, or, in other words, many partial uniformities of sequence, had previously become familiar. The more obvious of the particular uniformities suggest, and give evidence of, the general uniformity, once established, enables us to prove the remainder of the particular uniformities of which it is made up. (*Logic*, III. XXI. 4)**

These early inductions, which result in the law of universal causation, cannot belong to the same type as those rigorous inductions which conform to the canons of scientific induction and presuppose the law of universal causation; they belong to "the loose and uncertain mode of induction *per enumeration simplicem*." How, then, can a process whose basis is thus loose and uncertain have any certain validity? Mill's answer is that induction by simple enumeration, or "generalisation of an observed fact from the mere absence of any known instance to the contrary," as contrasted with the critical induction of science, is a valid, though a fallible process, which must precede the less fallible forms of the inductive process, and that "the precariousness of the method of simple enumeration is in an inverse ratio to the largeness of the generalization."

> **As the sphere widens, this unscientific methods becomes less and less liable to mislead; and the most universal class of truths, the law of causation, for instance, and the principles of number and geometry, are duly and satisfactorily proved by that method alone, nor are they susceptible of any other proof.**

The universality of the law of causation, as it is an induction from our experience, does not extend to "circumstances unknown to us, and beyond the possible range of our experience."

> **In distant parts of the stellar regions, where the phenomena may be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted, it would be folly to affirm confidently that this general law prevails, any more than those special ones which we have found to hold universally on our own planet. The uniformity in the succession of events, otherwise called the law of causation, must by received, not as a law of the universe, by of that**

> portion of it only which is within the range of our means of sure observation, with a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases. To extend it further is to make a supposition without evidence, and to which, in the absence of any ground from experience for estimating its degree of probability, it would be idle to attempt to assign any. (*Logic*, III. XXI. 4)

There is no difficulty in conceiving "that in someone, for instance, of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, events may succeed one another at random without any fixed law; nor can anything in our experience, or in our mental nature, constitute a sufficient, or indeed any, reason for believing that this is nowhere the case" (*Ibid*., III. XXI. 4).

The appearance of paradox in the view that the law of causation is at once the presupposition and the result of induction disappears, according to Mill, with "the old theory of reasoning, which supposes the universal truth, or major premise, in a ratiocination, to be the real proof of the particular truths which are ostensibly inferred from it." His own view is that "the major premise is not the proof of the conclusion, but is itself proved, along with the conclusion, from the same evidence." The old theory implies that the syllogism is a *petitio principii*, since the conclusion the conclusion which is supposed to be proved is already contained in the major premise; if we know that *all men are mortal,* we know, and do not require to prove, that *Socratesis mortal.* "No reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove anything, since from a general principle we cannot infer any particulars, but those which the principle itself assumes as known" (*Ibid*., II. III. 2). The only use of the syllogism is to convict your opponent of inconsistency; it cannot lead us from the known to the unknown. In reality the major premise is a register of previous inductions and a short formula for making more. "The conclusion is not an inference drawn *from* the formula, but an inference drawn *according* to the formula; the real logical antecedent or premise being the particular facts from which the general proposition was collected by induction" (*Logic*, II. III. 4). The major premise is merely a shorthand note, to assist the memory. "The inference is finished when we have asserted that all men are mortal. What remains to be performed afterwards is merely deciphering our own notes." The mistake of the traditional view is,

> that of referring a person to his own notes for the origin of his knowledge. If a person is asked a question, and is at the moment unable to answer it, he may refresh his memory by turning to a memorandum which he carries about with him. But if he would scarcely answer, because it was set down in his notebook: unless the book was written, like the Koran, with a quill from the wing of the angel Gabriel. (*Ibid*., III. III. 3)

All inference is from particulars to particulars; the syllogistic process is only an interpretation of our notes of previous inferences. "If we had sufficiently capacious memories, and a sufficient power of maintaining order among a huge mass of details, the reasoning could go on without any general propositions; they are mere formulae for inferring particulars from particulars" (*Ibid*., III. IV. 3).

Syllologistic reasoning is thus a circuitous way of reaching a conclusion which might have been reached directly, like going up a hill and down again when we might have traveled along the level road. There is no reason why we should be compelled to take the *high priori road* except by the arbitrary fiat of logicians. "Not only *may* we reason from particulars to particulars without passing through generals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences are of this nature" (*Ibid*., II. III. 3). Mill, however, acknowledges "the immense advantage, in point of security for

correctness, which is gained by interposing this step between the real evidence and the conclusion," the importance of "the appeal to former experience in the major premise of the syllogism" (*IBid*., II. III. 6). When we say that Socrates is mortal because he is a man, and all men are mortal, we assert that because he resembles that other individuals in the attributes connoted by the term man, he resembles them further in the attribute morality. "Whether, from the attributes in which Socrates resembles those men who have heretofore died, it is allowable to infer that he resembles them also in being mortal, is a question of Induction" (*Logic*, II. III. 7). The major premise is the record and reminder that we have made that induction, and are therefore not merely warranted, but required, to apply it in particular case before us.

"The chief strength of this false philosophy {intuitionism} in morals, politics, and religion," Mill remarks in his *Autobiography*,

> **lies in the appeal which it is accustomed to make to the evidence of mathematics and of the cognate branches of physical science. To expel it from these, is to drive it from its stronghold: and because this had never been effectually done, the intuitive school, even after what my father had written in his Analysis of Mind, had in appearance, and as far as published writings were concerned, on the whole the best of the argument. In attempting to clear up the real nature of the evidence of mathematical and physical truths, the *System of Logic* met the intuitive philosophers on ground on which they had previously been deemed unassailable; and gave its own explanation, from experience and association, of that peculiar character of what are called necessary truths, which is adduced as proof that their evidence must come from a deeper source than experience. (*Autobiography*, P. 226)**

The peculiar certainty and necessity attributed to these truths is, he argues, "an illusion, in order to sustain which, it is necessary to suppose that those truths relate to, and express the properties of purely imaginary objects." As a matter of fact, the truths of geometry do not hold, except approximately, of the real world, but only of that imaginary world which corresponds to its initial definitions. The truth is that geometry

> **is built on hypothesis; that it owes to this alone the peculiar certainty supposed to distinguish it; and that in any science whatever, by reasoning from a set of hypotheses, we may obtain a body of conclusions as certain as those of geometry, that is, as strictly in accordance with the hypotheses, and as irresistibly compelling assent, *on condition* that those hypotheses are true. (*Logic*, II. V. I)**

As for the axioms which, together with the definition, form the basis of geometrical reasoning, they are in reality "experimental truths, generalizations from observation." The great argument for their *a priori* character is that their opposites are inconceivable. But conceivability "has very little to do with the possibility of the thing in itself, but is in truth very much an affair of accident, and depends on the past history and habits of our own minds" (*Ibid*., II. V. 6). It is the effect of habitual association, itself the result of our earliest and most widely based inductions from experience; it is an acquired incapacity which can hardly, but be mistaken for a natural one, an experimental truth which can hardly, but be mistaken for a necessary one.

It is in the application of the inductive and psychological method to social and political problems that Mill sees the crowning achievement of scientific investigation. This application has yet to be made; the "German Coleridgian school" were "the first (except a solitary thinker here and there) who inquired with any comprehensiveness or depth, into the inductive laws of the existence and

growth of human society" (*Dissertations,* I. 425). To the consideration of this new science of *Ethology,* or the study of the causes influencing the formation of national character, the final book of the *Logic* is devoted. In thus seeking to inaugurate a scientific Sociology, Mill was undoubtedly influenced by Comte, but he was also proceeding on the familiar lines of the Utilitarians, who always regarded character as the product of circumstances, and looked to education to effect the transition from the present unsatisfactory state of things to one more in accordance with their social ideal. The indefinite modifiability of human nature by circumstances is the working hypothesis of the school; all that Mill adds is the demand that social life be conducted on scientific principles. It is significant that Mill finally abandoned the intention to construct the scheme of such a science, and devoted his energies to the writing of his *Political Economy*, published five years after the *Logic*, in 1848. It would be difficult to reconcile the view of the growth of character implied in the desiderated *Ethology* with his insistence upon the importance of individuality, and his protest against the interference of society with the liberty of the individual, in the essay on Liberty, published in 1859.

Examination of Hamilton.

Mill's only other work in general philosophy is the *Examinations of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, published in 1865. "I mean in this book," he writes to Bain, "to do what the nature and scope of the *Logic* forbade me to do there, to face the ultimate metaphysical difficulties of every question on which I touch" (*Letters,* I. 271). The discussion of Hamilton's philosophy was intended, as we learn from the *Autobiography,* to be made the occasion of a thorough-going examination of the rival philosophies of Intuitionism and Empiricism, the controversy between which had, in Mill's eyes, as we have already seen, the utmost practical and social significance.

> **The difference between these two schools of philosophy, that of Intuition, and that of Experience and Association, is not a mere matter of abstract speculation; it is full of practical consequences, and lies at the foundation of all the greatest differences of practical opinion in an age of progress. In particular, I have long felt that the prevailing tendency toward innateness is one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of great social questions, and one of the greatest stumbling blocks to human improvement. It was necessary, therefore, to determine the issue between these two philosophies.**

Mill's *Examination* covers much of the same ground as his *Logic*. Its key contribution is its account of beliefs in the External World and in Mind. As regards the former, Mill elaborates his famous view of the External World as "a Permanent Possibility of Sensation" (*Examination,* Ch. XI). As regards the latter, he elaborates the view of the Self as follows:

> **If we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability, at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts. (*Ibid,* p. 248)**

In the Appendix to Chapters XI and XII, he speaks more positively of the Self.

> **The inexplicable tie, or law, the organic union (as Professor Masson calls it) which connects the present consciousness with the past one, of which it reminds me, is as near as I think we can get to a positive conception of the Self. That there is something real in this tie, real as the sensations themselves, and not a mere product of the laws of thought without any fact corresponding to it, I hold to be indubitable. . . This original element, which has no community of nature with any of the things answering to our names, and to which we cannot give any name but its own peculiar one without implying some false or unguarded theory, is the Ego, or Self. As such, I ascribe a reality to the Egoto my own Minddifferent from that real existence as a Permanent Possibility, which is the only reality I acknowledge in Matter; and by fair experimental inference from that one Ego, I ascribe the same reality to other Egos, or Minds. . . We are forced to apprehend every part of the series as linked with the other parts by something in common, which is not the feelings themselves, any more than the succession of the feelings is the feelings themselves; and as that which is the same in the first as in the second, in the second as in the third, in the third as in the fourth, and so on, must be the same in the first and in the fiftieth, this common element is a permanent element. (*Examination*, Pp. 262, 263)**

Utilitarianism. **In spite of the numerous ethical discussions in his other writings, Mill's sole contribution to the fundamental problem of the ethical theory was his small volume *Utilitarianism*. It first appeared in *Fraser's Magazine* in 1861 and was reprinted in book-form in 1863. Perhaps he regarded the fundamental positions of Benthamism as too secure to need much elaboration.**

In the first Chapter, "General Remarks," Mill argues that moral theories are divided between two distinct approaches: the intuitive and inductive schools. Although both schools agree that there is a single and highest normative principle, they disagree about whether we have knowledge of that principle intuitively (without appeal to experience), or inductively (though experience and observation). Kant represents the best of the intuitive school, and Mill himself defends the inductive school. Mill criticizes Kant's categorical imperative noting that it is essentially the same as utilitarianism since it involves calculating the good or bad consequences of an action to determine the morality of that action. Mill argues that his task is to demonstrate this highest principle inductively.

In Chapter two, "What Utilitarianism Is," Mill gives a precise formulation of the highest principle, and defends the principle against attacks. The highest normative principle is that,

> **Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.**

Following his predecessors, such as Hume and Bentham, he refers to this as the principle of utility. Mill argues that by "happiness" he means pleasure both intellectual and sensual. However, we have a sense of dignity which has us prefer intellectual pleasures over sensual ones. He continues that the principle of utility involves an assessment of only an action's consequences, and not the motives or character traits of the agent performing the action. In this regard, he rejects classical virtue theory. Mill argues that the principle of utility should be seen as a tool for generating secondary moral principles, such as "don't steal," which promote general happiness. Most of our actions, then, will be judged according to these secondary principles. We should appeal directly to the principle of utility itself only when we face a moral dilemma between two secondary principles.

Suppose, for example, that a moral principle of charity dictates that I should feed a starving neighbor, and a moral principle of self-preservation dictates that I should feed myself. If I do not have enough food to do both, then I should determine whether general happiness would be better served by feeding my neighbor, or feeding myself.

In Chapter three, "The Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility," Mill discusses our motivations to abide by the utilitarian standard of morality. The problem is that we are commonly motivated to not kill or steal, which are specific acts, but it is less clear that we are motivated to promote the broad notion of general happiness. Mill argues that there are two classes of motivations (or sanctions) for promoting general happiness. First, there are external motivations arising from our hope of pleasing and fear of displeasing God and other humans. More importantly, though, there is a motivation internal to the agent herself which is her feeling of duty. For Mill, an agent's feeling of duty consists of a conglomerate of many feelings developed over one's life, such as sympathy, religious feelings, childhood recollections, and self-worth. The binding force of our sense of duty is that we experience pain or remorse when we act against these feelings by not promoting general happiness. Mill argues that duty is a subjective feeling which develops with experience. However, humans have an instinctive feeling of unity which guides the development of duty toward general happiness.

In Chapter four, "The Proof of the Principle," Mill presents his inductive proof of the principle of utility. He begins noting that his proof must be indirect since no foundational principle is capable of a direct proof. Instead, the only way to prove that general happiness is desirable is to show that people actually desire it. His indirect proof is as follows:

> **If X is the only thing desired, then X is the only thing that ought to be desired General happiness is the only thing desired Therefore, general happiness is the only thing that ought to be desired**

Mill believes Premise two is the most controversial and therefore anticipates criticisms. A critic might argue that there are other things we desire besides happiness, such as virtue. Mill responds that everything we desire becomes part of happiness. Happiness, then, is a complex phenomenon composed of many parts, including virtue, love of money, power, and fame.

Chapter five, "The Connection Between Justice and Utility," was originally written as a separate essay, but later incorporated into this work. Critics of utilitarianism argue that morality is not based on consequences of actions (as utilitarians suppose), but is instead based on the foundational and universal concept of justice. Mill sees this as the strongest attack on utilitarianism, and thus sees the concept of justice as a test case for utilitarianism. For, if he can explain the concept of justice in terms of utility, then he has thereby addressed the main nonconsequentialist argument against utilitarianism. Mill offers two counter arguments. First, he argues that all moral elements in the notion of justice depend on social utility. There are two essential elements in the notion of justice: punishment, and the notion that someone's rights were violated. Punishment derives from a combination of vengeance and social sympathy. Vengeance alone has no moral component, and social sympathy is the same thing as social utility. The notion of rights violation also derives from utility. For, rights are claims we have on society to protect us, and the only reason society should protect us is because of social utility. Thus, both elements of justice (i.e. punishment and rights) are based on utility. Mill's second argument is that if justice were as foundational as nonconsequentialists contend, then justice would not be as ambiguous as it is. According to Mill, there are disputes in the notion of justice when examining theories of punishment, fair distribution

of wealth, and fair taxation. These disputes can only be resolved by appealing to utility. Mill concludes that justice is a genuine concept, but that we must see it as based on utility.

Social and Political Writings.

Mill's social and political writings, in addition to occasional articles, consist of the short treatise *Considerations on Representative Government* (1806), *Thoughts on parliamentary Reform* (1859), the essays *On Liberty* (1859) and *On the Subjection of Women* (1869), *Essays on some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy* (1831, 1844) and *The Principles of Political Economy* (1848). The method appropriate to these topics had been already discussed in the chapters on *the Logic of the Moral Sciences* included in his *Logic*. He sought a *via media* between the purely empirical method and the deductive method. The latter, as employed by his father, was modeled on the reasonings of geometry, which is not a science of causation. The method of politics, if it is to be deductive, must belong to a different type, and will (he holds) be the same as that used in mathematical physics. Dynamics is a deductive science because the law of the composition of forces holds; similarly, politics is a deductive science because the causes with which it deals follow this law: the effects of these causes, when conjoined, are the same as the sum of the effects which the same causes produce when acting separatelya striking and unproved assumption. Like his predecessors, Mill postulated certain forces as determining human conduct; especially self-interest and mental association. From their working, he deducted political and social consequences. He did not diverge from the principles agreed upon by those with whom he was associated. Perhaps he did not add very much to them, but he saw their limitations more clearly than others did; the hypothetical nature of economic theory, and the danger that democratic government might prove antagonistic to the causes of individual freedom and of the common welfare. To guard against theses dangers, he proposed certain modifications of the representative system. But his contemporaries, and even his successors, of the same way of thinking in general, for long looked upon the dangers as imaginary, and his proposals for their removal were ignored. The essay *On Liberty* defends of the thesis "that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection;" but, as an argument, it meets everywhere with the difficulty of determining the precise point at which the distinction between self-regarding and social (even directly social) activity is to be drawn.

Political Economy.

Mill's *Political Economy* has been variously regarded as an improved Adam Smith and as a popularized Ricardo. Perhaps the latter description is nearer the mark. Its essential doctrines differ little, if at all, from those of Ricardo; the theory of the *wages fund,* for example, is formulated quite in the spirit of Ricardo, though this theory was afterwards relinquished or modified by Mill in consequence of the criticisms of William Thomas Thornton. But the work has a breadth of treatment which sometimes reminds one of Adam Smith; the hypothetical nature of economic theory was not overlooked, and the "applications to social philosophy" were kept in view. In spite of his adherence to the maxim of *laissez faire,* Mill recognized the possibility of modifying the system, he displayed a leaning to the socialist ideal, which grew stronger as his life advanced. His methodical and thorough treatment of economics made his work a text-book for more than a generation, and largely determined the scope of most of the treatises of his own and the succeeding period, even of those written by independent thinkers.

Essays On Religion. **The posthumously published volume of *Essays on Religion* contains three essayson Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism. The first and second were written between 1850 and 1858, that is, during the same period as the essays on Utilitarianism and on Liberty, while the third belongs to a much later time, having been written between 1868 and 1870, and is thus "the last considerable work which he completed," and "showsthe latest state of the Author's mind, the carefully balanced result of the deliberations of a lifetime" (*Essays on Religion*, Preface).**

The first essay is a protest against the view that the ideal of human conduct is found in conformity to Nature. It reminds us of Huxley's later condemnation, in his famous Romanes lecture on *Evolutioin and Ethics,* of the cosmic process from the ethical point of view. "In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's every day performances" (*Essays on Religion*, p. 28). It is a protest rather against naturalistic ethics than against Natural Theology, but the latter is included in the same condemnation with the former type of theory. The Author of Nature cannot be at once good and omnipotent.

The main argument of the essay on the Utility of Religion, which, like that on Nature, is a fine specimen of Mill's philosophical style, is the sufficiency of the Religion of Humanity and its superiority to all but the best of the supernatural religions. "Let it be remembered that if individual life is short, the life of the human species is not short; its indefinite duration is practically equivalent to endlessness; and being combined with indefinite capability of improvement, it offers to the imagination and sympathies a large enough object to satisfy any reasonable demand for grandeur of aspiration" (*Ibid*, P. 106).

> **The essence of religion is the strong and earnest direction of the emotions and desires towards an ideal object, recognized as of the highest excellence, and as rightfully paramount over all selfish objects of desire. This condition is fulfilled by the Religion on Humanity in as eminent a degree, and in as high a sense, as by the supernatural religions even in their best manifestations, and far more so than in any of their others. (*Ibid*., P. 109)**

The characteristic tendency of supernaturalism is to arrest the development not only of the intellectual, but also of the moral nature. Its appeal is to self-interest rather than to disinterested and ideal motives; and like the intuitional theory of ethics, it stereotypes morality. The special appeal of supernatural religion is to our sense of the mystery which circumscribes our little knowledge, but the same appeal is made, and the same service to the imagination rendered, by Poetry. "Religion and poetry address themselves, at least in one of their aspects, to the same part of the human constitution; they both supply the same want, that of ideal conceptions grander and more beautiful than we see realized in the prose of human life" (*Essays on Religion,* P. 103). "The idealization of our earthly life, the cultivation of a high conception of what it may be made," is "capable of supplying a poetry, and, in the best sense of the word, a religion, equally fitted to exalt the feelings, and (with the same aid from education) still better calculated to ennoble the conduct, than any belief respecting the unseen powers" (*Ibid*., P. 105). Yet "he to whom ideal good, and the progress of the world towards it, are already a religion" may find consolation and encouragement in the belief that he is,

> **a fellow-laborer with the Highest, a fellow-combatant in the great strife; contributing his little which by the aggregation of many like himself becomes much towards that progressive ascendancy, and ultimately complete triumph of good over evil, which history points to, and which this doctrine teaches us to regard as planned by the Being**

> to whom we behold in Nature. Against the moral tendency of this creed no possible objection can lie; it can produce on whoever can succeed in believing it, no other than an ennobling effect. (*Ibid*., P. 117)

The essay on Theism bears evidence, in the imperfection of its construction and the inferiority of its style, to its lack of the author's final revision. The argument for a First Cause is condemned, on the ground that there is a permanent element in nature itself; "as far as anything can be concluded from human experience, Force has all the attributes of a thing eternal and uncreated" (*Ibid*., P. 147). The argument from Design is found to be less unsatisfactory. The principle of the survival of the fittest, while not inconsistent with Creation, "would greatly attenuate the evidence for it." But "leaving this remarkable speculation to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have in store for it," Mill concludes that "it must be allowed that, in the present state of our knowledge, the adaptations in Nature afford a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence" (*Essays on Religion*, P. 174). On the other hand, "it is not too much to say that every indication of Design in the Kosmos is so much evidence against the Omnipotence of the Designer" (*Ibid*., P. 176). The necessity of contrivance, or the adaptation of means to ends, implies limitation of power in the agent. As to Immorality, there is "a total absence of evidence on either side." Miracles, while not impossible, are extremely improbable, even on the hypothesis of a supernatural Being. The reasonable attitude, on all these questions, is that of atheism.

> If we are right in the conclusions to which we have been led by the preceding inquiry, there is evidence, but insignificant for proof, and amounting only to one of the lower degrees of probability. The induction given by such evidence as there is, points to the creation, not indeed of the universe, but of the present order of it, by an Intelligent Mind, whose power over the materials was not absolute, whose love for his creatures was not his sole actuating inducement, but who nevertheless, desired their good. (*Ibid*., P. 242)

Where belief is not warranted, however, hope is permissible, and the imagination need not be controlled by purely rational considerations.

> To me it seems that human life, small and confined as it is, and as considered merely in the present, it is likely to remain even when the progress of material and moral improvement may have freed it from the greater part of its present calamities, stands greatly in need of any wider range and greater height of aspiration for itself and its destination, which the exercise of imagination can yield to it without running counter to the evidence of fact; and that it is a part of wisdom to make the most of any, even small, probabilities on this subject, which furnish imagination with any footing to support itself upon. (*Ibid*, p. 245).

Above all, the conception of a morally perfect being, and of his approbation, is an inspiration for the moral life which would be sorely missed, and Christianity has provided us with an "ideal representative and guide of humanity;" nor, "even now, would it be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than to endeavor so to live that Christ would approve our life" (*Essays on Religion*, P. 255). "The feeling of helping God" in the struggle with evil is "excellently fitted to aid and fortify that real, though purely human religion, which sometimes calls itself the Religion of Humanity and sometimes that of Duty," and which "is destined, with or without supernatural sanctions, to be the religion of the Future."

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Mind: Type Identity Theories

A family of views on the relationship between mind and body, Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states. The earliest advocates of Type Identity--U.T. Place, Herbert Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart, respectively--each proposed their own version of the theory in the late 50s-early 60s. But it was not until David Armstrong made the radical claim that *all* mental states (including intentional ones) are identical with physical states, that philosophers of mind divided themselves into camps over the issue. Over the years, numerous objections have been levied against Type Identity, ranging from epistemological complaints to charges of Leibniz's Law violations to Hilary Putnam's famous pronouncement that mental states are in fact capable of being "multiply realized." Defenders of Type Identity have come up with two basic strategies in response to Putnam's claim: they restrict type identity claims to *particular* species or structures, or else they extend such claims to allow for the possiblity of *disjunctive* physical kinds. To this day, debate concerning the validity of these strategies--and the truth of Mind-Brain Type Identity--rages in the philosophical literature.

A family of views on the relationship between mind and body, Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states. Before a clear and consistent distinction was made in the philosophical literature between mental state *types* and mental state *tokens*, two independent--though by no means unrelated--versions of what came to be known as the "Mind-Brain Identity Theory" arose out of dissatisfaction with Logical Behaviorism (the doctrine, loosely put, that the meaning of mental statements is reducible to statements about behavior and dispositions to behave). In 1956, U.T. Place published a brief article in which the statement "consciousness is a process in the brain" was presented as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. Two years later, in Herbert Feigl's lengthy paper "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'," Frege's well-known distinction between sense and reference was cited in support of the claim that neurophysiological terms and psychological terms, though widely differing in meaning, pick out the same things. Feigl's paper goes into much greater detail than Place's, but the former has had the greater impact, at least insofar as it inspired J.J.C. Smart's widely disseminated and hotly contested 1959 article, "Sensations and Brain Processes." Place had been a member of Smart's department at the University of Adelaide, and, together with D.M. Armstrong (who would go on to formulate his own version of the Identity Theory), the trio headed what Feigl jokingly referred to as the "United Front of Sophisticated Australian Materialists." In 1960, Sidney Hook published the proceedings of a well-attended "Dimensions of Mind" conference held in New York earlier that year, and debates concerning mind-brain identity began taking center stage in philosophy journals and

classrooms.

I. EARLY VERSIONS OF THE THEORY

Place accepted the Logical Behaviorists' dispositional analysis of cognitive and volitional concepts. With respect to those mental concepts "clustering around the notions of consciousness, experience, sensation, and mental imagery," however, he held that no behavioristic account (even in terms of unfulfilled dispositions to behave) would suffice. Seeking an alternative to the classic dualist position, according to which mental states possess an ontology distinct from the physiological states with which they are thought to be correlated, Place claimed that sensations and the like might very well be processes in the brain-- despite the fact that statements about the former cannot be logically analyzed into statements about the latter. Drawing an analogy with such scientifically verifiable (and obviously contingent) statements as "Lightning is a motion of electric charges," Place cited potential explanatory power as the reason for hypothesizing consciousness-brain state relations in terms of *identity* rather than mere correlation. This still left the problem of explaining introspective reports in terms of brain processes, since these reports (e.g. of a green after-image) typically make reference to entities which do not fit with the physicalist picture (there is nothing green in the brain, for example). To solve this problem, Place called attention to the "phenomenological fallacy"-- the mistaken assumption that one's introspective observations report "the actual state of affairs in some mysterious internal environment." All that the Mind-Brain Identity theorist need do to adequately explain a subject's introspective observation, according to Place, is show that the brain process causing the subject to describe his experience in this particular way is the kind of process which *normally* occurs when there is actually something in the environment corresponding to his description.

At least in the beginning, Smart followed Place in applying the Identity Theory only to those mental concepts considered resistant to behaviorist treatment, notably sensations. Because of the proposed identification of sensations with states of the central nervous system, this limited version of Mind-Brain Type Identity also became known as "Central-State Materialism." Smart's main concern was the analysis of sensation-reports (e.g. "I see a green after-image") into what he described--following Ryle--as "topic-neutral" language (roughly, "There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is something green illuminated in front of me"). Where Smart diverged from Place was in the explanation he gave for adopting the thesis that sensations are processes in the brain. According to Smart, "there is no conceivable experiment which could decide between materialism and epiphenomenalism" (where the latter is understood as a species of dualism); the statement "sensations are brain processes," therefore, is not a straight-out scientific hypothesis, but should be adopted on other grounds. Occam's razor is cited in support of the claim that, even if the brain-process theory and dualism are equally consistent with the (empirical) facts, the former has an edge in virtue of its simplicity and explanatory utility.

Occam's razor also plays a role in the version of Mind-Brain Type Identity developed by Feigl (in fact, Smart claimed to have been influenced by Feigl as well as by Place). On the epiphenomenalist picture, in addition to the normal physical laws of cause and effect there are psychophysical laws positing mental effects which do not by themselves function as causes for any observable behavior.

In Feigl's view, such "nomological danglers" have no place in a respectable ontology; thus, epiphenomenalism (again considered as a species of dualism) should be rejected in favor of an alternative, monistic theory of mind-body relations. Feigl's suggestion was to interpret the empirically ascertainable correlations between phenomenal experiences ("raw feels") and neurophysiological processes in terms of contingent identity: although the terms we use to identify them have different senses, their referents are one and the same-- namely, the immediately experienced qualities *themselves*. Besides eliminating dangling causal laws, Feigl's picture is intended to simplify our conception of the world: "instead of conceiving of two realms, we have only one reality which is represented in two different conceptual systems."

In a number of early papers, and then at length in his 1968 book, *A Materialist of the Mind*, Armstrong worked out a version of Mind-Brain Type Identity which starts from a somewhat different place than the others. Adopting straight away the scientific view that humans are nothing more than physico-chemical mechanisms, he declared that the task for philosophy is to work out an account of the mind which is compatible with this view. Already the seeds were sown for an Identity Theory which covers *all* of our mental concepts, not merely those which fit but awkwardly on the Behaviorist picture. Armstrong actually gave credit to the Behaviorists for logically connecting internal mental states with external behavior; where they went wrong, he argued, was in *identifying* the two realms. His own suggestion was that it makes a lot more sense to define the mental not as behavior, but rather as the inner *causes* of behavior. Thus, "we reach the conception of a mental state as a state of the person apt for producing certain ranges of behavior." Armstrong's answer to the remaining empirical question--what in fact is the intrinsic nature of these (mental) causes?--was that they are physical states of the central nervous system. The fact that Smart himself now holds that all mental states are brain states (of course, the reverse need not be true), testifies to the influence of Armstrong's theory.

Besides the so-called "translation" versions of Mind-Brain Type Identity advanced by Place, Smart, and Armstrong, according to which our mental concepts are first supposed to be translated into topic-neutral language, and the related version put forward by Feigl, there are also "disappearance" (or "replacement") versions. As initially outlined by Paul Feyerabend in 1963, this kind of Identity Theory actually favors doing away with our present mental concepts. The primary motivation for such a radical proposal is as follows: logically representing the identity relation between mental states and physical states by means of biconditional "bridge laws" (e.g., something is a pain if and only if it's a c-fiber excitation) not only implies that mental states have physical features; "it also seems to imply (if read from the right to the left) that some physical events...have non-physical features." In order to avoid this apparent dualism of properties, Feyerabend stressed the incompatibility of our mental concepts with empirical discoveries (including projected ones), and proposed a *redefinition* of our existent mental terms. Different philosophers took this proposal to imply different things. Some advocated a wholesale scrapping of our ordinary language descriptions of mental states, such that, down the road, people might develop a whole new (and vastly more accurate) vocabulary to describe their own and others' states of mind. This begs the question, of course, what such a new-and-improved vocabulary would look like. Others took a more theoretical/conservative line, arguing that our familiar ways of describing mental states could *in principle* be replaced by some very different (and again, vastly more accurate) set of terms and concepts, but that these new terms and concepts would not--at least not necessarily--be expected to become part of ordinary language. Responding to Feyerabend,

a number of philosophers expressed concern about the appropriateness of classifying disappearance versions as theories of Mind-Brain Type *Identity*. But in a 1965 paper, Richard Rorty answered this concern, arguing that there is nothing wrong with claiming that "what people *now* call 'sensations' are (identical with) certain brain processes." Two years later, in his Postscript to "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'," Feigl confessed an attraction to this version of the Identity Theory, and over the years Smart has moved in the same direction.

II. TRADITIONAL OBJECTIONS

A number of objections to Mind-Brain Type Identity, some a great deal stronger than others, began circulating soon after the publication of Smart's 1959 article. Perhaps the weakest were those of the epistemological variety. It has been claimed, for example, that because people have had (and still *do* have) knowledge of specific mental states while remaining ignorant as to the physical states with which they are correlated, the former could not possibly be identical with the latter. The obvious response to this type of objection is to call attention to the *contingent* nature of the proposed identities-- of course we have different conceptions of mental states and their correlated brain states, or no conception of the latter at all, but that is just because (as Feigl made perfectly clear) the language we use to describe them have different meanings. The contingency of mind-brain identity relations also serves to answer the objection that since presently accepted correlations may very well be empirically invalidated in the future, mental states and brain states should not be viewed as identical.

A more serious objection to Mind-Brain Type Identity, one that to this day has not been satisfactorily resolved, concerns various *non-intensional* properties of mental states (on the one hand), and physical states (on the other). After-images, for example, may be green or purple in color, but nobody could reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple. And conversely, while brain states may be spatially located with a fair degree of accuracy, it has traditionally been assumed that mental states are non-spatial. The problem generated by examples such as these is that they appear to constitute violations of Leibniz's Law, which states that if A is identical with B, then A and B must be indiscernible in the sense of having in common all of their (non-intensional) properties. We have already seen how Place chose to respond to this type of objection, at least insofar as it concerns conscious experiences-- that is, by invoking the so-called "phenomenological fallacy." Smart's response was to reiterate the point that mental terms and physical terms have different meanings, while adding the somewhat ambiguous remark that neither do they have the same *logic*. Lastly, Smart claimed that if his hypothesis about sensations being brain processes turns out to be correct, "we may easily adopt a convention...whereby it would make sense to talk of an experience in terms appropriate to physical processes" (the similarity to Feyerabend's disappearance version of Mind-Brain Type Identity should be apparent here). As for apparent discrepancies going in the other direction (e.g., the spatiality of brain states vs. the non-spatiality of mental states), Thomas Nagel in 1965 proposed a means of sidestepping any objections by redefining the candidates for identity: "if the two sides of the identity are not a sensation and a brain process but my *having* a certain sensation or thought and my body's *being* in a certain physical state, then they will both be going on in the same place-- namely, wherever I (and my body) happen to be." Suffice to say, opponents of Mind-Brain Type Identity found Nagel's suggestion unappealing.

The last traditional objection we shall look at concerns the phenomenon of "first-person authority"; that is, the apparent incorrigibility of introspective reports of thoughts and sensations. If I report the occurrence of a pain in my leg, then (the story goes) I must have a pain in my leg. Since the same cannot be said for reports of brain processes, which are always open to question, it might look like we have here another violation of Leibniz's Law. But the real import of this discrepancy concerns the purported correlations between mental states and brain states. What are we to make of cases in which the report of a brain scientist contradicts the introspective report, say, of someone claiming to be in pain? Is the brain scientist always wrong? Smart's initial response to Kurt Baier, who asked this question in a 1962 article, was to deny the likelihood that such a state of affairs would ever come about. But he also put forward another suggestion, namely, that "not even sincere reports of immediate experience can be absolutely incorrigible." A lot of weight falls on the word "absolutely" here, for if the incorrigibility of introspective reports is qualified too strongly, then, as C.V. Borst noted in 1970, "it is somewhat difficult to see how the required psycho-physical correlations could ever be set up at all."

III. TYPE VS. TOKEN IDENTITY

Something here needs to be said about the difference between Type Identity and Token Identity, as this difference gets manifested in the ontological commitments implicit in various Mind-Brain Identity theses. Nagel was one of the first to distinguish between "general" and "particular" identities in the context of the mind-body problem; this distinction was picked up by Charles Taylor, who wrote in 1967 that "the failure of [general] correlations...would still allow us to look for particular identities, holding not between, say, a yellow after-image and a certain type of brain process in general, but between a particular occurrence of this yellow after-image and a particular occurrence of a brain process." In contemporary parlance: when asking whether mental things are the same as physical things, or distinct from them, one must be clear as to whether the question applies to concrete particulars (e.g., individual instances of pain occurring in particular subjects at particular times) or to the *kind* (of state or event) under which such concrete particulars fall.

Token Identity theories hold that every concrete particular falling under a mental kind can be identified with some physical (perhaps neurophysiological) happening or other: instances of pain, for example, are taken to be not only instances of a mental state (e.g., pain), but instances of some physical state as well (say, c-fiber excitation). Token Identity is weaker than *Type* Identity, which goes so far as to claim that mental kinds *themselves* are physical kinds. As Jerry Fodor pointed out in 1974, Token Identity is entailed by, but does not entail, Type Identity. The former is entailed by the latter because if mental kinds themselves are physical kinds, then each individual instance of a mental kind will also be an individual instance of a physical kind. The former does not entail the latter, however, because even if a concrete particular falls under both a mental kind and a physical kind, this contingent fact "does not guarantee the identity of the kinds whose instantiation constitutes the concrete particulars."

So the Identity Theory, taken as a theory of types rather than tokens, must make some claim to the effect that mental states such as pain (and not just individual instances of pain) are contingently identical with--and therefore theoretically reducible to--physical states such as c-fiber excitation. Depending on the desired strength and scope of mind-brain identity, however, there are

various ways of refining this claim.

IV. MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY

In his 1967 paper, "The Nature of Mental States," Hilary Putnam introduced what is widely considered the most damaging objection to theories of Mind-Brain Type Identity-- indeed, the objection which effectively retired such theories from their privileged position in modern debates concerning the relationship between mind and body. Putnam's argument can be paraphrased as follows: (1) according to the Mind-Brain Type Identity theorist (at least post-Armstrong), for every mental state there is a unique physical-chemical state of the brain such that a life-form can be in that mental state if and only if it is in that physical state. (2) It seems quite plausible to hold, as an empirical hypothesis, that physically possible life-forms can be in the same mental state without having brains in the same unique physical-chemical state. (3) Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the Mind-Brain Type Identity theorist is correct.

In support of the second premise above--the so-called "multiple realizability" hypothesis--Putnam raised the following point: we have good reason to suppose that somewhere in the universe--perhaps on earth, perhaps only in scientific theory (or fiction)--there is a physically possible life-form capable of being in mental state X (e.g., capable of feeling pain) *without* being in physical-chemical brain state Y (that is, *without* being in the same physical-chemical brain state correlated with pain in mammals). To follow just one line of thought (advanced by Ned Block and Jerry Fodor in 1972), assuming that the Darwinian doctrine of evolutionary convergence applies to psychology as well as behavior, "psychological similarities across species may often reflect convergent environmental selection rather than underlying physiological similarities." Other empirically verifiable phenomena, such as the plasticity of the brain, also lend support to Putnam's argument against Type Identity. It is important to note, however, that *Token* Identity theories are fully consistent with the multiple realizability of mental states.

V. ATTEMPTS AT SALVAGING TYPE IDENTITY

Since the publication of Putnam's paper, a number of philosophers have tried to save Mind-Brain Type Identity from the philosophical scrapheap by making it fit somehow with the claim that the same mental states are capable of being realized in a wide variety of life-forms and physical structures. Two strategies in particular warrant examination here.

In a 1969 review of "The Nature of Mental States," David Lewis attacked Putnam for targeting his argument against a straw man. According to Lewis, "a reasonable brain-state theorist would anticipate that pain might well be one brain state in the case of men, and some other brain (or non-brain) state in the case of mollusks. It might even be one brain state in the case of Putnam, another in the case of Lewis." But it is not so clear (in fact it is doubtful) that Lewis' appeal to "tacit relativity to context" will succeed in rendering Type Identity compatible with the multiple realizability of mental states. Although Putnam does not consider the possibility of *species-specific* multiple realization resulting from such phenomena as injury compensation, congenital defects, mutation, developmental plasticity, and, theoretically, prosthetic brain surgery, neither does he say anything to rule them out. And this is not surprising. As early as 1960, Identity theorists such as

Stephen Pepper were acknowledging the existence of species (even *system*)-specific multiple realizability due to emergencies, accidents, injuries, and the like: "it is not...necessary that the [psychophysical] correlation should be restricted to areas of strict localization. One area of the brain could take over the function of another area of the brain that has been injured." Admittedly, some of the phenomena listed above tell against Lewis' objection more than others; nevertheless, *prima facie* there seems no good reason to deny the possibility of species-specific multiple realization.

In a desperate attempt at invalidating the conclusion of Putnam's argument, the brain-state theorist can undoubtedly come up with additional restrictions to impose upon the first premise, e.g., with respect to time. This is the strategy of David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, who wrote in a 1996 book that "there is...a better way to respond to the multiple realizability point [than to advocate token identity]. It is to retain a type-type mind-brain identity theory, but allow that that the identities between mental types and brain types may--indeed, most likely will--need to be restricted. ...Identity statements need to include an explicit temporal restriction." Mental states such as pain may not be identical with, say, c-fiber excitation in humans (because of species-specific multiple realization), but--the story goes--they could very well be identical with c-fiber excitation in humans *at time T*. The danger in such an approach, besides its *ad hoc* nature, is that the type physicalist basis from which the Identity Theorist begins starts slipping into something closer to token physicalism (recall that concrete particulars are individual instances occurring in particular subjects at particular *times*). At the very least, Mind-Brain Type Identity will wind up so weak as to be inadequate as an account of the nature of mental.

Another popular strategy for preserving Type Identity in the face of multiple realization is to allow for the existence of *disjunctive* physical kinds. By defining types of physical states in terms of disjunctions of two or more physical "realizers," the correlation of one such realizer with a particular (type) mental state is sufficient. The search for species- or system-specific identities is thereby rendered unnecessary, as mental states such as pain could eventually be identified with the (potentially infinite) disjunctive physical state of, say, c-fiber excitation (in humans), d-fiber excitation (in mollusks), and e-network state (in a robot). In "The Nature of Mental States," Putnam dismisses the disjunctive strategy out of hand, without saying why he thinks the physical-chemical brain states to be posited in identity claims must be uniquely specifiable. Fodor (in 1974) and Jaegwon Kim (eighteen years later), both former students of Putnam, tried coming to his rescue by producing independent arguments which purport to show that disjunctions of physical realizers cannot *themselves* be kinds. Whereas Fodor concluded that "reductionism...flies in the face of the facts," however, Kim concluded that psychology is open to sundering "by being multiply locally reduced."

Even if disjunctive physical kinds *are* allowed, it may be argued that the strategy in question *still* cannot save Type Identity from considerations of multiple realizability. Assume that all of the possible physical realizers for some mental state M are represented by the ideal, perhaps infinite, disjunctive physical state P; then it could never be the case that a physically possible life-form is in M and not in P. Nevertheless, we have good reason to think that some physically possible life-form could be in P *without* being in M-- maybe P in that life-form realizes some *other* mental state. As Block and Fodor have argued, "it seems plausible that practically any type of physical state could realize any type of psychological state in some physical system or other." The doctrine of "neurological equipotentiality" advanced by renowned physiological psychologist Karl Lashley,

according to which given neural structures underlie a whole slew of psychological functions depending upon the character of the activities engaged in, bears out this hypothesis. The obvious way for the committed Identity theorist to deal with this problem--by placing disjunctions of potentially infinite length on either side of a biconditional sign--would render largely uninformative any so-called "identity" claim. Just how uninformative depends on the size of the disjunctions (the more disjuncts, the less informative). Infinitely long disjunctions would render the identity claim *completely* uninformative. The only thing an Identity Theory of this kind could tell us is that *at least one* of the mental disjuncts is capable of being realized by *at least one* of the physical disjuncts. Physicalism would survive, but barely, and in a distinctly non-reductive form.

Recently, however, Ronald Endicott has presented compelling considerations which tell against the above argument. There, physical states are taken in isolation of their context. But it is only if the context is *varied* that Block and Fodor's remark will come out true. Otherwise, mental states would not be *determined* by physical states, a situation which contradicts the widely accepted (in contemporary philosophy of mind) "supervenience principle": no mental difference without a physical difference. A defender of disjunctive physical kinds can thus claim that M is identical with some ideal disjunction of complex physical properties like "C1 & P1," whose disjuncts are conjunctions of all the physical states (Ps) plus their contexts (Cs) which give rise to M. So while "some physically possible life-form could be in *P* without being in M," no physically possible life-form could be in *C1 & P1* without being in M. Whether Endicott's considerations constitute a sufficient defense of the disjunctive strategy is still open to debate. But one thing is clear-- in the face of numerous and weighty objections, Mind-Brain Type Identity (in one form or another) remains viable as a theory of mind-body relations.

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Monism

The term *monism* was first used by Christian Wolff in his discussions of the mind-body problem to depict both philosophers who would only acknowledge the mind (idealism or mentalism) and philosophers who only acknowledged the body (materialism). The meaning Wolff originally intended by using the term has broadened in scope through the centuries, and today applies to any doctrine or theory that claims that all things, no matter how many or of what variety, can be reduced to one unified thing in time, space, or quality. Monistic philosophers including Parmenides, Democritus, Spinoza, Berkeley, Hume, Hegel, and proponents of contemporary atomic theory. The denial of *monism* forces commitment to either *dualism* or *pluralism*.

Monists take different views about how many substances exist. Substantial monists, such as Spinoza, maintain that everything is part of a single substance. Attributive monists maintain that, although there may be many distinct substances, they are all attributes of one type of stuff. Other doctrines are classified as types of monism. These include *neutral monism*, *idealism*, *traditional materialism*, and *partial monism*. *Traditional materialism* is the variety of *monism* which sees that everything is based in the material and physical. Hobbes subscribed to this view. *Neutral monism*, a doctrine of Hume, Russell, and Mach, denies that reality is based in neither the physical nor the mental, but rather in one particular kind of substance that can be classified as *neutral stuff*. *Phenomenalism*, in most instances, is classified under *neutral monism*. *Idealism* is the form of *monism* which maintains that everything is based in the mental. The two philosophers most closely associated with *idealism* were Berkeley and Hegel, the latter's version bases everything in and on the World Spirit. *Partial monism* holds that if there are many realms of being, then there is still only one substance within one of the realms upon which everything is based. Descartes is a half-subscriber to this form of *monism*; he accepted this theory as far as matter was concerned, but rejected it when it was applied to the mind.

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Moral Dilemmas

A moral dilemma involves a situation in which the agent has only two courses of action available, and each requires performing a morally impermissible action. Plato presents the classic example of a moral dilemma. A man borrows a weapon from his neighbor promising to return it at his neighbor's request. One day the neighbor, in a fit of rage, asks for the weapon back apparently with the intention to kill someone. The man is faced with a dilemma: if he keeps his promise, then he will be an accessory to a murder; if he refuses to hand over the weapon, then he violates his promise. A moral dilemma, then, is a situation involving a choice between two opposing courses of action, where there are moral considerations in support of each course of action. Few would doubt whether we are in fact faced with difficult moral choices. The question raised by philosophers, though, is whether such dilemmas can be systematically resolved, or whether no systematic solution is available.

Defenders of dilemma resolution argue that only one of the courses of action can be our true obligation. For, it is not possible for an agent to perform both actions at the same time, and, hence, the agent cannot be obligated by both. Therefore, if the notion of obligation is to make sense, there must be a systematic way of determining which of the two courses of action represents our true obligation. Strictly speaking, then, genuine moral dilemmas do not exist, since all apparent moral conflicts can be systematically resolved. W.D. Ross argues for this view in *The Right and the Good*. For Ross, Each of our obligations is *prima facie*, that is, valid on face value until overridden by a stronger obligation. Once overridden, it is no longer obligatory.

From the other camp, critics of dilemma resolution argue that either choice may be acceptable and may represent our obligation. Our actual moral experience suggests that many conflicting moral choices simply are not capable of systematic resolution. Our moral decisions are often only a toss up between two courses of action. Strictly speaking, then, genuine moral dilemmas do exist because either choice could be the agent's true duty (depending on her decision).

There are important implications to the stand one takes on the possibility of systematically resolving moral dilemmas. First, if one denies that dilemmas can be resolved (the second option above), then the notion of absolute obligation is brought into question. For, in each particular dilemma, neither obligation will be absolute since neither will have priority. Further, it is theoretically possible that any obligation could conflict with at least one other obligation. Hence, none of our obligations would be absolute. This also suggests moral relativism, since the choice of action will be based on individual preference, and not on objective considerations. Second, if one argues the opposite view that conflicting obligations can be systematically resolved, then it must show how such resolution would be done. That is, a given normative moral theory must be designed to demonstrate that one course of action is objectively preferable to another. But many normative theories cannot live up to this task.

The most commonly suggested method of resolving conflicts between obligations is to appeal to the

highest intrinsic good. A thing is intrinsically good when it is valued for itself, and not merely as an instrument or means to some further end. Money is instrumentally good since it only provides a means to some further good, such as the purchase of a sports car. Music, on the other hand, is thought to be intrinsically good since it is valued for itself, and not as a means to something else. Moral philosophers are concerned with uncovering the highest intrinsic good -- that which is at the apex of everything that is valued. Human happiness is a common candidate for the highest intrinsic good since everyone strives for happiness, and happiness appears to be final goal of all our actions. Other nominees for the highest intrinsic good are pleasure, human rationality, God's will, free human choice, and highly evolved conduct.

Theoretically, if we can determine that pleasure, for example, is the highest intrinsic good, then conflicts between moral obligations would be resolved by determining which course of action produces the most pleasure. Similarly, if God's will is determined to be the highest intrinsic good, priority would be given to those actions which are most in accord with God's will. Thus, by locating the highest intrinsic good, moral dilemmas are resolved by appealing to that concept.

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Moral Luck

Moral Luck: A case of moral luck occurs whenever luck makes a moral difference. The problem of moral luck arises from a clash between the apparently widely held intuition that cases of moral luck should not occur with the fact that it is arguably impossible to prevent such cases from arising.

The literature on moral luck began in earnest in the wake of papers by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams.[1] Though Nagel's paper was written as a commentary on Williams', they have quite different emphases.[2] Still, the same question lies at the heart of both papers and, indeed, at the heart of the literature on moral luck: can luck ever make a moral difference? This idea of a moral difference is a wide one. Various sorts of difference have been considered. The most obvious is, perhaps, a difference in what a person is morally responsible for, but it has also been suggested both that luck affects the moral justification of our actions and that it affects a person's moral status in general (that is, that it affects how morally good or bad a person is). We shall pay more attention to these varied differences in time, but the important point for now is that both Williams and Nagel argue that luck can make a moral difference. So what? The problem is that the idea of luck making a moral difference is deeply counterintuitive. We know that luck enters into our lives in countless ways. It affects our success and our happiness. We might well think, however, that morality is the one arena in which luck has no power, that when it comes to a person's moral standing (an expression I will use to stand for all the sorts of moral difference luck might be thought to make), her standing is exactly the one she deserves. Luck, we might think, cannot alter that standing one bit. This seems a reasonable position, but it is a position both Nagel and Williams cast into doubt. We will first consider Williams' argument, primarily because it is the least successful. I will suggest that Williams' argument fails and that what is interesting in his argument is captured much better by Nagel.

1. WILLIAMS ON MORAL LUCK

Williams' aim in "Moral Luck" and much of his other work is to discredit the Kantian view of morality and to suggest that it would be best to abandon the notion of morality altogether (replacing it with the wider notion he calls the 'ethical'). (See Williams, 1985, for the distinction.) In doing so, Williams takes himself to be challenging not just Kantian thinking about morality, but also commonplace ideas about it. He claims the idea that morality is immune to luck is "basic to our ideas of morality." (Williams, 1993a, 36) Why should this be so? Because, Williams suggests, if moral value does depend on luck it cannot be the sort of thing we think it is. I have already noted the extent to which luck permeates our lives. Some are born healthy; others with various sorts of handicaps. Some stumble into great wealth; others work hard, but always remain poor. To those on the losing end of these matters, this often seems unfair. Success of whatever kind we might seek is not equally available to all. Luck gives some head starts and holds others back. Nonetheless, we might think there is at least one sort of value which is equally available to all: moral value. Bill

Gates may be richer than me, but that does not mean he is a better person. Donovan Bailey may be faster than me, but that does not make him my moral superior. Of course, both these men *may* be my moral superiors, but, if they are, luck is supposed to have nothing to do with it. Morality thus provides us with a sort of comfort. In Williams' words, it offers "solace to a sense of the world's unfairness." (Williams, 1993a, 36) As Williams points out, however, this will be cold comfort if morality doesn't matter much. Thus, just as it is essential to the notion of moral value that it is immune to luck, so, he claims, it is essential that moral value is the supreme sort of value. Williams claims that if moral value really does possess these two characteristics, it can give us the solace he describes. Luck may bring us all sorts of hardship, but when it comes to the single most important sort of value, we are immune to luck. It is against this picture of morality that Williams' argument must be understood. He presents us with a dilemma: either moral value is (sometimes) a matter of luck or else it is not the supreme sort of value. In either case, we have to give up something very important to the notion of moral value, hence Williams thinks we should give up morality in favour of the ethical.

Williams begins the drive towards this dilemma by focusing on rational justification rather than moral justification. The cornerstone of his argument is the claim that rational justification is a matter of luck to some extent. He uses a thought experiment to make this point. Williams presents us with a story based loosely on the life of the painter Paul Gauguin. Williams' Gauguin feels some responsibility towards his family and is reasonably happy living with them, but nonetheless abandons them, leaving them in dire straits. He does so in an attempt to become a great painter. He goes to live on a South Sea Island, believing that living in a more primitive environment will allow him to develop his gifts as a painter more fully. How can we tell whether Gauguin's decision to do this is rationally justified? We should ask first of all, what exactly Williams means by rational justification. He never says, but I take it he is interested in the question of whether Gauguin was epistemically justified in thinking that acting as he did would increase his chances of becoming a great painter. That is, the question is whether it was rational (given Gauguin's interests) for him to do as he did.

Williams rightly observes that it is effectively impossible to foresee whether Gauguin will succeed in his attempt to become a great painter. Even if, prior to making his decision, Gauguin had good reason to think he had considerable artistic talent, he could not be sure what would come of that talent, nor whether the decision to leave his family would help or hinder the development of that talent. In the end, says Williams, "the only thing that will justify his choice will be success itself." (Williams, 1993a, 38) Similarly, Williams claims the only thing that could show Gauguin to be rationally unjustified is failure. Since success depends, to some extent anyway, on luck, Williams' claim entails that rational justification depends, at least in some cases, on luck. Not every success, however, confers justification, nor does every failure signal lack of justification. It depends on what sort of luck, if any, was involved in the success or failure. Williams distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic luck, claiming that only the operation of intrinsic luck is compatible with the result of a decision determining the rational justification of that decision. Roughly, intrinsic luck is luck which arises from the elements of the project or action under consideration, while extrinsic luck is luck arising from 'outside' the project. In the case of Gauguin, intrinsic luck is luck arising from Gauguin himself, since he is the only one involved in his project. If Gauguin fails because it turns out that living on a South Sea Island distracts him to such an extent that he becomes a worse painter, this will be a case of bad intrinsic luck and so he will be unjustified. On the other hand, if, at the start of his project, a freak accident causes him to sustain an injury which prevents him

from ever painting again, he will be neither justified nor unjustified since his project is never really carried out. His project will have failed but, as regards justification, a verdict will not be returned due to the interference of extrinsic bad luck.[3] What matters then with regard to rational justification is intrinsic luck. If Gauguin is lucky enough to possess sufficient talent and to find circumstances in which that talent can flourish, his project will succeed. He will be justified and this will, in part, be due to (intrinsic) luck. What, if anything, does this have to do with morality? Williams hopes to inflict fatal damage on the notion of the moral by setting up a collision between rational and moral justification. Rational justification, Williams has suggested, is, at least partly, a matter of luck. Moral justification, as we have noted, is not supposed to be a matter of luck at all. This clearly leaves room for clashes between the two sorts of justification, cases in which an action is morally unjustified, but rationally justified (or vice versa). Indeed, the example of Gauguin is supposed to provide us with just such a case. Suppose that Gauguin's decision to leave his family is morally unjustified. Since luck has nothing to do with the moral value of this decision, we can say that Gauguin's decision is a morally bad one when he makes it and that it stays that way forever, regardless of how his project turns out. According to Williams, however, whether Gauguin's decision is rationally justified is not settled when he makes it. We have to wait and see how the project turns out. Suppose, as Williams clearly means us to, that his Gauguin, like the real one, becomes a great artist (and that this does not happen as the result of extrinsic luck). Once this is the case, Gauguin's decision is rationally justified though still morally unjustified.

This might be thought enough to generate a problem for the type of morality Williams opposes. As Judith Andre puts it:

> **Since rational justification is partly a matter of luck, ... our notion of rational justification is not synonymous with that of moral justification, and morality is not the unique source of value (Andre, 1993, 123)**

This doesn't, however, quite get Williams' point right. His claim was not that morality is the only source of value, but that it is the supreme source of value. On this picture, the mere fact that morality and rationality collide does not necessarily pose a problem. The possibility that rationality and morality may be distinct sources of value is no more troubling than the fact that morality and pleasure are distinct sources of value. There can be more than one source of value so long as moral value trumps these others sorts of value.[4] Problems only arise when we come to consider "where we place our gratitude" that Gauguin left his family and became a painter. (Williams, 1993b, 255) Suppose that we are genuinely grateful that Gauguin did what he did and, as a result, became a great artist. We might say this shows that, on occasion, we have reason to be glad that the morally correct thing did not happen. But to say something like this is to call into question part of the point of morality (or so Williams says). Remember Williams claims that morality "has an ultimate form of justice at its heart, and that that is its allure. ... it offers ... solace to a sense of the world's unfairness." (Williams, 1993a, 36) He adds that it can offer that solace only if moral value possesses "some special, indeed supreme, kind of dignity or importance." (Williams, 1993a, 36) Thus, the problem posed by the Gauguin case is not simply, as Andre suggests, that there might be other sources of value than morality floating around. The problem is that the example of Gauguin suggests morality is not the *supreme* source of value after all. We are supposedly stuck between two unpalatable options. If the picture is as Williams describes it, we are in a situation in which moral value and another value (i.e., rationality) clash and the other value is the winner. So much the worse for morality, it loses its position as the supreme sort of value to a sort of value which is

affected by luck.[5] In doing so, its ability to provide us with 'solace to a sense of the world's unfairness' is destroyed. This problem can be avoided by claiming that morality and rationality do not collide in this case. That is, we could declare that morality is dependent on luck in the same way that rationality is. This sort of move will eliminate the threat that rationality poses to morality's supremacy, but this occurs at the expense of one of our deep commitments about morality, namely its invulnerability to luck. Either way, the notion of morality fails to escape intact.

This, anyway, is what Williams would have us believe. Despite all the attention that Williams' article has generated, his argument is actually remarkably unimpressive. It is not clear, for instance, that moral value has to be the supreme sort of value. Why can't it just be an important sort of value (and, according to what value are the various sorts of value to be ranked anyway)? Moreover, what is there to stop us from saying that our gratitude (if we have any) that Gauguin did what he did is just misguided and so that this is not a case in which it is better that the rational thing rather than the moral thing happened? It may be that our gratitude is no indicator of whether or not it is better that Gauguin did as he did. These large problems aside, there is an even more basic problem with Williams' argument. It rests on a claim about rational justification that can quite easily be made to look doubtful. At the heart of Williams' argument is the claim that a rational justification for a particular decision can only be given after the fact. This is what allows luck to enter into rational justification. If we do not accept this claim, Williams has given us no reason to think that either rational or moral justification is a matter of luck and so we cease to have a reason to imagine a conflict between rationality and morality (on these grounds anyway). If so, Williams has given us no reason to think that either rational or moral justification is a matter of luck. What's more, there is good reason to doubt the claim that rational justification must sometimes be retrospective. The usual intuition about justification is that if we want to know whether Gauguin's decision to leave his family and become a painter was a rational one, what we need to consider is the information Gauguin had available to him *when he made that decision*. What did he have reason to believe would be the fate of his family? What indication did he have that he had the potential to become a great painter? Did he have good reason to think his family would hinder his quest after greatness? Did he have reason to believe a move to the South Seas would help him achieve his goal? And so on. Our standard picture of justification tells us that, regardless of how things turned out, the answer to the question about Gauguin's justification is to be found in the answers to the above questions. Luck is thought to have nothing to do with his justification. Indeed, if Gauguin is found to have been somehow relying on luck -- if, for example, he had never painted anything, but just somehow felt he had greatness in him -- this would weigh substantially against the rationality of his decision. The same could be said of the moral status of his decision: what counts is the information he had at the time, not how things turned out.[6,7]

Williams does have an argument against this picture of justification, albeit an ineffective one. He appeals to the notion of agent regret. Agent regret is a species of regret a person can feel only towards his or her own actions. It involves a 'taking on' of the responsibility for some action and the desire to make amends for it. Williams' example is of a lorry driver who "through no fault of his" runs over a small child. (Williams, 1993a, 43) He rightly says that the driver will feel a sort of regret at the death of this child that no one else will feel. The driver, after all, caused the child's death. Furthermore, we expect agent regret to be felt even in cases in which we do not think the agent was at fault. If we are satisfied that the driver could have done nothing else to prevent the child's death, we will try to console him by telling him this. But, as Williams observes, we would

think much less of the driver if he showed no regret at all, saying only 'It's a terrible thing that has happened, but I did everything I could to avoid it.' Williams suggests that a conception of rationality that does not involve retrospective justification has no room for agent regret and so is "an insane concept of rationality." (Williams, 1993a, 44) His worry is that if rationality is all a matter of what is the case when we make our decisions and leaves no room for the luck that finds its way into consequences, then the lorry driver ought not to experience agent regret, but instead should simply remind himself that he did all he could. This, however, just does not follow. The problem is that, in any plausible case of this sort, it will not be rational for the driver to believe that he could not have driven more safely. Driving just isn't like that. Indeed, what it is rational for the driver to do is to suspect there was something else he could have done which might have saved the life of the child. If he had just been a little more alert or driving a little closer to the centre of the road. If he had been driving a little more slowly. If he had seen the child playing near the street. If his brakes had been checked more recently and so on and so on. It will be rational for him to wonder whether he could have done more to avoid this tragedy and so rational for him feel a special sort of regret at the death of the child. (See Rosebury, 1995, 514-515 for this point.) Agent regret exists because we can almost never be sure we did 'everything we could'. Thus it provides us with no reason to believe there is a retrospective component to rational justification (and so no reason to conclude that luck plays the role in justification Williams suggests).

None of this is to deny that the way things turn out may figure in the justifications people *give* for their past actions. It is just that, despite this, the way things turn out has nothing to do with whether or not those past actions really were justified. Sometimes the way things turn out may be all we have to go on, but this tells us nothing about the actual justification or lack thereof of our actions, not unless we confuse the state of an action being justified with the activity of justifying that action after the fact.

Why then have Williams' claims about moral luck been taken so seriously? Because despite the shakiness of the argument he in fact gave, he pointed the way towards a much more interesting and troubling argument about moral luck. This argument, glimpses of which can be found in Williams' paper, is explicitly made in Thomas Nagel's response to Williams.

2. NAGEL ON MORAL LUCK

Nagel identifies the problem of moral luck as arising from a conflict between our practice and an intuition most of us share about morality. He states the intuition as follows:

> **Prior to reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control. (Nagel, 1993, 58)**

He then gives us a rough definition of the phenomenon of moral luck:

> **Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck. (Nagel, 1993, 59)**

Clearly cases of moral luck fly in the face of the above stated intuition about morality.[8] Yet, Nagel claims that, despite our having this intuition, we frequently do make moral judgments about people based on factors that are not within their control. We might, for instance, judge a drunk driver who kills a child (call him the 'unfortunate driver') more harshly than one who does not (call him the 'fortunate driver'), even if the only significant difference between the two cases is that

a child happened to be playing on the road at the wrong point on the unfortunate driver's route home. This, for Nagel, is the problem of moral luck: the tension between the intuition that a person's moral standing cannot be affected by luck and the possibility that luck plays an important (perhaps even essential) role in determining a person's moral standing. Nagel suggests that the intuition is correct and lies at the heart of the notion of morality, but he also endorses the view that luck will inevitably influence a person's moral standing. This leads him to suspect there is a real paradox in the notion of morality.

We might wonder whether the problem Nagel presents is best thought of as a problem about luck or if it is really about control. That is, is Nagel's worry that *luck* seems to play a role in determining a person's moral standing or that *things which are beyond that person's control* seem to affect her moral standing? The answer is both. Nagel thinks that luck should be understood as operating where control is lacking, so for him the problem about control and the problem about luck are one and the same. The important point, however, is that Nagel seems to think that, quite aside from how luck is analyzed, there is a real problem if luck ever makes a moral difference. This is important because there is reason to think the identification of luck with lack of control is mistaken.[9] Even if this is so, we are left with a problem of moral luck. For this reason, it is in terms of luck rather than lack of control that I shall hereafter frame the problem.

The problem of moral luck lies in the thought that luck sometimes makes a moral difference, but, as I have noted, there is more than one way in which luck might make a moral difference. Two sorts of difference are discussed in the literature on moral luck, although these are not always clearly distinguished. These two sorts are represented, on one hand, by the thought that the unfortunate driver is no worse a person than the fortunate driver and, on the other, by the thought that since we cannot plausibly hold the fortunate driver responsible for the death of a child (as no death occurred in his case), neither can we hold the unfortunate driver morally responsible for that death. The second thought has to do with the assigning of individual events to a person. The first involves a more direct assessment of a person. It involves an assessment of how much credit or discredit -- I will use the term 'moral worth' to capture both credit and discredit -- attaches directly to a person.

We have two sorts of question to consider: (1) can luck make a difference in a person's moral worth and (2) can luck make a difference in what a person is morally responsible for? Which of these questions is Nagel's? It is difficult to tell. Nagel does briefly refer to the problem of moral luck as a "fundamental problem about moral responsibility," but most of the time his worries are about 'blame', a notion with overtones of both sorts of moral difference. (Nagel, 1993, 58) Is he concerned that the driver will be blamed *for the event* of the child's death or that the unlucky driver *himself* will be rated morally worse than the lucky driver, i.e., blamed more? Nagel seems to entertain both possibilities, asking both whether the unfortunate driver is to blame for more and whether he is a worse person than the unfortunate driver. Indeed, it may be the case that Nagel thinks the two questions are inseparable, that we cannot make sense of the idea of holding a person morally to blame for some event without this, at the same time, being counted as a reason to lower that person's moral credit rating. Nothing Nagel says clearly reveals his position on this point. For now, it is enough simply to bear both sorts of moral difference in mind. The important point is that, in either case, there is something troubling about the idea that luck might make a moral difference. Yet, it seems we allow luck into our moral judgments all the time. We *do* think less of the unfortunate driver. We *do* hold him responsible for the death of the child. On the face of it, this might not seem particularly troubling. We might admit that, on occasion, we judge people for

things that happen as a result of luck, but simply claim that in any such case a mistake has been made. The mere fact that we do sometimes judge people for things that happen due to luck does not indicate that we should judge people for things that happen due to luck nor that we intend to. The problem Nagel points out, however, is that when we consider the sorts of things that influence us "Ultimately, nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." (Nagel, 1993, 59) That is, everything we do seems at some level to involve luck. Nagel makes a helpful comparison to the problem of epistemological skepticism. Just as the problem of skepticism emerges from the clash of our intuition that knowledge should be certain and non-accidental with the fact that few, if any, of our true beliefs are entirely certain or free from accident, so:

> **The erosion of moral judgment emerges not as the absurd consequence of an over-simple theory, but as a natural consequence of the ordinary idea of moral assessment, when it is applied in view of a more complete and precise account of the facts. (Nagel, 1993, 59)**

What are these facts? Nagel identifies four ways in which luck plays into our moral assessments. It enters through:

> **1) Constitutive Luck: the luck involved in a person's having the "inclinations, capacities and temperament" that she does.**
> **2) Circumstantial Luck: the luck involved in "the kind of problems and situations one faces"**
> **3) Causal Luck: "luck in how one is determined by antecedent circumstances."**
> **4) Resultant Luck: "luck in the way one's actions and projects turn out." (Nagel, 1993, 60)[10]**

Nagel gives illustrations of each type of luck. They are worth considering so that we might be clear on the differences between the types of luck. We should bear in mind, however, that we may ultimately disagree about whether these constitute cases of *moral* luck. This is something I will say more about shortly.

Resultant Luck:

Nagel gives us several examples of resultant luck. One we have already seen: the case of the fortunate and unfortunate drunk drivers. Nagel also makes much of decisions, particularly political ones, made under uncertainty. He gives the example of someone who must decide whether to instigate a revolution against a brutal regime. She knows that the revolution will be bloody and that, if it fails, those involved will be slaughtered and the regime will become even more brutal. She also knows that if no revolution occurs, the regime will become no less brutal than it currently is. If she succeeds she will be a hero, if she fails she will bear "some responsibility" for the terrible consequences of that failure. (Nagel, 1993, 61-62) Thus, how the revolution turns out, something which might be almost entirely a matter of resultant luck, seems to have a great deal to do with the moral credit or blame she will receive.[11]

Circumstantial Luck:

Just as luck may interfere in the course of our actions to produce results that have a profound influence on the way we are morally judged, so our luck in being in the right or wrong place at the right or wrong time can have a profound effect on the way we are morally assessed. Nagel's

example is of a person who lives in Germany during the Second World War and "behaves badly." (Nagel, 1993, 65) We are surely inclined to blame such a person, to hold him or her responsible for what he or she did. But Nagel asks us to contrast this person with a German who moves to Argentina shortly before the War for business reasons. Suppose that the expatriate would have behaved just as badly as the German if he had remained in Germany. Are we willing to say the expatriate should be judged as harshly as the German? If not, circumstantial luck has made a moral difference. We can make this sort of case more troubling if we focus on the way in which the person has 'behaved badly'. If the bad behaviour consists of being a concentration camp guard and gleefully shooting hundreds of people, we may be inclined to think of the expatriate, who would have behaved the same way given half a chance, as an undiscovered monster who rightly should be judged as harshly as the German.12 In such an extreme case, it is easy enough to claim that luck does not make a moral difference even if it makes a difference in whether we discover that the expatriate is so morally repellent. But, if the bad behaviour consists of something less drastic, say, in refusing to give refuge to a Jewish family being pursued by the Nazis, we can be much less confident that we would not have failed in the same way. Are we willing to say that all those of us who would have failed should be assessed in the same way as the German who actually failed? It is not at all clear that we are.

Causal Luck:

Nagel says very little about this sort of luck and the same is true of those who have written about moral luck after him. The worry about causal luck should be clear enough since it is precisely the sort of worry found in the debate on free will and determinism. It also seems to be a redundant sort of luck, included by Nagel only to indicate the connection between the problem of moral luck and the debate about free will and determinism. It is redundant because circumstantial and constitutive luck seem to cover the same territory. Constitutive luck covers what we are, while circumstantial luck covers what happens to us. Nothing else seems to remain that can play a role in determining what we do.

It is worth considering whether what I have just said about the relationship between the freewill versus determinism controversy and worries about causal luck might, as has sometimes been suggested, be applied to the whole problem of moral luck. Is the entire problem of moral luck nothing but the freewill and determinism problem in different clothing? It certainly does cover some of the same territory. Like worries about the compatibility of free will and determinism, worries about moral luck get their start when we notice how much of what is supposed to be morally significant about us is simply thrust upon us whether we like it or not. But while they cover some of the same territory, the notions upon which the problems turn are quite different. In particular, neither of the notions that get star billing in talk of freewill and determinism is of central concern when we think about moral luck. Given that luck may exist whether the world is deterministic or not, we do not worry about whether determinism is true or not when we consider the problem of moral luck.13 Nor, do we spend our time worrying about whether people possess freewill or not. This being so, it is best to think of the problem of moral luck as related to, but distinct from, the problem of freewill and determinism.

Constitutive Luck:

A natural reaction to worries about resultant and circumstantial luck is to suggest that what matters is not how a person's actions turn out or what circumstances they chance to encounter, but

what is in that person's 'heart'. We "pare each act down to its morally essential core, an inner act of pure will assessed by motive and intention." (Nagel, 1993, 63) To do so, however, is to open oneself up to worries about constitutive moral luck. If we focus on a person's character then what of the luck involved in determining what that person's character is? It may be that, in a given situation, you did not act with good intentions, but perhaps this was because you were unlucky enough to be born a bitter or spiteful person. Why then should your bad intentions figure in your blameworthiness? Nagel suggests they should not. He claims that we should not praise or condemn people for qualities that are not under the control of the will (and so not under their control). But as reasonable as this may sound, Nagel also claims we *cannot* refrain from making judgments about a person's moral status based upon just this sort of uncontrollable feature. If we did so refrain, it is not clear we would be able to make any judgments at all. In the end, people are assessed for what they are like, not for how they ended up that way.

The notion of constitutive luck illustrates the difficulty of the problem of moral luck. Our temptation is to avoid the other sorts of luck by focusing on what the person *really is*. In this way, we try to discount worries about the luck that affects the way our actions turn out or the luck that places us in situations in which we make unfortunate decisions. We focus on the core of the person, on his or her character. But on reaching that core, we are disappointed to find that luck has been at work there too. The trouble is that there is nowhere further to retreat when we are at the level of character. If we retreat further there is no person left to morally assess. Nagel concludes that "in a sense the problem has no solution." (Nagel, 1993, 68) The cost of not admitting the existence of moral luck is giving up the idea of agency. We seem driven to the conclusion that no one is blameworthy for anything. But the alternative is to preserve our notions of agency and responsibility by concluding that moral value is subject to luck.

3. RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM

The problem of moral luck traps us between an intuition and a fact:14

> **1) the intuition that luck must not make moral differences (e.g., that luck must not affect a person's moral worth, that luck must not affect what a person is morally responsible for).**
> **2) the fact that luck does seem to make moral differences (e.g., we blame the unfortunate driver more than the fortunate driver).**

Responses to the problem have been of two broad sorts. Some claim that the intuition is mistaken, that there is nothing wrong with luck making a moral difference. Others claim that we have our facts wrong, that luck never does make a moral difference. The first sort of response has been the least popular. When it has been made, the approach has usually been to suggest that, if cases of moral luck are troubling, this is only because we have a mistaken view of morality. Brynmor Browne (1992), for instance, has argued that moral luck is only troubling because we mistakenly tend to think of moral assessment as bound up with punishment. He argues that, once we correct our thinking, cases of moral luck cease to be troubling. In an argument reminiscent of Williams, Margaret Urban Walker (1993) claims that cases of moral luck are only troubling if we adopt the mistaken view of agency she calls 'pure agency'. She argues that this view has repugnant implications and so should be rejected in favour a view of agency on which moral luck ceases to be troubling (namely 'impure agency'). Judith Andre (1993) claims that we find cases of moral luck troubling because some of our thinking about morality is influenced by Kant. She adds, however, that the core of our thinking about morality is Aristotelian and that Aristotelians need not be

troubled by cases of moral luck.15 The claims of all these authors are controversial.

The most popular response to the problem of moral luck has been to deny that cases of moral luck ever occur. This is usually done by suggesting that cases in which luck appears to make a moral difference are really cases in which luck makes an epistemic difference, that is, in which luck puts us in a better or worse position to assess a person's moral standing (without actually changing that standing). Consider the case of the fortunate and unfortunate drivers. On this line of argument, it is claimed that there is no moral difference between them, it is just that in the case of the unfortunate driver we have a clear indication of his deficient moral standing. The fortunate driver is lucky in the sense that his moral failings may escape detection, but not in actually having a moral standing any different from that of the unfortunate driver. Along these lines, we find passages like the following:

> **the luck involved relates not to our moral condition but only to our image: it relates not to what we are but to how people (ourselves included) will regard us. (Rescher, 1993, 154-5)**
>
> **A culprit may thus be lucky or unlucky in how clear his deserts are. (Richards, 1993, 169)**
>
> **if actual harm occurs, the agent and others considering his act will have a painful awareness of this harm. (Jensen, 1993, 136)**
>
> **the actual harm serves only to make vivid how wicked the behaviour was because of the danger it created. (Bennett, 1995, 59-60)**

While appealing, the difficulty with this response to the problem of moral luck is that it tends to work better for some sorts of luck than others. While it is plausible that resultant or circumstantial luck might make only epistemic differences, perhaps revealing or concealing a person's character, it is not at all clear that constitutive luck can be said to make only epistemic differences. If a person possesses a very dishonest character by luck, what feature of the person does luck reveals to us that (non-luckily) determines his moral status? One response to this worry has been to deny that the notion of constitutive luck is coherent. (See, in particular, Rescher, 1995, 155-158 and also Hurley, 1993, 197-198.) This claim turns upon a substantive claim about the nature of luck, a topic that has been surprisingly absent from the literature on moral luck. It is my own view that it is only by investigating the nature of luck that we will be able to reach any sort of a final conclusion regarding the problem of moral luck. My own conclusion, which I shall leave undefended here, is that such an investigation leads to the view that cases of moral luck are both inescapable and troubling. The problem of moral luck is both real and deep.

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NOTES

1. I say 'in earnest' because the problem of moral luck had been discussed before Nagel's and Williams' articles (although not under the heading of 'moral luck'). See, for instance, Joel Feinberg (1962). [return to main text]

2. The papers, both entitled "Moral Luck," were originally published in *The Aristotelian Society Supplementary*, Volume 1, 1976. Revised versions of both papers were published as chapters of Williams (1981) and Nagel (1979). The revised versions of these papers are also included in an excellent anthology edited by Daniel Statman (1993). [return to main text]

3. Although Williams never mentions it, presumably if Gauguin were to succeed due to good extrinsic luck, he would also be neither justified nor unjustified. If an eccentric art critic were to find a way to make Gauguin's mediocre work speak, it might be impossible to tell whether Gauguin was justified or not. (The example was suggested to me by Arthur Ripstein.) [return to main text]

4. For the Kantian the problem is worse since, for Kant, to act morally is to act rationally. But remember that Williams takes as his enemy both Kantian and our everyday thinking about morality. It is not at all clear that our everyday thinking about morality requires us to endorse such a tight link between rationality and morality. [return to main text]

5. It is, however, possible to concede that morality is not the supreme source of value, but not give up the claim that our lives are, in some important respect, free of luck. Susan Mendus argues that, while the case of Gauguin shows that morality is not the supreme source of value, the only values which compete with morality for supremacy are themselves free from luck. In Gauguin's case, she claims that the value which competes with morality for supremacy is that of art and that even if Gauguin fails, "he has reason to think it worthwhile to have tried." (Mendus, 1988, 339) [return to main text]

6. I must admit that the 'standard picture' of justification I have sketched above is an internalist one. Such a picture is somewhat unfashionable amongst philosophers these days, although I would argue it is still our intuitive picture. Regardless, those favouring adding external considerations to an account of justification are no more inclined to factor in how things turn out than internalists. (See, for instance, Goldman, 1989) What matters to externalists is typically not how things do turn out, but how they are *likely* to turn out. [return to main text]

7. I should add that luck clearly can enter into rational justification in ways other than the one Williams has in mind. It can be a matter of luck that you are smart enough to see that the evidence

you possess justifies you in holding a certain belief or a matter of luck that you possess the evidence you do. Presumably luck can enter into moral justification in the same ways, but, with good reason, no one has ever suggested there is anything troubling about this. [return to main text]

8. Nagel (and many others) sometimes seem to attribute to Kant the position that luck could never make a moral difference. This is not so. In "On A Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives," Kant tells us that a person who lies to a murderer about the location of the murderer's intended victim thereby becomes responsible for whatever the murderer does (including things the murderer might do which could not have been foreseen). Since what the murderer actually does may be affected by luck, Kant clearly does allow the possibility that luck may affect what a person is responsible for. [return to main text]

9. The question of what luck is has been dealt with remarkably little in the literature on moral luck (see Rescher, 1995, for the beginnings of an account of luck). But even without an account of luck in hand, there is good reason to doubt that an event being lucky (or unlucky) for a given person is identical with that event being out of that person's control. An event can be out of my control (or, for that matter, anyone else's), yet still not such that we would say I am lucky that it occurred. An event such as the rising of the sun this morning was entirely out of my control, yet it is not at all clear that I am lucky the sun rose this morning (although it is surely a good thing that it did). Why? I suggest it is because, regardless of whether I had any control over the occurrence of that event, the chance of that event occurring was very good indeed. A successful account of luck must weave together these ideas about chance and control. [return to main text]

10. Nagel identifies, but does not give names to all four types of luck. He does write of 'constitutive luck,' an expression he probably gets from Williams. Williams, however, intends constitutive luck to have a wider scope than Nagel does. Williams appears to want constitutive luck to encompass what I have called 'circumstantial' and 'causal' luck. (Williams, 1993a, 36) I take the names 'circumstantial' and 'causal' luck from Daniel Statman. (Statman, 1993, 11) The term 'resultant luck' comes from Michael Zimmerman. (Zimmerman, 1993, 219) Other names have been given to resultant, circumstantial and causal luck. Resultant luck has been called 'consequential luck'. (Mendus, 1988, 334) Circumstantial luck has been called 'situational luck'. (Walker, 1993, 235) Causal luck has been called 'determining luck'. (Mendus, 1988, 334) [return to main text]

11. It is worth emphasizing again that Nagel means to suggest luck will affect not just what praise or blame she actually receives, but also, regardless of how she is actually treated, what praise or blame she deserves. [return to main text]

12. Obviously there would be huge epistemic obstacles to our ever discovering that the expatriate was such a monster, but that doesn't matter. We are not concerned here with how to find out how good or bad a person is. [return to main text]

13. Defending the claim that there are instances of luck even if determinism is true would require more space than I have here. The best I can do here is to give an example that suggests this is so. Suppose that determinism is true. Even if we were aware of this and so aware that it would have been possible in 1897 (or 1797 or ...) to correctly predict that X would win the lottery this weekend, I would suggest we would be no less inclined to say that X was lucky to win the lottery. [return to main text]

14. The problem of moral luck could equally well be presented as a conflict between intuitions. The fact that luck does seem to make moral differences would not be so troubling if we did not have the intuition that it is sometimes right that luck does this. I present the conflict as one between intuition and fact, partly because this is how Nagel presents it and partly because this seems the natural way to introduce it. We discover the problem when we notice how practices that, at first glance, seem right conflict with our intuition that luck should not make moral differences. **[return to main text]**

15. Martha Nussbaum's 1986 The *Fragility of Goodness* is an important work in which she considers Greek views towards luck and ethics. In particular, she presents Plato and Aristotle as disagreeing about whether a good life must be invulnerable to luck, arguing that for Plato it must, but for Aristotle it need not. Her views on these matters are controversial. She has been accused of reading too much Bernard Williams into Aristotle. See Farwell (1994), Irwin (1988) and Woodruff (1989) for helpful discussions of Nussbaum's book. **[return to main text]**

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Moral Rationalism

The term "moral rationalism," in its broadest sense, applies to moral theories that emphasize the use of reason or a rational procedure in moral decision making. Most moral philosophers in the history of philosophy noted that human reason plays at least some part, often a dominant one. Plato argued that moral decision making involves a rational intuition of moral principles. Part of our rational faculty involves an intuitive sense by which we perceive abstract concepts that exist in a spirit-like realm. With this rational intuition we perceive moral principles, such as the notion of justice, the same way we rationally perceive basic mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4.

Aristotle held that we use reason to determine the best way to achieve the highest moral good. All people strive for happiness, and moral reasoning involves determining the best means for achieving that end. For example, if happiness is attained by being courageous, then my reason will tell me what actions I need to perform to be courageous, without being either too cowardly or too rash. Aristotle referred to this as practical reasoning since reason guides our actions (or practice). Medieval philosophers such as Aquinas suggested that we an innate rational faculty called *synderesis* that informs us of our highest moral obligation. Aquinas also argued that our reason plays a role in deducing secondary moral principles from primary ones, analogous to the way that theorems in geometry are deduced from more fundamental principles. For example, given the primary principle that "We ought to treat people benevolently," we can deduce the secondary principle that "We should help feed starving people," since feeding the starving is clearly an act of benevolence. If we then observe that Jones is starving, we can rationally deduce further that it is our obligation to help feed Jones.

In the 18th century moral philosophers such as Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston followed Plato's notion of moral reasoning and argued that morality involves a rational judgment about moral truths. Clarke, for example, argues that there exist three different classes of eternal relations. First, there are mathematical relations that involve concepts such as "less than," "greater than," or "equal to." If I state that "the height of my dog is less than the height of your horse," my statement is "fit" or "proportioned" to the ideal meaning of "less than." Second, there are religious relations, such as "infinite greatness." If I state that "God should be worshipped," then my statement is "fit" to the ideal meaning of "infinite greatness. Finally, there are eternal moral relations such as equality, promoting universal good, and helping others from danger. If you donate to charity, for example, then your action is "fit" to the notion of promoting universal good. If you steal, then your action is unfit to that moral relation. We judge the moral status of all of our actions based on these moral relations. Clarke argues further that all humans have self-evident knowledge of these relations, just as we have self-evident knowledge of mathematical and religious relations. Moral assessments, then, are purely rational.

18th century British philosopher David Hume challenged the longstanding view that morality involves a rational judgment. Hume argued that the role of reason in moral decisions is very

limited, and that moral approval is only a feeling in the mind of the person that makes a moral judgment. In Book 3 of his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1740) and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751) Hume launches five distinct attacks against the view that moral pronouncements are judgments of reason. The first argument is based on the restrictive function of our rational faculty in general. Reason involves only judgments of about reality: either of facts we perceive through our five senses, or of abstract relations in mathematics and logic. When we closely examine the contents of any morally significant action, such as a murder, we will never locate a special moral fact or relation about which we can make a judgment. All we will find is our own feeling. Contrary to Clarke, even if such abstract moral standards exist, humans do not have the faculties to perceive that particular breed of abstract principles.

Secondly, Hume argues that moral pronouncements do not parallel logical and mathematical reasoning. In these disciplines, we begin with known facts, such as theorems, and deduce from these a new and previously unknown fact. But with moral pronouncements, all the relevant facts must be first known. Thirdly, moral pronouncements more closely parallel our aesthetic pronouncements about beauty, which are clearly feelings and not rational judgments. Fourthly, moral pronouncements cannot be judgments about relations since we find exactly the same abstract relations in both moral and nonmoral situations. Finally, moral pronouncements cannot be rational judgments, since all moral actions are done for the final and foundational purpose of happiness. And no final or foundational purpose can be accounted for by reason. Hume concludes his discussion in the Treatise noting that rationalist discussions of morality all begin with statements of fact, such as "Jones is starving," and then conclude with a statement of obligation, such as "We should help feed Jones." According to Hume, it is impossible to rationally deduce statements of obligation from statements of fact. This view of Hume's is encapsulated in the dictum that, "Ought cannot be derived from is."

Hume's critique of moral rationalism had a strong impact on subsequent moral theories. Although 18th and 19th century theorists were not as extreme as Hume in completely dismissing reason in favor of emotion, they nevertheless offered accounts of moral reasoning that differed substantially from Clarke's view. For example, German philosopher Immanuel argued that, although emotional factors indeed do influence our conduct, we should resist this kind of sway. Instead, true moral actions are freely motivated only by reason when emotions and desires do not influence it. Jeremy Bentham argued that we rationally calculate the consequences of our actions. Depending on whether the consequences are good or bad, these rational calculations will tell us whether the action is right or wrong. Following Hume's lead, early 20th century analytic philosophers offered a moral theory called *emotivism*, which rejected reason in favor of emotion. According to emotivists such as C.L. Stevenson, when we make moral utterances, a key part of our meaning is that we are both reporting and expressing our feelings. For example, when I say that "Jones is a good man," I am reporting that I approve of Jones, and also emotionally expressing approval such as "hooray for Jones!"

In reaction to emotivist theories, several philosophers have recently placed a new emphasis on the role of reason in a theory called best reasons morality. The most notable proponent of this view is Kurt Baier in *The Moral Point of View* (1958). According to Baier, moral decision making involves a search for the best reasons for or against a course of action. Moral reasoning, then, parallels legal reasoning that involves collecting relevant facts, weighing arguments on both sides of the issue, and then judging.

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Moral Realism

Moral realism is the view that moral principles have an objective foundation, and are not based on subjective human convention. Perhaps the first and strongest defense of moral realism appears in the writings of Plato, specifically the first passage below from Book 6 of the Republic. In this passage -- one of the most influential passages in Western Philosophy -- Plato explains how the universe is divided into two realms: the visible realm of material things and the intelligible realm of the forms. Field of mathematics inspired Plato's view of the forms. When we look at numbers and mathematical relations, such as 1+1=2, they seem to be timeless concepts that never change, and apply everywhere in the universe. Humans don't invent numbers, and humans can't alter them. Plato explained the eternal character of mathematics by stating that they are abstract entities that exist in a spirit-like realm of the forms.

Although Plato's theory of the forms was endorsed by some medieval philosophers, other notions of moral realism emerged at this time, specifically in the theory of natural law. For Aquinas, morality is grounded in principles that are fixed in nature, particularly in natural purposes, and discernible through reason. All human laws are judged in reference to these. Moral realism was pushed to its limits by Eighteenth-century philosophers, such as Samuel Clarke, who developed a rigorous account of moral realism known as the eternal fitness theory. On this view, morality is founded on eternally fit principles that belong to a spirit-like world of abstract entities -- paralleling Plato's world of the forms. In that spirit world, ethical principles exist eternally along side mathematical truths. Contemporary discussions of moral realism focus on whether moral facts exist independently of people's beliefs and attitude, and whether moral judgments can be true or false.

Positions that oppose moral realism are moral skepticism, moral relativism, and noncognitivism.

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Moral Relativism

Moral relativism, as opposed to other forms of relativism, is the view that moral standards are grounded only in social custom. The most famous statement of relativism in general is by the ancient Greek sophist Protagoras (480-411 BCE.): "Man is the measure of all things," or in a more complete and contemporary translation, "A human being is the measure of all things - of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not that they are not." This reflects the view of many of the sophists that social convention (nomos) has a status above nature (physis). Although Protagoras's claim applies to any proposed standard of knowledge, moral values are at least part of his position. David Hume (1711-1776) hints at the notion of moral relativism in his brief essay "A Dialogue," appended to his *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751). However, for much of the history of moral philosophy, moral relativism was a controversial position that stood in sharp contrast to more conventional theories that advocated an ideal standard of absolute morality. At times, the notion of moral relativism was developed more by philosophical critics of relativism, rather than by overt philosophical defenders of relativism.

More recently, writers both inside and outside of the field of philosophy have advocated moral relativism. For example, anthropologist William Graham Sumner dramatically expresses the notion of moral relativism here:

> The "right" way is the way which the ancestors used and which has been handed down. The tradition is its own warrant. It is not held subject to verification by experience. The notion of right is in the folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin, and brought to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right. This is because they are traditional, and therefore contain in themselves the authority of the ancestral ghosts. When we come to the folkways we are at the end of our analysis. [Folkways (Boston: Ginn, 1906)]

Arguments for moral relativism often involve two principal contentions:

1. Primacy of De Facto Values: our conceptions of morality should be based on how people actually behave (de facto values), and not on an ideal standard how people should behave (ideal values).
2. Cultural Variation: in point of fact, our main moral values vary from culture to culture.

As to the first of these, moral relativists note that there are two ways that we can approach morality: as de facto morality or as ideal morality. De facto morality concerns they way people in fact behave, and involves the moral principles that are actually in place in a given culture. By contrast, ideal morality concerns the way people should behave, irrespective of their actual behavior.

Regarding the second of the above claims, moral relativists emphasize the variation in values that we see in cultures around us. It is indisputable that some values vary from culture to culture, such as wearing

clothes, child marriages, and eating the bodies of dead relatives. Although many of these values are more like rules of etiquette than rules of morality, it is clear that at least some important moral values vary from culture to culture. For example, in Mainland China, abortion is recognized as an important tool for population control. In the Republic of Ireland, though, abortions are not readily available even when the life of a mother is at risk. But moral relativists defend an even stronger claim that our main moral values vary in at least some cultures. According to many relativists, then, moral standards of different cultures are like isolated islands of values, each of which gains its justification through the social customs of that particular culture.

Critics of moral relativism sometimes challenge the idea of cultural variation, defined above. For example in *Elements of Moral Philosophy* James Rachels attacks moral relativism arguing that there is in fact a core set of values that are common to all societies and are in fact necessary for any society to exist. These values are (1) we should care for children, (2) we should tell the truth, and (3) we should not murder. Critics also point out problems of consistency with moral relativism. For example, if moral relativism is true, then we could no longer say that customs of other societies such as slavery are morally inferior to our own.

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Moral Skepticism

Moral skepticism is an epistemological position that we do not have knowledge or justification for believing in objective moral principles. Moral skepticism does not involve the rejection of moral values themselves, but simply the denial that we have knowledge of an objective realm of morals. Moral skeptics sometimes argue that moral values are similar to aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic judgments such as "This painting is beautiful" and "The food in this restaurant is pretty awful" are not objective in nature are based on human preferences. Analogously, moral skeptics argue that moral judgments like "premarital sex is wrong" or "abortion is wrong" are also not objective in nature. The most effective argument for moral skepticism is to question the existence of the realms in which objective moral principles are thought to reside. If the very notion of a spirit-like realm of abstract entities is called into question, then moral principles cannot be objective in that sense.

MACKIE'S DEFENSE. In *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong,* J.L. Mackie defends moral skepticism with three specific arguments. His first argument is from cultural relativity. Mackie sees a problem with the fact that our allegedly objective moral beliefs do not appear to shape our cultural. Instead, it appears that it is our culture which shapes our particular moral beliefs, beliefs such as monogamy. Moral subjectivism, then, is the most reasonable explanation for why our moral beliefs mimic our culture. The only possible explanation an objectivist could have is that our particular moral beliefs become distorted as we try to perceive objective value through our diverse cultures. However, Mackie find this counter-argument weak. His second argument against moral realism is that there is some queer, or counterintuitive aspect of any description one might give of an objective moral realm. There are three distinct points to this argument. First, there is a metaphysical problem, or a problem based on the strange spirit-like realm which the realist would advocate. For Mackie, the strangeness of this realm alone is an argument against it. Second, there is a relational problem since it is not clear how this peculiar, non-natural realm would have any connection with natural objects and human actions. Using Plato's terminology, it is not clear how a spirit-like realm of the forms could affect the natural world of appearances: the two realms are too distinct. Third, there is an epistemological problem, that is, a problem in how we would have knowledge of these spirit-like things. We gain knowledge of the physical world through our five sense. But by what faculty do we gain knowledge of this spirit-like realm?

Mackie's third argument against moral realism is based on a psychological explanation for why people believe there are objective values (an explanation which he calls patterns of objectification). His point is that it is more reasonable (less paradoxical) to view morality as an artificial construction, providing we can give a decent account of why so many people erroneously believe that morality is objective. Mackie's psychological explanation is based on a tendency people have to objectify values which are actually subjective in origin. This tendency may best be described as a psychological projection which results from societal demands. There are two parts to this theory. The first is taken from Hume who argued that there is, in general, an instinctive psychological

tendency give an objective explanation to something which is subjective in origin. Second, society places external constraints on how we behave morally (such as society's demand that we should not run around naked). Given the external nature of these societal demands, we tend to think that the moral issue in question (running around naked in public) is externally objective. This, then, is why we erroneously believe that there are objective values.

Mackie concludes that even if values are not objective, this does not mean that morality is useless. Instead, Mackie emphasizes the importance of creating moral guidelines which regulate the actions of ourselves and others.

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Morality and Religion

For thousands of years many philosophers and theologians have tied moral principles to the existence of God. There is some rationale for this approach. Moral principles seem to be absolute and eternal, and to gain this status they must rest on the nature of God, which is also absolute and eternal. Also, moral behavior is required of everyone, and one way of reinforcing the impotance of moral behavior is to note that God mandates moral principles. In a famous passage from his dialog *The Euthyphro*, Plato exposes a dilemma with linking morality with God. Known as "the Euthyphro dilemma" in the dialog Socrates asks a young man named Euthyphro the following question:

> The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.

The two options in question are whether (1) God endorses a previously existing standard of morality that is external to him, or (2) God independently creates the standards of morality. The two options appear to be mutually exclusive, and, in the dialog, Socrates tries to explain this point to Euthyphro.

During the middle ages, religious philosophers who linked morality with God's existence indeed did choose between one of two options presented in the Euthyphro dilemma. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) offered a specific version of natural law theory by which God endorses a rational set of moral guidelines; Aquinas, then, goes with the first option of the Euthyphro dilemma. The theory of natural law involves three main contentions: (1) God prescribes a set of moral values and makes them law by instilling them in our human nature; (2) there is one ultimate rule of natural law, which we discover through an intuitive mental faculty; (3) from this ultimate rule, we deduce more specific moral rules that that carry the authority of natural law.

In the centuries following Aquinas, some natural law philosophers, such as Hugo Grotius, followed Aquinas's lead by going with the first option of the Euthyphro dilemma - that God endorses an independent and previously existing moral standard. However, other philosophers, such as William of Ockham and Samuel Pufendorf, went with the second option of the Euthyphro dilemma, namely that God independently creates the standards of morality. This position is called both divine command theory and voluntarism. On this view, God invents moral rules as a matter of his unconstrained and free will. By the 18th century, the concept of God's will played a key roll in many moral theories. Some writers, such as William King, argued that the existence of moral principles is completely dependent on God's will. Others, such as William Warburton, argued that God's will is an essential motivation for why we should adopt moral principles, although moral principles themselves are eternal and independent of God.

David Hume was the first philosopher since the middle ages to drive a wedge between religion and morality, separating the two completely, regardless of the stand that one takes on the Euthyphro dilemma. In two works, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779) and *The Natural History of Religion* (1757), Hume addresses the issue from several perspectives. First, he argues that our purely philosophical conceptions of God do not entitle us to ascribe to God the moral attributes that we see in

human nature. Human moral sentiments are linked to our biological nature and our survival. Since, God's nature - as traditionally understood -- infinitely surpasses that of human nature, then our human notions of morality cannot apply to him. Second, setting aside our philosophical conceptions of God, Hume argues that in our more popular conceptions of God we actually see God as an immoral being. He is cruel and spiteful. Finally, Hume argues that in our attempts to gain God's favor, we are not content to simply be moral, but we fall back on absurd religions rituals. That is, a religious person who aims at pleasing God will not have morality on his mind. Hume was so suspicious of the behavior of religious people that, as James Boswell reports, "when he heard a man was religious, he concluded he was a rascal."

In time, mainstream British moral philosophers adopted Hume's secualr approach to morality and eliminated references to God or religion in their theories. We see this especially in the theories offered by Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, Moore, Ross, and Stevenson. In recent years, some philosophers of religion have revived divine command theory, most notably University of Notre Dame philosophy professor Philip L. Quinn. In reaction to this revived interest in divine command theory, Canadian philosopher Kai Nielsen argues in a series of publication that that the divine command theory is conceptually flawed and morality is in no way dependent upon religion.

SEE ALSO: natural law theory, divine command theory, voluntarism

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Natural Law

The term 'natural law' is ambiguous. It refers to a type of moral theory, as well as to a type of legal theory, despite the fact that the core claims of the two kinds of theory are logically independent. According to natural law ethical theory, the moral standards that govern human behavior are, in some sense, objectively derived from the nature of human beings. According to natural law legal theory, the authority of at least some legal standards necessarily derives, at least in part, from considerations having to do with the moral merit of those standards. There are a number of different kinds of natural law theories of law, differing from each other with respect to the role that morality plays in determining the authority of legal norms.

Contents

I. Two Kinds of Natural Law Theory

At the outset, it is important to distinguish two kinds of theory that go by the name of natural law. The first is a theory of morality that is roughly characterized by the following theses. First, moral propositions have what is sometimes called objective standing in the sense that such propositions are the bearers of objective truth-value; that is, moral propositions can be objectively true or false. Though moral objectivism is sometimes equated with moral realism (see, e.g., Moore 1992, 190: "the truth of any moral proposition lies in its correspondence with a mind- and convention-independent moral reality"), the relationship between the two theories is controversial. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (1988), for example, views moral objectivism as one species of moral realism, but not the only form; on Sayre-McCord's view, moral subjectivism and moral intersubjectivism are also forms of moral realism. Strictly speaking, then, natural law moral theory is committed only to the objectivity of moral norms.

The second thesis constituting the core of natural law moral theory is the claim that standards of morality are in some sense derived from, or entailed by, the nature of the world and the nature of human beings. St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, identifies the rational nature of human beings as that which defines moral law: "the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts" (Aquinas, ST I-II, Q.90, A.I). On this common view, since human beings are by nature rational beings, it

is morally appropriate that they should behave in a way that conforms to their rational nature. Thus, Aquinas derives the moral law from the nature of human beings (thus, "natural law").

But there is another kind of natural law theory having to do with the relationship of morality to law. According to natural law theory of law, there is no clean division between the notion of law and the notion of morality. Though there are different versions of natural law theory, all subscribe to the thesis that there are at least some laws that depend for their "authority" not on some pre-existing human convention, but on the logical relationship in which they stand to moral standards. Otherwise put, some norms are authoritative in virtue of their moral content, even when there is no convention that makes moral merit a criterion of legal validity. The idea that the concepts of law and morality intersect in some way is called the Overlap Thesis.

As an empirical matter, many natural law moral theorists are also natural law legal theorists, but the two theories, strictly speaking, are logically independent. One can deny natural law theory of law but hold a natural law theory of morality. John Austin, the most influential of the early legal positivists, for example, denied the Overlap Thesis but held something that resembles a natural law ethical theory.

Indeed, Austin explicitly endorsed the view that it is not necessarily true that the legal validity of a norm depends on whether its content conforms to morality. But while Austin thus denied the Overlap Thesis, he accepted an objectivist moral theory; indeed, Austin inherited his utilitarianism almost wholesale from J.S. Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Here it is worth noting that utilitarians sometimes seem to suggest that they derive their utilitarianism from certain facts about human nature; as Bentham once wrote, "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne" (Bentham 1948, 1). Thus, a commitment to natural law theory of morality is consistent with the denial of natural law theory of law.

Conversely, one could, though this would be unusual, accept a natural law theory of law without holding a natural law theory of morality. One could, for example, hold that the conceptual point of law is, in part, to reproduce the demands of morality, but also hold a form of ethical subjectivism (or relativism). On this peculiar view, the conceptual point of law would be to enforce those standards that are morally valid in virtue of cultural consensus. For this reason, natural law theory of law is logically independent of natural law theory of morality. The remainder of this essay will be exclusively concerned with natural law theories of law.

II. **Conceptual Naturalism.**

II.1 The Project of Conceptual Jurisprudence

The principal objective of conceptual (or analytic) jurisprudence has traditionally been to provide an account of what distinguishes law as a system of norms from other systems of norms, such as ethical norms. As John Austin describes the project, conceptual jurisprudence seeks "the essence or nature which is common to all laws that are properly so called" (Austin 1995, 11). Accordingly, the task of conceptual jurisprudence is to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of law that distinguishes law from non-law in every possible world.

While this task is usually interpreted as an attempt to analyze the concepts of law and legal system, there is some confusion as to both the value and character of conceptual analysis in philosophy of law. As Brian Leiter (1998) points out, philosophy of law is one of the few philosophical disciplines that takes conceptual analysis as its principal concern; most other areas in philosophy have taken a naturalistic turn,

incorporating the tools and methods of the sciences. To clarify the role of conceptual analysis in law, Brian Bix (1995) distinguishes a number of different purposes that can be served by conceptual claims: (1) to track linguistic usage; (2) to stipulate meanings; (3) to explain what is important or essential about a class of objects; and (4) to establish an evaluative test for the concept-word. Bix takes conceptual analysis in law to be primarily concerned with (3) and (4).

In any event, conceptual analysis of law remains an important, if controversial, project in contemporary legal theory. Conceptual theories of law have traditionally been characterized in terms of their posture towards the Overlap Thesis. Thus, conceptual theories of law have traditionally been divided into two main categories: those like natural law legal theory that affirm there is a conceptual relation between law and morality and those like legal positivism that deny such a relation.

II.2 Classical Natural Law Theory

All forms of natural law theory subscribe to the Overlap Thesis, which asserts that there is some kind of non-conventional relation between law and morality. According to this view, then, the notion of law cannot be fully articulated without some reference to moral notions. Though the Overlap Thesis may seem unambiguous, there are a number of different ways in which it can be interpreted.

The strongest construction of the Overlap Thesis forms the foundation for the classical naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone. Aquinas distinguishes four kinds of law: (1) eternal law; (2) natural law; (3) human law; and (4) divine law. Eternal law is comprised of those laws that govern the nature of an eternal universe; as Susan Dimock (1999, 22) puts it, one can “think of eternal law as comprising all those scientific (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.) ‘laws’ by which the universe is ordered.” Divine law is concerned with those standards that must be satisfied by a human being to achieve eternal salvation. One cannot discover divine law by natural reason alone; the precepts of divine law are disclosed only through divine revelation.

The natural law is comprised of those precepts of the eternal law that govern the behavior of beings possessing reason and free will. The first precept of the natural law, according to Aquinas, is the somewhat vacuous imperative to do good and avoid evil. Here it is worth noting that Aquinas holds a natural law theory of morality: what is good and evil, according to Aquinas, is derived from the rational nature of human beings. Good and evil are thus both objective and universal.

But Aquinas is also a natural law legal theorist. On his view, a human law (i.e., that which is promulgated by human beings) is valid only insofar as its content conforms to the content of the natural law; as Aquinas puts the point: “[E]very human law has just so much of the nature of law as is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law” (ST I-II, Q.95, A.II). To paraphrase Augustine’s famous remark, an unjust law is really no law at all.

The idea that a norm that does not conform to the natural law cannot be legally valid is the defining thesis of conceptual naturalism. As William Blackstone describes the thesis, “This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original” (1979, 41). In this passage, Blackstone articulates the two claims that constitute the theoretical core of conceptual naturalism: 1) there can be no legally valid standards that conflict with the natural law; and 2) all valid laws derive what force and authority they have from the natural law.

It should be noted that classical naturalism is consistent with allowing a substantial role to human beings

in the manufacture of law. While the classical naturalist seems committed to the claim that the law necessarily incorporates all moral principles, this claim does not imply that the law is exhausted by the set of moral principles. There will still be coordination problems (e.g., which side of the road to drive on) that can be resolved in any number of ways consistent with the set of moral principles. Thus, the classical naturalist does not deny that human beings have considerable discretion in creating natural law. Rather she claims only that such discretion is necessarily limited by moral norms: legal norms that are promulgated by human beings are valid only if they are consistent with morality.

Critics of conceptual naturalism have raised a number of objections to this view. First, it has often been pointed out that, *contra* Augustine, unjust laws are all-too- frequently enforced against persons. As Austin petulantly put the point:

> Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals. Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God, who has commanded that human lawgivers shall not prohibit acts which have no evil consequences, the Court of Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up, in pursuance of the law of which I have impugned the validity (Austin 1995, 158).

Of course, as Brian Bix (1999) points out, the argument does little work for Austin because it is always possible for a court to enforce a law against a person that does not satisfy Austin's own theory of legal validity.

Another frequently expressed worry is that conceptual naturalism undermines the possibility of moral criticism of the law; inasmuch as conformity with natural law is a necessary condition for legal validity, all valid law is, by definition, morally just. Thus, on this line of reasoning, the legal validity of a norm necessarily entails its moral justice. As Jules Coleman and Jeffrey Murphy (1990, 18) put the point:

> The important things [conceptual naturalism] supposedly allows us to do (e.g., morally evaluate the law and determine our moral obligations with respect to the law) are actually rendered more difficult by its collapse of the distinction between morality and law. If we really want to think about the law from the moral point of view, it may obscure the task if we see law and morality as essentially linked in some way. Moral criticism and reform of law may be aided by an initial moral skepticism about the law.

There are a couple of problems with this line of objection. First, conceptual naturalism does not foreclose criticism of those norms that are being enforced by a society as law. Insofar as it can plausibly be claimed that the content of a norm being enforced by society as law does not conform to the natural law, this is a legitimate ground of moral criticism: given that the norm being enforced by law is unjust, it follows, according to conceptual naturalism, that it is not legally valid. Thus, the state commits wrong by enforcing that norm against private citizens.

Second, and more importantly, this line of objection seeks to criticize a conceptual theory of law by pointing to its practical implications – a strategy that seems to commit a category mistake. Conceptual jurisprudence assumes the existence of a core of social practices (constituting law) that requires a conceptual explanation. The project motivating conceptual jurisprudence, then, is to articulate the concept of law in a way that accounts for these pre-existing social practices. A conceptual theory of law can legitimately be criticized for its failure to adequately account for the pre-existing data, as it were; but

it cannot legitimately be criticized for either its normative quality or its practical implications.

A more interesting line of argument has recently been taken up by Brian Bix (1996). Following John Finnis (1980), Bix rejects the interpretation of Aquinas and Blackstone as conceptual naturalists, arguing instead that the claim that an unjust law is not a law should not be taken literally:

> A more reasonable interpretation of statements like "an unjust law is no law at all" is that unjust laws are not laws "in the fullest sense." As we might say of some professional, who had the necessary degrees and credentials, but seemed nonetheless to lack the necessary ability or judgment: "she's no lawyer" or "he's no doctor." This only indicates that we do not think that the title in this case carries with it all the implications it usually does. Similarly, to say that an unjust law is "not really law" may only be to point out that it does not carry the same moral force or offer the same reasons for action as laws consistent with "higher law" (Bix 1996, 226).

Thus, Bix construes Aquinas and Blackstone as having views more similar to the neo- naturalism of John Finnis discussed below in Section III. Nevertheless, while a plausible case can be made in favor of Bix's view, the long history of construing Aquinas and Blackstone as conceptual naturalists, along with its pedagogical value in developing other theories of law, ensures that this practice is likely, for better or worse, to continue indefinitely.

III. **The Substantive Neo-Naturalism of John Finnis**

John Finnis takes himself to be explicating and developing the views of Aquinas and Blackstone. Like Bix, Finnis believes that the naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone should not be construed as a conceptual account of the existence conditions for law. According to Finnis, the classical naturalists were not concerned with giving a conceptual account of legal validity; rather they were concerned with explaining the moral force of law: "the principles of natural law explain the obligatory force (in the fullest sense of 'obligation') of positive laws, even when those laws cannot be deduced from those principles" (Finnis 1980, 23-24). On Finnis's view of the Overlap Thesis, the essential function of law is to provide a justification for state coercion (a view he shares with Ronald Dworkin). Accordingly, an unjust law can be legally valid, but it cannot provide an adequate justification for use of the state coercive power and is hence not obligatory in the fullest sense; thus, an unjust law fails to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law. An unjust law, on this view, is legally binding, but is not fully law.

Like classical naturalism, Finnis's naturalism is both an ethical theory and a theory of law. Finnis distinguishes a number of equally valuable basic goods: life, health, knowledge, play, friendship, religion, and aesthetic experience. Each of these goods, according to Finnis, has intrinsic value in the sense that it should, given human nature, be valued for its own sake and not merely for the sake of some other good it can assist in bringing about. Moreover, each of these goods is universal in the sense that it governs all human cultures at all times. The point of moral principles, on this view, is to give ethical structure to the pursuit of these basic goods; moral principles enable us to select among competing goods and to define what a human being can permissibly do in pursuit of a basic good.

On Finnis's view, the conceptual point of law is to facilitate the common good by providing authoritative rules that solve coordination problems that arise in connection with the common pursuit of these basic goods. Thus, Finnis sums up his theory of law as follows:

> [T]he term 'law' ... refer[s] primarily to rules made, in accordance with regulative legal rules, by a determinate and effective authority (itself identified and, standardly, constituted

> as an institution by legal rules) for a ‘complete’ community, and buttressed by sanctions in accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of adjudicative institutions, this ensemble of rules and institutions being directed to reasonably resolving any of the community’s co-ordination problems (and to ratifying, tolerating, regulating, or overriding co-ordination solutions from any other institutions or sources of norms) for the common good of that community (Finnis 1980, 276).

Again, it bears emphasizing that Finnis takes care to deny that there is any necessary moral test for legal validity: “one would simply be misunderstanding my conception of the nature and purpose of explanatory definitions of theoretical concepts if one supposed that my definition ‘ruled out as non-laws’ laws which failed to meet, or meet fully, one or other of the elements of the definition” (Finnis 1980, 278).

Nevertheless, Finnis believes that to the extent that a norm fails to satisfy these conditions, it likewise fails to fully manifest the nature of law and thereby fails to fully obligate the citizen-subject of the law. Unjust laws may obligate in a technical legal sense, on Finnis’s view, but they may fail to provide moral reasons for action of the sort that it is the point of legal authority to provide. Thus, Finnis argues that “a ruler’s use of authority is radically defective if he exploits his opportunities by making stipulations intended by him not for the common good but for his own or his friends’ or party’s or faction’s advantage, or out of malice against some person or group” (Finnis 1980, 352). For the ultimate basis of a ruler’s moral authority, on this view, “is the fact that he has the opportunity, and thus the responsibility, of furthering the common good by stipulating solutions to a community’s co- ordination problems” (Finnis 1980, 351).

Finnis’s theory is certainly more plausible as a theory of law than the traditional interpretation of classical naturalism, but such plausibility comes, for better or worse, at the expense of naturalism’s identity as a distinct theory of law. Indeed, it appears that Finnis’s natural law theory is compatible with naturalism’s historical adversary, legal positivism, inasmuch as Finnis’s view is compatible with a source-based theory of legal validity; laws that are technically valid in virtue of source but unjust do not, according to Finnis, fully obligate the citizen. Indeed, Finnis (1996) believes that Aquinas’s classical naturalism fully affirms the notion that human laws are “posited.”

IV. **The Procedural Naturalism of Lon L. Fuller**

Like Finnis, Lon Fuller (1964) rejects the conceptual naturalist idea that there are necessary *substantive* moral constraints on the content of law. But Fuller, unlike Finnis, believes that law is necessarily subject to a *procedural* morality. On Fuller’s view, human activity is necessarily goal-oriented or purposive in the sense that people engage in a particular activity because it helps them to achieve some end. Insofar as human activity is essentially purposive, according to Fuller, particular human activities can be understood only in terms that make reference to their purposes and ends. Thus, since lawmaking is essentially purposive activity, it can be understood only in terms that explicitly acknowledge its essential values and purposes:

> The only formula that might be called a definition of law offered in these writings is by now thoroughly familiar: law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules. Unlike most modern theories of law, this view treats law as an activity and regards a legal system as the product of a sustained purposive effort (Fuller 1964, 106).

To the extent that a definition of law can be given, then, it must include the idea that law’s essential function is to “achiev[e] … [social] order … through subjecting people’s conduct to the guidance of

general rules by which they may themselves orient their behavior” (Fuller 1965, 657).

Fuller’s functionalist conception of law implies that nothing can count as law unless it is capable of performing law’s essential function of guiding behavior. And to be capable of performing this function, a system of rules must satisfy the following principles: (P1) the rules must be expressed in general terms; (P2) the rules must be publicly promulgated; (P3) the rules must be prospective in effect; (P4) the rules must be expressed in understandable terms; (P5) the rules must be consistent with one another; (P6) the rules must not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties; (P7) the rules must not be changed so frequently that the subject cannot rely on them; and (P8) the rules must be administered in a manner consistent with their wording.

On Fuller’s view, no system of rules that fails minimally to satisfy these principles of legality can achieve law’s essential purpose of achieving social order through the use of rules that guide behavior. A system of rules that fails to satisfy (P2) or (P4), for example, cannot guide behavior because people will not be able to determine what the rules require. Accordingly, Fuller concludes that his eight principles are “internal” to law in the sense that they are built into the existence conditions for law.

These internal principles constitute a morality, according to Fuller, because law necessarily has positive moral value in two respects: (1) law conduces to a state of social order and (2) does so by respecting human autonomy because rules guide behavior. Since no system of rules can achieve these morally valuable objectives without minimally complying with the principles of legality, it follows, on Fuller’s view, that they constitute a morality. Since these moral principles are built into the existence conditions for law, they are internal and hence represent a conceptual connection between law and morality. Thus, like the classical naturalists and unlike Finnis, Fuller subscribes to the strongest form of the Overlap Thesis, which makes him a conceptual naturalist.

Nevertheless, Fuller’s conceptual naturalism is fundamentally different from that of classical naturalism. First, Fuller rejects the classical naturalist view that there are necessary moral constraints on the content of law, holding instead that there are necessary moral constraints on the procedural mechanisms by which law is made and administered: “What I have called the internal morality of law is ... a procedural version of natural law ... [in the sense that it is] concerned, not with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with the ways in which a system of rules for governing human conduct must be constructed and administered if it is to be efficacious and at the same time remain what it purports to be” (Fuller 1964, 96- 97).

Second, Fuller identifies the conceptual connection between law and morality at a higher level of abstraction than the classical naturalists. The classical naturalists view morality as providing substantive constraints on the content of individual laws; an unjust norm, on this view, is conceptually disqualified from being legally valid. In contrast, Fuller views morality as providing a constraint on the existence of a legal system: “A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all” (Fuller 1964, 39).

Fuller’s procedural naturalism is vulnerable to a number of objections. H.L.A. Hart, for example, denies Fuller’s claim that the principles of legality constitute an internal morality; according to Hart, Fuller confuses the notions of morality and efficacy:

> [T]he author’s insistence on classifying these principles of legality as a “morality” is a source of confusion both for him and his readers.... [T]he crucial objection to the designation of these principles of good legal craftsmanship as morality, in spite of the qualification “inner,” is that it perpetrates a confusion between two notions that it is vital to hold apart: the notions of purposive activity and morality. Poisoning is no doubt a purposive

> activity, and reflections on its purpose may show that it has its internal principles. ("Avoid poisons however lethal if they cause the victim to vomit"....) But to call these principles of the poisoner's art "the morality of poisoning" would simply blur the distinction between the notion of efficiency for a purpose and those final judgments about activities and purposes with which morality in its various forms is concerned (Hart 1965, 1285-86).

On Hart's view, all actions, including virtuous acts like lawmaking and impermissible acts like poisoning, have their own internal standards of efficacy. But insofar as such standards of efficacy conflict with morality, as they do in the case of poisoning, it follows that they are distinct from moral standards. Thus, while Hart concedes that something like Fuller's eight principles are built into the existence conditions for law, he concludes they do not constitute a conceptual connection between law and morality.

Unfortunately, Hart overlooks the fact that most of Fuller's eight principles double as moral ideals of fairness. For example, public promulgation in understandable terms may be a necessary condition for efficacy, but it is also a moral ideal; it is morally objectionable for a state to enforce rules that have not been publicly promulgated in terms reasonably calculated to give notice of what is required. Similarly, we take it for granted that it is wrong for a state to enact retroactive rules, inconsistent rules, and rules that require what is impossible. Poisoning may have its internal standards of efficacy, but such standards are distinguishable from the principles of legality in that they conflict with moral ideals.

Nevertheless, Fuller's principles operate internally, not as moral ideals, but merely as principles of efficacy. As Fuller would likely acknowledge, the existence of a legal system is consistent with considerable divergence from the principles of legality. Legal standards, for example, are necessarily promulgated in general terms that inevitably give rise to problems of vagueness. And officials all too often fail to administer the laws in a fair and even-handed manner—even in the best of legal systems. These divergences may always be *prima facie* objectionable, but they are inconsistent with a legal system only when they render a legal system incapable of performing its essential function of guiding behavior. Insofar as these principles are built into the existence conditions for law, it is because they operate as efficacy conditions—and not because they function as moral ideals.

V. **Ronald Dworkin's "Third Theory"**

Ronald Dworkin's so-called third theory of law is best understood as a response to legal positivism, which is essentially constituted by three theoretical commitments: the Social Fact Thesis, the Conventionality Thesis, and the Separability Thesis. The Social Fact Thesis asserts it is a necessary truth that legal validity is ultimately a function of certain kinds of social facts; the idea here is that what ultimately explains the validity of a law is the presence of certain social facts, especially formal promulgation by a legislature.

The Conventionality Thesis emphasizes law's conventional nature, claiming that the social facts giving rise to legal validity are authoritative in virtue of a social convention. On this view, the criteria that determine whether or not any given norm counts as a legal norm are binding because of an implicit or explicit agreement among officials. Thus, for example, the U.S. Constitution is authoritative in virtue of the conventional fact that it was formally ratified by all fifty states.

The Separability Thesis, at the most general level, simply denies naturalism's Overlap Thesis; according to the Separability Thesis, there is no conceptual overlap between the notions of law and morality. As Hart more narrowly construes it, the Separability Thesis is "just the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they

have often done so" (Hart 1994, 185-186).

Dworkin rejects positivism's Social Fact Thesis on the ground that there are some legal standards the authority of which cannot be explained in terms of social facts. In deciding hard cases, for example, judges often invoke moral principles that Dworkin believes do not derive their *legal* authority from the social criteria of legality contained in a rule of recognition (Dworkin 1977, p. 40).

In *Riggs v. Palmer*, for example, the court considered the question of whether a murderer could take under the will of his victim. At the time the case was decided, neither the statutes nor the case law governing wills expressly prohibited a murderer from taking under his victim's will. Despite this, the court declined to award the defendant his gift under the will on the ground that it would be wrong to allow him to profit from such a grievous wrong. On Dworkin's view, the court decided the case by citing "the principle that no man may profit from his own wrong as a background standard against which to read the statute of wills and in this way justified a new interpretation of that statute" (Dworkin 1977, 29).

On Dworkin's view, the *Riggs* court was not just reaching beyond the law to extralegal standards when it considered this principle. For the *Riggs* judges would "rightfully" have been criticized had they failed to consider this principle; if it were merely an extralegal standard, there would be no rightful grounds to criticize a failure to consider it (Dworkin 1977, 35). Accordingly, Dworkin concludes that the best explanation for the propriety of such criticism is that principles are part of the law.

Further, Dworkin maintains that the legal authority of standards like the *Riggs* principle cannot derive from promulgation in accordance with purely formal requirements: "[e]ven though principles draw support from the official acts of legal institutions, they do not have a simple or direct enough connection with these acts to frame that connection in terms of criteria specified by some ultimate master rule of recognition" (Dworkin 1977, 41).

On Dworkin's view, the legal authority of the *Riggs* principle can be explained wholly in terms of its content. The *Riggs* principle was binding, in part, because it is a requirement of fundamental fairness that figures into the best moral justification for a society's legal practices considered as a whole. A moral principle is legally authoritative, according to Dworkin, insofar as it maximally conduces to the best moral justification for a society's legal practices considered as a whole.

Dworkin believes that a legal principle maximally contributes to such a justification if and only if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the principle coheres with existing legal materials; and (2) the principle is the most morally attractive standard that satisfies (1). The correct legal principle is the one that makes the law the moral best it can be. Accordingly, on Dworkin's view, adjudication is and should be interpretive:

> [J]udges should decide hard cases by interpreting the political structure of their community in the following, perhaps special way: by trying to find the best justification they can find, in principles of political morality, for the structure as a whole, from the most profound constitutional rules and arrangements to the details of, for example, the private law of tort or contract (Dworkin 1982, 165).

There are, thus, two elements of a successful interpretation. First, since an interpretation is successful insofar as it justifies the particular practices of a particular society, the interpretation must *fit* with those practices in the sense that it coheres with existing legal materials defining the practices. Second, since an interpretation provides a *moral justification* for those practices, it must present them in the best possible moral light.

For this reason, Dworkin argues that a judge should strive to interpret a case in roughly the following way:

> A thoughtful judge might establish for himself, for example, a rough "threshold" of fit which any interpretation of data must meet in order to be "acceptable" on the dimension of fit, and then suppose that if more than one interpretation of some part of the law meets this threshold, the choice among these should be made, not through further and more precise comparisons between the two along that dimension, but by choosing the interpretation which is "substantively" better, that is, which better promotes the political ideals he thinks correct (Dworkin 1982, 171).

As Dworkin conceives it, then, the judge must approach judicial decision-making as something that resembles an exercise in moral philosophy. Thus, for example, the judge must decide cases on the basis of those moral principles that "figure[] in the soundest theory of law that can be provided as a justification for the explicit substantive and institutional rules of the jurisdiction in question" (Dworkin 1977, 66).

And this is a process, according to Dworkin, that "must carry the lawyer very deep into political and moral theory." Indeed, in later writings, Dworkin goes so far as to claim, somewhat implausibly, that "any judge's opinion is itself a piece of legal philosophy, even when the philosophy is hidden and the visible argument is dominated by citation and lists of facts" (Dworkin 1986, 90).

Dworkin believes his theory of judicial obligation is a consequence of what he calls the Rights Thesis, according to which judicial decisions always enforce pre-existing rights: "even when no settled rule disposes of the case, one party may nevertheless have a right to win. It remains the judge's duty, even in hard cases, to discover what the rights of the parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively" (Dworkin 1977, 81).

In "Hard Cases," Dworkin distinguishes between two kinds of legal argument. Arguments of policy "justify a political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the community as a whole" (Dworkin 1977, 82). In contrast, arguments of principle "justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some individual or group right" (Dworkin 1977, 82).

On Dworkin's view, while the legislature may legitimately enact laws that are justified by arguments of policy, courts may not pursue such arguments in deciding cases. For a consequentialist argument of policy can never provide an adequate justification for deciding in favor of one party's claim of right and against another party's claim of right. An appeal to a pre-existing right, according to Dworkin, can ultimately be justified only by an argument of principle. Thus, insofar as judicial decisions necessarily adjudicate claims of right, they must ultimately be based on the moral principles that figure into the best justification of the legal practices considered as a whole.

Notice that Dworkin's views on legal principles and judicial obligation are inconsistent with all three of legal positivism's core commitments. Each contradicts the Conventionality Thesis insofar as judges are bound to interpret posited law in light of unposited moral principles. Each contradicts the Social Fact Thesis because these moral principles count as part of a community's law regardless of whether they have been formally promulgated. Most importantly, Dworkin's view contradicts the Separability Thesis in that it seems to imply that some norms are necessarily valid in virtue of their moral content. It is his denial of the Separability Thesis that places Dworkin in the naturalist camp.

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Natural Theology

"Natural Theology" is the favorite term in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries designating the knowledge of God drawn from nature in distinction from the knowledge of God contained in revelation. This division of theology into natural and revealed had its roots in the scholastic distinction between the two truths, one derived from nature by the use of the Aristotelian logic, subject to the authority of the Church, the other, truth above reason, revealed by God but formulated and taught solely by authority of the Church. The deists relied exclusively on natural theology, on the ground that the being and attributes of God could be exhaustively ascertained from the constitution and course of the world, thus superseding the necessity of supernatural revelation. David Hume, by his theory of knowledge, proved that even this knowledge was too precarious for rational certitude. On the other hand, Bishop Butler (*Analogy of Religion,* London, 1736) maintained that natural and revealed religion were so far one that the truths of natural theology provided a basis for the characteristic truths of the Christian faith, such as miracles, the incarnation, and redemption. Later, the wisdom, power, and even the goodness of God were held to be demonstrable by the processes of natural theology (Samuel Clarke, *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, London, 1-105; William Paley, *Natural Theology*, ib. 1802). The function and name of *natural theology* continued in vogue until the latter portion of the 19th century. This habit of thought has, however, been strongly opposed by Ritschl and his school. Relying on Kant's distinction between the pure and the practical reason, they seek the source of the knowledge of God not through the theoretic judgments of science or philosophy, but only through value-judgments to which revelation is addressed. Nature being impersonal can neither receive nor communicate the personal redemptive disclosure of God which man needs for reconciliation with him; this is to be sought ultimately only in Christ and the Christian community.

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Naturalistic Fallacy

The naturalistic fallacy is a metaethical theory proposed by G.E. Moore (1873-1958) in *Principia Ethica* (1903) that the notion of moral goodness cannot be defined or identified with any property. Moore argues that "goodness" is a foundational and unanalyzable property, similar to the foundational notion of "yellowness," and is not capable of being explained in terms of anything more basic. We intuitively recognize goodness when we see it, as we similarly recognize yellowness when we see it. But the notion of "goodness" itself cannot be defined. For Moore, philosophers who attempt to define intrinsic goodness commit the *naturalistic fallacy*, the fallacy of defining the term "goodness" in terms of some natural property, such as pleasure. Moore defends his contention with what has been called the *open question argument*. For any property we attempt to identify with "goodness," we can ask, "Is that property itself good?" For example, if I claim that pleasure is the highest intrinsic good, the question can be asked, "But, is pleasure itself good?" The fact that this question makes sense shows that "pleasure" and "goodness" are not identical. Moore believes that no proposed natural property can pass the test of the open question argument. This implies that all moral theories fail that are based on anything other than immediate moral intuition. It is only of secondary importance whether an action produces pleasure, is in accord with the will of God, or is conducive to reason. What truly matters is whether we can simply recognize the goodness of a particular action.

Commentators argue that we may more accurately view the naturalistic fallacy as a definist fallacy: it is wrong to identify moral goodness with *any* property at all. Subsets of the definist fallacy are (1) the naturalistic fallacy, which is the attempt to identify goodness with a natural property such as pleasure, and (2) the metaphysical fallacy, which is the attempt to identify goodness with a metaphysical property, such as the will of God.

One problem with Moore's theory can be raised from a positivist or practical point of view. Assume for the moment that his open question argument is successful, and goodness cannot be strictly defined in terms of any natural property. There is still another way in which a natural property such as human happiness can be considered the highest intrinsic good. If in the past we have observed that all moral action promotes human happiness, then for all *practical* purposes, we have discovered the highest intrinsic good. We could argue that it is irrelevant at that point whether we can intuitively recognize the presence of goodness. The presence of human happiness is the only criterion of moral value we need for the purposes of making our judgment.

A second problem with Moore's view concerns how it is that we perceive goodness, given that it is indefinable and foundational. Although "yellowness" is an indefinable and foundational concept, we perceive yellowness through our sense of sight. Is there a special *moral sense* we have which allows us to perceive moral goodness? Moore resists postulating the existence of a moral sixth sense -- an approach which was popular in the 18th century. Instead, he argues that we *intuitively* recognize good. Perception of moral goodness, then, seems to depend on a special rational faculty for Moore. But, from a

psychological standpoint, this is as empirically problematic as moral sense theory.

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Neoplatonism

CHARACTER AND ORIGIN. Neoplatonism is the last development of Greek philosophy. It adopted elements of the older systems, especially the Platonic, and added an element of mystical speculation. This speculation focused mainly on the relation of God to humans and the universe; however, physics, ethics, and logic were not completely neglected. The mystical tendency, which is apparent in Plato, is responsible for redirecting Neoplatonic speculation away from the scientific strictness of older Greek philosophers. In the historical development the Neoplatonists follow immediately upon the Neopythagoreans and the Pythagoreanizing or eclectic Platonists, but the Neoplatonist school had much more original and independent ideas than the schools which preceded it. As a definite school, it originated in Alexandria, where the mixture of nationalities made for a fusion of earlier philosophic and religious tendencies. Its founder was Ammonius Saccas, who had been brought up a Christian and had then returned to Hellenism. He left no written remains, and it is thus difficult to determine his exact relation to his successors. Among his pupils were Plotinus, the two Origens (the Neoplatonist and the Christian),and Longinus the critic. When Neoplatonism is mentioned in a general way, it connotes mainly the teaching of Plotinus. See PLOTINUS

PORPHYRY. Porphyry, the head of the Syrian school, was the most important among the disciples of Plotinus. Porphyry was born at Batanea, Syria in 233 CE, and he died in Rome in 304 CE. He wrote lives of Plotinus and Pythagoras, *treatises De abstinentia* and *De antro nymphartim*, a letter to Marcella, another *De diis doemonibus ad Anebonem*, a brief compendium of the doctrines of Plotinus entitled *Aphormai pros ta noeta*. he also authored an introduction to the "Categories" of Aristotle, besides a number of other works no longer in existence. The work last named, *Aphormai pros ta noeta*, is of considerable importance in the history of philosophy, as it contains the germ of the whole controversy between realism and nominalism. The religious character of Porphyry's philosophy is shown by his placing its aim in the "saving of the soul." He mentions four kinds of virtues: the political, which make an ordinary good man; the purifying, which make him a "daemonic" man; those which look up to the *nous*, their cause, constituting the rational activity of the soul; and the virtue of the *nous* itself, the paradigmatic. Connected with the purification on which he insists so strongly is the strict asceticism which he recommends, including abstinence from meat and from sexual intercourse. He asserts that he has reached once, but only once, and that when he was sixty-eight, the height of his desire, being permitted to approach and to be united with the most high God. While he regarded the national religions as justifiable, making no distinction between those of the Greeks and those of the barbarians, he opposed strongly the complete novelty of Christianity in his fifteen books "Against the Christians," which were totally destroyed by Theodosius II. in 335. This work is an indication that the Neoplatonists felt the whole Hellenic system and their own position to be threatened by Christianity. It was considered of so much importance that replies were published by Methodius and Eusebius of Caesarea among others.

JAMBLICHUS AND OTHERS. The sober character of Neoplatonism was lost in the soaring speculations of Jamblichus. Jamblichus was born in Coele, Syria in 283 CE, and he died at Alexandria in 330 CE. His belief in magic, miracles, and theurgy (the art of compelling demons and other supernatural powers to produce desired results), goes beyond all measure. His miracle-seeking followers believed him a being of a superior order, and called him "the Divine" or "Divinest." Besides his principal work, the *Synagoge ton Pythagoreion dogmaton*, five others are extant, of which the most important are the *Vita Pythagorica* and the *Adhortatiq ad philosophiam*. The *treatise De mysteries*, said to have been ascribed to him by Proclus, is certainly not his, but probably belongs to some member of his school. Jainblichus attempted to justify the whole polytheistic system, and added a still more absolutely primal and exalted One above the One of Plotinus. The lower powers are divided into a long series of hierarchies, described with a Pythagorean fondness for exact numbers. With the whole theurgic system is connected the belief that images of the gods, whether fallen from heaven or made by men, partake of divinity and are capable of working miracles. The surest method for winning the divine protection is by prayer, which the gods can bear apart from any tangible medium. The return to the suprasensual world is made by means of the virtues, of which at first Jamblichus adopted the fourfold classification of Porphyry, afterward adding a fifth class, the priestly or simple virtues (simple as referring directly to the One), by which the soul rises to mystic union with the Supreme. Among the disciples of Jamblichus the most independent thinker was Theodorus of Asine. Others of the Syrian school were Dexippus, Edesius of Cappadocia, who long conducted a flourishing school at Pergamum, Chrysanthius of Sardis, and Ennapius, known by his biographies of philosophers and sophists. A singular combination of learning and attractiveness won wide renown for Hypatia. Her disciple and admirer Synesius showed a great deal of Neoplatonist influence in his writings.

THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL. The Athenian school was later in time than the Syrian, and devoted itself to more scientific efforts, especially the exposition of Plato and Aristotle. Its first leader was Plutarch of Athens, head of the school there until 433. He seems to have followed Plotinus very closely. His successor was Syrianus (until about 450),who was then succeeded by Proclusthe Lycian. He remained the head of the school until his death in 485. Proclusthe Lycian's principal works are his commentaries on Plato (especially on the *Timoxus* and the *Republic*), the *Stoicheiosis theologike*, and the *Peri tes kata Platona theologias*. He attempted, like the later scholastics, to reduce the entire philosophical tradition to a complete logical system. He regarded the Platonic writings in the light of a revelation, but paid much attention also to Homer and Hesiod, and had an unbounded reverence for Jamblichus, on whom, with Plotinus, he depends for a large part of his system. Of less importance are his successors at Athens, Marinus, Zenodotus, Isidore of Alexandria, Hegias, and Damascius. In 529 the teaching of philosophy at Athens was suppressed by Justinian and the property of the school confiscated. Two years later, Damascius, with Simplicius, the well-known commentator on Aristotle, and five other Neoplatonists, went to Persia in the hope of finding in King Chosroes a friend of philosophy, but were grievously disappointed and returned to Athens in 533. From this time on the efforts of those who were interested in such matters tended more and more to limit themselves to the exposition of earlier philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle. The final dissolution of Neoplatonism was due partly to its unbounded recklessness of speculation and partly to the moral and religious force of Christianity, which borrowed what was most valuable of the Neoplatonist system and breathed new life into it. Augustine, Dionysius the Areopagite, and Scotus Erigena were particularly influenced by it, and through the two latter both the mystical and the pantheistic movements of the Middle Ages received much of their direction.

Neoplatonism had a marked revival at the Renaissance, especially through Marsilius Ficinus and Pico della Mirandola; and through Giordano Bruno in particular it has come down to modern times in one form or another, being discoverable by an acute analysis in the theories of schelling, Fichte, Hegel, and other leading nineteenth-century philosophers.

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Nihilism

Nihilism is the belief that all values are baseless and that nothing can be known or communicated. It is often associated with extreme pessimism and a radical skepticism that condemns existence. A true nihilist would believe in nothing, have no loyalties, and no purpose other than, perhaps, an impulse to destroy. While few philosophers would claim to be nihilists, nihilism is most often associated with Friedrich Nietzsche who argued that its corrosive effects would eventually destroy all moral, religious, and metaphysical convictions and precipitate the greatest crisis in human history. In the 20th century, nihilistic themes--epistemological failure, value destruction, and cosmic purposelessness--have preoccupied artists, social critics, and philosophers. Mid-century, for example, the existentialists helped popularize tenets of nihilism in their attempts to blunt its destructive potential. By the end of the century, existential despair as a response to nihilism gave way to an attitude of indifference, often associated with antifoundationalism.

Section Headings:

Origins

"Nihilism" comes from the Latin *nihil*, or nothing, which means not anything, that which does not exist. It appears in the verb "annihilate," meaning to bring to nothing, to destroy completely. Early in the nineteenth century, Friedrich Jacobi used the word to negatively characterize transcendental idealism. It only became popularized, however, after its appearance in Ivan Turgenev's novel *Fathers and Sons* (1862) where he used "nihilism" to describe the crude scientism espoused by his character Bazarov who preaches a creed of total negation.

In Russia, nihilism became identified with a loosely organized revolutionary movement (C.1860-1917) that rejected the authority of the state, church, and family. In his early writing, anarchist leader Mikhael Bakunin (1814-1876) composed the notorious entreaty still identified with nihilism: "Let us put our trust in the eternal spirit which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unsearchable and eternally creative source of all life--the passion for destruction is also a creative passion!" (*Reaction in Germany*, 1842). The movement advocated a social arrangement based on rationalism and materialism as the sole source of knowledge and individual freedom as the highest goal. By rejecting man's spiritual essence in

favor of a solely materialistic one, nihilists denounced God and religious authority as antithetical to freedom. The movement eventually deteriorated into an ethos of subversion, destruction, and anarchy, and by the late 1870s, a nihilist was anyone associated with clandestine political groups advocating terrorism and assassination.

The earliest philosophical positions associated with what could be characterized as a nihilistic outlook are those of the Skeptics. Because they denied the possibility of certainty, Skeptics could denounce traditional truths as unjustifiable opinions. When Demosthenes (c.371-322 BC), for example, observes that "What he wished to believe, that is what each man believes" (*Olynthiac*), he posits the relational nature of knowledge. Extreme skepticism, then, is linked to *epistemological nihilism* which denies the possibility of knowledge and truth; this form of nihilism is currently identified with postmodern antifoundationalism. Nihilism, in fact, can be understood in several different ways. *Political Nihilism*, as noted, is associated with the belief that the destruction of all existing political, social, and religious order is a prerequisite for any future improvement. *Ethical nihilism* or moral nihilism rejects the possibility of absolute moral or ethical values. Instead, good and evil are nebulous, and values addressing such are the product of nothing more than social and emotive pressures. *Existential nihilism* is the notion that life has no intrinsic meaning or value, and it is, no doubt, the most commonly used and understood sense of the word today.

Max Stirner's (1806-1856) attacks on systematic philosophy, his denial of absolutes, and his rejection of abstract concepts of any kind often places him among the first philosophical nihilists. For Stirner, achieving individual freedom is the only law; and the state, which necessarily imperils freedom, must be destroyed. Even beyond the oppression of the state, though, are the constraints imposed by others because their very existence is an obstacle compromising individual freedom. Thus Stirner argues that existence is an endless "war of each against all" (*The Ego and its Own*, trans. 1907).

Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism

Among philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche is most often associated with nihilism. For Nietzsche, there is no objective order or structure in the world except what we give it. Penetrating the façades buttressing convictions, the nihilist discovers that all values are baseless and that reason is impotent. "*Every* belief, every considering something-true," Nietzsche writes, "is necessarily false because there is simply no *true world*" (*Will to Power* [notes from 1883-1888]). For him, nihilism requires a radical repudiation of all imposed values and meaning: "Nihilism is . . . not only the belief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts one's shoulder to the plough; *one destroys"* (*Will to Power*).

The caustic strength of nihilism is absolute, Nietzsche argues, and under its withering scrutiny "*the highest values devalue themselves*. The aim is lacking, and 'Why' finds no answer" (*Will to Power*). Inevitably, nihilism will expose all cherished beliefs and sacrosanct truths as symptoms of a defective Western mythos. This collapse of meaning, relevance, and purpose will be the most destructive force in history, constituting a total assault on reality and nothing less than the greatest crisis of humanity:

> What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: *the advent of nihilism*. . . . For some time now our whole European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach the end. . . . (*Will to Power*)

Since Nietzsche's compelling critique, nihilistic themes--epistemological failure, value destruction, and cosmic purposelessness--have preoccupied artists, social critics, and philosophers. Convinced that Nietzsche's analysis was accurate, for example, Oswald Spengler in *The Decline of the West* (1926) studied several cultures to confirm that patterns of nihilism were indeed a conspicuous feature of collapsing civilizations. In each of the failed cultures he examines, Spengler noticed that centuries-old religious, artistic, and political traditions were weakened and finally toppled by the insidious workings of several distinct nihilistic postures: the Faustian nihilist "shatters the ideals"; the Apollinian nihilist "watches them crumble before his eyes"; and the Indian nihilist "withdraws from their presence into himself." Withdrawal, for instance, often identified with the negation of reality and resignation advocated by Eastern religions, is in the West associated with various versions of epicureanism and stoicism. In his study, Spengler concludes that Western civilization is already in the advanced stages of decay with all three forms of nihilism working to undermine epistemological authority and ontological grounding.

In 1927, Martin Heidegger, to cite another example, observed that nihilism in various and hidden forms was already "the normal state of man" (*The Question of Being*). Other philosophers' predictions about nihilism's impact have been dire. Outlining the symptoms of nihilism in the 20th century, Helmut Thielicke wrote that "Nihilism literally has only one truth to declare, namely, that ultimately Nothingness prevails and the world is meaningless" (*Nihilism: Its Origin and Nature, with a Christian Answer*, 1969). From the nihilist's perspective, one can conclude that life is completely amoral, a conclusion, Thielicke believes, that motivates such monstrosities as the Nazi reign of terror. Gloomy predictions of nihilism's impact are also charted in Eugene Rose's *Nihilism: The Root of the Revolution of the Modern Age* (1994). If nihilism proves victorious--and it's well on its way, he argues--our world will become "a cold, inhuman world" where "nothingness, incoherence, and absurdity" will triumph.

Existential Nihilism

While nihilism is often discussed in terms of extreme skepticism and relativism, for most of the 20th century it has been associated with the belief that life is meaningless. Existential nihilism begins with the notion that the world is without meaning or purpose. Given this circumstance, existence itself--all action, suffering, and feeling--is ultimately senseless and empty.

In *The Dark Side: Thoughts on the Futility of Life* (1994), Alan Pratt demonstrates that existential nihilism, in one form or another, has been a part of the Western intellectual tradition from the beginning. The Skeptic Empedocles' observation that "the life of mortals is so mean a thing as to be virtually un-life," for instance, embodies the same kind of extreme pessimism associated with existential nihilism. In antiquity, such profound pessimism may have reached its apex with Hegesis. Because miseries vastly outnumber pleasures, happiness is impossible, the philosopher argues, and subsequently advocates suicide. Centuries later during the Renaissance, William Shakespeare eloquently summarized the existential nihilist's perspective when, in this famous passage near the end of *Macbeth*, he has Macbeth pour out his disgust for life:

> Out, out, brief candle!
> Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
> That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
> And then is heard no more; it is a tale
> Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,

Signifying nothing.

In the twentieth century, it's the atheistic existentialist movement, popularized in France in the 1940s and 50s, that is responsible for the currency of existential nihilism in the popular consciousness. Jean-Paul Sartre's (1905-1980) defining preposition for the movement, "existence precedes essence," rules out any ground or foundation for establishing an essential self or a human nature. When we abandon illusions, life is revealed as nothing; and for the existentialists, nothingness is the source of not only absolute freedom but also existential horror and emotional anguish. Nothingness reveals each individual as an isolated being "thrown" into an alien and unresponsive universe, barred forever from knowing why yet required to invent meaning. It's a situation that's nothing short of *absurd*. Writing from the enlightened perspective of the absurd, Albert Camus (1913-1960) observed that Sisyphus' plight, condemned to eternal, useless struggle, was a superb metaphor for human existence (*The Myth of Sisyphus*, 1942).

The common thread in the literature of the existentialists is coping with the emotional anguish arising from our confrontation with nothingness, and they expended great energy responding to the question of whether surviving it was possible. Their answer was a qualified "Yes," advocating a formula of passionate commitment and impassive stoicism. In retrospect, it was an anecdote tinged with desperation because in an absurd world there are absolutely no guidelines, and any course of action is problematic. Passionate commitment, be it to conquest, creation, or whatever, is itself meaningless. Enter nihilism.

Camus, like the other existentialists, was convinced that nihilism was the most vexing problem of the twentieth century. Although he argues passionately that individuals could endure its corrosive effects, his most famous works betray the extraordinary difficulty he faced building a convincing case. In *The Stranger* (1942), for example, Meursault has rejected the existential suppositions on which the uninitiated and weak rely. Just moments before his execution for a gratuitous murder, he discovers that life alone is reason enough for living, a *raison d'être*, however, that in context seems scarcely convincing. In *Caligula* (1944), the mad emperor tries to escape the human predicament by dehumanizing himself with acts of senseless violence, fails, and surreptitiously arranges his own assassination. *The Plague* (1947) shows the futility of doing one's best in an absurd world. And in his last novel, the short and sardonic, *The Fall* (1956), Camus posits that *everyone* has bloody hands because we are all responsible for making a sorry state worse by our inane action and inaction alike. In these works and other works by the existentialists, one is often left with the impression that living authentically with the meaninglessness of life is impossible.

Camus was fully aware of the pitfalls of defining existence without meaning, and in his philosophical essay *The Rebel* (1951) he faces the problem of nihilism head-on. In it, he describes at length how metaphysical collapse often ends in total negation and the victory of nihilism, characterized by profound hatred, pathological destruction, and incalculable violence and death.

Antifoundationalism and Nihilism

By the late 20th century, "nihilism" had assumed two different castes. In one form, "nihilist" is used to characterize the postmodern man, a dehumanized conformist, alienated, indifferent, and baffled, directing psychological energy into hedonistic narcissism or into a deep *ressentiment* that often explodes in violence. This perspective is derived from the existentialists' reflections on nihilism stripped of any hopeful expectations, leaving only the experience of sickness, decay, and disintegration.

In his study of meaninglessness, Donald Crosby writes that the source of modern nihilism paradoxically

stems from a commitment to honest intellectual openness. "Once set in motion, the process of questioning could come to but one end, the erosion of conviction and certitude and collapse into despair" (*The Specter of the Absurd,* 1988). When sincere inquiry is extended to moral convictions and social consensus, it can prove deadly, Crosby continues, promoting forces that ultimately destroy civilizations. Michael Novak's recently revised *The Experience of Nothingness* (1968, 1998) tells a similar story. Both studies are responses to the existentialists' gloomy findings from earlier in the century. And both optimistically discuss ways out of the abyss by focusing of the positive implications nothingness reveals, such as liberty, freedom, and creative possibilities. Novak, for example, describes how since WWII we have been working to "climb out of nihilism" on the way to building a new civilization.

In contrast to the efforts to overcome nihilism noted above is the uniquely postmodern response associated with the current antifoundationalists. The philosophical, ethical, and intellectual crisis of nihilism that has tormented modern philosophers for over a century has given way to mild annoyance or, more interestingly, an upbeat acceptance of meaninglessness.

French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard characterizes postmodernism as an "incredulity toward metanarratives," those all-embracing foundations that we have relied on to make sense of the world. This extreme skepticism has undermined intellectual and moral hierarchies and made "truth" claims, transcendental or transcultural, problematic. Postmodern antifoundationalists, paradoxically grounded in relativism, dismiss knowledge as relational and "truth" as transitory, genuine only until something more palatable replaces it (reminiscent of William James' notion of "cash value"). The critic Jacques Derrida, for example, asserts that one can never be sure that what one *knows* corresponds with what *is.* Since human beings participate in only an infinitesimal part of the whole, they are unable to grasp anything with certainty, and absolutes are merely "fictional forms."

American antifoundationalist Richard Rorty makes a similar point: "Nothing grounds our practices, nothing legitimizes them, nothing shows them to be in touch with the way things are" ("From Logic to Language to Play," 1986). This epistemological cul-de-sac, Rorty concludes, leads inevitably to nihilism. "Faced with the nonhuman, the nonlinguistic, we no longer have the ability to overcome contingency and pain by appropriation and transformation, but only the ability to *recognize* contingency and pain" (*Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, 1989*).* In contrast to Nietzsche's fears and the angst of the existentialists, nihilism becomes for the antifoundationalists just another aspect of our contemporary milieu, one best endured with sang-froid.

In *The Banalization of Nihilism* (1992) Karen Carr discusses the antifoundationalist response to nihilism. Although it still inflames a paralyzing relativism and subverts critical tools, "cheerful nihilism" carries the day, she notes, distinguished by an easy-going acceptance of meaninglessness. Such a development, Carr concludes, is alarming. If we accept that all perspectives are equally non-binding, then intellectual or moral arrogance will determine which perspective has precedence. Worse still, the banalization of nihilism creates an environment where ideas can be imposed forcibly with little resistance, raw power alone determining intellectual and moral hierarchies. It's a conclusion that dovetails nicely with Nietzsche's, who pointed out that all interpretations of the world are simply manifestations of will-to-power.

Conclusion

It has been over a century now since Nietzsche explored nihilism and its implications for civilization. As he predicted, nihilism's impact on the culture and values of the 20th century has been pervasive, its apocalyptic tenor spawning a mood of gloom and a good deal of anxiety, anger, and terror. Interestingly, Nietzsche himself, a radical skeptic preoccupied with language, knowledge, and truth, anticipated many of the themes of postmodernity. It's helpful to note, then, that he believed we could--at a terrible price--eventually work through nihilism. If we survived the process of destroying all interpretations of the world, we could then perhaps discover the correct course for humankind:

> I praise, I do not reproach, [nihilism's] arrival. I believe it is one of the greatest crises, a moment of the deepest self-reflection of humanity. Whether man recovers from it, whether he becomes master of this crisis, is a question of his strength. It is possible. . . . (*Complete Works* Vol. 13)

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Noncognitivism

In Ethical theory, noncognitivism is the view that moral utterances are neither true nor false statements about the world. They are, instead, expressions of feelings or prescriptive utterances. The key to this issue is distinguishing between two types of utterances: (1) propositional utterances, and (2) nonpropositional utterances. Propositional utterances are either true or false statements about the world, such as the following:

- The door is brown
- The house is on fire
- Jones claims to have seen Elvis
- Smith is wearing his leisure suit again

To test for whether the statement "the door is brown" is propositional, we need only to ask, "Is it true or false that 'the door is brown?'" Since this question is intelligible, then the statement, "the door is brown" is propositional. Nonpropositional sentences, by contrast, are utterances which are not propositional. Examples of these are,

- What time is it?
- Keep your dog out of my yard!
- Oh, my aching back!
- Three cheers for Old Glory!

Although we understand what is being said by each of these utterances, they are neither true nor false statements about the world. For example, it makes no sense to ask, "Is it true or false that 'what time is it?'" Nonpropositional utterances include questions (such as "what time is it?"), commands (such as "keep your dog out of my yard!"), and expressions of feelings (such as "oh my aching back!").

Consider the following list of moral utterances:

- Jones is a good man
- Charity is good
- Smith is a bad man
- Murder is wrong

The traditional view of moral utterances is that they are propositional, since it seems intelligible to ask, "is it true or false that 'Jones is a good man'?" This traditional view is called cognitivism since it is suggested that the truth value of moral utterances can be known (or subject to cognition). Logical positivism challenges cognitivism arguing that, although moral statements may appear to be true or false statements about the world, they are not really propositional. Instead, they are nonpropositional utterances which are disguised as propositions. This view is called noncognitivism

since it contends that the truth value of moral utterances cannot be known (or subject to cognition).

One version of noncognitivism, called emotivism, associated with C.L. Stevenson, suggests that moral utterances are primarily nonpropositional expressions of our feelings, such as "Three cheers for Old Glory!" The statement, "Jones is a good man" simply expresses our approval of Jones, and could be reworded more accurately as "Three cheers for Jones!" Another version of noncognitivism, called prescriptivism, associated with R.M. Hare, contends that moral utterances are primarily nonpropositional commands, such as "Keep your dog out of my yard!" The statement, "Murder is wrong," is primarily a command intended to discourage people from murdering. This, too, could be more accurately reworded as, "Don't murder!"

The strongest defense of noncognitivism is to question the reference of moral predicates in statements such as "Jones *is a good man*". For, if such a statement is propositional (or cognitive) it must refer to something. However, it does not appear to mirror the world of facts as does a factual claim such as "Jones is a bald man." On the other hand, moral utterances are not complete nonsense, such as "I hear the color green." A noncognitivist interpretation of moral utterances is therefore the only remaining alternative.

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Objectivity

The word "objectivity" refers to the view that the truth of a thing is independent from the observing subject. The notion of objectivity entails that certain things exist independently from the mind, or that they are at least in an external sphere. Objective truths are independent of human wishes and beliefs. The notion of objectivity is especially relevant to the status of our various ideas, and the question is to what extent objectivity is possible for thought, and to what extent it is necessary.

In epistemology, the objectivist position is that truth independent of the individual; this follows the correspondence theory of truth. However, idealists use 'objectivity" to designate that existence in thought is the only kind of real existence. In metaphysics, Plato identifies objectivity as pertaining to the world of the forms. For Plato, the forms reside in a separate world, which is invisible to our sense, although obtainable through reason. Thus, Plato refers to real objects the "knowable forms" which include the objective truths of justice, beauty, truth, and love.

Philosophers of the modern period concede the reality of the objective realm, although argue that it is unattainable. This is so of Locke's account of the a thing's substance, and Kant's view that our knowledge is restricted to the phenomenal realm, with no direct access to things in themselves.

In this century, Richard Rorty distinguishes between two notions of "objectivity." One involves the correspondence with what is out there, and is supposedly discovered by an algorithm. This Rorty rejects as since we have no idea how to perform this task. His second notion of "objective" involves those considerations adopted by a consensus of rational discussants. This, he believes, is the most objectivity we can hope for.

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William of Ockham (d. 1347)

LIFE. William of Ockham, the Franciscan school man, nominalist, and "*doctor invincibilis,*" was born at Ockham in 1280 and died in Munich on April 10, 1349. Of his early life, little is known. From the scarce data, it may be concluded that he entered the Franciscan order at an early age. He received his bachelor's degree at Oxford, and his master's at Paris, where he taught from a date between 1315 and 1320. The tradition that he was a pupil of Duns Scotus is probably correct. There is no evidence that he returned to England and taught at Oxford. In any case, it is with Paris that his principal teaching activity is connected. His doctrines had taken such hold there by 1339 that the philosophical faculty felt obliged to issue a warning against them. By that time he himself had left Paris. The question of poverty which so deeply agitated his order determined the later course of his life. He threw all his strength into the defense of the ideal of absolute poverty. But it was not long before their common ground of opposition to the pope drew the extreme Franciscans together with the Emperor Louis the Bavarian, the opponent of John XXII. At the chapter of the order in Perugia, Ockham and Bonagratia were the chief supporters of the general Michael of Cesena. They supported his strict views, and afterward they spent some time in the dioceses of Ferrara and Bologna, urgino, considering the absolute poverty of Christ and the apostles as a necessary ideal. In December, 1323, he was summoned with some others to appear before the pope at Avignon, and was imprisoned there for over four years. On May 25, 1328, Michael of Cesena and Bonagratia made his escape and fled to Italy. Deposed and excommunicated, they made common cause with the emperor, who was then in Italy. In 1329 a general chapter held in Paris deposed Michael of Cesena from his office, and two years later he and his adherents were expelled from the order. Ockham became one of the emperor's principal advisers and literary defenders. The political ideas which he had already represented in Paris were now developed and adapted to the circumstances of the time. In stepping outside the range of pure theology, he never forgot that he was a theologian. The belief that John XXII. was a heretic and no true pope, that the poverty of Christ and the apostles was an article of faith, were as much a part of his fixed belief as that the State and the rights of the emperor were independent of pope and Church. After the unfortunate issue of Louis' visit to Rome, the Franciscans followed him to Munich in Feb., 1330 and took up their abode in a neighboring house of the order, where most of the political writings of Ockham were composed. In 1342 Michael of Cesena died, transmitting the seal of the order and his claims to its headship to Ockham. The death of Louis on Oct. 11, 1347 , the loss of some of the Munich group, and the reconciliation of the new Emperor Charles IV. with the papacy, left Ockham increasingly alone. Eventually, the time came when he was the only one of the old leaders left. He was once more cited in 1349 before the papal tribunal, but the negotiations came to naught with his refusal to admit that Louis was a heretic and schismatic. Clement VI. demanded that the order should take action. A chapter held in Whitsuntide, 1349, asserted that but few brothers remained who had supported Michael of Cesena and Louis; that " William the Englishman," who was prominent among these, had sent back the seal of the order to the general, and that he and the

others, while they could not conveniently appear in Rome, petitioned for release from their excommunication. On June 8, 1349, The pope offered to grant this request on condition of their subscribing a formula which was somewhat less stringent than that which had been usual since John XXII. Trithemius, Wadding, and others assert that Ockham signed this and was absolved. However, there is no documentary evidence to this effect, and Jacobus de Marchia says expressly that the three principal leaders "remained excommunicated heretics." This is more probably the case, whether Ockham remained inflexible or death intervened too soon to allow his acceptance of the terms of peace. The date of his death is uncertain; he was undoubtedly alive in the spring of 1349, and thus the date given on his monument (of later construction) in the former Franciscan chapel at Alunich (April 10, 1347) cannot be right. The day and month may be accepted, but the year will be either 1350, or more probably 1349. This would account for the theory that he had announced his readiness to make submission, but died before it could be accomplished.

WRITINGS. There is no complete edition of the works of Ockham, which can serve as an indicator of the disfavor into which he fell by his rebellious attitude. Although the numerous manuscripts and early printed editions testify to the interest which was felt in his writings. Under the head of philosophical works may be named the *Expositio aurea et admodum utilis super totam artem veterem*. This work, in the form of commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry, contains Ockham's logic, epistemology, metaphysic, *Summa logices, Qucestiones in octo libros physicorum, Summultv in libros physicorum,* and two or three works still unprinted. The principal theological work is *Quoestiones et decisiones in quatuor libros sententiarum*. The first book is much fuller than the other three and is frequently found in manuscripts independent of them. This leads us to believe that Ockham published it before the other three and on a much larger scale. Other theological treatises are the *Centiloquium theologicum,* "embracing almost the whole of speculative theology under one hundred conclusions," which gives a interesting collection of instances of what rational theology might consider possible. *Quodlibeta septem*, deals with the principal problems of philosophy and theology, based probably on the disputations with which he began his Paris teaching. *De Sacramento altaris and De corpore Christi*, two parts of one work, which was used to supply theoretical support for Luther's eucharistic doctrine (*De prcedestinatione et futuris contingentibus*).

NOMINALISM. The great revival of philosophical and theological study which the thirteenth century witnessed was conditioned by the influence of Aristotle. The theory of the universe propounded by the Stagirite had to be reconciled with the traditional Platonic-Augustinian realism. This Thomas Aquinas undertook to do, following, Aristotle as closely as possible. Duns Scotus, on the other hand, attempted to maintain the ancient realism, while supporting it by modern or Aristotelian methods. Interests and tendencies, however, came up in his work which drove his disciples away from his position. The growth of empirical research and psychological analysis together with the new activity of the reason in the epistemological field on the one side, and the recognition of the fact that the specific and the particular was the end of nature on the other, led to results widely divergent from those of Scotus. Here was Ockham's work ready to his hand. He was the leader of the nominalists, the founder of the "modern" school. Science has to do, he maintains, only with propositions, not with things as such, since the object of science is not what is but what is known. Things, too, are always singular, while science has to do with general concepts, which as such exist only in the human mind. Scotus had deduced the objective existence of universals from the concepts originated under the operation of the objects. Ockham, on the other hand, asserts that "no universal is a substance existing outside of the mind," and proves it by

a variety of keen logical reasons. He rejects even the milder forms of philosophic universalism, such as the theory that the universal is something in particulars which is distinguished from them not *realiter* but only *formaliter*. He considers the universal without qualification as an "intention" of the mind, a symbol representing conventionally several objects. In respect of the theory of cognition, where Duns Scotus had placed between the perceiving subject and the object perceived a "sensible species" and an "intelligible species," Ockham considers these as superfluous machinery. Objects call forth sense-impressions in us, which are transmuted by the active intellect into mental images. These images are thus a product of the intellect, not *species* which flow from the object into the *intellectus possibilis*. The reality of these images is thus, in the modern use of the terms, not objective but subjective. This is true not merely of the "terms of first intention" formed directly from sense-impression, but also of the "terms of second intention," i.e., the abstract terms which take note of common attributes, or universals. These latter correspond to a tendency of the human mind, which can not perceive individuals without at the same time attempting to form a general concept. A white object simultaneously suggests abstract whiteness; an extended, related, enduring object forces the conception of extension, relation, duration. The result of this line of reasoning is the absolute subjectivity of all concepts and universals and the limitation of knowledge to the mind and its concepts-although these are real entities because of their subjective existence in the mind, reproducing the actual according to the constitution of the mind. Thus Ockham is really the pioneer of modern epistemology. The mysterious universals with their species in the sense of objective realities are abolished. Objects work upon the senses of men, and out of these operations the active intellect frames its concepts, including the so-called universals, which, while they are in themselves subjective, yet correspond to objective realities. By the statement that science has nothing to do directly with things, but only with concepts of them, the theory of knowledge assumes vital import for the progress of science, and a new method of scientific cognition is made available. Of course this increases the difficulty of the task of theology. However, Ockham was essentially of a skeptical and critical temperament, of great critical acumen, but (especially in the religious province) he was by no means equally great in constructive ability. He did not have the broad general conception of religion which guided his master Scotus through his attempts to criticize the old evidences and bring up new ones. Where Ockham shows its power at all, it is usually simply borrowed from Scotus.

NATURE OF GOD. In regard to the nature and attributes of God, he applies a critical solvent to the principal proof given by Scotus for God's existence. Ockham shows that the reality of God as the *infinitus intensive* can as little be demonstrated from *efficientia, causalitas, eminentia*, as from the divine knowledge of the infinite or from the simplicity of his nature. Nevertheless, he considers the recognition of God to proceed from the idea of causality. If not by strict syllogistic deduction, then " by authority and reason." In the same sort of way, the infinity of God is confirmed. As to his unbounded power and absolute will, Ockham distinguishes *potentia absolute* and *potentia ordinate*, the two being, however, only different modes of considering a power which is essentially one. In practice it is always *ordinate*, the absolute power being merely the hypothetical possibility of God's doing anything whatever which does not involve a contradiction in terms. The absolute freedom of God is the characteristic trait in the theology of Ockham. The entire scheme of salvation planned by the *voluntas ordinate* is based on no inner necessity, but is determined by the fact that it pleased God. As a matter of fact, to please God and nothing else. The distinction of the two aspects of the divine power comes in here. The merits of the saints, e.g., are accepted as valid only because it pleases God to accept them-but since it has pleased God to establish this system, merit is absolutely

necessary. God and his grace do all, yet only in such a way that the cooperation of man is required. The freedom of the human will cannot be, strictly speaking, demonstrated, but is recognized as true by experience. Sin consists in the violation of the will of God. By it, however, no "real" change takes place in the soul. Sin consists in individual acts; it does not take away freedom nor weaken the soul, but simply destroys the future good, the reward, ordained by God for those who do his will. Since there is no fundamental connection between sin and punishment, God could by his absolute power forgive sin and infuse grace even without repentance. In the same connection appears the relation of original sin to original righteousness. The latter is "an absolute something superadded to man as he is in a state of nature"; the former is "a certain lack of the righteousness which he ought to have." Thus original sin is the result of the divine ordinance; God wills to consider the offender against his law as unworthy of acceptance, together with all his posterity. This explains his view of the immaculate conception of Mary. As a member of the human race, she would have been in the first instant of her conception a debtor to original righteousness. However, it is not inconceivable that God should have chosen to renounce the exaction of that righteousness from her and refused to impute its absence as a fault. By a subtle train of reasoning he concludes that she was not even for an instant in original sin.

REASON AND AUTHORITY. According to his attitude toward the dogmas of the Church, it appears that "authority, reason, and experience" are the sources of religious knowledge. A scientific proof of dogma is impossible. This he shows by the method of evolving a number of propoitions which on ecclesiastical principles ought to be possible, but actually contradict the doctrine of the Church. The instances are frequently rather startling; but it would be quite misleading to understand them in the sense of anti-ecclesiastical unbelief or frivolous skepticism. Ockham's purpose is to show that reason is useless as a foundation of ecclesiastical dogma. The infidel can " attain all the knowledge, whether simple or complex, which the believer can have"; the difference is in the possession of faith. The act of belief depends on the *fides infusa,* and proceeds from the cooperation of this with the *fides arquisita* derived from instruction, Bible-reading, and intelligent meditation on various truths. Theology is not thus in the strict sense a science; it is not a form of natural metaphysical cognition, but a special mode of cognition effected by the operation of the infused "habit" of faith. In the application of these principles to the faith of the church of his day, Ockham accepts and even enhances the ecclesiastical positivism of Scotus. The faith of the Church must be accepted *in toto*, either explicitly or implicitly. Reason may question the doctrines or ordinances of the Church, but the Christian as a Christian accepts them. The more critical activity awoke, the more need there was for this counterbalancing thought. The legal conception of the Church finds expression here; he who wishes to belong to it must subject himself to its laws, whether or not he is personally convinced of their justice. Here again there is need of the miraculous *fides infusa*. However, this is itself an article of faith which is learned only by authority, not "by reason, by experience, or by logic." So it comes back to the point that a man must accept the teachings of the Church because he wishes to belong to it. The authority of the Church's teaching was essentially based, for Ockham, on that of the Bible. This in itself was nothing new, as all the scholastics (following Augustine) had regarded church doctrine as the formulated expression of Scriptural truth. The novelty here is that Ockham is driven by the party conflicts of his day into acknowledging that the authorities of the day may diverge from Scriptural teaching. Thus he comes to a more consciously strict application of the principle of Scriptural infallibility. Popes and councils may err, but the written word is sure. "A Christian is not bound to believe, as necessary to salvation, anything which is neither contained in the Bible nor may be

plainly and of necessity inferred from what is contained there." It is true that he does not realize how far this principle might lead, or how far it was one day going to lead Luther. He also does not seem disposed to apply it except where the necessities of his own position, as in the controversy on poverty, forced him to it. In practice, throughout his whole dogmatic system, the authority of the Fathers and of the Roman Catholic Church stands out as coequal with that of the Scripture. In fact, the Church has the last word, and the doctrine of transubstantiation (which is not expressly taught in Scripture) is unquestioningly accepted on that authority.

CHRISTOLOGY. In his Christology, Ockham holds firmly to the hypostatic union, while distinguishing sharply between the two natures. As with Duns Scotus, so here the union consists in a "relation," the human nature being assumed by the divine. The special result of Christ's work is to be seen in the institution and operation of the sacraments. The operation is described in a manner usual in Franciscan theology; grace does not reside in them, but they are signs that God, in accordance with his institution, will accompany their administration with his grace. Grace is taken in a twofold sense, an infused quality of the mind by which man is enabled to act according to God's will, and divine acceptation, "the gratuitous will of God." Following Scotus again, Ockham is conscious of strong objections to the doctrine of the necessity of an infused "habit" of grace; and it is quite clear that the retention of it in his system is due merely to submission to authority. Under the head of the sacraments, his fullest treatment is given to the Eucharist, where he follows the consubstantiation theory which after Scotus was becoming common. Neither Scripture nor reason contradicts the possibility of the substance of bread, not merely the accidents, remaining together with the substance of the body of Christ; nor is transubstantiation taught in Scripture. He goes at considerable length into the question of the possibility of the presence of Christ in the sacrament. For him as a nominalist, quantity is a thing which has no existence in itself, but only the *res quanta*. Now quantity can increase or diminish, and thus a thing may be without quantity, like a mathematical point; this is the manner in which the body of Christ exists in the sacrament of the altar. In this way he comes to agree with Thomas Aquinas, that the body of Christ is present "after the manner of substance, not after that. of quantity" (Summa, III., lxxvi. 1). The criticism of Duns Scotus, that a substance without attributes is unthinkable, is avoided by the assertion that quantity is not an essential property of substance. While to some extent he prepared the way for Luther's teaching on the Lord's Supper, the difference between his doctrine of ubiquity and Luther's must not be overlooked. As to the sacrament of penance, like most of the later scholastics, Ockham lays most stress on the absolution. Since, as shown above, sin effects no "real" change in the soul, its destruction consists in the non-imputation of guilt. This might have been brought about, had God so willed, by an internal act of repentance on the part of a sinner having proper dispositions. Sin being an act of the will, the detestation of it by the same will is the appropriate means for its destruction, and in fact necessary, contrary to the view of Scotus that God gives his grace to the sinner through the sacrament without either attrition or contrition. But the essence of the sacrament, according to Ockham, lies in the deliverance of the sinner from the guilt of sin by God through the agency of the priest.

CHURCH AND STATE. In the important questions as to the external organization of the Church and its relation to the State, two principal motives guided Ockham to his conclusions. Accusing John XXII. of attempting to subjugate or destroy the empire and to prove erroneous and illicit the thorough-going poverty of the Franciscans, he met him by attempting on the one hand to make a sharp distinction between the Church and the world, and on the other by showing the limitations and errors of the official ecclesiastical authorities. Like Marsilius of Padua, he contends that the

papal power extends only to spiritual things. The apostles were subject to the secular authorities of their time and were far from claiming any temporal jurisdiction. Even the necessity of the papacy may be called in question; and if so, much less is there any necessary dependence of the emperor on the pope. The choice of the electors makes an emperor, who needs no papal confirmation. The relation of pope and emperor is discussed not only from the standpoint of the historic civil law, but from that of natural law as well. The idea of natural law had come down from the ancients to both canonists and civilians, as a criterion of the justice of positive enactments; the popes had employed it often enough against civil rulers, and now it was turned against themselves. The trouble with this criterion, however, was that it was too elastic; it could be stretched to include the most revolutionary conclusions in both Church and State. Ockham undoubtedly believed in the logical validity of his critical statements; but a complete overturning of the ecclesiastical organism was as far from his temperament as the creation of a new system of Scriptural theology. He never strove for anything more than a certain amelioration of existing conditions within the circle of the system, and his most reasonable demands went to pieces on the positivism of the nominalist. He was anything but timid; but he went on criticizing and constructing, and then doubting once more both his critical and his constructive work.

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Ordinary Language

Ordinary language philosophy the philosophical study of everyday language of life spoken by the average individual. It is a contemporary movement started in large part by Wittgenstein, although Locke and G.E. Moore are credited with setting its background. John Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle, P.F. Stawson, J.O. Urmson, Norman Malcolm, and J.L. Austin are all contributors to ordinary language philosophy.

Ordinary language philosophy is a reaction against reformists such as Russell who claim that ideal language is needed to avoid the ambiguities, vagueness and vacuousness of terms. Ordinary language philosophers argue that this does not clarify the problem, but makes the language more remote and problematic. By contrast, ordinary language philosophy examines the way common language is used, and critiques the technical speech or jargon used when discussing philosophical problems. Even certain everyday terms become misused in philosophical language. Thus, many classic philosophical problems can be solved by returning to the use of the everyday meanings of words.

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Origen (182-251)

LIFE: Origen, one of the most distinguished of the Fathers of the early Church, was born, probably at Alexandria, about 182; and died at Caesarea not later than 251. His full name was apparently Origenes Adamantius; and he received from his father, Leonides, thorough instruction in the Bible and in elementary studies. But in 202 the outbreak of the persecution of Septimius Severus robbed Origen of his father, whom he sought to follow in martyrdom, being prevented only by a ruse of his mother. The death of Leonides left the family of nine impoverished, their property being confiscated. Origen, however, was taken under the protection of a woman of wealth and standing; but as her household already included a heretic named Paul, the strictly orthodox Origen seems to have remained with her but a short time. Since his father's teaching enabled him also to give elementary instruction, he revived, in 203, the catechetical school at, whose last teacher, Clement, was apparently driven out by the persecution. But the persecution still raged, and the young teacher unceasingly visited the prisoners, attended the courts, and comforted the condemned, himself preserved from harm as if by a miracle. His fame and the number of his pupils increased rapidly, so that Demetrius, bishop of Alexandria, made him restrict himself to instruction in Christian doctrine alone. Origen, to be entirely independent, sold his library for a sum which netted him a daily income of 4 obols (about twelve cents) on which he lived by exercising the utmost frugality. Teaching throughout the day, he devoted the greater part of the night to the study of the Bible and lived a life of rigid asceticism. This he carried to such an extent that, fearing that his position as a teacher of women as well as men might give ground for scandal to the heathen, he followed literally Matt. xix. 12, partly influenced, too, by his belief that the Christian must follow the words of his Master without reserve. Later in life, however, he saw reason to judge differently concerning his extreme act.

During the reign of Caracalla, about 211-212, Origen paid a brief visit to Rome, but the relative laxity under the pontificate of Zephynintis seems to have disillusioned him, and on his return to Alexandria he resumed his teaching with zeal increased by the contrast. But the school had far outgrown the strength of a single man; the catechumens pressed eagerly for elementary instruction, and the baptized sought for interpretation of the Bible. Under these circumstances, Origen entrusted the teaching of the catechumens to Heraclas, the brother of the martyr Plutarch, his first pupil. His own interests became more and more centered in exegesis, and he accordingly studied Hebrew, though there is no certain Knowledge concerning his instructor in that language. From about this period (212-213) dates Origen's acquaintance with Ambrose of Alexandria, whom be as instrumental in converting from Valentianism to orthodoxy. Later (about 218) Ambrose, a man of wealth, made a formal agreement with Origen to promulgate his writings, and all the subsequent works of Origen (except his sermons, which were not expressly prepared for publication) were dedicated to Ambrose. In 213 or 214 Origen visited Arabia at the request of the prefect, who wished to have an interview with him; and Origen accordingly spent a brief time in Petra, after which he returned to Alexandria. In the following year (215), a popular uprising at

Alexandria caused Caracalla to let his soldiers plunder the city, shut the schools, and expel all foreigners. The latter measure caused Ambrose to take refuge in Caesarea, where he seems to have made his permanent home; and Origen, who felt that the turmoil hindered his activity as a teacher and imperiled his safety, left Egypt, apparently going, with Ambrose to Caesarea, where he spent some time., Here, in conformity with local usage based on Jewish custom, Origen, though not in orders, preached and interpreted the Scriptures at the request of the bishops Alexander of Jerusalem and Theoctistus of Caesarea. When, however, the confusion in Alexandria subsided, Demetrius recalled Origen, probably in 216. Of Origen's activity during the next decade little is known, but it was obviously devoted to teaching and writing. The latter was rendered the more easy for him by Ambrose, who provided him with more than seven stenographers to take dictation in relays, as many scribes to prepare long-hand copies, and a number of girls to multiply the copies. At the request of Ambrose, he now began a huge commentary on the Bible, beginning with John, and continuing with Genesis, Ps. i.-xxv., and Lamentations, besides brief exegeses of selected texts (forming the ten books of his Stromateis), two books on the resurrection, and the work "On First Principles."

About 230, Origen entered on the fateful journey which was to compel him to give up his work at Alexandria and embittered the next years of his life. Sent to Greece on some ecclesiastical mission, he paid a visit to Caesarea, where he was heartily welcomed and was ordained presbyter, that no further cause for criticism with might be given Demetrius, who had strongly disapproved his preaching before ordination while at Caesarea. But Demetrius, taking this well-meant act as an infringement of his rights, was furious, for not only was Origen under his jurisdiction, but, if Eastern sources may be believed, Demetrius had been the first to introduce episcopal ordination in Egypt. The metropolitan accordingly convened a synod of bishops and presbyters which banished Origen from Alexandria, while a -second synod declared his ordination invalid. Origen accordingly fled from Alexandria in 231, and made his permanent home in Caesarea. A series of attacks on him seems to have emanated from Alexandria, whether for his self-castration (a capital crime in Roman law) or for alleged heterodoxy is unknown; but at all events these fulminations were heeded only at Rome, while Palestine, Phoenicia, Arabia, and Achaia paid no attention to them. At Alexandria Heraclas became head of Origen's school, and shortly afterward, on the death of Demetrius, was consecrated bishop. At Caesarea Origen was joyfully received was also the guest in Cappadocia, and Julia Mammaaea, at Antioch. The former also visited him at Caesarea, where Origen, deeply loved by his pupils, preached and taught dialectics, physics, ethics, and metaphysics; thus laying his foundation for the crowning theme of theology. He accordingly sought to set forth all the science of the time from the Christian point of view, and to elevate Christianity to a theory of the universe compatible with Hellenism. In 235, with the accession of Maximinus, a persecution raged; and for two years Origin is said, though on somewhat doubtful authority, to have remained concealed in the house of a certain Juliana in Caesarea of Cappadocia. Little is known of the last twenty years of Origen's life. He preached regularly on Wednesdays and Fridays, and later daily. He evidently, however, developed an extraordinary literary productivity, broken by occasional journeys; one of which, to Athens during some unknown year, was of sufficient length to allow him time for research. After his return from Athens, he succeeded in converting Beryllus, bishop of Bostra, from his adoptianistic views to the orthodox faith; yet in these very years (about 240) probably occurred the attacks on Origen's own orthodoxy which compelled him to defend himself in writing to the Roman pontiff Fabiail (236-250) and many bishops. Neither the source nor the object of these attacks is known, though the latter may have been connected with

Novatianism. After his conversion of Beryllus, however, his aid was frequently invoked against heresies. Thus, when the doctrine was promulgated in Arabia that the soul died and decayed with the body, being restored to life only at the resurrection, appeal was made to Origen, who journeyed to Arabia, and by his preaching reclaimed the errina. In 250 persecutions of the Church broke out anew, and this time Origen did not escape. He was tortured pilloried, and bound hand and foot to the block for days without yielding. These tortures seem to have resulted in his death. A later legend, recounted by Jerome and numerous itineraries place his death and burial at Tyre, but to this little value can be attached.

WRITINGS. According to Epiphanius, Origen wrote about 6,000 works (i.e., rolls or chapters). A list was given by Eusebius in his lost life of Pamphilus, which was apparently known to Jerome. These fall into four classes: text criticism; exegesis; systematic, practical, and apologetic theology; and letters; besides certain spurious works. By far the most important work of Origen on textual criticism was the Hexapla. Of the fate of the Hexapla nothing is known. The exegetical writings of Origen fall into three classes: scholia, or brief summaries of the meaning of difficult passages; homilies; and " books," or commentaries in the strict sense of the term. Homilies on almost the entire Bible were prepared by Origen, these being taken down after his sixtieth year as he preached. It is probable that Origen gave no attention to supervising the publication of his homilies, for only by such a hypothesis can the numerous evidences of carelessness in diction be explained. The exegesis of the homilies was simpler than that of the scientific commentaries, but nevertheless demanded no mean degree of intelligence from the auditor. Origen's chief aim was the practical exposition of the text, verse by verse; and while in such barren books as Leviticus and Numbers he sought to allegorize, the wealth of material in the prophets seldom rendered it necessary for him to seek meanings deeper than the surface afforded. Whether the sermons were delivered in series, or the homilies on a single book were collected from various series, is unknown. The object of Origen's commentaries was to give an exegesis that discriminated strictly against the incidental, unimportant historical significance, in favor of the deeper, hidden, spiritual truth. At the same time, he neglected neither philological nor geographical, historical' nor antiquarian material, to all of which he devoted numerous excursuses. In his commentary on John he constantly considered the exegesis of the Valentinian Heracleon (probably at the instance of Ambrose), and in many other places he implied or expressly cited Gnostic views and refuted them. Unfortunately, only meager fragments of the commentaries have survived. Among the systematic, practical, and apologetic writings of Origen, mention should first be made of his work " On First Principles," perhaps written for his more advanced pupils at Alexandria and probably composed between 212 and 215. It is extant only in the free translation of Rufinus, except for fragments of the third and fourth books. After his removal to Caesarea, Origen wrote the works, still extant, " On Prayer," " On Martyrdom," and " Against Celsus." Eusebius had a collection of more than one hundred letters of Origen, and the list of Jerome speaks of several books of his epistles.

PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS. Origen, trained in the school of Clement and by his father, was essentially a Platonist with occasional traces of Stoic philosophy. He was thus a pronounced idealist, regarding all things temporal and masophical and terial as insignificant and indifferent, the only real and eternal things being comprised in the idea. He therefore regards as the purely ideal center of this spiritual and eternal world, God, the pure reason, whose creative powers call into being the world with matter as the necessary substratum. Likewise Platonic is the doctrine that those spirits capable of knowing supreme reason, but imprisoned in the body in this world, will rise after death to divinity, being purified by fire. In his attempt to amalgamate the system

evolved by Greek thought with Christianity, Origen found his predecessors in the Platonizing Philo and even in the Gnostics. His exegesis does Dot differ generally from that of Heracleon, but in the canon of the New Testament and in the tradition of the Church, Origen possessed a check which kept him from the excesses of Gnostic exegesis. He was, indeed, a rigid adherent of the Bible, making no statement without adducing some Scriptural basis. To him the Bible was divinely inspired, as was proved both by the fulfillment of prophecy and by the immediate impression which the Scriptures made on him who read them. Since the divine I,ogos spoke in the Scriptures, they were an organic whole and on every occasion he combated the Gnostic tenet of the inferiority of the Old Testament. He was aware of the discrepancies between the Old and New Testaments and the contradictory accounts of the Gospels; but he considered these only as inconsistencies that lend themselves to a unspiritual historical exegesis according to the letter In his exegesis, Origen sought to discover the deeper meaning implied in the Scriptures. One of his chief methods was the translation of proper names which enabled him, like Philo, to find a deep meaning even in every event of history; but at the same time he insisted on an exact grammatical interpretation of the text as the basis of all exegesis. A strict adherent of the Church, Origen yet distinguished sharply between the ideal and the empirical Church representing " a double church of men and angels," or, in Platonic phraseology, the lower church an its celestial ideal. The ideal Church alone was the Church of Christ, scattered over all the earth; the other provided also a shelter for sinners. Holding that the Church, as being in possession of the mysteries, affords the only means of salvation, he was indifferent to her external organization, although he spoke sometimes of the office-bearers as the pillars of the Church, and of their heavy duties and responsibilities. More important to him was the idea borrowed from Plato of the grand division between the great human multitude, capable of sensual vision only, and those who know how to comprehend the hidden meaning of Scripture and the diverse mysteries; church organization being for the former only. It is doubtful whether Origen possessed an obligatory creed; at any rate, such a confession of faith was not a norm like the inspired word of Scripture. The reason, illumined by the divine Logos, which is able to search the secret depths of the divine nature, remains as the only source of knowledge.

NATURE OF GOD. Origen's conception of God is entirely abstract. God is a perfect unity, invisible and incorporeal, transcending all things material, and therefore inconceivable and incomprehensible. He is likewise unchangeable, and transcends space and time. But his power is limited by his goodness, justice, and wisdom; and, though entirely free from necessity, his goodness and omnipotence constrained him to reveal himself. This revelation, the external self-emanation of God, is expressed by Origen in various ways, the Logos being only one of many. Revelation was the first creation of God (cf. Prov. viii. 22), in order to afford creative mediation between God and the world, such mediation being necessary, because God, as changeless unity, could not be the source of a multitudinous creation. The Logos is the rational creative principle that permeates the universe. Since God eternally manifests himself, the Logos is likewise eternal. He forms a bridge between the created and uncreated, and only through him, as the visible representative of divine wisdom, can the inconceivable and incorporeal God be known. Creation came into existence only through the Logos, and God's nearest approach to the world is the command to create. While the Logos is substantially a unity, be comprehends a multiplicity of concepts, so that Origen terms him, in Platonic fashion, "essence of essences" and "idea of ideas." The defense of the unity of God against the Gnostics led Origen to maintain the subordination of the Logos to God, and the doctrine of the eternal generation is later. Origen distinctly emphasized the independence of the

Logos us well as the distinction from the being and substance of God. The term " of the same substance with the Father " was not employed. He is merely an image, a reflex not to be compared with God; as one among other " gods," of course first in rank.

THE LOGOS AND COSMOLOGY. The activity of the Logos, was conceived by Origen in Platonic fashion, as the world soul, wherein God manifested his omnipotence. His first creative act was the divine spirit, as an independent existence; and partial reflexes of the Logos were the created rational beings, who, as they had to revert to the perfect God as their background, must likewise be perfect; yet their perfection, unlike in kind with that of God, the Logos, and the divine spirit, bad to be attained. The freedom of the will is an essential fact of the reason, notwithstanding the foreknowledge of God. The Logos, eternally creative, forms an endless series of finite, comprehensible worlds, which are mutually alternative. Combining the Stoic doctrine of a universe without beginning with the Biblical doctrine of the beginning and the end of the world, he conceived of the visible world as the stages of an eternal cosmic process, affording also an explanation of the diversity of human fortunes, rewards, and punishments. The material world, which at first had no place in this eternal spiritual progression, was due to the fall of the spirits from God the first being the serpent, who was imprisoned in matter and body. The ultimate aim of God in the creation of matter out of nothing was not punishment, but the upraising of the fallen spirits. Man's accidental being is rooted in transitory matter, but his higher nature is formed in the image of the Creator. The soul is divided into the rational and the irrational, the latter being material and transitory, while the former, incorporeal and immaterial, possesses freedom of the will and the power to reascend to purer life. The strong ethical import of this cosmic process can not remain unnoticed. The return to original being through divine reason is the object of the entire cosmic process. Through the worlds which follow each other in eternal succession, the spirits are able to return to Paradise. God so ordered the universe that all individual acts work together toward one cosmic end which culminates in himself. Likewise as to Origin's anthropology, man conceived in the image of God is able by imitating God in good works to become like God, if he first recognizes his own weakness and trusts all to the divine goodness. He is aided by guardian angels, but more especially by the Logos who operates through saints and prophets in proportion to the constitution of these and man's capacity.

CHRISTOLOGY. The culmination of this gradual revelation is the universal revelation of Christ. In Christ, God, hitherto manifest only as the Lord, appeared as the Father. The incarnation of the Logos, moreover, was necessary since otherwise he would not be intelligible to sensual man; but the indwelling of the Logos remained a mystery, which could be represented only by the analogy of his indwelling in the saints; nor could Origen fully explain it. He speaks of a " remarkable body," and in his opinion that the mortal body of Jesus was transformed by God into an ethereal and divine body, Origen approximated the Docetism that he otherwise abhorred. His concept of the soul of Jesus is likewise uncertain and wavering. He proposes the question whether it was not originally perfect with God but, emanating from him, at his command assumed a material body. As lie conceived matter as merely the universal limit of created spirits, so would it be impossible to state in what form the two were combined. He dismissed the solution by referring it to the mystery of the divine governance of the universe. More logically did he declare the material nature of the world to be merely an episode in the spiritual process of development, whose end should be the annihilation of all matter and return to God, who should again be all in all. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body he upholds by the explanation that the logos maintains the unity of man's existence by ever changing, his body into new forms, thus preserving the unity and identity of

personality in harmony with the tenet of an endless cosmic process. Origen's concept of the Logos allowed him to make no definite statement on the redemptive work of Jesus. Since sin was ultimately only negative as a lack of pure knowledge, the activity of Jesus was essentially example and instruction, and his human life was only incidental as contrasted with the immanent cosmic activity of the Logos. Origen regarded the death of Jesus as a sacrifice, paralleling it with other cases of self-sacrifice for the general good. On this, Origen's accord with the teachings of the Church was merely superficial.

ESCHATOLOGY. His idealizing tendency to consider the spiritual alone as real, fundamental to his entire system, led him to combat the rude Chiliasm of a sensual beyond; yet be constrained himself from breaking entirely with the distinct celestial hopes and representations of Paradise prevalent in the Church. He represents a progressive purification of souls, until, cleansed of all clouds of evil, they should know the truth and God as the Son knew him, see God face to face, and attain a full possession of the Holy Spirit and, union with God. The means of attainment of this end were described by Origen in different ways, the most important of which was his Platonic concept of a purifying fire which should cleanse the world of evil and thus lead to cosmic renovation. By a further spiritualization Origen could call God himself this consuming fire. In proportion as the souls were freed from sin and ignorance, the material world was to pass away, until, after endless eons, at the final end, God should be all in all, and the worlds and spirits should return to a knowledge of God.

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Original Position

The "Original Position" is a central concept in the political philosophy of John Rawls (b. 1921), which is most clearly set forth in his book *A Theory of Justice* (1971). Presenting a contemporary version of social contract theory, Rawls contends that in an original position, a group of rational and impartial people will establish a mutually beneficial principle of justice as the foundation for regulating all rights, duties, power, and wealth

THE ORIGINAL POSITION. Rawls sees his revived account of social contract theory as a direct challenge to utilitarianism. The key problem with utilitarianism is that an individual's rights may be violated if the consequences of doing so benefit societ y as a whole. Rawls believes his account of social contract-based justice avoids this problem. Rawls titles his view justice as fairness, which means that the rules of justice are agreed to in an initial contractual situation which is fair for all people involved. For Rawls, the starting point is the original position, which is a hypothetical community of people who are rational, equal, and self-interested. These people are not trying to start a new social system, but are seeking to establish a mutually b eneficial guideline which will reform and regulate all rights and duties within their system. In establishing this foundational guideline, the people see themselves behind a veil of ignorance. That is, they assume to be ignorant about their actual positio n in society (such as how rich they are). This assures that they (and their neighbors) will not create a foundational guideline which gives them special benefits. Rawls argues that the foundational guideline they adopt will be two rules of justice: one wh ich assures equal rights and duties for all, and a second which regulates power and wealth.

In the section titled "The Original Position and Justification," Rawls explains that the function of the contract is to etch out (or justify) a rule of justice which is most acceptable to the people concerned. Rival principles of justice should be we ighed according to what would be most acceptable to those involved in the contract. Rawls argues that his two principles of justice are clearly the most acceptable. He emphasizes that the original position is a state of impartiality and equality. It is im partial since, behind the veil of ignorance, there is no special consideration given to one's natural assets (such as education and wealth). It is also a state of equality since all have the same right in determining the foundational principle of justice. More precise circumstances of the original position are left unspecified. For, according to Rawls, the reader (who is outside of the original position) will also be able to evaluate the proposed principles of justice according to her common moral intuiti ons. She can then adjust the circumstances of the original position so that it gives rise to the notion of justice which conforms with her intuitions. This "going back and forth" from the original position to one's actual intuitions on justice is called r eflective equilibrium. However, Rawls argues that this does not involve an appeal to self-evident moral truths about justice.

PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE. According to Rawls, the two principles of justice which will be arrived at in the original position are as follow:

- **Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.**
- **Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.**

The first principle generates specific rights and duties, such as those regarding speech, assembly, conscience, thought, property, arbitrary arrest, and political liberties of voting and holding office. The second principle regulates the fair distribution of wealth and power. To understand how these principles work, Rawls suggests that we start with the assumption that all rights, duties, wealth, and power are equally distributed. If certain inequalities would then make everyone better off, then these ine qualities are permissible according to the second rule above. For example, it is cumbersome for each citizen to have equal political control. Everyone benefits if political power is concentrated in the hands of a few, as with representative democracies. F or Rawls, any equality may be permitted (perhaps even slavery) so long as each person benefits from an inequality (including the slave). According to Rawls, this is the point which makes justice as fairness superior to utilitarianism. For, under utilitari anism, an individual slave's unhappiness does not matter, so long as general happiness is served by an inequality.

Rawls recognizes that Part A of the second principle is the most controversial aspect of his account. He calls this the difference principle. The difference principle has two implications. First, people with fewer natural assets (such as education an d wealth) deserve special considerations. Differences in natural assets are the result of what is sometimes called the natural lottery. Rawls argues that the natural lottery is arbitrary, and therefore the principle of redress dictates that we should comp ensate those with fewer natural assets. Second, Rawls argues that even rich people should agree to give up some wealth for the poor, since in the end they gain simply by being in a society of mutual cooperation.

NOZICK'S CRITIQUE. In his Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick criticizes that the rules of justice which Rawls derives from the original position since, Nozick believes, they unfairly benefit the poor at the expense of the rich. Nozick t heoretically grants Rawls's account of the original position (most critics of Rawls will not grant even that much). His objection is that people in the original position will not have sufficient reason to put forth Rawls's second rule of justice which req uires that the rich make sacrifices for the poor. Again, Rawls maintains that the rich sacrifice something to benefit the poor, but the rich also receive a greater gain in terms of the benefit from thereby being in a society of mutual cooperation. This is sometimes called the minimax principle (a minimum loss yields a maximum gain). Nozick objects that it is not clear how much the rich gain from mutual cooperation. The rich could hold out for a principle of justice which would cost them less, although it may have a more restricted cooperative benefit. Also, it is no more outrageous to put forth an agreement which yields a higher benefit for the rich, than an agreement which yields a higher benefit for the poor. Thus, Rawls's endorsement of the difference principle is arbitrary.

Nozick also attacks Rawls for disregarding the manner in which natural assets are acquired. Again, Rawls maintains that all natural assets are arbitrary (for example, people who become rich through inheritance). Nozick, by contrast, argues that peopl e are entitled to their natural assets if they were acquired legitimately, and Rawls fails to consider this option. To make his point, Nozick uses an illustration of students who take an exam, do not know how they did, and must decide on a

procedure for a ssigning grades. Several procedures are considered. An equity principle dictates that all receive the same grade. An historical entitlement principle is also offered which bases grades on correct answers, which in turn hinges on how much a student studied . A bizarre reverse entitlement position is also offered which dictates that the highest historical entitlement scores are swapped with the lowest historical entitlement scores. Even more strange is that, in the eyes of the students, the historical entitl ement and reverse entitlement principles are on equal footing, since the students do not yet know how they did. Nozick's point is that Rawls's veil of ignorance locks one into a position where people can only consider a principle for determining wealth di stribution if it is not based on historical entitlement (how we came by it). That is, the veil of ignorance will only allow for end-result (or nonhistorical) principles of distribution, such as equality, which are not historically linked to how we came by it. The problem is that end-result (nonhistorical) explanations should be accepted only if all historical entitlement principles fail first. And Rawls presupposes that such principles are incorrect.

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Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds

Solipsism is sometimes expressed as the view that 'I am the only mind which exists', or 'My mental states are the only mental states'. However, the sole survivor of a nuclear holocaust might truly come to believe in either of these propositions without thereby being a solipsist. Solipsism is therefore more properly regarded as the doctrine that, in principle, 'existence' means for me *my* existence and that of *my* mental states. In other words, everything which I experience - physical objects, other people, events and processes, in short, anything which would commonly be regarded as a constituent of the spatio-temporal matrix in which I coexist with others - is necessarily construed by me as part of the content of *my* consciousness. For the solipsist, it is not merely the case that he believes that his thoughts, experiences, and emotions are, as a matter of contingent fact, the *only* thoughts, experiences, and emotions. Rather, the solipsist can attach no *meaning* to the supposition that there could be thoughts, experiences, and emotions other than his own. In short, the true solipsist understands the word 'pain', for example, to mean 'my pain' - he cannot accordingly conceive how this word is to be applied in any sense other than this exclusively egocentric one.

Section Headings:

The Importance of the Problem


It would be true to say that no great philosopher has been a solipsist. And as a theory, if indeed it can be termed such, it is clearly very far removed from common sense. In view of this, it might reasonably be asked why the problem of solipsism should receive any philosophical attention. There are two answers to this question, both of which merit clear articulation. Firstly, while it may indeed be true that no great philosopher has in fact espoused solipsism, but this can be attributed

entirely to the fact that inconsistency has been a more prevalent feature of philosophical reasoning than is commonly acknowledged, in that many philosophers have failed to accept the logical consequences of their own most fundamental commitments and preconceptions. For the foundations of solipsism lie at the heart of the view that the individual gets his own psychological concepts (thinking, willing, perceiving, etc.) from 'his own cases', i.e. by abstraction from 'inner experience'. And this view, or some variant of it, has been held by a great many, if not indeed the majority of, philosophers, since Descartes elevated the egocentric search for apodeictic certainty to the status of the primary goal of critical epistemology. In this sense, then, it is at least contestable that solipsism is implicit in many philosophies of knowledge and mind since Descartes, and that any theory of knowledge which adopts the Cartesian egocentric approach as its basic frame of reference is inherently solipsistic.

The second reason why the problem of solipsism merits close examination is that it is based upon three widely entertained philosophical *presuppositions*, which are themselves of fundamental and wide-ranging importance. These are: (a) That what I know most certainly are the contents of my own mind - my thoughts, experiences, affective states, etc.; (b) That there is no conceptual or logically necessary link between the mental and the physical, between, say, the occurrence of certain conscious experiences or mental states and the 'possession' and behavioural dispositions of a body of a particular kind; and (c) That the experiences of a given person are necessarily private to that person. These presuppositions are of unmistakable Cartesian provenance, and are, of course, very widely accepted by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. In tackling the problem of solipsism, then, one finds oneself immediately grappling with fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind - however spurious the problem of solipsism *per se* may strike one, there can be no questioning the importance of these latter issues. Indeed, one of the merits of the entire enterprise may well be the extent to which it reveals a direct connection between apparently unexceptionable and certainly widely-held common sense beliefs and the acceptance of solipsistic conclusions. If this connection does indeed exist, and we wish to avoid those solipsistic conclusions, we shall have no option but to revise, or at least to critically review, the beliefs from which they derive logical sustenance.

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Historical Origins of the Problem



René Descartes

In introducing 'methodic doubt' into philosophy, Descartes created the backdrop against which solipsism subsequently developed, and was made to seem, if not plausible, at least irrefutable. For the *ego* which is revealed by the *cogito* is, Descartes held, a solitary consciousness, a *res cogitans* which is not spatially extended, which, as such, is not necessarily located in any body, and which accordingly can be assured of its own existence exclusively *as* a conscious mind. (*Discourse on Method and the Meditations*). This view of the self is intrinsically solipsistic, and Descartes evades the solipsistic consequences of his method of doubt only by the rather desperate expedient of appealing to the benevolence of God. Since God is no deceiver, he argues, and since He has created man with an innate disposition to *assume* the existence of an external, public world corresponding to the private world of the 'ideas' which are the only immediate objects of consciousness, it follows that such a public world actually exists. (*Sixth Meditation*). Thus does God, in Descartes' philosophy, bridge the chasm between the solitary consciousness revealed by methodic doubt and the intersubjective world of public objects and other human beings. It should be clear that this particular evasion of solipsism cannot be availed of by a philosopher who at one and the same time accepts the Cartesian picture of consciousness and rejects the function attributed to God by Descartes - in view of this it is scarcely surprising that we should find the spectre of solipsism looming ever more threateningly in the works of Descartes' successors in the modern world, particularly in those of the British empiricist tradition.

Implicit in Descartes' account of the nature of mind is the view that the individual acquires such psychological concepts as he possesses 'from his own case', i.e. that each individual has a unique and privileged access to his own mind, which is denied to everyone else. Although this view utilises language and involves the employment of conceptual categories ('the individual', 'other minds', etc.) which are inimical to solipsism, it was nonetheless fundamentally conducive historically to the development of solipsistic patterns of thought. For on this view what I know immediately and with greatest certainty are the events which occur in my own mind - my thoughts, my emotions, my perceptions, my desires, etc. - and these are not known *in this way* by anyone else. By the same token, it follows that I do not know other minds in the way in which I know my own; indeed, if I


am to be said to know other minds at all - that they exist, and that they have a particular nature - it can only be on the basis of certain *inferences* which I have made from what is directly accessible to me, namely, the behaviour of other human beings.

This Cartesian view of the matter was, in its essentials, accepted by John Locke, the father of modern British empiricism. Rejecting Descartes' theory that the mind possesses ideas innately at birth, Locke argued instead that all ideas have their origins in experience. 'Reflection' (i.e. introspection or 'inner experience') is, according to Locke, the sole source of psychological concepts - without exception, he held, such concepts have their genesis in the experience of the corresponding mental processes. (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding* II.i.4ff). If this is so, if I do acquire my psychological concepts by introspecting upon my own mental operations, then it follows that I do so independently of my knowledge of my bodily states - any correlation which I make between the two will, of necessity, be effected subsequent to my acquisition of my psychological concepts. Thus it follows that this correlation cannot be a *logically necessary one.* I may discover, for example, that whenever I feel pain my body is injured in some way, but I can discover this factual correlation only after I have acquired the concept 'pain'. It cannot therefore be part of what I mean by the word 'pain' that my body should behave, or should be disposed to behave, in a particular way.

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The Argument from Analogy





John Stewart Mill **Bertrand Russell**

What then of my knowledge of the minds of others? On this view there can be only one answer: since what I know directly is the existence and contents of my own mind, it follows that my knowledge of the minds of others, if I am to be said to possess such knowledge at all, has to be indirect and analogical, an inference from my own case. This is the so-called 'argument from analogy' for other minds, which empiricist philosophers in particular who accept the Cartesian

account of consciousness generally assume as a mechanism for avoiding solipsism. (Cf. Mill, J.S., James, W., Russell, B., Ayer, A.J.).

Observing that the bodies of other human beings behave as my body does in similar circumstances, I can, on this view, *infer* that the mental life and series of mental events which characteristically accompany my bodily behaviour are also present in the case of others. Thus, for example, in my own case I see a problem which I am trying unsuccessfully to solve, I feel myself becoming frustrated, and I observe myself acting in a particular way. In the case of another I observe only the first and last terms of this three-term sequence, and on this basis I infer that the 'hidden' middle term, the feeling of frustration, has also occurred.

There are, however, fundamental difficulties with the argument from analogy. Firstly, if one accepts the Cartesian account of consciousness, one must, in all consistency, accept its implications. One of these implications, as we have seen above, is that there is, and can be, no logically necessary connection between the concepts of 'mind' and 'body': my mind may *in fact* be lodged in my body now, but this is a matter of sheer contingency - it need not have become located in this body, its nature will not be affected in any way by the death of this body, and there is no reason in principle why it should not in fact have been located in a body radically different from a human one, e.g. in that of a rock or a table. By exactly the same token, any correlation which exists between bodily behaviour and mental states must *also* be entirely contingent: there can be no conceptual connections between the contents of a mind at a given time and the nature and/or behaviour of the body in which it is located at that time.

This raises the question as to how my supposed analogical inferences to other minds are to take place at all: how can I apply psychological concepts to *others,* if I know *only* that they apply to myself? To take a concrete example again, if I learn what 'pain' means by reference to my own case, then of necessity I will understand 'pain' to mean 'my pain', and the supposition that pain can be ascribed to anything other than myself will be unintelligible to me.

To put the matter somewhat differently, if the relationship between having a human body, on the one hand, and having a certain kind of mental life, on the other hand, is as contingent as the Cartesian account of mind implies, then it should be equally easy - or equally difficult - for me to conceive of a table as being in pain as it is for me to conceive of another person as being in pain. The point, of course, is that this is *not* so: the supposition that a table might experience pain is a totally meaningless one, whereas the ascription of pain to other human beings, and indeed to animals which, in their physical characteristics and/or behavioural capabilities, resemble human beings, is something which even very young children find unproblematic. (Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations,* I. § 284).

How is this to be accounted for? It will not do, *in this context,* to simply respond that a table does not have the same complex set of physical characteristics as a human body, or that it is not capable of the same patterns of behaviour as a human body - although these are undeniable truths - for the Cartesian position, again, implies that there is no *logical* connection between the mental and the physical, between the possession of a body of a particular kind, and the capability for consciousness. From this point of view, physical differentiation can and must be acknowledged, but it can play no role in any explanation of what it is to have a mental life. I am surrounded by other bodies, some of which are similar to mine, and some of which are different; on Cartesian principles

such similarities, and such differences, are *irrelevant* - the question as to whether it is legitimate for me to ascribe psychological predicates to entities other than myself, which the argument from analogy is designed to address, cannot on this view hinge on the kind of body with which I am confronted at a given time. (Malcolm, N. (a)).


The point which we come to then, in essence, is this: assuming the validity of the Cartesian position, we have to infer that it makes as much or a little sense, on these premises, to attribute any psychological predicate to another human being as it does to attribute it to a table or a rock. Which is to say that on these premises it makes no sense to attribute consciousness to another human being at all. Thus on strict Cartesian principles the argument from analogy will not do the work which is required of it in bridging the gulf between *my* conscious states and putative conscious states which are *not mine* - ultimately, it must be confessed, on these principles I know only my own mental states, and the supposition that there are mental states other than my own ceases to be intelligible to me. It is thus that solipsism comes to seem inescapable.

If the above argument is valid, it demonstrates that the acceptance of the Cartesian account of consciousness, and in particular the view that my understanding of psychological concepts derives, as do the concepts themselves, from my own case, leads inexorably to solipsism. However, it may fairly be said that the argument accomplishes more than just this: it can, and should, be understood as a *reductio ad absurdum* refutation of these Cartesian principles. Viewed from this perspective, the argument may be paraphrased as follows:

> **If there is no logical connection between the physical and the mental, if the physical forms no part of the criteria which govern my ascription of psychological predicates, then I would be able to conceive of an inanimate object such as a table as having a soul, and being conscious. But I cannot attach any intelligibility to the notion of an inanimate object being conscious. It follows therefore that there *is* a logical connection between the physical and the mental: the physical *does* form part of the criteria which govern my ascription of psychological words.**

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The Physical and the Mental



Ludwig Wittgenstein

What then is this logical connection between the physical and the mental? This question can best be answered by reflecting, for example, on how a cartoonist might go about showing that a particular table was angry or in pain. Now as indicated above, it is impossible to attach literal meaning to the assertion that a given inanimate object is angry or in pain, but clearly a certain imaginative latitude may be allowed for specific purposes, and a cartoonist might conceivably want to picture a table as being angry for humorous reasons.

What is significant in this connection, however, is the fact that to achieve this effect, the cartoonist must picture the table as having *human features* - the pictured table will appear angry to us only to the extent to which it possesses the natural human expression of anger; the concept of anger can find purchase in relation to the table only if it is represented as possessing something like a human form. This example demonstrates a point of quite fundamental importance: so far from being acquired by abstraction from my own case, from my own 'inner' mental life, my psychological concepts are acquired in a specifically intersubjective, social, linguistic context, and it is part of their very meaning that their primary application is to living human beings. To put this slightly differently, a person *is* a living human being, and the human person in this sense functions as our paradigm of that which has a mental life - it is precisely in relation to their application to persons that we learn such concepts as 'consciousness', 'pain', 'anger', etc. in the first instance. As such, it is a necessary and antecedent condition for the ascription of psychological predicates such as these to an object that it should 'possess' a body of a particular kind.

This point is due to Wittgenstein, who articulated it in what is now recognised as one of the centrally important methodological tenets of the *Investigations*:

> **Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. (I. § 281).**

Consequently, the belief that there is something problematic about the application of psychological

words to other human beings, that such applications are necessarily the products of highly fallible inferences to the 'inner' mental lives of others, which require something like the argument from analogy for their justification, turns out to be fundamentally confused. The intersubjective world in which we live with other human beings, the public language-system which we must master if we are to think at all, these are the primary data, the 'proto-phenomena', in Wittgenstein's phrase (I. § 654) - our psychological and non-psychological concepts alike are derived from a single linguistic fountainhead. It is precisely because the living human being functions as our paradigm of that which is conscious and has a mental life that we find the solipsistic notion that other human beings could be 'automatons', machines devoid of any conscious thought or experience, bizarre and bewildering; the idea that other persons might all in reality be 'automatons' is not one which we can seriously entertain.

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Knowing Other Minds

We are now in a position to see the essential redundancy of the argument from analogy. Firstly, it is a misconception to think that we stand in need of this or any other inferential argument to assure us of the existence of other minds - such an assurance seems necessary only so long as it is *assumed* that each of us has to work 'outwards' from the interiority of his/her own consciousness, to abstract from our own cases, to the 'internal' world of others. As indicated above, this assumption is quite fundamentally wrong - our *knowledge* that other human beings are conscious, and our *knowledge* of their mental states at a given time, is not inferential in nature at all, but is rather determined by the public criteria which govern the application of psychological concepts. I know that a person who behaves in a particular way - who, for example, gets red in the face, shouts, gesticulates, speaks vehemently, and so forth - is angry, precisely because I have learnt the concept 'anger' by reference to such behavioural criteria. There is no inference involved here. I do not reason 'he behaves in this way, therefore he is angry' - rather 'behaving in this way' is *part of what it is to be angry,* and it does not occur to any sane person to question whether the individual who acts in this way is conscious or has a mental life. (*Investigations*, I. § 303; II. iv., p. 178).

Secondly, because the argument from analogy treats the existence of the mental lives of other living human beings as problematic, it seeks to establish that it is legitimate to infer that other living human beings do indeed have mental lives, that each one of us may be said to be justified in his confidence that he is surrounded by other persons, rather than 'automatons'. The difficulty here, however, is that the argument presupposes that I can draw an analogy between two things, myself as a person and other living human beings, which are sufficiently similar to permit the analogous comparison, and sufficiently different to require it. The question must be faced, however, as to how, or in what respects, I am either different from other human beings, or similar to them? The answer to this question, of course, is that I am *neither;* I am a living human being, as are these others. I see about me living human beings, and the argument from analogy is supposed to allow me to infer that these are persons like myself. However, the truth of the matter is that I have no criterion for discriminating living human beings from persons, for the very good reason that persons *are* living human beings - there is no conceptual difference between the two. And since the argument acknowledges that I know living human beings directly, it thereby implicitly

acknowledges that I know other persons directly, thus making itself functionally redundant. (Malcolm, N. *op. cit.*).

A final, frequently-encountered objection to the argument from analogy derives from the work of Strawson and Malcolm, and runs as follows: the argument attempts to move inferentially from my supposed direct knowledge of my own mental life and 'inner' states to my indirect knowledge of the mental states of others. It thus presupposes that I know what it means to assign mental states to myself without necessarily knowing what it means to ascribe them to others. And, it is argued, this is incoherent: to speak of certain mental states as *being mine* in the first place is to discriminate them from mental states which are *not mine,* and these, by definition, are the mental states of others. It follows, therefore, on this view, that in a fundamental sense the argument from analogy cannot get off the ground: one cannot know how to ascribe mental states to oneself unless one also knows what it means to ascribe mental states to others - which entails that the ascription of such states to others is no more problematic than their ascription to myself.

Plausible as this objection seems at first sight, it is (ironically, on Wittgensteinian criteria) quite mistaken. For it is not the case that, when I am in pain, I first identify the pain, and subsequently come to recognise that it is one which I, *as distinct from someone else,* have. The personal pronoun 'I' in the locution 'I am in pain' is not the 'I' of personal individuation - it does not refer to me, or discriminate me, as a publicly situated person as distinct from others. (*The Blue Book and Brown Books*, pp. 67-69; also *Investigations*, I. § 406). The exponent of the argument from analogy, then, is not guilty of the charge of presupposing the very thing which he is endeavouring to demonstrate, as both Strawson and Malcolm suggest. Wittgenstein in fact considered that there is a genuine asymmetry here, in relation to the ascription of psychological predicates to oneself and to others, which is dimly perceived, but misrepresented, by those who feel the need of the argument from analogy, viz. that whereas one ascribes psychological states to others by reference to bodily and behavioural criteria, one has and requires no criteria at all to self-ascribe or self-avow them. (*Investigations*, I. § 289-290).

Thus the exponent of the argument from analogy sees, quite correctly, that present-tense, first-person psychological assertions such as 'I am in pain' differ radically from third-person psychological predicate ascriptions, but thinks of the former as descriptions of 'inner' mental states to which he alone has a privileged access. And this is crucially wrong. For again, such uses of the word 'I' as occur in present-tense, first-person psychological assertions do not identify a possessor - they do not discriminate one person from amongst a group. As Wittgenstein puts it,

> **To say "I have pain" is no more a statement *about* a particular person than moaning is.(*The Blue Book and Brown Books*, p. 67; also *Investigations*, I. § 404.).**

To ascribe pain to a third party, on the other hand, is to *identify* a concrete individual as the possessor of the pain - on this point alone Wittgenstein concurs with the exponent of the argument from analogy. However, Wittgenstein here calls attention to the fact that the asymmetry is not one which exists between the supposedly direct and certain knowledge which I have of my own mental states as distinct from the wholly inferential knowledge which, allegedly, I have of the mental states of others - rather the asymmetry is, again, that the ascriptions of psychological predicates to others require criterial justificatory grounds, whereas the self-avowals or self-ascriptions of such predicates are criterionless. It thus transpires that the argument from analogy appears possible and necessary only to those who misapprehend the asymmetry between the criterial bases for

third-person psychological predicate ascription and the *non-criterial right* for their self-ascription or self-avowal for a cognitive asymmetry between direct and indirect knowledge of mental states. The Cartesian egocentric view of the mind and of mental events which gives rise both to the spectre of solipsism and attempts to evade it by means of the argument from analogy has its origins in this very misapprehension.

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The Privacy of Experience

What then of solipsism? To what extent does the foregoing undermine it as a coherent philosophical hypothesis, albeit one in which no-one really believes? Well, as indicated above, solipsism rests upon certain presuppositions about the mind and our knowledge of mental events and processes. Two of these, the thesis that I have a privileged form of access to, and knowledge of, my own mind, and the thesis that there is no conceptual or logically necessary link between the mental and the physical, have been dealt with above; if the foregoing is correct, both theses are false. This leaves us with the final presupposition underlying solipsism, that all experiences are necessarily (i.e. logically) private to the individual whose experiences they are. This thesis - which, it is fair to say, is very widely accepted - also derives from the Cartesian account of mind, and generates solipsistic conclusions by suggesting that experience is something which, because of its 'occult' or ephemeral nature, can never literally be shared - no two people, it suggests, can ever be said to have the *same* experience, which again introduces the problem as to how one person can know the experiences of another, or more radically, how he can know that another person has experiences at all.

Wittgenstein offers a comprehensive critique of this view too - specifically, he attacks the notion that experience is *necessarily* private. The arguments adumbrated by him against this are complex, if highly compressed and rather oracular - the following is merely an outline of their central thrust. (For more detailed accounts, cf. Kenny, A., Malcolm, N. (b), Vohra, A.).

Wittgenstein distinguishes two senses of the word 'private' as it is normally used: privacy of knowledge and privacy of possession. Something is private to me in the first sense if only I can know it; it is private to me in the second sense if only I can have it. Thus the thesis that experience is necessarily private can mean one of two things, which are not always discriminated from each other with sufficient care: (a) only I can know my experiences, or (b) only I can have my experiences. Wittgenstein argues that the first of these is false, and that the second is true in a sense which does not make experience necessarily private, as follows:

If we take pain as an experiential exemplar, we find that the assertion 'Only I can know my pains' is a conjunction of two separate theses: (i) I (can) know that I am in pain when I am in pain, and (ii) other people cannot know that I am in pain when I am in pain. Thesis (i) is, literally, a piece if nonsense: it cannot be meaningfully asserted of me that *I know* that I am in pain. Wittgenstein's point here is not that I do not know that I am in pain, when I am in pain, but rather that the word 'know' cannot be significantly employed in this way. (*Investigations*, I. § 246; II. xi. p. 222). This is because the verbal locution 'I am in pain' is usually (though not invariably) an expression of pain -

as part of acquired pain-behaviour it is a linguistic substitute for such natural expressions of pain as groaning. (I. § 244). For this reason it cannot be governed by an epistemic operator: the prepositional function 'I know that x' does not yield a meaningful proposition if the variable is replaced by an expression of pain, linguistic or otherwise. Thus to say that others learn of my pains only from my behaviour is misleading, because it suggests that I learn of them otherwise; whereas in fact I don't learn of them at all - I have them. (I. § 246).

Thesis (ii) - other people cannot know that I am in pain when I am in pain - is quite simply false: if we take the word 'know' is as it is normally used, then it is true to say that other people can and very frequently do know when I am in pain. Indeed, in cases where the pain is extreme, it is often impossible to prevent others from knowing this even when one wishes to do so. Thus, in certain circumstances, it would not be unusual to hear it remarked of someone, for example, that 'a moan of pain escaped him' - indicating that despite his efforts, he *could not but* manifest his pain to others. It thus transpires that neither thesis (i) nor (ii) is true.

If we turn to (b), we find that 'Only I can have my pains' expresses a truth, but it is a truth which is grammatical rather than ontological - it draws our attention to the grammatical connection between the personal pronoun 'I' and the possessive 'my'. However, it tells us nothing specifically about pains or other experiences, for it remains true if we replace the word 'pains' with many other plural nouns (e.g. 'Only I can have my blushes'). Another person can have the *same pain* as me: if our pains have the same phenomenal characteristics, and corresponding locations, we will quite correctly be said to have 'the same pain' - this is what the expression 'the same pain' means. Another person, however, cannot have *my* pains: *my* pains are the ones which, if they are expressed at all, are expressed by me. But by exactly the same (grammatical) token, another person cannot have my blushes, sneezes, frowns, fears, etc., and none of this can be taken as adding to our stockpile of metaphysical truths. It is true, of course, that I may deliberately and successfully keep an experience to myself, in which case that particular experience might be said to be private to me. But I might well do this by articulating it in a language which those with whom I was conversing did not understand - and there is clearly nothing occult or mysterious about this kind of privacy. (*Investigations*, II. xi, p. 222). By exactly the same token, it has to be acknowledged that an experience which I do not or cannot keep to myself is not private. In short, some experiences are private, and some are not, and from the fact that some experiences are private in this sense it does not follow that *all* experiences could be private. As Wittgenstein points out, 'What sometimes happens could always happen' is a fallacy. It does not follow from the fact that some orders are not obeyed that all orders might never be obeyed. For in that case the concept 'order' would become incapable of instantiation, and would lose its significance. (I. § 345).

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The Incoherence of Solipsism

With the belief in the essential privacy of experience eliminated as false, the last presupposition underlying solipsism is removed, and it can be seen that, so far from being an irrefutable, if unbelievable, philosophical thesis, solipsism is quite foundationless, in theory or in fact. Indeed, one might even say, solipsism is *necessarily* foundationless, for to make an appeal to logical rules or

empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing in which he purportedly refuses to believe: the reality of intersubjectively valid criteria, and of a public, extra-mental world. There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a *false* philosophical theory, but, if the foregoing is correct, this is not quite strong or accurate enough - as a theory, it is in fact incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (i.e. a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all. Given this, it is scarcely surprising that those philosophers who accept the Cartesian premises which make solipsism apparently plausible, if not indeed, inescapable, have also invariably assumed that language-usage is itself essentially private. The cluster of arguments - generally referred to as 'the private language argument' - which we find in the *Investigations* against this assumption effectively administers the *coup de grâce* to both Cartesian dualism and solipsism. (I. § 202; 242-315). Language is an irreducibly public form of life which is encountered in specifically social contexts; each natural language-system contains an indefinitely large number of 'language-games', each governed by rules which, though conventional, are not arbitrary personal fiats; the meaning of a word is its (publicly accessible) use in a language; to question, to argue, to doubt, is, in each case, to utilise language in a particular way, it is to play a particular *kind* of public language-game. The proposition 'I am the only mind which exists' makes sense only to the extent to which it is expressed in a public language, and the existence of such language itself implies the existence of a social context. Such a context exists for the hypothetical last survivor of a nuclear holocaust, but not for the solipsist. A non-linguistic solipsism is unthinkable, and a thinkable solipsism is necessarily linguistic. Solipsism therefore presupposes the very thing which it seeks to deny: the very fact that solipsistic thoughts are thinkable in the first instance implies the existence of the public, shared, intersubjective world which they purport to call into question.

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Thomas Paine (1736-1809)

LIFE. Thomas Paine was a political and deistic writer; born at Thetford, England, 1736- 1737. His parents were Quakers. He left school at thirteen and till eighteen worked at his father's trade of stay-making, when he went to sea in a privateer. In April, 1759, he settled at Sandwich as a master stay-maker, and in September of that year married. Not prospering he removed to Margate the next year and there soon after his wife died. In 1761 he entered the excise branch of the government service and remained there till 1774, with the exception of a couple of years when, probably owing to his lax conduct, he was out of the service. He was restored but again dismissed, and finally, on the charge of smuggling. In 1771 he married Elizabeth Ollive, daughter of his landlord. In 1772 he wrote a small pamphlet, *The Case of the Officers of Excise; with Remarks on the Qualifications of Officers, and on the numerous Evils arising to the Revenue, from the Insufficiency of the present Salary: humbly addressed to the Members of both Houses of Parliament*. It was the first public exhibit on of his power as a writer, but it gave offense to the upper officials and probably was the occasion of his dismissal on a trumped-up charge. Shortly after this he and his wife were formally separated.

By advice of Benjamin Franklin, whom he met in London, he came to America and at once found employment for his pen. He was a contributor to the first issue of the *Pennsylvania Magazine*, published in Philadelphia in January, 1775, and soon after its editor and so continued for eighteen months. From August, 1776, to January, 1777, he was a soldier in Washington's army, and it was while at the front that he wrote the first number of *The Crisis* which so powerfully heartened the country for the struggle. Thus introduced to the notice of the patriots he had employment as opportunity offered and was considered as a person worthy of substantial rewards. In 1777 he became secretary to the Congressional Committee of Foreign Affairs, but was obligated to resign on January 7, 1779, because in the heat of a newspaper controversy with Silas Deane he divulged state secrets. In November, 1779, he was clerk to the general assembly of Pennsylvania. In 1781, in association with Col. John Laurens he negotiated in France a loan of 6,000,000 livres. He returned on August 25. In February, 1782, he was engaged by the secretary of foreign affairs at what was then called the handsome salary of $800 per annum. In 1784 the state of New York gave him a house and 277 acres of land at New Rochelle, in 1785 Pennsylvania 500 pounds of sterling, and in October, 1785, Congress gave him $3000. The several amounts were sufficient to make him financially independent. From 1787 to 1802 he was in Europe, most of the time in France. His *Rights of Man*, published in London in 1791, attracted the attention of the French liberal party, and he was made a citizen of France and elected to the National Assembly. He had the courage to vote against the execution of Louis XVI., and thus incurred the anger of Robespierre, who threw him into the prison of the Luxembourg on December 28, 1793, and there he remained until November 4, 1794, when, on the solicitation of James Monroe, minister to France, he was released. He tells himself of his marvelous escape from the guillotine, which was solely due to the fact that his door in the prison was opened outward. It had been marked in token that the occupant of the

room was to be executed, but his door being closed for the night the mark was of course not seen by those going through the prison in the early morning to drag out their victims.

On October 30, 1802, he landed once more in America. He found that his friends had so managed his property that it would yield him an income of 400 pounds sterling. So he felt quite rich. But what cut him deeply was to find that the reputation he had made as a patriot had been almost forgotten and it was as the author of *The Age of Reason* he was known. So great was the popular execration of that book that many who would gladly have shown their appreciation of his great services to the country refused to countenance him on account of it. Hooted upon the streets, lampooned in the newspapers, deserted by his political associates, he lived a wretched existence. He was buried on his farm in New Rochelle, but his remains were removed to England in 1819 by William Cobbett. What became of them is unknown.

WRITINGS. If Paine's writings had been only political, he would have been held in honor as a bold and vigorous friend of human liberty. He was extraordinarily fertile in ideas, and broad-minded and progressive. He was in fact a great genius. His power of speech has always been admired. To him is to be traced the common saying, "These are the times that try men's souls," which is the opening sentence of the first number of *The Crisis* (which was printed in the *Pennsylvania Journal*, December 19, 1776). His pamphlet, *Common Sense* (January, 1776), was one of the memorable writings of the day, and helped the cause of Independence. His *Rights of Man; being an Answer to Mr. Burke's Attack on the French Revolution* is a complete statement of republican principles. But it is as the author of *The Age of Reason*, an uncompromising attack on the Bible, that he is most widely known, indeed notorious. The first part of this work was handed by him, while on his way to prison in the Luxembourg, to his friend Joel Barlow, and appeared, London and Paris, March 1794; the second part, composed while in prison, December, 1795; the third was left in manuscript. "His ignorance," says Leslie Stephen, "was vast, and his language brutal; but he had the gift of a true demagogue,--the power of wielding a fine vigorous English, a fit vehicle for fanatical passion." Paine was not an atheist, but a deist. In his will he speaks of his "reposing confidence in my Creator-God and in no other being; for I know no other, nor believe in any other." He voiced current doubt, and is still formidable; because, although he attacks a gross misconception of Christianity, he does it in such a manner as to turn his reader, in many cases, away from any serious consideration of the claim of Christianity. His *Age of Reason* is still circulated and read. The replies written at the time are not. Of these replies the most famous is Bishop Watson's (1796).

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William Paley (1743-1805)

English theologian; born at Peterborough (37 m. n.e. of Northampton) July, 1743; died at Lincoln May 25, 1805. His mother was a keen, thrifty woman of much intelligence, and his father was a minor canon at Peterborough and a pedagogue. In 1758 Paley entered, as sizar, Christ College, Cambridge. He had been a fair scholar at his father's school, especially interested in mathematics. After taking his degree in 1763, he became usher at an academy in Greenwich and, in 1766, was elected fellow of Christ College, where he became an intimate friend of John Law and lectured successfully on metaphysics, morals, and the Greek Testament. He offered lectures on Locke, Clark's *Attributes*, and Butler's *Analogy*; and in his lectures on divinity took the ground maintained in his *Moral Philosophy* that the Thirty-nine Articles were merely articles of peace, inasmuch as they contained about 240 distinct propositions, many of them inconsistent with each other. He had been ordained a priest in 1767, and was appointed to the rectory of Musgrave in Cumberland, which be resigned in 1776, to take the vicarage of the two parishes, Appleby and Dalston. In 1780, he was installed prebendary at Carlisle, and resigned Appleby on becoming archdeacon in 1782. At the close of 1785, he became chancellor of the diocese and (1789-92) figured as an active opponent of the slave-trade. Presented to the vicarage of Aldingham in 1792, he vacated Dalston for Stanwix in 1793. In recognition of his apologetic writings, he was given the prebend of St. Pancras in St. Paul's Cathedral; the subdeanery of Lincoln, in 1795; and the rectory of Bishop Warmouth in 1795; and transferred his residence to Lincoln shortly before his death.

Paley excelled as a writer of textbooks. He is an unrivaled expositor of plain arguments, but without much originality. His moral system, in which he is said to have anticipated Bentham, is the best statement of the utilitarianism of the eighteenth century. In theology and philosophy his common-sense method, which showed his limitations of intellect, by ignoring commonly perceived difficulties and by easily accepting conclusions, has been discarded. In the former he seems to have followed a liberal construction of orthodox views, sincerely convinced that his doctrines could be logically proved by rationalistic argument. His alleged plagiarism, even as to the classical illustration of the universe by a watch, must be understood in the light of his purpose in compiling text-books. Upon being urged by Law to expand his lectures he published *The Moral and Political Philosophy* (London, 1786). His most original work was *Horce Paulince; or the Truth of the Scripture History of St. Paul evinced, by a Comparison of the Epistles which bear his name with the Acts of the Apostles and with one another* (London, 1790; subsequent editions are by J. Tate, 1840; T. R. Birks, 1850; J. S. Howson, 1877; German ed. with annotations, H. P. C. Henke, Helmstadt, 1797). His prominent apologetic works are, *A View of the Evidences of Christianity* (London, 1794) and *Natural History: or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature* (1802): the first a compendium of the arguments against the eighteenth-century deists, and the second a clear account of the a *posteriori* argument from the facts of early Christianity. The *Natural Theology*, used for many years as a foremost text-book classic, has been superseded on account of the shifting of ground from the mechanical objective to

the immanent subjective theory of the universe. Paley advances the teleological argument from design founded on the unity and adaptability of created things. This argument was based on rationalistic grounds; yet did not ultimately prove conclusive to rationalists themselves, and has not been able to survive criticism. His analogical method has run its course; the idea of a complex, perfected organism dropping suddenly amidst foreign surroundings, as illustrated by the finding of a watch, was the dogmatic externalism the rebound from which gave birth to the subsequent hypotheses of natural selection and adaptation to environment and the theory of evolution as a whole. In the *Evidences*, Paley proceeds along historical lines to affirm the truth of Christianity by two propositions; namely, that "there is clear proof that the apostles and their successors underwent the greatest hardships rather than give up the Gospel and cease to obey its precepts" and that "other miracles than those of the Gospel are not satisfactorily attested." To these he appends "auxiliary" arguments drawn from the "morality of the Gospel," "originality of Christ's character," and others. The argument is one-sided on account of its disregard of the field of Christian consciousness.

Paley also published *Reasons for Contentment; addressed to the Laboring Part of the British Public* (1793). Individual sermons which may be mentioned are: *Dangers Incidental to the Clerical Character* (1795); *Assize Sermon at Durham* (1795); as well as the compilations *Sermons on Several Subjects and Sermons and Tracts* (1808). The first collected edition of the works of William Paley appeared in 1805-08; one by A. Chalmers with biography (5 vols., London, 1819); one by E. Lynam (1825); and one by his son, E. Paley (1825).

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Russell's Paradox

Russell's paradox represents either of two interrelated logical antinomies. The most commonly discussed form is a contradiction arising in the logic of sets or classes. Some classes (or sets) seem to be members of themselves, while some do not. The class of *all* classes is itself a class, and so it seems to be in itself. The null or empty class, however, must *not* be a member of itself. However, suppose that we can form a class of *all* classes (or sets) that, like the null class, are *not* included in themselves. The paradox arises from asking the question of whether *this* class is in itself. It is if and only if it is not. The other form is a contradiction involving properties. Some properties seem to apply to themselves, while others do not. The property of *being a property* is itself a property, while the propery of *being a cat* is not itself a cat. Consider the property that something has just in case it is a property (like that of *being a cat*) that does *not* apply to itself. Does this property apply to itself? Once again, from either assumption, the opposite follows. The paradox was named after Bertrand Russell, who discovered it in 1901.

History

Russell's discovery came while he was working on his *Principles of Mathematics*. Although Russell discovered the paradox independently, there is some evidence that other mathematicians and set-theorists, including Ernst Zermelo and David Hilbert, had already been aware of the first version of the contradiction prior to Russell's discovery. Russell, however, was the first to discuss the contradiction at length in his published works, the first to attempt to formulate solutions and the first to appreciate fully its importance. An entire chapter of the *Principles* was dedicated to discussing the contradiction, and an appendix was dedicated to the theory of types that Russell suggested as a solution.

Russell discovered the contradiction from considering Cantor's power class theorem: the mathematical result that the number of entities in a certain domain is always smaller than the number of subclasses of those entities. Certainly, there must be *at least* as many subclasses of

entities in the domain as there are entities in the domain given that for each entity, one subclass will be the class containing only that entity. However, Cantor proved that there also cannot be the *same* number of entities as there are subclasses. If there were the same number, there would have to be a 1-1 function *f* mapping entities in the domain on to subclasses of entities in the domain. However, this can be proven to be impossible. Some entities in the domain would be mapped by *f* on to subclasseses that contain them, whereas others may not. However, consider the subclass of entities in the domain that are not in the subclasses on to which *f* maps them. This is itself a subclass of entities of the domain, and thus, *f* would have to map it on to some particular entity in the domain. The problem is that then the question arises as to whether this entity is in the subclass on to which *f* maps it. Given the subclass in question, it does just in case it does not. The Russell paradox of classes can in effect be seen as an instance of this line of reasoning, only simplified. Are there more classes or subclasses of classes? It would seem that there would have to be more classes, since all subclasses of classes are themselves classes. But if Cantor's theorem is correct, there would have to be more subclasses. Russell considered the simple mapping of classes onto themselves, and invoked the Cantorian approach of considering the class of all those entities that are not in the classes onto which they are mapped. Given Russell's mapping, this becomes the class of all classes not in themselves.

The paradox had profound ramifications for the historical development of class or set theory. It made the notion of a universal class, a class containing all classes, extremely problematic. It also brought into considerable doubt the notion that for every specifiable condition or predicate, one can assume there to exist a class of all and only those things that satisfy that condition. The properties version of the contradiction--a natural extension of the classes or sets version--raised serious doubts about whether one can be committed to objective existence of a property or universal corresponding to every specifiable condition or predicate. Indeed, contradictions and problems were soon found in the work of those logicians, philosophers and mathematicians who made such assumptions. In 1902, Russell discovered that a version the contradiction was formulable in the logical system developed in Volume I of Gottlob Frege's *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, one of the central works in the late-19th and early-20th century revolution in logic. In Frege's philosophy, a class is understood as the "extension" or "value-range" of a concept. Concepts are the closest correlates to properties in Frege's metaphysics. A concept is presumed to exist for every specifiable condition or predicate. Thus, there is a concept of *being a class that does fall under its defining concept*. There is also a class defined by this concept, and it falls under its defining concept just in case it does not.

Russell wrote to Frege concerning the contradiction in June of 1902. This began one of the most interesting and discussed correspondences in intellectual history. Frege immediately recognized the disastrous consequences of the paradox. He did note, however, that the properties version of the paradox was solved in his philosophy by his distinction between levels of concepts. For him, concepts are understood a *functions* from arguments to truth-values. Some concepts, "first-level concepts", take objects as arguments, some concepts, "second-level concepts" take these functions as arguments, and so on. Thus, a concept can never take itself as argument, and the properties version cannot be formulated. However, classes, or extensions or concepts, were all understood by Frege to fall in the type of objects. The question does arise, then, for each class whether it falls under its defining concept.

When he received Russell's first letter, the second volume of Frege's *Grundgesetze* was already in

the latter stages of the publication process. Frege was forced to quickly prepare an appendix in response to the paradox. Frege considers a number of possible solutions. The conclusion he settles on, however, is to weaken the class abstraction principle in the logical system. In the original system, one could conclude that an object is in a class if and only if the object falls under the concept defining the class. In the revised system, one can conclude only that an object is in a class if and only if the object falls under the concept defining the class *and* the object is not identical to the class in question. This blocks the class version of the paradox. However, Frege was not entirely happy even with this solution. And this was for good reason. Some years later the revised system was found to lead to a more complicated form of the contradiction. Even before this result was discovered, Frege abandoned it and seems to have concluded that his earlier approach to the logic of classes was simply unworkable, and that logicians would have to make do entirely without commitment to classes or sets.

However, other logicians and mathematicians have proposed other, relatively more successful, alternative solutions. These are discussed below.

Possible Solutions to the Paradox of Properties

The Theory of Types. It was noted above that Frege did have an adequate response to the contradiction when formulated as a paradox of properties. Frege's response was in effect a precursor to what one of the most commonly discussed and articulated proposed solutions to this form of the paradox. This is to insist that properties fall into different types, and that the type of a property is never the same as the entities to which it applies. Thus, the question never even arises as to whether a property applies to itself. A logical language that divides entities into such a hierarchy is said to employ the *theory of types*. Though hinted at already in Frege, the theory of types was first fully explained and defended by Russell in Appendix B of the *Principles*. Russell's theory of types was more comprehensive than Frege's distinction of levels; it divided not only properties into different logical types, but classes as well. The use of the theory of types to solve the other form of Russell's paradox is described below.

To be philosophically adequate, the adoption of the theory of types for properties requires developing an account of the nature of properties such that one would be able to explain why they cannot apply to themselves. After all, at first blush, it would seem to make sense to predicate a property of itself. The property of being self-identical would seem to be self-identical. The property of being nice seems to be nice. Similarly, it seems *false*, not *nonsensical*, to say that the property of being a cat is a cat. However, different thinkers explain the justification for the type-division in different ways. Russell even gave different explanations at different parts of his career. For his part, the justification for Frege's division of different levels of concepts derived from his theory of the *unsaturatedness* of concepts. Concepts, as functions, are essentially incomplete. They require an argument in order to yield a value. One cannot simply predicate one concept of a concept of the same type, because the argument concept still requires its own argument. For example, while it is possible to take the square root of the square root of some number, one cannot simply apply the function square root to the function square root and arrive at a value.

Conservatism about Properties. Another possible solution to the paradox of properties would involve denying that a property exists corresponding to any specifiable conditions or well-formed predicate. Of course, if one eschews metaphysical commitment to properties as objective and independent entities altogether, that is, if one adopts nominalism, then the paradoxical question is avoided entirely. However, one does not need to be quite so extreme in order to solve the antinomy. The higher-order logical systems developed by Frege and Russell contained what is called *the comprehension* principle, the principle that for every open formula, no matter how complex, there exists as entity a property or concept exemplified by all and only those things that satisfy the formula. In effect, they were committed to attributes or properties for any conceivable set of conditions or predicates, no matter how complex. However, one could instead adopt a more austere metaphysics of properties, only granting objective existence to simple properties, perhaps including *redness*, *solidity* and *goodness*, etc. One might even allow that such properties can possibly apply to themselves, e.g. that goodness is good. However, on this approach one would deny the same status to complex attributes, e.g. the so-called "properties" as *having-seventeen-heads, being-a-cheese-made-England, having-been-written-underwater,* etc. It is simply not the case that any specifiable condition corresponds to a property, understood as an independently existing entity that has properties of its own. Thus, one might deny that there is a simple property *being-a-property-that-does-not-apply-to-itself*. If so, one can avoid the paradox simply by adopting a more conservative metaphysics of properties.

Possible Solutions to the Paradox of Classes or Sets

It was mentioned above that late in his life, Frege gave up entirely on the feasibility of the logic of classes or sets. This is of course one ready solution to the antinomy in the class or set form: simply deny the existence of such entities altogether. Short of this, however, the following solutions have enjoyed the greatest popularity:

The Theory of Types for Classes: It was mentioned earlier that Russell advocated a more comprehensive theory of types than Frege's distinction of levels, one that divided not only properties or concepts into various types, but classes as well. Russell divided classes into classes of individuals, classes of classes of individuals, and so on. Classes were not taken to be individuals, and classes of classes of individuals were not taken to be classes of individuals. A class is never of the right type to have itself as member. Therefore, there is no such thing as the class of all classes that are not members of themselves, because for any class, the question of whether it is in itself is a violation of type. Once again, here the challenge is to explain the metaphysics of classes or sets in order to explain the philosophical grounds of the type-division.

Stratification: In 1937, W. V. Quine suggested an alternative solution in some ways similar to type-theory. His suggestion was rather than actually divide entities into individuals, classes of individuals, etc., such that the proposition that some class is in itself is always ill-formed or nonsensical, we can instead put certain restrictions on what classes are supposed to exist. Classes are only supposed to exist if their defining conditions are so as to not involve what would, in type

theory, be a violation of types. Thus, for Quine, while "*x* is not a member of *x*" is a meaningful assertion, we do not suppose there to exist a class of all entities *x* that satisfy this statement. In Quine's system, a class is only supposed to exist for some open formula *A* if and only if the formula *A* is *stratified*, that is, if there is some assignment of natural numbers to the variables in *A* such that for each occurrence of the class membership sign, the variable preceding the membership sign is given an assignment one lower than the variable following it. This blocks Russell's paradox, because the formula used to define the problematic class has the same variable both before and after the membership sign, obviously making it unstratified. However, it has yet to be determined whether or not the resulting system, which Quine called "New Foundations for Mathematical Logic" or NF for short, is consistent or inconsistent.

***Aussonderung*: A quite different approach is taken in Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory. Here too, a restriction is placed on what sets are supposed to exist. Rather than taking the "top-down" approach of Russell and Frege, who originally believed that for any concept, property or condition, one can suppose there to exist a class of all those things in existence with that property or satisfying that condition, in ZF set theory, one begins from the "bottom up". One begins with individual entities, and the empty set, and puts such entities together to form sets. Thus, unlike the early systems of Russell and Frege, ZF is not committed to a universal set, a set including all entities or even all sets. ZF puts tight restrictions on what sets exist. Only those sets that are explicitly postulated to exist, or which can be put together from such sets by means of iterative processes, etc., can be concluded to exist. Then, rather than having a naive class abstraction principle that states that an entity is in a certain class if and only if it meets its defining condition, ZF has a principle of separation, selection, or as in the original German, "*Aussonderung*". Rather than supposing there to exist a set of all entities that meet some condition *simpliciter*, for each set already known to exist, *Aussonderung* tells us that there is a subset of that set of all those entities in the original set that satisfy the condition. The class abstraction principle then becomes: if set A exists, then for all entities *x* in A, *x* is in the subset of A that satisfies condition C if and only if *x* satisfies condition C. This approach solves Russell's paradox, because we cannot simply assume that there is a set of *all* sets that are not members of themselves. Given a set of sets, we can separate or divide it into those sets within it that are in themselves and those that are not, but since there is no universal set, we are not committed to the set of all such sets. Without the supposition of Russell's problematic class, the contradiction cannot be proven.**

There have been subsequent expansions or modifications made on all these solutions, such as the *ramified* type-theory of *Principia Mathematica*, Quine's later expanded system of his *Mathematical Logic*, and the later developments in set-theory made by Bernays, Gödel and von Neumann. The question of what is the *correct* solution to Russell's paradox is still a matter of debate.

See also the Russell-Myhill Paradox article in this encyclopedia.

Suggested Reading

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Russell-Myhill Paradox

The Russell-Myhill Antinomy, also known as the *Principles of Mathematics* Appendix B Paradox, is a contradiction that arises in the logical treatment of classes and "propositions", where "propositions" are understood as mind-independent and language-independent logical objects. If propositions are treated as objectively existing objects, then they can be members of classes. But propositions can also be *about* classes, including classes of propositions. Indeed, for each class of propositions, there is a proposition stating that all propositions in that class are true. Propositions of this form are said to "assert the logical product" of their associated classes. Some such propositions are themselves in the class whose logical product they assert. For example, the proposition asserting that all-propositions-in-the-*class-of-all-propositions*-are-true is itself a proposition, and therefore it itself is in the class whose logical product it asserts. However, the proposition stating that all-propositions-in-the-*null-class*-are-true is not itself in the null class. Now consider the class *w*, consisting of all propositions that state the logical product of some class *m* in which they are *not* included. This *w* is itself a class of propositions, and so there is a proposition *r*, stating *its* logical product. The contradiction arises from asking the question of whether *r* is in the class *w*. It seems that *r* is in *w* just in case it is not. This antinomy was discovered by Bertrand Russell in 1902, a year after discovering a simpler paradox usually called "Russell's paradox". It was discussed informally in Appendix B of his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics*. In 1958, the antinomy was independently rediscovered by John Myhill, who found it to plague the "Logic of Sense and Denotation" developed by Alonzo Church.

History and Historical Importance

In his early work (prior to 1907) Russell held an ontology of propositions understood as being mind independent entities corresponding to possible states of affairs. The proposition corresponding to the English sentence "Socrates is wise" would be thought to contain both Socrates the person and wisdom (understood as a Platonic universal) as constituent entities. These entities are the meanings of declarative sentences.

After discovering "Russell's paradox" in 1901 while working on his *Principles of Mathematics*, Russell began searching for a solution. He soon came upon the Theory of Types, which he describes in Appendix B of the *Principles*. This early form of the theory of types was a version of what has later come to be known as the "simple theory of types" (as opposed to ramified type theory). The simple theory of types was successful in solving the simpler paradox. However, Russell soon asked himself whether there were other contradictions similar to Russell's paradox that the simple theory of types could not solve. In 1902, he discovered such a contradiction. Like the simpler paradox, Russell discovered this paradox by considering Cantor's power class theorem: the mathematical result that the number of classes of entities in a certain domain is always greater than the number in the domain itself. However, there seems to be a 1-1 correspondence between the number of classes of propositions and the number of propositions themselves. A different proposition can seemingly be generated for each class of propositions, for instance, the proposition stating that all propositions in the class are true. This would mean that the number of propositions is as great as the number of classes of propositions, in violation of Cantor's theorem.

Unlike Russell's paradox, this paradox cannot be blocked by the simple theory of types. The simple theory of types divides entities into individuals, properties of individuals, properties of properties of individuals, and so forth. The question of whether a certain property applies to itself does not arise, because properties never apply to entities of their own type. Thus there is no question as to whether the property that a property has just in case it does not apply to itself applies to itself. Classes can only have entities of a certain type: the type to which the property defining the class applies. There can be classes of individuals, classes of classes of individuals, and classes of classes of classes of individuals, etc., but never classes that contain members of different types. Thus, there is no such thing as the class of all classes that are not in themselves. However, on the simple theory of types, propositions are not properties of anything, and thus, they are all in the type of individuals. However, they can include classes or properties as constituents. But consider the property a proposition has just in case it states the logical product of a class it is not in. This property defines a class. This class will be a class of individuals; for any individual, the question arises whether that individual is in the class. However, the proposition stating the logical product of this class is also an individual. Thus, the problematic question is not avoided by the simple theory of types.

Some authors have speculated that this antinomy was the first hint Russell found that what was needed to solve the paradoxes was something more than the simple theory of types. If so, then this antinomy is of considerable importance, as it might represent the first motivation for the ramified theory of types adopted by Russell and Whitehead in *Principia Mathematica*.

Formulation and Derivation

In 1902, when he discovered this paradox, Russell's logical notation was borrowed mostly from Peano. In this symbolism, the class *w* of all propositions stating the logical product of a class they are not in, and *r*, the proposition stating its logical product, are written as follows:

$w = p \ni [\exists m \ni \{p .=: q \varepsilon m .\supset_q. q :. p \sim\varepsilon m\}]$
$r = (q \varepsilon w .\supset_q. q)$

In somewhat more contemporary notation, these become:

$w = \{p: (\exists m)[(p = (\forall q)(q \in m \supset q)) \& (p \notin m)]\}$
$r = (\forall q)(q \in w \supset q)$

Because propositions are entities, variables for them in Russell's logic can be bound by quantifiers and can flank the identity sign. Indeed, Russell also allows complete sentences or formulae to flank the identity sign. If α is some complex formula, then "$p = \alpha$" is to be understood as asserting that *p* is *the proposition that* "α". Thus, *w* is defined as the class of propositions *p* such that there is a class of *m* for which *p* is the proposition that all propositions *q* in *m* are true, and such that *p* is not in *m*. The proposition *r* is then defined as the proposition stating that all propositions in *w* are true.

The derivation of the contradiction requires certain principles involving the identity conditions of propositions understood as entities. These principles were never explicitly formulated by Russell, but are informally stated in his discussion of the antinomy in the *Principles*. However, other writers have sought to make these principles explicit, and even to develop a fully formulated intensional logic of propositions based on Russell's views. The principles relevant for the derivation of the contradiction are the following:

Principle 1: $(\forall p)(\forall q)(\forall r)(\forall s)[((p \supset q) = (r \supset s)) \supset ((p = r) \& (q = s))]$
Principle 2: $[(\forall x)A(x) = (\forall x)B(x)] \supset (\forall y)[A(y) = B(y)]$

The first principle states that identical conditional propositions have identical antecedent and consequent component propositions. The second states that if the universal proposition that everything satisfies open formula A(*x*) is the same as the universal proposition that everything satisfies open formula B(*x*), then for any particular entity *y*, the proposition that A(*y*) is identical to the proposition that B(*y*).

Then, from either the assumption that $r \in w$ or the assumption $r \notin w$, the opposite follows.
Assume:
1. $r \in w$
From (1), by class abstraction and the definition of *w*:
2. $(\exists m)[(r = (\forall q)(q \in m \supset q)) \& (r \notin m)]$
(2) allows us to consider some *m* such that:
3. $(r = (\forall q)(q \in m \supset q)) \& (r \notin m)$
From the first conjunct of (3) definition of *r* we arrive at:
4. $(\forall q)(q \in w \supset q) = (\forall q)(q \in m \supset q)$

By (4) and principle 2, then:

5. $(\forall q)[(q \in w \supset q) = (q \in m \supset q)]$

Instantiating (5) to *r*, we conclude:

6. $(r \in w \supset r) = (r \in m \supset r)$

By (6), and principle 1, then:

7. $(r \in w) = (r \in m)$

The definition of $\notin$ and second disjunct of (3) yield:

8. $\sim(r \in m)$

By (7) and (8) and substitution of identicals, we get:

9. $\sim(r \in w)$

By (9) and the definition of $\notin$:

10. $r \notin w$

This contradicts our assumption. However, assume instead:

11. $r \notin w$

By (11) and class abstraction:

12. $\sim(\exists m)[(r = (\forall q)(q \in m \supset q)) \mathbin{\&} (r \notin m)]$

By the rules of the quantifiers and propositional logic, (12) becomes:

13. $(\forall m)[(r = (\forall q)(q \in m \supset q)) \supset (r \in m)]$

Instantiating (13) to *w*:

14. $(r = (\forall q)(q \in w \supset q)) \supset (r \in w)$

By (14), the definition of *r*, and modus ponens:

15. $r \in w$

Thus, from either assumption the opposite follows.

Frege's Response

Soon after discovering this antinomy, in September of 1902, Russell related his discovery to Gottlob Frege. Although Frege was clearly devastated by the simpler "Russell's paradox", which Russell had related to Frege three months prior, Frege was not similarly impressed by the Russell-Myhill antinomy. Russell had formulated the antinomy in Peano's logical notation, and Frege charged that the apparent paradox derived from defects of Peano's symbolism.

In Frege's own way of speaking, a "proposition" is understood simply as a declarative sentence, a bit of language. Frege certainly did not ascribe to propositions the sort of ontology Russell did. However, he thought propositions had both senses and references (see sense/reference distinction). He called the senses of propositions "thoughts" and believed that their references were truth-values, either the True or the False. An expression written in his logical language was thought to stand for its reference (though express a thought). When propositions flank the identity sign, e.g. "$p = q$" this is taken as expressing that the two propositions have the same truth-value, not that they express the same thought.

Thus, Frege was unsatisfied with Russell's formulation of the antinomy. In Russell's definition "$w = \{p: (\exists m)[(p = (\forall q)(q \in m \supset q)) \mathbin{\&} (p \notin m)]\}$", the part "$p = (\forall q)(q \in m \supset q)$" seems to mean not

an identity of truth-values, but thoughts. However, if this is the case, then "$(\forall q)(q \in m \supset q)$" must be understood as referring to, rather than simply expressing, a thought. However, on Frege's view, this would mean that the expressions that occur in it have indirect reference, i.e. they refer to the thoughts they customarily express. However, in indirect reference, the variable "*m*" in that context must be understood not as standing for a class, but as standing for a sense picking out a class. However, the second occurrence of "*m*" later on in the definition of *w* must be understood as referring to a class, not a sense picking out a class. However, if the two occurrences of "*m*" do not refer to the same thing, it is extremely problematic that they be bound by the same quantifier. Moreover, Russell's derivation of the contradiction requires treating the two occurrences of "*m*" as referring to the same thing. Thus, Frege himself concluded that the antinomy was due to unclarities in the symbolism Russell used to formulate the paradox. He suggests that the antinomy can only be derived in a system that conflates or assimilates sense and reference.

However, it is not clear that Frege's response is adequate. Frege criticizes only the syntactic formulation of the antinomy in a logical language, not the violation of Cantor's theorem lying behind the paradox. Frege does not have an ontology of propositions, but he does have an ontology of thoughts. Thoughts, as objectively existing entities, can be members of classes. Moreover, it seems that there will be as many thoughts as there are classes of thoughts. One can generate a different thought for every class, i.e. the thought that everything is in the class or that all thoughts in the class are true. We now consider the class of all thoughts that state the logical product of a class they are not in, and a thought stating the logical product of this class, and arrive at the same contradiction. Frege's metaphysics seems to have similar difficulties.

It is true that the antinomy cannot be formulated in Frege's own logical systems. However, this is only because those systems are entirely extensional. In them, it is impossible to *refer* to thoughts (as opposed to simply express them) and assert their identity--one can only refer to truth-values and assert their identity. However, it appears that if Frege's logical systems were expanded to include commitment to the realm of sense, to make it possible to refer not only to truth-values and classes, but thoughts and other senses, a version of the antinomy would be provable. In 1951, Alonzo Church developed an expanded logical system based loosely on Frege's views, which he called "the Logic of Sense and Denotation". In 1958, John Myhill discovered that the antinomy considered here was formulable in Church's system. Myhill seems to have rediscovered the paradox independently of Russell. Hence the term, "Russell-Myhill Antinomy."

Possible Solutions

The antinomy results from the following commitments

> (A) The commitment to classes, defined for every property,
>
> (B) The commitment to propositions as intensional entities (or to similar entities, such as Frege's thoughts),
>
> (C) An understanding of propositions such that there must exist as many propositions as there are classes of propositions; i.e. a *different* proposition can be generated for

every class,

(D) An understanding of propositions and classes such that for every proposition and every class of propositions, the question arises as to whether the proposition falls in the class.

One might hope to solve the antinomy by abandoning any one of these commitments. Let us examine them in turn.

Abandoning (A), the commitment to classes, is very tempting, especially given the other paradoxes of class theory. However, in this context, this option may be not be as fruitful as it might appear. Russell himself worked on a "no classes" theory from 1905 though 1907. However, he soon discovered a classless version of the same paradox. Here, rather than considering a class w consisting of propositions, we consider a property W that a proposition p has just in case there is some property F for which p states that all propositions with F are true but which p does not itself have. Thus:

$$(\forall p)[Wp \equiv (\exists F)[(p = (\forall q)(Fq \supset q)) \ \& \ {\sim}Fp]]$$

We then define proposition r as the proposition that all propositions with property W are true:

$$r = (\forall q)(Wq \supset q)$$

Then, via a similar deduction to that given above, from the assumption of Wr one can prove ${\sim}Wr$ and vice versa. Thus it does not do to simply abandon classes. One would also have to abandon a robust ontology of properties; perhaps eschewing all of higher-order logic.

One might simply want to abandon (B), the commitment to propositions or Fregean thoughts understood as logical entities. The commitment to logical entities in a Platonic realm has grown less and less popular, especially given the widespread view that logic ought to be without ontological commitment. The challenge would be to abandon such intensional entities while maintaining a plausible account of meaning and intentionality.

However, one might hope to maintain commitment to propositions or thoughts, but attempt to reduce the number posited. This would likely involve denying (C). The Cantorian construction lying at the heart of the antinomy involves the claim that one can generate a *different* proposition for every class. In the construction given above, this claim is justified by showing that for each class, one can generate a proposition stating its logical product, and showing that, for each class, the class so generated is *different*. To deny this, one could either deny that one can generate such a proposition for each class, or instead, deny that the proposition so generated is *different* for every class. The first strategy is difficult to justify if one understands propositions and classes as objectively existing entities, independent of mind and language. If a proposition exists for every possible state of affairs, then one such proposition will exist for every class.

However, if one adopts looser identity conditions for propositions or thoughts, one might attempt to take the second approach to denying (C). That is, one would allow that the proposition stating the logical product of one class might be the same proposition as the proposition stating the logical product of a *different* class. This is perhaps not an easy approach to justify. In the Russellian deduction given above, principles 1 and 2 guarantee that the proposition stating the logical product

of one class is always different from the proposition stating the logical product of another class. These principles seem justified by the understanding of propositions as composite entities with a certain fixed structure. Consider principle 1. It states that identical conditional propositions have identical propositions in their antecedent and consequent positions. However, this might be denied if one were adopt looser identity conditions for propositions. One might, for example, adopt *logical equivalence* as being a sufficient condition for propositions to be identical. If so, then principle 1 would be unjustified. For example $p \supset q$ and $\sim q \supset \sim p$ are logically equivalent, however, they obviously need not have the same antecedent propositions. However, this approach may lead to other difficulties. Often, part of the motivation for intensional entities such as propositions or Fregean thoughts is in order to view them as relata in belief and other intentional states. If one adopts logical equivalence as sufficient for propositions to be identical, this is extremely problematic. The simple proposition p is logically equivalent to the proposition $\sim(p \,\&\, \sim q) \supset \sim(q \supset \sim p)$. If we take these two be the same proposition, then if propositions are relata in belief states, we seemingly must conclude that anyone who believes p also believes $\sim(p \,\&\, \sim q) \supset \sim(q \supset \sim p)$. This does not seem to be true.

W. V. Quine is famous for suggesting that intensional entities are "creatures of darkness", having obscure identity conditions. Here it appears that if the identity conditions of intensions are taken to be too loose, then intensions cannot do many of the things we want of them. If the identity conditions of intensions are too stringent, however, it is difficult to avoid positing so many of them that inconsistency with Cantor's theorem is a genuine threat.

Lastly, one could maintain commitment to a great number of propositions or thoughts as entities, but block the paradox by suggesting that these entities fall into different logical types. That is, one could deny (D), and suggest instead that the question does not always arise for every proposition and class of propositions whether that proposition is in that class. This is in effect the approach taken with ramified type-theory. In ramified type theory, the type of a formula α depends not only on whether α stands for an individual, a property of an individual, or a property of a property of an individual, etc., but also on what sort of quantification α involves. The core notion is that α cannot involve quantification over, or classes including, entities within a domain that includes the thing that α itself stands for. Consider the proposition r from the antinomy. Recall that r was defined as $(\forall q)(q \in m \supset q)$. Thus, r involves quantification over propositions. In ramified type theory, we would disallow r to fall within the range of the quantifier involved in the definition of r. If a certain proposition involves quantification over a range of propositions, it cannot be included in that range. Thus, we divide the type of propositions into *orders*. Propositions of the lowest order include mundane propositions such as the proposition that Socrates is bald or the proposition that Hypatia is wise. Propositions of the next highest order involve quantification over, or classes of, propositions of this order, such as the proposition that all such propositions are true, or the proposition that if such a proposition is true, then God believes it, etc. Here, the challenge is to justify the ramified hierarchy as something more than a simple *ad hoc* dodge of the antinomies, to provide it with solid philosophical foundations. Poincaré's Vicious Circle Principle is perhaps one way of providing such justification.

Antinomies such as the Russell-Myhill antinomy must be a concern for anyone with a robust ontology of intensional entities. Nevertheless, there may be solutions to the antinomy short of eschewing intensions altogether.

Suggested Reading

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Parmenides (b. 510 BCE.)

Parmenides was a Greek philosopher and poet, born of an illustrious family about BCE. 510, at Elea in Lower Italy, and is is the chief representative of the Eleatic philosophy. He was held in high esteem by his fellow-citizens for his excellent legislation, to which they ascribed the prosperity and wealth of the town. He was also admired for his exemplary life. A "Parmenidean life" was proverbial among the Greeks. He is commonly represented as a disciple of Xenophanes. Parmenides wrote after Heraclitus, and in conscious opposition to him, given the evident allusion to Hericlitus: "for whom it is and is not, the same and not the same, and all things travel in opposite directions" (fr. 6, 8). Little more is known of his biography than that he stopped at Athens on a journey in his sixty-fifth year, and there became acquainted with the youthful Socrates. That must have been in the middle of the fifth century BCE., or shortly after it.

Parmenides broke with the older Ionic prose tradition by writing in hexameter verse. His didactic poem, called *On Nature*, survives in fragments, although the Proem (or introductory discourse) of the work has been preserved. Parmenides was a young man when he wrote it, for the goddess who reveals the truth to him addresses him as 'youth'. The work is considered inartistic. Its Hesiodic style was appropriate for the cosmogony he describes in the second part, but is unsuited to the arid dialectic of the first. Parmenides was no born poet, and we much ask what led him to take this new departure. The example of Xenophanes' poetic writings is not a complete explanation; for the poetry of Parmenides is as unlike that of Xenophanes as it well can be, and his style is more like Hesiod and the Orphics. In the Proem Parmenides describes his ascent to the home of the goddess who is supposed to speak the remainder of the verses; this is a reflexion of the conventional ascents into heaven which were almost as common as descents into hell in the apocalyptic literature of those days.

The Proem opens with Parmenides representing himself as borne on a chariot and attended by the Sunmaidens who have quitted the Halls of Night to guide him on his journey. They pass along the highway till they come to the Gate of Night and Day, which is locked and barred. The key is in the keeping of Dike (Right), the Avenger, who is persuaded to unlock it by the Sunmaidens. They pass in through the gate and are now, of course, in the realms of Day. The goal of the journey is the palace of a goddess who welcomes Parmenides and instructs him in the two ways, that of Truth and the deceptive way of Belief, in which is no truth at all. All this is described without inspiration and in a purely conventional manner, so it must be interpreted by the canons of the apocalyptic style. It is clearly meant to indicate that Parmenides had been converted, that he had passed from error (night) to truth (day), and the Two Ways must represent his former error and the truth which is now revealed to him.

There is reason to believe that the Way of Belief is an account of Pythagorean cosmology. In any case, it is surely impossible to regard it as anything else than a description of some error. The goddess says so in words that cannot be explained away. Further, this erroneous belief is not the

ordinary man's view of the world, but an elaborate system, which seems to be a natural development the Ionian cosmology on certain lines, and there is no other system but the Pythagorean that fulfils this requirement. To this it has been objected that Parmenides would not have taken the trouble to expound in detail a system he had altogether rejected, but that is to mistake the character of the apocalyptic convention. It is not Parmenides, but the goddess, that expounds the system, and it is for this reason that the beliefs described are said to be those of 'mortals'. Now a description of the ascent of the soul would be quite incomplete without a picture of the region from which it had escaped. The goddess must reveal the two ways at the parting of which Parmenides stands, and bid him choose the better. The rise of mathematics in the Pythagorean school had revealed for the first time the power of thought. To the mathematician of all men it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be, and this is the principle from which Parmenides starts. It is impossible to think what is not, and it is impossible for what cannot be thought to be. The great question, Is it or is it not? is therefore equivalent to the question, Can it be thought or not?

In any case, the work thus has two divisions. The first discusses the truth, and the second the world of illusion -- that is, the world of the senses and the erroneous opinions of mankind founded upon them. In his opinion truth lies in the perception that existence is, and error in the idea that non-existence also can be. Nothing can have real existence but what is conceivable; therefore to be imagined and to be able to exist are the same thing, and there is no development. The essence of what is conceivable is incapable of development, imperishable, immutable, unbounded, and indivisible. What is various and mutable, all development, is a delusive phantom. Perception is thought directed to the pure essence of being; the phenomenal world is a delusion, and the opinions formed concerning it can only be improbable.

Parmenides goes on to consider in the light of this principle the consequences of saying that anything is. In the first place, it cannot have come into being. If it had, it must have arisen from nothing or from something. It cannot have arisen from nothing; for there is no nothing. It cannot have arisen from something; for here is nothing else than what is. Nor can anything else besides itself come into being; for there can be no empty space in which it could do so. Is it or is it not? If it is, then it is now, all at once. In this way Parmenides refutes all accounts of the origin of the world. Ex nihilo nihil fit.

Further, if it is, it simply is, and it cannot be more or less. There is, therefore, as much of it in one place as in another. (That makes rarefaction and condensation impossible.) it is continuous and indivisible; for there is nothing but itself which could prevent its parts being in contact with on another. It is therefore full, a continuous indivisible plenum. (That is directed against the Pythagorean theory of a discontinuous reality.) Further, it is immovable. If it moved, it must move into empty space, and empty space is nothing, and there is no nothing. Also it is finite and spherical; for it cannot be in one direction any more than in another, and the sphere is the only figure of which this can be said. What is is, therefore a finite, spherical, motionless, continuous plenum, and there is nothing beyond it. Coming into being and ceasing to be are mere 'names', and so is motion, and still more color and the like. They are not even thoughts; for a thought must be a thought of something that is, and none of these can be.

Such is the conclusion to which the view of the real as a single body inevitably leads, and there is no escape from it. The 'matter' of our physical text-books is just the real of Parmenides; and, unless we can find room for something else than matter, we are shut up into his account of reality. No subsequent system could afford to ignore this, but of course it was impossible to acquiesce

permanently in a doctrine like that of Parmenides. It deprives the world we know of all claim to existence, and reduces it to something which is hardly even an illusion. If we are to give an intelligible account of the world, we must certainly introduce motion again somehow. That can never be taken for granted any more, as it was by the early cosmologists; we must attempt to explain it if we are to escape from the conclusions of Parmenides.

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Perception

In philosophy, "perception" is defined as the complex method of obtaining information about our surrounding world, specifically through our senses, and apprehending this information as beliefs. The main philosophical problem with this notion of perception is that we should not accept our perceptions as being reliable, since (1) it is possible for us to misperceive objects in the world, (2) our senses are susceptible to illusions (e.g. hallucinations), and (3) it is unclear how much epistemological value perceptions have, or how much belief, if any, should be rooted in that which we perceive.

Several answers to these problems have been proposed including the common-sense theory, the representative theory of perception, sense-datum theory, and phenomenalism. The common-sense or direct realist theory maintains that the world is as it is perceived, which assumes that there is a world with objects that exists independently of human perceptions. Direct realism not only denies that our experiences are subjective, but also denies that are perceptions are reduced to mere sense-data. It also avoids simplifying the perceptual experience into an act (awareness of) and an object.

The representative, or causal, theory of perception maintains that sense-data come to us from objects in the world around us, although we never have direct awareness of the objects in the world. Locke subscribed to this theory and can be seen particularly in his account of the mind as a blank slate. If the mind is considered to be a blank tablet upon which experience writes, then the writings can be assumed to be reliable inferences as to the nature of the world insofar as they are caused by objects in the world. For Locke, our perceptions of the world come to us pre-organized, and do not require cognitive structuring on the part of the perceiver.

The sense-data theory claims that we perceive something called "sense-data" in place of the actual objects that are in the world around us. This concept was first introduced by Moore, and was later adopted by Russell and Broad. This theory has come under scrutiny from Ryle and Austin, who propose that the notion of "sense- data" only complicates our account of perceptions. We do not perceive discrete bits of information, but instead perceive objects in our surrounding world.

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Peripatetics

"Peripatetic" is the name given to followers of Aristotle. The term means "to walk about." According the common account, the sect was called this from the fact that Aristotle *walked about* as he discoursed with his students. An alternative account is that the name derives from the public walk in the Lyceum which Aristotle and his disciples frequently took. Before leaving Athens, under fear of prosecution for impiety, Aristotle appointed Theophrastus as his successor. After him, the uninterrupted successors were Strato of Lampsacus, Lycon or Glycon of Troas, Ariston of Ceos, Critolaus the Lycian, and Diodorus of Tyre. The chain terminated in the 140 Olympiad.

The Peripatetic doctrines were introduced into Rome along with other Greek philosophies by the embassy of Critolaus, Carneades, and Diogenes, but were little known until the tie of Sylla. Tyrannion the grammarian and Andronicus of Rhodes were the first who brought the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus into notice. The obscurity of Aristotle's works hindered the success of his philosophy among the Romans. Julius Caesar and Augustus patronized the Peripatetic doctrines. Under Tiberius, Caligula, and Claudius, however, the Peripatetics along with other philosophical schools, were either banished or obliged to remain silent on their views. This was also the case during the greater part of the reign of Nero, although, in the early part of it philosophy was favored. Ammonius the Peripatetic made great efforts to extend the authority of Aristotle, but about this time the Platonists began to study his writings, and prepared the way for the Eclectic Peripatetics under Ammonius Sacas, who flourished about a century after Ammonius the Peripatetic. After the time of Justinian, philosophy in general declined. But in the writings of the scholastics, Aristotle's views predominated. About the 12th century it had many adherents among the Saracens and Jews, particularly in Spain.

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Moral Personhood

The problem of moral personhood focuses on determining which beings are members of what we might call the moral community. The moral community consists of all those beings who have moral duties, rights, or, in general, deserve moral consideration. Medieval theologians speculated about whether angels were members of the moral community and thereby had the same moral duties as humans. Science fiction fans speculate about whether aliens from other worlds would have fundamental rights. Animal rights advocates contend that at least some animals have the same moral status as humans. Medical ethicists struggle to determine whether permanently comatose humans have any rights. The issue in all of these cases involves what it takes to be a morally significant person. The term "person" in this sense is not necessarily restricted to human beings. A morally significant person is any being who is a member of the moral community. Several criteria of moral personhood have been suggested. Members of the Jain religion from India believe that all living animals -- even insects -- qualify as persons and thus have a right to life. Jains frequently wear cloths over their mouths to avoid accidentally inhaling bugs, and they sweep paths before themselves to keep from stepping on insects.

Few people in our part of the world agree with the Jain criterion of personhood. A less extreme criterion of personhood is that of consciousness. A conscious being is one which has sensory experiences and is aware of those experiences. The notion of sentience -- the ability to experience pleasure and pain -- is often associated with consciousness. If consciousness or sentience were the criteria of personhood, then insects would most likely not qualify as persons. But even the criterion of consciousness is too inclusive since lower animals such as lizards and chickens are conscious and would thus qualify as morally significant persons. A more narrow criterion of personhood which is widely adopted by contemporary ethicists is the notion of self-awareness, or the ability to conceive of oneself as existing in time. A self-aware being understands that it has a past history, and that the events of its history are relevant to who it is now. It is unlikely that lizards and chickens are self-aware, and thus would not be members of the moral community. However, higher mammals such as dogs and chimpanzees are self-aware so, according to this criterion, they would be entitled to the same moral standing as humans. Although self-awareness is a less inclusive criterion than that of consciousness, many people still believe that granting rights to dogs and chimpanzees is going too far. Thus, even the criterion of self-awareness is not strict enough.

Perhaps the most restrictive criterion of personhood which has been suggested is rationality, particularly the kind of rationality that on this planet is exhibited only by humans. Features of rationality commonly include the ability to develop a complex language, to make complex tools, and to understand the world around us. Critics have attacked this definition, though, since it gives an arbitrary preference for human rationality. Studies of chimpanzees and dolphins show that many higher animals do indeed communicate in complicated ways, can make tools for manipulating the environment, and have an understanding of the world. These abilities are not exactly like human abilities, but are nevertheless complex enough to be called "rational."

The precise criterion of personhood is an ongoing dispute. But regardless of which criterion is adopted, if a being qualifies as a person, then it has a direct moral standing. That is, that being is a rights-holder, and others have a direct duty toward that person. Beings which do not qualify as persons might be entitled to an indirect moral standing, that is, a moral consideration derived only from the interests of genuine persons. For example, even if a chicken does not qualify as a person, we might have an indirect duty to not torture that chicken because doing so may greatly offend persons. Similarly, although dead human beings are no longer morally significant persons, we have an indirect duty to treat the corpses of the dead with respect. If we treated the corpses disrespectfully, such as throwing the bodies out with the morning garbage, this would cause psychological harm to the living relatives. It is important to note that the issue of personhood is central not only to the moral status of animals, but also for the moral status human fetuses, infants, the mentally retarded, and the comatose.

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Phenomenon

In its most general philosophical sense, a phenomenon (pl. phenomena) involves any object in the world around us that we perceive through our senses. A phenomenon is that perception of an object which becomes visible to our consciousness.

Plato held that phenomena were in opposition to a thing's essence, and were weak and fragile forms of reality. For Kant, phenomena are in opposition to the thing-in-itself, or the noumenon; they are the objects or events that are interpreted through the categories. Modern positivists follow Kant and hold that phenomena are objects or events in time and space, and therefore are capable of being described and observed. The positivists hold that we have no knowledge of anything but phenomena, and that their knowledge of phenomena is relative.

The concept of "phenomenon" has become the basis for two schools of thought and study, *phenomenalism* and *phenomenology*. *Phenomenalism* is the position that arises out of the difficulties present in the dualism between the phenomenon and the object. It maintains that all we know are phenomena; we know nothing of the external things causing the phenomena. Berkeley was the first to examine the problem of accessing the external world and to arrive at the first phenomenalistic system. J.S. Mill gives a phenomenalist account of the external world by viewing material objects in terms of their possible sensations. Other phenomenalists are Renouvier, Mach, Carnap, and Ayer. *Phenomenology* is the description and study of appearances. The term has come to be closely associated with the method of inquiry that was originated by Brentano and further developed by Husserl. The movement originally placed an emphasis on human experience descriptions, as the human experience was directed onto objects. Husserl shifted the emphasis toward a description of the objects of experience, which were called phenomena. Like phenomenalism, phenomenology recognizes the problem of accessing the external world behind our perceptions. We, thus, "bracket" or postpone discussion of the external world and focus only on phenomena.

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Plotinus (204-270 CE.)

LIFE. Plotinus was born at Lycopolis, in Upper Egypt in 204 CE, and died at Campania in 270 CE. In the twenty-eighth year of his life he applied himself to philosophy, and attended the lectures of the most celebrated men of that time in Alexandria. After studying under Ammonius for some ten years, he accompanied the Emperor Gordian in his campaign against the Persians, in order to learn something of their philosophy. In this object he failed, owing to the unsuccessful issue of the undertaking; he was even obliged to flee for his life to Antioch. In 244 he went to Rome and won numerous adherents to his teaching, among them the Emperor Gallienus and his wife Salonina. He conceive the idea of founding an ideal city in Campania, with the approval and support of the emperor: this city was to be called Platonopolis, and its inhabitants were to live according to the laws of Plato. Gallienus was not disinclined to enter into the plan; but it was thwarted by the opposition of the imperial counselors. He taught in Rome until about 268, retiring then to the country estate of a disciple in Campania. Plotinus did not reduce his doctrine to writing until toward the close of his life, and then did not publish it. His pupil Porphyry, arranged the fifty-four treatises of Plotinus in six Enneades, placing them in logical order from the simplest to the most abstruse, as well as chronological sequence. They were first printed in a Latin translation by Marsilio Ficino at Florence in 1492, then in Greek and Latin at Basel, in 1580.

THE ONE. What principally distinguishes Plotinus from both Plato and his immediate predecessors is the assumption of a principle higher than the *nous*. This assumption proceeds from the requirement of unity as an attribute of the highest principle; the *nous*, as at once subject and object of perception, *nooun* and *nooumenon* is twofold. Therefore something higher must be sought, which is absolute unity, the One, identical with the Godhead and wholly transcendent-the first cause, the source of all thinking and being, all the good and beautiful, and all activity. The utter transcendence of God being was taught by Plotinus in a more extreme form than by any of his predecessors. He admits the insolubility by human reason of the most difficult of all metaphysical problems i.e. (how becoming arose out of immutable being and plurality out of unity). The theory of Emanation, which he accepts, also cannot answer the question. Following Plato, he suggests that the explanation may be found in the goodness or benevolence of God. All other beings produce yet others; and how should the most perfect of all beings, the primal goodness and the highest power, remain absorbed in itself as though impotent to produce? This, of course, is rather an anthropomorphic-ethical than a metaphysical explanation. His attempt to supply the metaphysical explanation is found in the view that the highest being is over-full, and, as the higher, does not precisely contain the lower in itself but allows it to flow forth from its superabundant perfection. This doctrine may possibly show oriental influence; but the idea of emanation occurs in the Stoic teaching, and still more in Philo, though in neither so fully developed as with Plotinus.

NOUS, THE WORLD SOUL. That which first issues from the One is the *nous*, which is conscious of being a product and image of the One and receives from its relation to the One its power to

produce other existences. It is not mere thought but actual being, comprehending all things as the genus comprehends the species. Plato conceived of actual being as being contained in one idea, that of good. Plotinus conceived of it as containing the ideas. Another difference is that whereas Plato asserted the existence of ideas only for such objects as had a common concept or name, Plotinus attributes them to all single existences. From the *nous* proceeds further the soul, the third principle. As the highest principle has neither thought nor consciousness, so the *nous*, which is purely contemplative, has no reflective, logical thought. This is the work of the world-soul, which is the link between the intelligible and the phenomenal world, carrying on the process of emanation down to its lowest terms. Matter is conceived by Plotinus not exactly as an emanation from the world-soul, but rather (as with Plato) in the guise of a receptive or passive principle in contrast to the formative or active. What the world-soul sees in the *nous*, with that it is pervaded and that it strives to reproduce. The content of the soul descends to lower stages. This content is composed of the ideas; and thus in the image of the *nous* and soul images of the ideas are also contained. These are the *logoi*, concepts, whose sum, the *Logos par excellence*, like the world-soul itself, is an emanation from the *nous*. These *logoi* are the essential factor in the giving of form to matter, which is formed in an organic, not a mechanical, manner. This formative process presupposes purpose, but not knowledge or deliberation-just as in Heraclitus all becoming takes place on rational principles, yet without any conscious foresight. If everything, therefore, is formed and pervaded by rational powers, the world-soul with its content permeating all, all must be rational or reason. Although the *logoi* are lower than their prototypes, and their relations with formless matter go lower still, yet Plotinus finds in the world of phenomena traces of the highest; the absolutely Good and Beautiful is visible even in the world of sense. The spirit of Plato, as expressed in the close of the *Timoeus*, the idea that the sensible world is a great and beautiful and perfect thing, dominates Plotinus also, so that in spite of matter producing evil, he is far from regarding this world as evil or hateful, representing rather in this point the general optimism of Greek philosophy than the tendency of the early Christian writers to despise the visible world. On the whole, in his explanation of the existence of evil in the universe and his justification of the higher powers in respect to it, he follows the Stoics.

RELIGION AND ETHICS. From the world-soul proceed individual souls, but they are not parts of it. Going down into bodies, they have forgotten the higher, the divine, from which they came, and have believed themselves independent. Thus, they have gone continually lower, and stand in need of a return to the better. Plotinus does not make it plain whether this can be executed With freedom by men. The ethical goal is sometimes represented, after Plato, as approximation to the Godhead, sometimes in a more Aristotelian fashion as operation in conformity with the nature of the operator, and again, with Heraclitus and the Stoics, as obedience to reason. Among the virtues Plotinus distinguishes first the "political" or social, which are the four commonly accepted by the Greeks-prudence, courage, temperance, and justice; but these can not make the soul like God. Above them are the purifying virtues, which have that effect. They consist in freeing oneself as far as possible from the body and from sin by an avoidance of what is sensual, though without any exaggerated asceticism. Man, however, is not to be satisfied by mere freedom from sin, but must strive actually to become God. To this end serve the deifying virtues, which are the reproduction on a higher plane of the primary or political virtues. Through these the true nature of man comes to its fulfillment; and thus his beatitude consists in the maintenance of his proper attitude toward himself, undisturbed by external happenings or relations. The supreme aim, indeed, with Plotinus as with Philo, lies not in the realm of thought (as the detailed exposition of the deifying virtues

might suggest), but in ecstatic elevation to the highest good, to the Godhead. Logical knowledge is only a preliminary to this, which consists in immediate knowledge of and union with God. To this Plotinus himself, according to the testimony of Porphyry, attained only four times in the six years that the disciple was with him. The reason why man on earth can not remain permanently in this state is that he has not yet succeeded in turning wholly away from the earthly; the time of permanent union will come when he is no longer tormented by any restlessness of the body. On the immortality of the soul Plotinus wrote a separate treatise, in which he follows Plato in the main, especially emphasizing the fact that the soul, as incorporeal and incomposite, is incapable of dissolution. A reunion of soul and body in the after life is inconceivable to him, since the passage into this higher life is conditioned by the desertion of the body, whose nature is in essential opposition to that of the soul.

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Pluralism

"Pluralism" denotes any metaphysical theory which claims that reality consists of a multiplicity of distinct, fundamental entities. The term was first used by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), and later popularized by William James in *The Will to Believe.* Pluralism is distinguished from both monism, the view that one kind of thing exists, and dualism, the view that two kinds of things exist. There are weak and strong forms of pluralism theories. The weak form holds that there are many distinct *individual* things, whereas the strong form holds that there are many distinct *kind* of things. Theories dealing with the number of entities are referred to as substantival, and theories dealing with the type of entities are referred to as attributive.

Theories of monism have varied greatly throughout the history of Western philosophy. In Presocratic Ionian philosophy, the universe is composed of the four primaries: air, water, fire, and earth. Thus, the origins of all things could be traced back to one or a combination of two or more of these primaries. Anaxagoras, however, held that the number of substances in the universe was infinitely great and cannot be numbered. Aristotle is sometimes classified as a pluralist given his view that reality is composed of individual substances (material objects with an essence). Leibniz held that all things are made up of monads, that is, elemental substances whose principal attribute is perception. They are infinite in number, and change according to their proximity with one another. As they perceive their neighboring monads, and change accordingly, they compose the things we use such as tables and chairs. Herbart described his ontology as a "pluralistic realism." This means that reality is made up of simple qualitative units for which he gave the name "reals." These join together in syntheses that lead to the world we perceive. In A Pluralistic Universe, William James explains pluralism in the world in terms of the dominance of external relations. James objected to monism on the grounds that it put too much emphasis on totality, and tended to exclude individuality and free will. In *A Pluralistic Universe* , James associates his concept of pluralism with the dominance of external relationships in the world. Bertrand Russell's account of logical atomism was pluralistic insofar as it was founded on the "common sense belief that there are many separate things. Later abandoning the view of logical atomism, Russell still held to pluralism given his conviction that the universe lacked a continuity and orderliness.

Contrary to Russell, one difficulty with pluralistic theories is the fact that there seems to be an underlying coherence in the universe, which suggests that there is some single shared feature, perhaps as expressed in monistic theories. Without a point of commonality, things would be in complete chaos. Further, Ordinary language philosophers, such as G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein, argue that no categories of the understanding account for the real world, whether these categories are pluralistic, monistic, or dualistic. Instead, there are there are hundreds of boxes in which to classify things.

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Jules Henri Poincaré (1854-1912)

Jules Henri Poincaré was a mathematician, physicist, and philosopher of science. He is best known to philosophers for his forceful development of the philosophical doctrine of conventionalism.

Contents.

LIFE. Poincaré was born on April 29,1854 in Nancy and died on July 17, 1912 in Paris. Poincaré's family was influential. His cousin Raymond was the President and the Prime Minister of France, and his father Leon was a professor of medicine at the University of Nancy. His sister Aline married the spiritualist philosopher Emile Boutroux.

Poincaré studied mining engineering, mathematics and physics in Paris. Beginning in 1881, he taught at the University of Paris. There he held the chairs of Physical and Experimental Mechanics, Mathematical Physics and Theory of Probability, and Celestial Mechanics and Astronomy.

At the beginning of his scientific career, in his doctoral dissertation of1879, Poincaré devised a new way of studying the properties of functions defined by differential equations. He not only faced the question of determining the integral of such equations, but also was the first person to study the general geometric properties of these functions. He clearly saw that this method was useful in the solution of problems such as the stability of the solar system, in which the question is about the qualitative properties of planetary orbits (for example, are orbits regular or chaotic?) and not about the numerical solution of gravitational equations. During his studies on differential equations, Poincaré made use of Lobachevsky's non-Euclidean geometry. Later, Poincaré applied to celestial mechanics the methods he had introduced in his doctoral dissertation. His research on the stability of the solar system opened the door to the study of chaotic deterministic systems; and the methods he used gave rise to algebraic topology.

Poincaré sketched a preliminary version of the special theory of relativity and stated that the velocity of light is a limit velocity and that mass depends on speed. He formulated the principle of relativity, according to which no mechanical or electromagnetic experiment can discriminate between a state of uniform motion and a state of rest, and he derived the Lorentz transformation. His fundamental theorem that every isolated mechanical system returns after a finite time [the Poincaré Recurrence Time] to its initial state is the source of many philosophical and scientific analyses on entropy. Finally, he clearly

understood how radical is quantum theory's departure from classical physics.

Poincaré was deeply interested in the philosophy of science and the foundations of mathematics. He argued for conventionalism and against both formalism and logicism. Cantor's set theory was also an object of his criticism. He wrote several articles on the philosophical interpretation of mathematical logic. During his life, he published three books on the philosophy of science and mathematics. A fourth book was published posthumously in 1913.

CHAOS AND THE SOLAR SYSTEM. In his research on the three-body problem, Poincaré became the first person to discover a chaotic deterministic system. Given the law of gravity and the initial positions and velocities of the only three bodies in all of space, the subsequent positions and velocities are fixed--so the three-body system is deterministic. However, Poincaré found that the evolution of such a system is often chaotic in the sense that a small perturbation in the initial state such as a slight change in one body's initial position might lead to a radically different later state than would be produced by the unperturbed system. If the slight change isn't detectable by our measuring instruments, then we won't be able to predict which final state will occur. So, Poincaré's research proved that the problem of determinism and the problem of predictability are distinct problems.

From a philosophical point of view, Poincaré's results did not receive the attention that they deserved. Also the scientific line of research that Poincaré opened was neglected until meteorologist Edward Lorenz, in 1963, rediscovered a chaotic deterministic system while he was studying the evolution of a simple model of the atmosphere. Earlier, Poincaré had suggested that the difficulties of reliable weather predicting are due to the intrinsic chaotic behavior of the atmosphere. Another interesting aspect of Poincaré's study is the real nature of the distribution in phase space of stable and unstable points, which are so mixed that he did not try to make a picture of their arrangement. Now we know that the shape of such distribution is fractal-like. However, the scientific study of fractals did not begin until Benoit Mandelbrot's work in 1975, a century after Poincaré's first insight.

Why was Poincaré's research neglected and underestimated? The problem is interesting because Poincaré was awarded an important scientific prize for his research; and his research in celestial mechanics was recognized to be of fundamental importance. Probably there were two causes. Scientists and philosophers were primarily interested in the revolutionary new physics of relativity and quantum mechanics, but Poincaré worked with classical mechanics. Also, the behavior of a chaotic deterministic system can be described only by means of a numerical solution whose complexity is staggering. Without the help of a computer the task is almost hopeless.

ARITHMETIC, INTUITION AND LOGIC. Logicists such as Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege believed that mathematics is basically a branch of symbolic logic, because they supposed that mathematical terminology can be defined using only the terminology of logic and because, after this translation of terms, any mathematical theorem can be shown to be a restatement of a theorem of logic. Poincaré objected to this logicist program. He was an intuitionist who stressed the essential role of human intuition in the foundations of mathematics. According to Poincaré, a definition of a mathematical entity is not the exposition of the essential properties of the entity, but it is the construction of the entity itself; in other words, a legitimate mathematical definition creates and justifies its object. For Poincaré, arithmetic is a synthetic science whose objects are not independent from human thought.

Poincaré made this point in his investigation of Peano's axiomatization of arithmetic. Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano (1858-1932) axiomatized the mathematical theory of natural numbers.

This is the arithmetic of the nonnegative integers. Apart from some purely logical principles, Peano employed five mathematical axioms. Informally, these axioms are:

1. Zero is a natural number.
2. Zero is not the successor of any natural number.
3. Every natural number has a successor, which is a natural number.
4. If the successor of natural number *a* is equal to the successor of natural number *b*, then *a* and *b* are equal.
5. Suppose:
   (i) zero has a property P;
   (ii) if every natural number less than *a* has the property P then *a* also has the property P.
   Then every natural number has the property P. (This is the principle of complete induction.)

Bertrand Russell said Peano's axioms constitute an implicit definition of natural numbers, but Poincaré said they do only if they can be demonstrated to be consistent. They can be shown consistent only by showing there is some object satisfying these axioms. From a general point of view, an axiom system can be conceived of as an implicit definition only if it is possible to prove the existence of at least one object that satisfies all the axioms. Proving this is not an easy task, for the number of consequences of Peano axioms is infinite and so a direct inspection of each consequence is not possible. Only one way seems adequate: we must verify that if the premises of an inference in the system are consistent with the axioms of logic, then so is the conclusion. Therefore, if after n inferences no contradiction is produced, then after n+1 inferences no contradiction will be either. Poincaré argues that this reasoning is a vicious circle, for it relies upon the principle of complete induction, whose consistency we have to prove. (In 1936, Gerhard Gentzen proved the consistency of Peano axioms, but his proof required the use of a limited form of transfinite induction whose own consistency is in doubt.) As a consequence, Poincaré asserts that if we can't noncircularly establish the consistency of Peano's axioms, then the principle of complete induction is surely not provable by means of general logical laws; thus it is not analytic, but it is a synthetic judgment, and logicism is refuted. It is evident that Poincaré supports Kant's epistemological viewpoint on arithmetic. For Poincaré, the principle of complete induction, which is not provable via analytical inferences, is a genuine synthetic a priori judgment. Hence arithmetic cannot be reduced to logic; the latter is analytic, while arithmetic is synthetic.

The synthetic character of arithmetic is also evident if we consider the nature of mathematical reasoning. Poincaré suggests a distinction between two different kinds of mathematical inference: *verification* and *proof*. Verification or proof-check is a sort of mechanical reasoning, while proof-creation is a fecund inference. For example, the statement '2+2 = 4' is verifiable because it is possible to demonstrate its truth with the help of logical laws and the definition of sum; it is an analytical statement that admits a straightforward verification. On the contrary, the general statement (the commutative law of addition)

For any x and any y, $x + y = y + x$

is not directly verifiable. We can choose an arbitrary pair of natural numbers *a* and *b*, and we can verify that $a+b = b+a$; but there is an infinite number of admissible choices of pairs, so the verification is always incomplete. In other words, the verification of the commutative law is an analytical method by means of which we can verify every particular instance of a general theorem, while the proof of the theorem itself is synthetic reasoning which really extends our knowledge, Poincaré believed.

Another aspect of mathematical thinking that Poincaré analyzes is the different roles played by intuition

and logic. Methods of formal logic are elementary and certain, and we can surely rely on them. However, logic does not teach us how to build a proof. It is intuition that helps mathematicians find the correct way of to assemble basic inferences into a useful proof. Poincaré offers the following example. An unskilled chess player who watches a game can verify whether a move is legal, but he does not understand why players move certain pieces, for he does not see the plan which guides players' choices. In a similar way, a mathematician who uses only logical methods can verify every inference in a given proof, but he cannot find an original proof. In other words, every elementary inference in a proof is easily verifiable through formal logic, but the invention of a proof requires the understanding -- grasped by intuition -- of the general scheme, which directs mathematician's efforts towards the final goal.

Logic is -- according to Poincaré -- the study of properties which are common to all classifications. There are two different kinds of classifications: *predicative* classifications, which are not modified by the introduction of new elements; and *impredicative* classifications, which are modified by new elements. Definitions as well as classifications are divided into predicative and impredicative. A set is defined by a law according to which every element is generated. In the case of an infinite set, the process of generating elements is unfinished; thus there are always new elements. If their introduction changes the classification of already generated objects, then the definition is impredicative. For example, look at phrases containing a finite number of words and defining a point of space. These phrases are arranged in alphabetical order and each of them is associated with a natural number: the first is associated with number 1, the second with 2, etc. Hence every point defined by such phrases is associated with a natural number. Now suppose that a new point is defined by a new phrase. To determine the corresponding number it is necessary to insert this phrase in alphabetical order; but such an operation modifies the number associated with the already classified points whose defining phrase follows, in alphabetical order, the new phrase. Thus this new definition is impredicative.

For Poincaré, impredicative definitions are the source of antinomies in set theory, and the prohibition of impredicative definitions will remove such antinomies. To this end, Poincaré enunciates the vicious circle principle: a thing cannot be defined with respect to a collection that presupposes the thing itself. In other words, in a definition of an object, one cannot use a set to which the object belongs, because doing so produces an impredicative definition. Poincaré attributes the vicious circle principle to French mathematician J. Richard. In 1905, Richard discovered a new paradox in set theory, and he offered a tentative solution based on the vicious circle principle.

Poincaré's prohibition of impredicative definitions is also connected with his point of view on infinity. According to Poincaré, there are two different schools of thought about infinite sets; he called these schools *Cantorian* and *Pragmatist*. Cantorians are realists with respect to mathematical entities; these entities have a reality that is independent of human conceptions. The mathematician discovers them but does not create them. Pragmatists believe that a thing exists only when it is the object of an act of thinking, and infinity is nothing but the possibility of the mind's generating an endless series of finite objects. Practicing mathematicians tend to be realists, not pragmatists or intuitionists. This dispute is not about the role of impredicative definitions in producing antinomies, but about the independence of mathematical entities from human thinking.

CONVENTIONALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF GEOMETRY. The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries upset the commonly accepted Kantian viewpoint that the true structure of space can be known apriori. To understand Poincaré's point of view on the foundation of geometry, it helps to remember that, during his research on functions defined by differential equations, he actually used

non-Euclidean geometry. He found that several geometric properties are easily provable by means of Lobachevsky geometry, while their proof is not straightforward in Euclidean geometry. Also, Poincaré knew Beltrami's research on Lobachevsky's geometry. Beltrami (Italian mathematician, 1835-1899) proved the consistency of Lobachevsky geometry with respect to Euclidean geometry, by means of a translation of every term of Lobachevsky geometry into a term of Euclidean geometry. The translation is carefully chosen so that every axiom of non-Euclidean geometry is translated into a theorem of Euclidean geometry. Beltrami's translation and Poincaré's study of functions led Poincaré to assert that:

- Non-Euclidean geometries have the same logical and mathematical legitimacy as Euclidean geometry.
- All geometric systems are equivalent and thus no system of axioms may claim that it is the true geometry.
- Axioms of geometry are neither synthetic a priori judgments nor analytic ones; they are conventions or 'disguised' definitions.

According to Poincaré, all geometric systems deal with the same properties of space, although each of them employs its own language, whose syntax is defined by the set of axioms. In other words, geometries differ in their language, but they are concerned with the same reality, for a geometry can be translated into another geometry. There is only one criterion according to which we can select a geometry, namely a criterion of economy and simplicity. This is the very reason why we commonly use Euclidean geometry: it is the simplest. However, with respect to a specific problem, non-Euclidean geometry may give us the result with less effort. In 1915, Albert Einstein found it more convenient, the conventionalist would say, to develop his theory of general relativity using non-Euclidean rather than Euclidean geometry. Poincaré's realist opponent would disagree and say that Einstein discovered space to be non-Euclidean.

Poincaré's treatment of geometry is applicable also to the general analysis of scientific theories. Every scientific theory has its own language, which is chosen *by convention*. However, in spite of this freedom, the agreement or disagreement between predictions and facts is not conventional but is substantial and objective. Science has an objective validity. It is not due to chance or to freedom of choice that scientific predictions are often accurate.

These considerations clarify Poincaré's conventionalism. There is an objective criterion, independent of the scientist's will, according to which it is possible to judge the soundness of the scientific theory, namely the accuracy of its predictions. Thus the principles of science are not set by an arbitrary convention. In so far as scientific predictions are true, science gives us objective, although incomplete, knowledge. The freedom of a scientist takes place in the choice of language, axioms, and the facts that deserve attention.

However, according to Poincaré, every scientific law can be analyzed into two parts, namely a *principle*, that is a conventional truth, and an *empirical law*. The following example is due to Poincaré. The law:

> Celestial bodies obey Newton's law of gravitation

The law consists of two elements:

1. Gravitation follows Newton law.
2. Gravitation is the only force that acts on celestial bodies.

We can regard the first statement as a principle, as a convention; thus it becomes the definition of

gravitation. But then the second statement is an empirical law.

Poincaré's attitude towards conventionalism is illustrated by the following statement, which concluded his analysis on classical mechanics in *Science and Hypothesis*:

> Are the laws of acceleration and composition of forces nothing but arbitrary conventions? Conventions, yes; arbitrary, no; they would seem arbitrary if we forgot the experiences which guided the founders of science to their adoption and which are, although imperfect, sufficient to justify them. Sometimes it is useful to turn our attention to the experimental origin of these conventions.

SCIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS. According to Poincaré, although scientific theories originate from experience, they are neither verifiable nor falsifiable by means of the experience alone. For example, look at the problem of finding a mathematical law that describes a given series of observations. In this case, representative points are plotted in a graph, and then a simple curve is interpolated. The curve chosen will depend both on the experience which determines the representative points and on the desired smoothness of the curve even though the smoother the curve the more that some points will miss the curve. Therefore, the interpolated curve -- and thus the tentative law -- is not a direct generalization of the experience, for it 'corrects' the experience. The discrepancy between observed and calculated values is thus not regarded as a falsification of the law, but as a correction that the law imposes on our observations. In this sense, there is always a necessary difference between facts and theories, and therefore a scientific theory is not directly falsifiable by the experience.

For Poincaré, the aim of the science is to prediction. To accomplish this task, science makes use of generalizations that go beyond the experience. In fact, scientific theories are hypotheses. But every hypothesis has to be continually tested. And when it fails in an empirical test, it must be given up. According to Poincaré, a scientific hypothesis which was proved untenable can still be very useful. If a hypothesis does not pass an empirical test, then this fact means that we have neglected some important and meaningful element; thus the hypothesis gives us the opportunity to discover the existence of an unforeseen aspect of reality. As a consequence of this point of view about the nature of scientific theories, Poincaré suggests that a scientist must utilize few hypotheses, for it is very difficult to find the wrong hypothesis in a theory which makes use of many hypotheses.

For Poincaré, there are many kinds of hypotheses:

- Hypotheses which have the maximum scope, and which are common to all scientific theories (for example, the hypothesis according to which the influence of remote bodies is negligible). Such hypotheses are the last to be changed.
- Indifferent hypotheses that, in spite of their auxiliary role in scientific theories, have no objective content (for example, the hypothesis that unseen atoms exist).
- Generalizations, which are subjected to empirical control; they are the true scientific hypotheses.

Regarding Poincaré's point of view about scientific theories, the following have the most lasting value:

- Every scientific theory is a hypothesis that had to be tested.
- Experience suggests scientific theories; but experience does not justify them.
- Experience alone is unable to falsify a theory, for the theory often corrects the experience.
- A central aim of science is prediction.

- The role of a falsified hypothesis is very important, for it throws light on unforeseen conditions.
- Experience is judged according to a theory.

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Political Realism

Political realism is a theory of political philosophy that attempts to explain, model, and prescribe political relations. It takes as its assumption that power is (or ought to be) the primary end of political action, whether in the domestic or international arena. In the domestic arena, the theory asserts that politicians do, or should, strive to maximize their power, whilst on the international stage, nation states are seen as the primary agents that maximize, or ought to maximize, their power. The theory is therefore to be examined as either a prescription of what ought to be the case, that is, nations and politicians ought to pursue power or their own interests, or as a description of the ruling state of affairs-that nations and politicians only pursue (and perhaps only can pursue) power or self-interest.

Political realism in essence reduces to the political-ethical principle that might is right. The theory has a long history, being evident in Thucydides' *Pelopennesian War*. It was expanded on by Machiavelli in *The Prince*, and others such as Thomas Hobbes, Spinoza, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau followed (the theory was given great dramatical portrayed in Shakespeare's *Richard III*). In the late nineteenth century it underwent a new incarnation in the form of social darwinism, whose adherents explained social and hence political growth in terms of a struggle in which only the fittest (strongest) cultures or polities would survive. Political realism assumes that interests are to be maintained through the exercise of power, and that the world is characterised by competing power bases. In international politics, most political theorists emphasise the nation state as the relevant agent, whereas Marxists focus on classes. Prior to the French Revolution in which nationalism as a political doctrine truly entered the world's stage, political realism involved the political jurisdictions of ruling dynasties, whilst in the nineteenth century, nationalist sentiments focused realists' attentions on the development of the nation-state, a policy that was later extended to include imperialist ambitions on the part of the major Western powers-Britain and France, and even Belgium, Germany and the United States were influenced by imperialism. Nationalist political realism later extended into geo-political theories, which perceive the world to be divided into supra-national cultures, such as East and West, North and South, Old World and New World, or focusing on the pan-national continental aspirations of Africa, Asia, etc. Whilst the social darwinist branch of political realism may claim that some nations are born to rule over others (being 'fitter' for the purpose, and echoing Aristotle's ruminations on slavery in Book 1 of the *The Politics*), generally political realists focus on the need or ethic of ensuring that the relevant agent (politician, nation, culture) must ensure its own survival by securing its own needs and interests before it looks to the needs of others.

To explore the various shades and implications of the theory, its application to international affairs is examined.

Descriptive political realism commonly holds that the international community is characterized by anarchy, since there is no overriding world government that enforces a common code of rules. Whilst this anarchy need not be chaotic, for various member states of the international community may engage in treaties or in trading patterns that generate an order of sorts, most theorists conclude that law or morality

does not apply beyond the nation's boundaries. Arguably political realism supports Hobbes's view of the state of nature, namely that the relations between self-seeking political entities are necessarily a-moral. Hobbes asserts that without a presiding government to legislate codes of conduct, no morality or justice can exist: "Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice… if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men." (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part I, Ch.13 'Of Man', and Part II, Ch.17, 'Of Commonwealth') Accordingly, without a supreme international power or tribunal, states view each other with fear and hostility, and conflict, or the threat thereof, is endemic to the system.

Another proposition is that a nation can only advance its interests against the interests of other nations; this implies that the international environment is inherently unstable. Whatever order may exists breaks down when nations compete for the same resources, for example, and war may follow. In such an environment, the realists argue, a nation has only itself to depend on.

Either descriptive political realism is true or it is false. If it is true, it does not follow, however, that morality ought not to be applied to international affairs: what ought to be does not always follow from what is. A strong form of descriptive political realism maintains that nations are necessarily self-seeking, that they can only form foreign policy in terms of what the nation can gain, and cannot, by their very nature, cast aside their own interests. However, if descriptive realism is held, it is as a closed theory, which means that it can refute all counter-factual evidence on its own terms (for example, evidence of a nation offering support to a neighbour as an ostensible act of altruism, is refuted by pointing to some self-serving motive the giving nation presumably has--it would increase trade, it would gain an important ally, it would feel guilty if it didn't, and so on), then any attempt to introduce morality into international affairs would prove futile. Examining the soundness of descriptive political realism depends on the possibility of knowing political motives, which in turn means knowing the motives of the various officers of the state and diplomats. The complexity of the relationship between officers' actions, their motives, subterfuge, and actual foreign policy makes this a difficult if not impossible task, one for historians rather than philosophers. Logically, the closed nature of descriptive realism implies that a contrary proposition that nations serve no interests at all, or can only serve the interests of others, could be just as valid. The logical validity of the three resulting theories suggests that preferring one position to another is an arbitrary decision-i.e., an assumption to be held, or not. This negates the soundness of descriptive realism; it is not a true or false description of international relations but is reduced to an arbitrary assumption. Assumptions can be tested against the evidence, but in themselves cannot be proved true or false. Finally, what is the case need not be, nor need it ought to be.

That the present international arena of states is characterized by the lack of an overarching power is an acceptable description. Evidentially, war has been common enough to give support to political realism-there have been over 200 wars and conflicts since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The seemingly anarchic state of affairs has led some thinkers to make comparisons with domestic anarchy, when a government does not exist to rule or control a nation. Without a world power, they may reason, war, conflict, tension, and insecurity have been the regular state of affairs; they may then conclude that just as a domestic government removes internal strife and punishes local crime, so too ought a world government control the activities of individual states-overseeing the legality of their affairs and punishing those nations that break the laws, and thereby calming the insecure atmosphere nations find themselves in. However, the 'domestic analogy' makes the presumption that relations between individuals and relations between states are the same. Christian Wolff, for example, holds that "since states are regarded as individual free persons living in a state of nature, nations must also be regarded in

relation to each other as individual free persons living in a state of nature." (*Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum* Trans. Joseph Drake. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1934, §2, p.9). Such an argument involves the collectivization of individuals and/or the personification of states: realism may describe nations as individuals acting upon the world stage to further their own interests, but behind the concept of 'France' or 'South Africa' exist millions of unique individuals, who may or may not agree with the claims for improving the national interest. Some (e.g., Gordon Graham, *Ethics and International Relations*, 1997) claim that the relationships between states and their civilians are much more different than those between nation states, since individuals can hold beliefs and can suffer whereas states cannot. If the domestic analogy does not hold, arguably a different theory must be proposed to explain the state of international affairs, which either means revising political realism to take into account the more complex relationship between a collective and individual entities, or moving to a alternative theory of international relations.

Beyond the descriptive propositions of political realism, prescriptive political realism argues that whatever the actual state of international affairs, nations should pursue their own interests. This theory resolves into various shades depending on what the standard of the national interest is claimed to be and the moral permissibility of employing various means to desired ends. Several definitions may be offered as to what ought to comprise the national interest: more often than not the claims invoke the need to be economically and politically self-sufficient, thereby reducing dependency on untrustworthy nations.

The argument in supporting the primacy of self-sufficiency as forming the national interest has a long history: Plato and Aristotle both argued in favour of economic self-sufficiency on grounds of securing a nation's power-nations, they both reasoned, should only import non-necessary commodities. The power of this economic doctrine has been often been used to support political realism: in the eighteenth century especially, political theorists and mercantilists maintained that political power could only be sustained and increased through reducing a nation's imports and increasing its exports. The common denominator between the two positions is the proposition that a nation can only grow rich at the expense of others. If England's wealth increases, France's must concomitantly decrease. This influential tier supporting political realism is, however, unsound. Trade is not necessarily exclusively beneficial to one party: it is often mutually beneficial. The economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo explained the advantages to be gained by both parties from free, unfettered trade. Nonetheless, the realist may admit this and retort that despite the gains from trade, nations should not rely on others for their sustenance, or that free trade ought not to be supported since it often implies undesired cultural changes. In that respect, the nation's interests are defined as lying over and above any material benefits to be gained from international collaboration and co-operation. The right to a separate cultural identity is a separate

Political realists are often characterised as a-moralists, that any means should be used to uphold the national interest, but a poignant criticism is that the definition of morality is being twisted to assume that acting in one's own or one's nation's interests is immoral or amoral at best. This is an unfair claim against serving one's national interest, just as claiming that any self-serving action is necessarily immoral on the personal level. The discussion invokes the ethics of impartiality; those who believe in a universal code of ethics argue that a self-serving action that cannot be universalized is immoral. However, universalism is not the only standard of ethical actions. Partiality, it can be claimed, should play a role in ethical decisions; partialists deem it absurd that state officials should not give their own nation greater moral weight over other nations, just as it would be absurd for parents to give equal consideration to their children and others' children. But if morality is employed in the sense of being altruistic, or at least universalistic, then political realists would rightly admit that attempting to be moral will be detrimental to

the national interest or for the world as a whole, and therefore morality ought to be ignored. But, if morality accepts the validity of at least some self-serving actions, then *ipso facto* political realism may be a moral political doctrine.

Alex Moseley

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Prima Facie Duties

A *prima facie* duty is a moral obligations which are initially binding until a stronger and overriding obligation emerges. The term is associated with W.D. Ross in Chapter 2 of his work, *The Right and the Good* (1930). Ross argues that we intuitively perceive a small set of foundational prima facie duties which are the basis of all moral judgments. Ross begins by attacking consequentialist approaches to morality, specifically utilitarianism. We keep promises, Ross argues, because it is our obligation, and not because of the beneficial consequences of doing so. Utilitarians typically defend their theory arguing that when two moral obligations conflict, we clearly choose the course of action with the best consequences. In response, Ross argues that it is better to resolve such moral conflicts by appealing to our strongest duty, irrespective of consequences. Adopting the terminology from the field of jurisprudence, Ross argues that these rank-ordered duties are best described as prima facie duties (Latin for first appearance). For example, if Aunt Martha asks me what I think about her new hat, I have a foundational duty to be truthful. However, if her hat is ugly, I risk hurting her by being truthful. In this situation, my greater obligation is to avoid hurting her. Thus, my duties of truthfulness and nonharm both begin as prima facie duties, but my duty of nonharm emerges as my actual duty.

Ross lists the following seven foundational prima facie duties: promise keeping, reparation for harm done, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-maleficence. He continues with points of clarification. First, this above list of moral principles emphasizes the personal character of duty (based on what one actually deserves), unlike utilitarianism which pursues general happiness with minimal consideration of which specific individuals benefit. Second, against virtue theory, Ross argues that in fulfilling our duty, performing the act is of primary importance, and our specific motives do not matter. Third, he believes that the list of duties he provides is not complete, but is essentially correct, Finally, he explains that there is no single principle we can appeal to that will determine which of our various prima facie duties at a given time is our actual duty.

Ross next argues that his list of prima facie duties can be arranged according to the intrinsic goods from which they arise. An intrinsic good is something which is valuable in and of itself, such as pleasure. If there are intrinsic goods, then we clearly have a duty to bring them out. Some duties are based specifically on the intrinsic goodness of pleasure, as experienced by others and ourselves. These are the duties of beneficence (regarding others) and self-improvement (regarding ourselves). Justice also is founded on the intrinsic goodness of pleasure. The duty of non-maleficence is based on ridding intrinsic evils (such as unhappiness). Other duties are derivatives of these four. Reparation involves a duty arising from harm which has been done. Gratitude arises from the beneficence which has been shown to us by others. Promise keeping arises from an act (or verbal agreement) which was intended to place us under obligation. He also notes that there are compound duties which arise from the above seven. Political obedience, for example, arises from gratitude for benefits we receive from the state.

Ross recognizes that the manner in which our actual duty emerges from prima facie duties is difficult to articulate. It is similar to the laws of mechanics, he argues, insofar as several forces add together to produce a given tendency. He also notes that we perceive our various prima facie duties by means of a self-evident intuition. Perceiving our actual duty, however, is not self-evident, and cannot be logically deduced. Thus, our judgments regarding our actual duties may be subject to error. Our perception of our prima facie duties is an intuition which develops as we mature. We begin with an understanding that a type of act is prima facie right. Through reflection, we then see that this type of act is our duty. Ross concludes by conceding that throughout his discussion he makes continual appeals to common moral consciousness (that is, what we think about moral issues). He argues that our common moral consciousness is in fact founded on our knowledge of morality, and is the cumulative product of the moral reflection of many generations. However, he notes that we should eliminate any contradictions they contain.

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The Right to Private Property

Why *Private* Property?

The right to private property[(1)] is the social-political principle that adult human beings may not be prohibited or prevented by anyone from acquiring, holding and trading (with willing parties) valued items not already owned by others. Such a right is, thus, unalienable and, if in fact justified, is supposed to enjoy respect and legal protection in a just human community.

In the development of classical liberalism there emerged in Western political thought a shift of focus as to the prime value in social-political matters, from the group--a tribe, class, state or nation--to the human individual. It started with the effort to gradually transfer power from a few or even one person as the source of collective authority and power to more segments of society involved in exercising such authority and power, leading, eventually, to the sovereignty of the human individual. The way in which power is diffused when individuals are sovereigns rather than groups is through the fact that individuals have only a little and highly diversified power to wield. In consequences, they aren't likely to impose themselves on others by, say, starting a war, even when they disagree very seriously. That, in essence, was the initial motivation for moving toward individualism, which, when implemented via law and public policy, is much more conducive to peace and, as a result, to prosperity than is any form of collectivism. Thus classical liberalism has had some considerable support on practical grounds--its usefulness to attaining various widely sought after objectives.

A major reason, however, that individualism makes better sense than its competitors is that the view that *human beings are primarily parts of a social whole* is wrong. This last is a false notion. When invoked, arguably it tends to serve as a disguise for certain special or vested privileges of some members of society.[(2)] Generalizing such special or vested interests, the values or goals pursued in their name, has been a major source of political acrimony throughout human history. It even continues to drive much of contemporary democratic politics.

There is, however, the problem that as far as its ethical presuppositions and implications are concerned, individualism and in consequences also classical liberalism have not fared all that well. These views are constantly being charged with opposition to community life and human fellowship, hedonism, materialism, and so forth. Even though this is wrongheaded, without a solid moral case it is difficult to show that to be true. The reason is that morality is extremely important in human affairs. Most people do not confidently embrace a political stance unless it manages to embrace certain basic moral principles. Pragmatic reasons thus never suffice to establish the soundness of political systems and public policies.

It is part of the point of this essay to show that private property rights accord with certain basic moral principles. These are the indispensability of human agency in any sensible moral framework and the moral virtue of prudence. I will argue that individualism embraces these principles and that the right to

private property makes their actual realization possible in human community life.

Individuality and Humanity

Human beings have, as one of their distinctive features, a significant element of individuality. Notice, for example, how this comes through in some thought experiments. If a friend dies, it is nonsense to think, "Oh well, I'll just get another friend." You cannot just replace a person with another if you regard him as he really is, most basically, not just as some member of a class of people, such as dentists or auto mechanics. (Even with pets it's difficult to replace them because they become sort of humanized around us.)

On the other hand, with a cow, fly, rock and most other things in the world, replacing them is no problem in one sense because they aren't important *individually*. They're important in their relationship to other things, whereas in the case of human beings it is everyone's individuality that matters most, especially in those most significant personal or intimate relationships. You fall in love with an individual, not a banker--when you really fall in love, that is. (Some people "fall in love" with a type, true enough, but there's something perverse about that -- it is somewhat sad to hear, "Well, I love him because he's in uniform or has a big car.")

Even apart from such common sense observations there is the clear evidence that whenever we consider human beings, we cannot avoid their volitional conduct, actions they choose to bring about on their own.(3) In intellectual discussions this is evident in the fact that we criticize one another about what we think, holding our adversaries directly or indirectly responsible for alleged misjudgments.(4)

It is a reasonable view, then, that human beings are first and foremost individuals who cause much of what they do. Their actions flow from their thinking and their thinking is the sphere in which they are free, self-determined.(5)

Individualism: True and False

Now individualism is associated somewhat uncomfortably with classical liberalism. The reason is that some have overemphasized the element of individuality, making it seem that we are not also members of communities, even of the human race. Such "atomistic" individualism has made it seem that classical liberalism is tied to a misguided social philosophy. An example of it may be found in the oft repeated story, by economists, of Robinson Crusoe. If one models human life on Crusoe's story and his interaction with Friday, it appears that we are born capable of self-sufficient productive conduct and from the start choose whether to associated with others. Yet this idea is patently absurd, considering that all human beings are born helpless and grow up in the company of others on whose support they vitally depend.

Yet it is not true that individualism is necessarily committed to atomism. One can fully admit to the communal aspects of human life while insisting that we are essentially individuals, as well. Such a robust, what I have called "classical" individualism, also stresses the importance of the private realm and insists that all bona fide human communities must adhere to the terms individuals set for themselves.

The crucial individualist ingredient of classical liberal social and political theory stresses not some arid independence or isolation of the individual human being but the fact that everyone can make what in principle can be independent judgments as to the kind of communities suitable to one's membership.

Given human nature, the element of choice must be preserved in every suitable human community. This is the source of the classical liberal political principles that demands that the consent of the governed be upheld in public policy as well as personal relations. The criminal nature of murder, assault, kidnapping, rape, robbery, burglary and so forth all make sense in terms of this classical or moderate individualism first found in Aristotle philosophy.(6)

Individuality and Privacy

The gist of individualism is, then, that everyone must consent to being used by another. This is because each is important, valuable in his or her own right. And if an individual is important as such, then there is a sphere that constitutes the individual's realm of sovereignty and others ought to respect it, the realm within which one must make effective judgments about one's life. And indeed in classical liberal, political, and legal theory there's a great deal of emphasis on individual rights rather than rights of families or other groups, bearing on this individualist element of the position. The right to private property is, in turn, the most practically relevant of those individual rights.

The term "privacy," then, underlines this emphasis of the importance of individuals. The right to private property is really just an extension, within the framework of a naturalist world view, of the right to one's own life. It is when one('s life) engages with the rest of the world in the unique way one will do so, and when another will do this in his or her unique way, then privacy becomes important.(7) It will then be possible to actualize and to protect who one is and one's manifestation in the world--one's own art, productivity, creativity, innovation and so forth. None of those, as well, may be used by others without the individual's consent to whom they belong.

Socialism and Humanity

Now consider that one of the interesting things about socialism is that in deep-seeded socialist theory there are no individuals. Marx said it directly: "The human essence is the true collectivity of man."(8) He also noted that human beings constitute specie-beings and comprise "an organic whole" in the collectivity we call humanity.(9) What is important about you and me for a consistent, thoroughgoing socialist is that we belong to the human race, somewhat analogously to the way a bee belongs to its hive or an ant to its colony, only in this case the constituent parts are intelligent persons.

This is especially true of international socialism, but National Socialism and even more restrictive, local forms of socialism, emphasize the group as a whole and *its* plan, telos or destiny. Even communitarians, as vague as their conception of a community comes to (so that one cannot pin them down as socialists because they leave room for some elements of individualism), speak mostly of concerns in behalf of "us" and use the term "we" to designate the primarily valued party when discussing public policy. The individual can then, at times, be sacrificed if some gains are made for the group, collective or community.

Classical Liberalism, Human Nature & Individuality

Yet, if we examine human life carefully, we notice clearly that there is something irreducibly, inescapably, individual about everybody. Just think about yourself. How do you insist on being regarded

by friends and others close to you? As a student? An American or Rumanian or Hispanic? Or as a woman or basketball player? Is there not in fact something unique that is the *you* that captures who you are? One's *identity* isn't racial, ethnic, religious or even professional. It is individual. As John Quincy Adams said in the motion picture *Amistad*, ask not *what* someone is but *who* someone is to come to know the person.

It's in classical liberalism that this is acknowledged more than in any other political philosophy. There's always been a little bit of emphasis on individuality, of course, in various rebellious political movements, but it's very difficult to maintain the supremacy of the tribe or, later, the state if one admits that what is truly important in a human society is the individuals who comprise it, as individuals. Because then one can't reasonably say, "Well, we can do away with that individual or with that group of individuals or their projects so as to benefit some others, including some collective such as the state, community, culture or race."

Indeed, with the recognition and acknowledgment of the supreme value of the individual, the very definition of a "good" or "just" society would have to emphasize the freedom and happiness of individuals.

In fact, a characteristic of the classical liberal political ethos is that one scrutinizes a society for its quality, its goodness, and its justice on the basis of how loyal it is to the mission of securing the rights of individuals to their liberty and pursuit of happiness. This is actually a very prominent movement in the world today. It's not done consistently and purely, but all those human rights organizations that go from country to country to check whether they adhere to tenants of justice are at least rhetorically committed to the examination of whether the countries treat their citizens as individuals with rights. Are their projects respected or are they neglected and treated with callous disregard for the choices of individuals?

This is one of the reasons that in a largely liberal--or, for the sake of avoiding confusion with American liberalism, a libertarian--society membership in a class looses its moral and political significance. In the United States of American, for example there are matters that may make no difference to most people, but when they matter to even just one, it is appreciated. I, for one, once worked as a busboy in Cleveland, Ohio, and noticed that when paid, I could go back to the same restaurant and eat a meal there. There was no frowning and shaking of the head and saying, "Wait a minute, you don't belong here." In much of Europe, in contrast, if you work in a restaurant you don't get to eat there--it is not illegal now but it's certainly gosh.

Fluctuating Classes

In a more or less libertarian social-political society the divisions that are based on incidental attributes--one's wealth, color, national origin, ethnicity, race, and so forth--tend to be less significant because one's individual worth trumps all these and classes, at any rate, are always in a flux. Even racial and ethnic, not to mention religious or economic categories tend to shift because there is no widespread and well entrenched legally enforced barriers to either entry to or exit from any of them.

Such categories and the behavior associated with them may still prevail in certain special contexts. For example, a professor will usually attain special respect in the classroom, but when one meets the professor at a restaurant, one will not need to carry over the behavior associated with that classroom status. No "Her Doctor, Doctor," as, for example, in much of Germany, in or outside the classroom. In

most American schools, however, one says, "Hello Professor," but outside the label isn't usually used.

All this can be a bit disturbing because it can sometimes spill over into disrespect for people who in fact deserve respect. Rampant individualism can corrupt into disrespect for all authority. The corruption can but by no means need be generated by the notion that individuals matter primarily as individuals, not so much as members of classes. It is also evident enough that we are social beings, members of the class of human beings, and there are some matters very important about that, too.

The Moral Standing of Private Property Rights

Individualism does, however, underlie the regime of private property rights. But why do we need a separate discussion of the merits of the right to private property? What will such an inquiry yield?

There are at least two answers to that question. One is that when you resist people taking something from you, by taxation, theft or any other means, it is important to know, even if only implicitly, that the resistance is justified. That it is a kind of self-defense, akin to resisting someone assaulting or raping someone else. It is vital to learn that one is in the right and is not doing something merely willful or stubborn or prejudicial, that one is not just being a recalcitrant, antisocial person, when one insists on the integrity of ownership. This is a point widely contested by opponents of classical liberal or libertarian legal orders.

When all things are considered, the most important questions about liberalism and its various tenants is, "Is it true?" "Is classical liberalism or, its purest versions, libertarianism, the way a society ought to be organized?" And, in order to answer that question, one must examine whether its various tenets can withstand challenges, criticisms and so on. Individualism is one of these tenets but the right to private property is the most important practical, public policy element of it.

The second reason we need to examine private property rights is whether system of individual rights, including the right to private property, is a just system? Or is it, as many critics claim, just a figment of some people's imagination?

One of the most prominent and oft-repeated criticisms leveled at classical liberalism, especially by students of various configurations of Marxism--there are about 300 versions now--is that this whole emphasis on individuality is a kind of a historical glitch. It's only a temporary phase in history which had its role but now can be dispensed with.

Individualism and Historicism

The Marxists and many others, some who follow them without knowing it, claim that in the 16th century the individual was *invented*, not merely discovered or his existence politically affirmed, for the sake of sustaining economic productivity. In order to create motivation for wealth-creation, the individual had to be made seem significant. It's a myth, but it's a useful myth. It's like telling someone that she is beautiful when she isn't so that she will do certain things from which certain advantages derive. According to Marxists, there was a period of human history where the belief in the importance of the individual had an objective historical function, not because it's true, but because it contributes to certain crucial elements of capitalism.

There are people who look at history in this way, as if it is the record of the growth of humanity from infancy to full maturity. They then take it that the bourgeois epoch is like the adolescence of an individual. It's a temporary stage and has its usefulness because, typically, adolescents embark upon all sorts of useless ventures--such as getting up at four o'clock to drive some place not because there's something important to do as a sort of exercise to prepare for adulthood. It trains them for the eventual serious challenges of maturity.

When one treats humanity this way, so that it has these various historical stages, individualism can be regarded to be one of those stages. It's a somewhat appealing picture--it fits some images we have of humankind. Ecologists encourage this, as do some moral visionaries who see humanity as a big family or some other kind of collectivity.

Marx explicitly said that the Greek era was the childhood of humanity. He, as I have noted already, and many of those who have been influenced by his thinking believe that humanity is some kind of organism, a being of which individuals are the parts. Humanity goes through stages of organic development, the tribalism its first and communism its final stage. And while the individualist stage in a necessary one, it is certainly not the completed stage of humanity.

Individualist Alternative to Organicism

These challenges have to be answered because they are extremely well developed, plausible enough, and with enormous influence in the world intellectual community. It is a little like when one meets a friend and asks them to explain some event such as their recent divorce and they proceed to give you a very well worked out and sincerely held rationalization as to how things happened. Now, in order to cope with one of these rationalizations, one must get to the heart of the actual situation and demonstrate beyond all reasonable doubt that the story is a different one. One must show that one's understanding of what's going on is more rational, coherent, comprehensive, and explains much more than does theirs. Otherwise the deceptive story will be the only viable account making the rounds, despite its conflict with common sense.

Unless liberalism is able to identify a better story than what those who champion the organic view advance, it will be defeated, at least theoretically. And while that isn't always decisive, it certainly has an impact on the confidence with which the position can be supported and implemented.

Indeed, one of the advantages of anti-liberal doctrines is that so many intellectuals are enchanted by them. They create elaborate and smart stories around them, stories that are extremely appealing and intellectually challenging. For one, such a story gives the intellectual a privileged position. Only intellectuals are in the position to grasp such a complex story, after all. Common sense does not support it. (For example, Marx thought only communists could really understand the truth of such a story, the rest of us having been blinded by our class outlook.)

The Appeal of Collectivism

The idea, for example, that we are all mere parts of a large human organism, humanity, has very a strong intellectual standing in our time. A great many people make reference to humanity--as when they talk about sacrificing oneself or one's private interests or one's materialistic goals for humanity. And others refer to smaller groups--the community or ethnic group or the race--as the organisms that are of

significance.

So it's almost a feature of the mainstream to think of us not as individuals but as parts of some larger whole. "Don't you have something more important to live for than yourself?" "Isn't there something greater than yourself to which your life must be devoted for it to be worthwhile?" Less loosely, some, such as the philosopher Charles Taylor, argue that we all must *belong* to a group, by dint of our very humanity, our nature as human beings. He tells us that "Theories which assert the primacy of rights are those which take as the fundamental, or at least a fundamental, principle of their political theory the ascription of certain rights to individuals which deny the same status to a principle of belonging or obligation, that is a principle which states our obligation as men to belong to or sustain society, or a society of a certain type, or to obey authority or an authority of a certain type."(10) Never mind that Taylor cannot give us any such theories--John Locke, for example, rested basic human rights on ethics or natural law. What is important in what Taylor says is not only that if you just live to make the most of *your* life, you're not really living a *significant enough* life. A significant life must not only fulfill a greater purpose and humanity's purpose is one of the candidates. God's purpose is another candidate. Ecologists have a biological purpose in mind. But a significant life but belong to the effort to pursue this purpose and thus our lives, to be properly significant, may be subordinated, by force, to such purposes.(11)

There's a very prominent tradition of selecting alternative wholes larger than ourselves as the proposed beneficiaries of significant human actions. And this can lead to the whole process of forcing individuals to be used for purposes to which they do not consent. This is the greatest source of coercive thinking in human history. Once it is accepted that human individuals are part of a larger whole they, as members of a partnership or team, have enforceable obligations to the goals of that large whole. They belong to it.

Consider, to appreciate this, how in certain cases we treat such wholes as ourselves. If something happens to one's ear, for example, and yet one prizes one's appearance with an intact ear, then one takes another part of one's body that's not visible and takes part of it so as to replace the ear. The famous Welsh actor, Richard Harris, had his nose destroyed in a fight, so doctors took a part of his hip bone and replaced it, clearly because the nose was more important to an actor than that little part of the hip bone.

Well, if humanity is the larger organism, then maybe a given individual may not be so important a part of it as another. So the less important individual can be sacrificed for the more important one (or the goals of the less important can be sacrificed for those of the more important). One may be an eye and the other just a useless thumb. That picture is widely embraced because of the belief that humanity is some organic whole.

If one recognizes collectivism as a misguided picture of human life, one must carefully and effectively argue in response to these well worked out and often honestly and sincerely meant doctrines. One must demonstrate that it is indeed individuals who count for the most in the human picture. It needs to be proven, some of the widespread opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, that notions such as "individual rights" are universal and not stuck to some limited historical epoch.

The Right to Private Property

One reason that it must be shown that the social regulative principle of a right to private property is sound and that it ought to be respected and protected in human community life is that it is a vital conceptual or logical implication of the individualist story. If individualism is indeed sound, so is the

principle of private property rights. When the right to private property is not respected and not sufficiently protected, then there is something wrong with a community.

This means that it is not quite fit for human inhabitation, given the individuality of every person and how respect for this is a precondition for his or her flourishing.

There are many different ways in which private property has been supported in the history of political economy. Most prominent has been the claim that there should be legal protection of the right private property because this facilitates productivity--a point that's in agreement with Marx, only universalized beyond a given epoch. Protecting this right helps society get rich--not only in the 16th century but always. Both Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill tended to argue along these lines: It's a good thing to have these rights because if we act in terms of them we will have greater prosperity. Many economists today argue a similar point. Indeed, that is one reason many governments engage in privatization, so as to encourage economic growth.

All of this is vital but it isn't what is most important. What needs to be shown is that the individual has these rights regardless of what's done when simply exercising them. Even if individuals waste away their lives, they have that right. It is theirs to waste away, not someone else's, because they are the important element of society, not some outsider, not some other being such as society, the community, the tribe or the ethnic group. It is this element of liberty, the right to choose how one lives, that is most central to human community life, even if, indeed because, as a matter of one's personal life it is equally important to make the right choice, to choose to do the right thing.

That is exactly why the right to private property is vital. When effectively protected, it secures for human individuals a sphere of personal jurisdiction, the right to acquire and hold the props, as it where, with which to order one's life. Moral virtues such as generosity, kindness, courage, moderation, prudence and the rest are all imperatives the practice of which engage one with the natural world. If one is not in charge of some of that world, at least oneself, one cannot conduct oneself virtuously. So the right to one's life, liberty and property are necessary conditions for a morally significant or meaningful life in human communities.

It needs to be noted here, as a significant aside, that even if we are essentially individuals, this doesn't mean we are not also naturally members of societies. But, as moral agents and as candidates for membership in some human communities or societies, we are morally responsible to take into consideration and never neglect the fact that we must judge those societies as to whether they do adequate justice to our individuality, most generally, and whether they best serve our flourishing.

No *Carte Blanche* to Communities

From this it follows that we must always keep in focus the question of whether we ought to live in a given community. Do we--ought we to--want to support this kind of public policy, this kind of a legal system? What is the standard by which we make that kind of decision when we have the chance? At the most basic level of community concern must lie the issue of what principles should govern human communities. The right to private property is one of those principles.

Very often we don't have a direct practical option to act on the choice we make about basic principles. But at least we can think about them so that when we do get a chance to make a significant decision, then we will know where to stand. We owe it to ourselves, to a life of integrity, not to forget about that issue,

ever. That is the highest duty of citizenship!

Property Rights, Individuality and the Moral Life

So what does the right to private property do in connection with the essential human element of individuality?

Well, as already suggested, the right to private property secures for one a sphere of sovereignty. See, if we are individuals, required, morally, to lead our lives by our judgements, it is crucial that we control the elements with which our lives are lived. Indeed, it becomes the most crucial thing.

The question, "How ought I to live?" becomes the foremost question to which you then seek an answer. While we aren't moral theoreticians and ethical philosophers and so on, that question still is always near the forefront of our minds. No matter what you do, even reading these lines, the question will arise: "Should I sleep or should I pay attention? Should I consider this point or should I just glide over it?"

All of those are questions having to do with your ethical agency, with one's governance of one's life, with one's sovereignty. One's feeling that one is doing the right thing becomes crucial if one is indeed the master of one's existence.

No Private Property Rights, No full Moral Agency

Now, without the right to private property, without having some props, some elements of reality that are under our jurisdiction, our ethical decisions cannot be effectual. Consider for example, if it turns out to be true that a good human being ought to be generous. Well, if we do not have the right to private property how are we going to be generous? Are we going to be like politicians and bureaucrats and expropriate what belongs to others and give this to the poor and needy? That's not generosity. That's theft.

In short, then, in order to have a effective life of moral virtue, for example the virtue of generosity, we must have the right to property, to hold and then to be free to part with values, on your own terms.

Moral Individualism

Although collectivism has some currency, especially among intellectuals and social theorists, so does a particular version of individualism. I have in mind the sort that pertains to moral responsibility.

Few people ever quite let go of the idea that some things they and others do are good and some bad things and that those doing them are responsible. When others judge our lives, or when we reflect upon ours, we say, "I did or didn't do the right thing." Moreover, we can go on to consider what we did with what belongs to us--use it well or badly.

Without our sphere of sovereignty, that's manifest in the actual world where we live our lives, we would not be able to act on most moral principles, especially those that involve allocating resources. Are we stingy? But one has to be stingy with something. If one is a neat person, one has to be neat within some sphere that one keeps orderly. If a slob, one will need something that belongs to one that one isn't taking good care of. If those items don't belong to you, if you always have to ask permission of society or the

clan or the tribe of the nation as to what to do with these things, the you are not the effective agents in the disposition of them. And you are then not an effective moral agent either. You cannot take pride in what you achieve, nor feel guilt for your failings. You are basically just a little bit of a cell in this larger organism.

The Virtue of Prudence

Prudence is one of the virtues identified in classical Greece. I want now to discuss it in a little more detail than thus far.

First, in the modern era prudence has been demeaned because the task of taking care of oneself and one's own has been deemed to be instinctual ever since Thomas Hobbes argued that we are all driven to preserve ourselves. But Hobbes rested his case on extrapolating the principles of classical mechanistic physics to human life, a move that is not at all justified. Human beings must choose their conduct, including whether they will serve others' or their own well-being. Prudence, as the ancients saw it, is the virtue one needs to take decent care of oneself.

Later Immanuel Kant argued that since prudence is a motivation that is aligned to one's own interest or inclinations, it is not a moral virtue. Only motives that are totally indifferent as to one's own interest or inclinations can have moral significance, even though we can not know whether we are ever so purely motivated.

Neither Hobbes nor Kant had it right. Prudence is a moral virtue, though not the only or highest on. In any case, a prudent person acts, among other ways, economically. Such a person realizes that one must reserve for the future, put resources away for a rainy day. Such a person isn't reckless in the disposition of the resources over which he or she has control.

But now if we have no right to acquire or hold things then we can't be prudent. We then don't have the decision-making authority to allocate resources in accordance with standards of prudence. On the other hand, if we do have this authority, then we can choose to act prudently.

Prudence and Justice

If in fact it is a moral virtue to be prudent, but it's politically impossible for one to act on that virtue, then there is a basic conflict between ethics and politics. Then the political sphere is not properly *adjusted* to the ethical sphere. Then our ethical agency has not been done sufficient justice by the legal system in which we act.

And, indeed, that is one of the things that is so frustrating in societies where one does not have the right to private property. Not only that one is going to be thwarted in one's efforts to acquire life's necessities, but that one cannot act responsibly. Here what happens is a version of the tragedy of commons.

The tragedy of commons is a problem usually associated with managing the environment. The reason is that most spheres where there are environmental problems are public. The atmosphere, oceans, rivers, large forests and so on are spheres wherein no one is individually responsible. To put it another way, everyone is responsible for the management of such spheres but no one has a clear idea what to do about this responsibility because the limits imposed by private property rights are missing.

When you have a distinct or definite sphere of jurisdiction, however complicated it may be--with various layers of responsibility and delegation--then when something is done wrong, it can be traced to the agent or agents who did it. And when things are done right, again it can be traced to the agent or agents whose responsibility it was to do them right. Without the right to private property this is impossible.

This is one of the reasons that no society can completely abolish private property. It is impossible to act in any sort of responsible way without some sphere of personal jurisdiction.

Moral Responsibility and Private Property

So the right to private property is the concrete manifestation of the possibility of responsible conduct in a community where there are lots of people who need to know what they ought to do and with what they ought to do it. We are talking about a life lived within the context of the natural world. If our bodies are non-existent and we are just living in an illusionary material world, then these matters are of no significance. There is an assumption underlying the right to private property, and indeed many other elements of classical liberalism or libertarianism, namely, that we have a task to live properly in the midst of a natural environment, a natural world. We are not just living a purely immaterial life. Food needs to be grown and distributed, production has to occur. All sorts of concrete, natural tasks need to be carried out in order to facilitate our human lives.

If this natural life turns out to be either illusionary or insignificant, then some of these things loose their importance. Then politics might indeed be subject to different principles, ones that facilitate different goals, different aims from prosperity, flourishing, or other kinds of earthly success. It's not easy to imagine what that would be. Yet, in a philosophical discussion of these issues, one has to contend with the fact that there are alternative basic ideas that are proposed concerning the basic elements of human living. Liberalism has to stand the test of being compared with these alternative pictures.

Naturalism and Politics

The naturalist approach, in the sense we are preparing and forging ways of living within the natural world, is, I am convinced, demonstrably sound. The alternatives tend to be very vaguely and confusedly supported.

There are doctrines in the world that say that all individuality, for example, is a myth. There are Eastern religions that contend that the natural, individual self is an illusion and that in truth, we're all just part of the universal consciousness.

In order to test this, one has to have some criteria by which truth needs to be determined. The naturalist approach rests on the application of criteria that are universally accessible, available to all human beings with their rational faculties intact.

Commerce and Property

Private property rights, of course, makes for the institution of commerce. If you trade goods and services, if you sell them, if you produce them, if you hoard them, if you save them, you have to have some level of jurisdiction over them. If I wanted to trade you my watch for your shirt, then it has to be my watch. Or

I have to have delegated to me the authority of someone whose watch it is. And it has to be your shirt; otherwise there would be no ability or justification in engaging in this trade. I can't sell you this; this belongs to this hotel. But if it belongs to nobody, then I can't even ask the permission of the hotel whether I can sell it or even give it away. So commerce, as well as charity and generosity presuppose the institution of private property rights. Without that institution, these activities cannot be undertaken smoothly, without confusion.

Moral Standing of Political-Economic Systems

One of the questions that arises in the discussion of political philosophy and political economy is whether they have moral standing. When the Left criticizes classical liberals morally because the liberal or libertarian polity makes profit-making possible, what is the answer?

It's not enough to just say, "Well, we just like to make profit." A murderer can just say, "We just like to kill people." That is no justification, clearly.

There are those who argue that a social science such as economics requires nothing from morality--indeed, it is entirely amoral, purely positive or descriptive in its central thrust. But this is a mistake. All human affairs, including economic ones, are permeated with moral issues. In economics, for example, there is the moral (or as Rasmussen and Den Uyl have called it, the meta-normative[(12)]) element of private property rights.

If one does not own anything, no trade can ensue and all the talk of supply and demand must be abandoned in favor of what collectivists tend to support, a sort of share-and-share alike "economy." But to own something means to be in a distinctively normative relationship with others. They are prohibited from taking what belongs to one. They ought not do so and will be penalized, furthermore, if they do.

So the amoral stance on the market economy is doomed to failure. What is needed is a moral or other normative justification of the institution of private property rights.[(13)]

To do that we must analyze human nature as it is manifest in the natural world. Will such an analysis support the institutions of freedom and free markets and give them a stronger moral standing in human society than alternative ones possess?

Morality and Public Affairs

Now there are some who would dismiss all this because there are cases in human community affairs involving innocent helpless persons, one's who meet with natural disaster and may find themselves without any voluntary help when they need it. And that is certain a possibility, even if not a likelihood in a free society. James Sterba, for example, has been arguing for decades that because such cases are possible, the people who find themselves in them have a right to welfare that the legal order may protect. These positive rights, whereby others are required to work for such persons--or part with goods they have worked for in order to support them--come about because it would not be reasonable, Sterba argues, to demand that such people respect private property rights. It would be more reasonable to expect of them to strive to obtain the goods they need--ones Sterba calls, in a question-begging fashion, surplus wealth. (As if someone is justified in identifying what constitutes surplus--a term from classical Marxism that makes no sense outside the Marxist framework.)

If one recognizes, however, that an individual's life is his or her own and he or she does not belong to anything or anyone outside of memberships to which he or she consents, then even the most dire needs of others does not support any institutional arrangement that fails to recognize individual rights--to life, liberty, and, yes, property (that one comes by without violating the rights of others even if one does not strictly deserve the property for some kind of service rendered or other achievement--for instance, come by because others want to purchase some talent or other attribute one naturally has). Just as it is unjustified to use others as a shield against natural danger, regardless of how little use one may make of them, one may not use others against their will, including wealth they own. One must find ways around this prohibition, as indeed most do when they engage in trade rather than theft in the effort to acquire their own wealth.

It is reasonable to demand this of everyone, even those in dire straits. If, however, in desperate circumstances such people do not honor this prohibition, there can be some measure of forgiveness, even within the purview of the legal authority (as per some cases that have been subject to unusual judicial discretion). But such exceptions, as hard cases in general, make bad general law.

Law and Common Sense

Let me go back to where we started. When somebody robs another who resists, the latter has a common sense idea of doing the right thing, that the resistance is not merely some immature, capricious and willful conduct. It is not as if one were simply engaged in feet stomping and crying, "I want it! I want it! I want it!" No, one senses that there is right on one's side, not just an arbitrary wish and desire.

That is one reason it is vital to consider whether the free system can be given justification. What has been said here is by no means a thorough defense of the right to private property, but it does furnish some hints as to how such a defense would have to be presented if the issue ever arises, which is quite often in our world. First, this right, if protected, preserves one's moral agency in this natural world in which community life occurs. Furthermore, it punctuates the fact that striving to prosper is a morally valid goal for human beings. So, the moral virtue of prudence, of taking the requisite actions to care for oneself and one's intimates, supports the right to private property as well.

One thing that respect and protection of private property rights makes possible is the pursuit of wealth. Oddly, however, that is a *criticism* many offer against the system of free market capitalism that is built on the legal infrastructure of private property rights. They say, as we have already seen Marx do so, that private property rights--if they are protected, maintained, developed as law--encourage a hedonistic, narrowly selfish life, one that is concerned exclusively with acquisition of worldly goods. As he said, "the right of man to property is the ? right of selfishness." Freedom is supposed to make too much self-indulgence, including pleasure, possible.

So another question that arises here turns out to be, "Is pleasure justified?" For even if the right to private property could be used for purposes quite different from obtaining pleasure in life, if pleasure is something loathsome and this right somehow encourages its relentless pursuit, perhaps it is an institution that is much more harmful than benign.

We cannot enter this topic at length but this much should suffice for now. If we are indeed natural beings in this world, one of our important values will be pleasure, the good feelings we experience *via* our bodies. This is so even if there are higher goods the attainment of which may require giving up some

pleasure.

So, now, if wealth brings with it the possibility of pleasure, then wealth itself is a worthy good, provided it is not stolen but created, produced, and that it is not chosen as the highest good if a higher one can also be identified.

Abandon the Divided Self Idea

If one has a completely different view of human nature, whereby only the spiritual side of human life is of significance, then one will embrace a different system of values and probably also champion different institutions. We have a powerful tradition in most civilizations whereby there is an uneasiness about facilitating the flourishing of the human body. And that is often what stands, at a most basic level, against the free society!

One reason underlying that stand is the lack of a clear, unambiguous and benign acceptance of our earthly selves. We often think ourselves to be so unique, so extraordinary that we believe we must be partly divine or otherworldly. St. Augustine said it well when he cried out, "How great, my God, is this force of memory, how exceedingly great! It is like a vast and boundless subterranean shrine....Yet this is a faculty of my mind and belongs to my nature; nor can I myself grasp all that I am. Therefore the mind is not large enough to contain itself. But where can that uncontained part of it be?"[(14)] And he then answered, as have millions of others, that it must be somewhere apart from nature.

Business, too, has a bad reputation because of this, as well as the free market place, because if our natural selves are somehow inferior, than servicing it with the vigor with which people in business do must be misguided. People who pursue profit or material wealth, would then be pursuing trivia. They would be mere hedonists. As the title of one of my articles put it, "Praise Mother Teresa and then Hit the Shopping Malls." In other words, we live a schizophrenic life. We embrace the value of prosperity, economic success, wealth on the one hand but then we deny it on the other.

Yet, if in our lives we embrace our bodies, minds, emotions, sensations and so on, then we suggest by this that a more integrated view of how to live and how to protect our values is right, not one that tears us into warring pieces.

The private property rights system rests, in part, on such an integrated understanding of human life, not the schizophrenic one. It rejects the idea that each human being is divided, a view that much of our literature embraces. It places us squarely on this earth, even though it is by no means hostile to anyone who chooses to look elsewhere for fulfillment, quite the contrary. (Indeed, the right to private property has made religious pursuits extremely fruitful as well as abundant, especially in the United States of America where churches can purchase their own land and welcome parishioners where they will not be disrupted by their foes.

The divided self idea started with Plato, at least with a certain reading of him, where he takes our minds to be divided from our bodies and where the mind is supposed to hold the rest of ourselves in check, rule it firmly. Major writers, especially theologians, have ever since stressed this drama and it is reflected in our society's institutions. Victor Hugo made note of this point:

On the day when Christianity said to man: You are a duality, you are composed of two beings, one

perishable, the other immortal, one carnal, the other ethereal, one enchained by appetites, needs, and passions, the other lofted on wings of enthusiasm and reverie, the former bending forever to earth, its mother, the latter soaring always toward heaven, its fatherland--on that day, the drama was created. Is it anything other, in fact, than this contrast on every day, this battle at every moment, between two opposing principles that are ever-present in life and that contend over man from the cradle to the grave?[(15)]

As a result of this, sadly, we are often apologetic for pursuing a satisfactory, happy life here on earth. And then we find it difficult if not impossible to defend the political regime that most clearly enhances such a life, having to accept it when others maintain that, well, it is a mundane, materialist life that such a regime supports.

All of this must be seriously rethought. Without it the best socioeconomic system human beings have ever identified will fail to flourish.

Endnotes:

1. Randy Barnett prefers the term "the right to several property" in *The Structure of Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1998). One reason that it is useful, at least in the context of political philosophy and moral theory, to keep with the terminology of "the right to private property" is that this right is tied to an important element of classic liberal social and political thought, namely, individualism.

2. This is what public choice theory, within contemporary political economy, has helped identify. See, however, Harold Kincaid**,** *Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences***:** Analyzing Controversies in Social Research (London: Cambridge University Press, 1996), in which the author argues that the individualist stance in modern economics is mistaken and that we ought to deploy a more holistic approach. Kincaid and many other critics of what they dub "liberal individualism" claim that individualism is atomistic. While some may, certainly not all individualist fit this description. Nor is that the only version of individualism that gives rise to liberal politics. A good case in point is John Locke, among the early liberals, and many others such as Ayn Rand, Eric Mack, Douglas B. Rasmussen, Douglas J. Den Uyl, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and the late David L. Norton, in our own age.

3. Exceptions are individuals crucially incapacitated. Political theory and law are not devices for dealing with exceptions, however.

4. I develop much of this throughout Tibor R. Machan, *Classical Individualism, The Supreme Importance of Each Human Being* (London: Routledge, 1998), especially in Chapter 13. "Individualism and Political Dialogue." Any kind of professional, including scholarly and intellectual, malpractice alleged in the course of political or other disputes implicitly rests responsibility with the interlocutors, blaming or commanding them for what they ought to or ought not to have done or said.

5. For more on this, see Edward Pols, *Acts of Our Being* (Boston, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982) and Tibor R. Machan, *Initiative: Human Agency and Society* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000).

6. "To [Aristotle] the Individual is the primary reality, and has the first claim to recognition. In his metaphysics individual things are regarded, not as the mere shadows of the idea, but as independent

realities; universal conceptions not as independent substances but as the expression for the common peculiarity of a number of individuals. Similarly in his moral philosophy he transfers the ultimate end of human action and social institutions from the State to the individual, and looks for its attainment in his free self-development. The highest aim of the State consists in the happiness of its citizens."[6]. Eduard Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, trans. B. F. C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead (London: Oxford University Press, 1897), pp. 224-26. This idea is developed further in Fred D. Miller, Jr., *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's* Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). The difference between the atomistic and classical type of individualism is discussed in Tibor R. Machan, *Capitalism and Individualism, Reframing the Argument for the Free Society* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

[7].A very important beginning had been made on this line of analysis by William of Ockham who regarded property rights as securing "the power of rights reason," that is, a sphere of personal jurisdiction that made reasoning about what one ought to do possible. This was extended more elaborate in John Locke's idea that one has the right to one's person and estate, something that, if protected, makes choice among other persons possible. An even greater advance on the precise identification of the nature of private property had been made in James Sadowsky, "Private Property and Collective Ownership," in Tibor R. Machan, *The Libertarian Alternative* (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1974). Karl Marx, too, got it nearly right when he wrote that "the right of man to property is the right to enjoy his possessions and dispose of the same arbitrarily without regard for other men, independently, from society, the right of selfishness." Karl Marx, "On The Jewish Question," in Robert C. Trucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), p. 26. Only, Marx's warped view of human nature prompted him to consider only the most wasteful and pointless way the right to private property might be exercised.

[8]. Karl Marx, *Selected Writings*, ed., D. McLellan (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 126.

[9]. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. D. McLennan (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971), p. 39.

[10]. Charles Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 188.

[11]. The concept "belong" can be used to refer to membership as well as to being a part of. Membership in human communities embarking on various purposes can be voluntary but being a part of is something ontologically pregnant ? one is part of something sometimes whether one likes it or not. Taylor seems clearly to mean by "belong" "being part of," so that one can be compelled to adhere to the purpose at hand.

[12]. Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, *Liberty and Nature* (Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing Co., Inc., 1990).

[13]. For more on this, see Tibor R. Machan, "The Normative Basis of Economic Science," *Economic Affairs,*Vol. 18 (June 1998), pp. 43-46.

[14]. Augustine, *Confessions*, Lib. X, chap. 17. 8ff

[15]. Victor Hugo, *La preface de Cromwell, Maurice* A. Souriau, ed. (Geneve: Slatkine Reprints, 1973).

Tibor Machan

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Prodicus (fl. 5th Cn. BCE.)

Prodicus was a sophist and rhetorician from Iulis on the island of Ceos. He was contemporary with Democritus and Gorgias, and was a disciple of Protagoras. He flourished in the 86th Olympiad, and it is reported that his disciples included Socrates, Euripides, Theramenes, and Isocrates. His countrymen, after giving him several public jobs, sent him as ambassador to Athens. He was so well received there that he was induced to open a school of rhetoric. In his lectures on literary style he laid stress on the right use of words and the accurate discrimination between synonyms. Plato frequently satirizes him as a pedantic lecturer on the niceties of language. Plato also insinuates that the prospect of wealth prompted Prodicus to open his school, and indeed his lectures seem to have brought him much money. Philostratus also notes that Prodicus was fond of money. He used to go from one city to another displaying his eloquence, and, though he did it in a mercenary way, he nevertheless had great honors paid to him in Thebes and Lacedaemon. His charge to a pupil was fifty drachmae. Aristophanes, however, describes him as the most remarkable of the natural philosophers for wisdom and character. It is reported that people flocked to hear Prodicus, although he had an unpleasant sounding voice. It also related that Xenophon, when a prisoner in Boeotia, desiring to hear Prodicus, came up with the required bail and went and gratified his curiosity (*Philostr. l. c.*). None of his lectures has come down to us in its original form. His most famous work is *The Choice of Hercules*, and was frequently cited. The original is lost, but the substance of it is in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2:1:21). Prodicus was put to death by the Athenians on the charge of corrupting their youth. Sextus Empiricus ranks him among the atheists, and Cicero remarks that some of his doctrines were subversive of all religion. It is said that he explained the origin of religion by the personification of natural objects.

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Protagoras (480-411 BCE.)

Protagoras is the earliest known sophist of ancient Greece. He was born at Abdera, in Thrace, probably about 480 BCE. It is said that Protagoras was once a poor porter carrying large bundles of wood on his shoulders. He attracted the attention of Democritus who took a liking toward him and instructed him in philosophy (Diog. Laert. ix. 53; x. 8; Gell. v. 3). This well-known story, however, appears to have arisen from the statement of Aristotle that Protagoras invented a sort of porter's knot for the more convenient carrying of burdens. In addition to this, Protagoras was about twenty years older than Democritus. Protagoras was the first who called himself a Sophist, and taught for pay; and he practiced his profession for forty years. Pericles debated moral problems with him, and he was employed to draw up a code of laws for the Athenian colony of Thurii in 445 BCE. Thus he arrived in Athens at least by that year. We are not informed about whether he accompanied the colonists to Thurii, but at the time of the plague (430) we find him again in Athens. Between his first and second visit to Athens he had spent some time in Sicily, where he had acquired fame. He brought with him to Athens many admirers from other Greek cities through which he had passed. His instructions were so highly valued that he sometimes received 100 minae from a pupil; Plato says that Protagoras made more money than Phidias and ten other sculptors.

Protagoras wrote a large number of works, of which the most important were entitled *Truth* (*Alethia*) and *On the Gods* (*Peritheon*). The first contained the theory refuted by Plato in the *Theaetetus*. In 411 he was accused of impiety by Pythodorus, one of the Four Hundred. The charges were based on his book *On the Gods*, which began with the statement, "Respecting the gods, I am unable to know whether they exist or do not exist" (Diog. Laert. ix. 52). The impeachment was followed by his banishment, or, as others affirm, only by the burning of his book. His doctrine was, in fact, a sort of agnosticism based upon the impossibility of attaining any absolute criterion of truth. Plato gives a vivid picture of the teaching of Protagoras in the dialogue that bears his name. Protagoras was especially celebrated for his skill in the rhetorical art. By way of practice in the art he was accustomed to make his pupils discuss theses (*communes loci*), an exercise which is also recommended by Cicero. He also directed his attention to language, and tried to explain difficult passages in the poets. He is said to have been the first to make the grammatical distinctions of moods in verse and of genders in nouns. Protagoras died about 411 at the age of nearly seventy years, when he was lost at sea on his way to Sicily.

Protagoras was the author of the famous saying, "Man is the measure of all things; of what is, that it is; of what is not, that it is not." This saying puts in a nutshell the whole teaching of Protagoras. Indeed, it contains the essence of the entire thought of the sophists. By "man" he did not mean humankind at large. He meant the individual person. By "measure of all things," he meant the standard of the truth of all things. Each individual person is the standard of what is true to himself. There is no truth except the sensations and impressions of each person. The earlier Greek philosophers made a clear distinction between sense and thought, between perception and reason,

and had believed that the truth is to be found, not by the senses, but by reason. The teaching of Protagoras rests on denying this distinction.

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Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694),

LIFE. Pufendorf, son of a Lutheran clergyman, was educated in theology and mathematics, and later turned to the study of moral and political theory. He was especially influenced by Grotius (who he credits with being the originator of the theory of natural law) and Hobbes. He briefly appointed as tutor to the son of the Swedish ambassador in Denmark. A war between the two countries resulted in Pufendorf's imprisonment for six months. Without any reading material at his disposal, he reflected on what he remembered from Grotius and Hobbes, and wrote his booklet Elementa Jurisprudentiae Universalis. He was appointed professor of the law of nature and nations at the University of Heidelberg in 1670, during which time he composed his greatest work, Of the Law of Nature and Nations (De Jure Naturae et Gentium, 1762). In this work Pufendorf argues that individual humans are vulnerable, and we must live in society to survive. Accordingly, God, as our creator, wills that we should be sociable, and this becomes the highest natural law. Our moral duties arise from this mandate and, in turn, these moral duties lead to civil and international laws. The next year Pufendorf published a shorter and more popular account of his theory in The Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law (De Jure Naturae et Gentium, 1673). Lutheran theologians attacked Pufendorf's theory, particularly his contention that natural law originates from God's will (as opposed to God's reason). Pufendorf defended himself against the attacks and published a collection of his correspondences on the issue. In 1677 he was appointed court historian for the King of Stockholm and wrote a 33 volume history of Sweden. He was later employed as an historian for the Elector of Brandenburg in 1688, the result of which was a 19 volume history of the Elector's life and reign.

NATURAL LAW. Like natural law theorists before him, Pufendorf distinguishes between divine and human law, both of which govern human conduct. Divine is created by God, and human law is created by governments. Pufendorf also distinguishes between natural law and positive law. Natural laws are fixed dictates which are necessary for a peaceful society. Positive law, by contrast, arises from the mere pleasure of the legislator. The foundation of natural law, for Pufendorf, arises from (1) our need to live in society, and (2) our otherwise unsociable inclinations which need to be regulated. Knowledge of natural law comes from our knowledge of human nature. The principle aspect of human nature which is the source of natural law is our instinctive drive for self-preservation. We are at the mercy of society for our self-preservation, and without society no human could survive. In spite of our dependence on society, we have many characteristics which make us unsociable. Compared to the rest of the animal kingdom, we are more lustful, vain in our dress, and competitive. Our individual preferences differ, thus making us more difficult for us to get along with each other. For Pufendorf, the fundamental law of nature follows from the above discussion of the importance of self-preservation through society. In short, we need to promote society, and all actions which universally serve this end are mandated. To attain the status of "laws" Pufendorf believes that these rules must be both authored by God and commanded by him. In short, "law" implies a lawgiver. Pufendorf acknowledges that these laws have a certain human

utility, or usefulness, but that the authority of these laws goes beyond utility and rests in God. The sense of religion which humans have confirms that God is the source of the natural law. Suppose, however, that we could physiologically change human nature so that, from birth, we could live independently from society. For Pufendorf, this would have no bearing on the content of natural law as commanded by God. Not only does God command these laws, but he gives us a natural knowledge of them which we acquire in the normal course of child development.

FORMATION OF SOCIETIES AND GOVERNMENTS. Knowledge of the natural law - that is, the mandate to be sociable - entails three groups of duties: duties to God, to oneself, and to others. Our duties to others, such as the duty to avoid injuring others, are an immediate consequence of the mandate to be sociable. The duties to God, such as worship, follow more indirectly from the mandate to be sociable. Our primary motive to be sociable is fear of God; we recognize, then, our duties to God. The source of our duties to ourselves arises both from our duties to God and our duties to ourselves. After listing our various duties to God, ourselves, and others, Pufendorf explains the necessity in forming large communities of people to protect us from each other. Pufendorf believes that human nature requires that we live in some kinds of societies, such as family units, and certain duties arise from this. However, human nature alone does not require that we live in large communities. The reason we do so is only because of the special benefits that we receive. Pufendorf lists three areas of disadvantage when opting to live in a large community: loss of liberty; abandonment of private good for public good; and conflict with natural inclinations. Given the above disadvantages, what, then, are the advantages of living in large communities? The single advantage is protection from other people. Even though people have an instinctive knowledge of the natural law and its prescribed duties to others, many of us will still harm others. For Pufendorf, the formation of a large community, with an effective government is the only way to motivate people to not harm others. Indeed, the civil government is even more effective in restraining people than is fear of punishment from God. Pufendorf explains why civil governments are more effective in restraining harmful conduct than either fear of punishment from God or conscience. As divine punishment, this is slow to occur, whereas punishment from civil government is immediate. As to conscience, this is too weak of a motivating factor. Given the fact that punishment from God is slow to occur, we sometimes mistake divine punishment for natural events. For Pufendorf, only a community of a considerable number of people will offer effective protection against harm from others, especially from those outside the community. The people in the community must form an initial covenant indicating who is included, and they cannot break this covenant when it suits their private advantage. After that, they must construct a constitution which establishes a ruling government. For, the wills of people in this community are best united in one person, or one assembly. The function of the government is to promote safety, and citizens are under the authority of this government. Such governments are indeed willed by God since (a) God ordains natural law, and (b) civil governments are the only way of creating an environment for us to follow natural law.

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Pyrrho (c. 360-c.270 BCE.)

Pyrrho was a Greek philosopher from Elea, and founder of the Greek school of skepticism. In his youth he practiced the art of painting, but passed over this for philosophy. He studied the writings of Democritus, became a disciple of Bryson, the son of Stilpo, and later a disciple of Anaxarchus. He took part in the Indian expedition of Alexander the Great, and met with philosophers of the Indus region. Back in Greece he was frustrated with the assertions of the Dogmatists (those who claimed to possess knowledge), and founded a new school in which he taught that every object of human knowledge involves uncertainty. Thus, he argued, it is impossible ever to arrive at the knowledge of truth (*Diog. Laert*, 58). It is related that he acted on his own principles, and carried his skepticism to such an extreme, that his friends were obliged to accompany him wherever he went, so he might not be run over by carriages or fall down precipices. It is likely, though, that these reports were invented by the Dogmatists whom he opposed. He spent a great part of his life in solitude, and was undisturbed by fear, or joy, or grief. He withstood bodily pain, and when in danger showed no sign of apprehension. In disputes he was known for his subtlety. Epicurus, though no friend to skepticism, admired Pyrrho because he recommended and practiced the kind of self-control that fostered tranquillity; this, for Epicurus, was the end of all physical and moral science. Pyrrho was so highly valued by his countrymen that they honored him with the office of chief priest and, out of respect for him, passed a decree by which all philosophers were made immune from taxation. He was an admirer of poets, particularly Homer, and frequently cited passages from his poems. After his death, the Athenians honored his memory with a statue, and a monument to him was erected in his own country.

Pyrrho left no writings, and we owe our knowledge of his thoughts to his disciple Timon of Phlius. His philosophy, in common with all post-Aristotelian systems, is purely practical in its outlook. Skepticism is not posited on account of its speculative interest, but only because Pyrrho sees in it the road to happiness, and the escape from the calamities of life. The proper course of the sage, said Pyrrho, is to ask himself three questions. Firstly we must ask what things are and how they are constituted. Secondly, we ask how we are related to these things. Thirdly, we ask what ought to be our attitude towards them. As to what things are, we can only answer that we know nothing. We only know how things appear to us, but of their inner substance we are ignorant. The same thing appears differently to different people, and therefore it is impossible to know which opinion is right. The diversity of opinion among the wise, as well as among the vulgar, proves this. To every assertion the contradictory assertion can be opposed with equally good grounds, and whatever my opinion, the contrary opinion is believed by somebody else who is quite as clever and competent to judge as I am. Opinion we may have, but certainty and knowledge are impossible. Hence our attitude to things (the third question), ought to be complete suspense of judgment. We can be certain of nothing, not even of the most trivial assertions. Therefore we ought never to make any positive statements on any subject. And the Pyrrhonists were careful to import an element of doubt even into the most trifling assertions which they might make in the course of their daily life. They

did not say, "it is so," but "it seems so," or "it appears so to me." Every observation would be prefixed with a "perhaps," or "it may be."

This absence of certainty applies as much to practical as to theoretical matters. Nothing is in itself true or false. It only appears so. In the same way, nothing is in itself good or evil. It is only opinion, custom, law, which makes it so. When the sage realizes this, he will cease to prefer one course of action to another, and the result will be apathy (*ataraxia*). All action is the result of preference, and preference is the belief that one thing is better than another. If I go to the north, it is because, for one reason or another, I believe that it is better than going to the south. Suppress this belief, learn that the one is not in reality better than the other, but only appears so, and one would go in no direction at all. Complete suppression of opinion would mean complete suppression of action, and it was at this that Pyrrho aimed. To have no opinions was the skeptical maxim, because in practice it meant apathy, total quietism. All action is founded on belief, and all belief is delusion, hence the absence of all activity is the ideal of the sage. In this apathy he will renounce all desires, for desire is the opinion that one thing is better than another. He will live in complete repose, in undisturbed tranquillity of soul, free from all delusions. Unhappiness is the result of not attaining what one desires, or of losing it when attained. The wise person, being free from desires, is free from unhappiness. He knows that, though people struggle and fight for what they desire, vainly supposing some things better than others, such activity is but a futile struggle about nothing, for all things are equally indifferent, and nothing matters. Between health and sickness, life and death, difference there is none. Yet insofar as we are compelled to act, we will follow probability, opinion, custom, and law, but without any belief in the essential validity or truth of these criteria.

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Pythagoras (fl. 530 BCE.)

Pythagoras (fl. 530 BCE) must have been one of the world's greatest men, but he wrote nothing, and it is hard to say how much of the doctrine we know as Pythagorean is due to the founder of the society and how much is later development. It is also hard to say how much of what we are told about the life of Pythagoras is trustworthy; for a mass of legend gathered around his name at an early date. Sometimes he is represented as a man of science, and sometimes as a preacher of mystic doctrines, and we might be tempted to regard one or other of those characters as alone historical. The truth is that there is no need to reject either of the traditional views. The union of mathematical genius and mysticism is commonly enough. Originally from Samos, Pythagoras founded at Kroton (in southern Italy) a society which was at once a religious community and a scientific school. Such a body was bound to excite jealousy and mistrust, and we hear of many struggles. Pythagoras himself had to flee from Kroton to Metapontion, where he died.

It is stated that he was a disciple of Anaximander, his astronomy was the natural development of Anaximander's. Also, the way in which the Pythagorean geometry developed also bears witness to its descent from that of Miletos. The great problem at this date was the duplication of the square, a problem which gave rise to the theorem of the square on the hypotenuse, commonly known still as the Pythagorean proposition (Euclid, I. 47). If we were right in assuming that Thales worked with the old 3:4:5 triangle, the connection is obvious.

Pythagoras argued that there are three kinds of men, just as there are three classes of strangers who come to the Olympic Games. The lowest consists of those who come to buy and sell, and next above them are those who come to compete. Best of all are those who simply come to look on. Men may be classified accordingly as lovers of wisdom, lovers of honor, and lovers of gain. That seems to imply the doctrine of the tripartite soul, which is also attributed to the early Pythagoreans on good authority, though it is common now to ascribe it to Plato. There are, however, clear references to it before his time, and it agrees much better with the general outlook of the Pythagoreans. The comparison of human life to a gathering like the Games was often repeated in later days. Pythagoras also taught the doctrine of Rebirth or transmigration, which we may have learned from the contemporary Orphics. Xenophanes made fun of him for pretending to recognize the voice of a departed friend in the howls of a beaten dog. Empedocles seems to be referring to him when he speaks of a man who could remember what happened ten or twenty generations before. It was on this that the doctrine of Recollection, which plays so great a part in Plato, was based. The things we perceive with the senses, Plato argues, remind us of things we knew when the soul was out of the body and could perceive reality directly.

There is more difficulty about the cosmology of Pythagoras. Hardly any school ever professed such reverence for its founder's authority as the Pythagoreans. 'The Master said so' was their watchword. On the other hand, few schools have shown so much capacity for progress and for adapting themselves to new conditions. Pythagoras started from the cosmical system of

Anaximenes. Aristotle tells us that the Pythagoreans represented the world as inhaling 'air' form the boundless mass outside it, and this 'air' is identified with 'the unlimited'. When, however, we come to the process by which things are developed out of the 'unlimited', we observe a great change. We hear nothing more of 'separating out' or even of rarefaction and condensation. Instead of that we have the theory that what gives form to the Unlimited is the Limit. That is the great contribution of Pythagoras to philosophy, and we must try to understand it. Now the function of the Limit is usually illustrated from the arts of music and medicine, and we have seen how important these two arts were for Pythagoreans, so it is natural to infer that the key to its meaning is to be found in them.

It may be taken as certain that Pythagoras himself discovered the numerical ratios which determine the concordant intervals of the musical scale. Similar to musical intervals, in medicine there are opposites, such as the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, and it is the business of the physician to produce a proper 'blend' of these in the human body. In a well-known passage of Plato's Phaedo (86 b) we are told by Simmias that the Pythagoreans held the body to be strung like an instrument to a certain pitch, hot and cold, wet and dry taking the place of high and low in music. Musical tuning and health are alike means arising from the application of Limit to the Unlimited. It was natural for Pythagoras to look for something of the same kind in the world at large. Briefly stated, the doctrine of Pythagoras was that all things are numbers. In certain fundamental cases, the early Pythagoreans represented numbers and explained their properties by means of dots arranged in certain 'figures' or patterns.

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Continental Rationalism

The term "Continental Rationalism" traditionally refers to a 17th century philosophical movement begun by Descartes. After Descartes, several dozen scientists and philosophers continued his t eachings throughout continental Europe and, accordingly were titled "Cartesians." Some Cartesians strayed little from Descartes' scientific and metaphysical theories. Others incorporated his theories into Calvinistic theology. But a handful of philosopher s influenced by Descartes were more original in developing their own views and these people are included under the more general title "rationalists." the principle rationalists include Benedict Spinoza , Nicholas Malebranche, Gottfried Willhelm Leibniz, and Christian Wolff.

Continental Rationalism is usually understood in relation to its rival 17th century movement, British Empiricism, founded by John Locke. The radical division between these two schools was fir st articulated by Thomas Reid in his *Inquiry Concerning the Human Mind*; Reid's division was taken as the definitive explanation, which has come down to the present time. Two key points distinguish Rationalism from British Empiricists. The first inv olves differing theories about the origin of ideas. Rationalists believed that an important group of foundational concepts are known intuitively through reason, as opposed to experience. Descartes describes such concepts as innate ideas, the most importan t of these including the ideas of oneself, infinite perfection, and causality. British Empiricists, as we will see, staunchly rejected this view, and argued that all ideas trace ultimately trace back to experiences, such as sense perceptions and emotions. The second distinguishing feature between Rationalism and Empiricism concerns their differing methods of investigating problems. Rationalists maintained that we could deduce truths with absolute certainty from our innate ideas, much the way theorems in g eometry are deduced from axioms. Mathematical demonstration was seen as the perfect type of demonstrating truth and, accordingly, mathematical proof became the model for all other kinds of demonstration. Although empiricists also used deductive reasoning, they put a greater emphasis on the inductive method championed by fellow British countryman Francis Bacon.

Contemporary historians of philosophy challenge this traditional distinction between rationalism and empiricism. Louis Loeb, for example, argues for an alternative classification of 17th and 18th century philosophers which is more representative of t he actual content of their metaphysical and epistemological positions. In spite of Loeb's suggestions, the traditional division between rationalism and empiricism offered by Reid has at least some foundation, and is convenient for understanding the evolut ion of philosophical theories during the modern period of philosophy.

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Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953)

Life. Hans Reichenbach, born on September 26th 1891 in Hamburg, Germany, was a leading philosopher of science, a founder of the Berlin circle, and a proponent of logical positivism (also known as neopositivism or logical empiricism). He studied physics, mathematics and philosophy at Berlin, Erlangen, Gottingen and Munich in 1910s. Among his teachers were the neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer, the mathematician David Hilbert, and the physicists Max Planck, Max Born and Albert Einstein. Reichenbach received his degree in philosophy from the University at Erlangen in 1915; his dissertation on the theory of probability was published in 1916. He attended Einstein's lectures on the theory of relativity at Berlin in 1917-20; at that time Reichenbach chose the theory of relativity as the first subject for his own philosophical research. He became a professor at Polytechnic at Stuttgart in 1920. In the same year he published his first book on the philosophical implications of the theory of relativity, *The theory of relativity and a priori knowledge*, in which Reichenbach criticized Kantian theory of synthetic a priori. In the following years he published three books on the philosophical meaning of the theory of relativity: *Axiomatization of the theory of relativity* (1924), *From Copernicus to Einstein* (1927) and *The philosophy of space and time* (1928); the last in a sense states logical positivism's view on the theory of relativity. In 1926 Reichenbach became a professor of philosophy of physics at the University at Berlin. His methods of teaching philosophy were something of a novelty; students found him easy to approach (this fact was uncommon in German universities); his courses were open to discussion and debate. In 1928 he founded the Berlin circle (named Die Gesellschaft fur empirische Philosophie, "Society for empirical philosophy"). Among the members of the Berlin circle were Carl Gustav Hempel, Richard von Mises, David Hilbert and Kurt Grelling. In 1930 Reichenbach and Carnap undertook the editorship of the journal *Erkenntnis* ("Knowledge").

In 1933 Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. In the same year Reichenbach emigrated to Turkey, where he became chief of the Department of Philosophy at the University at Istanbul. In Turkey Reichenbach promoted a shift in philosophy course; he introduced interdisciplinary seminars and courses on scientific subjects. In 1935 he published *The theory of probability*.

In 1938 he moved to the United States, where he became a professor at the University of California at Los Angeles; in the same year was published *Experience and prediction*. Reichenbach's work on quantum mechanics was published in 1944 (*Philosophic foundations of quantum mechanics*). Afterwards he wrote two popular books: *Elements of symbolic logic* (1947) and *The rise of scientific philosophy* (1951). In 1949 he contributed an essay on *The philosophical significance of the theory of relativity* to *Albert Einstein: philosopher-scientist* edit by Paul Arthur Schillp. Reichenbach died on April 9th 1953 at Los Angeles, California, while he was working on the philosophy of time. Two books *Nomological statements and admissible operations* (1954) and *The direction of time* (1956) were published posthumously.

The philosophy of space and time. The philosophical meaning of the theory of relativity.

Space. Euclidean geometry is based on the set of axioms stated by Greek mathematician Euclid who developed geometry into an axiomatic system, in which every theorem is derivable from the axioms. Euclid's work revealed that the truth of geometry depends on the truth of axioms and therefore the question arose whether the axioms were true. Many Euclidean axioms were self-evident, but the axiom of parallels, which states that there is one and only one parallel to a given line through a given point, was considered not self-evident, and many mathematicians tried to derive it from the other axioms. Eventually it was proved the axiom of parallels is not a logical consequence of the remainder. As a result of this research non-Euclidean geometries were discovered and mathematicians became aware of the existence of a plurality of geometries, namely:

- Euclidean geometry, in which the axiom of parallels is true;
- geometry of Bolyai and Lobachevsky, also known as hyperbolic geometry, in which there is an infinite number of parallels to the given line through the given point (Janos Bolyai b 1802 d 1860, Hungarian mathematician, published in 1832 the first account of a non-Euclidean geometry; Nikolay Lobachevsky b 1793 d 1856, Russian mathematician, independently discovered hyperbolic geometry);
- elliptical geometry, in which there exist no parallel.

In Reichenbach opinion, it must be realized that there are two different kinds of geometry, namely mathematical geometry and physical geometry. Mathematical geometry, a branch of mathematics, is a purely formal system and it does not deal with the truth of axioms, but with the proof of theorems, ie it only search for the consequences of axioms. Physical geometry is concerned with the real geometry, ie the geometry which is true in our physical world: it searches for the truth (or falsity) of axioms, using the methods of empirical science: experiments, measurements, etc; it is a branch of physics.

How can physicists discover the geometry of the real world? Look at the following example, which Reichenbach analyses in *The philosophy of space and time*. Two-dimensional intelligent beings live in a two-dimensional world, on the surface of a sphere, but they do not know where they live; in their opinion, they might live on a plane, a sphere or whatever surface. How can they discover where they live? They could use some mathematical properties that characterize a geometry; for example, in Euclidean geometry the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter equals pi (3.14...) while in elliptical geometry the ratio is variable and it is less than pi; also in hyperbolic geometry the ratio is variable but greater than pi. Therefore they could measure the circumference and the diameter of a circle; if the ratio equals pi the surface is a plane; if the ratio is less than pi the surface is a sphere. Thus they could discover where they live with the help of such measurements. This method, invented by Gauss (Karl Friedrich Gauss, b 1777 d 1855, German mathematician, was the first to discover a non-Euclidean geometry although he did not published his work) is suitable for a two-dimensional world. Riemann (Bernhard Riemann, b 1826 d 1866, German mathematician, developed both the elliptical geometry and the generalized theory of metric space in any number of dimension which Einstein used in his general theory of relativity) invented a method suitable for a three-dimensional world. There is no reason in principle why physicists could not use Riemann's method to discover the geometry of our world.

Riemann's method is based on physical measurements. Reichenbach carefully examines the epistemological implications of measuring geometrical entities. The empirical measurement of geometrical entities depends on physical objects or physical processes corresponding to geometrical concepts. The process of establishing such correlation is called a *co-ordinative definition*. Usually, a

definition is a statement that gives the exact meaning of a concept; this kind of definition is called an explicit definition. There is another kind of definition, namely the co-ordinative definition; it is not a statement, but an ostensive definition. The co-ordinative definition of a concept is a correlation between a real object or a physical process and the concept itself. Some geometrical entities cannot be defined by an explicit definition but they require a co-ordinative definition. For example, the unit of length, ie the metre, is defined by a co-ordinative definition; the physical object corresponding to the metre is the standard rod in Paris (Museum of weights and measures in Paris houses the units of measure for International System of Units). Another example is the definition of straight line which is co-ordinated with a physical process, namely the path of a light ray.

What is the philosophical meaning of a co-ordinative definition? Reichenbach proposes the following problem, discussed in *The philosophy of space and time*. A measuring rod is moved from one point of space (say A) to another point (say B). When the measuring rod is in B, is its length altered? Many physical circumstances can alter the length, eg if temperature in A differs from temperature in B. In this example, we can discover whether the temperature is the same by means of a metallic rod and a wooden rod which are of equal length when they are in A. Move the two rods to B: if their length becomes different then the temperature is also different, otherwise the temperature is the same. This method is suitable because temperature is a *differential force*, ie a force that produces different effects on different substances. But there are *universal forces*, which produce the same effect on all type of matter. The best known universal force is gravity: its effect is the same on all bodies and therefore all bodies fall with the same acceleration. Now suppose a universal force alters the length of the measuring rods when they are moved from A to B; in this instance, we do not observe any difference between the measuring rods and we cannot know whether the length is altered. Consequently, if a rod stays in A and the other is moved to B where a universal force alters its length, we cannot know their length is different. So we must acknowledge that there is not any way of knowing whether the length of two measuring rods, which are equal when they are in the same point of space, is the same when the two rods are in two different points of space. We can define the two rods equal in length if all differential forces are eliminated and disregard universal forces. But we can adopt a different definition, of course. Thus we must accept - Reichenbach says - that *the geometrical form of a body is not an absolute fact, but depends on a co-ordinative definition*. There is an astonish consequence of this fact. If a geometry G was proved to be the real geometry by a set of measurements, we could arbitrarily choose a different geometry G' and adopt a different set of co-ordinative definitions so that G' would become the real geometry. This is the *principle of relativity of geometry*, which Reichenbach examines, from a mathematical point of view, in *Axiomatization of the theory of relativity* and, from a philosophical point of view, in *The philosophy of space and time*. This principle states that all geometrical systems are equivalent; it falsifies alleged a priori character of Euclidean geometry and thus it falsifies the Kantian philosophy of space too.

At a first glance, the principle of relativity of geometry proves it is not possible to discover the real geometry of our world. This is true if we limit ourselves to metric relationships. Metric relationships are geometric properties of bodies depending on distances, angles, areas, etc; examples of metric relationships are "the ratio of circumference to diameter equals pi" and "the volume of A is greater than the volume of B". But we can study not only distances, angles, areas but also the order of space, the *topology* of space, ie way in which the points of space are placed in relation to one another; an example of a topological relationship is "point A is between point B and C". A consequence of the principle of relativity of geometry is, for instance, that a plane and a sphere are equivalent with respect to metric. From a topological point of view, a sphere and a plane are not equivalent (in topology, two geometrical

objects are equivalent if and only if there is a continuous transformation that assign to every point of the first object a unique point of the second and vice versa; there is not any transformation of this kind between a sphere and a plane). What is the philosophical significance of topology?

Reichenbach examines the following example (*The philosophy of space and time*). Measurements of space, performed by a two-dimensional being, suggest that he lives on a sphere, but, in spite of such measurements, he believes he lives on a plane. There is not any difficult, when he limits himself to metric relationships: he could adopt appropriate co-ordinative definitions and those measurements would become compatible with a plane. But the surface of a sphere is a finite surface and he might do a round-the-world tour, that is he could walk along a straight line from a point A and eventually he would arrive to the point A itself. Really this is impossible on a plane and he therefore should assert that this last point is not the point A, but a different point B which, in all other respects, is identical to A. Now there are two possibilities: (i) he changes his theory and acknowledges that he lives on a sphere or (ii) he maintains his position, but he needs to explain why point B is identical to A although A and B are different and distant points of space; he could accomplish his task only fabricating a fictitious theory of pre-established harmony: everything that occurs in A, immediately occurs in B.

Reichenbach says the second possibility entails an anomaly in the law of causality. If we assume normal causality, topology become an empirical theory and we can discover the geometry of the real world. This example is another falsification of Kantian theory of synthetic a priori. Kant believed both the Euclidean geometry and the law of causality were a priori. But if Euclidean geometry were an a priori truth, normal causality might be false; if normal causality were an a priori truth, Euclidean geometry might be false. We arbitrarily can choose the geometry or we arbitrarily can choose the causality; but we cannot choose both. Thus the most important implication of the philosophical analysis of topology is that *the theory of space depends on normal causality*.

Time. Normal causality is the main principle that underlies not only the theory of space but also the theory of time. The solution to the problem of an empirical theory of space was found when we acknowledged the priority of topological relationships over metric relationships. Also in the philosophy of time we must recognize the priority of topology. We must distinguish between two different concepts which are fundamental to the theory of time, namely the *order* of time and the *direction* of time. Time order is definable by means of causality (see *The philosophy of space and time*). The definition is: *event A occurs before event B* (and, of course, event B occurs after event A) *if event A can produce a physical effect on event B*. When can event A affect event B? The theory of relativity states that it is required a finite time for an effect to go from event A to event B. The required time is finite because the velocity of light is a speed limit for all material particles, messages or effects and the velocity of light is finite. Suppose A and B are two events occurring in point PA and PB. Event A can affect event B if a light pulse emitted from PA when event A occurs reaches the point PB before event B occurs. If the light pulse reaches point PB when event B already occurred, event A cannot affect event B. If event A cannot affect event B and event B cannot affect event A, the order of the two events is indefinite and we could arbitrarily choose the event that occurs first or we might define the two event simultaneous; therefore simultaneity depends on a definition.

Reichenbach examines the consistency of this definition. Suppose an event A occurs before an event B and, from another point of view, the event A occurs after the event B. In this circumstance there is a closed causal chain so that the event A produces an effect on the event B and the event B produces an effect on the event A. The definition is consistent only if we assume that there are not closed causal

chains: *the order of time depends on normal causality*.

Reichenbach asserts that the relativity of simultaneity is independent from the relativity of motion. The relativity of simultaneity is due to the finite velocity of causal propagation. So it is a mistake - Reichenbach asserts in *The philosophy of space and time* and *From Copernicus to Einstein* - to derive the relativity of simultaneity from the relative motion of observers. Reichenbach also cautions against a possible misunderstanding of the multiplicity of observers in some expositions of the theory of relativity: observers are used only for convenience; the relativity of simultaneity has nothing to do with the relativity of observers. We must recognize - Reichenbach asserts - that the theory of an absolute simultaneity is a consistent theory although it is a wrong one. Absolute simultaneity and absolute time does not exist, but they are clever concepts.

Reichenbach also faces the problem of the *direction of time*. All mechanical processes are reversible: if f(t) is a solution of the equations of classical mechanics then f(-t) is also an admissible solution; also in the theory of relativity f(-t) is an admissible solution. Thus neither theory gives a consistent definition of the direction of time. In fact the *direction of time is definable only by means of irreversible processes,* ie processes that are characterized by an increase of entropy. But the definition is not straightforward. The second law of thermodynamics, which states the principle of increase of entropy, is a statistical law, not a deterministic law. Really the elementary processes of statistical thermodynamics are reversible, because they are controlled by the laws of classical mechanics. In fact all macroscopic processes are also reversible, in a sense: every upgrade of entropy is naturally followed by a corresponding downgrade; we cannot control the downgrade and thus we cannot reverse the process. But statistical thermodynamics asserts that after a large amount of time the entropy will diminish to the initial value. In an isolated system, in an infinite time, there are as many downgrades as upgrades of the entropy. Thus if we observe two states A and B, and the entropy of B is greater than the entropy of A, we cannot assert that B is later than A. But if we consider not an isolated system, but many isolated systems, we realized that the probability that we observe a decrease of entropy is less than the probability we observe an increase of entropy. We can therefore use many-system probabilities to define a direction of time. Reichenbach asserts that it is possible to define an entropy for the whole universe and the statistical theory proves that the entropy of the universe first increases and then decreases; thus we can define a direction of time only for sections of time, not for the whole time. Reichenbach notes that this theory of time was stated in 19th century by Boltzmann (Ludwig Boltzmann, b 1844 d 1906, Austrian physicist, formulated the statistical theory of entropy).

The special theory of relativity. The special theory of relativity gives an unified theory of space and time in the absence of gravitational field. One example of the necessity of an unified theory of space and time is the *length contraction,* an effect predicted by the theory; this effect shows that the length of a moving rod depends on simultaneity. The special theory of relativity states that the length of a rod measured using a metre that is at rest with respect to the rod is different from the length measured using a metre which is moving with respect to the rod. In the first instance we measure the length of the rod by means of the well-known method used by classical mechanics. But we use a different method when the measuring rod is not at rest with respect to the metre. We measure the length of the moving rod by means of the distance between the two points occupied at a given time by the two ends of the moving rod, ie we mark the simultaneous positions of the two ends and we measure the distance between those positions; thus this method depend on the definition of simultaneity, which also depends on a definition. It must be acknowledged that the length of a moving rod is a matter of definition, but the length contraction is a genuine physical hypothesis confirmed by experiments. We must also recognize the priority of time over

space: the ability to measure time is a requisite for the theory of space. Therefore only an unified theory of space and time is suitable. In spite of the necessity for an unified theory of space and time, Reichenbach states (in *The philosophy of space and time*) that space and time are different concepts which remain distinct in the theory of relativity. The *real* space is three-dimensional and the *real* time is one-dimensional: the four-dimensional space-time used in the theory of relativity is a mathematical artefact. Also the mathematical formulation of the special theory of relativity acknowledges the difference between space and time: the equation that defines the metric is dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 - dt^2 = ds^2 and the time coordinate is distinguishable from the space coordinates by the negative sign. How can we know the space is three-dimensional? and how can we recognize the difference between a real space and a mathematical space?

A physical effect is not immediately transmitted from one point to another distant point but it passes through every point between the source and the destination. This principle is known as *the principle of local action* and it denies the existence of action at a distance. In three-dimensional space the principle of local action is true while in a four-dimensional space it is false, so we can recognize that the real space is three-dimensional. We can also distinguish between a mathematical space and the real space because in a mathematical space the principle of local action is false. Reichenbach says that the truth of the principle of local action is an empirical fact, not an a priori truth: it could be false. But if this principle is true then there is only one n-dimensional space in which it is true; this n-dimensional space is the real space and n is the number of the dimensions of space. So we recognize that the real space is three-dimensional while the four-dimensional space used in the theory of relativity is a mathematical space, not a real one. We also recognize that the *unified theory of space and time depends on normal causality*.

Among the results of the special theory of relativity is *time dilation*: the period of a moving clock is greater than the period of a clock at rest and therefore the moving clock slows. Time dilation is an empirical hypothesis and Reichenbach says its physical meaning is that a clock does not measure the time coordinate but it measures *the interval*, ie the space-time distance between two events. In classical mechanics space is Euclidean and Pythagoras' theorem gives the distance ds between two points: ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2; x,y,z are the space coordinates. The distance ds is measured by rod. Time is an independent coordinate and is measured by clock. The mathematical formulation of the special theory of relativity uses a four-dimensional space-time known as the *Minkowski space* (mathematician Hermann Minkowski, b 1864 d 1909, gave a mathematical formulation of Einstein's special theory of relativity), in which three coordinates are the space coordinates and one coordinate is the time coordinate. The distance ds between two points of Minkowski space is: ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 - dt^2; t is the time coordinate and ds (or ds^2) is the interval. A positive (negative) ds^2 is called a spacelike (timelike) interval. Suppose A and B are two events, interval ds^2 is negative and S is an inertial frame of reference moving with constant velocity v so that both events A and B occurs at the origin O of S, and suppose there is a clock in O; the time measured by the clock, called *characteristic time*, equals the interval ds. When the interval is positive, there is an inertial frame of reference S' with respect to which the two events are simultaneous; in this instance, the interval ds is realized by a measuring rod with the two ends coinciding with the events A and B and at rest with respect to S'. Time dilation shows an important difference between the special theory of relativity and classical mechanics; the special theory asserts that clocks and rods measure the interval while classical mechanics asserts they measure coordinates.

I briefly mention also Reichenbach's view on the velocity of light. He asserts that there is no way of measuring the velocity of light and proving it is constant, because the measurement of the velocity of light requires the definition of simultaneity which depends on the speed of light. Einstein - Reichenbach

says - does not prove the speed of light is constant, but the special theory of relativity assumes it is constant, ie it is constant by definition.

The general theory of relativity. Newton's second law of motion states that the acceleration **a** of a body is proportional to the force **F** applied, so that **F** = m * **a**, where m is the *inertial mass* which represents the resistance to acceleration (force and acceleration are vectors and I use bold face as indicator of vector). Newton's law of gravitation asserts that every particle attracts every other particle with a force **F** proportional to the product of *gravitational masses*: **F** = G (m * m') / **r**^2; **r** is the distance between the two particles, m and m' are the gravitational mass which represent the response to the gravitational force. In classical mechanics, gravitational mass and inertial mass are equivalent; this *principle of equivalence* accounts for the law of free fall which states that the acceleration of every falling body is the same. The principle of equivalence is one of the principle of the general theory of relativity and its consequences are very important.

Suppose a physicist is into a closed elevator and he observers a body attached to a spring; he find the spring is stretched. There are two different although equivalent explanations.

- First explanation. The body is attracted by the Earth and the gravitational force accounts for the stretching of the spring.
- Second explanation. The elevator is in empty space so there is not any gravitational force, but the elevator is accelerated and the inertia of the body causes the stretching of the spring.

The two explanation are indistinguishable because of the equivalence between gravitational and inertial mass. This thought experiment shows that an accelerated frames of reference can simulate a gravitational field. Now suppose that in another thought experiment the body does not exert any force on the spring. Also in this instance there are two explanations.

- First explanation. The elevator is at rest in empty space so there is not any force.
- Second explanation. The elevator is free falling in a gravitational field so its acceleration equals gravitational acceleration; the body is falling but also the spring, the elevator and the physicist are falling with the same acceleration and therefore they are relatively at rest and there is not any force.

The consequence of this second thought experiment is that a gravitational field can be eliminated by means of an accelerated frame of reference. The theory of general relativity states that free falling accelerated frames of reference are inertial systems. Reichenbach says that this hypothesis is not a consequence of the principle of equivalence; it is a genuine physical hypothesis which goes beyond experience. There is an important consequence of this hypothesis. The special theory of relativity is true in inertial frames of reference, so in every inertial system the motion of a light ray is represented by a straight line. But the general theory of relativity states that a free falling frame of reference is an inertial system, so the light moves in a straight line with respect to this frame of reference; with respect to a frame of reference which is at rest on Earth (in this system there is a gravitational field) the light rays are curved. The consequence is that light is curved by gravity. Another consequence of the hypothesis that a free falling frame of reference is an inertial system is the time dilation in the presence of a gravitational field.

The general theory of relativity gives an unified theory of space, time and gravitation; it requires a non-Euclidean four-dimensional geometry, known as Riemannian geometry. Reichenbach explains the

main properties of this kind of geometry and the main differences between Euclidean geometry and Riemannian geometry. In Euclidean geometry the distance between two points is given by a simple function of coordinates; also in Minkowski four-dimensional space-time the interval is calculable by means of coordinates. In Euclidean geometry the coordinates have both a metric and topological significance; this is true also in the special theory of relativity. In Riemannian geometry the four coordinates perform a topological function, not a metric one. This means that we cannot calculate the distance between two points by means of coordinates. The metric functions is performed by the *metric tensor* **g**; it is a mathematical entity represented by 16 components. The geometry of four-dimensional space-time depends on the metric tensor **g**; for example, if the components of **g** are

1	0	0	0
0	1	0	0
0	0	1	0
0	0	0	1

then the geometry is a Minkowski geometry (ie the geometry of the special theory). Thus the tensor **g** expresses the geometry. But **g** is determined by the gravitational field, because the metric tensor also expresses the acceleration of the frame of reference and the effects of an acceleration are equivalent to the effects of a gravitational field. The metric tensor **g** expresses both the physical geometry and the gravitational field. The consequence is astonishingly: *the geometry of the universe is produced by gravitational fields*. Therefore the general theory of relativity does not reduce gravitation to geometry; on the contrary, geometry is based on gravitation. The properties of space and time are empirical properties caused by gravitational fields.

The reality of space and time. Reichenbach asserts (in *The philosophy of space and time*) that the *reality of space and time is an unquestionable result of the epistemological analysis of the theory of relativity*. With respect to the problem of reality, space and time are not different from the other physical concepts. But the reality of space and time does not imply the concept of an absolute space and time. Space and time are relational concepts and we can study their properties because of the existence of physical objects, eg clocks, that realize relationships between space-time entities. Reichenbach also emphasizes the causal theory of space and time: *causality is the basis of both philosophical and physical theory of space and time.*

Quantum mechanics.

Interpretation of quantum physics: part I. The main thesis of Reichenbach's work on quantum mechanics (*Philosophic foundations of quantum mechanics*) is that *there is not any exhaustive interpretation of quantum mechanics which is free from causal anomalies*. A causal anomaly is a violation of the principle of local action; this principle states that the action at a distance does not exist. We have found the principle of local action and causal anomalies in Reichenbach's philosophy of space and time.

Two main interpretations of quantum mechanics are involved with the wave-particle duality. *Wave interpretation* states that atomic entities are waves or things that resemble waves; it grew out of the discovery of the wave-like nature of light and it is supported by many experiments, for example the two-slit experiment. In this experiment a beam of electrons is direct towards a screen with two slits and an interference pattern is produced behind the screen, showing that electrons act as waves. The *corpuscolar interpretation* regards atomic entities as particles; it is supported by a long standing tradition

and by the fact that atomic entities show corpuscular properties, eg mass and momentum. Both wave and corpuscular interpretation entail causal anomalies. For example corpuscular interpretation cannot fully explain the two-slit experiment. An electron acting as a particle goes through only one slit and its behaviour is independent of the existence of another slit in a different point of space. In fact, if one slit is open and the other is close, the interference pattern is not produced: electrons behave as if they were informed whether the other slit is open. But wave interpretation cannot fully explain a slightly different experiment. An electron can be localized by a detector put near a slit and the electron is detected as particle. However for every event in quantum realm there is an interpretation by means of particles or waves but there is not a unique interpretation for all events. Both corpuscular and wave interpretation are not verifiable; they are not matter of experience but they are matter of definition.

There are two models that are free of causal anomalies; they are restricted interpretations, ie they exclude the admissibility of certain statements. One is *Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation* (Niels Bohr, b 1885 d 1962, Danish physicist winner of Nobel prize in 1922, gave the first account of the quantum theory of atoms; Werner Karl Heisenberg, b 1901 d 1976, German physicist winner of Nobel prize in 1932, formulated matrix mechanics and proved the *principle of indeterminacy* according to which there is no way of measuring both position and momentum of atomic particles). This interpretation states that speaking about values of not measured physical quantities is meaningless. In the two-slit experiment, when the two slits are open and electrons interfere with themselves, the position of electrons cannot be measured; thus a statement about the position of electrons is meaningless and the particle interpretation is forbidden. There are two main faults - Reichenbach says - in Bohr-Heisenbergh interpretation: (i) Heisenberg indeterminacy principle becomes a meta-statement on the semantics of the language of physics and (ii) it implies the presence of meaningless statements in physics.

The other interpretation depends on three-valued logic, ie a formal system that acknowledges three truth values: true, false and indeterminate.

Mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics. Reichenbach carefully examines and explains the mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics. It is based on the notion of *quantum operator*; a quantum operator is a mathematical entity corresponding to a given classical quantity. For example, the quantum operator *energy* correspond to the energy in classical physics. A quantum operator can only assume discrete values while the corresponding classical quantity assumes continuous values. Note that an operator is not a function; it indicates a set of operation to be performed on a function.

Let U be a classical quantity; U depends on position **Q** and momentum **P**, that is U=F[**Q**,**P**] (position and momentum are vectors and I use bold face as indicator of vector; I use square brackets to show that a function depends on given quantities). The quantum operator corresponding to U is called Uop and is defined by the following statements.

- 1. For every function F[**Q**], substitute 'multiply by F[**Q**]' to 'F[**Q**]'.
- 2. Substitute 'multiply the first partial derivative with respect to **Q** by C' to '**P**', where C=h/(2*pi*i), h is the Planck constant, pi equals 3.14..., i is the square root of -1.
- 3. Substitute 'multiply the second partial derivative with respect to **Q** by C^2' to '**P**', where C=h/(2*pi*i), h is the Planck constant, pi equals 3.14..., i is the square root of -1.

Examples of quantum operators. Let T be the kinetic energy; in classical mechanics, the kinetic energy is given by the ratio of the square of momentum **P** to twice the mass m, that is T=**P**^2 / 2m. Quantum operator Top is given by Top=C^2 * (1/2m) * **D"** (I use symbol D' to indicate the first partial derivative

with respect to position and D" to indicate the second partial derivative with respect to position).

Let H be the mechanical energy, ie the sum of the kinetic energy T and the potential energy V: H=T+V[**Q**]; therefore Hop=Top+Vop=C^2 * (1/2m) * **D"** + V[**Q**]. If F is a given function, the result (indicated by Hop F) of performing the operations described by operator Hop on function F is C^2 * (1/2m) * **D"** F + V * F.

Classical and quantum physical quantities. Schrodinger equations. Quantum operators are useful to describe quantum systems; they transform physical quantities defined in classical mechanics into quantum quantities. Let U and Uop be a physical quantity and the corresponding operator; the very simple rule is

(E1) Uop F = U * F.

In equation E1 the function F is a parameter and the function U is the variable; functions F satisfying equation E1 are called *eigenfunctions*. When F is an eigenfunction, the variable U satisfying equation E1 is called an *eigenvalue*. Usually eigenvalues do not belong to a continuous interval but they are discrete values and they represent the admissible values of quantity U. The first Schrodinger equation can be derived from equation E1 substituting the energy H to the general function U.

(S1) Hop F = H * F that is
(S1) C^2 * (1/2m) * **D"** F + V * F = H * F.

The physical meaning of first Schrodinger equations is that the energy H of an atomic particle, eg an electron, can only assume values satisfying the equation; these values are discrete and belong to a set of fixed values. A given function F satisfying equation S1 is a wave function and describe a stationary state. The amplitude of the wave function F gives the probability to find the particle in a given point of space. The second Schrodinger equation is:

(S2) Hop PSI = (ih/2*pi) * PSI'

where PSI is a linear combination of wave functions and PSI' is the first partial derivative with respect to time. Equation S2 describe a quantum system by means of function PSI; this function is the infinite sum of eigenfunctions.

(S3) PSI = K1 * F1 + K2 * F2 + K3 * F3 + K4 * F4 + ...

where Kn is a series of coefficients and Fn is the series of eigenfunctions satisfying equation E1. The square of coefficient Kn gives the probability that the system is in the state described by Fn, ie the square of Kn is the probability that the value of U equals the eigenvalue corresponding to Fn. The second Schrodinger equations is a deterministic equation, ie if we know the wave function PSI in a given time t, we can calculate PSI in every time. Note that PSI does not fully describe the quantum system; it only gives the probability (by means of coefficients Kn) that the energy of the quantum system equals a specific value. Suppose a measurement of U gives the value Un, which is the eigenvalue corresponding to the eigenfunction Fn; then PSI = Fn. A measurement of U therefore changes the function PSI so that PSI = Fn, for an appropriate eigenfunction Fn.

Heisenberg indeterminacy principle. Let **P**op and **Q**op the quantum operator corresponding to momentum and position. It is easy to verify that for every function F

(H) **P**op **Q**op F **-** **Q**op **P**op F = C * F

and the equation H is a mathematical formulation of Heisenberg indeterminacy principle. The proof of equation H is straightforward.

> **P**op **Q**op F - **Q**op **P**op F =
> **P**op (**Q** * F) - **Q**op (C * **D'** F) =
> C * (**D'** (**Q** * F) - **Q** * (**D'** F) =
> C * (**D' Q** * F + **Q** * **D'** F - **Q** * **D'** F) =
> C * F

Reichenbach explains the physical meaning of equation H. Equation H proves that the eigenvalues of position and momentum are different. Now suppose a physicist measures both position and momentum of a particle; let Fp be the eigenfunction corresponding to the measured momentum and Fq be the eigenfunction corresponding to the measured position. From the measurement of position: PSI = Fp; from the measurement of momentum: PSI = Fq. Therefore Fp = Fq and the eigenvalues are the same; but the eigenvalues are different. So position and momentum of a particle cannot be simultaneously measured. Reichenbach asserts that Heisenberg indeterminacy principle is not due to the alleged interference an observer exerts on particles (the explanation of indeterminacy principle in terms of an interference is due to Heisenberg). This principle is an objective law of nature, and it can be stated without reference to observers.

The interpretation of quantum physics: part II. After the mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics, Reichenbach states the basic assumption of the different interpretation of quantum mechanics. *Corpuscolar interpretation* relies on the following definition. *If a measurement of U equals Um, then Um is the values of U not only at the time of measurement but also immediately before and immediately after*. If a physicist measures the position of an electron and immediately after its momentum, than he know both position and momentum of the electron. In this interpretation atomic particles have both momentum and position, so they are real particles; a physicist can also measure both momentum and position. The knowledge of both position and momentum is unusable because of the difference between the eigenfunctions: if PSI equals the eigenfunction "position" the knowledge of momentum is totally unused while if PSI equals the eigenfunction "momentum" the knowledge of position is totally unused.

Wave interpretation states that *the value of a measured quantity exists after the measurement but before the measurement the quantity assumes simultaneously all possible values*. The effect of the measurement is the *collapse of wave function*.

Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation asserts that *the value of a physical quantity exists only after the measurement; a statement about this value before the measurement is therefore meaningless.*

The interpretation based on *three-valued logic* states that *a statement about a not measured physical quantity can be neither true nor false: it can be indeterminate*. The following tables show the properties of logical connectives in the three-valued logic suggested by Reichenbach (symbols used in these tables differ from symbols used by Reichenbach).

negation: cyclic (-) diametrical (?) complete (^))

A	-A	?A	^A
T	I	F	I
I	F	I	T

F	T	T	T

or (v) and (&)
implication: standard (>) alternative (#) quasi (*)
equivalence: standard (=) alternative (<=>)

A	B	(AvB)	(A&B)	(A>B)	(A#B)	(A*B)	(A=B)	(A<=>B)
T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T
T	I	T	I	I	F	I	I	F
T	F	T	F	F	F	F	F	F
I	T	T	I	T	T	I	I	F
I	I	I	I	T	T	I	T	T
I	F	I	F	I	T	I	I	F
F	T	T	F	T	T	I	F	F
F	I	I	F	T	T	I	I	F
F	F	F	F	T	T	I	T	T

Suppose P is the statement "the momentum of the particle is p" and Q is the statement "the position of the particle is q"; then Heisenberg indeterminacy principle is expressed by the following statement: (Pv-P) # --Q. The following table is the truth-table of this sentence.

P	Q	-P	Pv-P	-Q	--Q	(Pv-P) # --Q
T	T	I	T	I	F	F
T	I	I	T	F	T	T
T	F	I	T	T	I	F
I	T	F	I	I	F	T
I	I	F	I	F	T	T
I	F	F	I	T	I	T
F	T	T	T	I	F	F
F	I	T	T	F	T	T
F	F	T	T	T	I	F

The truth of (Pv-P) # --Q implies that the situations described in 1st, 3rd, 7th and 9th row of the truth-table are forbidden. Reichenbach explains how the three-valued interpretation hides causal anomalies. Look at the two-slit experiment. Suppose the two slits are open and the interference pattern is produced. Let P(A) be the probability that an electron goes through the first slit; let P(B) be the probability that an electron goes through the second slit; let P(A,C) be the probability that an electron gone through the first slit hits the screen in point C; let P(B,C) be the probability that an electron gone through the second slit hits the screen in point C; let P(C) the probability that an electron hits the screen in point C. Corpuscular interpretation suggests that

(E2) P(C)=P(A)*P(A,C)+P(B)*P(B,C)

In fact P(C) is not given by equation E2: this is the origin of causal anomalies. Equation E2 can be expressed by the following statement: (AvB)#C, where A is "the electron goes through the first slit", B is "the electron goes through the second slit" and C is E2. We know that (i) if an electron goes through the first slit then it does not go through the second slit and vice versa, ie A # -B and B # -A; (ii) if an electron

does not go through a slit then it goes through the other slit, ie -A # B and -B # A. In classical logic, (i) and (ii) imply AvB, ie [(A # -B)&(B # -A)&(-A # B)&(-B # A)] # AvB is true (look at the following table).

```
A B [((A # -B) & (B # -A)) & ((-A # B) & (-B # A))] # AvB
F F    F T T    T    F T T    F    T F F    F    T F F    T    F
```

The truth-table is restricted to one combination of truth-values because in the other combinations the consequence AvB is true and the statement Z # (AvB) is true for all Z. In corpuscular interpretation of two-slit experiment the statement (A # -B)&(B # -A)&(-A # B)&(-B # A) is true; in classical logic the statement [(A # -B)&(B# -A)&(-A # B)&(-B # A)] # AvB is true and thus also AvB is true; therefore E2 is true. But E2 does not give the correct formula for the probability and so there is a causal anomaly. In three-valued logic, (i) and (ii) do not imply AvB; this fact is proved by means of the following table.

```
A B [((A # -B) & (B # -A)) & ((-A # B) & (-B # A))] # AvB
I I    I T F    T    I T F    T    F T I    T    F T I    F    I
```

Thus we cannot assert E2 and there is not any causal anomaly.

Reichenbach's epistemology.

The structure of science and the verifiability principle. A scientific theory is a formal system which requires a physical interpretation by means of co-ordinative definitions. Reichenbach's philosophical research on the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics implicitly depends on this view. For example, the distinction between mathematical geometry and physical geometry entails the distinction between a purely formal system and a system interpreted by means of definitions. Co-ordinative definitions are true by convention and cannot be verified, but they are not meaningless; in fact scientific theories require them to acquire an empirical significance. The acknowledgement of the existence of meaningful and not verifiable sentences is very important for a right interpretation of the epistemology of logical positivism. The *verifiability principle* is often regarded as the most important principle of logical positivism; it states that the meaning of a sentence is its method of verification and a sentence which cannot be verified is meaningless. According to this principle, co-ordinative definitions might be meaningless; on the contrary, in Reichenbach opinion, they are not only meaningful but also required by scientific theories. Note that Reichenbach explicit agrees with verifiability principle. In 'The philosophical significance of the theory of relativity' (1949) he says that the meaning of a sentence is reducible to its method of verification; he also says that a physicist can fully understand the Michelson's experiment only if he adopts the verifiability theory of meaning. In the same essay, Reichenbach says that the logic foundation of the theory of relativity is the discovery that many problems are not verifiable; these problems can be solved by means of co-ordinative definitions. Thus co-ordinative definitions are meaningful and not verifiable. So we must acknowledge that Reichenbach agrees with the verifiability principle and, at the same time, asserts that in scientific theories there are meaningful sentences, namely co-ordinative definitions, that are not verifiable. Why these sentences are not meaningless? Because they belong to scientific theories that are verifiable. For example, Reichenbach states that (i) the Euclidean geometry is not verifiable, (ii) the co-ordinative definitions of geometrical entities are not verifiable but (iii) the Euclidean geometry plus the co-ordinative definitions of geometrical entities is verifiable. *The theory must be verifiable, the individual statements belonging to the theory can be not verifiable*.

Conventionalism vs empiricism. In Reichenbach opinion, among the purposes of the philosophy of

science is the search for a distinction between empirical and conventional sentences. The separation of empirical from conventional sentences is not only possible but also necessary for a full understanding of scientific theories. Philosophical research on modern science clearly shows that conventional elements are present in scientific knowledge. The description of our world is not uniquely determined by observations, but there is a plurality of equivalent descriptions; for example, we can use different geometry for describing the same space. But conventionalism is in error. For example, conventionalism states that we can always adopt the Euclidean geometry by means of appropriate definitions. But if we adopt a set of definitions so that the geometry on the Earth is Euclidean, it is possible that in another point of the universe the same set of definitions entails a non-Euclidean geometry; so we can discover an objective difference between different points of space. Note that Reichenbach does not state that scientific knowledge can be proved by means of experience. On the contrary, he asserts that scientific theories are based on physical hypotheses which are not a logical consequence of experiments, eg the general theory of relativity is based on Einstein's hypothesis that free falling frames of reference are inertial systems; we cannot prove this hypothesis, but we can verify its consequences. *Scientific theories cannot be proved, but we can test their forecasts.*

Causality. Causality plays a central role in Reichenbach's philosophy of science. Reichenbach uses the theory of causality as a key to provide access to modern physics and understanding of the philosophical significance of both the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. According to Reichenbach, the causal theory of space and time is the basis for both the theory of relativity and the philosophy of space and time. In the theory of relativity it is always possible to choose a set of co-ordinative definitions satisfying normal causality. Therefore different geometrical systems are not equivalent and they can be divided into two groups, one group satisfying normal causality while the other entails causal anomalies. Only geometrical systems belonging to the first group are admissible. It is the experience that decides whether a given geometry belongs to the first group; thus conventionalism's view on geometry is wrong. In quantum mechanics there is not any set of co-ordinative definitions which is free from causal anomalies and satisfies classical logic. In fact, a three-valued logic is required to give an interpretation satisfying normal causality.

Science and philosophy. First of all, we must acknowledge his scientific seriousness and physical-mathematical skill. His deep knowledge of modern physics is unquestionable. Reichenbach's positive attitude towards scientific knowledge was influenced not only by his teachers but also by his own philosophical views. In his opinion, modern physics is concerned with problems that, until the late 19th century, were regarded as philosophical problems, eg the nature of space and time, the source of gravitation, the real extent of causality. In 17th and 18th century - Reichenbach says - philosophers were usually interested in science and many of them were also mathematicians and physicists, eg Descartes and Leibniz; Kant's epistemology was based on scientific knowledge. But since 18th science became extraneous to philosophy. Nowadays - Reichenbach wrote in 1928 - there is an almost complete separation of philosophy from physical sciences; philosophical researches into epistemology are fruitless, because of this separation. On the other hand, scientists cannot explicitly help the progress of epistemology: they are too much involved in technical researches. There is only one way to overcome this difficulty: philosophers, who are not concerned with technical subjects but deal with genuine philosophical problems, must dedicate themselves to the philosophical analysis of modern physics, so they can clearly express the implicit philosophical content of scientific theories. In fact, modern physics is rich in philosophical consequences: there is more philosophy in Einstein's work than in many philosophical systems.

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Mauro Murzi

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Relativism

Relativism is sometimes identified (usually by its critics) as the thesis that all points of view are equally valid. In ethics, this amounts to saying that all moralities are equally good; in epistemology it implies that all beliefs, or belief systems, are equally true. Critics of relativism typically dismiss such views as incoherent since they imply the validity even of the view that relativism is false. They also charge that such views are pernicious since they undermine the enterprise of trying to improve our ways of thinking.

Perhaps because relativism is associated with such views, few philosophers are willing to describe themselves as relativists. However, most of the leading thinkers who have been accused of relativism--for example, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter Winch, Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida--do share a certain common ground which, while recognizably relativistic, provides a basis for more sophisticated, and perhaps more defensible, positions.

Although there are many different kinds of relativism, they all have two features in common.

> 1) They all assert that one thing (e.g. moral values, beauty, knowledge, taste, or meaning) is relative to some particular framework or standpoint (e.g. the individual subject, a culture, an era, a language, or a conceptual scheme).
>
> 2) They all deny that any standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others.

It is thus possible to classify the different types and sub-types of relativism in a fairly obvious way. The main genera of relativism can be distinguished according to the object they seek to relativize. Thus, forms of moral relativism assert the relativity of moral values; forms of epistemological relativism assert the relativity of knowledge. These genera can then be broken down into distinct species by identifying the framework to which the object in question is being relativized. For example, moral subjectivism is that species of moral relativism that relativizes moral value to the individual subject.

How controversial, and how coherent, these forms of relativism are will obviously vary according to what is being relativized to what, and in what manner. In contemporary philosophy, the most widely discussed forms of relativism are moral relativism, cognitive relativism, and aesthetic relativism.

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Renaissance

"Renaissance" is the name given to the great intellectual movement in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries--a period which saw the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times. It began in the revolt of men of culture against the intellectual sterility and narrowness of the medieval spirit, and especially against scholasticism, whose pedantic and dogmatic narrowness had reached the extreme point of its development. The Renaissance began in Italy, and its first period (1300 to 1375) was marked by a universal revival of interest in classic literature and the classic ideals. It was a great revolt against bigotry and in favor of mental freedom and its first sign was a passion for the largeness and richness of the pagan world. Traces of this feeling can be seen in *Dante*(1265-1321), who, although thoroughly medieval in his sympathies, chose Virgil as his model, and who, in the vigor and magnificence of his own verse, was a striking contrast to the dull formalists who had before his time written for the men of the Middle Age. *Petrarch*(1304-1374) is the first true son of the Rennaissance. In his poem written in Latin hexameter on the subject of the Second Punic War and entitled *Africa*, he followed the classic models. He traveled in foreign countries and thus knew a larger world than his predecessors; and he may be said to have rediscovered Greek, which for some six centuries had been lost to the western world. His friend and disciple *Boccaccio* studied that language, and by his master's advice made a translation of Homer into Latin. Greeks were now encouraged to come from Constantinople to Italy, and in 1396 the learned Manuel Chrysolas began to teach in the chair of Greek founded at the instance of Salutato and Palla degli Strozzi at Florence. A Platonic academy was opened in the same city under the patronage of Cosimo de' Medici. Greek texts were brought from Constantinople, Europe was ransacked for copies of the long unused Latin classics, copyists multiplied them, libraries were founded, and schools for the study of both Greek and Latin in their classic forms were opened at Rome, Mautua, Verona, and many other towns. Pope Nicholas V earnestly fostered the new movement, and laid the foundation of the great Vatican collection; Cardinal Bessarion presided over the formation of the Library of St. Mark at Venice. Individual scholars went about looking for manuscripts of lost authors, for coins, medals, bronzes- anything that could give a better knowledge of classical antiquity. Among these men, the most famous were *Poggio Bracciolini*, who brought to light once more Quintilian, Lucretius, part of Cicero, Columella, Vitruvius, Silius Italicus and Asconius; and Cyriacus of Ancona, who sounded the key-note of the new movement in his famous saying "I go to awake the dead."

The second period of the Renaissance begins about 1375, and is marked by a continued zeal for classical study, and by the developmental of a broad learning and the new view of the intellectual life which is known as Humanism. By this time the movement had spread Germany and France and the northern countries generally, where it developed into the wide scholarship and sound learning of men like Erasmus, Melanchthon, Reuchlin, the Scaligers, Muretus, and Casanbon. The movement had now gone far beyond the mere revival of classical studies, and was felt in every department of life. In philosophy it gradually replaced the purely formal methods of thought that

scholasticism had fostered; in science it led to the great discoveries of Galileo and Copernicus; in architecture it brought about the revival of the classic style; in art it developed the new school of painting of which Michael Augelo and Raphael in Italy were the great names, and still another school in the Netherlands and Flanders; in religion its influence is seen in the revolt of Luther; and it indirectly inspired the passion for exploration that led to the discovery of the New World.

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Rights

Most generally, a right is a special advantage that someone gains because of his or her particular status. The "special advantage" might include gaining a liberty, a power, an entitlement, or an immunity. The "particular status" might include one's status as a human being, a woman, a minority, an animal, a child, or a citizen of some country. This general notion of "right" applies in both legal and moral contexts. For example, in the legal context, if I have the status of being a citizen of the United States, then I am entitled to the legal rights of any citizen under U.S. law. In the moral context, if I simply have the status of being human, then I am entitled to human rights that apply to all humans. Also in the moral context, if I am an animal, then I am entitled to any animal rights that may apply to animals of my kind. Moral philosophers are principally concerned with rights that are not simply created by political institutions such as the U.S. government. In this more narrow sense, a moral right is a justified constraint upon how others may act.

CLASSIC DISCUSSIONS. The modern notion of "rights" came to prominence in 17th and 18th century natural law theories. In his Latin work *The Law of War and Peace* (1625), natural law theorist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) expressed the notion of rights with the Latin term *ius*, a term that he also used to mean "law," as in the phrase "law of nature" (*ius naturae*). Inspired by Grotius, Thomas Hobbes introduced the English term "right" into political philosophy with his interpretation of *ius naturale* as "right of nature":

> The *right of nature*, which writers commonly call *ius naturale*, is the liberty each man has to use his own power as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. [*Leviathan*, Ch. 14]

For Hobbes, given the warring condition of the state of nature, my "right of nature" amounts to a liberty to protect myself from attack however I can. Later social contract theorists described the state of nature more optimistically, and, consequently rights of nature went beyond merely the liberty of self-preservation.

We find this more substantive notion of natural rights in the *Second Treatise of Government* (1690) by British philosopher John Locke (1632-1704). Locke argues that God created people free and equal in the state of nature and that, in this condition, no one is naturally sovereign over anyone else. In view of this natural equality, Locke maintains that it is a law of nature that no one should harm another person's life, health, liberty or possessions:

> The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions [*Second Treatise of Government*, 2:6]

These, then, are our foundational and God-given natural rights. Locke emphasizes that the state of nature is not necessarily a state of war. A state of war is declared only when someone violates our rights. In that case, the offender deserves to be punished, and even killed. We remedy conflicts in the state of nature by

making contracts with each other to create a civil society. This government is authorized to judge us and to defend our natural rights. However, these governments may be dissolved if they violate laws and threaten the life, liberty and property of the individual. Locke devotes particular attention to our right to possessions. We acquire property by mixing our labor with something that is held in common.

Locke's view of natural rights inspired 18th century political reformers such as Thomas Jefferson, which we see in the opening of the "Declaration of Independence":

> We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness -- That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

In an early draft of the Declaration, Jefferson follows Locke more closely by listing our natural rights as those of life, liberty and property. However, Jefferson later considered property to be only a means to happiness, he replaced "property" with "happiness." We also see Locke's influence in Emmanuel Sieyès' 1789 "Declaration of the Rights of Man" adopted by the French assembly:

> Men are born and remain free and equal in rights … [and the] aim of all political association is the conservation of the natural and imperscriptable rights of man … [including] liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.

Because of political documents such as these, the notion of natural rights became deeply imbedded in modern moral vocabulary. 18th century political documents and discussions of rights focused principally on a small set of foundational rights, such as life, liberty, and happiness. From these, we were to deduce more specific rights. This strategy is the direct result of natural law theories that articulated a few very general principles of natural law, and stipulated that more specific rules should be deduced from these.

In his *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785), British philosopher William Paley (1743-1805) notes several conceptual distinctions regarding rights, which were common to 18th century discussions of the topic. Paley notes that rights are either natural or adventitious (i.e., non-essential); the distinction here rests on whether rights are created by society. Natural rights include those listed by Locke, and adventitious rights are those which people in power have over subjects. Rights are also alienable or unalienable, that is, transferable or non-transferable. For Paley, rights to specific pieces of property are alienable insofar as they can be taken away. Contrary to Locke, Paley also believes that civil liberties are also alienable to the extent that we can sell our freedoms to tyrants. By contrast, unalienable rights are those that superiors have over subordinates, such as masters over servants. Finally, rights are perfect or imperfect, that is, whether they can or cannot be asserted by force. Perfect rights are those to life and property. Imperfect rights are those to employment or charity, and a child's rights to affection.

CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSIONS. Contemporary rights theorists have developed further analyses of rights. An initial division is between positive and negative rights. Positive rights are rights to benevolent actions from other people, such as rights to food, clothing, and shelter, or the right of an accident victim to be helped. Given the emphasis on benevolence, positive rights are sometimes called welfare rights. Negative rights, by contrast, are rights of noninterference. These include two subgroups of rights: active and passive rights. Active rights (or liberty rights) are rights to do as one chooses. For example, the liberty right of movement entitles me to travel without being chained or locked up. Passive

rights involve the right to let alone, such as the right not to be injured, and the right to keep trespassers off my property.

Today, rights theory continues to have practical political applications, just as it did in the 18th century. The most important example of this is *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* adopted on December 10, 1948, by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Whereas 18th century rights theorists focused on the uncreated or "natural" aspect of rights, thereby terming them "natural rights," the *Universal Declaration* focuses our particular status as humans, thereby terming them "human rights." Many elements of the *Universal Declaration* draw on classic concepts, such as the equality of people, the inalienable nature of rights, and the fact that these rights cut across all political boundaries. However, the *Universal Declaration* also departs from 18th century models. Unlike the 18th century discussions, which - inspired by natural law theory -- articulated only a few rights, the *Universal Declaration* lists dozens of rights. Along with rights to "life, liberty and the security of person," all humans also have specific rights against enslavement, torture, arbitrary arrest, and exile. We have a cluster of rights regarding due process in prosecution, such as the presumption of innocence. There are a series of liberty rights involving the right to movement, to marry, to have a family, to divorce, to freedom of thought, and to religion practice. There are political rights to participate in "genuine elections" and cultural rights to devolop one's personality. Economic rights include the right to work, to favorable pay, to join trade unions, and to paid holidays. We also have welfare rights to social security, to health care, to special assistance for child care, and to free education. Although few if any countries today adequately abide by all of these rights, the *Universal Declaration* sees these as a "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."

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Roman Philosophy

Roman philosophy is thoroughly grounded in the traditions of Greek philosophy. Interest in the subject was first excited at Rome in 155 BCE. by an Athenian embassy, consisting of the Academic Carneades, the Stoic Diogenes, and the Peripatetic Critolaus. Of more permanent influence was the work of the Stoic Panaetius, the friend of the younger Scipio and of Laelius; but a thorough study of Greek philosophy was first introduced in the time of Cicero and Varro. In a number of works they tried to make it accessible even to those of their countrymen who were outside the learned circles. Cicero chiefly took it up in a spirit of eclecticism ; but among his contemporaries Epicureanism is represented in the poetical treatise of Lucretius on the nature of things, and Pythagoreanism by Nigidium Figulus. In Imperial times Epicureanism and Stoicism were most popular, especially the latter, as represented by the writings of Seneca, Cornutus, and the emperor Marcus Aurelius; while Eclectic Platonism was taken up by Apuleius of Madaura. One of the latest philosophical writers of antiquity is Boethius, whose writings were the chief source of information as to Greek philosophy during the first centuries of the Middle Ages.

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Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)

French deistic philosopher and author; b. at Geneva June 28, 1712; d. at Ermenonville (28 m. n.e. of Paris) July 2, 1778. His mother died at his birth, and his father, a dissipated and violent-tempered man, paid little attention to the son's training, and finally deserted him. The latter developed a passion for reading, with a special fondness for Plutarch's *Lives*. Apprenticed first to a notary and then to a coppersmith, he ran away (1728) to escape the rigid discipline, and, after wandering for several days, he fell in with Roman Catholic priests at Consignon in Savoy, who turned him over to Madame de Warens at Annecy, and she sent him to an educational institution at Turin. Here he duly abjured Protestantism, and next served in various households, in one of which he was charged with theft. After more wanderings he was at Chambery (1730), from which Madame de Warens had removed. In her household he spent eight years diverting himself in the enjoyment of nature, the study of music, the reading of the English, German, and French philosophers and chemistry, pursuing the study of mathematics and Latin, and enjoying the playhouse and opera. He next spent eighteen months at Venice as secretary of the French ambassador, Comte de Montaignu (1744-45). Up to this time, when he was thirty-nine, his life, the details of which he publishes in his *Confessions* (Geneva, 1782), may be described as subterranean. He now returned to Paris, where his opera *Les Muses galantes* failed, copied music, and was secretary of Madame Dupin. Here he came into association with Diderot, Grimm, D'Alembert, Holbach, and Madame d'Epinay, and was admitted as a contributor to the *Encyclopedie;* and his gifts of entertainment, reckless manner, and boundless vanity attracted attention. With the *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (Paris, 1750), a prize essay in which he set forth the paradox of the superiority of the savage state, he proclaimed his gospel of "back to nature." His operetta *Devin du village* (1752) met with great success. His second sensational writing appeared*: Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1753), against the inequalities of society. His fame was then assured. In 1754 he revisited Geneva, was received with great acclamation, and called himself henceforth " citizen of Geneva." In 1756, upon invitation of Madame d'Epinay, he retired to a cottage (afterward " The Hermitage ") in the woods of Montmorency, where in the quiet of nature he expected to spend his life; but domestic troubles, his violent passion for Countess d'Houdetot, and Ms morbid mistrust and nervous excitability, which lost him his friends, induced him to change his residence to a chateau in the park of the duke of Luxembourg, Montmorency (1758-62). His famous works appeared during this period: *Lettre à d'Alembert* (Amsterdam, 1758); *Julie ou la nouvelle Heloise* (1761)*; Du Contrat social* (Amsterdam, 1762); and *Emile ou de 1'education* (Amsterdam, 1762). The last-named work was ordered to be burned by the French parliament and his arrest was ordered; but he fled to Neuchatel, then within the jurisdiction of Prussia. Here he wrote his *Lettres ecrites de la Montagne* (Amsterdam, 1762), in which, with reference to the Geneva constitution, he advocated the freedom of religion against the Church and police. Driven thence by peasant attacks (Sept., 1765), he returned to the Isle St. Pierre in the Lake of Bienne. The government of Berne ordered him out of its territory, and he

accepted the asylum offered to him by David Hume in England (Jan., 1766). But his morbid misanthropy, now goaded to an insane sense of being persecuted, made him suspicious of plots, and led him to quarrel with his friends for not making his opponents their own enemies, and he fled to France (1767). After wandering about and depending on friends he was permitted to return to Paris (1770), where he finished the *Confessions* begun in England, and produced many of his best stories. Here he copied notes, and studied music and botany. His dread of secret enemies grew upon his imagination, until he was glad to accept an invitation to retire to Ermenonville (1778), where his death came suddenly.

Rousseau reacted against the artificiality and corruption of the social customs and institutions of the time. He was a keen thinker, and was equipped with the weapons of the philosophical century and with an inspiring eloquence. To these qualities were added a pronounced egotism, self-seeking, and an arrogance that led to bitter antagonism against his revolutionary views and sensitive personality, the reaction against which resulted in a growing misanthropy. Error and prejudice in the name of philosophy, according to him, had stifled reason and nature, and culture, as he found it, had corrupted morals. In *Emile* he presents the ideal citizen and the means of training the child for the State in accordance with nature, even to a sense of God. This "nature gospel" of education, as Goethe called it, was the inspiration, beginning with Pestalozzi, of world-wide pedagogical methods. The most admirable part in this is the creed of the vicar of Savoy, in which, in happy phrase, Rousseau shows a true, natural susceptibility to religion and to God, whose omnipotence and greatness are published anew every day. The *Social Contract*, on the text that all men are born free and equal, regards the State as a contract in which individuals surrender none of their natural rights, but rather agree for the protection of them. Most remarkable in this projected republic was the provision to banish aliens to the state religion and to punish dissenters with death. The *Social Contract* became the text-book of the French Revolution, and Rousseau's theories as protests bore fruit in the frenzied bloody orgies of the Commune as well as in the rejuvenation of France and the history of the entire Western world.

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Rule Utilitarianism

Rule utilitarianism is a formulation utilitarianism which maintains that a behavioral code or rule is morally right if the consequences of adopting that rule are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone. It is contrasted with *act utilitarianism* which maintains that the morality of each action is to be determined in relation to the favorable or unfavorable consequences that emerge from that action. The principle of rule-utilitarianism is a litmus test only for the morality of moral rules, such as "stealing is wrong" and not a test for particular actions. Adopting a rule against theft clearly has more favorable consequences than unfavorable consequences for everyone. The same is true for moral rules against lying or murdering. Rule-utilitarianism, then, offers a three-tiered method for judging conduct. A particular action, such as stealing my neighbor's lawn furniture, is judged wrong since it violates a moral rule against theft. In turn, the rule against theft is morally binding because adopting this rule produces favorable consequences for everyone.

Rule-utilitarianism attempts to avoid some of the problems with act-utilitarianism. For example, with act-utilitarianism it seems that we should have to give up television for charity work if it was determined that each of our leisure moments would yield greater social benefit if we did charity work instead. With rule-utilitarianism, though, a rule a rule prohibiting leisure time is not socially beneficial; hence we are not required to abandon leisure for charity. Similarly, under rule-utilitarianism, enslaving someone would be morally wrong if it was determined that a general rule prohibiting slavery was more socially beneficial. Even if a particular act of enslaving someone produced more benefit for the slave owners than disbenefit for the slave himself, the act would still be wrong since it would violate the rule prohibiting slavery. But by side-stepping the problems of act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism creates a new problem: it is conceivable that, on balance, a rule permitting slavery actually produces more benefit for society.

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Russian Philosophy

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A. Overview of the Problem.

The very notion of Russian philosophy poses a cultural-historical problem. No consensus exists on which works it encompasses and which authors made decisive contributions. To a large degree, a particular ideological conception of Russian philosophy, of what constitutes its essential traits, has driven the choice of inclusions. In turn, the various conceptions have led scholars to locate the start of Russian philosophy at different moments and with different individuals. Among the first to deal with this issue was T. Masaryk, a student of Brentano's and later the first president of the newly formed Czechoslovakia. Masaryk, following the lead of a pioneering Russian scholar E. Radlov (1854-1928), held that Russian thinkers have historically given short shrift to epistemological issues in favor of ethical and political discussions. For Masaryk, even those who were indebted to Kant's ethical teachings, scarcely understood and appreciated his epistemological criticism, which they viewed as essentially subjectivistic. True, Masaryk does comment that the Russian mind is "more inclined" to mythology than the Western European, a position that could lead us to conclude that he viewed the Russian mind as in some way innately different from others. However, he makes clear that the Russian predilection for unequivocal acceptance or total negation of a viewpoint stems, at least to a large degree, from the native Orthodox faith. Church teachings had "accustomed" the Russian mind to accept doctrinaire revelation without criticism. For this reason Masaryk certainly placed the start of Russian philosophy no earlier than the 19th century with the historiosophical musings of P. Chaadaev (1794-1856), who not surprisingly also

pinned blame for the country's position in world affairs on its Orthodox faith.

Others, particularly ethnic Russians, alarmed by what they took to be Masaryk's implicit denigration of their intellectual character have denied that Russian philosophy suffered from a veritable absence of epistemological inquiry. For N. Lossky (1870-1965) Russian philosophers admittedly have, as a rule, sought to relate their investigations, regardless of the specific concern, to ethical problems. This together with a prevalent epistemological view that externality is knowable--and indeed through an immediate grasping or intuition--has given Russian philosophy a form distinct from much of modern Western philosophy. Nevertheless, the relatively late emergence of independent Russian philosophical thought was a result of the medieval "Tatar yoke" and of the subsequent cultural isolation of Russia until Peter the Great's opening to the West. Even then Russian thought remained heavily indebted to developments in Germany until the emergence of 19th century Slavophilism with I. Kireyevsky (1806-56) and A. Khomiakov (1804-60).

Even more emphatically than Lossky, V. Zenkovsky (1881-1962) denied the absence of epistemological inquiry in Russian thought. In his eyes, Russian philosophy rejected the primacy accorded, at least since Kant, to the theory of knowledge over ethical and ontological issues. A widespread, though not unanimous, view among Russian philosophers, according to Zenkovsky, is that knowledge plays but a secondary role in human existential affairs. Yet, whereas many Russians historically have advocated such an ontologism, it is by no means unique to that nation. More characteristic of Russian philosophy, for Zenkovsky, is its anthropocentrism, i.e., a concern with the human condition and humanity's ultimate fate. For this reason, philosophy in Russia has historically been expressed in terms noticeably different from those in the West. Furthermore, like Lossky, Zenkovsky saw the comparatively late development of Russian philosophy as a result of the country's isolation and subsequent infatuation with Western modes of thought until the nineteenth century. Thus, although Zenkovsky placed Kireyevsky only at the "threshold" of a mature, independent "Russian philosophy" (understood as a system), the former believed it possible to trace the first independent stirrings back to G. Skovoroda (1722-94), who, strictly speaking, was the first Russian philosopher.

Largely as a result of rejecting the primacy of epistemology and the Cartesian model of methodological inquiry, Lossky, and Zenkovsky even more, included within "Russian philosophy" figures whose views would hardly qualify for inclusion within contemporary Western treatises in the history of philosophy. During the Soviet period, Russian scholars appealed to the Marxist doctrine linking intellectual thought to the socio-economic base for their own rather broad notion of philosophy. Any attempt at confining their history to what passes for professionalism today in the West was simply dismissed as "bourgeois." In this way, such literary figures as Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy were routinely included in texts, though just as routinely condemned for their own supposedly bourgeois mentality. Western studies devoted to the history of Russian philosophy have largely since their emergence acquiesced in this acceptance of a broad understanding of philosophy. F. Copleston, for example, conceded that "for historical reasons" philosophy in Russia tended to be informed by a socio-political orientation. Such an apology for his book-length study can be seen as somewhat self-serving, since he recognizes that philosophy as a theoretical discipline never flourished in Russia. Likewise, A. Walicki fears viewing the history of Russian philosophy from the contemporary Western technical standpoint would result in an impoverished picture populated with wholly unoriginal authors. Obviously, one cannot write a history of some discipline if that discipline lacks content!

Of those seemingly unafraid to admit the historical poverty of philosophical thought in Russia, G. Shpet

stands out not only for his vast historical erudition but also because of his own original philosophical contributions. Shpet, almost defiantly, characterized the intellectual life of Russia as rooted in an "elemental ignorance." Unlike Masaryk, however, Shpet did not view this dearth as stemming from Russia's Orthodox faith but from his country's linguistic isolation. The adopted language of the Bulgars lacked a cultural and intellectual tradition. Without a heritage by which to appreciate ideas, intellectual endeavors were valued for their utility alone. Although the government saw no practical benefit in it, the Church initially found philosophy useful as a weapon to safeguard its position. This toleration extended no further, and certainly the clerical authorities countenanced no divergence or independent creativity. With Peter the Great's governmental reforms, the state saw the utility of education and championed those and only those disciplines that served a bureaucratic and apologetic function. After the successful military campaign against Napoleon, many young Russian officers had their first experience of Western European culture and returned to Russia with incipient revolutionary ideas that in a relatively short time found expression in the abortive Decembrist Uprising of 1825. Finally, towards the end of the 1830s a new group, a "nihilistic intelligentsia," appeared that preached a toleration of cultural forms, including philosophy, but only insofar as they served the "people." Such was the fate of philosophy in Russia that it was virtually never viewed as anything but a tool or weapon and had to incessantly demonstrate this utility on fear of losing its legitimacy. Shpet concludes that philosophy as knowledge, as being of value for its own sake, was never given a chance.

Regardless of the date from which we place the start of Russian philosophy and its first practitioner--and we will have more to say on this topic as we go--few would dispute the religious orientation of Russian thought prior to Peter the Great and that professional secular philosophy arose comparatively recently in the country's history. If we are to avoid a double standard, one for "Western" thought and another for Russian, which is not merely self-serving but also condescending, we must examine the historical record for indisputable instances of philosophical thought that would be recognized as such regardless of where they originated. Although our inclusions, omissions and evaluations, on the whole, may more closely resemble those of Shpet than, say, Lossky, we thereby need not invoke any metaphysical historical scheme to justify them.

How precisely to subdivide the history of Russian philosophy has also been a subject of some controversy. In his pioneering study from 1898, A. Vvedensky (see below), Russia's foremost neo-Kantian, found three periods up to his time. Of course, in light of 20th century events his list must be revisited, reexamined and expanded. We can readily discern five periods in Russian philosophy, the last of which is still too recent to characterize. Unlike as in most major nations, specific extra-philosophical, viz., political, events clearly played a major if not the sole cause in terminating a period.

B. *Historical Periods*

1. *The Period of Philosophical Remarks (ca. 1755-1825)*

Although one can find scattered remarks of a philosophical nature in Russian writings before the mid-eighteenth century, these are, at best, of marginal interest to the professionally trained philosopher. For the most part these remarks were not intended to stand as rational arguments in support of a position. Even in the ecclesiastic academies, the thin scholastic veneer of the accepted texts was merely a traditional schematic device, a relic from the time when the only appropriate texts available were Western. For whatever reason only with the opening of the nation's first university in Moscow in 1755 do we see the emergence of something resembling philosophy, as we use that term today. Even then, however, the floodgates did not burst wide open. The first occupant of the chair of philosophy, N. Popovsky (1730-1760), was more suited to the teaching of poetry and rhetoric, to which chair he was

shunted after one brief year.

Sensing the dearth of adequately trained native personnel, the government invited two Germans to the university, thus initiating a practice that would continue well into the next century. The story of the first ethnic Russian to hold the professorship in philosophy for any significant length of time is itself indicative of the precarious existence of philosophy in Russia for much of its history. Having already obtained a magister's degree in 1760 with a thesis entitled "Rassuzhdenie o bessmertii dushi chelovechoj" ("A Treatise on the Immortality of the Human Soul"), Dmitry Anichkov (1733-1788) submitted in 1769 a dissertation on natural religion that was found to contain atheistic opinions and was subjected to an 18 year (!) investigation. Legend has it that the dissertation was publicly burned, although there is no firm evidence for this. As was common at the time, Anichkov used Wolffian philosophy manuals and during his first years taught in Latin.

Another notable figure at this time was S. Desnitsky (~1740-1789), who taught jurisprudence at Moscow University. Desnitsky attended university in Glasgow, where he studied under Adam Smith and became familiar with the works of Hume. The influence of Smith and British thought in general is evident in memoranda from February 1768 that Desnitsky wrote on government and public finance. Some of these ideas, in turn, appeared virtually verbatim in a portion of Catherine the Great's famous Nakaz, or Instruction, published in April of that year.

Also in 1768 appeared Ya. Kozelsky's *Filosoficheskie predlozhenija* (*Philosophical Propositions*), an unoriginal but noteworthy collection of numbered statements on a host of topics, not all of which were philosophical in a technical narrow sense. By his own admission the material dealing with "theoretical philosophy" was drawn from the Wolffians, primarily Baumeister, and that dealing with "moral philosophy" from the French Enlightenment thinkers, primarily Rousseau, Montesquieu and Helvetius. The most interesting feature of the treatise is its acceptance of a social contract, of an eight-hour workday, the explicit rejection of great disparities of wealth and its silence on religion as a source of morality. Nevertheless, in his "theoretical philosophy" Kozelsky (1728-1795) rejected atomism and the Newtonian conception of the possibility of empty space.

During Catherine's reign, plans were made to establish several universities in addition to that in Moscow. Of course, nothing came of these. Moscow University itself had a difficult time attracting a sufficient number of students, most of whom came from poorer families. Undoubtedly given the state of the Russian economy and society the virtually ubiquitous attitude was that the study of philosophy was a sheer luxury with no utilitarian value. In terms of general education the government evidently concluded that sending students abroad offered a better investment than spending large sums at home where the infrastructure needed much work and time to develop. Unfortunately, although there were some who returned to Russia and played a role in the intellectual life of the country, many more failed to complete their studies for a variety of reasons including falling into debt. Progress, however, skipped a beat in 1796 when Catherine's son and successor Paul ordered the recall of all Russian students studying abroad.

Despite its relatively small number of educational institutions, Russia felt a need to invite foreign scholars to help staff these establishments. One of the scholars, J. Schaden (1731-97), ran a private boarding school in Moscow in addition to teaching philosophy at the university. The most notorious incident from these early years, however, involves the German Ludwig Mellman, who in the 1790s introduced Kant's thought into Russia. Mellman's advocacy found little sympathy even among his colleagues at Moscow University, and in a report to the Tsar the public prosecutor charged Mellman with

"mental illness." Not only was Mellman dismissed from his position, but he was forced to leave Russia as well.

Under the initiative of the new Tsar, Alexander I, two new universities were opened in 1804 and with them the need for adequately trained professors again arose. Once more the government turned to Germany, and with the dislocations caused by the Napoleonic Wars Russia stood in an excellent position to reap an intellectual harvest. Unfortunately, many of these invited scholars left little lasting impact on Russia thought. For example, one of the most outstanding, Johann Buhle (1763-1821), had already written a number of works on the history of philosophy before taking up residence in Moscow. Yet, once in Russia his literary output plummeted, and his ignorance of the local language certainly did nothing to extend his influence.

Nonetheless, the sudden influx of German scholars, many of whom were intimately familiar with the latest philosophical developments, acted as an intellectual tonic on others. The arrival of the Swiss physicist Franz Bronner (1758-1850) at the new University of Kazan may have introduced Kant's epistemology to the young future mathematician Lobachevsky. The Serb physicist A. Stoikovich (1773-1832), who taught at Kharkov University, prepared a text for class use in which the content was arranged in conformity with Kant's categories. One of the earliest Russian treatments of a philosophical topic, however, was A. Lubkin's two "Pis'ma o kriticheskoj filosofii" ("Letters on Critical Philosophy") from 1805. Lubkin (1770/1-1815), who at the time taught at the Petersburg Military Academy, criticized Kant's theory of space and time for its agnostic implications saying that we obtain our concepts of space and time from experience. Likewise, in 1807 a professor of mathematics at Kharkov University, T. Osipovsky (1765-1832), delivered a subsequently published speech "O prostranstve i vremeni" ("On Space and Time"), in which he questioned whether, given the various considerations, Kant's position was the only logical conclusion possible. Assuming the Leibnizian notion of a preestablished harmony, we can uphold all of Kant's specific observations concerning space and time without concluding that they exist solely within our cognitive faculty. Osipovsky went on to make a number of other perceptive criticisms of Kant's position, though Kant's German critics already voiced many of these during his lifetime.

In the realm of social and political philosophy, as understood today, the most interesting and arguably the most sophisticated document from the period of the Russian Enlightenment is A. Kunitsyn's *Pravo estestvennoe* (*Natural Law*). In his summary text consisting of 590 sections, Kunitsyn (1783-1840) clearly demonstrated the influence of Kant and Rousseau, holding that rational dictates concerning human conduct form moral imperatives, which we feel as obligations. Since each of us possesses reason, we must always be treated morally as ends, never as means toward an end. In subsequent paragraphs, Kunitsyn elaborated his conception of natural rights including his belief that among these rights is freedom of thought and expression. His outspoken condemnation of serfdom, however, is not one that the Russian authorities could either have missed or passed over. Shortly after the text reached their attention all attainable copies were confiscated, and Kunitsyn himself was dismissed from his teaching duties at St. Petersburg University in March 1821.

Another scholar associated with St. Petersburg University was Aleksandr I. Galich (1783-1848). Sent to Germany for further education, he there became acquainted with Schelling's thought. With his return to Russia in 1813 he was appointed adjunct professor of philosophy at the Pedagogical Institute in St. Petersburg, and when in 1819 it was transformed into a university Galich was named to the chair of philosophy. His teaching career, however, was short-lived, for in 1821 Galich was charged with atheism

and revolutionary sympathies. Although stripped of teaching duties, he continued to draw a full salary until 1837. Galich's importance lays not so much in his own quasi-Schellingian views as his pioneering treatments of the history of philosophy, aesthetics and philosophical anthropology. His two-volume *Istorija filosofskikh sistem* (*History of Philosophical Systems*) from 1818-19 concluded with an exposition of Schelling's position and contained quite probably the first discussion in Russian of Hegel and, in particular, of his *Science of Logic*. Galich's *Opyt nauki izjashchnogo* (*An Attempt at a Science of the Beautiful*) from 1825 is certainly among the first Russian treatises in aesthetics. For Galich the beautiful is the sensuous manifestation of truth and as such is a sub-discipline within philosophy. His 1834 work *Kartina cheloveka* (*A Picture of Man*) marked the first Russian foray into philosophical anthropology. For Galich all "scientific" disciplines, including theology, are in need of an anthropological foundation, and, moreover, such a foundation must recognize the unity of the human aspects and functions be they corporeal or spiritual.

The increasing religious and political conservativism that marked Tsar Alexander's later years imposed onerous restrictions on the dissemination of philosophy both in the classroom and in print. By the time of the Tsar's death in 1825, most reputable professors of philosophy had already been administratively silenced or cowed into compliance. At the end of that year the aborted coup known as the Decembrist Uprising, many of whose leaders had been exposed to the infection of Western European thought, only hardened the basically anti-intellectual attitude of the new Tsar Nicholas. Shortly after I. Davydov (1792/4-1863), hardly either an original or a gifted thinker, had given his introductory lecture "O vozmozhnosti filosofii kak nauki" ("On the Possibility of Philosophy as Science") in May 1826 as professor of philosophy at Moscow University, the chair was temporarily abolished and Davydov shifted to teaching mathematics.

2. *The Philosophical Dark Age (ca. 1825-1860)*

The reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855) was marked by intellectual obscurantism and an enforced philosophical silence, unusual even by Russian standards. The Minister of Public Education, A. Shishkov, blamed the Decembrist Uprising explicitly on the contagion of foreign ideas. To prevent their spread he and Nicholas's other advisors restricted the access of non-noble youths to higher education and had the tsar enact a comprehensive censorship law that held publishers legally responsible even after the official censor's approval of a manuscript. Yet the scope of this new "cast-iron statute" was conceived so broadly that even at the time it was remarked that the Lord's Prayer could be interpreted as revolutionary speech. Prevented an outlet in a dedicated professional manner at the universities, philosophy found energetic though amateurish expression first in the faculties of medicine and physics and then later in fashionable salons and social gatherings, where discipline, rigor and precision were held of little value. During these years, those empowered to teach philosophy at the universities struggled with the task of justifying the very existence of their discipline not in terms of a search for truth, but as having some social utility. Given the prevailing climate of opinion, this proved to be a hard sell. The news of revolutions in Western Europe in 1848 was the last straw. All talk of reform and social change was simply ruled impermissible, and travel beyond the Empire's borders was forbidden. Finally, in 1850, the minister of education took the step that was thought too extreme in the 1820s: To protect Russia from the latest philosophical systems--and therefore intellectual infection--the teaching of philosophy in public universities was simply to be eliminated. Logic and psychology were permitted but only in the safe hands of theology professors. This situation persisted until 1863, when in the aftermath of the humiliating Crimean War philosophy reentered the public academic arena. Even then, however, severe restrictions on its teaching persisted until 1889!

Nevertheless, despite the oppressive atmosphere some independent philosophizing emerged during the Nicholas years. True, at first Schelling's influence dominated abstract discussions, particularly those concerning the natural sciences and their place vis-a-vis the other academic disciplines. However, the two chief Schellingians of the era, D. Vellansky (1774-1847) and M. Pavlov (1793-1840), both valued German Romanticism more for its sweeping conclusions than for either its arguments or as the logical outcome of a philosophical development that had begun with Kant. Though both Vellansky and Pavlov penned a considerable number of works, none of them would find a place within today's philosophy curriculum. Slightly later, in the 1830s and '40s, the discussion turned to Hegel's system, again with great enthusiasm but with little understanding either with what Hegel actually meant or the philosophical backdrop of his writings. Not surprisingly Hegel's own self-described "voyage of discovery," the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, remained an unknown text. Suffice it to say that but for the dearth of original competent investigations at this time, the mere mention of the Stankevich and the Petrashevsky circles, the Slavophiles and the Westernizers, etc. in a history of philosophy text would be regarded a travesty.

Nevertheless, amid the darkness of official obscurantism there were a few brief glimmers of light. In his 1833 *Vvedenie v nauku filosofii* (*Introduction to the Science of Philosophy*) F. Sidonsky (1805-1873) treated philosophy as a rational discipline independent of theology. Although conterminous with theology, Sidonsky regarded philosophy as both a necessary and a natural searching of the human mind for answers that faith alone cannot adequately supply. By no means did he take this to mean that reason and faith conflict. Revelation provides the same truths but the path taken, though dogmatic and therefore rationally unsatisfying, is considerably shorter. Much more could be said about Sidonsky's introductory text, but both it and its author were quickly consigned to the margins of history. Notwithstanding his book's desired recognition in some secular circles, Sidonsky soon after its publication was shifted first from philosophy to the teaching of French and then simply dismissed from the St. Petersburg Ecclesiastic Academy in 1835. This time it was the clerical authorities who found his book, it was said, insufficiently rigorous from the official religious standpoint. Sidonsky spent the next 30 years, that is, until the re-introduction of philosophy in the universities, as a parish priest in the Russian capital.

Among those who most resolutely defended the autonomy of philosophy during this "Dark Age" were O. Novitsky (1806-1884) and I. Mikhnevich (1809-1885), both of whom taught for a period at the Kiev Ecclesiastic Academy. Although neither was a particularly outstanding thinker and left no enduring works on the perennial philosophical problems, both stand out for refusing simply to subsume philosophy to religion or politics. Novitsky in 1834 accepted the professorship in philosophy at the new Kiev University, where he taught until the government's abolition of philosophy, after which he worked as a censor. Mikhnevich, on the other hand, became an administrator.

One of the most interesting pieces of philosophical analysis from this time came from another Kiev scholar, S. Gogotsky (1813-1889). In his undergraduate thesis "Kriticheskij vzgljad na filosofiju Kanta" ("A Critical Look at Kant's Philosophy") from 1847, Gogotsky approached his topic from a moderate and informed Hegelianism, unlike that of his more vocal but dilettantish contemporaries. For Gogotsky, Kant's thought represented a distinct improvement over the positions of empiricism and rationalism. However, his advocacy of such ideas as that of the uncognizability of things in themselves, the rejection of the real existence of things in space and time, the sharp dichotomy between moral duty and happiness, etc. demonstrated his own extremism. During this "Dark Age," Gogotsky continued at Kiev University but taught pedagogy and remained silent on philosophical issues.

From our standpoint today one of the most important characteristics of the philosophizing of the early

"Kiev School" is the stress placed on the history of Western philosophy and particularly on epistemology. Mikhnevich, for example, wrote, "philosophy is the Science of consciousness...of the subject and the nature of our consciousness." Based on statements such as this, some (A.Vvedensky, A. Nikolsky) have seen the influence of Fichte.

The teaching of philosophy at this time was not eliminated from the ecclesiastic academies, the separate institutions of higher education parallel to the secular universities for those from a clerical background. Largely with good reason, the government felt secure about their political and intellectual passivity. Among the most noteworthy of the professors at an ecclesiastic academy during the Nicholaevan years was F. Golubinsky (1798-1854), who taught in Moscow. Generally recognized as the founder of the "Moscow School of Theistic Philosophy," his historical importance lies solely in his unabashed subordination of philosophy to theology and epistemology to ontology. For Golubinsky, humans seek knowledge in an attempt to recover an original diremption, a lost intimacy with the Infinite! Nevertheless, the idea of God is felt immediately within us. Owing to this immediacy, there is no need for and cannot be a proof of God's existence. Such was the tenor of "philosophical" thought in the religious institutions of the time.

At the very end of the "Dark Age" one figure--the Owl of Minerva or was it a phoenix?--emerged who combined the scholarly erudition of his Kiev predecessors with the dominating "ontologism" of the theistic apologists, such as Golubinsky. P. Jurkevich (1826-1874) stood with one foot in the Russian philosophical past and one in the future. Serving as the bridge between the eras, he largely defined the contours along which philosophical discussions would be shaped for the next two generations.

3. *The Emergence of Russian Professional Philosophy (ca. 1860-1917)*

While a professor of philosophy at the Kiev Ecclesiastic Academy, Jurkevich in 1861 caught the attention of a well-connected publisher with a long essay in the obscure house organ of the Academy attacking Chernyshevsky's materialism and anthropologism, which at the time were all the rage among Russia's youth. Having decided to re-introduce philosophy to the universities, the government, nevertheless, worried lest a limited and controlled measure of independent thought get out of hand. The decision to appoint Jurkevich to the professorship at Moscow University, it was hoped, would serve the government's ends while yet combating fashionable radical trends.

In a spate of articles from his last three years in Kiev, Jurkevich forcefully argued in support of a number of seemingly disconnected theses but all of which demonstrated his own deep commitment to a Platonic idealism. His most familiar stance, his rejection of the popular materialism of the day, was directed not actually at metaphysical materialism but at a physicalist reductionism. Among the points Jurkevich made was that no physiological description could do justice to the revelations offered by introspective psychology and that the transformation of quantity into quality occurred not in the subject, as the materialists held, but in the interaction between the object and the subject. Jurkevich did not rule out the possibility that necessary forms conditioned this interaction, but, in keeping with the logic of this notion, he ruled out an uncognizable "thing in itself" conceived as an object without any possible subject.

Although Jurkevich already presented the scheme of his overall philosophical approach in his first article "Ideja" ("The Idea") from 1859, his last, "Razum po ucheniju Platona i opyt po ucheniju Kanta" ("Plato's Theory of Reason and Kant's Theory of Experience"), written in Moscow, is today his most readable work. In it he concluded, as did Spinoza and Hegel before him, that epistemology cannot serve as first philosophy, i.e., that a body of knowledge need not and, indeed, cannot begin by asking for the

conditions of its own possibility. In Jurkevich's best-known expression: "In order to know it is unnecessary to have knowledge of knowledge itself." Kant, he held, conceived knowledge not in the traditional, Platonic sense as knowledge of what truly is, but in a radically different sense as knowledge of the universally valid. Hence, for Kant, the goal of science was to secure useful information, whereas for Plato science secured truth.

Unfortunately, Jurkevich's style prevented a greater dissemination of his views. In his own day, his unfashionable views, cloaked as they were in scholastic language with frequent allusions to scripture, hardly endeared him to a young, secular audience. Jurkevich remained largely a figure of derision at the university. Today, it is these same qualities, together with his failure to elucidate his argument in distinctly rational terms, that make studying his writings both laborious and unsatisfying. In terms of immediate impact, he had only one student--Vladimir Solovyov. Yet, notwithstanding his meager direct impact Jurkevic's Christian Platonism proved deeply influential until at least the Bolshevik Revolution.

Unlike Jurkevich, P. Lavrov (1823-1900), a teacher of mathematics at the Petersburg Military Academy, actively aspired to a university chair in philosophy, viz., the one in the capital when the position was restored in the early 1860s. However, the government apparently already suspected Lavrov of questionable allegiance and, despite a recommendation from a widely respected scholar (K. Kavelin), awarded the position instead to Sidonsky.

In a series of lengthy essays written when he had university aspirations, Lavrov developed a position, which he termed "anthropologism," that opposed metaphysical speculation, including the then-fashionable materialism of left-wing radicalism. Instead, he defended a simple epistemological phenomenalism that at many points bore a certain similarity to Kant's position though without the latter's intricacies, nuances and rigor. Essentially, Lavrov maintained that all claims regarding objects are translatable into statements about appearances or an aggregate of them. Additionally, he held that we have a collection of convictions concerning the external world, convictions whose basis lies in repeated experiential encounters with similar appearances. The indubitability of consciousness and our irresistible conviction in the reality of the external world are fundamental and irreducible. The error of both materialism and idealism fundamentally in the mistaken attempt to collapse one into the other. Since both are fundamental, the attempt to prove either is ill-conceived from the outset. Consistent with this skepticism, Lavrov argued that the study of "phenomena of consciousness," a "phenomenology of spirit," could be raised to a science only through introspection, a method he called "subjective." Likewise, the natural sciences, built on our firm belief in the external world, need little support from philosophy. To question the law of causality, for example, is, in effect, to undermine the scientific standpoint.

Parallel to the two principles of theoretical philosophy, Lavrov spoke of two principles underlying practical philosophy. The first is that the individual is consciously free in his worldly activity. Unlike for Kant, however, this principle is not a postulate but a phenomenal fact; it carries no theoretical implications. For Lavrov, the moral sphere is quite autonomous from the theoretical. The second principle is that of "ideal creation." Just as in the theoretical sphere we set ourselves against a real world, so in the practical sphere we set ourselves against ideals. Just as the real world is the source of knowledge, the world of our ideals serves as the motivation for action. In turning our own image of ourselves into an ideal, we create an ideal of personal dignity. Initially, the human individual conceives dignity along egoistic lines. In time, however, the individual's interaction, including competition, with others gives rise to his conception of them as having equal claims to dignity and to rights. In linking rights to human dignity, Lavrov thereby denied that animals have rights.

Of a similar intellectual bent, N. Mikhailovsky (1842-1904) was even more of a popular writer than Lavrov. Nevertheless, Mikhailovsky's importance in the history of Russian philosophy lies in his defense of the role of subjectivity in human studies. Unlike the natural sciences, the aim of which is the discovery of objective laws, the human sciences, according to Mikhailovsky, must take into account the epistemologically irreducible fact of conscious, goal-oriented activity. While not disclaiming the importance of objective laws, both Lavrov and Mikhailovsky held that the social scientist must introduce a subjective, moral evaluation into his analyses. Unlike the natural scientist, the social scientist recognizes the malleability of the laws under his investigation.

Comtean positivism, which for quite some years enjoyed considerable attention in 19th century Russia, found its most resolute and philosophically notable defender in V. Lesevich (1837-1905). Finding that it lacked a scientific grounding, Lesevich believed that positivism needed an inquiry into the principles that guide the attainment of knowledge. Such an inquiry must take for granted some body of knowledge without simply identifying itself with it. To the now-classic Hegelian charge that such a procedure amounted to not venturing into the water before learning how to swim, Lesevich replied that what was sought was not how to swim but, rather, the conditions that make swimming possible. In this vein he consciously turned to the Kantian model while remaining highly critical of any talk of an a priori. In the end, Lesevich drew heavily upon psychology and empiricism for establishing the conditions of knowledge, thus leaving himself open to the charge of psychologism and relativism.

As the years passed, Lesevich moved from his early "critical realism," which abhorred metaphysical speculation, to an appreciation for the positivism of Avenarius and Mach. However, this very abhorrence, which was decidedly unfashionable, as well as his political involvement somewhat limited his influence. Undoubtedly, of the philosophical figures to emerge in the 1870s, indeed arguably in any decade, the greatest was V. Solovyov (1853-1900). In fact, if we view philosophy not as an abstract, independent inquiry but as a more or less sustained intellectual conversation, then we can precisely date the start of Russian secular philosophy--24 November 1874, the day of Solovyov's defense of his magister's dissertation, *Krizis zapadnoj filosofii* (*The Crisis of Western Philosophy*). For only from that day forward do we find a sustained discussion within Russia of philosophical issues considered on their own terms, that is, without overt appeal to their extra-philosophical ramifications, such as their religious or political implications.

Concerning Solovyov, I will limit myself here to a few lines. After completion and defense of his magister's dissertation, Solovyov penned a highly metaphysical treatise entitled "Filosofskie nachala tsel'nogo znanija" ("Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge"), which he never completed. However, at approximately the same time he also worked on what became his doctoral dissertation, *Kritika otvlechennykh nachal* (*Critique of Abstract Principles*). the very title suggesting a Kantian influence. Although originally intended to consist of three parts, one each covering ethics, epistemology and aesthetics, the completed work omitted the latter. For more than a decade Solovyov remained silent on philosophical questions, preferring instead to concentrate on topical issues. When his interest was rekindled in the 1890s in preparing a second edition of his *Kritika*, a recognition of a fundamental shift in his views led him to recast their systemization in the form of an entirely new work, *Opravdanie dobra* (*The Justification of the Good*). Presumably, he intended follow up his ethical investigations with respective treatises on epistemology and aesthetics. Unfortunately, Solovyov died having completed only three brief chapters of the "Theoretical Philosophy."

Solovyov's most relentless philosophical critic was B. Chicherin (1828-1904), certainly one of the most

remarkable and versatile figures in Russian intellectual history. Despite his sharp differences with Solovyov, Chicherin himself accepted a modified Hegelian standpoint in metaphysics. Although viewing all of existence as rational, the rational process embodied in existence unfolds "dialectically." Chicherin, however, parted with the traditional triadic schematization of the Hegelian dialectic, arguing that the first moment consists of an initial unity of the one and the many. The second and third moments, paths or steps are antithetical and take various forms in different spheres, such as matter and reason or universal and particular. The final moment is a fusion of the two into a higher unity.

In the social and ethical realm, Chicherin placed great emphasis on individual human freedom. Social and political laws should strive for morally neutrality, permitting the flowering of individual self-determination. In this way, he remained a staunch advocate of economic liberalism, seeing essentially no role for government intervention. The government itself had no right to use its powers either to aim at a moral ideal or to force its citizens to seek an ideal. On the other hand, the government should not use its powers to prevent the citizenry from the exercise of private morality. Despite receiving less treatment than the negative conception of freedom, Chicherin, nevertheless, upheld the idealist conception of positive freedom as the striving for moral perfection and in this way reaching the Absolute.

Another figure to emerge in the late 1870s and 1880s was the neo-Leibnizian A. Kozlov (1831-1901), who taught at Kiev University and who called his highly developed metaphysical stance "panpsychism." As part of this stance, he, in contrast to Hume, argued for the substantial unity of the Self or I, which makes experience possible. This unity he held to be an obvious fact. Additionally, rejecting the independent existence of space and time, Kozlov held that they possessed being only in relation to thinking and sensing creatures. Like Augustine, however, Kozlov believed that God viewed time as a whole without our divisions into past, present and future. To substantiate space and time, to attribute an objective existence to either, begs an answer to where and when to place them. Indeed, the very formulation of the problem presupposes a relation between a substantiated space or time and our selves. Lastly, unlike Kant, Kozlov thought all judgments are analytic.

An unfortunately largely neglected figure to emerge in this period was M. Karinsky (1840-1917), who taught philosophy at the St. Petersburg Ecclesiastic Academy. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Karinsky devoted much of his attention to logic and an analysis of arguments in Western philosophy, rather than metaphysical speculation. Unlike his contemporaries, Karinsky came to philosophy with an analytical bent rather than with a literary flair--a fact that made his writing style often decidedly torturous. True to those schooled in the Aristotleian tradition, Karinsky, like Brentano, to whom he has been compared, held that German Idealism was essentially irrationalist. Arguing against Kant, Karinsky believed that our inner states are not merely phenomenal, that the reflective self is not an appearance. Inner experience, unlike outer, yields no distinction between reality and appearance. In his general epistemology, Karinsky argued that knowledge was built on judgments, which were legitimate conclusions from premises. Knowledge, however, could be traced back to a set of ultimate unprovable, yet reliable, truths, which he called "self-evident." Karinsky argued for a pragmatic interpretation of realism, saying that something exists in another room unperceived by me means I would perceive it if I were to go into that room. Additionally, he accepted an analogical argument for the existence of other minds similar to that of Mill and Russell.

In his two-volume magnum opus *Polozhitel'nye zadachi filosofii* (*The Positive Tasks of Philosophy*), L. Lopatin (1855-1920), who taught at Moscow University, defended the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, claiming that empirical knowledge is limited to appearances, whereas metaphysics yields

knowledge of the true nature of things. Although Lopatin saw Hegel and Spinoza as the definitive expositors of rationalistic idealism, he rejected both for their very transformation of concrete relations into rational or logical ones. Nevertheless, Lopatin affirmed the role of reason particularly in philosophy in conscious opposition to, as he saw it, Solovyov's ultimate surrender to religion. In the first volume, he attacked materialism as itself a metaphysical doctrine that elevates matter to the status of an absolute that cannot explain the particular properties of individual things or the relation between things and consciousness. In his second volume, Lopatin distinguishes mechanical causality from "creative causality," according to which one phenomenon follows another, though with something new added to it. Despite his wealth of metaphysical speculation, quite foreign to most contemporary readers, Lopatin's observations on the self or ego derived from speculation that is not without some interest. Denying that the self has a purely empirical nature, Lopatin emphasized that the undeniable reality of time demonstrated the non-temporality of the self, for temporality could only be understood by that which is outside time. Since the self is extra-temporal, it cannot be destroyed, for that is an event in time. Likewise, in opposition to Solovyov, Lopatin held that the substantiality of the self is immediately evident in consciousness.

In the waning years of the 19th century, neo-Kantianism came to dominate German philosophy. Because of the increasing tendency to send young Russian graduate students to Germany for additional training, it should come as no surprise that that movement gained a foothold in Russia too. In one of the very few Russian works devoted to philosophy of science A. Vvedensky (1856-1925) presented, in his lengthy dissertation, a highly idealistic Kantian interpretation of the concept of matter as understood in the physics of his day. He tried therein to defend and update Kant's own work as exemplified in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Vvedensky's book, however, attracted little attention and exerted even less influence. Much more widely recognized were his own attempts in subsequent years, while teaching at St. Petersburg University, to recast Kant's transcendental idealism in, what he called, "logicism." Without drawing any conclusions based upon the nature of space and time, Vvedensky believed it possible to prove the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge and, as a corollary so to speak, that everything we know, including our own self, is merely an appearance, not a thing in itself. Vvedensky was also willing to cede that the time and the space in which we experience everything in the world are also phenomenal. Although metaphysical knowledge is impossible, metaphysical hypotheses, being likewise irrefutable, can be brought into a world-view based on faith. Particularly useful are those demanded by our moral tenets such as the existence of other minds.

The next two decades saw a blossoming of academic philosophy on a scale hardly imaginable just a short time earlier. Most fashionable Western philosophies of the time found adherents within the increasingly professional Russian scene. Even Nietzsche's thought began to make inroads, particularly among certain segments of the artistic community and among the growing number of political radicals. Nonetheless, few, particularly during these formative years, adopted any Western system without significant qualifications. Even those who were most receptive to foreign ideas adapted them in line with traditional Russian concerns, interests and attitudes. One of these traditional concerns was with Platonism in general. Some of Plato's dialogues appeared in a Masonic journal as early as 1777, and we can easily discern an interest in Plato's ideas as far back as the medieval period. Possibly the Catholic assimilation of Aristotelianism had something to do with the Russian Orthodox Church's emphasis on Plato. And again possibly this interest in Plato had something to do with the metaphysical and idealistic character of much classic Russian thought as against the decidedly more empirical character of many Western philosophies. We have already noted the Christian Platonism of Jurkevich, and his student Solovyov,

who with his central concept of "vseedinstvo" ("total-unity") can, in turn, also be seen as a modern neo-Platonist.

In the immediate decades preceding the Bolshevik Revolution, a veritable legion of philosophers worked in Solovyov's wide shadow. Among the most prominent of these was S. Trubetskoi (1862-1905). The Platonic strain of his thought is evident in the very topics Trubetskoi chose for his magister's and doctoral theses: *Metaphysics in Ancient Greece*, 1890 and *The History of the Doctrine of Logos*, 1900 respectively. It is, however, in his programmatic essays "O prirode chelovecheskovo soznanija" ("The Nature of Human Consciousness"), 1889-1891 and "Osnovanija idealizma" ("The Foundations of Idealism"), 1896 that Trubetskoi elaborated his position vis-a-vis modern philosophy. Holding that the basic problem of contemporary philosophy is whether human knowledge is of a personal nature, Trubetskoi maintained that modern Western philosophers relate personal knowledge to a personal consciousness. Herein lies their error. Human consciousness is not an individual consciousness, but, rather, an on-going universal process. Likewise, this process is a manifestation not of a personal mind but of a cosmic one. Personal consciousness, as he puts it, presupposes a collective consciousness, and the latter presupposes an absolute consciousness. Kant's great error was in conceiving the transcendental consciousness as subjective. In the second of the essays mentioned above, Trubetskoi claims that there are three means of knowing reality: empirically through the senses, rationally through thought, and directly through faith. For him, faith is what convinces us that there is an external world, a world independent of my subjective consciousness. It is faith that underlies our accepting the information provided by our sense organs as reliable. Moreover, it is faith that leads me to think there are in the world other beings with a mental organization and capacity similar to mine. However, Trubetskoi rejects equating his notion of faith with the passive "intellectual intuition" of Schelling and Solovyov. For Trubetskoi, faith is intimately connected with the will, which is the basis of my individuality. My discovery of the other is grounded in my desire to reach out beyond myself, i.e., to love.

Although generally characterized as a neo-Leibnizian, N. Lossky (1870-1965) was also greatly influenced by a host of Russian thinkers including Solovyov and Kozlov. In addition to his own views, Lossky, having studied at Bern and Goettingen among other places, is remembered for his pioneering studies of contemporary German philosophy. He referred to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* already as early as 1906, and in 1911 he gave a course on Husserl's "intentionalism." Despite this early interest in strict epistemological problems, Lossky in general drew ever closer to the ontological concerns and positions of Russian Orthodoxy. He termed his epistemological views "intuitivism," believing that the cognitive subject apprehends the external world as it is in itself directly. Nevertheless, the object of cognition remains ontologically transcendent, while epistemologically immanent. This direct penetration into reality is possible, Lossky tells us, because all worldly entities are interconnected into an "organic whole." Additionally, all sensory properties of an object, e.g., its color, texture, temperature, etc., are actual properties of the object, our sense stimulation serving merely to direct our mental attention to those properties. That different people see one object in different ways is explained as a result of different ways individuals have of getting their attention directly towards one of the object's numerous properties. All entities, events and relations that lack a temporal and spatial character possess "ideal being" and are the objects of "intellectual intuition." Yet, there is another, a third, realm of being that transcends the laws of logic (here we see the influence of Lossky's teacher, Vvedensky), which he calls "metalogical being" and is the object of mystical intuition.

Another kindred spirit was S. Frank (1877-1950), who in his early adult years was involved with Marxism and political activities. His magister's thesis *Predmet znanija* (*The Object of Knowledge*), 1915,

is notable as much for its masterful handling of current Western philosophy as for its overall metaphysical position. Demonstrating a grasp not only of German neo-Kantianism, Frank drew freely from, among many others, Bergson, Husserl, and Scheler and possibly may have been the first in Russian to refer to Frege, whose Foundations of Arithmetic Frank calls "one of the rare genuinely philosophical works by a mathematician." Frank contends that all logically determined objects are possible thanks to a metalogical unity, which is itself not subject to the laws of logic. Likewise all logical knowledge is possible thanks solely to an "intuition," an "integral intuition," of this unity. Such intuition is possible because all of us are part of this unity or Absolute. In a subsequent book *Nepostizhimoe* (*The Unknowable*), 1939, Frank further elaborated his view stating that mystical experience reveals the supra-logical sphere in which we are immersed but which cannot be conceptually described. Although there is a great deal more to Frank's thought, we see that we are quickly leaving behind the secular, philosophical sphere for the religious, if not mystical.

No survey, however brief, of Russian thinkers under Solovyov's influence would be satisfactory without mention of the best known of these in the West, namely N. Berdjaev (1874-1948). Widely hailed as a Christian existentialist, he began his intellectual journey as a Marxist. However, by the time of his first publications he was attempting to unite a revolutionary political outlook with transcendental idealism, particularly a Kantian ethic. Within the next few years Berdjaev's thought evolved quickly decisively away from Marxism and away from critical idealism to an outright Orthodox Christian idealism. On the issue of free will versus determinism, Berdjaev moved from an initial acceptance of soft determinism to a resolute incompatibilist. Morality, he claimed, demanded his stand. Certainly, Berdjaev was among the first, if not the first, philosopher of his era to diminish the importance of epistemology in place of ontology. In time, however, he himself made clear that the pivot of his thought was not the concept of Being, as it would be for some others, and even less that of knowledge, but, rather, the concept of freedom. Acknowledging his debt to Kant, Berdjaev too saw science as providing knowledge of phenomenal reality but not of actuality, of things as they are in themselves. However applicable the categories of logic and physics may be to appearances, they are assuredly inapplicable to the noumenal world and, in particular, to God. In this way Berdjaev does not object to the neo-Kantianism of Vvedensky, for whom the objectification of the world is a result of functioning of the human cognitive apparatus, but only that it does not go far enough. There is another world or realm, namely one characterized by freedom.

Just as all of the above figures drew inspiration from Christian neo-Platonism, so too did they all feel the need to address the Kantian heritage. Lossky's dissertation *Obosnovanie intuitivizma* (*The Foundations of Intuitivism*), for example, is an extended engagement with Kant's epistemology, Lossky himself having prepared a Russian translation of the "First Critique" comparable in style and adequacy to Kemp Smith's rendering into English. Trubetskoi called Kant the "Copernicus of modern philosophy", who "discovered that there is an a priori precondition of all possible experience." Nevertheless, among the philosophers of this era not all saw transcendental idealism as a springboard to religious and mystical thought. A student of Vvedensky's, I. Lapshin (1870-1952) in his dissertation, *Zakony myshlenija i formy poznanija* (*The Laws of Thought and the Forms of Cognition*), 1906, attempted to show that, contrary to Kant's stand, space and time were categories of cognition and that all thought, even logical, relies on a categorical synthesis. Consequently, the laws of logic are themselves synthetic, not analytic, as Kant had thought and are applicable only within the bounds of possible experience.

G. Chelpanov (1863-1936), who taught at Moscow University, was another with a broadly conceived Kantian stripe. Remembered as much, if not more so, for his work in experimental psychology as in

philosophy, Chelpanov, unlike many others, wished to retain the concept of the thing-in-itself, seeing it as that which ultimately "evokes" a particular representation of an object. Without it, contended Chelpanov, we are left (as in Kant) without an explanation of why we perceive this, and not that, particular object. In much the same manner, we must appeal to some transcendent space in order to account for why we see an object in this spot and not another. For these reasons Chelpanov called his position "critical realism" as opposed to the more usual construal of Kantianism as "transcendental idealism." In psychology, Chelpanov upheld Wundt's psychophysical parallelism.

As the years of the First World War approached, a new generation of scholars came to the fore who returned to Russia from graduate work in Germany broadly sympathetic to one or even an amalgam of the schools of neo-Kantianism. Among these young scholars the works of B. Kistjakovsky (1868-1920) and P. Novgorodtsev (1866-1924) stand out as, arguably, the most accessible today for their analytic approach to questions of social-science methodology.

During this period, Husserlian phenomenology was introduced into Russia from a number of sources, but its first and, in a sense, only major propagandist was G. Shpet (1879-1937), whom we have referred to earlier. In any case, besides his historical studies Shpet did pioneering work in hermeneutics as early as 1918. Additionally, in two memorable essays he respectively argued, along the lines of the early Husserl and the late Solovyov, against the Husserlian view of the transcendental ego and in the other traced the Husserlian notion of philosophy as a rigorous science back to Parmenides.

Regrettably, Shpet was permanently silenced during the Stalinist era, but A. Losev (1893-1988), whose early works fruitfully employed some early phenomenological techniques, survived and blossomed in its aftermath. Concentrating on ancient Greek thought, particularly aesthetics, his numerous publications have yet to be assimilated into world literature, although during later years his enormous contributions were recognized within his homeland and by others to whom they were linguistically accessible. It must be said, nonetheless, that Losev's personal pronouncements hark back to a neo-Platonism completely at odds with the modern temperament.

4. *Russian Philosophy during the Soviet Era (1917-1991)*

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 ushered in a political regime with a set ideology that countenanced no intellectual competition. During the first few years of its existence, Bolshevik attention was directed towards consolidating political power, and the selection of university personnel in many cases was left an internal matter. In 1922, however, most explicitly non-Marxist philosophers who had not already fled were banished from the country. Many of them found employment, at least for a time, in the major cities of Europe and continued their personal intellectual agendas. None of them, however, during their lifetimes significantly influenced philosophical developments either in their homeland or in the West and few, with the notable exception of Berdyaev, received wide recognition.

During the first decade of Bolshevik rule the consuming philosophical question concerned the role of Marxism vis-a-vis traditional academic disciplines, particularly those that had either emerged since Marx's death or had seen recent breathtaking developments that had reshaped the field. The best known dispute occurred between the "mechanists" and the "dialecticians" or "Deborinists," after its principal advocate A. Deborin (1881-1963). Since a number of individuals composed both groups and the issues in dispute evolved over time, no simple statement of the respective stances can do complete justice to either. Nevertheless, the mechanists essentially held that philosophy as a separate discipline had no raison d'etre within the Soviet state. All philosophical problems could and would be resolved by the

natural sciences. The hallowed dialectical method of Marxism was, in fact, just the scientific method. The Deborinists, on the other hand, defended the existence of philosophy as a separate discipline. Indeed, they viewed the natural sciences as built on a set of philosophical principles. Unlike the mechanists, they saw nature as fundamentally dialectical, which could not be reduced to simpler mechanical terms. Even human history and society proceeded dialectically in taking leaps that resulted in qualitatively different states. The specifics of the controversy, which raged until 1929, are of marginal philosophical importance now, but to some degree the basic issue of the relation of philosophy to the sciences, of the role of the former vis-a-vis the latter, endures to this day. Regrettably, politics played as much of a role in the course of the dispute as abstract reasoning, and the outcome was a simple matter of a political fiat with the Deborinists gaining a temporary victory. Subsequent events over the next two decades, such as the defeat of the Deborinists, have nothing to do with philosophy. What philosophy did continue to be pursued during these years within Russia was kept a personal secret, any disclosure of which was at the expense of one's life. To a certain degree, the issue of the role of philosophy arose again in the 1950s when the philosophical implications of relativity theory became a disputed subject. Again, the issue arose of whether philosophy or science had priority. This time, however, with atomic weapons securely in hand there could be no doubt as to the ultimate victor with little need for political intervention.

Another controversy, though less vociferous, concerned psychological methodology and the very retention of such common terms as consciousness, psyche and attention. The introspective method, as we saw advocated by many of the idealistic philosophers, was seen by the new ideologues as subjective and unscientific in that it manifestly referred to private phenomena. I. Pavlov (1849-1936), already a star of Russian science at the time of the Revolution, was quickly seen as utilizing a method that subjected psychic activity to the objective methods of the natural sciences. The issue became, however, whether the use of objective methods would eliminate the need to invoke such traditional terms as consciousness. The central figure here was V. Bekhterev (1857-1927), who believed that since all mental processes eventually manifested themselves in objectively observable behavior, subjective terminology was superfluous. Again, the discussion was silenced through political means once a victory was secured over the introspectionists. Bekhterev's behaviorism was itself found to be dangerously leftist.

As noted above, during the 1930s and '40s independent philosophizing virtually ceased to exist, and what little was published is of no more than historical interest. Indicative of the condition of Russian thought at this time is the fact that when in 1946 the government decided to introduce logic into the curriculum of secondary schools the only suitable text available was a slim book by Chelpanov dating from before the Revolution. After Stalin's death a relative relaxation or "thaw" in the harsh intellectual climate was permitted, of course within the strict bounds of the official state ideology. In addition to the re-surfacing of the old issue of the role of Marxism with respect to the natural sciences, Russian scholars sought a return to the traditional texts in hopes of understanding the original inspiration of the official philosophy. Some, such as the young A. Zinoviev (1922-) sought an understanding of "dialectical logic" in terms of the operations, procedures and techniques employed in political economics. Others, for example, V. Tugarinov, drew heavily on Hegel's example in attempting to delineate a system of fundamental categories.

After the formal recognition in the validity of formal logic, it received significant attention in the ensuing years by Zinoviev, D. Gorsky, E. Voishvillo among many others. Their works have deservedly received international attention and made no use of the official ideology. What sense, if any, to make of "dialectical logic" was another matter that could not remain politically neutral. Until the last days of the Soviet period, there was no consensus as to what it is or its relation to formal logic. One of the most

resolute defenders of dialectical logic was E. Ilyenkov, who has received attention even in the West. In epistemology too, surface agreement, demonstrated through use of an official vocabulary obscured but did not quite hide differences of opinion concerning precisely how to construe the official stand. It certainly now appears that little of enduring worth in this field was published during the Soviet years. However, some philosophers who were active at that time produced works that only recently have been published. Perhaps the most striking example is M. Mamardashvili (1930-1990), who during his lifetime was noted for his deep interest in the history of philosophy and his anti-Hegelian stands.

Most work in ethics in the Soviet period took a crude apologetic form of service to the state. In essence, the good is that which promotes the stated goals of Soviet society. Against such a backdrop, Ja. Mil'ner-Irinin's study *Etika ili printsy istinnoj chelovechnosti* (*Ethics or The Principles of a True Humanity*) is all the more remarkable. Although only an excerpt appeared in print in the 1960s, the book-length manuscript, which as a whole was rejected for publication, was circulated and discussed. The author presented a normative system that he held to be universally valid and timeless. Harking back to the early days of German Idealism, Mil'ner-Irinin urged being true to one's conscience as a moral principle. However, he claimed he deduced his deontology from human social nature rather than from the idea of rationality, as in Kant.

After the accession of L. Brezhnev to the position of General Secretary and particularly after the events that curtailed the Prague Spring in 1968 all signs of independent philosophizing beat a speedy retreat. The government anxiously launched a campaign for ideological vigilance, which a German scholar, H. Dahm, termed an "ideological counter-reformation," that persisted until the "perestroika" of the Gorbachev years.

5. *Post-Soviet Era (1991-)*

Clearly, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the relegation of the Communist Party to the political opposition has also ushered in a new era in the history of Russian philosophy. What trends will emerge is still too early to tell. How Russian philosophers will eventually evaluate their own recent as well as tsarist past may turn, to a large degree, on the country's political and economic fortunes. Not surprisingly, the 1990s saw, in particular, a "re-discovery" of the previously forbidden works of the religious philosophers active just prior to or at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution. Whether Russian philosophers will continue along these lines or approach a style resembling Western "analytical" trends remains an open question.

C. *Concluding Remarks*

In the above historical survey we have emphasized Russian epistemological over ontological and ethical concerns hopefully without neglecting or disparaging them. Admittedly, doing so may reflect a certain "Western bias." Nevertheless, such a survey, whatever its deficiencies, shows that questions regarding the possibility of knowledge have never been completely foreign to the Russian mind. This we can unequivocally state without dismissing Masaryk's position, for indeed during the immediate decades preceding the 1917 Revolution epistemology was not accorded special attention, let alone priority. Certainly at the time when Masaryk formulated his position Russian philosophy was relatively young. Nonetheless, were the non-critical features of Russian philosophy, which Masaryk so correctly observed, a reflection of the Russian mind as such or were they a reflection of the era observed? If one were to view 19th century German philosophy from the rise of Hegelianism to the emergence of neo-Kantianism, would one not see it as shortchanging epistemology? Could it not be that our error lay in focussing on a single period in Russian history, albeit the philosophically most fruitful one? In any case, the mere

existence of divergent opinions during the Soviet era--however cautiously these had to be expressed--on recurring fundamental questions testifies to the tenacity of philosophy on the human mind.

Rather than ask for the general characteristics of Russian philosophy, should we not ask why philosophy arose so late in Russia compared to other nations? Was Vvedensky correct that the country lacked suitable educational institutions until relatively recently, or was he writing as a university professor who saw no viable alternative to make a living? Could it be that Shpet was right in thinking that no one found any utilitarian value in philosophy except in modest service to theology, or was he merely expressing his own fears for the future of philosophy in an overtly ideological state? Did Masaryk have grounds for linking the late emergence of philosophy in Russia to the perceived anti-intellectualism of Orthodox theology, or was he simply speaking as a Unitarian. Finally, intriguing as this question may be, are we not in searching for an answer guilty of what some would label the mistake of reductionism, i.e., of trying to resolve a philosophical problem by appeal to non-philosophical means?

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Earl of Shaftesbury Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671-1713)

Life and Writings.Anthony Ashley Cooper was the grandson of the first Earl of Shaftesbury. He was Locke's patron, and was himself educated under Locke's supervision. His weak health prevented him from following an active political career, and his life was mainly devoted to intellectual interests. After two or three unhappy years of school life at Winchester, he traveled abroad, chiefly in Italy, with a tutor. In early adulthood he lived in Holland, and in later life his health drove him to Italy once more. He was an ardent student of the classics, especially of Plato, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, a devotee of liberty of thought, and an amateur of art. His writings, penned between 1701 and 1712, were published in three volumes titled *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711); a revised and enlarged edition was ready at the time of his death in 1713. The essays include "A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm," "Sensus Communis, an essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor," "Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author," "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit," "The Moralist, a Philosophical Rhapsody," Miscellaneous Reflections on the said Treatises, and other critical Subjects," A Notion of the Historical Draught or Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules, with a Letter concerning Design." The most important of these is "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit." He comments that the miscellaneous style of the collection was in vogue in his day.

Religious Enthusiasm. The *Characteristics* opens with remarks on "Enthusiasm" and on "Wit and Humor". Regarding religious enthusiasts (or fanatics), he tells us that "vapors naturally rise," and he would dispel them by ridicule. "The melancholy way of treating religion is that which, according to my apprehension, renders it so tragical, and is the occasion of its acting in reality such dismal tragedies in the world." He would "recommend wisdom and virtue in the way of pleasantry and mirth," and

tells us that "good-humor is not only the best security against enthusiasm, but the best foundation of piety and true religion>" It does not appear very clearly what is the nature of the piety and religion which he would recommend. Sometimes he seems to scoff at Biblical passages, and at all their spiritual verities and holy mysteries; at other times he makes it appear as if he wished to be considered a believer in Christianity. There is, however, latent levity in the profession he makes: "We may in a proper sense be said faithfully and dutifully to embrace those holy mysteries even in their minutest particulars, and without the least exception on account of their amazing depth." This suffices to assure us of our own "steady orthodoxy, resignation, and entire submission to the truly Christian and catholic doctrines of our holy church, as by law established."

Innate Ideas. Shaftesbury has largely caught the spirit of Locke, but he by no means follows him, especially in his rejection of innate ideas. "Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world, and made the ideas of these, which are the same with those of God, unnatural, and without foundation in our minds. *Innate* is a word he poorly plays upon: the right word, though less used, is *connatural*." He shows that there are many of our mental qualities natural to us. "Life, and the sensations which accompany life, come when they will, are from mere nature and nothing else. Therefore, if you dislike the word innate, let us change it, if you will, for instinct, and call instinct that which nature teaches, exclusive of art, culture, or discipline." Beginning with these lower affections, he goes on to show that "preconceptions of a higher kind have place in human kind, preconceptions of the 'fair and beautiful.'"

He reviews Descartes' "I think therefore I am," and argues that nothing is more certain: "for the Ego or I being established in the first part of the proposition, the Ergo, no doubt, must hold it good in the latter." However, he adds, "For my own part, I take my being upon trust." He continually appeals to the "Sensus Communis," or Common Sense, and his general doctrine is thus expressed: "Some moral and philosophical truths there are withal so evident in themselves, that it would be easier to imagine half mankind too have run mad, and joined precisely in one and the same species of folly, than to admit any thing as truth which should be advanced against such *natural knowledge, fundamental reason,* and *common sense*." He allows

that what is natural to us may require labor and pains to bring it out.

Selfish and Social Affections. Shaftesbury's moral theory targets the account of selfish-based conduct as found in Hobbes and, more implicitly in Locke. He concedes that we do indeed have affections in us which have regard to our own interest or happiness; they included,

> **love of life, resentment of injury, pleasure, or appetite towards nourishment and the means of generation; interest, or the desire of those conveniences by which we are well provided for or maintained; emulation, or love of praise and honor; indolence, or love of ease and rest.**

However, these lead only to "the good of the private," and are not the natural foundation for virtue. Like Butler later argues, there are also social (or "natural") affections which are directed to the good of the species to which we belong. He argues that there is no conflict between the two systems. It is not merely that there are social as well as self-regarding impulses or affections, but that the system of human nature as a whole points to the subordination of the self-regarding affections in favor of the social affections as the essential feature of the "natural" or virtuous life. This is because the means to our good is placed in a network of relations to our fellow humans. Indeed, our natural affections stretch even further: we take in the universe so that we will love all things that exist in the world. For, in the universal design of things, "nothing is supernumerary or unnecessary", and "the whole is harmony, the numbers entire, the music perfect."

Contrary to those such as Hobbes and Mandeville who seek to found virtue on self-interest, Shaftesbury argues that

> **Whoever looks narrowly into the affairs of it, will find that passion, humor, caprice, zeal, faction, and a thousand other springs which are counter to self-interest, have as considerable a part in the movement of this machine. There are more wheels and counterpoises in this engine than are easily imagined.**

Virtue consists in the proper exercise of these two classes of affections (the selfish and social). Vice arises when the public affections are weak and deficient, when the private affections are too strong, or affections spring up which do not tend to the support of the public or private system. He holds that virtue, as consisting in these affections, is natural to humans, and that he who practices it is obeying the ancient Stoic maxim, and living according to nature. The virtues which he recommends fall far beneath the stern standard of the Stoics, and leave out all the peculiar graces of Christianity. They consist of, "a mind subordinate to reason, a temper humanized and fitted to all natural affection, an exercise of friendship uninterrupted, thorough candor, benignity, and good nature, with constant security, tranquillity, equanimity.

In spite of his insistence upon the harmony of virtue and self-interest, or of the self-regarding with the social affections, Shaftesbury is convinced that the good is not pleasure. "When Will and Pleasure are synonymous; when everything which pleases us is called pleasure, and we never chuse or prefer but as we please, 'tis trifling to say, 'Pleasure is our good.' For this has as little meaning as to say, 'We chuse what we think eligible'; and, 'We are pleased with what delights or pleases us.' The question is, Whether we are rightly pleased, and chuse as we should do" (*Characteristics* 2:226-227). The good is not mere satisfaction or pleasure, but that which satisfies a person *as* a human.

Shaftesbury's great objection to the theological ethics of Locke and of popular opinion is that it destroys the reality and disinterestedness of virtue. Action inspired by the motive of reward or punishment is, because self-interested, not truly virtuous. Not until a person "is come to have any affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect such good *for its own sake*, as good and amiable *in itself*," can that person be called "good or virtuous" (*Characteristics* 2:66). The appeal to self-interest by rewards and punishments may be a means of moral education used by God, as it is used by parents and guardians and by the state. But its aim must be to educate us to the disinterested love of virtue and supreme Goodness. Similarly, to make virtue dependent upon the will of God is to destroy the very idea of virtue, and to make the inference to supreme Goodness impossible. "For how can Supreme Goodness be intelligible to those who

know not what Goodness itself is? Or how can virtue be understood to deserve reward, when as yet its merit and excellence are unknown? We begin surely at the wrong end, when we would prove merit by favour, and order by a Deity" (*Characteristics*, 2:267). The alternative between a theological and an independent theory of ethics is, he holds, the alternative between ethical nominalism and realism. Shaftesbury's own view is that virtue is "really something in itself and in the nature of things: not arbitrary or factitious... constituted from without, or dependent on custom, fancy, or will: not even on the Supreme Will itself, which can no way govern it: but being necessarily good, is governed by it, and ever uniform with it" (*Loc. cit.*).

The Moral Sense. Shaftesbury is aware that the question of the character of the virtuous act is not the same as that of the mental faculty which looks at it and appreciates it. Natural to us is a "sense of right and wrong," to which Shaftesbury gives the name "the moral sense." This moral sense apprehends the beauty or deformity, the proportion or disproportion, of actions and affections.

> **"It feels the soft and harsh, the agreeable and disagreeable, in the affections; and finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, as really and truly here, as in any musical numbers, or in the outward forms or representations of sensible things. Nor can it withhold its admiration and extasy, its aversion and scorn, any more in what relates to one than to the other of these subjects" (*Characteristics* 2:83).**

This faculty of the moral sense he represents as a kind of sense organ. Locke describes two types of senses, the external and the internal (and from these tries to derive all our ideas or perceptions). In Shaftesbury, two internal senses occupy an important place: the sense of beauty and the moral sense:

> **No sooner does the eye open upon figures, the ear to sounds, than straight the Beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them as soon discerned as felt), than straight an *inward* eye distinguishes and sees the *fair* and *shapely*, the *amiable* and**

> ***admirable*, apart from the *deformed*, the *foul*, the *odious*, or the *despicable***

Although this advances beyond Locke's discussion of the senses in the *Essay*, he is anxious to connect his view of the moral sense with Locke's account of the inward sense.

IEP

Gustav Shpet (1879-1937)

Shpet, a professor of philosophy at the University of Moscow, introduced Husserlian transcendental phenomenology into Russia. Additionally, he wrote extensively on aesthetics, hermeneutics, the history of Russian philosophy and the philosophy of language. During the Stalinist years in Russia he was condemned as being an idealist in philosophy and a counter-revolutionary in politics. The depth and breadth of his numerous studies stand as a testament to the philosophic spirit in Russia during the waning years of tsarism.

LIFE. Gustav Gustavovich Shpet was born in Kiev in April 1879. Late in life during the Stalinist period, he sought to emphasize his humble origins as the illegitimate son of a seamstress. In fact, his maternal grandfather appears to have been a member of the Polish gentry. No information is available on his father. Whether he had any religious upbringing is unclear. On his university registration form he gave his religion as Lutheran, although his mother was, based on family testimony, Catholic.

Upon finishing studies at a gymnasium (secondary school) in Kiev Shpet enrolled at the university there in 1898. Also at this time he became involved in a Marxist circle, although the degree of his active participation is unclear. In any case, his involvement resulted in expulsion from the university. After a relatively short time, however, he was permitted back to attend classes. From that time onward, Shpet always maintained a respectable distance from philosophical Marxism, while apparently retaining a measured sympathy for its socio-economic ideals. After finishing his studies in 1906 he taught for a time at a Kiev gymnasium but followed his former teacher Georgij Chelpanov to Moscow in 1907 upon the latter's succession to the philosophy chair formerly held by Sergej Trubeckoj.

In Moscow Shpet continued his studies at the university and worked in Chelpanov's newly established psychology institute. In addition, he taught at a number of educational institutions in the city. During the summer months of 1910 and 1911 Shpet went abroad to Paris, Edinburgh and various locales in Germany in connection with the psychology institute and his own research for a dissertation. During one of these trips he first encountered Husserl, but it was not until his stay in Goettingen during the 1912-13 academic year that he came firmly under Husserl's influence. Attending Husserl's lectures and seminars at this time, Shpet became acquainted with the nascent ideas of transcendental phenomenology and, in particular, with those that would eventually become known as *Ideen II*. When *Ideen I* was published in 1913 Shpet amazingly mastered in short order the change in Husserl's orientation. The next several years were arguably the most philosophically productive of his life, producing in rapid succession a series of works on epistemology, the history of philosophy and the history of Russian philosophy. In 1915 he wrote a large study of the 19th century Moscow philosophy professor Pamfil Yurkevich, followed the next year by the defense and the publication of his dissertation *Istorija kak problema logika* (*History as a Problem of Logic*) and then the writing of *Germenevtika i ee problemy* (*Hermeneutics and Its*

Problems), which languished in manuscript for decades.

His work, however, as the first propagandist, if you will, in Russia for Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and philosophy as a rigorous science is perhaps that for which he is best known, at least in Western philosophical circles. Although the Husserlian influence waned over the years, due at least in part to his increasing isolation within Soviet Russia, Shpet produced within a few short months of its appearance in 1913 the first book-length study of Husserl's _Ideen I_. In 1917 and 1918 he edited the philosophical yearbook _Mysl' i slovo_, which also contained valuable contributions by Shpet himself and amplified his own position vis-a-vis Husserlian phenomenology. In 1918 he was appointed to a professorship at Moscow University and in the following year he succeeded to the chair held by Leo Lopatin, who had recently died.

Despite his varied intellectual activities on many fronts during the early years of the Bolshevik regime, Shpet, as an openly non-Marxist intellectual, could not be permitted to retain his teaching position long. His name appeared on Lenin's August 1922 listing of those to be exiled from Russia, a list that included numerous prominent philosophers, such as Berdyaev, Lossky and Lapshin. Shpet, however, successfully appealed to Lunacharskij, the Soviet cultural minister, with whom he was acquainted from his student days in Kiev, to have his name removed.

In 1923 with the creation of the Russian--later State--Academy for Cultural Studies, Shpet was tapped to be its vice-president. There he continued his scholarly work, albeit slightly redirected or, perhaps more accurately, re-focused away from pure philosophy. Again despite his prolific output and that of his colleagues, the Academy, though at least nominally headed by a Marxist, was closed in 1929. Over the next several years he made his living chiefly by preparing translations from such authors as Dickens and Byron, and he also participated in the preparation of a Russian edition of Shakespeare.

On 14 March 1935 Shpet, along with several other former colleagues from the State Academy, was arrested, charged with anti-soviet activities and sentenced to five years internal exile. Later that year the place of exile was changed to Tomsk, a university city in Siberia, where Shpet prepared a new Russian translation of Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_. On 27 October 1937 he was again arrested and charged with belonging to a monarchist organization. Recently uncovered documents from the former KGB headquarters in Tomsk indicate that Shpet was executed on 16 November 1937.

PHILOSOPHY. The nascent secondary literature is still at a very early stage. Nevertheless, already three areas of disagreement exist concerning: a) the influences on Shpet's philosophy; b) the number of stages in the development of his thought; and c) Shpet's lasting contribution to philosophy. With regard to the first area, some have tended to emphasize the phenomenological aspect of his thought and, consequently, have stressed the Husserlian influence. Others have noted the influence of Hegel, while still others have sought to demonstrate Shpet's indebtedness to the Russian metaphysical tradition. To a large degree, however, the depiction of the dominant influence on Shpet has been determined by one's response to the third area, viz. his contribution to philosophy. During the Soviet era, Russian scholars saw Shpet almost exclusively as an historian of Russian philosophy. To the extent that his ideas at that time received recognition in the West he was viewed as the Russian disciple of Husserl. Today both inside Russia and in Western circles Shpet is receiving attention as a phenomenologist of language, if not the first to study language from within a broadly phenomenological perspective.

In any case, Shpet's philosophical development can be broken into at least three periods. Although

one contemporary scholar (A. Haardt) holds the first of these to range from 1898-1905, no writings have emerged from these very youthful years and certainly Shpet published nothing at this time. What little information we have comes from an autobiographical remark in his huge 1916 thesis. Thus, seeing his Marxist infatuation as a stage in Shpet's thought serves no useful purpose.

Whatever was the nature of his Marxism, already by 1903 Shpet felt an affinity toward idealism and, in particular, saw the former as riddled with what he thought were epistemological and methodological errors. In his thesis for Kiev University, published under the title "The Problem of Causality in Hume and Kant: Did Kant Answer Hume's Doubt?," Shpet writing under the unmistakable influence of Chelpanov and the "Kiev School of Kant-Interpretation," fundamentally sided with a phenomenalist reading of Kant. In addition, referring explicitly to the writings of the Baden School of neo-Kantianism, Shpet cautiously held that although Kant had demonstrated the "real necessity" of a priori cognitions, he had not proved their "logical necessity."

> **"We must recognize, therefore, that Kant succeeded in proving the real necessity of a priori categories. Nevertheless, he did not prove their logical necessity. " (1, p. 202)**

That is, the Kantian a priori categories, including causality, must be postulated so as to account for objectively valid knowledge. In this way Shpet accords belief in the categories, and thus practical reason, a primacy in and over epistemology. Therefore, based simply on the textual evidence available to the contemporary scholar for analysis, the first period in Shpet's thought is marked by a neo-Kantian phase extending from circa 1903-1912 and is the only period conceptually quite distinct from the others.

The exact evolution of Shpet's ideas immediately after moving to Moscow is unclear. What is clear, however, is that he irrevocably distanced himself from neo-Kantianism and came under the influence of Lopatin and the works of the recently deceased S. Trubeckoj. From them, as well perhaps as through his reading of Vladimir Solovyov, Shpet began to employ the unmistakeable terminology and think philosophically in the categories and problems of Platonism, particularly that variant then dominant at Moscow University. In addition to criticizing psychologism--and, indeed, all "isms"-- for its failure to grasp the psyche as a "living whole," Shpet began to see philosophy itself as based on the immediate data of reflection.

> **"The spirit of our philosophy is that of a living,concrete and integral philosophy based on the reliable data of inner experience. " (2, p.264.)**

Despite the obvious pedigree of this conception in, on the one hand, the Moscow metaphysicians, and, on the other, James, Dilthey, Stumpf and the early Husserl--as Shpet himself acknowledged--we should not disregard the fact that Chelpanov also stressed the importance of introspection as a technique in psychology, albeit bereft of metaphysical interpretation.

The next period in Shpet's philosophy is that for which he is best known. In *Appearance and Sense*, published in mid-1914, Shpet provided, on the one hand, a summarization of many points covered in Husserl's *Ideen I*. Yet, on the other hand, Shpet sought to invoke Husserl's transcendental turn for his own purposes, while cautiously noting what he saw as deficiencies in the latter. Like Husserl, Shpet was willing to characterize phenomenology as the fundamental science and, again like Husserl, Shpet made extensive use of eidetic intuition. This reliance on the Husserlian technique of "ideation" is one that Shpet continued to value years later even after coming under political attack for his idealism. Husserl and Shpet differed, however, on the goal of such procedures and methods. Whereas the former sought to construct a presuppositionless philosophy,

a "science" of consciousness and cognition, Shpet saw philosophy as ultimately a study of being, of which cognizing is but one form among many. Modern philosophy's error is found in its concentration on the forms of cognition, rather than on cognition as such. In modern parlance we could say philosophy has failed to distinguish the forest from the trees. The subject-matter of phenomenology, as Shpet conceived it, is the study of cognition, qua a mode of being. The major oversight of modern philosophy is not to have seen the non-empirical and non-actual nature of the cognizing subject.

Of the several articles Shpet published immediately subsequent to the appearance of *Appearance and Sense* two in particular stand out: "Consciousness and Its Proprietor" and "Wisdom or Reason." In the first of these, which appeared in 1916, Shpet already addressed an issue that would later prove to be a major bone of contention among the next generation of phenomenologists. Developing ideas enunciated by Solovyov during the last years of his life, Shpet asked who "owns" or "possesses" the unity of consciousness. Whereas he is willing, pace Hume, to concede on the issue of such a unity, it is no one's, i.e., it has no proprietor. We are led astray in seeking such a proprietor by an inaccurate analogy drawn from our everyday language.

> **"Ultimately, it is as impossible to say *whose* consciousness as it is to say *whose* space, *whose* air, even though everybody is convinced that the air which he breathes is *his* air, and the space which he occupies is *his* space. " (4, p. 205)**

In direct opposition to Husserl, whom he accuses of betraying the "principle of all principles," stated in *Ideen I*, Shpet finds no "pure Ego." What unity there is certainly cannot serve as an epistemological guarantee, and it certainly cannot be called a Self or an Ego.

In "Wisdom or Reason" from 1917 Shpet presents what may well be the first attempt to depict the phenomenological idea, or what we today often view as that idea, as the telos of Western philosophy. Noticeably, however, Shpet never mentions phenomenology as such; instead he uses the locution "philosophy as pure knowledge" and even "philosophy as knowledge." In a precise manner, Parmenides established the proper object of philosophy and showed the path along which philosophy is directed to solve the problem posed by that object. (5, p. 7)

This itself can be seen as a distancing from the Husserlian influence in that Shpet traces *his* conception back to the Greeks and indeed to Parmenides. In any case, Shpet holds that philosophy proceeds through three stages (and as in Hegel's *Phenomenology* whether these are purely logical or chronological as well is arguable): from wisdom then on to metaphysics before finally arriving at rigorous science or knowledge. Unlike positivistic "scientific philosophy," which seeks to copy the methodology of an arbitrarily chosen natural science or bases itself on results attained in natural science, philosophy as pure knowledge grounds the specific sciences.

The recent emergence and publication of Shpet's hitherto virtually inaccessible 1918 work *Hermeneutics and Its Problems*, in both the original Russian and a German translation, has drawn notable international attention. In it Shpet presents a history of hermeneutics ranging from the Greeks to the early 20th century, seeing the work of Dilthey and Husserl, as represented in the first "Logical Investigation," as the highest point yet attained.

Throughout this period and later Shpet maintained that his work was a continuation of that direction in philosophy associated with Brentano and Husserl. Where they erred was in forgetting the social dimension. There can and do exist forms of collective or socio-cultural consciousness. An element of such consciousness is language, more specifically words. The understanding plays an analogous role in the grasping of sense, for which words act as the "material bearer," as sense

perception does in the individual's representational consciousness. Shpet developed these themes at some length in his *Aesthetic Fragments* from 1922/23 and his *Inner Form of the Word* from 1927.

In addition, Shpet shortly before and after the Bolshevik Revolution devoted considerable attention to the history of Russian philosophy, publishing a number of valuable studies studded with numerous caustic comments on the poverty of philosophy in his homeland.

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Ancient Greek Skepticism

Greek skepticism is usually divided into three periods: early Pyrrhonism (fourth and third centuries BCE.), Academic skepticism (third and second centuries BCE.), and post Academic skepticism (first through third centuries CE.).

Pyrrhonism. Early Pyrrhonism, represented by the teachings of Pyrrho of Elis and his student Timon, is noted as much for the life style or "agoge" of its two champions as for their specific teachings. Pyrrho is presented by Diogenes Laertius as a skeptic who is oblivious to all external objects and is saved from danger only by friends who steer him clear of "carts, precipices, dogs or what not." Philip Hallie challenges this portrayal and suggests instead that early Pyrrhonism is a eudemonean philosophy in the same class with Stoicism and Epicureanism. Pyrrho's intention was to recommend tranquility of mind by avoiding fanaticism concerning matters that cannot be proved. Although Timon's character was less tranquil than his teacher's, Hallie argues that he too was eudemonean by "being content to find happiness amongst the phenomena, and to laugh and rail at those who dared go beyond them." (*Sextus Empiricus*, 1985, p. 17).

Academic Skepticism. Greek skepticism became more formal with the skepticism of the Academy. A few generations after Plato, Arcesilaus, head of the academy, launched an attack on the Stoic theory of knowledge. The Stoics maintained that there were self-evidently true perceptions which reveal the logos and were not possible to doubt. Arcesilaus disputed this theory noting that people respect such claims to knowledge only when claimed by wise men, and not by fools. Since, however, there is no criteria for distinguishing wise men from fools, the whole question of self-evident principles is begged. His conclusion was that we should suspend judgment (*epoche*) on the question of truth. Carneades, who headed the Academy a century after Arcesilaus, continued the attack on Stoic epistemology. For Carneades, not only do we lack direct experience of self-evidently true perceptions and external objects, but those perceptions we have are subjective in character. Consequently, we do not know if even our best perceptions accurately copy external objects. The most we can say is that appearances lend themselves to varying degrees of probability (for example, the appearance of a door which does not open probably means that the door itself is locked).

Post Academic Skepticism. The Academic and Pyrrhonian traditions of skepticism each had proponents in the post Academic period. In his *Academica,* Cicero defends Academic skepticism about knowledge of objects against "dogmatic" philosophy, particularly Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism and Epicureanism. From the Pyrrhonian camp, Aenesidemus is remembered for his formulation of the ten skeptical tropes, or techniques by which we doubt a contention. In *Greek Skepticism,* C.L. Stough sorts the ten tropes into two groups: one group showing that impressions cannot be compared to objects, and the other that we cannot know

objects independent of impressions. An example of the first group of tropes concerns the frequency or rarity with which an object appears. Since the astonishment or value of an object (such as a comet or a piece of gold) results from the rarity of its appearance, and has little to do with the nature of the objects themselves, we must suspend judgment about the nature of these objects.

Sextus begins his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* by distinguishing between dogmatic, Academic and skeptical philosophies. Aristotle, Epicurus and the Stoics are dogmatic since they thought they had found truth. Academic philosophers, such as Carneades, are partially dogmatic since their notion of probability was an attempt gain access to inapprehensible objects. Skeptics, on the other hand, continue the search for truth and make neither dogmatic nor partially dogmatic claims. Like Pyrrho, Sextus believes the end of true skepticism is tranquility and the avoidance of any dogmatism; (consequently "Pyrrhonism" for Sextus is synonymous with skepticism).

Sextus adopts the following definition of skepticism:

> **Skepticism is an ability to place in antithesis, in any manner whatever, appearances and judgments, and thus-because of the equality of force in the objects and arguments opposed-come first of all to a suspension of judgment and then to mental tranquillity. (*Sextus Empiricus* 1985, pp. 32-33)**

Unique to Sextus' skepticism is that skepticism itself is something which ultimately requires the suspension of judgment. This is seen where he writes, "We may say that they [various formulations of skepticism] can be used to cancel themselves, since they are themselves included in those things to which they refer, just as purgative medicines not only remove the humours from the body but expel themselves together with the humours" (*Sextus Empiricus*, 1985, p. 86). Like his skeptical predecessors, Sextus concentrated heavily upon epistemological skepticism -- knowledge of external objects and the reliability of appearances. However, he also sets his skepticism loose on problems of causality, physical change, becoming and perishing, absolute rest, place and time.

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Contemporary Skepticism

Arguments for Skepticism. In *The Skeptical Tradition* (1983), Burnyeat argues that from Pyrrho until Kant, skepticism had been following a tradition insofar as there was a "succession of thinkers whose thought [was] conditioned in one way or another by a knowledge of their predecessors in the line." After Kant, Burnyeat continues, skepticism became a free creation of the post-modern and contemporary imagination. Although there are exceptions to his claim, Burnyeat is accurate about most contemporary discussions of skepticism. Nevertheless, Grayling offers the following seminal notion of skepticism which is presumed by most contemporary discussions:

> possibly (not P and E),

where P stands for a proposition and E stands for the best evidence in support of P. For Grayling, the skeptic holds roughly that the best evidence we have in support of proposition P is logically consistent with the denial of P. This notion of skepticism may also be expanded to account for different varieties of skepticism. For example, the skeptic may be selective about which propositions are represented by P. This is sometimes called local skepticism. Or the skeptic may argue that P stands for *any*. proposition, and thus advances a total or global skepticism.

Many contemporary arguments favoring skepticism begin with a claim that "knowledge of P requires some condition C." Condition C is then shown to be unattainable. And from this, it is then argued that there can be no knowledge of P. To give some examples, according to Naess, condition C is that we have "some evidence for the truth of P." Condition C is denied, however, since there will always be evidence for some proposition inconsistent with P. Naess concludes not only that the skeptic has no knowledge of P, but, rather unusually, that the skeptic can still *pronounce* the expression "I know P" without actually *asserting* that he knows P (given a limited intention of his utterance). Similarly, Unger, in *Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism*, thinks that knowledge of P requires the condition that it is all right to be certain about P. Unger continues that it is never all right to be certain about P since this would involve being closed minded with respect to new evidence. Consequently, we can never know P. Unger concludes that this skepticism is the result of faulty expectations built into our linguistic system, and that ridding skepticism requires revamping these expectations. As a final example in this vein, Nathan argues in *Evidence and Assurance* that knowledge of P requires the condition of being "radically assured" about the truth of P (assurance gained from conscious and deliberate investigation). Given foundationalism, radical assurance is something we reasonably expect of knowledge, particularly with foundational or core beliefs. However, radical reassurance is something we are unlikely to attain, hence, we cannot know P.

The above style of skeptical argument allows the skeptic great flexibility in choosing a necessary, yet unattainable condition for knowledge. Other contemporary arguments for skepticism, though, follow a different model. For example, Vander Veer in *Philosophical Skepticism and Ordinary Language Analysis* attacks ordinary language philosophy for not having discredited skepticism. In

view of skeptical arguments on topics such as knowledge, other minds and induction, Vander Veer shows how responses by Austin, Strawson and Wittgenstein have not adequately met the skeptical challenge. This analysis, however, shows only that ordinary language philosophy is inadequate as a positive account of knowledge, not that skepticism is true. Perhaps the most Humean of the contemporary skeptics is Mates, who, in his book *Skeptical Essays*, shows that the traditional problems of philosophy are filled with contradictions. Such problems include the liar's paradox, Russell's paradox, as well as problems with freedom of the will and external objects. Unlike Hume, though, Mates is psychologically content with philosophical agnosticism.

Refutations of Skepticism. Some contemporary refutations of skepticism should be briefly noted. Kekes's *A Justification of Rationality* argues that the alleged solipsistic skeptic refutes himself by using expressions which presuppose perception of an intended referent. Rescher, in *Skepticism: a Critical Reappraisal* (1980) argues that the skeptic's philosophical or hyperbolic doubt is refuted by mundane experiences and use of language. In *Reason and Skepticism*, Slote argues that, in spite of the strength of many skeptical arguments, there are intuitively reasonable "principles of inference" which make skepticism less credible than belief in non- skeptical theories. Using a dozen of these principles, Slote shows that it is reasonable to believe in external objects, other minds, and a deity. Odegard's *Knowledge and Skepticism* argues for a middle ground between skepticism and dogmatism, that is "epistemological toleration," a view which admits the strength of many skeptical arguments, but recognizes that these skeptical views may all be false. The result is that we should merely "tolerate" claims to knowledge. Johnson's *Skepticism and Cognitivism* contains refutations of Naess and Unger, as presented above. Other attacks on skepticism are Cornmans *Skepticism, Justification and Explanation*, Klein's *Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism* and Grayling's *The Refutation of Skepticism*.

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Modern Skepticism

Since the publication of Popkin's *History of Skepticism*, the strong influence of Greek skepticism on modern philosophy is now an accepted fact. In this and other publications Popkin traces the impact of skepticism on modern philosophy from 16th century editions of Sextus Empiricus to its ultimate resolution in the writings of the "new Pyrrho": David Hume. With a half dozen publications of Sextus' writings in the 17th and 18th centuries, skepticism became a popular and important philosophical issue to the moderns. Many thinkers, particularly in France, carried the Pyrrhonian torch as passed to them through Sextus's writings. Included were Michel de Montaigne (who made specific use of the ten skeptical tropes of Aenesidemus), Pierre Charron, Petrus Gassendi (who is remembered for his critical letters to Descartes), Joseph Glanvill (who introduced Pyrrhonism to England), Walter Raleigh, Pierre-Daniel Huet, and, most significantly, Pierre Bayle. In his highly influential *Historical and Critical Dictionary*, Bayle wrote substantial entries on over two and a half thousand people -- from Adam and Eve to Spinoza -- and near two hundred entries on non-person topics. But he delivered his most influential skeptical arguments in the extended footnotes to his entries. Of particular importance were his entries on Eve, David, Pyrrho, the Manicheans, the Paulicans, Zeno, Pomponazzi, Xenophanes, Spinoza, Nicole, and Pellison.

Bayle's Pyrrhonism involved two claims: (1) by the principles of philosophy one is led to doubt everything, and (2) the futile search within philosophy for certitude by the "natural light" leads one to conclude that it is necessary to turn to the supernatural light. In addition to epistemological topics (such as external objects) being cast into doubt, Bayle's Pyrrhonism attacked the concepts of space, morality and rational theology as well.

Critics of Early Modern Skepticism. A number of philosophers arose in strong opposition skepticism, such as Father Mersenne (remembered for his letters to Descartes), Wilhelm Langius and Jean-Pierre de Crousaz. Mersenne responded by giving a point by point refutation of Sextus' arguments. Crousaz argued that although the skeptic can find evidential problems in support of a given proposition P, there are, nevertheless, rules which guard against errors (although these rules do not guarantee truth).

More commonly, philosophers responded to the skeptical crisis less vehemently, such as Pascal, Malebranche, the Chevalier Ramsey (whom Hume visited when writing his *Treatise*), Abbe Foucher, Andrew Baxter and Archbishop Fenelon. The issue for these was not one of refuting the skeptic's arguments, but, given the skeptics claim, how could one avoid the *prescriptive consequence* of either doubting a given contention or suspending belief in that contention? Ramsey, for example, agreed with the Pyrrhonist's arguments maintaining that there is no demonstrative knowledge of any proposition, but such knowledge is not necessary if we have persuasive arguments supporting that proposition. Baxter argued similarly that even though the Pyrrhonist's arguments are sound, they cannot be consistently *believed*, consequently the skeptical arguments

fail.

Hume's Skepticism. Hume's skepticism emerges from virtually every topic on which he wrote, such as causality, personal identity, external objects, determinism, morality, and religion. However, his quintessential skeptical arguments appear in the final Part of *Treatise* Book I. There Hume not only denies the possibility of securing knowledge on issues held dear by traditional philosophers, but he argues further that reason is riveted with internal contractions. Section 12 of the *Enquiry* reiterates this theme, drawing on Zeno's paradoxes. Hume was acquainted with the skeptical writings of Sextus Empiricus and Bayle, and undoubtedly were of influence. He was also familiar with the above modern critiques of skepticism, which directed his unique spin on skepticism. Unlike Ramsey and Baxter, Hume argued that the philosophical truth of skepticism is an entirely different issue than the psychological ability to doubt or suspend judgment about a given proposition. Thus, the psychological issue can never constitute a refutation of the philosophical question. This makes Hume a uniquely consistent Pyrrhonist since one's psychological stance towards a proposition has no bearing on the philosophical consistency with which it is undermined.

In spite of Hume's skeptical arguments, there is a positive or constructive side to his writings, but where the one starts and the other stops is a matter of dispute. One problem is that Book I is mainly a collection of discussions on various epistemological topics such as space, time, causality, external objects and personal identity. Sometimes the topics are related, at other times they are not. This only makes it more difficult to see a pattern to his skepticism. After several unsuccessful attempts at finding a consistent interpretation, Passmore concluded pessimistically that, "to be a Humean, precisely, is to take no system as final, nothing as ultimate except the spirit of enquiry" (*Hume's Intentions*, 1952, p. 159). Contrary to Passmore, though, most commentators attempt some systematic account. Livingston argues that Hume's skeptical arguments are only a tool to procure a psychological compelling set of beliefs. For Livingston, Hume presents a number of epistemological accounts of external objects, but then skeptically rejects them all: "the Pyrrhonian arguments are a necessary stage in the natural history of philosophical reflection from vulgar thought through false philosophy to philosophy that is true." What emerges from Livingston's interpretation is a "true philosophy" which presupposes the original authority of common life (*Hume's Philosophy of Common Life*, 1985, pp. 3, 27-28, 247). However, the question still remains whether Hume's "philosophy of common life" itself constitutes a skeptical set of propositions. Norton believes that it does. For Norton, Hume adopted a skeptical method of arguing, similar to the Academic skepticism of Carneades and Cicero as a response to a speculative crisis in his day. This skeptical methodology also made for a skeptical set of propositions (including cause and effect, external objects and miracles) insofar as these propositions must be viewed with a certain "modesty and diffidence" (*David Hume*, 1982, pp. 220, 294). Although one senses from Norton's account that Hume is not just another Bayle or modern Academic skeptic, he only briefly notes a few features of Hume's skeptical methodology which distinguish him from his skeptical mentors (Norton 1982, 290-295).

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Social Contract

Social contract theory is the view that morality is founded solely on uniform social agreements that serve the best interests of those who make the agreement. Historically social contract theory is an outgrowth of natural law theory, specifically the theories of Grotius and Pufendorf. However, we find hints at social contract reasoning in earlier works, most notably in Book 2 of Plato's dialog *The Republic*. Two distinct portions of that Book contain social contractarian themes, the first of which is offered by a skeptical character in the dialog named Glaucon. According to Glaucon, we all recognize that it is good for us individually to be unjust, although it is bad for us individually to suffer. We also recognize that if we do act unjustly, we will suffer injuries from other people. To avoid suffering injury, then, make contracts with each other by which we give up injustice and practice justice. To demonstrate his point about our preference to be unjust, Glaucon presents a myth about a shepherd named Gyges who finds a ring that makes him invisible when he wears it. Understanding the special advantage gained by having such a ring, Gyges uses its powers to seduce the Queen and Kill the King. Glaucon then argues that if there were two such rings, worn by a just person and an unjust person respectively, they would both commit the same kind of unjust deeds. Plato himself rejects this skeptical view about justice; however, the hero of the dialog - the character Socrates - presents a different contractarian account of the origin of justice in society. According to Socrates, societies are formed for the purpose of fulfilling our human needs. We have many needs and thus many kinds people and activities are required to fulfill all those needs. We then form partnerships by which we exchange goods and services. The mutual fulfilling of the various tasks is the basis of justice in society.

HOBBES. The definitive statement of social contract theory is found in Chapters 13 through 15 of Hobbes's Leviathan. Briefly, Hobbes argues that the original state of nature is a condition of constant war, which rational and self-motivated people would want to end. These people, then, will establish fundamental moral laws to preserve peace. The foundation of Hobbes's theory is the view that humans are psychologically motivated by only selfish interests. Hobbes argued that, for purely selfish reasons, the agent is better off living in a world with moral rules than one without moral rules. Without moral rules, we are subject to the whims of other people's selfish interests. Our property, our families, and even our lives are at continual risk. Selfishness alone will therefore motivate each agent to adopt a basic set of rules which will allow for a civilized community. Not surprisingly, these rules would include prohibitions against lying, stealing and killing. However, these rules will ensure safety for each agent only if the rules are enforced. As selfish creatures, each of us would plunder our neighbors' property once their guards were down. Each agent would then be at risk from his neighbor. Therefore, for selfish reasons alone, we devise a means of enforcing these rules: we create a policing agency which punishes us if we violate these rules. Like rule-utilitarianism, Hobbes's social contract theory is a three-tiered moral system. Particular acts, such as stealing my neighbor's lawn furniture, are w rong since they violate the rule against stealing. The rule against stealing, in turn, is morally binding since it is in my interests to live in a

world which enforces this rule.

There are several traditional criticisms of Hobbes's theory. First critics questioned whether humans are as self-interested as Hobbes contends: many people have transcendent interests which focus on social, religious, or political communities. Second , it is not clear that people who are fundamentally equal in the state of nature would be rationally motivated to attack each other, given only a 50-50 chance of survival. Third, the moral rules arrived at make demands of an agent which go beyond what is necessary for an agent's self-preservation -- which is that agent's sole motive for making the contract. Fourth, the moral rules arrived at are only rules of prudence for people motivated by egoistic concerns. Thus, it is difficult to call this a "moral" theory. Finally, it is not clear why we should consistently follow a moral rule (such as a prohibition against stealing) if it can occasionally violate that rule without being caught. Further, since I am motivated only by self-interest, I would have strong reasons to occasionally violate rules when that served my interests. Social contract theory, then, will obligate me to follow moral rules only to the point where it is necessary to keep society together. And this makes it a fairly weak normative theory.

OTHER SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES. After Hobbes, social contract theory developed in different directions. John Locke argued that the state of nature is a pre-political, yet moral society where humans are bound by divinely commanded natural law. A social contract is made between citizens who institute a government to prevent people from occasionally violating natural law and showing partiality. Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that the state of nature is not a state of war, but a state of individual freedom where creativity flourishes. Since a fully mature person is a social person, a social contract is established to regulate social interaction. This contract between citizens establishes an absolute democracy which is ruled by the general will, or what is best for all people. Interest in social contract theory declined in the 19th century with the rise of utilitarianism, the theory that actions are right when they produce more benefit than disbenefit for society. Contemporary versions of social contract theory attempt to show that our basic rights and liberties are founded on mutually beneficial agreements which are made between members of society. John Rawls argues in A Theory of Justice (1971) that in an original position, a group of rational and impartial people will establish a mutually beneficial principle of justice as the foundation for regulating all rights, duties, power, and wealth.

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Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900)

LIFE. Solovyov was born in Moscow in 1853. His father, Sergej Mikhailovich, a professor at Moscow University, is universally recognized as one of Russia's greatest historians. After attending secondary school in Moscow, Vladimir enrolled at the university and began his studies there in the natural sciences in 1869, his particular interest at this time being biology. Already at the age of 13 he had renounced his Orthodox faith to his friends, accepting the banner of materialism perhaps best illustrated by the fictional character of Bazarov in Turgenev's novel *Fathers and Sons* and the actual historical figure of Pisarev. During the first two or three years of study at the university Solovyov grew disenchanted with his ardent positivism and did poorly in his examinations. An excellent student prior to this time, there is no reason for us to doubt his intellectual gifts. Nevertheless, although he himself as well as his interpreters have attributed his poor performance to growing disinterest in his course of study, this reasoning may sound to us at least somewhat disingenuous. In any case, Solovyov subsequently enrolled as an auditor in the Historical-Philosophical Faculty, then passing the examination for a degree in June 1873.

At some point during 1872 Solovyov reconverted, so to speak, to Orthodoxy. During the academic year 1873-74 he attended lectures at the Moscow Ecclesiastic Academy--an unusual step for a lay person. At this time Solovyov also began the writing of his magister's dissertation, several chapters of which were published in a Russian theological journal already before his formal defense of it in early December 1874. The death of his Moscow University philosophy teacher Pamfil Jurkevich created a vacancy that Solovyov surely harbored hopes of eventually filling. Nevertheless, despite being passed over, owing, at least in part, to his young age and lack of credentials, he was named a docent (lecturer) in philosophy. In spite of taking up his teaching duties with enthusiasm, within a few months Solovyov applied for a scholarship to do research abroad, primarily in London's British Museum.

His stay in the English capital was met with mixed emotions, but it could not have been entirely unpleasant, for in mid-September 1875 he was still informing his mother of plans to return to Russia only the following summer. For whatever reason, though, Solovyov abruptly changed his mind, writing again to his mother a mere month later that his work required him to go to Egypt via Italy and Greece. Some have attributed his change of plans to a mystical experience while sitting in the reading room of the Museum!

Upon his return to Russia the following year, Solovyov taught philosophy at Moscow University. He began work on a text that we know as the *Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge*, but which he never finished. In early 1877 Solovyov relinquished his university position due to his aversion towards academic politics, took up residence in St. Petersburg and accepted employment in the Ministry of Public Education. While preparing his doctoral dissertation, Solovyov gave a series of highly successful popular lectures at St. Petersburg University that was later published as *Lectures on Divine Humanity*, and in 1880 he defended a doctoral dissertation at St. Petersburg

University. Any lingering hope Solovyov may have entertained of obtaining a professorship in Russia were dashed when in early 1881 during a public lecture he appealed to the Tsar to pardon the regicides of the latter's father Alexander II.

For the remainder of the 1880s, despite his prolificacy, Solovyov concerned himself with themes of little interest to contemporary Western philosophy. He returned, however, to traditional philosophical issues in the 1890s, working in particular on ethics and epistemology. His studies on the latter, however, were left quite incomplete owing to his premature death in 1900 at the age of 47. At the end Solovyov, together with his younger brother, was also preparing a new Russian translation of Plato's works.

INTERPRETATIONS OF SOLOVYOV'S PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS. Despite the vast amount of secondary literature, particularly, of course, in Russian, little, especially that in English, is of interest to the professionally-trained philosopher. Nevertheless, even while memory of him was still fresh, many of his friends differed sharply on key issues involved in interpreting Solovyov's writings and legacy. Among the topics debated over the years has been the number of phases or periods through which his thought passed. Opinions have ranged from four to just one, depending largely on the different criteria selected for demarcating one period from another. Those who hold that Solovyov's thought underwent no "fundamental change" [Shein] do not deny that there were modifications but simply maintain that the fundamental thrust of his philosophy remained unaltered over the course of time. Others see different emphases in Solovyov's work from decade to decade. Yet in one of the most philosophically-informed interpretations, Solovyov moved from a philosophy of "integral knowledge" to a later phenomenological phase that anticipated the "essential methodology" of the German movement [Dahm].

Historically, another central concern among interpreters has been the extent of Solovyov's indebtedness to various other figures. Whereas several have stressed the influence of, if not an outright borrowing from, the late Schelling [Mueller, Shein], at least one prominent scholar has sought to accentuate Solovyov's independence and creativity [Losev]. Still others have argued for Solovyov's indebtedness to Hegel [Navickas], Kant [Vvedenskij], Boehme [David], the Russian Slavophiles and the philosophically-minded theologians Jurkevich and Kudryavtsev.

In Russia itself the thesis that Solovyov had no epistemology [Radlov] evoked a spirited rebuttal [Ern] that has continued in North America [Shein, Navickas]. None of these scholars, however, has demonstrated the presence of more than a rudimentary epistemology, at least as that term is currently employed in contemporary philosophy. Additionally, the vast majority of secondary studies have dealt with Solovyov's mysticism and views on religion, nationalism, social issues, and the role of Russia in world history. Consequently, it is not surprising that those not directly acquainted with his explicit philosophical writings and their Russian context view Solovyov as having nothing of interest to say in philosophy proper. We should also mention one of the historically most influential views, one that initially at least appears quite plausible. Berdyaev, seeing Solovyov as a paradoxical figure, distinguished a day- from a night-Solovyov. The "day-Solovyov" was a philosophical rationalist, in the broad sense, an idealist, who sought to convey his highly metaphysical religious and ontological conceptions through philosophical discourse utilizing terms current at the time; the "night- Solovyov" was a mystic who conveyed his personal revelations largely through poetry.

***THE CRISIS OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY*. This, Solovyov's first major work, displays youthful enthusiasm, vision, optimism and a large measure of audacity. Unfortunately, it is also at times**

repetitious and replete with sweeping generalizations, unsubstantiated conclusions, and non sequiturs. The bulk of the work is an excursion in the history of modern philosophy in an attempt to substantiate and amplify Solovyov's justly famous claims, made already in the opening lines, that: (i) philosophy, qua a body of abstract, purely theoretical knowledge, has finished its development; (ii) philosophy in this sense is no longer nor will it ever again be maintained by anyone; (iii) philosophy has bequeathed to its successor certain accomplishments or results that this successor will utilize to resolve the problems that philosophy has unsuccessfully attempted to resolve.

Solovyov tells us that his ambitious program differs from positivism in that, unlike the latter, he understands the superseded artifact called "philosophy" to include not merely its "speculative" but also its "empirical" direction. Whether these two directions constitute the entirety of modern philosophy, i.e., whether there has been any historical manifestation of another sense of philosophy, one that is not purely theoretical, during the modern era, is unclear. Also left unclear is what precisely Solovyov means by "positivism." He mentions as representatives of that doctrine Mill, Spencer and Comte, whose views were by no means identical, and mentions as the fundamental tenet of positivism that "independent reality cannot be given in external experience." This I take to mean that experience yields knowledge merely of things as they appear, not as they are "in themselves." Solovyov has, it would seem, confused positivism with phenomenalism.

Solovyov's reading of the development of modern philosophy proceeds along the lines of Hegel's own interpretation and, similar to the latter, sees Hegel's "panlogism" as the *necessary* result of Western philosophy. The "necessity" here is clearly conceptual, although Solovyov implicitly accepts without further ado that this necessity has, as a matter of fact, been historically manifested in the form of individual philosophies. Moreover, in line with Hegel's apparent self-interpretation Solovyov agrees that the former's system permits no further development. For the latter, at least, this is because, having rejected the law of (non)contradiction, Hegel's philosophy sees internal contradiction, which otherwise would lead to further development, as a "logical necessity," i.e., as something the philosophy itself requires and is accommodated within the system itself.

Similarly, Solovyov's analysis of the movement from Hegelianism to mid-19th century German materialism is largely indebted to the left-Hegelians. Solovyov, however, merely claims that one can exit Hegelianism by acknowledging its fundamental one-sidedness, a proposition the truth-value of which would be factual. Yet in the next breath, as it were, he holds that the emergence of empiricism, qua materialism, was necessary. Out of the phenomenalism of empiricism arises Schopenhauer's philosophy and thence Eduard von Hartmann's.

All representatives of Western philosophy, including to some extent Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, see rational knowledge as the decomposition of intuition into its sensuous and logical elements. Such knowledge, however, in breaking up the concrete into abstractions without re-synthesizing them, *additionally* is unable to recognize these abstractions as such but must hypostatize them. Nevertheless, even were we to grant Solovyov's audacious thesis that *all* Western philosophers have done this abstraction and hypostatizing, it by no means follows that rational thought necessarily has had to follow this procedure.

According to Solovyov, von Hartmann, in particular, is aware of the one-sidedness of both rationalism and empiricism, which respectively single out the logical and the sense element in cognition to the exclusion of the other. Nevertheless, he too hypostatizes will and idea instead of realizing that the only way to avoid any and all bifurcations is through a recognition of what

Solovyov terms "the fundamental metaphysical principle," namely that the all-encompassing spirit is the truly existent. This hastily enunciated conclusion receives here no further argument. Nor does Solovyov dwell on establishing his ultimate claim that the results of Western philosophical development, issuing in the discovery of the all-encompassing spirit, agree with the religious beliefs of the Eastern Church fathers.

PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES OF INTEGRAL KNOWLEDGE **This work originally appeared during 1877 as a series of articles in an official journal published by the Ministry of Education (*Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshchenija*). Of Solovyov's major writings it is probably the most difficult for the philosopher today to understand owing, to a large degree, to its forced trichotomization of philosophical issues and options and its extensive use of terms drawn from mystical sources even when employed in a quite different sense.**

There are three fundamental aspects, or "subjective foundations," of human life--in Solovyov's terminology, "forms of being": feeling, thinking and willing, each of which has both a personal and a social side, and each has its objective intentional object. These are, respectively, objective beauty, objective truth and the objective good. Three fundamental forms of the social union arise from human striving for the good: economic society, political society or government, and spiritual society. Likewise in the pursuit of truth there arises positive science, abstract philosophy, and theology. Lastly, in the sphere of feeling we have the technical arts, such as architecture, the fine arts and a form of mysticism, which Solovyov emphasizes is an immediate spiritual connection with the transcendent world and as such is not to be confused with the term "mysticism" as used to indicate a reflection on that connection.

Human cultural evolution has literally passed through these forms and done so according to what Solovyov calls "an incontestable law of development." Economic socialism, positivism and utilitarian realism represent for him the highest point yet of Western civilization and, in line with his earlier work, the final stage of its development. But Western civilization with its social, economic, philosophic and scientific atomization represents only a second, transitional phase in human development. The next, final stage, characterized by freedom from all one- sidedness and elevation over special interests is presently a "tribal character" of the Slavic peoples and, in particular, of the Russian nation.

Although undoubtedly of some historical interest as an expression of and contribution to ideas circulating in Russia as to the country's role in world affairs, Solovyov expounded all the above without argument and as such is of little interest to contemporary philosophy. Of somewhat greater value is his critique of traditional philosophical directions.

Developing its essential principle to the end, empiricism holds that I know only what the senses tell me. Consequently, I know even of myself only through conscious impressions, which, in turn, means that I am nothing but states of consciousness. Yet my consciousness presupposes me. Thus, we have found that empiricism leads, by *reductio ad absurdum*, to its self-refutation. The means to avoid such a conclusion, however, lies in recognizing the absolute being of the cognizing subject, which, in short, is idealism.

Likewise, the consistent development of the idealist principle leads to a denial of the epistemic subject and pure thought. The dissolution of these two directions means the collapse of all abstract philosophy. We are left with two choices: either complete skepticism or the view that what truly exists has an independent reality quite apart from our material world, a view Solovyov terms "mysticism." With mysticism we have, in Solovyov's view, exhausted all logical options. That is,

having seen that holding the truly existing to be either the cognized object or the cognizing subject leads to absurdity, the sole remaining logical possibility is that offered by mysticism, which, thus, completes the "circle of possible philosophical views." Although empiricism and rationalism (= idealism) rest on false principles, their respective objective contents, external experience, qua the foundation of natural science, and logical thought, qua the foundation of pure philosophy, are to be synthesized or encompassed along with mystical knowledge in "integral knowledge," what Solovyov terms "theosophy."

For whatever reason, *Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge* remained incomplete. Despite its expression of his own views, which undoubtedly at this stage were greatly indebted to the Slavophiles, Solovyov altered his *original* plan to submit this work as a doctoral dissertation. Instead, in April 1880 he defended at St. Petersburg University a large work that he had begun at approximately the same time as the *Philosophical Principles* and which, like the latter, appeared in serialized form starting in 1877 and as a separate book in 1880.

***CRITIQUE OF ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES* Originally planned to comprise three parts, ethics, epistemology and aesthetics, (which alone already reveals a debt to Kant) the completed work never turned to the last of these, on which, however, Solovyov labored extensively. Nevertheless, owing largely to its traditional philosophical style and its extended treatment of major historical figures, the *Critique* remains the most accessible of Solovyov's major early writings today.**

(1) Subjective Ethics. Over the course of human development a number of principles have been advanced in pursuit of various goals deemed to be that for which human actions should strive, for example, pleasure, happiness, fulfillment of duties, adherence to God's will, etc. Certainly seeking happiness, pleasure, or the fulfillment of duty is not unequivocally wrong. Yet the pursuit of any one of these alone without the others cannot provide a basis for a totally satisfactory ethical system. A higher synthesis or, if you will, a more encompassing unity is needed, one that will reveal how and when any of these particular pursuits is ethically warranted. Such a unity will show the truth, and thereby the error, of singling out any particular moment of the unity as sufficient alone. Doing so, that is, showing the proper place of each principle, showing them as necessary yet inadequate stages on the way to a complete synthetic system is what Solovyov means by "the critical method."

In the end all moral theories that rest on an empirical basis, something factual in human nature, fail because they cannot provide and account for obligation. The essential feature of moral law, as Solovyov understands the concept, is its absolute necessity for all rational beings. The Kantian influence here is unmistakable and indubitable. Nevertheless, Solovyov parts company with Kant in expressing that a natural inclination in support of an obligatory action *enhances* the moral value of an action. Since duty is the general *form* of the moral principle, whereas an inclination serves as the psychological motive for a moral action, i.e., as the material aspect of morality, the two cannot contradict one another.

The Kantian categorical imperative, which Solovyov, in general, endorses, presupposes freedom. Of course, we all feel that our actions are free, but what kind of freedom is this? Here Solovyov approaches phenomenology in stating that the job of philosophy is to analyze this feeling with an eye to determining what it is we are aware of. Undoubtedly, for the most part we can do as we please, but such freedom is freedom of action. The question, however, is whether I can actually *want* something other than I do, i.e., whether *the will* is free.

Again like Kant, Solovyov believes all our actions, even the will itself, is, at least viewed empirically, subject to the law of causality. From the moral perspective, however, there is a

"causality of freedom," a freedom to initiate a causal sequence on the part of practical reason. In other words, empirically the will is determined, whereas transcendentally it is free. Solovyov, though, goes on to pose, at least rhetorically, the question whether this transcendental freedom is genuine or could it be that the will is subject to transcendental conditions. In doing so, he reveals that his conception of "transcendental" differs from that of Kant. Nevertheless, waving aside all difficulties associated with a resolution of the metaphysical issue of freedom of the will, Solovyov tells us, ethics has no need of such investigations; reason and empirical inquiry are sufficient. The criteria of moral activity lie in its universality and necessity, i.e., that the principle of one's action can be made a universal law.

(2) Objective Ethics. In order that the good determine my will I must be subjectively convinced that the consequent action can be realized. This moral action presupposes a certain knowledge of and is conditioned by society. Subjective ethics instructs us that we should treat others not as means but as ends. Likewise, they should treat me as an end. Solovyov terms a community of beings freely striving to realize each other's good as if it were his or her own good "free communality." Although some undoubtedly see material wealth as a goal, it cannot serve as a *moral* goal. Rather, the goal of free communality is the just distribution of wealth, which, in turn, requires an organization to administer fair and equal treatment of and to all, in other words, a political arrangement or government. To make the other person's good my good, I must recognize such concern as obligatory. That is, I must recognize the other as having rights, which my *material* interests cannot infringe.

If all individuals acted for the benefit of all, there would be no need for a coordination of interests, for interests would not be in conflict. There is, however, no universal consensus on benefits and often enough individually perceived benefits conflict. In this need for adjudication lies a source of government and law. Laws express the negative side of morality, i.e., they do not say what *should* be done, but what is *not permitted*. Thus, the legal order is unable to provide positive directives, precisely because what humans specifically should do and concretely *aspire* to attain remains conditional and contingent. The absolute, unconditional form of morality demands an absolute, unconditional content, viz. an absolute goal.

As a finite being, the human individual cannot attain the absolute except through positive interaction with all others. Whereas in the legal order each individual is limited by the other, in the aspiration or striving for the absolute the other aids or completes the self. Such a union of beings is grounded psychologically in love. As a contingent being the human individual cannot fully realize an absolute object or goal. Only in the process of individuals working in concert, forming a "total-unity," does love become a non-contingent state. Only in an inner unity with all does man realize what Solovyov calls "the divine principle."

Solovyov himself views his position as diametrically opposed to that of Kant, who from absolute moral obligation was led to postulating the existence of God, immortality and human freedom. For Solovyov, the realization of morality presupposes an affirmative metaphysics. Once we progress from Kant's purely subjective ethics to an objective understanding of ethics, we see the need for a conviction in the theoretical validity of Kant's three postulates, their metaphysical truth independent of their practical desirability.

Again differing from Kant, and Fichte too, Solovyov at this point in his life rejects the priority of ethics over metaphysics. The genuine force of the moral principle rests on the existence of the absolute order. And the necessary conviction in this order can be had only if we know it to be true,

which demands an epistemological inquiry.

(3) Epistemology/Metaphysics. "To know what we should do we must know what is," Solovyov tells us. To say what is, however, is informative only in contrast to saying, at least implicitly, what is not -- this we already know from the opening pages of Hegel's *Logic*. One answer is that the true is that which objectively exists independent of any knowing subject. Here Solovyov leads us down a path strikingly similar, at least in outline, to that taken in the initial chapters of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. If the objectively real is the true, then *sense certainty* is our guarantee of having obtained it. But this certainty cannot be that of an individual knowing subject alone, for truth is objective and thus the same for everyone. Truth must not be in the facts but the things that make up the facts. Moreover, truth cannot be the individual things in isolation, for truths would then be isomorphic with the number of things. Such a conception of truth is vacuous; no, truth is one. With this Solovyov believes he has passed to naturalism.

Of course, our immediate sense experience lacks universality and does not in all its facets correspond to objective reality. Clearly, many qualities of objects, for example, color and taste, are subjective. Thus, reality must be what is general or present in *all* sense experience. To the general foundation of sensation corresponds the general foundation of things, viz. that conveyed through the sense of touch, i.e., the experience of resistance. The general foundation of objective being is its impenetrability.

Holding true being to be single and impenetrable, however, remains untenable. Through a series of dialectical maneuvers, reminiscent of Hegel, Solovyov arrives at the position that true being contains multiplicity. That is, whereas it is singular owing to absolute impenetrability, it consists of separate particles, each of which is impenetrable. Having in this way passed to atomism, Solovyov provides a depiction largely indebted to Kant in the latter's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Of course, the former recognizes that we have reached atomism, not through some experimental technique but through philosophical, logical reasoning. But every scientific explanation of the ultimate constituents of reality transgresses the bounds of experience. We return to the viewpoint that reality belongs to appearances alone, i.e., what is given in experience. Now, however, our realism has been dialectically transformed into a phenomenal or critical realism.

According to phenomenal realism, absolute reality is ultimately inaccessible to cognition. Nevertheless, that which cognitively is accessible constitutes a relative objectivity and is our sole standard for determining truth and thus knowledge. In this sensualism -- for that is what it is -- we refer particular sensations to definite objects. These objects are taken as objectively real despite the manifest subjectivity of sensation in general. Thus, objectification, as the imparting of the sense of objectivity onto the content of sensations, must be an independent activity of the cognizing subject.

Objectification, alone, cannot account for the definite object before me to which all my sensations of that object refer as parts or aspects. In addition to objectification there must be a unification or synthesizing of sensations, and this process or act is again distinct from sensing and certainly is not part of the sensation itself. Again evoking an image of Kant in the reader, Solovyov calls the independent cognitive act whereby sense data are formed into definite objective representations the *imagination*.

The two factors we have discerned, one contributed by the epistemic subject and the other by sensation, are absolutely independent of each other. Cognition requires both, but what connects them remains unanswered. According to Solovyov, any connection implies dependence, but the a

priori element certainly cannot be dependent on the empirical. For, following Hume, from the factual we cannot deduce the universality and the necessity of a law. The other alternative is to have the content of true cognition dependent on the forms of reason; such is the approach of Hegel's absolute rationalism. However, if all the determinations of being are created by cognition, then at the beginning we have only the pure form of cognition, pure thought, a concept of being in general. Solovyov finds such a starting point to be vacuous. For although Hegel correctly realizes the general form of truth to be universality, it is a negative conception from which nothing can be derived. The positive conception is a whole that contains everything in itself, not, as in Hegel, one that everything contains in itself.

For Solovyov, truth, in short, is the whole, and, consequently, each particular fact in isolation from the whole is false. Again Solovyov's position on rationality bears an uncanny resemblance to that of Hegel, although in the former's eyes this resemblance is superficial. Reason is the whole, and so the rationality of a particular fact lies in its interrelation with the whole. A fact divorced from the whole is irrational.

True knowledge, thus, implies the whole, the truly existent, the absolute. Following Solovyov's "dialectical" thinking, the absolute, qua absolute, presupposes a non-absolute; the whole or one presupposes the many. And, again conjuring up visions of Hegel, if the absolute *is* the one, the non-absolute is *becoming* the one. The latter can become the one only if it has the divine element potentially. In nature, the one exists only potentially, whereas in humans it is actual, though only ideally, i.e., in consciousness.

The object of knowledge has three forms: 1) as it appears to us empirically, 2) as conceptually ideal, and 3) as existing absolutely independent of our cognition of it. Our concepts and sensations would be viewed merely as subjective states were it not for the third form. The basis for this form is a third sort of cognition, without which objective truth would elude us. A study of the history of philosophy correctly shows that neither the senses nor the intellect, whether separately or in combination, can satisfactorily account for the third form. Sensations are relative, and concepts conditional. Indeed, the referral of our thoughts and sensations to an object in knowledge, thus, presupposes this third sort of cognition. Such cognition, viz., faith or mystical knowledge, would itself be impossible if the subject and the object of knowledge were completely divorced. In this interaction we perceive the object's essence or "idea," its constancy. The imagination (here, let us recall Kant), at a non-conscious level, organizes the manifold given by sense experience into an object via a referral of this manifold to the "idea" of the object.

Solovyov believes he has demonstrated that *all* knowledge arises through the confluence of empirical, rational and "mystical" elements. Only philosophical analysis can discover the role of the mystical. Just as an isolation of the first two elements has historically led to empiricism and rationalism respectively, so the mystical element has been accentuated by traditional theology. And just as the former directions have given rise to dogmatic manifestations, so too has theology found its dogmatic exponents. The task before us lies in freeing the three directions of their exclusiveness, intentionally integrating and organizing true knowledge into a complete system, which Solovyov called "free theosophy."

***THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE GOOD*. After the completion of the works mentioned above, Solovyov largely withdrew from philosophy, both as a profession and its concerns. During the 1880s he devoted himself increasingly to theological and topical social issues of little, if any, concern to the contemporary philosopher. However, in 1894 Solovyov took to preparing a second**

edition of the *Critique of Abstract Principles*. Owing, though, to an evolution, and thereby significant changes, in his viewpoint, he soon abandoned this venture and embarked on an entirely new statement of his philosophical views. Just as in his earlier treatise, Solovyov again intended to treat ethical issues before turning to an epistemological inquiry.

***The Justification of the Good* appeared in book form in 1897, many, though not all chapters of which had previously been published in several well-known philosophical and literary journals over the course of the previous three years. Largely in response to criticisms of the book or its serialized chapters, Solovyov managed to complete a second edition, which was published in 1899 and accompanied by a new preface.**

Most notably, Solovyov now holds that ethics is an independent discipline. In this he finds himself in solidarity with Kant, who made this "great discovery," as Solovyov put it. Knowledge of good and evil is accessible to all individuals possessing reason and a conscience and needs neither divine revelation nor epistemological deduction. Although philosophical analysis surely is unable to instill a certainty that I, the analyst, alone exist, solipsism even if true would eliminate only objective ethics. There is another, a subjective side to ethics that concerns duties to oneself. Likewise, morality is independent of the metaphysical question concerning freedom of the will. From the independence of ethics Solovyov draws the conclusion that life has meaning and, coupled with this, we can legitimately speak of a moral order.

The natural bases of morality, from which ethics as an independent discipline can be deduced and which form the basis of moral consciousness, are shame, pity and reverence. Shame reveals to man his higher human dignity. It sets the human apart from the animal world. Pity forms the basis of all of man's social relations to others. Reverence establishes the moral basis of man's relation to that which is higher to himself and, as such, is the root of religion.

Each of the three bases, Solovyov tells us, may be considered from three sides or points of view. Shame as a virtue reveals itself as modesty, pity as compassion and reverence as piety. All other proposed virtues are essentially expressions of one of these three. The other two points of view, as a principle of action and as a condition of an ensuing moral action, are interconnected with the first such that the first logically contains the others.

Interestingly, truthfulness is not itself a formal virtue. Solovyov opposes one sort of extreme ethical formalism, arguing that making a factually false statement is not always a lie in the moral sense. The nature of the will behind the action must be taken into account.

Likewise, despite his enormous respect for Kant's work in the field of ethics, Solovyov rejects viewing God and the immortality of the soul as postulates. God's existence, he tells us, is not a *deduction* from religious feeling or experience but its immediate content, i.e., that which is experienced. Furthermore, he adds that God and the soul are "direct creative forces of moral reality." How we are to interpret these claims in light of the supposed independence of ethics is contentious unless, of course, we find Solovyov guilty of simple-mindedness. Indeed one of his own friends [Trubeckoj] wrote: "It is not difficult to convince ourselves that these arguments about the independence of ethics are refuted on every later page in the *Justification of the Good*." However we look upon Solovyov's pronouncements, the Deity plays a significant role in his ethics. Solovyov provides a facile answer to the perennial question of how a morally perfect God can permit the existence of evil: Its elimination would mean the annihilation of human freedom thereby rendering free goodness (good without freedom is imperfect) impossible. Thus, God permits evil, because its removal would be a greater evil.

Often, all too often, Solovyov is prone to express himself in metaphysical, indeed theological, terms that do little to clarify his position. The realization of the Kingdom of God, he tells us, is the goal of life. What he means, however, is that the realization of a perfect moral order, in which the relations between individuals and the collective whole's relations to each individual are morally correct, is all that can be rationally desired. Each of us understands that the attainment of moral perfection is not a solipsistic enterprise, i.e., that the Kingdom of God can only be achieved if we each want it and collectively attain it. The individual can attain the moral ideal only in and through society. Christianity alone offers the idea of the perfect individual and the perfect society. Other ideas have been presented (Solovyov mentions Buddhism and Platonism), of course, and these have been historically necessary for the attainment of the universal human consciousness that Christianity promises.

Man's correct relations to God, his fellow humans and his own material nature, in accordance with the three foundations of morality, viz., piety, pity, or compassion, and shame, are collectively organized in three forms. The Church is collectively organized piety, whereas the state is collectively organized pity or compassion. To view the state in such terms already tells us a great deal concerning how Solovyov views the state's mission and, consequently, his general stand toward laissez-faire doctrines. Although owing to the connection between legality and morality one can speak of a Christian state, this is not to say that in pre-Christian times the state had no moral foundations. Just as the pagan can know the moral law "written in his heart," (an expression of St. Paul's that Solovyov was fond of invoking but also reminiscent of Kant's "the moral law within") so too the pagan state has two functions: 1) to preserve the foundation of social life necessary for continued human existence, and 2) to improve the condition of humanity.

At the end of *The Justification of the Good* Solovyov attempts in the most cursory fashion to make a transition to epistemology. He claims that the struggle between good and evil raises the question of the latter's origin, which in turn ultimately requires an epistemological inquiry. That ethics is an independent discipline does not mean that it is not connected to metaphysics and the theory of knowledge. One can study ethics in its entirety without first having answers to all other philosophical problems much as one can be an excellent swimmer without knowing the physics of buoyancy.

***THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY*. During the last few years of his life Solovyov sought to recast his thoughts on epistemology. Surely he intended to publish in serial fashion the various chapters of a planned book on the topic, much as he did *The Justification of the Good*. Unfortunately at the time of his death in 1900 only three chapters were completed, and it is only on the basis of these that we can judge his new standpoint. Nevertheless, on the basis of these meager writings we can already see that Solovyov's new epistemological reflections exhibit a greater transformation of his thoughts on the subject than does his ethics. Whereas a suggested affinity between these ideas and later German phenomenology must be viewed with caution and, in light of his earlier thoughts, a measure of skepticism, there can be little doubt that to all appearances Solovyov spoke and thought in this late work in a philosophical idiom close to that with which we have become familiar in the 20th century.**

For Solovyov epistemology concerns itself with the validity of knowledge in itself, that is, not in terms of whether it is useful in practice or provides a basis for an ethical system that has for whatever reason been accepted. Perhaps not surprisingly then, particularly in light of his firm religious views, Solovyov adheres to a correspondence theory, saying that knowledge is the agreement of a thought of an object with the actual object. The open questions are how such an

agreement is possible and how do we know that we know.

The Cartesian "I think, therefore I am" leads us virtually nowhere. Admittedly the claim contains indubitable knowledge, but it is merely that of a subjective reality. I might just as well be thinking of an illusory book as of an actually existing one. How do we get beyond the "I think"; how do we distinguish a dream from reality? The criteria are not present in the immediacy of the consciously intended object. To claim as did some Russian philosophers in his own day that the reality of the external world is an immediately given fact appears to Solovyov an arbitrary opinion hardly worthy of philosophy. Nor is it possible to deduce from the Cartesian inference that the I is a thinking substance. Here is the root of Descartes' error. The self discovered in self-consciousness has the same status as the object of consciousness, i.e., both have phenomenal existence. If we cannot say what this object of my consciousness is like in itself, i.e., apart from my conscious acts, so too we cannot say what the subject of consciousness is apart from consciousness and for the same reason. Likewise, just as we cannot speak about the I in itself, so too we cannot answer to whom consciousness belongs.

In "The Reliability of Reason," the second article comprising the *Theoretical Philosophy*, Solovyov concerns himself with affirming the universality of logical thought. In doing so he stands in opposition to the popular reductionisms, e.g., psychologism, that sought to deny any extra-temporal significance to logic. Thought itself, Solovyov tells us, requires recollection, language and intentionality. Since any logical thought is, nevertheless, a thought and since thought can be analyzed in terms of psychic functions, one could conceivably charge Solovyov with lapsing back into a psychologism, in precisely the same way as some critics have charged Husserl with doing so. And much the same defenses of Husserl's position can also be used in reply to the objection against Solovyov's stance.

The third article, "The Form of Rationality and the Reason of Truth," published in 1898, concerns itself with the proper starting points of epistemology. The first such point is the indubitable veracity of the given in immediate consciousness. There can be no doubt that the pain I experience upon stubbing my toe is genuine. The second starting point of epistemology is the objective, universal validity of rational thought. Along with Hume and Kant, Solovyov does not dispute that factual experience can provide claims only to conditional generality. Rationality alone provides universality. This universality, however, is merely formal. To distinguish the rational form from the conditional content of thought is the first essential task of philosophy. Taking up this challenge is the philosophical self or subject. Solovyov concludes, again as he always does, with a triadic distinction between the empirical subject, the logical subject and the philosophical subject. And although he labels the first the "soul," the second the "mind" and the third the "spirit," the trichotomy is contrived and the labeling, at best, imaginative with no foundation other than in Solovyov's a priori architectonic.

CONCLUDING REMARKS. Solovyov's relatively early death, brought on to some degree by his erratic life-style, precluded the completion of his last philosophical work. He also intended to turn his attention eventually towards aesthetics, but whether he would ever have been able to complete such a project remains doubtful. Solovyov was never at any stage of his development able to complete a systematic treatise on the topic, although he did publish a number of writings on the subject.

However beneficial our reading of Solovyov's works may be, there can be little doubt that he was very much a 19th-century figure. We can hardly take seriously his incessant predilection for

triadic schemes, far in excess to anything similar in the German Idealists. His choice of terminology, drawn from an intellectual fashion of his day, also poses a formidable obstacle to the contemporary reader. Lastly, despite, for example, an often perspicacious study of his philosophical predecessors, written during his middle years, Solovyov, in clinging obstinately to his rigid architectonic, failed to penetrate further than they. Indeed, he often fell far short of their achievements. His discussion of imagination, for example, as we saw, is much too superficial, adding nothing to that found in Kant. These shortcomings, though, should not divert us from recognizing his genuinely useful insights.

After his death, with interest surging in the mystical amid abundant decadent trends, so characteristic of decaying cultures, Solovyov's thought was seized upon by those far less interested in philosophical analysis than he was towards the end. Those who invoked his name so often in the years immediately subsequent to his death stressed the religious strivings of his middle years to the complete neglect of his final philosophical project, let alone its continuation and completion. In terms of Solovyov-studies today the philosophical project of discovering the "rational kernel within the mystical shell" [Marx], of separating the "living from the dead" [Croce], remains not simply unfulfilled but barely begun.

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The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Sophists

The growing demand for education in 5th century BCE. Greece called into existence a class of teachers known as sophists. They were a professional class rather than a school, and as such they were scattered over Greece and exhibited professional rivalries. The educational demand was partly for genuine knowledge, but mostly reflected a desire for spurious learning that would lead to political success. They wandered about Greece from place to place, gave lectures, took pupils, and entered into disputations. For these services they exacted large fees, and were, in fact, the first in Greece to take fees for teaching wisdom. Though not disgraceful in itself, the wise men of Greece had never accepted payment for their teaching. The sophists were not, technically speaking, philosophers, but, instead taught any subject for which there was a popular demand. Topics included rhetoric, politics, grammar, etymology, history, physics, and mathematics. Early on they were seen as teachers of virtue in the sense that they taught people to perform their function in the state. Protagoras of Abdera, who appeared about 445 BCE. is named as the first Sophist; after him the most important is Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis. Wherever they appeared, especially in Athens, they were received with enthusiasm and many flocked to hear them. Even such people as Pericles, Euripides, and Socrates sought their company.

The most popular career of a Greek of ability at the time was politics; hence the sophists largely concentrated on teaching rhetoric. The aims of the young politicians whom they trained were to persuade the multitude of whatever they wished them to believed. The search for truth was not top priority. Consequently the sophists undertook to provide a stock of arguments on any subject, or to prove any position. They boasted of their ability to make the worse appear the better reason, to prove that black is white. Some, like Gorgias, asserted that it was not necessary to have any knowledge of a subject to give satisfactory replies as regards it. Thus, Gorgias ostentatiously answered any question on any subject instantly and without consideration. To attain these ends mere quibbling, and the scoring of verbal points were employed. In this way, the sophists tried to entangle, entrap, and confuse their opponents, and even, if this were not possible, to beat them down by mere violence and noise. They sought also to dazzle by means of strange or flowery metaphors, by unusual figures of speech, by epigrams and paradoxes, and in general by being clever and smart, rather than earnest and truthful. Hence our word "sophistry": the use of fallacious arguments knowing them to be such. Early on Sophists were seen to be of merit as people of superior skill or wisdom, as we find in Pindar and Herodotus. We learn from Plato, though, that even in the 5th century there was a prejudice against the name "sophist". By Aristotle's time, the name bore a contemptuous meaning, as he defines "sophist" as one who reasons falsely for the sake of gain.

With the revival of Greek eloquence, from about the beginning of the second century CE., the name "sophist" attained a new distinction. At that time the name was given to the professional orators, who appeared in public with great pomp and delivered declamations either prepared beforehand or improvised on the spot. Like the earlier sophists, they went generally from place to

place, and were overwhelmed with applause and with marks of distinction by their contemporaries, including the Roman Emperors. Dion Chrysostom, Herodes Atticus, Aristides, Lucian, and Philostratus the Elder belong to the flourishing period of this second school of sophists, a period which extends over the entire second century. They appear afresh about the middle of the fourth century, devoting their philosophic culture to the zealous but unavailing defense of paganism. Among them was the emperor Julian and his contemporaries Libanius, Himerius, and Themistius. Synesius may be considered the last sophist of importance.

IEP

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Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)

British philosopher and sociologist, Herbert Spencer was a major figure in the intellectual life of the Victorian era. He was one of the principal proponents of evolutionary theory in the mid nineteenth century, and his reputation at the time rivaled that of Charles Darwin. Spencer was initially best known for developing and applying evolutionary theory to philosophy, psychology and the study of society --what he called his "synthetic philosophy" (see his *A System of Synthetic Philosophy*, 1862-93). Today, however, he is usually remembered in philosophical circles for his political thought, primarily for his defense of natural rights and for criticisms of utilitarian positivism, and his views have been invoked by 'libertarian' thinkers such as Robert Nozick.

Life

Spencer was born in Derby, England on 27 April 1820, the eldest of nine children, but the only one to survive infancy. He was the product of an undisciplined, largely informal education. His father, George, was a school teacher, but an unconventional man, and Spencer's family were Methodist 'Dissenters,' with Quaker sympathies. From an early age, Herbert was strongly influenced by the individualism and the anti-establishment and anti-clerical views of his father, and the Benthamite radical views of his uncle Thomas. Indeed, Spencer's early years showed a good deal of resistance to authority and independence.

A person of eclectic interests, Spencer eventually trained as a civil engineer for railways but, in his early 20s, turned to journalism and political writing. He was initially an advocate of many of the causes of philosophic radicalism and some of his ideas (e.g., the definition of 'good' and 'bad' in terms of their pleasurable or painful consequences, and his adoption of a version of the 'greatest happiness principle') show similarities to utilitarianism.

From 1848 to 1853, Spencer worked as a writer and subeditor for *The Economist* financial weekly and, as a result, came into contact with a number of political controversialists such as George Henry Lewes, Thomas Carlyle, Lewes' future lover George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans [1819-1880])--with whom Spencer had himself had a lengthy (though purely intellectual) association--and T.H. Huxley (1825-1895). Despite the diversity of opinions to which he was exposed, Spencer's unquestioning confidence in his own views was coupled with a stubbornness and a refusal to read authors with whom he disagreed.

In his early writings, Spencer defended a number of radical causes-- particularly on land nationalization, the extent to which economics should reflect a policy of *laissez-faire*, and the place and role of women in society--though he came to abandon most of these causes later in his life.

In 1851 Spencer's first book, *Social Statics, or the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness* appeared. ('Social statics'--the term was borrowed from Auguste Comte--deals with the conditions of social order, and was preliminary to a study of human progress and evolution--i.e., 'social dynamics.') In this work,

Spencer presents an account of the development of human freedom and a defense of individual liberties, based on a (Lamarckian-style) evolutionary theory.

Upon the death of his uncle Thomas, in 1853, Spencer received a small inheritance which allowed him to devote himself to writing without depending on regular employment.

In 1855, Spencer published his second book, *The Principles of Psychology*. As in *Social Statics*, Spencer saw Bentham and Mill as major targets, though in the present work he focussed on criticisms of the latter's associationism. (Spencer later revised this work, and Mill came to respect some of Spencer's arguments.*) The Principles of Psychology* was much less successful than *Social Statics*, however, and about this time Spencer began to experience serious (predominantly mental) health problems that affected him for the rest of his life. This led him to seek privacy, and he increasingly avoided appearing in public. Although he found that, because of his ill health, he could write for only a few hours each day, he embarked upon a lengthy project--the nine-volume *A System of Synthetic Philosophy* (1862-93)--which provided a systematic account of his views in biology, sociology, ethics and politics. This 'synthetic philosophy' brought together a wide range of data from the various natural and social sciences and organized it according to the basic principles of his evolutionary theory.

Spencer's *Synthetic Philosophy* was initially available only through private subscription, but he was also a contributor to the leading intellectual magazines and newspapers of his day. His fame grew with his publications, and he counted among his admirers both radical thinkers and prominent scientists, including John Stuart Mill and the physicist, John Tyndall. In the 1860s and 1870s, for example, the influence of Spencer's evolutionary theory was on a par with that of Charles Darwin.

In 1883 Spencer was elected a corresponding member of philosophical section of the French academy of moral and political sciences. His work was also particularly influential in the United States, where his book, *The Study of Sociology*, was at the center of a controversy (1879-80) at Yale University between a professor, William Graham Sumner, and the University's president, Noah Porter. Spencer's influence extended into the upper echelons of American society and it has been claimed that, in 1896, "three justices of the Supreme Court were avowed 'Spencerians'." His reputation was at its peak in the 1870s and early 1880s, and he was nominated for the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1902. Spencer, however, declined most of the honors he was given.

Spencer's health significantly deteriorated in the last two decades of his life, and he died in relative seclusion, following a long illness, on December 8, 1903.

Within his lifetime, some one million copies of his books had been sold, his work had been translated into French, German, Spanish, Italian, and Russian, and his ideas were popular in a number of other countries such as Poland (e.g., through the work of the positivist, Wladyslaw Kozlowski). Nevertheless, by the end of his life, his political views were no longer as popular as they had once been, and the dominant currents in liberalism allowed for a more interventionist state.

Method

Spencer's method is, broadly speaking, scientific and empirical, and it was influenced significantly by the positivism of Auguste Comte. Because of the empirical character of scientific knowledge and because of his conviction that that which is known--biological life--is in a process of evolution, Spencer held that knowledge is subject to change. Thus, Spencer writes, "In science the important thing is to modify and

change one's ideas as science advances." As scientific knowledge was primarily empirical, however, that which was not 'perceivable' and could not be empirically tested could not be known. (This emphasis on the knowable as perceivable led critics to charge that Spencer fails to distinguish perceiving and conceiving.) Nevertheless, Spencer was not a skeptic.

Spencer's method was also synthetic. The purpose of each science or field of investigation was to accumulate data and to derive from these phenomena the basic principles or laws or 'forces' which gave rise to them. To the extent that such principles conformed to the results of inquiries or experiments in the other sciences, one could have explanations that were of a high degree of certainty. Thus, Spencer was at pains to show how the evidence and conclusions of each of the sciences is relevant to, and materially affected by, the conclusions of the others.

Human Nature

In the first volume of *A System of Synthetic Philosophy*, entitled *First Principles* (1862), Spencer argued that all phenomena could be explained in terms of a lengthy process of evolution in things. This 'principle of continuity' was that homogeneous organisms are unstable, that organisms develop from simple to more complex and heterogeneous forms, and that such evolution constituted a norm of progress. This account of evolution provided a complete and 'predetermined' structure for the kind of variation noted by Darwin--and Darwin's respect for Spencer was significant.

But while Spencer held that progress was a necessity, it was 'necessary' only overall, and there is no teleological element in his account of this process. In fact, it was Spencer, and not Darwin, who coined the phrase "survival of the fittest," though Darwin came to employ the expression in later editions of the *Origin of Species*. (That this view was both ambiguous --for it was not clear whether one had in mind the 'fittest' individual or species--and far from universal was something that both figures, however, failed to address.)

Spencer's understanding of evolution included the Lamarckian theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics and emphasized the direct influence of external agencies on the organism's development. He denied (as Darwin had argued) that evolution was based on the characteristics and development of the organism itself and on a simple principle of natural selection.

Spencer held that he had evidence for this evolutionary account from the study of biology (see *Principles of Biology*, 2 vols. [1864-7]). He argued that there is a gradual specialization in things--beginning with biological organisms--towards self-sufficiency and individuation. Because human nature can be said to improve and change, then, scientific--including moral and political-- views that rested on the assumption of a stable human nature (such as that presupposed by many utilitarians) had to be rejected. 'Human nature' was simply "the aggregate of men's instincts and sentiments" which, over time, would become adapted to social existence. Spencer still recognized the importance of understanding individuals in terms of the 'whole' of which they were 'parts,' but these parts were mutually dependent, not subordinate to the organism as a whole. They had an identity and value on which the whole depended--unlike, Spencer thought, that portrayed by Hobbes.

For Spencer, then, human life was not only on a continuum with, but was also the culmination of, a lengthy process of evolution. Even though he allowed that there was a parallel development of mind and body, without reducing the former to the latter, he was opposed to dualism and his account of mind and of the functioning of the central nervous system and the brain was mechanistic.

Although what characterized the development of organisms was the 'tendency to individuation' (*Social Statics* [1851], p. 436), this was coupled with a natural inclination in beings to pursue whatever would preserve their lives. When one examines human beings, this natural inclination was reflected in the characteristic of rational self-interest. Indeed, this tendency to pursue one's individual interests is such that, in primitive societies, at least, Spencer believed that a prime motivating factor in human beings coming together was the threat of violence and war.

Paradoxically, perhaps, Spencer held an 'organic' view of society. Starting with the characteristics of individual entities, one could deduce, using laws of nature, what would promote or provide life and human happiness. He believed that social life was an extension of the life of a natural body, and that social 'organisms' reflected the same (Lamarckian) evolutionary principles or laws as biological entities did. The existence of such 'laws,' then, provides a basis for moral science and for determining how individuals ought to act and what would constitute human happiness.

Religion

As a result of his view that knowledge about phenomena required empirical demonstration, Spencer held that we cannot know the nature of reality in itself and that there was, therefore, something that was fundamentally "unknowable." (This included the complete knowledge of the nature of space, time, force, motion, and substance.)

Since, Spencer claimed, we cannot know anything non-empirical, we cannot know whether there is a God or what its character might be. Though Spencer was a severe critic of religion and religious doctrine and practice--these being the appropriate objects of empirical investigation and assessment--his general position on religion was agnostic. Theism, he argued, cannot be adopted because there is no means to acquire knowledge of the divine, and there would be no way of testing it. But while we cannot know whether religious beliefs are true, neither can we know that (fundamental) religious beliefs are false.

Moral Philosophy

Spencer saw human life on a continuum with, but also as the culmination of, a lengthy process of evolution, and he held that human society reflects the same evolutionary principles as biological organisms do in their development. Society--and social institutions such as the economy--can, he believed, function without external control, just as the digestive system or a lower organism does (though, in arguing this, Spencer failed to see the fundamental differences between 'higher' and 'lower' levels of social organization). For Spencer, all natural and social development reflected 'the universality of law'. Beginning with the 'laws of life', the conditions of social existence, and the recognition of life as a fundamental value, moral science can deduce what kinds of laws promote life and produce happiness. Spencer's ethics and political philosophy, then, depends on a theory of 'natural law,' and it is because of this that, he maintained, evolutionary theory could provide a basis for a comprehensive political and even philosophical theory.

Given the variations in temperament and character among individuals, Spencer recognized that there were differences in what happiness specifically consists in (*Social Statics* [1851], p. 5). In general, however, 'happiness' is the surplus of pleasure over pain, and 'the good' is what contributes to the life and development of the organism, or--what is much the same--what provides this surplus of pleasure over pain. Happiness, therefore, reflects the complete adaptation of an individual organism to its

environment--or, in other words, 'happiness' is that which an individual human being naturally seeks.

For human beings to flourish and develop, Spencer held that there must be as few artificial restrictions as possible, and it is primarily freedom that he, *contra* Bentham, saw as promoting human happiness. While progress was an inevitable characteristic of evolution, it was something to be achieved only through the free exercise of human faculties (see *Social Statics*).

Society, however, is (by definition, for Spencer) an aggregate of individuals, and change in society could take place only once the individual members of that society had changed and developed (*The Study of Sociology*, pp. 366-367). Individuals are, therefore, 'primary,' individual development was 'egoistic,' and associations with others largely instrumental and contractual.

Still, Spencer thought that human beings exhibited a natural sympathy and concern for one another; there is a common character and there are common interests among human beings that they eventually come to recognize as necessary not only for general, but for individual development. (This reflects, to an extent, Spencer's organicism.) Nevertheless, Spencer held that 'altruism' and compassion beyond the family unit were sentiments that came to exist only recently in human beings.

Spencer maintained that there was a natural mechanism--an 'innate moral sense'--in human beings by which they come to arrive at certain moral intuitions and from which laws of conduct might be deduced (*The Principles of Ethics*, I [1892], p. 26). Thus one might say that Spencer held a kind of 'moral sense theory' (*Social Statics*, pp. 23, 19). (Later in his life, Spencer described these 'principles' of moral sense and of sympathy as the 'accumulated effects of instinctual or inherited experiences.') Such a mechanism of moral feeling was, Spencer believed, a manifestation of his general idea of the 'persistence of force.' As this persistence of force was a principle of nature, and could not be created artificially, Spencer held that no state or government could promote moral feeling any more than it could promote the existence of physical force. But while Spencer insisted that freedom was the power to do what one desired, he also held that what one desired and willed was wholly determined by "an infinitude of previous experiences" (*The Principles of Psychology*, pp. 500-502.) Spencer saw this analysis of ethics as culminating in an 'Absolute Ethics,' the standard for which was the production of pure pleasure--and he held that the application of this standard would produce, so far as possible, the greatest amount of pleasure over pain in the long run.

Spencer's views here were rejected by Mill and Hartley. Their principal objection was that Spencer's account of natural 'desires' was inadequate because it failed to provide any reason *why* one ought to have the feelings or preferences one did.

There is, however, more to Spencer's ethics than this. As individuals become increasingly aware of their individuality, they also become aware of the individuality of others and, thereby, of the *law of equal freedom*. This 'first principle' is that 'Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man' (*Social Statics*, p. 103). One's 'moral sense,' then, led to the recognition of the existence of individual rights, and one can identify strains of a rights-based ethic in Spencer's writings.

Spencer's views clearly reflect a fundamentally 'egoist' ethic, but he held that rational egoists would, in the pursuit of their own self interest, not conflict with one another. Still, to care for someone who has no direct relation to oneself--such as supporting the un- and under employed--is, therefore, not only not in one's self interest, but encourages laziness and works against evolution. In this sense, at least, social

inequity was explained, if not justified, by evolutionary principles.

Political Philosophy

Despite his egoism and individualism, Spencer held that life in community was important. Because the relation of parts to one another was one of mutual dependency, and because of the priority of the individual 'part' to the collective, society could not do or be anything other than the sum of its units. This view is evident, not only in his first significant major contribution to political philosophy, *Social Statics*, but in his later essays--some of which appear in later editions of *The Man versus the State*.

As noted earlier, Spencer held an 'organic' view of society, Nevertheless, as also noted above, he argued that the natural growth of an organism required 'liberty'--which enabled him (philosophically) to justify individualism and to defend the existence of individual human rights. Because of his commitment to the 'law of equal freedom' and his view that law and the state would of necessity interfere with it, he insisted on an extensive policy of *laissez faire*. For Spencer, 'liberty' "is to be measured, not by the nature of the government machinery he lives under [...] but by the relative paucity of the restraints it imposes on him" (*The Man versus the State* [1940], p. 19); the genuine liberal seeks to repeal those laws that coerce and restrict individuals from doing as they see fit. Spencer followed earlier liberalism, then, in maintaining that law is a restriction of liberty and that the restriction of liberty, in itself, is evil and justified only where it is necessary to the preservation of liberty. The only function of government was to be the policing and protection of individual rights. Spencer maintained that education, religion, the economy, and care for the sick or indigent were not to be undertaken by the state.

Law and public authority have as their general purpose, therefore, the administration of justice (equated with freedom and the protection of rights). These issues became the focus of Spencer's later work in political philosophy and, particularly, in *The Man versus the State*. Here, Spencer contrasts early, classical liberalism with the liberalism of the 19th century, arguing that it was the latter, and not the former, that was a "new Toryism"--the enemy of individual progress and liberty. It is here as well that Spencer develops an argument for the claim that individuals have rights, based on a 'law of life'. (Interestingly, Spencer acknowledges that rights are not inherently moral, but become so only by one's recognition that for them to be binding on others the rights of others must be binding on oneself--this is, in other words, a consequence of the 'law of equal freedom.') He concluded that everyone had basic rights to liberty 'in virtue of their constitutions' as human beings (*Social Statics*, p. 77), and that such rights were essential to social progress. (These rights included rights to life, liberty, property, free speech, equal rights of women, universal suffrage, and the right 'to ignore the state'--though Spencer reversed himself on some of these rights in his later writings.) Thus, the industrious--those of character, but with no commitment to existing structures except those which promoted such industry (and, therefore, not religion or patriotic institutions)--would thrive. Nevertheless, all industrious individuals, Spencer believed, would end up being in fundamental agreement.

Not surprisingly, then, Spencer maintained that the arguments of the early utilitarians on the justification of law and authority and on the origin of rights were fallacious. He also rejected utilitarianism and its model of distributive justice because he held that it rested on an egalitarianism that ignored desert and, more fundamentally, biological need and efficiency. Spencer further maintained that the utilitarian account of the law and the state was also inconsistent---that it tacitly assumed the existence of claims or rights that have both moral and legal weight independently of the positive law. And, finally, Spencer argues as well against parliamentary, representative government, seeing it as exhibiting a virtual "divine

right"---i.e., claiming that "the majority in an assembly has power that has no bounds." Spencer maintained that government action requires not only individual consent, but that the model for political association should be that of a "joint stock company", where the 'directors' can never act for a certain good except on the explicit wishes of its 'shareholders'. When parliaments attempt to do more than protect the rights of their citizens by, for example, 'imposing' a conception of the good--be it only on a minority--Spencer suggested that they are no different from tyrannies.

Assessment

Spencer has been frequently accused of inconsistency; one finds variations in his conclusions concerning land nationalization and reform, the rights of children and the extension of suffrage to women, and the role of government. Moreover, in recent studies of Spencer's theory of social justice, there is some debate whether justice is based primarily on desert or on entitlement, whether the 'law of equal freedom' is a moral imperative or a descriptive natural law, and whether the law of equal freedom is grounded on rights, utility, or, ultimately, on 'moral sense'. Nevertheless, Spencer's work has frequently been seen as a model for later 'libertarian' thinkers, such as Robert Nozick, and he continues to be read--and is often invoked--by 'libertarians' on issues concerning the function of government and the fundamental character of individual rights.

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Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza (1632-1677)

LIFE. Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza (1632-1677) was the son of a Jewish merchant from Amsterdam. His father and grandfather were originally Spanish crypto-Jews -- that is, Jews who were forced to adopt Christianity in post-Islamic Spain, but secretly remained Jewish. He was educated in traditional Jewish Curriculum. His father died when he was 21, after which he was embroiled in a lawsuit with his stepsister over his father's estate. Spinoza won the suit, but nevertheless handed virtually all of it over to his stepsister. Shortly after, Spinoza's budding theological speculations prompted conflict with Jewish leaders. Spinoza publicly contended that the scriptures do not maintain that God has no body, that angels exist, or that the soul is immortal. After failed attempts to silence him, he was excommunicated in 1656. For a time Spinoza was associated with a former Jesuit who ran a school for children. Spinoza used this as an opportunity to further his own education and to supplement his income by teaching in the school. At this time he also learned the trade of lens grinding for glasses and telescopes.

In his late twenties, he supervised a discussion group on philosophical and theological issues. As his own ideas developed, he went on retreat from Amsterdam for three years to formulate them in writing. At a cottage in Rijnsburg, he wrote *A Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-Being*, and *On the Improvement of the Understanding*. He also composed a geometric version of Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, which friends encouraged him to publish. Part of the purpose of the work was to pave the way for publishing his own thoughts which were critical of Cartesianism. By producing such a work, he could not be accused later of not understanding Descartes. The work appeared in 1663 and was the only writing of Spinoza's published with his name on it during his life. Further developing his own ideas, over the next two years Spinoza composed his greatest work, *The Ethics*. In 1663 Spinoza left Rijnsburg and moved near The Hague. Hoping to publish the *Ethics*, and anticipating controversy, he wrote and published anonymously his *Tractatus Thologico-Politicus* (1670) which defends the liberty to philosophize in the face of religious or political interference. After a self-initiated and failed diplomatic mission to France, Spinoza and he was forced to give up hopes of publishing the *Ethics*. He died in 1677 from a lung disease, the result of breathing dust from lens grinding.

PART ONE OF THE ETHICS

SPINOZA'S PANTHEISM AND METHOD IN THE ETHICS. As directed in Spinoza's Will, the *Ethics* was published posthumously along with some of his other works (1677). The *Ethics* is about 200 pages in length and in five parts:

1. **Concerning God**
2. **The Nature and Origin of the Human Mind**
3. **The Nature and Origin of the Emotions**
4. **Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions**

5. The Power of the Understanding, or Human Freedom

Its most visibly distinguishing feature is its style of composition modeled after Euclid's geometry. Each of the five parts opens with a brief list of definitions and axioms, and from these a series of propositions (or theorems) are deduced. Spinoza initially composed the first parts of the *Ethics* in dialog form, but rejected this for the more precise -- and unfortunately more difficult -- geometric method. In general, geometric proofs are designed so that if we accept the definitions and axioms at the outset, and deductions from these are properly made, then we must accept the concluded propositions. However, as Leibniz observed, even though Spinoza's system follows this style, it nevertheless lacks mathematical rigor. Consequently, we must look at the content of Spinoza's complete system and accept or reject it on its own merits, rather than from the success of the various deductions.

In Part One of the *Ethics*, "Concerning God," after presenting a short list of definitions and axioms, Spinoza deduces 36 propositions which explain the nature of God. The most important of these is Proposition 14, which expresses Spinoza's pantheism: "Besides God, no substance can be granted or conceived." The term "pantheism" (literally all-God) means that God is identical to the universe as a whole. For example my car, my house, and even I myself are all parts of God. Other Western philosophers before Spinoza advocated pantheism, including Xenophanes, Parmenides, Plotinus, and Meister Eckhardt. However, the vast majority of Western philosophers and theologians strongly rejected this view in favor of a transcendent concept of God which holds that God is distinct from his creation. Indeed, some theologians maintained that God has the attribute of separateness thus being completely separate from the rest of the universe, including the physical world and humans. Spinoza's argument for pantheism in Proposition 14 is as follows:

> Proposition 5. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.
> Proposition 11: God (defined as a substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality) necessarily exists.
> Therefore, Proposition 14: Besides God, no substance can be granted or conceived.

The intuition behind Spinoza's argument above can be expressed simply. Two separate substances cannot share the same attributes (P 5). God has every actual and possible attribute (P 11). Thus, no other substance can exist. To illustrate Spinoza's point, imagine an infinitely long list of qualities such as "consiousness" and "three-dimensionality." For Spinoza, each attribute on this list can be assigned to only one substance or thing. So, substance 1 might exclusively have the attribute of "consciousness," and substance 2 might exclusively have the attribute of "three-dimensionality." However, God has already been assigned all attributes on the list, and no attributes are left to assign to other substances. Since a substance can't exist if it doesn't have any attributes, then God is the only substance which exists.

As noted, Spinoza opens part one of the *Ethics* with a list of definitions and axioms. His list of definitions are as follows:

1. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.
2. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

3. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
4. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.
5. By mode, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.
6. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite -- that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality. ...
7. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.
8. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.

Initially, the most important of the definitions below are those of substance, attribute, and mode. Substance, for Spinoza, turns out to be the totality of the universe. An attribute is an all-encompassing property of the universe, such as being three dimensional. Spinoza commentators give various explanations of "attribute" and its relation to "substance." Jonathan Bennett notes that that "An attribute for Spinoza is a basic way of being -- a property which sprawls across everything... [that pertains to that substance]." Edwin Curley notes that for Spinoza the totality of a thing's attributes constitutes its substance. A mode (or modification) is a more confined property of the universe, or how an attribute appears on a smaller level. For example, the shape of a tree is a modification of the universe's larger attribute "three-dimensionality."

Like definitions, axioms are also foundational elements from which propositions are derived. Rather than defining key terms, though, Spinoza's axioms stipulate some foundational fact about the world.

1. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.
2. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself.
3. From a given definite cause and effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow.
4. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.
5. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.
6. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
7. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence.

GOD IS THE ONLY SUBSTANCE. The first step in Spinoza's argument for pantheism is to prove Proposition 5 that two substances cannot share the same attribute. The only way to distinguish two substances is by noting differences in their attributes or differences in their modes. Suppose, though, that two substances had the same attributes, but different modifications. For example, suppose there were two universes in which both were three-dimensional (i.e. same attribute) but

one had trees and the other did not (i.e. differing modes). Spinoza argues that these differences in modification are not relevant. A substance has its own identity before it is modified. That is, the universe is what it is before it has trees or not. Thus, the only properties which truly distinguish one substance from another are broad attributes, not narrow modes. Thus, if two universes have precisely the same attributes, then they are the same universe.

Spinoza's next task is to prove the existence of God (Proposition 11). The central premise in his argument is Proposition 7: existence belongs to the nature of substance. He concedes that readers may have difficulty in comprehending Proposition 7. We see natural objects such as trees come into and go out of existence, and we assume that substances also come into and go out of existence. Spinoza argues that we would not make this confusion if we kept in mind the difference between modes and substances. Modes, such as properties of trees, do indeed come and go out of existence. Spinoza continues noting that we can also conceive of non-existent modes such as the properties of a unicorns. Again, though, we cannot conceive of a non-existent substance. Continuing with background material for his proof of God, Spinoza argues that an absolutely infinite substance has infinite attributes, each of which must be conceived through itself. Having made these points, Spinoza offers his proof for God:

> **Prop. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.**
> **Proof. -- If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. ...**

Spinoza's proof is an ontological argument in the style of Anslem's and Descartes'. Like Anselm, Spinoza gives his argument in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:

1. **(a) The idea of God is that of substance with infinite attributes, each of which is eternally and infinitely essential (Def. 6)**
2. **(b) Suppose that God does not exist**
3. **(c) Then existence is not part of his essence**
4. **(d) However, existence belongs to the nature of a substance**
5. **(e) Therefore, God exists**

More simply, his argument is that God exists since (a) God is a substance, and (b) existence belongs to the nature of a substance. Spinoza continues by giving three additional proofs for God's existence (which will not be explored here). All four proofs are based on the common notion that God's existence necessarily follows from his nature.

Having proved that (a) no two substances can have the same attributes (Proposition 5), and (b) God exists with infinite attributes (Proposition 11), Spinoza proceeds to conclude that God is the only substance (Proposition 14). Again, The proof for this is as follows:

1. **(a) There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute (Proposition 5)**
2. **(b) God (defined as a substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality) necessarily exists (Proposition 11)**
3. **(c) Therefore, besides God, no substance can be granted or conceived (Proposition 14).**

Spinoza continues by making clear that Proposition 14 implies pantheism.

- **Corollary I -- Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).**
- **Corollary II. -- It follows: 2. That extension and thought are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents (affectiones) of the attributes of God.**
- **Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.**

If all things are part of God, then the three-dimensional universe itself is part of God. This means that, in some sense, God has a body. However, Spinoza criticizes those who anthropomorphize the nature of God's body by maintaining that it is finite, and even susceptible to having emotions (given the fact that human emotions are the result of a human body). Spinoza harshly rejects both of these limitations on God's physical nature. However, the vast majority of western philosophers reject the notion that God has a three-dimensional body of any sort. He presents two traditional criticisms of the view that God has a body. First, there are absurdities involved when we consider quantity to be infinite. For example, one foot has twelve times the infinite number of points that one inch does. Second. God is active, and divided matter is passive. The two are thus incompatible. In response, Spinoza argues that the key error in all of these arguments is the assumption that extended substance is composed of parts. Instead, he maintains that the notion of extended substance must be drawn from the more foundational notion of infinite quality, and infinite quality cannot be measured.

In the remainder of Part I of the *Ethics,* Spinoza derives various properties of God. He summarizes these properties in the opening paragraph of the Appendix to Part I.

> **Appendix. In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that (1) he necessarily exists, (2) that he is one, (3) that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature, (4) that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so, (5) that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived, and (6) that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion offered, taken caret to remove the prejudices which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions, not a few which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the ordering of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.**

The principal misconception about God that Spinoza wants to address in the Appendix is that God acts purposefully and directs events in nature towards a definite goal. For Spinoza, God does not do this.

GOD DOES NOT WILLFULLY DIRECT THE COURSE OF NATURE. To make his case that God does not willfully direct the course of nature, he first explains why people think that God acts with a purpose. First, he notes that individual humans do not act freely, but are under the illusion that they do We are ignorant of the true causes of things, but only aware of our own desire to pursue what is useful us. Thus, we think we are free and that all our actions are guided by what is useful to us. Given this tendency to see human behavior as willful and purposeful, we continue by imposing willful purposes on events outside of us. We conclude that God willfully guides external events for our benefit (since we cannot guide it ourselves). Religious superstitions arose as humans found their own ways of worshipping God. Problems of consistency also arose as people insisted

that everything in nature is done by God for a purpose. Since natural disasters conflict with the view that God acts with a purpose, we then say that God's judgment transcends human understanding. For Spinoza, mathematics offers a standard of truth which refutes the view that God acts with a purpose.

Spinoza next argues that God does not act from a purpose. He first argues that the concept of a perfect final goal is flawed. For Spinoza, the most perfect of God's acts are those closest to him. Succeeding events further down the chain are more imperfect. Thus if a given chain of events culminated in sunny weather, for example, that would be less perfect than the initial events in the chain. Belief in final causes compromizes God's perfection since it implies that he desires something which he lacks. For Spinoza, the theologian's contention that God willfully directs all natural events amounts to a reduction to ignorance. That is, all natural events trace back to God's will, and we are all ignorant of God's will. Theologians insist on this path of ignorance since it preserves their authority

Finally, Spinoza maintains that belief in God's willful guidance of nature gives rise to an erroneous notion of value judgments, such as goodness, order, and beauty. These values are presumed to be objective abstract notions imposed on nature by God for our benefit. For example, objective foundation of goodness is that which is conducive to the worship of God. However, Spinoza contends that all of these value judgments in fact arise out of our own human construction and human preferences. For example, things are well-ordered when they require little imagination and are easily remembered. He sees that this is also the case with beauty, fragrance, and harmony. The variety of controversies we have on these topics arise from our differing human constructions. Why is it, we may ask, that God created us in such a way that values are based on human construction, rather than reason? Spinoza's answer is that God figure out an alternative way and had the material to do it.

[more to come]

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Leslie Stephen (1832-1904)

Leslie Stephen was a 19th century British philosopher, man of letters, and first editor of the *Dictionary of National Biography*. The portion of his writings which bear upon philosophy is small only in relation to his total literary output. He was born in Kensington Gore on November 28, 1832. In 1842 Stephen's parents moved to Brighton for the sake of his health. He attended a day school, but soon entered Eton College. His parents took a house at Windsor so that he could live at home. Stephen made little progress, and was removed by his father in 1846. He was later sent to King's college, and later entered Cambridge's Trinity Hall in 1850. He won a scholarship in mathematics and gained a reputation as an athlete. He was ordained a deacon in 1855, appointed junior tutor in 1856, and ordained a priest in 1859. In 1862 his position at Cambridge changed. His reading in Mill, Comte, and Kant led him to reject the historical evidences of Christianity. He declined to take part in the chapel services. Thereupon at the Master's request, he resigned his tutorship. Hs skepticism steadily grew, and on in 1875 he relinquished his holy orders. When freed from his tutorial and clerical duties, his interests took a wider range, and he subsequently published in the fields of politics, literary criticism, and social criticism. Religious and philosophical speculation engaged much of his attention, and he presented his views in *Fraser's Magazine*, and *Fortnightly Review*. A collection of religious and philosophical essays entitled *Essays on Free Thinking and Plain Speaking* came out in 1873. The book make him a leader of the agnostic school, and a chief challenger of popular religion, which he charged with being unable to satisfy genuine spiritual needs.

He devoted much of his time to his *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (1876) in which he explained the arguments of the old English deists and the skepticism of Hume. He places the philosophers and moralists in their due position in the whole literary activity of the period. A further stage of the same history ---*The English Utilitarians* (1900) was completed toward the end of his life. That same year appeared his "An Agnostic's Apology" in the *Fortnightly Review*; this further revealed his private convictions and helped familiarize the public with the term "agnostic" which had been invented in 1870 by Thomas Huxley, but had not yet become in vogue. In 1878 he joined the Metaphysical Society on the eve of its dissolution, and read two papers at its meetings, In 1882 he produced his *Science of Ethics*, in which he summed up his final conclusions on the dominant problems of life, in light of his study of Mill, Darwin, and Spencer. He devoted the remainder of his life to other literary projects and died in 1903 of cancer. After his death his monograph on Hobbes appeared (1904).

The first writers who worked out more general consequences of the theory of evolution were scientists with a philosophical turn of mind. Others outside the sciences soon followed in drawing out the consequences of evolution; Stephen was foremost among these, particularly in the area of the ethics. His own independent contribution is given in *The Science of Ethics* (1882). After Spencer's *Data*, this is the first book which worked out an ethical view determined by the theory of evolution. He followed Mill and Darwin as an ally of the empirical and utilitarian creed; but he

came to see that more extensive changes were necessary. Spencer's compromise between hedonism and evolutionism failed to satisfy him, and he found the ethical bearing of evolution better expressed by the conception of social vitality than by that of pleasure. The great merit of the work consists in its presentation of the social content of morality in the individual mind as well as in the community; but it does not sufficiently recognize the distinction between the historical process traced by the evolution theory and the ethical validity which evolution is assumed to possess.

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Stilpo (c.380-330 BCE.)

Stilpo was a Philosopher of Megara and the most distinguished member of the Megarean school. He was not only celebrated for his eloquence and skill in dialectics, but for the success with which he applied to moral precepts of philosophy to the correction of his natural propensities. Though in his youth he had been much addicted to intemperance and licentious pleasures, after he had ranked himself among philosophers he was never known to violate the laws of sobriety or chastity. With respect to riches he exercised a virtuous moderation. When Ptolemy Soter, at the taking of Megara, presented him with a large sum of money, and requested him to accompany him to Egypt, he returned the greater part of the present, and chose to retire, during Ptolemy's stay at Megara, to the island of Aegina. Afterward, when Megara was again taken by Demetrius, son of Antigonus, the conqueror ordered the soldiers to spare the house of Stilpo; and, if anything should be taken from him in the hurry of the plunder, to restore it. So great was the fame of Stilpo, that when he visited Athens, the people ran out of their shops to see him, and even the most eminent philosophers of Athens took pleasure in attending his discourses.

On moral topics Stilpo is said to have taught that the highest happiness consists in a mind free from the dominion of passion, a doctrine similar to that of the Stoics. (Diog. Laert. ii. 113-118; Sen. *Epist.* 9).

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James Hutchison Stirling

James Hutchison Stirling was a 19th century British Idealist philosopher. In 1865 Stirling's *The Secret of Hegel* appeared and marked the inauguration of a new era in the development of English idealism. In an article in the *Fortnightly Review* for October 1867 (republished in the volume *Jerrold, Tennyson, and Macaulay*) the author passes a ruthless condemnation upon the spurious reputation for a knowledge of German idealism which had attached itself to the name of Coleridge, as well as, in a minor degree, to that of De Quincey, and fastens especially upon Coleridge's 'dreamy misapprehensions' and 'strange misrepresentations' of the Kantian philosophy. Himself profoundly convinced of the truth of the Hegelian system, he set himself, in the *Secret*, to explain and defend that system. Stirling undoubtedly possessed 'the temperament of genius,' and was a man of remarkable speculative insight; but his style, though often striking, is so marked by the influence of Carlyle, and he so resolutely declines to conform to ordinary standards of systematic exposition, that his work is almost as difficult as the original which it is intended to illuminate. Yet its importance, and its influence at the time of its appearance, are not to be underestimated; it certainly called the attention of the English-speaking world to the significance of a system which even Ferrier had pronounced unintelligible, and brought home to the English mind the necessity of coming to terms, not only with Hegel, but with his predecessors, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling.

Stirling insisted upon going back to the origins of Hegelianism in these earlier systems, and in 1881 he followed up the *Secret of Hegel* with the *Tetbook to Kant*, in which the defects of the earlier work were less apparent and in which he supported a one-sided interpretation of the Kantian philosophy, as represented by the first two divisions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, with great learning and with remarkable ability. His translation of Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, published in 1867, which passed through many editions and was used by many generations of students, contains a series of illuminating 'annotations' which rival in interest and value the substance of the *History* itself. A little volume of lectures on *The Philosophy of Law* (1873) and the Gifford lectures on *Philosophy and Theology* (1890) complete the list of Stirling's more important contributions to philosophy. The standpoint is always the same -- that of the Hegelian idealism, which Stirling is inclined to interpret in a theistic rather than in a pantheistic sense.

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Stoicism

General Description. The term "Stoicism" derives from the Greek word "stoa," referring to a colonnade, such as those built outside or inside temples, around dwelling-houses, gymnasia, and market-places. They were also set up separately as ornaments of the streets and open places. The simplest form is that of a roofed colonnade, with a wall on one side, which was often decorated with paintings. Thus in the market-place at Athens the stoa poikile (Painted Colonnade) was decorated with Polygnotus's representations of the destruction of Troy, the fight of the Athenians with the Amazons, and the battles of Marathon and Oenoe. Zeno of Citium taught in the *stoa poikile* in Athens, and his adherents accordingly obtained the name of Stoics. Zeno was followed by Cleanthes, and then by Chrysippus, as leaders of the school. The school attracted many adherents, and flourished for centuries, not only in Greece, but later in Rome, where the most thoughtful writers, such as Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, and Epictetus, counted themselves among its followers.

We know little for certain as to what share particular Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes, or Chrysippus, had in the formation of the doctrines of the school, But after Chryssipus the main lines of the doctrine were complete. The stoic doctrine is divided into three parts: logic, physics, and ethics. Stoicism is essentially a system of ethics which, however, is guided by a logic as theory of method, and rests upon physics as foundation. Briefly, their notion of morality is stern, involving a life in accordance with nature and controlled by virtue. It is an ascetic system, teaching perfect indifference (apathea) to everything external, for nothing external could be either good or evil. Hence to the Stoics both pain and pleasure, poverty and riches, sickness and health, were supposed to be equally unimportant.

Stoic Logic. Stoic logic is, in all essential, the logic of Aristotle. To this, however, they added a theory, peculiar to themselves, of the origin of knowledge and the criterion of truth. All knowledge, they said, enters the mind through the senses. The mind is a blank slate, upon which sense-impressions are inscribed. It may have a certain activity of its own, but this activity is confined exclusively to materials supplied by the physical organs of sense. This theory stands, of course, in sheer opposition to the idealism of Plato, for whom the mind alone was the a source of knowledge, the senses being the source of knowledge, the senses being the sources of all illusion and error. The Stoics denied the metaphysical reality of concepts. Concepts are merely ideas in the mind, abstracted from particulars, and have no reality outside consciousness.

Since all knowledge is a knowledge of sense-objects, truth is simply the correspondence of our impressions to things. How are we to know whether our ideas are correct copies of things? How do we distinguish between reality and imagination, dreams, or illusions? What is the criterion of truth? It cannot lie in concepts, since they are of our own making. Nothing is true save sense impressions, and therefore the criterion of truth must lie in sensation itself. It cannot be in thought, but must be in feeling. Real objects, said the Stoics, produce in us an intense feeling, or conviction, of their reality. The strength and vividness of the image distinguish these real perceptions from a dream or fancy. Hence the sole criterion of truth is this striking conviction, whereby the real forces itself upon our consciousness, and will not be denied. There is, thus, no universally grounded criterion of truth. It is based, not on reason, but on feeling.

Stoic Physics. The fundamental proposition of the Stoic physics is that "nothing incorporeal exists." This materialism coheres with the sense-impression orientation of their doctrine of knowledge. Plato placed knowledge in thought, and reality, therefore, in the ideal form. The Stoics, however, place knowledge in physical sensation, and reality -- what is known by the senses -- is matter. All things, they said, even the soul, even God himself, are material and nothing more than material. This belief they based upon two main considerations. Firstly, the unity of the world demands it. The world is one, and must issue from one principle. We must have a monism. The idealism of Plato resolved itself into a futile struggle involving a dualism between matter and thought. Since the gulf cannot be bridged from the side of ideal realm of the forms, we must take our stand on matter, and reduce mind to it. Secondly, body and soul, God and the world, are pairs which act and react upon one another. The body, for example, produces thoughts (sense impressions) in the soul, the soul produces movements in the body. This would be impossible if both were not of the same substance. The corporeal cannot act on the incorporeal, nor the incorporeal on the corporeal. There is no point of contact. Hence all must be equally corporeal.

All things being material, what is the original kind of matter, or stuff, out of which the world is made? The Stoics turned to Heraclitus for an answer. Fire *logos*) is the primordial kind of being, and all things are composed of fire. With this materialism the Stoics combined pantheism. The primal fire is

God. God is related to the world exactly as the soul to the body. The human soul is likewise fire, and comes from the divine fire. It permeates and penetrates the entire body, and, in order that its interpenetration might be regarded as complete, the Stoics denied the impenetrability of matter. Just as the soul-fire permeates the whole body, so God, the primal fire, pervades the entire world.

But in spite of this materialism, the Stoics declared that God is absolute reason. This is not a return to idealism, and does not imply the incorporeality of God. For reason, like all else, is material. It means simply that the divine fire is a rational element. Since God is reason, it follows that the world is governed by reason, and this means two things. It means, firstly, that there is purpose in the world, and therefore, order, harmony, beauty, and design. Secondly, since reason is law as opposed to the lawless, it means that universe is subject to the absolute sway of law, is governed by the rigorous necessity of cause and effect. Hence the individual is not free. There can be no true freedom of the will in a world governed by necessity. We may, without harm, say that we choose to do this or that, and that our acts are voluntary. But such phrases merely mean that we assent to what we do. What we do is none the less governed by causes, and therefore by necessity.

The world-process is circular. God changes the fiery substance of himself first into air, then water, then earth. So the world arises. But it will be ended by a conflagration in which all things will return into the primal fire. Thereafter, at a pre-ordained time, God will again transmute himself into a world. It follows from the law of necessity that the course taken by this second, and every subsequent, world, will be identical in every way with the course taken by the first world. The process goes on for ever, and nothing new ever happens. The history of each successive world is the same as that of all the others down to the minutest details.

The human soul is part of the divine fire, and proceeds into humans from God. Hence it is a rational soul, and this is a point of cardinal importance in connection with the Stoic ethics. But the soul of each individual does not come direct from God. The divine fire was breathed into the first man, and thereafter passed from parent to child in the act of procreation. After death, all souls, according to some, but only the souls of the good, according to

others, continue in individual existence until the general conflagration in which they, and all else, return to God.

Stoic Ethics. The Stoic ethical teaching is based upon two principles already developed in their physics; first, that the universe is governed by absolute law, which admits of no exceptions; and second, that the essential nature of humans is reason. Both are summed up in the famous Stoic maxim, "Live according to nature." For this maxim has two aspects. It means, in the first place, that men should conform themselves to nature in the wider sense, that is, to the laws of the universe, and secondly, that they should conform their actions to nature in the narrower sense, to their own essential nature, reason. These two expressions mean, for the Stoics, the same thing. For the universe is governed not only by law, but by the law of reason, and we, in following our own rational nature, are *ipso facto* conforming ourselves to the laws of the larger world. In a sense, of course, there is no possibility of our disobeying the laws of nature, for we, like all else in the world, act of necessity. And it might be asked, what is the use of exhorting a person to obey the laws of the universe, when, as part of the great mechanism of the world, we cannot by any possibility do anything else? It is not to be supposed that a genuine solution of this difficulty is to be found in Stoic philosophy. They urged, however, that, though we will in any case do as the necessity of the world compels us, it is given to us alone, not merely to obey the law, but to assent to our own obedience, to follow the law consciously and deliberately, as only a rational being can.

Virtue, then, is the life according to reason. Morality is simply rational action. It is the universal reason which is to govern our lives, not the caprice and self-will of the individual. The wise man consciously subordinates his life to the life of the whole universe, and recognizes himself as a cog in the great machine. Now the definition of morality as the life according to reason is not a principle peculiar to the Stoics. Both Plato and Aristotle taught the same. In fact, it is the basis of every ethic to found morality upon reason, and not upon the particular foibles, feelings, or intuitions, of the individual self. But what was peculiar to the Stoics was the narrow and one-sided interpretation which they gave to this principle. Aristotle had taught that the essential nature of humans is reason, and that morality consists in following this, his essential nature. But he recognized that the passions and appetites have their

place in the human organism. He did not demand their suppression, but merely their control by reason. But the Stoics looked upon the passions as essentially irrational, and demanded their complete extirpation. They envisaged life as a battle against the passions, in which the latter had to be completely annihilated. Hence their ethical views end in a rigorous and unbalanced asceticism.

Aristotle, in his broad and moderate way, though he believed virtue alone to possess intrinsic value, yet allowed to external goods and circumstances a place in the scheme of life. The Stoics asserted that virtue alone is good, vice alone evil, and that all else is absolutely indifferent. Poverty, sickness, pain, and death, are not evils. Riches, health, pleasure, and life, are not goods. A person may commit suicide, for in destroying his life he destroys nothing of value. Above all, pleasure is not a good. One ought not to seek pleasure. Virtue is the only happiness. And people must be virtuous, not for the sake of pleasure, but for the sake of duty. And since virtue alone is good, vice alone evil, there followed the further paradox that all virtues are equally good, and all vices equally evil. There are no degrees.

Virtue is founded upon reason, and so upon knowledge. Hence the importance of science, physics, logic, which are valued not for themselves, but because they are the foundations of morality. The prime virtues, and the root of all other virtues, is therefore wisdom. The wise man is synonymous with the good man. From the root-virtue, wisdom, spring the four cardinal virtues: insight, bravery, self-control, and justice. But since all virtues have one root, those who possess wisdom possess all virtue, and those who lack it lack all. A person is either wholly virtuous, or wholly vicious. The world is divided into wise and foolish people, the former perfectly good, the latter absolutely evil. There is nothing between the two. There is no such thing as a gradual transition from one to the other. Conversion must be instantaneous. the wise person is perfect, has all happiness, freedom, riches, beauty. They alone are the perfect kings, politicians, poets, prophets, orators, critics, and physicians. The fool has all vice, all misery, all ugliness, all poverty. And every person is one or the other. Asked where such a wise person was to be found, the Stoics pointed doubtfully at Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic. The number of the wise, they thought, is small, and is continually growing smaller. The world, which they painted in the blackest colors as a sea of vice

and misery, grows steadily worse.

The similarities between Cynicism and Stoic ethics are apparent. However, the Stoics modified and softened the harsh outlines of Cynicism. To do this meant inconsistency, though. It meant that they first laid down harsh principles, and then proceeded to tone them down, to explain them away, to admit exceptions. Such inconsistency the stoics accepted with their habitual cheerfulness. This process of toning down their first harsh utterances took place mainly in three ways. First, the modified their principle of the complete suppression of the passions. Since this is impossible, and, if possible, could only lead to immovable inactivity, they admitted that the wise person might exhibit certain mild and rational emotions. Thus, the roots of the passions might be found in the wise person, though they would never be allowed to grow. In the second place, they modified their principle that all else, save virtue and vice, is indifferent. Such a view is unreal, and out of accord with life. Hence the stoics, with a masterly disregard of consistency, stuck to the principle, and yet declared that among things indifferent some are preferable to others. If the wise person has the choice between health and sickness, health is preferable. Indifferent things were thus divided into three classes: those to be preferred, those to be avoided, and those which are absolutely indifferent.

In the third place, the stoics toned down the principle that people are either wholly good, or wholly evil. The famous heroes and politicians of history, though fools, are yet polluted with the common vices of humankind less than others. Moreover, what were the Stoics to say about themselves? Were they wise men or fools? They hesitated to claim perfection, to put themselves on a level with Socrates and Diogenes. Yet they could not bring themselves to admit that there was no difference between themselves and the common herd. They were "proficients," and, if not absolutely wise, approximated to wisdom.

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Subjectivity

"Subjectivity" is a term used to denote that the truth of some class of statements depends on the mental state or reactions of the person making the statement. Not all uses of the term "subjective" are strictly philosophical, thus in medicine pain might be called subjective if it has no physical basis.

In epistemology, the notion of subjectivity is that knowledge is restricted to one's own perceptions. "Subjectivity of sensory qualities" is the phrase used by those who accept that the qualities experienced by the senses are not something belonging to the physical beings, but are subject to interpretation. This view is based on the limitation of the senses as physical organs. The subject or observer is herself involved in the object of the perception. In metaphysics, subjectivity includes the ideas of solipsism and subjective idealism. The latter notion is expressed in Berkeley's contention that "to be is to be perceived." In ethics and aesthetics, subjectivism is the view that statements about a person's character or an object's beauty are not reports of objective qualities inherent in those things. Instead we are either (cognitively) reporting our own inner feelings and attitudes, or (noncognitively) we are merely expressing our feelings.

Thomas Kuhn argued that "'Subjective' is a term with several established uses: in one of these it is opposed to 'objective,' in another to 'judgmental'" (*Essential Tension*, p. 336). For Kuhn, science is subjective in the first sense, but not in the second. Following Kuhn, Rorty distinguishes between two notions of "subjective": (1) a product only of what is in me, as opposed to out there, and (2) considerations which rational discussants should set aside. Rorty rejects the first notion completely since it is based on a notion of objectivity (correspondence to what is out there) which is impossible to achieve (*Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, pp. 338-339).

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Sublime

"Sublime" refers to an aesthetic value in which the primary factor is the presence or suggestion of transcendent vastness or greatness, as of power, heroism, extent in space or time. It differs from greatness or grandeur in that these are as such capable of being completely grasped or measured. By contrast, the sublime, while in one aspect apprehended and grasped as a whole, is felt as transcending our normal standards of measurement or achievement. Two elements are emphasized in varying degree by different writers, and probably varying in different observers: (1) a certain baffling of our faculty with feeling of limitation akin to awe and veneration; (2) a stimulation of our abilities and elevation of the self in sympathy with its object.

The element of magnitude in beauty was noted by Aristotle, and given by him a prominent place in tragedy. But the earliest extant determination of the sublime as a distinct conception is in the treatise ascribed to Longinus, but now supposed to be of earlier date (first century C.E.). In modern philosophy, it was given special prominence by Edmund Burke in his *Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful* (1756) and Henry Home in his *Elements of Criticism* who sought a psychological and physiological explanation. According to Burke, it is caused by a "mode of terror or pain," and is contrasted with the beautiful (rather than being part of the beautiful). Kant also distinguished it as a separate category form beauty, making it apply properly only to the mind, not to the object, and giving it a peculiar moral effect in opposing "the interests of sense." He distinguished a mathematical sublime of extension in space or time, and a dynamic of power. Most subsequent writers on aesthetics tend to bring the sublime within the beautiful in the broader sense insofar as its aesthetic quality is closely related to that of beauty.

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Suicide

Suicide is defined as an intentional and uncoerced self-killing in which the conditions causing death are self-arranged. The applied ethical issue of suicide focuses on two problems: (a) whether suicide is permissible, and, if so, (b) whether suicide intervention is permissible. The latter problem involves a question of balancing the agent's autonomy against paternalistic concerns of society.

CLASSIC THEORIES ON THE MORALITY OF SUICIDE. Although many applied ethics issues emerged only recently, the issue of the moral permissibility of suicide has a long history of philosophical discussion. . Plato opposed suicide since it "frustrates the decree of destiny" (*Laws*, Bk. 8, 873c); he also argued that "the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of theirs. ... Then there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me" (*Phaedo*, 62). Aristotle also opposed suicide since it is "contrary to the rule of life" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. 5, Ch. 11). Later Greek and Roman philosophers approved of suicide as a means of ending suffering. For example, the Roman philosopher Seneca (4 BCE - 65 CE) condones suicide in cases in which age takes its toll on us and prevents us from living as we should:

> **I will not relinquish old age if it leaves my better part intact. But if it begins to shake my mind, if it destroys my faculties one by one, if it leaves me not life but breath, I will depart from the putrid or the tottering edifice. If I know that I must suffer without hope of relief I will depart not through fear of the pain itself but because it prevents all for which I should live. [De Ira, 1:15]**

Stoic philosopher Epictetus (60 CE - 120 CE) also endorses suicide. The principal moral theme of Stoic philosophy is that we should resign ourselves to whatever fate has in store for us. Epictetus suggests that, for some of us, there may be limits to what we can endure in this life and, so, when things get too intolerable, we may wish to end our lives. He describes our options poetically:

... Above all, remember that the door stands open. Do not be more fearful than children. But, just as when they are tired of the game they cry, "I will play no more," so too when you are in a similar situation, cry, "I will play no more" and depart. But if you stay, do not cry.

... Is there smoke in the room? If it is slight, I remain. If it is grievous, I quit it. For you must remember this and hold it fast, that the door stands open. [Discourses, Book 1, Ch. 24, 25]

Attitudes about suicide changed in the writings of Christian philosophers. In *The City of God*, Augustine (354-430) opposes suicide on the grounds that it violates the commandment "thou shalt not kill." Although Augustine notes some exceptions to this rule, such as divinely ordained wars or government sanctioned executions, self-killing is not is not an exception since it lacks any parallel justification. It is not justified because of personal suffering, fear of possible punishment, or even on more lofty grounds such as high-mindedness. For Augustine, the more high-minded person is the one who faces life's ills, rather than escapes them.

In *Summa Theologica*, Thomas Aquinas gives three arguments against the permissibility of suicide. The first argument is based on natural law, or the natural purpose of a thing: suicide is wrong since it is contrary to the natural life asserting purpose of humans. Aquinas's second argument against suicide is a utilitarian type argument: suicide is not justified because of the greater social harm that is done. Aquinas's third argument is that suicide is wrong since it is like stealing from God. Our lives are property that is owned by God, and we are merely the trustees of that property. Renaissance and modern philosophers such as Montaigne, Montesquieu, and Voltaire wrote in favor of suicide, opposing the medieval arguments of divine providence.

David Hume gives one of the most famous philosophical defenses of suicide from this period in his essay "Of Suicide." The essay was printed for publication in 1757 in a collection of five dissertations, but, for reasons of political pressure, Hume pulled dropped the essay on suicide. The work eventually appeared in 1783, seven years after Hume's death. In this essay, Hume approaches the question of suicide from the standpoint of the traditional duty-based ethics championed by Grotius and Pufendorf. If suicide is immoral, then it must violate some duty to God, self, or others. Hume systematically goes through each of these possibilities and concludes that we have no such duty. The bulk of his argument focuses on whether suicide violates duties to God. We can reconstruct Hume's main argument against such a duty as follows:

1. **There is a self-rule established by God in two forces of nature (i.e., physical laws of the natural world, and purposeful action of the animal world)**
2. **As a rule, God has given humans the liberty to alter nature for their own happiness**
3. **Suicide is an instance of altering the course of nature for our own happiness**
4. **There is no good reason this instance should be an exception to the rule**
5. **Therefore, suicide does not violate God's plan**

Much of Hume's argument focuses on premise four. One possible criticism to premise four is that human life is uniquely important. In response, Hume argues that in the larger scheme of things our lives are of no greater importance than that of an oyster. Hume also considers the criticism that it is up to God to determine when someone should die. In response, Hume contends that if determining the time of death is entirely up to God, then it would also be wrong to lengthen our lives, such as through medicine. Another possible criticism is that suicide interferes with the natural order of things that God ordains. We build artificial shelters to protect ourselves from harsh weather conditions, we artificially irrigate barren land and we construct artificial means of transportation. Clearly, we interfere with the natural causal order all the time. For Hume, arguments from providence fails because there is no relevant difference between, say, diverting the Nile river from its natural course and taking one's life by diverting blood from its normal channel. Hume also argues that when life becomes so unbearable, an all good God would not prevent us from ending our miseries through suicide.

Concerning whether suicide violates our duty to others, Hume offers a series of arguments, such as the following argument from social reciprocity:

1. **When we die, we do not harm society, but only cease to do good**
2. **Our responsibility to do good is reciprocally related to benefit we receive from society**
3. **When I am dead, I can no longer receive the benefits**
4. **Therefore, I do not have a duty to do good**

He also argues that I am not obliged to do a small good for society at the expense of a great harm to myself. Using consequentialist reasoning, Hume argues further that if my continued existence is a burden on society, then suicide is permissible. For Hume, most people who kill themselves in such situation. According to Alan Donagan, if Hume were pushed to his logical conclusion, utilitarianism would require social indigents to kill themselves. And this, Donagan believes, is a decisive refutation of Hume's utilitarian defense of suicide, since requiring suicide is a clear violation of the principle of autonomy. Tom Beauchamp defends Hume against Donagan's charge by arguing that (a) Hume is a rule utilitarian, and (b) in normal circumstances, no rule requiring suicide could be established which would produce more good than harm for society. Finally, concerning whether suicide violates a duty to oneself, Hume argues that all suicides have been done for good personal reasons. This is evident since we have such a strong natural fear of death, which requires an equally strong motive to overcome that fear.

In his essay "Suicide," Immanuel Kant argues that suicide is wrong because it degrades our inner worth below that of animals. Kant considers two common justifications of suicide, and rejects them both. First, some may argue that suicide is permissible as a matter of freedom, so long as it does not violate the rights of others. In response Kant says self-preservation is our highest duty to ourselves and we may treat our body as we please, so long as our actions arise from motives of self-preservation. Some also might give examples from history that imply that suicide is sometimes virtuous. For example, in Roman history, Cato, who was a symbol of resistance against Caesar, found he could no longer resist Caesar; to continue living a compromised life would disillusion advocates of freedom. Kant argues that this is the only example of this sort and thus cannot be used as a general rule in defense of suicide. Kant's main argument against suicide is that people are entrusted with their lives, which have a uniquely inherent value. By killing oneself, a person dispenses with his humanity and makes himself into a thing to be treated like a beast. Kant also argues on more consequentialist grounds that if a person is capable of suicide, then he is capable of any crime. For Kant, "he who does not respect his life even in principle cannot be restrained from the most dreadful vices"

SUICIDE INTERVENTION. The central issue of suicide intervention is the distinction between self-killings that are autonomous as opposed to non-autonomous. Non-autonomous self-killings are done involuntarily, or without the person knowing what he is really doing. Philosophers commonly agree that intervention is always justified with attempted non-autonomous self-killings. For autonomous suicides, though, the justification for intervention is less clear. Intervention depends on whether paternalism in general is ever justified. Most simply, "paternalism" is the intentional limitation of a person's autonomy, exclusively for that person's own good. Mill's principle of liberty maintains that paternalism of this sort is never justified. According to Mill, we can only limit a person's conduct when it presents harm to others, irrespective of whether it presents harm to the agent himself. On this view, an initial suicide intervention may be justified, solely to establish whether the attempted suicide was autonomous or non-autonomous. If the attempt was autonomous, then no further intervention is justified.

Decisions about some suicides are complicated in that they take place in hospitals or under the supervision of health care workers. In these situations workers are guided by the Hippocratic oath, which advocates respect for all human life. The justifiability of suicide intervention in such situations rests on which moral consideration is weightier: autonomy or respect for life. Given the unique duties of health care workers, respect for life outweighs the principle of autonomy and suicide intervention is justified in health care settings.

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Supererogation

The term "supererogation" refers to good actions done beyond what is morally required. The expression has its roots in Christian theology referring to good works done in a state of grace in excess of the strict requirements of the divine law, and constituting a store of merit which may be used for the benefit of souls in purgatory or for other penitent persons. The Roman Catholic doctrine of supererogation rests on a distinction between what is mandatory and what is merely advisory in the divine law. With reference to the latter, humans are free and may lay up a store of merit which under given circumstances may be applied to the benefit of others. The doctrine involves a point of radical difference between Catholic and Reformed Christian churches, the latter denying the validity of the distinction on which the doctrine of supererogation rests.

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Symposium

"Symposium" is the Greek term for a drinking-party. The symposium must be distinguished from the*deipnon*; for though drinking almost always followed a dinner-party, yet the former was regarded as entirely distinct from the latter, was regulated by different customs, and frequently received the addition of many guests who were not present at the dinner. For the Greeks did not usually drink at their dinner, and it was not until the conclusion of the meal that wine was introduced. Symposia were very frequent at Athens. Their enjoyment was heightened by agreeable conversation, by the introduction of music and dancing, and by games and amusements of various kinds; sometimes, too, philosophical subjects were discussed at them. The *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon give us a lively idea of such entertainments at Athens. The name itself shows that the enjoyment of drinking was the main object of the symposia: wine from the juice of the grape (*oinos ampelinos*) was the only drink partaken of by the Greeks, with the exception of water. The wine was almost invariably mixed with water, and to drink it unmixed (*akraton*) was considered a characteristic of barbarians. The mixture was made in a large vessel called the *crater*, from which it was conveyed into the drinking-cups. The guests at a symposium reclined on couches, and were crowned with garlands of flowers. A master of t have been incidentally noticed above.

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Synderesis

"Synderesis" is a technical term from scholastic philosophy, signifying the innate principle in the moral consciousness of every person which directs the agent to good and restrains him from evil. It is first found in a singe passage of St. Jerome (d. 420) in his explanation of the four living creatures in Ezekiel's vision. Jerome explains that most commentators hold that the human, the loin, and the ox of the vision represent the rational, the irascible, and the appetitive (or concupiscent) parts of the soul, according to Plato's division, while the fourth figure, that of the eagle, represents a fourth part of the soul, above and outside these three:

> This the Greeks call synderesis, which spark of conscience was not extinguished from the breast of Adam when he was driven from Paradise. Through it, when overcome by pleasures or by anger, or even as sometimes deceived by a similitude of reason, we feel that we sin; ... and this in the scriptures is sometimes called spirit.... And yet we perceive that the conscience (conscientia) is itself also thrown aside and driven from its place by some who have no shame or modesty in their faults.

In this passage no distinction seems to be drawn between synderesis and conscientia. It has even been maintained that the former word is a copyist's error for synderesis, the usual Greek equivalent for "conscientia".

The use of synderesis as distinct from *conscientia* among the scholastics, and to a slight extent among early Protestant moralists, is founded on its description by Jerome as scintilla conscientiae - the spark - from which the light of conscience arises. Thus Jeremy Taylor calls it "the spark or fire put into the heart of humans," while synderesis, which is specifically called conscience of the deed done, is the "bringing fuel to this fire (*Ductor Dubitantium* 1:1:1) As distinguished from synderesis, conscientia is applied by these writers to the particular attitude of a person to good or evil action, and may accordingly be an unsafe guide. Synderesis is thus a faculty or habit (it was disputed which) both of judging and of willing the right, in agreeement with "original righteousness" and persisting in the separate powers of the soul in spite of the corruption of human nature brought about by the Fall. In the earlier descriptions it is spoken of as volitional as well as intellectual. According to Aquinas, however, it is distinctly practical reason - certain principles belonging to the practical side of reason which point out the right direction for action, just as the theoretical axioms of the understanding do for thinking. Both synderesis and conscientia are placed among the intellectual powers. A different view is given by Bonaventura, who makes the whole distinction between conscientia and synderesis rest upon the distinction between judgment and will. God (he says) has implanted a double rule of right in human nature: one for judging rightly, and this is the moral strength of conscience; another for right volition, and this is the moral strength of synderesis, whose function is to dissuade from evil and stimulate to good, and which may therefore be described as the original moral tendency of the disposition.

This, however, does not seem to be either the best or the most prevalent view of scholasticism

regarding synderesis. The question is fully discussed by Duns Scotus, who decided against Bonaventura that both synderesis and conscience belong to practial reason, the former giving the first principles or major premises of its practical syllogisms, the latter corresponding to their conclusions (*In Sent. Reportationes* Bk 2:39, Q1-2). Jeremy Taylor also follows the Thomistic use and makes synderesis "the general repository of moral principles or measures." This is the "rule of conscience," while conscience itself is "a conjunction of the universal practical law with the particular moral action." It applies the rule to the particular case, and is thus both witness and judge of moral actions. It may be noted that the term "conscience," when used (as by Kant) as equivalent to practical reason regarded as infallible, corresponds to the medieval synderesis, and not to the medieval conscientia.

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Taste

"Taste" is the 18th and 19th century term of choice referring to the faculty of critical and appreciatory discernment of and judgment upon objects of aesthetic experience. It is often used as synonymous with "good taste". Taste has been recognized by aestheticians as involving at least two distinguishable elements: (1) native sensibility and delicacy of feeling - what may be called aesthetic temperament; and (2) culture of the aesthetic judgment by actual exercise and discipline. Such discipline leads to the developed taste of the connoisseur. Taste is in the aesthetic life essentially what character is in the moral life. The question whether there can be any universal standard of taste was frequently discussed. Writers of the associationist school (e.g., Jeffrey) have generally denied any real universality for such a standard, because of the multifaceted nature of the sources of beauty. Hume falls back on the consensus of cultivated opinion. Grant Allen, under biological influences, admits only such consequences as springs from similarity of nervous organization. Idealists such as Lotze ordinary defend a contrary view because of the asserted universality of beauty.

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Temperance

Temperance is the virtue of moderation and self-control in anything, but especially in indulgence in pleasures. Temperance, in the large sense of moderation or self-control, was the characteristic Greek virtue. For Plato, temperance is one of the four cardinal virtues, both in the state and in the individual. He describes it as a harmony or agreement between the higher and the lower parts - the governing and the governed in the state, the rational and the appetitive in the soul resulting in the obedience of the lower to the higher. While Aristotle's specific virtue of temperance is still narrower in its range than Plato's, in his doctrine of the mean he may be said to reduce all virtue to the habit of moderation or temperance in the large sense. Christianity reaffirmed the importance of this virtue, deepening and broadening the Greek conception of it. The new emphasis given by Christianity to the negative element in temperance, through its principle "die to live" led to the exaggeration of temperance into abstinence, which is, in Aristotle's eyes, an extreme - that of defect - no less than excess.

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Thales (636-546)

An Ionian, the founder of Greek philosophy and the Milesian school of cosmologists. Born at Miletus about 636 BCE., he was a contemporary of Solon and Croesus and died at the age of ninety about 546. According to popular tradition he lived mainly as one of the Seven Sages -- seven men living between 620-550 BCE. distinguished for their wisdom as rulers, lawgivers, councilors, or authors of maxims. Many tales were told of him. In one of these he is an unpractical dreamer, and falls into a well while star-gazing. In another he shows himself superior to the ordinary practical man by the use he makes of his scientific knowledge. He is said to have foreseen an abundance of olives and made a corner in oil, thus proving he could be rich if he liked. It is plain that people in general had no idea of his real work, and regarded him simply as a typical 'sage', to whose name anecdotes originally anonymous might be attached. These stories, then, tell us nothing about Thales himself, but they do bear witness to the impression produced by science and scientific men when they first appeared in a world that was half inclined to marvel and half inclined to scoff.

There is, however, another set of traditions about Thales from which something may be learnt. They are not of a popular character, since they attribute to him certain definite scientific achievements. One of the most important of these, the prediction of a solar eclipse, is reported by Herodotus (i. 74). The existence at Miletos of a continuous school of cosmologists give credit to the preservation of such traditions. We are further told on the authority of Aristotle's disciple Eudomos, who wrote the first history of mathematics, that Thales introduced geometry into Hellas. However, the evidence is incomplete since no writings by Thales were extant even in the time of Aristotle, and it is believed that he wrote nothing. In the annals of Greek philosophy he was probably the first who looked for a physical origin of the world instead of resting upon mythology. As such he is credited with being the first human being who can rightly be called a man of science.

His philosophy, if it can be called by that name, consisted of two propositions. The first is that the earth is a flat disc which floats on water. From an early date the Greeks, as was natural for them, began to think of the earth as an island surrounded by the river Okeanos. To regard it as resting on the water is a further step towards a truer view. It was something to get the earth afloat. The second is the principle of all things is water, that all comes from water, and to water all returns. This means that water is the one primal kind of existence and that everything else in the universe is merely a modification of water. In Aristotle's terminology, Thales maintained that water is the material cause of all things. It may well have seemed to Thales that water was the original thing from which fire on the one hand and earth on the other arose. Henceforth the question whether everything can be regarded as a single reality appearing in different forms is the central one of Greek science. Why did he choose water as the first principle? This question cannot be answered with certainty. Aristotle says that Thales "probably derived his opinion from observing that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that even actual heat is generated therefrom, and that animal life is sustained by water... and from the fact that the sees of all things possess a moist nature, and that water is a first principle of all things that are humid." This is likely the true explanation, but it

will be noted that even Aristotle uses the word "probably," so gives his statement merely as a conjecture. It is even more uncertain by what process water changes into other things.

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Theophrastus (d. 287 BCE)

Theophrastus was a Greek philosopher of the Peripatetic school, and immediate successor of Aristotle in leadership of the Lyceum. He was a native of Eresus in Lesbos, and studied philosophy at Athens, first under Plato and afterwards under Aristotle. He became the favorite pupil of Aristotle, who named Theophrastus his successor, and bequeathed to him his library and manuscripts of his own writings. Theophrastus sustained the Aristotelian character of Lyceum. He is said to have 2,000 disciples, among them the comic poet Menander. He was esteemed by the kings Philippus, Cassander, and Ptolemy. He was tried for impiety, but acquitted by the Athenian jury. He died in 287 BCE, having presided over the Lyceum about thirty-five years. His age is sometimes put at 85, and 107 at others. He is said to have closed his life with the complaint about the short duration of human life, that it ended just when the insight into its problems was beginning.

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Theosophy

The main teachings of Theosophy (Gk. theosophia, "divine wisdom"), which are at the same time religious, philosophic, and scientific, may be summed up as follows: it postulates one eternal, immutable, all-pervading principle, the root of all manifestation. From that one existence comes forth periodically the whole universe, manifesting the two aspects of spirit and matter, life and form, positive and negative, "the two poles of nature between which the universe is woven." Those two aspects are inseparably united, therefore all matter is ensouled by life while all life seeks expression through forms. All life being fundamentally one with the life of the Supreme Existence, it contains in germ all the characteristics of its source, and evolution is only the unfolding of those divine potentialities brought about by the conditions afforded in the various kingdoms of nature. The visible universe is only a small part of this field of evolution. As ether interpenetrates the densest solid, so matter, still subtler, interpenetrates ether, and these different grades of matter constitute seven distinct regions, spoken of as the seven great planes of the universe. The physical is the densest; the one next to it is called astral; still subtler than the astral plane is the mental. The four higher spiritual planes are as yet mere names to all except initiates and adepts. The materials being thus prepared, the divine life begins the evolution of consciousness, building for itself forms on the various planes, passing slowly through the elemental, mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, and finally reaching self-consciousness and individualization, when it passes into the human stage.

HUMANS. People, being a part of the whole, are also evolving toward the perfect manifestation of the divine characteristics latent in them. That perfection, however, implies not only the attainment of sainthood, but also the possession of divine power and full knowledge of the universe, visible and invisible. As he needs a physical body to work with on the physical plane, so does he need bodies composed of the matter of those higher planes, in order to recognize them, and the organizing of such bodies is the task upon which men are engaged, consciously, in the more advanced members of the race, but unconsciously in the vast majority. The physical body, then, is not the only one humans use, even during this physical life. In connection with it and interpenetrating it, even as the planes of the universe interpenetrate each other, he has an astral body, by means of which he feels and desires, a mental body, by means of which he thinks. The higher four spiritual bodies are still unorganized at the present stage of evolution, save in rare instances. But the three just mentioned are already fairly developed and constitute the normal working instruments of humans. This does not mean that the astral and mental bodies are as yet organized so as to take direct cognizance of the planes to which they belong by constitution; in the majority, they work only in connection with the physical body. But some individuals have already developed the senses belonging to those higher bodies. The phenomena of clairvoyance, telepathy, prophetic dreams, etc., are merely manifestations of the activity of those finer senses. Unreliable at first, like the infant's vision, they can be developed and trained, until the subtler worlds stand as an open book before the person. This constitutes the evolution of the form, which proceeds *pari passu* with the evolution of the

consciousness, the activities of which in the subtler bodies may be termed the soul. As the soul grows in power, love, and wisdom, it needs a better form in which to manifest itself; as the form grows in perfection, it becomes a better instrument for the soul. Here again evolve side by side the two poles of the universe, life and form, spirit and matter.

REINCARNATION. This unfoldment of human powers is slow and gradual; hence the necessity of repeated incarnations, each life on earth being like a day in school. At death, a person drops his physical body, and, clothed in his subtle bodies, lives a life of purification, rest, and bliss, rich and full in proportion to his stage in evolution and the deeds of the life just ended. This is the time when he assimilates the experiences of that life, changing them into faculties. As this work is being done, he drops one after the other his worn-out astral and mental bodies, and, finally, having enjoyed all the bliss to which his achievements entitle him, he clothes himself in new bodies and returns to earth to take up the work where he had left it, each life being thus a progress on the preceding one. The fact that the person does not remember his past incarnations is no proof against their reality, for the memory of those lives is stored up in the soul and not in the brain, which belongs to the resent incarnation only and therefore cannot have kept the record of experiences it never event through. But people are so absorbed by earthly interests and ambitions that they identify themselves with the body and have no time to listen to the "still small voice" within. As soon as they turn their attention inward and know themselves as the soul, then their long past will lie unrolled before his vision, as it has done in the case of the sages of all times. But even at the present stage, that past shows itself in the accumulated faculties and powers of the person and the voice of conscience, which is but the effort of the soul to guide its lower nature along lines found by experience to be the best.

KARMA. Evolution proceeds under a law as unerring as any well-established scientific law, namely, that of *karma* or the law of cause and effect. Each action, each desire, each thought, produces its result with unfailing certainty. "As a person sows, so shall he also reap." This makes perfection possible, for knowledge is power, and when a person knows the law and works with it, he can produce any result he chooses, he becomes master of his destiny. Thought is the most potent factor in the creation of causes. Each thought affects the mental body for good or evil, and as mental faculties are the powers of the soul working in the mental body, the mentality shown in any one life is the result of repeated thinking in past lives. Hence the splendid mental apparatus of the person of genius is not a gratuitous gift, but is due to hard work in the past. Thought is also the parent of action, and its subtle vibrations, traveling through space, affect others, awakening similar thoughts in the minds attuned to the same key. Many a thought has thus urged other men to actions, good or evil, in which the thinker has his share of responsibility. As thoughts evolve the mental body, so desires evolve the astral body, and also influence others by their far-reaching vibrations. By controlling his desires, purifying them, turning them toward spiritual things, a person refines his astral body and rises above his animal instincts. Actions, speaking broadly, determine future physical surroundings; those surroundings are favorable or unfavorable, according as the person has made others happy or unhappy. Reincarnation and karma explain the apparent injustice in the world, the mental and moral differences among men, and the inequality of mental, moral, and physical conditions amid which men are placed.

Liberation. But a time will come when people, having reached the full perfection attainable in the human stage, shall need no longer these earth-experiences, and shall pass on to spheres of usefulness whose glory is beyond our conception. One of the missions of theosophy is to proclaim anew the possibility of treading the "ancient narrow path" which leads to adeptship and liberation,

when a person need not return to earth unless he choose to remain and help his less-advanced brothers. The more advanced members of humanity, a mere handful as yet, have already reached that level, and from their lodge come forth from time to time the great founders of religions, the spiritual teachers of the race. This common source explains the oneness of fundamental teachings in all religions; the form only varies, according to the needs of the times and peoples. Now, as in olden times, these Elder Brothers are willing to accept as pupils those who possess the necessary qualifications. Those qualifications are: a conviction of the impermanence of mere earthly aims, a perfect indifference to the fruit of one's own actions; perfect control of mind and conduct; tolerance; endurance; confidence in the master and himself; balance, and desire for liberation. But his motive for seeking liberation must be an intense desire to help humanity, for only when this complete forgetfulness of self is attained, can a person's powers be safely developed. So long as selfishness lurks in his heart, there is danger of his becoming a curse to the race, instead of the helper he should be. The teachings are not new; they represent a body of traditions preserved from time immemorial. Reincarnation was taught in the earliest history of India and Egypt, in Greece even before Pythagoras; it is found in the teachings of Plato, Plotinus, the Cabala , the early Christians, the Alexandrian Gnostics, Neoplatonists, Paracelsus, and Giordano Bruno. During the Middle Ages traces of it appeared in Freemasonry and among the Rosicrucians. In modern times, this wisdom-tradition was revived by Helena Petrovna Blavatsky , who had been for years the pupil of great oriental adepts or sages. Aided by Henry Steel Olcott, she founded the Theosophical Society in New York City, November 17, 1875. For the development see III., below.

The three objects of the society are: (1) to form a nucleus of the universal brotherhood of humanity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste, or color; (2) to encourage the study of comparative religion, philosophy, and science; (3) to investigate the unexplained laws of nature and the powers latent in people. Assent to the first of these objects is required for membership, the remaining two being optional. "The Society has no dogmas or creed, is entirely non-sectarian and includes in its membership adherents of all faiths and of none, exacting only from each member the tolerance for the beliefs of others that he would wish them to exhibit toward his own." In 1895, William Quan Judge, then vice-president of the society, led a secession movement which resulted in a separation therefrom of a large number of the American and some of the European members. The seceding body, however, soon divided into two bodies, one of which is known as the Universal Brotherhood and Theosophical Society (see III., below). The other body, known as the Theosophical Society in America, again subdivided; one division located at 244 Lenox Avenue, New York City, now publishes *The Word*, a monthly magazine, and the other division, headed by Charles Johnston, 159 Warren Street, Brooklyn, N. Y., publishes the Theosophical Quarterly. The parent society is international, with headquarters at Adyar, Madras, India. The last yearly report of its president, Mrs. Annie Besant, shows in December of 1907, a total of 655 branches all over the world, 77 of which are in America. A large literature has grown up within the society, including the regular publication of forty-seven magazines. The general secretary of the American section is Weller Van Hook, 103 State Street, Chicago, IL.

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Time

Time has been studied by philosophers and scientists for 2,500 years, and although time is much better understood today than long ago, many mysteries remain. This article explores both what is known about time and what is controversial and unresolved. The focus is on physical time, the time that clocks measure, rather than on psychological time, a human being's perception of physical time. The article is structured so that it provides answers to the following questions about physical time:

What should a philosophical theory of time do?

Can we begin with a definition of time? Succinct definitions of time are rarely helpful unless they are backed up with a more systematic treatment of time. The definitions are either too trivial (Time is what keeps everything from happening all at once) or too vague (Time is the dimension of causality) or too circular (Time is what happens when things change over time) or simply cryptic (Time is the flow of events past the stationary I). When philosophers ask, " What is time?", they normally are also asking for a 'definition' that provides something more elaborate, for a philosophical theory designed to answer many of the philosophical questions about time.

Consider what a more systematic theory of time should do. It should reveal, among other things, whether time exists objectively, or is instead a construct of our imagination.

A theory of time should be able to say what physical science presupposes and implies about time. Does it imply the possibility of time travel, for instance? What does it imply about the relationship between time and spacetime? What is the largescale and the smallscale structure of time? In the smallscale, what is time made of? Physicists say that, locally, time is made of a linear continuum of instants, with each instant lasting for zero seconds. A philosophical theory will say whether the physicists are merely inventing this notion of time because it is useful or, instead, are discovering what time is. Being a continuum implies that between any two instants, there is another instant. No scientific experiment is so fine grained that it could detect whether this is true for instants that are extremely close together in time. If so, then on what grounds do scientists 'know' that time is a continuum?

A philosophical theory of time should describe the relationship between instants and events. Does the instant that we label as "11:01 AM" for a certain date exist independently of the events that occur then? In other words, can time exist if no event is happening? This question raises the thorny metaphysical issue of absolute vs. relational theories of time.

A theory of time should address the question of time's apparent direction. If the projectionist in the movie theater showsa film of milk being added into black coffee but runs the film backwards, we in

the audience can immediately tell that events couldn't have occurred this way. We recognize the arrow of time because we know about the one-directional processes in nature: brown coffee never unmixes into black coffee and milk. This arrow becomes less and less apparent to the viewer as the film subject gets smaller and smaller and the time interval gets shorter and shorter. Philosophers disagree about the explanation of this arrow. The arrow appears to be very basic for understanding nature, yet it is odd that there are hardly any arrows (asymmetries in time) in the most basic laws of physics that arre supposed to accurately describe the one-directional processes of nature. Philosophers also wonder what life would be like in some far off corner of the universe if the arrow of time were reversed there. Would our counterparts walk backwards up steps while remembering the future?

Another philosophical problem about time concerns the questions, "What is the present moment and why does it move into the past?" Present events seem to flow by, receding ever farther into the past. Many philosophers are suspicious of this notion of the flow of time. They doubt whether it is a property of time as opposed to being some feature of human perception. There are also suspicions about the present, the feature that is referred to by the indexical word "now." If the now is real, then why isn't there a term for it in the laws of science? On the other hand, some argue that the lack of this term reveals a limitation on what science can tell us about reality.

For a last example of a philosophical problem regarding time, some philosophers argue that the future is not real. These philosophers have a problem with the apparent implication that, if the future were real, then it would be fixed now, and we would not have the freedom to affect that future. Other philosophers disagree. A full theory of time should address not only this issue but also the previously mentioned constellation of philosophical issues about time.

Definitions of time

There are a wide variety of short answers to the question "What is time?" Plato said time is the circular motion of the heavens. Aristotle said it's not motion but the measure of motion. St. Augustine said time is nothing in reality but exists only in the mind's apprehension of that reality. Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome both said time exists in reality as a mind-independent continuum, but is distinguished into earlier and later parts only by the mind. Kant said time is a form that the mind projects upon the external things-in-themselves. A modern definition says time is the dimension of causality. Let's explore some of these answers.

Aristotle provided an early, careful answer to the question "What is time?" when he said time is the "number of movement in respect of the before and after, and is continuous.... In respect of *size* there is no minimum; for every line is divided *ad infinitum*. Hence it is so with time." [Physics, 220a] In these passages, Aristotle argues that time is neither the circular motion of the heavens (Plato's view) nor any other motion. He believes time is something *by which* we measure motion. Time is like a line, he says; and it is continuous rather than discrete. The line he had in mind was a circle [223b], a structure that has no beginning or end point and so is endless in both directions. Saint Augustine objected to Aristotle's belief that time is circular, insisting that human experience is a one-way journey from Genesis to Judgment, regardless of any recurring patterns or cycles in nature. Thomas Aquinas agreed. In 1687, Newton captured some of this viewpoint when he

represented time by using a line rather than a circle. Aristotle argued that we cannot conceive of a first time because for any such time we could conceive of a time before that. Thomas Aquinas criticized the assumption that something doesn't exist if humans can't conceive it.

Aristotle raised the issue of whether time exists without consciousness: "Whether, if soul did not exist, time would exist or not, is a question that may fairly be asked; for if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can be counted..." [223a] He doesn't answer his own question because, he says, it depends on whether time is the conscious numbering of movement or instead is just the capability of movement's being numbered were consciousness to exist. Aristotle's distinction foreshadows the modern distinction between psychological time and physical time.

Physical time is public time. Psychological time is private time. We are referring to psychological time when we say that time passes slowly while we are waiting for the water to boil on the stove. We are referring to physical time when we speak of the time that a clock measures, or when we define speed to be the rate of change of position with respect to time. Psychological time is best understood as being consciousness of physical time. Psychological time stops when consciousness does, but physical time does not. Physical time is more basic for helping us understand our shared experiences in the world. It is more useful than psychological time for doing science. In the 11th century, the Persian philosopher Avicenna doubted the existence of physical time, arguing that time exists only in the mind due to memory and expectation, but Duns Scotus in the 13th century recognized both physical and psychological time.

In the 17th century, the English physicist Isaac Barrow rejected Aristotle's linkage between time and change, or between instants and events, by saying that time is something which exists independently of motion and which existed even before God's creation. Barrow's student, Isaac Newton, agreed. Newton added that motion (your speed, for example) is relative to the reference frame you are analyzing it from, but that there is a special reference frame in which real time (absolute time) is the measured time. Newton also argued very specifically that time and space are substances that provide an infinitely large container for all events; this container is the absolute reference frame. Gottfried Leibniz objected. He argued that time is not a substantial entity existing independently of those events. Leibniz insisted that Aristotle and Newton had overemphasized the relationship between time and duration, and underemphasized the fact that time ultimately involves **order as well. Time is an ordering of changes, the overall ordering of all non-simultaneous events. Leibniz added that this order is also a "something" as Newton had been insisting, but it is an ideal entity, not a concrete one as Newton was mistakenly supposing it to be. Trees and stars are concrete entities. Triangles, numbers, and relations are ideal entities.**

In the 18th century, Immanuel Kant said time and space are forms that the mind projects upon the external things-in-themselves. He spoke of our mind structuring our perceptions so that space always has a Euclidean geometry, and time has the structure of the infinite mathematical line. Kant's idea that time is a *form* of apprehending phenomena is probably best taken as suggesting that we have no direct perception of time but only the ability to experience things and events *in* time. Some historians distinguish perceptual space from physical space and say that Kant was right about perceptual space. It's difficult, though, to get a clear concept of perceptual space. If physical space and perceptual space are the same thing, then Kant is claiming we know a priori that physical space is Euclidean. With the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries in the 1820s, and

with increased doubt about the reliability of Kant's method of transcendental proof, the view that truths about space and time are apriori truths began to lose favor.

In 1924, Hans Reichenbach defined time order in terms of possible cause. Event A happens before event B if A could have caused B but B couldn't have caused A. This was the first causal theory of time. Its usefulness depends on a clarification of the notorious notions of causality and possibility.

One proper, but indirect, way to answer the question "What is physical time?" is to declare that it is whatever the time variable t is denoting in the best-confirmed and most fundamental theories of current physics. Many philosophers complain that this answer is incomplete because, although philosophical theories of time should be informed by what science requires of time, they should progress beyond.

What science requires of time

Quantum field theory and Einstein's general theory of relativity are the most fundamental theories of physics. According to these theories, spacetime is a collection of points called "spacetime locations" where physical events occur. Spacetime is four-dimensional and a continuum, with physical time being a distinguished, one-dimensional sub-space of this continuum. In 1908, the mathematician Hermann Minkowski had an original idea in metaphysics regarding space and time. He was the first person to realize that spacetime is more fundamental than time or than space. As he put it, "Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality." The metaphysical assumption behind Minkowski's remark is that what is independently real is what does not vary from one reference frame to another. It's their "union," what we now call "spacetime," that doesn't vary.

Newton would have disagreed. He declared that every observer can in principle determine time intervals that depend in no way on the observer's frame of reference. If the time interval between two lightning flashes is 100 seconds on someone's clock, then the interval also is 100 seconds on your clock, even if you are flying by at an incredible speed. Albert Einstein rejected this piece of common sense in his 1905 special theory of relativity when he declared that the time interval (and the distance) between two events depends on the observer's reference frame. As Einstein expressed it, "Every reference-body has its own particular time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event." Each reference frame (or reference body) divides spacetime differently into its time part and its space part.

For example, suppose a bolt of lightning strikes the front of a speeding train and another strikes the back of the train. The train conductor, who is sitting in the middle of the train, tries to determine whether the two lightning bolts struck simultaneously. If the two flashes from front and back reach the conductor at the same instant, they did. According to Einstein's definition of simultaneity for two events occuring at different places, light rays coming from those two events will reach the midpoint between them at the same time. The train conductor is at the midpoint of the train. You, however, are at rest on the platform beside the train track just as the two flashes reach the conductor. They reach you at the same instant as well, but you will judge that neither you nor the conductor are at the midpoint between the two events; you are merely at the midpoint of the train. From your perspective (reference frame), you will point out that the conductor is

speeding toward the place where the front lightning bolt struck. By the time the light reaches him (and you), he is closer to the front strike, so the lightning must have struck the back of the train before it struck the front. You will judge that the two events were not simultaneous. Einstein says both of you are correct in your apparently contradictory judgments about simultaneity. This feature of our universe is what Einstein calls the "relativity of simultaneity." The events really are simultaneous in the reference frame fixed to the train, and the events really are not simultaneous in the reference frame fixed to the track. This relativity is a relativity for distant events, not for events happening at the same place.

Science assigns numbers to times because, in any reference frame, the happens-before order-relation on events is faithfully reflected in the less-than order relation on the time numbers (dates) that we assign to events. In the fundamental theories, the values of the time variable t are real numbers, with each number designating an instant of time. Time is a linear continuum of instants, similar to the mathematician's line segment. Therefore, physical time is one-dimensional rather than two-dimensional, and continuous rather than discrete. One can't be sure from this that time is linear rather than circular because a segment of a circle is also a linear continuum. If it were circular, then Homer might write his Iliad and Odyssey epics in the future, a possibility that appealed to the ancient Stoic philosophers. The logic of the term "time" doesn't rule out a nonlinear structure, but there is no reason to believe it occurs.

Regarding the instants, time's being a linear continuum implies there is a nondenumerable infinity of them. It also implies they are so densely packed that between any two there is a third, and yet no instant has a next instant. There is little doubt that the actual temporal structure of events can be embedded in the real numbers, but how about the converse? That is, to what extent is it known that the real numbers can be adequately embedded into the structure of the instants? The problem is that, although time is not quantized in quantum theory, for times shorter than about 10 to the minus 43 seconds, the so-called Planck time, science has no experimental support for the claim that between any two events there is a third. The support comes from the fact that the assumption of continuity in the general theory of relativity and in quantum theory is convenient and useful, and it rests on the fact that there are no better theories available. Because of quantum mechanical considerations, physicists agree that the general theory of relativity must fail for durations shorter than the Planck time, but they don't know just how it fails. That is, there is no agreement among physicists as to whether the continuum feature of time will be adopted in the future theory of quantum gravity that will be created to take account of both gravitational and quantum phenomena.

In 1922, the Russian physicist Alexander Friedmann predicted from general relativity that the universe should be expanding. In 1929, the American astronomer Edwin Hubble made careful observations of clusters of galaxies and confirmed that the universe actually is undergoing a universal expansion. Each galaxy cluster is moving away from most every other. So, at any earlier moment the universe was more compact. Projecting to earlier and earlier times, and assuming that gravitation is the main force at work here, the astronomers now conclude that about twelve to fifteen billion years ago the universe was in a state of infinite density and zero size. Because all substances cool when they expand, physicists believe the universe itself must have been cooling down over the last twelve to fifteen billion years. Therefore, the universe started out very hot and very small. This beginning process is called the "big bang." As far as we know, the entire universe

was created in the big bang, and time itself come into existence 'at that time'.

In the literature in both physics and philosophy, descriptions of the big bang often assume that a first event is also a first instant of time and that spacetime did not exist outside the big bang. This intimate linking of a first event with a first time is a philosophical move, not something demanded by the science. It is not even clear that it's correct to call the big bang an event. The big bang event is a singularity without space coordinates, but events normally must have space coordinates. One response to this problem is to alter the definition of "event" to allow the big bang to be an event. Another response, from James Hartle and Stephen Hawking, is to consider the past cosmic time-interval to be open or unbounded at t=0 rather than closed or bounded by t=0. Looking back to the big bang is then like following the positive real numbers back to ever smaller numbers without ever reaching a smallest positive one. If Hartle and Hawking are correct that time is actually like this, then the universe had no beginning event, but it has a finite past, and the term "the big bang" refers to the very early events, not to a single event. The remainder of this article we will speak casually of 'the' big bang event in order to simplify the discussion.

There are serious difficulties in defending the big bang theory's implications about the universe's beginning. They are based on the assumption that the universal expansion of clusters of galaxies can be projected *all* the way back. Yet physicists agree that the projection must fail in the Planck era, that is, for all times less than 10 to the minus 43 seconds after 'the' big bang. Therefore, current science cannot speak with confidence about the nature of time in the Planck era, nor whether time existed before that era. If a theory of quantum gravity does get confirmed, it should provide information about the Planck era, and it may even allow physicists to answer the question, "What caused the big bang?" However, at present, the best answer is probably "Nothing; it just happened." The philosophically radical, but theologically popular, answer, "God caused the big bang, but He, himself, does not exist *in* time" is cryptic because it is not based on a well-justified and detailed theory of who God is, how He caused the big bang, and how He can exist but not be *in* time. It is also difficult to understand St. Augustine's remark that "time itself was made by God." On the other hand, for a person of faith, belief in God as creator is usually stronger than belief in any scientific hypothesis or in any epistemological demand for a scientific justification or in any philosopher's demand for clarification.

The big bang theory is accepted by the vast majority of astronomers, but it is not as firmly accepted as is the theory of relativity. Relativity theory challenges a great many of our intuitive beliefs about time. The theory is inconsistent with the common belief that the order in which two events occur is independent of the observer's point of view. For events occurring at the same place, the order is absolute (independent of the frame), but for distant events occurring close enough in time to be in each other's absolute elsewhere, event A can occur before event B in one reference frame, but after B in another frame, and simultaneous with B in yet another frame.

Relativity theory implies there is time dilation between one frame and another. For example, the faster a clock moves, the slower it runs, relative to stationary clocks. Time dilation shows itself when a speeding twin returns to find that his (or her) Earth-bound twin has aged more rapidly. This surprising dilation result has caused some philosophers to question the consistency of relativity theory, arguing that, if motion is relative, then from the perspective of the speeding twin, *he* should be the one who aged more rapidly. This argument is called the "twins paradox." Experts now are agreed that the mistake is within the argument for the paradox, not within relativity

theory. The argument fails to notice the radically different relationships that each twin has to the rest of the universe as a whole. These relationships call for treating the twins paradox with general relativity, not with special relativity.

There are two kinds of time dilation. Special relativity's time dilation involves speed; general relativity's involves acceleration and gravitational fields. Two ideally synchronized clocks need not stay in synchrony if they undergo different accelerations or different gravitational forces. This effect would be especially apparent if one of the two clocks were to fall into a black hole. A black hole can form when a star exhausts its nuclear fuel and contracts so compactly that the gravitational force prevents anything from escaping the hole, even light itself. The envelope of no return surrounding the black hole is its event horizon. As a clock falls in the direction of a black hole, time slows on approach to the event horizon, and it completely stops at the center of the hole--relative to time on a clock that remains safely back on Earth. As an astronaut swiftly falls into the hole, the proper time, the time measured on the astronaut's clock, passes beyond the end of our civilization's time.

The supplement to this article continues with the topic of what science requires of time, and it provides background information about other topics discussed in this article.

Time travel

Remembering an earlier episode in your life is a kind of mental time travel, but philosophers have generally been more interested in travel in physical time than in psychological time. This discussion will begin with a short list of the possibilities, then discuss some of them in greater detail afterwards. (a) Einstein showed that travel forward in physical time is possible relative to the time of those who move more slowly than you. With this kind of relativistic time travel, you can't return to the old present, but you can be present at the birth of your great grandchildren. (b) Travel backward in physical time is possible only if nothing that has happened gets changed; for example, you can't go back in time and prevent your parents from having any children. (c) If the history books were to tell of someone named Booth who seemed to pop into existence in the 1860s and who then assassinated Abraham Lincoln, then you or someone else will someday build a time machine to go back and become this Booth character. Suppose you are that person. Then, since Booth died back in the 1860s, you'd have died before you were born. (d) If you fell into a black hole, then you'd travel to a time after the end of the unverse, as measured in a reference frame tied to Earth. (e) If you get on a plane on the Earth's surface and travel west, you will cross a time zone and instantly go back an hour, but all you've done is changed your reference frame, so this is a trivial form of travel in physical time. (f) If your body were quick-frozen in the year 2,020 and thawed in 2,088, then you would travel forward 68 years in clock time but only a few seconds of your biological time. This is a case of biological time travel, not a case of physical time travel.

If you have a fast enough spaceship, you can travel to the year 4,500 A.D. according to someone else's stationary clock back on Earth. This is a direct consequence of the time dilation described in the theory of relativity. You can travel to *someone else's* future, not your own. You're always in your own present. Unfortunately, once you go to 4,500 A.D. (in the frame of reference in which the Earth is stationary), you are stuck in the Earth's future. You can not reverse course in your spaceship and return to the time you began. In other words, if you do leave Earth now and fly very

fast, then land back on Earth in 4,500 A.D., you must live with the consequence that all your friends have died centuries ago. On this trip to 4,500 A.D., how much time would elapse on your own clock? The answer depends on how fast your spaceship goes, what accelerations occur, and whether gravitational forces are acting. The faster your spaceship goes, the less time it will take--actually take, not just appear to take. As you approach infinitesimally close to the speed of light, the trip to 4,500 A.D. will take essentially no time at all for you, and you'll just 'pop' into the future of Earth. That's from your own perspective; observers who remained stationary on Earth will have observed your escapades for thousands of years.

Unlike the time travel in science fiction movies, relativistic time travel to the future is continuous, not abrupt. That is, as you travel to the future, you exist at all intervening times according to the stationary Earth clock. You don't 'poof' into existence in 4,500 A.D.; you existed during their year 4,499, but your spaceship hadn't yet landed. In science fiction movies, which almost always depict nonrelativistic time travel, time travelers suddenly appear from out of the past, and other travelers suddenly disappear from now and pop into the future. These phenomena have never been observed, despite the parapsychological literature, but if they were reliably observed, then we would consider the hypothesis that space has an extra dimension allowing time travel. The 'poofs' in ordinary 4-d spacetime could actually be motions along a continuous trajectory in 5-d spacetime. One would wonder, though, how anyone could ever verify (check) that the time traveler took one trajectory in the higher dimension rather than another.

There are two kinds of travel to the past: going back and changing the past, and going back and not changing it. Going back and murdering your infant self is impossible. Logic is more basic than physics. Going back to the past but not changing the past is probably possible, but there are significant difficulties yet to be overcome before we can be sure. In recent decades, mathematicians and theoretical physicists have described time machines, or at least universes containing backward time travel, that are consistent with Einstein's equations of general relativity. Stephen Hawking believes all these time machines are ruled out by the laws of general relativity. General relativity theory is so complex that it isn't always clear, even to the experts, what is and isn't allowed by the theory.

Going back and punching yourself in the nose even though you remember never having been punched may be possible, provided you have a faulty memory and provided we can make sense of the integrity of your personal identity, your being the same person through it all. If you travel back before your birth, you could die before you are born. Also, when you travel back you will remember some of the future. That is, you will remember some of what *we* call the future, though not what we think of as the past. Thus this sort of time travel requires a radical revision in our conceptions of memory and personal identity.

If a person travels back in time, the event of climbing into the time machine causes the person to appear back in history. The person's world line will be a closed loop, which implies backward causation. Some philosophers believe backward causation can be ruled out by the definition of "cause," just as they can rule out there being a week next year in which Monday is the day immediately after Friday. Many other philosophers disagree on the grounds that backward causation is improbable or nonexistent, but not impossible.

Optimists about time travel to the past face other obstacles. Where are all the time travelers now?

Why aren't they here visiting us on their vacations? There should be some evidence that we've been visited by now, unless of course time machines just never get built. Probing the possibility of a contradiction, John Earman has described a rocket ship that carries a very special time machine. The time machine is capable of firing a probe into the past. Suppose the ship is programmed to fire the probe on a certain date unless a safety switch is on. Suppose the safety switch is programmed to be turned on if and only if the 'return' of the probe is detected by a sensing device on the ship. Does the probe get launched? The way out of Earman's paradox seems to require us to accept that (a) the universe conspires to keep people from building the probe or the safety switch or the sensing device, or (b) time travel probes must go so far back in time that they never make it back to the time when they were launched, or (c) past time travel is impossible.

Feynman diagrams in particle physics have been described by Richard Feynman himself as illustrating how a particle's moving forward in time is actually its antiparticle moving backward in time. However, physicists don't take Feynman's suggestion literally. As a leading particle theorist, Chris Quigg of Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, explained in 1998, "It's not that antiparticles in my laboratory are actually moving backward in time. What's really meant by that is that if I think of a particle moving from one place to another forward in time, the physical process is the same as it would be if we imagine running the film backward and also changing the particle into an antiparticle."

Relational theories of time

When you set your alarm clock for 7:00, does the time of 7:00 cause your alarm to go off? No, although it wouldn't go off if it weren't 7:00, under the circumstances. Such is the nature of causality. It is generally agreed that time causes nothing. Another question, underlying the question about your alarm clock, is whether 7:00 exists despite what happens. Absolute and relational theories of spacetime offer opposing answers to the question of whether time exists independently of the spacetime relations exhibited by physical events. Absolute theories say it does; relational theories say it does not. The absolute theories describe spacetime as being like a container for events. The term "absolute" in this context does not mean independent of the observer, but independent of the events. The absolute theories imply that spacetime could exist even if there were no material objects in the universe, but relational theories imply that spacetime is nothing but material objects, their events, and the spatiotemporal relationships among them. Everyone agrees time cannot be *measured* without there being changes, but the present issue is whether it can *exist* without changes.

Aristotle took a position regarding the relationship between time and change when he remarked that, "neither does time exist without change [218b]." However, the battle lines were most clearly drawn in the 17th century when Leibniz explicitly said there is no time without actual change and Newton protested that time exists regardless of whether anything changes. They offered several arguments for their positions. Huygens, Berkeley, and Mach entered the arena on the side of Leibniz. In the 20th century, Reichenbach and the early Einstein declared the special theory of relativity to be a victory for the relational theory, but they may have been overstating the amount of metaphysics that can be extracted from the physics. Newton's own absolute theory of space used the notion of a space filling material aether at rest in absolute space with distances and times being independent of reference frames, and this is unacceptable, but other absolute theories are

consistent with current science.

Absolute theories were dominant in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the relational theories were dominant in most of the 20th century, but at the end of the century, absolute theories have gained some ground and there is no convergence of opinion on this prominent issue.

Absolute theories are called "substantival" or "substantial" if they require spacetime to be a substance. These are the kind of absolute theories discussed here. Absolutists disagree among themselves about what it means to be a substance. It does not mean that spacetime is a kind of stuff out of which physical events are composed. Absolutists have described spacetime as "an antecedent arena for events" and "ontologically prior to events" and "an irreducible object of predication" and "the substrata for properties" and "the domain of the intended models of the basic physical theories." The container metaphor may work for special relativity, but general relativity requires that the curvature of spacetime be affected by the distribution of matter, so today it is no longer plausible for an absolutist to assert that the 'container' is independent of what it contains.

To Newton, the time variable t in the laws of physics ranges over real numbers that label absolute instants. To Leibniz, t ranges over real numbers that are used to express relationships among events. What is implied by saying time is a relationship among events? For example, if events occur in a room a second before and after 11:01 AM, but not at that instant, must the relationist say there never was a time of 11:01 AM in the room? No. The relationist will say 11:01 exists, though not as an absolute instant. 11:01 exists because the whole system of instants exists as a means of expressing the facts about events. It exists because the universe's events have the order they do, the order of an interval of the real numbers. Something somewhere must be happening at 11:01 or else we were mistaken in assigning the order of the real numbers to events. There can be no 'empty' time, the relationist says. Will this relationist strategy for time work also for space? Can there be no empty space? No merely possible places? That is a bigger philosophical problem. We need to speak of an electron's taking a different path from the one it actually took. Is there a coherent role for these nonexistent events in the relationist's 'relationships among events'? This question needs to be answered in order to properly assess a standard problem for the relational theory, a problem raised by Newton. He argued that if one reference frame is stationary in absolute space while the other is moving at a constant velocity, then, we cannot tell which one is really moving; we can detect only the relative motion; but if one is accelerating and the other is stationary in absolute space, then we can detect which is which. We can tell whether our spaceship is accelerating forward in absolute space by whether we are pushed back into our seats. Absolutists have argued that this difference in what we feel is not properly explainable by a relational theory of space, but only by absolute accelerations. Relationists have counterattacked by asking how acceleration relative to an absolute space has anything to do with feeling pushed back in our seats. Translating this debate into the idiom of relativity theory, the Newtonians are saying that their absolute theory is required to explain curved world lines. The relationists' counterattack is asking how curvature of the world line is to be explained by appeal to absolute spacetime. The absolute theorists have an answer. Are there two points on the world line such that along some alternative world line that also connects the points the spacetime interval would have been shorter? If so, the world line is curving in absolute spacetime independently of the observer's reference frame. That's how the existence of absolute space enables us to tell who is really accelerating and who is not. Notice that this answer requires the notion of alternative, possible, but not actual, world lines. The absolute theory can

supply these because it takes all spacetime points as being substantial. The relational theory cannot do this, absolutists argue. At least it cannot if it appeals only to actual physical events, actual world lines composed of these events, and actual spacetime relations that hold among them. If the relational theory were to take spacetime points more seriously and consider them to be permanent possibilities of the location of events, then the relationist could use a very similar strategy to explain the feeling of being pushed back in our seats (namely that the feeling is due to curvature of the world line), but then the theory would collapse into substantivalism, and there would no longer be a difference between the two theories, John Earman has argued. To the absolutist, a spacetime point is a place where something *could* happen. The relational theory must use only actual events, not possible events, Earman argues. The relationists Leibniz and Russell would agree. Lawrence Sklar disagrees. He says that if relationists are going to talk about locations between material objects where no objects exist, then they "had better allow talk about possible objects and their possible spatial relations" because "versions of relationism that eschew such notions are pretty implausible...." The same point applies to possible events.

One of Leibniz's arguments against Newton's absolute time is still used today. If the entire universe were shifted five minutes in absolute time, no one would be the wiser. This pair of observationally indistinguishable states of affairs is metaphysically distasteful to anyone who subscribes to Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. The principle says that if no one could observe a difference between the two, then they are really just one. So, absolute theories are incorrect because they imply that the time shift makes a difference. Some absolutists would turn Leibniz's argument on its head. Rejecting Leibniz's Principle, these absolutists ask us to consider the possibility that everything has stopped happening for five minutes or, instead, stopped for ten minutes. Because we can imagine this difference, it's a real physical possibility, and the relational theory of time is refuted because it implies that the different freezings of time are not real physical possibilities.

Hartry Field argues for the absolute theory by pointing out that modern physics requires gravitational and electromagnetic fields that cover spacetime. They are states of spacetime. These fields cannot be states of some Newtonian aether, but there must be something to have the field properties. What else except substantive spacetime points?

The flow of time

"It is as if we were floating on a river, carried by the current past the manifold of events which is spread out timelessly on the bank," said Plato. Other writers describe the passage of time as the "moving now" that cleaves the past from the future. "The passage of time...is the very essence of the concept," said Gerald Whitrow, and philosophers are eager to expose the real story behind the metaphor. It is universally agreed that time doesn't pass by at a rate of one second per second. Some philosophers have argued that the passage of time is a feature of the world to be explained by noting how events change. An event such as the death of Queen Anne can change from having the property of being future (to one of her contemporaries), to having the property of being present, to having the property of being past. Agreeing that events can change their properties in this manner, J. M. E. McTaggart argued that the concept of time's flow is absurd because it is contradictory for Queen Anne's death to be both present *and* past. Many other philosophers believe events do not change any of their properties. An event's 'changing' from being future to being present to being

past is not a real change in its properties, but only in its relations to the observer. So, it is concluded that the notion of time's flow is a myth. The question of why the flowing conception of time is such a compelling myth is answered by Ludwig Wittgenstein who asks us to be more attentive to the proper use of our words so we don't consider time to be a process:

> **In our failure to understand the use of a word, we take it as the expression of a queer *process*. (As we think of time as a queer medium, of the mind as a queer kind of being.)**

On yet another analysis, the notion of time's flow is a subjective feature of psychological time to be explained by a person's having more memories and more information at later times.

The arrow of time

Unlike space, physical time seems to be inherently directional. Let's consider what this means. Time is directed from the past toward the future, and it cannot reverse direction; this is implied by the very definition of the terms "past" and "future." Consequently, to say "Time flows in one direction only, from past to future" is to express a tautology. However, time's arrow is *another* sort of directedness. It is what distinguishes events ordered by the happens-before relation from those ordered by its converse, the happens-after relation. Time's arrow is the sort of temporal asymmetry you notice when you light a fire cracker. You get a loud sound, along with heat, light and ashes. It's practically impossible to reverse the process and create an unlit firecracker from the combustion products. Similarly, if you pour hot water into cold water, you get lukewarm water, but you never notice lukewarm water unmixing into a cold part and a hot part . Such is the way irreversible processes go. The arrow of an irreversible physical process is the way it normally goes, the way it normally unfolds through time--time in the present epoch of the universe's history. The amalgamation of all the universe's irreversible processes produces time's arrow, the 'cosmic' arrow of time. The goals of a theory of time's arrow are to understand why this arrow exists, if it does, and to explain its connection to other temporally asymmetric phenomena such as causes preceding their effects and our knowing the past but never the future. Physicists often speak of multiple "arrows of time." These are processes that are noteworthy in their temporal asymmetry. For a process to be classified as such an arrow of time, it must work either differently or not at all if time were reversed.

Although no one doubts that psychological time has an arrow, philosophers of science are not all convinced that physical time has an arrow. Henryk Mehlberg said [in 1961], "On presently available scientific evidence, time should be considered as having no arrow or unique direction, and as involving no intrinsic (observer-independent) distinction between past and future." If this analysis is correct, then the so-called cosmic arrow of time is really the arrow of the world in time and not of time itself. There is no point in assigning a direction to *absolute* time since its direction is presumably unaffected by the direction or flow of any physical processes.

If physical processes in time do have an arrow, and if the processes obey scientific laws, and if these laws are to be accounted for by the basic laws of physics, then you might think that an inspection of these basic laws would readily reveal time's arrow. It won't. Nearly all the basic laws are time symmetric. This means that if the variable t is replaced by its negative -t in those laws, the result is still a law; the basic equations are unchanged. To illustrate, if you have a movie of a basic physical process, say two protons bouncing off each other, you can run it forwards or backwards and

neither showing will look odd. And both ways of running the movie describe a world consistent with the laws of physics. On the other hand, if you have a movie of ordinary, macroscopic phenomena, say a ping pong ball bouncing along a wooden floor, you have no trouble telling which way is the right way to show the movie. This difference between basic movies and ordinary movies is odd because ordinary phenomena are supposed to be composed of more basic phenomena. Some scientists and philosophers respond to the curious fact that nearly all the basic laws are time symmetric by suggesting that we must not yet have found the true laws (or invented the best laws) underlying nature's behavior; we need to keep looking for more basic, time asymmetrical laws in order to account for time's arrow. In 1947, physicists discovered one elementary phenomenon that is not time symmetric, the decay of a special kind of meson called the "kaon." It takes more than a trillion times longer for a kaon to decay into pions than for a kaon to be produced by motion reversal from those decay products. Unfortunately, most physicists don't believe that kaon decay alone could account for time's arrow. For example, what does kaon decay have to do with a whole container of lukewarm water never unmixing into cold and hot halves?

Ludwig Boltzmann was the first to show how an irreversible macroscopic phenomenon may arise from reversible microscopic laws. He showed that macroscopic thermodynamic processes such as heat flow in a gas are irreversible because the probability of their actually reversing is insignificant. There are more lukewarm microstates of the set of its constituent molecules than there are microstates with hot and cold regions, so the system evolves in the 'direction' of what is most probable. Let A be the set of microstates of an isolated container in which one part of the container contains hot gas and a separate part contains cold gas. Let B be the lukewarm microstates. Assume all the microstates are equally probable. The number of B states is dramatically larger than the number of A states, so the probability that one of the A states will lead to one of the B states is almost one whereas the probability that a B state will lead to an A state is almost zero. That is why the process of heat flow in a gas is irreversible, said Boltzmann. The law of physics describing these processes is the second law of thermodynamics, an irreversible law that doesn't hold at the micro-level. The second law says that a change occurring in an isolated, macroscopic system will most probably not lead it into a state of lower entropy. Entropy is approximately a measure of a system's disorder. Isolated systems change toward disorder because disorder is so probable; there are so many more disordered states than ordered ones. So, entropy's relentless increase accounts for the irreversibility of thermodynamic processes.

Creationist opponents of the theory of evolution often point out that the growth of a baby into an adult is an example of a thermodynamic process in which entropy decreases rather than increases, showing that life is a process that violates the laws of science accepted by evolutionists. Actually the process is consistent with the second law because the growth process doesn't occur in an isolated system. Instead, food, light, air and water enter the system at the expense of entropy elsewhere in the universe. So, creationists are misusing the second law of thermodynamics as they search for arguments to use against the theory of evolution.

The second law, as usually stated, does have exceptions. It holds only for isolated macro-processes that are short-lived compared to the period of Poincaré cycles. Henri Poincaré's recurrence theorem in statistical mechanics says every isolated system will eventually return to its original state. It follows that eventually every irreversible process must reverse. Therefore, it is not strictly correct to say the higher of two entropy states in an isolated system is the later of the two. In practice, though, these periods are absurdly long, even compared to the history of the universe.

Penrose has raised a problem for those who believe that the cosmic arrow of time is due to entropy increase. Big bang theorists assume that the universe began in a state of thermodynamic equilibrium, and from this they make their calculations about how the universe could have evolved to the state we find it in today. Yet thermodynamic equilibrium is a state of *maximum* entropy, so the big bang theory contradicts the second law of thermodynamics. Penrose says the way out of this problem is for the new theory of quantum gravity to violate time symmetry and to explicitly include an arrow of time. Stephen Hawking disagrees on the grounds that symmetries are so useful they should be given up only as a last resort after trying other revisions.

If the arrow of time is to be explained by entropy increase, then we want to know why entropy increases. Why do we live in a world in which the total entropy of an isolated system cannot decrease, except after astronomically long times (the Poincaré times)? Many physicists claim that if the universe had started out differently, entropy decreases could be much more likely than entropy increases. If so, entropy increase is not the deep reason behind time's arrow. Instead, the arrow of time depends on the world having started with the initial configuration that it had, especially on its having had an initial, rapid expansion. This leads naturally to the request for an explanation of the initial configuration of our universe, yet cosmologists cannot provide one.

The direction of increasing entropy may be only one of time's arrows, the 'thermodynamic arrow.' Additional arrows might be caused by the following processes:

- **a. It is easier to know the past than to know the future.**
- **b. Electromagnetic waves spread out from, and never converge into, a point.**
- **c. Quantum mechanical measurement collapses the wave function.**
- **d. Kaon decay is different in a time reversed world.**
- **e. We see black holes but never white holes.**
- **f. The universe expands, but doesn't contract.**
- **g. Explanation uses the past information, not the future.**
- **h. Causes precede their effects.**
- **i. Higgs boson decay is different in a time reversed world.**

Many physicists suspect all these arrows are linked and that they might somehow be explained in terms of the initial conditions at the time of the big bang. Most of these physicists believe that arrow i is the most fundamental here; the temporal asymmetry of the Higgs boson particle is the reason why the universe contains what little matter it now does after all the primordial world's antimatter collided with its matter. However, if the arrows are *not* all linked, then some may reverse while others do not. For example, if the universe expands to a maximum volume and then reverses and begins to collapse in a big crunch, arrow f above has reversed, but other arrows have not. The question of whether the arrows are or are not linked is one to be settled by the physicists, not the philosophers.

If scientists can explain why the world's irreversible processes are not normally observed to reverse, if they can do this without time-asymmetric laws of nature, and if they don't need to postulate an intrinsic difference between the past and future directions, then perhaps time itself has no arrow. This would not be to say the arrow is somehow unreal, but merely that it is contingent on which processes exist and isn't a necessary characteristic of time itself. Paul Horwich made this point, and offered an analogy. Most people are right-handed, but we don't conclude from this that the universe itself is right-handed or that space has an arrow. By analogy, if the universe's processes have an arrow, let's not conclude that time itself has that arrow.

Temporal indexicals and essentially tensed facts

Can everything sayable using tensed verbs also be said using tenseless ones? Reichenbach argued that the past tense fact "Custer died in Montana" could equally, though inelegantly, be expressed by the logically-tenseless sentence, "There is a time t such that Custer dies at t, and t is less than n, the time of utterance of this sentence." The number n is the present time, and its value can be selected by the analyst of the sentence. The past tense has disappeared, and the present tense verbs in the sentence are logically tenseless because they contain no essential reference to the present. In other words, tenses can be paraphrased away using tenseless language. Not so, say Roderick Chisholm and A. N. Prior, who claim that some facts are essentially tensed. For example, the "is" in the sentence "It's now midnight" is essentially present tensed because there is no equivalent sentence using tenseless verbs. Analyzing it as "There is a time n such that n=midnight" with the analyst choosing the value of n is to miss the essential reference to the present in the original sentence. Chisholm and Prior say that true sentences using the temporal indexical terms "now," "before now," and "happened yesterday" are part of the facts that science should account for, but that science fails to do this because it restricts itself to a Minkowski-like spacetime representation of events. A Minkowski spacetime diagram displays what happens before what, but not which time is present time. What is missing from the diagram is some moving point on the time axis representing the observer's "now." In the same spirit, Michael Dummett argues that you can have a complete description of a set of objects in space even if you haven't said which objects are near and which are far, but you cannot have a complete description of those objects without specifying which events are present and which are not.

Russell, Quine, Grünbaum, and Horwich object to assigning special ontological status to the present. According to Quine, logicians dealing with time and philosophical analysts of language dealing with talk involving tense should in principle be able to eliminate the temporal indexical words because their removal is needed for fixed truth and falsity of our sentences, and having fixed truth values is crucial for the logical system used to clarify science. "To formulate logical laws in such a way as not to depend thus upon the assumption of fixed truth and falsity would be decidedly awkward and complicated, and wholly unrewarding," says Quine. If attention is paid to how we normally use the term "fact," then the sentence "Event E is happening now (in reference frame R)" doesn't really express a fact. According to those who oppose assigning special ontological status to the present, facts must hold *simpliciter*, not relative to an observer's experience. Sentences expressing facts must have a fixed truth. The sentence "Custer's death in Montana happened a long time ago" isn't a fact because it's true for us but not for Custer's contemporaries. Unless there's a good reason to change what we mean by the very word "fact," the sentences "Event F is

past" and "It's now midnight" are not on the list of facts of the world. What are on the list are the sentences "Custer's death in Montana happened before Hitler's death in Berlin" and "Event E occurs before the event F in reference frame R." These sentences are fixed truths or eternal truths. Grammatically, the two verbs "happened" and "occurs" in the two sentences are past tense and present tense, respectively, but logically they occur tenselessly.

The determinate reality of the future

Are predictions true or false when uttered? Suppose someone yesterday said, "Tomorrow there will be a sea battle." If you, the admiral, choose to start a sea battle today, you will make the sentence be true. Many philosophers argue that in this case the sentence was true all along. Truth is eternal or fixed, they say, and "is true" is a tenseless predicate. The ancient Greek philosopher Chrysippus was convinced that a contingent sentence about the future is either true or it is false and not any value in between. Many others, following Aristotle's lead, argue that the sentence (that is, the proposition or statement made using the sentence) isn't true until the time at which the sea battle occurs. The sentence wasn't true yesterday. In other words, predictions have no truth values at the time they are uttered. A principal motivation for adopting the Aristotelian position is the belief that if future statements involving human actions are now true, then humans are determined to perform those actions and so humans have no free will. To defend free will, we must deny truth values to predictions. The first person to give a clear presentation of the implications of treating predictions as being neither true nor false was the Polish logician Jan Lukasiewicz in 1920. To carry out Aristotle's suggestions, he developed a three-valued symbolic logic, with all grammatical sentences having the truth-values of true, false, or else indeterminate. Contingent sentences about the future, such as predictions, are assigned the indeterminate truth-value.

The Aristotelian argument against predictions being true or false has been discussed as much as any in the history of philosophy, but it faces a series of challenges. If there really is no free will, or if free will is compatible with determinism, then the motivation to deny truth values to predictions is undermined. A second challenge complains that the Aristotelian position makes the future be presently unreal. There is no determinate reality to the future if statements about the future have no truth values. This lack of determinate reality is unacceptable because special relativity implies that some events in one person's present can be in another person's future, if the two persons are in relative motion. Surely Aristotelians are mistaken if they suppose some persons' presents are real and other persons' presents are not, argued Hilary Putnam. Putnam believes future things are real, even if they do not exist yet; and the real things are all those that will exist, do exist, or have existed. Putnam disagrees with Duns Scotus who argued that only the present is real and with Aristotle who argued that only the present and past are real. Agreeing with Putnam, Quine adds a moral argument. The determinate reality of the future is assumed in moral discussions about the interests of people who are as yet unborn. If we have an obligation to conserve the environment for these people, then we are treating them as being as real as the people around us now. Yet another challenge to the Aristotelian position comes from Quine and others who claim that it wreaks havoc with the logical system we use to reason and argue with such predictions. For example, here is a deductively valid argument:

> **We've learned there will be a sea battle tomorrow.**
>
> **If there will be a sea battle tomorrow, then the admiral should be awakened.**

So, the admiral should be awakened.

Without the sentences in this argument being true or false we cannot properly assess the argument using the standards of deductive validity and invalidity, despite the work by Lukasiewicz. Yet the Aristotelian position says these sentences aren't true or false. In light of these various challenges to the Aristotelian position, many philosophers conclude that Aristotle should revise his belief that predictions fail to be true or false at the time they are uttered.

The symbolic logic of time

In the 1950s, A. N. Prior created a new symbolic logic to describe our use of time words such as "now", "happens before", "afterwards", "next", "always", "sometimes", and so forth. He was the first to appreciate the similarity in structure between time concepts and modal concepts such as "it is possible." He applied a logic having infinitely many truth-values to create a "tense logic" in which the relationships that propositions have to the past, present, and future help to determine their truth-value. In classical logic, there are only two truth-values, namely true and false. Dummett and Lemmon also made major, early contributions to tense logic. In one standard system of the logic of past time, the S4.3 system, the usual modal operator "it is possible that" is re-interpreted to mean "at some past time it was the case that." Let the letter "M" represent this operator, and add to the axioms of classical propositional logic the modal axiom M(p v q) iff Mp v Mq. The axiom says that for any two propositions p and q, at some past time it was the case that p or q if and only if either at some past time it was the case that p or at some past time it was the case that q. S4.3's key axiom is the equivalence

Mp & Mq iff M(p & q) v M(p & Mq) v M(q & Mp).
This axiom captures our ordinary conception of time as a linear succession of states of the world. Logicians disagree about what additional axioms and revisions are needed to make more of our beliefs about time be theorems of a symbolic logic of time.

SUPPLEMENT

This supplement answers a series of questions designed to reveal more about what science requires of physical time, and to provide background information about other topics discussed in this article.

What is a reference frame?

A reference frame is a point of view, a perspective for making observations and judgments. Special relativity is intended to apply only to inertial reference frames. Inertial frames are reference frames in which Newton's first law of inertia holds: any object's acceleration is zero if no net force acts on the object. In other words, if no unbalanced external forces are acting on a moving object, then the object moves in a straight line. It doesn't curve or go into orbit. And it travels equal distances in equal amounts of time. Any frame of reference moving at constant velocity relative to an inertial frame is also an inertial frame. A reference frame spinning relative to an inertial frame isn't an inertial frame. The presence of gravitation normally destroys any possibility of finding a frame that is a perfect inertial frame, but a reference frame in which the 'fixed' stars are at rest is approximately an inertial reference frame, as is any reference frame moving at constant velocity with respect to the 'fixed' stars. Is a reference frame attached to Earth an equally good approximation to an inertial reference frame? Not quite. The frame is spinning relative to the heavenly bodies; and the gravitational forces due to the Moon, Sun and planets will make Newton's law fail; but for many situations these influences are negligible, and computations using special relativity or even Newton's mechanics give fine results.

What is spacetime?

Spacetime is a certain 4-d space (or 4-d manifold, to use Riemann's term for space). It's the 4-d

continuum we live in. Spacetime is the intended model of the general theory of relativity. This requires it to be a differentiable space in which certain geometrical objects obey the covariant field equations of general relativity, and in which physical objects obey the equations of motion of the theory. The metaphysical question of whether spacetime is a substantial object or a relationship among events, or neither, is taken up in the discussion of the relational theory of time. Regardless of how that question is answered, spacetime is more fundamental in science than either space or time alone. Einstein's general theory of relativity (1915) assumes that spacetime is fundamental, with space and time being two distinct sub-spaces of it.

Spacetime is a continuum in which we can define points and straight lines. However, these points and lines do not satisfy the principles of Euclidean geometry. Einstein's principal equation in his general theory of relativity implies that the curvature of the geometry of spacetime is directly proportional to the density of mass in the spacetime. The equation can be interpreted as implying that matter causes curvature in the spacetime geometry, or vice versa. The region of spacetime at the center of a black hole develops infinitely large curvature. Curvature of spacetime is a curvature of its space part, not its time part. Mass doesn't cause time to curve.

Regions of spacetime are frequently pictured with a Minkowski diagram using a rectangular coordinate system. The vertical 'time' axis is the product of time and the speed of light so that world lines of light rays leaving the origin make a forty-five degree angle with any space axis. The Minkowski diagram applies to a particular observer who experiences the event that occurs at the point indicated by the diagram's origin. In a Minkowski diagram, an ideally small physical particle is not represented as occupying a point of spacetime but as occupying a line containing all the spacetime points at which it exists. The line is called the "world line" of the particle. If two world lines intersect, then the two particles have collided. A person's world line is composed of the world lines of the person's component particles. Inertial motion corresponds to straight world lines, and accelerated motion corresponds to curved world lines.

Although relativity theory assumes that spacetime is fundamental, there have been serious attempts over the last few decades to construct theories of physics in which spacetime is not fundamental but is a product of more basic entities such as superstrings. The primary aim of these new theories is to unify relativity with quantum theory, but so far these theories have not stood up to any empirical observations or experiments that could show them to be superior to the presently accepted theories. So, spacetime remains fundamental.

What is an event?

An event might be defined simply as whatever is temporally before or after anything else. In ordinary discourse, an event is a happening during which some object changes its properties. The event of the buttering of the toast involves the toast's changing from having the property of being unbuttered to having the property of being buttered. In ordinary discourse, an event has more than an infinitesimal duration, but in the technical discourse of physics, all events are composed of point events. A point event is a spacetime point's having some property other than those it has just by being a location in spacetime. The point event is the having of some property at some point in space for an instant, with no change required. For example, there is the event of a certain point in spacetime having butter. The macroscopic event of a buttering of toast is composed of an infinite

number of point events involving the butter and toast. Although point events can be defined in terms of objects and properties and times in this way, point events and spacetime points actually are more basic in physics than are objects and properties. Point events are what all objects and events are made of, and spacetime points are what have the properties. The later Einstein moved away from the relational theory of time to the position that material objects are 'funny' places in the field, with the field itself being spacetime as characterized by the metric and stress-energy tensors. These metaphysical assumptions of modern science are not part of common sense, the shared background beliefs of most people. They also are not acceptable metaphysical assumptions for many philosophers. In 1936, Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead developed a theory of time based on the assumption that all events in spacetime have a finite duration. However, they had to assume that any finite part of an event is an event, and this assumption is no closer to common sense than the physicist's assumption that all events are composed of point events.

Does the theory of relativity imply time is partly space?

In 1908, when Minkowski remarked that "Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality," many people took this to mean that time is partly space, and vice versa. C. D. Broad countered that the discovery of spacetime did not break down the distinction between time and space but only their independence or isolation. He argued that their lack of independence does not imply a lack of reality. The Broad-Minkowski disagreement is still an issue in philosophy, but if Broad is correct, then time is time; it's not space at all. Nevertheless, there is a deep sense in which time and space are 'mixed up' or linked. This is evident from the Lorentz transformations of special relativity that connect the time t in one inertial frame with the time t' in another frame that is moving in the x direction at a constant speed v. The relationship is

$$t' = [t - vx/c^2]/[\text{square root}(1- v^2/c^2)]$$

In this equation, t' is dependent upon the space coordinate x and the speed. In this way, time is not independent of either space or speed. It follows that the time between two events could be zero in one frame but not zero in another. Each frame has its own way of splitting up spacetime into its space part and its time part. The reason time is not partly space is that time is not simply an arbitrary one-dimensional sub-space of spacetime; it is a *distinguished* sub-space. That is, time is a distinguished dimension of spacetime, not an arbitrary dimension. What being distinguished amounts to is that when you set up a rectangular coordinate system on spacetime with an origin at the signing of the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia, you can point the x-axis east or north or up or anywhere in between, but you are not allowed to point it forward in time--you can do that only with the t-axis, the time axis.

Is time the fourth dimension?

Yes and no; it depends on what you are talking about. Time is the fourth dimension of spacetime, but time is not the fourth dimension of the space of places. Mathematicians have a broader notion of the term "space" than the average person; and in their sense a space need not consist of places,

that is, geographical locations. Not paying attention to the two meanings of the term "space" is the source of all the confusion about whether time is the fourth dimension. The 'space' of spacetime is four dimensional and in that space, the space of places is a 3-d sub-space. But spacetime is a space of events, not a space of places.

In any coordinate system on spacetime, it takes at least four independent numbers to determine a spacetime location. In any coordinate system on the space of places, it takes at least three. That's why spacetime is four dimensional but the space of places is three dimensional. Actually this 19th century definition of dimensionality, which is due to Bernhard Riemann, is not quite adequate because mathematicians have subsequently discovered how to assign each point on the plane to a point on the line without any two points on the plane being assigned to one point on the line. Consequently, the line and the plane have the same number of points, and the line and plane must have the same dimensions according to the definition. To avoid this problem, the dimensionality of a space has been given a rather complex new definition.

Is time infinite?

There are three ways to interpret this question: (a) Was there an infinite amount of time in the past? No, not if time began with the big bang. (b) Is time infinitely divisible? Yes, because general relativity and quantum mechanics require time to be a continuum. (c) Will there be an infinite amount of time in the future? This is difficult to judge. First, can time exist without events? If so, the future is infinite. If not, then we need to know whether events will keep occurring. The best estimate from the cosmologists these days is that the expansion of the universe will continue forever. There always will be the events of particles getting farther apart, and so future time will be infinite.

Is there more than one kind of physical time?

Every reference frame has its own physical time, but the question is intended in another sense. At present, physicists measure time electromagnetically. They define a standard atomic clock using periodic electromagnetic processes in atoms, then use electromagnetic signals (light) to synchronize clocks that are far from the standard clock. In doing this, are physicists measuring 'electromagnetic time' but not other kinds of physical time? In the 1930s, the physicists Arthur Milne and Paul Dirac worried about this question. Independently, they suggested there may be very many time scales. For example, there could be the time of atomic processes and light, which is measured best by atomic clocks. There also could be the time of gravitation and large-scale physical processes, which is measured best by the rotation of a pulsar (pulsating star). The two physicists worried that the atomic clock and the astronomical clock might drift out of synchrony after being initially synchronized, yet there would be no reasonable explanation for why they don't stay in synchrony. Ditto for clocks based on the pendulum, on superconducting resonators, on the spread of electromagnetic radiation through space, and on other physical principles. Just imagine the difficulty for physicists if they had to work with electromagnetic time, gravitational time, nuclear time, neutrino time, and so forth. Current physics, however, has found no reason to assume there is more than one kind of time for physical processes. In 1967, physicists did reject the

astronomical standard for the atomic standard because the deviation between known atomic and gravitation periodic processes could be explained better assuming that the atomic processes were the more regular of the two. Physicists had no reason to believe that a gravitational periodic process, that is just as regular initially as the atomic process and that is not affected by friction or impacts or other forces, would ever drift out of synchrony with the atomic process, yet this is the possibility that worried Milne and Dirac.

How is time relative to the observer?

Physical time is not relative to any observer's state of mind. Wishing time will pass does not affect the rate at which the observed clock ticks. On the other hand, physical time *is* relative to the observer's reference system--in a trivial way and in a deep way. In a trivial way, time is relative to the chosen coordinate system on the reference frame, though not to the reference frame itself. For example, it depends on the units chosen as when the duration of some event is 34 seconds if seconds are defined to be this long, but not if they are defined to be that long. Similarly, the difference between the Christian calendar and the Jewish calendar for the date of some event is due to a different unit and origin. Also trivially, time depends on the coordinate system when a change is made from the Eastern Standard Time to Pacific Standard Time. These dependencies are ignored when scientists measure the duration of a process that would be affected by them. For example, if a pendulum's approximately one-second swing is measured in a physics laboratory during the autumn night when the society changes from Daylight Savings Time back to Standard Time, the scientists do not note that one unusual swing of the pendulum took a negative one hour instead of the usual one second.

In a deeper sense there is relativity to the reference frame and not just to the coordinate system on that frame. That is Einstein's principal original idea about time. To illustrate for special relativity, let's assume that a number of observers are at rest in their inertial frames of reference. Which of these observers will agree on their time measurements? Observers with zero relative velocity will agree. Observers with different relative velocities will not, even if they agree on how to define the second and agree on some event occuring at time zero (the origin of the time axis). All observers will be observing the same objective reality, the same spacetime, but their different frames of reference will require disagreement about how spacetime divides up into its space part and its time part.

Relative to any observer, was Adolf Hitler born before George Washington? No, because the two events are causally connectible. That is, one event could in principle have affected the other since light would have had time to travel from one to the other. We can select a reference frame to reverse the usual Earth-based order of two events only if they are not causally connectible. Despite the relativity of time to a reference frame, all observers should agree about what happens before what when it comes to describing causally connectible events.

What are the relativity and conventionality of simultaneity?

Events that occur simultaneously with respect to one reference frame may not occur

simultaneously in another reference frame that is moving with respect to the first frame. This is called the "relativity of simultaneity," but this philosophically uncontroversial feature of time is different from the philosophically controversial feature called the "conventionality of simultaneity."

Given two events that happen essentially at the same place, physicists assume they can tell by direct observation whether the events happened simultaneously by direct observation. If we don't see one of them happening first, then we say they happened simultaneously, and we assign them the same time coordinate. The determination of simultaneity is more difficult if the two happen at separate places. One proper way to measure (operationally define) simultaneity at a distance is to say that two events are simultaneous in a reference frame if unobstructed light signals from the two events would reach us simultaneously when we are midway between the two places where they occur, as judged in that frame. This is the operational definition of simultaneity used by Einstein in his theory of relativity.

The 'midway' method described above of operationally defining simultaneity in one reference frame for two distant signals causally connected to us has a significant presumption: that the light beams travel at the same speed regardless of direction. Einstein, Reichenbach and Grünbaum have called this a reasonable "convention" because any attempt to experimentally confirm it presupposes that we already know how to determine simultaneity at a distance. This is the conventionality, rather than relativity, of simultaneity. To pursue the point, suppose the two original events are in each other's absolute elsewhere; they couldn't have affected each other. Einstein noticed that there is no physical basis for judging the simultaneity or lack of simultaneity between these two events, and for that reason said we rely on a convention when we define distant simultaneity as we do. Hillary Putnam objects to calling it a convention--on the grounds that to make any other assumption about light's speed would unnecessarily complicate our description of nature, and we often make choices about how nature *is* on the basis of simplification of our description. Putnam would say there is less conventionality in the choice than Einstein supposed.

The 'midway' method isn't the only way to define simultaneity. Consider a second method, the 'mirror reflection' method. Select an Earth-based frame of reference, and send a flash of light from Earth to Mars where it hits a mirror and is reflected back to its source. The flash occurred at 12:00, let's say, and its reflection arrived back on Earth 20 minutes later. The light traveled the same empty, undisturbed path coming and going. At what time did the light flash hit the mirror? The answer involves the so-called conventionality of simultaneity. All physicists agree one should say the reflection event occurred at 12:10. The controversial philosophical question is whether this is really a convention. Einstein pointed out that there would be no inconsistency in our saying that it hit the mirror at 12:17, provided we live with the awkward consequence that light was relatively slow getting to the mirror, but then traveled back to Earth at a faster speed. If we picked the impact time to be 12:05, we'd have to live with the fact that light traveled slower coming back. There is a physical basis for not picking the impact time to be less than noon nor later than 12:20, because doing so would violate the physical principle that causes precede their effects. One requirement we place on the concept of simultaneity is that distant events which are simultaneous could not be in causal contact with each other. We can satisfy that requirement for any choice of impact time from 12:00 to 12:20.

What is the difference between the past and the absolute past?

The events in your absolute past are those that could have directly or indirectly affected you, the observer, now. These are the events in or on the backward light cone of your present event, your here-and-now. The backward light cone of event E is the imaginary cone-shaped surface of spacetime points formed by the paths of all light rays reaching E from the past. An event's being in a point's absolute past is a feature of spacetime itself because the event is in the point's past in all possible reference frames. The feature is frame-independent. For any event in your absolute past, every observer in the universe (who isn't making an error) will agree the event happened in your past. Not so for events that are in your past but not in your absolute past. Past events not in your absolute past will be in what Eddington called your "absolute elsewhere." This is the region of spacetime containing events that are not causally connectible to your here-and-now. For example, the nearest star to the sun, Proxima Centauri, is four light-years away. Any event happening there now is in our absolute elsewhere and couldn't affect us. An explosion of that star four years ago, or earlier, could affect us now, but no later event there could have any effect on us. Your absolute elsewhere contains all present events [the events simultaneous with your here-and-now event] and also all the future events that are not in your absolute future. The absolute elsewhere is the region of spacetime that is neither in nor on either your forward or backward light cones.

A single point's absolute elsewhere, absolute future, and absolute past partition all of spacetime. Event A is in event B's absolute elsewhere if it is far enough away in distance but close enough to B in time that an unobstructed signal could not have arrived at A from B. If A is in B's absolute elsewhere the two events are also said to be "spacelike related." If the two are in each other's forward or backward light cones they are said to be "timelike related."

What is time dilation?

According to special relativity, a properly functioning clock moving relative to you will tick slower than your clock, assuming that measurements are made in inertial reference frames. The moving clock will show a smaller number of seconds have passed if it is used to measure the duration of the same event that your clock is used to measure. We sometimes speak of time dilation by saying time itself is 'slower' or dilated, but time isn't going slower in any absolute sense, only relative to some other frame of reference. Time doesn't actually have a rate.

Time dilation is not an illusion of perception; and it's not a matter of the second having different definitions in different reference frames. Also, it's not a Doppler effect. For example, if a flashing green light is accelerating rapidly away from you, then each pulse of light is redder and more delayed than the one sent out before it. So, the time between pulses appears to be longer than it properly is. If the flashing light were, instead, moving toward you, the effect would be reversed. The light would be bluer and the pulses closer together. However, the red-shifts and blue shifts due to the Doppler effect are not examples of time dilation. Time dilation isn't affected by the direction of motion, only by speed.

Time dilation due to difference in constant speeds is described by Einstein's special theory of relativity. The general theory of relativity describes a second kind of time dilation, one due to different accelerations and different gravitational influences. For more on general relativistic

dilation, see the discussion of gravity and black holes.

Newton's physics describes duration as an absolute property, implying it is not relative to the reference frame. However, he describes the speed of light as being relative to the frame. Einstein's special theory of relativity reverses both of these aspects of time. For inertial frames, it implies the speed of light is not relative to the frame, but duration *is* relative to the frame. In general relativity, however, the speed of light can vary within one reference frame if matter and energy are present.

To quantitatively illustrate time dilation due to motion, consider a properly functioning clock moving with a constant velocity v in an inertial frame. The time which elapses between two ticks of its second hand is not really the one second it has when it's at rest in the frame, but is the longer time of 1/square root($1-v^2/c^2$) seconds. The moving clock takes longer to tick. Its second lasts longer, and so we observers at rest in the frame judge the clock's ticking to be 'dilated' or spread out and thus slowed down relative to our clock. The moving clock is still accurate, though. Time really is going slower in moving inertial frames than in stationary ones.

Time dilation due to motion is relative in the sense that if your spaceship moves past mine so fast that I measure your clock to be running at half speed, then you will measure my clock to be running at half speed also, provided both of us are in inertial frames. If one of us is affected by a gravitational field or undergoes acceleration, then that person isn't in an inertial frame and the results are different. See the twins paradox for a discussion of that case.

Both types of time dilation by a significant role in time-sensitive satellite navigation systems such as the Global Positionining System. The atomic clocks on the satellites must be programmed to compensate for the relativistic dilation effects of both gravity and motion.

How does gravity affect time?

Einstein's general theory of relativity (1915) is a generalization of his special theory of special relativity (1905). It is not restricted to inertial frames, and it encompasses a broader range of phenomena, namely gravity and accelerated motions. According to general relativity, gravitational differences affect time by dilating it. Observers in a less intense gravitational potential find that clocks in a more intense gravitational potential run slow relative to their own clocks. People live longer in basements than in attics, all other things being equal. Basement flashlights will be shifted toward the red end of the visible spectrum compared to the flashlights in attics. This effect is known as the gravitational red shift. Even the speed of light is slower in the presence of higher gravity.

What happens to time near a black hole?

A black hole is a volume of very high gravitational field or severe warp in the spacetime continuum. Astrophysicists believe black holes are commonly formed by the inward collapse of stars that have burned out. The center of spherical black holes is infinitely dense. It is surrounded by an event horizon, a concentric sphere marking the point of no return. Anything getting that close could never escape the inward pull, even if it had an unlimited fuel supply and could travel at

near the speed of light. In relativity theory, the proper time along a world line is the time that would be shown on a clock whose path in spacetime is that world line. The proper time is not the same as the coordinate time, namely the time that would be measured for the same events along the world line by an ideal clock at the origin of the coordinate system. If we fix Earth in our coordinate system, then an astronaut flying into a distant black hole will take an infinite coordinate time to reach the center of the black hole, but will take only a finite proper time.

No local physical quantity is singular (infinite) at the event horizon. That is, if you were to freely fall through the event horizon, you wouldn't notice anything special there about your time or the speed of light. You'd notice something very odd about distant events, though. You'd notice distant processes speeding up. You'd never notice them achieving an infinite rate because you'd crash into the black hole's center before the information could reach you.

What is the solution to the twins paradox?

This paradox, also called the clock paradox, is an argument about time dilation that uses the theory of relativity to produce a contradiction. Consider two twins who were born at the same instant. They possess synchronized clocks. Twin 1 gets into a spaceship and flies away from Earth at a constant speed, then reverses course and flies back to Earth. According to the Earth-based reference frame, time dilation makes Twin 1's clock in the spaceship move slower than Twin 2's clock back on Earth. So, Twin 1 on the ship will be younger than Twin 2, when they meet again. However, it's all relative, isn't it? That is, when the situation is looked at from a reference frame fixed to the spaceship, it is the Earth clock that falls behind in its ticks. So, when the twins meet, Twin 1 on the ship will be older, not younger, than his Earth-based twin. Therefore, each twin will be younger than the other, and that is a contradiction. This argument is the twins paradox. The twin paradox doesn't require the moving twin either to fly in straight segments or to go far away. The flying twin might stay in a small volume and fly in circles.

The way out of the paradox is to notice that the inconsistent conclusion does not follow because there was an error in the reasoning about the spaceship-based frame. It is not even approximately an inertial frame, yet that assumption was being made implicitly in the reasoning. Another way to describe the mistake is to say that the reasoning in the paradox paid no attention to proper times but only to coordinate times and thus paid no attention to the radically large accelerations involved at the time when the Earth (and the stars) turn around and race back toward the spaceship. When these are taken into account by general relativity, the proper age of the spaceship-based twin is less than the proper age of the Earth-based twin regardless of which reference frame is used. A twin ages according to his or her proper time, not coordinate time, so it is proper times that should be compared when the twins have their reunion. The proper time of a twin is the time that would be read by a clock fixed to the twin, and this time depends on the history of the twin, on the twin's specific world line.

Sometimes when thinking about the twins paradox, people will ask whether the twins' age difference is relative to the frame. If two events happen at the same place at the same time in one reference frame, then the two are simultaneous in all reference frames. Therefore the age difference when the two twins reunite is the same in all reference frames, although their age difference is not the same while they are apart.

Discussions of the twins paradox normally disregard the gravitational time dilation caused by the Earth-bound twin remaining in a relatively larger gravitational field than the twin in the spaceship. This dilation works to the opposite effect, causing the Earth-bound twin to be relatively younger than the spaceship twin. It is interesting to speculate on whether the twins paradox argument can be constructed for a world containing no Earth and stars. With only two twins in the universe and nothing else, one twin moves rapidly away from the other, then returns. Do they meet again with the same ages or with different ages?

What is the solution to Zeno's paradoxes?

In about 445 B.C., the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea offered several arguments that led to conclusions contradicting what we all know from our physical experience. The paradoxes had a dramatic impact upon the later development of mathematics, science, and philosophy. His most familiar paradox, the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, involves the fast-running Achilles and the slow-crawling tortoise. The tortoise has a head start. If Achilles hopes to overtake the tortoise, he must at least run to where the tortoise is, but by the time he arrives there, the tortoise has crawled to a new place. So, Achilles must run to the new place; but of course the tortoise isn't there, having crawled on to yet another place, and so on forever. Therefore, Zeno argues, good reasoning shows that fast runners never can catch slow ones. So much the worse for good reasoning. Notice that Zeno's reasoning rests on the assumption that time is continuous, that is, that time can be divided into infinitely many parts. We assume this continuity of time when we assume that a basektball dropped onto the court will bounce an infinite number of times before stopping.

In his Progressive Dichotomy Paradox, Zeno argued that a runner will never reach the goal line because he first must have time to reach the halfway point to the goal, but after arriving there he will need time to get to the 3/4 point, then the 7/8 point, and so forth. If the distance to the goal is, say, 1 meter, then the runner must cover a distance of 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + ... meters. Zeno believed this sum is infinite and concluded that the runner will never have the infinite time it takes to reach this infinitely distant goal. Because at any time there is always more time needed, motion can never be completed. Worse yet, argued Zeno in his Regressive Dichotomy Paradox, the runner can't even take a first step. Any first step may be divided into a first half and a second half. Before taking a full step, the runner must have time to take a 1/2 step, but before that a 1/4 step, and so forth. The runner will need an infinite amount of time just to take a first step, and so will never get going.

Zeno's Arrow Paradox takes a different approach to challenging the coherence of the concepts of time and motion. Consider one instant of an arrow's flight. For that entire instant the arrow occupies a region of space equal to its total length, so at that instant the arrow isn't moving, he reasoned. If at every instant the arrow isn't moving, then the arrow can't move.

Yet another paradox created by Zeno attacks the notion that there are shorter and shorter times. Consider a duration of one second. It can be divided into two non-overlapping parts. They, in turn, can be divided, and so on. At the end of this infinite division we reach the elements. Here there is a problem. If these elements have zero duration, then adding an infinity of zeros yields a zero sum, and the total duration is zero seconds, which is absurd. Alternatively, if that infinite division produced elements having a finite duration, then adding an infinite number of these together will

produce an infinite duration, which is also absurd. So, a second lasts either for no time at all or else for an infinite amount of time.

These paradoxes by Zeno can be considered to challenge the notion that time (and space) is continuous. Some of his other paradoxes, not discussed here, challenge the presumption that time might be discrete or discontinuous, with instants being like atoms of time.

Zeno's paradoxical arguments are valid, given his assumptions about space, time, motion and mathematics; and they reveal the underlying incoherence in ancient Greek thought, an incoherence that was not adequately resolved for 2,300 years. The way out of Zeno's paradoxes requires revising the concepts of duration, distance, instantaneous speed, and sum of a series. The relevant revisions were made by Leibniz, Newton, Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dedekind, Cantor, Einstein, and Lebesque over two centuries. The notion of infinite sums of numbers had to be revised so that an infinite series of numbers that decrease sufficiently rapidly can have a finite sum. Although 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4 +... is infinite, the more rapidly decreasing series 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 +... is 1. The other key idea was to appreciate that durations and distances must be topologically like an interval of the linear continuum, a dense ordering of uncountably many points. Although individual points of the continuum have zero measure (that is, zero 'total length'), the modern notion of measure on the linear continuum does not allow the measure of a segment (continuous region) to be the sum of the measures of its individual points, as Zeno had assumed in his argument against plurality. With these contemporary concepts, we can now make sense of Achilles covering an infinite number of distances in a finite time while running at a normal, finite speed. The new concepts restore the coherence of mathematics and science with our experience of space and time, and they are behind today's declaration that Zeno's arguments are based on naive and false assumptions.

How do time coordinates get assigned to points of spacetime?

A reference system is a reference frame plus either a coordinate system or an atlas of coordinate systems placed by the analyst upon the space to uniquely name the points. These names or coordinates are frame dependent in that a point can get new coordinates when the reference frame is changed. For spacetime, a coordinate system is a grid of smooth timelike and spacelike curves on the spacetime, it assigns each point three space coordinate numbers and one time coordinate number. Inertial frames can have global coordinate systems, but if we are working with general relativity where we cannot assume inertial frames, then the best we can do is to assign a coordinate system to a small region of spacetime where the laws of special relativity hold to a good approximation. General relativity requires special relativity to hold locally, and thus for spacetime to be Euclidean locally. So spacetime allows coordinate systems locally. Consider two coordinate systems on adjacent regions. For adjacent regions we make sure that the 'edges' of the two coordinate systems match up in the sense that each point near the intersection of the two coordinate systems gets a unique set of four coordinates and that nearby points get nearby coordinate numbers. The result is called an "atlas" on spacetime.

For small regions of spacetime, we create a coordinate system by choosing a style of grid, say rectangular coordinates, fixing a point as being the origin, selecting one timelike and three spacelike lines to be the axes, and defining a unit of distance for each dimension. We cannot use

letters for coordinates. The alphabet's structure is too simple. Integers won't do, either; but real numbers are adequate to the task. The definition of "coordinate system" requires us to assign our real numbers in such a way that numerical betweenness among the coordinate numbers reflects the betweenness relation among points. For example, if we assign numbers 17, pi, and 101.3 to instants, then every interval of time that contains the pi instant and the 101.3 instant had better contain the 17 instant. There is no way to select one point of spacetime and call it the "origin" of the coordinate system except by reference to actual events. In practice, we make the origin be the location of a special event, such as the birth of Jesus, or a selected tick of our atomic clock in Greenwich, England.

The choice of the unit presupposes we have defined what "distance" means. The metric for a space specifies what is meant by distance in that space. The natural metric between any two points in a one-dimensional space, such as the time sub-space of our spacetime, is the numerical difference between the coordinates of the two points. Using this metric, the duration between the 11:00 instant and the 11:05 instant is five minutes. The metric for spacetime defines the 'spacetime interval' between two spacetime locations, and it is more complicated than the metric for time alone. The spacetime interval between any two events is unchanged by a change to any other coordinate system, although the spatial distances and durations do change. A metric on a subspace is fixed by the metric defined on the full space.

Philosophers dispute the extent to which the choice of metric is conventional rather than forced by nature. Taking the conventional side, Adolf Grünbaum argues that time is metrically amorphous. It has no intrinsic metric in the sense of its structure determining the measure of durations. Instead, we analysts establish durations between instants by the way we assign coordinates to instants. If we were to say the instant at which Jesus was born and the instant at which Abraham Lincoln was assassinated occurred only 24 seconds apart, whereas the duration between Lincoln's assassination and his burial is 24 billion seconds, then we can't be mistaken. It's up to us to say what is correct when we first create our conventions about measuring duration. We can consistently assign any numerical time coordinates we wish, subject only to the condition that the assignment properly reflect the betweenness relations of the events that occur at those instants. That is, if event J (birth of Jesus) occurs before event L (Lincoln's assassination) and this in turn occurs before event B (burial of Lincoln), then the time assigned to J must be numerically less than the time assigned to L, and both must be less than the time assigned to B. $t(J) < t(L) < t(B)$. A simple requirement. It is other requirements that lead us to reject the above convention about 24 seconds and 24 billion seconds as unhelpful. What requirements? We've found that, for doing science, certain processes are better called "regular" than others. Pendulum swings are more regular than repeated barks of a dog. Periodic appearances of the sun overhead are more regular than rainstorms. A good convention for what is regular will make it easier for scientists to explain what causes other events to be irregular. It is the search for regularity that leads us to adopt the conventions for numerical time coordinate assignments that we do.

In this discussion, there is no need to worry about the distinction between change in metric and change in coordinates. For a space that is topologically equivalent to the real line and for metrics that are consistent with that topology, each coordinate system determines a metric and each metric determines a coordinate system. More precisely, once you decide on a positive direction in the one-dimensional space and a zero-point for the coordinates, then the possible coordinate systems and the possible metrics are in one-to-one correspondence.

There are still other restrictions on the assignments of coordinate numbers. The restriction that we called the "conventionality of simultaneity" fixes what time slices of spacetime can be counted as collections of simultaneous events. An even more complicated restriction is that coordinate assignments satisfy the demands of general relativity. The metric of spacetime is not global but varies from place to place due to the presence of matter and gravitation. Spacetime cannot be given its coordinate numbers without our knowing the distribution of matter and energy. However, for very small regions of spacetime, the general relativistic metric tensor reduces to the metric for special relativistic spacetime.

How do dates get assigned to actual events?

Our purpose in choosing a coordinate system or atlas to assign real numbers to all spacetime points is to express relationships among actual and possible events. The relationships we are interested in are order relationships (Did this event occur between those two?) and magnitude relationships (How long after A did B occur?). The date of a (point) event is the time coordinate number of the spacetime location where the event occurs. We expect all these assignments of dates to events to satisfy the requirement that event A happens before event B iff t(A) < t(B), where t(A) is the time coordinate of A. The assignments of dates to events also must satisfy the demands of our physical theories, and in this case we face serious problems involving inconsistency as when a geologist gives one date for the birth of Earth and an astronomer gives a different date.

It is a big step from assigning numbers to points to assigning them to real events. Here are some of the questions that need answers. How do we determine whether a nearby event and a distant event occurred simultaneously? How do we operationally define the second so we can measure whether one event occurred exactly one second later than another event? How do we know whether the clock we have is accurate? Attention must also be paid to the dependency of dates due to shifting from Standard Time to Daylight Savings Time, to crossing the International Date Line, and to switching from the Julian to the Gregorian Calendar.

Let's design a coordinate system. Suppose we have already assigned a date of zero to the event that we choose to be at the origin of our coordinate system. To assign dates to other events, we first must define a standard clock and declare that the time intervals between any two consecutive ticks of that clock are the same. The second will be defined to be so many ticks of the standard clock. We then synchronize other clocks with the standard clock so the clocks show equal readings at the same time. The time at which a point event occurs is the number reading on the clock at rest there. If there is no clock there, the assignment process is more complicated.

We want to use clocks to assign a time even to distant events, not just to events in the immediate vicinity of the clock. To do this correctly requires some appreciation of Einstein's theory of relativity. A major difficulty is that two nearby synchronized clocks, namely clocks that have been calibrated and set to show the same time when they are next to each other, will not in general stay synchronized if one is transported somewhere else. If they undergo the same motions and gravitational influences, they will stay synchronized; otherwise, they won't. For more on how to assign dates to distant events, see the discussion of the relativity and conventionality of simultaneity.

As a practical matter, dates are assigned to events in a wide variety of ways. The date of the birth of the Sun is measured very differently from dates assigned to two successive crests of a light wave. For example, there are lasers whose successive crests of visible light waves pass by a given location every 10 to the minus 15 seconds. This short time isn't measured with a stopwatch. It is computed from measurements of the light's wavelength. We rely on electromagnetic theory for the equation connecting the periodic time of the wave to its wavelength and speed. Dates for other kinds of events also are often computed rather than directly measured with a clock.

What is essential to being a clock?

Clocks record numerical information about time. They measure the quantity of time, the duration. A clock is basically an instrument for creating a periodic process and counting the periods. The goal is for each period to last the same amount of time. If the periods have the same duration, the clock is said to tick uniformly, or regularly.

Usually we assume that a clock is very small and that it can count high enough to be a calendar, although this is rarely the case with real clocks. To calibrate a clock, we associate a second with so many counts of its periodic process so that it is synchronized with the standard clock. That is, for any one event, say a 'tick', when our clock and the standard clock are near each other, we want them to assign the same time numbers to that event. Calibrated clocks assign a certain number of seconds to the time that elapses between two events (ticks) of the clock itself. Assuming there is no difficulty in telling which clock tick is simultaneous with which event that occurs in the immediate vicinity of the clock, then the clock is ready to report the time of any event in its immediate vicinity. The event outside the clock gets the same number as the tick that was simultaneous with the event. If the assumptions of special relativity do not hold, then a clock isn't really measuring the time between two events in any reference frame other than one fixed to the clock. In other words, a clock measures the elapsed proper time only between events that occur along its own world line.

What is our standard clock?

By current convention, the standard clock is the clock we agree to use for defining the second. The standard second is defined to be the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods (cycles, oscillations, vibrations) of the microwave radiation in the standard clock. More specifically, the second is defined to be the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the microwave radiation required to produce the maximum fluorescence of cesium 133 atoms (that is, their radiating a specific color of light) as the atoms make a transition between two specific hyperfine energy levels of the ground state of the atoms.

Atoms of cesium with a uniform energy are sent through a chamber that is being irradiated with these microwaves. The frequency of these microwaves is tuned until the maximum number of cesium atoms flip from one energy to the other, showing that the microwave radiation frequency is now precisely tuned to be 9,192,631,770 vibrations per second. Because this frequency for maximum fluorescence is so stable from one experiment to the next, the vibration number is

accurate to so many significant digits. The National Institute of Standards and Technology's F-1 atomic fountain clock, which was adopted in late 1999 as the primary time standard of the United States, is so accurate that it drifts by less than one second every 20 million years.

The standard clock is used to fix the units of all lengths. The unit of length depends on the unit of time. The meter depends on the second. It does not follow from this, though, that time is more basic than space. All that follows is that time measurement is more basic than space measurement. And this has to do with convention and with the fact that current science is capable of measuring time more precisely than space.

The meter is then defined in terms of time as the distance light travels in exactly 0.000000003335640952 seconds or 1/299,792,458 seconds. That number is picked so that the new meter will be nearly the same distance as the old meter, which was the distance between two marks on a platinum bar that was kept in the Paris Observatory.

These standard definitions of the second and the meter amount to defining or fixing the speed of light in all inertial frames. The speed is exactly one meter per 0.000000003335640952 seconds or 299,792,458 meters per second (about a foot per nanosecond). There can no longer be any direct measurement to see if that is how fast light REALLY moves in an inertial frame; it is simply defined to be moving that fast. Any measurement that produced a different value for the speed of light would be presumed initially to have an error in, say, its measurements of lengths and durations, or in its assumptions about the influence of gravitation and acceleration. This initial presumption comes from a deep reliance by scientists on Einstein's theory of relativity. However, if it were eventually decided by the community of scientists that the theory of relativity is incorrect and that the speed of light shouldn't have been fixed as it was, then the scientists would call for a new world convention to re-define the second. Some physicists believe that a better system of units would first define the speed of light, then define the second, and then make the meter be a computed consequence of these.

Why are some standard clocks better than others?

We choose as our standard clock our best clock, the one with the least drift. Other clocks ideally are calibrated by being synchronized to this clock. Our goal in selecting a standard clock is to find a periodic (cyclic) process that, if adopted as our standard, makes the resulting system of physical laws much simpler and more useful than if we were to have chosen some alternative periodic process such as the periodic dripping of water from our goat skin bag or even the revolution of the Earth about the Sun. We say the standard clock has the "least drift"of all clocks, by which we just mean that it's the best choice for a standard when all factors are considered.

Originally, the standard clock was defined astronomically in terms of the revolution of the Earth. The second was defined to be 1/86,400 of the mean solar day, the average rotational period of the Earth with respect to the Sun. Now we've found a better standard clock, an atomic clock. All atomic clocks measure time in terms of the natural resonant frequencies of various atoms and molecules. The periodic behavior of a super-cooled cesium atomic clock is the best practical standard clock we have so far discovered. Why is choosing it better than choosing an astronomical process such as the yearly motion of the Earth around the Sun? The brief answer is that the

sloshing of the tides is affecting the rotation of the Earth. The longer and more philosophical answer is that by using this astronomical clock as standard, all sorts of artificial complications are required to explain why cesium-133 atoms and other atomic processes do not behave uniformly as time goes on. On the other hand, by switching to the cesium atomic standard, these alterations are unnecessary, and we can readily explain the non-uniform wobbling of the Earth's yearly revolutions by reference to the tides on the Earth, the gravitational pull of other planets, dust between planets, and collisions with comets. These influences affecting a solar clock do not affect the cycles of the cesium atom. One other advantage of the cesium clock is that it provides a standard that is reproducible anywhere in the universe.

However, in order to keep our atomic-based calendar in synchrony with the rotations and revolutions of the Earth, say, to keep atomic-noons occurring on astronomical-noons and ultimately to keep Northern hemisphere winters from occurring in some future July, we systematically add leap years and leap seconds in the counting process. These changes don't affect the duration of a second, but they do affect the duration of a year because, with leap years, not all years last the same number of seconds.

We are lucky to live in a universe having a large number of different processes that bear consistent time relations or frequency of occurrence relations to each other. For example, the frequency of a fixed-length pendulum is a constant multiple of the half life of a specific radioactive uranium isotope; the relationship doesn't change as time goes by (at least not much and not for a long time). The existence of these sorts of relationships make our system of physical laws much simpler than it otherwise would be.

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The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Timon (fl. 279 BCE.)

Disciple of Pyrrho and philosopher of the sect of the Skeptics, who flourished in the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, about 279 BCE. and onwards.

Life. The son of Timarchus of Phlius, Timon first studied philosophy at Megara, under Stilpo, and then returned home and married. He next went to Elis with his wife, and heard Pyrrho, whose tenets he adopted. Driven from Elis by straitened circumstances, he spent some time on the Hellespont an the Propontis, and taught at Chalcedon as a sophist with such success that he acquired a fortune. He then moved to Athens, where he passed the remainder of his life, with the exception of a short residence at Thebes. He died at the age of almost ninety.

Philosophy. Timon appears to have had an active mind, and with a quick perception of the follies of people which betrays its possessor into a spirit of universal distrust both of men and truths, so as to make him a skeptic in philosophy and a satirist in everything. His agnosticism (to use a modern term) is shown by his saying that people need only know three things -- viz. what is the nature of things, how we are related to them, and what we can gain from them. But as our knowledge of things must always be subjective and unreal, we can only live in a state of suspended judgment. He wrote numerous works both in prose and poetry. The most celebrated of his poems were the satiric compositions called *silli*, a word of somewhat doubtful etymology, but which undoubtedly describes metrical compositions of a character at once ludicrous and sarcastic. The invention of this species of poetry is ascribed to Xenophones of Colophon. The *Silli* of Timon were in three books, in the first of which he spoke in his own person, and the other two are in the form of a dialogue between the author and Xenophanes of Colophon, in which Timon proposed question,s to which Xenophanes replied at length. The subject was a sarcastic account of the tenets of all philosophers, living and dead -- and unbounded field for skepticism and satire. They were in hexameter verse, and from the way in which they are mentioned by the ancient writers, as well as from the few fragments of them which have come down to us, it is evident that they were admirable productions. (Diog. Laert. ix. 12, 109-155; Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* xiv. p. 761).

Totem

The term "totem" is a native North American term which is now applied broadly to a class of material objects (animals, plants) which the members of a community regard with respect, to which they hold themselves to be peculiarly and intimately related, and which becomes the social bond of union between fellow clansmen. The term was introduced by J. Long in 1791. The totem is both religious and social. Its origin cannot be traced, but its extreme diffusion, both geographical and historical, entitles it to be regarded as a highly important factor in primal mental life. It may be related to fetishism, but differs from the latter not only in its social significance, but also in that the influence attached to the totem covers all objects of a certain class, while the fetishistic powers reside in a special individual object only. The religious aspect of the totem is apt to involve the belief, or the myth, that the clan was by some mystery or miracle descended from the totemic animal or object. Such animals or objects thus become sacred, are tabooed as food, or for use in dress, and the proscription may extend even to the mention or sight of the objects. The totem is looked to for protection from evil and the cure of disease. It is worshipped and respected, and a corresponding benefit is expected from the totemic influence, while violations of its sacredness are severely punished. It enters into the ceremonies which attend birth, marriage, and death, and the assumption of the totem may characterize the rites of puberty.

Besides the clan totems there are also, but far less frequently, totems for men and women separately, and individual or private totems. The last may be selected by divination at the time of birth, or by dreaming of it at puberty, or in any other way which would naturally bring about a mysterious and hallowed connection. On the social side, the totem gives rise to a more or less elaborate system of clan and family relationships which may properly be spoken of as totemism. Indeed, the totemic is frequently a stronger tie than the family connection, and becomes a mark of cognizance for each member of the clan. The custom of exogamy (or marriage outside the clan or totem) requires a sharp recognition of the totem, and brings about a double totem, that of father and mother. According to the rule of descent, whether by father or mother (the latter more usually), the paternal or maternal totem passes to the child, thus ever widening and complicating the clan relations and regulations. The further recognition of special tribes as suitable companions for marriage, and the presence of sub-totems in special branches, may develop a most elaborate and complicated system of relationships. The totem becomes an important symbol of kinship, and is thus used in architecture (totem poles), in dress and in decoration.

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Tragedy

The term "tragedy" derives from the Greek literally means "goat-song," perhaps from goatskin costumes worn by early tragic singers in imitation of satyrs. In aesthetics, tragedy is the quality of experience whereby, in and through some serious collision followed by fatal catastrophe or inner ruin, something valuable in personality becomes manifest, either as sublime or admirable in the hero, or as triumph of an idea. The situation itself or its portrayal is termed tragedy. The characteristic subjective effect is that of a complex of strongly painful and pleasurable elements existing simultaneously, both of which may be regarded as arising from sympathy: the painful elements from sympathy with the sufferer in evil, present or future (pity and fear), and the pleasurable from sympathy with the noble or heroic character displayed, or with the triumph of some idea (as in the case of guilt overtaken by catastrophe). In the case of the tragic in art, there is the additional element of the aesthetically pleasing form in which the action, character, or situation is presented. The tragic presupposes a greater magnitude in its objects or events than is necessarily involved in pathos and usually involves a more active collision.

Plato pointed out the mixed character of the feeling of the tragic. Aristotle noted the serious quality and the element of magnitude in tragedy, named pity and fear as the emotion is excited, and stated the result of tragedy to be the effecting of a catharsis (or purging) of such passions. He suggested also that the tragic catastrophe results from some fault or error. This, as the theory of tragic, has been developed in various aspects by German Idealists. Hegel regards it as the triumph of the universal, the idea, and the destruction of the individual. "Presumption" or overstepping of the due bounds of finiteness on the part of the individual has been emphasized as tragic motive by Vischer, Carriere, and Zeising. The inevitable and inherently necessary character of the collision or catastrophe in many cases enhances the tragic effect. This has been interpreted optimistically, by Hegel, Vischer, Carriere and Schiller (who in some way make the loss of the individual exhibit the triumph of the idea, or of the moral nature). It has also been interpreted pessimistically by Schopenliauer and Bahnsen. Others (Lipps, Volkelt) reject the theory of guilt or poetic justice as applicable to more than a portion of tragic situations.

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Universals

A universal can be defined as an abstract object or term which ranges over particular things. The classic problem of universals involves whether abstract objects such as "largeness" exist in a realm independent of human thought. Realists argue that they do.

Plato, the first and most extreme realist, argued that universals are forms and exist in their own spiritual realm. Individual objects, such as a large mountain, then participate in the universal form largeness. A universal can only be known by the intellect, and not the senses. Plato's metaphysics and epistemology centered around the concept of the universal: to have knowledge of a particular object, we need to access the unchanging universals. The particulars, for Plato, are only manifestations of the forms. Plato's theory is subject to the problem of explaining how universals are represented in their particulars and how a universal can reside in a particular.

Aristotle criticizes Plato's theory for introducing an aspect of separateness to the universal which was unneeded; He also attacks Plato for holding that a universal was a property as well as a substance. Aristotle believed that universals did not existent independently of particulars. He thought of universals as only being present in the particular things encountered through experience, thus rejecting any concept of "the forms." Aristotle too believed that universals such as "color" exist independently of human thought, but not in a spiritual form-like realm. Instead, universals are to be found in the specific shared attributes of individual objects. For example, the abstract object "greenness" is found in the class of all green individual objects, such as trees and grass.

Augustine sides with Plato's account of the universals, because he believed Aristotle's version did not adequately separate human abilities from those of the beasts. Aristotle believed universals were arrived at only through experience, which, to Augustine, could be accomplished by lower animals as well. For Augustine, humans are unique in our their ability to grasp *a priori* truths.

Aquinas disagreed with Augustine and Plato and developed the "shared attribute" realism of Aristotle. Universals , for Aquinas, are essences which do not exist without being in the world, but which may be arrived at without a supposed existence. Aquinas and Aristotle have been criticized for not adequately explaining how universals connect with particular things. They are also faulted for not addressing the possibility that classes are discovered by humans through experience and not created by the human mind.

English scholastic William of Ockham (d. 1347) takes an alternative approach called nominalism. Nominalism maintains that abstract objects do not exist in any real sense, but are simply general words that we apply to a collection of things. Thus, there is no non-mental or real thing which is a referent of our notion of "greenness". Extreme nominalists go a step further and argue that general terms (such as the word "greenness') are the only things which two given objects have in common (such as green grass and a green tree). One of Ockham's arguments for nominalism is based on a principle of simplicity known as Ockham's razor: plurality is never to be posited

without need. That is, do not postulate two realms of existence when one will do. The realist indeed posits three realms of existence: (1) individual objects, (2) the independent attributes which they have in common and (3) our concepts of these. On Ockham's account there are only two: (1) individual objects and (2) our concepts/words about those objects.

In the modern period, Locke argued that the universal did not reside in any particular objects or in another ideal realm. Instead, they are images in the human mind. This theory falls victim to the same criticism as Aristotle and Plato because it does not attempt to explain the application of the general words to particular instances. For Berkeley, universals are particular ideas associated with a general term which gives it a more extensive meaning. Berkeley objected to Locke's idea of universals representing mental images, since communicated words do not always produce the same mental image. Hume sided with Berkeley that universals were only particulars which represented other particulars with familiar aspects. Hume explained that representation takes place through association and habit. When we link certain objects with particular words enough times, that classes of things seem to develop.

Recent philosophers argue that necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be given as criteria for particular objects belonging to a group or universal. Creating these conditions either excludes particulars which we want to be included, or it includes so many particulars that it is difficult to determine a common strand. Wittgenstein believed that it is unnecessary to search for an exhaustive list of necessary and sufficient conditions for a universal because they do not exist, and, furthermore, we can operate with the concept "universal" with a flexible set of conditions that have a family resemblance. We arrive at these conditions by studying our use of language and how the words we use can have a common meaning which represent universal concepts.

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Vienna Circle

Group of philosophers who gathered round Moritz Schlick, after his coming in Vienna in 1922. They organized a philosophical association, named Verein Ernst Mach (Ernst Mach Association). However, meetings on philosophy of science and epistemology began as early as 1907, promoted by Frank, Hahn and Neurath, who later arranged to bring Schlick at the University of Vienna. Among Vienna Circle's members were M. Schlick, R. Carnap, H. Feigl, P. Frank, K. G&oumldel, H. Hahn, V. Kraft, O. Neurath, F. Waismann. Also K. R. Popper and H. Kelsen had many contacts with the Vienna Circle, although they did not belong to it. At the meetings was also discussed Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, and there were several meetings between Wittgenstein, Schlick, Waismann and Carnap. In 1929 Hahn, Neurath and Carnap published the manifesto of the circle: *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis* (A scientific world-view. The Vienna Circle).

Vienna Circle was very active in advertising the new philosophical ideas of logical positivism. Several congresses on epistemology and philosophy of science were organized, with the help of the Berlin Circle. There were some preparatory congresses: Prague (1929), K&oumlnisberg (1930), Prague (1934) and then the first congress on scientific philosophy held in Paris (1935), followed by congresses in Copenhagen (1936), Paris (1937), Cambridge, England (1938), Cambridge, Mass. (1939). The K&oumlnisberg congress (1930) was very important, for G&oumldel announced he has proved the completeness of first order logic and the incompleteness of arithmetic. Another very interesting congress was the one held in Copenhagen (1936), which was dedicated to quantum physics and causality.

Between 1928 and 1937, the Vienna Circle published ten books in a series named *Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung* (Papers on scientific world-view), edited by Schlick and Frank. Among these works was *Logik der Forschung*, 1935, which is the first book published by K. R. Popper. Seven works were published in another series, called *Einheitswissenschaft* (Unified science), edit by Carnap, Frank, Hahn, Neurath, Joergensen (after Hahn's death) and Morris (from 1938). In 1930 Carnap and Reichenbach undertook the editorship of the journal *Erkenntnis*, which was published between 1930 and 1940 (from 1939 the editors were Neurath, Carnap and Morris).

The following is the list of works published in the two series edit by the Vienna Circle.

> *Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung* (Papers on scientific world-view), edit by Schlick and Frank.

R. von Mises, *Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit*, 1928 (*Probability, statistics, and truth*, New York : Macmillan company, 1939)
R. Carnap, *Abriss der Logistik*, 1929
M. Schlick, *Fragen der Ethik*, 1930 (*Problems of ethics*, New York : Prentice-Hall, 1939)
O. Neurath, *Empirische Soziologie*, 1931

P. Frank, *Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen*, 1932 (*The law of causality and its limits*, Dordrecth ; Boston : Kluwer, 1997)
O. Kant, *Zur Biologie der Ethik*, 1932
R. Carnap, *Logische Syntax der Sprache*, 1934 (*The logical syntax of language*, New York : Humanities, 1937)
K. R. Popper, *Logik der Forschung*, 1934 (*The logic of scientific discovery*, New York : Basic Books, 1959)
J. Schächeter, *Prologomena zu einer kritischen Grammatik*, 1935 (*Prolegomena to a critical grammar*, Dordrecth ; Boston : D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1973)
V. Kraft, *Die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftliche Wertlehre*, 1937 (*Foundations for a scientific analysis of value*, Dordrecth ; Boston : D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1981)

> ***Einheitswissenschaft* (Unified science), edit by Carnap, Frank, Hahn, Neurath, Joergensen (after Hahn's death), Morris (from 1938)**

H. Hahn, *Logik, Mathematik und Naturerkennen*, 1933
O. Neurath, *Einheitswissenschaft und Psychologie*, 1933
R. Carnap, *Die Aufgabe der Wissenschaftlogik*, 1934
P. Frank, *Das Ende der mechanistichen Physik*, 1935
O. Neurath, *Was bedeutet rationale Wirtschaftsbetrachtung*, 1935
O. Neurath, E. Brunswik, C. Hull, G. Mannoury, J. Woodger, *Zur Enzyclopädie der Einheitswissenschaft. Vorträge*, 1938
R. von Mises, *Ernst Mach und die empiritische Wissenschaftauffasung*, 1939
These works are translated in *Unified science - The Vienna Circle monograph series originally edited by Otto Neurath*, Kluwer, 1987.

The members of the Vienna Circle were dispersed when Nazi party went into power in Germany; many of them emigrated to USA, where they taught in several universities. Schlick remained in Austria, but in 1936 he was killed by a Nazi sympathizer student in the University of Vienna.

See also Carnap, Logical positivism.

Mauro Murzi

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Virtue Theory

Virtue theory is the view that the foundation of morality is the development of good character traits, or virtues. A person is good, then, if he has virtues and lacks vices. Typical virtues include courage, temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude, liberality, and truthfulness. Some virtue theorists mention as many as 100 virtuous character traits which contribute to making someone a good person. Virtue theory places special emphasis on moral education since virtuous character traits are developed in one's youth; adults, therefore, are responsible for instilling virtues in the young. The failure to properly develop virtuous character traits will result in the agent acquiring vices, or bad character traits instead. Vices include cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity.

HISTORY. Historically, virtue theory is the oldest normative tradition in Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Greek epic poets and playwrights, such as Homer and Sophocles, paint the morality of their heroes and antiheroes in terms of their respective virtues and vices. Plato believed that an integral part of one's quest for truth was understanding the ideal nature of virtues such as justice, piety, and courage. The earliest and most influential systematic account of virtue theory appears in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, the heart of which is his account of moral virtues in Book two. There he argues that moral virtues are desire-regulating character traits which are at a mean between more extreme character traits (or vices). For example, in response to the natural emotion of fear, we should develop the virtuous character trait of courage. If we develop an excessive character trait by curbing fear too much, then we are said to be rash, which is a vice. If, on the other extreme, we develop a deficient character trait by curbing fear too little, then we are said to be cowardly, which is also a vice. The virtue of courage, then, lies at the mean between the excessive extreme of rashness, and the deficient extreme of cowardice. Most moral virtues, and not just courage, are to be understood as falling at the mean between two accompanying vices. Aristotle illustrates this with the virtues of temperance, liberality, magnificence, high-mindedness, controlled anger, friendliness, modesty, and righteous indignation. He concludes that it is difficult to live the virtuous life primarily because it is often difficult to find the mean between the extremes.

During the late Greek period, Aristotle's account of virtue ethics competed with rival moral theories, particularly those offered by Epicureanism and Stoicism. However, by the late Middle Ages Aristotle's virtue theory was the definitive account of morality, especially insofar as it was endorsed by medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. In medieval discussions, the particular virtues described by Aristotle and the ancient Greeks became known as the cardinal virtues. Medieval ethicists added to these the theological virtues which appear in the New Testament: faith, hope, and charity. With the waning of the Middle Ages and the rise of the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, and Enlightenment thought, the influence of Aristotle's virtue ethics declined. Historians of philosophy typically say that virtue ethics was neglected or ignored in the centuries which followed. However, in "The Misfortunes of Virtue" (1990) J.B. Schneewind argues that the fate of virtue ethics was not one of neglect, but instead, one of critique, revision, and eventually

abandonment in view of newer accounts of moral obligation. For Schneewind, virtue theory met its greatest challenge with the rise of natural law theory, particularly as put forward by 17th century Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius. For Grotius, morality involves conforming one's actions to moral laws which are fixed in nature and which even God cannot change. Grotius rejects the role of virtue assigned by Aristotle, and directly criticizes Aristotle's theory on three accounts. First, Aristotle's doctrine of the mean fails to adequately explain basic moral concepts such as truthfulness and justice. Second, in the case of justice, the agent's particular motive does not matter. All that matters is following proper reason with respect to the rights of others. Third, contrary to Aristotle, the moral agent does not have special moral insight simply because she is virtuous. Instead, morality is fixed in natural laws which can be rationally perceived by all.

By the 19th century, the "rule" emphasis of moral theories such as utilitarianism supplanted the character trait emphasis of virtue theory. Within the past few decades there has been a revived interest in virtue theory, owing to seminal writings by Elizabeth Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre in particular argues that today we have only fragments of conflicting moral traditions, and we need to re-establish the goal or meaning of life towards which ethics is directed. This meaning is established in the context of a moral tradition, particularly one which advocates virtuous character traits.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES. The key issue of contemporary virtue theory is whether virtue ethics can be completely independent of moral rules. One view, called eliminatism, states that rules must be eliminated from all notions of virtue. That is, morality is founded entirely on virtuous character traits such as courage, and these virtues are independent of ideal principles. The eliminatist will argue that courage is simply the character trait of facing fear, even if we are thieves who are facing the fear of a confrontation with the police. Thus, particular actions are understood as mere expressions of character traits. This stands in sharp contrast to both consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories which judge morality solely on the agent's intended action, with no regard for the agent's good or bad character traits. There are, however, problems with this view. In real life situations, do we condemn people for having bad character traits, or, instead, for committing bad actions? Critics argue that people are condemned for their bad actions. For, character traits only inform us about the types of actions an agent is likely to perform, but this does not mean that the agent will in fact perform that action. It is, then, wrong to pass moral judgment on an agent simply on the basis of her character traits. Therefore, the agent's action is the object of our judgment.

In contrast to eliminatism, the essentialist will argue that there is either a single rule or a core set of rules, which universally establish when a character trait is good or bad. However, this concession to rules may be to much of a compromise, and may not constitute a genuine alternative to rule-based approach normative ethics. First, for any virtue we choose, such as truthfulness, we can postulate a corresponding duty, such as the duty to be truthful. Similarly, virtues such as courage, temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude, and liberality would all have corresponding duties. Second, it is the obligatory nature of virtues which distinguishes them from mere character traits (such as the character trait of habitually humming a tune). It seems, then, that our obligation to develop a virtue such as truthfulness in fact presupposes that we have a prior duty to be consistently truthful.

LOUDEN'S CRITIQUE. In "On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics" (1984), Robert Louden presents one of the most systematic attacks on contemporary virtue theory. Louden suggests that virtue (or

agent-centered) ethics differs from act-centered approaches in two ways. First, act-centered morality focuses on procedures for determining obligation, and virtue theory focuses on long-term patterns of action. Second, in act-centered morality, the motivation to be moral is found either in our duties themselves, or in our desire to be happy. By contrast, the motivation in virtue theory is the virtue itself.

Louden discusses several areas where act-centered morality has a distinct advantage over virtue ethics. First, virtue ethics fails to adequately address dilemmas which arise in applied ethics, such as abortion. For, virtue theory is not designed to offer precise guidelines of obligation. Second, virtue theory cannot correctly assess the occasional tragic actions of virtuous people (such as Oedipus accidentally sleeping with his mother). Since virtue theory focuses on the general notion of a good person, it has little to say about particular tragic acts. Third, some acts are so intolerable, such as murder, that we must devise a special list of offenses which are prohibited. Virtue theory does not provide such a list. Fourth, character traits change, and unless we stay in practice, we risk losing our proficiency in these areas. This suggests a need for a more character-free way of assessing our conduct. Finally, there is the problem of moral backsliding. Since virtue theory emphasizes long-term characteristics, this runs the risk of overlooking particular lies, or acts of selfishness, on the grounds that such acts are temporary aberrations.

Louden continues by discussing three specific problems which are unique to virtue theory. First, there is the problem of determining who is virtuous. It does not help to look for some external criterion such as visible indications in the agent's action. For, these indications are no guarantee that the person's inner being is virtuous. It also does not help to look for an inner criterion, such as the agent's self-respect or integrity. For, we do not have the ability to read ourselves internally. Second, by de-emphasizing the substance of an agent's action (such as the consequences of the action), virtue theory places on over-emphasizes on the mere style of an agent's conduct. Finally, The variety of values in our complex society encourages a legalistic approach to judging actions; it is naive (or utopian) for virtue theorists to believe they can alter this variety of values simply by re-emphasizing certain virtuous character traits.

Voluntarism

Voluntarism is the theory that God or the ultimate nature of reality is to be conceived as some form of will (or conation). This theory is contrasted to intellectualism, which gives primacy to God's reason. The voluntarism/intellectualism distinction was intimately tied to medieval and modern theories of natural law; if we grant that moral or physical laws issue from God, it next needs to answered whether they issue from God's will or God's reason. In medieval philosophy, voluntarism was championed by Avicebron, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. Intellectualism, on the other hand, is found in Averroes, Aquinas, and Eckhart. The oppising theories were applied to the human psychology, the nature of God, ethics, and the heaven. According to intellectualism, choices of the will result from that which the intellect recognizes as good; the will itself is determined. For voluntarism, by contrast, it is the will which determines which objects are good, and the will itself is indetermined. Concerning the nature of heaven, intellectualists followed Aristotle's lead by seeing the final state of happiness as a state of contemplation. Voluntarism, by contrast, maintains that final happiness is an activity, specifically that of love. The conceptions of theology itself were polarized between these two views. According to intellectualism, theology should be an essentiall speculative science; according to voluntarism, it is a practical science aimed at controlling life, but not necessarily aimed at comprehending philosophic truth.

In the modern period Spinoza advocates intellectualism insofar as desire is an indication of imperfection, and the passions are a source of human bondage. When all things are seen purely in rational relations, desire is stilled, the mind is freed from the passions and we experience the intellectual love of God, which is the ideal happiness. According to Leibniz, Spinoza's interpretation of the world as rational and logical left no place for the individual, or for the conception of ends or purposes as a determining factor in reality. Voluntarism is seen in Leibniz's view of the laws which govern monads (individual units of which all reality is composed) in so far as they are the laws of the conscious realization of ends.

19th century voluntarism has its origin in Kant, particularly his doctrine of the "primacy of the practical over the pure reason." Intellectually, humans are incapable of knowing ultimate reality, but this need not and must not interfere with the duty of acting as though the spiritual character of this reality were certain. Freedom cannot be demonstrated speculatively, but whenever a person acts under a motive supplied by reason, he is thereby exhibiting the practical efficiency of reason, and thus showing its reality in a practical sense. Following Kant, two distinct lines of voluntarism have proceeded which may be called rational and irrational voluntarism respectively. For Fichte, the originator of rational voluntarism, the ethical is primary both in the sphere of conduct and in the sphere of knowledge. The whole nature of consciousness can be understood only from the point of view of ends which are set up by the self. The actual world, with all the activity that it has, is only to be understood as material for the activity of the practical reason, as the means through which the will achieves complete freedom and complete moral realization. Schopenhauer's irrational voluntarism asserts a more radical opposition between the will and intellect. For him, the

will is by its very nature irrational. It manifests itself in various stages in the world of nature as physical, chemical, magnetic, and vital force, pre-eminently, however, in the animal kingdom in the form of "the will to live," which means the tendency to assert itself in the struggle for means of existence and for reproduction of the species. This activity is all of it blind, so far as the individual agent is concerned, although the power and existence of the will are thereby asserted continually.

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William Warburton (1698-1779)

Church of England bishop of Gloucester; b. at Newark-upon-Trent (17 m. n.e. of Nottingham) Dec. 24, 1698; d. at Gloucester June 7, 1779. His father, an attorney, had him educated for the law, which he probably practiced 1719-23; but he had always a passionate liking for theology, and was ordained deacon, 1723, and priest, 1727; he became rector-at Greaseley, Nottingham, 1726; was rector at Brant-Broughton, 1728-30; and at Frisby, 1730-56; became chaplain to the Prince of Wales, 173S; preacher to Lincoln's Inn, 1746; chaplain to the king, 1754; prebendary of Durham, 1755; dean of Bristol, 1757; and bishop of Gloucester, 1760. As a critic Warburton had a reputation for being excessively sarcastic and abusive. In the retirement of country life during the earlier years of his activity he prosecuted his studies with great diligence, and wrote those works which have perpetuated his memory. The first of these was *The Alliance between Church and State; or the Necessity and Equity of an established Religion, and a Test Law demonstrated, from the Essence and End of civil Society upon the fundamental Principles of the Laws of Nature and Nations* (1736), in which, while taking high ground, as the title indicates, he yet maintains that the State Church should tolerate those who differed from it in doctrine and worship. Soon thereafter came his great work, *The Divine Legation of Moses, Demonstrated on the Principles of a Religious Deist, from the Omission of the Doctrine of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments in the Jewish Dispensation*. Books I.-III. appeared in vol. I. (1737-38); books IV., V., VI., in vol. II. (1741); books VII. and VIII. never appeared; book IX. was first published in his *Works* (1788; 10th ed. Of the entire work, ed. James Nichols, 3 vols., 1846). The treatise was directed against the Deists (see also Deism), especially their doctrine of the Old Testament and their stress upon the omission of mention of immorality in the Old Testament. Warburton turns the tables upon them by constructing, out of the very absence of such statements, a proof of the divinity of the Mosaic legislation.

The first three books deal with the necessity of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments to civil society from (1) the nature of the thing, (2) the conduct of the ancient lawgivers and founders of civil policy, and (3) the opinions and conduct of the ancient sages and philosophers. The fourth book proves the high antiquity of the arts and empire of Egypt, and that such high antiquity illustrates and confirms the truth of the Mosaic history. The fifth book explains the nature of the Jewish theocracy. In the sixth book Warburton shows from the Old and New Testaments that a future state of rewards and punishments did make part of the Mosaic dispensation. The ninth book treats of the true nature and genius of the Christian religion. The general argument is that because the sacred books of Judaism said nothing respecting a future state of rewards and punishments, it must be divine, since it did really accomplish the punishment of wrong-doers without such a doctrine, and no other legislation has been able to do so without it. This it could do because the foundation and support of the Mosaic legislation was the theocracy which was peculiar to the Jews, and dealt out in this life righteous rewards and punishments upon individual-and nation. An extraordinary providence conducted the affairs of this people, and

consequently the sending of Moses was divinely ordered. The work is confessedly limited to one line of argument, is defective in exegesis, and does not do justice to the intimations of immortality among the later Jews; yet it is distinguished by freshness and vigor, masterly argumentation, and bold imagination. The excursuses are particularly admirable. His writings, besides those already noted, embrace a commentary upon Pope's *Essay on Man* (1742; by this he won Pope's firm friendship); Julian (1750; on the numerous alleged providential interferences which defeated Julian's attempt to rebuild the temple); *Remarks on Mr. David Hume's Essay on The Natural History of Religion* (1757); *The Doctrine of Grace; or the Office and Operations of the Holy Spirit vindicated from the Insults of Infidelity and the Abuses of Fanaticism* (2 vols., 1762; a work directed against the Methodists, which did not advanace his reputation). His *Works* were edited with a biographical preface by Bishop Hurd (7 vols., 1788; new ed., 12 vols., 1811; the expense was borne by Warburton's widow). Supplementary to this edition are the *Tracts by Warburton and a Warburtonian* (1789); *Letters* (Kidderminster, 1808; 2d ed., London, 1809); *Selections from the Unpublished Papers of Warburton* (1841).

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Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

LIFE. Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein, born on April 26th 1889 in Vienna, Austria, was a charismatic enigma. He has been something of a cult figure but shunned publicity and even built an isolated hut in Norway to live in complete seclusion. His sexuality was ambiguous but he was probably gay; how actively so is still a matter of controversy. His life seems to have been dominated by an obsession with moral and philosophical perfection, summed up in the subtitle of Ray Monk's excellent biography *Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius.*

His concern with moral perfection led Wittgenstein at one point to insist on confessing to several people various sins, including that of allowing others to underestimate the extent of his 'Jewishness'. His father Karl Wittgenstein's parents were born Jewish but converted to Protestantism and his mother Leopoldine (nee Kalmus) was Catholic, but her father was of Jewish descent. Wittgenstein himself was baptized in a Catholic church and was given a Catholic burial, although between baptism and burial he was neither a practicing nor a believing Catholic.

The Wittgenstein family was large and wealthy. Karl Wittgenstein was one of the most successful businessmen in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, leading the iron and steel industry there. The Wittgensteins' home attracted people of culture, especially musicians, including the composer Johannes Brahms, who was a friend of the family. Music remained important to Wittgenstein throughout his life. So did darker matters. Ludwig was the youngest of eight children, and of his four brothers, three committed suicide.

As for his career, Wittgenstein studied mechanical engineering in Berlin and in 1908 went to Manchester, England to do research in aeronautics, experimenting with kites. His interest in engineering led to an interest in mathematics which in turn got him thinking about philosophical questions about the foundations of mathematics. He visited the mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), who recommended that he study with Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) in Cambridge. At Cambridge Wittgenstein greatly impressed Russell and G.E. Moore (1873- 1958), and began work on logic.

When his father died in 1913 Wittgenstein inherited a fortune, which he quickly gave away. When war broke out the next year, he volunteered for the Austrian army. He continued his philosophical work and won several medals for bravery during the war. The result of his thinking on logic was the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* which was eventually published in 1922 with Russell's help. This was the only book Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Having thus, in his opinion, solved all the problems of philosophy, Wittgenstein became an elementary school teacher in rural Austria, where his approach was strict and unpopular, but apparently effective. He spent 1926-28 meticulously designing and building an austere house in Vienna for his sister Gretl.

In 1929 he returned to Cambridge to teach at Trinity College, recognizing that in fact he had more work to do in philosophy. He became professor of philosophy at Cambridge in 1939. During World War II he worked as a hospital porter in London and as a research technician in Newcastle. After

the war he returned to university teaching but resigned his professorship in 1947 to concentrate on writing. Much of this he did in Ireland, preferring isolated rural places for his work. By 1949 he had written all the material that was published after his death as *Philosophical Investigations*, arguably his most important work. He spent the last two years of his life in Vienna, Oxford and Cambridge and kept working until he died of prostate cancer in Cambridge in April 1951. His work from these last years has been published as *On Certainty*. His last words were, "Tell them I've had a wonderful life."

TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS. Wittgenstein told Ludwig von Ficker that the point of the *Tractatus* was ethical. In the preface to the book he says that its value consists in two things: "that thoughts are expressed in it" and "that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved." The problems he refers to are the problems of philosophy defined, we may suppose, by the work of Frege and Russell, and perhaps also Schopenhauer. At the end of the book Wittgenstein says "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands *me* eventually recognizes *them* as nonsensical" [emphasis added]. What to make of the *Tractatus*, its author, and the propositions it contains, then, is no easy matter.

The book certainly does not seem to be about ethics. It consists of numbered propositions in seven sets. Proposition 1.2 belongs to the first set and is a comment on proposition 1. Proposition 1.21 is about proposition 1.2, and so on. The seventh set contains only one proposition, the famous "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."

Some important and representative propositions from the book are these:

> 1 The world is all that is the case.
> 4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.
> 4.0312 ...My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the *logic* of facts.
> 4.121 ...Propositions *show* the logical form of reality. They display it.
> 4.1212 What *can* be shown, *cannot* be said.
> 4.5 ...The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand.
> 5.43 ...all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing.
> 5.4711 To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world.
> 5.6 *The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world.

Here and elsewhere in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein seems to be saying that the essence of the world and of life is: This is how things are. One is tempted to add "--deal with it." That seems to fit what Cora Diamond has called his "accept and endure" ethics, but he says that the propositions of the *Tractatus* are *meaningless*, not profound insights, ethical or otherwise. What are we to make of this?

Many commentators ignore or dismiss what Wittgenstein said about his work and its aims, and instead look for regular philosophical theories in his work. The most famous of these in the *Tractatus* is the "picture theory" of meaning. According to this theory propositions are meaningful insofar as they picture states of affairs or matters of empirical fact. Anything normative, supernatural or (one might say) metaphysical must, it therefore seems, be nonsense. This has been an influential reading of parts of the *Tractatus*. Unfortunately, this reading leads to serious problems since by its own lights the *Tractatus'* use of words like "object," "reality" and "world" is illegitimate. These concepts are purely formal or *a priori*. A statement such as "There are objects

in the world" does not picture a state of affairs. Rather it is, as it were, presupposed by the notion of a state of affairs. The "picture theory" therefore denies sense to just the kind of statements of which the *Tractatus* is composed, to the framework supporting the picture theory itself. In this way the *Tractatus* pulls the rug out from under its own feet.

If the propositions of the *Tractatus* are nonsensical then they surely cannot put forward the picture theory of meaning, or any other theory. Nonsense is nonsense. However, this is not to say that the *Tractatus* itself is without value. Wittgenstein's aim seems to have been to show up as nonsense the things that philosophers (himself included) are tempted to say. Philosophical theories, he suggests, are attempts to answer questions that are not really questions at all (they are nonsense), or to solve problems that are not really problems. He says in proposition 4.003 that:

> **Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.**
>
> **(They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful.)**

And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact *not* problems at all.

Philosophers, then, have the task of presenting the logic of our language clearly. This will not solve important problems but it will show that some things that we take to be important problems are really not problems at all. The gain is not wisdom but an absence of confusion. This is not a rejection of philosophy or logic. Wittgenstein took philosophical puzzlement very seriously indeed, but he thought that it needed *dissolving* by analysis rather than *solving* by the production of theories. The *Tractatus* presents itself as a key for untying a series of knots both profound and highly technical.

ETHICS AND RELIGION. Wittgenstein had a lifelong interest in religion and claimed to see every problem from a religious point of view, but never committed himself to any formal religion. His various remarks on ethics also suggest a particular point of view, and Wittgenstein often spoke of ethics and religion together. This point of view or attitude can be seen in the four main themes that run through Wittgenstein's writings on ethics and religion: goodness, value or meaning are not to be found in the world; living the right way involves acceptance of or agreement with the world, or life, or God's will, or fate; one who lives this way will see the world as a miracle; there is no answer to the problem of life--the solution is the disappearance of the problem.

Certainly Wittgenstein worried about being morally good or even perfect, and he had great respect for sincere religious conviction, but he also said, in his 1929 lecture on ethics, that "the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language," i.e. to talk or write nonsense. This gives support to the view that Wittgenstein believed in mystical truths that somehow cannot be expressed meaningfully but that are of the utmost importance. It is hard to conceive, though, what these 'truths' might be.

An alternative view is that Wittgenstein believed that there is really nothing to say about ethics. This would explain why he wrote less and less about ethics as his life wore on. His "accept and endure" attitude and belief in going "the bloody hard way" are evident in all his work, especially after the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein wants his reader not to think (too much) but to look at the "language games" (any practices that involve language) that give rise to philosophical (personal, existential, spiritual) problems. His approach to such problems is painstaking, thorough, open-eyed and receptive. His ethical attitude is an integral part of his method and shows itself as such.

But there is little to say about such an attitude short of recommending it. In *Culture and Value* p.29e Wittgenstein writes:

> **Rules of life are dressed up in pictures. And these pictures can only serve to *describe* what we are to do, not *justify* it. Because they could provide a justification only if they held good in other respects as well. I can say: "Thank these bees for their honey as though they were kind people who have prepared it for you"; that is *intelligible* and describes how I should like you to conduct yourself. But I cannot say: "Thank them because, look, how kind they are!"--since the next moment they may sting you.**

In a world of contingency one cannot prove that a particular attitude is the correct one to take. If this suggests relativism, it should be remembered that it too is just one more attitude or point of view, and one without the rich tradition and accumulated wisdom, philosophical reasoning and personal experience of, say, orthodox Christianity or Judaism. Indeed crude relativism, the universal judgement that one cannot make universal judgements, is self- contradictory. Whether Wittgenstein's views suggest a more sophisticated form of relativism is another matter, but the spirit of relativism seems far from Wittgenstein's conservatism and absolute intolerance of his own moral shortcomings. Compare the tolerance that motivates relativism with Wittgenstein's assertion to Russell that he would prefer "by far" an organization dedicated to war and slavery to one dedicated to peace and freedom. (This assertion, however, should not be taken literally: Wittgenstein was no war-monger and even recommended letting oneself be massacred rather than taking part in hand-to-hand combat. It was apparently the complacency, and perhaps the self-righteousness, of Russell's liberal cause that Wittgenstein objected to.)

With regard to religion, Wittgenstein is often considered a kind of Anti-Realist (see below for more on this). He opposed interpretations of religion that emphasize doctrine or philosophical arguments intended to prove God's existence, but was greatly drawn to religious rituals and symbols, and considered becoming a priest. He likened the ritual of religion to a great gesture, as when one kisses a photograph. This is not based on the false belief that the person in the photograph will feel the kiss or return it, nor is it based on any other belief. Neither is the kiss just a substitute for a particular phrase, like "I love you." Like the kiss, religious activity does express an attitude, but it is not just the expression of an attitude in the sense that several other forms of expression might do just as well. There might be no substitute that would do. The same might be said of the whole language-game (or games) of religion, but this is a controversial point. If religious utterances, such as "God exists," are treated as gestures of a certain kind then this seems not to be treating them as literal statements. Many religious believers, including Wittgensteinian ones, would object strongly to this. There is room, though, for a good deal of sophisticated disagreement about what it means to take a statement literally. For instance, Charles Taylor's view, roughly, is that the real is whatever will not go away. If we cannot reduce talk about God to anything else, or replace it, or prove it false, then perhaps God is as real as anything else.

CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY. Wittgenstein's view of what philosophy is, or should be, changed little over his life. In the *Tractatus* he says at 4.111 that "philosophy is not one of the natural sciences," and at 4.112 "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts." Philosophy is not descriptive but elucidatory. Its aim is to clear up muddle and confusion. It follows that philosophers should not concern themselves so much with what is actual, keeping up with the latest popularizations of science, say, which Wittgenstein despised. The philosopher's proper concern is with what is possible, or rather with what is conceivable. This depends on our concepts and the ways they fit together as seen in language. What is conceivable and what is not,

what makes sense and what does not, depends on the rules of language, of grammar.

In *Philosophical Investigations* Sect. 90 Wittgenstein says:

Our investigation is a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language.

The similarities between the sentences "I'll keep it in mind" and "I'll keep it in this box," for instance, (along with many others) can lead one to think of the mind as a thing something like a box with contents of its own. The nature of this box and its mental contents can then seem very mysterious. Wittgenstein suggests that one way, at least, to deal with such mysteries is to recall the different things one says about minds, memories, thoughts and so on, in a variety of contexts.

What one says, or what people in general say, can change. Ways of life and uses of language change, so meanings change, but not utterly and instantaneously. Things shift and evolve, but rarely if ever so drastically that we lose all grip on meaning. So there is no timeless essence of at least some and perhaps all concepts, but we still understand one another well enough most of the time.

When nonsense is spoken or written, or when something just seems fishy, we can sniff it out. The road out of confusion can be a long and difficult one, hence the need for constant attention to detail and particular examples rather than generalizations, which tend to be vague and therefore potentially misleading. The slower the route, the surer the safety at the end of it. That is why Wittgenstein said that in philosophy the winner is the one who finishes last. But we cannot escape language or the confusions to which it gives rise, except by dying. In the meantime, Wittgenstein offers four main methods to avoid philosophical confusion, as described by Norman Malcolm: describing circumstances in which a seemingly problematic expression might actually be used in everyday life, comparing our use of words with imaginary language games, imagining fictitious natural history, and explaining psychologically the temptation to use a certain expression inappropriately.

The complex, intertwined relationship between a language and the form of life that goes with it means that problems arising from language cannot just be set aside--they infect our lives, making us live in confusion. We might find our way back to the right path, but there is no guarantee that we will never again stray. In this sense there can be no progress in philosophy.

In 1931 Wittgenstein described his task thus:

> Language sets everyone the same traps; it is an immense network of easily accessible wrong turnings. And so we watch one man after another walking down the same paths and we know in advance where he will branch off, where walk straight on without noticing the side turning, etc. etc. What I have to do then is erect signposts at all the junctions where there are wrong turnings so as to help people past the danger points.

But such signposts are all that philosophy can offer and there is no certainty that they will be noticed or followed correctly. And we should remember that a signpost belongs in the context of a particular problem area. It might be no help at all elsewhere, and should not be treated as dogma. So philosophy offers no truths, no theories, nothing exciting, but mainly reminders of what we all know. This is not a glamorous role, but it is difficult and important. It requires an almost infinite capacity for taking pains (which is one definition of genius) and could have enormous implications for anyone who is drawn to philosophical contemplation or who is misled by bad philosophical

theories. This applies not only to professional philosophers but to any people who stray into philosophical confusion, perhaps not even realizing that their problems are philosophical and not, say, scientific.

MEANING. Sect. 43 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* says that: "For a *large* class of cases--though not for all--in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."

It is quite clear that here Wittgenstein is *not* offering the general theory that "meaning is use," as he is sometimes interpreted as doing. The main rival views that Wittgenstein warns against are that the meaning of a word is some object that it names--in which case the meaning of a word could be destroyed, stolen or locked away, which is nonsense--and that the meaning of a word is some psychological feeling--in which case each user of a word could mean something different by it, having a different feeling, and communication would be difficult if not impossible.

Knowing the meaning of a word can involve knowing many things: to what objects the word refers (if any), whether it is slang or not, what part of speech it is, whether it carries overtones, and if so what kind they are, and so on. To know all this, or to know enough to get by, is to know the use. And generally knowing the use means knowing the meaning. Philosophical questions about consciousness, for example, then, should be responded to by looking at the various uses we make of the word "consciousness." Scientific investigations into the brain are not directly relevant to this inquiry (although they might be indirectly relevant if scientific discoveries led us to change our use of such words). The meaning of any word is a matter of what we do with our language, not something hidden inside anyone's mind or brain. This is not an attack on neuroscience. It is merely distinguishing philosophy (which is properly concerned with linguistic or conceptual analysis) from science (which is concerned with discovering facts).

One exception to the meaning-is-use rule of thumb is given in Sect.561, where Wittgenstein says that "the word "is" is used with two different meanings (as the copula and as the sign of equality)" but that its meaning is not its use. That is to say, "is" has not one complex use (including both "Water is clear" and "Water is H2O") and therefore one complex meaning, but two quite distinct uses and meanings. It is an accident that the same word has these two uses. It is not an accident that we use the word "car" to refer to both Fords and Hondas. But what is accidental and what is essential to a concept depends on us, on how we use it.

This is not completely arbitrary, however. Depending on one's environment, one's physical needs and desires, one's emotions, one's sensory capacities, and so on, different concepts will be more natural or useful to one. This is why "forms of life" are so important to Wittgenstein. What matters to you depends on how you live (and vice versa), and this shapes your experience. So if a lion could speak, Wittgenstein says, we would not be able to understand it. We might realize that "roar" meant zebra, or that "roar, roar" meant lame zebra, but we would not understand lion ethics, politics, aesthetic taste, religion, humor and such like, if lions have these things. We could not honestly say "I know what you mean" to a lion. Understanding another involves empathy, which requires the kind of similarity that we just do not have with lions, and that many people do not have with other human beings.

When a person says something what he or she means depends not only on what is said but also on the context in which it is said. Importance, point, meaning are given by the surroundings. Words, gestures, expressions come alive, as it were, only within a language game, a culture, a form of life. If a picture, say, means something then it means so *to somebody*. Its meaning is not an objective

property of the picture in the way that its size and shape are. The same goes of any mental picture. Hence Wittgenstein's remark that "If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of." Any internal image would need interpretation. If I interpret my thought as one of Hitler and God sees it as Charlie Chaplin, who is right? Which of the two famous contemporaries of Wittgenstein's I mean shows itself in the way I behave, the things I do and say. It is in this that the use, the meaning, of my thought or mental picture lies. "The arrow points only in the application that a living being makes of it."

RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE. Without sharing certain attitudes towards the things around us, sharing a sense of relevance and responding in similar ways, communication would be impossible. It is important, for instance, that nearly all of us agree nearly all the time on what colors things are. Such agreement is part of our concept of color, Wittgenstein suggests. Regularity of the use of such concepts and agreement in their application is part of language, not a logically necessary precondition of it. We cannot separate the life in which there is such agreement from our concept of color. Imagine a different form or way of life and you imagine a different language with different concepts, different rules and a different logic.

This raises the question of the relation between language and forms or ways of life. For instance, could just one person have a language of his or her own? To imagine an individual solitary from birth is scarcely to imagine a form of life at all, but more like just imagining a life- form. Moreover, language involves rules establishing certain linguistic practices. Rules of grammar express the fact that it is our practice to say this (e.g. "half past twelve") and not that (e.g. "half to one"). Agreement is essential to such practices. Could a solitary individual, then, engage in any practice, including linguistic ones? With whom could he or she agree? This is a controversial issue in the interpretation of Wittgenstein. Gordon Baker and P.M.S. Hacker hold that such a solitary man *could* speak his own language, follow his own rules, and so on, agreeing, over time, with himself in his judgements and behavior. Orthodoxy is against this interpretation, however.

Norman Malcolm has written (in an unpublished paper) that "If you conceive of an individual who has been in solitude his whole life long, then you have cut away the background of instruction, correction, acceptance--in short, the circumstances in which a rule is given, enforced, and followed." Mere regularity of behavior does not constitute following rules, whether they be rules of grammar or any other kind. A car that never starts in cold weather does not follow the rule "Don't start when it's cold," nor does a songbird follow a rule in singing the same song every day. Whether a solitary-from-birth individual would ever do anything that we would properly call following a rule is at least highly doubtful. How could he or she give himself or herself a rule to follow without language? And how could he or she get a language? Inventing one would involve inventing meaning, as Rush Rhees has argued, and this sounds incoherent. (The most famous debate about this was between Rhees and A.J. Ayer. Unfortunately for Wittgenstein, Ayer is generally considered to have won.) Alternatively, perhaps the Crusoe-like figure just does behave, sound, etc. just like a native speaker of, say, English. But this is to imagine either a freakish automaton, not a human being, or else a miracle. In the case of a miracle, Wittgenstein says, it is significant that we imagine not just the pseudo- Crusoe but also God. In the case of the automatic speaker, we might adopt what Daniel Dennett calls an "intentional stance" towards him, calling what he does "speaking English," but he is obviously not doing what the rest of us English-speakers--who learned the language, rather than being born speaking it, and who influence and are influenced by others in our use of the language--do.

The debate about solitary individuals is sometimes referred to as the debate about "private

language." Wittgenstein uses this expression in another context, however, to name a language that refers to private sensations. Such a private language by definition cannot be understood by anyone other than its user (who alone knows the sensations to which it refers). Wittgenstein invites us to imagine a man who decides to write 'S' in his diary whenever he has a certain sensation. This sensation has no natural expression, and 'S' cannot be defined in words. The only judge of whether 'S' is used correctly is the inventor of 'S'. The only criterion of correctness is whether a sensation feels the same to him or her. There are no criteria for its *being* the same other than its *seeming* the same. So he writes 'S' when he feels like it. He might as well be doodling. The so-called 'private language' is no language at all. The point of this is not to show that a private language is impossible but to show that certain things one might want to say about language are ultimately incoherent. If we really try to picture a world of private objects (sensations) and inner acts of meaning and so on, we see that what we picture is either regular public language or incomprehensible behavior (the man might as well quack as say or write 'S').

This does not, as has been alleged, make Wittgenstein a behaviorist. He does not deny the existence of sensations or experiences. Pains, tickles, itches, etc. are all part of human life, of course. At *Philosophical Investigations* Sect. 293 Wittgenstein says that "if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." This suggests not that pains and so on are irrelevant but that we should not construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation'. If we want to understand a concept like pain we should not think of a pain as a private object referred to somehow by the public word "pain." A pain is not "a something," just as love, democracy and strength are not things, but it is no more "a nothing" than they are either (see *Philosophical Investigations* Sect. 304). Saying this is hardly satisfactory, but there is no simple answer to the question "What is pain?" Wittgenstein offers not an answer but a kind of philosophical 'therapy' intended to clear away what can seem so obscure. To judge the value of this therapy, the reader will just have to read Wittgenstein's work for herself.

The best known work on Wittgenstein's writings on this whole topic is Saul A. Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Kripke is struck by the idea that anything might count as continuing a series or following a rule in the same way. It all depends on how the rule or series is interpreted. And any rule for interpretation will itself be subject to a variety of interpretations, and so on. What counts as following a rule correctly, then, is not determined somehow by the rule itself but by what the relevant linguistic community accepts as following the rule. So whether two plus two equals four depends not on some abstract, extra-human rule of addition, but on what we, and especially the people we appoint as experts, accept. Truth conditions are replaced by assertability conditions. To put it crudely, what counts is not what is true or right (in some sense independent of the community of language users), but what you can get away with or get others to accept.

Kripke's theory is clear and ingenious, and owes a lot to Wittgenstein, but is doubtful as an interpretation of Wittgenstein. Kripke himself presents the argument not as Wittgenstein's, nor as his own, but as "Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke" (Kripke p.5). That the argument is not Wittgenstein's is suggested by the fact that it is a theory, and Wittgenstein rejected philosophical theories, and by the fact that the argument relies heavily on the first sentence of *Philosophical Investigations* Sect. 201: "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule." For Kripke's theory as a reading of Wittgenstein, it is not good that the very next paragraph begins, "It

can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here..." Still, it is no easy matter to see just where Wittgenstein does diverge from the hybrid person often referred to as 'Kripkenstein'. The key perhaps lies later in the same paragraph, where Wittgenstein writes that "there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*". Many scholars, notably Baker and Hacker, have gone to great lengths to explain why Kripke is mistaken. Since Kripke is so much easier to understand, one of the best ways into Wittgenstein's philosophy is to study Kripke and his Wittgensteinian critics. At the very least, Kripke introduces his readers well to issues that were of great concern to Wittgenstein and shows their importance.

REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM. Wittgenstein's place in the debate about philosophical Realism and Anti-Realism is an interesting one. His emphasis on language and human behavior, practices, etc. makes him a prime candidate for Anti-Realism in many people's eyes. He has even been accused of linguistic idealism, the idea that language is the ultimate reality. The laws of physics, say, would by this theory just be laws of language, the rules of the language game of physics. Anti-Realist scepticism of this kind has proved quite popular in the philosophy of science and in theology, as well as more generally in metaphysics and ethics.

On the other hand, there is a school of Wittgensteinian Realism, which is less well known. Wittgenstein's views on religion, for instance, are often compared with those of Simone Weil, who was a Platonist of sorts. Sabina Lovibond argues for a kind of Wittgensteinian Realism in ethics in her *Realism and Imagination in Ethics* and the influence of Wittgenstein is clear in Raimond Gaita's *Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception*. However, one should not go too far with the idea of Wittgensteinian Realism. Lovibond, for instance, equates objectivity with intersubjectivity (universal agreement), so her Realism is of a controversial kind.

Both Realism and Anti-Realism, though, are theories, or schools of theories, and Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the advocacy of theories in philosophy. This does not prove that he practiced what he preached, but it should give us pause. It is also worth noting that supporters of Wittgenstein often claim that he was neither a Realist nor an Anti-Realist, at least with regard to metaphysics. There is something straightforwardly unWittgensteinian about the Realist's belief that language/thought can be compared with reality and found to 'agree' with it. The Anti-Realist says that we could not get outside our thought or language (or form of life or language games) to compare the two. But Wittgenstein was concerned not with what we can or cannot do, but with what makes sense. If metaphysical Realism is incoherent then so is its opposite. The nonsensical utterance "laubgefraub" is not to be contradicted by saying, "No, it is not the case that laubgefraub," or "Laubgefraub is a logical impossibility." If Realism is truly incoherent, as Wittgenstein would say, then so is Anti-Realism.

CERTAINTY. Wittgenstein's last writings were on the subject of certainty. He wrote in response to G.E. Moore's attack on scepticism about the external world. Moore had held up one hand, said "Here is one hand," then held up his other hand and said "and here is another." His point was that things outside the mind really do exist, we know they do, and that no grounds for scepticism could be strong enough to undermine this commonsense knowledge.

Wittgenstein did not defend scepticism, but questioned Moore's claim to know that he had two hands. Such 'knowledge' is not something that one is ever taught, or finds out, or proves. It is more like a background against which we come to know other things. Wittgenstein compares this background to the bed of a river. This river bed provides the support, the context, in which claims to know various things have meaning. The bed itself is not something we can know or doubt. In

normal circumstances no sane person doubts how many hands he or she has. But unusual circumstances can occur and what was part of the river bed can shift and become part of the river. I might, for instance, wake up dazed after a terrible accident and wonder whether my hands, which I cannot feel, are still there or not. This is quite different, though, from Descartes's pretended doubt as to whether he has a body at all. Such radical doubt is really not doubt at all, from Wittgenstein's point of view. And so it cannot be dispelled by a proof that the body exists, as Moore tried to do.

CONTINUITY. Wittgenstein is generally considered to have changed his thinking considerably over his philosophical career. His early work culminated in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* with its picture theory of language and mysticism, according to this view. Then there came a transitional middle period when he first returned to philosophical work after realizing that he had not solved all the problems of philosophy. This period led to his mature, later period which gave us the *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty*.

There certainly are marked changes in Wittgenstein's work, but the differences between his early and late work can be exaggerated. Two central discontinuities in his work are these: whereas the *Tractatus* is concerned with the general form of the proposition, the general nature of metaphysics, and so on, in his later work Wittgenstein is very critical of "the craving for generality"; and, in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein speaks of the central problems of philosophy, whereas the later work treats no problems as central. Another obvious difference is in Wittgenstein's style. The *Tractatus* is a carefully constructed set of short propositions. The *Investigations*, though also consisting of numbered sections, is longer, less clearly organized and more rambling, at least in appearance. This reflects Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that there are just a few central problems in philosophy, and his insistence on paying attention to particular cases, going over the rough ground.

On the other hand, the *Tractatus* itself says that its propositions are nonsense and thus, in a sense (not easy to understand), rejects itself. The fact that the later work also criticizes the *Tractatus* is not, therefore, proof of discontinuity in Wittgenstein's work. The main change may have been one of method and style. Problems are investigated one at a time, although many overlap. There is not a full-frontal assault on *the* problem or problems of philosophy. Otherwise, the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* attack much the same problems; they just do so in different ways.

WITTGENSTEIN IN HISTORY. Wittgenstein's place in the history of philosophy is a peculiar one. His philosophical education was unconventional (going from engineering to working first-hand with one of the greatest philosophers of his day in Bertrand Russell) and he seems never to have felt the need to go back and make a thorough study of the history of philosophy. He was interested in Plato, admired Leibniz, but was most influenced by the work of Schopenhauer, Russell and Frege.

From Schopenhauer (perhaps) Wittgenstein got his interest in solipsism and in the ethical nature of the relation between the will and the world. Schopenhauer's saying that "The world is my idea," (from *The World as Will and Idea*) is echoed in such remarks as "The world is *my* world" (from *Tractatus* 5.62). What Wittgenstein means here, where he also says that what the solipsist means is quite correct, but that it cannot be said, is obscure and controversial. Some have taken him to mean that solipsism is true but for some reason cannot be expressed. H.O. Mounce, in his valuable *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction*, says that this interpretation is surely wrong. Mounce's view is that Wittgenstein holds solipsism itself to be a confusion, but one that sometimes arises when one tries to express the fact that "I have a point of view on the world which is without

neighbours." (Mounce p.91) Wittgenstein was not a solipsist but he remained interested in solipsism and related problems of scepticism throughout his life.

Frege was a mathematician as well as a logician. He was interested in questions of truth and falsehood, sense and reference (a distinction he made famous) and in the relation between objects and concepts, propositions and thoughts. But his interest was in logic and mathematics exclusively, not in psychology or ethics. His great contribution to logic was to introduce various mathematical elements into formal logic, including quantification, functions, arguments (in the mathematical sense of something substituted for a variable in a function) and the value of a function. In logic this value, according to Frege, is always either the True or the False, hence the notion of truth-value. Both Frege and Russell wanted to show that mathematics is an extension of logic. Undoubtedly both men influenced Wittgenstein enormously, especially since he worked first-hand with Russell. Some measure of their importance to him can be seen in the preface to the *Tractatus*, where Wittgenstein says that he is "indebted to Frege's great works and to the writings of my friend Mr Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts." For some insight into whether Frege or Russell had the greater influence one can consider whether one would rather be recognized for his or her great works or for simply being a friend.

In turn Wittgenstein influenced twentieth century philosophy enormously. The Vienna Circle logical positivists were greatly impressed by what they found in the *Tractatus*, especially the idea that logic and mathematics are analytic, the verifiability principle and the idea that philosophy is an activity aimed at clarification, not the discovery of facts. Wittgenstein, though, said that it was what is *not* in the *Tractatus* that matters most.

The other group of philosophers most obviously indebted to Wittgenstein is the ordinary language or Oxford school of thought. These thinkers were more interested in Wittgenstein's later work and its attention to grammar.

Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key figure in the development and history of analytic philosophy, but he has become rather unfashionable because of his anti-theoretical, anti- scientism stance, because of the difficulty of his work, and perhaps also because he has been little understood. Similarities between Wittgenstein's work and that of Derrida are now generating interest among continental philosophers, and Wittgenstein may yet prove to be a driving force behind the emerging post-analytic school of philosophy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. A full bibliographical guide to works by and on Wittgenstein would fill a whole book, namely *Wittgenstein: A Bibliographical Guide* by Guido Frongia and Brian McGuinness (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1990). Obviously this is already out of date. Instead of a complete guide, therefore, what follows is a list of some of Wittgenstein's main works, some of the best secondary material on his work, and a few other works chosen for their accessibility and entertainment value, for want of a better expression.

Wittgenstein's main works are these:

- ***Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1961). His early classic.**
- ***The Blue and Brown Books*, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1969). From his middle period, these are preliminary studies for his later work.**
- ***Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1963). His late classic.**

- *On Certainty*, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1979). Like many of Wittgenstein's works, this was compiled after his death from notes he had made. In this case the notes come from the last year and a half of his life.

Works of more general interest by Wittgenstein include these:

- *Culture and Value*, translated by Peter Winch (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1980). These are notes from throughout Wittgenstein's life dealing with all kinds of topics hinted at by its title, including music, literature, philosophy, religion and the value of silliness.
- *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, edited by Cyril Barrett (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1966). For 'psychology' read 'Freud', otherwise the title is explanation enough. Hilary Putnam has recommended the section on religion as a valuable introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole.

The best biographies of Wittgenstein are:

- Ray Monk *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (Jonathan Cape, London 1990), which is full of enlightening detail.
- Norman Malcolm *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1984), which is much shorter and includes material from G.H. von Wright as well.

Two of the best books on the *Tractatus* are:

- G.E.M. Anscombe *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1971), which emphasizes the importance of Frege and is notoriously difficult
- H.O. Mounce *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1981), which is lighter but more reader-friendly.

A good rule of thumb for picking secondary material on Wittgenstein is to trust Wittgenstein's own judgement. He chose G.E.M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees and G.H. von Wright to understand and deal with his unpublished writings after his death. Anything by one of these people should be fairly reliable. More contentiously, I would say that the best people writing on Wittgenstein today are James Conant, Cora Diamond and Peter Winch. Other books referred to in the text above or of special note are these:

- O.K. Bouwsma *Wittgenstein: Conversations 1949-1951*, edited by J.L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit (Hackett, Indianapolis 1986). A seemingly little read slim volume that includes records of Wittgenstein's comments on such diverse and interesting topics as Descartes, utilitarianism and the word 'cheeseburger'.
- Stanley Cavell *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy* (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1979). A long, rich, challenging classic.
- Cora Diamond *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind* (MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991). A collection of essays of varying degrees of accessibility on Frege, Wittgenstein and ethics, united by their Wittgensteinian spirit.
- M.O'C. Drury *The Danger of Words* (Thoemmes Press, Bristol, U.K. and Washington, D.C. 1996). A classic, including discussions of issues in psychiatry and religion by a

friend of Wittgenstein's.

- Paul Engelmann *Letters from Wittgenstein with a memoir* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1967). Includes discussions by Wittgenstein and his friend Engelmann on the *Tractatus*, religion, literature and culture.
- Saul A. Kripke *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1982). See the section on rules and private language above.
- Norman Malcolm *Wittgenstein: Nothing is Hidden* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1986). One of the best accounts of Wittgenstein's philosophy from the disreputable point of view that the *Tractatus* advanced theses which are then attacked in the later work.
- Norman Malcolm *Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?*, edited with a response by Peter Winch (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1994). Malcolm basically summarizes Wittgenstein's philosophy, as he understands it, with a special emphasis on religion. Winch then responds, correcting Malcolm's account where necessary. The result is a highly accessible composite overview of Wittgenstein's work from the religious point of view, which is how Wittgenstein himself said that he saw every problem.

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Xenophanes (570-475 BCE.)

Founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, Xenophanes was a native of Colophon, and born about 570 BCE. It is difficult to determine the dates of his life with any accuracy and the facts of his life are also obscure. Xenophanes early left his own country and took refuge in Sicily, where he supported himself by reciting, at the court of Hiero, elegiac and iambic verses, which he had written in criticism of the *Theogony* of Hesiod and Homer. From Sicily he passed over into Magna Graecia, where he took up the profession of philosophy, and became a celebrated teacher in the Pythagorean school. Give way to a greater freedom of thought than was usual among the disciples of Pythagoras, he introduced new opinions of his own opposing the doctrines of Epimenides, Thales, and Pythagoras. He held the Pythagorean chair of philosophy for about seventy years, and lived to the extreme age of 105.

Xenophanes was an elegiac and satirical poet who approached the question of science from the standpoint of the reformer rather than of the scientific investigator. If we look at the very considerable remains of his poetry that have come down to us, we see that they are all in the satirist's and social reformer's vein. There is one dealing with the management of a feast, another which denounces the exaggerated importance attached to athletic victories, and several which attack the humanized gods of Homer. The problem is, therefore, to find, if we can, a single point of view from which all these fragments can be interpreted, although it may be that no such point of view exists. Like the religious reformers of the day, Xenophanes turned his back on the anthropomorphic polytheism of Homer and Hesiod. This revolt is based on a conviction that the tales of the poets are directly responsible for the moral corruption of the time. 'Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace among mortals, stealing and adulteries and deceiving of another' (fr. 11). And this he held was due to the representation of the gods in human form. Men make gods in their own image; those of the Ethiopians are black and snub-nosed, those of the Thracians have blue eyes and red hair (fr 16). If horses or oxen or lions had hands and could produce works of art, they too would represent the gods after their own fashion (fr. 15). All that must be swept away along with the tales of Titans and Giants, those 'figments of an earlier day' (fr. 1) if social life is to be reformed.

Xenophanes found the weapons he required for his attack on polytheism in the science of the time. Here are traces of Anaximander's cosmology in the fragments, and Xenophanes may easily have been his disciple before he left Ionia. He seems to have taken the gods of mythology one by one and reduced them to meteorological phenomena, and especially to clouds. And he maintained there was only one god -- namely, the world. God is one incorporeal eternal being, and, like the universe, spherical in form; that he is of the same nature with the universe, comprehending all things within himself; is intelligent, and pervades all things, but bears no resemblance to human nature either in body or mind.

He taught that if there had ever been a time when nothing existed, nothing could *ever* have existed.

Whatever is, always has been from eternity, without deriving its existence from any prior principles. Nature, he believed, is one and without limit; that what is one is similar in all its parts, else it would be many; that the one infinite, eternal, and homogeneous universe is immutable and incapable of change. His position is often classified as pantheistic, although his use of the term 'god' simply follows the use characteristic of the early cosmologists generally. There is no evidence that Xenophanes regarded this 'god' with any religious feeling, and all we are told about him (or rather about it) is purely negative. He is quite unlike a man, and has no special organs of sense, but 'sees all over, thinks all over, hears all over' (fr. 24). Further, he does not go about from place to place (fr. 26), but does everything 'without toil (fr. 25). It is not safe to go beyond this; for Xenophanes himself tells us no more. It is pretty certain that if he had said anything more positive or more definitely religious in its bearing it would have been quoted by later writers.

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Xenophon (444-357)

Life. **An Athenian, the son of Gryllus, Xenophon was born about 444 BCE. In his early life he was a pupil of Socrates; but the turning point in his career came when he decided to serve in the Greek contingent raised by Cyrus against Artaxerxes in 401. Xenophon himself mentions the circumstances under which he joined this army (*Anab*. 3:1). Proxenus, a friend of Xenophon, was already with Cyrus, and he invited Xenophon to come to Sardis, and promised to introduce him to the Persian prince. He accompanied Cyrus into Upper Asia. In the battle of Cunaxa (401 BCE.) Cyrus lost his life, his barbarian troops were dispersed, and the Greeks were left alone on the wide plains between the Tigris and the Euphrates. It was after the treacherous massacre of Clearchus and others of the Greek commanders by the Persian satrap Tissaphernes that Xenophon came forward. He had held no command in the army of Cyrus, nor had he, in fact, served as a soldier, yet he was elected one of the generals, and took the principal part in conducting the Greeks in their memorable retreat along the Tigris over the high table-lands of Armenia to Trapezus (Trebizond) on the Black Sea. From Trapezus the troops were conducted to Chrysopolis, which is opposite to Byzantium. The Greeks were in great distress, and some of them under Xenophon entered the service of Seuthes, king of Thrace. As the Lacedaemonians under Thimbrou (or Thibron) were now at war with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, Xenophon and his troops were invited to join the army of Thimbron, and Xenophon led them back out of Asia to join Thimbron (399). Xenophon, who was very poor, mad an expedition into the plain of the Caicus with his troops before they joined Thimbrou, to plunder the house and property of a Persian named Asidates. The Persian, with his women, children, and all his movables, was seized, and Xenophon, by this robbery, replenished his empty pockets (*Anab.* 7:8, 23). He tells the story himself, and is evidently not ashamed of it.**

In other ways also he showed himself the prototype of an adventurous leader of *condottieri*, with no ties of country or preference of nationality. He formed a scheme for establishing a town with the Ten Thousand on the shores of the Euxine; but it fell through. He joined the Spartans, as has been seen, and he continued in their service even when they were at war with Athens. Agesilaus, the Spartan, was commanding the Lacedaemonian forces in Asia against the Persians in 396, and Xenophon was with him at least during part of the campaign. When Agesilaus was recalled (394), Xenophon accompanied him, and he was on the side of the Lacedaemonians in the battle which they fought at Coronea (394) against the Athenians. As a natural consequence a decree of exile was passed against him at Athens. It seems that he went to Sparta with Agesilaus after the battle of Coronea, and soon after he settled at Scillus in Elis, not far from Olympia, a spot of which he has given a description in the *Anabasis*. Here he was joined by his wife, Philesia, and his children. His children were educated in Sparta.

Xenophon was now a Lacedaemonian so far as he could become one. His time during his long residence at Scillus was employed in hunting, writing, and entertaining his friends; and perhaps the *Anabasis* and part of the *Hellenica* were composed here. The treatise on hunting and that on

the horse were probably also written during this time, when amusement and exercise of this kind formed part of his occupation. On the downfall of the Spartan supremacy, at Leuctra in 371, Xenophon was at last expelled from his quite retreat at Scillus by the Elans, after remaining there about twenty years. The sentence of banishment from Athens was repealed on the motion of Eubulus, but it is uncertain in what year. There is no evidence that Xenophon ever returned to Athens. He is said to have retired to Corinth after his expulsion from Scillus, and as we know nothing more, we assume that he died there some time around 357.

Writings. The following is a list of Xenophon's works. (1) The *Anabasis*, a history of the expedition of the Younger Cyrus, and of the retreat of the Greeks who formed part of his army. It is divided into seven books. As regards the title, it will be noticed that under the name "The March Up" (*ana*, i.e., inland from the coast of Cunaxa) is included also the much longer account of the return march *down* to the Euxine. This work has immortalized Xenophon. It was the first work which made the Greeks acquainted with some portions of the Persian Empire, and it showed the weakness of that extensive monarchy. The skirmishes of the retreating Greeks with their enemies, and the battles with some of the barbarian tribes, are not such events as elevate the work to the character of a military history. (2) The *Hellenica* is divided into seven books, and covers the forty-eight years from the time when the History of Thucydides ends to the battle of Mantinea. (3) The *Cyropadia*, in eight books, is a kind of political romance, the basis of which is the history of the Elder Cyrus, the founder of the Persian monarchy. The *Agesilaus* is a panegyric on Agesilaus II, king of Sparta, the friend of Xenophon. (5) The *Hipparchicus* is a treatise on the duties of a commander of cavalry, containing military precepts. (6) *De Re Equestri* is a treatise on the horse; it is not limited to horsemanship, but also shows how to avoid being cheated in buying a horse, and how to train a horse. (7) The *Cynegeticus* is a treatise on hunting, and on the breading and training of hunting dogs. (8) The *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum* is a treatise on the Spartan states, and (9) the *Atheniensium* on the Athenian States. (10) The *De Vectigalibus*, a treatise on the revenues of Athens, is designed to show how the public revenue of Athens may be improved. (11) The *Memorabilia of Socrates*, in four books, was written by Xenophon to defend the memory of his master against the charge of irreligion and of corrupting the Athenian youth. Socrates is represented as holding a series of conversations, in which he develops and inculcates his moral doctrines. It is entirely a practical work such as we might expect from the practical nature of Xenophon, and it

professes to show Socrates as he taught. (12) The *Apology of Socrates* is a short speech, containing the reasons which induced Socrates to prefer death to life. (13) The *Symposium*, or Banquet of Philosophers, delineates the character of Socrates. The speakers are supposed to meet at the house of Callias, a rich Athenian, at the celebration of the Great Panathenaea. Socrates and others are the speakers. It is possible that Plato wrote his *Symposium* later, to some extent as a corrective. (14) The *Hiero* is a dialogue between King Hiero and Simonides, in which the king speaks of the dangers and difficulties incident to an exalted station, and the superior happiness of a private man. The poet, on the other hand, enumerates the advantages which the possession of power gives, and the means which it offers of obliging and doing services. (15) The *Oeconomicus* ("The Complete Householder") is a treatise in the form of a dialogue between Socrates and Critobulus, in which Socrates gives instruction in the administration of a household and property.

Xenophon's Account of Socrates. Four of Xenophon's works listed above purport to record actual conversations of Socrates, whom he had known as a young man. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon consulted on his decision to join Cyrus. Socrates, advised him to consult the oracle of Delphi, as it was a hazardous matter for him to enter the service of Cyrus, who was considered to be the friend of the Lacedaemonians and the enemy of Athens. Xenophon went to Delphi, but he did not ask the god whether he should go or not; he probably had made up his mind. He merely inquired to what gods he should sacrifice so that he might be successful in his intended enterprise. Socrates was not satisfied with his pupil's mode of consulting the oracle; but as he had got an answer, he told him to go. He tells us frankly that Socrates rebuked him for this evasion, and that is all we know of their discussion. If there had been more to tell, Xenophon would have told it, for he was not averse to talking about himself. At this time Xenophon was under thirty, and Socrates had passed away before his return from Asia. Several of the Socratic conversations he records are on subjects we know Xenophon was specially interested in, and the views he offers in them are just those he elsewhere expresses in his own name or through the mouth of Cyrus in the *Cyropadia*. Accordingly, no one appeals to such works as *Oeconomicus* for evidence regarding the historical Socrates. His *Apology* and *Symposium* are similarly disregarded as sources of information on Socrates.

Since the eighteenth century, however, it has been customary to make an exception in favor of a single work, the *Memorabilia*, composed by the exiled Xenophon with the professed intention of showing that Socrates was not irreligious, and that, so far from corrupting the young, he did them a great deal of good by his conversations. It makes sense that the eighteenth-century should have preferred the Socrates of the *Memorabilia* to that of the Platonic dialogues, for he comes nearer to their idea of what a philosopher ought to be. In other respects it is hard to see what there is to recommend Xenophon. It is recognized that he is far from being a trustworthy historian, and the *Cyropaedia* shows his turn for philosophical romance. It is methodologically unsound to isolate the *Memorabilia* from Xenophon's other Socratic writings, unless there are strong reasons to do so. Thus, since it is impossible to get anything like a complete picture of Socrates from the *Memorabilia* alone, Xenophon supporters fill their outline with Plato's account.

Nevertheless, one of the *Memorabilia*'s chief arguments for the soundness of Socrates' religious attitude is that he refused to busy himself with natural science and dissuaded others from studying it. What Plato tells us of the disappointment of Socrates with Anaxagoras, and his renunciation of physical speculations at an early age is enough to explain Xenophon's contention. Xenophon continues, though, maintaining that Socrates was not unversed in mathematical and astronomical subjects. Further, he know that what Aristophanes burlesqued in the *Clouds* was true, since Xenophon makes Socrates tell he Sophist Antophon, who was trying to rob him of his disciples, that he dies in fact study the writings of the older philosophers "unrolling the treasures... which they have written down in books and left behind them" (*Mem* 1:6:14). Admissions like these are more important than the words put into Socrates' mouth denying scientific study. It would be possible to find other admissions of this sort in Xenophon, but it is not clear how far the *Memorabilia* can be regarded as independent testimony at all. In fact, it is likely that Xenophon relied on Plato's dialogues for his information about Socrates. Otherwise, it would be significant that he has heard of the importance of "hypothesis" in Socrates' dialectic system.

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- Zeno of Elea

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Zeno of Elea (b. 488 BCE.)

Zeno was an Eleatic philosopher, a native of Elea (Velia) in Italy, son of Teleutagoras, and the favorite disciple of Parmenides. He was born about 488 BCE., and at the age of forty accompanied Parmenides to Athens. He appears to have resided some time at Athens, and is said to have unfolded his doctrines to people like Pericles and Callias for the price of 100 minae. Zeno is said to have taken part in the legislation of Parmenides, to the maintenance of which the citizens of Elea had pledged themselves every year by oath. His love of freedom is shown by the courage with which he exposed his life in order to deliver his native country from a tyrant. Whether he died in the attempt or survived the fall of the tyrant is a point on which the authorities vary. They also state the name of the tyranny differently. Zeno devoted all his energies to explain and develop the philosophical system of Parmenides. We learn from Plato that Zeno was twenty-five years younger than Parmenides, and he wrote his defense of Parmenides as a young man. Because only a few fragments of Zeno's writings have been found, most of what we know of Zeno comes from what Aristotle said about him in *Physics*, Book 6, chapter 9.

Zeno's contribution to Eleatic philosophy is entirely negative. He did not add anything positive to the teachings of Parmenides, but devoted himself to refuting the views of the opponents of Parmenides. Parmenides had taught that the world of sense is an illusion because it consists of motion (or change) and plurality (or multiplicity or the many). True Being is absolutely one; there is in it no plurality. True Being is absolutely static and unchangeable. Common sense says there is both motion and plurality. This is the Pythagorean notion of reality against which Zeno directed his arguments. Zeno showed that the common sense notion of reality leads to consequences at least as paradoxical as his master's.

Paradoxes of Multiplicity and Motion.

Zeno's arguments can be classified into two groups. The first group contains paradoxes against multiplicity, and are directed to showing that the 'unlimited' or the continuous, cannot be composed of units however small and however many. There are two principal arguments:

1. **If we assume that a line segment is composed of a multiplicity of points, then we can always bisect a line segment, and every bisection leaves us with a line segment that can itself be bisected. Continuing with the bisection process, we never come to a point, a stopping place, so a line cannot be composed of points.**

2. **The many, the line, must be both limited and unlimited in number of points. It must be limited because it is just as many (points) as it is, no more, and less. It is therefore, a definite number, and a definite number is a finite or limited number. However, the many must also be unlimited in number, for it is infinitely divisible. Therefore, it's contradictory to suppose a line is composed of a multiplicity of points.**

The second group of Zeno's arguments concern motion. They introduce the element of time, and are directed to showing that time is no more a sum of moments than a line is a sum of points. There are four of these arguments:

1. **If a thing moves from one point in space to another, it must first traverse half the distance. Before it can do that, it must traverse a half of the half, and so on ad infinitum. It must, therefore, pass through an infinite number of points, and that is impossible in a finite time.**

2. **In a race in which the tortoise has a head start, the swifter-running Achilles can never overtake the tortoise. Before he comes up to the point at which the tortoise started, the tortoise will have got a little way, and so on ad infinitum.**

3. **The flying arrow is at rest. At any given moment it is in a space equal to its own length, and therefore is at rest at that moment. So, it's at rest at all moments. The sum of an infinite number of these positions of rest is not a motion.**

4. **Suppose there are three arrows. Arrow B is at rest. Suppose A moves to the right past B, and C moves to the left past B, at the same rate. Then A will move past C at twice the rate. This doubling would be contradictory if we were to assume that time and space are atomistic. To see the contradiction, consider this position as the chains of atoms pass each other:**
A1 A2 A3 ==>
B1 B2 B3
C1 C2 C3 <==
Atom A1 is now lined up with C1, but an instant ago A3 was lined up with C1, and A1 was still two positions from C1. In that one unit of time, A2 must have passed C1 and lined up with C2. How did A2 have time for two different events (namely, passing C1 and lining up with C2) if it had only one unit of time available? It takes time to have an event, doesn't it?

Both groups of Zeno's arguments, those against multiplicity and those against motion, are variations of one argument that applies equally to space or time. For simplicity, we will consider it only in its spatial sense. Any quantity of space, say the space enclosed within a circle, must either be composed of ultimate indivisible units, or it must be divisible *ad infinitum*. If it is composed of indivisible units, these must have magnitude, and we are faced with the contradiction of a magnitude which cannot be divided. If it is divisible *ad infinitum*, we are faced with the contradiction of supposing that an infinite number of parts can be

added up to make a merely finite sum.

Zeno's point is that since multiplicity and motion contain these contradictions, they cannot be real. Therefore, as Parmenides said, there is only one Being, with no multiplicity in it, and it excludes all motion and change.

Kant's, Hume's, and Hegel's Solutions to Zeno's Paradoxes. According to Kant, these contradictions are immanent in our conceptions of space and time, so space and time are not real. Space and time do not belong to things as they are in themselves, but rather to our way of looking at things. They are forms of our perception. It is our minds which impose space and time upon objects, and not objects which impose space and time upon our minds. Further, Kant drew from these contradictions the conclusion that to comprehend the infinite is beyond the capacity of human reason. He attempted to show that, wherever we try to think the infinite, whether the infinitely large or the infinitely small, we fall into irreconcilable contradictions.

As might be expected, many thinkers have looked for a way out of the paradoxes. Hume denied the infinite divisibility of space and time, and declared that they are composed of indivisible units having magnitude. But the difficulty that it is impossible to conceive of units having magnitude which are yet indivisible is not satisfactorily explained by Hume.

Hegel believed that any solution which is to be satisfactory must somehow make room for both sides of the contradiction. It will not do to deny one side or the other, to say that one is false and the other true. A true solution is only possible by rising above the level of the two antagonistic principles and taking them both up to the level of a higher conception, in which both opposites are reconciled. Hegel regarded Zeno's paradoxes as examples of the essential contradictory character of reason. All thought, all reason, for Hegel, contains immanent

contradictions which it first posits and then reconciles in a higher unity, and this particular contradiction of infinite divisibility is reconciled in the higher notion of *quantity*. The notion of quantity contains two factors, namely the *one* and the *many*. Quantity means precisely a many in one, or a one in many. If, for example, we consider a quantity of anything, say a heap of wheat, this is, in the first place, one; it is one whole. Secondly, it is many, for it is composed of many parts. As one it is continuous; as many it is discrete. Now the true notion of quantity is not one, apart form many, nor many apart from one. It is the synthesis of both. It is a many *in* one. The antinomy we are considering arises from considering one side of the truth in a false abstraction from the other. To conceive unity as not being in itself multiplicity, or multiplicity as not being unity, is a false abstraction. The thought of the one involves the thought of the many, and the thought of the many involves the thought of the one. You cannot have a many without a one, any more than you can have one end of a stick without the other.

Now, if we consider anything which is quantitatively measured, such as a straight line, we may consider it, in the first place, as one. In that case it is a continuous divisible unit. Next we may regard it as many, in which case it falls into parts. Now each of these parts may again be regarded as one, and as such is an indivisible unit; and again each part may be regarded as many, in which case it falls into further parts; and this alternating process may go on for ever. This is the view of the matter which gives rise to Zeno's contradictions. But it is a false view. It involves the false abstraction of first regarding the many as something that has reality apart from the one, and then regarding the one as something that has reality apart from the many. If you persist in saying that the line is simply one and not many, then there arises the theory of indivisible units. If you persist in saying it is simply many and not one, then it is divisible *ad infinitum*. But the truth is that it is neither simply many nor simply one; it is a many *in* one, that is, it is a *quantity*. Both sides of the contradiction are, therefore, in one sense true, for each is a factor of the truth. But both sides are also false, if and in so far as, each sets itself up as the whole truth.

The Contemporary Solution to Zeno's Paradoxes.

Kant's, Hume's and Hegel's solutions to the paradoxes have been very stimulating to subsequent thinkers, but ultimately have not been accepted. There is now general agreement among mathematicians, physicists and philosophers of science on what revisions are necessary in order to escape the contradictions discovered by Zeno's fruitful paradoxes. The concepts of space, time, and motion have to be radically changed, and so do the mathematical concepts of line, number, measure, and sum of a series. Zeno's integers have to be replaced by the contemporary notion of real numbers. The new one-dimensional continuum, the standard model of the real numbers under their natural (less-than) order, is a radically different line than what Zeno was imagining. The new line is now the basis for the scientist's notion of distance in space and duration through time. The line is no longer a sum of points, as Zeno supposed, but a set-theoretic union of a non-denumerably infinite number of unit sets of points. Only in this way can we make sense of higher dimensional objects such as the one-dimensional line and the two-dimensional plane being composed of zero-dimensional points, for, as Zeno knew, a simple sum of even an infinity of zeros would never total more than zero. The points in a line are so densely packed that no point is next to any other point. Between any two there is a third, all the way 'down.' The infinity of points in the line is much larger than any infinity Zeno could have imagined. The non-denumerable infinity of real numbers (and thus of points in space and of events in time) is much larger than the merely denumerable infinity of integers. Also, the sum of an infinite series of numbers can now have a finite sum, unlike in Zeno's day. With all these changes, mathematicians and scientists can say that all of Zeno's arguments are based on what are now false assumptions and that no Zeno-like paradoxes can be created within modern math and science. Achilles catches his tortoise, the flying arrow moves, and it's possible to go to an infinite number of places in a finite time, without contradiction.

No single person can be credited with having shown how to solve Zeno's paradoxes. There have been essential contributions starting from the calculus of Newton and Leibniz and ending at the beginning of the twentieth century with the mathematical advances of Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dedekind, Cantor, Einstein, and Lebesque. Philosophically, the single greatest contribution was to replace a reliance on what humans can imagine with a reliance on creating logically consistent mathematical concepts that can promote quantitative science.

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Timeline of Western Philosophy

- **ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY**
  - **The PreSocratics:**
    - **Ionian: Thales, Anaximander, Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaximenes, Heraclitus**
    - **Pythagoras**
    - **Eleatic: Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno**
    - **Pluralists: Empedocles, Anaxagoras**
    - **Atomists: Leucippus, Democritus**
    - **Sophists: Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus**
  - **Socrates and Followers**
    - **Megarians: Euclides Stilpo**
    - **Cynics: Antisthenes Diogenes of Sinope**
    - **Cyreanics: Aristippus**
  - **Plato and Followers**
    - **Academy: Carneades**
  - **Aristotle and Followers**
    - **Peripatetics: Theophrastus**
  - **The Hellenistic Philosophy**
    - **Epicureanism: Epicurus, Lucretius Diogenes Laertius**
    - **Stoicism: Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Epictetus**
    - **Skepticism: Pyrrho, Timon, Aenesidemus**
    - **Eclecticism**
  - **Roman Philosophy: Cicero, Neo-Platonism, Plotinus**

- **MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY**
  - **Early Middle Ages: Origen, Augustine**
  - **High Middle Ages: Anselm, Lombard, Aquinas, Scotus**
  - **Late Middle Ages: Eckhart, Ockham**

- **RENAISSANCE AND EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY:**
  - **Humanism: Pico, More, Erasmus**
  - **Reformation: Luther, Calvin**
  - **Scientific Revolution: Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Bacon, Newton**
  - **Skeptics and Fideists: Montaigne, Gassendi, Bayle, Pascal**

- **MODERN PHILOSOPHY**
  - **Continental Rationalism: Descartes Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz**
  - **British Empiricism: John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume**
  - **Deism: English Deism, French Deism, Herbert of Cherbury, Bolingbroke, Pain**
  - **French Enlightenment: Encyclopedists, Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Helvetius**
  - **Natural Theology: Paley**
  - **Modern Political Philosophy: Machiavelli, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Mandeville, Rousseau, Beccaria, Wollstonecraft, Burke, Godwin**
  - **Modern Moral Philosophy: Clarke, Cudworth, Cumberland, Shaftesbury, Butler, Hutcheson, Price, Bentham,**
  - **Scottish Common Sense: Kames, Reid, Beattie, Oswald, Stewart, Brown, Abercombie**
  - **Kant**

- **19TH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY**
  - **German Idealism: Hegel, Jacobi, Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, J.G. Fichte, I.H. Fichte, Lotze**
  - **English Idealism: Hamilton, Caird, Sterling, Hodgson, Ferrier, Stephen, Bradley**
  - **American Idealism: St. Louis Hegelians**
  - **Evolutionists: Huxley**
  - **Late European: Nietzsche, Marx, Kierkegaard, J.S. Mill**

- **20TH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY**
  - **Early American Philosophy: Peirce, James, Dewey**
  - **Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore, Reichenbach, Carnap, Hempel, Logical Positivism, Berlin Circle, Vienna Circle**
  - **Russian Philosophy: Bakhtin, Solovyov, Shpet**
  - **Continental Philosophy, Phenomenology, Existentialism: Husserl, Freud, Heidegger, Sartre, Camus**
  - **Recent Moral and Political Philosophy: Ross, Toulmin, K. Baier, Rawls, Nozick**

- **Recent Metaphysics and Epistemology: Quine, Ryle, Kripke, Putnam, Davidson**

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Karl Robert Eduard Von Hartmann (1842-1906)

German philosopher, born at Berlin Feb. 23, 1842, died at the same place June 5, 1906. He was educated at the school of artillery in Berlin (1859-1862); and held a commission (1860-65), when he was compelled to retire on account of serious knee trouble. He took his degree at Rostock in 1867, returned to Berlin, and retired to Lichterfelde (5 m. s.w. of Berlin) in 1885, doing most of his work in bed while suffering great pain. After developing the thought for twenty-two years, he began in 1864 to prepare his main philosophical work, *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (Berlin, 1869; llth ed., 3 vols., 1904). Next in rank was his *Das sittliche Bewusstsein*, appearing first as *Phenomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins* (Berlin, 1879); and next to that was the *Religionsphilosophie* (2 vols., *Das religiose Bewusstein der Menschheit and Die Religion des Geistes*, 1882).

The object of his philosophy was to unite the "idea" of Hegel with the "will" of Schopenhauer in his doctrine of the Absolute Spirit, or, as he preferred to characterize it, spiritual monism. He held that " a will which does not will something is not." The world was produced by will and idea, but not as conscious; for consciousness, instead of being essential, is accidental to will and idea-the two poles of " the Unconscious." Matter is both idea and will. In organic existences, in instinct, in the human mind, on the field of history, the unconscious will acts as though it possessed consciousness, i.e., were aware of the ends and of the infallible means for their realization. Consciousness arises from the temporary diremption of the idea from the active will and the will's opposition to this condition. Because of the wisdom displayed in the action of the Unconscious, this is the best possible world; only this does not prove that the world is good, or that the world would not be better, the latter of which is true. Human life labors under three illusions: (1) that happiness is possible in this life, which came to an end with the Roman Empire; (2) that life will be crowned with happiness in another world, which science is rapidly dissipating; (3) that happy social well-being, although postponed, can at last be realized on earth, a dream which will also ultimately be dissolved. Man's only hope lies in "final redemption from the misery of volition and existence into the painlessness of non-being and non-willing." No mortal may quit the task of life, but each must do his part to hasten the time when in the major portion of the human race the activity of the Unconscious shall be ruled by intelligence, and this stage reached, in the simultaneous action of many persons volition will resolve upon its own non-continuance, and thus idea and will be once more reunited in the Absolute.

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Philosophy Text Collection

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- **Berkeley's "Principles of Human Knowledge" [text|rtf]**
- **Berkeley's "Three Dialogues" [text|rtf]**
- **Copernicus's "Dedication" to *Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies* [text|rtf]**
- **Descartes' "Discourse on the Method" [text|rtf]**
- **Descartes' "Meditations of First Philosophy" [text|rtf]**
- **Epictetus' "Enchiridion" [text|rtf]**
- **Epicurus' "Letter to Menoecius" [text|rtf]**
- **Epicurus' "Principal Doctrines" [text|rtf]**
- **Hume Archives**
- **James's "The Will to Believe" [text|rtf]**
- **Kant's "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics" [text|rtf]**
- **Leibniz's "Monadology" [text|rtf]**
- **Locke's "A Letter Concerning Toleration"**
- **Malebranche's "The Search After Truth" (selections) [text|rtf]**
- **McCosh's "The Scottish Philosophy" [text|rtf]**
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- **Plato's "Crito" [text|rtf]**
- **Lao Tzu's "Tao Te Ching" [text|rtf]**

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Principles of Morals and Legislation

Chapters 1-4

Jeremy Bentham

1781

Chapter I: Of The Principle Of Utility.

I. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The *principle of utility*[2] recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.

But enough of metaphor and declamation: it is not by such means that moral science is to be improved.

II. The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work: it will be proper therefore at the outset to give an explicit and determinate account of what if; meant by it. By the principle[3]of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not, only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.

III. By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the

party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.

IV. The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it has meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious *body*, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its *members*. The interest of the community then is, what? -- the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.

V. It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual.[4] A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be *for* the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.

VI. An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility, or, for shortness sake, to utility, (meaning with respect to the community at large) when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.

VII. A measure of government (which is but a particular kind of action, performed by a particular person or persons) may be said to be conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish it.

VIII. When an action, or in particular a measure of government, is supposed by a man to be conformable to the principle of utility, it may be convenient, for the purposes of discourse, to imagine a kind of law or dictate, called a law or dictate of utility: and to speak of the action in question, as being conformable to such law or dictate.

IX. A man may be said to be a partizan of the principle of utility, when the approbation or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any measure, is determined by and proportioned to the tendency which he conceives it to have to augment or to diminish the happiness of the community: or in other words, to its conformity or unconformity to the laws or dictates of utility.

X. Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that it is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it should be done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong action. When thus interpreted, the words *ought,* and *right* and *wrong*, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none.

XI. Has the rectitude of this principle been ever formally contested? It should seem that it had, by those who have not known what they have been meaning. Is it susceptible of any direct proof? it should seem not: for that which is used to prove every thing else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless.

XII. Not that there is or ever has been that human creature breathing, however stupid or perverse, who has not on many, perhaps on most occasions of his life, deferred to it. By the natural constitution of the human frame, on most occasions of their lives men in general embrace this principle, without thinking of it: if not for the ordering of their own actions, yet for the trying of their own actions, as well as of those of other men. There have been, at the same time, not many, perhaps, even of the most intelligent, who have been disposed to embrace it purely and without reserve. There are even few who have not taken some occasion or other to quarrel with it, either on

account of their not understanding always how to apply it, or on account of some prejudice or other which they were afraid to examine into, or could not bear to part with. For such in the stuff that man is made of: in principle and in practice, in a right track and in a wrong one, the rarest of all human qualities is consistency.

XIII. When a man attempts to combat the principle of utility, it is with reasons drawn, without his being aware of it, from that very principle itself.[5] His arguments, if they prove any thing, prove not that the principle is wrong, but that, according to the applications he supposes to be made of it, it is *misapplied*. Is it possible for a man to move the earth? Yes; but he must first find out another earth to stand upon.

XIV. To disprove the propriety of it by arguments is impossible; but, from the causes that have been mentioned, or from some confused or partial view of it, a man may happen to be disposed not to relish it. Where this is the case, if he thinks the settling of his opinions on such a subject worth the trouble, let him take the following steps, and at length, perhaps, he may come to reconcile himself to it.

1. Let him settle with himself, whether he would wish to discard this principle altogether; if so, let him consider what it is that all his reasonings (in matters of politics especially) can amount to?

2. If he would, let him settle with himself, whether he would judge and act without any principle, or whether there is any other he would judge and act by?

3. If there be, let him examine and satisfy himself whether the principle he thinks he has found is really any separate intelligible principle; or whether it be not a mere principle in words, a kind of phrase, which at bottom expresses neither more nor less than the mere averment of his own unfounded sentiments; that is, what in another person he might be apt to call caprice?

4. If he is inclined to think that his own approbation or disapprobation, annexed to the idea of an act, without any regard to its consequences, is a sufficient foundation for him to judge and act upon, let him ask himself whether his sentiment is to be a standard of right and wrong, with respect to every other man, or whether every man's sentiment has the same privilege of being a standard to itself?

5. In the first case, let him ask himself whether his principle is not despotical, and hostile to all the rest of human race?

6. In the second case, whether it is not anarchial, and whether at this rate there are not as many different standards of right and wrong as there are men? and whether even to the same man, the same thing, which is right to-day, may not (without the least change in its nature) be wrong to-morrow? and whether the same thing is not right and wrong in the same place at the same time? and in either case, whether all argument is not at an end? and whether, when two men have said, 'I like this,' and 'I don't like it,' they can (upon such a principle) have any thing more to say?

7. If he should have said to himself, No: for that the sentiment which he proposes as a standard must be grounded on reflection, let him say on what particulars the reflection is to turn? if on particulars having relation to the utility of the act, then let him say whether this is not deserting his own principle, and borrowing assistance from that very one in opposition to which he sets it up: or if not on those particulars, on what other particulars?

8. If he should be for compounding the matter, and adopting his own principle in part, and the principle of utility in part, let him say how far he will adopt it?

9. When he has settled with himself where he will stop, then let him ask himself how he justifies to

himself the adopting it so far? and why he will not adopt it any farther?

10. Admitting any other principle than the principle of utility to be a right principle, a principle that it is right for a man to pursue; admitting (what is not true) that the word *right* can have a meaning without reference to utility, let him say whether there is any such thing as a *motive* that a man can have to pursue the dictates of it: if there is, let him say what that motive is, and how it is to be distinguished from those which enforce the dictates of utility: if not, then lastly let him say what it is this other principle can be good for?

Chapter II: Of Principles Adverse To That Of Utility.

I. If the principle of utility be a right principle to be governed by, and that in all cases, it follows from what has been just observed, that whatever principle differs from it in any case must necessarily be a wrong one. To prove any other principle, therefore, to be a wrong one, there needs no more than just to show it to be what it is, a principle of which the dictates are in some point or other different from those of the principle of utility: to state it is to confute it.

II. A principle may be different from that of utility in two ways: 1. By being constantly opposed to it: this is the case with a principle which may be termed the principle of *asceticism*.[6] 2. By being sometimes opposed to it, and sometimes not, as it may happen: this is the case with another, which may be termed the principle of *sympathy* and *antipathy*.

III. By the principle of asceticism I mean that principle, which, like the principle of utility, approves or disapproves of any action, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; but in an inverse manner: approving of actions in as far as they tend to diminish his happiness; disapproving of them in as far as they tend to augment it.

IV. It is evident that any one who reprobates any the least particle of pleasure, as such, from whatever source derived, is *pro tanto* a partizan of the principle of asceticism. It is only upon that principle, and not from the principle of utility, that the most abominable pleasure which the vilest of malefactors ever reaped from his crime would be to be reprobated, if it stood alone. The case is, that it never does stand alone; but is necessarily followed by such a quantity of pain (or, what comes to the same thing, such a chance for a certain quantity of pain) that the pleasure in comparison of it, is as nothing: and this is the true and sole, but perfectly sufficient, reason for making it ground for punishment.

V. There are two classes of men of very different complexions, by whom the principle of asceticism appears to have been embraced; the one a set of moralists, the other a set of religionists. Different accordingly have been the motives which appear to have recommended it to the notice of these different parties. Hope, that is the prospect of pleasure, seems to have animated the former: hope, the aliment of philosophic pride: the hope of honour and reputation at the hands of men. Fear, that is the prospect of pain, the latter: fear, the offspring of superstitious fancy: the fear of future punishment at the hands of a splenetic and revengeful Deity. I say in this case fear: for of the invisible future, fear is more powerful than hope. These circumstances characterize the two different parties among the partizans of the principle of asceticism; the parties and their motives different, the principle the same.

VI. The religious party, however, appear to have carried it farther than the philosophical: they have acted more consistently and less wisely. The philosophical party have scarcely gone farther than to reprobate pleasure: the religious party have frequently gone so far as to make it a matter of merit and of duty to court pain. The philosophical party have hardly gone farther than the making pain a matter of indifference. It is no evil, they have said: they have not said, it is a good. They have not so much as reprobated all pleasure in the lump. They have discarded only what they have called the gross; that is, such as are organical, or of which the origin is easily traced up to such as are organical: they have even cherished and magnified the refined. Yet this, however, not under the name of pleasure: to cleanse itself from the sordes of its impure original, it was necessary it should change its name: the honourable, the glorious, the reputable, the becoming, the *honestum*, the *decorum*, it was to be called: in short, any thing but pleasure.

VII. From these two sources have flowed the doctrines from which the sentiments of the bulk of mankind have all along received a tincture of this principle; some from the philosophical, some from the religious, some from both. Men of education more frequently from the philosophical, as more suited to the elevation of their sentiments: the vulgar more frequently from the superstitious, as more suited to the narrowness of their intellect, undilated by knowledge: and to the abjectness of their condition, continually open to the attacks of fear. The tinctures, however, derived from the two sources, would naturally intermingle, insomuch that a man would not always know by which of them he was most influenced: and they would often serve to corroborate and enliven one another. It was this conformity that made a kind of alliance between parties of a complexion otherwise so dissimilar: and disposed them to unite upon various occasions against the common enemy, the partizan of the principle of utility, whom they joined in branding with the odious name of Epicurean.

VIII. The principle of asceticism, however, with whatever warmth it may have been embraced by its partizans as a rule of private conduct, seems not to have been carried to any considerable length, when applied to the business of government. In few instances it has been carried a little way by the philosophical party: witness the Spartan regimen. Though then, perhaps, it maybe considered as having been a measure of security: and an application, though a precipitate and perverse application, of the principle of utility. Scarcely in any instances, to any considerable length, by the religious: for the various monastic orders, and the societies of the Quakers, Dumplers, Moravians, and other religionists, have been free societies, whose regimen no man has been astricted to without the intervention of his own consent. Whatever merit a man may have thought there would be in making himself miserable, no such notion seems ever to have occurred to any of them, that it may be a merit, much less a duty, to make others miserable: although it should seem, that if a certain quantity of misery were a thing so desirable, it would not matter much whether it were brought by each man upon himself, or by one man upon another. It is true, that from the same source from whence, among the religionists, the attachment to the principle of asceticism took its rise, flowed other doctrines and practices, from which misery in abundance was produced in one man by the instrumentality of another: witness the holy wars, and the persecutions for religion. But the passion for producing misery in these cases proceeded upon some special ground: the exercise of it was confined to persons of particular descriptions: they were tormented, not as men, but as heretics and infidels. To have inflicted the same miseries on their fellow believers and fellow-sectaries, would have been as blameable in the eyes even of these religionists, as in those of a partizan o the principle of utility. For a man to give himself a certain number of stripes was indeed meritorious: but to give the same number of stripes to another man,

not consenting, would have been a sin. We read of saints, who for the good of their souls, and the mortification of their bodies, have voluntarily yielded themselves a prey to vermin: but though many persons of this class have wielded the reins of empire, we read of none who have set themselves to work, and made laws on purpose, with a view of stocking the body politic with the breed of highwaymen, housebreakers, or incendiaries. If at any time they have suffered the nation to be preyed upon by swarms of idle pensioners, or useless placemen, it has rather been from negligence and imbecility, than from any settled plan for oppressing and plundering of the people. If at any time they have sapped the sources of national wealth, by cramping commerce, and driving the inhabitants into emigration, it has been with other views, and in pursuit of other ends. If they have declaimed against the pursuit of pleasure, and the use of wealth, they have commonly stopped at declamation: they have not, like Lycurgas, made express ordinances for the purpose of banishing the precious metals. If they have established idleness by a law, it has been not because idleness, the mother of vice and misery, is itself a virtue, but because idleness (say they) is the road to holiness. If under the notion of fasting, they have joined in the plan of confining their subjects to a diet, thought by some to be of the most nourishing and prolific nature, it has been not for the sake of making them tributaries to the nations by whom that diet was to be supplied, but for the sake of, manifesting their own power, and exercising the obedience of the people. If they have established, or Suffered to be established, punishments for the breach of celibacy, they have done no more than comply with the petitions of those deluded rigorists, who, dupes to the ambitious and deep-laid policy of their rulers, first laid themselves under that idle obligation by a vow.

IX. The principle of asceticism seems originally to have bee t the reverie of certain hasty speculators, who having perceived, or fancied, that certain pleasures, when reaped in certain circumstances, have, at the long run, been attended with pains more than equivalent to them, took occasion to quarrel with e thing that offered itself under the name of pleasure. Having then got thus far, and having forgot the point which they set out from, they pushed on, and went so much further as to think it meritorious to fall in love with pain. Even this, we see, is a bottom but the principle of utility misapplied.

X. The principle of utility is capable of being consistently pursued; and it is but tautology to say, that the more consistently it is pursued, the better it must ever be for humankind. The principle of asceticism never was, nor ever can be, consistently pursued by any living creature. Let but one tenth part of the inhabitants of this earth pursue it consistently, and in a day's time they will have turned it into a hell.

XI. Among principles adverse[7] to that of utility, that which at this day seems to have most influence in matters of government, is what may be called the principle of sympathy and antipathy. By the principle of sympathy and antipathy, I mean that principle which approves or disapproves of certain actions, not on account of their tending to augment the happiness, nor yet on account of their tending to diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question, but merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them: holding up that approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic ground. Thus far in the general department of morals: and in the particular department of politics, measuring out the quantum (as well as determining the ground) of punishment, by the degree of the disapprobation.

XII. It is manifest, that this is rather a principle in name than in reality: it is not a positive principle of itself, so much as a term employed to signify the negation of all principle. What one

expects to find in a principle is something that points out some external consideration, as a means of warranting and guiding the internal sentiments of approbation and disapprobation: this expectation is but ill fulfilled by a proposition, which does neither more nor less than hold up each of those sentiments as a ground and standard for itself.

XIII. In looking over the catalogue of human actions (says a partizan of this principle) in order to determine which of them are to be marked with the seal of disapprobation, you need but to take counsel of your own feelings: whatever you find in yourself a propensity to condemn, is wrong for that very reason. For the same reason it is also meet for punishment: in what proportion it is adverse to utility, or whether it be adverse to utility at all, is a matter that makes no difference. In that same *proportion* also is it meet for punishment: if you hate much, punish much: if you hate little, punish little: punish as you hate. I you hate not at all, punish not at all: the fine feelings of the soul are not to be overborne and tyrannized by the harsh and rugged dictates of political utility.

XIV. The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of right and wrong, may all be reduced to the principle of sympathy and antipathy. One account may serve for all of them. They consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself. The phrases different, but the principle the same.[8]

XV. It is manifest, that the dictates of this principle will frequently coincide with those of utility, though perhaps without intending any such thing. Probably more frequently than not: and hence it is that the business of penal justice is carried on upon that tolerable sort of footing upon which we see it carried on in common at this day. For what more natural or more general ground of hatred to a practice can there be, than the mischievousness of such practice? What all men are exposed to suffer by, all men will be disposed to hate. It is far yet, however, from being a constant ground: for when a man suffers, it is not always that he knows what it is he suffers by. A man may suffer grievously, for instance, by a new tax, without being able to trace up the cause of his sufferings to the injustice of some neighbour, who has eluded the payment of an old one.

XVI. The principle of sympathy and antipathy is most apt to err on the side of severity. It is for applying punishment in many cases which deserve none: in many cases which deserve some, it is for applying more than they deserve. There is no incident imaginable, be it ever so trivial, and so remote from mischief, from which this principle may not extract a ground of punishment. Any difference in taste: any difference in opinion: upon one subject as well as upon another. No disagreement so trifling which perseverance and altercation Will not render serious. Each becomes in the other's eyes an enemy, and, if laws permit, a criminal.[9] This is one of the circumstances by which the human race is distinguished (not indeed to its advantage) from the brute creation.

XVII. It is not, however, by any means unexampled for this principle to err on the side of lenity. A near and perceptible mischief moves antipathy. A remote and imperceptible mischief, though not less real, has no effect. Instances in proof of this will occur in numbers in the course of the work. It would be breaking in upon the order of it to give them here.

XVIII. It may be wondered, perhaps, that in all this no mention has been made of the *theological* principle; meaning that principle which professes to recur for the standard of right and wrong to the will of God. But the case is, this is not in fact a distinct principle. It is never any thing more or less than one or other of the three before-mentioned principles presenting itself under another shape. The *will* of God here meant cannot be his revealed will, as contained in the sacred writings: for that is a system which nobody ever thinks of recurring to at this time of day, for the

details of political administration: and even before it can be applied to the details of private conduct, it is universally allowed, by the most eminent divines of all persuasions, to stand in need of pretty ample interpretations; else to what use are the works of those divines? And for the guidance of these interpretations, it is also allowed, that some other standard must be assumed. The will then which is meant on this occasion, is that which may be called the *presumptive* will: that is to say, that which is presumed to be his will on account of the conformity of its dictates to those of some other principle. What then may be this other principle? it must be one or other of the three mentioned above: for there cannot, as we have seen, be any more. It is plain, therefore, that, setting revelation out of the question, no light can ever be thrown upon the standard of right and wrong, by any thing that can be said upon the question, what is God's will. We may be perfectly sure, indeed, that whatever is right is conformable to the will of God: but so far is that from answering the purpose of showing us what is right, that it is necessary to know first whether a thing is right, in order to know from thence whether it be conformable to the will of God .[10]

XIX. There are two things which are very apt to be confounded, but which it imports us carefully to distinguish:-the motive or cause, which, by operating on the mind of an individual, is productive of any act: and the ground or reason which warrants a legislator, or other bystander, in regarding that act with an eye of approbation. When the act happens, in the particular instance in question, to be productive of effects which we approve of, much more if we happen to observe that the same motive may frequently be productive, in other instances, of the like effects, we are apt to transfer our approbation to the motive itself, and to assume, as the just ground for the approbation we bestow on the act, the circumstance of its originating from that motive. It is in this way that the sentiment of antipathy has often been considered as a just ground of action. Antipathy, for instance, in such or such a case, is the cause of an action which is attended with good effects: but this does not make it a right ground of action in that case, any more than in any other. Still farther. Not only the effects are good, but the agent sees beforehand that they will be so. This may make the action indeed a perfectly right action: but it does not make antipathy a right ground of action. For the same sentiment of antipathy, if implicitly deferred to, may be, and very frequently is, productive of the very worst effects. Antipathy, therefore, can never be a right ground of action. No more, therefore, can resentment, which, as will be seen more particularly hereafter, is but a modification of antipathy. The only right ground of action, that can possibly subsist, is, after all, the consideration of utility, which, if it is a right principle of action, and of approbation, in any one case, is so in every other. Other principles in abundance, that is, other motives, may be the reasons why such and such an act has been done: that is, the reasons or causes of its being done: but it is this alone that can be the reason why it might or ought to have been done. Antipathy or resentment requires always to be regulated, to prevent its doing mischief: to be regulated by what? always by the principle of utility. The principle of utility neither requires nor admits of any other regulator than itself.

Chapter III: Of The Four Sanctions Or Sources Of Pain And Pleasure.

I. It has been shown that the happiness of the individuals, of whom-a community is composed, that

is their pleasures and their security, is the end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view: the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be *made* to fashion his behaviour. But whether it be this or any thing else that is to be done, there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be *done* to do it, but either pain or pleasure. Having taken a general view of these two grand objects (viz. pleasure, and what comes to the same thing, immunity from pain) in the character of final causes; it will be necessary to take a view of pleasure and pain itself, in the character of *efficient* causes or means.

II. There are four distinguishable sources from which pleasure and pain are in use to flow: considered separately, they may be termed the *physical*, the *political*, the *moral*, and the *religious*: and inasmuch as the pleasures and pairs belonging to each of them are capable of giving a binding force to any law or rule of conduct, they may all of them be termed *sanctions*.[11]

III If it be in the present life, and from the ordinary course of nature, not purposely modified by the interposition of the will of any human being, nor by any extraordinary interposition of any superior invisible being, that the pleasure or the pain takes place or is expected, it may be said to issue from or to belong to the *physical sanction*.

IV. If at the hands of a *particular* person or set of persons in the community, who under names correspondent to that of *judge*, are chosen for the particular purpose of dispensing it, according to the will of the sovereign or supreme ruling power in the state, it may be said to issue from the *political sanction*.[12]

V. If at the hands of such *chance* persons in the community, as the party in question may happen in the course of his life to have concerns with, according to each man's spontaneous disposition, and not according to any settled or concerted rule, it may be said to issue from the *moral* or *popular sanction*.

VI. If from the immediate hand of a superior invisible being, either in the present life, or in a future, it may be said to issue from the *religious sanctions*.

VII. Pleasures or pains which may be expected to issue from the *physical, political*, or *moral* sanctions, must all of them be expected to be experienced, if ever, in the *present* life: those which may be expected to issue from the *religious* sanction, may be expected to be experienced either in the *present* life or in a *future*.

VIII. Those which can be experienced in the present life, can of course be no others than such as human nature in the course of the present life is susceptible of: and from each of these sources may flow all the pleasures or pains of which, in the course of the present life, human nature is susceptible. With regard to these then (with which alone we have in this place any concern) those of them which belong to any one of those sanctions, differ not ultimately in kind from those which belong to any one of the other three: the only difference there is among them lies in the circumstances that accompany their production. A suffering which befalls a man in the natural and spontaneous course of things, shall be styled, for instance, a *calamity*; in which case, if it be supposed to befall him through any imprudence of his, it may be styled a punishment issuing from the physical sanction. Now the same suffering, if inflicted by the law, will be what is commonly called a *punishment;* if incurred for want of any friendly assistance, which the misconduct, or supposed misconduct, of the sufferer has occasioned to be withholden, a punishment issuing from the *moral* sanction; if through the immediate interposition of a particular providence, a punishment issuing from the religious sanction.[13]

IX. A man's goods, or his person, are consumed by fire. If this happened to him by what is called an accident, it was a calamity: if by reason of his own imprudence (for instance, from his neglecting to put his candle out) it may be styled a punishment of the physical sanction: if it happened to him by the sentence of the political magistrate, a punishment belonging to the political sanction; that is, what is commonly called a punishment: if for want of any assistance which his *neighbour* withheld from him out of some dislike to his moral character, a punishment of the moral sanction: if by an immediate act of *God's* displeasure, manifested on account of some sin committed by him, or through any distraction of mind, occasioned by the dread of such displeasure, a punishment of the *religious* sanction.

X. As to such of the pleasures and pains belonging to the religious sanction, as regard a future life, of what kind these may be we cannot know. These lie not open to our observation. During the present life they are matter only of expectation: and, whether that expectation be derived from natural or revealed religion, the particular kind of pleasure or pain, if it be different from all those which lie open to our observation, is what we can have no idea of. The best ideas we can obtain of such pains and pleasures are altogether unliquidated in point of quality. In what other respects our ideas of them *may* be liquidated will be considered in another place.[14]

XI. Of these four sanctions the physicalis altogether, we may observe, the ground-work of the political and the moral: so is it also of the religious, in as far as the latter bears relation to the present life. It is included in each of those other three. This may operate in any case, (that is, any of the pains or pleasures belonging to it may operate) independently of *them*: none of the mean operate but by means of this. In a word, the powers of nature may operate of themselves; but neither the magistrate, nor men at large, can operate, nor is God in the case in question *supposed* to operate, but through the powers of nature.

XII. For these four objects, which in their nature have so much in common, it seemed of use to find a common name. It seemed of use, in the first place, for the convenience of giving a name to certain pleasures and pains, for which a name equally characteristic could hardly otherwise have been found: in the second place, for the sake of holding up the efficacy of certain moral forces, the influence of which is apt not to be sufficiently attended to. Does the political sanction exert an influence over the conduct of mankind? The moral, the religious sanctions do so too. In every inch of his career are the operations Of the political magistrate liable to be aided or impeded by these two foreign powers: who, one or other of them, or both, are sure to be either his rivals or his allies. Does it happen to him to leave them out in his calculations? he will be sure almost to find himself mistaken in the result. Of an this we shall find abundant proofs in the sequel of this work. It behoves him, therefore, to have them continually before his eyes; and that under such a name as exhibits the relation they bear to his own purposes and designs.

Chapter IV: Value Of A Lot Of Pleasure Or Pain, How To Be Measured.

I. Pleasures then, and the avoidance of pains, are the ends which the legislator has in view: it behoves him therefore to understand their *value*. Pleasures and pains are the *instruments* he has to work with: it behoves him therefore to understand their force, which is again, in other words, their

value.

II. To a person considered *by himself*, the value of a pleasure or pain considered *by itself*, will be greater or less, according to the four following circumstances: [15]

1. Its *intensity*.

2. Its *duration*.

3. Its *certainty* or *uncertainty*.

4. Its *propinquity* or *remoteness*.

III. These are the circumstances which are to be considered in estimating a pleasure or a pain considered each of the m by itself. But when the value of any pleasure or pain is considered for the purpose of estimating the tendency of any *act* by which it is produced, there are two other circumstances to be taken into the account; these are,

5. Its *fecundity*, or the chance it has of being followed by, sensations of the *same* kind: that is, pleasures, if it be a pleasure: pains, if it be a pain.

6. Its *purity*, or the chance it has of *not* being followed by, sensations of the *opposite* kind: that is, pains, if it be a pleasure: pleasures, if it be a pain.

These two last, however, are in strictness scarcely to be deemed properties of the pleasure or the pain itself; they are not, therefore, in strictness to be taken into the account of the value of that pleasure or that pain. They are in strictness to be deemed properties only of the act, or other event, by which such pleasure or pain has been produced; and accordingly are only to be taken into the account of the tendency of such act or such event.

IV. To a *number* of persons, with reference to each of whom the value of a pleasure or a pain is considered, it will be greater or less, according to seven circumstances: to wit, the six preceding ones; *viz*.

1. Its *intensity*.

2. Its *duration*.

3. Its *certainty* or *uncertainty*.

4. Its *propinquity* or *remoteness*.

5. Its *fecundity*.

6. Its *purity*.

And one other; to wit:

7. Its *extent*; that is, the number of persons to whom it extends; or (in other words) who are affected by it.

V. To take an exact account then of the general tendency of any act, by which the interests of a community are affected, proceed as follows. Begin with any one person of those whose interests seem most immediately to be affected by it: and take an account,

1. Of the value of each distinguishable *pleasure* which appears to be produced by it in the *first* instance.

2. Of the value of each *pain* which appears to be produced by it in the *first* instance.

3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be produced by it *after* the first. This constitutes the *fecundity* of the first *pleasure* and the *impurity* of the first pain.

4. Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by it after the first. This constitutes the *fecundity* of the first *pain*, and the *impurity* of the first pleasure.

5. Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the *good* tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that *individual* person; if on the side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole.

6. Take an account of the *number* of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above process with respect to each. *Sum up* the numbers expressive of the degrees of *good* tendency, which the act has, with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is *good* upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is *good* upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is *bad* upon the whole. Take the *balance*; which, if on the side of *pleasure*, will give the general *good tendency* of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals concerned; if on the side of pain, the general *evil tendency*, with respect to the same community.

VI. It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial operation. It may, however, be always kept in view: and as near as the process actually pursued on these occasions approaches to it, so near will such process approach to the character of an exact one.

VII. The same process is alike applicable to pleasure and pain, in whatever shape they appear: and by whatever denomination they are distinguished: to pleasure, whether it be called *good* (which is properly the cause or instrument of pleasure) or *profit* (which is distant pleasure, or the cause or instrument o distant pleasure,) or *convenience*, or *advantage*, *benefit*, *emolument*, *happiness*, and so forth: to pain, whether it be called *evil*, (which corresponds to good) or *mischief*, or *inconvenience*, or *disadvantage*, or *loss*, or *unhappiness*, and so forth.

VIII. Nor is this a novel and unwarranted, any more than it is a useless theory. In all this there is nothing but what the practice of mankind, wheresoever they have a clear view of their own interest, is perfectly conformable to. An article of property, an estate in land, for instance, is valuable, on what account? On account of the pleasures of all kinds which it enables a man to produce, and what comes to the same thing the pains of all kinds which it enables him to avert. But the value of such an article of property is universally understood to rise or fall according to the length or shortness of the time which a man has in it: the certainty or uncertainty of its coming into possession: and the nearness or remoteness of the time at which, if at all, it is to come into possession. As to the *intensity* of the pleasures which a man may derive from it, this is never thought of, because it depends upon the use which each particular person may come to make of it; which cannot be estimated till the particular pleasures he may come to derive from it, or the particular pains he may come to exclude by means of it, are brought to view. For the same reason, neither does he think of the *fecundity* or *purity* of those pleasures.

Thus much for pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, in *general*. We come now to consider the several particular kinds of pain and pleasure.

Notes

[2]Note by the Author, July 1822.

To this denomination has of late been added, or substituted, the *greatest happiness* or *greatest felicity* principle: this for shortness, instead of saying at length *that principle* which states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being the right and proper, and only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human action: of human action in every situation, and in particular in that of a functionary or set of functionaries exercising the powers of Government. The word *utility* does not so clearly point to the ideas of *pleasure* and *pain* as the words *happiness* and *felicity* do: nor does it lead us to the consideration of the *number*, of the interests affected; to the *number*, as being the circumstances, which contributes, in the largest proportion, to the formation of the standard here in question; the *standard of right and wrong*, by which alone the propriety of human conduct, in every situation, can with propriety be tried. This want of a sufficiently manifest connexion between the ideas of *happiness* and *pleasure* on the one hand, and the idea of *utility* on the other, I have every now and then found operating, and with but too much efficiency, as a bar to the acceptance, that might otherwise have been given, to this principle.

[3]The word principle is derived from the Latin principium: which seems to be compounded of the two words, *primus*, first, or chief, and *cipium*, a termination which seems to be derived from *capio*, to take, as in *mancipium, municipium*; to which are analogous, *auceps, forceps*, and others. It is a term of very vague and very extensive signification: it is applied to any thing which is conceived to serve as a foundation or beginning to any series of operations: in some cases, of physical operations; but of mental operations in the present case.

The principle here in question may be taken for an act of the mind; a sentiment; a sentiment of approbation; a sentiment which, when applied to an action, approves of its utility, as that quality of it by which the measure of approbation or disapprobation bestowed upon it ought to be governed.

[4]Interest is one of those words, which not having any superior genus, cannot in the ordinary way be defined.

[5]'The principle of utility (I have heard it said) is a dangerous principle: it is dangerous on certain occasions to consult it.' This is as much as to say, what? that it is not consonant to utility, to consult utility: in short, that it is *not* consulting it, to consult it.

Addition by the Author, July 1822.

Not long after the publication of the Fragment on Government, anno 1776, in which in the character of an all-comprehensive and all-commanding principle, the principle of *utility* was brought to view, one person by whom observation to the above effect was made was *Alexander Wedderburn*, at that time Attorney or Solicitor General, afterwards successively Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and Chancellor of England, under the successive titles of Lord Loughborough and Earl of Rosslyn. It was made -- not indeed in my hearing, but in the hearing of a person by whom it was almost immediately communicated to me. So far from being self-contradictory, it was

a shrewd and perfectly true one. By that distinguished functionary, the state of the Government was thoroughly understood: by the obscure individual, at that time not so much as supposed to be so: his disquisitions had not been as yet applied, with any thing like a comprehensive view, to the field of Constitutional Law, nor therefore to those features of the English Government, by which the greatest happiness of the ruling *one* with or without that of a favoured few, are now so plainly seen to be the only ends to which the course of it has at any time been directed. The *principle of utility* was an appellative, at that time employed -- employed by me, as it had been by others, to designate that which, in a more perspicuous and instructive manner, may, as above, be designated by the name of the *greatest happiness principle*. 'This principle (said Wedderburn) is a dangerous one" Saying so, he said that which, to a certain extent, is strictly true: a principle, which lays down, as the only *right* and justifiable end of Government, the greatest happiness of the greatest number -- how can it be denied to be a dangerous one? dangerous it unquestionably is, to every government which has for its *actual* end or object, the greatest happiness of a certain *one*, with or without the addition of some comparatively small number of others, whom it is matter of pleasure or accommodation to him to admit, each of them, to a share in the concern, on the footing of so many junior partners. *Dangerous* it therefore really was, to the interest -- the sinister interest -- of all those functionaries, himself included, whose interest it was, to maximize delay, vexation, and expense, in judicial and other modes of procedure, for the sake of the profit, extractable out of the expense. In a Government which had for its end in view the greatest happiness of the greatest number, Alexander Wedderburn might have been Attorney general and then Chancellor: but he would not have been Attorney General with L15,000 a year, nor chancellor, with a peerage with a veto upon all justice, with L25,000 a year, and with 500 sinecures at his disposal, under the name of Ecclesiastical Benefices, besides *et caeteras*.

[6]Ascetic is a term that has been sometimes applied to Monks. It comes from a Greek word which signifies exercise. The practices by which Monks sought to distinguish themselves from other men were called their Exercises. These exercises consisted in so many contrivances they had for tormenting themselves. By this they thought to ingratiate themselves with the Deity. For the Deity, said they, is a Being of infinite benevolence: now a Being of the most ordinary benevolence is pleased to see others make themselves as happy as they can: therefore to make ourselves as unhappy as we can is the way to please the Deity. If any body asked them, what motive they could find for doing all this? Oh! said they, you are not to imagine that we are punishing ourselves for nothing: we know very well what we are about. You are to know, that for every grain of pain it costs us now, we are to have a hundred grains of pleasure by and by. The case is, that God loves to see us torment ourselves at present: indeed he has as good as told us so. But this is done only to try us, in order just to see how we should behave: which it is plain he could not know, without making the experiment. Now then, from the satisfaction it gives him to see us make ourselves as unhappy as we can make ourselves in this present life, we have a sure proof of the satisfaction it will give him to see us as happy as he can make us in a life to come.

[7]The following Note was first printed in January 1789.

It ought rather to have been styled, more extensively, the principle of *caprice*. Where it applies to the choice of actions to be marked out for injunction or prohibition, for reward or punishment, (to stand, in a word, as subjects for obligations to be imposed,) it may indeed with propriety be termed, as in the text, the principle of *sympathy* and *antipathy*. But this appellative does not so well apply to it, when occupied in the choice of the *events* which are to serve as sources of *title* with respect to *rights*: where the actions prohibited and allowed the obligations and rights, being

already fixed, the only question is, under what circumstances a man is to be invested with the one or subjected to the other? from what incidents occasion is to be taken to invest a man, or to refuse to invest him, with the one, or to subject him to the other? from what incidents occasion is to be taken to invest a man, or to refuse to invest him, with the one, or to subject him to the other? from what incidents occasion is to be taken to invest a man, or to refuse to invest him, with the one, or to subject him to the other? In this latter case it may more appositely be characterized by the name of the *phantastic principle*. Sympathy and antipathy are affections of the *sensible* faculty. But the choice of *titles* with respect to *rights*, especially with respect to proprietary rights, upon grounds unconnected with utility, has been in many instances the work, not of the affections but of the imagination.

When, in justification of an article of English Common Law, calling uncles to succeed in certain cases in preference to fathers, Lord Coke produced a sort of ponderosity he had discovered in rights, disqualifying them from ascending in a straight line, it was not that he *loved* uncles particularly, or *hated* fathers, but because the analogy, such as it was, was what his imagination presented him with, instead of a reason, and because, to a judgment unobservant of the standard of utility, or unacquainted with the art of consulting it, where affection is out of the way, imagination is the only guide.

When I know not what ingenious grammarian invented the proposition *Delegatus non potest delegare*, to serve as a rule of law, it was not surely that he had any antipathy to delegates of the second order, or that it was any pleasure to him to think of the ruin which, for want of a manager at home, may befall the affairs of a traveller, whom an unforeseen accident has deprived of the object of his choice: it was, that the incongruity, of giving the same law to objects so contrasted as *active* and *passive* are, was not to be surmounted, and that *-atus* chimes, as well as it contrasts, with *-are*.

When that inexorable maxim, (of which the dominion is no more to be defined, than the date of its birth, or the name of its father, is to be found,) was imported from England for the government of Bengal, and the whole thunders of *ex post facto* justice, it blameless magistracy perishing in the unoffended authors of their misery; absorbing the whole imagination, had drowned the cries of humanity along with the dictates of common sense. *Fiat Justitia, ruat caelum*, says another maxim, as full of extravagance as it is of harmony: Go heaven to wreck -- so justice be but done: -- and what is the ruin of kingdoms, in comparison of the wreck of heaven?

So again, when the Prussian chancellor, inspired with the wisdom of I know not what Roman sage, proclaimed in good Latin, for the edification of German ears, *Servitus servitutis non datur*, [Cod. Fred. tom. ii. par. 2. liv. 2 tit. x. sect 6. p. 308.] it was not that he had conceived any aversion to the life-holder who, during the continuance of his term, should wish to gratify a neighbour with a right of way or water, or to the neighbour who should wish to accept of the indulgence; but that, to a jurisprudential ear, *-tus -tutis* sound little less melodious than *-atus -are*. Whether the melody of the maxim was the real reason of the rule, is not left open to dispute: for it is ushered in by the conjunction *quia*, reason's appointed harbinger: *quia servitus servitutis non datur*.

Neither would equal melody have been produced, nor indeed could similar melody have been called for, in either of these instances, by the n they are opposed to general rules, and are absorbed in them, that more specific ones can obtain a separate existence. *Delegatus potest delegare*, and *Servitus servitutis datur* provisions already included under the general adoption of contracts, would have been as unnecessary to the apprehension and the memory, as, in comparison of their

energetic negatives, they are insipid to the ear.

Were the inquiry diligently made, it would be found that the goddess of harmony has exercised more influence, however latent, over the dispensations of Themis, than her most diligent historiographers, or even her most passionate panegyrists, seem to have been aware of. Every one knows how, by the ministry of Orpheus, it was she who first collected the sons of men beneath the shadow of the sceptre: yet, in the midst of continual experience, men seem yet to learn, with what successful diligence she has laboured to guide it in its course. Every one knows, that measured numbers were the language of the infancy of law: none seem to have observed, with what imperious sway they have governed her maturer age. In English jurisprudence in particular, the connexion betwixt law and music, however less perceived than in Spartan legislation, is not perhaps less real nor less close. the music of the Office, though not of the same kind, is not less musical in its kind, than the music of the Theatre; that which hardens the heart, than that which softens it: -- sostenutos as long, cadences as sonorous; and those governed by rules, though not yet promulgated, not less determinate. Search indictments, pleadings, proceedings in chancery, conveyances: whatever trespasses you may find against truth or common sense, you will find none against the laws of harmony. The English Liturgy, justly as this quality has been extolled in that sacred office, possesses not a greater measure of it, than is commonly to be found in an English Act of Parliament. Dignity, simplicity, brevity, precision, intelligibility, possibility of being retained or so much as apprehended. every thing yields to Harmony. Volumes might be filled, shelves loaded, with the sacrifices that are made to this insatiate power. Expletives her ministers in Grecian poetry are not less busy, though in different shape and bulk, in English legislation: in the former, they are monosyllables: in the latter, they are whole lines.

To return to the *principle of sympathy and antipathy*: a term preferred at first, on account of its impartiality, to the *principle of caprice*. The choice of an appellative, in the above respects too narrow, was owing to my not having , at that time, extended my views over the civil branch of law, any otherwise than as I had found it inseparably involved in the penal. But when we come to the former branch, we shall see the *phantastic* principle making at least as great a figure there, as the principle of *sympathy and antipathy* in the latter.

In the days of Lord Coke, the light of utility can scarcely be said to have as yet shone upon the face of Common Law. If a faint ray of it, under the name of the *argumentum ad inconvenienti*, is to be found in a list of about twenty topics exhibited by that great lawyer as the co-ordinate leaders of that all-perfect system, the admission, so circumstanced, is as sure a proof of neglect, as to the statues of Brutus and Cassius, exclusion was a cause of notice. It stands, neither in the front nor in the rear, nor in any post of honour; but huddled in towards the middle, without the smallest mark of preference [Coke, Littleton, II. a.] Nor is this Latin *inconvenience* by any means the same thing with the English one. It stands distinguished from *mischief*: and because by the vulgar it is taken for something less bad, it is given by the learned as something worse. *The law prefers a mischief to an inconvenience,* says an admired maxim, and the more admired, because as nothing is expressed by it, the more is supposed to be understood.

Not that there is any avowed, much less constant opposition, between the prescriptions of utility and the operations of the common law: such constancy we have seen to be too much even for ascetic fervor. [Supra, par. x] From time to time instinct would unavoidably betray them into the paths of reason: instinct which, however it may be cramped, can never be killed by education. the cobwebs spun out of the materials brought together by 'the competition of opposite analogies,' can never have ceased being warped by the silent attraction of the rational principle: though it should

have been, as the needle is by the magnet, without the privity of conscience.

[8]It is curious enough to observe the variety of inventions men have hit upon, and the variety of phrases they have brought forward, in order conceal from the world and, if possible, from themselves this very and therefore very pardonable self-sufficiency.

1. One man says, he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called a *moral sense*: and then goes to work at his ease, and says, such a thing is right, and such a thing is wrong -- why? 'because my moral sense tells me it is.'

2. Another man comes and alters the phrase: leaving out *moral* and putting in common, in the room of it. He then tells you that his common sense teaches him what is right and wrong, as surely as the other's moral sense did: meaning by common sense, a sense of some kind or other, which, he says, is possessed by all mankind: the sense of those, whose sense is not the same as the author's being struck out of the account as not worth taking. This contrivance does better than the other; for a moral sense, being a new thing, a man may feel about him a good while without being able to find it out: but common sense is as old as the creation; and there is no man but would be ashamed to be thought not to have as much of it as his neighbours. It has another great advantage: by appearing to share power, it lessens envy: for when a man gets up upon this ground, in order to anathematize those who differ from him, it is not by a *sic volo sic jubeo*, but by a *velitis jubeatis*.

3. Another man comes, and says, that as to a moral sense indeed, he cannot find that he has any such thing : that however he has an *understanding*, which will do quite as well. This understanding, he says, is the standard of right and wrong: it tells him so and so. All good and wise men understand as he does: if other men's understandings differ in any point from his, so much the worse for them: it is a sure sign they are either defective or corrupt.

4. Another man says, that there is an eternal and immutable Rule of Right: that that rule of right dictates so and so: and then he begins giving you his sentiments upon any thing that comes uppermost: and these sentiments (you are to take for granted) are so many branches of the eternal rule of right.

5. Another man, or perhaps the same man (it's no matter) says, that there are certain practices conformable, and others repugnant, to the fitness of things; and then he tells you, at his leisure, what practices are conformable and what repugnant: just as he happens to like a practice or dislike it.

6. A great multitude of people we continually talking of the Law of Nature; and then they go on giving you their sentiments about what is right and what is wrong: and these sentiments, you are to understand, are so many chapters and sections of the Law of Nature.

7. Instead of the phrase, Law of Nature, you have sometimes, Law of Reason, Right Reason, Natural Justice, Natural Equity, Good Order. Any of them will do equally well. this latter is most used in politics. The three last are much more tolerable than the others, because they do not very explicitly claim to be any thing more than phrases: they insist but feebly upon the being looked upon as so many positive standards of themselves, and seem content to be taken, upon occasion, for phrases expressive of the conformity of the thing in question to the proper standard, whatever that may be. On most occasions, however, it will be better to say *utility: utility* is clearer, as referring more explicitly to pain and pleasure.

8. We have one philosopher, who says, there is no harm in any thing in the world but in telling a lie: and that if, for example, you were to murder your own father, this would not only be a

particular way of saying, he was not your father. Of course, when this philosopher sees any thing that he does not like, he says, it is a particular way of telling a lie. It s saying, that the act ought to be done, or may be done, when, *in truth*, it ought not to be done.

9. The fairest and openest of them all is that sort of man who speaks out and says, I am of the number of the Elect: now God himself takes care to inform the Elect what is right: and that with so good effect, and let them strive ever so, they cannot help not only knowing it but practising it. If therefore a man wants to know what is right and what is wrong, he has nothing to do but to come to me.

It is upon the principle of antipathy that such and such acts are often reprobated on the score of their being *unnatural*: the practice of exposing children, established among the Greeks and Romans, was an unnatural practice. Unnatural, when it means any thing, means unfrequent: and there it means something; although nothing to the present purpose. But here it means no such thing: for the frequency of such acts is perhaps the great complaint. It therefore means nothing; nothing, I mean, which there is in the act itself. All it can serve to express is, the disposition of the person who is talking of it: the disposition he is in to be angry at the thoughts of it. Does it merit his anger? very likely it may: but whether it does or no is a question, which, to be answered rightly, can only be answered upon the principle of utility.

Unnatural, is as good a word as moral sense, or common sense; and would be as good a foundation for a system. such an act is unnatural; that is, repugnant to nature: for I do not like to practise it: and, consequently, do not practise it. It is therefore repugnant to what ought to be the nature of every body else.

The mischief common to all these ways of thinking and arguing (which, in truth, as we have seen, are but one and the same method, couched in different forms of words) is their serving as a cloke, and pretence, and aliment, to despotism: if not a despotism in practice, a despotism however in disposition: which is but too apt, when pretence and power offer, to show itself in practice. The consequence is, that with intentions very commonly of the purest kind, a man becomes a torment either to himself or his fellow-creatures. If he be of the melancholy cast, he sits in silent grief, bewailing their blindness and depravity: if of the irascible, he declaims with fury and virulence against all who differ from him; blowing up the coals of fanaticism, and branding with the charge of corruption and insincerity, every man who does not think, or profess to think, as he does.

If such a man happens to possess the advantages of style, his book may do a considerable deal of mischief before the nothingness of it is understood.

These principles, if such they can be called, it is more frequent to see applied to morals than to politics: but their influence extends itself to both. In politics, as well as morals, a man will be at least equally glad of a pretence for deciding any question in the manner that best pleases him, without the trouble of inquiry. If a man is an infallible judge of what is right and wrong in the actions of private individuals, why not in the measures to be observed by public men in the direction of those actions? accordingly (not to mention other chimeras) I have more than once known to pretended law of nature set up in legislative debates, in opposition to arguments derived from the principle of utility.

'But is it never, then, from any other considerations than those of utility, that we derive our notions of right and wrong?' I do not know: I do not care. Whether a moral sentiment can be originally conceive from any other source than a view of utility, is one question: whether upon examination and reflection it can, in point of fact, be actually persisted in and justified on any other ground, by

a person reflecting within himself, is another: whether in point of right it can properly be justified on any other ground, by a person addressing himself to the community, is a third. The two first are questions of speculation: it matters not, comparatively speaking, how they are decided. The last is a question of practice: the decision of it is of as much importance as that of any can be.

'I feel in myself,' (say you) 'a disposition to approve of such or such an action in a moral view: but this is not owing to any notions I have of its being a useful one to the community. I do not pretend to know whether it be an useful one or not: it may be, for aught I know, a mischievous one." "But is it then,' (say I) 'a mischievous one? examine; and if you can make yourself sensible that it is so, then, if duty means any thing, that is, moral duty, it is your *duty* at least to abstain from it: and more than that, if it is what lies in your power, and can be done without too great a sacrifice, to endeavour to prevent it. It is not your cherishing the notion of it in your bosom, and giving it the name of virtue, that will excuse you.'

'I feel in myself' (say you again) 'a disposition to detest such or such an action in a moral view; but this is not owing to any notions I have of its being a mischievous one to the community. I do not pretend to know whether it be a mischievous one or not: it may be not a mischievous one: it may be, for aught I know, an useful one.' -- 'May it indeed,' (say I) 'an useful one? but let me tell you then, that unless duty, and right and wrong, be just what you please to make them, if it really be not a mischievous one, and any body has a mind to do it, it is no duty of yours, but, on the contrary, it would be very wrong in you, to take upon you to prevent him: detest it within yourself as much as you please; that may be a very good reason (unless it be also a useful one) for your not doing it yourself: but if you go about, by word or deed, to do any thing to hinder him, or make him suffer for it, it is you, and not he, that have done wrong: it is not your setting yourself to blame his conduct, or branding it with the name of vice, that will make him culpable, or you blameless. Therefore, if you can make yourself content that he shall be of one mind, and you of another, about that matter, and so continue, it is well: but if nothing will serve you, but that you and he must needs e of the same mind, I'll tell you what you have to do: it is for you to get the better of your antipathy, not for him to truckle to it.'

[9]King James the First of England had conceived a violent antipathy against Arians: two of whom he burnt (Hume's Hist. Vol. 6). This gratification he procured himself without much difficulty: the notions of the times were favourable to it. He wrote a furious book against Vorstius, for being what was called an Arminian: for Vorstius was at a distance. He also wrote a furious book, called 'A Counterblast to Tobacco,' against the use of that drug, which Sir Walter Raleigh had then lately introduced. Had the notions of the times co-operated with him, he would have burnt the Anbaptist and the smoker of tobacco in the same fire. However he had the satisfaction of putting Raleigh to death afterwards, though for another crime.

Disputes concerning the comparative excellence of France and Italian music have occasioned very serious bickerings at Paris. One of the parties would not have been sorry (say Mr. D'Alembert [Melanges Essai sur la Liberte de la Musique.]) to have brought government into the quarrel. Pretences were sought after and urged. Long before that, a dispute of like nature, and of at least equal warmth, had been kindled at London upon the comparative merits of two composers at London; where riots between the approvers and disapprovers of a new play are, at this day, not unfrequent. The ground of quarrel between the Big-endians and Little-endians in the fable, was not more frivolous than many an one which has laid empires desolate. In Russia, it is said, there was a time when some thousands of persons lost their lives in a quarrel, in which the government

had taken part, about the number of fingers to be used in making the sign of the cross. This was in days of yore: the ministers of Catherine II. are better *instructed* (Instruct. art. 474. 475, 476) than to take any other part in such disputes, than that of preventing the parties concerned from doing one another a mischief.

[10]The principle of theology refers every thing to God's pleasure. But what is God's pleasure? God does not, he confessedly does not now, either speak or write to us. How then are we to know what is his pleasure? By observing what is our own pleasure, and pronouncing it to be his. Accordingly, what is called the pleasure of god, is and must necessarily be (revelation apart) neither more nor less than the good pleasure of the person, whoever he be, who is pronouncing what he believes, or pretends, to be God's pleasure. How know you it to be God's pleasure that such or such an act should be abstained from? whence come you even to suppose as much? "Because the commission of it is attended with a gross and sensual, or at least with a trifling and transient satisfaction;' says the partizan of the principle of asceticism: 'Because I detest the thoughts of it; and I cannot, neither ought I to be called upon to tell why;' says he who proceeds upon the principles of antipathy. In the words of one or other of these must that persons necessarily answer (revelation apart) who professes to take for his standard the will of God.

[11]Sanctio, in Latin, was used to signify the *act of binding*, and, by a common grammatical transition, *any thing which serves to bind a man*: to wit, to the observance of such or such a mode of conduct. According to a Latin grammarian (Servius. See Ainsworth's Dict. ad verbum *Sanctio*.), the import of the word is derived by rather a far-fetched process (such as those commonly are, and in a great measure indeed must be, by which intellectual ideas are derived from sensible ones) from the word *sanguis*, blood: because, among the Romans, with a view to inculcate into the people a persuasion that such or such a mode of conduct would be rendered obligatory upon a man by the force of what I call the religious sanction (that is, that he would be made to suffer by the extraordinary interposition of some superior being, if he failed to observe the mode of conduct in question) certain ceremonies were contrived by the priests: in the course of which ceremonies the blood of victims was made use of.

A Sanction then is a source of obligatory powers or *motives*: that is, of *pains* and *pleasures*; which, according as they are connected with such or such modes of conduct, operate, and are indeed the only things which can operate, as *motives*. See Chap. X. [Motives].

[12]Better termed *popular*, as more directly indicative of its constituent cause; as likewise of its relation to the more common phrase *public opinion*, in French *opinion publique*, the name there given to that tutelary power, of which of late so much is said, and by which so much is done. The latter appellation is however unhappy and inexpressive; since if *opinion* is material, it is only in virtue of the influence it exercises over action, through the medium of the affections and the will.

[13]A suffering conceived to befall a man by the immediate act of God, as above, is often, for shortness' sake, called a *judgment*: instead of saying a suffering inflicted on him in consequence of a special judgment formed, and resolution thereupon taken, by the Deity.

[14]See ch. xii. [Cases unmeet] par. 2. note.

[15]These circumstances have since been dominated *elements* or *dimensions of value* in a pleasure or a pain.

Nor long after the publication of the first edition, the following memoriter verses were framed, in the view of lodging more effectually, in the memory, these points, on which the whole fabric of

morals and legislation may be seen to rest.

> ***Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure* --**
> **Such marks in *pleasures* and in *pains* endure.**
> **Such pleasures seek if *private* be thy end:**
> **If it be *public*, wide let them *extend*.**
> **Such *pains* avoid, whichever by thy view:**

If pains *must* come, let them *extend* to few.

Principles of Morals and Legislation
Chapters 1-4
Jeremy Bentham
1781

* * * *

Chapter I: Of The Principle Of Utility.

I. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, <pain> and <pleasure>. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The <principle of utility>[2] recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.

But enough of metaphor and declamation: it is not by such means that moral science is to be improved.

II. The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work: it will be proper therefore at the outset to give an explicit and determinate account of what if; meant by it. By the principle[3]of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not, only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.

III. By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.

IV. The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it has meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious <body>, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its <members>. The interest of the community then is, what? -- the sum of the interests of the

several members who compose it.

V. It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual.[4] A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be <for> the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.   VI. An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility, or, for shortness sake, to utility, (meaning with respect to the community at large) when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.

VII. A measure of government (which is but a particular kind of action, performed by a particular person or persons) may be said to be conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish it.

VIII. When an action, or in particular a measure of government, is supposed by a man to be conformable to the principle of utility, it may be convenient, for the purposes of discourse, to imagine a kind of law or dictate, called a law or dictate of utility: and to speak of the action in question, as being conformable to such law or dictate.

IX. A man may be said to be a partizan of the principle of utility, when the approbation or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any measure, is determined by and proportioned to the tendency which he conceives it to have to augment or to diminish the happiness of the community: or in other words, to its conformity or unconformity to the laws or dictates of utility.

X. Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that it is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it should be done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong action. When thus interpreted, the words <ought>, and <right> and <wrong>, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none.

XI. Has the rectitude of this principle been ever formally contested? It should seem that it had, by those who have not known what they have been meaning. Is it susceptible of any direct proof? it should seem not: for that which is used to prove every thing else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless.

XII. Not that there is or ever has been that human creature breathing, however stupid or perverse, who has not on many, perhaps on most occasions of his life, deferred to it. By the natural constitution of the human frame, on most occasions of their lives men in general embrace this principle, without thinking of it: if not for the ordering of their own actions, yet for the trying of their own actions, as well as of those of other men. There have been, at the same time, not many, perhaps, even

of the most intelligent, who have been disposed to embrace it purely and without reserve. There are even few who have not taken some occasion or other to quarrel with it, either on account of their not understanding always how to apply it, or on account of some prejudice or other which they were afraid to examine into, or could not bear to part with. For such in the stuff that man is made of: in principle and in practice, in a right track and in a wrong one, the rarest of all human qualities is consistency.

XIII. When a man attempts to combat the principle of utility, it is with reasons drawn, without his being aware of it, from that very principle itself.[5] His arguments, if they prove any thing, prove not that the principle is wrong, but that, according to the applications he supposes to be made of it, it is <misapplied>. Is it possible for a man to move the earth? Yes; but he must first find out another earth to stand upon.

XIV. To disprove the propriety of it by arguments is impossible; but, from the causes that have been mentioned, or from some confused or partial view of it, a man may happen to be disposed not to relish it. Where this is the case, if he thinks the settling of his opinions on such a subject worth the trouble, let him take the following steps, and at length, perhaps, he may come to reconcile himself to it.

1. Let him settle with himself, whether he would wish to discard this principle altogether; if so, let him consider what it is that all his reasonings (in matters of politics especially) can amount to?

2. If he would, let him settle with himself, whether he would judge and act without any principle, or whether there is any other he would judge and act by?

3. If there be, let him examine and satisfy himself whether the principle he thinks he has found is really any separate intelligible principle; or whether it be not a mere principle in words, a kind of phrase, which at bottom expresses neither more nor less than the mere averment of his own unfounded sentiments; that is, what in another person he might be apt to call caprice?

4. If he is inclined to think that his own approbation or disapprobation, annexed to the idea of an act, without any regard to its consequences, is a sufficient foundation for him to judge and act upon, let him ask himself whether his sentiment is to be a standard of right and wrong, with respect to every other man, or whether every man's sentiment has the same privilege of being a standard to itself?

5. In the first case, let him ask himself whether his principle is not despotical, and hostile to all the rest of human race?

6. In the second case, whether it is not anarchial, and whether at this rate there are not as many different standards of right and wrong as there are men? and whether even to the same man, the same thing, which is right to-day, may not (without the least change in its nature) be wrong to-morrow? and whether the same thing is not right and wrong in the same place at the same time? and in either case, whether all argument is not at an end?

and whether, when two men have said, 'I like this,' and 'I don't like it,' they can (upon such a principle) have any thing more to say?

7. If he should have said to himself, No: for that the sentiment which he proposes as a standard must be grounded on reflection, let him say on what particulars the reflection is to turn? if on particulars having relation to the utility of the act, then let him say whether this is not deserting his own principle, and borrowing assistance from that very one in opposition to which he sets it up: or if not on those particulars, on what other particulars?

8. If he should be for compounding the matter, and adopting his own principle in part, and the principle of utility in part, let him say how far he will adopt it?

9. When he has settled with himself where he will stop, then let him ask himself how he justifies to himself the adopting it so far? and why he will not adopt it any farther?

10. Admitting any other principle than the principle of utility to be a right principle, a principle that it is right for a man to pursue; admitting (what is not true) that the word <right> can have a meaning without reference to utility, let him say whether there is any such thing as a <motive> that a man can have to pursue the dictates of it: if there is, let him say what that motive is, and how it is to be distinguished from those which enforce the dictates of utility: if not, then lastly let him say what it is this other principle can be good for?

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Chapter II: Of Principles Adverse To That Of Utility.

I. If the principle of utility be a right principle to be governed by, and that in all cases, it follows from what has been just observed, that whatever principle differs from it in any case must necessarily be a wrong one. To prove any other principle, therefore, to be a wrong one, there needs no more than just to show it to be what it is, a principle of which the dictates are in some point or other different from those of the principle of utility: to state it is to confute it.

II. A principle may be different from that of utility in two ways: 1. By being constantly opposed to it: this is the case with a principle which may be termed the principle of <asceticism>.[6] 2. By being sometimes opposed to it, and sometimes not, as it may happen: this is the case with another, which may be termed the principle of <sympathy> and <antipathy>.

III. By the principle of asceticism I mean that principle, which, like the principle of utility, approves or disapproves of any action, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; but in an inverse manner: approving of actions in as far as they tend to diminish his happiness; disapproving of them in as far as they tend to augment it.

IV. It is evident that any one who reprobates any the least particle of pleasure, as such, from whatever source derived, is <pro tanto> a partizan of the principle of asceticism. It is only upon that principle, and not from the principle of utility, that the most abominable pleasure which the vilest of malefactors ever reaped from his crime would be to be reprobated, if it stood alone. The case is, that it never does stand alone; but is necessarily followed by such a quantity of pain (or, what comes to the same thing, such a chance for a certain quantity of pain) that the pleasure in comparison of it, is as nothing: and this is the true and sole, but perfectly sufficient, reason for making it ground for punishment.

V. There are two classes of men of very different complexions, by whom the principle of asceticism appears to have been embraced; the one a set of moralists, the other a set of religionists. Different accordingly have been the motives which appear to have recommended it to the notice of these different parties. Hope, that is the prospect of pleasure, seems to have animated the former: hope, the aliment of philosophic pride: the hope of honour and reputation at the hands of men. Fear, that is the prospect of pain, the latter: fear, the offspring of superstitious fancy: the fear of future punishment at the hands of a splenetic and revengeful Deity. I say in this case fear: for of the invisible future, fear is more powerful than hope. These circumstances characterize the two different parties among the partizans of the principle of asceticism; the parties and their motives different, the principle the same.

VI. The religious party, however, appear to have carried it farther than the philosophical: they have acted more consistently and less wisely. The philosophical party have scarcely gone farther than to reprobate pleasure: the religious party have frequently gone so far as to make it a matter of merit and of duty to court pain. The philosophical party have hardly gone farther than the making pain a matter of indifference. It is no evil, they have said: they have not said, it is a good. They have not so much as reprobated all pleasure in the lump. They have discarded only what they have called the gross; that is, such as are organical, or of which the origin is easily traced up to such as are organical: they have even cherished and magnified the refined. Yet this, however, not under the name of pleasure: to cleanse itself from the sordes of its impure original, it was necessary it should change its name: the honourable, the glorious, the reputable, the becoming, the <honestum>, the <decorum>, it was to be called: in short, any thing but pleasure.

VII. From these two sources have flowed the doctrines from which the sentiments of the bulk of mankind have all along received a tincture of this principle; some from the philosophical, some from the religious, some from both. Men of education more frequently from the philosophical, as more suited to the elevation of their sentiments: the vulgar more frequently from the superstitious, as more suited to the narrowness of their intellect, undilated by knowledge: and to the abjectness of their condition, continually open to the attacks of fear. The tinctures, however, derived from the two sources, would naturally intermingle, insomuch that a man would not always know by which of them he was most influenced: and they would often serve to corroborate and enliven one another. It was this conformity that

made a kind of alliance between parties of a complexion otherwise so dissimilar: and disposed them to unite upon various occasions against the common enemy, the partizan of the principle of utility, whom they joined in branding with the odious name of Epicurean.

VIII. The principle of asceticism, however, with whatever warmth it may have been embraced by its partizans as a rule of private conduct, seems not to have been carried to any considerable length, when applied to the business of government. In few instances it has been carried a little way by the philosophical party: witness the Spartan regimen. Though then, perhaps, it maybe considered as having been a measure of security: and an application, though a precipitate and perverse application, of the principle of utility. Scarcely in any instances, to any considerable length, by the religious: for the various monastic orders, and the societies of the Quakers, Dumplers, Moravians, and other religionists, have been free societies, whose regimen no man has been astricted to without the intervention of his own consent. Whatever merit a man may have thought there would be in making himself miserable, no such notion seems ever to have occurred to any of them, that it may be a merit, much less a duty, to make others miserable: although it should seem, that if a certain quantity of misery were a thing so desirable, it would not matter much whether it were brought by each man upon himself, or by one man upon another. It is true, that from the same source from whence, among the religionists, the attachment to the principle of asceticism took its rise, flowed other doctrines and practices, from which misery in abundance was produced in one man by the instrumentality of another: witness the holy wars, and the persecutions for religion. But the passion for producing misery in these cases proceeded upon some special ground: the exercise of it was confined to persons of particular descriptions: they were tormented, not as men, but as heretics and infidels. To have inflicted the same miseries on their fellow believers and fellow-sectaries, would have been as blameable in the eyes even of these religionists, as in those of a partizan o the principle of utility. For a man to give himself a certain number of stripes was indeed meritorious: but to give the same number of stripes to another man, not consenting, would have been a sin. We read of saints, who for the good of their souls, and the mortification of their bodies, have voluntarily yielded themselves a prey to vermin: but though many persons of this class have wielded the reins of empire, we read of none who have set themselves to work, and made laws on purpose, with a view of stocking the body politic with the breed of highwaymen, housebreakers, or incendiaries. If at any time they have suffered the nation to be preyed upon by swarms of idle pensioners, or useless placemen, it has rather been from negligence and imbecility, than from any settled plan for oppressing and plundering of the people. If at any time they have sapped the sources of national wealth, by cramping commerce, and driving the inhabitants into emigration, it has been with other views, and in pursuit of other ends. If they have declaimed against the pursuit of pleasure, and the use of wealth, they have commonly stopped at declamation: they have not, like Lycurgas, made express ordinances for the purpose of banishing the precious metals. If they have established idleness by a law, it has been not because idleness, the mother of vice and misery, is itself a virtue, but because idleness (say they) is the road to holiness. If under the notion of fasting, they

have joined in the plan of confining their subjects to a diet, thought by some to be of the most nourishing and prolific nature, it has been not for the sake of making them tributaries to the nations by whom that diet was to be supplied, but for the sake of, manifesting their own power, and exercising the obedience of the people. If they have established, or Suffered to be established, punishments for the breach of celibacy, they have done no more than comply with the petitions of those deluded rigorists, who, dupes to the ambitious and deep-laid policy of their rulers, first laid themselves under that idle obligation by a vow.

IX. The principle of asceticism seems originally to have bee t the reverie of certain hasty speculators, who having perceived, or fancied, that certain pleasures, when reaped in certain circumstances, have, at the long run, been attended with pains more than equivalent to them, took occasion to quarrel with e thing that offered itself under the name of pleasure. Having then got thus far, and having forgot the point which they set out from, they pushed on, and went so much further as to think it meritorious to fall in love with pain. Even this, we see, is a bottom but the principle of utility misapplied.

X. The principle of utility is capable of being consistently pursued; and it is but tautology to say, that the more consistently it is pursued, the better it must ever be for humankind. The principle of asceticism never was, nor ever can be, consistently pursued by any living creature. Let but one tenth part of the inhabitants of this earth pursue it consistently, and in a day's time they will have turned it into a hell.

XI. Among principles adverse[7] to that of utility, that which at this day seems to have most influence in matters of government, is what may be called the principle of sympathy and antipathy. By the principle of sympathy and antipathy, I mean that principle which approves or disapproves of certain actions, not on account of their tending to augment the happiness, nor yet on account of their tending to diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question, but merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them: holding up that approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic ground. Thus far in the general department of morals: and in the particular department of politics, measuring out the quantum (as well as determining the ground) of punishment, by the degree of the disapprobation.

XII. It is manifest, that this is rather a principle in name than in reality: it is not a positive principle of itself, so much as a term employed to signify the negation of all principle. What one expects to find in a principle is something that points out some external consideration, as a means of warranting and guiding the internal sentiments of approbation and disapprobation: this expectation is but ill fulfilled by a proposition, which does neither more nor less than hold up each of those sentiments as a ground and standard for itself.

XIII. In looking over the catalogue of human actions (says a partizan of this principle) in order to determine which of them are to be marked with the seal of disapprobation, you need but to

take counsel of your own feelings: whatever you find in yourself a propensity to condemn, is wrong for that very reason. For the same reason it is also meet for punishment: in what proportion it is adverse to utility, or whether it be adverse to utility at all, is a matter that makes no difference. In that same <proportion> also is it meet for punishment: if you hate much, punish much: if you hate little, punish little: punish as you hate. I you hate not at all, punish not at all: the fine feelings of the soul are not to be overborne and tyrannized by the harsh and rugged dictates of political utility.

XIV. The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of right and wrong, may all be reduced to the principle of sympathy and antipathy. One account may serve for all of them. They consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself. The phrases different, but the principle the same.[8] XV. It is manifest, that the dictates of this principle will frequently coincide with those of utility, though perhaps without intending any such thing. Probably more frequently than not: and hence it is that the business of penal justice is carried on upon that tolerable sort of footing upon which we see it carried on in common at this day. For what more natural or more general ground of hatred to a practice can there be, than the mischievousness of such practice? What all men are exposed to suffer by, all men will be disposed to hate. It is far yet, however, from being a constant ground: for when a man suffers, it is not always that he knows what it is he suffers by. A man may suffer grievously, for instance, by a new tax, without being able to trace up the cause of his sufferings to the injustice of some neighbour, who has eluded the payment of an old one.

XVI. The principle of sympathy and antipathy is most apt to err on the side of severity. It is for applying punishment in many cases which deserve none: in many cases which deserve some, it is for applying more than they deserve. There is no incident imaginable, be it ever so trivial, and so remote from mischief, from which this principle may not extract a ground of punishment. Any difference in taste: any difference in opinion: upon one subject as well as upon another. No disagreement so trifling which perseverance and altercation Will not render serious. Each becomes in the other's eyes an enemy, and, if laws permit, a criminal.[9] This is one of the circumstances by which the human race is distinguished (not indeed to its advantage) from the brute creation. XVII. It is not, however, by any means unexampled for this principle to err on the side of lenity. A near and perceptible mischief moves antipathy. A remote and imperceptible mischief, though not less real, has no effect. Instances in proof of this will occur in numbers in the course of the work. It would be breaking in upon the order of it to give them here.

XVIII. It may be wondered, perhaps, that in all this no mention has been made of the <theological> principle; meaning that principle which professes to recur for the standard of right and wrong to the will of God. But the case is, this is not in fact a distinct principle. It is never any thing more or less than one or other of the three before-mentioned principles presenting itself under another shape. The <will> of God here

meant cannot be his revealed will, as contained in the sacred writings: for that is a system which nobody ever thinks of recurring to at this time of day, for the details of political administration: and even before it can be applied to the details of private conduct, it is universally allowed, by the most eminent divines of all persuasions, to stand in need of pretty ample interpretations; else to what use are the works of those divines? And for the guidance of these interpretations, it is also allowed, that some other standard must be assumed. The will then which is meant on this occasion, is that which may be called the <presumptive> will: that is to say, that which is presumed to be his will on account of the conformity of its dictates to those of some other principle. What then may be this other principle? it must be one or other of the three mentioned above: for there cannot, as we have seen, be any more. It is plain, therefore, that, setting revelation out of the question, no light can ever be thrown upon the standard of right and wrong, by any thing that can be said upon the question, what is God's will. We may be perfectly sure, indeed, that whatever is right is conformable to the will of God: but so far is that from answering the purpose of showing us what is right, that it is necessary to know first whether a thing is right, in order to know from thence whether it be conformable to the will of God .[10]   XIX. There are two things which are very apt to be confounded, but which it imports us carefully to distinguish:-the motive or cause, which, by operating on the mind of an individual, is productive of any act: and the ground or reason which warrants a legislator, or other bystander, in regarding that act with an eye of approbation. When the act happens, in the particular instance in question, to be productive of effects which we approve of, much more if we happen to observe that the same motive may frequently be productive, in other instances, of the like effects, we are apt to transfer our approbation to the motive itself, and to assume, as the just ground for the approbation we bestow on the act, the circumstance of its originating from that motive. It is in this way that the sentiment of antipathy has often been considered as a just ground of action. Antipathy, for instance, in such or such a case, is the cause of an action which is attended with good effects: but this does not make it a right ground of action in that case, any more than in any other. Still farther. Not only the effects are good, but the agent sees beforehand that they will be so. This may make the action indeed a perfectly right action: but it does not make antipathy a right ground of action. For the same sentiment of antipathy, if implicitly deferred to, may be, and very frequently is, productive of the very worst effects. Antipathy, therefore, can never be a right ground of action. No more, therefore, can resentment, which, as will be seen more particularly hereafter, is but a modification of antipathy. The only right ground of action, that can possibly subsist, is, after all, the consideration of utility, which, if it is a right principle of action, and of approbation, in any one case, is so in every other. Other principles in abundance, that is, other motives, may be the reasons why such and such an act has been done: that is, the reasons or causes of its being done: but it is this alone that can be the reason why it might or ought to have been done. Antipathy or resentment requires always to be regulated, to prevent its doing mischief: to be regulated by what? always by the principle of utility. The principle of utility neither requires nor admits of any other regulator than itself.

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Chapter III: Of The Four Sanctions Or Sources Of Pain And Pleasure.

I. It has been shown that the happiness of the individuals, of whom-a community is composed, that is their pleasures and their security, is the end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view: the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be <made> to fashion his behaviour. But whether it be this or any thing else that is to be done, there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be <done> to do it, but either pain or pleasure. Having taken a general view of these two grand objects (viz. pleasure, and what comes to the same thing, immunity from pain) in the character of final causes; it will be necessary to take a view of pleasure and pain itself, in the character of <efficient> causes or means.

II. There are four distinguishable sources from which pleasure and pain are in use to flow: considered separately, they may be termed the <physical>, the <political>, the <moral>, and the <religious>: and inasmuch as the pleasures and pairs belonging to each of them are capable of giving a binding force to any law or rule of conduct, they may all of them be termed <sanctions>.[11] III If it be in the present life, and from the ordinary course of nature, not purposely modified by the interposition of the will of any human being, nor by any extraordinary interposition of any superior invisible being, that the pleasure or the pain takes place or is expected, it may be said to issue from or to belong to the <physical sanction>. IV. If at the hands of a <particular> person or set of persons in the community, who under names correspondent to that of <judge>, are chosen for the particular purpose of dispensing it, according to the will of the sovereign or supreme ruling power in the state, it may be said to issue from the <political sanction>.[12] V. If at the hands of such <chance> persons in the community, as the party in question may happen in the course of his life to have concerns with, according to each man's spontaneous disposition, and not according to any settled or concerted rule, it may be said to issue from the <moral> or <popular sanction>.

VI. If from the immediate hand of a superior invisible being, either in the present life, or in a future, it may be said to issue from the <religious sanctions>.

VII. Pleasures or pains which may be expected to issue from the <physical>, <political>, or <moral> sanctions, must all of them be expected to be experienced, if ever, in the <present> life: those which may be expected to issue from the <religious> sanction, may be expected to be experienced either in the <present> life or in a <future>.

VIII. Those which can be experienced in the present life, can of course be no others than such as human nature in the course of the present life is susceptible of: and from each of these sources may flow all the pleasures or pains of which, in the course of the present life, human nature is susceptible.

With regard to these then (with which alone we have in this place any concern) those of them which belong to any one of those sanctions, differ not ultimately in kind from those which belong to any one of the other three: the only difference there is among them lies in the circumstances that accompany their production. A suffering which befalls a man in the natural and spontaneous course of things, shall be styled, for instance, a <calamity>; in which case, if it be supposed to befall him through any imprudence of his, it may be styled a punishment issuing from the physical sanction. Now the same suffering, if inflicted by the law, will be what is commonly called a <punishment>; if incurred for want of any friendly assistance, which the misconduct, or supposed misconduct, of the sufferer has occasioned to be withholden, a punishment issuing from the <moral> sanction; if through the immediate interposition of a particular providence, a punishment issuing from the religious sanction.[13] IX. A man's goods, or his person, are consumed by fire. If this happened to him by what is called an accident, it was a calamity: if by reason of his own imprudence (for instance, from his neglecting to put his candle out) it may be styled a punishment of the physical sanction: if it happened to him by the sentence of the political magistrate, a punishment belonging to the political sanction; that is, what is commonly called a punishment: if for want of any assistance which his <neighbour> withheld from him out of some dislike to his moral character, a punishment of the moral sanction: if by an immediate act of <God's> displeasure, manifested on account of some sin committed by him, or through any distraction of mind, occasioned by the dread of such displeasure, a punishment of the <religious> sanction.

X. As to such of the pleasures and pains belonging to the religious sanction, as regard a future life, of what kind these may be we cannot know. These lie not open to our observation. During the present life they are matter only of expectation: and, whether that expectation be derived from natural or revealed religion, the particular kind of pleasure or pain, if it be different from all those which lie open to our observation, is what we can have no idea of. The best ideas we can obtain of such pains and pleasures are altogether unliquidated in point of quality. In what other respects our ideas of them <may> be liquidated will be considered in another place.[14] XI. Of these four sanctions the physicalis altogether, we may observe, the ground-work of the political and the moral: so is it also of the religious, in as far as the latter bears relation to the present life. It is included in each of those other three. This may operate in any case, (that is, any of the pains or pleasures belonging to it may operate) independently of <them>: none of the mean operate but by means of this. In a word, the powers of nature may operate of themselves; but neither the magistrate, nor men at large, can operate, nor is God in the case in question <supposed> to operate, but through the powers of nature.

XII. For these four objects, which in their nature have so much in common, it seemed of use to find a common name. It seemed of use, in the first place, for the convenience of giving a name to certain pleasures and pains, for which a name equally characteristic could hardly otherwise have been found: in the second place, for the sake of holding up the efficacy of certain moral forces, the influence of which is apt not to be sufficiently attended to. Does the political sanction exert an

influence over the conduct of mankind? The moral, the religious sanctions do so too. In every inch of his career are the operations Of the political magistrate liable to be aided or impeded by these two foreign powers: who, one or other of them, or both, are sure to be either his rivals or his allies. Does it happen to him to leave them out in his calculations? he will be sure almost to find himself mistaken in the result. Of an this we shall find abundant proofs in the sequel of this work. It behoves him, therefore, to have them continually before his eyes; and that under such a name as exhibits the relation they bear to his own purposes and designs.

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Chapter IV: Value Of A Lot Of Pleasure Or Pain, How To Be Measured.

I. Pleasures then, and the avoidance of pains, are the ends which the legislator has in view: it behoves him therefore to understand their <value>. Pleasures and pains are the <instruments> he has to work with: it behoves him therefore to understand their force, which is again, in other words, their value.

II. To a person considered <by himself>, the value of a pleasure or pain considered <by itself>, will be greater or less, according to the four following circumstances: [15] 1. Its <intensity>. 2. Its <duration>. 3. Its <certainty> or <uncertainty>. 4. Its <propinquity> or <remoteness>. III. These are the circumstances which are to be considered in estimating a pleasure or a pain considered each of the m by itself. But when the value of any pleasure or pain is considered for the purpose of estimating the tendency of any <act> by which it is produced, there are two other circumstances to be taken into the account; these are,

5. Its <fecundity>, or the chance it has of being followed by, sensations of the <same> kind: that is, pleasures, if it be a pleasure: pains, if it be a pain.

6. Its <purity>, or the chance it has of <not> being followed by, sensations of the <opposite> kind: that is, pains, if it be a pleasure: pleasures, if it be a pain.

These two last, however, are in strictness scarcely to be deemed properties of the pleasure or the pain itself; they are not, therefore, in strictness to be taken into the account of the value of that pleasure or that pain. They are in strictness to be deemed properties only of the act, or other event, by which such pleasure or pain has been produced; and accordingly are only to be taken into the account of the tendency of such act or such event.

IV. To a <number> of persons, with reference to each of whom the value of a pleasure or a pain is considered, it will be greater or less, according to seven circumstances: to wit, the six preceding ones; <viz>.

1. Its <intensity>.

2. Its <duration>.

3. Its <certainty> or <uncertainty>.

4. Its <propinquity> or <remoteness>.

5. Its <fecundity>.

6. Its <purity>.

And one other; to wit:

7. Its <extent>; that is, the number of persons to whom it extends; or (in other words) who are affected by it.

V. To take an exact account then of the general tendency of any act, by which the interests of a community are affected, proceed as follows. Begin with any one person of those whose interests seem most immediately to be affected by it: and take an account,

1. Of the value of each distinguishable <pleasure> which appears to be produced by it in the <first> instance.

2. Of the value of each <pain> which appears to be produced by it in the <first> instance.

3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be produced by it <after> the first. This constitutes the <fecundity> of the first <pleasure> and the <impurity> of the first pain.

4. Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by it after the first. This constitutes the <fecundity> of the first <pain>, and the <impurity> of the first pleasure.

5. Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the <good> tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that <individual> person; if on the side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole.

6. Take an account of the <number> of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above process with respect to each. <Sum up> the numbers expressive of the degrees of <good> tendency, which the act has, with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is <good> upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is <good> upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is <bad> upon the whole. Take the <balance>; which, if on the side of <pleasure>, will give the general <good tendency> of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals concerned; if on the side of pain, the general <evil tendency>, with respect to the same community.

VI. It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial operation. It may, however, be always kept in view: and as near as the process actually pursued on these occasions approaches to it, so near will such process

approach to the character of an exact one.

VII. The same process is alike applicable to pleasure and pain, in whatever shape they appear: and by whatever denomination they are distinguished: to pleasure, whether it be called <good> (which is properly the cause or instrument of pleasure) or <profit> (which is distant pleasure, or the cause or instrument o distant pleasure,) or <convenience>, or <advantage>, <benefit>, <emolument>, <happiness>, and so forth: to pain, whether it be called <evil>, (which corresponds to good) or <mischief>, or <inconvenience>, or <disadvantage>, or <loss>, or <unhappiness>, and so forth.

VIII. Nor is this a novel and unwarranted, any more than it is a useless theory. In all this there is nothing but what the practice of mankind, wheresoever they have a clear view of their own interest, is perfectly conformable to. An article of property, an estate in land, for instance, is valuable, on what account? On account of the pleasures of all kinds which it enables a man to produce, and what comes to the same thing the pains of all kinds which it enables him to avert. But the value of such an article of property is universally understood to rise or fall according to the length or shortness of the time which a man has in it: the certainty or uncertainty of its coming into possession: and the nearness or remoteness of the time at which, if at all, it is to come into possession. As to the <intensity> of the pleasures which a man may derive from it, this is never thought of, because it depends upon the use which each particular person may come to make of it; which cannot be estimated till the particular pleasures he may come to derive from it, or the particular pains he may come to exclude by means of it, are brought to view. For the same reason, neither does he think of the <fecundity> or <purity> of those pleasures.

Thus much for pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, in <general>. We come now to consider the several particular kinds of pain and pleasure.

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Notes

[2]Note by the Author, July 1822. To this denomination has of late been added, or substituted, the <greatest happiness> or <greatest felicity> principle: this for shortness, instead of saying at length <that principle> which states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being the right and proper, and only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human action: of human action in every

situation, and in particular in that of a functionary or set of functionaries exercising the powers of Government. The word <utility> does not so clearly point to the ideas of <pleasure> and <pain> as the words <happiness> and <felicity> do: nor does it lead us to the consideration of the <number>, of the interests affected; to the <number>, as being the circumstances, which contributes, in the largest proportion, to the formation of the standard here in question; the <standard of right and wrong>, by which alone the propriety of human conduct, in every situation, can with propriety be tried. This want of a sufficiently manifest connexion between the ideas of <happiness> and <pleasure> on the one hand, and the idea of <utility> on the other, I have every now and then found operating, and with but too much efficiency, as a bar to the acceptance, that might otherwise have been given, to this principle.

[3]The word principle is derived from the Latin principium: which seems to be compounded of the two words, <primus>, first, or chief, and <cipium>, a termination which seems to be derived from <capio>, to take, as in <mancipium, municipium>; to which are analogous, <auceps, forceps>, and others. It is a term of very vague and very extensive signification: it is applied to any thing which is conceived to serve as a foundation or beginning to any series of operations: in some cases, of physical operations; but of mental operations in the present case.

The principle here in question may be taken for an act of the mind; a sentiment; a sentiment of approbation; a sentiment which, when applied to an action, approves of its utility, as that quality of it by which the measure of approbation or disapprobation bestowed upon it ought to be governed.

[4]Interest is one of those words, which not having any superior genus, cannot in the ordinary way be defined. [5]'The principle of utility (I have heard it said) is a dangerous principle: it is dangerous on certain occasions to consult it.' This is as much as to say, what? that it is not consonant to utility, to consult utility: in short, that it is <not> consulting it, to consult it.

Addition by the Author, July 1822.

Not long after the publication of the Fragment on Government, anno 1776, in which in the character of an all-comprehensive and all-commanding principle, the principle of <utility> was brought to view, one person by whom observation to the above effect was made was <Alexander Wedderburn>, at that time Attorney or Solicitor General, afterwards successively Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and Chancellor of England, under the successive titles of Lord Loughborough and Earl of Rosslyn. It was made -- not indeed in my hearing, but in the hearing of a person by whom it was almost immediately communicated to me. So far from being self-contradictory, it was a shrewd and perfectly true one. By that distinguished functionary, the state of the Government was thoroughly understood: by the obscure individual, at that time not so much as supposed to be so: his disquisitions had not been as yet applied, with any thing like a comprehensive view, to the field of Constitutional Law, nor therefore to those features of the English Government, by which the greatest happiness of the ruling <one> with or without that of a favoured few, are now so plainly seen to be the only ends to which the

course of it has at any time been directed. The <principle of utility> was an appellative, at that time employed -- employed by me, as it had been by others, to designate that which, in a more perspicuous and instructive manner, may, as above, be designated by the name of the <greatest happiness principle>. 'This principle (said Wedderburn) is a dangerous one" Saying so, he said that which, to a certain extent, is strictly true: a principle, which lays down, as the only <right> and justifiable end of Government, the greatest happiness of the greatest number -- how can it be denied to be a dangerous one? dangerous it unquestionably is, to every government which has for its <actual> end or object, the greatest happiness of a certain <one>, with or without the addition of some comparatively small number of others, whom it is matter of pleasure or accommodation to him to admit, each of them, to a share in the concern, on the footing of so many junior partners. <Dangerous> it therefore really was, to the interest -- the sinister interest -- of all those functionaries, himself included, whose interest it was, to maximize delay, vexation, and expense, in judicial and other modes of procedure, for the sake of the profit, extractable out of the expense. In a Government which had for its end in view the greatest happiness of the greatest number, Alexander Wedderburn might have been Attorney general and then Chancellor: but he would not have been Attorney General with L15,000 a year, nor chancellor, with a peerage with a veto upon all justice, with L25,000 a year, and with 500 sinecures at his disposal, under the name of Ecclesiastical Benefices, besides <et caeteras>.

[6]Ascetic is a term that has been sometimes applied to Monks. It comes from a Greek word which signifies exercise. The practices by which Monks sought to distinguish themselves from other men were called their Exercises. These exercises consisted in so many contrivances they had for tormenting themselves. By this they thought to ingratiate themselves with the Deity. For the Deity, said they, is a Being of infinite benevolence: now a Being of the most ordinary benevolence is pleased to see others make themselves as happy as they can: therefore to make ourselves as unhappy as we can is the way to please the Deity. If any body asked them, what motive they could find for doing all this? Oh! said they, you are not to imagine that we are punishing ourselves for nothing: we know very well what we are about. You are to know, that for every grain of pain it costs us now, we are to have a hundred grains of pleasure by and by. The case is, that God loves to see us torment ourselves at present: indeed he has as good as told us so. But this is done only to try us, in order just to see how we should behave: which it is plain he could not know, without making the experiment. Now then, from the satisfaction it gives him to see us make ourselves as unhappy as we can make ourselves in this present life, we have a sure proof of the satisfaction it will give him to see us as happy as he can make us in a life to come.

[7]The following Note was first printed in January 1789.

It ought rather to have been styled, more extensively, the principle of <caprice>. Where it applies to the choice of actions to be marked out for injunction or prohibition, for reward or punishment, (to stand, in a word, as subjects for obligations to be imposed,) it may indeed with propriety be termed, as in the text, the principle of <sympathy> and <antipathy>. But this appellative does not so well apply to it,

when occupied in the choice of the <events> which are to serve as sources of <title> with respect to <rights>: where the actions prohibited and allowed the obligations and rights, being already fixed, the only question is, under what circumstances a man is to be invested with the one or subjected to the other? from what incidents occasion is to be taken to invest a man, or to refuse to invest him, with the one, or to subject him to the other? from what incidents occasion is to be taken to invest a man, or to refuse to invest him, with the one, or to subject him to the other? from what incidents occasion is to be taken to invest a man, or to refuse to invest him, with the one, or to subject him to the other? In this latter case it may more appositely be characterized by the name of the <phantastic principle>. Sympathy and antipathy are affections of the <sensible> faculty. But the choice of <titles> with respect to <rights>, especially with respect to proprietary rights, upon grounds unconnected with utility, has been in many instances the work, not of the affections but of the imagination.

When, in justification of an article of English Common Law, calling uncles to succeed in certain cases in preference to fathers, Lord Coke produced a sort of ponderosity he had discovered in rights, disqualifying them from ascending in a straight line, it was not that he <loved> uncles particularly, or <hated> fathers, but because the analogy, such as it was, was what his imagination presented him with, instead of a reason, and because, to a judgment unobservant of the standard of utility, or unacquainted with the art of consulting it, where affection is out of the way, imagination is the only guide.

When I know not what ingenious grammarian invented the proposition <Delegatus non potest delegare>, to serve as a rule of law, it was not surely that he had any antipathy to delegates of the second order, or that it was any pleasure to him to think of the ruin which, for want of a manager at home, may befall the affairs of a traveller, whom an unforeseen accident has deprived of the object of his choice: it was, that the incongruity, of giving the same law to objects so contrasted as <active> and <passive> are, was not to be surmounted, and that <-atus> chimes, as well as it contrasts, with <-are>.

When that inexorable maxim, (of which the dominion is no more to be defined, than the date of its birth, or the name of its father, is to be found,) was imported from England for the government of Bengal, and the whole thunders of <ex post facto> justice, it blameless magistracy perishing in the unoffended authors of their misery; absorbing the whole imagination, had drowned the cries of humanity along with the dictates of common sense. <Fiat Justitia, ruat caelum>, says another maxim, as full of extravagance as it is of harmony: Go heaven to wreck -- so justice be but done: -- and what is the ruin of kingdoms, in comparison of the wreck of heaven?

So again, when the Prussian chancellor, inspired with the wisdom of I know not what Roman sage, proclaimed in good Latin, for the edification of German ears, <Servitus servitutis non datur>, [Cod. Fred. tom. ii. par. 2. liv. 2 tit. x. sect 6. p. 308.] it was not that he had conceived any aversion to the life-holder who, during the continuance of his term, should wish to gratify a neighbour with a right of way or water, or to the neighbour who should wish to accept of the indulgence; but that,

to a jurisprudential ear, <-tus -tutis> sound little less melodious than <-atus -are>. Whether the melody of the maxim was the real reason of the rule, is not left open to dispute: for it is ushered in by the conjunction <quia>, reason's appointed harbinger: <quia servitus servitutis non datur>.

Neither would equal melody have been produced, nor indeed could similar melody have been called for, in either of these instances, by the n they are opposed to general rules, and are absorbed in them, that more specific ones can obtain a separate existence. <Delegatus potest delegare>, and <Servitus servitutis datur> provisions already included under the general adoption of contracts, would have been as unnecessary to the apprehension and the memory, as, in comparison of their energetic negatives, they are insipid to the ear.

Were the inquiry diligently made, it would be found that the goddess of harmony has exercised more influence, however latent, over the dispensations of Themis, than her most diligent historiographers, or even her most passionate panegyrists, seem to have been aware of. Every one knows how, by the ministry of Orpheus, it was she who first collected the sons of men beneath the shadow of the sceptre: yet, in the midst of continual experience, men seem yet to learn, with what successful diligence she has laboured to guide it in its course. Every one knows, that measured numbers were the language of the infancy of law: none seem to have observed, with what imperious sway they have governed her maturer age. In English jurisprudence in particular, the connexion betwixt law and music, however less perceived than in Spartan legislation, is not perhaps less real nor less close. the music of the Office, though not of the same kind, is not less musical in its kind, than the music of the Theatre; that which hardens the heart, than that which softens it: -- sostenutos as long, cadences as sonorous; and those governed by rules, though not yet promulgated, not less determinate. Search indictments, pleadings, proceedings in chancery, conveyances: whatever trespasses you may find against truth or common sense, you will find none against the laws of harmony. The English Liturgy, justly as this quality has been extolled in that sacred office, possesses not a greater measure of it, than is commonly to be found in an English Act of Parliament. Dignity, simplicity, brevity, precision, intelligibility, possibility of being retained or so much as apprehended. every thing yields to Harmony. Volumes might be filled, shelves loaded, with the sacrifices that are made to this insatiate power. Expletives her ministers in Grecian poetry are not less busy, though in different shape and bulk, in English legislation: in the former, they are monosyllables: in the latter, they are whole lines.

To return to the <principle of sympathy and antipathy>: a term preferred at first, on account of its impartiality, to the <principle of caprice>. The choice of an appellative, in the above respects too narrow, was owing to my not having , at that time, extended my views over the civil branch of law, any otherwise than as I had found it inseparably involved in the penal. But when we come to the former branch, we shall see the <phantastic> principle making at least as great a figure there, as the principle of <sympathy and antipathy> in the latter.

In the days of Lord Coke, the light of utility can scarcely be said to have as yet shone upon the face of Common Law. If a

faint ray of it, under the name of the <argumentum ad inconvenienti>, is to be found in a list of about twenty topics exhibited by that great lawyer as the co-ordinate leaders of that all-perfect system, the admission, so circumstanced, is as sure a proof of neglect, as to the statues of Brutus and Cassius, exclusion was a cause of notice. It stands, neither in the front nor in the rear, nor in any post of honour; but huddled in towards the middle, without the smallest mark of preference [Coke, Littleton, II. a.] Nor is this Latin <inconvenience> by any means the same thing with the English one. It stands distinguished from <mischief>: and because by the vulgar it is taken for something less bad, it is given by the learned as something worse. <The law prefers a mischief to an inconvenience>, says an admired maxim, and the more admired, because as nothing is expressed by it, the more is supposed to be understood.

Not that there is any avowed, much less constant opposition, between the prescriptions of utility and the operations of the common law: such constancy we have seen to be too much even for ascetic fervor. [Supra, par. x] From time to time instinct would unavoidably betray them into the paths of reason: instinct which, however it may be cramped, can never be killed by education. the cobwebs spun out of the materials brought together by 'the competition of opposite analogies,' can never have ceased being warped by the silent attraction of the rational principle: though it should have been, as the needle is by the magnet, without the privity of conscience.

[8]It is curious enough to observe the variety of inventions men have hit upon, and the variety of phrases they have brought forward, in order conceal from the world and, if possible, from themselves this very and therefore very pardonable self-sufficiency.

1. One man says, he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called a <moral sense>: and then goes to work at his ease, and says, such a thing is right, and such a thing is wrong -- why? 'because my moral sense tells me it is.'

2. Another man comes and alters the phrase: leaving out <moral> and putting in common, in the room of it. He then tells you that his common sense teaches him what is right and wrong, as surely as the other's moral sense did: meaning by common sense, a sense of some kind or other, which, he says, is possessed by all mankind: the sense of those, whose sense is not the same as the author's being struck out of the account as not worth taking. This contrivance does better than the other; for a moral sense, being a new thing, a man may feel about him a good while without being able to find it out: but common sense is as old as the creation; and there is no man but would be ashamed to be thought not to have as much of it as his neighbours. It has another great advantage: by appearing to share power, it lessens envy: for when a man gets up upon this ground, in order to anathematize those who differ from him, it is not by a <sic volo sic jubeo>, but by a <velitis jubeatis>.

3. Another man comes, and says, that as to a moral sense indeed, he cannot find that he has any such thing : that however he has an <understanding>, which will do quite as well. This

understanding, he says, is the standard of right and wrong: it tells him so and so. All good and wise men understand as he does: if other men's understandings differ in any point from his, so much the worse for them: it is a sure sign they are either defective or corrupt.

4. Another man says, that there is an eternal and immutable Rule of Right: that that rule of right dictates so and so: and then he begins giving you his sentiments upon any thing that comes uppermost: and these sentiments (you are to take for granted) are so many branches of the eternal rule of right.

5. Another man, or perhaps the same man (it's no matter) says, that there are certain practices conformable, and others repugnant, to the fitness of things; and then he tells you, at his leisure, what practices are conformable and what repugnant: just as he happens to like a practice or dislike it.

6. A great multitude of people we continually talking of the Law of Nature; and then they go on giving you their sentiments about what is right and what is wrong: and these sentiments, you are to understand, are so many chapters and sections of the Law of Nature.

7. Instead of the phrase, Law of Nature, you have sometimes, Law of Reason, Right Reason, Natural Justice, Natural Equity, Good Order. Any of them will do equally well. this latter is most used in politics. The three last are much more tolerable than the others, because they do not very explicitly claim to be any thing more than phrases: they insist but feebly upon the being looked upon as so many positive standards of themselves, and seem content to be taken, upon occasion, for phrases expressive of the conformity of the thing in question to the proper standard, whatever that may be. On most occasions, however, it will be better to say <utility: utility> is clearer, as referring more explicitly to pain and pleasure.

8. We have one philosopher, who says, there is no harm in any thing in the world but in telling a lie: and that if, for example, you were to murder your own father, this would not only be a particular way of saying, he was not your father. Of course, when this philosopher sees any thing that he does not like, he says, it is a particular way of telling a lie. It s saying, that the act ought to be done, or may be done, when, <in truth>, it ought not to be done.

9. The fairest and openest of them all is that sort of man who speaks out and says, I am of the number of the Elect: now God himself takes care to inform the Elect what is right: and that with so good effect, and let them strive ever so, they cannot help not only knowing it but practising it. If therefore a man wants to know what is right and what is wrong, he has nothing to do but to come to me.

It is upon the principle of antipathy that such and such acts are often reprobated on the score of their being <unnatural>: the practice of exposing children, established among the Greeks and Romans, was an unnatural practice. Unnatural, when it means any thing, means unfrequent: and there it means something; although nothing to the present purpose. But here it means no such thing: for the frequency of such acts is perhaps

the great complaint. It therefore means nothing; nothing, I mean, which there is in the act itself. All it can serve to express is, the disposition of the person who is talking of it: the disposition he is in to be angry at the thoughts of it. Does it merit his anger? very likely it may: but whether it does or no is a question, which, to be answered rightly, can only be answered upon the principle of utility.

Unnatural, is as good a word as moral sense, or common sense; and would be as good a foundation for a system. such an act is unnatural; that is, repugnant to nature: for I do not like to practise it: and, consequently, do not practise it. It is therefore repugnant to what ought to be the nature of every body else.

The mischief common to all these ways of thinking and arguing (which, in truth, as we have seen, are but one and the same method, couched in different forms of words) is their serving as a cloke, and pretence, and aliment, to despotism: if not a despotism in practice, a despotism however in disposition: which is but too apt, when pretence and power offer, to show itself in practice. The consequence is, that with intentions very commonly of the purest kind, a man becomes a torment either to himself or his fellow-creatures. If he be of the melancholy cast, he sits in silent grief, bewailing their blindness and depravity: if of the irascible, he declaims with fury and virulence against all who differ from him; blowing up the coals of fanaticism, and branding with the charge of corruption and insincerity, every man who does not think, or profess to think, as he does.

If such a man happens to possess the advantages of style, his book may do a considerable deal of mischief before the nothingness of it is understood.

These principles, if such they can be called, it is more frequent to see applied to morals than to politics: but their influence extends itself to both. In politics, as well as morals, a man will be at least equally glad of a pretence for deciding any question in the manner that best pleases him, without the trouble of inquiry. If a man is an infallible judge of what is right and wrong in the actions of private individuals, why not in the measures to be observed by public men in the direction of those actions? accordingly (not to mention other chimeras) I have more than once known to pretended law of nature set up in legislative debates, in opposition to arguments derived from the principle of utility.

'But is it never, then, from any other considerations than those of utility, that we derive our notions of right and wrong?' I do not know: I do not care. Whether a moral sentiment can be originally conceive from any other source than a view of utility, is one question: whether upon examination and reflection it can, in point of fact, be actually persisted in and justified on any other ground, by a person reflecting within himself, is another: whether in point of right it can properly be justified on any other ground, by a person addressing himself to the community, is a third. The two first are questions of speculation: it matters not, comparatively speaking, how they are decided. The last is a question of practice: the decision of it is of as much importance as that of any can be.

'I feel in myself,' (say you) 'a disposition to approve of such or such an action in a moral view: but this is not owing to any notions I have of its being a useful one to the community. I do not pretend to know whether it be an useful one or not: it may be, for aught I know, a mischievous one." "But is it then,' (say I) 'a mischievous one? examine; and if you can make yourself sensible that it is so, then, if duty means any thing, that is, moral duty, it is your <duty> at least to abstain from it: and more than that, if it is what lies in your power, and can be done without too great a sacrifice, to endeavour to prevent it. It is not your cherishing the notion of it in your bosom, and giving it the name of virtue, that will excuse you.'

'I feel in myself' (say you again) 'a disposition to detest such or such an action in a moral view; but this is not owing to any notions I have of its being a mischievous one to the community. I do not pretend to know whether it be a mischievous one or not: it may be not a mischievous one: it may be, for aught I know, an useful one.' -- 'May it indeed,' (say I) 'an useful one? but let me tell you then, that unless duty, and right and wrong, be just what you please to make them, if it really be not a mischievous one, and any body has a mind to do it, it is no duty of yours, but, on the contrary, it would be very wrong in you, to take upon you to prevent him: detest it within yourself as much as you please; that may be a very good reason (unless it be also a useful one) for your not doing it yourself: but if you go about, by word or deed, to do any thing to hinder him, or make him suffer for it, it is you, and not he, that have done wrong: it is not your setting yourself to blame his conduct, or branding it with the name of vice, that will make him culpable, or you blameless. Therefore, if you can make yourself content that he shall be of one mind, and you of another, about that matter, and so continue, it is well: but if nothing will serve you, but that you and he must needs e of the same mind, I'll tell you what you have to do: it is for you to get the better of your antipathy, not for him to truckle to it.'

[9]King James the First of England had conceived a violent antipathy against Arians: two of whom he burnt (Hume's Hist. Vol. 6). This gratification he procured himself without much difficulty: the notions of the times were favourable to it. He wrote a furious book against Vorstius, for being what was called an Arminian: for Vorstius was at a distance. He also wrote a furious book, called 'A Counterblast to Tobacco,' against the use of that drug, which Sir Walter Raleigh had then lately introduced. Had the notions of the times co-operated with him, he would have burnt the Anbaptist and the smoker of tobacco in the same fire. However he had the satisfaction of putting Raleigh to death afterwards, though for another crime.

Disputes concerning the comparative excellence of France and Italian music have occasioned very serious bickerings at Paris. One of the parties would not have been sorry (say Mr. D'Alembert [Melanges Essai sur la Liberte de la Musique.]) to have brought government into the quarrel. Pretences were sought after and urged. Long before that, a dispute of like nature, and of at least equal warmth, had been kindled at London upon the comparative merits of two composers at London; where riots between the approvers and disapprovers of a new play are, at this day, not unfrequent. The ground of quarrel between the Big-

endians and Little-endians in the fable, was not more frivolous than many an one which has laid empires desolate. In Russia, it is said, there was a time when some thousands of persons lost their lives in a quarrel, in which the government had taken part, about the number of fingers to be used in making the sign of the cross. This was in days of yore: the ministers of Catherine II. are better <instructed> (Instruct. art. 474. 475, 476) than to take any other part in such disputes, than that of preventing the parties concerned from doing one another a mischief.

[10]The principle of theology refers every thing to God's pleasure. But what is God's pleasure? God does not, he confessedly does not now, either speak or write to us. How then are we to know what is his pleasure? By observing what is our own pleasure, and pronouncing it to be his. Accordingly, what is called the pleasure of god, is and must necessarily be (revelation apart) neither more nor less than the good pleasure of the person, whoever he be, who is pronouncing what he believes, or pretends, to be God's pleasure. How know you it to be God's pleasure that such or such an act should be abstained from? whence come you even to suppose as much? "Because the commission of it is attended with a gross and sensual, or at least with a trifling and transient satisfaction;' says the partizan of the principle of asceticism: 'Because I detest the thoughts of it; and I cannot, neither ought I to be called upon to tell why;' says he who proceeds upon the principles of antipathy. In the words of one or other of these must that persons necessarily answer (revelation apart) who professes to take for his standard the will of God.

[11]Sanctio, in Latin, was used to signify the <act of binding>, and, by a common grammatical transition, <any thing which serves to bind a man>: to wit, to the observance of such or such a mode of conduct. According to a Latin grammarian (Servius. See Ainsworth's Dict. ad verbum <Sanctio>.), the import of the word is derived by rather a far-fetched process (such as those commonly are, and in a great measure indeed must be, by which intellectual ideas are derived from sensible ones) from the word <sanguis>, blood: because, among the Romans, with a view to inculcate into the people a persuasion that such or such a mode of conduct would be rendered obligatory upon a man by the force of what I call the religious sanction (that is, that he would be made to suffer by the extraordinary interposition of some superior being, if he failed to observe the mode of conduct in question) certain ceremonies were contrived by the priests: in the course of which ceremonies the blood of victims was made use of.

A Sanction then is a source of obligatory powers or <motives>: that is, of <pains> and <pleasures>; which, according as they are connected with such or such modes of conduct, operate, and are indeed the only things which can operate, as <motives>. See Chap. X. [Motives].

[12]Better termed <popular>, as more directly indicative of its constituent cause; as likewise of its relation to the more common phrase <public opinion>, in French <opinion publique>, the name there given to that tutelary power, of which of late so much is said, and by which so much is done. The latter appellation is however unhappy and inexpressive; since if <opinion> is material, it is only in virtue of the influence it exercises over action,

through the medium of the affections and the will.

[13]A suffering conceived to befall a man by the immediate act of God, as above, is often, for shortness' sake, called a <judgment>: instead of saying a suffering inflicted on him in consequence of a special judgment formed, and resolution thereupon taken, by the Deity. [14]See ch. xii. [Cases unmeet] par. 2. note. [15]These circumstances have since been dominated <elements> or <dimensions of value> in a pleasure or a pain.

Nor long after the publication of the first edition, the following memoriter verses were framed, in the view of lodging more effectually, in the memory, these points, on which the whole fabric of morals and legislation may be seen to rest.

<Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure> --
Such marks in <pleasures> and in <pains> endure.
Such pleasures seek if <private> be thy end:
If it be <public>, wide let them <extend>.
Such <pains> avoid, whichever by thy view:
If pains <must> come, let them <extend> to few.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

George Berkeley

1710

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Dedication

To the Right Honourable Thomas, Earl of Pembroke, &C., Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter and one of the Lords of Her Majesty's most honourable privy council .

My Lord,

You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and learning, and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you

this present of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I might add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship, MY LORD, Your lordship's most humble and most devoted servant, GEORGE BERKELEY

Preface

WHAT I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known- particularly to those who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine; since I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least read the whole through with that degree of attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the characters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notions may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that account. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration, for no other reason but because it is newly known, and contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend it.

Introduction

1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a

superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the support and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite.

3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves- that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided.

5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like designs, yet I am not without some hopes- upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes.

6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the

opinion that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or notions of things. He who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of those sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and of all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.

8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or singles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstract idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense.

9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or modes, so does it, by the same precision or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings which include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars equally partake- abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of man, or, if you please, humanity, or human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, their being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of animal, which

abstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By body is meant body without any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason left out of the abstract idea. Upon the same account the spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive.

10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid- which last are the two proper acceptations of abstraction. And there are grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract notions. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the learned.

11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. "The having of general ideas," saith he, "is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may suppose that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men, and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction."- Essay on Human Understanding,

II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other general signs; which is built on this supposition- that the making use of words implies the having general ideas. From which it follows that men who use language are able to abstract or generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the question he in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas."- Essay on Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But it seems that a word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever has extension is divisible," these propositions are to be understood of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that magnitude or figure.

12. By observing how ideas become general we may the better judge how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are any abstract general ideas; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. And, as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign, so the name "line," which taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general. And as the former owes its generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the various particular lines which it indifferently denotes.

13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV. vii. 9) which is as follows: "Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not

so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about."- If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?"

14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for communication, which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain know at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such painstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every common name they make use of?

15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the enlargement of knowledge than for communication. It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in the manner premised- universality, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are rendered universal. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal. All which seems very plain and not to include

any difficulty in it.

16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all the particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which sufficiently shows that the right angle might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right-angled equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal without framing the fore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered.

17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings and controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When men consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remains full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking all together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and amusement- I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more

wide and extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than this of abstract general ideas.

18. I come now to consider the source of this prevailing notion, and that seems to me to be language. And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence that if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there never had been any thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein words have contributed to the origin of that mistake.- First then, it is thought that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settled signification, which inclines men to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which doth evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain signification. For example, a triangle is defined to be "a plain surface comprehended by three right lines," by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.

19. But, to give a farther account how words came to produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion that language has no other end but the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for abstract notions. That there are many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for- in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.

20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition- to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between.

At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a good thing, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me "Aristotle hath said it," all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation should go before. Innumerable examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those things which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?

21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. We have considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and endeavored to show they are of no use for those ends to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.- It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and made the possession of one single person. But at the same time it must be owned that most parts of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered. Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following advantages:

22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely verbal- the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle net of abstract ideas which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. Thirdly, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding.

23. But the attainment of all these advantages doth presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an

union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of abstraction. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their words, it doth not seem strange that they should use words for ideas- it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and retain the abstract idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why those men who have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may be they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea.

24. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity- we need only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.

25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of words, we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised ideas.

A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

1. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination- either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid

ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things- which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.

2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein, they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived- for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.

3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.- I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exists, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed- meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percepi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?

5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures- in a word the things we see and feel- what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose

itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract- if that may properly be called abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it.

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit- it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.

7. From what has been said it follows there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives. But, for the fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as to perceive; that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of those ideas.

8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest.

9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call Matter. By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that that the very notion of what is called Matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it.

10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist

without the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not- which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.

11. Again, great and small, swift and slow, are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension in general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet of extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on the strange doctrine of abstract ideas. And here I cannot but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of materia prima, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of solidity.

12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, etc.; all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind.

13. Unity I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea answering the word unity I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is an abstract idea.

14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of

a different texture at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object?

15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an outward object.

16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.- It is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter, and that Matter is the substratum that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's supporting extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident "support" cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense- as when we say that pillars support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken?

17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by material substance, we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material substratum or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?

18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing

without resembling them. Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we see them in at present, without their concurrence.

19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.

20. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose- what no one can deny possible- an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this there can be no question- which one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of Matter after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think arguments a posteriori are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated a priori, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue:- If you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.

24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind. To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for the conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.

25. All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive- there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.

26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. I must therefore be a substance; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit.

27. A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being- as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will. Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vide

sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names will and understanding, distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers- which is signified by the name soul or spirit. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words will, soul, spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating- inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.

28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words.

29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.

30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.

31. This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally at a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive- all this we know, not by discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born.

32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather sends them wandering after second causes. For, when we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and we know this is not of our own doing,

we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called real things; and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are ideas, and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.

34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be understood by every one.

First, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shewn what is meant by real things in opposition to chimeras or ideas of our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense they are alike ideas.

35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation.

36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been said:- There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense- which, being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws

of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former:- by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of reality it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term reality different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see.

37. I will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense- for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like- this we cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense- for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind- then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.

38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so- the word idea not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called things; and it is certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the mind that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them ideas; which word if it was as ordinarily used as thing, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things rather than ideas.

39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word idea, and do not rather in compliance with custom call them things; I answer, I do it for two reasons:- first, because the term thing in contra-distinction to idea, is generally supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because thing hath a more comprehensive signification than idea, including spirit or thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word idea, which implies those properties.

40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.

41. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which the answer is evident from what hath been already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea.

42. Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind.

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a distance by sight. For, that we should in truth see external space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to carry with it some opposition to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," which was published not long since, wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath a necessary connexion with it; but that it is only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or things placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us by experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for; insomuch that a man born blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise.

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and heterogeneous. The former are marks and prognostics of the latter. That the proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the images of external things, was shewn even in that treatise. Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects- not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning Vision. So that in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas are the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point I refer to the Essay itself.

45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to

nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created. In answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them.

46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of Matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.

47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably follow, from the principles which are now generally admitted, that the particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident from sect. II and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which are not perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough to discern them. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. Each body therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely extended, and consequently void of all shape or figure. From which it follows that, though we should grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible world, any one whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived.

48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the

principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them.

49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it- that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by way of idea; and it no more follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, extended, and square," they will have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word die.

50. Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many things explained by matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which have been applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. In short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I answer that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear by an induction of particulars. To explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, as hath been already shewn. See sect. 25.

51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe everything to the immediate operation of Spirits? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he would so; in such things we ought to "think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar." They who to demonstration are convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say "the sun rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian"; and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets.

52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long as they excite in us proper

sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable.

53. As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes, this has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without them: this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition.

54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? I answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.

55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never so universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the world.

56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer, that men knowing they perceived several ideas, whereof they themselves were not the authors- as not being excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills- this made them maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had an existence independent of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without

the mind, they in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar; but at the same time run into another which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.

57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, first, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly, because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any reflexion; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a Free Spirit; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom.

58. Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not; but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles we have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena.

59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession of ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.

60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all their motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to

them? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist hath made the spring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of phenomena?

61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were some difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly, but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties; for, it may still be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will without all that apparatus; nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines without of mind; for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.

62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects; these are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining various phenomena- which explication consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production of natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all

the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again.

63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgement of the Divine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising events.

64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than this:- ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect; there are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being barely inefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being credible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no purpose.

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, by discerning a figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing.

66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching after

and endeavouring to understand those signs instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit "in whom we live, move, and have our being."

67. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected that- though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, movable substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe Matter- yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it exists not in place is no less certain- since all place or extension exists only in the mind, as hath been already proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all.

68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present," when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend.

69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. But when it is applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received signification.

70. You will Perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner.

71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind of God which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method- much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unperceived substance.

72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have just now seen.

73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of material substance; that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be conceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this substratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind.

74. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon; yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing itself is indefensible, at least to retain the name, which we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that

should make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds?

75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there are certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name.

76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such thing, since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance.

77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we know not why.

78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever.

79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas; though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words may be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please without danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other.

80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of material Substance, and stand to

it that Matter is an unknown somewhat- neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immovable, unextended, existing in no place. For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion, or any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use the word "Matter" in the same sense as other men use "nothing," and so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition, the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by the term nothing.

81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fore-said definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing- the positive abstract idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general notion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted narrow inlets of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption- since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit and idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and trifling with words.- It remains that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion.

82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles; and the difference betwixt things and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.

83. Again, whether there can be or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.

84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their stress and import by our

principles. What must we think of Moses' rod? was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other miracles; which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this I reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. I shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality; so that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what has been said.

85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences. Some of these appear at first sight- as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. "Whether corporeal substance can think," "whether Matter be infinitely divisible," and "how it operates on spirit"- these and like inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but depending on the existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been premised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel.

86. From the principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads- that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each of these I shall treat in order.

And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these hath been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense- the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and without the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?

87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all

agree with the real things existing in rerum natura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and show how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects.

88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own bodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of thought, they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words. and not amuse ourselves with the terms "absolute," "external," "exist, "and such-like, signifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived.

89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name. viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas- which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of.

90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their origin- in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be "without the mind" in another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind.

91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently

cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed on all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or spirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they call Matter, to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances created by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all created.

92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists.

93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the impulse of one body or another- all this is very natural. And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.

94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses are only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own ideas, but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND which produces and sustains all things.

95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which is perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take away this material substance, about the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body

what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.

96. Matter being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they were.

97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it hath been set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody knows, but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; in conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.

98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the sucession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation, will, I believe, find it no easy task.

99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight of them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofold abstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is the colour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only in some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived.

100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from

everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very difficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.

101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics; with regard to each of these I shall make some observations. And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The real essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest object, is hid from our view; something there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend.

102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes, to wit. the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible particles; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well as all other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine.

103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the manner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But, nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for aught we know) be termed "impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction." Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted for by attraction; but, in this as in the other instances, I do not perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at.

104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, etc, there is something alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who has nicely observed and

compared the effects of nature. For that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general name "attraction," whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a general rule or law of nature.

105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them- for that can be no other than the will of a spirit- but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind.

106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it universal; and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other; and, so far is that gravitation from being essential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the case, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He sees convenient.

107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mind or spirit. Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of things; and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied, and observations and experiments made, which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general conclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves, but only of God's

goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31 Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena; I do not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles: which we cannot evidently know.

108. Those men who frame general rules from the phenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seem to consider signs rather than causes. A man may well understand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to write improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar rules; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossible we may extend the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes.

109. As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how it follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order. extent, and variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures.

110. The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar; which distinction, as it is at large explained by the author, does suppose these quantities to have an existence without the mind; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at all.

111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author holds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and immovable; and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, being movable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immovable space. Place he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to another. And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures, and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immovable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body may be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative motions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at all in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true as we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by the following properties.- First, in true or absolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respect of the whole, partake of

the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which, nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of motion.

112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than relative; so that to conceive motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include relation.

113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however some may define relative motion, so as to term that body moved which changes its distance from some other body, whether the force or action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in the ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every man of common sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to move, because they change distance with his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is not therefore itself in motion.

114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is related to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined. For, as hath been already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all the above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it. See Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, hath, I think, no motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section.

115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and secondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which we see change its distance from some other to be moved, though it have no

force applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move; which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is not, and that is all.

116. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the being of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive of all body. This I must confess seems impossible, as being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space; but if I find a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion- though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance, but if that, too, were annihilated then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay concerning Vision.

117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of pure Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late have set themselves particularly to shew the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we adhere to the received opinions.

118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now to make some inquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics. These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: and they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and their way of deduction from those principles clear and incontestible, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and for that reason not

expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science; and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind.

119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of Number; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only for amusement; and hath therefore so far infected the minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of natural things by them. But, if we inquire into our own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries, about numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so far as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life.

120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from which and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is not any such idea. But, number being defined a "collection of units," we may conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic. if they are abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed to have nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation.

121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this will plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that science, and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e., some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians came into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to have been done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. And having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to be known, when we know the name of figures (with their due arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus

computing in signs (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we intend to number.

122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs, which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general (sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe that it is evident from what has been said, those things which pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things, except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.

123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension, which, considered as relative, is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite extension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning; so it is the principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of Mathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been.

124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it; but, it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind: wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not infinitely divisible. If by finite extension be meant something distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms "extension," "parts," &c., are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so; and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient

and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow.

125. He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that a line but an inch long may contain innumerable parts- really existing, though too small to be discerned. These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no difficult thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. At present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine.

126. It hath been observed in another place that the theorems and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. 15, Introd.); where it is explained in what sense this ought to be understood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes; or, in other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude- which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration. Hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in itself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties of the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the sign, and thence, through mistake, though to appertain to it considered in its own nature.

127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain parts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch taken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, not retaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten-thousandth part of an inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more; for, though the ten-thousandth part of that line considered in itself is nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without an error or inconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten-thousandth part is very considerable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of 10,000 parts or more.

128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the end any theorem become universal in its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which is far greater than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely great. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite

extension has been thought necessary in geometry.

129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity, as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true.

130. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., without ever coming to an end; so that according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a positive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain.

131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and unshaken on our principles; that science considered as practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has been said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper business of another place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence on the manners.

132. It is be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have been if their existence included a contradiction in it; I answer that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible.

133. By what we have premised, it is plain that very numerous and important errors have taken

their rise from those false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise; and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true philosophy. as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them a subsistance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinites being incomprehensible"; if withal the removal of this Matter be not attended with the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Religion: methinks we may expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existence of Matter had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not.

134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, are rejected as useless. But, how great a prejudice soever against our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and make large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make human sciences far more clear, compendious and attainable than they were before.

135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of IDEAS, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of SPIRITS- with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an idea of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here add that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd.

136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some have imagined) proper to know substances withal, which, if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms soul and substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round square.

137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at

all distinct from their body since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original.

138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of the term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a spirit.

139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarreling at a word, and that, since the immediately significations of other names are by common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea. See sect. 27.

140. In a large sense, indeed, we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them; so we know other spirits by means of our own soul- which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another.

141. It must not be supposed that they who assert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this notion has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness. We have shewn that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, "the soul of man is naturally immortal."

142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say "they exist," "they are known," or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we distinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be remarked that, all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern.

143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned.

144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively consider their own meaning.

145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs.

146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that those things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together

with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, "who works all in all," and "by whom all things consist."

147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, "upholding all things by the word of His power," maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which enlightens every one is itself invisible.

148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;- A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man- if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do- but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men.

149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, and move, and have our being." That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light.

150. But you will say, Hath Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and

general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures." Jerem. 10. 13. "He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night." Amos, 5. 8. "He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn." See Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) "He be not far from every one of us."

151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. "Verily" (saith the prophet) "thou art a God that hidest thyself." Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.

152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the

inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power.

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings.

154. From what has been said, it will be manifest to any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence, the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to comprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might be expected in reasonable creatures?

155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into Atheism. Since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we may attain conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on"; that He is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts; and that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice.

156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the consideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is the highest perfection of human nature.

THE END

A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

George Berkeley

1710

Editor's Note: This e-text is based on the Virginia Tech Eris project text of Berkeley's Principles. This slightly modified text version and associated HTML files were prepared for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (jfieser@utm.edu).

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Dedication

To the Right Honourable Thomas, Earl of Pembroke, &C., Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter and one of the Lords of Her Majesty's most honourable privy council .

My Lord,

You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and learning, and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I might add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship,

MY LORD,

Your lordship's most humble and most devoted servant,

GEORGE BERKELEY

* * * *

Preface

WHAT I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known- particularly to those who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine; since I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least read the whole through with that degree of attention and thought which the subject-matter

shall seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the characters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notions may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that account. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration, for no other reason but because it is newly known, and contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend it.

* * * *

Introduction

1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the support and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to

be comprehended by that which is finite.

3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves- that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided.

5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like designs, yet I am not without some hopes- upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes.

6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or notions of things. He who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of those sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and of all

that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.

8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or singles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstract idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense.

9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or modes, so does it, by the same precision or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings which include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars equally partake-abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of man, or, if you please, humanity, or human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any

particular colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, their being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of animal, which abstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By body is meant body without any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason left out of the abstract idea. Upon the same account the spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive.

10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid- which last are the two proper acceptations of abstraction. And there are grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract notions. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the learned.

11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to

embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. "The having of general ideas," saith he, "is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may suppose that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men, and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction."- Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other general signs; which is built on this supposition- that the making use of words implies the having general ideas. From which it follows that men who use language are able to abstract or generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the question he in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas."- Essay on Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But it seems that a word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever has extension is divisible," these propositions are to be understood of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, it matters not whether line, surface, or solid,

whether of this or that magnitude or figure.

12. By observing how ideas become general we may the better judge how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are any abstract general ideas; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. And, as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign, so the name "line," which taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general. And as the former owes its generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the various particular lines which it indifferently denotes.

13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV. vii. 9) which is as follows: "Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about."- If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I

go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?"

14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for communication, which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain know at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such painstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every common name they make use of?

15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the enlargement of knowledge than for communication. It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in the manner premised-universality, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are rendered universal. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal. All which seems very plain and not to include any difficulty in it.

16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any

proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all the particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which sufficiently shows that the right angle might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right-angled equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal without framing the fore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered.

17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings and controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When men consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remains full of darkness

and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking all together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and amusement- I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide and extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than this of abstract general ideas.

18. I come now to consider the source of this prevailing notion, and that seems to me to be language. And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence that if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there never had been any thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein words have contributed to the origin of that mistake.- First then, it is thought that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settled signification, which inclines men to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which doth evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain signification. For example, a triangle is defined to be "a plain surface comprehended by three right lines," by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.

19. But, to give a farther account how words came to produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion that language has no other end but the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether

insignificant do not always mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for abstract notions. That there are many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for- in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.

20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition- to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a good thing, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me "Aristotle hath said it," all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation should go before. Innumerable examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those things which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully

suggest unto him?

21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. We have considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and endeavored to show they are of no use for those ends to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.- It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and made the possession of one single person. But at the same time it must be owned that most parts of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered. Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following advantages:

22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely verbal- the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle net of abstract ideas which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. Thirdly, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding.

23. But the attainment of all these advantages doth presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of abstraction. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their words, it doth not seem strange that they should use words for ideas- it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and retain the abstract idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why those men who have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes

which grow out of the abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may be they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea.

24. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity- we need only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.

25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of words, we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised ideas.

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A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

1. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination- either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes;

and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things- which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.

2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein, they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived- for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.

3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.- I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exists, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed- meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percepi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?

5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will,

perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures- in a word the things we see and feel- what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract- if that may properly be called abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it.

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit- it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.

7. From what has been said it follows there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives. But, for the fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as to perceive; that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of those ideas.

8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between

our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest.

9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call Matter. By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that that the very notion of what is called Matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it.

10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not- which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.

11. Again, great and small, swift and slow, are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all.

But, say you, they are extension in general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet of extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on the strange doctrine of abstract ideas. And here I cannot but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of materia prima, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of solidity.

12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, etc.; all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind.

13. Unity I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea answering the word unity I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is an abstract idea.

14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object?

15. In short, let any one consider those arguments

which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an outward object.

16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.- It is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter, and that Matter is the substratum that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's supporting extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident "support" cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense- as when we say that pillars support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken?

17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by material substance, we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material substratum or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?

18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from

what we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing without resembling them. Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we see them in at present, without their concurrence.

19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.

20. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose- what no one can deny possible- an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this there can be no question- which one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of Matter after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think arguments a posteriori are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated a priori, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue:- If you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.

24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind. To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for the conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend

to the attentive thoughts of the reader.

25. All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive- there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.

26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. I must therefore be a substance; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit.

27. A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being- as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will. Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names will and understanding, distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers- which is signified by the name soul or spirit. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words will, soul, spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of soul,

spirit, and the operations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating- inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.

28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words.

29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.

30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.

31. This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally at a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive- all this we know, not by discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born.

32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather sends them wandering after second causes. For, when we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd and

unintelligible. Thus, for example, having observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called real things; and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are ideas, and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.

34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be understood by every one.

First, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shewn what is meant by real things in opposition to chimeras or ideas of our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense they are alike ideas.

35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist

indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation.

36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been said:- There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense- which, being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former:- by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of reality it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term reality different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see.

37. I will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense- for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like- this we cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense- for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind- then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.

38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so- the word idea not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called things; and it is certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the mind that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them ideas; which word if it was as ordinarily used as thing, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things rather than ideas.

39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word idea, and do not rather in compliance with custom call them things; I answer, I do it for two reasons:- first, because the term thing in contra-distinction to idea, is generally supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because thing hath a more comprehensive signification than idea, including spirit or thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word idea, which implies those properties.

40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.

41. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which the answer is evident from what hath been already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea.

42. Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind.

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a distance by sight. For, that we should in truth see external space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to carry with it some opposition to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," which was published not

long since, wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath a necessary connexion with it; but that it is only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or things placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us by experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for; insomuch that a man born blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise.

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and heterogeneous. The former are marks and prognostics of the latter. That the proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the images of external things, was shewn even in that treatise. Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects- not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning Vision. So that in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas are the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point I refer to the Essay itself.

45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created. In answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting to those propositions which

at bottom have no meaning in them.

46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of Matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.

47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably follow, from the principles which are now generally admitted, that the particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident from sect. II and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which are not perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough to discern them. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. Each body therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely extended, and consequently void of all shape or figure. From which it follows that, though we should grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible world, any one whereof

does not exist longer than it is perceived.

48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them.

49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it- that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by way of idea; and it no more follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, extended, and square," they will have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word die.

50. Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many things explained by matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which have been applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. In short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I answer that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear by an induction of particulars. To explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, as hath been

already shewn. See sect. 25.

51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe everything to the immediate operation of Spirits? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he would so; in such things we ought to "think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar." They who to demonstration are convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say "the sun rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian"; and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets.

52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable.

53. As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes, this has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without them: this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition.

54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? I answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of Matter or things without

the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.

55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never so universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the world.

56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer, that men knowing they perceived several ideas, whereof they themselves were not the authors- as not being excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills- this made them maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had an existence independent of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar; but at the same time run into another which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.

57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, first, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly, because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size,

complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any reflexion; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a Free Spirit; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom.

58. Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not; but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles we have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena.

59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession of ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.

60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all their motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist hath made the spring and wheels,

and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of phenomena?

61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were some difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly, but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties; for, it may still be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will without all that apparatus; nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines without of mind; for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.

62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects; these are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining various phenomena- which explication consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production of natural effects; as will be evident to

whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again.

63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgement of the Divine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising events.

64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than this:- ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect; there are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being barely inefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being credible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no purpose.

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the

connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, by discerning a figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing.

66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching after and endeavouring to understand those signs instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit "in whom we live, move, and have our being."

67. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected that- though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, movable substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe Matter- yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it exists not in place is no less certain- since all place or extension exists only in the mind, as hath been already proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all.

68. Let us examine a little the description that is

here given us of matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present," when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend.

69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. But when it is applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received signification.

70. You will Perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner.

71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind of God which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method- much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter seems

too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unperceived substance.

72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have just now seen.

73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of material substance; that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be conceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this substratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind.

74. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon; yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing itself is indefensible, at least to retain the name, which we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions

which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds?

75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there are certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name.

76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such thing, since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance.

77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we know not why.

78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever.

79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what

is meant by that word? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas; though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words may be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please without danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other.

80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown somewhat- neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immovable, unextended, existing in no place. For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion, or any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use the word "Matter" in the same sense as other men use "nothing," and so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition, the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by the term nothing.

81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fore-said definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing- the positive abstract idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general notion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted narrow inlets of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption- since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit and idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and trifling with words.- It remains that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion.

82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles; and the difference betwixt things and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.

83. Again, whether there can be or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.

84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' rod? was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other miracles; which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this I reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. I shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality; so that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what has been said.

85. Having done with the Objections, which I

endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences. Some of these appear at first sight- as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. "Whether corporeal substance can think," "whether Matter be infinitely divisible," and "how it operates on spirit"- these and like inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but depending on the existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been premised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel.

86. From the principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads- that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each of these I shall treat in order.

And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these hath been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense- the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and without the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?

87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerum natura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and show how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects.

88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own bodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of thought, they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words. and not amuse ourselves with the terms "absolute," "external," "exist, "and such-like, signifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived.

89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name. viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas- which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of.

90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their origin- in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be "without the mind" in

another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind.

91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed on all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or spirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they call Matter, to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances created by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all created.

92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists.

93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the impulse of one body or another- all this is very natural. And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies of religion lay so great a stress on

unthinking Matter, and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.

94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses are only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own ideas, but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND which produces and sustains all things.

95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which is perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take away this material substance, about the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.

96. Matter being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they were.

97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it hath been set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody knows, but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; in conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken

exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.

98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the sucession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation, will, I believe, find it no easy task.

99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight of them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofold abstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is the colour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only in some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived.

100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very difficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.

101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics; with regard to each of these I shall make some observations. And first I shall say somewhat

of Natural Philosophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The real essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest object, is hid from our view; something there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend.

102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes, to wit. the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible particles; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well as all other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine.

103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the manner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But, nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for aught we know) be termed "impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction." Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted for by attraction; but, in this as in the other instances, I do not perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at.

104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, etc, there

is something alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general name "attraction," whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a general rule or law of nature.

105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them- for that can be no other than the will of a spirit- but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind.

106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it universal; and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other; and, so far is that gravitation from being essential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the case, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He sees convenient.

107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mind or spirit. Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of things; and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied, and observations and experiments made, which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general conclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31 Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena; I do not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles: which we cannot evidently know.

108. Those men who frame general rules from the phenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seem to consider signs rather than causes. A man may well understand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to write improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar rules; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossible we may extend the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes.

109. As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how it follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order. extent, and variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures.

110. The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar; which distinction, as it is at

large explained by the author, does suppose these quantities to have an existence without the mind; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at all.

111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author holds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and immovable; and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, being movable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immovable space. Place he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to another. And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures, and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immovable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body may be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative motions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at all in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true as we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by the following properties.- First, in true or absolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respect of the whole, partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which, nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of motion.

112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than relative; so that to conceive motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include relation.

113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change

in the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however some may define relative motion, so as to term that body moved which changes its distance from some other body, whether the force or action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in the ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every man of common sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to move, because they change distance with his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is not therefore itself in motion.

114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is related to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined. For, as hath been already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all the above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it. See Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, hath, I think, no motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section.

115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and secondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which we see change its distance from some other to be moved, though it have no force applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move; which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in

motion which is not, and that is all.

116. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the being of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive of all body. This I must confess seems impossible, as being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space; but if I find a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion- though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance, but if that, too, were annihilated then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay concerning Vision.

117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of pure Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late have set themselves particularly to shew the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we adhere to the received opinions.

118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now to make some inquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics. These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, though

they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: and they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and their way of deduction from those principles clear and incontestible, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science; and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind.

119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of Number; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only for amusement; and hath therefore so far infected the minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of natural things by them. But, if we inquire into our own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries, about numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so far as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life.

120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from which and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is not any such idea. But, number being defined a "collection of units," we may conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic. if they are abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed to have nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation.

121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this will plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that science, and to what scope they

directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e., some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians came into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to have been done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. And having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to be known, when we know the name of figures (with their due arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus computing in signs (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we intend to number.

122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs, which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general (sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe that it is evident from what has been said, those things which pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things, except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.

123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension, which, considered as relative, is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite extension, though it is

not expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning; so it is the principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of Mathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been.

124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it; but, it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind: wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not infinitely divisible. If by finite extension be meant something distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms "extension," "parts," &c., are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so; and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow.

125. He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that a line but an inch long may contain innumerable parts- really existing, though too small to be discerned. These errors are grafted as well

in the minds of geometricians as of other men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no difficult thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. At present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine.

126. It hath been observed in another place that the theorems and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. 15, Introd.); where it is explained in what sense this ought to be understood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes; or, in other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude- which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration. Hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in itself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties of the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the sign, and thence, through mistake, though to appertain to it considered in its own nature.

127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain parts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch taken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, not retaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten-thousandth part of an inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more; for, though the ten-thousandth part of that line considered in itself is nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without an error or inconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten-thousandth part is very considerable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of 10,000 parts or more.

128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the end any theorem become universal in its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which is far greater than an inch,

and represented by it; and that when we say a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely great. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought necessary in geometry.

129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity, as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true.

130. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., without ever coming to an end; so that according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a positive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain.

131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and unshaken on our principles; that science considered as practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has been said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper business of another place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off

without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence on the manners.

132. It is be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have been if their existence included a contradiction in it; I answer that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible.

133. By what we have premised, it is plain that very numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise; and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true philosophy. as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them a subsistance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinites being incomprehensible"; if withal the removal of this Matter be not attended with the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Religion: methinks we may expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existence of Matter had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not.

134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, are rejected as useless. But, how great a prejudice soever against our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and make large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make human sciences far more clear, compendious and attainable than they were before.

135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of IDEAS, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of SPIRITS- with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an idea of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here add that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd.

136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some have imagined) proper to know substances withal, which, if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms soul and substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round square.

137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from their body since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original.

138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of the term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a spirit.

139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer,

those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarreling at a word, and that, since the immediately significations of other names are by common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea. See sect. 27.

140. In a large sense, indeed, we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them; so we know other spirits by means of our own soul- which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another.

141. It must not be supposed that they who assert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this notion has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness. We have shewn that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, "the soul of man is naturally immortal."

142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say "they exist," "they are known," or the like, these words must not

be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we distinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be remarked that, all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern.

143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned.

144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively consider their own meaning.

145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs.

146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that those things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, "who works all in all," and "by whom all things consist."

147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, "upholding all things by the word of His power," maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which enlightens every one is itself invisible.

148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;- A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not

see a man- if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do- but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men.

149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, and move, and have our being." That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light.

150. But you will say, Hath Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures." Jerem. 10. 13. "He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night." Amos, 5. 8. "He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn." See Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) "He be not far from every one of us."

151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. "Verily" (saith the prophet) "thou art a God that hidest thyself." Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.

152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power.

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state

we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings.

154. From what has been said, it will be manifest to any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence, the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to comprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might be expected in reasonable creatures?

155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into Atheism. Since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we may attain conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on"; that He is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts; and that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice.

156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the consideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God; and,

having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is the highest perfection of human nature.

THE END

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous

George Berkeley

1713

THREE DIALOGUES

Between

HYLAS AND PHILONOUS

The Design of which is Plainly to Demonstrate the Reality and Perfection of

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

The Incorporeal Nature of the

SOUL

And the Immediate Providence of a

DEITY

In Opposition to

SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS

Also to Open a Method for Rendering the Sciences More Easy, Useful, and Compendious

{171}

The First Dialogue

***Philonous*. Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find you abroad so early.**

***Hylas*. It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.**

***Phil*. It happened well, to let you see what innocent and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties too being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those meditations, which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally dispose us to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts: for you seemed very intent on something.**

***Hyl*. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will permit me to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any means deprive myself of your company, for my thoughts always flow more easily in conversation with a friend, than when I am alone: but my request is, that you would suffer me to impart my reflexions to you.**

***Phil*. With all my heart, it is what I should have requested myself if you had not prevented me.**

***Hyl*. I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages, through an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to believe nothing at all, or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This however might be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them some consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief lieth {172} here; that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most important truths, which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable.**

***Phil*. I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of the affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of others. I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my word; since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle.**

***Hyl*. I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of you.**

***Phil*. Pray, what were those?**

***Hyl*. You were represented, in last night's conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as *material substance* in the world.**

***Phil*. That there is no such thing as what *philosophers call material substance*, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.**

***Hyl*. What I can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as *matter*?**

***Phil*. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to Common Sense, than I who believe no such thing?**

***Hyl*. You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point.**

***Phil*. Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common Sense, and remote from Scepticism?**

***Hyl*. With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes {173} about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to say.**

***Phil*. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a *sceptic*?**

***Hyl*. I mean what all men mean -- one that doubts of everything.**

***Phil*. He then who entertains no doubts concerning some particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a sceptic.**

***Hyl*. I agree with you.**

***Phil*. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or negative side of a question?**

***Hyl*. In neither; for whoever understands English cannot but know that *doubting* signifies a suspense between both.**

***Phil*. He then that denies any point, can no more be said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance.**

***Hyl*. True.**

***Phil*. And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be esteemed a sceptic than the other.**

***Hyl*. I acknowledge it.**

***Phil*. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce me *a sceptic*, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in my denial, as you in your affirmation.**

***Hyl*. Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my definition; but every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on. I said indeed that a *sceptic* was one who doubted of everything; but I should have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things.**

***Phil*. What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences? But these you know are universal intellectual notions, and consequently independent of Matter. The denial therefore of this doth not imply the denying them.**

***Hyl*. I grant it. But are there no other things? What think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not this sufficient to**

denominate a man a *sceptic*?

***Phil*. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be {174} esteemed the greatest *sceptic*?**

***Hyl*. That is what I desire.**

***Phil*. What mean you by Sensible Things?**

***Hyl*. Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine that I mean anything else?**

***Phil*. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be said to be *sensible* which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?**

***Hyl*. I do not sufficiently understand you.**

***Phil*. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt: but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.**

***Hyl*. No, certainly: it were absurd to think *God* or *virtue* sensible things; though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary connexion.**

***Phil*. It seems then, that by *sensible things* you mean those only which can be perceived *immediately* by sense?**

***Hyl*. Right.**

***Phil*. Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing?**

***Hyl*. It doth.**

***Phil*. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds?**

***Hyl*. You cannot.**

***Phil*. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its heat or weight?**

***Hyl*. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for all, that by *sensible things* I mean those only which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive *immediately*: for they make no {175} inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.**

***Phil*. This point then is agreed between us -- That *sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense*. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than tangible qualities.**

***Hyl*. We do not.**

***Phil*. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?**

***Hyl*. I grant it.**

***Phil*. Sensible things therefore are {250} nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?**

***Hyl*. Nothing else.**

***Phil*. *Heat* then is a sensible thing?**

***Hyl*. Certainly.**

***Phil*. Doth the *reality* of sensible things consist in being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?**

***Hyl*. To *exist* is one thing, and to be *perceived* is another.**

***Phil*. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived?**

***Hyl*. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation to, their being perceived.**

***Phil*. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without the mind?**

***Hyl*. It must.**

***Phil*. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to others? And if there be, pray let me know that reason.**

***Hyl*. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.**

***Phil*. What! the greatest as well as the least?**

***Hyl*. *I* tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and consequently, if there is {176} any difference, we are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser degree.**

***Phil*. But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very great pain?**

***Hyl*. No one can deny it.**

***Phil*. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure?**

***Hyl*. No, certainly.**

***Phil*. Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed with sense and perception?**

***Hyl*. It is senseless without doubt.**

***Phil*. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?**

***Hyl*. By no means.**

***Phil*. Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?**

***Hyl*. I grant it.**

***Phil*. What shall we say then of your external object; is it a material Substance, or no?**

***Hyl*. It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it.**

***Phil*. How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in a material substance? I desire you would clear this point.**

***Hyl*. Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.**

***Phil*. Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations?**

***Hyl*. But one simple sensation.**

***Phil*. Is not the heat immediately perceived?,**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. And the pain?**

***Hyl*. True.**

***Phil*. Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and, consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.**

***Hyl*. It seems so.**

***Phil*. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure. {177}**

***Hyl*. I cannot.**

***Phil*. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? &c.**

***Hyl*. I do not find that I can.**

***Phil*. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense degree?**

***Hyl*. It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it.**

***Phil*. What! are you then in that sceptical state of suspense, between affirming and denying?**

***Hyl*. I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind.**

***Phil*. It hath not therefore according to you, any *real* being?**

***Hyl*. I own it.**

***Phil*. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature really hot?**

***Hyl*. I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only say, there is no such thing as an intense real heat.**

***Phil*. But, did you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally real; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser?**

***Hyl*. True: but it was because I did not then consider the ground there is for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it is this: because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensation; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being; it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is no reason wh' we should**

deny heat in an inferior degree to exist in such a substance.

***Phil*. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without it?**

***Hyl*. That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to think the same of them.**

***Phil*. I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain.**

***Hyl*. I did. {178}**

***Phil*. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure?**

***Hyl*. What then?**

***Phil*. Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving substance, or body.**

***Hyl*. So it seems.**

***Phil*. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance; may we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree of heat whatsoever?**

***Hyl*. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.**

***Phil*. *I* do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion.**

***Hyl*. I could rather call it an *indolence*. It seems to be nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking substance, I hope you will not deny.**

***Phil*. If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise than by appealing to your own sense. But what think you of cold?**

***Hyl*. The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great uneasiness: it cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree of heat.**

***Phil*. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them; and those, upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them.**

***Hyl*. They must.**

***Phil*. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an absurdity?**

***Hyl*. Without doubt it cannot.**

***Phil*. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at the same time both cold and warm?**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of {179} water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one**

hand, and warm to the other?

***Hyl*. It will.**

***Phil*. Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to your own concession, to believe an absurdity?**

***Hyl*. I confess it seems so.**

***Phil*. Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity.**

***Hyl*. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say, *there is no heat in the fire*?**

***Phil*. To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?**

.*Hyl*. We ought.

***Phil*. When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the fibres of your flesh?**

***Hyl*. It doth.**

***Phil*. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?**

***Hyl*. It doth not.**

***Phil*. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin; you should not, conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensation occasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire.**

***Hyl*. Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point, and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds. But there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external things.**

***Phil*. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible qualities, and that they can no more be supposed to exist without the mind, than heat and cold?**

***Hyl*. Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose; but that is what I despair of seeing proved.**

***Phil*. Let us examine them in order. What think you of *tastes*, do they exist without the mind, or no?**

***Hyl*. Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet, or wormwood bitter?**

***Phil*. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not? {180}**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain?**

***Hyl*. I grant it.**

***Phil*. If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness, that is, Pleasure and pain, agree to them?**

***Hyl*. Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was delude time. You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness at were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to which simply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished: those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pair existing in the external objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is no heat in**

the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say you to this?

***Phil*. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, *the things we immediately perceive by our senses*. Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of as distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without the mind?**

***Hyl*. I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up the cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet.**

***Phil*. But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along with you: that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered palate, appear bitter. And, nothing can be plainer than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same food; since that which one man delights in, another abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was something really inherent in the food?**

***Hyl*. I acknowledge I know not how.**

***Phil*. In the next place, *odours* are to be considered. And, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath {181} been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them? Are they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations?**

***Hyl*. They are.**

***Phil*. Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an unperceiving thing?**

***Hyl*. I cannot.**

***Phil*. Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with the same smells which we perceive in them?**

***Hyl*. By no means.**

***Phil*. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a perceiving substance or mind?**

***Hyl*. I think so.**

***Phil*. Then as to *sounds*, what must we think of them: are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?**

***Hyl*. That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hence: because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought the subject of sound.**

***Phil*. What reason is there for that, Hylas?**

***Hyl*. Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's motion; but without some motion in the air, we never hear any sound at all.**

***Phil*. And granting that we never hear a sound but when some motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can infer from thence, that the sound itself is in the air.**

***Hyl*. It is this very motion in the external air that produces in the mind the sensation of *sound*. For, striking on the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being**

communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called *sound*.

***Phil*. What! is sound then a sensation?**

***Hyl*. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in the mind.**

***Phil*. And can any sensation exist without the mind?**

***Hyl*. No, certainly.**

***Phil*. How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, if by the *air* you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind?**

***Hyl*. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is {182} perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion the air.**

***Phil*. I thought I had already obviated that distinction, by answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before. But, to say no more of that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion?**

***Hyl*. I am.**

***Phil*. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be attributed to motion?**

***Hyl*. It may.**

***Phil*. It is then good sense to speak of *motion* as of a thing that is *loud, sweet, acute, or grave*.**

***Hyl*. *I* see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound, or *sound in* the common acceptation of the word, but not to *sound* in the real and philosophic sense; which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a certain motion of the air?**

***Phil*. It seems then there are two sorts of sound -- the one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical and real?**

***Hyl*. Even so.**

***Phil*. And the latter consists in motion?**

***Hyl*. I told you so before.**

***Phil*. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?**

***Hyl*. No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.**

***Phil*. It should follow then, that, according to you, real sounds may possibly be *seen or felt*, but never *heard*.**

***Hyl*. Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into sound something oddly; but common language, you know, is framed by, and for the use of the vulgar: we must not therefore wonder if expressions adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the way.**

***Phil*. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained no small point, since you make so light of departing from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the {183} common road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the world. But, can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox, to say that *real sounds are never heard*, and that the idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?**

***Hyl*. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds too have no real being without the mind.**

***Phil*. And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge the same of *colours*.**

***Hyl*. Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects?**

***Phil*. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal Substances existing without the mind?**

***Hyl*. They are.**

***Phil*. And have true and real colours inhering in them?**

***Hyl*. Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it.**

***Phil*. How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight?**

***Hyl*. There is not.**

***Phil*. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive immediately?**

***Hyl*. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you, we do not.**

***Phil*. Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more, whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but I would now be informed, whether you still persist in the same opinion.**

***Hyl*. I do.**

***Phil*. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or made up of sensible qualities?**

***Hyl*. What a question that is! who ever thought it was?**

***Phil*. My reason for asking was, because in saying, *each visible object hath that colour which we see in it*, you make visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that there is something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight: but, as this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, that your *corporeal substance* is nothing distinct from *sensible qualities*. {184}**

***Hyl*. You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my own meaning.**

***Phil*. I wish you would make me understand it too. But, since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined, I shall urge that point no farther. Only be pleased to let me know, whether the same colours which we see exist in external bodies, or some other.**

***Hyl*. The very same.**

***Phil*. What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour?**

***Hyl*. I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent colours.**

***Phil*. *Apparent* call you them? how shall we distinguish these apparent colours from real?**

***Hyl*. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.**

***Phil*. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are discovered by the most near and exact survey.**

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a microscope, or by the naked eye?

Hyl. By a microscope, doubtless.

Phil. But a microscope often discovers colours in an object different from those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no object whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked eye.

Hyl. And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that there are really and naturally no colours on objects: because by artificial managements they may be altered, or made to vanish.

Phil. I think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions, that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope. Then' as to what you say by way of prevention: {185} I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which is less sharp?

Hyl. By the former without doubt.

Phil. Is it not plain from *Dioptrics* that microscopes make the sight more penetrating, and represent objects as they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite sharpness?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the thing, or what it is in itself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine and real than those perceived otherwise.

Hyl. I confess there is something in what you say.

Phil. Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness escape our sight. What think you of those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses? must we suppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving their bodies from injuries, which appears in that of all other animals? And if it hath, is it not evident they must see particles less than their own bodies; which will present them with a far different view in each object from that which strikes our senses? Even our own eyes do not always represent objects to us after the same manner. In the jaundice every one knows that all things seem yellow. Is it not therefore highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern a very different texture from that of ours, and whose bodies abound with different humours, do not see the same colours in every object that we do? From all which, should it not seem to follow that all colours are equally apparent, and that none of those which we perceive are really inherent in any outward object?

Hyl. It should.

Phil. The point will be past all doubt, if you consider that, in case colours were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies, they could admit of no alteration without some change wrought in the very bodies themselves: but, is it not evident from what hath been said that, upon the use of microscopes, upon a change happening in the burnouts of the eye, or a variation of

distance, without any manner of real alteration {186} in the thing itself, the colours of any object are either changed, or totally disappear? Nay, all other circumstances remaining the same, change but the situation of some objects, and they shall present different colours to the eye. The same thing happens upon viewing an object in various degrees of light. And what is more known than that the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light from what they do in the open day? Add to these the experiment of a prism which, separating the heterogeneous rays of light, alters the colour of any object, and will cause the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to the naked eye. And now tell me whether you are still of opinion that every body hath its true real colour inhering in it; and, if you think it hath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain distance and position of the object, what peculiar texture and formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, and distinguishing it from apparent ones.

***Hyl*. I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all equally apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering in external bodies, but that it is altogether in the light. And what confirms me in this opinion is, that in proportion to the light colours are still more or less vivid; and if there be no light, then are there no colours perceived. Besides, allowing there are colours on external objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no external body affects the mind, unless it acts first on our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies is motion; and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye; nor consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul. Whence it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous substance, which, operating on the eye, occasions a perception of colours: and such is light.**

***Phil*. Howl is light then a substance?**

***Hyl*.. I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but a thin fluid substance, whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk motion, and in various manners reflected from the different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes, communicate different motions to the optic nerves; which, being propagated to the brain, cause therein various impressions; and these are attended with the sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c.**

***Phil*. It seems then the light doth no more than shake the optic nerves. {187}**

***Hyl*. Nothing else.**

***Phil*. And consequent to each particular motion of the nerves, the mind is affected with a sensation, which is some particular colour.**

***Hyl*. Right.**

***Phil*. And these sensations have no existence without the mind.**

***Hyl*. They have not.**

***Phil*. How then do you affirm that colours are in the light; since by *light* you understand a corporeal substance external to the mind?**

***Hyl*. Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant cannot exist without the mind. But in themselves they are only the motions and configurations of certain insensible particles of matter.**

***Phil*. Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving substance.**

***Hyl*. That is what I say.**

***Phil*. Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind beside, you may hold what you please with regard to those invisible ones of the philosophers. It is not my business to dispute about *them*; only I would advise you to bethink yourself, whether, considering the inquiry we are upon, it be prudent for you to affirm -- *the red and blue which we see are not real colours, but certain unknown motions and figures which no man ever did or can see are truly so*. Are not these shocking notions, and are not they subject to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were obliged to renounce before in the case of sounds?**

***Hyl*. I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed *secondary qualities*, have certainly no existence without the mind. But by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate, the reality of Matter, or external objects; seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who nevertheless are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the clearer understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into *Primary* and *Secondary*. The former are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest; {188} and these they hold exist really in bodies. The latter are those above enumerated; or, briefly, *all sensible qualities beside the Primary*; which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind. But all this, I doubt not, you are apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time sensible there was such an opinion current among philosophers, but was never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now.**

***Phil*. You are still then of opinion that *extension* and *figures are* inherent in external unthinking substances?**

***Hyl*. I am.**

***Phil*. But what if the same arguments which are brought against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these also?**

***Hyl*. Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only in the mind.**

***Phil*. Is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance?**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the figure and extension which they see and feel?**

***Hyl*. Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.**

***Phil*. Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and well-being in life? or were they given to men alone for this end?**

***Hyl*. I make no question but they have the same use in all other animals.**

***Phil*. If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable of harming them?**

***Hyl*. Certainly.**

***Phil*. A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension; though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best as so many visible points?**

***Hyl*. I cannot deny it.**

***Phil*. And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger?**

Hyl. They will.

Phil. Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain? {189}

Hyl. All this I grant.

Phil. Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of different dimensions?

Hyl. That were absurd to imagine.

Phil. But, from what you have laid down it follows that both the extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true extension of the mite's foot; that is to say, by your own principles you are led into an absurdity.

Hyl. There seems to be some difficulty in the point.

Phil. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself?

Hyl. I have.

Phil. But, as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object?

Hyl. I own I am at a loss what to think.

Phil. Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the other?

Hyl. It was.

Phil. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and regular?

Hyl. The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen?

Phil. You may at any time make the experiment, by looking with one eye bare, and with the other through a microscope.

Hyl. I know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath to give up _extension_, I see so many odd consequences following upon such a concession.

Phil. Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness. [But, on the other hand, should it not seem very odd, if the general reasoning {190} which includes all other sensible qualities did not also include extension? If it be allowed that no idea, nor anything like an idea, can exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely it follows that no figure, or mode of extension, which we can either perceive, or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from extension to be the _substratum_ of extension. Be the sensible quality what it will -- figure, or sound, or colour, it seems alike impossible it should subsist in that which doth not perceive it.][2]

Hyl. I give up the point for the present, reserving still a right to retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false step in my progress to it.

Phil. That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and extension being despatched, we proceed next to _motion_. Can a real motion in any external body be at the same time very swift and very slow?

Hyl. It cannot.

Phil. Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given space? Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would in case it described only a mile in three hours.

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some spirit of another kind?

Hyl. I own it.

Phil. Consequently the same body may to another seem to perform its motion over any space in half the time that it doth to you. And the same reasoning will hold as to any other proportion: that is to say, according to your principles (since the motions perceived are both really in the object) it is possible one and the same body shall be really moved the same way at once, both very swift and very slow. How is this consistent either with common sense, or with what you just now granted? {191}

Hyl. I have nothing to say to it.

Phil. Then as for _solidity_; either you do not mean any sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry: or if you do, it must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses: it being evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft to another, who hath greater force and firmness of limbs. Nor is it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body.

Hyl. I own the very _sensation_ of resistance, which is all you immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the _cause_ of that sensation is.

Phil. But the causes of our sensations are not things immediately perceived, and therefore are not sensible. This point I thought had been already determined.

Hyl. I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little embarrassed: I know not how to quit my old notions.

Phil. To help you out, do but consider that if _extension_ be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the same must necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and gravity; since they all evidently suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you have denied them all to have any real existence.

Hyl. I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence should yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no difference between them, how can this be accounted for?

Phil. It is not my business to account for every opinion of the philosophers. But, among other reasons which may be assigned for this, it seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of extension, figure, and motion affect us with.

And, it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance, men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there is something in this, if you recollect the difference you made between an intense and more moderate degree of heat; allowing the one a real existence, while you denied it to the other. But, after all, there is no rational ground for that distinction; for, surely an indifferent sensation is as {191} truly *a sensation* as one more pleasing or painful; and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject.

***Hyl*. It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension. Now, though it be acknowledged that *great* and *small*, consisting merely in the relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere in the substances themselves; yet nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to *absolute extension*, which is something abstracted from *great* and *small*, from this or that particular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion; *swift* and *slow* are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of motion exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted from them doth not.**

***Phil*. Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each?**

***Hyl*. I think so.**

***Phil*. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties, are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call them.**

***Hyl*. They are.**

***Phil*. That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in general.**

***Hyl*. Let it be so.**

***Phil*. But it is a universally received maxim that *Everything which exists is particular*. How then can motion in general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal substance? {193}**

***Hyl*. I will take time to solve your difficulty.**

***Phil*. But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct *abstract idea* of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion of.**

***Hyl*. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.**

***Phil*. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term *secondary*?**

***Hyl*. What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?**

***Phil*. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word *motion* by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may be made of extension**

and figures, without any mention of *great* or *small*, or any other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible quality,[3] [should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible. qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension.

***Hyl*. But what say you to *pure intellect*? May not abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?**

***Phil*. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot frame them by the help of *pure intellect*; {194} whatsoever faculty you understand by those words. Besides, not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as *virtue*, *reason*, *God*, or the like, thus much seems manifest -- that sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore, and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities.**

***Hyl*. Let me think a little -- I do not find that I can.**

***Phil*. And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception?**

***Hyl*. By no means.**

***Phil*. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist likewise?**

***Hyl*. It should seem so.**

***Phil*. Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther application of force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear as being in the same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?**

***Hyl*. You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind. But, my fear is that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time to think.**

***Phil*. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty to recover any slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted which makes for your first opinion.**

***Hyl*. One great oversight I take to be this -- that I did not sufficiently distinguish the *object* from the *sensation*. Now, though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot.**

***Phil*. What object do you mean? the object of the senses?**

***Hyl*. The same.**

***Phil*. It is then immediately perceived? {195}**

***Hyl*. Right.**

***Phil*. Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived and a sensation.**

***Hyl*. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides which, there is something perceived; and this I call the *object*. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.**

***Phil*. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?**

***Hyl*. The same.**

***Phil*. And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension?**

***Hyl*. Nothing.**

***Phil*. What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent with the extension; is it not?**

***Hyl*. That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.**

***Phil*. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine; but, that any immediate object of the senses, -- that is, any idea, or combination of ideas -- should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to *all* minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red and yellow were on the tulip *you saw*, since you do not pretend to *see* that unthinking substance.**

***Hyl*. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from the subject.**

***Phil*. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to your distinction between *sensation* and *object*; if I take you right, you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not.**

***Hyl*. True.**

***Phil*. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may? {196}**

***Hyl*. That is my meaning.**

***Phil*. So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?**

***Hyl*. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a perception.**

***Phil*. When is the mind said to be active?**

***Hyl*. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.**

***Phil*. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an act of the will?**

***Hyl*. It cannot.**

***Phil*. The mind therefore is to be accounted *active* in its perceptions so far forth as *volition* is included in them?**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in applying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling?**

***Hyl*. *No*.**

***Phil*. I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But neither can this be called *smelling*: for, if it were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner?**

***Hyl*. True.**

***Phil*. Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more there is -- as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell at all -- this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive. Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?**

***Hyl*. No, the very same.**

***Phil*. Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?**

***Hyl*. Without doubt.**

***Phil*. But, doth it in like manner depend on *your* will that in looking on this flower you perceive *white* rather than any other colour? Or, directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition?**

***Hyl*. No, certainly.**

***Phil*. You are then in these respects altogether passive? {197}**

***Hyl*. I am.**

***Phil*. Tell me now, whether *seeing* consists in perceiving light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?**

***Hyl*. Without doubt, in the former.**

***Phil*. Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and colours altogether passive, what is become of that action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow from your own concessions, that the perception of light and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain contradiction?**

***Hyl*. I know not what to think of it.**

***Phil*. Besides, since you distinguish the *active* and *passive* in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them *external objects*, and give them in words what subsistence you please. But, examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say?**

***Hyl*. I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance. But then, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things in a different view, considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a *material substratum*, without which they cannot be conceived to exist.**

***Phil*. *Material substratum* call you it? Pray, by which of your senses came you acquainted with that being?**

***Hyl*. It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being perceived by the senses.**

***Phil*. I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained**

the idea of it?

***Hyl*. I do not pretend to any proper positive *idea* of it. However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without a support.**

***Phil*. It seems then you have only a relative *notion* of it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it bears to sensible qualities? {198}**

***Hyl*. Right.**

***Phil*. Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation**

consists.

***Hyl*. Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term *substratum*, or *substance*?**

***Phil*. If so, the word *substratum* should import that it is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents?**

***Hyl*. True.**

***Phil*. And consequently under extension?**

***Hyl*. I own it.**

***Phil*. It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct**

from extension?

***Hyl*. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different from the thing supporting?**

***Phil*. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is supposed to be the *substratum* of extension?**

***Hyl*. Just so.**

***Phil*. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in *spreading*?**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which it is spread?**

***Hyl*. It must.**

***Phil*. Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the *substratum* of extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified to be a *substratum*: and so on to infinity. And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the *substratum* was something distinct from and exclusive of extension?**

***Hyl*. Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is *spread* in a gross literal sense under extension. The word *substratum* is used only to express in general the same thing with *substance*.**

***Phil*. Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term *substance*. Is it not that it stands under accidents?**

***Hyl*. The very same.**

***Phil*. But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not be extended?**

***Hyl*. It must. {199}**

***Phil*. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former?**

***Hyl*. You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair, Philonous.**

***Phil*. I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents. How! is it as your legs support your body?**

***Hyl*. No; that is the literal sense.**

***Phil*. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in. -- How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?**

***Hyl*. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well enough what was meant by Matter's supporting accidents. But now, the more I think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know nothing of it.**

***Phil*. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents?**

***Hyl*. I acknowledge it.**

***Phil*. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a material support of them?**

***Hyl*. I did.**

***Phil*. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive?**

***Hyl*. It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind.**

***Phil*. Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet my arguments or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not {200} *at all* without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.**

***Hyl*. If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.**

***Phil*. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?**

***Hyl*. No, that were a contradiction.**

***Phil*. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of *conceiving* a thing which is *unconceived*?**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. The, tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?**

***Hyl*. How should it be otherwise?**

***Phil*. And what is conceived is surely in the mind?**

***Hyl*. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.**

***Phil*. How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?**

***Hyl*. That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me into it. -- It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive them *existing out of the minds of all Spirits*.**

***Phil*. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in the mind? {201}**

***Hyl*. I do.**

***Phil*. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive?**

***Hyl*. I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I *see things at* a distance? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?**

***Phil*. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?**

***Hyl*. I do.**

***Phil*. And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?**

***Hyl*. They have.**

***Phil*. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind?**

***Hyl*. By no means.**

***Phil*. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are perceived.**

***Hyl*. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?**

***Phil*. By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are without the mind.**

***Hyl*. True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests something of *outness or distance*?**

***Phil*. Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?**

***Hyl*. They are in a continual change.**

***Phil*. Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance, or will be perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach.**

***Hyl*. It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: {202} no matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of distance suggested in the case.**

***Phil*. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this: from the ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have by experience learned to collect what other ideas you will (according to the standing order of nature) be affected with, after such a certain succession of time and motion.**

***Hyl*. Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.**

***Phil*. Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what may be *suggested* by sight?**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of sensations, existing only in his mind?**

***Hyl*. It is undeniable.**

***Phil*. But, to make it still more plain: is not *distance* a line turned endwise to the eye?**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?**

***Hyl*. It cannot.**

***Phil*. Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight?**

***Hyl*. It should seem so.**

***Phil*. Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance?**

***Hyl*. It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.**

***Phil*. But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same place with extension and figures?**

***Hyl*. They do.**

***Phil*. How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without, when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being the very same with regard to both?**

***Hyl*. I know not what to answer.**

***Phil*. But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind. For, whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of the mind?**

***Hyl*. To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas?**

***Phil*. As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, {203} that is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And**

I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by this last question, to have departed from what you then thought.

Hyl. To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of objects: -- the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called *ideas*; the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations. Now, I own ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects do. I am sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner; it would probably have cut short your discourse.

Phil. Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other faculty?

Hyl. They are perceived by sense.

Phil. Howl Is there any thing perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived?

Hyl. Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.

Phil. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas?

Hyl. That is my meaning.

Phil. And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense.

Hyl. In the very same.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a certain symmetry and composition of the whole?

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar see as much? {204}

Hyl. He would.

Phil. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect a degree as you?

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory: should it not?

Hyl. It should.

Phil. Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything is perceived by sense which is not, immediately perceived. Though I grant we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense: that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense *suggests* to the mind others, perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be *heard but sound*; and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot

bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on us. As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return to your comparison of Caesar's picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you must hold the real things, or archetypes of our ideas, are not perceived by sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for the existence of what you call *real things or material objects*. Or, whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves; or, if you have heard or read of any one that did. {205}

***Hyl*. I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will never convince me.**

***Phil*. My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge of *material beings*. Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or mediately: by sense, or by reason and reflexion. But, as you have excluded sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe their existence; or what *medium* you can possibly make use of to prove it, either to mine or your own understanding.**

***Hyl*. To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point, I do not find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much seems pretty plain, that it is at least possible such things may really exist. And, as long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved to believe as I did, till you bring good reasons to the contrary.**

***Phil*. What! Is it come to this, that you only *believe* the existence of material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the possibility of its being true? Then you will have me bring reasons against it: though another would think it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative. And, after all, this very point which you are now resolved to maintain, without any reason, is in effect what you have more than once during this discourse seen good reason to give up. But, to pass over all this; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist without the mind, but that they are copies, images, or representations, of certain originals that do?**

***Hyl*. You take me right.**

***Phil*. They are then like external things?**

***Hyl*. They are.**

***Phil*. Have those things a stable and permanent nature, independent of our senses; or are they in a perpetual change, upon our producing any motions in our bodies -- suspending, exerting, or altering, our faculties or organs of sense?**

***Hyl*. Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or in the posture and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect the ideas in our minds, but it were absurd to think they had the same effect on things existing without the mind.**

***Phil*. How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and constant? Or, in other words, since all sensible {206} qualities, as size, figure, colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually changing, upon every alteration in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation; how can any determinate material objects be properly represented or painted forth by several distinct things, each of which is so different from and unlike the rest? Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones?**

***Hyl*. I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to say to this.**

***Phil*. But neither is this all. Which are material objects in themselves -- perceptible or imperceptible?**

***Hyl*. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to be perceived only by our ideas.**

***Phil*. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals insensible?**

***Hyl*. Right.**

***Phil*. But how can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible? Can a real thing, in itself *invisible*, be like a *colour*; or a real thing, which is not *audible*, be like a *sound*? In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea?**

***Hyl*. I must own, I think not.**

***Phil*. Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? Do. you not perfectly know your own ideas?**

***Hyl*. I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive or know can be no part of my idea.**

***Phil*. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there be anything in them which can exist without the mind: or if you can conceive anything like them existing without the mind.**

***Hyl*. Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive or understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it is most evident that *no idea can exist without the mind*.**

***Phil*. You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the *reality* of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which was to shew your principles led to Scepticism. {207}**

***Hyl*. For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least silenced.**

***Phil*. I would fain know what more you would require in order to a perfect conviction. Have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself all manner of ways? Were any little slips in discourse laid hold and insisted on? Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you had offered, as best served your purpose? Hath not everything you could say been heard and examined with all the fairness imaginable? In a word have you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth? And, if you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former concessions, or think of any remaining subterfuge, any new distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why do you not produce it?**

***Hyl*. A little patience, Philonous. I am at present so amazed to see myself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have drawn me into, that on the sudden it cannot be expected I should find my way out. You must give me time to look about me and recollect myself.**

***Phil*. Hark; is not this the college bell?**

***Hyl*. It rings for prayers.**

***Phil*. We will go in then, if you please, and meet here again tomorrow morning. In the meantime, you may employ your thoughts on this morning's discourse, and try if you can find any fallacy in it, or invent any new means to extricate yourself.**

***Hyl*. Agreed. {208}**

The Second Dialogue

***Hylas*. I beg your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting you sooner. All this morning my head was so filled with our late conversation that I had not leisure to think of the time of the day, or indeed of anything else.**

***Philonous*. I am glad you were so intent upon it, in hopes if there were any mistakes in your concessions, or fallacies in my reasonings from them, you will now discover them to me.**

***Hyl*. I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw you but search after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that view, have minutely examined the whole series of yesterday's discourse: but all in vain, for the notions it led me into, upon review, appear still more clear and evident; and, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do they force my assent.**

***Phil*. And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine, that they proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason? Truth and beauty are in this alike, that the strictest survey sets them both off to advantage; while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure being reviewed, or too nearly inspected.**

***Hyl*. I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can any one be more entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences, so long as I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But, when these are out of my thoughts, there seems, on the other hand, something so satisfactory, so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of explaining things that, I profess, I know not how to reject it.**

***Phil*. I know not what way you mean.**

***Hyl*. I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas.**

***Phil*. How is that?**

***Hyl*. It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the body; and that outward objects, by the different impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits propagate them to the brain {209} or seat of the soul, which, according to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas.**

***Phil*. And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are affected with ideas?**

***Hyl*. Why not, Philonous? Have you anything to object against it?**

***Phil*. I would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis. You make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our ideas. Pray tell me whether by the *brain* you mean any sensible thing.**

***Hyl*. What else think you I could mean?**

***Phil*. Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things which are immediately perceivable are ideas; and these exist only in the mind. Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to.**

***Hyl*. I do not deny it.**

***Phil*. The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists only in the mind. Now, I would**

fain know whether you think it reasonable to suppose that one idea or thing existing in the mind occasions all other ideas. And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the origin of that primary idea or brain itself?

Hyl. I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which is perceivable to sense -- this being itself only a combination of sensible ideas -- but by another which I imagine.

Phil. But are not things imagined as truly *in the mind* as things perceived?

Hyl. I must confess they are.

Phil. It comes, therefore, to the same thing; and you have been all this while accounting for ideas by certain motions or impressions of the brain; that is, by some alterations in an idea, whether sensible or imaginable it matters not.

Hyl. I begin to suspect my hypothesis.

Phil. Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas. When, therefore, you say all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the brain, do you conceive this brain or no? If you do, then you talk of ideas imprinted in an idea causing that same idea, which is absurd. If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of forming a reasonable hypothesis. {210}

Hyl. I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is nothing in it.

Phil. You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of explaining things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any reasonable man. What connexion is there between a motion in the nerves, and the sensations of sound or colour in the mind? Or how is it possible these should be the effect of that?

Hyl. But I could never think it had so little in it as now it seems to have.

Phil. Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things have a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic?

Hyl. It is too plain to be denied.

Phil. Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure? Is there not something in the woods and groves, in the rivers and clear springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports the soul? At the prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some huge mountain whose top is lost in the clouds, or of an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled with a pleasing horror? Even in rocks and deserts is there not an agreeable wildness? How sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth! To preserve and renew our, relish for them, is not the veil of night alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not change her dress with the seasons? How aptly are the elements disposed! What variety and use [in the meanest productions of nature]![4] What delicacy, what beauty, what contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies I How exquisitely are all things suited, as well to their particular ends, as to constitute opposite parts of the whole I And, while they mutually aid and support, do they not also set off and illustrate each other? Raise now your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those glorious luminaries that adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation of the planets, are they not admirable for use and order? Were those (miscalled *erratic*) globes once known to stray, in their repeated journeys through the pathless void? Do they not measure areas round the sun ever proportioned to the times? So fixed, so immutable are the laws by which the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe. {211} How vivid and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars! How magnificent and rich that negligent profusion with which they appear to be scattered throughout the whole azure vault! Yet, if you take the

telescope, it brings into your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye. Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer view immense orbs of fight at various distances, far sunk in the abyss of space. Now you must call imagination to your aid. The feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round the central fires; and in those worlds the energy of an all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms. But, neither sense nor imagination are big enough to comprehend the boundless extent, with all its glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind exert and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the vast bodies that compose this mighty frame, how distant and remote soever, are by some secret mechanism, some Divine art and force, linked in a mutual dependence and intercourse with each other; even with this earth, which was almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd of worlds. Is not the whole system immense, beautiful, glorious beyond expression and beyond thought! What treatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all *reality*? How should those Principles be entertained that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare? To be plain, can you expect this Scepticism of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men of sense?

***Hyl*. Other men may think as they please; but for your part you have nothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as much a sceptic as I am.**

***Phil*. There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you.**

***Hyl*. What! Have you all along agreed to the premises, and do you now deny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those paradoxes by myself which you led me into? This surely is not fair.**

***Phil*. *I* deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led to Scepticism. You indeed said the *reality* of sensible things consisted in *an absolute existence out of the minds of spirits*, or distinct from their being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of reality, *you* are obliged to deny sensible things any {212} real existence: that is, according to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. But I neither said nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined after that manner. To me it is evident for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that., seeing they depend not on my thought, and have all existence distinct from being perceived by me, *there must be some other Mind wherein they exist*. As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.**

***Hyl*. What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all others too who believe there is a God, and that He knows and comprehends all things.**

***Phil*. Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him.**

***Hyl*. But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it how we come by that belief?**

***Phil*. But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no difference between saying, *There is a God, therefore He perceives all things*; and saying, *Sensible things do really exist*; *and, if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite Mind*: *therefore there is an infinite Mind or God*? This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the *being of a God*. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all**

controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the creation, that it was the workmanship of God. But that -- setting aside all help of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjustment of things -- an infinite Mind should be necessarily inferred from the bare *existence of the sensible world*, is an advantage to them only who have made this easy reflexion: that the sensible world is that which we perceive by our several senses; and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no {213} idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now, without any laborious search into the sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate for Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an eternal succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous concourse of atoms; those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza: in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is it not entirely overthrown, by this single reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a mind? Let any one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of atoms; how anything at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist independent of a Mind, and he need go no farther to be convinced of his folly. Can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he holds to be true in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real existence?

Hyl. It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a notion entertained by some eminent moderns, of *seeing all things in God*?

Phil. I would gladly know that opinion: pray explain it to me.

Hyl. They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is incapable of being united with material things, so as to perceive them in themselves; but that she perceives them by her union with the substance of God, which, being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable of being the immediate object of a spirit's thought. Besides the Divine essence contains in it perfections correspondent to each created being; and which are, for that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind.

Phil. I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether passive and inert, can be the essence, or any part (or like any part) of the essence or substance of God, who is an {214} impassive, indivisible, pure, active being. Many more difficulties and objections there are which occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add that it is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Besides all which it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world serve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature, or the Divine wisdom, to make something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world made in vain?

Hyl. But what say you? Are not you too of opinion that we see all things in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.

Phil. [Few men think; yet all have opinions. Hence men's opinions are superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets which in themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with each other, by those who do not consider them attentively. I shall not therefore be

surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and, know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine. It must be owned that][5] I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture saith, "That in God we live and move and have our being." But that we see things in His essence, after the manner above set forth, I am far from believing. Take here in brief my meaning: -- It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind: nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears: they must therefore exist in some other Mind, whose {215} Will it is they should be exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them which you will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit? This indeed is inconceivable. And to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it not?

***Hyl*. Without doubt.**

***Phil*. But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should exist in and be produced by a spirit; since this is no more than I daily experience in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and, by an act of my will, can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my imagination: though, it must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those perceived by my senses -- which latter are called *red things*. From all which I conclude, *there is a Mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive*. *And*, from the variety, order, and manner of these, I conclude *the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension*. *Mark* it well; I do not say, I see things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible Substance of God. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this most plain and evident? Is there any more in it than what a little observation in our own minds, and that which passeth in them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to acknowledge.**

***Hyl*. I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But, allowing that God is the supreme and universal Cause of an things, yet, may there not be still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be *Matter*?**

***Phil*. How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately: therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason, and not by sense.**

***Hyl*. You are in the right. {216}**

***Phil*. Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded on; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of it.**

***Hyl*. I find myself affected with various ideas, whereof I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being**

altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore *some* cause distinct from me and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is *the cause of my ideas*. And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter.

***Phil*. Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current proper signification attached to a common name in any language? For example, suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain country men pass unhurt through the fire; and, upon explaining himself, you found he meant by the word fire that which others call *water*. Or, if he should assert that there are trees that walk upon two legs, meaning men by the term *trees*. Would you think this reasonable?**

***Hyl*. No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard of propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking improperly is to pervert the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply disputes, where there is no difference in opinion.**

***Phil*. And doth not *Matter*, in the common current acceptation of the word, signify an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking, inactive Substance?**

***Hyl*. It doth.**

***Phil*. And, hath it not been made evident that no *such* substance can possibly exist? And, though it should be allowed to exist, yet how can that which is *inactive* be a *cause*; or that which is *unthinking* be a *cause of thought*? You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word *Matter* a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell me you understand by it, an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the cause of our ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and run into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I do by no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect a cause from the *phenomena*: *but* I deny that *the* cause deducible by reason can properly be termed Matter.**

***Hyl*. There is indeed something in what you say. But I am {217} afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would by no means be thought to deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of all things. All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme Agent, there is a cause of a limited and inferior nature, which *concurs* in the production of our ideas, not by any act of will, or spiritual efficiency, but by that kind of action which belongs to Matter, viz. *motion*.**

***Phil*. I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, substance, existing without the mind. What! Have you already forgotten you were convinced; or are you willing I should repeat what has been said on that head? In truth this is not fair dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which you have so often acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist farther on what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing of action in them.**

***Hyl*. They are.**

***Phil*. And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?**

***Hyl*. How often have I acknowledged that they are not.**

***Phil*. But is not *motion* a sensible quality?**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. Consequently it is no action?**

***Hyl*. I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my finger, it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion is active.**

Phil. Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition: and, in the second place, whether to say something and conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense: and, lastly, whether, having considered the premises, you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active Cause of our ideas, other than _Spirit_, is highly absurd and unreasonable?

Hyl. I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being an _instrument_, subservient to the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?

Phil. An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument?

Hyl. Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me.

Phil. What? You are then of opinion it is made up of {218} unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?

Hyl. I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving substance.

Phil. But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of all sensible qualities, even extension itself?

Hyl. I do not pretend to have any notion of it.

Phil. And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceivable Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine God cannot act as well without it; or that you find by experience the use of some such thing, when you form ideas in your own mind?

Hyl. You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what reasons have you not to believe it?

Phil. It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist on reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know _what it is_ you would have me believe; since you say you have no manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe you know not what ' and you know not why.

Hyl. Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an _instrument_, I do not mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of instrument; but, however, I have some notion of _instrument in general_, which I apply to it.

Phil. But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the most general notion of _instrument_, as taken in a distinct sense from _cause_, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine attributes?

Hyl. Make that appear and I shall give up the point.

Phil. What mean you by the general nature or notion of _instrument_?

Hyl. That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the general notion.

Phil. Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our wills? Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volition. But I should use one if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the same mind? {219} Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in producing an effect _immediately_ depending on the

will of the agent?

***Hyl*. I own I cannot.**

***Phil*. How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on whose Will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it? Thus it seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of God; that is, by your own confession, to give up the point.**

***Hyl*. It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.**

***Phil*. But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite powers, are forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear consequence, that the supreme unlimited agent useth no tool or instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner exerted than executed, without the application of means; which, if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever.**

***Hyl*. I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. However, I would not be understood to give up its existence neither; since, notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an *occasion*.**

***Phil*. How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often must it be proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it? But, to say no more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame you for so frequently changing the signification of the principal term) -- I would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an occasion, having already denied it to be a cause. And, when you have shewn in what sense you understand *occasion*, pray, in the next place, be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an occasion of our ideas?**

***Hyl*. As to the first point: by *occasion* I mean an inactive {220} unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds.**

***Phil*. And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being?**

***Hyl*. I know nothing of its nature.**

***Phil*. Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason why we should allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, unknown thing.**

***Hyl*. When we see ideas produced in our minds, after an orderly and constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular occasions, at the presence of which they are excited.**

***Phil*. You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our ideas, and that He causes them at the presence of those occasions.**

***Hyl*. That is my opinion.**

***Phil*. Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt He perceives.**

***Hyl*. Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of acting.**

***Phil*. Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in**

the series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from those attributes, to suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, in case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your purpose; it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived, can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion of producing ideas in us?

***Hyl*. I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of *occasion* seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.**

***Phil*. Do you not at length perceive that in all these different acceptations of *Matter*, you have been only supposing you know not what, for no manner of reason, and to no kind of use?**

***Hyl*. I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused perception that there is such a thing as *Matter*. {221}**

***Phil*. Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately. If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately. So much for the perception. Then for the Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, *substratum*, cause, instrument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these, shifting your notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape, then in another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved and rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I would gladly bear it.**

***Hyl*. I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I am at a loss what more to urge.**

***Phil*. And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been hitherto suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon. supposition that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected by it. Or, supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you might for all that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the very same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have.**

***Hyl*. I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce' any idea in our minds. And, I do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such a thing as matter in any of the foregoing acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is *Matter* in some sense or other. *What that is I* do not indeed pretend to determine.**

***Phil*. I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and if so, whether you can suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case you suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me know what those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter's supporting them?**

***Hyl*. We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present understand by *Matter* neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something entirely unknown, distinct from all these. {222}**

***Phil*. It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter nothing but the general abstract idea of *entity*.**

***Hyl*. Nothing else; save only that I super-add to this general idea the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.**

***Phil*. Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?**

***Hyl*. Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say it exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you. And you must expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about Matter.**

***Phil*. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its *existence*?**

***Hyl*. It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.**

***Phil*. But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its existence?**

***Hyl*. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not what is meant by its *existence*, or how it exists.**

***Phil*. Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general, prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings, all particular things whatsoever.**

***Hyl*. Hold, let me think a little -- I profess, Philonous, I do not find that I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion of Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of Matter, its *where*, its *how*, its *entity*, or anything belonging to it.**

***Phil*. When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have not any notion in your mind?**

***Hyl*. None at all.**

***Phil*. Pray tell me if the case stands not thus -- At first, from a belief of material substance, you would have it that the {223} immediate objects existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes; next instruments; then occasions: lastly *something in general*, which being interpreted proves *nothing*. So Matter comes to nothing. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?**

***Hyl*. Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence.**

***Phil*. That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the existence of that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all this; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to -- I will not indeed thence conclude against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without any design or**

signification whatsoever. And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.

***Hyl*. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends demonstration. I find myself relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not what, *matter*.**

***Phil*. But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind,? Let a visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it will not be distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly, and adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is need of time and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in different lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence {224} you take, in pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what reason, to you know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art or science, any sect or profession of men? Or is there anything so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation? But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; though at the same time you neither know *what is meant* by *Matter*, or by its *existence*. This indeed is surprising, and the more so because it is altogether voluntary [and of your own head],[6] you not being led to it by any one reason; for I challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs Matter to explain or account for it.**

***Hyl*. *The reality* of things cannot be maintained without supposing the existence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its defence?**

***Phil*. The reality of things! What things? sensible or intelligible?**

***Hyl*. Sensible things.**

***Phil*. My glove for example?**

***Hyl*. That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.**

***Phil*. But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this *glove*, that I see it, and feel it, and wear it? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should be assured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see, exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or, in general of anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall think nothing too hard for you.**

***Hyl*. Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of matter is highly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does not appear to me.**

***Phil*. But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account merely, it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or a centaur.**

***Hyl*. I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and that which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.**

***Phil*. I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not, {225} evidently proved, from your own**

concessions, that it is not. In the common sense of the word *Matter*, is there any more implied than an extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind? And have not you acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen evident reason for denying the possibility of such a substance?

***Hyl*. True, but that is only one sense of the term *Matter*.**

***Phil*. But is it not the only proper genuine received sense? And, if Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible? Else how could anything be proved impossible? Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all one way or other, to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the common signification of words?**

***Hyl*. I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately than the vulgar, and were not always confined to the common acceptation of a term.**

***Phil*. But this now mentioned is the common received sense among philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have you not been allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have you not used this privilege in the utmost extent; sometimes entirely changing, at others leaving out, or putting into the definition of it whatever, for the present, best served your design, contrary to all the known rules of reason and logic? And hath not this shifting, unfair method of yours spun out our dispute to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of those senses? And can any more be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing, than the proving it impossible in every particular sense that either you or any one else understands it in?**

***Hyl*. But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure abstracted and indefinite sense.**

***Phil*.. When is a thing shewn to be impossible?**

***Hyl*. When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition.**

***Phil*. But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be demonstrated between ideas?**

***Hyl*. I agree with you.**

***Phil*. Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the word *Matter*, it is plain, by your own confession, there {226} was included no idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense; which is the same thing as none. You are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a repugnancy between ideas, where there are no ideas; or the impossibility of Matter taken in an *unknown* sense, that is, no sense at all. My business was only to shew you meant *nothing*; and this you were brought to own. So that, in all your various senses, you have been shewed either to mean nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let me know what is.**

***Hyl*. I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible; nor do I see what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the same time that I give up this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely none could be more seemingly evident than this once was: and yet it now seems as false and absurd as ever it did true before. But I think we have discussed the point sufficiently for the present. The remaining part of the day I would willingly spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this morning's conversation, and tomorrow shall be glad to meet you here again about the same time.**

***Phil*. *I* will not fail to attend you. {227}**

The Third Dialogue

Philonous. Tell me, Hylas,[7] what are the fruits of yesterday's meditation? Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting? or have you since seen cause to change your opinion?

Hylas. Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas I we know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us ever to know anything in this life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended us for speculation.

Phil. What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?

Hyl. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

Phil. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?

Hyl. You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense. Their internal constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly in the dark as to *that*.

Phil. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?

Hyl. *Know*? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it. All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that colour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real natures of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said of all other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the world. They have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

Phil. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, {228} from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

Hyl. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and have no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of a different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.

Phil. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

Hyl. Even so.

Phil. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is, but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life, as comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they are conversant about.

Hyl. They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But philosophers know better things.

Phil. You mean, they *know* that they *know nothing*.

Hyl. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

Phil. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

Hyl. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every, other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. {229} Nay, now I think on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that it is impossible any *real* corporeal thing should exist in nature.

Phil. You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of *material substance*? This makes you dream of those unknown natures in everything. It is this occasions your distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the true nature of everything, but you know not whether anything really exists, or whether there are any true natures at all; forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence, wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real existence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was. Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I say?

Hyl. I agree with you. *Material substance* was no more than an hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my breath in defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.

Phil. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of. It is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are on the {230} objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by *snow* and fire mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in *them*. But I, who understand by those words the things I see and feel,

am obliged to think like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be really perceived by my senses, and at the same time not really exist, is to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known them but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of God; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration! I might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel.

***Hyl*. Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible things should exist without the mind. Do you not?**

***Phil*. I do.**

***Hyl*. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist?**

***Phil*. *I* can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of {231} my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows there is an *omnipresent eternal Mind*, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the *laws of nature*.**

***Hyl*. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or have they any agency included in them?**

***Phil*. They are altogether passive and inert.**

***Hyl*. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?**

***Phil*. I acknowledge it.**

***Hyl*. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of God?**

***Phil*. It cannot.**

***Hyl*. Since therefore you have no *idea* of the mind of God, how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it?**

***Phil*. As to your first question: I own I have properly no *idea*, either of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless know that 1, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly a s I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the terms I *and myself*; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind,**

Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives. I say *indivisible*, because unextended; and *unextended*, because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word *idea* in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is, an image or likeness of God -- though indeed extremely inadequate. For, all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its {232} imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in *myself* some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflexion and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas. Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created things in the mind of God. So much for your first question. For the second: I suppose by this time you can answer it yourself. For you neither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act, neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other; nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately. All which makes the case of *Matter* widely different from that of the *Deity*.

[*Hyl*. You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no *idea* of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this?

Phil. _I_ say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of material substance, merely because I have no notion of it' but because the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that is, nothing {233} inconsistent must be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that, although we believe things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists, without some reason for such belief: but I have no reason for believing the existence of Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither can I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance -- either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflexion. You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer to the same objections. In the very notion or definition of *material Substance*, there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances: if to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no

argument, and there is a probability for the other; if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of it. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by reflexion.

***Hyl*. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that *you* are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in *spiritual Substance* than in *material Substance*, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.**

***Phil*. How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that *I myself* am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wifls, and operates about ideas. I know that I, one {234} and the same self, perceive both colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from aft other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.][8]**

***Hyl*. I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them? Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, *to be perceived* is one thing, and *to exist* is another.**

***Phil*. *I* am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real, being, and saith it *is or exists*; but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being.**

***Hyl*. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.**

***Phil*. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us.**

***Hyl*. But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men. {235} Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer think you he would make?**

***Phil*. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that is *exists in*) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot**

deny. The question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a *real* existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an *absolute* existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds. This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.

Hyl. But, according to your notions, what difference is there between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream -- since they are all equally in the mind?

Phil. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish *things from chimeras* on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

Hyl. But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very oddly.

Phil. I own the word *idea,* not being commonly used for *thing,* sounds something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to {236} be implied by that term; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its sense; which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every unthinking being is necessarily, and from -the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom "we five, and move, and have our being." Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not on the objects: or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things, or know any thing of their real natures -- though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all our senses?

Hyl. And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything more extravagant than this?

Phil. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say -- a thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions, [without any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom, *Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself*].[9] Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places. In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This is so much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to confirm it by citations.

Hyl. You are not aware, Philonous, that in making God the immediate Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.

***Phil*. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument or occasion, called *Matter*, you as truly make Him the author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude {237} doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since, therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making God an immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions.**

***Hyl*. But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there is the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most voices, I am confident you would give up the point, without gathering the votes.**

***Phil*. I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no doubts of their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts, your paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person. That there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed. And that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can deny. It is therefore evident there can be no *substratum* of those qualities but spirit; in which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny therefore that there is *any unthinking-substratum* of the objects of sense, and *in that acceptation* that there is any material substance. But if by *material substance* is meant only *sensible body*, *that* which is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare say, mean no more) -- then I am more certain of matter's existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to be. If there be anything which makes ,die generality of mankind {238} averse from the notions I espouse, it is a misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things. But, as it is you who are guilty of that, and not 1, it follows that in truth their aversion is against your notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal substances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses); and that, granting this, the bulk of mankind will take no thought about, nor think themselves at all concerned in the fate of those unknown natures, and philosophical quiddities, which some men are so fond of.**

***Hyl*. What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, crooked?**

***Phil*. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives, but in the inference he makes from his present perceptions. Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by**

sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and at present, (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive its motion.

Hyl. I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible enough. But, give me leave to put you in mind of {239} one thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you are now that it does not?

Phil. I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry, upon evidence.

Hyl. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with ideas *from without* is evident; and it is no less evident that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind, corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted; which I call *Matter*, and you call *Spirit*. This is all the difference.

Phil. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers, extended?

Hyl. It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the idea of extension.

Phil. It is therefore itself unextended?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. Is it not also active?

Hyl. Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?

Phil. Now let me ask you two questions: *First*, Whether it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name *Matter* to an unextended active being? And, *Secondly*, Whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of language?

Hyl. Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so, but some *Third Nature* distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason is there why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?

Phil. My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from volition, neither. can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit: therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a Spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be a Spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more {240} clearly if it be possible, I assert as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful Being. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus, I prove it to be Spirit. From the

effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and, because actions, volitions; and, because there are volitions, there must be a *will*. Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of *my* mind: but, being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding; there is therefore an *understanding*. But will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a *Spirit*.

Hyl. And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear, little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a contradiction. Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?

Phil. Without a doubt.

Hyl. To suffer pain is an imperfection?

Phil. It is.

Hyl. Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some other Being?

Phil. We are.

Hyl. And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that Spirit God?

Phil. I grant it.

Hyl. But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and uneasiness are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain contradiction.

Phil. That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But, that God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an {241} external Agent, which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do; whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing: it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body: that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind. So that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means no more than a correspondence in the order of nature, between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy, or natural ties. No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know everything knowable, is certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath ideas; but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your not distinguishing, where there is so manifest a difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity where there is none.

Hyl. But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies. And what can withstand demonstration?

***Phil*. Let me see how you demonstrate that point.**

***Hyl*. I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quantities of motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are equal, it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in each. But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small inequalities, arising from the resistance of the air) descend with an equal velocity; the motion therefore of descending bodies, and consequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that motion, is proportional to the quantity of Matter; which was to be demonstrated.**

***Phil*. You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of motion in any body is proportional to the velocity {242} and *Matter* taken together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition from whence the existence of *Carter* is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in a circle?**

***Hyl*. In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.**

***Phil*. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that gravity is proportional to *Matter*, in your philosophic sense of the word; except you take it for granted that unknown *substratum*, or whatever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities; which to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I will not dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers producing them, do exist in a *material substratum*; this is what I deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration, have not yet proved.**

***Hyl*. I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you shall persuade me that the natural philosophers have been dreaming all this while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter?**

***Phil*. What mean you, Hylas, by the *phenomena*?**

***Hyl*. I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.**

***Phil*. And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?**

***Hyl*. I have told you so a hundred times.**

***Phil*. Therefore, to explain the phenomena, is, to shew how we come to be affected with ideas, in that manner and order wherein they are imprinted on our senses. Is it not?**

***Hyl*. It is.**

***Phil*. Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the production of any one idea in our minds by the help of *Matter*, I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it as nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of phenomena. That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that a Being which is utterly destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say, though {243} we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew its qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far from explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in the world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers have been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the connexion of ideas, they discover the laws and methods of nature, which is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining.**

Hyl. After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do you imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of Matter, if there was no such thing?

Phil. That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or passion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father ' on Him, it must be either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation; or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it. But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, *taken for something distinct from what we perceive by our senses*, is thought to exist by all mankind; or indeed, by any except a few philosophers, who do not know what they would be at? Your question supposes these points are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to give you another answer. In the meantime, let it suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at all.

Hyl. But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger. New notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men's minds, and nobody knows where they will end.

Phil. Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is there the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making anything known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all such innovations had been forbidden, {244} men would have made a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But it is none of my business to plead for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the objects: that we must not believe our senses: that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be assured even of their existence: that real colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow: that there are in bodies absolute extensions, without any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle of a body contains innumerable extended parts: -- these are the novelties, these are the strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarrass the mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It is true, in doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some *ambages*, and ways of speech not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that which is most singular in them will, in effect, be found to amount to no more than this. -- that it is absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking Being should exist without being perceived by a Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country.

Hyl. As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to,. those are out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me *with scepticism*. This is so plain, there is no denying it.

Phil. You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.

Hyl. Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty

forms of things, the outside only which strikes the senses.

***Phil*. What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon your supposition -- that Matter {245} is an essential part of all corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein we differ -- you will have them to be empty appearances, I, real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do.**

***Hyl*. You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope the better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye?**

***Phil*. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye. But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind of individual, the endless number of confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine, by my other senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not being perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances. It will not thence follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything else: except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not rightly {246} understanding the common language of men, speaking of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing to the same original: while they began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of life, without any regard to speculation.**

***Hyl*. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.**

***Phil*. It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther real than as our ideas are the true *representations* of those *originals*. But, as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble them at all. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real knowledge. Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all be true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider the point, we cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an absolute existence out of a mind:**

nor consequently, according to you, how there should be any real thing in nature. The result of ;all which is that we are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me leave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the source of all this scepticism? Secondly, whether you are informed, either by sense or reason, of the existence of those unknown originals? And, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant by the *absolute or external existence of unperceiving substances*? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, it be not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances, admit with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses?

Hyl. For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the objects perceived by the {247} *senses* of one, likewise perceivable to others present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the same manner affected with the ideas I frame in my *imagination*. Does not this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?

Phil. I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the objects of sense and those of imagination. But what would you infer from thence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because they are perceived by many.

Hyl. I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me into another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds?

Phil. It is.

Hyl. But the *same* idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same thing? And is not this highly, absurd?

Phil. If the term *same* be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since men are used to apply the word *same* where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, *several saw the same thing*, so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But, if the term *same* be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing. But whether philosophers shall think fit to *call* a thing the *same or* no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language; they would, without question, agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, might call it the *same* thing: others, especially {248} regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of *different* things. But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether. what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term *same* applied to it? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built in their place; and that you should

call this the *same*, and I should say it was not the *same* house. -- would we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself? And would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you should say, We differed in our notions; for that you super-added to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know not what you mean by *the abstracted idea of identity*; and should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yourself. -- Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity, without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this farther reflexion with you: that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the Materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes equally against the Materialists and me.

Hyl. [Ay, Philonous,][10] But they suppose an external archetype, to which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive the same thing.

Phil. And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles; -- *external, I mean, to your own mind*: though indeed it must be' supposed to exist in that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the ends of *identity*, as well as if it existed out of a mind. And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.

Hyl. You have indeed clearly satisfied me -- either that there is no difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes equally against both opinions.

Phil. But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither.

Hyl. I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonous, when I consider {249} the substance of what you advance against *Scepticism*, it amounts to no more than this: We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that we are affected with sensible impressions.

Phil. And how are *we* concerned any farther? I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure *nothing* cannot be seen, or felt, or. tasted: it is therefore red. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word *cherry* you, mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its *existence* something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.

Hyl. But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same reasons against the existence of sensible things *in a mind*, which you have offered against their existing *in a material substratum*?

Phil. When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say ,to them.

Hyl. Is the mind extended or unextended?

Phil. Unextended, without doubt.

***Hyl*. Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?**

***Phil*. They are.**

***Hyl*. Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?**

***Phil*. I believe you may.**

***Hyl*. Explain to me now, 0 Philonous! how it is possible there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my *substratum*.**

***Phil*. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself. This is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material *substratum* intelligible, I would fain know.**

***Hyl*. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?**

***Phil*. None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. 'Nor is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in the terms *comprehend,* reflect, *discourse*, &*c*., which, being applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original sense.**

***Hyl*. You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over. And, indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others, without being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to make me a proselyte to your principles.**

***Phil*. Let me know this mighty difficulty.**

***Hyl*. The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions. Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what? of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things, solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and I shall perhaps agree with you.**

***Phil*. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants and animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning created by God, I make no question. {251} If by *ideas* you mean fictions and fancies of the mind, then these are no ideas. If by *ideas* you mean immediate objects of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot exist unperceived, or out of a mind, then these things are ideas. But whether you do or do not call them *ideas, it* matters little. The difference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained or rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues the same. In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed *ideas*, but *things*. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things, of *red* things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my**

principles, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so often said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to show where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be incumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic acceptation, for Matter, or *an unknown quiddity, with an absolute existence*. When you have proved these points, then (and not till then) may you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute.

***Hyl*. It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your notions?**

***Phil*. If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other, then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither do you pretend they exist without the mind.**

***Hyl*. Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.**

***Phil*. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I should have seen things produced into being -- that is become perceptible -- in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or end their existence, we {252} do not mean this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them. This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought, either of *substratum*, *instrument, occasion,* or *absolute existence*. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men, who believe the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.**

***Hyl*. But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical being: that is to say, upon supposition there were *men* to perceive them; without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?**

***Phil*. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was present -- that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, since they**

deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable; that it exactly suits with the common, natural, and undebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all things on God; and consequently hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible that important article of our faith should have in making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their [great][11] Creator. I say, moreover, that, in this naked {253} conception of things, divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the *actuality of absolute existence*. You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon.

***Hyl*. I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of God? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you? And how could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer or better connected than this?**

***Phil*. And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from eternity?**

***Hyl*. I am.**

***Phil*. Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.**

***Hyl*. This I acknowledge.**

***Phil*. By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.**

***Hyl*. What shall we make then of the creation?**

***Phil*. May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which He then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a *relative, or hypothetical existence* if you please. But, so long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all the religious ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can assign no other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this? Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary and immediate dependence of all {254} things on Him? Nay, would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?**

***Hyl*. Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did either execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to will what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will? If the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of existence, in finite things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge something new to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and all change argues imperfection.**

***Phil*. Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None of which can *we* conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having a beginning. God is a Being of transcerident and unlimited perfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether Materialist or**

Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer anything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is unavoidable on any scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.

***Hyl*. I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.**

***Phil*. What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of things -- the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? or, is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this one point. Either you are not able to conceive {255} the Creation on any hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or complaint against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able to conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion you have of the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter doth not make the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.**

***Hyl*. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of the creation.**

***Phil*. I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?**

***Hyl*. And so I am.**

***Phil*. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way?**

***Hyl*. In the plain sense, doubtless.**

***Phil*. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?**

***Hyl*. I cannot help thinking so.**

***Phil*. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?**

***Hyl*. This I have already acknowledged.**

***Phil*. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not {256} the creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation might terminate?**

***Hyl*. True.**

***Phil*. Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something equally unintelligible to themselves and me?**

***Hyl*. I cannot contradict you.**

***Phil*. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown quiddities, of occasions, or *substratum*? No, certainly; but of things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them.**

***Hyl*. I see you can assault me with my own weapons.**

***Phil*. Then as to *absolute existence*; was there ever known a more jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation? That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd! that not only the most celebrated among the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity. Lay these things together, and then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things.**

***Hyl*. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the *creation* is the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself towards your notions.**

***Phil*. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of' the question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted {257} notions? And indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned, education.**

***Hyl*. I confess it seems to be as you say.**

***Phil*. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of religion, are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general Cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but God, in the strict and proper sense of the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more reason to doubt than of our own being. -- Then, with relation to human sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led**

men into! To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c. -- do they not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with a cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, have they been able to reach the *mechanical* production of any one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course of things? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe? But, laying aside Matter and corporeal, causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the *phenomena* are nothing else but *ideas*; God is a *spirit*, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and usefulness of them can {258} never be sufficiently admired; God is infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance and design. These surely are great advantages in *Physics*. Not to mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second causes. -- Then in *Metaphysics*: what difficulties concerning entity in abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures, substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent substances so widely different as *Spirit and Matter*, should mutually operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas? -- Even the *Mathematics* themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things, become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the. infinite divisibility of finite extension; which depends on that supposition -- But what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas,. fleeting indeed, and changeable; -- however, not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the *irregular visions of* the fancy. {259}

***Hyl*. I agree to all you have now said., and must own that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of *Immaterialism*!**

***Phil*. After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination should appear most agreeable to Common Sense**

and remote from Scepticism. This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the *absolute* existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same notion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be false?

***Hyl*. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects. But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter?**

***Phil*. Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God, because there may be some particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties *attending Immaterialism*, there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the existence of Matter there is not one proof, and far more numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are those mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what they are; something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly and solidly soever demonstrated.**

***Hyl*. You have satisfied me, Philonous.**

***Phil*. But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider: That which bears equally hard on two contradictory {260} opinions can be proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the *Materialists*. Be not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you cannot conceive it easier by the help of *Materialism*, it is plain it can be no objection against *Immaterialism*. Had you proceeded all along by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more unintelligible with than without that supposition; and consequently makes rather *against than* for it. You should consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty arises from the *non-existence of Matter*. If it doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty against *Immaterialism*. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will find this to have been often, if not always, the case. You should likewise take heed not to argue on a *petitio principii*. One is apt to say -- The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our ideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question? But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called *ignoratio elenchi*. You talked often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real being; but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed *somewhat*), which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the mind. Remember I say,**

that it is not any object which is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all these things I affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever. Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question; without which your objections {261} will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they have been) against your own notions.

***Hyl*. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this same *mistaking the question*. In denying Matter,. at first, glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name *Matter*, and applying it to *sensible things*? This may be done without any change in your sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.**

***Phil*. With all my heart: retain the word *Matter*, and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. *Matter*, or *material substance*, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the *terms sensible*, *substance*, *body*, *stuff*, and the like, are retained, the word *Matter* should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term.**

***Hyl*. Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word *Matter* as I please, and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than *Spirit*. But I have been so long accustomed to the *term Matter* that I know not how to part with it: to say, there is no *Matter* in the world, is still shocking to me. Whereas to say -- There is no *Matter*, if by that term be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if by *Matter* is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in being perceived, then there is *Matter*: -- *this* distinction gives it quite another turn; and men will come into your notions with {262} small difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the controversy about *Matter* in the strict acceptation of it, lies altogether between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; or with unknown entities, *abstracted from dl relation to us*? It is evident, things regard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as you found them. Yet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not now think with the Philosophers; nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that respect; precisely, what you have added to, or altered in my former notions.**

***Phil*. I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours tend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers: --**

the former being of opinion, that *those things they immediately perceive are the real things*; and the latter, that *the things immediately perceived are ideas, which exist only in the mind*. Which two notions put together, do, in effect, constitute the substance of what I advance.

***Hyl*. I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw things by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are removed and a new light breaks in upon my under standing. I am clearly convinced that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in pain about their *unknown natures or absolute existence*. This is the state I find myself in at present; though, indeed, the course that brought me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their philosophical Scepticism: but, in the end, your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs.**

***Phil*. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at {263} which it breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent, as well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation. just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.**

Notes

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Editorial Conventions: Letters within angled brackets (e.g., *Hume*) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2]**[Text within brackets is not contained in the first and second editions.]**

[3]**["Size or figure, or sensible quality" -- "size, colour, &c," in the first and second**

editions.]

[4]**["In stones and minerals" -- in first and second editions.]**

[5]**[The passage within brackets first appeared in the third edition.]**

[6]**[0mitted in last edition.]**

[7]**"Tell me, Hylas," -- "So Hylas" -- in first and second editions.]**

[8][This important passage, printed within brackets, is not found in the first and second editions of the Didogues. It is, by anticipation, Berkeley's answer to Hume's application of the objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived Matter, to the reality of the Ego or Self, of which we are aware through memory, as identical amid the changes of its successive states.-A. C. F.]

[9][The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition.]

[10][Omitted in authoes last edition.]

[11][In the first and second editions only.]

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous

George Berkeley

1713

* * * *

THREE DIALOGUES
Between
HYLAS AND PHILONOUS

The Design of which is Plainly to Demonstrate the Reality and Perfection of

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
The Incorporeal Nature of the

SOUL
And the Immediate Providence of a

DEITY
In Opposition to

SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS

Also to Open a Method for Rendering the Sciences More Easy, Useful, and Compendious

{171}

THE FIRST DIALOGUE

<Philonous>. Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find you abroad so early.

<Hylas>. It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.

<Phil>. It happened well, to let you see what innocent and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of

nature inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties too being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those meditations, which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally dispose us to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts: for you seemed very intent on something.

<Hyl>. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will permit me to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any means deprive myself of your company, for my thoughts always flow more easily in conversation with a friend, than when I am alone: but my request is, that you would suffer me to impart my reflexions to you.

<Phil>. With all my heart, it is what I should have requested myself if you had not prevented me.

<Hyl>. I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages, through an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to believe nothing at all, or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This however might be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them some consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief lieth {172} here; that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most important truths, which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable.

<Phil>. I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of the affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of others. I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my word; since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle.

<Hyl>. I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of you.

<Phil>. Pray, what were those?

<Hyl>. You were represented, in last night's conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as <material substance> in the world.

<Phil>. That there is no such thing as what <philosophers call material substance>, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.

<Hyl>. What I can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as <matter>?

<Phil>. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to Common Sense, than I who believe no such thing?

<Hyl>. You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point.

<Phil>. Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common Sense, and remote from Scepticism?

<Hyl>. With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes {173} about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to say.

<Phil>. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a <sceptic>?

<Hyl>. I mean what all men mean -- one that doubts of everything.

<Phil>. He then who entertains no doubts concerning some particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a sceptic.

<Hyl>. I agree with you.

<Phil>. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or negative side of a question?

<Hyl>. In neither; for whoever understands English cannot but know that <doubting> signifies a suspense between both.

<Phil>. He then that denies any point, can no more be said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance.

<Hyl>. True.

<Phil>. And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be esteemed a sceptic than the other.

<Hyl>. I acknowledge it.

<Phil>. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce me <a sceptic>, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in my denial, as you in your affirmation.

<Hyl>. Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my definition; but every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on. I said indeed that a <sceptic> was one who doubted of everything; but I should have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things.

<Phil>. What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences? But these you know are universal intellectual notions, and consequently independent of Matter. The denial therefore of this doth not imply the denying them.

<Hyl>. I grant it. But are there no other things? What think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a <sceptic>?

<Phil>. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be {174} esteemed the greatest <sceptic>?

<Hyl>. That is what I desire.

<Phil>. What mean you by Sensible Things?

<Hyl>. Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine that I mean anything else?

<Phil>. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be said to be <sensible> which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?

<Hyl>. I do not sufficiently understand you.

<Phil>. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt: but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.

<Hyl>. No, certainly: it were absurd to think <God> or <virtue> sensible things; though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary connexion.

<Phil>. It seems then, that by <sensible things> you mean those only which can be perceived <immediately> by sense?

<Hyl>. Right.

<Phil>. Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing?

<Hyl>. It doth.

<Phil>. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds?

<Hyl>. You cannot.

<Phil>. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its heat or weight?

<Hyl>. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for all, that by <sensible things> I mean those only which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive <immediately>: for they make no {175} inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.

<Phil>. This point then is agreed between us -- That <sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense>. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than tangible qualities.

<Hyl>. We do not.

<Phil>. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?

<Hyl>. I grant it.

<Phil>. Sensible things therefore are {250} nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?

<Hyl>. Nothing else.

<Phil>. <Heat> then is a sensible thing?

<Hyl>. Certainly.

<Phil>. Doth the <reality> of sensible things consist in being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?

<Hyl>. To <exist> is one thing, and to be <perceived> is another.

<Phil>. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived?

<Hyl>. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation to, their being perceived.

<Phil>. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without the mind?

<Hyl>. It must.

<Phil>. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to others? And if there be, pray let me know that reason.

<Hyl>. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.

<Phil>. What! the greatest as well as the least?

<Hyl>. <I> tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and consequently, if there is {176} any difference, we are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser degree.

<Phil>. But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very great pain?

<Hyl>. No one can deny it.

<Phil>. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure?

<Hyl>. No, certainly.

<Phil>. Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed with sense and perception?

<Hyl>. It is senseless without doubt.

<Phil>. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?

<Hyl>. By no means.

<Phil>. Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?

<Hyl>. I grant it.

<Phil>. What shall we say then of your external object; is it a material Substance, or no?

<Hyl>. It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it.

<Phil>. How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in a material substance? I desire you would clear this point.

<Hyl>. Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.

<Phil>. Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations?

<Hyl>. But one simple sensation.

<Phil>. Is not the heat immediately perceived?,

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. And the pain?

<Hyl>. True.

<Phil>. Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and, consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.

<Hyl>. It seems so.

<Phil>. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure. {177}

<Hyl>. I cannot.

<Phil>. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? &c.

<Hyl>. I do not find that I can.

<Phil>. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense degree?

<Hyl>. It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it.

<Phil>. What! are you then in that sceptical state of suspense, between affirming and denying?

<Hyl>. I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind.

<Phil>. It hath not therefore according to you, any <real> being?

<Hyl>. I own it.

<Phil>. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature really hot?

<Hyl>. I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only say, there is no such thing as an intense real heat.

<Phil>. But, did you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally real; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser?

<Hyl>. True: but it was because I did not then consider the ground there is for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it is this: because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensation; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being; it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is no reason wh' we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist in such a substance.

<Phil>. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without

it?

<Hyl>. That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to think the same of them.

<Phil>. I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain.

<Hyl>. I did. {178}

<Phil>. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure?

<Hyl>. What then?

<Phil>. Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving substance, or body.

<Hyl>. So it seems.

<Phil>. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance; may we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree of heat whatsoever?

<Hyl>. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.

<Phil>. <I> do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion.

<Hyl>. I could rather call it an <indolence>. It seems to be nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking substance, I hope you will not deny.

<Phil>. If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise than by appealing to your own sense. But what think you of cold?

<Hyl>. The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great uneasiness: it cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree of heat.

<Phil>. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them; and those, upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them.

<Hyl>. They must.

<Phil>. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an absurdity?

<Hyl>. Without doubt it cannot.

<Phil>. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at the same time both cold and warm?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of {179} water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other?

<Hyl>. It will.

<Phil>. Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to your own concession, to believe an absurdity?

<Hyl>. I confess it seems so.

<Phil>. Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity.

<Hyl>. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say, <there is no heat in the fire>?

<Phil>. To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?

.<Hyl>. We ought.

<Phil>. When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the fibres of your flesh?

<Hyl>. It doth.

<Phil>. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?

<Hyl>. It doth not.

<Phil>. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin; you should not, conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensation occasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire.

<Hyl>. Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point, and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds. But there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external things.

<Phil>. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible qualities, and that they can no more be supposed to exist without the mind, than heat and cold?

<Hyl>. Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose; but that is what I despair of seeing proved.

<Phil>. Let us examine them in order. What think you of <tastes>, do they exist without the mind, or no?

<Hyl>. Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet, or wormwood bitter?

<Phil>. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not? {180}

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain?

<Hyl>. I grant it.

<Phil>. If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness, that is, Pleasure and pain, agree to them?

<Hyl>. Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was delude time. You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness at were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to which simply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished: those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pair existing in the external objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say you to this?

<Phil>. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, <the things we immediately perceive by our senses>. Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of as distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without the mind?

<Hyl>. I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up the cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet.

<Phil>. But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along with you: that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered palate, appear bitter. And, nothing can be plainer than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same food; since that which one man delights in, another abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was something really inherent in the food?

<Hyl>. I acknowledge I know not how.

<Phil>. In the next place, <odours> are to be considered. And, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath {181} been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them? Are they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations?

<Hyl>. They are.

<Phil>. Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an unperceiving thing?

<Hyl>. I cannot.

<Phil>. Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with the same smells which we perceive in them?

<Hyl>. By no means.

<Phil>. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a perceiving substance or mind?

<Hyl>. I think so.

<Phil>. Then as to <sounds>, what must we think of them: are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?

<Hyl>. That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hence: because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought the subject of sound.

<Phil>. What reason is there for that, Hylas?

<Hyl>. Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's motion; but without some motion in the air, we never hear any sound at all.

<Phil>. And granting that we never hear a sound but when some motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can infer from thence, that the sound itself is in the air.

<Hyl>. It is this very motion in the external air that produces in the mind the sensation of <sound>. For, striking on the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called <sound>.

<Phil>. What! is sound then a sensation?

<Hyl>. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in the mind.

<Phil>. And can any sensation exist without the mind?

<Hyl>. No, certainly.

<Phil>. How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, if by the <air> you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind?

<Hyl>. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is {182} perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is a particular

kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion the air.

<Phil>. I thought I had already obviated that distinction, by answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before. But, to say no more of that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion?

<Hyl>. I am.

<Phil>. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be attributed to motion?

<Hyl>. It may.

<Phil>. It is then good sense to speak of <motion> as of a thing that is <loud>, <sweet>, <acute>, <or grave>.

<Hyl>. <I> see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound, or <sound in> the common acceptation of the word, but not to <sound> in the real and philosophic sense; which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a certain motion of the air?

<Phil>. It seems then there are two sorts of sound -- the one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical and real?

<Hyl>. Even so.

<Phil>. And the latter consists in motion?

<Hyl>. I told you so before.

<Phil>. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?

<Hyl>. No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.

<Phil>. It should follow then, that, according to you, real sounds may possibly be <seen or felt>, but never <heard>.

<Hyl>. Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into sound something oddly; but common language, you know, is framed by, and for the use of the vulgar: we must not therefore wonder if expressions adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the way.

<Phil>. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained no small point, since you make so light of departing from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the {183} common road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the world. But, can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox, to say that <real sounds are never heard>, and that the idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?

<Hyl>. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the

concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds too have no real being without the mind.

<Phil>. And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge the same of <colours>.

<Hyl>. Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects?

<Phil>. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal Substances existing without the mind?

<Hyl>. They are.

<Phil>. And have true and real colours inhering in them?

<Hyl>. Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it.

<Phil>. How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight?

<Hyl>. There is not.

<Phil>. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive immediately?

<Hyl>. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you, we do not.

<Phil>. Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more, whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but I would now be informed, whether you still persist in the same opinion.

<Hyl>. I do.

<Phil>. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or made up of sensible qualities?

<Hyl>. What a question that is! who ever thought it was?

<Phil>. My reason for asking was, because in saying, <each visible object hath that colour which we see in it>, you make visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that there is something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight: but, as this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, that your <corporeal substance> is nothing distinct from <sensible qualities>. {184}

<Hyl>. You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my own meaning.

<Phil>. I wish you would make me understand it too. But, since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined, I shall urge that point no farther. Only be

pleased to let me know, whether the same colours which we see exist in external bodies, or some other.

<Hyl>. The very same.

<Phil>. What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour?

<Hyl>. I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent colours.

<Phil>. <Apparent> call you them? how shall we distinguish these apparent colours from real?

<Hyl>. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.

<Phil>. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are discovered by the most near and exact survey.

<Hyl>. Right.

<Phil>. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a microscope, or by the naked eye?

<Hyl>. By a microscope, doubtless.

<Phil>. But a microscope often discovers colours in an object different from those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no object whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked eye.

<Hyl>. And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that there are really and naturally no colours on objects: because by artificial managements they may be altered, or made to vanish.

<Phil>. I think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions, that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope. Then' as to what you say by way of prevention: {185} I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which is less sharp?

<Hyl>. By the former without doubt.

<Phil>. Is it not plain from <Dioptrics> that microscopes make the sight more penetrating, and represent objects as they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite sharpness?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. Consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the

thing, or what it is in itself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine and real than those perceived otherwise.

<Hyl>. I confess there is something in what you say.

<Phil>. Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness escape our sight. What think you of those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses? must we suppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving their bodies from injuries, which appears in that of all other animals? And if it hath, is it not evident they must see particles less than their own bodies; which will present them with a far different view in each object from that which strikes our senses? Even our own eyes do not always represent objects to us after the same manner. In the jaundice every one knows that all things seem yellow. Is it not therefore highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern a very different texture from that of ours, and whose bodies abound with different humours, do not see the same colours in every object that we do? From all which, should it not seem to follow that all colours are equally apparent, and that none of those which we perceive are really inherent in any outward object?

<Hyl>. It should.

<Phil>. The point will be past all doubt, if you consider that, in case colours were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies, they could admit of no alteration without some change wrought in the very bodies themselves: but, is it not evident from what hath been said that, upon the use of microscopes, upon a change happening in the burnouts of the eye, or a variation of distance, without any manner of real alteration {186} in the thing itself, the colours of any object are either changed, or totally disappear? Nay, all other circumstances remaining the same, change but the situation of some objects, and they shall present different colours to the eye. The same thing happens upon viewing an object in various degrees of light. And what is more known than that the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light from what they do in the open day? Add to these the experiment of a prism which, separating the heterogeneous rays of light, alters the colour of any object, and will cause the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to the naked eye. And now tell me whether you are still of opinion that every body hath its true real colour inhering in it; and, if you think it hath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain distance and position of the object, what peculiar texture and formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, and distinguishing it from apparent ones.

<Hyl>. I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all equally apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering in external bodies, but that it is altogether in the light. And what confirms me in this opinion is, that in proportion to the light colours are still more or less vivid; and if there be no light, then are there no colours perceived. Besides, allowing there are colours on external objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no external body

affects the mind, unless it acts first on our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies is motion; and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye; nor consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul. Whence it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous substance, which, operating on the eye, occasions a perception of colours: and such is light.

<Phil>. Howl is light then a substance?

<Hyl>.. I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but a thin fluid substance, whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk motion, and in various manners reflected from the different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes, communicate different motions to the optic nerves; which, being propagated to the brain, cause therein various impressions; and these are attended with the sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c.

<Phil>. It seems then the light doth no more than shake the optic nerves. {187}

<Hyl>. Nothing else.

<Phil>. And consequent to each particular motion of the nerves, the mind is affected with a sensation, which is some particular colour.

<Hyl>. Right.

<Phil>. And these sensations have no existence without the mind.

<Hyl>. They have not.

<Phil>. How then do you affirm that colours are in the light; since by <light> you understand a corporeal substance external to the mind?

<Hyl>. Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant cannot exist without the mind. But in themselves they are only the motions and configurations of certain insensible particles of matter.

<Phil>. Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving substance.

<Hyl>. That is what I say.

<Phil>. Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind beside, you may hold what you please with regard to those invisible ones of the philosophers. It is not my business to dispute about <them>; only I would advise you to bethink yourself, whether, considering the inquiry we are upon, it be prudent for you to affirm -- <the red and blue which we see are not real colours>, <but certain unknown motions and figures which no man ever did or can see are truly so>. Are not these shocking notions, and are not they subject to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were obliged to renounce before in the

case of sounds?

<Hyl>. I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed <secondary qualities>, have certainly no existence without the mind. But by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate, the reality of Matter, or external objects; seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who nevertheless are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the clearer understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into <Primary> and <Secondary>. The former are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest; {188} and these they hold exist really in bodies. The latter are those above enumerated; or, briefly, <all sensible qualities beside the Primary>; which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind. But all this, I doubt not, you are apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time sensible there was such an opinion current among philosophers, but was never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now.

<Phil>. You are still then of opinion that <extension> and <figures are> inherent in external unthinking substances?

<Hyl>. I am.

<Phil>. But what if the same arguments which are brought against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these also?

<Hyl>. Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only in the mind.

<Phil>. Is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the figure and extension which they see and feel?

<Hyl>. Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.

<Phil>. Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and well-being in life? or were they given to men alone for this end?

<Hyl>. I make no question but they have the same use in all other animals.

<Phil>. If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable of harming them?

<Hyl>. Certainly.

<Phil>. A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension; though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best as so many visible points?

<Hyl>. I cannot deny it.

<Phil>. And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger?

<Hyl>. They will.

<Phil>. Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain? {189}

<Hyl>. All this I grant.

<Phil>. Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of different dimensions?

<Hyl>. That were absurd to imagine.

<Phil>. But, from what you have laid down it follows that both the extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true extension of the mite's foot; that is to say, by your own principles you are led into an absurdity.

<Hyl>. There seems to be some difficulty in the point.

<Phil>. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself?

<Hyl>. I have.

<Phil>. But, as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object?

<Hyl>. I own I am at a loss what to think.

<Phil>. Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the other?

<Hyl>. It was.

<Phil>. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and regular?

<Hyl>. The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen?

<Phil>. You may at any time make the experiment, by looking with one eye bare, and with the other through a microscope.

<Hyl>. I know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath to give up <extension>, I see so many odd consequences following upon such a concession.

<Phil>. Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness. [But, on the

other hand, should it not seem very odd, if the general reasoning {190} which includes all other sensible qualities did not also include extension? If it be allowed that no idea, nor anything like an idea, can exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely it follows that no figure, or mode of extension, which we can either perceive, or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from extension to be the <substratum> of extension. Be the sensible quality what it will -- figure, or sound, or colour, it seems alike impossible it should subsist in that which doth not perceive it.][2]

<Hyl>. I give up the point for the present, reserving still a right to retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false step in my progress to it.

<Phil>. That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and extension being despatched, we proceed next to <motion>. Can a real motion in any external body be at the same time very swift and very slow?

<Hyl>. It cannot.

<Phil>. Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given space? Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would in case it described only a mile in three hours.

<Hyl>. I agree with you.

<Phil>. And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some spirit of another kind?

<Hyl>. I own it.

<Phil>. Consequently the same body may to another seem to perform its motion over any space in half the time that it doth to you. And the same reasoning will hold as to any other proportion: that is to say, according to your principles (since the motions perceived are both really in the object) it is possible one and the same body shall be really moved the same way at once, both very swift and very slow. How is this consistent either with common sense, or with what you just now granted? {191}

<Hyl>. I have nothing to say to it.

<Phil>. Then as for <solidity>; either you do not mean any sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry: or if you do, it must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses: it being evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft to another, who hath greater force and firmness of limbs. Nor is

it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body.

<Hyl>. I own the very <sensation> of resistance, which is all you immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the <cause> of that sensation is.

<Phil>. But the causes of our sensations are not things immediately perceived, and therefore are not sensible. This point I thought had been already determined.

<Hyl>. I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little embarrassed: I know not how to quit my old notions.

<Phil>. To help you out, do but consider that if <extension> be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the same must necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and gravity; since they all evidently suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you have denied them all to have any real existence.

<Hyl>. I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence should yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no difference between them, how can this be accounted for?

<Phil>. It is not my business to account for every opinion of the philosophers. But, among other reasons which may be assigned for this, it seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of extension, figure, and motion affect us with. And, it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance, men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there is something in this, if you recollect the difference you made between an intense and more moderate degree of heat; allowing the one a real existence, while you denied it to the other. But, after all, there is no rational ground for that distinction; for, surely an indifferent sensation is as {191} truly <a sensation> as one more pleasing or painful; and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject.

<Hyl>. It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension. Now, though it be acknowledged that <great> and <small>, consisting merely in the relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere in the substances themselves; yet nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to <absolute extension>, which is something abstracted from <great> and <small>, from this or that particular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion; <swift> and <slow> are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of motion exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted from them doth not.

<Phil>. Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain

magnitude or figure peculiar to each?

<Hyl>. I think so.

<Phil>. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties, are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call them.

<Hyl>. They are.

<Phil>. That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in general.

<Hyl>. Let it be so.

<Phil>. But it is a universally received maxim that <Everything which exists is particular>. How then can motion in general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal substance? {193}

<Hyl>. I will take time to solve your difficulty.

<Phil>. But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct <abstract idea> of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion of.

<Hyl>. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.

<Phil>. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term <secondary>?

<Hyl>. What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?

<Phil>. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word <motion> by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any mention of <great> or <small>, or any other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible quality,[3] [should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible. qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension.

<Hyl>. But what say you to <pure intellect>? May not

abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?

<Phil>. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot frame them by the help of <pure intellect>; {194} whatsoever faculty you understand by those words. Besides, not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as <virtue>, <reason>, <God>, or the like, thus much seems manifest -- that sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore, and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities.

<Hyl>. Let me think a little -- I do not find that I can.

<Phil>. And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception?

<Hyl>. By no means.

<Phil>. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist likewise?

<Hyl>. It should seem so.

<Phil>. Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther application of force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear as being in the same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?

<Hyl>. You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind. But, my fear is that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time to think.

<Phil>. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty to recover any slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted which makes for your first opinion.

<Hyl>. One great oversight I take to be this -- that I did not sufficiently distinguish the <object> from the <sensation>. Now, though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot.

<Phil>. What object do you mean? the object of the senses?

<Hyl>. The same.

<Phil>. It is then immediately perceived? {195}

<Hyl>. Right.

<Phil>. Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived and a sensation.

<Hyl>. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides which, there is something perceived; and this I call the <object>. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.

<Phil>. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?

<Hyl>. The same.

<Phil>. And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension?

<Hyl>. Nothing.

<Phil>. What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent with the extension; is it not?

<Hyl>. That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.

<Phil>. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine; but, that any immediate object of the senses, -- that is, any idea, or combination of ideas -- should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to <all> minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red and yellow were on the tulip <you saw>, since you do not pretend to <see> that unthinking substance.

<Hyl>. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from the subject.

<Phil>. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to your distinction between <sensation> and <object>; if I take you right, you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not.

<Hyl>. True.

<Phil>. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may? {196}

<Hyl>. That is my meaning.

<Phil>. So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?

<Hyl>. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a perception.

<Phil>. When is the mind said to be active?

<Hyl>. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes,

anything.

<Phil>. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an act of the will?

<Hyl>. It cannot.

<Phil>. The mind therefore is to be accounted <active> in its perceptions so far forth as <volition> is included in them?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in applying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling?

<Hyl>. <No>.

<Phil>. I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But neither can this be called <smelling>: for, if it were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner?

<Hyl>. True.

<Phil>. Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more there is -- as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell at all -- this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive. Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?

<Hyl>. No, the very same.

<Phil>. Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?

<Hyl>. Without doubt.

<Phil>. But, doth it in like manner depend on <your> will that in looking on this flower you perceive <white> rather than any other colour? Or, directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition?

<Hyl>. No, certainly.

<Phil>. You are then in these respects altogether passive?
{197}
<Hyl>. I am.

<Phil>. Tell me now, whether <seeing> consists in perceiving light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?

<Hyl>. Without doubt, in the former.

<Phil>. Since therefore you are in the very perception of

light and colours altogether passive, what is become of that action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow from your own concessions, that the perception of light and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain contradiction?

<Hyl>. I know not what to think of it.

<Phil>. Besides, since you distinguish the <active> and <passive> in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them <external objects>, and give them in words what subsistence you please. But, examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say?

<Hyl>. I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance. But then, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things in a different view, considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a <material substratum>, without which they cannot be conceived to exist.

<Phil>. <Material substratum> call you it? Pray, by which of your senses came you acquainted with that being?

<Hyl>. It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being perceived by the senses.

<Phil>. I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained

the idea of it?

<Hyl>. I do not pretend to any proper positive <idea> of it. However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without a support.

<Phil>. It seems then you have only a relative <notion> of it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it bears to sensible qualities? {198}

<Hyl>. Right.

<Phil>. Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation

consists.

<Hyl>. Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term <substratum>, or <substance>?

<Phil>. If so, the word <substratum> should import that it is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents?

<Hyl>. True.

<Phil>. And consequently under extension?

<Hyl>. I own it.

<Phil>. It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct

from extension?

<Hyl>. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different from the thing supporting?

<Phil>. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is supposed to be the <substratum> of extension?

<Hyl>. Just so.

<Phil>. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in <spreading>?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which it is spread?

<Hyl>. It must.

<Phil>. Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the <substratum> of extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified to be a <substratum>: and so on to infinity. And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the <substratum> was something distinct from and exclusive of extension?

<Hyl>. Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is <spread> in a gross literal sense under extension. The word <substratum> is used only to express in general the same thing with <substance>.

<Phil>. Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term <substance>. Is it not that it stands under accidents?

<Hyl>. The very same.

<Phil>. But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not be extended?

<Hyl>. It must. {199}

<Phil>. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former?

<Hyl>. You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair, Philonous.

<Phil>. I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents. How! is it as your legs support your body?

<Hyl>. No; that is the literal sense.

<Phil>. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in. -- How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?

<Hyl>. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well enough what was meant by Matter's supporting accidents. But now, the more I think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know nothing of it.

<Phil>. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents?

<Hyl>. I acknowledge it.

<Phil>. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a material support of them?

<Hyl>. I did.

<Phil>. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive?

<Hyl>. It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind.

<Phil>. Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet my arguments or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not {200} <at all> without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.

<Hyl>. If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

<Phil>. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?

<Hyl>. No, that were a contradiction.

<Phil>. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of <conceiving> a thing which is <unconceived>?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. The, tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?

<Hyl>. How should it be otherwise?

<Phil>. And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

<Hyl>. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.

<Phil>. How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?

<Hyl>. That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me into it. -- It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive them <existing out of the minds of all Spirits>.

<Phil>. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in the mind? {201}

<Hyl>. I do.

<Phil>. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive?

<Hyl>. I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I <see things at> a distance? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?

<Phil>. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?

<Hyl>. I do.

<Phil>. And have they not then the same appearance of being

distant?

<Hyl>. They have.

<Phil>. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind?

<Hyl>. By no means.

<Phil>. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are perceived.

<Hyl>. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?

<Phil>. By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are without the mind.

<Hyl>. True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests something of <outness or distance>?

<Phil>. Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?

<Hyl>. They are in a continual change.

<Phil>. Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance, or will be perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach.

<Hyl>. It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: {202} no matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of distance suggested in the case.

<Phil>. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this: from the ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have by experience learned to collect what other ideas you will (according to the standing order of nature) be affected with, after such a certain succession of time and motion.

<Hyl>. Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.

<Phil>. Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what may be <suggested> by sight?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of sensations, existing only in his mind?

<Hyl>. It is undeniable.

<Phil>. But, to make it still more plain: is not <distance> a line turned endwise to the eye?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?

<Hyl>. It cannot.

<Phil>. Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight?

<Hyl>. It should seem so.

<Phil>. Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance?

<Hyl>. It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.

<Phil>. But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same place with extension and figures?

<Hyl>. They do.

<Phil>. How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without, when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being the very same with regard to both?

<Hyl>. I know not what to answer.

<Phil>. But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind. For, whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of the mind?

<Hyl>. To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas?

<Phil>. As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, {203} that is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by this last question, to have departed from what you then thought.

<Hyl>. To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of objects: -- the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called <ideas>; the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations. Now, I own ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects do. I am sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner; it would probably have cut short your discourse.

<Phil>. Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other faculty?

<Hyl>. They are perceived by sense.

<Phil>. Howl Is there any thing perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived?

<Hyl>. Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.

<Phil>. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas?

<Hyl>. That is my meaning.

<Phil>. And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense.

<Hyl>. In the very same.

<Phil>. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a certain symmetry and composition of the whole?

<Hyl>. Nothing else.

<Phil>. And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar see as much? {204}

<Hyl>. He would.

<Phil>. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect a degree as you?

<Hyl>. I agree with you.

<Phil>. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory: should it not?

<Hyl>. It should.

<Phil>. Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything is perceived by sense which is not, immediately perceived. Though I grant we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense: that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense <suggests> to the mind others, perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be <heard but sound>; and the coach is

not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on us. As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return to your comparison of Caesar's picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you must hold the real things, or archetypes of our ideas, are not perceived by sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for the existence of what you call <real things or material objects>. Or, whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves; or, if you have heard or read of any one that did. {205}

<Hyl>. I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will never convince me.

<Phil>. My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge of <material beings>. Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or mediately: by sense, or by reason and reflexion. But, as you have excluded sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe their existence; or what <medium> you can possibly make use of to prove it, either to mine or your own understanding.

<Hyl>. To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point, I do not find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much seems pretty plain, that it is at least possible such things may really exist. And, as long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved to believe as I did, till you bring good reasons to the contrary.

<Phil>. What! Is it come to this, that you only <believe> the existence of material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the possibility of its being true? Then you will have me bring reasons against it: though another would think it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative. And, after all, this very point which you are now resolved to maintain, without any reason, is in effect what you have more than once during this discourse seen good reason to give up. But, to pass over all this; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist without the mind, but that they are copies, images, or representations, of certain originals that do?

<Hyl>. You take me right.

<Phil>. They are then like external things?

<Hyl>. They are.

<Phil>. Have those things a stable and permanent nature, independent of our senses; or are they in a perpetual change, upon our producing any motions in our bodies -- suspending, exerting, or altering, our faculties or organs of sense?

<Hyl>. Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or in the posture and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect the ideas in our minds, but it were absurd to think they had the same effect on things existing without the mind.

<Phil>. How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and constant? Or, in other words, since all sensible {206} qualities, as size, figure, colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually changing, upon every alteration in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation; how can any determinate material objects be properly represented or painted forth by several distinct things, each of which is so different from and unlike the rest? Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones?

<Hyl>. I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to say to this.

<Phil>. But neither is this all. Which are material objects in themselves -- perceptible or imperceptible?

<Hyl>. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to be perceived only by our ideas.

<Phil>. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals insensible?

<Hyl>. Right.

<Phil>. But how can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible? Can a real thing, in itself <invisible>, be like a <colour>; or a real thing, which is not <audible>, be like a <sound>? In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea?

<Hyl>. I must own, I think not.

<Phil>. Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? Do. you not perfectly know your own ideas?

<Hyl>. I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive or know can be no part of my idea.

<Phil>. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there be anything in them which can exist without the mind: or if you can conceive anything like them existing without the mind.

<Hyl>. Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive or understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it is most evident that <no idea can exist without the mind>.

<Phil>. You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the <reality> of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point,

which was to shew your principles led to Scepticism. {207}

<Hyl>. For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least silenced.

<Phil>. I would fain know what more you would require in order to a perfect conviction. Have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself all manner of ways? Were any little slips in discourse laid hold and insisted on? Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you had offered, as best served your purpose? Hath not everything you could say been heard and examined with all the fairness imaginable? In a word have you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth? And, if you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former concessions, or think of any remaining subterfuge, any new distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why do you not produce it?

<Hyl>. A little patience, Philonous. I am at present so amazed to see myself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have drawn me into, that on the sudden it cannot be expected I should find my way out. You must give me time to look about me and recollect myself.

<Phil>. Hark; is not this the college bell?

<Hyl>. It rings for prayers.

<Phil>. We will go in then, if you please, and meet here again tomorrow morning. In the meantime, you may employ your thoughts on this morning's discourse, and try if you can find any fallacy in it, or invent any new means to extricate yourself.

<Hyl>. Agreed. {208}

THE SECOND DIALOGUE

<Hylas>. I beg your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting you sooner. All this morning my head was so filled with our late conversation that I had not leisure to think of the time of the day, or indeed of anything else.

<Philonous>. I am glad you were so intent upon it, in hopes if there were any mistakes in your concessions, or fallacies in my reasonings from them, you will now discover them to me.

<Hyl>. I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw you but search after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that view, have minutely examined the whole series of yesterday's discourse: but all in vain, for the notions it led me into, upon review, appear still more clear and evident; and, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do they force my assent.

<Phil>. And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine, that they proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason? Truth and beauty are in this alike, that the strictest survey sets them both off to advantage; while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure being reviewed, or too nearly inspected.

<Hyl>. I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can any one be more entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences, so long as I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But, when these are out of my thoughts, there seems, on the other hand, something so satisfactory, so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of explaining things that, I profess, I know not how to reject it.

<Phil>. I know not what way you mean.

<Hyl>. I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas.

<Phil>. How is that?

<Hyl>. It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the body; and that outward objects, by the different impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits propagate them to the brain {209} or seat of the soul, which, according to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas.

<Phil>. And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are affected with ideas?

<Hyl>. Why not, Philonous? Have you anything to object against it?

<Phil>. I would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis. You make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our ideas. Pray tell me whether by the <brain> you mean any sensible thing.

<Hyl>. What else think you I could mean?

<Phil>. Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things which are immediately perceivable are ideas; and these exist only in the mind. Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to.

<Hyl>. I do not deny it.

<Phil>. The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists only in the mind. Now, I would fain know whether you think it reasonable to suppose that one idea or thing existing in the mind occasions all other ideas. And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the origin of that primary idea or brain itself?

<Hyl>. I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which is perceivable to sense -- this being itself only a combination of sensible ideas -- but by another which I imagine.

<Phil>. But are not things imagined as truly <in the mind> as things perceived?

<Hyl>. I must confess they are.

<Phil>. It comes, therefore, to the same thing; and you have been all this while accounting for ideas by certain motions or impressions of the brain; that is, by some alterations in an idea, whether sensible or imaginable it matters not.

<Hyl>. I begin to suspect my hypothesis.

<Phil>. Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas. When, therefore, you say all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the brain, do you conceive this brain or no? If you do, then you talk of ideas imprinted in an idea causing that same idea, which is absurd. If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of forming a reasonable hypothesis. {210}

<Hyl>. I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is nothing in it.

<Phil>. You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of explaining things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any reasonable man. What connexion is there between a motion in the nerves, and the sensations of sound or colour in the mind? Or how is it possible these should be the effect of that?

<Hyl>. But I could never think it had so little in it as now it seems to have.

<Phil>. Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things have a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic?

<Hyl>. It is too plain to be denied.

<Phil>. Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure? Is there not something in the woods and groves, in the rivers and clear springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports the soul? At the prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some huge mountain whose top is lost in the clouds, or of an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled with a pleasing horror? Even in rocks and deserts is there not an agreeable wildness? How sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth! To preserve and renew our, relish for them, is not the veil of night alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not change her dress with the seasons? How aptly are the elements disposed! What variety and use [in the meanest productions of nature]![4] What delicacy, what beauty, what contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies I How exquisitely are all things suited, as well to their particular ends, as to constitute opposite parts of the whole I And, while they mutually aid and support, do they not also set off and illustrate each other? Raise now your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those glorious luminaries that adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation of the planets, are they not admirable for use and order? Were those (miscalled <erratic>) globes once known to stray, in their repeated journeys through the pathless void? Do they not measure areas round the sun ever proportioned to the times? So fixed, so immutable are the laws by which the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe. {211} How vivid and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars! How magnificent and rich that negligent profusion with which they appear to be

scattered throughout the whole azure vault! Yet, if you take the telescope, it brings into your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye. Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer view immense orbs of fight at various distances, far sunk in the abyss of space. Now you must call imagination to your aid. The feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round the central fires; and in those worlds the energy of an all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms. But, neither sense nor imagination are big enough to comprehend the boundless extent, with all its glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind exert and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the vast bodies that compose this mighty frame, how distant and remote soever, are by some secret mechanism, some Divine art and force, linked in a mutual dependence and intercourse with each other; even with this earth, which was almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd of worlds. Is not the whole system immense, beautiful, glorious beyond expression and beyond thought! What treatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all <reality>? How should those Principles be entertained that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare? To be plain, can you expect this Scepticism of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men of sense?

<Hyl>. Other men may think as they please; but for your part you have nothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as much a sceptic as I am.

<Phil>. There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you.

<Hyl>. What! Have you all along agreed to the premises, and do you now deny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those paradoxes by myself which you led me into? This surely is not fair.

<Phil>. <I> deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led to Scepticism. You indeed said the <reality> of sensible things consisted in <an absolute existence out of the minds of spirits>, or distinct from their being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of reality, <you> are obliged to deny sensible things any {212} real existence: that is, according to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. But I neither said nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined after that manner. To me it is evident for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that., seeing they depend not on my thought, and have all existence distinct from being perceived by me, <there must be some other Mind wherein they exist>. As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.

<Hyl>. What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all others too who believe there is a God, and that He knows and comprehends all things.

<Phil>. Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because

all sensible things must be perceived by Him.

<Hyl>. But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it how we come by that belief?

<Phil>. But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no difference between saying, <There is a God>, <therefore He perceives all things>; and saying, <Sensible things do really exist>; <and>, <if they really exist>, <they are necessarily perceived by an infinite Mind>: <therefore there is an infinite Mind or God>? This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the <being of a God>. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the creation, that it was the workmanship of God. But that -- setting aside all help of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjustment of things -- an infinite Mind should be necessarily inferred from the bare <existence of the sensible world>, is an advantage to them only who have made this easy reflexion: that the sensible world is that which we perceive by our several senses; and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no {213} idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now, without any laborious search into the sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate for Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an eternal succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous concourse of atoms; those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza: in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is it not entirely overthrown, by this single reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a mind? Let any one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of atoms; how anything at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist independent of a Mind, and he need go no farther to be convinced of his folly. Can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he holds to be true in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real existence?

<Hyl>. It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a notion entertained by some eminent moderns, of <seeing all things in God>?

<Phil>. I would gladly know that opinion: pray explain it to me.

<Hyl>. They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is incapable of being united with material things, so as to perceive them in themselves; but that she perceives them by her union with the substance of God, which, being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable of being the immediate object of a spirit's thought. Besides the Divine essence contains in it perfections correspondent to each created being; and which are,

for that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind.

<Phil>. I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether passive and inert, can be the essence, or any part (or like any part) of the essence or substance of God, who is an {214} impassive, indivisible, pure, active being. Many more difficulties and objections there are which occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add that it is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Besides all which it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world serve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature, or the Divine wisdom, to make something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world made in vain?

<Hyl>. But what say you? Are not you too of opinion that we see all things in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.

<Phil>. [Few men think; yet all have opinions. Hence men's opinions are superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets which in themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with each other, by those who do not consider them attentively. I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and, know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine. It must be owned that][5] I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture saith, "That in God we live and move and have our being." But that we see things in His essence, after the manner above set forth, I am far from believing. Take here in brief my meaning: -- It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind: nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears: they must therefore exist in some other Mind, whose {215} Will it is they should be exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them which you will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit? This indeed is inconceivable. And to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it not?

<Hyl>. Without doubt.

<Phil>. But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should exist in and be produced by a spirit; since this is no more than I daily experience in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and, by an act of my will, can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my imagination: though, it

must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those perceived by my senses -- which latter are called <red things>. From all which I conclude, <there is a Mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive>. <And>, from the variety, order, and manner of these, I conclude <the Author of them to be wise>, <powerful>, <and good>, <beyond comprehension>. <Mark> it well; I do not say, I see things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible Substance of God. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this most plain and evident? Is there any more in it than what a little observation in our own minds, and that which passeth in them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to acknowledge.

<Hyl>. I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But, allowing that God is the supreme and universal Cause of an things, yet, may there not be still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be <Matter>?

<Phil>. How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately: therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason, and not by sense.

<Hyl>. You are in the right. {216}

<Phil>. Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded on; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of it.

<Hyl>. I find myself affected with various ideas, whereof I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore <some> cause distinct from me and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is <the cause of my ideas>. And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter.

<Phil>. Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current proper signification attached to a common name in any language? For example, suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain country men pass unhurt through the fire; and, upon explaining himself, you found he meant by the word fire that which others call <water>. Or, if he should assert that there are trees that walk upon two legs, meaning men by the term <trees>. Would you think this reasonable?

<Hyl>. No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard of propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking improperly is to pervert the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply disputes, where there is no difference in opinion.

<Phil>. And doth not <Matter>, in the common current acceptation of the word, signify an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking, inactive Substance?

<Hyl>. It doth.

<Phil>. And, hath it not been made evident that no <such> substance can possibly exist? And, though it should be allowed to exist, yet how can that which is <inactive> be a <cause>; or that which is <unthinking> be a <cause of thought>? You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word <Matter> a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell me you understand by it, an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the cause of our ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and run into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I do by no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect a cause from the <phenomena>: <but> I deny that <the> cause deducible by reason can properly be termed Matter.

<Hyl>. There is indeed something in what you say. But I am {217} afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would by no means be thought to deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of all things. All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme Agent, there is a cause of a limited and inferior nature, which <concurs> in the production of our ideas, not by any act of will, or spiritual efficiency, but by that kind of action which belongs to Matter, viz. <motion>.

<Phil>. I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, substance, existing without the mind. What! Have you already forgotten you were convinced; or are you willing I should repeat what has been said on that head? In truth this is not fair dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which you have so often acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist farther on what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing of action in them.

<Hyl>. They are.

<Phil>. And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?

<Hyl>. How often have I acknowledged that they are not.

<Phil>. But is not <motion> a sensible quality?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. Consequently it is no action?

<Hyl>. I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my finger, it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion is active.

<Phil>. Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition: and, in the second place, whether to say something and conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense: and, lastly, whether, having considered the premises, you do not

perceive that to suppose any efficient or active Cause of our ideas, other than <Spirit>, is highly absurd and unreasonable?

<Hyl>. I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being an <instrument>, subservient to the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?

<Phil>. An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument?

<Hyl>. Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me.

<Phil>. What? You are then of opinion it is made up of {218} unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?

<Hyl>. I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving substance.

<Phil>. But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of all sensible qualities, even extension itself?

<Hyl>. I do not pretend to have any notion of it.

<Phil>. And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceivable Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine God cannot act as well without it; or that you find by experience the use of some such thing, when you form ideas in your own mind?

<Hyl>. You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what reasons have you not to believe it?

<Phil>. It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist on reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know <what it is> you would have me believe; since you say you have no manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe you know not what ' and you know not why.

<Hyl>. Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an <instrument>, I do not mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of instrument; but, however, I have some notion of <instrument in general>, which I apply to it.

<Phil>. But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the most general notion of <instrument>, as taken in a distinct sense from <cause>, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine attributes?

<Hyl>. Make that appear and I shall give up the point.

<Phil>. What mean you by the general nature or notion of <instrument>?

<Hyl>. That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the general notion.

<Phil>. Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our wills? Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volition. But I should use one if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the same mind? {219} Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in producing an effect <immediately> depending on the will of the agent?

<Hyl>. I own I cannot.

<Phil>. How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on whose Will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it? Thus it seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of God; that is, by your own confession, to give up the point.

<Hyl>. It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.

<Phil>. But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite powers, are forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear consequence, that the supreme unlimited agent useth no tool or instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner exerted than executed, without the application of means; which, if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever.

<Hyl>. I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. However, I would not be understood to give up its existence neither; since, notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an <occasion>.

<Phil>. How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often must it be proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it? But, to say no more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame you for so frequently changing the signification of the principal term) -- I would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an occasion, having already denied it to be a cause. And, when you have shewn in what sense you understand <occasion>, pray, in the next place, be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an occasion of our ideas?

<Hyl>. As to the first point: by <occasion> I mean an inactive {220} unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds.

<Phil>. And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being?

<Hyl>. I know nothing of its nature.

<Phil>. Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason why we should allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, unknown thing.

<Hyl>. When we see ideas produced in our minds, after an orderly and constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular occasions, at the presence of which they are excited.

<Phil>. You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our ideas, and that He causes them at the presence of those occasions.

<Hyl>. That is my opinion.

<Phil>. Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt He perceives.

<Hyl>. Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of acting.

<Phil>. Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from those attributes, to suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, in case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your purpose; it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived, can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion of producing ideas in us?

<Hyl>. I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of <occasion> seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.

<Phil>. Do you not at length perceive that in all these different acceptations of <Matter>, you have been only supposing you know not what, for no manner of reason, and to no kind of use?

<Hyl>. I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused perception that there is such a thing as <Matter>. {221}

<Phil>. Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately. If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately. So much for the perception. Then for the Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, <substratum>, cause, instrument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these, shifting your notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape, then in another. And what you have

offered hath been disapproved and rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I would gladly bear it.

<Hyl>. I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I am at a loss what more to urge.

<Phil>. And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been hitherto suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon. supposition that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected by it. Or, supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you might for all that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the very same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have.

<Hyl>. I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce' any idea in our minds. And, I do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such a thing as matter in any of the foregoing acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is <Matter> in some sense or other. <What that is I> do not indeed pretend to determine.

<Phil>. I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and if so, whether you can suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case you suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me know what those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter's supporting them?

<Hyl>. We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present understand by <Matter> neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something entirely unknown, distinct from all these. {222}

<Phil>. It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter nothing but the general abstract idea of <entity>.

<Hyl>. Nothing else; save only that I super-add to this general idea the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.

<Phil>. Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?

<Hyl>. Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say it exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you. And you must expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about Matter.

<Phil>. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist,

or what you mean by its <existence>?

<Hyl>. It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.

<Phil>. But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its existence?

<Hyl>. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not what is meant by its <existence>, or how it exists.

<Phil>. Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general, prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings, all particular things whatsoever.

<Hyl>. Hold, let me think a little -- I profess, Philonous, I do not find that I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion of Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of Matter, its <where>, its <how>, its <entity>, or anything belonging to it.

<Phil>. When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have not any notion in your mind?

<Hyl>. None at all.

<Phil>. Pray tell me if the case stands not thus -- At first, from a belief of material substance, you would have it that the {223} immediate objects existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes; next instruments; then occasions: lastly <something in general>, which being interpreted proves <nothing>. So Matter comes to nothing. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?

<Hyl>. Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence.

<Phil>. That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the existence of that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all this; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to -- I will not indeed thence conclude against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without any design or signification whatsoever. And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.

<Hyl>. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends demonstration. I find myself relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not what, <matter>.

<Phil>. But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind,? Let a visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it will not be distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly, and adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is need of time and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in different lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence {224} you take, in pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what reason, to you know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art or science, any sect or profession of men? Or is there anything so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation? But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; though at the same time you neither know <what is meant> by <Matter>, or by its <existence>. This indeed is surprising, and the more so because it is altogether voluntary [and of your own head],[6] you not being led to it by any one reason; for I challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs Matter to explain or account for it.

<Hyl>. <The reality> of things cannot be maintained without supposing the existence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its defence?

<Phil>. The reality of things! What things? sensible or intelligible?

<Hyl>. Sensible things.

<Phil>. My glove for example?

<Hyl>. That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.

<Phil>. But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this <glove>, that I see it, and feel it, and wear it? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should be assured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see, exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or, in general of anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall think nothing too hard for you.

<Hyl>. Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of matter is highly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does not appear to me.

<Phil>. But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account merely, it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or a centaur.

<Hyl>. I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and that which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.

<Phil>. I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not, {225} evidently proved, from your own concessions, that it is not. In the common sense of the word <Matter>, is there any more implied than an extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind? And have not you acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen evident reason for denying the possibility of such a substance?

<Hyl>. True, but that is only one sense of the term <Matter>.

<Phil>. But is it not the only proper genuine received sense? And, if Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible? Else how could anything be proved impossible? Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all one way or other, to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the common signification of words?

<Hyl>. I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately than the vulgar, and were not always confined to the common acceptation of a term.

<Phil>. But this now mentioned is the common received sense among philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have you not been allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have you not used this privilege in the utmost extent; sometimes entirely changing, at others leaving out, or putting into the definition of it whatever, for the present, best served your design, contrary to all the known rules of reason and logic? And hath not this shifting, unfair method of yours spun out our dispute to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of those senses? And can any more be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing, than the proving it impossible in every particular sense that either you or any one else understands it in?

<Hyl>. But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure abstracted and indefinite sense.

<Phil>.. When is a thing shewn to be impossible?

<Hyl>. When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition.

<Phil>. But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be demonstrated between ideas?

<Hyl>. I agree with you.

<Phil>. Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the word <Matter>, it is plain, by your own confession, there {226} was included no idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense; which is the same thing as none. You are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a repugnancy between ideas, where there are no ideas; or the impossibility of Matter taken in an <unknown> sense, that is, no sense at all. My business was only to shew you meant <nothing>; and this you were brought to own. So that, in all your various senses, you have been shewed either to mean nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let me know what is.

<Hyl>. I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible; nor do I see what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the same time that I give up this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely none could be more seemingly evident than this once was: and yet it now seems as false and absurd as ever it did true before. But I think we have discussed the point sufficiently for the present. The remaining part of the day I would willingly spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this morning's conversation, and tomorrow shall be glad to meet you here again about the same time.

<Phil>. <I> will not fail to attend you. {227}

THE THIRD DIALOGUE

<Philonous.> Tell me, Hylas,[7] what are the fruits of yesterday's meditation? Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting? or have you since seen cause to change your opinion?

<Hylas>. Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas I we know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us ever to know anything in this life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended us for speculation.

<Phil>. What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?

<Hyl>. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

<Phil>. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?

<Hyl>. You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense. Their internal constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly in the dark as to <that>.

<Phil>. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?

<Hyl>. <Know>? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it. All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what is this to the real

tree or stone? I tell you that colour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real natures of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said of all other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the world. They have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

<Phil>. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, {228} from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

<Hyl>. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and have no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of a different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.

<Phil>. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

<Hyl>. Even so.

<Phil>. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is, but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life, as comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they are conversant about.

<Hyl>. They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But philosophers know better things.

<Phil>. You mean, they <know> that they <know nothing>.

<Hyl>. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

<Phil>. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

<Hyl>. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every, other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. {229} Nay, now I think on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that it is impossible any <real>

corporeal thing should exist in nature.

<Phil>. You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of <material substance>? This makes you dream of those unknown natures in everything. It is this occasions your distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the true nature of everything, but you know not whether anything really exists, or whether there are any true natures at all; forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence, wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real existence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was. Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I say?

<Hyl>. I agree with you. <Material substance> was no more than an hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my breath in defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.

<Phil>. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of. It is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are on the {230} objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by <snow> and fire mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in <them>. But I, who understand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to think like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be really perceived by my senses, and at the same time not really exist, is to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known them but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived

there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of God; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration! I might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel.

<Hyl>. Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible things should exist without the mind. Do you not?

<Phil>. I do.

<Hyl>. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist?

<Phil>. <I> can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of {231} my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows there is an <omnipresent eternal Mind>, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the <laws of nature>.

<Hyl>. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or have they any agency included in them?

<Phil>. They are altogether passive and inert.

<Hyl>. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?

<Phil>. I acknowledge it.

<Hyl>. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of God?

<Phil>. It cannot.

<Hyl>. Since therefore you have no <idea> of the mind of God, how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it?

<Phil>. As to your first question: I own I have properly no <idea>, either of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless know that 1, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly a s I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the terms I <and myself>; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives. I say <indivisible>, because unextended; and <unextended>, because extended, figured, moveable things are

ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word <idea> in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is, an image or likeness of God -- though indeed extremely inadequate. For, all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its {232} imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in <myself> some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflexion and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas. Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created things in the mind of God. So much for your first question. For the second: I suppose by this time you can answer it yourself. For you neither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act, neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other; nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately. All which makes the case of <Matter> widely different from that of the <Deity>.

[<Hyl>. You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no <idea> of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this?

<Phil>. <I> say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of material substance, merely because I have no notion of it' but because the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that is, nothing {233} inconsistent must be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that, although we believe things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists, without some reason for such belief: but I have no reason for believing the existence of Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither can I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance -- either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflexion. You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer to the same objections. In the very notion or definition of <material Substance>, there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the notion of

Spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances: if to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there is a probability for the other; if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of it. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by reflexion.

<Hyl>. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that <you> are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in <spiritual Substance> than in <material Substance>, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.

<Phil>. How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that <I myself> am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wifls, and operates about ideas. I know that I, one {234} and the same self, perceive both colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from aft other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.][8]

<Hyl>. I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them? Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, <to be perceived> is one thing, and <to exist> is another.

<Phil>. <I> am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real, being, and saith it <is or exists>; but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being.

<Hyl>. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible

thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.

<Phil>. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us.

<Hyl>. But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men. {235} Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer think you he would make?

<Phil>. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that is <exists in>) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a <real> existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an <absolute> existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds. This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.

<Hyl>. But, according to your notions, what difference is there between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream -- since they are all equally in the mind?

<Phil>. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish <things from chimeras> on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

<Hyl>. But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very oddly.

<Phil>. I own the word <idea>, not being commonly used for <thing>, sounds something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to {236} be implied by that term; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its

sense; which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every unthinking being is necessarily, and from -the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom "we five, and move, and have our being." Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not on the objects: or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things, or know any thing of their real natures -- though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all our senses?

<Hyl>. And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything more extravagant than this?

<Phil>. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say -- a thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions, [without any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom, <Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself>].[9] Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places. In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This is so much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to confirm it by citations.

<Hyl>. You are not aware, Philonous, that in making God the immediate Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.

<Phil>. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument or occasion, called <Matter>, you as truly make Him the author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude {237} doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since, therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making God an immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions.

<Hyl>. But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there is the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most voices, I am confident you would

give up the point, without gathering the votes.

<Phil>. I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no doubts of their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts, your paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person. That there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed. And that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can deny. It is therefore evident there can be no <substratum> of those qualities but spirit; in which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny therefore that there is <any unthinking>-<substratum> of the objects of sense, and <in that acceptation> that there is any material substance. But if by <material substance> is meant only <sensible body>, <that> which is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare say, mean no more) -- then I am more certain of matter's existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to be. If there be anything which makes ,die generality of mankind {238} averse from the notions I espouse, it is a misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things. But, as it is you who are guilty of that, and not 1, it follows that in truth their aversion is against your notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal substances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses); and that, granting this, the bulk of mankind will take no thought about, nor think themselves at all concerned in the fate of those unknown natures, and philosophical quiddities, which some men are so fond of.

<Hyl>. What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, crooked?

<Phil>. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives, but in the inference he makes from his present perceptions. Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and at present, (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as

we are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive its motion.

<Hyl>. I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible enough. But, give me leave to put you in mind of {239} one thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you are now that it does not?

<Phil>. I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry, upon evidence.

<Hyl>. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with ideas <from without> is evident; and it is no less evident that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind, corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted; which I call <Matter>, and you call <Spirit>. This is all the difference.

<Phil>. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers, extended?

<Hyl>. It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the idea of extension.

<Phil>. It is therefore itself unextended?

<Hyl>. I grant it.

<Phil>. Is it not also active?

<Hyl>. Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?

<Phil>. Now let me ask you two questions: <First>, Whether it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name <Matter> to an unextended active being? And, <Secondly>, Whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of language?

<Hyl>. Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so, but some <Third Nature> distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason is there why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?

<Phil>. My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from volition, neither. can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit: therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a Spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be a Spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more {240} clearly if it be possible, I assert as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful Being. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you

know not what) Third Nature. Thus, I prove it to be Spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and, because actions, volitions; and, because there are volitions, there must be a <will>. Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of <my> mind: but, being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding; there is therefore an <understanding>. But will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a <Spirit>.

<Hyl>. And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear, little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a contradiction. Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?

<Phil>. Without a doubt.

<Hyl>. To suffer pain is an imperfection?

<Phil>. It is.

<Hyl>. Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some other Being?

<Phil>. We are.

<Hyl>. And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that Spirit God?

<Phil>. I grant it.

<Hyl>. But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and uneasiness are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain contradiction.

<Phil>. That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But, that God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an {241} external Agent, which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do; whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing: it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body: that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind. So that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means no more than a correspondence in the order of nature, between two sets of ideas, or things immediately

perceivable. But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy, or natural ties. No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know everything knowable, is certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath ideas; but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your not distinguishing, where there is so manifest a difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity where there is none.

<Hyl>. But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies. And what can withstand demonstration?

<Phil>. Let me see how you demonstrate that point.

<Hyl>. I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quantities of motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are equal, it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in each. But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small inequalities, arising from the resistance of the air) descend with an equal velocity; the motion therefore of descending bodies, and consequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that motion, is proportional to the quantity of Matter; which was to be demonstrated.

<Phil>. You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of motion in any body is proportional to the velocity {242} and <Matter> taken together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition from whence the existence of <Carter> is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in a circle?

<Hyl>. In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.

<Phil>. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that gravity is proportional to <Matter>, in your philosophic sense of the word; except you take it for granted that unknown <substratum>, or whatever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities; which to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I will not dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers producing them, do exist in a <material substratum>; this is what I deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration, have not yet proved.

<Hyl>. I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you shall persuade me that the natural philosophers have been dreaming all this while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter?

<Phil>. What mean you, Hylas, by the <phenomena>?

<Hyl>. I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.

<Phil>. And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?

<Hyl>. I have told you so a hundred times.

<Phil>. Therefore, to explain the phenomena, is, to shew how we come to be affected with ideas, in that manner and order wherein they are imprinted on our senses. Is it not?

<Hyl>. It is.

<Phil>. Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the production of any one idea in our minds by the help of <Matter>, I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it as nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of phenomena. That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that a Being which is utterly destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say, though {243} we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew its qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far from explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in the world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers have been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the connexion of ideas, they discover the laws and methods of nature, which is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining.

<Hyl>. After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do you imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of Matter, if there was no such thing?

<Phil>. That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or passion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father ' on Him, it must be either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation; or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it. But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, <taken for something distinct from what we perceive by our senses>, is thought to exist by all mankind; or indeed, by any except a few philosophers, who do not know what they would be at? Your question supposes these points are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to give you another answer. In the meantime, let it suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at all.

<Hyl>. But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger. New notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men's minds, and nobody knows where they will end.

<Phil>. Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is there the like reason why

they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making anything known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all such innovations had been forbidden, {244} men would have made a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But it is none of my business to plead for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the objects: that we must not believe our senses: that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be assured even of their existence: that real colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow: that there are in bodies absolute extensions, without any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle of a body contains innumerable extended parts: -- these are the novelties, these are the strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarrass the mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It is true, in doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some <ambages>, and ways of speech not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that which is most singular in them will, in effect, be found to amount to no more than this. -- that it is absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking Being should exist without being perceived by a Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country.

<Hyl>. As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to,. those are out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me <with scepticism>. This is so plain, there is no denying it.

<Phil>. You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.

<Hyl>. Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which strikes the senses.

<Phil>. What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon your supposition -- that Matter {245} is an essential part of all corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein we differ -- you will have them to be empty appearances, I, real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do.

<Hyl>. You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope the better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye?

<Phil>. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye. But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind of individual, the endless number of confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine, by my other senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not being perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances. It will not thence follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything else: except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not rightly {246} understanding the common language of men, speaking of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing to the same original: while they began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of life, without any regard to speculation.

<Hyl>. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.

<Phil>. It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther real than as our ideas are the true <representations> of those <originals>. But, as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble them at all. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real knowledge. Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all be true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider the point, we cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an absolute existence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how there should be any real thing in nature. The result of ;all which is that we are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me leave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the source of all this scepticism? Secondly, whether you are informed, either by sense or reason, of the

existence of those unknown originals? And, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant by the <absolute or external existence of unperceiving substances>? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, it be not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances, admit with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses?

<Hyl>. For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the objects perceived by the {247} <senses> of one, likewise perceivable to others present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the same manner affected with the ideas I frame in my <imagination>. Does not this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?

<Phil>. I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the objects of sense and those of imagination. But what would you infer from thence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because they are perceived by many.

<Hyl>. I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me into another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds?

<Phil>. It is.

<Hyl>. But the <same> idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same thing? And is not this highly, absurd?

<Phil>. If the term <same> be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since men are used to apply the word <same> where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, <several saw the same thing>, so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But, if the term <same> be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing. But whether philosophers shall think fit to <call> a thing the <same or> no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language; they would, without question, agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, might call it the <same> thing: others, especially {248} regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, might choose

the denomination of <different> things. But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether. what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term <same> applied to it? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built in their place; and that you should call this the <same>, and I should say it was not the <same> house. -- would we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself? And would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you should say, We differed in our notions; for that you super-added to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know not what you mean by <the abstracted idea of identity>; and should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yourself. -- Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity, without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this farther reflexion with you: that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the Materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes equally against the Materialists and me.

<Hyl>. [Ay, Philonous,][10] But they suppose an external archetype, to which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive the same thing.

<Phil>. And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles; -- <external>, <I mean>, <to your own mind>: though indeed it must be' supposed to exist in that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the ends of <identity>, as well as if it existed out of a mind. And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.

<Hyl>. You have indeed clearly satisfied me -- either that there is no difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes equally against both opinions.

<Phil>. But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither.

<Hyl>. I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonous, when I consider {249} the substance of what you advance against <Scepticism>, it amounts to no more than this: We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that we are affected with sensible impressions.

<Phil>. And how are <we> concerned any farther? I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure <nothing> cannot be seen, or felt, or. tasted: it is therefore red. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in such

sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word <cherry> you, mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its <existence> something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.

<Hyl>. But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same reasons against the existence of sensible things <in a mind>, which you have offered against their existing <in a material substratum>?

<Phil>. When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say ,to them.

<Hyl>. Is the mind extended or unextended?

<Phil>. Unextended, without doubt.

<Hyl>. Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?

<Phil>. They are.

<Hyl>. Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?

<Phil>. I believe you may.

<Hyl>. Explain to me now, 0 Philonous! how it is possible there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my <substratum>.

<Phil>. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself. This is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material <substratum> intelligible, I would fain know.

<Hyl>. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?

<Phil>. None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. 'Nor is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in

the terms <comprehend>, reflect, <discourse>, &<c>., which, being applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original sense.

<Hyl>. You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over. And, indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others, without being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to make me a proselyte to your principles.

<Phil>. Let me know this mighty difficulty.

<Hyl>. The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions. Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what? of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things, solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and I shall perhaps agree with you.

<Phil>. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants and animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning created by God, I make no question. {251} If by <ideas> you mean fictions and fancies of the mind, then these are no ideas. If by <ideas> you mean immediate objects of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot exist unperceived, or out of a mind, then these things are ideas. But whether you do or do not call them <ideas>, <it> matters little. The difference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained or rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues the same. In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed <ideas>, but <things>. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things, of <red> things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my principles, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so often said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to show where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be incumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic acceptation, for Matter, or <an unknown quiddity>, <with an absolute existence>. When you have proved these points, then (and not till then) may you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute.

<Hyl>. It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your notions?

<Phil>. If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other, then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither do you pretend they exist without the mind.

<Hyl>. Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.

<Phil>. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I should have seen things produced into being -- that is become perceptible -- in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or end their existence, we {252} do not mean this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them. This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought, either of <substratum>, <instrument, occasion, or absolute existence. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men, who believe the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.

<Hyl>. But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical being: that is to say, upon supposition there were <men> to perceive them; without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?

<Phil>. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was present -- that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable; that it exactly suits with the common, natural, and undebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all things on God; and consequently hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible that important article of our faith should have in making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their [great][11] Creator. I say, moreover, that, in this naked {253} conception of things, divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the <actuality of absolute existence>. You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon.

<Hyl>. I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them.

But what say you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of God? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you? And how could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer or better connected than this?

<Phil>. And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from eternity?

<Hyl>. I am.

<Phil>. Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.

<Hyl>. This I acknowledge.

<Phil>. By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.

<Hyl>. What shall we make then of the creation?

<Phil>. May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which He then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a <relative>, <or hypothetical existence> if you please. But, so long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all the religious ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can assign no other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this? Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary and immediate dependence of all {254} things on Him? Nay, would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?

<Hyl>. Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did either execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to will what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will? If the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of existence, in finite things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge something new to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and all change argues imperfection.

<Phil>. Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None of which can <we> conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having a beginning. God is a Being of transcerident and unlimited perfections: His nature, therefore,

is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer anything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is unavoidable on any scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.

<Hyl>. I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.

<Phil>. What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of things -- the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? or, is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this one point. Either you are not able to conceive {255} the Creation on any hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or complaint against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able to conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion you have of the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter doth not make the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.

<Hyl>. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of the creation.

<Phil>. I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?

<Hyl>. And so I am.

<Phil>. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way?

<Hyl>. In the plain sense, doubtless.

<Phil>. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?

<Hyl>. I cannot help thinking so.

<Phil>. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?

<Hyl>. This I have already acknowledged.

<Phil>. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not {256} the creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation might terminate?

<Hyl>. True.

<Phil>. Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something equally unintelligible to themselves and me?

<Hyl>. I cannot contradict you.

<Phil>. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown quiddities, of occasions, or <substratum>? No, certainly; but of things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them.

<Hyl>. I see you can assault me with my own weapons.

<Phil>. Then as to <absolute existence>; was there ever known a more jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation? That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd! that not only the most celebrated among the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity. Lay these things together, and then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things.

<Hyl>. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the <creation> is the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself towards your notions.

<Phil>. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of' the question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted {257} notions? And indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned, education.

<Hyl>. I confess it seems to be as you say.

<Phil>. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of religion, are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general Cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but God, in the strict and proper sense of the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more reason to doubt than of our own being. -- Then, with relation to human sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c. -- do they not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with a cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, have they been able to reach the <mechanical> production of any one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course of things? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe? But, laying aside Matter and corporeal, causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the <phenomena> are nothing else but <ideas>; God is a <spirit>, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and usefulness of them can {258} never be sufficiently admired; God is infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance and design. These surely are great advantages in <Physics>. Not to mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second causes. -- Then in <Metaphysics>: what difficulties concerning entity in abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures, substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent substances so widely different as <Spirit and Matter>, should mutually operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and

endless disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas? -- Even the <Mathematics> themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things, become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the. infinite divisibility of finite extension; which depends on that supposition -- But what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas,. fleeting indeed, and changeable; -- however, not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the <irregular visions of> the fancy. {259}

<Hyl>. I agree to all you have now said., and must own that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of <Immaterialism>!

<Phil>. After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism. This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the <absolute> existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same notion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be false?

<Hyl>. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects. But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter?

<Phil>. Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God, because there may be some particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties <attending Immaterialism>, there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the existence of Matter there is not one proof, and far more numerous and insurmountable objections lie

against it. But where are those mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what they are; something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly and solidly soever demonstrated.

<Hyl>. You have satisfied me, Philonous.

<Phil>. But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider: That which bears equally hard on two contradictory {260} opinions can be proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the <Materialists>. Be not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you cannot conceive it easier by the help of <Materialism>, it is plain it can be no objection against <Immaterialism>. Had you proceeded all along by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more unintelligible with than without that supposition; and consequently makes rather <against than> for it. You should consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty arises from the <non>-<existence of Matter>. If it doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty against <Immaterialism>. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will find this to have been often, if not always, the case. You should likewise take heed not to argue on a <petitio principii>. One is apt to say -- The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our ideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question? But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called <ignoratio elenchi>. You talked often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real being; but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed <somewhat>), which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the mind. Remember I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all these things I affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever. Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question; without which your objections {261} will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they have been) against your own notions.

<Hyl>. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this same <mistaking the question>. In denying Matter,. at first, glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel: but, upon reflexion,

find there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name <Matter>, and applying it to <sensible things>? This may be done without any change in your sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.

<Phil>. With all my heart: retain the word <Matter>, and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. <Matter>, or <material substance>, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the <terms sensible>, <substance>, <body>, <stuff>, and the like, are retained, the word <Matter> should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term.

<Hyl>. Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word <Matter> as I please, and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than <Spirit>. But I have been so long accustomed to the <term Matter> that I know not how to part with it: to say, there is no <Matter> in the world, is still shocking to me. Whereas to say -- There is no <Matter>, if by that term be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if by <Matter> is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in being perceived, then there is <Matter>: -- <this> distinction gives it quite another turn; and men will come into your notions with {262} small difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the controversy about <Matter> in the strict acceptation of it, lies altogether between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; or with unknown entities, <abstracted from dl relation to us>? It is evident, things regard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as you found them. Yet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not now think with the Philosophers; nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that respect; precisely, what you have added to, or altered in my former notions.

<Phil>. I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours tend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers: -- the former being of opinion, that <those things

they immediately perceive are the real things>; and the latter, that <the things immediately perceived are ideas>, <which exist only in the mind>. Which two notions put together, do, in effect, constitute the substance of what I advance.

<Hyl>. I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw things by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are removed and a new light breaks in upon my under standing. I am clearly convinced that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in pain about their <unknown natures or absolute existence>. This is the state I find myself in at present; though, indeed, the course that brought me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their philosophical Scepticism: but, in the end, your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs.

<Phil>. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at {263} which it breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent, as well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation. just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.

Editorial Conventions: Letters within angled brackets (e.g., <Hume>) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's.

This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2][Text within brackets is not contained in the first and second editions.]

[3]["Size or figure, or sensible quality" -- "size, colour, &c," in the first and second editions.]

[4]["In stones and minerals" -- in first and second editions.]

[5][The passage within brackets first appeared in the third edition.]

[6][0mitted in last edition.]

[7]"Tell me, Hylas," -- "So Hylas" -- in first and second editions.]

[8][This important passage, printed within brackets, is not found

in the first and second editions of the Didogues. It is, by anticipation, Berkeley's answer to Hume's application of the objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived Matter, to the reality of the Ego or Self, of which we are aware through memory, as identical amid the changes of its successive states.- A. C. F.]

[9][The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition.]

[10][Omitted in authoes last edition.]

[11][In the first and second editions only.]

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Dedication to *The Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies*

Nicolaus Copernicus

1543

To Pope Paul III

I can easily conceive, most Holy Father, that as soon as some people learn that in this book which I have written concerning the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, I ascribe certain motions to the Earth, they will cry out at once that I and my theory should be rejected. For I am not so much in love with my conclusions as not to weigh what others will think about them, and although I know that the meditations of a philosopher are far removed from the judgment of the laity, because his endeavor is to seek out the truth in all things, so far as this is permitted by God to the human reason, I still believe that one must avoid theories altogether foreign to orthodoxy. Accordingly, when I consider in my own mind how absurd a performance it must seem to those who know that the judgment of many centuries has approved the view that the Earth remains fixed as center in the midst of the heavens, if I should on the contrary, assert that the Earth moves; I was for a long time at a loss to know whether I should publish the commentaries which I have written in proof of its motion, or whether it were not better to follow the example of the Pythagoreans and of some others, who were accustomed to test the secrets of Philosophy not in writing but orally, and only to their relatives and friends, as the letter from Lysis to Hipparchus bears witness.

They did this, it seems to me, not as some think, because of a certain selfish reluctance to give their views to the world, but in order that the noblest truths, worked out by the careful study of great men, should not be despised by those who are vexed at the idea of taking great pains with any forms of literature except such as would be profitable, or by those who, if they are driven to the study of Philosophy for its own sake by the admonitions and the example of others, nevertheless, on account of their stupidity, hold a place among philosophers similar to that of drones among bees. Therefore, when I considered this carefully, the contempt which I had to fear because of the novelty and apparent absurdity of my view, nearly induced me to abandon utterly the work I had began.

My friends, however, in spite of long delay and even resistance on my part, withheld me from this decision. First among these was Nicolaus Schonberg, Cardinal of Capua, distinguished in all branches of learning. Next to him comes my very dear friend, Tidemann Giese, Bishop of Culm, a most earnest student, as he is, of sacred and, indeed, of all good learning. The latter has often urged me, at times even spurring me on with reproaches, to publish and at last bring to the light the book which had lain in my study not nine years merely, but already going on four times nine.

Not a few other very eminent and scholarly men made the same request, urging that I should no longer through fear refuse to give out my work for the common benefit of students of Mathematics.

They said I should find that the more absurd most men now thought this theory of mine concerning the motion of the Earth, the more admiration and gratitude it would command after they saw in the publication of my commentaries the mist of absurdity cleared away by most transparent proofs. So, influenced by these advisors and this hope, I have at length allowed my friends to publish the work, as they had long besought me to do.

But perhaps Your Holiness will not so much wonder that I have ventured to publish these studies of mine, after having taken such pains in elaborating them that I have not hesitated to commit to writing my views of the motion of the Earth, as you will be curious to hear how it occurred to me to venture, contrary to the accepted view of mathematicians, and well-nigh contrary to common sense, to form a conception of any terrestrial motion whatsoever.

Therefore I would not have it unknown to Your Holiness, that the only thing which induced me to look for another way of reckoning the movements of the heavenly bodies was that I knew that mathematicians by no means agree in their investigations thereof. For, in the first place, they are so much in doubt concerning the motion of the sun and the moon, that they can not even demonstrate and prove by observation the constant length of a complete year; and in the second place, in determining the motions both of these and of the five other planets, they fail to employ consistently one set of first principles and hypotheses, but use methods of proof based only upon the apparent revolutions and motions. For some employ concentric circles only; others eccentric circles and epicycles; and even by these means they do not completely attain the desired end. For, although those who have depended upon concentric circles have shown that certain diverse motions can be deduced from these, yet they have not succeeded thereby in laying down any sure principle, corresponding indisputably to the phenomena. These, on the other hand, who have devised systems of' eccentric circles, although they seem in great part to have solved the apparent movements by calculations which by these eccentrics are made to fit, have nevertheless introduced many things which seem to contradict the first principles of the uniformity of motion. Nor have they been able to discover or calculate from these the main point, which is the shape of the world and the fixed symmetry of its parts; but their procedure has been as if someone were to collect hands, feet, a head, and other members from various places, all very fine in themselves, but not proportionate to one body, and no single one corresponding in its turn to the others, so that a monster rather than a man would be formed from them. Thus in their process of demonstration which they term a "method," they are found to have omitted something essential, or to have included something foreign and not pertaining to the matter in hand. This certainly would never have happened to them if they had followed fixed principles; for if the hypotheses they assumed were not false, all that resulted therefrom would be verified indubitably. Those things which I am saying now may be obscure, yet they will be made clearer in their proper place.

Therefore, having turned over in my mind for a long time this uncertainty of the traditional mathematical methods of calculating the motions of the celestial bodies, I began to grow disgusted that no more consistent scheme of the movements of the mechanism of the universe, set up for our benefit by that best and most law abiding Architect of all things, was agreed upon by philosophers who otherwise investigate so carefully the most minute details of this world. Wherefore I undertook the task of re-reading the books of all the philosophers I could get access to, to see whether any one ever was of the opinion that the motions of the celestial bodies were other than those postulated by the men who taught mathematics in the schools. And I found first, indeed, in

Cicero, that Niceta perceived that the Earth moved; and afterward in Plutarch I found that some others were of this opinion, whose words I have seen fit to quote here, that they may be accessible to all: --

> **"Some maintain that the Earth is stationary, but Philolaus the Pythagorean says that it revolves in a circle about the fire of the ecliptic, like the sun and moon. Heraklides of Pontus and Ekphantus the Pythagorean make the Earth move, not changing its position, however, confined in its falling and rising around its own center in the manner of a wheel.**

Taking this as a starting point, I began to consider the mobility of the Earth; and although the idea seemed absurd, yet because I knew that the liberty had been granted to others before me to postulate all sorts of little circles for explaining the phenomena of the stars, I thought I also might easily be permitted to try whether by postulating some motions of the Earth, more reliable conclusions could be reached regarding the revolution of the heavenly bodies, than those of my predecessors.

And so, after postulating movements, which, farther on In the book, I ascribe to the Earth, I have found by many and long observations that if the movements of the other planets are assumed for the circular motion of the Earth and are substituted for the revolution of each star, not only do their phenomena follow logically therefrom, but the relative positions and magnitudes both of the stars and all their orbits, and of the heavens themselves, become so closely related that in none of its parts can anything be changed without causing confusion in the other parts and in the whole universe.

Therefore, in the course of the work I have followed this plan: I describe in the first book all the positions of the orbits together with the movements which I ascribe to the Earth, in order that this book might contain, as it were, the general scheme of the universe. Thereafter in the remaining books, I set forth the motions of the other stars and of all their orbits together with the movement of the Earth, in order that one may son, from this to what extent the movements and appearances of the other stars and their orbits can be saved, if they are transferred to the movement of the Earth. Nor do I doubt that ingenious and learned mathematicians will sustain me, if they are willing to recognize and weigh, not superficially, but with that thoroughness which Philosophy demands above all things, those matters which have been adduced by me in this work to demonstrate these theories.

In order, however, that both the learned and the unlearned equally may see that I do not avoid anyone's judgment, I have preferred to dedicate these lucubrations of mine to Your Holiness rather than to any other, because, even in this remote corner of the world where I live, you are considered to be the most eminent man in dignity of rank and in love of all learning and even of mathematics, so that by your authority and judgment you can easily suppress the bites of slanderers, albeit the proverb has it that there is no remedy for the bite of a sycophant. If perchance there shall be idle talkers, who, though they are ignorant of all mathematical sciences, nevertheless assume the right to pass judgment on these things, and if they should dare to criticize and attack this I theory of mine because of some passage of scripture which they have falsely distorted for their own purpose, I care not at all; I will even despise their judgment as foolish. For it is not unknown that Lactantius, otherwise a famous writer but a poor mathematicians, speaks most childishly of the shape of the Earth when he makes fun of those who said that the Earth has the form of a sphere. It should not seem strange then to zealous students, if some such people shall

ridicule us also. Mathematics are written for mathematicians, to whom, if my opinion does not deceive me, our labors will seem to contribute something to the ecclesiastical state whose chief office Your Holiness now occupies; for when not so very long ago, under Leo X, in the Lateran Council the question of revising the ecclesiastical calendar was discussed, it then remained unsettled, simply because the length of the years and months, and the motions of the sun and moon were held to have been not yet sufficiently determined. Since that time, I have given my attention to observing these more accurately, urged on by a very distinguished man, Paul, Bishop of Fossombrone, who at that time had charge of the matter. But what I may have accomplished herein I leave to the judgment of Your Holiness in particular, and to that of all other learned mathematicians; and lest I seem to Your Holiness to promise. more regarding the usefulness of the work than I can perform, I now pass to the work itself.

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Discourse on the Method
Rene Descartes
1637

* * * *

Introductory Note

The Discourse on the Method and Essays was originally published anonymously in 1637 by Jan Maire of Leiden, in somewhat shabby form. It was Descartes' first published work, the much talked of "World" or "Cosmos" having been suppressed or destroyed on his bearing of the condemnation of Galileo in 1632. In 1636, however, when forty years of age, he felt that it was time to bring his views before the public and publish them abroad. The Elzevirs naturally suggested themselves as the publishers to be selected, especially as they had once before made advances and as the original member of the firm resided in Leiden, where Descartes probably was at the time. They, however, had become less friendly, evidently doubting the success of an anonymous book of the kind, and consequently the author went elsewhere. Descartes endeavored to preserve the anonymity of his work with scrupulous care, and was annoyed by his zealous but fussy friend Mersenne showing the work to others, and announcing the author's name, with the ostensible object of obtaining from the King of France permission for its publication. In the end he found himself compelled to avow his authorship.

The book was written in French "the language of my country," as Descartes says, "in the hope that those who avail themselves of their natural reason alone, may be better judges of my opinions than those who give heed only to the writings of the ancients." Four hundred copies were given him for distribution to his friends and this was probably all the remuneration that he expected; none other seems in any case to have come to him.

The Latin version is the work of Etienne de Courcelles, a Protestant minister at Amsterdam, and was published in 1644 by Louis Elzevir at the same time as the "Principles." The Essays (the Dioptric, the Meteors and the Geometry) which are termed "Essays on this Method" have not been translated here.

Elizabeth. S. Haldane, 1911

* * * *

Discourse on the Method
Of Rightly Conducting the Reason
And Seeking for Truth in the Sciences.

If this Discourse appears too long to be read all at once, it may be separated into six portions. And in the

first these will be found various considerations respecting the sciences; in the second, the principal rules regarding the method which the author has sought out; while in the third are some of the rules of morality which he has derived from this Method. In the fourth are the reasons by which he proves the existence of God and of the human soul, which farm the foundation of his Metaphysic. In the fifth, the order of the questions regarding physics which he has investigated, and particularly the explanation of the movement of the heart, and of some other difficulties which pertain to medicine, as also the deference between the soul of man and that of the brutes. And in the last part the questions raised relate to those matters which the author believes to be requisite in order to advance further in the investigation of nature, in addition to the reasons that caused him to write.

PART I.

Good sense is of all things in the world the most equally distributed, for everybody thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that even those most difficult to please in all other matters do not commonly desire more of it than they already possess. It is unlikely that this is an error on their part; it seems rather to be evidence in support of the view that the power of forming a good judgment and of distinguishing the true from the false, which is properly speaking what is called Good sense or Reason, is by nature equal in all men. Hence too it will show that the diversity of our opinions does not proceed from some men being more rational than others, but solely from the fact that our thoughts pass through {82}diverse channels and the same objects are not considered by an. For to be possessed of good mental powers is not sufficient; the principal matter is to apply them well. The greatest minds are capable of the greatest vices as well as of the greatest virtues, and those who proceed very slowly may, provided they always follow the straight road, really advance much faster than those who, though they run, forsake it.

For myself I have never ventured to presume that my mind was in any way more perfect than that of the ordinary man; I have even longed to possess thought as quick, or an imagination as accurate and distinct, or a memory as comprehensive or ready, as some others. And besides these I do not know any other qualities that make for the perfection of the human mind. For as to reason or sense, inasmuch as it is the only thing that constitutes us men and distinguishes us from the brutes, I would fain believe that it is to be found complete in each individual, and in this I follow the common opinion of the philosophers, who say that the question of more or less occurs only in the sphere of the <accidents> and does not affect the <forms> or natures of the <individuals> in the same <species>.

But I shall not hesitate to say that I have had great good fortune from my youth up, in lighting upon and pursuing certain paths which have conducted me to considerations and maxims from which I have formed a Method, by whose assistance it appears to me I have the means of gradually increasing my knowledge and of little by little raising it

to the highest possible point which the mediocrity of my talents and the brief duration of my life call permit me to reach. For I have already reaped from it fruits of such a nature that, even though I always try in the judgments I make on myself to lean to the side of self-depreciation rather than to that of arrogance, and though, looking with the eye of a philosopher on the diverse actions and enterprises of all mankind, I find scarcely any which do not seem to me vain and useless, I do not cease to receive extreme satisfaction in the progress which I seem to have already made in the search after truth, and to form such hopes for the future as to venture to believe that, if amongst the occupations of men, simply as men, there is some one in particular that is excellent and important, that is the one which I have selected.

It must always be recollected, however, that possibly I deceive myself, and that what I take to be gold and diamonds is perhaps no {83} more than copper and glass. I know how subject we are to delusion in whatever touches ourselves, and also how much the judgments of our friends ought to be suspected when they are in our favor. But in this Discourse I shall be very happy to show the paths I have followed, and to set forth my life as in a picture, so that everyone may judge of it for himself; and thus in learning from the common talk what are the opinions which are held of it, a new means of obtaining self-instruction will be reached, which I shall add to those which I have been in the habit of using.

Thus my design is not here to teach the Method which everyone should follow in order to promote the good conduct of his Reason, but only to show in what manner I have endeavored to conduct my own. Those who set about giving precepts must esteem themselves more skillful than those to whom they advance them, and if they fall short in the smallest matter they must of course take the blame for it. But regarding this Treatise simply as a history, or, if you prefer it, a fable in which, amongst certain things which may be imitated, there are possibly others also which it would not be right to follow, I hope that it will be of use to some without being hurtful to any, and that all will thank me for my frankness.

I have been nourished on letters since my childhood, and since I was given to believe that by their means a clear and certain knowledge could be obtained of all that is useful in life, I had an extreme desire to acquire instruction. But so soon as I had achieved the entire course of study at the close of which one is usually received into the ranks of the learned, I entirely changed my opinion. For I found myself embarrassed with so many doubts and errors that it seemed to me that the effort to instruct myself had no effect other than the increasing discovery of my own ignorance. And yet I was studying at one of the most celebrated Schools in Europe, where I thought that there must be men of learning if they were to be found anywhere in the world. I learned there all that others learned; and not being satisfied with the sciences that we were taught, I even read through all the books which fell into my hands, treating of what is considered most curious and rare. Along

with this I knew the judgments that others had formed of me, and I did not feel that I was esteemed inferior to my fellow-students, although there were amongst them some destined to fill the places of our masters. And finally our century seemed to me as flourishing, and as fertile in great minds, as any which had preceded. And this made me take the liberty of judging all {84} others by myself and of coming to the conclusion that there was no learning in the world such as I was formerly led to believe it to be.

I did not omit, however, always to hold in esteem those exercises which are the occupation of the Schools. I knew that the Languages which one learns there are essential for the understanding of all ancient literature; that fables with their charm stimulate the mind and histories of memorable deeds exalt it; and that, when read with discretion, these books assist in forming a sound judgment. I was aware that the reading of all good books is indeed like a conversation with the noblest men of past centuries who were the authors of them, nay a carefully studied conversation, in which they reveal to us none but the best of their thoughts. I deemed Eloquence to have a power and beauty beyond compare; that Poesy has most ravishing delicacy and sweetness; that in Mathematics there are the subtlest discoveries and inventions which may accomplish much, both in satisfying the curious, and in furthering all the arts, and in diminishing man's labor; that those writings that deal with Morals contain much that is instructive, and many exhortations to virtue which are most useful; that Theology points out the way to Heaven; that Philosophy teaches us to speak with an appearance of truth on all things, and causes us to be admired by the less learned; that Jurisprudence, Medicine and all other sciences bring honor and riches to those who cultivate them; and finally that it is good to have examined all things, even those most full of superstition and falsehood, in order that we may know their just value, and avoid being deceived by them.

But I considered that I had already given sufficient time to languages and likewise even to the reading of the literature of the ancients, both their histories and their fables. For to converse with those of other centuries is almost the same thing as to travel. It is good to know something of the customs of different peoples in order to judge more sanely of our own, and not to think that everything of a fashion not ours is absurd and contrary to reason, as do those who have seen nothing. But when one employs too much time in traveling, one becomes a stranger in one's own country, and when one is too curious about things which were practiced in past centuries, one is usually very ignorant about those which are practiced in our own time. Besides, fables make one imagine many events possible which in reality are not so, and even the most accurate of histories, if they do not exactly misrepresent {85} or exaggerate the value of things in order to render them more worthy of being read, at least omit in them all the circumstances which are basest and least notable; and from this fact it follows that what is retained is not portrayed as it really is, and that those who regulate their conduct by examples which they derive from such a source,

are liable to fall into the extravagances of the knights-errant of Romance, and form projects beyond their power of performance.

I esteemed Eloquence most highly and I was enamored of Poesy, but I thought that both were gifts of the mind rather than fruits of study. Those who have the strongest power of reasoning, and who most skillfully arrange their thoughts in order to render them clear and intelligible, have the best power of persuasion even if they can bat speak the language of Lower Brittany and have never learned Rhetoric. And those who have the most delightful original ideas and who know how to express them with the maximum of style and suavity, would not fail to be the beat poets even if the art of Poetry were unknown to them.

Most of all was I delighted with Mathematics because of the certainty of its demonstrations and the evidence of its reasoning; but I did not yet understand its true use, and, believing that it was of service only in the mechanical arts, I was astonished that, seeing how firm and solid was its basis, no loftier edifice had been reared thereupon. On the other hand I compared the works of the ancient pagans which deal with Morals to palaces most superb and magnificent, which are yet built on sand and mud alone. They praise the virtues most highly and show them to be more worthy of being prized than anything else in the world, but they do not sufficiently teach us to become acquainted with them, and often that which is called by a fine name is nothing but insensibility, or pride, or despair, or parricide.

I honored our Theology and aspired as much as anyone to reach to heaven, but having learned to regard it as a most highly assured fact that the road is not less open to the most ignorant than to the most learned, and that the revealed truths which conduct thither are quite above our intelligence, I should not have dared to submit them to the feebleness of my reasonings; and I thought that, in order to undertake to examine them and succeed in so doing, it was necessary to have some extraordinary assistance from above and to be more than a mere man.

I shall not say anything about Philosophy, but that seeing that {86} it has been cultivated for many centuries by the best minds that have ever lived, and that nevertheless no single thing is to be found in it which is not subject of dispute, and in consequence which is not dubious, I had not enough presumption to hope to fare better there than other men had done. And also, considering how many conflicting opinions there may be regarding the self-same matter, all supported by learned people, while there can never be more than one which is true, I esteemed as well-nigh false all that only went as far as being probable.

Then as to the other sciences, inasmuch as they derive their principles from Philosophy, I judged that one could have built nothing solid on foundations so far from firm. And neither the honor nor the promised gain was sufficient to persuade me to cultivate them, for, thanks be to God, I did not find myself in a condition which obliged me to make

a merchandise of science for the improvement of my fortune; and, although I did not pretend to scorn all glory like the Cynics, I yet had very small esteem for what I could not hope to acquire, excepting through fictitious titles. And, finally, as to false doctrines, I thought that I already knew well enough what they were worth to be subject to deception neither by the promises of an alchemist, the predictions of an astrologer, the impostures of a magician, the artifices or the empty boastings of any of those who make a profession of knowing that of which they are ignorant.

This is why, as soon as age permitted me to emerge from the control of my tutors, I entirely quitted the study of letters. And resolving to seek no other science than that which could be found in myself, or at least in the great book of the world, I employed the rest of my youth in travel, in seeing courts and armies, in intercourse with men of diverse temperaments and conditions, in collecting varied experiences, in proving myself in the various predicaments in which I was placed by fortune, and under all circumstances bringing my mind to bear on the things which came before it, so that I might derive some profit from my experience. For it seemed to me that I might meet with much more truth in the reasonings that each man makes on the matters that specially concern him, and the issue of which would very soon punish him if he made a wrong judgment, than in the case of those made by a man of letters in his study touching speculations which lead to no result, and which bring about no other consequences to himself excepting that he will be all the more vain the more they are removed from common sense, {87} since in this case it Proves him to have employed so much the more ingenuity and skill in trying to make them seem probable. And I always had an excessive desire to learn to distinguish the true from the false, in order to see clearly in my actions and to walk with confidence in this life.

It is true that while I only considered the manners of other men I found in them nothing to give me settled convictions; and I remarked in them almost as much diversity as I had formerly seen in the opinions of philosophers. So much was this the case that the greatest profit which I derived from their study was that, in seeing many things which, although they seem to us very extravagant and ridiculous, were yet commonly received and approved by other great nations, I learned to believe nothing too certainly of which I had only been convinced by example and custom. Thus little by little I was delivered from many errors which might have obscured our natural vision and rendered us less capable of listening to Reason. But after I had employed several years in thus studying the book of the world and trying to acquire some experience, I one day formed the resolution of also making myself an object of study and of employing all the strength of my mind in choosing the road I should follow. This succeeded much better, it appeared to me, than if I had never departed either from my country or my books.

PART II.

I was then in Germany, to which country I had been attracted by the wars which are not yet at an end. And as I was returning from the coronation of the Emperor to join the army, the setting in of winter detained me in a quarter where, since I found no society to divert me, while fortunately I had also no cares or passions to trouble me, I remained the whole day shut up alone in a stove-heated room, where I had complete leisure to occupy myself with my own thoughts. One of the first of the considerations that occurred to me was that there is very often less perfection in works composed of several portions, and carried out by the hands of various masters, than in those on which one individual alone has worked. Thus we see that buildings planned and carried out by one architect alone are usually more beautiful and better proportioned than those which many have tried to put in order and improve, making use of old walls which were built with other ends in view. In the game way also, those ancient cities which, originally mere villages, have become in the process of time great towns, are usually {88} badly constructed in comparison with those which are regularly laid out on a plain by a surveyor who is free to follow his own ideas. Even though, considering their buildings each one apart, there is often as much or more display of skill in the one case than in the other, the former have large buildings and small buildings indiscriminately placed together, thus rendering the streets crooked and irregular, so that it might be said that it was chance rather than the will of men guided by reason that led to such an arrangement. And if we consider that this happens despite the fact that from all time there have been certain officials who have had the special duty of looking after the buildings of private individuals in order that they may be public ornaments, we shall understand how difficult it is to bring about much that is satisfactory in operating only upon the works of others. Thus I imagined that those people who were once half-ravage, and who have become civilized only by slow degrees, merely forming their laws as the disagreeable necessities of their crimes and quarrels constrained them, could not succeed in establishing so good a system of government as those who, from the time they first came together as communities, carried into effect the constitution laid down by some prudent legislator. Thus it is quite certain that the constitution of the true Religion whose ordinances are of God alone is incomparably better regulated than any other. And, to come down to human affairs, I believe that if Sparta was very flourishing in former times, this was not because of the excellence of each and every one of its laws, seeing that many were very strange and even contrary to good morals, but because, being drawn up by one individual, they all tended towards the same end. And similarly I thought that the sciences found in books-in those at least whose reasonings are only probable and which have no demonstrations, composed as they are of the gradually accumulated opinions of many different individuals-do not approach so near to the truth as the simple reasoning which a man of common sense can quite naturally carry out respecting the things which come immediately before him. Again I thought that since we have all been children before being men, and since it has for long fallen to us to be governed by our appetites and by our teachers (who often enough contradicted one another, and

none of whom perhaps counseled us always for the best), it is almost impossible that our judgments should be so excellent or solid as they should have been had we had complete use of our reason since our birth, and had we been guided by its means alone. {89}

It is true that we do not find that all the houses in a town are razed to the ground for the sole reason that the town is to be rebuilt in another fashion, with streets made more beautiful; but at the same time we see that many people cause their own houses to be knocked down in order to rebuild them, and that sometimes they are forced so to do where there is danger of the houses falling of themselves, and when the foundations are not secure. From such examples I argued to myself that there was no plausibility in the claim of any private individual to reform a state by altering everything, and by overturning it throughout, in order to set it right again. Nor is it likewise probable that the whole body of the Sciences, or the order of teaching established by the Schools, should be reformed. But as regards all the opinions which up to this time I had embraced, I thought I could not do better than endeavor once for all to sweep them completely away, so that they might later on be replaced, either by others which were better, or by the same, when I had made them conform to the uniformity of a rational scheme. And I firmly believed that by this means I should succeed in directing my life much better than if I had only built on old foundations, and relied on principles of which I allowed myself to be in youth persuaded without having inquired into their truth. For although in so doing I recognized various difficulties, these were at the same time not insurmountable, nor comparable to those which are found in reformation of the most insignificant kind in matters which concern the public. In the case of great bodies it is too difficult a task to raise them again when they are once thrown down, or even to keep them in their places when once thoroughly shaken; and their fall cannot be otherwise than very violent. Then as to any imperfections that they may possess (and the very diversity that is found between them is sufficient to tell us that these in many cases exist) custom has doubtless greatly mitigated them, while it has also helped us to avoid, or insensibly corrected a number against which mere foresight would have found it difficult to guard. And finally the imperfections are almost always more supportable than would be the process of removing them, just as the great roads which wind about amongst the mountains become, because of being frequented, little by little so well-beaten and easy that it is much better to follow them than to try to go more directly by climbing over rocks and descending to the foot of precipices.

This is the reason why I cannot in any way approve of those turbulent and unrestful spirits who, being called neither by birth {90} nor fortune to the management of public affairs, never fail to have always iii their minds some new reforms. And if I thought that in this treatise there was contained the smallest justification for this folly, I should be very sorry to allow it to be published. My design has never extended beyond trying to reform my own opinion and to build on a foundation which is entirely my

own. If my work has given me a certain satisfaction, so that I here present to you a draft of it, I do not so do because I wish to advise anybody to imitate it. Those to whom God has been most beneficent in the bestowal of His graces will perhaps form designs which are more elevated; but I fear much that this particular one will seem too venturesome for many. The simple resolve to strip oneself of all opinions and beliefs formerly received is not to be regarded as an example that each man should follow, and the world may be said to be mainly composed of two classes of minds neither of which could prudently adopt it. There are those who, believing themselves to be cleverer than they are, cannot restrain themselves from being precipitate in judgment and have not sufficient patience to arrange their thoughts in proper order; hence, once a man of this description had taken the liberty of doubting the principles he formerly accepted, and had deviated from the beaten track, he would never be able to maintain the path which must be followed to reach the appointed end more quickly, and he would hence remain wandering astray all through his life. Secondly, there are those who having reason or modesty enough to judge that they are less capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood than some others from whom instruction might be obtained, are right in contenting themselves with following the opinions of these others rather than in searching better ones for themselves.

For myself I should doubtless have been of these last if I had never had more than a single master, or had I never known the diversities which have from all time existed between the opinions of men of the greatest learning. But I had been taught, even in my College days, that there is nothing imaginable so strange or so little credible that it has not been maintained by one philosopher or other, and I further recognized in the course of my travels that all those whose sentiments are very contrary to ours are yet not necessarily barbarians or savages, but may be possessed of reason in as great or even a greater degree than ourselves. I also considered how very different the self-same man, identical in mind and spirit, may become, according as he is brought up from childhood amongst the French or Germans, or has passed his whole life amongst Chinese or {91} cannibals. I likewise noticed how even in the fashions of one's clothing the same thing that pleased us ten years ago, and which will perhaps please us once again before ten years are passed, seems at the present time extravagant and ridiculous. I thus concluded that it is much more custom and example that persuade us than any certain knowledge, and yet in spite of this the voice of the majority does not afford a proof of any value in truths a little difficult to discover, because such truths are much more likely to have been discovered by one man than by a nation. I could not, however, put my finger on a single person whose opinions seemed preferable to those of others, and I found that I was, so to speak, constrained myself to undertake the direction of my procedure.

But like one who walks alone and in the twilight I resolved to go so slowly, and to use so much circumspection in all things, that if my advance was but very small, at least I guarded myself well from falling. I did not wish to

set about the final rejection of any single opinion which might formerly have crept into my beliefs without having been introduced there by means of Reason, until I had first of all employed sufficient time in planning out the task which I had undertaken, and in seeking the true Method of arriving at a knowledge of all the things of which my mind was capable.

Among the different branches of Philosophy, I had in my younger days to a certain extent studied Logic; and in those of Mathematics, Geometrical Analysis and Algebra-three arts or sciences which seemed as though they ought to contribute something to the design I had in view. But in examining them I observed in respect to Logic that the syllogisms and the greater part of the other teaching served better in explaining to others those things that one knows (or like the art of Lully, in enabling one to speak without judgment of those things of which one is ignorant) than in learning what is new. And although in reality Logic contains many precepts which are very true and very good, there are at the same time mingled with them so many others which are hurtful or superfluous, that it is almost as difficult to separate the two as to draw a Diana or a Minerva out of a block of marble which is not yet roughly hewn. And as to the Analysis of the ancients and the Algebra of the moderns, besides the fact that they embrace only matters the most abstract, such as appear to have no actual use, the former is always so restricted to the consideration of symbols that it cannot exercise the Understanding without greatly fatiguing the imagination; and in the latter one is so subjected to certain rules and formulas that {92} the result is the construction of an art which is confused and obscure, and which embarrasses the mind, instead of a science which contributes to its cultivation. This made me feel that some other Method must be found, which, comprising the advantages of the three, is yet exempt from their faults. And as a multiplicity of laws often furnishes excuses for evil-doing, and as a State is hence much better ruled when, having but very few laws, these are most strictly observed; so, instead of the great number of precepts of which Logic is composed, I believed that I should find the four which I shall state quite sufficient, provided that I adhered to a firm and constant resolve never on any single occasion to fail in their observance.

The first of these was to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be so: that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments, and to accept in them nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it.

The second was to divide up each of the difficulties which I examined into as many parts as possible, and as seemed requisite in order that it might be resolved in the best manner possible.

The third was to carry on my reflections in due order, commencing with objects that were the most simple and easy to understand, in order to rise little by little, or by degrees, to knowledge of the most complex, assuming an

order, even if a fictitious one, among those which do not follow a natural sequence relatively to one another.

The last was in all cases to make enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I should be certain of having omitted nothing.

Those long chains of reasoning, simple and easy as they are, of which geometricians make use in order to arrive at the most difficult demonstrations, had caused me to imagine that all those things which fall under the cognizance of man might very likely be mutually related in the same fashion; and that, provided only that we abstain from receiving anything a8 true which is not so, and always retain the order which is necessary in order to deduce the one conclusion from the other, there can be nothing so remote that we cannot reach to it, nor so recondite that we cannot discover it. And I had not much trouble in discovering which objects it was necessary to begin with, for I already knew that it was with the most simple and those most easy to apprehend. Considering also that, of all those who have hitherto sought for the truth in the {93} Sciences, it has been the mathematicians alone who have been able to succeed in making any demonstrations, that is to say producing reasons which are evident and certain, I did not doubt that it had been by means of a similar kind that they carried on their investigations. I did not at the same time hope for any practical result in so doing, except that my mind would become accustomed to the nourishment of truth and would not content itself with false reasoning. But for all that I had no intention of trying to master all those particular sciences that receive in common the name of Mathematics; but observing that, although their objects are different, they do not fail to agree in this, that they take nothing under consideration but the various relationships or proportions which are present in these objects, I thought that it would be better if I only examined these proportions in their general aspect, and without viewing them otherwise than in the objects which would serve most to facilitate a knowledge of them. Not that I should in any way restrict them to these objects, for I might later on all the more easily apply them to all other objects to which they were applicable. Then, having carefully noted that in order to comprehend the proportions I should sometimes require to consider each one in particular, and sometimes merely keep them in mind, or take them in groups, I thought that, in order the better to consider them in detail, I should picture them in the form of lines, because I could find no method more simple nor more capable of being distinctly represented to my imagination and senses. I considered, however, that in order to keep them in my memory or to embrace several at once, it would be essential that I should explain them by means of certain formulas, the shorter the better. And for this purpose it was requisite that I should borrow all that is best in Geometrical Analysis and Algebra, and correct the errors of the one by the other.

As a matter of fact, I can venture to say that the exact observation of the few precepts which I had chosen gave me so much facility in sifting out all the questions embraced in these two sciences, that in the two or three

months which I employed in examining them -- commencing with the most simple and general, and making each truth that I discovered a rule for helping me to find others -- not only did I arrive at the solution of many questions which I had hitherto regarded as most difficult, but, towards the end, it seemed to me that I was able to determine in the case of those of which I was still ignorant, by what means, and in how far, it was possible to {94} solve them. In this I might perhaps appear to you to be very vain if you did not remember that having but one truth to discover in respect to each matter, whoever succeeds in finding it knows in its regard as much as can be known. It is the same as with a child, for instance, who has been instructed in Arithmetic and has made an addition according to the rule prescribed; he may be sure of having found as regards the sum of figures given to him all that the human mind can know. For, in conclusion, the Method which teaches us to follow the true order and enumerate exactly every term in the matter under investigation contains everything which gives certainty to the rules of Arithmetic.

But what pleased me most in this Method was that I was certain by its means of exercising my reason in all things, if not perfectly, at least as well as was in my power. And besides this, I felt in making use of it that my mind gradually accustomed itself to conceive of its objects more accurately and distinctly; and not having restricted this Method to any particular matter, I promised myself to apply it as usefully to the difficulties of other sciences as I had done to those of Algebra. Not that on this account I dared undertake to examine just at once all those that might present themselves; for that would itself have been contrary to the order which the Method prescribes. But having noticed that the knowledge of these difficulties must be dependent on principles derived from Philosophy in which I yet found nothing to be certain, I thought that it was requisite above all to try to establish certainty in it. I considered also that since this endeavor is the most important in all the world, and that in which precipitation and prejudice were most to be feared, I should not try to grapple with it till I had attained to a much riper age than that of three and twenty, which was the age I had reached. I thought, too, that I should first of all employ much time in preparing myself for the work by eradicating from my mind all the wrong opinions which I had up to this time accepted, and accumulating a variety of experiences fitted later on to afford matter for my reasonings, and by ever exercising myself in the Method which I had prescribed, in order more and more to fortify myself in the power of using it. {95}

PART III.

And finally, as it is not sufficient, before commencing to rebuild the house which we inhabit, to pull it down and provide materials and an architect (or to act in this capacity ourselves, and make a careful drawing of its design), unless we have also provided ourselves with some other house where we can be comfortably lodged during the time of rebuilding, so in order that I should not remain irresolute in my actions while reason obliged me to be so in my judgments, and that I might not omit to carry on my life

as happily as I could, I formed for myself a code of morals for the time being which did not consist of more than three or four maxims, which maxims I should like to enumerate to you.

The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering constantly to the religion in which by God's grace I had been instructed since my childhood, and in all other things directing my conduct by opinions the most moderate in nature, and the farthest removed from excess in all those which are commonly received and acted on by the most judicious of those with whom I might come in contact. For since I began to count my own opinions as naught, because I desired to place all under examination, I was convinced that I could not do better than follow those held by people on whose judgment reliance could be placed. And although such persons may possibly exist amongst the Persians and Chinese as well as amongst ourselves, it seemed to me that it was most expedient to bring my conduct into harmony with the ideas of those with whom I should have to live; and that, in order to ascertain that these were their real opinions, I should observe what they did rather than what they said, not only because in the corrupt state of our manners there are few people who desire to say all that they believe, but also because many are themselves ignorant of their beliefs. For since the act of thought by which we believe a thing is different from that by which we know that we believe it, the one often exists without the other. And amongst many opinions all equally received, I chose only the most moderate, both because these are always most suited for putting into practice, and probably the best (for all excess has a tendency to be bad), and also because I should have in a less degree turned aside from the right path, supposing that I was wrong, than if, having chosen an extreme course, I found that I had chosen amiss. I also made a point of counting as excess all the engagements by means of which we limit {96} in some degree our liberty. Not that I hold in low esteem those laws which, in order to remedy the inconstancy of feeble souls, permit, when we have a good object in our view, that certain vows be taken, or contracts made, which oblige us to carry out that object. This sanction is even given for security in commerce where designs are wholly indifferent. But because I saw nothing in all the world remaining constant, and because for my own part I promised myself gradually to get my judgments to grow better and never to grow worse, I should have thought that I had committed a serious sin against commonsense if, because I approved of something at one time, I was obliged to regard it similarly at a later time, after it had possibly ceased to meet my approval, or after I had ceased to regard it in a favorable light.

My second maxim was that of being as firm and resolute in my actions as I could be, and not to follow less faithfully opinions the most dubious, when my mind was once made up regarding them, than if these had been beyond doubt. In this I should be following the example of travelers, who, finding themselves lost in a forest, know that they ought not to wander first to one side and then to the other, nor, still less, to stop in one place, but understand that they should continue to walk as straight as they can in one

direction, not diverging for any slight reason, even though it was possibly chance alone that first determined them in their choice. By this means if they do not go exactly where they wish, they will at least arrive somewhere at the end, where probably they will be better off than in the middle of a forest. And thus since often enough in the actions of life no delay is permissible, it is very certain that, when it is beyond our power to discern the opinions which carry most truth, we should follow the most probable; and even although we notice no greater probability in the one opinion than in the other, we at least should make up our minds to follow a particular one and afterwards consider it as no longer doubtful in its relationship to practice, but as very true and very certain, inasmuch as the reason,which caused us to determine upon it is known to be so. And henceforward this principle was sufficient to deliver me from all the penitence and remorse which usually affect the mind and agitate the conscience of those weak and vacillating creatures who allow themselves to keep changing their procedure, and practice as good, things which they afterwards judge to be evil.

My third maxim was to try always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and to alter my desires rather than change the order {97} of the world, and generally to accustom myself to believe that there is nothing entirely within our power but our own thoughts: so that after we have done our best in regard to the things that are without us, our ill-success cannot possibly be failure on our part.[2] And this alone seemed to me sufficient to prevent my desiring anything in the future beyond what I could actually obtain, hence rendering me content; for since our will does not naturally induce us to desire anything but what our understanding represents to it as in some way possible of attainment, it is certain that if we consider all good things which are outside of us as equally outside of our power, we should not have more regret in resigning those goods which appear to pertain to our birth, when we are deprived of them for no fault of our own, than we have in not possessing the kingdoms of China or Mexico. In the same way, making what is called a virtue out of a necessity, we should no more desire to be well if ill, or free, if in prison, than we now do to have our bodies formed of a substance as little corruptible as diamonds, or to have Wings to fly with like birds. I allow, however, that to accustom oneself to regard all things from this point of view requires long exercise and meditation often repeated; and I believe that it is principally in this that is to be found the secret of those philosophers who, in ancient times, were able to free themselves from the empire of fortune, or, despite suffering or poverty, to rival their gods in their happiness. For, ceaselessly occupying themselves in considering the limits which were prescribed to them by nature, they persuaded themselves so completely that nothing was within their own power but their thoughts, that this conviction alone was sufficient to prevent their leaving any longing for other things. And they had so absolute a mastery over their thoughts that they had some reason for esteeming themselves as more rich and more powerful, and more free and more happy than other men, who, however favored by nature or fortune they might be, if

devoid of this philosophy, never could arrive a& all at which they aim.

And last of all, to conclude this moral code, I felt it incumbent on me to make a review of the various occupations of men in this life in order to try to choose out the best; and without wishing to say anything of the employment of others I thought that I could I "So that whatever does not eventuate after we have done all in our power that it should happen is to be accounted by us as among the things which evidently cannot be done and which in philosophical phrase are called impossible." Latin Version. {98} not do better than continue in the one in which I found myself engaged, that is to say, in occupying my whole life in cultivating my Reason, and in advancing myself as much as possible in the knowledge of the truth in accordance with the method which I had prescribed myself. I had experienced so much satisfaction since beginning to use this method, that I did not believe that any sweeter or more innocent could in this life be found,-every day discovering by its means some truths which seemed to me sufficiently important, although commonly ignored by other men. The,satisfaction which I had so filled my mind that all else- seemed of no account. And, besides, the three preceding maxims were founded solely on the plan which I had formed of continuing to instruct myself. For since God has given to each of us some light with which to distinguish truth from error, I could not believe that I ought for a single moment to content myself with accepting the opinions held by others unless I had in view the employment of my own judgment in examining them at the proper time; and I could not have held myself free of scruple in following such opinions, if nevertheless I had not intended to lose no occasion of finding superior opinions, supposing them to exist; and finally, I should not have been able to restrain my desires nor to remain content, if I had not followed a road by which, thinking that I should be certain to be able to acquire all the knowledge of which I was capable, I also thought I should likewise be certain of obtaining all the best things which could ever come within my power. And inasmuch as our will impels us neither to follow after nor to flee from anything, excepting as our understanding represents it as good or evil, it is sufficient to judge wisely in order to act well, and the best judgment brings the best action-that is to say, the acquisition of all the virtues and all the other good things that it is possible to obtain. When one is certain that this point is reached, one cannot fail to be contented.

Having thus assured myself of these maxims, and having set them on one side along with the truths of religion which have always taken the first place in my creed, I judged that as far as the rest of my opinions were concerned, I could safely undertake to rid myself of them. And inasmuch as I hoped to be able to reach my end more successfully in converse with man than in living longer shut up in the warm room where these reflections had come to me, I hardly awaited the end of winter before I once more set myself to travel. And in all the nine following years I did naught but roam {99} hither and thither, trying to be a spectator rather than an actor in all the comedies the world displays. More especially did I reflect in each matter that came

before me as to anything which could make it subject to suspicion or doubt, and give occasion for mistake, and I rooted out of my mind all the errors which might have formerly crept in. Not that indeed I imitated the skeptics, who only doubt for the sake of doubting, and pretend to be always uncertain; for, on the contrary, my design was only to provide myself with good ground for assurance, and to reject the quicksand and mud in order to find the rock or clay. In this task it seems to me, I succeeded pretty well, since in trying to discover the error or uncertainty of the propositions which I examined, not by feeble conjectures, but by clear and assured reasonings, I encountered nothing so dubious that I could not draw from it some conclusion that was tolerably secure, if this were no more than the inference that it contained in it nothing that was certain. And just as in pulling down an old house we usually preserve the debris to serve in building up another, so in destroying all those opinions which I considered to be ill-founded, I made various observations and acquired many experiences, which have since been of use to me in establishing those which are more certain. And more than this, I continued to exercise myself in the method which I had laid down for my use; for besides the fact that I was careful as a rule to conduct all my thoughts according to its maxims, I set aside some hours from time to time which I more especially employed in practicing myself in the solution of mathematical problems according to the Method, or in the solution of other problems which though pertaining to other sciences, I was able to make almost similar to those of mathematics, by detaching them from all principles of other sciences which I found to be not sufficiently secure. You will see the result in many examples which are expounded in this volume.[3] And hence, without living to all appearance in any way differently from those who, having no occupation beyond spending their lives in ease and innocence, study to separate pleasure from vice, and who, in order to enjoy their leisure without weariness, make use of all distractions that are innocent and good, I did not cease to prosecute my design, and to profit perhaps even more in my study of truth than if I had done nothing but read books or associate with literary people. {100}

These nine years thus passed away before I had taken any definite part in regard to the difficulties as to which the learned are in the habit of disputing, or had commenced to seek the foundation of any philosophy more certain than the vulgar. And the example of many excellent men who had tried to do the same before me, but, as it appears to me, without success, made me imagine it to be so hard that possibly I should not have dared to undertake the task, had I not discovered that someone had spread abroad the report that I had already reached its conclusion. I cannot tell on what they based this opinion; if my conversation has contributed anything to it, this must have arisen from my confessing my ignorance more ingenuously than those who have studied a little usually do. And perhaps it was also due to my having shown forth my reasons for doubting many things which were held by others to be certain, rather than from having boasted of any special philosophic system. But being at heart honest enough not to desire to be esteemed as different from what I am, I thought that I must try by every

means in my power to render myself worthy of the reputation which I had gained. And it is just eight years ago that this desire made me resolve to remove myself from all places where any acquaintances were possible, and to retire to a country such as this,4 where the long-continued war has caused such order to be established that the armies which are maintained seem only to be of use in allowing the inhabitants to enjoy the fruits of peace with so much the more security; and where, in the crowded throng of a great and very active nation, which is more concerned with its own affairs than curious about those of others, without missing ally of the conveniences of the most populous towns, I can live as solitary and retired as in deserts the most remote.

PART IV.

I do not know that I ought to tell you of the first meditations there made by me, for they are so metaphysical and so unusual that they may perhaps not be acceptable to everyone. And yet at the same time, in order that one may judge whether the foundations which I have laid are sufficiently secure, I find myself constrained in some measure to refer to them. For a long time I had remarked that it is sometimes requisite in common life to follow opinions which one knows to be most uncertain, exactly as though they were indisputable, as has been said above. But because in this case {101} I wished to give myself entirely to the search after Truth, I thought that it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course, and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain. Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it to be; and because there are men who deceive themselves in their reasoning and fall into paralogisms, even concerning the simplest matters of geometry, and judging that I was as subject to error as was any other, I rejected as false all the reasons formerly accepted by me as demonstrations. And since all the same thoughts and conceptions which we have while awake may also come to us in sleep, without any of them being at that time true, I resolved to assume that everything that ever entered into my mind was no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the "I" who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth "<I think, therefore I am>" was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking.

And then, examining attentively that which I was, I saw that I could conceive that I had no body, and that there was no world nor place where I might be; but yet that I could not for all that conceive that I was not. On the contrary, I saw from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it very evidently and certainly followed that I was; on the other hand if I had only ceased from

thinking, even if all the rest of what I had ever imagined had really existed, I should have no reason for thinking that I had existed. From that I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is.

After this I considered generally what in a proposition is requisite in order to be true and certain; for since I had just discovered one which I knew to be such, I thought that I ought {102} also to know in what this certainty consisted. And having remarked that there was nothing at all in the statement "<I think, therefore I am>" which assures me of having thereby made a true assertion, excepting that I see very clearly that to think it is necessary to be, I came to the conclusion that I might assume, as a general rule, that the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true-remembering, however, that there is some difficulty in ascertaining which are those that we distinctly conceive.

Following upon this, and reflecting on the fact that I doubted, and that consequently my existence was not quite perfect (for I saw clearly that it was a greater perfection to know than to doubt), I resolved to inquire whence I had learnt to think of anything more perfect than I myself was; and I recognized very clearly that this conception must proceed from some nature which was really more perfect. As to the thoughts which I had of many other things outside of me, like the heavens, the earth, light, heat, and a thousand others, I had not so much difficulty in knowing whence they came, because, remarking nothing in them which seemed to render them superior to me, I could believe that, if they were true, they were dependencies upon my nature, in so far as it possessed some perfection; and if they were not true, that I held them from naught, that is to say, that they were in me because I had something lacking in my nature. But this could not apply to the idea of a Being more perfect than my own, for to hold it from naught would be manifestly impossible; and because it is no less contradictory to say of the more perfect that it is what results from and depends on the less perfect, than to say that there is something which proceeds from nothing, it was equally impossible that I should hold it from myself. In this way it could but follow that it had been placed in me by a Nature which was really more perfect than mine could be, and which even had within itself all the perfections of which I could form any idea -- that is to say, to put it in a word, which was God. To which I added that since I knew some perfections which I did not possess, I was not the only being in existence (I shall here use freely, if you will allow, the terms of the School); but that there was necessarily some other more perfect Being on which I depended, or from which I acquired all that I had. For if I had existed alone and independent of any others, so that I should have had from myself all that perfection of being in which I participated to however small an extent, I should have been able for the same reason

to have had all the remainder which {103} I knew that I lacked; and thus I myself should have been infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, all-powerful, and, finally, I should have all the perfections which I could discern in God. For, in pursuance of the reasonings which I have just carried on, in order to know the nature of God as far as my nature is capable of knowing it, I had only to consider in reference to all these things of which I found some idea in myself, whether it was a perfection to possess them or not. And I was assured that none of those which indicated some imperfection were in Him, but that all else was present; and I saw that doubt, inconstancy, sadness, and such things, could not be in Him considering that I myself should have been glad to be without them. In addition to this, I had ideas of many things which are sensible and corporeal, for, although I might suppose that I was dreaming, and that all that I saw or imagined was false, I could not at the same time deny that the ideas were really in my thoughts. But because I had already recognized very clearly in myself that the nature of the intelligence is distinct from that of the body, and observing that all composition gives evidence of dependency, and that dependency is manifestly an imperfection, I came to the conclusion that it could not be a perfection in God to be composed of these two natures, and that consequently He was not so composed. I judged, however, that if there were any bodies in the world, or even any intelligences or other natures which were not wholly perfect, their existence must depend on His power in such a way that they could not subsist without Him for a single moment.

After that I desired to seek for other truths, and having put before myself the object of the geometricians, which I conceived to be a continuous body, or a space indefinitely extended in length, breadth, height or depth, which was divisible into various parts, and which might have various figures and sizes, and might be moved or transposed in all sorts of ways (for all this the geometricians suppose to be in the object of their contemplation), I went through some of their simplest demonstrations, and having noticed that this great certainty which everyone attributes to these demonstrations is founded solely on the fact that they are conceived of with clearness, in accordance with the rule which I have just laid down, I also noticed that there was nothing at all in them to assure me of the existence of their object. For, to take an example, I saw very well that if we suppose a triangle to be given, the three angles must certainly be equal to two right angles; but for all that I saw no {104} reason to be assured that there was any such triangle in existence, while on the contrary, on reverting to the examination of the idea which I had of a Perfect Being, I found that in this case existence was implied in it in the same manner in which the equality of its three angles to two right angles is implied in the idea of a triangle; or in the idea of a sphere, that all the points on its surface are equidistant from its center, or even more evidently still. Consequently it is at least as certain that God, who is a Being, so perfect, is, or exists, as any demonstration of geometry can possibly be.

What causes many, however, to persuade themselves that

there is difficulty in knowing this truth, and even in knowing the nature of their soul, is the fact that they never raise their minds above the things of sense, or that they are so accustomed to consider nothing excepting by imagining it, which is a mode of thought specially adapted to material objects, that all that is not capable of being imagined appears to them not to be intelligible at all. This is manifest enough from the fact that even the philosophers in the Schools hold it as a maxim that there is -nothing in the understanding which has not first of all been in the senses, in which there is certainly no doubt that the ideas of God and of the soul have never been. And it seems to me that those who desire to make use of their imagination in order to understand these ideas, act in the same way as if, to hear sounds or smell odors, they should wish to make use of their eyes: excepting that there is indeed this difference, that the sense of sight does not give us less assurance of the truth of its objects, than do those of seeing or of hearing, while neither our imagination nor our senses can ever assure us of anything, if our understanding does not intervene.

If there are finally any persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of God and of their soul by the reasons which I have brought forward, I wish that they should know that all other things of which they perhaps think themselves more assured (such as possessing a body, and that there are stars and an earth and so on) are less certain. For, although we have a moral assurance of these things which is such that it seems that it would be extravagant in us to doubt them, at the same time no one, unless he is devoid of reason, can deny, when a metaphysical certainty is in question, that there is sufficient cause for our not having complete assurance, by observing the fact that when asleep we may similarly imagine that we have another body, and that we see other stars and another earth, without there being anything of the kind. {105} For how do we know that the thoughts that come in dreams are more false than those that we have when we are awake, seeing that often enough the former are not less lively and vivid than the latter? And though the wisest minds may study the matter as much as they will, I do not believe that they will be able to give any sufficient reason for removing this doubt, unless they presuppose the existence of God. For to begin with, that which I have just taken as a rule, that is to say, that all the things that we very clearly and very distinctly conceive of are true, is certain only because God is or exists, and that He is a Perfect Being, and that all that is in us issues from Him. From this it follows that our ideas or notions, which to the extent of their being clear or distinct are ideas of real things issuing from God, cannot but to that extent be true. So that though we often enough have ideas which have an element of falsity, this can only be the case in regard to those which have in them somewhat that is confused or obscure, because in so far as they have this character they participate in negation -that is, they exist in us as confused only because we are not quite perfect. And it is evident that there is no less repugnance in the idea that error or imperfection, inasmuch as it is imperfection, proceeds from God, than there is in the idea of truth or perfection proceeding from naught. But

if we did not know that all that is in us of reality and truth proceeds from a perfect and infinite Being, however clear and distinct were our ideas, we should not have any reason to assure ourselves that they had the perfection of being true.

But after the knowledge of God and of the soul has thus rendered us certain of this rule, it is very easy to understand that the dreams which we imagine in our sleep should not make us in any way doubt the truth of the thoughts which we have when awake. For even if in sleep we had some very distinct idea such as a geometrician might have who discovered some new demonstration, the fact of being asleep would not militate against its truth. And as to the most ordinary error in our dreams, which consists in their representing to us various objects in the same way as do our external senses, it does not matter that this should give us occasion to suspect the truth of such ideas, because we may be likewise often enough deceived in them without our sleeping at all, just as when those who have the jaundice see everything as yellow, or when stars or other bodies which are very remote appear much smaller than they really are. For, finally, whether we are awake or asleep, we {106} should never allow ourselves to be persuaded excepting by the evidence of our Reason. And it must be remarked that I speak of our Reason and not of our imagination nor of our senses; just as though we see the sun very clearly, we should not for that reason judge that it is of the size of which it appears to be; likewise we could quite well distinctly imagine the head of a lion on the body of a goat, without necessarily concluding that a chimera exists. For Reason does not insist that whatever we see or imagine thus is a truth, but it tells us clearly that all our ideas or notions must have some foundation of truth. For otherwise it could not be possible that God, who is all perfection and truth, should have placed them within us. And because our reasonings are never so evident nor so complete during sleep as during wakefulness, although sometimes our imaginations are then just as lively and acute, or even more so, Reason tells us that since our thoughts cannot possibly be all true, because we are not altogether perfect, that which they have of truth must infallibly be met with in our waking experience rather than in that of our dreams.

PART V.

I should be very glad to proceed to show forth the complete chain of truths which I have deduced from these first, but because to do this it would have been necessary now to speak of many matters of dispute among the learned, with whom I have no desire to embroil myself, I think that it will be better to abstain. I shall only state generally what these truths are, so that it may be left to the decision of those best able to judge whether it would be of use for the public to be more particularly informed of them or not. I always remained firm in the resolution which I had made, Dot to assume any other principle than that of which I have just made use, in order to demonstrate the existence of God and of the Soul, and to accept nothing as true which did not appear to be more clear and more certain than the demonstrations of the geometricians had formerly seemed. And

nevertheless I venture to say that not only have I found the means of satisfying myself in a short time as to the more important of those difficulties usually dealt with iii philosophy, but I have also observed certain laws which God has so established in Nature, and of which He has imprinted such ideas on our minds, that,, after having reflected sufficiently upon the matter, we cannot doubt their being accurately observed in all that exists or is done in the world. Further, in considering the sequence {107} of these laws, it seems to me that I leave discovered many truth,-, more useful and more important than all that I had formerly learned or even hoped to learn.

But because I tried to explain the most important of these in a Treatise[5] which certain considerations prevented me from publishing, I cannot do better, in making them known, than here summarize briefly what that Treatise contains. I had planned to comprise in it all that I believed myself to know regarding the nature of material objects, before I set myself to write. However, just as the painters who cannot represent equally well on a plain surface all the various sides of a solid body, make selection of one of the most important, which alone is set in the light, while the others are put in shadow and made to appear only as they may be seen in looking at the former, so, fearing that I could not put in my Treatise all that I had in my mind, I undertook only to show very fully my conceptions of light, Later on, when occasion occurred, I resolved to add something about the sun and fixed stars, because light proceeds almost entirely from them; the heavens would be dealt with because they transmit light, the planets, the comets and the earth because they reflect it, and more particularly would all bodies which are on the earth, because they are either colored or transparent, or else luminous; and finally I should deal with man because he is the spectator of all. For the very purpose of putting all these topics somewhat in shadow, and being able to express myself freely about them, without being obliged to adopt or to refute the opinions which are accepted by the learned, I resolved to leave all this world to their disputes, and to speak only of what would happen in a new world if God now created, somewhere in an imaginary space, matter sufficient where-with to form it, and if He agitated in diverse ways, and without any order, the diverse portions of this matter, so that there resulted a chaos as confused as the poets ever feigned, and concluded His work by merely lending His concurrence to Nature in the usual way, leaving her to act in accordance with the laws which He had established. So, to begin with, I described this matter and tried to represent it in such a way, that it seems to me that nothing in the world could be more clear or intelligible, excepting what has just been said of God and the Soul. For I even went so far as expressly to assume that there was in it none of these forms or qualities which are so debated in the Schools, nor anything at all the {108} knowledge of which is not so natural to our minds that none could even pretend to be ignorant of it. Further I pointed out what are the laws of Nature, and, without resting my reasons on any other principle than the infinite perfections of God, I tried to demonstrate all those of which one could have any doubt, and to show that they are of such a nature that even if God had

created other worlds, He could not have created any in which these laws would fail to be. observed. After that, I showed how the greatest part of the matter of which this chaos is constituted, must, in accordance with these laws, dispose and arrange itself in such a fashion as to render it similar to our heavens; and how meantime some of its parts must form an earth, some planets and comets, and some others a sun and fixed stars. And, enlarging on the subject of light, I here explained at length the nature of the light which would be found in the sun and stars, and how from these it crossed in an instant the immense space of the heavens, and how it was reflected from the planets and comets to the earth. To this I also added many things touching the substance, situation, movements, and all the different qualities of these heavens and stars, so that I thought I had said enough to make it clear that there is nothing to be seen in the heavens and stars pertaining to our system which must not, or at least may not, appear exactly the same in those of the system which I described. From this point I came to speak more particularly of the earth, showing how, though I had expressly presupposed that God had not placed any weight in the matter of which it is composed, its parts did not fail all to gravitate exactly to its center; and how, having water and air on its surface, the disposition of the heavens and of the stars, more particularly of the moon, must cause a flux or reflux, which in all its circumstances is similar to that which is observed in our seas, and besides that, a certain current both of water and air from east to west, such as may also be observed in the tropics. I also showed how the mountains, seas, fountains and rivers, could naturally be formed in it, how the metals came to be in the mines and the plants to grow in the fields; and generally how all bodies, called mixed or composite, might arise. And because I knew nothing but fire which could produce light, excepting the stars, I studied amongst other things to make very clear all that pertains to its nature, how it is formed, how nourished, how there is sometimes only heat without light, and sometimes light without heat; I showed, too, how different colors might by it be induced upon different bodies and qualities of diverse kinds, how {109} some of these were liquefied and others solidified, bow nearly all can be consumed or converted into ashes and smoke by its means, and finally how of these ashes, by the intensity of its action alone, it forms glass. Since this transformation of ashes into glass seemed to me as wonderful as any other process in nature, I took particular pleasure in describing it.

I did not at the same time wish to infer from all these facts that this world has been created in the manner which I described; for it is much more probable that at the beginning God made it such as it was to be. But it is certain, and it is an opinion commonly received by the theologians, that the action by which He now preserves it is just the same as that by which He at first created it. In this way, although He had not, to begin with, given this world any other form than that of chaos, provided that the laws of nature had once been established and that He had lent His aid in order that its action should be according to its wont, we may well believe, without doing outrage to the miracle of creation, that by this means alone all things

which are purely material might in course of time have become such as we observe them to be at present; and their nature is much easier to understand when we see them coming to pass little by little in this manner, than were we to consider them as all complete to begin with.

From a description of inanimate bodies and plants I passed on to that of animals, and particularly to that of men. But since I had not yet sufficient knowledge to speak of them in the same style as of the rest, that is to say, demonstrating the effects from the causes, and showing from what beginnings and in what fashion Nature must produce them, I contented myself with supposing that God formed the body of man altogether like one of ours, in the outward figure of its members as well as in the interior conformation of its organs, without making use of any matter other than that which I had described, and without at the first placing in it a rational soul, or any other thing which might serve as a vegetative or as a sensitive soul; excepting that He kindled in the heart one of these fires without light, which I have already described, and which I did not conceive of as in any way different from that which makes the hay heat when shut up before it is dry, and which makes new wine grow frothy when it is left to ferment over the fruit. For, examining the functions which might in accordance with this supposition exist in this body, I found precisely all those which might exist in us without our having the power of thought, and consequently {110} without our soul-that is to say, this part of us, distinct from the body, of which it has just been said that its nature is to think-contributing to it, functions which are identically the same as those in which animals lacking reason may be said to resemble us. For all that, I could not find in these functions any which, being dependent on thought, pertain to us alone, inasmuch as we are men; while I found all of them afterwards, when I assumed that God had created a rational soul and that He had united it to this body in a particular manner which I described.

But in order to show how I there treated of this matter, I wish here to set forth the explanation of the movement of heart and arteries which, being the first and most general movement that is observed in animals, will give us the means of easily judging as to what we ought to think about all the rest. And so that there may be less difficulty in understanding what I shall say on this matter, I should like that those not versed in anatomy should take the trouble, before reading this, of having out up before their eyes the heart of some large animal which has lungs (for it is in all respects sufficiently similar to the heart of a man), and cause that there be demonstrated to them the two chambers or cavities which are within it. There is first of all that which is on the right side, with which two very large tubes or channels correspond, viz. the <vena cava>, which is the principal receptacle of the blood, and so to speak the trunk of a tree of which all the other veins of the body are the branches; and there is the arterial vein which has been badly named because it is nothing but an artery which, taking its origin from the heart, divides, after having issued from it, into many branches which proceed to disperse themselves all through the lungs. Then

there is secondly the cavity on the left side with which there again correspond two tubes which are as large or larger than the preceding, viz. the venous artery, which has also been badly named, because it is nothing but a vein which comes from the lungs, where it is divided into many branches, interlaced with those of the arterial vein, and with those of the tube which is called the windpipe, through which enters the air which we breathe; and the great artery which, issuing from the heart, sends its branches throughout the body. I should also wish that the eleven little membranes, which, like so many doors, open and shut the four entrances which are in these two cavities, should be carefully shown. There are of these three at the entrance of the <vena cava>, where they are so arranged that they can in nowise prevent the blood which it contains {111} from flowing into the right cavity of the heart and yet exactly prevent its issuing out; there are three at the entrance to the arterial vein, which, being arranged quite the other way, easily allow the blood which is in this cavity to pass into the lungs, but not that which is already in the lungs to return to this cavity. There are also two others at the entrance of the venous artery, which allow the blood in the lungs to flow towards the left cavity of the heart, but do not permit its return; and three at the entrance of the great artery, which allow the blood to flow from the heart, but prevent its return. There is then no cause to seek for any other reason for the number of these membranes, except that the opening of the venous artery being oval, because of the situation where it is met with, may be conveniently closed with two membranes, while the others, being round, can be better closed with three. Further, I should have my readers consider that the grand artery and the arterial vein are much harder and firmer than are the venous artery and the <vena cava>; and that these two last expand before entering the heart, and there form so to speak two pockets called the auricles of the heart, which are composed of a tissue similar to its own; and also that there is always more heat in the heart than in any other part of the body; and finally that this heat is capable of causing any drop of blood that enters into its cavities promptly to expand and dilate, as liquids usually do when they are allowed to fall drop by drop into some very hot vessel.

After this I do not need to say anything with a view to explaining the movement of the heart, except that when its cavities are not full of blood there necessarily flows from the <vena cava> into the right cavity, and from the venous artery into the left, enough blood to keep these two vessels always full, and being full, that their orifices, which are turned towards the heart, cannot then be closed. But as soon as two drops of blood have thus entered, one into each of the cavities, these drops, which cannot be otherwise than very large, because the openings by which they enter are very wide and the vessels from whence they come are very full of blood, rarefy and dilate because of the heat which they find there. By this means, causing the whole heart to expand, they force home and close the five little doors which are at the entrances of the two vessels whence they flow, thus preventing any more blood from coming down into the heart and becoming more and more rarefied, they push open the six doors which are in the entrances of the two

other vessels through which they make their exit, by this means causing {112} all the branches of the arterial vein and of the great artery to expand almost at the same instant as the heart. This last immediately afterward contracts as do also the arteries, because the blood which has entered them has cooled; and the six little doors close up again, and the five doors of the <vena cava> and of the venous artery re-open and make a way for two other drops of blood which cause the heart and the arteries once more to expand, just as we saw before. And because the blood which then enters the heart passes through these two pouches which are called auricles, it comes to pass that their movement is contrary to the movement of the heart, and that they contract when it expands. For the rest, in order that those who do not know the force of mathematical demonstration and are unaccustomed to distinguish true reasons from merely probable reasons, should not venture to deny what has been said without examination, I wish to acquaint them with the fact that this movement which I have just explained follows as necessarily from the very disposition of the organs, as can be seen by looking at the heart, and from the heat which can be felt with the fingers, and from the nature of the blood of which we can learn by experience, as does that of a clock from the power, the situation, and the form, of its counterpoise and of its wheels.

But if we ask how the blood in the veins does not exhaust itself in thus flowing continually into the heart, and how the arteries do not become too full of blood, since all that passes through the heart flows into them, I need only reply by stating what has already been written by an English physician,[6] to whom the credit of having broken the ice in this matter must be ascribed, as also of being the first to teach that there are many little tubes at the extremities of the arteries whereby the blood that they receive from the heart enters the little branches of the veins, whence it returns once more to the heart; in this way its course is just a perpetual circulation. He proves this very clearly by the common experience of surgeons, who, by binding the arm moderately firmly above the place where they open the vein, cause the blood to issue more abundantly than it would have done if they had not bound it at all; while quite a contrary result would occur if they bound it below, between the hand and the opening, or if they bound it very firmly above. For it is clear that when the bandage is moderately tight, though it may prevent the blood already in the arm from {113} returning to the heart by the Veins, it cannot for all that prevent more blood from coming anew by the arteries, because these are situated below the veins, and their walls, being stronger, are less easy to compress; and also that the blood which comes from the heart tends to pass by means of the arteries to the band with greater force than it does to return from the band to the heart by the veins. And because this blood escapes from the arm by the opening which is made in one of the veins, there must necessarily be some passages below the ligature, that is to say, towards the extremities of the arm, through which it can come thither from the arteries. This physician likewise proves very clearly the truth of that which he says of the course of the blood, by the existence of certain little membranes or valves which are so arranged in different

places along the course of the veins, that they do not permit the blood to pass from the middle of the body towards the extremities, but only to return from the extremities to the heart; and further by the experiment which shows that all the blood which is in the body may issue from it in a very short time by means of one single artery that has been cut, and this is so even when it is very tightly bound very near the heart, and cut between it and the ligature, so that there could be no ground for supposing that the blood which flowed out of it could proceed from any other place but the heart.

But there are many other things which demonstrate that the true cause of this motion of the blood is that which I have stated. To begin with, the difference which is seen between the blood which issues from the veins, and that which issues from the arteries, can only proceed from the fact, that, being rarefied, and so to speak distilled by passing through the heart, it is more subtle and lively, and warmer immediately after leaving the heart (that is to say, when in the arteries) than it is a little while before entering it (that is, when in the veins). And if attention be paid, we shall find that this difference does not appear clearly, excepting in the vicinity of the heart, and is not so clear in those parts which are further removed from it. Further, the consistency of,he coverings of which the arterial vein and the great artery are composed, shows clearly enough that the blood beats against them with more force than it does in the case of the veins. And why should the left cavity of the heart and the great artery be larger and wider than the right cavity and the arterial vein, if it is not that the blood of the venous artery having only been in the lungs since it had passed through the heart, is more subtle and rarefies more effectively and {114} easily than that which proceeds immediately from the <vena cava>? And what is it that the physicians can discover in feeling the pulse, unless they know that, according as the blood changes its nature, it may be rarefied by the warmth of the heart in a greater or less degree, and more or less quickly than before ? And if we inquire how this heat is communicated to the other members, must it not be allowed that it is by means of the blood which, passing through the heart, is heated once again and thence is spread throughout all the body? From this it happens that if we take away the blood from any particular part, by that same means we take away from it the heat; even if the heart were as ardent as a red hot iron it would not suffice to heat up the feet and hands as it actually does, unless it continually sent out to them new blood. We further understand from this that the true use of respiration is to carry sufficient fresh air into the lungs to cause the blood, which comes there from the right cavity of the heart, where it has been rarefied and so to speak transformed into vapors, to thicken, and become anew converted into blood before falling into the left cavity, without which process it would not be fit to serve as fuel for the fire which there exists. We are confirmed in this statement by seeing that the animals which have no lungs have also but one cavity in their hearts, and that in children, who cannot use them while still within their mother's wombs, there is an opening by which the blood flows from the <vena cava> into the left cavity of the heart, and

a conduit through which it passes from the arterial vein into the great artery without passing through the lung. Again, how could digestion be carried on in the stomach if the heart did not send heat there by the arteries, and along with this some of the more fluid parts of the blood which aid in dissolving the foods which have been there placed? And is not the action which converts the juice of foods into blood easy to understand if we consider that it is distilled by passing and repassing through the heart possibly more than one or two hundred times in a day? What further need is there to explain the process of nutrition and the production of the different humors which are in the body, if we can say that the force with which the blood, in being rarefied, passes from the heart towards the extremities of the arteries, causes some of its parts to remain among those of the members where they are found and there to take the place of others which they oust; and that according to the situation or form or smallness of the little pores which they encounter, certain ones proceed to certain parts rather than others, just as {115} a number of different sieves variously perforated, as everyone has probably seen, are capable of separating different species of grain? And finally what in all this is most remarkable of all, is the generation of the animal spirits, which resemble a very subtle wind, or rather a flame which is very pure and very vivid, and which, continually rising Up in great abundance from the heart to the brain, thence proceeds through the nerves to the muscles, thereby giving the power of motion to all the members. And it is Dot necessary to suppose any other cause to explain how the particles of blood, which, being most agitated and most penetrating, are the most proper to constitute these spirits, proceed towards the brain rather than elsewhere, than that the arteries which carry them thither are those which proceed from the heart in the most direct lines, and that according to the laws of Mechanics, which are identical with those of Nature, when many objects tend to move together to the same point, where there is not room for all (as is the case with the particles of blood which issue from the left cavity of the heart and tend to go towards the brain), the weakest and least agitated parts must necessarily be turned aside by those that are stronger, which by this means are the only ones to reach it.

I had explained all these matters in some detail in the Treatise which I formerly intended to publish. And afterwards I had shown there, what must be the fabric of the nerves and muscles of the human body in order that the animal spirits therein contained should have the power to move the members, just as the heads of animals, a little while after decapitation, are still observed to move and bite the earth, notwithstanding that they are no longer animate; what changes are necessary in the brain to cause wakefulness, sleep and dreams; how light, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and all other qualities pertaining to external objects are able to imprint on it various ideas by the intervention of the senses; how hunger, thirst and other internal affections can also convey their impressions upon it; what should be regarded as the "common sense" by which these ideas are received, and what is meant by the memory which retains them, by the fancy which can change them in

diverse ways and out of them constitute new ideas, and which, by the same means, distributing the animal spirits through the muscles, can cause the members of such a body to move in as many diverse ways, and in a manner as suitable to the objects which present themselves to its senses and to its internal passions, as can happen in our own case apart from the direction of our free will. And this will not seem strange {116} to those, who, knowing how many different automata or moving machines can be made by the industry of man, without employing in so doing more than a very few parts in comparison with the great multitude of bones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins, or other parts that are found in the body of each animal. From this aspect the body is regarded as a machine which, having been made by the hands of God, is incomparably better arranged, and possesses in itself movements which are much more admirable, than any of those which can be invented by man. Here I specially stopped to show that if there had been such machines, possessing the organs and outward form of a monkey or some other animal without reason, we should not have had any means of ascertaining that they were not of the same nature as those animals. On the other hand, if there were machines which bore a resemblance to our body and imitated our actions as far as it was morally possible to do so, we should always have two very certain tests by which to recognize that, for all that, they were not real men. The first is, that they could never use speech or other signs as we do when placing our thoughts on record for the benefit of others. For we can easily understand a machine's being constituted so that it can utter words, and even emit some responses to action on it of a corporeal kind, which brings about a change in its organs; for instance, if it is touched in a particular part it may ask what we wish to say to it; if in another part it may exclaim that it is being hurt, and so on. But it never happens that it arranges its speech in various ways, in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. And the second difference is, that although machines can perform certain things as well as or perhaps better than any of us can do, they infallibly fan short in others, by the which means we may discover that they did not act from knowledge, but only from the disposition of their organs. For while reason is a universal instrument which can serve for all contingencies, these organs have need of some special adaptation for every particular action. From this it follows that it is morally impossible that there should be sufficient diversity in any machine to allow it to act in all the events of life in the same way as our reason causes us to act.

By these two methods we may also recognize the difference that exists between men and brutes. For it is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, {117} forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. It is not the want of organs that brings this to pass, for it is evident that ma.-Pies and parrots are able to utter words just like ourselves, and yet they cannot speak

as we do, that is, so as to give evidence that they think of what they say. On the other hand, men who, being born deaf and dumb, are in the same degree, or even more than the brutes, destitute of the organs which serve the others for talking, are in the habit of themselves investing certain signs by which they make themselves understood by those who, being usually in their company, have leisure to learn their language. And this does not merely show that the brutes have less reason than men, but that they have none at all, since it is clear that very little is required in order to be able to talk. And when we notice the inequality that exists between animals of the same species, as well as between men, and observe that some are more capable of receiving instruction than others, it is not credible that a monkey or a parrot, selected as the most perfect of its species, should not in these matters equal the stupidest child to be found, or at least a child whose mind is clouded, unless in the case of the brute the soul were of an entirely different nature from ours. And we ought not to confound speech with natural movements which betray passions and may be imitated by machines as well as be manifested by animals; nor must we think, as did some of the ancients, that brutes talk, although we do not understand their language. For if this were true, since they have many organs which are allied to our own, they could communicate their thoughts to us just as easily as to those of their own race. It is also a very remarkable fact that although there are many animals which exhibit more dexterity than we do in some of their actions, we at the same time observe that they do not manifest any dexterity at all in many others. Hence the fact that they do better than we do, does not prove that they are endowed with mind, for in this case they would have more reason than any of us, and would surpass us in all other things. It rather shows that they have no reason at all, and that it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, just as a clock, which is only composed of wheels and weights is able to tell the hours and measure the time more correctly than we can do with all our wisdom.

I had described after this the rational soul and shown that it {118} could not be in any way derived from the power of matter, like the other things of which I had spoken, but that it must be expressly created. I showed, too, that it is not sufficient that it should be lodged in the human body like a pilot in his ship, unless perhaps for the moving of its members, but that it is necessary that it should also be joined and united more closely to the body in order to have sensations and appetites similar to our own, and thus to form a true man. In conclusion, I have here enlarged a little on the subject of the soul, because it is one of the greatest importance. For next to the error of those who deny God, which I think I have already sufficiently refuted, there is none which is more effectual in leading feeble spirits from the straight path of virtue, than to imagine that the soul of the brute is of the same nature as our own, and that in consequence, after this life we have nothing to fear or to hope for, any more than the flies and ants. As a matter of fact, when one comes to know how greatly they differ, we understand much better the reasons which go to prove that our soul is in its nature entirely independent of body, and in consequence that it is not liable to die with

it. And then, inasmuch as we observe no other causes capable of destroying it, we are naturally inclined to judge that it is immortal.

PART VI.

It is three years since I arrived at the end of the Treatise which contained all these things; and I was commencing to revise it in order to place it in the hands of a printer, when I learned that certain persons, to whose opinions I defer, and whose authority cannot have less weight with my actions than my own reason has over my thoughts, had disapproved of a physical theory published a little while before by another person.[7] I will not say that I agreed with this opinion, but only that before their censure I observed in it nothing which I could possibly imagine to be prejudicial either to Religion or the State, or consequently which could have prevented me from giving expression to it in writing, if my reason had persuaded me to do so: and this made me fear that among my own opinions one might be found which should be misunderstood, notwithstanding the great care which I have always taken not to accept any new beliefs unless I had very certain proof of their truth, and not to give expression to what could tend to the disadvantage {119} of any person. This sufficed to cause me to alter the resolution which I had made to publish. For, although the reasons for my former resolution were very strong, my inclination, which always made me hate the profession of writing books, caused me immediately to find plenty of other reasons for excusing myself from doing so. And these reasons, on the one side and on the other, are of such a nature that not only have I here some interest in giving expression to them, but possibly the public may also have some interest in knowing them.

I have never made much of those things which proceed from my own mind, and so long as I culled Do other fruits from the Method which I use, beyond that of satisfying myself respecting certain difficulties which pertain to the speculative sciences, or trying to regulate my conduct by the reasons which it has taught me, I never believed myself to be obliged to write anything about it. For as regards that which concerns conduct, everyone is so confident of his own common sense, that there might be found as many reformers as heads, if it were permitted that others than those whom God has established as the sovereigns of his people, or at least to whom He has given sufficient grace and zeal to be prophets, should be allowed to make any changes in that. And, although my speculations give me the greatest pleasure, I believed that others also had speculations which possibly pleased them even more. But so soon as I had acquired some general notions concerning Physics, and as, beginning to make use of them in various special difficulties, I observed to what point they might lead us, and how much they differ from the principles of which we have made use up to the present time, I believed that I could not keep them concealed without greatly sinning against the law which obliges us to procure, as much as in us lies, the general good of all mankind. For they caused me to see that it is possible to attain knowledge which is very useful in life, and that, instead of that speculative

philosophy which is taught in the Schools, we may find a practical philosophy by means of which, knowing the force and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens and all other bodies that environ us, as distinctly as we know the different crafts of our artisans, we can in the same way employ them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature. This is not merely to be desired with a view to the invention of an infinity of arts and crafts which enable us to enjoy without any trouble the fruits of the earth and all the good things which are to {120} be found there, but also principally because it brings about the preservation of health, which is without doubt the chief blessing and the foundation of all other blessings in this life. For the mind depends so much on the temperament and disposition of the bodily organs that, if it is possible to find a means of rendering men wiser and cleverer than they have hitherto been, I believe that it is in medicine that it must be sought. It is true that the medicine which is now in vogue contains little of which the utility is remarkable; but, without having any intention of decrying it, I am sure that there is no one, even among those who make its study a profession, who does not confess that all that men know is almost nothing in comparison with what remains to be known; and that we could be free of an infinitude of maladies both of body and mind, and even also possibly of the infirmities of age, if we had sufficient knowledge of their causes, and of all the remedies with which nature has provided us. But, having the intention of devoting all my life to the investigation of a knowledge which is so essential, and having discovered a path which appears to me to be of such a nature that we must by its means infallibly reach our end if we pursue it, unless, indeed, we are prevented by the shortness of life or by lack of experience, I judged that there was no better provision against these two impediments than faithfully to communicate to the public the little which I should myself have discovered, and to beg all well-inclined persons to proceed further by contributing, each one according to his own inclination and ability, to the experiments which must be made, and then to communicate to the public all the things which they might discover, in order that the last should commence where the preceding had left off; and thus, by joining together the lives and labors of many, we should collectively proceed much further than any one in particular could succeed in doing.

I remarked also respecting experiments, that they become so much the more necessary the more one is advanced in knowledge, for to begin with it is better to make use simply of those which present themselves spontaneously to our senses, and of which we could not be ignorant provided that we reflected ever so little, rather than to seek out those which are more rare and recondite; the reason of this is that those which are more rare often mislead us so long as we do not know the causes of the more common, and the fact that the circumstances on which they depend are almost always so particular and so minute that it is very difficult to observe {121} them. But in this the order which I have followed is as follows: I have first tried to discover generally the principles or first causes of everything that is or that can be in the world, without considering anything

that might accomplish this end but God Himself who has created the world, or deriving them from any source excepting from certain germs of truths which are naturally existent in our souls. After that I considered which were the primary and most ordinary effects which might be deduced from these causes, and it seems to me that in this way I discovered the heavens, the stars, an earth, and even on the earth, water, air, fire, the minerals and some other such things, which are the most common and simple of any that exist, and consequently the easiest to know. Then, when I wished to descend to those which were more particular, so many objects of various kinds presented themselves to me, that I did not think it was possible for the human mind to distinguish the forms or species of bodies which are on the earth from an infinitude of others which might have been so if it had been the will of God to place them there, or consequently to apply them to our use, if it were not that we arrive at the causes by the effects, and avail ourselves of many particular experiments. In subsequently passing over in my mind all the objects which have ever been presented to my senses, I can truly venture to say that I have not there observed anything which I could not easily explain by the principles which I had discovered. But I must also confess that the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and these principles are so simple and general, that I observed hardly any particular effect as to which I could not at once recognize that it might be deduced from the principles in many different ways; and my greatest difficulty is usually to discover in which of these ways the effect does depend upon them. As to that, I do not know any other plan but again to try to find experiments of such a nature that their result is not the same if it has to be explained by one of the methods, as it would be if explained by the other. For the rest, I have now reached a position in which I discern, as it seems to me, sufficiently clearly what course must be adopted in order to make the majority of the experiments which may conduce to carry out this end. But I also perceive that they are of such a nature, and of so great a number, that neither my hands nor my income, though the latter were a thousand times larger than it is, could suffice for the whole; so that just in proportion as henceforth I shall have the power of carrying out more of them or less, shall I make more or less progress in arriving at a knowledge {122} of nature. This is what I had promised myself to make known by the Treatise which I had written, and to demonstrate in it so clearly the advantage which the public might receive from it, that I should induce all those who have the good of mankind at heart-that is to say, all those who are really virtuous in fact, and not only by a false semblance or by opinion-both to communicate to me those experiments that they have already carried out, and to help me in the investigation of those that still remain to be accomplished.

But I have since that time found other reasons which caused me to change my opinion, and consider that I should indeed continue to put in writing all the things which I judged to be of importance whenever I discovered them to be true, and that I should bestow on them the same care as I should have done had I wished to have them printed. I did this because it would give me so much the more occasion to examine them carefully (for there is no doubt that we always

scrutinize more closely what we think will be seen by many, than what is done simply for ourselves, and often the things which have seemed true to me when I began to think about them, seemed false when I tried to place them on paper); and because I did not desire to lose any opportunity of benefiting the public if I were able to do so, and in order that if my works have any value, those into whose hands they will fall after my death, might have the power of making use of them as seems best to them. I, however, resolved that I should not consent to their being published during my lifetime, so that neither the contradictions and controversies to which they might possibly give rise, nor even the reputation, such as it might be, which they would bring to me, should give me any occasion to lose the time which I meant to set apart for my own instruction. For although it is true that each man is obliged to procure, as much as in him lies, the good of others, and that to be useful to nobody is popularly speaking to be worthless, it is at the same time true that our cares should extend further than the present time, and that it is good to set aside those things which may possibly be adapted to bring profit to the living, when we have in view the accomplishment of other ends which will bring much more advantage to our descendants. In the same wry I should much like that men should know that the little which I have learned hitherto is almost nothing in comparison with that of which I am ignorant, and with the knowledge of which I do not despair of being able to attain. For it is much the same with those who little by little discover the truth in the Sciences, as with those who, {123} commencing to become rich, have less trouble in obtaining great acquisitions than they formerly experienced, when poorer, in arriving at those much smaller in amount. Or we might compare them to the Generals of our armies, whose forces usually grow ill proportion to their victories, and who require more leadership in order to hold together their troops after the loss of a battle, than is needed to take towns and provinces after having obtained a success. For he really gives battle who attempts to conquer all the difficulties and errors which prevent him from arriving at a knowledge of the truth, and it is to lose a battle to admit a false opinion touching a matter of any generality and importance. Much more skill is required in order to recover the position that one beforehand held, than is necessary to make great progress when one already possesses principles which are assured. For myself, if I have succeeded in discovering certain truths in the Sciences (and I hope that the matters contained in this volume will show that I have discovered some), I may say that they are resultant from, and dependent on, five or six principal difficulties which I have surmounted, and my encounter with these I look upon as so many battles in which I have had fortune on my side. I will not even hesitate to say that I think I shall have no need to win more than two or three other victories similar in kind in order to reach the accomplishment of my plans. And my age is not so advanced but that, in the ordinary course of nature, I may still have sufficient leisure for this end. But I believe myself to be so much the more bound to make the most of the time which remains, as I have the greater hope of being able to employ it well. And without doubt I should have many chances of being robbed of it, were I to publish the

foundations of my Physics; for though these are nearly all so evident that it is only necessary to understand them in order to accept them, and although there are none of them as to which I do not believe myself capable of giving demonstration, yet because it is impossible that they should accord with all the various opinions of other men, I foresee that I should often be diverted from my main design by the opposition which they would bring to birth.

We may say that these contradictions might be useful both in making me aware of my errors, and, supposing that I had reached some satisfactory conclusion in bringing others to a fuller understanding of my speculations; and, as many can see more than can a single man, they might help in leading others who from the present time may begin to avail themselves of my system, to assist {124} me likewise with their discoveries. But though I recognize that I am extremely liable to err, and though I almost never trust the first reflections that I arrive at, the experience which I have had of the objections which may be made to my system prevents my having any hope of deriving profit from them. For I have often had experience of the judgments both of those whom I have esteemed as my friends, and of some others to whom I believed myself to be indifferent, and even, too, of some whose ill-feeling and envy would, I felt sure, make them endeavor to reveal what affection concealed from the eyes of my friends. But rarely has it happened that any objection has been made which I did not in some sort foresee, unless where it was something very far removed from my subject. In this way hardly ever have I encountered any censor of my opinions who did not appear to me to be either less rigorous or less judicial than myself. And I certainly never remarked that by means of disputations employed by the Schools any truth has been discovered of which we were formerly ignorant. And so long as each side attempts to vanquish his opponent, there is a much more serious attempt to establish probability than to weigh the reasons on either side; and those who have for long been excellent pleaders are not for that reason the best judges.

As to the advantage which others may receive from the communication of my reflections, it could not be very great, inasmuch as I have not yet carried them so far as that it is not necessary to add many things before they can be brought into practice. And I think I can without vanity say that if anyone is capable of doing this, it should be myself rather than another-not indeed that there may not be in the world many minds incomparably superior to my own, but because no one can so well understand a thing and make it his own when learnt from another as when it is discovered for himself. As regards the matter in hand there is so much truth in this, that although I have often explained some of my opinions to persons of very good intelligence, who, while I talked to them appeared to understand them very clearly, yet when they recounted them I remarked that they had almost always altered them in such a manner that I could no longer acknowledge them as mine. On this account I am very glad to have the opportunity here of begging my descendants never to believe that what is told to them proceeded from myself unless I have myself divulged it. And I do not in the least wonder at the extravagances attributed to all the ancient

philosophers whose writings we do not possess, nor do I judge from {125} these that their thoughts were very unreasonable, considering that theirs were the best minds of the time they lived in, but only that they have been imperfectly represented to us. We see, too, that it hardly ever happens that any of their disciples surpassed them, and I am sure that those who most passionately follow Aristotle now-a-days would think themselves happy if they had as much knowledge of nature as he had, even if this were on the condition that they should never attain to any more. They are like the ivy that never tries to mount above the trees which give it support, and which often even descends again after it has reached their summit; for it appears to me that such men also sink again-that is to say, somehow render themselves more ignorant than they would have been had they abstained from study altogether. For, not content with knowing all that is intelligibly explained in their author, they wish in addition to find in him the solution of many difficulties of which he says nothing, and in regard to which he possibly had no thought at all. At the same time their mode of philosophizing is very convenient for those who have abilities of a very mediocre kind, for the obscurity of the distinctions and principles of which they make use, is the reason of their being able to talk of all things as boldly as though they really knew about them, and defend all that they say against the most subtle and acute, without any one having the means of convincing them to the contrary. In this they seem to me like a blind man who, in order to fight on equal terms with one who sees, would have the latter to come into the bottom of a very dark cave. I may say, too, that it is in the interest of such people that I should abstain from publishing the principles of philosophy of which I make use, for, being so simple and evident as they are, I should, in publishing them, do the same as though I threw open the windows and caused daylight to enter the cave into which they have descended in order to fight. But even the best minds have no reason to desire to be acquainted with these principles, for if they wish to be able to talk of everything and acquire a reputation for learning, they will more readily attain their end by contenting themselves with the appearance of truth which may be found in all sorts of things without much trouble, than in seeking for truth which only reveals itself little by little in certain spheres, and which, when others come into question, obliges one to confess one's ignorance. If, however, they prefer the knowledge of some small amount of truth to the vanity of seeming to be ignorant of nothing, which knowledge is {126} doubtless preferable, or if they desire to follow a course similar to my own, it is not necessary that I should say any more than what I have already said in this Discourse. For if they are capable of passing beyond the point I have reached, they will also so much the more be able to find by themselves all that I believe myself to have discovered; since, not having examined anything but in its order, it is certain that what remains for me to discover is in itself more difficult and more recondite than anything that I have hitherto been able to meet with, and they would have much less pleasure in learning from me than from themselves. Besides, the habit which they will acquire of seeking first things that are simple and then little by little and by degrees passing to

others more difficult, will be of more use than could be all my instructions. For, as regards myself, I am persuaded that if from my youth up I had been taught all the truths of which I have since sought the demonstrations, or if I had not had any difficulty in learning them, I should perhaps never have known any others, or at least I should never have acquired the habit or facility which I think I have obtained, of ever finding them anew, in proportion as I set myself to seek for them. And, in a word, if there is any work at all which cannot be so well achieved by another as by him who has begun it, it is that at which I labor.

It is true as regards the experiments which may conduce to this end, that one man could not possibly accomplish all of them. But yet he could not, to good advantage, employ other hands than his own, excepting those of artisans or persons of that kind whom he could pay, and whom the hope of gain-which is a very effectual incentive-might cause to perform with exactitude all the things they were directed to accomplish. As to those who, whether by curiosity or desire to learn, might possibly offer him their voluntary assistance, not only are they usually more ready with promises than with performance, planning out fine sounding projects, none of which are ever realized, but they will also infallibly demand payment for their trouble by requesting the explanation of certain difficulties, or at least by empty compliments and useless talk, which could not occupy any of the student's time without causing it to be lost. And as to the experiments already made by others, even if they desired to communicate these to him-which those who term them secrets would never do-they are for the most part accompanied by so many circumstances or superfluous matter, that it would be very difficult for him to disentangle the truth. In addition to this he {127} would find nearly all so badly explained, or even so false (because those who carried them out were forced to make them appear to be in conformity with their principles), that if there had been some which might have been of use to him, they would hardly be worth the time that would be required in making the selection. So true is this, that if there were anywhere in the world a person whom one knew to be assuredly capable of discovering matters of the highest importance and those of the greatest possible utility to the public, and if for this reason all other men were eager by every means in their power to help him in reaching the end which he set before him, I do not see that they could do anything for him beyond contributing to defray the expenses of the experiments which might be requisite, or, for the rest, seeing that he was not deprived of his leisure by the importunities of anyone. But, in addition to the fact that I neither esteem myself so highly as to be willing to promise anything extraordinary, nor give scope to an imagination so vain as to conceive that the public should interest itself greatly in my designs, I do not yet own a soul so base as to be willing to accept from anyone whatever a favor which it might be supposed I did not merit.

All those considerations taken together were, three years ago, the cause of my not desiring to publish the Treatise which I had on hand, and the reason why I even formed the resolution of not bringing to light during my

life any other of so general a kind, or one by which the foundations of Physics could be understood. But since then two other reasons came into operation which compelled me to bring forward certain attempts, as I have done here, and to render to the public some account of my actions and designs. The first is that if I failed to do so, many who knew the intention I formerly had of publishing certain writings, might imagine that the causes for which I abstained from so doing were more to my disadvantage than they really were; for although I do not care immoderately for glory, or, if I dare say so, although I even hate it, inasmuch as I judge it to be antagonistic to the repose which I esteem above all other things, at the same time I never tried to conceal my actions as though they were crimes, nor have I used many precautions against being known, partly because I should have thought it damaging to myself, and partly because it would have given me a sort of disquietude which would again have militated against the perfect repose of spirit which I seek. And for as much as having in this way always held myself in a condition of indifference as {128} regards whether I was known or was not known, I have not yet been able to prevent myself from acquiring some sort of reputation, I thought that I should do my best at least to prevent myself from acquiring an evil reputation. The other reason which obliged me to put this in writing is that I am becoming every day more and more alive to t-he delay which is being suffered in the design which I have of instructing myself, because of the lack of an infinitude of experiments, which it is impossible that I should perform without the aid of others: and although I do not flatter myself so much as to hope that the public should to any large degree participate in my interest, I yet do not wish to be found wanting, both on my own account, and as one day giving occasion to those who will survive me of reproaching me for the fact that I might have left many matters in a much better condition than I have done, had I not too much neglected to make them understand in what way they could have contributed to the accomplishment of my designs.

And I thought that it was easy for me to select certain matters which would not be the occasion for many controversies, nor yet oblige me to propound more of my principles than I wish, and which yet would suffice to allow a pretty clear manifestation of what I can do and what I cannot do in the sciences. In this I cannot say whether I have succeeded or have not succeeded, and I do not wish to anticipate the judgment of any one by myself speaking of my writings; but I shall be very glad if they will examine them. And in order that they may have the better opportunity of so doing, I beg all those who have any objections to offer to take the trouble of sending them to my publishers, so that, being made aware of them, I may try at the same time to subjoin my reply. By this means, the reader, seeing objections and reply at the same time, will the more easily judge of the truth; for I do not promise in any instance to make lengthy replies, but just to avow my errors very frankly if I am convinced of them; or, if I cannot perceive them, to say simply what I think requisite for the defense of the matters I have written, without adding the exposition of any new matter, so that I may not be endlessly engaged in passing from one side to the other.

If some of the matters of which I spoke in the beginning of the <Dioptrics> and <Meteors> should at first sight give offense because I call them hypotheses and do not appear to care about their proof, let them have the patience to read these in entirety, and I hope that they will find themselves satisfied. For it appears to me that {129} the reasonings are so mutually interwoven, that as the later ones are demonstrated by the earlier, which are their causes, the earlier are reciprocally demonstrated by the later which are their effects. And it must not be imagined that in this I commit the fallacy which logicians name arguing in a circle, for, since experience renders the greater part of these effects very certain, the causes from which I deduce them do not so much serve to prove their existence as to explain them; on the other hand, the causes are explained by the effects. And I have not named them hypotheses with any other object than that it may be known that while I consider myself able to deduce them from the primary truths which I explained above, yet I particularly desired not to do so, in order that certain persons may not for this reason take occasion to build up some extravagant philosophic system on what they take to be my principles, and thus cause the blame to be put on me. I refer to those who imagine that in one day they may discover all that another has arrived at in twenty years of work, so soon as he has merely spoken to them two or three words on the subject; while they are really all the more subject to err, and less capable of perceiving the truth as they are the more subtle and lively. For as regards the opinions that are truly mine I do not apologize for them as being new, inasmuch as if we consider the reasons of them well, I assure myself that they will be found to be so simple and so conformable to common sense, as to appear less extraordinary and less paradoxical than any others which may be held on similar subjects. And I do not even boast of being the first discoverer of any of them, but only state that I have adopted them, not because they have been held by others, nor because they have not been so held, but only because Reason has persuaded me of their truth.

Even if artisans are not at once able to carry out the invention[8] explained in the <Dioptrics>, I do not for that reason think that it can be said that it is to be condemned; for, inasmuch as great address and practice is required to make and adjust the mechanism which I have described without omitting any detail, I should not be less astonished at their succeeding at the first effort than I should be supposing some one were in one day to learn to play the guitar with skill, just because a good sheet of musical notation were set up before him. And if I write in French which is the language of my country, rather than in Latin which is that of my teachers, that is {130} because I hope that those who avail themselves only of their natural reason in its purity may be better judges of my opinions than those who believe only in the writings of the ancients; and as to those who unite good sense with study, whom alone I crave for my judges, they will not, I feel sure, be so partial to Latin as to refuse to follow my reasoning because I expound it in a vulgar tongue.

For the rest, I do not desire to speak here more particularly of the progress which I hope in the future to make in the sciences, nor to bind myself as regards the public with any promise which I shall not with certainty be able to fulfill. But I will just say that I have resolved not to employ the time which remains to me in life in any other matter than in endeavoring to acquire some knowledge of nature, which shall be of such a kind that it will enable us to arrive at rules for Medicine more assured than those which have as yet been attained; and my inclination is so strongly opposed to any other kind of pursuit, more especially to those which can only be useful to some by being harmful to others, that if certain circumstances had constrained me to employ them, I do not think that I should have been capable of succeeding. In so saying I make a declaration that I know very well cannot help me to make myself of consideration in the world, but to this end I have no desire to attain; and I shall always hold myself to be more indebted to those by whose favor I may enjoy my leisure without hindrance, than I shall be to any who may offer me the most honorable position in all the world.

Editorial Conventions: Letters within angled brackets (e.g., <Hume>) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2]["So that whatever does not eventuate after we have done all in our power that it should happen is to be accounted by us as among the things which evidently cannot be done and which in philosophical phrase are called impossible." Latin Version.]

[3][The Dioptrics, Meteors and Geometry were published originally in the same volume.]

[4][i.e. Holland, where Descartes settled in 1629.]

[5][i.e. "Le Monde," supressed on hearing of Galileo's condemnation.]

[6][Harvy (Latin Tr.).]

[7][i.e. Galileo.]

[8][Doubtless the machine for the purpose of cutting lenses which Descartes so minutely describes.]

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Discourse on the Method

Rene Descartes

1637

Introductory Note

The Discourse on the Method and Essays was originally published anonymously in 1637 by Jan Maire of Leiden, in somewhat shabby form. It was Descartes' first published work, the much talked of "World" or "Cosmos" having been suppressed or destroyed on his bearing of the condemnation of Galileo in 1632. In 1636, however, when forty years of age, he felt that it was time to bring his views before the public and publish them abroad. The Elzevirs naturally suggested themselves as the publishers to be selected, especially as they had once before made advances and as the original member of the firm resided in Leiden, where Descartes probably was at the time. They, however, had become less friendly, evidently doubting the success of an anonymous book of the kind, and consequently the author went elsewhere. Descartes endeavored to preserve the anonymity of his work with scrupulous care, and was annoyed by his zealous but fussy friend Mersenne showing the work to others, and announcing the author's name, with the ostensible object of obtaining from the King of France permission for its publication. In the end he found himself compelled to avow his authorship.

The book was written in French "the language of my country," as Descartes says, "in the hope that those who avail themselves of their natural reason alone, may be better judges of my opinions than those who give heed only to the writings of the ancients." Four hundred copies were given him for distribution to his friends and this was probably all the remuneration that he expected; none other seems in any case to have come to him.

The Latin version is the work of Etienne de Courcelles, a Protestant minister at Amsterdam, and was published in 1644 by Louis Elzevir at the same time as the "Principles." The Essays (the Dioptric, the Meteors and the Geometry) which are termed "Essays on this Method" have not been translated here.

Elizabeth. S. Haldane, 1911

Discourse on the Method Of Rightly Conducting the Reason And Seeking for Truth in the Sciences.

If this Discourse appears too long to be read all at once, it may be separated into six portions. And in the first these will be found various considerations respecting the sciences; in the second, the principal rules regarding the method which the author has sought out; while in the third are some of the rules of morality which he has derived from this Method. In the fourth are the reasons by which he proves the existence of God and of the human soul, which farm the foundation of his Metaphysic. In the fifth, the order of the questions regarding physics which he has investigated, and particularly the explanation of the movement of the heart, and of some other difficulties which pertain to medicine, as also the deference between the soul of man and that of the brutes. And in the last part the questions raised relate to those matters which the author believes to be requisite in order to advance further in the investigation of nature, in addition to the reasons that caused him to write.

Part I

Good sense is of all things in the world the most equally distributed, for everybody thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that even those most difficult to please in all other matters do not commonly desire more of it than they already possess. It is unlikely that this is an error on their part; it seems rather to be evidence in support of the view that the power of forming a good judgment and of distinguishing the true from the false, which is properly speaking what is called Good sense or Reason, is by nature equal in all men. Hence too it will show that the diversity of our opinions does not proceed from some men being more rational than others, but solely from the fact that our thoughts pass through {82}diverse channels and the same objects are not considered by an. For to be possessed of good mental powers is not sufficient; the principal matter is to apply them well. The greatest minds are capable of the greatest vices as well as of the greatest virtues, and those who proceed very slowly may, provided they always follow the straight road, really advance much faster than those who, though they run, forsake it.

For myself I have never ventured to presume that my mind was in any way more perfect than that of the ordinary man; I have even longed to possess thought as quick, or an imagination as accurate and distinct, or a memory as comprehensive or ready, as some others. And besides these I do not know any other qualities that make for the perfection of the human mind. For as to reason or sense, inasmuch as it is the only thing that constitutes us men and distinguishes us from the brutes, I would fain believe that it is to be found complete in each individual, and in this I follow the common opinion of the philosophers, who say that the question of more or less occurs only in the sphere of the *accidents* and does not affect the *forms* or natures of the *individuals* in the same *species*.

But I shall not hesitate to say that I have had great good fortune from my youth up, in lighting upon and pursuing certain paths which have conducted me to considerations and maxims from

which I have formed a Method, by whose assistance it appears to me I have the means of gradually increasing my knowledge and of little by little raising it to the highest possible point which the mediocrity of my talents and the brief duration of my life call permit me to reach. For I have already reaped from it fruits of such a nature that, even though I always try in the judgments I make on myself to lean to the side of self-depreciation rather than to that of arrogance, and though, looking with the eye of a philosopher on the diverse actions and enterprises of all mankind, I find scarcely any which do not seem to me vain and useless, I do not cease to receive extreme satisfaction in the progress which I seem to have already made in the search after truth, and to form such hopes for the future as to venture to believe that, if amongst the occupations of men, simply as men, there is some one in particular that is excellent and important, that is the one which I have selected.

It must always be recollected, however, that possibly I deceive myself, and that what I take to be gold and diamonds is perhaps no {83} more than copper and glass. I know how subject we are to delusion in whatever touches ourselves, and also how much the judgments of our friends ought to be suspected when they are in our favor. But in this Discourse I shall be very happy to show the paths I have followed, and to set forth my life as in a picture, so that everyone may judge of it for himself; and thus in learning from the common talk what are the opinions which are held of it, a new means of obtaining self-instruction will be reached, which I shall add to those which I have been in the habit of using.

Thus my design is not here to teach the Method which everyone should follow in order to promote the good conduct of his Reason, but only to show in what manner I have endeavored to conduct my own. Those who set about giving precepts must esteem themselves more skillful than those to whom they advance them, and if they fall short in the smallest matter they must of course take the blame for it. But regarding this Treatise simply as a history, or, if you prefer it, a fable in which, amongst certain things which may be imitated, there are possibly others also which it would not be right to follow, I hope that it will be of use to some without being hurtful to any, and that all will thank me for my frankness.

I have been nourished on letters since my childhood, and since I was given to believe that by their means a clear and certain knowledge could be obtained of all that is useful in life, I had an extreme desire to acquire instruction. But so soon as I had achieved the entire course of study at the close of which one is usually received into the ranks of the learned, I entirely changed my opinion. For I found myself embarrassed with so many doubts and errors that it seemed to me that the effort to instruct myself had no effect other than the increasing discovery of my own ignorance. And yet I was studying at one of the most celebrated Schools in Europe, where I thought that there must be men of learning if they were to be found anywhere in the world. I learned there all that others learned; and not being satisfied with the sciences that we were taught, I even read through all the books which fell into my hands, treating of what is considered most curious and rare. Along with this I knew the judgments that others had formed of me, and I did not feel that I was esteemed inferior to my fellow-students, although there were amongst them some destined to fill the places of our masters. And finally our century seemed to me as flourishing, and as fertile in great minds, as any which had preceded. And this made me take the liberty of judging all {84} others by myself and of coming to the conclusion that there was no learning in the world such as I was formerly led to believe it to be.

I did not omit, however, always to hold in esteem those exercises which are the occupation of the Schools. I knew that the Languages which one learns there are essential for the understanding of

all ancient literature; that fables with their charm stimulate the mind and histories of memorable deeds exalt it; and that, when read with discretion, these books assist in forming a sound judgment. I was aware that the reading of all good books is indeed like a conversation with the noblest men of past centuries who were the authors of them, nay a carefully studied conversation, in which they reveal to us none but the best of their thoughts. I deemed Eloquence to have a power and beauty beyond compare; that Poesy has most ravishing delicacy and sweetness; that in Mathematics there are the subtlest discoveries and inventions which may accomplish much, both in satisfying the curious, and in furthering all the arts, and in diminishing man's labor; that those writings that deal with Morals contain much that is instructive, and many exhortations to virtue which are most useful; that Theology points out the way to Heaven; that Philosophy teaches us to speak with an appearance of truth on all things, and causes us to be admired by the less learned; that Jurisprudence, Medicine and all other sciences bring honor and riches to those who cultivate them; and finally that it is good to have examined all things, even those most full of superstition and falsehood, in order that we may know their just value, and avoid being deceived by them.

But I considered that I had already given sufficient time to languages and likewise even to the reading of the literature of the ancients, both their histories and their fables. For to converse with those of other centuries is almost the same thing as to travel. It is good to know something of the customs of different peoples in order to judge more sanely of our own, and not to think that everything of a fashion not ours is absurd and contrary to reason, as do those who have seen nothing. But when one employs too much time in traveling, one becomes a stranger in one's own country, and when one is too curious about things which were practiced in past centuries, one is usually very ignorant about those which are practiced in our own time. Besides, fables make one imagine many events possible which in reality are not so, and even the most accurate of histories, if they do not exactly misrepresent {85} or exaggerate the value of things in order to render them more worthy of being read, at least omit in them all the circumstances which are basest and least notable; and from this fact it follows that what is retained is not portrayed as it really is, and that those who regulate their conduct by examples which they derive from such a source, are liable to fall into the extravagances of the knights-errant of Romance, and form projects beyond their power of performance.

I esteemed Eloquence most highly and I was enamored of Poesy, but I thought that both were gifts of the mind rather than fruits of study. Those who have the strongest power of reasoning, and who most skillfully arrange their thoughts in order to render them clear and intelligible, have the best power of persuasion even if they can bat speak the language of Lower Brittany and have never learned Rhetoric. And those who have the most delightful original ideas and who know how to express them with the maximum of style and suavity, would not fail to be the beat poets even if the art of Poetry were unknown to them.

Most of all was I delighted with Mathematics because of the certainty of its demonstrations and the evidence of its reasoning; but I did not yet understand its true use, and, believing that it was of service only in the mechanical arts, I was astonished that, seeing how firm and solid was its basis, no loftier edifice had been reared thereupon. On the other hand I compared the works of the ancient pagans which deal with Morals to palaces most superb and magnificent, which are yet built on sand and mud alone. They praise the virtues most highly and show them to be more worthy of being prized than anything else in the world, but they do not sufficiently teach us to become acquainted with them, and often that which is called by a fine name is nothing but insensibility, or pride, or despair, or parricide.

I honored our Theology and aspired as much as anyone to reach to heaven, but having learned to regard it as a most highly assured fact that the road is not less open to the most ignorant than to the most learned, and that the revealed truths which conduct thither are quite above our intelligence, I should not have dared to submit them to the feebleness of my reasonings; and I thought that, in order to undertake to examine them and succeed in so doing, it was necessary to have some extraordinary assistance from above and to be more than a mere man.

I shall not say anything about Philosophy, but that seeing that {86} it has been cultivated for many centuries by the best minds that have ever lived, and that nevertheless no single thing is to be found in it which is not subject of dispute, and in consequence which is not dubious, I had not enough presumption to hope to fare better there than other men had done. And also, considering how many conflicting opinions there may be regarding the self-same matter, all supported by learned people, while there can never be more than one which is true, I esteemed as well-nigh false all that only went as far as being probable.

Then as to the other sciences, inasmuch as they derive their principles from Philosophy, I judged that one could have built nothing solid on foundations so far from firm. And neither the honor nor the promised gain was sufficient to persuade me to cultivate them, for, thanks be to God, I did not find myself in a condition which obliged me to make a merchandise of science for the improvement of my fortune; and, although I did not pretend to scorn all glory like the Cynics, I yet had very small esteem for what I could not hope to acquire, excepting through fictitious titles. And, finally, as to false doctrines, I thought that I already knew well enough what they were worth to be subject to deception neither by the promises of an alchemist, the predictions of an astrologer, the impostures of a magician, the artifices or the empty boastings of any of those who make a profession of knowing that of which they are ignorant.

This is why, as soon as age permitted me to emerge from the control of my tutors, I entirely quitted the study of letters. And resolving to seek no other science than that which could be found in myself, or at least in the great book of the world, I employed the rest of my youth in travel, in seeing courts and armies, in intercourse with men of diverse temperaments and conditions, in collecting varied experiences, in proving myself in the various predicaments in which I was placed by fortune, and under all circumstances bringing my mind to bear on the things which came before it, so that I might derive some profit from my experience. For it seemed to me that I might meet with much more truth in the reasonings that each man makes on the matters that specially concern him, and the issue of which would very soon punish him if he made a wrong judgment, than in the case of those made by a man of letters in his study touching speculations which lead to no result, and which bring about no other consequences to himself excepting that he will be all the more vain the more they are removed from common sense, {87} since in this case it Proves him to have employed so much the more ingenuity and skill in trying to make them seem probable. And I always had an excessive desire to learn to distinguish the true from the false, in order to see clearly in my actions and to walk with confidence in this life.

It is true that while I only considered the manners of other men I found in them nothing to give me settled convictions; and I remarked in them almost as much diversity as I had formerly seen in the opinions of philosophers. So much was this the case that the greatest profit which I derived from their study was that, in seeing many things which, although they seem to us very extravagant and ridiculous, were yet commonly received and approved by other great nations, I learned to believe nothing too certainly of which I had only been convinced by example and custom. Thus little by

little I was delivered from many errors which might have obscured our natural vision and rendered us less capable of listening to Reason. But after I had employed several years in thus studying the book of the world and trying to acquire some experience, I one day formed the resolution of also making myself an object of study and of employing all the strength of my mind in choosing the road I should follow. This succeeded much better, it appeared to me, than if I had never departed either from my country or my books.

Part II

I was then in Germany, to which country I had been attracted by the wars which are not yet at an end. And as I was returning from the coronation of the Emperor to join the army, the setting in of winter detained me in a quarter where, since I found no society to divert me, while fortunately I had also no cares or passions to trouble me, I remained the whole day shut up alone in a stove-heated room, where I had complete leisure to occupy myself with my own thoughts. One of the first of the considerations that occurred to me was that there is very often less perfection in works composed of several portions, and carried out by the hands of various masters, than in those on which one individual alone has worked. Thus we see that buildings planned and carried out by one architect alone are usually more beautiful and better proportioned than those which many have tried to put in order and improve, making use of old walls which were built with other ends in view. In the game way also, those ancient cities which, originally mere villages, have become in the process of time great towns, are usually {88} badly constructed in comparison with those which are regularly laid out on a plain by a surveyor who is free to follow his own ideas. Even though, considering their buildings each one apart, there is often as much or more display of skill in the one case than in the other, the former have large buildings and small buildings indiscriminately placed together, thus rendering the streets crooked and irregular, so that it might be said that it was chance rather than the will of men guided by reason that led to such an arrangement. And if we consider that this happens despite the fact that from all time there have been certain officials who have had the special duty of looking after the buildings of private individuals in order that they may be public ornaments, we shall understand how difficult it is to bring about much that is satisfactory in operating only upon the works of others. Thus I imagined that those people who were once half-ravage, and who have become civilized only by slow degrees, merely forming their laws as the disagreeable necessities of their crimes and quarrels constrained them, could not succeed in establishing so good a system of government as those who, from the time they first came together as communities, carried into effect the constitution laid down by some prudent legislator. Thus it is quite certain that the constitution of the true Religion whose ordinances are of God alone is incomparably better regulated than any other. And, to come down to human affairs, I believe that if Sparta was very flourishing in former times, this was not because of the excellence of each and every one of its laws, seeing that many were very strange and even contrary to good morals, but because, being drawn up by one individual, they all tended towards the same end. And similarly I thought that the sciences found in books-in those at least whose reasonings are only probable and which have no demonstrations, composed as they are of the gradually accumulated opinions of many different individuals-do not approach so near to the truth as the simple reasoning which a man of common sense can quite naturally carry out respecting the things which come immediately before him. Again I thought that since we have all been children before being men, and since it has for long fallen to us to be governed by our appetites and by our teachers (who often

enough contradicted one another, and none of whom perhaps counseled us always for the best), it is almost impossible that our judgments should be so excellent or solid as they should have been had we had complete use of our reason since our birth, and had we been guided by its means alone. {89}

It is true that we do not find that all the houses in a town are razed to the ground for the sole reason that the town is to be rebuilt in another fashion, with streets made more beautiful; but at the same time we see that many people cause their own houses to be knocked down in order to rebuild them, and that sometimes they are forced so to do where there is danger of the houses falling of themselves, and when the foundations are not secure. From such examples I argued to myself that there was no plausibility in the claim of any private individual to reform a state by altering everything, and by overturning it throughout, in order to set it right again. Nor is it likewise probable that the whole body of the Sciences, or the order of teaching established by the Schools, should be reformed. But as regards all the opinions which up to this time I had embraced, I thought I could not do better than endeavor once for all to sweep them completely away, so that they might later on be replaced, either by others which were better, or by the same, when I had made them conform to the uniformity of a rational scheme. And I firmly believed that by this means I should succeed in directing my life much better than if I had only built on old foundations, and relied on principles of which I allowed myself to be in youth persuaded without having inquired into their truth. For although in so doing I recognized various difficulties, these were at the same time not insurmountable, nor comparable to those which are found in reformation of the most insignificant kind in matters which concern the public. In the case of great bodies it is too difficult a task to raise them again when they are once thrown down, or even to keep them in their places when once thoroughly shaken; and their fall cannot be otherwise than very violent. Then as to any imperfections that they may possess (and the very diversity that is found between them is sufficient to tell us that these in many cases exist) custom has doubtless greatly mitigated them, while it has also helped us to avoid, or insensibly corrected a number against which mere foresight would have found it difficult to guard. And finally the imperfections are almost always more supportable than would be the process of removing them, just as the great roads which wind about amongst the mountains become, because of being frequented, little by little so well-beaten and easy that it is much better to follow them than to try to go more directly by climbing over rocks and descending to the foot of precipices.

This is the reason why I cannot in any way approve of those turbulent and unrestful spirits who, being called neither by birth {90} nor fortune to the management of public affairs, never fail to have always iii their minds some new reforms. And if I thought that in this treatise there was contained the smallest justification for this folly, I should be very sorry to allow it to be published. My design has never extended beyond trying to reform my own opinion and to build on a foundation which is entirely my own. If my work has given me a certain satisfaction, so that I here present to you a draft of it, I do not so do because I wish to advise anybody to imitate it. Those to whom God has been most beneficent in the bestowal of His graces will perhaps form designs which are more elevated; but I fear much that this particular one will seem too venturesome for many. The simple resolve to strip oneself of all opinions and beliefs formerly received is not to be regarded as an example that each man should follow, and the world may be said to be mainly composed of two classes of minds neither of which could prudently adopt it. There are those who, believing themselves to be cleverer than they are, cannot restrain themselves from being precipitate in judgment and have not sufficient patience to arrange their thoughts in proper order;

hence, once a man of this description had taken the liberty of doubting the principles he formerly accepted, and had deviated from the beaten track, he would never be able to maintain the path which must be followed to reach the appointed end more quickly, and he would hence remain wandering astray all through his life. Secondly, there are those who having reason or modesty enough to judge that they are less capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood than some others from whom instruction might be obtained, are right in contenting themselves with following the opinions of these others rather than in searching better ones for themselves.

For myself I should doubtless have been of these last if I had never had more than a single master, or had I never known the diversities which have from all time existed between the opinions of men of the greatest learning. But I had been taught, even in my College days, that there is nothing imaginable so strange or so little credible that it has not been maintained by one philosopher or other, and I further recognized in the course of my travels that all those whose sentiments are very contrary to ours are yet not necessarily barbarians or savages, but may be possessed of reason in as great or even a greater degree than ourselves. I also considered how very different the self-same man, identical in mind and spirit, may become, according as he is brought up from childhood amongst the French or Germans, or has passed his whole life amongst Chinese or {91} cannibals. I likewise noticed how even in the fashions of one's clothing the same thing that pleased us ten years ago, and which will perhaps please us once again before ten years are passed, seems at the present time extravagant and ridiculous. I thus concluded that it is much more custom and example that persuade us than any certain knowledge, and yet in spite of this the voice of the majority does not afford a proof of any value in truths a little difficult to discover, because such truths are much more likely to have been discovered by one man than by a nation. I could not, however, put my finger on a single person whose opinions seemed preferable to those of others, and I found that I was, so to speak, constrained myself to undertake the direction of my procedure.

But like one who walks alone and in the twilight I resolved to go so slowly, and to use so much circumspection in all things, that if my advance was but very small, at least I guarded myself well from falling. I did not wish to set about the final rejection of any single opinion which might formerly have crept into my beliefs without having been introduced there by means of Reason, until I had first of all employed sufficient time in planning out the task which I had undertaken, and in seeking the true Method of arriving at a knowledge of all the things of which my mind was capable.

Among the different branches of Philosophy, I had in my younger days to a certain extent studied Logic; and in those of Mathematics, Geometrical Analysis and Algebra-three arts or sciences which seemed as though they ought to contribute something to the design I had in view. But in examining them I observed in respect to Logic that the syllogisms and the greater part of the other teaching served better in explaining to others those things that one knows (or like the art of Lully, in enabling one to speak without judgment of those things of which one is ignorant) than in learning what is new. And although in reality Logic contains many precepts which are very true and very good, there are at the same time mingled with them so many others which are hurtful or superfluous, that it is almost as difficult to separate the two as to draw a Diana or a Minerva out of a block of marble which is not yet roughly hewn. And as to the Analysis of the ancients and the Algebra of the moderns, besides the fact that they embrace only matters the most abstract, such as appear to have no actual use, the former is always so restricted to the consideration of symbols that it cannot exercise the Understanding without greatly fatiguing the imagination; and in the latter one is so subjected to certain rules and formulas that {92} the result is the construction of an art

which is confused and obscure, and which embarrasses the mind, instead of a science which contributes to its cultivation. This made me feel that some other Method must be found, which, comprising the advantages of the three, is yet exempt from their faults. And as a multiplicity of laws often furnishes excuses for evil-doing, and as a State is hence much better ruled when, having but very few laws, these are most strictly observed; so, instead of the great number of precepts of which Logic is composed, I believed that I should find the four which I shall state quite sufficient, provided that I adhered to a firm and constant resolve never on any single occasion to fail in their observance.

The first of these was to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be so: that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments, and to accept in them nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it.

The second was to divide up each of the difficulties which I examined into as many parts as possible, and as seemed requisite in order that it might be resolved in the best manner possible.

The third was to carry on my reflections in due order, commencing with objects that were the most simple and easy to understand, in order to rise little by little, or by degrees, to knowledge of the most complex, assuming an order, even if a fictitious one, among those which do not follow a natural sequence relatively to one another.

The last was in all cases to make enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I should be certain of having omitted nothing.

Those long chains of reasoning, simple and easy as they are, of which geometricians make use in order to arrive at the most difficult demonstrations, had caused me to imagine that all those things which fall under the cognizance of man might very likely be mutually related in the same fashion; and that, provided only that we abstain from receiving anything a8 true which is not so, and always retain the order which is necessary in order to deduce the one conclusion from the other, there can be nothing so remote that we cannot reach to it, nor so recondite that we cannot discover it. And I had not much trouble in discovering which objects it was necessary to begin with, for I already knew that it was with the most simple and those most easy to apprehend. Considering also that, of all those who have hitherto sought for the truth in the {93} Sciences, it has been the mathematicians alone who have been able to succeed in making any demonstrations, that is to say producing reasons which are evident and certain, I did not doubt that it had been by means of a similar kind that they carried on their investigations. I did not at the same time hope for any practical result in so doing, except that my mind would become accustomed to the nourishment of truth and would not content itself with false reasoning. But for all that I had no intention of trying to master all those particular sciences that receive in common the name of Mathematics; but observing that, although their objects are different, they do not fail to agree in this, that they take nothing under consideration but the various relationships or proportions which are present in these objects, I thought that it would be better if I only examined these proportions in their general aspect, and without viewing them otherwise than in the objects which would serve most to facilitate a knowledge of them. Not that I should in any way restrict them to these objects, for I might later on all the more easily apply them to all other objects to which they were applicable. Then, having carefully noted that in order to comprehend the proportions I should sometimes require to consider each one in particular, and sometimes merely keep them in mind, or take them in groups, I thought that, in order the better to consider them in detail, I should picture them in the form of

lines, because I could find no method more simple nor more capable of being distinctly represented to my imagination and senses. I considered, however, that in order to keep them in my memory or to embrace several at once, it would be essential that I should explain them by means of certain formulas, the shorter the better. And for this purpose it was requisite that I should borrow all that is best in Geometrical Analysis and Algebra, and correct the errors of the one by the other.

As a matter of fact, I can venture to say that the exact observation of the few precepts which I had chosen gave me so much facility in sifting out all the questions embraced in these two sciences, that in the two or three months which I employed in examining them -- commencing with the most simple and general, and making each truth that I discovered a rule for helping me to find others -- not only did I arrive at the solution of many questions which I had hitherto regarded as most difficult, but, towards the end, it seemed to me that I was able to determine in the case of those of which I was still ignorant, by what means, and in how far, it was possible to {94} solve them. In this I might perhaps appear to you to be very vain if you did not remember that having but one truth to discover in respect to each matter, whoever succeeds in finding it knows in its regard as much as can be known. It is the same as with a child, for instance, who has been instructed in Arithmetic and has made an addition according to the rule prescribed; he may be sure of having found as regards the sum of figures given to him all that the human mind can know. For, in conclusion, the Method which teaches us to follow the true order and enumerate exactly every term in the matter under investigation contains everything which gives certainty to the rules of Arithmetic.

But what pleased me most in this Method was that I was certain by its means of exercising my reason in all things, if not perfectly, at least as well as was in my power. And besides this, I felt in making use of it that my mind gradually accustomed itself to conceive of its objects more accurately and distinctly; and not having restricted this Method to any particular matter, I promised myself to apply it as usefully to the difficulties of other sciences as I had done to those of Algebra. Not that on this account I dared undertake to examine just at once all those that might present themselves; for that would itself have been contrary to the order which the Method prescribes. But having noticed that the knowledge of these difficulties must be dependent on principles derived from Philosophy in which I yet found nothing to be certain, I thought that it was requisite above all to try to establish certainty in it. I considered also that since this endeavor is the most important in all the world, and that in which precipitation and prejudice were most to be feared, I should not try to grapple with it till I had attained to a much riper age than that of three and twenty, which was the age I had reached. I thought, too, that I should first of all employ much time in preparing myself for the work by eradicating from my mind all the wrong opinions which I had up to this time accepted, and accumulating a variety of experiences fitted later on to afford matter for my reasonings, and by ever exercising myself in the Method which I had prescribed, in order more and more to fortify myself in the power of using it. {95}

Part III

And finally, as it is not sufficient, before commencing to rebuild the house which we inhabit, to pull it down and provide materials and an architect (or to act in this capacity ourselves, and make a careful drawing of its design), unless we have also provided ourselves with some other house where we can be comfortably lodged during the time of rebuilding, so in order that I should not remain irresolute in my actions while reason obliged me to be so in my judgments, and that I might not

omit to carry on my life as happily as I could, I formed for myself a code of morals for the time being which did not consist of more than three or four maxims, which maxims I should like to enumerate to you.

The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering constantly to the religion in which by God's grace I had been instructed since my childhood, and in all other things directing my conduct by opinions the most moderate in nature, and the farthest removed from excess in all those which are commonly received and acted on by the most judicious of those with whom I might come in contact. For since I began to count my own opinions as naught, because I desired to place all under examination, I was convinced that I could not do better than follow those held by people on whose judgment reliance could be placed. And although such persons may possibly exist amongst the Persians and Chinese as well as amongst ourselves, it seemed to me that it was most expedient to bring my conduct into harmony with the ideas of those with whom I should have to live; and that, in order to ascertain that these were their real opinions, I should observe what they did rather than what they said, not only because in the corrupt state of our manners there are few people who desire to say all that they believe, but also because many are themselves ignorant of their beliefs. For since the act of thought by which we believe a thing is different from that by which we know that we believe it, the one often exists without the other. And amongst many opinions all equally received, I chose only the most moderate, both because these are always most suited for putting into practice, and probably the best (for all excess has a tendency to be bad), and also because I should have in a less degree turned aside from the right path, supposing that I was wrong, than if, having chosen an extreme course, I found that I had chosen amiss. I also made a point of counting as excess all the engagements by means of which we limit {96} in some degree our liberty. Not that I hold in low esteem those laws which, in order to remedy the inconstancy of feeble souls, permit, when we have a good object in our view, that certain vows be taken, or contracts made, which oblige us to carry out that object. This sanction is even given for security in commerce where designs are wholly indifferent. But because I saw nothing in all the world remaining constant, and because for my own part I promised myself gradually to get my judgments to grow better and never to grow worse, I should have thought that I had committed a serious sin against commonsense if, because I approved of something at one time, I was obliged to regard it similarly at a later time, after it had possibly ceased to meet my approval, or after I had ceased to regard it in a favorable light.

My second maxim was that of being as firm and resolute in my actions as I could be, and not to follow less faithfully opinions the most dubious, when my mind was once made up regarding them, than if these had been beyond doubt. In this I should be following the example of travelers, who, finding themselves lost in a forest, know that they ought not to wander first to one side and then to the other, nor, still less, to stop in one place, but understand that they should continue to walk as straight as they can in one direction, not diverging for any slight reason, even though it was possibly chance alone that first determined them in their choice. By this means if they do not go exactly where they wish, they will at least arrive somewhere at the end, where probably they will be better off than in the middle of a forest. And thus since often enough in the actions of life no delay is permissible, it is very certain that, when it is beyond our power to discern the opinions which carry most truth, we should follow the most probable; and even although we notice no greater probability in the one opinion than in the other, we at least should make up our minds to follow a particular one and afterwards consider it as no longer doubtful in its relationship to practice, but as very true and very certain, inasmuch as the reason,which caused us to determine

upon it is known to be so. And henceforward this principle was sufficient to deliver me from all the penitence and remorse which usually affect the mind and agitate the conscience of those weak and vacillating creatures who allow themselves to keep changing their procedure, and practice as good, things which they afterwards judge to be evil.

My third maxim was to try always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and to alter my desires rather than change the order {97} of the world, and generally to accustom myself to believe that there is nothing entirely within our power but our own thoughts: so that after we have done our best in regard to the things that are without us, our ill-success cannot possibly be failure on our part.[2] And this alone seemed to me sufficient to prevent my desiring anything in the future beyond what I could actually obtain, hence rendering me content; for since our will does not naturally induce us to desire anything but what our understanding represents to it as in some way possible of attainment, it is certain that if we consider all good things which are outside of us as equally outside of our power, we should not have more regret in resigning those goods which appear to pertain to our birth, when we are deprived of them for no fault of our own, than we have in not possessing the kingdoms of China or Mexico. In the same way, making what is called a virtue out of a necessity, we should no more desire to be well if ill, or free, if in prison, than we now do to have our bodies formed of a substance as little corruptible as diamonds, or to have Wings to fly with like birds. I allow, however, that to accustom oneself to regard all things from this point of view requires long exercise and meditation often repeated; and I believe that it is principally in this that is to be found the secret of those philosophers who, in ancient times, were able to free themselves from the empire of fortune, or, despite suffering or poverty, to rival their gods in their happiness. For, ceaselessly occupying themselves in considering the limits which were prescribed to them by nature, they persuaded themselves so completely that nothing was within their own power but their thoughts, that this conviction alone was sufficient to prevent their leaving any longing for other things. And they had so absolute a mastery over their thoughts that they had some reason for esteeming themselves as more rich and more powerful, and more free and more happy than other men, who, however favored by nature or fortune they might be, if devoid of this philosophy, never could arrive a& all at which they aim.

And last of all, to conclude this moral code, I felt it incumbent on me to make a review of the various occupations of men in this life in order to try to choose out the best; and without wishing to say anything of the employment of others I thought that I could I "So that whatever does not eventuate after we have done all in our power that it should happen is to be accounted by us as among the things which evidently cannot be done and which in philosophical phrase are called impossible." Latin Version. {98} not do better than continue in the one in which I found myself engaged, that is to say, in occupying my whole life in cultivating my Reason, and in advancing myself as much as possible in the knowledge of the truth in accordance with the method which I had prescribed myself. I had experienced so much satisfaction since beginning to use this method, that I did not believe that any sweeter or more innocent could in this life be found,-every day discovering by its means some truths which seemed to me sufficiently important, although commonly ignored by other men. The,satisfaction which I had so filled my mind that all else-seemed of no account. And, besides, the three preceding maxims were founded solely on the plan which I had formed of continuing to instruct myself. For since God has given to each of us some light with which to distinguish truth from error, I could not believe that I ought for a single moment to content myself with accepting the opinions held by others unless I had in view the employment of my own judgment in examining them at the proper time; and I could not have held

myself free of scruple in following such opinions, if nevertheless I had not intended to lose no occasion of finding superior opinions, supposing them to exist; and finally, I should not have been able to restrain my desires nor to remain content, if I had not followed a road by which, thinking that I should be certain to be able to acquire all the knowledge of which I was capable, I also thought I should likewise be certain of obtaining all the best things which could ever come within my power. And inasmuch as our will impels us neither to follow after nor to flee from anything, excepting as our understanding represents it as good or evil, it is sufficient to judge wisely in order to act well, and the best judgment brings the best action-that is to say, the acquisition of all the virtues and all the other good things that it is possible to obtain. When one is certain that this point is reached, one cannot fail to be contented.

Having thus assured myself of these maxims, and having set them on one side along with the truths of religion which have always taken the first place in my creed, I judged that as far as the rest of my opinions were concerned, I could safely undertake to rid myself of them. And inasmuch as I hoped to be able to reach my end more successfully in converse with man than in living longer shut up in the warm room where these reflections had come to me, I hardly awaited the end of winter before I once more set myself to travel. And in all the nine following years I did naught but roam {99} hither and thither, trying to be a spectator rather than an actor in all the comedies the world displays. More especially did I reflect in each matter that came before me as to anything which could make it subject to suspicion or doubt, and give occasion for mistake, and I rooted out of my mind all the errors which might have formerly crept in. Not that indeed I imitated the skeptics, who only doubt for the sake of doubting, and pretend to be always uncertain; for, on the contrary, my design was only to provide myself with good ground for assurance, and to reject the quicksand and mud in order to find the rock or clay. In this task it seems to me, I succeeded pretty well, since in trying to discover the error or uncertainty of the propositions which I examined, not by feeble conjectures, but by clear and assured reasonings, I encountered nothing so dubious that I could not draw from it some conclusion that was tolerably secure, if this were no more than the inference that it contained in it nothing that was certain. And just as in pulling down an old house we usually preserve the debris to serve in building up another, so in destroying all those opinions which I considered to be ill-founded, I made various observations and acquired many experiences, which have since been of use to me in establishing those which are more certain. And more than this, I continued to exercise myself in the method which I had laid down for my use; for besides the fact that I was careful as a rule to conduct all my thoughts according to its maxims, I set aside some hours from time to time which I more especially employed in practicing myself in the solution of mathematical problems according to the Method, or in the solution of other problems which though pertaining to other sciences, I was able to make almost similar to those of mathematics, by detaching them from all principles of other sciences which I found to be not sufficiently secure. You will see the result in many examples which are expounded in this volume.[3] And hence, without living to all appearance in any way differently from those who, having no occupation beyond spending their lives in ease and innocence, study to separate pleasure from vice, and who, in order to enjoy their leisure without weariness, make use of all distractions that are innocent and good, I did not cease to prosecute my design, and to profit perhaps even more in my study of truth than if I had done nothing but read books or associate with literary people. {100}

These nine years thus passed away before I had taken any definite part in regard to the difficulties as to which the learned are in the habit of disputing, or had commenced to seek the foundation of any philosophy more certain than the vulgar. And the example of many excellent men who had

tried to do the same before me, but, as it appears to me, without success, made me imagine it to be so hard that possibly I should not have dared to undertake the task, had I not discovered that someone had spread abroad the report that I had already reached its conclusion. I cannot tell on what they based this opinion; if my conversation has contributed anything to it, this must have arisen from my confessing my ignorance more ingenuously than those who have studied a little usually do. And perhaps it was also due to my having shown forth my reasons for doubting many things which were held by others to be certain, rather than from having boasted of any special philosophic system. But being at heart honest enough not to desire to be esteemed as different from what I am, I thought that I must try by every means in my power to render myself worthy of the reputation which I had gained. And it is just eight years ago that this desire made me resolve to remove myself from all places where any acquaintances were possible, and to retire to a country such as this,[4] where the long-continued war has caused such order to be established that the armies which are maintained seem only to be of use in allowing the inhabitants to enjoy the fruits of peace with so much the more security; and where, in the crowded throng of a great and very active nation, which is more concerned with its own affairs than curious about those of others, without missing ally of the conveniences of the most populous towns, I can live as solitary and retired as in deserts the most remote.

Part IV

I do not know that I ought to tell you of the first meditations there made by me, for they are so metaphysical and so unusual that they may perhaps not be acceptable to everyone. And yet at the same time, in order that one may judge whether the foundations which I have laid are sufficiently secure, I find myself constrained in some measure to refer to them. For a long time I had remarked that it is sometimes requisite in common life to follow opinions which one knows to be most uncertain, exactly as though they were indisputable, as has been said above. But because in this case {101} I wished to give myself entirely to the search after Truth, I thought that it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course, and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain. Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it to be; and because there are men who deceive themselves in their reasoning and fall into paralogisms, even concerning the simplest matters of geometry, and judging that I was as subject to error as was any other, I rejected as false all the reasons formerly accepted by me as demonstrations. And since all the same thoughts and conceptions which we have while awake may also come to us in sleep, without any of them being at that time true, I resolved to assume that everything that ever entered into my mind was no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the "I" who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth "*I think, therefore I am*" was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking.

And then, examining attentively that which I was, I saw that I could conceive that I had no body, and that there was no world nor place where I might be; but yet that I could not for all that

conceive that I was not. On the contrary, I saw from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it very evidently and certainly followed that I was; on the other hand if I had only ceased from thinking, even if all the rest of what I had ever imagined had really existed, I should have no reason for thinking that I had existed. From that I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is.

After this I considered generally what in a proposition is requisite in order to be true and certain; for since I had just discovered one which I knew to be such, I thought that I ought {102} also to know in what this certainty consisted. And having remarked that there was nothing at all in the statement "*I think, therefore I am*" which assures me of having thereby made a true assertion, excepting that I see very clearly that to think it is necessary to be, I came to the conclusion that I might assume, as a general rule, that the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true-remembering, however, that there is some difficulty in ascertaining which are those that we distinctly conceive.

Following upon this, and reflecting on the fact that I doubted, and that consequently my existence was not quite perfect (for I saw clearly that it was a greater perfection to know than to doubt), I resolved to inquire whence I had learnt to think of anything more perfect than I myself was; and I recognized very clearly that this conception must proceed from some nature which was really more perfect. As to the thoughts which I had of many other things outside of me, like the heavens, the earth, light, heat, and a thousand others, I had not so much difficulty in knowing whence they came, because, remarking nothing in them which seemed to render them superior to me, I could believe that, if they were true, they were dependencies upon my nature, in so far as it possessed some perfection; and if they were not true, that I held them from naught, that is to say, that they were in me because I had something lacking in my nature. But this could not apply to the idea of a Being more perfect than my own, for to hold it from naught would be manifestly impossible; and because it is no less contradictory to say of the more perfect that it is what results from and depends on the less perfect, than to say that there is something which proceeds from nothing, it was equally impossible that I should hold it from myself. In this way it could but follow that it had been placed in me by a Nature which was really more perfect than mine could be, and which even had within itself all the perfections of which I could form any idea -- that is to say, to put it in a word, which was God. To which I added that since I knew some perfections which I did not possess, I was not the only being in existence (I shall here use freely, if you will allow, the terms of the School); but that there was necessarily some other more perfect Being on which I depended, or from which I acquired all that I had. For if I had existed alone and independent of any others, so that I should have had from myself all that perfection of being in which I participated to however small an extent, I should have been able for the same reason to have had all the remainder which {103} I knew that I lacked; and thus I myself should have been infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, all-powerful, and, finally, I should have all the perfections which I could discern in God. For, in pursuance of the reasonings which I have just carried on, in order to know the nature of God as far as my nature is capable of knowing it, I had only to consider in reference to all these things of which I found some idea in myself, whether it was a perfection to possess them or not. And I was assured that none of those which indicated some imperfection were in Him, but that all else was present; and I saw that doubt, inconstancy, sadness, and such things, could not be in Him

considering that I myself should have been glad to be without them. In addition to this, I had ideas of many things which are sensible and corporeal, for, although I might suppose that I was dreaming, and that all that I saw or imagined was false, I could not at the same time deny that the ideas were really in my thoughts. But because I had already recognized very clearly in myself that the nature of the intelligence is distinct from that of the body, and observing that all composition gives evidence of dependency, and that dependency is manifestly an imperfection, I came to the conclusion that it could not be a perfection in God to be composed of these two natures, and that consequently He was not so composed. I judged, however, that if there were any bodies in the world, or even any intelligences or other natures which were not wholly perfect, their existence must depend on His power in such a way that they could not subsist without Him for a single moment.

After that I desired to seek for other truths, and having put before myself the object of the geometricians, which I conceived to be a continuous body, or a space indefinitely extended in length, breadth, height or depth, which was divisible into various parts, and which might have various figures and sizes, and might be moved or transposed in all sorts of ways (for all this the geometricians suppose to be in the object of their contemplation), I went through some of their simplest demonstrations, and having noticed that this great certainty which everyone attributes to these demonstrations is founded solely on the fact that they are conceived of with clearness, in accordance with the rule which I have just laid down, I also noticed that there was nothing at all in them to assure me of the existence of their object. For, to take an example, I saw very well that if we suppose a triangle to be given, the three angles must certainly be equal to two right angles; but for all that I saw no {104} reason to be assured that there was any such triangle in existence, while on the contrary, on reverting to the examination of the idea which I had of a Perfect Being, I found that in this case existence was implied in it in the same manner in which the equality of its three angles to two right angles is implied in the idea of a triangle; or in the idea of a sphere, that all the points on its surface are equidistant from its center, or even more evidently still. Consequently it is at least as certain that God, who is a Being, so perfect, is, or exists, as any demonstration of geometry can possibly be.

What causes many, however, to persuade themselves that there is difficulty in knowing this truth, and even in knowing the nature of their soul, is the fact that they never raise their minds above the things of sense, or that they are so accustomed to consider nothing excepting by imagining it, which is a mode of thought specially adapted to material objects, that all that is not capable of being imagined appears to them not to be intelligible at all. This is manifest enough from the fact that even the philosophers in the Schools hold it as a maxim that there is -nothing in the understanding which has not first of all been in the senses, in which there is certainly no doubt that the ideas of God and of the soul have never been. And it seems to me that those who desire to make use of their imagination in order to understand these ideas, act in the same way as if, to hear sounds or smell odors, they should wish to make use of their eyes: excepting that there is indeed this difference, that the sense of sight does not give us less assurance of the truth of its objects, than do those of seeing or of hearing, while neither our imagination nor our senses can ever assure us of anything, if our understanding does not intervene.

If there are finally any persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of God and of their soul by the reasons which I have brought forward, I wish that they should know that all other things of which they perhaps think themselves more assured (such as possessing a body, and that there are stars and an earth and so on) are less certain. For, although we have a moral assurance of

these things which is such that it seems that it would be extravagant in us to doubt them, at the same time no one, unless he is devoid of reason, can deny, when a metaphysical certainty is in question, that there is sufficient cause for our not having complete assurance, by observing the fact that when asleep we may similarly imagine that we have another body, and that we see other stars and another earth, without there being anything of the kind. {105} For how do we know that the thoughts that come in dreams are more false than those that we have when we are awake, seeing that often enough the former are not less lively and vivid than the latter? And though the wisest minds may study the matter as much as they will, I do not believe that they will be able to give any sufficient reason for removing this doubt, unless they presuppose the existence of God. For to begin with, that which I have just taken as a rule, that is to say, that all the things that we very clearly and very distinctly conceive of are true, is certain only because God is or exists, and that He is a Perfect Being, and that all that is in us issues from Him. From this it follows that our ideas or notions, which to the extent of their being clear or distinct are ideas of real things issuing from God, cannot but to that extent be true. So that though we often enough have ideas which have an element of falsity, this can only be the case in regard to those which have in them somewhat that is confused or obscure, because in so far as they have this character they participate in negation -that is, they exist in us as confused only because we are not quite perfect. And it is evident that there is no less repugnance in the idea that error or imperfection, inasmuch as it is imperfection, proceeds from God, than there is in the idea of truth or perfection proceeding from naught. But if we did not know that all that is in us of reality and truth proceeds from a perfect and infinite Being, however clear and distinct were our ideas, we should not have any reason to assure ourselves that they had the perfection of being true.

But after the knowledge of God and of the soul has thus rendered us certain of this rule, it is very easy to understand that the dreams which we imagine in our sleep should not make us in any way doubt the truth of the thoughts which we have when awake. For even if in sleep we had some very distinct idea such as a geometrician might have who discovered some new demonstration, the fact of being asleep would not militate against its truth. And as to the most ordinary error in our dreams, which consists in their representing to us various objects in the same way as do our external senses, it does not matter that this should give us occasion to suspect the truth of such ideas, because we may be likewise often enough deceived in them without our sleeping at all, just as when those who have the jaundice see everything as yellow, or when stars or other bodies which are very remote appear much smaller than they really are. For, finally, whether we are awake or asleep, we {106} should never allow ourselves to be persuaded excepting by the evidence of our Reason. And it must be remarked that I speak of our Reason and not of our imagination nor of our senses; just as though we see the sun very clearly, we should not for that reason judge that it is of the size of which it appears to be; likewise we could quite well distinctly imagine the head of a lion on the body of a goat, without necessarily concluding that a chimera exists. For Reason does not insist that whatever we see or imagine thus is a truth, but it tells us clearly that all our ideas or notions must have some foundation of truth. For otherwise it could not be possible that God, who is all perfection and truth, should have placed them within us. And because our reasonings are never so evident nor so complete during sleep as during wakefulness, although sometimes our imaginations are then just as lively and acute, or even more so, Reason tells us that since our thoughts cannot possibly be all true, because we are not altogether perfect, that which they have of truth must infallibly be met with in our waking experience rather than in that of our dreams.

Part V

I should be very glad to proceed to show forth the complete chain of truths which I have deduced from these first, but because to do this it would have been necessary now to speak of many matters of dispute among the learned, with whom I have no desire to embroil myself, I think that it will be better to abstain. I shall only state generally what these truths are, so that it may be left to the decision of those best able to judge whether it would be of use for the public to be more particularly informed of them or not. I always remained firm in the resolution which I had made, Dot to assume any other principle than that of which I have just made use, in order to demonstrate the existence of God and of the Soul, and to accept nothing as true which did not appear to be more clear and more certain than the demonstrations of the geometricians had formerly seemed. And nevertheless I venture to say that not only have I found the means of satisfying myself in a short time as to the more important of those difficulties usually dealt with iii philosophy, but I have also observed certain laws which God has so established in Nature, and of which He has imprinted such ideas on our minds, that,, after having reflected sufficiently upon the matter, we cannot doubt their being accurately observed in all that exists or is done in the world. Further, in considering the sequence {107} of these laws, it seems to me that I leave discovered many truth,-, more useful and more important than all that I had formerly learned or even hoped to learn.

But because I tried to explain the most important of these in a Treatise[5] which certain considerations prevented me from publishing, I cannot do better, in making them known, than here summarize briefly what that Treatise contains. I had planned to comprise in it all that I believed myself to know regarding the nature of material objects, before I set myself to write. However, just as the painters who cannot represent equally well on a plain surface all the various sides of a solid body, make selection of one of the most important, which alone is set in the light, while the others are put in shadow and made to appear only as they may be seen in looking at the former, so, fearing that I could not put in my Treatise all that I had in my mind, I undertook only to show very fully my conceptions of light, Later on, when occasion occurred, I resolved to add something about the sun and fixed stars, because light proceeds almost entirely from them; the heavens would be dealt with because they transmit light, the planets, the comets and the earth because they reflect it, and more particularly would all bodies which are on the earth, because they are either colored or transparent, or else luminous; and finally I should deal with man because he is the spectator of all. For the very purpose of putting all these topics somewhat in shadow, and being able to express myself freely about them, without being obliged to adopt or to refute the opinions which are accepted by the learned, I resolved to leave all this world to their disputes, and to speak only of what would happen in a new world if God now created, somewhere in an imaginary space, matter sufficient where-with to form it, and if He agitated in diverse ways, and without any order, the diverse portions of this matter, so that there resulted a chaos as confused as the poets ever feigned, and concluded His work by merely lending His concurrence to Nature in the usual way, leaving her to act in accordance with the laws which He had established. So, to begin with, I described this matter and tried to represent it in such a way, that it seems to me that nothing in the world could be more clear or intelligible, excepting what has just been said of God and the Soul. For I even went so far as expressly to assume that there was in it none of these forms or qualities which are so debated in the Schools, nor anything at all the {108} knowledge of which is not so natural to our minds that none could even pretend to be ignorant of it. Further I pointed

out what are the laws of Nature, and, without resting my reasons on any other principle than the infinite perfections of God, I tried to demonstrate all those of which one could have any doubt, and to show that they are of such a nature that even if God had created other worlds, He could not have created any in which these laws would fail to be. observed. After that, I showed how the greatest part of the matter of which this chaos is constituted, must, in accordance with these laws, dispose and arrange itself in such a fashion as to render it similar to our heavens; and how meantime some of its parts must form an earth, some planets and comets, and some others a sun and fixed stars. And, enlarging on the subject of light, I here explained at length the nature of the light which would be found in the sun and stars, and how from these it crossed in an instant the immense space of the heavens, and how it was reflected from the planets and comets to the earth. To this I also added many things touching the substance, situation, movements, and all the different qualities of these heavens and stars, so that I thought I had said enough to make it clear that there is nothing to be seen in the heavens and stars pertaining to our system which must not, or at least may not, appear exactly the same in those of the system which I described. From this point I came to speak more particularly of the earth, showing how, though I had expressly presupposed that God had not placed any weight in the matter of which it is composed, its parts did not fail all to gravitate exactly to its center; and how, having water and air on its surface, the disposition of the heavens and of the stars, more particularly of the moon, must cause a flux or reflux, which in all its circumstances is similar to that which is observed in our seas, and besides that, a certain current both of water and air from east to west, such as may also be observed in the tropics. I also showed how the mountains, seas, fountains and rivers, could naturally be formed in it, how the metals came to be in the mines and the plants to grow in the fields; and generally how all bodies, called mixed or composite, might arise. And because I knew nothing but fire which could produce light, excepting the stars, I studied amongst other things to make very clear all that pertains to its nature, how it is formed, how nourished, how there is sometimes only heat without light, and sometimes light without heat; I showed, too, how different colors might by it be induced upon different bodies and qualities of diverse kinds, how {109} some of these were liquefied and others solidified, bow nearly all can be consumed or converted into ashes and smoke by its means, and finally how of these ashes, by the intensity of its action alone, it forms glass. Since this transformation of ashes into glass seemed to me as wonderful as any other process in nature, I took particular pleasure in describing it.

I did not at the same time wish to infer from all these facts that this world has been created in the manner which I described; for it is much more probable that at the beginning God made it such as it was to be. But it is certain, and it is an opinion commonly received by the theologians, that the action by which He now preserves it is just the same as that by which He at first created it. In this way, although He had not, to begin with, given this world any other form than that of chaos, provided that the laws of nature had once been established and that He had lent His aid in order that its action should be according to its wont, we may well believe, without doing outrage to the miracle of creation, that by this means alone all things which are purely material might in course of time have become such as we observe them to be at present; and their nature is much easier to understand when we see them coming to pass little by little in this manner, than were we to consider them as all complete to begin with.

From a description of inanimate bodies and plants I passed on to that of animals, and particularly to that of men. But since I had not yet sufficient knowledge to speak of them in the same style as of the rest, that is to say, demonstrating the effects from the causes, and showing from what

beginnings and in what fashion Nature must produce them, I contented myself with supposing that God formed the body of man altogether like one of ours, in the outward figure of its members as well as in the interior conformation of its organs, without making use of any matter other than that which I had described, and without at the first placing in it a rational soul, or any other thing which might serve as a vegetative or as a sensitive soul; excepting that He kindled in the heart one of these fires without light, which I have already described, and which I did not conceive of as in any way different from that which makes the hay heat when shut up before it is dry, and which makes new wine grow frothy when it is left to ferment over the fruit. For, examining the functions which might in accordance with this supposition exist in this body, I found precisely all those which might exist in us without our having the power of thought, and consequently {110} without our soul-that is to say, this part of us, distinct from the body, of which it has just been said that its nature is to think-contributing to it, functions which are identically the same as those in which animals lacking reason may be said to resemble us. For all that, I could not find in these functions any which, being dependent on thought, pertain to us alone, inasmuch as we are men; while I found all of them afterwards, when I assumed that God had created a rational soul and that He had united it to this body in a particular manner which I described.

But in order to show how I there treated of this matter, I wish here to set forth the explanation of the movement of heart and arteries which, being the first and most general movement that is observed in animals, will give us the means of easily judging as to what we ought to think about all the rest. And so that there may be less difficulty in understanding what I shall say on this matter, I should like that those not versed in anatomy should take the trouble, before reading this, of having out up before their eyes the heart of some large animal which has lungs (for it is in all respects sufficiently similar to the heart of a man), and cause that there be demonstrated to them the two chambers or cavities which are within it. There is first of all that which is on the right side, with which two very large tubes or channels correspond, viz. the *vena cava*, which is the principal receptacle of the blood, and so to speak the trunk of a tree of which all the other veins of the body are the branches; and there is the arterial vein which has been badly named because it is nothing but an artery which, taking its origin from the heart, divides, after having issued from it, into many branches which proceed to disperse themselves all through the lungs. Then there is secondly the cavity on the left side with which there again correspond two tubes which are as large or larger than the preceding, viz. the venous artery, which has also been badly named, because it is nothing but a vein which comes from the lungs, where it is divided into many branches, interlaced with those of the arterial vein, and with those of the tube which is called the windpipe, through which enters the air which we breathe; and the great artery which, issuing from the heart, sends its branches throughout the body. I should also wish that the eleven little membranes, which, like so many doors, open and shut the four entrances which are in these two cavities, should be carefully shown. There are of these three at the entrance of the *vena cava*, where they are so arranged that they can in nowise prevent the blood which it contains {111} from flowing into the right cavity of the heart and yet exactly prevent its issuing out; there are three at the entrance to the arterial vein, which, being arranged quite the other way, easily allow the blood which is in this cavity to pass into the lungs, but not that which is already in the lungs to return to this cavity. There are also two others at the entrance of the venous artery, which allow the blood in the lungs to flow towards the left cavity of the heart, but do not permit its return; and three at the entrance of the great artery, which allow the blood to flow from the heart, but prevent its return. There is then no cause to seek for any other reason for the number of these membranes, except that the opening of the venous

artery being oval, because of the situation where it is met with, may be conveniently closed with two membranes, while the others, being round, can be better closed with three. Further, I should have my readers consider that the grand artery and the arterial vein are much harder and firmer than are the venous artery and the *vena cava*; and that these two last expand before entering the heart, and there form so to speak two pockets called the auricles of the heart, which are composed of a tissue similar to its own; and also that there is always more heat in the heart than in any other part of the body; and finally that this heat is capable of causing any drop of blood that enters into its cavities promptly to expand and dilate, as liquids usually do when they are allowed to fall drop by drop into some very hot vessel.

After this I do not need to say anything with a view to explaining the movement of the heart, except that when its cavities are not full of blood there necessarily flows from the *vena cava* into the right cavity, and from the venous artery into the left, enough blood to keep these two vessels always full, and being full, that their orifices, which are turned towards the heart, cannot then be closed. But as soon as two drops of blood have thus entered, one into each of the cavities, these drops, which cannot be otherwise than very large, because the openings by which they enter are very wide and the vessels from whence they come are very full of blood, rarefy and dilate because of the heat which they find there. By this means, causing the whole heart to expand, they force home and close the five little doors which are at the entrances of the two vessels whence they flow, thus preventing any more blood from coming down into the heart and becoming more and more rarefied, they push open the six doors which are in the entrances of the two other vessels through which they make their exit, by this means causing {112} all the branches of the arterial vein and of the great artery to expand almost at the same instant as the heart. This last immediately afterward contracts as do also the arteries, because the blood which has entered them has cooled; and the six little doors close up again, and the five doors of the *vena cava* and of the venous artery re-open and make a way for two other drops of blood which cause the heart and the arteries once more to expand, just as we saw before. And because the blood which then enters the heart passes through these two pouches which are called auricles, it comes to pass that their movement is contrary to the movement of the heart, and that they contract when it expands. For the rest, in order that those who do not know the force of mathematical demonstration and are unaccustomed to distinguish true reasons from merely probable reasons, should not venture to deny what has been said without examination, I wish to acquaint them with the fact that this movement which I have just explained follows as necessarily from the very disposition of the organs, as can be seen by looking at the heart, and from the heat which can be felt with the fingers, and from the nature of the blood of which we can learn by experience, as does that of a clock from the power, the situation, and the form, of its counterpoise and of its wheels.

But if we ask how the blood in the veins does not exhaust itself in thus flowing continually into the heart, and how the arteries do not become too full of blood, since all that passes through the heart flows into them, I need only reply by stating what has already been written by an English physician,[6] to whom the credit of having broken the ice in this matter must be ascribed, as also of being the first to teach that there are many little tubes at the extremities of the arteries whereby the blood that they receive from the heart enters the little branches of the veins, whence it returns once more to the heart; in this way its course is just a perpetual circulation. He proves this very clearly by the common experience of surgeons, who, by binding the arm moderately firmly above the place where they open the vein, cause the blood to issue more abundantly than it would have done if they had not bound it at all; while quite a contrary result would occur if they bound it

below, between the hand and the opening, or if they bound it very firmly above. For it is clear that when the bandage is moderately tight, though it may prevent the blood already in the arm from {113} returning to the heart by the Veins, it cannot for all that prevent more blood from coming anew by the arteries, because these are situated below the veins, and their walls, being stronger, are less easy to compress; and also that the blood which comes from the heart tends to pass by means of the arteries to the band with greater force than it does to return from the band to the heart by the veins. And because this blood escapes from the arm by the opening which is made in one of the veins, there must necessarily be some passages below the ligature, that is to say, towards the extremities of the arm, through which it can come thither from the arteries. This physician likewise proves very clearly the truth of that which he says of the course of the blood, by the existence of certain little membranes or valves which are so arranged in different places along the course of the veins, that they do not permit the blood to pass from the middle of the body towards the extremities, but only to return from the extremities to the heart; and further by the experiment which shows that all the blood which is in the body may issue from it in a very short time by means of one single artery that has been cut, and this is so even when it is very tightly bound very near the heart, and cut between it and the ligature, so that there could be no ground for supposing that the blood which flowed out of it could proceed from any other place but the heart.

But there are many other things which demonstrate that the true cause of this motion of the blood is that which I have stated. To begin with, the difference which is seen between the blood which issues from the veins, and that which issues from the arteries, can only proceed from the fact, that, being rarefied, and so to speak distilled by passing through the heart, it is more subtle and lively, and warmer immediately after leaving the heart (that is to say, when in the arteries) than it is a little while before entering it (that is, when in the veins). And if attention be paid, we shall find that this difference does not appear clearly, excepting in the vicinity of the heart, and is not so clear in those parts which are further removed from it. Further, the consistency of,he coverings of which the arterial vein and the great artery are composed, shows clearly enough that the blood beats against them with more force than it does in the case of the veins. And why should the left cavity of the heart and the great artery be larger and wider than the right cavity and the arterial vein, if it is not that the blood of the venous artery having only been in the lungs since it had passed through the heart, is more subtle and rarefies more effectively and {114} easily than that which proceeds immediately from the *vena cava*? And what is it that the physicians can discover in feeling the pulse, unless they know that, according as the blood changes its nature, it may be rarefied by the warmth of the heart in a greater or less degree, and more or less quickly than before ? And if we inquire how this heat is communicated to the other members, must it not be allowed that it is by means of the blood which, passing through the heart, is heated once again and thence is spread throughout all the body? From this it happens that if we take away the blood from any particular part, by that same means we take away from it the heat; even if the heart were as ardent as a red hot iron it would not suffice to heat up the feet and hands as it actually does, unless it continually sent out to them new blood. We further understand from this that the true use of respiration is to carry sufficient fresh air into the lungs to cause the blood, which comes there from the right cavity of the heart, where it has been rarefied and so to speak transformed into vapors, to thicken, and become anew converted into blood before falling into the left cavity, without which process it would not be fit to serve as fuel for the fire which there exists. We are confirmed in this statement by seeing that the animals which have no lungs have also but one cavity in their hearts, and that in children, who cannot use them while still within their mother's wombs, there is an opening by

which the blood flows from the *vena cava* into the left cavity of the heart, and a conduit through which it passes from the arterial vein into the great artery without passing through the lung. Again, how could digestion be carried on in the stomach if the heart did not send heat there by the arteries, and along with this some of the more fluid parts of the blood which aid in dissolving the foods which have been there placed? And is not the action which converts the juice of foods into blood easy to understand if we consider that it is distilled by passing and repassing through the heart possibly more than one or two hundred times in a day? What further need is there to explain the process of nutrition and the production of the different humors which are in the body, if we can say that the force with which the blood, in being rarefied, passes from the heart towards the extremities of the arteries, causes some of its parts to remain among those of the members where they are found and there to take the place of others which they oust; and that according to the situation or form or smallness of the little pores which they encounter, certain ones proceed to certain parts rather than others, just as {115} a number of different sieves variously perforated, as everyone has probably seen, are capable of separating different species of grain? And finally what in all this is most remarkable of all, is the generation of the animal spirits, which resemble a very subtle wind, or rather a flame which is very pure and very vivid, and which, continually rising Up in great abundance from the heart to the brain, thence proceeds through the nerves to the muscles, thereby giving the power of motion to all the members. And it is Dot necessary to suppose any other cause to explain how the particles of blood, which, being most agitated and most penetrating, are the most proper to constitute these spirits, proceed towards the brain rather than elsewhere, than that the arteries which carry them thither are those which proceed from the heart in the most direct lines, and that according to the laws of Mechanics, which are identical with those of Nature, when many objects tend to move together to the same point, where there is not room for all (as is the case with the particles of blood which issue from the left cavity of the heart and tend to go towards the brain), the weakest and least agitated parts must necessarily be turned aside by those that are stronger, which by this means are the only ones to reach it.

I had explained all these matters in some detail in the Treatise which I formerly intended to publish. And afterwards I had shown there, what must be the fabric of the nerves and muscles of the human body in order that the animal spirits therein contained should have the power to move the members, just as the heads of animals, a little while after decapitation, are still observed to move and bite the earth, notwithstanding that they are no longer animate; what changes are necessary in the brain to cause wakefulness, sleep and dreams; how light, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and all other qualities pertaining to external objects are able to imprint on it various ideas by the intervention of the senses; how hunger, thirst and other internal affections can also convey their impressions upon it; what should be regarded as the "common sense" by which these ideas are received, and what is meant by the memory which retains them, by the fancy which can change them in diverse ways and out of them constitute new ideas, and which, by the same means, distributing the animal spirits through the muscles, can cause the members of such a body to move in as many diverse ways, and in a manner as suitable to the objects which present themselves to its senses and to its internal passions, as can happen in our own case apart from the direction of our free will. And this will not seem strange {116} to those, who, knowing how many different automata or moving machines can be made by the industry of man, without employing in so doing more than a very few parts in comparison with the great multitude of bones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins, or other parts that are found in the body of each animal. From this aspect the body is regarded as a machine which, having been made by the hands of God, is incomparably better

arranged, and possesses in itself movements which are much more admirable, than any of those which can be invented by man. Here I specially stopped to show that if there had been such machines, possessing the organs and outward form of a monkey or some other animal without reason, we should not have had any means of ascertaining that they were not of the same nature as those animals. On the other hand, if there were machines which bore a resemblance to our body and imitated our actions as far as it was morally possible to do so, we should always have two very certain tests by which to recognize that, for all that, they were not real men. The first is, that they could never use speech or other signs as we do when placing our thoughts on record for the benefit of others. For we can easily understand a machine's being constituted so that it can utter words, and even emit some responses to action on it of a corporeal kind, which brings about a change in its organs; for instance, if it is touched in a particular part it may ask what we wish to say to it; if in another part it may exclaim that it is being hurt, and so on. But it never happens that it arranges its speech in various ways, in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. And the second difference is, that although machines can perform certain things as well as or perhaps better than any of us can do, they infallibly fan short in others, by the which means we may discover that they did not act from knowledge, but only from the disposition of their organs. For while reason is a universal instrument which can serve for all contingencies, these organs have need of some special adaptation for every particular action. From this it follows that it is morally impossible that there should be sufficient diversity in any machine to allow it to act in all the events of life in the same way as our reason causes us to act.

By these two methods we may also recognize the difference that exists between men and brutes. For it is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, {117} forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. It is not the want of organs that brings this to pass, for it is evident that ma.-Pies and parrots are able to utter words just like ourselves, and yet they cannot speak as we do, that is, so as to give evidence that they think of what they say. On the other hand, men who, being born deaf and dumb, are in the same degree, or even more than the brutes, destitute of the organs which serve the others for talking, are in the habit of themselves investing certain signs by which they make themselves understood by those who, being usually in their company, have leisure to learn their language. And this does not merely show that the brutes have less reason than men, but that they have none at all, since it is clear that very little is required in order to be able to talk. And when we notice the inequality that exists between animals of the same species, as well as between men, and observe that some are more capable of receiving instruction than others, it is not credible that a monkey or a parrot, selected as the most perfect of its species, should not in these matters equal the stupidest child to be found, or at least a child whose mind is clouded, unless in the case of the brute the soul were of an entirely different nature from ours. And we ought not to confound speech with natural movements which betray passions and may be imitated by machines as well as be manifested by animals; nor must we think, as did some of the ancients, that brutes talk, although we do not understand their language. For if this were true, since they have many organs which are allied to our own, they could communicate their thoughts to us just as easily as to those of their own race. It is also a very remarkable fact that although there are many animals which exhibit more dexterity than we do in some of their actions, we at the same time observe that they do not manifest any dexterity at all in

many others. Hence the fact that they do better than we do, does not prove that they are endowed with mind, for in this case they would have more reason than any of us, and would surpass us in all other things. It rather shows that they have no reason at all, and that it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, just as a clock, which is only composed of wheels and weights is able to tell the hours and measure the time more correctly than we can do with all our wisdom.

I had described after this the rational soul and shown that it {118} could not be in any way derived from the power of matter, like the other things of which I had spoken, but that it must be expressly created. I showed, too, that it is not sufficient that it should be lodged in the human body like a pilot in his ship, unless perhaps for the moving of its members, but that it is necessary that it should also be joined and united more closely to the body in order to have sensations and appetites similar to our own, and thus to form a true man. In conclusion, I have here enlarged a little on the subject of the soul, because it is one of the greatest importance. For next to the error of those who deny God, which I think I have already sufficiently refuted, there is none which is more effectual in leading feeble spirits from the straight path of virtue, than to imagine that the soul of the brute is of the same nature as our own, and that in consequence, after this life we have nothing to fear or to hope for, any more than the flies and ants. As a matter of fact, when one comes to know how greatly they differ, we understand much better the reasons which go to prove that our soul is in its nature entirely independent of body, and in consequence that it is not liable to die with it. And then, inasmuch as we observe no other causes capable of destroying it, we are naturally inclined to judge that it is immortal.

Part VI

It is three years since I arrived at the end of the Treatise which contained all these things; and I was commencing to revise it in order to place it in the hands of a printer, when I learned that certain persons, to whose opinions I defer, and whose authority cannot have less weight with my actions than my own reason has over my thoughts, had disapproved of a physical theory published a little while before by another person.[7] I will not say that I agreed with this opinion, but only that before their censure I observed in it nothing which I could possibly imagine to be prejudicial either to Religion or the State, or consequently which could have prevented me from giving expression to it in writing, if my reason had persuaded me to do so: and this made me fear that among my own opinions one might be found which should be misunderstood, notwithstanding the great care which I have always taken not to accept any new beliefs unless I had very certain proof of their truth, and not to give expression to what could tend to the disadvantage {119} of any person. This sufficed to cause me to alter the resolution which I had made to publish. For, although the reasons for my former resolution were very strong, my inclination, which always made me hate the profession of writing books, caused me immediately to find plenty of other reasons for excusing myself from doing so. And these reasons, on the one side and on the other, are of such a nature that not only have I here some interest in giving expression to them, but possibly the public may also have some interest in knowing them.

I have never made much of those things which proceed from my own mind, and so long as I culled Do other fruits from the Method which I use, beyond that of satisfying myself respecting certain difficulties which pertain to the speculative sciences, or trying to regulate my conduct by the

reasons which it has taught me, I never believed myself to be obliged to write anything about it. For as regards that which concerns conduct, everyone is so confident of his own common sense, that there might be found as many reformers as heads, if it were permitted that others than those whom God has established as the sovereigns of his people, or at least to whom He has given sufficient grace and zeal to be prophets, should be allowed to make any changes in that. And, although my speculations give me the greatest pleasure, I believed that others also had speculations which possibly pleased them even more. But so soon as I had acquired some general notions concerning Physics, and as, beginning to make use of them in various special difficulties, I observed to what point they might lead us, and how much they differ from the principles of which we have made use up to the present time, I believed that I could not keep them concealed without greatly sinning against the law which obliges us to procure, as much as in us lies, the general good of all mankind. For they caused me to see that it is possible to attain knowledge which is very useful in life, and that, instead of that speculative philosophy which is taught in the Schools, we may find a practical philosophy by means of which, knowing the force and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens and all other bodies that environ us, as distinctly as we know the different crafts of our artisans, we can in the same way employ them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature. This is not merely to be desired with a view to the invention of an infinity of arts and crafts which enable us to enjoy without any trouble the fruits of the earth and all the good things which are to {120} be found there, but also principally because it brings about the preservation of health, which is without doubt the chief blessing and the foundation of all other blessings in this life. For the mind depends so much on the temperament and disposition of the bodily organs that, if it is possible to find a means of rendering men wiser and cleverer than they have hitherto been, I believe that it is in medicine that it must be sought. It is true that the medicine which is now in vogue contains little of which the utility is remarkable; but, without having any intention of decrying it, I am sure that there is no one, even among those who make its study a profession, who does not confess that all that men know is almost nothing in comparison with what remains to be known; and that we could be free of an infinitude of maladies both of body and mind, and even also possibly of the infirmities of age, if we had sufficient knowledge of their causes, and of all the remedies with which nature has provided us. But, having the intention of devoting all my life to the investigation of a knowledge which is so essential, and having discovered a path which appears to me to be of such a nature that we must by its means infallibly reach our end if we pursue it, unless, indeed, we are prevented by the shortness of life or by lack of experience, I judged that there was no better provision against these two impediments than faithfully to communicate to the public the little which I should myself have discovered, and to beg all well-inclined persons to proceed further by contributing, each one according to his own inclination and ability, to the experiments which must be made, and then to communicate to the public all the things which they might discover, in order that the last should commence where the preceding had left off; and thus, by joining together the lives and labors of many, we should collectively proceed much further than any one in particular could succeed in doing.

I remarked also respecting experiments, that they become so much the more necessary the more one is advanced in knowledge, for to begin with it is better to make use simply of those which present themselves spontaneously to our senses, and of which we could not be ignorant provided that we reflected ever so little, rather than to seek out those which are more rare and recondite; the reason of this is that those which are more rare often mislead us so long as we do not know the

causes of the more common, and the fact that the circumstances on which they depend are almost always so particular and so minute that it is very difficult to observe {121} them. But in this the order which I have followed is as follows: I have first tried to discover generally the principles or first causes of everything that is or that can be in the world, without considering anything that might accomplish this end but God Himself who has created the world, or deriving them from any source excepting from certain germs of truths which are naturally existent in our souls. After that I considered which were the primary and most ordinary effects which might be deduced from these causes, and it seems to me that in this way I discovered the heavens, the stars, an earth, and even on the earth, water, air, fire, the minerals and some other such things, which are the most common and simple of any that exist, and consequently the easiest to know. Then, when I wished to descend to those which were more particular, so many objects of various kinds presented themselves to me, that I did not think it was possible for the human mind to distinguish the forms or species of bodies which are on the earth from an infinitude of others which might have been so if it had been the will of God to place them there, or consequently to apply them to our use, if it were not that we arrive at the causes by the effects, and avail ourselves of many particular experiments. In subsequently passing over in my mind all the objects which have ever been presented to my senses, I can truly venture to say that I have not there observed anything which I could not easily explain by the principles which I had discovered. But I must also confess that the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and these principles are so simple and general, that I observed hardly any particular effect as to which I could not at once recognize that it might be deduced from the principles in many different ways; and my greatest difficulty is usually to discover in which of these ways the effect does depend upon them. As to that, I do not know any other plan but again to try to find experiments of such a nature that their result is not the same if it has to be explained by one of the methods, as it would be if explained by the other. For the rest, I have now reached a position in which I discern, as it seems to me, sufficiently clearly what course must be adopted in order to make the majority of the experiments which may conduce to carry out this end. But I also perceive that they are of such a nature, and of so great a number, that neither my hands nor my income, though the latter were a thousand times larger than it is, could suffice for the whole; so that just in proportion as henceforth I shall have the power of carrying out more of them or less, shall I make more or less progress in arriving at a knowledge {122} of nature. This is what I had promised myself to make known by the Treatise which I had written, and to demonstrate in it so clearly the advantage which the public might receive from it, that I should induce all those who have the good of mankind at heart-that is to say, all those who are really virtuous in fact, and not only by a false semblance or by opinion-both to communicate to me those experiments that they have already carried out, and to help me in the investigation of those that still remain to be accomplished.

But I have since that time found other reasons which caused me to change my opinion, and consider that I should indeed continue to put in writing all the things which I judged to be of importance whenever I discovered them to be true, and that I should bestow on them the same care as I should have done had I wished to have them printed. I did this because it would give me so much the more occasion to examine them carefully (for there is no doubt that we always scrutinize more closely what we think will be seen by many, than what is done simply for ourselves, and often the things which have seemed true to me when I began to think about them, seemed false when I tried to place them on paper); and because I did not desire to lose any opportunity of benefiting the public if I were able to do so, and in order that if my works have any value, those into whose hands they will fall after my death, might have the power of making use of them as seems best to them. I,

however, resolved that I should not consent to their being published during my lifetime, so that neither the contradictions and controversies to which they might possibly give rise, nor even the reputation, such as it might be, which they would bring to me, should give me any occasion to lose the time which I meant to set apart for my own instruction. For although it is true that each man is obliged to procure, as much as in him lies, the good of others, and that to be useful to nobody is popularly speaking to be worthless, it is at the same time true that our cares should extend further than the present time, and that it is good to set aside those things which may possibly be adapted to bring profit to the living, when we have in view the accomplishment of other ends which will bring much more advantage to our descendants. In the same wry I should much like that men should know that the little which I have learned hitherto is almost nothing in comparison with that of which I am ignorant, and with the knowledge of which I do not despair of being able to attain. For it is much the same with those who little by little discover the truth in the Sciences, as with those who, {123} commencing to become rich, have less trouble in obtaining great acquisitions than they formerly experienced, when poorer, in arriving at those much smaller in amount. Or we might compare them to the Generals of our armies, whose forces usually grow ill proportion to their victories, and who require more leadership in order to hold together their troops after the loss of a battle, than is needed to take towns and provinces after having obtained a success. For he really gives battle who attempts to conquer all the difficulties and errors which prevent him from arriving at a knowledge of the truth, and it is to lose a battle to admit a false opinion touching a matter of any generality and importance. Much more skill is required in order to recover the position that one beforehand held, than is necessary to make great progress when one already possesses principles which are assured. For myself, if I have succeeded in discovering certain truths in the Sciences (and I hope that the matters contained in this volume will show that I have discovered some), I may say that they are resultant from, and dependent on, five or six principal difficulties which I have surmounted, and my encounter with these I look upon as so many battles in which I have had fortune on my side. I will not even hesitate to say that I think I shall have no need to win more than two or three other victories similar in kind in order to reach the accomplishment of my plans. And my age is not so advanced but that, in the ordinary course of nature, I may still have sufficient leisure for this end. But I believe myself to be so much the more bound to make the most of the time which remains, as I have the greater hope of being able to employ it well. And without doubt I should have many chances of being robbed of it, were I to publish the foundations of my Physics; for though these are nearly all so evident that it is only necessary to understand them in order to accept them, and although there are none of them as to which I do not believe myself capable of giving demonstration, yet because it is impossible that they should accord with all the various opinions of other men, I foresee that I should often be diverted from my main design by the opposition which they would bring to birth.

We may say that these contradictions might be useful both in making me aware of my errors, and, supposing that I had reached some satisfactory conclusion in bringing others to a fuller understanding of my speculations; and, as many can see more than can a single man, they might help in leading others who from the present time may begin to avail themselves of my system, to assist {124} me likewise with their discoveries. But though I recognize that I am extremely liable to err, and though I almost never trust the first reflections that I arrive at, the experience which I have had of the objections which may be made to my system prevents my having any hope of deriving profit from them. For I have often had experience of the judgments both of those whom I have esteemed as my friends, and of some others to whom I believed myself to be indifferent, and

even, too, of some whose ill-feeling and envy would, I felt sure, make them endeavor to reveal what affection concealed from the eyes of my friends. But rarely has it happened that any objection has been made which I did not in some sort foresee, unless where it was something very far removed from my subject. In this way hardly ever have I encountered any censor of my opinions who did not appear to me to be either less rigorous or less judicial than myself. And I certainly never remarked that by means of disputations employed by the Schools any truth has been discovered of which we were formerly ignorant. And so long as each side attempts to vanquish his opponent, there is a much more serious attempt to establish probability than to weigh the reasons on either side; and those who have for long been excellent pleaders are not for that reason the best judges.

As to the advantage which others may receive from the communication of my reflections, it could not be very great, inasmuch as I have not yet carried them so far as that it is not necessary to add many things before they can be brought into practice. And I think I can without vanity say that if anyone is capable of doing this, it should be myself rather than another-not indeed that there may not be in the world many minds incomparably superior to my own, but because no one can so well understand a thing and make it his own when learnt from another as when it is discovered for himself. As regards the matter in hand there is so much truth in this, that although I have often explained some of my opinions to persons of very good intelligence, who, while I talked to them appeared to understand them very clearly, yet when they recounted them I remarked that they had almost always altered them in such a manner that I could no longer acknowledge them as mine. On this account I am very glad to have the opportunity here of begging my descendants never to believe that what is told to them proceeded from myself unless I have myself divulged it. And I do not in the least wonder at the extravagances attributed to all the ancient philosophers whose writings we do not possess, nor do I judge from {125} these that their thoughts were very unreasonable, considering that theirs were the best minds of the time they lived in, but only that they have been imperfectly represented to us. We see, too, that it hardly ever happens that any of their disciples surpassed them, and I am sure that those who most passionately follow Aristotle now-a-days would think themselves happy if they had as much knowledge of nature as he had, even if this were on the condition that they should never attain to any more. They are like the ivy that never tries to mount above the trees which give it support, and which often even descends again after it has reached their summit; for it appears to me that such men also sink again-that is to say, somehow render themselves more ignorant than they would have been had they abstained from study altogether. For, not content with knowing all that is intelligibly explained in their author, they wish in addition to find in him the solution of many difficulties of which he says nothing, and in regard to which he possibly had no thought at all. At the same time their mode of philosophizing is very convenient for those who have abilities of a very mediocre kind, for the obscurity of the distinctions and principles of which they make use, is the reason of their being able to talk of all things as boldly as though they really knew about them, and defend all that they say against the most subtle and acute, without any one having the means of convincing them to the contrary. In this they seem to me like a blind man who, in order to fight on equal terms with one who sees, would have the latter to come into the bottom of a very dark cave. I may say, too, that it is in the interest of such people that I should abstain from publishing the principles of philosophy of which I make use, for, being so simple and evident as they are, I should, in publishing them, do the same as though I threw open the windows and caused daylight to enter the cave into which they have descended in order to fight. But even the best minds have no reason to desire to be acquainted with these principles, for if they wish to be able to talk of everything and acquire a reputation for

learning, they will more readily attain their end by contenting themselves with the appearance of truth which may be found in all sorts of things without much trouble, than in seeking for truth which only reveals itself little by little in certain spheres, and which, when others come into question, obliges one to confess one's ignorance. If, however, they prefer the knowledge of some small amount of truth to the vanity of seeming to be ignorant of nothing, which knowledge is {126} doubtless preferable, or if they desire to follow a course similar to my own, it is not necessary that I should say any more than what I have already said in this Discourse. For if they are capable of passing beyond the point I have reached, they will also so much the more be able to find by themselves all that I believe myself to have discovered; since, not having examined anything but in its order, it is certain that what remains for me to discover is in itself more difficult and more recondite than anything that I have hitherto been able to meet with, and they would have much less pleasure in learning from me than from themselves. Besides, the habit which they will acquire of seeking first things that are simple and then little by little and by degrees passing to others more difficult, will be of more use than could be all my instructions. For, as regards myself, I am persuaded that if from my youth up I had been taught all the truths of which I have since sought the demonstrations, or if I had not had any difficulty in learning them, I should perhaps never have known any others, or at least I should never have acquired the habit or facility which I think I have obtained, of ever finding them anew, in proportion as I set myself to seek for them. And, in a word, if there is any work at all which cannot be so well achieved by another as by him who has begun it, it is that at which I labor.

It is true as regards the experiments which may conduce to this end, that one man could not possibly accomplish all of them. But yet he could not, to good advantage, employ other hands than his own, excepting those of artisans or persons of that kind whom he could pay, and whom the hope of gain-which is a very effectual incentive-might cause to perform with exactitude all the things they were directed to accomplish. As to those who, whether by curiosity or desire to learn, might possibly offer him their voluntary assistance, not only are they usually more ready with promises than with performance, planning out fine sounding projects, none of which are ever realized, but they will also infallibly demand payment for their trouble by requesting the explanation of certain difficulties, or at least by empty compliments and useless talk, which could not occupy any of the student's time without causing it to be lost. And as to the experiments already made by others, even if they desired to communicate these to him-which those who term them secrets would never do-they are for the most part accompanied by so many circumstances or superfluous matter, that it would be very difficult for him to disentangle the truth. In addition to this he {127} would find nearly all so badly explained, or even so false (because those who carried them out were forced to make them appear to be in conformity with their principles), that if there had been some which might have been of use to him, they would hardly be worth the time that would be required in making the selection. So true is this, that if there were anywhere in the world a person whom one knew to be assuredly capable of discovering matters of the highest importance and those of the greatest possible utility to the public, and if for this reason all other men were eager by every means in their power to help him in reaching the end which he set before him, I do not see that they could do anything for him beyond contributing to defray the expenses of the experiments which might be requisite, or, for the rest, seeing that he was not deprived of his leisure by the importunities of anyone. But, in addition to the fact that I neither esteem myself so highly as to be willing to promise anything extraordinary, nor give scope to an imagination so vain as to conceive that the public should interest itself greatly in my designs, I do not yet own a soul so base

as to be willing to accept from anyone whatever a favor which it might be supposed I did not merit.

All those considerations taken together were, three years ago, the cause of my not desiring to publish the Treatise which I had on hand, and the reason why I even formed the resolution of not bringing to light during my life any other of so general a kind, or one by which the foundations of Physics could be understood. But since then two other reasons came into operation which compelled me to bring forward certain attempts, as I have done here, and to render to the public some account of my actions and designs. The first is that if I failed to do so, many who knew the intention I formerly had of publishing certain writings, might imagine that the causes for which I abstained from so doing were more to my disadvantage than they really were; for although I do not care immoderately for glory, or, if I dare say so, although I even hate it, inasmuch as I judge it to be antagonistic to the repose which I esteem above all other things, at the same time I never tried to conceal my actions as though they were crimes, nor have I used many precautions against being known, partly because I should have thought it damaging to myself, and partly because it would have given me a sort of disquietude which would again have militated against the perfect repose of spirit which I seek. And for as much as having in this way always held myself in a condition of indifference as {128} regards whether I was known or was not known, I have not yet been able to prevent myself from acquiring some sort of reputation, I thought that I should do my best at least to prevent myself from acquiring an evil reputation. The other reason which obliged me to put this in writing is that I am becoming every day more and more alive to t-he delay which is being suffered in the design which I have of instructing myself, because of the lack of an infinitude of experiments, which it is impossible that I should perform without the aid of others: and although I do not flatter myself so much as to hope that the public should to any large degree participate in my interest, I yet do not wish to be found wanting, both on my own account, and as one day giving occasion to those who will survive me of reproaching me for the fact that I might have left many matters in a much better condition than I have done, had I not too much neglected to make them understand in what way they could have contributed to the accomplishment of my designs.

And I thought that it was easy for me to select certain matters which would not be the occasion for many controversies, nor yet oblige me to propound more of my principles than I wish, and which yet would suffice to allow a pretty clear manifestation of what I can do and what I cannot do in the sciences. In this I cannot say whether I have succeeded or have not succeeded, and I do not wish to anticipate the judgment of any one by myself speaking of my writings; but I shall be very glad if they will examine them. And in order that they may have the better opportunity of so doing, I beg all those who have any objections to offer to take the trouble of sending them to my publishers, so that, being made aware of them, I may try at the same time to subjoin my reply. By this means, the reader, seeing objections and reply at the same time, will the more easily judge of the truth; for I do not promise in any instance to make lengthy replies, but just to avow my errors very frankly if I am convinced of them; or, if I cannot perceive them, to say simply what I think requisite for the defense of the matters I have written, without adding the exposition of any new matter, so that I may not be endlessly engaged in passing from one side to the other.

If some of the matters of which I spoke in the beginning of the *Dioptrics* and *Meteors* should at first sight give offense because I call them hypotheses and do not appear to care about their proof, let them have the patience to read these in entirety, and I hope that they will find themselves satisfied. For it appears to me that {129} the reasonings are so mutually interwoven, that as the later ones are demonstrated by the earlier, which are their causes, the earlier are reciprocally demonstrated by the later which are their effects. And it must not be imagined that in this I commit the fallacy

which logicians name arguing in a circle, for, since experience renders the greater part of these effects very certain, the causes from which I deduce them do not so much serve to prove their existence as to explain them; on the other hand, the causes are explained by the effects. And I have not named them hypotheses with any other object than that it may be known that while I consider myself able to deduce them from the primary truths which I explained above, yet I particularly desired not to do so, in order that certain persons may not for this reason take occasion to build up some extravagant philosophic system on what they take to be my principles, and thus cause the blame to be put on me. I refer to those who imagine that in one day they may discover all that another has arrived at in twenty years of work, so soon as he has merely spoken to them two or three words on the subject; while they are really all the more subject to err, and less capable of perceiving the truth as they are the more subtle and lively. For as regards the opinions that are truly mine I do not apologize for them as being new, inasmuch as if we consider the reasons of them well, I assure myself that they will be found to be so simple and so conformable to common sense, as to appear less extraordinary and less paradoxical than any others which may be held on similar subjects. And I do not even boast of being the first discoverer of any of them, but only state that I have adopted them, not because they have been held by others, nor because they have not been so held, but only because Reason has persuaded me of their truth.

Even if artisans are not at once able to carry out the invention[8] explained in the *Dioptrics*, I do not for that reason think that it can be said that it is to be condemned; for, inasmuch as great address and practice is required to make and adjust the mechanism which I have described without omitting any detail, I should not be less astonished at their succeeding at the first effort than I should be supposing some one were in one day to learn to play the guitar with skill, just because a good sheet of musical notation were set up before him. And if I write in French which is the language of my country, rather than in Latin which is that of my teachers, that is {130} because I hope that those who avail themselves only of their natural reason in its purity may be better judges of my opinions than those who believe only in the writings of the ancients; and as to those who unite good sense with study, whom alone I crave for my judges, they will not, I feel sure, be so partial to Latin as to refuse to follow my reasoning because I expound it in a vulgar tongue.

For the rest, I do not desire to speak here more particularly of the progress which I hope in the future to make in the sciences, nor to bind myself as regards the public with any promise which I shall not with certainty be able to fulfill. But I will just say that I have resolved not to employ the time which remains to me in life in any other matter than in endeavoring to acquire some knowledge of nature, which shall be of such a kind that it will enable us to arrive at rules for Medicine more assured than those which have as yet been attained; and my inclination is so strongly opposed to any other kind of pursuit, more especially to those which can only be useful to some by being harmful to others, that if certain circumstances had constrained me to employ them, I do not think that I should have been capable of succeeding. In so saying I make a declaration that I know very well cannot help me to make myself of consideration in the world, but to this end I have no desire to attain; and I shall always hold myself to be more indebted to those by whose favor I may enjoy my leisure without hindrance, than I shall be to any who may offer me the most honorable position in all the world.

Notes

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Editorial Conventions: Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2] ["So that whatever does not eventuate after we have done all in our power that it should happen is to be accounted by us as among the things which evidently cannot be done and which in philosophical phrase are called impossible." Latin Version.]

[3] [The Dioptrics, Meteors and Geometry were published originally in the same volume.]

[4] [i.e. Holland, where Descartes settled in 1629.]

[5] [i.e. "Le Monde," supressed on hearing of Galileo's condemnation.]

[6] [Harvy (Latin Tr.).]

[7] [i.e. Galileo.]

[8] [Doubtless the machine for the purpose of cutting lenses which Descartes so minutely describes.]

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Meditations On First Philosophy

Rene Descartes

1641

1/20/96

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Prefatory Note To The Meditations.

The first edition of the *Meditations* was published in Latin by Michael Soly of Paris *at the Sign of the Phoenix* in 1641 cum Privilegio et Approbatione Doctorum. The Royal *privilege* was indeed given, but the *approbation* seems to have been of a most indefinite kind. The reason of the book being published in France and not in Holland, where Descartes was living in a charming country house at Endegeest near Leiden, was apparently his fear that the Dutch ministers might in some way lay hold of it. His friend, Pere Mersenne, took charge of its publication in Paris and wrote to him about any difficulties that occurred in the course of its progress through the press. The second edition was however published at Amsterdam in 1642 by Louis Elzevir, and this edition was accompanied by the now completed *Objections and Replies.*[2] The edition from which the present translation is made is the second just mentioned, and is that adopted by MM. Adam and Tannery as the more correct, for reasons that they state in detail in the preface to their edition. The work was translated into French by the Duc de Luynes in 1642 and Descartes considered the translation so excellent that he had it published some years later. Clerselier, to complete matters, had the *Objections* also published in French with the *Replies,* and this, like the other, was subject to Descartes' revision and correction. This revision renders the French edition specially valuable. Where it seems desirable an alternative reading from the French is given in square brackets.

Elizabeth S. Haldane

Dedication

To the Most Wise and Illustrious the Dean and Doctors of the Sacred Faculty of Theology in Paris.

The motive which induces me to present to you this Treatise is so excellent, and, when you become acquainted with its design, I am convinced that you will also have so excellent a motive for taking it under your protection, that I feel that I cannot do better, in order to render it in some sort acceptable to you, than in a few words to state what I have set myself to do.

I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than theological argument. For although it is quite enough for us faithful ones to accept by means of faith the fact that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it certainly does not seem possible ever to persuade infidels of any religion, indeed, we may almost say, of any moral virtue, unless, to begin with, we prove these two facts by means of the natural reason. And inasmuch as often in this life greater rewards are offered for vice than for virtue, few people would prefer the right to the useful, were they restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another life; and although it is absolutely true that we must believe that there is a God, because we are so taught in the Holy Scriptures, and, on the other hand, that we must believe the Holy Scriptures because they come from God (the reason of this is, that, faith being a gift of God, He who gives the grace to cause us to believe other things can likewise give it to cause us to believe that He exists), we nevertheless could

not place this argument before infidels, who might accuse us of reasoning in a circle. And, in truth, I have noticed that you, along with all the theologians, did not only affirm that the existence of God may be proved by the natural reason, but also that it may be inferred from the Holy Scriptures, that knowledge about Him is much clearer than that which we have of many created things, and, as a matter of fact, is so easy to acquire, that those who have it not are culpable in their ignorance. This indeed appears from the Wisdom of Solomon, chapter xiii., where it is said *Howbeit they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather find out the Lord thereof?* and in Romans, chapter i., it is said that they are *without excuse*; and again in the same place, by these words *that which may be known of God is manifest in them*, it seems as through we were shown that all that which can be known of God may be made manifest by means which are not derived from anywhere but from ourselves, and from the simple consideration of the nature of our minds. Hence I thought it not beside my purpose to inquire how this is so, and how God may be more easily and certainly known than the things of the world.

And as regards the soul, although many have considered that it is not easy to know its nature, and some have even dared to say that human reasons have convinced us that it would perish with the body, and that faith alone could believe the contrary, nevertheless, inasmuch as the Lateran Council held under Leo X (in the eighth session) condemns these tenets, and as Leo expressly ordains Christian philosophers to refute their arguments and to employ all their powers in making known the truth, I have ventured in this treatise to undertake the same task.

More than that, I am aware that the principal reason which causes many impious persons not to desire to believe that there is a God, and that the human soul is distinct from the body, is that they declare that hitherto no one has been able to demonstrate these two facts; and although I am not of their opinion but, on the contrary, hold that the greater part of the reasons which have been brought forward concerning these two questions by so many great men are, when they are rightly understood, equal to so many demonstrations, and that it is almost impossible to invent new ones, it is yet in my opinion the case that nothing more useful can be accomplished in philosophy than once for all to seek with care for the best of these reasons, and to set them forth in so clear and exact a manner, that it will henceforth be evident to everybody that they are veritable demonstrations. And, finally, inasmuch as it was desired that I should undertake this task by many who were aware that I had cultivated a certain Method for the resolution of difficulties of every kind in the Sciences -- a method which it is true is not novel, since there is nothing more ancient than the truth, but of which they were aware that I had made use successfully enough in other matters of difficulty -- I have thought that it was my duty also to make trial of it in the present matter.

Now all that I could accomplish in the matter is contained in this Treatise. Not that I have here drawn together all the different reasons which might be brought forward to serve as proofs of this subject: for that never seemed to be necessary excepting when there was no one single proof that was certain. But I have treated the first and principal ones in such a manner that I can venture to bring them forward as very evident and very certain demonstrations. And more than that, I will say that these proofs are such that I do not think that there is any way open to the human mind by which it can ever succeed in discovering better. For the importance of the subject, and the glory of God to which all this relates, constrain me to speak here somewhat more freely of myself than is my habit. Nevertheless, whatever certainty and evidence I find in my reasons, I cannot persuade myself that all the world is capable of understanding them. Still, just as in Geometry there are

many demonstrations that have been left to us by Archimedes, by Apollonius, by Pappus, and others, which are accepted by everyone as perfectly certain and evident (because they clearly contain nothing which, considered by itself, is not very easy to understand, and as all through that which follows has an exact connection with, and dependence on that which precedes), nevertheless, because they are somewhat lengthy, and demand a mind wholly devoted tot heir consideration, they are only taken in and understood by a very limited number of persons. Similarly, although I judge that those of which I here make use are equal to, or even surpass in certainty and evidence, the demonstrations of Geometry, I yet apprehend that they cannot be adequately understood by many, both because they are also a little lengthy and dependent the one on the other, and principally because they demand a mind wholly free of prejudices, and one which can be easily detached from the affairs of the senses. And, truth to say, there are not so many in the world who are fitted for metaphysical speculations as there are for those of Geometry. And more than that; there is still this difference, that in Geometry, since each one is persuaded that nothing must be advanced of which there is not a certain demonstration, those who are not entirely adepts more frequently err in approving what is false, in order to give the impression that they understand it, than in refuting the true. But the case is different in philosophy where everyone believes that all is problematical, and few give themselves to the search after truth; and the greater number, in their desire to acquire a reputation for boldness of thought, arrogantly combat the most important of truths.[3]

That is why, whatever force there may be in my reasonings, seeing they belong to philosophy, I cannot hope that they will have much effect on the minds of men, unless you extend to them your protection. But the estimation in which you Company is universally held is so great, and the name of Sorbonne carries with it so much authority, that, next to the Sacred Councils, never has such deference been paid to the judgment of any Body, not only in what concerns the faith, but also in what regards human philosophy as well: everyone indeed believes that it is not possible to discover elsewhere more perspicacity and solidity, or more integrity and wisdom in pronouncing judgment. For this reason I have no doubt that if you deign to take the trouble in the first place of correcting this work (for being conscious not only of my infirmity, but also of my ignorance, I should not dare to state that it was free from errors), and then, after adding to it these things that are lacking to it, completing those which are imperfect, and yourselves taking the trouble to give a more ample explanation of those things which have need of it, or at least making me aware of the defects so that I may apply myself to remedy them[4] -- when this is done and when finally the reasonings by which I prove that there is a God, and that the human soul differs from the body, shall be carried to that point of perspicuity to which I am sure they can be carried in order that they may be esteemed as perfectly exact demonstrations, if you deign to authorize your approbation and to render public testimony to their truth and certainty, I do not doubt, I say, that henceforward all the errors and false opinions which have ever existed regarding these two questions will soon be effaced from the minds of men. For the truth itself will easily cause all men of mind and learning to subscribe to your judgment; and your authority will cause the atheists, who are usually more arrogant than learned or judicious, to rid themselves of their spirit of contradiction or lead them possibly themselves to defend the reasonings which they find being received as demonstrations by all persons of consideration, lest they appear not to understand them. And, finally, all others will easily yield to such a mass of evidence, and there will be none who dares to doubt the existence of God and the real and true distinction between the human soul and the body. It is for you now in your singular wisdom to judge of the importance of the establishment of such beliefs [you who see

the disorders produced by the doubt of them][5] . But it would not become me to say more in consideration of the cause of God and religion to those who have always been the most worthy supports of the Catholic Church.

Preface to the Reader

I have already slightly touched on these two questions of God and the human soul in the Discourse on the Method of rightly conducting the Reason and seeking truth in the Sciences, published in French in the year 1637. Not that I had the design of treating these with any thoroughness, but only so to speak in passing, and in order to ascertain by the judgment of the readers how I should treat them later on. For these questions have always appeared to me to be of such importance that I judged it suitable to speak of them more than once; and the road which I follow in the explanation of them is so little trodden, and so far removed from the ordinary path, that I did not judge it to be expedient to set it forth at length in French and in a Discourse which might be read by everyone, in case the feebler minds should believe that it was permitted to them to attempt to follow the same path.

But, having in this Discourse on Method begged all those who have found in my writings somewhat deserving of censure to do me the favour of acquainting me with the grounds of it, nothing worthy of remark has been objected to in them beyond two matters: to these two I wish here to reply in a few words before undertaking their more detailed discussion.

The first objection is that it does not follow from the fact that the human mind reflecting on itself does not perceive itself to be other than a thing that thinks, that its nature or its essence consists only in its being a thing that thinks, in the sense that this word only excludes all other things which might also be supposed to pertain to the nature of the soul. To this objection I reply that it was not my intention in that place to exclude these in accordance with the order that looks to the truth of the matter (as to which I was not then dealing), but only in accordance with the order of my thought [perception]; thus my meaning was that so far as I was aware, I knew nothing clearly as belonging to my essence, excepting that I was a thing that thinks, or a thing that has in itself the faculty of thinking. But I shall show hereafter how from the fact that I know no other thing which pertains to my essence, it follows that there is no other thing which really does belong to it.

The second objection is that it does not follow from the fact that I have in myself the idea of something more perfect than I am, that this idea is more perfect than I, and much less that what is represented by this idea exists. But I reply that in this term idea there is here something equivocal, for it may either be taken materially, as an act of my understanding, and in this sense it cannot be said that it is more perfect than I; or it may be taken objectively, as the thing which is represented by this act, which, although we do not suppose it to exist outside of my understanding, may, none the less, be more perfect than I, because of its essence. And in following out this Treatise I shall show more fully how, from the sole fact that I have in myself the idea of a thing more perfect than myself, it follows that this thing truly exists.

In addition to these two objections I have also seen two fairly lengthy works on this subject, which, however, did not so much impugn my reasonings as my conclusions, and this by arguments drawn from the ordinary atheistic sources. But, because such arguments cannot make any impression on

the minds of those who really understand my reasonings, and as the judgments of many are so feeble and irrational that they very often allow themselves to be persuaded by the opinions which they have first formed, however false and far removed from reason they may be, rather than by a true and solid but subsequently received refutation of these opinions, I do not desire to reply here to their criticisms in case of being first of all obliged to state them. I shall only say in general that all that is said by the atheist against the existence of God, always depends either on the fact that we ascribe to God affections which are human, or that we attribute so much strength and wisdom to our minds that we even have the presumption to desire to determine and understand that which God can and ought to do. In this way all that they allege will cause us no difficulty, provided only we remember that we must consider our minds as things which are finite and limited, and God as a Being who is incomprehensible and infinite.

Now that I have once for all recognised and acknowledged the opinions of men, I at once begin to treat of God and the Human soul, and at the same time to treat of the whole of the First Philosophy, without however expecting any praise from the vulgar and without the hope that my book will have many readers. On the contrary, I should never advise anyone to read it excepting those who desire to meditate seriously with me, and who can detach their minds from affairs of sense, and deliver themselves entirely from every sort of prejudice. I know too well that such men exist in a very small number. But for those who, without caring to comprehend the order and connections of my reasonings, form their criticisms on detached portions arbitrarily selected, as is the custom with many, these, I say, will not obtain much profit from reading this Treatise. And although they perhaps in several parts find occasion of cavilling, they can for all their pains make no objection which is urgent or deserving of reply.

And inasmuch as I make no promise to others to satisfy them at once, and as I do not presume so much on my own powers as to believe myself capable of foreseeing all that can cause difficulty to anyone, I shall first of all set forth in these Meditations the very considerations by which I persuade myself that I have reached a certain and evident knowledge of the truth, in order to see if, by the same reasons which persuaded me, I can also persuade others. And, after that, I shall reply to the objections which have been made to me by persons of genius and learning to whom I have sent my Meditations for examination, before submitting them to the press. For they have made so many objections and these so different, that I venture to promise that it will be difficult for anyone to bring to mind criticisms of any consequence which have not been already touched upon. This is why I beg those who read these Meditations to form no judgment upon them unless they have given themselves the trouble to read all the objections as well as the replies which I have made to them.[6]

Synopsis of the Six Following Meditations.

In the first Meditation I set forth the reasons for which we may, generally speaking, doubt about all things and especially about material things, at least so long as we have no other foundations for the sciences than those which we have hitherto possessed. But although the utility of a Doubt which is so general does not at first appear, it is at the same time very great, inasmuch as it delivers us from every kind of prejudice, and sets out for us a very simple way by which the mind may detach itself from the senses; and finally it makes it impossible for us ever to doubt those things which we have once discovered to be true.

In the second Meditation, mind, which making use of the liberty which pertains to it, takes for granted that all those things of whose existence it has the least doubt, are non-existent, recognises that it is however absolutely impossible that it does not itself exist. This point is likewise of the greatest moment, inasmuch as by this means a distinction is easily drawn between the things which pertain to mind -- that is to say to the intellectual nature -- and those which pertain to body.

But because it may be that some expect from me in this place a statement of the reasons establishing the immortality of the soul, I feel that I should here make known to them that having aimed at writing nothing in all this Treatise of which I do not possess very exact demonstrations, I am obliged to follow a similar order to that made use of by the geometers, which is to begin by putting forward as premises all those things upon which the proposition that we seek depends, before coming to any conclusion regarding it. Now the first and principal matter which is requisite for thoroughly understanding the immortality of the soul is to form the clearest possible conception of it, and one which will be entirely distinct from all the conceptions which we may have of body; and in this Meditation this has been done. In addition to this it is requisite that we may be assured that all the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are true in the very way in which we think them; and this could not be proved previously to the Fourth Mediation. Further we must have a distinct conception of corporeal nature, which is given partly in this Second, and partly in the Fifth and Sixth Meditations. And finally we should conclude from all this, that those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly as being diverse substances, as we regard mind and body to be, are really substances essentially distinct one from the other; and this is the conclusion of the Sixth Meditation. This is further confirmed in this same Meditation by the fact that we cannot conceive of body excepting in so far as it is divisible, while the mind cannot be conceived of excepting as indivisible. For we are not able to conceive of the half of a mind as we can do of the smallest of all bodies; so that we see that not only are their natures different but even in some respects contrary to one another. I have not however dealt further with this matter in this treatise, both because what I have said is sufficient to show clearly enough that the extinction of the mind does not follow from the corruption of the body, and also to give men the hope of another life after death, as also because the premises from which the immortality of the soul may be deduced depend on an elucidation of a complete system of Physics. This would mean to establish in the first place that all substances generally -- that is to say all things which cannot exist without being created by God -- are in their nature incorruptible, and that they can never cease to exist unless God, in denying to them his concurrence, reduce them to nought; and secondly that body, regarded generally, is a substance, which is the reason why it also cannot perish, but that the human body, inasmuch as it differs from other bodies, is composed only of a certain configuration of members and of other similar accidents, while the human mind is not similarly composed of any accidents, but is a pure substance. For although all the accidents of mind be changed, although, for instance, it think certain things, will others, perceive others, etc., despite all this it does not emerge from these changes another mind: the human body on the other hand becomes a different thing from the sole fact that the figure or form of any of its portions is found to be changed. From this it follows that the human body may indeed easily enough perish, but the mind [or soul of man (I make no distinction between them)] is owing to its nature immortal.

In the third Meditation it seems to me that I have explained at sufficient length the principal argument of which I make use in order to prove the existence of God. But none the less, because I did not wish in that place to make use of any comparisons derived from corporeal things, so as to withdraw as much as I could the minds of readers from the senses, there may perhaps have

remained many obscurities which, however, will, I hope, be entirely removed by the Replies which I have made to the Objections which have been set before me. Amongst others there is, for example, this one, How the idea in us of a being supremely perfect possesses so much objective reality [that is to say participates by representation in so many degrees of being and perfection] that it necessarily proceeds from a cause which is absolutely perfect. This is illustrated in these Replies by the comparison of a very perfect machine, the idea of which is found in the mind of some workman. For as the objective contrivance of this idea must have some cause, i.e. either the science of the workman or that of some other from whom he has received the idea, it is similarly impossible that the idea of God which is in us should not have God himself as its cause.

In the fourth Meditation it is shown that all these things which we very clearly and distinctly perceive are true, and at the same time it is explained in what the nature of error or falsity consists. This must of necessity be known both for the confirmation of the preceding truths and for the better comprehension of those that follow. (But it must meanwhile be remarked that I do not in any way there treat of sin -- that is to say of the error which is committed in the pursuit of good and evil, but only of that which arises in the deciding between the true and the false. And I do not intend to speak of matters pertaining to the Faith or the conduct of life, but only of those which concern speculative truths, and which may be known by the sole aid of the light of nature.)

In the fifth Meditation corporeal nature generally is explained, and in addition to this the existence of God is demonstrated by a new proof in which there may possibly be certain difficulties also, but the solution of these will be seen in the Replies to the Objections. And further I show in what sense it is true to say that the certainty of geometrical demonstrations is itself dependent on the knowledge of God.

Finally in the Sixth I distinguish the action of the understanding[7] from that of the imagination;[8] the marks by which this distinction is made are described. I here show that the mind of man is really distinct from the body, and at the same time that the two are so closely joined together that they form, so to speak, a single thing. All the errors which proceed from the senses are then surveyed, while the means of avoiding them are demonstrated, and finally all the reasons from which we may deduce the existence of material things are set forth. Not that I judge them to be very useful in establishing that which they prove, to wit, that there is in truth a world, that men possess bodies, and other such things which never have been doubted by anyone of sense; but because in considering these closely we come to see that they are neither so strong nor so evident as those arguments which lead us to the knowledge of our mind and of God; so that these last must be the most certain and most evident facts which can fall within the cognizance of the human mind. And this is the whole matter that I have tried to prove in these Meditations, for which reason I here omit to speak of many other questions which I dealt incidentally in this discussion.

Meditations On First Philosophy
in which the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Mind and Body are Demonstrated. [9]

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Meditation I

Of the things which may be brought within the sphere of the doubtful

It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation, if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to be a very great one, I waited until I had attained an age so mature that I could not hope that at any later date I should be better fitted to execute my design. This reason caused me to delay so long that I should feel that I was doing wrong were I to occupy in deliberation the time that yet remains to me for action. To-day, then, since very opportunely for the plan I have in view I have delivered my mind from every care [and am happily agitated by no passions] and since I have procured for myself an assured leisure in a peaceable retirement, I shall at last seriously and freely address myself to the general upheaval of all my former opinions.

Now for this object it is not necessary that I should show that all of these are false -- I shall perhaps never arrive at this end. But inasmuch as reason already persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly to be false, if I am able to find in each one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the whole. And for that end it will not be requisite that I should examine each in particular, which would be an endless undertaking; for owing to the fact that the destruction of the foundations of necessity brings with it the downfall of the rest of the edifice, I shall only in the first place attack those principles upon which all my former opinions rested.

All that up to the present time I have accepted as most true and certain I have learned either from the senses or through the senses; but it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive, and it is wiser not to trust entirely to anything by which we have once been deceived.

But it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things which are hardly perceptible, or very far away, there are yet many others to be met with as to which we cannot reasonably have any doubt, although we recognise them by their means. For example, there is the fact that I am here, seated by the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and other similar matters. And how could I deny that these hands and this body are mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to certain persons, devoid of sense, whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by the violent vapours of black bile, that they constantly assure us that they think they are kings when they are really quite poor, or that they are clothed in purple when they are really without covering, or who imagine that they have an earthenware head or are nothing but pumpkins or are made of glass. But they are mad, and I should not be any the less insane were I to follow examples so extravagant.

At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that consequently I am in the habit of

sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the same things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the fire, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed! At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; what happens in sleep does not appear so clear nor so distinct as does all this. But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream.

Now let us assume that we are asleep and that all these particulars, e.g. that we open our eyes, shake our head, extend our hands, and so on, are but false delusions; and let us reflect that possibly neither our hands nor our whole body are such as they appear to us to be. At the same time we must at least confess that the things which are represented to us in sleep are like painted representations which can only have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true, and that in this way those general things at least, i.e. eyes, a head, hands, and a whole body, are not imaginary things, but things really existent. For, as a matter of fact, painters, even when they study with the greatest skill to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary, cannot give them natures which are entirely new, but merely make a certain medley of the members of different animals; or if their imagination is extravagant enough to invent something so novel that nothing similar has ever before been seen, and that then their work represents a thing purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is certain all the same that the colours of which this is composed are necessarily real. And for the same reason, although these general things, to with, [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and such like, may be imaginary, we are bound at the same time to confess that there are at least some other objects yet more simple and more universal, which are real and true; and of these just in the same way as with certain real colours, all these images of things which dwell in our thoughts, whether true and real or false and fantastic, are formed.

To such a class of things pertains corporeal nature in general, and its extension, the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude and number, as also the place in which they are, the time which measures their duration, and so on.

That is possibly why our reasoning is not unjust when we conclude from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine and all other sciences which have as their end the consideration of composite things, are very dubious and uncertain; but that Arithmetic, Geometry and other sciences of that kind which only treat of things that are very simple and very general, without taking great trouble to ascertain whether they are actually existent or not, contain some measure of certainty and an element of the indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three together always form five, and the square can never have more than four sides, and it does not seem possible that truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity [or uncertainty].

Nevertheless I have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an all-powerful God existed by whom I have been created such as I am. But how do I know that He has not brought it to pass that there is no earth, no heaven, no extended body, no magnitude, no place, and that nevertheless [I possess the perceptions of all these things and that] they seem to me to exist just exactly as I now see them? And, besides, as I sometimes imagine that others deceive themselves in the things which they think they know best, how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I add two and three, or

count the sides of a square, or judge of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined? But possibly God has not desired that I should be thus deceived, for He is said to be supremely good. If, however, it is contrary to His goodness to have made me such that I constantly deceive myself, it would also appear to be contrary to His goodness to permit me to be sometimes deceived, and nevertheless I cannot doubt that He does permit this.

There may indeed be those who would prefer to deny the existence of a God so powerful, rather than believe that all other things are uncertain. But let us not oppose them for the present, and grant that all that is here said of a God is a fable; nevertheless in whatever way they suppose that I have arrived at the state of being that I have reached -- whether they attribute it to fate or to accident, or make out that it is by a continual succession of antecedents, or by some other method -- since to err and deceive oneself is a defect, it is clear that the greater will be the probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is the Author to whom they assign my origin the less powerful. To these reasons I have certainly nothing to reply, but at the end I feel constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty [in the sciences].

But it is not sufficient to have made these remarks, we must also be careful to keep them in mind. For these ancient and commonly held opinions still revert frequently to my mind, long and familiar custom having given them the right to occupy my mind against my inclination and rendered them almost masters of my belief; nor will I ever lose the habit of deferring to them or of placing my confidence in them, so long as I consider them as they really are, i.e. opinions in some measure doubtful, as I have just shown, and at the same time highly probable, so that there is much more reason to believe in than to deny them. That is why I consider that I shall not be acting amiss, if, taking of set purpose a contrary belief, I allow myself to be deceived, and for a certain time pretend that all these opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at last, having thus balanced my former prejudices with my latter [so that they cannot divert my opinions more to one side than to the other], my judgment will no longer be dominated by bad usage or turned away from the right knowledge of the truth. For I am assured that there can be neither peril nor error in this course, and that I cannot at present yield too much to distrust, since I am not considering the question of action, but only of knowledge.

I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things; I shall remain obstinately attached to this idea, and if by this means it is not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of any truth, I may at least do what is in my power [i.e. suspend my judgment], and with firm purpose avoid giving credence to any false thing, or being imposed upon by this arch deceiver, however powerful and deceptive he may be. But this task is a laborious one, and insensibly a certain lassitude leads me into the course of my ordinary life. And just as a captive who in sleep enjoys an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that his liberty is but a dream, fears to awaken, and conspires with these agreeable illusions that the deception may be prolonged, so insensibly of my own accord I fall back

into my former opinions, and I dread awakening from this slumber, lest the laborious wakefulness which would follow the tranquillity of this repose should have to be spent not in daylight, but in the excessive darkness of the difficulties which have just been discussed.

Meditation II

Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and that it is more easily known than the Body

The Meditation of yesterday filled my mind with so many doubts that it is no longer in my power to forget them. And yet I do not see in what manner I can resolve them; and, just as if I had all of a sudden fallen into very deep water, I am so disconcerted that I can neither make certain of setting my feet on the bottom, nor can I swim and so support myself on the surface. I shall nevertheless make an effort and follow anew the same path as that on which I yesterday entered, i.e. I shall proceed by setting aside all that in which the least doubt could be supposed to exist, just as if I had discovered that it was absolutely false; and I shall ever follow in this road until I have met with something which is certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned for certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain. Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, and transport it elsewhere, demanded only that one point should be fixed and immoveable; in the same way I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain and indubitable.

I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false; I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me. I consider that I possess no senses; I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement and place are but the fictions of my mind. What, then, can be esteemed as true? Perhaps nothing at all, unless that there is nothing in the world that is certain.

But how can I know there is not something different from those things that I have just considered, of which one cannot have the slightest doubt? Is there not some God, or some other being by whatever name we call it, who puts these reflections into my mind? That is not necessary, for is it not possible that I am capable of producing them myself? I myself, am I not at least something? But I have already denied that I had senses and body. Yet I hesitate, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on body and senses that I cannot exist without these? But I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something [or merely because I thought of something]. But there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something. So that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, we must come to the definite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it.

But I do not yet know clearly enough what I am, I who am certain that I am; and hence I must be careful to see that I do not imprudently take some other object in place of myself, and thus that I

do not go astray in respect of this knowledge that I hold to be the most certain and most evident of all that I have formerly learned. That is why I shall now consider anew what I believed myself to be before I embarked upon these last reflections; and of my former opinions I shall withdraw all that might even in a small degree be invalidated by the reasons which I have just brought forward, in order that there may be nothing at all left beyond what is absolutely certain and indubitable.

What then did I formerly believe myself to be? Undoubtedly I believed myself to be a man. But what is a man? Shall I say a reasonable animal? Certainly not; for then I should have to inquire what an animal is, and what is reasonable; and thus from a single question I should insensibly fall into an infinitude of others more difficult; and I should not wish to waste the little time and leisure remaining to me in trying to unravel subtleties like these. But I shall rather stop here to consider the thoughts which of themselves spring up in my mind, and which were not inspired by anything beyond my own nature alone when I applied myself to the consideration of my being. In the first place, the, I considered myself as having a face, hands, arms, and all that system of members composed on bones and flesh as seen in a corpse which I designated by the name of body. In addition to this I considered that I was nourished, that I walked, that I felt, and that I thought, and I referred all these actions to the soul: but I did not stop to consider what the soul was, or if I did stop, I imagined that it was something extremely rare and subtle like a wind, a flame, or an ether, which was spread throughout my grosser parts. As to body I had no manner of doubt about its nature, but thought I had a very clear knowledge of it; and if I had desired to explain it according to the notions that I had then formed of it, I should have described it thus: By the body I understand all that which can be defined by a certain figure: something which can be confined in a certain place, and which can fill a given space in such a way that every other body will be excluded from it; which can be perceived either by tough, or by sight, or by hearing, or by taste, or by smell: which can be moved in many ways not, in truth, by itself, but by something which is foreign to it, by which it is touched [and from which it receives impressions]: for to have the power of self-movement, as also of feeling or of thinking, I did not consider to appertain to the nature of body: on the contrary, I was rather astonished to find that faculties similar to them existed in some bodies.

But what am I, now that I suppose that there is a certain genius which is extremely powerful, and, if I may say so, malicious, who employs all his powers in deceiving me? Can I affirm that I possess the least of all those things which I have just said pertain to the nature of body? I pause to consider, I revolve all these things in my mind, and I find none of which I can say that it pertains to me. It would be tedious to stop to enumerate them. Let us pass to the attributes of soul and see if there is any one which is in me? What of nutrition or walking [the first mentioned]? But if it is so that I have no body it is also true that I can neither walk nor take nourishment. Another attribute is sensation. But one cannot feel without body, and besides I have thought I perceived many things during sleep that I recognised in my waking moments as not having been experienced at all. What of thinking? I find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just when I think; for it might possibly be the case if I ceased entirely to think, that I should likewise cease altogether to exist. I do not now admit anything which is not necessarily true: to speak accurately I am not more than a thing which thinks, that is to say a mind or a soul, or an understanding, or a reason, which are terms whose significance was formerly unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing and really exist; but what thing? I have answered: a thing which thinks.

And what more? I shall exercise my imagination [in order to see if I am not something more]. I am

not a collection of members which we call the human body: I am not a subtle air distributed through these members, I am not a wind, a fire, a vapour, a breath, nor anything at all which I can imagine or conceive; because I have assumed that all these were nothing. Without changing that supposition I find that I only leave myself certain of the fact that I am somewhat. But perhaps it is true that these same things which I supposed were non-existent because they are unknown to me, are really not different from the self which I know. I am not sure about this, I shall not dispute about it now; I can only give judgment on things that are known to me. I know that I exist, and I inquire what I am, I whom I know to exist. But it is very certain that the knowledge of my existence taken in its precise significance does not depend on things whose existence is not yet known to me; consequently it does not depend on those which I can feign in imagination. And indeed the very term feign in imagination[10] proves to me my error, for I really do this if I image myself a something, since to imagine is nothing else than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing. But I already know for certain that I am, and that it may be that all these images, and, speaking generally, all things that relate to the nature of body are nothing but dreams [and chimeras]. For this reason I see clearly that I have as little reason to say, *I shall stimulate my imagination in order to know more distinctly what I am*, than if I were to say, *I am now awake, and I perceive somewhat that is real and true: but because I do not yet perceive it distinctly enough, I shall go to sleep of express purpose, so that my dreams may represent the perception with greatest truth and evidence.* And, thus, I know for certain that nothing of all that I can understand by means of my imagination belongs to this knowledge which I have of myself, and that it is necessary to recall the mind from this mode of thought with the utmost diligence in order that it may be able to know its own nature with perfect distinctness.

But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels.

Certainly it is no small matter if all these things pertain to my nature. But why should they not so pertain? Am I not that being who now doubts nearly everything, who nevertheless understands certain things, who affirms that one only is true, who denies all the others, who desires to know more, is averse from being deceived, who imagines many things, sometimes indeed despite his will, and who perceives many likewise, as by the intervention of the bodily organs? Is there nothing in all this which is as true as it is certain that I exist, even though I should always sleep and though he who has given me being employed all his ingenuity in deceiving me? Is there likewise any one of these attributes which can be distinguished from my thought, or which might be said to be separated from myself? For it is so evident of itself that it is I who doubts, who understands, and who desires, that there is no reason here to add anything to explain it. And I have certainly the power of imagining likewise; for although it may happen (as I formerly supposed) that none of the things which I imagine are true, nevertheless this power of imagining does not cease to be really in use, and it forms part of my thought. Finally, I am the same who feels, that is to say, who perceives certain things, as by the organs of sense, since it truth I see light, I hear noise, I feel heat. But it will be said that these phenomena are false and that I am dreaming. Let it be so; still it is at least quite certain that it seems to me that I see light, that I hear noise and that I feel heat. That cannot be false; properly speaking it is what is in me called feeling;[11] and used in this precise sense that is no other thing than thinking.

From this time I begin to know what I am with a little more clearness and distinction than before; but nevertheless it still seems to me, and I cannot prevent myself from thinking, that corporeal things, whose images are framed by thought, which are tested by the senses, are much more

distinctly known than that obscure part of me which does not come under the imagination. Although really it is very strange to say that I know and understand more distinctly these things whose existence seems to me dubious, which are unknown to me, and which do not belong to me, than others of the truth of which I am convinced, which are known to me and which pertain to my real nature, in a word, than myself. But I see clearly how the case stands: my mind loves to wander, and cannot yet suffer itself to be retained within the just limits of truth. Very good, let us once more give it the freest rein, so that, when afterwards we seize the proper occasion for pulling up, it may the more easily be regulated and controlled.

Let us begin by considering the commonest matters, those which we believe to be the most distinctly comprehended, to wit, the bodies which we touch and see; not indeed bodies in general, for these general ideas are usually a little more confused, but let us consider one body in particular. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax: it has been taken quite freshly from the hive, and it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey which it contains; it still retains somewhat of the odour of the flowers from which it has been culled; its colour, its figure, its size are apparent; it is hard, cold, easily handled, and if you strike it with the finger, it will emit a sound. Finally all the things which are requisite to cause us distinctly to recognise a body, are met with in it. But notice that while I speak and approach the fire what remained of the taste is exhaled, the smell evaporates, the colour alters, the figure is destroyed, the size increases, it becomes liquid, it heats, scarcely can one handle it, and when one strikes it, now sound is emitted. Does the same wax remain after this change? We must confess that it remains; none would judge otherwise. What then did I know so distinctly in this piece of wax? It could certainly be nothing of all that the senses brought to my notice, since all these things which fall under taste, smell, sight, touch, and hearing, are found to be changed, and yet the same wax remains.

Perhaps it was what I now think, viz. that this wax was not that sweetness of honey, nor that agreeable scent of flowers, nor that particular whiteness, nor that figure, nor that sound, but simply a body which a little while before appeared tome as perceptible under these forms, and which is now perceptible under others. But what, precisely, is it that I imagine when I form such conceptions? Let us attentively consider this, and, abstracting from all that does not belong to the wax, let us see what remains. Certainly nothing remains excepting a certain extended thing which is flexible and movable. But what is the meaning of flexible and movable? Is it not that I imagine that this piece of wax being round is capable of becoming square and of passing from a square to a triangular figure? No, certainly it is not that, since I imagine it admits of an infinitude of similar changes, and I nevertheless do not know how to compass the infinitude by my imagination, and consequently this conception which I have of the wax is not brought about by the faculty of imagination. What now is this extension? Is it not also unknown? For it becomes greater when the wax is melted, greater when it is boiled, and greater still when the heat increases; and I should not conceive [clearly] according to truth what wax is, if I did not think that even this piece that we are considering is capable of receiving more variations in extension than I have ever imagined. We must then grant that I could not even understand through the imagination what this piece of wax is, and that it is my mind[12] alone which perceives it. I say this piece of wax in particular, for as to wax in general it is yet clearer. But what is this piece of wax which cannot be understood excepting by the [understanding or] mind? It is certainly the same that I see, touch, imagine, and finally it is the same which I have always believed it to be from the beginning. But what must particularly be observed is that its perception is neither an act of vision, nor of touch, nor of imagination, and has never been such although it may have appeared formerly to be so, but only an intuition[13] of the

mind, which may be imperfect and confused as it was formerly, or clear and distinct as it is at present, according as my attention is more or less directed to the elements which are found in it, and of which it is composed.

Yet in the meantime I am greatly astonished when I consider [the great feebleness of mind] and its proneness to fall [insensibly] into error; for although without giving expression to my thought I consider all this in my own mind, words often impede me and I am almost deceived by the terms of ordinary language. For we say that we see the same wax, if it is present, and not that we simply judge that it is the same from its having the same colour and figure. From this I should conclude that I knew the wax by means of vision and not simply by the intuition of the mind; unless by chance I remember that, when looking from a window and saying I see men who pass in the street, I really do not see them, but infer that what I see is men, just as I say that I see wax. And yet what do I see from the window but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines? Yet I judge these to be men. And similarly solely by the faculty of judgment which rests in my mind, I comprehend that which I believed I saw with my eyes.

A man who makes it his aim to raise his knowledge above the common should be ashamed to derive the occasion for doubting from the forms of speech invented by the vulgar; I prefer to pass on and consider whether I had a more evident and perfect conception of what the wax was when I first perceived it, and when I believed I knew it by means of the external senses or at least by the common sense[14] as it is called, that is to say by the imaginative faculty, or whether my present conception is clearer now that I have most carefully examined what it is, and in what way it can be known. It would certainly be absurd to doubt as to this. For what was there in this first perception which was distinct? What was there which might not as well have been perceived by any of the animals? But when I distinguish the wax from its external forms, and when, just as if I had taken from it its vestments, I consider it quite naked, it is certain that although some error may still be found in my judgment, I can nevertheless not perceive it thus without a human mind.

But finally what shall I say of this mind, that is, of myself, for up to this point I do not admit in myself anything but mind? What then, I who seem to perceive this piece of wax so distinctly, do I not know myself, not only with much more truth and certainty, but also with much more distinctness and clearness? For if I judge that the wax is or exists from the fact that I see it, it certainly follows much more clearly that I am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it. For it may be that what I see is not really wax, it may also be that I do not possess eyes with which to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see, or (for I no longer take account of the distinction) when I think I see, that I myself who think am nought. So if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I touch it, the same thing will follow, to wit, that I am; and if I judge that my imagination, or some other cause, whatever it is, persuades me that the wax exists, I shall still conclude the same. And what I have here remarked of wax may be applied to all other things which are external to me [and which are met with outside of me]. And further, if the [notion or] perception of wax has seemed to me clearer and more distinct, not only after the sight or the touch, but also after many other causes have rendered it quite manifest to me, with how much more [evidence] and distinctness must it be said that I now know myself, since all the reasons which contribute to the knowledge of wax, or any other body whatever, are yet better proofs of the nature of my mind! And there are so many other things in the mind itself which may contribute to the elucidation of its nature, that those which depend on body such as these just mentioned, hardly merit being taken into account.

But finally here I am, having insensibly reverted to the point I desired, for, since it is now manifest

to me that even bodies are not properly speaking known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding only, and since they are not known from the fact that they are seen or touched, but only because they are understood, I see clearly that there is nothing which is easier for me to know than my mind. But because it is difficult to rid oneself so promptly of an opinion to which one was accustomed for so long, it will be well that I should halt a little at this point, so that by the length of my meditation I may more deeply imprint on my memory this new knowledge.

Meditation III

Of God: that He exists

I shall now close my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I shall call away all my senses, I shall efface even from my thoughts all the images of corporeal things, or at least (for that is hardly possible) I shall esteem them as vain and false; and thus holding converse only with myself and considering my own nature, I shall try little by little to reach a better knowledge of and a more familiar acquaintanceship with myself. I am a thing that thinks, that is to say, that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a few things, that is ignorant of many [that loves, that hates], that wills, that desires, that also imagines and perceives; for as I remarked before, although the things which I perceive and imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me and in themselves, I am nevertheless assured that these modes of thought that I call perceptions and imaginations, inasmuch only as they are modes of thought, certainly reside [and are met with] in me.

And in the little that I have just said, I think I have summed up all that I really know, or at least all that hitherto I was aware that I knew. In order to try to extend my knowledge further, I shall now look around more carefully and see whether I cannot still discover in myself some other things which I have not hitherto perceived. I am certain that I am a thing which thinks; but do I not then likewise know what is requisite to render me certain of a truth? Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as a general rule that all things which I perceive[15] very clearly and very distinctly are true.

At the same time I have before received and admitted many things to be very certain and manifest, which yet I afterwards recognised as being dubious. What then were these things? They were the earth, sky, stars and all other objects which I apprehended by means of the senses. But what did I clearly [and distinctly] perceive in them? Nothing more than that the ideas or thoughts of these things were presented to my mind. And not even now do I deny that these ideas are met with in me. But there was yet another thing which I affirmed, and which, owing to the habit which I had formed of believing it, I thought I perceived very clearly, although in truth I did not perceive it at all, to wit, that there were objects outside of me from which these ideas proceeded, and to which they were entirely similar. And it was in this that I erred, or, if perchance my judgment was correct, this was not due to any knowledge arising from my perception.

But when I took anything very simple and easy in the sphere of arithmetic or geometry into

consideration, e.g. that two and three together made five, and other things of the sort, were not these present to my mind so clearly as to enable me to affirm that they were true? Certainly if I judged that since such matters could be doubted, this would not have been so for any other reason than that it came into my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a nature that I may have been deceived even concerning things which seemed to me most manifest. But every time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought, I am constrained to confess that it is easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence. And, on the other hand, always when I direct my attention to things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly, I am so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out into words such as these: Let who will deceive me, He can never cause me to be nothing while I think that I am, or some day cause it to be true to say that I have never been, it being true now to say that I am, or that two and three make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I see a manifest contradiction. And, certainly, since I have no reason to believe that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I have not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all, the reason for doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical. But in order to be able altogether to remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything.

And in order that I may have an opportunity of inquiring into this in an orderly way [without interrupting the order of meditation which I have proposed to myself, and which is little by little to pass from the notions which I find first of all in my mind to those which I shall later on discover in it] it is requisite that I should here divide my thoughts into certain kinds, and that I should consider in which of these kinds there is, properly speaking, truth or error to be found. Of my thoughts some are, so to speak, images of the things, and to these alone is the title *idea* properly applied; examples are my thought of a man or of a chimera, of heaven, of an angel, or [even] of God. But other thoughts possess other forms as well. For example in willing, fearing, approving, denying, though I always perceive something as the subject of the action of my mind,[16] yet by this action I always add something else to the idea[17] which I have of that thing; and of the thoughts of this kind some are called volitions or affections, and others judgments.

Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond themselves, they cannot properly speaking be false; for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not less true that I imagine the one that the other. We must not fear likewise that falsity can enter into will and into affections, for although I may desire evil things, or even things that never existed, it is not the less true that I desire them. Thus there remains no more than the judgments which we make, in which I must take the greatest care not o deceive myself. But the principal error and the commonest which we may meet with in them, consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me are similar or conformable to the things which are outside me; for without doubt if I considered the ideas only as certain modes of my thoughts, without trying to relate them to anything beyond, they could scarcely give me material for error.

But among these ideas, some appear to me to be innate, some adventitious, and others to be formed [or invented] by myself; for, as I have the power of understanding what is called a thing, or a truth, or a thought, it appears to me that I hold this power from no other source than my own nature. But if I now hear some sound, if I see the sun, or feel heat, I have hitherto judged that these sensations proceeded from certain things that exist outside of me; and finally it appears to me that sirens,

hippogryphs, and the like, are formed out of my own mind. But again I may possibly persuade myself that all these ideas are of the nature of those which I term adventitious, or else that they are all innate, or all fictitious: for I have not yet clearly discovered their true origin.

And my principal task in this place is to consider, in respect to those ideas which appear to me to proceed from certain objects that are outside me, what are the reasons which cause me to think them similar to these objects. It seems indeed in the first place that I am taught this lesson by nature; and, secondly, I experience in myself that these ideas do not depend on my will nor therefore on myself -- for they often present themselves to my mind in spite of my will. Just now, for instance, whether I will or whether I do not will, I feel heat, and thus I persuade myself that this feeling, or at least this idea of heat, is produced in me by something which is different from me, i.e. by the heat of the fire near which I sit. And nothing seems to me more obvious than to judge that this object imprints its likeness rather than anything else upon me.

Now I must discover whether these proofs are sufficiently strong and convincing. When I say that I am so instructed by nature, I merely mean a certain spontaneous inclination which impels me to believe in this connection, and not a natural light which makes me recognise that it is true. But these two things are very different; for I cannot doubt that which the natural light causes me to believe to be true, as, for example, it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt, or other facts of the same kind. And I possess no other faculty whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood, which can teach me that what this light shows me to be true is not really true, and no other faculty that is equally trustworthy. But as far as [apparently] natural impulses are concerned, I have frequently remarked, when I had to make active choice between virtue and vice, that they often enough led me to the part that was worse; and this is why I do not see any reason for following them in what regards truth and error.

And as to the other reason, which is that these ideas must proceed from objects outside me, since they do not depend on my will, I do not find it any the more convincing. For just as these impulses of which I have spoken are found in me, notwithstanding that they do not always concur with my will, so perhaps there is in me some faculty fitted to produce these ideas without the assistance of any external things, even though it is not yet known by me; just as, apparently, they have hitherto always been found in me during sleep without the aid of any external objects.

And finally, though they did proceed from objects different from myself, it is not a necessary consequence that they should resemble these. On the contrary, I have noticed that in many cases there was a great difference between the object and its idea. I find, for example, two completely diverse ideas of the sun in my mind; the one derives its origin from the senses, and should be placed in the category of adventitious ideas; according to this idea the sun seems to be extremely small; but the other is derived from astronomical reasonings, i.e. is elicited from certain notions that are innate in me, or else it is formed by me in some other manner; in accordance with it the sun appears to be several times greater than the earth. These two ideas cannot, indeed, both resemble the same sun, and reason makes me believe that the one which seems to have originated directly from the sun itself, is the one which is most dissimilar to it.

All this causes me to believe that until the present time it has not been by a judgment that was certain [or premeditated], but only by a sort of blind impulse that I believed that things existed outside of, and different from me, which, by the organs of my senses, or by some other method whatever it might be, conveyed these ideas or images to me [and imprinted on me their similitudes].

But there is yet another method of inquiring whether any of the objects of which I have ideas within me exist outside of me. If ideas are only taken as certain modes of thought, I recognise amongst them no difference or inequality, and all appear to proceed from me in the same manner; but when we consider them as images, one representing one thing and the other another, it is clear that they are very different one from the other. There is no doubt that those which represent to me substances are something more, and contain so to speak more objective reality within them [that is to say, by representation participate in a higher degree of being or perfection] than those that simply represent modes or accidents; and that idea again by which I understand a supreme God, eternal, infinite, [immutable], omniscient, omnipotent, and Creator of all things which are outside of Himself, has certainly more objective reality in itself than those ideas by which finite substances are represented.

Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect. For, pray, whence can the effect derive its reality, if not from its cause? And in what way can this cause communicate this reality to it, unless it possessed it in itself? And from this it follows, not only that something cannot proceed from nothing, but likewise that what is more perfect -- that is to say, which has more reality within itself -- cannot proceed from the less perfect. And this is not only evidently true of those effects which possess actual or formal reality, but also of the ideas in which we consider merely what is termed objective reality. To take an example, the stone which has not yet existed not only cannot now commence to be unless it has been produced by something which possesses within itself, either formally or eminently, all that enters into the composition of the stone [i.e. it must possess the same things or other more excellent things than those which exist in the stone] and heat can only be produced in a subject in which it did not previously exist by a cause that is of an order [degree or kind] at least as perfect as heat, and so in all other cases. But further, the idea of heat, or of a stone, cannot exist in me unless it has been placed within me by some cause which possesses within it at least as much reality as that which I conceive to exist in the heat or the stone. For although this cause does not transmit anything of its actual or formal reality to my idea, we must not for that reason imagine that it is necessarily a less real cause; we must remember that [since every idea is a work of the mind] its nature is such that it demands of itself no other formal reality than that which it borrows from my thought, of which it is only a mode [i.e. a manner or way of thinking]. But in order that an idea should contain some one certain objective reality rather than another, it must without doubt derive it from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as this idea contains of objective reality. For if we imagine that something is found in an idea which is not found in the cause, it must then have been derived from nought; but however imperfect may be this mode of being by which a thing is objectively [or by representation] in the understanding by its idea, we cannot certainly say that this mode of being is nothing, nor consequently, that the idea derives its origin from nothing.

Nor must I imagine that, since the reality that I consider in these ideas is only objective, it is not essential that this reality should be formally in the causes of my ideas, but that it is sufficient that it should be found objectively. For just as this mode of objective existence pertains to ideas by their proper nature, so does the mode of formal existence pertain tot he causes of those ideas (this is at least true of the first and principal) by the nature peculiar to them. And although it may be the case that one idea gives birth to another idea, that cannot continue to be so indefinitely; for in the end we must reach an idea whose cause shall be so to speak an archetype, in which the whole reality [or perfection] which is so to speak objectively [or by representation] in these ideas is

contained formally [and really]. Thus the light of nature causes me to know clearly that the ideas in me are like [pictures or] images which can, in truth, easily fall short of the perfection of the objects from which they have been derived, but which can never contain anything greater or more perfect.

And the longer and the more carefully that I investigate these matters, the more clearly and distinctly do I recognise their truth. But what am I to conclude from it all in the end? It is this, that if the objective reality of any one of my ideas is of such a nature as clearly to make me recognise that it is not in me either formally or eminently, and that consequently I cannot myself be the cause of it, it follows of necessity that I am not alone in the world, but that there is another being which exists, or which is the cause of this idea. On the other hand, had no such an idea existed in me, I should have had no sufficient argument to convince me of the existence of any being beyond myself; for I have made very careful investigation everywhere and up to the present time have been able to find no other ground.

But of my ideas, beyond that which represents me to myself, as to which there can here be no difficulty, there is another which represents a God, and there are others representing corporeal and inanimate things, others angels, others animals, and others again which represent to me men similar to myself.

As regards the ideas which represent to me other men or animals, or angels, I can however easily conceive that they might be formed by an admixture of the other ideas which I have of myself, of corporeal things, and of God, even although there were apart from me neither men nor animals, nor angels, in all the world.

And in regard to the ideas of corporeal objects, I do not recognise in them anything so great or so excellent that they might not have possibly proceeded from myself; for if I consider them more closely, and examine them individually, as I yesterday examined the idea of wax, I find that there is very little in them which I perceive clearly and distinctly. Magnitude or extension in length, breadth, or depth, I do so perceive; also figure which results from a termination of this extension, the situation which bodies of different figure preserve in relation to one another, and movement or change of situation; to which we may also add substance, duration and number. As to other things such as light, colours, sounds, scents, tastes, heat, cold and the other tactile qualities, they are thought by me with so much obscurity and confusion that I do not even know if they are true or false, i.e. whether the ideas which I form of these qualities are actually the ideas of real objects or not [or whether they only represent chimeras which cannot exist in fact]. For although I have before remarked that it is only in judgments that falsity, properly speaking, or formal falsity, can be met with, a certain material falsity may nevertheless be found in ideas, i.e. when these ideas represent what is nothing as though it were something. For example, the ideas which I have of cold and heat are so far from clear and distinct that by their means I cannot tell whether cold is merely a privation of heat, or heat a privation of cold, or whether both are real qualities, or are not such. And inasmuch as [since ideas resemble images] there cannot be any ideas which do not appear to represent some things, if it is correct to say that cold is merely a privation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive will not be improperly termed false, and the same holds good of other similar ideas.

To these it is certainly not necessary that I should attribute any author other than myself. For if they are false, i.e. if they represent things which do not exist, the light of nature shows me that they issue from nought, that is to say, that they are only in me so far as something is lacking to the perfection of my nature. But if they are true, nevertheless because they exhibit so little reality to

me that I cannot even clearly distinguish the thing represented from non-being, I do not see any reason why they should not be produced by myself.

As to the clear and distinct idea which I have of corporeal things, some of them seem as though I might have derived them from the idea which I possess of myself, as those which I have of substance, duration, number, and such like. For [even] when I think that a stone is a substance, or at least a thing capable of existing of itself, and that I am a substance also, although I conceive that I am a thing that thinks and not one that is extended, and that the stone on the other hand is an extended thing which does not think, and that thus there is a notable difference between the two conceptions -- they seem, nevertheless, to agree in this, that both represent substances. In the same way, when I perceive that I now exist and further recollect that I have in former times existed, and when I remember that I have various thoughts of which I can recognise the number, I acquire ideas of duration and number which I can afterwards transfer to any object that I please. But as to all the other qualities of which the ideas of corporeal things are composed, to wit, extension, figure, situation and motion, it is true that they are not formally in me, since I am only a thing that thinks; but because they are merely certain modes of substance [and so to speak the vestments under which corporeal substance appears to us] and because I myself am also a substance, it would seem that they might be contained in me eminently.

Hence there remains only the idea of God, concerning which we must consider whether it is something which cannot have proceeded from me myself. By the name God I understand a substance that is infinite [eternal, immutable], independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself and everything else, if anything else does exist, have been created. Now all these characteristics are such that the more diligently I attend to them, the less do they appear capable of proceeding from me alone; hence, from what has been already said, we must conclude that God necessarily exists.

For although the idea of substance is within me owing to the fact that I am substance, nevertheless I should not have the idea of an infinite substance -- since I am finite -- if it had not proceeded from some substance which was veritably infinite.

Nor should I imagine that I do not perceive the infinite by a true idea, but only by the negation of the finite, just as I perceive repose and darkness by the negation of movement and of light; for, on the contrary, I see that there is manifestly more reality in infinite substance than in finite, and therefore that in some way I have in me the notion of the infinite earlier then the finite -- to wit, the notion of God before that of myself. For how would it be possible that I should know that I doubt and desire, that is to say, that something is lacking to me, and that I am not quite perfect, unless I had within me some idea of a Being more perfect than myself, in comparison with which I should recognise the deficiencies of my nature?

And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps materially false and that consequently I can derive it from nought [i.e. that possibly it exists in me because I am imperfect], as I have just said is the case with ideas of heat, cold and other such things; for, on the contrary, as this idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it more objective reality than any other, there can be none which is of itself more true, nor any in which there can be less suspicion of falsehood. The idea, I say, of this Being who is absolutely perfect and infinite, is entirely true; for although, perhaps, we can imagine that such a Being does not exist, we cannot nevertheless imagine that His idea represents nothing real to me, as I have said of the idea of cold. This idea is also very clear and distinct; since all that I conceive clearly and distinctly of the real and the true, and of what conveys

some perfection, is in its entirety contained in this idea. And this does not cease to be true although I do not comprehend the infinite, or though in God there is an infinitude of things which I cannot comprehend, nor possibly even reach in any way by thought; for it is of the nature of the infinite that my nature, which is finite and limited, should not comprehend it; and it is sufficient that I should understand this, and that I should judge that all things which I clearly perceive and in which I know that there is some perfection, and possibly likewise an infinitude of properties of which I am ignorant, are in God formally or eminently, so that the idea which I have of Him may become the most true, most clear, and most distinct of all the ideas that are in my mind.

But possibly I am something more than I suppose myself to be, and perhaps all those perfections which I attribute to God are in some way potentially in me, although they do not yet disclose themselves, or issue in action. As a matter of fact I am already sensible that my knowledge increases [and perfects itself] little by little, and I see nothing which can prevent it from increasing more and more into infinitude; nor do I see, after it has thus been increased [or perfected], anything to prevent my being able to acquire by its means all the other perfections of the Divine nature; nor finally why the power I have of acquiring these perfections, if it really exists in me, shall not suffice to produce the ideas of them.

At the same time I recognise that this cannot be. For, in the first place, although it were true that every day my knowledge acquired new degrees of perfection, and that there were in my nature many things potentially which are not yet there actually, nevertheless these excellences do not pertain to [or make the smallest approach to] the idea which I have of God in whom there is nothing merely potential [but in whom all is present really and actually]; for it is an infallible token of imperfection in my knowledge that it increases little by little. and further, although my knowledge grows more and more, nevertheless I do not for that reason believe that it can ever be actually infinite, since it can never reach a point so high that it will be unable to attain to any greater increase. But I understand God to be actually infinite, so that He can add nothing to His supreme perfection. And finally I perceive that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being that exists potentially only, which properly speaking is nothing, but only by a being which is formal or actual.

To speak the truth, I see nothing in all that I have just said which by the light of nature is not manifest to anyone who desires to think attentively on the subject; but when I slightly relax my attention, my mind, finding its vision somewhat obscured and so to speak blinded by the images of sensible objects, I do not easily recollect the reason why the idea that I possess of a being more perfect then I, must necessarily have been placed in me by a being which is really more perfect; and this is why I wish here to go on to inquire whether I, who have this idea, can exist if no such being exists.

And I ask, from whom do I then derive my existence? Perhaps from myself or from my parents, or from some other source less perfect than God; for we can imagine nothing more perfect than God, or even as perfect as He is.

But [were I independent of every other and] were I myself the author of my being, I should doubt nothing and I should desire nothing, and finally no perfection would be lacking to me; for I should have bestowed on myself every perfection of which I possessed any idea and should thus be God. And it must not be imagined that those things that are lacking to me are perhaps more difficult of attainment than those which I already possess; for, on the contrary, it is quite evident that it was a matter of much greater difficulty to bring to pass that I, that is to say, a thing or a substance that

thinks, should emerge out of nothing, than it would be to attain to the knowledge of many things of which I am ignorant, and which are only the accidents of this thinking substance. But it is clear that if I had of myself possessed this greater perfection of which I have just spoken [that is to say, if I had been the author of my own existence], I should not at least have denied myself the things which are the more easy to acquire [to wit, many branches of knowledge of which my nature is destitute]; nor should I have deprived myself of any of the things contained in the idea which I form of God, because there are none of them which seem to me specially difficult to acquire: and if there were any that were more difficult to acquire, they would certainly appear to me to be such (supposing I myself were the origin of the other things which I possess) since I should discover in them that my powers were limited.

But though I assume that perhaps I have always existed just as I am at present, neither can I escape the force of this reasoning, and imagine that the conclusion to be drawn from this is, that I need not seek for any author of my existence. For all the course of my life may be divided into an infinite number of parts, none of which is in any way dependent on the other; and thus from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now, unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me. It is as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider with attention the nature of time, that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew, supposing it did not yet exist, so that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a distinction of the reason.

All that I thus require here is that I should interrogate myself, if I wish to know whether I possess a power which is capable of bringing it to pass that I who now am shall still be in the future; for since I am nothing but a thinking thing, or at least since thus far it is only this portion of myself which is precisely in question at present, if such a power did reside in me, I should certainly be conscious of it. But I am conscious of nothing of the kind, and by this I know clearly that I depend on some being different from myself.

Possibly, however, this being on which I depend is not that which I call God, and I am created either by my parents or by some other cause less perfect than God. This cannot be, because, as I have just said, it is perfectly evident that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect; and thus since I am a thinking thing, and possess an idea of God within me, whatever in the end be the cause assigned to my existence, it must be allowed that it is likewise a thinking thing and that it possesses in itself the idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God. We may again inquire whether this cause derives its origin from itself or from some other thing. For if from itself, it follows by the reasons before brought forward, that this cause must itself be God; for since it possesses the virtue of self-existence, it must also without doubt have the power of actually possessing all the perfections of which it has the idea, that is, all those which I conceive as existing in God. But if it derives its existence from some other cause than itself, we shall again ask, for the same reason, whether this second cause exists by itself or through another, until from one step to another, we finally arrive at an ultimate cause, which will be God.

And it is perfectly manifest that in this there can be no regression into infinity, since what is in question is not so much the cause which formerly created me, as that which conserves me at the present time.

Nor can we suppose that several causes may have concurred in my production, and that from one I

have received the idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God, and from another the idea of some other, so that all these perfections indeed exist somewhere in the universe, but not as complete in one unity which is God. On the contrary, the unity, the simplicity or the inseparability of all things which are in god is one of the principal perfections which I conceive to be in Him. And certainly the idea of this unity of all Divine perfections cannot have been placed in me by any cause from which I have not likewise received the ideas of all the other perfections; for this cause could not make me able to comprehend them as joined together in an inseparable unity without having at the same time caused me in some measure to know what they are [and in some way to recognise each one of them].

Finally, so far as my parents [from whom it appears I have sprung] are concerned, although all that I have ever been able to believe of them were true, that does not make it follow that it is they who conserve me, nor are they even the authors of my being in any sense, in so far as I am a thinking being; since what they did was merely to implant certain dispositions in that matter in which the self -- i.e. the mind, which alone I at present identify with myself -- is by me deemed to exist. And thus there can be no difficulty in their regard, but we must of necessity conclude from the fact alone that I exist, or that the idea of a Being supremely perfect -- that is of God -- is in me, that the proof of God's existence is grounded on the highest evidence.

It only remains to me to examine into the manner in which I have acquired this idea from God; for I have not received it through the senses, and it is never presented to me unexpectedly, as is usual with the ideas of sensible things when these things present themselves, or seem to present themselves, to the external organs of my senses; nor is it likewise a fiction of my mind, for it is not in my power to take from or to add anything to it; and consequently the only alternative is that it is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me.

And one certainly ought not to find it strange that God, in creating me, placed this idea within me to be like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work; and it is likewise not essential that the mark shall be something different from the work itself. For from the sole fact that God created me it is most probable that in some way he has placed his image and similitude upon me, and that I perceive this similitude (in which the idea of God is contained) by means of the same faculty by which I perceive myself -- that is to say, when I reflect on myself I not only know that I am something [imperfect], incomplete and dependent on another, which incessantly aspires after something which is better and greater than myself, but I also know that He on whom I depend possesses in Himself all the great things towards which I aspire [and the ideas of which I find within myself], and that not indefinitely or potentially alone, but really, actually and infinitely; and that thus He is God. And the whole strength of the argument which I have here made use of to prove the existence of God consists in this, that I recognise that it is not possible that my nature should be what it is, and indeed that I should have in myself the idea of a God, if God did not veritably exist -- a God, I say, whose idea is in me, i.e. who possesses all those supreme perfections of which our mind may indeed have some idea but without understanding them all, who is liable to no errors or defect [and who has none of all those marks which denote imperfection]. From this it is manifest that He cannot be a deceiver, since the light of nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarily proceed from some defect.

But before I examine this matter with more care, and pass on to the consideration of other truths which may be derived from it, it seems to me right to pause for a while in order to contemplate God Himself, to ponder at leisure His marvellous attributes, to consider, and admire, and adore, the beauty of this light so resplendent, at least as far as the strength of my mind, which is in some

measure dazzled by the sight, will allow me to do so. For just as faith teaches us that the supreme felicity of the other life consists only in this contemplation of the Divine Majesty, so we continue to learn by experience that a similar meditation, though incomparably less perfect, causes us to enjoy the greatest satisfaction of which we are capable in this life.

Meditation IV

Of the True and the False

I have been well accustomed these past days to detach my mind from my senses, and I have accurately observed that there are very few things that one knows with certainty respecting corporeal objects, that there are many more which are known to us respecting the human mind, and yet more still regarding God Himself; so that I shall now without any difficulty abstract my thoughts from the consideration of [sensible or] imaginable objects, and carry them to those which, being withdrawn from all contact with matter, are purely intelligible. And certainly the idea which I possess of the human mind inasmuch as it is a thinking thing, and not extended in length, width and depth, nor participating in anything pertaining to body, is incomparably more distinct than is the idea of any corporeal thing. And when I consider that I doubt, that is to say, that I am an incomplete and dependent being, the idea of a being that is complete and independent, that is of God, presents itself to my mind with so much distinctness and clearness -- and from the fact alone that this idea is found in me, or that I who possess this idea exist, I conclude so certainly that God exists, and that my existence depends entirely on Him in every moment of my life -- that I do not think that the human mind is capable of knowing anything with more evidence and certitude. And it seems to me that I now have before me a road which will lead us from the contemplation of the true God (in whom all the treasures of science and wisdom are contained) to the knowledge of the other objects of the universe.

For, first of all, I recognise it to be impossible that He should ever deceive me; for in all fraud and deception some imperfection is to be found, and although it may appear that the power of deception is a mark of subtilty or power, yet the desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or feebleness, and accordingly cannot be found in God.

In the next place I experienced in myself a certain capacity for judging which I have doubtless received from God, like all the other things that I possess; and as He could not desire to deceive me, it is clear that He has not given me a faculty that will lead me to err if I use it aright.

And no doubt respecting this matter could remain, if it were not that the consequence would seem to follow that I can thus never be deceived; for if I hold all that I possess from God, and if He has not placed in me the capacity for error, it seems as though I could never fall into error. And it is true that when I think only of God [and direct my mind wholly to Him],[18] I discover [in myself] no cause of error, or falsity; yet directly afterwards, when recurring to myself, experience shows me that I am nevertheless subject to an infinitude of errors, as to which, when we come to investigate them more closely, I notice that not only is there a real and positive idea of God or of a Being of supreme perfection present to my mind, but also, so to speak, a certain negative idea of nothing, that is, of that which is infinitely removed from any kind of perfection; and that I am in a sense something intermediate between God and nought, i.e. placed in such a manner between the

supreme Being and non-being, that there is in truth nothing in me that can lead to error in so far as a sovereign Being has formed me; but that, as I in some degree participate likewise in nought or in non-being, i.e. in so far as I am not myself the supreme Being, and as I find myself subject to an infinitude of imperfections, I ought not to be astonished if I should fall into error. Thus do I recognise that error, in so far as it is such, is not a real thing depending on God, but simply a defect; and therefore, in order to fall into it, that I have no need to possess a special faculty given me by God for this very purpose, but that I fall into error from the fact that the power given me by God for the purpose of distinguishing truth from error is not infinite.

Nevertheless this does not quite satisfy me; for error is not a pure negation [i.e. is not the dimple defect or want of some perfection which ought not to be mine], but it is a lack of some knowledge which it seems that I ought to possess. And on considering the nature of God it does not appear to me possible that He should have given me a faculty which is not perfect of its kind, that is, which is wanting in some perfection due to it. For if it is true that the more skilful the artizan, the more perfect is the work of his hands, what can have been produced by this supreme Creator of all things that is not in all its parts perfect? And certainly there is no doubt that God could have created me so that I could never have been subject to error; it is also certain that He ever wills what is best; is it then better that I should be subject to err than that I should not?

In considering this more attentively, it occurs to me in the first place that I should not be astonished if my intelligence is not capable of comprehending why God acts as He does; and that there is thus no reason to doubt of His existence from the fact that I may perhaps find many other things besides this as to which I am able to understand neither for what reason nor how God has produced them. For, in the first place, knowing that my nature is extremely feeble and limited, and that the nature of God is on the contrary immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, I have no further difficulty in recognising that there is an infinitude of matter in His power, the causes of which transcend my knowledge; and this reason suffices to convince me that the species of cause termed final, finds no useful employment in physical [or natural] things; for it does not appear to me that I can without temerity seek to investigate the [inscrutable] ends of God.

It further occurs to me that we should not consider one single creature separately, when we inquire as to whether the works of God are perfect, but should regard all his creations together. For the same thing which might possibly seem very imperfect with some semblance of reason if regarded by itself, is found to be very perfect if regarded as part of the whole universe; and although, since I resolved to doubt all things, I as yet have only known certainly my own existence and that of God, nevertheless since I have recognised the infinite power of God, I cannot deny that He may have produced many other things, or at least that He has the power of producing them, so that I may obtain a place as a part of a great universe.

Whereupon, regarding myself more closely, and considering what are my errors (for they alone testify to there being any imperfection in me), I answer that they depend on a combination of two causes, to wit, on the faculty of knowledge that rests in me, and on the power of choice or of free will -- that is to say, of the understanding and at the same time of the will. For by the understanding alone I [neither assert nor deny anything, but] apprehend[19] the ideas of things as to which I can form a judgment. But no error is properly speaking found in it, provided the word error is taken in its proper signification; and though there is possibly an infinitude of things in the world of which I have no idea in my understanding, we cannot for all that say that it is deprived of these ideas [as we might say of something which is required by its nature], but simply it does not

possess these; because in truth there is no reason to prove that God should have given me a greater faculty of knowledge than He has given me; and however skillful a workman I represent Him to be, I should not for all that consider that He was bound to have placed in each of His works all the perfections which He may have been able to place in some. I likewise cannot complain that God has not given me a free choice or a will which is sufficient, ample and perfect, since as a matter of fact I am conscious of a will so extended as to be subject to no limits. And what seems to me very remarkable in this regard is that of all the qualities which I possess there is no one so perfect and so comprehensive that I do not very clearly recognise that it might be yet greater and more perfect. For, to take an example, if I consider the faculty of comprehension which I possess, I find that it is of very small extent and extremely limited, and at the same time I find the idea of another faculty much more ample and even infinite, and seeing that I can form the idea of it, I recognise from this very fact that it pertains to the nature of God. If in the same way I examine the memory, the imagination, or some other faculty, I do not find any which is not small and circumscribed, while in God it is immense [or infinite]. It is free-will alone or liberty of choice which I find to be so great in me that I can conceive no other idea to be more great; it is indeed the case that it is for the most part this will that causes me to know that in some manner I bear the image and similitude of God. For although the power of will is incomparably greater in God than in me, both by reason of the knowledge and the power which, conjoined with it, render it stronger and more efficacious, and by reason of its object, inasmuch as in God it extends to a great many things; it nevertheless does not seem to me greater if I consider it formally and precisely in itself: for the faculty of will consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or to shun it), or rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm or deny, pursue or shun those things placed before us by the understanding, we act so that we are unconscious that any outside force constrains us in doing so. For in order that I should be free it is not necessary that I should be indifferent as to the choice of one or the other of two contraries; but contrariwise the more I lean to the one -- whether I recognise clearly that the reasons of the good and true are to be found in it, or whether God so disposes my inward thought -- the more freely do I choose and embrace it. And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural knowledge, far from diminishing my liberty, rather increase it and strengthen it. Hence this indifference which I feel, when I am not swayed to one side rather than to the other by lack of reason, is the lowest grade of liberty, and rather evinces a lack or negation in knowledge than a perfection of will: for if I always recognised clearly what was true and good, I should never have trouble in deliberating as to what judgment or choice I should make, and then I should be entirely free without ever being indifferent.

From all this I recognise that the power of will which I have received from God is not of itself the source of my errors -- for it is very ample and very perfect of its kind -- any more than is the power of understanding; for since I understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for understanding, there is no doubt that all that I understand, I understand as I ought, and it is not possible that I err in this. Whence then come my errors? They come from the sole fact that since the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand: and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error and sin, and chooses the evil for the good, or the false for the true.

For example, when I lately examined whether anything existed in the world, and found that from the very fact that I considered this question it followed very clearly that I myself existed, I could

not prevent myself from believing that a thing I so clearly conceived was true: not that I found myself compelled to do so by some external cause, but simply because from great clearness in my mind there followed a great inclination of my will; and I believed this with so much the greater freedom or spontaneity as I possessed the less indifference towards it. Now, on the contrary, I not only know that I exist, inasmuch as I am a thinking thing, but a certain representation of corporeal nature is also presented to my mind; and it comes to pass that I doubt whether this thinking nature which is in me, or rather by which I am what I am, differs from this corporeal nature, or whether both are not simply the same thing; and I here suppose that I do not yet know any reason to persuade me to adopt the one belief rather than the other. From this it follows that I am entirely indifferent as to which of the two I affirm or deny, or even whether I abstain from forming any judgment in the matter.

And this indifference does not only extend to matters as to which the understanding has no knowledge, but also in general to all those which are not apprehended with perfect clearness at the moment when the will is deliberating upon them: for, however probable are the conjectures which render me disposed to form a judgment respecting anything, the simple knowledge that I have that those are conjectures alone and not certain and indubitable reasons, suffices to occasion me to judge the contrary. Of this I have had great experience of late when I set aside as false all that I had formerly held to be absolutely true, for the sole reason that I remarked that it might in some measure be doubted.

But if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly and am not deceived. But if I determine to deny or affirm, I no longer make use as I should of my free will, and if I affirm what is not true, it is evident that I deceive myself; even though I judge according to truth, this comes about only by chance, and I do not escape the blame of misusing my freedom; for the light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should always precede the determination of the will. And it is in the misuse of the free will that the privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error is met with. Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as it proceeds from me, but it is not found in the faculty which I have received from God, nor even in the act in so far as it depends on Him.

For I have certainly no cause to complain that God has not given me an intelligence which is more powerful, or a natural light which is stronger than that which I have received from Him, since it is proper to the finite understanding not to comprehend a multitude of things, and it is proper to a created understanding to be finite; on the contrary, I have every reason to render thanks to God who owes me nothing and who has given me all the perfections I possess, and I should be far from charging Him with injustice, and with having deprived me of, or wrongfully withheld from me, these perfections which He has not bestowed upon me.

I have further no reason to complain that He has given me a will more ample than my understanding, for since the will consists only of one single element, and is so to speak indivisible, it appears that its nature is such that nothing can be abstracted from it [without destroying it]; and certainly the more comprehensive it is found to be, the more reason I have to render gratitude to the giver.

And, finally, I must also not complain that God concurs with me in forming the acts of the will, that is the judgment in which I go astray, because these acts are entirely true and good, inasmuch as they depend on God; and in a certain sense more perfection accrues to my nature from the fact

that I can form them, than if I could not do so. As to the privation in which alone the formal reason of error or sin consists, it has no need of any concurrence from God, since it is not a thing [or an existence], and since it is not related to God as to a cause, but should be termed merely a negation [according to the significance given to these words in the Schools]. For in fact it is not an imperfection in God that He has given me the liberty to give or withhold my assent from certain things as to which He has not placed a clear and distinct knowledge in my understanding; but it is without doubt an imperfection in me not to make a good use of my freedom, and to give my judgment readily on matters which I only understand obscurely. I nevertheless perceive that God could easily have created me so that I never should err, although I still remained free, and endowed with a limited knowledge, viz. by giving to my understanding a clear and distinct intelligence of all things as to which I should ever have to deliberate; or simply by His engraving deeply in my memory the resolution never to form a judgment on anything without having a clear and distinct understanding of it, so that I could never forget it. And it is easy for me to understand that, in so far as I consider myself alone, and as if there were only myself in the world, I should have been much more perfect than I am, if God had created me so that I could never err. Nevertheless I cannot deny that in some sense it is a greater perfection in the whole universe that certain parts should not be exempt from error as others are than that all parts should be exactly similar. And I have no right to complain if God, having placed me in the world, has not called upon me to play a part that excels all others in distinction and perfection.

And further I have reason to be glad on the ground that if He has not given me the power of never going astray by the first means pointed out above, which depends on a clear and evident knowledge of all the things regarding which I can deliberate, He has at least left within my power the other means, which is firmly to adhere to the resolution never to give judgment on matters whose truth is not clearly known to me; for although I notice a certain weakness in my nature in that I cannot continually concentrate my mind on one single thought, I can yet, by attentive and frequently repeated meditation, impress it so forcibly on my memory that I shall never fail to recollect it whenever I have need of it, and thus acquire the habit of never going astray.

And inasmuch as it is in this that the greatest and principal perfection of man consists, it seems to me that I have not gained little by this day's Meditation, since I have discovered the source of falsity and error. And certainly there can be no other source than that which I have explained; for as often as I so restrain my will within the limits of my knowledge that it forms no judgment except on matters which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can never be deceived; for every clear and distinct conception[20] is without doubt something, and hence cannot derive its origin from what is nought, but must of necessity have God as its author -- God, I say, who being supremely perfect, cannot be the cause of any error; and consequently we must conclude that such a conception [or such a judgment] is true. Nor have I only learned to-day what I should avoid in order that I may not err, but also how I should act in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth; for without doubt I shall arrive at this end if I devote my attention sufficiently to those things which I perfectly understand; and if I separate from these that which I only understand confusedly and with obscurity. To these I shall henceforth diligently give heed.

Meditation V

Of the essence of material things, and, again, of God, that He exists

Many other matters respecting the attributes of God and my own nature or mind remain for consideration; but I shall possibly on another occasion resume the investigation of these. Now (after first noting what must be done or avoided, in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth) my principal task is to endeavour to emerge from the state of doubt into which I have these last days fallen, and to see whether nothing certain can be known regarding material things.

But before examining whether any such objects as I conceive exist outside of me, I must consider the ideas of them in so far as they are in my thought, and see which of them are distinct and which confused.

In the first place, I am able distinctly to imagine that quantity which philosophers commonly call continuous, or the extension in length, breadth, or depth, that is in this quantity, or rather in the object to which it is attributed. Further, I can number in it many different parts, and attribute to each of its parts many sorts of size, figure, situation and local movement, and, finally, I can assign to each of these movements all degrees of duration.

And not only do I know these things with distinctness when I consider them in general, but, likewise [however little I apply my attention to the matter], I discover an infinitude of particulars respecting numbers, figures, movements, and other such things, whose truth is so manifest, and so well accords with my nature, that when I begin to discover them, it seems to me that I learn nothing new, or recollect what I formerly knew -- that is to say, that I for the first time perceive things which were already present to my mind, although I had not as yet applied my mind to them.

And what I here find to be most important is that I discover in myself an infinitude of ideas of certain things which cannot be esteemed as pure negations, although they may possibly have no existence outside of my thought, and which are not framed by me, although it is within my power either to think or not to think them, but which possess natures which are true and immutable. For example, when I imagine a triangle, although there may nowhere in the world be such a figure outside my thought, or ever have been, there is nevertheless in this figure a certain determinate nature, form, or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented, and which in no wise depends on my mind, as appears from the fact that diverse properties of that triangle can be demonstrated, viz. that its three angles are equal to two right angles, that the greatest side is subtended by the greatest angle, and the like, which now, whether I wish it or do not wish it, I recognise very clearly as pertaining to it, although I never thought of the matter at all when I imagined a triangle for the first time, and which therefore cannot be said to have been invented by me.

Nor does the objection hold good that possibly this idea of a triangle has reached my mind through the medium of my senses, since I have sometimes seen bodies triangular in shape; because I can form in my mind an infinitude of other figures regarding which we cannot have the least conception of their ever having been objects of sense, and I can nevertheless demonstrate various properties pertaining to their nature as well as to that of the triangle, and these must certainly all be true since I conceive them clearly. Hence they are something, and not pure negation; for it is perfectly clear that all that is true is something, and I have already fully demonstrated that all that I know clearly is true. And even although I had not demonstrated this, the nature of my mind is such that I could not prevent myself from holding them to be true so long as I conceive them clearly; and I recollect that even when I was still strongly attached to the objects of sense, I counted as the most certain those truths which I conceived clearly as regards figures, numbers, and the other matters which pertain to arithmetic and geometry, and, in general, to pure and abstract

mathematics.

But now, if just because I can draw the idea of something from my thought, it follows that all which I know clearly and distinctly as pertaining to this object does really belong to it, may I not derive from this an argument demonstrating the existence of God? It is certain that I no less find the idea of God, that is to say, the idea of a supremely perfect Being, in me, than that of any figure or number whatever it is; and I do not know any less clearly and distinctly that an [actual and] eternal existence pertains to this nature than I know that all that which I am able to demonstrate of some figure or number truly pertains to the nature of this figure or number, and therefore, although all that I concluded in the preceding Meditations were found to be false, the existence of God would pass with me as at least as certain as I have ever held the truths of mathematics (which concern only numbers and figures) to be.

This indeed is not at first manifest, since it would seem to present some appearance of being a sophism. For being accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence, I easily persuade myself that the existence can be separated from the essence of God, and that we can thus conceive God as not actually existing. But, nevertheless, when I think of it with more attention, I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a [rectilinear] triangle, or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley; and so there is not any less repugnance to our conceiving a God (that is, a Being supremely perfect) to whom existence is lacking (that is to say, to whom a certain perfection is lacking), than to conceive of a mountain which has no valley.

But although I cannot really conceive of a God without existence any more than a mountain without a valley, still from the fact that I conceive of a mountain with a valley, it does not follow that there is such a mountain in the world; similarly although I conceive of God as possessing existence, it would seem that it does not follow that there is a God which exists; for my thought does not impose any necessity upon things, and just as I may imagine a winged horse, although no horse with wings exists, so I could perhaps attribute existence to God, although no God existed.

But a sophism is concealed in this objection; for from the fact that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that there is any mountain or any valley in existence, but only that the mountain and the valley, whether they exist or do not exist, cannot in any way be separated one from the other. While from the fact that I cannot conceive God without existence, it follows that existence is inseparable from Him, and hence that He really exists; not that my thought can bring this to pass, or impose any necessity on things, but, on the contrary, because the necessity which lies in the thing itself, i.e. the necessity of the existence of God determines me to think in this way. For it is not within my power to think of God without existence (that is of a supremely perfect Being devoid of a supreme perfection) though it is in my power to imagine a horse either with wings or without wings.

And we must not here object that it is in truth necessary for me to assert that God exists after having presupposed that He possesses every sort of perfection, since existence is one of these, but that as a matter of fact my original supposition was not necessary, just as it is not necessary to consider that all quadrilateral figures can be inscribed in the circle; for supposing I thought this, I should be constrained to admit that the rhombus might be inscribed in the circle since it is a quadrilateral figure, which, however, is manifestly false. [We must not, I say, make any such allegations because] although it is not necessary that I should at any time entertain the notion of

God, nevertheless whenever it happens that I think of a first and a sovereign Being, and, so to speak, derive the idea of Him from the storehouse of my mind, it is necessary that I should attribute to Him every sort of perfection, although I do not get so far as to enumerate them all, or to apply my mind to each one in particular. And this necessity suffices to make me conclude (after having recognised that existence is a perfection) that this first and sovereign Being really exists; just as though it is not necessary for me ever to imagine any triangle, yet, whenever I wish to consider a rectilinear figure composed only of three angles, it is absolutely essential that I should attribute to it all those properties which serve to bring about the conclusion that its three angles are not greater than two right angles, even although I may not then be considering this point in particular. But when I consider which figures are capable of being inscribed in the circle, it is in no wise necessary that I should think that all quadrilateral figures are of this number; on the contrary, I cannot even pretend that this is the case, so long as I do not desire to accept anything which I cannot conceive clearly and distinctly. And in consequence there is a great difference between the false suppositions such as this, and the true ideas born within me, the first and principal of which is that of God. For really I discern in many ways that this idea is not something factitious, and depending solely on my thought, but that it is the image of a true and immutable nature; first of all, because I cannot conceive anything but God himself to whose essence existence [necessarily] pertains; in the second place because it is not possible for me to conceive two or more Gods in this same position; and, granted that there is one such God who now exists, I see clearly that it is necessary that He should have existed from all eternity, and that He must exist eternally; and finally, because I know an infinitude of other properties in God, none of which I can either diminish or change.

For the rest, whatever proof or argument I avail myself of, we must always return to the point that it is only those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly that have the power of persuading me entirely. And although amongst the matters which I conceive of in this way, some indeed are manifestly obvious to all, while others only manifest themselves to those who consider them closely and examine them attentively; still, after they have once been discovered, the latter are not esteemed as any less certain than the former. For example, in the case of every right-angled triangle, although it does not so manifestly appear that the square of the base is equal to the squares of the two other sides as that this base is opposite to the greatest angle; still, when this has once been apprehended, we are just as certain of its truth as of the truth of the other. And as regards God, if my mind were not pre-occupied with prejudices, and if my thought did not find itself on all hands diverted by the continual pressure of sensible things, there would be nothing which I could know more immediately and more easily than Him. For is there anything more manifest than that there is a God, that is to say, a Supreme Being, to whose essence alone existence pertains?[21]

And although for a firm grasp of this truth I have need of a strenuous application of mind, at present I not only feel myself to be as assured of it as of all that I hold as most certain, but I also remark that the certainty of all other things depends on it so absolutely, that without this knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly.

For although I am of such a nature that as long as[22] I understand anything very clearly and distinctly, I am naturally impelled to believe it to be true, yet because I am also of such a nature that I cannot have my mind constantly fixed on the same object in order to perceive it clearly, and as I often recollect having formed a past judgment without at the same time properly recollecting the reasons that led me to make it, it may happen meanwhile that other reasons present themselves

to me, which would easily cause me to change my opinion, if I were ignorant of the facts of the existence of God, and thus I should have no true and certain knowledge, but only vague and vacillating opinions. Thus, for example, when I consider the nature of a [rectilinear] triangle, I who have some little knowledge of the principles of geometry recognise quite clearly that the three angles are equal to two right angles, and it is not possible for me not to believe this so long as I apply my mind to its demonstration; but so soon as I abstain from attending to the proof, although I still recollect having clearly comprehended it, it may easily occur that I come to doubt its truth, if I am ignorant of there being a God. For I can persuade myself of having been so constituted by nature that I can easily deceive myself even in those matters which I believe myself to apprehend with the greatest evidence and certainty, especially when I recollect that I have frequently judged matters to be true and certain which other reasons have afterwards impelled me to judge to be altogether false.

But after I have recognised that there is a God -- because at the same time I have also recognised that all things depend upon Him, and that He is not a deceiver, and from that have inferred that what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true -- although I no longer pay attention to the reasons for which I have judged this to be true, provided that I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it no contrary reason can be brought forward which could ever cause me to doubt of its truth; and thus I have a true and certain knowledge of it. And this same knowledge extends likewise to all other things which I recollect having formerly demonstrated, such as the truths of geometry and the like; for what can be alleged against them to cause me to place them in doubt? Will it be said that my nature is such as to cause me to be frequently deceived? But I already know that I cannot be deceived in the judgment whose grounds I know clearly. Will it be said that I formerly held many things to be true and certain which I have afterwards recognised to be false? But I had not had any clear and distinct knowledge of these things, and not as yet knowing the rule whereby I assure myself of the truth, I had been impelled to give my assent from reasons which I have since recognised to be less strong than I had at the time imagined them to be. What further objection can then be raised? That possibly I am dreaming (an objection I myself made a little while ago), or that all the thoughts which I now have are no more true than the phantasies of my dreams? But even though I slept the case would be the same, for all that is clearly present to my mind is absolutely true.

And so I very clearly recognise that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the true God, in so much that, before I knew Him, I could not have a perfect knowledge of any other thing. And now that I know Him I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of an infinitude of things, not only of those which relate to God Himself and other intellectual matters, but also of those which pertain to corporeal nature in so far as it is the object of pure mathematics [which have no concern with whether it exists or not].

Meditation VI

Of the Existence of Material Things, and of the real distinction between the Soul and Body of Man

Nothing further now remains but to inquire whether material things exist. And certainly I at least

know that these may exist in so far as they are considered as the objects of pure mathematics, since in this aspect I perceive them clearly and distinctly. For there is no doubt that God possesses the power to produce everything that I am capable of perceiving with distinctness, and I have never deemed that anything was impossible for Him, unless I found a contradiction in attempting to conceive it clearly. Further, the faculty of imagination which I possess, and of which, experience tells me, I make use when I apply myself to the consideration of material things, is capable of persuading me of their existence; for when I attentively consider what imagination is, I find that it is nothing but a certain application of the faculty of knowledge to the body which is immediately present to it, and which therefore exists.

And to render this quite clear, I remark in the first place the difference that exists between the imagination and pure intellection [or conception[23]]. For example, when I imagine a triangle, I do not conceive it only as a figure comprehended by three lines, but I also apprehend[24] these three lines as present by the power and inward vision of my mind,[25] and this is what I call imagining. But if I desire to think of a chiliagon, I certainly conceive truly that it is a figure composed of a thousand sides, just as easily as I conceive of a triangle that it is a figure of three sides only; but I cannot in any way imagine the thousand sides of a chiliagon [as I do the three sides of a triangle], nor do I, so to speak, regard them as present [with the eyes of my mind]. And although in accordance with the habit I have formed of always employing the aid of my imagination when I think of corporeal things, it may happen that in imagining a chiliagon I confusedly represent to myself some figure, yet it is very evident that this figure is not a chiliagon, since it in no way differs from that which I represent to myself when I think of a myriagon or any other many-sided figure; nor does it serve my purpose in discovering the properties which go to form the distinction between a chiliagon and other polygons. But if the question turns upon a pentagon, it is quite true that I can conceive its figure as well as that of a chiliagon without the help of my imagination; but I can also imagine it by applying the attention of my mind to each of its five sides, and at the same time to the space which they enclose. And thus I clearly recognise that I have need of a particular effort of mind in order to effect the act of imagination, such as I do not require in order to understand, and this particular effort of mind clearly manifests the difference which exists between imagination and pure intellection.[26]

I remark besides that this power of imagination which is in one, inasmuch as it differs from the power of understanding, is in no wise a necessary element in my nature, or in [my essence, that is to say, in] the essence of my mind; for although I did not possess it I should doubtless ever remain the same as I now am, from which it appears that we might conclude that it depends on something which differs from me. And I easily conceive that if some body exists with which my mind is conjoined and united in such a way that it can apply itself to consider it when it pleases, it may be that by this means it can imagine corporeal objects; so that this mode of thinking differs from pure intellection only inasmuch as mind in its intellectual activity in some manner turns on itself, and considers some of the ideas which it possesses in itself; while in imagining it turns towards the body, and there beholds in it something conformable to the idea which it has either conceived of itself or perceived by the senses. I easily understand, I say, that the imagination could be thus constituted if it is true that body exists; and because I can discover no other convenient mode of explaining it, I conjecture with probability that body does exist; but this is only with probability, and although I examine all things with care, I nevertheless do not find that from this distinct idea of corporeal nature, which I have in my imagination, I can derive any argument from which there will necessarily be deduced the existence of body.

But I am in the habit of imagining many other things besides this corporeal nature which is the object of pure mathematics, to wit, the colours, sounds, scents, pain, and other such things, although less distinctly. And inasmuch as I perceive these things much better through the senses, by the medium of which, and by the memory, they seem to have reached my imagination, I believe that, in order to examine them more conveniently, it is right that I should at the same time investigate the nature of sense perception, and that I should see if from the ideas which I apprehend by this mode of thought, which I call feeling, I cannot derive some certain proof of the existence of corporeal objects.

And first of all I shall recall to my memory those matters which I hitherto held to be true, as having perceived them through the senses, and the foundations on which my belief has rested; in the next place I shall examine the reasons which have since obliged me to place them in doubt; in the last place I shall consider which of them I must now believe.

First of all, then, I perceived that I had a head, hands, feet, and all other members of which this body -- which I considered as a part, or possibly even as the whole, of myself -- is composed. Further I was sensible that this body was placed amidst many others, from which it was capable of being affected in many different ways, beneficial and hurtful, and I remarked that a certain feeling of pleasure accompanied those that were beneficial, and pain those which were harmful. And in addition to this pleasure and pain, I also experienced hunger, thirst, and other similar appetites, as also certain corporeal inclinations towards joy, sadness, anger, and other similar passions. And outside myself, in addition to extension, figure, and motions of bodies, I remarked in them hardness, heat, and all other tactice qualities, and, further, light and colour, and scents and sounds, the variety of which gave me the means of distinguishing the sky, the earth, the sea, and generally all the other bodies, one from the other. And certainly, considering the ideas of all these qualities which presented themselves to my mind, and which alone I perceived properly or immediately, it was not without reason that I believed myself to perceive objects quite different from my thought, to wit, bodies from which those ideas proceeded; for I found by experience that these ideas presented themselves to me without my consent being requisite, so that I could not perceive any object, however desirous I might be, unless it were present to the organs of sense; and it was not in my power not to perceive it, when it was present. And because the ideas which I received through the senses were much more lively, more clear, and even, in their own way, more distinct than any of those which I could of myself frame in meditation, or than those I found impressed on my memory, it appeared as though they could not have proceeded from my mind, so that they must necessarily have been produced in me by some other things. And having no knowledge of those objects excepting the knowledge which the ideas themselves gave me, nothing was more likely to occur to my mind than that the objects were similar to the ideas which were caused. And because I likewise remembered that I had formerly made use of my senses rather than my reason, and recognised that the ideas which I formed of myself were not so distinct as those which I perceived through the senses, and that they were most frequently even composed of portions of these last, I persuaded myself easily that I had no idea in my mind which had not formerly come to me through the senses. Nor was it without some reason that I believed that this body (which be a certain special right I call my own) belonged to me more properly and more strictly than any other; for in fact I could never be separated from it as from other bodies; I experienced in it and on account of it all my appetites and affections, and finally I was touched by the feeling of pain and the titillation of pleasure in its parts, and not in the parts of other bodies which were separated from it. But when I inquired, why, from some, I know not what, painful sensation, there follows sadness of mind, and

from the pleasurable sensation there arises joy, or why this mysterious pinching of the stomach which I call hunger causes me to desire to eat, and dryness of throat causes a desire to drink, and so on, I could give no reason excepting that nature taught me so; for there is certainly no affinity (that I at least can understand) between the craving of the stomach and the desire to eat, any more than between the perception of whatever causes pain and the thought of sadness which arises from this perception. And in the same way it appeared to me that I had learned from nature all the other judgments which I formed regarding the objects of my senses, since I remarked that these judgments were formed in me before I had the leisure to weigh and consider any reasons which might oblige me to make them.

But afterwards many experiences little by little destroyed all the faith which I had rested in my senses; for I from time to time observed that those towers which from afar appeared to me to be round, more closely observed seemed square, and that colossal statues raised on the summit of these towers, appeared as quite tiny statues when viewed from the bottom; and so in an infinitude of other cases I found error in judgments founded on the external senses. And not only in those founded on the external senses, but even in those founded on the internal as well; for is there anything more intimate or more internal than pain? And yet I have learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut off, that they sometimes seemed to feel pain in the part which had been amputated, which made me think that I could not be quite certain that it was a certain member which pained me, even although I felt pain in it. And to those grounds of doubt I have lately added two others, which are very general; the first is that I never have believed myself to feel anything in waking moments which I cannot also sometimes believe myself to feel when I sleep, and as I do not think that these things which I seem to feel in sleep, proceed from objects outside of me, I do not see any reason why I should have this belief regarding objects which I seem to perceive while awake. The other was that being still ignorant, or rather supposing myself to be ignorant, of the author of my being, I saw nothing to prevent me from having been so constituted by nature that I might be deceived even in matters which seemed to me to be most certain. And as to the grounds on which I was formerly persuaded of the truth of sensible objects, I had not much trouble in replying to them. For since nature seemed to cause me to lean towards many things from which reason repelled me, I did not believe that I should trust much to the teachings of nature. And although the ideas which I receive by the senses do not depend on my will, I did not think that one should for that reason conclude that they proceeded from things different from myself, since possibly some faculty might be discovered in me -- though hitherto unknown to me -- which produced them.

But now that I begin to know myself better, and to discover more clearly the author of my being, I do not in truth think that I should rashly admit all the matters which the senses seem to teach us, but, on the other hand, I do not think that I should doubt them all universally.

And first of all, because I know that all things which I apprehend clearly and distinctly can be created by God as I apprehend them, it suffices that I am able to apprehend one thing apart from another clearly and distinctly in order to be certain that the one is different from the other, since they may be made to exist in separation at least by the omnipotence of God; and it does not signify by what power this separation is made in order to compel me to judge them to be different: and, therefore, just because I know certainly that I exist, and that meanwhile I do not remark that any other thing necessarily pertains to my nature or essence, excepting that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thin [or a substance whose whole essence or nature is to think]. And although possibly (or rather certainly, as I shall

say in a moment) I possess a body with which I am very intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I [that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am], is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it.

I further find in myself faculties imploying modes of thinking peculiar to themselves, to wit, the faculties of imagination and feeling, without which I can easily conceive myself clearly and distinctly as a complete being; while, on the other hand, they cannot be so conceived apart from me, that is without an intelligent substance in which they reside, for [in the notion we have of these faculties, or, to use the language of the Schools] in their formal concept, some kind of intellection is comprised, from which I infer that they are distinct from me as its modes are from a thing. I observe also in me some other faculties such as that of change of position, the assumption of different figures and such like, which cannot be conceived, any more than can the preceding, apart from some substance to which they are attached, and consequently cannot exist without it; but it is very clear that these faculties, if it be true that they exist, must be attached to some corporeal or extended substance, and not to an intelligent substance, since in the clear and distinct conception of these there is some sort of extension found to be present, but no intellection at all. There is certainly further in me a certain passive faculty of perception, that is, of receiving and recognising the ideas of sensible things, but this would be useless to me [and I could in no way avail myself of it], if there were not either in me or in some other thing another active faculty capable of forming and producing these ideas. But this active faculty cannot exist in me [inasmuch as I am a thing that thinks] seeing that it does not presuppose thought, and also that those ideas are often produced in me without my contributing in any way to the same, and often even against my will; it is thus necessarily the case that the faculty resides in some substance different from me in which all the reality which is objectively in the ideas that are produced by this faculty is formally or eminently contained, as I remarked before. And this substance is either a body, that is, a corporeal nature in which there is contained formally [and really] all that which is objectively [and by representation] in those ideas, or it is God Himself, or some other creature more noble than body in which that same is contained eminently. But, since God is no deceiver, it is very manifest that He does not communicate to me these ideas immediately and by Himself, nor yet by the intervention of some creature in which their reality is not formally, but only eminently, contained. For since He has given me no faculty to recognise that this is the case, but, on the other hand, a very great inclination to believe [that they are sent to me or] that they are conveyed to me by corporeal objects, I do not see how He could be defended from the accusation of deceit if these ideas were produced by causes other than corporeal objects. Hence we must allow that corporeal things exist. However, they are perhaps not exactly what we perceive by the senses, since this comprehension by the senses is in many instances very obscure and confused; but we must at least admit that all things which I conceive in them clearly and distinctly, that is to say, all things which, speaking generally, are comprehended in the object of pure mathematics, are truly to be recognised as external objects.

As to other things, however, which are either particular only, as, for example, that the sun is of such and such a figure, etc., or which are less clearly and distinctly conceived, such as light, sound, pain and the like, it is certain that although they are very dubious and uncertain, yet on the sole ground that God is not a deceiver, and that consequently He has not permitted any falsity to exist in my opinion which He has not likewise given me the faculty of correcting, I may assuredly hope

to conclude that I have within me the means of arriving at the truth even here. And first of all there is no doubt that in all things which nature teaches me there is some truth contained; for by nature, considered in general, I now understand no other thing than either God Himself or else the order and disposition which God has established in created things; and by my nature in particular I understand no other thing than the complexus of all the things which God has given me.

But there is nothing which this nature teaches me more expressly [nor more sensibly] than that I have a body which is adversely affected when I feel pain, which has need of food or drink when I experience the feelings of hunger and thirst, and so on; nor can I doubt there being some truth in all this.

Nature also teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole. For if that were not the case, when my body is hurt, I, who am merely a thinking thing, should not feel pain, for I should perceive this wound by the understanding only, just as the sailor perceives by sight when something is damaged in his vessel; and when my body has need of drink or food, I should clearly understand the fact without being warned of it by confused feelings of hunger and thirst. For all these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are in truth none other than certain confused modes of thought which are produced by the union and apparent intermingling of mind and body.

Moreover, nature teaches me that many other bodies exist around mine, of which some are to be avoided, and others sought after. And certainly from the fact that I am sensible of different sorts of colours, sounds, scents, tastes, heat, hardness, etc., I very easily conclude that there are in the bodies from which all these diverse sense-perceptions proceed certain variations which answer to them, although possibly these are not really at all similar to them. And also from the fact that amongst these different sense-perceptions some are very agreeable to me and others disagreeable, it is quite certain that my body (or rather myself in my entirety, inasmuch as I am formed of body and soul) may receive different impressions agreeable and disagreeable from the other bodies which surround it.

But there are many other things which nature seems to have taught me, but which at the same time I have never really received from her, but which have been brought about in my mind by a certain habit which I have of forming inconsiderate judgments on things; and thus it may easily happen that these judgments contain some error. Take, for example, the opinion which I hold that all space in which there is nothing that affects [or makes an impression on] my senses is void; that in a body which is warm there is something entirely similar to the idea of heat which is in me; that in a white or green body there is the same whiteness or greenness that I perceive; that in a bitter or sweet body there is the same taste, and so on in other instances; that the stars, the towers, and all other distant bodies are of the same figure and size as they appear from far off to our eyes, etc. But in order that in this there should be nothing which I do not conceive distinctly, I should define exactly what I really understand when I say that I am taught somewhat by nature. For here I take nature in a more limited signification than when I term it the sum of all the things given me by God, since in this sum many things are comprehended which only pertain to mind (and to these I do not refer in speaking of nature) such as the notion which I have of the fact that what has once been done cannot ever be undone and an infinitude of such things which I know by the light of nature [without the help of the body]; and seeing that it comprehends many other matters besides which only pertain to body, and are no longer here contained under the name of nature, such as the

quality of weight which it possesses and the like, with which I also do not deal; for in talking of nature I only treat of those things given by God to me as a being composed of mind and body. But the nature here described truly teaches me to flee from things which cause the sensation of pain, and seek after the things which communicate to me the sentiment of pleasure and so forth; but I do not see that beyond this it teaches me that from those diverse sense-perceptions we should ever form any conclusion regarding things outside of us, without having [carefully and maturely] mentally examined them beforehand. For it seems to me that it is mind alone, and not mind and body in conjunction, that is requisite to a knowledge of the truth in regard to such things. Thus, although a star makes no larger an impression on my eye than the flame of a little candle there is yet in me no real or positive propensity impelling me to believe that it is not greater than that flame; but I have judged it to be so from my earliest years, without any rational foundation. And although in approaching fire I feel heat, and in approaching it a little too near I even feel pain, there is at the same time no reason in this which could persuade me that there is in the fire something resembling this heat any more than there is in it something resembling the pain; all that I have any reason to believe from this is, that there is something in it, whatever it may be, which excites in me these sensations of heat or of pain. So also, although there are spaces in which I find nothing which excites my senses, I must not from that conclude that these spaces contain no body; for I see in this, as in other similar things, that I have been in the habit of perverting the order of nature, because these perceptions of sense having bee placed within me by nature merely for the purpose of signifying to my mind what things are beneficial or hurtful to the composite whole of which it forms a part, and being up to that point sufficiently clear and distinct, I yet avail myself of them as though they were absolute rules by which I might immediately determine the essence of the bodies which are outside me, as to which, in fact, they can teach me nothing but what is most obscure and confused.

But I have already sufficiently considered how, notwithstanding the supreme goodness of God, falsity enters into the judgments I make. Only here a new difficulty is presented -- one respecting those things the pursuit or avoidance of which is taught me by nature, and also respecting the internal sensations which I possess, and in which I seem to have sometimes detected error [and thus to be directly deceived by my own nature]. To take an example, the agreeable taste of some food in which poison has been intermingled may induce me to partake of the poison, and thus deceive me. It is true, at the same time, that in this case nature may be excused, for it only induces me to desire food in which I find a pleasant taste, and not to desire the poison which is unknown to it; and thus I can infer nothing from this fact, except that my nature is not omniscient, at which there is certainly no reason to be astonished, since man, being finite in nature, can only have knowledge the perfectness of which is limited.

But we not unfrequently deceive ourselves even in those things to which we are directly impelled by nature, as happens with those who when they are sick desire to drink or eat things hurtful to them. It will perhaps be said here that the cause of their deceptiveness is that their nature is corrupt, but that does not remove the difficulty, because a sick man is none the less truly God's creature than he who is in health; and it is therefore as repugnant to God's goodness for the one to have a deceitful nature as it is for the other. And as a clock composed of wheels and counter-weights no less exactly observes the laws of nature when it is badly made, and does not show the time properly, than when it entirely satisfies the wishes of its maker, and as, if I consider the body of a man as being a sort of machine so built up and composed of nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin, that though there were no mind in it at all, it would not cease to have the same motions as at present, exception being

made of those movements which are due to the direction of the will, and in consequence depend upon the mind [as apposed to those which operate by the disposition of its organs], I easily recognise that it would be as natural to this body, supposing it to be, for example, dropsical, to suffer the parchedness of the throat which usually signifies to the mind the feeling of thirst, and to be disposed by this parched feeling to move the nerves and other parts in the way requisite for drinking, and thus to augment its malady and do harm to itself, as it is natural to it, when it has no indisposition, to be impelled to drink for its good by a similar cause. And although, considering the use to which the clock has been destined by its maker, I may say that it deflects from the order of its nature when it does not indicate the hours correctly; and as, in the same way, considering the machine of the human body as having been formed by God in order to have in itself all the movements usually manifested there, I have reason for thinking that it does not follow the order of nature when, if the throat is dry, drinking does harm to the conservation of health, nevertheless I recognise at the same time that this last mode of explaining nature is very different from the other. For this is but a purely verbal characterisation depending entirely on my thought, which compares a sick man and a badly constructed clock with the idea which I have of a healthy man and a well made clock, and it is hence extrinsic to the things to which it is applied; but according to the other interpretation of the term nature I understand something which is truly found in things and which is therefore not without some truth.

But certainly although in regard to the dropsical body it is only so to speak to apply an extrinsic term when we say that its nature is corrupted, inasmuch as apart from the need to drink, the throat is parched; yet in regard to the composite whole, that is to say, to the mind or soul united to this body, it is not a purely verbal predicate, but a real error of nature, for it to have thirst when drinking would be hurtful to it. And thus it still remains to inquire how the goodness of God does not prevent the nature of man so regarded from being fallacious.

In order to begin this examination, then, I here say, in the first place, that there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For, as a matter of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from my mind. And the faculties of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind which employs itself in willing and in feeling and understanding. But it is quite otherwise with corporeal or extended objects, for there is not one of these imaginable by me which my mind cannot easily divide into parts, and which consequently I do not recognise as being divisible; this would be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already learned it from other sources.

I further notice that the mind does not receive the impressions from all parts of the body immediately, but only from the brain, or perhaps even from one of its smallest parts, to wit, from that in which the common sense[27] is said to reside, which, whenever it is disposed in the same particular way, conveys the same thing to the mind, although meanwhile the other portions of the body may be differently disposed, as is testified by innumerable experiments which it is unnecessary here to recount.

I notice, also, that the nature of body is such that none of its parts can be moved by another part a

little way off which cannot also be moved in the same way by each one of the parts which are between the two, although this more remote part does not act at all. As, for example, in the cord ABCD [which is in tension] if we pull the last part D, the first part A will not be moved in any way differently from what would be the case if one of the intervening parts B or C were pulled, and the last part D were to remain unmoved. And in the same way, when I feel pain in my foot, my knowledge of physics teaches me that this sensation is communicated by means of nerves dispersed through the foot, which, being extended like cords from there to the brain, when they are contracted in the foot, at the same time contract the inmost portions of the brain which is their extremity and place of origin, and then excite a certain movement which nature has established in order to cause the mind to be affected by a sensation of pain represented as existing in the foot. But because these nerves must pass through the tibia, the thigh, the loins, the back and the neck, in order to reach from the leg to the brain, it may happen that although their extremities which are in the foot are not affected, but only certain ones of their intervening parts [which pass by the loins or the neck], this action will excite the same movement in the brain that might have been excited there by a hurt received in the foot, in consequence of which the mind will necessarily feel in the foot the same pain as if it had received a hurt. And the same holds good of all the other perceptions of our senses.

I notice finally that since each of the movements which are in the portion of the brain by which the mind is immediately affected brings about one particular sensation only, we cannot under the circumstances imagine anything more likely than that this movement, amongst all the sensations which it is capable of impressing on it, causes mind to be affected by that one which is best fitted and most generally useful for the conservation of the human body when it is in health. But experience makes us aware that all the feelings with which nature inspires us are such as I have just spoken of; and there is therefore nothing in them which does not give testimony to the power and goodness of the God [who has produced them[28]]. Thus, for example, when the nerves which are in the feet are violently or more than usually moved, their movement, passing through the medulla of the spine[29] to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a sign to the mind which makes it feel somewhat, to wit, pain, as though in the foot, by which the mind is excited to do its utmost to remove the cause of the evil as dangerous and hurtful to the foot. It is true that God could have constituted the nature of man in such a way that this same movement in the brain would have conveyed something quite different to the mind; for example, it might have produced consciousness of itself either in so far as it is in the brain, or as it is in the foot, or as it is in some other place between the foot and the brain, or it might finally have produced consciousness of anything else whatsoever; but none of all this would have contributed so well to the conservation of the body. Similarly, when we desire to drink, a certain dryness of the throat is produced which moves its nerves, and by their means the internal portions of the brain; and this movement causes in the mind the sensation of thirst, because in this case there is nothing more useful to us than to become aware that we have need to drink for the conservation o our health; and the same holds good in other instances.

From this it is quite clear that, notwithstanding the supreme goodness of God, the nature of man, inasmuch as it is composed of mind and body, cannot be otherwise than sometimes a source of deception. For if there is any cause which excites, not in the foot but in some part of the nerves which are extended between the foot and the brain, or even in the brain itself, the same movement which usually is produced when the foot is detrimentally affected, pain will be experienced as though it were in the foot, and the sense will thus naturally be deceived; for since the same

movement in the brain is capable of causing but one sensation in the mind, and this sensation is much more frequently excited by a cause which hurts the foot than by another existing in some other quarter, it is reasonable that it should convey to the mind pain in the foot rather than in any other part of the body. And although the parchedness of the throat does not always proceed, as it usually does, from the fact that drinking is necessary for the health of the body, but sometimes comes from quite a different cause, as is the case with dropsical patients, it is yet much better that it should mislead on this occasion than if, on the other hand, it were always to deceive us when the body is in good health; and so on in similar cases.

And certainly this consideration is of great service to me, not only in enabling me to recognise all the errors to which my nature is subject, but also in enabling me to avoid them or to correct them more easily. for knowing that all my senses more frequently indicate to me truth than falsehood respecting the things which concern that which is beneficial to the body, and being able almost always to avail myself of many of them in order to examine one particular thing, and, besides that, being able to make use of my memory in order to connect the present with the past, and of my understanding which already has discovered all the causes of my errors, I ought no longer to fear that falsity may be found in matters every day presented to me by my senses. And I ought to set aside all the doubts of these past days as hyperbolical and ridiculous, particularly that very common uncertainty respecting sleep, which I could not distinguish from the waking state; for at present I find a very notable difference between the two, inasmuch as our memory can never connect our dreams one with the other, or with the whole course of our lives, as it unites events which happen to us while we are awake. And, as a matter of fact, if someone, while I was awake, quite suddenly appeared to me and disappeared as fast as do the images which I see in sleep, so that I could not know from whence the form came nor whither it went, it would not be without reason that I should deem it a spectre or a phantom formed by my brain [and similar to those which I form in sleep], rather than a real man. But when I perceive things as to which I know distinctly both the place from which they proceed, and that in which they are, and the time at which they appeared to me; and when, without any interruption, I can connect the perceptions which I have of them with the whole course of my life, I am perfectly assured that these perceptions occur while I am waking and not during sleep. And I ought in no wise to doubt the truth of such matters, if, after having called up all my senses, my memory, and my understanding, to examine them, nothing is brought to evidence by any one of them which is repugnant to what is set forth by the others. For because God is in no wise a deceiver, it follows that I am not deceived in this. But because the exigencies of action often oblige us to make up our minds before having leisure to examine matters carefully, we must confess that the life of man is very frequently subject to error in respect to individual objects, and we must in the end acknowledge the infirmity of our nature.

Notes

[2] For convenience sake the *Objections and Replies* are published in the second volume of this edition.

[3] The French version is followed here.

[4] The French version is followed here.

[5] When it is thought desirable to insert additional readings from the French version this will be indicated by the use of square brackets.

[6] Between the Praefatio ad Lectorem and the Synopsis, the Paris Edition (1st Edition) interpolates an Index which is not found in the Amsterdam Edition (2nd Edition). Since Descartes did not reproduce it, he was doubtless not its author. Mersenne probably composed it himself, adjusting it to the paging of the first Edition. (Note in Adam and Tannery's Edition.)

[7] intellectio.

[8] imaginatio.

[9] In place of this long title at the head of the page the first Edition had immediately after the Synopsis, and on the same page 7, simply *First Meditation.* (Adam's Edition.)

[10] Or *form an image* (effingo).

[11] Sentire.

[12] entendement F., mens L.

[13] inspectio.

[14] sensus communis.

[15] Percipio, F. nous concevons.

[16] The French version is followed here as being more explicit. In it *action de mon esprit* replaces *mea cogitatio.*

[17] In the Latin version *similitudinem.*

[18] Not in the French version.

[19] percipio.

[20] perceptio.

[21] *In the idea of whom alone necessary or eternal existence is comprised.* French version.

[22] *From the moment that.* French version.

[23] *Conception,* French version. *intellectionem,* Latin version.

[24] intueor.

[25] acie mentis.

[26] intellectionem.

[27] sensus communis.

[28] Latin version only.

[29] spini dorsae medullam.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Meditations on First Philosophy

Rene Descartes

1641

 This file is of the 1911 edition of The Philosophical Works of Descartes (Cambridge University Press), translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane.1

Prefatory Note To The Meditations.

The first edition of the Meditations was published in Latin by Michael Soly of Paris "at the Sign of the Phoenix" in 1641 cum Privilegio et Approbatione Doctorum. The Royal "privilege" was indeed given, but the "approbation" seems to have been of a most indefinite kind. The reason of the book being published in France and not in Holland, where Descartes was living in a charming country house at Endegeest near Leiden, was apparently his fear that the Dutch ministers might in some way lay hold of it. His friend, Pere Mersenne, took charge of its publication in Paris and wrote to him about any difficulties that occurred in the course of its progress through the press. The second edition was however published at Amsterdam in 1642 by Louis Elzevir, and this edition was accompanied by the now completed "Objections and Replies."2 The edition from which the present translation is made is the second just mentioned, and is that adopted by MM. Adam and Tannery as the more correct, for reasons that they state in detail in the preface to their edition. The work was translated into French by the Duc de Luynes in 1642 and Descartes considered the translation so excellent that he had it published some years later. Clerselier, to complete matters, had the "Objections" also published in French with the "Replies," and this, like the other, was subject to Descartes' revision and correction. This revision renders the French edition specially valuable. Where it seems desirable an alternative reading from the French is given in square brackets.

Elizabeth S. Haldane

TO THE MOST WISE AND ILLUSTRIOUS THE DEAN AND DOCTORS OF THE SACRED FACULTY OF THEOLOGY IN PARIS.

The motive which induces me to present to you this Treatise is so excellent, and, when you become acquainted with its design, I am convinced that you will also have so excellent a motive for taking it under your protection, that I feel that I cannot do better, in order to render it in some sort acceptable to you, than in a few words to state what I have set myself to do.

I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than theological argument. For although it is quite enough for us faithful ones to accept by means of faith the fact that the human soul

does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it certainly does not seem possible ever to persuade infidels of any religion, indeed, we may almost say, of any moral virtue, unless, to begin with, we prove these two facts by means of the natural reason. And inasmuch as often in this life greater rewards are offered for vice than for virtue, few people would prefer the right to the useful, were they restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another life; and although it is absolutely true that we must believe that there is a God, because we are so taught in the Holy Scriptures, and, on the other hand, that we must believe the Holy Scriptures because they come from God (the reason of this is, that, faith being a gift of God, He who gives the grace to cause us to believe other things can likewise give it to cause us to believe that He exists), we nevertheless could not place this argument before infidels, who might accuse us of reasoning in a circle. And, in truth, I have noticed that you, along with all the theologians, did not only affirm that the existence of God may be proved by the natural reason, but also that it may be inferred from the Holy Scriptures, that knowledge about Him is much clearer than that which we have of many created things, and, as a matter of fact, is so easy to acquire, that those who have it not are culpable in their ignorance. This indeed appears from the Wisdom of Solomon, chapter xiii., where it is said "Howbeit they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather find out the Lord thereof?" and in Romans, chapter i., it is said that they are "without excuse"; and again in the same place, by these words "that which may be known of God is manifest in them," it seems as through we were shown that all that which can be known of God may be made manifest by means which are not derived from anywhere but from ourselves, and from the simple consideration of the nature of our minds. Hence I thought it not beside my purpose to inquire how this is so, and how God may be more easily and certainly known than the things of the world.

And as regards the soul, although many have considered that it is not easy to know its nature, and some have even dared to say that human reasons have convinced us that it would perish with the body, and that faith alone could believe the contrary, nevertheless, inasmuch as the Lateran Council held under Leo X (in the eighth session) condemns these tenets, and as Leo expressly ordains Christian philosophers to refute their arguments and to employ all their powers in making known the truth, I have ventured in this treatise to undertake the same task.

More than that, I am aware that the principal reason which causes many impious persons not to desire to believe that there is a God, and that the human soul is distinct from the body, is that they declare that hitherto no one has been able to demonstrate these two facts; and although I am not of their opinion but, on the contrary, hold that the greater part of the reasons which have been brought forward concerning these two questions by so many great men are, when they are rightly understood, equal to so many demonstrations, and that it is almost impossible to invent new ones, it is yet in my opinion the case that nothing more useful can be accomplished in philosophy than once for all to seek with care for the best of these reasons, and to set them forth in so clear and exact a manner, that it will henceforth be evident to everybody that

they are veritable demonstrations. And, finally, inasmuch as it was desired that I should undertake this task by many who were aware that I had cultivated a certain Method for the resolution of difficulties of every kind in the Sciences¥a method which it is true is not novel, since there is nothing more ancient than the truth, but of which they were aware that I had made use successfully enough in other matters of difficulty¥I have thought that it was my duty also to make trial of it in the present matter.

Now all that I could accomplish in the matter is contained in this Treatise. Not that I have here drawn together all the different reasons which might be brought forward to serve as proofs of this subject: for that never seemed to be necessary excepting when there was no one single proof that was certain. But I have treated the first and principal ones in such a manner that I can venture to bring them forward as very evident and very certain demonstrations. And more than that, I will say that these proofs are such that I do not think that there is any way open to the human mind by which it can ever succeed in discovering better. For the importance of the subject, and the glory of God to which all this relates, constrain me to speak here somewhat more freely of myself than is my habit. Nevertheless, whatever certainty and evidence I find in my reasons, I cannot persuade myself that all the world is capable of understanding them. Still, just as in Geometry there are many demonstrations that have been left to us by Archimedes, by Apollonius, by Pappus, and others, which are accepted by everyone as perfectly certain and evident (because they clearly contain nothing which, considered by itself, is not very easy to understand, and as all through that which follows has an exact connection with, and dependence on that which precedes), nevertheless, because they are somewhat lengthy, and demand a mind wholly devoted tot heir consideration, they are only taken in and understood by a very limited number of persons. Similarly, although I judge that those of which I here make use are equal to, or even surpass in certainty and evidence, the demonstrations of Geometry, I yet apprehend that they cannot be adequately understood by many, both because they are also a little lengthy and dependent the one on the other, and principally because they demand a mind wholly free of prejudices, and one which can be easily detached from the affairs of the senses. And, truth to say, there are not so many in the world who are fitted for metaphysical speculations as there are for those of Geometry. And more than that; there is still this difference, that in Geometry, since each one is persuaded that nothing must be advanced of which there is not a certain demonstration, those who are not entirely adepts more frequently err in approving what is false, in order to give the impression that they understand it, than in refuting the true. But the case is different in philosophy where everyone believes that all is problematical, and few give themselves to the search after truth; and the greater number, in their desire to acquire a reputation for boldness of thought, arrogantly combat the most important of truths3.

That is why, whatever force there may be in my reasonings, seeing they belong to philosophy, I cannot hope that they will have much effect on the minds of men, unless you extend to them your protection. But the estimation in which you Company is universally held is so great, and the name of SORBONNE carries with it so much authority, that, next

to the Sacred Councils, never has such deference been paid to the judgment of any Body, not only in what concerns the faith, but also in what regards human philosophy as well: everyone indeed believes that it is not possible to discover elsewhere more perspicacity and solidity, or more integrity and wisdom in pronouncing judgment. For this reason I have no doubt that if you deign to take the trouble in the first place of correcting this work (for being conscious not only of my infirmity, but also of my ignorance, I should not dare to state that it was free from errors), and then, after adding to it these things that are lacking to it, completing those which are imperfect, and yourselves taking the trouble to give a more ample explanation of those things which have need of it, or at least making me aware of the defects so that I may apply myself to remedy them4 ¥when this is done and when finally the reasonings by which I prove that there is a God, and that the human soul differs from the body, shall be carried to that point of perspicuity to which I am sure they can be carried in order that they may be esteemed as perfectly exact demonstrations, if you deign to authorize your approbation and to render public testimony to their truth and certainty, I do not doubt, I say, that henceforward all the errors and false opinions which have ever existed regarding these two questions will soon be effaced from the minds of men. For the truth itself will easily cause all men of mind and learning to subscribe to your judgment; and your authority will cause the atheists, who are usually more arrogant than learned or judicious, to rid themselves of their spirit of contradiction or lead them possibly themselves to defend the reasonings which they find being received as demonstrations by all persons of consideration, lest they appear not to understand them. And, finally, all others will easily yield to such a mass of evidence, and there will be none who dares to doubt the existence of God and the real and true distinction between the human soul and the body. It is for you now in your singular wisdom to judge of the importance of the establishment of such beliefs [you who see the disorders produced by the doubt of them]5 . But it would not become me to say more in consideration of the cause of God and religion to those who have always been the most worthy supports of the Catholic Church.

Preface to the Reader.

I have already slightly touched on these two questions of God and the human soul in the Discourse on the Method of rightly conducting the Reason and seeking truth in the Sciences, published in French in the year 1637. Not that I had the design of treating these with any thoroughness, but only so to speak in passing, and in order to ascertain by the judgment of the readers how I should treat them later on. For these questions have always appeared to me to be of such importance that I judged it suitable to speak of them more than once; and the road which I follow in the explanation of them is so little trodden, and so far removed from the ordinary path, that I did not judge it to be expedient to set it forth at length in French and in a Discourse which might be read by everyone, in case the feebler minds should believe that it was permitted to them to attempt to follow the same path.

But, having in this Discourse on Method begged all those

who have found in my writings somewhat deserving of censure to do me the favour of acquainting me with the grounds of it, nothing worthy of remark has been objected to in them beyond two matters: to these two I wish here to reply in a few words before undertaking their more detailed discussion.

The first objection is that it does not follow from the fact that the human mind reflecting on itself does not perceive itself to be other than a thing that thinks, that its nature or its essence consists only in its being a thing that thinks, in the sense that this word only excludes all other things which might also be supposed to pertain to the nature of the soul. To this objection I reply that it was not my intention in that place to exclude these in accordance with the order that looks to the truth of the matter (as to which I was not then dealing), but only in accordance with the order of my thought [perception]; thus my meaning was that so far as I was aware, I knew nothing clearly as belonging to my essence, excepting that I was a thing that thinks, or a thing that has in itself the faculty of thinking. But I shall show hereafter how from the fact that I know no other thing which pertains to my essence, it follows that there is no other thing which really does belong to it.

The second objection is that it does not follow from the fact that I have in myself the idea of something more perfect than I am, that this idea is more perfect than I, and much less that what is represented by this idea exists. But I reply that in this term idea there is here something equivocal, for it may either be taken materially, as an act of my understanding, and in this sense it cannot be said that it is more perfect than I; or it may be taken objectively, as the thing which is represented by this act, which, although we do not suppose it to exist outside of my understanding, may, none the less, be more perfect than I, because of its essence. And in following out this Treatise I shall show more fully how, from the sole fact that I have in myself the idea of a thing more perfect than myself, it follows that this thing truly exists.

In addition to these two objections I have also seen two fairly lengthy works on this subject, which, however, did not so much impugn my reasonings as my conclusions, and this by arguments drawn from the ordinary atheistic sources. But, because such arguments cannot make any impression on the minds of those who really understand my reasonings, and as the judgments of many are so feeble and irrational that they very often allow themselves to be persuaded by the opinions which they have first formed, however false and far removed from reason they may be, rather than by a true and solid but subsequently received refutation of these opinions, I do not desire to reply here to their criticisms in case of being first of all obliged to state them. I shall only say in general that all that is said by the atheist against the existence of God, always depends either on the fact that we ascribe to God affections which are human, or that we attribute so much strength and wisdom to our minds that we even have the presumption to desire to determine and understand that which God can and ought to do. In this way all that they allege will cause us no difficulty, provided only we remember that we must consider our minds as things which are finite and limited, and God as a Being who is incomprehensible and infinite.

Now that I have once for all recognised and acknowledged

the opinions of men, I at once begin to treat of God and the Human soul, and at the same time to treat of the whole of the First Philosophy, without however expecting any praise from the vulgar and without the hope that my book will have many readers. On the contrary, I should never advise anyone to read it excepting those who desire to meditate seriously with me, and who can detach their minds from affairs of sense, and deliver themselves entirely from every sort of prejudice. I know too well that such men exist in a very small number. But for those who, without caring to comprehend the order and connections of my reasonings, form their criticisms on detached portions arbitrarily selected, as is the custom with many, these, I say, will not obtain much profit from reading this Treatise. And although they perhaps in several parts find occasion of cavilling, they can for all their pains make no objection which is urgent or deserving of reply.

And inasmuch as I make no promise to others to satisfy them at once, and as I do not presume so much on my own powers as to believe myself capable of foreseeing all that can cause difficulty to anyone, I shall first of all set forth in these Meditations the very considerations by which I persuade myself that I have reached a certain and evident knowledge of the truth, in order to see if, by the same reasons which persuaded me, I can also persuade others. And, after that, I shall reply to the objections which have been made to me by persons of genius and learning to whom I have sent my Meditations for examination, before submitting them to the press. For they have made so many objections and these so different, that I venture to promise that it will be difficult for anyone to bring to mind criticisms of any consequence which have not been already touched upon. This is why I beg those who read these Meditations to form no judgment upon them unless they have given themselves the trouble to read all the objections as well as the replies which I have made to them.6

Synopsis of the Six Following Meditations.

In the first Meditation I set forth the reasons for which we may, generally speaking, doubt about all things and especially about material things, at least so long as we have no other foundations for the sciences than those which we have hitherto possessed. But although the utility of a Doubt which is so general does not at first appear, it is at the same time very great, inasmuch as it delivers us from every kind of prejudice, and sets out for us a very simple way by which the mind may detach itself from the senses; and finally it makes it impossible for us ever to doubt those things which we have once discovered to be true.

In the second Meditation, mind, which making use of the liberty which pertains to it, takes for granted that all those things of whose existence it has the least doubt, are non-existent, recognises that it is however absolutely impossible that it does not itself exist. This point is likewise of the greatest moment, inasmuch as by this means a distinction is easily drawn between the things which pertain to mind¥that is to say to the intellectual nature¥and those which pertain to body.

But because it may be that some expect from me in this place a statement of the reasons establishing the immortality of the soul, I feel that I should here make known to them that having aimed at writing nothing in all this Treatise of which

I do not possess very exact demonstrations, I am obliged to follow a similar order to that made use of by the geometers, which is to begin by putting forward as premises all those things upon which the proposition that we seek depends, before coming to any conclusion regarding it. Now the first and principal matter which is requisite for thoroughly understanding the immortality of the soul is to form the clearest possible conception of it, and one which will be entirely distinct from all the conceptions which we may have of body; and in this Meditation this has been done. In addition to this it is requisite that we may be assured that all the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are true in the very way in which we think them; and this could not be proved previously to the Fourth Mediation. Further we must have a distinct conception of corporeal nature, which is given partly in this Second, and partly in the Fifth and Sixth Meditations. And finally we should conclude from all this, that those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly as being diverse substances, as we regard mind and body to be, are really substances essentially distinct one from the other; and this is the conclusion of the Sixth Meditation. This is further confirmed in this same Meditation by the fact that we cannot conceive of body excepting in so far as it is divisible, while the mind cannot be conceived of excepting as indivisible. For we are not able to conceive of the half of a mind as we can do of the smallest of all bodies; so that we see that not only are their natures different but even in some respects contrary to one another. I have not however dealt further with this matter in this treatise, both because what I have said is sufficient to show clearly enough that the extinction of the mind does not follow from the corruption of the body, and also to give men the hope of another life after death, as also because the premises from which the immortality of the soul may be deduced depend on an elucidation of a complete system of Physics. This would mean to establish in the first place that all substances generally¥that is to say all things which cannot exist without being created by God¥are in their nature incorruptible, and that they can never cease to exist unless God, in denying to them his concurrence, reduce them to nought; and secondly that body, regarded generally, is a substance, which is the reason why it also cannot perish, but that the human body, inasmuch as it differs from other bodies, is composed only of a certain configuration of members and of other similar accidents, while the human mind is not similarly composed of any accidents, but is a pure substance. For although all the accidents of mind be changed, although, for instance, it think certain things, will others, perceive others, etc., despite all this it does not emerge from these changes another mind: the human body on the other hand becomes a different thing from the sole fact that the figure or form of any of its portions is found to be changed. From this it follows that the human body may indeed easily enough perish, but the mind [or soul of man (I make no distinction between them)] is owing to its nature immortal.

In the third Meditation it seems to me that I have explained at sufficient length the principal argument of which I make use in order to prove the existence of God. But none the less, because I did not wish in that place to make use of any comparisons derived from corporeal things, so as to withdraw as much as I could the minds of readers from the senses, there may perhaps have remained many obscurities

which, however, will, I hope, be entirely removed by the Replies which I have made to the Objections which have been set before me. Amongst others there is, for example, this one, "How the idea in us of a being supremely perfect possesses so much objective reality [that is to say participates by representation in so many degrees of being and perfection] that it necessarily proceeds from a cause which is absolutely perfect." This is illustrated in these Replies by the comparison of a very perfect machine, the idea of which is found in the mind of some workman. For as the objective contrivance of this idea must have some cause, i.e. either the science of the workman or that of some other from whom he has received the idea, it is similarly impossible that the idea of God which is in us should not have God himself as its cause.

In the fourth Meditation it is shown that all these things which we very clearly and distinctly perceive are true, and at the same time it is explained in what the nature of error or falsity consists. This must of necessity be known both for the confirmation of the preceding truths and for the better comprehension of those that follow. (But it must meanwhile be remarked that I do not in any way there treat of sin¥that is to say of the error which is committed in the pursuit of good and evil, but only of that which arises in the deciding between the true and the false. And I do not intend to speak of matters pertaining to the Faith or the conduct of life, but only of those which concern speculative truths, and which may be known by the sole aid of the light of nature.)

In the fifth Meditation corporeal nature generally is explained, and in addition to this the existence of God is demonstrated by a new proof in which there may possibly be certain difficulties also, but the solution of these will be seen in the Replies to the Objections. And further I show in what sense it is true to say that the certainty of geometrical demonstrations is itself dependent on the knowledge of God.

Finally in the Sixth I distinguish the action of the understanding7 from that of the imagination;8 the marks by which this distinction is made are described. I here show that the mind of man is really distinct from the body, and at the same time that the two are so closely joined together that they form, so to speak, a single thing. All the errors which proceed from the senses are then surveyed, while the means of avoiding them are demonstrated, and finally all the reasons from which we may deduce the existence of material things are set forth. Not that I judge them to be very useful in establishing that which they prove, to wit, that there is in truth a world, that men possess bodies, and other such things which never have been doubted by anyone of sense; but because in considering these closely we come to see that they are neither so strong nor so evident as those arguments which lead us to the knowledge of our mind and of God; so that these last must be the most certain and most evident facts which can fall within the cognizance of the human mind. And this is the whole matter that I have tried to prove in these Meditations, for which reason I here omit to speak of many other questions which I dealt incidentally in this discussion.

MEDITATIONS ON THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY IN WHICH THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MIND AND BODY ARE DEMONSTRATED.9

Meditation I.

Of the things which may be brought within the sphere of the doubtful.

It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation, if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to be a very great one, I waited until I had attained an age so mature that I could not hope that at any later date I should be better fitted to execute my design. This reason caused me to delay so long that I should feel that I was doing wrong were I to occupy in deliberation the time that yet remains to me for action. To-day, then, since very opportunely for the plan I have in view I have delivered my mind from every care [and am happily agitated by no passions] and since I have procured for myself an assured leisure in a peaceable retirement, I shall at last seriously and freely address myself to the general upheaval of all my former opinions.

Now for this object it is not necessary that I should show that all of these are false¥I shall perhaps never arrive at this end. But inasmuch as reason already persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly to be false, if I am able to find in each one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the whole. And for that end it will not be requisite that I should examine each in particular, which would be an endless undertaking; for owing to the fact that the destruction of the foundations of necessity brings with it the downfall of the rest of the edifice, I shall only in the first place attack those principles upon which all my former opinions rested.

All that up to the present time I have accepted as most true and certain I have learned either from the senses or through the senses; but it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive, and it is wiser not to trust entirely to anything by which we have once been deceived.

But it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things which are hardly perceptible, or very far away, there are yet many others to be met with as to which we cannot reasonably have any doubt, although we recognise them by their means. For example, there is the fact that I am here, seated by the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and other similar matters. And how could I deny that these hands and this body are mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to certain persons, devoid of sense, whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by the violent vapours of black bile, that they constantly assure us that they think they are kings when they are really quite poor, or that they are clothed in purple when they are really without covering, or who imagine that they have an earthenware head or are nothing but pumpkins or are made of glass. But they are mad, and I should not be any the less insane were I to follow examples so extravagant.

At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that consequently I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the same things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the fire, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed! At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; what happens in sleep does not appear so clear nor so distinct as does all this. But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream.

Now let us assume that we are asleep and that all these particulars, e.g. that we open our eyes, shake our head, extend our hands, and so on, are but false delusions; and let us reflect that possibly neither our hands nor our whole body are such as they appear to us to be. At the same time we must at least confess that the things which are represented to us in sleep are like painted representations which can only have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true, and that in this way those general things at least, i.e. eyes, a head, hands, and a whole body, are not imaginary things, but things really existent. For, as a matter of fact, painters, even when they study with the greatest skill to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary, cannot give them natures which are entirely new, but merely make a certain medley of the members of different animals; or if their imagination is extravagant enough to invent something so novel that nothing similar has ever before been seen, and that then their work represents a thing purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is certain all the same that the colours of which this is composed are necessarily real. And for the same reason, although these general things, to with, [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and such like, may be imaginary, we are bound at the same time to confess that there are at least some other objects yet more simple and more universal, which are real and true; and of these just in the same way as with certain real colours, all these images of things which dwell in our thoughts, whether true and real or false and fantastic, are formed.

To such a class of things pertains corporeal nature in general, and its extension, the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude and number, as also the place in which they are, the time which measures their duration, and so on.

That is possibly why our reasoning is not unjust when we conclude from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine and all other sciences which have as their end the consideration of composite things, are very dubious and uncertain; but that Arithmetic, Geometry and other sciences of that kind which only treat of things that are very simple and very general, without taking great trouble to ascertain whether they are actually existent or not, contain some measure of certainty

and an element of the indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three together always form five, and the square can never have more than four sides, and it does not seem possible that truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity [or uncertainty].

Nevertheless I have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an all-powerful God existed by whom I have been created such as I am. But how do I know that He has not brought it to pass that there is no earth, no heaven, no extended body, no magnitude, no place, and that nevertheless [I possess the perceptions of all these things and that] they seem to me to exist just exactly as I now see them? And, besides, as I sometimes imagine that others deceive themselves in the things which they think they know best, how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined? But possibly God has not desired that I should be thus deceived, for He is said to be supremely good. If, however, it is contrary to His goodness to have made me such that I constantly deceive myself, it would also appear to be contrary to His goodness to permit me to be sometimes deceived, and nevertheless I cannot doubt that He does permit this.

There may indeed be those who would prefer to deny the existence of a God so powerful, rather than believe that all other things are uncertain. But let us not oppose them for the present, and grant that all that is here said of a God is a fable; nevertheless in whatever way they suppose that I have arrived at the state of being that I have reached¥whether they attribute it to fate or to accident, or make out that it is by a continual succession of antecedents, or by some other method¥since to err and deceive oneself is a defect, it is clear that the greater will be the probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is the Author to whom they assign my origin the less powerful. To these reasons I have certainly nothing to reply, but at the end I feel constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty [in the sciences].

But it is not sufficient to have made these remarks, we must also be careful to keep them in mind. For these ancient and commonly held opinions still revert frequently to my mind, long and familiar custom having given them the right to occupy my mind against my inclination and rendered them almost masters of my belief; nor will I ever lose the habit of deferring to them or of placing my confidence in them, so long as I consider them as they really are, i.e. opinions in some measure doubtful, as I have just shown, and at the same time highly probable, so that there is much more reason to believe in than to deny them. That is why I consider that I shall not be acting amiss, if, taking of set purpose a contrary belief, I allow myself to be deceived, and for a certain time pretend that all these opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at last, having thus balanced my former prejudices with my latter [so that they cannot divert my opinions more to one side than to the other], my judgment will no longer be

dominated by bad usage or turned away from the right knowledge of the truth. For I am assured that there can be neither peril nor error in this course, and that I cannot at present yield too much to distrust, since I am not considering the question of action, but only of knowledge.

I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things; I shall remain obstinately attached to this idea, and if by this means it is not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of any truth, I may at least do what is in my power [i.e. suspend my judgment], and with firm purpose avoid giving credence to any false thing, or being imposed upon by this arch deceiver, however powerful and deceptive he may be. But this task is a laborious one, and insensibly a certain lassitude leads me into the course of my ordinary life. And just as a captive who in sleep enjoys an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that his liberty is but a dream, fears to awaken, and conspires with these agreeable illusions that the deception may be prolonged, so insensibly of my own accord I fall back into my former opinions, and I dread awakening from this slumber, lest the laborious wakefulness which would follow the tranquillity of this repose should have to be spent not in daylight, but in the excessive darkness of the difficulties which have just been discussed.

Meditation II

Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and that it is more easily known than the Body.

The Meditation of yesterday filled my mind with so many doubts that it is no longer in my power to forget them. And yet I do not see in what manner I can resolve them; and, just as if I had all of a sudden fallen into very deep water, I am so disconcerted that I can neither make certain of setting my feet on the bottom, nor can I swim and so support myself on the surface. I shall nevertheless make an effort and follow anew the same path as that on which I yesterday entered, i.e. I shall proceed by setting aside all that in which the least doubt could be supposed to exist, just as if I had discovered that it was absolutely false; and I shall ever follow in this road until I have met with something which is certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned for certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain. Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, and transport it elsewhere, demanded only that one point should be fixed and immoveable; in the same way I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain and indubitable.

I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false; I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me. I consider that I

possess no senses; I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement and place are but the fictions of my mind. What, then, can be esteemed as true? Perhaps nothing at all, unless that there is nothing in the world that is certain.

But how can I know there is not something different from those things that I have just considered, of which one cannot have the slightest doubt? Is there not some God, or some other being by whatever name we call it, who puts these reflections into my mind? That is not necessary, for is it not possible that I am capable of producing them myself? I myself, am I not at least something? But I have already denied that I had senses and body. Yet I hesitate, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on body and senses that I cannot exist without these? But I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something [or merely because I thought of something]. But there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something. So that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, we must come to the definite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it.

But I do not yet know clearly enough what I am, I who am certain that I am; and hence I must be careful to see that I do not imprudently take some other object in place of myself, and thus that I do not go astray in respect of this knowledge that I hold to be the most certain and most evident of all that I have formerly learned. That is why I shall now consider anew what I believed myself to be before I embarked upon these last reflections; and of my former opinions I shall withdraw all that might even in a small degree be invalidated by the reasons which I have just brought forward, in order that there may be nothing at all left beyond what is absolutely certain and indubitable.

What then did I formerly believe myself to be? Undoubtedly I believed myself to be a man. But what is a man? Shall I say a reasonable animal? Certainly not; for then I should have to inquire what an animal is, and what is reasonable; and thus from a single question I should insensibly fall into an infinitude of others more difficult; and I should not wish to waste the little time and leisure remaining to me in trying to unravel subtleties like these. But I shall rather stop here to consider the thoughts which of themselves spring up in my mind, and which were not inspired by anything beyond my own nature alone when I applied myself to the consideration of my being. In the first place, the, I considered myself as having a face, hands, arms, and all that system of members composed on bones and flesh as seen in a corpse which I designated by the name of body. In addition to this I considered that I was nourished, that I walked, that I felt, and that I thought, and I referred all these actions to the soul: but I did not stop to consider what the soul was, or if I did stop, I imagined that it was something extremely rare and subtle like a wind, a flame, or an ether, which was spread throughout my grosser parts. As to body I had no

manner of doubt about its nature, but thought I had a very clear knowledge of it; and if I had desired to explain it according to the notions that I had then formed of it, I should have described it thus: By the body I understand all that which can be defined by a certain figure: something which can be confined in a certain place, and which can fill a given space in such a way that every other body will be excluded from it; which can be perceived either by tough, or by sight, or by hearing, or by taste, or by smell: which can be moved in many ways not, in truth, by itself, but by something which is foreign to it, by which it is touched [and from which it receives impressions]: for to have the power of self-movement, as also of feeling or of thinking, I did not consider to appertain to the nature of body: on the contrary, I was rather astonished to find that faculties similar to them existed in some bodies.

But what am I, now that I suppose that there is a certain genius which is extremely powerful, and, if I may say so, malicious, who employs all his powers in deceiving me? Can I affirm that I possess the least of all those things which I have just said pertain to the nature of body? I pause to consider, I revolve all these things in my mind, and I find none of which I can say that it pertains to me. It would be tedious to stop to enumerate them. Let us pass to the attributes of soul and see if there is any one which is in me? What of nutrition or walking [the first mentioned]? But if it is so that I have no body it is also true that I can neither walk nor take nourishment. Another attribute is sensation. But one cannot feel without body, and besides I have thought I perceived many things during sleep that I recognised in my waking moments as not having been experienced at all. What of thinking? I find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just when I think; for it might possibly be the case if I ceased entirely to think, that I should likewise cease altogether to exist. I do not now admit anything which is not necessarily true: to speak accurately I am not more than a thing which thinks, that is to say a mind or a soul, or an understanding, or a reason, which are terms whose significance was formerly unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing and really exist; but what thing? I have answered: a thing which thinks.

And what more? I shall exercise my imagination [in order to see if I am not something more]. I am not a collection of members which we call the human body: I am not a subtle air distributed through these members, I am not a wind, a fire, a vapour, a breath, nor anything at all which I can imagine or conceive; because I have assumed that all these were nothing. Without changing that supposition I find that I only leave myself certain of the fact that I am somewhat. But perhaps it is true that these same things which I supposed were non-existent because they are unknown to me, are really not different from the self which I know. I am not sure about this, I shall not dispute about it now; I can only give judgment on things that are known to me. I know that I exist, and I inquire what I am, I whom I know to exist. But it is very certain that the knowledge of my existence taken in its precise significance does not depend on things whose existence is not yet known to me; consequently it does not depend on those which I can feign in imagination. And indeed the very term feign in imagination10 proves to me my error, for I

really do this if I image myself a something, since to imagine is nothing else than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing. But I already know for certain that I am, and that it may be that all these images, and, speaking generally, all things that relate to the nature of body are nothing but dreams [and chimeras]. For this reason I see clearly that I have as little reason to say, "I shall stimulate my imagination in order to know more distinctly what I am," than if I were to say, "I am now awake, and I perceive somewhat that is real and true: but because I do not yet perceive it distinctly enough, I shall go to sleep of express purpose, so that my dreams may represent the perception with greatest truth and evidence." And, thus, I know for certain that nothing of all that I can understand by means of my imagination belongs to this knowledge which I have of myself, and that it is necessary to recall the mind from this mode of thought with the utmost diligence in order that it may be able to know its own nature with perfect distinctness.

But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels.

Certainly it is no small matter if all these things pertain to my nature. But why should they not so pertain? Am I not that being who now doubts nearly everything, who nevertheless understands certain things, who affirms that one only is true, who denies all the others, who desires to know more, is averse from being deceived, who imagines many things, sometimes indeed despite his will, and who perceives many likewise, as by the intervention of the bodily organs? Is there nothing in all this which is as true as it is certain that I exist, even though I should always sleep and though he who has given me being employed all his ingenuity in deceiving me? Is there likewise any one of these attributes which can be distinguished from my thought, or which might be said to be separated from myself? For it is so evident of itself that it is I who doubts, who understands, and who desires, that there is no reason here to add anything to explain it. And I have certainly the power of imagining likewise; for although it may happen (as I formerly supposed) that none of the things which I imagine are true, nevertheless this power of imagining does not cease to be really in use, and it forms part of my thought. Finally, I am the same who feels, that is to say, who perceives certain things, as by the organs of sense, since it truth I see light, I hear noise, I feel heat. But it will be said that these phenomena are false and that I am dreaming. Let it be so; still it is at least quite certain that it seems to me that I see light, that I hear noise and that I feel heat. That cannot be false; properly speaking it is what is in me called feeling;11 and used in this precise sense that is no other thing than thinking.

From this time I begin to know what I am with a little more clearness and distinction than before; but nevertheless it still seems to me, and I cannot prevent myself from thinking, that corporeal things, whose images are framed by thought, which are tested by the senses, are much more distinctly known than that obscure part of me which does not come under the imagination. Although really it is very strange to say that I know and understand more distinctly these things whose existence seems to me dubious, which are unknown to me, and which do not belong to me, than others of

the truth of which I am convinced, which are known to me and which pertain to my real nature, in a word, than myself. But I see clearly how the case stands: my mind loves to wander, and cannot yet suffer itself to be retained within the just limits of truth. Very good, let us once more give it the freest rein, so that, when afterwards we seize the proper occasion for pulling up, it may the more easily be regulated and controlled.

Let us begin by considering the commonest matters, those which we believe to be the most distinctly comprehended, to wit, the bodies which we touch and see; not indeed bodies in general, for these general ideas are usually a little more confused, but let us consider one body in particular. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax: it has been taken quite freshly from the hive, and it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey which it contains; it still retains somewhat of the odour of the flowers from which it has been culled; its colour, its figure, its size are apparent; it is hard, cold, easily handled, and if you strike it with the finger, it will emit a sound. Finally all the things which are requisite to cause us distinctly to recognise a body, are met with in it. But notice that while I speak and approach the fire what remained of the taste is exhaled, the smell evaporates, the colour alters, the figure is destroyed, the size increases, it becomes liquid, it heats, scarcely can one handle it, and when one strikes it, now sound is emitted. Does the same wax remain after this change? We must confess that it remains; none would judge otherwise. What then did I know so distinctly in this piece of wax? It could certainly be nothing of all that the senses brought to my notice, since all these things which fall under taste, smell, sight, touch, and hearing, are found to be changed, and yet the same wax remains.

Perhaps it was what I now think, viz. that this wax was not that sweetness of honey, nor that agreeable scent of flowers, nor that particular whiteness, nor that figure, nor that sound, but simply a body which a little while before appeared tome as perceptible under these forms, and which is now perceptible under others. But what, precisely, is it that I imagine when I form such conceptions? Let us attentively consider this, and, abstracting from all that does not belong to the wax, let us see what remains. Certainly nothing remains excepting a certain extended thing which is flexible and movable. But what is the meaning of flexible and movable? Is it not that I imagine that this piece of wax being round is capable of becoming square and of passing from a square to a triangular figure? No, certainly it is not that, since I imagine it admits of an infinitude of similar changes, and I nevertheless do not know how to compass the infinitude by my imagination, and consequently this conception which I have of the wax is not brought about by the faculty of imagination. What now is this extension? Is it not also unknown? For it becomes greater when the wax is melted, greater when it is boiled, and greater still when the heat increases; and I should not conceive [clearly] according to truth what wax is, if I did not think that even this piece that we are considering is capable of receiving more variations in extension than I have ever imagined. We must then grant that I could not even understand through the imagination what this piece of wax is, and that it is my mind12 alone which perceives it. I say this piece of wax in particular, for as

to wax in general it is yet clearer. But what is this piece of wax which cannot be understood excepting by the [understanding or] mind? It is certainly the same that I see, touch, imagine, and finally it is the same which I have always believed it to be from the beginning. But what must particularly be observed is that its perception is neither an act of vision, nor of touch, nor of imagination, and has never been such although it may have appeared formerly to be so, but only an intuition13 of the mind, which may be imperfect and confused as it was formerly, or clear and distinct as it is at present, according as my attention is more or less directed to the elements which are found in it, and of which it is composed.

Yet in the meantime I am greatly astonished when I consider [the great feebleness of mind] and its proneness to fall [insensibly] into error; for although without giving expression to my thought I consider all this in my own mind, words often impede me and I am almost deceived by the terms of ordinary language. For we say that we see the same wax, if it is present, and not that we simply judge that it is the same from its having the same colour and figure. From this I should conclude that I knew the wax by means of vision and not simply by the intuition of the mind; unless by chance I remember that, when looking from a window and saying I see men who pass in the street, I really do not see them, but infer that what I see is men, just as I say that I see wax. And yet what do I see from the window but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines? Yet I judge these to be men. And similarly solely by the faculty of judgment which rests in my mind, I comprehend that which I believed I saw with my eyes.

A man who makes it his aim to raise his knowledge above the common should be ashamed to derive the occasion for doubting from the forms of speech invented by the vulgar; I prefer to pass on and consider whether I had a more evident and perfect conception of what the wax was when I first perceived it, and when I believed I knew it by means of the external senses or at least by the common sense14 as it is called, that is to say by the imaginative faculty, or whether my present conception is clearer now that I have most carefully examined what it is, and in what way it can be known. It would certainly be absurd to doubt as to this. For what was there in this first perception which was distinct? What was there which might not as well have been perceived by any of the animals? But when I distinguish the wax from its external forms, and when, just as if I had taken from it its vestments, I consider it quite naked, it is certain that although some error may still be found in my judgment, I can nevertheless not perceive it thus without a human mind.

But finally what shall I say of this mind, that is, of myself, for up to this point I do not admit in myself anything but mind? What then, I who seem to perceive this piece of wax so distinctly, do I not know myself, not only with much more truth and certainty, but also with much more distinctness and clearness? For if I judge that the wax is or exists from the fact that I see it, it certainly follows much more clearly that I am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it. For it may be that what I see is not really wax, it may also be that I do not possess eyes with which to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see, or (for I no longer take account of the distinction) when I think I see, that I myself who think am nought. So if I judge that the wax exists from the

fact that I touch it, the same thing will follow, to wit, that I am; and if I judge that my imagination, or some other cause, whatever it is, persuades me that the wax exists, I shall still conclude the same. And what I have here remarked of wax may be applied to all other things which are external to me [and which are met with outside of me]. And further, if the [notion or] perception of wax has seemed to me clearer and more distinct, not only after the sight or the touch, but also after many other causes have rendered it quite manifest to me, with how much more [evidence] and distinctness must it be said that I now know myself, since all the reasons which contribute to the knowledge of wax, or any other body whatever, are yet better proofs of the nature of my mind! And there are so many other things in the mind itself which may contribute to the elucidation of its nature, that those which depend on body such as these just mentioned, hardly merit being taken into account.

But finally here I am, having insensibly reverted to the point I desired, for, since it is now manifest to me that even bodies are not properly speaking known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding only, and since they are not known from the fact that they are seen or touched, but only because they are understood, I see clearly that there is nothing which is easier for me to know than my mind. But because it is difficult to rid oneself so promptly of an opinion to which one was accustomed for so long, it will be well that I should halt a little at this point, so that by the length of my meditation I may more deeply imprint on my memory this new knowledge.

Meditation III.

Of God: that He exists.

I shall now close my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I shall call away all my senses, I shall efface even from my thoughts all the images of corporeal things, or at least (for that is hardly possible) I shall esteem them as vain and false; and thus holding converse only with myself and considering my own nature, I shall try little by little to reach a better knowledge of and a more familiar acquaintanceship with myself. I am a thing that thinks, that is to say, that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a few things, that is ignorant of many [that loves, that hates], that wills, that desires, that also imagines and perceives; for as I remarked before, although the things which I perceive and imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me and in themselves, I am nevertheless assured that these modes of thought that I call perceptions and imaginations, inasmuch only as they are modes of thought, certainly reside [and are met with] in me.

And in the little that I have just said, I think I have summed up all that I really know, or at least all that hitherto I was aware that I knew. In order to try to extend my knowledge further, I shall now look around more carefully and see whether I cannot still discover in myself some other things which I have not hitherto perceived. I am certain that I am a thing which thinks; but do I not then likewise know what is requisite to render me certain of a truth? Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me

that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as a general rule that all things which I perceive15 very clearly and very distinctly are true.

At the same time I have before received and admitted many things to be very certain and manifest, which yet I afterwards recognised as being dubious. What then were these things? They were the earth, sky, stars and all other objects which I apprehended by means of the senses. But what did I clearly [and distinctly] perceive in them? Nothing more than that the ideas or thoughts of these things were presented to my mind. And not even now do I deny that these ideas are met with in me. But there was yet another thing which I affirmed, and which, owing to the habit which I had formed of believing it, I thought I perceived very clearly, although in truth I did not perceive it at all, to wit, that there were objects outside of me from which these ideas proceeded, and to which they were entirely similar. And it was in this that I erred, or, if perchance my judgment was correct, this was not due to any knowledge arising from my perception.

But when I took anything very simple and easy in the sphere of arithmetic or geometry into consideration, e.g. that two and three together made five, and other things of the sort, were not these present to my mind so clearly as to enable me to affirm that they were true? Certainly if I judged that since such matters could be doubted, this would not have been so for any other reason than that it came into my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a nature that I may have been deceived even concerning things which seemed to me most manifest. But every time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought, I am constrained to confess that it is easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence. And, on the other hand, always when I direct my attention to things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly, I am so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out into words such as these: Let who will deceive me, He can never cause me to be nothing while I think that I am, or some day cause it to be true to say that I have never been, it being true now to say that I am, or that two and three make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I see a manifest contradiction. And, certainly, since I have no reason to believe that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I have not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all, the reason for doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical. But in order to be able altogether to remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything.

And in order that I may have an opportunity of inquiring into this in an orderly way [without interrupting the order of meditation which I have proposed to myself, and which is little by little to pass from the notions which I find first of all in my mind to those which I shall later on discover in it] it is requisite that I should here divide my thoughts into certain kinds, and that I should consider in which of these kinds there is, properly speaking, truth or error to be found.

Of my thoughts some are, so to speak, images of the things, and to these alone is the title "idea" properly applied; examples are my thought of a man or of a chimera, of heaven, of an angel, or [even] of God. But other thoughts possess other forms as well. For example in willing, fearing, approving, denying, though I always perceive something as the subject of the action of my mind,16 yet by this action I always add something else to the idea17 which I have of that thing; and of the thoughts of this kind some are called volitions or affections, and others judgments.

Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond themselves, they cannot properly speaking be false; for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not less true that I imagine the one that the other. We must not fear likewise that falsity can enter into will and into affections, for although I may desire evil things, or even things that never existed, it is not the less true that I desire them. Thus there remains no more than the judgments which we make, in which I must take the greatest care not o deceive myself. But the principal error and the commonest which we may meet with in them, consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me are similar or conformable to the things which are outside me; for without doubt if I considered the ideas only as certain modes of my thoughts, without trying to relate them to anything beyond, they could scarcely give me material for error.

But among these ideas, some appear to me to be innate, some adventitious, and others to be formed [or invented] by myself; for, as I have the power of understanding what is called a thing, or a truth, or a thought, it appears to me that I hold this power from no other source than my own nature. But if I now hear some sound, if I see the sun, or feel heat, I have hitherto judged that these sensations proceeded from certain things that exist outside of me; and finally it appears to me that sirens, hippogryphs, and the like, are formed out of my own mind. But again I may possibly persuade myself that all these ideas are of the nature of those which I term adventitious, or else that they are all innate, or all fictitious: for I have not yet clearly discovered their true origin.

And my principal task in this place is to consider, in respect to those ideas which appear to me to proceed from certain objects that are outside me, what are the reasons which cause me to think them similar to these objects. It seems indeed in the first place that I am taught this lesson by nature; and, secondly, I experience in myself that these ideas do not depend on my will nor therefore on myself¥for they often present themselves to my mind in spite of my will. Just now, for instance, whether I will or whether I do not will, I feel heat, and thus I persuade myself that this feeling, or at least this idea of heat, is produced in me by something which is different from me, i.e. by the heat of the fire near which I sit. And nothing seems to me more obvious than to judge that this object imprints its likeness rather than anything else upon me.

Now I must discover whether these proofs are sufficiently strong and convincing. When I say that I am so instructed by nature, I merely mean a certain spontaneous inclination which impels me to believe in this connection, and not a natural light which makes me recognise that it is true. But these two

things are very different; for I cannot doubt that which the natural light causes me to believe to be true, as, for example, it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt, or other facts of the same kind. And I possess no other faculty whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood, which can teach me that what this light shows me to be true is not really true, and no other faculty that is equally trustworthy. But as far as [apparently] natural impulses are concerned, I have frequently remarked, when I had to make active choice between virtue and vice, that they often enough led me to the part that was worse; and this is why I do not see any reason for following them in what regards truth and error.

And as to the other reason, which is that these ideas must proceed from objects outside me, since they do not depend on my will, I do not find it any the more convincing. For just as these impulses of which I have spoken are found in me, notwithstanding that they do not always concur with my will, so perhaps there is in me some faculty fitted to produce these ideas without the assistance of any external things, even though it is not yet known by me; just as, apparently, they have hitherto always been found in me during sleep without the aid of any external objects.

And finally, though they did proceed from objects different from myself, it is not a necessary consequence that they should resemble these. On the contrary, I have noticed that in many cases there was a great difference between the object and its idea. I find, for example, two completely diverse ideas of the sun in my mind; the one derives its origin from the senses, and should be placed in the category of adventitious ideas; according to this idea the sun seems to be extremely small; but the other is derived from astronomical reasonings, i.e. is elicited from certain notions that are innate in me, or else it is formed by me in some other manner; in accordance with it the sun appears to be several times greater than the earth. These two ideas cannot, indeed, both resemble the same sun, and reason makes me believe that the one which seems to have originated directly from the sun itself, is the one which is most dissimilar to it.

All this causes me to believe that until the present time it has not been by a judgment that was certain [or premeditated], but only by a sort of blind impulse that I believed that things existed outside of, and different from me, which, by the organs of my senses, or by some other method whatever it might be, conveyed these ideas or images to me [and imprinted on me their similitudes].

But there is yet another method of inquiring whether any of the objects of which I have ideas within me exist outside of me. If ideas are only taken as certain modes of thought, I recognise amongst them no difference or inequality, and all appear to proceed from me in the same manner; but when we consider them as images, one representing one thing and the other another, it is clear that they are very different one from the other. There is no doubt that those which represent to me substances are something more, and contain so to speak more objective reality within them [that is to say, by representation participate in a higher degree of being or perfection] than those that simply represent modes or accidents; and that idea again by which I understand a supreme God, eternal, infinite, [immutable], omniscient, omnipotent, and Creator of all things which are outside of Himself, has certainly more objective reality in itself than those ideas by

which finite substances are represented.

Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect. For, pray, whence can the effect derive its reality, if not from its cause? And in what way can this cause communicate this reality to it, unless it possessed it in itself? And from this it follows, not only that something cannot proceed from nothing, but likewise that what is more perfect¥that is to say, which has more reality within itself¥cannot proceed from the less perfect. And this is not only evidently true of those effects which possess actual or formal reality, but also of the ideas in which we consider merely what is termed objective reality. To take an example, the stone which has not yet existed not only cannot now commence to be unless it has been produced by something which possesses within itself, either formally or eminently, all that enters into the composition of the stone [i.e. it must possess the same things or other more excellent things than those which exist in the stone] and heat can only be produced in a subject in which it did not previously exist by a cause that is of an order [degree or kind] at least as perfect as heat, and so in all other cases. But further, the idea of heat, or of a stone, cannot exist in me unless it has been placed within me by some cause which possesses within it at least as much reality as that which I conceive to exist in the heat or the stone. For although this cause does not transmit anything of its actual or formal reality to my idea, we must not for that reason imagine that it is necessarily a less real cause; we must remember that [since every idea is a work of the mind] its nature is such that it demands of itself no other formal reality than that which it borrows from my thought, of which it is only a mode [i.e. a manner or way of thinking]. But in order that an idea should contain some one certain objective reality rather than another, it must without doubt derive it from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as this idea contains of objective reality. For if we imagine that something is found in an idea which is not found in the cause, it must then have been derived from nought; but however imperfect may be this mode of being by which a thing is objectively [or by representation] in the understanding by its idea, we cannot certainly say that this mode of being is nothing, nor consequently, that the idea derives its origin from nothing.

Nor must I imagine that, since the reality that I consider in these ideas is only objective, it is not essential that this reality should be formally in the causes of my ideas, but that it is sufficient that it should be found objectively. For just as this mode of objective existence pertains to ideas by their proper nature, so does the mode of formal existence pertain tot he causes of those ideas (this is at least true of the first and principal) by the nature peculiar to them. And although it may be the case that one idea gives birth to another idea, that cannot continue to be so indefinitely; for in the end we must reach an idea whose cause shall be so to speak an archetype, in which the whole reality [or perfection] which is so to speak objectively [or by representation] in these ideas is contained formally [and really]. Thus the light of nature causes me to know clearly that the ideas in me are like [pictures or] images which can, in truth, easily fall short of the perfection of the objects from which they have been derived, but which can never contain

anything greater or more perfect.

And the longer and the more carefully that I investigate these matters, the more clearly and distinctly do I recognise their truth. But what am I to conclude from it all in the end? It is this, that if the objective reality of any one of my ideas is of such a nature as clearly to make me recognise that it is not in me either formally or eminently, and that consequently I cannot myself be the cause of it, it follows of necessity that I am not alone in the world, but that there is another being which exists, or which is the cause of this idea. On the other hand, had no such an idea existed in me, I should have had no sufficient argument to convince me of the existence of any being beyond myself; for I have made very careful investigation everywhere and up to the present time have been able to find no other ground.

But of my ideas, beyond that which represents me to myself, as to which there can here be no difficulty, there is another which represents a God, and there are others representing corporeal and inanimate things, others angels, others animals, and others again which represent to me men similar to myself.

As regards the ideas which represent to me other men or animals, or angels, I can however easily conceive that they might be formed by an admixture of the other ideas which I have of myself, of corporeal things, and of God, even although there were apart from me neither men nor animals, nor angels, in all the world.

And in regard to the ideas of corporeal objects, I do not recognise in them anything so great or so excellent that they might not have possibly proceeded from myself; for if I consider them more closely, and examine them individually, as I yesterday examined the idea of wax, I find that there is very little in them which I perceive clearly and distinctly. Magnitude or extension in length, breadth, or depth, I do so perceive; also figure which results from a termination of this extension, the situation which bodies of different figure preserve in relation to one another, and movement or change of situation; to which we may also add substance, duration and number. As to other things such as light, colours, sounds, scents, tastes, heat, cold and the other tactile qualities, they are thought by me with so much obscurity and confusion that I do not even know if they are true or false, i.e. whether the ideas which I form of these qualities are actually the ideas of real objects or not [or whether they only represent chimeras which cannot exist in fact]. For although I have before remarked that it is only in judgments that falsity, properly speaking, or formal falsity, can be met with, a certain material falsity may nevertheless be found in ideas, i.e. when these ideas represent what is nothing as though it were something. For example, the ideas which I have of cold and heat are so far from clear and distinct that by their means I cannot tell whether cold is merely a privation of heat, or heat a privation of cold, or whether both are real qualities, or are not such. And inasmuch as [since ideas resemble images] there cannot be any ideas which do not appear to represent some things, if it is correct to say that cold is merely a privation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive will not be improperly termed false, and the same holds good of other similar ideas.

To these it is certainly not necessary that I should attribute any author other than myself. For if they are

false, i.e. if they represent things which do not exist, the light of nature shows me that they issue from nought, that is to say, that they are only in me so far as something is lacking to the perfection of my nature. But if they are true, nevertheless because they exhibit so little reality to me that I cannot even clearly distinguish the thing represented from non-being, I do not see any reason why they should not be produced by myself.

As to the clear and distinct idea which I have of corporeal things, some of them seem as though I might have derived them from the idea which I possess of myself, as those which I have of substance, duration, number, and such like. For [even] when I think that a stone is a substance, or at least a thing capable of existing of itself, and that I am a substance also, although I conceive that I am a thing that thinks and not one that is extended, and that the stone on the other hand is an extended thing which does not think, and that thus there is a notable difference between the two conceptions¥they seem, nevertheless, to agree in this, that both represent substances. In the same way, when I perceive that I now exist and further recollect that I have in former times existed, and when I remember that I have various thoughts of which I can recognise the number, I acquire ideas of duration and number which I can afterwards transfer to any object that I please. But as to all the other qualities of which the ideas of corporeal things are composed, to wit, extension, figure, situation and motion, it is true that they are not formally in me, since I am only a thing that thinks; but because they are merely certain modes of substance [and so to speak the vestments under which corporeal substance appears to us] and because I myself am also a substance, it would seem that they might be contained in me eminently.

Hence there remains only the idea of God, concerning which we must consider whether it is something which cannot have proceeded from me myself. By the name God I understand a substance that is infinite [eternal, immutable], independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself and everything else, if anything else does exist, have been created. Now all these characteristics are such that the more diligently I attend to them, the less do they appear capable of proceeding from me alone; hence, from what has been already said, we must conclude that God necessarily exists.

For although the idea of substance is within me owing to the fact that I am substance, nevertheless I should not have the idea of an infinite substance¥since I am finite¥if it had not proceeded from some substance which was veritably infinite.

Nor should I imagine that I do not perceive the infinite by a true idea, but only by the negation of the finite, just as I perceive repose and darkness by the negation of movement and of light; for, on the contrary, I see that there is manifestly more reality in infinite substance than in finite, and therefore that in some way I have in me the notion of the infinite earlier then the finite¥to wit, the notion of God before that of myself. For how would it be possible that I should know that I doubt and desire, that is to say, that something is lacking to me, and that I am not quite perfect, unless I had within me some idea of a Being more perfect than myself, in comparison with which I should recognise the deficiencies of my nature?

And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps

materially false and that consequently I can derive it from nought [i.e. that possibly it exists in me because I am imperfect], as I have just said is the case with ideas of heat, cold and other such things; for, on the contrary, as this idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it more objective reality than any other, there can be none which is of itself more true, nor any in which there can be less suspicion of falsehood. The idea, I say, of this Being who is absolutely perfect and infinite, is entirely true; for although, perhaps, we can imagine that such a Being does not exist, we cannot nevertheless imagine that His idea represents nothing real to me, as I have said of the idea of cold. This idea is also very clear and distinct; since all that I conceive clearly and distinctly of the real and the true, and of what conveys some perfection, is in its entirety contained in this idea. And this does not cease to be true although I do not comprehend the infinite, or though in God there is an infinitude of things which I cannot comprehend, nor possibly even reach in any way by thought; for it is of the nature of the infinite that my nature, which is finite and limited, should not comprehend it; and it is sufficient that I should understand this, and that I should judge that all things which I clearly perceive and in which I know that there is some perfection, and possibly likewise an infinitude of properties of which I am ignorant, are in God formally or eminently, so that the idea which I have of Him may become the most true, most clear, and most distinct of all the ideas that are in my mind.

But possibly I am something more than I suppose myself to be, and perhaps all those perfections which I attribute to God are in some way potentially in me, although they do not yet disclose themselves, or issue in action. As a matter of fact I am already sensible that my knowledge increases [and perfects itself] little by little, and I see nothing which can prevent it from increasing more and more into infinitude; nor do I see, after it has thus been increased [or perfected], anything to prevent my being able to acquire by its means all the other perfections of the Divine nature; nor finally why the power I have of acquiring these perfections, if it really exists in me, shall not suffice to produce the ideas of them.

At the same time I recognise that this cannot be. For, in the first place, although it were true that every day my knowledge acquired new degrees of perfection, and that there were in my nature many things potentially which are not yet there actually, nevertheless these excellences do not pertain to [or make the smallest approach to] the idea which I have of God in whom there is nothing merely potential [but in whom all is present really and actually]; for it is an infallible token of imperfection in my knowledge that it increases little by little. and further, although my knowledge grows more and more, nevertheless I do not for that reason believe that it can ever be actually infinite, since it can never reach a point so high that it will be unable to attain to any greater increase. But I understand God to be actually infinite, so that He can add nothing to His supreme perfection. And finally I perceive that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being that exists potentially only, which properly speaking is nothing, but only by a being which is formal or actual.

To speak the truth, I see nothing in all that I have just said which by the light of nature is not manifest to anyone

who desires to think attentively on the subject; but when I slightly relax my attention, my mind, finding its vision somewhat obscured and so to speak blinded by the images of sensible objects, I do not easily recollect the reason why the idea that I possess of a being more perfect then I, must necessarily have been placed in me by a being which is really more perfect; and this is why I wish here to go on to inquire whether I, who have this idea, can exist if no such being exists.

And I ask, from whom do I then derive my existence? Perhaps from myself or from my parents, or from some other source less perfect than God; for we can imagine nothing more perfect than God, or even as perfect as He is.

But [were I independent of every other and] were I myself the author of my being, I should doubt nothing and I should desire nothing, and finally no perfection would be lacking to me; for I should have bestowed on myself every perfection of which I possessed any idea and should thus be God. And it must not be imagined that those things that are lacking to me are perhaps more difficult of attainment than those which I already possess; for, on the contrary, it is quite evident that it was a matter of much greater difficulty to bring to pass that I, that is to say, a thing or a substance that thinks, should emerge out of nothing, than it would be to attain to the knowledge of many things of which I am ignorant, and which are only the accidents of this thinking substance. But it is clear that if I had of myself possessed this greater perfection of which I have just spoken [that is to say, if I had been the author of my own existence], I should not at least have denied myself the things which are the more easy to acquire [to wit, many branches of knowledge of which my nature is destitute]; nor should I have deprived myself of any of the things contained in the idea which I form of God, because there are none of them which seem to me specially difficult to acquire: and if there were any that were more difficult to acquire, they would certainly appear to me to be such (supposing I myself were the origin of the other things which I possess) since I should discover in them that my powers were limited.

But though I assume that perhaps I have always existed just as I am at present, neither can I escape the force of this reasoning, and imagine that the conclusion to be drawn from this is, that I need not seek for any author of my existence. For all the course of my life may be divided into an infinite number of parts, none of which is in any way dependent on the other; and thus from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now, unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me. It is as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider with attention the nature of time, that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew, supposing it did not yet exist, so that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a distinction of the reason.

All that I thus require here is that I should interrogate myself, if I wish to know whether I possess a power which is capable of bringing it to pass that I who now am shall still be in the future; for since I am nothing but a thinking thing,

or at least since thus far it is only this portion of myself which is precisely in question at present, if such a power did reside in me, I should certainly be conscious of it. But I am conscious of nothing of the kind, and by this I know clearly that I depend on some being different from myself.

Possibly, however, this being on which I depend is not that which I call God, and I am created either by my parents or by some other cause less perfect than God. This cannot be, because, as I have just said, it is perfectly evident that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect; and thus since I am a thinking thing, and possess an idea of God within me, whatever in the end be the cause assigned to my existence, it must be allowed that it is likewise a thinking thing and that it possesses in itself the idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God. We may again inquire whether this cause derives its origin from itself or from some other thing. For if from itself, it follows by the reasons before brought forward, that this cause must itself be God; for since it possesses the virtue of self-existence, it must also without doubt have the power of actually possessing all the perfections of which it has the idea, that is, all those which I conceive as existing in God. But if it derives its existence from some other cause than itself, we shall again ask, for the same reason, whether this second cause exists by itself or through another, until from one step to another, we finally arrive at an ultimate cause, which will be God.

And it is perfectly manifest that in this there can be no regression into infinity, since what is in question is not so much the cause which formerly created me, as that which conserves me at the present time.

Nor can we suppose that several causes may have concurred in my production, and that from one I have received the idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God, and from another the idea of some other, so that all these perfections indeed exist somewhere in the universe, but not as complete in one unity which is God. On the contrary, the unity, the simplicity or the inseparability of all things which are in god is one of the principal perfections which I conceive to be in Him. And certainly the idea of this unity of all Divine perfections cannot have been placed in me by any cause from which I have not likewise received the ideas of all the other perfections; for this cause could not make me able to comprehend them as joined together in an inseparable unity without having at the same time caused me in some measure to know what they are [and in some way to recognise each one of them].

Finally, so far as my parents [from whom it appears I have sprung] are concerned, although all that I have ever been able to believe of them were true, that does not make it follow that it is they who conserve me, nor are they even the authors of my being in any sense, in so far as I am a thinking being; since what they did was merely to implant certain dispositions in that matter in which the self¥i.e. the mind, which alone I at present identify with myself¥is by me deemed to exist. And thus there can be no difficulty in their regard, but we must of necessity conclude from the fact alone that I exist, or that the idea of a Being supremely perfect¥that is of God¥is in me, that the proof of God's existence is grounded on the highest evidence.

It only remains to me to examine into the manner in which

I have acquired this idea from God; for I have not received it through the senses, and it is never presented to me unexpectedly, as is usual with the ideas of sensible things when these things present themselves, or seem to present themselves, to the external organs of my senses; nor is it likewise a fiction of my mind, for it is not in my power to take from or to add anything to it; and consequently the only alternative is that it is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me.

And one certainly ought not to find it strange that God, in creating me, placed this idea within me to be like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work; and it is likewise not essential that the mark shall be something different from the work itself. For from the sole fact that God created me it is most probable that in some way he has placed his image and similitude upon me, and that I perceive this similitude (in which the idea of God is contained) by means of the same faculty by which I perceive myself¥that is to say, when I reflect on myself I not only know that I am something [imperfect], incomplete and dependent on another, which incessantly aspires after something which is better and greater than myself, but I also know that He on whom I depend possesses in Himself all the great things towards which I aspire [and the ideas of which I find within myself], and that not indefinitely or potentially alone, but really, actually and infinitely; and that thus He is God. And the whole strength of the argument which I have here made use of to prove the existence of God consists in this, that I recognise that it is not possible that my nature should be what it is, and indeed that I should have in myself the idea of a God, if God did not veritably exist¥a God, I say, whose idea is in me, i.e. who possesses all those supreme perfections of which our mind may indeed have some idea but without understanding them all, who is liable to no errors or defect [and who has none of all those marks which denote imperfection]. From this it is manifest that He cannot be a deceiver, since the light of nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarily proceed from some defect.

But before I examine this matter with more care, and pass on to the consideration of other truths which may be derived from it, it seems to me right to pause for a while in order to contemplate God Himself, to ponder at leisure His marvellous attributes, to consider, and admire, and adore, the beauty of this light so resplendent, at least as far as the strength of my mind, which is in some measure dazzled by the sight, will allow me to do so. For just as faith teaches us that the supreme felicity of the other life consists only in this contemplation of the Divine Majesty, so we continue to learn by experience that a similar meditation, though incomparably less perfect, causes us to enjoy the greatest satisfaction of which we are capable in this life.

Meditation IV.

Of the True and the False.

I have been well accustomed these past days to detach my mind from my senses, and I have accurately observed that there are very few things that one knows with certainty respecting corporeal objects, that there are many more which are known to us respecting the human mind, and yet more still regarding God

Himself; so that I shall now without any difficulty abstract my thoughts from the consideration of [sensible or] imaginable objects, and carry them to those which, being withdrawn from all contact with matter, are purely intelligible. And certainly the idea which I possess of the human mind inasmuch as it is a thinking thing, and not extended in length, width and depth, nor participating in anything pertaining to body, is incomparably more distinct than is the idea of any corporeal thing. And when I consider that I doubt, that is to say, that I am an incomplete and dependent being, the idea of a being that is complete and independent, that is of God, presents itself to my mind with so much distinctness and clearness¥and from the fact alone that this idea is found in me, or that I who possess this idea exist, I conclude so certainly that God exists, and that my existence depends entirely on Him in every moment of my life¥that I do not think that the human mind is capable of knowing anything with more evidence and certitude. And it seems to me that I now have before me a road which will lead us from the contemplation of the true God (in whom all the treasures of science and wisdom are contained) to the knowledge of the other objects of the universe.

For, first of all, I recognise it to be impossible that He should ever deceive me; for in all fraud and deception some imperfection is to be found, and although it may appear that the power of deception is a mark of subtilty or power, yet the desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or feebleness, and accordingly cannot be found in God.

In the next place I experienced in myself a certain capacity for judging which I have doubtless received from God, like all the other things that I possess; and as He could not desire to deceive me, it is clear that He has not given me a faculty that will lead me to err if I use it aright.

And no doubt respecting this matter could remain, if it were not that the consequence would seem to follow that I can thus never be deceived; for if I hold all that I possess from God, and if He has not placed in me the capacity for error, it seems as though I could never fall into error. And it is true that when I think only of God [and direct my mind wholly to Him],18 I discover [in myself] no cause of error, or falsity; yet directly afterwards, when recurring to myself, experience shows me that I am nevertheless subject to an infinitude of errors, as to which, when we come to investigate them more closely, I notice that not only is there a real and positive idea of God or of a Being of supreme perfection present to my mind, but also, so to speak, a certain negative idea of nothing, that is, of that which is infinitely removed from any kind of perfection; and that I am in a sense something intermediate between God and nought, i.e. placed in such a manner between the supreme Being and non-being, that there is in truth nothing in me that can lead to error in so far as a sovereign Being has formed me; but that, as I in some degree participate likewise in nought or in non-being, i.e. in so far as I am not myself the supreme Being, and as I find myself subject to an infinitude of imperfections, I ought not to be astonished if I should fall into error. Thus do I recognise that error, in so far as it is such, is not a real thing depending on God, but simply a defect; and therefore, in order to fall into it, that I have no need to possess a special faculty given me by God for this very purpose, but that I fall into error from the fact that the power given me by God for

the purpose of distinguishing truth from error is not infinite.

Nevertheless this does not quite satisfy me; for error is not a pure negation [i.e. is not the dimple defect or want of some perfection which ought not to be mine], but it is a lack of some knowledge which it seems that I ought to possess. And on considering the nature of God it does not appear to me possible that He should have given me a faculty which is not perfect of its kind, that is, which is wanting in some perfection due to it. For if it is true that the more skilful the artizan, the more perfect is the work of his hands, what can have been produced by this supreme Creator of all things that is not in all its parts perfect? And certainly there is no doubt that God could have created me so that I could never have been subject to error; it is also certain that He ever wills what is best; is it then better that I should be subject to err than that I should not?

In considering this more attentively, it occurs to me in the first place that I should not be astonished if my intelligence is not capable of comprehending why God acts as He does; and that there is thus no reason to doubt of His existence from the fact that I may perhaps find many other things besides this as to which I am able to understand neither for what reason nor how God has produced them. For, in the first place, knowing that my nature is extremely feeble and limited, and that the nature of God is on the contrary immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, I have no further difficulty in recognising that there is an infinitude of matter in His power, the causes of which transcend my knowledge; and this reason suffices to convince me that the species of cause termed final, finds no useful employment in physical [or natural] things; for it does not appear to me that I can without temerity seek to investigate the [inscrutable] ends of God.

It further occurs to me that we should not consider one single creature separately, when we inquire as to whether the works of God are perfect, but should regard all his creations together. For the same thing which might possibly seem very imperfect with some semblance of reason if regarded by itself, is found to be very perfect if regarded as part of the whole universe; and although, since I resolved to doubt all things, I as yet have only known certainly my own existence and that of God, nevertheless since I have recognised the infinite power of God, I cannot deny that He may have produced many other things, or at least that He has the power of producing them, so that I may obtain a place as a part of a great universe.

Whereupon, regarding myself more closely, and considering what are my errors (for they alone testify to there being any imperfection in me), I answer that they depend on a combination of two causes, to wit, on the faculty of knowledge that rests in me, and on the power of choice or of free will¥that is to say, of the understanding and at the same time of the will. For by the understanding alone I [neither assert nor deny anything, but] apprehend19 the ideas of things as to which I can form a judgment. But no error is properly speaking found in it, provided the word error is taken in its proper signification; and though there is possibly an infinitude of things in the world of which I have no idea in my understanding, we cannot for all that say that it is deprived of these ideas [as we might say of something which is

required by its nature], but simply it does not possess these; because in truth there is no reason to prove that God should have given me a greater faculty of knowledge than He has given me; and however skillful a workman I represent Him to be, I should not for all that consider that He was bound to have placed in each of His works all the perfections which He may have been able to place in some. I likewise cannot complain that God has not given me a free choice or a will which is sufficient, ample and perfect, since as a matter of fact I am conscious of a will so extended as to be subject to no limits. And what seems to me very remarkable in this regard is that of all the qualities which I possess there is no one so perfect and so comprehensive that I do not very clearly recognise that it might be yet greater and more perfect. For, to take an example, if I consider the faculty of comprehension which I possess, I find that it is of very small extent and extremely limited, and at the same time I find the idea of another faculty much more ample and even infinite, and seeing that I can form the idea of it, I recognise from this very fact that it pertains to the nature of God. If in the same way I examine the memory, the imagination, or some other faculty, I do not find any which is not small and circumscribed, while in God it is immense [or infinite]. It is free-will alone or liberty of choice which I find to be so great in me that I can conceive no other idea to be more great; it is indeed the case that it is for the most part this will that causes me to know that in some manner I bear the image and similitude of God. For although the power of will is incomparably greater in God than in me, both by reason of the knowledge and the power which, conjoined with it, render it stronger and more efficacious, and by reason of its object, inasmuch as in God it extends to a great many things; it nevertheless does not seem to me greater if I consider it formally and precisely in itself: for the faculty of will consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or to shun it), or rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm or deny, pursue or shun those things placed before us by the understanding, we act so that we are unconscious that any outside force constrains us in doing so. For in order that I should be free it is not necessary that I should be indifferent as to the choice of one or the other of two contraries; but contrariwise the more I lean to the one¥whether I recognise clearly that the reasons of the good and true are to be found in it, or whether God so disposes my inward thought¥the more freely do I choose and embrace it. And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural knowledge, far from diminishing my liberty, rather increase it and strengthen it. Hence this indifference which I feel, when I am not swayed to one side rather than to the other by lack of reason, is the lowest grade of liberty, and rather evinces a lack or negation in knowledge than a perfection of will: for if I always recognised clearly what was true and good, I should never have trouble in deliberating as to what judgment or choice I should make, and then I should be entirely free without ever being indifferent.

From all this I recognise that the power of will which I have received from God is not of itself the source of my errors¥for it is very ample and very perfect of its kind¥any more than is the power of understanding; for since I understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for

understanding, there is no doubt that all that I understand, I understand as I ought, and it is not possible that I err in this. Whence then come my errors? They come from the sole fact that since the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand: and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error and sin, and chooses the evil for the good, or the false for the true.

For example, when I lately examined whether anything existed in the world, and found that from the very fact that I considered this question it followed very clearly that I myself existed, I could not prevent myself from believing that a thing I so clearly conceived was true: not that I found myself compelled to do so by some external cause, but simply because from great clearness in my mind there followed a great inclination of my will; and I believed this with so much the greater freedom or spontaneity as I possessed the less indifference towards it. Now, on the contrary, I not only know that I exist, inasmuch as I am a thinking thing, but a certain representation of corporeal nature is also presented to my mind; and it comes to pass that I doubt whether this thinking nature which is in me, or rather by which I am what I am, differs from this corporeal nature, or whether both are not simply the same thing; and I here suppose that I do not yet know any reason to persuade me to adopt the one belief rather than the other. From this it follows that I am entirely indifferent as to which of the two I affirm or deny, or even whether I abstain from forming any judgment in the matter.

And this indifference does not only extend to matters as to which the understanding has no knowledge, but also in general to all those which are not apprehended with perfect clearness at the moment when the will is deliberating upon them: for, however probable are the conjectures which render me disposed to form a judgment respecting anything, the simple knowledge that I have that those are conjectures alone and not certain and indubitable reasons, suffices to occasion me to judge the contrary. Of this I have had great experience of late when I set aside as false all that I had formerly held to be absolutely true, for the sole reason that I remarked that it might in some measure be doubted.

But if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly and am not deceived. But if I determine to deny or affirm, I no longer make use as I should of my free will, and if I affirm what is not true, it is evident that I deceive myself; even though I judge according to truth, this comes about only by chance, and I do not escape the blame of misusing my freedom; for the light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should always precede the determination of the will. And it is in the misuse of the free will that the privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error is met with. Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as it proceeds from me, but it is not found in the faculty which I have received from God, nor even in the act in so far as it depends on Him.

For I have certainly no cause to complain that God has not given me an intelligence which is more powerful, or a natural light which is stronger than that which I have

received from Him, since it is proper to the finite understanding not to comprehend a multitude of things, and it is proper to a created understanding to be finite; on the contrary, I have every reason to render thanks to God who owes me nothing and who has given me all the perfections I possess, and I should be far from charging Him with injustice, and with having deprived me of, or wrongfully withheld from me, these perfections which He has not bestowed upon me.

I have further no reason to complain that He has given me a will more ample than my understanding, for since the will consists only of one single element, and is so to speak indivisible, it appears that its nature is such that nothing can be abstracted from it [without destroying it]; and certainly the more comprehensive it is found to be, the more reason I have to render gratitude to the giver.

And, finally, I must also not complain that God concurs with me in forming the acts of the will, that is the judgment in which I go astray, because these acts are entirely true and good, inasmuch as they depend on God; and in a certain sense more perfection accrues to my nature from the fact that I can form them, than if I could not do so. As to the privation in which alone the formal reason of error or sin consists, it has no need of any concurrence from God, since it is not a thing [or an existence], and since it is not related to God as to a cause, but should be termed merely a negation [according to the significance given to these words in the Schools]. For in fact it is not an imperfection in God that He has given me the liberty to give or withhold my assent from certain things as to which He has not placed a clear and distinct knowledge in my understanding; but it is without doubt an imperfection in me not to make a good use of my freedom, and to give my judgment readily on matters which I only understand obscurely. I nevertheless perceive that God could easily have created me so that I never should err, although I still remained free, and endowed with a limited knowledge, viz. by giving to my understanding a clear and distinct intelligence of all things as to which I should ever have to deliberate; or simply by His engraving deeply in my memory the resolution never to form a judgment on anything without having a clear and distinct understanding of it, so that I could never forget it. And it is easy for me to understand that, in so far as I consider myself alone, and as if there were only myself in the world, I should have been much more perfect than I am, if God had created me so that I could never err. Nevertheless I cannot deny that in some sense it is a greater perfection in the whole universe that certain parts should not be exempt from error as others are than that all parts should be exactly similar. And I have no right to complain if God, having placed me in the world, has not called upon me to play a part that excels all others in distinction and perfection.

And further I have reason to be glad on the ground that if He has not given me the power of never going astray by the first means pointed out above, which depends on a clear and evident knowledge of all the things regarding which I can deliberate, He has at least left within my power the other means, which is firmly to adhere to the resolution never to give judgment on matters whose truth is not clearly known to me; for although I notice a certain weakness in my nature in that I cannot continually concentrate my mind on one single thought, I can yet, by attentive and frequently repeated meditation, impress it so forcibly on my memory that I shall

never fail to recollect it whenever I have need of it, and thus acquire the habit of never going astray.

And inasmuch as it is in this that the greatest and principal perfection of man consists, it seems to me that I have not gained little by this day's Meditation, since I have discovered the source of falsity and error. And certainly there can be no other source than that which I have explained; for as often as I so restrain my will within the limits of my knowledge that it forms no judgment except on matters which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can never be deceived; for every clear and distinct conception20 is without doubt something, and hence cannot derive its origin from what is nought, but must of necessity have God as its author¥God, I say, who being supremely perfect, cannot be the cause of any error; and consequently we must conclude that such a conception [or such a judgment] is true. Nor have I only learned to-day what I should avoid in order that I may not err, but also how I should act in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth; for without doubt I shall arrive at this end if I devote my attention sufficiently to those things which I perfectly understand; and if I separate from these that which I only understand confusedly and with obscurity. To these I shall henceforth diligently give heed.

Meditation V.

Of the essence of material things, and, again, of God, that He exists.

Many other matters respecting the attributes of God and my own nature or mind remain for consideration; but I shall possibly on another occasion resume the investigation of these. Now (after first noting what must be done or avoided, in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth) my principal task is to endeavour to emerge from the state of doubt into which I have these last days fallen, and to see whether nothing certain can be known regarding material things.

But before examining whether any such objects as I conceive exist outside of me, I must consider the ideas of them in so far as they are in my thought, and see which of them are distinct and which confused.

In the first place, I am able distinctly to imagine that quantity which philosophers commonly call continuous, or the extension in length, breadth, or depth, that is in this quantity, or rather in the object to which it is attributed. Further, I can number in it many different parts, and attribute to each of its parts many sorts of size, figure, situation and local movement, and, finally, I can assign to each of these movements all degrees of duration.

And not only do I know these things with distinctness when I consider them in general, but, likewise [however little I apply my attention to the matter], I discover an infinitude of particulars respecting numbers, figures, movements, and other such things, whose truth is so manifest, and so well accords with my nature, that when I begin to discover them, it seems to me that I learn nothing new, or recollect what I formerly knew¥that is to say, that I for the first time perceive things which were already present to my mind, although I had not as yet applied my mind to them.

And what I here find to be most important is that I

discover in myself an infinitude of ideas of certain things which cannot be esteemed as pure negations, although they may possibly have no existence outside of my thought, and which are not framed by me, although it is within my power either to think or not to think them, but which possess natures which are true and immutable. For example, when I imagine a triangle, although there may nowhere in the world be such a figure outside my thought, or ever have been, there is nevertheless in this figure a certain determinate nature, form, or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented, and which in no wise depends on my mind, as appears from the fact that diverse properties of that triangle can be demonstrated, viz. that its three angles are equal to two right angles, that the greatest side is subtended by the greatest angle, and the like, which now, whether I wish it or do not wish it, I recognise very clearly as pertaining to it, although I never thought of the matter at all when I imagined a triangle for the first time, and which therefore cannot be said to have been invented by me.

Nor does the objection hold good that possibly this idea of a triangle has reached my mind through the medium of my senses, since I have sometimes seen bodies triangular in shape; because I can form in my mind an infinitude of other figures regarding which we cannot have the least conception of their ever having been objects of sense, and I can nevertheless demonstrate various properties pertaining to their nature as well as to that of the triangle, and these must certainly all be true since I conceive them clearly. Hence they are something, and not pure negation; for it is perfectly clear that all that is true is something, and I have already fully demonstrated that all that I know clearly is true. And even although I had not demonstrated this, the nature of my mind is such that I could not prevent myself from holding them to be true so long as I conceive them clearly; and I recollect that even when I was still strongly attached to the objects of sense, I counted as the most certain those truths which I conceived clearly as regards figures, numbers, and the other matters which pertain to arithmetic and geometry, and, in general, to pure and abstract mathematics.

But now, if just because I can draw the idea of something from my thought, it follows that all which I know clearly and distinctly as pertaining to this object does really belong to it, may I not derive from this an argument demonstrating the existence of God? It is certain that I no less find the idea of God, that is to say, the idea of a supremely perfect Being, in me, than that of any figure or number whatever it is; and I do not know any less clearly and distinctly that an [actual and] eternal existence pertains to this nature than I know that all that which I am able to demonstrate of some figure or number truly pertains to the nature of this figure or number, and therefore, although all that I concluded in the preceding Meditations were found to be false, the existence of God would pass with me as at least as certain as I have ever held the truths of mathematics (which concern only numbers and figures) to be.

This indeed is not at first manifest, since it would seem to present some appearance of being a sophism. For being accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence, I easily persuade myself that the existence can be separated from the essence of God, and that we can thus conceive God as not actually existing. But,

nevertheless, when I think of it with more attention, I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a [rectilinear] triangle, or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley; and so there is not any less repugnance to our conceiving a God (that is, a Being supremely perfect) to whom existence is lacking (that is to say, to whom a certain perfection is lacking), than to conceive of a mountain which has no valley.

But although I cannot really conceive of a God without existence any more than a mountain without a valley, still from the fact that I conceive of a mountain with a valley, it does not follow that there is such a mountain in the world; similarly although I conceive of God as possessing existence, it would seem that it does not follow that there is a God which exists; for my thought does not impose any necessity upon things, and just as I may imagine a winged horse, although no horse with wings exists, so I could perhaps attribute existence to God, although no God existed.

But a sophism is concealed in this objection; for from the fact that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that there is any mountain or any valley in existence, but only that the mountain and the valley, whether they exist or do not exist, cannot in any way be separated one from the other. While from the fact that I cannot conceive God without existence, it follows that existence is inseparable from Him, and hence that He really exists; not that my thought can bring this to pass, or impose any necessity on things, but, on the contrary, because the necessity which lies in the thing itself, i.e. the necessity of the existence of God determines me to think in this way. For it is not within my power to think of God without existence (that is of a supremely perfect Being devoid of a supreme perfection) though it is in my power to imagine a horse either with wings or without wings.

And we must not here object that it is in truth necessary for me to assert that God exists after having presupposed that He possesses every sort of perfection, since existence is one of these, but that as a matter of fact my original supposition was not necessary, just as it is not necessary to consider that all quadrilateral figures can be inscribed in the circle; for supposing I thought this, I should be constrained to admit that the rhombus might be inscribed in the circle since it is a quadrilateral figure, which, however, is manifestly false. [We must not, I say, make any such allegations because] although it is not necessary that I should at any time entertain the notion of God, nevertheless whenever it happens that I think of a first and a sovereign Being, and, so to speak, derive the idea of Him from the storehouse of my mind, it is necessary that I should attribute to Him every sort of perfection, although I do not get so far as to enumerate them all, or to apply my mind to each one in particular. And this necessity suffices to make me conclude (after having recognised that existence is a perfection) that this first and sovereign Being really exists; just as though it is not necessary for me ever to imagine any triangle, yet, whenever I wish to consider a rectilinear figure composed only of three angles, it is absolutely essential that I should attribute to it all those properties which serve to bring about the conclusion that its three angles are not greater than two

right angles, even although I may not then be considering this point in particular. But when I consider which figures are capable of being inscribed in the circle, it is in no wise necessary that I should think that all quadrilateral figures are of this number; on the contrary, I cannot even pretend that this is the case, so long as I do not desire to accept anything which I cannot conceive clearly and distinctly. And in consequence there is a great difference between the false suppositions such as this, and the true ideas born within me, the first and principal of which is that of God. For really I discern in many ways that this idea is not something factitious, and depending solely on my thought, but that it is the image of a true and immutable nature; first of all, because I cannot conceive anything but God himself to whose essence existence [necessarily] pertains; in the second place because it is not possible for me to conceive two or more Gods in this same position; and, granted that there is one such God who now exists, I see clearly that it is necessary that He should have existed from all eternity, and that He must exist eternally; and finally, because I know an infinitude of other properties in God, none of which I can either diminish or change.

For the rest, whatever proof or argument I avail myself of, we must always return to the point that it is only those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly that have the power of persuading me entirely. And although amongst the matters which I conceive of in this way, some indeed are manifestly obvious to all, while others only manifest themselves to those who consider them closely and examine them attentively; still, after they have once been discovered, the latter are not esteemed as any less certain than the former. For example, in the case of every right-angled triangle, although it does not so manifestly appear that the square of the base is equal to the squares of the two other sides as that this base is opposite to the greatest angle; still, when this has once been apprehended, we are just as certain of its truth as of the truth of the other. And as regards God, if my mind were not pre-occupied with prejudices, and if my thought did not find itself on all hands diverted by the continual pressure of sensible things, there would be nothing which I could know more immediately and more easily than Him. For is there anything more manifest than that there is a God, that is to say, a Supreme Being, to whose essence alone existence pertains?21

And although for a firm grasp of this truth I have need of a strenuous application of mind, at present I not only feel myself to be as assured of it as of all that I hold as most certain, but I also remark that the certainty of all other things depends on it so absolutely, that without this knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly.

For although I am of such a nature that as long as22 I understand anything very clearly and distinctly, I am naturally impelled to believe it to be true, yet because I am also of such a nature that I cannot have my mind constantly fixed on the same object in order to perceive it clearly, and as I often recollect having formed a past judgment without at the same time properly recollecting the reasons that led me to make it, it may happen meanwhile that other reasons present themselves to me, which would easily cause me to change my opinion, if I were ignorant of the facts of the existence of God, and thus I should have no true and certain knowledge, but

only vague and vacillating opinions. Thus, for example, when I consider the nature of a [rectilinear] triangle, I who have some little knowledge of the principles of geometry recognise quite clearly that the three angles are equal to two right angles, and it is not possible for me not to believe this so long as I apply my mind to its demonstration; but so soon as I abstain from attending to the proof, although I still recollect having clearly comprehended it, it may easily occur that I come to doubt its truth, if I am ignorant of there being a God. For I can persuade myself of having been so constituted by nature that I can easily deceive myself even in those matters which I believe myself to apprehend with the greatest evidence and certainty, especially when I recollect that I have frequently judged matters to be true and certain which other reasons have afterwards impelled me to judge to be altogether false.

But after I have recognised that there is a God¥because at the same time I have also recognised that all things depend upon Him, and that He is not a deceiver, and from that have inferred that what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true¥although I no longer pay attention to the reasons for which I have judged this to be true, provided that I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it no contrary reason can be brought forward which could ever cause me to doubt of its truth; and thus I have a true and certain knowledge of it. And this same knowledge extends likewise to all other things which I recollect having formerly demonstrated, such as the truths of geometry and the like; for what can be alleged against them to cause me to place them in doubt? Will it be said that my nature is such as to cause me to be frequently deceived? But I already know that I cannot be deceived in the judgment whose grounds I know clearly. Will it be said that I formerly held many things to be true and certain which I have afterwards recognised to be false? But I had not had any clear and distinct knowledge of these things, and not as yet knowing the rule whereby I assure myself of the truth, I had been impelled to give my assent from reasons which I have since recognised to be less strong than I had at the time imagined them to be. What further objection can then be raised? That possibly I am dreaming (an objection I myself made a little while ago), or that all the thoughts which I now have are no more true than the phantasies of my dreams? But even though I slept the case would be the same, for all that is clearly present to my mind is absolutely true.

And so I very clearly recognise that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the true God, in so much that, before I knew Him, I could not have a perfect knowledge of any other thing. And now that I know Him I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of an infinitude of things, not only of those which relate to God Himself and other intellectual matters, but also of those which pertain to corporeal nature in so far as it is the object of pure mathematics [which have no concern with whether it exists or not].

Meditation VI.

Of the Existence of Material Things, and of the real distinction between the Soul and Body of Man.

Nothing further now remains but to inquire whether material things exist. And certainly I at least know that these may exist in so far as they are considered as the objects of pure mathematics, since in this aspect I perceive them clearly and distinctly. For there is no doubt that God possesses the power to produce everything that I am capable of perceiving with distinctness, and I have never deemed that anything was impossible for Him, unless I found a contradiction in attempting to conceive it clearly. Further, the faculty of imagination which I possess, and of which, experience tells me, I make use when I apply myself to the consideration of material things, is capable of persuading me of their existence; for when I attentively consider what imagination is, I find that it is nothing but a certain application of the faculty of knowledge to the body which is immediately present to it, and which therefore exists.

And to render this quite clear, I remark in the first place the difference that exists between the imagination and pure intellection [or conception23]. For example, when I imagine a triangle, I do not conceive it only as a figure comprehended by three lines, but I also apprehend24 these three lines as present by the power and inward vision of my mind,25 and this is what I call imagining. But if I desire to think of a chiliagon, I certainly conceive truly that it is a figure composed of a thousand sides, just as easily as I conceive of a triangle that it is a figure of three sides only; but I cannot in any way imagine the thousand sides of a chiliagon [as I do the three sides of a triangle], nor do I, so to speak, regard them as present [with the eyes of my mind]. And although in accordance with the habit I have formed of always employing the aid of my imagination when I think of corporeal things, it may happen that in imagining a chiliagon I confusedly represent to myself some figure, yet it is very evident that this figure is not a chiliagon, since it in no way differs from that which I represent to myself when I think of a myriagon or any other many-sided figure; nor does it serve my purpose in discovering the properties which go to form the distinction between a chiliagon and other polygons. But if the question turns upon a pentagon, it is quite true that I can conceive its figure as well as that of a chiliagon without the help of my imagination; but I can also imagine it by applying the attention of my mind to each of its five sides, and at the same time to the space which they enclose. And thus I clearly recognise that I have need of a particular effort of mind in order to effect the act of imagination, such as I do not require in order to understand, and this particular effort of mind clearly manifests the difference which exists between imagination and pure intellection.26

I remark besides that this power of imagination which is in one, inasmuch as it differs from the power of understanding, is in no wise a necessary element in my nature, or in [my essence, that is to say, in] the essence of my mind; for although I did not possess it I should doubtless ever remain the same as I now am, from which it appears that we might conclude that it depends on something which differs from me. And I easily conceive that if some body exists with which my mind is conjoined and united in such a way that it can apply itself to consider it when it pleases, it may be that by this means it can imagine corporeal objects; so that this mode of thinking differs from pure intellection only inasmuch as mind in its intellectual activity in some manner turns on

itself, and considers some of the ideas which it possesses in itself; while in imagining it turns towards the body, and there beholds in it something conformable to the idea which it has either conceived of itself or perceived by the senses. I easily understand, I say, that the imagination could be thus constituted if it is true that body exists; and because I can discover no other convenient mode of explaining it, I conjecture with probability that body does exist; but this is only with probability, and although I examine all things with care, I nevertheless do not find that from this distinct idea of corporeal nature, which I have in my imagination, I can derive any argument from which there will necessarily be deduced the existence of body.

But I am in the habit of imagining many other things besides this corporeal nature which is the object of pure mathematics, to wit, the colours, sounds, scents, pain, and other such things, although less distinctly. And inasmuch as I perceive these things much better through the senses, by the medium of which, and by the memory, they seem to have reached my imagination, I believe that, in order to examine them more conveniently, it is right that I should at the same time investigate the nature of sense perception, and that I should see if from the ideas which I apprehend by this mode of thought, which I call feeling, I cannot derive some certain proof of the existence of corporeal objects.

And first of all I shall recall to my memory those matters which I hitherto held to be true, as having perceived them through the senses, and the foundations on which my belief has rested; in the next place I shall examine the reasons which have since obliged me to place them in doubt; in the last place I shall consider which of them I must now believe.

First of all, then, I perceived that I had a head, hands, feet, and all other members of which this body¥which I considered as a part, or possibly even as the whole, of myself¥is composed. Further I was sensible that this body was placed amidst many others, from which it was capable of being affected in many different ways, beneficial and hurtful, and I remarked that a certain feeling of pleasure accompanied those that were beneficial, and pain those which were harmful. And in addition to this pleasure and pain, I also experienced hunger, thirst, and other similar appetites, as also certain corporeal inclinations towards joy, sadness, anger, and other similar passions. And outside myself, in addition to extension, figure, and motions of bodies, I remarked in them hardness, heat, and all other tactice qualities, and, further, light and colour, and scents and sounds, the variety of which gave me the means of distinguishing the sky, the earth, the sea, and generally all the other bodies, one from the other. And certainly, considering the ideas of all these qualities which presented themselves to my mind, and which alone I perceived properly or immediately, it was not without reason that I believed myself to perceive objects quite different from my thought, to wit, bodies from which those ideas proceeded; for I found by experience that these ideas presented themselves to me without my consent being requisite, so that I could not perceive any object, however desirous I might be, unless it were present to the organs of sense; and it was not in my power not to perceive it, when it was present. And because the ideas which I received through the senses were much more lively, more clear, and even, in their

own way, more distinct than any of those which I could of myself frame in meditation, or than those I found impressed on my memory, it appeared as though they could not have proceeded from my mind, so that they must necessarily have been produced in me by some other things. And having no knowledge of those objects excepting the knowledge which the ideas themselves gave me, nothing was more likely to occur to my mind than that the objects were similar to the ideas which were caused. And because I likewise remembered that I had formerly made use of my senses rather than my reason, and recognised that the ideas which I formed of myself were not so distinct as those which I perceived through the senses, and that they were most frequently even composed of portions of these last, I persuaded myself easily that I had no idea in my mind which had not formerly come to me through the senses. Nor was it without some reason that I believed that this body (which be a certain special right I call my own) belonged to me more properly and more strictly than any other; for in fact I could never be separated from it as from other bodies; I experienced in it and on account of it all my appetites and affections, and finally I was touched by the feeling of pain and the titillation of pleasure in its parts, and not in the parts of other bodies which were separated from it. But when I inquired, why, from some, I know not what, painful sensation, there follows sadness of mind, and from the pleasurable sensation there arises joy, or why this mysterious pinching of the stomach which I call hunger causes me to desire to eat, and dryness of throat causes a desire to drink, and so on, I could give no reason excepting that nature taught me so; for there is certainly no affinity (that I at least can understand) between the craving of the stomach and the desire to eat, any more than between the perception of whatever causes pain and the thought of sadness which arises from this perception. And in the same way it appeared to me that I had learned from nature all the other judgments which I formed regarding the objects of my senses, since I remarked that these judgments were formed in me before I had the leisure to weigh and consider any reasons which might oblige me to make them.

But afterwards many experiences little by little destroyed all the faith which I had rested in my senses; for I from time to time observed that those towers which from afar appeared to me to be round, more closely observed seemed square, and that colossal statues raised on the summit of these towers, appeared as quite tiny statues when viewed from the bottom; and so in an infinitude of other cases I found error in judgments founded on the external senses. And not only in those founded on the external senses, but even in those founded on the internal as well; for is there anything more intimate or more internal than pain? And yet I have learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut off, that they sometimes seemed to feel pain in the part which had been amputated, which made me think that I could not be quite certain that it was a certain member which pained me, even although I felt pain in it. And to those grounds of doubt I have lately added two others, which are very general; the first is that I never have believed myself to feel anything in waking moments which I cannot also sometimes believe myself to feel when I sleep, and as I do not think that these things which I seem to feel in sleep, proceed from objects outside of me, I do not see any reason why I should

have this belief regarding objects which I seem to perceive while awake. The other was that being still ignorant, or rather supposing myself to be ignorant, of the author of my being, I saw nothing to prevent me from having been so constituted by nature that I might be deceived even in matters which seemed to me to be most certain. And as to the grounds on which I was formerly persuaded of the truth of sensible objects, I had not much trouble in replying to them. For since nature seemed to cause me to lean towards many things from which reason repelled me, I did not believe that I should trust much to the teachings of nature. And although the ideas which I receive by the senses do not depend on my will, I did not think that one should for that reason conclude that they proceeded from things different from myself, since possibly some faculty might be discovered in me¥though hitherto unknown to me¥which produced them.

But now that I begin to know myself better, and to discover more clearly the author of my being, I do not in truth think that I should rashly admit all the matters which the senses seem to teach us, but, on the other hand, I do not think that I should doubt them all universally.

And first of all, because I know that all things which I apprehend clearly and distinctly can be created by God as I apprehend them, it suffices that I am able to apprehend one thing apart from another clearly and distinctly in order to be certain that the one is different from the other, since they may be made to exist in separation at least by the omnipotence of God; and it does not signify by what power this separation is made in order to compel me to judge them to be different: and, therefore, just because I know certainly that I exist, and that meanwhile I do not remark that any other thing necessarily pertains to my nature or essence, excepting that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thin [or a substance whose whole essence or nature is to think]. And although possibly (or rather certainly, as I shall say in a moment) I possess a body with which I am very intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I [that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am], is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it.

I further find in myself faculties imploying modes of thinking peculiar to themselves, to wit, the faculties of imagination and feeling, without which I can easily conceive myself clearly and distinctly as a complete being; while, on the other hand, they cannot be so conceived apart from me, that is without an intelligent substance in which they reside, for [in the notion we have of these faculties, or, to use the language of the Schools] in their formal concept, some kind of intellection is comprised, from which I infer that they are distinct from me as its modes are from a thing. I observe also in me some other faculties such as that of change of position, the assumption of different figures and such like, which cannot be conceived, any more than can the preceding, apart from some substance to which they are attached, and consequently cannot exist without it; but it is very clear that these faculties, if it be true that they exist, must be attached to some corporeal or extended substance, and not to

an intelligent substance, since in the clear and distinct conception of these there is some sort of extension found to be present, but no intellection at all. There is certainly further in me a certain passive faculty of perception, that is, of receiving and recognising the ideas of sensible things, but this would be useless to me [and I could in no way avail myself of it], if there were not either in me or in some other thing another active faculty capable of forming and producing these ideas. But this active faculty cannot exist in me [inasmuch as I am a thing that thinks] seeing that it does not presuppose thought, and also that those ideas are often produced in me without my contributing in any way to the same, and often even against my will; it is thus necessarily the case that the faculty resides in some substance different from me in which all the reality which is objectively in the ideas that are produced by this faculty is formally or eminently contained, as I remarked before. And this substance is either a body, that is, a corporeal nature in which there is contained formally [and really] all that which is objectively [and by representation] in those ideas, or it is God Himself, or some other creature more noble than body in which that same is contained eminently. But, since God is no deceiver, it is very manifest that He does not communicate to me these ideas immediately and by Himself, nor yet by the intervention of some creature in which their reality is not formally, but only eminently, contained. For since He has given me no faculty to recognise that this is the case, but, on the other hand, a very great inclination to believe [that they are sent to me or] that they are conveyed to me by corporeal objects, I do not see how He could be defended from the accusation of deceit if these ideas were produced by causes other than corporeal objects. Hence we must allow that corporeal things exist. However, they are perhaps not exactly what we perceive by the senses, since this comprehension by the senses is in many instances very obscure and confused; but we must at least admit that all things which I conceive in them clearly and distinctly, that is to say, all things which, speaking generally, are comprehended in the object of pure mathematics, are truly to be recognised as external objects.

As to other things, however, which are either particular only, as, for example, that the sun is of such and such a figure, etc., or which are less clearly and distinctly conceived, such as light, sound, pain and the like, it is certain that although they are very dubious and uncertain, yet on the sole ground that God is not a deceiver, and that consequently He has not permitted any falsity to exist in my opinion which He has not likewise given me the faculty of correcting, I may assuredly hope to conclude that I have within me the means of arriving at the truth even here. And first of all there is no doubt that in all things which nature teaches me there is some truth contained; for by nature, considered in general, I now understand no other thing than either God Himself or else the order and disposition which God has established in created things; and by my nature in particular I understand no other thing than the complexus of all the things which God has given me.

But there is nothing which this nature teaches me more expressly [nor more sensibly] than that I have a body which is adversely affected when I feel pain, which has need of food or drink when I experience the feelings of hunger and thirst, and so on; nor can I doubt there being some truth in all this.

Nature also teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole. For if that were not the case, when my body is hurt, I, who am merely a thinking thing, should not feel pain, for I should perceive this wound by the understanding only, just as the sailor perceives by sight when something is damaged in his vessel; and when my body has need of drink or food, I should clearly understand the fact without being warned of it by confused feelings of hunger and thirst. For all these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are in truth none other than certain confused modes of thought which are produced by the union and apparent intermingling of mind and body.

Moreover, nature teaches me that many other bodies exist around mine, of which some are to be avoided, and others sought after. And certainly from the fact that I am sensible of different sorts of colours, sounds, scents, tastes, heat, hardness, etc., I very easily conclude that there are in the bodies from which all these diverse sense-perceptions proceed certain variations which answer to them, although possibly these are not really at all similar to them. And also from the fact that amongst these different sense-perceptions some are very agreeable to me and others disagreeable, it is quite certain that my body (or rather myself in my entirety, inasmuch as I am formed of body and soul) may receive different impressions agreeable and disagreeable from the other bodies which surround it.

But there are many other things which nature seems to have taught me, but which at the same time I have never really received from her, but which have been brought about in my mind by a certain habit which I have of forming inconsiderate judgments on things; and thus it may easily happen that these judgments contain some error. Take, for example, the opinion which I hold that all space in which there is nothing that affects [or makes an impression on] my senses is void; that in a body which is warm there is something entirely similar to the idea of heat which is in me; that in a white or green body there is the same whiteness or greenness that I perceive; that in a bitter or sweet body there is the same taste, and so on in other instances; that the stars, the towers, and all other distant bodies are of the same figure and size as they appear from far off to our eyes, etc. But in order that in this there should be nothing which I do not conceive distinctly, I should define exactly what I really understand when I say that I am taught somewhat by nature. For here I take nature in a more limited signification than when I term it the sum of all the things given me by God, since in this sum many things are comprehended which only pertain to mind (and to these I do not refer in speaking of nature) such as the notion which I have of the fact that what has once been done cannot ever be undone and an infinitude of such things which I know by the light of nature [without the help of the body]; and seeing that it comprehends many other matters besides which only pertain to body, and are no longer here contained under the name of nature, such as the quality of weight which it possesses and the like, with which I also do not deal; for in talking of nature I only treat of those things given by God to me as a being composed of mind and body. But the nature here

described truly teaches me to flee from things which cause the sensation of pain, and seek after the things which communicate to me the sentiment of pleasure and so forth; but I do not see that beyond this it teaches me that from those diverse sense-perceptions we should ever form any conclusion regarding things outside of us, without having [carefully and maturely] mentally examined them beforehand. For it seems to me that it is mind alone, and not mind and body in conjunction, that is requisite to a knowledge of the truth in regard to such things. Thus, although a star makes no larger an impression on my eye than the flame of a little candle there is yet in me no real or positive propensity impelling me to believe that it is not greater than that flame; but I have judged it to be so from my earliest years, without any rational foundation. And although in approaching fire I feel heat, and in approaching it a little too near I even feel pain, there is at the same time no reason in this which could persuade me that there is in the fire something resembling this heat any more than there is in it something resembling the pain; all that I have any reason to believe from this is, that there is something in it, whatever it may be, which excites in me these sensations of heat or of pain. So also, although there are spaces in which I find nothing which excites my senses, I must not from that conclude that these spaces contain no body; for I see in this, as in other similar things, that I have been in the habit of perverting the order of nature, because these perceptions of sense having bee placed within me by nature merely for the purpose of signifying to my mind what things are beneficial or hurtful to the composite whole of which it forms a part, and being up to that point sufficiently clear and distinct, I yet avail myself of them as though they were absolute rules by which I might immediately determine the essence of the bodies which are outside me, as to which, in fact, they can teach me nothing but what is most obscure and confused.

But I have already sufficiently considered how, notwithstanding the supreme goodness of God, falsity enters into the judgments I make. Only here a new difficulty is presented¥one respecting those things the pursuit or avoidance of which is taught me by nature, and also respecting the internal sensations which I possess, and in which I seem to have sometimes detected error [and thus to be directly deceived by my own nature]. To take an example, the agreeable taste of some food in which poison has been intermingled may induce me to partake of the poison, and thus deceive me. It is true, at the same time, that in this case nature may be excused, for it only induces me to desire food in which I find a pleasant taste, and not to desire the poison which is unknown to it; and thus I can infer nothing from this fact, except that my nature is not omniscient, at which there is certainly no reason to be astonished, since man, being finite in nature, can only have knowledge the perfectness of which is limited.

But we not unfrequently deceive ourselves even in those things to which we are directly impelled by nature, as happens with those who when they are sick desire to drink or eat things hurtful to them. It will perhaps be said here that the cause of their deceptiveness is that their nature is corrupt, but that does not remove the difficulty, because a sick man is none the less truly God's creature than he who is in health; and it is therefore as repugnant to God's goodness for the one to have a deceitful nature as it is for the other. And as a

clock composed of wheels and counter-weights no less exactly observes the laws of nature when it is badly made, and does not show the time properly, than when it entirely satisfies the wishes of its maker, and as, if I consider the body of a man as being a sort of machine so built up and composed of nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin, that though there were no mind in it at all, it would not cease to have the same motions as at present, exception being made of those movements which are due to the direction of the will, and in consequence depend upon the mind [as apposed to those which operate by the disposition of its organs], I easily recognise that it would be as natural to this body, supposing it to be, for example, dropsical, to suffer the parchedness of the throat which usually signifies to the mind the feeling of thirst, and to be disposed by this parched feeling to move the nerves and other parts in the way requisite for drinking, and thus to augment its malady and do harm to itself, as it is natural to it, when it has no indisposition, to be impelled to drink for its good by a similar cause. And although, considering the use to which the clock has been destined by its maker, I may say that it deflects from the order of its nature when it does not indicate the hours correctly; and as, in the same way, considering the machine of the human body as having been formed by God in order to have in itself all the movements usually manifested there, I have reason for thinking that it does not follow the order of nature when, if the throat is dry, drinking does harm to the conservation of health, nevertheless I recognise at the same time that this last mode of explaining nature is very different from the other. For this is but a purely verbal characterisation depending entirely on my thought, which compares a sick man and a badly constructed clock with the idea which I have of a healthy man and a well made clock, and it is hence extrinsic to the things to which it is applied; but according to the other interpretation of the term nature I understand something which is truly found in things and which is therefore not without some truth.

But certainly although in regard to the dropsical body it is only so to speak to apply an extrinsic term when we say that its nature is corrupted, inasmuch as apart from the need to drink, the throat is parched; yet in regard to the composite whole, that is to say, to the mind or soul united to this body, it is not a purely verbal predicate, but a real error of nature, for it to have thirst when drinking would be hurtful to it. And thus it still remains to inquire how the goodness of God does not prevent the nature of man so regarded from being fallacious.

In order to begin this examination, then, I here say, in the first place, that there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For, as a matter of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from my mind. And the faculties of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind which employs itself in willing and in feeling and understanding. But it is quite otherwise with

corporeal or extended objects, for there is not one of these imaginable by me which my mind cannot easily divide into parts, and which consequently I do not recognise as being divisible; this would be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already learned it from other sources.

I further notice that the mind does not receive the impressions from all parts of the body immediately, but only from the brain, or perhaps even from one of its smallest parts, to wit, from that in which the common sense27 is said to reside, which, whenever it is disposed in the same particular way, conveys the same thing to the mind, although meanwhile the other portions of the body may be differently disposed, as is testified by innumerable experiments which it is unnecessary here to recount.

I notice, also, that the nature of body is such that none of its parts can be moved by another part a little way off which cannot also be moved in the same way by each one of the parts which are between the two, although this more remote part does not act at all. As, for example, in the cord ABCD [which is in tension] if we pull the last part D, the first part A will not be moved in any way differently from what would be the case if one of the intervening parts B or C were pulled, and the last part D were to remain unmoved. And in the same way, when I feel pain in my foot, my knowledge of physics teaches me that this sensation is communicated by means of nerves dispersed through the foot, which, being extended like cords from there to the brain, when they are contracted in the foot, at the same time contract the inmost portions of the brain which is their extremity and place of origin, and then excite a certain movement which nature has established in order to cause the mind to be affected by a sensation of pain represented as existing in the foot. But because these nerves must pass through the tibia, the thigh, the loins, the back and the neck, in order to reach from the leg to the brain, it may happen that although their extremities which are in the foot are not affected, but only certain ones of their intervening parts [which pass by the loins or the neck], this action will excite the same movement in the brain that might have been excited there by a hurt received in the foot, in consequence of which the mind will necessarily feel in the foot the same pain as if it had received a hurt. And the same holds good of all the other perceptions of our senses.

I notice finally that since each of the movements which are in the portion of the brain by which the mind is immediately affected brings about one particular sensation only, we cannot under the circumstances imagine anything more likely than that this movement, amongst all the sensations which it is capable of impressing on it, causes mind to be affected by that one which is best fitted and most generally useful for the conservation of the human body when it is in health. But experience makes us aware that all the feelings with which nature inspires us are such as I have just spoken of; and there is therefore nothing in them which does not give testimony to the power and goodness of the God [who has produced them28]. Thus, for example, when the nerves which are in the feet are violently or more than usually moved, their movement, passing through the medulla of the spine29 to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a sign to the mind which makes it feel somewhat, to wit, pain, as though in the foot,

by which the mind is excited to do its utmost to remove the cause of the evil as dangerous and hurtful to the foot. It is true that God could have constituted the nature of man in such a way that this same movement in the brain would have conveyed something quite different to the mind; for example, it might have produced consciousness of itself either in so far as it is in the brain, or as it is in the foot, or as it is in some other place between the foot and the brain, or it might finally have produced consciousness of anything else whatsoever; but none of all this would have contributed so well to the conservation of the body. Similarly, when we desire to drink, a certain dryness of the throat is produced which moves its nerves, and by their means the internal portions of the brain; and this movement causes in the mind the sensation of thirst, because in this case there is nothing more useful to us than to become aware that we have need to drink for the conservation o our health; and the same holds good in other instances.

From this it is quite clear that, notwithstanding the supreme goodness of God, the nature of man, inasmuch as it is composed of mind and body, cannot be otherwise than sometimes a source of deception. For if there is any cause which excites, not in the foot but in some part of the nerves which are extended between the foot and the brain, or even in the brain itself, the same movement which usually is produced when the foot is detrimentally affected, pain will be experienced as though it were in the foot, and the sense will thus naturally be deceived; for since the same movement in the brain is capable of causing but one sensation in the mind, and this sensation is much more frequently excited by a cause which hurts the foot than by another existing in some other quarter, it is reasonable that it should convey to the mind pain in the foot rather than in any other part of the body. And although the parchedness of the throat does not always proceed, as it usually does, from the fact that drinking is necessary for the health of the body, but sometimes comes from quite a different cause, as is the case with dropsical patients, it is yet much better that it should mislead on this occasion than if, on the other hand, it were always to deceive us when the body is in good health; and so on in similar cases.

And certainly this consideration is of great service to me, not only in enabling me to recognise all the errors to which my nature is subject, but also in enabling me to avoid them or to correct them more easily. for knowing that all my senses more frequently indicate to me truth than falsehood respecting the things which concern that which is beneficial to the body, and being able almost always to avail myself of many of them in order to examine one particular thing, and, besides that, being able to make use of my memory in order to connect the present with the past, and of my understanding which already has discovered all the causes of my errors, I ought no longer to fear that falsity may be found in matters every day presented to me by my senses. And I ought to set aside all the doubts of these past days as hyperbolical and ridiculous, particularly that very common uncertainty respecting sleep, which I could not distinguish from the waking state; for at present I find a very notable difference between the two, inasmuch as our memory can never connect our dreams one with the other, or with the whole course of our lives, as it unites events which happen to us while we are

awake. And, as a matter of fact, if someone, while I was awake, quite suddenly appeared to me and disappeared as fast as do the images which I see in sleep, so that I could not know from whence the form came nor whither it went, it would not be without reason that I should deem it a spectre or a phantom formed by my brain [and similar to those which I form in sleep], rather than a real man. But when I perceive things as to which I know distinctly both the place from which they proceed, and that in which they are, and the time at which they appeared to me; and when, without any interruption, I can connect the perceptions which I have of them with the whole course of my life, I am perfectly assured that these perceptions occur while I am waking and not during sleep. And I ought in no wise to doubt the truth of such matters, if, after having called up all my senses, my memory, and my understanding, to examine them, nothing is brought to evidence by any one of them which is repugnant to what is set forth by the others. For because God is in no wise a deceiver, it follows that I am not deceived in this. But because the exigencies of action often oblige us to make up our minds before having leisure to examine matters carefully, we must confess that the life of man is very frequently subject to error in respect to individual objects, and we must in the end acknowledge the infirmity of our nature.

2For convenience sake the "Objections and Replies" are published in the second volume of this edition.
3The French version is followed here.
4The French version is followed here.
5When it is thought desirable to insert additional readings from the French version this will be indicated by the use of square brackets.
6Between the Praefatio ad Lectorem and the Synopsis, the Paris Edition (1st Edition) interpolates an Index which is not found in the Amsterdam Edition (2nd Edition). Since Descartes did not reproduce it, he was doubtless not its author. Mersenne probably composed it himself, adjusting it to the paging of the first Edition. (Note in Adam and Tannery's Edition.)
7intellectio.
8imaginatio.
9In place of this long title at the head of the page the first Edition had immediately after the Synopsis, and on the same page 7, simply "First Meditation." (Adam's Edition.)
10Or "form an image" (effingo).
11Sentire.
12entendement F., mens L.
13inspectio.
14sensus communis.
15Percipio, F. nous concevons.
16The French version is followed here as being more explicit. In it "action de mon esprit" replaces "mea cogitatio."

17In the Latin version "similitudinem."
18Not in the French version.
19percipio.
20perceptio.
21"In the idea of whom alone necessary or eternal existence is comprised." French version.
22"From the moment that." French version.
23"Conception," French version. "intellectionem," Latin version.
24intueor.
25acie mentis.
26intellectionem.
27sensus communis.
28Latin version only.
29spini dorsae medullam.

The Enchiridion, or Manual

Epictetus

c. 135 CE.

The Enchiridion

1. Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.

The things in our control are by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered; but those not in our control are weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others. Remember, then, that if you suppose that things which are slavish by nature are also free, and that what belongs to others is your own, then you will be hindered. You will lament, you will be disturbed, and you will find fault both with gods and men. But if you suppose that only to be your own which is your own, and what belongs to others such as it really is, then no one will ever compel you or restrain you. Further, you will find fault with no one or accuse no one. You will do nothing against your will. No one will hurt you, you will have no enemies, and you not be harmed.

Aiming therefore at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself to be carried, even with a slight tendency, towards the attainment of lesser things. Instead, you must entirely quit some things and for the present postpone the rest. But if you would both have these great things, along with power and riches, then you will not gain even the latter, because you aim at the former too: but you will absolutely fail of the former, by which alone happiness and freedom are achieved.

Work, therefore to be able to say to every harsh appearance, "You are but an appearance, and not absolutely the thing you appear to be." And then examine it by those rules which you have, and first, and chiefly, by this: whether it concerns the things which are in our own control, or those which are not; and, if it concerns anything not in our control, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.

2. Remember that following desire promises the attainment of that of which you are desirous; and aversion promises the avoiding that to which you are averse. However, he who fails to obtain the object of his desire is disappointed, and he who incurs the object of his aversion wretched. If, then, you confine your aversion to those objects only which are contrary to the natural use of your faculties, which you have in your own control, you will never incur anything to which you are

averse. But if you are averse to sickness, or death, or poverty, you will be wretched. Remove aversion, then, from all things that are not in our control, and transfer it to things contrary to the nature of what is in our control. But, for the present, totally suppress desire: for, if you desire any of the things which are not in your own control, you must necessarily be disappointed; and of those which are, and which it would be laudable to desire, nothing is yet in your possession. Use only the appropriate actions of pursuit and avoidance; and even these lightly, and with gentleness and reservation.

3. With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved, remember to tell yourself of what general nature they are, beginning from the most insignificant things. If, for example, you are fond of a specific ceramic cup, remind yourself that it is only ceramic cups in general of which you are fond. Then, if it breaks, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies.

4. When you are going about any action, remind yourself what nature the action is. If you are going to bathe, picture to yourself the things which usually happen in the bath: some people splash the water, some push, some use abusive language, and others steal. Thus you will more safely go about this action if you say to yourself, "I will now go bathe, and keep my own mind in a state conformable to nature." And in the same manner with regard to every other action. For thus, if any hindrance arises in bathing, you will have it ready to say, "It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to keep my mind in a state conformable to nature; and I will not keep it if I am bothered at things that happen.

5. Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things. Death, for instance, is not terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death that it is terrible. When therefore we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never attribute it to others, but to ourselves; that is, to our own principles. An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his own bad condition upon others. Someone just starting instruction will lay the fault on himself. Some who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others nor on himself.

6. Don't be prideful with any excellence that is not your own. If a horse should be prideful and say, " I am handsome," it would be supportable. But when you are prideful, and say, " I have a handsome horse," know that you are proud of what is, in fact, only the good of the horse. What, then, is your own? Only your reaction to the appearances of things. Thus, when you behave conformably to nature in reaction to how things appear, you will be proud with reason; for you will take pride in some good of your own.

7. Consider when, on a voyage, your ship is anchored; if you go on shore to get water you may along the way amuse yourself with picking up a shellish, or an onion. However, your thoughts and continual attention ought to be bent towards the ship, waiting for the captain to call on board; you must then immediately leave all these things, otherwise you will be thrown into the ship, bound neck and feet like a sheep. So it is with life. If, instead of an onion or a shellfish, you are given a wife or child, that is fine. But if the captain calls, you must run to the ship, leaving them, and regarding none of them. But if you are old, never go far from the ship: lest, when you are called, you should be unable to come in time.

8. Don't demand that things happen as you wish, but wish that they happen as they do happen, and you will go on well.

9. Sickness is a hindrance to the body, but not to your ability to choose, unless that is your choice. Lameness is a hindrance to the leg, but not to your ability to choose. Say this to yourself with regard to everything that happens, then you will see such obstacles as hindrances to something else, but not to yourself.

10. With every accident, ask yourself what abilities you have for making a proper use of it. If you see an attractive person, you will find that self-restraint is the ability you have against your desire. If you are in pain, you will find fortitude. If you hear unpleasant language, you will find patience. And thus habituated, the appearances of things will not hurry you away along with them.

11. Never say of anything, "I have lost it"; but, "I have returned it." Is your child dead? It is returned. Is your wife dead? She is returned. Is your estate taken away? Well, and is not that likewise returned? "But he who took it away is a bad man." What difference is it to you who the giver assigns to take it back? While he gives it to you to possess, take care of it; but don't view it as your own, just as travelers view a hotel.

12. If you want to improve, reject such reasonings as these: "If I neglect my affairs, I'll have no income; if I don't correct my servant, he will be bad." For it is better to die with hunger, exempt from grief and fear, than to live in affluence with perturbation; and it is better your servant should be bad, than you unhappy.

Begin therefore from little things. Is a little oil spilt? A little wine stolen? Say to yourself, "This is the price paid for apathy, for tranquillity, and nothing is to be had for nothing." When you call your servant, it is possible that he may not come; or, if he does, he may not do what you want. But he is by no means of such importance that it should be in his power to give you any disturbance.

13. If you want to improve, be content to be thought foolish and stupid with regard to external things. Don't wish to be thought to know anything; and even if you appear to be somebody important to others, distrust yourself. For, it is difficult to both keep your faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature, and at the same time acquire external things. But while you are careful about the one, you must of necessity neglect the other.

14. If you wish your children, and your wife, and your friends to live for ever, you are stupid; for you wish to be in control of things which you cannot, you wish for things that belong to others to be your own. So likewise, if you wish your servant to be without fault, you are a fool; for you wish vice not to be vice," but something else. But, if you wish to have your desires undisappointed, this is in your own control. Exercise, therefore, what is in your control. He is the master of every other person who is able to confer or remove whatever that person wishes either to have or to avoid. Whoever, then, would be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others else he must necessarily be a slave.

15. Remember that you must behave in life as at a dinner party. Is anything brought around to you? Put out your hand and take your share with moderation. Does it pass by you? Don't stop it. Is it not yet come? Don't stretch your desire towards it, but wait till it reaches you. Do this with regard to children, to a wife, to public posts, to riches, and you will eventually be a worthy partner of the feasts of the gods. And if you don't even take the things which are set before you, but are able even to reject them, then you will not only be a partner at the feasts of the gods, but also of their empire. For, by doing this, Diogenes, Heraclitus and others like them, deservedly became, and were called, divine.

16. When you see anyone weeping in grief because his son has gone abroad, or is dead, or because he has suffered in his affairs, be careful that the appearance may not misdirect you. Instead,

distinguish within your own mind, and be prepared to say, "It's not the accident that distresses this person., because it doesn't distress another person; it is the judgment which he makes about it." As far as words go, however, don't reduce yourself to his level, and certainly do not moan with him. Do not moan inwardly either.

17. Remember that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to make it. If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it is his pleasure you should act a poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. For this is your business, to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is another's.

18. When a raven happens to croak unluckily, don't allow the appearance hurry you away with it, but immediately make the distinction to yourself, and say, "None of these things are foretold to me; but either to my paltry body, or property, or reputation, or children, or wife. But to me all omens are lucky, if I will. For whichever of these things happens, it is in my control to derive advantage from it."

19. You may be unconquerable, if you enter into no combat in which it is not in your own control to conquer. When, therefore, you see anyone eminent in honors, or power, or in high esteem on any other account, take heed not to be hurried away with the appearance, and to pronounce him happy; for, if the essence of good consists in things in our own control, there will be no room for envy or emulation. But, for your part, don't wish to be a general, or a senator, or a consul, but to be free; and the only way to this is a contempt of things not in our own control.

20. Remember, that not he who gives ill language or a blow insults, but the principle which represents these things as insulting. When, therefore, anyone provokes you, be assured that it is your own opinion which provokes you. Try, therefore, in the first place, not to be hurried away with the appearance. For if you once gain time and respite, you will more easily command yourself.

21. Let death and exile, and all other things which appear terrible be daily before your eyes, but chiefly death, and you win never entertain any abject thought, nor too eagerly covet anything.

22. If you have an earnest desire of attaining to philosophy, prepare yourself from the very first to be laughed at, to be sneered by the multitude, to hear them say,." He is returned to us a philosopher all at once," and " Whence this supercilious look?" Now, for your part, don't have a supercilious look indeed; but keep steadily to those things which appear best to you as one appointed by God to this station. For remember that, if you adhere to the same point, those very persons who at first ridiculed will afterwards admire you. But if you are conquered by them, you will incur a double ridicule.

23. If you ever happen to turn your attention to externals, so as to wish to please anyone, be assured that you have ruined your scheme of life. Be contented, then, in everything with being a philosopher; and, if you wish to be thought so likewise by anyone, appear so to yourself, and it will suffice you.

24. Don't allow such considerations as these distress you. "I will live in dishonor, and be nobody anywhere." For, if dishonor is an evil, you can no more be involved in any evil by the means of another, than be engaged in anything base. Is it any business of yours, then, to get power, or to be admitted to an entertainment? By no means. How, then, after all, is this a dishonor? And how is it true that you will be nobody anywhere, when you ought to be somebody in those things only which are in your own control, in which you may be of the greatest consequence? "But my friends will be unassisted." -- What do you mean by unassisted? They will not have money from you, nor will you make them Roman citizens. Who told you, then, that these are among the things in our own

control, and not the affair of others? And who can give to another the things which he has not himself? "Well, but get them, then, that we too may have a share." If I can get them with the preservation of my own honor and fidelity and greatness of mind, show me the way and I will get them; but if you require me to lose my own proper good that you may gain what is not good, consider how inequitable and foolish you are. Besides, which would you rather have, a sum of money, or a friend of fidelity and honor? Rather assist me, then, to gain this character than require me to do those things by which I may lose it. Well, but my country, say you, as far as depends on me, will be unassisted. Here again, what assistance is this you mean? "It will not have porticoes nor baths of your providing." And what signifies that? Why, neither does a smith provide it with shoes, or a shoemaker with arms. It is enough if everyone fully performs his own proper business. And were you to supply it with another citizen of honor and fidelity, would not he be of use to it? Yes. Therefore neither are you yourself useless to it. "What place, then, say you, will I hold in the state?" Whatever you can hold with the preservation of your fidelity and honor. But if, by desiring to be useful to that, you lose these, of what use can you be to your country when you are become faithless and void of shame.

25. Is anyone preferred before you at an entertainment, or in a compliment, or in being admitted to a consultation? If these things are good, you ought to be glad that he has gotten them; and if they are evil, don't be grieved that you have not gotten them. And remember that you cannot, without using the same means [which others do] to acquire things not in our own control, expect to be thought worthy of an equal share of them. For how can he who does not frequent the door of any [great] man, does not attend him, does not praise him, have an equal share with him who does? You are unjust, then, and insatiable, if you are unwilling to pay the price for which these things are sold, and would have them for nothing. For how much is lettuce sold? Fifty cents, for instance. If another, then, paying fifty cents, takes the lettuce, and you, not paying it, go without them, don't imagine that he has gained any advantage over you. For as he has the lettuce, so you have the fifty cents which you did not give. So, in the present case, you have not been invited to such a person's entertainment, because you have not paid him the price for which a supper is sold. It is sold for praise; it is sold for attendance. Give him then the value, if it is for your advantage. But if you would, at the same time, not pay the one and yet receive the other, you are insatiable, and a blockhead. Have you nothing, then, instead of the supper? Yes, indeed, you have: the not praising him, whom you don't like to praise; the not bearing with his behavior at coming in.

26. The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we don't distinguish from each other. For example, when our neighbor's boy breaks a cup, or the like, we are presently ready to say, "These things will happen." Be assured, then, that when your own cup likewise is broken, you ought to be affected just as when another's cup was broken. Apply this in like manner to greater things. Is the child or wife of another dead? There is no one who would not say, "This is a human accident." but if anyone's own child happens to die, it is presently, "Alas I how wretched am I!" But it should be remembered how we are affected in hearing the same thing concerning others.

27. As a mark is not set up for the sake of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world.

28. If a person gave your body to any stranger he met on his way, you would certainly be angry. And do you feel no shame in handing over your own mind to be confused and mystified by anyone who happens to verbally attack you?

29. In every affair consider what precedes and follows, and then undertake it. Otherwise you will

begin with spirit; but not having thought of the consequences, when some of them appear you will shamefully desist. "I would conquer at the Olympic games." But consider what precedes and follows, and then, if it is for your advantage, engage in the affair. You must conform to rules, submit to a diet, refrain from dainties; exercise your body, whether you choose it or not, at a stated hour, in heat and cold; you must drink no cold water, nor sometimes even wine. In a word, you must give yourself up to your master, as to a physician. Then, in the combat, you may be thrown into a ditch, dislocate your arm, turn your ankle, swallow dust, be whipped, and, after all, lose the victory. When you have evaluated all this, if your inclination still holds, then go to war. Otherwise, take notice, you will behave like children who sometimes play like wrestlers, sometimes gladiators, sometimes blow a trumpet, and sometimes act a tragedy when they have seen and admired these shows. Thus you too will be at one time a wrestler, at another a gladiator, now a philosopher, then an orator; but with your whole soul, nothing at all. Like an ape, you mimic all you see, and one thing after another is sure to please you, but is out of favor as soon as it becomes familiar. For you have never entered upon anything considerately, nor after having viewed the whole matter on all sides, or made any scrutiny into it, but rashly, and with a cold inclination. Thus some, when they have seen a philosopher and heard a man speaking like Euphrates (though, indeed, who can speak like him?), have a mind to be philosophers too. Consider first, man, what the matter is, and what your own nature is able to bear. If you would be a wrestler, consider your shoulders, your back, your thighs; for different persons are made for different things. Do you think that you can act as you do, and be a philosopher? That you can eat and drink, and be angry and discontented as you are now? You must watch, you must labor, you must get the better of certain appetites, must quit your acquaintance, be despised by your servant, be laughed at by those you meet; come off worse than others in everything, in magistracies, in honors, in courts of judicature. When you have considered all these things round, approach, if you please; if, by parting with them, you have a mind to purchase apathy, freedom, and tranquillity. If not, don't come here; don't, like children, be one while a philosopher, then a publican, then an orator, and then one of Caesar's officers. These things are not consistent. You must be one man, either good or bad. You must cultivate either your own ruling faculty or externals, and apply yourself either to things within or without you; that is, be either a philosopher, or one of the vulgar.

30. Duties are universally measured by relations. Is anyone a father? If so, it is implied that the children should take care of him, submit to him in everything, patiently listen to his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad father. Is you naturally entitled, then, to a good father? No, only to a father. Is a brother unjust? Well, keep your own situation towards him. Consider not what he does, but what you are to do to keep your own faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature. For another will not hurt you unless you please. You will then be hurt when you think you are hurt. In this manner, therefore, you will find, from the idea of a neighbor, a citizen, a general, the corresponding duties if you accustom yourself to contemplate the several relations.

31. Be assured that the essential property of piety towards the gods is to form right opinions concerning them, as existing "I and as governing the universe with goodness and justice. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them in all events, as produced by the most perfect understanding. For thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them as neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be effected any other way than by withdrawing yourself from things not in our own control, and placing good or evil in those only which are. For if you suppose any of the things not in our own control to be either good or evil, when you are disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you must necessarily

find fault with and blame the authors. For every animal is naturally formed to fly and abhor things that appear hurtful, and the causes of them; and to pursue and admire those which appear beneficial, and the causes of them. It is impractical, then, that one who supposes himself to be hurt should be happy about the person who, he thinks, hurts him, just as it is impossible to be happy about the hurt itself. Hence, also, a father is reviled by a son, when he does not impart to him the things which he takes to be good; and the supposing empire to be a good made Polynices and Eteocles mutually enemies. On this account the husbandman, the sailor, the merchant, on this account those who lose wives and children, revile the gods. For where interest is, there too is piety placed. So that, whoever is careful to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought, is, by the very same means, careful of piety likewise. But it is also incumbent on everyone to offer libations and sacrifices and first fruits, conformably to the customs of his country, with purity, and not in a slovenly manner, nor negligently, nor sparingly, nor beyond his ability.

32. When you have recourse to divination, remember that you know not what the event will be, and you come to learn it of the diviner; but of what nature it is you know before you come, at least if you are a philosopher. For if it is among the things not in our own control, it can by no means be either good or evil. Don't, therefore, bring either desire or aversion with you to the diviner (else you will approach him trembling), but first acquire a distinct knowledge that every event is indifferent and nothing to you., of whatever sort it may be, for it will be in your power to make a right use of it, and this no one can hinder; then come with confidence to the gods, as your counselors, and afterwards, when any counsel is given you, remember what counselors you have assumed, and whose advice you will neglect if you disobey. Come to divination, as Socrates prescribed, in cases of which the whole consideration relates to the event, and in which no opportunities are afforded by reason, or any other art, to discover the thing proposed to be learned. When, therefore, it is our duty to share the danger of a friend or of our country, we ought not to consult the oracle whether we will share it with them or not. For, though the diviner should forewarn you that the victims are unfavorable, this means no more than that either death or mutilation or exile is portended. But we have reason within us, and it directs, even with these hazards, to the greater diviner, the Pythian god, who cast out of the temple the person who gave no assistance to his friend while another was murdering him.

33. Immediately prescribe some character and form of conduce to yourself, which you may keep both alone and in company.

Be for the most part silent, or speak merely what is necessary, and in few words. We may, however, enter, though sparingly, into discourse sometimes when occasion calls for it, but not on any of the common subjects, of gladiators, or horse races, or athletic champions, or feasts, the vulgar topics of conversation; but principally not of men, so as either to blame, or praise, or make comparisons. If you are able, then, by your own conversation bring over that of your company to proper subjects; but, if you happen to be taken among strangers, be silent.

Don't allow your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor profuse.

Avoid swearing, if possible, altogether; if not, as far as you are able.

Avoid public and vulgar entertainments; but, if ever an occasion calls you to them, keep your attention upon the stretch, that you may not imperceptibly slide into vulgar manners. For be assured that if a person be ever so sound himself, yet, if his companion be infected, he who converses with him will be infected likewise.

Provide things relating to the body no further than mere use; as meat, drink, clothing, house,

family. But strike off and reject everything relating to show and delicacy.

As far as possible, before marriage, keep yourself pure from familiarities with women, and, if you indulge them, let it be lawfully." But don't therefore be troublesome and full of reproofs to those who use these liberties, nor frequently boast that you yourself don't.

If anyone tells you that such a person speaks ill of you, don't make excuses about what is said of you, but answer: " He does not know my other faults, else he would not have mentioned only these."

It is not necessary for you to appear often at public spectacles; but if ever there is a proper occasion for you to be there, don't appear more solicitous for anyone than for yourself; that is, wish things to be only just as they are, and him only to conquer who is the conqueror, for thus you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from declamations and derision and violent emotions. And when you come away, don't discourse a great deal on what has passed, and what does not contribute to your own amendment. For it would appear by such discourse that you were immoderately struck with the show.

Go not [of your own accord] to the rehearsals of any [authors], nor appear [at them] readily. But, if you do appear, keep your gravity and sedateness, and at the same time avoid being morose.

When you are going to confer with anyone, and particularly of those in a superior station, represent to yourself how Socrates or Zeno would behave in such a case, and you will not be at a loss to make a proper use of whatever may occur.

When you are going to any of the people in power, represent to yourself that you will not find him at home; that you will not be admitted; that the doors will not be opened to you; that he will take no notice of you. If, with all this, it is your duty to go, bear what happens, and never say [to yourself], " It was not worth so much." For this is vulgar, and like a man dazed by external things.

In parties of conversation, avoid a frequent and excessive mention of your own actions and dangers. For, however agreeable it may be to yourself to mention the risks you have run, it is not equally agreeable to others to hear your adventures. Avoid, likewise, an endeavor to excite laughter. For this is a slippery point, which may throw you into vulgar manners, and, besides, may be apt to lessen you in the esteem of your acquaintance. Approaches to indecent discourse are likewise dangerous. Whenever, therefore, anything of this sort happens, if there be a proper opportunity, rebuke him who makes advances that way; or, at least, by silence and blushing and a forbidding look, show yourself to be displeased by such talk.

34. If you are struck by the appearance of any promised pleasure, guard yourself against being hurried away by it; but let the affair wait your leisure, and procure yourself some delay. Then bring to your mind both points of time: that in which you will enjoy the pleasure, and that in which you will repent and reproach yourself after you have enjoyed it; and set before you, in opposition to these, how you will be glad and applaud yourself if you abstain. And even though it should appear to you a seasonable gratification, take heed that its enticing, and agreeable and attractive force may not subdue you; but set in opposition to this how much better it is to be conscious of having gained so great a victory.

35. When you do anything from a clear judgment that it ought to be done, never shun the being seen to do it, even though the world should make a wrong supposition about it; for, if you don't act right, shun the action itself; but, if you do, why are you afraid of those who censure you wrongly?

36. As the proposition, "Either it is day or it is night," is extremely proper for a disjunctive

argument, but quite improper in a conjunctive one, so, at a feast, to choose the largest share is very suitable to the bodily appetite, but utterly inconsistent with the social spirit of an entertainment. When you eat with another, then, remember not only the value of those things which are set before you to the body, but the value of that behavior which ought to be observed towards the person who gives the entertainment.

37. If you have assumed any character above your strength, you have both made an ill figure in that and quitted one which you might have supported.

38. When walking, you are careful not to step on a nail or turn your foot; so likewise be careful not to hurt the ruling faculty of your mind. And, if we were to guard against this in every action, we should undertake the action with the greater safety.

39. The body is to everyone the measure of the possessions proper for it, just as the foot is of the shoe. If, therefore, you stop at this, you will keep the measure; but if you move beyond it, you must necessarily be carried forward, as down a cliff; as in the case of a shoe, if you go beyond its fitness to the foot, it comes first to be gilded, then purple, and then studded with jewels. For to that which once exceeds a due measure, there is no bound.

40. Women from fourteen years old are flattered with the title of "mistresses" by the men. Therefore, perceiving that they are regarded only as qualified to give the men pleasure, they begin to adorn themselves, and in that to place ill their hopes. We should, therefore, fix our attention on making them sensible that they are valued for the appearance of decent, modest and discreet behavior.

41. It is a mark of want of genius to spend much time in things relating to the body, as to be long in our exercises, in eating and drinking, and in the discharge of other animal functions. These should be done incidentally and slightly, and our whole attention be engaged in the care of the understanding.

42. When any person harms you, or speaks badly of you, remember that he acts or speaks from a supposition of its being his duty. Now, it is not possible that he should follow what appears right to you, but what appears so to himself. Therefore, if he judges from a wrong appearance, he is the person hurt, since he too is the person deceived. For if anyone should suppose a true proposition to be false, the proposition is not hurt, but he who is deceived about it. Setting out, then, from these principles, you will meekly bear a person who reviles you, for you will say upon every occasion, "It seemed so to him."

43. Everything has two handles, the one by which it may be carried, the other by which it cannot. If your brother acts unjustly, don't lay hold on the action by the handle of his injustice, for by that it cannot be carried; but by the opposite, that he is your brother, that he was brought up with you; and thus you will lay hold on it, as it is to be carried.

44. These reasonings are unconnected: "I am richer than you, therefore I am better"; "I am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better." The connection is rather this: "I am richer than you, therefore my property is greater than yours;" "I am more eloquent than you, therefore my style is better than yours." But you, after all, are neither property nor style.

45. Does anyone bathe in a mighty little time? Don't say that he does it ill, but in a mighty little time. Does anyone drink a great quantity of wine? Don't say that he does ill, but that he drinks a great quantity. For, unless you perfectly understand the principle from which anyone acts, how should you know if he acts ill? Thus you will not run the hazard of assenting to any appearances

but such as you fully comprehend.

46. Never call yourself a philosopher, nor talk a great deal among the unlearned about theorems, but act conformably to them. Thus, at an entertainment, don't talk how persons ought to eat, but eat as you ought. For remember that in this manner Socrates also universally avoided all ostentation. And when persons came to him and desired to be recommended by him to philosophers, he took and- recommended them, so well did he bear being overlooked. So that if ever any talk should happen among the unlearned concerning philosophic theorems, be you, for the most part, silent. For there is great danger in immediately throwing out what you have not digested. And, if anyone tells you that you know nothing, and you are not nettled at it, then you may be sure that you have begun your business. For sheep don't throw up the grass to show the shepherds how much they have eaten; but, inwardly digesting their food, they outwardly produce wool and milk. Thus, therefore, do you likewise not show theorems to the unlearned, but the actions produced by them after they have been digested.

47. When you have brought yourself to supply the necessities of your body at a small price, don't pique yourself upon it; nor, if you drink water, be saying upon every occasion, "I drink water." But first consider how much more sparing and patient of hardship the poor are than we. But if at any time you would inure yourself by exercise to labor, and bearing hard trials, do it for your own sake, and not for the world; don't grasp statues, but, when you are violently thirsty, take a little cold water in your mouth, and spurt it out and tell nobody.

48. The condition and characteristic of a vulgar person, is, that he never expects either benefit or hurt from himself, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is, that he expects all hurt and benefit from himself. The marks of a proficient are, that he censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one, says nothing concerning himself as being anybody, or knowing anything: when he is, in any instance, hindered or restrained, he accuses himself; and, if he is praised, he secretly laughs at the person who praises him; and, if he is censured, he makes no defense. But he goes about with the caution of sick or injured people, dreading to move anything that is set right, before it is perfectly fixed. He suppresses all desire in himself; he transfers his aversion to those things only which thwart the proper use of our own faculty of choice; the exertion of his active powers towards anything is very gentle; if he appears stupid or ignorant, he does not care, and, in a word, he watches himself as an enemy, and one in ambush.

49. When anyone shows himself overly confident in ability to understand and interpret the works of Chrysippus, say to yourself, " Unless Chrysippus had written obscurely, this person would have had no subject for his vanity. But what do I desire? To understand nature and follow her. I ask, then, who interprets her, and, finding Chrysippus does, I have recourse to him. I don't understand his writings. I seek, therefore, one to interpret them." So far there is nothing to value myself upon. And when I find an interpreter, what remains is to make use of his instructions. This alone is the valuable thing. But, if I admire nothing but merely the interpretation, what do I become more than a grammarian instead of a philosopher? Except, indeed, that instead of Homer I interpret Chrysippus. When anyone, therefore, desires me to read Chrysippus to him, I rather blush when I cannot show my actions agreeable and consonant to his discourse.

50. Whatever moral rules you have deliberately proposed to yourself. abide by them as they were laws, and as if you would be guilty of impiety by violating any of them. Don't regard what anyone says of you, for this, after all, is no concern of yours. How long, then, will you put off thinking yourself worthy of the highest improvements and follow the distinctions of reason? You have

received the philosophical theorems, with which you ought to be familiar, and you have been familiar with them. What other master, then, do you wait for, to throw upon that the delay of reforming yourself? You are no longer a boy, but a grown man. If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and always add procrastination to procrastination, purpose to purpose, and fix day after day in which you will attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue without proficiency, and, living and dying, persevere in being one of the vulgar. This instant, then, think yourself worthy of living as a man grown up, and a proficient. Let whatever appears to be the best be to you an inviolable law. And if any instance of pain or pleasure, or glory or disgrace, is set before you, remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be put off. By once being defeated and giving way, proficiency is lost, or by the contrary preserved. Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by everything. attending to nothing but reason. And though you are not yet a Socrates, you ought, however, to live as one desirous of becoming a Socrates.

51. The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is that of the use of moral theorems, such as, "We ought not to lie;" the second is that of demonstrations, such as, "What is the origin of our obligation not to lie;" the third gives strength and articulation to the other two, such as, "What is the origin of this is a demonstration." For what is demonstration? What is consequence? What contradiction? What truth? What falsehood? The third topic, then, is necessary on the account of the second, and the second on the account of the first. But the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. But we act just on the contrary. For we spend all our time on the third topic, and employ all our diligence about that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are immediately prepared to show how it is demonstrated that lying is not right.

52. Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at hand:

> **"Conduct me, Jove, and you, 0 Destiny,**
> **Wherever your decrees have fixed my station." [Cleanthes]**
> **"I follow cheerfully; and, did I not,**
> **Wicked and wretched, I must follow still**
>
> **Whoever yields properly to Fate, is deemed**
> **Wise among men, and knows the laws of heaven." [Euripides, Frag. 965]**

And this third:

> **"0 Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be. Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed, but hurt me they cannot." [Plato's Crito and Apology]**

Notes

***Epictetus' "Enchiridion"*, ed. James Fieser (Internet Release, 1996).**

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Enchiridion, or Manual
Epictetus
c. 135 CE.
 This text file is based on and adapted from Elizabeth Carter's 1758 English translation of the Enchiridion. This is a working draft; please report errors.1

The Enchiridion

1. Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.

The things in our control are by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered; but those not in our control are weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others. Remember, then, that if you suppose that things which are slavish by nature are also free, and that what belongs to others is your own, then you will be hindered. You will lament, you will be disturbed, and you will find fault both with gods and men. But if you suppose that only to be your own which is your own, and what belongs to others such as it really is, then no one will ever compel you or restrain you. Further, you will find fault with no one or accuse no one. You will do nothing against your will. No one will hurt you, you will have no enemies, and you not be harmed.

Aiming therefore at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself to be carried, even with a slight tendency, towards the attainment of lesser things. Instead, you must entirely quit some things and for the present postpone the rest. But if you would both have these great things, along with power and riches, then you will not gain even the latter, because you aim at the former too: but you will absolutely fail of the former, by which alone happiness and freedom are achieved.

Work, therefore to be able to say to every harsh appearance, "You are but an appearance, and not absolutely the thing you appear to be." And then examine it by those rules which you have, and first, and chiefly, by this: whether it concerns the things which are in our own control, or those which are not; and, if it concerns anything not in our control, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.

2. Remember that following desire promises the attainment of that of which you are desirous; and aversion promises the avoiding that to which you are averse. However, he who fails to obtain the object of his desire is disappointed, and he who incurs the object of his aversion wretched. If, then, you confine your aversion to those objects only which are contrary to the natural use of your faculties, which you have in your own control, you will never incur anything to which you are averse. But if you are averse to sickness, or death, or poverty, you will be wretched. Remove aversion, then, from all things that are not in our control, and transfer it to things contrary to the nature of what is in our control. But, for the present, totally suppress desire: for, if you desire any of the things which are not in your own control, you must necessarily be disappointed; and of those which are, and which it would be laudable to desire, nothing is yet in your possession. Use only the appropriate actions of pursuit and avoidance; and even these lightly, and with gentleness and reservation.

3. With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved, remember to tell yourself of what general nature they are, beginning from the most insignificant things. If, for example, you are fond of a specific ceramic cup, remind yourself that it is only ceramic cups in general of which you are fond. Then, if it breaks, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies.

4. When you are going about any action, remind yourself what nature the action is. If you are going to bathe, picture to yourself the things which usually happen in the bath: some people splash the water, some push, some use abusive language, and others steal. Thus you will more safely go about this action if you say to yourself, "I will now go bathe, and keep my own mind in a state conformable to nature." And in the same manner

with regard to every other action. For thus, if any hindrance arises in bathing, you will have it ready to say, "It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to keep my mind in a state conformable to nature; and I will not keep it if I am bothered at things that happen.

5. Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things. Death, for instance, is not terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death that it is terrible. When therefore we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never attribute it to others, but to ourselves; that is, to our own principles. An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his own bad condition upon others. Someone just starting instruction will lay the fault on himself. Some who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others nor on himself.

6. Don't be prideful with any excellence that is not your own. If a horse should be prideful and say, " I am handsome," it would be supportable. But when you are prideful, and say, " I have a handsome horse," know that you are proud of what is, in fact, only the good of the horse. What, then, is your own? Only your reaction to the appearances of things. Thus, when you behave conformably to nature in reaction to how things appear, you will be proud with reason; for you will take pride in some good of your own.

7. Consider when, on a voyage, your ship is anchored; if you go on shore to get water you may along the way amuse yourself with picking up a shellish, or an onion. However, your thoughts and continual attention ought to be bent towards the ship, waiting for the captain to call on board; you must then immediately leave all these things, otherwise you will be thrown into the ship, bound neck and feet like a sheep. So it is with life. If, instead of an onion or a shellfish, you are given a wife or child, that is fine. But if the captain calls, you must run to the ship, leaving them, and regarding none of them. But if you are old, never go far from the ship: lest, when you are called, you should be unable to come in time.

8. Don't demand that things happen as you wish, but wish that they happen as they do happen, and you will go on well.

9. Sickness is a hindrance to the body, but not to your ability to choose, unless that is your choice. Lameness is a hindrance to the leg, but not to your ability to choose. Say this to yourself with regard to everything that happens, then you will see such obstacles as hindrances to something else, but not to yourself.

10. With every accident, ask yourself what abilities you have for making a proper use of it. If you see an attractive person, you will find that self-restraint is the ability you have against your desire. If you are in pain, you will find fortitude. If you hear unpleasant language, you will find patience. And thus habituated, the appearances of things will not hurry you away along with them.

11. Never say of anything, "I have lost it"; but, "I have returned it." Is your child dead? It is returned. Is your wife dead? She is returned. Is your estate taken away? Well, and is not that likewise returned? "But he who took it away is a bad man." What difference is it to you who the giver assigns to take it back? While he gives it to you to possess, take care of it; but don't view it as your own, just as travelers view a hotel.

12. If you want to improve, reject such reasonings as these: "If I neglect my affairs, I'll have no income; if I don't correct my servant, he will be bad." For it is better to die with hunger, exempt from grief and fear, than to live in affluence with perturbation; and it is better your servant should be bad, than you unhappy.

Begin therefore from little things. Is a little oil spilt? A little wine stolen? Say to yourself, "This is the price paid for apathy, for tranquillity, and nothing is to be had for nothing." When you call your servant, it is possible that he may not come; or, if he does, he may not do what you want. But he is by no means of such importance that it should be in his power to give you any disturbance.

13. If you want to improve, be content to be thought foolish and stupid with regard to external things. Don't wish to be thought to know anything; and even if you appear to be somebody important to others, distrust yourself. For, it is difficult to both keep your faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature, and at the same time acquire external things. But while you are careful about the one, you must of necessity neglect the other.

14. If you wish your children, and your wife, and your friends to live for ever,

you are stupid; for you wish to be in control of things which you cannot, you wish for things that belong to others to be your own. So likewise, if you wish your servant to be without fault, you are a fool; for you wish vice not to be vice," but something else. But, if you wish to have your desires undisappointed, this is in your own control. Exercise, therefore, what is in your control. He is the master of every other person who is able to confer or remove whatever that person wishes either to have or to avoid. Whoever, then, would be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others else he must necessarily be a slave.

15. Remember that you must behave in life as at a dinner party. Is anything brought around to you? Put out your hand and take your share with moderation. Does it pass by you? Don't stop it. Is it not yet come? Don't stretch your desire towards it, but wait till it reaches you. Do this with regard to children, to a wife, to public posts, to riches, and you will eventually be a worthy partner of the feasts of the gods. And if you don't even take the things which are set before you, but are able even to reject them, then you will not only be a partner at the feasts of the gods, but also of their empire. For, by doing this, Diogenes, Heraclitus and others like them, deservedly became, and were called, divine.

16. When you see anyone weeping in grief because his son has gone abroad, or is dead, or because he has suffered in his affairs, be careful that the appearance may not misdirect you. Instead, distinguish within your own mind, and be prepared to say, "It's not the accident that distresses this person., because it doesn't distress another person; it is the judgment which he makes about it." As far as words go, however, don't reduce yourself to his level, and certainly do not moan with him. Do not moan inwardly either.

17. Remember that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to make it. If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it is his pleasure you should act a poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. For this is your business, to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is another's.

18. When a raven happens to croak unluckily, don't allow the appearance hurry you away with it, but immediately make the distinction to yourself, and say, "None of these things are foretold to me; but either to my paltry body, or property, or reputation, or children, or wife. But to me all omens are lucky, if I will. For whichever of these things happens, it is in my control to derive advantage from it."

19. You may be unconquerable, if you enter into no combat in which it is not in your own control to conquer. When, therefore, you see anyone eminent in honors, or power, or in high esteem on any other account, take heed not to be hurried away with the appearance, and to pronounce him happy; for, if the essence of good consists in things in our own control, there will be no room for envy or emulation. But, for your part, don't wish to be a general, or a senator, or a consul, but to be free; and the only way to this is a contempt of things not in our own control.

20. Remember, that not he who gives ill language or a blow insults, but the principle which represents these things as insulting. When, therefore, anyone provokes you, be assured that it is your own opinion which provokes you. Try, therefore, in the first place, not to be hurried away with the appearance. For if you once gain time and respite, you will more easily command yourself.

21. Let death and exile, and all other things which appear terrible be daily before your eyes, but chiefly death, and you win never entertain any abject thought, nor too eagerly covet anything.

22. If you have an earnest desire of attaining to philosophy, prepare yourself from the very first to be laughed at, to be sneered by the multitude, to hear them say,." He is returned to us a philosopher all at once," and " Whence this supercilious look?" Now, for your part, don't have a supercilious look indeed; but keep steadily to those things which appear best to you as one appointed by God to this station. For remember that, if you adhere to the same point, those very persons who at first ridiculed will afterwards admire you. But if you are conquered by them, you will incur a double ridicule.

23. If you ever happen to turn your attention to externals, so as to wish to please anyone, be assured that you have ruined your scheme of life. Be contented, then, in everything with being a philosopher; and, if you wish to be thought so likewise by anyone, appear so to yourself, and it will suffice you.

24. Don't allow such considerations as these distress you. "I will live in dishonor, and be nobody anywhere." For, if dishonor is an evil, you can no more be involved in any evil by the means of another, than be engaged in anything base. Is it any business of yours, then, to get power, or to be admitted to an entertainment? By no means. How, then, after all, is this a dishonor? And how is it true that you will be nobody anywhere, when you ought to be somebody in those things only which are in your own control, in which you may be of the greatest consequence? "But my friends will be unassisted." -- What do you mean by unassisted? They will not have money from you, nor will you make them Roman citizens. Who told you, then, that these are among the things in our own control, and not the affair of others? And who can give to another the things which he has not himself? "Well, but get them, then, that we too may have a share." If I can get them with the preservation of my own honor and fidelity and greatness of mind, show me the way and I will get them; but if you require me to lose my own proper good that you may gain what is not good, consider how inequitable and foolish you are. Besides, which would you rather have, a sum of money, or a friend of fidelity and honor? Rather assist me, then, to gain this character than require me to do those things by which I may lose it. Well, but my country, say you, as far as depends on me, will be unassisted. Here again, what assistance is this you mean? "It will not have porticoes nor baths of your providing." And what signifies that? Why, neither does a smith provide it with shoes, or a shoemaker with arms. It is enough if everyone fully performs his own proper business. And were you to supply it with another citizen of honor and fidelity, would not he be of use to it? Yes. Therefore neither are you yourself useless to it. "What place, then, say you, will I hold in the state?" Whatever you can hold with the preservation of your fidelity and honor. But if, by desiring to be useful to that, you lose these, of what use can you be to your country when you are become faithless and void of shame.

25. Is anyone preferred before you at an entertainment, or in a compliment, or in being admitted to a consultation? If these things are good, you ought to be glad that he has gotten them; and if they are evil, don't be grieved that you have not gotten them. And remember that you cannot, without using the same means [which others do] to acquire things not in our own control, expect to be thought worthy of an equal share of them. For how can he who does not frequent the door of any [great] man, does not attend him, does not praise him, have an equal share with him who does? You are unjust, then, and insatiable, if you are unwilling to pay the price for which these things are sold, and would have them for nothing. For how much is lettuce sold? Fifty cents, for instance. If another, then, paying fifty cents, takes the lettuce, and you, not paying it, go without them, don't imagine that he has gained any advantage over you. For as he has the lettuce, so you have the fifty cents which you did not give. So, in the present case, you have not been invited to such a person's entertainment, because you have not paid him the price for which a supper is sold. It is sold for praise; it is sold for attendance. Give him then the value, if it is for your advantage. But if you would, at the same time, not pay the one and yet receive the other, you are insatiable, and a blockhead. Have you nothing, then, instead of the supper? Yes, indeed, you have: the not praising him, whom you don't like to praise; the not bearing with his behavior at coming in.

26. The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we don't distinguish from each other. For example, when our neighbor's boy breaks a cup, or the like, we are presently ready to say, "These things will happen." Be assured, then, that when your own cup likewise is broken, you ought to be affected just as when another's cup was broken. Apply this in like manner to greater things. Is the child or wife of another dead? There is no one who would not say, "This is a human accident." but if anyone's own child happens to die, it is presently, "Alas I how wretched am I!" But it should be remembered how we are affected in hearing the same thing concerning others.

27. As a mark is not set up for the sake of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world.

28. If a person gave your body to any stranger he met on his way, you would certainly be angry. And do you feel no shame in handing over your own mind to be confused and mystified by anyone who happens to verbally attack you?

29. In every affair consider what precedes and follows, and then undertake it. Otherwise you will begin with spirit; but not having thought of the consequences, when some of them appear you will shamefully desist. "I would conquer at the Olympic games." But consider what precedes and follows, and then, if it is for your advantage, engage in

the affair. You must conform to rules, submit to a diet, refrain from dainties; exercise your body, whether you choose it or not, at a stated hour, in heat and cold; you must drink no cold water, nor sometimes even wine. In a word, you must give yourself up to your master, as to a physician. Then, in the combat, you may be thrown into a ditch, dislocate your arm, turn your ankle, swallow dust, be whipped, and, after all, lose the victory. When you have evaluated all this, if your inclination still holds, then go to war. Otherwise, take notice, you will behave like children who sometimes play like wrestlers, sometimes gladiators, sometimes blow a trumpet, and sometimes act a tragedy when they have seen and admired these shows. Thus you too will be at one time a wrestler, at another a gladiator, now a philosopher, then an orator; but with your whole soul, nothing at all. Like an ape, you mimic all you see, and one thing after another is sure to please you, but is out of favor as soon as it becomes familiar. For you have never entered upon anything considerately, nor after having viewed the whole matter on all sides, or made any scrutiny into it, but rashly, and with a cold inclination. Thus some, when they have seen a philosopher and heard a man speaking like Euphrates (though, indeed, who can speak like him?), have a mind to be philosophers too. Consider first, man, what the matter is, and what your own nature is able to bear. If you would be a wrestler, consider your shoulders, your back, your thighs; for different persons are made for different things. Do you think that you can act as you do, and be a philosopher? That you can eat and drink, and be angry and discontented as you are now? You must watch, you must labor, you must get the better of certain appetites, must quit your acquaintance, be despised by your servant, be laughed at by those you meet; come off worse than others in everything, in magistracies, in honors, in courts of judicature. When you have considered all these things round, approach, if you please; if, by parting with them, you have a mind to purchase apathy, freedom, and tranquillity. If not, don't come here; don't, like children, be one while a philosopher, then a publican, then an orator, and then one of Caesar's officers. These things are not consistent. You must be one man, either good or bad. You must cultivate either your own ruling faculty or externals, and apply yourself either to things within or without you; that is, be either a philosopher, or one of the vulgar.

30. Duties are universally measured by relations. Is anyone a father? If so, it is implied that the children should take care of him, submit to him in everything, patiently listen to his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad father. Is you naturally entitled, then, to a good father? No, only to a father. Is a brother unjust? Well, keep your own situation towards him. Consider not what he does, but what you are to do to keep your own faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature. For another will not hurt you unless you please. You will then be hurt when you think you are hurt. In this manner, therefore, you will find, from the idea of a neighbor, a citizen, a general, the corresponding duties if you accustom yourself to contemplate the several relations.

31. Be assured that the essential property of piety towards the gods is to form right opinions concerning them, as existing "I and as governing the universe with goodness and justice. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them in all events, as produced by the most perfect understanding. For thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them as neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be effected any other way than by withdrawing yourself from things not in our own control, and placing good or evil in those only which are. For if you suppose any of the things not in our own control to be either good or evil, when you are disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you must necessarily find fault with and blame the authors. For every animal is naturally formed to fly and abhor things that appear hurtful, and the causes of them; and to pursue and admire those which appear beneficial, and the causes of them. It is impractical, then, that one who supposes himself to be hurt should be happy about the person who, he thinks, hurts him, just as it is impossible to be happy about the hurt itself. Hence, also, a father is reviled by a son, when he does not impart to him the things which he takes to be good; and the supposing empire to be a good made Polynices and Eteocles mutually enemies. On this account the husbandman, the sailor, the merchant, on this account those who lose wives and children, revile the gods. For where interest is, there too is piety placed. So that, whoever is careful to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought, is, by the very same means, careful of piety likewise. But it is also incumbent on everyone to offer libations and sacrifices and first fruits, conformably to the customs of his country, with purity, and not in a slovenly manner, nor

negligently, nor sparingly, nor beyond his ability.

32. When you have recourse to divination, remember that you know not what the event will be, and you come to learn it of the diviner; but of what nature it is you know before you come, at least if you are a philosopher. For if it is among the things not in our own control, it can by no means be either good or evil. Don't, therefore, bring either desire or aversion with you to the diviner (else you will approach him trembling), but first acquire a distinct knowledge that every event is indifferent and nothing to you., of whatever sort it may be, for it will be in your power to make a right use of it, and this no one can hinder; then come with confidence to the gods, as your counselors, and afterwards, when any counsel is given you, remember what counselors you have assumed, and whose advice you will neglect if you disobey. Come to divination, as Socrates prescribed, in cases of which the whole consideration relates to the event, and in which no opportunities are afforded by reason, or any other art, to discover the thing proposed to be learned. When, therefore, it is our duty to share the danger of a friend or of our country, we ought not to consult the oracle whether we will share it with them or not. For, though the diviner should forewarn you that the victims are unfavorable, this means no more than that either death or mutilation or exile is portended. But we have reason within us, and it directs, even with these hazards, to the greater diviner, the Pythian god, who cast out of the temple the person who gave no assistance to his friend while another was murdering him.

33. Immediately prescribe some character and form of conduce to yourself, which you may keep both alone and in company.

Be for the most part silent, or speak merely what is necessary, and in few words. We may, however, enter, though sparingly, into discourse sometimes when occasion calls for it, but not on any of the common subjects, of gladiators, or horse races, or athletic champions, or feasts, the vulgar topics of conversation; but principally not of men, so as either to blame, or praise, or make comparisons. If you are able, then, by your own conversation bring over that of your company to proper subjects; but, if you happen to be taken among strangers, be silent.

Don't allow your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor profuse.

Avoid swearing, if possible, altogether; if not, as far as you are able.

Avoid public and vulgar entertainments; but, if ever an occasion calls you to them, keep your attention upon the stretch, that you may not imperceptibly slide into vulgar manners. For be assured that if a person be ever so sound himself, yet, if his companion be infected, he who converses with him will be infected likewise.

Provide things relating to the body no further than mere use; as meat, drink, clothing, house, family. But strike off and reject everything relating to show and delicacy.

As far as possible, before marriage, keep yourself pure from familiarities with women, and, if you indulge them, let it be lawfully." But don't therefore be troublesome and full of reproofs to those who use these liberties, nor frequently boast that you yourself don't.

If anyone tells you that such a person speaks ill of you, don't make excuses about what is said of you, but answer: " He does not know my other faults, else he would not have mentioned only these."

It is not necessary for you to appear often at public spectacles; but if ever there is a proper occasion for you to be there, don't appear more solicitous for anyone than for yourself; that is, wish things to be only just as they are, and him only to conquer who is the conqueror, for thus you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from declamations and derision and violent emotions. And when you come away, don't discourse a great deal on what has passed, and what does not contribute to your own amendment. For it would appear by such discourse that you were immoderately struck with the show.

Go not [of your own accord] to the rehearsals of any [authors], nor appear [at them] readily. But, if you do appear, keep your gravity and sedateness, and at the same time avoid being morose.

When you are going to confer with anyone, and particularly of those in a superior station, represent to yourself how Socrates or Zeno would behave in such a case, and you will not be at a loss to make a proper use of whatever may occur.

When you are going to any of the people in power, represent to yourself that you will not find him at home; that you will not be admitted; that the doors will not be

opened to you; that he will take no notice of you. If, with all this, it is your duty to go, bear what happens, and never say [to yourself], " It was not worth so much." For this is vulgar, and like a man dazed by external things.

In parties of conversation, avoid a frequent and excessive mention of your own actions and dangers. For, however agreeable it may be to yourself to mention the risks you have run, it is not equally agreeable to others to hear your adventures. Avoid, likewise, an endeavor to excite laughter. For this is a slippery point, which may throw you into vulgar manners, and, besides, may be apt to lessen you in the esteem of your acquaintance. Approaches to indecent discourse are likewise dangerous. Whenever, therefore, anything of this sort happens, if there be a proper opportunity, rebuke him who makes advances that way; or, at least, by silence and blushing and a forbidding look, show yourself to be displeased by such talk.

34. If you are struck by the appearance of any promised pleasure, guard yourself against being hurried away by it; but let the affair wait your leisure, and procure yourself some delay. Then bring to your mind both points of time: that in which you will enjoy the pleasure, and that in which you will repent and reproach yourself after you have enjoyed it; and set before you, in opposition to these, how you will be glad and applaud yourself if you abstain. And even though it should appear to you a seasonable gratification, take heed that its enticing, and agreeable and attractive force may not subdue you; but set in opposition to this how much better it is to be conscious of having gained so great a victory.

35. When you do anything from a clear judgment that it ought to be done, never shun the being seen to do it, even though the world should make a wrong supposition about it; for, if you don't act right, shun the action itself; but, if you do, why are you afraid of those who censure you wrongly?

36. As the proposition, "Either it is day or it is night," is extremely proper for a disjunctive argument, but quite improper in a conjunctive one, so, at a feast, to choose the largest share is very suitable to the bodily appetite, but utterly inconsistent with the social spirit of an entertainment. When you eat with another, then, remember not only the value of those things which are set before you to the body, but the value of that behavior which ought to be observed towards the person who gives the entertainment.

37. If you have assumed any character above your strength, you have both made an ill figure in that and quitted one which you might have supported.

38. When walking, you are careful not to step on a nail or turn your foot; so likewise be careful not to hurt the ruling faculty of your mind. And, if we were to guard against this in every action, we should undertake the action with the greater safety.

39. The body is to everyone the measure of the possessions proper for it, just as the foot is of the shoe. If, therefore, you stop at this, you will keep the measure; but if you move beyond it, you must necessarily be carried forward, as down a cliff; as in the case of a shoe, if you go beyond its fitness to the foot, it comes first to be gilded, then purple, and then studded with jewels. For to that which once exceeds a due measure, there is no bound.

40. Women from fourteen years old are flattered with the title of "mistresses" by the men. Therefore, perceiving that they are regarded only as qualified to give the men pleasure, they begin to adorn themselves, and in that to place ill their hopes. We should, therefore, fix our attention on making them sensible that they are valued for the appearance of decent, modest and discreet behavior.

41. It is a mark of want of genius to spend much time in things relating to the body, as to be long in our exercises, in eating and drinking, and in the discharge of other animal functions. These should be done incidentally and slightly, and our whole attention be engaged in the care of the understanding.

42. When any person harms you, or speaks badly of you, remember that he acts or speaks from a supposition of its being his duty. Now, it is not possible that he should follow what appears right to you, but what appears so to himself. Therefore, if he judges from a wrong appearance, he is the person hurt, since he too is the person deceived. For if anyone should suppose a true proposition to be false, the proposition is not hurt, but he who is deceived about it. Setting out, then, from these principles, you will meekly bear a person who reviles you, for you will say upon every occasion, "It seemed so to him."

43. Everything has two handles, the one by which it may be carried, the other by

which it cannot. If your brother acts unjustly, don't lay hold on the action by the handle of his injustice, for by that it cannot be carried; but by the opposite, that he is your brother, that he was brought up with you; and thus you will lay hold on it, as it is to be carried.

44. These reasonings are unconnected: "I am richer than you, therefore I am better"; "I am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better." The connection is rather this: "I am richer than you, therefore my property is greater than yours;" "I am more eloquent than you, therefore my style is better than yours." But you, after all, are neither property nor style.

45. Does anyone bathe in a mighty little time? Don't say that he does it ill, but in a mighty little time. Does anyone drink a great quantity of wine? Don't say that he does ill, but that he drinks a great quantity. For, unless you perfectly understand the principle from which anyone acts, how should you know if he acts ill? Thus you will not run the hazard of assenting to any appearances but such as you fully comprehend.

46. Never call yourself a philosopher, nor talk a great deal among the unlearned about theorems, but act conformably to them. Thus, at an entertainment, don't talk how persons ought to eat, but eat as you ought. For remember that in this manner Socrates also universally avoided all ostentation. And when persons came to him and desired to be recommended by him to philosophers, he took and- recommended them, so well did he bear being overlooked. So that if ever any talk should happen among the unlearned concerning philosophic theorems, be you, for the most part, silent. For there is great danger in immediately throwing out what you have not digested. And, if anyone tells you that you know nothing, and you are not nettled at it, then you may be sure that you have begun your business. For sheep don't throw up the grass to show the shepherds how much they have eaten; but, inwardly digesting their food, they outwardly produce wool and milk. Thus, therefore, do you likewise not show theorems to the unlearned, but the actions produced by them after they have been digested.

47. When you have brought yourself to supply the necessities of your body at a small price, don't pique yourself upon it; nor, if you drink water, be saying upon every occasion, "I drink water." But first consider how much more sparing and patient of hardship the poor are than we. But if at any time you would inure yourself by exercise to labor, and bearing hard trials, do it for your own sake, and not for the world; don't grasp statues, but, when you are violently thirsty, take a little cold water in your mouth, and spurt it out and tell nobody.

48. The condition and characteristic of a vulgar person, is, that he never expects either benefit or hurt from himself, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is, that he expects all hurt and benefit from himself. The marks of a proficient are, that he censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one, says nothing concerning himself as being anybody, or knowing anything: when he is, in any instance, hindered or restrained, he accuses himself; and, if he is praised, he secretly laughs at the person who praises him; and, if he is censured, he makes no defense. But he goes about with the caution of sick or injured people, dreading to move anything that is set right, before it is perfectly fixed. He suppresses all desire in himself; he transfers his aversion to those things only which thwart the proper use of our own faculty of choice; the exertion of his active powers towards anything is very gentle; if he appears stupid or ignorant, he does not care, and, in a word, he watches himself as an enemy, and one in ambush.

49. When anyone shows himself overly confident in ability to understand and interpret the works of Chrysippus, say to yourself, " Unless Chrysippus had written obscurely, this person would have had no subject for his vanity. But what do I desire? To understand nature and follow her. I ask, then, who interprets her, and, finding Chrysippus does, I have recourse to him. I don't understand his writings. I seek, therefore, one to interpret them." So far there is nothing to value myself upon. And when I find an interpreter, what remains is to make use of his instructions. This alone is the valuable thing. But, if I admire nothing but merely the interpretation, what do I become more than a grammarian instead of a philosopher? Except, indeed, that instead of Homer I interpret Chrysippus. When anyone, therefore, desires me to read Chrysippus to him, I rather blush when I cannot show my actions agreeable and consonant to his discourse.

50. Whatever moral rules you have deliberately proposed to yourself. abide by them as they were laws, and as if you would be guilty of impiety by violating any of them. Don't regard what anyone says of you, for this, after all, is no concern of yours.

How long, then, will you put off thinking yourself worthy of the highest improvements and follow the distinctions of reason? You have received the philosophical theorems, with which you ought to be familiar, and you have been familiar with them. What other master, then, do you wait for, to throw upon that the delay of reforming yourself? You are no longer a boy, but a grown man. If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and always add procrastination to procrastination, purpose to purpose, and fix day after day in which you will attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue without proficiency, and, living and dying, persevere in being one of the vulgar. This instant, then, think yourself worthy of living as a man grown up, and a proficient. Let whatever appears to be the best be to you an inviolable law. And if any instance of pain or pleasure, or glory or disgrace, is set before you, remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be put off. By once being defeated and giving way, proficiency is lost, or by the contrary preserved. Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by everything. attending to nothing but reason. And though you are not yet a Socrates, you ought, however, to live as one desirous of becoming a Socrates.

51. The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is that of the use of moral theorems, such as, "We ought not to lie;" the second is that of demonstrations, such as, "What is the origin of our obligation not to lie;" the third gives strength and articulation to the other two, such as, "What is the origin of this is a demonstration." For what is demonstration? What is consequence? What contradiction? What truth? What falsehood? The third topic, then, is necessary on the account of the second, and the second on the account of the first. But the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. But we act just on the contrary. For we spend all our time on the third topic, and employ all our diligence about that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are immediately prepared to show how it is demonstrated that lying is not right.

52. Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at hand:

"Conduct me, Jove, and you, 0 Destiny,
Wherever your decrees have fixed my station." [Cleanthes]
"I follow cheerfully; and, did I not,
Wicked and wretched, I must follow still
Whoever yields properly to Fate, is deemed
Wise among men, and knows the laws of heaven." [Euripides, Frag. 965]

And this third:

"0 Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be. Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed, but hurt me they cannot." [Plato's Crito and Apology]

Notes

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Letter to Menoeceus

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Greeting.

Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search thereof when he is grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it.

Those things which without ceasing I have declared to you, those do, and exercise yourself in those, holding them to be the elements of right life. First believe that God is a living being immortal and happy, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of humankind; and so of him anything that is at agrees not with about him whatever may uphold both his happyness and his immortality. For truly there are gods, and knowledge of them is evident; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that people do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them. Not the person who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good from the hand of the gods, seeing that they are always favorable to their own good qualities and take pleasure in people like to themselves, but reject as alien whatever is not of their kind.

Accustom yourself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply awareness, and death is the privation of all awareness; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an unlimited time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. For life has no terror; for those who thoroughly apprehend that there are no terrors for them in ceasing to live. Foolish, therefore, is the person who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer. But in the world, at one time people shun death as the

greatest of all evils, and at another time choose it as a respite from the evils in life. The wise person does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life is no offense to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as people choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirability of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of Hades. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his words are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.

We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.

We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a happy life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure. For this reason we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a happy life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatever, but often pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And often we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is worthy of choice, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, teat all these matters must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as a good. Again, we regard. independence of outward things as a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but so as to be contented with little if we have not much, being honestly persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of it, and that whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win. Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when one the pain of want has been removed, while bread an water confer the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate one's se therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies al that is needful for health, and enables a person to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.

When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in

the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of merrymaking, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest disturbances take possession of the soul. Of all this the d is prudence. For this reason prudence is a more precious thing even than the other virtues, for ad a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honor, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honor, and justice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them.

Who, then, is superior in your judgment to such a person? He holds a holy belief concerning the gods, and is altogether free from the fear of death. He has diligently considered the end fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight. Destiny which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach. It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed. The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape if we honor the gods, while the necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties. Nor does he hold chance to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the acts of a god there is no disorder; nor to be a cause, though an uncertain one, for he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to people so as to make life happy, though it supplies the starting-point of great good and great evil. He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance.

Exercise yourself in these and kindred precepts day and night, both by yourself and with him who is like to you; then never, either in waking or in dream, will you be disturbed, but will live as a god among people. For people lose all appearance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings.

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Epicurus
Letter to Menoeceus

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Principal Doctrines

Epicurus

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1. A happy and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such movement implies weakness

2. Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us.

3. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.

4. Continuous pain does not last long in the body; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the body does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the body.

5. It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the person is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.

6. In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

7. Some people have sought to become famous and renowned, thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against their fellow-humans. If, then, the life of such persons really was secure, they attained natural good; if, however, it was insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's own prompting they originally sought.

8. No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.

9. If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, -- if this had gone on not only be recurrences in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of human nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.

10. If the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind, -- the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain; if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should never have any

fault to find with such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasures to overflowing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil.

11. If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science.

12. It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a person did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures.

13. There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow humans, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.

14. When tolerable security against our fellow humans is attained, then on a basis of power sufficient to afford supports and of material prosperity arises in most genuine form the security of a quiet private life withdrawn from the multitude.

15. Nature's wealth at once has its bounds and is easy to procure; but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite distance.

16. Fortune but seldom interferes with the wise person; his greatest and highest interests have been, are, and will be, directed by reason throughout the course of his life.

17. The just person enjoys. the greatest peace of mind, while the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude.

18. Pleasure in the body admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed; after that it only admits of variation. The limit of pleasure in the mind, however, is reached when we reflect on the things themselves and their congeners which cause the mind the greatest alarms.

19. Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.

20. The body receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the body is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life, and has no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.

21. He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by labor and conflict.

22. We must take into account as the end all that really exists and all clear evidence of sense to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything will be full of uncertainty and confusion.

23. If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those judgments which you pronounce false.

24. If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any immediate perception of the mind, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth altogether. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that

awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong opinion.

25. If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the end prescribed by nature, but instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories.

26. All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.

27. Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends.

28. The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.

29. Of our desires some are natural and necessary others are natural, but not necessary; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to illusory opinion.

30. Those natural desires which entail no pain when not gratified, though their objects are vehemently pursued, are also due to illusory opinion; and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the person's illusory opinion.

31. Natural justice is a symbol or expression of usefullness, to prevent one person from harming or being harmed by another.

32. Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with one another, to the end that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. And those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in like case.

33. There never was an absolute justice, but only an agreement made in reciprocal association in whatever localities now and again from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.

34. Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, viz. the terror which is excited by apprehension that those appointed to punish such offenses will discover the injustice.

35. It is impossible for the person who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for right on to the end of his life he is never sure he will not be detected.

36. Taken generally, justice is the same for all, to wit, something found useful in mutual association; but in its application to particular cases of locality or conditions of whatever kind, it varies under different circumstances.

37. Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual association is attested to be useful, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the usefulness of mutual association, then this is no longer just. And should the usefulness which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

38. Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really

just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be useful in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just when they were useful for the mutual association of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be useful.

39. He who best knew how to meet fear of external foes made into one family all the creatures he could; and those he could not, he at any rate did not treat as aliens; and where he found even this impossible, he avoided all association, and, so far as was useful, kept them at a distance.

40. Those who were best able to provide themselves with the means of security against their neighbors, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most agreeable life in each other's society; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his time, the survivors did not mourn his death as if it called for sympathy.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Epicurus
Principal Doctrines

 Epicurus's "Principal Doctrines" are preserved in Diogenes Laertius's Lives of Eminent Philosophers. The following is from Robert Drew Hicks's 1925 translation. This is a working draft; please report errors.[1]

* * * *

1. A happy and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such movement implies weakness

2. Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us.

3. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.

4. Continuous pain does not last long in the body; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the body does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the body.

5. It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the person is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.

6. In order to obtain security from other people any means whatever of procuring this was a natural good.

7. Some people have sought to become famous and renowned, thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against their fellow-humans. If, then, the life of such persons really was secure, they attained natural good; if, however, it was insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's own prompting they originally sought.

8. No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.

9. If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, -- if this had gone on not only be recurrences in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of human nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.

10. If the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind, -- the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain; if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should never have any fault to find with such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasures to overflowing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil.

11. If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science.

12. It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a person did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures.

13. There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow humans, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.

14. When tolerable security against our fellow humans is attained, then on a basis of power sufficient to afford supports and of material prosperity arises in most genuine form the security of a quiet private life withdrawn from the multitude.

15. Nature's wealth at once has its bounds and is easy to procure; but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite distance.

16. Fortune but seldom interferes with the wise person; his greatest and highest interests have been, are, and will be, directed by reason throughout the course of his life.

17. The just person enjoys. the greatest peace of mind, while the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude.

18. Pleasure in the body admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed; after that it only admits of variation. The limit of pleasure in the mind, however, is reached when we reflect on the things themselves and their congeners which cause the mind the greatest alarms.

19. Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.

20. The body receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the body is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life, and has no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of existence by

circumstances, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.

21. He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by labor and conflict.

22. We must take into account as the end all that really exists and all clear evidence of sense to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything will be full of uncertainty and confusion.

23. If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those judgments which you pronounce false.

24. If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any immediate perception of the mind, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth altogether. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong opinion.

25. If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the end prescribed by nature, but instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories.

26. All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.

27. Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends.

28. The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.

29. Of our desires some are natural and necessary others are natural, but not necessary; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to illusory opinion.

30. Those natural desires which entail no pain when not gratified, though their objects are vehemently pursued, are also due to illusory opinion; and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the person's illusory opinion.

31. Natural justice is a symbol or expression of usefullness, to prevent one person from harming or being harmed by another.

32. Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with one another, to the end that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. And those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in like case.

33. There never was an absolute justice, but only an agreement made in reciprocal association in whatever localities now and again from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.

34. Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, viz. the terror which is excited by apprehension that those appointed to punish such offenses will discover the injustice.

35. It is impossible for the person who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for right on to the end of his life he is never sure he will not be detected.

36. Taken generally, justice is the same for all, to wit, something found useful in mutual association; but in its application to particular cases of locality or conditions of whatever kind, it varies under different circumstances.

37. Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual association is attested to be useful, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the usefulness of mutual association, then this is no longer just. And should the usefulness which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

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Hume's Writings

As time permits, text files of Hume's complete writings will be available here. Next in the pipeline: the *Treatise*.

- **A Treatise of Human Nature (Book I) [text|rtf]**
- **Essays, Moral and Literary**
  - **Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion [text|rtf]**
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- The Natural History of Religion [text|rtf]
- My Own Life [text|rtf]
- Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [text|rtf]
- Essays on Suicide and Immortality (complete 1783 edition) [text|rtf]

18th Century British Reviews of Hume's Writings

Between 1739 and 1784, no less than 25 British reviews of Hume's first edition works appeared. The following is a partial list of those reviews (others will be added).

- Review of Hume's Treatise, History of the Works of the Learned (1739) [text|rtf]
- Review of Hume's Second Enquiry, Monthly Review (1752) [text|rtf]
- Review of Hume's Four Dissertations, Monthly Review (1757) [text|rtf]
- Review of Hume's Dialogues, Monthly Review (1779) [text|rtf]
- Review of Hume's Essays on Suicide, Gentleman's Magazine (1784) [text|rtf]
- Review of Hume's Essays on Suicide, Monthly Review (1784) [text|rtf]

Early Commentaries on Hume's Writings

Since Hume's first publication in 1739, thousands of books, pamphlets and articles on Hume's writings have appeared. The vast majority of these discussions are out of print and many can be accessed only through library special collections. The following is a partial list of early commentaries.

- Letter to "Commonsense" on Hume's Account of Necessity (1740), anonymous [text|rtf]
- Hume on Miracles (1749), William Warburton [text|rtf]
- The Credibility of Miracles Defended (1751), Thomas Rutherforth [text|rtf]

- An Examination of Mr. Hume's Arguments in his Essay on Miracles (1752), Anthony Ellys [text|rtf]
- Some Late Opinions Concerning the Foundation of Morality (1753), anonymous [text|rtf]
- Postscript on Mr. Hume's Natural History of Religion (1757), Caleb Fleming [text|rtf]
- Remarks on... the Natural History of Religion (1757), William Warburton [text|rtf]
- Remarks upon the Natural History of Religion (1758), Thomas Stona [text|rtf]
- The Insufficiency of Mr. Hume's Objection to... Miracles (1776), W.S. Powell [text|rtf]
- Remarks on... Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1780), Thomas Hayter [text|rtf]
- An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice (1793), anonymous [text|rtf]
- Hume on Miracles (1794), William Paley [text|rtf]
- On... the Origin of the Idea of Necessary Connection (1797), H. Richter [text|rtf]
- David Hume (1875), James McCosh

Early Biographies of David Hume

The first substantial biography of Hume was Thomas Edward Ritchie's 520 page *An account of the life and writings of David Hume, Esq.* (1807). However, as early as 1762 biographical essays on Hume appeared in magazines, reference books, and personal memoirs. The essays below include critical discussions of Hume's life as well as historical accounts.

- David Hume (1762), William Rider [text|rtf]
- An Account of the Life and Writings of David Hume (1776), anonymous [text|rtf]
- Strictures on the "Account of the Life... of David Hume" (1777), "Tobias Simple" [text|rtf]
- Letter from Adam Smith, LL.D. to William Strahan, Esq. (1777), Adam Smith [text|rtf]
- Letter to Adam Smith (1777), George Horne [text|rtf]
- Supplement to the Life of David Hume, Esq. (1777), S.J. Pratt [text|rtf]
- David Hume (a. 1799), James Caulfield [text|rtf]
- Anecdotes of David Hume (a. 1800), Alexander Carlyle [text|rtf]
- The Life of David Hume, Esq. (1800), William Smellie [text|rtf]

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The Will To Believe
William James
1897

The Will To Believe[2]

In the recently published Life by Leslie Stephen of I his brother, Fitz-James, there is an account of a school to which the latter went when he was a boy. The teacher, a certain Mr. Guest, used to converse with his pupils in this wise: "Gurney, what is the difference between justification and sanctification? Stephen, prove the omnipotence of God!" etc. In the midst of our Harvard freethinking and indifference we are prone to imagine that here at your good old orthodox College conversation continues to be somewhat upon this order; and to show you that we at Harvard have not lost all interest in these vital subjects, I have brought with me to-night something like a sermon on justification by faith to read to you, -- I mean an essay in justification of faith, a defense of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced. I The Will to Believe,' accordingly, is the title of my paper.

I have long defended to my own students the lawfulness of voluntarily adopted faith; but as soon as they have got well imbued with the logical spirit, they have as a rule refused to admit my contention I to be lawful philosophically, even though in point of fact they were personally all the time chock-full of some faith or other themselves. I am all the while, however, so profoundly convinced that my own position is correct, that your invitation has seemed to me a good occasion to make my statements more clear. Perhaps your minds will be more open than those with which I have hitherto had to deal, I will be as little technical as I can, though I must begin by setting up some technical distinctions that will help us in the end.

1. Hypotheses and Options. Let us give the name of *hypothesis* to anything that

may be proposed to our belief; and just as the electricians speak of live and dead wires, let us speak of any hypothesis as either *live* or *dead*. A live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed. If I asked you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no electric connection with your nature, -- it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it is completely dead. To an Arab, however (even if he be not one of the Mahdi's followers), the hypothesis is among the mind's possibilities: it is alive. This shows that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the individual thinker. They are measured

by his willingness to act. The maximum of liveness in an hypothesis , means willingness to act irrevocably. Practically, that means belief; but there is some believing tendency wherever there is willingness to act at all.

Next, let us call the decision between two hypotheses an *option*. Options may be of several kinds. They may be -- 1. *living* or *dead*; 2. *forced* or *avoidable*; 3, *momentous* or *trivial*; and for our purposes we may call an option a genuine option when it is of the forced, living, and momentous kind.

1. A living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones. If I say to you: "Be a theosophist or be a Mohammedan," it is probably a dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if I say: " Be an agnostic or be a Christian," it is otherwise: trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal, however small, to your belief.

2. Next, if I say to you: "Choose between going out with your umbrella or without it," I do not offer you a genuine option, for it is not forced. You can easily avoid it by not going out at all. Similarly, if I say, "Either love me or hate me," "Either call my theory true or call it false," your option is avoidable. You may remain indifferent to me, neither loving nor hating, and you may decline to offer any judgment as to my theory. But if I say, "Either accept this truth or go without it," I put on you a forced option, for there is no standing place outside of the alternative. Every dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, is an option of this forced kind.

3. Finally, if I were Dr. Nansen and proposed to you to join my North Pole expedition, your option would be momentous; for this would probably be your only similar opportunity, and your choice now would either exclude you from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether or put at least the chance of it into your hands. He who refuses to embrace a unique opportunity loses the prize as surely as if he tried and failed. *Per contra*, the option is trivial when the opportunity is not unique, when the stake is insignificant, or when the decision is reversible if it later prove unwise. Such trivial options abound in the scientific life. A chemist finds an hypothesis live enough to spend a year in its verification: he believes in it to that extent. But if his experiments prove inconclusive either way, he is quit for his loss of time, no vital harm being done.

It will facilitate our discussion if we keep all these distinctions well in mind.

2. Pascal's Wager. The next matter to consider is the actual psychology of human opinion. When we look at certain facts, it seems as if our passional and volitional nature lay at the root of all our convictions. When we look at others, it seems as if they could do nothing when the intellect had once said its say. Let us take the latter facts up first

Does it not seem preposterous on the very face of it to talk of our opinions being modifiable at will? Can our will either help or hinder our 'intellect in its perceptions of truth? Can we, by just willing it, believe that Abraham Lincoln's existence is a myth, and that the portraits of him in McClure's Magazine are all of some one else? Can we, by any effort of our will, or by any strength of wish that it were true, believe ourselves well and about when we are roaring with rheumatism in bed, or feel certain that the sum of the two one-dollar bills in our pocket must be a hundred dollars? We can *say* any of these things, but we are absolutely impotent to believe them; and of just such things is the whole fabric of the truths that we do believe in made up, -- matters of fact, immediate or remote, as Hume said, and relations between ideas, which are either there or not there for us if we see them so, and which if not there cannot be put there by any action of our own.

In Pascal's Thoughts there is a celebrated passage known in literature as Pascal's wager. In it he

tries to force us into Christianity by reasoning as if our concern with truth resembled our concern with the stakes in a game of chance. Translated freely his words are these: You must either believe or not believe that God is -- which will you do? Your human reason cannot say. A game is going on between you and the nature of 'things which at the day of judgment will bring out either heads or tails. Weigh what your gains and your losses would be if you should stake all you have on heads, or God's existence: if you win in such case, you gain eternal beatitude; if you lose, you lose nothing at all. If there were an infinity of chances, and only one for God in this wager, still you ought to stake your all. on God; for though you surely risk a finite loss by this procedure, any finite loss is reasonable, even a certain one is reasonable, if there is but the possibility of infinite gain. Go, then, and take holy water, and have masses said; belief will come and stupefy your scruples, -- *Cela vous fera croire et vous abltira*. Why should you not? At bottom, what have you to lose?

You probably feel that when religious faith expresses itself thus, in the language of the gamingtable, it is put to its last trumps. Surely Pascal's own personal belief in masses and holy water had far other springs; and this celebrated page of his is but an argument for others, a last desperate snatch at a weapon against the hardness of the unbelieving heart. We feel that a faith in masses and holy water adopted willfully after such a mechanical calculation -- would lack the inner soul of faith's reality; and if we were ourselves in the place of the Deity, we should probably take particular pleasure in cutting off believers of this pattern from their infinite reward. It is evident that unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy water, the option offered to 'the will by Pascal is not a living option. Certainly no Turk ever took to masses and holy water on its account; and even to us Protestants these means of salvation seem such foregone impossibilities that Pascal's logic, invoked for them specifically, leaves us unmoved. As well might the Mahdi write to us, saying, "I am the Expected One whom God has created in his effulgence. You shall be infinitely happy if you confess me; otherwise you shall be cut off from the light of the sun. Weigh, then, your infinite gain if I am genuine against your finite sacrifice if I am not! " His logic would be that of Pascal; but he would vainly use it on us, for the hypothesis he offers us is dead. No tendency to act on it exists in us to any degree.

The talk of believing by our volition seems, then, from one point of view, simply silly. From another point of view it is worse than silly, it is vile. When one turns to the magnificent edifice of the physical sciences, and sees how it was reared; what thousands of disinterested moral lives of men lie buried in its mere foundations; what patience and postponement, what choking down of preference, what submission to the icy laws of outer fact are wrought into its very stones and mortar; how absolutely impersonal it stands in its vast augustness, -- then how besotted and contemptible seems every little sentimentalist who comes blowing his voluntary smoke-wreaths, and pretending to decide things from out of his private dream! Can we wonder if those bred in the rugged and manly school of science should feel like spewing such subjectivism out of their mouths? The whole system of loyalties which grow up in the schools of science go dead against its toleration; so that it is only natural that those who have caught the scientific fever should pass over to the opposite extreme, and write sometimes as if the incorruptibly truthful intellect ought positively to prefer bitterness and unacceptableness to the heart in its cup.

It fortifies my soul to know

That, though I perish, Truth is so --

sings Clough, while Huxley exclaims: "My only consolation lies in the reflection that, however bad our posterity may become, so far as they hold by the plain rule of not pretending to believe what

they have no reason to believe, because it may be to their advantage so to pretend the word ' pretend' is surely here redundant, they will not have reached the lowest depth of immorality." And that delicious *enfant terrible* Clifford writes: " Belief is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements for the solace and private pleasure of the believer. . . . Whoso would deserve well of his fellows in this matter will guard the purity of his belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it should rest on an unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away. . . . If a belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence even though the belief be true, as Clifford on the same page explains the pleasure is a stolen one. . . . It is sinful because it is stolen in defiance of our duty to mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence which may shortly master our own body and then spread to the rest of the town. . . . It is ,wrong always, everywhere, and for every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."

3. Clifford's Veto, Psychological Causes of Belief. All this strikes one as healthy, even when expressed, as by Clifford, with somewhat too much of robustious pathos in the voice.,; Free-will and simple wishing do seem, in the matter of our credences, to be only fifth wheels to the coach. Yet if any one should thereupon assume that intellectual insight is what remains after wish and will and sentimental preference have taken wing, or that pure reason is what then settles our opinions, he would fly quite as directly in the teeth of the facts.

It is only our already dead hypotheses that our willing nature is unable to bring to life again But what has made them dead for us is for the most part a previous action of our willing nature of an antagonistic kind. When I say 'willing nature,' I do not mean only such deliberate volitions as may have set up habits of belief that we cannot now escape from, I mean all such factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the circumpressure of our caste and set. As a matter of fact we find ourselves believing, we hardly know how or why. Mr. Balfour gives the name of authority' to all those influences, born of the intellectual climate, that make hypotheses possible or impossible for us, alive or dead. Here in this room, we all of us believe in molecules and the conservation of energy, in democracy and necessary progress, in Protestant Christianity and the duty of fighting for 'the doctrine of the immortal Monroe,' all for no reasons worthy of the name. We see into these matters with no more inner clearness,. and probably with much less, than any disbeliever in them might possess. His unconventionality would probably have some grounds to show for its conclusions; but for us, not insight, but the *prestige* of the opinions, is what makes the spark shoot from them and light up our sleeping magazines of faith. Our reason is quite satisfied, in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of every thousand of us, if it can find a few arguments that will do to recite in case our credulity is criticized by some one else. Our faith is faith in some one else's faith, and in the greatest matters this is most the case. Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other, -- what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up? We want to have a truth; we want to believe that our experiments and studies and discussions must put us in a continually better and better position towards it; and on this line we agree to fight out our thinking lives. But if a pyrrhonistic skeptic asks us *how we know* all this, can our logic find a reply? No! certainly it cannot. It is just one volition against another, -- we willing to go in for life upon a trust or assumption which he, for his part, does not care to make.[3]

As a rule we disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use. Clifford's cosmic emotions find no use for Christian feelings. Huxley belabors the bishops because there is no use for sacerdotalism in his scheme of life. Newman, on the contrary, goes over to Romanism, and finds all

sorts of reasons good for staying there, because a priestly system is for him an organic need and delight. Why do so few "scientists" even look at the evidence for telepathy, so-called? Because they think, as a leading biologist, now dead, once said to me, that even if such a thing were true, scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of Nature and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits. But if this very man had been shown something which as a scientist he might *do* with telepathy, he might not only have examined the evidence, but even have found it good enough. This very law which the logicians would impose upon us -- if I may give the name of logicians to those who would rule out our willing nature here -- is based on nothing but their own natural wish to exclude all elements form which they, in their professional quality of logicians, can find no use.

Evidently, then, our non-intellectual nature does influence our convictions. There are passional tendencies and volitions which run before and others which come after belief, and it is only the latter that are too late for the fair; and they are not too late when the previous passional work has been already in their own direction. Pascal's argument, instead of being powerless, then seems a regular clincher, and is the last stroke needed to make our faith in masses and holy water complete. The state of things is evidently far from simple; and pure insight and logic, whatever they might do ideally, are not the only things that really do produce our creeds.

4. Thesis of the Essay. Our next duty, having recognized this mixed-up state of affairs, is to ask whether it be simply reprehensible and pathological, or whether, on the contrary, we must treat it as a normal element in making up our minds. The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: *Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an o option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds ; for to say, under such circumstances, " Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision, -- just like deciding yes or no, -- and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.* The thesis thus abstractly expressed will, I trust, soon become quite clear. But I must first indulge in a bit more of preliminary work.

5. Empiricism and Absolutism. It will be observed that for the purposes of this discussion we are on 'dogmatic ' ground, -- ground, I mean, which leaves systematic philosophical skepticism altogether out of account. The postulate that there is truth, and that it is the destiny of our minds to attain it, we are deliberately resolving to make, though the skeptic will not make it. We part company with him, therefore, absolutely, at this point. But the faith that truth exists, and that our minds can find it, may be held in two ways. We may talk of the *empiricist* way and of the *absolutist* way of believing in truth. The absolutists in this matter say that we not only can attain to knowing truth, but we can *know* when we have attained to knowing it; while the empiricists think that although we may attain it, we cannot infallibly know when. To *know* is one thing, and to know for certain *that* we know is another. One may hold to the first being possible without the second; hence the empiricists and the absolutists, although neither of them is a skeptic in the usual philosophic sense of the term, show very different degrees of dogmatism in their lives.

If we look at the history of opinions, we see that the empiricist tendency has largely prevailed in science, while in philosophy the absolutist tendency has had everything its own way. The characteristic sort of happiness, indeed, which philosophies yield has mainly consisted in the conviction felt by each successive school or system that by it bottom-certitude had been attained. "Other philosophies are collections of opinions, mostly false; *my* philosophy gives standing-ground forever," -- who does not recognize in this the key-note of every system worthy of the name? A system, to be a system at all, must come as a *closed* system, reversible in this or that detail,

perchance, but in its essential features never!

Scholastic orthodoxy, to which one must always go when one wishes to find perfectly clear statement, has beautifully elaborated this absolutist conviction in a doctrine which it calls that of ' objective evidence.' If, for example, I am unable to doubt that I now exist before you, that two is less than three, or that if all men are mortal then I am mortal too, it is because these things illumine my intellect irresistibly. The final ground of this objective evidence possessed by certain propositions is the *adaequatio intellectus nostri cum re*. The certitude it brings involves an *apititudinem ad extorquendum certum assensum* on the part of the truth envisaged, and on the side of the subject a *quietem in cognitione*, when once the object is mentally received, that leaves no possibility of doubt behind; and in the whole transaction nothing operates but the *entitas ipsa* of the object and the *entitas ipsa* of the mind. We slouchy modern thinkers dislike to talk in Latin, -- indeed, we dislike to talk in set terms at all; but at bottom our own state of mind is very much like this whenever we uncritically abandon ourselves: You believe in objective evidence, and I do. Of some things we feel that we are certain: we know, and we know that we do know. There is something that gives a click inside of us, a bell that strikes twelve, when the hands of our mental clock have swept the dial and meet over the meridian hour. The greatest empiricists among us are only empiricists on reflection: when left to their instincts, they dogmatize like infallible popes. When the Cliffords tell us how sinful it is to be Christians on such 'insufficient evidence,' insufficiency is really the last thing they have in mind. For them the evidence is absolutely sufficient, only it makes the other way. They believe so completely in an anti-Christian order of the universe that there is no living option: Christianity is a dead hypothesis from the start.

6. Objective Certitude and its Unattainability. But now, since we are all such absolutists by instinct, what in our quality of students of philosophy ought we to do about the fact? Shall we espouse and endorse it? Or shall we treat it as a weakness of our nature from which we must free ourselves, if we can?

I sincerely believe that the latter course is the only one we can follow as reflective men. Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found? I am, therefore, myself a complete empiricist so far as my theory of human knowledge goes. I live, to be sure, by the practical faith that we must go on experiencing and thinking over our experience, for only thus can our opinions grow more true; but to hold any one of them -- I absolutely do not care which -- as if it never could be reinterpretable or corrigible, I believe to be a tremendously mistaken attitude, and I think that the whole history of philosophy will bear me out. There is but one indefectibly certain truth, and that is the truth that pyrrhonistic skepticism itself leaves standing, -- the truth that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists. That, however, is the bare starting-point of knowledge, the mere admission of a stuff to be philosophized about. The various philosophies are but so many attempts at expressing what this stuff really is. And if we repair to our libraries what disagreement do we discover! Where is a certainly true answer found? Apart from abstract propositions of comparison (such as two and two are the same as four), propositions which tell us nothing by themselves about concrete reality, we find no proposition ever regarded by any one as evidently certain that has not either been called a falsehood, or at least had its truth sincerely questioned by some one else. The transcending of the axioms of geometry, not in play but in earnest, by certain of our contemporaries (as Zollner and Charles H. Hinton), and the rejection of the whole Aristotelian logic by the Hegelians, are striking instances in point.

No concrete test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon. Some make the criterion external

to the moment of perception, putting it either in revelation, the *consensus gentium,* the instincts of the heart, or the systematized experience of the race. Others make the perceptive moment its own test, Descartes, for instance, with his clear and distinct ideas guaranteed by the veracity of God; Reid with his 'common-sense;' and Kant with his forms of synthetic judgment *a priori*. The inconceivability of the opposite; the capacity to be verified by sense; the possession of complete organic unity or self-relation, realized when a thing is its own other, -- are standards which, in turn, have been used, The much lauded objective evidence is never triumphantly there; it is a mere aspiration or *Grenzbegriff,* marking the infinitely remote ideal of our thinking life. To claim that certain truths now possess it, is simply to say that when you think them true and they *are* true, then their evidence is objective, otherwise it is not. But practically one's conviction that the evidence one goes by is of the real objective brand, is only one more subjective opinion added to the lot. For what a contradictory array of opinions have objective evidence and absolute certitude been claimed! The world is rational through and through, -- its existence is an ultimate brute fact; there is a personal God, -- a personal God is inconceivable; there is an extra-mental physical world immediately known, -- the mind can only know its own ideas; a moral imperative exists, -- obligation is only the resultant of desires; a permanent spiritual principle is in every one, -- there are only shifting states of mind; there is an endless chain of causes, -- there is an absolute first cause; an eternal necessity, -- a freedom; a purpose, -- no purpose; a primal One, -- a primal Many; a universal continuity, -- an essential discontinuity in things; an infinity, -- no infinity. There is this, -- there is that; there is indeed nothing which some one has not thought absolutely true, while his neighbor deemed it absolutely false; and not an absolutist among them seems ever to have considered that the trouble may all the time be essential, and that the intellect, even with truth directly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be truth or no. When, indeed, one remembers that the most striking practical application to life of the doctrine of objective certitude has been the conscientious labors of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, one feels less tempted than ever to lend the doctrine a respectful ear.

But please observe, now, that when as empiricists we give up the doctrine of objective certitude, we do not thereby give up the quest or hope of truth itself. We still pin our faith on its existence, and still believe that we gain an ever better position towards it by systematically continuing to roll up experiences and think. Our great difference from the scholastic lies in the way we face. The strength of his system lies in the principles, the origin, the *terminus a quo* of his thought; for us the strength is in the outcome, the upshot, the *terminus ad quem*. Not where it comes from but what it leads to is to decide. It, matters not to an empiricist from what quarter an hypothesis may come to him: he may have acquired it by fair means or by foul; passion may have whispered or accident suggested it; but if the total drift of thinking continues to confirm it, that is what he means b its being true.

7. Two Different Sorts of Risks in Believing. One more point, small but important, and our preliminaries are done. There are two ways of looking at our duty in the. matter of opinion, -- ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose difference the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown very little concern. *We must know the truth*; and *we must avoid error*, -- these are our first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws. Although it may indeed happen that when we believe the truth A, we escape as an incidental consequence from believing the falsehood B, it hardly ever happens that by merely disbelieving B we necessarily believe A. We may in escaping B fall into believing other falsehoods, C or D, just as bad as B; or we may escape B by not believing

anything at all not even A. Believe truth! Shun error -- these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance. Clifford, in the instructive passage which I have quoted, exhorts us to the latter course. Believe nothing, he tells us, keep your mind in suspense forever', rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence incur the awful risk of believing lies. You, on the other hand, may think that the risk Of being in error is a very small matter when compared with the blessings of real knowledge, and be ready to be duped many times in your investigation rather than postpone indefinitely the chance of guessing true. I myself find it impossible to go with Clifford. We must remember that these feelings of our duty about either truth or error are in any case only expressions of our passional life. Biologically considered, our minds are as ready to grind out falsehood as veracity, and he who says, "Better go without belief forever than believe a lie!" merely shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming a dupe. He may be critical of many of his desires and fears, but this fear he slavishly obeys. He cannot imagine any one questioning its binding force. For my own part, I have also a horror of being duped; but I can believe that worse things than being duped may happen to a man in this world: so Clifford's exhortation has to my ears a thoroughly fantastic sound. It is like a general informing his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a single wound. Not so are victories either over enemies or over nature gained. Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf At any rate, it seems the fittest thing for the empiricist philosopher.

8. Some Risk Unavoidable. And now, after all this introduction, let us go straight at our question. I have said, and now repeat it, that not only as a matter of fact do we find our passional nature influencing us in our opinions, but that there are some options between opinions in which this influence must be regarded both as an inevitable and as a lawful determinant of our choice.

I fear here that some of you my hearers will begin to scent danger, and lend an inhospitable ear. Two first steps of passion you have indeed had to admit as necessary, -- we must think so as to avoid dupery, and -- we must think so as to gain truth; but the surest path to those ideal consummations, you will probably consider, is from now onwards to take no further passional step.

Well, of course, I agree as far as the facts will allow. Wherever the option between losing truth and gaining it is not momentous, we can throw the chance of *gaining truth* away, and at any rate save ourselves from any chance of *believing falsehood*, by not making up our minds at all till objective evidence has come. In scientific questions, this is almost always the case; and even in human affairs in general, the need of acting is seldom so urgent that a false belief to act on is better than no belief at all. Law courts, indeed, have to decide on the best evidence attainable for the moment, because a judge's duty is to make law as well as to ascertain it, and (as a learned judge once said to me) few cases are worth spending much time over: the great thing is to have them decided on any acceptable principle, and got out of the way. But in our dealings with objective nature we obviously are recorders, not makers, of the truth; and decisions for the mere sake of deciding promptly and getting on to the next business would be wholly out of place. Throughout the breadth of physical nature facts are what they are quite independently of us, and seldom is there any such hurry about them that the risks of being duped by believing a premature theory need be faced. The questions here are always trivial options, the hypotheses are hardly living (at any rate not living for us

spectators), the choice between believing truth or falsehood is seldom forced. The attitude of skeptical balance is therefore the absolutely wise one if we would escape mistakes. What difference, indeed, does it make to most of us whether we have or have not a theory of the Rontgen rays, whether we believe or not in mind-stuff, or have a conviction about the causality of conscious states? It makes no difference. Such options are not forced on us. On every account it is better not to make them, but still keep weighing reasons Pro *et contra* with an indifferent hand.

I speak, of course, here of the purely judging mind. For purposes of discovery such indifference is to be less highly recommended, and science would be far less advanced than she is if the passionate desires of individuals to get their own faiths confirmed had been kept out of the game. See for example the sagacity which Spencer and Weismann now display. On the other hand, if you want an absolute duffer in an investigation, you must, after all, take the man who has no interest whatever in its results: he is the warranted incapable, the positive fool. The most useful investigator, because the most sensitive observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived.[4] Science has organized this nervousness into a regular *technique*, her so-called method of verification; and she has fallen so deeply in love with the method that one may even say she has ceased to care for truth by itself at all. It is only truth as technically verified that interests her. The truth of truths might come in merely affirmative form, and she would decline to touch it. Such truth as that, she might repeat with Clifford, would be stolen in defiance of her duty to mankind. Human passions, however, are stronger than technical rules. " Le coeur a ses raisons," as Pascal says, " que la raison ne connait pas;" and however indifferent to all but the bare rules of the game the umpire, the abstract intellect, may be, the concrete players who furnish him the materials to judge of are usually, each one of them, in love with some pet 'live hypothesis' of his own. Let us agree, however, that wherever there is no forced option, the dispassionately judicial intellect with no pet hypothesis, saving us, as it does, from dupery at any rate, ought to be our ideal.

The question next arises: Are there not somewhere forced options in our speculative questions, and can we (as men who may be interested at least as much in positively gaining truth as in merely escaping dupery) always wait with impunity till the coercive evidence shall have arrived? It seems *a priori* improbable that the truth should be so nicely adjusted to our needs and powers as that. In the great boarding-house of nature, the cakes and the butter and the syrup seldom come out so even and leave the plates so clean. Indeed, we should view them with scientific suspicion if they did.

9. Faith May Bring Forth its Own Verification. *Moral questions* immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof. A moral question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist. Science can tell us what exists; but to compare the *worths*, both of what exists and of what does not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart. Science herself consults her heart when she lays it down that the infinite ascertainment of fact and correction of false belief are the supreme goods for man. Challenge the statement, and science can only repeat it oracularly, or else prove it by showing that such ascertainment and correction bring man all sorts of other goods which man's heart in turn declares. The question of having moral beliefs at all or not having them is decided by our will. Are our moral preferences true or false, or are they only odd biological phenomena, making things good or bad for *us*, but in themselves indifferent? How can your pure intellect decide? If your heart does not *want* a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in one. Mephistophelian skepticism, indeed, will satisfy the head's play-instincts much better than any rigorous idealism can. Some men (even at the student age) are so naturally cool-hearted that the

moralistic hypothesis never has for them any pungent life, and in their supercilious presence the hot young moralist always feels strangely ill at ease. The appearance of knowingness is on their side, of *naivet,* and gullibility on his. Yet, in the inarticulate heart of him, he clings to it that he is not a dupe, and that there is a realm in which (as Emerson says) all their wit and intellectual superiority is no better than the cunning of a fox. Moral skepticism can no more be refuted or proved by logic than intellectual skepticism can. When we stick to it that there *is* truth (be it of either kind), we do so with our whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results. The skeptic with his whole nature adopts the doubting attitude; but which of us is the wiser, Omniscience only knows.

Turn now from these wide questions of good to a certain class of questions of fact, questions concerning personal relations, states of mind between one man and another. *Do you like me or not?* -- for example. Whether you do or not depends, in countless instances, on whether I meet you half-way, am willing to assume that you must like me, and show you trust and expectation. The previous faith on my part in your liking's existence is in such cases what makes your liking come. But if I stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence, until you shall have done something apt, as the absolutists say, *ad extorquendum assensum meum*, ten to one your liking never comes. How many women's hearts are vanquished by the mere sanguine insistence of some man that they *must* love him! he will not consent to the hypothesis that they cannot. The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about that special truth's existence; and so it is in innumerable cases of other sorts. Who gains promotions, boons, appointments, but the man in whose life they are seen to play the part of live hypotheses, who discounts them, sacrifices other things for their sake before they have come, and takes risks for them in advance? His faith acts on the powers above him as a claim, and creates its own verification.

A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted. A whole train of passengers (individually brave enough) will be looted by a few highwaymen, simply because the latter can count on one another, while each passenger fears that if he makes a movement of resistance, he will be shot before any one else backs him up. If we believed that the whole car-full would rise at once with us, we should each severally rise, and train-robbing would never even be attempted. There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming. *And where faith in a fact can help create the fact*, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the 'lowest kind of immorality' into which a thinking being can fall. Yet such is the logic by which our scientific absolutists pretend to regulate our lives!

10. Logical Conditions of Religious Belief. In truths dependent on our personal action, then, faith based on desire is certainly a lawful and possibly an indispensable thing.

But now, it will be said, these are all childish human cases, and have nothing to do with great cosmical matters, like the question of religious faith. Let us then pass on to that. Religions differ so much in their accidents that in discussing the religious question we must make it very generic and broad. What then do we now mean by the religious hypothesis? Science says things are; morality says some things are better than other things; and religion says essentially two things.

First, she says that the best things are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word. " Perfection is eternal," this phrase of Charles Secretan seems a good way of putting this first affirmation of religion, an affirmation which obviously cannot yet be verified scientifically at all.

The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true.

Now, let us consider what the logical elements of this situation are *in case the religious hypothesis in both its branches be really true*. (Of course, we must admit that possibility at the outset. If we are to discuss the question at all, it must involve a living option. If for any of you religion be a hypothesis that cannot, by any living possibility be true, then you need go no farther. I speak to the 'saving remnant' alone.) So proceeding, we see, first, that religion offers itself as a *momentous* option. We are supposed to gain, even now, by our belief, and to lose by our nonbelief, a certain vital good. Secondly, religion is a *forced* option, so far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by remaining skeptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way *if religion be untrue*, we lose the good, *if it be true*, just as certainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve. It is as if a man should hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him because he was not perfectly sure that she would prove an angel after he brought her home. Would he not cut himself off from that particular angel-possibility as decisively as if he went and married some one else? Skepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. *Better risk loss of truth than chance of error*, -- that is' your faith-vetoer's exact position. He is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing the field against the religious hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the religious hypothesis against the field. To preach skepticism to us as a duty until 'sufficient evidence' for religion be found, is tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion laying down its law. And by what, forsooth, is the supreme wisdom of this passion warranted? Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear? I, for one, can see no proof; and I simply refuse obedience to the scientist's command to imitate his kind of option, in a case where my own stake is important enough to give me the right to choose my own form of risk. If religion be true and the evidence for it be still insufficient, I do not wish, by putting your extinguisher upon my nature (which feels to me as if it had after all some business in this matter), to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side, -- that chance depending, of course, on my willingness to run the risk of acting as if my passional need of taking the world religiously might be prophetic and right.

All this is on the supposition that it really may be prophetic and right, and that, even to us who are discussing the matter, religion is a live hypothesis which may be true. Now, to most of us religion comes in a still further way that makes a veto on our active faith even more illogical. The more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our religions as having personal form. The universe is no longer a mere *It* to us, but a *Thou,* if we are religious; and any relation that may be possible from person to person might be possible here. For instance, although in one sense we are passive portions of the universe, in another we show a curious autonomy, as if we were small active centers on our own account. We feel, too, as if the appeal of religion to us were made to our own active good-will, as if evidence might be forever withheld from us unless we met the hypothesis half-way. To take a trivial illustration: just as a man who in a company of

gentlemen made no advances, asked a warrant for every concession, and believed no one's word without proof, would cut himself off by such churlishness from all the social rewards that a more trusting spirit would earn, -- so here, one who should shut himself up in snarling logicality and try to make the gods extort his recognition willy-nilly, or not get it at all, might cut himself off forever from his only opportunity of making the gods' acquaintance. This feeling, forced on us we know not whence, that by obstinately believing that there are gods (although not to do so would be so easy both for our logic and our life) we are doing the universe the deepest service we can, seems part of the living essence of the religious hypothesis. If the hypothesis *were* true in all its parts, including this one, then pure intellectualism, with its veto on our making willing advances, would be an absurdity; and some participation of our sympathetic nature would be logically required. I, therefore, for one, cannot see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, or willfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the game. I cannot do so for this plain reason, that *a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule*. That for me is the long and short of the formal logic of the situation, no matter what the kinds of truth might materially be.

I confess I do not see how this logic can be escaped. But sad experience makes me fear that some of you may still shrink from radically saying with me, *in abstractor* that we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will. I suspect, however, that if this is so, it is because you have got away from the abstract logical point of view altogether, and are thinking (perhaps without realizing it) of some particular religious hypothesis which for you is dead. The freedom to 'believe what we will' you apply to the case of some patent superstition; and the faith you think of is the faith defined by the schoolboy when he said, " Faith is when you believe something that you know ain't true." I can only repeat that this is misapprehension. *In concreto*, the freedom to believe can only cover living options which the intellect of the individual cannot by itself resolve; and living options never seem absurdities to him who has them to consider. When I look at the religious question as it really puts itself to concrete men, and when I think of all the possibilities which both practically and theoretically it involves, then this command that we shall put a stopper on our heart, instincts, and courage, and *wait* -- acting of course meanwhile more or less as if religion were *not* true[5] -- till doomsday, or till such time as our intellect and senses working together may have raked in evidence enough, -- this command, I say, seems to me the queerest idol ever manufactured in the philosophic cave. Were we scholastic absolutists, there might be more excuse. If we had an infallible intellect with its objective certitudes, we might feel ourselves disloyal to such a perfect organ of knowledge in not trusting to it exclusively, in not waiting for its releasing word. But if we are empiricists, if we believe that no bell in us tolls to let us know for certain when truth is in our grasp, then it seems a piece of idle fantasticality to preach so solemnly our duty of waiting for the bell. Indeed we *may* wait if we will, -- I hope you do not think that I am denying that, -- but if we do so, we do so at our peril as much as if we believed. In either case we *act*, taking our life in our hands. No one of us ought to issue vetoes to the other, nor should we bandy words of abuse. We ought, on the contrary, delicately and profoundly to respect one another's mental freedom: then only shall we bring about the intellectual republic; then only shall we have that spirit of inner tolerance without which all our outer tolerance is soulless, and which is empiricism's glory; then only shall we live and let live, in speculative as well as in practical things.

I began by a reference to Fitz James Stephen; let me end by a quotation from him. " What do you think of yourself? What do you think of the world? . . . These are questions with which all must deal as it seems good to them. They are riddles of the Sphinx, in some way or other we must deal

with them... In all important transactions of life we have to a leap in the dark. . . . If we decide to leave the riddles unanswered, that is a choice; if we waver in our answer, that, too, is a choice: but whatever choice we make, we make it at our peril. If a man chooses to turn his back altogether on God and the future, no one can prevent him; no one can show beyond reasonable doubt that he is mistaken. If a man thinks otherwise and acts as he thinks, I do not see that any one can prove that *he* is mistaken. Each must act as he thinks best; and if he is wrong, so much the worse for him. We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there is any right one. What must we do? "Be strong and of a good courage." Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes. . . . If death ends all, we cannot meet death better."[6]

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., H/UME\) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g.,) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

2 An Address to the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities. Published in the New World, June, 1896.

3 Compare the admirable page 310 in S. H. Hodpon's " Time and Space," London, 1865.

4 Compare Wilfrid Ward's Essay, "The Wish to Believe," in his Witnesses to the Unseen, Macmillan & Co., 1893.

5 Since belief is measured by action, he who forbids us to believe religion to be true, necessarily also forbids us to act as we should if we did believe it to be true. The whole defense of religious faith hinges upon action. If the action required or inspired by the religious hypothesis is in no way different from that dictated by the naturalistic hypothesis, then religious faith is a pure superfluity, better pruned away, and controversy about its legitimacy is a piece of idle trifling, unworthy of serious minds. I myself believe, of course, that the religious hypothesis gives to the world an expression which specifically determines our reactions, and makes them in a large part unlike what they might be on a purely naturalistic scheme of belief.

6 Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, P. 353, 2d edition. London, 1874.

William James
The Will To Believe.
1897

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The Will To Believe.[2]

In the recently published Life by Leslie Stephen of I his brother, Fitz-James, there is an account of a school to which the latter went when he was a boy. The teacher, a certain Mr. Guest, used to converse with his pupils in this wise: "Gurney, what is the difference between justification and sanctification? Stephen, prove the omnipotence of God!" etc. In the midst of our Harvard freethinking and indifference we are prone to imagine that here at your good old orthodox College conversation continues to be somewhat upon this order; and to show you that we at Harvard have not lost all interest in these vital subjects, I have brought with me to-night something like a sermon on justification by faith to read to you, -- I mean an essay in justification of faith, a defense of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced. I The Will to Believe,' accordingly, is the title of my paper.

I have long defended to my own students the lawfulness of voluntarily adopted faith; but as soon as they have got well imbued with the logical spirit, they have as a rule refused to admit my contention I to be lawful philosophically, even though in point of fact they were personally all the time chock-full of some faith or other themselves. I am all the while, however, so profoundly convinced that my own position is correct, that your invitation has seemed to me a good occasion to make my statements more clear. Perhaps your minds will be more open than those with which I have hitherto had to deal, I will be as little technical as I can, though I must begin by setting up some technical distinctions that will help us in the end.

1. Hypotheses and Options. Let us give the name of <hypothesis> to anything that
may be proposed to our belief; and just as the electricians speak of live and dead wires, let us speak of any hypothesis as either <live> or <dead>. A live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed. If I asked you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no electric connection with your nature, -- it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it is completely dead. To an Arab, however (even if he be not one of the Mahdi's followers), the hypothesis is among the mind's possibilities: it is alive. This shows that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the individual thinker. They are measured by his willingness to act. The maximum of liveness in an

hypothesis , means willingness to act irrevocably. Practically, that means belief; but there is some believing tendency wherever there is willingness to act at all.

Next, let us call the decision between two hypotheses an <option>. Options may be of several kinds. They may be -- 1. <living> or <dead>; 2. <forced> or <avoidable>; 3, <momentous> or <trivial>; and for our purposes we may call an option a genuine option when it is of the forced, living, and momentous kind.

1. A living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones. If I say to you: "Be a theosophist or be a Mohammedan," it is probably a dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if I say: " Be an agnostic or be a Christian," it is otherwise: trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal, however small, to your belief.

2. Next, if I say to you: "Choose between going out with your umbrella or without it," I do not offer you a genuine option, for it is not forced. You can easily avoid it by not going out at all. Similarly, if I say, "Either love me or hate me," "Either call my theory true or call it false," your option is avoidable. You may remain indifferent to me, neither loving nor hating, and you may decline to offer any judgment as to my theory. But if I say, "Either accept this truth or go without it," I put on you a forced option, for there is no standing place outside of the alternative. Every dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, is an option of this forced kind.

3. Finally, if I were Dr. Nansen and proposed to you to join my North Pole expedition, your option would be momentous; for this would probably be your only similar opportunity, and your choice now would either exclude you from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether or put at least the chance of it into your hands. He who refuses to embrace a unique opportunity loses the prize as surely as if he tried and failed. <Per contra>, the option is trivial when the opportunity is not unique, when the stake is insignificant, or when the decision is reversible if it later prove unwise. Such trivial options abound in the scientific life. A chemist finds an hypothesis live enough to spend a year in its verification: he believes in it to that extent. But if his experiments prove inconclusive either way, he is quit for his loss of time, no vital harm being done.

It will facilitate our discussion if we keep all these distinctions well in mind.

2. Pascal's Wager. The next matter to consider is the actual psychology of human opinion. When we look at certain facts, it seems as if our passional and volitional nature lay at the root of all our convictions. When we look at others, it seems as if they could do nothing when the intellect had once said its say. Let us take the latter facts up first

Does it not seem preposterous on the very face of it to talk of our opinions being modifiable at will? Can our will either help or hinder our 'intellect in its perceptions of truth? Can we, by just willing it, believe that Abraham Lincoln's existence is a myth, and that the portraits of him in McClure's Magazine are all of some one else? Can we, by any effort of our will, or by any strength of wish that it were true, believe ourselves well and about when we are roaring with rheumatism in bed, or feel certain that the sum of the two one-dollar bills in our pocket must be a hundred dollars? We can <say> any of these things, but we are absolutely impotent to believe them; and of just such things is the whole fabric of the truths that we do believe in made up, -- matters of fact, immediate or remote, as Hume said, and relations between ideas, which are either there or not there for us if we see them so, and which if not there cannot be put there by any action of our own.

In Pascal's Thoughts there is a celebrated passage known in literature as Pascal's wager. In it he tries to force us into Christianity by reasoning as if our concern with truth resembled our concern with the stakes in a game of chance. Translated freely his words are these: You must either believe or not believe that God is -- which will you do? Your human reason cannot say. A game is going on between you and the nature of 'things which at the day of judgment will bring out either heads or tails. Weigh what your gains and your losses would be if you should stake all you have on heads, or God's existence: if you win in such case, you gain eternal beatitude; if you lose, you lose nothing at all. If there were an infinity of chances, and only one for God in this wager, still you ought to stake your all. on God; for though you surely risk a finite loss by this procedure, any finite loss is reasonable, even a certain one is reasonable, if there is but the possibility of infinite gain. Go, then, and take holy water, and have masses said; belief will come and stupefy your scruples, -- <Cela vous fera croire et vous abltira>. Why should you not? At bottom, what have you to lose?

You probably feel that when religious faith expresses itself thus, in the language of the gamingtable, it is put to its last trumps. Surely Pascal's own personal belief in masses and holy water had far other springs; and this celebrated page of his is but an argument for others, a last desperate snatch at a weapon against the hardness of the unbelieving heart. We feel that a faith in masses and holy water adopted willfully after such a mechanical calculation -- would lack the inner soul of faith's reality; and if we were ourselves in the place of the Deity, we should probably take particular pleasure in cutting off believers of this pattern from their infinite reward. It is evident that unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy water, the option offered to 'the will by Pascal is not a living option. Certainly no Turk ever took to masses and holy water on its account; and even to us Protestants these means of salvation seem such foregone impossibilities that Pascal's logic, invoked for them specifically, leaves us unmoved. As well might the Mahdi write to us, saying, "I am the Expected One whom God has created in his effulgence. You shall be infinitely happy if

you confess me; otherwise you shall be cut off from the light of the sun. Weigh, then, your infinite gain if I am genuine against your finite sacrifice if I am not! " His logic would be that of Pascal; but he would vainly use it on us, for the hypothesis he offers us is dead. No tendency to act on it exists in us to any degree.

The talk of believing by our volition seems, then, from one point of view, simply silly. From another point of view it is worse than silly, it is vile. When one turns to the magnificent edifice of the physical sciences, and sees how it was reared; what thousands of disinterested moral lives of men lie buried in its mere foundations; what patience and postponement, what choking down of preference, what submission to the icy laws of outer fact are wrought into its very stones and mortar; how absolutely impersonal it stands in its vast augustness, -- then how besotted and contemptible seems every little sentimentalist who comes blowing his voluntary smoke-wreaths, and pretending to decide things from out of his private dream! Can we wonder if those bred in the rugged and manly school of science should feel like spewing such subjectivism out of their mouths? The whole system of loyalties which grow up in the schools of science go dead against its toleration; so that it is only natural that those who have caught the scientific fever should pass over to the opposite extreme, and write sometimes as if the incorruptibly truthful intellect ought positively to prefer bitterness and unacceptableness to the heart in its cup.

It fortifies my soul to know
That, though I perish, Truth is so --

sings Clough, while Huxley exclaims: "My only consolation lies in the reflection that, however bad our posterity may become, so far as they hold by the plain rule of not pretending to believe what they have no reason to believe, because it may be to their advantage so to pretend [the word ' pretend' is surely here redundant], they will not have reached the lowest depth of immorality." And that delicious <enfant terrible> Clifford writes: " Belief is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements for the solace and private pleasure of the believer. . . . Whoso would deserve well of his fellows in this matter will guard the purity of his belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it should rest on an unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away. . . . If [a] belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence [even though the belief be true, as Clifford on the same page explains] the pleasure is a stolen one. . . . It is sinful because it is stolen in defiance of our duty to mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence which may shortly master our own body and then spread to the rest of the town. . . . It is ,wrong always, everywhere, and for every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."

3. Clifford's Veto, Psychological Causes of Belief. All this strikes one as healthy, even when expressed, as by Clifford, with somewhat too much of robustious pathos in the voice.,; Free-will and simple wishing do seem, in the matter

of our credences, to be only fifth wheels to the coach. Yet if any one should thereupon assume that intellectual insight is what remains after wish and will and sentimental preference have taken wing, or that pure reason is what then settles our opinions, he would fly quite as directly in the teeth of the facts.

It is only our already dead hypotheses that our willing nature is unable to bring to life again But what has made them dead for us is for the most part a previous action of our willing nature of an antagonistic kind. When I say 'willing nature,' I do not mean only such deliberate volitions as may have set up habits of belief that we cannot now escape from, I mean all such factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the circumpressure of our caste and set. As a matter of fact we find ourselves believing, we hardly know how or why. Mr. Balfour gives the name of authority' to all those influences, born of the intellectual climate, that make hypotheses possible or impossible for us, alive or dead. Here in this room, we all of us believe in molecules and the conservation of energy, in democracy and necessary progress, in Protestant Christianity and the duty of fighting for 'the doctrine of the immortal Monroe,' all for no reasons worthy of the name. We see into these matters with no more inner clearness,. and probably with much less, than any disbeliever in them might possess. His unconventionality would probably have some grounds to show for its conclusions; but for us, not insight, but the <prestige> of the opinions, is what makes the spark shoot from them and light up our sleeping magazines of faith. Our reason is quite satisfied, in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of every thousand of us, if it can find a few arguments that will do to recite in case our credulity is criticized by some one else. Our faith is faith in some one else's faith, and in the greatest matters this is most the case. Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other, -- what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up? We want to have a truth; we want to believe that our experiments and studies and discussions must put us in a continually better and better position towards it; and on this line we agree to fight out our thinking lives. But if a pyrrhonistic skeptic asks us <how we know> all this, can our logic find a reply? No! certainly it cannot. It is just one volition against another, -- we willing to go in for life upon a trust or assumption which he, for his part, does not care to make.[3] As a rule we disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use. Clifford's cosmic emotions find no use for Christian feelings. Huxley belabors the bishops because there is no use for sacerdotalism in his scheme of life. Newman, on the contrary, goes over to Romanism, and finds all sorts of reasons good for staying there, because a priestly system is for him an organic need and delight. Why do so few "scientists" even look at the evidence for telepathy, so-called? Because they think, as a leading biologist, now dead, once said to me, that even if such a thing were true, scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of Nature and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry

on their pursuits. But if this very man had been shown something which as a scientist he might <do> with telepathy, he might not only have examined the evidence, but even have found it good enough. This very law which the logicians would impose upon us -- if I may give the name of logicians to those who would rule out our willing nature here -- is based on nothing but their own natural wish to exclude all elements form which they, in their professional quality of logicians, can find no use.

Evidently, then, our non-intellectual nature does influence our convictions. There are passional tendencies and volitions which run before and others which come after belief, and it is only the latter that are too late for the fair; and they are not too late when the previous passional work has been already in their own direction. Pascal's argument, instead of being powerless, then seems a regular clincher, and is the last stroke needed to make our faith in masses and holy water complete. The state of things is evidently far from simple; and pure insight and logic, whatever they might do ideally, are not the only things that really do produce our creeds.

4. Thesis of the Essay. Our next duty, having recognized this mixed-up state of affairs, is to ask whether it be simply reprehensible and pathological, or whether, on the contrary, we must treat it as a normal element in making up our minds. The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: <Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an o option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds ; for to say, under such circumstances, " Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision, -- just like deciding yes or no, -- and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.> The thesis thus abstractly expressed will, I trust, soon become quite clear. But I must first indulge in a bit more of preliminary work.

5. Empiricism and Absolutism. It will be observed that for the purposes of this discussion we are on 'dogmatic ' ground, -- ground, I mean, which leaves systematic philosophical skepticism altogether out of account. The postulate that there is truth, and that it is the destiny of our minds to attain it, we are deliberately resolving to make, though the skeptic will not make it. We part company with him, therefore, absolutely, at this point. But the faith that truth exists, and that our minds can find it, may be held in two ways. We may talk of the <empiricist> way and of the <absolutist> way of believing in truth. The absolutists in this matter say that we not only can attain to knowing truth, but we can <know> when we have attained to knowing it; while the empiricists think that although we may attain it, we cannot infallibly know when. To <know> is one thing, and to know for certain <that> we know is another. One may hold to the first being possible without the second; hence the empiricists and the absolutists, although neither of them is a skeptic in the usual philosophic sense of the term, show very different degrees of dogmatism in their lives.

If we look at the history of opinions, we see that the empiricist tendency has largely prevailed in science, while in philosophy the absolutist tendency has had everything its own way. The characteristic sort of happiness, indeed, which philosophies yield has mainly consisted in the conviction felt by each successive school or system that by it bottom-certitude had been attained. "Other philosophies are collections of opinions, mostly false; <my> philosophy gives standing-ground forever," -- who does not recognize in this the key-note of every system worthy of the name? A system, to be a system at all, must come as a <closed> system, reversible in this or that detail, perchance, but in its essential features never!

Scholastic orthodoxy, to which one must always go when one wishes to find perfectly clear statement, has beautifully elaborated this absolutist conviction in a doctrine which it calls that of ' objective evidence.' If, for example, I am unable to doubt that I now exist before you, that two is less than three, or that if all men are mortal then I am mortal too, it is because these things illumine my intellect irresistibly. The final ground of this objective evidence possessed by certain propositions is the <adaequatio intellectus nostri cum re>. The certitude it brings involves an <apititudinem ad extorquendum certum assensum> on the part of the truth envisaged, and on the side of the subject a <quietem in cognitione>, when once the object is mentally received, that leaves no possibility of doubt behind; and in the whole transaction nothing operates but the <entitas ipsa> of the object and the <entitas ipsa> of the mind. We slouchy modern thinkers dislike to talk in Latin, -- indeed, we dislike to talk in set terms at all; but at bottom our own state of mind is very much like this whenever we uncritically abandon ourselves: You believe in objective evidence, and I do. Of some things we feel that we are certain: we know, and we know that we do know. There is something that gives a click inside of us, a bell that strikes twelve, when the hands of our mental clock have swept the dial and meet over the meridian hour. The greatest empiricists among us are only empiricists on reflection: when left to their instincts, they dogmatize like infallible popes. When the Cliffords tell us how sinful it is to be Christians on such 'insufficient evidence,' insufficiency is really the last thing they have in mind. For them the evidence is absolutely sufficient, only it makes the other way. They believe so completely in an anti-Christian order of the universe that there is no living option: Christianity is a dead hypothesis from the start.

6. Objective Certitude and its Unattainability. But now, since we are all such absolutists by instinct, what in our quality of students of philosophy ought we to do about the fact? Shall we espouse and endorse it? Or shall we treat it as a weakness of our nature from which we must free ourselves, if we can?

I sincerely believe that the latter course is the only one we can follow as reflective men. Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they

found? I am, therefore, myself a complete empiricist so far as my theory of human knowledge goes. I live, to be sure, by the practical faith that we must go on experiencing and thinking over our experience, for only thus can our opinions grow more true; but to hold any one of them -- I absolutely do not care which -- as if it never could be reinterpretable or corrigible, I believe to be a tremendously mistaken attitude, and I think that the whole history of philosophy will bear me out. There is but one indefectibly certain truth, and that is the truth that pyrrhonistic skepticism itself leaves standing, -- the truth that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists. That, however, is the bare starting-point of knowledge, the mere admission of a stuff to be philosophized about. The various philosophies are but so many attempts at expressing what this stuff really is. And if we repair to our libraries what disagreement do we discover! Where is a certainly true answer found? Apart from abstract propositions of comparison (such as two and two are the same as four), propositions which tell us nothing by themselves about concrete reality, we find no proposition ever regarded by any one as evidently certain that has not either been called a falsehood, or at least had its truth sincerely questioned by some one else. The transcending of the axioms of geometry, not in play but in earnest, by certain of our contemporaries (as Zollner and Charles H. Hinton), and the rejection of the whole Aristotelian logic by the Hegelians, are striking instances in point.

No concrete test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon. Some make the criterion external to the moment of perception, putting it either in revelation, the <consensus gentium>, the instincts of the heart, or the systematized experience of the race. Others make the perceptive moment its own test, Descartes, for instance, with his clear and distinct ideas guaranteed by the veracity of God; Reid with his 'common-sense;' and Kant with his forms of synthetic judgment <a priori>. The inconceivability of the opposite; the capacity to be verified by sense; the possession of complete organic unity or self-relation, realized when a thing is its own other, -- are standards which, in turn, have been used, The much lauded objective evidence is never triumphantly there; it is a mere aspiration or <Grenzbegriff>, marking the infinitely remote ideal of our thinking life. To claim that certain truths now possess it, is simply to say that when you think them true and they <are> true, then their evidence is objective, otherwise it is not. But practically one's conviction that the evidence one goes by is of the real objective brand, is only one more subjective opinion added to the lot. For what a contradictory array of opinions have objective evidence and absolute certitude been claimed! The world is rational through and through, -- its existence is an ultimate brute fact; there is a personal God, -- a personal God is inconceivable; there is an extra-mental physical world immediately known, -- the mind can only know its own ideas; a moral imperative exists, -- obligation is only the resultant of desires; a permanent spiritual principle is in every one, -- there are only shifting states of mind; there is an endless chain of causes, -- there is an absolute first cause; an eternal necessity, -- a freedom; a purpose, -- no

purpose; a primal One, -- a primal Many; a universal continuity, -- an essential discontinuity in things; an infinity, -- no infinity. There is this, -- there is that; there is indeed nothing which some one has not thought absolutely true, while his neighbor deemed it absolutely false; and not an absolutist among them seems ever to have considered that the trouble may all the time be essential, and that the intellect, even with truth directly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be truth or no. When, indeed, one remembers that the most striking practical application to life of the doctrine of objective certitude has been the conscientious labors of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, one feels less tempted than ever to lend the doctrine a respectful ear.

But please observe, now, that when as empiricists we give up the doctrine of objective certitude, we do not thereby give up the quest or hope of truth itself. We still pin our faith on its existence, and still believe that we gain an ever better position towards it by systematically continuing to roll up experiences and think. Our great difference from the scholastic lies in the way we face. The strength of his system lies in the principles, the origin, the <terminus a quo> of his thought; for us the strength is in the outcome, the upshot, the <terminus ad quem>. Not where it comes from but what it leads to is to decide. It, matters not to an empiricist from what quarter an hypothesis may come to him: he may have acquired it by fair means or by foul; passion may have whispered or accident suggested it; but if the total drift of thinking continues to confirm it, that is what he means b its being true.

7. Two Different Sorts of Risks in Believing. One more point, small but important, and our preliminaries are done. There are two ways of looking at our duty in the. matter of opinion, -- ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose difference the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown very little concern. <We must know the truth>; and <we must avoid error>, -- these are our first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws. Although it may indeed happen that when we believe the truth A, we escape as an incidental consequence from believing the falsehood B, it hardly ever happens that by merely disbelieving B we necessarily believe A. We may in escaping B fall into believing other falsehoods, C or D, just as bad as B; or we may escape B by not believing anything at all not even A. Believe truth! Shun error -- these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance. Clifford, in the instructive passage which I have quoted, exhorts us to the latter course. Believe nothing, he tells us, keep your mind in suspense forever', rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence incur the awful risk of believing lies. You, on the other hand, may think that the risk Of being in error is a very small matter when compared with the blessings of real knowledge, and be ready to be duped many

times in your investigation rather than postpone indefinitely the chance of guessing true. I myself find it impossible to go with Clifford. We must remember that these feelings of our duty about either truth or error are in any case only expressions of our passional life. Biologically considered, our minds are as ready to grind out falsehood as veracity, and he who says, "Better go without belief forever than believe a lie!" merely shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming a dupe. He may be critical of many of his desires and fears, but this fear he slavishly obeys. He cannot imagine any one questioning its binding force. For my own part, I have also a horror of being duped; but I can believe that worse things than being duped may happen to a man in this world: so Clifford's exhortation has to my ears a thoroughly fantastic sound. It is like a general informing his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a single wound. Not so are victories either over enemies or over nature gained. Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf At any rate, it seems the fittest thing for the empiricist philosopher.

8. Some Risk Unavoidable. And now, after all this introduction, let us go straight at our question. I have said, and now repeat it, that not only as a matter of fact do we find our passional nature influencing us in our opinions, but that there are some options between opinions in which this influence must be regarded both as an inevitable and as a lawful determinant of our choice.

I fear here that some of you my hearers will begin to scent danger, and lend an inhospitable ear. Two first steps of passion you have indeed had to admit as necessary, -- we must think so as to avoid dupery, and -- we must think so as to gain truth; but the surest path to those ideal consummations, you will probably consider, is from now onwards to take no further passional step.

Well, of course, I agree as far as the facts will allow. Wherever the option between losing truth and gaining it is not momentous, we can throw the chance of <gaining truth> away, and at any rate save ourselves from any chance of <believing falsehood>, by not making up our minds at all till objective evidence has come. In scientific questions, this is almost always the case; and even in human affairs in general, the need of acting is seldom so urgent that a false belief to act on is better than no belief at all. Law courts, indeed, have to decide on the best evidence attainable for the moment, because a judge's duty is to make law as well as to ascertain it, and (as a learned judge once said to me) few cases are worth spending much time over: the great thing is to have them decided on any acceptable principle, and got out of the way. But in our dealings with objective nature we obviously are recorders, not makers, of the truth; and decisions for the mere sake of deciding promptly and getting on to the next business would be wholly out of place. Throughout the breadth of physical nature facts are what they are quite independently of us, and seldom is there any such hurry about them that the risks of

being duped by believing a premature theory need be faced. The questions here are always trivial options, the hypotheses are hardly living (at any rate not living for us spectators), the choice between believing truth or falsehood is seldom forced. The attitude of skeptical balance is therefore the absolutely wise one if we would escape mistakes. What difference, indeed, does it make to most of us whether we have or have not a theory of the Rontgen rays, whether we believe or not in mind-stuff, or have a conviction about the causality of conscious states? It makes no difference. Such options are not forced on us. On every account it is better not to make them, but still keep weighing reasons Pro <et contra> with an indifferent hand.

I speak, of course, here of the purely judging mind. For purposes of discovery such indifference is to be less highly recommended, and science would be far less advanced than she is if the passionate desires of individuals to get their own faiths confirmed had been kept out of the game. See for example the sagacity which Spencer and Weismann now display. On the other hand, if you want an absolute duffer in an investigation, you must, after all, take the man who has no interest whatever in its results: he is the warranted incapable, the positive fool. The most useful investigator, because the most sensitive observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived.[4] Science has organized this nervousness into a regular <technique>, her so-called method of verification; and she has fallen so deeply in love with the method that one may even say she has ceased to care for truth by itself at all. It is only truth as technically verified that interests her. The truth of truths might come in merely affirmative form, and she would decline to touch it. Such truth as that, she might repeat with Clifford, would be stolen in defiance of her duty to mankind. Human passions, however, are stronger than technical rules. " Le coeur a ses raisons," as Pascal says, " que la raison ne connait pas;" and however indifferent to all but the bare rules of the game the umpire, the abstract intellect, may be, the concrete players who furnish him the materials to judge of are usually, each one of them, in love with some pet 'live hypothesis' of his own. Let us agree, however, that wherever there is no forced option, the dispassionately judicial intellect with no pet hypothesis, saving us, as it does, from dupery at any rate, ought to be our ideal.

The question next arises: Are there not somewhere forced options in our speculative questions, and can we (as men who may be interested at least as much in positively gaining truth as in merely escaping dupery) always wait with impunity till the coercive evidence shall have arrived? It seems <a priori> improbable that the truth should be so nicely adjusted to our needs and powers as that. In the great boarding-house of nature, the cakes and the butter and the syrup seldom come out so even and leave the plates so clean. Indeed, we should view them with scientific suspicion if they did.

9. Faith May Bring Forth its Own Verification. <Moral questions> immediately present themselves as questions whose

solution cannot wait for sensible proof. A moral question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist. Science can tell us what exists; but to compare the <worths>, both of what exists and of what does not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart. Science herself consults her heart when she lays it down that the infinite ascertainment of fact and correction of false belief are the supreme goods for man. Challenge the statement, and science can only repeat it oracularly, or else prove it by showing that such ascertainment and correction bring man all sorts of other goods which man's heart in turn declares. The question of having moral beliefs at all or not having them is decided by our will. Are our moral preferences true or false, or are they only odd biological phenomena, making things good or bad for <us>, but in themselves indifferent? How can your pure intellect decide? If your heart does not <want> a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in one. Mephistophelian skepticism, indeed, will satisfy the head's play-instincts much better than any rigorous idealism can. Some men (even at the student age) are so naturally cool-hearted that the moralistic hypothesis never has for them any pungent life, and in their supercilious presence the hot young moralist always feels strangely ill at ease. The appearance of knowingness is on their side, of <naivet,> and gullibility on his. Yet, in the inarticulate heart of him, he clings to it that he is not a dupe, and that there is a realm in which (as Emerson says) all their wit and intellectual superiority is no better than the cunning of a fox. Moral skepticism can no more be refuted or proved by logic than intellectual skepticism can. When we stick to it that there <is> truth (be it of either kind), we do so with our whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results. The skeptic with his whole nature adopts the doubting attitude; but which of us is the wiser, Omniscience only knows.

Turn now from these wide questions of good to a certain class of questions of fact, questions concerning personal relations, states of mind between one man and another. <Do you like me or not?> -- for example. Whether you do or not depends, in countless instances, on whether I meet you half-way, am willing to assume that you must like me, and show you trust and expectation. The previous faith on my part in your liking's existence is in such cases what makes your liking come. But if I stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence, until you shall have done something apt, as the absolutists say, <ad extorquendum assensum meum>, ten to one your liking never comes. How many women's hearts are vanquished by the mere sanguine insistence of some man that they <must> love him! he will not consent to the hypothesis that they cannot. The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about that special truth's existence; and so it is in innumerable cases of other sorts. Who gains promotions, boons, appointments, but the man in whose life they are seen to play the part of live hypotheses, who discounts them, sacrifices other things for their sake before they have come, and takes risks for them in advance? His faith acts on the powers above him as a claim, and creates its own verification.

A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted. A whole train of passengers (individually brave enough) will be looted by a few highwaymen, simply because the latter can count on one another, while each passenger fears that if he makes a movement of resistance, he will be shot before any one else backs him up. If we believed that the whole car-full would rise at once with us, we should each severally rise, and train-robbing would never even be attempted. There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming. <And where faith in a fact can help create the fact>, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the 'lowest kind of immorality' into which a thinking being can fall. Yet such is the logic by which our scientific absolutists pretend to regulate our lives!

10. Logical Conditions of Religious Belief. In truths dependent on our personal action, then, faith based on desire is certainly a lawful and possibly an indispensable thing.

But now, it will be said, these are all childish human cases, and have nothing to do with great cosmical matters, like the question of religious faith. Let us then pass on to that. Religions differ so much in their accidents that in discussing the religious question we must make it very generic and broad. What then do we now mean by the religious hypothesis? Science says things are; morality says some things are better than other things; and religion says essentially two things.

First, she says that the best things are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word. " Perfection is eternal," this phrase of Charles Secretan seems a good way of putting this first affirmation of religion, an affirmation which obviously cannot yet be verified scientifically at all.

The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true.

Now, let us consider what the logical elements of this situation are <in case the religious hypothesis in both its branches be really true>. (Of course, we must admit that possibility at the outset. If we are to discuss the question at all, it must involve a living option. If for any of you religion be a hypothesis that cannot, by any living possibility be true, then you need go no farther. I speak to the 'saving remnant' alone.) So proceeding, we see, first,

that religion offers itself as a <momentous> option. We are supposed to gain, even now, by our belief, and to lose by our nonbelief, a certain vital good. Secondly, religion is a <forced> option, so far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by remaining skeptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way <if religion be untrue>, we lose the good, <if it be true>, just as certainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve. It is as if a man should hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him because he was not perfectly sure that she would prove an angel after he brought her home. Would he not cut himself off from that particular angel-possibility as decisively as if he went and married some one else? Skepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. <Better risk loss of truth than chance of error>, -- that is' your faith-vetoer's exact position. He is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing the field against the religious hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the religious hypothesis against the field. To preach skepticism to us as a duty until 'sufficient evidence' for religion be found, is tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion laying down its law. And by what, forsooth, is the supreme wisdom of this passion warranted? Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear? I, for one, can see no proof; and I simply refuse obedience to the scientist's command to imitate his kind of option, in a case where my own stake is important enough to give me the right to choose my own form of risk. If religion be true and the evidence for it be still insufficient, I do not wish, by putting your extinguisher upon my nature (which feels to me as if it had after all some business in this matter), to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side, -- that chance depending, of course, on my willingness to run the risk of acting as if my passional need of taking the world religiously might be prophetic and right.

All this is on the supposition that it really may be prophetic and right, and that, even to us who are discussing the matter, religion is a live hypothesis which may be true. Now, to most of us religion comes in a still further way that makes a veto on our active faith even more illogical. The more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our religions as having personal form. The universe is no longer a mere <It> to us, but a <Thou>, if we are religious; and any relation that may be possible from person to person might be possible here. For instance, although in one sense we are passive portions of the universe, in another we show a curious autonomy, as if we were small active centers on our own account. We feel, too, as if the appeal of religion to us were made to our own active good-will, as if evidence might be forever withheld from us unless we met the hypothesis half-way. To take a trivial illustration: just as a man who in a company of gentlemen made no advances, asked a warrant for every concession, and believed no one's word without proof, would

cut himself off by such churlishness from all the social rewards that a more trusting spirit would earn, -- so here, one who should shut himself up in snarling logicality and try to make the gods extort his recognition willy-nilly, or not get it at all, might cut himself off forever from his only opportunity of making the gods' acquaintance. This feeling, forced on us we know not whence, that by obstinately believing that there are gods (although not to do so would be so easy both for our logic and our life) we are doing the universe the deepest service we can, seems part of the living essence of the religious hypothesis. If the hypothesis <were> true in all its parts, including this one, then pure intellectualism, with its veto on our making willing advances, would be an absurdity; and some participation of our sympathetic nature would be logically required. I, therefore, for one, cannot see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, or willfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the game. I cannot do so for this plain reason, that <a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule>. That for me is the long and short of the formal logic of the situation, no matter what the kinds of truth might materially be.

I confess I do not see how this logic can be escaped. But sad experience makes me fear that some of you may still shrink from radically saying with me, <in abstractor> that we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will. I suspect, however, that if this is so, it is because you have got away from the abstract logical point of view altogether, and are thinking (perhaps without realizing it) of some particular religious hypothesis which for you is dead. The freedom to 'believe what we will' you apply to the case of some patent superstition; and the faith you think of is the faith defined by the schoolboy when he said, " Faith is when you believe something that you know ain't true." I can only repeat that this is misapprehension. <In concreto>, the freedom to believe can only cover living options which the intellect of the individual cannot by itself resolve; and living options never seem absurdities to him who has them to consider. When I look at the religious question as it really puts itself to concrete men, and when I think of all the possibilities which both practically and theoretically it involves, then this command that we shall put a stopper on our heart, instincts, and courage, and <wait> -- acting of course meanwhile more or less as if religion were <not> true[5] -- till doomsday, or till such time as our intellect and senses working together may have raked in evidence enough, -- this command, I say, seems to me the queerest idol ever manufactured in the philosophic cave. Were we scholastic absolutists, there might be more excuse. If we had an infallible intellect with its objective certitudes, we might feel ourselves disloyal to such a perfect organ of knowledge in not trusting to it exclusively, in not waiting for its releasing word. But if we are empiricists, if we believe that no bell in us tolls to let us know for certain when truth is in our grasp, then it seems a piece of idle fantasticality to preach so solemnly our duty of waiting for the bell. Indeed we <may>

wait if we will, -- I hope you do not think that I am denying that, -- but if we do so, we do so at our peril as much as if we believed. In either case we <act>, taking our life in our hands. No one of us ought to issue vetoes to the other, nor should we bandy words of abuse. We ought, on the contrary, delicately and profoundly to respect one another's mental freedom: then only shall we bring about the intellectual republic; then only shall we have that spirit of inner tolerance without which all our outer tolerance is soulless, and which is empiricism's glory; then only shall we live and let live, in speculative as well as in practical things.

I began by a reference to Fitz James Stephen; let me end by a quotation from him. " What do you think of yourself? What do you think of the world? . . . These are questions with which all must deal as it seems good to them. They are riddles of the Sphinx, in some way or other we must deal with them... In all important transactions of life we have to a leap in the dark. . . . If we decide to leave the riddles unanswered, that is a choice; if we waver in our answer, that, too, is a choice: but whatever choice we make, we make it at our peril. If a man chooses to turn his back altogether on God and the future, no one can prevent him; no one can show beyond reasonable doubt that he is mistaken. If a man thinks otherwise and acts as he thinks, I do not see that any one can prove that <he> is mistaken. Each must act as he thinks best; and if he is wrong, so much the worse for him. We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there is any right one. What must we do? "Be strong and of a good courage." Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes. . . . If death ends all, we cannot meet death better."[6]

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., H/UME\) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g., <Hume>) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

2 An Address to the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities. Published in the New World, June, 1896.3 Compare the admirable page 310 in S. H. Hodpon's " Time and

Space," London, 1865.4 Compare Wilfrid Ward's Essay, "The Wish to Believe," in his Witnesses to the Unseen, Macmillan & Co., 1893.

5 Since belief is measured by action, he who forbids us to believe religion to be true, necessarily also forbids us to act as we should if we did believe it to be true. The whole defense of religious faith hinges upon action. If the action required or inspired by the religious hypothesis is in no way different from that dictated by the naturalistic hypothesis, then religious faith is a pure superfluity, better pruned away, and controversy about its legitimacy is a piece of idle trifling, unworthy of serious minds. I myself believe, of course, that the religious hypothesis gives to the world an expression which specifically determines our reactions, and makes them in a large part unlike what they might be on a purely naturalistic scheme of belief.

6 Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, P. 353, 2d edition. London, 1874.

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics

Immanuel Kant

1783

The following is based on Paul Carus's 1902 translation of the Prolegomena. Spelling has been Americanized. A few of Lewis White Beck's conventions have been adopted from his revision of Carus's translation, such as replacing the word "cognise" with "knowledge." [1]

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1

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* * * *

INTRODUCTION.

These Prolegomena are destined for the use, not of pupils, but of future teachers, and even the latter should not expect that they will be serviceable for the systematic exposition of a ready-made science, but merely for the discovery of the science itself.

There are scholarly men, to whom the history of philosophy (both ancient and modern) is philosophy itself; for these the present Prolegomena are not written. They must wait till those who endeavor to draw from the fountain of reason itself have completed their work; it will then be the historian's turn to inform the world of what has been done. Unfortunately, nothing can be said, which in their opinion has not been said before, and truly the same prophecy applies to all future time; for since the human reason has for many centuries speculated upon innumerable objects in various ways, it is hardly to be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of past ages.

My object is to persuade all those who think Metaphysics worth studying, that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment, and, neglecting all that has been done, to propose first the preliminary question, 'Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible?'

If it be a science, how comes it that it cannot, like other sciences, obtain universal and permanent recognition ? If not,

how can it maintain its pretensions, and keep the human mind in suspense with hopes, never ceasing, yet never fulfilled? Whether then we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance in this field, we must come once for all to a definite conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called science, which cannot possibly remain on its present footing. It seems almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually advancing, that in this, which pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle every one inquires, we should constantly move round the same spot, without gaining a single step. And so its followers having melted away, we do not find men confident of their ability to shine in other sciences venturing their reputation here, where everybody, however ignorant in other matters, may deliver a final verdict, as in this domain there is as yet no standard weight and measure to distinguish sound knowledge from shallow talk.

After all it is nothing extraordinary in the elaboration of a science, when men begin to wonder how far it has advanced, that the question should at last occur, whether and how such a science is possible? Human reason so delights in constructions, that it has several times built up a tower, and then razed it to examine the nature of the foundation. It is never too late to become wise; but if the change comes late, there is always more difficulty in starting a reform.

The question whether a science be possible, presupposes a doubt as to its actuality. But such a doubt offends the men whose whole possessions consist of this supposed jewel; hence he who raises the doubt must expect opposition from all sides. Some, in the proud consciousness of their possessions, which are ancient, and therefore considered legitimate, will take their metaphysical compendia in their hands, and look down on him with contempt; others, who never see anything except it be identical with what they have seen before, will not understand him, and everything will remain for a time, as if nothing had happened to excite the concern, or the hope, for an impending change.

Nevertheless, I venture to predict that the independent reader of these Prolegomena will not only doubt his previous science, but ultimately be fully persuaded, that it cannot exist unless the demands here stated on which its possibility depends, be satisfied; and, as this has never been done, that there is, as yet, no such thing as Metaphysics. But as it can never cease to be in demand,2 -- since the interests of common sense are intimately interwoven with it, he must confess that a radical reform, or rather a new birth of the science after an original plan, are unavoidable, however men may struggle against it for a while.

Since the Essays of Locke and Leibniz, or rather since the origin of metaphysics so far as we know its history, nothing has ever happened which was more decisive to its fate than the attack made upon it by David Hume. He threw no light on this species of knowledge, but he certainly struck a spark from which light might have been obtained, had it caught some inflammable substance and had its smoldering fire been carefully nursed and developed.

Hume started from a single but important concept in Metaphysics, viz., that of Cause and Effect (including its derivatives force and action, etc.). He challenges reason, which pretends to have given birth to this idea from herself, to answer

him by what right she thinks anything to be so constituted, that if that thing be posited, something else also must necessarily be posited; for this is the meaning of the concept of cause. He demonstrated irrefutably that it was perfectly impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of concepts a combination involving necessity. We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the existence of one thing, another must necessarily exist, or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori. Hence he inferred, that reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept, which she erroneously considered as one of her children, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of imagination, impregnated by experience, which subsumed certain representations under the Law of Association, and mistook the subjective necessity of habit for an objective necessity arising from insight. Hence he inferred that reason had no power to think such, combinations, even generally, because her concepts would then be purely fictitious, and all her pretended a priori cognitions nothing but common experiences marked with a false stamp. In plain language there is not, and cannot be, any such thing as metaphysics at all.3

However hasty and mistaken Hume's conclusion may appear, it was at least founded upon investigation, and this investigation deserved the concentrated attention of the brighter spirits of his day as well as determined efforts on their part to discover, if possible, a happier solution of the problem in the sense proposed by him, all of which would have speedily resulted in a complete reform of the science.

But Hume suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, of not being understood. It is positively painful to see bow utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the problem; for while they were ever taking for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his valuable suggestion that everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing had happened.

The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a wider application than merely to the objects of experience. This was Hume's problem. It was a question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of the concept. Were the former decided, the conditions of the use and the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a matter of course.

But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of reason, so far as it is concerned with pure thinking,-a task which did not suit them. They found a more convenient method of being defiant without any insight, viz., the appeal to common sense. It is indeed a great gift of God, to possess right, or (as they now call it) plain common sense. But this common sense must be shown practically, by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing to it as an oracle, when no rational justification can be advanced. To appeal to common sense, when insight and science fail, and no sooner-this is one of the subtle discoveries of modern times, by means of which the most

superficial ranter can safely enter the lists with the most thorough thinker, and hold his own. But as long as a particle of insight remains, no one would think of having recourse to this subterfuge. For what is it but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and confides in it? I should think that Hume might fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as Beattie, and in addition to a critical reason (such as the latter did not possess), which keeps common sense in check and prevents it from speculating, or, if speculations are under discussion restrains the desire to decide because it cannot satisfy itself concerning its own arguments. By this means alone can common sense remain sound. Chisels and hammers may suffice to work a piece of wood, but for steel-engraving we require an engraver's needle. Thus common sense and speculative understanding are each serviceable in their own way, the former in judgments which apply immediately to experience, the latter when we judge universally from mere concepts, as in metaphysics, where sound common sense, so called in spite of the inapplicability of the word, has no right to judge at all.

I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction. I was far from following him in the conclusions at which he arrived by regarding, not the whole of his problem, but a part, which by itself can give us no information. If we start from a well-founded, but undeveloped, thought, which another has bequeathed to us, we may well hope by continued reflection to advance farther than the acute man, to whom we owe the first spark of light.

I therefore first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the understanding thinks the connection of things a priori, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connections. I sought to ascertain their number, and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts, which I was now certain were not deduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended, but sprang from the pure understanding. This deduction (which seemed impossible to my acute predecessor, which bad never even occurred to any one else, though no one had hesitated to use the concepts without investigating the basis of their objective validity) was the most difficult task ever undertaken in the service of metaphysics; and the worst was that metaphysics, such as it then existed, could not assist me in the least, because this deduction alone can render metaphysics possible. But as soon as I had succeeded in solving Hume's problem not merely in a particular case, but with respect to the whole faculty of pure reason, I could proceed safely, though slowly, to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its circumference as well as in its contents. This was required for metaphysics in order to construct its system according to a reliable method.

But I fear that the execution of Hume's problem in its widest extent (viz., my Critique of the Pure Reason) will fare as the problem itself fared, when first proposed. It will be misjudged because it is misunderstood, and misunderstood because

men choose to skim through the book, and not to think through it-a disagreeable task, because the work is dry, obscure, opposed to all ordinary notions, and moreover long-winded. I confess, however, I did not expect, to hear from philosophers complaints of want of popularity, entertainment, and facility, when the existence of a highly prized and indispensable cognition is at stake, which cannot be established otherwise, than by the strictest rules of methodic precision. Popularity may follow, but is inadmissible at the beginning. Yet as regards a certain obscurity, arising partly from the diffuseness of the plan, owing to which. the principal points of the investigation are easily lost sight of, the complaint is just, and I intend to remove it by the present Prolegomena.

The first-mentioned work, which discusses the pure faculty of reason in its whole compass and bounds, will remain the foundation, to which the Prolegomena, as a preliminary, exercise, refer; for our critique must first be established as a complete and perfected science, before we can think of letting Metaphysics appear on the scene, or even have the most distant hope of attaining it.

We have been long accustomed to seeing antiquated knowledge produced as new by taking it out of its former context, and reducing it to system in a new suit of any fancy pattern under new titles. Most readers will set out by expecting nothing else from the Critique; but these Prolegomena may persuade him that it is a perfectly new science, of which no one has ever even thought, the very idea of which was unknown, and for which nothing hitherto accomplished can be of the smallest use, except it be the suggestion of Hume's doubts. Yet even he did not suspect such a formal science, but ran his ship ashore, for safety's sake, landing on skepticism, there to let it lie and rot; whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot, who, by means of safe astronomical principles drawn from a knowledge of the globe, and provided with a complete chart and compass, may steer the ship safely, whither he listeth.

If in a new science, which is wholly isolated and unique in its kind, we started with the prejudice that we can judge of things by means of our previously acquired knowledge, which., is precisely what has first to be called in question, we should only fancy we saw everywhere what we had already known,. the expressions, having a similar sound, only that all would appear utterly metamorphosed, senseless and unintelligible, because we should have as a foundation out own notions, made by long habit a second nature, instead of the author's. But the longwindedness of the work, so far as it depends on the subject, and not the exposition, its consequent unavoidable dryness and its scholastic precision are qualities which can only benefit the science, though they may discredit the book.

Few writers are gifted with the subtlety, and at the same time with the grace, of David Hume, or with the depth, as well as the elegance, of Moses Mendelssohn. Yet I flatter myself I might have made my own exposition popular, had my object been merely to sketch out a plan and leave its completion to others instead of having my heart in the welfare of the science, to which I had devoted myself so long; in truth, it required no little constancy, and even self-denial, to postpone the sweets of an immediate success to the prospect of a slower, but more lasting,

reputation.

Making plans is often the occupation of an opulent and boastful mind, which thus obtains the reputation of a creative genius, by demanding what it cannot itself supply; by censuring, what it cannot improve; and by proposing, what it knows not where to find. And yet something more should belong to a sound plan of a general critique of pure reason than mere conjectures, if this plan is to be other than the usual declamations of pious aspirations. But pure reason is a sphere so separate and self-contained, that we cannot touch a part without affecting all the rest. We can therefore do nothing without first determining the position; of each part, and its relation to the rest; for, as our judgment cannot be corrected by anything without, the validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in which it stands to all the rest within the domain of reason.

So in the structure of an organized body, the end of each member can only be deduced from the full conception of the whole. It may, then, be said of such a critique that it is never trustworthy except it be perfectly complete, down to the smallest elements of pure reason. In the sphere of this faculty you can determine either everything or nothing.

But although a mere sketch, preceding the Critique of Pure Reason, would be unintelligible, unreliable, and useless, it is all the more useful as a sequel. For so we are able to grasp the whole, to examine in detail the chief points of importance in the science, and to improve in many respects our exposition, as compared with the first execution of the work.

After the completion of the work I offer here such a plan which is sketched out after an analytical method, while the work itself had to be executed in the synthetical style, in order that the science may present all its articulations, as the structure of a peculiar cognitive faculty, in their natural combination. But should any reader find this plan, which I publish as the Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics, still obscure, let him consider that not every one is bound to study Metaphysics, that many minds will succeed very well, in the exact and even in deep sciences, more closely allied to practical experience,4 while they cannot succeed in investigations dealing exclusively with abstract concepts. In such cases men should apply their talents to other subjects. But he who undertakes to judge, or still more, to construct, a system of Metaphysics, must satisfy the demands here made, either by adopting my solution, or by thoroughly refuting it, and substituting another. To evade it is impossible.

In conclusion, let it be remembered that this much-abused obscurity (frequently serving as a mere pretext under which people hide their own indolence or dullness) has its uses, since all who in other sciences observe a judicious silence, speak authoritatively in metaphysics and make bold decisions, because their ignorance is not here contrasted with the knowledge of others. Yet it does contrast with sound critical principles, which we may therefore commend in the words of Virgil:

" Ignavum, fucos, pecus a praesepibus arcent. "
"Bees are defending their hives against drones, those indolent creatures. "

* * * *

PROLEGOMENA.

PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL METAPHYSICAL COGNITION.

Sect. 1: Of the Sources of Metaphysics

If it becomes desirable to formulate any cognition as science, it will be necessary first to determine accurately those peculiar features which no other science has in common with it, constituting its characteristics; otherwise the. boundaries of all sciences become confused, and none of them can be treated thoroughly according to its nature.

The characteristics of a science may consist of a simple difference of object, or of the sources of cognition, or of the kind of cognition, or perhaps of all three conjointly. On this, therefore, depends the idea of a possible science and its territory.

First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure Understanding and pure Reason.

But so far Metaphysics would not be distinguishable from pure Mathematics; it must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition; and for the meaning of this term I refer to the Critique of the Pure Reason (II. "Method of Transcendentalism," Chap. I., Sec. 1), where the distinction between these two employments of the reason is sufficiently explained. So far concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition.

Sect. 2. Concerning the Kind of Cognition which can alone be called Metaphysical

a. Of the Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical judgments in general. -- The peculiarity of its sources demands that metaphysical cognition must consist of nothing but a priori judgments. But whatever be their origin, or their logical form, there is a distinction in judgments, as to their content, according to which they are either merely explicative, adding nothing to the content of the cognition, or expansive, increasing the given cognition: the former may be called analytical, the latter synthetical, judgments.

Analytical judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has been already actually thought in the concept of the subject, though not so distinctly or with the same (full) consciousness. When I say: All bodies are extended, I have not amplified in the least my concept of body, but have only analyzed it, as extension was really thought to belong to that concept before the judgment was made, though it was not expressed, this judgment is therefore analytical. On the contrary, this judgment, All bodies have weight, contains in its predicate something not

actually thought in the general concept of the body; it amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my concept, and must therefore be called synthetical.

b. The Common Principle of all Analytical Judgments is the Law of Contradiction. -- All analytical judgments depend wholly on the law of Contradiction, and are in their nature a priori cognitions, whether the concepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not. For the predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained in the concept of the subject, of which it cannot be denied without contradiction. In the same way its opposite is necessarily denied of the subject in an analytical, but negative, judgment, by the same law of contradiction. Such is the nature of the judgments: all bodies are extended, and no bodies are unextended (i. e., simple).

For this very reason all analytical judgments are a .priori even when the concepts are empirical, as, for example, Gold is a yellow metal; for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold as a yellow metal: it is, in fact, the very concept, and I need only analyze it, without looking beyond it elsewhere.

c. Synthetical judgments require a different Principle from the Law of Contradiction.-There are synthetical a posteriori judgments of empirical origin; but there are also others which are proved to be certain a priori, and which spring from pure Understanding and Reason. Yet they both agree in this, that they cannot possibly spring from the principle of analysis, viz., the law of contradiction, alone; they require a quite different principle, though, from whatever they may be deduced, they must be subject to the law of contradiction, which must never be violated, even though everything cannot be deduced from it. I shall first classify synthetical judgments.

1. Empirical judgments are always synthetical. For it would be absurd to base an analytical judgment on experience, as our concept suffices for the purpose without requiring any testimony from experience. That body is extended, is a judgment established a priori, and not an empirical judgment. For before appealing to experience, we already have all the conditions of the judgment in the concept, from which we have but to elicit the predicate according to the law of contradiction, and thereby to become conscious of the necessity of the judgment, which experience could not even teach us.

2. Mathematical judgments are all synthetical. This fact seems hitherto to have altogether escaped the observation of those who have analyzed human reason; it even seems directly opposed to all their conjectures, though incontestably certain, and most important in its consequences. For as it was found that the conclusions of mathematicians all proceed according to the law of contradiction (as is demanded by all apodictic certainty), men persuaded themselves that the fundamental principles were known from the same law. This was a great mistake, for a synthetical proposition can indeed be comprehended according to the law of contradiction, but only by presupposing another synthetical proposition from which it follows, but never in itself.

First of all, we must observe that all proper mathematical

judgments are a priori, and not empirical, because they carry with them necessity, which cannot be obtained from experience. But if this be not conceded to me, very good; I shall confine my assertion pure Mathematics, the very notion of which implies that it contains pure a priori and not empirical cognitions.

It might at first be thought that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a mere analytical judgment, following from the concept of the sum of seven and five, according to the law of contradiction. But on closer examination it appears that the concept of the sum Of 7+5 contains merely their union in a single number, without its being at all thought what the particular number is that unites them. The concept of twelve is by no means thought by merely thinking of the combination of seven and five; and analyze this possible sum as we may, we shall not discover twelve in the concept. We must go beyond these concepts, by calling to our aid some concrete image [Anschauung], i.e., either our five fingers, or five points (as Segner has it in his Arithmetic), and we must add successively the units of the five, given in some concrete image [Anschauung], to the concept of seven. Hence our concept is really amplified by the proposition 7 + 5 = I 2, and we add to the first a second, not thought in it. Arithmetical judgments are therefore synthetical, and the more plainly according as we take larger numbers; for in such cases it is clear that, however closely we analyze our concepts without calling visual images (Anscliauung) to our aid, we can never find the sum by such mere dissection.

All principles of geometry are no less analytical. That a straight line is the shortest path between two points, is a synthetical proposition. For my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality. The attribute of shortness is therefore altogether additional, and cannot be obtained by any analysis of the concept. Here, too, visualization [Anschauung] must come to aid us. It alone makes the synthesis possible.

Some other principles, assumed by geometers, are indeed actually analytical, and depend on the law of contradiction; but they only serve, as identical propositions, as a method of concatenation, and not as principles, e. g., a=a, the whole is equal to itself, or a + b > a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these, though they are recognized as valid from mere concepts, are only admitted in mathematics, because they can be represented in some visual form [Anschauung]. What usually makes us believe that the predicate of such apodictic5 judgments is already contained in our concept, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is the duplicity of the expression, requesting us to think a certain predicate as of necessity implied in the thought of a given concept, which necessity attaches to the concept. But the question is not what we are requested to join in thought to the given concept, but what we actually think together with and in it, though obscurely; and so it appears that the predicate belongs to these concepts necessarily indeed, yet not directly but indirectly by an added visualization [Anschauung].

Sect. 3. A Remark on the General Division of judgments into Analytical and Synthetical

This division is indispensable, as concerns the Critique of human understanding, and therefore deserves to be called classical, though otherwise it is of little use, but this is the reason why dogmatic philosophers, who always seek the sources of metaphysical judgments in Metaphysics itself, and not apart from it, in the pure laws of reason generally, altogether neglected this apparently obvious distinction. Thus the celebrated Wolf, and his acute follower Baumgarten, came to seek the proof of the principle of Sufficient Reason, which is clearly synthetical, in the principle of Contradiction. In Locke's Essay, however, I find an indication of my division. For in the fourth book (chap. iii. Sect. 9, seq.), having discussed the various connections of representations in judgments, and their sources, one of which he makes -I identity and contradiction" (analytical judgments), and another the coexistence of representations in a subject, he confesses (Sect. 10) that our a priori knowledge of the latter is very narrow, and almost nothing. But in his remarks on this species of cognition, there is so little of what is definite, and reduced to rules, that we cannot wonder if no one, not even Hume, was led to make investigations concerning this sort of judgments. For such general and yet definite principles are not easily learned from other men, who have had them obscurely in their minds. We must hit on them first by our own reflection, then we find them elsewhere, where we could not possibly nave found them at first, because the authors themselves did not know that such an idea lay at the basis of their observations. Men who never think independently have nevertheless the acuteness to discover everything, after it has been once shown them, in what was said long since, though no one ever saw it there before.

Sect. 4. The General Question of the Prolegemena. - Is Metaphysics at all Possible?

Were a metaphysics, which could maintain its place as a science, really in existence; could we say, here is metaphysics, learn it, and it will convince you irresistibly and irrevocably of its truth: this question would be useless, and there would only remain that other question (which would rather be a test of our acuteness, than a proof of the existence of the thing itself), "How is the science possible, and how does reason come to attain it?" But human reason has not been so fortunate in this case. There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and say: This is Metaphysics; here you may find the noblest objects of this science, the knowledge of a highest Being, and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure reason. We can be shown indeed many judgments, demonstrably certain, and never questioned; but these are all analytical, and rather concern the materials and the scaffolding for Metaphysics, than the extension of knowledge, which is our proper object in studying it (Sect 2). Even supposing you produce synthetical judgments (such as the law of Sufficient Reason, which you have never proved, as you ought to, from pure reason a priori, though we gladly concede its truth), you lapse when they come to be employed for your principal object, into such doubtful assertions, that in all ages one Metaphysics has contradicted another, either in its assertions, or their proofs, and thus has itself destroyed its own claim to lasting assent. Nay, the very attempts to set up such a science are the main cause of the early appearance of skepticism, a mental attitude in which reason treats itself with such violence that it could never have arisen save from complete despair of ever satisfying our most important

aspirations. For long before men began to inquire into nature methodically, they consulted abstract reason, which had to some extent been exercised by means of ordinary experience; for reason is ever present, while laws of nature must usually be discovered with labor. So Metaphysics floated to the surface, like foam, which dissolved the moment it was scooped off. But immediately there appeared a new supply on the surface, to be ever eagerly gathered up by some, while others, instead of seeking in the depths the cause of the phenomenon, thought they showed their wisdom by ridiculing the idle labor of their neighbors.

The essential and distinguishing feature of pure mathematical cognition among all other a priori cognitions is, that it cannot at all proceed from concepts, but only by means of the construction of concepts (see Critique II., Method of Transcendentalism, Chap. I., sect. 1). As therefore in its judgments it must proceed beyond the concept to that which its corresponding visualization [Anschauung] contains, these judgments neither can, nor ought to, arise analytically, by dissecting the concept, but are all synthetical.

I cannot refrain from pointing out the disadvantage resulting to philosophy from the neglect of this easy and apparently insignificant observation. Hume being prompted (a task worthy of a philosopher) to cast his eye over the whole field of a priori cognitions in which human understanding claims such mighty possessions, heedlessly severed from it a whole, and indeed its most valuable, province, viz., pure mathematics; for he thought its nature, or, so to speak, the state-constitution of this empire, depended on totally different principles, namely, on the law of contradiction alone; and although he did not divide judgments in this manner formally and universally as I have done here, what he said was equivalent to this: that mathematics contains only analytical, but metaphysics synthetical, a priori judgments. In this, however, he was greatly mistaken, and the mistake had a decidedly injurious effect upon his whole conception. But for this, he would have extended his question concerning the origin of our synthetical judgments far beyond the metaphysical concept of Causality, and included in it the possibility of mathematics a priori also, for this latter he must have assumed to be equally synthetical. And then he could not have based his metaphysical judgments on mere experience without subjecting the axioms of mathematics equally to experience, a thing which he was far too acute to do. The good company into which metaphysics would thus have been brought, would have saved it from the danger of a contemptuous ill-treatment, for the thrust intended for it must have reached mathematics, which was not and could not have been Hume's intention. Thus that acute man would have been led into considerations which must needs be similar to those that now occupy us, but which would have gained inestimably by his inimitably elegant style.

Metaphysical judgments, properly so called, are all synthetical. We must distinguish judgments pertaining to metaphysics from metaphysical judgments properly so called. Many of the former are analytical, but they only afford the means for metaphysical judgments, which are the whole end of the science, and which are always synthetical. For if there be concepts pertaining to metaphysics (as, for example, that of substance), the judgments springing from simple analysis of them also pertain to metaphysics, as, for example, substance is that which only

exists as subject; and by means of several such analytical judgments, we seek to approach the definition of the concept. But as the analysis of a pure concept of the understanding pertaining to metaphysics, does not proceed in any different manner from the dissection of any other, even empirical, concepts, not pertaining to metaphysics (such as: air is an elastic fluid, the elasticity of which is not destroyed by any known degree of cold), it follows that the concept indeed, but not the analytical judgment, is properly metaphysical. This science has something peculiar in the production of its a priori cognitions, which must therefore be distinguished from the features it has in common with other rational knowledge. Thus the judgment, that all the substance in things is permanent, is a synthetical and properly metaphysical judgment.

If the a priori principles, which constitute the materials of metaphysics, have first been collected according to fixed principles, then their analysis will be of great value; it might be taught as a particular part (as a philosophia definitiva), containing nothing but analytical judgments pertaining to metaphysics, and could be treated separately from the synthetical which constitute metaphysics proper. For indeed these analyses are not elsewhere of much value, except in metaphysics, i.e., as regards the synthetical judgments, which are to be generated by these previously analyzed concepts.

The conclusion drawn in this section then is, that metaphysics is properly concerned with synthetical propositions a priori, and these alone constitute its end, for which it indeed requires various dissections of its concepts, viz., of its analytical judgments, but wherein the procedure is not different from that in every other kind of knowledge, in which we merely seek to render our concepts distinct by analysis. But the generation of a priori cognition by concrete images as well as by concepts, in fine of synthetical propositions a priori in philosophical cognition, constitutes the essential subject of Metaphysics.

Weary therefore as well of dogmatism, which teaches us nothing, as of skepticism, which does not even promise us anything, not even the quiet state of a contented ignorance; disquieted by the importance of knowledge so much needed; and lastly, rendered suspicious by long experience of all knowledge which we believe we possess, or which offers itself, under the title of pure reason: there remains but one critical question on the answer to which our future procedure depends, viz., Is Metaphysics at all possible? But this question must be answered not by skeptical objections to the asseverations of some actual system of metaphysics (for we do not as yet admit such a thing to exist), but from the conception, as yet only problematical, of a science of this sort.

In the Critique of Pure Reason I have treated this question synthetically, by making inquiries into pure reason itself, and endeavoring in this source to determine the elements as well as the laws of its pure use according to principles. The task is difficult, and requires a resolute reader to penetrate by degrees into a system, based on no data except reason itself, and which therefore seeks, without resting upon any fact, to unfold knowledge from its original germs. Prolegomena, however, are designed for preparatory exercises; they are intended rather to

point out what we have to do in order if possible to actualize a science, than to propound it. They must therefore rest upon something already known as trustworthy, from which we can set out with confidence, and ascend to sources as yet unknown, the discovery of which will not only explain to us what we knew, but exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which all spring from the same sources. The method of Prolegomena, especially of those designed as a preparation for future metaphysics, is consequently analytical.

But it happens fortunately, that though we cannot assume metaphysics to be an actual science, we can say with confidence that certain pure a priori synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are actual and given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly recognized as apodictically certain, partly by mere reason, partly by general consent arising from experience, and yet as independent of experience. We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetical knowledge a priori, and need not ask whether it be possible, for it is actual, but how it is possible, in order that we may deduce from the principle which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of all the rest.

Sect. 5. The General Problem: How is Cognition from Pure Reason Possible?

We have above learned the significant distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments. The possibility of analytical propositions was easily comprehended, being entirely founded on the law of Contradiction. The possibility of synthetical a posteriori judgments, of those which are gathered from experience, also requires no particular explanation; for experience is nothing but a continual synthesis of perceptions. There remain therefore only synthetical propositions a priori, of which the possibility must be sought or investigated, because they must depend upon other principles than the law of contradiction.

But here we need not first establish the possibility of such propositions so as to ask whether they are possible. For there are enough of them which indeed are of undoubted certainty, and as our present method is analytical, we shall start from the fact, that such synthetical but purely rational cognition actually exists; but we must now inquire into the reason of this possibility, and ask, how such cognition is possible, in order that we may from the principles of its possibility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use, its sphere and its limits. The proper problem upon which all depends, when expressed with scholastic precision, is therefore: How are Synthethetic Propositions a priori possible?

For the sake of popularity I have above expressed this problem somewhat differently, as an inquiry into purely rational cognition, which I could do for once without detriment to the desired comprehension, because, as we have only to do here with metaphysics and its sources, the reader will, I hope, after the foregoing remarks, keep in mind that when we speak of purely rational cognition, we do not mean analytical, but synthetical cognition.6

Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this

problem: its very existence depends upon it. Let any one make metaphysical assertions with ever so much plausibility, let him overwhelm us with conclusions, if he has not previously proved able to answer this question satisfactorily, I have a right to say this is all vain baseless philosophy and false wisdom. You speak through pure reason, and claim, as it were to create cognitions a priori. by not only dissecting given concepts, but also by asserting connections which do not rest upon the law of contradiction, and which you believe you conceive quite independently of all experience; how do you arrive at this, and how will you justify your pretensions? An appeal to the consent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed; for that is a witness whose authority depends merely upon rumor. Says Horace:

" Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi."
"To all that which thou provest me thus, I refuse to give credence. "

The answer to this question, though indispensable, is difficult; and though the principal reason that it was not made long ago is, that the possibility of the question never occurred to anybody, there is yet another reason, which is this that a satisfactory answer to this one question requires a much more persistent, profound, and painstaking reflection, than the most diffuse work on Metaphysics, which on its first appearance promised immortality to its author. And every intelligent reader, when he carefully reflects what this problem requires, must at first be struck with its difficulty, and would regard it as insoluble and even impossible, did there not actually exist pure synthetical cognitions a priori. This actually happened to David Hume, though he did not conceive the question in its entire universality as is done here, and as must be done, should the answer be decisive for all Metaphysics. For how is it possible, says that acute man, that when a concept is given me, I can go beyond it and connect with it another, which is not contained in it, in such a manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former? Nothing but experience can furnish us with such connections (thus he concluded from the difficulty which he took to be an impossibility), and all that vaunted necessity, or, what is the same thing, all cognition assumed to be a priori, is nothing but a long habit of accepting something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for objective.

Should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which I occasion him in the solution of this problem, he is at liberty to solve it himself in an easier way. Perhaps he will then feel under obligation to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so profound research, and will rather be surprised at the facility with which, considering the nature of the subject, the solution has been attained. Yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its whole universality (using the term in the mathematical sense, viz., for that which is sufficient for all cases), and finally to exhibit it in the analytical form, as the reader finds it here.

All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory manner the question, "How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" For the answer contains the only credentials which they must show when they have anything to offer in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these credentials,

they can expect nothing else of reasonable people, who have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed without further ado.

If they on the other hand desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense of man, they cannot in justice be prevented. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief, they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical purposes only) the existence of something that is possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this mariner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians; for the latter profess to be speculative philosophers, and since, when judgments a prior: are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be admitted (for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby announced as necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with conjectures, but their assertions must be either science, or are worth nothing at all.

It may be said, that the entire transcendental philosophy, which necessarily precedes all metaphysics, is nothing but the complete solution of the problem here propounded, in systematical order and completeness, and hitherto we have never had any transcendental philosophy; for what goes by its name is properly a part of metaphysics, whereas the former sciences intended first to constitute the possibility of the 'matter, and must therefore precede all metaphysics. And it is not surprising that when a whole science, deprived of all help from other sciences, and consequently in itself quite new, is required to answer a -single question satisfactorily, we should find the answer troublesome and difficult, nay even shrouded in obscurity.

As we now proceed to this solution according to the analytical method, in which we assume that such cognitions from pure reasons actually exist, we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition . which alone is under consideration here), pure mathematics and pure natural science (physics). For these alone can exhibit to us objects in a definite and actualizable form (in der Anschauung), and consequently (if there should occur in them a cognition a priori) can show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the object in concrete, that is, its actuality, from which we could proceed to the reason of its possibility by the analytic method. This facilitates our work greatly for here universal considerations are not only applied to facts, but even start from them, while in a synthetic procedure they must strictly be derived in abstracts from concepts.

But, in order to rise from these actual and at the same time well-grounded pure cognitions a priori to such a possible cognition of the same as we are seeking, viz., to metaphysics as a science, we must comprehend that which occasions it, I mean the mere natural, though in spite of its truth not unsuspected, cognition a priori which lies at the bottom of that science, the elaboration of which without any critical investigation of its possibility is commonly called metaphysics. In a word, we must comprehend the natural conditions of such a science as a part of our inquiry, and thus the transcendental problem will be gradually answered by a division into four questions:

1. How is pure mathematics possible?
2. How is pure natural science possible?
3. How is metaphysics in general possible?
4. How is metaphysics as a science possible?

It may be seen that the solution of these problems, though chiefly designed to exhibit the essential matter of the Critique, has yet something peculiar, which for itself alone deserves attention. This is the search for the sources of given sciences in reason itself, so that its faculty of knowing something a priori may by its own deeds be investigated and measured. By this procedure these sciences gain, if not with regard to their contents, yet as to their proper use, and while they throw light on the higher question concerning their common origin, they give, at the same time, an occasion better to explain their own nature.

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FIRST PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM:
HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE?

Here is a great and established branch of knowledge, encompassing even now a wonderfully large domain and promising an unlimited extension in the future. Yet it carries with it thoroughly apodictical certainty, i.e., absolute necessity, which therefore rests upon no empirical grounds. Consequently it is a pure product of reason, and moreover is thoroughly synthetical. [Here the question arises:] "How then is it possible for human reason to produce a cognition of this nature entirely a priori?"

Does not this faculty [which produces mathematics], as it neither is nor can be based upon experience, presuppose some ground of cognition a priori, which lies deeply hidden, b,.--, which might reveal itself by these its effects, if their first beginnings were but diligently ferreted out?

Sect. 7. But we find that all mathematical cognition has this peculiarity: it must first exhibit its concept in a visual form [Anschauung] and indeed a priori, therefore in a visual form which is not empirical, but pure. Without this mathematics cannot take a single step; hence its judgments are always visual, viz., "Intuitive"; whereas philosophy must be satisfied with discursive judgments from mere concepts, and though it may illustrate its doctrines through a visual figure, can never derive them from it. This observation on the nature of mathematics gives us a clue to the first and highest condition of its possibility, which is, that some non-sensuous visualization [called pure intuition, or reine Anschauung] must form its basis, in which all its concepts can be exhibited or constructed, in concrete and yet a priori. If we can find out this pure intuition and its possibility, we may thence easily explain how synthetical propositions a priori are possible in pure mathematics, and consequently how this science itself is possible. Empirical intuition [viz., sense-perception] enables us without difficulty to enlarge the concept which we frame of an object of intuition [or sense-perception], by new predicates, which intuition [i.e., sense-perception] itself presents synthetically in experience. Pure intuition [viz., the visualization of forms in our imagination, from which every thing sensual, i.e., every thought of material qualities, is excluded] does so likewise, only with this difference, that in the latter

case the synthetical judgment is a priori certain and apodictical, in the former, only a posteriori and empirically certain; because this latter contains only that which occurs in contingent empirical intuition, but the former, that which must necessarily be discovered in pure intuition. He.-e intuition, being an intuition a priori, is before all experience, viz., before any perception of particular objects, inseparably conjoined with its concept.

Sect. 8. But with this step our perplexity seems rather to increase than to lessen. For the question now is, "How is it possible to intuit [in a visual form] anything a priori" An intuition [viz., a visual sense perception] is such a representation as immediately depends upon the presence of the object. Hence it seems impossible to intuit from the outset a priori, because intuition would in that event take place without either a former or a present object to refer to, and by consequence could not be intuition. Concepts indeed are such, that we can easily form some of them a priori, viz., such as contain nothing but the thought of an object in general; and we need not find ourselves in an immediate relation to the object. Take, for instance, the concepts of Quantity, of Cause, etc. But even these require, in order to make them understood, a certain concrete use-that is, an application to some sense-experience [Anschauung], by which an object of them is given us. But how can the intuition of the object [its visualization] precede the object itself?

Sect. 9. If our intuition [i.e., our sense-experience] were perforce of such a nature as to represent things as they are in themselves, there would not be any intuition a priori, but intuition would be always empirical. For I can only know what is contained in the object in itself when it is present and given to me. It is indeed even then incomprehensible how the visualizing [Anschauung] of a present thing should make me know this thing as it is in itself, as its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation. But even granting this possibility, a visualizing of that sort would not take place a priori, that is, before the object were presented to me; for without this latter fact no reason of a relation between my representation and the object can be imagined, unless it depend upon a direct inspiration.

Therefore in one way only can my intuition [Anschauung] anticipate the actuality of the object, and be a cognition a priori, viz.: if my intuition contains nothing but the form of sensibility, antedating in my subjectivity all the actual impressions through which I am affected by objects.

For that objects of sense can only be intuitd according to this form of sensibility I can know a priori. Hence it follows: that propositions, which concern this form of sensuous intuition only, are possible and valid for objects of the senses; as also, conversely, that intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any other things than objects of our senses.7

Sect. 10. Accordingly, it is only the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things a priori, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they are in themselves; and this assumption is absolutely necessary if synthetical propositions a priori be granted as

possible, or if, in case they actually occur, their possibility is to be comprehended and determined beforehand.

Now, the intuitions which pure mathematics lays at the foundation of all its cognitions and judgments which appear at once apodictic and necessary are Space and Time. For mathematics must first have all its concepts in intuition, and pure mathematics in pure intuition, that is, it must construct them. If it proceeded in any other way, it would be impossible to make any headway, for mathematics proceeds, not analytically by dissection of concepts, but synthetically, and if pure intuition be wanting, there is nothing in which the matter for synthetical judgments a priori can be given. Geometry is based upon the pure intuition of space. Arithmetic accomplishes its concept of number by the successive addition of units in time; and pure mechanics especially cannot attain its concepts of motion without employing the representation of time. Both representations, however, are only intuitions; for if we omit from the empirical intuitions of bodies and their alterations (motion) everything empirical, or belonging to sensation, space and time still remain, which are therefore pure intuitions that lie a priori at the basis of the empirical. Hence they can never be omitted, but at the same time, by their being pure intuitions a priori, they prove that they are mere forms of our sensibility, which must precede all empirical intuition, or perception of actual objects, and conformably to which objects can be known a priori, but only as they appear to us.

Sect. 11. The problem of the present section is therefore solved. Pure mathematics, as synthetical cognition a priori, is only possible by referring to no other objects than those of the senses. At the basis of their empirical intuition lies a pure intuition (of space and of time) which is a priori. This is possible, because the latter intuition is nothing but the mere form of sensibility, which precedes the actual appearance of the objects, in, that it, in fact, makes them possible. Yet this faculty of intuiting a priori affects not the matter of the phenomenon (that is, the sense-element in it, for this constitutes that which is empirical), but its form, viz., space and time. Should any man venture to doubt that these are determinations adhering not to things in themselves, but to their relation to our sensibility, I should be glad to know how it can be possible to know the constitution of things a priori, viz., before we have any acquaintance with them and before they are presented to us. Such, however, is the case with space and time. But this is quite comprehensible as soon as both count for nothing more than formal conditions of our sensibility, while the objects count merely as phenomena; for then the form of the phenomenon, i.e., pure intuition, can by all means be represented as proceeding from ourselves, that is, a priori.

Sect. 12. In order to add something by way of illustration and confirmation, we need only watch the ordinary and necessary procedure of geometers. All proofs of the complete congruence of two given figures (where the one can in every respect be substituted for the other) come ultimately to this that they may be made to coincide; which is evidently nothing else than a synthetical proposition resting upon immediate intuition, and this intuition must be pure, or given a priori, otherwise the proposition could not rank as apodictically certain, but would have empirical certainty only. In that case, it could only be

said that it is always found to be so, and holds good only as far as our perception reaches. That everywhere space (which (in its entirety] is itself no longer the boundary of another space) has three dimensions, and that space cannot in any way have more, is based on the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect at right angles in one point; but this proposition cannot by any means be shown from concepts, but rests immediately on intuition, and indeed on pure and a priori intuition, because it is apodictically certain. That we can require a line to be drawn to infinity (in indefinitum), or that a series of changes (for example, spaces traversed by motion) shall be infinitely continued, presupposes a representation of space and time, which can only attach to intuition, namely, so far as it in itself is bounded by nothing, for from concepts it could never be inferred. Consequently, the basis of mathematics actually are pure intuitions, which make its synthetical and apodictically valid propositions possible. Hence our transcendental deduction of the notions of space and of time explains at the same time the possibility of pure mathematics. Without some such deduction its truth may be granted, but its existence could by no means be understood, and we must assume II that everything which can be given to our senses (to the external senses in space, to the internal one in time) is intuitd by us as it appears to us, not as it is in itself."

Sect. 13. Those who cannot yet rid themselves of the notion that space and time are actual qualities inhering in things in themselves, may exercise their acumen on the following paradox. When they have in vain attempted its solution, and are free from prejudices at least for a few moments, they will suspect that the degradation of space and of time to mere forms of @ur sensuous intuition may perhaps be well founded,

If two things are quite equal in all respects ask much as can be ascertained by all means possible, quantitatively and qualitatively, it must follow, that the one can in all cases and under all circumstances replace the other, and this substitution would not occasion the least perceptible difference. This in fact is true of plane figures in geometry; but some spherical figures exhibit, notwithstanding a complete internal agreement, such a contrast in their external relation, that the one figure cannot possibly be put in the place of the other. For instance, two spherical triangles on opposite hemispheres, which have an arc of the equator as their common base, may be quite equal, both as regards sides and angles, so that nothing is to be found in either, if it be described for itself alone and completed, that would not equally be applicable to both; and yet the one cannot be put in the place of the other (being situated upon the opposite hemisphere). Here then is an internal difference between the two triangles, which difference our understanding cannot describe as internal, and which only manifests itself by external relations in space.

But I shall adduce examples, taken from common life, that are more obvious still.

What can be more similar in every respect and in every part more alike to my hand and to my ear, than their images in a mirror? And yet I cannot put such a hand as is seen in the glass in the place of its archetype; for if this is a right hand, that in the glass is a left one, and the image or reflection of the

right ear is a left one which never can serve as a substitute for the other. There are in this case no internal differences which our understanding could determine by thinking alone. Yet the differences are internal as the senses teach, for, notwithstanding their complete equality and similarity, the left hand cannot be enclosed in the same bounds as the right one (they are not congruent); the glove of one hand cannot be used for the other. What is the solution? These objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves, and as the pure understanding would know them, but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances, the possibility of which rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility. Space is the form of the external intuition of this sensibility, and the internal determination of every space is only possible by the determination of its external relation to the whole space, of which it is a part (in other words, by its relation to the external sense). That is to say, the part is only possible through the whole, which is never the case with things in themselves, as objects of the mere understanding, but with appearances only. Hence the difference between similar and equal things, which are yet not congruent (for instance, two symmetric helices), cannot be made intelligible by any concept, but only by the relation to the right and the left hands which immediately refers to intuition.

REMARK 1.

Pure Mathematics, and especially pure geometry, can only have objective reality on condition that they refer to objects of sense. But in regard to the latter the principle holds good, that our sense representation is not a representation of things in themselves but of the way in which they appear to us. Hence it follows, that the propositions of geometry are not the results of a mere creation of our poetic imagination, and that therefore they cannot be referred with assurance to actual objects; but rather that they are necessarily valid of space, and consequently of all that may be found in space, because space is nothing else than the form of all external appearances, and it is this form alone in which objects of sense can be given. Sensibility, the form of which is the basis of geometry, is that upon which the possibility of external appearance depends. Therefore these appearances can never contain anything but what geometry prescribes to them.

It would be quite otherwise if the senses were so constituted as to represent objects as they are in themselves. For then it would not by any means follow from the conception of space, which with all its properties serves to the geometer as an a priori foundation, together with what is thence inferred, must be so in nature. The space of the geometer would be considered a mere fiction, and it would not be credited with objective validity, because we cannot see how things must of necessity agree with an image of them, which we make spontaneously and previous to our acquaintance with them. But if this image, or rather this formal intuition, is the essential property of our sensibility, by means of which alone objects are given to us, and if this sensibility represents not things in themselves, but their appearances: we shall easily comprehend, and at the same time indisputably prove, that all external objects of our world of sense must necessarily coincide in the most rigorous way with the propositions of geometry; because sensibility by means of its

form of external intuition, viz., by space, the same with which the geometer is occupied, makes those objects at all possible as mere appearances.

It will always remain a remarkable phenomenon in the history of philosophy, that there was a time, when even mathematicians, who at the same time were philosophers, began to doubt, not of the accuracy of their geometrical propositions so far as they concerned space, but of their objective validity and the applicability of this concept itself, and of all its corollaries, to nature. They showed much concern whether a-line in nature might not consist of physical points, and consequently that true space in the object might consist of simple [discrete] parts, while the space which the geometer has in his mind [being continuous] cannot be such. They did not recognize that this mental space renders possible the physical space, i.e., the extension of matter; that this pure space is not at all a quality of things in themselves, but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation; and that all objects in space are mere appearances, i.e., not things in themselves but representations of our sensuous intuition. But such is the case, for the space of the geometer is exactly the form of sensuous intuition which we find a priori in us, and contains the ground of the possibility of all external appearances (according to their form), and the latter must necessarily and most rigidly agree with the propositions of the geometer, which he draws not from any fictitious concept, but from the subjective basis of all external phenomena, which is sensibility itself. In this and no other way can geometry be made secure as to the undoubted objective reality of its propositions against all the intrigues of a shallow Metaphysics, which is surprised at them [the geometrical propositions], because it has not traced them to the sources of their concepts.

REMARK II.

Whatever is given us as object, must be given us in intuition. All our intuition however takes place by means of the senses only; the understanding intuits nothing, but only reflects. And as we have just shown that the senses never and in no manner enable us to know things in themselves, but only their appearances, which are mere representations of the sensibility, we conclude that all bodies, together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts.' You will say: Is not this manifest idealism?

Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are none but thinking beings, all other things, which we think are perceived in intuition, being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them corresponds in fact. Whereas I say, that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their appearances, 1. e., the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this

be termed idealism? It is the very contrary.

Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it has been generally assumed and granted without detriment to the actual existence of external things, that many of their predicates may be said to belong not to the things in themselves, but to their appearances, and to have no proper existence outside our representation. Heat, color, and taste, for instance, are of this kind. Now, if I go farther, and for weighty reasons rank as mere appearances the remaining qualities of bodies also, which are called primary, such as extension, place, and in general space, with all that which belongs to it (impenetrability or materiality, space, etc.)-no one in the least can adduce the reason of its being inadmissible. As little as the man who admits colors not to be properties of the object in itself, but only as modifications of the sense of sight, should on that account be called an idealist, so little can my system be named idealistic, merely because I find that more, nay, A11 the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong merely to its appearance.

The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but it is only shown, that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself.

I should be glad to know what my assertions must be in order to avoid all idealism. Undoubtedly, I should say, that the representation of space is not only perfectly conformable to the relation which our sensibility has to objects-that I have said- but that it is quite similar to the object,-an assertion in which I can find as little meaning as if I said that the sensation of red has a similarity to the property of vermilion, which in me excites this sensation.

REMARK III.

Hence we may at once dismiss an easily foreseen but futile objection, "that by admitting the ideality of space and of time the whole sensible world would be turned into mere sham." At first all philosophical insight into the nature of sensuous cognition was spoiled, by making the sensibility merely a confused mode of representation, according to which we still know things as they are, but without being able to reduce everything in this our representation to a clear consciousness; whereas proof is offered by us that sensibility consists, not in this logical distinction of clearness and obscurity, but in the genetical one of the origin of cognition itself. For sensuous perception represents things not at all as they are, but only the mode in which they affect our senses, and consequently by sensuous perception appearances only and not things themselves are given to the understanding for reflection. After this necessary corrective, an objection rises from an unpardonable and almost intentional misconception, as if my doctrine turned all the things of the world of sense into mere illusion.

When an appearance is given us, we are still quite free as to how we should judge the matter. The appearance depends upon the senses, but the judgment upon the understanding, and the only question is, whether in the determination of the object there is truth or not. But the difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the nature of the representations, which are

referred to objects (for they are the same in both cases), but by their connection according to those rules, which determine the coherence of the representations in the concept of an object, and by ascertaining whether they can subsist together in experience or not. And it is not the fault of the appearances if our cognition takes illusion for truth, i.e., if the intuition, by which an object is given us, is considered a concept of the thing or of its existence also, which the understanding can only think. The senses represent to us the paths of the planets as now progressive, now retrogressive, and herein is neither falsehood nor truth, because as long as we hold this path to be nothing but appearance, we do not judge of the objective nature of their motion. But as a false judgment may easily arise when the understanding is not on its guard against this subjective mode of representation being considered objective, we say they appear to move backward; it is not the senses however which must be charged with the illusion, but the understanding, whose province alone it is to give an objective judgment on appearances.

Thus, even if we did not at all reflect on the origin of our representations, whenever we connect our intuitions of sense (whatever they may contain), in space and in time, according to the rules of the coherence of all cognition in experience, illusion or truth will arise according as we are negligent or careful. It is merely a question of the use of sensuous representations in the understanding, and not of their origin. In the same way, if I consider all the representations of the senses, together with their form, space and time, to be nothing but appearances, and space and time to be a mere form of the sensibility, which is not to be met with in objects out of it, and if I make use of these representations in reference to possible experience only, there is nothing in my regarding them as appearances that can lead astray or cause illusion. For all that they can correctly cohere according to rules of truth in experience. Thus all the propositions of geometry hold good of space as well as of all the objects of the senses, consequently of all possible experience, whether I consider space as a mere form of the sensibility, or as something cleaving to the things themselves. In the former case however I comprehend how I can know a priori these propositions concerning all the objects of external intuition. Otherwise, everything else as regards all possible experience remains just as if I had not departed from the vulgar view.

But if I venture to go beyond all possible experience with my notions of space and time, which I cannot refrain from doing if I proclaim them qualities inherent in things in themselves (for what should prevent me from letting them hold good of the same things, even though my senses might be different, and unsuited to them?), then a grave error may arise due to illusion, for thus I would proclaim to be universally valid what is merely a subjective condition of the intuition of things and sure only for all objects of sense, viz., for all possible experience; I would refer this condition to things in themselves, and do not limit it to the conditions of experience.

My doctrine of the ideality of space and of time, therefore, far from reducing the whole sensible world to mere illusion, is the only means of securing the application of one of the most important cognitions (that which mathematics propounds a priori) to actual objects, and of preventing its being regarded as mere

illusion. For without this observation it would be quite impossible to make out whether the intuitions of space and time, which we borrow from no experience, and which yet lie in our representation a priori, are not mere phantasms of our brain, to which objects do not correspond, at least not adequately, and consequently, whether we have been able to show its unquestionable validity with regard to all the objects of the sensible world just because they are mere appearances.

Secondly, though these my principles make appearances of the representations of the senses, they are so far from turning the truth of experience into mere illusion, that they are rather the only means of preventing the transcendental illusion, by which metaphysics has hitherto been deceived, leading to the childish endeavor of catching at bubbles, because appearances, which are mere representations, were taken for things in themselves. Here originated the remarkable event of the antimony of Reason which I shall mention by and by, and which is destroyed by the single observation, that appearance, as long as it is employed in experience, produces truth, but the moment it transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing but illusion.

Inasmuch therefore, as I leave to things as we obtain them by the senses their actuality, and only limit our sensuous intuition of these things to this, that they represent in no respect, not even in the pure intuitions of space and of time, anything more than mere appearance of those thin-s, but never their constitution in themselves, this is not a sweeping illusion invented for nature by me. My protestation too against all charges of idealism is so valid and clear as even to seem superfluous, were there not incompetent judges, who, while they would have an old name for every deviation from their perverse though common opinion, and never judge of the spirit of philosophic nomenclature, but cling to the letter only, are ready to put their own conceits in the place of well-defined notions, and thereby deform and distort them. I have myself given this my theory the name of transcendental idealism, but that cannot authorize any one to confound it either with the empirical idealism of Descartes, (indeed, his was only an insoluble problem, owing to which he thought every one at liberty to deny the existence of the corporeal world, because it could never be proved satisfactorily), or with the mystical and visionary idealism of Berkeley, against which and other similar phantasms our Critique contains the proper antidote. My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since it never came into my head to doubt it, but it concerns the sensuous representation of things, to which space and time especially belong. Of these [viz., space and time], consequently of all appearances in general, I have only shown, that they are neither things (but mere modes of representation), nor determinations belonging to things in themselves. But the word "transcendental," which with me means a reference of our cognition, i.e., not to things, but only to the cognitive faculty, was meant to obviate this misconception. Yet rather than give further occasion to it by this word, I now retract it, and desire this idealism of mine to be called critical. But if it be really an objectionable idealism to convert actual thin.-Is (not appearances) into mere representations.. by what name shall we call him who conversely changes mere representations to things? It may, I think, be

called "dreaming idealism," in contradistinction to the former, which may be called "visionary," both of which are to be refuted by my transcendental, or, better, critical idealism.

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SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM: HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE?

Sect. 14. Nature is the existence of things, so far as it is determined according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of things in themselves, we could never know it either a priori or a posteriori. Not a priori, for how can we know what belongs to things in themselves, since this never can be done by the dissection of our concepts (in analytical judgments)? We do not want to know what is contained in our concept of a thing (for the [concept describes what] belongs to its logical being), but what is in the actuality of the thing superadded to our concept, and by what the thing itself is determined in its existence outside the concept. Our understanding, and the conditions on which alone it can connect the determinations of things in their existence, do not prescribe any rule to things themselves; these do not conform to our understanding, but it must conform itself to them; they must therefore be first given us in order to gather these determinations from them, wherefore they would not be known a priori.

A cognition of the nature of things in themselves a posteriori would be equally impossible. For, if experience is to teach us laws, to which the existence of things is subject, these laws, if they regard things in themselves, must belong to them of necessity even outside our experience. But experience teaches us what exists and how it exists, but never that it must necessarily exist so and not otherwise. Experience therefore can never teach us the nature of things in themselves.

Sect. 15. We nevertheless actually possess a pure science of nature in which are propounded, a priori and with all the necessity requisite to apodictical propositions, laws to which nature is subject. I need only call to witness that propaedeutic of natural science which, under the title of the universal Science of Nature, precedes all Physics (which is founded upon empirical principles). In it we have Mathematics applied to appearance, and also merely discursive principles (or those derived from concepts), which constitute the philosophical part of the pure cognition of nature. But there are several things in it, which are not quite pure and independent of empirical sources: such as the concept of motion, that of impenetrability (upon which the empirical concept of matter rests), that of inertia, and many others, which prevent its being called a perfectly pure science of nature. Besides, it only refers to objects of the external sense and therefore does not give an example of a universal science of nature, in the strict sense, for such a science must reduce nature in general, whether it regards the object of the external or that of the internal sense (the object of Physics as well as Psychology), to universal laws. But among the principles of this universal physics there are a few which actually have the required universality; for instance, the propositions that "substance is permanent, " and that "every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws," etc.

These are actually universal laws of nature, which subsist completely a priori. There is then in fact a pure science of nature, and the question arises, How is it possible?

Sect. 16. The word "nature" assumes yet another meaning, which determines the object, whereas in the former sense it only denotes the conformity to law [Gesetzmdssigkeit] of the determinations of the existence of things generally. If we consider it materialiter (i.e., in the matter that forms its objects) "nature is the complex of all the objects of experience." And with this only are we now concerned, for besides, things which can never be objects of experience, if they must be known as to their nature, would oblige us to have recourse to concepts whose meaning could never be given in concrete (by any example of possible experience). Consequently we must form for ourselves a list of concepts of their nature, the reality whereof (i.e., whether they actually refer to objects, or are mere creations of thought) could never be determined. The cognition of what cannot be an object of experience would be hyperphysical, and with things hyperphysical we are here not concerned, but only with the cognition of nature, the actuality of which can be confirmed by experience, though it [the cognition of nature] is possible a priori and precedes all experience.

Sect. 17. The formal [aspect] of nature in this narrower sense is therefore the conformity to law of all the objects of experience, and so far as it is known a priori, their necessary conformity. But it has just been shown that the laws of nature can never be known a priori in objects so far as they are considered not in reference to possible experience, but as things in themselves. And our inquiry here extends not to things in themselves (the properties of which we pass by), but to things as objects of possible experience, and the complex of these is what we properly designate as nature. And now I ask, when the possibility of a cognition of nature a priori is in question, whether it is better to arrange the problem thus: How can we know a priori that things as objects of experience necessarily conform to law? or thus: How is it possible to know a priori the necessary conformity to law of experience itself as regards all its objects generally?

Closely considered, the solution of the problem, represented in either way, amounts, with regard to the pure cognition of nature (which is the point of the question at issue), entirely to the same thing. For the subjective laws, under which alone an empirical cognition of things is possible, hold good of these things, as objects of possible experience (not as things in themselves, which are not considered here). Either of the following statements means quite the same: "A judgment of observation can never rank as experience, without the law, that 'whenever an event is observed, it is always referred to some antecedent, which it follows according to a universal rule'"; alternatively, "Everything, of which experience teaches that it happens, must have a cause."

It is, however, more commendable to choose the first formula. For we can a priori and previous to all given objects have a cognition of those conditions, on which alone experience is possible, but never of the laws to which things may in themselves be subject, without reference to possible experience. We cannot therefore study the nature of things a priori otherwise

than by investigating the conditions and the universal (though subjective) laws, under which alone such a cognition as experience (as to mere form) is possible, and we determine accordingly the possibility of things, as objects of experience. For if I should choose the second formula, and seek the conditions a priori, on which nature as an object of experience is possible, I might easily fall into error, and fancy that I was speaking of nature as a thing in itself, and then move round in endless circles, in a vain search for laws concerning things of which nothing is given me.

Accordingly we shall here be concerned with experience only, and the universal conditions of its possibility which are given a priori. Thence we shall determine nature as the whole object of all possible experience. I think it will be understood that I here do not mean the rules of the observation of a nature that is already given, for these already presuppose experience. I do not mean how (through experience) we can study the laws of nature; for these would not then be laws a priori, and would yield us no pure science of nature; but [I mean to ask] how the condi. tions a priori of the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources from which all the universal laws of nature must be derived.

Sect. 18. In the first place we must state that, while all judgments of experience [Erfahrungsurtheile] are empirical (i.e., have their ground in immediate senseperception), vice versa, all empirical judgments [empirische Urtheile] are not judgments of experience, but, besides the empirical, and in general besides what is given to the sensuous intuition, particular concepts must yet be superadded-concepts which have their origin quite a priori in the pure understanding, and under which every perception must be first of all subsumed and then by their means changed into experience.8

Empirical judgments, so far as they have objective validity, are judgments of experience; but those which are only subjectively valid, I name mere judgments of perception. The latter require no pure concept of the understanding, but only the logical connection of perception in a thinking subject. But the former always require, besides the representation of the sensuous intuition, particular concepts originally begotten in the understanding, which produce the objective validity of the judgment of experience.

All our judgments are at first merely judgments of perception; they hold good only for us (i.e., for our subject), and we do not till afterwards give them a new reference (to an object), and desire that they shall always hold good for us and in the same way for everybody else; for when a judgment agrees with an object, all judgments concerning the same object must likewise agree among themselves, and thus the objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies nothing else than its necessary universality of application. And conversely when we have reason to consider a judgment necessarily universal (which never depends upon perception, but upon the pure concept of the understanding, under which the perception is subsumed), we must consider it objective also, that is, that it expresses not merely a reference of our perception to a subject, but a quality of the object. For there would be no reason for the judgments of other men necessarily agreeing with mine, if it were not the unity of

the object to which they all refer, and with which they accord; hence they must all agree with one another.

Sect. 19. Therefore objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody) are equivalent terms, and though we do not know the object in itself, yet when we consider a judgment as universal, and also necessary, we understand it to have objective validity. By this judgment we know the object (though it remains unknown as it is in itself) by the universal and necessary connection of the given perceptions. As this is the case with all objects of sense, judgments of experience take their objective validity not from the immediate cognition of the object (which is impossible), but from the condition of universal validity in empirical judgments, which, as already said, never rests upon empirical, or, in short, sensuous conditions, but upon a pure concept of the understanding. The object always remains unknown in itself; but when by the concept of the understanding the connection of the representations of the object, which are given to our sensibility, is determined as universally valid, the object is determined by this relation, and it is the judgment that is objective.

To illustrate the matter: When we say, "the room is warm, sugar sweet, and wormwood bitter,"9 -- we have only subjectively valid judgments, I do not at all expect that I or any other person shall always find it as I now do; each of these sentences only expresses a relation of two sensations to the same subject, to myself, and that only in my present state of perception; consequently they are not valid of the object. Such are judgments of perception. judgments of experience are of quite a different nature. What experience teaches me under certain circumstances, it must always teach me and everybody; and its validity is not limited to the subject nor to its state at a particular time. Hence I pronounce all such judgments as being objectively valid. For instance, when I say the air is elastic, this judgment is as yet a judgment of perception only-I do nothing but refer two of my sensations to one another. But, if I would have it called a judgment of experience, I require this connection to stand under a condition, which makes it universally valid. I desire therefore that I and everybody else should always connect necessarily the same perceptions under the same circumstances.

Sect. 20. We must consequently analyze experience in order to see what is contained in this product of the senses and of the understanding, and how the judgment of experience itself is possible. The foundation is the intuition of which I become conscious, i.e., perception (perceptio), which pertains merely to the senses. But in the next place, there are acts of judging (which belong only to the understanding). But this judging may be twofold-first, I may merely compare perceptions and connect them in a particular state of my consciousness; or, secondly, I may connect them in consciousness generally. The former judgment is merely a judgment of perception, and of subjective validity only: it is merely a connection of perceptions in my mental state, without reference to the object. Hence it is not, as is commonly imagined, enough for experience to compare perceptions and to connect them in consciousness through judgment; there arises no universality and necessity, for which alone judgments can become objectively valid and be called experience.

Quite another judgment therefore is required before

perception can become experience. The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept, which determines the form of judging in general relatively to the intuition, connects its empirical consciousness in consciousness generally, and thereby procures universal validity for empirical judgments. A concept of this nature is a pure a priori concept of the Understanding, which does nothing but determine for an intuition the general way in which it can be used for judgments. Let the concept be that of cause, then it determined the intuition which is subsumed under it, e.g., that of air, relative to judgments in general, viz., the concept of air serves with regard to its expansion in the relation of antecedent to consequent in a hypothetical judgment. The concept of cause accordingly is a pure concept of the understanding, which is totally disparate from all possible perception, and only serves to determine the representation subsumed under it, relatively to judgments in general, and so to make a universally valid judgment possible.

Before, therefore, a judgment of perception can become a judgment of experience, it is requisite that the perception should be subsumed under some such a concept of the understanding.; for instance, air ranks under the concept of causes, which determines our judgment about it in regard to its expansion as hypothetical.10 Thereby the expansion of the air is represented not as merely belonging to the perception of the air in my present state or in several states of mine, or in the state of perception of others, but as belonging to it necessarily. The judgment, "the air is elastic," becomes universally valid, and a judgment of experience, only by certain judgments preceding it, which subsume the intuition of air under the concept of cause and effect: and they thereby determine the perceptions not merely as regards one another in me, but relatively to the form of judging in general, which is here hypothetical, and in this way they render the empirical judgment universally valid.

If all our synthetical judgments are analyzed so far as they are objectively valid, it will be found that they never consist of mere intuitions connected only (as is commonly believed) by comparison into a judgment; but that they would be impossible were not a pure concept of the understanding superadded to the concepts abstracted from intuition, under which concept these latter are subsumed, and in this manner only combined into an objectively valid judgment. Even the judgments of pure mathematics in their simplest axioms are not exempt from this condition. The principle, II a straight line is the shortest between two points," presupposes that the line is subsumed under the concept of quantity, which certainly is no mere intuition, but bas its seat in the understanding alone, and serves to determine the intuition (of the line) with regard to the judgments which may be made about it, relatively to their quantity, that is, to plurality (as judicia plurativa).11 For under them it is understood that in a given intuition there is contained a plurality of homogenous parts.

Sect. 21. To prove, then, the possibility of experience so far as it rests upon pure concepts of the understanding a priori, we must first represent what belongs to judgments in general and the various functions of the understanding, in a complete table. For the pure concepts of the understanding must run parallel to these functions, as such concepts are nothing more than concepts of intuitions in general, so far as these are determined by one

or other of these functions of judging, in themselves, that is, necessarily and universally. Hereby also the a priori principles of the possibility of all experience, as of an objectively valid empirical cognition, will be precisely determined. For they are nothing but propositions by which all perception is (under certain universal conditions of intuition) subsumed under those pure concepts of the understanding.

LOGICAL TABLE OF JUDGMENTS.

1. As to Quantity.
   Universal.
   Particular.
   Singular.

2. As to Quality.
   Affirmative.
   Negative.
   Infinite.

3. As to Relation.
   Categorical.
   Hypothetical.
   Disjunctive.

4. As to Modality.
   Problematical.
   Assertorical.
   Apodictical.

TRANSCENDENTAL TABLE OF THE PURE CONCEFITS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

1 . As to Quantity.
   Unity (the Measure).
   Plurality (the Quantity).
   Totality (the Whole).

2. As to Quality.
   Reality.
   Negation.
   Limitation.

3. As to Relation.
   Substance.
   Cause.
   Community.

4. As to Modality.
   Possibility.
   Existence.
   Necessity.

PURE PHYSICAL TABLE OF THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE OF NATURE.

1. Axioms of Intuition.
2. Anticipations of Perception.
3. Analogies of Experience.
4. Postulates of Empirical Thinking generally.

Sect. 21a. In order to comprise the whole matter in one

idea, it is first necessary to remind the reader that we are discussing not the origin of experience, but of that which lies in experience. The former pertains to empirical psychology, and would even then never be adequately explained without the latter, which belongs to the Critique of cognition, and particularly of the understanding.

Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments, which the understanding forms alone from sensuous intuitions, are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in the sensuous intuition, while in the other the judgments must express what experience in general, and not what the mere perception (which possesses only subjective validity) contains. The judgment of experience must therefore add to the sensuous intuition and its logical connection in a judgment (after it has been rendered universal by comparison) something that determines the synthetical judgment as necessary and therefore as universally valid. This can be nothing else than that concept which represents the intuition as determined in itself with regard to one form of judgment rather than another, viz., a concept of that synthetical unity of intuitions which can only be represented by a given logical function of judgments.

Sect. 22. The sum of the matter is this: the business of the senses is to intuit -- that of the understanding is to think. But thinking is uniting representations in one consciousness. This union originates either merely relative to the subject, and is accidental and subjective, or is absolute, and is necessary or objective. The union of representations in one consciousness is judgment. Thinking therefore is the same as judging, or referring representations to judgments in general. Hence judgments are either merely subjective, when representations are referred to a consciousness in one subject only, and united in it, or objective, when they are united in a consciousness generally, that is, necessarily. The logical functions of all judgments are but various modes of uniting representations in consciousness. But if they serve for concepts, they are concepts of their necessary union in a consciousness, and so principles of objectively valid judgments. This union in a consciousness is either analytical, by identity, or synthetical, by the combination and addition of various representations one to another. Experience consists in the synthetical connection of phenomena (perceptions) in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Hence the pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must be subsumed ere they can serve for judgments of experience, in which the synthetical unity of the perceptions is represented as necessary and universally valid.12

Sect. 23. judgments, when considered merely as the condition of the union of given representations in a consciousness, are rules. These rules, so far as they represent the union as necessary, are rules a priori, and so far as they cannot be deduced from higher rules, are fundamental principles. But in regard to the possibility of all experience, merely in relation to the form of thinking in it, no conditions of judgments of experience are higher than those which bring the phenomena, according to the various form of their intuition, under pure concepts of the understanding, and render the empirical judgment

objectively valid. These concepts are therefore the a priori principles of possible experience.

The principles of possible experience are then at the same time universal laws of nature, which can be known a priori. And thus the problem in our second question, "How is the pure Science of Nature possible?" is solved. For the system which is required for the form of a science is to be met with in perfection here, because, beyond the above-mentioned formal conditions of all judgments in general offered in logic, no others are possible, and these constitute a logical system. The concepts grounded thereupon, which contain the a priori conditions of all synthetical and necessary judgments, accordingly constitute a transcendental system. Finally the principles, by means of which all phenomena are subsumed under these concepts, constitute a physical13 system, that is, a system of nature, which precedes all empirical cognition of nature, makes it even possible, and hence may in strictness be denominated the universal and pure science of nature.

Sect. 24. The first one14 of the physiological principles subsumes all phenomena, as intuitions in space and time, under the concept of Quantity, and is so far a principle of the application of Mathematics to experience. The second one subsumes the empirical element, viz., sensation, which denotes the real in intuitions, not indeed directly under the concept of quantity, because sensation is not an intuition that contains either space or time, though it places the respective object into both. But still there is between reality (sense-representation) and the zero, or total void of intuition in time, a difference which has a quantity. For between every given degree of light and of darkness, between every degree of beat and of absolute cold, between every degree of weight and of absolute lightness, between every degree of occupied space and of totally void space, diminishing degrees can be conceived, in the same manner as between consciousness and total unconsciousness (the darkness of a psychological blank) ever diminishing degrees obtain. Hence there is no perception that can prove an absolute absence of it; for instance, no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as a kind of consciousness, which is only out-balanced by a stronger consciousness. This occurs in all cases of sensation, and so the understanding can anticipate even sensations, which constitute the peculiar quality of empirical representations (appearances), by means of the principle: "that they all have (consequently that what is real in all phenomena has) a degree." Here is the second application of mathematics (mathesis intensortim) to the science of nature.

Sect. 25. Anent the relation of appearances merely with a view to their existence, the determination is not mathematical but dynamical, and can never be objectively valid, consequently never fit for experience, if it does not come under a priori principles by which the cognition of experience relative to appearances becomes even possible. Hence appearances must be subsumed under the concept of Substance, which is the foundation of all determination of existence, as a concept of the thing itself; or secondly so far as a succession is found among phenomena, that is, an event-under the concept of an Effect with reference to Cause; or lastly-so far as coexistence is to be known objectively, that is, by a judgment of experience-under the concept of Community (action and reaction).15 Thus a priori

principles form the basis of objectively valid, though empirical judgments, that is, of the possibility of experience so far as it must connect objects as existing in nature. These principles are the proper laws of nature, which may be termed dynamical.

Finally the cognition of the agreement and connection not only of appearances among themselves in experience, but of their relation to experience in general, belongs to the judgments of experience. This relation contains either their agreement with the formal conditions, which the understanding knows, or their coherence with the materials of the senses and of perception, or combines both into one concept. Consequently it contains Possibility, Actuality, and Necessity according to universal laws of nature; and this constitutes the physical doctrine of method, or the distinction of truth and of hypotheses, and the bounds of the certainty of the latter.

Sect. 26. The third table of Principles drawn from the nature of the understanding itself after the critical method, shows an inherent perfection, which raises it far above every other table which has hitherto though in vain been tried or may yet be tried by analyzing the objects themselves dogmatically. It exhibits all synthetical a priori principles completely and according to one principle, viz., the faculty of judging in general, constituting the essence of experience as regards the understanding, so that we can be certain that there are no more such principles, which affords a satisfaction such as can never be attained by the dogmatical method. Yet is this not all: there is a still greater merit in it.

We must carefully bear in mind the proof which shows the possibility of this cognition a priori, and at the same time limits all such principles to a condition which must never be lost sight of, if we desire it not to be misunderstood, and extended in use beyond the original sense which the understanding attaches to it. This limit is that they contain nothing but the conditions of possible experience in general so far as it is Subjected to laws a priori. Consequently I do not say, that things in themselves possess a quantity, that their actuality possesses a degree, their existence a connection of accidents in a substance, etc. This nobody can prove, because such a synthetical connection from mere concepts, without any reference to sensuous intuition on the one side, or connection of it in a possible experience on the other, is absolutely impossible. The essential limitation of the concepts in these principles then is: That all things stand necessarily a priori under the aforementioned conditions, as objects of experience only.

Hence there follows secondly a specifically peculiar mode of proof of these principles: they are not directly referred to appearances and to their relations, but to the possibility of experience, of which appearances constitute the matter only, not the form. Thus they are referred to objectively and universally valid synthetical propositions, in which we distinguish judgments of experience from those of perception. This takes place because appearances, as mere intuitions, occupying a part of space and time, come under the concept of Quantity, which unites their multiplicity a priori according to rules synthetically. Again, so far as the perception contains, besides intuition, sensibility, and between the latter and nothing (i.e., the total disappearance of sensibility), there is an ever-decreasing transition, it is

apparent that that which is in appearances must have a degree, so far as it (viz., the perception) does not itself occupy any part of space or of time.16 Still the transition to actuality from empty time or empty space is only possible in time; consequently though sensibility, as the quality of empirical intuition, can never be known a priori, by its specific difference from other sensibilities, yet it can, in a possible experience in general, as a quantity of perception be intensely distinguished from every other similar perception. Hence the application of mathematics to nature, as regards the sensuous intuition by which nature is given to us, becomes possible and is thus determined.

Above all, the reader must pay attention to the mode of proof of the principles which occur under the title of Analogies of experience. For these do not refer to the genesis of intuitions, as do the principles of applied mathematics, but to the connection of their existence in experience; and this can be nothing but the determination of their existence in time according to necessary laws, under which alone the connection is objectively valid, and thus becomes experience. The proof therefore does not turn on the synthetical unity in the connection of things in themselves, but merely of perceptions, and of these not in regard to their matter, but to the determination of time and of the relation of their existence in it, according to universal laws. If the empirical determination in relative time is indeed objectively valid (i.e., experience), these universal laws contain the necessary determination of existence in time generally (viz., according to a rule of the understanding a priori).

In these Prolegomena I cannot further descant on the subject, but my reader (who has probably been long accustomed to consider experience a mere empirical synthesis of perceptions, and hence not considered that it goes much beyond them, as it imparts to empirical judgments universal validity, and for that purpose requires a pure and a priori unity of the understanding) is recommended to pay special attention to this distinction of experience from a mere aggregate of perceptions, and to judge the mode of proof from this point of view.

Sect. 27. Now we are prepared to remove Hume's doubt. He justly maintains, that we cannot comprehend by reason the possibility of Causality, that is, of the reference of the existence of one thing to the existence of another, which is necessitated by the former. I add, that we comprehend just as little the concept of Subsistence, that is, the necessity that at the foundation of the existence of things there lies a subject which cannot itself be a predicate of any other thing; nay, we cannot even form a notion of the possibility of such a thing (though we can point out examples of its use in experience). The very same incomprehensibility affects the Community of things, as we cannot comprehend bow from the state of one thing an inference to the state of quite another thing beyond it, and vice versa, can be drawn, and how substances which have each their own separate existence should depend upon one another necessarily. But I am very far from holding these concepts to be derived merely from experience, and the necessity represented in them, to be imaginary and a mere illusion produced in us by long habit. On the contrary, I have amply shown, that they and the theorems derived from them are firmly established a priori, or before all experience, and have their undoubted objective value, though only

with regard to experience.

Sect. 28. Though I have no notion of such a connection of things in themselves, that they can either exist as substances, or act as causes, or stand in community with others (as parts of a real whole), and I can just as little conceive such properties in appearances as such (because those concepts contain nothing that lies in the appearances, but only what the understanding alone must think): we have yet a notion of such a connection of representations in our understanding, and in judgments generally; consisting in this that representations appear in one sort of judgments as subject in relation to predicates, in another as reason in relation to consequences, and in a third as parts, which constitute together a total possible cognition. Besides we know a priori that without considering the representation of an object as determined in some of these respects, we can have no valid cognition of the object, and, if we should occupy ourselves about the object in itself, there is no possible attribute, by which I could know that it is determined under any of these aspects, that is, under the concept either of substance, or of cause, or (in relation to other substances) of community, for I have no notion of the possibility of such a connection of existence. But the question is not how things in themselves, but how the empirical cognition of things is determined as regards the above aspects of judgments in general, that is, how things, as objects of experience, can and shall be subsumed under these concepts of the understanding. And then it is clear, that I completely comprehend not only the possibility, but also the necessity of subsuming all phenomena under these concepts, that is, of using them for principles of the possibility of experience.

Sect. 29. When making an experiment with Hume's problematical concept (his crux metaphysicorum), the concept of cause, we have, in the first place, given a priori, by means of logic, the form of a conditional judgment in general, i.e., we have one given cognition as antecedent and another as consequence. But it is possible, that in perception we may meet with a rule of relation, which runs thus: that a certain phenomenon is constantly followed by another (though not conversely), and this is a case for me to use the hypothetical judgment, and, for instance, to say, if the sun shines long enough upon a body, it grows warm. Here there is indeed as yet no necessity of connection, or concept of cause. But I proceed and say, that if this proposition, which is merely a subjective connection of perceptions, is to be a judgment of experience, it must be considered as necessary and universally valid. Such a proposition would be, II the sun is by its light the cause of heat." The empirical rule is now considered as a law, and as valid not merely of appearances but valid of them for the purposes of a possible experience which requires universal and therefore necessarily valid rules. I therefore easily comprehend the concept of cause, as a concept necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience, and its possibility as a synthetical union of perceptions in consciousness generally; but I do not at all comprehend the possibility of a thing generally as a cause, because the concept of cause denotes a condition not at all belonging to things, but to experience. It is nothing in fact but an objectively valid cognition of appearances and of their succession, so far as the antecedent can be conjoined with the consequent according to the rule of hypothetical judgments.

Sect. 30. Hence if the pure concepts of the understanding do not refer to objects of experience but to things in themselves (noumena), they have no signification whatever. They serve, as it were, only to decipher appearances, that we may be able to read them as experience. The principles which arise from their reference to the sensible world, only serve our understanding for empirical use. Beyond this they are arbitrary combinations, without objective reality, and we can neither know their possibility a priori, nor verify their reference to objects, let alone make it intelligible by any example; because examples can only be borrowed from some possible experience, consequently the objects of these concepts can be found nowhere but in a possible experience.

This complete (though to its originator unexpected) solution of Hume's problem rescues for the pure concepts of the understanding their a priori origin, and for the universal laws of nature their validity, as laws of the understanding, yet in such a way as to limit their use to experience, because their possibility depends solely on the reference of the understanding to experience, but with a completely reversed mode of connection which never occurred to Hume, not by deriving them from experience, but by deriving experience from them.

This is therefore the result of all our foregoing inquiries: "All synthetical principles a priori are nothing more than principles of possible experience, and can never be referred to things in themselves, but to appearances as objects of experience. And hence pure mathematics as well as a pure science of nature can never be referred to anything more than mere appearances, and can only represent either that which makes experience generally possible, or else that which, as it is derived from these principles, must always be capable of being represented in some possible experience."

Sect. 31. And thus we have at last something definite, upon which to depend in all metaphysical enterprises, which have hitherto, boldly enough but always at random, attempted everything without discrimination. That the aim of their exertions should be so near, struck neither the dogmatical thinkers nor those who, confident in their supposed sound common sense, started with concepts and principles of pure reason (which were legitimate and natural, but destined for mere empirical use) in quest of fields of knowledge, to which they neither knew nor could know any determinate bounds, because they bad never reflected nor were able to reflect on the nature or even on the possibility of such a pure understanding.

Many a naturalist of pure reason (by which I mean the man who believes he can decide in matters of metaphysics without any science) may pretend, that lie long ago by the prophetic spirit of his sound sense, not only suspected, but knew and comprehended, what is here propounded with so much ado, or, if he likes, with prolix and pedantic pomp: "that with all our reason we can never reach beyond the field of experience." But when he is questioned about his rational principles individually, he must grant, that there are many of them which be has not taken from experience, and which are therefore independent of it and valid a priori. How then and on what grounds will he restrain both himself and the dogmatist, who makes use of these concepts and

principles beyond all possible experience, because they are recognized to be independent of it? And even he, this adept in sound sense, in spite of all his assumed and cheaply acquired wisdom, is not exempt from wandering inadvertently beyond objects of experience into the field of chimeras. He is often deeply enough involved in them, though in announcing everything as mere probability, rational conjecture, or analogy, be gives by his popular language a color to his groundless pretensions.

Sect. 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which make up the sensible world, certain creations of the understanding (Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should constitute an intelligible world. And as appearance and illusion were by those men identified (a thing which we may well excuse in an undeveloped epoch), actuality was only conceded to the creations of thought.

And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing in its internal constitution, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by assuming appearances, grants the existence of things in themselves also, and so far we may say, that the representation of such things as form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere creations of the understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable.

Our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort (noumena), but rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic (the science of the sensibility) to this, that they shall not extend to all things, as everything would then be turned into mere appearance, but that they shall only hold good of objects of possible experience. Hereby then objects of the understanding are granted, but with the inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception: "that we neither know nor can know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the understanding, because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever."

Sect. 33. There is indeed something seductive in our pure concepts of the understanding, which tempts us to a transcendent use, -- a use which transcends all possible experience. Not only are our concepts of substance, of power, of action, of reality, and others, quite independent of experience, containing nothing of sense appearance, and so apparently applicable to things in themselves (noumena), but, what strengthens this conjecture, they contain a necessity of determination in themselves, which experience never attains. The concept of cause implies a rule, according to which one state follows another necessarily; but experience can only show us, that one state of things often, or at most, commonly, follows another, an(i therefore affords neither strict universality, nor necessity.

Hence the Categories seem to have a deeper meaning and import than can be exhausted by their empirical use, and so the understanding inadvertently adds for itself to the house of experience a much more extensive wing, which it fills with

nothing but creatures of thought, without ever observing that it has transgressed with its otherwise lawful concepts the bounds of their use.

Sect. 34. Two important, and even indispensable, though very dry, investigations had therefore become indispensable in the Critique of Pure Reason,-viz., the two chapters "Vom Schematismus der reinen Verstandsbegriffe," and "Vom Grunde der Unterscheidung aller Verstandesbegriffe uberhaupt in Phenomena und Noumena. " In the former it is shown, that the senses furnish not the pure concepts of the understanding in concreto, but only the schedule for their use, and that the object conformable to it occurs only in experience (as the product of the understanding from materials of the sensibility). In the latter it is shown, that, although our pure concepts of the understanding and our principles are independent of experience, and despite of the apparently greater sphere of their use, still nothing whatever can be thought by them beyond the field of experience, because they can do nothing but merely determine the logical form of the judgment relatively to given intuitions. But as there is no intuition at all beyond the field of the sensibility, these pure concepts, as they cannot possibly be exhibited in concrete, are void of all meaning; consequently all these noumena, together with their complex, the intelligible world,17 are nothing but representation of a problem, of which the object in itself is possible, but the solution, from the nature of our understanding, totally impossible. For our understanding is not a faculty of intuition, but of the connection of given intuitions in experience. Experience must therefore contain all the objects for our concepts; but beyond it no concepts have any significance, as there is no intuition that might offer them a foundation.

Sect. 35. The imagination may perhaps be forgiven for occasional vagaries, and for not keeping carefully within the limits of experience, since it gains life and vigor by such flights, and since it is always easier to moderate its boldness, than to stimulate its languor. But the understanding which ought to think can never be forgiven for indulging in vagaries; for we depend upon it alone for assistance to set bounds, when necessary, to the vagaries of the imagination.

But the understanding begins its aberrations very innocently and modestly. It first elucidates the elementary cognitions, which inhere in it prior to all experience, but yet must always have their application in experience. It gradually drops these limits, and what is there to prevent it, as it has quite freely derived its principles from itself? And then it proceeds first to newly-imagined powers in nature, then to beings outside nature; in short to a world, for whose construction the materials cannot be wanting, because fertile fiction furnishes them abundantly, and though not confirmed, is never refuted, by experience. This is the reason that young thinkers arc so partial to nietaph3,sics of the truly dogmatical kind, and often sacrifice to it their time and their talents, which might be otherwise better employed.

But there is no use in trying to moderate these fruitless endeavors of pure reason by all manner of cautions as to the difficulties of solving questions so occult, by complaints of the limits of our reason, and by degrading our assertions into mere conjectures. For if their impossibility is not distinctly shown, and reason's cognition of its own essence does not become a true

science, in which the field of its right use is distinguished, so to say, with mathematical certainty from that of its worthless and idle use, these fruitless efforts will never be abandoned for good.

Sect. 36. How is Nature itself possible?

This question -- the highest point that transcendental philosophy can ever reach, and to which, as its boundary and completion, it must proceed-properly contains two questions.

First: How is nature at all possible in the material sense, by intuition, considered as the totality of appearances; how are space, time, and that which fills both -- the object of sensation, in general possible? The answer is: By means of the constitution of our Sensibility, according to which it is specifically affected by objects, which are in themselves unknown to it, and totally distinct from those phenomena. This answer is given in the Critique itself in the transcendental Aesthetic, and in these Prolegomena by the solution of the first general problem.

Secondly: How is nature possible in the formal sense, as the totality of the rules, under which all phenomena must come, in order to be thought as connected in experience? The answer must be this: it is only possible by means of the constitution of our Understanding, according to which all the above representations of the sensibility are necessarily referred to a consciousness, and by which the peculiar way in which we think (viz., by rules), and hence experience also, are possible, but must be clearly distinguished from an insight into the objects in themselves. This answer is given in the Critique itself in the transcendental Logic, and in these Prolegomena, in the course of the solution of the second main problem.

But how this peculiar property of our sensibility itself is possible, or that of our understanding and of the apperception which is necessarily its basis and that of all thinking, cannot be further analyzed or answered, because it is of them that we are in need for all our answers and for all our thinking about objects.

There are many laws of nature, which we can only know by means of experience; but conformity to law in the connection of appearances, i.e., in nature in general, we cannot discover by any experience, because experience itself requires laws which are a priori at the basis of its possibility.

The possibility of experience in general is therefore at the same time the universal law of nature, and the principles of the experience are the very laws of nature. For we do not know nature but as the totality of appearances, i.e., of representations in us, and hence we can only derive the laws of its connection from the principles of their connection in us, that is, from the conditions of their necessary union in consciousness, which constitutes the possibility of experience.

Even the main proposition expounded throughout this section -- that universal laws of nature can be distinctly known a priori -- leads naturally to the proposition: that the highest legislation of nature must lie in ourselves, i.e., in our

understanding, and that we must not seek the universal laws of nature in nature by means of experience, but conversely must seek nature, as to its universal conformity to law, in the conditions of the possibility of experience, which lie in our sensibility and in our understanding. For bow were it otherwise possible to know a priori these laws, as they are not rules of analytical cognition, but truly synthetical extensions of it?

Such a necessary agreement of the principles of possible experience with the laws of the possibility of nature, can only proceed from one of two reasons: either these laws are drawn from nature by means of experience, or conversely nature is derived from the laws of the possibility of experience in general, and is quite the same as the mere universal conformity to law of the latter. The former is self-contradictory, for the universal laws of nature can and must be known a priori (that is, independent of all experience), and be the foundation of all empirical use of the understanding; the latter alternative therefore alone remains.18

But we must distinguish the empirical laws of nature, which always presuppose particular perceptions, from the pure or universal laws of nature, which, without being based on particular perceptions, contain merely the conditions of their necessary union in experience. In relation to the latter, nature and possible experience are quite the same, and as the conformity to law here depends upon the -necessary connection of appearances in experience (without which we cannot know any object whatever in the sensible world), consequently upon the original laws of the understanding, it seems at first strange, but is not the less certain, to say: The understanding does not derive its laws (a priori) from, but prescribes them to, nature.

Sect. 37. We shall illustrate this seemingly bold proposition by an example, which will show, that laws, which we discover in objects of sensuous intuition (especially when these laws are known as necessary), are commonly held by us to be such as have been placed there by the understanding, in spite of their being similar in all points to the laws of nature, which we ascribe to experience.

Sect. 38. If we consider the properties of the circle, by which this figure combines so many arbitrary determinations of space in itself, at once in a universal rule, we cannot avoid attributing a constitution (eine Natur) to this geometrical thing. Two right lines, for example, which intersect one another and the circle, howsoever they may be drawn, are always divided so that the rectangle constructed with the segments of the one is equal to that constructed with the segments of the other. The question now is: Does this law lie in the circle or in the understanding, that is, Does this figure, independently of the understanding, contain in itself the ground of the law, or does the understanding, having constructed according to its concepts (according to the quality of the radii) the figure itself, introduce into it this law of the chords cutting one another in geometrical proportion? When we follow the proofs of this law, we soon perceive, that it can only be derived from the condition on which the understanding founds the construction of this figure, and which is that of the equality of the radii. But, if we enlarge this concept, to pursue further the unity of various properties of geometrical figures under common laws, and consider

the circle as a conic section, which of course is subject to the same fundamental conditions of construction as other conic sections, we shall find that all the chords which intersect within the ellipse, parabola, and hyperbola, always intersect so that the rectangles of their segments are not indeed equal, but always bear a constant ratio to one another. If we proceed still farther, to the fundamental laws of physical astronomy, we find a physical law of reciprocal attraction diffused over all material nature, the rule of which is: II that it decreases inversely as the square of the distance from each attracting point, i.e., as the spherical surfaces increase, over which this force spreads," which law seems to be necessarily inherent in the very nature of things, and hence is usually propounded as knowable a priori. Simple as the sources of this law are, merely resting upon the relation of spherical surfaces of different radii, its consequences are so valuable with regard to the variety of their agreement and its regularity, that not only are all possible orbits of the celestial bodies conic sections, but such a relation of these orbits to each other results, that no other law of attraction, than that of the inverse square of the distance, can be imagined as fit for a cosmical system.

Here accordingly is a nature that rests upon laws which the understanding knows a priori, and chiefly from the universal principles of the determination of space. Now I ask: Do the laws of nature lie in space, and does the understanding learn them by merely endeavoring to find out the enormous wealth of meaning that lies in space; or do they inhere in the understanding and in the way in which it determines space according to the conditions of the synthetical unity in which its concepts are all centered?

Space is something so uniform and as to all particular properties so indeterminate, that we should certainly not seek a store of laws of nature in it. Whereas that which determines space to assume the form of a circle or the figures of a cone and a sphere, is the understanding, so far as it contains the ground of the unity of their constructions.

The mere universal form of intuition, called space, must therefore be the substratum of all intuitions determinable to particular objects, and in it of course the condition of the possibility and of the variety of these intuitions lies. But the unity of the objects is entirely determined by the understanding, and on conditions which lie in its own nature; and thus the understanding is the origin of the universal order of nature, in that it comprehends all appearances under its own laws, and thereby first constructs, a priori, experience (as to its form), by means of which whatever is to be known only by experience, is necessarily subjected to its laws. For we are not now concerned with the nature of things in themselves, which is independent of the conditions both of our sensibility and our understanding, but with nature, as an object of possible experience, and in this case the understanding, whilst it makes experience possible, thereby insists that the sensuous world is either not an object of experience at all, or must be nature [viz., an existence of things, determined according to universal laws19].

APPENDIX TO THE PURE SCIENCE OF NATURE.

Sect. 39. Of the System of the Categories.

There can be nothing more desirable to a philosopher, than to be able to derive the scattered multiplicity of the concepts or the principles, which had occurred to him in concrete use, from a principle a priori, and to unite everything in this way in one cognition. He formerly only believed that those things, which remained after a certain abstraction, and seemed by comparison among one another to constitute a particular kind of cognitions, were completely collected; but this was only an Aggregate. Now he knows, that just so many, neither more nor less, can constitute the mode of cognition, and perceives the necessity of his division, which constitutes comprehension; and now only he has attained a System.

To search in our daily cognition for the concepts, which do not rest upon particular experience, and yet occur in all cognition of experience, where they as it were constitute the mere form of connection, presupposes neither greater reflection nor deeper insight, than to detect in a language the rules of the actual use of words generally, and thus to collect elements for a grammar. In fact both researches are very nearly related, even though we are not able to give a reason why each language has just this and no other formal constitution, and still less why an exact number of such formal determinations in general are found in it.

Aristotle collected ten pure elementary concepts under the name of Categories.20 To these, which are also called predicaments,21 he found himself obliged afterwards to add five post-predicaments, some of which however (prius, simul, and molus) are contained in the former; but this random collection must be considered (and commended) as a mere hint for future inquirers, not as a regularly developed idea, and hence it has, in the present more advanced state of philosophy, been rejected as quite useless.

After long reflection on the pure elements of human knowledge (those which contain nothing empirical), I at last succeeded in distinguishing with certainty and in separating the pure elementary notions of the Sensibility (space and time) from those of the Understanding. Thus the 7th, 8th, and 8th Categories had to be excluded from the old list. And the others were of no service to me; because there was no principle [in them], on which the understanding could be investigated, measured in its completion, and all the functions, whence its pure concepts arise, determined exhaustively and with precision.

But in order to discover such a principle, I looked about for an act of the understanding which comprises all the rest, and is distinguished only by various modifications or phases, in reducing the multiplicity of representation to the unity of thinking in general: I found this act of the understanding to consist in judging. Here then the labors of the logicians were ready at hand, though not yet quite free from defects, and with this help I was enabled to exhibit a complete table of the pure functions of the understanding, which are however undetermined in regard to any object. I finally referred these functions of judging to objects in general, or rather to the condition of determining judgments as objectively valid, and so there arose the pure concepts of the understanding, concerning which I could make certain, that these, and this exact number only, constitute our whole cognition of things from pure understanding. I was

justified in calling them by their old name, Categories, while I reserved for myself the liberty of adding, under the title of "Predicables," a complete list of all the concepts deducible from them, by combinations whether among themselves, or with the pure form of the appearance, i.e., space or time, or with its matter, so far as it is not yet empirically determined (viz., the object of sensation in general), as soon as a system of transcendental philosophy should be completed with the construction of which I am engaged in the Critique of Pure Reason itself.

Now the essential point in this system of Categories, which distinguishes it from the old rhapsodical collection without any principle, and for which alone it deserves to be considered as philosophy, consists in this: that by means of it the true significance of the pure concepts of the understanding and the condition of their use could be precisely determined. For here it became obvious that they are themselves nothing but logical functions, and as such do not produce the least concept of an object, but require some sensuous intuition as a basis. They therefore only serve to determine empirical judgments, which are otherwise undetermined and indifferent as regards all functions of judging, relatively to these functions, thereby procuring them universal validity, and by means of them making judgments of experience in general possible.

Such an insight into the nature of the categories, which limits them at the same time to the mere use of experience, never occurred either to their first author, or to any of his successors; but without this insight (which immediately depends upon their derivation or deduction), they are quite useless and only a miserable list of names, without explanation or rule for their use. Had the ancients ever conceived such a notion, doubtless the whole study of the pure rational knowledge, which under the name of metaphysics has for centuries spoiled many a sound mind, would have reached us. in quite another shape, and would have enlightened the human understanding, instead of actually exhausting it in obscure and vain speculations, thereby rendering it unfit for true science.

This system of categories makes all treatment of every object of pure reason itself systematic, and affords a direction or clue how and through what points of inquiry every metaphysical consideration must proceed, in order to be complete; for it exhausts all the possible movements (momenta) of the understanding, among which every concept must be classed. In like manner the table of Principles has been formulated, the completeness of which we can only vouch for by the system of the categories. Even in the division of the concepts,22 which must go beyond the physical application of the understanding, it is always the very same clue, which, as it must always be determined a priori by the same fixed points of the human understanding, always forms a closed circle. There is no doubt that the object of a pure conception either of the understanding or of reason, so far as it is to be estimated philosophically and on a priori principles, can in this way be completely known. I could not therefore omit to make use of this clue with regard to one of the most abstract ontological divisions, viz., the various distinctions of "the notions of something and of nothing," and to construct accordingly (Critique, P. 207) a regular and necessary table of their divisions.23

And this system, like every other true one founded on a universal principle, shows its inestimable value in this, that it excludes all foreign concepts, which might otherwise intrude among the pure concepts of the understanding, and determines the place of every cognition. Those concepts, which under the name of "concepts of reflection" have been likewise arranged in a table according to the clue of the categories, intrude, without having any privilege or title to be among the pure concepts of the understanding in Ontology. They are concepts of connection, and thereby of the objects themselves, whereas the former are only concepts of a mere comparison of concepts already given, hence of quite another nature and use. By my systematic division24 they are saved from this confusion. But the value of my special table of the categories will be still more obvious, when we separate the table of the transcendental concepts of Reason from the concepts of the understanding. The latter being of quite another nature and origin, they must have quite another form than the former. This so necessary separation has never yet been made in any system of metaphysics for, as a rule, these rational concepts all mixed up with the categories, like children of one family, which confusion was unavoidable in the absence of a definite system of categories.

THIRD PART OF THE MAIN TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.
HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE?

Sect. 40. Pure mathematics and pure science of nature had no occasion for such a deduction, as we have made of both, for their own safety and certainty. For the former rests upon its own evidence; and the latter (though sprung from pure sources of the understanding) upon experience and its thorough confirmation. Physics cannot altogether refuse and dispense with the testimony of the latter; because with all its certainty, it can never, as philosophy, rival mathematics. Both sciences therefore stood in need of this inquiry, not for themselves, but for the sake of another science, metaphysics.

Metaphysics has to do not only with concepts of nature, which always find their application in experience, but also with pure rational concepts, which never can be given in any possible experience. Consequently the objective reality of these concepts (viz., that they are not mere chimeras), and the truth or falsity of metaphysical assertions, cannot be discovered or confirmed by any experience. This part of metaphysics however is precisely what constitutes its essential end, to which the rest is only a means, and thus this science is in need of such a deduction for its, own sake. The third question now proposed relates therefore as it were to the root and essential difference of metaphysics, i.e., the occupation of Reason with itself, and the supposed knowledge of objects arising immediately from this incubation of its own concepts, without requiring, or indeed being able to reach that knowledge through, experience.25

Without solving this problem reason never is justified. The empirical use to which reason limits the pure understanding, does not fully satisfy the proper destination of the latter. Every single experience is only a part of the whole sphere of its domain, but the absolute totality of all possible experience is itself not experience. Yet it is a necessary [concrete] problem for reason, the mere representation of which requires concepts quite different from the categories, whose use is only immanent,

or refers to experience, so far as it can be given. Whereas the concepts of reason aim at the completeness, i.e., the collective unity of all possible experience, and thereby transcend every given experience. Thus they become transcendent.

As the understanding stands in need of categories for experience, reason contains in itself the source of ideas, by which I mean necessary concepts, whose object cannot be given in any experience. The latter are inherent in the nature of reason, as the former are in that of the understanding. While the former carry with them an illusion likely to mislead, the illusion of the latter is inevitable, though it certainly can be kept from misleading us.

Since all illusion consists in holding the subjective ground of our judgments to be objective, a self-knowledge of pure reason in its transcendent (exaggerated) use is the sole preservative from the aberrations into which reason falls when it mistakes its destination, and refers that to the object transcendently, which only regards its own subject and its guidance in all immanent use.

Sect. 41. The distinction of ideas, that is, of pure concepts of reason, from categories, or pure concepts of the understanding, as cognitions of a quite distinct species, origin and use, is so important a point in founding a science which is to contain the system of all these a priori cognitions, that without this distinction metaphysics is absolutely impossible, or is at best a random, bungling attempt to build a castle in the air without a knowledge of the materials or of their fitness for any purpose. Had the Critique of Pure Reason done nothing but first point out this distinction, it had thereby contributed more to clear up our conception of, and to guide our inquiry in, the field of metaphysics, than all the vain efforts which have hitherto been made to satisfy the transcendent problems of pure reason, without ever surmising that we were in quite another field than that of the understanding, and hence classing concepts of the understanding and those of reason together, as if they were of the same kind.

Sect. 42. All pure cognitions of the understanding have this feature, that their concepts present themselves in experience, and their principles can be confirmed by it; whereas the transcendent cognitions of reason cannot, either as ideas, appear in experience, -or as propositions ever be confirmed or refuted by it. Hence whatever errors may slip in unawares, can only be discovered by pure reason itself-a discovery of much difficulty, because this very reason naturally becomes dialectical by means of its ideas, and this unavoidable illusion cannot be limited by any objective and dogmatical researches into things, but by a subjective investigation of reason itself as a source of ideas.

Sect. 43. In the Critique of Pure Reason it was always my greatest care to endeavor not only carefully to distinguish the several species of cognition, but to derive concepts belonging to each one of them from their common source. I did this in order that by knowing whence they originated, I might determine their use with safety, and also have the unanticipated but invaluable advantage of knowing the completeness of my enumeration, classification and specification of concepts a priori, and therefore according to principles. Without this, metaphysics is

mere rhapsody, in which no one knows whether he has enough, or whether and where something is still wanting. We can indeed have this advantage only in pure philosophy, but of this philosophy it constitutes the very essence.

As I had found the origin of the categories in the four logical functions of all the judgments of the understanding, it was quite natural to seek the origin of the ideas in the three functions of the syllogisms of reason. For as soon as these pure concepts of reason (the transcendental ideas) are given, they could hardly, except they be held innate, be found anywhere else, than in the same activity of reason, which, so far as it regards mere form, constitutes the logical element of the syllogisms of reason; but, so far as it represents judgments of the understanding with respect to the one or to the other form a priori, constitutes transcendental concepts of pure reason.

The formal distinction of syllogisms renders their division into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive necessary. The concepts of reason founded on them contained therefore, first, the idea of the complete subject (the substantial); secondly, the idea of the complete series of conditions; thirdly, the determination of all concepts in the idea of a complete complex of that which is possible.26 The first idea is psychological, the second cosmological, the third theological, and, as all three give occasion to Dialectics, yet each in its own way, the division of the whole Dialects of pure reason into its Paralogism, its Antinomy, and its Ideal, was arranged accordingly. Through this deduction we may feel assured that all the claims of pure reason are completely represented, and that none can be wanting; because the faculty of reason itself, whence they all take their origin, is thereby completely surveyed.

Sect. 44. In these general considerations it is also remarkable that the ideas of reason are unlike the categories, of no service to the use of our understanding in experience, but quite dispensable, and become even an impediment to the maxims of a rational cognition of nature. Yet in another aspect still to be determined they are necessary. Whether the soul is or is not a simple substance, is of no consequence to us in the explanation of its phenomena. For we cannot render the notion of a simple being intelligible by any possible experience that is sensuous or concrete. The notion is therefore quite void as regards all hoped-for insight into the cause of phenomena, and cannot at all serve as a principle of the explanation of that which internal or external experience supplies. So the cosmological ideas of the beginning of the world or of its eternity (a parte ante) cannot be of any greater service to us for the explanation of any event in the world itself. And finally we must, according to a right maxim of the philosophy of nature, refrain from all explanations of the design of nature, drawn from the will of a Supreme Being; because this would not be natural philosophy, but an acknowledgment that we have come to the end of it. The use of these ideas, therefore, is quite different from that of those categories by which (and by the principles built upon which) experience itself first becomes possible. But our laborious analytics of the understanding would be superfluous if we had nothing else in view than the mere cognition Of nature as it can be given in experience; for reason does its work, both in mathematics and in the science of nature, quite safely and well without any of this subtle deduction. Therefore our Critique of

the Understanding combines with the ideas of pure reason for a purpose which lies beyond the empirical use of the understanding; but this we have above declared to be in this aspect totally inadmissible, and without any object or meaning. Yet there must be a harmony between that of the nature of reason and that of the understanding, and the former must contribute to the perfection of the latter, and cannot possibly upset it.

The solution of this question is as follows: Pure reason does not in its ideas point to particular objects, which lie beyond the field of experience, but only requires completeness of the use of the understanding in the system of experience. But this completeness can be a completeness of principles only, not of intuitions [i.e., concrete atsights or Anschauungen] and of objects. In order however to represent the ideas definitely, reason conceives them after the fashion of the cognition of an object. The cognition is as far as these rules are concerned completely determined, but the object is only an idea invented for the purpose of bringing the cognition of the understanding as near as possible to the completeness represented by that idea.

Prefatory Remark to the Dialectics of Pure Reason.

Sect. 45. We have above shown in Sect. Sect. 33 and 34 that the purity of the categories from all admixture of sensuous determinations may mislead reason into extending their use, quite beyond all experience, to things in themselves; though as these categories themselves find no intuition which can give them meaning or sense in concrete, they, as mere logical functions, can represent a thing in general, but not give by themselves alone a determinate concept of anything. Such hyperbolical objects are distinguished by the appellation of Noumena, or pure beings of the understanding (or better, beings of thought), such as, for example, "substance," but conceived without permanence in time, or "cause," but not acting in time, etc. Here predicates, that only serve to make the conformity-to-law of experience possible, are applied to these concepts, and yet they are deprived of all the conditions of intuition, on which alone experience is possible, and so these concepts lose all significance.

There is no danger, however, of the understanding spontaneously making an excursion so very wantonly beyond its own bounds into the field of the mere creatures of thought, without being impelled by foreign laws. But when reason, which cannot be fully satisfied with any empirical use of the rules of the understanding, as being always conditioned, requires a completion of this chain of conditions, then the understanding is forced out of its sphere. And then it partly represents objects of experience in a series so extended that no experience can grasp, partly even (with a view to complete the series) it seeks entirely beyond it noumena, to which it can attach that chain, and so, having at last escaped from the conditions of experience, make its attitude as it were final. These are then the transcendental ideas, which, though according to the true but hidden ends of the natural determination of our reason, they may aim not at extravagant concepts, but at an unbounded extension of their empirical use, yet seduce the understanding by an unavoidable illusion to a transcendent use, which, though deceitful, cannot be restrained within the bounds of experience by any resolution, but only by scientific instruction and with

much difficulty.

!. The Psychological Idea.27

Sect. 46. People have long since observed, that in all substances the proper subject, that which remains after all the accidents (as predicates) are abstracted, consequently that which forms the substance of things remains unknown, and various complaints have been made concerning these limits to our knowledge. But it will be well to consider that the human understanding is not to be blamed for its inability to know the substance of things, that is, to determine it by itself, but rather for requiring to know it which is a mere idea definitely as though it were a given object. Pure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a thing its proper subject, and for this subject, which is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate, its subject, and so on indefinitely (or as far as we can reach). But hence it follows, that we must not hold anything, at which we can arrive, to be an ultimate subject, and that substance itself never can be thought by our understanding, however deep we may penetrate, even if all nature were unveiled to us. For the specific nature of our understanding consists in thinking everything discursively, that is, representing it by concepts, and so by mere predicates, to which therefore the absolute subject must always be wanting. Hence all the real properties, by which we know bodies, are mere accidents, not excepting impenetrability, which we can only represent to ourselves as the effect of a power of which the subject is unknown to us.

Now we appear to have this substance in the consciousness of ourselves (in the thinking subject), and indeed in an immediate intuition; for all the predicates of an internal sense refer to the ego, as a subject, and I cannot conceive myself as the predicate of any other subject. Hence completeness in the reference of the given concepts as predicates to a subject -- not merely an idea, but an object-that is, the absolute subject itself, seems to be given in experience. But this expectation is disappointed. For the ego is not a concept,28 but only the indication of the object of the internal sense, so far as we know it by no further predicate. Consequently it cannot be in itself a predicate of any other thing; but just as little can it be a determinate concept of an absolute subject, but is, as in all other cases, only the reference of the internal phenomena to their unknown subject. Yet this idea (which serves very well, as a regulative principle, totally to destroy all materialistic explanations of the internal phenomena of the soul) occasions by a very natural misunderstanding a very specious argument, which, from this supposed cognition of the substance of our thinking being, infers its nature, so far as the knowledge of it falls quite without the complex of experience.

Sect. 47. But though we may call this thinking self (the soul) substance, as being the ultimate subject of thinking which cannot be further represented as the predicate of another thing; it remains quite empty and without significance, if permanence- the quality which renders the concept of substances in experience fruitful-cannot be proved of it.

But permanence can never be proved of the concept of a substance, as a thing in itself, but for the purposes of experience only. This is sufficiently shown by the first Analogy

of Experience,29 and whoever will not yield to this proof may try for himself whether he can succeed in proving, from the concept of a subject which does not exist itself as the predicate of another thing, that its existence is thoroughly permanent, and that it cannot either in itself or by any natural cause original or be annihilated. These synthetical a priori propositions can never be proved in themselves, but only in reference to things as objects of possible experience.

Sect. 48. If therefore from the concept of the soul as a substance, we would infer its permanence, this can hold good as regards possible experience only, not [of the soul] as a thing in itself and beyond all possible experience. But life is the subjective condition of all our possible experience, consequently we can only infer the permanence of the soul in life; for the death of man is the end of all experience which concerns the soul as an object of experience, except the contrary be proved, which is the very question in hand. The permanence of the soul can therefore only be proved (and no one cares for that) during the life of man, but not, as we desire to do, after death; and for this general reason, that the concept of substance, so far as it is to be considered necessarily combined with the concept of permanence, can be so combined only according to the principles of possible experience, and therefore for the purposes of experience only.30

Sect. 49. That there is something real without us which not only corresponds, but must correspond, to our external perceptions, can likewise be proved to be not a connection of things in themselves, but for the sake of experience. This means that there is something empirical, i.e., some phenomenon in space without us, that admits of a satisfactory proof, for we have nothing to do with other objects than those which belong to possible experience; because objects which cannot be given us in any experience, do not exist for us. Empirically without me is that which appears in space, and space, together with all the phenomena which it contains, belongs to the representations, whose connection according to laws of experience proves their objective truth, just as the connection of the phenomena of the internal sense proves the actuality of my soul (as an object of the internal sense). By means of external experience I am conscious of the actuality of bodies, as external phenomena in space, in the same manner as by means of the internal experience I am conscious of the existence of my soul in time, but this soul is only known as an object of the internal sense by phenomena that constitute an internal state, and of which the essence in itself, which forms the basis of these phenomena, is unknown. Cartesian idealism therefore does nothing but distinguish external experience from dreaming; and the conformity to law (as a criterion of its truth) of the former, from the irregularity and the false illusion of the latter. In both it presupposes space and time as conditions of the existence of objects, and it only inquires whether the objects of the external senses, which we when awake put in space, are as actually to be found in it, as the object of the internal sense, the soul, is in time; that is, whether experience carries with it sure criteria to distinguish it from imagination. This doubt, however, may easily be disposed of, and we always do so in common life by investigating the connection of phenomena in both space and time according to universal laws of experience, and we cannot doubt, when the representation of external things throughout agrees therewith,

that they constitute truthful experience. Material idealism, in which phenomena are considered as such only according to their connection in experience, may accordingly be very easily refuted; and it is just as sure an experience, that bodies exist without us (in space), as that I myself exist according to the representation of the internal sense (in time): for the notion without us, only signifies existence in space. However as the Ego in the proposition, III am," means not only the object of internal intuition (in time), but the subject of consciousness, just as body means not only external intuition (in space), but the thing-in-itself, which is the basis of this phenomenon; [as this is the case] the question, whether bodies (as phenomena of the external sense) exist as bodies apart from my thoughts, may without any hesitation be denied in nature. But the question, whether I myself as a phenomenon of the internal sense (the soul according to empirical psychology) exist apart from my faculty of representation in time, is an exactly similar inquiry, and must likewise be answered in the negative. Arid in this manner everything, when it is reduced to its true meaning, is decided and certain. The formal (which I have also called transcendental) actually abolishes the material, or Cartesian, idealism. For if space be nothing but a form of my sensibility, it is as a representation in me just as actual as I myself am, and nothing but the empirical truth of the representations in it remains for consideration. But, if this is not the case, if space and the phenomena in it are something existing without us, then all the criteria of experience beyond our perception can never prove the actuality of these objects without us.

II. The Cosmological Idea.31

Sect. 50. This product of pure reason in its transcendent use is its most remarkable curiosity. It serves as a very powerful agent to rouse philosophy from its dogmatic slumber, and to stimulate it to the arduous task of undertaking a Critique of Reason itself.

I term this idea cosmological, because it always takes its object only from the sensible world, and does not use any other than those whose object is given to sense, consequently it remains in this respect in its native home, it does not become transcendent, and is therefore so far not mere idea; whereas, to conceive the soul as a simple substance, -already means to conceive such an object (the simple) as cannot be presented to the senses. Yet the cosmological idea extends the connection of the conditioned with its condition (whether the connection is mathematical or dynamical) so far, that experience never can keep up with it. It is therefore with regard to this point always an idea, whose object never can be adequately given in any experience.

Sect. 51. In the first place, the use of a system of categories becomes here so obvious and unmistakable, that even if there were not several other proofs of it, this alone would sufficiently prove it indispensable in the system of pure reason. There are only four such transcendent ideas, as there are so many classes of categories; in each of which, however, they refer only to the absolute completeness of the series of the conditions for a given conditioned. In analogy to these cosmological ideas there are only four kinds of dialectical assertions of pure reason, which, as they are dialectical, thereby prove, that to each of

them, oii equally specious principles of pure reason, a contradictory assertion stands opposed. As all the metaphysical art of the most subtle distinction cannot prevent this opposition, it compels the philosopher to recur to the first sources of pure reason itself. This Antinomy, not arbitrarily invented, but founded in the nature of human reason, and hence unavoidable and never ceasing, contains the following four theses together with their antitheses:

1.

Thesis: The World has, as to, Time and Space, a Beginning (limit).
Antithesis: The World is, as to Time and Space, infinite.

2.

Thesis: Everything in the World consists of [elements that are] simple.
Antithesis: There is nothing simple, but everything is composite.

3.

Thesis: There are in the World Causes through Freedom.
Antithesis: There is no Liberty, but all is Nature.

4.

Thesis: In the Series of the World-Causes there is some necessary Being.
Antithesis: There is Nothing necessary in the World, but in this Series All is incidental.

Sect. 52. a. Here is the most singular phenomenon of human reason, no other instance of which can be shown in any other use. If we, as is commonly done, represent to ourselves the appearances of the sensible world as things in themselves, if we assume the principles of their combination as principles universally valid of things in themselves and not merely of experience, as is usually, nay without our Critique, unavoidably done, there arises an unexpected conflict, which never can be removed in the common dogmatical way; because the thesis, as well as the antithesis, can be shown by equally clear, evident, and irresistible proofs-for I pledge myself as to the correctness of all these proofs-and reason therefore perceives that it is divided with itself, a state at which the skeptic rejoices, but which must make the critical philosopher pause and feel ill at ease.

Sect. 52. b. We may blunder in various ways in metaphysics without any fear of being detected in falsehood. For we never can be refuted by experience if we but avoid self-contradiction, which in synthetical, though purely fictitious propositions, may be done whenever the concepts, which we connect, are mere ideas, that cannot be given (in their whole content) in experience. For how can we make out by experience, whether the world is from eternity or had a beginning, whether matter is infinitely divisible or consists of simple parts? Such concept cannot be given in any experience, be it ever so extensive, and consequently the falsehood either of the positive or the negative proposition cannot be discovered by this touchstone.

The only possible way in which reason could have revealed unintentionally its secret Dialectics, falsely announced as Dogmatics, would be when it were made to ground an assertion upon a universally admitted principle, and to deduce the exact contrary with the greatest accuracy of inference from another

which is equally granted. This is actually here the case with regard to four natural ideas of reason, whence four assertions on the one side, and as many counter-assertions on the other arise, each consistently following from universally-acknowledged principles. Thus they reveal by the use of these principles the dialectical illusion of pure reason which would otherwise forever remain concealed.

This is therefore a decisive experiment, which must necessarily expose any error lying hidden in the assumptions of reason.32 Contradictory propositions cannot both be false, except the concept, which is the subject of both, is self-contradictory; for example, the propositions, "a square circle is round, and a square circle is not round," are both false. For, as to the former it is false, that the circle is round, because it is quadrangular; and it is likewise false, that it is not round, that is, angular, because it is a circle. For the logical criterion of the impossibility of a concept consists in this, that if we presuppose it, two contradictory propositions both become false; consequently, as no middle between them is conceivable, nothing at all is thought by that concept.

Sect. 52. c. The first two antinomies, which I call mathematical, because they are concerned with the addition or division of the homogeneous, are founded on such a self-contradictory concept; and hence I explain how it happens, that both the Thesis and Antithesis of the two are false.

When I speak of objects in time and in space, it is not of things in themselves, of which I know nothing, but of things in appearance, that is, of experience, as the particular way of cognising objects which is afforded to man. I must not say of what I think in time or in space, that in itself, and independent of these my thoughts, it exists in space and in time; for in that case I should contradict myself; because space and time, together with the appearances in them, are nothing existing in themselves and outside of my representations, but are themselves only modes of representation, and it is palpably contradictory to say, that a mere mode of representation exists without our representation. Objects of the senses therefore exist only in experience; whereas to give them a self-subsisting existence apart from experience or before it, is merely to represent to ourselves that experience actually exists apart from experience or before it.

Now if I inquire after the quantity of the world, as to space and time, it is equally impossible, as regards all my notions, to declare it infinite or to declare it finite. For neither assertion can be contained in experience, because experience either of an infinite space, or of an infinite time elapsed, or again, of the boundary of the world by a void space, or by an antecedent void time, is impossible; these are mere ideas. This quantity of the world, which is determined in either way, should therefore exist in the world itself apart from all experience. This contradicts the notion of a world of sense, which is merely a complex of the appearances whose existence and connection occur only in our representations, that is, in experience, since this latter is not an object in itself, but a mere mode of representation. Hence it follows, that as the concept of an absolutely existing world of sense is self-contradictory, the solution of the problem concerning its quantity, whether attempted affirmatively or negatively, is

always false.

The same holds good of the second antinomy, which relates to the division of phenomena. For these are mere representations, and the parts exist merely in their representation, consequently in the division, or in a possible experience where they are given, and the division reaches only as far as this latter reaches. To assume that an appearance, e.g., that of body, contains in itself before all experience all the parts, which any possible experience can ever reach, is to impute to a mere appearance, which can exist only in experience, an existence previous to experience. In other words, it would mean that mere representations exist before they can be found in our faculty of representation. Such an assertion is self-contradictory, as also every solution of our misunderstood problem, whether we maintain, that bodies in themselves consist of an infinite number of parts, or of a finite number of simple parts.

Sect. 53. In the first (the mathematical) class of antinomies the falsehood of the assumption consists in representing in one concept something self-contradictory as if it were compatible (i.e., an appearance as an object in itself). But, as to the second (the dynamical) class of antinomies, the falsehood of the representation consists in representing as contradictory what is compatible; so that, as in the former case, the opposed assertions are both false, in this case, on the other hand, where they are opposed to one another by mere misunderstanding, they may both be true.

Any mathematical connection necessarily presupposes homogeneity of what is connected (in the concept of magnitude), while the dynamical one by no means requires the same. When we have to deal with extended magnitudes, all the parts must be homogeneous with one another and with the whole; whereas, in the connection of cause and effect, homogeneity may indeed likewise be found, but is not necessary; for the concept of causality (by means of which something is posited through something else quite different from it), at all events, does not require it.

If the objects of the world of sense are taken for things in themselves, and the above laws of nature for the laws of things in themselves, the contradiction would be unavoidable. So also, if the subject of freedom were, like other objects, represented as mere appearance, the contradiction would be just as unavoidable, for the same predicate would at once be affirmed and denied of the same kind of object in the same sense. But if natural necessity is referred merely to appearances, and freedom merely to things in themselves, no contradiction arises, if we at once assume, or admit both kinds of causality, however difficult or impossible it may be to make the latter kind conceivable.

As appearance every effect is an event, or something that happens in time; it must, according to the universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the causality of its cause (a state), which follows according to a constant law. But this determination of the cause as causality must likewise be something that takes place or happens; the cause must have begun to act, otherwise no succession between it and the effect could be conceived. Otherwise the effect, as well as the causality of the cause, would have always existed. Therefore the determination of the cause to act must also have originated among appearances,

and must consequently, as well as its effect, be an event, which must again have its cause, and so on; hence natural necessity must be the condition, on which effective causes are determined. Whereas if freedom is to be a property of certain causes of appearances, it must, as regards these, which are events, be a faculty of starting them spontaneously, that is, without the causality of the cause itself, and hence without requiring any other ground to determine its start. But then the cause, as to its causality, must not rank under time-determinations of its state, that is, it cannot be an appearance, and must be considered a thing in itself, while its effects would be only appearances.33 If without contradiction we can think of the beings of understanding [Verstandeswesen] as exercising such an influence on appearances, then natural necessity will attach to all connections of cause and effect in the .sensuous world, though on the other hand, freedom can be granted to such cause, as is itself not an appearance (but the foundation of appearance). Nature therefore and freedom can without contradiction be attributed to the very same thing, but in different relations-on one side as a phenomenon, on the other as a thing in itself.

We have in us a faculty, which not only stands in connection with its subjective determining grounds that are the natural causes of its actions, and is so far the faculty of a being that itself belongs to appearances, but is also referred to objective grounds, that are only ideas, so far as they can determine this faculty, a connection which is expressed by the word ought. This faculty is called reason, and, so far as we consider a being (man) entirely according to this objectively determinable reason, he cannot be considered as a being of sense, but this property is that of a thing in itself, of which we cannot comprehend the possibility-I mean how the ought (which however has never yet taken place) should determine its activity, and can become the cause of actions, whose effect is an appearance in the sensible world. Yet the causality of reason would be freedom with regard to the effects in the sensuous world, so far as we can consider objective grounds, which are themselves ideas, as their determinants. For its action in that case would not depend upon subjective conditions, consequently not upon those of time, and of course not upon the law of nature, which serves to determine them, because grounds of reason give to actions the rule universally, according to principles, without the influence of the circumstances of either time or place.

What I adduce here is merely meant as an example to make the thing intelligible, and does not necessarily belong to our problem, which must be decided from mere concepts, independently of the properties which we meet in the actual world.

Now I may say without contradiction: that all the actions of rational beings, so far as they are appearances (occurring in any experience), are subject to the necessity of nature; but the same actions, as regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting according to mere reason, are free. For what is required for the necessity of nature? Nothing more than the determinability of every event in the world of sense according to constant laws, that is, a reference to cause in the appearance; in this process the thing in itself at its foundation and its causality remain unknown. But I say, that the law of nature remains, whether the rational being is the cause of the effects

in the sensuous world from reason, that is, through freedom, or whether it does not determine them on grounds of reason. For, if the former is the case, the action is performed according to maxims, the effect of which as appearance is always conformable to constant laws; if the latter is the case, and the action not performed on principles of reason, it is subjected to the empirical laws of the sensibility, and in both cases the effects are connected according to constant laws; more than this we do not require or know concerning natural necessity. But in the former case reason is the cause of these laws of nature, and therefore free; in the latter the effects follow according to mere natural laws of sensibility, because reason does not influence it; but reason itself is not determined on that account by the sensibility, and is therefore free in this case too. Freedom is therefore no hindrance to natural law in appearance, neither does this law abrogate the freedom of the practical use of reason, which is connected with things in themselves, as determining grounds.

Thus practical freedom, viz., the freedom in which reason possesses causality according to objectively determining grounds, is rescued and yet natural necessity is not in the least curtailed with regard to the very same effects, as appearances. The same remarks will serve to explain what we had to say concerning transcendental freedom and its compatibility with natural necessity (in the same subject, but not taken in the same reference). For, as to this, every beginning of the action of a being from objective causes regarded as determining grounds, is always a first start, though the same action is in the series of appearances only a subordinate start, which must be preceded by a state of the cause, which determines it, and is itself determined in the same manner by another immediately preceding. Thus we are able, in rational beings, or in beings generally, so far as their causality is determined in them as things in themselves, to imagine a faculty of beginning from itself a series of states, without falling into contradiction with the laws of nature. For the relation of the action to objective grounds of reason is not a time-relation; in this case that which determines the causality does not precede in time the action, because such determining grounds represent not a reference to objects of sense, e.g., to causes in the appearances, but to determining causes, as things in themselves, which do not rank under conditions of time. And in this way the action, with regard to the causality of reason, can be considered as a first start in respect to the series of appearances, and yet also as a merely subordinate beginning. We may therefore without contradiction consider it in the former aspect as free, but in the latter (in so far as it is merely appearance) as subject to natural necessity.

As to the fourth Antinomy, it is solved in the same way as the conflict of reason with itself in the third. For, provided the cause in the appearance is distinguished from the cause of the appearance (so far as it can be thought as a thing in itself), both propositions are perfectly reconcilable: the one, that there is nowhere in the sensuous world a cause (according to similar laws of causality), whose existence is absolutely necessary; the other, that this world is nevertheless connected with a Necessary Being as its cause (but of another kind and according to another law). The incompatibility of these propositions entirely rests upon the mistake of extending what is valid merely of appearances to things in themselves, and in

general confusing both in one concept.

Sect. 54. This then is the proposition and this the solution of the whole antinomy, in which reason finds itself involved in the application of its principles to the sensible world. The former alone (the mere proposition) would be a considerable service in the cause of our knowledge of human reason, even though the solution might fail to fully satisfy the reader, who has here to combat a natural illusion, which has been but recently exposed to him, and which he had hitherto always regarded as genuine. For one result at least is unavoidable. As it is quite impossible to prevent this conflict of reason with itself-so long as the objects of the sensible world are taken for things in themselves, and not for mere appearances, which they are in fact-the reader is thereby compelled to examine over again the deduction of all our a priori cognition and the proof which I have given of my deduction in order to come to a decision on the question. This is all I require at present; for when in this occupation he shall have thought himself deep enough into the nature of pure reason, those concepts by which alone the solution of the conflict of reason is possible, will become sufficiently familiar to him. Without this preparation I cannot expect an unreserved assent even from the most attentive reader.

III. The Theological Idea.34

Sect. 55. The third transcendental Idea, which affords matter for the most important, but, if pursued only speculatively, transcendent and thereby dialectical use of reason, is the ideal of pure reason. Reason in this case does not, as with the psychological and the cosmological Ideas, begin from experience, and err by exaggerating its grounds, in striving to attain, if possible, the absolute completeness of their series. It rather totally breaks with experience, and from mere concepts of what constitutes the absolute completeness of a thing in general, consequently by means of the idea of a most perfect primal Being, it proceeds to determine the possibility and therefore the actuality of all other things. And so the mere presupposition of a Being, who is conceived not in the series of experience, yet for the purposes of experience-for the sake of comprehending its connection, order, and unity -i.e., the idea [the notion of it], is more easily distinguished from the concept of the understanding here, than in the former cases. Hence we can easily expose the dialectical illusion which arises from our making the subjective conditions of our thinking objective conditions of objects themselves, and an hypothesis necessary for the satisfaction of our reason, a dogma. As the observations of the Critique on the pretensions of transcendental theology are intelligible, clear, and decisive, I have nothing more to add on the subject.

General Remark on the Transcendental Ideas.

Sect. 56. The objects, which are given us by experience, are in many respects incomprehensible, and many questions, to which the law of nature leads us, when carried beyond a certain point (though quite conformably to the laws of nature), admit of no answer; as for example the question: why substances attract one another? But if we entirely quit nature, or in pursuing its combinations, exceed all possible experience, and so enter the

realm of mere ideas, we cannot then say that the object is incomprehensible, and that the nature of things proposes to us insoluble problems. For we are not then concerned with nature or in general with given objects, but with concepts, which have their origin merely in our reason, and with mere creations of thought; and all the problems that arise from our notions of them must be solved, because of course reason can and must give a full account of its own procedure.35 As the psychological, cosmological, and theological Ideas are nothing but pure concepts of reason, which cannot be given in any experience, the questions which reason asks us about them are put to us not by the objects, but by mere maxims of our reason for the sake of its own satisfaction. They must all be capable of satisfactory answers, which is done by showing that they are principles which bring our use of the understanding into thorough agreement, completeness, and synthetical unity, and that they so far hold good of experience only, but of experience as a whole.

Although an absolute whole of experience is impossible, the idea of a whole of cognition according to principles must impart to our knowledge a peculiar kind of unity, that of a system, without which it is nothing but piecework, and cannot be used for proving the existence of a highest purpose (which can only be the general system of all purposes), I do not here refer only to the practical, but also to the highest purpose of the speculative use of reason.

The transcendental Ideas therefore express the peculiar application of reason as a principle of systematic unity in the use of the understanding. Yet if we assume this unity of the mode of cognition to be attached to the object of cognition, if we regard that which is merely regulative to be constitutive, and if we persuade ourselves that we can by means of these Ideas enlarge our cognition transcendently, or far beyond all possible experience, while it only serves to render experience within itself as nearly complete as possible, i.e., to limit its progress by nothing that cannot belong to experience: we suffer from a mere misunderstanding in our estimate of the proper application of our reason and of its principles, and from a Dialectic, which both confuses the empirical use of reason, and also sets reason at variance with itself.

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CONCLUSION:
ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE BOUNDS OF PURE REASON.

Sect. 57. Having adduced the clearest arguments, it would be absurd for us to hope that we can know more of any object, than belongs to the possible experience of it, or lay claim to the least atom of knowledge about anything not assumed to be an object of possible experience, which would determine it according to the constitution it has in itself. For how could we determine anything in this way, since time, space, and the categories, and still more all the concepts formed by empirical experience or perception in the sensible world [Anschauung], have and can have no other use, than to make experience possible. And if this condition is omitted from the pure concepts of the understanding, they do not determine any object, and have no meaning whatever.

But it would be on the other hand a still greater absurdity

if we conceded no things in themselves, or set up our experience for the only possible mode of knowing things, our way of beholding [Anschauung] them in space and in time for the only possible way, and our discursive understanding for the archetype of every possible understanding; in fact if we wished to have the principles of the possibility of experience considered universal conditions of things in themselves.

Our principles, which limit the use of reason to possible experience, might in this way become transcendent, and the limits of our reason be set up as limits of the possibility of things in themselves (as Hume's dialogues may illustrate), if a careful critique did not guard the bounds of our reason with respect to its empirical use, and set a limit to its pretensions. Skepticism originally arose from metaphysics and its licentious dialectics. At first it might, merely to favor the empirical use of reason, announce everything that transcends this use as worthless and deceitful; but by and by, when it was perceived that the very same principles that are used in experience, insensibly, and apparently with the same right, led still further than experience extends, then men began to doubt even the propositions of experience. But here there is no danger; for common sense will doubtless always assert its rights. A certain confusion, however, arose in science which cannot determine how far reason is to be trusted, and why only so far and no further, and this confusion can only be cleared up and all future relapses obviated by a formal determination, on principle, of the boundary of the use of our reason.

We cannot indeed, beyond all possible experience, form a definite notion of what things in themselves may be. Yet we are not at liberty to abstain entirely from inquiring into them; for experience never satisfies reason fully, but in answering questions, refers us further and further back, and leaves us dissatisfied with regard to their complete solution. This any one may gather from the Dialectics of pure reason, which therefore has its good subjective grounds. Having acquired, as regards the nature of our soul, a clear conception of the subject, and having come to the conviction, that its manifestations cannot be explained materialistically, who can refrain from asking what the soul really is, and, if no concept of experience suffices for the purpose, from accounting for it by a concept of reason (that of a simple immaterial being), though we cannot by any means prove its objective reality? Who can satisfy himself with mere empirical knowledge in all the cosmological questions of the duration and of the quantity of the world, of freedom or of natural necessity, since every answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, which likewise requires its answer and thereby clearly shows the insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to satisfy reason? Finally, who does not see in the thoroughgoing contingency and dependence of all his thoughts and assumptions on mere principles of experience, the impossibility of stopping there? And who does not feel himself compelled, notwithstanding all interdictions against losing himself in transcendent ideas, to seek rest and contentment beyond all the concepts which he can vindicate by experience, in the concept of a Being, the possibility of which we cannot conceive, but at the same time cannot be refuted, because it relates to a mere being of the understanding, and without it reason must needs remain forever dissatisfied?

Bounds (in extended beings) always presuppose a space existing outside a certain definite place, and enclosing it; limits do not require this, but are mere negations, which affect a quantity, so far as it is not absolutely complete. But our reason, as it were, sees in its surroundings a space for the cognition of things in themselves, though we can never have definite notions of them, and are limited to appearances only.

As long as the cognition of reason is homogeneous, definite bounds to it are inconceivable. In mathematics and in natural philosophy human reason admits of limits but not of bounds, viz., that something indeed lies without it, at which it can never arrive, but not that it will at any point find completion in its internal progress. The enlarging of our views in mathematics, and the possibility of new discoveries, are infinite; and the same is the case with the discovery of new properties of nature, of new powers and laws, by continued experience and its rational combination. But limits cannot be mistaken here, for mathematics refers to appearances only, and what cannot be an object of sensuous contemplation, such as the concepts of metaphysics and of morals, lies entirely without its sphere, and it can never lead to them; neither does it require them. It is therefore not a continual progress and an approximation towards these sciences, and there is not, as it were, any point or line of contact. Natural science will never reveal to us the internal constitution of things, which though not appearance, yet can serve as the ultimate ground of explaining appearance. Nor does that science require this for its physical explanations. Nay even if such grounds should be offered from other sources (for instance, the influence of immaterial beings), they must be rejected and not used in the progress of its explanations. For these explanations must only be grounded upon that which as an object of sense can belong to experience, and be brought into connection with our actual perceptions and empirical laws.

But metaphysics leads us towards bounds in the dialectical attempts of pure reason (not undertaken arbitrarily or wantonly, but stimulated thereto by the nature of reason itself). And the transcendental Ideas, as they do not admit of evasion, and are never capable of realization, serve to point out to us actually not only the bounds of the pure use of reason, but also the way to determine them. Such is the end and the use of this natural predisposition of our reason, which has brought forth metaphysics as its favorite child, whose generation, like every other in the world, is not to be ascribed to blind chance, but to an original germ, wisely organized for great ends. For metaphysics, in its fundamental features, perhaps more than any other science, is placed in us by nature itself, and cannot be considered the production of an arbitrary choice or a casual enlargement in the progress of experience from which it is quite disparate.

Reason with all its concepts and laws of the understanding, which suffice for empirical use, i.e., within the sensible world, finds in itself no satisfaction because ever-recurring questions deprive us of all hope of their complete solution. The transcendental ideas, which have that completion in view, are such problems of reason. But it sees clearly, that the sensuous world cannot contain this completion, neither consequently can all the concepts, which serve merely for understanding the world of sense, such as space and time, and whatever we have adduced under the name of pure concepts of the understanding. The

sensuous world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected according to universal laws; it has therefore no subsistence by itself; it is not the thing in itself, and consequently must point to that which contains the basis of this experience, to beings which cannot be known merely as phenomena, but as things in themselves. In the cognition of them alone reason can hope to satisfy its desire of completeness in proceeding from the conditioned to its conditions.

We have above (Sects. 33, 34) indicated the limits of reason with regard to all cognition of mere creations of thought. Now, since the transcendental ideas have urged us to approach them, and thus have led us, as it were, to the spot where the occupied space (viz., experience) touches the void (that of which we can know nothing, viz., noumena), we can determine the bounds of pure reason. For in all bounds there is something positive (e.g., a surface is the boundary of corporeal space, and is therefore itself a space, a line is a space, which is the boundary of the surface, a point the boundary of the line, but yet always a place in space), whereas limits contain mere negations. The limits pointed out in those paragraphs are not enough after we have discovered that beyond them there still lies something (though we can never know what it is in itself). For the question now is, What is the attitude of our reason in this connection of what we know with what we do not, and never shall, know? This is an actual connection of a known thing with one quite unknown (and which will always remain so), and though what is unknown should not become the least more known-which we cannot even hope-yet the notion of this connection must be definite, and capable of being rendered distinct.

We must therefore accept an immaterial being, a world of understanding, and a Supreme Being (all mere noumena), because in them only, as things in themselves, reason finds that completion and satisfaction, which it can never hope for in the derivation of appearances from their homogeneous grounds, and because these actually have reference to something distinct from them (and totally heterogeneous), as appearances always presuppose an object in itself, and therefore suggest its existence whether we can know more of it or not.

But as we can never know these beings of understanding as they are in themselves, that is, definitely, yet must assume them as regards the sensible world, and connect them with it by reason, we are at least able to think this connection by means of such concepts as express their relation to the world of sense. Yet if we represent to ourselves a being of the understanding by nothing but pure concepts of the understanding, we then indeed represent nothing definite to ourselves, consequently our concept has no significance; but if we think it by properties borrowed from the sensuous world, it is no longer a being of understanding, but is conceived as an appearance, and belongs to the sensible world. Let us take an instance from the notion of the Supreme Being.

Our deistic conception is quite a pure concept of reason, but represents only a thing containing all realities, without being able to determine any one of them; because for that purpose an example must be taken from the world of sense, in which case we should have an object of sense only, not something quite heterogeneous, which can never be an object of sense. Suppose I

attribute to the Supreme Being understanding, for instance; I have no concept of an understanding other than my own, one that must receive its perceptions [Anschauung] by the senses, and which is occupied in bringing them under rules of the unity of consciousness. Then the elements of my concept would always lie in the appearance; I should however by the insufficiency of the appearance be necessitated to go beyond them to the concept of a being which neither depends upon appearance, nor is bound up with them as conditions of its determination. But if I separate understanding from sensibility to obtain a pure understanding, then nothing remains but the mere form of thinking without perception [Anschauung], by which form alone I can know nothing definite, and consequently no object. For that purpose I should conceive another understanding, such as would directly perceive its objects,36 but of which I have not the least notion; because the human understanding is discursive, and can [not directly perceive, it can] only know by means of general concepts. And the very same difficulties arise if we attribute a will to the Supreme Being; for we have this concept only by drawing it from our internal experience, and therefore from our dependence for satisfaction upon objects whose existence we require; and so the notion rests upon sensibility, which is absolutely incompatible with the pure concept of the Supreme Being.

Hume's objections to deism are weak, and affect only the proofs, and not the deistic assertion itself. But as regards theism, which depends on a stricter determination of the concept of the Supreme Being which in deism is merely transcendent, they are very strong, and as this concept is formed, in certain (in fact in all common) cases irrefutable. Hume always insists, that by the mere concept of an original being, to which we apply only ontological predicates (eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence), we think nothing definite, and that properties which can yield a concept in concrete must be superadded; that it is not enough to say, it is Cause, but we must explain the nature of its causality, for example, that of an understanding and of a will. He then begins his attacks on the essential point itself, i.e., theism, as he; had previously directed his battery only against the proofs of deism, an attack which is not very dangerous to it in its consequences. All his dangerous arguments refer to anthropomorphism, which he holds to be inseparable from theism, and to make it absurd in itself; but if the former be abandoned, the latter must vanish with it, and nothing remain but deism, of which nothing can come, which is of no value, and which cannot serve as any foundation to religion or morals. If this anthropomorphism were really unavoidable, no proofs whatever of the existence of a Supreme Being, even were they all granted, could determine for us the concept of this Being without involving us in contradictions.

If we connect with the command to avoid all transcendent judgments of pure reason, the command (which apparently conflicts with it) to proceed to concepts that lie beyond the field of its immanent (empirical) use, we discover that both can subsist together, but only at the boundary of all lawful use of reason. For this boundary belongs as well to the field of experience, as to that of the creations of thought, and we are thereby taught, as well, bow these so remarkable ideas serve merely for marking the bounds of human reason. On the one hand they give warning not boundlessly to extend cognition of experience, as if nothing but world37 I remained for us to know, and yet, on the other hand,

not to transgress the bounds of experience, and to think of judging about things beyond them, as things in themselves.

But we stop at this boundary if we limit our judgment merely to the relation which the world may have to a Being whose very concept lies beyond all the knowledge which we can attain within the world. For we then do not attribute to the Supreme Being any of the properties in themselves, by which we represent objects of experience, and thereby avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism; but we attribute them to his relation to the world, and allow ourselves a symbolical anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns language only, and not the object itself.

If I say that we are compelled to consider the world, as if it were the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will, I really say nothing more, than that a watch, a ship, a regiment, bears the same relation to the watchmaker, the shipbuilder, the commanding officer, as the world of sense (or whatever constitutes the substratum of this complex of appearances) does to the Unknown, which I do not hereby know as it is in itself, but as it is for me or in relation to the world, of which I am a part.

Sect. 58. Such a cognition is one of analogy, and does not signify (as is commonly understood) an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things.38 By means of this analogy, however, there remains a concept of the Supreme Being sufficiently determined for us, though we have left out everything that could determine it absolutely or in itself; for we determine it as regards the world and as regards ourselves, and more do we not require. The attacks which Hume makes upon those who would determine this concept absolutely, by taking the materials for so doing from themselves and the world, do not affect us; and he cannot object to us, that we have nothing left if we give up the objective anthropomorphism of the concept of the Supreme Being.

For let us assume at the outset (as Hume in his dialogues makes Philo grant Cleanthes), as a necessary hypothesis, the deistical concept of the First Being, in which this Being is thought by the mere ontological predicates of substance, of cause, etc. This must be done, because reason, actuated in the sensible world by mere conditions, which are themselves always conditional, cannot otherwise have any satisfaction, and it therefore can be done without falling into anthropomorphism (which transfers predicates from the world of sense to a Being quite distinct from the world), because those predicates are mere categories, which, though they do not give a determinate concept of God, yet give a concept not limited to any conditions of sensibility. Thus nothing can prevent our predicating of this Being a causality through reason with regard to the world, and thus passing to theism, without being obliged to attribute to God in himself this kind of reason, as a property inhering in him. For as to the former, the only possible way of prosecuting the use of reason (as regards all possible experience, in complete harmony with itself) in the world of sense to the highest point, is to assume a supreme reason as a cause of all the connections in the world. Such a principle must be quite advantageous to reason and can hurt it nowhere in its application to nature. As to the latter, reason is thereby not transferred as a property to the First Being in himself, but only to his relation to the world

of sense, and so anthropomorphism is entirely avoided. For nothing is considered here but the cause of the form of reason which is perceived everywhere in the world, and reason is attributed to the Supreme Being, so far as it contains the ground of this form of reason in the world, but according to analogy only, that is, so far as this expression shows merely the relation, which the Supreme Cause unknown to us has to the world, in order to determine everything in it conformably to reason in the highest degree. We are thereby kept from using reason as an attribute for the purpose of conceiving God, but instead of conceiving the world in such a manner as is necessary to have the greatest possible use of reason according to principle. We thereby acknowledge that the Supreme Being is quite inscrutable and even unthinkable in any definite way as to what he is in himself. We are thereby kept, on the one band, from making a transcendent use of the concepts which we have of reason as an efficient cause (by means of the will), in order to determine the Divine Nature by properties, which are only borrowed from human nature, and from losing ourselves in gross and extravagant notions, and on the other hand from deluging the contemplation of the world with hyperphysical modes of explanation according to our notions of human reason, which we transfer to God, and so losing for this contemplation its proper application, according to which it should be a rational study of mere nature, and not a presumptuous derivation of its appearances from a Supreme Reason. The expression suited to our feeble notions is, that we conceive the world as if it came, as to its existence and internal plan, from a Supreme Reason, by which notion we both know the constitution, which belongs to the world itself, yet without pretending to determine the nature of its cause in itself, and on the other hand, we transfer the ground of this constitution (of the form of reason in the world) upon the relation of the Supreme Cause to the world, without finding the world sufficient by itself for that purpose.39

Thus the difficulties which seem to oppose theism -disappear by combining with Hume's principle -- "not to carry the use of reason dogmatically beyond the field of all possible experience" -- this other principle, which be quite overlooked: "not to consider the field of experience as one which bounds itself in the eye of our reason." The Critique of Pure Reason here points out the true mean between dogmatism, which Hume combats, and skepticism, which he would substitute for it-a mean which is not like other means that we find advisable to determine for ourselves as it were mechanically (by adopting something from one side and something from the other), and by which nobody is taught a better way, but such a one as can be accurately determined on principles.

Sect. 59. At the beginning of this annotation I made use of the metaphor of a boundary, in order to establish the limits of reason in regard to its suitable use. The world of sense contains merely appearances, which are not things in themselves, but the understanding must assume these latter ones, viz., noumena. In our reason both are comprised, and the question is, How does reason proceed to set boundaries to the understanding as regards both these fields? Experience, which contains all that belongs to the sensuous world, does not bound itself; it only proceeds in every case from the conditioned to some other equally conditioned object. Its boundary must lie quite without it, and this field is that of the pure beings of the understanding. But this field, so

far as the determination of the nature of these beings is concerned, is an empty space for us, and if dogmatically-determined concepts alone are in question, we cannot pass out of the field of possible experience. But as a boundary itself is something positive, which belongs as well to that which lies within, as to the space that lies without the given complex, it is still an actual positive cognition, which reason only acquires by enlarging itself to this boundary, yet without attempting to pass it; because it there finds itself in the presence of an empty space, in which it can conceive forms of things, but not things themselves. But the setting of a boundary to the field of the understanding by something, which is otherwise unknown to it, is still a cognition which belongs to reason even at this standpoint, and by which it is neither confined within the sensible, nor straying without it, but only refers, as befits the knowledge of a boundary, to the relation between that which lies without it, and that which is contained within it.

Natural theology is such a concept at the boundary of human reason, being constrained to look beyond this boundary to the Idea of a Supreme Being (and, for practical purposes to that of an intelligible world also), not in order to determine anything relatively to this pure creation of the understanding, which lies beyond the world of sense, but in order to guide the use of reason within it according to principles of the greatest possible (theoretical as well as practical) unity. For this purpose we make use of the reference of the world of sense to an independent reason, as the cause of all its connections. Thereby we do not purely invent a being, but, as beyond the sensible. world there must be something that can only be thought by the pure understanding, we determine that something in this particular way, though only of course according to analogy.

And thus there remains our original proposition, which is the resume of the whole Critique: "that reason by all its a priori principles never teaches us anything more than objects of possible experience, and even of these nothing more than can be known in experience." But this limitation does not prevent reason leading us to the objective boundary of experience, viz., to the reference to something which is not itself an object of experience, but is the ground of all experience. Reason does not however teach us anything concerning the thing in itself: it only instructs us as regards its own complete and highest use in the field of possible experience. But this is all that can be reasonably desired in the present case, and with which we have cause to be satisfied.

Sect. 60. Thus we have fully exhibited metaphysics as 'it is actually given in the natural predisposition of human reason, and in that which constitutes the essential end of its pursuit, according to its subjective possibility. Though we have found, that this merely natural use of such a predisposition of our reason, if no discipline arising only from a scientific critique bridles and sets limits to it, involves us in transcendent, either apparently or really conflicting, dialectical syllogisms; and this fallacious metaphysics is not only unnecessary as regards the promotion of our knowledge of nature, but even disadvantageous to it: there yet remains a problem worthy of solution, which is to find out the natural ends intended by this disposition to transcendent concepts in our reason, because everything that lies in nature must be originally intended for

some useful purpose.

Such an inquiry is of a doubtful nature; and I .acknowledge, that what I can say about it is conjecture only, like every speculation about the first ends of nature. The question does not concern the objective validity of metaphysical judgments, but our natural predisposition to them, and therefore does not belong to the system of metaphysics but to anthropology.

When I compare all the transcendental Ideas, the totality of which constitutes the particular problem of natural pure reason, compelling it to quit the mere contemplation of nature, to transcend all possible experience, and in this endeavor to produce the thing (be it knowledge or fiction) called metaphysics, I think I perceive that the aim of this natural tendency is, to free our notions from the fetters of experience and from the limits of the mere contemplation of nature so far as at least to open to us a field containing mere objects for the pure understanding, which no sensibility can reach, not indeed for the purpose of speculatively occupying ourselves with them (for there we can find no ground to stand on), but because practical principles, which, without finding some such scope for their necessary expectation and hope, could not expand to the universality which reason unavoidably requires from a moral point of view.

So I find that the Psychological Idea (however little it may reveal to me the nature of the human soul, which is higher than all concepts of experience), shows the insufficiency of these concepts plainly enough, and thereby deters me from materialism, the psychological notion of which is unfit for any explanation of nature, and besides confines reason in practical respects. The Cosmological Ideas, by the obvious insufficiency of all possible cognition of nature to satisfy reason in its lawful inquiry, serve in the same manner to keep us from naturalism, which asserts nature to be sufficient for itself. Finally, all natural necessity in the sensible world is conditional, as it always presupposes the dependence of things upon others, and unconditional necessity must be sought only in the unity of a cause different from the world of sense. But as the causality of this cause, in its turn, were it merely nature, could never render the existence of the contingent (as its consequent) comprehensible, reason frees itself by means of the Theological Idea from fatalism, (both as a blind natural necessity in the coherence of nature itself, without a first principle, and as a blind causality of this principle itself), and leads to the concept of a cause possessing freedom, or of a Supreme Intelligence. Thus the transcendental Ideas serve, if not to instruct us positively, at least to destroy the rash assertions of Materialism, of Naturalism, and of Fatalism, and thus to afford scope for the moral Ideas beyond the field of speculation. These considerations, I should think, explain in some measure the natural predisposition of which I spoke.

The practical value, which a merely speculative science may have, lies without the bounds of this science, and can therefore be considered as a scholion merely, and like all scholia does not form part of the science itself. This application however surely lies within the bounds of philosophy, especially of philosophy drawn from the pure sources of reason, where its speculative use in metaphysics must necessarily be at unity with its practical

use in morals. Hence the unavoidable dialectics of pure reason, considered in metaphysics, as a natural tendency, deserves to be explained not as an illusion merely, which is to be removed, but also, if possible, as a natural provision as regards its end, though this duty, a work of supererogation, cannot justly be assigned to metaphysics proper.

The solutions of these questions which are treated in the chapter on the Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason40 should be considered a second scholion which however has a greater affinity with the subject of metaphysics. For there certain rational principles are expounded which determine a priori the order of nature or rather of the understanding, which seeks nature's laws through experience. They seem to be constitutive and legislative with regard to experience, though they spring from pure reason, which cannot be considered, like the understanding, as a principle of possible experience. Now whether or not this harmony rests upon the fact, that just as nature does not inhere in appearances or in their source (the sensibility) itself, but only in so far as the latter is in relation to the understanding, as also a systematic unity in applying the understanding to bring about an entirety of all possible experience can only belong to the understanding when in relation to reason; and whether or not experience is in this way mediately subordinate to the legislation of reason: may be discussed by those who desire to trace the nature of reason even beyond its use in metaphysics, into the general principles of a history of nature; I have represented this task as important, but not attempted its solution, in the book itself.41

And thus I conclude the analytical solution of the main question which I had proposed: How is metaphysics in general possible? by ascending from the data of its actual use in its consequences, to the grounds of its possibility.

* * * *

SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE PROLEGOMENA: "HOW IS METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE?"

Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of reason, is actual, but if considered by itself alone (as the analytical solution of the third principal question showed), dialectical and illusory. If we think of taking principles from it, and in using them follow the natural, but on that account not less false, illusion, we can never produce science, but only a vain dialectical art, in which one school may outdo another, but none can ever acquire a just and lasting approbation.

In order that as a science metaphysics may be entitled to claim not mere fallacious plausibility, but insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must itself exhibit the whole stock of a priori concepts, their division according to their various sources (Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason), together with a complete table of them, the analysis of all these concepts, with all their consequences, especially by means of the deduction of these concepts, the possibility of synthetical cognition a priori, the principles of its application and finally its bounds, all in a complete system. Critique, therefore, and critique alone, contains in itself the whole well-proved and well-tested plan, and even all the means required to accomplish

metaphysics, as a science; by other ways and means it is impossible. The question here therefore is not so much how this performance is possible, as how to set it going, and induce men of clear heads to quit their hitherto perverted and fruitless cultivation for one that will not deceive, and how such a union for the common end may best be directed.

This much is certain, that whoever has once tasted Critique will be ever after disgusted with all dogmatical twaddle which be formerly put up with, because his reason must have something, and could find nothing better for its support.

Critique stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of the schools, as chemistry does to alchemy, or as astronomy to the astrology of the fortune-teller. I pledge myself that nobody who has read through and through, and grasped the principles of, the Critique even in these Prolegomena only, will ever return to that old and sophistical pseudo-science; but will rather with a certain delight look forward to metaphysics which is now indeed in his power, requiring no more preparatory discoveries, and now at last affording permanent satisfaction to reason. For here is an advantage upon which, of all possible sciences, metaphysics alone can with certainty reckon: that it can be brought to such completion and fixity as to be incapable of further change, or of any augmentation by new discoveries; because here reason has the sources of its knowledge in itself, not in objects and their observation [Anschauung], by which latter its stock of knowledge cannot be further increased. When therefore it has exhibited the fundamental laws of its faculty completely and so definitely as to avoid all misunderstanding, there remains nothing for pure reason to know a priori, nay, there is even no ground to raise further questions. The sure prospect of knowledge so definite and so compact has a peculiar charm, even though we should set aside all its advantages, of which I shall hereafter speak.

All false art, all vain wisdom, lasts its time, but finally destroys itself, and its highest culture is also the epoch of its decay. That this time is come for metaphysics appears from the state into which it has fallen among all learned nations, despite of all the zeal with which other sciences of every kind are prosecuted. The old arrangement of our university studies still preserves its shadow; now and then an Academy of Science tempts men by offering prizes to write essays on it, but it is no longer numbered among thorough sciences; and let any one judge for himself how a man of genius, if he were called a great metaphysician, would receive the compliment, which may be well-meant, but is scarce envied by anybody.

Yet, though the period of the downfall of all dogmatical metaphysics has undoubtedly arrived, we are yet far from being able to say that the period of its regeneration is come by means of a thorough and complete Critique of Reason. All transitions from a tendency to its contrary pass through the stage of indifference, and this moment is the most dangerous for an author, but, in my opinion, the most favorable for the science. For, when party spirit has died out by a total dissolution of former connections, minds are in the best state to listen to several proposals for an organization according to a new plan.

When I say, that I hope these Prolegomena will excite

investigation in the field of critique and afford a new and promising object to sustain the general spirit of philosophy, which seems on its speculative side to want sustenance, I can imagine beforehand, that every one, whom the thorny paths of my Critique have tired and put out of humor, will ask me, upon what I found this hope. My answer is, upon the irresistible law of necessity.

That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we should prefer to give up breathing altogether, to avoid inhaling impure air. There will therefore always be metaphysics in the world; nay, every one, especially every man of reflection, will have it, and for want of a recognized standard, will shape it for himself after his own pattern. What has hitherto been called metaphysics, cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego it entirely is impossible; therefore a Critique of Pure Reason itself must now be attempted or, if one exists, investigated, and brought to the full test, because there is no other means of supplying this pressing want, which is something more than mere thirst for knowledge.

Ever since I have come to know critique, whenever I finish reading a book of metaphysical contents, which, by the preciseness of its notions, by variety, order, and an easy style, was not only entertaining but also helpful, I cannot help asking, 11 Has this author indeed advanced metaphysics a single step?" The learned men, whose works have been useful to me in other respects and always contributed to the culture of my mental powers, will, I hope, forgive me for saying, that I have never been able to find either their essays or my own less important ones (though self-love may recommend them to me) to have advanced the science of metaphysics in the least, and why?

Here is the very obvious reason: metaphysics did not then exist as a science, nor can it be gathered piecemeal, but its germ must be fully preformed in the Critique. But in order to prevent all misconception, we must remember what has been already said, that by the analytical treatment of our concepts the understanding gains indeed a great deal, but the science (of metaphysics) is thereby not in the least advanced, because these dissections of concepts are nothing but the materials from which the intention is to carpenter our science. Let the concepts of substance and of accident be ever so well dissected and determined, all this is very well as a preparation for some future use. But if we cannot prove, that in all which exists the substance endures, and only the accidents vary, our science is not the least advanced by all our analyzes.

Metaphysics has hitherto never been able to prove a priori either this proposition, or that of sufficient reason, still less any more complex theorem, such as belongs to psychology or cosmology, or indeed any synthetical proposition. By all its analyzing therefore nothing is affected, nothing obtained or forwarded and the science, after all this bustle and noise, still remains as it was in the days of Aristotle, though far better preparations were made for it than of old, if the clue to synthetical cognitions had only been discovered.

If any one thinks himself offended, he is at liberty to refute my charge by producing a single synthetical proposition

belonging to metaphysics, which he would prove dogmatically a priori, for until he has actually performed this feat, I shall not grant that he has truly advanced the science; even should this proposition be sufficiently confirmed by common experience. No demand can be more moderate or more equitable, and in the (inevitably certain) event of its non-performance, no assertion more just, than that hitherto metaphysics has never existed as a science.

But there are two things which, in case the challenge be accepted, I must deprecate: first, trifling about probability and conjecture, which are suit-d as little to metaphysics, as to geometry; and secondly, a decision by means of the magic wand of common sense, which does not convince every one, but which accommodates itself to personal peculiarities.

For as to the former, nothing can be more absurd, than in metaphysics, a philosophy from pure reason to think of grounding our judgments upon probability and conjecture. Everything that is to be known a priori, is thereby announced as apodictically certain, and must therefore be proved in this way. We might as well think of grounding geometry or arithmetic upon conjectures. As to the doctrine of chances in the latter, it does not contain probable, but perfectly certain, judgments concerning the degree of the probability of certain cases, under given uniform conditions, which, in the sum of all possible cases, infallibly happen according to the rule, though it is not sufficiently determined in respect to every single chance. Conjectures (by means of induction and of analogy) can be suffered in an empirical science of nature only, yet even there the possibility at least of what we assume must be quite certain.

The appeal to common sense is even more absurd, when concept and principles are announced as valid, not in so far as they hold with regard to experience, but even beyond the conditions of experience. For what is common sense? It is normal good sense, so far it judges right. But what is normal good sense? It is the faculty of the knowledge and use of rules in concreto, as distinguished from the speculative understanding, which is a faculty of knowing rules in abstracto. Common sense can hardly understand the rule, 11 that every event is determined by means of its cause," and can never comprehend it thus generally. It therefore demands an example from experience, and when it hears that this rule means nothing but what it always thought when a pane was broken or a kitchen-utensil missing, it then understands the principle and grants it. Common sense therefore is only of use so far as it can see its rules (though they actually are a priori) confirmed by experience; consequently to comprehend them a priori, or independently of experience, belongs to the speculative understanding, and lies quite beyond the horizon of common sense. But the province of metaphysics is entirely confined to the latter kind of knowledge, and it is certainly a bad index of common sense to appeal to it as a witness, for it cannot here form any opinion whatever, and men look down upon it with contempt until they are in difficulties, and can find in their speculation neither in nor out.

It is a common subterfuge of those false friends of common sense (who occasionally prize it highly, but usually despise it) to say, that there must surely be at all events some propositions which are immediately certain, and of which there is no occasion

to give any proof, or even any account at all, because we otherwise could never stop inquiring into the grounds of our judgments. But if we except the principle of contradiction, which is not sufficient to show the truth of synthetical judgments, they can never adduce, in proof of this privilege, anything else indubitable, which they can immediately ascribe to common sense, except mathematical propositions, such as twice two make four, between two points there is but one straight line, etc. But these judgments are radically different from those of metaphysics. For in mathematics I myself can by thinking construct whatever I represent to myself as possible by a concept: I add to the first two the other two, one by one, and myself make the number four, or I draw in thought from one point to another all manner of lines, equal as well as unequal; yet I can draw one only, which is like itself in all its parts. But I cannot, by all my power of thinking, extract from the concept of a thing the concept of something else, whose existence is necessarily connected with the former, but I must call in experience. And though my understanding furnishes me a priori (yet only in reference to possible experience) with the concept of such a connection (i.e., causation), I cannot exhibit it, like the concepts of mathematics, by [Anschauung] visualizing them, a priori, and so show its possibility a priori. This concept, together with the principles of its application, always requires, if it shall hold a priori as is requisite in metaphysics -a justification and deduction of its possibility, because we cannot otherwise know how far it holds good, and whether it can be used in experience only or beyond it also.

Therefore in metaphysics, as a speculative science of pure reason, we can never appeal to common sense, but may do so only when we are forced to surrender it, and to renounce all purely speculative cognition, which must always be knowledge, and consequently when we forego metaphysics itself and its instruction, for the sake of adopting a rational faith which alone may be possible for us, and sufficient to our wants, perhaps even more salutary than knowledge itself. For in this case the attitude of the question is quite altered. Metaphysics must be science, not only as a whole, but in all its parts, otherwise it is nothing; because, as a speculation of pure reason, it finds a hold only on general opinions. Beyond its field, however, probability and common sense may be used with advantage and justly, but on quite special principles, of which the importance always depends on the reference to practical life.

This is what I hold myself justified in requiring for the possibility of metaphysics as a science.

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APPENDIX: ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE METAPHYSICS ACTUAL AS A SCIENCE.

Since all the ways heretofore taken have failed to attain the goal, and since without a preceding critique of pure reason it is not likely ever to be attained, the present essay now before the public has a fair title to an accurate and careful investigation, except it be thought more advisable to give up all pretensions to metaphysics, to which, if men but would consistently adhere to their purpose, no objection can be made.

If we take the course of things as it is, not as it ought to be, there are two sorts of judgments: (1) one a judgment which precedes investigation (in our case one in which the reader from his own metaphysics pronounces judgment on the Critique of Pure Reason which was intended to discuss the very possibility of metaphysics); (2) the other a judgment subsequent to investigation. In the latter the reader is enabled to waive for awhile the consequences of the critical researches that may be repugnant to his formerly adopted metaphysics, and first examines the grounds whence those consequences are derived. If what common metaphysics propounds were demonstrably certain, as for instance the theorems of geometry, the former way of judging would bold good. For if the consequences of certain principles are repugnant to established truths, these principles are false and without further inquiry to be repudiated. But if metaphysics does not possess a stock of indisputably certain (synthetical) propositions, and should it even be the case that there are a number of them, which, though among the most specious, are by their consequences in mutual collision, and if no sure criterion of the truth of peculiarly metaphysical (synthetical) propositions is to be met with in it, then the former way of judging is not admissible, but the investigation of the principles of the critique must precede all judgments as to its value.

On A Specimen Of A Judgment Of The Critique Prior To Its Examination.

This judgment is to be found in the Gottingischen gelehrten Anzeigen, in the supplement to the third division, of January 19, 1782, pages 40 et seq.

When an author who is familiar with the subject of his work and endeavors to present his independent reflections in its elaboration, falls into the hands of a reviewer who in his turn, is keen enough to discern the points on which the worth or worthlessness of the book rests, who does not cling to words, but goes to the heart of the subject, sifting and testing more than the mere principles which the author takes as his point of departure, the severity of the judgment may indeed displease the latter, but the public does not care, as it gains thereby; and the author himself may be contented, as an opportunity of correcting or explaining his positions is afforded to him at an early date by the examination of a competent judge, in such a manner, that if he believes himself fundamentally right, he can remove in time any stone of offense that might hurt the success of his work.

I find myself, with my reviewer, in quite another position. He seems not to see at all the real matter of the investigation with which (successfully or unsuccessfully) I have been occupied. It is either impatience at thinking out a lengthy work, or vexation at a threatened reform of a science in which he believed he had brought everything to perfection long ago, or, what I am unwilling to imagine, real narrow-mindedness, that prevents him from ever carrying his thoughts beyond his school-metaphysics. In short, he passes impatiently in review a long series of propositions, by which, without knowing their premises, we can think nothing, intersperses here and there his censure, the reason of which the reader understands just as little as the

propositions against which it is directed; and hence [his report] can neither serve the public nor damage me, in the judgment of experts. I should, for these reasons, have passed over this judgment altogether, were it not that it may afford me occasion for some explanations which may in some cases save the readers of these Prolegomena from a misconception.

In order to take a position from which my reviewer could most easily set the whole work in a most unfavorable light, without venturing to trouble himself with any special investigation, he begins and ends by saying: "This work is a system of transcendent (or, as he translates it, of higher) Idealism."42

A glance at this line soon showed me the sort of criticism that I had to expect, much as though the reviewer were one who had never seen or heard of geometry, having found a Euclid, and coming upon various figures in turning over its leaves, were to say, on being asked his opinion of it: "The work is a text-book of drawing; the author introduces a peculiar terminology, in order to give dark, incomprehensible directions, which in the end teach nothing more than what every one can effect by a fair natural accuracy of eye, etc."

Let us see, in the meantime, what sort of an idealism it is that goes through my whole work, although it does not by a long way constitute the soul of the system.

The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: "All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth."

The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism, is on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth."

But this is directly contrary to idealism proper. How came I then to use this expression for quite an opposite purpose, and how came my reviewer to see it everywhere?

The solution of this difficulty rests on something that could have been very easily understood from the general bearing of the work, if the reader had only desired to do so. Space and time, together with all that they contain, are not things nor qualities in themselves, but belong merely to the appearances of the latter: up to this point I am one in confession with the above idealists. But these, and amongst them more particularly Berkeley, regarded space as a mere empirical presentation that, like the phenomenon it contains, is only known to us by means of experience or perception, together with its determinations. I, on the contrary, prove in the first place, that space (and also time, which Berkeley did not consider) and all its determinations a priori, can be known by us, because, no less than time, it inheres in our sensibility as a pure form before all perception or experience and makes all intuition of the same, and therefore all its phenomena, possible. It follows from this, that as truth rests on universal and necessary laws as its criteria, experience, according to Berkeley, can have no criteria of truth,

because its phenomena (according to him) have nothing a priori at their foundation; whence it follows, that they are nothing but sheer illusion; whereas with us, space and time (in conjunction with the pure conceptions of the understanding) prescribe their law to all possible experience a priori, and at the same time afford the certain criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein.43

My so-called (properly critical) Idealism is of quite a special character, in that it subverts the ordinary idealism, and that through it all cognition a priori, even that of geometry, first receives objective reality, which, without my demonstrated ideality of space and time, could not be maintained by the most zealous realists. This being the state of the case, I could have wished, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, to have named this conception of mine otherwise, but to alter it altogether was impossible. It may be permitted me however, in future, as has been above intimated, to term it the formal, or better still, the critical Idealism, to distinguish it from the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, and from the skeptical Idealism of Descartes.

Beyond this, I find nothing further remarkable in the judgment of my book. The reviewer criticizes here and there, makes sweeping criticisms, a mode prudently chosen, since it does not betray one's own knowledge or ignorance; a single thorough criticism in detail, had it touched the main question, as is only fair, would have exposed, it may be my error, or it may be my reviewer's measure of insight into this species of research. It was, moreover, not a badly conceived plan, in order at once to take from readers (who are accustomed to form their conceptions of books from newspaper reports) the desire to read the book itself, to pour out in one breath a number of passages in succession, torn from their connection, and their grounds of proof and explanations, and which must necessarily sound senseless, especially considering how antipathetic they are to all school-metaphysics; to exhaust the reader's patience ad nauseam, and then, after having made me acquainted with the sensible proposition that persistent illusion is truth, to conclude with the crude paternal moralization: to what end, then, the quarrel with accepted language, to what end, and whence, the idealistic distinction? A judgment which seeks all that is characteristic of my book, first supposed to be metaphysically heterodox, in a mere innovation of the nomenclature, proves clearly that my would-be judge has understood nothing of the subject, and in addition, has not understood himself.44

My reviewer speaks like a man who is conscious of important and superior insight which he keeps hidden; for I am aware of nothing recent with respect to metaphysics that could justify his tone. But he should not withhold his discoveries from the world, for there are doubtless many who, like myself, have not been able to find in all the fine things that have for long past been written in this department, anything that has advanced the science by so much as a finger-breadth; we find indeed the giving a new point to definitions, the supplying of lame proofs with new crutches, the adding to the crazy-quilt of metaphysics fresh patches or changing its pattern; but all this is not what the world requires. The world is tired of metaphysical assertions; it wants the possibility of the science, the sources from which certainty therein can be derived, and certain criteria by which it may distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from

truth. To this the critic seems to possess a key, otherwise he would never have spoken out in such a high tone.

But I am inclined to suspect that no such requirement of the science has ever entered his thoughts, for in that case he would have directed his judgment to this point, and even a mistaken atteriipt in such an important matter, would have won his respect. If that be the case, we are once more good friends. He may penetrate as deeply as he likes into metaphysics, without any one hindering him; only as concerns that which lies outside metaphysics, its sources, which are to be found in reason, he cannot form a judgment. That my suspicion is not without foundation, is proved by the fact that he does not mention a word about the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori, the special problem upon the solution of which the fate of metaphysics wholly rests, and upon which my Critique (as well as the present Prolegomena) entirely hinges. The Idealism he encountered, and which he hung upon,: was only taken up in the doctrine as the sole means of solving the above problem (although it received its confirmation on other grounds), and hence he must have shown either that the above problem does not possess the importance I attribute to it (even in these Prolegomena), or that by my conception of appearances, it is either not solved at all, or can be better solved in another way; but I do not find a word of this in the criticism. The reviewer, then, understands nothing of my work, and possibly also nothing of the spirit and essential nature of metaphysics itself; and it is not, what I would rather assume, the hurry of a man incensed at the labor of plodding through so many obstacles, that threw an unfavorable shadow over the work lying before him, and made its fundamental features unrecognizable.

There is a good deal to be done before a learned journal, it matters not with what care its writers may be selected, can maintain its otherwise well-merited reputation, in the field of metaphysics as elsewhere. Other sciences and branches of knowledge have their standard. Mathematics has it, in itself; history and theology, in profane or sacred books; natural science and the art of medicine, in mathematics and experience; jurisprudence, in law books; and even matters of taste in the examples of the ancients. But for the judgment of the thing called metaphysics, the standard has yet to be found. I have made an attempt to determine it, as well as its use. What is to be done, then, until it be found, when works of this kind have to be judged of? If they are of a dogmatic character, -one may do what one likes; no one will play the master over others here for long, before some one else appears to deal with him in the same manner. If, however, they are critical in their character, not indeed with reference to other works, but to reason itself, so that the standard of judgment cannot be assumed but has first of all to be sought for, then, though objection and blame may indeed be permitted, yet a certain degree of leniency is indispensable, since the need is common to us all, and the lack of the necessary insight makes the high-handed attitude of judge unwarranted.

In order, however, to connect my defense with the interest of the philosophical commonwealth, I propose a test, which must be decisive as to the mode, whereby all metaphysical investigations may be directed to their common purpose. This is nothing more than what formerly mathematicians have done, in establishing the advantage of their methods by competition. I

challenge my critic to demonstrate, as is only just, on a priori grounds, in his way, a single really metaphysical principle asserted by him. Being metaphysical it must be synthetic and known a priori from conceptions, but it may also be any one of the most indispensable principles, as for instance, the principle of the persistence of substance, or of the necessary determination of events in the world by their causes. If he cannot do this (silence however is confession), he must admit, that as metaphysics without apodictic certainty of propositions of this kind is nothing at all, its possibility or impossibility must before all things be established in a critique of the pure reason. Thus he is bound either to confess that my principles in the Critique are correct, or he must prove their invalidity. But as I can already foresee, that, confidently as he has hitherto relied on the certainty of his principles, when it comes to a strict test he will not find a single one in the whole range of metaphysics he can bring forward, I will concede to him an advantageous condition, which can only be expected in such a competition, and will relieve him of the onus probandi by laying it on myself.

He finds in these Prolegomena and in my Critique (chapter on the "Theses and Antitheses Antinomies") eight propositions, of which two and two contradict one another, but each of which necessarily belongs to metaphysics, by which it must either be accepted or rejected (although there is not one that has not in this time been held by some philosopher). Now he has the liberty of selecting any one of these eight propositions at his pleasure, and accepting it without any proof, of which I shall make him a present, but only one (for waste of time will be just as little serviceable to him as to me), and then of attacking my proof of the opposite proposition. If I can save this one, and at the same time show, that according to principles which every dogmatic metaphysics must necessarily recognize, the opposite of the proposition adopted by him can be just as clearly proved, it is thereby established that metaphysics has an hereditary failing, not to be explained, much less set aside, until we ascend to its birth-place, pure reason itself, and thus my Critique must either be accepted or a better one take its place; it must at least be studied, which is the only thing I now require. If, on the other hand, I cannot save my demonstration, then a synthetic proposition a priori from dogmatic principles is to be reckoned to the score of my opponent, then also I will deem my impeachment of ordinary metaphysics as unjust, and pledge myself to recognize his stricture on my Critique as justified (although this would not be the consequence by a long way). To this end it would be necessary, it seems to me, that he should step out of his incognito. Otherwise I do not see how it could be avoided, that instead of dealing with one, I should be honored by several problems coming from anonymous and unqualified opponents.

Proposals As To An Investigation Of The Critique Upon Which A Judgment May Follow.

I feel obliged to the honored public even for the silence with which it for a long time favored my Critique, for this proves at least a postponement of judgment, and some supposition that in a work, leaving all beaten tracks and striking out on a new path, in which one cannot at once perhaps so easily find one's way, something may perchance lie, from which an important

but at present dead branch of human knowledge may derive new life and productiveness. Hence may have originated a solicitude for the as yet tender shoot, lest it be destroyed by a hasty judgment. A test of a judgment, delayed for the above reasons, is now before my eye in the Gothaischen gelehrten Zeitung, the thoroughness of which every reader will himself perceive, from the clear and unperverted presentation of a fragment of one of the first principles of my work, without taking into consideration my own suspicious praise.

And now I propose, since an extensive structure cannot be judged of as a whole from a hurried glance, to test it piece by piece from its foundations, so thereby the present Prolegomena may fitly be used as a general outline with which the work itself may occasionally be compared. This notion, if it were founded on nothing more than my conceit of importance, such as vanity commonly attributes to one's own productions, would be immodest and would deserve to be repudiated with disgust. But now, the interests of speculative philosophy have arrived at the point of total extinction, while human reason hangs upon them with inextinguishable affection, and only after having been ceaselessly deceived does it vainly attempt to change this into indifference.

In our thinking age it is not to be supposed but that many deserving men would use any good opportunity of working for the common interest of the more and more enlightened reason, if there were only some hope of attaining the goal. Mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even morality, etc., do not completely fill the soul; there is always a space left over, reserved for pure and speculative reason, the vacuity of which prompts us to seek in vagaries, buffooneries, and mysticism for what seems to be employment and entertainment, but what actually is mere pastime; in order to deaden the troublesome voice of reason, which in accordance with its nature requires something that can satisfy it, and not merely subserve other ends or the interests of our inclinations. A consideration, therefore, which is concerned only with reason as it exists for it itself, has as I may reasonably suppose a great fascination for every one who has attempted thus to extend his conceptions, and I may even say a greater than any other theoretical branch of knowledge, for which he would not willingly exchange it, because here all other cognitions, and even purposes, must meet and unite themselves in a whole.45

I offer, therefore, these Prolegomena as a sketch and text-book for this investigation, and not the work itself. Although I am even now perfectly satisfied with the latter as far as contents, order, and mode of presentation, and the care that I have expended in weighing and testing every sentence before writing it down, are concerned (for it has taken me years to satisfy myself fully, not only as regards the whole but in some cases even as to the sources of one particular proposition); yet I am not quite satisfied with my exposition in some sections of the doctrine of elements, as for instance in the deduction of the conceptions of the Understanding, or in that on the paralogisms of pure reason, because a certain diffuseness takes away from their clearness, and in place of them, what is here said in the Prolegomena respecting these sections, may be made the basis of the test.

It is the boast of the Germans that where steady and

continuous industry are requisite, they can carry things farther than other nations. If this opinion be well founded, an opportunity, a business, presents itself, the successful issue of which we can scarcely doubt, and in which all thinking men can equally take part, though they have hitherto been unsuccessful in accomplishing it and in thus confirming the above good opinion. But this is chiefly because the science in question is of so peculiar a kind, that it can be at once brought to completion and to that enduring state that it will never be able to be brought in the least degree farther or increased by later discoveries, or even changed (leaving here out of account adornment by greater clearness in some places, or additional uses), and this is an advantage no other science has or can have, because there is none so fully isolated and independent of others, and which is concerned with the faculty of cognition pure and simple. And the present moment seems, moreover, not to be unfavorable to my expectation, for just now, in Germany, no one seems to know wherewith to occupy himself, apart from the so-called useful sciences, so as to pursue not mere play, but a business possessing an enduring purpose.

To discover the means how the endeavors of the learned may be united in such a purpose, I must leave to others. In the meantime, it is my intention to persuade any one merely to follow my propositions, or even to flatter me with the hope that he will do so; but attacks, repetitions, limitations, or confirmation, completion, and extension, as the case may be, should be appended. If the matter be but investigated from its foundation, it cannot fail that a system, albeit not my own, shall be erected, that shall be a possession for future generations for which they may have reason to be grateful.

It would lead us too far here to show what kind of metaphysics may be expected, when only the principles of criticism have been perfected, and how, because the old false feathers have been pulled out, she need by no means appear poor and reduced to an insignificant figure, but may be in other respects richly and respectably adorned. But other and great uses which would result from such a reform, strike one immediately. The ordinary metaphysics had its uses, in that it sought out the elementary conceptions of the pure understanding in order to make them clear through analysis, and definite by explanation. In this way it was a training for reason, in whatever direction it might be turned; but this was all the good it did; service was subsequently effaced when it favored conceit by venturesome assertions, sophistry by subtle distinctions and adornment, and shallowness by the ease with which it decided the most difficult problems by means of a little school-wisdom, which is only the more seductive the more it has the choice, on the one hand, of taking something from the language of science, and on the other from that of popular discourse, thus being everything to everybody, but in reality nothing at all. By criticism, however, a standard is given to our judgment, whereby knowledge may be with certainty distinguished from pseudo-science, and firmly founded, being brought into full operation in metaphysics; a mode of thought extending by degrees its beneficial influence over every other use of reason, at once infusing into it the true philosophical spirit. But the service also that metaphysics performs for theology, by making it independent of the judgment of dogmatic speculation, thereby assuring it completely against the attacks of all such opponents, is certainly not to be valued

lightly. For ordinary metaphysics, although it promised the latter much advantage, could not keep this promise, and moreover, by summoning speculative dogmatics to its assistance, did nothing but arm enemies against itself. Mysticism, which can prosper in a rationalistic age only when it hides itself behind a system of school-metaphysics, under the protection of which it may venture to rave with a semblance of rationality, is driven from this, its last hiding-place, by critical philosophy. Last, but not least, it cannot be otherwise than important to a teacher of metaphysics, to be able to say with universal assent, that what he expounds is Science, and that thereby genuine services will be rendered to the commonweal.

2 Says Horace:
" Rusticus expectat, dum defluat amnis, at ille
Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum;
" A rustic fellow waiteth on the shore
For the river to flow away,
But the river flows, and flows on as before,
And it flows forever and aye."
3 Nevertheless Hume called this very destructive science metaphysics and attached to it great value. "Metaphysics and morals" he declares "are the most important branches of science; mathematics and physics are not nearly so important" ["On the Rise and Progress of Arts and Sciences," Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary]. But the acute man merely regarded the negative use arising from the moderation of extravagant claims of speculative reason, and the complete settlement of the many endless and troublesome controversies that mislead mankind. He overlooked the positive injury which results, if reason be deprived of its most important prospects, which can alone supply to the will the highest aim for all its endeavor.
4 [The term Anschauung here used means sense-perception. It is that which is given to the senses and apprehended Immediately, as an object is seen by merely looking at it. The translation intuiition, though etymologically correct, is misleading. In the

present passage the term is not used in its technical significance but means " practical experience."-Ed.]
5 [The term apodictic is borrowed by Kant from Aristotle who uses it in the sense of "certain beyond dispute." The word is derived from [Greek] (= I show) and is contrasted to dialectic propositions, i. e., such statements " admit of controversy. --Ed.]
6 It is unavoidable that as knowledge advances, certain expressions which have become classical, after having been used since the infancy: of science, will be found inadequate and unsuitable, and a newer and more appropriate application of the terms will give rise to confusion. . [This is the case with the term " analytical."] The analytical method, so far as it is opposed to the synthetical, is very different from that which

constitutes the essence of analytical propositions: it signifies only that we start from what is sought, as if it were given, and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible. In this method we often use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in mathematical analysis, and it were better to term it the regressive method, in contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive. A principal part of Logic too is distinguished by the name of Analytics, which here signifies the logic of truth in contrast to Dialectics, without considering whether the cognitions belonging to it are analytical or synthetical.

7 [This whole paragraph (Sect. 9) will be better understood when compared with Remark I., following this section. - Ed.]

8 [Empirical judgments (emfiirische Urtheile) are either mere statements of fact, viz.. records of a perception, or statements of a natural law, implying a causal connection between two facts. The former Kant calls" judgments of perception" (Wahrnehmungsurtheile), the latter "judgments of experience " (Erfahrungsurtheile).-Ed.]

9 I freely grant that these examples do not represent such judgments of perception as ever could become judgments of experience, even though a concept of the understanding were superadded, because they refer merely to feeling, which everybody knows to be merely subjective, and which of course can never be attributed to the object, and consequently never become objective. I only wished to give here an example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid, containing no ground for universal validity, and thereby for a relation to the object. An example of the judgments of perception, which become judgments of experience by superadded concepts of the understanding, will be given in the next note.

10 As an easier example, we may take the following: " When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm." This judgment, however often I and others may have perceived it, is a mere judgment of perception, and contains no necessity; perceptions are only usually conjoined in this manner. But if I say, "The sun warms the stone," I add to the perception a concept of the understanding, viz., that of cause, which connects with the concept of sunshine that of heat as a necessary consequence, and the synthetical judgment becomes of necessity universally valid, viz., objective, and is converted from a perception into experience.

11 This name seems preferable to the term particularia, which is used for these judgments in logic. For the latter implies the idea that they are not universal. But when I start from unity (in single judgments) and so proceed to universality, I must not [even indirectly and negatively] imply any reference to universality. I think plurality merely without universality, and not the exception from universality. This is necessary, if logical considerations shall form the basis of the pure concepts of the understanding. However, there is no need of making changes in logic.

12 But how does this proposition, 11 that judgments of experience contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions," agree with my statement so often before inculcated, that "experience as cognition a posteriori can afford contingent judgments only? "When I say that experience teaches me something, I mean only the perception that lies in experience,-for example, that heat always follows the shining of the sun on a stone; consequently the proposition of experience is always so far accidental. That this heat necessarily follows the shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of experience (by means of the concept of

cause), yet is a fact not learned by experience; for conversely, experience is first of all generated by this addition of the concept of the understanding (of cause) to perception. How perception attains this addition may be seen by referring in the Critique itself to the section on the Transcendental faculty of Judgment Lviz-, in the first edition, Vex dem Schematismxs der Taxes Verstandsbegrirel.
13 [Kant uses the term physiological in its etymological meaning as "pertaining to the science of physics," i.e., nature in general, not as we use the term now as "pertaining to the functions of the living body." Accordingly it has been translated "physical." -- Ed.]
14 The three following paragraphs will hardly be understood unless reference be made to what the Citique itself says on the subject of the Principles; they will, however, be of service in giving a general view of the Principles, and in fixing the attention of the main points.
15 [Kant uses here the equivocal term Wechsetwirkung. --Ed.]
16 Heat and light are in a small space just as large as to degree as in a large one; in like manner the internal representations, pain, consciousness in general, whether they last a short or a long time, need not vary as to the degree. Hence the quantity is here in a point and in a moment just as great as in any space or time however great. Degrees are therefore capable of increase, but not in intuition, rather in mere sensation (or the quantity of the degree of an intuition). Hence they can only be estimated quantitatively by the relation of 1 to 0, viz, by their capability of decreasing by infinite intermediate degrees to disappearance, or of increasing from naught through infinite gradations to a determinate sensation in a certain time. Quantitas qualitatis est gradus [i.e., the degrees of quality must be measured by equality.]
17 We speak of the "intelligible world," not (as the usual expression is) "intellectual world." For cognitions are intellectual through the understanding, and refer to our world of sense also; but objects, so far as they can be represented merely by the understanding, and to which none of our sensible intuitions can refer, are termed " intelligible." But as some possible intuition must correspond to every object, we would have to assume an understanding that intuits things immediately; but of such we have not the least notion, nor have we of the things of the understanding [Verstandes wasen], to which it should be applied.
18 Crusius alone thought of a compromise: that a Spirit, who can neither err nor deceive, implanted these laws in us originally. But since false principles often intrude themselves, as indeed the very system of this man shows in not a few examples, we are involved ill difficulties as to the use of such a principle in the absence of sure criteria to distinguish the genuine origin from the spurious as we never can know certainly what the Spirit of truth or the father of lies may have instilled into us.
19 The definition of nature is given in the beginning of the Second Part of the " Transcendental Problem," in Sect. 14.
20 1. Substantia, 2. Qualitas 3, Quamtitas, 4. Relatio, 5. Actio, 6. Passio, 7. Quando, 8. Ubi, 9. Situs, 10. Habitus.
21 Oppositum, Prius, Simul, Motus, Habere.
22 See the two tables in the chapters Von den Paralogismen der reinen Verunft and the first division of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, System der kosmologischen Ideen.
23 On the table of the categories many neat observations may be made, for instance (1) that the third arises from the first and

the second joined in one concept (2) that in those of Quantity and of Quality there is merely a progress from unity to totality or from something to nothing (for this purpose the categories of Quality must stand thus: reality, limitation, total negation), without correlata or opposita, whereas those of Relation and of Modality have them; (3) that, as in Logic categorical judgments are the basis of all others, so the category of Substance is the basis of all concepts of actual things; (4) that as Modality in the judgment is not a particular predicate, so by the modal concepts a determination is not superadded to things, etc., etc. Such observations are of great use. If we besides enumerate all the predicables, which we can find pretty completely in any good ontology (for example, Baumgarten's), and arrange them in classes under the categories, in which operation we must not neglect to add as complete a dissection of all these concepts as possible, there will then arise a merely analytical part of metaphysics, which does not contain a single synthetical proposition. which might precede the second (the synthetical), and would by its precision and completeness be not only useful, but, in virtue of its system, be even to some extent elegant.
24 See Critique of Pure Reason, Von der Amphibolie der Reflexbergriffe.
25 If we can say, that a science is actual at least in the idea of all men, as soon as it appears that the problems which lead to it are proposed to everybody by the nature of human reason, and that therefore many (though faulty) endeavors are unavoidably made in its behalf, then we are bound to Fay that metaphysics is subjectively (and indeed necessarily) actual, and therefore we justly ask, how is it (objectively) possible.
26 In disjunctive judgments we consider all possibility as divided in respect to a particular concept. By the ontological principle of the universal determination of a thing in general, I understand the principle that either the one or the other of all possible contradictory predicates must be assigned to any object. This is at the same time the principle of all disjunctive judgments, constituting the foundation of our conception of possibility, and in it the possibility of every object in general is considered as determined. This may serve as a slight explanation of the above proposition: that the activity of reason in disjunctive syllogisms is formally the same as that by which it fashions the idea of a universal conception of all reality, containing in itself that which is positive in all contradictory predicates.
27 See Critique of Pure Reason, Von ded Paralogismen der reinen Verunft.
28 Were the representation of the apperception (the Ego) a concept, by which anything could be thought, it could be used as a predicate 'of other things or contain predicates in itself. But it is nothing more than the feeling of an existence without the least definite conception and is only the representation of that to which all thinking stands in relation (relative accidentis).
29 Cf. Critique, Von den Analogien der Erfahrung.
30 It is indeed very remarkable how carelessly metaphysicians have always passed over the principle of the permanents of substances without ever attempting a proof of it; doubtless because they found themselves abandoned by all proofs as soon as they began to deal with the concept of substance. Common sense, which felt distinctly that without this presupposition no union of perceptions in experience is possible, supplied the want by a postulate. From experience itself it never could derive such a principle, partly because substances cannot be so traced in all

their alterations and dissolutions, that the matter can always be found undiminished, partly because the principle contains Necessity. which is always the sign of an a priori principle. People then boldly applied this postulate to the concept of soul as a substance, and concluded a necessary continuance of the soul after the death of man (especially as the simplicity of this substance, which is interred from the indivisibility of consciousness, secured it from destruction by dissolution). Had they found the genuine source of this principles discovery which requires deeper researches than they were ever inclined to make -- they would have seen, that the law of the permanence of substances has place for the purposes of experience only, and hence can hold good of things so far as they are to be known and conjoined with others in experience, but never independently of all possible experience, and consequently cannot hold good of the soul after death.
31 Cf. Critique, Die antinomie der reinen Vernunft.
32 I therefore would be pleased to have the critical reader to devote to this antinomy of pure reason his chief attention, because nature itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretensions, and to force it to self-examination. For every proof, which I have given, as well of the thesis as of the antithesis, I undertake to be responsible, and thereby to show the certainty of the inevitable antinomy of reason. When the reader is brought by this curious phenomenon to fall back upon the proof of the presumption upon which it rests, he will feet himself obliged to investigate the ultimate foundation of all the cognition of pure reason with me more thoroughly.
33 The idea of freedom occurs only in the relation of the intellectual, as cause, to the appearance, as effect. Hence we cannot attribute freedom to matter in regard to the incessant action by which it fills its space. though this action takes place from an internal principle. We dan likewise find no notion of freedom suitable to purely rational beings, for instance, to God, so far as his action is immanent. For his action, though independent of external determining causes, is determined in his eternal reason, that is, in the divine nature. It is only, if something, is to start by an action, and so the effect occurs in the sequence of time, or in the world of sense (e.g., the beginning of the world), that we can put the question, whether the causality of the cause must in its turn have been started, or whether the cause can originate an effect without its causality itself beginning. In the former case the concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity, in the latter, that of freedom. From this the reader will see. that, as I explained freedom to be the faculty of starting an event spontaneously, I have exactly hit the notion which is the problem of metaphysics.
34 Cf. Critique, the chapter on "Transcendental Ideals."
35 Herr Platner in his Aphorisms acutely says (Sects. 728, 729), "If reason be a criterion, no concept, which is incomprehensible to human reason, can be possible. Incomprehensibility has place in what is actual only. Here incomprehensibility arises from the insufficiency of the acquired ideas." It sounds paradoxical, but is otherwise not strange to say, that in nature there is much incomprehensible (e.g., the faculty of generation) but if we mount still higher, and even go beyond nature, everything again becomes comprehensible; for we then quit entirely the objects, which can be given us, and occupy ourselves merely about ideas, in which occupation we can easily comprehend the law that reason prescribes by them to the understanding for its use in

experience, because the law is the reason's own production.
36 Der die Gegenstande anschaute.
37 [The use of the word "world" without article, though odd, seems to be the correct reading, but it may be a mere misprint. -- Ed.]
38 There is, e.g., an analogy between the juridical relation of human actions and the mechanical relation of motive powers. I never can do anything to an. other man without giving him a right to do the same to me on the same conditions; just as no mass can act with its motive power on another mass without thereby occasioning the other to react equally against it. Here right and motive power are quite dissimilar things, but in their relation there is complete similarity. By means of such an analogy I can obtain a notion of the relation of things which absolutely are unknown to me. For instance, as the promotion of the welfare of children (= a) is to the love of parents (= b), so the welfare of the human species (= c) is to that unknown [quantity which is] in God (= x), which we call love; not as if it had the least similarity to any human inclination, but because we can suppose its relation to the world to be similar to that which things of the world bear one another. But the concept of relation in this case is a mere category, viz., the concept of cause, which has nothing to do with sensibility.
39 I may say, that the causality of the Supreme Cause holds the same place with regard to the world that human reason does with regard to its works of art. Here the nature of the Supreme Cause itself remains unknown to me: I only compare its effects (the order of the world) which I know, and their conformity to reason, to the effects of human reason which I also know; and hence I term the former reason, without attributing to it on that account what I understand in man by this term, or attaching to it anything else known to me, as its property.
40 Critique Pure Reason, II., chap. 3, section 7.
41 Throughout in the Critique I never lost sight of the plan not to neglect anything, were it ever so recondite, that could render the inquiry into the nature of pure reason complete. Everybody may afterwards carry his researches as far as he pleases, when he has been merely shown what yet remains to be done. It is this a duty which must reasonably be expected of him who has made it his business to survey the whole field, in order to consign it to others for future cultivation and allotment. And to this branch both the scholia belong, which will hardly recommend themselves by their dryness to amateurs, and hence are added here for connoisseurs only.
42 By no means "higher." High towers, and metaphysically-great man resembling them, round both of which there is commonly much wind, are not for me. My place is the fruitful bathos, the bottom-land, of experience; and the word transcendental, the meaning of which is so often explained by me but not once grasped by my reviewer (so carelessly has he regarded everything), does not signify something passing beyond all experience, but some. thing that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended simply to make cognition of experience possible. If these conceptions overstep experience, their employment is termed transcendent, a word which must be distinguished from transcendental, the latter being limited to the immanent use, that is, to experience. All misunderstandings of this kind have been sufficiently guarded against in the work itself, but my reviewer found his advantage in misunderstanding me.
43 Idealism proper always has a mystical tendency, and can have no other, but mine is solely designed for the purpose of

comprehending the possibility of our cognition a priori as to objects of experience, which is a problem never hitherto solved or even suggested. In this way all mystical idealism falls to the ground, for (as may be seen already in Plato) it inferred from our cognitions a priori (even from those of geometry) another intuition different from that of the senses (namely, an intellectual intuition), because it never occurred to any one that the senses themselves might intuit a priori.

44 The reviewer often fights with his own shadow. When I oppose the truth of experience to dream, he never thinks that I am here speaking simply of the well-known somnio objective sumto of the Wolffian philosophy, which is merely formal, and with which the distinction between sleeping and waking is in no way concerned, and in a transcendental philosophy indeed can have no place. For the rest, he calls my deduction of the categories and table of the principles of the understanding," common well-known axioms of logic and ontology, expressed in an idealistic manner." The reader need only consult these Prolegomena upon this point, to convince himself that a more miserable and historically incorrect, judgment, could hardly be made.

45 [Kant rewrote these sections in the second edition of the Critique.]

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Monadology

Gottfried Leibniz

1714

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1. The monad, of which we will speak here, is nothing else than a simple substance, which goes to make up composites; by simple, we mean without parts.

2. There must be simple substances because there are composites; for a composite is nothing else than a collection or *aggregatum* of simple substances.

3. Now, where there are no constituent parts there is possible neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility. These monads are the true atoms of nature, and, in fact, the elements of things.

4. Their dissolution, therefore, is not to be feared and there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance can perish through natural means.

5. For the same reason there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance might, through natural means, come into existence, since it can not be formed by composition.

6. We may say then, that the existence of monads can begin or end only all at once, that is to say, the monad can begin only through creation and end only through annihilation. Composites, however, begin or end gradually.

7. There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed in its inner being by any other created thing, since there is no possibility of transposition within it, nor can we conceive of any internal movement which can be produced, directed, increased or diminished there within the substance, such as can take place in the case of composites where a change can occur among the parts. The monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out. The Attributes are not liable to detach themselves and make an excursion outside the substance, as could *sensible species* of the Schoolmen. In the same way neither substance nor attribute can enter from without into a monad.

8. Still monads need to have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be existences. And if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no means of perceiving any change in things. Whatever is in a composite can come into it only through its simple elements and the monads, if they were without qualities (since they do not differ at all in quantity) would be indistinguishable one from another. For instance, if we imagine *a plenum* or completely filled space, where each part receives only the equivalent of its own previous motion, one state of things would not be distinguishable from another.

9. Each monad, indeed, must be different from every other monad. For there are never in nature two beings which are exactly alike, and in which it is not possible to find a difference either internal or based on an intrinsic property.

10. I assume it as admitted that every created being, and consequently the created monad, is subject to change, and indeed that this change is continuous in each.

11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural changes of the monad come from an internal principle, because an external cause can have no influence on its inner being.

12. Now besides this principle of change there must also be in the monad a variety which changes. This variety constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and the variety of the simple substances.

13. This variety must involve a multiplicity in the unity or in that which is simple. For since every natural change takes place by degrees, there must be something which changes and something which remains unchanged, and consequently there must be in the simple substance a plurality of conditions and relations, even though it has no parts.

14. The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called *perception*. This should be carefully distinguished from apperception or consciousness, as will appear in what follows. In this matter the Cartesians have fallen into a serious error, in that they deny the existence of those perceptions of which we are not conscious. It is this also which has led them to believe that spirits alone are monads and that there are no souls of animals or other entelechies, and it has led them to make the common confusion between a protracted period of unconsciousness and actual death. They have thus adopted the Scholastic error that souls can exist entirely separated from bodies, and have even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the belief that souls are mortal.

15. The action of the internal principle which brings about the change or the passing from one perception to another may be called appetition. It is true that the desire (*l'appetit*) is not always able to attain to the whole of the perception which it strives for, but it always attains a portion of it and reaches new perceptions.

16. We, ourselves, experience a multiplicity in a simple substance, when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are conscious involves a variety in the object. Therefore all those who acknowledge that the soul is a simple substance ought to grant this multiplicity in the monad, and Monsieur Bayle should have found no difficulty in it, as he has done in his *Dictionary*, article "Rorarius."

17. It must be confessed, however, that perception, and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the composite nor in a machine that the perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the internal activities of the simple substance can consist.

18. All simple substances or created monads may be called entelechies, because they have in themselves a certain perfection. There is in them a sufficiency which makes them the source of their internal activities, and renders them, so to speak, incorporeal Automatons.

19. If we wish to designate as soul everything which has perceptions and desires in the general sense that I have just explained, all simple substances or created monads could be called souls. But since feeling is something more than a mere perception I think that the general name of monad or entelechy should suffice for simple substances which have only perception, while we may reserve the term Soul for those whose perception is more distinct and is accompanied by memory.

20. We experience in ourselves a state where we remember nothing and where we have no distinct perception, as in periods of fainting, or when we are overcome by a profound, dreamless sleep. In such a state the soul does not sensibly differ at all from a simple monad. As this state, however, is not permanent and the soul can recover from it, the soul is something more.

21. Nevertheless it does not follow at all that the simple substance is in such a state without perception. This is so because of the reasons given above; for it cannot perish, nor on the other hand would it exist without some affection and the affection is nothing else than its perception. When, however, there are a great number of weak perceptions where nothing stands out distinctively, we are stunned; as when one turns around and around in the same direction, a dizziness comes on, which makes him swoon and makes him able to distinguish nothing. Among animals, death can occasion this state for quite a period.

22. Every present state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future.

23. Therefore, since on awakening after a period of unconsciousness we become conscious of our perceptions, we must, without having been conscious of them, have had perceptions immediately before; for one perception can come in a natural way only from .another perception, just as a motion can come in a natural way only from a motion.

24. It is evident from this that if we were to have nothing distinctive, or so to speak prominent, and of a higher flavor in our perceptions, we should be in a continual state of stupor. This is the condition of monads which are wholly bare.

25. We see that nature has given to animals heightened perception, s, having provided them with organs which collect numerous rays of light or numerous waves of air and thus make them more effective in their combination. Something similar to this takes place in the case of smell, in that of taste and of touch, and perhaps in many other senses which are unknown to us. I shall have occasion very soon to explain how that which occurs in the soul represents that which goes on in the sense organs.

26. The memory furnishes a sort of consecutiveness which imitates reason but is to be distinguished from it. We see that animals when they have the perception of something which they notice and. of which they have had a similar previous perception, are led by the representation of their memory to expect that which was associated in the preceding perception, and they come to have feelings like those which they had before. For instance, if a stick be shown to a dog, he remembers the pain which it has caused him and he whines or runs away.

27. The vividness of the picture, which comes to him or moves him, is derived either from the magnitude or from the number of the previous perceptions. For, oftentimes, a strong impression brings about, all at once, the same effect as a long-continued habit or as a great many reiterated, moderate perceptions.

28. Men act in like manner as animals, in so far as the sequence of their perceptions is determined only by the law of memory, resembling the *empirical physicians* who practice simply, without any

theory, and we are empiricists in three-fourths of our actions. For instance, when we expect that there will be daylight tomorrow, we do so empirically, because it has always happened so up to the present time. It is only the astronomer who uses his reason in making such an affirmation.

29. But the knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is that which distinguishes us from mere animals and gives us reason and the sciences, thus raising us to a knowledge of ourselves and of God. This is what is called in us the Rational Soul or the Mind.

30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths and through abstractions from them that we come to perform Reflective Acts, which cause us to think of what is called the I, and to decide that this or that is within us. it is thus, that in thinking upon ourselves we think of *being*, of *substance*, of the *simple* and *composite*, of a *material* thing and of *God* himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in him without limits. These reflective acts furnish the principal objects of our reasonings.

31. Our reasoning is based upon two great principles: first, that of contradiction, by means of which we decide that to be false which involves contradiction and that to be true which contradicts or is opposed to the false.

32. And second, the principle of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise. Most frequently, however, these reasons cannot be known by us.

33. There are also two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and those of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible. Those of fact, however, are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, the reason can be found by analysis in resolving it into simpler ideas and into simpler truths until we reach those which are primary.

34. It is thus that with mathematicians the speculative theorems and the practical canons are reduced by analysis to definitions, axioms, and postulates.

35. There are finally simple ideas of which no definition can be given. There are also the axioms and postulates or, in a word, the primary principles which cannot be proved and, indeed, have no need of proof. These are identical propositions whose opposites involve express contradictions.

36. But there must be also a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact; that is to say, for the sequence of the things which extend throughout the universe of created beings, where the analysis into more particular reasons can be continued into greater detail without limit because of the immense variety of the things in nature and because of the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of figures and of movements, present and past, which enter into the efficient cause of my present writing, and in its final cause there are an infinity of slight tendencies and dispositions of my soul, present and past.

37. And as all this detail again involves other and more detailed contingencies, each of which again has need of a similar analysis in order to find its explanation, no real advance has been made. Therefore, the sufficient or ultimate reason must needs be outside of the sequence or series of these details of contingencies, however infinite they may be.

38. It is thus that the ultimate reason for things must be a necessary substance, in which the detail of the changes shall be present merely potentially, as in the fountainhead, and this substance we call God.

39. Now, since this substance is a sufficient reason for all the above mentioned details, which are linked together throughout, *there is but one God, and this God is sufficient*.

40. We may hold that the supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary with nothing independent outside of it, which is further a pure sequence of possible being, must be incapable of limitation and must contain as much reality as possible.

41. Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect, perfection being understood as the magnitude of positive reality in the strict sense, when the limitations or the bounds of those things which have them are removed. There where there are no limits, that is to say, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.

42. It follows also that created things derive their perfections through the influence of God, but their imperfections come from their own natures, which cannot exist without limits. It is in this latter that they are distinguished from God. An example of this original imperfection of created things is to be found in the natural inertia of bodies.

43. It is true, furthermore, that in God is found not only the source of existences, but also that of essences, in so far as they are real. In other words, he is the source of whatever there is real in the possible. This is because the Understanding of God is in the region of eternal truths or of the ideas upon which they depend, and because without him there would be nothing real in the possibilities of things, and not only would nothing be existent, nothing would be even possible.

44. For it must needs be that if there is a reality in essences or in possibilities or indeed in the eternal 'truths, this reality is based upon something existent and actual, and, consequently, in the existence of the necessary Being in whom essence includes existence or in whom possibility is sufficient to produce actuality.

45. Therefore God alone (or the Necessary Being) has this prerogative that if he be possible he must necessarily exist, and, as nothing is able to prevent the possibility of that which involves no bounds, no negation and consequently, no contradiction, this alone is sufficient to establish *a priori* his existence. We have, therefore, proved his existence through the reality of eternal truths. But a little while ago we also proved it *a posteriori,* because contingent beings exist which can have their ultimate and sufficient reason only in the necessary being which, in turn, has the reason for existence in itself.

46. Yet we must not think that the eternal truths being dependent upon God are therefore arbitrary and depend upon his will, as Descartes seems to have held, and after him M. Poiret. This is the case only with contingent truths which depend upon fitness or the choice of the greatest good; necessarily truths on the other hand depend solely upon his understanding and are the inner objects of it.

47. God alone is the ultimate unity or the original simple substance, of which all created or derivative monads are the products, and arise, so to speak, through the continual outflashings (fulgurations) of the divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the creature to whom limitation is an essential.

48. In God are present: power, which is the source of everything; knowledge, which contains the details of the ideas; and, finally, will, which changes or produces things in accordance with the principle of the greatest good. To these correspond in the created monad, the subject or basis, the faculty of perception, and the faculty of appetition. In God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect, while in the created monads or in the entelechies (*perfectihabies*, as Hermolaus Barbarus translates this word), they are imitations approaching him in proportion to the perfection.

49. A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has perfection, and to be acted upon by another in so far as it is imperfect. Thus action is attributed to the monad in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and passion or passivity is attributed in so far as it has confused perceptions.

50. One created thing is more perfect than another when we find in the first that which gives an *a priori* reason for what occurs in the second. This why we say that one acts upon the other.

51. In the case of simple substances, the influence which one monad has upon another is only ideal. It can have its effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God each monad can rightly demand that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regarded it also. For since one created monad cannot have a physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only through the primal regulation that one can have dependence upon another.

52. It is thus that among created things action and passivity are reciprocal. For God, in comparing two simple substances, finds in each one reasons obliging him to adapt the other to it; and consequently what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view, active in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to give a reason for what occurs in another, and passive in so far as the reason for what occurs in it is found in what is distinctly known in another.

53. Now as there are an infinity of possible universes in the ideas of God, and but one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason' for the choice of God which determines him to select one rather than another.

54. And this reason is to be found only in the fitness or in the degree of perfection which these worlds possess, each possible thing having the right to claim existence in proportion to the perfection which it involves.

55. This is the cause for the existence of the greatest good; namely, that the wisdom of God permits him to know it, his goodness causes him to choose it, and his power enables him to produce it.

56. Now this interconnection, relationship, or this adaptation of all things to each particular one, and of each one to all the rest, brings it about that every simple substance has relations which express all the others and that it is consequently a perpetual living mirror of the universe.

57. And as the same city regarded from different sides appears entirely different, and is, as it were multiplied respectively, so, because of the infinite number of simple substances, there are a similar infinite number of universes which are, nevertheless, only the aspects of a single one as seen from the special point of view of each monad.

58. Through this means has been obtained the greatest possible variety, together with the greatest order that may be; that is to say, through this means has been obtained the greatest possible perfection.

59. This hypothesis, moreover, which I venture to call demonstrated, is the only one which fittingly gives proper prominence to the greatness of God. M. Bayle recognized this when in his dictionary (article "Rorarius") he raised objections to it; indeed, he was inclined to believe that I attributed too much to God, and more than it is possible to attribute to him: But he was unable to bring forward any reason why this universal harmony which causes every substance to express exactly all others through the relation which it has with them is impossible.

60. Besides, in what has just been said can be seen the *a priori* reasons why things cannot be otherwise than they are. It is because God, in ordering the whole, has had regard to every part and in particular to each monad; and since the monad is by its very *nature representative*, nothing can

limit it to represent merely a part of things. It is nevertheless true that this representation is, as regards the details of the whole universe, only a confused representation, and is distinct only as regards a small part of them, that is to say, as regards those things which are nearest or greatest in relation to each monad. If the representation were distinct as to the details of the entire Universe, each monad would be a Deity. It is not in the object represented that the monads are limited, but in the modifications of their knowledge of the object. In a confused way they reach out to infinity or to the whole, but are limited and differentiated in the degree of their distinct perceptions.

61. In this respect composites are like simple substances, for all space is filled up; therefore, all matter is connected. And in a plenum or filled space every movement has an effect upon bodies in proportion to this distance, so that not only is every body affected by those which are in contact with it and responds in some way to whatever happens to them, but also by means of them the body responds to, those bodies adjoining them, and their intercommunication reaches to any distance whatsoever. Consequently every body responds to all that happens in the universe, so that h e who saw all could read in each one what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened and what will happen. He can discover in the present what is distant both as regards space and as regards time; "all things conspire" as Hippocrates said. A soul can, however, read in itself only what is there represented distinctly. It cannot all at once open up all its folds, because they extend to infinity.

62. Thus although each created monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it and of which it constitutes the entelechy. And as this body expresses all the universe through the interconnection of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in a particular way.

63. The body belonging to a monad, which is its entelechy or soul, constitutes together with the entelechy what may be called a *rising being*, and with a soul what is called an *animal*. Now this body of a living being or of an animal is always organic, because every monad is a mirror of the universe is regulated with perfect order there must needs be order also in what represents it, that is to say in the perceptions of the soul and consequently in the body through which the, universe is represented in the soul.

64. Therefore every organic body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, infinitely surpassing all artificial automatons. Because a machine constructed by man's skill is not a machine in each of its parts; for instance, the teeth of a brass wheel have parts or bits which to us are not artificial products and contain nothing in themselves to show the use to which the wheel was destined in the machine. The machines of nature, however, that is to say, living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts *ad infinitum*. Such is the difference between nature and art, that is to say, between divine art and ours.

65. The author of nature has been able to employ this divine and infinitely marvelous artifice, because each portion of matter is not only, as the ancients recognized, infinitely divisible, but also because it is really divided without end, every part into other parts, each one of which has its own proper motion. Otherwise it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express all the universe.

66. Whence we see that there is a world of created things, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls, in the minutest particle of matter.

67. Every portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants and like a pond full of fish. But every branch of a plant, every member of an animal, and every drop of the fluids within

it, is also such a garden or such a pond.

68. And although the ground and air which lies between the plants of the garden, and the water which is between the fish in the pond, are not themselves plants or fish, yet they nevertheless contain these, usually so small however as to be imperceptible to us.

69. There is, therefore, nothing uncultivated, or sterile or dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion, save in appearance; somewhat as a pond would appear at a distance when we could see in it a confused movement, and so to speak, a swarming of the fish, without however discerning the fish themselves.

70. It is evident, then, that every living body has a dominating entelechy, which in animals is the soul. The parts, however, of this living body are full of other living beings, plants and animals, which in turn have each one its entelechy or dominating soul.

71. This does not mean, as some who have misunderstood my thought have imagined, that each soul has a quantity or portion of matter appropriated to it or attached to itself for ever, and that it consequently owns other inferior living beings destined to serve it always; because all bodies are in a state of perpetual flux like rivers, and the parts are continually entering in or passing out.

72. The soul, therefore, changes its body only gradually and by degrees, so that it is never deprived all at once of all its organs. There is frequently a metamorphosis in animals, but never metempsychosis or a transmigration of souls. Neither are there souls wholly separate from bodies, nor bodiless spirits. God alone is without body.

73. This is also why there is never absolute generation or perfect death in the strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul from the body. What we call generation is development and growth, and what we call death is envelopment and diminution.

74. Philosophers have been much perplexed in accounting for the origin of forms, entelechies, or souls. Today, however, when it has been learned through careful investigations made in plant, insect and animal life, that the organic bodies of nature are never the product of chaos or putrefaction, but always come from seeds in which there was without doubt some preformation, it has been decided that not only is the organic body already present before conception, but also a soul in this body, in a word, the animal itself; and it has been decided that, by means of conception the animal is merely made ready for a great transformation, so as to become an animal of another sort. We can see cases somewhat similar outside of generation when grubs become flies and caterpillars butterflies.

75. These little animals, some of which by conception become large animals' may be called spermatic. Those among them which remain in their species, that is to say, the greater part, are born, multiply, and are destroyed, like the larger animals. There are only a few chosen ones which come out upon a greater stage.

76. This, however, is only half the truth. I believe, therefore, that if the animal never actually commences by natural means, no more does it by natural means come to an end. Not only is there no generation, but also there is no entire destruction or absolute death. These reasonings, carried on *a posteriori* and drawn from experience, accord perfectly with the principles which I have above deduced *a priori*.

77. Therefore we may say that not only the soul (the mirror of the indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal itself is, although its mechanism is frequently destroyed in parts and although it puts off and takes on organic coatings.

78. These principles have furnished me the means of explaining on natural grounds the union, or rather the conformity between the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise follows its own laws. They are fitted to each other in virtue of the preestablished harmony between all substances ' since they are all representations of one and the same universe.

79. Souls act in accordance with the laws of final causes through their desires, ends and means. Bodies act in accordance with the laws of efficient causes or of motion. The two realms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony, each with the other.

80. Descartes saw that souls cannot at all impart force to bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in matter. Yet he thought that the soul could change the direction of bodies. This was, however, because at that time the law of nature which affirms also that conservation of the same total direction in the motion of matter was not known. If he hid known that law, he would have fallen upon my system of preestablished harmony.

81. According to this system bodies act as if (to suppose the impossible) there were no souls at all, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and yet both body and soul act as if the one were influencing the other.

82. Although I find that essentially the same thing is true of all living things and animals, which we have just said (namely, that animals and souls begin from the very commencement of the world and that they no more come to an end than does the world) nevertheless, rational animals have this peculiarity, that their little spermatic animals, as long as they remain such, have only ordinary or sensuous souls, but those of them which are, so to speak, elected, attain by actual conception to human nature, and their sensuous souls are raised to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of spirits.

83. Among the differences that there are between ordinary souls and spirits, some of which I have already instanced, there is also this, that while souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things, spirits are also images of the Deity himself or of the author of nature. They are capable of knowing the system of the universe, and of imitating some features of it by means of artificial models, each spirit being like a small divinity in its own sphere.

84. Therefore, spirits are able to enter into a sort of social relationship with God, and with respect to them he is not only what an inventor is to his machine (as in his relation to the other created things), but be is also what a prince is to his subjects, and even what a father is to his children.

85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the totality of all spirits must compose the city of God, that is to say, the most perfect state that is possible under the most perfect monarch.

86. This city of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world within the natural world. It is what is noblest and most divine among the works of God. And in it consists in reality the glory of God, because he would have no glory were not his greatness and goodness known and wondered at by spirits. It is also in relation to this divine city that God properly has goodness. His wisdom and his power are shown everywhere.

87. As we established above that there is a perfect harmony between the two natural realms of efficient and final causes, it will be in place here to point out another harmony which appears between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, that is to say, between God considered as the architect of the mechanism of the world and God considered as the monarch of the divine city of spirits.

88. This harmony brings it about that things progress of themselves toward grace along natural

lines, and that this earth, for example, must be destroyed and restored by natural means at those times when the proper government of spirits demands it, for chastisement in the one case and for a reward in the other.

89. We can say also that God, the Architect, satisfies in all respects God the Law Giver, that therefore sins will bring their own penalty with them through the order of nature, and because of the very structure of things, mechanical though it is. And in the same way the good actions will attain their rewards in mechanical way through their relation to bodies, although this cannot and ought not always to take place without delay.

90. Finally, under this perfect government, there will be no good action unrewarded and no evil action unpunished; everything must turn out for the well-being of the good; that is to say, of those who are not disaffected in this great state, who, after having done their duty, trust in Providence and who love and imitate, as is meet, the Author of all Good, delighting in the contemplation of his perfections according to the nature of that genuine, pure love which finds pleasure in the happiness of those who are loved. It is for this reason that wise and virtuous persons work in behalf of everything which seems conformable to presumptive or antecedent will of God, and are, nevertheless, content with what God actually brings to pass through his secret, consequent and determining will, recognizing that if we were able to understand sufficiently well the order of the universe, we should find that it surpasses all the desires of the wisest of us, and that it is impossible to render it better than it is, not only for all in general, but also for each one of us in particular, provided that we have the proper attachment for the author of all, not only as the Architect and the efficient cause of our being, but also as our Lord and the Final Cause, who ought to be the whole goal of our will, and who alone can make us happy.

Notes

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Monadology.
Gottfried Leibniz
1714

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1. The monad, of which we will speak here, is nothing else than a simple substance, which goes to make up composites; by simple, we mean without parts.

2. There must be simple substances because there are composites; for a composite is nothing else than a collection or <aggregatum> of simple substances.

3. Now, where there are no constituent parts there is possible neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility. These monads are the true atoms of nature, and, in fact, the elements of things.

4. Their dissolution, therefore, is not to be feared and there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance can perish through natural means.

5. For the same reason there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance might, through natural means, come into existence, since it can not be formed by composition.

6. We may say then, that the existence of monads can begin or end only all at once, that is to say, the monad can begin only through creation and end only through annihilation. Composites, however, begin or end gradually.

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such as can take place in the case of composites where a change can occur among the parts. The monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out. The Attributes are not liable to detach themselves and make an excursion outside the substance, as could <sensible species> of the Schoolmen. In the same way neither substance nor attribute can enter from without into a monad.

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12. Now besides this principle of change there must also be in the monad a variety which changes. This variety constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and the variety of the simple substances.

13. This variety must involve a multiplicity in the unity or in that which is simple. For since every natural change takes place by degrees, there must be something which changes and something which remains unchanged, and consequently there must be in the simple substance a plurality of conditions and relations, even though it has no parts.

14. The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called <perception>. This should be carefully distinguished from apperception or consciousness, as will appear in what follows. In this matter the Cartesians have fallen into a serious error, in that they deny the existence of those perceptions of which we are not conscious. It is this also which has led them to believe that spirits alone are monads and that there are no souls of animals or other entelechies, and it has led them to make the common confusion between a protracted period of unconsciousness and actual death. They have thus adopted the Scholastic error that souls can exist entirely separated from bodies, and have even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the belief that souls are mortal.

15. The action of the internal principle which brings about the change or the passing from one perception to another may be called appetition. It is true that the desire (<l'appetit>) is not always able to attain to the whole of the perception which it strives for, but it always attains a portion of it and reaches new perceptions.

16. We, ourselves, experience a multiplicity in a simple substance, when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are conscious involves a variety in the object. Therefore all those who acknowledge that the soul is a simple substance ought to grant this multiplicity in the monad, and Monsieur Bayle should have found no difficulty in it, as he has done in his <Dictionary>, article "Rorarius."

17. It must be confessed, however, that perception, and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the composite nor in a machine that the perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the internal activities of the simple substance can consist.

18. All simple substances or created monads may be called entelechies, because they have in themselves a certain perfection. There is in them a sufficiency which makes them the source of their internal activities, and renders them, so to speak, incorporeal Automatons.

19. If we wish to designate as soul everything which has perceptions and desires in the general sense that I have just explained, all simple substances or created monads could be called souls. But since feeling is something more than a mere perception I think that the general name of monad or entelechy should suffice for simple substances which have only perception, while we may reserve the term Soul for those whose perception is more distinct and is accompanied by memory.

20. We experience in ourselves a state where we remember nothing and where we have no distinct perception, as in periods of fainting, or when we are overcome by a profound, dreamless sleep. In such a state the soul does not sensibly differ at all from a simple monad. As this state, however, is not permanent and the soul can recover from it, the soul is something more.

21. Nevertheless it does not follow at all that the simple substance is in such a state without perception. This is so because of the reasons given above; for it cannot perish, nor on the other hand would it exist without some affection and the affection is nothing else than its perception. When, however, there are a great number of weak perceptions where nothing stands out distinctively, we are stunned; as when one turns around and around in the same direction, a dizziness comes on, which makes him swoon and makes him able to distinguish nothing. Among

animals, death can occasion this state for quite a period.

22. Every present state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future.

23. Therefore, since on awakening after a period of unconsciousness we become conscious of our perceptions, we must, without having been conscious of them, have had perceptions immediately before; for one perception can come in a natural way only from .another perception, just as a motion can come in a natural way only from a motion.

24. It is evident from this that if we were to have nothing distinctive, or so to speak prominent, and of a higher flavor in our perceptions, we should be in a continual state of stupor. This is the condition of monads which are wholly bare.

25. We see that nature has given to animals heightened perception, s, having provided them with organs which collect numerous rays of light or numerous waves of air and thus make them more effective in their combination. Something similar to this takes place in the case of smell, in that of taste and of touch, and perhaps in many other senses which are unknown to us. I shall have occasion very soon to explain how that which occurs in the soul represents that which goes on in the sense organs.

26. The memory furnishes a sort of consecutiveness which imitates reason but is to be distinguished from it. We see that animals when they have the perception of something which they notice and. of which they have had a similar previous perception, are led by the representation of their memory to expect that which was associated in the preceding perception, and they come to have feelings like those which they had before. For instance, if a stick be shown to a dog, he remembers the pain which it has caused him and he whines or runs away.

27. The vividness of the picture, which comes to him or moves him, is derived either from the magnitude or from the number of the previous perceptions. For, oftentimes, a strong impression brings about, all at once, the same effect as a long-continued habit or as a great many reiterated, moderate perceptions.

28. Men act in like manner as animals, in so far as the sequence of their perceptions is determined only by the law of memory, resembling the <empirical physicians> who practice simply, without any theory, and we are empiricists in three-fourths of our actions. For instance, when we expect that there will be daylight tomorrow, we do so empirically, because it has always happened so up to the present time. It is only the astronomer who uses his reason in making such an affirmation.

29. But the knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is that which distinguishes us from mere animals and gives us reason and the sciences, thus raising us to a knowledge of ourselves and of God. This is what is called in us the Rational Soul or the Mind.

30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths and through abstractions from them that we come to perform Reflective

Acts, which cause us to think of what is called the I, and to decide that this or that is within us. it is thus, that in thinking upon ourselves we think of <being>, of <substance>, of the <simple> and <composite>, of a <material> thing and of <God> himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in him without limits. These reflective acts furnish the principal objects of our reasonings.

31. Our reasoning is based upon two great principles: first, that of contradiction, by means of which we decide that to be false which involves contradiction and that to be true which contradicts or is opposed to the false.

32. And second, the principle of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise. Most frequently, however, these reasons cannot be known by us.

33. There are also two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and those of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible. Those of fact, however, are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, the reason can be found by analysis in resolving it into simpler ideas and into simpler truths until we reach those which are primary.

34. It is thus that with mathematicians the speculative theorems and the practical canons are reduced by analysis to definitions, axioms, and postulates.

35. There are finally simple ideas of which no definition can be given. There are also the axioms and postulates or, in a word, the primary principles which cannot be proved and, indeed, have no need of proof. These are identical propositions whose opposites involve express contradictions.

36. But there must be also a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact; that is to say, for the sequence of the things which extend throughout the universe of created beings, where the analysis into more particular reasons can be continued into greater detail without limit because of the immense variety of the things in nature and because of the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of figures and of movements, present and past, which enter into the efficient cause of my present writing, and in its final cause there are an infinity of slight tendencies and dispositions of my soul, present and past.

37. And as all this detail again involves other and more detailed contingencies, each of which again has need of a similar analysis in order to find its explanation, no real advance has been made. Therefore, the sufficient or ultimate reason must needs be outside of the sequence or series of these details of contingencies, however infinite they may be.

38. It is thus that the ultimate reason for things must be a necessary substance, in which the detail of the changes shall be present merely potentially, as in the fountainhead, and this substance we call God.

39. Now, since this substance is a sufficient reason for all the above mentioned details, which are linked together throughout, <there is but one God>, <and this God is sufficient>.

40. We may hold that the supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary with nothing independent outside of it, which is further a pure sequence of possible being, must be incapable of limitation and must contain as much reality as possible.

41. Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect, perfection being understood as the magnitude of positive reality in the strict sense, when the limitations or the bounds of those things which have them are removed. There where there are no limits, that is to say, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.

42. It follows also that created things derive their perfections through the influence of God, but their imperfections come from their own natures, which cannot exist without limits. It is in this latter that they are distinguished from God. An example of this original imperfection of created things is to be found in the natural inertia of bodies.

43. It is true, furthermore, that in God is found not only the source of existences, but also that of essences, in so far as they are real. In other words, he is the source of whatever there is real in the possible. This is because the Understanding of God is in the region of eternal truths or of the ideas upon which they depend, and because without him there would be nothing real in the possibilities of things, and not only would nothing be existent, nothing would be even possible.

44. For it must needs be that if there is a reality in essences or in possibilities or indeed in the eternal 'truths, this reality is based upon something existent and actual, and, consequently, in the existence of the necessary Being in whom essence includes existence or in whom possibility is sufficient to produce actuality.

45. Therefore God alone (or the Necessary Being) has this prerogative that if he be possible he must necessarily exist, and, as nothing is able to prevent the possibility of that which involves no bounds, no negation and consequently, no contradiction, this alone is sufficient to establish <a priori> his existence. We have, therefore, proved his existence through the reality of eternal truths. But a little while ago we also proved it <a posteriori>, because contingent beings exist which can have their ultimate and sufficient reason only in the necessary being which, in turn, has the reason for existence in itself.

46. Yet we must not think that the eternal truths being dependent upon God are therefore arbitrary and depend upon his will, as Descartes seems to have held, and after him M. Poiret. This is the case only with contingent truths which depend upon fitness or the choice of the greatest good; necessarily truths on the other hand depend solely upon his understanding and are the inner objects of it.

47. God alone is the ultimate unity or the original simple

substance, of which all created or derivative monads are the products, and arise, so to speak, through the continual outflashings (fulgurations) of the divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the creature to whom limitation is an essential.

48. In God are present: power, which is the source of everything; knowledge, which contains the details of the ideas; and, finally, will, which changes or produces things in accordance with the principle of the greatest good. To these correspond in the created monad, the subject or basis, the faculty of perception, and the faculty of appetition. In God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect, while in the created monads or in the entelechies (<perfectihabies>, as Hermolaus Barbarus translates this word), they are imitations approaching him in proportion to the perfection.

49. A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has perfection, and to be acted upon by another in so far as it is imperfect. Thus action is attributed to the monad in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and passion or passivity is attributed in so far as it has confused perceptions.

50. One created thing is more perfect than another when we find in the first that which gives an <a priori> reason for what occurs in the second. This why we say that one acts upon the other.

51. In the case of simple substances, the influence which one monad has upon another is only ideal. It can have its effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God each monad can rightly demand that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regarded it also. For since one created monad cannot have a physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only through the primal regulation that one can have dependence upon another.

52. It is thus that among created things action and passivity are reciprocal. For God, in comparing two simple substances, finds in each one reasons obliging him to adapt the other to it; and consequently what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view, active in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to give a reason for what occurs in another, and passive in so far as the reason for what occurs in it is found in what is distinctly known in another.

53. Now as there are an infinity of possible universes in the ideas of God, and but one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason' for the choice of God which determines him to select one rather than another.

54. And this reason is to be found only in the fitness or in the degree of perfection which these worlds possess, each possible thing having the right to claim existence in proportion to the perfection which it involves.

55. This is the cause for the existence of the greatest good; namely, that the wisdom of God permits him to know it, his goodness causes him to choose it, and his power enables him to produce it.

56. Now this interconnection, relationship, or this adaptation of all things to each particular one, and of each one to all the rest, brings it about that every simple substance has relations which express all the others and that it is consequently a perpetual living mirror of the universe.

57. And as the same city regarded from different sides appears entirely different, and is, as it were multiplied respectively, so, because of the infinite number of simple substances, there are a similar infinite number of universes which are, nevertheless, only the aspects of a single one as seen from the special point of view of each monad.

58. Through this means has been obtained the greatest possible variety, together with the greatest order that may be; that is to say, through this means has been obtained the greatest possible perfection.

59. This hypothesis, moreover, which I venture to call demonstrated, is the only one which fittingly gives proper prominence to the greatness of God. M. Bayle recognized this when in his dictionary (article "Rorarius") he raised objections to it; indeed, he was inclined to believe that I attributed too much to God, and more than it is possible to attribute to him: But he was unable to bring forward any reason why this universal harmony which causes every substance to express exactly all others through the relation which it has with them is impossible.

60. Besides, in what has just been said can be seen the <a priori> reasons why things cannot be otherwise than they are. It is because God, in ordering the whole, has had regard to every part and in particular to each monad; and since the monad is by its very <nature representative>, nothing can limit it to represent merely a part of things. It is nevertheless true that this representation is, as regards the details of the whole universe, only a confused representation, and is distinct only as regards a small part of them, that is to say, as regards those things which are nearest or greatest in relation to each monad. If the representation were distinct as to the details of the entire Universe, each monad would be a Deity. It is not in the object represented that the monads are limited, but in the modifications of their knowledge of the object. In a confused way they reach out to infinity or to the whole, but are limited and differentiated in the degree of their distinct perceptions.

61. In this respect composites are like simple substances, for all space is filled up; therefore, all matter is connected. And in a plenum or filled space every movement has an effect upon bodies in proportion to this distance, so that not only is every body affected by those which are in contact with it and responds in some way to whatever happens to them, but also by means of them the body responds to, those bodies adjoining them, and their intercommunication reaches to any distance whatsoever. Consequently every body responds to all that happens in the universe, so that h e who saw all could read in each one what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened and what will happen. He can discover in the present what is distant both as regards space and as regards time; "all things conspire" as Hippocrates said. A soul can, however, read in itself only what is there represented distinctly. It cannot all at once open up all its folds, because they extend to infinity.

62. Thus although each created monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it and of which it constitutes the entelechy. And as this body expresses all the universe through the interconnection of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in a particular way.

63. The body belonging to a monad, which is its entelechy or soul, constitutes together with the entelechy what may be called a <rising being>, and with a soul what is called an <animal>. Now this body of a living being or of an animal is always organic, because every monad is a mirror of the universe is regulated with perfect order there must needs be order also in what represents it, that is to say in the perceptions of the soul and consequently in the body through which the, universe is represented in the soul.

64. Therefore every organic body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, infinitely surpassing all artificial automatons. Because a machine constructed by man's skill is not a machine in each of its parts; for instance, the teeth of a brass wheel have parts or bits which to us are not artificial products and contain nothing in themselves to show the use to which the wheel was destined in the machine. The machines of nature, however, that is to say, living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts <ad infinitum>. Such is the difference between nature and art, that is to say, between divine art and ours.

65. The author of nature has been able to employ this divine and infinitely marvelous artifice, because each portion of matter is not only, as the ancients recognized, infinitely divisible, but also because it is really divided without end, every part into other parts, each one of which has its own proper motion. Otherwise it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express all the universe.

66. Whence we see that there is a world of created things, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls, in the minutest particle of matter.

67. Every portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants and like a pond full of fish. But every branch of a plant, every member of an animal, and every drop of the fluids within it, is also such a garden or such a pond.

68. And although the ground and air which lies between the plants of the garden, and the water which is between the fish in the pond, are not themselves plants or fish, yet they nevertheless contain these, usually so small however as to be imperceptible to us.

69. There is, therefore, nothing uncultivated, or sterile or dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion, save in appearance; somewhat as a pond would appear at a distance when we could see in it a confused movement, and so to speak, a swarming of the fish, without however discerning the fish themselves.

70. It is evident, then, that every living body has a

dominating entelechy, which in animals is the soul. The parts, however, of this living body are full of other living beings, plants and animals, which in turn have each one its entelechy or dominating soul.

71. This does not mean, as some who have misunderstood my thought have imagined, that each soul has a quantity or portion of matter appropriated to it or attached to itself for ever, and that it consequently owns other inferior living beings destined to serve it always; because all bodies are in a state of perpetual flux like rivers, and the parts are continually entering in or passing out.

72. The soul, therefore, changes its body only gradually and by degrees, so that it is never deprived all at once of all its organs. There is frequently a metamorphosis in animals, but never metempsychosis or a transmigration of souls. Neither are there souls wholly separate from bodies, nor bodiless spirits. God alone is without body.

73. This is also why there is never absolute generation or perfect death in the strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul from the body. What we call generation is development and growth, and what we call death is envelopment and diminution.

74. Philosophers have been much perplexed in accounting for the origin of forms, entelechies, or souls. Today, however, when it has been learned through careful investigations made in plant, insect and animal life, that the organic bodies of nature are never the product of chaos or putrefaction, but always come from seeds in which there was without doubt some preformation, it has been decided that not only is the organic body already present before conception, but also a soul in this body, in a word, the animal itself; and it has been decided that, by means of conception the animal is merely made ready for a great transformation, so as to become an animal of another sort. We can see cases somewhat similar outside of generation when grubs become flies and caterpillars butterflies.

75. These little animals, some of which by conception become large animals' may be called spermatic. Those among them which remain in their species, that is to say, the greater part, are born, multiply, and are destroyed, like the larger animals. There are only a few chosen ones which come out upon a greater stage.

76. This, however, is only half the truth. I believe, therefore, that if the animal never actually commences by natural means, no more does it by natural means come to an end. Not only is there no generation, but also there is no entire destruction or absolute death. These reasonings, carried on <a posteriori> and drawn from experience, accord perfectly with the principles which I have above deduced <a priori>.

77. Therefore we may say that not only the soul (the mirror of the indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal itself is, although its mechanism is frequently destroyed in parts and although it puts off and takes on organic coatings.

78. These principles have furnished me the means of explaining on natural grounds the union, or rather the conformity between the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own

laws, and the body likewise follows its own laws. They are fitted to each other in virtue of the preestablished harmony between all substances ' since they are all representations of one and the same universe.

79. Souls act in accordance with the laws of final causes through their desires, ends and means. Bodies act in accordance with the laws of efficient causes or of motion. The two realms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony, each with the other.

80. Descartes saw that souls cannot at all impart force to bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in matter. Yet he thought that the soul could change the direction of bodies. This was, however, because at that time the law of nature which affirms also that conservation of the same total direction in the motion of matter was not known. If he hid known that law, he would have fallen upon my system of preestablished harmony.

81. According to this system bodies act as if (to suppose the impossible) there were no souls at all, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and yet both body and soul act as if the one were influencing the other.

82. Although I find that essentially the same thing is true of all living things and animals, which we have just said (namely, that animals and souls begin from the very commencement of the world and that they no more come to an end than does the world) nevertheless, rational animals have this peculiarity, that their little spermatic animals, as long as they remain such, have only ordinary or sensuous souls, but those of them which are, so to speak, elected, attain by actual conception to human nature, and their sensuous souls are raised to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of spirits.

83. Among the differences that there are between ordinary souls and spirits, some of which I have already instanced, there is also this, that while souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things, spirits are also images of the Deity himself or of the author of nature. They are capable of knowing the system of the universe, and of imitating some features of it by means of artificial models, each spirit being like a small divinity in its own sphere.

84. Therefore, spirits are able to enter into a sort of social relationship with God, and with respect to them he is not only what an inventor is to his machine (as in his relation to the other created things), but be is also what a prince is to his subjects, and even what a father is to his children.

85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the totality of all spirits must compose the city of God, that is to say, the most perfect state that is possible under the most perfect monarch.

86. This city of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world within the natural world. It is what is noblest and most divine among the works of God. And in it consists in reality the glory of God, because he would have no glory were not his greatness and goodness known and wondered at by spirits. It is also in relation to this divine city that God properly has

goodness. His wisdom and his power are shown everywhere.

87. As we established above that there is a perfect harmony between the two natural realms of efficient and final causes, it will be in place here to point out another harmony which appears between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, that is to say, between God considered as the architect of the mechanism of the world and God considered as the monarch of the divine city of spirits.

88. This harmony brings it about that things progress of themselves toward grace along natural lines, and that this earth, for example, must be destroyed and restored by natural means at those times when the proper government of spirits demands it, for chastisement in the one case and for a reward in the other.

89. We can say also that God, the Architect, satisfies in all respects God the Law Giver, that therefore sins will bring their own penalty with them through the order of nature, and because of the very structure of things, mechanical though it is. And in the same way the good actions will attain their rewards in mechanical way through their relation to bodies, although this cannot and ought not always to take place without delay.

90. Finally, under this perfect government, there will be no good action unrewarded and no evil action unpunished; everything must turn out for the well-being of the good; that is to say, of those who are not disaffected in this great state, who, after having done their duty, trust in Providence and who love and imitate, as is meet, the Author of all Good, delighting in the contemplation of his perfections according to the nature of that genuine, pure love which finds pleasure in the happiness of those who are loved. It is for this reason that wise and virtuous persons work in behalf of everything which seems conformable to presumptive or antecedent will of God, and are, nevertheless, content with what God actually brings to pass through his secret, consequent and determining will, recognizing that if we were able to understand sufficiently well the order of the universe, we should find that it surpasses all the desires of the wisest of us, and that it is impossible to render it better than it is, not only for all in general, but also for each one of us in particular, provided that we have the proper attachment for the author of all, not only as the Architect and the efficient cause of our being, but also as our Lord and the Final Cause, who ought to be the whole goal of our will, and who alone can make us happy.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

A Letter Concerning Toleration

John Locke

1/20/96

HONOURED SIR,

Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual toleration of Christians in their different professions of religion, I must needs answer you freely that I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristic mark of the true Church. For whatsoever some people boast of the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward worship; others, of the reformation of their discipline; all, of the orthodoxy of their faith- for everyone is orthodox to himself- these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks of men striving for power and empire over one another than of the Church of Christ. Let anyone have never so true a claim to all these things, yet if he be destitute of charity, meekness, and good-will in general towards all mankind, even to those that are not Christians, he is certainly yet short of being a true Christian himself. "The kings of the Gentiles exercise leadership over them," said our Saviour to his disciples, "but ye shall not be so" (Luke 22. 25). The business of true religion is quite another thing. It is not instituted in order to the erecting of an external pomp, nor to the obtaining of ecclesiastical dominion, nor to the exercising of compulsive force, but to the regulating of men's lives, according to the rules of virtue and piety. Whosoever will list himself under the banner of Christ, must, in the first place and above all things, make war upon his own lusts and vices. It is in vain for any man to unsurp the name of Christian, without holiness of life, purity of manners, benignity and meekness of spirit. "Let everyone that nameth the name of Christ, depart from iniquity" (II Tim. 2. 19). "Thou, when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren," said our Lord to Peter (Luke 22. 32). It would, indeed, be very hard for one that appears careless about his own salvation to persuade me that he were extremely concerned for mine. For it is impossible that those should sincerely and heartily apply themselves to make other people Christians, who have not really embraced the Christian religion in their own hearts. If the Gospel and the apostles may be credited, no man can be a Christian without charity and without that faith which works, not by force, but by love. Now, I appeal to the consciences of those that persecute, torment, destroy, and kill other men upon pretence of religion, whether they do it out of friendship and kindness towards them or no? And I shall then indeed, and not until then, believe they do so, when I shall see those fiery zealots

correcting, in the same manner, their friends and familiar acquaintance for the manifest sins they commit against the precepts of the Gospel; when I shall see them persecute with fire and sword the members of their own communion that are tainted with enormous vices and without amendment are in danger of eternal perdition; and when I shall see them thus express their love and desire of the salvation of their souls by the infliction of torments and exercise of all manner of cruelties. For if it be out of a principle of charity, as they pretend, and love to men's souls that they deprive them of their estates, maim them with corporal punishments, starve and torment them in noisome prisons, and in the end even take away their lives- I say, if all this be done merely to make men Christians and procure their salvation, why then do they suffer whoredom, fraud, malice, and such-like enormities, which (according to the apostle; Rom. I). manifestly relish of heathenish corruption, to predominate so much and abound amongst their flocks and people? These, and such-like things, are certainly more contrary to the glory of God, to the purity of the Church, and to the salvation of souls, than any conscientious dissent from ecclesiastical decisions, or separation from public worship, whilst accompanied with innocence of life. Why, then, does this burning zeal for God, for the Church, and for the salvation of souls- burning I say, literally, with fire and faggot- pass by those moral vices and wickednesses, without any chastisement, which are acknowledged by all men to be diametrically opposite to the profession of Christianity, and bend all its nerves either to the introducing of ceremonies, or to the establishment of opinions, which for the most part are about nice and intricate matters, that exceed the capacity of ordinary understandings? Which of the parties contending about these things is in the right, which of them is guilty of schism or heresy, whether those that domineer or those that suffer, will then at last be manifest when the causes of their separation comes to be judged of He, certainly, that follows Christ, embraces His doctrine, and bears His yoke, though he forsake both father and mother, separate from the public assemblies and ceremonies of his country, or whomsoever or whatsoever else he relinquishes, will not then be judged a heretic.

Now, though the divisions that are amongst sects should be allowed to be never so obstructive of the salvation of souls; yet, nevertheless, adultery, fornication, uncleanliness, lasciviousness, idolatry, and such-like things, cannot be denied to be works of the flesh, concerning which the apostle has expressly declared that "they who do them shall not inherit the kingdom of God" (Gal. 5). Whosoever, therefore, is sincerely solicitous about the kingdom of God and thinks it his duty to endeavour the enlargement of it amongst men, ought to apply himself with no less care and industry to the rooting out of these immoralities than to the extirpation of sects. But if anyone do otherwise, and whilst he is cruel and implacable towards those that differ from him in opinion, he be indulgent to such iniquities and immoralities as are unbecoming the name of a Christian, let such a one talk never so much of the Church, he plainly demonstrates by his actions that it is another kingdom he aims at and not the advancement of the kingdom of God.

That any man should think fit to cause another man- whose salvation he heartily desires- to expire in torments, and that even in an unconverted state, would, I confess, seem very strange to me, and I think, to any other also. But nobody, surely, will ever believe that such a carriage can proceed from charity, love, or goodwill. If anyone maintain that men ought to be compelled by fire and sword to profess certain doctrines, and conform to this or that exterior worship, without any regard had unto their morals; if anyone endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto the faith, by forcing them to profess things that they do not believe and allowing them to practise things that the Gospel does not permit, it cannot be doubted indeed but such a one is desirous to have a numerous assembly joined in the same profession with himself; but that he principally intends by those

means to compose a truly Christian Church is altogether incredible. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at if those who do not really contend for the advancement of the true religion, and of the Church of Christ, make use of arms that do not belong to the Christian warfare. If, like the Captain of our salvation, they sincerely desired the good of souls, they would tread in the steps and follow the perfect example of that Prince of Peace, who sent out His soldiers to the subduing of nations, and gathering them into His Church, not armed with the sword, or other instruments of force, but prepared with the Gospel of peace and with the exemplary holiness of their conversation. This was His method. Though if infidels were to be converted by force, if those that are either blind or obstinate were to be drawn off from their errors by armed soldiers, we know very well that it was much more easy for Him to do it with armies of heavenly legions than for any son of the Church, how potent soever, with all his dragoons.

The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light. I will not here tax the pride and ambition of some, the passion and uncharitable zeal of others. These are faults from which human affairs can perhaps scarce ever be perfectly freed; but yet such as nobody will bear the plain imputation of, without covering them with some specious colour; and so pretend to commendation, whilst they are carried away by their own irregular passions. But, however, that some may not colour their spirit of persecution and unchristian cruelty with a pretence of care of the public weal and observation of the laws; and that others, under pretence of religion, may not seek impunity for their libertinism and licentiousness; in a word, that none may impose either upon himself or others, by the pretences of loyalty and obedience to the prince, or of tenderness and sincerity in the worship of God; I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising between those that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side, a concernment for the interest of men's souls, and, on the other side, a care of the commonwealth.

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests.

Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.

It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all the people in general and to every one of his subjects in particular the just possession of these things belonging to this life. If anyone presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity, established for the preservation of those things, his presumption is to be checked by the fear of punishment, consisting of the deprivation or diminution of those civil interests, or goods, which otherwise he might and ought to enjoy. But seeing no man does willingly suffer himself to be punished by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much less of his liberty or life, therefore, is the magistrate armed with the force and strength of all his subjects, in order to the punishment of those that violate any other man's rights.

Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments, and that all civil power, right and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls, these following considerations seem unto me abundantly to demonstrate.

First, because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate, any more than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God; because it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another as to compel anyone to his religion. Nor can any such power be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people, because no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion consist in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing. Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true and the other well pleasing unto God, such profession and such practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation. For in this manner, instead of expiating other sins by the exercise of religion, I say, in offering thus unto God Almighty such a worship as we esteem to be displeasing unto Him, we add unto the number of our other sins those also of hypocrisy and contempt of His Divine Majesty.

In the second place, the care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force; but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgement that they have framed of things.

It may indeed be alleged that the magistrate may make use of arguments, and, thereby; draw the heterodox into the way of truth, and procure their salvation. I grant it; but this is common to him with other men. In teaching, instructing, and redressing the erroneous by reason, he may certainly do what becomes any good man to do. Magistracy does not oblige him to put off either humanity or Christianity; but it is one thing to persuade, another to command; one thing to press with arguments, another with penalties. This civil power alone has a right to do; to the other, goodwill is authority enough. Every man has commission to admonish, exhort, convince another of error, and, by reasoning, to draw him into truth; but to give laws, receive obedience, and compel with the sword, belongs to none but the magistrate. And, upon this ground, I affirm that the magistrate's power extends not to the establishing of any articles of faith, or forms of worship, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force at all without penalties, and penalties in this case are absolutely impertinent, because they are not proper to convince the mind. Neither the profession of any articles of faith, nor the conformity to any outward form of worship (as has been already said), can be available to the salvation of souls, unless the truth of the one and the acceptableness of the other unto God be thoroughly believed by those that so profess and practise. But penalties are no way capable to produce such belief. It is only light and evidence that can work a change in men's opinions; which light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings, or any other outward penalties.

In the third place, the care of the salvation of men's souls cannot belong to the magistrate; because, though the rigour of laws and the force of penalties were capable to convince and change men's minds, yet would not that help at all to the salvation of their souls. For there being but one truth, one way to heaven, what hope is there that more men would be led into it if they had no rule but the religion of the court and were put under the necessity to quit the light of their own reason, and oppose the dictates of their own consciences, and blindly to resign themselves up to the will of their governors and to the religion which either ignorance, ambition, or superstition had chanced to

establish in the countries where they were born? In the variety and contradiction of opinions in religion, wherein the princes of the world are as much divided as in their secular interests, the narrow way would be much straitened; one country alone would be in the right, and all the rest of the world put under an obligation of following their princes in the ways that lead to destruction; and that which heightens the absurdity, and very ill suits the notion of a Deity, men would owe their eternal happiness or misery to the places of their nativity.

These considerations, to omit many others that might have been urged to the same purpose, seem unto me sufficient to conclude that all the power of civil government relates only to men's civil interests, is confined to the care of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to come.

Let us now consider what a church is. A church, then, I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls.

I say it is a free and voluntary society. Nobody is born a member of any church; otherwise the religion of parents would descend unto children by the same right of inheritance as their temporal estates, and everyone would hold his faith by the same tenure he does his lands, than which nothing can be imagined more absurd. Thus, therefore, that matter stands. No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect, but everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God. The hope of salvation, as it was the only cause of his entrance into that communion, so it can be the only reason of his stay there. For if afterwards he discover anything either erroneous in the doctrine or incongruous in the worship of that society to which he has joined himself, why should it not be as free for him to go out as it was to enter? No member of a religious society can be tied with any other bonds but what proceed from the certain expectation of eternal life. A church, then, is a society of members voluntarily uniting to that end.

It follows now that we consider what is the power of this church and unto what laws it is subject.

Forasmuch as no society, how free soever, or upon whatsoever slight occasion instituted, whether of philosophers for learning, of merchants for commerce, or of men of leisure for mutual conversation and discourse, no church or company, I say, can in the least subsist and hold together, but will presently dissolve and break in pieces, unless it be regulated by some laws, and the members all consent to observe some order. Place and time of meeting must be agreed on; rules for admitting and excluding members must be established; distinction of officers, and putting things into a regular course, and suchlike, cannot be omitted. But since the joining together of several members into this church-society, as has already been demonstrated, is absolutely free and spontaneous, it necessarily follows that the right of making its laws can belong to none but the society itself; or, at least (which is the same thing), to those whom the society by common consent has authorised thereunto.

Some, perhaps, may object that no such society can be said to be a true church unless it have in it a bishop or presbyter, with ruling authority derived from the very apostles, and continued down to the present times by an uninterrupted succession.

To these I answer: In the first place, let them show me the edict by which Christ has imposed that law upon His Church. And let not any man think me impertinent, if in a thing of this consequence I require that the terms of that edict be very express and positive; for the promise He has made us (Matt. 18. 20), that "wheresoever two or three are gathered together" in His name, He will be in

the midst of them, seems to imply the contrary. Whether such an assembly want anything necessary to a true church, pray do you consider. Certain I am that nothing can be there wanting unto the salvation of souls, which is sufficient to our purpose.

Next, pray observe how great have always been the divisions amongst even those who lay so much stress upon the Divine institution and continued succession of a certain order of rulers in the Church. Now, their very dissension unavoidably puts us upon a necessity of deliberating and, consequently, allows a liberty of choosing that which upon consideration we prefer.

And, in the last place, I consent that these men have a ruler in their church, established by such a long series of succession as they judge necessary, provided I may have liberty at the same time to join myself to that society in which I am persuaded those things are to be found which are necessary to the salvation of my soul. In this manner ecclesiastical liberty will be preserved on all sides, and no man will have a legislator imposed upon him but whom himself has chosen.

But since men are so solicitous about the true church, I would only ask them here, by the way, if it be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ to make the conditions of her communion consist in such things, and such things only, as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in express words, to be necessary to salvation; I ask, I say, whether this be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ than for men to impose their own inventions and interpretations upon others as if they were of Divine authority, and to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely necessary to the profession of Christianity, such things as the Holy Scriptures do either not mention, or at least not expressly command? Whosoever requires those things in order to ecclesiastical communion, which Christ does not require in order to life eternal, he may, perhaps, indeed constitute a society accommodated to his own opinion and his own advantage; but how that can be called the Church of Christ which is established upon laws that are not His, and which excludes such persons from its communion as He will one day receive into the Kingdom of Heaven, I understand not. But this being not a proper place to inquire into the marks of the true church, I will only mind those that contend so earnestly for the decrees of their own society, and that cry out continually, "The Church! the Church!" with as much noise, and perhaps upon the same principle, as the Ephesian silversmiths did for their Diana; this, I say, I desire to mind them of, that the Gospel frequently declares that the true disciples of Christ must suffer persecution; but that the Church of Christ should persecute others, and force others by fire and sword to embrace her faith and doctrine, I could never yet find in any of the books of the New Testament.

The end of a religious society (as has already been said) is the public worship of God and, by means thereof, the acquisition of eternal life. All discipline ought, therefore, to tend to that end, and all ecclesiastical laws to be thereunto confined. Nothing ought nor can be transacted in this society relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods. No force is here to be made use of upon any occasion whatsoever. For force belongs wholly to the civil magistrate, and the possession of all outward goods is subject to his jurisdiction.

But, it may be asked, by what means then shall ecclesiastical laws be established, if they must be thus destitute of all compulsive power? I answer: They must be established by means suitable to the nature of such things, whereof the external profession and observation- if not proceeding from a thorough conviction and approbation of the mind- is altogether useless and unprofitable. The arms by which the members of this society are to be kept within their duty are exhortations, admonitions, and advices. If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons,

who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the society. This is the last and utmost force of ecclesiastical authority. No other punishment can thereby be inflicted than that, the relation ceasing between the body and the member which is cut off. The person so condemned ceases to be a part of that church.

These things being thus determined, let us inquire, in the next place: How far the duty of toleration extends, and what is required from everyone by it?

And, first, I hold that no church is bound, by the duty of toleration, to retain any such person in her bosom as, after admonition, continues obstinately to offend against the laws of the society. For, these being the condition of communion and the bond of the society, if the breach of them were permitted without any animadversion the society would immediately be thereby dissolved. But, nevertheless, in all such cases care is to be taken that the sentence of excommunication, and the execution thereof, carry with it no rough usage of word or action whereby the ejected person may any wise be damnified in body or estate. For all force (as has often been said) belongs only to the magistrate, nor ought any private persons at any time to use force, unless it be in self-defence against unjust violence. Excommunication neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated person of any of those civil goods that he formerly possessed. All those things belong to the civil government and are under the magistrate's protection. The whole force of excommunication consists only in this: that, the resolution of the society in that respect being declared, the union that was between the body and some member comes thereby to be dissolved; and, that relation ceasing, the participation of some certain things which the society communicated to its members, and unto which no man has any civil right, comes also to cease. For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated person by the church minister's refusing him that bread and wine, in the celebration of the Lord's Supper, which was not bought with his but other men's money.

Secondly, no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion. All the rights and franchises that belong to him as a man, or as a denizen, are inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the business of religion. No violence nor injury is to be offered him, whether he be Christian or Pagan. Nay, we must not content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare justice; charity, bounty, and liberality must be added to it. This the Gospel enjoins, this reason directs, and this that natural fellowship we are born into requires of us. If any man err from the right way, it is his own misfortune, no injury to thee; nor therefore art thou to punish him in the things of this life because thou supposest he will be miserable in that which is to come.

What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing from one another in religion, I understand also of particular churches which stand, as it were, in the same relation to each other as private persons among themselves: nor has any one of them any manner of jurisdiction over any other; no, not even when the civil magistrate (as it sometimes happens) comes to be of this or the other communion. For the civil government can give no new right to the church, nor the church to the civil government. So that, whether the magistrate join himself to any church, or separate from it, the church remains always as it was before- a free and voluntary society. It neither requires the power of the sword by the magistrate's coming to it, nor does it lose the right of instruction and excommunication by his going from it. This is the fundamental and immutable right of a spontaneous society- that it has power to remove any of its members who transgress the rules of its institution; but it cannot, by the accession of any new members, acquire any right of jurisdiction over those that are not joined with it. And therefore peace, equity, and friendship are always mutually to be observed by particular churches, in the same manner as by private persons,

without any pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over one another.

That the thing may be made clearer by an example, let us suppose two churches- the one of Arminians, the other of Calvinists- residing in the city of Constantinople. Will anyone say that either of these churches has right to deprive the members of the other of their estates and liberty (as we see practised elsewhere) because of their differing from it in some doctrines and ceremonies, whilst the Turks, in the meanwhile, silently stand by and laugh to see with what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against Christians? But if one of these churches hath this power of treating the other ill, I ask which of them it is to whom that power belongs, and by what right? It will be answered, undoubtedly, that it is the orthodox church which has the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical. This is, in great and specious words, to say just nothing at all. For every church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical. For whatsoever any church believes, it believes to be true and the contrary unto those things it pronounce; to be error. So that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on both sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at Constantinople or elsewhere upon earth, by whose sentence it can be determined. The decision of that question belongs only to the Supreme judge of all men, to whom also alone belongs the punishment of the erroneous. In the meanwhile, let those men consider how heinously they sin, who, adding injustice, if not to their error, yet certainly to their pride, do rashly and arrogantly take upon them to misuse the servants of another master, who are not at all accountable to them.

Nay, further: if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting churches were in the right, there would not accrue thereby unto the orthodox any right of destroying the other. For churches have neither any jurisdiction in worldly matters, nor are fire and sword any proper instruments wherewith to convince men's minds of error, and inform them of the truth. Let us suppose, nevertheless, that the civil magistrate inclined to favour one of them and to put his sword into their hands that (by his consent) they might chastise the dissenters as they pleased. Will any man say that any right can be derived unto a Christian church over its brethren from a Turkish emperor? An infidel, who has himself no authority to punish Christians for the articles of their faith, cannot confer such an authority upon any society of Christians, nor give unto them a right which he has not himself. This would be the case at Constantinople; and the reason of the thing is the same in any Christian kingdom. The civil power is the same in every place. Nor can that power, in the hands of a Christian prince, confer any greater authority upon the Church than in the hands of a heathen; which is to say, just none at all.

Nevertheless, it is worthy to be observed and lamented that the most violent of these defenders of the truth, the opposers of errors, the exclaimers against schism do hardly ever let loose this their zeal for God, with which they are so warmed and inflamed, unless where they have the civil magistrate on their side. But so soon as ever court favour has given them the better end of the staff, and they begin to feel themselves the stronger, then presently peace and charity are to be laid aside. Otherwise they are religiously to be observed. Where they have not the power to carry on persecution and to become masters, there they desire to live upon fair terms and preach up toleration. When they are not strengthened with the civil power, then they can bear most patiently and unmovedly the contagion of idolatry, superstition, and heresy in their neighbourhood; of which on other occasions the interest of religion makes them to be extremely apprehensive. They do not forwardly attack those errors which are in fashion at court or are countenanced by the government. Here they can be content to spare their arguments; which yet (with their leave) is the only right method of propagating truth, which has no such way of prevailing as when strong

arguments and good reason are joined with the softness of civility and good usage.

Nobody, therefore, in fine, neither single persons nor churches, nay, nor even commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other upon pretence of religion. Those that are of another opinion would do well to consider with themselves how pernicious a seed of discord and war, how powerful a provocation to endless hatreds, rapines, and slaughters they thereby furnish unto mankind. No peace and security, no, not so much as common friendship, can ever be established or preserved amongst men so long as this opinion prevails, that dominion is founded in grace and that religion is to be propagated by force of arms.

In the third place, let us see what the duty of toleration requires from those who are distinguished from the rest of mankind (from the laity, as they please to call us) by some ecclesiastical character and office; whether they be bishops, priests, presbyters, ministers, or however else dignified or distinguished. It is not my business to inquire here into the original of the power or dignity of the clergy. This only I say, that, whencesoever their authority be sprung, since it is ecclesiastical, it ought to be confined within the bounds of the Church, nor can it in any manner be extended to civil affairs, because the Church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their original, end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other. No man, therefore, with whatsoever ecclesiastical office he be dignified, can deprive another man that is not of his church and faith either of liberty or of any part of his worldly goods upon the account of that difference between them in religion. For whatsoever is not lawful to the whole Church cannot by any ecclesiastical right become lawful to any of its members.

But this is not all. It is not enough that ecclesiastical men abstain from violence and rapine and all manner of persecution. He that pretends to be a successor of the apostles, and takes upon him the office of teaching, is obliged also to admonish his hearers of the duties of peace and goodwill towards all men, as well towards the erroneous as the orthodox; towards those that differ from them in faith and worship as well as towards those that agree with them therein. And he ought industriously to exhort all men, whether private persons or magistrates (if any such there be in his church), to charity, meekness, and toleration, and diligently endeavour to ally and temper all that heat and unreasonable averseness of mind which either any man's fiery zeal for his own sect or the craft of others has kindled against dissenters. I will not undertake to represent how happy and how great would be the fruit, both in Church and State, if the pulpits everywhere sounded with this doctrine of peace and toleration, lest I should seem to reflect too severely upon those men whose dignity I desire not to detract from, nor would have it diminished either by others or themselves. But this I say, that thus it ought to be. And if anyone that professes himself to be a minister of the Word of God, a preacher of the gospel of peace, teach otherwise, he either understands not or neglects the business of his calling and shall one day give account thereof unto the Prince of Peace. If Christians are to be admonished that they abstain from all manner of revenge, even after repeated provocations and multiplied injuries, how much more ought they who suffer nothing, who have had no harm done them, forbear violence and abstain from all manner of ill-usage towards those from whom they have received none! This caution and temper they ought certainly to use towards those. who mind only their own business and are solicitous for nothing but that (whatever men think of them) they may worship God in that manner which they are persuaded is acceptable to Him and in which they have the strongest hopes of eternal salvation. In private domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man may consider what

suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes best. No man complains of the ill-management of his neighbour's affairs. No man is angry with another for an error committed in sowing his land or in marrying his daughter. Nobody corrects a spendthrift for consuming his substance in taverns. Let any man pull down, or build, or make whatsoever expenses he pleases, nobody murmurs, nobody controls him; he has his liberty. But if any man do not frequent the church, if he do not there conform his behaviour exactly to the accustomed ceremonies, or if he brings not his children to be initiated in the sacred mysteries of this or the other congregation, this immediately causes an uproar. The neighbourhood is filled with noise and clamour. Everyone is ready to be the avenger of so great a crime, and the zealots hardly have the patience to refrain from violence and rapine so long till the cause be heard and the poor man be, according to form, condemned to the loss of liberty, goods, or life. Oh, that our ecclesiastical orators of every sect would apply themselves with all the strength of arguments that they are able to the confounding of men's errors! But let them spare their persons. Let them not supply their want of reasons with the instruments of force, which belong to another jurisdiction and do ill become a Churchman's hands. Let them not call in the magistrate's authority to the aid of their eloquence or learning, lest perhaps, whilst they pretend only love for the truth, this their intemperate zeal, breathing nothing but fire and sword, betray their ambition and show that what they desire is temporal dominion. For it will be very difficult to persuade men of sense that he who with dry eyes and satisfaction of mind can deliver his brother to the executioner to be burnt alive, does sincerely and heartily concern himself to save that brother from the flames of hell in the world to come.

In the last place, let us now consider what is the magistrate's duty in the business of toleration, which certainly is very considerable.

We have already proved that the care of souls does not belong to the magistrate. Not a magisterial care, I mean (if I may so call it), which consists in prescribing by laws and compelling by punishments. But a charitable care, which consists in teaching, admonishing, and persuading, cannot be denied unto any man. The care, therefore, of every man's soul belongs unto himself and is to be left unto himself. But what if he neglect the care of his soul? I answer: What if he neglect the care of his health or of his estate, which things are nearlier related to the government of the magistrate than the other? Will the magistrate provide by an express law that such a one shall not become poor or sick? Laws provide, as much as is possible, that the goods and health of subjects be not injured by the fraud and violence of others; they do not guard them from the negligence or ill-husbandry of the possessors themselves. No man can be forced to be rich or healthful whether he will or no. Nay, God Himself will not save men against their wills. Let us suppose, however, that some prince were desirous to force his subjects to accumulate riches, or to preserve the health and strength of their bodies. Shall it be provided by law that they must consult none but Roman physicians, and shall everyone be bound to live according to their prescriptions? What, shall no potion, no broth, be taken, but what is prepared either in the Vatican, suppose, or in a Geneva shop? Or, to make these subjects rich, shall they all be obliged by law to become merchants or musicians? Or, shall everyone turn victualler, or smith, because there are some that maintain their families plentifully and grow rich in those professions? But, it may be said, there are a thousand ways to wealth, but one only way to heaven. It is well said, indeed, especially by those that plead for compelling men into this or the other way. For if there were several ways that led thither, there would not be so much as a pretence left for compulsion. But now, if I be marching on with my utmost vigour in that way which, according to the sacred geography, leads straight to Jerusalem, why am I beaten and ill-used by others because, perhaps, I wear not buskins; because my hair is

not of the right cut; because, perhaps, I have not been dipped in the right fashion; because I eat flesh upon the road, or some other food which agrees with my stomach; because I avoid certain by-ways, which seem unto me to lead into briars or precipices; because, amongst the several paths that are in the same road, I choose that to walk in which seems to be the straightest and cleanest; because I avoid to keep company with some travellers that are less grave and others that are more sour than they ought to be; or, in fine, because I follow a guide that either is, or is not, clothed in white, or crowned with a mitre? Certainly, if we consider right, we shall find that, for the most part, they are such frivolous things as these that (without any prejudice to religion or the salvation of souls, if not accompanied with superstition or hypocrisy) might either be observed or omitted. I say they are such-like things as these which breed implacable enmities amongst Christian brethren, who are all agreed in the substantial and truly fundamental part of religion.

But let us grant unto these zealots, who condemn all things that are not of their mode, that from these circumstances are different ends. What shall we conclude from thence? There is only one of these which is the true way to eternal happiness: but in this great variety of ways that men follow, it is still doubted which is the right one. Now, neither the care of the commonwealth, nor the right enacting of laws, does discover this way that leads to heaven more certainly to the magistrate than every private man's search and study discovers it unto himself. I have a weak body, sunk under a languishing disease, for which (I suppose) there is one only remedy, but that unknown. Does it therefore belong unto the magistrate to prescribe me a remedy, because there is but one, and because it is unknown? Because there is but one way for me to escape death, will it therefore be safe for me to do whatsoever the magistrate ordains? Those things that every man ought sincerely to inquire into himself, and by meditation, study, search, and his own endeavours, attain the knowledge of, cannot be looked upon as the peculiar possession of any sort of men. Princes, indeed, are born superior unto other men in power, but in nature equal. Neither the right nor the art of ruling does necessarily carry along with it the certain knowledge of other things, and least of all of true religion. For if it were so, how could it come to pass that the lords of the earth should differ so vastly as they do in religious matters? But let us grant that it is probable the way to eternal life may be better known by a prince than by his subjects, or at least that in this incertitude of things the safest and most commodious way for private persons is to follow his dictates. You will say: "What then?" If he should bid you follow merchandise for your livelihood, would you decline that course for fear it should not succeed? I answer: I would turn merchant upon the prince's command, because, in case I should have ill-success in trade, he is abundantly able to make up my loss some other way. If it be true, as he pretends, that he desires I should thrive and grow rich, he can set me up again when unsuccessful voyages have broken me. But this is not the case in the things that regard the life to come; if there I take a wrong course, if in that respect I am once undone, it is not in the magistrate's power to repair my loss, to ease my suffering, nor to restore me in any measure, much less entirely, to a good estate. What security can be given for the Kingdom of Heaven?

Perhaps some will say that they do not suppose this infallible judgement, that all men are bound to follow in the affairs of religion, to be in the civil magistrate, but in the Church. What the Church has determined, that the civil magistrate orders to be observed; and he provides by his authority that nobody shall either act or believe in the business of religion otherwise than the Church teaches. So that the judgement of those things is in the Church; the magistrate himself yields obedience thereunto and requires the like obedience from others. I answer: Who sees not how frequently the name of the Church, which was venerable in time of the apostles, has been made use

of to throw dust in the people's eyes in the following ages? But, however, in the present case it helps us not. The one only narrow way which leads to heaven is not better known to the magistrate than to private persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him for my guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is less concerned for my salvation than I myself am. Amongst so many kings of the Jews, how many of them were there whom any Israelite, thus blindly following, had not fallen into idolatry and thereby into destruction? Yet, nevertheless, you bid me be of good courage and tell me that all is now safe and secure, because the magistrate does not now enjoin the observance of his own decrees in matters of religion, but only the decrees of the Church. Of what Church, I beseech you? of that, certainly, which likes him best. As if he that compels me by laws and penalties to enter into this or the other Church, did not interpose his own judgement in the matter. What difference is there whether he lead me himself, or deliver me over to be led by others? I depend both ways upon his will, and it is he that determines both ways of my eternal state. Would an Israelite that had worshipped Baal upon the command of his king have been in any better condition because somebody had told him that the king ordered nothing in religion upon his own head, nor commanded anything to be done by his subjects in divine worship but what was approved by the counsel of priests, and declared to be of divine right by the doctors of their Church? If the religion of any Church become, therefore, true and saving, because the head of that sect, the prelates and priests, and those of that tribe, do all of them, with all their might, extol and praise it, what religion can ever be accounted erroneous, false, and destructive? I am doubtful concerning the doctrine of the Socinians, I am suspicious of the way of worship practised by the Papists, or Lutherans; will it be ever a jot safer for me to join either unto the one or the other of those Churches, upon the magistrate's command, because he commands nothing in religion but by the authority and counsel of the doctors of that Church?

But, to speak the truth, we must acknowledge that the Church (if a convention of clergymen, making canons, must be called by that name) is for the most part more apt to be influenced by the Court than the Court by the Church. How the Church was under the vicissitude of orthodox and Arian emperors is very well known. Or if those things be too remote, our modern English history affords us fresh examples in the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, how easily and smoothly the clergy changed their decrees, their articles of faith, their form of worship, everything according to the inclination of those kings and queens. Yet were those kings and queens of such different minds in point of religion, and enjoined thereupon such different things, that no man in his wits (I had almost said none but an atheist) will presume to say that any sincere and upright worshipper of God could, with a safe conscience, obey their several decrees. To conclude, it is the same thing whether a king that prescribes laws to another man's religion pretend to do it by his own judgement, or by the ecclesiastical authority and advice of others. The decisions of churchmen, whose differences and disputes are sufficiently known, cannot be any sounder or safer than his; nor can all their suffrages joined together add a new strength to the civil power. Though this also must be taken notice of- that princes seldom have any regard to the suffrages of ecclesiastics that are not favourers of their own faith and way of worship.

But, after all, the principal consideration, and which absolutely determines this controversy, is this: Although the magistrate's opinion in religion be sound, and the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet, if I be not thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against the dictates of my conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed. I may grow rich by an art that I take not delight in; I may be cured of some disease by remedies that I have not faith in; but I cannot be saved by a

religion that I distrust and by a worship that I abhor. It is in vain for an unbeliever to take up the outward show of another man's profession. Faith only and inward sincerity are the things that procure acceptance with God. The most likely and most approved remedy can have no effect upon the patient, if his stomach reject it as soon as taken; and you will in vain cram a medicine down a sick man's throat, which his particular constitution will be sure to turn into poison. In a word, whatsoever may be doubtful in religion, yet this at least is certain, that no religion which I believe not to be true can be either true or profitable unto me. In vain, therefore, do princes compel their subjects to come into their Church communion, under pretence of saving their souls. If they believe, they will come of their own accord, if they believe not, their coming will nothing avail them. How great soever, in fine, may be the pretence of good-will and charity, and concern for the salvation of men's souls, men cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no. And therefore, when all is done, they must be left to their own consciences.

Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another in matters of religion, let us now consider what they are to do. All men know and acknowledge that God ought to be publicly worshipped; why otherwise do they compel one another unto the public assemblies? Men, therefore, constituted in this liberty are to enter into some religious society, that they meet together, not only for mutual edification, but to own to the world that they worship God and offer unto His Divine Majesty such service as they themselves are not ashamed of and such as they think not unworthy of Him, nor unacceptable to Him; and, finally, that by the purity of doctrine, holiness of life, and decent form of worship, they may draw others unto the love of the true religion, and perform such other things in religion as cannot be done by each private man apart.

These religious societies I call Churches; and these, I say, the magistrate ought to tolerate, for the business of these assemblies of the people is nothing but what is lawful for every man in particular to take care of- I mean the salvation of their souls; nor in this case is there any difference between the National Church and other separated congregations.

But as in every Church there are two things especially to be considered- the outward form and rites of worship, and the doctrines and articles of things must be handled each distinctly that so the whole matter of toleration may the more clearly be understood.

Concerning outward worship, I say, in the first place, that the magistrate has no power to enforce by law, either in his own Church, or much less in another, the use of any rites or ceremonies whatsoever in the worship of God. And this, not only because these Churches are free societies, but because whatsoever is practised in the worship of God is only so far justifiable as it is believed by those that practise it to be acceptable unto Him. Whatsoever is not done with that assurance of faith is neither well in itself, nor can it be acceptable to God. To impose such things, therefore, upon any people, contrary to their own judgment, is in effect to command them to offend God, which, considering that the end of all religion is to please Him, and that liberty is essentially necessary to that end, appears to be absurd beyond expression.

But perhaps it may be concluded from hence that I deny unto the magistrate all manner of power about indifferent things, which, if it be not granted, the whole subject-matter of law-making is taken away. No, I readily grant that indifferent things, and perhaps none but such, are subjected to the legislative power. But it does not therefore follow that the magistrate may ordain whatsoever he pleases concerning anything that is indifferent. The public good is the rule and measure of all law-making. If a thing be not useful to the commonwealth, though it be never so indifferent, it may not presently be established by law.

And further, things never so indifferent in their own nature, when they are brought into the Church and worship of God, are removed out of the reach of the magistrate's jurisdiction, because in that use they have no connection at all with civil affairs. The only business of the Church is the salvation of souls, and it no way concerns the commonwealth, or any member of it, that this or the other ceremony be there made use of. Neither the use nor the omission of any ceremonies in those religious assemblies does either advantage or prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any man. For example, let it be granted that the washing of an infant with water is in itself an indifferent thing, let it be granted also that the magistrate understand such washing to be profitable to the curing or preventing of any disease the children are subject unto, and esteem the matter weighty enough to be taken care of by a law. In that case he may order it to be done. But will any one therefore say that a magistrate has the same right to ordain by law that all children shall be baptised by priests in the sacred font in order to the purification of their souls? The extreme difference of these two cases is visible to every one at first sight. Or let us apply the last case to the child of a Jew, and the thing speaks itself. For what hinders but a Christian magistrate may have subjects that are Jews? Now, if we acknowledge that such an injury may not be done unto a Jew as to compel him, against his own opinion, to practise in his religion a thing that is in its nature indifferent, how can we maintain that anything of this kind may be done to a Christian?

Again, things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by any human authority, be made any part of the worship of God- for this very reason: because they are indifferent. For, since indifferent things are not capable, by any virtue of their own, to propitiate the Deity, no human power or authority can confer on them so much dignity and excellency as to enable them to do it. In the common affairs of life that use of indifferent things which God has not forbidden is free and lawful, and therefore in those things human authority has place. But it is not so in matters of religion. Things indifferent are not otherwise lawful in the worship of God than as they are instituted by God Himself and as He, by some positive command, has ordained them to be made a part of that worship which He will vouchsafe to accept at the hands of poor sinful men. Nor, when an incensed Deity shall ask us, "Who has required these, or such-like things at your hands?" will it be enough to answer Him that the magistrate commanded them. If civil jurisdiction extend thus far, what might not lawfully be introduced into religion? What hodgepodge of ceremonies, what superstitious inventions, built upon the magistrate's authority, might not (against conscience) be imposed upon the worshippers of God? For the greatest part of these ceremonies and superstitions consists in the religious use of such things as are in their own nature indifferent; nor are they sinful upon any other account than because God is not the author of them. The sprinkling of water and the use of bread and wine are both in their own nature and in the ordinary occasions of life altogether indifferent. Will any man, therefore, say that these things could have been introduced into religion and made a part of divine worship if not by divine institution? If any human authority or civil power could have done this, why might it not also enjoin the eating of fish and drinking of ale in the holy banquet as a part of divine worship? Why not the sprinkling of the blood of beasts in churches, and expiations by water or fire, and abundance more of this kind? But these things, how indifferent soever they be in common uses, when they come to be annexed unto divine worship, without divine authority, they are as abominable to God as the sacrifice of a dog. And why is a dog so abominable? What difference is there between a dog and a goat, in respect of the divine nature, equally and infinitely distant from all affinity with matter, unless it be that God required the use of one in His worship and not of the other? We see, therefore, that indifferent things, how much soever they be under the power of the civil magistrate, yet cannot, upon that

pretence, be introduced into religion and imposed upon religious assemblies, because, in the worship of God, they wholly cease to be indifferent. He that worships God does it with design to please Him and procure His favour. But that cannot be done by him who, upon the command of another, offers unto God that which he knows will be displeasing to Him, because not commanded by Himself. This is not to please God, or appease his wrath, but willingly and knowingly to provoke Him by a manifest contempt, which is a thing absolutely repugnant to the nature and end of worship.

But it will be here asked: "If nothing belonging to divine worship be left to human discretion, how is it then that Churches themselves have the power of ordering anything about the time and place of worship and the like?" To this I answer that in religious worship we must distinguish between what is part of the worship itself and what is but a circumstance. That is a part of the worship which is believed to be appointed by God and to be well-pleasing to Him, and therefore that is necessary. Circumstances are such things which, though in general they cannot be separated from worship, yet the particular instances or modifications of them are not determined, and therefore they are indifferent. Of this sort are the time and place of worship, habit and posture of him that worships. These are circumstances, and perfectly indifferent, where God has not given any express command about them. For example: amongst the Jews the time and place of their worship and the habits of those that officiated in it were not mere circumstances, but a part of the worship itself, in which, if anything were defective, or different from the institution, they could not hope that it would be accepted by God. But these, to Christians under the liberty of the Gospel, are mere circumstances of worship, which the prudence of every Church may bring into such use as shall be judged most subservient to the end of order, decency, and edification. But, even under the Gospel, those who believe the first or the seventh day to be set apart by God, and consecrated still to His worship, to them that portion of time is not a simple circumstance, but a real part of Divine worship, which can neither be changed nor neglected.

In the next place: As the magistrate has no power to impose by his laws the use of any rites and ceremonies in any Church, so neither has he any power to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are already received, approved, and practised by any Church; because, if he did so, he would destroy the Church itself: the end of whose institution is only to worship God with freedom after its own manner.

You will say, by this rule, if some congregations should have a mind to sacrifice infants, or (as the primitive Christians were falsely accused) lustfully pollute themselves in promiscuous uncleanness, or practise any other such heinous enormities, is the magistrate obliged to tolerate them, because they are committed in a religious assembly? I answer: No. These things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life, nor in any private house; and therefore neither are they so in the worship of God, or in any religious meeting. But, indeed, if any people congregated upon account of religion should be desirous to sacrifice a calf, I deny that that ought to be prohibited by a law. Meliboeus, whose calf it is, may lawfully kill his calf at home, and burn any part of it that he thinks fit. For no injury is thereby done to any one, no prejudice to another man's goods. And for the same reason he may kill his calf also in a religious meeting. Whether the doing so be well-pleasing to God or no, it is their part to consider that do it. The part of the magistrate is only to take care that the commonwealth receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to any man, either in life or estate. And thus what may be spent on a feast may be spent on a sacrifice. But if peradventure such were the state of things that the interest of the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be forborne for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle that had been

destroyed by some extraordinary murrain, who sees not that the magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves for any use whatsoever? Only it is to be observed that, in this case, the law is not made about a religious, but a political matter; nor is the sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves, thereby prohibited.

By this we see what difference there is between the Church and the Commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth cannot be prohibited by the magistrate in the Church. Whatsoever is permitted unto any of his subjects for their ordinary use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any sect of people for their religious uses. If any man may lawfully take bread or wine, either sitting or kneeling in his own house, the law ought not to abridge him of the same liberty in his religious worship; though in the Church the use of bread and wine be very different and be there applied to the mysteries of faith and rites of Divine worship. But those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people in their ordinary use and are, therefore, forbidden by laws, those things ought not to be permitted to Churches in their sacred rites. Only the magistrate ought always to be very careful that he do not misuse his authority to the oppression of any Church, under pretence of public good.

It may be said: "What if a Church be idolatrous, is that also to be tolerated by the magistrate?" I answer: What power can be given to the magistrate for the suppression of an idolatrous Church, which may not in time and place be made use of to the ruin of an orthodox one? For it must be remembered that the civil power is the same everywhere, and the religion of every prince is orthodox to himself. If, therefore, such a power be granted unto the civil magistrate in spirituals as that at Geneva, for example, he may extirpate, by violence and blood, the religion which is there reputed idolatrous, by the same rule another magistrate, in some neighbouring country, may oppress the reformed religion and, in India, the Christian. The civil power can either change everything in religion, according to the prince's pleasure, or it can change nothing. If it be once permitted to introduce anything into religion by the means of laws and penalties, there can be no bounds put to it; but it will in the same manner be lawful to alter everything, according to that rule of truth which the magistrate has framed unto himself. No man whatsoever ought, therefore, to be deprived of his terrestrial enjoyments upon account of his religion. Not even Americans, subjected unto a Christian prince, are to be punished either in body or goods for not embracing our faith and worship. If they are persuaded that they please God in observing the rites of their own country and that they shall obtain happiness by that means, they are to be left unto God and themselves. Let us trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is: An inconsiderable and weak number of Christians, destitute of everything, arrive in a Pagan country; these foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the bowels of humanity, that they would succour them with the necessaries of life; those necessaries are given them, habitations are granted, and they all join together, and grow up into one body of people. The Christian religion by this means takes root in that country and spreads itself, but does not suddenly grow the strongest. While things are in this condition peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice are preserved amongst them. At length the magistrate becomes a Christian, and by that means their party becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken, all civil rights to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated; and unless these innocent Pagans, strict observers of the rules of equity and the law of Nature and no ways offending against the laws of the society, I say, unless they will forsake their ancient religion and embrace a new and strange one, they are to be turned out of the lands and possessions of their forefathers and perhaps deprived of life itself. Then, at last, it appears what zeal for the Church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to produce, and how easily the pretence of religion, and of the care of souls,

serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.

Now whosoever maintains that idolatry is to be rooted out of any place by laws, punishments, fire, and sword, may apply this story to himself. For the reason of the thing is equal, both in America and Europe. And neither Pagans there, nor any dissenting Christians here, can, with any right, be deprived of their worldly goods by the predominating faction of a court-church; nor are any civil rights to be either changed or violated upon account of religion in one place more than another.

But idolatry, say some, is a sin and therefore not to be tolerated. If they said it were therefore to be avoided, the inference were good. But it does not follow that because it is a sin it ought therefore to be punished by the magistrate. For it does not belong unto the magistrate to make use of his sword in punishing everything, indifferently, that he takes to be a sin against God. Covetousness, uncharitableness, idleness, and many other things are sins by the consent of men, which yet no man ever said were to be punished by the magistrate. The reason is because they are not prejudicial to other men's rights, nor do they break the public peace of societies. Nay, even the sins of lying and perjury are nowhere punishable by laws; unless, in certain cases, in which the real turpitude of the thing and the offence against God are not considered, but only the injury done unto men's neighbours and to the commonwealth. And what if in another country, to a Mahometan or a Pagan prince, the Christian religion seem false and offensive to God; may not the Christians for the same reason, and after the same manner, be extirpated there?

But it may be urged farther that, by the law of Moses, idolaters were to be rooted out. True, indeed, by the law of Moses; but that is not obligatory to us Christians. Nobody pretends that everything generally enjoined by the law of Moses ought to be practised by Christians; but there is nothing more frivolous than that common distinction of moral, judicial, and ceremonial law, which men ordinarily make use of. For no positive law whatsoever can oblige any people but those to whom it is given. "Hear, O Israel," sufficiently restrains the obligations of the law of Moses only to that people. And this consideration alone is answer enough unto those that urge the authority of the law of Moses for the inflicting of capital punishment upon idolaters. But, however, I will examine this argument a little more particularly.

The case of idolaters, in respect of the Jewish commonwealth, falls under a double consideration. The first is of those who, being initiated in the Mosaical rites, and made citizens of that commonwealth, did afterwards apostatise from the worship of the God of Israel. These were proceeded against as traitors and rebels, guilty of no less than high treason. For the commonwealth of the Jews, different in that from all others, was an absolute theocracy; nor was there, or could there be, any difference between that commonwealth and the Church. The laws established there concerning the worship of One Invisible Deity were the civil laws of that people and a part of their political government, in which God Himself was the legislator. Now, if any one can shew me where there is a commonwealth at this time, constituted upon that foundation, I will acknowledge that the ecclesiastical laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil, and that the subjects of that government both may and ought to be kept in strict conformity with that Church by the civil power. But there is absolutely no such thing under the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth. There are, indeed, many cities and kingdoms that have embraced the faith of Christ, but they have retained their ancient form of government, with which the law of Christ hath not at all meddled. He, indeed, hath taught men how, by faith and good works, they may obtain eternal life; but He instituted no commonwealth. He prescribed unto His followers no new and peculiar form of government, nor put He the sword into any magistrate's hand, with commission to make use of it in forcing men to forsake their former religion and receive His.

Secondly, foreigners and such as were strangers to the commonwealth of Israel were not compelled by force to observe the rites of the Mosaical law; but, on the contrary, in the very same place where it is ordered that an Israelite that was an idolater should be put to death (Exod. 22, 20, 21), there it is provided that strangers should not be vexed nor oppressed. I confess that the seven nations that possessed the land which was promised to the Israelites were utterly to be cut off; but this was not singly because they were idolaters. For if that had been the reason, why were the Moabites and other nations to be spared? No: the reason is this. God being in a peculiar manner the King of the Jews, He could not suffer the adoration of any other deity (which was properly an act of high treason against Himself) in the land of Canaan, which was His kingdom. For such a manifest revolt could no ways consist with His dominion, which was perfectly political in that country. All idolatry was, therefore, to be rooted out of the bounds of His kingdom because it was an acknowledgment of another god, that is say, another king, against the laws of Empire. The inhabitants were also to be driven out, that the entire possession of the land might be given to the Israelites. And for the like reason the Emims and the Horims were driven out of their countries by the children of Esau and Lot; and their lands, upon the same grounds, given by God to the invaders (Deut. 2). But, though all idolatry was thus rooted out of the land of Canaan, yet every idolater was not brought to execution. The whole family of Rahab, the whole nation of the Gibeonites, articled with Joshua, and were allowed by treaty; and there were many captives amongst the Jews who were idolaters. David and Solomon subdued many countries without the confines of the Land of Promise and carried their conquests as far as Euphrates. Amongst so many captives taken, so many nations reduced under their obedience, we find not one man forced into the Jewish religion and the worship of the true God and punished for idolatry, though all of them were certainly guilty of it. If any one, indeed, becoming a proselyte, desired to be made a denizen of their commonwealth, he was obliged to submit to their laws; that is, to embrace their religion. But this he did willingly, on his own accord, not by constraint. He did not unwillingly submit, to show his obedience, but he sought and solicited for it as a privilege. And, as soon as he was admitted, he became subject to the laws of the commonwealth, by which all idolatry was forbidden within the borders of the land of Canaan. But that law (as I have said) did not reach to any of those regions, however subjected unto the Jews, that were situated without those bounds.

Thus far concerning outward worship. Let us now consider articles of faith.

The articles of religion are some of them practical and some speculative. Now, though both sorts consist in the knowledge of truth, yet these terminate simply in the understanding, those influence the will and manners. Speculative opinions, therefore, and articles of faith (as they are called) which are required only to be believed, cannot be imposed on any Church by the law of the land. For it is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws which are not in men's power to perform. And to believe this or that to be true does not depend upon our will. But of this enough has been said already. "But." will some say; "let men at least profess that they believe." A sweet religion, indeed, that obliges men to dissemble and tell lies, both to God and man, for the salvation of their souls! If the magistrate thinks to save men thus, he seems to understand little of the way of salvation. And if he does it not in order to save them, why is he so solicitous about the articles of faith as to enact them by a law?

Further, the magistrate ought not to forbid the preaching or professing of any speculative opinions in any Church because they have no manner of relation to the civil rights of the subjects. If a Roman Catholic believe that to be really the body of Christ which another man calls bread, he does no injury thereby to his neighbour. If a Jew do not believe the New Testament to be the Word of

God, he does not thereby alter anything in men's civil rights. If a heathen doubt of both Testaments, he is not therefore to be punished as a pernicious citizen. The power of the magistrate and the estates of the people may be equally secure whether any man believe these things or no. I readily grant that these opinions are false and absurd. But the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man's goods and person. And so it ought to be. For the truth certainly would do well enough if she were once left to shift for herself. She seldom has received and, I fear, never will receive much assistance from the power of great men, to whom she is but rarely known and more rarely welcome. She is not taught by laws, nor has she any need of force to procure her entrance into the minds of men. Errors, indeed, prevail by the assistance of foreign and borrowed succours. But if Truth makes not her way into the understanding by her own light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her. Thus much for speculative opinions. Let us now proceed to practical ones.

A good life, in which consist not the least part of religion and true piety, concerns also the civil government; and in it lies the safety both of men's souls and of the commonwealth. Moral actions belong, therefore, to the jurisdiction both of the outward and inward court; both of the civil and domestic governor; I mean both of the magistrate and conscience. Here, therefore, is great danger, lest one of these jurisdictions intrench upon the other, and discord arise between the keeper of the public peace and the overseers of souls. But if what has been already said concerning the limits of both these governments be rightly considered, it will easily remove all difficulty in this matter.

Every man has an immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness or misery; whose happiness depending upon his believing and doing those things in this life which are necessary to the obtaining of God's favour, and are prescribed by God to that end. It follows from thence, first, that the observance of these things is the highest obligation that lies upon mankind and that our utmost care, application, and diligence ought to be exercised in the search and performance of them; because there is nothing in this world that is of any consideration in comparison with eternity. Secondly, that seeing one man does not violate the right of another by his erroneous opinions and undue manner of worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man's affairs, therefore, the care of each man's salvation belongs only to himself. But I would not have this understood as if I meant hereby to condemn all charitable admonitions and affectionate endeavours to reduce men from errors, which are indeed the greatest duty of a Christian. Any one may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleases, towards the promoting of another man's salvation. But all force and compulsion are to be forborne. Nothing is to be done imperiously. Nobody is obliged in that matter to yield obedience unto the admonitions or injunctions of another, further than he himself is persuaded. Every man in that has the supreme and absolute authority of judging for himself. And the reason is because nobody else is concerned in it, nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct therein.

But besides their souls, which are immortal, men have also their temporal lives here upon earth; the state whereof being frail and fleeting, and the duration uncertain, they have need of several outward conveniences to the support thereof, which are to be procured or preserved by pains and industry. For those things that are necessary to the comfortable support of our lives are not the spontaneous products of nature, nor do offer themselves fit and prepared for our use. This part, therefore, draws on another care and necessarily gives another employment. But the pravity of mankind being such that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men's labours than take pains to provide for themselves, the necessity of preserving men in the possession of what

honest industry has already acquired and also of preserving their liberty and strength, whereby they may acquire what they farther want, obliges men to enter into society with one another, that by mutual assistance and joint force they may secure unto each other their properties, in the things that contribute to the comfort and happiness of this life, leaving in the meanwhile to every man the care of his own eternal happiness, the attainment whereof can neither be facilitated by another man's industry, nor can the loss of it turn to another man's prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced from him by any external violence. But, forasmuch as men thus entering into societies, grounded upon their mutual compacts of assistance for the defence of their temporal goods, may, nevertheless, be deprived of them, either by the rapine and fraud of their fellow citizens, or by the hostile violence of foreigners, the remedy of this evil consists in arms, riches, and multitude of citizens; the remedy of the other in laws; and the care of all things relating both to one and the other is committed by the society to the civil magistrate. This is the original, this is the use, and these are the bounds of the legislative (which is the supreme) power in every commonwealth. I mean that provision may be made for the security of each man's private possessions; for the peace, riches, and public commodities of the whole people; and, as much as possible, for the increase of their inward strength against foreign invasions.

These things being thus explained, it is easy to understand to what end the legislative power ought to be directed and by what measures regulated; and that is the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society; which is the sole reason of men's entering into society, and the only thing they seek and aim at in it. And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in reference to their eternal salvation, and that is that every one should do what he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty, on whose good pleasure and acceptance depends their eternal happiness. For obedience is due, in the first place, to God and, afterwards to the laws.

But some may ask: "What if the magistrate should enjoin anything by his authority that appears unlawful to the conscience of a private person?" I answer that, if government be faithfully administered and the counsels of the magistrates be indeed directed to the public good, this will seldom happen. But if, perhaps, it do so fall out, I say, that such a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear. For the private judgement of any person concerning a law enacted in political matters, for the public good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor deserve a dispensation. But if the law, indeed, be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the magistrate's authority (as, for example, that the people, or any party amongst them, should be compelled to embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and ceremonies of another Church), men are not in these cases obliged by that law, against their consciences. For the political society is instituted for no other end, but only to secure every man's possession of the things of this life. The care of each man's soul and of the things of heaven, which neither does belong to the commonwealth nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to every man's self. Thus the safeguard of men's lives and of the things that belong unto this life is the business of the commonwealth; and the preserving of those things unto their owners is the duty of the magistrate. And therefore the magistrate cannot take away these worldly things from this man or party and give them to that; nor change propriety amongst fellow subjects (no not even by a law), for a cause that has no relation to the end of civil government, I mean for their religion, which whether it be true or false does no prejudice to the worldly concerns of their fellow subjects, which are the things that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

But what if the magistrate believe such a law as this to be for the public good? I answer: As the

private judgement of any particular person, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation of law, so the private judgement (as I may call it) of the magistrate does not give him any new right of imposing laws upon his subjects, which neither was in the constitution of the government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to grant, much less if he make it his business to enrich and advance his followers and fellow-sectaries with the spoils of others. But what if the magistrate believe that he has a right to make such laws and that they are for the public good, and his subjects believe the contrary? Who shall be judge between them? I answer: God alone. For there is no judge upon earth between the supreme magistrate and the people. God, I say, is the only judge in this case, who will retribute unto every one at the last day according to his deserts; that is, according to his sincerity and uprightness in endeavouring to promote piety, and the public weal, and peace of mankind. But What shall be done in the meanwhile? I answer: The principal and chief care of every one ought to be of his own soul first, and, in the next place, of the public peace; though yet there are very few will think it is peace there, where they see all laid waste.

There are two sorts of contests amongst men, the one managed by law, the other by force; and these are of that nature that where the one ends, the other always begins. But it is not my business to inquire into the power of the magistrate in the different constitutions of nations. I only know what usually happens where controversies arise without a judge to determine them. You will say, then, the magistrate being the stronger will have his will and carry his point. Without doubt; but the question is not here concerning the doubtfulness of the event, but the rule of right.

But to come to particulars. I say, first, no opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate. But of these, indeed, examples in any Church are rare. For no sect can easily arrive to such a degree of madness as that it should think fit to teach, for doctrines of religion, such things as manifestly undermine the foundations of society and are, therefore, condemned by the judgement of all mankind; because their own interest, peace, reputation, everything would be thereby endangered.

Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative covered over with a specious show of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the civil right of the community. For example: we cannot find any sect that teaches, expressly and openly, that men are not obliged to keep their promise; that princes may be dethroned by those that differ from them in religion; or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate and awaken all the care of the commonwealth to a watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerous an evil. But, nevertheless, we find those that say the same things in other words. What else do they mean who teach that faith is not to be kept with heretics? Their meaning, forsooth, is that the privilege of breaking faith belongs unto themselves; for they declare all that are not of their communion to be heretics, or at least may declare them so whensoever they think fit. What can be the meaning of their asserting that kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms? It is evident that they thereby arrogate unto themselves the power of deposing kings, because they challenge the power of excommunication, as the peculiar right of their hierarchy. That dominion is founded in grace is also an assertion by which those that maintain it do plainly lay claim to the possession of all things. For they are not so wanting to themselves as not to believe, or at least as not to profess themselves to be the truly pious and faithful. These, therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto themselves, any peculiar privilege or

power above other mortals, in civil concernments; or who upon pretence of religion do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion, I say these have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate; as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the Government and possess themselves of the estates and fortunes of their fellow subjects; and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrate so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?

Again: That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince. For by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country and suffer his own people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers against his own Government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the Court and the Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience; especially when both the one and the other are equally subject to the absolute authority of the same person, who has not only power to persuade the members of his Church to whatsoever he lists, either as purely religious, or in order thereunto, but can also enjoin it them on pain of eternal fire. It is ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in his religion, but in everything else a faithful subject to a Christian magistrate, whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the Mufti of Constantinople, who himself is entirely obedient to the Ottoman Emperor and frames the feigned oracles of that religion according to his pleasure. But this Mahometan living amongst Christians would yet more apparently renounce their government if he acknowledged the same person to be head of his Church who is the supreme magistrate in the state.

Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all; besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration. As for other practical opinions, though not absolutely free from all error, if they do not tend to establish domination over others, or civil impunity to the Church in which they are taught, there can be no reason why they should not be tolerated.

It remains that I say something concerning those assemblies which, being vulgarly called and perhaps having sometimes been conventicles and nurseries of factions and seditions, are thought to afford against this doctrine of toleration. But this has not happened by anything peculiar unto the genius of such assemblies, but by the unhappy circumstances of an oppressed or ill-settled liberty. These accusations would soon cease if the law of toleration were once so settled that all Churches were obliged to lay down toleration as the foundation of their own liberty, and teach that liberty of conscience is every man's natural right, equally belonging to dissenters as to themselves; and that nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion either by law or force. The establishment of this one thing would take away all ground of complaints and tumults upon account of conscience; and these causes of discontents and animosities being once removed, there would remain nothing in these assemblies that were not more peaceable and less apt to produce disturbance of state than in any other meetings whatsoever. But let us examine particularly the heads of these accusations.

You will say that assemblies and meetings endanger the public peace and threaten the commonwealth. I answer: If this be so, why are there daily such numerous meetings in markets

and Courts of Judicature? Why are crowds upon the Exchange and a concourse of people in cities suffered? You will reply: "Those are civil assemblies, but these we object against are ecclesiastical." I answer: It is a likely thing, indeed, that such assemblies as are altogether remote from civil affairs should be most apt to embroil them. Oh, but civil assemblies are composed of men that differ from one another in matters of religion, but these ecclesiastical meetings are of persons that are all of one opinion. As if an agreement in matters of religion were in effect a conspiracy against the commonwealth; or as if men would not be so much the more warmly unanimous in religion the less liberty they had of assembling. But it will be urged still that civil assemblies are open and free for any one to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations. I answer that this is not strictly true, for many civil assemblies are not open to everyone. And if some religious meetings be private, who are they (I beseech you) that are to be blamed for it, those that desire, or those that forbid their being public! Again, you will say that religious communion does exceedingly unite men's minds and affections to one another and is therefore the more dangerous. But if this be so, why is not the magistrate afraid of his own Church; and why does he not forbid their assemblies as things dangerous to his Government? You will say because he himself is a part and even the head of them. As if he were not also a part of the commonwealth, and the head of the whole people!

Let us therefore deal plainly. The magistrate is afraid of other Churches, but not of his own, because he is kind and favourable to the one, but severe and cruel to the other. These he treats like children, and indulges them even to wantonness. Those he uses as slaves and, how blamelessly soever they demean themselves, recompenses them no otherwise than by galleys, prisons, confiscations, and death. These he cherishes and defends; those he continually scourges and oppresses. Let him turn the tables. Or let those dissenters enjoy but the same privileges in civils as his other subjects, and he will quickly find that these religious meetings will be no longer dangerous. For if men enter into seditious conspiracies, it is not religion inspires them to it in their meetings, but their sufferings and oppressions that make them willing to ease themselves. Just and moderate governments are everywhere quiet, everywhere safe; but oppression raises ferments and makes men struggle to cast off an uneasy and tyrannical yoke. I know that seditions are very frequently raised upon pretence of religion, but it is as true that for religion subjects are frequently ill treated and live miserably. Believe me, the stirs that are made proceed not from any peculiar temper of this or that Church or religious society, but from the common disposition of all mankind, who when they groan under any heavy burthen endeavour naturally to shake off the yoke that galls their necks. Suppose this business of religion were let alone, and that there were some other distinction made between men and men upon account of their different complexions, shapes, and features, so that those who have black hair (for example) or grey eyes should not enjoy the same privileges as other citizens; that they should not be permitted either to buy or sell, or live by their callings; that parents should not have the government and education of their own children; that all should either be excluded from the benefit of the laws, or meet with partial judges; can it be doubted but these persons, thus distinguished from others by the colour of their hair and eyes, and united together by one common persecution, would be as dangerous to the magistrate as any others that had associated themselves merely upon the account of religion? Some enter into company for trade and profit, others for want of business have their clubs for claret. Neighbourhood joins some and religion others. But there is only one thing which gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is oppression.

You will say "What, will you have people to meet at divine service against the magistrate's will?" I

answer: Why, I pray, against his will? Is it not both lawful and necessary that they should meet? Against his will, do you say? That is what I complain of; that is the very root of all the mischief. Why are assemblies less sufferable in a church than in a theatre or market? Those that meet there are not either more vicious or more turbulent than those that meet elsewhere. The business in that is that they are ill used, and therefore they are not to be suffered. Take away the partiality that is used towards them in matters of common right; change the laws, take away the penalties unto which they are subjected, and all things will immediately become safe and peaceable; nay, those that are averse to the religion of the magistrate will think themselves so much the more bound to maintain the peace of the commonwealth as their condition is better in that place than elsewhere; and all the several separate congregations, like so many guardians of the public peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be innovated or changed in the form of the government, because they can hope for nothing better than what they already enjoy- that is, an equal condition with their fellow-subjects under a just and moderate government. Now if that Church which agrees in religion with the prince be esteemed the chief support of any civil government, and that for no other reason (as has already been shown) than because the prince is kind and the laws are favourable to it, how much greater will be the security of government where all good subjects, of whatsoever Church they be, without any distinction upon account of religion, enjoying the same favour of the prince and the same benefit of the laws, shall become the common support and guard of it, and where none will have any occasion to fear the severity of the laws but those that do injuries to their neighbours and offend against the civil peace?

That we may draw towards a conclusion. The sum of all we drive at is that every man may enjoy the same rights that are granted to others. Is it permitted to worship God in the Roman manner? Let it be permitted to do it in the Geneva form also. Is it permitted to speak Latin in the market-place? Let those that have a mind to it be permitted to do it also in the Church. Is it lawful for any man in his own house to kneel, stand, sit, or use any other posture; and to clothe himself in white or black, in short or in long garments? Let it not be made unlawful to eat bread, drink wine, or wash with water in the church. In a word, whatsoever things are left free by law in the common occasions of life, let them remain free unto every Church in divine worship. Let no man's life, or body, or house, or estate, suffer any manner of prejudice upon these accounts. Can you allow of the Presbyterian discipline? Why should not the Episcopal also have what they like? Ecclesiastical authority, whether it be administered by the hands of a single person or many, is everywhere the same; and neither has any jurisdiction in things civil, nor any manner of power of compulsion, nor anything at all to do with riches and revenues.

Ecclesiastical assemblies and sermons are justified by daily experience and public allowance. These are allowed to people of some one persuasion; why not to all? If anything pass in a religious meeting seditiously and contrary to the public peace, it is to be punished in the same manner and no otherwise than as if it had happened in a fair or market. These meetings ought not to be sanctuaries for factious and flagitious fellows. Nor ought it to be less lawful for men to meet in churches than in halls; nor are one part of the subjects to be esteemed more blamable for their meeting together than others. Every one is to be accountable for his own actions, and no man is to be laid under a suspicion or odium for the fault of another. Those that are seditious, murderers, thieves, robbers, adulterers, slanderers, etc., of whatsoever Church, whether national or not, ought to be punished and suppressed. But those whose doctrine is peaceable and whose manners are pure and blameless ought to be upon equal terms with their fellow-subjects. Thus if solemn assemblies, observations of festivals, public worship be permitted to any one sort of professors, all these things

ought to be permitted to the Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, Arminians, Quakers, and others, with the same liberty. Nay, if we may openly speak the truth, and as becomes one man to another, neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because of his religion. The Gospel commands no such thing. The Church which "judgeth not those that are without" (I Cor. 5. 12, 13) wants it not. And the commonwealth, which embraces indifferently all men that are honest, peaceable, and industrious, requires it not. Shall we suffer a Pagan to deal and trade with us, and shall we not suffer him to pray unto and worship God? If we allow the Jews to have private houses and dwellings amongst us, why should we not allow them to have synagogues? Is their doctrine more false, their worship more abominable, or is the civil peace more endangered by their meeting in public than in their private houses? But if these things may be granted to Jews and Pagans, surely the condition of any Christians ought not to be worse than theirs in a Christian commonwealth.

You will say, perhaps: "Yes, it ought to be; because they are more inclinable to factions, tumults, and civil wars." I answer: Is this the fault of the Christian religion? If it be so, truly the Christian religion is the worst of all religions and ought neither to be embraced by any particular person, nor tolerated by any commonwealth. For if this be the genius, this the nature of the Christian religion, to be turbulent and destructive to the civil peace, that Church itself which the magistrate indulges will not always be innocent. But far be it from us to say any such thing of that religion which carries the greatest opposition to covetousness, ambition, discord, contention, and all manner of inordinate desires, and is the most modest and peaceable religion that ever was. We must, therefore, seek another cause of those evils that are charged upon religion. And, if we consider right, we shall find it to consist wholly in the subject that I am treating of. It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted), that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon account of religion. The heads and leaders of the Church, moved by avarice and insatiable desire of dominion, making use of the immoderate ambition of magistrates and the credulous superstition of the giddy multitude, have incensed and animated them against those that dissent from themselves, by preaching unto them, contrary to the laws of the Gospel and to the precepts of charity, that schismatics and heretics are to be outed of their possessions and destroyed. And thus have they mixed together and confounded two things that are in themselves most different, the Church and the commonwealth. Now as it is very difficult for men patiently to suffer themselves to be stripped of the goods which they have got by their honest industry, and, contrary to all the laws of equity, both human and divine, to be delivered up for a prey to other men's violence and rapine; especially when they are otherwise altogether blameless; and that the occasion for which they are thus treated does not at all belong to the jurisdiction of the magistrate, but entirely to the conscience of every particular man for the conduct of which he is accountable to God only; what else can be expected but that these men, growing weary of the evils under which they labour, should in the end think it lawful for them to resist force with force, and to defend their natural rights (which are not forfeitable upon account of religion) with arms as well as they can? That this has been hitherto the ordinary course of things is abundantly evident in history, and that it will continue to be so hereafter is but too apparent in reason. It cannot indeed, be otherwise so long as the principle of persecution for religion shall prevail, as it has done hitherto, with magistrate and people, and so long as those that ought to be the preachers of peace and concord shall continue with all their art and strength to excite men to arms and sound the trumpet of war. But that magistrates should thus suffer these incendiaries and disturbers of the

public peace might justly be wondered at if it did not appear that they have been invited by them unto a participation of the spoil, and have therefore thought fit to make use of their covetousness and pride as means whereby to increase their own power. For who does not see that these good men are, indeed, more ministers of the government than ministers of the Gospel and that, by flattering the ambition and favouring the dominion of princes and men in authority, they endeavour with all their might to promote that tyranny in the commonwealth which otherwise they should not be able to establish in the Church? This is the unhappy agreement that we see between the Church and State. Whereas if each of them would contain itself within its own bounds- the one attending to the worldly welfare of the commonwealth, the other to the salvation of souls- it is impossible that any discord should ever have happened between them. Sed pudet hoec opprobria. etc. God Almighty grant, I beseech Him, that the gospel of peace may at length be preached, and that civil magistrates, growing more careful to conform their own consciences to the law of God and less solicitous about the binding of other men's consciences by human laws, may, like fathers of their country, direct all their counsels and endeavours to promote universally the civil welfare of all their children, except only of such as are arrogant, ungovernable, and injurious to their brethren; and that all ecclesiastical men, who boast themselves to be the successors of the Apostles, walking peaceably and modestly in the Apostles' steps, without intermeddling with State Affairs, may apply themselves wholly to promote the salvation of souls.

FAREWELL.

PERHAPS it may not be amiss to add a few things concerning heresy and schism. A Turk is not, nor can be, either heretic or schismatic to a Christian; and if any man fall off from the Christian faith to Mahometism, he does not thereby become a heretic or schismatic, but an apostate and an infidel. This nobody doubts of; and by this it appears that men of different religions cannot be heretics or schismatics to one another.

We are to inquire, therefore, what men are of the same religion. Concerning which it is manifest that those who have one and the same rule of faith and worship are of the same religion; and those who have not the same rule of faith and worship are of different religions. For since all things that belong unto that religion are contained in that rule, it follows necessarily that those who agree in one rule are of one and the same religion, and vice versa. Thus Turks and Christians are of different religions, because these take the Holy Scriptures to be the rule of their religion, and those the Alcoran. And for the same reason there may be different religions also even amongst Christians. The Papists and Lutherans, though both of them profess faith in Christ and are therefore called Christians, yet are not both of the same religion, because these acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be the rule and foundation of their religion, those take in also traditions and the decrees of Popes and of these together make the rule of their religion; and thus the Christians of St. John (as they are called) and the Christians of Geneva are of different religions, because these also take only the Scriptures, and those I know not what traditions, for the rule of their religion.

This being settled, it follows, first, that heresy is a separation made in ecclesiastical communion between men of the same religion for some opinions no way contained in the rule itself; and, secondly, that amongst those who acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be their rule of faith, heresy is a separation made in their Christian communion for opinions not contained in the express words of Scripture. Now this separation may be made in a twofold manner:

1. When the greater part, or by the magistrate's patronage the stronger part, of the Church

separates itself from others by excluding them out of her communion because they will not profess their belief of certain opinions which are not the express words of the Scripture. For it is not the paucity of those that are separated, nor the authority of the magistrate, that can make any man guilty of heresy, but he only is a heretic who divides the Church into parts, introduces names and marks of distinction, and voluntarily makes a separation because of such opinions.

2. When any one separates himself from the communion of a Church because that Church does not publicly profess some certain opinions which the Holy Scriptures do not expressly teach.

Both these are heretics because they err in fundamentals, and they err obstinately against knowledge; for when they have determined the Holy Scriptures to be the only foundation of faith, they nevertheless lay down certain propositions as fundamental which are not in the Scripture, and because others will not acknowledge these additional opinions of theirs, nor build upon them as if they were necessary and fundamental, they therefore make a separation in the Church, either by withdrawing themselves from others, or expelling the others from them. Nor does it signify anything for them to say that their confessions and symbols are agreeable to Scripture and to the analogy of faith; for if they be conceived in the express words of Scripture, there can be no question about them, because those things are acknowledged by all Christians to be of divine inspiration and therefore fundamental. But if they say that the articles which they require to be professed are consequences deduced from the Scripture, it is undoubtedly well done of them who believe and profess such things as seem unto them so agreeable to the rule of faith. But it would be very ill done to obtrude those things upon others unto whom they do not seem to be the indubitable doctrines of the Scripture; and to make a separation for such things as these, which neither are nor can be fundamental, is to become heretics; for I do not think there is any man arrived to that degree of madness as that he dare give out his consequences and interpretations of Scripture as divine inspirations and compare the articles of faith that he has framed according to his own fancy with the authority of Scripture. I know there are some propositions so evidently agreeable to Scripture that nobody can deny them to be drawn from thence, but about those, therefore, there can be no difference. This only I say- that however clearly we may think this or the other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture, we ought not therefore to impose it upon others as a necessary article of faith because we believe it to be agreeable to the rule of faith, unless we would be content also that other doctrines should be imposed upon us in the same manner, and that we should be compelled to receive and profess all the different and contradictory opinions of Lutherans, Calvinists, Remonstrants, Anabaptists, and other sects which the contrivers of symbols, systems, and confessions are accustomed to deliver to their followers as genuine and necessary deductions from the Holy Scripture. I cannot but wonder at the extravagant arrogance of those men who think that they themselves can explain things necessary to salvation more clearly than the Holy Ghost, the eternal and infinite wisdom of God.

Thus much concerning heresy, which word in common use is applied only to the doctrinal part of religion. Let us now consider schism, which is a crime near akin to it; for both these words seem unto me to signify an ill-grounded separation in ecclesiastical communion made about things not necessary. But since use, which is the supreme law in matter of language, has determined that heresy relates to errors in faith, and schism to those in worship or discipline, we must consider them under that distinction.

Schism, then, for the same reasons that have already been alleged, is nothing else but a separation made in the communion of the Church upon account of something in divine worship or ecclesiastical discipline that is not any necessary part of it. Now, nothing in worship or discipline

can be necessary to Christian communion but what Christ our legislator, or the Apostles by inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have commanded in express words.

In a word, he that denies not anything that the Holy Scriptures teach in express words, nor makes a separation upon occasion of anything that is not manifestly contained in the sacred text- however he may be nicknamed by any sect of Christians and declared by some or all of them to be utterly void of true Christianity- yet in deed and in truth this man cannot be either a heretic or schismatic.

These things might have been explained more largely and more advantageously, but it is enough to have hinted at them thus briefly to a person of your parts.

THE END

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The Search After Truth

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Bk. 6, Pt. 2, Ch. 3

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BOOK III

THE SECOND PART

CHAPTER 1, SECTION. 1*: *What is meant by Idea's; That they truly Exist, and that they are necessary to perceive all material Objects.

I Think every one will confess, that we do not perceive External Objects by themselves. We see the Sun, the Stars, and many Objects without us; and it is not probable that the Soul should go out of the Body, and walk as it were, through the Heavens, to Contemplate all those Objects there. She does not then see them by themselves and as the immediate Object of Mind; when it sees the Sun, for instance, it is not the Sun, but something which is nearly united to our Soul; and it is that which I call Idea: So that here by this word *Idea*, I mean only what is the immediate Object, or the nearest the Mind when it perceives any thing.

It must be observed, that to make the Mind perceive any Object, it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Object should be actually present, of which we can have no doubt; but it is not requisite that there should be some external Object which resembles this Idea; for it often happens, that we perceive things which are not, and which never had a being. So that we often have in our Minds real Idea's of things which never were. For instance, when a Man imagines a Mountain of God, it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Mountain should be really present to his Mind: When a Mad Man, a Man in a high Fever, or a Man that is asleep, sees any terrible Animal before his Eyes, it is certain that the Idea of this animal truly Exists; and yet this Mountain of Gold, and this Animal, never were.

However, Men being Naturally inclined to believe that there is none but Corporeal Objects which Exist, they Judge of the Reality and Existence of things quite after another manner than they ought to do; for as soon as they are sensible of any Object, they will certainly have it that this Object

Exists, although it often happens, that there is nothing without: And further, they affirm, that this Object is exactly the same as they see it, which never happens. But in respect to the Idea which necessarily Exists, and which can be nothing else besides what it appears to be, they without any reflection, commonly Judge it to be nothing; as if Idea's had not a very great number of Properties: As if the Idea's of a Square, for instance, was not very different from that of some number, and did not represent things perfectly distinct; which could never happen to nothing, since nothing has no Propriety. It is therefore indisputable, that Idea's have a real Existence. But let us examine their Nature and Essence, and see what it can be in the Soul that is capable of representing all things.

Whatever things the Soul perceives, are either in, or out of its self, those which are in the Soul, are its own thoughts; that is, all its different Modifications; for by these words, *Thought, manner of Thinking, or modification of the Soul*, I understand in general all things, that can be in the Soul without her perceiving them, as her own Sensations, Imaginations, pure Intellections, or simple Conceptions, even her Passions, and Natural Inclinations. Now our Soul has no need of Idea's to perceive all these things, because they are within the Soul; or rather, the Soul it self, after such or such a manner: Even as the real roundness of some Body, and its Motion, are only this Body Figured, and moved after such or such a manner.

But as for things that are out of the Soul, we can perceive them only by the means of Idea's, supposing that these things cannot be intimately united to it. There are two sorts of them, Spiritual, and Material: As for the Spiritual, there is some probability that they may discover themselves to the Soul without Idea's, and by themselves. For although Experience teaches us, that we cannot immediately, and of our selves, declare our Thoughts to one another, but only by words, or some other sensible Sign, to which we have affixed our Idea's: We may say, that God has ordained it so only during this Life, to hinder those Disorders that would soon happen, if Men could make themselves be understood as they pleased. But when Justice and Order shall Reign, and we shall be delivered from the Captivity of our Bodies, we shall perhaps make our selves mutually understood by an intimate Union of our selves, as its probable the Angels do in Heaven; so that it does not seem absolutely necessary to admit Idea's to represent spiritual things to the Soul, because it may be, we may see them by themselves, although after a very imperfect manner.

I examine not here how two Spirits can be united one to the other, and if they can after this manner mutually discover one anothers Thoughts. I believe however, that there is no Substance purely intelligible, but that of God; nothing can be evidently known but in his Light; and that the Union of spirits cannot make them Visible: For although we are most strictly united to our selves, we are and shall be unintelligible to our selves, until we see our selves in God; and that he represents to us the perfect intelligible Idea that he hath of our being included in his. So that although I may seem here to grant, that Angels can manifest one to another what they are, and what they think; 'tis only because I will not dispute of it, provided I am granted what is not to be doubted, viz. That we cannot see material things by themselves, and without Idea's.

I shall explain in the Seventh Chapter, my Opinion how we know Spirits; and will shew, that at present we cannot absolutely know them by themselves, although it may be they are united to us. But I speak here chiefly of material things, which certainly cannot be united to the Soul, in such a manner as is necessary for us to perceive them: Because being extended, and the Soul not, there is no proportion between them. Besides, our Souls go not out of our Bodies to measure the greatness of the Heaven, and consequently, they cannot see External Bodies, but by the Idea's which represent them. This is what all the World ought to grant.

CHAPTER 1, SECTION. 2: A division of the several ways whereby External Objects may be seen.

We are assured the, that it's absolutely necessary, that the Idea's we have of Bodies, and of all other Objects which we perceive not by themselves, proceed from these Bodies, or these Objects; or else that our Soul has the power of producing these Idea's, or that God Created them with our Souls; or that he produces them every time that we think of any Object; or else that the Soul has all those perfections in it self that it sees in these Bodies: Or in fine, that it is united with a perfect Being, which in general includes all the Perfections of Created Beings.

We cannot see Objects but after one of these ways: Let us examine without prejudice, and without frighting our selves with the difficulty of the Question, which of them seems most probable: It may be, we may resolve it very clearly, although we do not pretend here to give such Demonstrations as will satisfie all sorts of persons; but only convincing Proofs to those at least, as will meditate with serious Attention upon them; for perhaps it would be thought too rash if we should pretend otherwise.

CHAPTER 2: That material Objects do not emit Species which resemble them.

The most common received Opinion is that of the Peripateticks, who think that External Objects emit Species which resemble them, and that those Species are carried by the External Senses to the Common Sense or Understanding. They call these Species *impressed*, because the Object imprints them on the External Senses. These *impressed* Species being Material and Sensible, are render'd intelligible, by means of the *active*, or *active intellect*; and are fit to be received in the *passive intellect*. These Species thus spiritualiz'd, are called *express'd* Species, because they are express'd by the impress'd ones; and 'tis by them that the Passive Intellect knows all material things.

We shall not stay to explain at large these fine things, and the divers manners in which different Philosophers conceive them; for although they do not agree as to the number of Faculties which they attribute to the Interior Sense, and the Understanding; and though there are not a few, who doubt whether they have need of any *active Intellect*, to know sensible Objects, yet however they generally agree, that External Objects emit the Species or Images which represent them. And 'tis only upon this Foundation that they multiply their Faculties, and defend their *active intellect*: So that this Foundation having no Solidity, as shall soon be shewn, it will be unnecessary to spend any time to overturn the Superstructure.

We are assur'd then, that it is improbable that Objects should emit their Images, or Species which represent them, for these reasons. I. From the impenetrability of Objects: All Objects, as the Sun, Stars, and all such as are near the Eyes; cannot emit Species which are different from their respective Natures: Wherefore Philosophers commonly say, that these Species are Gross and Material, in which they differ from *express'd* Species which are Spiritualised. These impress'd Species of Objects then are little Bodies, they cannot therefore be penetrated, nor all the Spaces which are betwixt the Earth and the Heaven, which must be full of them. Whence it's easie to conclude, they must be bruis'd and broken, in moving every way; and thus they cannot render Objects visible.

Moreover, one may see from the same place or point, a great number of Objects in the Heavens, and on the Earth; therefore the Species of these Objects can be reduc'd into a Point. But they are impenetrable since they are extended, Therefore, *etc.*

But one may not only see a multitude of very great and vast Objects: There is no Point in all the great Spaces of the World, from whence we cannot discover an almost infinite number of Objects, and even Objects as large as the Sun, Moon, and the Heavens, there is therefore no Point in all the

World where the Species of all these things ought not to meet; which is against all appearance of Truth.

The Second Reason is taken from the Change which happens in the Species; it's evident, that the nearer any Object is, the greater its Species ought to be, since we see the Object's greater. But what is yet more difficult to conceive, according to their Opinion, is, That if we look upon this Object with a Telescope, or a Microscope, the Species immediately becomes Six Hundred times as great as it was before; for 'tis yet more difficulty conceiv'd from what Parts it can grow so great in an instant.

The Third Reason is, when we look upon a perfect Cube, all the Species of its Sides are unequal; nevertheless, we see all the Sides equally Square. So when we consider Ellipses and Parallelograms in a Picture, which cannot but emit like Species, yet we see Circles and Squares: This manifestly shews, that it is not necessary that the Object beheld, should emit Species like it self, that it may be seen.

In fine, it cannot be conceiv'd how it can be, that a Body, which does not sensibly diminish, should always emit Species on every Side, which should continually fill all the great Spaces about it, and that with an inconceivable swiftness. For an Object that was hidden, in that Instant that it discovers it self may be seen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides; and what appears yet more strange is, that Bodies in great Motion, as Air, and some other, have not that power of pushing outwards these Images which resemble them; as the more gross and quiescent Bodies, such as the Earth, Stones, and generally all Hard Bodies have.

But I shall not stay any longer to enumerate all the contrary Reasons to their Opinion, there would be no end, a very ordinary Judgment would raise innumerable Objections. Those that we have brought are sufficient, though they were not so necessary after what has been said upon the Subject of the First Book, where the Errors of the Senses were explain'd. But there are so great a number of Philosophers wedded to this Opinion, that we believe it will be necessary to say something to incline them to reflect upon their own Thoughts.

CHAPTER 3: That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's. The Cause of Mens Error, in reference to this Subject.

The Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's of such things as they will think upon, and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Objects make upon Bodies, although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them; they believe that 'tis in this, that Man is made after the Image of God, and participates of his Power. That even as God Created all things out of nothing, and can reduce them to nothing again, and then Create them anew; so Man can Create, and Annihilate the Idea's of all things as he pleases. But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which extol a Man, these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original, and which the Father of Light hath not inspir'd.

This participation of the power of God which Men boast of having, to represent Objects, and of doing many other particular actions, is a participation which seems to relate to something of independence, as independence is commonly explain'd; it is also a Chimerical Participation, which Mens Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine. They depend much more than they think, upon the Goodness and Mercy of God: But this is not a place to explain these things. It's enough if we endeavour to shew, that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which they perceive.

No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings, since they have real Properties, since they differ from one another, and represent all different things; Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are spiritual, and very different from the Bodies which they represent. But it seems reasonable to doubt, whether Idea's, by whose means we see Bodies, are not more Noble than the Bodies themselves: for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly, as we shall see hereafter. Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Idea's as we please, we shall be in danger of perswading our selves, to make more Noble and Perfect Beings, than the World which God hath Created. However, some do not reflect upon it, because they imagine that an Idea is Nothing, since it is not to be felt; or else if they look upon it as a Being, 'tis a very mean, contemptible one, because they imagine it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind.

But supposing it true, that Idea's were only little contemptible Beings, yet they are Beings, and Spiritual Ones; and Men not having the power of Believing, it follows that they cannot produce them; for the production of Idea's after the manner before explain'd, is a true Creation; and although Men endeavour to palliate and molline the hardness of this Opinion, by saying, that the production of Idea's presupposes something else, but Creation nothing; yet the difficulty is not solv'd by this Subterfuge.

For we ought to consider, that it is not more difficult to produce something out of nothing, than to produce one thing out of another: which cannot at all contribute to its Production. For example, it is not more difficult to Create an Angel, than to produce him from a Stone; because a Stone being of another sort of Being wholly different, it cannot in the least be useful to the Production of an Angel. But it may contribute to the Production of Bread, Gold, *etc.* for a Stone, Gold, and Bread, are but the same thing differently configur'd, and are all Material.

It is even more difficult to produce an Angel of a Stone, than to produce him out of nothing; because to make an Angel out of a Stone; (so far as it can be done) the Stone must be annihilated, and afterwards the Angel Created; But simply to Create an Angel, nothing is to be annihilated. If therefore the Mind produces its Idea's from the material Impressions which the Brain receives from Objects, it must always do the same thing, or a thing as difficult, or even more difficult than if it Created them; since Idea's being Spiritual, they cannot be produc'd of material Images, which have no proportion with them.

But if it be said, that an Idea is not a Substance, I consent to it, yet it is always something that is Spiritual; and as it is impossible to make a Square of a Spirit, although a Square be not a Substance from a Spiritual Idea, although an Idea was no Substance.

But although we should grant to the Mind of Man a Sovereign Power to Annihilate, and Create the Idea's of things, yet it would never make use of that Power to produce them; for even as a Painter, how skilful soever he be, could not represent an Animal which he had never seen, and of which he never had any Idea: So that the Picture which he should make, should be like to this unknown Animal. Thus a Man cannot form the Idea of an Object, if he knew it not before, that is, if he has not already had some Idea of it, which does not depend upon his Will; and if he already had an Idea of it, he certainly knows this Object, and it would be unnecessary for him to Form it anew. It is therefore in vain to attribute to the Mind of Man the Power of producing his Idea's. It might be said perhaps, that the Mind of Man hath general and confused Idea's which it does not produce; and that those which it produces are particular, more clear and distinct; but it is always the same thing. For even as a Painter cannot draw the Picture of a particular Person, so as to be sure that he

hath perfected it, if he had had no distinct Idea of him; and even if the Person had not been present: Thus the Mind, for example, which could only have the Idea of a Being, or an Animal in general, could not represent to its self a Horse, nor Form a distinct Idea of one, and be assured that it is perfectly like a Horse, if it had not already the first Idea with which it might compare this second: Now if it had a first, it is unuseful to Form a second; and the Question respects this first. Therefore, *etc.*

It's true, that when we conceive a Square by pure Intellection, we can also imagine it, that is, perceive it in our selves, by tracing an Image of it in the Brain; yet it must be first observ'd, that we are not the true nor principal Cause of this Image: But it will be too long to explain it here. Secondly, So far is the second Idea which accompanies this Image, from being more distinct and more exact than the other, that on the contrary, it is not so Exact, because it resembles the first, which was only a pattern for the second. For indeed we must not believe that the Imagination and Senses represent Objects more distinctly to us than the pure Understanding; but only that they apply them more to the Mind; for the Idea's of the Senses and Imagination are not distinct, but only so far as they are conformable to the pure Intellection: The Image of a Square for example, which the Imagination Traces in the Brain, is not exact and perfect, but only so far as it resembles the Idea of the Square, which we conceive by pure Intellection. It is this Idea which regulates this Image, 'tis the Mind which Conducts the Imagination; and which Obliges it, if we may so say, to behold from time to time, whether the Image it Paints, be a Figure of four right and equal Lines, whose Angles are alike. In a word, whether what it Imagines, is like to what it Conceives.

After what has been said, I do not believe it can be doubted, but those are deceived, who affirm, the Mind is able to Form the Idea's of Objects; since they attribute the Power of Creation to the Mind, and even of Creating with Wisdom and Order, although it has no knowledge of what it does; for that is not Conceivable: But the cause of their Error is, that Men always Judge that a thing is the Cause of some Effect, when both are joined together, supposing the true Cause of this Effect be unknown to them. That makes all the World conclude, that a Bowl put in Motion, and meeting another, is the true and principal Cause of the Motion that it communicates to it; as the Will of the Soul is the true and principal Cause of the Motion of the Arm, and other the like prejudices; because it always happens, that a Bowl is shaken when it is met by another that runs against it: As our Arms are moved almost always when we Will, and we do not see any other apparent Cause of this Motion.

But when an Effect does not so often follow something which is not the Cause of it, there is nevertheless a great many Men, who believe this thing is the Cause of the Effect which happens; yet every Body is not guilty of the same Error. For instance, if a Comet appears, and after this Comet a Prince Dies: Some Stones lie exposed to the Moon, and they are eaten with Worms: The Sun is joined with Mars at the Nativity of a Child, and something extraordinary happens to this Child: All this is enough to perswade a great many Men, that the Comet, the Moon, and the Conjunction of the Sun with Mars, are the Causes of these Effects, and others like them; and the reason why all the World does not believe it, is that they do not always see these Effects follow these Causes.

But all Men having commonly the Idea's of Objects present to their Minds as soon as they with it, and it happening many times in a day, almost all conclude that the Will which accompanies the production, or rather the presence of Idea's, is truly the Cause of them: Because they see nothing in the same time that they can attribute it to; and they imagine the Idea's no longer Exist, when the Mind sees them no longer; and that they revive again anew, when they are again represented to the

Mind.

‘Tis for these Reasons some Judge, that External Objects emit Images which resemble them, as we have mention’d in the precedent Chapter: For it being impossible to see Objects by themselves, but only by their Idea’s, they judge the Object produces the Idea; because as soon as it is present they see it; and as soon as absent they see it no longer; and because the presence of the Object almost always accompanies the Idea which represents it to us.

Yet if Men were not prejudiced in their Judgments from this, that the Idea’s of things are present to their Mind as soon as they Will them, they should only conclude, that according to the Order of Nature, their Will is commonly necessary for them to have those Idea’s. Not that the Will is the true and principal Cause which presents them to the Mind, and much less, that the Will produces them from nothing, or after the manner they explain it. Nor ought they to conclude, that Objects emit Species resembling them, because the Soul commonly perceives them only when they are present; but only that the Object is for the most part necessary, in order to the Idea’s being present to the Mind. And lastly, that a Bowl put into Motion, is the principal and true Cause of the shaking of another Bowl that it meets in the way, since the first had not the power of Motion in its self. They can only determine, that the meeting of two Bowls is an occasion to the Author, of the Motion of Matter to execute the Decree of his Will, which is the Universal Cause of all things, in communicating to the other Bowl a part of the Motion of the first; that is, to speak more clearly, in willing that the last should acquire so much more Motion as the first lost; for the moving force of Bodies can proceed only from the Will of him who preserves them, as we shall shew elsewhere.

CHAPTER 4: That we do not see Objects by the Means of Idea’s which were created with us. And that God does not produce them in us so often as we have occasion for them.

THE Third Opinion is, That of those who say all Idea’s are created with us.

To discover the Improbability of this Opinion, it will be necessary to consider that there is many different things in the World of which we have Idea’s. But to speak only of simple Figures, it is certain that the Number of them is Infinite: Nay, even if we consider but one only, as the Ellipsis, we cannot doubt but the Mind conceives an infinite Number of different Kinds of them, when it considers that one of the Diameters may be lengthened out to Infinity, and the other always continue the same.

So the height of a Triangle may be augmented or diminished infinitely, the base being always the same, we may conceive there is an infinite Number of different Kinds of them: And also, which I desire may be consider’d here, The Mind in some manner perceives this infinite Number, although we can imagine but very few of them; and that we can at the same time have particular and distinct Idea’s of many Triangles of different Kinds. But what must chiefly be observed is, That this general Idea that the Mind has of this Number of Triangles of different Kinds is sufficient to prove, That if we do not conceive each of these different Triangles by particular Idea’s: And in short, If we comprehend not their Infinity, ‘tis not the Defect of the Idea’s, or that Infinity is not represented to us, but only the Defect of the Capacity and Extension of the Mind. If a Man should apply himself to consider the Properties of all the diverse Kinds of Triangles, although he should eternally continue this sort of Study, he would never want new and particular Idea’s, but his Mind would be unprofitably fatigued.

What I have said of Triangles, may be applied to five, six, a hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand sided Figures, and so on *ad infinitum*. Now if the sides of a Triangle, which have infinite relations one with the other, make Triangles of infinite Kinds, it is plain that four, five, or a thousand sided

Figures are capable of admitting much greater Differences, since they are capable of a greater Number of Relations and Combinations of their sides, than simple Triangles are.

The Mind then sees all these things; it hath Idea's of them; and these Idea's would never fail it, although it should employ infinite Ages in the Consideration of one Figure only: And if it perceived not these infinite Figures all of a sudden, or comprehended not their Intinity, 'tis only because its Extension is very much limited. It hath then an infinite Number of Idea's: Do I say an infinite Number? It hath as many infinite Numbers of Idea's, as there are different Figures to be consider'd: So that since there is an infinite Number of different Figures, it's necessary that to know the Figures, the Mind have an infinitely infinite Number of Idea's.

Now I ask, If it's probable that God should Create so many things with the Mind of Man? For my part it does not appear so to me; chiefly, since that might be made in a more simple and easie manner, as we shall soon see. For as God always acts by the most simple ways, it does not seem reasonable to explain how we know Objects, by admitting the Creation of an infinite Number of Beings, since we can resolve this Difficulty in a more Easie and Natural way.

But although the Mind should have a Magazine of all the Idea's, which are necessary for it to see things, it would be yet more difficult to explain how the Soul should make choice of them to represent them: For instance, how it can represent the Sun to it self, whilst it is present to the Eyes of its Body?

For whereas the Image which the Sun imprints in the Brain, resembles not the Idea we have thereof, as has been elsewhere proved, and since the Soul perceives not the Motion that the Sun produces in the bottom of the Eyes, and in the Brain, it's inconceivable how it should exactly guess, amongst these infinite Number of Idea's that it has, which it must represent to it self, to imagine or to see the Sun: We cannot therefore say, That the Idea's of things were created with us, it is sufficient that we see the Objects that are about us.

Nor can we say that God produces as many of them every Moment, as we perceive different things; this has been sufficiently resuted from what has been said in this Chapter. Besides it is necessary that at all times we actually have in our selves the Idea's of all things, since we are always able to think of all things; which we could not if we perceiv'd them already confusedly; that is, If an infinite Number of Idea's were not present to our Minds; for we cannot will to think of Objects, of which we have no Idea.

CHAPTER 5: That the Mind neither sees the Essence, nor Existence of Objects, in considering its own Perfections. That none but God sees them in that manner.

THE Fourth Opinion is, That the Mind stands in need of nothing besides it self, to perceive Objects; and that it can, in considering it self and its own Perfections, discover all things that are without it.

It is certain that the Soul sees within it self, and without Idea's, all the Sensations and Passions it is capable of, as Pleasure, Pain, Cold, Heat, Colours, Sounds, Odours, Sapors, its Love, its Hatred, Joy and Sadness, *etc.* because all the Sensations and Passions of the Soul represent nothing External which is like them; and because they are only Modifications, which nothing but the Mind is capable of. But the Difficulty is, to know whether the Idea's which represent something that is without the Soul, and which resembles them in some measure, as the Idea's of a Sun, a House, a Horse, a River, *etc*. are only Modifications of the Soul; insomuch that the Soul cannot stand in need of any thing besides it self, to represent to it self all External Things.

There are Persons who make no Scruple to affirm, That the Soul being made to think, it has in it self, I mean, in considering its own Perfections, whatever is necessary to perceive Objects; for indeed the Soul being nobler than all the things it conceives distinctly, it may be said, that it contains them in some measure *Eminently*, according to the Notions of the Schools; that is, after a Nobler and more Sublime Manner than they are in themselves. They pretend, that thus Superior things comprehend the Perfections of those that are Inferior. And thus being the Noblest of the Creatures they know; they fancy they have in themselves, after a Spiritual Manner, all that is in the visible World. In a word, They will have the Soul to be like an Intelligible World, which comprehends in it self, whatever the Material and Sensible World comprehends; nay, Infinitely more.

But in my Opinion it is a great Presumption to maintain that Thought: If I am not mistaken, it is Natural Vanity, the Love of Independence, and the Desire of resembling him who comprehends all Beings in himself, which Confounds the Mind, and inclines us to believe, we possess what we have not: *Do not say that you are a :ogjt tp upir se;f. saus St/ Aistom*; for there is none but God who is a Light to himself, and who can, in considering himself, see whatever he has produced, or can produce.

It is certain that there was none but God alone before the World was Created, and he could not produce it without Knowledge and without Idea's: Consequently those Idea's which God had of the World, are not different from himself; and thus all Creatures, even the most Material and most Terrestrial, are in God, though in a manner altogether Spiritual, which we cannot apprehend. God therefore sees all Beings in himself, in considering his own Perfections which represent them to him. He also knows their Existence perfectly, for since the Existence of all things depend on his Will, he cannot be Ignorant of his own Will; it follows then, that he cannot be Ignorant of their Existence. And thus God does not only see in himself the Essence of all things, but also their Existence.

But the case is different as to Created Spirits, they can neither see the Essence of things, nor their Existence within themselves: They cannot see their Essence within themselves, because being very much limited, they do not contain all Beings, like God whom we may call the Universal Being, or plainly *He that is*, as he calls himself. Since therefore the Humane Mind may know all Beings and Infinite Beings, and yet not contain them, it is a certain Proof, that it does not see their Essence in it self. For the Mind does not only see sometimes one thing, and sometimes another successively, it also actually perceives Infinity though it does not comprehend it. So that not being actually Infinite, nor capable of Infinite Modifications at the same time, it is absolutely Impossible that it should see within it self what is not there. Therefore it does not see the Essence of things in considering its own Perfections, or by modifying it self diversely.

Neither does it see their Existence within it self, because the Existence of Beings do not depend upon its Will; and because the Idea's of those Beings may be present to the Mind, though they do not Exist; for everybody may have the Idea of a Mountain of Gold, though there be no Mountain of Gold in Nature: And though we rely on the report of the Senses to judge of the Existence of Objects; nevertheless Reason does not assure us, that we should always believe our Senses, since we find clearly that they deceive us. When a Man's Blood, for instance, is very much inflam'd; or barely when he Sleeps, he sometimes beholds Fields, Combats, and the like, which nevertheless are not present, and which perhaps never were. Therefore it is certain that it is neither within it self, nor by it self, that the Mind sees the Existence of things, but that in this case it depends upon some other things.

CHAPTER 6: That we see all things in God.

WE have examin'd in the preceding Chapter four different Manners in which the Humane Mind may see External Objects, which do not appear probable to us: There only remains the Fifth, which alone appears consonant to Reason, and the most proper to shew the Dependence that Spirits have on God in all their Thoughts.

In order to apprehend it rightly, we must remember what has been said in the preceding Chapter, that it is absolutely necessary that God should have in himself the Idea's of all the Beings he has created, since otherwise he could not have produced them; and that thus he sees all those Beings, by considering the Perfections which he includes in himself, and to which all Beings are related. Moreover, it is necessary to know that God is very strictly united to our Souls by his Presence, so that we may say that he is the place of Spirits, as Space is the place of Bodies. These two things being supposed, it is certain that the Mind may see what there is in God, which represents Created Beings, since that is very Spiritual, very Intelligible, and most present to the Mind. Thus the Mind may see in God the Works of God, supposing God be willing to discover to it what there is in him which represents them. These are the Reasons which seem to prove, that he rather Wills than Creates an Infinite Number of Idea's in every Mind.

First, Although we do not absolutely deny, that God was able to produce an Infinitely infinite Number of Beings, which represent Objects with every Mind he Creates; yet we ought not to believe that he does so. For it is not only consonant to Reason, but it also appears by the Oeconomy of Nature, that God never does by very difficult means, what may be done by a plain easie way: God does nothing in vain and without Reason: That which shews his Wisdom and his Power, is not to do little things by difficult Means; for that is repugnant to Reason, and shews a limited Knowledge: But on the contrary, it is to do great things by plain easie Means. 'Tis thus that out of Extension only he produces whatever we see that is admirable in Nature, and even that which gives Life and Motion to Animals. For those who will needs have Substantial Forms, Faculties, and Souls in Animals, different from their Blood, and from the Organs of their Body, in order to perform their Functions, at the same time seem to argue that God wants Understanding, or that he cannot do those admirable things by Extension only. They measure the Power of God, and his Sovereign Wisdom, by the smallness of their own Capacity. Then since God may make Humane Minds see all things, by willing barely that they should see what is in themselves; that is, what is in him that has a relation to those things, and which represents them, there is no probability that he would do it otherwise; and that he should produce, in order thereunto, as many Infinities of Infinite Numbers of Idea's, as there are Created Spirits.

But we must observe, that we are not to conclude, that Spirits see the Essence of God, because they can see all things in God in that manner: Since what they see is very Imperfect; but that God is very Perfect: They see Matter Divisible and Figured, *etc.* and there is nothing in God that is Divisible or Figured; for God is all Beings, because he is Infinite and Comprehends all; but he is no Being in particular. Nevertheless that which we see is but one, or several Beings in particular, and we do not apprehend that perfect Simplicity of God which includes all Beings. Besides that it may be said, that we do not so much see the Idea's of things, as the things which those Idea's represent; for when we see a Square, for instance, we do not say that we see the Idea of that Square, which is united to the Mind, but only the Square which is without us.

The Second Reason which may induce us to believe, that we see all Beings, because God Wills, that that which is in him, which represents them, should be discover'd to us; and not because we have

as many Idea's created with us as we can see things; for this puts all created Spirits in an absolute dependence upon God, and the greatest that can be: For this being so, we cannot only see nothing, but what God is will we should see, but we can also see nothing, unless God himself shews it us. *Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, tanquam ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est.* 'Tis God himself which instructs and enlightens Philosophers in that Knowledge which ungrateful Men call Natural, although it is an immediate gift from Heaven: *Deus enim illis manifestavit*. It is he that is properly the Light of the Mind, and the Father of Light or Knowledge. *Pater Luminum*. It is he that teaches Wisdom to Men: *Qui docet hominem scientiam*. In a word, He is the true Light, which enlightens all those that come into this World: *Lux vera que illuminat omnem hominem venientem in bunc Mundum.*

For in fine, It is pretty difficult distinctly to apprehend the Dependence which our Minds have on God in all their particular Actions, supposing they have all that which we distinctly know to be necessary for them in order to Act, or all the Idea's of things present to their Mind, and truly that general and confused word Concurrence, by which Men pretend to explain the Dependence that Creatures have on God, does not awaken any distinct Idea in an attentive Mind; and yet it is very necessary Men should know distinctly, that they can do nothing without God.

But the strongest of all Reasons, is the manner how the Mind perceives all things. It is certain, and every body knows by Experience, that when we have a mind to think on any thing in particular, we first cast our Eyes on all Beings; and in the next place we apply our selves to the Consideration of the Object we design to think on. Now it is most certain that we see it already, though confusedly and in general: So that as we may desire to see all the Beings, sometimes one and sometimes another, it is certain that all Beings are present to our Mind; and it appears that all Beings can only be present to our Mind, because God is present to it, that is, He who includes all things in the Simplicity of his Being.

It seems moreover, That the Mind would not be capable of representing to it self universal Idea's of Kinds and Species, *etc.* unless it saw all Beings included in one. For every Creature being a particular Being, we cannot say that we see any thing Created, when we see, for instance, a Triangle in general. In fine, I am of opinion, that it is impossible to give a good Reason of the Manner how the Mind comes to know several abstracted and general Truths, unless it be by the presence of him that can direct the Mind in a World of different Manners.

In fine, The Best, the most Sublime, the most Solid, and the chief Proof of the Existence of God, or that which supposes the fewest things, is the Idea we have of Infinity, though it does not comprehend it; and that it has a very distinct Idea of God, which it can only have by the Union it has with him; since it cannot be conceiv'd that the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, as that we have of God, should be any thing that is Created.

But the Mind has not only the Idea of Infinity, it has it even before that of Finite. For we conceive the Infinite Being, from this alone that we conceive a Being, without considering whether it is Finite or Infinite. But in order to conceive a Finite Being, we must needs retrench something of that general Notion of a Being, which consequently must precede. Thus the Mind perceives nothing but in Infinity; and that Idea is so far from being form'd by the confused Mixture of all the Idea's of particular Beings, as Philosophers imagine; that on the contrary all those particular Idea's are only Participations of the general Idea of Infinity: As God does not derive his Being from the Creatures, but all Creatures only subsist by him.

The last Proof, which perhaps will be a Demonstration to those that are used to abstracted

Arguments, is this, It is impossible that God should have any other principal End of his Actions but himself: It is a Notion that is common to all Men that are capable of any Reflection; and Holy Writ does not allow us to doubt, but that God has made every thing for himself. Therefore it is necessary, that not only our Natural Love, I mean the Motion he produces in our Mind, should tend towards him: But moreover, That the Knowledge and the Light which he bestows upon it, should make us know any thing that is in him; for whatever comes from God can only be for God. Should God Create a Spirit, and give it for an Idea, or for the immediate Object of its knowledge the Sun: In my Opinion, God would Create that Spirit, and the Idea of that Spirit, for the Sun and not for him.

God cannot therefore Create a spirit to know his Works, unless that Spirit sees God in some measure, by beholding his Works. So that we may say, that unless we do see God in some measure, we should see nothing: In like manner, unless we do Love God, I mean, unless God did continually Imprint in us the Love of Good in general, we should Love nothing. For that Love being our Will, we can Love nothing, nor Will anything without him; since we cannot Love particular Goods, without determining towards those Goods, the motion of Love, which God gives us towards him. So that as we Love nothing but by the necessary Love we have for God, so we see nothing but by the Natural Knowledge we have of God: And all the particular Idea's we have of Creatures, are only Limitations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Motions of the Will for the Creatures, are only determinations of the motion for the Creator.

I believe there are no Divines but what will grant, that the Impious Love God with that Natural Love I speak of: and St. *Austin* and some other Fathers affirm as an undeniable thing, That the Impious behold in God the Rule of Manners, and Eternal Truths. So that the Opinion I explain ought not to trouble any Body. Thus St. *Austin* speaks: *Ab ida incommutabili luce veritatis, etiam impius, dum ab ea avertitur, quedammodo tangitur. Hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant eternitatem, & multa recte riprehendunt recteque laudant in bominum moribus. Quibus ea tandem regulis judicant, nisi in quibus vident, quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat, etiam si nec ipsi eodem modo vivant? Ubi autem eas vident? Neque enim in sua natura. Nam cum precul dubio mente ista videantur, corumque mentes constet esse mutabiles, bas vero regulai immutabiles, videa: quisquis in eis & Loc videre potuerit—ubinam ergo sunt ishe regula Scripta, misi in libro lucis illiue, que veritas dicitur, unde lex omnis justa describitur—inquavidet quid operandum sit, etiam qui operatur injustitiam, & ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur a qua tamen tangitur.*

There are many passages in St. *Austin* like unto this, by which he proves, that we see God even in this Life, by the knowledge we have of Eternal Truths. Truth is uncreated, Immutable, Immense, Eternal, above all things. It is true by it self. It derives its Perfection from nothing: It makes Creatures more perfect; and all Spirits naturally endeavour to know it. Nothing but God can have all those Perfections. Therefore Truth is God. We see some of those Immutable Eternal Truths. Therefore we see God. These are St. *Austin's* Reasons, ours differ a little from them; and we are unwilling to use the Authority of so great a Man unjustly, to second our Sentiment.

We believe that Truths, even those that are Eternal; as that twice two are four, are not so much as absolute Beings: So far are we from believing that they are in God. For it is visible, that that Truth only consists in a relation of Equality, which is between twice Two and Four. Therefore we do not say that we see God in seeing Truths, as St. *Austin* says, but in seeing the Idea's of those Truths: For Idea's are real, but the Equality between the Idea's, which is Truth, has no reality. When for example, Men say that the Cloth they measure contains Three Yards; the Cloth and the Yards are real: But the Equality between Three Yards and the Cloth is not a real Being; it is only a relation

that is between the Three Yards and the Cloth. When we say that twice Two are Four, the Idea's of the Numbers are real; but the Equality there is between them is only a Relation. Thus according to our Sentiment we see God, when we see Eternal Truths; not that those Eternal Truths are God, but because the Idea's on which those Truths depend are in God; perhaps St. *Austin* understood it so. We also believe, that we know in God Changeable and Corruptible things, although St. *Austin* only speaks of Immutable and Incorruptible things; because it is not necessary for that to place any Imperfection in God; since it suffices, as we have already said, that God should shew us what there is in him that has a Relation to these things.

But though I say, we see in God the things that are Material and Sensible, it must be observ'd, that I do not say we have a Sensation of them in God, but only that it is from God who Acts in us; for God Knows sensible things, but he does not Feel them. When we perceive any thing that is sensible, Sensation and pure Idea is in our Perception. Sensation is a Modification of our Soul, and it is God that Causes it in us: And he may Cause it, though he has it not, because he sees in the Idea he has of our Soul, that it is capable of it. As for the Idea which is joyn'd to Sensation, it is in God, we see it, because it is his pleasure to discover it to us: And God joins Sensation to the Idea, when Objects are present, to the end that we may believe them as they are: and that we may have such Sensations and Passions as we ought to have in relation the them.

Lastly, We believe that all Spirits see the Eternal Laws as well as other things in God, but with some difference: They know the Eternal Order and Eternal Truths, and even the Beings which God has made according to those Truths, or according to the Order by the Union which those Spirits have necessarily with the *Word*, or *Wisdom* of God which directs them, as we have shewn; But 'tis by the Impression they receive continually from the Will of God, which inclines them to him, and endeavours, as it were, to render their Will absolutely like unto his; that they know Order is a Law, I mean, that they know the Eternal Laws: How we must love Good, and shy from Evil: That we must love Justice more than all Riches: That it is better to Obey God than to Command Men, and many other Natural Laws. For the knowledge of all those Laws is not different from the knowledge of that Impression, which they always feel in themselves, though they do not always follow it by the free choice of their Will; which they know to be Common to all Spirits, though it is not equally strong in all.

It is by that Dependance, Relation, and Union of our Mind to the *Word* of God, and of our Will to his Love, that we are made after the Image and Likeness of God: And although this may be very much defac'd by Sin, yet it is necessary that it should subsist as long as we do. But if we bear the Image of the *Word* humbled upon earth; and if we follow the Motions of the Holy Ghost, that Primitive Image of our first Creation, that Union of our Mind with the *Word* of the Father, and to the Love of the Father and of the Son, will be re-established, and render'd indelible. We shall be like God, if we are like the *Man God*. In fine, God will be all in us, and we all in God, in a far more perfect manner than that by which it is necessary for us to subsist, that we should be in him, and he in us.

Here are some reasons which may perswade us, that Spirits perceive all things by the immediate Presence of him who Comprehends all in the Simplicity of his Being. Every one will Judge of it according to the Internal Conviction he shall receive of it, after having seriously consider'd it. But 'tis thought that there will be no probability in all the other ways of explaining these things; and that this last will appear more than probable. Thus our Souls depend on God in all respects. For as it is he who makes them feel Grief, Pleasure, and all other Sensations, by the Natural Union he has Establish'd between them and our Body which is no other than his Decree and general Will. Thus

it is he, who by the Natural Union which he has made between the Sill of Man, and the Representation of the Idea's which the Immensity of the Divine Being includes, that makes them know whatever they do know; and that Natural Union is also nothing else but his general Will. So that none but he can direct us, by representing all things to us; as none but he can make us Happy, by making us taste all manner of Pleasures.

Let us therefore keep to this Opinion, That God is the Intelligible World, or the place of Spirits, as the material World is the place of Bodies. That they receive all their Modifications from his Power: That they find all their Idea's in his wisdom: And that it is by his Love that they are acted in all their regular Motions; and since his Power and Love are nothing but himself, let us believe with St. *Paul*, that he is not far from every one of us; and that it is in him we have Life, Motion, and a Being. *Non longe est ab unequoque nostrum, in ipso cnim vivimus, movemur, & sumius.*

BOOK 6

THE SECOND PART

CHAP. III: *Of the most dangerous Error in Philosophy. Of the Ancients.*

Philosophers have not only spoke what they did not conceive, when they explained the Effects of Nature, by certain Beings which they have no particular Idea of, but even establish a Principle from whence may directly be drawn most false and dangerous Consequences.

For if, according to their Opinion, we suppose, that in Bodies there are some Beings distinct from Matter; and not having any distinct Idea of these Entities, we might easily imagine, that they are the true, or principal Causes of the Effects which we see produced. Tis even the common Sentiment of most Philosophers: For 'tis chiefly to explain these Effects, that they make use of Substantial Forms, Real Qualities, and other the like Entities. But when we come to consider attentively, the Idea we have of *Cause* or *Power* of acting, we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine: For the Idea of a Sovereign Power, is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity; and the Idea of a Subordinate Power, is the Idea of an inferiour; but a true Divinity at least, according to the Opinion of the Heathens, if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause. We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us, when we admit Forms, Faculties, Qualities, Vertues, and real Beings, capable of producing certain Effects, by the Power of their own Nature: And thus, they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens, by the Respect they have for their Philosophy. Faith indeed works it, but it may perhaps be said, that if we are Christians in our Hearts, we are Heathens in our Minds.

Moreover, it is difficult to perswade our selves, that we ought neither to love or fear, true Powers and Beings, who can act upon us, punish us with Pain, or recompense us with Pleasure. And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration, 'tis also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them. For whatever can act upon us, as a real and true Cause, is necessarily above us, according to *St. Austin* and right Reason: The same Father, and the same Reason tells us, 'tis an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour. And from hence, this great Father concludes, that the Body cannot act upon the Soul, and that nothing can be above the Soul but God.

In the Holy Scriptures, when God proves to the *Israelites*, that they ought to adore him, that is, that they ought to fear and love him, the chief Reasons he brings, are taken from his Power, to recompence and punish them. He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him, the

Evils wherewith he hath chastised them, and that he has still the same Power. He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens, because they have no Power over them, and can do them neither Good nor Hurt. He requires them to honour him only, because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil, and that there happens none in their City, according to the Prophet, which he has not done; for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us. 'Tis God alone that acts in them, and 'tis he only that we must fear and love: *Soli Deo Honor & Gloria.*

In short, this Opinion, that we ought to fear and love, whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil, appears so natural and just, that it is impossible to destroy it; so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers (which we endeavour here to confuse) that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel: Reason seems to juitine a Religion like to that of the Heathens, and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners.

It is true, that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks, as the Sovereign Divinity; because they cannot make us entirely happy when we have of them, or entirely unhappy when we want them. Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great *Jupiter*, upon whom all their Divinities depend, or as to the Sun, which our Senses represent to us, as the universal Cause, which gives Life and Motion to all things, and, which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity; if with the Heathen Philosophers, we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce, not only in our Bodies and Minds, but likewise in all Beings which encompass us.

But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons, yet we may always render them some particular adoration: I mean, we may think of and love them in some manner; if it is true, that in some sort they can make us happy, we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us. And certainly, Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses, think that Pulse is capable of doing them good; for else the *Israelites*, for instance, would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect, nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them, if they did not, in some manner, look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them. These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in, when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy, and follows the Impressions of the Senses.

That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosophy, and the Certainty of our Principles, and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of: It is necessary, clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy, and to prove, in short, that there is only one true Cause, because there is only one true God: That Nature, or the Power of every thing, proceeds only from the Will of God: That all Natural things are not true Causes, but only occasional ones; and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these.

It is evident that all Bodies, both great and small, have no power of removing themselves: A Mountain, an House, a Stone, a grain of Sand; and in short, the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive, have no power of removing themselves. We have only two sorts of Idea's, that of Bodies, and that of Spirits; whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's. Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies, shows us that they cannot move themselves, it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only. But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds, we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be: On the contrary, we see that there is none, nor can be any; whence we ought to conclude, if we will argue according to our Knowledge, that as no body can be able to move it self, so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal

cause of the Motion of any body whatever.

But when we think of the Idea of God, of a Being infinitely Perfect, and consequently Almighty, we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will, and the Motion of all Bodies, that 'tis impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body, that should not be moved: We must then say, that his Will only can move Bodies, if we will speak things as we conceive them, and not as we feel them. The moving force of Bodies therefore, is not in the Bodies which move, since this power of Motion is nothing else but the Will of God. Thus Bodies have no Action, and when a Bowl which is moved, by meeting it moves another, yet it communicates nothing of its own; for in itself it hath not the Impression that it communicates to the other: Yet a Bowl is the Natural Cause of the motion which it communicates. A Natural Cause then is not a real and true Cause, but only an occasional one, and which determined the Author o Nature to act after such and such a manner, in such and such an Occurrence.

It is certain, that 'tis by the motion of visible or invisible Bodies that all things are produced: For Experience teaches us, that Bodies, whose parts are in greatest Motion, always act more than others, and produce the greatest Change in the World. All the Powers of Nature then proceed from the Will of God: He has created the World because he willed it: *Dixit & facta funt*: He moves all things, and so produces all the Effects that we see happen; because he has also willed certain Laws, according to which Bodies communicate their Motions in their Rencounter; and because these Laws are Efficacious they act, and Bodies cannot act. There is therefore no Force, Power, or true Cause, in the Material and Sensible World, nor must we admit of Forms, Faculties, and real Qualities, to produce Effects that Bodies cannot; and to divide, with God, the Force and Power which is Essential to him. Not only Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing, the most noble Spirits also are under a like Impotence. They can know nothing if God does not enlighten them; nor can they have any Sensation if he does not modifie them. They are capable of willing nothing if God moves them not towards him. I confess they can determine the Impression that God gives them towards him, to other Objects; but I know not whether that can be called a Power. If the Capability of Sinning is a Power, it would be a Power which the Almighty has not. St. *Austin says* in some of his Works, If Men had in themselves the Power of loving Good, we might say they had some Power: But can only Love, because God Wills they should Love, and because his Will is Efficacious. They Love only, because God continually inclines them to Good in General; that is, towards himself: For God has created them only for himself, he never preserves them without turning them towards and inclining them to himself. They have no Motion towards Good in general, 'tis God who moves them; they only follow by an entire free Choice, this Impression according to the Law of God, or determine it towards a false Good after the Law of the Flesh: They can only be determined by a Prospect of Good: For being able to do only what God makes them, they can love nothing but Good.

But if we should suppose what is true in one Sense, that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truth and loving Good, if their Thoughts and Wills produced nothing External, we might always say they were able to do nothing. Now it appears most certain to me, that the Will of Spirits is not capable of moving the least Body in the World: For 'tis evident there is no necessary Connexion between the Will we have of moving our Arms, and the Motion of them. It is true, they are moved when we please, and by that means we are the Natural Cause of their Motion: But Natural Causes are not true Causes, they are only Occasional ones, which act merely through the Power and Efficacy of God, as I have already explained.

For how can we move our Arms? To move them we must have Animal Spirits, and convey them by

certain Nerves, into such and such Muscles to swell and contract them. For by this means the Arms move; or according to the Opinion of some, we know not yet how 'tis performed: And we see, that Men who do not so much as know they have Spirits, Nerves, and Muscles to move their Arms, yet move them with as much Art and Facility, as those that understand Anatomy best. 'Tis then granted, that Men Will the Motion of their Arms, but 'tis only God that can and knows how to remove them. If a Man cannot throw down a Tower, at least he knows well what must be done in order to it: But there is no Man that knows so much, as what he must do to move one of his Fingers by the help of his Animal Spirits. How then can Men move their Arms? These things appear evident to me, and to all those that will think of them, though perhaps they may be incomprehensible to such as will not consider them.

But Men only are not the True Causes of the Motions produced in their Bodies, it seems even a Contradiction that they should be so. A True Cause is such an one as the Mind perceives a necessary Connexion between it and its Effect; 'tis that I mean. Now there is only the Infinitely Perfect Being, whose Mind can perceive a necessary Connexion between his Will and the Effects of it. 'Tis only God then, who is the True Cause, and who has really the Power of moving Bodies. I say moreover, 'tis not probable that God should communicate, either to Men or Angels, this Power he has of moving Bodies; and those who pretend the Power we have of moving our Arms is a true Power, must confess that God can also give to Spirits the Power of creating, annihilating, and performing all possible things: In a word, That he can make them Almighty, as I shall further shew.

God has no need of any Instrument to act, it is sufficient if he Wills a thing for it to be, because it is a Contradiction to suppose he Wills it, and that it should not be. His Power then is his Will, and the communicating of his Power is a Communication of his Will. But to communicate his Will to a Man or an Angel, can signifie nothing else but Willing; some body, for instance, should be effectively moved when 'tis Will'd by a Man or an Angel. Now in this case I see two Wills which concur when an Angel would move a Body, that of God, and that of the Angel; and to know which of the two will be the true Cause of the Motion of this Body, we must know which it is that is Efficacious. There is a necessary Connexion between the Will of God, and what he Wills. God Wills in this case, that a Body should move when it is willed by an Angel: There is a necessary Connexion therefore, between the Will of God and the Motion of this Body; and consequently 'tis God who is the true cause of the Motion of the Body, and the Will of the Angel only an occasional one.

But to shew it yet more clearly, let us suppose that God Wills it should happen quite contrary to what some Spirits desire; as we may think of Devils, or some other Spirits, who merit this Punishment; we cannot say in this case, that God communicates his Power to them, since they can do nothing that they would do. Yet the Wills of these spirits would be the Natural Causes of whatever Effects should be produced; as such Bodies should be moved to the Right Hand, because these Spirits would have them moved to the Left; and the desire of these Spirits would determine the Will of God to act, as our Wills to move the parts of our Bodies, determine the first Cause to move them: So that the Wills of Spirits are only occasional Causes.

Yet if after all these Reasons, we will still maintain, that the Will of an angel, which moves any body, should be a true Cause, and not an occasional one; it is plain that this same Angel might be the true Cause of the Creation and Annihilation of all things: For God could as well communicate to him his Power of Creating and Destroying Bodies, as that of moving them, if he will'd that things should be created and annihilated: In a word, If he will'd that all things should happen as the Angel wishes them, even as he Wills Bodies should move, as the Angel pleases. If it be said, that

an Angel or a Man would be the true movers, because God moves Bodies when they with it; it may also be said, that a Man and an Angel may be true Creators, since God can create Beings when they will it: Nay, perhaps it might be said, that the most Vile Animals, or Matter of it self, should be the effective Cause of the Creation of any Substance; if we supposed as the Philosophers do, that God produces substantial Forms whenever the Disposition of Matter requires it. In fine, Because God has resolved from all Eternity in certain times to create such or such things, we might also say, that these times should be the Causes of the Creation of these Beings, as reasonably as to pretend, that a Bowl which meets another, is the true cause of the motion it communicates to it: Because God has determined by his general Will, which constituted the Order of Nature, that when two Bodies should meet there should be such and such a Communication of Motion.

There is then but one only true God, and he the one only true Cause: And we must not imagine, that which precedes and Effect, to be the true Cause of it. God cannot even communicate his Power to the Creatures, if we follow the Light of Reason; he cannot make them true Causes, because he cannot make them Gods. Bodies, Spirits, pure Intelligences, can all do nothing. 'Tis he who hath made these Spirits that illuminates and acts them. 'Tis he who has created the Heavens and the Earth, which regulates the Motions thereof. In short, 'tis the Author of our Being that executes our Wills, *femel jussis, sewsper pares.* He even moves our Arms when we make use of them against his Orders, for he complains by his Prophets, that we make him serve our unjust and criminal Desires.

All these little Heathen Divinities, and all these particular Causes of the Philosophers, are only Chymera's that the wicked Spirit endeavours to establish to ruin the Worship of the true God. It is not the Philosophy they have received from Adam, which teaches these things; 'tis that they have received from the Serpent; for since the Fall, the Mind of Man is perfectly Heathenish. 'Tis this Philosophy which joyned to the Errors of the Senses, has made them adore the Sun, and which is still at this Day, the universal Cause of the Irregularity of the Mind, and Corruption of the Heart of Man. By their Actions, and sometimes by their Words; why say they, should we not love the Body, since the Body is capable of affording us all Pleasures? And why do we laugh at the *Israelites*, which regretted the Loss of the Garlick and Onyons of *Egypt*; since, in Effect, they were unhappy, by being deprived of what, in some Measure, could make them happy? But the new Philosophy, which they represent as a dismal thing, to affrighten weak Minds, that is despised and condemned without being understood. The new Philosophy, I say, since they are pleased to call it so, destroys all the Arguments of the Libertines, by the Establishment of the chiefest of its Principles, which perfectly agrees with the first Principle of the Christian Religion, that we must love and fear but one God, since there is only one God who can make us happy.

For if Religion teaches us, that there is but one true God, this Philosophy shews us there is but one true Cause. If Religion informs us, that all the Divinities of the Heathens are only Stones and Metals without Life and Motion: This Philosophy discovers to us also, that all second Causes, or all the Divinities of their Philosophy, are only Matter and inefficacious Wills. In short, if Religion teaches us, that we must not bow our Knees to false Gods. This Philosophy also tells us, that our Imaginations and Minds ought not to be prostituted to the Imaginary Greatness and Power of Causes, which are not true Causes: That we must neither love nor fear them, nor busie our selves about them; but think upon God only, see him, adore him, fear and love him in all things.

But this agrees not with the Inclination of some Philosophers: They will neither see nor think upon God: For since the Fall, there is a secret Opposition between God and Man: Men take Pleasure in erecting Gods after their own Fancy, they voluntarily love and fear the Fictions of their own Imagination, as they Heathens did the Works of their own Hands. They are like Children who

tremble at their Companions, after they have daubed their Faces: Or if they will have a more Noble Comparison, although perhaps it be not so just, they resemble those famous *Romans*, who had some Fear and Respect for the Fictions of their own Minds, and foolishly adored their Emperors after they had let loose the Eagle when they deified them.

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Bk. 3, Pt. 2, Ch. 1-6
Bk. 6, Pt. 2, Ch. 3

Nicholas Malebranche

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BOOK III
THE SECOND PART

CHAPTER 1, SECTION. 1: What is meant by Idea's; That they truly Exist, and that they are necessary to perceive all material Objects.

I Think every one will confess, that we do not perceive External Objects by themselves. We see the Sun, the Stars, and many Objects without us; and it is not probable that the Soul should go out of the Body, and walk as it were, through the Heavens, to Contemplate all those Objects there. She does not then see them by themselves and as the immediate Object of Mind; when it sees the Sun, for instance, it is not the Sun, but something which is nearly united to our Soul; and it is that which I call Idea: So that here by this word Idea, I mean only what is the immediate Object, or the nearest the Mind when it perceives any thing.

It must be observed, that to make the Mind perceive any Object, it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Object should be actually present, of which we can have no doubt; but it is not requisite that there should be some external Object which resembles this Idea; for it often happens, that we perceive things which are not, and which never had a being. So that we often have in our Minds real Idea's of things which never were. For instance, when a Man imagines a Mountain of God, it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Mountain should be really present to his Mind: When a Mad Man, a Man in a high Fever, or a Man that is asleep, sees any terrible Animal before his Eyes, it is certain that the Idea of this animal truly Exists; and yet this Mountain of Gold, and this Animal, never were.

However, Men being Naturally inclined to believe that there is none but Corporeal Objects which Exist, they Judge of the Reality and Existence of things quite after another manner than they ought to do; for as soon as they are sensible of any Object, they will certainly have it that this Object Exists, although it often happens, that there is nothing without: And further, they affirm, that this Object is exactly the same as they see it, which never happens. But in respect to the Idea which necessarily Exists, and which can be nothing else besides what it appears to be, they without any reflection, commonly Judge it to be nothing; as if Idea's had not a very great number of Properties: As if the Idea's of a Square, for instance, was not very different from that of some number, and did not represent things perfectly distinct; which could never happen to nothing, since nothing has no Propriety. It is therefore indisputable, that Idea's have a real Existence. But let us examine their Nature and Essence, and see what it can be in the Soul that is capable of representing

all things.

Whatever things the Soul perceives, are either in, or out of its self, those which are in the Soul, are its own thoughts; that is, all its different Modifications; for by these words, Thought, manner of Thinking, or modification of the Soul, I understand in general all things, that can be in the Soul without her perceiving them, as her own Sensations, Imaginations, pure Intellections, or simple Conceptions, even her Passions, and Natural Inclinations. Now our Soul has no need of Idea's to perceive all these things, because they are within the Soul; or rather, the Soul it self, after such or such a manner: Even as the real roundness of some Body, and its Motion, are only this Body Figured, and moved after such or such a manner.

But as for things that are out of the Soul, we can perceive them only by the means of Idea's, supposing that these things cannot be intimately united to it. There are two sorts of them, Spiritual, and Material: As for the Spiritual, there is some probability that they may discover themselves to the Soul without Idea's, and by themselves. For although Experience teaches us, that we cannot immediately, and of our selves, declare our Thoughts to one another, but only by words, or some other sensible Sign, to which we have affixed our Idea's: We may say, that God has ordained it so only during this Life, to hinder those Disorders that would soon happen, if Men could make themselves be understood as they pleased. But when Justice and Order shall Reign, and we shall be delivered from the Captivity of our Bodies, we shall perhaps make our selves mutually understood by an intimate Union of our selves, as its probable the Angels do in Heaven; so that it does not seem absolutely necessary to admit Idea's to represent spiritual things to the Soul, because it may be, we may see them by themselves, although after a very imperfect manner.

I examine not here how two Spirits can be united one to the other, and if they can after this manner mutually discover one anothers Thoughts. I believe however, that there is no Substance purely intelligible, but that of God; nothing can be evidently known but in his Light; and that the Union of spirits cannot make them Visible: For although we are most strictly united to our selves, we are and shall be unintelligible to our selves, until we see our selves in God; and that he represents to us the perfect intelligible Idea that he hath of our being included in his. So that although I may seem here to grant, that Angels can manifest one to another what they are, and what they think; 'tis only because I will not dispute of it, provided I am granted what is not to be doubted, viz. That we cannot see material things by themselves, and without Idea's.

I shall explain in the Seventh Chapter, my Opinion how we know Spirits; and will shew, that at present we cannot absolutely know them by themselves, although it may be they are united to us. But I speak here chiefly of material things, which certainly cannot be united to the Soul, in such a manner as is necessary for us to perceive them: Because being extended, and the Soul not, there is no proportion between them. Besides, our Souls go not out of our Bodies to measure the greatness of the Heaven, and consequently, they cannot see External Bodies, but by the Idea's which represent them. This is what all the World ought to grant.

CHAPTER 1, SECTION. 2: A division of the several ways whereby External Objects may be seen.

We are assured the, that it's absolutely necessary, that the Idea's we have of Bodies, and of all other Objects which we

perceive not by themselves, proceed from these Bodies, or these Objects; or else that our Soul has the power of producing these Idea's, or that God Created them with our Souls; or that he produces them every time that we think of any Object; or else that the Soul has all those perfections in it self that it sees in these Bodies: Or in fine, that it is united with a perfect Being, which in general includes all the Perfections of Created Beings.

We cannot see Objects but after one of these ways: Let us examine without prejudice, and without frighting our selves with the difficulty of the Question, which of them seems most probable: It may be, we may resolve it very clearly, although we do not pretend here to give such Demonstrations as will satisfie all sorts of persons; but only convincing Proofs to those at least, as will meditate with serious Attention upon them; for perhaps it would be thought too rash if we should pretend otherwise.

CHAPTER 2: That material Objects do not emit Species which resemble them.

The most common received Opinion is that of the Peripateticks, who think that External Objects emit Species which resemble them, and that those Species are carried by the External Senses to the Common Sense or Understanding. They call these Species impressed, because the Object imprints them on the External Senses. These impressed Species being Material and Sensible, are render'd intelligible, by means of the active, or active intellect; and are fit to be received in the passive intellect. These Species thus spiritualiz'd, are called express'd Species, because they are express'd by the impress'd ones; and 'tis by them that the Passive Intellect knows all material things.

We shall not stay to explain at large these fine things, and the divers manners in which different Philosophers conceive them; for although they do not agree as to the number of Faculties which they attribute to the Interior Sense, and the Understanding; and though there are not a few, who doubt whether they have need of any active Intellect, to know sensible Objects, yet however they generally agree, that External Objects emit the Species or Images which represent them. And 'tis only upon this Foundation that they multiply their Faculties, and defend their active intellect: So that this Foundation having no Solidity, as shall soon be shewn, it will be unnecessary to spend any time to overturn the Superstructure.

We are assur'd then, that it is improbable that Objects should emit their Images, or Species which represent them, for these reasons. I. From the impenetrability of Objects: All Objects, as the Sun, Stars, and all such as are near the Eyes; cannot emit Species which are different from their respective Natures: Wherefore Philosophers commonly say, that these Species are Gross and Material, in which they differ from express'd Species which are Spiritualised. These impress'd Species of Objects then are little Bodies, they cannot therefore be penetrated, nor all the Spaces which are betwixt the Earth and the Heaven, which must be full of them. Whence it's easie to conclude, they must be bruis'd and broken, in moving every way; and thus they cannot render Objects visible.

Moreover, one may see from the same place or point, a great number of Objects in the Heavens, and on the Earth; therefore the Species of these Objects can be reduc'd into a Point. But they

are impenetrable since they are extended, Therefore, etc.

But one may not only see a multitude of very great and vast Objects: There is no Point in all the great Spaces of the World, from whence we cannot discover an almost infinite number of Objects, and even Objects as large as the Sun, Moon, and the Heavens, there is therefore no Point in all the World where the Species of all these things ought not to meet; which is against all appearance of Truth.

The Second Reason is taken from the Change which happens in the Species; it's evident, that the nearer any Object is, the greater its Species ought to be, since we see the Object's greater. But what is yet more difficult to conceive, according to their Opinion, is, That if we look upon this Object with a Telescope, or a Microscope, the Species immediately becomes Six Hundred times as great as it was before; for 'tis yet more difficulty conceiv'd from what Parts it can grow so great in an instant.

The Third Reason is, when we look upon a perfect Cube, all the Species of its Sides are unequal; nevertheless, we see all the Sides equally Square. So when we consider Ellipses and Parallelograms in a Picture, which cannot but emit like Species, yet we see Circles and Squares: This manifestly shews, that it is not necessary that the Object beheld, should emit Species like it self, that it may be seen.

In fine, it cannot be conceiv'd how it can be, that a Body, which does not sensibly diminish, should always emit Species on every Side, which should continually fill all the great Spaces about it, and that with an inconceivable swiftness. For an Object that was hidden, in that Instant that it discovers it self may be seen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides; and what appears yet more strange is, that Bodies in great Motion, as Air, and some other, have not that power of pushing outwards these Images which resemble them; as the more gross and quiescent Bodies, such as the Earth, Stones, and generally all Hard Bodies have.

But I shall not stay any longer to enumerate all the contrary Reasons to their Opinion, there would be no end, a very ordinary Judgment would raise innumerable Objections. Those that we have brought are sufficient, though they were not so necessary after what has been said upon the Subject of the First Book, where the Errors of the Senses were explain'd. But there are so great a number of Philosophers wedded to this Opinion, that we believe it will be necessary to say something to incline them to reflect upon their own Thoughts.

CHAPTER 3: That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's. The Cause of Mens Error, in reference to this Subject.

The Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's of such things as they will think upon, and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Objects make upon Bodies, although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them; they believe that 'tis in this, that Man is made after the Image of God, and participates of his Power. That even as God Created all things out of nothing, and can reduce them to nothing again, and then Create them anew; so Man can Create, and Annihilate the Idea's of all things as he pleases. But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which extol a Man, these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original, and which the Father of Light hath not inspir'd.

This participation of the power of God which Men boast of

having, to represent Objects, and of doing many other particular actions, is a participation which seems to relate to something of independence, as independence is commonly explain'd; it is also a Chimerical Participation, which Mens Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine. They depend much more than they think, upon the Goodness and Mercy of God: But this is not a place to explain these things. It's enough if we endeavour to shew, that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which they perceive.

No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings, since they have real Properties, since they differ from one another, and represent all different things; Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are spiritual, and very different from the Bodies which they represent. But it seems reasonable to doubt, whether Idea's, by whose means we see Bodies, are not more Noble than the Bodies themselves: for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly, as we shall see hereafter. Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Idea's as we please, we shall be in danger of perswading our selves, to make more Noble and Perfect Beings, than the World which God hath Created. However, some do not reflect upon it, because they imagine that an Idea is Nothing, since it is not to be felt; or else if they look upon it as a Being, 'tis a very mean, contemptible one, because they imagine it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind.

But supposing it true, that Idea's were only little contemptible Beings, yet they are Beings, and Spiritual Ones; and Men not having the power of Believing, it follows that they cannot produce them; for the production of Idea's after the manner before explain'd, is a true Creation; and although Men endeavour to palliate and molline the hardness of this Opinion, by saying, that the production of Idea's presupposes something else, but Creation nothing; yet the difficulty is not solv'd by this Subterfuge.

For we ought to consider, that it is not more difficult to produce something out of nothing, than to produce one thing out of another: which cannot at all contribute to its Production. For example, it is not more difficult to Create an Angel, than to produce him from a Stone; because a Stone being of another sort of Being wholly different, it cannot in the least be useful to the Production of an Angel. But it may contribute to the Production of Bread, Gold, etc. for a Stone, Gold, and Bread, are but the same thing differently configur'd, and are all Material.

It is even more difficult to produce an Angel of a Stone, than to produce him out of nothing; because to make an Angel out of a Stone; (so far as it can be done) the Stone must be annihilated, and afterwards the Angel Created; But simply to Create an Angel, nothing is to be annihilated. If therefore the Mind produces its Idea's from the material Impressions which the Brain receives from Objects, it must always do the same thing, or a thing as difficult, or even more difficult than if it Created them; since Idea's being Spiritual, they cannot be produc'd of material Images, which have no proportion with them.

But if it be said, that an Idea is not a Substance, I consent to it, yet it is always something that is Spiritual; and as it is impossible to make a Square of a Spirit, although a Square be not a Substance from a Spiritual Idea, although an Idea was no Substance.

But although we should grant to the Mind of Man a Sovereign Power to Annihilate, and Create the Idea's of things, yet it would never make use of that Power to produce them; for even as a

Painter, how skilful soever he be, could not represent an Animal which he had never seen, and of which he never had any Idea: So that the Picture which he should make, should be like to this unknown Animal. Thus a Man cannot form the Idea of an Object, if he knew it not before, that is, if he has not already had some Idea of it, which does not depend upon his Will; and if he already had an Idea of it, he certainly knows this Object, and it would be unnecessary for him to Form it anew. It is therefore in vain to attribute to the Mind of Man the Power of producing his Idea's. It might be said perhaps, that the Mind of Man hath general and confused Idea's which it does not produce; and that those which it produces are particular, more clear and distinct; but it is always the same thing. For even as a Painter cannot draw the Picture of a particular Person, so as to be sure that he hath perfected it, if he had had no distinct Idea of him; and even if the Person had not been present: Thus the Mind, for example, which could only have the Idea of a Being, or an Animal in general, could not represent to its self a Horse, nor Form a distinct Idea of one, and be assured that it is perfectly like a Horse, if it had not already the first Idea with which it might compare this second: Now if it had a first, it is unuseful to Form a second; and the Question respects this first. Therefore, etc.

It's true, that when we conceive a Square by pure Intellection, we can also imagine it, that is, perceive it in our selves, by tracing an Image of it in the Brain; yet it must be first observ'd, that we are not the true nor principal Cause of this Image: But it will be too long to explain it here. Secondly, So far is the second Idea which accompanies this Image, from being more distinct and more exact than the other, that on the contrary, it is not so Exact, because it resembles the first, which was only a pattern for the second. For indeed we must not believe that the Imagination and Senses represent Objects more distinctly to us than the pure Understanding; but only that they apply them more to the Mind; for the Idea's of the Senses and Imagination are not distinct, but only so far as they are conformable to the pure Intellection: The Image of a Square for example, which the Imagination Traces in the Brain, is not exact and perfect, but only so far as it resembles the Idea of the Square, which we conceive by pure Intellection. It is this Idea which regulates this Image, 'tis the Mind which Conducts the Imagination; and which Obliges it, if we may so say, to behold from time to time, whether the Image it Paints, be a Figure of four right and equal Lines, whose Angles are alike. In a word, whether what it Imagines, is like to what it Conceives.

After what has been said, I do not believe it can be doubted, but those are deceived, who affirm, the Mind is able to Form the Idea's of Objects; since they attribute the Power of Creation to the Mind, and even of Creating with Wisdom and Order, although it has no knowledge of what it does; for that is not Conceivable: But the cause of their Error is, that Men always Judge that a thing is the Cause of some Effect, when both are joined together, supposing the true Cause of this Effect be unknown to them. That makes all the World conclude, that a Bowl put in Motion, and meeting another, is the true and principal Cause of the Motion that it communicates to it; as the Will of the Soul is the true and principal Cause of the Motion of the Arm, and other the like prejudices; because it always happens, that a Bowl is shaken when it is met by another that runs against it: As our Arms are moved almost always when we Will, and we do not see any other apparent Cause of this Motion.

But when an Effect does not so often follow something which is not the Cause of it, there is nevertheless a great many Men, who believe this thing is the Cause of the Effect which happens; yet every Body is not guilty of the same Error. For instance, if a Comet appears, and after this Comet a Prince Dies: Some Stones lie exposed to the Moon, and they are eaten with Worms: The Sun is joined with Mars at the Nativity of a Child, and something extraordinary happens to this Child: All this is enough to perswade a great many Men, that the Comet, the Moon, and the Conjunction of the Sun with Mars, are the Causes of these Effects, and others like them; and the reason why all the World does not believe it, is that they do not always see these Effects follow these Causes.

But all Men having commonly the Idea's of Objects present to their Minds as soon as they with it, and it happening many times in a day, almost all conclude that the Will which accompanies the production, or rather the presence of Idea's, is truly the Cause of them: Because they see nothing in the same time that they can attribute it to; and they imagine the Idea's no longer Exist, when the Mind sees them no longer; and that they revive again anew, when they are again represented to the Mind.

'Tis for these Reasons some Judge, that External Objects emit Images which resemble them, as we have mention'd in the precedent Chapter: For it being impossible to see Objects by themselves, but only by their Idea's, they judge the Object produces the Idea; because as soon as it is present they see it; and as soon as absent they see it no longer; and because the presence of the Object almost always accompanies the Idea which represents it to us.

Yet if Men were not prejudiced in their Judgments from this, that the Idea's of things are present to their Mind as soon as they Will them, they should only conclude, that according to the Order of Nature, their Will is commonly necessary for them to have those Idea's. Not that the Will is the true and principal Cause which presents them to the Mind, and much less, that the Will produces them from nothing, or after the manner they explain it. Nor ought they to conclude, that Objects emit Species resembling them, because the Soul commonly perceives them only when they are present; but only that the Object is for the most part necessary, in order to the Idea's being present to the Mind. And lastly, that a Bowl put into Motion, is the principal and true Cause of the shaking of another Bowl that it meets in the way, since the first had not the power of Motion in its self. They can only determine, that the meeting of two Bowls is an occasion to the Author, of the Motion of Matter to execute the Decree of his Will, which is the Universal Cause of all things, in communicating to the other Bowl a part of the Motion of the first; that is, to speak more clearly, in willing that the last should acquire so much more Motion as the first lost; for the moving force of Bodies can proceed only from the Will of him who preserves them, as we shall shew elsewhere.

CHAPTER 4: That we do not see Objects by the Means of Idea's which were created with us. And that God does not produce them in us so often as we have occasion for them.

THE Third Opinion is, That of those who say all Idea's are created with us.

To discover the Improbability of this Opinion, it will be necessary to consider that there is many different things in the World of which we have Idea's. But to speak only of simple

Figures, it is certain that the Number of them is Infinite: Nay, even if we consider but one only, as the Ellipsis, we cannot doubt but the Mind conceives an infinite Number of different Kinds of them, when it considers that one of the Diameters may be lengthened out to Infinity, and the other always continue the same.

So the height of a Triangle may be augmented or diminished infinitely, the base being always the same, we may conceive there is an infinite Number of different Kinds of them: And also, which I desire may be consider'd here, The Mind in some manner perceives this infinite Number, although we can imagine but very few of them; and that we can at the same time have particular and distinct Idea's of many Triangles of different Kinds. But what must chiefly be observed is, That this general Idea that the Mind has of this Number of Triangles of different Kinds is sufficient to prove, That if we do not conceive each of these different Triangles by particular Idea's: And in short, If we comprehend not their Infinity, 'tis not the Defect of the Idea's, or that Infinity is not represented to us, but only the Defect of the Capacity and Extension of the Mind. If a Man should apply himself to consider the Properties of all the diverse Kinds of Triangles, although he should eternally continue this sort of Study, he would never want new and particular Idea's, but his Mind would be unprofitably fatigued.

What I have said of Triangles, may be applied to five, six, a hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand sided Figures, and so on ad infinitum. Now if the sides of a Triangle, which have infinite relations one with the other, make Triangles of infinite Kinds, it is plain that four, five, or a thousand sided Figures are capable of admitting much greater Differences, since they are capable of a greater Number of Relations and Combinations of their sides, than simple Triangles are.

The Mind then sees all these things; it hath Idea's of them; and these Idea's would never fail it, although it should employ infinite Ages in the Consideration of one Figure only: And if it perceived not these infinite Figures all of a sudden, or comprehended not their Intinity, 'tis only because its Extension is very much limited. It hath then an infinite Number of Idea's: Do I say an infinite Number? It hath as many infinite Numbers of Idea's, as there are different Figures to be consider'd: So that since there is an infinite Number of different Figures, it's necessary that to know the Figures, the Mind have an infinitely infinite Number of Idea's.

Now I ask, If it's probable that God should Create so many things with the Mind of Man? For my part it does not appear so to me; chiefly, since that might be made in a more simple and easie manner, as we shall soon see. For as God always acts by the most simple ways, it does not seem reasonable to explain how we know Objects, by admitting the Creation of an infinite Number of Beings, since we can resolve this Difficulty in a more Easie and Natural way.

But although the Mind should have a Magazine of all the Idea's, which are necessary for it to see things, it would be yet more difficult to explain how the Soul should make choice of them to represent them: For instance, how it can represent the Sun to it self, whilst it is present to the Eyes of its Body?

For whereas the Image which the Sun imprints in the Brain, resembles not the Idea we have thereof, as has been elsewhere proved, and since the Soul perceives not the Motion that the Sun produces in the bottom of the Eyes, and in the Brain, it's inconceivable how it should exactly guess, amongst these infinite

Number of Idea's that it has, which it must represent to it self, to imagine or to see the Sun: We cannot therefore say, That the Idea's of things were created with us, it is sufficient that we see the Objects that are about us.

Nor can we say that God produces as many of them every Moment, as we perceive different things; this has been sufficiently resuted from what has been said in this Chapter. Besides it is necessary that at all times we actually have in our selves the Idea's of all things, since we are always able to think of all things; which we could not if we perceiv'd them already confusedly; that is, If an infinite Number of Idea's were not present to our Minds; for we cannot will to think of Objects, of which we have no Idea.

CHAPTER 5: That the Mind neither sees the Essence, nor Existence of Objects, in considering its own Perfections. That none but God sees them in that manner.

THE Fourth Opinion is, That the Mind stands in need of nothing besides it self, to perceive Objects; and that it can, in considering it self and its own Perfections, discover all things that are without it.

It is certain that the Soul sees within it self, and without Idea's, all the Sensations and Passions it is capable of, as Pleasure, Pain, Cold, Heat, Colours, Sounds, Odours, Sapors, its Love, its Hatred, Joy and Sadness, etc. because all the Sensations and Passions of the Soul represent nothing External which is like them; and because they are only Modifications, which nothing but the Mind is capable of. But the Difficulty is, to know whether the Idea's which represent something that is without the Soul, and which resembles them in some measure, as the Idea's of a Sun, a House, a Horse, a River, etc. are only Modifications of the Soul; insomuch that the Soul cannot stand in need of any thing besides it self, to represent to it self all External Things.

There are Persons who make no Scruple to affirm, That the Soul being made to think, it has in it self, I mean, in considering its own Perfections, whatever is necessary to perceive Objects; for indeed the Soul being nobler than all the things it conceives distinctly, it may be said, that it contains them in some measure Eminently, according to the Notions of the Schools; that is, after a Nobler and more Sublime Manner than they are in themselves. They pretend, that thus Superior things comprehend the Perfections of those that are Inferior. And thus being the Noblest of the Creatures they know; they fancy they have in themselves, after a Spiritual Manner, all that is in the visible World. In a word, They will have the Soul to be like an Intelligible World, which comprehends in it self, whatever the Material and Sensible World comprehends; nay, Infinitely more.

But in my Opinion it is a great Presumption to maintain that Thought: If I am not mistaken, it is Natural Vanity, the Love of Independence, and the Desire of resembling him who comprehends all Beings in himself, which Confounds the Mind, and inclines us to believe, we possess what we have not: Do not say that you are a :ogjt tp upir se;f. saus St/ Aistom; for there is none but God who is a Light to himself, and who can, in considering himself, see whatever he has produced, or can produce.

It is certain that there was none but God alone before the World was Created, and he could not produce it without Knowledge and without Idea's: Consequently those Idea's which God had of

the World, are not different from himself; and thus all Creatures, even the most Material and most Terrestrial, are in God, though in a manner altogether Spiritual, which we cannot apprehend. God therefore sees all Beings in himself, in considering his own Perfections which represent them to him. He also knows their Existence perfectly, for since the Existence of all things depend on his Will, he cannot be Ignorant of his own Will; it follows then, that he cannot be Ignorant of their Existence. And thus God does not only see in himself the Essence of all things, but also their Existence.

But the case is different as to Created Spirits, they can neither see the Essence of things, nor their Existence within themselves: They cannot see their Essence within themselves, because being very much limited, they do not contain all Beings, like God whom we may call the Universal Being, or plainly He that is, as he calls himself. Since therefore the Humane Mind may know all Beings and Infinite Beings, and yet not contain them, it is a certain Proof, that it does not see their Essence in it self. For the Mind does not only see sometimes one thing, and sometimes another successively, it also actually perceives Infinity though it does not comprehend it. So that not being actually Infinite, nor capable of Infinite Modifications at the same time, it is absolutely Impossible that it should see within it self what is not there. Therefore it does not see the Essence of things in considering its own Perfections, or by modifying it self diversely.

Neither does it see their Existence within it self, because the Existence of Beings do not depend upon its Will; and because the Idea's of those Beings may be present to the Mind, though they do not Exist; for everybody may have the Idea of a Mountain of Gold, though there be no Mountain of Gold in Nature: And though we rely on the report of the Senses to judge of the Existence of Objects; nevertheless Reason does not assure us, that we should always believe our Senses, since we find clearly that they deceive us. When a Man's Blood, for instance, is very much inflam'd; or barely when he Sleeps, he sometimes beholds Fields, Combats, and the like, which nevertheless are not present, and which perhaps never were. Therefore it is certain that it is neither within it self, nor by it self, that the Mind sees the Existence of things, but that in this case it depends upon some other things.

CHAPTER 6: That we see all things in God.

WE have examin'd in the preceding Chapter four different Manners in which the Humane Mind may see External Objects, which do not appear probable to us: There only remains the Fifth, which alone appears consonant to Reason, and the most proper to shew the Dependence that Spirits have on God in all their Thoughts.

In order to apprehend it rightly, we must remember what has been said in the preceding Chapter, that it is absolutely necessary that God should have in himself the Idea's of all the Beings he has created, since otherwise he could not have produced them; and that thus he sees all those Beings, by considering the Perfections which he includes in himself, and to which all Beings are related. Moreover, it is necessary to know that God is very strictly united to our Souls by his Presence, so that we may say that he is the place of Spirits, as Space is the place of Bodies. These two things being supposed, it is certain that the Mind may see what there is in God, which represents Created Beings, since that is very Spiritual, very Intelligible, and most present to

the Mind. Thus the Mind may see in God the Works of God, supposing God be willing to discover to it what there is in him which represents them. These are the Reasons which seem to prove, that he rather Wills than Creates an Infinite Number of Idea's in every Mind.

First, Although we do not absolutely deny, that God was able to produce an Infinitely infinite Number of Beings, which represent Objects with every Mind he Creates; yet we ought not to believe that he does so. For it is not only consonant to Reason, but it also appears by the Oeconomy of Nature, that God never does by very difficult means, what may be done by a plain easie way: God does nothing in vain and without Reason: That which shews his Wisdom and his Power, is not to do little things by difficult Means; for that is repugnant to Reason, and shews a limited Knowledge: But on the contrary, it is to do great things by plain easie Means. 'Tis thus that out of Extension only he produces whatever we see that is admirable in Nature, and even that which gives Life and Motion to Animals. For those who will needs have Substantial Forms, Faculties, and Souls in Animals, different from their Blood, and from the Organs of their Body, in order to perform their Functions, at the same time seem to argue that God wants Understanding, or that he cannot do those admirable things by Extension only. They measure the Power of God, and his Sovereign Wisdom, by the smallness of their own Capacity. Then since God may make Humane Minds see all things, by willing barely that they should see what is in themselves; that is, what is in him that has a relation to those things, and which represents them, there is no probability that he would do it otherwise; and that he should produce, in order thereunto, as many Infinities of Infinite Numbers of Idea's, as there are Created Spirits.

But we must observe, that we are not to conclude, that Spirits see the Essence of God, because they can see all things in God in that manner: Since what they see is very Imperfect; but that God is very Perfect: They see Matter Divisible and Figured, etc. and there is nothing in God that is Divisible or Figured; for God is all Beings, because he is Infinite and Comprehends all; but he is no Being in particular. Nevertheless that which we see is but one, or several Beings in particular, and we do not apprehend that perfect Simplicity of God which includes all Beings. Besides that it may be said, that we do not so much see the Idea's of things, as the things which those Idea's represent; for when we see a Square, for instance, we do not say that we see the Idea of that Square, which is united to the Mind, but only the Square which is without us.

The Second Reason which may induce us to believe, that we see all Beings, because God Wills, that that which is in him, which represents them, should be discover'd to us; and not because we have as many Idea's created with us as we can see things; for this puts all created Spirits in an absolute dependence upon God, and the greatest that can be: For this being so, we cannot only see nothing, but what God is will we should see, but we can also see nothing, unless God himself shews it us. Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, tanquam ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. 'Tis God himself which instructs and enlightens Philosophers in that Knowledge which ungrateful Men call Natural, although it is an immediate gift from Heaven: Deus enim illis manifestavit. It is he that is properly the Light of the Mind, and the Father of Light or Knowledge. Pater Luminum. It is he that teaches Wisdom to Men: Qui docet hominem scientiam. In a word, He is the true Light,

which enlightens all those that come into this World: Lux vera que illuminat omnem hominem venientem in bunc Mundum.

For in fine, It is pretty difficult distinctly to apprehend the Dependence which our Minds have on God in all their particular Actions, supposing they have all that which we distinctly know to be necessary for them in order to Act, or all the Idea's of things present to their Mind, and truly that general and confused word Concurrence, by which Men pretend to explain the Dependence that Creatures have on God, does not awaken any distinct Idea in an attentive Mind; and yet it is very necessary Men should know distinctly, that they can do nothing without God.

But the strongest of all Reasons, is the manner how the Mind perceives all things. It is certain, and every body knows by Experience, that when we have a mind to think on any thing in particular, we first cast our Eyes on all Beings; and in the next place we apply our selves to the Consideration of the Object we design to think on. Now it is most certain that we see it already, though confusedly and in general: So that as we may desire to see all the Beings, sometimes one and sometimes another, it is certain that all Beings are present to our Mind; and it appears that all Beings can only be present to our Mind, because God is present to it, that is, He who includes all things in the Simplicity of his Being.

It seems moreover, That the Mind would not be capable of representing to it self universal Idea's of Kinds and Species, etc. unless it saw all Beings included in one. For every Creature being a particular Being, we cannot say that we see any thing Created, when we see, for instance, a Triangle in general. In fine, I am of opinion, that it is impossible to give a good Reason of the Manner how the Mind comes to know several abstracted and general Truths, unless it be by the presence of him that can direct the Mind in a World of different Manners.

In fine, The Best, the most Sublime, the most Solid, and the chief Proof of the Existence of God, or that which supposes the fewest things, is the Idea we have of Infinity, though it does not comprehend it; and that it has a very distinct Idea of God, which it can only have by the Union it has with him; since it cannot be conceiv'd that the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, as that we have of God, should be any thing that is Created.

But the Mind has not only the Idea of Infinity, it has it even before that of Finite. For we conceive the Infinite Being, from this alone that we conceive a Being, without considering whether it is Finite or Infinite. But in order to conceive a Finite Being, we must needs retrench something of that general Notion of a Being, which consequently must precede. Thus the Mind perceives nothing but in Infinity; and that Idea is so far from being form'd by the confused Mixture of all the Idea's of particular Beings, as Philosophers imagine; that on the contrary all those particular Idea's are only Participations of the general Idea of Infinity: As God does not derive his Being from the Creatures, but all Creatures only subsist by him.

The last Proof, which perhaps will be a Demonstration to those that are used to abstracted Arguments, is this, It is impossible that God should have any other principal End of his Actions but himself: It is a Notion that is common to all Men that are capable of any Reflection; and Holy Writ does not allow us to doubt, but that God has made every thing for himself. Therefore it is necessary, that not only our Natural Love, I mean the Motion he produces in our Mind, should tend towards him: But moreover, That the Knowledge and the Light which he bestows upon

it, should make us know any thing that is in him; for whatever comes from God can only be for God. Should God Create a Spirit, and give it for an Idea, or for the immediate Object of its knowledge the Sun: In my Opinion, God would Create that Spirit, and the Idea of that Spirit, for the Sun and not for him.

God cannot therefore Create a spirit to know his Works, unless that Spirit sees God in some measure, by beholding his Works. So that we may say, that unless we do see God in some measure, we should see nothing: In like manner, unless we do Love God, I mean, unless God did continually Imprint in us the Love of Good in general, we should Love nothing. For that Love being our Will, we can Love nothing, nor Will anything without him; since we cannot Love particular Goods, without determining towards those Goods, the motion of Love, which God gives us towards him. So that as we Love nothing but by the necessary Love we have for God, so we see nothing but by the Natural Knowledge we have of God: And all the particular Idea's we have of Creatures, are only Limitations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Motions of the Will for the Creatures, are only determinations of the motion for the Creator.

I believe there are no Divines but what will grant, that the Impious Love God with that Natural Love I speak of: and St. Austin and some other Fathers affirm as an undeniable thing, That the Impious behold in God the Rule of Manners, and Eternal Truths. So that the Opinion I explain ought not to trouble any Body. Thus St. Austin speaks: Ab ida incommutabili luce veritatis, etiam impius, dum ab ea avertitur, quedammodo tangitur. Hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant eternitatem, & multa recte riprehendunt recteque laudant in bominum moribus. Quibus ea tandem regulis judicant, nisi in quibus vident, quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat, etiam si nec ipsi eodem modo vivant? Ubi autem eas vident? Neque enim in sua natura. Nam cum precul dubio mente ista videantur, corumque mentes constet esse mutabiles, bas vero regulai immutabiles, videa: quisquis in eis & Loc videre potuerit¥ubinam ergo sunt ishe regula Scripta, misi in libro lucis illiue, que veritas dicitur, unde lex omnis justa describitur¥inquavidet quid operandum sit, etiam qui operatur injustitiam, & ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur a qua tamen tangitur.

There are many passages in St. Austin like unto this, by which he proves, that we see God even in this Life, by the knowledge we have of Eternal Truths. Truth is uncreated, Immutable, Immense, Eternal, above all things. It is true by it self. It derives its Perfection from nothing: It makes Creatures more perfect; and all Spirits naturally endeavour to know it. Nothing but God can have all those Perfections. Therefore Truth is God. We see some of those Immutable Eternal Truths. Therefore we see God. These are St. Austin's Reasons, ours differ a little from them; and we are unwilling to use the Authority of so great a Man unjustly, to second our Sentiment.

We believe that Truths, even those that are Eternal; as that twice two are four, are not so much as absolute Beings: So far are we from believing that they are in God. For it is visible, that that Truth only consists in a relation of Equality, which is between twice Two and Four. Therefore we do not say that we see God in seeing Truths, as St. Austin says, but in seeing the Idea's of those Truths: For Idea's are real, but the Equality between the Idea's, which is Truth, has no reality. When for example, Men say that the Cloth they measure contains Three Yards; the Cloth and the Yards are real: But the Equality between Three Yards and the Cloth is not a real Being; it is only a

relation that is between the Three Yards and the Cloth. When we say that twice Two are Four, the Idea's of the Numbers are real; but the Equality there is between them is only a Relation. Thus according to our Sentiment we see God, when we see Eternal Truths; not that those Eternal Truths are God, but because the Idea's on which those Truths depend are in God; perhaps St. Austin understood it so. We also believe, that we know in God Changeable and Corruptible things, although St. Austin only speaks of Immutable and Incorruptible things; because it is not necessary for that to place any Imperfection in God; since it suffices, as we have already said, that God should shew us what there is in him that has a Relation to these things.

But though I say, we see in God the things that are Material and Sensible, it must be observ'd, that I do not say we have a Sensation of them in God, but only that it is from God who Acts in us; for God Knows sensible things, but he does not Feel them. When we perceive any thing that is sensible, Sensation and pure Idea is in our Perception. Sensation is a Modification of our Soul, and it is God that Causes it in us: And he may Cause it, though he has it not, because he sees in the Idea he has of our Soul, that it is capable of it. As for the Idea which is joyn'd to Sensation, it is in God, we see it, because it is his pleasure to discover it to us: And God joins Sensation to the Idea, when Objects are present, to the end that we may believe them as they are: and that we may have such Sensations and Passions as we ought to have in relation the them.

Lastly, We believe that all Spirits see the Eternal Laws as well as other things in God, but with some difference: They know the Eternal Order and Eternal Truths, and even the Beings which God has made according to those Truths, or according to the Order by the Union which those Spirits have necessarily with the Word, or Wisdom of God which directs them, as we have shewn; But 'tis by the Impression they receive continually from the Will of God, which inclines them to him, and endeavours, as it were, to render their Will absolutely like unto his; that they know Order is a Law, I mean, that they know the Eternal Laws: How we must love Good, and shy from Evil: That we must love Justice more than all Riches: That it is better to Obey God than to Command Men, and many other Natural Laws. For the knowledge of all those Laws is not different from the knowledge of that Impression, which they always feel in themselves, though they do not always follow it by the free choice of their Will; which they know to be Common to all Spirits, though it is not equally strong in all.

It is by that Dependance, Relation, and Union of our Mind to the Word of God, and of our Will to his Love, that we are made after the Image and Likeness of God: And although this may be very much defac'd by Sin, yet it is necessary that it should subsist as long as we do. But if we bear the Image of the Word humbled upon earth; and if we follow the Motions of the Holy Ghost, that Primitive Image of our first Creation, that Union of our Mind with the Word of the Father, and to the Love of the Father and of the Son, will be re-established, and render'd indelible. We shall be like God, if we are like the Man God. In fine, God will be all in us, and we all in God, in a far more perfect manner than that by which it is necessary for us to subsist, that we should be in him, and he in us.

Here are some reasons which may perswade us, that Spirits perceive all things by the immediate Presence of him who Comprehends all in the Simplicity of his Being. Every one will Judge of it according to the Internal Conviction he shall receive of it, after having seriously consider'd it. But 'tis thought

that there will be no probability in all the other ways of explaining these things; and that this last will appear more than probable. Thus our Souls depend on God in all respects. For as it is he who makes them feel Grief, Pleasure, and all other Sensations, by the Natural Union he has Establish'd between them and our Body which is no other than his Decree and general Will. Thus it is he, who by the Natural Union which he has made between the Sill of Man, and the Representation of the Idea's which the Immensity of the Divine Being includes, that makes them know whatever they do know; and that Natural Union is also nothing else but his general Will. So that none but he can direct us, by representing all things to us; as none but he can make us Happy, by making us taste all manner of Pleasures.

Let us therefore keep to this Opinion, That God is the Intelligible World, or the place of Spirits, as the material World is the place of Bodies. That they receive all their Modifications from his Power: That they find all their Idea's in his wisdom: And that it is by his Love that they are acted in all their regular Motions; and since his Power and Love are nothing but himself, let us believe with St. Paul, that he is not far from every one of us; and that it is in him we have Life, Motion, and a Being. Non longe est ab unequoque nostrum, in ipso cnim vivimus, movemur, & sumius.

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BOOK 6
THE SECOND PART

CHAP. III: Of the most dangerous Error in Philosophy. Of the Ancients.

Philosophers have not only spoke what they did not conceive, when they explained the Effects of Nature, by certain Beings which they have no particular Idea of, but even establish a Principle from whence may directly be drawn most false and dangerous Consequences.

For if, according to their Opinion, we suppose, that in Bodies there are some Beings distinct from Matter; and not having any distinct Idea of these Entities, we might easily imagine, that they are the true, or principal Causes of the Effects which we see produced. Tis even the common Sentiment of most Philosophers: For 'tis chiefly to explain these Effects, that they make use of Substantial Forms, Real Qualities, and other the like Entities. But when we come to consider attentively, the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting, we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine: For the Idea of a Sovereign Power, is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity; and the Idea of a Subordinate Power, is the Idea of an inferiour; but a true Divinity at least, according to the Opinion of the Heathens, if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause. We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us, when we admit Forms, Faculties, Qualities, Vertues, and real Beings, capable of producing certain Effects, by the Power of their own Nature: And thus, they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens, by the Respect they have for their Philosophy. Faith indeed works it, but it may perhaps be said, that if we are Christians in our Hearts, we are Heathens in our Minds.

Moreover, it is difficult to perswade our selves, that we ought neither to love or fear, true Powers and Beings, who can act upon us, punish us with Pain, or recompense us with Pleasure. And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration, 'tis also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them. For whatever

can act upon us, as a real and true Cause, is necessarily above us, according to St. Austin and right Reason: The same Father, and the same Reason tells us, 'tis an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour. And from hence, this great Father concludes, that the Body cannot act upon the Soul, and that nothing can be above the Soul but God.

In the Holy Scriptures, when God proves to the Israelites, that they ought to adore him, that is, that they ought to fear and love him, the chief Reasons he brings, are taken from his Power, to recompence and punish them. He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him, the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them, and that he has still the same Power. He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens, because they have no Power over them, and can do them neither Good nor Hurt. He requires them to honour him only, because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil, and that there happens none in their City, according to the Prophet, which he has not done; for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us. 'Tis God alone that acts in them, and 'tis he only that we must fear and love: Soli Deo Honor & Gloria.

In short, this Opinion, that we ought to fear and love, whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil, appears so natural and just, that it is impossible to destroy it; so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers (which we endeavour here to confuse) that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel: Reason seems to juitine a Religion like to that of the Heathens, and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners.

It is true, that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks, as the Sovereign Divinity; because they cannot make us entirely happy when we have of them, or entirely unhappy when we want them. Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter, upon whom all their Divinities depend, or as to the Sun, which our Senses represent to us, as the universal Cause, which gives Life and Motion to all things, and, which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity; if with the Heathen Philosophers, we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce, not only in our Bodies and Minds, but likewise in all Beings which encompass us.

But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons, yet we may always render them some particular adoration: I mean, we may think of and love them in some manner; if it is true, that in some sort they can make us happy, we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us. And certainly, Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses, think that Pulse is capable of doing them good; for else the Israelites, for instance, would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect, nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them, if they did not, in some manner, look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them. These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in, when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy, and follows the Impressions of the Senses.

That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosophy, and the Certainty of our Principles, and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of: It is necessary, clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy, and to prove, in short, that there is only one true Cause, because there is only one true God: That Nature, or the Power of every thing, proceeds only from the Will of God: That all Natural things are not true Causes, but only occasional ones;

and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these.

It is evident that all Bodies, both great and small, have no power of removing themselves: A Mountain, an House, a Stone, a grain of Sand; and in short, the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive, have no power of removing themselves. We have only two sorts of Idea's, that of Bodies, and that of Spirits; whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's. Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies, shows us that they cannot move themselves, it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only. But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds, we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be: On the contrary, we see that there is none, nor can be any; whence we ought to conclude, if we will argue according to our Knowledge, that as no body can be able to move it self, so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever.

But when we think of the Idea of God, of a Being infinitely Perfect, and consequently Almighty, we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will, and the Motion of all Bodies, that 'tis impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body, that should not be moved: We must then say, that his Will only can move Bodies, if we will speak things as we conceive them, and not as we feel them. The moving force of Bodies therefore, is not in the Bodies which move, since this power of Motion is nothing else but the Will of God. Thus Bodies have no Action, and when a Bowl which is moved, by meeting it moves another, yet it communicates nothing of its own; for in itself it hath not the Impression that it communicates to the other: Yet a Bowl is the Natural Cause of the motion which it communicates. A Natural Cause then is not a real and true Cause, but only an occasional one, and which determined the Author o Nature to act after such and such a manner, in such and such an Occurrence.

It is certain, that 'tis by the motion of visible or invisible Bodies that all things are produced: For Experience teaches us, that Bodies, whose parts are in greatest Motion, always act more than others, and produce the greatest Change in the World. All the Powers of Nature then proceed from the Will of God: He has created the World because he willed it: Dixit & facta funt: He moves all things, and so produces all the Effects that we see happen; because he has also willed certain Laws, according to which Bodies communicate their Motions in their Rencounter; and because these Laws are Efficacious they act, and Bodies cannot act. There is therefore no Force, Power, or true Cause, in the Material and Sensible World, nor must we admit of Forms, Faculties, and real Qualities, to produce Effects that Bodies cannot; and to divide, with God, the Force and Power which is Essential to him. Not only Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing, the most noble Spirits also are under a like Impotence. They can know nothing if God does not enlighten them; nor can they have any Sensation if he does not modifie them. They are capable of willing nothing if God moves them not towards him. I confess they can determine the Impression that God gives them towards him, to other Objects; but I know not whether that can be called a Power. If the Capability of Sinning is a Power, it would be a Power which the Almighty has not. St. Austin says in some of his Works, If Men had in themselves the Power of loving Good, we might say they had some Power: But can only Love, because God Wills they should Love, and because his Will is Efficacious. They Love only, because God continually inclines them to Good in General; that is, towards himself: For God has created them only

for himself, he never preserves them without turning them towards and inclining them to himself. They have no Motion towards Good in general, 'tis God who moves them; they only follow by an entire free Choice, this Impression according to the Law of God, or determine it towards a false Good after the Law of the Flesh: They can only be determined by a Prospect of Good: For being able to do only what God makes them, they can love nothing but Good.

But if we should suppose what is true in one Sense, that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truth and loving Good, if their Thoughts and Wills produced nothing External, we might always say they were able to do nothing. Now it appears most certain to me, that the Will of Spirits is not capable of moving the least Body in the World: For 'tis evident there is no necessary Connexion between the Will we have of moving our Arms, and the Motion of them. It is true, they are moved when we please, and by that means we are the Natural Cause of their Motion: But Natural Causes are not true Causes, they are only Occasional ones, which act merely through the Power and Efficacy of God, as I have already explained.

For how can we move our Arms? To move them we must have Animal Spirits, and convey them by certain Nerves, into such and such Muscles to swell and contract them. For by this means the Arms move; or according to the Opinion of some, we know not yet how 'tis performed: And we see, that Men who do not so much as know they have Spirits, Nerves, and Muscles to move their Arms, yet move them with as much Art and Facility, as those that understand Anatomy best. 'Tis then granted, that Men Will the Motion of their Arms, but 'tis only God that can and knows how to remove them. If a Man cannot throw down a Tower, at least he knows well what must be done in order to it: But there is no Man that knows so much, as what he must do to move one of his Fingers by the help of his Animal Spirits. How then can Men move their Arms? These things appear evident to me, and to all those that will think of them, though perhaps they may be incomprehensible to such as will not consider them.

But Men only are not the True Causes of the Motions produced in their Bodies, it seems even a Contradiction that they should be so. A True Cause is such an one as the Mind perceives a necessary Connexion between it and its Effect; 'tis that I mean. Now there is only the Infinitely Perfect Being, whose Mind can perceive a necessary Connexion between his Will and the Effects of it. 'Tis only God then, who is the True Cause, and who has really the Power of moving Bodies. I say moreover, 'tis not probable that God should communicate, either to Men or Angels, this Power he has of moving Bodies; and those who pretend the Power we have of moving our Arms is a true Power, must confess that God can also give to Spirits the Power of creating, annihilating, and performing all possible things: In a word, That he can make them Almighty, as I shall further shew.

God has no need of any Instrument to act, it is sufficient if he Wills a thing for it to be, because it is a Contradiction to suppose he Wills it, and that it should not be. His Power then is his Will, and the communicating of his Power is a Communication of his Will. But to communicate his Will to a Man or an Angel, can signifie nothing else but Willing; some body, for instance, should be effectively moved when 'tis Will'd by a Man or an Angel. Now in this case I see two Wills which concur when an Angel would move a Body, that of God, and that of the Angel; and to know which of the two will be the true Cause of the Motion of this Body, we must know which it is that is Efficacious. There is a necessary Connexion between the Will of

God, and what he Wills. God Wills in this case, that a Body should move when it is willed by an Angel: There is a necessary Connexion therefore, between the Will of God and the Motion of this Body; and consequently 'tis God who is the true cause of the Motion of the Body, and the Will of the Angel only an occasional one.

But to shew it yet more clearly, let us suppose that God Wills it should happen quite contrary to what some Spirits desire; as we may think of Devils, or some other Spirits, who merit this Punishment; we cannot say in this case, that God communicates his Power to them, since they can do nothing that they would do. Yet the Wills of these spirits would be the Natural Causes of whatever Effects should be produced; as such Bodies should be moved to the Right Hand, because these Spirits would have them moved to the Left; and the desire of these Spirits would determine the Will of God to act, as our Wills to move the parts of our Bodies, determine the first Cause to move them: So that the Wills of Spirits are only occasional Causes.

Yet if after all these Reasons, we will still maintain, that the Will of an angel, which moves any body, should be a true Cause, and not an occasional one; it is plain that this same Angel might be the true Cause of the Creation and Annihilation of all things: For God could as well communicate to him his Power of Creating and Destroying Bodies, as that of moving them, if he will'd that things should be created and annihilated: In a word, If he will'd that all things should happen as the Angel wishes them, even as he Wills Bodies should move, as the Angel pleases. If it be said, that an Angel or a Man would be the true movers, because God moves Bodies when they with it; it may also be said, that a Man and an Angel may be true Creators, since God can create Beings when they will it: Nay, perhaps it might be said, that the most Vile Animals, or Matter of it self, should be the effective Cause of the Creation of any Substance; if we supposed as the Philosophers do, that God produces substantial Forms whenever the Disposition of Matter requires it. In fine, Because God has resolved from all Eternity in certain times to create such or such things, we might also say, that these times should be the Causes of the Creation of these Beings, as reasonably as to pretend, that a Bowl which meets another, is the true cause of the motion it communicates to it: Because God has determined by his general Will, which constituted the Order of Nature, that when two Bodies should meet there should be such and such a Communication of Motion.

There is then but one only true God, and he the one only true Cause: And we must not imagine, that which precedes and Effect, to be the true Cause of it. God cannot even communicate his Power to the Creatures, if we follow the Light of Reason; he cannot make them true Causes, because he cannot make them Gods. Bodies, Spirits, pure Intelligences, can all do nothing. 'Tis he who hath made these Spirits that illuminates and acts them. 'Tis he who has created the Heavens and the Earth, which regulates the Motions thereof. In short, 'tis the Author of our Being that executes our Wills, femel jussis, sewsper pares. He even moves our Arms when we make use of them against his Orders, for he complains by his Prophets, that we make him serve our unjust and criminal Desires.

All these little Heathen Divinities, and all these particular Causes of the Philosophers, are only Chymera's that the wicked Spirit endeavours to establish to ruin the Worship of the true God. It is not the Philosophy they have received from Adam, which teaches these things; 'tis that they have received

from the Serpent; for since the Fall, the Mind of Man is perfectly Heathenish. 'Tis this Philosophy which joyned to the Errors of the Senses, has made them adore the Sun, and which is still at this Day, the universal Cause of the Irregularity of the Mind, and Corruption of the Heart of Man. By their Actions, and sometimes by their Words; why say they, should we not love the Body, since the Body is capable of affording us all Pleasures? And why do we laugh at the Israelites, which regretted the Loss of the Garlick and Onyons of Egypt; since, in Effect, they were unhappy, by being deprived of what, in some Measure, could make them happy? But the new Philosophy, which they represent as a dismal thing, to affrighten weak Minds, that is despised and condemned without being understood. The new Philosophy, I say, since they are pleased to call it so, destroys all the Arguments of the Libertines, by the Establishment of the chiefest of its Principles, which perfectly agrees with the first Principle of the Christian Religion, that we must love and fear but one God, since there is only one God who can make us happy.

For if Religion teaches us, that there is but one true God, this Philosophy shews us there is but one true Cause. If Religion informs us, that all the Divinities of the Heathens are only Stones and Metals without Life and Motion: This Philosophy discovers to us also, that all second Causes, or all the Divinities of their Philosophy, are only Matter and inefficacious Wills. In short, if Religion teaches us, that we must not bow our Knees to false Gods. This Philosophy also tells us, that our Imaginations and Minds ought not to be prostituted to the Imaginary Greatness and Power of Causes, which are not true Causes: That we must neither love nor fear them, nor busie our selves about them; but think upon God only, see him, adore him, fear and love him in all things.

But this agrees not with the Inclination of some Philosophers: They will neither see nor think upon God: For since the Fall, there is a secret Opposition between God and Man: Men take Pleasure in erecting Gods after their own Fancy, they voluntarily love and fear the Fictions of their own Imagination, as they Heathens did the Works of their own Hands. They are like Children who tremble at their Companions, after they have daubed their Faces: Or if they will have a more Noble Comparison, although perhaps it be not so just, they resemble those famous Romans, who had some Fear and Respect for the Fictions of their own Minds, and foolishly adored their Emperors after they had let loose the Eagle when they deified them.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Scottish Philosophy

James McCosh

1875

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THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY
Biographical, Expository, Critical
FROM HUTCHESON TO HAMILTON

BY
JAMES McCOSH, LL.D., D.D.

PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY, PRINCETON

London:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1875

* * * *

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PREFATORY NOTE.

T/HIS\ work has been with me a labor of love. The gathering of materials for it, and the writing of it, as carrying me into what I feel to be interesting scenes, have afforded me great pleasure, which is the only reward I am likely to get. I publish it, as the last, and to me the only remaining, means of testifying my regard for my country -- loved all the more because I am now far from it -- and my country's philosophy, which has been the means of stimulating thought in so many of Scotland's sons.

The English-speaking public, British and American, has of late been listening to divers forms of philosophy, -- to Coleridge, to Kant, to Cousin, to Hegel, to Comte, to Berkeley, -- and is now inclined to a materialistic psychology. Not finding permanent satisfaction in any of these, it is surely possible that it may grant a hearing to the sober philosophy of Scotland.

M. Cousin has remarked that the philosophy of Scotland is part of the history of the country. I have treated it as such; and I claim to have one qualification for the work: I am in thorough sympathy with the characteristic sentiments of my native land. I have farther tried to make my work a contribution to what {iv} may be regarded as a new department of science, the history of thought, which is quite as important as the history of wars, of commerce, of literature, or of civilization.

Some of these articles have appeared in the "North British Review," the "British and Foreign Evangelical Review," and the "Dublin University Magazine; " but the greater number are now given to the public for the first time, and all of them have been rewritten.
J. MCC.
P/RINCETON\, New Jersey,
October, 1874.

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APPENDIX.

THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY.

I.-- CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCHOOL.

T/HE\ Germans have histories without number of their philosophy from Kant to Hegel, with not a few historical reviews of the later speculations. The French, too, have numerous sketches of the philosophy of their country generally, and of individual systems, such as that of Descartes. It is no way to the credit of British thought, and least of all to that of the Scotch metaphysicians, that we have not in our language a history of the Scottish school of philosophy. There are valuable notices of it, it is true, in Dugald Stewart's Historical Dissertation, and in his Eloges of Reid and Adam Smith; but Stewart is far too dignified and general in his style to be able to give an articulate account of the special doctrines of the different masters of the school, or a vivid picture of the times, with many of the marked characteristics of which he had no sympathy. The best history of the Scottish Philosophy is by a Frenchman, and has not been translated into English. We look on "Philosophic Ecossaise," the volume in which M. Cousin treats of the Scottish school, as containing upon the whole the most faultless of all his historical disquisitions. In his other volumes he scarcely does justice to Locke, whom he always judges from the evil consequences which have flowed from his philosophy on the continent, and he is not able to wrestle successfully with the powerful logical intellect of Kant; but he has a thorough appreciation of the excellencies of the Scottish metaphysicians, and, when he finds fault, his criticisms are always worthy of being considered. But it could not be expected of a foreigner, that he should thoroughly comprehend the state of Scotland when its peculiar philosophy arose, nor be able to estimate its relation to the national character; and the account given by M. Cousin is fragmentary, and critical rather than expository.

The Scottish Philosophy possesses a unity, not only in the circumstance that its expounders have been Scotchmen, but also and more specially in its method, its doctrines, and its spirit. It is distinguished by very marked and decided features, which we may represent as determined by the bones rather than the flesh or muscles.

1. It proceeds on the method of observation, professedly and really. In this respect it is different from nearly all the philosophies which went before, from many of those which were contemporary, and from some of those which still linger among us. The method pursued in Eastern countries, in ancient Greece and Rome, in the scholastic times, and in the earlier ages of modern European speculation, had not been that of induction, either avowedly or truly. No doubt, speculators have been obliged in all ages and countries to make some use of facts, in the investigation of both mind and matter. But in the earlier theosophies, physiologies, and philosophies, they looked at the phenomena of nature merely as furnishing a starting-point to their systems, or a corroboration of them; and their inquiries were conducted in the dogmatic, or deductive, or analytic manner, explaining phenomena by assumed principles, or bringing facts to support theories, or resolving the complexities of the universe by refined mental distinctions. This spirit had been banished from

physical science, first, by the great realistic awakening of the sixteenth century; then by the profound wisdom and far-sighted sagacity of Bacon; and, finally, by the discoveries of Newton and the establishment of the Royal Society of London. But it lingered for some ages longer in material science, from which it has not even yet been finally expelled. Bacon had declared, that his method was applicable to all other sciences as well as to the investigation of the material universe. "Does any one doubt (rather than object)," says he, "whether we speak merely of natural philosophy or of other sciences also, such as logics, ethics, politics, as about to be perfected by our method?" "We certainly," he replies, "understand all these things which have been referred to; and like as the vulgar logic, which regulates things by the syllogism, pertains not to the natural but all sciences, so ours, which proceeds by induction, embraces them all. For thus we would form a history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty, and the like, as also examples of civil affairs, not omitting the mental emotions of memory, composition, division, judgment, and the rest, just as we form such of heat and cold, of light, vegetation, and such like." Sir Isaac Newton had said in his Optics: "And if natural philosophy in all its parts, by pursuing this method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of moral philosophy will also be enlarged." But the employment of the method of induction in the study of the human mind was for ages slow, wavering, and uncertain. It has been asserted, that Descartes proceeded on the method of induction; but the statement has been made by metaphysicians who have never correctly apprehended the mode of procedure recommended by Bacon. Descartes does indeed appeal to profound ideas, which may be regarded as mental facts; but it is not by them to arrive at laws by a gradual generalization; it is rather to employ them as foundation-stones of his structure, which is reared high above them by the joint dogmatic and deductive method, and on the geometric and not the inductive plan. It has been averred that Hobbes proceeded on the method of his friend Bacon; but Hobbes nowhere professes to do so: his doctrine of the origin of civil government is a mere theory, and his system of the human mind and of morals is obtained by a very defective analysis, and in fact, is mainly borrowed from Aristotle, whose profounder principles he was incapable of appreciating. It cannot be denied that Locke does proceed very largely in the way of observation; but it is a curious circumstance that he nowhere professes to follow the method of induction; and his great work may be summarily represented as an attempt to establish by internal facts the preconceived theory, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. To the Scottish school belongs the merit of being the first, avowedly and knowingly, to follow the inductive method, and to employ it systematically in psychological investigation. As the masters of the school were the first to adopt it, so they, and those who have borrowed from them, are almost the only persons who have studiously adhered to it. The school of Condillac in France, and its followers in England {4} and Germany, do indeed profess to attend to observation, but it is after the manner of the empiricists, described by Bacon as beginning with experience, but immediately abandoning it for premature hypotheses. It will be seen, as we advance, that Kant

followed the critical and not the inductive method. Hutcheson and Turnbull, and especially Reid and Stewart, have the credit of announcing unambiguously, that the human mind is to be studied exclusively by the method of observation, and of consistently employing this mode of procedure in all their investigations.

II. It employs self-consciousness as the instrument of observation. It may thus be distinguished from some other schools with which it has been confounded. Bacon, we have seen, did believe in the applicability of his method to all the mental sciences. But he had no clear apprehension of the agency by which the observation is to be accomplished; he supposed it to be by " the history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty, the memory, composition, division, judgment, and the like." In respect of the means of observation, philosophy is greatly indebted to Descartes, who taught men, in studying the human mind, to seize on great internal ideas. The questions started by Locke, and his mode of settling them, tend towards the same issue; he dwells fondly on reflection as the alone source of the ideas which we have of the workings of the human mind, and ever appeals to the internal sense as an arbiter in discussions as to the origin of ideas. But the Scottish philosophers took a step in advance of any of their predecessors, inasmuch as they professed to draw all the laws of mental philosophy -- indeed, their whole systems -- from the observations of consciousness.

By this feature they are at once distinguished from those who would construct a science of the human mind from the observation of the brain or nerves, or generally from animal physiology. Not indeed that the Scottish philosophy is required, by its manner or its principles, to reject the investigation of the functions of the bodily frame, as fitted to throw light on mental action. Certain of the masters of the school, such as Reid, Brown, and Hamilton, were well acquainted with physiology in its latest discoveries in their day, and carefully employed their knowledge to illustrate the operations of the human mind. {5} There is nothing in the method, or the spirit, or the cherished doctrines of the school tending to discountenance or disparage a painstaking experimental investigation of the parts of the bodily frame most intimately connected with mental action. Possibly the next great addition may be made to psychology, when internal observation of the thoughts and feelings, and external observation of the brain and nerves and vital forces, are in circumstances to combine their lights. But in the days of the great masters of the Scottish school, physiology was not in a state, nor is it yet in a position, to furnish much aid in explaining mental phenomena. The instrument employed by them was the internal sense; and they always maintained that it is only by it that we can reach an acquaintance with mind proper and its various operations, and that the knowledge acquired otherwise must ever be regarded as subordinate and subsidiary. They might have admitted that the occasion of the production, and the modifications of our mental states, could so far be influenced by the cerebro-spinal mass, or the forces operating in it; but they strenuously maintained that we can know what our perceptions, and judgments, and

feelings, and wishes, and resolves, and moral appreciations are, not by the senses or the microscope, not by chemical analysis, or the estimation of the vital forces, but solely through our inward experience revealed by consciousness.

But let us properly understand what the Scottish school intend when they maintain that a science of the human mind can be constructed only by immediate consciousness. They do not mean that the study of the mind can be prosecuted in no other way than by looking in for ever on the stream of thought as it flows on without interruption. The operation of introspection is felt to be irksome in the extreme if continued for any length of time, and will certainly be abandoned when thought is rapid or feeling is intense; and those who trust to it exclusively are apt to fix their attention on a few favorite mental states, and omit many others no less characteristic of the human mind. He who would obtain an adequate and comprehensive view of our complex mental nature must not be satisfied with occasional glances at the workings of his own soul: he must take a survey of the thoughts and feelings of others so far as he can gather them from their deeds and from their words; from the {6} acts of mankind generally, and of individual men, women, and children; from universal language as the expression of human cogitation and sentiment; and from the commerce we hold with our fellow-men by conversation, by writing, or by books. Reid in particular is ever appealing to men's actions and language, as a proof that there must be certain principles, beliefs, and affections in the mind. Still this evidence ever carries us back to consciousness, as after all both the primary witness and the final judge of appeal; as it is only by it, and by what has passed through our own minds, that we can come to discern and appreciate the feelings of our brother men.[2]

III. By the observations of consciousness, principles are reached which are prior to and independent of experience. This is another grand characteristic of the school, distinguishing it, on the one hand, from empiricism and sensationalism; and, on the other hand, from the dogmatism and <a priori> speculation of all ages and countries. It agrees with the former in holding that we can construct a science of mind only by observation, and out of the facts of experience; but then it separates from them, inasmuch as it resolutely maintains that we can discover principles which are not the product of observation and experience, and which are in the very constitution of the mind, and have there the sanction of the Author of our nature. These are somewhat differently apprehended and described by the masters of the school, some taking a deeper and others a more superficial view of them. Hutcheson calls them senses, and finds them in the very constitution of the mind. Reid designates them principles of common sense, and represents them as being natural, original, and necessary. Stewart characterizes them as fundamental laws of human thought and belief. Brown makes them intuitions simple and original. Hamilton views them under a great many aspects, but seems {7} to contemplate them most frequently and fondly after the manner of Kant, as <a priori> forms or conditions. But whatever minor or major differences there may be in the fulness of their exposition, or in the favorite views which

they individually prefer, all who are truly of the Scottish school agree in maintaining that there are laws, principles, or powers in the mind anterior to any reflex observation of them, and acting independently of the philosophers' classification or explanation of them. While the Scottish school thus far agrees with the rational and <a priori> systems, it differs from them most essentially, in refusing to admit any philosophic maxims except such laws or principles as can be shown by self-inspection to be in the very constitution of the mind. It has always looked with doubt, if not suspicion, on all purely abstract and rational discussions, such as that by which Samuel Clarke demonstrated the existence of God; and its adherents have commonly discountenanced or opposed all ambitious <a priori> systems, such as those which were reared in imposing forms in Germany in the end of last, and the beginning of the present, century.

These three characters are found, in a more or less decided form, in the works of the great masters of the school. I am not sure indeed whether they have been formally announced by all, nor whether they have always been consistently followed out. I allow that the relation of the three principles one to another, and their perfect congruity and consistency, have not always been clearly discerned or accurately expressed. In particular, I am convinced that most of the Scottish metaphysicians have not clearly seen how it is that we must ever proceed in mental science by observation, while there are at the same time in the mind laws superior to and independent of observation; how it is that while there are <a priori> principles in the mind, it is yet true that we cannot construct a philosophy by <a priori> speculation. But with these explanations and deductions, it may be maintained that the characters specified are to be found, either announced or acted on, in the pages of all the writers of the school, from Hutcheson to Hamilton. Whenever they are discovered in the works of persons connected with Scotland, the writers are to be placed among the adherents of the school. Wherever there is the total absence of any one of them, we cannot allow the author a place in the fraternity. {8}

The Scottish metaphysicians and moralists have left their impression their own land, not only on the ministers of religion, and through them upon the body of the people, but also on the whole thinking mind of the country. The chairs of mental science in the Scottish colleges have had more influence than any others in germinating thought in the minds of Scottish youth, and in giving a permanent bias and direction to their intellectual growth. We have the express testimony of a succession of illustrious men for more than a century, to the effect that it was Hutcheson, or Smith, or Reid, or Beattie, or Stewart, or Jardine, or Mylne, or Brown, or Chalmers, or Wilson, or Hamilton, who first made them feel that they had a mind, and stimulated them to independent thought. We owe it to the lectures and writings of the professors of mental science, acting always along with the theological training and preaching of the country, that men of ability in Scotland have commonly been more distinguished by their tendency to inward reflection than inclination to sensuous observation. Nor is it to be omitted

that the Scottish metaphysicians have written the English language, if not with absolute purity, yet with propriety and taste, -- some of them, indeed, with elegance and eloquence, -- and have thus helped to advance the literary cultivation of the country. All of them have not been men of learning in the technical sense of the term, but they have all been well informed in various branches of knowledge (it is to a Scottish metaphysician we owe the "Wealth of Nations"); several of them have had very accurate scholarship; and the last great man among them was not surpassed in erudition by any scholar of his age. Nor has the influence of the Scottish philosophy been confined to its native soil. The Irish province of Ulster has felt it quite as much as Scotland, in consequence of so many youths from the north of Ireland having been educated at Glasgow University. Though Scotch metaphysics are often spoken of with contempt in the southern part of Great Britain, yet they have had their share in fashioning the thought of England, and, in particular, did much good in preserving it, for two or three ages towards the end of last century and the beginning of this, from falling altogether into low materialistic and utilitarian views; and in this last age Mr. J. S. Mill got some of his views through his father from Hume, Stewart, and Brown, {9} and an active philosophic school at Oxford has built on the foundation laid b Hamilton. The United States of America especially the writers connected with the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches, have felt pleasure in acknowledging-, their obligations to the Scottish thinkers. It is a most interesting circumstance, that when the higher metaphysicians of France undertook, in the beginning of this century, the laborious work of throwing back the tide of materialism, scepticism, and atheism which had swept over the land, they called to their aid the sober and well-grounded philosophy of Scotland. Nor is it an unimportant fact in the history of philosophy, that the great German metaphysician, Emmanuel Kant, was roused, as he acknowledges, from his dogmatic slumbers by the scepticism of David Hume.

But the great merit of the Scottish philosophy lies in the large body of truth which it has -- if not discovered -- at least settled on a foundation which can never be moved. It has added very considerably to our knowledge of the human mind, bringing out to view the characteristics of mental as distinguished from material action; throwing light on perception through the senses; offering valuable observations on the intellectual powers, and on the association of ideas; furnishing, if not ultimate, yet very useful provisional classifications of the mental faculties; unfolding many of the peculiarities of man's moral and emotional nature, of his conscience, and of his taste for the beautiful; resolving many complex mental phenomena into their elements; throwing aside by its independent research a host of traditional errors which had been accumulating for ages; and, above all, establishing certain primary truths as a foundation on which to rear other truths, and as a breakwater to resist the assaults of scepticism.

In comparing it with other schools, we find that the transcendental speculators of Germany have started

discussions which they cannot settle, and followed out their principles to extravagant consequences, which are a <reductio ad absurdum> of the whole method on which they proceed. Again, the physiologists have failed to furnish any explanation of consciousness, of thought, of moral approbation, or of any other peculiar mental quality. Meanwhile, the philosophy of consciousness has coordinated many facts, ascertained many mental laws, {10} explained many curious phenomena of our inward experience, and established a body of intuitive truths. By its method of careful observation, and by it alone, can the problems agitated in the rival <a priori> schools be solved, so far as they can be solved by the human faculties. Whatever aid physiological research as it advances may furnish to psychology, it must always be by the study, not of the brain, and nerves, and vital forces, but of our conscious operations, that a philosophy of the human mind is to be constructed. Whether the Scottish philosophy is to proceed exclusively in its old method, and go on co-ordinating facts with ever-increasing care, and expressing them with greater and greater precision, or whether it is to borrow from other schools, -- say to resolve in its own way the questions started by Schelling and Hegel, or to call in physiology to account for the rise of mental states, -- it is at least desirable that we should now have a combined view of what has been accomplished by the philosophy of consciousness. This is what is attempted in this work.

It should be freely admitted that the Scottish school has not discovered all truth, nor even all discoverable truth, in philosophy; that it does not pretend to have done so is one of its excellencies, proceeding from the propriety of its method and the modesty of its character. Among the writings of the Scottish school, it is only in those of Sir William Hamilton that we find some of the profoundest problems of philosophy, such as the conditions of human knowledge and the idea of the infinite discussed; and the majority of the genuine adherents of the school are inclined to think that on these subjects his conclusions are too bare and negative, and that he has not reached the full truth. Reid and Stewart are ever telling us that they have obtained only partial glimpses of truth, and that a complete science of the human mind is to be achieved solely by a succession of inquirers prosecuting the investigation through a series of ages. Brown and Hamilton make greater pretensions to success in erecting complete systems, but this is one of the defects of these great men, arising, as we shall see, from their departing from the genuine Scottish method, and adopting, so far, other and continental modes of philosophizing, the one betaking himself to the empirical analysis of the French sensational school, and the other adopting the critical method {11} of Kant; and it is to be said in behalf of Brown, that he never mounts into a re.-lion of cloudy speculation; and in favor of Hamilton, that his most vigorous efforts were employed in showing how little can be known by man. All the great masters of the school not only admit, but are at pains to show, that there are mysteries in the mind of man, and in every department of human speculation, which they cannot clear up. This feature has tempted some to speak of the whole school with contempt, as doing little because attempting little. They have been

charged with their country's sin of caution, and the national reproach of poverty has been unsparingly cast upon them. Let them not deny, let them avow, that the charge is just. Let them acknowledge that they have proceeded in time past in the patient method of induction, and announce openly, and without shame, that they mean to do so in time to come. Let it be their claim, that if they have not discovered all truth, they have discovered and settled some truth -- while they have not promulgated much error, or wasted their strength in rearing showy fabrics, admired in one age and taken down the next. It is the true merit of Scotchmen that, without any natural advantages of soil or climate, they have carefully cultivated their land, and made it yield a liberal produce, and that they have been roused to activity, and stimulated to industry, by their very poverty. Let it, in like manner, be the boast of the Scottish philosophy, that it has made profitable use of the materials at its disposal, and that it has by patience and shrewdness succeeded in establishing a body of fundamental truth, which can never be shaken, but which shall stand as a bulwark in philosophy, morals, and theology, as long as time endures.

II. STATE OF SCOTLAND.

D/URING\ the seventeenth century, the three kingdoms had passed through a series of political and religious convulsions, and in the opening of the following century the Protestant people were seeking to enjoy and improve the seasonable -- as they reckoned it the providential -- rest which was brought by the Revolution Settlement. The floods had swept over the {12} country, partly to destroy and partly to fertilize, and men are busily employed in removing the evils (as they reckon them) which had been left, and in sowing, planting, and building on the now dry and undisturbed territory. In particular, there is a strong desire on the part of the great body of the people to make the best use of the peace which they now possess, and to employ it to draw forth the material resources of the country. As a consequence of the intellectual stimulus which had been called forth mainly by the previous great contests, and of the liberty achieved, and the industry in active exercise, the riches of the nation are increasing, agriculture begins to make progress, great commercial cities are aggregating, household and social elegance and comfort are sought after and in a great measure secured, refinement of manners is cultivated, and civilization is advancing. In the eager pursuit of these worldly ends, the Generation then springing up scarcely set sufficient value on the higher blessings which had been secured by the struggles of their forefathers. By the profound discussions of the seventeenth century, the great body of the people had been made to read their Bibles, and to inquire into the foundation and functions of political government. By the deeds done, by the sufferings endured, and the principles enunciated, the great questions of civil and religious liberty had been started, and opinions set afloat which were ultimately to settle them theoretically and practically. But the race now reared did not sufficiently appreciate the advantages thence accruing. They were kept from doing so by two impressions left by the terrible battles which had been fought on their soil.

Every one who has read the history of the period knows that a large amount of profligacy had prevailed among certain classes in the latter reigns of the Stuarts. The rampant vice led naturally to religious infidelity, and the two continued to act and react on each other. Self-indulgent men were little inclined to value the truths of spiritual religion, and lent their ears to plausible systems of belief or unbelief which left them undisturbed in their worldly enjoyments; while youths who had broken loose from the old religious trammels were often tempted to break through moral restraints likewise, and to rush into vice, as exhibiting spirit and courage. The great cavalier party, composed largely of the upper classes, and of {13} those who aspired to rise to them, had been all along in the habit of ridiculing the fervor and strictness of the puritan movement, which bad sprung up chiefly among the middle and better portion of the lower classes, and of describing all who made solemn pretensions to religion as being either knaves or fools. Many of those who had originally brought the charge did not believe it in their hearts, as they had been constrained to respect the great and good qualities of their opponents; but they succeeded in instilling their sentiments into the minds of their children, who were taught to regard it as a mark of a gentleman to swear and to scoff at all religion. From whatever causes it may have proceeded, it is certain that in the first half of the eighteenth century there is a frequent and loud complaint on the part of theologians, both within and beyond the Established Churches, of the rapid increase and wide prevalence of infidelity, and even of secret or avowed atheism.

The struggles of the seventeenth century had left another very deep sentiment. The sects had contended so much about minor points, that now, in the reaction, there was a strong disposition, both among the professedly religious and irreligious, to set little or no value on doctrinal differences, and to turn away with distaste from all disputes among ecclesiastical bodies. The indifference thence ensuing tended, equally with the mistaken zeal of the previous age, to prevent the principles of toleration from being thoroughly carried out. Those who stood up for what were esteemed small peculiarities were reckoned pragmatical and obstinate. Their attempts to secure full liberty of worship and of propagation met with little sympathy, and were supposed to be fitted to bring back needlessly the battles and the sufferings of the previous ages. The two sentiments combined, the desire to have a liberal or a loose creed, and the aversion to the discussion of lesser differences, issued in a result which it is more to our present purpose to contemplate. It led the great thinkers of the age, such as Samuel Clarke, Berkeley, and Butler, to spend their strength, not so much in discussing doctrines disputed among Christians, as in defending religion in general, and in laying a deep foundation on which to rest the essential principles of morality and the eternal truths of religion, natural and revealed. The first age of the eighteenth century, as it was the period {14} in which the first serious attacks were made on Christianity, so it was also the time in which were produced the first great modern defences of religion, natural and supernatural. Men of

inferior philosophical breadth, but of eminent literary power, such as Addison, were also employing their gifts and accomplishments and contributing to what they reckoned the same good end, by writing apologies in behalf of religion, and laboring to make it appear amiable, reasonable, and refined. These same causes led preachers of the new school to assume a sort of apologetic air in their discourses, to cultivate a refined language, moulded on the French, and not the old English model, to avoid all extravagance of statement and appeal, to decline doctrinal controversy, and to dwell much on truths, such as the immortality of the soul, common to Christianity and to natural religion, and to enlarge on the loveliness of the Bible morality. The manner and spirit were highly pleasing to many in the upper and refined classes were acceptable to those who disliked earnest religion, as they had nothing of "the offence of the cross;" and were commended by some who valued religion, as it seemed to present piety in so attractive a light to their young men, about whom they were so anxious in those times, and of whom they hoped that they would thus be led to imbibe its elements, and thereby acquire a taste for its higher truths. But all this was powerless on the great body of the people, who were perfectly prepared to believe the preacher when he told them that they were sinners, and that God bad provided a Saviour, but felt little interest in refined apologies in behalf of God and Christ and duty; and they gradually slipped away from a religion and a religious worship which had nothing to interest, because they had nothing to move them. All this was offensive in the extreme to those who had been taught to value a deeper doctrine and a warmer piety. They complained that when they needed food they were presented with flowers; and, discontented with the present state of things, they were praying for a better era.

To complete the picture of the times, it should be added that there was little vital piety among the clergy to counteract the tendency to religious indifference. The appointments to the livings in England and Ireland lay in the hands of the government and the upper classes, who preferred men of refinement {15} and prudence, inclined to political moderation or subserviency, to men of spiritual warmth and religious independence. The Nonconformists themselves felt the somnolent influence creeping over them, after the excitement of the battle in which they had been engaged was over. Their pastors were restrained in their ministrations, and consequently in their activities, by laws which were a plain violation of the principles of toleration, but which, as they did not issue in any overt act of bitter persecution, were not resented with keenness by the higher class of Dissenters, who, to tell the truth, after what they had come through in the previous age, were not much inclined to provoke anew the enmity from which they had suffered, but were rather disposed, provided only their individual convictions were not interfered with, to take advantage of what liberty they had, to proclaim peace with others, and to embrace the opportunities thrown open to them in the -- rowing cities and manufactories, of promoting the temporal interests of themselves and their families. In these circumstances, the younger ministers were often allured (as Butler was) to go over to the Established Church; and those who remained were infected with the spirit

which prevailed around them, and sought to appear as elegant and as liberal as the clergy of the church, who were beginning to steal from them the more genteel portion of the younger members of their flocks. The design of those who favored this movement was no doubt to make religion attractive and respected. The result did not realize the expectation. The upper classes were certainly not scandalized by a religion which was so inoffensive, but they never thought of heartily embracing what they knew had no earnestness; and, paying only a distant and respectful obeisance to religion in the general, they gave themselves up to the fashion. able vices, or, at best, practised only the fashionable moralities of their times. The common people, little cared for by the clergy, and caring nothing for the refined emptiness presented to them instead of a living religion, went through their daily toils with diligence, but in most districts, both of town and country, viewed religion with indifference, and relieved their manual labor with low indulgences. England is rapidly growing in wealth and civilization, and even in industry, mainly from the intellectual stimulus imparted by moral causes acting in the {16} previous ages; but it is fast descending to the most unbelieving, condition to which it has ever been reduced. From this state of religious apathy it is roused, so far as the masses of the people are concerned, in the next age, and ere the life had altogether died out, by the trumpet voices of Whitfield and Wesley. It was in a later age, and after the earthquake convulsions of the French Revolution had shaken society to its foundation, that the upper classes were made to know and feel that when " the salt has lost its savor," it is good for nothing but to be cast out and trodden under foot of men, and that a dead religion is of no use either to rich or poor, either for political ends or for personal comfort.

An analogous, but by no means identical, process begins and goes on, and is consummated in Scotland about half an age or an age later in point of time. All throughout the seventeenth century, Scotland, like England, had been ploughed by religious contests. But the penetrating observer notices a difference between the shape taken by the struggle in the two countries. In England, the war had been a purely internal one between opposing principles, the prelatic and puritan; whereas, in Scotland, the battle had been mainly against an external foe, that is, an English power, which sought to impose a prelatic church on the people contrary to their wishes. Again, in England the contest had been against an ecclesiastical power, which sought to crush civil liberty; whereas, in Scotland, the power of the Church of Scotland had been exerted in behalf of the people, and against a foreign domination. This difference in the struggle was followed by a difference in the state of feeling resulting when the contest was terminated by the accession of William and Mary.

The great body of the people, at least in the Lowlands, acquiesced in the Revolution Settlement, and clung round the Government and the Presbyterian Church as by law established. But there soon arose antagonisms, which, though they did not break out into open wars, as in the previous century, did yet range the country into sections and parties

with widely differing sympathies and aims. In fact, Scotland was quite as much divided in opinion and sentiment in the eighteenth, as it ever was in the seventeenth century. In saying so, I do not refer to the strong prelatic feeling which existed all over the north {17} east coast of Scotland, or to the attachment to the house of Stuart which prevailed in the Highlands, -- for these, though they led to the uprisings of 1715 and 1745, were only the backward beatings of the retreating tide, -- but to other and stronger currents which have been flowing and coming into more or less violent collision with one another from that day till ours.

At the close of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century, the Church of Scotland was composed of a somewhat heterogeneous mixture of covenanting ministers, who had lived in the times of persecution; of prelatic clergy whose convictions in favor of Episcopacy were not sufficiently deep to induce them to abandon their livings, and to suffer the annoyances and persecutions to which the more sincere non jurors were exposed and of a race of young men zealous for the Presbyterian establishment, but "only half educated and superficially accomplished." The conforming "curates" were commonly indifferent to religion of every kind, and it was hoped that they would soon die out, and that the heritors and elders, with whom the election of pastors lay, would fill the churches with a learned and zealous ministry. But, in 1711, the Jacobite government of Queen Anne took the power of election from the parish authorities, and vested it in the ancient patrons, being the Crown for above five hundred and fifty livings, and noblemen, gentlemen of landed property, and town-councils, for the remaining four hundred.[3] The effect of this new law became visible in the course of years, in the appointment of persons to the churches who, for good reasons or bad, were acceptable to the government of the day, or were able to secure the favor of the private patrons. Forced upon the people in the first instance, there was a public feeling ready to gather round this law of patronage. From bad motives and from good -- like those which we have traced in England -- there was a desire among the upper, and a portion of the middle and educated, classes to have a clergy suited to the new age which had come in. As the result, there was formed a type of ministers which has continued till nearly our time in Scotland, called "New light" by the people, and designating themselves " moderates," as claiming the virtue of being moderate in all things, though, as Witherspoon charges {18} them, they became very immoderate for moderation, when they rose to be the dominant party. Most of them refrained in their preaching from uttering a very decided sound on disputed doctrinal points; some of them were suspected of Arianism or Socinianism, which, however, they kept to themselves out of respect for, or fear of, the Confession of Faith, which they had sworn to adhere to; the more highly educated of them cultivated a refinement and elegance of diction, and dwelt much on the truths common to both natural and revealed religion; and all of them were fond of depicting the high morality of the New Testament, and of recommending the example of Jesus. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that this style of preaching did not gain, as it did not warm, the hearts of the common people,

who either became callous to all religion, without any zealous efforts being made to stir them up, or longed and prayed for a better state of things. The enforcement of the law of patronage, and the settlement of ministers against the wishes of the people, led to the separation of the Erskines and the Secession Body in 1733, and of Gillespie and the Relief Body in 1753. In the Established Church there still remained a number of men of evangelical views and popular sympathies, such as Willison and Boston, who hoped that they might stem and ultimately turn the tide which was for the time against them. The boast of the moderate party was, that they were introducing into Scotland a greater liberality of sentiment on religious topics, and a greater refinement of taste. The charge against them is, that they abandoned the peculiar doctrines of the gospel, that they could not draw towards them the affections of the people who, in rural districts, sank into a stupid ignorance of religious truth, and, in the crowded lanes of the rising cities, into utter ungodliness and criminality, -- except, indeed, in so far as they were drawn out by the rapidly increasing dissenters, or by the evangelical minority within the Established Church. The collisions of the century took various forms. After the Union with England, dancing assemblies, theatres, and wandering players (with Allan Ramsay to patronize them), dancing on the tight-rope, cock-fighting, gambling, and horse-racing make their appearance, and receive considerable countenance and patronage from various classes, upper and lower; while {19} ineffectual attempts are made to put them down by civil penalties inflicted by burgher magistrates, and by public ecclesiastical censures, which the zealous clergy rigidly enforce, but which the new-light clergy are anxious to relax. In the turmoil of opinions which sprang up in this new state of things, there are rumors of deism, and even of atheism, being secretly entertained or openly avowed, and of the establishment here and there, in town and country, of " hell-fire clubs," where bold men met to discuss new opinions, and even, it is said, to act mock ceremonies, intended to ridicule the sacraments, and all that is awful in religion. Worse than all, and without being Much noticed, or meeting with much opposition on the part of the clergy of either party, there is the commencement of those drinking customs, which have ever since exercised so prejudicial an influence on the Scottish character.

If we look to the common people in the first quarter of the century, we find them in a state of great rudeness in respect of the comforts and elegancies of life. In the Highlands, they are scarcely removed above the lowest state of barbarism; and in the borders between the Highlands and Lowlands, the Celts are lifting cattle and exacting black-mail from the Lowlanders. Even in the more favored districts in the south of Scotland, the ground is unfenced; roads are very rare; and goods are carried on the backs of horses. The clothing of the people in the same region is of undyed black and white plaiding, and neither men nor women have shoes or stockings. Their ordinary food is oatmeal, pease, or beer, with kail groats and milk, and they rarely partake of flesh meat. The houses have only the bare ground as floors, with a fireplace in the midst, and the smoke escaping out of a hole in the roof, and with seats and the very beds of turf; even

in the dwellings of the farmers there are seldom more than two apartments; not unfrequently, however, in the south-west of Scotland, there is in addition a closet, to which the head of the house would retire at set times for devotion. Superstitious beliefs are still entertained in all ranks of life, and are only beginning to disappear among the educated classes. In the Highlands and Islands, second-sight is as firmly believed by the chieftain as by the clansmen. In the Lowlands, mysterious diseases, arising from a deranged nervous {20} system, are ascribed to demoniacal possessions; and witches, supposed to have sold themselves to the Evil One, and accomplishing his purposes in inflicting direful evils on the persons and properties of neighbors, are being punished by the magistrates, who are always incited on by the people, and often by the more zealous ministers of religion. Toleration is not understood or acknowledged by any of the great parties, political or religious.

What, it may be asked, is there in the condition of this people fitted to raise any hope that they are ever to occupy a high place among the nations of the earth? I am sure that a worldly-minded traveller, or an admirer of mere refinement and art, in visiting the country at those times, and comparing it with France or Italy, would have discovered nothing in it to lead him to think that it was to have a glorious future before it. But a deeper and more spiritually-minded observer might have discovered already the seeds of its coming intelligence and love of freedom: -- in the schools and colleges planted throughout the land in the love of education instilled into the minds of the people and, above all, in their acquaintance with the Bible, and in their determined adherence to what they believed to be the truth of God.[4]

Before the first age of the century has passed, there are unmistakable signs of industrial and intellectual activity. The Union has connected the upper classes with the metropolis and the Court of England, from which they are receiving a new refinement and some mental stimulus. The middle classes, and even the lower orders, are obtaining instruction from a very different quarter, from their parochial schools and churches, {21} from their burgh academies and their universities. The towns are hastening to take advantage of the new channels of trade and commerce; manufactures are springing up in various places, and already there is a considerable trading intercourse between the west of Scotland and America. The proprietors of the soil, in need of money to support their English life and to buy luxuries, are beginning to subdivide and enclose their lands, and to grant better dwellings and leases to their tenantry, who, being thereby placed in circumstances fitted to encourage and reward industry, are prepared to reclaim waste lands, to manure their grounds, to improve their stock of sheep and cattle, and introduce improved agricultural implements.

This imperfect sketch may help the reader to comprehend the circumstances in which the Scottish philosophy sprang up and grew to maturity, and the part which its expounders acted in the national history. It could have appeared only in a time of peace and temporal prosperity, but there had

been a preparation for it in the prior struggles. The stream which had risen in a higher region, and long pursued its course in ruggedness, -- like the rivers of the country, -- is now flowing through more level ground, and raising up plenty on its banks. It is a collegiate, and therefore a somewhat isolated, element among the agencies which were forming the national character and directing the national destiny; but it had its sphere. Through the students at the universities, it fostered a taste for literature and art; it promoted a spirit of toleration, and softened the national asperities in religious and other discussions; it is identified with the liberalism of Scotland, and through Adam Smith, D. Stewart, Mackintosh, Horner, Brougham, Jeffrey, Sydney Smith, Lord John Russell, and Palmerston, with the liberalism of the three kingdoms; and, above all, it has trained the educated portion of the inhabitants of North Britain to habits of reflection and of independent thought. The Scottish metaphysicians, with the exception of Chalmers, have never identified themselves very deeply with the more earnest spiritual life of the country; but they defended the fundamental truths of natural religion, and they ever spoke respectfully of the Bible. The Scottish philosophy, so far as it is a co-ordination of the facts of consciousness, never can be antagonistic to a true theology; I believe indeed it may help to establish some {22} of the vital truths of religion, by means, for instance, of the moral faculty, the existence of which has been so resolutely maintained by the Scottish school. Some of the moderate clergy did at times preach the Scottish moral philosophy instead of scriptural truth; but they did so in opposition to the counsel of the metaphysicians, at least of Hutcheson, who recommended his students to avoid the discussion of philosophic topics in the pulpit. Some of those who have been the most influential expounders of the Scottish theology, such as Chalmers and Welsh, have also been supporters of the Scottish philosophy, and have drawn from its established doctrines arguments in favor of evangelical religion.

III. -- PRECURSORS OF THE SCHOOL.

I/N\ the Libraries of some of the Scotch Colleges are collected a number of the theses which had been defended in the Scottish Universities in the seventeenth century. These seem to fall under the heads of Theses Logicae, Theses Ethicae, Theses Physicae, Theses Sphericae. Aristotle still rules both in logic and ethics. In logic, there is much abstract enunciation, and there are many acute distinctions in regard to Ens and unity, singulars and universals; and in ethics, the discussions are about virtue and vice, and choice. In physics, there are rational and deductive investigations of the nature of motion and resistance. During the century, the courses of study differ somewhat in the different universities, but still there is a general correspondence. In the course of Philosophy the Regents use Aristotle <De Anima>, Porphyry's Introduction, the Categories of Aristotle, the Dialectics of Ramus, and the Rhetoric of Vossius, with the works of such writers as Crassotus, Reas, Burgersdicius, Ariaga, Oviedo, &c. The ethics include politics and economics, and there are discussions about the nature of habits. It is scarcely necessary to say that all topics are treated in a logical

and rational, and not in an observational, manner and spirit.

The Parliamentary Commission for visiting the universities, appointed in 1690, and following years, directed, in 1695, the {23} professors of philosophy in St. Andrews to prepare the heads of a system of logic, and the corresponding professors in Edinburgh to prepare a course of metaphysics. The compends drawn up in consequence were passed from one college to another for revision there is no evidence that they were finally sanctioned, but they may be accepted as giving a fair idea of the instructions in philosophy conveyed in the universities of Scotland at the close of the eighteenth century, -- at the very time when Locke's Essay was finding its way so rapidly over the three kingdoms.[5] Logic is called the instrument to acquire other sciences, inasmuch as it prescribes rules for rightly apprehending, judging, and arguing. It is said to be defined by others as the science which directs the operations of the mind for finding out truth in every other science. It is represented as treating of the three operations of apprehension, judgment, and discourse, to which some add a fourth part, on method, under which analysis and synthesis are explained. In all this there is nothing but the commonplace of by-gone ages. But in this same text-book of logic we have the distinction drawn in the Port Royal Logic, between the extension and comprehension of the notion, adopted and stated. "We must distinguish betwixt the extension and comprehension of an idea. All the essential attributes of an idea are called its comprehension, as being, substance, vegetative, sensitive, and rational are the comprehension of man; but Peter, Paul, &c., contained under man, are called the extent of man." It can be shown that this distinction comes down in an unbroken historical chain in Glasgow to Sir W. Hamilton, who has so profitably amplified and applied it. It is found in the Introduction to Logic by Carmichael, and in the Logical Compend of Hutcheson; and the latter continued to be used in Glasgow till towards the time when Hamilton was a student there. Metaphysics are said to be defined by some, as a science of being as being; by others as a speculative science, which considers being in general, and its properties and kinds, as abstracted from matter. The benefits arising from the study of metaphysics are said to be, that treating of undoubted truths and axioms, we are enabled by their assistance the better to discover truths generally, and avoid errors; that as dividing {24} beings into classes it keeps us from confusion; that giving general names to common and abstracted beings, it aids the understanding in every kind of learning, and specially in theology, in which use is made of metaphysical terms. The first part of metaphysics treats of the principles of being, and of the various species of beings. The second part treats of the properties of being, such as unity, verity, goodness; and under this head we have abstract discussions as to the finite and infinite, the necessary and contingent, the absolute and relative, cause and effect, means and end, substance and quality. Such was the pabulum on which college youths fed during the century. This was the learning which helped to sharpen the intellects of such men as Henderson, Rutherford, Leighton, Gillespie, Baillie, Dickson, Burnet (Bishop), Stair (Lord), and

Carstairs, who acted so important a part in the affairs of their country.

But in order to appreciate fully the philosophic tastes and capacities of Scotchmen, we must follow them into France. From a very old date, certainly from the thirteenth century, there had been a close connection between that country and Scotland, arising from the jealousy entertained by both nations of the power and ambition of England. The Scottish youth who had a love of adventure, or a thirst for military glory, had a splendid opening provided for them in the Scottish Guard, which protected the person of the king of France, while those who had a taste for letters found means of instruction and employment in the numerous French colleges.[6] The Scotch scholars who returned to their own land brought back the French learning with them. Bishop Elphinston, who was the founder, and Hector Boece, who was the first principal of King's College, Aberdeen, had both taught in the University of Paris; and they set up the Scottish University on the model of the French one. John Major or Mair, who taught scholastic theology in Glasgow and St. Andrews, and who was the preceptor of Knox and Buchanan, had been for some time in the University of Paris. During the sixteenth, and the early part of the seventeenth century, there was a perpetual stream of Scottish scholars flowing into France. Some of these were Catholics, {25} to whom toleration was denied at home, and who betook themselves to a country where they had scope for the free exercise of their gifts. But quite as many were Protestants, who finding (as Scotchmen in later ages have done) their own land too narrow, or thirsting for farther knowledge or learned employment, connected themselves with one or other of the reformed colleges of Saumur, Montauban, Sedan, Montpellier, and Nismes, where some of them remained all their lives, while others returned to their own country. Some of these emigrants were lawyers or physicians; but by far the greater number of them were devoted to literature, philosophy, or theology. George Buchanan, Thomas Ricalton, three Blackwoods, Thomas Dempster, two Barclays, Andrew Melville, John Cameron, Walter Donaldson, and William Chalmers are only a few of the Scotchmen who occupied important offices in France. Two deserve to be specially named, as they wrote able logical works, -- the one, Robert Balfour, a Catholic, and Principal of Guienne College, Bourdeaux, and an erudite commentator on Aristotle; and the other, Mark Duncan, a Protestant, and Principal of the University of Saumur, and author of Institutes of Logic. There must have been some reality as the ground of the extravagant statement of Sir Thomas Urquhart in his "Discovery of a Most Exquisite jewel," that "the most of the Scottish nation, never having restricted themselves so much to the propriety of words as to the knowledge of things, where there was one preceptor of languages among them, there was above forty professors of philosophy." "The French conceived the Scots to have above all nations in matter of their subtlety in philosophical disputations, that there have not been till of late for these several years together any lord, gentleman, or other in all that country, who, being desirous to have his son instructed in the principles of philosophy, would entrust him to the discipline of any other than a Scottish master." He adds, that "if a Frenchman

entered into competition, a Scotchman would be preferred."

By such teaching at home, and by such foreign intercourse, a considerable amount of narrow but intense intellectual life was produced and fostered in Scotland. But youths were beginning to feel that the air was too close, too confined, and too monastic for them, and were longing for greater freedom and {26} expansion. While Aristotle and the scholastic method still hold their place in the cloisters of the colleges, there is a more bracing atmosphere in the regions without and beyond; and this is now to rush into Scotland. From the time of the revival of letters in the sixteenth century, almost every great and original thinker had thought it necessary to protest against the authority of Aristotle and the schoolmen. Bacon left Cambridge with a thorough contempt for the scholastic studies pursued there; and the grand end aimed at in his "Novum Organum," was to carry away men's regards from words and notions, to which they had paid too exclusive attention, and to fix them on things. In respect of a disposition to rebel against Aristotle and the schoolmen, Descartes was of the same spirit as Bacon; and Gassendi and Hobbes agreed with Descartes, with whom they differed in almost every thing else. It would be easy to produce a succession of strong testimonies against the Stagyrite and the Mediaevals, spread over the whole of the seventeenth century. The rising sentiment is graphically expressed by Glanvil in his "Scepsis Scientifica," published in 1665. He declares that the " ingenious world is grown quite weary of qualities and forms-," he declaims against "dry spinosities, lean notions, endless altercations about things of nothing; " and he recommends a " knowledge of nature, without which our hypotheses are but dreams and romances, and our science mere conjecture and opinion; for, while we have schemes of things without consulting the phenomena, we do but build in the air, and describe an imaginary world of our own making, that is but little akin to the real one that God made."

The realistic reaction took two different but not totally divergent directions in the seventeenth century, and both the streams reached Scotland in the following century. In the works of Grotius and Puffendorf, an elaborate attempt was made to determine the laws of nature in regard to man's political and social conditions, and apply the same to the examination and rectification of national and international laws. This was thought by many to be a more profitable and promising theme than the perpetual discussion of the nature of being and universals. This school had undoubtedly its influence in Scotland, where Carmichael, in 1718, edited and annotated Puffendorf, {27} and where Hutcheson, and Hume, and A. Smith, and Ferguson, and D. Stewart, combined juridical and political with moral inquiries, and became the most influential writers of the century on all questions of what has since been called social science.

But a stronger and deeper current was setting in about the same time,-a determination to have the experimental mode of investigation applied to every department of knowledge. This method had already been applied to physical science with brilliant results. And now there was a strong desire felt to have the new manner adopted in the investigation of

the human mind. In 1670, John Locke and five or six friends are conversing in his chamber in Oxford on a knotty topic, and quickly they find themselves at a stand; and it occurred to Locke that, before entering " on inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with." He pondered and wrote on this subject for twenty years, at the close of which (in 1690) he published his immortal " Essay on the Human Understanding." In this work he would banish for ever those innate ideas which had offered such obstacles to the progress of thought; and, by an inquiry into the actual operations of the human mind, he would trace the ways in which mankind attain ideas and knowledge, and settle the bounds imposed on the human understanding. Locke's Essay was hailed with acclamation by all who were wearied of the old scholastic abstractions and distinctions, and who had caught the new spirit that was abroad.

Still Locke's Essay was not allowed to take possession of the thinking minds of the country without a vigorous opposition. Locke was met in his own day by Stillingfleet, the Bishop of Worcester, who argued resolutely that the view given in the Essay of our idea of substance was not sufficiently deep to enable it to bear up the great truths of religion, especially the doctrine of the Trinity. The great Leibnitz severely blamed Locke for overlooking necessary truth, and reviewed his work, 'book by book and chapter by chapter, in his "Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain; " which, however, in consequence of Locke's death taking place in the mean time, was not published for many years after. It was felt by many otherwise {28} favorable to the new spirit, that Locke had not laid a sufficiently deep foundation for morality in his account of our idea of virtue, which he derived from mere sensations of pleasure and pain, with the law of God superadded in utter inconsistency with his theory. There were still in England adherents of the great English moralists, More and Cudworth, who had opposed Hobbes with learning and ability; and these maintained that there was need of deeper principles than those laid down by Locke to oppose the all-devouring pantheistic fatalism of Spinoza on the one hand, and the rising materialistic spirit on the other.

In the early part of the eighteenth century, there appeared several works which were not conceived at least wholly in the spirit of Locke. I do not refer to such works as Norris's "Ideal World," in which we have an able defence of the Aristotelian analysis of reasoning, and an exposition of Platonism, more ideal far than that presented in Plato's own dialectic; nor to Collier's "Clavis," "being a demonstration of the non-existence or impossibility of an external world:" I allude to works which left a far deeper impression on their age. Samuel Clarke, with vast erudition and great logical power, was establishing, in a mathematical manner, the existence and attributes of God, giving virtue a place among the eternal relations of things perceived by reason, and defending the doctrine of human freedom and responsibility against those who were reducing men to the condition of brutes or machines. Berkeley did adopt the

theory of Locke as to the mind being percipient only of ideas, but the view which he took of human knowledge was very different; for while Locke, consistently or inconsistently, was a sober realist, Berkeley labored to show that there was no substantial reality except spirit, and thought in this way to arrest the swelling tide of materialism and scepticism. A more accurate thinker than either, Bishop Butler, was establishing the supremacy of conscience, and showing that there was a moral government in the world; and that revealed religion was suited to the constitution of the mind, and to the position in which man is placed.

It was while philosophic thought was in this state that the Scottish Philosophy sprang up. The Scottish metaphysicians largely imbibed the spirit of Locke; all of them speak of him {29} with profound respect; and they never differ from him without expressing a regret or offering an apology. Still the Scottish school never adopted the full theory of Locke; on the contrary, they opposed it in some of its most essential points; and this while they never gave in to the mathematical method of Clarke, and while they opposed the ingenuities of Berkeley. Hutcheson, the founder of the Scottish school, was a rather earlier author than Butler, to whom therefore he was not indebted for the peculiarities of his method and system. But there was a writer to whom both Butler and Hutcheson, and the early Scottish school generally, were under deeper obligation than to any other author, or all other authors, and who deserves in consequence a more special notice.

IV. -- SHAFTESBURY.

T/HE\ author who exercised the most influence on the earlier philosophic school of Scotland was not Locke, but Lord Shaftesbury (born 1671, died 1713), the grandson of the Lord Chancellor Shaftesbury, who bad been the friend of Locke. " Peace," says he, " be with the soul of that charitable and courteous author, who, for the common benefit of his fellow-authors, introduced the way of miscellaneous writing." He follows this miscellaneous method. The pieces which were afterwards combined in his " Characteristics of Men, Manners, and Times," were written at various times, from I 707 to 1712. They consist of a " Letter Concerning Enthusiasm," " Sensus Communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor," " Soliloquy, or, Advice to an Author," "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit," "The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody," "Miscellaneous Reflections on the said Treatises, and other Critical Subjects," "A Notion of the Historical Draught or Tablature of the judgment of Hercules, with a Letter concerning Design." He tells us that the miscellaneous manner was in the highest esteem in his day, that the old plan of subdividing into firsts and seconds had grown out of fashion, and that the " elegant court divine exhorts in miscellany, and is ashamed to bring his {30} twos and threes before a fashionable assembly." " Ragouts and fricassees are the reigning dishes; so authors, in order to become fashionable, have run into the more savory way of learned ragout and medley." His style is evidently after the French, and not the old English, model. It has the jaunty air of one who affects to be a man of

elegance and fashion. Undoubtedly he was extensively read in the Greek and Roman philosophy, especially in Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and the Roman Stoics, and he has many just and profound views, but these are ever made to appear as the ornaments of a modern nobleman, who studies philosophy as an accomplishment.

His " Characteristics" open with remarks on " Enthusiasm," and on " Wit and Humor." He tells us that "vapors naturally rise," and he would dispel them by ridicule. " The melancholy way of treating religion is that which, according to my apprehension, renders it so tragical, and is the occasion of its acting in reality such dismal tragedies in the world." He would " recommend wisdom and virtue in the way of pleasantry and mirth," and tells us that " good-humor is not only the best security against enthusiasm, but the best foundation of piety and true religion." It does not appear very clearly what is the nature of the piety and religion which he would recommend. Sometimes he seems to scoff at the Scriptures, and at all their spiritual verities and holy mysteries; at other times he would make it appear as if he wished to be thought a believer in Christianity. There is, I suspect, much of latent levity in the profession he makes: " We may in a proper sense be said faithfully and dutifully to embrace those holy mysteries even in their minutest particulars, and without the least exception on account of their amazing depth," " being," he adds, " fully assured of our own steady orthodoxy, resignation, and entire submission to the truly Christian and catholic doctrines of our holy church, as by law established."

But he reckons these pleasantries merely as an introduction to graver subjects. He has largely caught the spirit of Locke, but he by no means follows him, especially in his rejection of innate ideas. "No one," says he, "has done more than Locke towards recalling of true philosophy from barbarity into the use and practice of the world, and into the company of the better and politer sort, who might well be ashamed of it in its {31} other dress. No one has opened a better and clearer way to reason." But he qualifies his praise. "'Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue Out Of the world, and made the ideas of these, which are the same with those of God, unnatural, and without foundation in our minds. <Innate> is a word he poorly plays upon: the right word, though less used, is <connatural>." He shows that there are many of our mental qualities natural to us. " Life, and the sensations which accompany life, come when they will, are from mere nature and nothing else. Therefore, if you dislike the word innate, let us change it, if you will, for instinct, and call instinct that which nature teaches, exclusive of art, culture, or discipline." Beginning with these lower affections, he goes on to show that preconceptions of a higher kind have place in human kind, preconceptions' of the 'fair and beautiful.'"[7]

He reviews the famous argument of Descartes, " We think, therefore we are." "Nothing more certain: for the Ego or I being established in the first part of the proposition, the Ergo, no doubt, must hold it good in the latter." "For

my own part," he adds, "I take my being upon trust" He everywhere appeals to the "Sensus Communis," or Common Sense. His general doctrine is thus expressed: "Some moral and philosophical truths there are withal so evident in themselves, that it would be easier to imagine half mankind to have run mad, and joined precisely in one and the same species of folly, than to admit any thing as truth which should be advanced against such <natural knowledge, fundamental reason, and common sense>."[8] He allows that what is natural to us may require labor and pains to bring it out. " Whatever materials or principles of this kind we may possibly bring with us, whatever good faculties, senses, or anticipating sensations and imaginations may be of nature's growth, and arise properly of themselves without our art, promotion, or assistance, the general <idea> which is formed of all this management, and the clear notion we attain of what is preferable and principal in all these subjects of choice and estimation, will not, as I imagine, by any person be taken for {32} <innate>. Use, practice, and culture must precede the under standing and wit of such an advanced size and growth as this." These surely are the very views which were developed more fully and articulately by Reid, in his opposition to the scepticism of Hume. The object of his works is to carry out these principles to taste and morals. "Nor do I ask more when I undertake to prove the reality of virtue and morals. If I be certain that I am, it is certain and demonstrable who and what I should be." Should one who had the countenance of a gentleman ask me why I would avoid being nasty when nobody was present?' in the first place, I should be fully satisfied that he himself was a very nasty gentleman who could ask this question, and that it would be a hard matter for me to make him ever conceive what true cleanliness was. However, I might, notwithstanding this, be contented to give him a slight answer, and say, I It was because I had a nose.' Should he trouble me further, and ask again, 'What if I had a cold? or what if naturally I had no such nice smell?' I might answer perhaps, 'That I cared as little to see myself nasty as that others should see me in that condition.' I But what if it were in the dark?' 'Why, even then, though I had neither nose nor eyes, my <sense> of the matter would still be the same: my nature would rise at the thought of what was sordid."' He thus reaches a sense of beauty. "Much in the same manner have I heard it asked, 'Why should a man be honest in the dark?"' The answer to this question brings him to a moral sense.

He speaks of nature in general, and human nature in particular, as an " economy," and as having a "constitution" and a "frame." In examining the nature of the soul, he finds (1) self-affections, which lead only to " the good of the private." He enumerates, as belonging to this class, ,love of life, resentment of injury, pleasure, or appetite towards nourishment and the means of generation; interest, or the desire of those conveniences by which we are well provided for or maintained; emulation, or love of praise and honor; indolence, or love of ease and rest." But he finds also (2) natural affections, which lead to the good of the public. He takes great pains to establish the existence of disinterested affections, and opposes the views of those who, like Rochefoucauld, would resolve all human action {33}

into a refined selfishness. Referring to the common saying, that interest governs the world, he remarks shrewdly: " Whoever looks narrowly into the affairs of it, will find that passion, humor, caprice, zeal, faction, and a thousand other springs which are counter to self-interest, have as considerable a part in the movements of this machine. There are more wheels and counterpoises in this engine than are easily imagined." With such affections, " man is naturally social, and society is natural to him;" and in illustrating this position, he sets himself vigorously against the social theory of Hobbes, who represents the original state of man as one of war. Virtue consists in the proper exercise of these two classes of affections. Vice arises when the public affections are weak and deficient, when the private affections are too strong, or affections spring up which do not tend to the support of the public or private system. He shows that virtue, as consisting in these affections, is natural to man, and that he who practises it is obeying the ancient Stoic maxim, and living according to nature. The virtues which he recommends fall far beneath the stern standard of the Stoics, and leave out all the peculiar graces of Christianity: they consist of, -- "a mind subordinate to reason, a temper humanized and fitted to all natural affection, an exercise of friendship uninterrupted, thorough candor, benignity, and good-nature, with constant security, tranquillity, equanimity."

He would establish a morality on grounds independent of religion. "Whoever thinks that there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is just and good, must suppose that there is, independently, such a thing as justice, truth, and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true." " If virtue be not really estimable in itself, I can see nothing estimable in following it for the sake of a bargain; " and he complains of those who " speak so much of the rewards and punishments, and so little of the worth or value of the thing itself." He remarks very justly: " By building a future state on the ruins of virtue, religion in general, and the cause of a deity, is betrayed; and by making rewards and punishments the principal motives to duty, the Christian religion in particular is overthrown, and its greatest principle, that of love, rejected and exposed." He admits, how {34} ever, that a good God, as a model, has an effect on our views of morals and conduct; and allows that "fear of future punishment and hope of future reward, how mercenary and servile however it may be accounted, is yet, in many circumstances, a great advantage, security, and support to virtue."

Such is his view of the nature of virtue. But Shaftesbury is quite aware that the question of the character of the virtuous act is not the same as that of the mental faculty which looks at it and appreciates it. This faculty he represents as being of the nature of a sense. Locke had allowed the existence of two senses, an external and an internal; and had labored in vain to derive all men's ideas from these two sources. Hutcheson, perceiving that the inlets to the mind were too few according to the theory of Locke, calls in other senses. These senses become very numerous in the systems of some of the Scottish

metaphysicians, such as Gerard. In the writings of Shaftesbury, two occupy an important place, -- the sense of beauty and the moral sense.

"No sooner," he says, "does the eye open upon figures, the ear to sounds, than straight the Beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them as soon discerned as felt), than straight an <inward> eye distinguishes and sees the <fair> and <shapely>, the <amiable> and <admirable>, apart from the <deformed>, the <foul>, the <odious>, or the <despicable>." Though in all this advancing quite beyond the "Essay on the Human Understanding," yet he seems to be anxious to connect his view of the moral sense with the reflection or inward sense of Locke. "In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of the affections, but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards these very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike." Conscience is represented by him "as the reflection in the mind of any unjust action or behavior, which he knows to be naturally odious and ill-deserving. {35} No creature can maliciously and intentionally do ill, without being sensible, at the same time, that he deserves ill. And in this respect, every sensible creature may be said to have a conscience."[9]

He has evidently been smitten with some of the Platonic views of beauty. "We have," he says, "a sense of order and proportion; and having, a sensation, reason can give this account of it, that whatever things have order, the same have unity of design and concur in one, are parts constituent of one whole, or are in themselves one system. Such is a tree with all its branches, an animal with all its members, an edifice with all exterior and interior ornaments." He is fond of connecting or identifying the beautiful and the good; in fact, virtue is represented by him as a higher kind of beauty. "It is, I must own, on certain relations or respective proportions, that all natural affection does in some measure depend." "The same numbers, harmony, and proportions have a place in morals." He evidently clings fondly to the idea that " beauty and good are one and the same."

We have given so full an account of the philosophy of Shaftesbury, because of the influence which it exercised on the Scottish Philosophy. Francis Hutcheson did little more than expound these views, with less versatility, but in a more equable, thorough, and systematic manner. Turnbull, who founded the Aberdeen branch of the school, and influenced greatly the mind of Reid, avowedly drew largely from Hutcheson in his theories of taste and virtue. Reid and Beattie got their favorite phrase, " common sense," I have no doubt, directly or indirectly from the treatise so entitled in the " Characteristics." Hume was evidently well

acquainted with the writings of {36} Shaftesbury; and I am inclined to think that they may have helped to form his style, and to suggest some of his essays. We have an anticipation of the spirit of Hume in the miscellany entitled, " Philocles to Palemon:" "You know that in this Academic Philosophy I am to present you with, there is a certain way of questioning and doubting, which in no way suits the genius of our age. Men love to take party instantly. They can't bear being kept in suspense. The examination torments them." Theocles observes, that "if there be so much disorder in the present state of things, he would not be disposed to think better of the future." Lord Monboddo declares that " Shaftesbury's Inquiry is the best book in English on the subject of morals." His Draught or Tablature of the judgment of Hercules, and his Disquisitions on Taste, originated the theories of Beauty which formed an essential part of Scottish metaphysics for more than a century.

V. -- GERSHOM CARMICHAEL.

S/IR\ W/ILLIAM\ H/AMILTON\ says that Gershom Carmichael "may be regarded, on good grounds, as the real founder of the Scottish school of philosophy." ("Reid's Works," P. 30.) I am disposed to retain the honor for Francis Hutcheson, to whom it is usually ascribed. Carmichael does not possess the full characteristics of the school. He seems to me to be the bond which connects the old philosophy with the new in Scotland.

He was descended from a genuine covenanting stock. His father was Alexander Carmichael, the son of Frederick Carmichael, who had been minister in various places in Fifeshire, and who died in 1667; his mother was relict (she had been the second wife) of Fraser of Bray. Alexander was minister at Pittenain, and had at one time been attached to prelacy, but abandoned it to join the suffering ministers. Early in 1672, he is in the tolbooth of Edinburgh. On February 22, he is before the Council, charged with keeping conventicles, and is ordered to depart the kingdom, never to return without license; and February 26, he is transported in a ship to London, where {37} he was useful as a minister, and died about the year 1676 or 1677. In 1677, shortly after his death, there was published, from the copy which he had left, a treatise, entitled, "The Believer's Mortification of Sin by the Spirit," edited by Thomas Lye, who says in the preface, "As for that flesh of his flesh, and the fruit of his loins, as for that Ruth and Gershom he hath left behind him, I question not but as long as the saints among you continue to bear your old name, Philadelphia (so the old Puritans of England have used to style you), you will not, you cannot, forget to show kindness to Mephibosheth for Jonathan's sake." Gershom, so called by his father because he was "a stranger in a strange land," seems to have been born in London about 1672. It may be supposed that the family returned to Scotland after the father's death. We certainly find Gershom enrolled a Master of Arts in the University of Edinburgh, July 31, 1691. He afterwards became Regent at St. Andrews, where he took the oath of allegiance,

and subscribed the Assurance. On November 22, 1694, he is elected and admitted Master in the University of Glasgow, having been brought in by public dispute, that is, by disputation on comparative trial, through the influence of Lord Carmichael, afterwards the first Earl of Hyndford. About the same time he lost his mother, and "married a good woman, the daughter of Mr. John Inglis." Wodrow, who tells us this (" Letters "), was his pupil, and describes him as at that time possessed of little reading, as dictating several sheets of peripatetic physics <de materia prima>, as teaching Rohault, and being very much a Cartesian, -- this seven years after the publication of Newton's " Principia." Afterwards he made himself master of the mathematics and the new philosophy, and Wodrow used to jest with him on this matter of his juvenile teaching. From these notices it appears that, by parentage and birth and training and ancestral prepossessions, he belongs to the seventeenth, but catches the spirit of the eighteenth century. He exhibits in his own personal history the transition from the old to the new thought of Scotland.

He is represented as a hard student, a thinking, poring man, his favorite study being moral philosophy. At the commencement of his professorial life, a Master took up the batch of students as they entered on the study of philosophy, and carried {38} them in successive years through all the branches, including logic, pneumatology, moral philosophy, and natural philosophy. This system required the teacher to be a well-informed man in various departments, but was a hindrance to eminence in any one branch of learning. But from 1727 the Masters are restricted to their several classes, and to Carmichael is consigned moral philosophy. It appears that, in 1726, there were thirty-six students in the third year's class, and nineteen in that of the fourth year; in the latter days of Carmichael the numbers were larger. The classes were swelled by non-conforming students from England, who, shut out from the English universities by their tests and their churchified influence, betook themselves to the Scottish colleges. Many of these were attracted to Glasgow by the fame of Carmichael. The college session lasted from the beginning of November to the end of May. On the Lord's day, the Masters met with their classes, to take an account of the sermons, and this was a work in which Carmichael felt a special interest.

Carmichael was a most affectionate, friendly man, but withal a little warm in his temper, and became involved in consequence in scenes which seem somewhat inconsistent with the supposed calm of an academic life. The college corporation was evidently much agitated by internal feuds, and Carmichael takes his part in them, commonly siding with the party of independence against the Principal. In 1704, joined by Mr. Loudon, he protests that several things minuted as Acts of Faculty were written and signed privately by the Principal. The Faculty finds the charge unfounded, and suspends the two from their functions. Subsequently they ask forgiveness, and are restored. In 1705, Mr. Law, one of the Regents, complains that some expressions had been uttered against him by Mr. Carmichael, who is gravely admonished, and exhorted to avoid every thing irritating

towards his colleagues in time to come. In 1717, there are hot disputes as to who should elect the Rector. The Masters combine against the Principal, call the students to the common hall, and choose their man. But, in 1718, the Commission for the Visitation of the College finds some of the Masters, including Carmichael, guilty of great disorder in the election of the Rector; and they are discharged for a time from exercising any part of their office (such as choosing professors), {39} except the ordinary discipline in the class. In 1722, a bonfire was kindled by the students on a decision in favor of the election of Lord Molesworth (we shall meet with him again in these articles) to Parliament, and Carmichael rushes into the heart of the mob, and gets into trouble in extinguishing the flames. In November, 1728, we find him joining in a protest against the claim of the Chancellor to sit and vote. It was by such disputes that the constitution of the Scottish colleges came to be settled.

Patriotic exertions helped to relieve the sameness of the college life, and in these the collegiate body in Glasgow (it was different in Aberdeen) are of one mind. In 1708, the kingdom is threatened with "an invasion of French and Irish papists," and the Masters agree each to maintain a number of foot soldiers; and Carmichael signs for five men. In September, 1715, the rising in the north of Scotland in favor of the pretender becomes known. The Faculty agrees to raise fifty men at sixpence a day; the Principal provides eight, the professor of divinity five, and Carmichael subscribes for four. It was by such active exertions in the south of Scotland that the progress of the Rebellion was so speedily arrested.

In his later years, as he became known, Carmichael carried on a correspondence with Barbeyrac and other learned men. He had a numerous family, "who were all a comfort to him, except one, who was a cause of great distress." Wodrow says, that " in his advanced years he was singularly religious. I know he was under great depths of soul exercise, and much the worse that he did not communicate his distress to anybody almost." This is the only record we have of a Scottish metaphysician having had his" soul exercises;" but surely there must have been others who had their conflicts as they dived into the depths of the human soul. For the last two or three years of his life, he had a cancerous wart, which spread over one eye and across his nose to the other eye, and at last carried him off. During all his illness he remained a hard student and serious Christian. He died, November 25, 1729. On his death the English students leave the university, the attendance at which is reported by Wodrow as very thin in December; and it does not seem to improve till Hutcheson commences his lectures in the following October. {40}

Carmichael published "Breviuscula Introductio ad Logicam," which reached a second edition in 1722. He defines logic as the science which shows the method of discovering truth, and of expounding it to others. He represents it as having to do with judgment, but then it also treats of apprehension as necessary to judgment. Under apprehension he speaks of the doctrine of the difference of the comprehension and extension of a notion, and of the former

being evolved by definition, and the latter by division, as being quite commonplace. He distinguishes between immediate and mediate judgment. Immediate is between two ideas immediately compared; mediate, in which the comparison is by means of a third judgment, is called discourse. He says all knowledge may ultimately be resolved into immediate judgments, known in their own light; and he divides immediate judgments into two classes: one abstract, in which there is no direction of the mind to the thing itself as really existing, <e.g.>, the whole is greater than a part; and the other intuitive, when the mind has a consciousness of the thing as present, as, for example, the proposition, <Ego cogitaits existo>. Coming to mediate judgment, he gives as the supreme rule of affirmative syllogism the axiom, "Things which are the same with one and the same third are the same with one another g, " and of negative syllogisms the axiom, " Things of which one is the same with a third, and the other not the same, are not the same with one another." These statements show a " thinking, poring," man, and will be valued most by those who have thought longest on these subjects. We see a new historical step in the transmission of the distinction between the extension and comprehension of a notion; we see that the difference between immediate and mediate judgments was known in these times; and that there was an attempt to find a supreme rule of mediate reasoning in the sameness (here lies the looseness) of two things with a third. Carmichael is aware that there are propositions seen to be true in their own light; and that there is an intuitive apprehension, in which the thing is known as present; and many will think that the <ego cogitaiis existo> is a preferable form to the <cogito ergo sum> of Descartes.

Carmichael published an edition of Puffendorf, " De Officio Hominis et Civis," with Notes and Supplements, for the use of students, described by Hutcheson as more valuable than the {41} original work. In the notes he offers many acute observations, and gives extracts from De Vries, Titius, and Grotius. In the first supplement he speaks of a divine law, to which all morality has reference, which alone obliges, and to which all obligation of human laws is ultimately to be referred. The law may be made known either by means of signs, oral or written, or by the constitution of human nature, and other things which offer themselves to the observation of men. What is known by the latter is called <natural law>, which has two meanings, -- one the faculty of reason itself as given to man by God, and the other such a power of intelligence as can discover what is in nature by ordinary diligence. He takes far higher grounds of religion than those adopted by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. He declares that no one can be said to obey the law who does not know what the law enjoins, or who acts without reference to God and his law. At the same time, he seems to be a eudaimonist, and inclined to look on God as having an ultimate respect to happiness in his law. He has a second supplement, calm, moderate, and sensible, on the " Duties of Man towards his own Mind," and a third on " Quasi-Contracts."

His latest work, published in 1729, shortly before his death, is " Synopsis Theologiae Naturalis." In his preface

he tells us that, in teaching pneumatology, he had used two Belgian textbooks. He advises that the forms of the Aristotelian school be avoided, as obscure and artificial, but declares at the same time that the doctrines of the scholastics, at least of the older, are more agreeable to reason and holy Scripture than those opposed to them in his day, especially in their finding a foundation for morality and obligation in God; and he denounces some who, of late years, with a showy appearance of genius and eloquence, would separate morality from religion, referring, I should suppose, to the school of Shaftesbury, against which, therefore, he thus gives his dying testimony, as it were in the name of. the old philosophy.

In establishing the existence and perfections of God, he draws arguments from a variety of sources. He would call in metaphysical principles. Thus he urges that there must be <ens aliquod independens>, otherwise we are landed in an infinite series of causes, which he declares (with Aristotle) self-evidently impossible. He appeals, with the French theologian Abbadie, {42} to universal consent. But he reckons the arguments of Descartes and De Vries, and that by Samuel Clarke, as unsatisfactory. He maintains that we can argue that what we attribute to a thing in idea exists, only after we have shown that the thing exists. He maintains that the existence of God as an existing being is to be established, not <a priori>, but <a posteriori>, and appeals to the traces of order, beauty, and design in the universe, and to the illustrations to be found in the writings of Ray, Pelling, Cheyne, Derham, Niewentite, and in Pitcairn on the Circulation of the Blood. He refers to the properties of matter, as established by Newton; and argues, as Baxter did so resolutely afterwards, that matter cannot move of itself, but needs a new force impressed on it. In regard to the dependence of creature on created power, he holds that things spiritual and corporeal exist so long as they have being from the creative efficacy of God, and speaks of the need of a divine <precursus> or <concursus>. He admits, however, that created spirits have efficacy in themselves. He refers to Leibnitz, and shows that he was well acquainted with his theory of possible worlds. It is surely interesting to observe a modest and retiring Scottish writer so thoroughly acquainted with the highest philosophy of his time, British and Continental, and yet retaining his own independence in the midst of his learning. If he cannot be regarded as the founder of the new school, he has the credit of judiciously combining some of the best properties of the old and new philosophy.

VI. -- ANDREW BAXTER

B/AXTER\ cannot be justly described as a leader or a follower of the Scottish school. His method is not really nor professedly that of inductive observation. He belongs rather to the school of Samuel Clarke, to whom he often refers, and always with admiration. But be was a Scotchman, and an independent thinker: he does not belong to the old philosophy; but he was a contemporary of the men who founded the Scottish school, and treated of many of the same topics. He had readers both in England and Scotland in his own day, and for some years after his death; and he deserves a

passing notice as the representative of a style of thought which met with considerable favor in his time, but had to give way before the new school. {43}

We have a life of him in Kippis's " Biographia Britannica," drawn up from materials supplied by his son. He was the son of a merchant in Old Aberdeen, where he was born in 1686 or 1687. His mother was Elizabeth Frazer, descended from a considerable family in the north. He was educated at King's College, Aberdeen, where, at the beginning of last century, he would be trained in the old logic and metaphysics. But, as we shall see more fully in future articles, a considerable amount of a fresh literary taste, and of a spirit of philosophical inquiry, began to spring up in Aberdeen in connection with the two Universities pretty early in that century. Baxter, besides being a good mathematician, was well acquainted with the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, and with the theories of Leibnitz as to matter and motion. He was familiar with the Essay on the Human Understanding, but had a deeper appreciation of the speculations of Clarke.

The chief professional employment of his life was that of tutor to young men of good family. The boys who, in our days, would be sent to the great public schools of England taught by Oxford or Cambridge masters, were very often, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, put under tutors, who went about with them to the colleges at home, or travelled with them abroad. The occupation of teaching and travelling tutor was one coveted by young men of limited means and of a reading taste, who did not wish officially to enter the church, and had no other office open to them than that referred to, fitted to furnish them with means of study. When the tutor had trained and travelled with the heir of a good estate, the family felt bound to make provision for him for life. It was thus that, in the seventeenth century, Hobbes had been tutor to two successive Earls of Devonshire; that, in the eighteenth century, Thomson the poet became tutor to the Lord Chancellor Talbot's son on the Grand Tour; that Hume coveted the office of travelling tutor to Murray of Broughton; and Turnbull and A. Smith gave up chairs in the Scottish colleges to become tutors, -- the one to the Wauchopes of Niddrie (?) and the other to the Duke of Buccleuch Baxter was tutor, among others, to Lord John Gray, Lord Blantyre, and Mr. Hay of Drummelzier.

In the spring Of 1741, he went abroad with Mr. Hay, having also Lord Blantyre under his care. He resided some years at Utrecht, and thence made excursions into Flanders, France, and Germany. Carlyle met him -- " Immateriality Baxter," as he calls him -- at Utrecht in 1745, and says of him, 'though he was a profound philosopher and a hard student, he was at the same time a man of the world, and of such pleasing conversation as attracted the young." His son bad described him as being at polite assemblies in Holland, and a favorite of ladies; but a writer in the Corrigenda of the following volume of the " Biographia," after mentioning that he saw him daily for more than two years at Utrecht, declares: " His dress was plain and simple, -- not that of a priggish French man, but of a mathematician who was not a

sloven. I am pretty well persuaded that while in the Low Countries, he never had any conversation with women of higher or lower degree, unless it were to ask for the bill at an ordinary, or desire the servant maid to bring up the turf for his chimney." The same writer describes him as a "plain, decent, good humored man, who passed all his time, but {44} what was bestowed at his meals, in meditation and study." His son describes him as social and cheerful, and extremely studious, sometimes' sitting up whole nights reading and writing.

In 1724, he had married the daughter of Mr. Mebane, a minister in Berwickshire; and, while he was abroad, his wife and family seem to have resided at Berwick-on-Tweed. In 1747, he returned to Scotland, and resided till his death at Whittingham, in East Lothian, where he employed himself in country affairs, and in his philosophic studies. In his latter years, he was much afflicted with gout and gravel. In January 29, 1750, he wrote to (the afterwards notorious) John Wilkes, with whom he bad formed a friendship in Holland, " I am a trouble to all about me, especially my poor wife, who has the life of a slave night and day in helping to take care of a diseased carcass." He had long, be states, considered the advantages of a separate state, but " I shall soon know more than all men I leave behind me." He died April 13, 1750, and was buried in the family vault of Mr. Hay at Whittingham.

He wrote a book in two volumes entitled " Matho," being a compend of the universal scientific knowledge of the day. He published his principal work, " An Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul," in 1733,[10] and it reached a second edition in 1737. In 1750, shortly after his death, was published, "An Appendix to his Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul." He had taken a great body of manuscripts with him to Holland; in the letter referred to, he speaks fondly of his unfinished manuscripts, in which he had discussed " a great many miscellaneous subjects in philosophy of a very serious nature, few of them ever considered before, as I know of" In 1779, the Rev. Dr. Duncan of South Warnborough published from his manuscripts, after correcting the style, " The Evidence of Reason in proof of the Immortality of the Soul," and at the close is his letter to Wilkes. Another work of his, entitled " Histor," discussing, on the English side, the controversy between the British and Continental writers as to force, and on the side of Clarke, the controversy between Clarke and Leibnitz, was offered to Millar the bookseller; but the new generation did not appreciate his life-labors; his day was over, and the offer was declined.

The avowed design of Baxter, in all his works, is to establish the existence of an immaterial power. Such a defence seemed to him to be required, in consequence of the new views of the powers of matter founded on the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton; by the equivocal language of Locke, frequently quoted about our not being "able to know whether any material being thinks or not;" and by the materialistic spirit abroad. The new doctrine of all matter attracting other matter seemed to show that we must be prepared to modify the old doctrine, that body is altogether passive.

Leibnitz, on metaphysical grounds, and in opposition to the accepted Cartesian {45} doctrine, had maintained that matter has an essential potency. Baxter proceeds on the doctrine of Clarke, the friend of Newton, and quotes his language. "All things that are done in the world are done either immediately by God himself, or by created intelligent beings; matter being evidently not at all capable of any laws or powers whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intelligence, excepting only this one negative power, that every part of it will always and necessarily continue in that state, whether of rest or motion, wherein it at present is. So that all those things which we commonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter and laws of motion, of gravitation, attraction, or the like, are indeed (if one will speak strictly and properly) the effects of God's acting continually and every moment, either immediately by himself, or mediately by some created intelligent being," The first volume of Baxter's work on the "Nature of the Soul," his "Appendix" and a large part of his "Evidence," are mainly occupied with a full elucidation and elaborate defence of the views summarily expressed in this passage.

He labors to prove that a <vis inertiae>, or resistance to a change of present state of rest or motion, is essential to matter; that matter hath this and nothing else; that it cannot have any sort of active power; that what are called the powers of matter is force impressed upon it <ab extra>. He maintains that matter is "liable to but one change or casualty, /viz\., to be annihilated, or to be destroyed by a Being to whose power that effect is competent," and lie denies that Infinite Power may " superadd a property to a substance incapable of receiving it." He maintains this doctrine as resolutely as if it were the foundation of religion, which must stand or fall with it. The questions which he has taken up had been discussed in a profound manner by Descartes and Leibnitz, and they cannot be regarded as settled at this day. But from his dogma of the impotency of matter he argues the necessity of an immaterial powerful being who first made the dead substance, matter, who originally impressed, and still continues to impress, motion upon it. " I am of opinion, and think it would be easy to show it, if one bad leisure to run through the several particulars, that unless an immaterial power continually re-excited motion in the material universe, all would stop in it in a very short time, perhaps in half an hour, except that the planets would run out in straight-lined directions" ! ! "To say that Deity interposes when he sees that matter would go wrong, is the same thing, in other words, as owning that lie interposes always if that were proper. Every particle of matter resists a change of its present state, and therefore could not effect a change of state in itself nor in other particles." He would thus establish his conclusion, that the " Deity, who can be excluded from no place, but is active and present everywhere, acts immediately on all the parts of matter," and that his governing is only his creating power constantly repeated. "Our philosophy can only be consistent when we take in the immediate power of the Creator as the efficient cause in all the works of nature." He looks on his own position as being very much superior, in its religious aspects, to the doctrines which had been entertained by many

others. " Low and pitiful are the shifts we are put to when we would remove the Deity to the head of nature, and the head of nature out of sight." {46}

"It is not right to exalt the Deity in words and derogate from his perfections in facts. This is only paying him a compliment, and then setting aside his government in whole or in part, -- a state artifice. Cicero objects this low cunning to Epicurus, when he says, it is " verbis ponere re tollere." " Descartes, before Spinoza, had given the government of the universe to matter and motion; and Leibnitz, under a pretence of extolling the original contrivance of things, leaves the execution of all this to dead substance. According to all these schemes, we see nothing that the Deity does now: we behold only the operations of matter. This fills the mind with anxious doubts. If matter performs all that is wonderful, it catches our first admiration; and we know not where to search for the being who contrived that which we see matter executes with such dexterity." Much may be said in favor of the doctrine, that God acts in all physical action; but it is wiser not to found it on the peculiar dogma of Baxter, that matter is inactive.

But the grand aim of Baxter, in depriving matter of its powers, is to establish the immateriality, and consequent immortality, of the soul. It is a fundamental position with him, that "a power always belongs to something living." He is thus able to establish the existence of a human soul active and immortal. He maintains that " no substance or being can have a natural tendency to annihilation or become nothing," and argues that the soul must endlessly abide an active perceptive substance, without either fear or hopes of dying, through all eternity." When we find such positions coolly assumed, one almost feels justified in rejoicing that in that very age David Hume rose up to dispute all such dogmas; and that in the following age Emmanuel Kant examined narrowly the foundations both of rational theology and of rational psychology. We are certainly warranted in feeling a high gratification that Thomas Reid, a wiser man than any of these, did immediately after the time of Hume, and before the time of Kant, set about establishing natural religion and philosophy upon a safer foundation.

Baxter is prepared to follow out his principles to all their consequences, however preposterous they might appear. The phenomena of dreaming came in his way, and he gives an explanation of them. He cannot refer these dreams to dead matter, nor can it be the soul that forms the scenes present to it. His theory is, that separate immaterial beings act upon the matter of our bodies, and produce on the sensory a [Greek term] or vision, which is perceived by the active and recipient mind. He acknowledges that he knows nothing of the conditions and circumstances of these separate agencies, but he evidently clings to the idea that there is no scarcity of living immaterial beings, and asks triumphantly: "Why so much dead matter, without living immaterial substance in proportion? " " Hath not the most despicable reptile animalcule an immaterial soul joined to it?"

It ought to be added, that in his " Evidence " be

adduces stronger arguments, than those derived from his favorite view of matter, in favor of the soul's immortality. He shows that if there be no state beyond the grave, our existence is incomplete, without design, irrelative; and he calls in the divine perfections as furnishing 'a certain ground of confidence that our existence will not be finally broken off in the midst of divine purposes thus visibly unfinished here," and securing that beings "becoming good for {47} something should not instantly become nothing." In arguing thus, be shows his besetting tendency to take up extreme positions; for lie maintains that in our world pain is much more extensive in its nature than pleasure, and that all bodily pleasures are merely instigations of pains. He argues that as in this world reason may often be disobeyed with no evil consequences and obeyed without any good ones, so there must be a future world to make every thing consistent with reason. He shows that the prepossessions of mankind are in favor of this tenet. " In the very dawnings of reason, let a child be told what is death, having no idea of any way of existing beside the present, amazement seizes him: lie is perplexed, uneasy, dismayed." He is met, as so many others have been, by the objection, that most of these arguments would prove that brutes are immortal. In answering it, he is obliged to allow that immortality does not depend solely on immateriality, and to throw himself on the moral argument, which does not apply to brutes, which, not being moral agents, are not capable of rewards and punishments. But it is clear that he cherishes the idea that the immaterial part of brutes, while not constituting the same conscious being, may not perish ultimately when separated from the material frame.

In treating of these favorite topics, he discusses a great many important philosophic questions, and always gives a clear and decided opinion. He evidently favors the arguments derived from "abstract reason and the nature of things" in behalf of the divine existence. He argues the necessity of an infinitely perfect intelligent being, -- not only from space and time, as Clarke did, but from the necessity of eternal truth in geometry or in other abstract sciences." Truth is not a being existing by itself, and therefore the immutable necessary nature of truth must be referred to some being existing of itself, and existing immutably and eternally." We have only to define truth as the conformity of our ideas to things, to see the fallacy lurking in this argument.

His view of space and time is taken from Newton and Clarke. He represents them as not beings, but the affections of beings: " And as time and space are not existences, so their correlate infinites (if I may say so), that is, eternity and immensity, are not existences, but the properties of necessary existence." In some other of his statements, be goes back to some of the mystic statements of the schoolmen, and anticipates some of the doctrines of Kant. "God's existence is unsuccessive." He says, "<Nunc stans> implies opposite ideas, if applied to our existence; but if we allow an eternal and immutable mind, the distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to such a mind, and the phrase has propriety." But surely there is an inconsistency in first arguing the divine existence from

our ideas of space and time, and then declaring that our ideas in regard to space and time do not apply to Deity.

In maintaining that mind is ever active, he has to consider its seeming dormancy in sleep. "The soul in sleep seems to suffer something like what happens to a live coal covered up under ashes; which is alive all the while, but only appears so when disencumbered and exposed to open air." As to what has since been called unconscious mental action, his theory of it is the same as that defended in after years by D. Stewart; he supposes {48} that the mind was conscious of its action at the time, but that the memory could not recall it. "There is certainly a great deal of our past consciousness which we retain no memory of afterwards. It is a particular part of our finite and imperfect nature, that we cannot become Conscious of all our past consciousness at pleasure. But no man at night would infer that he was not in a state of consciousness and thinking at such a certain minute, about twelve o'clock of the day, because now perhaps he hath no memory what particular thought be had at that minute. And it is no better argument, considered in itself, that a man was not conscious at such a minute in his sleep because next morning he hath no memory of what ideas were in his mind then."

Baxter was most earnest in restricting the properties of matter, but he was equally resolute in maintaining its existence. In his work on the soul he has a long section on " Dean Berkeley's scheme." He was one of the first who examined systematically the new theory. He takes the obvious and vulgar view of it, and not the refined one ascribed to the ingenious author by his admirers: for those who have opposed Berkeley have usually given one account of his system, while those who have defended him have usually given another; and some have thence come to the conclusion, that his whole theory is so ethereal that it is not capable of definite expression. Baxter maintains that " we perceive, besides our sensations themselves, the objects of them that " we are conscious not only of sensation excited, but that it is excited by some cause beside ourselves," and that "such objects as rivers, houses, mountains, are the very things we perceive by sense." He endeavors to prove that the system of Berkeley carried out consistently would land us in a solitary egoism, for " we only collect concerning the souls of other men from the spontaneous motions and actions of their bodies; these, according to him, belong to nothing." Berkeley had boasted that, by expelling matter out of nature, he had dragged with it so many sceptical and impious notions; Baxter replies that this " puts us into a way of denying all things, that we may get rid of the absurdity of those who deny some things," -- " as if one should advance that the best way for a woman who may silence those who attack her reputation is to turn a common prostitute." He thinks that the doctrine may tend to remove the checks to immorality; for "he who thinks theft, murder, or adultery nothing real beyond bare idea, and that for aught we know be injures nobody, will be surely under less restraint to satisfy his Declinations of any kind." The mathematician is evidently annoyed and vexed at the attacks which Berkeley bad made on his science, and shows "that if there be no such thing as quantity, we have a large body of

immutable truths conversant about an impossible object."

In examining Berkeley he gives his views of sense-perception, which are not so clear and satisfactory as those of Reid; but are vastly juster than those of his contemporaries. He distinctly separates himself from those who hold that the mind can perceive nothing but its own states. " If our ideas have no parts, and yet if we perceive parts, it is plain we perceive something more than our own perceptions." He adds "We are conscious that we perceive parts as that we have perceptions at all." The {49} existence of matter in general, or at least of material sensories to which the soul is united, seems to me to be nearer intuitive than demonstrative knowledge." He declares that the "same perception of parts proves to us both the spirit and a material agency." This is so far an anticipation of the doctrine of Hamilton as an advance upon that of Reid. As to the manner of the action of matter on spirit, and spirit on matter, he says, in the very spirit of Reid. " We are certain this is matter of fact in many instances, whether we conceive it or not." He adds, in his own manner: " The Deity himself moves matter in almost all the phenomena of nature, and the soul of man perhaps moves some matter of the body, though in an infinitely less degree."

VII. -- FRANCIS HUTCHESON.[11]

D/URING\ the greater part of the seventeenth century there was a constant immigration into the north-east of Ireland of Scotch men, who carried with them their hardy mode of life and persevering habits; their love of education and their anxiety to have an educated ministry; their attachment to the Bible and the simple Presbyterian worship. This movement commenced with the attempt of the first James of England to civilize Ireland by the Plantation of Ulster, and was continued during the period of the prelatic persecution in Scotland, whereby not a few sturdy adherents of the Solemn League and Covenant were driven for refuge to the sister isle. The Scottish Church kept a watchful guardianship over her scattered children, and sent after them a succession of ministers to preach the gospel, for a time in the Established Church, and, when churchmen from England (such as Jeremy Taylor) would not tolerate this any longer, to set up a Presbyterian organization. Among these was the Rev. Alexander Hutcheson, the second son of an old and respectable family at Monkwood, in Ayrshire, who became minister at Saintfield, in the heart of county Down, and purchased the townland of Drumalig. His second son ' 'John, was settled at Ballyrea, within two miles of Artnagh, and ministered to a Presbyterian congregation in the archiepis opal city, where he {50} was known by his church as a man of retiring habits and of superior abilities, and a firm supporter of Calvinistic doctrine. His second son, Francis, was born Aug. 8, 1694, it is said in his grandfather's house in Drumalig.[12] When about eight years of age, he (with his elder brother, Hans) was put under the care of the same grandfather, and attended a classical school kept by Mr. Hamilton in the "meeting house" at Saintfield. He was afterwards sent to Killyleagh, in the same county, to an

academy kept by the Rev. James Macalpin, said to be a man of virtue and ability, and who taught the future metaphysician the scholastic philosophy. We have it on record, that the Presbyterian Church of Ireland -- seeking now, after coming through a long period of harassment and trouble, to work out its full educational system --did about this time set up several such schools for philosophy and theology. However, the great body of the young men intending for the ministry did then, and for more than a century after, resort to the University of Glasgow for their higher education. Of this college Hutcheson became a student about 1710 (he does not seem to have matriculated till 1711). During his residence with his grandfather he became such a favorite with the old man, that when he died in 1711, it was found that he bad altered a prior settlement of his family affairs, and, passing by the older grandson, had left all his landed property to the second. Francis, though a cautious, was a generous youth: he had all along taken pains, even by means of innocent artifices, to uphold his brother in the old man's esteem; and now he refused to accept the bequest, while Hans, with equal liberality, declined to receive what had been destined for another; and the friendly dispute had at last to be settled by a partition of the lands, which again became united when Hans, dying without issue, left his share to the son of Francis.

Francis Hutcheson thus sprang, like Gershom Carmichael (and we shall afterwards see George Turnbull), from the old {51} orthodox Presbyterian Church and its educated pastors; and both were early nurtured in the scholastic logic, from which they received much benefit. But Hutcheson comes an age later than Carmichael, and falls more thoroughly under the new spirit which has gone abroad.

At Glasgow the youth followed the usual course of study in the classical languages and philosophy, and enjoyed the privilege of sitting under the prelections of Carmichael. In after years, when called back to be a professor in the college, he gives in his Introductory Lecture a glimpse of the books and branches in which he felt most interest in his student life. After referring to the pleasure which he experienced in seeing once more the buildings, gardens, fields, suburbs, and rivers' banks (more pleasant then than now), which had been so dear to him, he expresses the peculiar gratification which he felt in revisiting the place where he had drunk the first elements of the quest for truth; where Homer and Virgil, where Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Terence, where the philosophy of Cicero and the discussions of the Fathers, had been opened to him; and where be had first been taught to inquire into the nature and reasons (<rationes>) of virtue, the eternal relations of number and figures, and the character of God. Having taken the Master's degree in 1712, he entered, the following year, on the study of theology under Professor John Simson. This professor was at that time, and, indeed, for the greater part of the period from 1712 to 1729, under prosecution before the ecclesiastical courts for teaching doctrines inconsistent with the Confession of Faith. It appears from the charges brought against him, and from his shuffling and vacillating explanations (he was often in a shattered state of health), that he took a favorable view of the state of

the heathen; that he was inclined to the doctrine of free-will; he maintained that punishment for original sin alone was not just; he held that rational creatures must necessarily seek their chief good, -- always under subserviency to the glory of God, who cannot impose a law contrary to his own nature and to theirs, and who cannot condemn any except those who seek their chief good in something else, and in a different way than God has prescribed: but the special charge against him was, that he denied that Jesus Christ is a necessarily existent being in the same sense as the Father is. The lengthened process {52} concluded with the General Assembly declaring, in 1729, that Mr. Simson was not fit to be intrusted with the training of students for the ministry. It does not appear that young Mr. Hutcheson ever threw himself into this agitation on the one side or other, but it doubtless left its impression on his mind; and this, I rather think, was to lead him to adopt, if not the doctrine, at least some of the liberal sentiments of Simson; to keep him from engaging in religious controversy, and to throw him back for certainty on the fundamental truths of natural theology and the lofty morality of the New Testament.

To the teaching of Simson the historians of the Church of Scotland are accustomed to trace the introduction of the " New Light " theology into the pulpits both of Scotland and Ulster. But there were other and deeper causes also at work, producing simultaneously very much the same results all over the Protestant Continent of Europe, and in England both in the Church and among Non-conformists. It was a period of growing liberality of opinion, according to the view of the rising literary men of the country. It was a time of doctrinal deterioration, followed rapidly by a declension of living piety, and in the age after of a high morality, according to the view of the great body of earnest Christians. In the preceding age, Milton, Newton, and Locke had abandoned the belief in the divinity of Christ, and the great Church of England divine of that age, Samuel Clarke, was defending the Arian creed, and setting aside the Reformation doctrine of grace. Francis Hutcheson, by this time a preacher, writes from Ireland to a friend in Scot land, in 1718, Of the younger ministers in Ulster: "I find by the conversation I have had with some ministers and comrades, that there is a perfect Hoadley mania among our younger ministers in the north; and, what is really ridiculous, it does not serve them to be of his opinions, but their pulpits are ringing with them, as if their hearers were all absolute princes going to impose tests and confessions in their several territories, and not a set of people entirely excluded from the smallest hand in the government anywhere, and entirely incapable of bearing any other part in the prosecution but as sufferers. I have reason however, to apprehend that the antipathy to confessions is upon other grounds than a new spirit of charity. Dr. Clarke's work (on the Trinity), I'm sufficiently informed, has made several {53} unfixed in their old principles, if not entirely altered them." Hutcheson never utters any more certain sound than this on the religious controversies of his day. It is evident that his mind is all along more inclined towards ethical philosophy and natural theology. It is interesting to notice

that, in 1717, he wrote a letter to S. Clarke stating objections to his famous " Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," and that he received a reply, both of which are lost. We are reminded that, about four years before this, Joseph Butler, then a youth of twenty-one, at a dissenting academy, had written Clarke, taking exception to certain points in his "Demonstration," and had received answers to his letters. The objections of Hutcheson must have been more fundamental as to method than those of Butler. He was convinced that, as some subjects from their nature are capable of demonstration, so others admit only of probable proof, and he had great doubts of the validity of all metaphysical arguments in behalf of the existence of Deity. Dr. Leechman tells us: "This opinion of the various degrees of evidence adapted to various subjects first led Dr. Hutcheson to treat morals as a matter of fact, and not as founded on the abstract relation of things."

During his student life he was tutor for a time to the Earl of Kilmarnock. Leaving college about 1716, he was licensed to preach the gospel by the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. His preaching does not seem to have been acceptable to the people, who were alarmed at the New Light doctrine which was creeping in among them, and felt that the young preacher's discourses were scarcely in the spirit of the Scriptures, as they were not after the model of the ministers and divines whom they reverenced.[13] However, he received a call from a country {54} congregation at Magherally, in his native county, but was easily persuaded to accept instead an invitation to open an academy in Dublin, to give instruction in the higher branches. About the time he settled there the Protestant Non-conformists, aided by the government, but after a keen opposition from the Irish bishops, had succeeded in obtaining a parliamentary repeal of the Acts which required all persons to resort to their parish church every Sunday, and imposed a fine of L100 upon the dissenting minister who officiated in any congregation. But the young teacher had to suffer two prosecutions in the Archbishop's court for daring to teach youth without subscribing the canons and obtaining a license. These attacks upon him came to nothing, as they were discouraged by the Archbishop. Dr. King, author of the metaphysical work on the " Origin of Evil," who, though he had been a determined opponent of the relaxation allowed by law to dissenters, was unwilling to oppress so accomplished a man and well-disposed a citizen as Hutcheson. In Dublin he had laborious duties to discharge, which left him, he complained, little time for literature and mental culture; but he seems to have met with congenial society. The Presbyterians and Independents were the representatives of the English Non-conformists, who had been a considerable body there when Henry Cromwell was vice-regent, and when Winter and Charnock preached to them in Christ's Church Cathedral; and they had among them families of standing and influence. His literary accomplishments opened other circles to him. There seems to have been at that time a considerable taste for learning and philosophy in the metropolis of Ireland. From a very early date after its publication, the " Essay on the Human {55} Understanding," had been most enthusiastically welcomed by Molyneux, who corresponded with Locke, and expressed his excessive admiration of him.

Berkeley, the tutor of Molyneux's son, began in 1707 to give to the world his ingenious speculations on mathematical and philosophical subjects. It does not appear that Hutcheson was acquainted with Berkeley, who, we rather think, would not appreciate the views of Hutcheson: be has certainly condemned the opinions of Shaftesbury. But he enjoyed the friendship of a number of eminent men, including Viscount Molesworth and Dr. Synge afterwards Bishop of Elphin; both of whom encouraged him to publish his first work, and assisted him in preparing it for the press. The former connects him historically with Shaftesbury, who had written letters to Molesworth, which were published in 1721. When in Dublin, Hutcheson and some others formed a club in which papers were read by the members on philosophic themes. It is an interesting circumstance, that in the next age some of the more important works of Gerard, Reid, Beattie, and Campbell sprang out of a similar society in Aberdeen.

It was in 1725 that he published in London his first work, "An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue." The treatise was published anonymously, as (so he tells us in the second edition) he had so little confidence of success that he was unwilling to own it. The subject, the thoughts, and the style were suited to the age; and the work was favorably received from the first. Lord Granville (afterwards Lord Carteret), the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, sent his private secretary to inquire at the bookseller's for the author; and when he could not learn his name he left a letter to be conveyed to him, in consequence of which Hutcheson became acquainted with his Excellency and was treated by him with distinguished marks of esteem. A second edition, corrected and enlarged, was called for in 1726.

This was the age of serial literary essays which had commenced in England with the "Tatler" and "Spectator." There was such a periodcal set up in the metropolis of Ireland called the "Dublin Journal" conducted by Hibernicus (Dr. Arbucle), and to this paper Hutcheson sent two letters, of date June 5th and June 12th, 1725, on " Laughter," in opposition to the views of Hobbes, who attributed men's actions to selfish motives, and {56} represented laughter as nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others or our own formerly. He characterizes Hobbes as "having fallen into a way of speaking which was much more intelligible than that of the School men," and "so becoming agreeable to many wits of his age;" and as "assuming positive, solemn airs, which he uses most when he is going to assert some solemn absurdity or some ill natured nonsense." He finds it difficult to treat the subject of laughter "gravely," but gives his theory of the cause of laughter, which is "the bringing together of images which have contrary additional ideas, as well as some resemblance in the principal idea g, this contrast between ideas of grandeur, dignity, sanctity, perfection, and ideas of meanness, baseness, profanity, seems to be the very spirit of burlesque, and the greater part of our raillery and jest are founded on it." Some such view as this has ever since been given of wit. Samuel Johnson describes it as a sort of <Concordia discors or concors discordia>. Hutcheson

ventures to specify the use of laughter: "Our passions are apt to lead us into foolish apprehensions of objects both in the way of admiration and honor, and ridicule comes in to temper our minds." This moderate view falls considerably short of that given by Shaftesbury, who represents ridicule as a test of truth.

Mandeville, in "The Fable of the Bees," had advanced some curious and doubtful speculations as to private vices being public benefits; showing that the power and grandeur of any nation depend much upon the number of people and their industry, which cannot be procured unless there be consumption of manufactures; and that the intemperance, luxury, and pride of men consume manufactures, and promote industry. The author has here caught hold of a positive and important truth, the explanation of which carries us into some of the deepest mysteries of Providence, in which we see good springing out of vice, and God ruling this world in spite of its wickedness, and by means of its wickedness, but without identifying himself with it. But Mandeville was not able to solve the profound problem, and in dealing with it he uses expressions which look as if he intended to justify, or at least to palliate vice. Hutcheson hastens to save morality, and writes letters on the subject to Hibernicus, {57 } and easily shows that virtue tends to private and public happiness, and vice to private and public misery; and that there "would be an equal consumption of manufactures without these vices and the evils which flow from them."

Hutcheson had now tasted the draught of authorship, and must drink on. In the "London Journal" for 1725 there appeared some Letters signed "Philaretus," containing objections to the doctrine of the "Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue," which is represented as not giving a sufficiently deep view of virtue as founded on the nature of things and perceived by reason. Hutcheson replies in the same journal. In that same year he published his second great work, being " An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with illustrations of the Moral Sense." In the Preface he says, " Some Letters in the ' London journal,' in 1728, subscribed 'Philaretus,' gave occasion to the Fourth Treatise (on the Moral Sense); the answer given to them in these weekly papers bore too visible marks of the hurry in which they were wrote, and therefore the author declined to continue the debate that way, choosing to send a private letter to Philaretus to desire a more private correspondence on the subject of our debate. He was soon after informed that his death disappointed the author's great expectations from so ingenious a correspondent." Philaretus turned out to be Gilbert Burnet (second son, I believe, of the bishop), and the correspondence was published in 1735, with a postscript written by Burnet shortly before his death. Burnet examines Hutcheson from the stand-point of Clarke, and fixes on some of the weak points of the new theory.

At this time there was a keen controversy in Ulster as to whether the Presbyterian Church should require an implicit subscription to the Westminster Confession of Faith, and this issued in those who refused to subscribe forming themselves into a separate body called the Antrim

Presbytery, the members of which published a " Narrative of the Proceedings of the Seven Synods," which led to their separation. The work of replying to this document was committed to Mr. Hutcheson, of Armagh, whose paper, however, was not published till after his decease, which took place in February, 1729. The old man had anxieties about his son, lest he should be tempted by the flattering attentions paid him in Dublin to conform to the Established {58} Church, and wrote a letter expressing his fears. We have the reply of the son, of date Aug. 4, 1726. In this he avows that he did not regard the "government or externals of worship so determined in the gospel as to oblige men to one particular way in either:" that he looks upon the established form as an "inconvenient one;" that he reckons the dissenters' cause "in most disputed points the better;" that he believes the original of both civil and ecclesiastical power is from God; he denounces those religious penal laws which "no magistrate can have a right to make;" but he would not blame any man of his own principles who did conform, if the "ends proposed were such as would over-balance the damage which the more just cause would sustain by his leaving, particularly if he had any prospect of an unjust establishment being altered," of which, he confesses, he does not see the least probability. He says, that both Lord Cathcart and the Bishop of Elphin had professed their desire to have him brought over " to the Church, to a good living; " that he kept his mind "very much to him self in these matters, and resolved to do ," but that he had no intention whatever to depart from his present position, and that he would feel it his duty continually to promote the cause of dissenters. I rather think that this frank but expediency letter would not altogether satisfy the good old father, who had stood firm on principle in trying times. I have referred to these transactions, because they exhibit the struggles which were passing in many a bosom in those times of transition from one state of things to another. Hutcheson never conformed, as his contemporary Butler did, to the Church. His Presbyterian friends were soon relieved from all anxieties in this direction by his being appointed, after be had been seven or eight years in Dublin, to an office altogether congenial to his tastes, in Glasgow University, where, however, he exercised a religious influence which his father, provided he had been spared to witness it, would have viewed with apprehension and disapproval.

He was chosen to succeed Carmichael, Dec. 19, 1729, by a majority of the Faculty, over Mr. Warner, favored at first by the principal, and over Mr. Frederick Carmichael, son of Gershom, supported by five of the professors. His appointment could be justified on the ground of merit; but he owed it mainly {59} to family connections, who gained Lord Isla, the great government patron of the day, before whom the principal had to give way.[14] In October, 1730, twenty English students have come to the college, expecting Mr. Hutcheson -- whose " Inquiry " and work on the " Passions " were already well known -- to " teach morality Professor Loudon, however, insisted that he had a right to take the chair of Moral Philosophy, whereupon the English students gave in a paper declaring that, if Mr. Hutcheson, who had not yet come over from Ireland, did not teach them morality, they would set off to Edinburgh, and Mr. Loudon

had to yield. On November 30, he was publicly admitted, and delivered, in a low tone and hurried manner, as if awed and bashful, an inaugural discourse, "De Naturali Hominum Socialitate," in which he expounds, in a clear and pleasant manner, and in good Latin, his favorite doctrine as to man having in his nature disinterested affections. He maintains, in opposition to the "very celebrated" Locke, that man has something natural, but admits that it requires time and circumstances to bring it forth; and in opposition to Hobbes and Puffendorff, that man can be swayed by other motives than self-love. He represents the conscience as the [Greek term] to which all our nature ought to be subjected, and to which it had been subjected in our entire state; but admits that our nature is fallen, weakened, and corrupted, in many ways. Hutcheson lectured five days a week on his proper course, which embraced Natural Religion, Morals, jurisprudence, and Government; and at another hour he read three days of the week, with his students, some of the finest writers of antiquity, Greek and Latin, on the subject of morals; interpreting both the language and sentiment. This practice of combining reading with lectures was followed by his successors in the moral chair in Glasgow, and is vastly superior to the plan of the Edinburgh professors of a later date, who instructed their pupils only by reading lectures. His prelections were at first, after the manner of the times, in Latin; but he had the courage to break off from the ancient custom, and to speak in the English tongue, no doubt to the great joy and benefit of the students, who might lose somewhat in not being familiarized with the ancient learned language; but would gain vastly more in being brought into close sympathy with the {60} speaker, in listening from day to day to elegant English, and in the mastery which they would thereby acquire over their own tongue. Dr. Carlyle has left us a picture of the lecturer: "I attended Hutcheson's class this year (I 743-44) with great satisfaction and improvement. He was a good-looking man, of engaging countenance. He delivered his lectures without notes, walking backwards and forwards in the area of his room. As his elocution was good, and his voice and manner pleasing, he raised the attention of his hearers at all times; and when the subject led him to explain and enforce the moral virtues, he displayed a fervent and persuasive eloquence which was irresistible." A like account is given of him by his professed biographer Leechman: "A stature above middle size, a gesture and manner negligent and easy, but decent and manly, gave a dignity to his appearance. His complexion was fair and sanguine, and his features regular. His countenance and look bespoke sense, spirit, kindness and joy of heart," It may be added that this is the very impression left as we gaze on his portrait, with wig and gown, with florid face, and easy but dignified air, in the common hall of Glasgow College. Leechman represents him as dwelling in his lectures in a more diffuse manner on such moral considerations as are suited to touch the heart, and excite a relish for what is truthful and noble; and by his vivacity of thought, and sensibility of temper, commanding the attention of his students, and leaving strong impressions on their minds.

In the college he had an eminent colleague in Mr. Robert Simson (nephew of the theological professor), and a

congenial one in Mr. Alexander Dunlop, the professor of Greek. Mr. Simson was an eccentric man, who spent his time between severe geometrical studies in the morning, and social meetings in the tavern at which he lived, or in his club, in the evening. Hutcheson and Dunlop -- who was a man of strong sense and capacity for business -- got the credit of managing all the affairs of the university, and both exerted themselves to maintain the discipline of the college and foster its literary tastes. In particular, Hutcheson had great success in reviving the study of ancient literature, particularly the Greek, which had been much neglected in the university before his time. At a later date, he had associates of a kindred spirit in the elegant {61} and grave Dr. Leechman, professor of theology (afterwards principal); in the lively and learned Dr. Moor, first the librarian of the college, and in 1746 made professor of Greek; and in the two eminent printers, Robert and Andrew Foulis, who published a multitude of learned works, including many of Hutcheson's. With such a spirit reigning in the college, and a great thirst for education on the part of the Scottish youth, fostered by the parish and burgh schools, the class-rooms were filled with students. Carlyle, who had just come in 1743 to Glasgow, after having been at Edinburgh College, describes the spirit that reigned among the youths: "Although at the time there appeared to be a marked superiority in the best scholars and most diligent students of Edinburgh, yet in Glasgow learning seemed to be an object of more importance, and the habit of application was much more general," -- a description which applies equally to Glasgow in after years. He mentions that among the students there were sundry young gentlemen from Ireland, with their tutors; and he names, among young men of station attending, Walter Lord Blantyre, Sir -- Kennedy and his brother David, afterwards Lord Cassilis. Walter Scott of Harden, James Murray of Broughton, and Dunbar Hamilton, afterwards Earl of Selkirk. The Scotch colleges were quite competent at that time to educate the nobility of the country, who had not yet fallen into the way of going to the great English schools and colleges, there to lose their national predilections and become separated, as they did in succeeding ages, from the sympathies, social, political, and religious, of the middle classes and common people of Scotland, to the great injury of the church and the nation generally.

Hutcheson exercised a special influence in drawing students, Scottish, Irish Presbyterian, and English Non-conformist, to the college. His own class was so large that he had to employ an assistant. The Calvinistic creed of the south-west of Scotland, the theological preaching of the old-school ministers, and the training of the young in the Shorter Catechism, all inclined the students to mental philosophy; and in Hutcheson they had much to attract, and little to offend. When he set before them wide fields of knowledge; when, in his lectures on natural theology, he pointed out evidences of the wisest contrivance and {62} most beneficent intention; when he led them from the external world into the still greater wonders of the internal, and traced the parts of man's moral constitution, and described the virtues in their loveliest form, and enlarged on the elevated enjoyments furnished by them; when he quoted, with glowing zest, the noblest passages of Greek

and Roman literature; when he inculcated, with immense enthusiasm, the importance of civil and religious liberty, -- the students felt as if a new world were thrown open to them, and a new life kindled within them. Following the custom of his predecessor, he lectured on the sabbath evenings on the truth and excellence of Christianity, and the students of all the classes eagerly rushed to his prelections. The conversation of the youths in their social walks and visits often turned on the literary and philosophic themes which he discussed, and some of them chose to attend his lectures for four or five successive years. Among his pupils were Mr. Millar, afterwards President of the Court of Session; Archibald Maclaine, who in future years translated Mosheim's " Ecclesiastical History;" Matthew Stewart, famous for his Mathematical Tracts, and father of Dugald Stewart; and a youth, specially appreciated by Hutcheson, with a vast capacity for learning of every kind, and destined in future years to be so famous in Hutcheson's own department, -- Adam Smith, author of " The Theory of Moral Sentiments," and of " The Wealth of Nations." All of these ever spoke of Hutcheson in terms of high admiration and gratitude.

Defoe describes the city of Glasgow, with its four principal streets meeting in a cruciform manner at a point, as being, in 1726, one of the cleanliest, most beautiful, and best built cities in Great Britain. On the street that ran toward the north stood the college, completed in 1656, with quadrangles, arcade, and spire, built after the style of Louis XIII. and Louis XIV. The population, when Hutcheson was a professor, might be upwards of twenty thousand. At the summit of the social scale were the foreign merchants engaged in the American trade, in which they carried out linen and brought back tobacco " the tobacco merchants, with their scarlet cloaks and gold-headed canes, and cocked hats, perched on powdered hair or wig, with dangling clubtie or pigtail." Next to them, but at a considerable distance, were the ordinary shopkeepers; and farther {63} down, the tradesmen and servants; while at the base were the Highlandmen, with their tartan jacket and kilts, driven from their native hills by starvation, and ready to perform the most servile work. All classes made a solemn religious profession; but Wodrow mourns over degenerate customs which wealth and luxury were introducing. The better citizens dined early in their own homes, without show; and many of them spent their evenings in social meetings at taverns, -- a practice which gendered those drinking customs which, beginning with the upper classes about this time, went down to the peasant class in the days of Burns, and by the end of the century infected the whole of Scottish society, which has not yet recovered from the evil influence. But Hutcheson does not seem to have been much mixed up with the citizen life of Glasgow; we do not hear of his spending his evenings in the tavern, or being a member of any of the social clubs which began to spring up in Glasgow at this time. He had experience of the evil effects of the new habits (which were coming in with the new theology), in the lives of some of the Irish students who were committed to his care, and over whom he watched with the most friendly interest. "The wretched turn their minds take is to the silly manliness of taverns." He satisfies himself with keeping personally free

from the evil. He presses his friend Tom Drennan, from Belfast, to pay him a visit for a month or six weeks, and promises: "Robert Simson, with you and Charles Moor, would be wondrous happy till three in the morning; I would be with you from five to ten."

His sphere was within the walls of the college; whence, how ever, his influence spread over the educated mind of the south west of Scotland and of Ulster, and over not a few of the Non-conformists in England. Carlyle tells us that he was believed by the students to be a Socinian. There is no evidence of this, nor of his expressing any positive opinion on any doctrinal subject. Even in his Sabbath evening lectures he kept to Grotius "De Veritate Christianae Religionis," and avoided, Leechman tells us, " the party tenets or scholastic system of modern ages." He seems to have maintained a friendly communication with the non-subscribing Presbyterian ministers in Ireland, some of whom (such as Abernethy and Leland, and Bruce and Boyce) were as accomplished men as any theologians {64} of their age, and of whom it may be said to their credit, that they suffered in their temporal interests rather than subscribe articles which they did not believe. In particular, Hutcheson carried on a very genial correspondence with the Rev. Thomas Drennan, a non-subscribing minister at Belfast.[15] The ministers of this communion, more especially as they were often abandoned by the people when their views became known, were at times in very poor circumstances. On hearing this, Hutcheson writes to his friend (May 31, 1742) am concerned that in my prosperous circumstances I did not think of it sooner. If you have any little contributions made towards such as are more distressed than the rest, you may mark me as a subscriber for L5 <per annum>, and take the above ten pounds as my payment for two years past. . . . I think it altogether proper you should not mention my name to your brethren, but conceal it. I am already called New Light here. I don't value it for myself, but I see it hurts some ministers who are most intimate with me. I have been these ten days in great hurry and perplexity, as I have for that time foreseen the death of our professor, who died last Wednesday, and some of my colleagues join me in laboring for Mr. Leechman to succeed. We are not yet certain of the event, but have good hopes. If he succeed, it will put a new face upon theology in Scotland."

This was no doubt one of the ends for which Hutcheson lived and labored, "<to put a new face upon theology in Scotland>."[16] Discouraging all doctrinal exposition, and all rousing appeals to the conscience, he would have the preachers recommend the Christian religion as embracing a pure morality, and holding out the hope of a blessed immortality; but meanwhile providing no pardon to the poor sinner anxious about the past, nor gracious aid to help him in his struggles to deliver himself from sin in the future. Never avowing any doctrinal belief, his students {65} looked upon him as a Socinian, and so his influence went in that direction. The crop that sprang up may be taken as represented by such men as Carlyle, elegant and accommodating but dreadfully rankled by a Calvinistic creed which they had to swear, and by the opposition of the people, who could not be made to feel that the New Light was

suited to them, or to believe that it had any title to be called a religion. But all this was in the future, and was not the precise result expected b), Hutcheson. Meanwhile he rejoices in Leechman, and describes him as one " who sees all I do." It seems that the Scotch divine received a call from a non-subscribing congregation in Belfast, and Hutcheson is rather inclined that he should go; he is so anxious to have him out of "that obscure place where he was so much lost," and where he was "preaching to a pack of horse-copers and smugglers of the rudest sort," who, we venture to say, would not profit much by that calm, abstract, elegant style which so pleased the professor of moral philosophy. Hutcheson uses every means to secure Leechman's appointment to the chair of theology in Glasgow, and brings influence of a very unscrupulous character (as I reckon it) to carry his point. He writes Mr. Mure of Caldwell (Nov. 23, 1743) that he wants a letter from the Duke of Montrose, the Chancellor of the University, in behalf of Leechman to Morthland, professor of Oriental languages, to be shown to others, and he malignantly mentions that Professor Anderson, the chief opponent of Leechman, " made himself ridiculous to all men of sense by dangling after Whitefield and M'Cullogh " (" Caldwell Papers "); and he wants this to be specially known to Tweeddale, who was Secretary of State for Scotland, and to Andrew Mitchell, his private secretary' It seems that the advocates of liberality could not tolerate that a man should be favorable to a revival of religion. It was by such means that " a new face was to be put upon the theology of Scotland." He writes to his Belfast friend (Feb. 20, 1743-44): I could tell you a good deal of news upon the unexpected election of a professor of divinity, and the furious indignation of our zealots." He had written previously (March 5, 1738-39): "I hope Jack Smith has sent down to your town a 'Serious Address to the Kirk of Scotland,' lately published in London; it has run like lightning here, and is producing some effect; the author is unknown; 'tis wrote {66} with anger and contempt of the Kirk and Confession, but it has a set of objections against the Confession which I imagine few will have the brow to answer." The moderate party in the Church of Scotland is being crystallized by coldness out of the floating elements; and already there is a felt polar antipathy between them and those whom they choose to call " zealots." Hutcheson writes (April 16, 1746), " I would as soon speak to the Roman conclave as our presbytery."

The professor of theology introduced by him to the college, had signed the Confession of Faith, and professed his willingness to sign it at any time. He accomplished the end of Hutcheson. The subjects represented by him as suitable to be dwelt on by the preacher from the pulpit, were the perfections of God; the excellence of virtue, and the perfection of the divine law; the truth of the Christian religion, and the important purposes for which Jesus came into the world; the great doctrines he taught the interesting scenes of providence he has displayed to men the dignity and immortality of the soul, and the inconceivable happiness of the heavenly state. In the social circle he was grave and silent, but is represented by Carlyle as having a lively wife, who entertained the students that came to his

house in the evening, and was anxious to hear about the new plays and novels which were coming into Scot land. He set out a body of young preachers, who unfortunately lost the common people, and the pious of all ranks, without gaining the worldly and unbelieving. He published a sermon in which he thought to recommend prayer as fitted to have an influence on the mind of the person praying, and submitted a copy to Hume, who told him plainly that the person praying must believe that his prayers have an influence on God and bring an answer.

It should be allowed that Hutcheson was most anxious to impart a taste for learning and refinement to the ministers of the Church of Scotland. He was deeply impressed with the evils which were springing from the law of patronage being now put in operation with a high hand. In 1735, he published " Considerations on Patronage, addressed to the Gentlemen of Scotland." In this pamphlet he predicts that, " instead of studying sobriety of manners, piety, diligence, or literature, one or other of which qualities are now necessary to recommend {67} the candidates to the favor of heritors, elders or presbytery, the candidate's sole study will be to stand right in politics, to make his zeal for the <ministry of state> conspicuous; or by all servile compliance with the humor of some great lord who has many churches in his gift, whether that humor be virtuous or vicious, to secure a presentation." He fears the mischiefs of patronage were but beginning to appear, and that gentlemen's sons will no longer devote themselves to the ministerial office, which will be sought by lads of mean parentage and circumstances. It is quite certain that, owing to the law of patronage, combined with the smallness of the livings, estimated by Hutcheson as at that time about L80 a year, and the influence of London court life, the upper classes (from which so many ministers had sprung in the previous century) ceased from this time to encourage their sons to enter the sacred office.

The recorded incidents of his person and family life are not numerous. He seems to have been engrossed in lecturing to his students, in managing college matters, and in preparing text-books. He published a "Compend of Logic," a "Synopsis of Metaphysics," and "Institutes of Philosophy," all in clear and graceful Latin (referred to with commendation by Dr. Parr in his " Spital Sermon "). He joined Dr. Moor in publishing a translation of the " Meditations " of Antoninus, with a life of Antoninus, an introduction and notes in English, the last showing a considerable acquaintance with the Stoic philosophy.

When in Dublin, he had married Mary Wilson, daughter of Francis Wilson, a gentleman of property, and belonging to a Presbyterian family in Longford.' In a letter to a friend, Feb. 12, 1740, he speaks of himself as " having been married now fifteen years and having only one boy surviving, of seven children borne to me by a very agreeable woman. I bless God for the one he has spared to me, and that he has no bad genius. If he proves a wise and good man, I am very well in this world. Since my settlement in this college I have had an agreeable and I hope not an useless life, pretty much hurried with study and business, but such as is not

unpleasant. I hope I am contributing to promote the more moderate and charitable sentiments in religious matters in this country, where yet there remains too much warmth, and commonly about matters of no great consequence to real religion. We must make allowance {68} for the power of education in all places, and have indulgence to the weakness of our brethren."[17]

So early, as June, 1741, he writes to his Belfast friend: " In short, Tom, I find old age, not in gray hairs and other trifles, but in an incapacity of mind for such close thinking and composition as I once had, and have pretty much dropped the thoughts of some great designs I had once sketched out." On April 3, 1745, he was nominated to the chair of moral philosophy in Edinburgh by the Town Council, but declined the honor, in consequence of not feeling strong enough to engage in new labors. He writes, April 16, 1746: "I am in a great deal of private distresses about Jo. Wilson and his sister, the latter in the utmost danger, the other scarce recovered from death; my wife, too, very tender; but, by a set of most intricate business, upon which the soul of this college depends, and all may be ruined by the want of one vote, I cannot leave this till after 26th June, and we go to Dublin first." He had been for some months in an uncertain state of health: he went to Dublin about the time mentioned in the letter quoted; and there, after a few days' fever, he was cut off, Aug. 8, 1746. His remains were buried in the old graveyard of Knockmark, East Meath, among his wife's kindred, the Wilsons and Stanhopes. He left one son, who became a physician, and rose to be professor of chemistry in Dublin College. That son published, in 1754, his "System of Moral Philosophy," to which is prefixed an account of the father's life by Dr. Leechman.

Hutcheson has nowhere explained very fully or formally the method on which he proceeds. But he everywhere appeals to facts; he brings all theories to the test of the actual operations of the human mind as disclosed to consciousness (a word frequently employed by him); he sets no value on speculations built up in any other way; and he everywhere speaks doubtfully or disparagingly of the logical distinctions and verbal subtleties of the schoolmen, and of the rational deductions of Descartes and Samuel Clarke. Proceeding on the method of observation, he discovers certain cognitive powers, which he {69} calls, perhaps unhappily, senses, which have a place in our very nature and constitution, and operate independent of any notice we may take of them. These features show that he belongs to the Scottish school, of which he is entitled to be regarded ,is the founder, inasmuch as no philosopher connected with North Britain had previously combined these characters, and as lie in fact gave the modern stimulus to philosophic speculation in Scotland.

He does not dwell at great length, nor very minutely, on the intellectual powers. He says that "late inquiries have been very much employed about our understanding. and the several methods of obtaining truth and so he would rather investigate " the various pleasures which human

nature is capable of receiving," and our various internal senses, perceptions, and affections, specially the sense of beauty and the moral sense. Still he intimates very clearly what views he takes of man's intellectual nature. And first, as to the senses, he says, " It is not easy to divide distinctly our several sensations into classes. The division of our external senses into the five common classes seems very imperfect. Some sensations received without any previous idea, can either be reduced to none of them, such as the sensations of hunger, thirst, weariness, sickness; or, if we reduce them to the sense of feeling,, they are perceptions as different from the other ideas of touch, such as cold, heat, hardness, softness, as the ideas of taste or smell. Others have hinted at an external sense different from all of these. The following general account may possibly be useful: (1) That certain motions raised in our bodies are by a general law constituted the occasion of perceptions in the mind. (2) These perceptions never come alone, but have some other perceptions joined with them. Thus every sensation is accompanied with the idea of duration, and yet duration is not a sensible idea, since it also accompanies ideas of internal consciousness or reflection; so the idea of number may accompany any sensible ideas, and yet may also accompany any other ideas as well as external senses. Brutes, when several objects are before them, have probably all the proper ideas of sight which we have without the idea of number. (3) Some ideas are found accompanying the most different sensations, which yet are not to be perceived separately from some sensible quality, {70} such as extension, figure, motion, and rest, accompany the ideas of sight or colors, and yet may be perceived without them, as in the ideas of touch, at least if we move our organs along the parts of the body touched. Extension, figure, motion, or rest, seem therefore to be more properly called ideas accompanying the sensations of sight and touch than the sensations of either of these senses, since they can be received sometimes without the ideas of color, and sometimes without those of touching, though never without the one or other. The perceptions which are purely sensible, received each by its proper sense, are tastes, smells, colors, sound, cold, heat, &c. The universal concomitant ideas which may attend any idea whatsoever are duration and number. The ideas which accompany the most different sensations are extension, figure, motion, rest. These all arise without any previous ideas assembled or compared g, the concomitant ideas are reputed images of something external. From all these we may justly distinguish those pleasures perceived upon the previous reception and comparison of various sensible perceptions with their concomitant ideas, or intellectual ideas, when we find uniformity or resemblance among them. These are meant by the perceptions of the internal sense." ("Nature and Con duct of the Passions," Sect. I.)

This note comprises the result and the sum of much reading and much reflection. The principal thoughts, more especially as to the separation of the ideas of number and duration, and of extension, figure, motion, and rest from our common sensations, are taken, directly or indirectly, from Aristotle's " Psyche," B. II. c. vi. (which is not referred to, however), where there is a distinction drawn

between common and proper percepts. But he seems to take a step beyond Aristotle when he tells us here, and still more expressly in his " Logic," that number and duration can be perceived both by the external and internal sense. It has been felt by all profound thinkers, that in order to account for the phenomena, and to save the senses from deceiving us, there must be distinctions of some sort drawn between different kinds of sensations or perceptions. Adopting the distinction of Aristotle, we find him in his " Logic " identifying it with that of Locke, between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies. It may be doubted whether we can so {71} absolutely divide, as Aristotle and Hutcheson did, the accompanying ideas from the sensations or perceptions. The sensations and ideas are in every case wrapped up in one concrete cognitive act, while, however, the may come tip in a different t, y concretion in our next experience, and may be separated into elements by an analytic process. I rather think, too, that the perception of extension (as has been shown by Hamilton) is involved in all our sense-perceptions, for we seem to know our organism as in space and localized by every one of the senses. The language about the motions of bodies constituting the <occasion> of the perceptions in the mind, proceeds upon the inadequate distinction between efficient and occasional cause, drawn by the disciples of Descartes, -- a distinction adopted by Reid as well as Hutcheson. I suspect that it still remains true, that the common division of our external senses is very imperfect, and that it is not easy to arrange our sensations into classes.

In regard to the question started in the next age by Reid, as to whether we perceive by the senses the external object, or an idea of it, it is certain that he accepts the view and the language of the great body of philosophers prior to his time, and he speaks of our perceiving by ideas " as images of something external."

Formal logic has been taught, I believe, in Glasgow University from its establishment in 1451 to this present time. Hutcheson has a "Logical Compendium" which was used as a text-book in Glasgow and elsewhere. In this treatise, after a meagre dissertation on the rise of philosophy, he defines logic as " the art of guiding the mind in the knowledge of things; adding, that it may also be considered a science, and that others define it " the art of discovering and declaring truth." These definitions will be regarded as too loose and vague by the rigid logicians of our time. In treating of the concept, notion, or idea, he represents ideas as being divided into sensations, imaginations, and pure intellections, -- a theory adopted by Gassendi, and favorably received by not a few for an age or two after the time of Descartes and Gassendi, as seeming to reconcile these two eminent men. Hutcheson had previously represented all sensation as external and internal, and declared, with Locke, that all our ideas arise either from the external sense or {72} from reflection. The intellections he defines as " any ideas not reached or comprehended by any bodily sense; " they are chiefly " suggested by the internal sense, and include our actions, passions, judgments, doubts, and the like, and also abstract ideas." There is an incongruous mixture here of the Lockian

with an older theory. The ideas derived from reflection, which are all singular and concrete, should not be put in the same class with those abstract and general ideas which are formed by the intellect from the materials got from sensation and reflection, and, we may add, from those furnished by the faculties of the mind in their exercise, such as those we have of the beautiful and the good. This confusion long lingered in the Scottish psychology from which it has scarcely yet been expelled.

Hutcheson represents complex (concrete would be the better phrase) ideas as having comprehension, and universal ideas as having extension; and announces the rule that extension and comprehension stand to each other in a reverse order. He distinguishes between a logical whole, which is a universal in respect of its species, which are spread out in division; and a metaphysical whole, which is the comprehension of a complex idea, and is declared by definition. He distinguishes between noetic and dianoetic judgment, in the former of which the two ideas are compared immediately (<proxime>), and in the latter by means of a third. The subject, predicate, and copula are said to be in the proposition either expressed or suppressed and involved. He does give the dictum of Aristotle as the regulating principle of reasoning, but derives all the force of syllogism from these three axioms, in which, we think, there is a very unsatisfactory vagueness in the phrase <agree>: " (1) Things which agree in one third agree with one another; (2) Things of which the one agrees and the other does not agree with one and the same third do not agree with one another; (3) Things which agree in no third do not agree with each other; (4) Things which disagree in no third do not disagree among them selves. Hence are deduced the general rules of syllogisms." This "Compend" continued to be printed and used down to at least the close of the third quarter of the eighteenth century. One is inclined to think that these phrases and distinctions must have been introduced to the notice, and inscribed on the {73} memory, of William Hamilton during his collegiate life at Glasgow, and that they may have helped as they recurred, consciously or unconsciously, to suggest to him certain of the essential principles of the "New Analytic of Logical Forms."

He has a separate treatise on metaphysics ("Metaphysical Synopsis," 1742) which he divides into ontology, or the science of being, and pneumatology, or the science of spirit (divine and human). " It appears from his treatise on metaphysics," says his admiring biographer, " that he was well acquainted with the logomachies, meaningless questions, and trivial debates of the old scholastics, which had thrown a thick darkness on that part of philosophy: he has set that branch of knowledge in a clear light, and rendered it instructive and entertaining." The sneer at the scholastics is a symptom of the age. The alleged " meaningless questions " are still put, and must be put, by profound thinkers who would go down to the foundations of truth. Even Hutcheson was obliged to put them and to answer them. The answers which he gives, if not so profound in fact or in appearance as those given by the ancient Greek philosophers, by the scholastics, or by Descartes and Leibnitz, are always clear and sensible, and

often just and satisfactory. He discusses, and this by no means in a superficial manner, topics which the Scottish metaphysicians between him and Hamilton carefully avoided. His scholastic training at Killyleagh, and the spirit of the older teaching, had still a hold upon him for good.

He treats of being, declaring it to be undefinable, and showing that it involves existence and essence, and that potency and action are the principles of being. He refers the conviction of our identity of being to consciousness. As to the much agitated question of the principle of individuation he comes to the sound conclusion that it is to be ascribed to the nature of the thing existing.

He discusses the question whether metaphysical axioms are innate. He denies that they are innate in the sense of their being known or observed by the mind from its birth, and affirms that in their general form they are not reached till after many comparisons of singular ideas. He shows that the mind assents to them in their singular form, even when a sensible object is presented. He stands up for axioms, self-evident and immutable, {74} -- with him, as with Locke, self-evidence being their prominent feature and their mark but he also declares them to be eternal and unchangeable, -- the mind perceiving at once the agreement or disagreement of the subject or predicate. He denies that there is any principle entitled to be regarded as the first of all, and maintains that it is vain to seek any other criterion of truth than the faculty of reason itself, and the native power of the mind. These views are surely more profound than those of Locke, less extravagant than those of Descartes, Leibnitz, or Wolf (he refers to Wolf). They do not exhaust the subject; in particular, while he says truly (with Aristotle) that the singulars and the less general are first known, he does not enter on the question, which neither the Scottish nor any other metaphysicians have yet settled, of the relation of self-evident truths in their singular to their generalized form.

In regard to space and time, he avoids the extreme positions both of Clarke, who represents them as modes of the divine being, and of Leibnitz, who describes them as mere relations perceived by the mind. He represents them as things or realities, and declares modestly and truly that we are ignorant of the relation in which they stand towards the divine nature. These judicious views were followed by the Scottish metaphysicians generally down to the time of Hamilton.

This leads him into the investigation of the infinite. He regards the following propositions as probable: that it is scarcely possible that there should be a number of infinite things of the same kind , that the infinite, because it is infinite, cannot be greater; that infinites, so far as infinites, cannot be multiplied; nor can have any finite relation (<rationem>) to finite parts, although things by one reason infinite and by another finite may be divided and multiplied, if only there are other things of the same description. But after enunciating these bold propositions he cautiously adds that these questions may well be held to surpass human capacity.

He declares that, properly speaking, there is only one sort of cause, the efficient. He says that in the impulse and motion of bodies, and in the effort to change the idea in our minds, and to produce motions in our bodily members, we not only see change, but perceive some energy or efficacy. This view is not thoroughly carried out; it certainly is the truth so far as {75} it goes. He cautions us, in the very spirit of Reid, against dogmatizing too minutely as to the power of the mind over the body.

Substance is that which remains when the affections change. He agrees with Locke that the nature of substance is unknown, except that we have an obscure idea of something as the substratum of qualities. His views on this whole subject are meagre and unsatisfactory.

Still it is in the discussion of these questions that he passes beyond Shaftesbury, and shows the clearness, the judiciousness, and the independence of his thinking. I am not sure whether these metaphysical topics have been discussed in a profounder manner by any thinker of the Scottish school except Sir W. Hamilton; and he has not shown the same amount of speculative caution and good sense as Hutcheson.

But Hutcheson dwells far more on the motive and moral parts of man's nature than on logical and metaphysical subjects. We have seen that he brings in many other senses besides the external ones. He defines sense, " every determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain." The following is his classification of them: " (1) In the first class are the external senses, universally known. (2) In the second, the pleasant perceptions arising from regular harmonious uniform objects, as also from grandeur and novelty. These we may call, after Mr. Addison, the `pleasures of the imagination,' or we may call the power of receiving them an internal sense. Whoever dislikes this name may substitute another. (3) The next class of perceptions we may call a public sense; viz., our determination to be pleased with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their misery. This is found in some degree in all men, and was sometimes called [Greek term], or <sensus commnunis>, by the ancients; this inward pain or compassion cannot be called a sensation of sight. It solely arises from an opinion of misery felt by another, and not immediately from a visible form. The same form presented to the eye by the exactest painting, or the action of a player, gives no pain to those who remember that' there is no misery felt. When men by imagination conceive real pain felt by an actor, without recollecting that it is merely {76} feigned, or when they think of the real story represented, then, as there is a confused opinion of real misery, there is also pain in compassion. (4) The fourth class we may call the moral sense, by which we perceive virtue or vice in ourselves or others. This is plainly distinct from the former class of perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the fortunes of others who seldom reflect upon virtue or vice in themselves or others as an object; as we may find in natural affection, compassion, friendship, or even general

benevolence to mankind, which connect our happiness or pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own temper, nor delighted with the perception of our own virtue. (5) The fifth class is a sense of honor which makes the approbation or gratitude of others, for any good actions we have done, the necessary occasion of pleasure, and then dislike, condemnation, or resentment of injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy sensation called shame, even when we fear no further evil from them." He adds that this enumeration may not be sufficient, and says that "there may be others, such as some ideas of decency, dignity, suitableness to human nature in certain actions and circumstances."

He then shows that the objects gratifying these senses call forth desires, which fall into five corresponding classes, those of the bodily senses, of the imagination or internal sense, of public happiness, of virtue, and honor. We are yet (so I am inclined to think) without a thoroughly exhaustive classification of the natural appetencies which lead to emotion, and desire, and action. That of Hutcheson is one of the best which we yet have, and should be looked to by those who would draw out a scheme of the categories of man's motive principles. I am disposed to think, however, that the sense of honor may be resolved into the moral sense combined with some other principles. (" Moral Philosophy," Book I.)

He shows how secondary grow upon these original desires. "Since we are capable of reflection, memory, observation, and reasoning about the distant tendencies of objects and actions, and not confined to things present, there must arise, in consequence of our <original desires, secondary desires> of every thing imagined useful to gratify any of the primary desires, and that {77} with strength proportioned to the several original desires and the imagined usefulness or necessity of the advantageous object. Thus, as soon as we come to apprehend the use Of wealth or power to gratify any of our original desires we must also desire them. Hence arises the universality of these desires of wealth and power, since they are the means of gratifying all other desires." Mackintosh says, " He seems to have been the first who entertained just nations of the formation of the secondary desires which had been overlooked by Butler." ("Passions," Sect. I. Mackintosh's " Diss.," Sect. V.)

He also shows how the association of ideas, which he characterizes as the "disposition in our nature to associate any ideas together for the future which once presented themselves jointly," has an influence upon our desires, primary and secondary, and specially on our sense of beauty. " Some objects which, of themselves, are indifferent to any sense, yet by reason of some additional grateful idea may become very desirable, or by like addition of an ungrateful idea ma raise the strongest aversion. When any circumstance, dress, state, posture, is constituted as a mark of infamy, it may become, in like manner, the object of aversion, though in itself most inoffensive to our senses. If a certain way of living, of receiving company, of showing courtesy, is once received among those who are honored, they who cannot bear the expense of all this may be made uneasy

at their condition, though much freer from trouble than that of higher stations. Thus dress, retinue, equipage, furniture, behavior, and diversions, are made matters of considerable importance by additional ideas." , The beauty of trees, their cool shades and their aptness to conceal from observation, have made groves and woods the usual retreat to those who love solitude, especially to the religious, the pensive, the melancholy, and the amorous. And do not we find that we have so joined the ideas of these dispositions of mind with those external objects, that they always recur to us along with them." He thus started those views regarding the influence of association of ideas on our perceptions of beauty and moral good which were prosecuted by Turnbull, Beattie, and others, till they culminated in the ingenious but extravagant theories of Alison and Jeffrey in regard to the beautiful, and of Adam Smith and Mackintosh as to virtue. Hutcheson certainly has not developed the full {78} influence of association of ideas, but the account which he gives is just, so far as it goes.[18]

He dwells at great length on the sense of beauty. The feeling is raised at once on the perception of certain objects. He does not stand up for beauty supposed to be in the nature of things without relation to any mind perceiving it. On the contrary, all beauty implies the perception of some mind. Still there may be a distinction drawn between original or absolute beauty on the one hand, and relative or comparative beauty on the other. By the former he understands the beauty which we perceive in objects without comparison with any thing external, such as that observed in the works of nature, artificial forms, figures, theorems; by the latter, the beauty founded on uniformity, or a kind of unity between the original and the copy. In determining what the beautiful is, he propounds the theory that it is a compound ratio of uniformity and variety, so that where the uniformity of bodies is equal, the beauty is as the variety; and where the variety is equal, the beauty is as the uniformity. He seeks to establish this view by examples, dwelling on beautiful objects in nature and art, showing how there is in all of them uniformity or unity, proportion or harmony. This doctrine may not be the full theory of beauty; but there must surely be some truth in it; for in some modification or other it has cast up among profound thinkers in all ages, from Plato and Augustine in ancient times, to Cousin, Macvicar, and Ruskin in our day.

He stands up resolutely for the existence of disinterested and social affections. He earnestly opposes those who, like the Cyrenaics, and probably the Epicureans, would make pleasure the end of existence, and who would make us desire the good of others or of societies merely as the means of our own safety and prosperity, or as the means of some subtler {79} pleasures of our own by sympathy with others in their happiness; or who would make our end to be the pleasure we enjoy in being honored, or some reward we expect for our services, and these either from God or man. He opposes also that more refined system which makes our aim the joys proceeding from generous motions and moral approbation. He shows, with great acuteness, that in all our desires, whether benevolent or selfish, there is some motive, some end intended distinct from the joy of success,

or the removal of the pain of desire; and that there is first the motive operating, and then the joy or pain following, according as the motive is gratified or thwarted. He proves that men have affections, such as the love of offspring and of relatives, which fit them for a state of society; he takes pains to show that in this respect he differs from Puffendorf, who constructs his theory of society on the principle that self-love is the spring of all our actions; and he offers a most determined opposition to Hobbes when he makes the natural state of man to be one of war.

A considerable portion of all his works is occupied in demonstrating that man is possessed of a moral sense. In his "Inquiry," published before Butler's "Sermons on Human Nature," he declares, " that from the very frame of our nature we are determined to perceive pleasure in the practice of virtue, and to approve of it when practised by ourselves or others." He declares that the vast diversity of moral principles in various ages and nations " is indeed a good argument against innate ideas or principles, but will not evidence mankind to be void of a moral sense to perceive virtue or vice in actions." He ever kindles into a gentle warmth when he speaks of the joys derived from this sense, which he represents as purer and more elevated than those which can be had from any other source. The conscience, though often unable to govern our inferior nature, is yet in its own nature born for government; it is the ruling principle ([Greek term]) to which all things had been subjected in the entire (<integro>) state of our nature, and to which they ought to be subjected. His views on the subject of the supremacy of conscience are not so thoroughly wrought out as those of Butler; but they are explicitly stated, and become more decisive in his later works.

But what is the quality in actions looked at, appreciated, and {80} approved by the moral sense? To this question Hutcheson gives, if not a satisfactory, a very decisive reply. He represents this quality as good-will or benevolence. " All those kind affections which incline us to make others happy, and all actions which flow from such affections, appear morally good, if while they are benevolent towards some persons they be not pernicious to others." Advancing, a step farther, he discovers that "the several affections which are approved, though in very different degrees, yet all agree in one general character of tendency to the happiness of others," and the most perfectly virtuous actions are such " as appear to have the most unlimited tendency to the greatest and most extensive happiness of all the rational agents to whom our influence can reach." He is evidently inclined to reckon the moral sense as planted in our nature to lead us to commend at once those actions which tend towards the general happiness. His theory of virtue thus comes to be an exalted kind of eudaimonism, with God giving us a moral sense to approve of the promotion of happiness without our discovering the consequences of actions. Hume required only to leave out the divine sanction (he retained some sort of moral sense) in order to reach his theory of virtue consisting in the useful and agreeable. Hutcheson opposes very resolutely all those moralists who seek to give morality a deeper foundation in

the nature of things. The function of reason in morals is simply to show what external actions are laudable or censurable, according as they evidence good or evil affections of soul.[19]

Proceeding on these principles, derived mainly from Shaftesbury, but more systematically expounded, he builds up a system of moral philosophy. He gives a division of the virtues, and treats of the duties we owe toward God, toward mankind, and toward ourselves. In proving the existence of God, he appeals to the structure of the world. He reaches the divine perfections by a set of metaphysical principles surreptitiously introduced, and scarcely consistent with his philosophy. {81} He answers the objections derived from the existence of evil in a commonplace way, by showing how particular evils are necessary to superior good. He seeks to establish the immortality of the soul by an appeal to the nature of the soul as being different from the body, and to the hopes of a future state.

He enters at great length into the discussion of the ages which preceded him, as to the law of nature. He shows that there are rights antecedent to the institution of civil government. He establishes the right of property, first, on the principle that " things fit for present use the first occupier should enjoy undisturbed; " and on the farther principle, that each has a right to the fruits of his own labor, and that it is the common interest of society, and tends towards the furtherance of industry, that mankind should be secured in their possessions.

He says that "civil power is most naturally founded by these three different acts of a whole people: (1) An agreement or contract of each one with all the rest, that they will unite into one society or body, to be governed in all their common interests by one council; (2) A decree or designation made by the whole people of the form or plan of power and of the persons to be intrusted with it; (3) A mutual agreement or contract between the governors thus constituted and the people, the former obliging themselves to a faithful administration of the powers vested in them for the common interest, and the latter obliging themselves to obedience. Though it is not probable that, in the constitution of the several states, men have generally taken these three regular steps; yet it is plain that, in every just constitution of power, there is some such transaction as implicitly contains the whole force of all the three." He argues that the people have a right of resistance, and of dethroning a prince who is grossly perfidious to his trust.

He thinks that the senate of the country should create a censorial power, " that by it the manners of the people may be regulated, and luxury, voluptuous debauchery, and other private vices prevented or made infamous." He holds that the " magistrate should provide proper instruction for all, especially for young minds, about the existence, goodness, and providence of God, and all the social duties of life and motives {82} to them." But he particularly maintains that " every rational creature has a right to judge for itself in these matters." While an earnest supporter of liberty of thought and action, he yet holds "

as to those who support atheism, or deny a moral providence, or the obligation of the moral law, or social virtues, that the state may justly restrain them by force, as hurting,, it in its most important interests."

When Calamy heard of Hutcheson's call to Glasgow, he smiled, and said he was not for Scotland, and that he would be reckoned there as unorthodox as Simson. But Hutcheson lived an age later than Simson; he was much more prudent, and was personally liked; he was professor of philosophy and not of theology; and so he passed through life with very little public opposition. Still the stone which he had set a-moving could not go on without meeting with some little ruffling. About the beginning of the session 1737-38, a paper was printed and published anonymously by one who professed to have been lately in the college, charging Hutcheson with teaching dangerous views. I have not seen this attack; but the reply prepared by a body of his favorite students is preserved. There seems to be force in some of the objections taken; others entirely fail. It is objected to him that he taught that we could have the knowledge of moral good and evil, although we knew nothing of the being of a God; it is replied that Hutcheson's doctrine was that we might have knowledge of some virtues, though we had not known God, and that a notion of moral good must come prior to any notion of the will or law of God. It is objected that he taught that the tendency to promote the happiness of others is the standard of moral goodness; it is acknowledged in the answer that benevolent affections towards others are our primary notion of moral goodness, and the primary object of our approbation. It is objected that he taught that it is sometimes lawful to tell a lie; it is answered that Hutcheson's doctrine was very much against lying, but did imply that there might be cases in which lying was justifiable.

Throughout Scotland there was an impression among the scholars who had been trained in the previous generation that he was sensualizing and degrading the old philosophy. The friends of evangelical truth perceived that the young preachers {83} who admired him addressed them in a very different speech from that of their old divines and from that of the inspired writers. The description given of the new style of preaching by the clerical satirist Witherspoon, in his " Characteristics," was found to have point and edge: " It is quite necessary in a moderate man, because his moderation teaches him, to avoid all the high flights of evangelic enthusiasm and the mysteries of grace of which the common people are so fond. It may be observed, nay, it is observed, that all our stamp avoid the word grace as much as possible, and have agreed to substitute the moral virtues' in the room of the `graces of the Spirit.' Where an old. preacher would have said a great decree of sanctification, a man of moderation and politeness will say a high pitch of virtue." In the advice to a good preacher the following counsels are given: "(1) His subjects must be confined to the social duties. (2) He must recommend them only from rational considerations; viz., the beauty and comely proportions of virtue, and its advantages in the present life, without any regard to a future state of more extended self-interest. (3) His authorities must be drawn from

heathen writers; none, or as few as possible, from Scripture. (4) He must be very unacceptable to the common people." " The scattering a few phrases in their sermons, as harmony, order, proportion, taste, sense of beauty, balance of the affections, will easily persuade the people that they are learned; and this persuasion is to all intents and purposes the same thing as if it were true. It is one of those deceitful feelings which Mr. Hg in his essays has shown to be beautiful and useful." In illustrating the third counsel he says: " It is well known there are multitudes in our island who reckon Socrates and Plato to have been much greater men than any of the apostles, although (as the moderate preacher I mentioned lately told his hearers) the apostle Paul had a university education and was instructed in logic by Gamaliel. Therefore let religion be constantly and uniformly called virtue, and let the heathen philosophers be set up as great patterns and promoters of it. Upon this head most particularly recommend M. Antoninus by name, because an eminent person of the moderate character says his `Meditations' are the best book that ever was written for forming the heart." The effect of this accommodation of religion to the {84} world is graphically and truly described: "The necessity of such a conduct cannot be denied when it is considered what effect the length and frequency of public devotion have had in driving most of the fashionable gentry from our churches altogether." "Now the only way to regain them to the church is to accommodate the worship as much as may be to their taste." "I confess there has sometimes been an ugly objection thrown up against this part of my argument; viz., that this desertion of public worship by those in high life seems, in fact, to be contemporary with, and to increase in a pretty exact proportion to, the attempts that have been made and are made to suit it to their taste."

Hutcheson's works got fit audience in his own day, but did not continue to be much read after his death. In his mode and manner of writing he is evidently indebted to the wits of Queen Anne, such as Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, Pope, and Swift, who were Frenchifying the English tongue, polishing away at once its roughness and its vigor, introducing the French clearness of expression, and, we may add, the French morals. Hutcheson has their clearness, but is without their liveliness and wit. His style is like a well-fenced, level country, in which we weary walking for any length of time; it is not relished by those who prefer elevations and depressions, and is disliked by those who have a passion for mountains and passes. He ever maintains a high moral tone but it is doubtful whether he has retained for morality a sufficiently deep foundation.

His philosophy is undoubtedly an advance upon that of Locke, and rises immeasurably above that of those professed followers of Locke in England and France, who in the days of Hutcheson were leaving out Locke's reflection, and deriving all man's ideas from sensation, and all his motives from pleasures and pains. His view of the moral faculty is correct so far as it goes. He represents it as natural to man, and in his very constitution and nature. There may even be a propriety in calling it a <sense> with the qualifying phrase <moral>, inasmuch as, like the senses, it is a source

of knowledge, revealing to us certain qualities of voluntary acts or agents, and inasmuch as it has always feeling or sensibility attached to its exercises.

But, on the other hand, his view of the moral power falls greatly beneath that of the great English moralists of the previous century, and below that of the school of Clarke {85} in his own day. The word sense allies the conscience too much with the animal organism, and the whole account given of it separates it from the reason or higher intelligence. On this point he was met, immediately on the publication of his views, by Gilbert Burnet, who maintains that moral good and evil are discerned by reason; that there is first reason, or an internal sense of truth and falsehood, moral good and evil, right and wrong, which is accompanied by another succeeding internal sense of beauty and pleasure; and that reason is the judge of the goodness and badness of our affections and of the moral sense itself. Hutcheson does speak of the moral sense as being superior in its nature to the other senses, but he does not bring out so prominently and decisively as Butler did its supremacy and its right to govern.

If his theory of the moral power is superficial and defective, his account of that to which the conscience looks is positively erroneous. He represents virtue as consisting in benevolence, by which he means good-will. This view cannot be made to embrace love to God, except by stretching it so wide as to make it another doctrine altogether; for surely it is not as a mere exercise of good-will that to love God can be described as excellent. His theory is especially faulty in that it overlooks justice, which has ever been regarded by our higher moralists as among the most essential of the virtues. Nor is it to be omitted that his moral system is self-righteous in its injunctions, and pagan in its spirit. No doubt he speaks everywhere with deep admiration of the morality of the New Testament; but the precepts which he inculcates, are derived fully as much from Antoninus and the Stoics as from the discourses of our Lord, and the epistles of the apostles; and we look in vain for a recommendation of such graces as repentance and humility, meekness and long-suffering.

By bringing down morality from the height at which the great ethical writers, of ancient and modern times, had placed it, he prepared the way for the system of Adam Smith, and even for that of Hume. Smith was a pupil of his own, and Hutcheson was brought into contact with Hume. Hume submitted to Hutcheson in manuscript the " Third Part of his Treatise of Human Nature," that on morals, before giving it {86} to the world. The remarks which Hutcheson offered have been lost, but we can gather what they were from the letter which Hume sent him on receiving them, and which has been preserved. Hutcheson most characteristically objects to Hume, that he had not expressed a sufficient warmth in the cause of virtue, and that he was defective in point of prudence. Was this all that the high moralist Hutcheson had to object to the founder of modern utilitarianism? On the publication of his " Institutes of Moral Philosophy," Hutcheson sends a copy of it to Hume, who remarks upon it, specially objecting to it as adopting Butler's opinion, that

our moral sense has an authority distinct from its force and desirableness g, but confessing his delight " to see such just philosophy, and such instructive morals, to have once set their foot in the schools. I hope they will next get into the world, and then into the churches." Yes, this was what the rationalists wished in that day, and what they wish in ours, to get their views <into the churches>. Hutcheson, though disapproving of the philosophy of Hume, and refusing to support him as a candidate for the chair of moral philosophy in Edinburgh, which he himself declined, had not retained sufficiently deep principles to enable him successfully to resist the great sceptic who had now appeared. Error has been committed, God's law has been lowered, and the avenger has come.

VIII.-- RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS.-- RALPH ERSKINE.

W/E\ are now in the heart of the Scottish conflicts of the century. It is the crisis of the contest between Cavalier and Whig. On one point the philosophers and the evangelicals agree: they are defenders of the House of Hanover and opponents of the Pretender and the Stuarts, of whom they could not expect that they would be supporters of culture on the one hand, or of Protestantism on the other. The last formidable contest between Jacobite and Whig, was decided in behalf of the latter in 1746, at Culloden; and henceforth the former. is sinking into a state of complaining and garrulous, though often lively, old age. The religious conflicts are deeper, and continue for a longer period. From the time of Hutcheson, there is a felt and known feud, not always avowed, between the new philosophy and the old theology. It would have been greatly for the benefit of both, had there been one to reconcile and unite them. In the absence of such, each ran its own {87} course and did its own work, being good so far as it went, and evil only in its narrowness and exclusiveness, in what it overlooked or denied. The philosophers were laudably engaged when they were unfolding man's intellectual, esthetic, and moral nature; but they missed the deepest properties of human nature, when, in the fear of the ghosts of fanaticism, they took no notice of man's feelings of want, his sense of sin, and his longing after God and immortality; and the views of theologians would have been more just and profound, had they observed -- always in the inductive manner of the Scottish school -- those nascent ideas of good and evil and infinity which are at the basis of all religious knowledge and belief. The evangelical preachers were only faithful to their great Master when they declined to allow the doctrines of grace to sink out of sight; but they erred so far as they opposed the refinement and liberal sentiments which the moral philosophers were introducing, and showed that they were incapable of fully appreciating the apostolic command, "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." Pity it is that it should be so, but it is only by vibrations that the world moves on, only by breezes that its atmosphere is kept pure; and when the church errs by cowardice, it has to be rebuked by the unbelieving as -- an old Covenanter might have said -- the

father of the faithful was rebuked by a pagan Egyptian. It was only in a later age, and mainly through the influence of Chalmers, that the church was prepared heartily to accept what was true in the Scottish philosophy, and to acknowledge its compatibility with the doctrine of salvation by grace.

Three distinct religious parties are being formed in Scotland, not including the covenanting "remnant," who never submitted to the Revolution settlement, and whose vocation was on the mountains, rather than the colleges of their country. First, in the Church of Scotland there is the "Moderate" type of minister crystallized by coldness out of the floating elements. He is or be affects to be elegant and tolerant, and he is terribly afraid of a zealous religious life. He wishes to produce among the people a morality without religion, or at least without any of the peculiar dogmas of Christianity. As yet he himself is a moral man, and the people are moral, for they believe in the old theology; in the next age both pastors and people, retaining little faith, become considerably immoral, showing that, if we would have the fruit good, we must make the tree good. This party, preaching moral sermons without doctrine, is the genuine product of the Scottish philosophy in the Church of Scotland.

Secondly, the Evangelical party, called by their opponents `zealots' and `highflyers,' were placed in an ambiguous position and shorn of much of their strength since the enforcement of the law of patronage. They are fast becoming a minority, and a small minority, in the church; and they have to submit to much that they abhor, as, for example, to the settlement of pastors contrary to the will of the people. But they labor earnestly to keep alive the fire all through the dark and wild night; they cherish fellowship with other evangelical churches, and anticipate the missionary spirit of a later {88} age by countenancing the " Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge." They come into collision with the philosophic moralists by maintaining so resolutely the doctrines of grace; and they carry their antagonism to the " legal " system to the very verge of Antinomianism, as shown in their favor for the "Marrow of Divinity," this by a reaction prompting the moral divines to preach a morality without an atonement for immorality.

Thirdly, beyond the Established Church, the Seceding body, encompassed with hardships as fierce as the storms, but breathing a spirit as free as the air of their country, are rallying around them the old-fashioned and more determined religious life of Scotland. At this stage of its history it serves itself heir to the Covenants of the previous century, blames the Church of Scotland for being too indulgent, is intolerant of toleration, and has little sympathy with other churches. This body is beneath the notice of the philosophers; and in return it shows its utter distrust of them by declining to allow its students to attend the classes of moral philosophy, and appointing a professor of its own to give instruction in that branch, on which, as on other high departments of learning, it continued to set a high value. The event of that period which agitated lowland Scotland more than even the inroad of

the Pretender was the preaching of Whitefield, which moved the common people as the winds do the trees of the forest. The moderate party affected to despise and actually hated the preacher and his doctrine. The evangelicals in the Established Church rejoiced in his labors and their fruits. The seceders might have triumphed in his success; but they expected him to identify himself with their peculiar ecclesiastical constitution, and stand by them in the fight for the old cause of the Covenant. Upon Whitefield declining to do this, they became jealous of his influence, and were in doubts about the sound character of the revivals which he was the means of awakening. Out of this arose a very curious controversy, forgotten by all but a few antiquarians, but not unworthy of being noticed.

Mr. Robe, belonging to the evangelical party in the Church of Scotland, and a promoter of revivals and of the lively feeling manifested in them, declared that "our senses and imagination are greatly helpful to bring us to the knowledge of the divine nature and perfections; " and in defending this he asked: " Can you or any man else think upon Christ really as he is, God-man, without an imaginary idea of it?" To this Ralph Erskine, the seceder, replies in a treatise Of 372 closely printed pages, entitled " Faith no Fancy; or a Treatise of Mental Images, discovering the Vain Philosophy and Vile Divinity of a late Pamphlet entitled `Mr. Robe's Fourth Letter to Mr. Fisher,' and showing that an Imaginary Idea of Christ as Man (when supposed to belong to Saving Faith, whether in its Act or Object) imports nothing but Ignorance, Atheism, Idolatry, great Falsehood, or gross Delusion " (1745). He says of Mr. Robe: " This way of speaking appears indeed new and strange divinity to me, and makes the object of faith truly a sensible object; not the object of faith, but of sense." This leads him to criticise various philosophies. He refers to Tertuilian (as quoted by Jerome), who in regard to Platonic ideas said, " Haereticorum patriarchae philosophi." He shows him that the learned De Vries, Mastricht, and other eminent doctors {89} and divines abroad, had noticed how the ideal doctrine of Cartesius and his followers had led to imagery and idolatry. He also criticises Locke with considerable skill. "There seems nothing more common in the experience of mankind than that a man who hath the greatest stock of habitual knowledge and understanding relating to many truths, yet while his body sleeps, or his mind is in a muse about other things, lie perceives none of theme truths." So "I see no greater absurdity in saying one may leave a stock of seminal or habitual knowledge, though lie leave no actual knowledge, than to say one may have a stock of senses, though be hath no actual sensation, or consciousness of the acts or exercise of any of his senses, as a child not born or a man in a deep sleep; or a natural store of affections subjectively in him, and yet affected with nothing till occasions and objects appear. One may have a good pair of eyes, and yet see nothing till light be given and objects be presented. Nor is it an improper way of speaking to say a man hath not his eyes or sight, though he be not actually seeing. And as little is it improper to say a man hath understanding and knowledge, though he be not actually knowing or perceiving the truths he has the impress of in his understanding." This is a wonderfully clear statement of

the distinctions between the seminal capacity and the actual ideas, between a laid-up stock and occasions, by which philosophers have sought to overthrow the theory of Locke. In regard to the special question discussed, Mr. Robe had quoted the received rule, "<Oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari>." Erskine quotes against him Hieroboord, " Mens non indiget semper phantasmata ad suas perceptiones." "The object of that idea is only corporeal things as corporeal; but the object of rational knowledge is not only corporeal things, but spiritual and corporeal things, not as corporeal, but as intelligible." " It is reason, and not sense, that is the only help to attain the natural knowledge of God and his perfections." Above reason he places faith. " True faith differs as much from, and is as far above, mere intellectual ideas as intellectual ideas are above corporeal and imaginary ideas; yea, much farther than human reason is above sense; even as far as what is above human and supernatural, is above merely natural." It is evident that there are curious questions started, though not precisely settled, as to the place which the phantasm has in thought, and the imagination in religion. We feel that we are in the society of men of reflection and of reading. The evangelical and the seceding ministers of these days are quite as erudite as the academic men who despised them, and are holding firmly by old truths which the new philosophy is overlooking.

IX.-- ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL.

H/E\ was a pupil of Professor Simson's, in Glasgow, and became minister of Tarbert in Stirlingshire. I have been able to collect few notices of him. He is worthy of being mentioned, as having had played upon him one of the basest tricks mentioned in literary history. He wrote a treatise on {90} "Moral Virtue," and sent it up to London to his friend, Alexander Innes, D.D., assistant at St. Margaret's, Westminster, to have it published; and Innes published it in his own name, with the date, Tothill Fields, Jan. 20, 1727-28. In 1730, Campbell went to London and exposed Innes's imposture. It seems that the Lord Chancellor, believing that Innes was the author of the work, presented him to a living. The Chancellor, being convinced of the deceit, sought to male amends by offering a living to Campbell, who declined the offer, saying that he preferred his own country; and he becomes professor of ecclesiastical history in St. Andrews. In 1733, he published the work in his own name, dating it St. Andrews, and disowning the " Prefatory Introduction " and " some little marginal notes of Innes." "An Inquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue, wherein is shown, against the Author of the Fable of the Bees, that Virtue is founded in the Nature of Things, is unalterable and eternal, and the great Means of Private and Public Happiness, with some Reflections on a late Book entitled `An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.' " Hutcheson, whom he thus assailed, spoke of him as no better than a disciple of Epicurus. His system is the boldest form of self-love. " Human nature is originally formed to pleasure and pain." " There is, indeed, a. distinction of goodness into natural and moral, but the latter as well as the former lies wholly in pleasure." 'God and all mankind are governed

by one common principle, viz., self-love." "They can favor or esteem no other beings but as they gratify this principle." " The affections and actions that correspond to the self-love of our own species are likewise agreeable to the self-love of the Deity." " From self-love we desire the love and esteem of other intelligent beings." There is a passage in which there is an anticipation of Smith's theory of sympathy: " Whatever tenderness we conceive in favor of other people, it comes from putting ourselves in their circumstances, and must therefore be resolved into self-love." He also wrote a treatise on the " Necessity of Revelation," 1739; and another, " Oratio de Vanitate Luminis Naturae." He thinks it impossible that man kind, left to themselves, should `discover' the great truths and articles of natural religion, or should be capable of giving a system to natural religion." He died in April, 1756. A posthumous work, " The Authenticity of the Gospel History," was published 1759. He was opposed by [Alexander Moncrieff].

X.-- ALEXANDER MONCRIEFF.[20]

A/LEXANDER\ M/ONCRIEFF\ Of Culfergie in the parish of Abernethy was educated at the grammar school of Perth and St. Andrews University, and became minister of his native parish. He was favorable to the Marrow school of divinity, and took part with the Erskines in defending the popular rights and in seceding from the Church of Scotland, being one of the four fathers of the secession. In 1724, he was made their professor of divinity. He {91} died in 1761. He wrote "An Inquiry into the Principle, Rule, and End of Moral Actions, wherein the Scheme of Selfish Love laid down by Mr. Archibald Campbell . . . is examined, and the received Doctrine vindicated." To quote the summary supplied by his biographers, he establishes the following propositions: " (1) To show that self-love is not, or ought not to be, the leading principle of moral virtue; (2) That self-interest or pleasure is not the only standard by which we can and should judge of the virtue of our own and others' actions, or that actions are not to be called virtuous on account of their correspondency to self-interest; (3) That self-love, as it exerts itself in the desire of universal, unlimited esteem, ought not to be the great remaining motive to virtuous actions," &c.

XI.-- RISE OF THE ABERDEEN BRANCH.

T/HE\ north-east of Scotland, -- embracing Aberdeen, Banff, Murray, Mearns, and a large portion of Angus, -- though now very much amalgamated with the rest of Scotland, had a character of its own in the seventeenth century. The people had a large Scandinavian element in their composition, had a shrill intonation, and a marked idiom, and a harder aspect (though probably with quite as much feeling within) than the people of the south and west. When Samuel Johnson lumbered through the region in 1773, and visited Lord Monboddo, he found it miserably bare of trees; but, had he travelled a century or two earlier, he would have had to pass through wide-spread forests. These were cut down in the seventeenth century; and in the stead of the

deer and wild animals a more industrious people substituted sheep and cattle, ranging over high mountains and large undulating plains, on which you would have seen patches of oats or bear here and there around the clay or turf dwellings of the tenants, but few fences or enclosures of any kind, except in the immediate neighborhood of the proprietors, whose castles and gardens, on the French model, relieved the wildness of the scene. On to the eighteenth century the rural population consisted of landlords, with rather small farmers absolutely dependent on them, and who paid their rent in the service, on certain occasions, of men and horses, and in such articles as oats, bear, mutton, salmon, geese, poultry, and peats. In these regions the peasantry had not been taught to think and act for themselves, as they had been in the south-west by the ploughing {92} up of the soil effected by the great covenanting movement. But in some of the towns, particularly in Aberdeen, which was looked up to as a capital by a considerably wide district, there was not a little refinement, which spread its influence over the landlords, the ministers of religion, and the other professional men: in particular, there had been in the city named a gifted painter, Jameson, a disciple of Rubens; and a very superior printer, Raban, who put in type the works of the Aberdeen doctors. The two universities, King's and Marischial's, trained and sent forth a large body of educated men, some of whom found their proper field on the Continent; while the great body of them remaining at home, were the special instruments-as teachers, clergymen, doctors, lawyers, or country gentlemen-of spreading a civilizing influence in these regions. For ten years after the Restoration, seventy students entered annually at King's, and a considerable number, though not so large, at Marischal some of these rose to eminence, and all of them helped to create a taste for learning and an appreciation for it, on the southern slope of the Grampians, and in the wide region lying north of that range of mountains, which was never crossed by the Roman legions, but was now conquered by the Roman literature.

The Calvinistic and covenanting principles which had determined the Scottish character in the south and west, and so far north as Fife, Perth, and some parts of Angus, had not generally permeated the region beyond. No doubt, the common people in the northern counties gladly listened to the evangelical preachers from the west, when they had the opportunity; and some of the covenanting ministers, banished in the times of persecution from their own people in the south, gathered around them in the places of their exile -- as Samuel Rutherford in Aberdeen, David Dickson in Turriff -- bodies of devoted adherents attached to the Presbyterian preaching and organization. Still these were as yet merely fermenting, but leavening, centres in the midst of influences which were resisting their extension. In the wide country held by the Gordon family, the Roman Catholic religion still held its sway. In the other parts, the landlords, the college regents, and the clergy were mostly Cavalier in politics and High Church in religion; and the mass of the people bad not learned to claim the prerogative {93} of thinking and acting for themselves. When a deputation from the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland-consisting of Alexander Henderson, Samuel

Rutherford, and Andrew Cant-went north to Aberdeen to proclaim the Covenant in 1638, they were met by "Replies and Duplies" on the part of the Aberdeen doctors, and the landlords discouraged their tenantry from following the new zeal imported from the south. The divines of Aberdeen, during that century, such as Baron and John Forbes (author of "Irenicum"), were adherents of Episcopacy; their studies were in the later fathers of the church, and their sympathies with the Laudean divines of England; and like them they wrote against Popery on the one hand, and Puritanism on the other. It was years after the Revolution before the Presbyterian Church could put its legal rights in execution in the north-east of Scotland. Almost all the old Presbyterian ministers had disappeared; and, in 1694, the Synod of Aberdeen consisted of six clerical members, most of them brought from the south. It was not till 1703 that John Willison was settled as first Presbyterian minister at Brechin in Angus; it was not till 1708 that he was in a position to dispense the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. When he intimated that he was to do so next Lord's day, Mr. Skinner, the Episcopalian minister who preached in the same church in the after part of the day, announced that he would dispense the communion on the same day in the afternoon to his supporters; and the ecclesiastical records report that 1500 communicated with Mr. Skinner. When Mr. Gray was appointed minister of Edzell, in the same district, the Presbytery had to conduct the services at his ordination in a neighboring parish; and they then passed into the parish to " lay hands on him " and return immediately; and, on the following sabbath when he rode to Edzell for the purpose of preaching, the people, hounded on by the landlords, took him off his horse, flung him into the West Water, and kept him there till he was nearly drowned, " to their eternal disgrace," as he causes it to be written in the parish records. During the Rebellion of 1715 the Presbyterian ministers were rabbled from their churches, which were occupied by the nonjuring clergy praying for the Pretender. A considerable body of the students in both the Aberdeen colleges sympathized {94} with the banished king; and, after the battle of Sheriffmuir, several of the professors had to retire in consequence of the part which they had taken against the government. It was not till after the suppression of the Rebellion of 1715,-indeed, not fully till after the crushing of the chieftain power after 1745,-that the north-east of Scotland became one with the south of Scotland in religion and in national feeling.

In the universities, both tinder Prelatic and Presbyterian domination, the philosophy taught had been to a great extent Aristotelian and scholastic. The university commissioners appointed, in 1643, a <cursus> for Aberdeen; and in it the student is required, after taking Greek the first year, to go on the second year to the dialectics of Ramus, to Aristotle's categories, interpretation, and prior analytics, and in the third year to the rest of logics and portions of the ethics of Aristotle, &c. In the " Metaphysics " of Robert Baron, who lectured in Marischal College in the first half of the seventeenth century, he treats of being, unity, and goodness; enters fully into the controversy between the Thomists and Scotists; gives the divisions of <ens> and of cause, and treats of necessity and

contingency, of sameness and diversity, of absolute and relative, of whole and parts. In the university library of Aberdeen we have theses occupying 121 pages by Andrew Cant, the younger, of date 1658; in these he shows that he knew the Copernican theory of the heavens and Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood: but the whole discussions are conducted in a formal manner; and he dwells fondly on the scholastic logic, in the treatment of which he shows some independence of thought. In 1710 there was published a work by Thomas Blackwell, who had come from Paisley, in 1700, to be minister at Aberdeen in the Presbyterian interest, and who was made professor in 1711, and principal in 1717: his work is entitled " Schema Sacrum, or a Sacred Scheme of Natural and Revealed Religion; " and in it the common orthodox theology is defended by the old distinctions, and there are no traces of a new spirit or a new school.

But, after the year 1715, Aberdeen was prepared for a new style of thought. The High Church theology was no longer encouraged, except among a scattered nonjuring clergy subjected to poverty and privation. The Calvinistic divinity had {95}never struck its roots deep into the soil; but the literature and physical science of England were known to and relished by the educated classes, and there must be a fresh philosophy to meet the awakened intelligence and new tastes of the country. The first to gratify this feeling was a young graduate of Edinburgh, appointed as one of the rectors in Marischal by the Crown, which had seized the patronage of the college, vacated by the attainder of Earl Marischal, who had been out in the rebellion.

XII. -- GEORGE TURNBULL.[21]

T/HE\ celebrated Hogarth, in his "Beer Street," has a graphic picture of a porter drinking barley wine, after depositing on the ground a load, directed to the trunk-maker, of five enormous folios; one of which has on the back, "Turnbull on Ancient Paintings." Turnbull was one of the most voluminous writers of his age. I have read many thousand pages written by him; but I fear the greater part of the copies of his works have gone to the destiny indicated by Hogarth. It is disappointing to find that this author, who was both an able and a graceful writer, has passed away from the public view so effectively that it is difficult now to procure materials for his biography, or even to get a sight of most of his works. It may be doubted whether any one, except the writer of this history, has been at pains to peruse his works as a whole, for the last hundred years. Dugald Stewart, so well informed on British philosophy, had only looked into one of his volumes; and Sir William Hamilton, in his multifarious researches among obscure writers, does not seem to have thought it worth his while making any inquiries about him. Yet it can be shown that he exercised a greater influence than all other masters and writers put together on his pupil Thomas Reid,-the true representative of the Scottish philosophy. He seems to have been the son of the Rev. George Turnbull (his mother's name was Elizabeth Glass), of whom we {96} can gather a few scattered notices: as that he was born about 1656; that he

graduated in Edinburgh University in 1675; that he became minister of Alloa in 1689, when the Episcopal clergyman was ejected; that he was translated to Tyningham in 1699; that he was nominated but not carried as moderator of the General Assembly in 1711; that he preached before that body in 1713; that his name appears among the members of "The Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge," in 1720 and that he died in June, 1744, at the age of eighty-eight. His son was born in 1698 (he was baptized July 15) graduated in Edinburgh in April, 1721 and in November of the same year he was appointed, by a presentation from the Crown, regent of Marischal College; and is taken on trial in philosophy and the Greek Language, and declares his willingness to sign the Confession of Faith. He comes to have among his colleagues Thomas Blackwell, son of the principal, admitted regent in 1723, who did much to create a taste for Greek in the college, and who is still known to antiquarian scholars by his learned but uninteresting works, "Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer," "Letters concerning Mythology," and " Memoirs of the Court of Augustus." In Aberdeen at that time there was-as we have seen there was in Glasgow-- a principal's party and an opposition party; and there were disputes about the election of the rector. The majority of the masters, including Mr. Turnbull, in opposition to the principal, Blackwell the elder, wish the society to make up a list of persons recommended for the office of rector, to be submitted to the procurators chosen by the students in their nations; and, upon the principal refusing, they elect a preses in his room, and choose a rector, who holds a court and summons the principal to appear before them; but they are stayed in their career by a suit from " the Lords of Council and Session." On April 14, 1726, he has carried a batch of thirty-nine students through a course of philosophy on to graduation; and the last name on the list is Thomas Reid. As having to preside on this occasion, he prepares a thesis, afterwards published, to be discussed by the candidates, -- "De Pulcherrima Mundi Materialis turn Rationalis Constitutione," -- in which the new physics are employed to furnish proofs of the existence of God, and in which he declares that natural science (physiology) is to be taught before moral philosophy, and inclines to censure Socrates because {97} he discouraged inquiries into the structure of nature. He also printed, when at Aberdeen, a " Thesis on the Connection of Natural and Moral Philosophy." In his lectures on pneumatology he delivered to his students those views which, after being rewritten, were given to the world in his treatise on moral philosophy. In his later writings he frequently quotes Hutcheson and Butler; but his own philosophic opinions seem to have been formed, and delivered in lectures, before either of these influential writers had published any of their works.

In 1726, he published "A Philosophical Inquiry concerning the Connection between the Doctrines and Miracles of Jesus Christ." In it he treats of subjects in which there is a revived interest and which are anxiously discussed in our day, and advances principles which would be favorably received by many in these times. He argues that the works of Jesus were natural proper samples of his doctrines. That he had abandoned the old theology of Scotland is evident, from his declaring that the Scripture way of talking about the

Spirit of God and his operations means simply assistance to the virtuous. It is interesting to notice, that in this treatise he refers once and again to common-sense as settling certain moral questions; in this, as in other matters, anticipating and probably guiding Dr. Reid.

In the spring of 1727, Turnbull resigned his office in Marischal College; and for the next twelve years we have little record of him. There is reason to believe that he became a travelling tutor, -- it is said, to the family of the Wauchopes, of Niddry, near Edinburgh. It is certain that he must have travelled extensively on the Continent, and made himself conversant with the treasures of art in Italy. In 1732, he received the honorary degree of doctor of laws from the University of Edinburgh. He seems to have mingled in the literary circles of London,'[22] and acquired friends among persons of eminence. During these years he prepared an immense store of literary works, which were issued in rapid succession, -- more rapidly, I suspect, than the public were prepared to receive them. In {98} October, 1739, he advertises, at four guineas, in sheets, his " Treatise on Ancient Painting;" in which he has observations on the rise, progress, and decline of that art among the Greeks and Romans, comments on the genius of Raphael, Michael Angelo, Nicholas Poussin, and others, and illustrates the work will) engravings of fifty pieces of ancient painting. It will be remembered that Shaftesbury had " Disquisitions on Taste;" and we shall see most of the Scottish metaphysicians speculate on taste and beauty. The work was not of such an original or daring character as to recommend it to the genius of Hogarth; yet it seems to have had a considerable roll of subscribers. " is style is pleasant, and the remarks judicious and highly appreciative of the classical painters. In February, 1740, there appeared his most important work, and the only one that continues to be read, "The Principles of Moral Philosophy." At the close he promises, as soon as his health admits, a work on " Christian Philosophy," which was actually published before the close of the year; and in it he treats of the Christian doctrines concerning God, providence, virtue, and a future state, and recommends the Word of God because it embraces and illustrates such doctrines. He dates October, 1740, a preface and appendix to Heineccius's " Methodical System of Universal Law."[23] In 1742, he published " Observations upon Liberal Education; and in it he speaks as having long been engaged in the work of education. He subscribes himself as Chaplain to the Prince of Wales, and dedicates the treatise to the " Right Reverend Father in God," Thomas, Lord Bishop of Derry; in whose esteem, he says, " he had long had a share."[24] It appears that before {99}this time be had left the communion of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and entered into orders in the Episcopal Church of England, which was doubtless more congenial to his tastes. Through the bishop, to whom he dedicated his work, he was appointed Rector of Drumachose, in the diocese of Derry. I cannot find that he left any mark behind him in that parish: there is no remembrance of him in the popular tradition of the district, and no record of him in the diocese. In consequence of failing health, he went to the Continent, and died at the Hague, Jan. 31, 1748.[25]

Turnbull was the first metaphysician of the Scottish -- I believe of any -- school to announce unambiguously and categorically that we ought to proceed in the method of induction in investigating the human mind. He takes as the motto of his " Moral Philosophy " the passage from Newton about the method of natural philosophy being applicable to moral subjects, and the line of Pope, " Account for moral as for natural things." His enunciations on this subject are as clear and decided as those of Reid and Stewart in after ages. "If a fact be certain, there is no reasoning against it; but every reasoning, however specious it may be, -- or rather however subtle and confounding, -- if it be repugnant to fact, must be sophistical." It must have been from Turnbull that Reid learned, even as it was from Reid that Stewart learned, to appeal to common language as built on fact or universal feeling. "Language not being invented by philosophers, but contrived to express common sentiments or what every one perceives, we may be morally sure that where universally all languages make a distinction there is really in nature a difference." Reid only catches the spirit of his old master, who speaks of " philosophers who, seeking the knowledge of human nature not from experience, but from I know not what subtle theories of their own invention, depart from common language, and therefore are {100} not understood by others, and sadly perplex and involve them selves." In some respects, his exposition of the method is more comprehensive and correct (so I believe) than that given by Reid and Stewart; inasmuch as he avows distinctly that, having got facts and ideas from experience, we may reason deductively from them, in what Mr. J. S. Mill calls the deductive method, but which is in fact a joint inductive and deductive method. He sees clearly that in natural philosophy there is a mixture of experiments with reasonings from experiments; and he asserts that reasonings from experiments may have the same relation to moral philosophy that mathematical truths have to natural philosophy. " In both cases equally, as soon as certain powers or laws of nature are inferred from experience, we may consider them, reason about them, and compare them with other properties, powers, or laws." He instances among the moral ideas which we may compare, and from which we may draw deductions, those of intelligence, volition, affection, and habit. Moral philosophy is described by him as a mixed science of observations, and reasoning from principles known by experience to take place in or to belong, to human nature. In his preface to Heineccius, he says that the appended " discourse upon the nature and origin of laws is an attempt to introduce the experimental way of reasoning into morals, or to deduce human duties from internal principles and dispositions in the human mind." In following this method, he claims to be superior to Puffendorf, to Grotius, and the older jurists.

Proceeding in this method he discovers, both in matter and mind, an established order and excellent general laws, and on this subject quotes largely from his contemporaries Berkeley and Pope. He constantly appeals to these laws as illustrating the divine wisdom; and to the excellence of laws as justifying the divine procedure, despite certain incidental acts which may flow from them. As inquirers discover these laws, science is advanced; and he dwells as

fondly on the progressiveness of knowledge as Bacon had done and as Stewart has done.

In particular, he shows that if we look at human nature as a whole, and at its several parts, we shall find beneficent general laws. He discovers in our constitution means to moral ends, and the science of these means and ends is properly {101} called moral philosophy. He shows that by such a study we can discover what are natural laws; and that, in all well-regulated states, the sum and substance of what is called its civil laws are really laws of natural and universal obligation adding that "civil law adopts only those laws of nature on which the quiet of mankind entirely depends, and that there are other duties to which men must attend out of reverence to their Creator and sincere love to mankind, without regard to the fear of human penalties." He shows that mankind are not left indifferent to virtue and to beauty: "As we are capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, so we are capable of distinguishing good and approvable actions, affections, and characters, from bad and disapprovable ones." He would call this capacity moral sense, moral taste, moral discernment, or moral conscience. Like Shaftesbury (" who must live forever in the esteem of all who delight in moral inquiries"), and Hutcheson, whom he often approvingly quotes, he represents the virtues as capable of being reduced into benevolence.

In unfolding the elements of human nature, he dwells with evident fondness on the "association of ideas." He does not seem to attempt an ultimate resolution of the laws; but he considers association as "a league or cohesion formed by frequent conjunction in the mind," and says that "any appearance immediately suggests its concomitants and consequents to us." He adds, that association is more easily engendered between ideas that have some affinity or likeness." It may be doubted whether we have a better account at this day of the law of association as a whole. In regard to what Brown calls " secondary laws," and Hamilton the " law of preference," he prescribes two rules from Cicero for helping the memory: one is to attend to the things we would wish to recall; and the other is to consider its analogies, relations, and oppositions to other objects which will thus call it up. He accounts (as Stewart does) by the association of ideas for the law of habit, which he represents as a " propension to do, and a facility and readiness in doing, what we have often done." He shows truly and ingeniously how association influences the senses, by connecting the qualities perceived by one sense with those perceived by the others (a subject much dwelt on in a later age {102} by Brown); and, in particular, how, according to the theory of Berkeley, it aids the eye in discovering distance, not itself an idea of sight. He shows how our ideas have other ideas so associated with them that they make one perception, and how difficult it is to separate ideas that have thus been associated, and to find out precisely and philosophically what is involved in any particular idea, and how apt we are in consequence to confound qualities that are different. He is particularly successful in showing that desires and volitions are prompted by associations. " Ideas, as often as they return, must excite certain affections; and the affections which

lead to action must, as often as they are revived, dispose and excite to act, or, in other words, produce will to act." He remarks that " very few, if any, of the ideas which excite our warmest and keenest affections are quite free from associated parts." He insists that " various associations must produce various tempers and dispositions of mind; since every idea, as often as it is repeated, must move the affection it naturally tends to excite, and ideas with their correspondent affections often returning must naturally form inclinations, propensions, and tempers." He would account in this way for much of our feeling of beauty, and for propensity to imitate passing into custom. His exposition of the association of ideas is more satisfactory and accurate than the one, so much commended, published by Hume at the same time; and is far more philosophical than that given by Reid, who, in this respect, fell behind his master. I jam acquainted with no exposition of this part of our constitution published prior to his time which seems to me so full and correct.

His ideas on education are liberal and advanced. He is opposed to corporal punishment, and declares that the grand aim of education should be to foster good habits. Giving a high place to the study of the mind, he maintains, as did all the great masters of the Aberdeen school who came after him, that mental science should not be taught to young men till their minds have been other-wise well furnished. He gives logic a somewhat large and wide field;, in this respect, too, like the Scottish metaphysicians who came after him. Its province is to " examine the power and faculties of our minds (favorite phrases of Reid's), their objects, and operations; to inquire {103} into the foundations, the causes of error, deceit, and false taste; and, for that effect, to compare the several arts and sciences with one another, and to observe how each of them may derive light and assistance from all the rest. Its business is to give a full view of the natural union, connection, and dependence of all the sciences." Like Reid, and Stewart after him, he sets a high value on the study of " the nature and degrees of moral, probable, or historical evidence," and complains that it is left out in the logical treatises. The teacher should aim to make his pupil look at things, instead of words. At the same time, he recommends the study of languages with the study of things employing language in an enlarged sense, as embracing the different methods of expressing, embellishing, or enforcing and recommending truth, such as oratory, poetry, design, sculpture, and painting. He complains that in education the arts of design are quite severed, not only from philosophy, but from classical studies. The object contemplated by him in his work on " Painting " was to bring these various branches into union: he thinks that paintings may teach moral philosophy. The essential elements of painting are represented by him as being truth, beauty, unity, greatness, and grace, in composition. He dwells fondly on the analogy between the sense of beauty and moral sense; and on the inseparable connection between beauty and truth. His works on " education " and on the fine arts are clear and judicious, written in a pleasant and equable, but at the same time a commonplace style; and they seem never to have attracted the attention which they deserved, and which would

have been freely given to works of greater pretension, eccentricity, or extravagance.

But, after all, we are most interested in noticing the points in which Turnbull seems to have influenced Reid. We have already had some of these before us. We have seen that Turnbull announces as clearly as Reid that the human mind is to be studied by careful observation. Both are averse to abstruse scholastic distinctions and recondite ratiocinations on moral subjects. Turnbull ever appeals, as Reid did after him, to consciousness as the instrument of observation. Both are fond of designating mental attributes by the terms ,powers " and "faculties." Both would give a wide, and I may add a loose, field to logic, and include in it the inquiry into the nature of probable evidence. {104} In proceeding in the way of observation, both discover natural laws or principles, and both call them by the name of " common-sense." " Common-sense is certainly sufficient to teach those who think of the matter with tolerable seriousness and attention, all the duties and offices of human life; all our obligations to God and our fellow-creatures; all that is morally fit and binding. And there is no need of words to prove that to be morally fit and obligatory, which common-sense and reason clearly show to be so." Reid holds that all active power implies mind. This was the expressed doctrine of Turnbull before him. " It is, therefore, will alone that produces both power and productive energy." " To speak of any other activity and power, is to Speak without any meaning at all; because experience, the only source of all our ideas (and of the materials of our knowledge), does not lead us to any other conception or idea of power." Nor should it be omitted that both -- in this respect, however, like all the other Scotch metaphysicians ever speak with profound reverence of Scripture; ever, however, dwelling most fondly on those doctrines of the word which are also truths of natural religion; such as the existence of God, the obligations of morality, and the immortality of the soul.

I have been at pains to trace these agreements, not with the view of depreciating the originality and still less the independence of Reid, who may have had some of these views suggested to him by his teacher, but who may have afterwards found them in other writers, and who no doubt thought them all for himself, and adopted them because they seemed to him to be sound.[26] We have seen that in one or two points, Reid fell behind his master, who had clearer apprehensions than his pupil of mingling deductive with inductive observation, and of the laws of the association of ideas. But in other and more important philosophic doctrines, Reid passed far beyond his teacher. Reid claims to be original in rejecting the ideal theory of sense perception; which had been the received one for two thousand years, which had been adopted by Locke, and pursued to its logical consequences by Berkeley. But Turn bull evidently adheres to the old view. " Properly speaking, what we call matter and space are but certain orders of sensible {105} ideas produced in us, according to established rules of nature, by some external cause; for when we speak of material effects and of space, we only mean, and can indeed only mean, certain sensible perceptions excited in our mind

according to a certain order, which are experienced to be absolutely inert and passive, and to have no productive force." He speaks of the "external material world " as unperceived by us, and in itself absolutely unperceivable, as all philosophers acknowledged When, in speaking of the material world, he says it may be called the "external cause or occasion of those sensible ideas, and their connections, which make to each of us what we call the sensible world," we see that this is the doctrine which Reid set aside g, and yet we may notice that the phrase " occasion " is used by Turnbull, as by Reid, to designate the relation of the external action to the internal perception. In another point, Reid made a more important advance upon Turnbull. Living at a later age, Reid had to meet the objections of the great modern revolutionist, and had in consequence to dive down into profounder depths of the human constitution. The scepticism of Hume brought out to view the superficialities of the philosophy of Shaftesbury, partly by following its principles to their legitimate consequences, but mainly by making all men feel that it is nothing wherewith to meet the assaults of the new and formidable enemy. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Turnbull had all appealed to common-sense; but Reid behoved to take a deeper and more searching view of the principles which constitute common-sense, in order to meet the exigencies of the new era.

Turnbull's works had no great circulation in their own day, and they speedily disappeared from public view. It might have been different had he continued in Aberdeen, and gathered around him a body of young men ready to receive and to propagate the lessons he taught them. But he departed into other fields, -- into the literary circle of England, and a church which set more value on liturgy than on abstract doctrine, -- and there he met with few to appreciate his gifts. A Presbyterian Scot might have urged, with some plausibility, that his name has perished because he forsook the country and the church in which his philosophic labors would have been valued. It might even have been different, had he published his metaphysical {106} treatises a dozen of years earlier; for then they might have run their course with those of Hutcheson and Butler. But at the very time that Turnbull advertised his work on "Moral Philosophy," Hume published his "Treatise of Human Nature," which, as it forced its way to the front, required philosophy to deepen its foundations and give a new facing to its buttresses. Turnbull is remembered because he had, for three years, when he was himself a very young man, a diligent and thoughtful pupil, who in due time wrestled with the great sceptic, and is acknowledged by Scotland as the representative of its native philosophy.

XIII.-- DAVID FORDYCE. [27]

H/E\ was born in Aberdeen in 1711, entered Marischal College in 1742, and was drowned at sea, as he was returning from travel, in September, 1751. During that age and the next there was a strong disposition towards the study of mental philosophy. In 1748, R. Dodsley began the publication of the " Preceptor," in London, and Fordyce wrote the article on " Moral Philosophy." He was appointed professor

of moral philosophy in the college in which he bad been educated, in 1742. In 1745, he published " Dialogues concerning Education," a very pleasantly written book. He discusses the question whether nature or training does most, and inquires whether the Socratic method is fitted to bring forth what is in our nature. He dwells fondly, like most of the philosophers of the Scottish school, on the influence of the association of ideas. The religion he recommends was evidently the moderate type: " As the religion of Christ was designed as a plain, consistent rule of life, and not a system of abstracted reasonings and speculations, -- to influence the heart more than fill the head, -- I would endeavor above all things a high spirit of disinterested and extensive virtue." He was author also of an essay on "Action of the Pulpit." After his death there was published a work of his, " Theodorus, a Dialogue concerning the Art of Preaching," to which was added " A discourse on the Eloquence of the Pulpit, by James Fordyce." His " Elements of Moral Philosophy" was published in 1754. There is little that is original in his works, but much that is judicious and useful. It is evident that he was acquainted with the works of Butler and Hutcheson. " Moral philosophy contemplates human nature, its moral powers and connections, and deduces the laws of action." " Moral philosophy has this in common with natural {107} philosophy that it appeals to nature or to fact." He finds passions or affections, some private, some public, and above these; (1) reason or reflection; (2) conscience, by which we denominate some actions and principles of conduct honest and good, and others wrong, dishonest, or ill." " We came by the idea of moral obligation or duty in the same way as our other original and primary perceptions: we receive them from the Author of our nature." We employ reason in moral cases, in "examining the condition, relations, and other circumstances of the agent, and patient." " Therefore, when we use these terms, obligation, duty, ought, and the like, they stand for a simple idea." He opposes those who establish morals on the divine will, and those who place it in the natures and reasons, truths and fitnesses, of things."

XIV.-- WILLIAM DUNCAN.[28]

H/E\ was born in Aberdeen, July, 1717, and was the son of a respectable tradesman. He received his education partly at Aberdeen and partly at Foveran. He entered Marischal College in 1733, and took his degree in 1737. Originally, he was designed for the gospel ministry; but not finding an inclination for the work, he went, as so many Scottish youths have done in like circumstances, to London (in 1739), and devoted himself to literature; translating " Select Orations of Cicero " and " Caesar's Commentaries," which were long found useful by youths averse to turn over the leaves of a dictionary. He wrote for Dodsley's " Preceptor " the article on " Logic and this was afterwards published in a separate volume, and continued for an age or two to furnish, not very philosophical but very useful, instruction to Scottish and other youths. The work is partly psychological partly logical. In Book First he treats of the origin and division of ideas, and of language; in the Second, of judgment, self-evident and demonstrable; in the Third, of reasoning and demonstration; and in the Fourth, of

invention, science, and the parts, of knowledge. He was appointed professor of philosophy in Marischal College, May 18, 1752, and entered the professorship, Aug. 21, 1753. He was drowned when bathing, May, 1760.

XV.-- JOHN STEVENSON.[29]

F/ROM\ the date at which we have now arrived, we have a succession of distinguished men testifying to the benefit they received. from the instruction imparted in the departments of logic and moral philosophy in the Scotch colleges. As being among the eminently successful teachers of his age, we have to give a place to John Stevenson, professor of Logic or {108} "Rational and Instrumental philosophy" in the University of Edinburgh. Dugald Stewart says of him that to his ,valuable prelections, particularly to his illustrations of Aristotle's "Poetics," and of Longinus on the "Sublime," Dr. Robertson has been often heard to say, that lie considered himself as more deeply indebted than to any other circumstance in his academic studies." "I derived," says Dr. Somerville, "more substantial benefit from these exercises and lectures than from all the public classes I attended at the university." Similar testimony is borne by the famous leader of the evangelical party in the Church of Scotland, Dr. Erskine (see Life by Sir Henry W. Moncreiff). The course of instruction followed by Stevenson is given in the Scots Magazine, and is well worthy of being quoted as an exhibition of the highest style of education imparted in the age. He gives lectures upon "Heineccii Elementa Philosopliae Rationalis," and Wynne's abridgment of Locke's "Essay upon the Human Understanding: " in which he explains all the different forms of reasoning, the nature of certainty both mathematical and moral, with the different degrees of probability; and shows how the understanding is to be conducted in our inquiries after truth of all kinds. He likewise explains the fundamental rules to be observed in the interpretation of the texts of very ancient authors. He teaches metaphysics in lectures upon De Vries's "Ontologia," in which he explains the several terms and distinctions which frequently occur in the writings of the learned. He also lectures upon Longinus, in which he illustrates the several precepts of oratory given by Cicero and Quintilian; and also, upon Aristotle, in which he illustrates his rules by examples from ancient and modern poets, and explains the grounds of criticism in eloquence and poetry. He gives likewise a course upon "Heineccii Historia Philosophica," in which he gives an account of the most famous philosophers ancient and modern, and the several opinions by which the different sects were distinguished. Each of his students is required to make a discourse upon a subject assigned him, and to impugn and defend a thesis, for his improvement in the art of reasoning. These exercises are performed before the principal and some of the professors with open doors. The students met him two hours daily; one of them was devoted to lectures on logic, delivered in the Latin tongue. It is stated that the college opens about the 10th of October, and rises about the end of May. The shortening of the length of the session in the colleges of Scotland, in later years, has done much to lower the standard of attainment.

John Stevenson was appointed professor in Edinburgh, in 1730, and died Sept. 12th, 1775, in the eighty-first year of his age. It is mentioned to his credit, by Stewart, that at the age of seventy be gave a candid reception to the philosophy of Reid, which was subversive of the theories which he had taught for forty years; and that "his zeal for the advancement of knowledge prompted him, when his career was almost finished, to undertake the laborious task of new-modelling that useful compilation of elementary instruction to which a singular diffidence of his powers limited his literary exertions." (Stewart's " Life and Writings of Reid.") {109}

XVI.-- SIR JOHN PRINGLE.[30]

H/E\ was for a time " professor of pneumatology and ethical philosophy " in Edinburgh University. The pneumatics are divided into the following parts: (1) A physical inquiry into the nature of such subtle and material substances as are imperceptible to the senses, and known only front their operations; (2) The nature of immaterial substances connected with matter, in which is demonstrated, by natural evidence, the immortality of the human soul (3) The nature of immaterial created beings not connected with matter (4) Natural theology, or the existence and attributes of God demonstrated front the light of nature. Ethics or moral philosophy is divided into the theoretical and practical parts, in treating of which the authors lie chiefly uses are Cicero, Marcus Antoninus, Puffendorf, and Lord Bacon. He had lectures explaining the origin and principles of civil government, illustrated with an account of the rise and fall of the ancient governments of Greece and Rome, and a view of that form of government which took its rise from the irruptions of the northern nations. His students have also discourses presented to them upon some important heads of pneumatical or moral philosophy, which are delivered before the principal with open doors. Pringle was by no means so thorough an instructor as Stevenson. Carlyle describes him "as an agreeable lecturer, though no great master of the science he taught." " His lectures were chiefly a compilation from Lord Bacon's works, and had it not been for Puffendorf's small book, which he made his text, we should not have been instructed in the rudiments of the science." Nevertheless, we see that he discussed topics which must issue, sooner or later, in a scientific jurisprudence and political economy. We see, in the case both of Stevenson and Pringle, how much attention was paid in the Scottish universities to the practice of English composition.

Pringle's taste did not lie specially in metaphysics. He was born in Roxburghshire, in 1707, and became a physician. He settled in Edinburgh about 1734; and after 1748, resided in London, where be was elected president of the Royal Society in 1773. He died in 1782

XVII.-- THOMAS BOSTON.

W/E\ wish our readers to transport themselves to the eastern border country of Scotland, and to try to realize its condition in the first half of last century. People are

apt to take their views of that district from Sir Walter Scott, who passed the most interesting portion of his boyhood there, and picking up the dim traditions of the past ere they were finally lost, and tingeing them with the romantic hues of his own imagination, has presented to us such a picture as a man of the nineteenth century, in love with chivalry, would be {110} likely to furnish of the ages of border strife. But the truth is, Sir Walter has given us only one side of the Scottish character; he never thoroughly sympathized with the more earnest features of the national mind, and he did not appreciate the attempts which were made in the seventeenth century to deliver the country from violence and superstition, and to Promote education and a scriptural religion. The people of the eighteenth century had such traditions of the earlier ages as to be glad that the days of the border raids had passed away. At the time we wish to sketch, two classes of people were to be found in the district. There were landed prorietors, disposed to allow no opposition to their not very generous or enlightened will, but who were already catching the taste for improving the land, which has made Berwickshire one of the most advanced agricultural districts in the three kingdoms. Under them were small farmers and their servants, with the ignorance and much of the rudeness of the previous ages, and not yet awakened to independent thought and action. Between them there was scarcely any middle class, except the parish ministers, who, in the early part of the century, if not highly cultivated, were zealous preachers of the doctrines of grace, and actively seeking to raise their people to church-going habits and a decent morality; and who, at a later date, as patrons began to assert their legal rights, and colleges adopted the new philosophy, became the most vehement opponents of the evangelical party: so that, in the days of Carlyle, the Synod of Merse and Teviotdale turned the vote against popular rights, and the ministers of it, coming to the General Assembly, rushed to the theatre to hear Mrs. Siddons when she happened to be in Edinburgh. Believing that there was nothing suited to them in such a religion, the common people set up in the towns and large villages seceding congregations, which drew towards them the more earnest of the inhabitants. Out of one of these congregations sprang Thomas M'Crie, who has given us the other phase of the Scottish character.

At the beginning of the century, the most remarkable man in the district was undoubtedly Thomas Boston. Born at Dunse in the previous century, he remembered his going, when a boy, to the prison of his native place to keep his father company when lie was incarcerated for resisting the imposition of Prelacy. All his life he is most sedulous and consistent in discountenancing the system of church patronage, which is being steadily introduced. Settled as a minister first in Simprin, and then in Ettrick, he is consumingly earnest in visiting once a year, in catechising twice a year, and in preaching on Sabbath-day and week-day to, an ignorant and careless people just rising out of barbarism. But he contrived to retain a literary taste amidst his active parochial employments. With a difficulty in getting books, and rejoicing so when a good one came in his way, he was able, by his own independent study, to develop views in regard to the importance of Hebrew points

which were far in advance of those attained in his time by any British scholar. Endowed with a clear, logical mind, he has, in his " Fourfold State " and " Covenant of Grace," given us perhaps the best exposition we have of the old Scotch theology in its excellencies,-- some would add, in its exclusiveness. Living and breathing in the doctrine of free grace, he seized with avidity and valued excessively the " Marrow of Modern Divinity," {111} which he found in the cottage of one of his people, and he vigorously opposed the moral or legal preaching which was fast coming in with the new literature and philosophy. Singularly single-minded, earnest, and fervent in his piety, this man becomes a favorite and a power, first in his district, and, in the end, by his theological works all over Scotland. In reading his Memoirs, we observe that lie was painfully careful in watching his moods of mind, often referring to spiritual interposition what arose from wretched health; and that he was ever looking on events occurring in God's providence as <signs> indicating that he should pursue a particular line of conduct. It needed a philosophy -- we regret that it should have been an infidel one which did the work -- to correct these errors of a narrow theology.[31]

XVIII.-- DAVID DUDGEON.

A/LREADY\ the old orthodoxy was being troubled. Mr. David Dudgeon published, in 1732, a work entitled "The Moral World." We have no record of the early history of this man, and we do not know whether he received a college education. When he comes under our notice, he is tenant of a large farm called Lennel Hill, in the parish of Coldstream. In the work referred to he maintains, with clearness and ability, a doctrine like that of Anthony Collins, whom he had read. He asserts " that there is no evil in the moral world but what necessarily ariseth from the nature of imperfect creatures, who always pursue their good, but cannot but be liable to error or mistake," and that evil or sin is inseparable in some degree from all created beings, and most consistent with the designs of a perfect Creator." On account of the errors in this work, he was summoned before the Presbytery, where two charges are brought against him: 1st, That he denies and destroys all distinction and difference between moral good and evil, or else makes God the author of evil, and refers all evil to the imperfection of creatures; 2d, That he denies the punishment of another life, or that God punishes men for sin in this life, -- yea, that man is accountable. He appears before the court, and holds it to be contrary to Scripture that man has free-will in the Arminian sense, but holds that man is accountable and punishable for practising contrary to the divine precepts of our Saviour, the practice of which tends to make all men happy. The case goes up from presbytery to synod, and from synod to General Assembly, which remits it to the Commission of Assembly in 1733, again in 1734, again in 1735, and again in 1736, with no evidence that the commission ever ventured {112} to take it up.[32] In 1734, he published a vindication of the " Moral World," in reply to a pamphlet against him, said to be written by Andrew Baxter; and therein he maintains that when a rogue is hanged he is set free to enter a state where he may be reformed. His most important work is " Philosophical

Letters concerning the Being and Attributes of God," first printed in 1737. These letters were written, in the midst of pressing agricultural cares. to the Rev. Mr. Jackson, author of a work written in the spirit of Clarke, " The Existence and Unity of God." In these letters, Dudgeon reaches a species of refined Spinozism, mingled with Berkeleyanism. He denies the distinction of substances into spiritual and material, maintains that there is no substance distinct from God, and that "all our knowledge but of God is about ideas they exist only in the mind, and their essence and modes consist only in their being perceived." In 1739, he published a " Catechism founded upon Experience and Reason, collected by a Father for the use of his Children " and, in an introductory letter, lie wishes that natural religion alone was embraced by all men, and states that, though he believes there was an extraordinary man sent into our world seventeen hundred years ago to instruct mankind, yet he doubts whether he " ever commanded any of those things to be written concerning him which we have." The same year, he published " A View of the Necessitarian or Best Scheme, freed from the Objections of M. Crousaz, in his Examination of Pope's `Essay on Man.'"

Dudgeon died at Upsettlington, on the borders of England, January, 1743, at the age of thirty-seven. His works were published in a combined form in 1765, in a volume without a printer's name attached, showing, that there was not as yet thorough freedom of thought in Scotland. His writings had for a time a name in the district (the " Catechism " reached a third edition), but afterwards passed away completely from public notice. The late Principal Lee was most anxious to know more of his history, and in particular whether he could have influenced David Hume in personal intercourse or by his writings. As they lived in the same district, Hume must have heard of the case, which appeared when Hume was cogitating his own system. There are points in which Dudgeon anticipated Hume. Thus, Dudgeon maintains that all knowledge is about ideas, the essence of which is that they are perceived. He says that the words "just, unjust, desert &c., are necessarily relative to society; " and that if we allow that there is not justice in the government of this world, we cannot argue that there is justice in the world to come. Dudgeon, too, is a stern necessarian. But in all these points Dudgeon had himself been anticipated by others. In other respects the two widely differ. Dudgeon assumes throughout a much higher moral tone than Hume ever did. Dudgeon had evidently abandoned a belief in Christianity, but he stood up resolutely for a rational demonstration of the existence of God as the cause of the ideas which come under our experience; and he has a whole system of natural religion: whereas Hume undermines all religion, natural as well as revealed. {113} Dudgeon had superior philosophic abilities; and in other circumstances might have had a chance of becoming the head of a new philosophic Heresy. But there was a young man in his own neighborhood being trained to supersede and eclipse him in his own line, and to go beyond deism to atheism. It is thus that error advances till it corrects itself.

XIX.-- DAVID HUME.[33]

D/AVID\ H/UME\ was born at Edinburgh, on April 26, 1711. He was the second son of Joseph Home or Hume, of Ninewells, so called from a number of springs which may still be seen as fresh as when the name was given. The mansion is in the parish of Chirnside, in Berwickshire, and is situated on the green slope of a hill which rises from the river Whitadder, immediately in front. The situation is remarkably pleasant, and from the heights above there are extensive views of the whole eastern border country, now associated in the minds of all reading people with tales of romance. Here David Hume passed the greater portion of his younger years, and much of the quieter and more studious parts of his middle age. But he never refers to the scenes of his native place, not even (as Mr. Burton has remarked) when be has occasion in his History of England" to relate events which might have led him to do so. It is clear that his taste for the beauties of nature was never very keen; the time had not come when all people rave about natural scenery; he was in no way disposed to expose himself to English prejudice by betraying Scottish predilections, and I rather think that he was glad that the time of border raids had for ever passed away.

His father was a member of the Faculty of Advocates, but passed his life as a country gentleman. His mother was a daughter of Sir D. Falconer of Newton, who had been a lawyer in the times of the Stuarts, and had filled the office of president of the Court of Session from 1682 to 1685. So far as the youth was exposed to hereditary predilections, they were those of Scotch landlords, who ruled supreme in their own estates, of hard-headed Edinburgh lawyers, and of old families {114} opposed to the great Whig or covenanting struggle of the previous century. His father having died when the second son was yet an infant, the education of the children devolved on their mother, who is represented as training them with great care,-in what way or form in respect of religion we are not told.

David became an entrant of the class of William Scott, professor of Greek in the Edinburgh University, February 27, 1723, being still under twelve years of age. What his precise college course was is not recorded; but we know generally that in those times, and for many years after, boys who should have been at school, after getting an imperfect acquaintance with Latin and Greek, were introduced in the classes of logic, pneumatics, and moral philosophy, to subjects fitted only for men of mature powers and enlarged knowledge. I suspect there was no ruling mind among his teachers to sway him, and he was left to follow the bent of his own mind. Already he has a taste for literature, and a tendency to speculative philosophy. " I was seized very early," be says in " My Own Life," with a passion for literature, which has been the ruling passion of my life, and a great source of my enjoyments." In writing to a friend, July 4, 1727, he mentions having by him written papers which he will not make known till he has polished them, and these evidently contain the germs of a system of mental philosophy. " All the progress I have made is but drawing the outlines on loose bits of paper: here a hint of a passion; there a phenomenon in the mind accounted for; in

another an alteration of these accounts." Mr. Burton publishes part of a paper of his early years, being " An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honor." In it we have no appreciation of chivalry, but we have the germs of the historical, political, and ethical speculations which he afterwards developed. He inquires why courage is the principal virtue of barbarous nations, and why chastity is the point of honor with women (always a favorite topic with him), and is evidently in the direction of his utilitarian theory of virtue. About his seventeenth year he began, but speedily relinquished, the study of the law. " My studious disposition, my sobriety, and my industry, gave my family a notion that the law was a proper profession for me; but I found an unsurmountable aversion {115} to every thing but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning; and while they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors I was secretly devouring."

We have two admirable accounts of Hume's life: the one, " My Own Life," calm as philosophy itself; the other by Mr. Hill Burton, who had access to the papers collected by Baron Hume, and deposited with the Royal Society of Edinburgh; and who has collected all other available information, and put it together in a clear and systematic manner. But there is much that we should like to know not communicated. The autobiography, though honest enough, is not open or communicative. We may rest assured that in that great lake which spreads itself so calmly before us, there were depths, and movements in these depths, which have been kept from our view. Though so skilled in psychological analysis, he gives no account of the steps by which he was led to that deadly scepticism in philosophy and theology which be held by so firmly, and propounded so perseveringly. Mr. Burton has, however, published a remarkable document, which lets us see what we should never have learned from " My Own Life," that there had been an awful struggle and a crisis.

It is a letter written to a physician with great care, but possibly never sent. He begins with stating that he " had always a strong inclination to books and letters," and that, after fifteen years, he had been left to his own choice in reading: " I found it to incline almost equally to books of reasoning and philosophy, and to poetry and the polite authors. Every one who is acquainted either with the philosophers or critics, knows that there is nothing yet established in either of these sciences, and that they contain little more than endless disputes, even in the most fundamental articles. Upon examination of these, I found a certain boldness of temper growing in me, which was not inclined to submit to any authority on these subjects, but led me to seek out some new medium by which truth might be established. After much study and reflection on this, at last, when I was about eighteen years of age, there seemed to be opened up to me a new source of thought, which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ardor natural to young men, throw up every other pleasure or {116} business to apply actively to it. The law, which was the business I designed to follow, appeared nauseous to me; and I could think of no other way of pushing my fortune in the world but that of scholar and philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this course of life for some months, till at last,

about the be ginning of September, 1729, all my ardor seemed in a moment to be extinguished, and I could no longer raise my mind to that pitch which formerly gave me such excessive pleasure. I felt no uneasiness or want of spirits when I laid aside my book; and therefore never imagined there was any bodily distemper in the case, but that my coldness proceeded from a laziness of temper which must be overcome by redoubling my application. In this condition I remained for nine months, very uneasy to myself, but without growing any worse, which was a miracle. There was another particular which contributed more than any thing to waste my spirits, and bring on me this distemper, which was, that, having read many books of morality,-- such as Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, - and being smit with their beautiful representations of virtue and philosophy, I undertook the improvement of my temper and will, along with my reason and understanding. I was continually fortifying myself with reflections against death and poverty and shame and pain, and all the other calamities of life. These no doubt are exceeding useful when joined with an active life, because the occasion being presented, along with the reflection, works it into the soul, and makes it take a deep impression; but in solitude they serve to little other purpose than to waste the spirits, the force of the mind meeting with no resistance, but wasting itself in the air, like our arm when it misses the aim. This, however, I did not learn but by experience, and till I had already ruined my health, though I was not sensible of it." He then describes the symptoms: scurvy spots breaking out on his fingers the first winter, then a wateriness in the mouth. Next year, about May, 173 1, there grew upon him a ravenous appetite, and a palpitation of heart. In six weeks, from " being tall, lean, and rawboned, he became on a sudden the most sturdy robust, healthful-like fellow you have seen, with a ruddy complexion and a cheerful countenance." He goes on to say, that " having now time and leisure to cool my inflamed imagination, I began to consider seriously how I should proceed with my philosophical {117} studies. I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity labored under the same inconvenience that has been found in their natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending more upon invention than experience every one consulted his fancy in erecting schemes of virtue and happiness, without regarding human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend. This, therefore, I resolved to male my principal study, and the source from which I would derive every truth in criticism as well as morality." He tells how he had read most of the celebrated books in Latin, French, and English; how "within these three years I find I have scribbled many a quire of paper, in which there is nothing contained but my own inventions;" how he " had collected the rude materials for many volumes but he adds, " I had no hopes of delivering my opinions with such elegance and neatness as to draw to me the attention of the world, and I would rather live and die in obscurity than produce them maimed and imperfect." "It. is a weakness rather than lowness of spirits which troubles me;" and he traces an analogy between what he had passed through and recorded religious experiences. " I have noticed in the writings of the French mystics, and in those of our fanatics here, that when they give a history of the situation of their souls,

they mention a coldness and desertion of the spirit, which frequently returns." But, " however this may be, I have not come out of the cloud so well as they commonly tell us they have done, or rather began to despair of ever recovering. To keep myself from being melancholy on so dismal a prospect, my only security was in peevish reflections on the vanity of the world, and of all human glory, which, however just sentiments they may be esteemed, I have found can never be sincere, except in those who are possessed of them. Being sensible that all my philosophy would never make me contented in my present situation, I began to rouse up myself." He found these two things very bad for this distemper, study and idleness, and so he wishes to betake himself to active life. His choice was confined to two kinds of life, that of a travelling governor, and that of a merchant. The first not being fit for him he says he is now on his way to Bristol, to engage in business till he is able to "leave this distemper behind me." He says, that " all the physicians {118} I have consulted, though very able, could never enter into my distemper," and so he now applies to this eminent doctor.

In this remarkable document Hume unbosoms himself for the first time, and, I may add, for the last time. He had endeavored to act the self-righteous and self-sufficient stoic. We have other evidence of this. In the letter already extracted from, written when he was sixteen, he says. "I hate task-reading, and I diversify them at pleasure; sometimes a philosopher, sometimes a poet." "The philosopher's wise man and the poet's husbandman agree in peace of mind in a liberty and independence on fortune, and contempt of riches, power, and glory. Every thing is placid and quiet in both, nothing perturbed or in disorder." " A perfectly wise man that outbraves fortune is surely greater than the husbandman who slips by her; and indeed this pastoral and Saturnian happiness I have in a great measure come at just now. I live a king, pretty much by myself, neither full of action nor perturbation, -- <molles somnos>. This state, however, I can foresee, is not to be relied on. My peace of mind is not sufficiently confirmed by philosophy to withstand the blows of fortune. This greatness and elevation of soul is to be found only in study and contemplation; this can alone teach us to look down on human accidents. You must allow me to talk thus like a philosopher; 'tis a subject I think much on, and could talk all day long of." But the attempt had turned out a miserable failure, as he acknowledges in his letter to the physician. Doubts had crept in, and the stoic was tempted to turn sceptic. Writing long after to Sir Gilbert Elliott in regard to his " Dialogues on Natural Religion," which sap all religion, be mentions a manuscript, afterwards destroyed, which he had written before twenty. "It began with an anxious search after arguments to confirm the common opinion, doubts stole in, dissipated, returned, were again dissipated, returned again; and it was a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against inclination, perhaps against reason."

The letter is supposed by Mr. Burton, on good grounds, to have been written to the celebrated Dr. Cheyne, author of the Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion" (1705),

and The English Malady; or a Treatise of Nervous Diseases of all kinds, Spleens, Vapours, Lowness of Spirits, Hypochondriacal {119} Distempers," &c. It is doubtful whether the letter ever reached Dr. Cheyne, and it may be doubted whether that eminent physician had in all his pharmacopoea a medicine to cure the malady of this remarkable youth. Dr. Cheyne defends with the common arguments the "great fundamental principles of all virtue and all morality: viz., the existence of a supreme and infinitely perfect Being; the freedom of the will, the immortality of the spirits of all intellectual beings, and the certainty of future rewards or punishments." But the youth who proposed to address him had already a system evolved which undermined all these. One could have wished that there had been a friend at hand to direct him away from Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, to a better teacher who is never mentioned. Not that we should have expected him in his then state to be drawn to the character of Jesus, but he might have found something in His work fitted to give peace and satisfaction to his distracted soul. But it is useless to speculate on these possibilities. All he says himself is: " In 1734 I went to Bristol with some recommendations to eminent merchants, but in a few months found that scene totally unsuitable to me. I went over to France, with a view of prosecuting my studies in a country retreat, and I there laid that plan of life which I have steadily and successfully pursued."[34]

We can easily picture the youth of twenty-three as he set out for France. By nature he is one of a class of persons to be found in all countries, but quite as frequently in Scotland as anywhere else, who are endowed with a powerful intellect, conjoined with a heavy animal temperament, and who, with no high aspirations, ideal, ethereal, or spiritual, have a tendency {120} to look with suspicion on all kinds of enthusiasm and highflown zeal. With an understanding keen and searching, he could not be contented with the appearances of things, and was ever bent on penetrating beneath the surface; and his native shrewdness, his hereditary predilections, and the reaction against the heats of the previous century, all combined to lead him to question common impressions and popular opinions. He saw the difficulties which beset philosophical and theological investigations, and was unable to deliver himself from them, being without the high sentiments which might have lifted him above the low philosophy of his own day in England and France, and the sophistries suggested by a restless intellect. He knew only the ancient Stoic philosophy in the pages of Roman authors, and the modern philosophy of Locke, as modified by such men as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and driven to its logical consequences by Berkeley: he bad tried the one in his practical conduct, and the other by his sifting intellect, and having found both wanting, he is prepared to abandon himself to scepticism, which is the miserable desert resorted to by those who despair of truth. Meanwhile his great intellectual powers find employment in constructing theories of the mind, in which he himself perhaps had no great faith, but which seemed the logical conclusion of the acknowledged philosophical principles of his time, and quite as plausible as any that had been devised by others, and brought such

fame to their authors.

With these predilections, France was the country which had most attractions to him, but was at the same time the most unfortunate country he could have gone to, and the middle of the eighteenth century the most unfortunate period for visiting it. In philosophy, the age had outgrown Descartes and Malebranche, Arnauld and Pascal, and the grave and earnest thinkers of the previous century, and was embracing the most superficial parts of Locke's philosophy, which had been introduced by Voltaire to the knowledge of Frenchmen, who turned it to a wretched sensationalism. In religion he saw around him, among the great mass of the people, a very corrupted and degenerate form of Christianity, while, among the educated classes, infidelity was privately cherished, and was ready to burst out. Voltaire had issued his first attack on Christianity, {121} in his " Epitre a Uranie," published in 1728, and the fire spread with a rapidity which showed that there were materials ready to catch it and propagate it. Sixty years later, one so fond of order and peace would have been scared by the effects produced by scepticism, so powerful in overthrowing old abuses, and so weak in constructing any thing new or better but at this time infidelity was full of hope, and promising an era of liberty and peace. The very section of the Catholic Church which retained the highest faith and the purest morality, had unfortunately been involved in a transaction which favored the sceptical tendency among shrewd minds. Only a few years before, the people believed that the sick were healed, and the blind made to see at the tomb of the famous Jansenist, the Abbe Paris; the noise made by the occurrences, and the discussions created by them, had not passed away when Hume arrived in Paris; and the youth pondered the event, to bring it out years after in his " Essay on Miracles." While he lived at La Fleche, a Jesuit plied him with some "nonsensical miracle," performed lately in their convent, and then and there occurred to him the famous argument which he afterwards published against miracles. " As my head was full of the topics of the `Treatise of Human Nature,' which I was at that time composing, the argument immediately occurred to me, and I thought it very much gravelled my companion; but at last he observed to me that it was impossible for that argument to have any validity, because it operated equally against the gospel as the Catholic miracles, which observation I thought fit to admit as a sufficient answer."

After living a short time in Paris, he retired to Rheims, and afterwards went to La Fleche, where he passed two of the three years he spent in France. We know nothing of his employments these years, except that he devoted himself most earnestly to the composition of his " Treatise on Human Nature." In 1737 he brought it over with him to London, where he published the two first books the end of the following year.

This treatise is by far the most important of all. his philosophical works. If we except certain speculations in history and political economy, it contains nearly all his favorite ideas. He devoted to it all the resources of his

mighty intellect. He {122} had read extensively, pondered deeply, and taken immense pains in polishing his style. He could scarcely, indeed, be called a learned man, in the technical sense of the term, but he was well informed. We could have wished that he had possessed wider sympathies with earnest seekers after truth in all ages, but this was not in the nature of the man. His knowledge of Greek was very imperfect at this time (he afterwards renewed his acquaintance with that language); what he knew of Greek philosophy was chiefly through Cicero (his very pictures of the Stoics and Epicureans are Roman rather than Grecian), and he never entered into the spirit of such deep and earnest thinkers as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, -- he tells us somewhere that the fame of Aristotle is utterly decayed. In respect even of modern writers, he never comprehended the profundity of such men as Cudworth and Descartes in the previous century; and he had no appreciation of the speculations of Clarke and Leibnitz, who lived in the age immediately preceding his own. He belongs to the cold, elegant, doubting, and secular eighteenth century; and, setting little value on antiquity, he builds for the present and the future on the philosophy of his own time.

As to style, which he greatly cultivated, the models which he set before him were the Roman prose writers, the French authors of his own day, and the Englishmen who were introducing the French clearness and point, such as Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, and Pope, -- he says: " The first polite prose we have was written by Swift." Though he took great pains, he never altogether succeeded in weeding out his Scotticisms, nor in acquiring a genuine English idiom; but his style is always clear, manly, and elegant, and worthy of his weighty thoughts. When he broke down his elaborate treatise into smaller ones, he endeavored to catch the ease and freedom of the lighter French literature; but neither the subjects discussed nor the ideas of the author admit of such treatment; and though the essays are more ornate, and have more attempts at smartness and repartee, the student will ever betake himself to the treatise, as containing the only systematic, and by far the most satisfactory statement of his views.

He is now publicly committed to a theory, and he adheres to it resolutely and doggedly. In after years he said: " So {123} great an undertaking, planned before I was one-and-twenty, and composed before twenty-five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my haste a hundred and a hundred times." But this refers to the form and style, not the matter. He never abandoned nor modified the scepticism advanced in the early work. When he failed in obtaining a hearing for his views in the more elaborate treatise, he set them forth in " Essays," which might be more attractive to the general reader. He had instituted an inquiry, and satisfied himself that speculative truth was unattainable, either in philosophy or theology , owing to the weakness of the human intellect, and he did not wish to be disturbed with questionings. He seems to have studiously abstained from speaking on such subjects in social intercourse, except at times, in a tone of playful humor, not meant to be offensive; and on becoming an author he

formed the resolution " never to reply to anybody." He rather delighted to associate with ministers of religion, such as Robertson, Blair, and Carlyle, whom he reckoned moderate and tolerant, and helpful in producing a religious indifference; but he never allowed them to try to convert him to the truths of natural and revealed religion which they held by; and when Dr. Blair ventured on one occasion to make the attempt, he received such a reply as prevented the repetition of it on any future occasion. There are traditions of him and Adam Smith conversing familiarly on such subjects on the sands of Kirkcaldy, and of Hume succeeding in bringing his friend over to infidelity; but we have no authenticated record of Hume ever opening to any human being the religious or irreligious convictions of his soul. A good-natured and sociable man, kind and indulgent to those with whom he came in contact, he passed through life a solitary being, certainly with no God, and apparently with no human being to whom to unbosom himself.

Having set the matured and confirmed man before our readers, we have no intention of detailing minutely the events of his future life. Having published his work, he retired to Ninewells to wait the result. "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my `Treatise of Human Nature.' It fell deadborn from the press without reaching such distinction as even to create a murmur among the zealots." He evidently felt the {124} disappointment. "I am out of humor with myself." He was amazed that the liberty he had taken with all established truth had not created a sensation. But he was conscious of intellectual power: he had laid his plan for life; and he indomitably persevered in his literary career. Next year he published the third volume of his treatise, that on ethics, with no better success. In 1741 he printed at Edinburgh the first, and in 1742 the second, of his " Essays Moral and Political." The work was favorably received and he was encouraged. In 1744 he was anxious to be appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, but public sentiment could not bear the idea of one so sceptical being appointed a teacher of youth. He was a younger brother without a profession, and he wished to have a competency; and so in 1745, the year of the rebellion of Prince Charles, he became the companion and guide of the weak-minded Marquis of Annandale. The engagement brought him some accession of fortune, but terminated abruptly from the caprice of the Marquis. In 1747 he attended General St. Clair in his military embassy to the Courts of Vienna and Turin. There he saw a variety of life; and he congratulates himself that when the engagement closed, he was " master of near a thousand pounds." In 1748 he cast the first part of his unfortunate treatise in a new form, in the "Inquiry concerning Human Understanding," but the work failed to excite any interest. His brother at Ninewells having married in 1751, his place of residence was now Edinburgh, where he was appointed to, and held for five years, the office of librarian to the advocates' library, a situation which brought him little or no emolument. In 1752 he published in Edinburgh the second part of his essays, being his " Political Discourses." This work was immediately received with acclamation; and, being translated into French, it procured him a high reputation, and in fact awakened those discussions which issued in making political

economy a science in the " Wealth of Nations." Whatever merit Hume may have in demolishing error, he has, I believe, established very little positive truth: what he effected in this way was done in political economy. The same year he published his " Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," being an improved version of the third part of his treatise. " Meanwhile my bookseller, A. Millar, informed me that my {125} former publications (all but the unfortunate treatise) were beginning to be the subject of conversation, that the sale of them was gradually increasing, and that new editions were demanded. Answers by reverends and right reverends came out two or three in a year; and I found, by Dr. Warburton's railing, that the books were beginning to be esteemed in good company." He had long had the idea of writing some historical work, and from the time of his being appointed librarian to the well-stored advocates' collection of books, he formed the plan of writing the " History of England." The first volume commenced with the accession of the house of Stuart, but was received so coldly that in a twelvemonth the publisher sold only forty-five copies. Nevertheless he persevered, bringing out volume after volume, till at last the great merits of the work were acknowledged. This perseverance in his life plan, in spite of discouragements, I reckon as the noblest feature in Hume's character. It does not concern us here to speak of the excellencies and defects of the history. It could be shown that the prejudices running throughout it were his constitutional and hereditary ones, and that the work, as a whole, is an illustration of his metaphysical and ethical theory.

In 1763 he received from the Earl of Hertford an invitation to attend him on his embassy to Paris. His visit to the capital of France on this occasion deserves a special notice. It may be doubted whether there ever were such compliments paid to any literary man. Dukes, mareschals, foreign ambassadors, vied with each other in honoring him. The famous men, whose persons and conversations he liked best, were D'Alembert, Marmontel, Diderot, Duclos, Helvetius, and old President Henault; and he writes to Dr. Blair, and bids him tell Dr. Robertson that there was not a single deist among them, meaning that there was none of them but went farther. He met also with Buffon, Malesherbes, Crebillon, Holbach, Renauld, Suard, and Turgot.

But he was the special favorite of the ladies, who at that time ruled the fashion in Paris. In particular, he was flattered and adored by the Countess de Boufflers. His correspondence with that lady had commenced in 1761. She addressed him first, declaring the admiration which, your sublime work (the `History of England') has awakened in me." "I know no terms {126} capable of expressing what I felt in reading the work. I was moved, transported; and the emotion which it caused me, is in some measure painful by its continuance. It elevates the soul it fills the heart with sentiments of humanity and benevolence it enlightens the intellect, by showing that true happiness is closely connected with virtue; and discovers, by the same light, what is the end, the sole end, of every reasonable being"! In truth, I believed I had before my eyes the work of some celestial being, free from the passions of humanity, who,

for the benefit of the human race, has designed to write the events of these latter times"! The philosopher is evidently gratified. " What new wonder is this which your letter presents to me? I not only find a lady, who, in the bloom of beauty and height of reputation, can withdraw herself from the pleasures of a gay court, and find leisure to cultivate the sciences, but deigns to support a correspondence with a man of letters, in a remote country, and to reward his labors by a suffrage the most agree able of all others to a man who has any spark of generous sentiment or taste for true glory." This lady, it is proper to say in plain terms, was the wife of the Comte de Boufflers, still alive, but the mistress of the Prince of Conti, who superintended for the king that mean diplomatic correspondence which he carried on unknown to his ministers. Hume might also be seen attending the evening <salons> of Madame Geoffrin, who had been the daughter of a <valet de chambre>, and was now the centre of a circle of artists and men of letters. He also waited on the entertainments of the famous Mademoiselle de l'Espinasse, who, originally an illegitimate child, had raised herself by being, first, the humble companion, and then the rival of Madame Du Deffaud, and was well known to have been the mistress of a number of successive or contemporaneous lovers. There must have been something in the philosophy of Hume which recommended him to so many ladies of this description. We believe they were glad to find so eminent a philosopher, with a system which did not seem to bear bard upon them. The courtiers told him that Madame de Pompadour " was never heard to say so much to any man."

He says of himself: " I eat nothing but ambrosia, drink nothing but nectar, breathe nothing but incense, and tread on nothing but flowers. Every man I meet, and still more every lady, {127} would think they were wanting in the most indispensable duty if they did not make a long and elaborate harangue in my praise." Lord Charlemont has given us a picture, or rather a caricature, of his person as he met him at Turin some years before this. " His face was broad and flat, his mouth wide, and without any other expression than that of imbecility. His eyes vacant and spiritless, and the corpulence of his whole person was far better fitted to communicate the idea of a turtle-eating alderman than of a refined philosopher. His speech in English was tendered ridiculous by the broadest Scotch accent, and his French was, if possible, still more laughable." This was the man who was made by the Parisian ladies to take the part, in an acted tableau, of a sultan assailed by two female slaves: " On le place sur un sopha entre les deux plus jolies femmes de Paris, il les regarde attentivement, il se frappe le ventre et les genoux A plusieurs reprises, et ne trouve jamais autre chose a leur dire que, -- `Eh bien! mes demoiselles. . . . Eh bien! nous voila donc. . . . Eh bien ! vous voila. . . . vous voila ici.'" His good sense led him to see the vanity of all this: but he was pleased with it; and he often expresses a wish to settle in Paris, or somewhere in France.

When he was introduced to the Dauphin, his son, afterwards the unfortunate Louis XVI., but then a boy of nine, stepped forth, evidently by instruction, and told him

how many friends and admirers he had in the country, and that he reckoned himself among the number from the reading of many passages in his works. The Comte de Provence (who, after his long exile, became Louis XVIII.),a year or so younger, now approached Hume, and told him he had been long and impatiently expected in France, and that he anticipated great pleasure from reading his fine history. Even the Comte d'Artois, afterwards Charles X., but then a boy of six, had to mumble a panegyric. A wise man learned in providence might have seen that awful miseries must issue from a state of things in which, as Horace Walpole pointedly expresses it, " There is a God and the king to be pulled down first, and men and women are devoutly employed in the demolition," while princes were taught to cherish the viper that was to sting them. It would have been an appropriate punishment to have got Hume placed, half a century later, in the scenes of the French Revolution, to let him eat the fruit of the seed he had helped to sow. {128}

But what, it may be asked, did be think of the state of society in which he had to mingle? It is evident that he was horrified at times with the proclaimed atheism of men and women. But what did he think of the morality of the circles in which he moved, more especially of the loose relationship of the marriage tie? Did his utilitarian theory of morals, of which he surely knew the bearing and tendency, allow of such a state of things? It is certain that Hume uttered no protest at the time, and he has left behind no condemnation of the morality of France, while he was fond of making sly and contemptuous allusions to the manifestations of religious zeal in his own country. The tone of morality in France could never have been amended by him, nor, we venture to say, by any utilitarian. When the husband of Madame Boufflers dies, he writes to her as a person now within reach of honor and felicity; that is, as likely to be married to the Prince de Conti. However, the prince declines, and Hume gives her wise enough counsel: gradually to diminish her connection with the prince, and at last to separate from him; and, he says: " If I could dispose of my fate, nothing would be so much my choice as to live where I might cultivate your friendship. Your taste for travelling might also afford you a plausible pretence for putting this plan in execution; a journey to Italy would loosen your connections here; and, if it were delayed, I would, with some probability, expect to have the felicity of attending you thither." One can picture the scene; the countess travelling with Hume attending her. But the prospect had not such attractions as to induce her to leave the prince. Hume continued his correspondence with her; and, on hearing of the death of the Prince of Conti, wrote her within a few days of his own death, knowing he was dying, and expresses no condemnation of her past conduct. The question arises whether this would be the moral tone allowed in a community in which the word of God is discarded, and utilitarian principles are adopted?

We do not mean to discuss the miserable quarrel between him and Rousseau. His attention was called to the alleged ill usage of Rousseau by Madame de Boufflers, who described him as a noble and disinterested soul, " flying from intercourse with the world," and " feeling pleasure only in

solitude." Hume, believing him to be persecuted, exerted himself to help him. {129} But his morbid vanity and intolerable habits (he insisted in taking his disgusting governante with him when he visited a family) rendered it impossible to befriend him. Unwilling to allow himself to think, or let others conclude, that he was indebted to any one, he repaid Hume's manly and delicate kindness with suspicion; and Hume, who began by describing him as a man whose modesty proceeded from ignorance of his own excellence," ended by declaring him to be " the blackest and most atrocious villain beyond comparison that now exists in the world." It is justice to Hume to say that he was always kind to persons of literary ability. Thus, he interested himself much in Thomas Blacklock, a blind man, of some poetical talent, when the people of Kirkcudbright declined to accept him as their minister. He also did all in his power to bring into notice the publications of Robertson, Adam Smith, and Ferguson.

By his connection with the embassy and the sale of his works, which had become great, he now attained a competency which made him feel independent. He had many temptations to settle in France, but old associations drew him back to Scotland. It was proposed by Lord Hertford to send him to Ireland as Secretary; but the Irish would not receive him, because he was a Scotchman. It was on this occasion that the Princess Amelia said that she thought the affair might be easily accommodated. "Why may not Lord Hertford give a bishopric to Mr. Hume?" In 1767-68 he was appointed by Lord Conway Under-Secretary of State, and had charge of Scottish affairs, including the patronage of churches But his residence was now mainly in Edinburgh, first in the old town, afterwards in a house which he built in the new town, in St. David Street, so called as the name had been chalked on the wall by a witty young lady as she passed. Here he was the acknowledged chief of a literary circle, embracing men of considerable eminence, such as Robertson, Blair, Lord Kames, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith at Kirkcaldy, who all looked up to him with respect. He rather enjoyed being an object of wonder to the multitude beyond the favored circle in which he mingled, and made many jocular remarks about the unpopularity of his opinions. Good-natured, sociable, and avoiding controversy, he suffered few annoyances {130} because of his scepticism -- certainly none that deserved to be called persecution. For we suppose it will be scarcely reckoned as such, that, on one occasion, in picking his steps from his lodging in the old town to the house he was building in the new, he fell into a swamp, and, observing some Newhaven fishwives passing, he called to them for help, but on learning that it was Hume the unbeliever who was in such a plight, they refused to aid him till he said the Lord's prayer. He carried on a pleasant correspondence with Sir Gilbert Elliott of Minto, with Mure of Caldwell, and others of a literary or philosophic taste. He lived on familiar terms with several of the moderate clergy, such as Robertson and Blair, and at times mingled in their ecclesiastical counsels. Many of the younger ministers reckoned it an honor to be admitted to his society, and he encouraged them to associate with him. These circumstances have led some to think that the leading moderate ministers of that period must have been infidels in secret, and acting

hypocritically in professing Christianity; but there is no ground for such a charge: they believed sincerely in the doctrines of natural religion, and in the Word of God as inspired to teach a pure morality and the immortality of the soul. But it is equally clear, that they had no faith in the peculiar Bible doctrines of grace; and Hume was delighted to find them frowning on all religious earnestness, and advancing so rapidly on the road to deism and philosophic indifference.

By April, 1776, Hume knew that he would not recover from the disease with which he had been afflicted for two years, being a disorder in the bowels. He bought a piece of ground in the new church-yard in the Calton Hill as a burying-place, and left money for the erection of a small monument, with the simple inscription, " David Hume." lie wrote " My Own Life," giving an account of his literary career. In his will Adam Smith had been appointed his literary executor, and two hundred pounds had been bequeathed to him for the pains he might take in correcting and publishing his " Dialogues on Natural Religion," a work written before 1751, but not yet given to the world. But he had ground for fearing that Smith might be unwilling to take the odium of editing such a work, and so he took effectual steps to guard against its suppression. He came to {131} an understanding with Smith on the subject, and in a codicil to his will, dated August 7, he left the manuscripts to Strahan the publisher, ordaining " that if my `Dialogues' from whatever cause be not published within two years and a half after my death, as also the account of my life, the property shall return to my nephew David, whose duty in publishing them, as the last request of his uncle, must be approved of by all the world." Strahan was as indisposed as Smith to undertake the responsibility of publishing so offensive a work. The truth is, Hume's Scottish friends, though they had abandoned Christianity, were most anxious to have left to them a natural religion, in which they might find a refuge and some comfort; and in the "Dialogues" Hume had undermined this last support. The " Dialogues " were published in 1779 by the author's nephew.

In April he took a journey to Bath for the benefit of his health, but with no hope of ultimate recovery. John Home, the author of " Douglas, a Tragedy," travelled with him, and has preserved a diary. He talked cheerfully of the topics of the day, and of his favorite subjects, lamenting over the state of the nation, and predicting that the national debt must be the ruin of Britain. He returned to Edinburgh about the beginning of July. Dr. Cullen reports: " He passed most part of the day in his drawing-room: admitted the visits of his friends, and with his usual spirits conversed with them upon literature, politics, or whatever was accidentally started." Colonel Edmonstoune had come to take leave of him Hume said he had been reading a few days before, Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead," and, among all the reasons for not entering readily into Charon's boat, he could not find one that fitted him, and he invented several peculiar ones to give the boatman. " I might urge, I Have a little patience, good Charon: I have been endeavoring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfall of some of

the prevailing systems of superstition.' But Charon would then lose all temper and decency: `You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term ? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy, loitering rogue.'" All this is evidently very gratifying to the colonel. Dr. Black reports that he " passes his time very well with the assistance of amusing books." {132} Dr. Cullen continues: "For a few days before his death, he became more averse to receive visits; speaking, became more and more difficult to him; and for twelve hours before his death his speech failed him altogether. His senses and judgment did not fail till the last hour of his life. He constantly discovered a strong sensibility to the attention and care of his friends, and, amidst great uneasiness and languor, never betrayed any peevishness or impatience."

This was the account left by his literary friends, and it was matter of triumph to them that he betrayed no signs of fear in his hour of weakness. Are we to allow, that, as in the early ages of the world's history, those who did not like to retain God in their knowledge continued all their lives in the most abject superstition , so in these last days, under other influences, there may be persons so bewildered that they die as they live, without any fixed religious belief? The fact, if it be a fact, is not flattering to the race; nor is the prospect encouraging. Good Christians had hoped, that ere he left the world there might be a change of sentiment, and an acknowledgment of the existence of God, and the need of a Saviour. Many of them maintained that it was impossible for an infidel to die in peace, and it was reported among religious circles, that, though he was cheerful when his unbelieving friends visited him, he had terrible uneasiness when left alone. Some of these rumors utterly break down when we try to trace them to their original sources. The statement, however, of Mr. Robert Haldane of Airthrey, as to what he learned from his neighbor, Mr. Abercromby of Tullibody, must contain some truth. Mr. Abercromby was travelling to Haddington in a lumbering stage-coach. " The conversation during the tedious journey turned on the death-bed of the great philosopher, and as Mr. Abercromby's son-in-law, Colonel Edmonstoune of Newton, was one of Hume's intimate friends, he had heard from him much of the buoyant cheerfulness which had enlivened the sick room of the dying man. Whilst the conversation was running on in this strain, a respectable-looking female, dressed in black, who made a fourth in the coach, begged permission to offer a remark: `Gentlemen,' she said, `I attended Mr. Hume on his death-bed, but, I can assure you, I hope never again to attend the death-bed of a philosopher.' {133} They then cross-examined her as to her meaning; and she told them that, when his friends were with him, Mr. Hume was cheerful even to frivolity, but that when alone be was often overwhelmed with unutterable gloom, and had in his hours of depression declared that he had been in search of light all his life, but was now in greater darkness than ever." This is Mr. Haldane's statement, as taken from Mr. Abercromby.[35] We confess we should like to know more of this woman in black, and to have taken part in the cross-questioning. The question is left in that region of doubt where Hume himself left all religion. He died on

Monday, August 26, 1776, at four o'clock in the afternoon.

Everybody knows that Hume was a sceptic. It is not so generally known that he has developed a full system of the human mind. Students of philosophy should make themselves acquainted with it. It has in fact been the stimulating cause of all later European philosophy: of that of Reid and his school of that of Kant, and the powerful thinkers influenced by him and of that of M. Cousin, and his numerous followers in France, in their attempt to combine Reid and Kant. Nor is it to be omitted that Mr. J. S. Mill, in his " Examination of Hamilton," has reproduced to a large extent the theory of Hume, but without so clearly seeing or candidly avowing the consequences. I rather think that Mr. Mill himself is scarcely aware of the extent of the resemblance between his doctrines and those of the Scottish sceptic; as he seems to have wrought out his conclusions from data supplied him by his own father, Mr. James Mill, who, however, has evidently drawn much from Hume. The circumstance that Mr. Mill's work was welcomed by such declamations by the chief literary organs in London is a proof, either that the would-be leaders of opinion are so ignorant of philosophy that they do not see the consequences; or that the writers, being chiefly young men bred at Oxford or Cambridge, are fully prepared to accept them in the reaction against the revived mediaevalism which was sought to be imposed upon them. In no history of philosophy that we are acquainted with is there a good account of the system of Hume. As few persons now read, or in fact ever did read, through his weighty {134} volumes, we are in hopes that some may feel grateful to us, if in short space we give them an expository and critical account of his philosophy, with a special facing towards the philosophy which has been introduced among us by the British section of the nescient school of Comte.

Hume begins thus his famous "Treatise of Human Nature:" "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I call <impressions> and <ideas>. The difference betwixt them consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may name <impressions>, and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By <ideas>, I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion." He tells us, that, in the use of terms, " I rather restore the word <idea> to its original sense, from which Mr. Locke had perverted it, in making it stand for all our perceptions." This theory is certainly very simple, but surely it is lamentably scanty. It will not do to place under the same bead, and call by the one name of <impressions>, two such things as the affections of the senses on the one hand, and the mental emotions of hope, fear, joy, and sorrow, on the other. Nor can we allow him to describe all our sense-perceptions by the vague name of impressions. What is meant by impressions? If the word bas

any proper meaning, it must signify that there is something impressing, without which there would be no impression, and also something impressed. If Hume admits all this to be in the impression we ask him to go on with us to inquire what is in the thing impressed and in the thing that impresses, and we are at once in the region of existences, internal and external. " I never," he says, " catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception." His very language contradicts itself. He talks of catching <himself>. What is this <self> that he catches? But he may say it is only a perception. I reply that there is more. We never observe {135} a perception alone. We always observe self as perceiving. It is true that I never can catch myself at any time without a perception; but it is quite as certain, and we have the same evidence for it, that we never observe a perception except when we observe self perceiving. Let us unfold what is in this self, and we shall find that it no way resembles an impression, like that left by a seal upon wax.[36] In regard to certain of our perceptions, those through the senses, we observe not only the self perceiving, but an object perceived.

He now explains the way in which <ideas> appear. By memory the impressions come forth in their original order and position as ideas. This is a defective account of memory, consciousness being the witness. In memory, we have not only a reproduction of a sensation, or, it may be, a mental affection, we recognize it as <having been before us in time past>. Of all this we have as clear evidence as we have of the presence of the idea.[37] In imagination the ideas are more strong and lively, and are transposed and changed. This, he says, is effected by an associating quality; and he here develops his account of the laws of association, which has been so commended. But the truth is, his views on this subject, so far from being an advance on those of Hutcheson, are rather a retrogression: they are certainly far behind those of his contemporary Turnbull. He seems to confine the operation of association to the exercise of imagination: he does not see that our very memories are regulated by the same principle; nay, he allows that the imagination can join two ideas without it. The associating qualities are said by him to be three in number: resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause or effect. "I do not find," he says, "that {136} any philosopher has attempted to enumerate all the principles of association." But the classification propounded by him bears so close a resemblance to that of Aristotle, that we must believe that the one given by the Stagyrite had, in the course of his reading, fallen under his notice, though he had forgotten the circumstance. The difference between the two lies in Hume giving us cause and effect, instead of contrast as proposed by the Greek philosopher. It has often been remarked that Hume's arrangement is redundant, inasmuch as cause and effect, according to him, are nothing but contiguity in time and place.

He now shows how our complex ideas are formed. Following Locke, he represents these as consisting of substances, modes, and relations. He dismisses substance very summarily. He proceeds on the view of substance given by Locke, one of the most defective and unsatisfactory parts

of his philosophy. Locke stood tip for some unknown thing, called substance, behind the qualities. Berkeley had shown that there is no evidence of the existence of such a substratum. Hume assumes that we have no idea of external substance different from the qualities, and he proceeds to show that we have no notion of the substance mind distinct from particular perceptions. " I believe none will assert that substance is either a color, or a sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions, none of which can possibly represent a substance." A substance is thus nothing else than a collection of particular qualities united by the imagination. He thus suits the idea to his preconceived theory, instead of looking at the peculiar idea, and suiting his theory to the facts. I give up the idea of an unknown substratum behind the qualities. I stand up only for what we know. In consciousness, we know self, and in sense-perception we know the external objects as <existing things exercising qualities>. In this is involved what I reckon the true idea of substance. We can as little know the qualities apart from an object exercising them, as we can an object apart from qualities. We know both in one concrete act, and we have the same evidence of the one as the other.

When he comes to modes, he examines them by the doctrine {137} of abstract or general ideas propounded by Berkeley, which he characterizes "as one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters." According to this very defective theory (as it appears to us), all abstract or general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term. Like Locke, Hume confounds abstract and general ideas, which should be carefully distinguished: the former meaning the notion of the part of an object as a part, more particularly an attribute; the other, the notion of objects possessing common attributes, the notion being such that it embraces all the objects possessing the common attributes. Abstraction and generalization are most important intellectual operations, the one bringing specially to view what is involved in the concrete knowledge (not impression) of the individual, and the other exhibiting the qualities in respect of which objects agree. Without such elaborative processes, we should never know all that is involved in our original perceptions by sense and consciousness. Nor is it to be forgotten, that when the concrete is a real object, the abstract is a real quality existing in the object; and that when the singulars are real, the universal is also real, that is, a class all the objects in which possess common qualities. Here again we find Hume overlooking one of the most essential of our mental attributes, and thus degrading human intelligence. In relation to the particular end for which he introduces his doctrine, I hold that substance and mode are known in one concrete act and that we can separate them by abstraction for more particular consideration; the one having quite as real an existence as the other, and both having their reality in the singular object known by sense and consciousness.

He goes on to a very subtle discussion as to our ideas of space and time. He says, that "it is from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space, and from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time." The statement requires to be amended. It is not from the disposition of separate objects we have the idea of space, but in the very perception of material objects we know them as extended, that is, occupying space; and in the very remembrance of events we have time in the concrete, that is, events happening in time past. He is therefore wrong in the {138} sceptical conclusion which he draws, that the ideas of space and time are no distinct ideas; for they are ideas formed by a high intellectual process from things immediately known. Taking a defective view of the nature and function of abstraction, he denies that we can form any idea of a vacuum or extension without matter. He maintains that the idea we form of any finite quality is not infinitely divisible. The dispute, he says, should not be about the nature of mathematical points, but about our ideas of them; and that, in the division of our ideas, we come to a minimum, to an indivisible idea. This whole controversy seems to me to arise from a misapprehension. Our idea of space, it is evident, is neither divisible nor indivisible and as to space, it is not divisible either finitely or infinitely for while we can divide matter, that is, have a space between, we cannot separate any portion of space from all other space: space is and must be continuous. He is evidently jealous of the alleged certainty of mathematics, which seemed to be opposed to his universal scepticism. He maintains that the objects of geometry are mere ideas in the mind. I admit that surfaces, lines, points, have no independent existence, but they have all an existence in solid bodies. By an excess of ingenuities and subtleties, he would drive us to the conclusion that space and time are mere ideas, for which we need not seek a corresponding reality; a conclusion unfortunately accepted by Kant, who thus opened the way to the empty idealism which so long reigned in the German philosophy.[38] {139}

The result reached is summed up in the statement: "As long as we confine our speculations to the <appearances> of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrassed by any question; " but, " if we carry our inquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty." The intelligent reader will here perceive the source whence Kant derived his doctrine that the senses give us, not things, but <phenomena>, that is appearances, and that we are involved in contradiction when we suppose that they furnish more. However great the logical power of the German metaphysician, it is clear that he did not possess the shrewdness of the common-sense philosopher of Scotland, when he adopted the conclusion of the sceptic as his starting-point.

He has now to face the important subjects of existence and knowledge. Proceeding on his assumption that nothing is present to the mind but perceptions, he argues, I think

logically (if the premises be allowed), that we can never advance a step beyond ourselves, and that it is " impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas or impressions." As knowledge had been represented by Locke as consisting in comparison (I reckon this a false and dangerous doctrine), Hume has to consider the relations which the mind of man can discover.

These he represents as being seven: those of resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity, degree, contrariety, cause and effect. This is a very good enumeration of the relations perceivable by man: it is certainly very much superior to that of many later metaphysicians, British and Continental. " These relations may be divided into two classes, into such as depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together, and such as may be changed without any change in the ideas." In the first class he places resemblance, contrariety, degree, proportion. These depend solely on our ideas. These only can be the objects of knowledge and certainty, but they can never go beyond our ideas, which can never go beyond our impressions. The other four do not depend on our ideas, and might seem to carry us beyond them; but this he shows {140} is an illusion. In identity, and time and space, we can never ,,go beyond what is immediately present to the senses," and thus can never discover the real existence or the relations of objects. And so "`tis only causation which produces such a connection as to give us assurance, from the existence or action of one object, that 'twas followed or preceded by any other existence or action." He devotes the whole energy of his intellect to the task of showing that we know nothing of the nature of the relation between cause and effect; that we know their conjunction within our experience, but not their connection.

In discussing this question, and kindred ones, he finds it necessary to explain the nature of belief. " The belief of the existence of an object joins no new ideas to those which compose the idea of the object." What then is the difference between belief and incredulity? It consists solely in the liveliness of the former. " We must not be contented with saying that the vividness of the idea produces the belief, we must maintain that they are individually the same." " The belief or assent which always attends the memory and senses is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they represent, and this alone distinguishes them from imagination." The theory is surely palpably false here, for our imaginations, in which there is no faith, are often livelier than our memories, in which there is belief. But, by this theory, he would account for all our beliefs. He would establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature, that when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity. " A present impression being vivid, conveys its vividness to all the ideas which are associated with it by such general laws as those of resemblance, contiguity, and causation." " A person that has lost a leg or an arm by amputation, endeavors, for a long time afterwards, to serve himself with them. After

the death of any one, 'tis a common remark of the whole family, but especially the servants, that they can scarce believe him to be dead, but still imagine him to be in his chamber, or in any other place where they were accustomed to find him." The explanation may seem a very ingenious, but it is a very feeble one. We may {141} believe that we saw a particular person yesterday, though we have no lively impression or idea retarding him; and we do not believe in the existence of Achilles, though the reading of Homer has given us a vivid conception of him.[39]

But this theory is employed to give an explanation of our {142} belief in the relation of cause and effect. The one having always been with the other in our experience, we are led by habit, and proceeding on the principle of association, when we find the one to look for the other, and thus, too, the effect being present, that is an impression, gives its vividness to the cause as an associating idea. "The idea of cause and effect is derived from experience, which, presenting us with certain objects constantly conjoined with each other, produces such a habit of surveying them in that relation, that we cannot, with out a sensible violence, survey them in any other." This is his explanation of what is implied in efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, connection, productive quality. The essence of necessity is " the propensity which custom produces to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant." " When any object is presented to it, it immediately conveys to the mind a lively idea of that object which is usually found to attend it, and this determination forms the necessary connection of these objects." His definition of cause is "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other."

Hume's doctrine is founded on his favorite principle, " that all our ideas are copied from our impressions but the necessary connection of cause and effect cannot be in the impression, for " when I cast my eye on the known qualities of objects, I immediately discover that the relation of cause and effect depends not the least on them." Not being in the impression, it cannot be found in the idea. Now it is here, I apprehend, that Hume is to be met. I have disputed his theory that the mind begins with mere impressions; it commences with the perception or knowledge of objects within itself, and without itself. Now, in its primitive perception of objects, it knows them as having power; it knows self as a power, and it knows the not-self as a power, -- as a power in resisting and impressing the self. Here is the <impression>, if any one will call it so (I call it knowledge), that gives rise to the idea which may be separated in thought by abstraction, and put in the form of-- a maxim by generalization.

Unfortunately, as I think, the opponents of Hume have {143} not always met him at the proper point. They have allowed him that we have no original knowledge of power in the objects, and having given this entrance to the sceptic, they find great difficulty in resisting his farther ravages. Sometimes they have endeavored to discover a <nexus> of some

kind <between> the cause and its effect, but have always failed to tell what the bond is. Causation is not to be regarded as a <connection between> cause and effect, but a power in the object, that is, substance (or objects and substances), acting as the cause to produce the effect. Kant labored to oppose the scepticism of the Scotchman by supposing that the mind, by its own forms, bound together events in its contemplation of them. But when he allowed that the power was not in the objects, he introduced a more subtle and perilous scepticism than that which he sought to overthrow. We avoid this subjective idealism by insisting that it is on the bare contemplation of a thing becoming, and not by the mere association of ideas and custom (which may aid), that we declare that it must have had a cause.

He is now prepared to discuss two questions: "Why we attribute a continued existence to objects even when they are not present to the senses, and why we suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind and perception?" He shows, as to the first, the senses give us nothing but a present perception; and, as to the second, that our perceptions being of ourselves, can never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. He dwells in the usual manner on the acknowledged unreality of what have been called the secondary qualities of matter, and as we naturally look upon the primary qualities, such as motion and solidity, and the secondary qualities, such as colors, sound, heat and cold, as alike real, so we must philosophically consider them as alike unreal. After the manner of the times, he rejects the notion that we can immediately perceive our bodily frame, and not mere impressions, and that we can know both the" objects and ourselves." But whence, it is asked, the coherence and constancy of certain impressions? He accounts for it on the principle that the thought, according to the laws of association, slides from one impression to others with which it has been joined, and reckons them the same, and mistakes the succession of images for an identity of objects. {144}

The result reached by him is," All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences," and ,the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences." "What we call mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different impressions united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity." He gives the same account of what we call matter. He shows that having nothing but impressions, we can never, on the mere ground of a conjunction which we have never witnessed, argue from our perceptions to the existence of external continued objects; and he proves (very conclusively, I think, on his assumption), that we could never have any reason to infer that the supposed objects resemble our sensations.[40] He now draws his sceptical conclusion: " There is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses, or, more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions which we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continued and independent existence of body. When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude that neither color, sound, taste, nor smell have a continued and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities, there

remains nothing in the universe which has such an existence."

The question is: How is such a scepticism to be met? Reid opposed it by showing that the sensation leads us intuitively to believe in the existence of the external thing, and that the states of self, known by consciousness, imply a thinking substance. {145} The more correct statement seems to me to be, that we know at once the external objects; that intuitively we know our own frame and objects affecting it; that we are conscious, not of states arguing a self, but of self in a certain state; and that, on comparing a former self recalled by memory and a present self known by consciousness, we declare them to be the same. Kant certainly did not meet the scepticism of Hume in a wise or in an effective manner, when he supposed that the unity was given to the scattered phenomena by forms in the mind.

It is clear that all the usual psychological arguments for the immateriality and immortality of the soul are cut up and destroyed by this theory. We cannot speak of the soul as either material or spiritual, for we know nothing either of matter or spirit except as momentary impressions. The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one." Identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them.

His theory of causation undermines the argument for the divine existence. He carefully abstains from dwelling on this in his great philosophic work, but he expounds it at great length, and with all his intellectual power, in his " Dialogues on Natural Religion." We know nothing of cause, except that it has been observed to be the antecedent of its effect; when we have noticed an occurrence usually preceded by another occurrence, we may on discovering the one look for the other. But when we have never seen the events together, we have really nothing to guide us in arguing from the one to the other. We can argue that a watch implies a watchmaker, for we have observed them together; but never having had any experience of the making of a world, we cannot argue that the existence of a world implies the existence of a world maker. There is no effective way of answering this objection, but by maintaining that an effect necessarily implies a cause. It was on this ground that he was met by Reid, who argues that traces of design in God's works argue an intelligent cause. Kant deprived himself of the right to argue in this way, by making the mind itself impose the relation of causation on events, {146} so that we cannot argue that there is a corresponding law in the things themselves. Hume urges with great force and ingenuity, as Kant did after him, that if we are compelled to seek for a cause of every object, we must also seek for a cause of the Divine Being. This is to be met by showing that our intuitive conviction simply requires us to seek for a cause of a new occurrence. He argues, as Kant also did after him, that the existence of order in the universe could at best prove merely a finite and not an infinite cause. The reply is, that we must seek for the evidence of the infinity of God in the peculiar conviction of the mind in regard to the

infinite and the perfect.[41]

This may be the most expedient place for stating and examining his famous argument against miracles, as advanced in his essay on the subject. It is clear that he could not argue, as some have done, that a miracle is an impossibility, or that it is contrary to the nature of things. He assails not the possibility of the occurrence of a miraculous event, but the proof of it. Experience being with him the only criterion of truth, it is to experience he appeals. He maintains that there has been an invariable experience in favor of the uniformity of nature, and that a miracle being a violation of a law of nature, can never be established by as strong proof as what can be urged against it. He then exerts his ingenuity in disparaging the evidence usually urged in behalf of miraculous occurrences, by showing how apt mankind are to be swayed on these subjects by such principles as fear, wonder, and fancy. We are not {147} sure whether Hume has always been opposed in a wise or judicious manner by his opponents on this subject. It is of little use showing that there is some sort of original instinct leading us to believe in testimony; for this instinct, if it exists, often leads us astray, and we must still go to experience to indicate what we are to trust in and what we are to discard. But the opponents of Hume were perfectly right when they showed, that in maintaining that nature always acted according to certain mundane laws, he was assuming the point in dispute. Let us admit that the whole question is to be decided by experiential evidence. Let us concede that in the present advanced state of science there is ample evidence that there is a uniformity in nature; but then let us place alongside of this a counterpart fact, that there is a sufficient body of evidence in favor of there being a supernatural system. For this purpose let the cumulative proofs in behalf of Christianity, external and internal, be adduced; those derived from testimony and from prophecy, and those drawn from the unity of design in the revelation of doctrine and morality, and from the character of Jesus; and we shall find that in their consistency and congruity they are not unlike those which can be advanced in behalf of the existence of a natural system.

In Book Second of his Treatise, Hume treats of the passions. It is the most uninteresting part of his writings. The reading of it is like travelling over an immense plain, which looks inviting at the distance, but in which we find no spots of fertility or of historical interest. It looks as if the good-humored but phlegmatic man were incapable of discussing the nature of the passions. The composition, though clear and sustained, is never elevated by bursts of feeling or irradiated by gleams of genius. He has a theory to support, and he defends it by wiredrawn ingenuity. When he treats of the understanding, if be does not establish much truth, he at least overthrows venerable error, and we are constrained to admire his intellectual energy and courage; but, in dealing with the feelings of our nature, he wastes his strength in rearing a baseless fabric, which, so far as I know, no one has ever adopted, and no one has been at the trouble to assail. He has no proper analysis of man's original springs of action. He says only in a general way,

that "the chief spring or actuating {148} principle of the human mind is pleasure and pain." He gives no psychological account of the place which the idea or apprehension of an object as good or evil, or rather as appetible or inappetible, has in all feeling. Of course, all passions are according to him impressions, only he calls them reflective impressions, to distinguish them from sensations. The reflective impressions are of two kinds, the calm and the violent; the first including beauty and deformity, and the latter such passions as love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. He connects his theory of the passions throughout with his theory of the understanding. There are associations among the passions, as there are associations among ideas; only he says, that while ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation, impressions are associated only by resemblance. There has as yet been no thorough examination, so it appears to me, of the laws of succession of feeling, as distinguished from that of ideas; I am not convinced that the theory of Hume, that feelings are associated only by resemblance, is the correct one. He draws a distinction between the cause and the object of passion. Thus if a man has made a beautiful house, the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house. The idea of ourselves is always present with, and conveys a' sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object to which we are related; in short, turns the idea into an impression. Some other person is the object of love, but the cause of that passion is the relation of that person to self. Out of this may proceed the desire of happiness or misery of others, which he describes "<as an arbitrary and original instinct implanted in our nature>," -- I put the language in italics, as I may have occasion again to refer to it. In this way he constructs an elaborate, but by no means clear, theory of the passions. He divides them into direct and indirect. By direct, he understands such as arise immediately from good or evil, that is, from pain or pleasure. He says of them: " The direct passions frequently arise from a natural <impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable>. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies and of happiness to our friends, hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites." Under the direct, he includes desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security. The indirect proceed {149} from the same principles, but by conjunction with other qualities; and he comprehends under them pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependents. It may be said of his exposition of the passions generally, that he has often seized on important circumstances which modify their action, but has altogether failed in his explanation of their nature. Thus he has some just remarks upon the transition of one idea to another, upon the effects thus produced, and upon the predominant passion swallowing up the inferior; but after all we have no proper evolution of the psychological process.

He occasionally refers to beauty, but the account he gives of it is very inadequate. "Beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as either by the primary constitution of our nature, or by custom, or by caprice, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to our souls." "The

conveniency of a house, the fertility of a field, the strength of a horse, the capacity, security, and swift-sailing of a vessel, form the principal beauty of these several objects." It is clear that the aesthetic tastes of one satisfied with such a theory could not have been keen, and we do not wonder to find that in the letters written during his travels, he never makes a single allusion to a fine statue or painting.

The account which he gives of the will is still more defective. "The will is the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body." Surely we may have will in regard to our mental operations as well as in regard to our bodily motions. The will, he says, is an impression, but surely it is an impression of a very peculiar kind; and he should have inquired, which he has not done, into its nature, when he would have seen that it possesses an essential freedom. As not perceiving this, he has left nothing to save man from being driven on by an iron necessity.

In Book Third, he treats of morals, and starts his utilitarian theory, which, however, he develops more fully, and in a livelier, more pointed, and ornate manner, in his essay, ,An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals." He says of this work, that it is " of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best." In respect of practical influence, {150} it has certainly been the most important. By his speculative doubts in regard to the operations of the under standing he has furnished a gymnastic to metaphysicians ever since his time; but by his theory of virtue he has swayed belief and practice.

He shows that we cannot distinguish between good and evil by reason alone, defining reason as the discovery of truth or false hood, and truth and falsehood as consisting in the agreement or disagreement, either to the real relation of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Taking reason in this sense, it certainly cannot be said to discern the morally good. But then it may be maintained that the mind has a power of discerning moral good and evil analogous to the reason which distinguishes truth and falsehood, and all that he could urge in opposition would be, that such a view is inconsistent with his theory of impressions and ideas. It is by no means clear what is the faculty or feeling to which he allots the function of perceiving and approving the morally good. Sometimes he seems to make man a selfish being, swayed only by motives of pleasure or pain; and in this view virtue is to be regarded as good, because associated directly or indirectly with the pleasure it would bring to ourselves. But in other places he calls in a " benevolent sentiment, leading us to approve what is useful." Hume's general theory might certainly seem op posed to every thing <innate>, and yet, in criticising Locke, he is obliged to say: " I should desire to know what can be meant by asserting that self-love or resentment of injuries, or passion between the sexes, is not innate." We have already quoted passages in which he appeals to instincts. He says elsewhere, "The mind, by an <original> instinct, tends to unite itself with the good, and avoid the

evil." At times he seems to adhere to the theory of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, as to the existence of a moral sense. "The mind of man is so formed by nature, that upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame." He tells us expressly that he is inclined to think it probable that the final sentence in regard to moral excellence "depends on some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species." I believe that we cannot account for the ideas in the mind except by calling in {151} such a faculty or feeling; and it was his business, as an experimental inquirer, to ascertain all that is in this power, and to determine its mode of operation and its laws. But such an investigation would have overthrown his whole theory, metaphysical as well as ethical.

According to Hume, virtue consists in the agreeable and useful. "Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colors, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind." " Virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment, or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation." This theory goes a step farther than that of Hutcheson in the same direction. Hutcheson placed virtue in benevolence, thereby making the intention of the agent necessary to virtue; whereas Hume does not regard it as necessary that it should be voluntary, and requires us to look merely to the act and its tendency. His definition might lead one to think that an easy road or a pleasant carriage should be regarded as virtuous. But he will not admit that because an inanimate object may be useful as well as a man, that therefore it ought also to merit the appellation of virtuous; for he says: ,The sentiments excited by utility are in the two cases very different, and the one is mixed with affection, esteem, approbation, and not the other." This language, more particularly the phrases "esteem" and "approbation," might leave led him to discover that there is a peculiar judgment or sentiment attached to virtuous action not produced by mere utility.

He easily satisfies himself that he can show that benevolence is a virtue because it is so agreeable and useful; but he never faces the real difficulty, which is to account for the sense of obligation which we feel, and the obligation actually lying upon us, to do good to others.[42] He strives to show that justice is commended by us because of its beneficial tendency. justice can have a meaning, he maintains, only in regard to society and arrangements made with others. True, the giving to every one his due, implies beings to whom the due is to be {152} given; but the due arises from the relation in which we stand to these beings. Thus the first man and woman having children, had duties to discharge towards them as soon as they were born, and independent of any promise. He labors to prove that our obligation to keep a promise arises from utility. " Fidelity is no natural virtue, and promises have no force antecedent to human conventions." True, a promise implies a person to whom it is made, but, once made, the obligation is complete.

This leads us at once to the fundamental objections

which may be taken to the utilitarian theory. Whence the obligation lying on us to promote the happiness of others? to give others their due? to keep our promises? From their utility, it is answered. But why are we bound to attend to what is useful? is the question that immediately occurs; why the reproach that follows, and which justifies itself when we have failed to keep our word? These questionings bring us to a justice which guards conventions, to a law which enjoins love.

The practical morality sanctioned by the system, and actually recommended by Hume, excludes all the higher virtues and loftier graces. The adoration of a Supreme Being, and love to him, are represented as superstition. He has no God to sanction the moral law, and no judgment day at which men have to give in an account. Repentance has and can have no place in a system which has no fixed law and no conscience. Humility, of which he treats at great length, is disparaged. The stern virtues of justice, of self-sacrifice, of zeal in a good cause, of faithfulness in denouncing evil, and of courage in stemming the tide of error and corruption, these are often so immediately disagreeable, that their ultimate utility will never be perceived except by those who are swayed by a higher principle. It is certain that they were not valued by Hume, who speaks of them as superstition and bigotry, and characterizes those who practise them as zealots and fanatics. His view of the marriage relation was of a loose and flexible character, and did not profess to discountenance the evil practices of his time. "A man in conjoining himself to a woman is bound to her ac cording to the terms of his engagement: in begetting children, he is bound by all the ties of nature and humanity to provide for their sustenance and education. When he has performed {153} these two parts of duty, no one can reproach him with injustice or injury." Not acknowledging a God bestowing the gift of life, and requiring us to give an account of the use we make of it, and setting no value on courage in difficulties, he argues that a man may take away his life when it is no longer useful.

The state of society which he aimed at producing is thus described: " But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous .to society than those here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off with which many divines, and some philosophers, have covered her, and nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay, even at proper intervals play, frolic, and gayety. She talks not of useless austerities and rigors, suffering and self-denial." People have often speculated as to what Hume would have taught had he been elected professor of moral philosophy in Edinburgh. I believe he would have expounded a utilitarian theory, ending in the recommendation of the pleasant social virtues; speaking always respectfully of the Divine Being, but leaving his existence an unsettled question.

And what, it may be asked, is the conclusion to which he wishes to bring us by his whole philosophy? I am not sure that he has confessed this to himself. Sometimes it looks as

if his sublime aim was to expose the unsatisfactory condition of philosophy, in order to impel thinkers to conduct their researches in a new and more satisfactory manner. " If, in order to answer the doubts started, new principles of philosophy must be laid, are not these doubts themselves very useful? Are they not preferable to blind and ignorant assent? I hope I can answer my own doubts; but, if I could not, is it to be wondered at? " I verily believe that this was one of the alternatives he loved to place before him to justify his scepticism. " I am apt," he says, in writing to Hutcheson, " to suspect in general that most of my reasonings will be more useful in furnishing hints, and exciting people's curiosity, than as containing any principles that will augment the stock of knowledge that must pass to future ages." But I suspect that the settled conviction reached by him was that no certainty could be attained in speculative philosophy; he was sure {154} that it had not been attained in time past. The tone of the introduction to his great work is: " There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. If truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must be very deep and abstruse; and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous." As being thus deep, he feels as if the great body of mankind need not trouble themselves much about it. He seems at times complacently to contemplate this as the issue to which he would drive mankind for he sees at once that if men become convinced that they cannot reach certainty in such speculations, they will give up inquiry. " For nothing is more certain than that despair has almost the same effect upon us as enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire than the desire itself vanishes and he thinks it a satisfactory condition of things when men discover the impossibility of making any farther progress, and make a free confession of their ignorance. Considered in this light, Hume's philosophy, in its results, may be considered as an anticipation of the positive school of M. Comte, which in the British section of it approaches much nearer the position of Hume than most people are aware of.

He allows that man should, as indeed he must, follow his natural impulses, and the lessons of experience, as far as this world is concerned. But he will grant nothing more. He thus closes his inquiry into the understanding: "When we trace up the human understanding to its first principles, we find it to lead us into such sentiments as seem to turn into ridicule all our past pains and industry, and to discourage us from future inquiries." "The understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of confidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life." In common life this scepticism meets with insuperable barriers, which we should not try to overcome. But it is different with philosophical, and, we may add, theological truths, which are supported solely by speculative considerations. In these departments {155} we may discuss and doubt as we please, without doing any injury. " What injury can ever come from ingenious reasoning

and inquiry? The worst speculative sceptic I ever knew was a much better man than the best superstitious devotee." Those who think they can reach truth in these matters are at liberty to cherish their conviction, provided always that they do not thereby disturb their neighbors. But the time is coming, and already wise men see that it is coming, when mankind will not concern themselves with such speculative questions, or will engage in them only as a gymnastic to the intellect, or as a means of showing that ultimate truth is unattainable by man.

It was, I believe, on such grounds as these that Hume justified himself in his sceptical doubts, and his sceptical solution of these doubts. He thought they might stir up inquiry on subjects on which no truth had been reached; and tend to confound the dogmatism and restrain the disputations in philosophy, and the fanaticism and superstition in religion, which had wrought such mischief; and prepare the way for a reign of universal toleration. As to religious belief, it could be supported only by speculative arguments, derived from an absolute causation, or from miracles which cannot stand a searching investigation. So far as men follow a moderate and tolerant religion, Hume was rather pleased with them, and he evidently shrank from the fanatical atheism avowed by some of the more advanced followers of the system in France. If there be a world to come, it will clear up itself when it comes; and, meanwhile, there are duties which we must perform, from a regard to ourselves and our relation to others. There had hitherto been no science of metaphysics; but there could be a science of ethics (and also of politics) founded on the circumstance, that certain acts are found to be agreeable and useful to ourselves and others.

It is in this way we are to reconcile certain seeming inconsistencies in his character. He had no settled faith in any religion, yet he went to church, at least at times; he wished his servant to go to church, and he mingled in the counsels of the Church of Scotland. He never committed himself to deism or atheism. He wrapped up his thoughts on these subjects in his bosom, perhaps with some feeble hope that he {156} might get light; but the cloud seems only to have settled more deeply upon him. When the pert Mrs. Mallet met him one night at an assembly, and boldly accosted him, " Mr. Hume, give me leave to introduce myself to you: we deists ought to know each other," " Madam," replied he, " I am no deist: I do not style myself so, neither do I desire to be known by that appellation." He did not avow himself an atheist in Paris. Sir Samuel Romilly has detailed a characteristic anecdote told of him by Diderot. He dined with a large company at the house of Baron D'Holbach. "As for atheists," said Hume, " I do not believe one exists: I have never seen one." " You have been a little unfortunate," said the baron: " here you are with seventeen of them at the table for the first time." We may suppose there was some sincerity in the statement he made: " I have surely endeavored to refute the sceptic with all the force of which I am master, and my refutation must be allowed to be sincere because drawn from the capital principles of my system," only he was not prepared to review his system. In writing to Elliott, he says he wishes to make Cleanthes, the theist,

the hero of the dialogue. Adam Ferguson told his son, who reports the incident, that one clear and beautiful night, when they were walking home together, Hume suddenly stopped, looked up to the starry sky, and said, " O Adam, can any one contemplate the wonders of that firmament, and not believe there is a God! " Dr. Carlyle tells us, that when his mother died he was found in deepest affliction and a flood of tears, upon which Mr. Boyle said to him that his uncommon grief arose from his having thrown off the principles of religion; to which he replied: " Though I throw out my speculations to entertain the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other things I do not think so differently from the rest of the world as you imagine." In whatever way we may account for it, there was evidently a consistency in the character of Hume which made him respected by his worldly friends, who thought a man might be good, though he had no godliness.

The all-important question is, How is this spirit to be corrected, this error to be met?

<First>. It must be firmly maintained that an honest mind can spontaneously attain such truth, secular, moral, and religious, {157} as is needful to its peace and progress. This truth does not lie deep down in some pit, which can be reached only by deep down, or whence it can be drawn only by the cords of lengthened ratiocination; it lies on the surface, and may be seen by immediate perception, or picked up by brief discursive processes. By this spontaneous exercise of our faculties and common observation, we reach the existence of God, the accountability of man, and a day of judgment. By such an easy method we rise to a belief in the Word of God, and in the spiritual verities there set forth. We should hold that man reaches all this by as natural a procedure as that by which he comes to know what path he should take in the common affairs of this life. No doubt be will at times meet with difficulties, but this only as he may be beset by perplexities in the affairs of this world; and in the one case, as in the other, the sincere mind has commonly enough of light to guide it.

Secondly. It should be held that he who undermines the fundamental truth spontaneously discovered, is doing an injury to humanity. Scepticism, as Hume delights to show, can produce no mischief in the common secular affairs of life, because there are circumstances which keep men right in spite of their principles, or want of principles. But it is very different in respect of those questions which fall to be discussed in higher ethics and theology. A man will not be tempted by any sophistry to doubt the connection of cause and effect when he is thirsty and sees a cup of water before him; in such a case he will put forth his hand and take it, knowing that the beverage will refresh him. But he may be led by a wretched sophistry to deny the necessary relation of cause and effect when it would lead him upward from God's works to God himself, or induce him to seek peace in Him. Hence the importance of not allowing fundamental truth to be assailed; not because the attack will have any influence on the practical affairs of this life, but because it may hold back and damp our higher aspirations, moral and religious. Hume hoped that his scepticism might soften

asperities, but he did not wish to think that any bad influences could follow from it. On one occasion he was told of a banker's clerk in Edinburgh, of good reputation, who had eloped with a sum of money; and the philosopher wondered greatly what could {158} induce such a man thus to incur, for an inconsiderable sum, such an amount of guilt and infamy. "I can easily account for it," said John Home, "from the nature of his studies, and the kind of books he was in the habit of reading." "What were they," said the philosopher. He was greatly annoyed when told, Boston's "Fourfold State," and Hume's "Essays." Certainly the youth must have been in a perplexed state who had been converted from a belief in the " Fourfold State" by Hume's " Essays," or who was hesitating between them. Thirdly. The philosopher must undertake a more important work. He must inquire into the nature of fundamental truth; he must endeavor to unfold the mental powers that discover it, and to expound their mode of operation, and their laws. He cannot indeed prove first truths by mediate evidence, for if they were capable of probation they could not be first truths; but he can show that they are first truths perceived by immediate cognition of the objects, and in no need of external support. He must as far as possible clear tip the difficulties and perplexities in which the discussions in regard to them have become involved. In particular, he must show that while the reflex consideration of the ultimate principles of knowledge often lands us in difficulties, the principles them selves never lead us into positive contradictions; and that, therefore, while we allow that the human faculties are limited, we cannot admit that they are deceptive. This is what has been attempted by one philosopher after another since the days of Hume.

In fact, all later philosophy springs directly or indirectly from the thorough-going examination to which the Scotch sceptic had subjected received truths. It has been the aim of the Scottish school, as modified and developed by Reid, to throw back the scepticism of Hume. Reid tells us that he once believed the received doctrine of ideas so firmly as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system along with it, till, on discovering the consequences to which it had been driven by Hume, he was led to review the whole theory and abandon it. Kant declares that he was roused from his dogmatic slumbers by the assaults of the Scottish sceptic, and was thus impelled to the task of repelling the attack. It is scarcely necessary to say that all other philosophies, deserving the name, which have {159} originated within the last hundred years, have ramified directly or indirectly from the Scottish and the German schools; one school, the French school of M. Cousin, seeking to combine the two.

It is interesting to observe the respective ways in which the Scottish and the German metaphysician sought to meet the great sceptic. It is evident that his assaults might be repelled at one or other of two places: either where the foe has entered, or after he has made certain advances. That the mind begins with impressions and goes on to ideas, which are mere reproductions of impressions,-this is the fundamental principle of Hume. Now this may be denied, I think should be denied. On what ground, we ask,

does he allow the existence of impressions and ideas? When he answers, we can show him that on the same ground he must admit more; that he must allow that the mind has convictions in regard to its own existence, and the existence of external objects, and perceptions of moral goodness. But again, he may be met at the farther stages of his progress. He asserts that the mind can reach no truth except such as it gets from experience. It may be shown in opposition that it has an original furniture in the shape of tendencies and laws which lead to and guarantee necessary and eternal truth. It is interesting to observe that Reid met him at both these points. Reid made a very careful inquiry into the nature of the senses as inlets of knowledge; and showed that accompanying the sensation there is always an intuitive perception of an external world. He showed too, though he did not make so much of it as he might, that consciousness is a mental faculty and a source of knowledge. He farther met the sceptic at the more advanced point, and proved that the mind has a primitive reason or common-sense which decides at once that things are so and so; that every effect, for instance, must have a cause. I am not of opinion that Reid has thoroughly cleared up these subjects, that he has detected all that is in the senses, that he has unfolded fully the laws of intuition and its mode of operation; but he has established enough to repel the assaults of the sceptic.

Reid possessed many of the best qualities of his countrymen; in particular, he was shrewd and independent: but he was not {160} endowed with great powers of logical analysis. On the other hand, Kant was strong where Reid was weak; that is, in power of dissection and construction: but was deficient where Reid excelled, in patient observation. He neglected, as I think most unfortunately, to oppose the fundamental principle of Hume. He allows that the mind begins with <phenomena> in the sense of appearances, and these phenomena are just the <impressions> of Hume. But if it be allowed that in the original inlet we have only impressions or phenomena, it never can be satisfactorily shown how we can reach reality by any composition or decomposition of these. Kant exercised his vast powers in meeting Hume at the other point; that is, in showing that there is an priori furniture in the mind, independent of all experience. But what he built with the one hand he took down with the other. For these <a priori> forms could not, in his theory, guarantee any objective reality. He accepts the conclusion of Hume, and allows that the speculative reason could not guide to truth; he goes so far as to maintain that it lands us in contradictions. This philosophy, intended to overthrow the scepticism of Hume, has thus led to a scepticism which has had a more extensive sway than that of the cold Scotchman ever had. He endeavored to save himself from such an issue by calling in a practical reason, which guaranteed as its corollaries the freedom and immortality of the soul, and the Divine existence. But it was immediately asked how it could be shown that the practical reason does not deceive, after it has been conceded that the speculative reason leads to illusion? Thus the insecure mound, raised with such labor to stem the flood, only aggravated the outburst and overflow as it gave way.

Sir W. Hamilton sought to unite Reid and Kant, but was never able to weld thoroughly together the principles which he took from two such different sources. His doctrines of the relativity of knowledge, and of causation as a mere impotency of the mind, have prepared the way for a doctrine of nescience now largely espoused. Some of his pupils have betaken themselves to a sort of confused Berkeleyanism mingled with Kantism, which will furnish an easy passage to the nescient theory in so shrewd a nation as Scotland, and among so practical a people as the English. Mr. Mill, in his examination {161} of Hamilton's Philosophy, has brought us to a <Humism> joined to Comtism. This is the dismal creed provided for those who choose to follow the negative criticisms. of the day in philosophy and theology. What we need in these circumstances is a new Thomas Reid, not to do over again the work which the common-sense philosopher did, but a corresponding service in this age to what he did in his time.

XX.-BOOKS ADVERTISED IN " SCOT'S MAGAZINE."

T/HE\ "S/COT'S\ M/AGAZINE\" begins in 1739. The works mentioned and the topics discussed will give us a better idea of the times, than any thing else that can be produced. In January is advertised " A Treatise of Human Nature," the work that revolutionized all modern philosophy. For years, we have papers about Whitefield, who revolutionized religion in England, and had a mighty influence in Scotland and America. The magazine has a series of papers, lasting for years, under the head of " Common Sense." In March, there is an advertisement of a " Second Volume of Common Sense Letters collected," showing that we have no need to go to remote quarters to find the source from which Reid and the Aberdeen school got the phrase, "common sense," which had been in constant use since the time of Shaftesbury (P. 31). It is curious to notice that, in January, comedians are prosecuted before the Court of Session, and, in February, are found guilty, and "decerned for the penalties in the late Act against strollers." In March, there is an advertisement, " A View of the Necessitarian or Best Scheme, freed from the Objections of M. Crouzaz in his Examinations of Pope's I Essay on Man."' In June, "The Necessity of Revelation," by Archibald Campbell, PP. 45, 3d-- in sheets, showing that revelation needed to be defended. In October, an attack on Campbell's book, and, in December, a reply by Campbell. In October, " A Treatise of Ancient Painting," by Dr. Turnbull, 41. 4s. in sheets. In February, 1740, "The Principles of Moral Philosophy;" in December, "A Methodical System of Universal Law; " and, in May, -- A Curious Collection of fifty Ancient Paintings," 1L. 8s., all by Turnbull, showing that there was a taste in the country for ethical and aesthetic discussions, -- the failure of Turnbull's works proving that it was not to be gratified by the excellent commonplace of that author. In 1740, Simson, whose views in regard to the Trinity raised such discussion, passes away from this world, after having lived in retirement since his suspension in 1728. In May, we have "The Principles and Connection of Natural and Revealed Religion," by A. Ashley Sykes; and "The Divine Authority of the Old and New Testament asserted," by J. Leland, D.D., 25S.; and, in July, " Discourses concerning {162} the Being

and Natural Perfections of God," by J. Abernethy, M. A-, 5s-- 6d-; all showing that there were men ready to defend natural and revealed religion on sound, sensible principles. That deism is alive, appears from May, when " Physico, Theologico, Philosophico, Moral Disquisition concerning Human Nature, Free Agency, Moral Government, and Divine Providence," by T. Morgan, M.D., 5s. 6d., appears. In June, " Remarks on the Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul," is. In December, among preferments, Adam Smith, Comptroller of the Customs at Kirkcaldy, Inspector-General of the Customs; showing that a competent man was being prepared to discuss political economy. In April, 1741, " The Temper, Character, and Duty of a Minister of the Gospel," a sermon by William Leechman, M. A., 6d.; indicating the introduction of Moderatism into the Church of Scotland in its most plausible form, denying no orthodox doctrine, and yet recommend, in graceful language, only the truths of natural religion, and the common moralities of life, -- an evidence that the attacks of deistical writers had made many ashamed of the deeper doctrines of Scripture. In January, 1744, there is an abstract of the associate presbytery for renewing the Covenants, dated at Stirling, Dec. 23, 1743, "complaining of several immoralities, and the repealing of the penal statutes against witches. The penal statutes against witches have been repealed by the parliament, contrary to the express law of God: by which a holy God may be provoked in a way of righteous judgment, to leave those who are already ensnared to be hardened more and more, and to permit Satan to tempt and seduce others to the same wicked and dangerous snares." The above list shows clearly an age of great intellectual activity, a strong tendency to philosophical discussion among Scotchmen, a vigorous attack on Christianity, a respectable defence of it and of natural religion, a revival of evangelical religion under Whitefield, and a strong love of it on the part of the common people, along with the appearance of intemperance and strolling players. It was in the midst of this ferment that Hume's work appeared, to shake all that was thought to be established in philosophy and in natural religion.

XXI.-ADAM SMITH.[43]

H/IS\ is perhaps the most illustrious name appearing in these sketches. But he has a higher reputation in political economy than in metaphysics, in which latter department he comes before us as the author of a theory of moral sentiments, and of very interesting fragmentary histories of certain departments of philosophy. {163}

He was born June 5, 1723, in the "lang toun" of Kirkcaldy, which lies on the opposite side of the Frith of Forth from Edinburgh. His father was comptroller of the customs there and his mother, a benignant Christian lady, watched over his sickly childhood with tenderness, which he repaid her by a corresponding kindness for the long period of sixty years, for the greater part of which the two lived together. When about three years old he was stolen by a party of tinkers, who took him to the woods, but was fortunately rescued. We should have liked to hear him, in his later years, speculating as to what might have been his place in the gypsy camp had he been brought up among them.

We can conceive that, while fashioning spoons out of horns and mending tin dishes, his comprehensive head would have been spinning a theory of the organization of the tribe. But it would have been beyond the capacity even of the explorer of the nature and causes of national wealth to determine what he himself or any other might have become if trained in such different circumstances. He seems to have received an excellent education in his native place, at a school which reared a number of eminent men. Unable from his weak bodily constitution to join in active amusements, he gave himself to reading, and, even at that early age, was noted for speaking to himself when alone, and falling into absent fits in company. At the premature age of fourteen, he went to the University of Glasgow, where his favorite studies seem to have been mathematics and natural philosophy. But before he left he attended the lectures of Hutcheson, whom he greatly admired, and who, no doubt, helped to direct him to philosophic pursuits. From Glasgow he went, on a salary provided by the Snell Foundation, to Baliol College, Oxford, where he resided for seven years, and seems to have given himself specially to the studies of polite literature. " He employed himself frequently in the practice of translation (particularly from the French), with a view to the improvement of his own style." Every one knows that the French authors were the models to which the greater part of the Scottish writers looked at that time. Hume and Smith entertained a feeling of admiration for French prose and poetry, but had no appreciation (as Adam Ferguson remarked) of Shakespeare or Milton. {164}

His original destination had been to the Church of England, but he did not find the profession to suit him. When at Oxford, the heads of the college found him reading Hume's Treatise of Human Nature," and they seized the work, and reprimanded the youth. ("Life," by M'Culloch.) On leaving Oxford he spent two years at Kirkcaldy, uncertain as to what he might do. In 1748 he removed to Edinburgh, where he delivered lectures on rhetoric and belles-lettres; the commencement, I believe, of that instruction in polite literature and English composition which has ever since been a distinguishing feature of the collegiate education in Scotland. In 1748 he was elected professor of logic, and in 1752 professor of moral philosophy, in the University of Glasgow. In the former, after an exposition, apparently brief (as we might expect from the spirit of the times), of the ancient logic, he devoted the rest of his time to rhetoric and belles-lettres. In the latter he divided his course into four parts: (1) Natural theology; (2) Ethics, unfolding the views he afterwards published in his " Theory of Moral Sentiments; " (3) Justice, that part of morality which can be expressed in precise rules; (4) Political science in which he delivered the thoughts and observations which were afterwards embodied in his great work, " The Wealth of Nations." In the later years of his Glasgow life, he expanded this last part more and more. An eminent pupil, Dr. Millar, afterwards professor of law in the university, describes him as a lecturer. " In delivering his lectures, he trusted almost entirely to extemporary elocution. His manner, though not graceful, was plain and unaffected; and, as he seemed to be always interested in the subject, he never failed to interest his hearers. Each discourse

consisted commonly of several distinct propositions, which he successively endeavored to prove and illustrate. These propositions, when announced in general terms, had, from their extent, not unfrequently something of the air of a paradox. In his attempts to explain them, he often appeared at first not to be sufficiently possessed of the subject, and spoke with some hesitation. As he advanced, however, the matter seemed to crowd upon him: his manner became warm and animated, and his expression easy and fluent. In points susceptible of controversy, you could easily discover that he secretly conceived an opposition to his opinions, and that he {165} was led upon this account to support them with greater energy and vehemence. By the fulness and variety of his illustrations, the subject gradually swelled in his hands, and acquired a dimension which, without a tedious repetition of the same views, was calculated to seize the attention of his audience, and to afford them pleasure, as well as instruction, in following the same object through all the diversity of shades and aspects in which it was presented, and afterwards in tracing it backwards to that original proposition or general truth from which this beautiful train of speculation had proceeded."

The thirteen years he spent in this office, he looked back upon as the happiest in his life. He published, in 1759, his " Theory of Moral Sentiments," to which was appended an article on Johnson's Dictionary for the then " Edinburgh Review." While in Glasgow he collected a large body of the observations and facts which he afterwards embodied in his immortal work. He was stimulated and aided in these studies by his attending a weekly club founded by Provost Cochran, a Glasgow merchant, who furnished him with much valuable information on mercantile subjects.

In 1763 he gave up his chair in Glasgow, and, at the invitation of Mr. Charles Townsend, became travelling tutor to the young Duke of Buccleuch. One wonders, in these times, at so intellectual a man abandoning the influential position he held in Glasgow to become the teacher of a single youth, however eminent in station. But it was undoubtedly a great advantage to Smith that he was thus enabled to see more of mankind and of the world, and was brought into immediate contact with eminent men of kindred tastes and pursuits in France. Proceeding to France in the spring of 1764, he and his pupil spent eighteen months at Toulouse, and lived on terms of intimacy with some of the principal members of their parliament, and is supposed to have gathered there further materials for his great projected work. On leaving this place, he took an extensive tour in the south of France; spent two months at Geneva; and then went to Paris, and, having recommendations from Hume, he enjoyed the society of such men as Turgot, Quesnay, Morellet, Necker, D'Alembert, Heivetius, Marmontel, and Madame Riccoboni. He is supposed to have derived special benefit from his intercourse with Turgot and Quesnay, {166} who were engaged in political studies similar to his own. In October, to Great Britain, and spent the 1766, he returned next ten years with the mother whom he so much loved, in Kirkcaldy. There are traditions of David Hume visiting him there from time to time, and of their holding earnest conversations on questions of political economy, and, it is supposed, of

religion, as they walked on the sands of the Frith of Forth. From this retreat issued, in 1776, his " Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," -- the work which made political economy a science.

In 1778 he was appointed, at the request of the Duke of Buccleuch, one of the commissioners of his majesty's customs in Scotland, and removed to Edinburgh, taking his mother with him: it is scarcely necessary to mention that he continued all his life a bachelor. Here he spent the last twelve years of his life. Henceforth he became an object of curiosity to all people of literary culture; and his person was scrutinized, as he walked the streets, by the curious, and his peculiar habits reported. Many a youth, studying in Edinburgh, was proud to relate in after years that he had seen him, -- a fine gentleman of the old school, a little above the ordinary size, with a manly countenance lighted by large gray eyes, wearing a cap, a long, wide great-coat, breeches, and shoebuckles; and they remarked that, when "he walked, his head had a gentle motion from side to side, and his body, at every step, a rolling or vermicular motion, as if he meant to alter his direction, or even turn back. In the street, or elsewhere, he always carried his cane on his shoulder, as a soldier does his musket." ("Lives," by Smellie.) Dr. Carlyle gives a graphic picture of his manner in company. " Adam Smith was far superior to Hume in conversational talents. In that of public speaking they were equal. David never tried it; and I never heard Adam but once, which was at the first meeting of the Select Society, when he opened up the design of the meeting. His voice was harsh, and enunciation thick, approaching to stammering. His conversation was not colloquial, but like lecturing, in which, I have been told, he was not deficient, especially when he grew warm. He was the most absent man in company that I ever saw; moving his lips, and talking with himself, and smiling, in the midst of large companies. If you awaked him from his reverie {167} and made him attend to the subject of conversation, he immediately began to harangue, and never stopped till he told you all he knew about it, with the utmost philosophical ingenuity. He knew nothing of characters, and yet was ready to draw them on the slightest invitation. But when you checked him, or doubted, he retracted with the utmost ease, and contradicted all he had been saying." Carlyle tells us that " David Hume, like Smith, had no discernment at all of character."

Dugald Stewart mentions it as an interesting circumstance that all Hume's works were written with his own hands, whereas Smith dictated to a secretary as he walked up and down his apartment, and hints that we may perceive, in the different styles of these two classical writers, the effects of these different modes of study: as he wrote with his own pen, Hume, gave a greater terseness and compactness to his style, whereas I Smith, in dictating to an amanuensis, kept himself more in sympathy with his reader, and was more disposed, like a speaker, to flow and fluency. It may have been from the same circumstance that Hume wrote with great rapidity, whereas Smith composed as slowly, and with as great difficulty, at last as at first.

In Edinburgh, his studies were much interrupted by his

official duties, and often -- as he mentions in a letter written on his being elected by the students lord rector of his old University-did he cast a longing eye back upon the academic leisure he enjoyed in Glasgow. Like most men of high aims, he regretted, when he saw death approaching, that he had done so little. " I meant to have done more, and there are materials in my papers of which I could have made a great deal. But that is now out of the question." Shortly before his death, he gave orders to destroy all his manuscripts, which were supposed to contain his lectures on rhetoric, on natural religion, and on jurisprudence. He died in July, 1790.

Let us turn to his philosophy. His mind was essentially a reflecting one, a self-revolving one. He was always thinking, and talking to himself, gathering facts, forming theories, and seeking out events to confirm them; thus building up a system which was always ingenious, sometimes too ingenious, but {168} ever worthy of being weighed. His "Theory of Moral Sentiments " has commonly been a favorite with students, because of the eloquence of its language, modelled after the best philosophic writers of ancient Rome and modern France, and of the fertility of his resources in confirming his positions from his varied observation and reading. But his theory has gained the assent of few, and has often been prescribed by professors as a subject on which to exercise the critical acumen of their pupils. Adam Smith is always a discursive writer, and in the work now before us he wanders like a river amidst luxuriant banks, and it is not easy to define his course. Dugald Stewart in his "Memoir" has given the clearest account of it I have seen; and I mean to make free use of what he has written, in the shorter abstract which I submit.

According to the common moral theories, men first judge of their own actions, and then those of their neighbors. Smith reverses this, and maintains that the primary objects of our moral perceptions are the actions of other men. We put ourselves in their position, and partake with them in their affections by what he calls <sympathy> or fellow-feeling, which is the grand principle of his system. We thus judge of their conduct, and then apply to ourselves the decisions which we have passed on our neighbors, and which we may conceive they would pronounce on us. Our moral judgments, both with respect to others and ourselves, include two perceptions: first, of conduct as right or wrong; and, secondly, of the merit or demerit of the agent. When the spectator of another man's situation, upon bringing home to himself all its various circumstances, feels himself affected in the same manner with the person principally concerned, he approves of the affection or passion of this person as just, proper, and suitable to its object. We judge of the propriety of the affection of another only by its coincidence with that which we feel when we put ourselves in the same circumstances, and the perception of this coincidence is the foundation of the perception of moral obligation. Now this is a very circuitous way of gendering our moral ideas and judgments. Whether we look to ourselves or others, the mind pronounces a judgment upon the act, -- say a deed of benevolence or cruelty, -- and must do so according to some law which is the true basis of morality.

We are more likely to {169} pronounce first upon ourselves. But it may be acknowledged that it does help us in forming a correct judgment, to put ourselves in the position of others, and inquire how they would view us; and hence the important rule: " Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them." This is the element of truth in Smith's theory. In illustrating his views, he is particularly happy in showing how circumstances affect our moral judgments; that, for example, when there is no envy in the case, our sympathy with joy is much stronger than our sympathy with sorrow, and that in consequence it is more easy to obtain the approbation of mankind in prosperity than in adversity. From the same principle he traces the origin of ambition, or of the desire of rank and pre-eminence the great object of which passion is to attain that situation which sets a man most in view of general sympathy and attention, and gives an easy empire over the affections of others.

Having thus shown how we come to a sense of propriety (as he calls moral excellence), he proceeds to analyze our sense of merit and demerit, which have always a respect to the effect which the affection tends to produce. The only actions which appear to us deserving of reward are actions of a beneficial tendency, proceeding from proper motives, with which we can sympathize; the only actions which seem to us to deserve punishment are actions of a hurtful tendency, proceeding from improper motives. He accounts for our sense of justice by the circumstance that, if I wish to secure the sympathy and approbation of my fellow-men, -- represented by Smith as the strongest desire of our natures, -- it is necessary for me to regard my happiness not in that light in which it appears to myself, but that in which it appears to mankind in general, as if in all justice there was not an inflexible rule for judging of the conduct both of ourselves and others.

He then shows how our sense of duty comes to be formed in consequence of an application to ourselves of the judgments we have previously passed on others. In doing this we lay down rules of morality which become universally applicable. He allows to Hume that every thing approved of by the mind is useful and agreeable; but he insists that it is not the view of this utility which is either the first or principal source of moral approbation. {170}

Most people have felt that this theory is too artificial, -- is too ingenious to be true. It contains some elements of truth, but they are not put in their proper place; and the fabric is left without a sure foundation, -- virtue has no other foundation than the sympathy and approbation of men. The beauty of the building lies not in the structure as a whole, but in portions, often subordinate portions of it. His illustrations are abundant, and always felicitous; and many of them show a very nice and delicate perception of the peculiarities of human nature. We see this very specially in his chapter " Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our Notions of Beauty and Deformity," -- perhaps the most valuable part of his work, as being that in which he sketches the various moral systems, such as those of the Stoics and Epicureans. Here he shows erudition, and

enters thoroughly into the spirit of the authors and their times. The work will continue to be read for its style and these adjuncts, by persons who set no value on the theory which be expounds.

Smith intended to write a connected history of the liberal sciences and elegant arts, but found the plan far too extensive. He has left us only a few fragments, which were published posthumously by Joseph Black and James Hutton. In these be discusses, always ingeniously, such topics as the nature of the imitation which takes place in what are called the imitative arts; the affinity between music, dancing, and poetry; the affinity between English and Italian verses. But the most valuable of these papers, are three on the principles which lead and direct philosophical inquiries, Illustrated by the history of astronomy, of ancient physics, of ancient logic and metaphysics, and one on the external senses.

The three philosophico-historical essays exhibit all the peculiarities of his mind: they are theoretical, they inquire into causes, and display an enlarged acquaintance with the sciences. He begins with showing that wonder called forth by the new and singular, surprise excited by what is unexpected, and admiration raised by what is great and beautiful, these -- and not any expectation of advantage, or the love of truth for its own sake-are the principles which prompt mankind to try to discover the concealed connections that unite the various appearances of nature, which give rise to the study of philosophy, {171} which is defined as the science of the connecting principles of nature. " Nature, after the largest expenditure that common observation can acquire, seems to abound with events which appear solitary and incoherent with all that go before them, which therefore disturb the easy movement of the imagination; and philosophy aims at discovering the invisible chains which bind together all the disjointed objects. Hence, in astronomy, the invention of eccentric spheres, of epicycles, and of the revolution of the centres of the eccentric spheres; in physics, the four elements; and in metaphysics and logic, species, essence, and ideas, -- all these give the imagination something to rest on." These motives have no doubt helped to create a taste for science, and often given it a particular direction; but many other causes have been in operation. It appears to me that, had Smith been able to devote as much time to a history of philosophy as he did to the "Wealth of Nations," and been in circumstances to review his theories from time to time, he might have written a better work than any produced in that century. No doubt he would at times have added a thought of his own to the account given of a philosophic opinion; but, following out his favorite principle of sympathy, he would always have put himself <en rapport> with the authors and their times.

His paper "Of the External Senses" is characterized by much sound sense and a profound study of the subject. He goes over the senses one by one. He has a glimpse of the important distinction -- afterwards carefully elaborated by Sir William Hamilton, and Miller the physiologist -- between the perception of the organ and of objects beyond the body.

Tasting, smelling, hearing, and certain sensations of touch, are altogether in the organ, and nowhere else but in the organ. But in regard to touching, " the thing which presses and resists I feel as something altogether different from these affections, as external to my hand, and as altogether independent of it." He represents the objects of touch as solidity, and those modifications of solidity which we consider as essential to it and inseparable from it, -- solid extension, figure, divisibility, and mobility." He defines the impenetrability of matter as " the absolute impossibility that two solid, resisting substances should occupy the same place at the same time." He expounds {172} a doctrine in regard to the so-called secondary qualities of matter or, to speak more properly, these four classes, of sensations heat and cold, taste, smell, and sound being felt not as resisting or pressing on the organ, but as in the organ." He says that they "are not naturally perceived as external and independent substances, but as mere affections of the organ, and what can exist nowhere but in the organ." This is perhaps a more philosophical account than that given by Locke, Reid, or Hamilton, who proceed on the distinction drawn between the primary and secondary qualities of matter. In regard to sight, he says the objects of it are color, and those modifications of color which in the same manner we consider as essential to it and inseparable from it, -- colored extension, figure, divisibility, and mobility." The tangible world has three dimensions, -- length, breadth, and depth; the visible world, only two, -- length and breadth. He recognizes Berkeley's theory of vision as "one of the finest examples of philosophical analysis that is to be found either in our own or in any other language; " and he quotes the Chiselden case. He notices the fact that, antecedent to all experience, the young of at least the greater part of animals possess some instinctive perception of distance. "The young partridge, almost as soon as it comes from the shell, runs about among the long grass and corn." He is inclined to think that the young of the human race may have some instinctive perception of the same kind, which does not come forth or manifest itself so strongly as in the lower animals, because mankind have greater aids from intelligence and education. He thinks that other senses, " antecedently to all observation and experience, may obscurely suggest a vague notion of some external thing which excites it. The smell not only excites the appetite, but directs to the object which can alone gratify that appetite. But, by suggesting the direction towards that object, the smell must necessarily give some notion of distance and externality, which are necessarily involved in the idea of direction." These hints are worthy of being carried out: they will certainly not be despised by those who in our day are studying hereditary instinct.

It does not consist with our purpose to give an account of his labors in political economy. I may remark, however, that in his work, and in every other, there is an omitted chapter, {173} which will require to be written by some one before the science is completed. In speaking of soil, labor, money, rent, and other external agents, there is no searching estimate of the internal motives which impel men to the acquisition and distribution of wealth. Some writers, such as James Mill, represent all men as swayed only by

self-love; others dwell fondly on such principles as a taste for literature or the fine arts: but there has been no discriminating computation of the springs of action, general and special, which lead men to make acquisitions, and which have produced different results in different ages and nations; for instance, to one form of civilization in Italy or in France, to others in Germany or in Scotland. Smith might have been tempted to set too high a value on certain influences which were favorites with him, but he was eminently fitted to begin the undertaking; and had he done so, he would have left us admirable illustrations of the power of motives actually swaying mankind.

XXII.-HENRY HOME (LORD KAMES).[44]

H/E\ was the son of George Home, of Kames, a country gentleman of small fortune, in Berwickshire, married to a granddaughter of Principal Baillie. He was born in 1696, and was educated at home, under a private tutor. It was in after life that he devoted himself to the study of Greek and Latin, to which be added mathematics, natural philosophy, logic, ethics, and metaphysics. He was never at any university. He showed an early taste for philosophical speculation. It seems that he came in contact with Andrew Baxter, who was tutor to a son of Mr. Hay, of Drumelzier, and lived at that time at Dunse Castle, within a few miles of Kames, and the two had a correspondence; Home arguing that motion was not a single effect, but a continued succession of effects, each requiring a new or a successive repetition of the cause to produce it. Like so many others in the same age, he had a thrust at Clarke's " Demonstration {174} of the Existence of God," and wrote, in 1723, a letter to the doctor. Already he is drawing up arguments against liberty of will. Having chosen the law as his profession, he was called to the bar 1723-24. As a pleader he began with a very short and distinct statement of the facts f the cause and a plain enunciation of the question of law thence arising, abandoning all the weaker points of the case. He excelled more in making an opening statement than in reply. We have a picture of his habits. He rose at five or six, and spent his morning in preparation for the business of the court. In the forenoon he was at the Court of Session, which, at that time, rose soon after mid-day. He did not go much out to dinner, as he needed all his time for business and study. In the evening, if he had leisure, he joined the ladies in the drawing-room, or took part in a game of cards, or might be seen at the concert or the assembly room. "The evening was generally closed by a small domestic party, where a few of his intimate friends assembled, for the most part without invitation; found a plain but elegant little supper , and where, enlivened often by some of Mrs. Home's female acquaintance, the hours were passed in the most rational enjoyment of sensible and spirited conversation, and easy social mirth, till after midnight."

Throughout his life he published various works on law and jurisprudence; beginning, in 1728, with a folio volume of " Remarkable Decisions of the Court of Session " from 1716 down to that period. In 1752 he was appointed a judge of the Court of Session, by the title of Lord Kames.

But his tastes ever led him towards metaphysical speculation. From 1727 he had been acquainted with David Hume, and he carefully studied his writings as they were published. It seems he had dissuaded the sceptic from publishing his "Philosophical Essays," and he felt himself called to oppose what he believed to be the extreme views there propounded. This gave rise, in 1751, to a work which produced a great noise in his own day, " Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion." It was published under the name of "Sopho." He shows that man is influenced by a great number and variety of principles, such as self-love, benevolence, sympathy, and utility, consonance to the divine will; and that his actions are most frequently the combined result of the opposite {175} springs, tempering and restraining each other's powers. He shows that man has, as a separate principle, in his nature and constitution, a moral feeling or conscience, the function of which is to judge with unerring rectitude of all his motives to action, and direct his conduct to one great and beautiful end, -- the utmost happiness of his nature. In expounding these views, he examines Hume's theory, and shows that it annihilates all real distinction between right and wrong in human actions, and makes our preference of one or other depend on the fluctuating opinions of men in respect to the general good. In particular, he opposes Hume's view of justice, and shows that the idea of property is coeval with society, and that its violation is universally attended with a feeling of a breach of duty, which is the sentiment of justice. He sets himself specially to oppose Hume's attempt to undermine the arguments in behalf of the Divine Existence.

In developing his moral and esthetic views, in this and in other works, he enunciates his metaphysical principles. He maintains that man can acquire intuitive knowledge from a single act of perception. "It is an undoubted truth that man has an original feeling or consciousness of himself and of his existence." He maintains (" History of Man,") that there is a sense by which we perceive the truth of many propositions: such as that every thing which begins to exist must have a cause; that every effect adapted to some end or purpose proceeds from a designing cause; and that every effect adapted to a good end or purpose proceeds from a designing and benevolent cause. A multitude of axioms in every science, particularly in mathematics, are equally perceived to be true. By a peculiar sense we know that there is a Deity. From all this it is evident that he stood up for intuitive principles.

There must surely be truth in the account he gives of power; so different from that of Locke on the one hand, and that of the high <a priori> philosophers on the other. " Every action we perceive gives a notion of power; for a productive cause is implied in every action or event, and the very idea of a cause comprehends the power of producing its effects. Let us only reflect on the perception we have when we see a stone thrown into the air out of one's hand." "As I discover power in external objects by the eye, so I discover power in {176} my mind by an internal sense." "This feeling is involved in the very perception of the action, without taking in either reason or experience." "We cannot

discover power in any object as we discover the object itself, merely by intuition; but the moment an alteration is produced by any object, we perceive that the object has a power to produce that alteration, which leads us to denominate the one a cause and the other an effect." It is generally acknowledged that we know objects within and without us only by their properties; but what are properties but powers, which must thus be known intuitively with the objects that possess them.

But the doctrine which startled the public was that of philosophical necessity, as expounded and defended by him. It is a circumstance worthy of being noted that this doctrine was upheld by three men, who arose about the same period and in much the same district of country, -- David Dudgeon, David Hume, and Henry Home; it looks as if it were the residuum left by the doctrine of predestination, when the flowing waters of the stream have been dried up by an and period. " With respect to instinctive actions, no person, I presume, thinks that there is any freedom; an infant applies to the nipple, and a bird builds a nest, no less necessarily than a stone falls to the ground. With respect to voluntary actions done in order to produce some effect, the necessity is the same, though less apparent at first view. The external action is determined by the will; the will is determined by desire , and desire, by what is agreeable or disagreeable. Here is a chain of causes and effects, not one link of which is arbitrary, or under command of the agent. He cannot will but according to his desire; he cannot desire but according to what is agreeable or disagreeable in the objects perceived. Nor do these qualities depend on the inclination or fancy: he has no power to make a beautiful woman appear ugly, nor to make a rotten carcase smell sweetly." "Thus, with regard to human conduct, there is a chain of laws established by nature, no one link of which is left arbitrary. By that wise system man is made accountable; by it he is made a fit subject for divine and human government; by it persons of sagacity foresee the conduct of others; and by it the presence of the Deity with respect to human actions is clearly established." He founds the responsibility of man upon this very doctrine. {177} "The final cause of this branch of our nature is admirable. If the necessary influence of motives had the effect either to lessen the merit of a virtuous action, or the demerit of a crime, morality would be totally unhinged." In regard to liberty, man acts with the conviction of his being a free agent, and is quite as much accountable as if he were truly free. The answer to all this is, that man has an intuition in regard to his possessing freedom quite as deep and ineradicable as his intuition about cause and effect. If we attend to the latter of these, and adhere to it, as Home does, we should equally hold by the other.

The friends of religion, unenlightened and enlightened, felt at once that there was something here repugnant to all that they had been led to believe about God and man; and Henry Home came to be put in the same class with David Hume, to whom he was in many respects opposed. In 1753, there appeared " An Estimate of the Profit and Loss of Religion, illustrated with References to Essays on Morality and Natural Religion." The author was Rev. George Anderson, who

had been an army officer, and was now chaplain to Watson's Hospital in Edinburgh, and who wrote some tracts against the stage, and a " Remonstrance against Bolingbroke's Philosophical Religion." He is described, by Home's biographer, as " a man of a bold spirit and irascible temperament, and considerable learning." This gave rise to other pamphlets, as " A Letter to the Author of a late Book entitled an I Estimate of the Profit and Loss of Religion."' Anderson sets him self in opposition to those who say that Christianity is not founded on argument, and to Sopho, Hume, and Hutcheson. " Feelings being so uncertain and variable, it is most ridiculous to found upon them a law so important and extensive as is the law of nature." He prefers the ground taken by Clarke and Cumberland. As to the scheme of necessity, it is no other than that of Collins. " That Sopho's (Home's) principles serve the cause of atheism will be plain enough to any who duly consider the consequences of his scheme of necessity, which excludes a providence and binds up the Almighty in the same chain of fate with all other intelligent beings."[45] There appeared in 1755 "An Analysis {178} of the Moral and Religious Sentiments contained in the Writings of Sopho and David Hume, Esq., addressed to the Consideration of the Reverend and Honorable Members of the General Assembly.[46] The author denounces Home as maintaining that man is a mere machine, under an irresistible necessity in all his actions, and yet, " though man be thus necessarily determined in all his actions, yet does he believe himself free, God having planted in his nature this deceitful feeling of liberty," this deceitful feeling being the only foundation of virtue. He argues that from this doctrine it follows, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no sin or moral evil in the world.[47] As to Hume, he is charged with making all distinction betwixt virtue and vice as merely imaginary: "Adultery is very lawful, but sometimes not expedient." This letter was met by a pamphlet, " Observations on the Analysis," generally attributed to Blair, "who is believed likewise to have lent his aid to the composition of a formal reply made by Mr. Home himself, under the title of "Objections against the `Essays on Morality and Natural Religion' examined, 1756." {179}

In all this we have an able and legitimate discussion. But the opponents of the rising scepticism resorted to other and more doubtful steps. Henry Home, it is presumed, was a member of the Church of Scotland, and it would have been quite within the province of that church to summon him before it, and inquire into the opinions which 'he was believed to be propagating. Over David Hume, it is clear that the church had no jurisdiction. But the Church of Scotland claimed to be the guardian of religion in the country, and to have an authority to prevent the circulation of error. So a motion was made in the committee of overtures of the General Assembly that the body should take into their consideration how far it was proper to call before them and censure the authors of infidel books. "There is one person, styling himself David Hume, Esq., hath arrived at such a degree of boldness as publicly to avow himself the author of books containing the most rude and open attacks on the glorious gospel of Christ, and principles evidently subversive even of natural religion and the foundations of

morality, if not establishing direct atheism: therefore, the Assembly appoint the following persons as a committee to inquire into the writings of this author. to call him before them, and prepare the matter for the next General Assembly." `I here was a keen debate in the committee for two days. It was moved in opposition, " that although all the members have a just abhorrence of any principles tending to infidelity or to the prejudice of our holy religion; yet, on account of certain circumstances in this case, they drop the overture, because it would not, in their judgment, serve the purpose of edification." The question being put, "transmit the overture to the Assembly or not," it passed in the negative by a majority of fifty to seventeen votes. After this, Mr. Anderson gave in a petition and complaint to the Presbytery of Edinburgh against the printer and publisher of the " Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion," requiring that the presbytery should summon them to appear before them and declare the name of the author of that work, that he might be censured according to the law of the gospel and the practice of this and all other well-governed churches." The defenders appeared by counsel. Meanwhile Mr. Anderson was summoned away by death from the scene. The case, however, goes on to a decision on the {180} merits, and the complaint is rejected. These incidents give us a more vivid picture of the times than any generalized statements. It is evidently the good function of the rising Moderate party in the church to restrain the intemperate zeal of those who would lay restraint on liberty of thought and writing, who would claim for the church a power not committed to it, and meet error with other weapons than argument.

Meanwhile there are able thinkers preparing to meet the scepticism both of Hume and Home, by well-established philosophic principles. We shall see that Reid and James Gregory, in particular, came forth to defend the doctrine of the freedom of the will. A curious cross-fight was produced at this stage by the introduction into Scotland of Edwards' " Treatise on the Will." In the pamphlet published in defence of Home, it is urged that, " among the list of subscribers to Edwards' book are many members of this church; and it was dispersed last year in this city by the most zealous friends to religion and true Calvinism." It is clear that Home and his friends wished to shelter themselves under the Calvinism of the Church of Scotland; and the pamphlet quotes Calvin, Turretin, and Pictet. It might have been urged in reply that Calvin stands up for an essential freedom of the will, possessed by all responsible beings; and that the reformers generally, in holding by a slavery of the will, meant a slavery produced by the fall of man and by sin. As to Edwards' doctrine, it is a metaphysical one not before the mind of the reformers; and it is so explained and illustrated by the author as to make it have a very different aspect and practical tendency from that propounded by the Scottish necessarians.

The " Essays on Morality" was the work of Home that produced the greatest sensation. It was followed by other philosophical works. In 1761, he published his "Introduction to the Art of Thinking," in which shrewd metaphysics and practical remarks are grafted on the old logic. For several

years be had meditated an extensive work on the principles of criticism, which would inquire into the causes of that pleasure which is derived from the production of poetry, painting, sculpture, music, and architecture. The work appeared in I 762, under the title of " Elements of Criticism." It is gracefully {181} written: it treats of all the subjects usually discussed in books of rhetoric, and shows an extensive reading in the great classical writers of ancient and modern times. He professes to found the whole upon a philosophic basis. But his analysis of the mental principles involved does not seem to me to be very searching or profound. What is the use of telling us, What is now said about the production of emotion or passion resolves into a very simple proposition, that we love what is agreeable and hate what is disagreeable"? He does not follow the Scottish metaphysicians in resolving beauty into association of ideas. He discovers a beauty that is intrinsic as well as a relative beauty.

For years he was collecting materials for a work on man, which appeared in 1774 under the title of " Sketches of the History of Man." This work is meant to describe the progress made by man, in respect of language, food, commerce, the arts, science, government, morality, and religion. He is inclined to think that, as there are different climates, so there are different species of men fitted for these climates, and argues that we cannot account for the differences of mankind by climate or by external agencies. He would believe that there must have been an original difference of languages; but, yielding to the Scriptures, he accounts for the diversities by the confusion of tongues at Babel. He is fond of discovering every where a final cause on the part of God, and a progress on the part of man. He has collected what seems a wide induction of facts; but there is a great want of what Bacon insists on as a necessary part of all legitimate induction, -- " the necessary rejections and exclusions."

He was married to Miss Drummond, by whom he became possessed of one of the most beautiful places in Scotland, Blair Drummond, -- on the banks of the Teith, half way between hill and dale, -- in the south of Perthshire. Home was one of the earliest of those agricultural improvers who became very numerous, from this time onward, for an age or two among those lawyers of Edinburgh who possessed landed estates. He took a lead first at Kames, and then at Blair Drummond, in summer-fallow, and in raising green crops and sown grass. His great agricultural work, which made him famous all over Scotland, consisted in clearing the moss of Kincardine, which {182} extended four miles in length and one or two miles in breadth, and was covered with turf, eight or nine feet in thickness, and underneath which was a rich soil. He effected this by giving the land for a time to moss-planters, who floated away the turf by means of ditches which he dug. He was a leading member of the Board of Trustees for the Encouragement of the Fisheries, Arts, and Manufactures of Scotland, and of the Commission for the Management of Forfeited Estates, the rents of which were to be applied to the improvement of the highlands and islands of Scotland. By means of these boards he did much to stimulate the industry of Scotland. It is asserted that he

did more than any man in his time in encouraging the introduction of " new modes and instruments of industry, the enclosure and culture of wastes and moors, the rearing of forest timber, the draining and cultivation of moss lands, the raising and spinning of flax, the growth and storing of winter fodder for cattle, the improvement of the breed of sheep, and the manufacture of coarse woollen stuffs."

In his old age he published " Loose Hints on Education." He thought that religion should form a main branch of education even in the earliest period of infancy, and that the parents or preceptor should acquaint the child with the fundamental doctrines of revealed religion. The common opinion of him was, that he must be a man devoid of all religion. But a clergyman writes " I have heard him mention the light of immortality as an excellence peculiar to the doctrine of Christ. He gave unqualified praise to Butler's `Analogy,' which is a defence of revealed as well as of natural religion. He was regular in his attendance upon public worship; and during my abode with him he had divine worship in his family every evening." It is interesting to notice that he defends the Scottish view of the Sabbath. " This consideration leads me necessarily to condemn a practice authorized among Christians, with very few exceptions; that of abandoning to diversion and merriment what remains of Sunday after public worship, parties of pleasure, dancing, gaming, any thing that trifles away the time without a serious thought; as if the purpose were to cancel every virtuous impression made at public worship." (" Sketches of the History of Man," B. III.) {183}

In his person he was tall and of a thin and slender make. His portrait shows a high, marked brow; a long nose; and a shrewd, humorous face, -- altogether a strong-marked countenance. "In his manners there was a f rankness amounting to bluntness, and in his conversation a humorous playfulness." He died Dec. 27, 1782, in the eighty-seventh year of his age.

XXIII. -- AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. -- JOHN WITHERSPOON.

A/MERICA\ was now reaching such a settled condition that reflective thought could make its appearance. Underneath the Puritan action and self-sacrifice, there was a Puritan faith which required men to judge and reason. American philosophy put forth at that time its greatest representative. Jonathan Edwards was born in Connecticut, in 1703; was a tutor in Yale in 1724; was pastor and missionary from 1726 to 1757; and died President of Princeton College, in 1758. From his very childhood he pondered the profoundest subjects, and penetrated as far as -- at times farther, some think, than -- human thought could carry him. Possessed of no great variety of reading, he reached his very definite opinions, by revolving every subject in his own mind. I am inclined to think that his opinions might have been modified, had he been brought more fully into contact and collision with other thinkers. His " Freedom of the Will " is the acutest work ever written on that perplexing subject; but many think that he has overlooked an essential freedom in the mind, acknowledged by Calvin, Owen, and the great Calvinistic divines, and revealed by consciousness. He is

known more as a theologian than a philosopher; but the fact is, his metaphysics, always along with his deep spiritual insight, are the valuable element in his divinity. Contemporaneously with Berkeley, he arrives at a doctrine of power and of body,-not the same with that of the ideal bishop, but coming close to it and perhaps of a more consistently philosophic structure. Cause he explains to be " that after or upon the existence of which, or its existence after such a manner, the existence of another thing follows. The connection between these two existences, or between the cause and effect is what is called power." "When we say that grass is green, all that we can mean is, that, in a constant course, when we see grass, the idea of green is excited by it" " What idea is that which we call by the name of body? I find color has the chief share in it. `Tis nothing but color, and figure, which is the termination of this figure, together with some powers, such as the power of resisting and motion, that wholly takes up what we call body, and if that which we principally mean by the thing itself cannot be said to be in the thing itself, I think {184} nothing can be. If color exists not out of the mind, then nothing be longing to body exists out of the mind, but resistance, which is solidity, and the termination of this resistance with its relations, which is figure, and the communication of this resistance from place to place, which is motion; though the latter are nothing, but modes of the former. Therefore, there is nothing out of the mind but resistance; and not that either, when nothing is actively resisted. Then there is nothing but the power of resistance. And, as resistance is nothing but the actual exertion of God's power, so the power can be nothing else but the constant law or method of that actual exercise." (Notes on Mind, in Dwight's " Life of Edwards.")

It could be shown that, at this time, there was everywhere a tendency towards idealism among the higher minds, which had been trained under the philosophy of Locke. The Rev. Samuel Johnson, the tutor of Edwards in Yale, who afterwards wrote " Elementa Philosolphica," welcomed Berkeley on his coming to Rhode Island, and adopted his philosophy. Berkeley was personally beloved by all who came in contact with him, and gained some devoted adherents to his theory. In Princeton College, Mr. Meriam, a tutor, defended the system. But idealism has never struck deep into the American soil. The " Scottish Philosophy," coming in with the great Scotch and Scotch-Irish migration, which, next to the Puritan, has had the greatest power for good on the American character, has had much greater influence. Edwards was acquainted with the moral theory of Hutcheson, which makes virtue consist in benevolence; but propounded one of his own, somewhat akin to it, but much more profound, making virtue consist in love to being as being. I feel that I must take a passing notice of the energetic man who actually introduced Scottish thought into the new world.

John Witherspoon[48] was the son of a minister of the Church of Scotland, and was born February 5, 1722, in the parish of Yester, in East Lothian, the probable birthplace of Knox. He entered the university of Edinburgh, at the age of fourteen, and pursued his studies there for seven years, with such fellow-students as Blair, Robertson, and John

Erskine. Carlyle, who could not have been specially inclined towards him, is obliged to say that " he was open, frank, and generous, pretending to what he was, and sup porting his title with spirit." " At the time I speak of, he was a good scholar, far advanced for his age, very sensible and shrewd, but of a disagreeable temper, which was irritated by a flat voice and awkward manner, which prevented his making an impression on his contemporaries at all adequate to his abilities." Descended from Knox, through his heroic daughter, Mrs. Welch, who told King James that she would rather " kep his head in her lap" than have him submit to the king's supremacy in {185} religion," young Witherspoon inherited the spirit of the reformer,[49] -- his devoted piety, his keen perception of abounding evil, his undaunted courage, his unflinching perseverance, and, I may add, his vigorous sense and his broad humor. He was settled as minister, first in Beith in Ayrshire, famous for its cheese, and then in Paisley, famous for its shawls and for the piety of its older inhabitants; and in both places was an effective, popular preacher, and wrote works -- such as his Treatises on justification, and on Regeneration -- which continue to be read with profit to this day.

He perceived clearly and felt keenly the great change which was coming over the Church of Scotland: he watched carefully the rise and progress of moderatism, tracing it to the restoration of church patronage, and to the philosophy of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, favored by a young race of divines, who seemed to him to be addicted to levity in their whole character, to be ready to abandon the old truths, and to trample on the spiritual rights of the people. He did not scruple to satirize it in a work, published anonymously, and distinguished for its plain speaking and its humor, scarcely inferior in power to the sarcasm of Swift, and having a much higher aim, -- " Ecclesiastical Characteristics, or the Arcana of Church Policy: Being an humble attempt to open the mystery of moderation, wherein is shown a plain and easy way of attaining to the character of a moderate man, as at present in repute in the Church of Scotland," " Oh, yes! fierce for moderation." " When any man is charged with loose practices or tendencies to immoralities, he is to be screened and protected as much as possible; especially if the faults laid to his charge be -- as they are incomparably termed in a sermon, preached by a hopeful youth, that made some noise lately -- `good-humored vices."' " It will serve further for the support of this maxim, that, according to modern discoveries, there is a great analogy between the moral virtues, or, if you will, the science of morals, and the fine arts: and it is on account of this analogy that most of the present reigning expressions upon the subject of morals are borrowed from the arts; as, beauty, order, proportion, harmony." "Another thing strongly pleads for gentlemen having the chief hand in settling kirks, that nowadays very few of our principal gentry attend ordinances, or receive any benefit by a minister after he is settled, unless perhaps talking of the news at a private visit or playing a game at backgammon." " As for logic, it is well known this part of education is fallen into great contempt, and it is not to be expected that such brisk and lively spirits, who have always hated every thing that looked scholastic-like, can bear to be tied down to the strict

rules of argumentation." " It illustrates the truth of Mr. H -- 's doctrine: that virtue is founded upon instinct and affection, and not upon reason; that benevolence is its source, support, and perfection; and that all the particular rules of conduct are to be suspended when they seem to interfere with the general good." This satire cut deep, and he was attacked on all hands, for resorting to such a weapon. He {186} defended himself in a " Serious Apology for the Ecclesiastical Characteristics,' by the real author of that performance." One other reason I shall mention for making choice of this way of writing was drawn from the modern notions of philosophy, which had so greatly contributed to the corruption of the clergy. The great patron and advocate for these was Lord Shaftesbury, one of whose leading principles it is, that I ridicule is the test of truth.' This principle of his had been adopted by many of the clergy; and there is hardly any man conversant in the literary world, who has not heard it a thousand times defended in conversation. I was there fore willing, to try how they themselves could stand the edge of this weapon." Taking his part in the controversy raised by the publication of Home's " Douglas," he published "A Serious Inquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Stage." Robertson, now acknowledged as the consummately able leader of the moderate party, found at times a powerful opponent in Witherspoon. Dr. Robertson had remarked that, with a real minority, the moderate party had been able to carry their measures; whereupon Witherspoon said: `We allow you whatever merit you may be entitled to for your skill, but remember the authority which says, I the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light.' " One day after Witherspoon had carried some important questions in the General Assembly, Dr. Robertson said to him in a pleasant and easy manner: " I think you have your men better disciplined than formerly," a remark showing how much value lie set on skilful leadership. " Yes," replied Witherspoon, "by urging your politics too far, you have compelled us to beat you with your own weapons." He acts in character throughout, and as if be still lived in the seventeenth century. On the night before the communion sabbath, it is reported that a set of youths, following the example set in the " hell-fire clubs," to which I have referred (p. 19), held a meeting for mock preaching and praying. This was an awful scene to been acted, in so godly a town as Paisley, where, on a sabbath morning, family praise might be heard rising from every dwelling; and Witherspoon a fortnight after, Feb. 21, 1762, preaches " a seasonable advice to young persons," and publishes it with the names of the offenders. But he is living in the eighteenth and not the seventeenth century, and a lawyer started an action and got costs, which greatly embarrassed the doctor. All these things -- the enemies raised up by the " Characteristics," and these local troubles -- must have made Scotland somewhat too hot for him, the more so that the law was against him, and the church party opposed to him was increasing in power and in imperiousness. He had a brave heart and could have stood it all. But it was at this juncture that there came an invitation to him to become president of the college of New Jersey, Princeton. He did not listen to that call when it was first made in 1766; but he accepted it in 1768, and was inducted as president, Sept. 28 of that year. He had now a

far wider field opened to him than ever he could have had in his own country, where all the civil patronage and the literature of the age were against him He has evidently fallen into his predestined sphere, and feels that he has a fitness, a taste, and a talent for the work.

The course of instruction followed in the college during his administration {187} was a good one. "In the first year, they read Latin and Greek, with the Roman and Grecian antiquities and rhetoric. In the second, continuing the study of languages, they learn a complete system of geography with the use of the globes, the first principles of philosophy, and the elements of mathematical knowledge. The third, though the languages are not wholly omitted, is chiefly employed in mathematics and natural Philosophy, and the senior year is employed in reading the higher classics, proceeding in the mathematics and natural philosophy, and going through a course of moral philosophy." In addition, Dr. Witherspoon delivered lectures to the juniors and seniors upon chronology and history, and upon composition and criticism, and taught Hebrew and French to those who wished it. During the whole course of their studies, the three younger classes, two or three every evening, were called to pronounce an oration on a stage erected for the purpose, immediately after prayers, " that they may learn, by early habit, presence of mind and proper pronunciation and gesture in public speaking." " The senior scholars, every five or six weeks, pronounce orations of their own composition, to which all persons of any note in the neighborhood are invited or admitted." (" Address by Witherspoon in behalf of the College of New Jersey.") It will be observed that in this last provision, that for public speaking, there is something not found in the European colleges. The course as a whole is good; but the State of New Jersey would not furnish funds, and private benevolence did not supply sufficient means to procure an adequate number of instructors. By means of this instruction, even with its scanty staff of teachers, the college in that age raised, not only a large body of devoted ministers. but a great number of the ablest statesmen and lawyers of which America can boast, and furnished professors to a great many colleges, west and south.[50] Witherspoon took four different departments, composition, taste, and criticism; chronology and history; moral philosophy; and divinity. Many of his pupils have testified to the benefit which they derived from his instructions, so sagacious, so stimulating and practically useful. In particular, James Madison, perhaps the most philosophical of all the founders and framers of the American constitution, acknowledges his obligations to the study of moral philosophy under Witherspoon. "The increased attention paid to the study of the nature and constitution of the human mind, and the improvements which had been introduced into this fundamental department of knowledge by the philosophical inquiries of his own countrymen, constituted a marked and most important feature of Dr. Witherspoon's reforms. Mr. Madison formed a taste for these inquiries, which entered deeply, as we shall hereafter have occasion to remark, into the character and habits of his mind, and gave to his political writings in after life a profound and philosophic cast, which distinguished them eminently and favorably from the

production of the ablest of his contemporaries." (" Life and Times of Madison," by William C. Rives.)

President Ashbel Green tells us, "The Berkeleyan system of metaphysics was in repute in the college when he entered. The tutors were zealous {188} believers in it, and waited on the president with some expectation of either confounding him, or making him a proselyte. They had mistaken their man. He first reasoned against the system, and then ridiculed it till he drove it out of the college. The writer has heard him state, that, before Reid or any other author of their views had published any theory on the ideal system, lie wrote against it, and suggested the same trains of thought which they adopted, and that he published his essay in a Scotch magazine." He refers in his moral philosophy to the common-sense school of Scotland. " Some late writers have advanced, with great apparent reason, that there are certain first principles or dictates of common-sense, which are either simple perceptions or seen with intuitive evidence. These are the foundation of all reasoning, and, without them, to reason is a word with out a meaning. They can no more be proved than you can prove an axiom in mathematical science. These authors of Scotland have lately produced and supported this opinion, to resolve at once all the refinement and metaphysical objections of some infidel writers. (" Moral Philosophy," sect. v.) His son-in-law, and his successor as president, Samuel Stanhope Smith, at one time inclined to Berkeleyanism, formally renounces idealism. " Whatever medium, in the opinion of these philosophers (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume), nature may employ to connect the object with the organ of sense, whether image or idea, or any other sensible phantasm, it is, beyond a doubt the object itself, not its idea, which is discovered by the sense; any image or phantasm, in the case, being either unknown or unperceived, and at the time wholly unthought of. An idea is merely a conception of the fancy, or the reminiscence of the object."[51] From this date, the Scottish became the most influential philosophy in America.

His work on moral philosophy is not particularly profound or interesting. But I suppose we have only the skeleton of his course; and, as he illustrated it orally by his reading and wide observation of mankind, I believe it was useful and attractive. He discussed such authors as Leibnitz, Clarke, Hutcheson, Wollaston, Collins, Nettleton, Hume, Kames, Adam Smith, Reid, Balfour, Butler, Balguy, Beattie. He had vigorously opposed Hutcheson in Scotland, and he sees the logical result of his view of virtue in the systems of Hume and Home, who are criticised by him. He refers to the theory of his predecessor in office, Edwards, that " virtue consists in the love of being as such," but without approval. His own view is summed up in these words: " There is in the nature of things a difference between virtue and vice; and, however much virtue and happiness are connected by the divine law and in the event of things, we are made so as to feel towards them and conceive of them as distinct, -- we have the simple perceptions of duty and interest." " The result of the whole is, that we ought to take the rule of duty from conscience, enlightened by reason, experience, and every way by which we can be supposed to learn the will of our Maker." {189}

But Witherspoon was a man of action, rather than reflection. His administration of the college seems to have been successful. Following the original theory of the American college, Princeton college was placed in a village supposed to be away from the temptations of great cities. " It is not," Witherspoon says, " in the power of those who are in great cities to keep the discipline with equal strictness where boys have so many temptations to do evil, and can so easily and effectually conceal it after it is done. With us, they live all in college, under the inspection of their masters; and the village is so small that any irregularity is immediately and certainly discovered, and therefore easily corrected." The rules of government which he explained to the tutors are admirable. " Govern, govern always, but beware of governing too much. Convince your pupils, for you may convince them, that you would rather gratify than thwart them; that you wish to see them happy; and desire to impose no restraints but such as their real advantage, and the order and welfare of the college, render indispensable. Put a wide difference between youthful follies and foibles, and those acts which manifest a malignant spirit or intentional insubordination. Do not even notice the former, except it be by private advice. Overlook them entirely, unless they occur in such a public manner that it is known that you must have observed them. Be exceeding careful not to commit your own authority or that of the college, in any case that cannot be carried through with equity. But having pursued this system, then, in every instance in which there has been a manifest intention to offend or resist your authority, or that of the college, make no compromise with it whatever: put it down absolutely and entirely. Maintain the authority of the laws ,in their full extent. and fear no consequences."

But his influence was exerted and felt far beyond the college walls. As might have been expected from his love of liberty, and his impetuous spirit, and the part he took in Scotland, be early threw himself into the struggle for independence, and he was elected a representative in Congress for the State of New Jersey, in 1776, and declared there the way by which he had been led. " We were contending for a restoration of certain privileges under the government of Great Britain, and were praying for a reunion with her. But in the beginning of July, with the universal approbation of all the States now united, we renounced this conviction, and declared our selves free and independent." His is one of the names -- the most honored of any in America-attached to the Declaration of Independence, and his portrait adorns Independence Hall. I rather think that-if we except Washington, Franklin, and perhaps half a dozen others -- none bad so important an influence as Witherspoon in guiding the American Revolution. It will be remembered that one of the decisive battles of the war was fought at Princeton; and, in 1783, the Congress sat for months in the college, presided over by one of the trustees, and with Witherspoon as a member. When in Congress, he exerted himself to secure a firm, central government, and a gold instead of a paper standard. He retired from Congress in 1783, to give himself to his college work. He died, Nov. 15, 1794. {190} From the picture of him by the elder Peale in Princeton college, and

the account given by Ashbel Green, we learn that " his stature was of middle size, with some tendency to corpulence. His limbs were well-proportioned, and his complexion was fair. His eyes were strongly indicative of intelligence. His eyebrows were large, hanging down at the ends next his temples, occasioned, probably, by a habit he had contracted of pulling them when he was under excitement." His whole air is that of a man of strong character; and we see traces of his being naturally a man of strong passion, which, however, he was able to subdue. Scotland did not allow him, what would have been for her good, to become a leader of men; and Scotland's loss became America's gain.

XXIV.-JAMES BALFOUR.

H/E\ was a member of the Scotch bar, and one of the many Edinburgh lawyers who devoted themselves to philosophy. He was one of the first to write against the ethical principles of Hume, which he did in his " Delineations of the Nature and Obligations of Morality," published anonymously, 1752 or 1753. He sets out with the principle that private happiness must be the chief end and object of every man's pursuit; shows how the good of others affords the highest happiness; and then to sanction natural conscience be calls in the authority of God, who must approve of what promotes the greatest happiness. This theory does not give morality a sufficiently deep foundation in the constitution of man or the character of God, and could not have stood against the assaults of Hume. In 1754, he was appointed professor of moral philosophy in the university of Edinburgh, the chair which David Hume had wished to fill some years before, -- and continued to hold it till 1764, when be became professor of the law of nature and nations, and held the office till about 1779. In 1768, he published a second work, written against Hume and Lord Kames and in defence of active power and liberty. Like all enlightened opponents of the new scepticism, he felt it necessary to oppose the favorite theory of Locke, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. " It may indeed be allowed that the first notions of things are given to the mind by means of some sensation or other; but then it may also be true that after such notions are given the mind, by the exertion of some inherent power, may be able to discover some remarkable qualities of such things, and even things of a very different nature, which are not to be discovered merely by any sense whatever." He published " Philosophical Dissertations," in 1782.

He was born in 1705, and died 1795. His father was a merchant in Edinburgh, and his mother a daughter of Hamilton of Airdrie, from which family Sir William Hamilton was descended. He seems to have received his education first in Edinburgh College, and then, like so many scholars of the preceding ages, at Leyden. {191}

XXV. -- ALEXANDER GERARD.

H/E\ was the son of the minister of a parish, called the chapel of Garioch, in Aberdeenshire, and was born in 1728. In July, 1752, lie was admitted professor of moral

philosophy in Marischal College. In August, 1755, he submits in a printed paper an improved plan of education for the college. He argues powerfully against the established practice of reaching logic in the early years of the course. He recommends that the curriculum consist: First year, classics; second year, history and elementary mathematics; third year, natural philosophy, with belles-lettres and mathematics; fourth year, pneumatology, or natural philosophy of spirit, including the doctrine of the nature, faculties, and states of the human mind, and natural theology; moral philosophy, containing ethics, jurisprudence, and politics, -- the study of these being accompanied with a perusal of some of the best ancient moralists; logic, or the laws and rules of inventing, proving, retaining, and communicating knowledge; and metaphysics. This is, in many respects, an enlightened course, but confines the attention of every student too exclusively to one department for the year, -- whereas the mind works better with some variety, -- and does not give a sufficient space to classics and English. This course was substantially adopted by the college, which thus came to differ from the other Scotch universities.

It is indicative of a strong desire on the part of an enlightened body of men to promote elegance and refinement in their country, that the Edinburgh Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Sciences, Manufactures, and Agriculture offered a premium for the best essay on "Taste," the phrase " taste " having come unfortunately into use as the translation of the French "gout" The prize was gained by Gerard, and the work was published in 1759, the publisher adding three dissertations by Voltaire, D'Alembert, and Montesquieu. Anxious to promote the objects of the above-named society, he offered through it a gold medal on style in composition. In the same year, he was chosen professor of divinity in Marischal, and, in 1773, he became professor of divinity in King's College, and his attention was thus called away from philosophy. In 1766, he published " Dissertations on Subjects relating to the Genius and Evidences of Christianity." Still cherishing his old tastes, he published, in 1774, an " Essay on Genius," meant to be the complement of his work on ,Taste." He wrote also "Sermons," in two volumes; "The Pastoral Care;" and "The Evidences of the Christian Religion."

He is best known by his work on " Taste." He enlarges the number of senses or tastes far beyond what Hutcheson or any other has done, -- illustrating the sense or taste of novelty, sublimity, beauty, imitation, harmony, oddity and ridicule, and virtue, and shows bow they all enter into fine taste He calls them internal or reflex senses, as distinguished from external senses. He does not enter upon a searching inquiry into their psychological nature, nor seek to determine what objective reality is implied in them: he contents himself with a graceful pleasant exposition and illustration. {192} In his other philosophical work, he describes genius as the faculty of invention, treats of such interesting subjects as the influence of habit and passion on association, and quotes largely from the best writers of Greece and Rome, France and England; but shows little analytic or metaphysical acumen. By his lectures and works,

he helped to create and foster a literary taste in the region of which Aberdeen claims to be the capital, and is believed to have had influence on the studies and teaching of Beattie. Beattie is said to allude to him, when he speaks of a person who "by two hours' application could fix a sermon in his mind so effectively as to be able to recite it in public without the change, omission, or transposition of a single word." He died in 1795 [52]

XXVI. -- THOMAS REID.[53]

I/F\ he was not the founder, he is the fit representative of the Scottish philosophy. He is in every respect, a Scotchman of the genuine type: shrewd, cautious, outwardly calm, and yet with a deep well of feeling within, and capable of enthusiasm; not witty, but with a quiet vein of humor. And then he has the truly philosophic spirit: seeking truth modestly, humbly, diligently; piercing beneath the surface to gaze on the true nature of things; and not to be caught by sophistry, or misled by plausible representations. He has not the mathematical consecutiveness of Descartes, the speculative genius of Leibnitz, the sagacity of Locke, the <spirituel> of Berkeley, or the {193} detective skill of Hume; but he has a quality quite as valuable as any of these, even in philosophy; he has in perfection that common-sense which he so commends, and this saves him from the extreme positions into which these great men have been tempted by the soaring nature of their inexorable logic. It is genius, and not the want of it, that adulterates philosophy." He looks steadily and inquires carefully into the subjects of which he is treating; and if he does not go round them he acknowledges that he has not done so; and what he does see, he sees clearly and describes honestly. " The labyrinth may be too intricate, and the thread too fine to be traced through all its windings; but if we stop when we can trace it no farther, and secure the ground we have gained, there is no harm done, and a quicker eye may at times trace it farther." Speculative youths are apt to feel that, because he is so sober, and makes so little pretension, he cannot possibly be far-seeing or profound; but this is at the time of life when they have risen above taking a mother's counsel, and become wiser than their fathers; and, after following other and more showy lights for a time, they may at last be obliged to acknowledge that they have here the true light of the sun, which it is safer to follow than that of the flashing meteor. M. Cousin, in his preface to the last edition of his volume on the Scottish philosophy, declares that the true modern Socrates has not been Locke, but Reid. " Kant," he says, " has commenced the German philosophy, but he has not governed it. It early escaped him, to throw itself in very opposite directions. The name of Kant rests only on the ruins of his doctrines. Reid has impressed on the Scottish mind a movement less grand, but this movement has had no reactions." " Yes," he adds, " Reid is a man of genius, and of a true and powerful originality; so we said in 1819, and so we say in 1857, after having held long converse with mighty systems, discovered their secret, and taken their measure." There is profound truth in this; but it is scarcely correct to say that there have been no reactions against Reid in Scotland. There was a reaction by Brown

against his indiscriminate admission of first principles. Again, there is a reaction in the present day on the part of those who dislike his appeal to consciousness as revealing to us a certain amount of truth, and who deal, in consequence, solely with {194} historical sketches of philosophic systems, or who make the philosophy of the human mind a branch of physiology. Still Reid has continued to exercise a greater influence than any other metaphysician on the thought of his country. It is true, that in some respects he resembles Socrates; but in others he differs from him quite as much as the Scotch mind differs from the Greek. Both have very much the same truth-loving spirit, the same homely sense, and contempt for pretension: but Socrates has vastly more subtlety and dialectic skill, and reaches the conclusion that truth cannot be found except in moral subjects; whereas Reid firmly maintains and resolutely proclaims that settled truth can be attained by observation, in the kingdoms both of mind and matter. Reid's style will not please those who are seeking for flashes of genius, of wit or eloquence. But it always clearly expresses his ideas; and some prefer his plain statements, his familiar idioms, commonly purely English, to the stateliness of Stewart, -- who cannot express a commonplace thought except in a rounded period, -- and the perpetual rhetoric of Brown.

Thomas Reid was born, April 26, 1710, at Strachan, which is situated about twenty miles from Aberdeen, on the banks of a lively mountain stream, which rises on the high Grampians, and flows down the hollows of their northern slope into the Dee. The place is rather tame, and must have been bleak enough in winter; but it is quite a spot in which a thoughtful student might profitably pass the long summer vacations which the Scotch colleges allow, and have enjoyable rambles among the heath-clad and rocky mountains above him, including Clochnaben with the conspicuous stone on the top. His father, the Rev. Lewis Reid, was minister of the place for fifty years, and stood by the whig and reformation cause at the great crisis of the Revolution of 1688, when the people of that region, still under strong landlord influence, might have been readily swayed to the one side or the other. He was descended from a succession of Presbyterian ministers in Banchory-Ternan on the Dee, who traced their descent from an old county family, and go as far back as the Reformation. His mother was Margaret Gregory of Kinnairdie in Banffshire, and be longed to the family of that name, which was so illustrious in Scotland during the whole of last century and the beginning {195} of this. On both sides of his house were persons who had risen to eminence in literature and science. On his father's side, Dugald Stewart mentions Thomas Reid, who, on finishing his education at home, went to the continent, and maintained public discussions in several universities, and afterwards collected his theses in a volume; who published some Latin poems to be found in the " Delitim Poetarum Scotorum; " who became Secretary in the Greek and Latin tongues to James I., and, along with Patrick Young, translated the works of that monarch into Latin. A brother of his, Alexander Reid, was physician to King Charles I., and published several books on medicine; and another brother, Adam, translated into English Buchanan's " History of Scotland." On the side of the Gregorys the subject of our memoir could claim as grand-

uncle, James Gregory, the inventor of the reflecting telescope, and as uncles David Gregory, -- Savilian professor of astronomy at Oxford, and an intimate friend of Sir Isaac Newton's, -- and two others, professors of mathematics respectively at St. Andrews and Edinburgh. Such a kinsmanship must have given a powerful stimulus towards literature and science to a thoughtful youth like Thomas Reid.

The boy was two years at the parish school of Kincardine when the teacher foretold " that he would turn out to be a man of good and well-wearing parts." He was then sent to Aberdeen to prosecute his classical studies. He entered Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1722, when he was only twelve years of age. He was in the first Greek class taught by Dr. Thomas Blackwell, afterwards principal, who took such pains to revive the study of the Greek tongue in the north of Scotland; and the pupil seems to have caught somewhat of the spirit of his master, for in after life he was known to recite in his class demonstrations of Euclid in the Greek language. But his special instructor was Dr. George Turnbull, who conducted him and other thirty-nine pupils through a three years' course in what was called philosophy.

He has left us in a letter written in 1779, an account of a curious youthful experience.

> "About the age of fourteen, I was almost every night, unhappy in my sleep, from frightful dreams -- . sometimes hanging over a dreadful hemisphere and just ready to drop down; sometimes pursued for my life and {196} stopped by a wall, or by a sudden loss of all strength; sometimes ready to be devoured by a wild beast. How long I was plagued with such dreams, I do not now recollect. I believe it was for a year or two at least; and I think they had quite left me before I was fifteen. In those days, I was much given to what Mr. Addison, in one of His "Spectators," calls castle building; and, in my evening solitary walk, which was generally all the exercise I took. my thoughts would hurry me into some active scene, where I generally acquitted myself much to my own satisfaction; and, in these scenes of imagination, I performed many a gallant exploit. At the same time, in my dreams, I found myself the most arrant coward that ever was. Not only my courage, but my strength, failed me in every danger; and I often rose from my bed in the morning in such a panic that it took some time to get the better of it. I wished very much to be free of these uneasy dreams, which not only made me unhappy in sleep, but often left a disagreeable impression in my mind, for some part of the following day. I thought it was worth trying whether it was possible to recollect that it was all a dream, and that I was in no real danger. I often went to sleep with my mind as strongly impressed as I could with this thought, that I never in my lifetime was in any real danger, and that every fright I had was a dream. After many fruitless endeavors to recollect this when the danger appeared, I effected it at last, and have often, when I was sliding over a precipice into

the abyss, recollected that it was all a dream, and boldly jumped down. The effect of this commonly was, that I immediately awoke. But I awoke calm and intrepid, which I thought a great acquisition. After this, my dreams were never very uneasy; and, in a short time, I dreamed not at all. During all this time I was in perfect health; but whether my ceasing to dream was the effect of the recollection above mentioned, or of any change in the habit of my body, which is usual about that period of life, I cannot tell. I think it may more probably be imputed to the last. How ever, the fact was that, for at least forty years after, I dreamed none, to the best of my remembrance; and, finding from the testimony of others that this is somewhat uncommon, I have often, as soon as I awoke, endeavored to recollect without being able to recollect any thing that passed in my sleep. For some years past, I can sometimes recollect some kind of dreaming thoughts, but so incoherent that I can make nothing of them. The only distinct dream I ever had since I was about sixteen, as far as I remember, was about two years ago. I had got my head blistered for a fall. A plaster, which was put on it after the blister, pained me excessively for a whole night. In the morning I slept a little, and dreamed very distinctly that I had fallen into the bands of a party of Indians, and was scalped. I am apt to think that as there is a state of sleep and a state wherein we are awake, so there is an intermediate state which partakes of the other two. If a man peremptorily resolves to rise at an early hour for some interesting purpose, he will of himself awake at that hour. A sick-nurse gets the habit of sleeping in such a manner that she bears the least Whisper of the sick person, and yet is refreshed by this kind of half sleep. The same is the case of a nurse who sleeps with a child in her arms. I have slept on horseback, but so as to preserve my balance; and, if the horse stumbled, I {197} could make the exertion necessary for saving me from a fall, as if I was awake. I hope the sciences at your good university are not in this state. Yet, from so many learned men so much at their ease, one would expect something more than we hear of."

He graduated in 1726 at the age of sixteen. His college life was prolonged by his being appointed librarian to the university, which office he continued to hold till 1736. Ever a student, and busied with solid work, he joined eagerly with his friend John Stewart, afterwards professor in Marischal College, in pursuing mathematical studies, specially the " Principia " of Newton. His life was varied by his taking with his friend Stewart an excursion into England, and visiting London, Oxford, and Cambridge. Through his relative David Gregory he got access to the house of Martin Folkes, where he met with " the most interesting objects which the metropolis had to offer to his curiosity. At Cambridge he saw Dr. Bentley, -- who delighted him with his learning and amused him with his vanity,-and enjoyed repeatedly the conversation of the blind mathematician Saunderson, a phenomenon in the history of the human mind to which he has referred more than once in his philosophical speculations."

In 1737, he was presented by King's College, Aberdeen, to the living of New Machar, -- a country parish about a dozen miles from Aberdeen, lying on the level agricultural land of the county, but with glorious views of the distant mountains towards the west. The circumstances connected with his settlement furnish a vivid picture of the age. By this time there was a keen antagonism between the Evangelical and the Moderate parties in the Church of Scotland and this was fiercely manifested on this occasion. In order to his being settled, the probationer or minister had not only to receive a presentation from the patron, but a "call " from the people, which, however, was by this time becoming a mere form, as the ecclesiastical courts falling under the influence of the patronage spirit contrived to avoid insisting on a <bona fide> concurrence from the members of the congregation. We have preserved "A Sermon preached before the Reverend the Presbytery of Aberdeen in the Church of New Machar, Feb. 10, 1737, at the Moderation of a Call to a Minister for that vacant Church, by Mr. John Bisset, Minister of the Gospel at Aberdeen." Mr. Bisset had {198} formerly been minister of New Machar, and was known all over the north as a popular preacher, a defender of evangelical religion, and an opponent of patronage. In this discourse, which is full of stirring appeals, he warns the people against the fear of man which bringeth a snare," against being intimidated by their landlords, and acting on the slavish principle, 'I am for the man the laird is for." Expressing his affection for a people to whom he had been minister for twelve years, he reminds them that when he left them their landlords had persuaded them to take a minister who had fallen into fornication and absconded. He complains of persons not residing in the parish, or though residing in it not attending gospel ordinances, interfering to serve a friend, referring, it is supposed, to a near relative of Dr. Reid's. He asserts that the election of a minister is a Christian right, and that " the poor Christian in vile raiment may claim the same regard that is paid to him who wears the gay clothing, the gold ring and the goodly apparel." It is a poor and worthless story for any man to say, that you, the people, are tenants at will, and to improve this as if you were to have no will but theirs in the work of this day. Well may you reply that you are tenants at God's will, who can take them away with His stroke when they are thinking to have their wills of you. He exhorts them to trust in God and do what is right, and warns them that, even though they should by acting an unconscientious part secure an earthly habitation, yet they might soon be driven out of it." The appeal produced a powerful effect. The people, having no hope of getting their rights protected by the church courts, adopted a mode of expressing their feelings characteristic of the times. The tradition is that, when their minister came to the place, men dressed in women's clothes, ducked him in a pond; and that, on the sabbath on which he preached his first sermon, an uncle of his who resided at Rosehill, two miles off, defended him on the pulpit stair with a drawn sword.

I am not sure that the sphere to which Reid was now appointed was the one exactly suited to him, or that he was the fittest man to preach the gospel of Christ to a country

congregation, or indeed that the old Scotch theory of connecting the church and the colleges so closely was the best either for the church or the colleges. For the first seven years he was in {199} the way of preaching the sermons of others, a practice very obnoxious to the people. The tradition is that on one occasion when at Fintray, three miles off, the lady of Sir -- Forbes thanked him for preaching on the previous sabbath so excel lent a sermon from Tillotson; whereupon he denied in strong terms that he had taken a sermon from Tillotson. To his confusion he found, on retiring to his bedroom, a volume of Tillotson's on his table, lying open at the place where was the discourse he had preached. Ashamed, not of the fact of his preaching another man's sermons, but of his being supposed capable of uttering a falsehood, he hastened to inform the lady that he had taken the discourse not from Tillotson's published sermons, but from a packet which he had otherwise.[54]

But while thus obnoxious at his first settlement, he is said to have gradually won the good opinion of his parishioners by the propriety of his conduct, his conscientiousness, and his kindness. His popularity was increased when, in 1740, he married Elizabeth, -- the daughter of his uncle Dr. George Reid, physician in London, -- who endeared herself to the people by her kind offices to the sick and poor. There is reason to believe that in the later years of his ministry he became earnest in his Master's service. The tradition is that, in dispensing the sacrament of the supper, tears rolled from his eyes, when he spoke of the loveliness of the Saviour's character. The following dedication of himself to God is preserved in the manuscripts,[55] and lets us see more clearly than any thing that has been printed by Dugald Stewart the deep feeling that lay beneath that calm outward demeanor. It is dated March 30, 1746.

> " O God: I desire humbly to supplicate thy Divine Majesty in behalf of my distressed wife, who is by thy hand brought very low, and in imminent danger of death, if thou, who alone dost wonders, do not in mercy interpose thy Almighty arm, and bring her back from the gates of death. I deserve justly, O Lord, that thou shouldst deprive me of the greatest comfort of my life, because I have not been so thankful to thee as I ought for giving me such a kind and affectionate wife. I have forgot thy goodness in bringing us happy together by an unforeseen and undesigned train of events, and blessing us with so much love and harmony of affections and so many of the {200} comforts and conveniences of life. I have not been so careful as I ought to have been to stir her up to piety and Christian virtues. I have not taken that pains with my children and servants and relatives as I ought. Alas ! I have been too negligent of my pastoral duty in my private devotions, too much given to the pleasures and satisfactions of this world, and too little influenced by thy promises and the hopes of a future state. I have employed my studies, reading, and conversation, rather to please myself than to edify myself and others. I have sinned greatly in neglecting

many opportunities of making private applications to my flock and family in the affairs of their souls, and in using too slight preparation for my public exercises. I have thrown away too much of my time in sloth and sleep, and have not done so much for the relief of the poor and destitute as I might Dave done. The means that Providence has afforded me of correcting any evil inclinations I have abused to panper and feed them, n various instances. For these and many other sins which have escaped my memory, thou mightst justly inflict so great a chastisement upon me, as to make my children motherless, and deprive me of my dear wife. O Lord, for thy mercy's sake, accept of my humble and penitent confession of these my offences, which I desire to ac knowledge with shame and sorrow, and am resolved by thy grace to amend. If thou art pleased to Hearken to the voice of my supplications, and grant my request in behalf of my dear wife in restoring her to health, I do promise and covenant through grace to turn from these backslidings, to express my thankfulness by a vigorous discharge of my duty as a Christian, a minister, and master of a family; and by an alms of ten pounds sterling to the poor, in meal and money. Lord, pardon, if there is any thing in this over presumptuous, or unbecoming a humble, penitent sinner; and, Lord, accept of what is sincerely designed as a new bond upon my soul to my duty, through Jesus Christ, my Lord and Saviour."

Stewart tells us that, " during his residence at New Machar, the greater part of his time was spent in the most intense study; more particularly in a careful examination of the laws of external perception, and of the other principles which form the groundwork of human knowledge. His chief relaxations were gardening and botany, to both of which pursuits he retained his attachment in old age." It was while he was minister, and at the mature age of thirty-eight, that he published in the " Transactions of the Royal Society of London," " An Essay on Quantity, occasioned by reading a Treatise in which Simple and Compound Ratios are applied to Virtue and Merit." Francis Hutcheson had spoken of the benevolence of an agent which with him constitutes virtue-as "proportional to a fraction, having the moment of good for the numerator and the ability of the agent for denominator." I suspect that he meant this to be little more than an illustration, and did not seriously propose {201} to apply mathematical demonstration to moral subjects. But Pitcairn and Cheyne had been applying mathematical reasoning to medicine; and Reid thought it of importance to show what it is that renders a subject susceptible of mathematical demonstration. It is interesting to notice that the first publications both of Reid and Kant had a relation to mathematical subjects. But it was the publication of Hume's " Treatise of Human Nature" that first directed his intellectual abilities to independent philosophic research. In his " Essays on the Intellectual Powers," published in 1785, he says, " having long believed the prevailing doctrine of ideas, it came into my mind more than forty years ago to put the question, What evidence have I for this doctrine, that all the objects of my knowledge are ideas of

my own mind? From that time to the present, I have been candidly and impartially, as I think, seeking for the evidence of this principle; but can find none, excepting the authority of philosophers." It is clear that the professors of King's College put one so employed in the fitting place, when, in 1752, they elected him professor of philosophy.

" Immediately on Dr. Reid's appointment to the place of one of the regents of King's College, he prevailed on his colleagues to make great improvements in their system of university education. The session was extended from five to seven months; a humanity class was added, on a higher scale than had been taught previously; and the teaching of the elements of Latin, by the professor of humanity, discontinued; some of the small bursaries were united, and an account of these alterations was given to the public, in 1754. Dr. Reid was in favor of one professor teaching the whole or the greater part of the curriculum, and therefore did not follow the plan of confining the professors to separate branches, as had been done in Glasgow since 1727, and at Marischal College since 1723. The plan of a seven-months' session, after a trial of five years, was abandoned." [56] In Aberdeen he was surrounded by an able body of colleagues in the two universities, by not a few thoughtful and accomplished men, ministers and professional men of the town and neighborhood and he had under him a succession {202} of shrewd students, whom he conducted, in a series of years, through all the higher branches. He managed to bring together the literary and scientific men by means of the famous "Aberdeen Philosophical Society," which he was the main instrument in founding, and which helped to call forth and combine what may be called the Aberdeen branch of the Scottish philosophy. To that society he contributed a series of papers containing most of the views which were afterwards embodied in the work which established his reputation, "An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense." That work was published in 1764.

In the end of 1763, he was invited by the University of Glasgow to the professorship of moral philosophy there, and entered upon his duties the following year. In this new sphere he confined his instructions to the intellectual and active powers of man, and unfolded a system of ethics comprising some general views with respect to natural jurisprudence and the fundamental principles of politics; he delivered, besides, a few lectures on rhetoric to an advanced class. We have here a sketch of him by his most distinguished pupil and biographer: " In his elocution and mode of instruction there was nothing peculiarly attractive. He seldom, if ever, indulged himself in the warmth of extempore discourse; nor was his manner of reading calculated to increase the effect of what he had committed to writing. Such, however, was the simplicity and perspicuity of his style, such the gravity and authority of his character, and such the general interest of his young hearers in the doctrines which he taught, that, by the numerous audiences to which his instructions were addressed, he was heard, uniformly, with the most silent and respectful attention. On this subject I speak from personal knowledge, having had the good fortune during a considerable part of

the winter of 1772 to be one of his pupils."

We have preserved letters [57] of his to his old Aberdeen friends, Dr. Andrew Skene and Dr. David Skene, which give us glimpses of the Glasgow college life of the period. -- " Glasgow, Nov. 14, 1764. I must launch forth in the morning so as to be at the college (which is a walk of eight minutes), half an hour after seven o'clock, when I speak for an hour, without interruption, {203} to an audience of about a hundred. At eleven, I examine for an hour upon my morning prelection, but my audience is little more than a third part of what it was in the morning. In a week or two, for three days of the week, I have a second prelection at twelve, upon a different subject, when my audience will be made up of those who hear me in the morning, but do not attend at eleven. My hearers attend my class two years at least. The first session they attend the morning prelection and the time of examination at eleven; the second and subsequent years they attend the two prelections, but not the hour of examination. They pay fees for the first two years; and then they are caves of that class, and may attend gratis as many years as they please. Many attend the moral philosophy class four or five years, so that I have many preachers and students of divinity and law of considerable standing, before whom I stand in awe to speak without more preparation than I have leisure for. I have great inclination to attend some of the professors here, several of whom are very eminent in their way, but I cannot find much leisure. Much time is consumed in our college in business meetings, of which we have, commonly, four or five in the week. We have a literary society once a week, consisting of the masters and two or three more, where each of the members has a discourse once in the session. The professors of humanity, Greek, logic, and natural philosophy, have as many as I have, some of them more. All the other professors, except one, teach at least one hour a day, and we are no less than fourteen in number. The hours of the different professors are different, so far as can be, that the same student may attend two or three, or perhaps more, at the same time. Near a third part of our students are Irish. Thirty came over lately in one ship, besides those that went to Edinburgh. We have a good many English, and some foreigners. Many of the Irish, as well as Scotch, are poor and came up late to save money, so that we are not fully convened, though I have been teaching ever since the 10th of October. Those who pretend to know say that the number of students this year, when fully convened, will amount to 300. The masters live in good habits with one another, and manage their political differences with good manners, although with a good deal of intrigue and secret caballing when there is an election." {204}

A year after we have another picture of his collegiate position. "Our college is considerably more crowded than it was last session. My class indeed is much the same as last year, but all the rest are better. I believe the number of our students of one kind or other may be between four and five hundred. But the College of Edinburgh is increased this year much more than we are. The professor, Ferguson, is indeed as far as I can judge a man of noble spirit, of very elegant manners, and has a very uncommon flow of eloquence.

I hear he is about to publish, I do not know under what title, a natural history of man, exhibiting a view of him in the savage state, and in the several successive states of pasturage, agriculture, and commerce." " The most disagreeable thing in the teaching part is to have a great number of stupid Irish teagues who attend classes for two or three years, to qualify them for teaching schools or being dissenting teachers. I preach to these as St. Thomas did to the fishes. I do not know what pleasure he had in his audience; but I should have none in mine if there was not in it a mixture of reasonable creatures. I confess I think there is a smaller portion of these in my class this year than there was the last, although the number on the whole was not less. I have long been of opinion that in a right constituted college there ought to be two professors for each class, one for the dunces, and another for those who have parts. The province of the former would not be the most agreeable; but perhaps it would require the greatest talents, and therefore ought to be accounted the post of honor. There is no part of my time more disagreeably spent than that which is spent in college meetings, of which we have often five or six a week." "These meetings are become more disagreeable by an evil spirit of party, that seems to put us in a ferment; and I am afraid will produce bad consequences." We have here glimpses of the evils arising from the college patronage being so largely vested in a limited self-elected body, who turned it to party and family ends. As to the roughness of the Irish <teagues> (colts) which seems partly to have amused, and partly to have alarmed him, the blame of it is partly to be charged on the college itself, which received these students too eagerly, and allowed them to graduate too easily after a shorter period of attendance than the Scottish youths. The Presbyterian youth of {205} Ulster-shut out from Dublin University, owing to its sectarian character -- received from Glasgow, if not a refined, a very useful education, which enabled them, as ministers, doctors, and teachers, to raise their province above the other districts of Ireland in industry and intelligence.

As it is interesting to notice the Aberdeen philosopher's view of the frolicsome Irish youth, so it is instructive to observe the estimate by the Aberdeen moderate of the Calvinistic religion of the land of the covenant. Writing to Aberdeen, July 13, 1765: ,I think the common people here and in the neighborhood, greatly inferior to the common people with you. They are Boeotian in their understandings, fanatic in their religion, and clownish in their dress and manners. The clergy encourage this fanaticism too much, and find it the only way to popularity. I often hear a gospel here which you know nothing about; for you neither hear it from the pulpit nor will you find it in the Bible." Possibly this gospel was the very gospel of grace so valued by the people of the west of Scotland. It is possible, too, that at this time, when the contest between the refined moral system and the evangelical system was the closest and keenest, Dr. Reid may have been kept at a distance from the latter. In another letter he sees some of the more favorable features of the western character. " The common people have a gloom in their countenance which I am at a loss whether to ascribe to their religion or to the air

and climate. There is certainly more of religion among the common people in this town than in Aberdeen, and although it has a gloomy enthusiastic cast, yet I think it makes them tame and sober. I have not heard either of a house or head broke, of a pocket pict [picked], or of any flagrant crime, since I came here. I have not heard any swearing in the streets, nor seen a man drunk (excepting, <inter nos>, one prof -- r), since I came here." The Aberdeen moderate is not prepossessed in favor of the west-country religion, but testifies in behalf of the west-country morality. He has an idea that the morality may somehow be connected with the religion; and possibly he might have seen more amiability and cheerfulness in the piety of the common people had he come in closer contact with it. It is significant that the drunk man is to be found in the class which had risen above the national faith. We shall have to look at a very {206} different picture half a century later, when Chalmers begins his moderate <regime> labors in Glasgow. By that time, under the regime, both morality and religion have disappeared from the region (Drygate) in which Reid lived. The Glasgow professors may not have been directly responsible for the growing wickedness; but there was nothing in their teaching, moral or theological, adequate to the task of purifying the pollution coagulating all around them.

There are indications in these letters of the interest taken by Reid in every sort of scientific pursuit. He confidentially reports to Dr. David Skene Dr. Black's theory of heat before it was made known to the world. He is aiding a Turin professor of medicine who comes to Glasgow in his inquiries about the petrifaction of stones. He sends philosophical instruments to his friends in Aberdeen (Feb. 25, 1767). " For my part, if I could find a machine as proper for analyzing ideas, moral sentiments, and other materials belonging to the Fourth Kingdom, I believe I should find in my heart to bestow the money for it. I have the more use for a machine of this kind, because my alembic for performing these operations -- I mean my cranium-has been a little out of order this winter by vertigo, which has made my studies go on heavily, though it has not hitherto interrupted my teaching."

Thus flowed along, quietly and honorably, the remaining days of Dr. Reid. He corresponded with Lord Kames and Dr. James Gregory on such subjects as liberty, cause, motives, and volition. The letters have been published. Many of them are controversial, but they are conducted in an admirable spirit. He wrote a number of papers of some value, apparently for the literary society of Glasgow. In particular, be has " Some Observations on the Modern System of Materialism," meaning by Materialism that advanced by Dr. Priestley in his " Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit" (1777), and "A free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity" (1777). This paper appears in no fewer than five forms, showing what pain she had taken with it. One or two of the forms look like mere notes or preparations, the other three are fully written out. It is of a thorough and searching character, distinguished for acuteness beyond almost any of his published writings, and written with great point and <naivete>. He {207} also wrote " Miscellaneous Reflections

on Priestley's Account of Hartley's "Theory of the Human Mind." He speaks with great fondness and respect of Hartley, but shows that his doctrines were unfounded hypotheses. He is severe upon Priestley's application of Hartley's theories, and examines the attempt to explain the memory, and the mental faculties generally, and the passions and volitions, by association.[58] But the principal work of his declining life consisted in writing his " Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," published in 1785, and the " Essays on the Active Powers," which appeared in 1788.

Underneath the calm, unpretentious demeanor, there was a deep fountain of devout feeling ready to burst out on certain occasions. Again we are told that, in dispensing the sacrament of the Lord's supper, he could not refer to the love of Christ without tears running down his eyes.[59] In the autumn Of 1796, he had repeated strokes of palsy, and he died Oct. 7th. His daughter Mrs. Carmichael writes: " His piety and resignation never forsook him in times of deepest affliction, and in all his distress during his last illness. Such is the blessed effect of the power of religion, and of a conscience void of offence towards God and man."[60]

Turning now to the philosophy of Reid, we find it distinguished throughout by independence of thought and a love of truth. He admires the genius of those who were rulers in the world of speculation in his time, but he does not follow them. He might have been inclined to do so, but he was staggered by the consequences which had been drawn by Hume; and this led him to review the philosophy that prevailed in his time, and which claimed as its authors the illustrious names of Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley. The consequence is, that his works, though expository throughout, have all along a polemical front, but always bearing a calm, a polite, and benignant aspect. We cannot understand his philosophy, and we cannot appreciate his originality, unless we bear this circumstance in mind, which, I may add, we are not likely to forget, as he is constantly referring to some one or other of these authors. He claims {208} credit in regard to two points, gone in examining and under mining the ideal theory of sense-perception, the other in establishing the doctrine of common sense. These are the topics on which I mean chiefly to dwell in the exposition and criticism of his two works.

His "Inquiry" is occupied almost exclusively with the senses. It is one of the excellencies of his philosophy as compared with those that have gone before, and most of those that have appeared since his time, that he so carefully inquired into these original inlets of knowledge. In doing so, he shows that be is acquainted with all that had been done in physiology down to his time, and that he had been in the way of making original observations. He goes over the senses one by one, beginning with the simpler, smelling and tasting; and going on to the more complex, hearing, touch, and seeing. Under smelling he announces a number of general principles applicable to all the senses, as in regard to sensation considered absolutely, and the nature of judgment and belief. Under hearing he speaks of natural language; and under touch, of natural signs and primary qualities. He dilates at greatest length on sight: discussing such topics

as color, visible figure, extension, the parallel motion of the eyes, squinting, and Berkeley's theory of vision. He treats them physiologically, so far as physiology could then carry him; but he treats them also, which so many later German and British psychologists do not, in the light of the revelations of consciousness. He takes up the same subject in the earlier parts of his " Essays."

" All philosophers, from Plato to Hume, agree in this that we do not perceive external objects immediately, and that the immediate object of perception must be some image present to the mind." He shows that no solid proof has been advanced of the existence of the ideas; that they are a mere fiction and hypothesis, contrived to solve the phenomena of the human understanding; that they do not at all answer this end; and that this hypothesis of ideas or images of things, in the mind or in the sensorium, is the parent of foolish paradoxes.

Let us try to determine precisely his doctrine as to perception by the senses. Negatively: he denies, first, that we perceive by means of ideas, in the mind or out of it, coming between the mind and the material object perceived; secondly, that we {209} reach a knowledge of the external object by means of reasoning; and, thirdly, that, in order to the conception of any thing it is necessary to have some impression or idea in our minds which resembles it, particularly setting himself against the doctrine of Locke, that Our ideas of the primary qualities are resemblances of them. What he advances on these points seems to me clear, full, and satisfactory. He has done special service to philosophy by removing these confusing and trouble some intermediaries which were called <ideas>. It may be that the great body of philosophers had not drawn out for their own use such a doctrine of ideas as Reid exposes; it may be that some of them, if the question had been put to them, would have denied that they held any such doctrine; it may be, as Hamilton has tried to show, that some few held a doctrine of perception without ideas: but I believe that Reid was right in holding that mental philosophers generally did bring in an idea between the mind perceiving and the external object; that some objectified the internal thought, and confounded it with the object perceived that others created an image in the mind or in the brain and that some had not clearly settled what they meant by the term they employed. I believe he is right when he says generally, that " ideas being supposed to be a shadowy kind of beings, intermediate between the thought and the object of thought, sometimes seem to coalesce with the thought, sometimes with the object of thought, and sometimes to have a distinct existence of their own." I am sure that the discussion in which he engaged has been of great utility in compelling those philosophers who still use the word "idea" to tell us what they mean by it, and of still greater utility in leading so many to abandon the use of the phrase altogether in strictly philosophic investigations.

I am not to enter deeply into the interminable discussions as to the sense in which the word "idea" has been used by Descartes and Locke. Hamilton says that by the phrase Descartes " designated two very different things;

viz., the proximate bodily antecedent and the mental consequence." ("Works," p. 273.) As to the meaning which Locke attached to the term, I must content myself with referring to the discussions of Stewart, Brown, and Hamilton. After reading these with care, I am convinced that the following observations of Reid are as just as {210} they are important: " Perhaps it was unfortunate for Mr. Locke that he used the word idea so very frequently as to make it very difficult to give the attention necessary to put it always to the same meaning. And it appears evident that, in many places, be means nothing more by it but the notion or conception we have of any object of thought; that is, the act of the mind in conceiving it, and not the object conceived." But then he frequently uses it to signify " the images of external things in the mind." " There is a third sense in which he uses the word not unfrequently,-to signify objects of thought that are not in the mind, but external." " Thus we see that the word idea has three different meanings in the `Essay;' and the author seems to have used it sometimes in one, sometimes in another, without being aware of any change in the meaning. The reader slides easily into the same fallacy, that meaning occurring most readily to his mind which gives the best sense to what he reads." It is specially true of Locke what Reid affirms generally: "The way in which philosophers speak of ideas seems to imply that they are the only objects of perception " (P. 263).

The service which Reid has done to philosophy by banishing these intermediaries between perception and its external object cannot be over-estimated. He has also been successful in proving that it cannot be by a process of reasoning that we reach the conception of, and belief in, the existence of body. There is nothing in any organic affection of the nerves or brain, nothing in the sensation in the mind, to entitle us to believe in an extended resisting object. He also deserves great credit for showing so clearly that the conceptions of the qualities of matter are not to be supposed to have a resemblance to the qualities themselves. Locke acknowledges as to the secondary qualities of matter that the ideas are not to be regarded as being like them; but he still talked of ideas of the primary qualities as being resemblances. This may have been little else than loose language on the part of Locke, to indicate that there was a correspondence or relation of some kind; but it was desirable to correct it, as it was fitted to convey a very erroneous impression. In a later age, Hamilton exposed thoroughly the more general error, that like can only influence like, and that like can only be known by like. It is disheartening to think how much of the energy of our greatest thinkers has {211}been spent in correcting errors which other great thinkers have introduced. It looks as if it were only by a continued struggle that truth is to gain a victory over error.

He has not been so Successful in establishing a doctrine of his own as in opposing the errors of others. But his view of perception, whether we approve of it or not, can be understood by us. He maintains that there is first a sensation in the mind, and that this sensation suggests a perception. The word <suggestion> to denote the rise of a thought in the mind, was employed by earlier philosophers,

but was adopted by Reid from Berkeley, who again took it from Locke. Reid maintains that there are natural suggestions; particularly that sensation suggests the notion of present existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does now exist; that memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past; and that our sensations and thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind, and the belief of its existence and of its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is, that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature, suggests to us the notion of a cause and compels our belief in its existence.... And, in like manner, certain sensations of touch, by the constitution of our nature, suggest to us extension, solidity, and motion." (" Works," p.111.) Closely connected or rather identical with this theory of suggestion is his doctrine of natural language and signs, -- a phraseology also taken from Berkeley. He maintains that there are natural signs, " which, though we never had any notion or conception of the thing signified, do suggest it, or conjure it up, as it were by a natural kind of magic, and at once give us a conception and create a belief in it." He calls " our sensations signs of external objects." The operations are represented by him as " simple and original, and therefore inexplicable, acts of the mind."

The whole account seems to me unsatisfactory, nearly as much so as the ideal hypothesis. There is no evidence that sensation comes before perception. The two are thus distinguished by Reid: " When I smell a rose, there is in this operation both sensation and perception. The agreeable odor I feel, considered by itself, without relation to any external object, is merely a sensation." The quality in the rose which {212} produces the sensation "is the object perceived, and that act of my mind by which I have the conviction and belief of this quality is what I call perception." (310.) These two seem to me to constitute one concrete act, and they can be separated only by a process of abstraction. There is not first a sensation of a colored surface, and then a perception of it; but we have the two at once. This does away with the necessity of signs and suggestions, which might be quite as troublesome intermediaries as ideas. It would be better to say that, upon certain affections of sense being conveyed to the mind, it <knows> (this is a better phrase than <conceive>, or than <believe in> at once the colored surface.

Hamilton, when he began to edit Reid, thought that Reid's doctrine was the same as his own. But, as he advances, he sees that it is not so; and he comes to doubt whether, after all, Reid held the doctrine to which he himself adhered so tenaciously, that of immediate perception. Reid does, indeed, represent perception as immediate; meaning that it is direct, and with out a process of reasoning. Yet he tells us that, " although there is no reasoning in perception, yet there are certain means and instruments, which, by the appointment of nature, must intervene between the, object and our perception of it; and by these our perceptions are limited and regulated." Surely Hamilton himself will admit that there are such means in the action of the senses, of the nerves, and the brain, without

which there can be no perception. Reid indeed calls in more of such anterior processes than Hamilton does; in particular, he calls in signs and suggestions, and makes sensation come before perception. But, after all, the two agree in the main point. While both allow, as all men do, that there are processes prior to the perception, both agree that when the mind is perceiving, it is perceiving not an idea, or even a sensation or suggestion, but an external extended object.

On one point, however, and this not an unimportant one, Reid and his commentator do differ; and that is as to what should be represented as the object of perception. Locke means by idea, " whatever is the object of the understanding when it thinks." But the word <object>, in such a connection, may be as ambiguous as <idea>. Reid speaks of the stars as the objects before the mind when we look into the heavens. Hamilton {213} says that the object is the rays of light reaching the eye. He maintains that in perception the proper object is not a distant one, but is either the organism or the objects in contact with the organism. Physiological research seems to show that in this respect Hamilton is right. But still it is true that, whatever be the immediate object, the distant star, and not the rays of light, does become, always by an easy process of observation and inference, the main object contemplated. The two are agreed that the object is an external extended one; is, in short, a natural object, and not an idea in the mind, or a modification of the mind.

Let us attend a little more carefully to the view which he gives of perception proper. " If, therefore, we attend to that act of our mind which we call the perception of an external object, we shall find in it these three things: First, some conception or notion of the object perceived; secondly, a strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence; thirdly, that this conviction and belief are immediate, and not the effect of reasoning." (" Works," P. 258.) The two first of these he discovers by an analysis of the concrete act. They are not happily expressed. The better statement is, that in perception we know at once the object; and this knowledge embraces what he calls the " notion " or " conception," -- phrases which should be reserved for the abstract and general notions which are formed by a subsequent discursive process, -- and also what he calls the conviction and belief, which latter phrase should be confined, I think, to the conviction which we have of objects not now present, to objects of faith as distinguished from objects of sight or sense generally. By giving this account we are saved from being obliged to represent such ideas as extension as concomitants of our perceptions. The correct statement is that, by sight and touch, -- I believe by all the senses, we know objects as extended -- , and we can then separate, by abstraction, the extension from the other parts of our concrete cognition, and can also inquire what intuitive convictions are involved in it. Hamilton, venturing " a step beyond Reid and Stewart, no less than Kant " has fallen into the awkwardness of calling in both an <a priori> conception with Kant, and an <a posteriori> perception with Reid. (P. 126.) Our cognition of extension is just one experience, but involves certain

intuitive convictions. {214}

Reid, like Locke, draws the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter; but he grounds it on a different principle. According to Locke, primary qualities are " such as are utterly inseparable from the body in what state soever it be." (" Essay" II., 8.) According to Reid, , the distinction is this, that our senses give us a direct and a distinct notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they are in themselves. But of the secondary our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion. They inform us only that they are qualities that affect us in a certain manner; that is, produce in us a certain sensation: but, as to what they are in themselves, our senses leave us in the dark." He says more expressly: " Of some things, we know what they are in themselves: our conceptions of such things I call <direct>. Of other things, we know not what they are in themselves, but only that they have certain properties or attributes, or certain relations to other things: of these our conception is only <relative>." (P. 513.) Hamilton remarks that "by the expression, 'what they are in themselves,' in reference to the primary qualities, and of `relative notion' in reference to the secondary, Reid cannot mean that the former are known to us <absolutely and in themselves>; that is, <out of relation> to our cognitive faculties." (PP. 313, 314.) Certainly Reid was not dealing with such ideas as the absolute, and things " out of relation to our faculties: " these are phrases and distinctions belonging to a very different philosophy. He means that, when we look on a material object, we are led to believe it to be extended; whereas, when we experience the sensation of heat, we simply know that there must be an external object causing it, without knowing what it is. When physical science shall have thrown farther light on the qualities of bodies, I should like to have the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies reviewed by a competent philosopher. For the present, the distinction, as drawn by Reid, seems to me to be upon the whole the best: " The notion we have of primary qualities is direct, and not relative only." Hamilton might have done well, in reference to his own theory of relativity, to ponder the statement of Reid: " A relative notion of a thing is, strictly speaking, no notion of the thing at all, but only of some relation which it bears to something else." {215}

The substance of the "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," was delivered annually, for more than twenty years, in lectures to his class in the University of Glasgow, and for several years before in Aberdeen. He commences with such topics as the explication of words, principles taken for granted, analogy, the proper means of knowing the operations of the mind, the difficulty of attending to the operations of the mind, on all of which he has remarks characterized by much sound sense and fitted to be eminently useful to those entering on the study of the human mind. He closes Essay 1. with a classification of the mental powers: (1) The powers we have by means of our external senses; (2) Memory; (3) Conception; (4) The power of resolving and analyzing complex objects, and compounding those that are simple; (5) judging; (6) Reasoning; (7) Taste; (8) Moral perception; and, last of

all, consciousness. may offer a few remarks on each of these.

<Perception>. After the full discussion in which we have been engaged in reviewing his " Inquiry," it is not needful to dwell on this subject. A large portion of Essay II. is occupied with a review of the " sentiments of philosophers about the perception of external objects," such as the Peripatetics, Malebranche, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Arnauld, and Leibnitz. His account of the opinions of these men is marked by great conscientiousness and candor: it is generally clear, often searching, always characterized by plain sense, at times superficial and mistaken. Hamilton has shown that Reid has fallen into gross blunders from not having mastered, as a whole, the higher speculative systems, such as those of Aristotle, Descartes, and Leibnitz. Hamilton's notes should always be read with Reid's exposition. These notes are as valuable for their logical acumen and erudition, as the text is for its independence and its homely sense.

<Memory>. His analysis of this power, which will be found to contain such elements as retention, phantasy, association, and recognition, is not at all searching. But he is successful in showing that it is an original faculty, and he has a number of useful, though somewhat superficial, remarks upon its mode of operation. He describes memory as giving us an immediate knowledge of things past, which leads to a very severe criticism by Hamilton, who remarks that an immediate knowledge {216} of things past is a contradiction. But Reid does not use the word `immediate' in the same rigid sense as Hamilton: all that he means is that, in our recognition of the past, there is no reasoning or any other discursive process. Hamilton is right when he says that the immediate object before the mind is a phantasm or representation in the mind; but it is also true that in memory we go intuitively, beyond the representation in the mind, to the past occurrence which it represents. Reid says that "our notion of duration, as well as our belief in it, is got by the faculty of memory." Whereon Hamilton remarks that this is to make " time an empirical or generalized notion," and then tells us that time is a necessary notion, arising on the occasion of experience. But Reid's doctrine is the more correct of the two. In every act of memory we have the remembrance of an event in time past, and have thus the idea of time in the concrete, and get the idea of time in the abstract by separating the time from the event; and upon reflection we discover that there are necessary convictions involved in our belief in time. Reid's account of the idea of time, though not exhaustive, is thus correct so far as it goes. By not calling in a faculty of recognition, Hamilton has not been able to show how we get the idea of time, and has been obliged with Kant to make it some sort of <a priori> form.

<Conception>. Under this phrase he includes three things. They are either the conceptions of individual things, the creatures of God; or they are conceptions of the meaning of general words; or they are the creatures of our own imagination." He has sensible remarks as to each of these, but not a good nomenclature to indicate the

distinctions. It is in this essay that he treats of the train of thought in the mind, which he does in a superficial manner, compared even with his predecessors Turnbull and Hutcheson.

<Abstraction>. He does not distinguish so carefully as he should have done between the abstract and general notion. He has a glimpse of the distinction between the comprehension and extension of a general conception. " The species comprehends all that is in the genus, and those attributes, likewise, which distinguish that species from others belonging to the same genus, and, the more subdivisions we make, the names of the lower become still the more comprehensive in their signification, {217} but the less extensive in their application to individuals." (P. 391.) In regard to the subjects discussed by the nominalists, realists, and conceptualists, he is a moderate conceptualist, dwelling fondly on the necessity of observing the points of resemblance in the objects placed in the group. He has some good remarks on the formation of general notions, but does not discover -- what is, after all, the essential point-the putting together in the class all the objects possessing the common attribute, or attributes, fixed on. His realistic tendency is seen in the remark: "When I speak of general notions, or general conceptions, I always mean things conceived, and not the act of the mind in conceiving them." (P. 404.)

<Judgment>. Under this head we are introduced to the full discussion of his favorite subject, common sense, which he says means common judgment. " We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident the second, to draw conclusions which are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province and the sole province of common sense; and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or degree of reason." (P. 425.) He divides the principles of common sense into two classes: -- as they are contingent; or as they are necessary and immutable, whose contrary is impossible.

I. P/RINCIPLES OF\ C/OMMON\ S/ENSE RELATING TO\ C/ONTINGENT\ T/RUTH\.

1. The existence of every thing of which I am conscious.
2. The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person.
3 Those things did really happen which I distinctly remember.
4. Our own personal identity and continued existence as far back as we remember distinctly.
5. Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be.
6. We have some degree of power over our actions, and the determinations of our wills.
7. The natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not fallacious.{218}
8. There is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we converse.
9. That certain features of the countenance, sounds of

the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind.

10. There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion.

11. There are many events depending on the will of man in which there is a self-evident probability, greater or less according to circumstances.

12. In the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances.

II. P/RINCIPLES RELATING TO\ N/ECESSARY\ T/RUTHS\.

1. Grammatical; as, that every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive expressed or understood.

2. Logical axioms; such as, any contexture of words which does not make a proposition is neither true nor false.

3. Mathematical axioms.

4. Axioms in matters of taste.

5. First Principles in Morals; as, that an unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one.

6. Metaphysical; as that,

   a. The qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which we all body; and that the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind.
   b. Whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced it.
   c. Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty from marks or signs of it in the effect.

The first remark I have to make on this scheme is, that it may be doubted whether the distinction which he draws between contingent and necessary truths is so profound as he would represent it. The test of the latter is that " their contrary is impossible." But is it not true of all the truths of common sense when they are properly expressed, that their contrary or rather contradictory is impossible? Thus take the {219} case of the intuitive conviction of our own existence. The conviction is not that I must have existed, but that " I do now exist; " and of the contradictory of this, " I do not now exist," the conviction is as impossible as of the contradictory of the metaphysical principle of substance and quality, -- namely, that this quality does not imply a substance.

Looking to the account as a whole, including the division and arrangement, it seems to me sufficiently crude. Some of the principles enumerated under the head of contingent truths have no claim to be regarded as original laws of reason; such as the signification of sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, the belief in human testimony, and the uniformity of nature. These seem rather to be the result of a gathered experience, to which we may be impelled by natural inclination; and in all such cases the natural principle, which in the case of the uniformity of nature is the principle of cause and effect, should have been enunciated, and not the experiential rule. If these laws were principles of reason, there could be no exceptions

to them: but every one knows that the sounds of the voice, and the expression of the countenance, and human testimony, may deceive; and it is conceivable that the present order of things may be changed "as a vesture." I cannot see how, under the head of principles relating to necessary truth, he should include convictions relating to so artificial a product as language. It may be argued, I think, that the principle of design is a modification of the principle of causality; that is, discovering design as an effect, we argue an intelligent cause. By his loose statements he exposed himself to the criticism of Priestley,[61] who {220} objects to our regard for testimony as being a principle of common sense. " It is a long time before a child hears any thing but truth, and therefore it can expect nothing else. The contrary would be absolutely miraculous." But while Reid may be justly charged with a defect of critical analysis, and of categorical expression, he has enunciated in a plain manner an immense body of important truth which can be shown to have the sanction of intuitive reason.

The question has been much discussed, Where did Reid get the phrase common sense? I believe it is not difficult to settle that question. The phrase was introduced formally into philosophy by Shaftesbury, who, however, shows that it was in use before. Reid has been charged with borrowing it without acknowledgment from Buffier, who certainly employs it in much the same sense as Reid.[62] But it might be argued with greater show of reason, but yet with no sufficient reason, that Buffier, who published his " First Truths " in 1717, took it from Shaftesbury or those who were familiar with the writings of Shaftesbury, which became known on the Continent at an early date. It is certain that by the time of Reid the phrase was in constant use.[63] Even Berkeley says that " since his revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common {221} sense he found his understanding strangely enlightened." (Preface to " Dialogues.") In the previous age philosophy had taken up a number of extreme positions, and those who were not ready to adopt them, and yet were not prepared to refute them by logic, were everywhere appealing to common sense.

Notwithstanding the able and learned defence of the phrase by Hamilton, I look upon it as an unfortunate one. The word sense seems to associate the faculty with the bodily organism, with which certainly it has no connection. Still the term was so frequently used by Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, who all talked not only of a bodily but an internal sense, while the two latter called in a moral sense and a sense of beauty, that it might, in accordance with established usage, be employed to indicate that the sense common to all mankind is an original inlet of knowledge,-an aspect often overlooked by those who represent it as an <a priori> form or regulative principle. By employing the word, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Reid meant to intimate that there are other sources of ideas besides the external and internal senses, sensation and reflection. The fundamental objection to the phrase "common sense" is, that it is ambiguous. In saying so, I do not refer to the meaning attached to it by Aristotle, who denoted by [Greek quote] the knowledge imparted by the senses in common. This

continued, for long, to be one of the meanings of the phrase in philosophy; but by Reid's time it was thus known only to scholars. In the use which Reid makes of it, there is a fatal ambiguity. It is employed to signify two very different things. It denotes that combination of qualities which constitutes <good sense>, being, according to an old saying, the most uncommon of all the senses. This valuable property is not common to all men, but is possessed only by a certain number; and there are others who can never acquire it, and it is always the result of a number of gifts and attainments, such as an originally sound judgment and a careful observation of mankind and the world. In this signification common sense is not to be the final appeal in philosophy, science, or any other department of investigation; though in all it may keep us from much error. Practical sense, as it claimed to be, long opposed the doctrine of there being an antipodes and of the earth moving; it spoke contemptuously in the first instance of some of the greatest achievements of our world, the deeds {222} of philanthropists, and the sufferings of martyrs; it laughed at the early poetry of Wordsworth and Tennyson. All that good sense can do in science and philosophy is to guard us against accepting any doctrine till it is settled by inductive proof.

But the phrase has another and a different signification in the philosophical works, including Reid's, of last century. It denotes the aggregate of original principles planted in the minds of all, and in ordinary circumstances operating in the minds of all. It is only in this last sense that it can be legitimately employed in overthrowing scepticism, or for any philosophic purpose. Reid seeks to take advantage of both these meanings. He would show that the views he opposes, though supported by men of high intellectual power,-such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, -- have the good sense of mankind against them. It can easily be shown that he employs the phrase once and again to designate sound practical judgment. He describes Newton's "Regulae Philosophandi" as " maxims of common sense." (P. 97.) He is constantly opposing common sense to reason and philosophy; whereas he admits elsewhere, using the phrase in the other sense that " philosophy has no other root but the principles of common sense." (p. 101.) This dexterous attempt to combine the two meanings, while perhaps contributing to the immediate popularity of Reid, and still more of Beattie, turned in the end against them (in the use of a two-edged sword, one edge is apt to wound him who uses it) in the estimation of philosophic thinkers, who, looking on the appeal as only to vulgar judgment, which may be prejudice, have denied the validity of the argument.

Hamilton has succeeded, so I think, in showing that the argument as employed by Reid is valid in itself, and legitimately used against scepticism. His appeal is to principles in our constitution which all are obliged to admit and act upon. But an appeal in a loose way to a sense supposed to be in all men may be very illusive. In order to its philosophical application, it must be shown that the principle is in all men as a necessary principle; and this Reid has commonly done, though there are cases, we have seen, in which he admits first principles too readily. But

he should have done more: it is only when we have carefully ascertained the precise nature of the original perception, and expressed it in a law, that we are entitled {223} to employ it in constructing a philosophy or in opposing scepticism. As long as it is a mere loose appeal to an undetermined principle, the argument may be very illusive. At this point Reid has often failed, owing to a deficiency of logical power. What he calls in is commonly a genuine mental principle; but, owing to his not furnishing a rigid account of its nature and its laws, we may be in doubt whether the application which he makes of it is legitimate. The important work of Reid needs to be supplemented by an investigation, conducted in his own careful manner, of the precise nature of the principles of common sense, of their points of agreement and of difference, of their precise laws and varied modes of action.

It is not easy to determine to what the appeal is ultimately to be in the philosophy of Reid. It is to common sense: but in what signification? Because it is a sense? Or because it is so constituted as to discern objects and truth? Or because it is common to all men? Or because we must trust to it whether we will or no? It is not easy to ascertain what would be Reid's, or even Hamilton's, answers to these questions. There are frequent passages in which Reid's appeal seems to be to the constitution of our minds (Hamilton's ultimate test, like Kant's, seems to be necessity); for he says, we " cannot have a better reason for trusting consciousness, than that every man, while his mind is sound, is determined by the constitution of his nature, to give implicit belief to it." But some one may ask, Why should we trust our constitution? May not our constitution, common or individual, deceive us? Has Hume succeeded in showing that our constitution followed out in different ways leads to contradictions? To such questions Reid would have little else to say than that we <must> attend to these principles of common sense; and this would make his appeal to be, like that of Kant and Hamilton, to stern necessity. It is worthy of being stated that, in his manuscript papers,[64] an answer is attempted to some of these questions, and this of a more satisfactory kind than any thing I have noticed in his published writings. " As soon as this truth is understood, that two and two make four, I immediately assent to it; because God has given me the faculty of immediately discerning its truth, and if I had not this faculty, I would not perceive its truth. The truth {224} itself, therefore, does not depend on my constitution; for it was a truth before my existence, and will be a truth, although I were annihilated: but my perception evidently depends on my constitution, and particularly upon my having, as a part of my constitution, that faculty, whether you call it reason or common sense, by which I perceive or discern this truth." "The truth of this proposition, that a lion is a ravenous beast, depends on the constitution of a lion, and upon nothing else." In like manner as to right and wrong "although the rectitude or depravity has a real existence in this case, yet it cannot be discerned by a spectator who has not the faculty of discerning objects of this kind." "Evidence is the sole and ultimate ground of belief, and self-evidence is the strongest possible ground of belief; and he who desires

reason for believing what is self-evident knows not what he means." Any one who would join into a consistent whole the various characteristics referred to in this paper, and give each its exact place, will advance a step beyond Reid, and, I may add, beyond Hamilton. The question occurs, Why has he not' placed these statements in his published works? Was it because he was not prepared to reduce them to a rigid consistency, and was averse to utter anything which he could not stand by in every respect?

It is also worthy of being noticed that, in one of the manuscripts, he shows that he had a glimpse of the distinction between what Kant calls analytic and synthetic judgments. The question is put, "Is there not a difference between the evidence of some first principles and others?" and he answers, "There are various differences. This seems to be one, that, in some first principles, the predicate of the proposition is evidently contained in the subject, as in this, two and three are equal to five, a man has flesh and blood; for, in these and the like self-evident principles, the subject includes the predicate in the very notion of it. There are other first principles in which the predicate is not contained in the notion of the subject, as when we affirm that a thing which begins to exist must have a cause." This last is an example of what Kant calls synthetic judgments a priori. Reid, however, has not laid hold of the distinction so firmly as Kant, nor did he see its importance, and elaborate it so fully as the great German metaphysician. It is interesting to notice these correspondences between the Scottish and German opponents of Hume. {225}

I do not mean to dwell on the remaining portion of the essays, which contain many sound remarks, but little that is fresh and novel.

<Reasoning>. This essay has nothing worthy of comment, except a vigorous attempt to show, as against Locke, that morality is not capable of demonstration.

<Taste>. He argues that "it implies an original faculty, and that it is in the moral and intellectual perfections of mind, and in its active powers, that beauty originally dwells." In a letter to Rev. Archibald Alison, he claims: " I am proud to think that I first, in clear and explicit terms, and in the cool blood of a philosopher, maintained that all the beauty and sublimity of objects of sense is derived from the expression they exhibit of things intellectual, which alone have original beauty." (p. 89.) Possibly this may be a pretty close approximation to the truth. It seems to me to be a more just and enlightened view than that presented by Alison, and those Scotch metaphysicians who refer beauty to the association of ideas capable of raising feeling.

<Active Power in General>. He argues resolutely, that we have an idea of active power, and examines the doctrines of Locke and Hume. It does not appear to him that there can be active power " in a subject which has no thought, no understanding, no will." He maintains that natural philosophy, even if brought to perfection, " does not

discover the efficient cause of any one phenomenon in nature." He draws the distinction between efficient and physical causes. " A physical cause is not an agent. It does not act, but is acted on, and is passive as to its effect." (P. 74.) He holds that it is the business of natural philosophy, to discover physical cause. On this, Cousin remarks that " to pretend that all cause is necessarily endowed with will and thought, is to deny all natural cause." The human race believes in the reality of natural causes: it believes that the fire burns, that the fire is the cause of pain which we feel, &c.; and, at the same time, according as it reflects, it attaches all natural causes to their common and supreme principle." When we discover a true physical cause, say that oxygen and hydrogen when joined in certain proportions, produce water, intuitive reason leads to believe that there is property, that is power, in the object; that the physical cause is truly {226} an efficient cause; and that the effect follows from a power in the agents.

<Will>. He is a strenuous advocate of free-will. " Every man is conscious of a power to determine in things which he conceives to depend on his determination." He draws the distinction between desire and will. " The distinction is, that what we will must be an action, and our own action: what we desire may not be our own action; it may be no action at all. The following statement is taken from the manuscripts: "I grant that all rational beings are influenced, and ought to be influenced, by motives. But the relation between a motive and the action is of a very different nature from the relation between an efficient cause and its effect. An efficient cause must be a being that exists, and has power to produce the effect. A motive is not a thing that exists. It is only a thing conceived in the mind of the agent. Motives supply liberty in the agent, otherwise they have no influence at all." Such statements may not go down to the depths of this deep subject, but they are worthy of being considered and weighed.

<Principles of Action>. By which he means "every thing that makes us to act." He divides them into mechanical, animal and rational. Under mechanical be includes instincts and habits. Under animal principles, appetites and desires, benevolent affections and passions. The rational embrace a regard to our good upon the whole, the notions of duty, rectitude, and moral obligation; and, in treating of these, he offers observations on conscience, maintaining that it is both an active and intellectual power.

<The Liberty of Moral Agents>. He had entered on this subject in treating of the will. He now discusses it more fully, showing that man has a power over the determination of his own will, and that we have by our constitution a natural conviction or belief that we act freely.

<Morals>. If he delivered nothing more to his class than is contained in this essay, it must have been a very defective system of moral philosophy; but there is no reason to believe that he published all the instruction he conveyed in college. What he does say is always weighty. He shows that there are first principles in morals, that an action

deserving moral approbation must be done with the belief of its being morally {227} good. "Hence it follows necessarily that the moral goodness which we ascribe to an action considered abstractly, and that which we ascribe to a person for doing that action, are not the same." He is careful to explain that "morality requires not only that a man should act according to his judgment, but that he should use the best means in his power that his judgment be according to truth," thus pointing to a standard above the judgment. He argues powerfully against Hume that justice is a natural, and not a mere artificial, virtue. He maintains that we draw the sentiments of justice from conscience. That these sentiments are not the effects of education or acquired habits we have the same reason to conclude, as that our perception of what is true, and what is false, is not the effect of education or acquired habits." " By the conscience we perceive a merit in honest conduct, and a demerit in dishonest, without regard to public utility." He is particularly successful in proving that a contract implies an obligation, independent of the beneficial or prejudicial consequences that may follow.

XXVII.-THE ABERDEEN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY.[65]

T/HIS\ society deserves a special notice, as from it proceeded, directly or indirectly, the greater number of the works of the Aberdeen metaphysicians. The names of the members are worthy of being preserved, as they were all men of ability. The original members were Dr. John Gregory, Dr. David Skene, Mr. Robert Trail, Mr. George Campbell, Mr. John Steward and Mr. Thomas Reid. In 1758, were elected Mr. Charles Gordon, Mr. Alexander Gerard, Mr. John Farquhar (minister at Nigg), and Mr. John Kerr. In later years were elected Mr. James Beattie in 1760, Dr. George Skene in 1763, Mr. W. Ogilvy in 1763, Mr. James Dunbar in 1765, and Mr. William Traill in 1766. Dr. Reid was secretary for the first year. The society met twice a month, in the afternoon or evening, in a tavern in one or other of the towns. We are amused at the provision made by the philosophers for their bodily wants. There was an entertainment, the expense of which was not to exceed eighteen pence a head; the whole expense might be about ten shillings, of which one-half was for a bottle of {228} port, for punch and porter, the other half for the more solid eatables. It was a written rule, showing how anxious the grave men were to secure propriety, that "any member may take a glass at a by-table while the president is in the chair, but no health shall be drunk during that time." The meeting continued its sittings for three hours, there being room for free conversation half an hour before, and half an hour after, the president took or vacated the chair. The attendance may have averaged half a dozen. The first meeting was held Jan. 12, 1758. About 1772, the forfeits for nonattendance are getting heavy, and discontent is expressed. The minutes show a meeting so late as February, 1773, after which the society disappears.

The society was formed for the purpose of reading discourses or dissertations, and making observations on the subjects of them, and of discussing questions proposed and sanctioned. " The subjects of the discourses and questions shall be philosophical; all grammatical, historical, and

philological discussions being conceived to be foreign to the design of this society [it is evident that they had no idea of the importance of philology]. And philosophical matters are understood to comprehend every principle of science, which may be deduced by just and lawful induction from the phenomena either of the human mind, or of the material world; all observations and experiments that may furnish materials for such inductions; the examination of false schemes of philosophy and false methods of philosophizing; the subserviency of philosophy to arts, the principles they borrow from it, and the means of carrying them to their perfection."

It is interesting to notice that so many of the speculations of the Aberdeen philosophers, afterwards given to the world in their published writings, were first laid before this society. Thus Dr. Reid, on May 24, 1758, intimates that the subject of his discourse at next meeting (June 13) is to be " The philosophy of the mind in general, and particularly on the perceptions we have by sight." In 1760, he gives an analysis of the senses, and a discourse on the sense of touch. On Jan. 26, 1762, he read a discourse at the laying down of the office of president, on " Euclid's definitions and axioms." On Oct. 11, 1762, Dr. Reid read a discourse, which the society approved of; but he declined inserting it, in regard he proposed soon to send it to the press, along with the other discourses he had read before the society.

Gerard, too, discourses on his own subjects, from 1758 to 1771, and reads a series of papers on genius, and a paper on the effect of the passions on the association of our ideas. Between 1761 and 1768, be inquires: " What is peculiar to those Operations of the Mind of which we can form some Ideas, and what distinguishes them from other Operations of the Mind of which we can form no Ideas? " He writes on the Principles which determine our Degrees of Approbation in the Fine Arts; upon the " Characters of Poetical Imagination; " upon the " Difference between Common Sense and Reason; " and he gives a series of papers on the " Universality and Immutability of the Moral Sentiment." From 1761 to 1767, Dr. Campbell reads papers on " Eloquence; " on " The Relation of Eloquence to Logic; on " The Dependence of Eloquence on Grammar." {229}

The other members take up cognate subjects. Traill takes "An Abstract of a Discourse of M. Rousseau, of the Sourse [so spelled] of the Inequality among Mankind." Mr. Gordon treats of "Memory and its Influence in forming Characters among Men; " on the " Origin of Polytheism;" on the Universal Belief in a Deity; on the " Existence and Perfections of the Supreme Being; " on " Language; " and on the "Alphabet." Farquhar reads on the " Imagination," and a " Particular Providence." Dr. David Skene has a paper on "The Different Branches of Philosophy," particularly "The Study of the Nature and Philosophy of the Mind." Dr. Gregory discourses on "The Usefulness of Natural Philosophy" on The Prolongation of Human Life;" "The Retardation of Old Age; and "The Foundation of Taste in Music." Mr. Ross takes up "The Use of the Leaves of Plants;" and "The Methods of

Classing Plants." Professor Stuart writes on the "Nature of Evidence" on "Mathematical Evidence;" on the "Evidence of Experience;" and "Moral Evidence." Dr. George Skene reads on "The Abuse of Mechanical Reasoning in Natural Philosophy." Mr. Traill discourses on " The Arrangement and Evidence of Mathematics;" and Dunbar, on "The Union of King's and Marischal Colleges," on " The Equality of Mankind," and "The Influence of Place and Climate upon Human Affairs." Dr. David Skene has a paper on "Happiness." Surely there is proof here of great intellectual activity, and of the keen interest felt in a wide range of subjects.

Most of the topics discussed turn round the various departments of mental science and speculative philosophy. But it will be seen, from the list of questions propounded for discussion, that they travelled over other fields. Many of the discussions had a special reference to the new sceptical philosophy; so that Reid could write to Hume, March 18,1763: ,Your friendly adversaries, Drs. Campbell and Gerard, as well as Dr. Gregory, return their compliments to you, respectfully. A little philosophical society here, of which all three are members, is much indebted to you for its entertainment. Your company would, although we are all good Christians, be more acceptable than that of Athanasius; and since we cannot have you upon the bench, you are brought oftener than any other man, to the bar; accused and defended, with great zeal, but without bitterness. If you write no more in morals, politics, or metaphysics, I am afraid we shall be at a loss for subjects."

XXVIII.-JAMES OSWALD.

P/RIESTLEY\ speaking of "a set of pretended philosophers, of whom the most conspicuous and assuming is Reid," says of Oswald, that he wonders bow his ,performance should have excited any other feeling than that of contempt." 'As to Dr. Oswald, whom I have treated with the least ceremony, the disgust his writings gave me was so great, that I could not possibly show him more respect." ("Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry.") Oswald's work is entitled " An Appeal to Common Sense in behalf of {230} religion." The first volume appeared in 1766, and it reached a second edition in 1768. The second volume was published in 1772. He takes substantially the same line of defence as Reid; but the " Appeal " is less pointed, and is vastly looser than Reid's " Inquiry; " and one feels it a dreary task to go through its platitudes. He entrenches himself behind certain distinctions recognized in the age. " The distinction between the occasion and cause of a thing is too considerable to be overlooked in a philosophical inquiry. Sensation and reflection, do indeed give occasion to all our ideas, but do not therefore produce them. They may in our present state be considered as the <sine qua non> to our most rational and sublime conceptions, but are not therefore the powers by which we form them." He opposes Lord Kames, and blames him for resting morality on feeling, and Adam Smith for resting it on sympathy, whereas it should be represented as founded on common sense. " Common sense perceives and pronounces upon all primary truths with the same indubitable certainty with which we perceive and

pronounce on objects of sense by our bodily organs." " By the discernment peculiar to rational beings we perceive all primary truths, in the same manner as we perceive objects of sense by our bodily organs." " Primary truths of religion and morality are as much objects of common sense as other primary truths." In the advertisement to the second volume, be mentions that some think that this Appeal ought to have set out with a definition of common sense; and be goes on to show that he does not mean by it common opinion, just or unjust. He calls it the simple authority of reason, or that capacity of pronouncing on obvious truth. " Reason requires our admitting primary truths on its authority, under the penalty of being convicted of folly and nonsense, if we do not." Oswald cannot be represented as grappling with the deeper problems of metaphysics, as, for example, with the question, whether the common sense is subjective or objective, or whether it is subjective in one sense, as it is in the mind, and objective in another sense, as the mind in many cases -- not all, however -- looks to external objects. He seems to me to be right when he combines two elements in moral apprehension: " we have a feeling, as well as perception, of moral excellence." Dr. Oswald was born in Dunnet became minister there (1727), and at Methven (1750), and died in 1793.

XXIX-- JAMES BEATTIE.[66]

J/AMES\ B/EATTIE\ was born Oct. 25, 1735, at the north-east end of Lawrencekirk, a village in the heart of the <Howe of the Mearns> in Kincardineshire, where his father kept a retail shop, and rented a small farm in the neighborhood. He was educated, {231} as so many eminent Scotchmen have been, at his parish school, and showed an early taste for reading, especially books of poetry. In 1749, he entered Marischal College, Aberdeen, where he competed for and received a bursary; and there his classical tastes were at once discovered by Dr. Blackwell, and there in coming years he studied philosophy under Dr. Gerard. In 1753, he was appointed schoolmaster of the parish of Fordoun about six miles from his native place, in a hollow at the base of the Grampians. He had all along a taste for the beauties of nature; and his poetical genius was kindled, and may have been partly guided into the direction which it took, by the peculiar scenery of the country, where a fine rich plain stretches out with a low range of hills overlooking the German Ocean on the one side, and the lofty Grampians on the other. The tradition is, that at this period of his life he would saunter in the fields or on the hills the livelong night, watching the aspects of the sky and welcoming the approach of day, and that he was specially fond of wandering in a deep and finely wooded glen in the neighborhood. While at this place he secured friends and patrons in the parish minister, in Lord Monboddo and Lord Gardenstone. The last named of these having seen some pieces of his poetry in manuscript, and being in doubt whether they were entirely the composition of so young a man, asked him to translate a passage of Lucretius; whereupon Beattie retired into an adjoining wood, and produced a translation in a very short time. While a schoolmaster at Fordoun, he seems to have attended divinity lectures during several winters at Aberdeen, with a view to the gospel ministry; but

he soon relinquished the pursuit. In 1757, he stood a competitive examination for the office of usher in the grammar-school of Aberdeen, and was defeated; but so satisfied were the judges of his qualifications that, on the office falling vacant the following year, he was appointed to it without any farther examination. In this more public position, his literary abilities became known; and, through the influential friends whom he had acquired, be was installed professor of moral philosophy and logic in Marischal College in 1760. About this time he became a member of the Aberdeen Club, and associated with such men as Reid, Campbell, John Gregory, and Gerard.

As professor, he lectured and examined two or three hours {232} every day, from November to April, on pneumatology, embracing psychology and natural theology; on speculative and practical ethics, economics, jurisprudence, politics, rhetoric, and logic, with readings in Cicero and others of the ancient philosophers. As a moral philosopher, he felt himself called to oppose the scepticism of which Hume was the champion. It appears from letters of Dr. John Gregory, published in Forbes's Life of Beattie," that atheism and materialism were at that time in high fashion, and were spouted by many who used the name of Hume, but who had never read his works, and who were incapable of understanding them. Reid had for years been examining the foundations of philosophy, which Hume had been undermining, and published his " Inquiry" in 1764. Beattie followed in 1770, with the Essay on "The Nature and Immutability of Truth." This work was his principal study for four years: he wrote it three times over, and some parts of it oftener. It had so rapid a sale that, in 1771, a second edition was demanded; and, shortly after, there were proposals to translate it into French, Dutch, and German. While engaged in these severer labors, he was all the while cherishing, what I suspect was to him the more congenial occupation, his taste for poetry. So early as 1766, he is laboring in the style and stanza of Spencer, at a poem in which he is to give an account of the birth, education, and adventures of one of the old minstrels. The First Book of the " Minstrel " was published anonymously in 1771, and a new edition of this Book and the Second Book, with his name attached, in 1774. Beattie, it may be acknowledged, stands higher as a poet than a philosopher. Some of his poems are in the first rank of their kind.

The personal incidents in his remaining life worthy of being recorded are not numerous. In 1767, he had married Miss Mary Dunn, who was inflicted with a tendency to mental disease, which broke out first in a distempered mind, and afterwards in insanity, which greatly distressed the kind husband, and compelled him at last to provide for her living separate from him. His quiet life was varied by several visits paid to London, where, as he became known by his works, he received considerable attention and was introduced to many eminent literary men. On two several occasions he had the honor of {233} an interview with George III., who had a great admiration of the character and object of his works, and granted him a pension. The famous painter Sir Joshua Reynolds took a fine portrait of him, with the " Essay on Truth " under his arm, and above him a winged

angelic being holding scales in one hand, as if weighing truth, and with the other pushing three hideous figures, supposed to represent Sophistry, Scepticism, and Folly (Reynolds meant two of these to be Voltaire and Hume),[67] who are shrinking away from the light of the sun, beaming from the breast of the angel.

His defences of religion were highly esteemed by several of the bishops and a number of the clergy of the Church of England, and he was offered a rich living if he would take orders in that church. This he declined, not because he disapproved of the doctrine or worship of the Episcopal Church, but he was apprehensive that by accepting such preferment he " might strengthen the hands of the gainsayer and give the world some ground to believe that the love of the truth was not quite so ardent or so pure as he had pretended." In 1773, Oxford University conferred an honorary degree of LL.D. upon him. The same year, he was offered the chair of moral philosophy in Edinburgh, but declined, as he preferred Aberdeen as his sphere, and was indisposed to go to a place where he would be in the heart of those he had attacked. His declining days were embittered by trials, which sank deep into his soul; such as the state of his wife, and the death first of one and then of the other of his sons, one of them being a very promising young man, called in early life to be his father's assistant in the college.[68] We discover traces of irritation in his afflictions; and one could have wished to see him sustained not only by what he sincerely entertained, a belief in providence and in the word of God, but in the peculiar doctrines of redemption and grace, so specially fitted to give comfort in trouble. He died Oct. 5, 1802. {234}

In person he was of a middle size, with something of a slouch in his gait; and in his latter years he was inclined to corpulency. He had dark eyes, and a mild and somewhat pensive look. There is an account of his life and writings in a work by Sir W. Forbes, in three volumes. It contains many of his letters, which are full of criticisms of no great profundity, and display at once the amiabilities and weaknesses of the author.

The following are the titles, with the dates, of his works: Poems (1760) Essay on Truth (1770); Minstrel, B. l. (1771); B. ". (1774); on Poetry and Music, on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition, on Classical Learning (1776); Dissertations on Memory and Imagination, on Dreaming, on the Theory of Language, on Fable and Romance, on the Attachments of Kindred, on Illustrations of Sublimity (1783); Evidences of Christianity (1786) Elements of Moral Science (1790-93). He has also Scotticisms, and original notes to an edition of Addison's papers.

His poems will ever hold a place among the classical writings of Great Britain. His " Minstrel " and his " Hermit" are exquisite poems of their kind: simple, graceful, tender, and leaving a peaceful and peace-giving impression on the mind; and therefore not likely to be appreciated by those whose tastes were formed by the passionate and startling style of poetry introduced in the next age by Byron, who was at school in Aberdeen while Beattie was in

his declining years. His prose works do not exhibit much grasp or depth of thought, but are characterized by much ease and elegance. In his lectures he dwelt fondly on style (" Elements of Mental Science," part 10), and his remarks are clear and judicious, though somewhat tame and commonplace, but not on that account the less useful. His criticism of the " Pilgrim's Progress " may be compared with that of Macaulay, written in a later age: " It was written about a hundred and thirty years ago, while the author, who had been a tinker, was in prison in Bedford, where he was confined twelve years. Some false notions in theology may be found in it; and the style is vulgar, and savors of the author's trade; but the fable is ingenious and entertaining." He everywhere holds forth Addison as the model English writer. His own style is without the idiom, the playfulness, the corruscations, the flexible windings by which the best papers of the "Spectator" are characterized. In reading such a work as his Moral Science," we feel as if we were walking along a road with pleasant grass and corn fields on either side, but without a {235} turn in it, and without a rock or stream, without a hill or valley. His papers on literary subjects are more attractive, as allowing free scope for his fine taste.

In his "Theory of Language" he argues strongly that speech is of divine origin. In his "Dissertation on the Imagination," which is very pleasantly written, he holds the theory, afterwards expanded by Alison, that the feeling of beauty arises from the association of ideas. He begins his " Elements of Moral Science " with psychology. He mentions the twofold division of the faculties into perception and volition, but says it is not accurate, and adds affections, approaching thus to the threefold division adopted by Kant and Hamilton. He mentions nine perceptive faculties: external sensation, consciousness, memory, imagination, dreaming, speech, abstraction, reason Judgment or understanding), conscience. I rather think he is right in giving speech a place among the native faculties, but we wonder to find dreaming there. His account of consciousness is loose and popular, but he avoids the error of Dugald Stewart in making it look merely at qualities, and of Kant in making it look merely at phenomena. " Of the things perceived by this faculty, the chief is the mind itself," &c. He has often valuable remarks on the faculties. Thus, under memory: " What we perceive by two senses at once has a good chance to be remembered. Hence, to read aloud slowly and with propriety, when one is accustomed to it, contributes greatly to remembrance; and that which we write in a good hand, without contractions, with dark-colored ink, exactly pointed and spelled, in straight lines, with a moderate space between them, and properly subdivided into paragraphs as the subject may require, is better remembered than what we throw together in confusion. For by all these circumstances attention is fixed, and the writing, being better understood, makes a deeper impression. Those things, also, which are related in two or more respects are more easily remembered than such as are related in one respect only. Hence, by most people verse is more easily remembered than prose, because the words are related in measure as well as in sense; and rhyme, than blank verse, because the words are related not only in sense and measure, but also by

similar sounds at the end of the lines." Some will think that the students who listened to such prelections ranging over all the faculties, {236} and touching on a great variety of topics, esthetical and moral, might be as much benefited as those who had to listen to the more scholastic discussions of the German universities. He says that " laughter is occasioned by an incongruity or unsuitableness of the parts that compose, or seem to compose, any complex idea or object."

The philosophical work by which Beattie was best known in his own day, and by which be is still known by students, is his " Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism." He quotes approvingly Reid's " Inquiry," and Campbell's " Philosophy of Rhetoric." In an edition published in 1776 he replies to some who had blamed him for borrowing some hints without acknowledgment from Dr. Price, Dr. Oswald, and Buffier. " I beg to say that I am to this hour totally unacquainted with that work of Dr. Price which is alluded to, and that when I published the first edition of the `Essay on Truth' I was totally unacquainted with the writings of Buffier and Dr. Oswald. I had heard, indeed, that the French philosopher used the term I common sense' in a way similar to that in which I use it; but this was only hearsay, and I have since found that, though between his fundamental opinions and mine there is a striking resemblance, his application of that term is not entirely the same." All I have to remark on this statement is, that if he had not read those well-known works on the subject of which he was treating he ought to have done so.

The work is pleasantly and pointedly written, and it had an immediate and wide circulation. It wants the depth and shrewdness of Reid's "Inquiry," but on that account was better relished by many readers, such as George III. The book is, throughout, a popular, rather than a scientific one. His somewhat <ad captandum> appeals gained the ear of those who had never been troubled with doubts, but rather turned away those who wished to find the great sceptic met by an opponent worthy of him.

His object is, first, to trace the several kinds of evidence up to their first principles; second, to show that his sentiments are in accordance with true philosophy and the principles of the most eminent philosophers; and, third, to answer sceptical objections. He says it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to give a {237} definition of truth; but endeavors to give such a description of it as may make others understand what we mean by the word. He then tells us that he accounts " that to be truth which the constitution of human nature determines a man to believe, and that to be falsehood which the constitution of human nature determines man to disbelieve." This makes the ultimate appeal to lie to man's constitution; and does not meet those who say that man's constitution may be an accretion of fortuitous agencies gathered in the course of ages, and may lead us into partial or total falsehood. According to this definition, there might be events without a cause in the constellation Orion, or at a " reasonable distance beyond," provided the constitution of the inhabitants there had been

determined by a different experience. He then distinguishes between truth perceived intuitively and truth perceived in consequence of a proof, and enters upon a discussion as to the most appropriate terms to employ to designate these two kinds of truth. " We might call the one `reason,' and the other reasoning; , but the similarity of the terms would frequently occasion both obscurity and harshness in the sound." Henceforward he seems to use the words " reason " and "reasoning" as synonymous, and uses "reason" in the sense of "reasoning." He is quite aware of the ambiguity in the phrase "common sense;" but he is to use it to denote that " faculty by which we perceive self-evident truth," and then distinguishes between common sense arid reason. This distinction between common sense and reason is no modern discovery, and he proceeds to quote Aristotle's account of axioms, principles, and common sentiments.

He starts the question, "By what criterion shall we know a sentiment of nature from a prejudice of education, a dictate of common sense from the fallacy of an inveterate opinion?" It is clear that Reid must often have had that question before him, but does not give a very articulate reply. Beattie answers it clearly, and I believe judiciously. " He takes that for an ultimate principle which forces our belief by its own intrinsic evidence, and which cannot by any reasoning be rendered more evident." Here the main stress is laid, as I believe it ought, on self-evidence, while necessity comes in secondarily; " it forces our belief by its own intrinsic evidence," a better account than that given by Leibnitz and Kant, who put necessity, in the front. {238} He illustrates his views by mathematical evidence and the evidence of sense; and shows that they agree, in both having the sanction of common sense. He argues that analogy and testimony are principles of common sense; but he is in evident difficulties when he is obliged to admit that both of these may deceive. He draws a distinction between two kinds of truths, each intuitively certain. " It is a character of some that their contraries are inconceivable; such are the axioms of geometry. But of many other intuitive truths the contraries are inconceivable. `I do feel a hard body,' `I do not feel a hard body;' these propositions are equally conceivable." If we would defend fundamental truth effectively, we must draw such distinctions; but the main point here is to determine what we are led intuitively to believe in the different cases. He shows convincingly, in opposition to Locke, that self-evidence is not confined to propositions.

He sustains these principles pretty satisfactorily; but when he proceeds to apply them in a criticism of Berkeley and Hume, is not eminently successful. He understands Berkeley, as he has been vulgarly understood, as denying the existence of matter; whereas Berkeley is continually asserting that he believes firmly in the existence of matter; only he regards it as having no existence, except as an idea, in a contemplative mind,-whereas our intuitive convictions represent it as having a reality, so far, independent of the mind contemplating it. The consequence is, that Beattie's objections are felt by us as missing the point; as when he argues that, if Berkeley's doctrine be true, we should not run out of the way of threatened danger.

He delights to point out some petty incongruities in Hume; but we see at once that he is not able to meet him face to face, and to wrestle with him. He acknowledges the superior abilities of Hume; but thinks the sceptics unworthy of any kind of reserve or deference, and maintains that their reasonings were not only false but ridiculous, and that their talents as philosophers and logicians were absolutely contemptible. {239}

XXX. -- GEORGE CAMBELL.[69]

W/E\ are still in an age in which young men belonging to county families devoted themselves to the work of the ministry of the gospel. George Campbell was the son of the Rev. John Campbell, a minister in Aberdeen, and one of the Campbells of Westhall, who claimed to be cadets of the house of Argyll. He was educated at the grammar-school, Aberdeen, and at Marischal College; and, being destined by his family to the law, he was apprenticed to a writer to the signet in Edinburgh. But he had a strong disposition towards the church, and he attended divinity lectures first in Edinburgh, and then in Marischal and in King's, Aberdeen. He was licensed to preach the gospel in 1746, and was settled as minister of Banchory-Ternan on the banks of the Dee in I 748. He was translated to a church in Aberdeen in 1757, and there (in 1758) became a member of the famous Philosophical Society, and contributed papers which were afterwards elaborated into volumes. In 1759, he was made principal of Marischal College, and every one felt that he was worthy of the office and fitted for it. In 1779, he was appointed professor of divinity in the same college, as successor to Gerard. In his opening lecture he says: " It is supposed that I am to teach you every thing connected with the study of divinity." " I am to teach you nothing; but, by the grace of God, I will assist you to teach yourselves every thing." He now resigned his city charge; but, as minister of Grayfriars, an office conjoined with the professorship, he preached every Sunday in one of the churches. It is a curious coincidence that as Reid succeeded the Rev. John Bissett in Old Machar, so Campbell succeeded him in Aberdeen: the earnest evangelical giving way in both cases to the cultured moderate. From his entrance into Aberdeen he was much admired by the educated and refined. The story is that some one told Gerard that he must now look to his laurels, whereupon the old professor replied that the incomer was indolent, a remark which was reported to Campbell, who {240} profited by it, and became remarkable for his diligence. It is certain that in his later years he showed amazing industry in his literary pursuits. From time to time he gave to the press sermons characteristic of the age: calm, dignified, elegant, and moral, full of reverence, and carefully free from all extravagance and fanaticism. One feels as if be should have been a bishop delivering charges to his clergy, fitted to sustain the dignity of the Church of England. His speaking is thus described The closeness, the force, the condensed precision of his reasoning exceed the power of description. Not a single superfluous word was used, no weak or doubtful argument introduced."

But he gave to the world more elaborate works. Hume's influence was now beginning to be felt, and in 1763,

Campbell publicly entered the lists against him, in " A Dissertation on Miracles." Before publishing the work, he transmitted through Dr. Blair a copy to Hume, who writes him in his usual pleasant manner, not entering into controversy, but stating how his own argument had occurred to him when a Jesuit was plying him with some " nonsensical miracle." In answering the sceptic, Campbell proposes to prove that testimony hath a natural and original influence on belief antecedent to experience. He may be right in saying that there is such a tendency, -- I believe it to be hereditary in children; but this can serve him very little in his argument, as it is not of the nature of a necessary principle, and he is obliged to admit that testimony often deceives, so that we are brought back, as Hume maintains, to experience. But he is more successful when he shows that experience can prove a miracle, and this notwithstanding that nature is uniform. " For this purpose I make the following supposition. I have lived for some years near a ferry. It consists with my knowledge that the passage-boat has a thousand times crossed the river, and as many times returned safe. An unknown man, whom I have just now met, tells me in a serious manner that it is lost, and affirms that he himself saw the passengers carried down the stream and the boat overwhelmed. No person who is influenced in his judgment of things, not by philosophical subtleties, but by common sense, a much surer guide, will hesitate to declare that in such a testimony I have probable evidence of the fact asserted." The last work published by him was " The {241} Four Gospels, translated from the Greek, with Preliminary Dissertations, and Notes Critical and Explanatory," 1789, The translation, though elegant, is not idiomatic; but the dissertations show a fine critical spirit. After his death, his " Lectures on Ecclesiastical History," his " Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence," and his "Lectures on the Pastoral Character," were published. But in this work we have to look merely at the philosophical discussions in his work on the " Philosophy of Rhetoric," which was commenced at Banchory, and published in 1776.

We have seen all throughout this history that the Scottish metaphysicians following Shaftesbury were fond of speculating about beauty and taste, and that all the Scottish thinkers at this time were anxious to acquire an elegant style. Adam Smith for several years read lectures with great eclat on rhetoric and belles-lettres in Edinburgh, under the patronage of Lord Kames, and afterwards did the same in the class of logic in Glasgow University. Lord Kames himself discussed like subjects in his " Elements of Criticism." The elegant preacher Dr. Hugh Blair lectured on the subject in the university of Edinburgh, and his " Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-lettres " is one of the most useful books ever published on the art of composition. These works were used for several ages, not only in Scotland, but even in England, and helped to make rhetoric a leading branch of study in all the American colleges. Among all the works, Campbell's " Philosophy of Rhetoric " is perhaps the most philosophical, or is, at least, the one in which there is the most frequent discussion of philosophic problems.[70]

He opens: " In speaking, there is always some end in

view, or some effect which the speaker intends to produce on the hearer." The word <eloquence>, in its greatest latitude, denotes that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end. In speaking of oratory suited to light and trivial matters, he endeavors to define wit. "It is the design of wit to excite in {242} the mind an agreeable surprise, and that arising not from any thing marvellous in the subject, but solely from the imagery she employs, or the strange assemblage of related ideas presented to the mind." This end is effected in one or other of these three was, -- first, in debasing things pompous or seemingly grave;" "secondly, in agarandizing things, little and frivolous; thirdly, in setting ordinary objects by means not only remote, but apparently contrary, in a particular and uncommon point of view."

He enlarges, as most of the Scottish metaphysicians have done, on the different kinds of evidence. He begins with intuitive evidence, which, he says, is of different sorts. " One is that which results purely from intellection. Of this kind is the evidence of these propositions: 'One and four make five;' things equal to the same thing are equal to one another; `the whole is greater than a part;' and, in brief, all in arithmetic and geometry. These are in effect but so many different expositions of our own general notions taken in different views." " But when the thing, though in effect coinciding, is considered under a different aspect, -- when what is single in the subject's divided in the predicate, and conversely, or when what is a whole in the one is regarded as a part of something in the other, -- such propositions lead to the discovery of innumerable and apparently remote relations." Under this head be also places, secondly, consciousness, "whence every man derives the perfect assurance which he hath of his own existence." He mentions, thirdly, common sense, giving to Buffier the credit of first noticing this principle as one of the genuine springs of our knowledge, whereas Shaftesbury had previously given it a special and important place. That he has not a definite idea of what common sense is as a philosophic principle, is evident from his stating that "in different persons it prevails in different degrees of strength," thus confounding the common principles of intelligence in all men with the sound sense possessed only by certain persons. He mentions a number of such principles, such as "whatever has a beginning has a cause;" "when there is in the effect a manifest adjustment of the several parts to a certain end, there is intelligence," "the course of nature will be the same tomorrow that it is to-day." He tries to draw distinctions between different kinds of intuitive truth. Thus, {243} in regard to primary truths of the third class, " it may be urged that it cannot be affirmed of them all at least, as it may be of the axioms in mathematics, or the assurances we have from consciousness, that the denial of them implies a contradiction." It is necessary, I believe, to draw some such distinctions as these between the various kinds of first truths; some of them seem to me to be of the nature of primitive cognitions, others of primitive judgments. But it is doubtful whether Campbell has been able to enunciate the nature of the difference. That he has no clear ideas of the relation of our primary perceptions to realities is evident from his

statement. "All the axioms in mathematics are but the enunciations of certain properties in our abstract notions, distinctly perceived by the mind, but have no relation to any thing without themselves, and cannot be made the foundation of any conclusion concerning actual existence; " as if the demonstrations of Archimedes as to conic sections had not been found to apply to the elliptic orbits of the comets as discovered by Kepler.

In speaking of deductive evidence, he distinguishes between scientific and moral. (1) "The subject of the one is abstract, in dependent truth, or the unchangeable and necessary relation of ideas; that of the other, the real but often changeable and contingent connections that subsist among things actually existing." (2). Moral evidence admits degrees, demonstration doth not. (3) In the one there never can be any contrariety of proofs; in the other, there not only may be, but almost always is. (4) The one is simple, consisting of only one coherent series; whereas moral evidence is generally complicated, being in reality a bundle of independent proofs. Under moral reasoning he treats of experience, analogy, testimony, calculation of chances, &c. He discusses the nature and use of the scholastic art of syllogizing. He has no idea of the syllogism being merely an analysis of the process which passes through the mind in all ratiocination. His objections have been satisfactorily answered by Whately.

He has a very interesting chapter on the cause of that pleasure which we receive from objects or representations that excite pity and other painful feelings, criticising the explanations by others, and unfolding one of his own, which is rather complicated. We are not concerned to follow him when he enters {244} on style and elocution. Speaking of his philosophic ability, I am inclined to place him next to Reid in the Aberdeen school.

When minister at Banchory, he married Miss Farquharson, of Whitehouse, of whom "I can say with truth that I never knew a more pious, more humane woman, or a woman of better sense. She had an enlargement of sentiment not often to be found in man (who have many advantages by education), and very unlike the contracted notions of the party among whom she had been bred. You will not mistake me, my dear; it is not those of the Church of England I mean, -- a society for which I have a great respect, -- but our Scotch nonjurors, who, though they concur pretty much with the other in the ceremonial part, differ widely in the spirit they infuse." This is an extract from letters to his niece, Annie Richardson, who bad gone to a boarding-school at Durham. These letters are preserved in the Farquharson manuscripts, and are very kindly. "You may depend upon it we do not forget our dear little niece who has been so long with us, and whom we do and cannot help considering as one of ourselves, -- as an essential part of our little family." The advices given, though rather commonplace, are not on that account the less useful. " Let it be an invariable maxim with you, my dear, that no art will continue long to have influence but what is founded on truth. Deceit and falsehood may sometimes serve a present turn, but never fail sooner or later to be detected. An injury is done to the

integrity of one's own mind by doing what is wrong, though it should never be discovered; the discovery which commonly follows injures one's character." His religious counsels are characteristic: " In regard to religion, you are now at the time of life when it specially claims your attention; and I shall at present only observe to you that you ought to study to be possessed of the spirit of it, which consists truly in fearing God and working righteousness; in other words, in loving God and your neighbor; but avoid carefully an excessive attachment to any particular form or mode of worship. The two extremes to be guarded against are libertinism and bigotry. The former consists in the want of a proper sense of religion; and the latter in an inordinate attachment to forms, or to any of the distinguishing badges of a particular sect or party." {245}

In the Farquharson manuscripts there are letters from Dr. Douglas, of Windsor, from which we gather some glimpses of the times. " It appears that in Oxford and Cambridge the number of students [letter dated 1789] had greatly decreased in consequence of the little attention which many of the bishops of late years had paid to their degrees." He goes on to say: The very great influx of young men from Scotland offering themselves as candidates for orders has been generally remarked. This did not use to be the case, and nothing perhaps will check it but a strictness which, in particular cases, will, I have no doubt, be dispensed with." It appears from these letters that he is in London in July, 1787, along with Dr. Beattie and his son, and that he is making arrangements about the publication of his "Dissertations." He spends a week with Dr. Douglas; and had the honor of a little conversation with his Majesty no less than three different times, and once, which is still more, with the Queen. " It is not to be questioned, that, after such distinction, I feel myself a much greater man than when you knew me at Aberdeen."

In person he was below the middle size, with a mild and delicate expression. In conversation he was pleasant and agreeable, though at times falling into fits of absence. He resigned his professorship in I 795, and soon after his principalship. He died April 1, 1796.

XXXI.-- JAMES BURNETT (LORD MONBODDO).

H/E\ was descended from an ancient family in Kincardineshire, and was born in October, 1714, at Monboddo, which is beautifully situated on the southern slope of the Grampians, and commands a view of the <Howe of the Mearns>, lying below it. He received the rudiments of his education at the parish school of Laurencekirk, which lies a few miles off, and studied the usual branches at King's College, Aberdeen, where he showed a taste for Greek literature, and graduated there in 1729. It was still the habit of Scottish youths who wished to have a high education to resort to Holland, and he went to Groningen, where he continued three years studying civil law, and where, {246} it is reported, in the society of some English Gentlemen and French refugees, he contrived to get rid of his Scotch pronunciation, and to acquire an accurate knowledge of the French tongue. In 1738, he was admitted to the Scotch bar,

where he rose to eminence by his learning and his shrewdness, and particularly distinguished himself in the famous Douglas case, and helped to gain the title and estates for his client. In 1767, he was raised to the bench by the title of Lord Monboddo. As a judge, he was painstaking and upright; his decisions were sound, and supported by great erudition and acuteness-. From time to time he rode up to London on horseback, and there mingled in the best literary circles, with such men as Murdoch, Armstrong, James Thomson, and Mallet, Markham, the Archbishop of York, Earl Stanhope, the first and second Earls of Mansfield, Lords Thurlow and Grantley, Bishops Horsley, Lowth, Porteous, Shipley, and Burgess, Sir John Pringle, Lewis, Scot, Seward, and Harris the author of "Hermes." While there, he showed himself at the levee and drawing-room at St. James, where the King took special notice of him.

He married a very lovely woman, Grace Farquharson, who died early, having had three children, a son and two daughters; the son and one of the daughters were cut off to the great distress of the father. The poet Burns, who received much attention from the judge, addressed a poem to that daughter, and says of her: "There has not been any thing nearly like her, in all the combinations of beauty, grace, and goodness the great Creator has formed, since Milton's Eve, on the first day of her existence." In the midst of his legal studies and his domestic afflictions be ever turned eagerly to metaphysical pursuits. In 1773, he published his elaborate work, "On the Origin and Progress of Language," and at various times from 1779 to 1799 his still larger work on " Ancient Metaphysics." At his country seat, he acted the farmer, lived on terms of pleasant familiarity with the people on his estate, was generously hospitable, and zealously promoted agriculture in his neighbor hood. At this place he received Samuel Johnson on his Scottish tour. In Boswell's account of the intercourse of the two, Lord Monboddo appears in by no means a disadvantageous light. He died at his house in Edinburgh, May 26, 1799. {247}

The eccentricities of his opinions and his conduct never interfered with his practical sagacity, or lowered him in the esteem and affection of the community. " His unbounded admiration of the customs, the literature, and the philosophy of the ancients strongly prepossessed him in favor of whatever was connected with such studies. In them, he supposed that he beheld all that was praiseworthy and excellent, while he looked on the moderns as a degenerate race, exhibiting only effeminacy and corruption. This attachment to ancient manners led him to imitate them, even in his amusements and habits of life. He was fond of athletic exercises in his youth, particularly fencing and fox-hunting, which tended to strengthen a constitution naturally healthy and robust. His general hour of rising in all seasons was six in the morning; and till a late period of his life he used the cold bath in the open air, even in the middle of winter. He took a light, early dinner, and a plentiful supper. The ancient practice of anointing, even, was not forgotten, though the lotion he used was not the oil of the ancients, but a saponaceous liquid composed of rose-water, olive oil, saline aromatic spirit, and Venice soap,

which, when well mixed, resembled cream. This he applied at bedtime, before a large fire, after coming from a warm bath. His method of travelling was also in conformity to his partiality for ancient customs. A carriage, which was not in common use among the ancients, he considered as an engine of effeminacy and sloth; and to be dragged at the tail of a horse, instead of mounting upon his back, appeared to him to be a truly ludicrous degradation of the genuine dignity of human nature."[71] In Kames's Life it is said his " temper was affectionate, friendly, social. He was fond of convivial intercourse, and it was his daily custom to unbend himself amidst a select party of literary friends, whom he invited to an early supper. The entertainment itself partook of the costume of the ancients; it had all the variety and abundance of a principal meal; and the master of the feast crowned his wine, like Anacreon, with a garland of roses. His conversation, too, had a race and flavor peculiarly its own. It was nervous, sententious, and tinctured with genuine wit. His apothegms, or, as his favorite Greeks would rather term them, were singularly terse and forcible, {248} and the grave manner in which he often conveyed the keenest irony, and the eloquence with which he supported his paradoxical theories, afforded the highest amusements of those truly Attic banquets which will be long remembered by all who had the pleasure of partaking in them."

I confess that I have felt a deep interest in reading the philosophical works of Lord Monboddo, -- he is so unlike any other Scotch metaphysician, he is so unlike his age. As appearing among a body of inductive inquirers, and in the middle of the eighteenth century, he looks very much like a megatherium coming in upon us in the historical period. His society is not with the modern empiricists, not even with the Latins, but with Plato and the Neo-Platonists, with Aristotle and his commentators. As regards the higher Greek philosophy, he is the most erudite scholar that Scotland has produced, not excepting even Sir William Hamilton. His favorite author among the moderns is Cudworth, whom he characterizes as " more learned in the whole ancient philosophy, the older as well as the later, than any modern author I know." He speaks of Locke's Essay as "no other than a hasty collection of crude, undigested thoughts, by a man who thought and reasoned by himself upon subjects of the greatest difficulty and deepest speculation, without assistance of leaming." He refers to Andrew Baxter, and charges the Newtonion astronomy with making the system of the heavens a mere machine; it supposes the universe had a beginning in time, contrary to all the ancients, who held that it " was an eternal emanation of an eternal being." It is mind that moves the celestial bodies, mind moving simply and uniformly. He refers to Berkeley, and also to Hume, lately deceased, and says of the latter, that his chief argument arises from "confounding sensations and ideas." He refers also to Reid's "Inquiry," and I suppose that the rising Scottish school was before him when he speaks of it as an unsatisfactory philosophy, which would maintain that " the perception of every sensible object is necessarily accompanied with a belief of its existence; that is the constitution of our nature, and that we are to inquire no more about it." He holds it " to be impossible that intellect can believe any thing without a reason." He

maintains that we do not form {249} ideas by nature. "We mistake habits of judging acquired by experience for the natural perceptions of sense." He thinks that by the eye we perceive objects first as double and inverted. His postulatum is that "the evidence of consciousness is infallible." " By consciousness, we know that we have perceptions of sense." "In the perceptions of sense, every man is conscious that he is passive, and that he is moved or excited to sensation by some thing." Of all his contemporaries, he is most thoroughly in sympathy with Mr. Harris, the author of " Hermes," with whom he corresponded.

We may here give an extract-letter from Lord Monboddo to Mr. Harris, in return for presentation copy of " Hermes."

> "Edinburgh, Wednesday, 26 March, 1766. -- As your works first introduced me to the Greek Philosophy, so this present you have now made me has revived my taste for that study, which, though never quite extinguished, had been lost for some time amid the hurry of law business. I fell on greedily, as soon as the book was sent me, and began with the most philosophical part of your I Hermes,' viz., the chapter upon General Ideas, which you have explained most truly and philosophically, according to the dictates of that school to which, I confess, I have entirely addicted myself, -- I mean the school of Aristotle, for as to Plato, he speaks of them in such mysterious and enigmatical terms, as if they had been a secret known only to himself; and I remember he makes Hippias the Sophist, when he was asked what the [Greek word] was, answer, `it was a fine virgin.' If philosophy was in such a state in the days of Plato, as not to understand perfectly what is the foundation of all science and knowledge among men, bow much is it indebted to that wonderful man, Aristotle, who, besides his discoveries in every branch of philosophy, has cleared the principles of it from that obscurity which the enthusiasm and mystic genius of Plato had thrown upon them?
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> "I think I may, without the least suspicion of flattery, give to you the praise which Cicero takes to himself, of teaching philosophy to speak a new language; for as he taught it to speak Latin, so you have taught it to speak English. The language which Mr. Locke has put into her mouth is mere stammering, and is, in my opinion, as contemptible as the matter which be has made her utter. Mr. Hobbes I am not so well acquainted with; but as be is of the same heresy, that is, one of those who pretend to philosophize, without the assistance of the ancients, I suppose he has succeeded as ill. As for myself, I am meditating great things in the literary way, but I am not sure that I will ever execute any thing. I have one work in view, which I think would not make a bad second part, if it were executed, to your I Hermes,'-- I mean a work showing the origin and progress of this most wonderful of all the arts of man, the art of speech. What set me upon this train of thinking was the study of some most barbarous and imperfect languages, spoken in America,

from grammars and dictionaries which I had {250} out of the King's Library, when I was last at Paris. Besides the curiosity of seeing the process of so wonderful an art, in tracing the progress of language, you at the same time trace the progress of the human understanding, and I think I have already collected materials from which a very good history of the human mind might be formed,-- better, at least, than that which Mr. Locke has given us. This, if I had leisure, I would make part of a much greater work which I project, viz., a History of fan; in which I would propose to trace him through the several stages of his existence; for there is a progression of our species from a state little better than mere brutality to that most perfect state you describe in ancient Greece, which is really amazing, and peculiar to our species. But the business of a laborious profession will, I'm afraid, prevent me from executing this, and several other projects which I have had in my head. But with respect to you, being now eased of the care of public affairs, the world will certainly exact from you an account of your leisure; especially as you have given them such pledges of your capacity to instruct and entertain them. You have done enough upon grammar. But I would have you do something upon logic, to show an ignorant age that the greatest discovery in science ever made by any one man is the discovery of the Syllogism by Aristotle." [72]

He has two great philosophic works. The first is "Ancient Metaphysics, or the Science of Universals; with an Appendix containing an Examination of the Principles of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy." It is in six quarto volumes, averaging four hundred pages each. He treats first of metaphysics and then of man. The proper subject of metaphysics is " mind pure and separate from all matter." In nature, all is either body or mind or their accidents. There is not in the universe, so far as our knowledge extends, any body without mind; they are never separated in the material world. " What is moved I call body, what moves is called mind." " Under mind in this definition I include, 1st, the rational and intellectual; 2d, the animal life; 3d, the principle in the vegetable by which it is nourished, grows, and produces its like, and which, therefore, is commonly called the vegetable life; and 4th, the motive principle, which I understand to be in all bodies, even such as are thought to be inanimate." He says the Greek word [Greek word] denotes the three first kinds; the fourth, the motive, is not commonly in Greek called [Greek word], but Aristotle says it is [Greek words]. He makes moving or producing motion an essential property of mind. In respect of quality, motion applies to mind as well as {251} body. By motion the whole business of nature above, below, and round about us is carried on. " It is impossible that any thing can be generated, come to maturity, or be extinguished without passing from one state to another. Now that passage is motion." He proves the immateriality of mind in general, (1) from the nature of motion, (2) from the nature of body, (3) from the nature of mind. He establishes the two first <a priori>, and the third by a demonstration <ex absurdo>. He has then <a posteriori> proof. " Sensation cannot be produced by a material cause; reasoning and consciousness

far less."

Coming to minds, he adopts the Aristotelean distinction between the gnostic and orective powers. The gnostic powers are sense, phantasy, and comparison. In sense, the mind is not conversant with the visible object itself, but with the image or [Greek word], as the Epicureans called it, thrown off from the object. The essential distinction between sense and phantasia is, that what we perceive by the sense is present and operating upon the sense, whereas the object of the imagination is not present. Phantasy is only of sensible objects. Memory is only of ideas, and belongs exclusively to man. " Brutes have no idea of time, or of first and last. Phantasy serves to them the purpose of memory." The object is painted on the brute's phantasia, but without any perception of the time when he first saw it. Sense and phantasy perceive particular things, -- comparison, generals or ideas. He thinks that brutes possess the comparative faculty, and that here the mind of the brute acts without the assistance of the body. As to will, he reckons " all will as free, and, at the same time, it is necessary; but of a necessity very different from material or physical." Much of this psychology is avowedly taken from Aristotle, but at the same time exhibits traces of shrewdness and independence, and, it has to be added, of eccentricity.

He criticises Locke's theory of the origin of ideas. He acknowledges no innate ideas, if we mean ideas present to the mind, and contemplated before they are excited by objects; but they are there though "latent and unproductive," and are there even before our existence in this world. Nature, however, has so ordained it, that they can only be excited by the impulse of objects upon our organs of sense." It should be noticed here, that notwithstanding the prominence given to it by {252} Locke, Lord Monboddo has no recognition of reflection or consciousness as a separate source of ideas.

He dwells with evident fondness on categories or universal forms. All things are to be known by their causes. The knowledge of first causes belongs to metaphysics. Every thing that is to be known falls under one or other of the categories. He shows that God must have ideas. Man is capable of forming ideas. Time is not a cause, but is a necessary adjunct or concomitant of the material world. If nothing existed, it is evident there could be no such thing as time. His definition of time does not make the subject much clearer, as it introduces the phrase duration, which needs explanation quite as much as time does: " it is the measure of the duration of things that exist in succession by the motion of the celestial bodies. Beings which suffer no change, neither in substance, qualities, nor energies, cannot be in time. Of this kind we conceive Divinity to be, and therefore he is not in time but in eternity." As to space, it is nothing actually, but it is something potentially; for it has the capacity of receiving body, "for which it furnishes room or place." Here it should be observed that room or place comes in to explain space, which is as clear as either room or place, -- which are, in, fact embraced in it. " Space has not the capacity of becoming any thing, but only of receiving any thing."

He represents Aristotle as saying that the beauty of nature consists in final causes, without which we can conceive no beauty in any thing. In expounding his own views, he tells us that in a single object there may be truth, but no beauty. In order to give beauty to truth, there must be " a system, of which the mind, perceiving the union, is at the same time struck with that most agreeable of all perceptions which we call beauty. And the greater the variety there is in this system, the greater the number of parts, the more various their connections and dependencies upon one another, the greater the beauty, provided the mind can distinctly comprehend the several parts in one united view." There must be some truth here, though it may not be the whole truth.

In vols. iii. and iv. he treats of man. This is the only part of his book fitted to excite an interest in these times. " It is surprising," he says, " that so little inquiry has been made concerning {253} the natural history of our own species." He then proceeds to divulge his own theory, which, in some respects, is an anticipation of the Darwinian. He maintains that man was at first a mere animal, that he walked on all fours, and that he possessed a tail, of which we discover the rudiments. There has been a progression in mankind from one stage to higher they erect themselves, they learn the use of their hands, and they learn to swim. They lived first on natural fruits as they presented themselves, and then learned hunting and fishing. Men were for a time solitary, and then came to herd together. He is not so trustworthy as Darwin in his facts: he tells us that there is a whole nation of Esquimaux with only one leg; that the one-eyed cyclops of Homer is not a mere fiction; that in Ethiopia men have only one eye, and this in their foreheads and he expresses his belief in mermaids.

But he detects far higher properties than the Darwinians have yet done. Man's mind was at first immersed in matter; but, by exerting its native power, it can act without the assistance of body, and transports itself into that ideal world which every man who believes in God must believe to be the archetype of this material world. But he insists that there has been a great degeneracy in the race, of which Moses' account of the fall of man is an allegorical version. Corruption of manners begins in every nation among the better sort, and from them descends to the people. He shows that there must be a total reformation of manners and morals; and, in doing so, be speaks of the effeminacy which has arisen from the use of clothes. But he is ever insisting on the difference between man and brute. The actions of man proceed from opinion, but not the actions of brutes. In the lower animals there is no consideration of means and ends. He finds one great difference in the circumstance that man is dissatisfied, envies, and repines, which the brute creatures never do.

In volume vi. he treats of the being of God. Nothing can exist without a cause. A first cause, therefore, is necessary, and he inquires into what must be the nature of the cause of the world. The cause must be self-existent,

necessarily existent, eternal, and unchangeable Of this nature must be the efficient cause of the world. But he agrees with Aristotle that there must also have been a natural cause from all eternity. In {254} his work on language he represents the theology of Plato as more sublime than that of Aristotle. The theology of Aristotle, so far as it goes, is a pure system of theism; but it is defective in two great points. First, the providence of God over all his works is not asserted; on the contrary, God is represented as passing his whole time in contemplation. Secondly, he does not make God the author of the material world, but only the mover; he does not derive from Him even the minds that animate this world.

His work on " The Origin and Progress of Language," in six vols. 8vo., is less important. Still, it contains some shrewd remarks. By language he means the expression of the conceptions of the mind by articulate sounds. He does not think that language is natural to man. Men came to invent articulate sounds by the imitation of other animals. A political state was necessary for the invention of language. He had evidently some acquaintance with the affinities of the Teutonic, Persian, Greek, and Latin. He represents the Hebrew, Phoenician, Syriac, and Chaldaic, as having also an affinity. He believes that there may also be an affinity between the two groups.

He corrects a very common misapprehension of his day as to abstract and general ideas. In his work on metaphysics: "Abstract ideas are different from general, though they be confounded by our modern philosophers; an idea must be first abstracted from the particular object from which it exists before it can be generalized." In his work on language, he shows that we may have a conception of a particular quality of any substance abstracted from its other qualities without averring such quality to belong to any other substance. " In order to form the general idea, a separation or discrimination is necessary of these qualities one from another; and this kind of abstraction I hold to be the first act of human intellect, and it is here the road parts betwixt us and the brute; for the brute perceives the thing and perceives the perception in his memory just as the object is presented by nature-that is, with all its several sensible qualities united; whereas the human intellect separates and discriminates and considers by itself the color, <e.g.>, without the figure, and the size without either." {255}

XXXII.-ADAM FERGUSON[73]

H/E\ was the son of Rev. Adam Ferguson, minister of the parish of Loarerait, Perthshire, and was born June 20, 1723. The Scottish ministers often belonged to good families in these times, and Carlyle describes Ferguson as the son of a Highland clergyman with good connections and a Highland pride and spirit. He received his early education partly from his father, partly at the parish school. We are ever discovering traces of the influence of the parish schools of Scotland in producing its great men. He afterwards went to the gram mar school of Perth, where he excelled in classics and the composition of essays, which has always had a high

place in Scotland, fostered by the very circumstance that boys had to unlearn the Scottish and learn the English tongue. Thence he resorted to the University of St. Andrews, where he graduated May 4, 1742, with a high reputation in classics, mathematics, and metaphysics. He now entered on the study of theology, first at St. Andrews, and then in Edinburgh, where he fell into the circle of Robertson, Blair, Wedderburn, and Carlyle, and joined them in forming a debating society. Before finishing his theological course, he was appointed deputy-chaplain of the Highland forty-second regiment, and was present at the battle of Fontenoy, where he went into action at the head of the attacking column with a drawn sword in his hand. His military career helped him afterwards to give accurate descriptions of battles in -- his "Roman History," and furnished him opportunities for studying human nature and politics. He never had any predilection for the clerical profession, and abandoned it altogether on the death of his father. After spending some time in Holland, as so many Scottish youths had done in the previous century, he returned to his old associates in Edinburgh, where he was appointed, in 1757, David Hume's successor as librarian and clerk in the Advocate's Library. He there became a member of the "Select Society" instituted {256} in 1754 by Allan Ramsay, and holding its meetings in one of the inner apartments of the library, for literary discussion, philosophical inquiry, and improvement in public speaking. Among its members were Hume, Robertson, Smith, John Home, Wilkie, Lord Hailes, Lord Monboddo, Sir John Dalrymple, and the elder Mr. Tytler, the men who constituted the bright literary constellation of their age and Country. This society declined after a time, but was renewed in 1762, under the name (at the suggestion of Ferguson) of the " Poker Club." Ferguson became involved in the controversy stirred by his friend Home writing the play of Douglas, and published " The Morality of Stage Plays seriously Considered." He seems to have left the office of librarian rather abruptly, being allured by an offer to become tutor to the sons of Lord Bute. By the influence of his friends he was made professor of natural philosophy in the University of Edinburgh in 1759, and David Hume remarked: "Ferguson had more genius than any of them, as he had made himself so much master of a difficult science, viz., natural philosophy, which he had never studied but when at college, in three months, so as to be able to teach it." In 1760, he was elected to an office more congenial to him, that of professor of pneumatics and moral philosophy, as successor to Mr. Balfour, who took the chair of the law of nature and nations. In less than two years he published his " Essay on the History of Civil Society," a work on which he had been engaged for a considerable time. It was conceived in the manner of Montesquieu, but dwelt on elements at work in the formation of civil society which the French author had overlooked. Part I. treats of the " General Characteristics of Human Nature." Works on social economy proceed very much on the principle that man is mainly swayed by a desire to promote his own interests, and they furnish no analysis of the other interests which men look to. They do not consider that man has social and conscientious feelings, by which many are influenced quite as much as by self-love; and that he is as often swayed by caprice, vanity, and passion, as by a cold-hearted

selfishness. Ferguson perceived this. Mankind, we are told, are devoted to interest, and this in all commercial nations is undoubtedly true. But it does not follow that they are by their natural dispositions averse to society and mutual affection. {257} Speaking of those who deny moral sentiment, he says that they are fond of detecting the fraud by which moral restraints have been imposed; "as if to censure a fraud were not already to take a part on the side of morality." "The foreigner who believed that Othello on the stage was enraged for the loss of his handkerchief was not more mistaken than the reasoner who imputes any of the more vehement passions of men to the impressions of mere profit or loss." So, after discussing the question of the state of nature, he treats of the principles of self-preservation, of union among mankind, of war and dissension, of intellectual powers, of moral sentiment, of happiness, of national felicity. In unfolding these, be insists that mankind should be studied in groups or in society. He then traces these principles in the history of rude nations, of policy and arts, the advancement of civil and commercial arts, the decline of nations, corruption of political slavery. The tone of the work is healthy and liberal, but is filled with common-place thought and observation. I find a sixth edition published in 1793. After this it was not much heard of The French Revolution gave men more earnest questions to think of. But these disquisitions, and still more effectively the publication of the " Wealth of Nations," in 1776, kindled a taste for social inquiries in the University of Edinburgh and in the capital of Scotland.

The smallness of his salary, only L100 a year, tempted him to undertake the charge of the education of Charles, Earl of Chesterfield, nephew to the earl who wrote on manners, and he had the benefit of a continental tour with his pupil. He waited upon Voltaire at Ferney, where, he tells us, " I encouraged every attempt at conversation, even jokes against Moses, Adam, and Eve, and the rest of the prophets, till I began to be considered as a person who, though true to my own faith, had no ill-humor to the freedom of fancy in others." His description is graphic: " I found the old man in a state of perfect indifference to all authors except two sorts, -- one, those who wrote panegyrics, and those who wrote invectives on himself. There is a third kind, whose names he has been used to repeat fifty or sixty years without knowing any thing of them, -- such as Locke, Boyle, Newton, &c. I forget his competitors for fame, of whom he is always either silent or speaks {258} slightingly. The fact is, that he reads little or none; his mind exists by reminiscence, and by doing over and over what it has been used to do, -- dictates tales, dissertations, and tragedies, even the latter with all his elegance, though not with all his former force. His conversation is among the pleasantest I ever met with. He lets you forget the superiority which the public opinion gives him, which is indeed greater than we conceive in this island." In consequence of his absence, the town council tried to turn Ferguson out of his office in Edinburgh, but he resisted at law, and returned to his duties in 1775.

He had evidently a strong inclination to active life, which might bring him into new scenes and situations

favorable to the study of character. So in 1778 he was appointed secretary to the commissioners appointed to discuss and settle the points in dispute between Great Britain and her American colonies. In New York the commissioners received a communication from Congress intimating that the only ground upon which they could enter on a treaty would be an acknowledgment of the independence of the States and the withdrawal of the British force from America. So he returns the following year to his professorial duties, which it is interesting to notice were performed during his absence by his pupil, Dugald Stew art. During these years he became involved in the controversy about the authenticity of the " Poems of Ossian," taking, as might be expected of a Highlander, the side of Mr. McPherson. He also took an active part in the formation of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, which originated very much with Principal Robertson, and was incorporated in 1783. He had long been engaged on the work by which he was best known in his own day, " The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic." Avoiding the early and disputed period of Roman history, and leaving the later period to Gibbon, he gives a clear and judicious account of the time which elapsed between 240 /A.U.C.| and the death of Tiberius. I am not sure that we have a better account of the republic, published prior to the investigations started by Niebuhr.

In 1766, he had published a short syllabus of his lectures, entitled "Analysis of Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy, for the use of Students in the College of Edinburgh." Using this as a text-book, he lectured to his class without writing out what {259} he said. He claims, however, that he bestowed his utmost diligence in studying the subject, including the order in which it was to be treated, and in preparing himself for every successive step he was to make in his course, but to have no more in writing than the heads or short notes from which he was to speak, preparing himself, however, very diligently for every particular day's work. When his health gave way, in 1781, he wrote out his course, and during his retirement corrected it for the press and published it in 1792: " Principles of Moral and Political Science; being chiefly a retrospect of Lectures delivered in the College of Edinburgh." He confesses that he is partial to the Stoic philosophy, and acknowledges his obligations to Shaftesbury, Montesquieu, Harris, and Hutcheson. The work is divided into two parts, -- the first relating to the fact of man's progressive nature; the second, to the principles of right, or the foundations of judgment and choice. The sources of knowledge are consciousness, perception, testimony, and inference. Consciousness is the first and most essential attribute of the mind. To other animals, appetite continues to be the sole motive to action; and the animal in every moment of time proceeds on the motive then present. But to man, the repeated experience of gratification and crosses, like the detail of particulars in any other, is matter of generalization; he collects from thence the predicaments of good and evil, and is affected towards any particular object according as he has referred it to the one or the other. In unfolding his views, he has important remarks on the purposes served by abstraction. " The abstract form of an

operation is a physical law, and its application the constituent of physical science. The abstract form and expression of what is excellent or good is a moral law and principle of moral science." But " to whatever object we incline, or however we may have classed individual things in our conception of what is good or evil, it is proper to remember in this place that every effort of the mind is also individual and particular, relating to an object in some particular and individual situation." There is a hint here of a distinction between governing principles in their individual exercise and in their abstract form fashioned by the logical understanding, which might have cleared up a vast amount of confused discussion, had he carried it out. He adds: " The more general character {260} of man's inclinations or active dispositions is not a blind propensity to the use of means, but instinctive intimation of an end for the attainment of which he is left to discover and to choose by his own observations and experience the means which may prove most effectual." He starts questions which had been discussed by Aristotle, but which had been lost sight of by modern moralists, as to the ends by which man is swayed, and the importance in ethics of considering means and end, and for this gets an occasional commendation from Sir W. Hamilton. Believing in the progression of man, he would set before him no meaner end than the attainment of perfection, and places in this the principle of moral approbation, and for this he receives the commendation of M. Cousin. " We find in his method the wisdom and circumspection of the Scottish school, with something more masculine and decisive in its results. The principle of <perfection> is a new one, at once more rational and comprehensive than benevolence and sympathy, and which, in our view, places Ferguson as a moralist above all his predecessors." He thinks that he embraces all moral systems in his own, admitting, with Hobbes and Hume' the power of self-interest or utility, Hutcheson's benevolence and Smith's sympathy,-all helping progression, and tending towards perfection. All this sounds very lofty, and contains important truth, as we should all aim at our own perfection and that of the race, but leaves the question unsettled, what is this perfection to be, -- a perfection in felicity, as the final end, or a perfection in moral good: and what is the nature and criterion of moral good?

Ferguson's style and manner are not so subdued as those of the Scottish metaphysicians who preceded him. He has more of a leaping mode of composition, as if he had an audience before him, and is at times eloquent or magniloquent. I have an idea that, as Dugald Stewart drew his philosophy mainly from Reid, so he got his taste for social studies from Ferguson, who may also have helped to give him a livelier style, -- the academic dignity, however, being entirely Stewart's own.

In 1785, he resigned his professorial labors. He passed the remainder of his life in retirement, residing in various places, and living till 22d June, 1816. The following pen-and-ink sketch of the old man by Lord Cockburn, in the " Memorials {261} of his Time," brings him vividly before us: "His hair was silky and white; his eyes animated and light-blue; his cheeks sprinkled with broken red, like autumnal

apples, but fresh and healthy; his lips thin, and the under one curled. A severe paralytic attack had reduced his animal vitality, though it left no external appearance, and he required considerable artificial heat. His raiment, therefore, consisted of half-boots, lined with fur cloth breeches; a long cloth waistcoat, with capacious pockets a single-breasted coat; a cloth greatcoat, also lined with fur; and a felt hat, commonly tied by a ribbon below the chin. His boots were black, but, with this exception, the whole coverings, including the hat, were of a quaker-gray color, or of a whitish-brown; and he generally wore the furred greatcoat even within doors. When he walked forth, he used a tall staff, which he commonly held at arm's-length out towards the right side; and his two coats, each buttoned by only the upper button, flowed open below, and exposed the whole of his curious and venerable figure. His gait and air were noble; his gesture slow; his look full of dignity and composed fire. He looked like a philosopher from Lapland." I never heard of his dining out except at his relation, Joseph Black's, where his son, Sir Adam (the friend of Scott), used to say "it was delightful to see the two rioting over a boiled turnip. Domestically, he was kind, but anxious and peppery." "He always locked the door of his study when he left it, and took the key in his pocket , and no housemaid got in till the accumulation of dust and rubbish made it impossible to put the evil day off any longer, and then woe on the family."

XXXIII.-JAMES HUTTON.

H/E\ was the son of a merchant in Edinburgh, was born June 3, 1726, studied first in his native city, then in Leyden, where he took the degree of M.D., and devoted his life to agricultural pursuits and scientific investigations in chemistry, mineralogy, and specially in geology. He died March 26, 1797. He is best known as the author of a " Theory of the Earth," which was expounded in a clear and elegant manner by Playfair. He accounts for the present condition of the earth by the operation of a central heat; and there was long a contest between his theory and that of Werner, {262} who explains the formation of strata by water; geologists now find place for both agencies. It is not so generally known that he found much satisfaction in the pursuit of metaphysics, and is author of an elaborate work in three large quarto volumes, " An Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, and of the Progress of Reason from Sense to Science and Philosophy." The work is full of awkwardly constructed sentences and of repetitions, and it is a weariness in the extreme to read it. Yet we are made to feel at times that these thoughts must be profound, if only we could understand them. He certainly speculates on recondite subjects, but does not throw much light on them. Knowledge is considered as consisting first of external information; secondly, of internal conception. In the first, mind is made to know no passion; in the second, it is made to known action." "Knowledge is no more the attribute of mind than mind is that of knowledge. We suppose that there is a substance called mind, and we then attribute knowledge to this substance; but knowledge is the very thing which in this case subsists. Space and time are conceptions of the

mind, founded upon activity and inactivity; that is to say, upon the volition of the mind, whereby either on the one hand action is produced that is change, or on the other hand inaction is ordained wherein the powers of the mind are preserved in a state of attention to the idea then in view." In his view of matter, he expounds a dynamical theory which becomes an ideal theory, closely approaching that of Berkeley. "There is no inert matter subsisting with magnitude and figure; but the external thing exists with moving and resisting powers." " Real solidity or impenetrability is truly a conception of our intellect, like that of equal lines and angles, but it is a supposition which nothing in nature authorizes us to make." " We deceive ourselves when we imagine that there is a subsisting independent of our thought, -- an external thing, which is actually extended and necessarily figured." " Figure is a thing formed in the mind alone, or produced by the proper action of our thinking substance." He says it is wrong to suppose that magnitude and figure subsist without our mind. He tells us that big theory agrees with that of Berkeley in this, that " figure and magnitude are not real and absolute qualities in external things; " but he holds that " there is truly an external existence as the cause of our knowledge," whereas Berkeley holds that there is no such external existence. We have here a view of matter very different from that of the Scottish school, who have commonly been inclined to the doctrine of Descartes. Metaphysical science will now have to set itself to determine what substantial truth there is in idealism, and, with the light of modern inquiries as to atoms, what truth there is in the dynamical theory of matter. {263}

XXXIV.-JOHN GREGORY.[74]

T/HE\ Gregorys are about as illustrious a family as Scotland has produced. Chalmers, in his " Biographical Dictionary," reckons no fewer than sixteen who have held British professorships. The founder of the family was James Gregory, the inventor of the reflecting telescope which bears his name. He became professor of mathematics in St. Andrew's, where he died in 1675, at the early age of thirty-six. He had a son James, who became professor of medicine in King's College, Aberdeen, and founded the school of medicine there. John, who merits a passing notice in our pages, was the son of this gentleman. He was born at Aberdeen in 1724, was educated there, occupied successively the chairs of philosophy and medicine, and, along with Reid, instituted the famous literary society. To this society he read essays, which were methodized and published in 1764, under the title, " Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man with those of the Animal World." He considers the condition of man in a state of society under three different aspects; (1) in a savage state, where be is distinguished by his corporeal powers; (2) when the social affections and the heroic virtues appear; (3) where men have the means of acquiring wealth. and seek refinement and luxury. In treating of these topics he offers many thoughtful reflections. He remarks that men of refined genius must live in a manner abstracted from the world, that hence they are liable to cherish envy and jealousy; so there is perhaps less real friendship among authors than among the rest of

mankind. " Certain it is, virtue, genius, beauty, wealth, power, and every natural advantage one can be possessed of, are usually mixed with some alloy, while disappointing the fond hopes of their raising the possessor to any uncommon degree of eminence, and even in some measure bring him down to the common level of his species." He dwells fondly on taste, and remarks, " wherever what is denominated a very correct taste is generally prevalent, genius and invention soon languish." In treating of religion, he exhibits the rising spirit of his age. " The articles of religious belief falling within the comprehension of mankind are few and simple, but have been erected by ingenious men into monstrous Systems of metaphysical subtlety." "Speculative and controversial theology injure both the temper and affections." In the same year he removed to the wider field offered in Edinburgh, and became one of the ornaments of the brilliant literary circle there. Two years after he was appointed professor of the practice of medicine in the university, and was a very popular teachers He published a number of medical works, and left behind him when he died in 1773 a work composed after he lost his wife, "A Father's Legacy to his Daughter." It is characterized by calm wisdom, often somewhat worldly, and for long bad a large circulation. " Be ever cautious in {264} displaying your good sense. It will be thought you assume a superiority over the rest of the company. But if you happen to have any learning, keep it a profound secret, especially from the men, who generally look with a jealous and malignant eye on a woman of great parts and a cultivated understanding."

XXXV.-JAMES GREGORY

J/AMES\ G/REGORY\, the third of this name, was the son and the successor in the chair of medicine in Edinburgh of John Gregory. He was born in Aberdeen in 1753, and died in 1821. For many years lie stood at the head of his profession as a physician in Edinburgh. He published a number of medical works. His " Conspectus Medicinae Theoreticae," written in good Latin, was long used as one of the works on which the candidates for medical degrees were examined. He comes before us as author of " Philosophical and Literary Essays," dated Jan. 1St, 1790, and published 1792. He dedicates the work to Reid, and acknowledges that lie had taken a principal argument from one of Reid's observations in the essays on the " Intellectual Powers of Man." The most important essay is " On the difference between the Relation of Motive and Action and that of Cause in Physics, on Physical and Mathematical Principles." In an introduction in which he is long in coming to the point, he dwells on the looseness and ambiguity of the word "cause," and remarks that if" there should be occasion to attend to the more minute or specific differences among the several things comprehended under the genus 'cause,' it would be highly expedient or rather absolutely necessary to give to each of them a specific name, were it only an addition to the generic name cause." He has a glimpse of there being more than one agent involved in cause. "No substance is of itself a physical cause; this depends on its relation to some other substance, and implies the tendency to change in the latter." " The substance in which the change is observed is

considered as the subject, the other as the cause; and as change occurs generally in both or all of the substances so related, though it be not always of the same kind in them all, it depends on the circumstance of our attention being directed first and chiefly to one or other of them, and on our opportunities of observing the changes that occur in them, which of them we shall regard as the subject and which as the cause, as in the example of the communication and the loss of motion, of mutual gravitation, of the solution of salt and saturation of water, the melting of ice, or the boiling of water and the absorption of heat." This is a vague anticipation of the doctrine started in our day as to their being two or more agents in all material causation, -- a doctrine, I may add, not yet followed out to its consequences in regard to mechanical, chemical, and physiological action. He insists that there is in mind a certain independent self-governing power which there is not in body; in consequence of which there is a great difference between the relation of motive and action and that of cause {265} and effect in physics; and by means of which a person in all cases may at his own discretion act, either according to or in opposition to any motive or combination of motives applied to him; while body in all cases irresistible undergoes the change corresponding to the cause or combination of causes applied to it. " I propose to demonstrate the falsity and absurdity of the doctrine of necessity on mathematical principles, in mathematical form, partly by means of algebraic formulae, partly with the help of diagrams," and he uses mathematical formulae and others invented by himself. He endeavors to show by an indirect demonstration that the doctrine of necessity must be false, as it leads to false conclusions. He takes the case of a porter carrying a burden: " If a guinea should be offered for carrying it in the direction of A B, and half a guinea for carrying it in the direction A C, and let him be assured that if lie can earn the guinea he cannot earn the half guinea, and that if he earn the half guinea he cannot earn the guinea; will he go in the direction of A B or A C, or remain at rest in A? " He answers, that if the principle on which the necessity is founded be true, he must move in the diagonal A D. " But as it must be acknowledged that the porter will not move in that direction, experience proving the fact, then it follows that the law of physical causes and that of motives do not coincide, and that the relation between motives and actions is not necessary as between physical causes and their effects." Dr. Crombie attacked Dr. Gregory's reasoning, Sir W. Hamilton says "with much acrimony and considerable acuteness." There subsequently appeared letters from Dr. James Gregory, of Edinburgh, in defence of his essay on the " Difference of the Relation between Motive and Action and that of Cause and Effect in Physics; with Replies by the Rev. Alexander Crombie, LL.D." London: 1819. " It is much to be regretted that Dr. Gregory did not find leisure to complete his answer to Messrs Crombie, Priestley, and Co., of which five hundred and twelve pages have been printed, but are still unpublished." (Coll. Works of Reid, by Hamilton. p. 87.) We are reminded that the clearest defence by Reid of the doctrine of the freedom of the will is contained in letters to Dr. Gregory, and published in Hamilton's edition of his works. At a time when the Calvinistic faith of Scotland might have led

theologians into perilous necessarian doctrines, it was of great moment to have the essential liberty of will (which Calvin never denied) defended by such philosophers as Reid and Gregory.

XXXVI. -- ALEXANDER CROMBIE.

H/E\ was born in Aberdeen in 1760, and lived till 1842 He became a Presbyterian minister in London, and a schoolmaster at Highgate and afterwards at Greenwich. He wrote a number of educational works of value, as " Etymology and Syntax of the English Language," and "Gymnasium sive Symbola Critica." He has two philosophical works, gone on " Philosophical Necessity," dated Newington Green, 1793, and another on "Natural Theology," in 1829. In the preface to the first of these works, he tells us {266} that he was initiated in the principles of moral science by Dr. Beattie; that when he was a student in divinity the question was debated in a theological society, " Is man a free or necessary agent? " that he was then attached to the libertarian system, and continued to be so till he read Priestley's " Illustrations; " and that he was confirmed in the change of view by Hartley's " Observations." He answers Gregory's argument and illustration quoted above: "This demonstration of the essayist's is founded in error. It proceeds on the supposition that the two motives are not directly but indirectly repugnant, which is obviously false; any reconciliation between them being absolutely impossible." " If a guinea is offered to carry a letter ten miles east, and another to carry a letter ten miles south; and if I know I cannot earn both; if I know also that by taking any intermediate road I shall receive nothing, -- then my situation is precisely the same as if the directions, instead of being eastward and southward, had been to points diametrically opposite." He admits "that a necessarian, consistently with his principles, cannot feel that remorse which is founded on the conviction that he has acted immorally, and might have acted otherwise; but by the law of his nature he feels pain from that state of mind which is connected with a vicious conduct." "A necessarian should feel no remorse, no painful sentiment for any past action, as he knows it was necessary for general happiness." The opponents of necessity argue that these are the logical consequences of the system, in order to land it in a <reductio ad absurdum>: but scarcely any of the defenders have allowed this. It is evident that the necessity he expounds is very different from that of Edwards. His work on "Natural Theology" is a clear and judicious one. He argues that no metaphysical argument such as Clarke's, and no metaphysical principle such as Reid's common sense, can of itself prove the existence of God. The question is " Are or are there not conclusive proofs in the phenomena of nature that they must be productions of an intelligent author? " " Wherever we find order and regularity obtaining, either uniformly or in a vast majority of instances, where the possibilities of disorder are indefinitely numerous, we are justified in inferring from this an intelligent cause." He argues against materialism, and in favor of the immateriality of the soul

XXXVII. -- ARCHIBALD ARTHUR.

H/E\ was born at Abbot's Inch in the parish of Renfrew in 1774 , and died in 1797. He became assistant and successor to Dr. Reid, in the chair of moral philosophy, in Glasgow. There is a posthumous volume by him, entitled " Discourses on Theological and Literary Subjects," 1803, edited by Professor Richardson, and containing an account of his life. His views do not seem profound or original, but his style is elegant, and he has some good remarks on cause and effect and on beauty. {267}

XXXVIII. -- JOHN BRUCE.

H/E\ was born in 1744, and died in 1826. He published a little book for the use of his students,-" First Principles of philosophy, by john Bruce, A.M., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh." It reached a second edition in 178 I-- It consists of mere notes or heads. Logic has a wide enough field: -- it is " the comprehensive science which explains the method of discovering and applying the laws of nature." He makes the sources of human knowledge to be sensation, understanding, and consciousness. He has another work, " Elements of the Science of Ethics, on the Principles of Natural Philosophy." He defines the moral faculty as " the power of perceiving the objects which regard the happiness or enjoyments of human nature." If we ask in what the physical law of gravitation consists, the answer is, in the uniformity of the effect in material nature. If we ask in what the moral law consists, the answer is, in the uniformity of the effect "that the observation of rights is the source of enjoyment." Mr. Bruce does not sound the depths of any subject of which he treats.

XXXIX-REVIEW OF THE CENTURY.

B/Y\ the close of the century, the fathers and elder sons of the family have passed away from the scene; and we may be profited by taking a glance at the work they have done. The Scottish metaphysicians have had an influence on their country, partly by their writings, but still more by the instruction which they imparted in the colleges to numerous pupils, afterwards filling important offices in various walks of life, and scattered all over the land. I cannot do better here than quote from the chapter in which M. Cousin closes his criticism of Reid. "By his excellencies as well as his defects, Reid represents Scotland in philosophy." "It would be impossible to write a history of Scotland in the last half of the eighteenth century, without meeting everywhere in the numerous and remarkable productions of the Scotch genius of this epoch, the noble spirit which that genius has excited, and which, in its turn, has communicated to it a new force. In face of the authority {268} of Hume, and despite the attacks of Priestley, the philosophy of common sense spread itself rapidly, from Aberdeen to Glasgow, and from Glasgow to Edinburgh; it penetrates into the universities, among the clergy, into the bar, among men of letters and men of the world; and, without producing a movement so vast as that of the German philosophy, it exercised an influence of the same

kind within narrower limits." We have the testimony of a succession of eminent men, to the effect that the chairs of mental philosophy, taken along with the essay writing which the professors holding these chairs demanded, exercised a greater influence than any others in the colleges and sent forth a body of youths capable of thinking, and of expressing their thoughts in a clear and orderly manner. From an old date, a reverence for the Roman law; and, at a later date, the judicial training of many youths in Holland had given a logical form to the pleadings at the Scottish bar, and the decisions of the bench: and now the philosophy widened the comprehension of the Edinburgh lawyers, and gave to their law papers a philosophical order scarcely to be found in those of England or Ireland.[75] The Scottish philosophy never attempted, as the German philosophy did (greatly to the injury of religion), to absorb theology into itself; but keeping to its own field, that of inductive psychology, it allowed the students to follow their own convictions, evangelical or rationalistic, but training all to a habit of skilful arrangement and exposition. It enabled and it led the theological professors to dwell on the relation between the truths of God's Word, and the fundamental principles of human nature; to lay a {269} deep and solid foundation for moral principle, to impart a moral tone to their teaching in divinity, and to expound, clearly and wisely, the arguments for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. In the pulpit, it produced a thoughtful style of address, of which English and Irish hearers were wont to complain, as requiring from them too great a strain of thought. It fostered a habit of reasoning and discussion among educated men generally; and, through the ministers of religion and the parochial teachers, -- not a few of whom were college bred, -- it descended to the common people as a general intelligence and independence of spirit.

On literature the influence of the Scottish has not been so great as that of the German philosophy; but still it has been considerable, and altogether beneficent. All the professors paid great attention to style: they weeded out their Scotticisms with excessive care not a few of them were teachers of rhetoric; they exacted essays on the subjects lectured on, and sent forth a body of pupils capable of writing clearly and easily. Every one who has read their writings notices a style common to the whole Aberdeen school: it consists of simple sentences without strength or genuine idiom, but always limpid, calm, and graceful. It is worthy of being mentioned that, in the last quarter of the century, Edinburgh had a distinguished literary circle: embracing the historian Robertson; the preacher Blair; Mackenzie, the author of " The Man of Feeling; " such scientific men as Hutton, Black, Playfair, the Monros (father and son), and Cullen with the Gregories -- , and among them the metaphysicians, Hume, Smith, Ferguson, Monboddo, and Dugald Stewart, held a prominent place.

It has to be allowed that the original genius of Scotland was riot called forth by the Scottish philosophy, nor, it may be added, by the Scottish colleges. The truth is, it is not the province of colleges, or of education even, to produce originality: their function is to guide and

refine it. Robert Burns owed little to school training, and nothing to college learning; still such a man, with so much profound sense mingling with lust and passion, could have appeared only in a state of society in which there was a large amount of intelligence. His father was a thoughtful man, with a considerable amount of reading, and {270} the mother's memory was filled with Scottish songs. After mingling in the literary circle of Edinburgh, he testifies that he had found as much intelligence and wit among the jolly bachelors of Tarbolton, as among the polished men of the capital.[76] It is to the credit of the Scottish metaphysicians,-- such as Lord Monboddo, Ferguson, and Stewart, -- that they paid the most delicate attention to the young poet when he came to Edinburgh in 1786. He strove to understand the Scottish metaphysics with {271} only imperfect success.[77] Alison's, "Essay on Taste" made known to him the theory which refers beauty to association of ideas, and Burns yields his theoretical assent, while evidently doubting inwardly. He writes: " That the martial clangor of a trumpet had something in it vastly more grand, heroic, and sublime, than the twingle-twangle of a jew's-harp; that the delicate texture of a rose-twig, when the half-blown flower is heavy with the tears of dawn, was infinitely more beautiful and elegant than the upright stalk of the burdock, and that from something innate, and independent of all association of ideas, -- these I had set down as irrefragable orthodox truths until perusing your book shook my faith." It is an interesting circumstance that young Walter Scott met with Burns in Edinburgh, in the house of Adam Ferguson, and was struck with his dark, expressive eye, and with his combined humor and pathos. Scott did not owe much more than Burns to the Scottish philosophy. But he was a pupil of Dugald Stewart's, and may have owed to him and his college training, that power of clear exposition and order by which his prose works are distinguished above those of most men of high imaginative genius.[78]

It may be interesting at this point to look across the channel, and inquire what philosophy was doing on the continent. I begin with that country which was the ancient ally of Scotland. Both the Scotch and French philosophies professed to draw much from Locke; but they seized on very different elements. The Scotch followed him in his cautious spirit and {272} careful observation, but withstood from the beginning the rash hypothesis which derived all our ideas from sensation and reflection; and they called in, besides the external and internal senses, other senses as inlets, and in the end came to look upon them as being exercises of reason.[79] The French looked exclusively at the other side of Locke's philosophy, at the experiential side, carrying Locke's theory a stage farther; they left out reflection, made little use of observation, betook themselves to analysis, and exerted their ingenuity to derive all ideas from sensation. Condillac (born 1715, died 1786), made all man's ideas, even the highest, such as cause and moral good, transformed sensations. Most of his works were written for the purpose of helping to educate a prince of Parma, and the author did not mean to undermine morality or religion. But the logical consequences of error follow it unrelentingly, and are apt to come out in practical issues which the authors of it never contemplated. If Condillac did not see,

those who came after him clearly perceived that we could not, out of the mere materials supplied by the senses, extract, by any mental chemistry, the idea of moral obligation and of a spiritual God. Helvetius expounded a morality of self-interest; Cabanis evolved all thought out of organized matter, made the brain secrete thought as the liver secretes bile; D'Holbach showed that the issue was blank atheism; and licentious men and women were rejoicing in the thought that they had got rid of duty, of mind, and of God. The fruit of the whole was seen, not in the French Revolution, which was much needed, and would have come, with or without the philosophy, -- but in the direction which it took, and the atrocities which it perpetrated, and which caused it, unlike the English and American revolutions, to issue in a military despotism. By the close of the century, this philosophy had gone beyond ripeness to rottenness, and finer minds were turning away from it, and seeking for something better. The reaction started by Laromiguierre, and carried on more effectively by Royer Collard, and yet more so by his pupils Jouffroy and {273} Cousin, turned eagerly, as we shall see, towards the well-rounded philosophy of Reid and Stewart.

In Germany, philosophy took a very different direction. Leibnitz had opposed Locke and his experiential method, and had imparted a speculative spirit and an ideal elevation to the German thinking; and Wolf had labored to reduce the whole to logical forms. And now, as the offspring of the two, of idealism and formalism, the true German philosophy came forth from the brain of Emmanuel Kant, who was born 1724, died 1804, and published his great work, the "Kritik der reine Vernunft" in 1781, which took a considerably revised form in 1787. That philosophy was already taking firm hold of the German mind, and has not at this day lost its grasp, notwithstanding the efforts of Darwinism and materialism to loosen it. As it differed from the French, so it also differed from the Scotch. In a sense, indeed, Kant's philosophy was transplanted from the Scottish soil. Kant's grandfather named Cant, a saddler, emigrated from Scotland;[80] I and some think that he thence derived hereditarily his high conception of moral law: and he acknowledges that he was roused from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume's sceptical account of the relation of cause and effect But Reid and Kant, though both opposed to Hume, took up very different lines of defence. In respect of method, Reid followed the inductive method, with self-consciousness as the instrument of observation; whereas Kant inaugurated the critical method, as distinguished from the dogmatic method of Descartes on the one hand, and the empirical method of Locke on the other. The critical method takes upon itself to criticise all principles; but it can do so only by other principles, {274} avowed, or more frequently unavowed, -- and the question is started: How are these other principles to be judged? by other principles, and these by other principles without end? Or, if we must stop somewhere, the question is, Where? and, Why there? Every German metaphysician plants himself on his own stand-point, which he says cannot be disputed: but his neighbor disputes it or selects another; and there is a perpetual criticism, and an endless building, but without an undisputed foundation. In one respect, indeed, the two, the Scotch and German

philosophies, were alike: both stood up for principles which did not derive their authority from experience. But the Scottish metaphysicians discovered these by a careful inquiry into the operations of the human mind; Kant, by a process of logical discussion. On another point they differed: the Scottish metaphysicians make our primitive perceptions or intuitions look at realities -- , whereas Kant stands up for <a priori> principles, which regulate experience and have only a subjective validity. Having allowed idealism to enter, there was no means of arresting its career. As Kant had made time and space, substance and cause, mere forms in the mind, Fichte was only advancing a few steps farther on the same road when he made the whole universe a projection of the mind -- , and, in the succeeding age, Schelling made it an intellectual intuition, and Hegel a logical process. Even as the French sensationalism led to atheism, so the German idealism culminated in pantheism. Every one will allow that the German philosophy had a much more elevated character, and a much more elevating tendency, than the French. Its influence on the great body of the German people may not have been so great as that of the Scottish philosophy on the Scottish thought. On the other hand, its influence has been vastly greater on literature, to which it has imparted a high ideal character, as seen especially in the poetry of Germany, and of other countries which have borrowed from it. {275}

XL.-DUGALD STEWART.[81]

D/UGALD\ S/TEWART\ was born in the old college buildings, Edinburgh, on November 22, 1753. His father was Dr. Matthew Stewart, at one time minister at Roseneath, and afterwards successor to Maclaurin in the mathematical chair in Edinburgh, and still known as one of those British mathematicians, who were applying, with great skill and beauty, the geometrical method, while the continental mathematicians were far outstripping them by seizing on the more powerful instrument of the calculus. His mother was the daughter of an Edinburgh writer to the signet. He was thus connected on the part of his father (and also of his grandfather, who had been minister of Rothesay), with the Presbyterian ministry, and on the part of his mother with the Edinburgh lawyers, -- the two classes which, next to the heritors, held the most influential position in Scotland.

Dugald was a feeble and delicate infant. He spent his boyish years partly in Edinburgh, and partly in the maternal mansion-house of Catrine, which I remember as being, when I paid pilgrimage thither many years ago, a whitewashed, broad-faced, common-place old house, situated very pleasantly in what Wordsworth calls expressively the "holms of bonnie Ayr," but unpleasantly near a cotton-mill and a thriving village, which, as they rose about 1792, destroyed to Stewart the charms of the place as a residence. Stewart entered, at the age of eight, the High School of Edinburgh, where he had, in the latter years of his attendance, Dr. Adam for his instructor, and where he was distinguished for the elegance of his translations, and early acquired that love for the prose and poetical works of ancient Rome which continued with him through life. He entered Edinburgh College in the session 1765-66; that is, in his thirteenth

year. I remember that Bacon, David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and many other original-minded men, entered college about the same age; and I am strengthened in the conviction that, in order to {276} the production of fresh and independent thought, it is of ad vantage to have the drilling in the ordinary elements all over at a comparatively early age, and then allow the mind, already well stocked with general knowledge, to turn its undivided energies to its favorite and evidently predestinated field; and that the modern English plan of continuing the routine discipline in classics or mathematics till the age of twenty-two, while well fitted to produce good technical scholars, is not so well calculated to raise up great reformers in method and execution. What the Scottish colleges have to deplore is not so much the juvenility of the entrants-though this has been carried to excess -- as the total want of a provision for bringing to a point, for carrying on, for consolidating and condensing the scattered education which has been so well begun in the several classes. But to return to the college youth, we find him attending, among other classes, that of logic under Stevenson, for two sessions; that of moral philosophy under Adam Ferguson -- , that of natural philosophy under Russell: and from all of these he received a stimulus and a bent which swayed him at the crisis of his being, and abode with him during the whole of his life.

After finishing his course in Edinburgh, he went to Glasgow in 1771, partly by the advice of Ferguson, that he might be under Dr. Thomas Reid, and partly with the view of being sent to Oxford on the Snell foundation, which has been of use to many students of Glasgow, but has in some respects been rather injurious to the college; as it has led many to ascribe to it the mere reflected glory of being a training-school to higher institutions, whereas Glasgow should assert of itself that it is prepared to give as high an education as can be had in any university in the world. The youth seems at this time to have had thoughts of entering the Church of England; and if he had gone south, he would no doubt, in that event, have discharged the duties of the episcopal office with great propriety and dignity. But a destiny better suited to his peculiar character and gifts was awaiting him. In the autumn of 1772 -- that is, when he was at the age of nineteen -- he became substitute for his father in the chair of mathematics in Edinburgh. It is precisely such an office as this, a tutorship or assistant professorship, that the Scottish colleges should provide for their {277} more promising students; an office not to be reserved for sons or personal friends of professors, but to be thrown open to public competition. This is the one thing needful to the Scottish universities, to enable them to complete the education which they commence so well, and to raise a body of learned youths, ready to compete with the tutors and fellows of Oxford and Cambridge. In 1775, Mr. Stewart was elected assistant and successor to his father; in 1778, on Professor Adam Ferguson going to America as secretary to a commission, he, upon a week's notice, lectured for him on morals; and, in 1785, Ferguson having resigned, Stewart was appointed to the office for which he was so specially fitted, -- to the chair of moral philosophy in the university of Edinburgh.

We pause in the narrative, in order to look at the circumstances which combined to influence the youth, to determine his career, and to fit him for the good work which he performed. First we have a mind, not certainly of bright original genius, or of great intellectual force, but with a blending of harmonious qualities, a capacity for inward reflection, and a disposition toward it, a fine taste, and consummate judgment. From his youth he breathed the air of a college. He was early introduced to Roman literature, and made it his model. Stevenson used Wynne's " Abridgment of Locke's Essay " as a text-book, and from it the student may have caught the fresh and observational spirit which Locke had awakened, while, at the same time, he was kept from what Cousin describes as the common defect of the British philosophy -- being "insular" by the other text-books employed, namely, the "Elementa Philosophiae" of Heineccius, and the " Determinationes Ontologicae " of De Vries; works which discussed, in a more abstract and scholastic method, the questions agitated on the continent posterior to the publication of the philosophy of Descartes. A still greater influence was exercised over the youth by Ferguson, who, with no great metaphysical ability, but in an altogether Roman and in a somewhat pagan manner, discussed, with great majesty and sweep, the topics -- of which the pupil was ever after so fond -- lying between mental science on the one hand, and jurisprudence on the other. From his own father and through his own academical teaching, he acquired a taste for the Geometrical method, so well fitted to {278} give clearness and coherency to thought, and to teach caution in deduction. He thus became one of those metaphysicians (and they are not few) who have been mathematicians likewise, in this respect resembling (no, to go back to Thales, Pythagoras, and Plato, in ancient times) Descartes, Leibnitz, Samuel Clarke, Reid, and Kant. In the class of natural philosophy he was introduced to the Newtonian physics, which had been taught at an early date in Scotland, and caught an enthusiastic affection for the inductive method and for Bacon, which continued with him through life, and is his characteristic among metaphysicians. But the teacher influencing him most, and, indeed, determining his whole philosophic career, was Thomas Reid, who, in a homely manner, but with unsurpassed shrewdness, and great independence and originality, was unfolding the principles of common sense, and thus laying a foundation for philosophy, while he undermined the scepticism of Hume. Stewart has found in Reid the model instructor, and it may be added that Reid has found in Stewart the model disciple. This whole course was an excellent training for a metaphysician: it would have been perfect if, along with his knowledge of natural philosophy, his somewhat dull apprehension had been whetted by an acquaintance -- such as that of Locke in an earlier, and that of Brown in a later age -- with the more fugitive and complicated phenomena of the physiology of the body; and if, in addition, his over-cautious temper had been raised heavenward by an intimacy with the lofty spirit of Plato, or, better still, by an appreciation of the deep theological discussions which had collected around them so much of the English and Scottish speculative intellect of the two preceding centuries.

Like every other man not altogether self-contained, Stewart must have felt the spirit of his age, which, as coming in from every quarter, like air and sunshine, commonly exercises a greater influence on young men than individual teachers can possibly do through the special channels open to them. Hume had stirred the thoughts of thinkers to their greatest depths; and this was now the age in which Hume had to be met. Stewart was born fourteen years after the publication of the great sceptical work of modern times, the "Treatise on Human Nature" and two years after the publication of the {279} work from which all modern utilitarianism has sprung, the "Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals." At the time when the youth was forming his convictions, Hume was living in Edinburgh, and the centre of an influence radiating round the man, who was a mixture of the lively, good-natured animal and of the intellectual giant, but with a terrible want of the high moral and spiritual. The original disposition of Stewart did not tempt him to daring speculation; his domestic training must have prepossessed him against infidelity; and he had been placed, in Glasgow, under the only opponent worthy of Hume, who had appeared; and so these earthquake shocks just made him look round for a means of settling fast the foundations of the temple of knowledge.

Locke's philosophy had been the reigning one for the last age or two. Mr. Vetch speaks of the " tradition of sensationalism, which the Scottish universities during the first half of the century, and up to the time of Reid, had in general dispensed in Scotland." This statement is too sweeping: for, first, Locke had given as high a place to reflection as to sensation; and, secondly, he had given a high office to intuition; while, thirdly, Locke's philosophy had not been received in Scotland without modification, or in its worst aspects, as it had been in France. Stewart, like Reid, entertained a high admiration of Locke, and was unwilling to separate from him, but he saw at the same time the defects of Locke, and that there were fundamental laws in the mind which Locke had overlooked, or only incidentally noticed. In Glasgow he must have felt the influence left behind by a train of eminent men. There Hutcheson had been the founder of the genuine Scottish school. In Glasgow, too, Adam Smith had expounded those original views which he afterwards published in his " Theory of Moral Sentiments " and his " Wealth of Nations." In order to estimate the character of the age, it must also be taken into account that there was a strong expectation that results were to follow, from the application of inductive science, to mental phenomena, similar to those which had flowed from its application to physics. Turnbull's aim was to " apply himself to the study of the human mind, in the same way as to that of the human body, or to any other part of natural philosophy." Catching this spirit, Reid was even now employing it to discover {280} principles deeper than any that had been systematically noticed by Locke, by Hutcheson, or any Scottish philosopher. To this same noble work Stewart now devoted himself; but seeking, meanwhile, to combine with the profound philosophy of Reid a literary excellence like that of Hume and Smith.

And this leads us to notice that we cannot form any

thing like an adequate idea of the influences which combined to mould the character of Stewart, who cultivated literature as eagerly as he did philosophy, without taking into account that he lived in an age of great literary revival in Scotland. The union between Scotland and England being now compacted, it was seen that the old Scottish dialect must gradually disappear; and ambitious youths were anxious to get rid of their northern idioms, and even grave seniors, including noblemen and dignified doctors, like Robertson (as we learn from Lord Campbell's "Life of Loughborough"), had formed a society, in order to be delivered from their Scottish pronunciation. A company of authors had sprung up, determined to assert their place among the classical writers of England; and this had been already allowed to Hume, to Robertson and Smith, and was being allowed to Beattie. Stewart had, no doubt, an ambition to take his place among the classical writers of Scotland.

While pursuing his studies at Glasgow, he read a paper on "Dreaming" before a literary society in connection with the university; and he subsequently read the same paper to a similar society in Edinburgh. The theory here started was afterwards embodied in his " Elements," and contains certainly not the whole truth on this mysterious subject, but still a truth, namely, that in dreaming the will is in abeyance, and the mind follows a spontaneous train. In the Edinburgh society he also read papers on " Taste," on " Cause and Effect," and " Scepticism." The fact that such topics were discussed is a sign of the spirit which prevailed among the youth of Scotland at that time. It is worthy of being noticed that at Glasgow he boarded in the same house with Mr. Alison, who afterwards, in his essay on " Taste," carried out the theory which had been started by Beattie in his " Dissertation on Imagination," as to the feeling of beauty being produced by the association of ideas.

Quitting his course of training, we may now view him as delivering his professorial lectures in the class-room in Edinburgh. {281} By far the liveliest account of him is by Lord Cockburn. It is worthy of being read again by those who may have seen it before.

> " He was about the middle size, weakly limbed, and with an appearance of feebleness which gave an air of delicacy to his gait and structure. His forehead was large and bald; his eyebrows busily; his eyes gray and intelligent, and capable of conveying any emotion from indignation to pity, form serene sense to hearty humor, in which they were powerfully aided by his lips, which, though rather large perhaps, were flexible and expressive. The voice was singularly pleasing; and, as he managed it, a slight burr only made its tones softer. His ear both for music and for speech was exquisite; and he was the finest reader I have ever heard. His gesture was simple and elegant, though not free from a tinge of professional formality, and his whole manner that of an academic gentleman.... He lectured standing, from notes which, with their successive additions, must, I suppose, at last have been nearly as full as his spoken words. His lecturing

manner was professorial, but gentlemanlike, calm and expository, but rising into greatness, or softening into tenderness, whenever his subject required it. A slight asthmatic tendency made him often clear his throat; and such was my admiration of the whole exhibition, that Macvey Napier told him not long ago that I had said there was eloquence in his very spitting, I Then,' said he, I am glad there was at least one thing in which I had no competitor.' . . To me, his lectures were like the opening of the heavens. I felt that I had a soul. His noble views, unfolded in glorious sentences, elevated me into a higher world."

There were hearers who felt that there was a want in his expositions, and there are readers still who feel in the same way. Ardent youths, like Brown and Chalmers, looked on him as timid and over-cautious. Chalmers wrote in 1801: " I attend his lectures regularly. I must confess I have been rather disappointed. I never heard a single discussion of Stewart's which made up one masterly and comprehensive whole. His lectures seem to me to be made up of detached hints and incomplete outlines, and he almost uniformly avoids every subject which involves any difficult discussion." Chalmers lived to proclaim him the highest of academic moralists. Still there was ground, in appearance and in reality, for the early criticism. In his writings he adopts the plan which Dr. Robertson took credit for introducing, that of throwing a great deal of his matter into notes and illustrations. This method, carried to the extent to which it has been done by Robertson, Stewart, and M'Crie, is a radically defective one, as it interrupts the flow of {282} the discourse, and, with this, the interest in and comprehension of the whole. He has a most sensitive aversion to all such bold speculations as Leibnitz indulged in, and is jealous of all such consecutive deductions as Descartes and Kant have drawn out. He has no ability for sharp analysis, and he looks on a high abstraction with as great terror as some men do on ghosts. He studiously avoids close discussion, and flinches from controversy; he seems afraid of fighting with an opponent, lest it should exhibit him in no seemly attitudes. Seldom does he venture on a bold assertion, and, when he does, he takes shelter immediately after behind an authority. Determined to sustain his dignity and keep up his flow of language, he often takes rounded sentences and paragraphs to bring out what a more direct mind would have expressed in a single clinching clause, or even by an expressive epithet. Often does the eager, ingenuous youth, in reading his pages, wish that he would but lay aside ceremony for a very little, and speak out frankly and heartily.

Still we should form a very unjust opinion of Stewart, if, in consequence of weaknesses, we thought him devoid of originality, independence, or profundity. We certainly do not claim for him the sagacity of Locke, or the speculative genius of Leibnitz, or a power of generalizing, details equal to Adam Smith, or the shrewdness of Reid, or the logical grasp of Kant and Hamilton, and I admit that he was inferior to all these men in originality; but he has admirable qualities of his own, in soundness of judgment he is more to be trusted than any of them; and, if he is

without some of their excellencies, he is also without some of their faults. He has no such rash and unmeasured diatribes as Locke's assault on innate ideas; no such extravagances as the monadical theory of Leibnitz; no such wasting of ingenuity as Smith's theory in his " Moral Sentiments; " he does not commit such gross misapprehensions in scholarship as Reid does; and he never allows any logic to conduct him to such preposterous conclusions as Kant and Hamilton landed themselves in, when they declared causation to be a law of thought and not of things. I have noticed that in many cases Stewart hides his originality as carefully as others boast of theirs. Often have I found, after going the round of philosophers in seeking light on some abstruse subject, that, on {283} turning to Stewart, his doctrine is, after all, the most profound, as it s the most judicious.

I do not mean to enter into the details of his remaining life. In 1783, he married a Miss Bannatyne of Glasgow, who died in 1787, leaving an only child, afterwards Colonel Stewart. He spent the summers of 1788 and 1789 on the Continent. In the appendix to the Memoir, there is a selection from the letters which he wrote to his friends at home. Though written in the midst of instructive scenes, and on the eve of great events, they are excessively general and common-place, and display no shrewdness of observation. In 1790, he married a daughter of Lord Cranston, a lady of high accomplishments, fascinating manners, and literary tastes. His house now became the resort of the best society of Edinburgh, and he himself the centre and bond of an accomplished circle, at a time when the metropolis of Scotland in the winter months was the residence of many of the principal Scottish families, and of persons of high literary and scientific eminence. The weekly reunions in his house, which happily blended the aristocracies of rank and letters, bringing together the peer and the unfriended scholar, were for many years the source of an influence that most beneficially affected the society of the capital. His influence was extended by his receiving into his house, as boarders, young men chiefly of rank and fortune. In his classes of moral philosophy and of political economy, he had under him a greater body of young men who afterwards distinguished themselves, than any other teacher that I can think of. Among them we have to place Lord Brougham, Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Francis Horner, Lord Lansdowne, Francis Jeffrey, Walter Scott, Sydney Smith, Thomas Brown, Thomas Chalmers, James Mill, Archibald Alison, and many others who have risen to great eminence in politics, in literature, or philosophy; and most of these have acknowledged the good which they derived from his lectures, while some of them have carried out in practical measures the principles which he inculcated. He seems, in particular, to have kindled a fine enthusiasm in the breast of Francis Horner, who ever speaks of him in terms of loftiest admiration, and, though cut off in early life, lived long enough to exhibit the high moral aims which he had imbibed from the lessons of Stewart. {284}

It was in 1792 that the first volume of his "Elements" was published. In 1793, appeared his " Outlines of Moral Philosophy," containing an epitome of the doctrines expanded

in his larger writings. His other works appeared after successive intervals: his Account of Adam Smith in 1793, of Robertson in 1796, and of Reid in 1802; his "Philosophical Essays" in 1810; the second volume of his "Elements" in 1814; the first part of his Dissertation, in 1815, and the second in 1821; the third volume of his "Elements" in 1827; and the "Active and Moral Powers" in 1828. The lectures on Political Economy, were not published till 1856.

In 1805, he threw himself, with more eagerness than he was wont to display in public matters, into the controversy which arose about the appointment of Leslie -- a man of high scientific eminence, but with a great deal of the gross animal in his nature-to the chair of mathematics. He wrote a pamphlet on the subject, and appeared in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, as a Presbyterian elder, to aid the evangelical party, who, under the leadership of Sir Henry Moncreiff, were no way inclined to join the moderate party in their attempt to keep out a distinguished man, because he entertained certain views on the subject of physical causation, and to retain the college chairs for themselves. In his speech on the occasion, Stewart does let out feeling for once, and it is mingled pride and scorn. " After having discharged for more than thirty years (not, I trust, without discredit to myself) the important duties of my academical station, I flatter myself that the House does not think it incumbent on me to descend to philosophical controversies with such antagonists. Such of the members, at least, as I have the honor to be known to, will not, I am confident, easily allow themselves to be persuaded that I would have committed myself rashly and wantonly on a question in which the highest interests of mankind are involved." In delivering the speech from which the above is an extract, he was called to order, and, not being accustomed to such handling, he sat down abruptly. The motion of Sir Henry Moncreiff was carried by a majority, which occasioned great joy to the Edinburgh Liberals, and helped to sever the connection between the universities and the church.

In 1806, the Whig party, being in power, procured for him a sinecure {285} office, entitled the writership of the "Edinburgh Gazette," with a salary Of 300l. a year. In 1809, he was in a precarious state of health, much aggravated by the death of a son by his second wife, and he asked Dr. Thomas Brown to lecture for him. In 1810, Brown, being strongly recommended to the Town Council by Stewart, was appointed conjoint professor, and henceforth discharged all the duties of the office. Brown never attacked Stewart, but he openly assailed Reid; and we suppose the intimacy between Stewart and Brown henceforth could not have been great. Stewart delivered his ultimate estimate of Brown in a note appended to the third volume of the " Elements." There is evidently keen feeling underlying it; but the criticism is, on the whole, a fair and just one. Stewart now lived, till the close of his life, at Kinniel House, Linlithgowshire, -- a residence placed at his service by the Duke of Hamilton Henceforth he was chiefly employed in maturing and arranging the philosophical works which he published. The details given of this part of his life are scanty and uninstructive. In 1820, he came forth to support Sir James Mackintosh as

successor to Brown; and when Sir James declined the office, Stewart recommended Sir William Hamilton, who seems ever afterwards to have cherished a feeling of gratitude towards Stewart. The election fell on Professor Wilson, who, while the fittest man living for the chair of rhetoric and belles-lettres, had no special qualifications for a chair of philosophy.

In 1822, Mr. Stewart had a stroke of paralysis, from which, however, he partially recovered. Mrs. Stewart describes him, in 1824, as troubled with a difficulty of speech, and a tremor in his hand, as walking two or three hours every day, as cheerful in his spirits, his mind as acute as ever, and as amusing himself with reading on his favorite pursuits, and with the classics. He had just given to the world his work on the "Active Powers," and was on a visit to a friend in Edinburgh, when he died on 11th June, 1828. He was buried in the family vault in the Canongate. There is a monument in honor of him on the Calton Hill; but the fittest memorial of him is to be found, first, in his pupils, who have done a good work in their day, and now in his writings, which may do a good work for ages to come. {286}

His collected works have been edited by Sir William Hamilton. The editor has not enriched it with such notes as he has appended to his edition of Reid, -- notes distinguished for the very qualities which Reid was deficient in, extensive scholarship and rigid analysis. Sir William Hamilton, in undertaking the work, stipulated that Mr. Stewart's writings should be published without note or comment. I rather think that Hamilton had not such a sympathy with the elegant and cautious disciple as with the shrewd and original master. Besides, elaborate notes to Stewart must have been very much a repetition of his notes to Reid. In this edition Hamilton is tempted at times to depart from his rule: he does give us a note or comment when the subject is a favorite one, such as the freedom of the will; and often must he have laid a restraint on himself, in not pruning or amending to a greater extent. .But the value of this edition consists in its being complete, in its having references supplied, and one index after another, and in its containing additions from Stewart's manuscripts, and these often of great value, both in themselves and as illustrating Stewart's philosophy. Sir William Hamilton was cut off before the edition was completed, but Mr. Vetch has carried on the work in the same manner and spirit. Having said so much of this fine edition, we must protest against the occasional translation of the language and views of Stewart into those of Hamilton, in places where it is purported to give us Stewart himself. Thus, in index, vol. iv., p. 408, Stewart is represented as, in a place referred to, discussing the question as to whether some of our notions be not " native or a priori," but, on looking up the page, no such language is used; and the same remark holds good of vol. v., P. 474, where Stewart is spoken of as describing our notions both of matter and mind as merely " phenomenal," a view thoroughly Kantian and Hamiltonian, and not sanctioned by Stewart. I must be allowed, also, to disapprove of the liberty taken with the " Outlines of Moral Philosophy," which is cut up into three parts, and appears

in three distinct volumes. This is the most condensed and direct of all Stewart's writings: it contains an abridgment of his whole doctrines; it is one of the best text-books ever written, and it should have appeared in its unity, as Stewart left it. {287}

I do not propose to criticise these ten massive volumes of his works. This would be a heavy work to my readers: it would almost be equivalent to a criticism of all modern philosophy. Nevertheless, I must touch on some topics of an interesting and important kind, as discussed by Stewart, and again discussed by later writers on mental science.

The first volume of the collected works contains the " Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical and Ethical Philosophy." I look upon it as the finest of the dissertations in the " Encyclopaedia Britannica " -- , and this is no mean praise, when we consider the number of eminent men who have written for that work. I regard it, indeed, as, upon the whole, the best dissertation which ever appeared in a philosophical serial. As a history of modern philosophy, especially of British philosophy, it has not been superseded, and, I believe, never will be set aside. It is pre-eminent for its fine literary taste, its high moral tone, its general accuracy, its comprehensiveness of survey, and its ripeness of wisdom. When we read it, we feel as if we were breathing a pure and healthy atmosphere, and that the whole spirit of the work is cheering, as being so full of hope in the progress of knowledge. Its critical strictures are ever candid, generally mild, very often just, and always worthy of being noted and pondered. The work is particularly pleasing in the account given of those who have contributed by their literary works to diffuse a taste for metaphysical studies, such as Montaigne, Bayle, Fontenelle, and Addison. It should be admitted that the author has scarcely done justice to Grotius, and failed to fathom the depth of such minds as Leibnitz and Jonathan Edwards. I agree, moreover, with those who regret that he should ever have been tempted to enter on a criticism of Kant, whose works he knew only from translations and imperfect compends.

The next three volumes contain the" Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," and are introduced by a portion of the " Outlines of Moral Philosophy." In the first volume of the "Elements" and in the opening of the second, he spreads out before us a classification of the intellectual powers, -- as perception, attention, conception, abstraction, association of ideas, memory, imagination, and reason. The list is at once defective and redundant. Stewart acknowledges self-consciousness, {288} which is an inseparable concomitant of all the present operations of the mind, to be a separate attribute; and in this he seems to be right, inasmuch as it looks at a special object, namely, self in the existing state, and gives us a distinct class of ideas, namely, the qualities of self, such as thinking and feeling. Yet it is curious that, while he gives it half a page in his " Outlines," it has no separate place in the "Elements." It is also a singular circumstance that Reid dismisses it in the same summary way. An inductive observation, with an analysis of the precise knowledge given us by self-consciousness, would give a solid foundation for

the doctrine of human personality, and clear away the greater part of the confusion and error lingering in the metaphysics of our day. Nor is there any proper account given in the " Elements " of that important group of faculties which discover relations among the objects known by sense-perception and consciousness. The omission of this class of attributes has led him into a meagre nominalism, very unlike the general spirit 'of his philosophy. He restricts the word conception to the mere imaging power of the mind, and even to the picturing of bodily objects, as if we could not represent mental objects as well, as, for example, ourselves or others in joy or sorrow. In a later age, Hamilton has confined the term in an opposite direction to the logical or general notion. Stewart's classification is also redundant. Attention is not a separate faculty, but is an exercise of will, roused, it may be, by feeling, and fixing the mind on a present object. He does not seem to know what to make of reason as a distinct faculty; and, as defined by him, it ought to include abstraction, which is certainly a rational exercise. But, if the work is defective in logical grasp, it excels in its descriptions of concrete operations, and in its explanations and elucidations of phenomena presenting themselves in real life. All his works are replete with those "intermediate axioms " which Bacon commends as most useful of all, as being removed equally from the lowest axioms, which differ but little from particulars, and from the highest and most general, which are notional, abstract, and of no weight; whereas the " intermediate are true, solid, full of life, and upon them depend the business and fortune of mankind." The fine reflection and lofty eloquence of Stewart come out most pleasingly and instructively {289} in all those passages in which he treats of association and imagination.

On one important point, discussed frequently in the " Elements," the school of Reid and Stewart was led into error by their excessive caution, and by being awed so much by the authority of Locke. Reid maintained in a loose way, that we do not know substance, but qualities; and Stewart wrought this view into a system. We are not, he says, properly speaking, conscious of self or the existence of self: we are conscious merely of a sensation or some other quality, which, by a <subsequent suggestion of the understanding>, leads to a belief in that which exercises the quality. -- (" Phil. Essays," P. 58, etc.) This I must regard as a radically defective doctrine. We do not know intuitively a quality of self apart from self; we know both in one primitive, concrete act, and it is only by a subsequent operation that we separate in thought the quality which may change in its action from the self or substance which abideth. Descartes erred I think, when he represented the mental process as being "<cogito, ergo sum>:" the primitive cognition is of the ego cogitans. But I look on Stewart as equally erring when he says, that there is first a sensation and then a belief in self. In a later age, Sir William Hamilton connected the <qualitative> theory of Stewart with the <phenomenal> theory of Kant. In doing so he was guilty, I must take the liberty of saying of a great and inexcusable blunder. Stewart would have repudiated the phenomenal theory of Kant as at all identical with his own. Stewart, no doubt, speaks of the phenomena of the mind; but he means by

phenomena not, as Kant did, <appearances>, but individual <facts> to be referred to a law; and qualities with him were realities. But, legitimately or illegitimately, Hamilton identifying the qualitative theory with the phenomenal, deduces from them a system of relativity, which ended in nihilism, or at least in nescience. I am glad to notice that Mr. Mansel, notwithstanding his great and just admiration of Hamilton, has emancipated himself from this fundamental error. He proclaims, " I am immediately conscious of myself, seeing and hearing, willing and thinking." -- (" Proleg. Logica," P. 129; also Art. <Metaph.> in " Encyc. Brit."'. I have sometimes thought that, if Stewart had foreseen ail the logical consequences to be deduced from his views, he would have fallen {290} back on the same common-sense doctrine. I regret that Mr. Mansel has not gone a step farther, and placed our cognition of matter on the same footing in this respect as our knowledge of mind. I am sure, at least, that this would be altogether in the spirit of Reid and Stewart. I maintain that, just as by self-consciousness we know self as exercising such and such a quality, say thinking or feeling, so, by sense-perception, we know a body as extended and exercising power or energy. This is the simplest doctrine: it seems to be the only one consistent with consciousness, and is the proper doctrine of natural realism as distinguished from an artificial system of relativity.

In the second volume of the " Elements," after a feeble and chiefly verbal disquisition on reason, he proceeds to treat of the "fundamental laws of belief." I reckon the phrase a very happy one, and a great improvement on "common sense," which labors under the disadvantage of being ambitious; inasmuch as it usually denotes that unbought, untaught sagacity, which is found only in certain men, and which others can never acquire, whereas it can be admitted into philosophical discussion only when it denotes principles which are regulating the minds of all. I have a remark to make as to the place in which he discusses these fundamental laws. It is after he has gone over the greater number of the faculties, and he seems to treat them as involved in reason. And I acknowledge that there may be some advantages in first going over the faculties and then speaking of these fundamental laws. But we must guard against the idea that these principles are not involved in the faculties which he has previously gone over; such as, perception, abstraction, and memory. The "fundamental laws" are not to be regarded as different from the faculties: they are, in fact, the necessary laws of the faculties, and guiding their exercise. These laws work in all minds, infant and mature, sane and insane. M. Morel was asked to examine a prisoner who seemed to be deranged, and he asked him how old he was; to which the prisoner replied: " 245 francs, 35 centimes, 124 carriages," etc. To the same question, more distinctly asked, he replied,: " 5 metres, 75 centimetres." When asked how long he had been deranged, he answered: "Cats, always cats." M. Morel at once declared his madness {291} to be simulated, and states: " In their extreme aberrations, in their most furious delirium, madmen do not confound what it is impossible for the most extravagant logic to confound. There is no madman who loses the idea of cause, of substance, of existence." (See " Psychol. Journal," Oct. 1857.)

Stewart's doctrine of causation seems to me to be deficient and inadequate. He is altogether right in calling it a fundamental law of belief, which necessitates the mind to rise from an effect to a cause. But he does not seem to observe all that is involved in the cause. He gives in too far to Hume on this subject, and prepares the way for Brown's theory. He does not see, in particular, that causation springs from power being in the substance or substances which act as the cause, and that we intuitively discover power to be in substances both mental and material. His distinction between efficient and physical cause is of a superficial and confused character. It may be all true that, in looking at physical action, we may not know intuitively where the full efficiency resides, whether in the physical object alone or in mind (the divine) acting in it; but we are certain that there is an efficiency somewhere in some substance. I am by no means sure that he is right in limiting power in the sense of efficiency to mental action. I agree here with the criticisms of Cousin (as indeed I agree with most of the criticisms of Cousin on the Scottish school) where he says that, while our first idea of cause may be derived from our own voluntary action, we are at the same time intuitively led to ascribe potency to other objects also -- , and that Reid and Stewart, in denying that we discover efficiency in body, are acting contrary to their own principles of common sense, and in contradiction to the universal opinion of the human race, which is, that fire burns and light shines. (See Cousin, " Phil. Ecoss.," P. 437, ed. 1857.) Stewart has also failed, as it appears to me, to give the proper account of the intuition which regulates and underlies our investigations of nature. This is not, as he represents it, a belief in the uniformity of nature; a belief which appears to me to be the result of experience, which experience, as it discovers the rule, may also announce the exceptions. The child does not believe, nor does the savage believe, nature to be uniform. The underlying beliefs, which carry us on in our investigations of nature are those of identity, {292} of being, of substance and quality, of cause and effect. Hence it is quite possible to prove a miracle which may not be in conformity with the uniformity of nature, but is quite compatible, as Brown has shown, with our intuitive belief in causation for when creature power fails we can believe in creative.

It is in the second volume of the " Elements " that we find the logical disquisitions of Stewart. He has utterly failed in his strictures on Aristotle's logic. The school of Locke, and the school of Condillac, and the school of Reid, have all failed in constructing a logic of inference which can stand a sifting examination. The Aristotelian analysis of reasoning stands at this moment untouched in its radical positions. The objections of Campbell and Stewart have been answered by Whately, who shows that the syllogism is not a new or peculiar mode of reasoning, but an analytic of the process which passes through the mind when it reasons. In giving an adherence to the Aristotelian analysis, I admit that improvements were wrought in it by that school of logicians which has sprung from Kant, and of which Hamilton was the leader in Great Britain, followed by such eminent

men as Mansel, Thomson, and Spalding. But their improvements ought not to be admitted till the formal logicians thoroughly deliver their exposition of the laws of thought from all that false Kantian metaphysics which represents thought as giving to the objects a " form " which is not in the objects themselves. Besides, I cannot allow logic to be an <a priori> science except under an explanation: I admit that the laws of thought operate in the mind prior to all experience; but I maintain that they can be discovered by us only <a posteriori>, and by a generalization of their individual actings.

But while we may thus expect a perfected universal logic, treating of the laws of thought as laws of thought, -- not independent of objects, but whatever be the objects, -- I hope there will grow up alongside a particular logic, which will be a more practically useful logic, to consider the laws of thought as directed to particular classes of objects, and to treat of such topics as demonstrative and probable evidence, induction, and analogy. In regard to this latter logic, Stewart must ever be referred to as an authority. So far, indeed, as the theory of definitions and axioms is concerned, I prefer very much the view of Whewell, as developed in his " Philosophy of the Inductive {293} Sciences." But, in regard to induction, I believe that Stewart's account of it is, upon the whole, the best which appeared from the time of Bacon down to his own age. Since his time, we have two great works, which have left every other far behind, -- that of Whewell and that of Mr. John Stuart Mill. Not that I regard either of these as perfect. Dr. Whewell has exaggerated the place of the mental element, and has expressed it in most unfortunate phraseology, such as " fundamental ideas " and " conceptions," terms which have been used in twenty different significations, and are used by him to denote that the mind superinduces on the facts something not in the facts, whereas the mental power merely discovers what is in the facts. Mr. Mill, on the other hand, has overlooked the mental element altogether, and denies all necessary and universal truth. We may hope, in future years, to have a perfect inductive logic by a judicious combination of these two works but this can be done only by a man of the same high intellectual stature as Whewell and Mill, and this will seldom be met with. It is to be regretted that, since the days of Stew art, there is not a single Scotchman who has presented a work on induction, of any name or value.[82] In regard to analogy, the discoveries as to the typical forms of animals and plants and evolution will enable logicians to give a far more comprehensive and yet more stringent view of reasoning from analogy than has been done by Stewart, by Whewell, or by Mill.

The third volume of the " Elements " treats of certain concrete and practical matters, which Stewart was peculiarly qualified to discuss, and which bring out some of the finer qualities of his mind. All his disquisitions had tended to become verbal; and here he treats expressly of languages which he does with fine discernment, but falls into a great blunder in regard to {294} Sanscrit, which he represents as of comparatively late origin, and analogous to mediaeval Latin, whereas it has a literature reaching back at least twelve hundred years before Christ. He has some interesting,

though by no means profound, remarks on the sympathetic affections. But by far the finest parts of the volume are those in which he treats of the varieties of intellectual character, and of the peculiarities of the metaphysician, the mathematician, the poet, and the sexes. Thus, of the mere metaphysician, he says, that, " he cannot easily submit to the task of examining details, or of ascertaining facts, and is apt to seize on a few <data> as first principles, following them out boldly to their remotest consequences, and afterwards employing his ingenuity to reconcile, by means of false refinements, his theoretical assumptions with the exceptions which seem to contradict them." He shows that the metaphysician is safe from the checks met with in physics, "where speculative mistakes are contradicted by facts which strike our senses." Again, of mathematics, he says, " that, while they increase the faculty of reasoning or deduction, they give no employment to the other powers of the understanding concerned in the investigation of truth." He adds: " I have never met a mere mathematician who was not credulous to excess."

In the same volume he discusses cautiously and judiciously the comparison between the faculties of man and brutes. I suspect, however, that the theory has not yet been devised it has certainly not been published -- which is fitted to give a satisfactory account of the relation of the brute to the human faculties. I suppose that Bonnet is right when he says that we shall never be able to understand the nature of brute instinct, till we are in the dog's head without being the dog. It is certain that we have at this moment nothing deserving of the name of science on this subject. I have sometimes thought that the modern doctrine of homologues and analogues, if extended and modified to suit the new object, might supply the key to enable us to express some of the facts. Certain of the brute qualities are merely analogous to those of man (as the wing of a butterfly is analogous to that of a bird); others are homologues, but inferior in degree; while there are qualities in man different in kind from any, in the brute. Aristotle called brute instincts, [Greek quote]. They would be more accurately described as anticipations or types of the coming archetype. {295} The volume closes with an account of James Mitchell, a boy born blind and dumb.

The " Philosophical Essays " are an episode in his system as a whole, even as his numerous notes and illustrations are episodes in the individual volumes. I am tempted, in looking at them, to take up two of the subjects discussed, as a deep interest still collects around them, and the questions agitated cannot yet be regarded as settled.

Every careful reader of Locke's "Essay" must have observed two elements running through all his philosophy, -- the one, a sensational, or rather to do justice to Locke, who ever refers to reflection as a separate source of ideas, an experiential element, and the other a rational. In the opening of the " Essay" he denies innate ideas apparently in every sense, and affirms that the materials of all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection; but, as he advances, his language is, that by these sources ideas are

"suggested and furnished to the mind" (the language adopted by Reid and Stewart); he calls in faculties with high functions to work on the materials; speaks of ideas which are "creatures and inventions of the understanding;" appeals to "natural law" and the "principles of common reason; "and in the Fourth Book gives a very high, or rather deep, place to intuition; says we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence; speaks of the " mind perceiving truth as the eye doth light, only by being directed toward it;" declares that, in the "discovery of and assent to these truths, there is no use of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are known by a superior and higher degree of evidence," and talks even of a " necessary connection of ideas." It unfortunately happened that in France, to which Locke was introduced by Voltaire and the encyclopedists, they took the sensational element alone, and the effect on thought and on morality was most disastrous. Unfortunately, too, Locke has become known in Germany, chiefly through France, and hence we find him, all over the Continent, described both by friends and foes as a sensational 1st; and the charge has been re-echoed in Great Britain by Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Morell. Yet it is quite certain that Locke has an intellectual as well as a sensational side.[83] I have, {296} in a careful perusal of the "Essay," mainly for this very end, discovered in every book, and in the majority even of the chapters, both sides of the shield; but I confess that I have not been able to discover the line that joins them. I do not think that Stewart's remarks on this subject are exhaustive or decisive: he is evidently wrong in supposing that Locke identified reflection with the reason which discovers truth, but his strictures are always candid and sometimes just.

In the "Philosophical Essays," Stewart has many fine observations on taste and beauty. On this subject he was favorably disposed towards the theory of his friend Mr. Alison, and he ascribes more than he should have done to the association of ideas. But he never gave his adhesion to this hypothesis as a full explanation of the phenomena. " If there was nothing," he says, " originally and intrinsically pleasing or beautiful, the associating principle would have no materials on which it could operate." The theory of association was never favorably received by artists, and has been abandoned by all metaphysicians. The tendency now is to return to the deeper views which had been expounded long ago by Plato, and, I may add, by Augustine. I find that Stewart refers to the doctrine of Augustine, who " represents beauty as consisting in that relation of the parts of a whole to each other which constitutes its unity;" and all that he has to say of it is: "The theory certainly is not of great value, but the attempt is curious." The aesthetical writers of our age would be inclined to say of it that there is more truth in it than in all the speculations of Alison, Stewart, Jeffrey, and Brown. It may be safely said that, while earnest inquirers have had pleasant glimpses of beauty, to no one has she revealed her full charms. When such writers as Cousin, Ruskin, and Macvicar dwell so much on unity, harmony, proportion, I am tempted to ask them: Does then the feeling of beauty not arise till we have discovered such qualities as proportion, unity, and harmony? And if they answer in the affirmative, then I venture to show them that

they are themselves holding a sort of association theory; for they affirm that the beautiful object does not excite emotion till, as a sign, it calls forth certain ideas, -- I suspect of truth and goodness. I am not quite sure that we can go the length of this school, when they speak of beauty as a quality necessary, immutable, eternal, like {297} truth and moral good, and connect it so essentially with the very nature of God. There are sounds and colors and proportions felt to be beautiful by us, but which may not be appreciated by other intelligences, and which are so relished by us, simply because of the peculiarities of our human organization and constitution. I acknowledge that, when we follow these colors and sounds and proportions sufficiently far, we come in variably to mathematical ratios and relations; but we are now, be it observed, in the region of immutable truth. Other kinds of beauty, arising from the contemplation of happiness and feeling, land us in the moral good, which is also necessary and eternal. I have sometimes thought that beauty is a gorgeous robe spread over certain portions of the true and the good, to recommend them to our regards and cluster our affections round them. Our aesthetic emotions being thus roused, the association of ideas comes in merely as a secondary agent to prolong and intensify the feeling.

The two volumes on the "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers " were published by Stewart immediately before his death. The leading ideas unfolded in them had been given, in an epitomized form, in the "Outlines," published many years before. They are somewhat too bulky for all the matter they contain, and they want somewhat of the freshness of his earlier works; but they are characterized by profound wisdom, by a high moral tone, by a stately eloquence, and the felicitous application of general principles to the elucidation of practical points. He begins with the instinctive principles of action, which he classifies as appetites, desires, and affections. The arrangement is good in some respects, but is by no means exhaustive. As the next step in advance in this department of mental science, an attempt must be made to give a classification of man's motive principles, or of the ends by which man may be swayed in desire and action. Among these will fall to be placed, first of all pleasure and pain; that is, man has a natural disposition to take to pleasure and avoid pain. But this is far from being the sole motive principle in man's mind. There are many others. There is, for example, the tendency of every native faculty to act, and this irrespective of pleasure or pain. Again, there are particular natural appetencies, which look to ends of their own, towards (to use the language {298} of Butler) particular external things of which the mind hath always a particular idea or perception, towards these things themselves, such as knowledge, power, fame, and this independent of the pleasure to be derived from them. Higher than all, and claiming to be higher, is the moral motive, or obligation to do right. A classification of these motive principles, even though only approximately correct, would serve most important purposes in philosophy generally, and more especially in ethics and all the social sciences. Very low and inadequate views have been taken of these motive principles of humanity, especially by those who represent man as capable of being

swayed only by the prospect of securing pleasure or avoiding pain. It should never be forgotten, that the emotive part of man's nature may be excited by a great many other objects as well as pleasure and pain, by all the objects, indeed, which are addressed to the motive principles of man. It is the apprehension of objects as about to gratify the motive principles of the mind -- whatever they be -- which stirs up the emotions. Thus, the apprehension of a coming object, which is to gratify a motive principle, excites hope, which is strong in proportion to the strength of the apprehension, and the strength of the particular motive principle; while the apprehension of a coming object, which is to disappoint this motive principle, stirs up fear. It is strange that Stewart nowhere treats of the emotions in his " Philosophy of the Active Powers."

Stewart's view of the moral power in man, and of moral good, seems to me to be substantially correct. In treating of these subjects, he avows his obligations to Butler and Price. His doctrine has been adopted, with some modifications, which are improvements, by Cousin. Stewart and Cousin are the most elevated of all the moralists who treat of ethics on grounds independent of the Word of God. I am convinced that they never could have given so pure a morality, had they not lived in the midst of light shed abroad on our earth by a super natural religion. I have always felt it to be a strange circumstance, that Stewart and Cousin, in giving so high a view of the moral faculty, are never led to acknowledge that it condemns the possessor; and after presenting moral good in so rigid a form, are not constrained to acknowledge that the moral law has not been kept by man. Taking their own high principles {299} along with them, neither could have looked within, without discovering sin to be quite as much a reality as virtue. Stewart could not have gone out of his dwelling in the old College or the Canongate, nor could Cousin have gone out of his chambers in the Sorbonne, without being obliged to observe how far man and woman have fallen beneath the ideal picture which they have drawn in their lectures. At the very time when the Scottish metaphysicians were discoursing so beautifully of moral virtue, there was a population springing up around their very colleges in Edinburgh and Glasgow, sunk in vice and degradation, which appalled the good men of the next age the age of Chalmers -- to contemplate, which the men of this age know not how to grapple with, and which is not to be arrested by any remedy which the mere philosophic moralists have propounded. I acknowledge most fully, that Stewart's lectures and writings have tended, directly or indirectly, to carry several important measures which are calculated to elevate the condition of mankind, such as reform in the legislature, prison improvement, and the abolition of tests and of restrictions on commerce. But the institutions which aim at lessening the sin and misery of the outcast and degraded such as missions, ragged schools, and reformatories, -- have proceeded from very different influences; and a philosophy embracing the facts which they contemplate, must dive deeper into human nature, and probe its actual condition more faithfully, than the academic moralists of Scotland ever ventured to do.

It is very evident that the Scottish academic metaphysicians of last century, while they pay a dignified respect to Christianity, have not identified themselves with its profound peculiarities. Without meaning to excuse this deficiency, I may yet affirm that some incidental advantages have sprung from this <reticence>. It was certainly better that they should have kept at a respectful distance from Christianity, than that they should have approached it only, like the great German metaphysical systems, to set all its truths in rigid philosophic framework, -- to absorb them all within themselves, as by a devouring flame. But the peculiar advantage arising from their method consists in this, that they have, by induction, established a body of ethical truth on grounds independent of revealed {300} religion; and this can now be appealed to in all defences of Christianity, and as an evidence of the need of something which philosophy is incompetent to supply. Divines can now found on those great truths which the Scottish philosophers have established, as to there being a distinct moral faculty and an immutable moral law, and then press on those whose conscience tells them that they have broken that law, to embrace the provision which revelation has made to meet the wants of humanity.

The space which I have occupied with the " Mental and Moral Philosophy" precludes me from entering on the two volumes of " Political Economy," published partly from manuscripts left by Stewart himself, and partly from notes by pupils. The views expounded will scarcely be regarded as much advancing the science in the present day; but they did good service when delivered for twenty years in lectures. They are still worthy of being looked at on special topics; they may form an interesting chapter in the history of the literature of political economy, and they illustrate the character of Stewart's intellect and philosophy.

An estimate of the influence which has been exercised by Stewart may form an appropriate close to this article.

In Scotland, he increased the reputation of the Edinburgh University. Horner speaks of " many young Englishmen who had come to Edinburgh to finish their education," and not a few of these had been attracted by Stewart. He has had a greater influence than perhaps any other, in diffusing through out Scotland a taste for mental and moral science. I have referred to the power exercised on him by Reid; but, if Stewart owed much to Reid, Reid owed nearly as much to his grateful pupil, who finished and adorned the work of his master, and by his classical taste has recommended the common-sense philosophy to many who would have turned away with disdain from the simpler manner of Reid. And here I am tempted to give utterance to the feeling, that Reid has been peculiarly fortunate in those who have attached themselves to his school. If Stewart helped to introduce Reid to polite society, Sir William Hamilton, by his unmatched logic and vast erudition, has compelled philosophers to give him -- notwithstanding the some what untechnical character of his writings -- a place in their {301} privileged circle. By his expositions of Reid, and his own in dependent labors, Mr. Stewart aided in throwing back a tide of scepticism: -- which had appeared in

France in the previous century; in England toward the beginning of the eighteenth century, on the back of the licentious reigns of Charles II. and James ".; and, in Scotland, about the middle of that century. This tide came to a height about the time of the French Revolution, and it was one of the avowed aims of Stewart, " to stem the inundation of sceptical, or rather atheistical, publications which were imported from the Continent." Nor is it to be forgotten, that Stewart, directly by his lectures and indirectly by his pupils, contributed as much as any man of his age, to diffuse throughout Scotland a taste for elegant literature, and enlarged and liberal opinions in politics.

As to England, Sir J. Mackintosh, writing to Stewart in 1802, speaks of the want of any thing which he could call purely philosophical thinking; and Horner, in 1804, declares, that the highest names in the estimation of those in the metropolis, who felt any interest in speculative pursuits, were Hobbes and Hartley. Such works as the " Moral Philosophy " of Paley, were fitted to lower still farther, rather than elevate, this taste. It was altogether, then, for the benefit of English thought, that Stewart did become gradually known in South Britain, where his elegant style, his crowning good sense, and the moderation of his opinions, recommended him to many who had imbibed as great an aversion to Scotch metaphysics as ever George III. had. There are still Englishmen who abhor the infidelity of Hume, and who despise the plainness of Reid, who suspect the rhetoric of Brown, and are frightened by the bristling nomenclature and logical distinctions of Hamilton, but who are attracted by the writings of Stewart, which are felt to be as pleasing and as regular as their own rich fields bounded by hedge-rows. In England he has so far been of use in creating a philosophical spirit, where none existed before, and in checking the utilitarianism of Paley. lie is also entitled to a share of the credit of the great measures of reform, which such pupils as Horner, Brougham, Lord John Russell, Palmerston, Jeffrey, and Lansdowne carried in Parliament. Perhaps these eminent men have never estimated the amount of wholesome impulse which they received in early life from the prelections and lofty character of the Edinburgh professor. {302}

In France the influence of Reid and Stewart has been considerable, and has been of the most beneficial character. In that country, Locke's philosophy, unfortunately introduced by Voltaire and accepted in its worst side, had wrought only mischief, partly by its drawing away the attention of thinkers from the more spiritual philosophy of Descartes, and partly by its tempting a set of speculators to derive all men's ideas from sensation, and to deny the existence of all ideas which could not be derived from this source, -- such as the idea of moral good, of infinity, and of God. This wretched philosophy -- if philosophy it can be called -- was one of the fatal powers which operated to give an evil issue to the Revolution, and prevented good from coming out of it. After sensationalism-which used, but only to abuse, the name of Locke -- had reigned for more than half a century, there appeared a reaction led on by M. Royer Collard, who began in 1811 to lecture at the Normal School. It is a most interesting circumstance, that, in conducting

this war against the debasing systems which prevailed, he betook himself to the philosophy of Reid and Stewart. Exercising a considerable influence in himself, Royer Collard has had a more extended sway through his pupils, especially Victor Cousin and Theodore Jouffroy. In the course of years, the works of Reid were' translated into French, with an admirable historical and critical introduction, by Jouffroy. So early as 1808, the first volume of Stewart's " Elements " was translated into French by M. Prevost of Geneva; and, at a later date, M. Peisse, has translated the other two volumes of the same work. Stewart's " Outlines " were translated into the same tongue by Jouffroy, who has prefixed a preface of great judgment and acuteness. It thus appears, that the great reaction in favor of sound philosophy, commenced by Royer Collard and conducted by Cousin and Jouffroy, has made large and profitable use of the Scottish school, and rejoices to acknowledge its obligations to Scotland. No doubt, it has also called in aid from other quarters. Cousin has been indebted to the school of Kant, as well as to the school of Reid, and has derived some of his favorite principles immediately from the great metaphysician of his own country, Descartes; and he has besides carefully examined the human mind, in an inductive manner, and he has been able to give a unity to these {303} materials, because he is possessed of great original genius, acuteness, and comprehensiveness of mind. I am sometimes inclined to think, however, that he has got the most precious element in his eclectic system from the school of Scotland. I have been greatly gratified to observe, that, after he had been drawn aside for a time from his attachment to the Scottish philosophy, by a later affection for German transcendentalism (this is very visible in his course of lectures delivered in 1828 and 1829), he returned in his later years to his first love, and this at a time when Scotland was rather forsaking the inductive method, and turning its regards towards the a .priori method of Germany.

I feel proud, I confess, of the eulogiums which have been pronounced on Scotland, not only by Cousin, but by Jouffroy and Remusat. But these philosophers have scarcely seen, after all, wherein lies the peculiar strength of the Scottish nation. This is not to be found in its systems of moral philosophy, but in its religion, of which the high moral tone of its philosophy is but a reflection, which would soon wax dim and vanish were the original light extinguished; -- nay, in remembering that Kant was descended from Scottish parentage, I have sometimes thought that his high moral precepts may be also a reflection from the same light. Often, I should think, when M. Cousin looked around him on these scenes of revolution through which France has passed, must he have seen that his country needs something deeper and more influential than any system of moral science, even though it should be as pure and elevated as that which he inculcated.

In Germany Stewart has been little known, and has exercised no power for good or for evil. The only English philosopher familiarly referred to in that country is Locke, and even he is known, I suspect, more through his French consequences than from the study of his work. The German

professors speak of him, under the name of Locke, as the representative of sensationalism, overlooking the constant reference which he makes to reflection as a separate source of ideas, and to the lengthened account which he gives of intuition, -- a much juster account, in some respects, of its function than that given by Kant or Schelling. The great English ethical writer, Butler, who has established for ever the great truth of the supremacy {304} of conscience in the human constitution, is either altogether unknown in Germany, or referred to by such writers as Tholuck only to show that he is not understood or appreciated. The only Scottish metaphysician thoroughly known in Germany is David Hume. Reid is occasionally spoken of, only to be disparaged in his system and its results. Stewart is scarcely ever named. I must be allowed to regret this. Such a body of carefully inducted fundamental truth as we have in the philosophy of Reid and Stewart is precisely what was and is needed to preserve thought from the extravagances of the transcendental schools in the last age, and now, in the natural recoil which has taken place, since 1848, from the tide of materialism which is setting in so strongly, and with no means or method of meeting it. The philosophy of Germany must ever go by oscillations, by actions and reactions, till the critical method of Kant is abandoned, and the inductive method is used to determine the rule and law of those <a priori> principles of which so much use is made, while there has been so little careful inquiry into their precise nature and mode of operation.

This may be the proper place for referring to the relation in which Stewart stood toward Kant. I have already expressed my regret that Stewart should have entered on a criticism of Kant without a deeper acquaintance with his system. No doubt it might be retorted, that the criticisms of Stewart upon Kant are not more ignorant and foolish than those of the disciples of Kant upon Reid; but it is better to admit that Stewart committed a blunder in his review of the Kantian system. Some have supposed that, if he had known more of Kant, he would have formed a totally different opinion of his philosophy. And I admit that a further acquaintance with Kant's works would have raised Kant in his estimation; would have kept him from describing his nomenclature as "jargon," and his philosophy as " incomprehensible," from affirming that Kant has " thrown no new light on the laws of the intellectual world;" would have shown him many curious points of correspondence between the views of Kant and the profoundest of his own doctrines, and have enabled him, when he did depart from Kant, to give fair and valid reasons, and thus to help in what must be one of the tasks of philosophy in this age, -- the work of taking from Kant what is good and true, and casting away {305} what is evil, because false. While I admit all this, I am convinced at the same time that Stewart would never have given an adhesion to the peculiarities of Kantism. He would have said, " My method of induction is better than your method of criticism, and my account of the intuitive convictions of the mind is correct when I represent them as fundamental laws of thought and belief; whereas you are giving a wrong account of them when you represent them as <a priori> forms imposing on the objects in all cognition something which is not in the objects." I cannot conceive

him, in any circumstances, allowing to Kant (as Hamilton unfortunately did) that space and time and causation are laws of thought and not of thought and may have merely a subjective existence. His caution, his good sense, and his careful observation, would have prevented him from ever falling into a system of nescience such as that to which the relentless logic of Hamilton has carried him, founding, I acknowledge, on premises which Stewart as well as Kant had furnished. He would have adhered, after knowing all, to his decision: "We are irresistibly led to ascribe to the thing itself (space) an existence independent of the will of any being." It is an " in comprehensible doctrine which denies the objective reality of time." " That space is neither a <substance>, nor an <accident>, nor a <relation>, may be safely granted; but it does not follow from this that it is nothing objective." " Our first idea of space or extension seems to be formed by abstracting this attribute from the other qualities of matter. The idea of space, however, in whatever manner formed, is manifestly accompanied with an irresistible conviction that space is necessarily existent, and that its annihilation is impossible," etc. He adds, " To call this proposition in question, is to open a door to universal scepticism." ("Diss.," pp. 596, 597.)

The great work which the school of Reid has done consists in its careful investigation, in the inductive manner first, of the faculties of the mind; and, secondly, and more particularly, of man's primary and intuitive convictions. For this they ought to be honored in all time. Kant did a work similar to this last, but in a different manner. Rejecting (as Reid had done) the combined dogmatic and deductive method of Descartes, he introduced the critical method, affirming that reason can criticise itself, and proceeding to criticise reason by a kind of {306} logical process of a most unsatisfactory kind. Criticism has succeeded criticism, each new critic taking a new standing-point, or advancing a step farther, till Hegel's system became the <reductio ad absurdum> of the whole method of procedure inaugurated by Kant. I admit that Kant was right in affirming that <a priori> principles should be examined before they are assumed in philosophical investigation. We are not at liberty to assume a first truth till we have shown it to be a first truth; and we have no right to use it in argument or deduction till we have determined its precise nature and law; but this is to be done, I maintain, in the inductive manner, with its accompanying analysis and exclusions. The Scottish school commenced this work, but they do not profess to have completed it. Stewart everywhere proclaims that it is to be done by the combined efforts of successive inquirers, pursuing the same method for ages.

Reid and Stewart nowhere profess to give a full list, or even a rigid classification, of the intuitive convictions of the mind. All that they affirm is, that those principles which they have seized for the purpose of meeting the scepticism of Hume, are and must be intuitive. They do not even pretend to give a full account of these, or to express them in their ultimate form. They vacillate in the account which they give of them, and in the nomenclature which they employ to denote them. They draw no definite distinction between cognitions, beliefs, and judgments. They treat of

the faculties, and also of the principles of common sense, but they do not tell us how the two stand related to each other. And here I may be permitted to observe, that I look on these fundamental laws as being the necessary laws of the faculties regulating all their exercises, but not as laws or principles before the consciousness; and they are to be reflexly discovered as general laws only by the induction of their individual acts. Reid and Stewart do not even tell us what are the tests by which their presence may be detected: these I hold to be, first, as Aristotle and Locke have shown, self-evidence; and, second, as Leibnitz and Kant have shown, necessity and universality. Such defects as these they were quite willing to confess in that spirit of modesty which was one of their highest characteristics; and to any one complaining that they had not settled every point, they would, {307} as it were, say, Go on in the path which we have opened; we are sure that there is more truth yet to be discovered, and rejoice we must and will if you succeed where we have failed and raise a little higher that fabric of which we have laid the foundation.

XLI -- WILLIAM LAWRENCE BROWN.

I/N\ 1785, Mr. Burnett, a merchant in Aberdeen, bequeathed certain sums to be expended at intervals of forty years in the shape of two premiums for the best works furnishing "evidence that there is a Being, all powerful, wise, and good, by whom every thing exists: and particularly to obviate difficulties regarding the wisdom and goodness of the Deity; and this, in the first place, from considerations independent of written revelation, and. in the second place, from the revelation of the Lord Jesus, and from the whole to point out inferences most necessary for and useful to mankind." This endowment has not called forth any one great work; but, on each of the two occasions on which it has been competed for, it has been the means of publishing two excellent treatises. On the first competition, the first prize was awarded to Principal Brown of Aberdeen, and the second to the Rev. John Bird Sumner, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury.

Dr. Brown was born at Utrecht, 1755, and became minister of the Scotch church there. He removed to Scotland in 1795, became professor of divinity in Aberdeen, and afterwards principal of Marischal College. He lived till 1830. When in Holland he wrote an " Essay on the Folly of Scepticism." His Burnett Prize Essay, "On the Existence of a Supreme Creator," was given to the world in 1816. The work did not produce much impression in its own age, and is now all but forgotten. People wonder that so large a sum (upwards of l 1,200) did not call forth a more brilliant production; but the truth is, that money cannot produce an original work, which can come only from the spontaneous thoughts of the man of genius, that prize essays are commonly respectably good and nothing more. and, while they may serve a good purpose in their own day, are seldom valued as a legacy by posterity. The book is in many respects the perfection of a prize essay. It conforms rigidly to the conditions imposed by the donor; it is supremely judicious; it did not startle the judges by any eccentricity or even

novelty, and certainly not by any profundity; and altogether is a clear and able defence of natural and revealed religion. It interests us to notice that the principles of the Scottish philosophy are here employed to support the great truths relating to the being of God and the destiny of man. {308}

XLII. -- ARCHIBALD ALISON

H/E\ was born in Edinburgh in 1757, studied at Glasgow University, went thence to Oxford, where he matriculated in Baliol College. Taking orders in the Church of England in 1784, he received several preferments; such as, a prebendal stall in Salisbury, and the perpetual curacy of Kenley in Shropshire. He married a daughter of John Gregory, and thus became more closely identified with Edinburgh, where he continued usually to reside, and where he discharged the duties of an Episcopal clergyman in the Cowgate chapel from the year 1 down to the time of his death in 1839. He was distinguished for his excessive politeness. He published a volume of sermons, which had the good fortune (or the bad, for the " Edinburgh had never a great reputation as a critic of sermons) to get a laudatory notice in the Edinburgh Review, where they were compared to the "Oraisons Funebres" of Bossuet, and it was said of them: "We do not know any sermons so pleasing or so likely to be popular, and do good to those who are pleased with them. All the feelings are generous and gentle, all the sentiments liberal, and all the general views just and ennobling" But the work which lives is "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste," which was published in 1790, but seems to have passed very much out of sight till the booksellers in 1810 told him that there was a wish expressed for the second edition, which was reviewed by Francis Jeffrey in 1811, and afterwards had an extensive circulation in various countries.

The arrangement and manner of the work are admirable. The style is distinguished by infinite grace, and is worthy of being compared to that of Addison: -- indeed I am not sure if we have a more beautiful specimen of the last-century manner of composition, moulded on the " Spectator," on the French classics, and the wits of Queen Anne. Every word is appropriate, and is in its appropriate place; and the sentences glide along like a silvery stream. The descriptions of natural scenery, which are very numerous, are singularly felicitous and gracefully: that word <graceful> ever comes up when we would describe his manner. He does not seem to have had an equal opportunity {309} of studying beauty in the fine arts, in architecture, statuary, and painting, though the allusions to the universally known models of these are always appreciative and discriminating.

Drawing a distinction, very essential in all such inquiries, he would investigate, first, the nature of those qualities that produce the emotions of taste, and then that faculty by which the emotions are received. This distinction, clearly announced, is not thoroughly carried out. In the body of the work, in inquiring into the faculty raising the emotions, he makes the remark, that they are not " the objects of immediate observation," and that they are often obscured under the number of qualities with which they

are accidentally combined. He does not seem to have expounded his views as to the faculty. He opposes the theories which have uniformly taken for granted the simplicity of the emotion, and especially those which have made it a sense or senses. He endeavors to show that it has no resemblance to a sense, and that it is finally to be resolved into the more general principles of our constitution. He shows that "it is not, in fact, a simple but a complex emotion: that it involves in all cases, first, the production of some simple emotion or the exercise of some moral affection; and, secondly, the consequent excitement of a peculiar exercise of the imagination; that these concomitant effects are distinguishable and very often distinguished in our experience; and that the peculiar pleasure of the beautiful or sublime is only felt when these two effects are conjoined, and the complex emotions produced." In entering on his " Analysis," he proceeds on the philosophic principle, that we should consider the effects before we proceed to determine the cause. So he is to begin with considering the effect produced on the mind when the emotions of beauty or sublimity are felt, and then go on to investigate the causes which are productive of it, or, in other words, the sources of the beautiful and sublime in nature.

(1) "When any object either of sublimity or beauty is presented to the mind, I believe man is conscious of a train of thought being immediately awakened in his imagination analogous to the character or expression of the original object. The simple perception of the object, we frequently find, is insufficient to excite these emotions, unless it is accompanied with this operation of mind; unless, according to common expression, {310} our imagination is seized and our fancy busied in the pursuit of all those trains of thought which are allied to this character or expression. Thus, when we feel either the beauty or sublimity of natural scenery, the gay lustre of a morning in spring, or the mild radiance of a summer evening, the savage majesty of a wintry storm, or the wild magnificence of a tempestuous ocean, -- we are conscious of a variety of images in our minds very different from those which the objects themselves can. present to the eye. Trains of pleasing or of solemn thought arise spontaneously within our minds: our hearts swell with emotions of which the objects before us afford no adequate cause." The state of mind most favorable to the emotions of taste is one in which the imagination is free and unembarrassed; and the feeling is not interfered with by any thing which interrupts the flow, is not interfered with in particular by the intrusion of criticism. He shows that the exercise of imagination and the feeling of beauty is increased by association, especially that of resemblance, and enters upon the field which had been so cultivated by Beattie. He remarks very truly how an acquaintance with poetry in our earlier years has a powerful influence in increasing our sensibility to the beauties of nature.

He then gives an analysis of the peculiar exercise of the imagination. There is, in all cases, the indulgence of a train of thought. But then, every train of thought does not raise emotions of beauty; and so he investigates the nature of those trains of thought that are produced by object, of

sublimity and beauty, and their difference from those ordinary trains which are unaccompanied with such pleasure. This difference consists in two things: first, in the nature of the ideas or conceptions which compose such trains; and, secondly, in the nature of the law of their succession. Some ideas are fitted to raise emotions: these he calls " ideas of emotions; " and the train of thought which produces beauty is in all cases composed of ideas capable of exciting some affection or emotion." Thus, the ideas suggested by the scenery of spring are ideas productive of emotions of cheerfulness, of gladness, and of tenderness. The images suggested by the prospect of ruins are images belonging to pity, to melancholy, to admiration. The ideas in the same manner awakened by the view of the ocean in a storm are ideas of power, of majesty, and of terror. But farther the {311} ideas themselves must have some general principle of connection, subsisting through the whole extent of the train, giving them a certain and definite character, and a conformity to that peculiar emotion which first excited them. It appears, that " in every operation of taste, there are thus two different faculties employed; viz., some affection or emotion raised, and the imagination excited to a train of thought corresponding to this emotion. The peculiar pleasure which attends and which constitutes the emotions of taste, may naturally be considered as composed of the pleasures which separately attend the exercise of those faculties, or, in other words, as produced by the union of pleasing emotion with the pleasure which by the constitution of our nature is annexed to the exercise of the imagination." Our consciousness testifies that there is truth and very important truth in all this. Every form of beauty in nature and art, music for instance, raises a train of ideas which are accompanied with emotions all of a certain kind. While he has brought before us a body of facts, it may be doubted whether he has seen himself, or exposed to the view of others, the whole of the mental phenomena. The question arises, What starts the train? and a farther question follows, What gives the unity and harmony to the train? An answer to these questions, or rather to this question, -- for the questions are one, -- may disclose to our view an objective beauty and sublimity very much overlooked by Alison, and the supporters of the association theory.

(2) It is proper to state that Alison does speak in the second and longest essay of the beauty and sublimity of the material world. He treats of the beauty of sound, color, form, motion, and of the human countenance and form. He says matter in itself is unfitted to produce any kind of emotion, and can raise an emotion of beauty only by an association with other qualities, and "as being either the signs or expressions of such qualities as are fitted by the constitution of our nature to produce emotion." To those who consider sounds simply as sounds they have no beauty. There is surely an oversight here: for music has in itself a beauty which can be mathematically expressed; but then the feeling of beauty is prolonged and intensified by the train of emotional ideas which is set a going. Alison traces the associations raised by sounds. The sublimity of thunder is founded on awe and some degree of {312} terror. Sounds arc no longer sublime when they do not awaken such feelings.

"There is nothing more common than for people who are afraid of thunder to mistake some very common and indifferent sound for it; as, the rumbling of a cart, or the rattling of a carriage. While their mistake continues, they feel the sound as sublime: the moment they are undeceived, they are the first to laugh at their terror and to ridicule the sound which occasioned it. Children, at first, are as much alarmed at the thunder of the stage as at real thunder. Whenever they find that it is only a deception, they amuse themselves by mimicking it." He represents the real power of music as consisting in its imitation of those signs of emotion or passion which take place in the human voice.

In respect of colors, he holds that they are not beautiful, except as " expressive to us of pleasing or interesting qualities." He is successful in showing that there is a beauty of color arising from association of color, as in dress for instance: but science announces that there is a harmony of colors, as of complementary colors, that is, of colors making up the white beam, which is beautiful physiologically. He maintains that "the beauty of forms arises altogether from the associations we connect with them," or the qualities of which they are expressive to us. Sublimity of forms arises from their suggesting ideas of danger or power, or from their magnitude. Among natural objects, angular forms are associated with hardness, strength, or durability, suggesting force; and winding forms, with freewill, fineness, delicacy, ease. He labors to prove that proportion, as in architecture, is felt to be beautiful, because expressive of fitness. Aesthetic science maintains in opposition that there are certain proportions in length and composition which to our eye have a beauty in themselves. As to motion, it is felt to be beautiful, because associated with power. Rapid motion in a straight line is simply expressive of great power. Slow motion in curves is expressive of gentle power, united with ease, freedom, and playfulness.

He dwells at length on the different sources of the beauty or sublimity of the countenance of man. It arises, first, from physical beauty, or the beauty of certain colors and forms considered simply as forms or colors; secondly, from the beauty of expression and character, or that habitual form of features and {313} color of complexion which, from experience, we consider as significant of those habitual dispositions of the human mind which we love or approve or admire; thirdly, from the beauty of emotion, or the expression of certain local or temporary affections of mind which we approve or love or admire. Each of these species of beauty will be perfect when the composition of the countenance is such as to preserve, pure and unmingled, the expression which it predominantly conveys -- and when no feature or color is admitted but which is subservient to the unity of this expression. The last or highest degree of beauty or sublimity of the human countenance will alone be attained when <all> these expressions are united when the physical beauty corresponds to the characteristic when the beauty of temporary emotion harmonizes with the beauty of character; and when all fall upon the heart of the spectator as one whole, in which matter, in all its most exquisite forms, is only felt as the sign of one great or amiable

character of mind."

In criticising this theory, I am prepared to admit that the ingenious author has seized and unfolded to our view a large body of truth which had never been so fully developed before. He is surely right in saying that there is a train of ideas in all those operations of mind in which we contemplate what is called beautiful and sublime: it is so, as we listen to music, grave or gay; as we gaze at a waterfall, or into the starry vault of heaven. It is also certain that all these ideas are emotional: that is, accompanied with emotion; and that the ideas and emotions are all of a connected kind, and thus produce the one effect. On these points his views seem to me to be just, and they are to a great extent original. It should farther be allowed that in all this there is the influence of association of ideas, regulated by such principles as contiguity and resemblance: this had been shown fully before his time by Hutcheson, by Beattie, and others of the Scottish school. But is this all? It seems as if we needed, besides, both a start to the movement and a principle of connection to make it proceed in one direction. In music there are sounds which produce a pleasant sensation: these are regulated, as has been known since the time of Pythagoras, by mathematical relations. This pleasant sensation gives the impulse to the train of emotional thought, it sustains it, and gives to it a congruity. Again, it has been shown that there {314} are melodious and harmonious colors, which are pleasing to the eye; and these set out the mind on a pleasant train of association, and keep it on the one tract. Attempts have been made, since the days of Plato, to discover forms which are essentially beautiful; and these have so far been successful. There are proportions and there are curves which are adapted to the laws of light on the one hand, and to our sensory organs on the other. Are not these the roots from which our associated ideas and emotions spring? Are not the objects possessing them entitled to be called beautiful and sublime?

While there is a beauty of sound, color, and form to act as the root of the feeling, it is to be allowed to Alison that there is a train of ideas and feelings which constitutes, is it were, the growing trunk. But, as Alison has shown, it is not every train of idea, nor even every train of emotional idea, that is fitted to raise emotions which are beautiful or sublime. There is need of a bond of connection to raise the proper kind of ideas, and to make them flow in one direction, so as to produce a uniform result. The objective sound, color, form, proportion, expression, must not only start the association, but must so far guide it along a consistent line; make the ideas and feelings, for instance, which are raised as we stand gazing on a lovely countenance or a lofty waterfall, all to be of a sort and to contribute to one emotional result.

There are two grand oversights in the explanations of Alison: he overlooks the moving power which starts the train, and the guiding rails which direct it. This leaves a very great gap in his theory: he has no objective ground for beauty; and this has set against it both artists and scientific investigators, who are apt to turn away from it

with unbelief or with scorn, saying that they are not to be taken in by this illusory picture, for they are sure that beauty is a reality in the thing itself. It is the business of science, by its own methods, to investigate the precise objective nature of sounds, colors, and forms; and there is ground for believing that the laws involved will at last be enunciated in mathematical expressions.

But there is a higher element than all this in beauty; an element seen by Plato and by those who have so far caught his spirit,-- such as, Augustine, Cousin, MacVicar, and Ruskin, but commonly overlooked by men of science and the upholders {315} of the association theory. The mere sensations or perceptions called forth by the presence of harmonious sounds, colors, and proportional forms, is not the main ingredient in the lovely and the grand. Beauty, after all, lies essentially in the ideas evoked. I hold by an association theory on this subject. But the ideas entitled to be called aesthetic should be of mind, and the higher forms of mind, intellectual and moral. There was, therefore, grand truth in the speculation of Plato, that beauty consists in the bounding of the waste, in the formation of order out of chaos; or, in other words, in harmony and proportion. There was truth in the theory of Augustine, that beauty consists ill order and design; and in that of Hutcheson, that it consists in unity with variety. Alison had, at times, a glimpse of this truth, but then lost sight of it. He speaks with favor of the doctrine held by Reid, that matter is not beautiful in itself, but derives its beauty from the expression of mind; he holds it true, so far as the qualities of matter are immediate signs of the powers or capacities of mind, and in so far as they are signs of those affections or dispositions of mind which we love, or with which we are formed to sympathize. He thus sums up his views: " The conclusion, therefore, in which I wish to rest is, that the beauty and sublimity which is felt in the various appearances of matter are finally to be ascribed to their expression of mind; or to their being, either directly or indirectly, the signs of those qualities of mind, which are fitted, by the constitution of our nature, to affect us with pleasing or interesting emotion." There is a singular mixture of truth and error in this statement: truth, in tracing all beauty and sublimity to the expression of mind; but error, in placing it in qualities which raise emotion according to our constitution. Beauty, and sublimity are not the same as the true and the good; but they are the expression and the signs of the true and the good, suggested by the objects that evidently participate in them. {316}

XLIII.-GEORGE FARDINE.

A/LL\ throughout the seventeenth century, there was a strong reaction in Great Britain against Aristotle, scholasticism, and formal logic generally. College youths everywhere were protesting against the syllogism, moods and figures, and reduction. Unfortunately, logic -- in Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Saint Andrews, -- came in the second year of the college course; and youths of fifteen or sixteen groaned under the yoke, and longed for some thing more fascinating and less arduous. The professor who did most to gratify this

taste was Jardine, professor of logic and rhetoric in the university of Glasgow.

For several sessions after his appointment, he followed the established method, giving the usual course of logic and metaphysics, though he says, " every day more and more convinced me that something was wrong in the system of instruction; that the subjects on which I lectured were not adapted to the age, the capacity, and the previous attainments of my pupils." "To require the regular attendance of very young men two hours every day during a session of six or seven months, on lectures which they could not understand, and in which, of course, they could take no interest, had a direct tendency to produce habits of negligence, indifference, and inattention, which, it is well known, frequently terminate in a positive aversion to study of every description. The change from the animated perusal of the Greek and Roman classics to the unfathomable depths of logic and metaphysics was far too abrupt." The fault evidently lay, not in having logic as a required branch of study, and not in requiring it to be thoroughly learned, but in bringing it in too early in the course, and in not having in the second year a course on English literature and composition. Jardine did give a course of formal logic, but it was very much pressed into a corner. His text-book, "Quaedam ex Logicae Compendiis Selecta," is a meagre abridgment carrying the student among the bones of the study, without clothing them with life, and fitted to leave the impression that the branch is as useless as it is dry. He enlarged with much deeper interest on the human mind generally, and the various faculties: on language, on taste, on beauty, on criticism, -- showing no originality or grasp of intellect, but furnishing a course of great utility to young students, and felt to be interesting and stimulating.

His views were expounded in his " Outlines of Philosophical Education, illustrated by the Method of Teaching the Logic Class in the University of Glasgow." The work is still worthy of being looked into by all who would study what the Germans call " Pedagogic." He points out the advantages of the lecturing system. " While listening to a discourse delivered with some degree of animation, the mind of the student is necessarily more awakened, and feels a more powerful demand made upon its energies, than when perusing a printed volume." "In a class-room, a sympathetic feeling pervades the whole; the glow of zeal and an expression of curiosity {317} are perceived in almost every countenance; all the faculties of the mind are exerted; and powers unused before are awakened into life and activity." But he insists that the lecturing be accompanied with regular examinations. The teacher " will not examine the class in any stated order, but occasionally call upon the same individual at two successive hours, or even twice in one hour; and, as a check upon open negligence, lie may sometimes select such as appear the least attentive, and thereby expose their idleness to their fellow-students." But the most important part of his work is that in which he explains his views as to themes for composition, recommending that some be presented as fitted to enable the student to form clear and accurate notions and to express his thoughts, others to give a power of analysis and

classification, a third to exercise and strengthen the reasoning faculties, and a fourth to encourage processes of investigation. Under this fourth head, he suggests as a theme, "There was fine linen in Egypt in the time of Moses," and would have the student thence determine the state of Egypt as to government, science, and art.

Professor Jardine was born at Wandal, in the upper ward of Lanarkshire, in 1742. He was educated at Glasgow College, and became a licentiate of the Church of Scotland. In 1771, be became tutor to two sons of Baron Mure, and travelled with them in France. On his return in 1773, he was an unsuccessful candidate for the chair of humanity in Glasgow; but, in 1774, he was appointed assistant and successor to Mr. Clow, professor or logic and rhetoric. In 1824, -- he retired from the teaching of logic, and died in 1827. His pupils acknowledged their deep obligations to him in interesting them in study and imparting to them a power of writing the English language. But certainly he did not advance the science of logic, or help to promote the study of it among young men. Francis Jeffrey, who was fond of expressing his gratitude to him, may be taken as the representative pupil produced by him, capable of thinking and expressing himself clearly and ably on every subject, but not diving into the depths of any subject. It required all the ability and energy of Sir William Hamilton to bring back Scottish youths to the scientific study of logic.

XLIV.-THOMAS BROWN.[84]

I/N\ regard to the younger years of Thomas Brown, it is enough
to mention, that he was born at Kirkmabreck, in the stewartry of Kirkcudbright, in January, 1778; that his father, who was minister of that place, died soon after, when the family removed to Edinburgh; that he there received the rudiments {318} of his education from his mother, that, in his seventh year, he went to London, under the protection of a maternal uncle, and attended successively schools at Camberwell, Chiswick, and Kensington, down to the time of the death of his uncle, in 1792, when he returned to Edinburgh, to reside with his mother and sisters, and begin his collegiate course in the university. He is described as a precocious child, and we can believe it. He was precocious all his life, and in every thing. We have to regret that he did not take sufficient pains to secure that the flower which blossomed so beautifully should be followed by corresponding fruit. We can credit his biographer, when he tells us that he learned the alphabet at a single lesson; but I suspect that there must have been the prompting of some theological friend preceding the reply which he gave, when he was only between four and five, to an inquiring lady, that he was seeking out the differences in the narratives of the evangelists. At school he was distinguished by the gentleness of his nature and the delicacy of his feelings; by the quickness of his parts, and particularly by the readiness of his memory; by his skill in recitation, and his love of miscellaneous reading, especially of works of imagination. Nor is it to be forgotten that he also gave promise of his genius for

poetry, by verses which one of his masters got published, perhaps unfortunately for the youth, in a magazine. He read with a pencil in his hand, with which he made marks; and, in the end, he had no pleasure in reading a book which was not his own. He began his collegiate course in Edinburgh by the study of logic under Finlayson; and having, in the summer of I 793, paid a visit to Liverpool, Currie, the biographer of Burns, introduced him to the first volume of Stewart's " Elements." The following winter he attended Stewart's course of lectures, and had the courage to wait on the professor, so renowned for his academic dignity, and read to him observations on one of his theories. Mr. Stewart listened patiently, and then read to the youth a letter which he had received from M. Prevost of Geneva, containing the very same objections. This was followed by an invitation to the house of the professor, who, how ever, declined on this, as he did on all other occasions, to enter into controversy. It is but justice to Stewart to say, that he continued to take a paternal interest in the progress of his {319} pupil, till the revolt of Brown against the whole school of Reid cooled their friendship, and loosened the bonds which connected them. In 1796 he is studying law, which, however, he soon abandoned for medicine, and attended the medical classes from 1798 till 1803. At college, he received instructions from such eminent professors as Stewart, Robison, Playfair, and Black, and was stimulated by intercourse with college friends, such as Erskine, Brougham, Reddie, Leyden, Horner, Jeffrey, and Sidney Smith, -- all precocious and ambitious like himself, and who, in the "Academy of Sciences," debated on topics far beyond their years and their knowledge.

It was when Brown was at college, that Erasmus Darwin's "Zoonomia" was published. The work is filled with premature theories as to life and mind, and proceeds on the method, as Brown calls it, of " hypothetical reasoning," -- a method, I may remark, carried still further, but with a more carefully observed body of facts to support it, by his illustrious grandson, Charles Darwin. Brown read it at the age of eighteen, was irritated by its materialistic tendency, and scribbles notes upon it; these ripen into a volume by the time he is nineteen, and were published by the time he was twenty, -- " Observations on the Zoonomia of Erasmus Darwin, M. D." Brown was an excellent physiologist for his day; but both the original work and the reply proceed on principles now regarded as antiquated. But Brown's criticism is a remarkable example of intellectual precocity. In the midst of physiological discussions, most of the metaphysical ideas which he developed in future years are to be found here in the bud. He considers the phenomena of the mind as mental states, speaks of them as "feelings," delights to trace them in their succession, and so dwells much on suggestion, and approaches towards the theory of general notions, and the theory of causation, expounded in his subsequent works. It should be added, that the book committed him prematurely to principles which he was indisposed to review in his riper years. It appears from a letter to Darwin, that, at the age of nineteen, he had a theory of mind which he is systematizing.

Out of the " Academy of Sciences " arose, as is well known, the " Edinburgh Review," in the second number of

which there was a review, by Brown, of Viller's "Philosophie de {320} Kant." The article is characterized by acuteness, especially when it points out the inconsistency of Kant in admitting that matter has a reality, and yet denying this of space and time, in behoof of the existence of which we have the very same kind of evidence. But the whole review is a blunder, quite as much as the reviews of Byron and Wordsworth in the same periodical. He has no appreciation of the profundity of Kant's philosophy, and no anticipation of the effects which it was to produce, not only on German but on British thinking. Immersed as he was in medical studies, fond of French literature, and tending towards a French sensationalism, he did not relish a system which aimed at showing how much there is in the mind independent of outward impression. The effects likely to be produced on one who had never read Kant, and who took his views of him from that article, are expressed by Dr. Currie " I shall trouble myself no more with <transcendentalism>; I consider it a philosophical hallucination." It is a curious instance of retribution, that, in the succeeding age, Brown's philosophy declined before systems which have borrowed their main principles from the philosophy of Kant, and deal as largely with <a priori> " forms," " categories," and " ideas," as Brown did with " sensations," " suggestions," and " feelings."

We feel less interest than he did himself in two volumes of poetry, which he published shortly after taking his medical degree in 1803. His next publication was a more important one. The chair of mathematics in Edinburgh was vacant, and Leslie was a candidate. The city ministers attached to the court party wished to reserve it for themselves, and urged that Leslie was incapacitated, inasmuch as he had expressed approbation of Hume's doctrine of causation. It was on this occasion that Brown wrote his " Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect," -- at first a comparatively small treatise, but swolen, in the third edition (of 1818), into a very ponderous one It is divided into four parts, -- the first, on the import of the relation; the second, on the sources of the illusion with respect to it; the third, on the circumstances in which the belief arises; and the fourth, a review of Hume's theory. The work is full of repetitions, and the style, though always clear, is often cumbrous, and wants that vivacity and eloquence which so distinguish his posthumous lectures. It is characterized {321} by great ingenuity and power of analysis. He has dispelled for ever a large amount of confusion which had collected around the relation; and, in particular, he has shown that there is no link coming <between> the cause and its effect. "The <substances> that exist in a train of phenomena are still, and must always be, the whole constituents of the train." If the cause be A and the effect B, there is not a third thing x necessary in order to A being followed by B. He agrees with Hume, in representing the relation as consisting merely in invariable antecedence and consequence. In this he has been guilty of a glaring oversight. It may be all true, that there is nothing coming <between> the cause and its effect, and yet there may be, what he has inexcusably overlooked, a power or property in the substances acting as the cause to produce the effect. He calls in substances, we have seen. " The cause must

always be a substance existing in a certain state, and the effect, too, a substance existing in a certain state; " -- he does not see that in material action there are substances two or more in the cause, and substances two or more in the effect. But he fails to enquire what is involved in substances, and the qualities of substance, and does not discover that power is involved in substance and properties. It is but justice to Brown to add, that, in one very important particular, he differs from Hume; that is, in regard to the mental principle which leads us to believe in the relation. This, according to Hume, is mere custom; whereas, according to Brown, it is an irresistible intuitive belief. By this doctrine, he attached himself to the school of Reid, and saved his system from a sceptical tendency, with which it cannot be justly charged. This irresistible be lief, he shows, constrains us to believe that the universe, as an effect, must have had a cause. It is to be regretted that he did not inquire a little more carefully into the nature of this intuitive belief which he is obliged to call in, when he would have found that it constrains us to believe not only in the invariability of the relation but in the potency of the substances operating as causes to produce their effects.

We are not concerned to follow him in his medical career, in which he became the associate of the famous Dr. Gregory in 1806. We are approaching a more momentous epoch in his life. Dugald Stewart being in a declining state of health, {322} Brown lectured for him during a part of sessions 1808-9 and 1809-10; and, in the summer of 1810, Stewart having expressed a desire to this effect, Brown was chosen his colleague, and, from that time, discharged the whole duties of the office of Professor of Moral Philosophy.

Even those who have never seen him can form a pretty lively image of him at this time, when his talents have reached all the maturity of which they are capable, and his reputation is at its height. In person, he is about the middle size; his features are regular, and in the expression of his countenance, and especially of his eye, there is a combination of sweetness and calm reflection. His manner and address are somewhat too fastidious, not to say finical and feminine, for a philosopher; but the youths who wait on his lectures are disposed to, over look this, when they fall under the influence of his gentleness, so fitted to win, and of the authority which he has to command. Expectation was on the tiptoe, and he fully met and gratified it. His amiable look, his fine elocution, his acuteness and ingenuity, his skill in reducing a complex subject into a few elements, his show of originality and independence, the seeming comprehensiveness of his system, and, above all, his fertility of illustration, and the glow, like that of stained glass, in which he set forth his refined speculations, did more than delight his youthful audience, -- it entranced them; and, in their ecstasies, they declared that he was superior to all the philosophers who had gone before him, and, in particular, that he had completely superseded Reid, and they gave him great credit, in that he generously refrained from attacking and overwhelming Stewart. He had every quality fitted to make him a favorite with students. His eloquence would have been felt to be too

elaborate by a younger audience, and regarded as too artificial and sentimental by an older audience, but exactly suited the tastes of youths between sixteen and twenty. A course so eminently popular among students had not, I rather think, been delivered in any previous age in the University of Edinburgh, and has not, in a later age, been surpassed in the fervor excited by Chalmers or Wilson. In the last age you would have met, in Edinburgh and all over Scotland, with ministers and lawyers who fell into raptures when they spoke of his lectures, and assured the younger generation that in comparison with him Wilson {323} was no philosopher, and Hamilton a stiff pedant. It should be added, that, when the students attending him were asked what they had got, not a few could answer only by exclamations of admiration, "How fine!" "How beautiful!" "How ingenious!" In those large classes in the Scottish colleges which are taught exclusively by written lectures, large numbers, including the dull, the idly inclined, and the pleasure-loving, are apt to pass through without receiving much benefit, -- unless, indeed, the professor be a very systematic examiner and laborious exacter of written exercises; and this, I rather think, Brown was not. As he left the impression on his students, that there was little wisdom in the past, and that his own system was perfect, he did not create a spirit of philosophic reading such as Hamilton evoked in select minds in a later age. But all felt the -- low of his spirit, had a fine literary taste awakened by his poetical bursts, had their acuteness sharpened by his fine analysis, went away with a high idea of the spirituality of the soul, and retained through life a lively recollection of his sketches of the operations of the human mind. This, I venture to affirm, is a more wholesome result than what was substituted for psychology in the succeeding age, -- <a priori> discussions derived from Germany or demonstrated idealisms spun out by an exercise of human ingenuity.

His biographer tells us that, on his appointment to the chair, he had retired into the country in order that fresh air and exercise might strengthen him for his labors, and that, when the session opened, he had only the few lectures of the previous winters; but such was the fervor of his genius and the readiness of his pen, that he generally commenced the composition of a lecture after tea and had it ready for delivery next day by noon, and that nearly the whole of the lectures contained in the first three of the four-volumed edition were written the first year of his professorship, and the whole of the remaining next session. Nor does he appear to have rewritten any portion of them, or to have been disposed to review his judgments, or make up what was defective in his philosophic reading. He seems to have wasted his life in sending forth volume after volume of poetry, which is, doubtless, beautifully and artistically composed, after the model of the English poets of the eighteenth century, but its pictures are without individuality, and {324} they fail to call forth hearty feeling. Far more genuine poetical power comes out incidentally in some of the bursts in his philosophic lectures than in whole volumes of his elaborate versification.

The incidents of his remaining life are few, but are

sufficient to bring out the lineaments of his character. His chief enjoyments lay in his study, in taking a quiet walk in some solitary place, where he would watch the smoke curling from a cottage chimney, or the dew illuminated with sunshine on the grass, and in the society of his family and a few friends. Never had a mother a more devoted son, or sisters a more affectionate brother. In his disposition there is great gentleness, with a tendency to sentimentality: -- thus, on the occasion of his last visit to his native place, he is thrown into a flood of sensibility, which, when it is related in future years to Chalmers, on his happening to be in the place, the sturdier Scotch divine was thrown into a fit of merriment. We perceive that he is fond of fame and sensitive of blame, but seeking to cherish both as a secret flame; and that he is by no means inclined to allow any one to offer him counsel. In 1819, he prepared his " Physiology of the Mind," as a text-book for his students, and put it into the press the following winter. By the Christmas of that year he was rather unwell; in spring he removed for the benefit of his health to London, and died at Brompton in April, 1820. His remains were deposited in the churchyard of his native place, beside those of his father and mother.

His lectures were published shortly after his death, and excited an interest wherever the English language is spoken, quite equal to that awakened by the living lecturer among the students of Edinburgh. They continued for twenty years to have a popularity in the British dominions and in the United States greater than any philosophical work ever enjoyed before. During these years most students were introduced to metaphysics by the perusal of them, and attractive beyond measure did they find them to be. The writer of this article would give much to have revived within him the enthusiasm which he felt when he first read them. They had never, however, a great reputation on the Continent, where the sensational school thought he had not gone sufficiently far in analysis; where those fighting with the sensational school did not feel that he {325} was capable of yielding them any aid; and where the transcendental school, in particular, blamed him for not rendering a sufficiently deep account of some of the profoundest ideas which the mind of man can entertain, such as those of space, time, and infinity. His reputation was at its greatest height from 1830 to 1835, from which date it began to decline, partly because it was seen that his analyses were too ingenious, and his omissions many and great; and partly because new schools were engaging the philosophic mind; and, in particular, the school of Coleridge, the school of Cousin, and the school of Hamilton. Coleridge was superseding him by views derived from Germany, which he had long been inculcating, regarding the distinction between the understanding and the reason Cousin, by a brilliant eclectic system, which professedly drew largely from Reid and Kant; and Hamilton, by a searching review of Brown's theory of perception, and by his own metaphysical views promulgated in his lectures and his published writings. The result of all this was a recoil of feeling in which Brown was as much undervalued as he had at one time been overrated. In the midst of these laudations and condemnations, Brown's psychological system has never been completely reviewed. Now that he has passed through a

period of undeserved popularity, and a period of unmerited disparagement, the public should be prepared to listen with candor to an impartial criticism.

The psychology of Brown may be summarily described as a combination of the Scottish philosophy of Reid and Stewart, and of the analyses by Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, and the higher philosophers of the sensational school of France, together with views of the association of ideas derived from a prevailing British school. To Reid and Stewart he was indebted more than he was willing to allow, and it would have been better for his ultimate reputation had he imbibed more of their spirit, and adhered more closely to their principles. He admits everywhere with them the existence of principles of irresistible belief; for example, he comes to such a principle when he is discussing the beliefs in our personal identity, and in the invariability of the relation between cause and effect. But acknowledging, as he does, the existence of intuitive principles, he makes no inquiry into their nature and laws {326} and force, or the relation in which they stand to the faculties. In this respect, so far from being an advance on Reid and Stewart, he is rather a retrogression. His method is as much that of Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, and the ideologists of France, as that of Reid and Stewart. He is infected with the besetting sin of metaphysicians, -- that of trusting to analyses instead of patient observation; and, like the French school, his analysis is exercised in reducing the phenomena of the mind to as few powers as possible, and this he succeeds in doing by omitting some of the most characteristic peculiarities of the phenomena. His classification of the faculties bears a general resemblance to that of M. de Tracy, the metaphysician of the sensational school. The Frenchman's division of the faculties is -- sensibility, memory, judgment, and desire Brown's is-sensation, simple and relative suggestion, and emotion.

In estimating the influences exercised from without on Brown, we must further take into account, that ever since the days of Hartley there had been a great propensity in Britain to magnify the power and importance of the association of ideas. Not only habit but most of our conceptions and beliefs had been referred to it: Beattie and Alison, followed by Jeffrey, ascribed to it our ideas of beauty; and, in a later age, Sir James Mackintosh carried this tendency the greatest length, and helped to bring about a reaction, by tracing our very idea of virtue to this source. It is evident that Brown felt this influence largely. Our intelligence is resolved by him into simple and relative suggestion. There is a flagrant and inexcusable oversight here. All that association, or, as he designates it, suggestion, can explain, is the order of the succession of our mental states; it can render no account of the character of the states themselves. It might show, for example, in what circumstances a notion of any kind arises, say our notion of time, or space, or extension, but cannot explain the nature of the notion itself.

But it will be necessary to enter a little more minutely into the system of Brown. From the affection which I bear to his memory, and remembering that his views have

never been used by himself or others to undermine any of the great principles of morality, I would begin with his excellences. {327}

(1) In specifying these, I am inclined to mention, first, his lofty views of man's spiritual being. He everywhere draws the distinction between mind and body very decidedly. In this respect, he is a true follower of the school of Descartes and Reid, and is vastly superior to some who, while blaming Locke and Brown for holding views tending to sensationalism, or even materialism, do yet assure us that the essential distinction between mind and matter is now broken down.

(2) I have already referred to the circumstance, that Brown stands up resolutely for intuitive principles, and in this respect is a genuine disciple of the Scottish school. He calls them by the very name which some prefer as most expressive, -- " beliefs; " and employs the test which Leibnitz and Kant have been so lauded as introducing into philosophy. He everywhere characterizes them as "irresistible,"-a phrase pointing to the same quality as "necessary,"-the term used by the German metaphysicians. No one, not even Cousin, has demonstrated, in a more effective manner, that our belief in cause and effect is not derived from experience. " When we say, then, that B will follow A to-morrow, because A was followed by B to-day, we do not prove that the future will resemble the past, but we take for granted that the future is to resemble the past. We have only to ask ourselves why we believe in this similarity of sequence; and our very inability of stating any ground of inference may convince us that the belief, which it is impossible for us not to feel (observe the appeal to necessity, but it is an appeal to a necessity of feeling), is the result of some other principle of reasoning." (" Cause and Effect," P. 111.) " In ascribing the belief of efficiency to such a principle, we place it, then, on a foundation as strong as that on which we suppose our belief of an external world, and even of our own identity, to rest. What daring atheist is he, who has ever truly disbelieved the existence of himself and others? For it is he alone who can say, with corresponding argument, that he is an atheist, because there is no relation of cause and effect." " The just analysis, then, which reduces our expectation of similarity in the future trains of events to intuition, we may safely admit, without any fear of losing a single argument for the existence of God." By this doctrine he has separated himself for ever from sensationalists, and given great trouble to those classifiers {328} of philosophic systems who insist, contrary to the whole history of British philosophy, that all systems must either be sensational or ideal. It is quite obvious that such men as Butler, Brown, and Chalmers, cannot be included in either of the artificial compartments, and hence one ground of their neglect by the system-builders of our age.

(3) His account of sensation is characterized by fine analysis: in particular, his discrimination of the sensations commonly ascribed to touch, and his separation of the muscular sense from the sense of touch proper. About this very time Charles Bell was establishing the distinction

of the nerves of sensation and motion. " I was finally enabled," says Sir Charles, to show that the muscles had two classes of nerves; that on exciting one of these the muscles contracted, that on exciting the other no action took place. The nerve which had no power to make the muscle contract was found to be a nerve of sensation." Contemporaneously, Brown was arguing, on psychological grounds, that by the muscular sense we get knowledge which cannot be had from mere feeling or touch. "The feeling of resistance is, I conceive, to be ascribed not to our organ of touch but to our muscular frame." Hamilton, by his vast erudition, has been able (note appended to Reid's works) to detect anticipations of these views; but they were not so clearly stated, and they were not conclusively demonstrated. Brown started, and carried a certain length, those inquiries regarding the variety of sensations commonly ascribed to touch, which have ever since had a place in psycho logical treatises.

(4) Nor must we omit his ingenious and felicitous mode of illustrating the succession of our mental states, called by him "suggestion," to intimate that there is no connection in the nature of things between the ideas, and not " association," which might leave the impression that there was a nexus joining them. He is particularly successful in showing how by association the various ideas and, he adds, feelings blend, and, as it were, coalesce. He has called attention to an important phenomenon, which has been little noticed ever since he brought it out to view, and which he himself did not see the significance of. " In our mental sequences, the one feeling which precedes and induces another feeling does not necessarily on that account give place to it; but may continue in {329} that virtual sense of combination, as applied to the phenomena of the mind, of which I have often spoken, to coexist with the new feeling which it excites, outlasting it, perhaps, and many other feeling to which, during its permanence, it may have given rise. I pointed out to you how important this circumstance in our mental constitution is to us in various ways: to our intellectual acquirements, since without it there would be no continued meditation, but only a hurrying confusion of image after image, in wilder irregularity than in the wildest of our dreams; and to our virtue and happiness, since, by allowing the coexistence and condensation of various feelings in one complex emotion, it furnishes the chief source of those moral affections which it is at once our happiness to feel and our virtue to obey." He has here got a glimpse of a great truth, which needs to be developed more fully than it has yet been it is the power of a motive principle, and of a strong purpose and resolution abiding in the mind to sway the train of thoughts and feelings. Had he followed out his own hint, it would have led him to discover deep springs of action directing the flow of suggestions.

While he illustrates the laws of suggestion under the three Aristotelian heads of contiguity, resemblance, and contrast, he intimates his belief that they may all be reduced to a finer kind of contiguity. As the latest speculations have not yet got down to the depths of this subject, it may be useful to know the hints thrown out by Brown, who seems to me to be so far on the right track, but not to have reached the highest fountain from which the

stream issues: --

"All suggestion, as I conceive, may, if our analysis be sufficiently minute, be found to depend on prior existence, or at least on such immediate proximity as is itself very probably a modification of coexistence." He begins with resemblance: "if a portrait be faithfully painted, the effect which it produces on the eye that perceives it is the same, or very nearly the same, as the effect produced on the eye by similar light reflected from the living object; and we might therefore almost as justly say, that when any individual is seen by us repeatedly he suggests himself by resemblance, as that he is thus suggested by his portrait." This surely comes very close to Hamilton's principle, that resembling objects, so far as they are alike, are the same, and to his law of repetition or identity. The following brings us quite as near his law of redintegration In many other cases, in which the resemblance is less complete, its operation may, even without such refinement of analysis as that to which I have alluded, be very obviously brought under the influence of contiguity. Thus, as the drapery forms {330} so important a part of the complex perception of the human figure, the costume of any period may recall to us some distinguished person of that time. A ruff like that worn by Queen Elizabeth brings before us the sovereign herself, though the person who wears the ruff may have no other circumstance of resemblance: because the ruff and the general appearance of Queen Elizabeth, having formed one complex whole in our mind, it is necessary only that one part of the complexity should be recalled -- as the ruff in the case supposed -- to bring back all the other parts by the mere principle of contiguity. The instance of drapery, which is but an adjunct or accidental circumstance of the person, may be easily extended to other instances, in which the resemblance is in parts of the real and permanent figure." " In this manner, by analyzing every complex whole, and tracing, in the variety of its composition, that particular part in which the actual similarity consists, -- and which may therefore be supposed to introduce the other parts that have formerly coexisted with it, -- we might be able to reduce every case of suggestion from direct resemblance -- to the influence of mere contiguity." " By the application of a similar refined analysis to other tribes of associations, even to those of contrast, we may perhaps find that it would be possible to reduce these also to the same comprehensive influence of mere proximity as the single principle on which all suggestion is founded." I am far from holding that this analysis into parts of the concrete idea starting the suggestion, furnishes a complete solution of the difficulties connected with fixing on one ultimate law; but it seems to set us on the right track.

He gives us a somewhat crude, but still important, classification of what he calls the secondary laws of suggestion, which induce one associate conception rather than another. He mentions longer or shorter continuance;

more or less liveliness; more or less frequently present; more or less purity from the mixture of other feelings; differences of original constitution; differences of temporary emotion; changes in the state of the body; and general tendencies produced by prior habits. Had this arrangement been presented by another he would have proceeded to reduce it to simpler elements.

(5) His distribution of the relations which the mind can discover is worthy of being looked at: they are --

I. COEXISTENCE.

(1) Position.
(2) Resemblance or Difference.
(3) Degree.
(4) Proportion.
(5) Comprehension (whole and parts).

II. SUCCESSION.

(6) Casual Priority.
(7) Causal Priority.

{331} This classification is worthy of being placed along side that of Locke and Hume. It may be compared with Kant's " Categories of the Understanding; " but it should be observed that the German metaphysician makes his categories forms imposed by the mind on things, whereas the Scotch psychologist simply gives to the mind the power of discerning the relations in things. The arrangement of Brown is superior to that of Hamilton, to be afterwards discussed, and vastly more comprehensive and just than that of those later physiological psychologists who reduce the relations which the mind can perceive to the single one of resemblance and difference, thus restricting the powers of intelligence within far narrower limits than have been assigned by nature, and all to make it somewhat easier to account for the whole on materialistic principles.

(6) His biographer declares his account of the general notion to be a great advance on all that had been proposed by previous philosophers. Brown states the process to be the following: "We perceive two or more objects, -- this is one state of the mind. We are struck with the <feeling> of their resemblance in certain respects, -- this is a second state of the mind. We then, in the third stage, give a name to these circumstances of felt resemblance, a name which is, of course, applied afterwards only where this relation of similarity is felt. " He has here seized some of the characteristic steps in the process of forming the general notion. He is right in giving a prominent place to the discovery of resemblance, but he should have called it a perception of resemblance, and not a feeling of resemblance, -- language which seems to ascribe the whole to the emotive rather than the cognitive part of our nature. And he has missed, after all, the essential, the consummating step,-the placing of the objects under a head or in a class which embraces all the objects possessing the resembling qualities, to which class thus formed the name is given. He has a searching review of nominalism, which be charges with

overlooking the resemblance. He asks, " Why do I class together certain objects, and exclude certain others from the class which I have formed? " He shows that the infant must reason before it has acquired language, " He has already calculated distances long before he knew the use of a single word expressive of distance. "

(7) He has some fine remarks on beauty. He separates from {332} Alison, who resolves it into the general feelings of our nature, and argues resolutely that there is an original and unresolvable class of feelings excited by the beautiful. He remarks that in the emotion of beauty, "by a sort of reflex transfer to the object which excited it, we identify or combine our agreeable feeling with the very conception of the object, whether present or absent." He is able to come to the conclusion: " It is mind alone that is the living fountain of beauty, because it is the mind which, by reflection from itself, embodies in the object or spreads over it its own delight. " He overlooks, however, the objective beauty arising from the harmony of sounds and colors, and from proportion and harmony.

(8) Some place higher than any of his other excellencies his eloquent exposition of the emotions,-- an exposition which called forth the laudations both of Stewart and Chalmers, the latter of whom wrote a preface to that part of his lectures which treats of the feelings. He is particularly successful in showing that man is not by his nature and constitution a selfish being, but is possessed of social and benevolent affections. His lectures on the emotions are radiant all over with poetry, and will repay a careful reading much better than many of the scholastic discussions or anatomical descriptions which are furnished in some of the chairs of mental science.

(9) It would be injustice not to add that he has some very splendid illustrations of natural theism, fitted at once to refine and elevate the soul. I have never heard of any youth being inclined towards scepticism or pantheism, or becoming prejudiced against Christian truth, in consequence of attending or reading the lectures of Brown. In note E, appended to his work on " Cause and Effect, " he has a powerful argument in favor of the possibility of a miracle, showing that it is not inconsistent with the intuitive law of cause and effect. " There is no violation of a law of nature, but there is a new consequent of a new antecedent."

Over against these excellencies I have to place certain grave deficiencies and errors.

(1) I take exception to the account which he gives of the very object and end of mental science. According to him, it is to analyze the complex into the simple, and discover the laws of the succession of our mental states. There is a great {333} and obvious oversight here. The grand business of the science of the human mind is to observe the nature of our mental states, with the view of co-ordinating them and rising to the discovery of the laws which they obey and the faculties from which they proceed. Taking this view, analysis becomes a subordinate though of course an important instrument; and we have to seek to discover the faculties

which determine the nature of the states as well as the laws of their succession.

(2) In his analysis he often misses the main element of the concrete or complex phenomena. In referring ideas to sensation he neglects to consider how much is involved in body occupying space, and how much in body exercising property; and the account of memory he fails to discover how much is implied in recognizing the event remembered as having happened in time past,-that is, he omits the idea of time. Often, too, when he has accomplished an analysis of a complex state, does he forget the elements, and reminds us of the boy who imagines that be has annihilated a piece of paper when he has burnt it, forgetting that the elements are to be found in the smoke and in the ashes. It is by a most deceitful decomposition -- it is by missing the very <differentia> of the phenomena -- that he is able to derive all our intellectual ideas from sensation and simple and relative suggestion.

(3) He grants that there are intuitive principles of belief in the mind; but he has never so much as attempted an induction of them, or an exposition of their nature and of the laws which regulate them, or a classification of them. In this respect he must be regarded as falling behind his predecessors in the school, and behind Hamilton, who succeeded him in the estimation of students of mental science. The intelligent reader is greatly disappointed to find him, after he has shown so forcibly that there is an intuition involved in our belief in personal identity and in causation, immediately dropping these intuitions and inquiring no more into their nature. He takes great credit for reducing the faculties and principles enumerated by Reid to a much smaller number; but if we gather up all the elements which he is obliged to bring in, we shall find the list to be as large as that of Reid or Stewart. {334}

(4) Thus he represents consciousness as merely a general term for all the states and affections of mind; and then, in order to account for our belief in the sameness of self, he is obliged to call in a special instinct. " We believe our identity, as one mind, in our feelings of to-day and our feelings of yesterday, as indubitably as we believe that the fire which burned yesterday would in the same circumstances burn us to-day, not from reasoning, but from a principle of instinct and irresistible belief, such as gives to reasoning itself all its validity." It is this irresistible belief, involved in the very nature of consciousness, this belief in self and the identity of self, which makes consciousness -- I mean self-consciousness (and not a vague consciousness) -- a separate faculty. This faculty is a source to us of a separate set of cognitions and ideas, the knowledge of self and of the states of self, -- such as thinking, feeling, resolving.

(5) According to Brown, in perception through the senses we look immediately on a sensation in the mind, and not on any thing out of the mind. Hamilton has severely criticised this doctrine. Hamilton had a discriminately searching classification of the forms. which ideal sense-perception bad assumed, and he makes Brown's theory one of

the forms of idealism. But the truth is, Brown's doctrine can scarcely be called idealism. It might be appropriately called inferentialism. It is the same substantially as that of Destutt de Tracy and the French ideologists, who, maintaining the existence of body, argued that infants reach a knowledge of it by a process of inference. The argument is unfolded by Brown at great length and with much ingenuity. The mind can never perceive any thing directly but the sensation, but then this sensation as a -- phenomenon must have a cause. He argues this on the principle, perceived to be intuitively certain, that every effect has a cause. The sensation then must have a cause; but then it has not, like some other of our mental states and affections, -- such as our sentiments and perceptions of duty, -- a cause within the mind itself; it must therefore have a cause without the mind, and this cause is matter. It is clear as to this inference, that it will be acknowledged frankly only by those who look on causation as an intuitive conviction. If belief in causation be merely experimental, it is doubtful whether {335} we should ever discover the law to be universal, for by far the greater number of our sensations would be phenomena of which we could discover no cause. We might group the phenomena in some way, but we should not be able to say logically whether they have a cause or not. But leaving this, as perhaps only a doubtful point, we can affirm confidently that even if, by such a process, we could infer that these sensations have a cause, it must be an unknown cause, a cause of which we have no experience. But matter seems to be something known. We certainly have an idea of extension, or rather of something extended -- I would add, a belief in an extended substance. Our belief is not in an unknown cause, but in a known existence,-- known as existing and extended. But we never could reach the belief, we never could reach even the idea of space which we certainly have, by any logical process proceeding on the existence of a sensation. From a sensation, which is unextended, we cannot rise to the idea of an extended thing. Logically and consequentially, Brown's theory of the cognition of matter prepared the way for that of J. S. Mill, who makes our idea of body to be of a mere possibility of sensations.

(6) He overlooks some of the distinguishing attributes of the reproductive powers of the mind. Conception, memory, and imagination are merely exercises of simple suggestion. He does not give the phantasy or imaging power a separate place. "Memory is not a distinct intellectual faculty, but is merely conception or suggestion combined with the feeling of a particular relation, -- the relation to which we give the name of priority." Observe what confusion of things we have here: memory is a " suggestion, " but implies a " relation, " which is represented as a ,feeling;" and "priority," implying the idea of time past, present, and future, comes in so quietly that we are not expected to notice it, though it is one of the most profound of our ideas. In imagination, he overlooks that high intellectual power which binds the scattered images in a unity, often of a very grand character. A simplification gained by overlooking these characteristic qualities is altogether illusive.

(7) In his account of the faculties of relative suggestion, he mixes up two things which ought to be carefully distinguished, -- the suggestion, which is a mere law of the succession {336} of our ideas, and comparison, by which we discover the relations of things. He cannot make these one by calling them by the one name of relative suggestion.

(8) He has discovered an important element in the process of reasoning. He sees that in reasoning there is the explication of what is involved in the conceptions; but he does not notice the laws of comprehension and extension involved in drawing one conception from another or others.

(9) He has a fine exposition of the emotions, dividing them according to the principle of time, -- as immediate, retrospective, and prospective; but be overlooks two essential elements. One is, the idea or phantasm as the basis of the emotion. We cannot have a feeling towards a mother unless we have an idea of her. He is guilty of a greater oversight: he has taken no notice of those springs of action or motive principles, dwelt on by Stewart,-such as the love of self, of our neighbors of society, of power, -- which call forth and guide the emotions in certain channels.

(10) He does not distinguish between our emotions on the one hand and the wishes and volitions on the other, -- a distinction always drawn in one form or other by our highest moralists, and strongly insisted on by Kant and his school in Germany. Surely there is a difference in kind between such an emotion as that of hope or fear on the, one hand and a purpose or determination to act on the other. With Brown, will is merely the prevailing desire, and desire an emotion.

(11) His view of the moral faculty is very defective. It is represented by him as a mere class of emotions. He calls them " emotions of approbation and disapprobation." The very epithets employed by him, "approbation" and " disapprobation, " might have shown that judgment is involved. Conscience is not only an emotive, it is a cognitive power, revealing to us what ought and ought not to be done. Dr. Chalmers shows that be has overlooked the great truth brought out by Butler, that conscience is a power in the mind, not simply co-ordinate with the others, but authoritative and supreme, claiming subjection from all the voluntary powers. Nor ought it to be omitted that be does not bring out fully that the moral faculty declares man to be a sinner. He thus constructed an ethical system, and delivered it in Edinburgh, -- which sometimes {337} claims to be the metropolis of evangelical theology, without a reference to redemption or grace. No teachers ever inculcated a purer moral system than Reid, Stewart, or Brown; but they do not seem willing to look at the fact that man falls infinitely beneath the purity of the moral law. They give us lofty views of the moral power in man, but forget to tell that this power condemns him. Taking up the demonstrations of the Scottish metaphysicians in regard to the conscience, an inquiry should be made,-How are they affected by the circumstance that man is a sinner? This was the grand topic started by Chalmers, and by which he effected a reconciliation between the philosophy and the

theology of Scotland.

(12) He has not been able to give an adequate account of some of the profoundest ideas which the mind of man entertains; such as, that of personal identity, of power in substances, of infinity and moral good. The tendency of his philosophy was counteracted in the next age by Coleridge, Cousin, and Hamilton, drawing largely from German sources.

XLV.-FRANCIS JEFFREY.[85]

FRANCIS JEFFREY was not specially a metaphysician, but he studied metaphysics and wrote upon them, and so deserves a passing notice. He was the son of a depute clerk of the Court of Session, and was born on a " flat " in Charles Street, Edinburgh, October 23, 1773. At the age of eight, he entered (in an intensely excited state) the high school, at that time presided over by Dr. Adam, a scholar and a man of character; and at fourteen be entered Glasgow College with some idea of getting an Oxford exhibition, and there he was under Jardine, the professor of logic and rhetoric, of whom he says:" It is to him and his most judicious instruction I owe my taste for letters, and any literary distinction I may since have been enabled to attain." A fellow-student, afterwards Principal Macfarlan of Glasgow, reports of him that in the first year " he exhibited nothing remarkable, {338} except a decree of quickness, bordering, as some thought, on petulance; " and another fellow-student, afterwards Principal Haldane of St. Andrews, describes him as a little black creature whom he had not observed, but was noticed by him as haranguing some boys on the college green against voting for Adam Smith as lord rector, and who was opposed by young Jeffrey because he was the candidate of the professors. In the second year he broke upon them very brilliantly as one of the most acute and fluent speakers, his favorite subjects being criticism and metaphysics. While at college be was most diligent in writing, in a terribly illegible hand, whole volumes of notes of his professors' lectures, mixed with remarks of his own, and innumerable essays, most of them of a critical character. Francis Jeffrey was absolutely destined to be a critic. Any one might have seen this in these restless eyes, ever scintillating, and might have argued it from his quick and clear apprehension, from his searching spirit and his sound judgment on all subjects not requiring wide comprehension or original genius. On leaving Glasgow, he went home to the "dear, retired, adored little window " of his Lawnmarket garret, and again scribbled papers, sixty of which remained in the time of his biographer. Jeffrey was the genuine product of the lecture-hearing, essay-writing, debating-society privileges of the Scottish colleges. In 1791 he went up to Oxford, the instruction in which, as requiring quiet study and no writing, he did not enjoy so much as that of Glasgow, and he describes his fellow-students as "pedants, coxcombs, and strangers." He eagerly sought when in England to get rid of his Scotch pronunciation, and succeeded in acquiring a clipped and affected English. At the end of the academic year, he went back to Scotland, where he got into the heart of a body of clever and ambitious youths. His peculiar talents were specially called forth by the "

Speculative Society," which had been instituted in 1764, and which reached its highest reputation at the time he attended it; and there he had to wrestle with such men as Francis Horner, Henry Brougham, Lord Lansdowne, and David Boyle, afterwards president of the Court of Session; and Henry Cockburn tells us how enraptured he was with speeches by him on national character, by Horner on the immortality of the soul, and Brougham on the power of Russia. I doubt much whether any of them threw {339} much light on these subjects; but they discussed them ably, and to the great delight of the aspiring youths of Edinburgh. His business consisted in attending law lectures, and his amusement in writing thousands of lines of poetry, the moon being the special object of his admiration among, natural beauties. His ambition then was, " I should like, therefore, to be the rival of Smith and Hume." He joined conscientiously and eagerly the Whig party, which included such men as James Gibson (afterwards Sir James Gibson Craig), the Rev. Sir Henry Wellwood Moncreiff, John Allen, John Thomson in the medical profession, and Dugald Stewart and John Playfair in the college and in doing so he knowingly cut himself off from all hope of receiving government patronage.

We now come to the most important event in his life, the establishment of the " Edinburgh Review," the first number of which appeared in October, 1802. The account is given by Sydney Smith: " One day we happened to meet on the eighth or ninth story or flat [it was actually the third, but the whole party wished to make their descriptions lively and telling] in Buccleuch Place, the elevated residence of the then Mr. Jeffrey. I proposed we should set up a Review: this was acceded to with acclamation. I was appointed editor (not formally), and remained long enough in Edinburgh to edit the first number." The most influential writers were Jeffrey, Smith,[86] Brougham, and Horner; but the ruling spirit and the guiding hand was Jeffrey, who now found the sphere for which he was fitted by native taste and capacity, and for which he had been prepared by his whole training in reading miscellaneously and writing systematically, and in his legal learning. Horner describes him at this period, " when the genius of that little man was almost unknown to all but his roost intimate acquaintances. His manner is not at first pleasing; but, what is worse, it is of that cast which almost irresistibly impresses upon strangers the idea of levity and superficial talents. Yet there is not any man whose real character is so much the reverse. He has, indeed, a very sportive {340} and playful fancy; but it is accompanied with an extensive and varied information, and a readiness of apprehension almost intuitive, with judicious and calm discernment, with a profound and penetrating understanding."

The starting of the " Edinburgh Review," with its blue and yellow cover, undoubtedly constituted an era in the history of literature. There had been magazines and even reviews, such as the earlier " Edinburgh Review," but none of the same comprehensive, independent, and fearless character. Hitherto literary periodicals had been very much the organs of booksellers; but these bold youths undertook to make the publisher their mere agent, and required him to pay decently for the articles. In the first number seven

articles were written by Smith, four by Horner, four commonly ascribed to Brougham, and five by Jeffrey. None of the writers were learned, in the proper sense of the term none of them were engaged in profound investigations: but they were all well informed men, and possessed of brilliant talents, if not of genius. They wrote quickly, easily, clearly, pungently, with quite as much information as their readers wished. The early writers did little fitted to advance science, or the higher forms of literary genius; but they cut down pretension of every kind Unmercifully, and they were ever in favor of good taste and good sense. They have left nothing permanent themselves; but they produced a mighty influence on their own age and through it on the succeeding age. They failed to discover the rising genius of Byron; they did not appreciate Wordsworth; they did not encourage the study of Goethe,[87] and of the great German writers; they ridiculed {341} missionary effort when it appeared in the churches, and proclaimed that heathen nations must be civilized before they can be Christianized, -- as if to teach men that they have a soul were not the most potent means of awakening thought and thereby starting civilization. But the " Review" promoted a healthy tone of writing and a liberal spirit in politics, and helped more than any other literary organ to effect a reform in the legislature. From this Lime forth, Francis Jeffrey became the terror of all authors about to publish, and of all bigoted Tory politicians. While thus an object of dread to strangers, be seems to have been loved by all who knew him. He was editor of the " Review" for twenty-seven years, and wrote two hundred and sixty-one articles. He published a selection from these in 1843.

Though obnoxious to the government of the day, and without political or family patronage, and not a favorite with some of the old writers to the signet who had the means of sending cases to him or keeping them back, he rose steadily at the bar, and in the course of years stood in the first rank. He was well read in law, was particularly fitted to discuss questions of right and equity, was clear and philosophical in his arrangement, ingenious in his arguments, fluent in utterance, tasteful in language, ready at reply, poignant in repartee, and sharp in his strokes of with judges came to appreciate his legal ability, juries liked his point and life, and church courts enjoyed his ingenious defences of bad causes, which he was often called to defend.

We are now arrived at the second great literary epoch of the capital of Scotland. In the first, that of the last half of the previous century, had appeared a number of grave and thinking men, each striking out a path for himself. This second consisted of a brilliant circle of writers, critics, and talkers. They formed a club of which Scott, Jeffrey, Stewart, Playfair, Sydney Smith, Brougham, the " Man of Feeling," Cockburn, {342} Horner, Alison, and Thomas Brown were members. In this circle, the two most eminent men were Walter Scott, the poet and reputed novelist, and Francis Jeffrey, the critic. " Edinburgh was at that time, to a far greater extent than it is now the resort of the families of the gentry, who used to leave their country residences and enjoy the gayety and the fashion which their presence tended

to promote. Many of the curious characters and habits of the preceding age -- the last purely Scotch age that Scotland was destined to see-still lingered among us." After this time the ambitious youths of Scotland trooped to London, and left Edinburgh as specially a lawyers' city, relieved by a healthy mixture of university professors, of eminent doctors, and high-class teachers. When Jeffrey's professional income became large, he had as his residence Craigcrook, three miles north west of Edinburgh, on the eastern slope of the Corstorphine Hill, and he lived there thirty-four seasons. Thither a select but miscellaneous band of visitors resorted on the Saturday afternoons " The Craigcrook party began to assemble about three, each taking to his own enjoyment. The bowling-green was sure to have its matches in which the host joined with skill and keenness; the garden had its loiterers; the wall, not forgetting the wall of yellow roses, their worshippers; the hill its prospect seekers. The banquet that followed was generous; the-wines never spared, but rather too various; mirth unrestrained except by propriety; the talk always good, but never ambitious, and those listening in no disrepute."

As he had promoted the cause of parliamentary reform so steadily and consistently, there was an appropriateness in his being sent to the House of Commons, where he spoke in behalf of the Reform Bill, and, after the Reform Bill passed, in his being the representative of the city of Edinburgh. One of the great speeches in behalf of the bill was by him, and he carried through the Scotch Reform Bill and the Borough Reform measure. Still his career in Parliament was not eminently successful. I remember that, when he was first sent to St. Stephen's, the question was eagerly discussed in Edinburgh, whether their great literary critic was likely to prove a parliamentary states man and orator, when Chalmers decided, " he wants momentum." He retired from the House of Commons in 1834, and became a judge, his decisions being always wise and weighty. In particular {343} he defended the ancient rights and the independence of the church of Scotland in a very able paper, showing that he had a very clear apprehension of the distinction between the spiritual and temporal powers. When between four and five hundred ministers threw up their livings rather than submit to have the spiritual privileges of the church and the liberties of the people trampled on, he exclaimed: " I am proud of my country." He died January, 1850, giving so far as is known no religious sign either in life or in death.

In his " Contributions to the Edinburgh Review," he has a number of articles on metaphysical subjects. He has a long review, afterwards republished in the " Encyclopaedia Britannica," of Alison on Taste. He argues against the notion of beauty being a simple sensation, or the object of a separate and peculiar faculty, and urges the difference of tastes as a proof of this: an analogous argument might show that there was no faculty to discern truth or moral good. He also opposes the idea of beauty being a real property of objects. He then expounds his own theory. " In our opinion, then, our sense of beauty depends entirely on our previous experience of simpler pleasures or emotions, and consists in the <suggestion> of agreeable or interesting sensations with

which we had formerly been made familiar by the direct and intelligible agency of our common sensibilities; and that vast variety of objects to which we give the name of beautiful become entitled to that appellation, merely because they all possess the power of recalling or reflecting those sensations of which they have been the accompaniments, or with which they have been associated in our imagination by any other more casual bond of connection." This theory differs slightly from that of Alison; but is not an improvement of it, and is liable to the same objections. In one point, he seems to have the advantage of the author he reviews. Jeffrey holds the perception of beauty " to be, in most cases, quite instantaneous, and altogether as immediate as the perception of the external qualities of the object to which it is ascribed." I believe that Alison is right when he says that there is a flow of imagination; but then there must be something to start it, and this something -- be it a color, a form, a sound, a harmony -- raises a feeling at once, and is entitled to be called beautiful. He maintains that objects are sublime or beautiful when, along with other qualities, {344} they act as " natural signs and perpetual concomitants of pleasurable sensations, or, at any rate, of some lively feeling or emotion in ourselves, or in some other sentient beings." I am inclined to think that beautiful objects act as signs, but they do so by suggesting ideas of the true and the good.

He has a review of Priestley, and in it examines materialism. He shows that " the qualities of matter are perceived, but perception cannot be perceived." " If the eye and the ear, with their delicate structures and fine sensibility, are but vehicles and apparatus, why should the attenuated and unknown tissues of the cerebral nerves be supposed to be any thing else?" "Their proposition is, not that motion produces sensation, which might be as well in the mind as in the body, -- but that sensation is motion, and that all the phenomena of thought and perception are intelligently accounted for by saying that they are certain little shakings in the pulpy part of the brain." There may be little shakings in the brain for any thing we know, and there may even be shakings of a different kind accompanying every act of thought or perception; but that the shakings themselves <are> the thought or perception we are so far from admitting that we find it absolutely impossible to comprehend what is meant by the assertion."

He has a review of Stewart's " Life of Reid " and of Stewart's Philosophical Essays." He writes in the most laudatory terms of both, and of the Scotch philosophy generally. But he ventures to criticise them, and blames Reid for multiplying without necessity the number of original principles and affections: he sees no reason for admitting a principle of credulity or a principle of veracity in human nature, or for interpreting natural signs. He commends his exemplary diligence and success in subverting the ideal system, but adds: " We must confess that we have not been able to perceive how the destruction of the ideal can be held as a demonstration of the real existence of matter," -- as if Reid had ever claimed that it did so, or as if he had not expressly rested our belief on

body on the principle of common sense. He labors to show that mental science cannot bring with it any solid issues, and represents " the lofty estimate which Mr. Stewart has made of the <practical> of his favorite study as one of those splendid visions by which men of genius have been so often misled in the enthusiastic pursuit of {345} science and virtue." No doubt psychology cannot directly add to our animal comforts, as chemistry can, but surely when we know approximately and <provisionary> (which is all we know in chemistry) the laws of the senses, of memory, of association, imagination, judgment, reasoning, feeling, and conscience, we may get <practical> benefits of another kind in being better able to regulate our own minds and influence the minds of others. On one point he seems rather to have the advantage of Stewart. In his review of Stewart's " Life and Writings of Reid," he maintains that it is principally by <experiment>, and not by mere observation, that those splendid improvements have been made which have erected so vast a trophy to the prospective genius of Bacon." Stewart replied, in his " Philosophical Essays " and " Dissertation," showing that experiment is a species of observation and that mind can be and has been experimented on: " Hardly any experiment can be imagined which has not already been tried by the hand of nature." But Jeffrey has a truth which however, he has not elaborated successfully. The physical investigator has much more accurate tests than the mental philosopher in the means which modern science has provided for weighing and measuring the results; and this, I apprehend, is the main reason for the fact that there is less disputing about physical than mental laws. On the other hand, we have more immediate, constant, and familiar access to our thoughts and feelings than we have to any facts of natural philosophy; and thus our knowledge of mind, scientific and practical, may, without being so much observed by the vulgar, be as useful as our knowledge of physics, as it may at all times be restraining and constraining us, though unconsciously, and enabling us to sway the minds and actions of others. {346}

XLVI.-SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH.[88]

"I /WAS\ born," he tells us, " at Aldowrie, on the banks of Loch Ness within seven miles of the town of Inverness, in Scotland, on the 26th of October, 1765." His father was a subaltern and younger brother, possessed of a small family property, and his mother was pressed with many anxieties; but she and the whole female kindred combined to lavish kindness upon the child and possibly fondled him too much. In 1775, he was sent to the school at Fortrose. The boarding mistress was very pious and orthodox, and at times rebuked the usher who was suspected of some heretical opinions. He betook himself early to reading thoughtful works, some of them beyond his years, such as Burnet on the Thirty-Nine Articles, and he formed opinions of his own, and became a warm advocate for free-will.

"About the same time," be says,

"I read the old translation (called Dryden's) of Plutarch's 'Lives' and Echard's 'Roman History.' I well

remember that the perusal of the last led me into a ridiculous habit. from which I shall never be totally free. I used to fancy myself emperor of Constantinople. I distributed offices and provinces amongst my school fellows; I loaded my favorites with dignity and power, and I often made the objects of my dislike feel the weight of my imperial resentment. I carried on the series of political events in solitude for several hours;. I resumed them, and continued them from day to day for months. Ever since, I have been more prone to building castles in the air than most others. My castle-building bas always been of a singular kind. It was not the anticipation of a sanguine disposition, expecting extraordinary success in its pursuits. My disposition is not sanguine, and my visions have generally regarded things as much unconnected with my ordinary pursuits and as little to be expected as the crown of Constantinople at the school of Fortrose. These fancies, indeed, have never amounted to conviction, or, in other words, they have never influenced my actions; but I must confess that they have often been as steady and of as regular recurrence as conviction itself, and that they have sometimes created a little faint expectation, a state of mind in which my wonder that they should be realized would not be so great as it rationally ought to be. The indulgence of this dreaming propensity produces good and bad consequences. It produces indolence, improvidence, cheerfulness; a study is its favorite scene; and I have no doubt that many a man, surrounded by piles of folios and apparently engaged in the most profound researches, is in reality often employed in distributing the offices and provinces of the empire of Constantinople." {347}

The instruction he received at school was loose and far from accurate. " Whatever I have done beyond has been since added by my own irregular reading But no subsequent circumstance could make up for that invaluable habit of vigorous and methodical industry which the indulgence and irregularity of my school life prevented me from acquiring, and of which I have painfully felt the want in every part of my life." In 1780 he went to college at Aberdeen. " I bought and read three or four books this first winter, which were very much out of the course of boys of fifteen anywhere, but most of all at Aberdeen. Among them was Priestley's " Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion," and Beattie's " Essay on Truth," which confirmed my disposition to metaphysical inquiries, and Warburton's " Divine Legation," which delighted me more than any book I had yet read, and which perhaps tainted my mind with a fondness for the twilight of historical hypothesis, but which certainly inspired me with that passion for investigating the history of opinions which has influenced my reading through life. At the college he formed an intimacy with a most engaging and promising youth, Robert Hall, who afterwards became the most brilliant preacher of his age. " His society and conversation had a great influence on my mind; our controversies were almost unceasing. We lived in the same house, and we were both very disputatious. He led me to the perusal of Jonathan Edwards's book on Free Will, which Dr.

Priestley had pointed out before. I am sorry that I never got the other works of that most extraordinary man, who, in a metaphysical age or country, would certainly have been deemed as much the boast of America as his great countryman Franklin." In their joint studies the two youths read much of Xenophon and Herodotus and more of Plato; and so well was this known -- exciting admiration in some, in others envy- that it was not unusual, as they went along, for their class-fellows to point at them and say: " There go Plato and Herodotus." But the arena in which they met most frequently was that of morals and metaphysics. "After having sharpened their weapons by reading, they often repaired to the spacious sands upon the sea-shore, and still more frequently to the picturesque scenery on the banks of the Don above the old town, to discuss with eagerness the various subjects to which their attention had been directed. There was scarcely an important {348} position in Berkeley's "Minute Philosopher," or Butler's " Analogy," or in Edwards on the Will, over which they had not thus debated with the utmost intensity. Night after night, nay month after month, for two seasons, they met only to study or dispute, yet no unkindly feeling ensued." (Gregory's " Memoir of Robert Hall.")

In 1784 he entered on the study of medicine, and was under the famous Dr. Cullen, but attached himself to the fancies of John Brown, author of the Brunonian system, which had its little day. At Edinburgh he became a member of the famous Speculative Society, which did so much to stimulate the intellectual life of young men. He is able to testify of Edinburgh University, " that it is not easy to conceive a university where industry was more general, where reading was more fashionable, and where indolence and ignorance were more disreputable. Every mind was in a state of fermentation. The direction of mental activity will not indeed be universally approved. It certainly was very much, though not exclusively, pointed towards metaphysical inquiries." To the " Royal Physical Society," he read a paper on the instincts and dispositions of animals, and showed that animals had memory, imagination, and reason in different degrees; declining to enter on the difficult question: "To what circumstance are we to attribute the intellectual superiority of man over other animals?" He took his medical degree with credit, but it does not appear that he ever had the taste for the patient observation of physiological facts which would have made him eminent in the profession. It is quite clear that, while a hard student, he mingled freely in the excesses for which the Edinburgh lawyers and students were noted at that period. It is proper to add that, when in Edinburgh, he attended the lectures of Dugald Stewart, with whom he carried on an occasional correspondence through life.

He was now seized with the disposition attributed to his countrymen of going south when they have to seek a settlement for life, and he went to London in the spring of 1788. There he meant to follow the medical profession, but he was easily turned aside from it. He became deeply interested in the politics of the time, which took their direction from the revolt of the American colonies, and from the fermentation preceding the revolutionary outburst in France. He listened eagerly to the {349} orations of Burke

and Sheridan; and became a speaker him self in one of the numerous political societies of the period. He was led by his social dispositions to mingle in the society that was open to him. "His company was sought after, and few were the occupations which induced him willingly to decline a pleasant invitation." Feeling a difficulty in sustaining him self, he sold his little highland estate, and bravely entered into the state of matrimony. He now betook himself to the study of the law, and, had he kept to it steadily, would undoubtedly have risen to great eminence in certain departments of it requiring thought and lofty eloquence. But an opportunity now presented itself to call forth his special gifts, and enable him at once to rise to distinction.

About this time there was a wide difference of opinion in England in regard to the tendency and influence of the French Revolution. Young minds of a liberal tendency were strongly impressed with the need of political reformation in France. But, as the revolution advanced, not a few who at first favored it became alarmed at the infidelity and the cruel excesses. Burke, in particular, denounced the whole movement in language of extraordinary power and eloquence in his " Reflections." But multitudes were not disposed to abandon the hope which they cherished. Many were the replies to Burke, but they were all feeble compared with that now issued, in April, 1791, -- the " Vindiciae Gallicae," by Mackintosh. The work has not the magnificent glow of Burke; but it is philosophical and eloquent, and had a rapid and wide circulation. At a later date, when some Frenchmen at Paris complimented him on the " Vindiciae Gallicae," he replied: " Messieurs, vous m'avez si bien refute."

In 1795 he was called to the bar, and gradually acquired a considerable practice. But his native tendency was still toward speculation, and in 1799 he delivered a course of thirty-nine "Lectures on the Law of Nature and Nations." This work does not exhaust the grand topic of which it treats; but it was a most important contribution to the science of natural and international law, and furnished ample evidence of the eminently philosophical mind of the author. " The foundation of moral government and its tests he examined at great length and with much acuteness; he entered into a question which, many years after, received from him almost as much elucidation as can be {350} hoped, -- the relation of conscience and utility as the guides of moral conduct; he showed the vanity of every system that would sacrifice the particular affections to general benevolence; the origin and use of rules and of habits to the moral being." Parr wrote him a characteristic letter: " You dog, nobody can do it better; nobody I say, -- not Hume, not Adam Smith, not Burke, not Dugald Stewart; and the only exception I can think of is Lord Bacon. Yet, you dog, I hate you, for you want decision. 0 Jimmy! feel your own powers, assert your dignity, out upon vanity and cherish pride." In writing to Dugald Stewart about the state of philosophical opinion at this time (1802), he says: " One might give a just account of the state of learning at Paris, by saying that the mathematical and physical sciences were very actively and successfully cultivated, polite literature neglected, erudition extinct, and that moral and political

speculation were discountenanced by the government and had ceased to interest the public." " Germany is metaphysically mad. France has made some poor efforts which have ended in little more than the substitution of the word ideology for metaphysics."

His next great effort was his defence of M. Peltier, an emigrant royalist, for a libel on Napoleon Bonaparte, at that time first consul of France. His oration is regarded by some as one of the most eminent displays of forensic eloquence which modern times have produced. But he has now to consider two very important points,-- one is how he is to execute what he intends to make his life-work, and the other is how is he to get a living suited to his tastes and habits. He has all along been cherishing ambitious literary projects, not always very clearly defined, but pointing towards a great work on moral philosophy and a history of England or certain eras of it. But these schemes could not very well be carried into execution by one who had to toil at the bar. And then he was fond of society, and had not sufficient moral restraint to curb expenditure. In these circumstances he was led to accept (1804) the office of Recorder of Bombay, which was handsomely offered by the tory government, and he became Sir James Mackintosh. He thought he would now be able to undertake and complete, as he expressed it, " my intended work on morals and politics, which I consider as the final cause of my existence." But his hopes were not realized. He had not sufficient decision to contend with the relaxing {351} influence of the climate. " Our climate may be endured: but I feel that, by its constant though silent operation, existence is rendered less joyous and even less comfortable. I see around me no extraordinary prevalence of disease, but I see no vigorous cheerful health." He longed for letters from England and wrote letters to his friends which are full of thought. Philosophy is my trade, though I have hitherto been but a poor workman, I observe you touch me with the spur once or twice about my book on morals; I felt it gall me, for I have not begun; and I shall not make any promises to you till I can say that it is well begun: but I tell you what has either really or apparently to myself retarded me; it was the restless desire of thoroughly mastering the <accursed> German philosophy." "It is vain to despise them. Their opinions will, on account of their number and novelty, occupy more pages in the history of philosophy than those of us humble disciples of Locke and Hartley. Besides, their abilities are not really contemptible. It seems to me that I am bound not only to combat these new adversaries, but to explain the principle and ground of their hostility, which is in itself a most curious confutation in detail."

He discharges the duties of his office, and instituted the Literary Society at Bombay and had a plan for forming a comparative vocabulary of Indian languages, read a great number and variety of books, and often writes critiques upon them, some of them distinguished by great ability and worthy of being preserved in a more permanent form than in the memoir written by his son. In philosophy, he reads Reinhold, Tiedemann, and says: " I shall begin with Descartes" `Meditations' and `Objections,' Spinoza, Hobbes on `Human Nature,' Berkeley's `Principles' and `Dialogues,' Hume on

`Human Nature,' then Kant." " The German philosophy, under its present leader Schelling, has reached a degree of darkness in comparison of which Kant was noonday. Kant, indeed, perplexed all Europe; but he is now disdainfully rejected by his countrymen as a superficial and popular writer "! While engaged in this reading, he says: " My nature would have been better consulted, if I had been placed in a quieter situation, where speculation might have been my business, and visions of the fair and good my chief recreation." I venture to affirm that, if be had been placed in such a position, he would not have remained in it a month. He {352} remembers the feelings and projects of his youth, when "my most ardent ambition was to have been a professor of moral philosophy." He writes to Dugald Stewart: " I am now employed in attempting to throw into order some speculations, on the origin of our notions of space and time, of poor Tom Wed wood." "I am very desirous of seeing what you say on the theory of ethics. I am now employed on what the Germans have said on that subject. They agree with you in rejecting the doctrine of personal or public interest, and in considering the moral principle as an ultimate law. I own to you that I am not a whit more being a Kantian than I was before; yet I think much more highly of Kant's philosophical genius than I did when I less comprehended his writings." He reads one hundred pages of Fichte's Lectures on " The Characteristic Features of the present Age," " a very ingenious book with most striking parts." " Finished Fichte, -- a book, certainly, of extraordinary merit, but so mysterious and dogmatical as to be often unintelligible and often offensive. Read one hundred pages of Kieswetter's I Introduction to the Kantian Philosophy.' It is the first clear book on this subject which I have seen." I have given so many extracts from his journal and letters, because they exhibit so vividly the process through which in that age many a young mind had to pass, in trying to cross from the British to the German philosophy.

Thus did he pass eight years of his life. He returned to England in 1812; and, as his opinions had undergone consider able modification since he wrote against Burke, he had flattering political offers from Perceval and Canning. But he conscientiously stuck by his whig friends and whig principles. He was soon in the whirl of London society, the charms of which he could not resist. He and Madame de Stael became for a season the most brilliant conversers in the literary and political circles. " She treats me as the person whom she most delights to honor: I am generally ordered with her to dinner, as one orders beans and bacon; I have in consequence dined with her at the houses of nearly all the cabinet ministers." Through the influence of his whig friends, he became M. P. for the County of Nairn, and in the House of Commons promoted every liberal measure, and, from time to time, made speeches of a very high order,-- in thought, expression, in tone, far above the {353} ordinary level of statesmen. He also wrote miscellaneous articles in the " Edinburgh Review." But what of his cherished work? He had not formally abandoned it. But he had not the courage to resist the pleasures of society, and the excitement of politics, and devote himself to what he knew to be his proper sphere.

Two opportunities presented themselves for returning to his favorite philosophic pursuits. In 1818 he was appointed professor of law and general politics in the college instituted for the education of the civil servants of the East India Company at Haileybury. There he treated of moral science, dividing it into ethics and jurisprudence; and of law, civil, criminal, and constitutional. He did not commit his lectures to writing, and nothing is preserved of them but the barest outline. Another opportunity, and the last, presented itself. On the death of Thomas Brown in May, 1820, he was offered the chair of moral philosophy, in the university of Edinburgh. It was the very place for him. He would have been one of the three mighty men in the capital of Scotland, the others being Walter Scott and Francis Jeffrey. He would have been constrained to complete his philosophical reading, and thoroughly work out his system, and might have left works worthy of being ranked with those of Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton, though not equal to the first and last of these in originality. But he is sucked back into the amenities of London society and the agitations of politics.

He was the favorite of every society he entered, by his good-nature, his urbanity, his extensive knowledge, his keen sense of the ludicrous, his pleasant humor, his good-natured wit, and his profound wisdom. As a parliamentary orator, he was thoughtful, always thoughtful; and thoughtful bearers were pleased to notice that he was evidently thinking as he spoke. His speeches had also the charm of elegant diction and brilliant illustration. But for popular effect they were too candid, and wanted coarseness, invective, satire, and passion. His whig friends never made him a member of the cabinet, and Sir James Scarlet commented: "There is a certain degree of merit which is more convenient for reward than the highest." The students of Glasgow University paid him an appropriate honor when they elected him lord rector. At length be set {354} himself vigorously to write a history of England. The work is calm, candid, full of fine generalizations and analyses of character; but wants liveliness of narrative, and a searching detection of motives, especially bad motives, -- he was too charitable, or, rather, too genial, to believe in human wickedness. His greatest work might have been a " History of the Revolution in England," as he had such a sympathy with the wisdom and moderation of the event , but he left the book unfinished. He was persuaded with some difficulty to write a " Dissertation of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy," for a new edition of the " Encyclopedia Britannica." He took an active part in promoting Catholic emancipation and the Reform Bill. He was now evidently hastening to fulfil the grand work which he had allotted to himself. But he was seized with illness ere he completed it. He had not identified himself much with the religion of Jesus in his life, but he turned to it at his dying hours. His son reports: " He would speak of God with more reverence and awe than I have almost ever met with." "Our Lord Jesus was very frequently the subject of his thoughts; he seemed often perplexed and unable to comprehend much of his history. He once said to me: 'It is a great mystery to me, -- I cannot understand it.' " " His difficulty lay in the account given

of the manner in which he became the Saviour of men." " I said to him at one time: 'Jesus Christ loves you;' he answered slowly and pausing between each word: `Jesus Christ -- love -- the same thing.' After a long silence, he said: `I believe-' We said, in a voice of inquiry: 'In God?' He answered: ' In Jesus.' He spoke but once more after this."

We have very imperfect means of knowing what his philosophy would have been had he fully formed it. We can judge of it only by the skeleton of his lectures at Haileybury, preserved in the Memoir, and by his historical and critical dissertation in the Encyclopaedia. He has a clear idea of the end to be served by ethical science " Not what <is>, but what <ought to be>. Here a new world opens on the mind: the word, the idea, <ought> has no resemblance to any object of natural science; no more than colors to sound, not so much. Both are phenomena. The question by what rules the voluntary actions of men ought to be governed. This important word ought, which represents no fact, is yet intelligible to all mankind; a correspondent term in {355} every language, -- the terms `right,' `wrong,' `moral,' `immoral,' `duty,' `crime,' `virtue,' `vice,' `merit,' `demerit,' distinguished and contrasted." He has evidently kept three ends before him in his " Dissertation: " The progress of the science, especially during the two previous centuries a critical examination of the more eminent ethical writers and an exposition of his own views. These three ends are not kept separate, but run through the whole work. We may first take a cursory view of the historical exposition, and then critically examine his own theory.

He has a retrospect of ancient ethics. His sketches are not equal to those of Adam Smith in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments," but are worthy of being placed near them. They are not very erudite or very profound, but they are by no means superficial. He can sketch admirably the practical tendency of a philosophic system such as that of the Stoics. He has then a retrospect of scholastic ethics. It could scarcely be expected of a whig that he should have much reverence for mediaeval times; but, in his treatment of the schoolmen, he is appreciative in the highest degree of their excellencies. It is evident that he has not that thorough acquaintance with their discussions and individual opinions which later research on the part of historians of philosophy and of the church might have enabled him to attain. He enters on a more congenial theme when he comes to modern times.

He begins with Grotius and Hobbes, of both of whom he has a high admiration, but remarks of Hobbes' system, that " a theory of man which comprehends in its explanations neither the social affections nor the moral sentiments must be owned to be sufficiently defective." He then enters on the controversies concerning the moral faculties and social affections, and gives a critical exposition of Cumberland, Cudworth, Clarke, Shaftesbury, Bossuet, Fenelon, Leibnitz, Malebranche, Edwards, and Buffier. He has formed a higher estimate of the merits of Edwards than most Europeans, whether British or German. He had studied the " Treatise on the Will " when a student in Aberdeen, and he favors the view taken by Edwards that virtue consists in love to being

as being, according as being has claims on it. But whence the claims of being? An answer to this question must bring us, whether we wish or no, to an ethical {356} principle guiding the direction and flow of the affection. The discussion by Edwards is certainly a very profound one, and he brings out deep truths of which Mackintosh did not discover the importance.

He goes on to men who are represented as laying the foundations of a more just theory of ethics; that is, as approaching nearer the theory of Mackintosh. He gives just and valuable accounts of the systems of Butler, Hutcheson, Berkeley, Hume, Smith, Price, Hartley, Tucker, Paley, Bentham, Stewart, and Brown. He perhaps, exaggerates the originality of Butler, who was much indebted to Shaftesbury, but passed far beyond him in maintaining the supremacy of conscience. " In these sermons he has taught truths more capable of being exactly distinguished from the doctrines of his predecessors, more satisfactorily established by him, more comprehensively applied to particulars, more rationally connected with each other, and, therefore, more worthy of the name of discovery, than any with which we are acquainted; if we ought not, with some hesitation, to accept the first steps of Grecian philosophy towards a theory of morals." Mackintosh does not seem to be aware that, lofty as was Berkeley's idealism in its moral tone, his ethical system is based on pleasure as the ultimate good. " Sensual pleasure is the <summum bonum>. This is the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the gospels, may clearly be demonstrated. Sensual pleasures, qua pleasure, is good and desirable by a wise man. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not <qua> pleasure, but <qua> pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure." (" Berkeley's Works, by Fraser, vol. iv. 457). He has a great admiration of Hartley, but points out his defects. ,The work of Dr. Hartley entitled `Observations on Man' is distinguished by an uncommon union of originality with modesty in unfolding a simple and fruitful principle of human nature. It is disfigured by the ab surd affectation of mathematical forms then prevalent; and it is encumbered by a mass of physiological speculations, ground less, or at best uncertain." He was particularly struck with the shrewdness and graphic though homely illustrations of Tucker, who was always a great favorite with him. He criticises Bentham at considerable length. He blames him, in particular, for maintaining that, " because the principle of utility {357} forms a necessary part of every moral theory, it ought therefore to be the chief motive of human conduct." But he has not seized on the fundamental defect in Bentham's theory, for he himself has so far given in to it by reckoning tendency to produce happiness as the constituent of virtue. As setting so high a value on the social affections, he was specially offended with Mr. James Mill, who" derives the whole theory of government from the single fact that every man pursues his interest when he knows it."

Altogether, these sketches have not the calm wisdom nor some of the other admirable qualities of those drawn by Dugald Stewart, who had evidently devoted his life to the study, and contemplated the subject on all sides. But they

are often searching, generally just, and always candid, sympathetic, and comprehensive.

He criticises the ethical writers, as we might expect, by a standard of his own, which is ever cropping out, and at the close of his dissertation he expounds his own theory. He insists, very properly, on a distinction being drawn between the inquiry into right and wrong, and into the mental power which discerns them. In answer to the first, he maintains that virtue consists in beneficial tendency, and to the second that it consists of a class of feelings gendered by association. In both these points, he goes a step in the descending progress beyond Brown, who makes moral good a simple unresolvable quality, and the feeling of moral approbation an original one. I propose to consider both these points in the reverse order to that which he follows.

(1) He lays down the principle that morality is not affected by the way in which we explain the rise of the moral emotion, whether we trace it to moral reason, to an original feeling, or to association. I am not prepared to give in to this. If it is to be ascribed with Brown to mere feeling, it will always be competent to argue that the distinction between good and evil depends on human temperament, and does not imply an original, a necessary, and eternal distinction between good and evil. If it is regarded with Mackintosh, as a mere feeling gendered by association, then it is simply the product of circumstances, and may shift with circumstances. It is vain on this theory to appeal, as Mackintosh would wish to do, to conscience as having {358} authority, and supreme authority; it has merely the authority of association, and cannot claim the authority of God, or even of our essential constitution. I rather think that Mackintosh would have shrunk from his doctrine, had he foreseen how physiologists, by means of heredity and undesigned natural selection, manufacture moral feeling out of animal sensations. The authority of conscience depends on the source from which it is derived.

According to Brown, conscience is a mere class of feelings, and Mackintosh follows him. But Mackintosh makes the feelings to be gendered by association. In order to support this theory, he is obliged to give to association a larger power than was given to it even by Brown. He correct, the erroneous but prevalent notion, that the law of association produces only such a close union of thought as gives one the power of reviving the other; " and insists that " it forms them into a new compound, in which the properties of the component parts are no longer discoverable, and which may itself become a substantive principle of human nature. They supposed the condition, produced by its power, to resemble that of material substances in a state of mechanical diffusion; whereas, in reality, it may be better likened to a chemical combination of the same substances from which a totally new product arises" (Sect.VII). But what does he mean by association? I suppose merely the succession of ideas. The laws of the association of ideas are merely the laws of their succession. It is quite a straining of the word to give association the power of creating a new idea. We place oxygen and hydrogen in a certain relation to each other, and

water is the product; and the water possesses properties not discernible in the elements separately. But chemists do not ascribe this to the mere association of the two: they derive it from the properties of the oxygen and the hydrogen. In like manner when a new idea springs up, we are not to attribute it to the association of feelings, but to a property of the feelings, a property proceeding from a power actual or potential. We have thus to go back to a power deeper and more fundamental, and to get a source of ideas, not in mere association, but in the <intellectus ipse> of Leibnitz, or in the feelings themselves; and this is the moral power.

(2) If we thus prove that there is an original moral faculty {359} of the nature of moral perception, discerning between good and evil, we are in a position to settle the further question: Whether virtue can be resolved into benevolence? Mackintosh stands up for the existence and authority of conscience as a class of feeling. He holds that our business is to follow conscience, even when we do not see the consequences of the acts we perform. But what is the common quality in the acts which conscience approves of? He maintains that, in the last resort, it is beneficial tendency which distinguishes virtuous acts, and dispositions from those which we call vicious. He allows that the virtuous man may not see the beneficial consequences of the acts he performs, that the man who speaks truth may never think that to speak truth leads to happiness: he does it simply because it is right. Still, if we inquire into it, it will be found that beneficial tendency is the essential quality in virtuous acts. I dispute this statement, appealing to conscience as the arbiter. For conscience affirms that justice, that veracity, that candor, are good, quite as much so as benevolence itself, and it is difficult, I believe impossible, to resolve justice and the virtues embraced under it, such as veracity and the love of truth, into benevolence.

Altogether Sir James Mackintosh never fulfilled the expectations that were formed by Robert Hall and his other friends. He went from medicine to law, and from law to politics; and with first-rate intellectual powers, failed to reach the highest positions in any one of these departments. He was without firmness of purpose to resist temptation and concentrate his energies on what he acknowledged to be his life-work, and so was at the mercy of circumstances, and attained the highest eminence only as a <talker> in the best social circles of London, where he had a perpetual stimulus to excel. If he had only had the courage to devote himself to what he knew to be his forte, but which could not bring him immediate fame; had he read systematically, instead of discursively, and made himself as well acquainted with the higher forms of the Greek and German philosophy, as he did with the later forms and of British philosophy, -- he might have ranked with the highest thinkers of his age, As it is he has left us little that will endure beyond these able and candid sketches of ethical writers. {360}

XLVII. -- HENRY (LORD) BROUGHAM.[89]

L/ORD\ B/ROUGHAM\ was born in Scotland, was the son of

a Scotch mother, was trained in the Scotch metaphysics, and employed them with advantage in his work on natural theology, and was swayed by them, often unconsciously, in his addresses at scientific associations, in his speeches, his sketches of statesmen and philosophers, and in his legal opinions and decisions which, when they relate to moral themes, are evidently founded on sound ethical principles, caught from Stewart and the Scottish professors. We are therefore entitled to claim him as belonging to the fraternity.

He was born in Edinburgh, September, 1779. His father was Henry Brougham, of Brougham Hall, Westmoreland, who came to Edinburgh after the death of his first wife, and there married Eleanor Lyme, a niece of Principal Robertson, the historian. He was educated at the high school of Edinburgh, where he early showed his great capacity and his power of application. At the university he devoted himself closely and systematically to higher learning, and at times took excessive fits of study. If tradition speaks true, he had also fits of drinking, from the visible effects of which he was kept by his strong mind and bodily constitution. He attended Dugald Stewart's lectures; and we see traces of a happy influence produced on his restless temper by the calm, moral wisdom of that true philosopher and great teacher. But he was specially addicted to physical and mathematical studies, and profited greatly by the instructions of Play fair, Black, and Robison. " Great as was the pleasure and solid advantage of studying under such men as Playfair and Stewart, the gratification of attending one of Black's last courses exceeded all I ever enjoyed." At a very early age, from sixteen to twenty, he had papers on optics and porisms inserted in the " Philosophical Transactions " of Edinburgh. He acquired at this time an immense body of information which be turned to profitable use as a pleader and a statesman, and which greatly increased his usefulness. No doubt his admirers ascribed to him, and he probably ascribed to himself, a larger amount of learning than he really possessed: still he had attained and mastered a vast amount of real knowledge. He continued all his life an ardent and laborious student; and he had laid, in his college days, a solid foundation on which to build his acquirements.

He became, as we might expect, a stirring member of the Speculative Society, which at that time embraced, among its younger members, Jeffrey, Horner, Murray, Moncreiff, Miller, Loch, Adam, Cockburn, Jardine, Charles (afterwards Lord) Kinnaird, Lord Webb Seymour, and at a some what later date the two Grants, Glenelg and his brother Sir Robert. " After the day's work we would adjourn to the Apollo Club, where the orgies were more of the 'high jinks' than of the calm or philosophical debating order, or to Johnny Dow's, celebrated for oysters. Sometimes, if not generally, these nocturnal meetings had endings that in no small degree {361} disturbed the tranquillity of the good town of Edinburgh." He became a member of the Society of Advocates in 1800, and in 1808 he was called to the bar at Lincoln's Inn, London. The profession was at first distasteful to him in the highest degree, but he soon got reconciled to it when it brought him into scenes of excitement, as when he became counsellor to the Princess Caroline, and earned such fame by his defence

of her.

There would be no propriety in our entering into the details of his London life, where he espoused the liberal side in politics, became member of parliament, and compelled all men to acknowledge at once that he was a debater of extraordinary power. His eloquence was of a very marked kind, full, elaborate, yet pointed and telling. His sentences were complex, often taking in a mighty sweep of arguments and facts; and people wondered how lie was ever to get out of the labyrinth in which he had involved himself, but in the end he always came out perspicuous. His clear arrangement of a difficult subject, the fulness of his information, gained the judgment, while his massive language made the whole argument come down with the power of a sledge-hammer, His speeches did resemble thunder quite as much as those of any modern orator; and if Demosthenes "fulmined" over Greece, Brougham "fulmined" over Westminster Hall and St. Stephen's, and popular meetings all over England. His sarcasm was very biting and his invective terrific, and the effect was increased by a nervous curl of the lip, resembling the snarl of a dog. He had every quality of a great orator except tenderness and pathos.

He was a powerful (the most powerful in his day) advocate of every measure of reform, political and social. He uttered the most withering denunciations of slavery; he advocated law reform, and parliamentary reform, and took a deep interest in education and in all social questions, -- becoming president of the Social Science Congress. But perhaps his greatest work was the formation of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, which did so much to extend a knowledge of literature and science and promote reading among the people.

His vast powers, however, were greatly marred by certain weaknesses. He was impelled by a fiery intellect to constant labor, and was often busy when he might have carried his point more effectively by retiring. He was intensely fond of popular applause, -- partly through his sympathy with man kind, and often sought fame in quarters where he got only infamy. All this wrought in him a restlessness and an inequality of temper; and his party, even his friends, complained that they could not trust him. When the Whigs carried the Reform Bill he was made Lord Chancellor, -- unfortunately for himself, for be had not all the qualities necessary to make a dignified and a wise supreme judge in a great country with such complicated interests. His predecessor, Lord Eldon, had hesitated and delayed in his judgments, so that there was an immense accumulation of undecided cases; and Brougham cleared them all off in an amazingly brief time. Many of his decisions were reckoned rash by the wisest lawyers; but his opinions in all cases involving equity -- in which he had been instructed by his ethical training in Edinburgh -- will ever be reckoned of great value. As he had excessive self-will and little prudence, his colleagues were in a constant {362} state of alarm as to what he might do next. They felt that he was dragging the Great Seal through the dirt in a tour which he took through Scotland, receiving congratulations from quarters which did not add to his dignity.[90] At one

of his meetings he boasted that he would write that evening to his sovereign, King William, telling him how great was the honor which bad been conferred on him. His colleagues took advantage of the occasion to part with him, and henceforth he held a somewhat ambiguous position in political life; cast off by the liberals and not willing to join the tories, not withstanding his excessive admiration of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Lyndhurst. Still he led a useful life, helping on every educational cause, such as Mechanics' Institutes and the London University.

He was elected, as so many eminent men have been, lord rector of Glasgow University, and delivered, in 1825, a very able and elaborate defence of learning; but declared that man is no more responsible for his belief than for the color of his skin. He may have imagined that the supporters of Calvinism would not frown on such a doctrine; but he was immediately met by Chalmers, Wardlaw, and a host of others, who could not stand such a perversion of the doctrine of necessity, and who showed that the will had much to do with the formation of opinions, for which man, therefore, was responsible, if not to his neighbors, at least to God.

Prompted by a boundless ambition and activity of mind, he threw him self into an infinite number and variety of works, in no one of which, except oratory, did he reach the highest eminence. He continued to cultivate science, physical and mathematical, but had not leisure nor patience to widen the boundaries of any one department. He wrote innumerable articles and papers, especially sketches of statesmen and philosophers. These are always able, candid, kindly, but are deficient in delicate appreciation of character and motive. In his later years he employed a portion of his time in writing an autobiography.

He had been all along an able defender of the great truths of natural religion. He had spoken with reverence of the scriptures, and delighted to show that the theology of nature had sustained revelation. But it was only in his later days that be seemed thoroughly to bow down before God. it is believed that he was much affected by a change which bad taken place in the character of Lord Lyndhurst, whose clear and sharp intellect he so much admired. Certain it is that in old age he gave forth utterances which show that be was thoroughly penetrated with the importance of divine realities. He spent a good deal of his later life at Cannes, and died there May 9, 1868.

I believe that there is a philosophy-underlying most of the criticisms, {363} and even the orations, of Brougham. His metaphysical principles especially appear in his "Discourse on Natural Theology," prefixed to his edition of Paley a work executed when he held the Great Seal of England. This discourse professes to be logical, but does not throw much light on the method of inquiry, or on the nexus of the parts of the theistic argument. He professes to proceed throughout on the method of Bacon, of whom he entertained, as all the Scottish metaphysicians did, a high admiration. He maintains that natural theology " is strictly a branch of inductive theology, formed and supported by the same kind of reasoning upon which the physical and

psychological sciences are founded." He argues that " the two inquiries, that into the nature and constitution of the universe and that into the evidence of design which it displays, are to a large extent identical." Turning to psychology, he expresses his wonder that writers in modern times have confined themselves to the proofs afforded by the visible and sensible works of nature, while the evidence furnished by the mind and its operations has been neglected. " The structure of the mind, in every way in which we can regard it, affords evidence of the most skilful contrivance. All that adapts it so admirably to the operations which it performs, all its faculties, are plainly means working to an end." He refers in proof to the processes involved in reasoning, association, habit, memory, and to the feelings and affections so adapted to their end. In speaking of habit, he gives a powerful description of what no doubt was his own experience as a speaker. " A practised orator will declaim in measured and in various periods; will weave his discourse into one texture; form parentheses within parentheses; excite the passions or move to laughter; take a turn in his discourse from an accidental interruption, making it the topic of his rhetoric for five minutes to come, and pursuing in like manner the new illustrations to which it gives rise; mould his diction with a view to attain or to shun an epigrammatic point, or an alliteration, or a discord; and all this with so much assured reliance on his own powers, and with such perfect ease to himself, that be will even plan the next sentence while he is pronouncing off-hand the one be is engaged with, adapting each to the other, and shall look forward to the topic which is to follow, and fit in the close of the one he is handling to be its introducer; nor will any auditor be able to discover the least difference between all this and the portion of his speech he has got by heart or mark the transition from the one to the other." I do believe that there is proof of design in the structure of a mind that is capable of bringing forth such products; but to ascribe all this to habit while there are a great many other principles involved, argues a defective power of mental analysis on the part of our author. He thinks to the ordinary argument an addition of great importance remains to be made. " The whole reasoning proceeds necessarily upon the assumption that there exists a being or thing separate from and independent of matter and conscious of its own existence, which we call mind." So he sets him self against materialism.

He sets no great value on the argument <a priori>, and examines it, not very powerfully, in the form in which it is put by Clarke. He admits, how ever, that, after we have, by the argument <a posteriori>, "satisfied ourselves {364} of the existence of the intelligent cause, we naturally connect with this cause those impressions which we have derived from the contemplation of infinite space and endless duration, and hence we clothe with the attributes of immensity and eternity the awful Being whose existence has been proved by a more vigorous process of investigation." Brougham, it is evident, was ignorant of the terrible criticism to which the theistic argument bad been subjected half a century before by Kant, with whose philosophy he seems to have been utterly unacquainted. He does not see clearly what Kant bad proven, that the <a priori> principle of cause and effect is

involved in the argument from design. We look on design as an effect, and infer a designer as a cause, on the principle that every effect has a cause. At the same time he treats of cause and effect. " Whence do we derive it? I apprehend only from our consciousness. We feel that we have a will and a power; that we can move a limb. and effect, by our own powers excited after our own volition, a change upon external objects. Now from this consciousness we derive the idea of power, and we transfer this idea and the relation on which it is founded, between our own will and the change produced, to the relations between events wholly external to ourselves, assuming them to be connected as we feel our volition and our movements are mutually connected. If it be said that this idea by no means involves that of necessary connection, nothing can be more certain. The whole is a question of fact, -- of contingent truth." This statement is exposed to criticism. Whence this transference of what we feel, or rather the legitimate application of it, to the objective world? If there be not a necessary principle involved, how are we entitled to argue that world-making, of which we have no experience, implies a world-maker. He argues in behalf of the immortality of the soul, and that it is quite possible to prove a miracle. It has to be added that be has some papers on instinct, on which he throws no great light as he had not caught the idea that instinct is the beginning of intelligence, and that it is capable, within a limited degree, of being cultivated and made hereditary.

XLVIII.-- JAMES MYLNE.

IT is a curious circumstance that systems of philosophy so like each other should have been formed, simultaneously in the end of last century, and propounded at the beginning of this, by three men so different in temperament as James Mylne of Glasgow, Thomas Brown of Edinburgh, and James Mill of London. But the phenomenon can be explained. They could not have borrowed from each other, but they felt a common influence. All felt that Hume had undermined a great many received principles, that Hartley had resolved into association many operations of the mind before referred to independent faculties; all three, but especially Mylne and {365} Brown, were acquainted with the analyses of Condillac, De Tutt Tracy, and the ideologists of France; and all lived under the reaction against the excessive multiplication of first principles by Reid and Stewart. Of the three, Brown had the greatest genius and the keenest analytical power; Mill, of London, the greatest tenacity of purpose, of consistency, and in the end of influence: but, Mylne, of Glasgow, had quite as much of searching ability as either of the others. He died without publishing any philosophic work but for upwards of forty years he delivered to large classes in Glasgow a course of lectures which set many minds a working There was nothing attractive, certainly nothing stimulating, in his manner, his language, or his system; but the author of this work remembers him, as he lectured every winter morning at half-past seven in the dingy old class-room in Glasgow College, as the very embodiment and personification of wisdom, which had viewed a subject on all sides and looked it through and through.

He was the son of the Rev. James Mylne, of Kinnaird, near Dundee; was born in the same shire as James Mill of London; was licensed to preach in 1779; was soon after ordained as deputy chaplain Of 83d Foot; and admitted minister of the Abbey Church, Paisley, in 1783. He was appointed professor of philosophy in Glasgow College in 1797, resigned on the 3d and died on the 21st Of September, 1839. His business was to preach or provide preachers for the students in the college chapel. The students felt his preaching and that of his substitutes to be cold, and regarded him as secretly a rationalist or a Socinian. After the revival of evangelical faith in the city of Glasgow under Chalmers, loud complaints were uttered as to the doctrine taught in the college chapel.

Opposed to the national creed of Scotland, and an adherent of liberal principles, he was regarded as a dangerous man by the government of the day. On Sunday, March 26, 1815, news came of the escape of Bonaparte from Elba, and in the chapel he happened to give out the paraphrase used in the Scotch worship, " Behold, be comes ! your leader comes! " and it was interpreted as a welcome to the restored emperor, and he was subjected to a prosecution by the Lord Advocate. He answered with spirit in a pamphlet, " Statement of the Facts connected with a Precognition taken in the College on March 30 and 31, 1815." He speaks of Bonaparte as "a man whom he had long regarded with sentiments of the deepest abhorrence and detestation, not only as the disturber of the peace and happiness of nations, but as the greatest enemy to the civil and political liberties of mankind."

His philosophy was a sufficiently simple one: he made it very clear, and he saw no difficulties. There are three, and only three, faculties of the mind, -- sensation, memory, and judgment. With certain explanations he adopts the principle "nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu." He sees that it may be necessary to have a separation of the senses usually represented as touch, gone sense to receive sensations from solids, and another from such qualities as heat. He does not get rid of memory so readily as Brown and Mill. He opposes the theory of the French philosophers who affirm that memory is a mere modification of former impressions, and from Hume who makes conceptions differ merely in degrees from sensation. The eye, indeed, after long looking at a bright object, when shut retains {366} the brightness; but this, lie argues, is a proof that memory is not a sensation, for frequently, at the very time the spectrum, as it is called, remains in the eye, we can remember that it is not the same. He is obliged to make judgment a separate faculty; but then it consists merely in perceiving the difference of feelings. He starts the question, whether our ideas are images of external objects, and answers that external objects are rather pictures of our sensations. He distinguishes between ideas and sensations. An idea is a feeling in the mind which it has distinguished and recognized as different from the other feelings, and feeling becomes an idea as soon as this distinction is made.

It seems to him easy to explain all the operations of the mind by these three faculties. He accounts for attention by showing that some of our sensations and feelings are more strong and lively than others. He thinks the laws of association may be reduced to two, -- contiguity and (taking the hint from Stewart) relationship. As most of our perceptions are furnished in combinations, no wonder that they are again brought together before the mind in combination. But the associations of relationship are much more numerous than those of contiguity. Abstraction is nothing more than the attention directed in a particular way. He explains the peculiarity of habit by the circumstance that, by the frequent repetition of an action, we become acquainted with all the means necessary towards its accomplishment. This is surely not the whole truth, for habit is often carried on without any exercise of will; but there may be some truth in his idea that there may be volitions which are not remembered. Feelings are nothing but modifications of sensation, -- the effect of sensations. Conscience is a decision of the judgment, accompanied in many cases by strong and vivid emotions. Desire is the conception of an object as good, as absent, and as attainable. He succeeds in this cool way to account for all the deeper and higher acts and ideas of the mind; but it is by simply overlooking their Peculiar and distinguishing properties.

He dwells at length on principles of action. The ultimate principle is a desire to secure pleasure and avoid pain. He traces the intellectual operation of conception in all affections and passions, following out the Stoic resolution of passion as developed by the representative of Stoicism in Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" (lib. iv.),[91] and by which they thought that passion might be brought thoroughly under the control of judgment by a proper regulation of the conception. The Stoic moralists and Mylne did service to philosophy by giving the proper place to the idea or conception; but then he does not see that the conception must be of something appetible or inappetible, derived from a spring of action in the heart or will. He has a good division of the affections into: (1) Those in which the object of them is regarded as in possession, including joy and all its modifications; (2) Those in which the object is absent, though attainable: this produces desire; (3) Those in which the object either already attained, or about to be attained, is produced by ourselves, which produces self-satisfaction; (4) Those in which the agency of others is concerned, giving rise to affection and esteem. He held firmly by the doctrine of philosophical necessity in its sternest and most unrelenting form. Altogether, he had much of the character of an old Stoic philosopher, but without those lofty ideas about following nature and the will and decree of God which elevated the systems of Zeno, Cleanthes, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.

XLIX.-- JOHN YOUNG.[92]

T/WO\ pupils of Professor Mylne's created and sustained for a number of years a strong taste for mental science in the Irish province of Ulster, from which the founder of the

Scottish philosophy bad come. These were professors in the Belfast College, which imparted a high and useful education to the young men of the north-east of Ireland for a considerable number of years, and till it gave way to Queen's College, Belfast. One of these was John Young, professor of moral philosophy, and the other William Cairns, professor of logic and belles-lettres.

John Young was the son of a seceder elder, and was born in Rutherglen in the neighborhood of Glasgow in 1781. He early showed, in the midst of business pursuits, a taste for reading of a high order, for composition, and for spouting. He had difficulties n getting a learned education; but he taught a school, became a clerk in a bleach-field in the neighborhood, and then in a mercantile house in Glasgow; and struggled on, as many a Scotch youth has done, till in 1808, at the age of twenty-seven, he became a student in the University of Glasgow, where he distinguished himself in the classes of logic and moral philosophy, taught by Professors Jardine and Mylne, and took an active part in the college societies, where be displayed, as was thought, extraordinary eloquence. He next attended the divinity hall in the university, and, losing his faith in the stern principles of the seceders, bad his thoughts directed towards the ministry in the established church. But his destination was fixed when, in 1815, the spirited inhabitants of Belfast set up the Belfast Academical Institution, embracing a college. Mr. Young, on the recommendation of the Glasgow professors, was appointed professor of moral philosophy.

Belfast was at that time a much smaller place than it is now, but a place of great enterprise; and among its merchants, its flax spinners, its linen manufacturers, and its ministers of religion, it had a body, if not of very refined yet of very intelligent men, many of them inclined to the Unitarian, or non-subscribing faith; and these men desired to have a good education {368} for their sons, and were proud of the pleasant, the accomplished, and public-spirited man who now came to live among them. His manners were genial; he had acquired a very varied knowledge; he was a ready and instructive talker and an eloquent speaker. The consequence was that he became a favorite in the best society of the place, and, it is to be added, spent too much of his time in dining out, and in entertaining the citizens by his humor and his sparkling conversation.

But he was an able and a most successful teacher, expounding his views with great clearness and fire, and creating a taste for the study, even among the mercantile classes, but especially among the ministers of religion, subscribing and non-subscribing, in Ulster. His lectures were at first carefully written out; but, as years rolled on, he became less dependent on his papers, and expanded like a flood on his favorite topics, and had difficulty in compressing his superabundant matter in the limited course allowed him. He collected for the college a vast number of books published from the time of Locke down to his own day in mental philosophy: these were subsequently bought by the Queen's College. He continued a popular and useful member of society and of his college down to his death, March 9,1829. His lectures were edited by his colleague, Dr. Cairns, and

published in 1834. These published lectures scarcely do justice to him, as they are taken from his manuscripts written in the early years of his college life, and do not contain the oral illustrations and emendations which be was accustomed to pour forth from day to day in his class-room.

At the basis of his whole system, we discover the threefold division of the intellectual faculties by Mylne into sensation, memory, and judgment. Yet his lectures were of a more quickening and comprehensive character than those of his preceptor. We discover, too. that as Dr. Brown's views were given to the world, Professor Young grafted many of the living buds of that ingenious analyst on the old and drier stock. He is obliged like Stewart, and unlike Mylne, -- who used to speak of that "undescribed and undescribable faculty of the mind" denominated common sense, -- to call in fundamental laws of belief, and places among these causation and personal identity. "Experience itself does not reveal to reason the relation of cause and effect." "Cause is not that only which in a particular instance precedes a change; but that which, in similar circumstances, we believe must always have been followed by a similar change, and will always be so followed in future: our belief in the relation of cause and effect thus presents us with a universal truth." "The belief is irresistible and is derived from an instinctive principle in our nature." He says "another important idea connected with the fundamental laws of belief is that of personal identity." " If we ask why each of us believes in his own identity, or regards the feelings which he formerly experienced as belonging to the same person which he now calls himself, does not the very statement of the question show its absurdity? Is it not obvious that, even in the casual expressions which we employ, we take the fact for granted by the use of the pronouns, I and he? It is to be referred. therefore, to a primary law of our nature."

He dwells fondly on the senses, in the operation of which he took a keen {369} interest. He holds that, in perception, there is involved sensation, memory, and judgment. There are sensations; they are remembered; and then a judgment pronounced that the sensations must have a cause, which cause is body. "All our sensations are connected with the conviction of certain external things as their cause; and things which are independent of us, because we cannot command their existence by our volition." "We not only believe that, in the act of perception, we are conscious of knowing two different things, matter and mind, which are at the moment distinct; but we believe that they are permanently distinct and independent." It is not very clear to me how he reaches this result. He seems to refer it, like Reid and Hamilton, to an original belief. "The belief is of the same kind and rests on the same grounds with our belief in the permanence of the laws of nature." (Lect. L.) l believe the principle he appeals to, is that of cause and effect. and he hold-- that we are bound by our very constitution to believe that every effect has a cause. This might entitle him to argue, by this instinctive principle of causation, that our sensations, having no cause within the mind, must have a cause without the mind; if indeed we could in such circumstances rise to the idea of a Without. But lie knows that what a cause is we must learn

from experience; and from a sensation, which is unextended, we could never reach the idea of any thing extended. But our idea of body is of something extended; and we never can reach this except by some original perception as is maintained by Reid and Hamilton. He is thus in all the difficulties of the inferential theory, in the illogical process of arguing from something unextended within to an extended existence without.

He argues powerfully that our knowledge of motion is prior to our knowledge of extension, and that, in motion, there is implied time and the observation of the succession of our thoughts.

L. -- WILLIAM CAIRNS.

T/HE\ Belfast College was modelled on the Scotch colleges, and was meant to give a liberal education to a large body of students. Dr. Cairns was the professor of logic and belles-lettres. He was born in Calton, in the suburbs of Glasgow, about 1780-85. His father was so anxious he should be a scholar that he carried him in his arms to his first school. He received his higher education in the grammar-school and the college of Glasgow, took license as a preacher in connection with the secession church about 1804, and was ordained a minister in Johnshaven in 1806. From his known intellectual ability, he was appointed professor of Belfast in 1815, and continued to give instruction there till his death in 1848. His knowledge of English and classics was extensive, his taste pure and highly refined, and his reading and elocution of a high order. He was greatly respected by all for his talents and accomplishments; he endeared himself to his friends, and was {370} greatly beloved in his family circle. He took great pains in instructing his pupils in the art of English composition, and helped to produce a fine taste among the ministers of religion and the educated men of Ulster. His nature was too sensitive, and the younger pupils took advantage of this infirmity to irritate him and disturb the class. In his later days the institution with which he was connected was greatly disquieted by disputes between the Trinitarians, who composed the great body of the people, and the Unitarians, who had the chief control of the school and college; and Dr. Cairns was often in great perplexity, as he was a man of liberal spirit on the one hand, and a firm supporter of evangelical religion on the other. The breach was not heated till the institution of Queen's College, in 1849.

He published an elaborate treatise on " Moral Freedom," 1844. It is not easy to give an analysis of it: in fact it is not easy to understand it. He starts with the very defective view, for which the teaching of Mylne of Glasgow had prepared him, that all the mental phenomena consist of sensations and ideas, a doctrine which James Mill of London was contemporaneously turning to a very different purpose. He finds a difficulty in rearing his loftier view of man's spiritual nature on such a basis. He dwells fondly on a principle of particular reference and comparative survey as

the highest intellectual exercises, carrying us upward to volition, motive, and moral freedom. He is resolute in claiming for man an essential freedom; and opposes Edwards and those divines who, as Chalmers, were connecting the philosophical doctrine of necessity with the Scripture doctrine of predestination. He regards it as a contracted view to indentify moral freedom and freedom of will. He finds moral freedom not in mere volition, but in the great influential principle of comparative survey. He unfolds, not very clearly, a whole theory of human nature. The truth in his system seems to be, that more is involved in moral freedom than mere volition , that the whole soul, including the intellect, is involved in it; and that a preferential feeling, as he calls it, is an essential part of it, -- pointing to the fact that there may be preference or choice not amounting to full volition, but implying responsibility. He shows that the freedom he advocates may be compatible with divine foreknowledge.

LI. -- JAMES MILL.[93]

T/HE\ author, as he writes this article, has before him a photograph of a house which stood at Upper North Water Bridge, on the south side of the North Esk River, which there divides Angus from Mearns, and flows into the German Ocean a few miles below. The house consists of two apartments "a but and a ben," with possibly a closet, and a lower addition at one end {371} for a workshop. Here, a hundred years ago, lived a shoemaker, named James Mill, with several men under him; he was also a crofter farming some acres of land. His wife was Isabel Fenton, said to have been a woman of superior manners and intelligence, the daughter of a farmer who was out in the forty-five" on the pretender's side. In this house on April 6, 1773, was born James Mill, destined to exercise such an influence on thought. He was one of a family of three, having a brother William, who died young; and a sister Marjory, who married William Greig, who succeeded to her father's trade and left descendants in the district. He seems to have been educated at the school of his native parish, Logie-Pert. His abilities were discovered by his minister, Rev. Dr. Peter, of Logie-Pert, and by Rev. James Foote,[94] of Fettercairn, some miles off, where was the family seat of Sir John Stuart, to whose notice Dr. Foote introduced him; and he was sent to the university of Edinburgh, his son says, " at the expense of a fund established by Lady Jane Stuart [the wife of Sir John Stuart], and some other ladies for educating young men for the ministry." In the university of Edinburgh, he pursued the usual course in arts and theology, and attended the lectures of Dugald Stewart. We have no account of his student's life or his preacher's life;[95] for he became a licentiate of the Church of Scotland. " or a few years he was a private tutor in various families in Scotland, among others that of the Marquis of Tweeddale." He expected, it is said, to receive a presentation to the parish church of Craig, which, however, was given to Dr. James Brewster, brother to (the afterwards) Sir David Brewster. People may speculate as to what sort of minister in faith and practice he would have become, had he been settled in that country parish of farmers and fishers.

We may believe that at no time had the ministry of the gospel any particular charm for him. In the year 1800, he went to London, where it is said that he preached in the Presbyterian churches. But he soon devoted himself to literature and authorship. {372} We do not know to which of the two strong parties in the church of Scotland he had attached himself, whether to the moderate or rationalistic, -- which Burns and most literary men favored,-or to the evangelical, to which Dr. Peter and Mr. James Foote belonged. It is not uncommon for Scotchmen, when they bury themselves in London, to lose their religious faith, which is so sustained by public opinion-as Mill would have said by association of ideas -- in their native land. With his usual reticence he has not furnished us with any account of the struggle which must have passed in his mind when he abandoned his belief, not only in the Bible, but in the very existence of God and providence. Such a record would have given us a deeper insight into the depths of human nature than all his refined metaphysical analyses. If he ever belonged sincerely to the evangelical party, there must have been a tremendous revulsion of feeling in the change. If he belonged to the moderates, he had little to abandon beyond the doctrines of natural religion.

He married -- it is curious that the son never refers to the lady -- not long after his settlement in London, and when he had no resource but the precarious one of writing in periodicals. He must have had a hard struggle in these times, but he bore it resolutely. A writer in the "Edinburgh Review" (July, 1873) describes him. " In appearance he was strikingly like the portraits of Charles XII. of Sweden, with a lofty forehead, a keen and cutting face. His powers of conversation were extraordinary; but, both in his family and among his disciples, he was to the last degree tyrannical, arbitrary, and impatient of contradiction." "He was a harsh husband and a stern father." The first great literary work planned by him was the " History of British India," which he commenced and completed in about ten years, and published in 1817-18. In 1819 the Court of Directors of the India Company appointed him to the high post of assistant examiner of India correspondence, and he held this office till within four years of his death. He wrote articles in the " Encyclopaedia Britannica, " on government, education, jurisprudence, law of nations, liberty of the press, colonies, and prison discipline. He was also a contributor to the " Westminster Review," and the " London Review," which after a few months was merged in the " London and Westminster." In 1821-22 he published his " Elements of Political Economy; " in {373} 1829 his "Analysis of the Human Mind;" and in 1835 the " Fragment on Mackintosh," being the last work before his death, which took place 23d June, 1836.

For the last fifteen or twenty years of his life he was an important member of a thinking and writing circle, he himself being the centre of a smaller circle within that circle. In morals and politics he attached himself to Bentham, at that time obnoxious in the extreme to many, but adored by a select few. " Mr. Bentham, " says Mrs. Grote, " being a man of easy fortune, kept a good table, and took

pleasure in receiving guests at his board, though never more than one at a time. To this one guest he would talk fluently, yet not caring to listen in his turn." James Mill was often the one guest so highly favored. " Bentham lived in Queen's Square Place, Westminster, close to the residence of Mill and his family, and his house was lent to the historian of India." Acquainted with mental science (at that time not studied in London), through his training in Scottish philosophy, and his reading of Hartley, he became the leader in metaphysical thought in the metropolis. He had qualities which fitted him to influence young men. He was earnest; he was clear; he was strongly impressed with the evils of the past and present; he spoke authoritatively and dogmatically, and with contempt of those who opposed him, and facile minds bent before him. We have a friendly picture of him drawn by Mrs. Grote as he began to exercise a powerful influence over her husband. " Before many months the ascendancy of James Mill's powerful mind over his younger companion made itself apparent. George Grote began by admiring the wisdom, the acuteness, the depths of Mill's intellectual character. Presently he found himself enthralled in the circle of Mill's speculations; and, after a year or two of intimate commerce, there existed but little difference, in point of opinion, between master and pupil. Mr. Mill had the strongest convictions as to the superior advantages of democratic government over the monarchical or the aristocratic -- , and with these he mingled a scorn and hatred of the ruling classes which amounted to positive fanaticism. Coupled with this aversion to-- aristocratic influence (to which influence he invariably ascribed most of the defects and abuses prevalent in the administration of public affairs), Mr. Mill entertained a profound prejudice against the Established Church, {374} and, of course, a corresponding dislike to its ministers. These two vehement currents of antipathy came to be gradually shared by George Grote, in proportion as his veneration of Mr. Mill took deeper and deeper root. Although his own nature was of a gentle, charitable, humane quality, his fine intellect was worked upon by the inexorable teacher with so much persuasive power that George Grote found himself inoculated, as it were, with the conclusions of the former almost without a choice, since the subtle reasonings of Mr. Mill appeared to his logical mind to admit of no refutation. And thus it came to pass that, starting from acquired convictions, George Grote adopted the next phase; viz., the antipathies of his teacher,-- antipathies which colored his mind through the whole period of his ripe meridian age, and may be said to have inspired and directed many of the important actions of life. Originating in an earnest feeling for the public good, these currents gradually assumed the force and sanction of duties, prompting George Grote to a systematic course both of study, opinion, action, and self-denial, in which be was urgently encouraged by the master-spirit of James Mill, to that gentleman's latest breath in 1836. This able dogmatist exercised considerable influence over other young men of that day as well as over Grote. He was indeed a propagandist of a high order, equally master of the pen and of speech. Moreover, he possessed the faculty of kindling in his auditors the generous impulses towards the popular side both in politics and social theories; leading them at the same time to regard the cultivation of

individual affections and sympathies as destructive of lofty aims and indubitably hurtful to the mental character." Mr. Grote says in 1819: "I have met Mill often at his (Ricord's) house, and hope to derive great pleasure and instruction from his acquaintance, as he is a very profound-thinking man and seems well disposed to communicate, as well as clear and intelligible in his manner. His mind has indeed all that cynicism and asperity which belong to the Benthamian school; and what I chiefly dislike in him is the readiness and seeming preference with which he dwells on the faults and defects of others, even of the greatest of men. But it is so very rarely that a man of any depth comes across my path, that I shall almost assuredly cultivate his acquaintance a good deal farther." We have a less favorable picture in an article in the " Edinburgh Review" (July, 1873), {375} which says of the son His fine and loving temper was constantly struggling against the imperious dictates of his master, who had taught him to regard, as Mr. Grote tells us, the cultivation of individual affections and sympathies as destructive of lofty aims, and hurtful to the mental character. In the course of years several young men devoted to the study of metaphysics and mental philosophy were accustomed to meet twice a week at Mr. Grote's in the city, at half-past eight in the morning, for an hour or two. Jeremy Bentham was regarded by them as a kind of deity, whose utterances were closely watched and reverently received. James Mill was their prophet, who exercised uncontrolled sway over their minds." Mrs. Grote gives an account of the men and their studies. " They read Mr. Mill's last work, " The Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," Hartley" On Man," Dutrieux's "Logic," Whately's works, &c., discussing as they proceeded. Mr. John Stuart Mill, Mr. Charles Buller, Mr. Eyton Tooke, (son of Mr. Thomas Tooke), Mr. John Arthur Roebuck, Mr. G. H. Graham, Mr. Grant, and Mr. W. G. Prescott formed part of their class."

He now became a leader of opinion, and imparted his own character to a whole school. His intellect was clear, but not comprehensive; was strong, but one-sided. He saw what he wished to see, and did not go round the object to view the other side. Hence be was not troubled with uncertainties or doubts, and he laid down his opinions coolly and dogmatically, wondering how every man did not see as he did, and bearing no contradiction. The school of which he was a leader -- or, rather, I believe, <the> leader -- came to be called " Philosophical Radicalism," or sometimes the "Westminster Review" school, from that review being its organ. It was founded on Utilitarianism in morals and on sensational empiricism in philosophy; and Mill gave it its earnestness, its narrowness, its exclusiveness, and its fanaticism. The school had at first the general sentiment against them; but they persevered, and came in a few years to exercise a potent influence, which is felt at this day, in consequence mainly of the able men, then young, but now old or deceased, who became attached to it.

He has left us no account of the religious crisis through which he passed, but his son has told us the results which he {376} reached: "The turning point of his mind on the subject -- as reading Butler's `Analogy.' That work, of

which he always continued to speak with respect, kept him, as he said, for some considerable time a believer in the divine authority of Christianity, by proving to him that, whatever are the difficulties in believing that the Old and New Testaments proceed from, or record the acts of, a perfectly wise and good Being, the same and still greater difficulties stand in the way of the belief that a Being of such a character can have been the Maker of the universe. He considered Butler's argument as conclusive against the only opponents for whom it was intended. Those who admit an omnipotent as well as perfectly just and benevolent Maker and Ruler of such a world as this can say little against Christianity but what can, with at least equal force, be retorted against themselves. Finding, therefore, no halting place in deism, he remained in a state of perplexity, until, doubtless after many struggles, he yielded to the conviction that, concerning the origin of things, nothing whatever can be known. This is the only correct statement of his opinion; for dogmatic atheism he looked upon as absurd, as most of those whom the world has considered atheists have always done." " He found it impossible to believe that a world so full of evil was the work of an Author combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness." He saw, what natural religion shuts its eyes to, that there were manifold evils in the world; so say the Scriptures, and tell us how they sprang up, and point to the remedy,-a remedy which Mr. Mill was not pre pared to adopt, and so was left without any relief from the dark prospect. We do not wonder in these circumstances that " he thought human life a poor thing at best, after the freshness of youth and of unsatisfied curiosity had gone by."

He was thoroughly discontented with the education commonly given to the young. "In psychology his fundamental doctrine was the formation of all human character by circumstances, through the universal principle of association, and the consequent unlimited possibility of improving the moral and intellectual condition of mankind by education." So he took the education of his oldest son into his own hand. At three he taught him Greek; and by the age of eight the boy had read " the whole of Herodotus, of Xenophon's' `Cyropaedia' and {377} `Memorials of Socrates,' some of the `Lives of the Philosophers' by Diogenes Laertius, part of `Isocrates ad Demonicum' and `Ad Nicoclem.'" At the age of nine he had read the first six Dialogues of Plato, from the "Euthyphron" to the "Theaetetus" inclusive. He was made to begin Latin in his eighth year; and from his eighth to his twelfth year he read the "Bucolics" of Virgil and the first six books of the "Aeneid," all Horace except the "Epodes," the "Fables" of Phaedrus, the first five books of Livy, with the remainder of the first decade, all Sallust, a considerable part of Ovid's " Metamorphoses," some plays of Terence, two or three books of Lucretius, several of the orations of Cicero and of his writings on oratory and his "Letters to Atticus;" and this while he was adding largely to his Greek and devouring elaborate volumes of history. At the age of twelve he entered on the study of logic, beginning with the " Analytics " of Aristotle. Everybody feels that it was a dangerous thing to lay such a load on the mind of one so young; and that there was an imminent risk either of his

brain being overworked or of his being turned into a pedant. The success of the trial proves that a boy of good ability may learn much more by systematic teaching than most people imagine. In the morning walks with the father the boy was induced to give an account of what he had read the day before.

There were surely great oversights in this training, as, for instance, in not allowing him to mingle with other boys, and in restraining natural emotions. " For passionate emotions of all sorts, and for every thing that has been said or written in exaltation of them, he expressed the greatest contempt. He regarded them as a form of madness. The intense was with him a byword of scornful disapprobation." In respect of religion the son says: " I am thus one of the very few examples of one who has not thrown off religious belief, but never had it: I grew up in a negative state with regard to it." The father " looked forward to a considerable increase of freedom in the relations between the sexes, though without pretending to define exactly what would be or ought to be the precise conditions of that freedom." A writer in the " Quarterly " (July, 1873) says: " He was full of what we should call the fanaticism of Malthusianism; to such a degree that he risked his own fairly earned reputation {378} with decent people, and involved in the like discreditable danger the youth of his son, by running a Malay muck against what he called the superstitions of the nursery with regard to sexual relations, and giving the impulse to a sort of shameless propaganda of prescriptions for artificially checking population. We should not even have alluded to this grave offence against decency, on the part of the elder and younger Mill, had it not been forced on our notice by recent events." The result was what might have been expected. We can understand how the son's natural feelings, so repressed, should have been ready to flow forth towards a lady who entered thoroughly into his peculiar views on all subjects, and that he did not seek to restrain these feelings, and had no compunctions of conscience, though that lady was married to another man. I believe we can see the result of the training in a younger son, represented as an engaging youth, who went to a warm climate for his health, and when there insisted on the physician telling him whether there was any hope of his recovery, and, on receiving an unfavorable reply, went and shot himself to avoid a lingering death.[96]

The work with which we have to do, is his " Analysis of the Human Mind." The title indicates the aim of the treatise. It is not an inductive observation of facts; it is not a classification of facts in a cautious and careful manner: it is a determined attempt to resolve the complex phenomena of the mind into as few elements as possible. Mental analysis, called by When the decomposition of facts, is undoubtedly a necessary agent in all investigation: but it should be kept as a subordinate instrument; and it requires to be preceded, accompanied, and verified throughout, by a microscopic and conscientious inspection of facts, with particular attention to residuary phenomena and apparent exceptions; if this is neglected the whole process may lead to most fallacious results. Thomas Brown had proceeded very much in the method of analysis, and

accomplished a great many feats in the way of decompounding the faculties enumerated by Reid and Stewart; and, encouraged by his success, Mill advances a great way further on the same route. Brown had stood up resolutely for the existence and validity of intuition, {379} maintaining in particular that we have an intuitive belief in cause and effect; had allotted a place, though an inadequate one, to judgment, under the name of "relative suggestion;" had poured forth a most eloquent exposition of the emotions, and defended the great truths of natural religion, including the existence of the deity and the immortality of the soul. Mill resolves all mental exercises into sensations and ideas, with laws of association connecting and combining them , and has left himself avowedly no religious belief whatever.

Dugald Stewart's teaching seems to have exercised little influence on his mind except to suggest the order in which he takes up his topics. I suspect he derived more from Hume than from Stewart. With Hume there is nothing in the mind but impressions and ideas; with Mill, only sensations and ideas; and both undermine our belief in the reality either of mind or body. He took advantage of all that has been done, in illustrating the influence Of association, by Hutcheson, Smith, Hume, Beattie, Alison, and Brown, and accounted by it for principles which these men reckoned original. He had also profoundly studied Hartley (" Observations on Man "), who had accounted for our complex mental feelings by sensations, ideas of sensations and association, connecting the whole with a theory of nerve vibrations, which Mill, following the Scottish school, abandoned.

Following the sensational school of France and Brown, he calls all the exercises of the mind " feelings." He begins with sensations, and goes over (Chap. I.) smell, hearing, sight, taste, touch, carefully separating from touch as Brown had done, and as Mr. Bain has since done, the feeling of resistance, extension, and figure, which he refers to muscular sensation; he also dwells fondly, as Mr. Bain has done, on the sensations of disorganization in the alimentary canal. He then treats of idea (Chap. II.); and now " we have two classes of feelings, one which exists when the object of sense is present, another that exists after the object of sense has ceased to be present. The one class of feelings I call sensations; the other class of feelings I call ideas." At this stage we wonder where or how he has got objects of sense with nothing but sensations and ideas. " As we say sensation, we might also say ideation: " " sensation would in that case be a general name for one part of our constitution, {380} ideation for another." It is clear that Mill's analysis has been the main book, or the only book on mental science, care fully studied by a certain class of London physiologists, -- such as Carpenter, Huxley, and Maudesley, -- who seldom rise above the contemplation of sensations and sensations reproduced. Verily it is an easy way of enunciating and unfolding all the varied processes of the mind to represent them as feelings, and put them under two heads, sensations and ideas; the ideas being copies of sensations, so that he is able to say: " There is nothing in the mind but sensations and copies of sensations." There is no room left for knowledge of objects or belief in objects,

internal and external, no judgment or reasoning, no perception of moral good and evil. It is a more inadequate resolution than that of Condillac, who called in a sort of alchemical power, and spoke of "transformed sensations." Mr. Grote writes to the younger Mill: " It has always rankled in my thoughts that so grand and powerful a mind as he should have left behind it such insufficient traces in the estimation of successors." I do not wonder that such a meagre exposition should not have carried with it the highest minds of the age, which turned more eagerly towards the German speculators, and towards Cole ridge, Cousin, and Hamilton. But his book has had its influence over the school to which he belonged, including Mr. Grote, and over certain physiologists, who, if they have only sensations and copies of sensations to account for, are tempted to imagine that they can explain them all by organic processes. His son, John Stuart, and Mr. Bain, have been greatly swayed by the elder Mill, but have clearly perceived the enormous defects of the analysis, which they have sought to rectify in the valuable edition of the work published in it; the fundamental defects however remain, and the corrections admit principles which these authors have not dared to avow or to carry out, as they involve so many other mental operations beyond sensations and ideas.

In Chap. III. he goes on to his favorite subject, association of ideas. Ideas have a synchronous and a successive order. When sensations have occurred synchronically, the ideas also spring up synchronically," and thus he fashions many of our complex ideas, as of a violin with a certain figure and tone. He resolves the ideas of successive associations into the one {381} law of contiguity. This resolution has been criticised by Hamilton (" Reid's Collected Works " Note D. . . . 2), and also by his son (Note to Chap. III.), who endeavor to show that the suggestion of similars cannot be thus accounted for, which they certainly cannot be unless we call in some intermediate processes. He shows how, by these associations, we get certain complex ideas, as the ideas of metals from the separate ideas of several sensations, -- color, hardness, extension, weight. In illustrating this point, he says, that " philosophy has ascertained that we draw nothing from the eye whatever but sensations of color." In opposition to this, Hamilton has demonstrated that, if we perceive color, we must also perceive the line that separates one color from another (Met. Lect. 27). The result he has reached is summed up: "We have seen first that we have sensations secondly, that we have ideas, the copies of these sensations thirdly, that those ideas are sometimes simple, the copies of one sensation; sometimes complex, the copies of several sensations so combined as to appear not several ideas but one idea and, fourthly, that we have trains of these ideas, or one succeeding another without end."

He turns to naming (Chap. IV.), and treats of the various parts of speech, but throws little light on them. He goes on to explain the various processes of the mind, beginning with consciousness (Chap. V.). " To say I feel a sensation, is merely to say I feel a feeling, which is an impropriety of speech; and to say I am conscious of a feeling is merely to say that I feel it. To have a feeling

is to be conscious, and to be conscious is to have a feeling." "In the very word 'feeling' all that is implied in the word 'consciousness' is involved." There is a palpable oversight here. When I feel a sensation it is of a sensitive organ as affected, and knowledge is involved in this. To be conscious is to know self as feeling or in some other state. " When I smell a rose, I am conscious." True, but I am conscious not of the rose, but of self as having the sensation. In explaining consciousness, he overlooks the very peculiarity of the thing to be explained.

He then (Chap. V., VI., VII., VIII., IX.) treats of conception, imagination, classification, abstraction. " Conception applies only to ideas and to ideas only in a state of combination. It is a general name, including the several classes of complex {382} ideas." But the question arises, What intellectual bond combines things generally? and we have no satisfactory answer. He thus misses one of the most important capacities of our mental nature. " An imagination is the name of a train but what combines so many scattered things into one image, often so grand? He has a long disquisition on classification. The word `man,' we shall say, is first applied to an individual it is first associated with the idea of that individual, and acquires the power of calling up the idea of him; it is next applied to another individual, and acquires the power of calling tip the idea of him, so of another and another, till it has become associated with an infinite number, and has acquired the power of calling up an indefinite number of these ideas indifferently." " It is association that forms the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals into one complex idea." Here again he has explained every thing by overlooking the <differentia> of the process, -- the resemblance between the individuals; the perception of the resemblances; the placing the resembling objects into a class of which so many predications may be made; and, as might be expected, he has no idea that there is such a thing as classes in nature. By taking a superficial view, he is able to throw ridicule on the theory of ideas by Plato, by Philo, by Cudworth, and Harris, in which there is no doubt much mysticism, but also much truth, which it should be the business of a correct analysis to bring out to view. The father thus set his son to what he is so fond of in his " Logic " and other works, -- the exposure of the error of looking on concepts as if they were individual existences. True, universals are not the same as singulars, yet they may have a reality which we should try to seize: some of them <ante rem>, in the Divine mind arranging classes in nature; in re, in the common attributes which join the objects in the class; and <post rem>, in the concepts formed by the mind, and performing most important functions in thought. Both Mr. Grote and Mr. John Stuart Mill in their notes have tried to improve Mill's doctrine of generification, but have left it, and their own doctrine as well, in a most unsatisfactory state. Abstract terms " are simply the concrete terms with the connotation dropped," whereon his son annotates. " This seems a very indirect and circuitous mode of making us understand what an abstract name signifies. Instead of aiming {383} directly at the mark, it goes round it. It tells us that one name signifies a part of what another name signifies, leaving us to infer that part." Neither father nor son has seen that

abstraction in all cases implies a high exercise of judgment or comparison, in which we perceive the relation of a part to a whole, a process which is the basis of so many other intellectual exercises.

He turns (Chap. X.) to memory, which has so puzzled the son, who says: "Our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate: no reason can be given for it which does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well grounded." The subject presents no difficulties to the father. He acknowledges that in memory there is not only the idea of the thing remembered; there is also the idea of my having seen it: and he shows that this implies "the idea of my present self, the remembering self; and the idea of my past self, the remembered or witnessing self? " But where has he got self? Where a past self? He brings in, without attempting to explain them, <self>, and <time present>, and <past>, which are' not sensations nor copies of sensations. All that is done is " to run over a number of states of consciousness called up by the association." There is here, as in so many other cases, simply the shutting of the eye to the main element in memory, the recognition of an object as having been before the mind in time past: in which there is involved, first, belief, and, secondly, time in the concrete, from which the mind forms the idea of time in the abstract.

There follows (Chap. X -- I.) an elaborate discussion of belief, which both his son and Mr. Bain have been seeking to amend without success; because their own views, starting from those of the older Mill, are radically defective. In all belief, as it appears to me, there is a conviction of the reality of the object believed in. When the object is present, I would be disposed to call this knowledge; but, if any one calls it belief, the question between him and me would be simply a verbal one, provided he acknowledges the existence of a conviction. In other cases the conviction or belief is the result of judgment or reasoning. Let us now look at the account given by Mill. " A sensation is a feeling, but a sensation and a belief of it is the same thing. The observation applies equally to ideas. When I say I have {384} the idea of the sun, I express the same thing exactly as when I say that I believe I have it. The feeling is one: the names only are different." Here again the resolution is accomplished so dexterously, because the main elements of the thing resolved are not noticed. In a sensation I have not only a feeling, but a belief in the existence of a sentient organ. To have a belief in the existence of the sun is something more than merely to have an idea of the sun. The belief, be it intuitive, or be it derivative, is a different thing from the sensation and the idea, and should have a separate place in every system of psychology.

It is at this place that he develops most fully the principle for which he has received such praise from his son, -- the principle of inseparable association. " In every instance of belief, there is indissoluble association of the ideas," and he defies any one to show that there is any other ingredient. But, surely, there is often belief without any inseparable association: thus I may believe that a

friend is dead, though in time past all my associations have been of him as alive. But, even in cases of indissoluble association, the belief is different from the association. One of the grand defects of the whole theory consists in accounting by association of ideas for what is assuredly a different process, for judgment, for judgment proceeding on a knowledge of things. At no other point do we see so clearly the tendency of the whole school to degrade the dignity and undermine the trustworthiness of the human intellect.

By this indissoluble association he can account easily for our belief in causation. " I hear words in the street,-- <event>; some one of course is making them, -- <antecedent>. My house is broken and my goods are gone, -- event; a thief has taken them, -- <antecedent>. This is that remarkable case of association in which the association is inseparable." " We cannot think [in the sense of having an idea] of the one without thinking of the other." Once more the essential element is left out; we not only have an idea, we judge, decide, and believe; and when we judge, decide, and believe, that everywhere, at all times, and for ever, an event has and must have a cause, the process seems to me to be justifiable, but to involve an intuitive principle. Mr. John Stuart Mill is only following out the principles advocated by his father, when he holds that there may be worlds {385} in which two and two make five, and in which there may be an effect without a cause. In another subject James Mill has led his son to a point where the father has stopped, while the son has gone on. " In my belief, then, of the existence of an object, there is included the belief that, in such and such circumstances, I should have such and such sensations. Is there any thing more?" "I not only believe that I shall see St. Paul's church-yard, but I believe that I should see it if I were in St. Paul's church-yard this instant." This is on the very verge of the son's definition of body and of mind. We see how needful it is to examine the fundamental assumptions of a philosophy which has culminated in such results, and is undermining our belief in the reality of things.

In Chap. XII. we have a short and feeble account of ratiocination, in which he proceeds on the syllogistic analysis without comprehending the principles involved in it. He takes as his example, " All men are animals. Kings are men. Therefore kings are animals; " and he shows that in all this there is only association, and the belief which is part of it. In the proposition "kings are men," the belief is merely the recognition that the individuals named kings are part of the many of whom men is the common name. "Kings" is associated with "all men," " all men " with " animals; " " kings," therefore, with animals. The account of evidence, in the short chapter which succeeds, is merely a summation of what had gone before, and is exceedingly meagre.

He now turns (Chap. XIV.) to "names requiring particular explanations," and explains, according to his theory of sensations and ideas, such profound subjects as relations, numbers, time, motion, identity. Mr. Bain represents him as here "endeavoring to express the most fundamental fact of consciousness, the necessity of change

or transition from one state to another, in order to our being conscious. He approaches very near to, without exactly touching, the inference, that all consciousness, all sensation, all knowledge, must be of <doubles>," as if we could not have a sensation of pain till there is a change into pleasure, or of pleasure till we have also pain. This is to reverse the natural process in which we have first the individuals, and thus and then discover relations between them, -- it may be, many and varied, according to the knowledge we previously have of {386} the individuals. According to Mill, that a feeling of red and a feeling of blue is "different and known to be so, are not two things but one and the same thing;" thus doing away with all relation, in fact with all comparison and judgment, and reasoning as founded on comparison. "Space is a mere abstract term formed by dropping the connotation. Linear extension is the idea of a line, the connotation dropped; that is, the idea of resisting dropped." We ask what is the line? Infinite is the concrete term, here denoting line: drop the connotation, and you have infinity, the abstract." It is a convenient but certainly a most fallacious way of reducing realities to nonentities. Time is "pastness, presentness, and futureness" joined by association; but he can render no account of pastness, presentness, and futureness. The idea of motion and the idea of extension are the same. Identity is merely the name of a certain case of belief. " Reflection (Chap. XV.) is nothing; but consciousness is the having the sensations and ideas:" most people would say it is a knowledge of self, as having an idea, a sensation, or some other mental exercise.

He treats from Chap. XVI.-XXII. of the active powers of the mind, or the powers which excite to action. All throughout, he gains a delusive simplicity, simply by overlooking an element, commonly the main element, in the phenomenon. Desire is the same thing as the idea of a pleasure, " and the number of our desires is the same with that of our pleasurable sensations; the number of our aversions, the same with that of our painful sensations."I hold that desire is something superadded to mere sensation, and indicating a higher capacity, and that we may and ought to desire many things beside mere sensations of pleasure. He then proceeds to show us in the way the Scottish metaphysicians had done, from Hutcheson and Turnbull downwards; how the desire of pleasure gives rise to other impulses, which may by association become ends, and not mere means; such as, wealth, power, dignity, friendship, kindness, family, country, party, mankind. A man looks upon his child as a cause to him of future pains and pleasures, much more certain than any other person; " and thus gathers round it a whole host of associations that constitute parental love. All this I admit will mingle with and strengthen family affection; but in the heart of the affection there is a natural {387} love on the part of parents for their children. In accounting for the love of beauty, he takes advantage of Alison's theory, a theory not favored by those who have discovered mathematical relations in beautiful forms. The following quotation will en able us to understand what he means by motives: "As every pleasure is worth having, -- for otherwise it would not be a pleasure, -- the idea of every pleasure associated with that

of an action of ours as the cause is a motive; that is, leads to the action. But every motive does not produce the action. The reason is, the existence of other motives which prevent it. A man is tempted to commit adultery with the wife of his friend: the composition of the motive is obvious. He does not obey the motive. Why? He obeys other motives which are stronger. Though pleasures are associated with the immoral act, pains are associated with it also; the pains of the injured husband, the pains of the injured wife, the moral indignation of man kind, the future reproaches of his own mind. Some men obey the first rather than the second motive. The reason is obvious. In them the association of the act with the pleasure is, from habit, unduly strong: the association of the act with the pains is, from want of habit, unduly weak. This is a case of education." I believe that if men were trained to think that chastity has no other foundation than Mr. Mill has given it, the husband would be little attended to when he claimed to be injured, and the wife would cease to believe that she had injured any one, and the moral indignation of mankind would disappear; thus perilous would it be to remove morality from its foundation in moral principle, and place it on the shifting sand of association.

We are prepared for his analysis of the moral sense. "It is interesting here to observe by what a potent call we are summoned to virtue. Of all that we enjoy more is derived from those acts of other men on which we bestow the name I virtue,' than from any other cause. Our own virtue is the principal cause why other men reciprocate the acts of virtue towards us: with the idea of our own acts of virtue there are naturally associated the ideas of all the immense advantages we derive from the virtuous acts of our fellow-creatures. When this association is formed in due strength, which it is the main business of a good education to effect, the motive of virtue becomes paramount in the human breast." By all means let us try to collect {388} good associations round virtuous acts; but, as the centre and bond of the whole, let us have the principle that virtuous acts should be done because they are right. Discard this restraint, and attractive associations will be sure to gather round vice. He tells us (" Fragment on Mackintosh "), that his analysis of virtue into the love of pleasure and association does not lessen the influence of the motive. " Gratitude remains gratitude, resentment remains resentment, generosity, generosity in the mind of him who feels them, after analysis, the same as before." Yes in the mind of him " who feels them; " but the feeling may be undermined, and remorse for sin be quieted.

He closes the work with a discussion as to will and intention. Will is the peculiar state of mind or consciousness by which action is preceded. He treats of its influence over the actions of the body, and over the actions of the mind. He shows that sensations and ideas are the true antecedents of the bodily actions, and so he does not need to call in a separate capacity called the will. He then turns to the power which the mind seems to possess over its associations. He proves, as Brown and others had done, that we cannot will an absent idea before us, -- for to will it is already to have it; and the recalling is always a process

of association. He does not see that, by a stern act of will, we can detain a present thought, and thus gather around it a whole host of associations. He speaks of ends, but has no idea of the way in which ends spring up and influence the mind. He takes no notice of the essential freedom belonging to the will, and thus leaves no ground on which to rear the doctrine of human responsibility.

LII. -- JOHN BALLANTYNE.[97]

H/E\ was born at Piteddie, parish of Kinghorn, Fifeshire, May 8, 1778, and received his early education in the village school of Lochgelly. He matriculated in the university of Edinburgh in 1795, and seems there to have enjoyed the privilege of sitting under the instructions of Dugald Stewart. His parents belonged to the church of Scotland, but from conscientious motives, and from perceiving the want of religion in the students intending for the ministry in that body, he joined the burgher branch of the seceders, and attended their theological hall, where his metaphysical abilities were noticed by his professor Dr. Lawson. After being licensed to preach the gospel, he taught schools at Lochgelly, and at Colinsburgh. In 1805, he was settled as minister in the shire of Kincardine, at Stonehaven, a some what exposed place on the German ocean, but made interesting by bold rocks in the neighborhood, and a grand old ruined castle where the covenanters had been imprisoned. There he ministered to a small congregation of fifty members, and specially exerted himself in establishing sabbath schools, at that time very much unknown in the district. He lived a sly and retired life, cheerful in his own home, but not much known beyond, except by a few who noticed him taking his solitary walk daily along the links of Cowie, with tall and well-proportioned frame, and high capacious forehead, pondering, they supposed, some deep ecclesiastical or philosophic subject. In 1824, he published anonymously, "A Comparison of Established and Dissenting Churches by a Dissenter," and, in 1830, an enlarged edition of the same with his name prefixed. This work may be regarded as starting the voluntary controversy, which was carried on vigorously by the religious body to which he belonged, for years agitated Scotland from one end of it to the other, in the course of time spread into England, and, directly or indirectly, has been followed by far-reaching results, that have not yet exhausted themselves. There is reason to believe that he foresaw the consequences; he told his friend, Mr. Longmuir, that he expected to see him out of the established church and a dissenting minister like himself.

But he was also speculating on other topics. In 1828, he published An Examination of the Human Mind." It should be interesting to any one who has had to contend with adverse circumstances to contemplate this man in his quiet seceder manse on that bare coast, and among a people who appreciated his piety and devotedness, but had no comprehension of his philosophy, devoting himself so earnestly to the original study of the human mind. He could have been swayed by no inferior hope in the shape of an expected chair in one of the Scottish colleges; for these, while open to persons adhering really or nominally to established-church

Presbyterianism and Episcopacy were practically closed to a dissenting minister. This was doubtless one of the rankling causes that prompted the seceders to espouse the voluntary side so eagerly. They felt, in an age which was moving on towards the reform bill, that they had a title to complain of being consigned to an inferior position: it should be added that they felt that they had to abandon their strict covenanting principles, which were seen to be exclusive. Nor was this man or his book likely to get a favorable. hearing from the literary or metaphysical readers in Scotland, where the influential thinkers were James Mylne and Thomas Brown, to whose philosophy he was entirely opposed; and, as to England, it felt little interest in such inquiries. The work, though clearly written, has no such literary beauties as drew many towards the writings of Stewart and Brown, and it had some difficulty in getting into notice. There is no evidence that any of the professors {390} in the chairs of mental science took any interest in it, or were disposed to lift the author out of his obscurity. Nevertheless there were some in his own religious communion, and beyond it, who perceived the merit of the work, which is distinguished for its independence, and its rising above the philosophy of his time. " A gentleman," says Mr. Longmuir, " eminent both for his wealth and literary distinction, (the late Mr. Douglas of Cavers?) having seen the manuscript, and been informed of the limited means of the author, kindly offered to run the risk of its publication; but Mr. Ballantyne, having found that he had accumulated sufficient means to publish it himself, gratefully declined the generous offer. Some time after, a considerable sum of money was sent by the same gentleman, and placed entirely at Mr. Ballantyne's disposal. Instead of applying it, however, to the publication of his book, he paid it over for the benefit of the missionary operations that his presbytery was then promoting." A disparaging notice of his work appeared in "The Edinburgh Literary journal," a periodical long since consigned to oblivion, but he was not moved by it: he had done his work, and left it to speak for itself. Thus lived, and thus died, Nov. 5, 1830, one who was, above all things, resolute in maintaining his independence, both of action and thinking, -- independence not of God, but of man.

He finds it necessary to criticise Dr. Brown, and has anticipated some of the objections, afterwards propounded more formally by Hamilton. The system of Dr. Brown certainly discovers great ingenuity, and is expounded with great eloquence; but it appears to betray a want of that persevering diligence and scrupulous caution, without which metaphysical enquiries are in a great measure unavailing." He begins with a discussion of the sensitive principle." He distinguishes between sensations and ideas of sensation. "The sensations and ideas of extension, as far as can be ascertained, are suggested at the very same instant," where, it may be observed, that he uses the very objectionable word " suggest." Almost the whole of the body, whether external or internal, is sensitive and an impression on every sensitive part, whether occasioned by an external or internal influence, is accompanied with a sensation." " It is also accompanied, I imagine. with an idea of extension corresponding to the form and magnitude of the impression." " We always find that an impression on the organ of taste is

accompanied not only with a sensation, but with an idea of the part of the organ affected." " It is highly probable that the organ of smell also affords ideas of extension." " The sense of hearing seems to be governed by the same laws." Locke taught that we get our ideas of extension solely from sight and touch. Ballantyne maintains that we have them from all the senses, because by all the senses we have " an idea of the part of the organ affected," here anticipating favorite positions of Hamilton and the physiologist Muller.

He criticises the doctrine of Brown, that by the eye we discern only color, not in so climbing a manner as Hamilton, but in a like spirit. Some indeed contend that sight affords only sensations of color, and no idea of extension at all; but this opinion has never been established by adequate evidence and appears to be incompatible with not a few phenomena. At any rate, in the present state of our knowledge, we certainly have {391} by sight ideas of extension and ideas of greater or smaller portions of it, other things being equal, according to the impression on the organ, and are bound, therefore, to regard this as an ultimate principle, till it be traced to one more general. This, so far as I know, has never yet been done, and I am utterly unable to perceive how it can be done."

" We never but find that an impression on a sensitive organ is accompanied with an idea of duration, as well as with a sensation and an idea of extension." " Every impression, besides suggesting a sensation and an idea of extension, suggests in connection with them an idea of a portion of duration corresponding to the duration of the impression." And here he has again to criticise Brown, and by anticipation Mill. " There are no doubt many analogies between duration and extension; but to assume that they are literally one and the same thing, as Dr. Brown most evidently does, is one of the most unwarrantable assumptions that ever was hazarded." "That doctrine is, that duration and extension are substantially one and the same thing, and that a cubical foot, or a cubical yard, is not essentially different from an hour or a day." The sensations and ideas of extension " will give rise to the notion of length of duration as occurring in different points of duration, and of course as occurring in succession; but, unless length of duration be the same thing with length of extension, they can evidently give us no manner of notion of this latter species of length at all."

He has a very elaborate inquiry into the associative principle, "a branch of our constitution still involved in considerable obscurity." As I believe him to be right in affirming that at this point there are many unsettled questions, and as his observations are original and independent, I will quote from him at considerable length. He shows that ideas suggest each other, not according to relation among their objects, but among the ideas themselves. He dwells on what he calls the law of precedence. " One idea acquires power to suggest another by immediately preceding it," using the word "power" in the sense in which it is commonly used in physical inquiries. It follows, (1) "If one idea acquire power to suggest another by immediately preceding it, the greater the number of ideas

that it immediately precedes, the greater the number it will acquire the power of suggesting." (2) If one idea acquire power to suggest others by immediately preceding them, the more frequently it precedes, the greater power it must acquire to suggest them. He thus explains the circumstance that, when we meet with a person whom we have formerly seen only in one particular place, there is usually, to our recollection, a very distinct idea of that place; but when we meet with a person whom we have seen in a great many different places, there is seldom recalled an idea of any of them. (3) If an idea acquire power to suggest others by immediately preceding them, the greater the number of ideas that immediately precede any others, the greater will be their power when they recur to suggest these ideas. (4) If an idea acquire power to suggest another by immediately preceding it, the more vivid the idea that precedes any other, the greater will be its power when it recurs in a state equally vivid to suggest it.

He says that the law of contiguity in point of time is really three laws, -- {392} that "an idea will acquire power to suggest another by immediately preceding it, by existing at the same with it, and by immediately following it. The first of these laws is that of precedence, and into it he resolves all the others. Thus he resolves the law of coexistence into precedence. " Let A and B be two ideas which coexist for two sensible points of time, then A, while existing in the first point, precedes B while B is existing in the second; and B, while existing in the first point, precedes A while A is existing in the second point." Proceeding on the principle that the greater the number of ideas that coexist with any other, the greater the number afterwards suggested by i@ he explains how the longer an idea continues in the mind, the more readily will it afterwards recur; how the more frequently it has been in the mind, it will come up the more readily; how the longer it continues, it will be the more likely to recur; and how the more frequently it has been in the mind, it will be the more likely to continue. He resolves in the same way the law of contiguity in place, and the law of cause and effect; and affirms that the idea of cause has no power, independently of the law of precedence, to suggest the idea of an effect. He tries hard to explain in the same way the law of similarity. " Yesterday I saw a winged animal, to-day a winged animal of the same species." "When I yesterday saw the first animal, I obtained ideas of its peculiar qualities, and likewise of those common to it with all the individuals of the species to which it belonged. To-day, when I saw the other animal, I also obtained ideas of its peculiar properties, and of those common to it with all the species to which it belonged, that is, along with the ideas of the peculiar properties of the second animal, I obtained a number of ideas which coexisted with those of the peculiar properties of the first. According to the doctrine of coexistence, formerly explained, they would suggest ideas of the peculiar properties of the first. When they do so, I have ideas both of the common and of the peculiar properties of the first animal; in other words, I have an idea of the first animal itself, for that idea can be nothing but the aggregate of the ideas of its common and peculiar properties." He explains the law of contrast by showing

that, in every case where contrasted ideas suggest one another, it will be found that there is a considerable degree of similarity along with the contrast. He accounts by the same law of precedence for the secondary laws of Brown. Some of these resolutions seem to me over subtle, but they are worthy of consideration by those who would sound the depths of the subject.

He treats at length of the voluntary principle, and offers many judicious remarks. He criticises Stewart's doctrine of power, according to which " the author of nature has bestowed on matter no powers at all, of course never preserves its powers in being, nor even employs them in accomplishing his purposes, as there are no powers to be exercised. In the second volume (Part I 1.), he treats of moral law, of right, jurisprudence, and politics, somewhat after the manner of Stewart, with considerable sweep of style, but no great power of metaphysical analysis. {393}

LIII. -- THOMAS CHALMERS.[98]

H/ITHERTO\ there has been a severance, at times an opposition, if not avowed yet felt, between the Scottish philosophy and the Scottish theology. The one had magnified human nature, and tended to produce a legal, self-righteous spirit; whereas the other humbled man and exalted God, enjoining such graces as faith, humility, and penitence. But there never was any real opposition between the facts gathered by the one and the truths taken out of God's Word by the other. The metaphysicians had shown that there is such a faculty in man as the conscience; and the conscience proclaims that man is a sinner, while the Bible provides a forgiveness for the sinner in a way which honors the moral law. The reconciliation between the philosophy and the religion was effected by Thomas Chalmers, who has had greater influence in moulding the religious be lief and character of his countrymen than any one since the greatest Scotchman, John Knox.

He was born at Anstruther, in the "East Neuk" of Fife, and was the son of a reputable merchant there. In his boyish days he had to suffer not a little from a nurse and from a teacher who ruled by the rod; but he was " joyous, vigorous, and humorous." He manifested his natural character from an early age, being eager and impetuous in pursuing his favorite ends. He was not a very diligent pupil, but was a leader in fun and frolic. At the age of twelve he entered the University of St. Andrews, which about that time had such pupils as John (afterwards Sir John) Leslie, James Mylne, and John (afterwards Chief justice) Campbell. He is described as " enthusiastic and persevering in every thing he undertook, giving his whole mind to it, and often pursuing some favorite and even, as we thought, some foolish idea, whilst we were talking around him and perhaps laughing at his abstraction, or breaking in upon his cogitations and pronouncing him the next thing to mad;[99] and then he would good-naturedly join in the merriment with {394} his common affectionate expression 'very well, my good lads.'" It was in 1793 that he was awakened intellectually, and became excited with and absorbed in geometry, for which he had a strong taste and talent.

"St. Andrews," he tells us in after years, "was at this time overrun with moderatism, under the chilling influence of which we inhaled not a distaste only, but a positive contempt, for all that is properly and peculiarly gospel; insomuch that our confidence was nearly as entire in the sufficiency of natural theology as in the sufficiency of natural science." He has left it on record that he profited by the debating societies of the college. At this time he studied Godwin's "Political Justice," and was staggered by Mirabaud's "System of Nature." His friend, Professor Duncan, tells us that , he studied Edwards on Free Will with such ardor that he seemed to regard nothing else, could scarcely talk of any thing else, and one was almost afraid of his mind losing its balance." His favorite study, however, continued to be mathematics, towards which, as the science of quantity, he had a strong predilection, as shown in his propensity to count his steps as he walked. Still, even at this time, he had aspirations after something higher. One common expression in his college prayers was Oh! give us some steady object for our mind to rest on." I remember when a student of divinity, and long ere I could relish evangelical sentiment, I spent nearly a twelvemonth in a sort of mental Elysium, and the one idea which ministered to my soul all its rapture, was the magnificence of the godhead and the universal subordination of all things to the one great principle for which he evolved and was supporting creation. I should like to be impressed over again, but with such a view of the Deity as coalesced and was in harmony with the doctrine of the New Testament."

He was licensed to preach the gospel in 1799. His brother writes: " We are at some pains in adjusting his dress, manner, &c.; but he does not seem to pay any great regard to himself." Mathematical studies continue to engross his attention. He spent a winter in Edinburgh, studied under Robison, for whom he entertained a profound reverence, and Stewart, and devoted himself to chemistry and moral philosophy. Of Stewart he says: "I have obtained a much clearer idea than I ever had of {395} the distinctive character of Reid's philosophy. I think it tends to a useless multiplication of principles, and shrinks even from an appearance of simplicity." He was ordained minister at Kilmany, in his native county, in 1803. He still contrived to teach mathematics and chemistry in St. Andrews, -- a divided work from which be would have shrunk in later years, when he attained a higher idea of the importance of the ministerial office. In 1806, Napoleon Bonaparte issued his famous Berlin decree, shutting continental ports to British goods. Chalmers had all along a predilection for political economy: he was convinced that Great Britain had resources which made it in dependent of any other country, and in 1807 he published " An Inquiry into the Extent and Stability of National Resources."

We are now approaching the crisis of his life. In 1818 he was required to write an article for the " Edinburgh Encyclopedia," at that time under the editorship of Dr. Brewster, on the " Evidences of Christianity , " and he had to study the Christian religion and the proof which can be adduced in its favor more carefully and earnestly than he

had ever done before. Meanwhile there occurred a number of deaths among his relatives, and he was deeply affected. He now felt himself called on to strive after a pure and heavenly morality. March 17, 1810, -- I have this day completed my thirtieth year; and, upon a review of the last fifteen years of my life, I am obliged to ac knowledge that at least two-thirds of that time have been uselessly or idly spent, sometimes to while away an evening in parish gossip or engaging in a game at cards." A change has evidently come over him he did not yet open it fully, but he made allusions to it. I find that principle and reflection afford a feeble support against the visitations of melancholy." He was subjected to a period of confinement, and was led to read Wilberforce's " Practical View." " The conviction was now wrought in him that he had been attempting an impossibility; that he had been trying to compound elements which would not amalgamate; that it must be either on his own merits wholly or on Christ's merits wholly he must lean." He now betook himself in earnest to the study of the Bible. A visible change appeared in him. He became more diligent in the visitation of his parish, and his sermons had a power over his people such as they never had before. {306}

One so able, so earnest, must take an active part in the affairs of his country and of his age. He sets out with an excessive admiration of the parochial system of Scotland, not just as an end in itself, but as fitted to accomplish the ends which his great heart cherished. It seemed to him to provide every thing which the good and the elevation of a country required. It secured a school in every parish, and a minister to preach to and to visit every man and woman, and a body of assistant elders to watch over the morals of the community. It provided, too, for the wants of the poor by a voluntary relief which did not interfere with their spirit of independence. The whole system bulked in magnificent proportions before his splendid imagination. No doubt he saw that the church was not realizing this pattern: he knew that there were ministers around him who were not fulfilling these high ends. But then the church, by the exercise of the high prerogatives given it by Christ, could restrain the evils of patronage, and carry out thoroughly the original design of the Church of Scotland. He did not foresee the difficulties he would have to meet in carrying out his grand ideal,-difficulties arising from the State, which did not wish too zealous and too powerful a Church, and on the part of the people, who were jealous of too strong an ecclesiastical organization.

He was called to Glasgow in 1815, and there labored with all his might to put his idea in execution, first in the Tron Church and then in St. John's Church, -- built expressly for him. He preached as no man in Glasgow had ever preached before. He visited from house to house, and thus became aware of, and hastened to proclaim to all men, the awfully degraded condition to which Glasgow, and, as was soon discovered by others, to which all the great cities in Scotland and England had been reduced. The world, as well it might, was startled and awed by the scene disclosed. The philosophers had made no inquiry into the subject, and had no remedy for the evil. The refined city ministers were satisfied with preaching well-composed sermons, moral or

evangelical, to the better classes. The dissenters ministered zealously to their own select congregations, but were not able for the Herculean task of cleansing the impurity which had been accumulating for ages. But the evils must be remedied. So he set about erecting chapels, and {397} called on the paternal government to endow them. But he met with opposition from statesmen not willing to tax the community for the benefit of one sect, and from dissenters who believed that their own method of spreading the gospel was the better. The voluntary question was started, and he threw himself into the fight, and defended religious establishments on the ground that man, being carnal, would not seek for spiritual things, which could not, therefore, be left to the ordinary political principle of demand and supply, -- thereby, as some of us think, overlooking the power in the living converted members of the church, who are more likely than the State to supply what is wanted to the careless and the outcast. He certainly did not estimate, as he ought to have done, the enmity of the world toward the church,-an enmity which met him at every point. But he persevered manfully, never losing sight of his grand aim. His course may seem an inconsistent one to a superficial observer; but there was a unity given to it by the end which he pursued as steadfastly as the sun moves in the heavens above the winds and clouds of the earth. He must have the glorious gospel of Jesus Christ preached to every creature, and he supported the Established Church as fitted to accomplish this end, at the same time holding resolutely by the spiritual independence of the church as given it by Christ, and as necessary to enable it to fulfil its grand ends. And when he found that the church he so loved was interfered with in carrying out its designs, he went on bravely to the disruption of 1843, and amidst convulsions led on an exodus towards a land which he saw before him, but into which he could scarcely be said to enter. Ere he departed in 1847, he had by his wisdom established a sustentation fund for the benefit of the ministers of religion, which he hoped would secure the stability and other benefits of an established church without its temptations. He lived to see churches multiplied by means of the secession far beyond his most sanguine expectations; but he did not live to see such a union among churches as is fitted to secure the grind end which he kept ever before him, -- the spread of the gospel in all the destitute and depraved districts of the land.

I regard Chalmers as the greatest preacher which Scotland has produced. Those who have heard him can never forget {398} the impression he produced. As he spoke, he stood firm upon his legs, and looked with a broad, honest face on his audience. At first there was a flabbiness, a sort of cheesiness, about his look and a blankness in his expression; but he uttered a clear, broad, emphatic sentence, and gained the attention of his hearers; and as he advanced he was evidently interested him self and thoroughly interested the congregation; and soon he became absorbed as did all who listened to him; and in the end there was mind and heart manifested in every member and in every action (often uncouth) of his body, and the people were carried along to the close by a torrent which they could not resist, and to which they enthusiastically yielded. His

pronunciation was Scotch, -- provincially Scotch. His style was not pure, not classical, was scarcely English; but it was his own, as is Thomas Carlyle's. It was clear, manly, broad, and massive. But when he spoke no one ever thought of his manner or language: everybody was so carried along by his earnestness and his matter. He commonly began by a clear enunciation of some philosophic or moral principle of great practical moment, and then proceeded to unfold and illustrate it. He did not turn aside himself and he did not distract his hearers by the introduction of a variety of topics; he keeps to his one principle, but he presents it under a vast variety of aspects, all contributing towards the one impression. He is marching up a hill, and he takes us with him; he often lingers by the way and gives us glorious retrospects of the ground we have traversed and glorious prospects of the heights to which he is to conduct us, and he carries us at last to a lofty height with a magnificent scene spread all around. The result is that he has gained our convictions: he has done more, we are ready, by the impulse he has given, to execute what he proposes. At the close, as we feel that he has forgot himself, so we forget our selves, and forget him as a speaker in an admiration of the truth he has expounded or an eager desire to perform what he has inculcated. What he has said has become incorporated with us, like food to strengthen us and go with us. He has planted a principle in the heads and hearts of his hearers to continue there for ever, to send out roots downward and stems and branches upward. The consequence was, that, if be was not the most intellectual or emotional speaker of his age, {399} he was the most practically influential, spreading his power over the length and breadth of Scotland.

Even in the most active operations, and the keenest controversies thereby excited, he retained his academic and philosophic tastes. He delivered in 1815-16 his " Astronomical Discourses," which drew on week-days the busiest Glasgow merchants from their offices and warerooms. In these discourses he obviates the prepossession apt to be created and fostered in intelligent and refined minds by the Scripture doctrine of the Son of God dying for man, and he does so by showing how great care God takes of the most minute objects and events. In most of his sermons he proceeds upon and unfolds some important philosophic principle. In his "Mercantile Discourses" he lays down the moral principles of business transactions, and shows how a rigid attention to them would restrain injurious speculation and promote a healthy trade. In those on " Human Depravity," he proves that there may be the deepest sinfulness in hearts which yet have many amiabilities. In his " Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans," he is not always able to enter into the thoughts of the apostle, or follow him in his subtle transitions; but he powerfully defends the grand doctrines of revelation by showing that they are sustained by a profound philosophy. His doctrine, drawn from Scripture, is substantially that of the old Scotch divines from Knox downwards: but every one feels that it is pervaded by a new and fresh spirit; it has less of a stern aspect; it is tolerant; it is catholic. The stream has descended from the stern rocks of the sixteenth, and is sweeping along amid the fertility of the nineteenth, century.

I never met any man who had so large a veneration for all that is great and good. It was primarily a veneration of God, and derivatively for all excellence. He had a profound reverence for royalty, for greatness, for rank and station; was essentially a conservatist in politics; and felt very keenly when by his unflinching adherence to principle he seemed to be separating the upper classes from the Church of Scotland. Without being a hero-worshipper, for he worshipped God only, he had a great admiration of intellectual greatness, at least when it was associated with humility. He never wearied to dilate on the greatness of Sir Isaac Newton, and often introduced him some {400} what inappropriately. Jonathan Edwards he admired for his profound metaphysical ability and his consuming piety; and he employed the arguments of that great man on behalf of philosophical necessity to support, what is a different thing the Scripture doctrine of predestination. But the author from whom he derived most, and who again was indebted to him for eloquent expositions of his philosophy, was Bishop Butler. He was vastly impressed with his enlarged views and with his cautious, practical wisdom; and learned from him the habit of connecting nature and revelation.

With such tastes and aims we can conceive that he would look with a favorable predilection towards the occupation of an academic position. So in 1823 he accepted the call to become professor of moral philosophy in the University of St. Andrews. Here he exercised a very great influence in attracting students, in exciting a prodigious enthusiasm among them, and in setting them forth with high purposes to noble works. He gained the position of highest influence when he was appointed in 1827 to the chair of theology in the University of Edinburgh. I am not sure that Scotland has ever had a higher instructor than Chalmers, in respect of all the qualities that go to constitute a successful teacher. He was always well prepared: he was as orderly as a mathematician could be; even his very prayers were often written out. He was a very methodical examiner on his text-books and his lectures, having his very questions ready, but departing from his prepared queries when circumstances required. As a lecturer he did more than delight his audience: he entranced them. They gazed upon him; and at times had difficulty in taking notes, they were so moved and elevated. He did not carry on his students very rapidly or over much ground; but he made them thorough masters of the subject, and imparted an impulse which led them to enter fields of their own. He was particularly interesting and successful when he was expatiating in the border country which lies between theology and philosophy. His course of moral philosophy in St. Andrews, and that on natural theology in Edinburgh, were particularly relished by all students capable of appreciating high truth. He expatiated with great delight on the analogies between natural and revealed religion. His special lectures on the ,Evidences of Christianity" were not so eminently {401} successful, though they were very valuable. In his early and immature work on the " Evidences," he was particularly anxious to make the whole proof inductive, and missed some of those great principles of our moral nature, which, how ever, he afterwards expanded so fully and so effectively in the work

as it took its later forms. The student feels that he is deficient in scholarship, and that he gives us metaphysics when he should have presented us with history. In his theology proper, it is evident that he is not specially an exegete. No one would reckon him a high authority in the exposition of a passage of Scripture. But he presents the great truths of the Bible in noble and attractive forms. His creed is essentially Calvinistic; that is, he holds by the same views as Calvin drew out of the Scriptures; but they appear with a more humane and benignant aspect, and with a more thorough conformity to the principles of man's nature.

In his philosophical works he unfolds and enforces a number of very important principles, not, it may be, absolutely original, but still fresh and independent in his statement and illustration of them, and setting aside error on the one side or other. His " Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy " cannot be said to be a full work on ethics, but it enforces great truths in a very impressive and eloquent way. He draws the distinction between mental and moral philosophy: the one has to do with <quid est>, and the other with <quid oportet>. He holds by the distinction between will and desire, maintaining that the former may be moral or immoral, whereas the latter is not. It seems to me that he has scarcely hit on the essential ethical distinction, which is not between will and desire, but between emotion and will; the latter of which may embrace not only volition, but wishes; in short, every thing optative, every thing in which is choice. He treats of the emotions, and shows that there is always a conception (the better expression is phantasm) involved in them. He dwells on the command which the will has over the emotions and of the morality of the emotions. Nothing is either virtuous or vicious unless the voluntary in some way intermingles with it; but then the will has influence over a vast number of the operations of the mind. " It may be very true that the will has as little to do with that pathological law by which the sight of distress awakens in my {402} bosom an emotion of pity, as with that other pathological law by which the sight of a red object impresses on my retina the sensation peculiar to that color; yet the will, though not the proximate, may have been the remote, and so the real cause both of the emotion and sensation notwithstanding. It may have been at the bidding of my will that, instead of hiding my self from my own flesh, I visited a scene of wretchedness, and entered within the confines, as it were, of the pathological influence, in virtue of which, after that the spectacle of suffering was seen, the compassion was unavoidable." He has very just remarks, propounded with great eloquence, on the final cause of the emotions.

His views on natural theology appeared first in the "Bridge water Treatise," on" The Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man." The feeling of admiration excited was mingled with disappointment. The bulk was too great for the matter, and the work had the appearance of a hasty recooking of his old thoughts which were grand in themselves, but were not formed into a duly proportioned whole. His arguments and his illustrations have a much better form given them in his subsequently published work, "Natural Theology." He begins

with a discussion of the <a priori> argument for the existence of God, and examines Samuel Clarke's " Demonstration." He objects that Clarke would make the test of a logical and mathematical truth to be also the test of a physical necessity in the existent state of actual nature, and that he confounds a logical with a physical impossibility. He turns to the <a posteriori> argument, but is obliged, without his being aware of it, to call in an <a priori> principle. "The doctrine of innate ideas in the mind is totally different from the doctrine of innate tendencies in the mind, which tendencies may be undeveloped till the excitement of some occasion have manifested or brought them forth." He proceeds, as every one must, in constructing the argument from design, on the principle of cause and effect, but identifies that principle with what is surely a different thing, -- with the expectation of a uniformity in the succession of events. At this point he draws the distinction, which has been accepted by J. S. Mill, and has ever since been identified with Chalmers's name, between the laws of matter and the collocations of matter. It is from the {403} collocations of matter rather than the laws of matter that he draws his argument for the divine existence. The distinction seems to be deep in the constitution of things, but might be better represented, perhaps, as the distinction between the properties of matter and the dispositions of matter, these dispositions manifesting design, and consequently intelligence.

He is most successful when he is arguing from the constitution of the human mind. He dwells with great fondness and force on the supremacy of conscience and the inherent pleasure of virtuous and the misery of vicious affections, and gives a powerful exposition of the law of habit. He has a clear, masterly, and eloquent exposition of Leibnitz's theory of the origin of evil, not positively adopting it, but using it as an hypothesis to obviate objections. Here and elsewhere he unfolds a very favorite principle, that hypotheses may be advanced in theology to answer objections even when they do not establish positive truth. The logical meaning of this principle is that the hypothesis sets aside the unlimited major premise necessary to establish the infidel objection. He seeks to answer the objection to prayer drawn from the uniformity and fixed character of the laws of nature by showing that we can trace the agencies of nature only a little way back, and that interferences may take place in that outer region which lies beyond the ken of man. It may be replied that, by just inference, we can trace the agencies far beyond the immediate inspection of man, and that we find them everywhere uniform. It might be wiser in these circumstances to trace up both the prayer and its answer to the pre-established harmony of things appointed by God. He closes his work by showing that natural theology is as useful in exhibiting man's needs, and thus preparing him to receive the remedial complement supplied by the Bible, as even in the positive truths which it has established.

We have seen in the cases of Stewart, Brown, and Mackintosh what difficulties those trained in the Scottish metaphysics had in comprehending the German philosophy and accepting the truth. Hamilton, we shall find, labored to

combine the two. Chalmers, meanwhile, was engrossed with philanthropic work; he did not understand the German language, and it was not till the last year of his life, when he got a little lull in 1847 after the disruption storm, that he became acquainted with the {404} German philosophy, to which he was introduced by Mr. J. D. Morell's well-written and interesting work, " An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century." He entered on the study with a youthful enthusiasm, and reviewed the work in the " North British Review." " It is long since an), work has made its appearance before a public in a state of greater expectancy and readiness for its lessons." With a mind of similar openness and candor, he is ready to receive whatever truth Kant and the Germans may offer. He confesses his gratification on finding, "amid all these conflicting systems and speculations, that our theology is safe." He rejoices to find profound points of agreement between Reid and Kant, and is willing to take the truth in either form. " Now, for comparing the Scottish and German philosophies, whether as it respects their similarities or their differences, it is of importance to mark how these primary beliefs of Dr. Reid are at one with the primitive arguments of Kant, or with his forms of the understanding. They may have been the better named by the latter of these two philosophers he may have probed more deeply into their foundations, or, rather, perhaps, into their method of development; he may have constructed a fuller and more accurate list of them, and, without pronouncing on his scheme for their application, or by which he would bring his categories to bear on the objects of the external world, it might be fully conceded that, altogether, be has enlarged and in some respects amended the philosophy of Dr. Reid. Yet let us not, because of the altered nomenclature, or of the new garb that has been thrown over them, overlook the substantial identity, and that, in respect of almost all, between the principles of the Scottish school and those from which Kant has earned his chief reputation." It is clear that he was not sufficiently far advanced in his knowledge of Kant and of the German philosophy to discover that there was a subtle scepticism in the philosophy which made the forms of the reason merely subjective; whereas Reid gave them an objective validity, an external validity when they related to external objects.

With great shrewdness he seizes on an incipient error, which has since grown into a formidable error. "We demur to the proposed substitution of Mr. Morell for Dr. Reid's account {405} of perception, that it is altogether an act of the mind. He affirms that the very essence of perception consists in the felt relation between mind and matter. And what we affirm is, that matter might be perceived, and, with the strongest sense and conviction in the mind of its reality, when the mind itself is altogether out of the reckoning." " It is not more necessary to be conscious of the mind in the business of perceiving than to be conscious of the eye in the business of seeing." " We can perceive without thinking of the mind, as we can perceive without thinking of the eye; and he complains of the " undue mixing up of the subjective with the objective, in which chiefly it is that the erratic movements of the German philosophy have

taken rise." He here opposes at the entrance that doctrine of relativity which was developed by Hamilton, and has been applied by Herbert Spencer.

He also makes good use of the distinction, as drawn by M. Cousin, between the spontaneous and the reflex exercises of the human understanding. "We have long been in the habit of recognizing these under the title of the mind's direct and reflex processes, and we shall continue so to name them." Though it be only by looking inwardly or looking back upon ourselves that we take cognizance of our various beliefs, these beliefs must be formed so as to exist ere they can be recognized or reflected on." So he blames Mr. Morell for constantly " mixing up consciousness and the facts of consciousness," and M. Cousin for finding the ground of our belief in an external world in a subjective act. "He looks for it, and imagines that he has got his first hold of it among the reflections of the psychological tablet within, whereas, if it is to be had at all, spontaneous as it is, it will be the primary act of looking direct on that radiance that cometh from the object of contemplation without." In following this train of thought he comes near to, and yet does not reach, a distinction on which I set great value, -- the distinction between our primitive apperceptions or intuitions as they spontaneously act and as they are generalized into maxims, axioms, or fundamental truths by the metaphysician. Considered under the first aspect, they act whether we observe them or no, and act best when, like the physiological processes of breathing, they are not noticed, and they cannot in any circumstances be supposed to err; whereas under the other {406} aspect they are the result of a discursive process of abstraction and generalization, in which there may be much error, by our adding to, or taking from, or mutilating the spontaneous process in the reflex account given of it by those who would put what is concrete and individual into a universal form.

This was one of the last compositions of Thomas Chalmers, who was found dead in his bed on the morning of May 31, 1847. His soul was transparently ready for the new truth to be disclosed to him in heaven, where what he saw as through a glass darkly on earth, appeared to him face to face.

LIV.-- JOHN ABERCROMBIE.

C/AN\ mental science be made popular and practical? It is certainly desirable that it should become so. It is of moment that the great body of educated men and women, in knowing something of history and physics, should also be acquainted with the laws of their own mind, and this though they have no predilection for the abstruse discussions of metaphysics. We have admirable compends of physical science made comprehensible to the common understanding' If we are to preserve the intelligent mind of the country from falling under the influence of the advancing materialism, we should have like expositions of mental and moral investigation for the use of upper schools, male and female, and the reading population who have not the advantage of a collegiate

education. We have such works in Abercrombie's " Intellectual Powers " (1830),and his " Philosophy of the Moral Feelings" (1833). He proceeds throughout on the method of Reid, and his treatises summarize some of the best results of the philosophy of Scotland. They are also valuable for the admirably reported cases illustrative of the influence of mind on body and body on mind. Nor is it to be omitted that there runs through all his works a vein of evangelical piety, decisive and outspoken without being offensive.

He was the son of a minister of the Church of Scotland, and was born at Aberdeen in 1780. He studied medicine in the University of Edinburgh, and became, after the death of Dr. Gregory, the most eminent Scotch physician of his time, being distinguished for his great skill and judgment. He wrote a number of medical works, treating of the brain, spinal cord, and of disease. He died in 1844.

In his "Intellectual Powers," he begins with stating what be regards as the object of science: it is to observe facts and trace their relations. He here treats of cause and effect, which he confounds with the uniformity of nature. He makes our belief in it an original instinct, but awkwardly brings observation and inference as involved in it. He distinguishes, in the manner of Reid and Stewart, between physical and efficient cause, regarding {407} the former as the only object of philosophic inquiry. He opposes materialism, but not very effectively. He then treats of the faculties of the mind arranging them: sensation and perception, consciousness and reflection, memory, abstraction, imagination, reason or judgment. Under the last he treats of first truths. But by far the most interesting and useful parts of his works are those in which he treats of the practical application of metaphysical subjects, as, for instance, of the laws of investigation, of fallacies, attention. He is in his own field when he is illustrating dreaming, somnambulism spectral illusions, and insanity. He makes a most useful application of the whole to the study of medicine. His statement of cases may always be depended on for its accuracy. I may give a few examples. He says of Dr. Leyden that he could repeat correctly a long act of parliament, or any similar document, after having once read it. When he was on one occasion congratulated by a friend on his remarkable power in this respect, he replied that instead of an advantage, it was often a source of great inconvenience. This he explained by saying that when he wished to recollect a particular point in any thing which he had read, he could do it only by repeating to himself the whole from the commencement till be reached the point which be wished to recall. Again, "a distinguished theatrical performer, in consequence of the sudden illness of another actor, had occasion to prepare himself in a few hours' notice for a part which was entirely new to him, and the part was long and rather difficult. He acquired it in a very short time, and went through it with perfect accuracy, but immediately after the performance forgot it to such a degree that, though he performed the character for several days in succession, he was obliged every day to study it anew. Characters which he had acquired in a more deliberate manner he never forgets, but can perform them at any time without a

moment's preparation. When questioned respecting the mental process which he employed the first time he performed this part, he says that he lost sight entirely of the audience, and seemed to have nothing before him but the pages of the book from which he had learned, and that if any thing had occurred to stop this illusion, he should have stopped instantly." I may give another instance. "A lady, in the last stage of chronic disease, was carried from London to a lodging in the country; there her infant daughter was taken to visit her, and, after a short inter view, carried back to town. The lady died a few days after, and the daughter grew up without any recollection of her till she was of mature age. At this time she happened to be taken into the room in which her mother died without knowing it to have been so. She started on entering it, and, when a friend who was along with her asked the cause of her agitation, replied -- "I have a distinct impression of having been in this room before, and that a lady who lay in that room, and seemed very ill, leaned over me and wept."'

The work on the " Moral Feelings " does not seem to me so valuable, and this because he cannot in treating of such a subject, have so many of those cases which he as a medical man had so carefully noted. But it is characterized by a fine spirit, and it has a useful tendency. He has some important remarks on the " Analogy between first Truths or Intuitive Principles {408} of Belief in Intellectual and Moral Science." "In applying to these important articles of belief the name of first truths or primary principles of moral conviction, I do not mean to ascribe to them any thing of the nature of innate ideas. I mean only that they come with a rapid or instantaneous conviction, entirely distinct from what we call a process of reasoning in every well-regulated mind, when it is directed by the most simple course of reflection to the phenomena of nature without and to the moral feelings of which it is conscious within." In his analysis of man as a moral being, he includes: (1) The desires, the affections, and self-love; (2) The will; (3) Moral principle or conscience; (4) The moral relation of man towards the Deity. The discussion of these subjects is not very deep or original, but it is commonly correct and always useful.

LV. -- DAVID WELSH. [100]

A/T\ the time we have now reached there was a strong reaction against moderatism and rationalism, and a tendency to return to the simple faith of the Bible; and a reconciliation of Scotch philosophy and evangelism was openly proclaimed. Ministers from the pulpit, and theologians in the divinity halls, were employing the principles of the mind and of morality to support the peculiar truths of Christianity. If there be a moral law, it points to a law-giver. If that law be immutable and unbending it shows that man is a sinner; it points to the need of an atonement, and requires such evangelical graces as humility, faith, and repentance. We have a fine exemplification of this union of philosophy and evangelism in Dr. David Welsh. He belonged to a " God-fearing " family residing in that somewhat bare but romantic sheep country in which the rivers Clyde, Tweed, and Annan rise. He was born

Dec. 11, 1793, was educated first by a private tutor, next at the parish school of Moffat, then at the high school of Edinburgh, and thence went to the university. There he fell, in 1808-9, under the attractive influence of Dr. Brown, " who admitted him to much and intimate intercourse, directed him in his private studies, discussed with him the subjects of his reading, and aided in cultivating his taste for polite literature." When in the university he devoted himself carefully to composition, and afterwards recommended the habit to his pupils. "I cannot conceive it possible for a young man to think very closely or profoundly upon any subject if he does not commit his thought,; to paper. A confused idea, a kind of half comprehension, a partial glimpse of any subject, will satisfy every person -- I mean every young person -- who has not to make an immediate use of his information upon that subject. But if you have to write upon the subject, an indefinite conception will not suffice: the cur rent of your thoughts is arrested; you are compelled calmly and deliberately to revolve and to consider, and the consequence necessarily must be that you arrive at clear and comprehensive views." {409}

He was licensed to preach in 1816, but in these days of patronage did not get a church till 1821, when lie was settled in Crossmichael, a peaceful country parish among the hills of Galloway. There he was a much beloved and respected pastor for six years, and there he wrote his life of Dr. Brown. In 1827 he became minister of St. David's, Glasgow, and was soon very influential as a preacher. " His delivery wanted some of those outward graces which often gloss over defect in matter. He was far from fluent; and indeed lie preached apparently with effort. In consequence of the weakness of his chest, there was often a straining in the getting out his words, which was at times painful to the listener; though it added to, rather than detracted from, the earnestness with which his discourses were delivered." He gathered a large congregation of thoughtful people, including not a few students of Glasgow University, who were delighted with his clear, chaste language, his fine reflection, and his warm piety. He was a noble example of a philosopher, teaching, not philosophy, but the doctrines of the cross, always in a philosophic manner and spirit. In 1831 he was elected professor of church history in the university of Edinburgh, where he was a conscientious, careful teacher, and a discerner and patron of young men of promise. He did not take a very prominent part in church politics, but was a consistent opponent of church patronage, and a firm supporter of popular rights and the spiritual independence of the church. He was moderator of the general assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1842, which passed a solemn " claim, declaration, and protest against the encroachment of the civil courts." In 1843 he had to preach at the opening of the assembly, and took as his text, " Let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind; " and delivered a sermon, through which there runs a vein of fine philosophy. After reading the protest he headed the imposing procession of ministers, who marched through the streets of Edinburgh to the Canon Mills Hall. In the Free Church of Scotland he especially interested himself in the cause of education. He died April 24, 1845.

In his life of Brown we have a very interesting account of the man, and an able abstract of his philosophy. He gives a full and fair statement of the favorite tenets of Brown, and defends them from objections which have been taken to them. He dwells with fondness on the additions which Brown is regarded as making to philosophy by his theory of causation, by his analysis of the faculties, by his account of suggestion simple and relative, and specially of generalization. As might be expected of one who had felt the fascination and enjoyed the eloquence of his master, be over-estimates his merits. " In the philosophic love of truth, and in the patient investigation of it, Dr. Brown may be pronounced as at least equal, and in subtlety of intellect and powers of analysis as superior, to any metaphysician that ever existed. Or if there ever was any philosopher who might dispute with him the palm for any one of these qualities, of this at least I am certain, -- that no one ever combined them all in equal perfection."

It was hoped by many that Dr. Welsh would write a philosophic work of his own. But he became " fully convinced of the substantial truth of the doctrines originally published by Dr. Gall." He is careful to explain: " The cerebral organs are not the mind, nor is any state of these organs the mind. {410} The mind we believe to be a simple and indivisible substance." In a sketchy article in an early number of the " North British Review," of which he was editor at the time, he showed that he was able to grapple with the deeper problems of the day. We see in all his sermons and papers an underlying philosophy gendered by the study of the Scottish school. But his energy was directed to preaching, to lecturing on church history, and to philanthropic objects.

LVI. -- JOHN WILSON.[101]

A/T\ the end of last century, Paisley had a considerable body of high-class citizens who made money and benefited their town by turning cotton into gauze and other useful products. John Wilson was the son of one of these, and was born in 1785 in by no means a poetical spot in a dingy court at the head of the High Street. We can believe that the boy was " as beautiful and animated a creature as ever played in the sunshine." He received his education first in his native town, and then at the manse of Mearns, -- a bare, wild upland district fitted to call forth a sense of freedom, but with nothing grand or romantic in its scenery. On the death of his father he entered as a student in Glasgow University, and continued there till 1803. In future years he acknowledged in "Blackwood" his obligations to Jardine as "a person who, by the singular felicity of his tact in watching youthful minds, had done more good to a whole host of individuals, and gifted individuals too, than their utmost gratitude could ultimately repay. They spoke of him as a kind, intellectual father, to whom they were proud of acknowledging the eternal obligations of their intellectual being." He indulged freely in dinners, balls, and parties; but Glasgow College made its students work, and Wilson was an ardent student He began to keep a diary, and we have an entry: " Prize for the best specimens of the

Socratic mode of reasoning given out in the logic." " Got the first prize in the logic class." Prizes have always been numerous, often not very discriminating in their subjects, in Glasgow College, and he records: " Prizes distributed; got three of them."

In all his youthful days he luxuriated in fishing and field sports, and nobody could match him at " hop, step, and jump." At an early age, when the " Edinburgh Review " was ridiculing Wordsworth, Wilson was seized with an admiration of him, and wrote him: " In all your poems you have adhered to natural feelings, and described what comes within the range of every one's observation. It is from following this plan that, in my estimation, you have surpassed every poet both of ancient and modern times." Yet he ventures to hint a fault. " No feeling, no state of mind, ought, in my mind, to become the subject of poetry that does not please." {411} In 1803 he entered, as a gentleman commoner, Magdalen College, Oxford, and participated ardently both in the high studies and in the boating and physical sports. Here he began a common-place book, which was doubtless of great use to him: " In the following pages I propose to make such remarks upon the various subjects of polite literature as have been suggested to my mind during the course of my studies by the perusal of writers on the different branches of human knowledge; reflections upon law, history, philosophy, theology, and poetry, will be classed under separate heads." With regard to the department of poetry, original verses of my own composition will be frequently introduced." " Should any reflections upon men and authors occur in my mind, even with regard to the general characters of mankind, or the particular dispositions of acquaintances and friends, they shall be written down as they occur, without any embellishment. In short, this commonplace book, or whatever else it may be called, will contain, so far as it goes, a faithful representation of the state of my mind, both in its moments of study and retirement."

At the close of his Oxford life he passed, in 1806, a brilliant examination. "Sotheby was there, and declared it was worth while coming from London to hear him translate a Greek chorus." On leaving college, having, as he believed, an independent fortune, he betook himself to the Lake country of England, and purchased Elleray, within nine miles of Wordsworth, and henceforth may be regarded as one of the Lake poets. He now divided his activities between poetry and rural sports, and "had a small fleet on Windermere." By 1810 he had written as many poems " as will make a volume Of 400 pages," of which the principal was " The Isle of Palms," descriptive of sea and island scenery, with a love story. In 1811 he was married to Miss Penny. A few years later he lost suddenly the fortune which his father had laid up for him so industriously. He bore the trial manfully, but had to remove to Edinburgh to the home of his mother, and he became an advocate. He did not acquire a large practice at the bar, and had time to write novels and poems, which were noticed favorably in the " Edinburgh Review."

Jeffrey asked him to write for the " Edinburgh," and he furnished an article on Byron. But Wilson was destined to occupy a place of his own. "Blackwood's Magazine" was

started in 1817 by others, but did not become a power till it came under the control of Wilson. He was never formal editor. Blackwood retained the management in his own hand; and, knowing that literary men were commonly both needy and dilatory, he kept them to punctuality by not remunerating them till they produced the articles, and then paying them handsomely. But the winds and the sails were given to the vessel by Wilson, and "Blackwood " immediately became the best literary magazine of its day.

So that city of Edinburgh is still maintaining its high literary reputation. In Jeffrey they have a representative of the talent, and in Scott, with Wilson in an inferior degree, representatives of the genius of their country. The " blue and yellow " is the organ of the one and old " ebony of the other. The one favors taste and judgment; the other originality and literary beauty. The one is seeking to improve things, has no great {412} reverence for the wisdom of the ancients, looks forward to the future, and is considerably cool and indifferent towards religion; the other likes things as they are, has a profound reverence for old customs and feudal castles, and speaks highly of the forms of religion as established by law and custom,

"Blackwood's Magazine" is the great work of Wilson. his tales are full of sentiment too; much in the manner of Mackenzie, -- so much so as to be at times cloying as treacle. He professes to describe the trials and sorrows of the poor; but it is clear that he paints them as one who, with a warm heart, has viewed them at a distance, and who has never truly be come one of them. His poor are certainly not the Scotch poor, with their deep feeling, which oppresses them all the more that it cannot get an out let except in brief and restrained phrases, showing that they are repressing what should be allowed to flow out. His poetry is certainly beautiful in imagery and expression, but has too redundant foliage in proportion to the stem and branches which support it, and often wants a healthy air and a manly bearing. But the whole soil of Wilson comes out in the "Noctes Ambrosianm." We have here an extravaganza full of all excellencies and defects, of fun and frolic, wit and humor, fancies and imaginations, shrewd wisdom and ingenious nonsense, of offensively personal comment and genuine pathos, of drinking, swearing, morality, and religion, -- which, however, always smells of the whiskey punch of the tavern. The whole is a sort of rhapsody which reads like an inspiration, but breathing more of the soil of earth than the air of heaven. It is a waste, newly turned up, and yielding an exuberance of seeds and trees, flowers and fruit; but with weeds and chills and fevers.

In 1820, when Brown died, there was a keen struggle for the chair of moral philosophy. Sir James Mackintosh might have had it, but could not resist the temptations of politics and London society. The contest lay between Wilson and Sir William Hamilton known already as a scholar, but not as an author. The town council was unreformed; the tories had the political power of the city; they were annoyed by the attacks of Jeffrey and jealous of the growing liberal spirit fostered by the philosophical professors of the University. So Wilson was started and warmly supported by

the government. Scott, the literary genius of Edinburgh, threw himself thoroughly into the canvass for Wilson, who received the appointment. Every one felt that Scottish metaphysics had suffered a reverse; but some rejoiced at this, as feeling that the Scottish colleges were too exclusively metaphysical, and introduced students to philosophy at too early an age, and they expected Wilson to give an impulse to literary culture.

We have a record in the "Memoir" of the attempts of the literary man and the poet to produce a course of lectures on philosophy. He would commence with some attractive and eloquent introductory lectures of a "popular though philosophical character, so as to make a good impression at first on his students and also on the public," and so he proposes to give eight or ten lectures on the moral systems of ancient Greece. Then he is to have six or more lectures on the physical nature of man. And now the difficulties meet him. Must he tread in the steps of Reid and Stewart {413} "which to avoid would be of great importance "? " Surely," he says, " we may contrive to write with more spirit and effect than either of them; with less formality, less caution; for Stewart seems terrified to place one foot before another." Then he would branch forth on taste and genius, which he was glad to find had been treated of by the Scotch moralists. Then comes the moral nature, the affections, and conscience, or whatever name that faculty may be called; and he anticipates that the passions and affections will furnish fine ground for description. Then there is the will and all its problems; " but here I am also in the dark." One more lecture on man's spiritual nature will make fifty-eight in all. " I would fain hope that something different from the common metaphysical lectures will produce itself out of this plan." Then he would treat of duties to God and man; of virtues and vices, -- in all, 108 lectures. Such was his projected plan. In later years he modified it, giving more time to the moral faculty, on which he did not throw any light.

He was never very systematic in his course. He enlarged on subjects suited to him, and was always poetical, often eloquent. The writer of this article remembers the impression left as he passed one day into his class-room. The students received him with applause. -- I believe they always did so; and he advanced in a rapid, genial manner, fresh as if he had just come from the Highlands or Lake country. He produced a roll of papers, some of them apparently backs of letters. I could not discover where he was in his course, but I soon found myself carried along pleasantly but irresistibly by a glowing description of faith, of its swaying and elevating influence. On another occasion I found him enlarging on the place which association has in forming our imaginations. I am not able to give his theory, but it seemed to me at the time fresh and original. His pupils felt that it was a stimulating thing to be under such a man. "One indubitable advantage," says Mr. Hill Burton, "was possessed by all Professor Wilson's students who had I eyes to see and ears to hear,' viz., the advantage of beholding closely the workings of a great and generous mind swayed by the noblest and sincerest impulses, and of listening to the eloquent utterances of a

voice which, reprobating every form of meanness and duplicity, was ever raised to its loftiest pitch in recommendation of high-souled honor, truth, virtue, disinterested love, and melting charity." Another pupil, Mr. A. Taylor Innes, describes him: 'His appearance in his class-room it is far easier to remember than forget. He strode into it with the professor's gown hanging loosely on his arms, took a comprehensive look over the mob of young faces, laid down his watch so as to be out of the reach of his sledge-hammer fist, glanced at the notes of his lecture (generally written on the most wonderful scraps of paper), and then, to the bewilderment of those who had never heard him before, looked long and earnestly out of the north window towards the spire of the old Town Kirk, until, having at last got his idea, he faced round and uttered it with eye and hand and voice and soul and spirit, and bore the class along with him. As he spoke, the bright blue eye looked with a strange gaze into vacancy, sometimes sparkling with a coming joke, sometimes darkening before a rush of indignant eloquence, the tremulous upper lip curving with {414} every wave of thought or hint or passion, and the golden-gray hair floating on the old man's shoulders." He had no philosophy himself, and so could not impart it to his pupils. But at times he made a profound remark, as when, in the " Noctes," he says: " Honesty is the best policy, but it is only the honest man who will discover this." Hamilton, who was ardently attached to the man praises his metaphysical acuteness as shown in a review of Brown's theory of cause and effect in " Blackwood" for 1837.

But his true merit consisted in creating a literary taste among his students. He was not a very rigid examiner or exacter of essays, and idle students passed through his class without much severe study. But he read conscientiously the papers given in to him, and was a discerning critic, particularly appreciative of excellence. The more ambitious youths cherished secretly or avowedly the idea that they might be asked by him to write a communication to dear old North for "Blackwood;" but Wilson had to consult the tastes of his readers, and their hopes had often to be disappointed.

Thus did be pass his rather lengthened life, ever looking after the magazine with which he identified himself, lecturing all winter to his students, taking excursions in the summer, and very often dining in company in the evening where the wine and the wit flowed freely, and where he was always the favorite. In 1850 his health began to break down. He retained his universal sympathy all along. His ruling passion was strong in death. " It was an affecting sight to see him busy, nay, quite absorbed, with the fishing tackle scattered about his bed where he lay propped up with pillows." " How neatly he picked out each elegantly dressed fly from its little bunch, drawing it out with trembling hand along the white coverlet, and then replacing it in his pocket-book; he would tell ever and anon of the streams he used to fish in of old." The prospect of death produced more solemn feelings, and he betook himself to the Bible, "for is not all human nature and all human life shadowed forth in these pages? " The tender and anxious question which he asked concerning Robert Burns, " Did he read his Bible?"

may, perhaps, by some be asked about himself. On a little table near his bedside his Bible lay during his whole illness, and was read morning and evening regularly. His servant also read it frequently to him. Thus departed John Wilson, April 2, 1853. {415}

LVII.-SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.[102]

H/E\ is the most learned of all the Scottish metaphysicians. Not that the Scottish school ought to be described, as it has sometimes been, as ignorant. Hutcheson was a man of learning, as well as of accomplishment, and visibly experienced great delight in quoting the Greek and Roman philosophers, as he walked up and down in his class-room in Glasgow. Adam Smith had vast stores of information; and the ground-plan which he has left of departments of ancient philosophy, and the sketch of the sects which he has given in his " Moral Sentiments," show that he was more competent, had he devoted his attention to the subject, than any man of his age to write a history of philosophy. Hume had extensive philosophic, as well as historical, knowledge; but he was so accustomed to twist it to perverse uses, that we cannot trust his candor or accuracy. Reid was pre-eminently a well-informed man. His first printed paper was on quantity. He taught in Aberdeen College, according to the system of rotation which continued even to his day, natural as well as moral philosophy; and continued, even in his old age, to be well read on all topics of general interest. Beattie and Campbell were respectable scholars, as well as elegant writers; and the former was reckoned at Oxford, and by the English clergy, as the great expounder, in his day, of sound philosophy. Lord Monboddo was deeply versed in the Greek and Roman philosophies, and in spite of all his paradoxes has often given excellent accounts of their systems. Dugald Stewart was a mathematician as well as a metaphysician; and, if not of very varied, was of very correct, and, altogether, of very competent, ripe, and trustworthy scholarship. Brown was certainly not widely or extensively read in philosophy; but, besides a knowledge of medicine, he had an acquaintance with Roman and with modern French literature. Sir James Mackintosh was familiar with men and manners, was learned in all social questions, {416} and had a general, though certainly not a very minute or correct, knowledge of philosophic systems. But, for scholarship, in the technical sense of the term, and, in particular, for the scholarship of philosophy, they were all inferior to Hamilton, who was equal to any of them in the knowledge of Greek and Roman systems, and of the earlier philosophies of modern Europe -- [1] and vastly above them in a comprehensive acquaintance with all schools; and standing alone in his knowledge of the more philosophic fathers, such as Tertullian and Augustine; of the more illustrious schoolmen, such as Thomas Aquinas and Scotus; of the writers of the Revival, such as the elder Scaliger; and of the ponderous systems of Kant, and the schools which ramified from him in Germany.

When he was alive, he could always be pointed to as redeeming Scotland from the reproach of being without high scholarship. Oxford had no man to put on the same level. Germany had not a profounder scholar, or one whose judgment

in a disputed point could be so relied on. Nor was his the scholarship of mere words: he knew the history of terms, but it was because he was familiar with the history of opinions. In reading his account, for example, of the different meanings which the word " idea" has had, and of the views taken of sense-perception, one feels that his learning is quite equalled by his power of discrimination. No man has ever done more in clearing the literature of philosophy of commonplace mistakes, of thefts and impostures. He has shown all of us how dangerous it is to quote without consulting the original, or to adopt, without examination, the common traditions in philosophy; that those who borrow at second hand will be found out; and that those who steal, without acknowledgment, will, sooner or later, be detected and exposed. He experiences a delight in stripping modern authors of their borrowed feathers, and of pursuing stolen goods from one literary thief to another, and giving them back to their original owner. For years to come, ordinary authors will seem learned by drawing from his stores. In incidental discussions, in foot-notes, and notes on foot-notes, he has scattered nuts which it will take many a scholar many a day to gather and to crack. It will be long before the rags which shine from him will be so scattered and diffused through philosophic literature as the sunbeams are through the atmosphere-that they shall {417} become common property, and men shall cease to distinguish the focus from which they have come.

The only other decided lineament of his character that I shall mention is his logical power, including therein all such exercises as abstraction, generalization, division, definition, formal judgment, and deduction. In this respect he may be placed along side of those who have been most distinguished for this faculty such as, Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Descartes, Spinoza, Samuel Clarke, Kant, and Hegel. In directing his thoughts to a subject, he proceeds to divide, distribute, define, and arrange, very much in the manner of Aristotle: take, as an example, his masterly analysis of the primary qualities of matter. He pursues Much the same method, in giving the history of opinions, as on the subjects of the principles of common sense and perception. No man ever displayed such admirable examples of Porphyry's tree, reaching from the <summum genus> to the <infirma species>. It is quite clear that, had he lived in the days of the schoolmen, he would have ranked with the greatest of them, -- with Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Abelard, -- and would have been handed down to future generations by such an epithet as Doctor Criticus, Doctor Doctissimus, or Doctor Indomitabilis.

Here, however, his strength is his weakness. He attempts far too much by logical differentiation and formalization. No man purposes now to proceed in physical investigation by logical dissection, as was done by Aristotle and the schoolmen. I have at times looked into the old compends of physical science which were used in the colleges down even to an age after the time of Newton. Ingenious they were beyond measure, and perfect in form far beyond what Herschel or Faraday have attempted. I am convinced that logical operations can do nearly as little in the mental as they have done in the material sciences. I

admit that Sir William Hamilton had deeply observed the operations of the mind, and that his lectures contribute more largely to psychology than any work published in his day. But his induction is too much subordinated to logical arrangement and critical rules. His system will be found, when fully unfolded, to have a completeness such as Reid and Stewart did not pretend to, but it is effected by a logical analysis and synthesis, and much that he has built up will require to be taken down. {418}

We may compare him with the Scotch metaphysician who had the greatest reputation when Hamilton determined to claim a place for himself. Brown and Hamilton are alike in the fame which they attained, in the influence which they exercised over young and ardent spirits, in the interest which they excited in the study of the human mind, and in their success in upholding the reputation of the Scottish colleges for metaphysical pursuits: each had an ambition to be independent, to appear original and establish a system of his own; both were possessed of large powers of ingenuity and acuteness, and delighted to reduce the compound into elements; and each, we may add, had a considerable acquaintance with the physiology of the senses: but in nearly all other respects they widely diverge, and their points of contrast are. more marked than their points of correspondence. They differed even in their natural disposition. The one was amiable, gentle, somewhat effeminate, and sensitive, and not much addicted to criticism; the other, as became the descendant of a covenanting hero, was manly, intrepid, resolute, -- at times passionate, -- and abounding in critical strictures, even on those whom he most admires. As to their manner of expounding their views, there could not be a stronger contrast. Both have their attractions; but the one pleases by the changing hues of his fancy and the glow of his sentiment, whereas the other stimulates our intellectual activity by the sharpness of his discussions, and the variety and aptness of his erudition. The one abounds in illustrations, and excites himself into eloquence and his readers into enthusiasm: the other is brief and curt; seldom giving us a concrete example; restraining all emotion, except it be passion at times never deigning to warm the students by a flash of rhetoric and presenting only the naked truth, that it may allure by its own charms. If we lose the meaning of the one, it is in a blaze of light, in a cloud of words, or in repeated repetitions: the quickest thinkers are not always sure that they understand the other, because of the brevity of his style, and the compression of his matter; and his admirers are found poring over his notes, as the ancients did over the responses of their oracles. The one helps us up the hill, by many a winding in his path, and allows us many a retrospect, when we might become weary, and where the view is most expanded; whereas {419} the other conducts us straight up the steep ascent, and, though be knows all the paths by which others have mounted, he ever holds directly on; and if there be not a path made for him, he will clear one for himself. Both were eminently successful lecturers: but the one called forth an admiration of himself in the minds of his whole class; whereas the other succeeded in rousing the energies of select minds, in setting them forth

on curious research, and in sharpening them for logical dissection. One feels, in reading Brown, as if he were filled and satisfied but sometimes as he finds in the digestion, the food has been far from substantial: whereas we are forced to complain, in regard to Hamilton, that he gives us the condensed essence, which the stomach feels great difficulty in mastering. The one never coins a new technical word, when the phrases in current use among the British and French philosophers of the previous century will serve his purpose; the other delights to stamp his thoughts with a nomenclature of his own, derived from the scholastics or the Germans, or fashioned out of the Greek tongue: and so the one feels soft as a bird of delicate plumage, whereas the other is bristling all over with sharp points like a porcupine. The works of the one remind us of Versailles, with its paintings, its woods, its fountains,-- all somewhat artificial, but beautiful withal; those of the other are ruled and squared like the pyramids, and look as if they were as lofty, and must be as enduring.

Both were extensive readers: but the reading of the one was in the Latin classics, and the works of the well-known authors of England and France in the last century; whereas the other ranged over all ancient literature, and over the philosophic systems of all ages and countries; delighted supremely in writings which had never been read since the age in which they were penned; troubled many a librarian to shake the dust from volumes which no other man had ever asked for; and must, we should think, have gratified the dead, grieving in their graves over neglect, by showing them that they were yet remembered. The one delights to show how superior he is to Reid, to Stewart, to the Schoolmen, to the Stagyrite; the other rejoices to prove his superior learning by claiming for old, forgotten philosophers the doctrines attributed to modern authors, and by demonstrating how much we owe to the scholastic ages and to Aristotle. {420}

Both departed so far from the true Scottish school: but the one went over to France for refinement and sentiment, the other to Germany for abstractions and erudition. If Brown is a mixture of the Scottish and French schools, Hamilton is a union of the schools of Reid and Kant. Brown thought that Reid's influence was too high, and had a secret desire to undermine him and Stewart with him; Hamilton thought that Brown was over-rated, and makes no scruple in avowing that he labors to strip him of the false glory in which he was enveloped; and he took up Reid at the time he was being decried in Scotland, and allowed no man -- but himself -- to censure the commonsense philosopher. Brown had no sense of the merits of Kant, and did his best (along with Stewart) to keep him unknown for an age in Scotland; Hamilton was smitten with a deep admiration of the great German metaphysician, helped to introduce him to the knowledge of Scottish thinkers, was caught in his logical network, and was never able thoroughly to extricate himself.

As to their method of investigation, both employ analysis as their chief instrument, but the one uses a retort and proceeds by a sort of chemical composition, while the other employs a lens and works by logical division. In comparison with Reid and Stewart, both erred by excess of

decomposition and overlooked essential parts of the phenomenon; but the object of the one was to resolve all mental states into as few powers as possible, whereas the aim of the other was to divide and subdivide a whole into parts, which be again distributes into compartments of a framework provided for them. The one has added to the body of philosophy mainly by his acute analyses of concrete phenomena and by his illuminated illustrations of psychological laws; the other by his vast erudition, which enabled him to dispose under heads the opinions of all philosophers, and by his skill in arranging the facts of consciousness by means of logical division and distribution.

Brown acquired a wide reputation at an early date; but, like those showy members of the female sex who have many admirers but few who make proposals of union, he has had scarcely any professing to follow him throughout. His most distinguished pupil, Dr. Welsh, was possessed of a fine philosophic spirit, but abandoned Scotch metaphysics for phrenology and for theological and ecclesiastical studies. Several eminent {421} men, not pupils, have been influenced by Brown. Payne's work on Mental and Moral Science is drawn largely from his lectures. Isaac Taylor, in his "Elements of Thought," has adopted some of his peculiarities. Chalmers had to prepare his lectures Oil moral philosophy when Brown's name was blazing high in Scotland, and, feeling an intense admiration of his eloquence and of the purity of his ethical system, has followed him perhaps further than he should have done, but has been kept from following him in several most important points by his attachment to Reid and Butler. John Stuart Mill has got the very defective metaphysics which underlies and weakens much of his logic from his father, James Mill, from Brown, and from Comte. Still, Brown has no school and few professed disciples. It is different with Hamilton. His influence, if not so extensive -- to use a favorite distinction of his own -- has been more comprehensive. His articles in the " Edinburgh Review were above the comprehension, and still further above the tastes, of the great body even of metaphysical students in Great Britain when they appeared between 1829 and 1833. But they were translated by M. Peisse into the French language, and there were penetrating minds in Britain, America, and the Continent which speedily discovered the learning and capacity of one who could write such dissertations. By the force of his genius he raised up a body of pupils ready to defend him and to propagate his influence. He has had a school and disciples, as the Greek philosophers had in ancient times, and as such men as Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant have had in modern times. His pupils employ his distinctions and delight in his nomenclature: their speech everywhere "bewrayeth" them. Some of them, it is true, remind us of a modern soldier in mediaeval coat of mail, and move very cumbrously under the ponderous armor of their master; but, as a whole, they constituted an able and influential school of abstract philosophy. Some of them seem incapable of looking on any subject except through the well-cut lenses which Hamilton has provided for them others seem dissatisfied with his negative conclusions, and with his rejection a la Kant of final cause as a proof of the divine existence, but then, do not seem to have the courage to examine and separate the

truth from the error in that doctrine of relativity on which his whole system is founded. {422}

While Hamilton has thus been establishing a school and acquiring an authority, it has not been without protest. In saying so, I do not refer to the criticisms of his attacks on the character and doctrines of Luther, which have been repelled by Archdeacon Hare and others, but to opposition offered to his philosophic principles. There has been a general dissent even by disciples, such as Mansel, from his doctrine of causation, and, if this tenet is undermined, his elaborate scheme of systematized "Conditions of the Thinkable" is laid in ruins. Dr. Calderwood has opposed his negative doctrine of the infinite. Others, not pupils, have expressed doubts of his whole theory of relativity. Ulrici, in the leading philosophic journal of Germany, "Zeitschrift fur Philosophie" (1855), has charged him with departing in his method from the standpoint of Scotland, with giving in to the critical method of Kant, and ploughing with the German heifer, and alleges that he or his school must advance with Germany. As the unkindest cut of all, Mr. Ferrier, who was supported by Hamilton in the competition for the moral philosophy chair in Edinburgh when Professor Wilson retired, and with whom Hamilton (as he assured the writer of this article) was long in the habit of consulting, published the " Institutes of Metaphysic," which is a complete revolt against the whole Scottish philosophy; and Kant was not more annoyed with the idealism of Fichte than Hamilton was with the " Object plus Subject " of Ferrier. There has been an able review of him from the stand-point of Hegel by Mr. Sterling. But the most formidable attack was made on him in 1865 by John Stuart Mill in his "Examination of the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton." The physiological psychologists and materialists of the present day are seeking to turn away the attention from him.

William Hamilton was born in the dingy Professors' Court of Glasgow College, March 8, 1791. He was the son of Dr. Thomas Hamilton, professor of anatomy and natural history in that college, and, it is worthy of being noted, physician to the family of Thomas Reid. He was the lineal descendant of Sir Robert Hamilton, the not very wise commander of the Covenanters at Drumclog, and through him, of the Hamiltons of Preston, who claim to be descended from the second son of the progenitor of the Duke of Hamilton; and he succeeded in {423} establishing his claim to the title of Sir William Hamilton. Having lost his father in early life, he was boarded for some time with the Rev. Dr. Summers, the parish minister at Mid Calder, and was afterwards sent to a school at Bromley, where he was taught classics in the thorough old English style. He entered the University of Glasgow in 1803, attended three winters, and there studied logic under Jardine, and moral philosophy under Mylne, standing at the head of his class in both departments, by the votes of his fellow-students -- the method of determining honors at that time when competitive examinations had not been exalted into so exclusive a place. By this time he had become an irregular, but most insatiable devourer and also an eager collector of books -- in the end his library amounted to nearly ten thousand volumes. In 1807 he was sent up on the Snell foundation to Oxford, and

entered Balliol College. Here he took his share in the boating and other gymnastic exercises, but entered with far more eagerness into the study of Aristotle, the favorite of Oxford at that time. " His manner of reading was characteristic. He had his table, chairs, and generally his floor strewed with books; and you might find him in the midst of this confusion studying with his foot on a chair, poising one great folio on his knee, with another in his hand. His mode of 'tearing out the entrails of a book,' as he termed it, was remarkable. A perusal of the preface, table of contents, and index, and a glance at those parts which were new to him, which were few, were all that was necessary." The paper which he gave in at his examination for the degree was preserved as being singular:

"Divinity: Aristotle's Philosophy of Man.
"Theoretical: De Anima, &c.
"Practical-Moral-Ethic: Nic., Mag., Cic. Op. Ph.
  Domestic: OEcon. Civil: De Republ.
"Instrumental: Logic: Organon. Rhetoric: Ars. Rhet.,
  Cic. Op. Rhet Poetic: De Poetica Pindar, Eschylus."

"He allowed himself to be examined on more than four times the number of philosophical and didactic books ever wont to be taken up even for the highest honors; and those, likewise, authors far more abstruse than had previously been attempted in the schools; while at the same time he was examined in more than any ordinary complement of merely {424} classical works." In 1812 he went to Edinburgh, and in the following year, he became an advocate. He lived in the house of his mother, and married an estimable lady, Miss Janet Marshall, a niece of his mother's. In 1820, when Brown died, he became a candidate for his chair, and had the support of Dugald Stewart, who was greatly impressed with his learning and philosophical ability. He was not particularly successful at the bar, and every one rejoiced when, in 1821, he was appointed professor of universal history by the faculty of advocates, the patrons of the chair. His class was not a language one; but he studied and expounded rare and profound subjects. About this time phrenology, as expounded by George Combe, was favored by a considerable body of people in Edinburgh; and Hamilton set himself determinedly against it. He conducted numerous experiments with his own hands, sawing open skulls, dissecting and testing the weight of brains: he is said to have weighed one thousand brains belonging to above fifty species of animals. In 1827, he published in the "Edinburgh Review," his famous article on Cousin and the philosophy of the conditioned. This was followed in 1830 by an article on perception, and on Reid and Brown; and in 1833 by an article on Whately and on logic. In 1836 he was appointed professor of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, in opposition to Isaac Taylor, supported by the religious public, and George Combe, supported by the phrenologists. He has now a large class of students, numbering from perhaps one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty, and he prepared for them the courses of lectures in logic and metaphysics, which he, or his assistants for him, delivered each successive session, till his decease. Having occasion to prelect on Reid, his labors led, in 1856, to his edition

of Reid's "Collected Works, with Notes and Dissertations," which was left unfinished by him, but had additions made to it after his death by papers which he had written. In 1852 the articles in the " Edinburgh were republished in the " Discussions on Philosophy," with large additions on university education, including his vehement and senseless diatribe against mathematics. Some years before his death he had a stroke of paralysis, which partially affected his speech and his power of using his pen, and his lectures had to be read in part or in whole by an assistant, {425} while his lady acted as his amanuensis. A second attack carried him off, after a few days' illness, May 6, 1856.

Mr. George Moir describes his person: "The massive though well-cut features, the firm compressed mouth, and the eagle-looking eye, of which the whole pupil was visible, created a feeling akin to awe. But in proportion to this apparent sternness was the charm of his smile and of his whole manner when animated." Though a most devoted reader, he never liked composition, and commonly wrote under pressure. There were stories told in Edinburgh of the nervous agitation into which he wrought himself when he had to prepare his lectures for his class. His style was always clear and clinching, but gives evidence that the writer composed painfully and elaborately, and was unwilling to waste a single unnecessary word. His temper was keen and vehement, but never mean or vindictive. When he could not carry his purposes, he might break off in a passion. He was appointed secretary to the college senatus, and there he had a great many projects for elevating the university scholarship, and often came into collision with his colleagues.

Of all thinkers Hamilton is the least disposed to call any man master; still there were forces operating upon him and making his native tendencies take the particular direction which they did. I am convinced that a wholesome tone was given to his mind by the philosophy of Reid, the metaphysician of his native college, and who died six years after Hamilton was born. Had he been trained exclusively in Oxford, he might have spent his powers in mere notes and comments on others, and we should have been without his profound original observations. Had he been reared in Germany, his speculative spirit might have wasted itself in a hopelessly entangled dialectic, like that of Hegel. To Glasgow and to Reid he owes his disposition to appeal, even in the midst of his most abstract disquisitions, to consciousness and to facts. To Oxford we may trace his classical scholarship and his love of Aristotle, the favorite for long ages with technical Oxonian tutors. We only wish that he had been led to drink as deep into Plato as he did into Aristotle: it would have widened his sympathies, and rubbed off some acute angles of his mind, and made his philosophy less cold and negative. A third master mind exercised {426} as great a power over him as either Reid or Aristotle. In prosecuting his researches, he was necessarily led beyond the narrow scholarship of Britain into the wide field of German learning, and while ranging there could not but observe that there was a constant reference to the name of Kant. The logical power of the author of the "Critic of Pure Reason" at once seized his

kindred mind, and he eagerly took hold of his critical method, and adopted many -- I think far too many of his distinctions. Kant exercised as great an influence over him as even Reid did. His whole philosophy turns round those topics which were discussed in Kant's great work; and he can never get out of those "forms " in which Kant set all our ideas so methodically, nor lose sight of those terrible antinomies, or contradictions of reason which Kant expounded, in order to show that the laws of pure reason can have no application to objects, and which Hegel gloried in and was employing as the ground principle of his philosophy. From Kant he got the principle that the mine begins with phenomena instead of things, and builds thereon by forms or laws of thought; and it was as he pondered on the sphinx enigmas of Kant and Hegel, that he evolved his famous axiom about all positive thought lying in the proper conditioning of one or other of two contradictory propositions, one or other of which must, by the rule of excluded middle, be void. Fortunately he fell in, at the same time, with the less hard and more genial writings of Jacobi, who taught him that there was a faith element as well as a rational element in the human mind; but, unfortunately, Jacobi thought that faith was opposed to reason, and had no distinct views as to the nature of faith, or as to the harmony between faith and reason. To this source we may trace those appeals which Hamilton is ever making to faith, but without specifying what faith is. To his legal studies we may refer somewhat of his dry manner and his disputatious spirit. His readings in connection with the chair of history enabled him to realize the precise condition of the ages in which the opinions of philosophers were given forth. The catholic views which his extensive reading led him to adopt set him in determined opposition to the miserably narrow sensational school of France, and to Professor Mylne, of Glasgow, and Dr. Thomas Brown, who had given way too much to that school. The lofty {427} spiritual views which he had caught from Reid and Kant set him against materialism; and his medical studies, to which his father's profession may have directed him, enabled him to meet phrenology, and to give an admirable account of the physiology of the senses. Such was the course of training which he had gone through when he was asked to write a review of Cousin, and found himself face to face with the philosophy of the absolute.

In contemplating these two eminent philosophers, -- Hamilton and Cousin, -- then brought into collision, it is difficult to say whether one is most struck with their resemblances or their differences. They are alike in respect of the fulness and the general accuracy of their scholarship. Both are alike distinguished for their historical knowledge and critical power. Even here, however, we may observe a contrast,-Cousin being the more universal in his sympathies, and Hamilton being the more discriminating and the more minutely accurate in his acquaintance with rare and obscure authors. Both, perhaps, might have had some of their views expanded, if, along with their scholarship, they had entered more thoroughly into the inductive spirit of modern physical researches. But the age of universal knowledge is past, and it is vain to expect that any human capacity will contain all learning. Both are original, vigorous, and independent thinkers; and both are

distinguished by a catholic spirit in philosophy: but the one is more Platonic, and the other more Aristotelian, in his tastes and habits. The one delights to show wherein he agrees with all others, the other is more addicted to show wherein he differs from all others. Both are clear writers: but the one is distinguished by the eloquence of his composition and the felicity of his illustrations; the other, by the accuracy and expressiveness of his, at times, harsh nomenclature. Cousin is, undoubtedly, the man of finest genius and most refined taste; the other appears to me to have been the man of coolest and most penetrating intellect. The one makes every subject of which he treats irridescent by the play of his fancy; the other bands it into a structure of great solidity by the rigidity of his logic. Both were admirers of the German as well as the Scottish schools of philosophy; but Cousin's predilections were at one time more towards the {428} former, and of a later date he became more attached to the latter; whereas Hamilton started more in the Scottish spirit, and swung latterly towards the German method. The two came into collision when the Scotchman reviewed the Frenchman in the " Edinburgh Review." But when Hamilton became a candidate for the chair of moral philosophy in Edinburgh he received powerful and generous aid from his rival; and when Hamilton published his edition of Reid, he dedicated it to M. Victor Cousin.

The writer of this article has a very vivid recollection of Sir William in happening to pass into his class-room a year or two after his appointment. There was an evident manliness in his person and his whole manner and address. His features were marked, he had an eye of a very deep lustre, and his expression was eminently intellectual. He read his lecture in a clear, emphatic manner, without show, pretension, or affectation of any kind. His nomenclature sounded harsh and uncouth to one unacquainted with it, but his enunciations were all perspicuous and explicit. The class was a large one, numbering I should suppose 150. At the opening there was a furious scribbling, visible and audible, by all the students in their notebooks; but I observed that, as the lecture proceeded, one after another was left behind, and, when it was half through, at least one-third had ceased to take notes, and had evidently lost their interest in, or comprehension of, the subject. Unfortunately for the Scottish colleges, unfortunately for the youth attending them, students enter the logic class in the second year of their course, when the majority are not ripe for it. A course of lectures, like that given by Jardine of Glasgow, might be fit for such a class, but not a rigid course like that of Hamilton, who did, indeed, make his thoughts as clear as such profound thoughts could be made, but could not bring them down to the comprehension of a promiscuous class, of which many are under seventeen, and some under sixteen, or even fifteen years of age. But even among second year students there were every year a larger or less number who rejoiced to find that he first awakened independent thought within them, and who were ready to acknowledge ever afterwards that they owed more to him than to any other professor, or to all the other professors under whom they studied. {429}

In his examinations be expected a sort of recitation of his lectures from the students. He also encouraged his pupils to submit to voluntary examinations on private studies undertaken by them. He prescribed essays on subjects lectured on, and in these essays he allowed great latitude in the expression of opinions, and some of his students, out of a spirit of independence or contradiction, would at times take up the defence of Dr. Brown, and were not discouraged. All students of high intellectual power, and especially those of a metaphysical taste, received a stimulus of a very lofty kind from his lectures, and these examinations and essays. I suspect that some of the duller and idler passed through the class without getting much benefit. In his whole intercourse with young men there was great courtesy and kindness, and a readiness to appreciate talent and independent thinking wherever he found it. For a number of years before his death, Sir William was oppressed with infirmities, and had to employ an assistant; and it was characteristic of him that he was in the habit of selecting for the office some one of those who had been his more distinguished students. We may now look at his metaphysics and his logic.

<Metaphysics>. The first of the volumes is on philosophy generally and on mental philosophy in particular. He begins by recommending the study, gives the definitions, unfolds the divisions, explains the terms with amazing erudition and unsurpassed logical precision, and dwells largely on consciousness, its laws and conditions. The reading of this volume will prove as bracing to the mind as a run up a hill of a morning on a botanical or geological excursion is to the body. We especially recommend the study of it to those whose pursuits are usually of a different character, as, for example, to those who are dissipating their minds by light literature, or whose attention has been directed exclusively to physical facts, and who have thus been cultivating one set of the faculties which God has given them, to the neglect of others, and have thus been putting their mental frame out of proper shape and proportion, -- as the fisher, by strengthening his chest and arms in rowing, leaves his lower extremities thin and slender. There is a fine healthy tone about his defence of the liberal as against the more lucrative sciences, which latter Schelling called <Brodwissenchaften>, {430} which Hamilton wittily translates, <the bread and butter sciences>. He quotes with approbation the well-known sentiment of Lessing, " Did the Almighty, holding in his right hand Truth, and in his left <Search after Truth>, deign to tender me the one I might prefer,-in all humility, but without hesitation, I would request Search after Truth." But we should concur in such statements as these only with two important explanations or qualifications; the one is, that the search be after truth, which we must value when we find it; and the other is, that it be after attainable and useful truth. It has been the great error and sin of speculative philosophy that it has been expending its strength in building in one age ingenious theories which the next age takes down. I maintain that such activity wastes the energy without increasing the strength. He who thus fights is like one beating the air, and his exertion ends, not in satisfaction, but in weariness and restlessness. The

admirable test of Bacon here comes in to restrain all such useless speculation, viz., that we are to try them by their fruits. Had this been the proper place we could have shown that Bacon's doctrine on this subject has often been misunderstood. He does not say that science is to be valued for its fruits, but it is to be tested by its fruits; just as faith, which, however, is of value in itself, is to be tried by the good works to which it leads. Thus limited and thus understood, there is profound wisdom in the caution of Bacon, which will not discourage an inductive inquiry into the human mind, its laws and fundamental principles, but will lay a restraint on the profitless metaphysical theories which have run to seed prematurely in Germany, where thinkers are sick of them, and are now being blown into our country and scattered over it like the down of thistles.

This volume is full of brief and sententious maxims. Take the following as examples: --

> "It is ever the contest that pleases us, and not the victory. Thus it is in play; thus it is in bunting; thus it is in the search after truth; thus it is in life. The past does not interest, the present does not satisfy, the future alone is the object which engages us." "What man holds of matter does not make up his personality. They are his, not be; man is not an organism, -- he is an intelligence served by organs." "I do not mean to assert that all materialists deny or actually disbelieve a God. For in very many cases this would be at once an unmerited compliment to their reasoning, {431} and an unmerited reproach to their faith." "Wonder has been contemptuously called the daughter of ignorance; true, but wonder we should add is the mother of knowledge" "Woe to the revolutionist who is not him self a creature of the revolution ! If he anticipate he is lost, for it requires what no individual can supply, a long and powerful counter-sympathy in a nation to untwine the ties of custom which bind a people to the established and the old."

The following is his tabular view of the distribution of philosophy:-

Mind or Consciousness
- Facts -- Phaenomenology, Empirical Psychology
  - Cognitions,
  - Feelings
  - Conative Powers (Will and Desire)
- Laws -- Nomology, Rational Psychology
  - Cognitions -- Logic
  - Feelings -- Aesthetic
  - Conative Powers
    - Moral Philosophy
    - Political Philosophy
- Results -- Ontology, Inferential Psychology
  - Being of God
  - Immortality of the Soul, &c.

I set little value on this division. The same topics would require to be discussed under more than one head. In his lectures Sir William has taken up only one of the three

grand general groups, viz., Empirical Psychology, and even this he has discussed only in part. A portion of the second group is treated of in his lectures on logic. On the others he never entered.

It will be seen from the above table that he followed Kant in giving a threefold distribution of the mental faculties into the Cognitive, the Emotive, and the Conative. This is an improvement on the old division by Aristotle into the cognitive and motive, or of that of the schoolmen into the understanding and the will. Still it is not complete and exhaustive. He is obliged to include the imagination in the first head, and yet it can scarcely be called a cognitive power, though, of course, it implies a previous cognition. The conscience comes in under the conative powers; but, in fact, the conscience partakes of the nature both of a cognitive and conative power. It is one of the defects of the arrangement that it does not allot a clearly separate place to the conscience.

The following is his division of the cognitive powers: --

1. Presentative
    External -- Perception.
    Internal -- Self-Consciousness
2. Conservative
    Memory
3. Reproductive
    Without Will -- Suggestion
    With Will -- Reminiscence
4. Representative
    Imagination
5. Elaborative
    Comparison -- Faculty of Relation
6. Regulative
    Reason -- Common sense

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The account of the cognitive powers in the first 332 pages of the second volume, down to the regulative powers, not included, will be regarded in the end, if I do not mistake, as the most valuable part of Sir William Hamilton's metaphysics. His pupils will probably fix on the very part I have designedly excepted, viz., the regulative faculties, as being the most important. Farther on in this article I mean to show that he has greatly misapprehended the nature of these regulative powers. Meanwhile let us look at the account which he has given of the other mental faculties.

I. Like the Scotch metaphysicians he paid great attention to the Senses. His views were first given to the world in his article in the " Edinburgh Review," republished in the Discussions, and have been expanded in his notes on Reid and in his class lectures. He has a famous arrangement of the various forms which have been taken by the ideal theory of sense-perception. Realists are either natural, who maintain that we know the external thing directly; or hypothetical (cosmothetic idealists), who suppose that there is a real world not directly known. Idealists are absolute or presentative, who suppose that there is only the idea; or

cosmothetic or representative (hypothetical realists) who bold that we know the external thing by a representation. The possible forms of the representative hypothesis are three: (1) The representative object not a modification of mind, but an extra-mental object, physical or hyperphysical; (2) The representative object a modification of mind, dependent for its apprehension, but not for its existence, on an act of consciousness, say an idea in the mind, as was held apparently by Locke; (3) The representative object a modification of mind, non-existent out of consciousness, the idea and its perception only different relations of an act (state) really identical; the view taken by Arnauld and Brown. The distinctions thus drawn are of great importance, and should be kept steadily in view in judging of theories. But his divisions do not embrace all cases. Dr. Brown does not bold by the ideal, but the causal or inferential, theory; and Hamilton has missed the mark in his criticism of him.

I am inclined to agree with him that our original perceptions are probably of our organism, or of objects in immediate contact with it. This doctrine seems to have been expounded {433} simultaneously by Hamilton; by Saisset, the French metaphysician; and by John Muller, the physiologist. On one small point I would differ from Hamilton. Our original perceptions through the eye do not seem to me to be points of light, but of a colored surface affecting our organism, but at what distance we cannot say till experience comes to our aid. But the doctrine identified with his name is that of immediate perception. He intended to take the same view as Reid did, and, when he began to edit Reid's works, he thought that their opinions were the same. But, as he advances, he sees that they differ; and he ends by doubting whether Reid was after all a realist. Reid's doctrine is, that there is first an organic affection; then a sensation in the mind; and, thirdly, a perception suggested by an unreasoning and instinctive process. Hamilton's doctrine is, that, following the organic affection, there is simultaneously a sensation and perception, the one being strong as the other is weak, and <vice versa>; that is, when the sensation is lively the perception is faint, and when the perception is prominent the impression is feeble. Both, however, agree in the main point, that the process is intuitive and that there is no reasoning involved. Hamilton's doctrine is specially that of <immediate> perception; that is, of perception without a medium.

It is objected to Hamilton's theory, that he overlooks the numerous intermediate processes revealed by physiology. In vision there are the rays of light; the reflection and refraction of them, the picture on the retina, an action along the optic nerve to the seat of sensation, an action thence we know not how to the brain, an action in the cells which constitute the gray matter surrounding the brain, and then, or perhaps not even then, but only after some farther steps, the perception of the object, say a tree, from which the rays of light come. How it is asked can perception be immediate, when all these media are evidently implied? To this the followers of Hamilton might reply, that he never thought of disputing the existence of steps between the

external object and the percipient mind, which, when it comes into exercise, contemplates the tree, and not an image or representation of it in the mind, in the body or out of the body. But the objection may now take a somewhat different form. It may be urged that, after all, we do not see the tree, {434} and it will be asked, What do we perceive intuitively? Certainly not the brain cells, or the influence transmitted to them, or the action of the sensorium, or even the image on the retina, or the coats and humors of the eye, or the vibrations that constitute the light. What, then, do we perceive? Hamilton. allowed that it was not the distant tree; for he adopted the Berkleian theory of vision, and held that we are immediately percipient of distance by the eye. What, then, do we see immediately? Hamilton was helped here by another doctrine of his, that the mind may be said to be indiscriminately in the brain and in the whole nervous apparatus, so long as it keeps up its connection with the centre; and by the further doctrine that our primary perceptions are of our bodily frame and of objects in contact with it. In taste, smell, and hearing, we perceive the palate, nostrils, ear; in feeling, our extended frame; and by the muscular sense an extra-organic object resisting our energy. The proper account is, that in sense-perception, when formed, we perceive our frame as affected or objects affecting the frame. I am ready to allow as many processes as the physiologist can prove to exist in the nervous system and brain prior to perception. But I hold that perception is a mental and not a bodily act. We hold further that nervous action, and brain action and cellular, do not constitute perception, which is knowledge. I assert that, while there may be bodily antecedents, they are not properly the causes of perception or any proper mental act, such as the perception of beauty or of moral excellence. I may add that I have no objections to find them represented as the occasions or conditions of sense-perception, not therefore of our higher mental acts. If we hold, as I hold, that in creature action all causes are concauses, that is composed of more than one agent, then the brain action may be an agent, a necessary but inferior agent, in producing perception, the main agency being a capacity of the mind. I am inclined to go a step further, and to allow that the defenders of natural realism might admit for the sake of argument, and admit out and out if proven, that there is a process of reasoning in every perceptive operation, even in such an operation as perceiving snow as a colored surface -- just as all admit that there is inference when we place that snow on a mountain too at a distance. But still they will insist that when mind perceives matter, it {435} perceives it as out of itself, and as extended; that it cannot infer this from a nervous action, or from an unextended sensation or impression within the mind; and that the perception of an external, extended object, be it in the body or beyond the body, must be immediate, intuitive, and original.

II. Sir William Hamilton has been much landed for the view which he has given of Consciousness. In this I cannot concur. He avows that he uses consciousness in two distinct senses or applications. First, he has a general consciousness treated of largely in the first volume. This he tells us cannot be defined. (Vol. I. P. 158.) " But it

comprehends all the modifications, -- all -- the phenomena of the thinking subject." (p. 183.) ',Knowledge and belief are both contained under consciousness." (p. 191.) Again, "consciousness is co-extensive with our cognitive faculties." " Our special faculties of knowledge are only modifications of consciousness." (P. 207.) He shows that consciousness implies discrimination, judgment, and memory. (P. 202-206.) This is wide enough: still he imposes a limit; for consciousness " is an immediate not a mediate knowledge." (p. 202.) Already, as it seems to me, inconsistencies are beginning to creep in -- for he had told us first that consciousness includes "all the phenomena of the thinking subject;" now be so limits it as to exclude ,mediate knowledge," which is surely a modification of the thinking subject. Consciousness is represented as including belief; and yet it must exclude all those beliefs in which the object is not immediately before us. He stoutly maintains what no one will deny, that this general consciousness is not a special faculty; but when he comes to draw out a list of faculties in the second volume, he includes among them a special faculty, which he calls consciousness, but to which, for distinction's sake, he prefixes self, and designates it self-consciousness. It is the office of this special faculty to afford us a knowledge of the phenomena of our minds." (Vol. II. p. 192.) He justifies himself in drawing a distinction between sense-perception and self-consciousness on the ground that, " though the immediate knowledge of matter and of mind are still only modifications of consciousness, yet that their discrimination as subaltern faculties is both allowable and convenient."

Such is the doctrine and such the nomenclature of Hamilton {436} on this subject. I confess that I have great doubts of the propriety of applying the phrase "consciousness," both in this general and specific way. In the first sense "Consciousness constitutes, or is co-extensive with all Our faculties of knowledge," and he speaks of our being endowed with a faculty of cognition or consciousness, in general (Vol. 2. p. 10), and says that " consciousness may be regarded as the general faculty of knowledge." Now it is certainly desirable to have a word to denote our faculties of knowledge, or of immediate knowledge but why not call them knowing powers, or cognitive powers, and their exercise or energy, knowledge or cognition, and then the word " consciousness " would be reserved unambiguously for the cognizance which the mind takes of self in its particular states. The word (from <con scio> to know together with) seems the appropriate one to denote that knowledge of self which co exists with all our other knowledge of things material or things spiritual; and indeed with all our other mental exercises, such as feelings and volitions. It is certainly in this sense that the term is employed by Hutcheson, by Reid, by Stewart, by Royer Collard; and all Hamilton's vehement criticisms of these men are inapplicable and powerless, for this very obvious reason, that they use the word consciousness as he uses self-consciousness, acknowledged by him to be a special faculty. It is an inevitable result of using the phrases in two senses, a wider and a straiter, that we are ever in danger of passing inadvertently from the one meaning to the

other, and making affirmations in the one sense which are true only in the other. I rather think that Hamilton himself has not escaped this error, and the confusion thence arising. lie is ever appealing to consciousness, as Locke did to ideal and Brown did to suggestion; but we are not always sure in which of the senses, whether in both, or in one, or in which one. He is ever ascribing powers to consciousness, which he would have explained, or modified, or limited, if the distinction had been kept steadily in view. Thus he is often announcing that consciousness is the universal condition of intelligence; if this is meant of the general consciousness, it can mean no more than this, that man must have knowing powers in order to know; if meant of the special consciousness, it is not true; it is rather true that there must be some mental exercise as a condition of the knowledge of {437} self. He calls the principles of common sense the facts of consciousness, emphatically; whereas these principles, as principles, are not before the consciousness as principles at all. The individual manifestations are of course before the consciousness (though not more so than any other mental exercise), but not the principles themselves, which are derived from the individual exercises, by a reflex process of abstraction and generalization. He speaks everywhere as if we must ever be conscious at one and the same time of subject and object, -- meaning external object; whereas we may be conscious of the subject mind thinking about some state of self present or absent. His <quondam> friend, Professor Ferrier, carried the doctrine a step farther, and maintained that a knowledge of self is a condition of all knowledge of not self, whereas it is merely a fact that the one co-exists with the other in one concrete act, in which we know not self to be different from self, and independent of self.

III. The Conservative, Reproductive, and Representative faculties might all have been included, I think, under one head, with subdivisions. The account which he gives of this group is upon the whole the best which we have in our language. Still there are oversights in it. Thus, in order to make the analysis complete, I should have had the recognitive power, or that which recognizes the object recalled as having been before the mind <in time past>. Had he given this power a separate place, he would have seen more clearly than he does how the idea of time arises. Along with the mere representative power he should have mentioned the compounding or grouping power of imagination, which combines the scattered images into one new whole. He refers at times to man's native power of using signs; why not specify a symbolic power, enabling man to think by signs standing for notions.

In explaining the nature of the conservative or retentive faculty, and elsewhere, he has unfolded some peculiar views which I consider to be as correct as they are profound, but he carries them to a length which I am not prepared to allow. What is the state of an idea when not falling at the time under consciousness? This is the question which has often been put. Thus having seen the Crystal Palace of 1851, the question is put, -- what place has that idea in my mind, when {438} I am not precisely thinking about the object? Is it dead or simply dormant? We

must of course answer that the idea can have no existence as an idea, when not before the consciousness. Still it must have some sort of existence. There exists in the mind a power to reproduce it according to the laws of association. The writer of this article having had occasion, years ago, to pass over the plains of Lombardy, is not therefore always imaging them, but he has the power of recalling them, and finds that they are recalled every time he hears of the jealousies between Austria and Italy. It is a great truth that the mind is ever acquiring potency, is ever laying up power. We have something analogous in the physical world. Thus a power coming from the sun in the geological age of the coal-measures was laid up in the plant, went down into the strata of the ground, and comes up now in our coals ready to supply us with comfortable heat in our rooms, and with tremendous mechanical force for our steam-engines. This is the doctrine of all the physicists of our day. But there is a similar laying up of power in the mind, of intellectual, and we may add, of moral or immoral power. Aristotle had certainly a glimpse of some such doctrine, and spoke of a <dunamis>, an <entelecheia>, and an <energeia>; the first denoting the original capacity, the second -- the capacity in complete readiness to act, and the third the capacity in act or operation. Modern mechanical science is enunciating this doctrine in a more definite form, and distinguishing between capacity and potential energy and actual energy. Sir William Hamilton, taking the hint from Aristotle, has adopted the views of the German Schmid (who again had certain speculations of Leibnitz before him), who declares that the energy of mind which has once been cannot readily be conceived as abolished, and that " the problem most difficult of solution is not how a mental activity endures, but how it ever vanishes." (Vol. II. P. 212.)

So far I can concur; but when he maintains that there are in the mind, acts, energies, and operations, of which it is not conscious, I hesitate and draw back. His doctrine on this subject is founded on the views of Leibnitz, as to there being perceptions below consciousness. The class of facts on which he rests his opinion seem to me to be misapprehended. {439} "When we hear the distant murmur of the sea, what are the constituents of this total perception of which we are conscious? " He answers that the murmur is a sum made up of parts, and that if the noise of each wave made no impression on our sense, the noise of the sea as the result of these impressions could not be realized. " But the noise of each several wave at the distance, we suppose, is inaudible; we must, how ever, admit that they produce a certain modification beyond consciousness, on the percipient object." (Vol. I. P. 351.) He speaks of our perception of a forest as made up of impressions left by each leaf, which impressions are below consciousness. There is an entire misinterpretation of the facts in these statements, and this according to Hamilton's own theory of the object intuitively perceived. The mind is not immediately cognizant of the sound of the sea or of its several waves; nor of the trees of the forest and their several leaves. All that it knows intuitively is an affection of the organism as affected by the sound or sight. The impression made by the distant object is on the organism, and when the impression is sufficiently strong on the organism, the mind is called into

exercise, and from the organic affections <argues> or <infers> the external and distant cause. Thus there is no proof of a mental operation of which we are unconscious.

He explains by these supposed unconscious acts a class of mental phenomena with which every one who has ever reflected on the operations of his own mind is familiar. The merchant walks in a brown study from his house to his place of business; there must have been many mental acts performed on the way, but they are now all gone. The question is, were they ever before the consciousness? Hamilton maintains that they never were; Dugald Stewart maintains that they were for the time, but that the mind cannot recall them. Notwithstanding all the acute remarks of Hamilton, I adhere to the theory of Stewart. I do so on the general principle that in devising a theory to explain a set of phenomena we should never call in a class of facts, of whose existence we have no other proof, when we can account for the whole by an order of facts known to exist on independent evidence. Hamilton says: "When suddenly awakened during sleep (and to ascertain the fact I have caused myself to be roused at different seasons of the {440} night), I have always been able to observe that I was in the middle of a dream;" but adds, "that he was often scarcely certain of more than the fact that he was not awakened from an unconscious state, and that we are often not able to recollect our dreams." He gives, as the peculiarity of somnambulism, that we have no recollection when we awake of what has occurred during its continuance. (Vol. I. P. 320-322.) Every one will admit that we are often conscious of states at the time, which we either cannot remember at all, or (what will equally serve our purpose) more probably cannot remember, except for a very brief period after we have experienced them. We have thus an established order of facts competent to explain the whole phenomenon without resorting to a Leibnitzian doctrine, which has been applied by certain later German pantheists to show how existence may rise gradually from deadness to life, and from unconsciousness to consciousness.

Under the head of the reproductive faculties he has two profound lectures on the Association of Ideas. In the close of his edition of Reid there is a learned disquisition on the well-known passage of Aristotle, in which he gives, with his usual brevity, a classification of. laws which regulate the train of our thoughts. Hamilton so interprets that passage as to make Aristotle announce one generic law and three special ones. I am unwilling to set my authority against so accurate a scholar as Hamilton -- , but I have often looked into that passage, and can find no evidence of Aristotle having resolved all into one law. In the same note Hamilton had begun to expound his own theory, but broke off, and closed the book in the middle of a sentence. Most readers will feel that the account given in these lectures, though somewhat fuller, is far too brief, and illustrated by too few examples to be easily understood. His pupils could not be more profitably employed than in fully unfolding the doctrine of their master on this subject, and applying it to explain the well-known phenomena. He thinks that the whole facts can be explained by one great law, which he calls the law of redintegration, which he finds incidentally expressed by Augustine. This law may be thus enounced, -- "Those

thoughts suggest each other which had previously constituted parts of the same entire or total act of cognition." (Vol. II. p. 238.) He again quotes Schmid Thus {441} the supreme law of association, -- that activities excite each other in proportion as they have previously belonged as parts to one whole activity, -- is explained from the still more universal principle of the unity of all our mental energies in general." (P. 241.) I am inclined to look on this as, on the whole, the most philosophical account which has been given of the law of association. It at once explains the cases of simple repetition in which one link of a chain of ideas which had previously passed through the mind, being caught, all the rest come after; as when we have got the first line of a poem committed to memory, and the others follow in order. It easily explains, too, all cases in which we have had a variety of objects before us in one concrete act, -- thus if we have passed along a particular road, with a certain person, observing the mountain or river in front, and talking on certain objects, -- we find that when any one of these recurs it is apt to suggest the others. It is thus if we have often heard in youth the cry of a particular animal, goose or grouse, turkey or curlew, the cry will ever bring up afresh the scenes of our childhood. It is more doubtful whether the law can explain a third class of cases when it is not the same which suggests the same, but an object suggests another object which has never been individually associated with it, but is like it, or is otherwise correlated with it; as when the conqueror Alexander suggests Julius Caesar or Bonaparte. It needs an explanation to show how the law can cover such a case, which, however, I rather think it can, though I am by no means inclined to admit the explanations of the Hamiltonians proceeding on their narrow and peculiar view of correlates.

IV. This leads us to refer to the next faculty, -- the Elaborative, equal to Comparison, -- that is the Faculty of Relations. The phrase elaborative is an expressive epithet, but is not a good special denomination, as there is elaboration in other exercises as well as in this. Comparison, or the correlative faculties, or the faculties of relation, is the better epithet. Under this head he has some learned and acute remarks on the abstract and the general notion, and on language, and is terribly severe, as usual, on Dr. Thomas Brown. I am of opinion that Brown's views on this subject are, in one or two points, more enlarged than those of Hamilton himself, who has over {442} looked essential elements. " In so far," he says, "as two objects resemble each other, the notion we have of them is identical, and, therefore, to us, the objects may be considered as the same." (Vol. II. pp. 294.) I cannot give my adherence to this doctrine of the identity of resembling objects. Altogether his account of the relations which the mind can discover is narrow and exclusive. He specifies first the judgment virtually pronounced in an act of perception of the <non-ego>, or an act of self-consciousness of the <ego>; then secondly the something of which we are conscious and of which the predicate existence is twofold, the <ego> and the <non-ego>; thirdly, the recognition of the multiplicity of the co-existent or successive phenomena, and the judgment in regard to their resemblance or dissimilarity; fourthly, the comparison of the phenomena

with the native notion of substance; fifthly, the collection of successive phenomena under the native notion of causation. He might have seen a much broader and more comprehensive account of the relations which the mind can perceive in Locke's "Essay" (B. II. C. 28); in Hume's " Treatise on Human Nature" (B. I. P. i. 5); or in Brown's Lectures (Lect. xlv.) I am surprised he has never made a reference to such relations -- on which the mind so often dwells -- as those of space, time, quantity, properties of objects, cause and effect, and moral good.

V. We have now only to consider, and in doing so have to discuss, the Regulative Faculties of the mind. I like the phrase regulative, only we must dissociate it from the peculiar sense in which it is used by Kant (from whom Hamilton has borrowed it), who supposes that the mind in judging of objects imposes on them a relation not in the objects themselves. The epithet expresses that such principles as substance and quality, cause and effect, are "the laws by which the mind is governed in its operations " (Vol. II., P. I 5), which laws I may add -- but Hamilton would not-are not before the consciousness as principles when we exercise them. In calling them faculties, he acknowledges that he uses the word in a peculiar signification. (P. 347.) The truth is Hamilton does not see the relation in which they stand to the faculties: they are not separate faculties, but are involved in all the faculties, being, in fact, the necessary laws which spontaneously and unconsciously {443} guide their exercise. His treatment of this subject in a more elaborate manner, in the " Conditions of the Thinkable Systematized, or the Alphabet of Human Thought," appended to the Discussions, and in a somewhat more popular manner in his Lectures, was probably regarded by himself, and is certainly regarded by his admiring pupils, as the most important contribution made by him to philosophy. On the other hand, I look on the system as being, on the whole, a failure. He has labored to combine the philosophies of Reid and Kant; but we see everywhere the chinks at the line of junction. The principles of common sense looking at objective truth, will not join on to the empty forms which imply and -- guarantee no reality. In the construction of his philosophy of the relative or conditioned, as he calls it, he has expended an immense amount of logical ability; but he has lost himself in Kantian distinctions, giving in to Kant's theory as to space and time, making them, and also cause and effect, merely subjective laws of thought and not of things; and the system which be has reared is an artificial one, in which the flaws and oversights and rents are quite as evident as the great skill which he has shown in its erection. I dispute three of his fundamental and favorite positions.

(1) I dispute his theory of relativity. I acknowledge that there is a sense in which human knowledge is relative. There is a sense in which all thinkers, except those of the extravagant schools of Schelling and Hegel, hold a doctrine of relativity; but this is not the same as that elaborated by Hamilton: " From what has been said you will be able to understand what is meant by the proposition that all our knowledge is only relative. It is relative,-first, because existence is not cognizable absolutely and in itself, but

only in special modes; second, because these modes can be known only if they stand in a certain relation to our faculties , and, thirdly, because the modes thus relative to our faculties are presented to, and known by, the mind only under modifications determined by these faculties themselves." (Vol. I., p. 148.)

In these three general propositions, and in the several clauses, there are an immense number and variety of assertions wrapped up: to some I assent, from others I as decidedly dissent. I acknowledge, first, that things are known to us {444} only so far as we have the capacity to know them; in this sense, indeed, even the divine knowledge is relative. I acknowledge, secondly, that we do not know all things; nay, that we do not know all about any one thing. Herein human knowledge differs from the divine: but the word relative is not the phrase to attach to human knowledge; in order to point out the difference, it would be better to say that man's knowledge is partial or finite as distinguished from perfect or absolute. I may admit, thirdly, that man discovers external objects under a relation to himself and his cognitive mind. So much, then, I freely allow. But, on the ether hand, I demur, first, to the statement that we do not know existence in itself, or, as he expresses it elsewhere in Kantian phraseology, that we do not know the thing in itself (Ding an sich). I do not like the language: it is ambiguous. I doubt whether there be such a thing as " existence in itself and, of course, what does not exist cannot be known. If he mean to assert that we do not know things as existing, I deny the statement. Every thing we know, we know as existing; not only so, but we know the thing itself, -- not all about the things, but so much of the very thing itself. Then I demur secondly, to the statement, which is thoroughly Kantian, that the mind in cognition adds elements of its own: as he expresses it elsewhere, " Suppose that the total object of consciousness in perception = 12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, the material sense 3, and the mind 3; this may enable you to form some rude conjecture of the nature of the object of perception." (Vol. II., p. 129.) I allow that sensations, feelings, impressions associate themselves with our knowledge: but every man of sound sense knows how to distinguish between them, and it is surely the business of the philosopher not to confound them, but to point out the essential difference. To suppose that in perception, or cognition proper, the mind adds any thing, is a doctrine fraught with perilous consequences; for, if it adds one thing, why not two things, or ten things, or all things, till we are landed in absolute idealism, or, what is nearly allied to it, in absolute scepticism?

The defective nature of the whole Hamiltonian philosophy comes out in its results. Comparing his philosophy with that {445} of Germany he says: " Extremes meet. In one respect both coincide, for both agree that the knowledge of nothing is the principle or the consummation of all true philosophy, `<Scire nihil, -- studium quo nos laetamur utrique.>' But the one doctrine openly maintaining that the nothing must yield everything, is a philosophic omniscience, whereas the other holding, that nothing can yield nothing, is a philosophic nescience In other words:

the doctrine of the unconditioned is a philosophy confessing relative ignorance, but professing absolute knowledge; while the doctrine of the conditioned, is a philosophy professing relative knowledge, but confessing absolute ignorance." (Dis. p. 609.) Surely this is a pitiable enough conclusion to such an elaborate process. A mountain labors, and something infinitely less than the mouse emerges.

I suspect that Sir William Hamilton was wont to meet all such objections, and try to escape from such a whirlpool as that in which Ferrier would engulf him, by taking refuge in belief, -- in faith. And I am thoroughly persuaded of the sincerity of his faith, philosophic and religious. But it is unsatisfactory, it is unphilosophic, to allow that cognition and intelligence may lead to nihilism, and then resort to faith to save us from the consequences. Surely there is faith involved in the exercises of intelligence; there is faith (philosophical) involved, when from a seen effect we look up to an unseen cause. I am sure that human intelligence does not lead to absolute knowledge, but as little does it lead to scepticism or to nothing. Of this I am further sure, that the same criticism which pretends to demonstrate that intelligence ends in absolute ignorance, will soon -- probably in the immediately succeeding age -- go on to show with the same success, that our beliefs are not to be trusted.

The same doctrine of relativity carried out led him to deny that there could be any valid argument in behalf of the divine existence, except the moral one. I acknowledge that the moral argument, properly enunciated, is the most satisfactory of all. I admit that the argument from order and adaptation (the physico-theological) can prove no more, than that there is a living being of vast power and wisdom, presiding over the universe; but this it can do by the aid of the law of cause and effect properly interpreted. The proof that this Being is in {446} finite must be derived from the mental intuition in regard to the infinite. Hamilton has deprived himself of the power of using the arguments from our belief in causation and infinity by what I regard as a defective and mutilated account of both these intuitions. He has nowhere stated the moral argument which he trusts in. I suspect that the criticism which cuts down the argument from intelligence, needs only to be carried a step further to undermine the argument from our moral nature. This process has actually taken place in German), and I have no desire to see it repeated among metaphysical youths in this country. It is on this account, mainly, that I have been so anxious to point out the gross defects in the account given by Hamilton of our necessary convictions.

(2) I dispute his doctrine of causation. It is so lamentably defective in the view taken of the nature of cause, and so perversely mistaken in the theory grounded on this view, that several of his most distinguished disciples have been obliged to abandon it. The following is his account of effect and cause " An effect is nothing more than the sum or complement of all the partial causes, the concurrence of which constitutes its existence." I remember no eminent philosopher who has given so inadequate a view of what constitutes cause. It leaves out the main element, --

the power in the substance, or, more frequently, substances, acting as the cause to produce the effect. It leads him to represent the effect as an emanation from previously existing elements, a doctrine which he turns to no pantheistic use, but which has, undoubtedly, a pantheistic tendency. Taking such a view it is no wonder that he should represent creation as inconceivable; for the only creation which he can conceive, according to his theory, is not a creation of a new substance by God, but a creation out of God. Thus defective is his view of cause in itself. His view of the internal principle, which leads us, when we discover an effect to look for a cause is equally inadequate. According to him it is a mere <impotence> to conceive that there should not be something out of which this effect is formed; and, to complete the insufficiency of his theory, he makes even this a law of thought and not of things. Surely all this is in complete opposition to the consciousness to which he so often appeals. Our conviction as to cause is not a powerlessness, but a power; not {447} an inability, but an ability. It is an intuitive and necessary belief that this effect, and every other effect, must have a cause in something with power to produce it.

(3) I dispute his theory as to our conviction of infinity. We are," he says, "altogether unable to conceive space as bounded-as finite; that is, as a whole beyond which there is no farther space." " On the other hand, we are equally power less to realize in thought the possibility of the opposite contradictory: we cannot conceive space infinite or without limits." (VOL. "., P. 369, 370.) The seeming contradiction here arises from the double sense in which the word " conceive " is used. In the second of these counter propositions the word is used in the sense of imaging or representing in consciousness, as when the mind's eye pictures a fish or a mermaid. In this signification we cannot have an idea or notion of the infinite. But the thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the same as the imaging power. The mind can think of the class fish, or even of the imaginary class mermaid, while it can not picture the class. Now, in the first of the opposed propositions the word "conceive" is taken in the sense of thinking, deciding, being convinced. We picture space as bounded, but we cannot think, judge, or believe it to be bounded. When thus explained all appearance of contradiction disappears indeed all the contradictions which the Kantians, Hegelians, and Hamiltonians are so fond of discovering between our intuitive convictions, will vanish if we but carefully inquire into the nature of these convictions. Both propositions, when rightly understood, are true, and there is no contradiction. They stand thus: -- "We cannot image space as without bounds:" "we cannot think that it has bounds or believe that it has bounds." The former may well be represented as a creature impotency; the latter is, most assuredly, a creature potency, is one of the most elevated and elevating convictions of which the mind is possessed, -- and is a conviction of which it can never be shorn.

It will be seen from these remarks that I refuse my adherence to his peculiar theory of relativity, and to his maxim that " positive thought lies in the limitation or conditioning of one or other of two opposite extremes,

neither of which, as unconditioned, can be realized to the mind as possible, and yet {448} of which, as contradictions, one or other must, by the fundamental laws of thought, be recognized as necessary." (Reid's " Works," P. 743.) It fails as to causation and as to infinity, and he has left no formal application of it to substance and quality, where, as Kant showed, there is no such infinite <regressus>, as in infinite time and space or cause. He would have found himself in still greater difficulties had he ventured elaborately to apply his theory to moral good. As I believe him to have been on the wrong track, I scarcely regret that he has not completed his system and given us a doctrine of rational psychology or ontology. Indeed I have no faith whatever in a metaphysics which pretends to do any more than determine, in an inductive manner, the laws and faculties of the mind, and, in doing so, to ascertain, formalize, and express the fundamental principles of cognition, belief, judgment, and moral good. The study of logic began to revive from the time that Archbishop Whately constrained it to keep to a defined province. The study of metaphysics would be greatly promoted if the science would only learn to be a little more humble and less pretending, and confine itself to that which is attainable.

<Logic>. We may now look at his work on Logic, which is a very elaborate one, and contains very able discussions and learned notes. It proceeds upon a very thorough acquaintance with Aristotle and his commentators, with the schoolmen and the logical writers of the seventeenth century; but was directly suggested by the Kantian criticism and amendment of logic, and by the works of such men as Esser, Fries, Krug, and Drobisch, who carried out the principles of the great German metaphysician. just as the " Port Royal Logic " has all the excellencies and defects of the philosophy of Descartes, so the logic of Hamilton has the combined truth and error of the metaphysics of Kant. It should be added, that his analytic; so far drawn from German sources in some of its fundamental views, is, after all, Hamilton's own, in the way in which it is wrought out and applied. Logic is defined as "the science of the laws of thought as thought." It is represented to be an <a priori> science. "It considers the laws of thought proper as contained <a priori> in the nature of pure intelligence." He does not state, and evidently does not see, that these laws of thought, while not the laws of the objects of thought, {449} are laws of thought as employed about objects, and can be discovered not <a priori>, but simply by an observation of the workings of thought.

He reviewed the not very philosophical but very shrewd and useful work of Whately, in the " Edinburgh Review " for 1833, criticising it with terrible severity, and giving indications of his own views. He was already cogitating his system, he expounded it to his class after he became professor, and he gave it to the public in "An Essay toward a new Analytic of Logical Forms," being that which gained the prize proposed by Sir William Hamilton, in the year 1846, for the best exposition of the new doctrine propounded in his lectures, with an historical appendix, by Thomas Spencer Baynes. It would require a treatise as elaborate as Hamilton's two volumes to state and examine it in detail,

but I may notice some of the fundamental points.

<The Concept>. It proceeds on the distinction between the extension and comprehension of a term or notion. He makes no pretensions to the discovery of this principle. He knew that it was stated in the "Port Royal Logic," and that it was taught in Glasgow University by Hutcheson. Professor Baynes has shown in his translation of the "Port Royal Logic" that there were anticipations of it in earlier works. Hamilton carries out the distinction more thoroughly than it had ever been before. " The comprehension of a concept is nothing more than the sum or complement of the distinguishing characters or attributes of which the concept is made up; and the extension of a concept is nothing more than the sum or complement of the objects themselves, whose resembling characters were abstracted to constitute the concept." (Vol. I., P. 148.) If we except his exposition of this distinction, he does not seem to me to throw much light, otherwise, on the first part of logic, -- the part as it appears to me which has most need to be cleared up. He draws no distinction between the general notion and the abstract notion, but treats of both under the one designation, concept. But surely there is a distinction between two such notions as "animal" on the one band, embracing an indefinite number of objects, and " life," which has not a complement of objects, but is only an attribute of objects. {450}

<Judgment>. He claims originality chiefly for his doctrine of the thorough quantification of the predicate. "Touching the principle of an explicitly quantified predicate, I bad by 1833 become convinced of the necessity to extend and correct the logical doctrine on this point." " Before 1840 I had become convinced that it was necessary to extend the principle equally to negatives." (Vol. "., P. 209.) This doctrine, as Professor Baynes shows, had been partially anticipated, but had never been fully carried out. I am inclined to admit that the credit, if there be any credit, in the thorough quantification of the predicate belongs to Hamilton. But I set no value on the supposed improvement. It proceeds on the simple logical postulate, "to state explicitly what is thought implicitly." I admit the principle, but deny that it requires the predicate to be universally quantified. When we say "the dog barks," we make the predication, without inquiring in thought whether there are or are not other dogs that bark, whether dogs are all or only some barking animals. When we say " man is rational," we do not determine whether or no there are other creatures that are rational; whether, for example, angels may be called rational, whether men are "all" or only "some" rational. As the predicate is not always or even commonly quantified in spontaneous thought, so we do not require always to quantify it in the logical enunciation. At the same time, it is of importance to be able to quantify it on demand, and thus to see reflectively what is involved in every proposition. In carrying out his principles, he adds to the four classes of propositions acknowledged in the received logic A, E, I, 0, other four,

U. Common salt is chloride of sodium.
Y. Some stars are all the planets.

n. No birds are some animals.
w. Some common salt is not some chloride of sodium.

I do regard it as of moment to place in a distinct class those propositions which assert the equivalence of subject and predicate (U). But the others seem to me to be converted or rather perverted forms that never do present themselves in spontaneous thought: in which we say instead " all the planets are stars," and " some animals are not birds," and that " chloride {451} of sodium in this cellar is not the same as chloride of sodium in that salt-cellar."

It is one of the supposed advantages of his analytic that it reduces the conversion of propositions from three species to one, -- that of simple conversion. This holds true after we have converted the proposition into the form in which Hamilton has put it. When we say, "The bird sings," which is the form in spontaneous thought, Hamilton insists that logically it is, " The bird is some singing animal; " and after we have thus converted it once, the second conversion follows simply, " Some singing animals are birds." But there is nothing saved by requiring us to put every proposition in a form so different from that which it assumes in spontaneous thought.

Hamilton has done service to logic by unfolding more fully than had been done before what Kant called " syllogisms of the understanding," and which he calls immediate inferences, that is, inferences without a middle term, as when, from the proposition " All men have a conscience," we infer that some men have a conscience. He includes very properly under this head every form of conversion and opposition; and it has been shown by him and others that it includes other immediate inferences which it is important to spread out to view. But instead of placing them under reasoning, they might be allowed to remain where conversion and opposition have usually been placed, in the second part of logic.

<Reasoning>. It is an alleged advantage of his analytic that it is ,the revocation of two terms of a proposition to their true relation; a proposition being always an equation of its subject and predicate." So he says the proposition all men are mortal, means "all men = some mortal." That in some propositions the subject and predicate are equivalent may be allowed; and in such cases there may be no impropriety in using the mathematical equation, though generally it is better to allow mathematicians to keep their own symbols, as in their science they have a definite meaning, a meaning in regard to quantity; and if we introduce symbols into logic, let us introduce new symbols appropriated to the ideas. Human thought is employed about a great many other objects as well as quantity. When we say, "Virtue leads to happiness," we are not uttering a quantitative {452} statement, "Virtue = some things that lead to happiness; " but primarily an attributive assertion, that virtue has the attribute of leading to happiness, and by implication in extension, "among the things that lead to happiness is virtue."

The new analytic claims that it reduces all the general

laws of categorical syllogisms to a single canon. But what is that canon? I confess I have difficulty in finding it. Mr. Baynes states it " A syllogism is the product of that act of mediate comparison " by which we recognized that two notions stand to each other in the relation of whole and part, through the recognition that these notions severally stand in the same relation to a third. This canon is vague enough till it is explained what is meant by the relation of whole and parts. There is valid ratiocination where the relationship does not seem that of whole and parts.

Chloride of sodium is not common salt;
Pepper is not chloride of sodium;
Therefore pepper is not common salt.

In many cases the relation is one of whole and parts. But of what kind of whole? Hamilton says that it is first one of comprehension, and complains that logicians have overlooked it. Thus (Vol. I., P. 272): --

Every morally responsible agent is a free agent;
Man is a morally responsible agent;
Therefore man is a free agent, --

which is thus explained: The notion man comprehends in it the notion responsible agent; but the notion responsible agent comprehends in it the notion free agent; therefore, on the principle that a part of a part is a part of a whole, the notion man also comprehends in it the notion free agent.

But it is clear to me that in every one of these propositions there is generalization or extension implied. We have " every responsible agent," "every man," and in the class of "free agents," or "some free agents." I acknowledge that there is also comprehension involved, for all extension involves comprehension. But the uppermost thought seems to me to be in extension: Man is in the class responsible; which again is in the class free agent; consequently man is in the class free agent. Unless our knowledge of attributes is such as to enable us {453} thus to form classes, the reasoning is not valid; and the best form in which to brand out the principle involved is,

All responsible agents are free agents;
But man is a responsible agent
Therefore he is a free agent.

But if this be so, then we are back to the <dictum>, "Whatever is true of a class is true of all the members of the class." But as all extension involves comprehension, it is of moment to be able on demand to put reasoning in the form of comprehension.

It is urged in favor of the practical value of the analytic, that it makes figure unessential and reduction unnecessary. But it enlarges the number of legitimate moods, making them 36 under each figure, or in all 108, -- a number which is apt to frighten the student.

He vacillates in his account of hypotheticals and disjunctives. His final opinion is given (Vol. II., 370-378

-- " Hypotheticals (conjunctive and disjunctive), April 30, 1849"). "These syllogisms appear to be only modifications or corruptions of certain immediate inferences, for they have only two terms, and obtain a third proposition only by placing the general rule of inference (stating, of course, the possible alternatives), disguised, it is true, as the major premises.

He had divided logic into pure and modified, and he treats of the latter in Vol. ". He doubts whether there can be a modified logic; and is ever striving to impart to what he says under that head a rigidly technical form. The remarks which he throws out are often characterized by much intellectual ability, and some of them are of great value. But most of the topics discussed do not admit of so formal a treatment as he would give them. His account of the Baconian induction is a failure. The truth is, he never appreciated or understood the method pursued in the physical sciences.

The appendix contains a miscellaneous but very valuable set of papers on logical subjects. I doubt much whether Hamilton's system of logic will ever as a whole be adopted by our colleges. We have, however, two admirable text-books founded on it-. Thomson's "Outline of the Laws of Thought" and Bowen's "Logic." It will be acknowledged by all, that the discussions he has raised have done more to clear up unsettled points in {454} formal logic than any work published since the days of Kant. These discussions will be looked at by writers on logic in all coming ages.

In parting with this great man, now gone from our world, it is most satisfactory to notice what was the professed aim of all his philosophy,-- it was to point out the limits to human thought, and thereby to teach man the lesson of intellectual humility. It is instructive to find that this has been the aim of not a few of the most profound philosophers with which our world has been honored. The truth is, it is always the smallest minds which are most apt to be swollen with the wind engendered by their own vanity. The intellects which have gone out with greatest power to the farthest limits are those which feel most keenly the barriers by which man's capacity is bounded. The minds that have set out on the widest excursions, and which have taken the boldest flights, are those which know best that there is a wider region beyond, which is altogether inaccessible to man. It was the peculiarly wise man of the Hebrews who said, " No man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end." The Greek sage by emphasis declared that if he excelled others it was only in this, that he knew that he knew nothing. It was the avowed object of the sagacious Locke to teach man the length of his tether,-- which, we may remark, those feel most who attempt to get away from it. Reid labored to restrain the pride of philosophy, and to bring men back to a common sense in respect of which the peasant and philosopher are alike. It was the design of Kant's great work to show how little the speculative reason can accomplish. And now we have Sir William Hamilton showing within what narrow limits the thought of man is restrained; and the metaphysician, <par excellence>, of Oxford has, in the Bampton lectures, employed this philosophy to lay a restraint on the rational

theology of Britain, and the speculative theology which is coming like a fog from the German Ocean. It is pleas ant to think that Sir William Hamilton ever professed to bow with reverence before the revelations of the Bible, and takes delight in stating it to be the result of all his investigations, " that no difficulty emerges in theology which had not previously emerged in philosophy." In one of the letters which the author {455} of this article has had from him he proceeds on the great Bible doctrines of grace; and from all I know of him personally, I am prepared to believe in the account which I have heard from what I reckon competent authority, that the prayer which came from him at his dying hour was, " God be merciful to me, a sinner." It is most instructive to perceive the publican and the philosopher thus made to stand on the same level before the all-righteous judge.

LVIII. -- THE METAPHYSICS OF THE FUTURE.

W/HAT\ are we to make in these times of metaphysics? It is quite clear that this kind of investigation has lost, I suspect for ever, the position once allowed it, when it stood at the head of all secular knowledge, and claimed to be equal, or all but equal, in rank to theology itself. " Time was," says Kant, "when she was the queen of all the sciences; and if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honor. Now it is the fashion to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns forlorn and forsaken like Hecuba." Some seem inclined to treat her very much as they treat those <de jure> sovereigns wandering over Europe whom no country will take as <de facto> sovereigns, -- that is, they give her all outward honor, but no authority; others are prepared to set aside her claims very summarily. The multitudes who set value on nothing but what can be counted in money never allow themselves to speak of metaphysics except with a sneer. The ever-increasing number of persons who read, but who are indisposed to think, complain that philosophy is not so interesting as the new novel, or the pictorial history, which is quite as exciting and quite as untrue as the novel. The physicist, who has kept a register of the heat of the atmosphere at nine o'clock in the morning, for the last five years, and the naturalist, who has discovered a plant or insect, distinguished from all hitherto known species by an additional spot, cannot conceal their contempt for a department of inquiry which deals with objects which can neither be seen nor handled, neither weighed nor measured. {456}

In the face of all this scorn I boldly affirm that mental philosophy is not exploded, and that it never will be exploded. Whatever men may profess or affect, they cannot, in fact, do without it. It often happens that a profession of contempt for all metaphysics, as being futile and unintelligible, is often an introduction to a discussion which is metaphysical without the parties knowing it (just as the person in the French play had spoken prose all his life without being aware of it); and of such metaphysics it will commonly be found that they, are futile and

unintelligible enough. Often is Aristotle denounced in language borrowed from himself, and the schoolmen are disparaged by those who are all the while using distinctions Which they have cut with sharp chisel in the rock, never to be effaced. There are persons speaking with contempt of Plato, Descartes, Locke, and all the metaphysicians, who are taking advantage of the great truths which they have discovered. Perhaps these individuals are telling you very solemnly that they prefer the <practical> to the <theoretical>, or that they care little for the <form> if they have the <matter>, and are profoundly ignorant that they are all the while using distinctions introduced by the Stagyrite, and elaborated into their present shape by the scholastics. But surely, they will tell you, the discovery of a new <species> of an old <genus> is a more important event than all your philosophic discoveries; and they will be surprised to learn that we owe the introduction of the phrases genus and species to Plato or to Socrates. Or perhaps they boast that they can have <ideas> without the aid of the philosophers, forgetting that Plato gave us the word <idea>, while Descartes and Locke brought it to its present signification. "Ah, but," says our novel reader, eager to discover whether the heroine so sad and forlorn in the second volume is to fall in with her lover, and be married to him before the close of the third, "metaphysics are associated in my mind with a dreary desert without and a headache within; " and is quite unaware that he is able so to express himself, because philosophers have explained that ideas are <associated>. I could easily show that in our very sermons from the pulpit, and orations in the senate, and pleadings at the bar, principles are ever and anon appealed to which have come from the heads of our deepest thinkers in ages long gone by, and who may now be forgotten by all but a few antiquarians {457} in philosophy. Our very natural science, in the hands of such men as Faraday and Mayer, is ever touching on the borders of metaphysics, and compelling our physicists to rest on certain fundamental convictions as to extension and force. The truth is, in very proportion as material science advances, do thinking minds feel the need of something to go down deeper and mount up higher than the senses can do; of some means of settling those questions which the mind is ever putting in regard to the soul, and the relation of the universe to God; and of a foundation on which the understanding can ultimately and confidently repose.

II. Metaphysics may have now to take anew start by taking advantage of physiological research. The Scottish school has never been slow to profit by the discoveries of science as to the brain, the nerves, the senses. From the first, and all along, they embraced and used all that was established in regard to the eye not being originally percipient of distance, to the distinction between the nerves of sensation, and to the reflex system in the human body; and they set themselves against premature and rash hypotheses by Hartley, by Erasmus Darwin, and by the phrenologists. But physiology in its natural and necessary progress is coming nearer and closer to the line which divides mind from matter, and in these circumstances mental science has both to watch and profit by the investigations which are being so diligently pursued.

First, metaphysics must restrain the rash inferences of mere physiologists, as Reid did the vibration theory of Hartley, as Brown did the hypotheses of Darwin as to life, and as Hamilton did the pretended science of craniology. They must make the whole educated community know, believe, and realize, that such physical actions as attraction, repulsion, and motion are one set of phenomena, and perception, reasoning, desire, and moral discernment another and a very different set of phenomena. We can trace so far into the brain what takes place when the mother sees her son thrown out from a boat on the wild waves; we can follow the rays of light through the eye on to the retina, to the sensorium, possibly on to the gray matter in the periphery of the brain; and in the end physiology may throw some light on the whole cerebral action. But in the end, as at the beginning, we are in the domain of matter and {458} motion; we have only the same action as takes place in the brain of the dog as it looks on. But when the mother's affection rises up, when she forgets herself in thinking of her boy, when she uses expedients for rescuing him, when she resolves to plunge into the water and buffets the billows till she clasps her boy and lavishes her affection on him, we are in a region beyond that reached by the physiologist,-- a region which I believe he can never reach; and it is of importance to tell him so. But the psychologist can reach that region by consciousness, and ought diligently to explore it. Whatever be the pretensions it makes, physiology has hitherto thrown little light on purely mental phenomena, and none whatever on higher mental action, such as ratiocination, the idea of the good, and resistance to temptation.

Secondly, the metaphysician must enter the physiological field. He must, if he can, conduct researches; he must at least master the ascertained facts. He must not give up the study of the nervous system and brain to those who cannot comprehend any thing beyond what can be made patent to the senses or disclosed to the microscope. I do cherish the hope that physiological psychology may in the end be rewarded by valuable discoveries. Light may be thrown on purely mental action by the fact that sensory action travels to the brain at the rate of 144.32 feet in the second, and from the brain at the rate of 108.24; that the movement is slowest in the case of the sense of sight and quickest in touch; and by what is alleged by Donders that a thought requires 1/26 of a second. There are mental actions which cannot well be explained by mental laws, such as the rise of certain states and the association of certain states; the rise, for instance, and the association of cheerful thoughts in the time of health, and of gloomy thoughts when we are laboring under derangement of the stomach. There may here be latent processes which do not fall under consciousness, but may be detected by the microscope or chemical analysis. By such researches the results reached by the psychologist may be so far modified on the one hand and considerably widened on the other. But all such investigations should be conducted by those who can understand and appreciate the peculiar nature of mental phenomena, and allow them their full and legitimate space. No physiologist can talk of, {459} or so much as refer to,

mental action without speaking of feelings, affections, thoughts, fancies, imaginations, desires, purposes, resolves; but no eye, no mechanical instrument, can detect these. They cannot be weighed in the balance or measured by the line. There is a division of the mental faculties commonly adopted in the present day into the senses and the intellect, the emotions and the will; but this distribution is suggested by the inward sense, and could never be discovered by an inspection of the compartments of the brain.

III. Metaphysics will now require to determine by the aid of physical science what truth there is in idealism. All is not real that may seem or be declared to be so. The sky is not a vault; color is produced on the visual organism by vibration in a medium; the pleasure is not in the musical sounds. To save realism we are obliged to draw distinctions, say with Aristotle, between common and proper percepts, or with Locke and the Scottish school, between the primary and secondary qualities of matter. But I have a strong conviction that all such distinctions may only be partially correct, and are only provisionally applicable. But as physical and physiological science make farther progress, we may ascertain the exact truth, and find that it clears up many obscure points. As the facts are ascertained, metaphysics should take them up, and, combining our intuitive perceptions with them, may determine precisely what we are entitled to affirm of matter. In the end some of the statements of the Scottish school as to the precise nature of the external reality may be modified or even set aside. But the great truths propounded by such men as Hamilton will only be established, and seen to rest on a basis which can never be moved. It will be acknowledged that there is an external thing independent of mind, and that this is extended, and has a passive potency. However much we may refine it, enough will be left of matter to undermine Berkleianism and every form of idealism.

IV. Metaphysics may be able to give a more accurate expression of fundamental truth. It is one of the peculiar excellencies of the Scottish school that they stand up for first truths which cannot be proven on the one hand nor set aside on the other. They are not just agreed as to the form which they should take, or the language in which they should be expressed. Mr. {460} J. S. Mill and Mr. Herbert Spencer think that they can account for all or many of these by the association of ideas or heredity. But neither of these thinkers is so bold as to maintain that he has done away with all fundamental truth. It can be shown that Mr. Mill is for ever appealing to truths which he assumes and regards himself as entitled to assume. (See " Examination of the Philosophy of J. S. Mill.") Mr. Spencer falls back on a law of necessity which testifies to a great unknown, which he allots as a territory to faith and to religion. I do not admit that he has given a proper expression to the fundamental verity or fundamental verities which he assumes. He starts on the principle of relativity, as expounded by Hamilton and Mansel, the authoritative metaphysicians when he began to speculate. I do not admit that the known logically or metaphysically implies the unknown. I am sure that his followers will leave behind them as they advance

this unknown region of faith. Following out his own method, they will account for it all by circumstances working from generation to generation. But as Mill and Spencer have not been able to get rid of first truths, so no others will and this whether they avow it or no. All processes must conduct to something ultimate. Thought requires a final resting-place, which will be found self-evident, necessary, universal. The age demands that the whole subject be rediscussed, with the view of determining what are the first, the last, and the everlasting principles of thought and truth. Some of those defended by the Scottish metaphysicians may be derivative, but they will be found to imply a root from which they are sprung. {461}

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX.

ART. 1. <Extracts from MS. Letters of Francis Hutcheson to the Rev. Thomas Drennan, Minister of First Presbyterian (un-subscribing) Congregation, Belfast; lent me by his grandson, Dr. Drennan> (<see p.> 64)

<Glasgow, Jan.> 31, 1737. -- I am glad your present situation is agreeable to you. I must insist on your promise of a visit whenever you find honest Mr. Haliday (Mr. Drennan's colleague) in good health, so that he could take the whole bur den for a month or six weeks. Robert Simson, with you and Charles Moor, would be wondrous happy till three in a morning; I would be with you from five to ten. I can write you little news. Our college is very well this year as to numbers and quality of scholars, but the younger classes are less numerous as people here grow less set on a college education for lads designed for business.... I must tell you a shameful story of our college. My letter I wrote from Dublin stopped Clotworthy O'Neal getting his degree upon his first application. He got some folks in this country who are tools of the court to recommend the matter to our principal. He made a compliment of twenty guineas to the college library, and the principal watched an opportunity when there was a thin meeting, but his tools all present, and carried to him a degree in --; that too, only an honorary one, and declared so in the diploma without any certificate for his learning or manners. My dissent is entered in the books, and four more masters decline signing it."

<April> 17, 1738 -- Robert Simson, if he were not indolent beyond imagination, could in a fortnight's application finish another book which would surprise the connoisseurs. About November last, I sent a manuscript to Will Bruce chiefly for his and Mr. Abernethy's perusal. He showed it to the Bishop of Derry, who, it seems, is much pleased with it, and promises me a long epistle soon. I heartily wish you had seen it, but it did not get to Dublin till February, and was in the bishop's hands till the beginning of this month. I believe Will is perusing it now. I am not expecting it back again speedily. During our college session I get nothing done, but if I get them back

during our vacation, with remarks of my friends, I shall endeavor to put the last hand to them. If I can get leisure next month, I shall endeavor to send you such a letter as I once gave you an imperfect promise of, if my hand be not gone out of use. We have at last got a minister in Glasgow to my taste. As I know your laziness, I really wish you and he could interchange sermons now and then. I am surprised to find some people of very good sense, laymen more than clergy, here not a little pleased with some of the notions of the foreign mystics; they have raised my curiosity of late to look into these books. I shall, sometime or other, let you know the result of my reading that way. I am persuaded their warm imaginations would make them moving preachers. I am going to read Madame Bourignon when I have leisure. You'll make Sam Haliday laugh heartily by telling him this particular. My most hearty respects to him. {464}

<Glasgow, March> 5, 1738-39 -- I had yours of the 26th of February on Friday, and could not answer sooner. I had resolved, when I first read yours, to have wrote you in the negative, being in as Much hurry at present as I have been this session by many letters of business as well as by my ordinary work. I have got on my hands almost the whole paternal care of my old pupil Lord Kilmarnock's three sons here. But upon reading over your letter this morning, with the deepest concern for that worthy, friendly, generous man, I could not refuse you altogether what you desire; though I concluded it must be either an unreasonable diffidence in yourself or an unjust value your friendship makes you put upon what comes from me, that occasions such requests. I shall be forced to work in starts, with many interruptions, which never succeeds right with me; and beseech you be as busy as you can in some scheme of your own, and don't take any sudden interrupted attempts of mine as fit for all the purposes you say are expected by friends on this occasion. I hint to you my plan that you may work upon it, and be the readier to patch up a right thing out of the two: -- "A consideration of what sort of life is most worthy and best suited to a being capable of such high endowments, and improvements, and actions destined to an immortal existence, and vet subjected for a certain space to a mortal existence. in this world, and then without drawing a character, leaving it to the audience to recollect how much of this appeared in our friend's life."

I hope Jack Smith has sent down to your town a "Serious Address to the Kirk of Scotland," lately published in London; it has run like lightning here, and is producing some effect; the author is unknown; he wrote with anger and contempt of the Kirk and Confession; but it has a set of objections against the Confession which I imagine few will have the brow to answer.

I really suffer with you heartily in the loss of your worthy friend; you will miss him exceedingly, and so will your cause.

A worthy lad in this town, one Robert Foulis, out of a true public spirit, undertook to reprint for the populace an old excellent book, "A Persuasive to Mutual Love and Charity," wrote by White, Oliver Cromwell's chaplain; it is

a divine old-fashioned thing. Some are cast off in better paper, sold at 5d. in marble paper; the coarse one,, are sold at 5d. in blue paper, and at 4d. to book sellers. I wish your booksellers would commission a parcel of both sorts. There has been some whimsical buffoonery about my heresy, of which I will send you a copy.

<Glasgow, June> 1, 1741.[103] -- your countrymen very generally have such an affectation of being men and gentlemen immediately, and of despising every thing in Scotland, that they neglect a great deal of good, wise instruction they might have here. I am truly mortified with a vanity and foppery prevailing among our countrymen beyond what I see in others; and a softness and sauntering forsooth which makes them incapable of any hearty drudgery at books. We had five or six young gentlemen from Edinburgh, men of fortune and fine genius at my class, and studying law; our Irishmen thought them poor book-worms.

<Glasgow, June> 15, 1741.-The wretched turn their minds take is to the silly manliness of taverns. . . . I shall not leave Glasgow except about three weeks in July for this whole vacation, but have more avocations by too numerous an acquaintance than you can imagine. In short, Tom, I find old age not in gray hairs and other trifles, but in an incapacity of mind for such close thinking or composition as I once had, and have pretty much dropped the thoughts of some great designs I had once sketched out. In running over my papers I am quite {465} dissatisfied with method, style, matter, and some reasonings, though I don't repent my labor, as by it and the thoughts suggested by friends, -- a multitude of which I had from W. Bruce and Synge, and still more in number from some excellent friends here, -- I am fitter for my business; but, as to composing in order, I am quite bewildered, and am adding confusedly to a confused book all valuable remarks in a farrago, to refresh my memory in my class lectures on several subjects. You'll find the like. Pray lay up a good stock of sermons. You would see a noble one by one of my Scotch intimates, who sees all I do, Mr. Leechman.

<Glasgow, April> 12, 1742 -- You are such a lazy wretch that I should never write you more. Not one word of answer to my congratulatory epistle you got six weeks before you were married. Not one word of godly admonitions about spending at,. evening with friends at the Welshes Head, and other pious sentiments about the vanity and folly of staying at home in the evenings.

<Glasgow, May> 31, 1742. The bearer, Mr. Hay, takes over some copies of a new translation of Antoninus, the greater half of which, and more, was my amusement last summer for the sake of a singular worthy soul, one Foulis; but I don't let my name appear in it, nor indeed have I told it to any here but the man concerned: I hope you'll like it. The rest was done by a very ingenious lad, one Moore. Pray try your critical faculties in finding what parts I did, and what he did. I did not translate books in suite; but I one or two, and he one or two. I hope if you like it that it may sell pretty well with you about Belfast. I am sure it is doing a public good to diffuse the sentiments; and, if you

knew Foulis, you would think he well deserved all encouragement.

<Date cut off.> -- Having this opportunity, I must trouble you with a small affair. Upon conversation with Mr. Brown, who came lately from Ireland, along with Mr. Alexander Haliday, about the circumstances of some ministers, very worthy men, in your presbytery, it occurred to me that a little liberality could not be better exercised than among them. I am concerned that in my prosperous circumstances I did not think of it sooner. If you have any little contributions made towards such as are more distressed than the rest, you may mark me as a subscriber for 5L. per annum, and take the above ten pounds as my payment for the two years past. Alexander Young will advance it immediately, as I wrote him lately that I would probably draw such a bill, without telling him the purposes. I think it altogether proper you should not mention my name to your brethren, but conceal it. I am already called New Light here. I don't value it for myself, but I see it hurts some ministers here, who are most intimate with me. I have been these ten days in great hurry and perplexity, as I have for that time foreseen the death of our professor, who died last Wednesday, and some of my colleagues join me in laboring for Mr. Leechman to succeed. We are not yet certain of the event, but have good hopes. If he succeeds, it will put a new face upon theology in Scotland. I am extremely concerned for your divisions in Belfast. I find they talk of Jack Maxwell of Armagh or young Kennedy. The talents of this latter I know not, but believe he has a very honest heart. Jack Maxwell is an ingenious, lively fellow, for any thing I could discover. That presbytery will miss him much. Pray write me now sometimes. I am sorry the event in your family made some hints in my last so seasonable. But your son is now as well as if he had lived sixty years a Plato or a Caesar, or if he is not, life is scarce worth spending under such a Providence: we should all long [Greek words].

<Glasgow, August> 5, 1743 -- I have had two letters of late from Mr. Mussenden; one about five weeks ago, with an invitation to Mr. Leechman to succeed Dr. Kilpatrick. Leechman was then just upon his marriage. I concluded the matter {466} quite impracticable, and returned an answer to that purpose; and, upon conversing, Leechman found I was not then mistaken. He was lately very ill treated by our judges in a discretionary augmentation he applied for, which they could have given with full consent of parties. His wife is not so averse to removal as formerly. Indeed the difficulty is with himself. You never knew a better, sweeter man, -- of excellent literature, and, except his air and a little roughness of voice, the best preacher imaginable. You could not get a greater blessing among you of that kind. As I have heard nothing from other hands, I want fuller information. Are the people generally hearty for Leechman upon the character they hear? Is there no other worthy man on the field? Unless these points be cleared. He will take no steps. I remember one Millan, an assistant. Pray is he to be continued, and no way affronted or neglected in this design? Leechman is well as he is, and happy, though preaching to a pack of horse-copers and smugglers of the rudest sort. He would do nothing hard or disagreeable to any worthy man, and

has no desire of change. But if the field be clear, it were <peccare in publica commoda> not to force him out of that obscure hole where he is so much lost. He was the man I wished in the first place to be our professor of theology. . . . I have no news but that we expect immediately from Robert Simson a piece of amazing geometry, reinventing two books of Appollonius, and he has a third almost ready. He is the best geometer in the world, reinventing old books, of which Pappius preserves only a general account of the subjects.

<Glasgow, Sept.> 20, 1743. -- I had the favor of yours by Mr. Blow, but could not return an answer by him, being much employed in promoting the affair you wrote about. I had also very urgent letters from Messrs. Mairs and Duchals to the same purpose. `Tis very difficult to persuade a modest worthy man who is tolerably settled, to adventure upon a new scene of affairs among strangers. I shall use my utmost endeavors to prevail upon him as I have been doing for some time past. I am sorry I cannot give you great hopes of success , but I don't yet so despair as to quit solicitation, as he is exceedingly moved with the affection and generosity of that people. My most humble and hearty respects to your brethren of your presbytery, whom I shall always remember with the greatest esteem and affection.

<Glasgow, Feb.> 20, 1743-44 -- am not a little surprised that I have not heard from you these four months past, though there were some of my letters which any other person would have thought required an answer. I could tell you a good deal of news upon the unexpected election of a professor of divinity, and the furious indignation of our zealots; but you deserve no news from anybody. We have our own concern about the settlement in Belfast, but we are to expect no accounts from you of any thing. Pray tell Mrs. Haliday her son is doing very well. . . . I was never more honored than since our late professor's death. Our hearty respects to Mrs. Drennan, and sympathy on the loss of her boys.

Dicimus autem hos quoque felices qui ferre incommoda
vtae Nec jactare jugum vita dedicere magistra

<Glasgow, April> 16, 1746. -- Our public news of the 15th from Edinburgh was, that the duke had passed the Spey, that 2,000 rebels on the banks fled precipitately upon his pointing his cannon at them. They may reassemble, and, as they are very cunning, may have some artifice to surprise; but I cannot but hope they are dispersing, and their chiefs making their escape. You have heard no doubt of our taking from them the " Hazard " sloop they had taken at Montrose. She returned from France with 150 men and arms and ammunition, and had landed them; but Lord Rea very boldly attacked them with a smaller number, and took {467} them all prisoners with 13,000L sterling. The same man-of-war took another of their ships, with arms and ammunitions, which had seized twelve small merchant. men in Orkneys for their use. The duke has endeared himself to some of his very enemies by his good sense and humanity, void of all state or pride.

I had this day a letter from a presbytery of

Pennsylvania, of a very good turn, regretting their want of proper ministers and books, expecting some assistance here; it was of a very old date of October last. I shall speak to some wise men here, but would as soon speak to the Roman conclave as our presbytery. The Pennsylvanians regret the want of true literature; that Whitfield has promoted a contempt of it among his followers, and bewailing some wretched contentions among themselves. The only help to be expected from you is sending some wise men if possible. I shall send them my best advice about books and philosophy, and hope to be employed to buy them books cheaper here than they are to be got anywhere. I long for a. fuller letter about all your chat and news. I am in a great deal of private distresses about Jo Wilson and his sister, -- the latter in the utmost danger, the other scarce recovered from death, my wife too very tender; but by a set of most intricate business, upon which the soul of this college depends, and all may be ruined by the want of one vote, I cannot leave this till after the 26th of June, and we go to Dublin first.

ART. II. <Questions proposed in the Philosophical Society in Aberdeen> (<see p.> 227).

1. President. -- Whether the greatest part of the matter that composes the bodies of vegetables and animals is not air or some substance that is mixed with the air and floats in it Handled, Feb. 8.

2. Dr. Skene.-What are the proper characters of enthusiasm and superstition, and their natural effects upon the human mind? Handled, Jan. 25.

3. Mr. Trail. -- What are the proper methods of determining the sun's parallax by the transit of Venus over his disk in 1761? Handled, April 12.

4 Mr. Campbell. -- What is the cause of that pleasure we have from representations or objects which excite pity or other painful feelings? Handled, Feb. 8.

5. What is the true cause of the ascent, suspension, and fall of vapors in the atmosphere? Mr. Stewart. Handled, Feb. 22.

6. Mr. Reid. -- Whether some part of that food of plants which is contained in the air is not absorbed by the earth, and in the form a watery fluid conveyed into the vessels of plants. And whether any thing can enter into the vessels of plants that is not perfectly soluble in water. Handled, March 8.

7 President. -- Is there a standard of taste in the fine arts and in polite writing; and how is that standard to be ascertained? Handled, March 22, and May to.

8. Dr. Skene. -- How far human actions are free or necessary. Handled, May 24, and June 14.

9. How far the motion of the earth and of light accounts for the aberration of the fixed stars. Mr. Trail. Handled, April 12.

10. Mr. Campbell. -- Can the generation of worms in the bodies of animals be accounted for on the common principles of generation. Handled, June 28 {468}

11. Is the human soul confined to any part of the human body; and, if so, to what part? Mr. Stewart. Handled, June 28.

12. Mr. Reid. -- Are the objects of the human mind properly divided into impressions and ideas? And must every idea be a copy of a preceding impression. Handled, July 13 and 26.

Jan. 25, no questions.

Feb. 8, 22. March 8, none.

13. [March 22, 1758.] Mr. Gordon. -- What is the origin of polytheism? Handled, Aug. 10.

14. [March 22, 1758.] Mr. Gerard. -- What are the proper subjects of demonstrative reasoning? Handled, Aug. 23, and Sept. 13

15. [April 12.] Mr. Farquhar. -- Upon what the characters of men chiefly depend? Nov. 15

16. [April 12.] What is the apparent figure of the heavens, and what are the causes of it? Humanist, Nov. 15

17. [April 12.] Whether justice be a natural or artificial virtue. Nov. 22.

April 22.

18. [April 22] Mr. Farquhar. -- In the perfection of what faculty does genius consist? Or if in a combination of faculties what are they? Superseded, because the subject of Mr. Gerard's discourses.

19. What are the parts of the body so connected with the several faculties of the mind that the destruction of those parts brings on a destruction of the exercise of those faculties. Dec. 13.

20. Dr. Gregorie. -- What are the plants that enrich a soil and what are those that impoverish it, and what are the causes of their enriching it, and impoverishing it? Feb.11, 1759

21. Dr. Skene. -- Wherein does happiness consist? March 28.

22. Whether the ideas of mixed modes are to be considered as the mere creatures of the mind, or are formed after patterns, as well as the ideas of the substances whereof they are modes. Mr. Trail, Feb.11, 1759.

23. Mr. Campbell. -- Whether matter has a separate and permanent existence. [previous sentence crossed out] The nature of contrariety. May 30.

24. Mr. Stewart. -- Whether the sense of hearing may not be asserted by act, in like manner as that of seeing is by optical glasses. April it.

25. Mr. Reid. -- Whether mankind with regard to morals always was and is the same. June 12.

26. In what cases and for what causes is lime a proper manure? Mr. Thos. Gordon. July 24, and Aug. 14

27. Mr. Gerard. -- What is the origin of civil government? June 26.

28. Mr. Farquhar. -- What is the foundation of moral obligation? Sept. 26.

29. Mr. Ross. -- How can it be accounted for that an inflammable spirit is obtained from regenerated tartar (vinegar saturated with chalk or saccharum saturne by distillation)? Or how comes it about that vinegar is restored to the state of an ardent spirit by being distilled with fixed alkali, chalk, or lead? Oct. 16, 1759

30. Dr. Gregorie.-Whether the Socratic method of instruction or that of prelection is preferable. Jan. 8, 1760.

31. How far the ancient method of education in public seminaries from earliest infancy was preferable or inferior

to the modern practice. By Dr. Skene, NOV. 27, 1759

32. Mr. Trail. -- What is the Agrian law which will conduce most to the populousness of a nation? Or what is the maximum of estates fittest for that purpose? {469}

33. Whether education in public schools or by private tutors be preferable. Principal Campbell, Dec. ", 1759, and Feb. 26, 1760.

34. Mr. Stewart. -- Whether the time allotted for teaching Greek in the universities of Scotland be not too short, and, if so, what would be the proper remedy. Feb. 26, 1760.

35. Mr. Reid. -- Whether it is proper to educate children without instilling principles into them of any kind whatsoever. April 1, 1760.

36. Mr. Gordon. -- Whether there be not, in the very nature of our reaching societies, a tendency to stop farther advancement in those branches of learning which they profess. And, if it is so, what is the best remedy. June 24, and July 9, 1760.

37. Prof. Gerard. -- In what manner the general course of education may be conducted so as it may answer best as a preparation for the different businesses of life. Aug. 12, 1760.

38. What is the best method for training to the practice of virtue? Mr. Farquhar. Dec. 9, 1760.

39. What are the natural consequences of high national debt; and whether, upon the whole, it be a benefit to a nation or not? Dr. Gregorie. Jan. 13, 1761.

40. Whether paper credit be beneficial to a nation or not. Dr. Skene, Feb. 24.

41. What is the cause of the apparent color of the heavens? Or what is properly the object to which that color can be attributed? Principal Campbell, March to.

42. Whether the idea of cause and effect include in it any thing more than their constant conjunction. And, if so, what it is that it includes. Prof. Stew. art. March 10th and 31st

43. Mr. Trail. -- Whether the substituting of machines instead of men's labor, in order to lessen the expense of labor, contributes to the populousness of a country. Feb. 24

44. Mr. Reid. -- Whether moral character consists in affections, wherein the will is not concerned; or in fixed habitual and constant purposes. April 15.

45. Mr. Gordon.-Whether slavery be in all cases inconsistent with good government. NOV. 24

46. Mr. Gerard. -- Whether there be any such affection in human nature as universal benevolence. Dec. 8.

47. Mr. Farquhar.-Whether in writing history it be proper to mix moral and political reflexions or to draw characters. Dec. 8.

48. Whence does man derive the authority which he assumes over the brutes, and how far does this authority extend? Mr. Beattie. Dec. 22, 1761.

49. What are the best expedients for preventing an extravagant rise of servants' wages, and for obliging them to bestow their labor where agriculture and manufactures require it. Jan. 12, 1762. Occasional question.

50. Doctor Gregorie. -- What are the good and bad effects of the provision for the poor by poor's rates, infirmaries, hospitals, and the like? Feb. 9.

51. Doctor Skene. -- Whether the determination by

unanimity or a majority injuries is most equitable. March 9.

52. Doctor Campbell. -- How far human laws can justly make alterations on what seems to be founded on the principles of the law of nature. March 23.

53, Mr. Stewart.-Whether human laws be binding on the consciences of men. April 16.

54. Mr. Reid. -- Whether by the encouragement of proper laws the number of births in Great Britain might not be nearly doubled or at least greatly increased. June 8. {470}

55. Mr. Thomas Gordon. -- Whether the current coin of the nation ought not to be debased by alloy or raised in its value, so as there shall be no profit made by exporting it. Dec. 14.

56. Doctor Gerard. -- Whether it be best that courts of law and courts of equity were different, or that the same court had the power of determining either according to law or equity as circumstances require. Feb. 22, 1763.

57. Mr. Farquhar -- Whether justice is most effectually promoted in civil and criminal courts where the judges are numerous or where they are few. March 22.

58. Mr. Beattie. -- What are the advantages and disadvantages of an extensive commerce? March 22.

59. Dr. Gregory. -- Whether the art of medicine, as it has been practised, has contributed to the advantage of mankind. July 12.

60. Dr. Skene. -- Whether in the same person opposite passions and affections, such as love and hatred, resentment of injuries and benefits, always subsist in an equal degree of strength. Oct. to.

61. Dr. Campbell. -- Whether any animals besides men and domestic animals are liable to diseases, the decay of nature and accidental hurts excepted; and if they are not, whether there is any thing in the domestic life which can account for such diseases as men and domestic animals are obnoxious to. May to.

62. Mr. Stewart. -- Whether or not there be a real foundation for the distinction betwixt precepts or counsels in matters of morality. Dec.-- 13

63. Dr. Reid. -- Whether every action deserving moral approbation must be done from a persuasion of its being morally good. NOV. 22, 1763.

64. Mr. Thomas Gordon. -- How far the profession of a soldier of fortune is defensible <in foro conscientiae>. Jan. 24, 1764.

65. Dr. Gerard. -- Whether eloquence be useful or pernicious. Feb. 28, 1764

66. Mr. Farquhar.-What is the origin of the blacks? March 13, 1764.

67. Mr. Beattie. -- What is that quality in objects that makes them provoke laughter? March 27

68. Dr. George Skene. -- Whether are men become degenerate in point of size and strength, or has the modern method of living increased the number of diseases or altered their nature? April 9.

69. Mr. William Ogilvy. -- Whether curiosity be not the most powerful motive to study in the mind of youth and that which acts most uniformly. NOV. 27

70. Dr. Gregory. -- What are the distinguishing characteristics of wit and humor? May 8.

71. Dr. David Skene.-- Whether brutes have souls , or, if they have, wherein do they differ from the human? Nov. 15

72. Dr. Campbell. -- Whether the manner of living of parents affects the genius or intellectual abilities of the children Jan. 22, 1765

73. Mr. Stuart. -- Whether the idea of an infinitely perfect Being be a good argument for his existence. June 11, 1765.

74. Dr. Reid. -- Wherein does the nature of a promise consist, and whence does its obligation arise? March 12, 1765

75. Mr. Thomas Gordon. -- Whether there is any degeneracy of genius in the moderns. March 26, 1765.

76. Dr. Gerard. -- Whether children do not take more after the mother than the father, and if they do, what are the causes of it? Aug. 13, 1765.

77. Mr. Farquhar. -- Whether would the end of religion be most effectually promoted by a regular civil establishment for the support of the clergy, or by leaving their support to the voluntary contributions of the people? Nov. 12 {471}

78. What is the difference between common sense and reason? Dec. 10, 1765

79 Dr. George Skene. -- Is light a body whose particles are thrown off with great velocity from the luminous body, or is it a tremulous motion excited and propagated through a subtle medium analogous to the tremors of flies which occasion sound? Dec. 9, 1766.

80. Mr. William Ogilvie. -- Suppose a legislator were to form an establishment of clergy, on what principles ought he to proceed in order to render it most effectual for promoting religion and morality without favoring superstition? Nov. ", 1766.

81. Mr. Dunbar. -- Whether the considerations of good policy may not some. times justify the laying of a restraint upon population in a state.

82. Dr. David Skene. -- What are the advantages which mankind peculiarly derive from the use of speech? March 13, 1766.

83. Dr. Campbel. -- Whether it is possible that the language of any people should continue invariably the same, and if not, from what causes the variations arise. Oct. 13, 1766.

84. Mr. Thomas Gordon.-Whether in science it ought to be an aim to in. crease or to diminish the number of first principles. June 10, 1766.

85. Dr. Gerard. -- Whether any form of government can be perpetual. Dec. 9, 1766

86. Mr. Farquhar. -- Whether the observation of the unities of time and place are essentially requisite to the perfection of dramatic performances. Jan. 27, 1767.

87. Mr. Beattie. -- Whether the different opinions and different practices which prevail in different nations be an objection to the universality of the virtuous sentiment. Feb. 24, 1767.

88. Dr. George Skene.-Whether the opportunities of acquiring a learned
education may not be too much in the power of the commonalty either for the advancement of learning or the good of the state.

89. Mr. Ogilvy.-I low does it appear to be equitable that the subjects of the state should be taxed in proportion to their respective fortunes and not equally over head or by

any other rule? March 24, 1767.

90. Mr. Trail. -- In what sense may virtue be said to consist in acting agree. ably to nature, and vice in deviating from it?

91. Dr. David Skene.-- If mankind are considered in respect of rank and fortune, in what class may we expect to find the virtuous principle most prevalent? June 9, 1767

92. Dr. Campbel. -- Whether the Greek language remained invariably the same so long as is commonly thought, and to what causes the duration which it had ought to be ascribed. Nov. 10, 1767.

93. Mr. Gordon. -- What is the province and use of metaphysics? Dec. 8, 1767

94. Dr. Gerard. -- Whether poetry can be justly reckoned an imitative art; and, if it can, in what respects? Jan. 26, 1768.

95. Mr. Farquhar. -- Whether the maintaining an esoteric and exoteric doctrine, as was practised by the ancients, is reconcilable to the principles of virtue.

96. Mr. Beattie. -- Whether that superiority of understanding by which the inhabitants of Europe and of the countries immediately adjoining imagine them. selves to be distinguished may not easily be accounted for without supposing the rest of mankind of an inferior species. {472}

97. Dr. George Skene. -- Whether the aim of a public teacher ought to be to adapt his instructions to the capacities of the duller part of his audience or to forward the ingenious.

98. Mr. Ogilvie. -- What is that in the manners of any nation which exhibits it justly to the appellations of civilized or barbarous?

99. Mr. Dunbar.-What are the characteristics of polished language? and how is the comparative excellency of different languages to be estimated?

too. Mr. Trail. -- How far may the inequalities of astronomical refraction be remedied by the thermometer and barometer?

101. Dr. David Skene. -- Whether the late proceedings with respect to a favorite of the mob be an evidence of the corruption or of the improvement of our constitution.

102. Principal Campbel. -- What is the proper notion of civil liberty? Oct. 24, 1769

103. Mr. Gordon. -- How far the facts relating to the burning of the Roman ships in the harbor of Syracuse be reconcilable to the laws of reflection and refraction of light. Nov. 1769.

104. Dr. Gerard. -- Whether any account can be given of the causes why great geniuses have arisen at the periods which have been most remarkable for them, and why they have frequently arisen in clusters. Dec. 12, 1769.

105. Mr. Beattie. -- Whether the use of translations can ever supersede the necessity o' studying the Greek and Roman authors in the original languages. May 8, 1770

106. Dr. George Skene. -- What is the difference between pressure and momentum; and how are they to I>e compared? NOV. 27, 1770.

107. Mr. Ogilvy. -- Whether there may be any reason to believe that the friendships of this life may continue after death.

108. Mr. Dunbar.-Whether the increasing the number of

British peers tends to enlarge or diminish the power of the crown. March 27, 1770

109. Mr. Trail. -- What are the <desideraia> in mathematics? June 12, 1770,

110. Occasional question proposed by Mr. Beattie. -- Whether it be not for the advantage of mankind as moral beings that the evidence of a future state is rather a high probability than an absolute certainty. Oct.-- 9, 1769.

111. Dr. David Skene. -- What are the advantages and disadvantages arising from the different arrangements of words which obtain in the antient and modern languages?

112. Principal Campbel. -- What is the best method of teaching a foreign or dead language?

113. Mr. Gordon. -- How are <vis inertae> and weight to be distinguished, and in what do they agree?

114. Dr. Gerard. -- Whether national characters depend upon physical or moral causes, or whether they are influenced by both. Feb. 26, 1771

115. Mr. Beattie. -- Does it imply any absurdity or any thing inconsistent with the divine perfections to suppose that evil, both physical and moral, must be permitted to take place in a state of moral probation? March 26, 1771.

116. Dr. George Skene.

117. Mr. Ogilvy. -- Is there any injustice done to an impressed man, when he is punished according to the articles of war? March 12, 1771

118. Mr. Dunbar.-- How are the proceedings of instinct to be distinguished from reason or sagacity in animals? Feb. II, 1772.

119. Mr. Trail. -- What is the cause of the color of the heavenly bodies P Feb. 25, 1772 {473}

111 [sic]. Dr. Campbel.-- What are the advantages and disadvantages arising from the different arrangements of words which obtain in the ancient and modern languages?

120. Mr. Gordon. -- How far is an expensive taste of living connected with corruption of manners and the ruin of a nation?

121. Dr. Gerard. -- What are the ways in which watering operates in improving land? March 24, 1772.

122. Dr. Beattie. -- How far is versification essential to poetry?

123. Dr. George Skene.

124. Mr. Ogilvy. -- By what circumstances has slavery been so moderated as to become supportable to so many nations of mankind?

125. Dr. Dunbar.

126. Mr. Trail. -- Does Dr. Halley's theory of evaporation sufficiently account for the constant influx into the Mediterranean at the Straits of Gibraltar?

ART. III. MSS. <Papers by Dr. Reid, text me by Francis Edmund, Esq., Aberdeen> (<see pp.> 192, 223.)

I. <Some Observations on the modern System of Materialism>. This paper is in no fewer than five forms, showing what pains he took with it. One or two of the forms were notes or preparations, the other three fully written out as if to be read before a society.

By the modern system of materialism he means that advanced by Dr. Priestley in his " Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit," 1777, and " Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity," 1777. The paper is of a thorough and searching character, distinguished for acuteness beyond almost any of the published writings of Reid, and written with great point and naivete. It looks as if designed for publication. Chap. 1. <Of the Connection of this System with other philosophical Opinions>. Here he describes the views entertained of substance by eminent men, criticising ably the defective views of Locke. Chap. II. <Of Newton's Rules of philosophizing>, showing that he had profoundly studied Newton. He gives fair explanations of Newton's rules. He shows that Priestley does not follow these rules. Chap. III. <Of the Solidity or Impenetrability of Matter>, showing there is an ambiguity in the meaning of the word solidity, and that Priestley has not succeeded in showing that matter is not solid or impenetrable. Chap. IV. <Of the Inertia of Matter>, showing that Priestley does not follow Newton. The whole is the result of much reading and reflection. ".

II <Miscellaneous Reflections on Priestley's account of Hartley's Theory of Me Human Mind>. He shows that Hartley's views were unfounded hypotheses, but speaks with great fondness and respect of Hartley. He is very severe upon Priestley's employment of Hartley's theories, particularly upon his attempt to explain every mental faculty by association. He refers to Aristotle's views of association. He shows that association cannot account for memory, which was explained by the vividness of the ideas. " Every man knows what memory is, and every man knows what is meant by vividness of ideas or conceptions, and their power of suggesting one another; and when we know and understand what each of these things is we can be at no loss to know whether they are one and the same. Let every man judge for himself whether memory is a certain degree {474} of vividness in ideas, and of a certain degree of strength in their power of suggesting one another. To me they appear to be things quite of a different nature; and I could as easily believe that a hat is a pair of shoes as that memory is a certain degree of vividness in ideas and of strength in their association." "A malefactor that is going to be hanged has a cluster of very vivid ideas, and very strongly associated, of what he is about to suffer, but it is not the object of remembrance but of foresight;" or, "It appears evident, therefore, that something more than association of ideas is required to produce memory, and consequently that association is not of itself sufficient to explain or account for memory." He shows that association cannot account for judgment; "for if there is a power in the mind of comparing ideas and of perceiving certain relations between them, such as those of universal concurrence and perfect coincidence, this power is not that of association; for it is evident that ideas may be associated with any degree of strength without being compared, without perception of any relation between them." He shows in much the same way that association cannot account for the passions and volition. He shows in the same paper that Priestley's attempt to get Locke's ideas of reflection from sensation utterly fails. Priestley had said,

"got by abstraction." "We would be glad to be informed by Dr. Priestley whether a man, when he thinks, is not conscious of his thoughts? Whether he has not the power of reflecting upon his own thoughts and making them an object of thought," &c.

III. <On Liberty or Necessity>. "The liberty of the will is a phrase similar to that of the liberty of speech. The last signifies not a power inherent in speech, but a power in the man to speak this or that. In like manner, the liberty of the will signifies not a power inherent in the will, but a power in man to will this or that." "This power is given by his Maker; and, at his pleasure whose gift it is, it may be enlarged or diminished, continued or withdrawn. No power in the creature can be independent of the Creator. The hook is in its nose; he can give it line as far as he sees fit, and when he pleases can restrain it or turn it whither soever he will. Let this be always understood when we ascribe liberty to man or to any created being. Supposing it therefore to be true that man is a free agent, it may be true at the same time that his liberty may be impugned or lost by disorder of body or of mind, as in melancholy or in madness; it may be impaired or lost by vicious habits; it may in particular cases be restrained by divine interposition." He explains cause and effect, native and active power, liberty and necessity, standing up for efficient cause. In a fragmentary paper upon the same subject, perhaps a continuation: "I grant that all rational beings are influenced and ought to be influenced by motives. But the relation between a motive and the action is of a very different nature from the relation between an efficient cause and its effect. An efficient cause must be a being that exists and has power to produce the effect. A motive is not a thing that exists. It is only a thing conceived in the mind of the agent, and is what the schoolmen called an ens rationis, and therefore cannot possibly be the efficient cause of any thing. It may influence to action, but it cannot act. It is like advice or persuasion, which may have an influence of the same kind with that of motives; but they leave the man still at liberty and indeed suppose liberty. For in vain is advice given if the person be not at liberty either to follow or reject it. In like manner, motives suppose liberty in the agent, otherwise they have no influence at all."

IV. <Of Constitution>. Apparently a very old paper, not written with care for the press. "Everything that is made must have some constitution, -- some fabric, make, or nature,-from Which all its qualities, appearances' powers, and operations do result" "It is one thing to say such a truth depends upon my constitution; {475}it is another thing to say that my perception of that truth depends on my constitution, and these two things ought most carefully to be distinguished." "My perception of every self-evident truth depends upon my constitution, and is the immediate effect of my constitution, and of that truth being presented to my mind. As soon as this truth is understood that two and two make four, I immediately assent to it, because God has given me the faculty of discerning immediately its truth, and if I had not this faculty I would not perceive this truth; but it would be a true proposition still, although I

did not perceive its truth. The truth itself therefore does not depend upon my constitution, for it was a truth before I had an existence, and will be a truth, although I were annihilate; but my perception of it evidently depends upon my constitution, and particularly upon my having as a part of my constitution that faculty (whether you call it reason or common sense) by which I perceive or discover this truth." "If it should farther be inquired how far the truth of self-evident propositions depends on the constitution of the being that perceives them, the answer to this question is no less easy and obvious. As every truth expresses some attribute of a thing, or some relation between two or more things, the truth depends on the nature of the thing whose attribute is expressed. The truth of this proposition, that a lion is a ravenous beast, depends upon the constitution of a lion, and upon nothing else. The truth of this proposition, that the sun is greater than the moon, depends upon the magnitude of the sun and moon, and upon nothing else." In like manner as to right and wrong. " Although the rectitude or depravity has a real existence in the agent in this case, yet it cannot be discerned by a spectator who has not the faculty of discerning objects of this kind." " Why do I believe first principles?" "One philosopher says, Because I am so constituted that I must believe them. This, say some, is the only possible reason that can be given for the belief of first principles. But, say others, this is a very bad reason; it makes truth a vague thing which depends on constitution. Is not this the ancient sceptical system of Heraclitus, that man is the measure of truth, that what is true to one man may be false to another? How shall we judge of this controversy? Answer, This question admits of two meanings. 1. For what reason do you believe first principles? 2. To what cause is your belief of first principles to be ascribed?" "To first, evidence is the sole and ultimate ground of belief, and self-evidence is the strongest possible ground of belief, and he who desires a reason for believing what is self-evident knows not what he means." To the second the answer is not so satisfactory. It is "that belief is a simple and original operation of the mind which always accompanies a thing we call evidence." "If it should be asked, what this evidence is which so imperiously commands belief, I confess I cannot define it." "If it should farther be asked, what is the cause of our perceiving evidence in first principles, to this I can give no other answer but that God has given us the faculty of judgment or common sense.' The paper closes thus: "Q. Is there not a difference between the evidence of some first principles and others? A. There are various differences perhaps. This seems to be one, that, in some first principles, the predicate of the proposition is evidently contained in the subject: it is in this, two and three are equal to five; a man has flesh and blood. In these and the like self-evident principles, the subject includes the predicate in the very notion of it. There are other first principles in which the predicate is not contained in the notion of the subject; as, where we affirm that a-thing which begins to exist must have a cause. Here the beginning of existence and causation are really different notions, nor does the first include the last. Again, when I affirm that the body which I see and feel really exists, existence is not included in the notion of a body. I can have the

{476}notion of it as distinct when it is annihilate. The truth of principles of the first kind is only perceiving some part of the definition of a thing to belong to it, and such propositions are indeed of very little use: they may justly, as Mr. Locke observes, be called trifling propositions. One general maxim may include all first principles of this kind; viz., Whatever is contained in the definition of a thing may be predicated of it. But in reality the definition sufficiently supplies the place of such axioms. That the sides of a square are equal, that all the radii of a circle are equal, these do not deserve the name of axioms; for they are included in the definitions of a square and of a circle. Of the same kind are these propositions that an effect must have a cause, that a son must have a father. There is nothing affirmed in such propositions but what is contained in the definition or in the notion of the terms. There are other first principles wherein the predicate is not contained in the definition or notion of the subject. Of this kind is every proposition which affirms the real existence of any thing. Existence is not included in the notion of any thing. I " -- here the paper abruptly closes. The paper is the dimmest and yellowest of all: looks old. Query: when written? The whole paper 11 pages.

V. <On the Axioms of Euclid>. "It seems no man pretends to define sum or difference, or what it is to be greater or less. There are therefore some terms that frequently enter into mathematical reasoning, so simple as not to admit of mathe. matical definition. The mathematical axioms ought to be employed about these and only about these."

VI. <On tlte Muscular Motion in the Human Body>. A paper worthy of constituting a chapter in "Paley's Natural Theology," showing a thorough knowledge of mechanical principles, and of the physiology of his time.

VII. <Some Thoughts on the Utopian System>. In this paper he seems to amuse himself with describing the advantages of a community without private property.

VIII. <An Essay on Quantity>. Royal Society of London, Oct., 1748, and published in works.-" P. S. When this essay was wrote in 1748, 1 knew so little of the history of the controversy about the force of moving bodies, as to think that the British mathematicians only opposed the notion of Leibnitz, and that all the foreign mathematicians adopted it. The fact is, the British and French are of one side; the Germans, Dutch, and Italians of the other. I find likewise that Desaguliers, in the second volume of his course of 'Experimental Philosophy,' published in 1744, is of the opinion that the parties in dispute put different meanings upon the word force, and that in reality both are in the right when well under. stood."

INDEX.

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., H/UME\) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g., <Hume>) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]).

Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2]Mr. Buckle, in his "History of Civilization," vol. ii., professes a deep ac quaintance with the Scottish metaphysicians of last Century, who are represented by him as proceeding in the deductive, and not in the inductive, method. He adds, that in Scotland "men have always been deductive." But Mr. B. was never able to understand the difference between the method of deduction on the one hand, and the method of induction with consciousness as the agent of obser vation, on the other: the former derives consequences by reasoning from princi. ples, the latter reaches principles by internal observation. That his whole views on this subject were confused is evident, from the circumstance that he represents women as proceeding (like Scotchmen) by deduction!

[3]See "Considerations on Patronage, by Francis Hutcheson," 1735.

[4]Mr. Buckle is reported to have expressed, in his dying days, bis regret that he could not see moral causes operating in the promotion of civilization. Of course intellectual power must always be the immediate agent in producing civil ization; but did it never occur to Mr. Buckle to ask what stirred up the intellec tual power in a country so unfavorably situated as Scotland? It is all true that steam power is the main agent in producing manufactures in our country; but how contracted would be the vision of one who can see only the steam power, and not the intellectual power which called the steam into operation! Equally narrow is the view of the man who discerns the intellectual power which effected the peculiar civilization of Scotland, but cannot discover the moral power which awoke the intelligence. It should be added, that just as the steam polver, in vented by intellectual skill, may be devoted to very unintellectual uses, so the intelligence aroused by moral or religious causes may be turned (as Scotland shows) to very immoral and irreligious ends.

[5]There is a copy in the Edinburgh University Library.

[6]The reader curious on this subject will find ample information in ixossais en France," by Michel.

[7]Letters to a student at the University.

[8]It was owing, I doubt not, to the influence, direct or indirect, of Shaftesbury that the phrase "common sense" came

to be so much used by the Scottish School.
[9]The intelligent reader will see how much indebted Bishop Butler was to Shaftesbury, for the views propounded in his "Sermons on Human Nature." Shaftesbury, before Butler, had spoken of human nature as a " constitution," and had shown that to live according to nature implies a respect to the conscience. Ife complains of those who speak much of nature, without explaining its meaning ("Wit and Humor," iii.2). He had divided our affections into personal and public and the moral power, and represented that power as a principle of reflection. Butler goes beyond Shaftesbury in showing that our personal affections are nnt in themselves selfish, and that the moral faculty is not only in our soul, but claims supremacy there. Butler declines to say whether the moral faculty is a a sense, or what else; and he will not say that moral good consists in benevolence.
[10]tewart was not "able to discover the date of the first edition," and others have been as unsuccessful. It is criticised in jackson's "Dissertation on Matter and Spirit," 1735, and referred to in " Bibliothque Raisonn6e des ouvrages des Savans," for April, May, and June, 1735. But the question is settled by its appearing (as a friend has shown us) in the " Gentleman's Magazine," in the register of books published October, 1733
[11]"Account of the Life, Writings, and Character of Francis Hutcheson," by William Leechman, D.D., prefixed to Hutcheson's "Moral Philosophy;" Carlyle's "Autobiography;" MSS. Letters from Hutcheson to Dr. Drennan, &c.
[12]Sir James Mackintosh says in his "Dissertation:" "The place of Hutcheson's birth is not mentioned in any account known to me. Ireland may be truly said to be <incuriosa suorum>." Had Sir James made inquiries in the likely quarter, he would have found the place of his birth and the leading incidents of his life mentioned in an article signed "M." in the "Belfast Magazine" (for August, 1813), edited by Dr. Drennan, a man of superior literary ability, and son of the Rev. Thomas Drennan, one of Hutcheson's most intimate friends.
[13]"His father, laboring under a slight rheumatic affection, deputed him to preach in his place on a cold and rainy sabbath. About two hours after Francis had left Ballyrea, the rain abated and the sun shone forth, the day became serene and warm, and Mr. Hutcheson, feeling anxious to collect the opinions of his con. gregatioii on the merits of his favorite son, proceeded directly to the city. But how was he astonished and chagrined when he met almost the whole of his flock coming from the meetingghouse, with strong marks of disappointment and disgust visible in their countenance. One of the elders, a native of Scotland, addressed the surprised and mortified father thus: 'We a' feel muckle wae for your mishap, reverend sit; but it canna be concealed. Your silly loon Frank has fashed a' the congregation wi' his idle cackle; for he has been babbling this oor about a gude and benevolent God, and that the sauls o' the heathens themsels will gang to heeven, if they follow the light of their own consciences. Not a word does the daft boy kl!n, speer, nor say, about the gude auld comfortable doctrine of election, reprobation, original sin, and faith. Hoot, mon, awa' wi' sic a fellow!'" The only members who waited for the end of the sermon were Nir. Johnson of Knappa, Mr. M'Geough, and the clerk. (Stuart's "History of

Armagh.") This story may be made somewhat more pointed in the telling, but is, we have no doubt, substantially correct. It will be remembered that P,.fessor Simson held similar views in regard to the heathen; and, in the Introduction to the Translation of Antoninus by Hutcheson and Moor, the authors maintain: "'Tis but a late doctrine in the Christian church that the grace of God and all divine influences were confined to such as knew the Christian history, and were by profession in the Christian church."
[14]Wodrow's "Analecta."
[15]The valuable letters of Hutcheson have been kindly placed at the disposal of the author of this work by Dr. Drennan, grandson of the Rev. Thomas Dren nan, and have been used in this Memoir.
[16]There is evidently an analogous (not identical) movement going on in Scot land at this present time. There is an understood combination of persons in and beyond the universities, laboring in reviews, in books, and from the pulpits "to put a new face upon theology in Scotland," just as Hutcheson and Lechman did.
[17]MS. letter to Rev. T. Steward, minister at St. Edmundsbury, in possession of Mr. Reid in Londonderry.
[18]There is a curious book, " An Introduction towards an Essay on the Origin of the Passions, in which it is endeavored to be shown how they are all acquired, and that they are no other than Associations of Ideas of our own making, or what we learn of others," London, printer for R. Dodsley, at Tully's Head in Pall Mall, and sold by T. Cooper, at the Globe in Paternoster Row, 1741. It is a mere fragment of thirty-two pages. The author says that the arguments made use of by Locke in order to prove that there are no innate ideas will, I think, hold fully as strong against all implanted appetites, or whatsoever "actions which we style moral or immoral, virtuous or vicious, are approved and disapproved, not by nat ure and constitution, but by habit and association."
[19]There is a work, " An Examination of the Scheme of Morality advanced by Dr. Hutcheson, late Professor of Morality in the University of Glasgow," 1759, in which the author criticises Hutcheson's wholc doctrine of senses, instincts, affections; and objects to his attempts to reduce all virtue and religion to benevolence or goodgwill to others, and also to his doctrine of moral sense as a faculty.
[20]"Memorials of Alexander Moncrieff and James Fisher," by Dr. Young and Dr. Brown.
[21]Parish records of Alloa in Register Office, Edinburga; " Catalogue of Graduates in Edinburgh," edited by Laing (Bannatyne Club); " Presentation Book " of Marischal College, Aberdeen.
[22]In the Preface to his "Moral Philosophy," he refers to a certain poet, " universally confessed to have shown a most extraordinary genius for descriptive poetry in some of his works, and in all of them a heart deeply impregnated with the warmest love of virtue and mankind," as likely from friendship to cast his eye on that Preface; from which we may argue that he had contracted a friendship with James Thomson.
[23]I cannot find that this work was published till 1763, the date of the copy in W. S. Library, Edinburgh. In 1740, he published a translation of " Vertot, Three

Dissertations."
[24]This was Thomas Rundle (born 1686, died 1743). Strong objections were taken to his getting the see of Gloucester, and so he went to Derry, when Thomson writes of him in a poem to the memory of Talbot:

"Though from native sunshine driven,
Driven from your friends, the sunshine of the soul,
By slanderous zeal and politics' infern,
Jealous of worth."

In these times, men were sent to Ireland who would not be tolerated in the Church of England. Pope says of him: " Rundle has a heart and Swift:

"Rundle a bishop, well he may,
He's still a Christian more than they."

He was the author of " Letters to the late Mrs. Barbara Landis," in which he speaks in favor of theatres, gives a high place to reason, says a word in behalf of Chubb, praises Shaftesbury, though he regrets his opposition to Christianity. He says of those who would destroy the foundation of virtue: "That they turn, as the elephants did of old, and trample down those that brought them to the war." The following has, Often been uttered since: "Christianity is so amiable in itself, that what Plato says of virtue is true of it, that if it is beheld in its native charms every man would be in love with it."
[25]See " London Magazine," for that year.
[26]It does seem rather strange that Reid sbould nowhere have acknowledged what he owed to Turnbull.
[27]"Preceptor," vol. ii., 1748; Darling's "Cyclopaedia; " Mackie's " Index Funercgrius; " Kennedy's "Annals of Aberdeen."
[28]"Scottish Register," January, February, March, 1794.
[29]"Scot'S Magazine," August, 1841; Somerville's "Life and Times."
[30]"Scot's Magazine," 1747, 1749; Chambers's "Biographical Dictionary."
[31]The representative book of the age then passing away was " Natural Religion insufficient, and Revealed Necessary to Man's Happiness in his Present State " by the late Rev. Thomas Halyburton, professor of divinity in the University of St. Andrews (born 1674, died 1712). It is a clearly written, respectably learned work, and establishes its point. It was superseded by the deeper discussions raised by Hume. ("Life and Writings," by Burns.)
[32]The author of this work has been aided in his researches on this subject by the great kindness of the Rev. Alexander Christison, clerk to the Presbytery of Chirnside.
[33]"My own Life," by David Hume; "Life and Correspondence of David Hume," by John Hill Burton, &c.
[34]For some years past it has been well known in literary circles in Edinburgh, that there was a scandal about David Hume in his younger years. Having been kindly allowed to look into the ecclesiastical records which bear upon it, I find that there was a charge brought, but no evidence to support it. A woman did, March 5, 1734, charge "Mr. David Home, brother to Ninewells, as being the father of her child." But this woman had previously had three illegitimate children; she had refused to say who was the father of her child when David Hume was in the country, though it was known he was leaving, and she brought the charge after he was gone. The Presbytery of Chirnside, when the case was

brought before them, rebuked the woman for her conduct, and there is no other record of the matter. It is a curious circumstance that this incident should have happened at the time when the youth was leaving his home in so singular a frame of mind.
[35]"Memoirs of R. and J. A. Haldane," chap. xxv.
[36]J.S. Mill labors to derive all our ideas and convictions from sensations. He is to be met by showing that we never have a sensation without knowing a self as sentient.
[37]Mr. Mill is in difficulties at this point, and avows it in a foot-note, P. 174: Our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate; no reason can be given for it which does not presuppose the belief, and assume it to be Well grounded." The full facts of the recognitive power of memory are not embraced in this brief enunciation, but there is much stated, and more implied; he should have inquired how much is involved, and he would have seen that there is truth admitted fatal to his system. He should also have shown on what ground he proclaims this belief to be "evidently ultimate," and then we might have shown that on the same ground, that is self-evidence, we are entitled to call in the other ultimate beliefs.
[38]J.S. Mill's treatment of space and time is superficial. He brings in time quietly without noticing it, or giving any account of it. He does not see that the idea of it in the concrete is involved in memory; we remember the event as happening <in time past>. He derives our idea of space from that of the time occupied by our muscular sensations: " When we say that there is a space between A and B, we mean that some amount of these muscular sensations must intervene." " Resisting points " are said to be " at different distances from one another, because the series of intervening muscular sensations is longer in some cases than in others " (pp. 228, 229). He thus avowedly makes, p. 227, an "identification" of length in time and length in space " as one; " whereas our consciousness declares them to be as different as it is possible for ideas to be. The hypothesis on which he and Professor Bain build their whole theory of the origin of our idea of extension, viz., the sensations of our muscles, is doubted by some. The conclusion of F.H. Weber, from numerous and careful observations, is: "Of the Voluntary motion of our limbs, we know originally nothing. We do not perceive the motion of our muscles by their own sensations, but attain a knowledge Of them only when perceived by another sense " (see Abbot on " Sight and Touch," P-- 71).
[39]J. S. Mill has made a most unwarrantable application of the laws of association, in accounting for the formation of our higher ideas. He labors to derive all our ideas from sensation through association. But sensations -- say of sounds, smells, colors, and forms, or of pleasure and pain -- can never be any thing else than sensations, -- that is sounds, smells, colors, forms, pleasures or pains, -- and never can of themselves yield such ideas as those of space and time, cause and effect, moral good and moral obligation. But then he gives to association a sort of chemical power, bv which it changes a series of successive or contemporaneous ideas into something different from any of the ideas, just as oxygen and hydrogen by their union form a third substance, water. He is to be met here by showing that the laws of the association are merely the laws of the

succession of our ideas, and they do not generate a new idea. Repeated association may quicken the flow of our ideas, and make several, as it were, coalesce into one, or it may weaken some and intensify others, but it cannot yield a new element. Even on the supposition that there is (which there is not) a chemical power in association to transmute one thing into another, this would be a new and different capacity, not in the sensations and associations, but superinduced upon them. Mr. Mill's professed evolution of our higher ideas out of sensation by association, is a mere jugglery, in which he changes the elements without perceiving it, and overlooks the peculiarities of the com. posites he would explain.

He has been guilty of an equal error in very much overlooking the relations which the mind of man can discover; and, so far as he does notice them, in giving a very inadequate account of them. In this respect he is far behind Hume, who, we have seen, gives a very comprehensive summary of them. So far as Mr. Mill treats of them, he (followed by Professor Bain) seems to give the mind no other power of comparison than that of observing resemblances and differences. Nor is this his worst error. He confounds the judgments of the mind with associations, and thus endeavors, in a plausible but superficial way to account for that conviction of necessity which is appealed to as a test of fundamental truth. " If we find it," he says, "impossible by any trial to separate two ideas, we have all the feeling of necessity the mind is capable of " (P. 264). Now there is here the confounding of two things that are very different, the association of two ideas, so that the one always calls up the other, with the judgment which declares that two things are necessarily related. The letter A suggests the letter B; this is one mental phenomenon: we decide that two plus two makes four, and that it cannot be otherwise; this is an entirely different phenomenon. Now it is this necessity of judgment, and not the invariable association, that is the test of first truths. When we thus show that association cannot produce a new idea, and that judgment, especially necessary jud&nnents, are something different from associations, we deprive Mr. Mill's theory of the plausibility which has so deceived the London critics bred at the English universities, -- where, I may take the liberty of saying, they would be very much the better of instruction in a sound and sober philosophy.

[40]Here again, from like premises, J.S. Mill has arrived at much the same conclusions. Mind, according to him, is "a series of feelings," with "a belief of the permanent possibility of the feelings." He is to be met by showing that in every conscious act we know self as existing; that when we remember, we remember self as in some state; and that, on comparing the former self with the present, we declare them to be the same. This implies more than a mere series of feelings, or a belief (he does not well know what to make of this belief) in possibilities; it implies a self existing and feeling, now and in time past. Again: "Matter may be defined the permanent possibility of sensation." He is to be met here by showing that we apprehend matter as an existence external and extended, and that we cannot get this idea of extension from mere sensations which are not extended. As to the contradiction between the senses and the

reason, which Hume maintains, Mr. Mill makes the reason and senses say the same thing, that we can know nothing whatever of matter except as the " possibility of sensation," and that it "may be but a mode in which the mind repre sents to itself the possible modifications of the Ego" (p. 189), which Ego is but a series of feelings. This conclusion is quite as blank as that reached by Hume.
[41]Mr. Mill has adopted Hume's doctrine of causation with a few modifications. The question is: Has he left to himself or to his followers an argument for the divine existence? He advises the defenders of theism to stick by the argument from design, but does not say that it has convinced himself. The advice is a sound one; we should not give up the argument from design because of the objections of Kant, which derive their force from the errors of his philosophy. Mr. Mill says, that we can " find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one Of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, events may succeed one another at random, without any fixed law" (" Logic," b. iii. C. 21). I should like to see an attempt made to construct an argument for the divine existence by those who accept this view. Mr. Mill shows that our belief in the uniformity of nature is the result of experience. But the uniformity of nature is one thing and causation is a different thing. He should be met by showing that we have a necessary conviction that every thing that begins to be has a cause, and that he has utterly failed in deriving this conviction from sensa. tions and associations.
[42]In his "Utilitarianism," Mr. Mill has endeavored to defend the theory from the objections commonly taken to it. But he has utterly failed in his attempt to derive our idea and conviction of moral good from mere sensations and associations of sensation.
[43]"Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith," by Dugald Stewart; "Life and Writings of Adam Smith," anonymous, but understood to be by J. R. M'Culloch; " Literary and Characteristical Lives," by William Smellie, &c.
[44]"Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Hon. Henry Home, of Kames," by Alex. Fraser Tytler, Lord Woodhouselee, 2 vols., 1807.
[45]There appeared " Some late Opinions concerning the Foundation of Morality examined, in a Letter to a Friend," London, 1753. The author says of Home: His merit is great, were it only in stating so clearly the sentiment of duty or moral obligation, and distinguishing it from the sentiment of simple moral obligation." The peculiarity of this sentiment, as expressed by the words "ought" and ,should," our author distinctly explains, and shows how it is "to be distinguished from simple approbation by the sanction of self-condemnation or remorse." He says of Hume, that it is "his error from the beginning to the end to haye overlooked the innate feelings of duty, -- that authority which conscience carries in itself, prescribing certain virtues as a law or rule upon which alone morality can be founded and ascertained." "Mr. Hutcheson led the way, by re solving all the several virtues into benevolence, as our author has done into utility, which, in his scnse of it, is much the same."
[46]It is said that Home has been confuted by "the smart and sensible author of the `Estimate of the Profit and Loss of Religion,' and in the modest and elegant `Delineation of

Morality' (Balfour). Two other authors have distinguished themselves against the particular parts of the scheme; viz., Rev. Mr. Adams, a clergyman of the Church of England, in his answer to the `Essay on Miracles,' and Dr. John Stewart in his very masterly reply to the `Essay of Motion.'"

[47]It is proper to state that in his third edition (1779) Home says, on farther reflection he has modified some of his opinions. He gives up the position that "some of our moral feelings and emotions must be founded on a delusion." He now asserts that the notion we have of being able to act against motives "is suggested by the irregular influence of passion, and that we never have it in our cool moments; consequently it is not a delusion of nature, but of passion only." lie thinks that he thus escapes the position that virtue in any measure; rests on the foundation of any natural feelings being a delusion. But, in avoiding one difficulty, he only falls into another; for it is in our moments of cool reflection that we adhere most resolutely to the conviction that we have an essential freedom.

[48]MS. " Life of Witherspoon," by Ashbel Green (formerly President of Princeton College), in the Library of the New Jersey Historical Society MS. "Life of Witherspoon." in a History of the College, by Ex-President Maclean, who has kindly allowed me to use it. " Funeral Sermon," by Rev. Dr. Rodgers, of New York, in edition of Witherspoon's " Works," Philadelphia, 1800.

[49]The genealogy seems to have been:-John Knox; Mrs. Welch; her daughter married to Mr. Witherspoon; Rev. James Witherspoon, their son: Rev. John Witherspsoon.

[50]"Princeton College during the Eighteenth Century " by Samuel D. Alexander.

[51]Stanhope Smith's " Lectures on Moral and Political Philosophy." Stanhope Smith was the author of an "Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure of the Human Species." He holds by the unity of the race, and accounts for the diversities by natural causes. It was first published, 1787, and ran through several editions.

[52]I may mention, as belonging to the same age, "An Essay on Virtue and Harmony, wherein a Reconciliation of the Various Accounts of Moral Obligation is attempted," by William Jameson, M.A. minister of Rerick, 1749. He shows that man is endowed with various senses, but especially with a moral sense; and, "as several parts or strains uf music and different musical instruments do compose a concert, so the various sorts of beauty, order, proportion, and harmony in the vegetable kingdom, in the animal, and in the intellectual system, constitute one universal harmony or concert: in that grand concert, every man is bound to perform his part in a proper key, as it were, or in just consonance with the whole which can only be done by the order and harmony of his affections, and the beauty and regularity of his actions." The scepticism of Hume cast aside these inquiries into senses and tastes, and led to the profounder philosophy of Reid.

[53]"Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid," by Dugald Stewart; "The Works of Thomas Reid," by Sir William Hamilton; MS. letters in possession of the late Alexander Thomson of Banchory (used by Hamilton); Papers of Dr. Reid in possession of Francis Edmond of Aberdeen.

[54]One version is, that Tillotson had preached from Clarke, and that, in conse. quence, one of Clarke's sermons had been

published among Tillotson's sermons, and that Reid had taken the sermon from Clirke, while the lady had read it in Tillotson. I have not found any confirmation of this.

[55]In possession of Francis Edmond.

[56]MS. notes furnished me by Thomson of Banchory.

[57]MS. letters possessed by Thomson of Banchory.

[58]MS. papers of Dr. Reid, in possession of Francis Edmond, Esq.

[59]Life of Dr. McKinlay of Kilmarnock, prefixed to a volume of his " Sermons."

[60]MS. papers in possession of Francis Edmond.

[61]"An Examination of Dr. Reid's 'Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense,' Dr. Beattie's `Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth,' and Dr. Oswald's `Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion,"' by Joseph Priestley, 1774. Reid's work appears to him "an ingenious piece of sophistry." He wonders that none of the Scottish writers (except Beattie) refer to Hartley. " Something was done in this field by Descartes, very much by Mr. Locke, but most of all by Dr. Hartley, who has thrown more useful light on the theory of the mind than Newton did upon the theory of the natural world." " The evidence that any two properties are necessarily united is the constant observation of their union." Propositions and reasoning " are in fact nothing more than cases of association of ideas." "There are many opinions which we know to be acquired, and even founded on prejudice and mistake, which, however, the fullest correction that they are void of all real foundation cannot erase from the mind; the groundless belief and expectation founded upon it being so closely connected with the idea of certain circumstances, that no mental power of which we are possessed can separate them: "and he gives, as an example, our fear of ghosts. We see the commencement of the feud which culminated in John Stuart Mill's "Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy." But Priestley, like Mill, is obliged, unconsciously and surreptitiously, to call in first truths. " No man ever denied that there are self-evident truths, and that these must be assumed as the foundation of all our reasoning." " I never met with any person who did not acknowledge this." It is curious to find him saying that they "recommend particular positions as axioms, not as being founded on the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, which is the great doctrine of Mr. Locke, and which makes truth depend upon the necessary nature of things, to be <absolutely unchangeable and everlasting>; but merely some unaccountable instinctive persuasions depending on the arbitrary constitution of our natures."

[62]The translator of Buffier (1780) charges Reid with plagiarism. Dugald Stewart defends him (" Elements," vol. ii., pp. 63, 64); as does also Hamilton (Reid's "Collected Works," P-- 789), who shows that Reid "only became acquainted with the treatise of Buffier after the publication of his own `Inquiry; ' for in his 'Account of Aristotle's Logic,' written and published some ten years subsequently to that work, he says, 'I have lately met with a very judicious treatise, written by Father Buffier.' "

[63]In " Scot's Magazine," February, 1847, was advertised "The Impartial Philosopher, or the Philosophy of Common Sense," by the Marquis d'Argens, in two volumes, 6s.

[64]In possession of Francis Edmond

[65]Original minutes of the Society, kindly lent me by Francis Edmond; " Biographical Sketch of David Skene, M.D," by Alexander Thomson of Banchory.
[66]"An Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. Beattie," by Sir William Forbes.
[67]This portrait was lately in possession of the Misses Glennie, his grandnieces, in Aberdeen. A print of it is to be found in a few copies of Forbes' "Life of Beattie. "
[68]The father published "Miscellanies," by James Hay Beattie, A.M.. in two volumes, 1799. There are some verses worth preserving:

"And how Milton has glands in his brain
That secreted the 'Paradise lost."'

[69]Life, by Rev. Dr. Keith. MS. Papers in possession of Andrew Farquharson of Whitehouse, kindly lent me.
[70]This may be the most appropriate place for referring to Ogilvie's " Philosophical and Critical Observations on the Nature, Character, and Various Species of Composition," 1774. The author was born 1737, became minister of Midmar in Aberdeenshire, and died in 1814. He was a miscellaneous writer in poetry and prose. In " The Theology of Plato compared with the Principles of Oriental and Grecian Philosophy," he treats of topics not usually discussed by the Scottish metaphysicians.
[71]Article, James Burnett, in the "Edinburgh Encyclopedia."
[72]This letter is in possession of the family at Monboddo.
[73]Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson, LLD., F.R.S.E., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, by John Small, M.A., Librarian to the university. Read before the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, April 18, 1864.
[74]Life, by Lord Woodhouselee, prefixed to his " Works " in four volumes; " Literary and Characteristical Lives," by William Smellie.
[75]Not a few of the Edinburgh lawyers wrote philosophical treatises. Thus, "Essays, Moral and Divine," by Sir William Anstruther, of Ailstruther, one of the Senators of the College of justice, 1701. He treats of atheism. providence, learing and religion, trifling studies, stage-plays and romances, incarlation, Jesus Christ, and redemption of mankind. He opposes Locke with some ability, and shows that the idea of a Perfect Being is simple and innate, imprinted on our minds by God in our creation. Then in Sir George Mackenzie's (the bloody Mackenzie) "Works," two vols. folio, 1716, we have an essay on happiness. He shows that nothing without us, not even philosophy, can make us happy, that religion alone can do so. He treats of atheism, of moral gallantry, of the moral history of frugality. He begins with an address to fanatics. He would act the religious stoic, and holds that solitude is to be preferred to public employment. We have also, "Some Thoughts concerning Religion, Natural and Revealed, with Reflections on the Sources of Incredulity with regard to Religion," by Rt. Hon. Duncan Forbes, of Culloden, 1750
[76]Having, in my boyish days, often "kissed the cup to pass it by," among those who had drunk and been drunk with Burns, I am prepared to believe this: but I have to add, that though the sense and humor were strong and shrewd they were often coarse and sensual. Burns was reared in an age in which the uncompromising religion of the covenant was giving way, in the south-west of Scotland, to the milder religion

or irreligion of the moderate type. He owed much to the sincere devoutness of his father; but, in spite of all that the literary admirers of Burns may say to the contrary, I am not sure that it was for the benefit of the son that the father, brought up in the more latitudinarian cast coast of Scotland, attached himself to the New-Light party, as the youth was thereby thrown among those who had no depth of piety, and who rather rejoiced in the ebullitions against religion which he uttered in moments of passion, which he never meant to publish, and over which he lamented in his declining life. Burns ever held firmly by the great truths of natural religion, and had a profound reverence for the Bible, to which he turned fondly in his latter days: he seems often, always in times of impulse, to have prayed, and would rise from his prayers to write to Clarinda: "I have just been before the throne of my God, Clarinda; according to my association of ideas [observe the Scotch metaphysics], my sentiments of love and friendship, I next devote myself to you." He declared, in the presence of the elegant Dr. Blair, that his favorite preacher in Edinburgh was the evangelical Dr. Walker. Burns lived in the age in which, contemporaneous with the declining p;ety, the two great vices of Scotland, intemperance and illicit intercourse of young nen and women, descended to the common people. The evangelical ministers had not the courage to check in the bud the rising intemperance, and, in the second age of moderatism, many of the moderate clergy became the victims of it. The dwellings of the Scottish peasantry were wretched; and court. ship among the young people was concealed as if it were a crime, and driven out of the house into places of darkness, the summons to which is indicated in the line, " Whistle, and I'll come to you, my lad." The consequence was, coarse tastes among the small farmers' and cotters' daughters and servant girls, which neither the evangelicals nor the moral philosophers or clergy bred by them sought to refine. Cromek, speaking of Burns's visit to Edinburgh, says: " But a refined and accomplished woman was a thing almost new to him, and of which he had formed but a very inadequate idea." The evil was not lessened, but rather fomented, by the coarse mode of public ecclesiastical discipline which greatly chafed Burns when applied to him. I am convinced that the conduct and poetry of Burns helped greatly to foster the national vices. I speak what I know, as my boyish days were spent in the land of Burns, and I met wilh old men who knew Burns and the state of society in which he lived.

[77]I've sent you here, by johnie Simson,
     Twa sage philosophers to glimpse on:
     Smith wi' his
     sympathetic feeling,
     And Reid to common sense appealing.
     Philosophers have fought and wrangled,
     And mickle Greek and latin mangled,
     Till, wi' their logic-jargon tired
     And in the depth of science mired,
     To common sense they now appeal,
     That wives and wabsters see and feel. It is curious to find Bums referring to the philosophy of Spinoza.

[78]In Stewart's class he wrote an essay on the "Manners and Customs of the Northern Nations," and the professor said, "the author of this paper shows much knowledge of his

subject, and a great taste for such researches." Scott became, before the close of the session, a frequent visitor in Mr. Stewart's family, and an affectionate intercourse was maintained between them through their after lives. (Lockhart's " Life of Scott ")
[79]In "Dissertatio Philosophica Inauguralis de Analogia et Philosophia Prima," Feb. 23, 1739, Professor Cleghorn says: " Idea innata nulla est. Aptitudo qumdam innata menti inest qua ad ideas hasce, vulgo innatas dictas? percipiendas approbandasque, quandocumque se obtulerit necessario dirigetur."
[80]I have employed more time than I would like to tell any one, in searching after the Scottish ancestry of Kant, but without success. I find that the name Cant was not uncommon in Forfarshire in last century: it occurs on the tombstones in a number of churchyards. In a map of a piece of ground at the north end of Brechin, there is mention of its belonging successively to George Cant and Alex. ander Cant. There was a James Cant, weaver in Brechin, admitted to the guild in 1779. I have seen a deed in which George Scott sells, in 1799, to John Cant, tanner in Brechin, a piece of property on the east side of High Street. It had been bought in I 796 by the two, in a contract of copartnery for carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling of leather. As leather and saddlery are connected, I have at times favored the idea that Kant, the saddler, may have been descended from the same Cants as John Cant, the tanner, who it is understood came from Montrose to Brechin. It is proper to state that I have been assisted in these researches by D. 1). Black, Esq., town clerk, Brechin.
[81]"The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, edited by Sir William Hamilton, Bart., with a Memoir of Dugald Stewart, by John Veitch."
[82]It is an interesting circumstance that, perhaps, the fairest estimate which we have of Bacon and the inductive system is by a German, Kuno Fischer, in We " Francis Bacon of Verulam " (translated by Oxenford). He errs, however, after the usual German mode of theorizing, in connecting Bacon with such men as Hobbes and Hume, the former of whom never professed to follow the Baconian method, and the latter of whom formed a very low estimate of Bacon, and has been most effectively met by Reid and Stewart, who professedly and really adopted the inductive system. This has been shown by Remusat, in his pleasantively written and judicious work, " Bacon: Sa Vie, son Temps, sa Philosophic where there is a just estimate of Bacon's general philosophy, and some good remarks on the metaphysical points involved in induction.
[83]The intellectual side has been brought out to view by Henry Rogers, Professor Bowen of Harvard, and Professor Webb of Dublin.
[84]"Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Brown, M.D." (1825), by David Welsh. Shorter Memoir by same prefixed to Brown's " Lectures."
[85]"Life of Francis Jeffrey," by Lord Cockburn.
[86]I am afraid we cannot claim Sydney Smith (born 1771, died 1845) as one of the Scotch metaphysicians as he was not a Scotchman: he merely resided for a time in Edinburgh. But his "Lectures on Moral Philosophy," delivered in London, 1804-6, and published in a volume (1850), is drawn from the Scottish philosophy, especially from Stewart, and is a

remarkably clear, lively, and judicious work.
[87]Thus of Wordsworth's "Excursion" Jeffrey says: "This will never do." "It is longer, weaker, and tamer than any of Mr. Wordsworth's other productions." Of Goethe's "Wilhelm Meister " he says: "To us it certainly appears, after the most deliberate consideration, to be eminently absurd, puerile, incongruous, vulgar, and affected; and, though redeemed by considerable powers of invention and some traits of vivacity, to be so far from perfection as to be almost from beginning to end one flagrant offence against every principle of taste and every rule of composition." How different the estimate formed by Thomas Car lyle of the second period of the Edinburgh Review ! The late Lord Ashburton shortly after the decease of his lady, who was a great admirer of Carlyle, did the author of this work the honor of applying to him to explain what Carlyle could mean by an advice which he gave. "I inquired of him," said his Lordship, "what I could do to form my character, and make myself what I ought to be. `Read "Wilheim Meister,"' said he. So I read I Wilhelm Meister' and went back to my counsellor, saying that I had read the book and admired it, but could not discover any thing in it fitted to accomplish the end I have in view. `Read "Wilhelm Meister,"' said the great man, `a second time.' Now I have read it a second time without getting what I wish. I now come to you to see if you can tell me what Carlyle can mean." .I told him he must go to the oracle himself to find out what he meant: but I added that I believed that neither Goethe nor Carlyle, though eminent literary geniuses, knew of, or could direct him to, what might effect the good end his Lordship had in view.
[88]"Memoirs of the Life of the Right Honorable Sir James Mackintosh," edited by his son, Robert James Mackintosh.
[89]The Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham, written by himself.
[90]He was to be received at Brechin in the parish church. He separated from those who were to conduct him, and came to the door in tartan trews, and was refused entrance by an old sergeant who had charge of the admission. " Do not you know," thundered his lordship, "that in order of mine could hang you on that lamp-post? " To which the sergeant replied that he knew nothing as to what the person addressing him could do, but he knew that it was his duty not to allow any one to enter at that door without an express order.
[91]Laetitia autem et libido in bunorum opinione versatur, &c.
[92]"Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy, by the late John Young, with a Memoir of the Author, edited by William Cairns."
[93]"Autobiography by John Stuart Mill; " " Personal Life of George Grote," by Mrs. Grote; &c.
[94]I had this from a son of Dr. Foote, Archibald Foote, Esq., -- manufacturer, Montrose, to whom John Stuart Mill applied to get information about his father, who does not seem to have been very communicative to his family about his parentage or younger years.
[95]It is said that he published two sermons under the name of James Miln or Milne.
[96]I had this from the late John Pim, of Belfast, who was at the place at the time. I would not have referred to it had the suicide been the rcsult of a mental derangement: it was the logical consequence of the philosophic training.

[97]Recollections of Rev. John Ballantyne," an address delivered at a soiric on opening the new United Presbyterian Church, Stonehaven, by Rev. John Longmtiir, Aberdeen, 1862.
[98]"Memoir of Thomas Chalmers," by William Hanna.
[99]In fact, " Daft Tam Chalmers " was a phrase applied to him by those who could not discern his greatness in the bud.
[100]"Memoir of Dr. Welsh," by Alexander Dunlop, Esq., prefixed to Sermons.
[101]"Christopher North. A Memoir of John Wilson, by his daughter, Mrs. Gordon."
[102]Article by Thomas Spencer Baynes in " Edinburgh Essays " by members of the University of Edinburgh; " Memoir of Sir William Hamilton" by John Veitch.
[103]In this letter, and in of those that follow, them is a great deal said about a young man named Robert Haliday, who is studying at Glasgow, and about whom Hutch is very anxious.

On Liberty
J.S. Mill
1859

Editor's Note: This e-text is based on the Wiretap edition of J.S. Mill's On Liberty (Harvard Classics Volume 25 Copyright 1909 P.F. Collier & Son) The Wiretap edition contains the following notice: "This was scanned from the 1909 edition and mechanically checked against a commercial copy of the text from CDROM. Differences were corrected against the paper edition. The text itself is thus a highly accurate rendition. The footnotes were entered manually. This text is in the PUBLIC DOMAIN, released September 1993." This slightly modified text version and associated HTML files were prepared for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (jfieser@utm.edu).

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Chapter I: Introductory

THE subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. A question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make itself recognized as the vital question of the future. It is so far from being new, that, in a certain sense, it has divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages, but in the stage of progress into which the more civilized portions of the species have now entered, it presents itself under new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment.

The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest; who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying upon the flock than any of the minor

harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks; by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power. To the first of these modes of limitation, the ruling power, in most European countries, was compelled, more or less, to submit. It was not so with the second; and to attain this, or when already in some degree possessed, to attain it more completely, became everywhere the principal object of the lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind were content to combat one enemy by another, and to be ruled by a master, on condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations beyond this point.

A time, however, came in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way alone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage. By degrees, this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party existed; and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself. That (it might seem) was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified with the people; that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of its tyrannizing over itself. Let the rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made. Their power was but the nation's own power, concentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise. This mode of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of European liberalism, in the Continental section of which, it still apparently predominates. Those who admit any limit to what a government may do, except in the case of such governments as they think ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of

sentiment might by this time have been prevalent in our own country, if the circumstances which for a time encouraged it had continued unaltered.

But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation. The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French Revolution, the worst of which were the work of an usurping few, and which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made itself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of nations; and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the power of the people over themselves," do not express the true state of the case. The "people" who exercise the power, are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised, and the "self-government" spoken of, is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this, as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals, loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations "the tyranny of the majority" is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.

Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant -- society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it -- its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the

details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit -- how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control -- is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should be, is the principal question in human affairs; but if we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed. The rules which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the first. The effect of custom, in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because the subJect is one on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to himself. People are accustomed to believe and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for

any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and his chief guide in the interpretation even of that. Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blamable, are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their reason -- at other times their prejudices or superstitions: often their social affections, not seldom their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness: but most commonly, their desires or fears for themselves -- their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest. Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots, between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and roturiers, between men and women, has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings: and the sentiments thus generated, react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of the ascendant class, in their relations among themselves. Where, on the other hand, a class, formerly ascendant, has lost its ascendency, or where its ascendency is unpopular, the prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the impress of an impatient dislike of superiority. Another grand determining principle of the rules of conduct, both in act and forbearance which have been enforced by law or opinion, has been the servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their temporal masters, or of their gods. This servility though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence; it made men burn magicians and heretics. Among so many baser influences, the general and obvious interests of society have of course had a share, and a large one, in the direction of the moral sentiments: less, however, as a matter of reason, and on their own account, than as a consequence of the sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them: and sympathies and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests of society, have made themselves felt in the establishment of moralities with quite as great force.

The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling, have left this condition of things unassailed in principle, however they may have come into conflict with it in some of its details. They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally. The only case in which the higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained with consistency, by any but an individual here and there, is that of religious belief: a case instructive in many ways, and not

least so as forming a most striking instance of the fallibility of what is called the moral sense: for the odium theologicum, in a sincere bigot, is one of the most unequivocal cases of moral feeling. Those who first broke the yoke of what called itself the Universal Church, were in general as little willing to permit difference of religious opinion as that church itself. But when the heat of the conflict was over, without giving a complete victory to any party, and each church or sect was reduced to limit its hopes to retaining possession of the ground it already occupied; minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they could not convert, for permission to differ. It is accordingly on this battle-field, almost solely, that the rights of the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle, and the claim of society to exercise authority over dissentients openly controverted. The great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his religious belief. Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves. One person will bear with dissent in matters of church government, but not of dogma; another can tolerate everybody, short of a Papist or an Unitarian; another, every one who believes in revealed religion; a few extend their charity a little further, but stop at the belief in a God and in a future state. Wherever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed.

In England, from the peculiar circumstances of our political history, though the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier, that of law is lighter, than in most other countries of Europe; and there is considerable jealousy of direct interference, by the legislative or the executive power with private conduct; not so much from any just regard for the independence of the individual, as from the still subsisting habit of looking on the government as representing an opposite interest to the public. The majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their power, or its opinions their opinions. When they do so, individual liberty will probably be as much exposed to invasion from the government, as it already is from public opinion. But, as yet, there is a considerable amount of feeling ready to be called forth against any attempt of the law to control individuals in things in which they have not hitherto been accustomed to be controlled by it; and this with very little discrimination as to whether the matter is, or is not, within the legitimate sphere of legal control; insomuch that the feeling, highly salutary on the whole, is perhaps quite as often misplaced as well grounded in the particular instances of its application.

There is, in fact, no recognized principle by which the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested. People decide according to their personal preferences. Some, whenever they see any good to be done, or evil to be remedied, would willingly instigate the government to undertake the business; while others prefer to bear almost any amount of social evil, rather than add one to the departments of human interests amenable to governmental control. And men range themselves on one or the other side in any particular case, according to this general direction of their sentiments; or according to the degree of interest which they feel in the particular thing which it is proposed that the government should do; or according to the belief they entertain that the government would, or would not, do it in the manner they prefer; but very rarely on account of any opinion to which they consistently adhere, as to what things are fit to be done by a government. And it seems to me that, in consequence of this absence of rule or principle, one side is at present as often wrong as the other; the interference of government is, with about equal frequency, improperly invoked and improperly condemned.

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for

overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.

It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in neither case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception. In all things which regard the external relations of the individual, he is de jure amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the

enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment-seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external protection; judging himself all the more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the judgment of his fellowcreatures.

But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

Though this doctrine is anything but new, and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice. Society has expended fully as much effort in the attempt (according to its lights) to compel people to conform to its notions of personal, as of social excellence. The ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practise, and the ancient

philosophers countenanced, the regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on the ground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens, a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom. In the modern world, the greater size of political communities, and above all, the separation between the spiritual and temporal authority (which placed the direction of men's consciences in other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs), prevented so great an interference by law in the details of private life; but the engines of moral repression have been wielded more strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in self-regarding, than even in social matters; religion, the most powerful of the elements which have entered into the formation of moral feeling, having almost always been governed either by the ambition of a hierarchy, seeking control over every department of human conduct, or by the spirit of Puritanism. And some of those modern reformers who have placed themselves in strongest opposition to the religions of the past, have been noway behind either churches or sects in their assertion of the right of spiritual domination: M. Comte, in particular, whose social system, as unfolded in his Traite de Politique Positive, aims at establishing (though by moral more than by legal appliances) a despotism of society over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the political ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers.

Apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers, there is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation: and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable. The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power; and as the power is not declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase.

It will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering upon the general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of it, on which the principle here stated is, if not fully, yet to a certain point, recognized by the current opinions. This one branch is the Liberty of Thought: from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and

of writing. Although these liberties, to some considerable amount, form part of the political morality of all countries which profess religious toleration and free institutions, the grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which they rest, are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, nor so thoroughly appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion, as might have been expected. Those grounds, when rightly understood, are of much wider application than to only one division of the subject, and a thorough consideration of this part of the question will be found the best introduction to the remainder. Those to whom nothing which I am about to say will be new, may therefore, I hope, excuse me, if on a subject which for now three centuries has been so often discussed, I venture on one discussion more.

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Chapter II: Of The Liberty Of Thought And Discussion

THE time, it is to be hoped, is gone by when any defence would be necessary of the "liberty of the press" as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of the question, besides, has been so often and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it needs not be specially insisted on in this place. Though the law of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it was in the time of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety;[1] and, speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional countries, to be apprehended that the government, whether completely responsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public. Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more

than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.

First: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.

Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical judgment, which is always allowed to it in theory; for while every one well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable. Absolute princes, or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference, usually feel this complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects. People more happily situated, who sometimes hear their opinions disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom they habitually defer: for in proportion to a man's want of confidence in his own solitary judgment, does he usually repose, with implicit trust, on the infallibility of "the world" in general. And the world, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact; his party, his sect, his church, his class of society: the man may be called, by comparison, almost liberal and largeminded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. Nor is his faith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages, countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties have thought, and even now think, the exact reverse. He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dissentient worlds of other people; and it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin. Yet it is as evident in itself as any amount of argument can make it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false

but absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.

The objection likely to be made to this argument, would probably take some such form as the following. There is no greater assumption of infallibility in forbidding the propagation of error, than in any other thing which is done by public authority on its own judgment and responsibility. Judgment is given to men that they may use it. Because it may be used erroneously, are men to be told that they ought not to use it at all? To prohibit what they think pernicious, is not claiming exemption from error, but fulfilling the duty incumbent on them, although fallible, of acting on their conscientious conviction. If we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed. An objection which applies to all conduct can be no valid objection to any conduct in particular.

It is the duty of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can; to form them carefully, and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right. But when they are sure (such reasoners may say), it is not conscientiousness but cowardice to shrink from acting on their opinions, and allow doctrines which they honestly think dangerous to the welfare of mankind, either in this life or in another, to be scattered abroad without restraint, because other people, in less enlightened times, have persecuted opinions now believed to be true. Let us take care, it may be said, not to make the same mistake: but governments and nations have made mistakes in other things, which are not denied to be fit subjects for the exercise of authority: they have laid on bad taxes, made unjust wars. Ought we therefore to lay on no taxes, and, under whatever provocation, make no wars? Men, and governments, must act to the best of their ability. There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life. We may, and must, assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct: and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert society by the propagation of opinions which we regard as false and pernicious.

I answer, that it is assuming very much more. There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.

When we consider either the history of opinion, or the ordinary conduct of human life, to what is it to be ascribed that the one and the other are no worse than they are? Not certainly to the inherent force of the human understanding; for, on any matter not self-evident, there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it, for one who is

capable; and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative; for the majority of the eminent men of every past generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify. Why is it, then, that there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct? If there really is this preponderance -- which there must be, unless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate state -- it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man, either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his mistakes by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cognizant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his position against all gainsayers knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter -- he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process.

It is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even at the canonization of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a "devil's advocate." The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted to posthumous honors, until all that the devil could say against him is known and weighed. If even the Newtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind could not feel as complete assurance of

its truth as they now do. The beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it; and in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to truth, as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining it.

Strange it is, that men should admit the validity of the arguments for free discussion, but object to their being "pushed to an extreme;" not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any case. Strange that they should imagine that they are not assuming infallibility when they acknowledge that there should be free discussion on all subjects which can possibly be doubtful, but think that some particular principle or doctrine should be forbidden to be questioned because it is so certain, that is, because they are certain that it is certain. To call any proposition certain, while there is any one who would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we ourselves, and those who agree with us, are the judges of certainty, and judges without hearing the other side.

In the present age -- which has been described as "destitute of faith, but terrified at scepticism," -- in which people feel sure, not so much that their opinions are true, as that they should not know what to do without them -- the claims of an opinion to be protected from public attack are rested not so much on its truth, as on its importance to society. There are, it is alleged, certain beliefs, so useful, not to say indispensable to well-being, that it is as much the duty of governments to uphold those beliefs, as to protect any other of the interests of society. In a case of such necessity, and so directly in the line of their duty, something less than infallibility may, it is maintained, warrant, and even bind, governments, to act on their own opinion, confirmed by the general opinion of mankind. It is also often argued, and still oftener thought, that none but bad men would desire to weaken these salutary beliefs; and there can be nothing wrong, it is thought, in restraining bad men, and prohibiting what only such men would wish to practise. This mode of thinking makes the justification of restraints on discussion not a question of the truth of doctrines, but of their usefulness; and flatters itself by that means to escape the responsibility of claiming to be an infallible judge of opinions. But those who thus satisfy themselves, do not perceive that the assumption of infallibility is merely shifted from one point to another. The usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion: as disputable, as open to discussion and requiring discussion as much, as the opinion itself. There is the same need of an infallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion to be noxious, as to decide it to be false, unless the

opinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself. And it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. The truth of an opinion is part of its utility. If we would know whether or not it is desirable that a proposition should be believed, is it possible to exclude the consideration of whether or not it is true? In the opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful: and can you prevent such men from urging that plea, when they are charged with culpability for denying some doctrine which they are told is useful, but which they believe to be false? Those who are on the side of received opinions, never fail to take all possible advantage of this plea; you do not find them handling the question of utility as if it could be completely abstracted from that of truth: on the contrary, it is, above all, because their doctrine is "the truth," that the knowledge or the belief of it is held to be so indispensable. There can be no fair discussion of the question of usefulness, when an argument so vital may be employed on one side, but not on the other. And in point of fact, when law or public feeling do not permit the truth of an opinion to be disputed, they are just as little tolerant of a denial of its usefulness. The utmost they allow is an extenuation of its absolute necessity or of the positive guilt of rejecting it.

In order more fully to illustrate the mischief of denying a hearing to opinions because we, in our own judgment, have condemned them, it will be desirable to fix down the discussion to a concrete case; and I choose, by preference, the cases which are least favourable to me -- in which the argument against freedom of opinion, both on the score of truth and on that of utility, is considered the strongest. Let the opinions impugned be the belief in a God and in a future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality. To fight the battle on such ground, gives a great advantage to an unfair antagonist; since he will be sure to say (and many who have no desire to be unfair will say it internally), Are these the doctrines which you do not deem sufficiently certain to be taken under the protection of law? Is the belief in a God one of the opinions, to feel sure of which, you hold to be assuming infallibility? But I must be permitted to observe, that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking to decide that question for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. And I denounce and reprobate this pretension not the less, if put forth on the side of my most solemn convictions. However positive any one's persuasion may be, not only of the falsity, but of the pernicious consequences -- not only of the pernicious consequences, but (to adopt expressions which I altogether condemn) the immorality and impiety of an opinion; yet if, in pursuance of that private judgment, though backed by the public judgment of his country or his cotemporaries, he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence, he assumes infallibility. And so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal. These are

exactly the occasions on which the men of one generation commit those dreadful mistakes which excite the astonishment and horror of posterity. It is among such that we find the instances memorable in history, when the arm of the law has been employed to root out the best men and the noblest doctrines; with deplorable success as to the men, though some of the doctrines have survived to be (as if in mockery) invoked, in defence of similar conduct towards those who dissent from them, or from their received interpretation.

Mankind can hardly be too often reminded, that there was once a man named Socrates, between whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of his time, there took place a memorable collision. Born in an age and country abounding in individual greatness, this man has been handed down to us by those who best knew both him and the age, as the most virtuous man in it; while we know him as the head and prototype of all subsequent teachers of virtue, the source equally of the lofty inspiration of Plato and the judicious utilitarianism of Aristotle, "i maestri di color che sanno," the two headsprings of ethical as of all other philosophy. This acknowledged master of all the eminent thinkers who have since lived -- whose fame, still growing after more than two thousand years, all but outweighs the whole remainder of the names which make his native city illustrious -- was put to death by his countrymen, after a judicial conviction, for impiety and immorality. Impiety, in denying the gods recognized by the State; indeed his accuser asserted (see the "Apologia") that he believed in no gods at all. Immorality, in being, by his doctrines and instructions, a "corrupter of youth." Of these charges the tribunal, there is every ground for believing, honestly found him guilty, and condemned the man who probably of all then born had deserved best of mankind, to be put to death as a criminal.

To pass from this to the only other instance of judicial iniquity, the mention of which, after the condemnation of Socrates, would not be an anti-climax: the event which took place on Calvary rather more than eighteen hundred years ago. The man who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation, such an impression of his moral grandeur, that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to him as the Almighty in person, was ignominiously put to death, as what? As a blasphemer. Men did not merely mistake their benefactor; they mistook him for the exact contrary of what he was, and treated him as that prodigy of impiety, which they themselves are now held to be, for their treatment of him. The feelings with which mankind now regard these lamentable transactions, especially the latter of the two, render them extremely unjust in their judgment of the unhappy actors. These were, to all appearance, not bad men -- not worse than men most commonly are, but rather the contrary; men who possessed in a full, or somewhat more than a full measure, the religious, moral, and patriotic feelings of their time and people: the very kind of men who, in all times, our own included, have every chance of passing through life blameless and respected. The high-priest who rent his garments when the words were pronounced, which, according to all the ideas of his country, constituted the blackest guilt, was in all

probability quite as sincere in his horror and indignation, as the generality of respectable and pious men now are in the religious and moral sentiments they profess; and most of those who now shudder at his conduct, if they had lived in his time and been born Jews, would have acted precisely as he did. Orthodox Christians who are tempted to think that those who stoned to death the first martyrs must have been worse men than they themselves are, ought to remember that one of those persecutors was Saint Paul.

Let us add one more example, the most striking of all, if the impressiveness of an error is measured by the wisdom and virtue of him who falls into it. If ever any one, possessed of power, had grounds for thinking himself the best and most enlightened among his cotemporaries, it was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Absolute monarch of the whole civilized world, he preserved through life not only the most unblemished justice, but what was less to be expected from his Stoical breeding, the tenderest heart. The few failings which are attributed to him, were all on the side of indulgence: while his writings, the highest ethical product of the ancient mind, differ scarcely perceptibly, if they differ at all, from the most characteristic teachings of Christ. This man, a better Christian in all but the dogmatic sense of the word, than almost any of the ostensibly Christian sovereigns who have since reigned, persecuted Christianity. Placed at the summit of all the previous attainments of humanity, with an open, unfettered intellect, and a character which led him of himself to embody in his moral writings the Christian ideal, he yet failed to see that Christianity was to be a good and not an evil to the world, with his duties to which he was so deeply penetrated. Existing society he knew to be in a deplorable state. But such as it was, he saw or thought he saw, that it was held together and prevented from being worse, by belief and reverence of the received divinities. As a ruler of mankind, he deemed it his duty not to suffer society to fall in pieces; and saw not how, if its existing ties were removed, any others could be formed which could again knit it together. The new religion openly aimed at dissolving these ties: unless, therefore, it was his duty to adopt that religion, it seemed to be his duty to put it down. Inasmuch then as the theology of Christianity did not appear to him true or of divine origin; inasmuch as this strange history of a crucified God was not credible to him, and a system which purported to rest entirely upon a foundation to him so wholly unbelievable, could not be foreseen by him to be that renovating agency which, after all abatements, it has in fact proved to be; the gentlest and most amiable of philosophers and rulers, under a solemn sense of duty, authorized the persecution of Christianity. To my mind this is one of the most tragical facts in all history. It is a bitter thought, how different a thing the Christianity of the world might have been, if the Christian faith had been adopted as the religion of the empire under the auspices of Marcus Aurelius instead of those of Constantine. But it would be equally unjust to him and false to truth, to deny, that no one plea which can be urged for punishing anti-Christian teaching, was wanting to Marcus Aurelius for punishing, as he did, the propagation of Christianity. No Christian more firmly believes that Atheism is false, and

tends to the dissolution of society, than Marcus Aurelius believed the same things of Christianity; he who, of all men then living, might have been thought the most capable of appreciating it. Unless any one who approves of punishment for the promulgation of opinions, flatters himself that he is a wiser and better man than Marcus Aurelius -- more deeply versed in the wisdom of his time, more elevated in his intellect above it -- more earnest in his search for truth, or more single-minded in his devotion to it when found; -- let him abstain from that assumption of the joint infallibility of himself and the multitude, which the great Antoninus made with so unfortunate a result.

Aware of the impossibility of defending the use of punishment for restraining irreligious opinions, by any argument which will not justify Marcus Antoninus, the enemies of religious freedom, when hard pressed, occasionally accept this consequence, and say, with Dr. Johnson, that the persecutors of Christianity were in the right; that persecution is an ordeal through which truth ought to pass, and always passes successfully, legal penalties being, in the end, powerless against truth, though sometimes beneficially effective against mischievous errors. This is a form of the argument for religious intolerance, sufficiently remarkable not to be passed without notice.

A theory which maintains that truth may justifiably be persecuted because persecution cannot possibly do it any harm, cannot be charged with being intentionally hostile to the reception of new truths; but we cannot commend the generosity of its dealing with the persons to whom mankind are indebted for them. To discover to the world something which deeply concerns it, and of which it was previously ignorant; to prove to it that it had been mistaken on some vital point of temporal or spiritual interest, is as important a service as a human being can render to his fellow-creatures, and in certain cases, as in those of the early Christians and of the Reformers, those who think with Dr. Johnson believe it to have been the most precious gift which could be bestowed on mankind. That the authors of such splendid benefits should be requited by martyrdom; that their reward should be to be dealt with as the vilest of criminals, is not, upon this theory, a deplorable error and misfortune, for which humanity should mourn in sackcloth and ashes, but the normal and justifiable state of things. The propounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine, should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors, can not be supposed to set much value on the benefit; and I believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.

But, indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution. If not

suppressed forever, it may be thrown back for centuries. To speak only of religious opinions: the Reformation broke out at least twenty times before Luther, and was put down. Arnold of Brescia was put down. Fra Dolcino was put down. Savonarola was put down. The Albigeois were put down. The Vaudois were put down. The Lollards were put down. The Hussites were put down. Even after the era of Luther, wherever persecution was persisted in, it was successful. In Spain, Italy, Flanders, the Austrian empire, Protestantism was rooted out; and, most likely, would have been so in England, had Queen Mary lived, or Queen Elizabeth died. Persecution has always succeeded, save where the heretics were too strong a party to be effectually persecuted. No reasonable person can doubt that Christianity might have been extirpated in the Roman empire. It spread, and became predominant, because the persecutions were only occasional, lasting but a short time, and separated by long intervals of almost undisturbed propagandism. It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake. Men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either. The real advantage which truth has, consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.

It will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new opinions: we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we even build sepulchres to them. It is true we no longer put heretics to death; and the amount of penal infliction which modern feeling would probably tolerate, even against the most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to extirpate them. But let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinion, or at least for its expression, still exist by law; and their enforcement is not, even in these times, so unexampled as to make it at all incredible that they may some day be revived in full force. In the year 1857, at the summer assizes of the county of Cornwall, an unfortunate man,[2] said to be of unexceptionable conduct in all relations of life, was sentenced to twenty-one months imprisonment, for uttering, and writing on a gate, some offensive words concerning Christianity. Within a month of the same time, at the Old Bailey, two persons, on two separate occasions,[3] were rejected as jurymen, and one of them grossly insulted by the judge and one of the counsel, because they honestly declared that they had no theological belief; and a third, a foreigner,[4] for the same reason, was denied justice against a thief. This refusal of redress took place in virtue of the legal doctrine, that no person can be allowed to give evidence in a court of justice, who does not profess belief in a God (any god is sufficient) and in a future state; which is equivalent to declaring such persons to be outlaws, excluded from the protection of the tribunals; who

may not only be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if no one but themselves, or persons of similar opinions, be present, but any one else may be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if the proof of the fact depends on their evidence. The assumption on which this is grounded, is that the oath is worthless, of a person who does not believe in a future state; a proposition which betokens much ignorance of history in those who assent to it (since it is historically true that a large proportion of infidels in all ages have been persons of distinguished integrity and honor); and would be maintained by no one who had the smallest conception how many of the persons in greatest repute with the world, both for virtues and for attainments, are well known, at least to their intimates, to be unbelievers. The rule, besides, is suicidal, and cuts away its own foundation. Under pretence that atheists must be liars, it admits the testimony of all atheists who are willing to lie, and rejects only those who brave the obloquy of publicly confessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood. A rule thus self-convicted of absurdity so far as regards its professed purpose, can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred, a relic of persecution; a persecution, too, having the peculiarity that the qualification for undergoing it is the being clearly proved not to deserve it. The rule, and the theory it implies, are hardly less insulting to believers than to infidels. For if he who does not believe in a future state necessarily lies, it follows that they who do believe are only prevented from lying, if prevented they are, by the fear of hell. We will not do the authors and abettors of the rule the injury of supposing, that the conception which they have formed of Christian virtue is drawn from their own consciousness.

These, indeed, are but rags and remnants of persecution, and may be thought to be not so much an indication of the wish to persecute, as an example of that very frequent infirmity of English minds, which makes them take a preposterous pleasure in the assertion of a bad principle, when they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry it really into practice. But unhappily there is no security in the state of the public mind, that the suspension of worse forms of legal persecution, which has lasted for about the space of a generation, will continue. In this age the quiet surface of routine is as often ruffled by attempts to resuscitate past evils, as to introduce new benefits. What is boasted of at the present time as the revival of religion, is always, in narrow and uncultivated minds, at least as much the revival of bigotry; and where there is the strongest permanent leaven of intolerance in the feelings of a people, which at all times abides in the middle classes of this country, it needs but little to provoke them into actively persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution.[5] For it is this -- it is the opinions men entertain, and the feelings they cherish, respecting those who disown the beliefs they deem important, which makes this country not a place of mental freedom. For a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that they strengthen the social stigma. It is that stigma which is really effective, and so effective is it, that the profession of opinions which are under the ban of society is much less common in

England, than is, in many other countries, the avowal of those which incur risk of judicial punishment. In respect to all persons but those whose pecuniary circumstances make them independent of the good will of other people, opinion, on this subject, is as efficacious as law; men might as well be imprisoned, as excluded from the means of earning their bread. Those whose bread is already secured, and who desire no favors from men in power, or from bodies of men, or from the public, have nothing to fear from the open avowal of any opinions, but to be ill-thought of and illspoken of, and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould to enable them to bear. There is no room for any appeal ad misericordiam in behalf of such persons. But though we do not now inflict so much evil on those who think differently from us, as it was formerly our custom to do, it may be that we do ourselves as much evil as ever by our treatment of them. Socrates was put to death, but the Socratic philosophy rose like the sun in heaven, and spread its illumination over the whole intellectual firmament. Christians were cast to the lions, but the Christian Church grew up a stately and spreading tree, overtopping the older and less vigorous growths, and stifling them by its shade. Our merely social intolerance, kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion. With us, heretical opinions do not perceptibly gain or even lose, ground in each decade or generation; they never blaze out far and wide, but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles of thinking and studious persons among whom they originate, without ever lighting up the general affairs of mankind with either a true or a deceptive light. And thus is kept up a state of things very satisfactory to some minds, because, without the unpleasant process of fining or imprisoning anybody, it maintains all prevailing opinions outwardly undisturbed, while it does not absolutely interdict the exercise of reason by dissentients afflicted with the malady of thought. A convenient plan for having peace in the intellectual world, and keeping all things going on therein very much as they do already. But the price paid for this sort of intellectual pacification, is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind. A state of things in which a large portion of the most active and inquiring intellects find it advisable to keep the genuine principles and grounds of their convictions within their own breasts, and attempt, in what they address to the public, to fit as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises which they have internally renounced, cannot send forth the open, fearless characters, and logical, consistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world. The sort of men who can be looked for under it, are either mere conformers to commonplace, or time-servers for truth whose arguments on all great subjects are meant for their hearers, and are not those which have convinced themselves. Those who avoid this alternative, do so by narrowing their thoughts and interests to things which can be spoken of without venturing within the region of principles, that is, to small practical matters, which would come right of themselves, if but the minds of mankind were strengthened and enlarged, and which will never be made effectually right until then; while that which would strengthen and enlarge men's minds, free and daring speculation on the highest subjects, is abandoned.

Those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil, should consider in the first place, that in consequence of it there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions; and that such of them as could not stand such a discussion, though they may be prevented from spreading, do not disappear. But it is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most, by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy. Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral? Among them we may occasionally see some man of deep conscientiousness, and subtile and refined understanding, who spends a life in sophisticating with an intellect which he cannot silence, and exhausts the resources of ingenuity in attempting to reconcile the promptings of his conscience and reason with orthodoxy, which yet he does not, perhaps, to the end succeed in doing. No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead. Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think. Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much, and even more indispensable, to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of. There have been, and may again be, great individual thinkers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intellectually active people. Where any people has made a temporary approach to such a character, it has been because the dread of heterodox speculation was for a time suspended. Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so remarkable. Never when controversy avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings. Of such we have had an example in the condition of Europe during the times immediately following the Reformation; another, though limited to the Continent and to a more cultivated class, in the speculative movement of the latter half of the eighteenth century; and a third, of still briefer duration, in the intellectual fermentation of Germany during the Goethian and Fichtean period. These periods differed widely in the particular opinions which they developed; but were alike in this, that during all three the yoke of authority was broken. In each, an old mental despotism had been thrown off, and no new one had yet

taken its place. The impulse given at these three periods has made Europe what it now is. Every single improvement which has taken place either in the human mind or in institutions, may be traced distinctly to one or other of them. Appearances have for some time indicated that all three impulses are well-nigh spent; and we can expect no fresh start, until we again assert our mental freedom.

Let us now pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing the Supposition that any of the received opinions may be false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into the worth of the manner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed. However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.

There is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly) who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned. Where their influence prevails, they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument. Waiving, however, this possibility -- assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument -- this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.

If the intellect and judgment of mankind ought to be cultivated, a thing which Protestants at least do not deny, on what can these faculties be more appropriately exercised by any one, than on the things which concern him so much that it is considered necessary for him to hold opinions on them? If the cultivation of the understanding consists in one thing more than in another, it is surely in learning the grounds of one's own opinions. Whatever people believe, on subjects on which it is of the first importance to believe rightly, they ought to be able to defend against at least the common objections. But, some one may say, "Let them be taught the grounds of their opinions. It does not follow that opinions must be merely parroted because they are never heard controverted. Persons who learn geometry do not simply commit the theorems to memory, but understand and learn likewise the demonstrations; and it would be absurd to say that they remain ignorant of the grounds of geometrical truths, because they never hear any one deny, and attempt to

disprove them." Undoubtedly: and such teaching suffices on a subject like mathematics, where there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong side of the question. The peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is, that all the argument is on one side. There are no objections, and no answers to objections. But on every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this is shown and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our opinion. But when we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favor some opinion different from it. The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record that he always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not with still greater, intensity than even his own. What Cicero practised as the means of forensic success, requires to be imitated by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. The rational position for him would be suspension of judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination. Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. This is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of, else he will never really possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty. Ninety-nine in a hundred of what are called educated men are in this condition, even of those who can argue fluently for their opinions. Their conclusion may be true, but it might be false for anything they know: they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess. They do not know those parts of it which explain and justify the remainder; the considerations which show that a fact which seemingly conflicts with another is reconcilable with it, or that, of two apparently strong reasons, one and not the other ought to be preferred. All that part of the truth which turns the scale, and decides the judgment of a completely informed mind, they are

strangers to; nor is it ever really known, but to those who have attended equally and impartially to both sides, and endeavored to see the reasons of both in the strongest light. So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure up.

To abate the force of these considerations, an enemy of free discussion may be supposed to say, that there is no necessity for mankind in general to know and understand all that can be said against or for their opinions by philosophers and theologians. That it is not needful for common men to be able to expose all the misstatements or fallacies of an ingenious opponent. That it is enough if there is always somebody capable of answering them, so that nothing likely to mislead uninstructed persons remains unrefuted. That simple minds, having been taught the obvious grounds of the truths inculcated on them, may trust to authority for the rest, and being aware that they have neither knowledge nor talent to resolve every difficulty which can be raised, may repose in the assurance that all those which have been raised have been or can be answered, by those who are specially trained to the task.

Conceding to this view of the subject the utmost that can be claimed for it by those most easily satisfied with the amount of understanding of truth which ought to accompany the belief of it; even so, the argument for free discussion is no way weakened. For even this doctrine acknowledges that mankind ought to have a rational assurance that all objections have been satisfactorily answered; and how are they to be answered if that which requires to be answered is not spoken? or how can the answer be known to be satisfactory, if the objectors have no opportunity of showing that it is unsatisfactory? If not the public, at least the philosophers and theologians who are to resolve the difficulties, must make themselves familiar with those difficulties in their most puzzling form; and this cannot be accomplished unless they are freely stated, and placed in the most advantageous light which they admit of. The Catholic Church has its own way of dealing with this embarrassing problem. It makes a broad separation between those who can be permitted to receive its doctrines on conviction, and those who must accept them on trust. Neither, indeed, are allowed any choice as to what they will accept; but the clergy, such at least as can be fully confided in, may admissibly and meritoriously make themselves acquainted with the arguments of opponents, in order to answer them, and may, therefore, read heretical books; the laity, not unless by special permission, hard to be obtained. This discipline recognizes a knowledge of the enemy's case as beneficial to the teachers, but finds means, consistent with this, of denying it to the rest of the world: thus giving to the elite more mental culture, though not more mental freedom, than it allows to the mass. By this device it succeeds in obtaining the kind of mental superiority which its purposes require; for though culture without freedom never made a large and liberal mind, it can make a clever nisi prius advocate of a cause. But in

countries professing Protestantism, this resource is denied; since Protestants hold, at least in theory, that the responsibility for the choice of a religion must be borne by each for himself, and cannot be thrown off upon teachers. Besides, in the present state of the world, it is practically impossible that writings which are read by the instructed can be kept from the uninstructed. If the teachers of mankind are to be cognizant of all that they ought to know, everything must be free to be written and published without restraint.

If, however, the mischievous operation of the absence of free discussion, when the received opinions are true, were confined to leaving men ignorant of the grounds of those opinions, it might be thought that this, if an intellectual, is no moral evil, and does not affect the worth of the opinions, regarded in their influence on the character. The fact, however, is, that not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself. The words which convey it, cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to communicate. Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote; or, if any part, the shell and husk only of the meaning is retained, the finer essence being lost. The great chapter in human history which this fact occupies and fills, cannot be too earnestly studied and meditated on.

It is illustrated in the experience of almost all ethical doctrines and religious creeds. They are all full of meaning and vitality to those who originate them, and to the direct disciples of the originators. Their meaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into even fuller consciousness, so long as the struggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an ascendency over other creeds. At last it either prevails, and becomes the general opinion, or its progress stops; it keeps possession of the ground it has gained, but ceases to spread further. When either of these results has become apparent, controversy on the subject flags, and gradually dies away. The doctrine has taken its place, if not as a received opinion, as one of the admitted sects or divisions of opinion: those who hold it have generally inherited, not adopted it; and conversion from one of these doctrines to another, being now an exceptional fact, occupies little place in the thoughts of their professors. Instead of being, as at first, constantly on the alert either to defend themselves against the world, or to bring the world over to them, they have subsided into acquiescence, and neither listen, when they can help it, to arguments against their creed, nor trouble dissentients (if there be such) with arguments in its favor. From this time may usually be dated the decline in the living power of the doctrine. We often hear the teachers of all creeds lamenting the difficulty of keeping up in the minds of believers a lively apprehension of the truth which they nominally recognize, so that it may penetrate the feelings, and acquire a real mastery over the conduct. No such difficulty is complained of while the creed is still fighting for its existence: even the weaker combatants then know and feel what they are fighting for, and the difference between it

and other doctrines; and in that period of every creed's existence, not a few persons may be found, who have realized its fundamental principles in all the forms of thought, have weighed and considered them in all their important bearings, and have experienced the full effect on the character, which belief in that creed ought to produce in a mind thoroughly imbued with it. But when it has come to be an hereditary creed, and to be received passively, not actively -- when the mind is no longer compelled, in the same degree as at first, to exercise its vital powers on the questions which its belief presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies, or to give it a dull and torpid assent, as if accepting it on trust dispensed with the necessity of realizing it in consciousness, or testing it by personal experience; until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being. Then are seen the cases, so frequent in this age of the world as almost to form the majority, in which the creed remains as it were outside the mind, encrusting and petrifying it against all other influences addressed to the higher parts of our nature; manifesting its power by not suffering any fresh and living conviction to get in, but itself doing nothing for the mind or heart, except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant.

To what an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs, without being ever realized in the imagination, the feelings, or the understanding, is exemplified by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the doctrines of Christianity. By Christianity I here mean what is accounted such by all churches and sects -- the maxims and precepts contained in the New Testament. These are considered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing Christians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian in a thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by reference to those laws. The standard to which he does refer it, is the custom of his nation, his class, or his religious profession. He has thus, on the one hand, a collection of ethical maxims, which he believes to have been vouchsafed to him by infallible wisdom as rules for his government; and on the other, a set of every-day judgments and practices, which go a certain length with some of those maxims, not so great a length with others, stand in direct opposition to some, and are, on the whole, a compromise between the Christian creed and the interests and suggestions of worldly life. To the first of these standards he gives his homage; to the other his real allegiance. All Christians believe that the blessed are the poor and humble, and those who are illused by the world; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven; that they should judge not, lest they be judged; that they should swear not at all; that they should love their neighbor as themselves; that if one take their cloak, they should give him their coat also; that they should take no thought for the morrow; that if they would be perfect, they should sell all that they have and give it to the poor. They are not insincere when they say that they believe these things. They do believe them, as people believe what they have always heard

lauded and never discussed. But in the sense of that living belief which regulates conduct, they believe these doctrines just up to the point to which it is usual to act upon them. The doctrines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt adversaries with; and it is understood that they are to be put forward (when possible) as the reasons for whatever people do that they think laudable. But any one who reminded them that the maxims require an infinity of things which they never even think of doing would gain nothing but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who affect to be better than other people. The doctrines have no hold on ordinary believers -- are not a power in their minds. They have an habitual respect for the sound of them, but no feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified, and forces the mind to take them in, and make them conform to the formula. Whenever conduct is concerned, they look round for Mr. A and B to direct them how far to go in obeying Christ.

Now we may be well assured that the case was not thus, but far otherwise, with the early Christians. Had it been thus, Christianity never would have expanded from an obscure sect of the despised Hebrews into the religion of the Roman empire. When their enemies said, "See how these Christians love one another" (a remark not likely to be made by anybody now), they assuredly had a much livelier feeling of the meaning of their creed than they have ever had since. And to this cause, probably, it is chiefly owing that Christianity now makes so little progress in extending its domain, and after eighteen centuries, is still nearly confined to Europeans and the descendants of Europeans. Even with the strictly religious, who are much in earnest about their doctrines, and attach a greater amount of meaning to many of them than people in general, it commonly happens that the part which is thus comparatively active in their minds is that which was made by Calvin, or Knox, or some such person much nearer in character to themselves. The sayings of Christ coexist passively in their minds, producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland. There are many reasons, doubtless, why doctrines which are the badge of a sect retain more of their vitality than those common to all recognized sects, and why more pains are taken by teachers to keep their meaning alive; but one reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines are more questioned, and have to be oftener defended against open gainsayers. Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the field.

The same thing holds true, generally speaking, of all traditional doctrines -- those of prudence and knowledge of life, as well as of morals or religion. All languages and literatures are full of general observations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself in it; observations which everybody knows, which everybody repeats, or hears with acquiescence, which are received as truisms, yet of which most people first truly learn the meaning, when experience, generally of a painful kind, has made it a reality to them. How often, when smarting under some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment, does a person call to mind some proverb or common saying familiar to him all

his life, the meaning of which, if he had ever before felt it as he does now, would have saved him from the calamity. There are indeed reasons for this, other than the absence of discussion: there are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized, until personal experience has brought it home. But much more of the meaning even of these would have been understood, and what was understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued pro and con by people who did understand it. The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors. A contemporary author has well spoken of "the deep slumber of a decided opinion."

But what! (it may be asked) Is the absence of unanimity an indispensable condition of true knowledge? Is it necessary that some part of mankind should persist in error, to enable any to realize the truth? Does a belief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is generally received -- and is a proposition never thoroughly understood and felt unless some doubt of it remains? As soon as mankind have unanimously accepted a truth, does the truth perish within them? The highest aim and best result of improved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is to unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important truths: and does the intelligence only last as long as it has not achieved its object? Do the fruits of conquest perish by the very completeness of the victory?

I affirm no such thing. As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested. The cessation, on one question after another, of serious controversy, is one of the necessary incidents of the consolidation of opinion; a consolidation as salutary in the case of true opinions, as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous. But though this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable and indispensable, we are not therefore obliged to conclude that all its consequences must be beneficial. The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefit of its universal recognition. Where this advantage can no longer be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavoring to provide a substitute for it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion, eager for his conversion.

But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They were essentially a negative discussion of the great questions of philosophy and life, directed with consummate skill to the

purpose of convincing any one who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion, that he did not understand the subject -- that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed; in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school disputations of the Middle Ages had a somewhat similar object. They were intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the premises appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and, as a discipline to the mind, they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the "Socratici viri:" but the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit, and the present modes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other. A person who derives all his instruction from teachers or books, even if he escape the besetting temptation of contenting himself with cram, is under no compulsion to hear both sides; accordingly it is far from a frequent accomplishment, even among thinkers, to know both sides; and the weakest part of what everybody says in defence of his opinion, is what he intends as a reply to antagonists. It is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic -- that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result; but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents. That, therefore, which when absent, it is so indispensable, but so difficult, to create, how worse than absurd is it to forego, when spontaneously offering itself! If there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought, if we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions, to do with much greater labor for ourselves.

It still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which make diversity of opinion advantageous, and will continue to do so until mankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at present seems at an incalculable distance. We have hitherto considered only two possibilities: that the received opinion may be false, and some other opinion, consequently, true; or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling

of its truth. But there is a commoner case than either of these; when the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part. Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited. Heretical opinions, on the other hand, are generally some of these suppressed and neglected truths, bursting the bonds which kept them down, and either seeking reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion, or fronting it as enemies, and setting themselves up, with similar exclusiveness, as the whole truth. The latter case is hitherto the most frequent, as, in the human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception. Hence, even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than that which it displaces. Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even when resting on a true foundation; every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth may be blended. No sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we should otherwise have overlooked, overlook some of those which we see. Rather, he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided asserters too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole.

Thus, in the eighteenth century, when nearly all the instructed, and all those of the uninstructed who were led by them, were lost in admiration of what is called civilization, and of the marvels of modern science, literature, and philosophy, and while greatly overrating the amount of unlikeness between the men of modern and those of ancient times, indulged the belief that the whole of the difference was in their own favor; with what a salutary shock did the paradoxes of Rousseau explode like bombshells in the midst, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its elements to recombine in a better form and with additional ingredients. Not that the current opinions were on the whole farther from the truth than Rousseau's were; on the contrary, they were nearer to it; they contained more of positive truth, and very much less of error. Nevertheless there lay in Rousseau's doctrine, and has floated down the stream of opinion along with it, a considerable amount of exactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted; and these are the deposit which was left behind when the flood subsided. The superior worth of simplicity of life, the enervating and demoralizing effect

of the trammels and hypocrisies of artificial society, are ideas which have never been entirely absent from cultivated minds since Rousseau wrote; and they will in time produce their due effect, though at present needing to be asserted as much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for words, on this subject, have nearly exhausted their power.

In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away. Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity. Unless opinions favorable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale is sure to go up, and the other down. Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners. On any of the great open questions just enumerated, if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority. That is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected interests, the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share. I am aware that there is not, in this country, any intolerance of differences of opinion on most of these topics. They are adduced to show, by admitted and multiplied examples, the universality of the fact, that only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth. When there are persons to be found, who form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something by their silence.

It may be objected, "But some received principles, especially on the highest and most vital subjects, are more than half-truths. The Christian morality, for instance, is the whole truth on that subject and if any one teaches a morality which varies from it, he is wholly in error." As this is of all cases the most important in practice, none can be fitter to test the general maxim. But before pronouncing what Christian morality is or is not, it would be desirable to decide what is meant by Christian morality. If it means the morality of the New Testament, I wonder that

any one who derives his knowledge of this from the book itself, can suppose that it was announced, or intended, as a complete doctrine of morals. The Gospel always refers to a preexisting morality, and confines its precepts to the particulars in which that morality was to be corrected, or superseded by a wider and higher; expressing itself, moreover, in terms most general, often impossible to be interpreted literally, and possessing rather the impressiveness of poetry or eloquence than the precision of legislation. To extract from it a body of ethical doctrine, has never been possible without eking it out from the Old Testament, that is, from a system elaborate indeed, but in many respects barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous people. St. Paul, a declared enemy to this Judaical mode of interpreting the doctrine and filling up the scheme of his Master, equally assumes a preexisting morality, namely, that of the Greeks and Romans; and his advice to Christians is in a great measure a system of accommodation to that; even to the extent of giving an apparent sanction to slavery. What is called Christian, but should rather be termed theological, morality, was not the work of Christ or the Apostles, but is of much later origin, having been gradually built up by the Catholic Church of the first five centuries, and though not implicitly adopted by moderns and Protestants, has been much less modified by them than might have been expected. For the most part, indeed, they have contented themselves with cutting off the additions which had been made to it in the Middle Ages, each sect supplying the place by fresh additions, adapted to its own character and tendencies. That mankind owe a great debt to this morality, and to its early teachers, I should be the last person to deny; but I do not scruple to say of it, that it is, in many important points, incomplete and one-sided, and that unless ideas and feelings, not sanctioned by it, had contributed to the formation of European life and character, human affairs would have been in a worse condition than they now are. Christian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive; passive rather than active; Innocence rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic Pursuit of Good: in its precepts (as has been well said) "thou shalt not" predominates unduly over "thou shalt." In its horror of sensuality, it made an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality. It holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell, as the appointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous life: in this falling far below the best of the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give to human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man's feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for consulting them. It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience; it inculcates submission to all authorities found established; who indeed are not to be actively obeyed when they command what religion forbids, but who are not to be resisted, far less rebelled against, for any amount of wrong to ourselves. And while, in the morality of the best Pagan nations, duty to the State holds even a disproportionate place, infringing on the just liberty of the individual; in purely Christian ethics that grand

department of duty is scarcely noticed or acknowledged. It is in the Koran, not the New Testament, that we read the maxim -- "A ruler who appoints any man to an office, when there is in his dominions another man better qualified for it, sins against God and against the State." What little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains in modern morality, is derived from Greek and Roman sources, not from Christian; as, even in the morality of private life, whatever exists of magnanimity, high-mindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honor, is derived from the purely human, not the religious part of our education, and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth, professedly recognized, is that of obedience.

I am as far as any one from pretending that these defects are necessarily inherent in the Christian ethics, in every manner in which it can be conceived, or that the many requisites of a complete moral doctrine which it does not contain, do not admit of being reconciled with it. Far less would I insinuate this of the doctrines and precepts of Christ himself. I believe that the sayings of Christ are all, that I can see any evidence of their having been intended to be; that they are irreconcilable with nothing which a comprehensive morality requires; that everything which is excellent in ethics may be brought within them, with no greater violence to their language than has been done to it by all who have attempted to deduce from them any practical system of conduct whatever. But it is quite consistent with this, to believe that they contain and were meant to contain, only a part of the truth; that many essential elements of the highest morality are among the things which are not provided for, nor intended to be provided for, in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity, and which have been entirely thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the basis of those deliverances by the Christian Church. And this being so, I think it a great error to persist in attempting to find in the Christian doctrine that complete rule for our guidance, which its author intended it to sanction and enforce, but only partially to provide. I believe, too, that this narrow theory is becoming a grave practical evil, detracting greatly from the value of the moral training and instruction, which so many wellmeaning persons are now at length exerting themselves to promote. I much fear that by attempting to form the mind and feelings on an exclusively religious type, and discarding those secular standards (as for want of a better name they may be called) which heretofore coexisted with and supplemented the Christian ethics, receiving some of its spirit, and infusing into it some of theirs, there will result, and is even now resulting, a low, abject, servile type of character, which, submit itself as it may to what it deems the Supreme Will, is incapable of rising to or sympathizing in the conception of Supreme Goodness. I believe that other ethics than any one which can be evolved from exclusively Christian sources, must exist side by side with Christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind; and that the Christian system is no exception to the rule that in an imperfect state of the human mind, the interests of truth require a diversity of opinions. It is not necessary that in ceasing to ignore

the moral truths not contained in Christianity, men should ignore any of those which it does contain. Such prejudice, or oversight, when it occurs, is altogether an evil; but it is one from which we cannot hope to be always exempt, and must be regarded as the price paid for an inestimable good. The exclusive pretension made by a part of the truth to be the whole, must and ought to be protested against, and if a reactionary impulse should make the protestors unjust in their turn, this one-sidedness, like the other, may be lamented, but must be tolerated. If Christians would teach infidels to be just to Christianity, they should themselves be just to infidelity. It can do truth no service to blink the fact, known to all who have the most ordinary acquaintance with literary history, that a large portion of the noblest and most valuable moral teaching has been the work, not only of men who did not know, but of men who knew and rejected, the Christian faith.

I do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of enunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the evils of religious or philosophical sectarianism. Every truth which men of narrow capacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted, inculcated, and in many ways even acted on, as if no other truth existed in the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify the first. I acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated thereby; the truth which ought to have been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons regarded as opponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil: there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. And since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to.

We have now recognized the necessity to the mental wellbeing of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds; which we will now briefly recapitulate.

First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.

Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any object is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision

of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.

Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.

Before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it is fit to take notice of those who say, that the free expression of all opinions should be permitted, on condition that the manner be temperate, and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion. Much might be said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be placed; for if the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked, I think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent. But this, though an important consideration in a practical point of view, merges in a more fundamental objection. Undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one, may be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe censure. But the principal offences of the kind are such as it is mostly impossible, unless by accidental self-betrayal, to bring home to conviction. The gravest of them is, to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion. But all this, even to the most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good faith, by persons who are not considered, and in many other respects may not deserve to be considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible on adequate grounds conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable; and still less could law presume to interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct. With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely, invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like, the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation. Yet whatever mischief arises from their use, is greatest when they are employed against the comparatively defenceless; and whatever unfair advantage can be derived by any opinion from this mode of asserting it, accrues almost exclusively to received opinions. The worst offence of this kind which can be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatize those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men.

To calumny of this sort, those who hold any unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they are in general few and uninfluential, and nobody but themselves feels much interest in seeing justice done them; but this weapon is, from the nature of the case, denied to those who attack a prevailing opinion: they can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor if they could, would it do anything but recoil on their own cause. In general, opinions contrary to those commonly received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language, and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate even in a slight degree without losing ground: while unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the prevailing opinion, really does deter people from professing contrary opinions, and from listening to those who profess them. For the interest, therefore, of truth and justice, it is far more important to restrain this employment of vituperative language than the other; and, for example, if it were necessary to choose, there would be much more need to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity, than on religion. It is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining either, while opinion ought, in every instance, to determine its verdict by the circumstances of the individual case; condemning every one, on whichever side of the argument he places himself, in whose mode of advocacy either want of candor, or malignity, bigotry or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves, but not inferring these vices from the side which a person takes, though it be the contrary side of the question to our own; and giving merited honor to every one, whatever opinion he may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state what his opponents and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keeping nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their favor. This is the real morality of public discussion; and if often violated, I am happy to think that there are many controversialists who to a great extent observe it, and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it.

[1] These words had scarcely been written, when, as if to give them an emphatic contradiction, occurred the Government Press Prosecutions of 1858. That illjudged interference with the liberty of public discussion has not, however, induced me to alter a single word in the text, nor has it at all weakened my conviction that, moments of panic excepted, the era of pains and penalties far political discussion has, in our own country, passed away. For, in the first place, the prosecutions were not persisted in; and in the second, they were never, properly speaking, political prosecutions. The offence charged was not that of criticizing institutions, or the acts or persons of rulers, but of circulating what was deemed an immoral doctrine, the lawfulness of Tyrannicide.

If the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered. It would, therefore, be irrelevant and out of place to examine here, whether the doctrine of Tyrannicide deserves that title. I shall content myself with saying,

that the subject has been at all times one of the open questions of morals, that the act of a private citizen in striking down a criminal, who, by raising himself above the law, has placed himself beyond the reach of legal punishment or control, has been accounted by whole nations, and by some of the best and wisest of men, not a crime, but an act of exalted virtue and that, right or wrong, it is not of the nature of assassination but of civil war. As such, I hold that the instigation to it, in a specific case, may be a proper subject of punishment, but only if an overt act has followed, and at least a probable connection can be established between the act and the instigation. Even then it is not a foreign government, but the very government assailed, which alone, in the exercise of self-defence, can legitimately punish attacks directed against its own existence.

[2] Thomas Pooley, Bodmin Assizes, July 31, 1857. In December following, he received a free pardon from the Crown.

[3] George Jacob Holyoake, August 17, 1857; Edward Truelove, July, 1857.

[4] Baron de Gleichen, Marlborough Street Police Court, August 4, 1857.

[5] Ample warning may be drawn from the large infusion of the passions of a persecutor, which mingled with the general display of the worst parts of our national character on the occasion of the Sepoy insurrection. The ravings of fanatics or charlatans from the pulpit may be unworthy of notice; but the heads of the Evangelical party have announced as their principle, for the government of Hindoos and Mahomedans, that no schools be supported by public money in which the Bible is not taught, and by necessary consequence that no public employment be given to any but real or pretended Christians. An Under-Secretary of State, in a speech delivered to his constituents on the 12th of November, 1857, is reported to have said: "Toleration of their faith" (the faith of a hundred millions of British subjects), "the superstition which they called religion, by the British Government, had had the effect of retarding the ascendency of the British name, and preventing the salutary growth of Christianity.... Toleration was the great corner-stone of the religious liberties of this country; but do not let them abuse that precious word toleration. As he understood it, it meant the complete liberty to all, freedom of worship, among Christians, who worshipped upon the same foundation. It meant toleration of all sects and denominations of Christians who believed in the one mediation." I desire to call attention to the fact, that a man who has been deemed fit to fill a high office in the government of this country, under a liberal Ministry, maintains the doctrine that all who do not believe in the divinity of Christ are beyond the pale of toleration. Who, after this imbecile display, can indulge the illusion that religious persecution has passed away, never to return?

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Chapter III: On Individuality, As One Of The Elements Of Wellbeing

SUCH being the reasons which make it imperative that human beings should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual, and through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is either conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibition; let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their opinions -- to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable. No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corndealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost. That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part, are only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at present of recognizing all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men's modes of action, not less than to their opinions. As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person's own character, but the traditions of customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

In maintaining this principle, the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself. If it were felt that

the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being; that it is not only a coordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; there would be no danger that liberty should be undervalued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary difficulty. But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account. The majority, being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are (for it is they who make them what they are), cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for everybody; and what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of the majority of moral and social reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the general acceptance of what these reformers, in their own judgment, think would be best for mankind. Few persons, out of Germany, even comprehend the meaning of the doctrine which Wilhelm von Humboldt, so eminent both as a savant and as a politician, made the text of a treatise -- that "the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole;" that, therefore, the object "towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development;" that for this there are two requisites, "freedom, and a variety of situations;" and that from the union of these arise "individual vigor and manifold diversity," which combine themselves in "originality."[1]

Little, however, as people are accustomed to a doctrine like that of Von Humboldt, and surprising as it may be to them to find so high a value attached to individuality, the question, one must nevertheless think, can only be one of degree. No one's idea of excellence in conduct is that people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another. No one would assert that people ought not to put into their mode of life, and into the conduct of their concerns, any impress whatever of their own judgment, or of their own individual character. On the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances and character. The traditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience has taught them; presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim to this deference: but, in the first place, their experience

may be too narrow; or they may not have interpreted it rightly. Secondly, their interpretation of experience may be correct but unsuitable to him. Customs are made for customary circumstances, and customary characters: and his circumstances or his character may be uncustomary. Thirdly, though the customs be both good as customs, and suitable to him, yet to conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person's own reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to be weakened by his adopting it: and if the inducements to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his own feelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others are not concerned), it is so much done towards rendering his feelings and character inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic.

He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. Supposing it were possible to get houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes tried, and even churches erected and prayers said, by machinery -- by automatons in human form -- it would be a considerable loss to exchange for these automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the more civilized parts of the world, and who assuredly are but starved specimens of what nature can and will produce. Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.

It will probably be conceded that it is desirable people should exercise their understandings, and that an intelligent following of custom, or even occasionally an

intelligent deviation from custom, is better than a blind and simply mechanical adhesion to it. To a certain extent it is admitted, that our understanding should be our own: but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our own likewise; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any strength, is anything but a peril and a snare. Yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced; when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while others, which ought to coexist with them, remain weak and inactive. It is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their consciences are weak. There is no natural connection between strong impulses and a weak conscience. The natural connection is the other way. To say that one person's desires and feelings are stronger and more various than those of another, is merely to say that he has more of the raw material of human nature, and is therefore capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good. Strong impulses are but another name for energy. Energy may be turned to bad uses; but more good may always be made of an energetic nature, than of an indolent and impassive one. Those who have most natural feeling, are always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. The same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest selfcontrol. It is through the cultivation of these, that society both does its duty and protects its interests: not by rejecting the stuff of which heroes are made, because it knows not how to make them. A person whose desires and impulses are his own -- are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture -- is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his owN, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character. Whoever thinks that individuality of desires and impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself, must maintain that society has no need of strong natures -- is not the better for containing many persons who have much character -- and that a high general average of energy is not desirable.

In some early states of society, these forces might be, and were, too much ahead of the power which society then possessed of disciplining and controlling them. There has been a time when the element of spontaneity and individuality was in excess, and the social principle had a hard struggle with it. The difficulty then was, to induce men of strong bodies or minds to pay obedience to any rules which required them to control their impulses. To overcome this difficulty, law and discipline, like the Popes struggling against the Emperors, asserted a power over the whole man, claiming to control all his life in order to control his character -- which society had not found any other sufficient means of binding. But society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the

deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences. Things are vastly changed, since the passions of those who were strong by station or by personal endowment were in a state of habitual rebellion against laws and ordinances, and required to be rigorously chained up to enable the persons within their reach to enjoy any particle of security. In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only themselves, the individual, or the family, do not ask themselves -- what do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition? or, what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair play, and enable it to grow and thrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse still) what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine? I do not mean that they choose what is customary, in preference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done: peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes: until by dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered and starved: they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own. Now is this, or is it not, the desirable condition of human nature?

It is so, on the Calvinistic theory. According to that, the one great offence of man is Self-will. All the good of which humanity is capable, is comprised in Obedience. You have no choice; thus you must do, and no otherwise; "whatever is not a duty is a sin." Human nature being radically corrupt, there is no redemption for any one until human nature is killed within him. To one holding this theory of life, crushing out any of the human faculties, capacities, and susceptibilities, is no evil: man needs no capacity, but that of surrendering himself to the will of God: and if he uses any of his faculties for any other purpose but to do that supposed will more effectually, he is better without them. That is the theory of Calvinism; and it is held, in a mitigated form, by many who do not consider themselves Calvinists; the mitigation consisting in giving a less ascetic interpretation to the alleged will of God; asserting it to be his will that mankind should gratify some of their inclinations; of course not in the manner they themselves prefer, but in the way of obedience, that is, in a way prescribed to them by authority; and, therefore, by the necessary conditions of the case, the same for all.

In some such insidious form there is at present a strong tendency to this narrow theory of life, and to the pinched and hidebound type of human character which it patronizes. Many persons, no doubt, sincerely think that human beings thus cramped and dwarfed, are as their Maker designed them to be; just as many have thought that trees are a much finer thing when clipped into pollards, or cut

out into figures of animals, than as nature made them. But if it be any part of religion to believe that man was made by a good Being, it is more consistent with that faith to believe, that this Being gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and consumed, and that he takes delight in every nearer approach made by his creatures to the ideal conception embodied in them, every increase in any of their capabilities of comprehension, of action, or of enjoyment. There is a different type of human excellence from the Calvinistic; a conception of humanity as having its nature bestowed on it for other purposes than merely to be abnegated. "Pagan selfassertion" is one of the elements of human worth, as well as "Christian self-denial."[2] There is a Greek ideal of self-development, which the Platonic and Christian ideal of self-government blends with, but does not supersede. It may be better to be a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles than either; nor would a Pericles, if we had one in these days, be without anything good which belonged to John Knox.

It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fulness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them. As much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human development. The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives. In proportion as this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to posterity. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as Individuality exists under it; and whatever crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it may be

called, and whether it professes to be enforcing the will of God or the injunctions of men.

Having said that Individuality is the same thing with development, and that it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings, I might here close the argument: for what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this? Doubtless, however, these considerations will not suffice to convince those who most need convincing; and it is necessary further to show, that these developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped -- to point out to those who do not desire liberty, and would not avail themselves of it, that they may be in some intelligible manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance.

In the first place, then, I would suggest that they might possibly learn something from them. It will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human affairs. There is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life. This cannot well be gainsaid by anybody who does not believe that the world has already attained perfection in all its ways and practices. It is true that this benefit is not capable of being rendered by everybody alike: there are but few persons, in comparison with the whole of mankind, whose experiments, if adopted by others, would be likely to be any improvement on established practice. But these few are the salt of the earth; without them, human life would become a stagnant pool. Not only is it they who introduce good things which did not before exist; it is they who keep the life in those which already existed. If there were nothing new to be done, would human intellect cease to be necessary? Would it be a reason why those who do the old things should forget why they are done, and do them like cattle, not like human beings? There is only too great a tendency in the best beliefs and practices to degenerate into the mechanical; and unless there were a succession of persons whose ever-recurring originality prevents the grounds of those beliefs and practices from becoming merely traditional, such dead matter would not resist the smallest shock from anything really alive, and there would be no reason why civilization should not die out, as in the Byzantine Empire. Persons of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but in order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow. Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom. Persons of genius are, ex vi termini, more individual than any other people -- less capable, consequently, of fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the small number of moulds which society provides in order to save its members the trouble of forming their own character. If from timidity they consent to be forced into one of these moulds, and to let all that part of themselves which cannot expand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will be little the

better for their genius. If they are of a strong character, and break their fetters they become a mark for the society which has not succeeded in reducing them to common-place, to point at with solemn warning as "wild," "erratic," and the like; much as if one should complain of the Niagara river for not flowing smoothly between its banks like a Dutch canal.

I insist thus emphatically on the importance of genius, and the necessity of allowing it to unfold itself freely both in thought and in practice, being well aware that no one will deny the position in theory, but knowing also that almost every one, in reality, is totally indifferent to it. People think genius a fine thing if it enables a man to write an exciting poem, or paint a picture. But in its true sense, that of originality in thought and action, though no one says that it is not a thing to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think they can do very well without it. Unhappily this is too natural to be wondered at. Originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of. They cannot see what it is to do for them: how should they? If they could see what it would do for them, it would not be originality. The first service which originality has to render them, is that of opening their eyes: which being once fully done, they would have a chance of being themselves original. Meanwhile, recollecting that nothing was ever yet done which some one was not the first to do, and that all good things which exist are the fruits of originality, let them be modest enough to believe that there is something still left for it to accomplish, and assure themselves that they are more in need of originality, the less they are conscious of the want.

In sober truth, whatever homage may be professed, or even paid, to real or supposed mental superiority, the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind. In ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself; and If he had either great talents or a high social position, he was a considerable power. At present individuals are lost in the crowd. In politics it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world. The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses. This is as true in the moral and social relations of private life as in public transactions. Those whose opinions go by the name of public opinion, are not always the same sort of public: in America, they are the whole white population; in England, chiefly the middle class. But they are always a mass, that is to say, collective mediocrity. And what is still greater novelty, the mass do not now take their opinions from dignitaries in Church or State, from ostensible leaders, or from books. Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers. I am not complaining of all this. I do not assert that anything better is compatible, as a general rule, with the present low state of the human mind. But that does not hinder the government of mediocrity from being

mediocre government. No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed One or Few. The initiation of all wise or noble things, comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one individual. The honor and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open. I am not countenancing the sort of "hero-worship" which applauds the strong man of genius for forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of itself. All he can claim is, freedom to point out the way. The power of compelling others into it, is not only inconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest, but corrupting to the strong man himself. It does seem, however, that when the opinions of masses of merely average men are everywhere become or becoming the dominant power, the counterpoise and corrective to that tendency would be, the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought. It Is in these circumstances most especially, that exceptional individuals, instead of being deterred, should be encouraged in acting differently from the mass. In other times there was no advantage in their doing so, unless they acted not only differently, but better. In this age the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. Eccentricity has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded; and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius, mental vigor, and moral courage which it contained. That so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time.

I have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that it may in time appear which of these are fit to be converted into customs. But independence of action, and disregard of custom are not solely deserving of encouragement for the chance they afford that better modes of action, and customs more worthy of general adoption, may be struck out; nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own way. There is no reason that all human existences should be constructed on some one, or some small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode. Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike. A man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him, unless they are either made to his measure, or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from: and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat, or are human beings more like one another in their whole physical and spiritual conformation than in the

shape of their feet? If it were only that people have diversities of taste that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model. But different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical atmosphere and climate. The same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to another. The same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in their best order, while to another it is a distracting burden, which suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable. Why then should tolerance, as far as the public sentiment is concerned, extend only to tastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by the multitude of their adherents? Nowhere (except in some monastic institutions) is diversity of taste entirely unrecognized; a person may without blame, either like or dislike rowing, or smoking, or music, or athletic exercises, or chess, or cards, or study, because both those who like each of these things, and those who dislike them, are too numerous to be put down. But the man, and still more the woman, who can be accused either of doing "what nobody does," or of not doing "what everybody does," is the subject of as much depreciatory remark as if he or she had committed some grave moral delinquency. Persons require to possess a title, or some other badge of rank, or the consideration of people of rank, to be able to indulge somewhat in the luxury of doing as they like without detriment to their estimation. To indulge somewhat, I repeat: for whoever allow themselves much of that in dulgence, incur the risk of something worse than disparaging speeches -- they are in peril of a commission de lunatico, and of having their property taken from them and given to their relations.[3]

There is one characteristic of the present direction of public opinion, peculiarly calculated to make it intolerant of any marked demonstration of individuality. The general average of mankind are not only moderate in intellect, but also moderate in inclinations: they have no tastes or wishes strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual, and they consequently do not understand those who have, and class all such with the wild and intemperate whom they are accustomed to look down upon. Now, in addition to this fact which is general, we have only to suppose that a strong movement has set in towards the improvement of morals, and it is evident what we have to expect. In these days such a movement has set in; much has actually been effected in the way of increased regularity of conduct, and discouragement of excesses; and there is a philanthropic spirit abroad, for the exercise of which there is no more inviting field than the moral and prudential improvement of our fellow-creatures. These tendencies of the times cause the public to be more disposed than at most former periods to prescribe

general rules of conduct, and endeavor to make every one conform to the approved standard. And that standard, express or tacit, is to desire nothing strongly. Its ideal of character is to be without any marked character; to maim by compression, like a Chinese lady's foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to commonplace humanity.

As is usually the case with ideals which exclude one half of what is desirable, the present standard of approbation produces only an inferior imitation of the other half. Instead of great energies guided by vigorous reason, and strong feelings strongly controlled by a conscientious will, its result is weak feelings and weak energies, which therefore can be kept in outward conformity to rule without any strength either of will or of reason. Already energetic characters on any large scale are becoming merely traditional. There is now scarcely any outlet for energy in this country except business. The energy expended in that may still be regarded as considerable. What little is left from that employment, is expended on some hobby; which may be a useful, even a philanthropic hobby, but is always some one thing, and generally a thing of small dimensions. The greatness of England is now all collective: individually small, we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining; and with this our moral and religious philanthropists are perfectly contented. But it was men of another stamp than this that made England what it has been; and men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its decline.

The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement. The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals. The progressive principle, however, in either shape, whether as the love of liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving at least emancipation from that yoke; and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. The greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of Custom is complete. This is the case over the whole East. Custom is there, in all things, the final appeal; Justice and right mean conformity to custom; the argument of custom no one, unless some tyrant intoxicated with power, thinks of resisting. And we see the result. Those nations must once have had originality; they did not start out of the ground populous, lettered, and versed in many of the arts of life; they made themselves all this, and were then the greatest and most powerful nations in the world. What are they now? The subjects or dependents of tribes whose forefathers

wandered in the forests when theirs had magnificent palaces and gorgeous temples, but over whom custom exercised only a divided rule with liberty and progress. A people, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and then stop: when does it stop? When it ceases to possess individuality. If a similar change should befall the nations of Europe, it will not be in exactly the same shape: the despotism of custom with which these nations are threatened is not precisely stationariness. It proscribes singularity, but it does not preclude change, provided all change together. We have discarded the fixed costumes of our forefathers; every one must still dress like other people, but the fashion may change once or twice a year. We thus take care that when there is change, it shall be for change's sake, and not from any idea of beauty or convenience; for the same idea of beauty or convenience would not strike all the world at the same moment, and be simultaneously thrown aside by all at another moment. But we are progressive as well as changeable: we continually make new inventions in mechanical things, and keep them until they are again superseded by better; we are eager for improvement in politics, in education, even in morals, though in this last our idea of improvement chiefly consists in persuading or forcing other people to be as good as ourselves. It is not progress that we object to; on the contrary, we flatter ourselves that we are the most progressive people who ever lived. It is individuality that we war against: we should think we had done wonders if we had made ourselves all alike; forgetting that the unlikeness of one person to another is generally the first thing which draws the attention of either to the imperfection of his own type, and the superiority of another, or the possibility, by combining the advantages of both, of producing something better than either. We have a warning example in China -- a nation of much talent, and, in some respects, even wisdom, owing to the rare good fortune of having been provided at an early period with a particularly good set of customs, the work, in some measure, of men to whom even the most enlightened European must accord, under certain limitations, the title of sages and philosophers. They are remarkable, too, in the excellence of their apparatus for impressing, as far as possible, the best wisdom they possess upon every mind in the community, and securing that those who have appropriated most of it shall occupy the posts of honor and power. Surely the people who did this have discovered the secret of human progressiveness, and must have kept themselves steadily at the head of the movement of the world. On the contrary, they have become stationary -- have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners. They have succeeded beyond all hope in what English philanthropists are so industriously working at -- in making a people all alike, all governing their thoughts and conduct by the same maxims and rules; and these are the fruits. The modern regime of public opinion is, in an unorganized form, what the Chinese educational and political systems are in an organized; and unless individuality shall be able successfully to assert itself against this yoke, Europe, notwithstanding its noble antecedents and its professed Christianity, will tend to become another China.

What is it that has hitherto preserved Europe from this lot? What has made the European family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of mankind? Not any superior excellence in them, which when it exists, exists as the effect, not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character and culture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another: they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable; and although at every period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road, their attempts to thwart each other's development have rarely had any permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good which the others have offered. Europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided development. But it already begins to possess this benefit in a considerably less degree. It is decidedly advancing towards the Chinese ideal of making all people alike. M. de Tocqueville, in his last important work, remarks how much more the Frenchmen of the present day resemble one another, than did those even of the last generation. The same remark might be made of Englishmen in a far greater degree. In a passage already quoted from Wilhelm von Humboldt, he points out two things as necessary conditions of human development, because necessary to render people unlike one another; namely, freedom, and variety of situations. The second of these two conditions is in this country every day diminishing. The circumstances which surround different classes and individuals, and shape their characters, are daily becoming more assimilated. Formerly, different ranks, different neighborhoods, different trades and professions lived in what might be called different worlds; at present, to a great degree, in the same. Comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, listen to the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the same rights and liberties, and the same means of asserting them. Great as are the differences of position which remain, they are nothing to those which have ceased. And the assimilation is still proceeding. All the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high. Every extension of education promotes it, because education brings people under common influences, and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvements in the means of communication promote it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact, and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another. The increase of commerce and manufactures promotes it, by diffusing more widely the advantages of easy circumstances, and opening all objects of ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the desire of rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class, but of all classes. A more powerful agency than even all these, in bringing about a general similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and other free countries, of the ascendancy of public opinion in the State. As the various social eminences which enabled persons entrenched on them to disregard the opinion of the multitude, gradually

became levelled; as the very idea of resisting the will of the public, when it is positively known that they have a will, disappears more and more from the minds of practical politicians; there ceases to be any social support for non-conformity -- any substantive power in society, which, itself opposed to the ascendancy of numbers, is interested in taking under its protection opinions and tendencies at variance with those of the public.

The combination of all these causes forms so great a mass of influences hostile to Individuality, that it is not easy to see how it can stand its ground. It will do so with increasing difficulty, unless the intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value -- to see that it is good there should be differences, even though not for the better, even though, as it may appear to them, some should be for the worse. If the claims of Individuality are ever to be asserted, the time is now, while much is still wanting to complete the enforced assimilation. It is only in the earlier stages that any stand can be successfully made against the encroachment. The demand that all other people shall resemble ourselves, grows by what it feeds on. If resistance waits till life is reduced nearly to one uniform type, all deviations from that type will come to be considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. Mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it.

[1] The Sphere and Duties of Government, from the German of Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, pp. 11-13.

[2] Sterling's Essays.

[3] There is something both contemptible and frightful in the sort of evidence on which, of late years, any person can be judicially declared unfit for the management of his affairs; and after his death, his disposal of his property can be set aside, if there is enough of it to pay the expenses of litigation -- which are charged on the property itself. All of the minute details of his daily life are pried into, and whatever is found which, seen through the medium of the perceiving and escribing faculties of the lowest of the low, bears an appearance unlike absolute commonplace, is laid before the jury as evidence of insanity, and often with success; the jurors being little, if at all, less vulgar and ignorant than the witnesses; while the judges, with that extraordinary want of knowledge of human nature and life which continually astonishes us in English lawyers, often help to mislead them. These trials speak volumes as to the state of feeling and opinion among the vulgar with regard to human liberty. So far from setting any value on individuality -- so far from respecting the rights of each individual to act, in things indifferent, as seems good to his own judgment and inclinations, judges and juries cannot even conceive that a person in a state of sanity can desire such freedom. In former days, when it was proposed to burn atheists, charitable people used to suggest putting them in a madhouse instead: it would be nothing surprising now-a-days were we to see this done, and the doers applauding themselves, because, instead of persecuting

for religion, they had adopted so humane and Christian a mode of treating these unfortunates, not without a silent satisfaction at their having thereby obtained their deserts.

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Chapter IV: Of The Limits To The Authority Of Society Over The Individual

WHAT, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?

Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularly concerns it. To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society.

Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all costs to those who endeavor to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.

It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine, to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But

disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social. It is equally the business of education to cultivate both. But even education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated. Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They should be forever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations. But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested in his own well-being, the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else. The interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, Individuality has its proper field of action. In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but in each person's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others; but he, himself, is the final judge. All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.

I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others, ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desirable. If he is eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object of admiration. He is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature. If he is grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the opposite of admiration will follow. There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called (though the phrase is not unobjectionable) lowness or depravation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject

of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt: a person could not have the opposite qualities in due strength without entertaining these feelings. Though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. It would be well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than the common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person could honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without being considered unmannerly or presuming. We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavorable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit -- who cannot live within moderate means -- who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences -- who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect -- must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favorable sentiments, but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited their favor by special excellence in his social relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not affected by his demerits towards himself.

What I contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavorable judgment of others, are the only ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which concerns his own good, but which does not affect the interests of others in their relations with him. Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment. Encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights; falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury -- these are fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment. And not only these acts, but the dispositions which lead to them, are properly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence. Cruelty of disposition; malice and ill-nature; that most anti-social and odious of all passions, envy; dissimulation and insincerity, irascibility on insufficient cause, and

resentment disproportioned to the provocation; the love of domineering over others; the desire to engross more than one's share of advantages (the [greekword] of the Greeks); the pride which derives gratification from the abasement of others; the egotism which thinks self and its concerns more important than everything else, and decides all doubtful questions in his own favor; -- these are moral vices, and constitute a bad and odious moral character: unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness. They may be proofs of any amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and self-respect; but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for himself. What are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatory, unless circumstances render them at the same time duties to others. The term duty to oneself, when it means anything more than prudence, means self-respect or self-development; and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow-creatures, because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable to them.

The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the reprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of others, is not a merely nominal distinction. It makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him, whether he displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to control him, or in things in which we know that we have not. If he displeases us, we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable. We shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error; if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still further: instead of wishing to punish him, we shall rather endeavor to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be to us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy of society: the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, If we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for him. It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively. The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he is an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, in one shape or another, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow from our using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him in his.

The distinction here pointed out between the part of a

person's life which concerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many persons will refuse to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If he deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes to his fellow-creatures generally; perhaps becomes a burden on their affection or benevolence; and if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any offence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of good. Finally, if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example; and ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead.

And even (it will be added) if the consequences of misconduct could be confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to abandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it? If protection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons under age, is not society equally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who are equally incapable of self-government? If gambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as injurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many or most of the acts prohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should not law, so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience, endeavor to repress these also? And as a supplement to the unavoidable imperfections of law, ought not opinion at least to organize a powerful police against these vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties those who are known to practise them? There is no question here (it may be said) about restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new and original experiments in living. The only things it is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world until now; things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality. There must be some length of time and amount of experience, after which a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as established, and it is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors.

I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself, may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearly connected with him, and in a minor degree, society at large. When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to

moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term. If, for example, a man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them, he is deservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for the breach of duty to his family or creditors, not for the extravagence. If the resources which ought to have been devoted to them, had been diverted from them for the most prudent investment, the moral culpability would have been the same. George Barnwell murdered his uncle to get money for his mistress, but if he had done it to set himself up in business, he would equally have been hanged. Again, in the frequent case of a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits, he deserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude; but so he may for cultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to those with whom he passes his life, or who from personal ties are dependent on him for their comfort. Whoever fails in the consideration generally due to the interests and feelings of others, not being compelled by some more imperative duty, or justified by allowable self-preference, is a subject of moral disapprobation for that failure, but not for the cause of it, nor for the errors, merely personal to himself, which may have remotely led to it. In like manner, when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is guilty of a social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.

But with regard to the merely contingent or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom. If grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it were for their own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity of rendering to society benefits which society does not pretend it has a right to exact. But I cannot consent to argue the point as if society had no means of bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary standard of rational conduct, except waiting till they do something irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally, for it. Society has had absolute power over them during all the early portion of their existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in life. The existing generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always, in individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to make the rising generation, as a whole, as good as,

and a little better than, itself. If society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences. Armed not only with all the powers of education, but with the ascendency which the authority of a received opinion always exercises over the minds who are least fitted to judge for themselves; and aided by the natural penalties which cannot be prevented from falling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who know them; let not society pretend that it needs, besides all this, the power to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal concerns of individuals, in which, on all principles of justice and policy, the decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences. Nor is there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the better means of influencing conduct, than a resort to the worse. If there be among those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance, any of the material of which vigorous and independent characters are made, they will infallibly rebel against the yoke. No such person will ever feel that others have a right to control him in his concerns, such as they have to prevent him from injuring them in theirs; and it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority, and do with ostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins; as in the fashion of grossness which succeeded, in the time of Charles II., to the fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans. With respect to what is said of the necessity of protecting society from the bad example set to others by the vicious or the self-indulgent; it is true that bad example may have a pernicious effect, especially the example of doing wrong to others with impunity to the wrong-doer. But we are now speaking of conduct which, while it does no wrong to others, is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself: and I do not see how those who believe this, can think otherwise than that the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful, since, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful or degrading consequences which, if the conduct is justly censured, must be supposed to be in all or most cases attendant on it.

But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. On questions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the public, that is, of an overruling majority, though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener right; because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests; of the manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affect themselves. But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as likely to be wrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at the best, some people's opinion of what is good or bad for other people; while very often it does not even mean that; the public, with the most perfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, and considering only their own

preference. There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse. It is easy for any one to imagine an ideal public, which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstain from modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned. But where has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its censorship? or when does the public trouble itself about universal experience. In its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself; and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy, by nine tenths of all moralists and speculative writers. These teach that things are right because they are right; because we feel them to be so. They tell us to search in our own minds and hearts for laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others. What can the poor public do but apply these instructions, and make their own personal feelings of good and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world?

The evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory; and it may perhaps be expected that I should specify the instances in which the public of this age and country improperly invests its own preferences with the character of moral laws. I am not writing an essay on the aberrations of existing moral feeling. That is too weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically, and by way of illustration. Yet examples are necessary, to show that the principle I maintain is of serious and practical moment, and that I am not endeavoring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils. And it is not difficult to show, by abundant instances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called moral police, until it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities.

As a first instance, consider the antipathies which men cherish on no better grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are different from theirs, do not practise their religious observances, especially their religious abstinences. To cite a rather trivial example, nothing in the creed or practice of Christians does more to envenom the hatred of Mahomedans against them, than the fact of their eating pork. There are few acts which Christians and Europeans regard with more unaffected disgust, than Mussulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying hunger. It is, in the first place, an offence against their religion; but this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or the kind of their repugnance; for wine also is

forbidden by their religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong, but not disgusting. Their aversion to the flesh of the "unclean beast" is, on the contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, which the idea of uncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks into the feelings, seems always to excite even in those whose personal habits are anything but scrupulously cleanly and of which the sentiment of religious impurity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remarkable example. Suppose now that in a people, of whom the majority were Mussulmans, that majority should insist upon not permitting pork to be eaten within the limits of the country. This would be nothing new in Mahomedan countries.[1] Would it be a legitimate exercise of the moral authority of public opinion? and if not, why not? The practice is really revolting to such a public. They also sincerely think that it is forbidden and abhorred by the Deity. Neither could the prohibition be censured as religious persecution. It might be religious in its origin, but it would not be persecution for religion, since nobody's religion makes it a duty to eat pork. The only tenable ground of condemnation would be, that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere.

To come somewhat nearer home: the majority of Spaniards consider it a gross impiety, offensive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being, to worship him in any other manner than the Roman Catholic; and no other public worship is lawful on Spanish soil. The people of all Southern Europe look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious, but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgusting. What do Protestants think of these perfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against non-Catholics? Yet, if mankind are justified in interfering with each other's liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possible consistently to exclude these cases? or who can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of God and man?

No stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who regard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves.

The preceding instances may be objected to, although unreasonably, as drawn from contingencies impossible among us: opinion, in this country, not being likely to enforce abstinence from meats, or to interfere with people for worshipping, and for either marrying or not marrying, according to their creed or inclination. The next example, however, shall be taken from an interference with liberty which we have by no means passed all danger of. Wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently powerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at the time of the Commonwealth, they

have endeavored, with considerable success, to put down all public, and nearly all private, amusements: especially music, dancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and the theatre. There are still in this country large bodies of persons by whose notions of morality and religion these recreations are condemned; and those persons belonging chiefly to the middle class, who are the ascendant power in the present social and political condition of the kingdom, it is by no means impossible that persons of these sentiments may at some time or other command a majority in Parliament. How will the remaining portion of the community like to have the amusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of the stricter Calvinists and Methodists? Would they not, with considerable peremptoriness, desire these intrusively pious members of society to mind their own business? This is precisely what should be said to every government and every public, who have the pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong. But if the principle of the pretension be admitted, no one can reasonably object to its being acted on in the sense of the majority, or other preponderating power in the country; and all persons must be ready to conform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by the early settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to theirs should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground, as religions supposed to be declining have so often been known to do.

To imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realized than the one last mentioned. There is confessedly a strong tendency in the modern world towards a democratic constitution of society, accompanied or not by popular political institutions. It is affirmed that in the country where this tendency is most completely realized -- where both society and the government are most democratic -- the United States -- the feeling of the majority, to whom any appearance of a more showy or costly style of living than they can hope to rival is disagreeable, operates as a tolerably effectual sumptuary law, and that in many parts of the Union it is really difficult for a person possessing a very large income, to find any mode of spending it, which will not incur popular disapprobation. Though such statements as these are doubtless much exaggerated as a representation of existing facts, the state of things they describe is not only a conceivable and possible, but a probable result of democratic feeling, combined with the notion that the public has a right to a veto on the manner in which individuals shall spend their incomes. We have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion of Socialist opinions, and it may become infamous in the eyes of the majority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any income not earned by manual labor. Opinions similar in principle to these, already prevail widely among the artisan class, and weigh oppressively on those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that class, namely, its own members. It is known that the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry, are decidedly of opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as good, and that no one ought to be allowed, through piecework or otherwise, to earn by superior skill or

industry more than others can without it. And they employ a moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one, to deter skilful workmen from receiving, and employers from giving, a larger remuneration for a more useful service. If the public have any jurisdiction over private concerns, I cannot see that these people are in fault, or that any individual's particular public can be blamed for asserting the same authority over his individual conduct, which the general public asserts over people in general.

But, without dwelling upon supposititious cases, there are, in our own day, gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practised, and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of success, and opinions proposed which assert an unlimited right in the public not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but in order to get at what it thinks wrong, to prohibit any number of things which it admits to be innocent.

Under the name of preventing intemperance the people of one English colony, and of nearly half the United States, have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical purposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of their use. And though the impracticability of executing the law has caused its repeal in several of the States which had adopted it, including the one from which it derives its name, an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate for a similar law in this country. The association, or "Alliance" as it terms itself, which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some notoriety through the publicity given to a correspondence between its Secretary and one of the very few English public men who hold that a politician's opinions ought to be founded on principles. Lord Stanley's share in this correspondence is calculated to strengthen the hopes already built on him, by those who know how rare such qualities as are manifested in some of his public appearances, unhappily are among those who figure in political life. The organ of the Alliance, who would "deeply deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested to justify bigotry and persecution," undertakes to point out the "broad and impassable barrier" which divides such principles from those of the association. "All matters relating to thought, opinion, conscience, appear to me," he says, "to be without the sphere of legislation; all pertaining to social act, habit, relation, subject only to a discretionary power vested in the State itself, and not in the individual, to be within it." No mention is made of a third class, different from either of these, viz., acts and habits which are not social, but individual; although it is to this class, surely, that the act of drinking fermented liquors belongs. Selling fermented liquors, however, is trading, and trading is a social act. But the infringement complained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the buyer and consumer; since the State might just as well forbid him to drink wine, as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it. The Secretary, however, says, "I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by the

social act of another." And now for the definition of these "social rights." "If anything invades my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It destroys my primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating social disorder. It invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery, I am taxed to support. It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralizing society, from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse." A theory of "social rights," the like of which probably never before found its way into distinct language -- being nothing short of this -- that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest particular, violates my social right, and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them; for the moment an opinion which I consider noxious, passes any one's lips, it invades all the "social rights" attributed to me by the Alliance. The doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard.

Another important example of illegitimate interference with the rightful liberty of the individual, not simply threatened, but long since carried into triumphant effect, is Sabbatarian legislation. Without doubt, abstinence on one day in the week, so far as the exigencies of life permit, from the usual daily occupation, though in no respect religiously binding on any except Jews, is a highly beneficial custom. And inasmuch as this custom cannot be observed without a general consent to that effect among the industrious classes, therefore, in so far as some persons by working may impose the same necessity on others, it may be allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each, the observance by others of the custom, by suspending the greater operations of industry on a particular day. But this justification, grounded on the direct interest which others have in each individual's observance of the practice, does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in which a person may think fit to employ his leisure; nor does it hold good, in the smallest degree, for legal restrictions on amusements. It is true that the amusement of some is the day's work of others; but the pleasure, not to say the useful recreation, of many, is worth the labor of a few, provided the occupation is freely chosen, and can be freely resigned. The operatives are perfectly right in thinking that if all worked on Sunday, seven days' work would have to be given for six days' wages: but so long as the great mass of employments are suspended, the small number who for the enjoyment of others must still work, obtain a proportional increase of earnings; and they are not obliged to follow those occupations, if they prefer leisure to emolument. If a further remedy is sought, it might be found in the

establishment by custom of a holiday on some other day of the week for those particular classes of persons. The only ground, therefore, on which restrictions on Sunday amusements can be defended, must be that they are religiously wrong; a motive of legislation which never can be too earnestly protested against. "Deorum injuriae Diis curae." It remains to be proved that society or any of its officers holds a commission from on high to avenge any supposed offence to Omnipotence, which is not also a wrong to our fellow-creatures. The notion that it is one man's duty that another should be religious, was the foundation of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated, and if admitted, would fully justify them. Though the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to stop railway travelling on Sunday, in the resistance to the opening of Museums, and the like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the state of mind indicated by it is fundamentally the same. It IS a determination not to tolerate others in doing what is permitted by their religion, because it is not permitted by the persecutor's religion. It is a belief that God not only abominates the act of the misbeliever, but will not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested.

I cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account commonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country, whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism. Much might be said on the unexpected and instructive fact, that an alleged new revelation, and a religion, founded on it, the product of palpable imposture, not even supported by the prestige of extraordinary qualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands, and has been made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers, railways, and the electric telegraph. What here concerns us is, that this religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs; that its prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob; that others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawless violence; that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country in which they first grew up; while, now that they have been chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly declare that it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send an expedition against them, and compel them by force to conform to the opinions of other people. The article of the Mormonite doctrine which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the ordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy; which, though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Chinese, seems to excite unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak English, and profess to be a kind of Christians. No one has a deeper disapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution; both for other reasons, and because, far from being in any way countenanced by the principle of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that principle, being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them. Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and who

may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its explanation in the common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that many a woman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a wife at all. Other countries are not asked to recognize such unions, or release any portion of their inhabitants from their own laws on the score of Mormonite opinions. But when the dissentients have conceded to the hostile sentiments of others, far more than could justly be demanded; when they have left the countries to which their doctrines were unacceptable, and established themselves in a remote corner of the earth, which they have been the first to render habitable to human beings; it is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living there under what laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways. A recent writer, in some respects of considerable merit, proposes (to use his own words,) not a crusade, but a civilizade, against this polygamous community, to put an end to what seems to him a retrograde step in civilization. It also appears so to me, but I am not aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilized. So long as the sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities, I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant, who have no part or concern in it. Let them send missionaries, if they please, to preach against it; and let them, by any fair means, (of which silencing the teachers is not one,) oppose the progress of similar doctrines among their own people. If civilization has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive and conquer civilization. A civilization that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such a civilization receives notice to quit, the better. It can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated (like the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians.

[1] The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point. When this industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of the Persian fireworshippers, flying from their native country before the Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were admitted to toleration by the Hindoo sovereigns, on condition of not eating beef. When those regions afterwards fell under the dominion of Mahomedan conquerors, the Parsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condition of refraining from pork. What was at first obedience to authority became a second nature, and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork. Though not required by their religion, the

double abstinence has had time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the East, is a religion.

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Chapter V: Applications

THE principles asserted in these pages must be more generally admitted as the basis for discussion of details, before a consistent application of them to all the various departments of government and morals can be attempted with any prospect of advantage. The few observations I propose to make on questions of detail, are designed to illustrate the principles, rather than to follow them out to their consequences. I offer, not so much applications, as specimens of application; which may serve to bring into greater clearness the meaning and limits of the two maxims which together form the entire doctrine of this Essay and to assist the judgment in holding the balance between them, in the cases where it appears doubtful which of them is applicable to the case.

The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people, if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.

In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit -- namely, fraud or treachery, and force.

Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to

sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society: accordingly, it was once held to be the duty of governments, in all cases which were considered of importance, to fix prices, and regulate the processes of manufacture. But it is now recognized, though not till after a long struggle, that both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil: but the restraints in question affect only that part of conduct which society is competent to restrain, and are wrong solely because they do not really produce the results which it is desired to produce by them. As the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of Free Trade so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits of that doctrine: as for example, what amount of public control is admissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration; how far sanitary precautions, or arrangements to protect work-people employed in dangerous occupations, should be enforced on employers. Such questions involve considerations of liberty, only in so far as leaving people to themselves is always better, caeteris paribus, than controlling them: but that they may be legitimately controlled for these ends, is in principle undeniable. On the other hand, there are questions relating to interference with trade which are essentially questions of liberty; such as the Maine Law, already touched upon; the prohibition of the importation of opium into China; the restriction of the sale of poisons; all cases, in short, where the object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. These interferences are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on that of the buyer.

One of these examples, that of the sale of poisons, opens a new question; the proper limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident. It is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. The preventive function of government, however, is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, or even a private person, sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent it. If poisons were never bought or used for any purpose except the commission of murder, it would be right to prohibit their

manufacture and sale. They may, however, be wanted not only for innocent but for useful purposes, and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case without operating in the other. Again, it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore, (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty,) he ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it. Similar considerations, applied to such a question as the sale of poisons, may enable us to decide which among the possible modes of regulation are or are not contrary to principle. Such a precaution, for example, as that of labelling the drug with some word expressive of its dangerous character, may be enforced without violation of liberty: the buyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous qualities. But to require in all cases the certificate of a medical practitioner, would make it sometimes impossible, always expensive, to obtain the article for legitimate uses. The only mode apparent to me, in which difficulties may be thrown in the way of crime committed through this means, without any infringement, worth taking into account, Upon the liberty of those who desire the poisonous substance for other purposes, consists in providing what, in the apt language of Bentham, is called "preappointed evidence." This provision is familiar to every one in the case of contracts. It is usual and right that the law, when a contract is entered into, should require as the condition of its enforcing performance, that certain formalities should be observed, such as signatures, attestation of witnesses, and the like, in order that in case of subsequent dispute, there may be evidence to prove that the contract was really entered into, and that there was nothing in the circumstances to render it legally invalid: the effect being, to throw great obstacles in the way of fictitious contracts, or contracts made in circumstances which, if known, would destroy their validity. Precautions of a similar nature might be enforced in the sale of articles adapted to be instruments of crime. The seller, for example, might be required to enter in a register the exact time of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quality and quantity sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he received. When there was no medical prescription, the presence of some third person might be required, to bring home the fact to the purchaser, in case there should afterwards be reason to believe that the article had been applied to criminal purposes. Such regulations would in general be no material impediment to obtaining the article, but a very considerable one to making an improper use of it without detection.

The right inherent in society, to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of prevention or punishment. Drunkennesses, for example, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject for legislative interference; but I should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and that if when in that state he committed another offence, the punishment to which he would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity. The making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. So, again, idleness, except in a person receiving support from the public, or except when it constitutes a breach of contract, cannot without tyranny be made a subject of legal punishment; but if either from idleness or from any other avoidable cause, a man fails to perform his legal duties to others, as for instance to support his children, it is no tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory labor, if no other means are available.

Again, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offences against others, may rightfully be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency; on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only connected indirectly with our subject, the objection to publicity being equally strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor supposed to be so.

There is another question to which an answer must be found, consistent with the principles which have been laid down. In cases of personal conduct supposed to be blameable, but which respect for liberty precludes society from preventing or punishing, because the evil directly resulting falls wholly on the agent; what the agent is free to do, ought other persons to be equally free to counsel or instigate? This question is not free from difficulty. The case of a person who solicits another to do an act, is not strictly a case of self-regarding conduct. To give advice or offer inducements to any one, is a social act, and may therefore, like actions in general which affect others, be supposed amenable to social control. But a little reflection corrects the first impression, by showing that if the case is not strictly within the definition of individual liberty, yet the reasons on which the principle of individual liberty is grounded, are applicable to it. If people must be allowed, in whatever concerns only themselves, to act as seems best to themselves at their own peril, they must equally be free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; to exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions. Whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do. The question is doubtful, only when the instigator derives a personal benefit from his advice; when he makes it his occupation, for subsistence, or

pecuniary gain, to promote what society and the State consider to be an evil. Then, indeed, a new element of complication is introduced; namely, the existence of classes of persons with an interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal, and whose mode of living is grounded on the counteraction of it. Ought this to be interfered with, or not? Fornication, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling; but should a person be free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling-house? The case is one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two principles, and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs. There are arguments on both sides. On the side of toleration it may be said, that the fact of following anything as an occupation, and living or profiting by the practice of it, cannot make that criminal which would otherwise be admissible; that the act should either be consistently permitted or consistently prohibited; that if the principles which we have hitherto defended are true, society has no business, as society, to decide anything to be wrong which concerns only the individual; that it cannot go beyond dissuasion, and that one person should be as free to persuade, as another to dissuade. In opposition to this it may be contended, that although the public, or the State, are not warranted in authoritatively deciding, for purposes of repression or punishment, that such or such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad, they are fully justified in assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its being so or not is at least a disputable question: That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial -- who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only. There can surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good, by so ordering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely or foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own. Thus (it may be said) though the statutes respecting unlawful games are utterly indefensible -- though all persons should be free to gamble in their own or each other's houses, or in any place of meeting established by their own subscriptions, and open only to the members and their visitors -- yet public gambling-houses should not be permitted. It is true that the prohibition is never effectual, and that whatever amount of tyrannical power is given to the police, gamblinghouses can always be maintained under other pretences; but they may be compelled to conduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy and mystery, so that nobody knows anything about them but those who seek them; and more than this society ought not to aim at. There is considerable force in these arguments. I will not venture to decide whether they are sufficient to justify the moral anomaly of punishing the accessary, when the principal is (and must be) allowed to go free; of fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not the fornicator, the gambling-house keeper, but not the gambler. Still less ought the common operations of buying and selling to be interfered with on analogous grounds. Almost every article which is bought and

sold may be used in excess, and the sellers have a pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess; but no argument can be founded on this, in favor, for instance, of the Maine Law; because the class of dealers in strong drinks, though interested in their abuse, are indispensably required for the sake of their legitimate use. The interest, however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance is a real evil, and justifies the State in imposing restrictions and requiring guarantees, which but for that justification would be infringements of legitimate liberty.

A further question is, whether the State while it permits, should nevertheless indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests of the agent; whether, for example, it should take measures to render the means of drunkenness more costly, or add to the difficulty of procuring them, by limiting the number of the places of sale. On this as on most other practical questions, many distinctions require to be made. To tax stimulants for the sole purpose of making them more difficult to be obtained, is a measure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition; and would be justifiable only if that were justifiable. Every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste. Their choice of pleasures, and their mode of expending their income, after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to individuals, are their own concern, and must rest with their own judgment. These considerations may seem at first sight to condemn the selection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation for purposes of revenue. But it must be remembered that taxation for fiscal purposes is absolutely inevitable; that in most countries it is necessary that a considerable part of that taxation should be indirect; that the State, therefore, cannot help imposing penalties, which to some persons may be prohibitory, on the use of some articles of consumption. It is hence the duty of the State to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what commodities the consumers can best spare; and a fortiori, to select in preference those of which it deems the use, beyond a very moderate quantity, to be positively injurious. Taxation, therefore, of stimulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing that the State needs all the revenue which it yields) is not only admissible, but to be approved of.

The question of making the sale of these commodities a more or less exclusive privilege, must be answered differently, according to the purposes to which the restriction is intended to be subservient. All places of public resort require the restraint of a police, and places of this kind peculiarly, because offences against society are especially apt to originate there. It is, therefore, fit to confine the power of selling these commodities (at least for consumption on the spot) to persons of known or vouched-for respectability of conduct; to make such regulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite for public surveillance, and to withdraw the license if breaches of the peace repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing

offences against the law. Any further restriction I do not conceive to be, in principle, justifiable. The limitation in number, for instance, of beer and spirit-houses, for the express purpose of rendering them more difficult of access, and diminishing the occasions of temptation, not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there are some by whom the facility would be abused, but is suited only to a state of society in which the laboring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages, and placed under an education of restraint, to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is not the principle on which the laboring classes are professedly governed in any free country; and no person who sets due value on freedom will give his adhesion to their being so governed, unless after all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom and govern them as freemen, and it has been definitively proved that they can only be governed as children. The bare statement of the alternative shows the absurdity of supposing that such efforts have been made in any case which needs be considered here. It is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of inconsistencies, that things find admittance into our practice which belong to the system of despotic, or what is called paternal, government, while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the exercise of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint of any real efficacy as a moral education.

It was pointed out in an early part of this Essay, that the liberty of the individual, in things wherein the individual is alone concerned, implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no persons but themselves. This question presents no difficulty, so long as the will of all the persons implicated remains unaltered; but since that will may change, it is often necessary, even in things in which they alone are concerned, that they should enter into engagements with one another; and when they do, it is fit, as a general rule, that those engagements should be kept. Yet in the laws probably, of every country, this general rule has some exceptions. Not only persons are not held to engagements which violate the rights of third parties, but it is sometimes considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an engagement, that it is injurious to themselves. In this and most other civilized countries, for example, an engagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at the least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of

allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption in its favor, that would be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom. These reasons, the force of which is so conspicuous in this peculiar case, are evidently of far wider application; yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the necessities of life, which continually require, not indeed that we should resign our freedom, but that we should consent to this and the other limitation of it. The principle, however, which demands uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents themselves, requires that those who have become bound to one another, in things which concern no third party, should be able to release one another from the engagement: and even without such voluntary release, there are perhaps no contracts or engagements, except those that relate to money or money's worth, of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of retractation. Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, in the excellent Essay from which I have already quoted, states it as his conviction, that engagements which involve personal relations or services, should never be legally binding beyond a limited duration of time; and that the most important of these engagements, marriage, having the peculiarity that its objects are frustrated unless the feelings of both the parties are in harmony with it, should require nothing more than the declared will of either party to dissolve it. This subject is too important, and too complicated, to be discussed in a parenthesis, and I touch on it only so far as is necessary for purposes of illustration. If the conciseness and generality of Baron Humboldt's dissertation had not obliged him in this instance to content himself with enunciating his conclusion without discussing the premises, he would doubtless have recognized that the question cannot be decided on grounds so simple as those to which he confines himself. When a person, either by express promise or by conduct, has encouraged another to rely upon his continuing to act in a certain way -- to build expectations and calculations, and stake any part of his plan of life upon that supposition, a new series of moral obligations arises on his part towards that person, which may possibly be overruled, but can not be ignored. And again, if the relation between two contracting parties has been followed by consequences to others; if it has placed third parties in any peculiar position, or, as in the case of marriage, has even called third parties into existence, obligations arise on the part of both the contracting parties towards those third persons, the fulfilment of which, or at all events, the mode of fulfilment, must be greatly affected by the continuance or disruption of the relation between the original parties to the contract. It does not follow, nor can I admit, that these obligations extend to requiring the fulfilment of the contract at all costs to the happiness of the reluctant party; but they are a necessary element in the question; and even if, as Von Humboldt maintains, they ought to make no difference in the legal freedom of the parties to release themselves from the engagement (and I also hold that they ought not to make much difference), they necessarily make a great difference in the

moral freedom. A person is bound to take all these circumstances into account, before resolving on a step which may affect such important interests of others; and if he does not allow proper weight to those interests, he is morally responsible for the wrong. I have made these obvious remarks for the better illustration of the general principle of liberty, and not because they are at all needed on the particular question, which, on the contrary, is usually discussed as if the interest of children was everything, and that of grown persons nothing.

I have already observed that, owing to the absence of any recognized general principles, liberty is often granted where it should be withheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted; and one of the cases in which, in the modern European world, the sentiment of liberty is the strongest, is a case where, in my view, it is altogether misplaced. A person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for another under the pretext that the affairs of another are his own affairs. The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others. This obligation is almost entirely disregarded in the case of the family relations, a case, in its direct influence on human happiness, more important than all the others taken together. The almost despotic power of husbands over wives needs not be enlarged upon here, because nothing more is needed for the complete removal of the evil, than that wives should have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law in the same manner, as all other persons; and because, on this subject, the defenders of established injustice do not avail themselves of the plea of liberty, but stand forth openly as the champions of power. It is in the case of children, that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfilment by the State of its duties. One would almost think that a man's children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his absolute and exclusive control over them; more jealous than of almost any interference with his own freedom of action: so much less do the generality of mankind value liberty than power. Consider, for example, the case of education. Is it not almost a selfevident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognize and assert this truth? Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others and towards himself. But while this is unanimously declared to be the father's duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to the child, it is left to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis! It still remains unrecognized, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of

being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent.

Were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted, there would be an end to the difficulties about what the State should teach, and how it should teach, which now convert the subject into a mere battle-field for sects and parties, causing the time and labor which should have been spent in educating, to be wasted in quarrelling about education. If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them. The objections which are urged with reason against State education, do not apply to the enforcement of education by the State, but to the State's taking upon itself to direct that education: which is a totally different thing. That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by the State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the task; then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils, take upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may that of joint-stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape fitted for undertaking great works of industry does not exist in the country. But in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education under government auspices, the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory, combined with State aid to those unable to defray the expense.

The instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public examinations, extending to all children, and beginning at an early age. An age might be fixed at which every child must be examined, to ascertain if he (or she) is

able to read. If a child proves unable, the father, unless he has some sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, if necessary, by his labor, and the child might be put to school at his expense. Once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal acquisition, and what is more, retention, of a certain minimum of general knowledge, virtually compulsory. Beyond that minimum, there should be voluntary examinations on all subjects, at which all who come up to a certain standard of proficiency might claim a certificate. To prevent the State from exercising through these arrangements, an improper influence over opinion, the knowledge required for passing an examination (beyond the merely instrumental parts of knowledge, such as languages and their use) should, even in the higher class of examinations, be confined to facts and positive science exclusively. The examinations on religion, politics, or other disputed topics, shouLd not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the matter of fact that such and such an opinion is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or churches. Under this system, the rising generation would be no worse off in regard to all disputed truths, than they are at present; they would be brought up either churchmen or dissenters as they now are, the State merely taking care that they should be instructed churchmen, or instructed dissenters. There would be nothing to hinder them from being taught religion, if their parents chose, at the same schools where they were taught other things. All attempts by the State to bias the conclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects, are evil; but it may very properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person possesses the knowledge requisite to make his conclusions, on any given subject, worth attending to. A student of philosophy would be the better for being able to stand an examination both in Locke and in Kant, whichever of the two he takes up with, or even if with neither: and there is no reasonable objection to examining an atheist in the evidences of Christianity, provided he is not required to profess a belief in them. The examinations, however, in the higher branches of knowledge should, I conceive, be entirely voluntary. It would be giving too dangerous a power to governments, were they allowed to exclude any one from professions, even from the profession of teacher, for alleged deficiency of qualifications: and I think, with Wilhelm von Humboldt, that degrees, or other public certificates of scientific or professional acquirements, should be given to all who present themselves for examination, and stand the test; but that such certificates should confer no advantage over competitors, other than the weight which may be attached to their testimony by public opinion.

It is not in the matter of education only that misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being recognized, and legal obligations from being imposed, where there are the strongest grounds for the former always, and in many cases for the latter also. The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this

responsibility -- to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing -- unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being. And in a country either over-peopled or threatened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labor by their competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labor. The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the State: and whether such laws be expedient or not (a question mainly dependent on local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as violations of liberty. Such laws are interferences of the State to prohibit a mischievous act -- an act injurious to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation, and social stigma, even when it is not deemed expedient to superadd legal punishment. Yet the current ideas of liberty, which bend so easily to real infringements of the freedom of the individual, in things which concern only himself, would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when the consequence of their indulgence is a life, or lives, of wretchedness and depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by their actions. When we compare the strange respect of mankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect for it, we might imagine that a man had an indispensable right to do harm to others, and no right at all to please himself without giving pain to any one.

I have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of government interference, which, though closely connected with the subject of this Essay, do not, in strictness, belong to it. These are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle of liberty: the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals, but about helping them: it is asked whether the government should do, or cause to be done, something for their benefit, instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually, or in voluntary combination.

The objections to government interference, when it is not such as to involve infringement of liberty, may be of three kinds.

The first is, when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government. Speaking generally, there is no one so fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it. This principle condemns the interferences, once so common, of the legislature, or the officers of government, with the ordinary processes of industry. But this part of the subject has been sufficiently enlarged upon by political economists, and is not particularly related to the principles of this Essay.

The second objection is more nearly allied to our

subject. In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education -- a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. This is a principal, though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in cases not political); of free and popular local and municipal institutions; of the conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary associations. These are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that subject only by remote tendencies; but they are questions of development. It belongs to a different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as parts of national education; as being, in truth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns -- habituating them to act from public or semipublic motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another. Without these habits and powers, a free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved, as is exemplified by the too-often transitory nature of political freedom in countries where it does not rest upon a sufficient basis of local liberties. The management of purely local business by the localities, and of the great enterprises of industry by the union of those who voluntarily supply the pecuniary means, is further recommended by all the advantages which have been set forth in this Essay as belonging to individuality of development, and diversity of modes of action. Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience. What the State can usefully do, is to make itself a central depository, and active circulator and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many trials. Its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others, instead of tolerating no experiments but its own.

The third, and most cogent reason for restricting the interference of government, is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. Every function superadded to those already exercised by the government, causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and converts, more and more, the active and ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the government, or of some party which aims at becoming the government. If the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities, and the public charities, were all of them branches of the government; if, in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all that now devolves on them, became departments of the central administration; if the employes of all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to the government for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other

country free otherwise than in name. And the evil would be greater, the more efficiently and scientifically the administrative machinery was constructed -- the more skilful the arrangements for obtaining the best qualified hands and heads with which to work it. In England it has of late been proposed that all the members of the civil service of government should be selected by competitive examination, to obtain for those employments the most intelligent and instructed persons procurable; and much has been said and written for and against this proposal. One of the arguments most insisted on by its opponents is that the occupation of a permanent official servant of the State does not hold out sufficient prospects of emolument and importance to attract the highest talents, which will always be able to find a more inviting career in the professions, or in the service of companies and other public bodies. One would not have been surprised if this argument had been used by the friends of the proposition, as an answer to its principal difficulty. Coming from the opponents it is strange enough. What is urged as an objection is the safety-valve of the proposed system. If indeed all the high talent of the country could be drawn into the service of the government, a proposal tending to bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness. If every part of the business of society which required organized concert, or large and comprehensive views, were in the hands of the government, and if government offices were universally filled by the ablest men, all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country, except the purely speculative, would be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom alone the rest of the community would look for all things: the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had to do; the able and aspiring for personal advancement. To be admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy, and when admitted, to rise therein, would be the sole objects of ambition. Under this regime, not only is the outside public ill-qualified, for want of practical experience, to criticize or check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can be effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy. Such is the melancholy condition of the Russian empire, as is shown in the accounts of those who have had sufficient opportunity of observation. The Czar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic body: he can send any one of them to Siberia, but he cannot govern without them, or against their will. On every decree of his they have a tacit veto, by merely refraining from carrying it into effect. In countries of more advanced civilization and of a more insurrectionary spirit the public, accustomed to expect everything to be done for them by the State, or at least to do nothing for themselves without asking from the State not only leave to do it, but even how it is to be done, naturally hold the State responsible for all evil which befalls them, and when the evil exceeds their amount of patience, they rise against the government and make what is called a revolution; whereupon somebody else, with or without legitimate authority from the nation, vaults into the seat, issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and everything goes on much as it did before; the bureaucracy

being unchanged, and nobody else being capable of taking their place.

A very different spectacle is exhibited among a people accustomed to transact their own business. In France, a large part of the people having been engaged in military service, many of whom have held at least the rank of noncommissioned officers, there are in every popular insurrection several persons competent to take the lead, and improvise some tolerable plan of action. What the French are in military affairs, the Americans are in every kind of civil business; let them be left without a government, every body of Americans is able to improvise one, and to carry on that or any other public business with a sufficient amount of intelligence, order and decision. This is what every free people ought to be: and a people capable of this is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central administration. No bureaucracy can hope to make such a people as this do or undergo anything that they do not like. But where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all. The constitution of such countries is an organization of the experience and practical ability of the nation, into a disciplined body for the purpose of governing the rest; and the more perfect that organization is in itself, the more successful in drawing to itself and educating for itself the persons of greatest capacity from all ranks of the community, the more complete is the bondage of all, the members of the bureaucracy included. For the governors are as much the slaves of their organization and discipline, as the governed are of the governors. A Chinese mandarin is as much the tool and creature of a despotism as the humblest cultivator. An individual Jesuit is to the utmost degree of abasement the slave of his order though the order itself exists for the collective power and importance of its members.

It is not, also, to be forgotten, that the absorption of all the principal ability of the country into the governing body is fatal, sooner or later, to the mental activity and progressiveness of the body itself. Banded together as they are -- working a system which, like all systems, necessarily proceeds in a great measure by fixed rules -- the official body are under the constant temptation of sinking into indolent routine, or, if they now and then desert that mill-horse round, of rushing into some half-examined crudity which has struck the fancy of some leading member of the corps: and the sole check to these closely allied, though seemingly opposite, tendencies, the only stimulus which can keep the ability of the body itself up to a high standard, is liability to the watchful criticism of equal ability outside the body. It is indispensable, therefore, that the means should exist, independently of the government, of forming such ability, and furnishing it with the opportunities and experience necessary for a correct judgment of great practical affairs. If we would possess permanently a skilful and efficient body of functionaries -- above all, a body able to originate and willing to adopt improvements; if we would not have our bureaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross

all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind.

To determine the point at which evils, so formidable to human freedom and advancement begin, or rather at which they begin to predominate over the benefits attending the collective application of the force of society, under its recognized chiefs, for the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of its well-being, to secure as much of the advantages of centralized power and intelligence, as can be had without turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general activity, is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government. It is, in a great measure, a question of detail, in which many and various considerations must be kept in view, and no absolute rule can be laid down. But I believe that the practical principle in which safety resides, the ideal to be kept in view, the standard by which to test all arrangements intended for overcoming the difficulty, may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion of it from the centre. Thus, in municipal administration, there would be, as in the New England States, a very minute division among separate officers, chosen by the localities, of all business which is not better left to the persons directly interested; but besides this, there would be, in each department of local affairs, a central superintendence, forming a branch of the general government. The organ of this superintendence would concentrate, as in a focus, the variety of information and experience derived from the conduct of that branch of public business in all the localities, from everything analogous which is done in foreign countries, and from the general principles of political science. This central organ should have a right to know all that is done, and its special duty should be that of making the knowledge acquired in one place available for others. Emancipated from the petty prejudices and narrow views of a locality by its elevated position and comprehensive sphere of observation, its advice would naturally carry much authority; but its actual power, as a permanent institution, should, I conceive, be limited to compelling the local officers to obey the laws laid down for their guidance. In all things not provided for by general rules, those officers should be left to their own judgment, under responsibility to their constituents. For the violation of rules, they should be responsible to law, and the rules themselves should be laid down by the legislature; the central administrative authority only watching over their execution, and if they were not properly carried into effect, appealing, according to the nature of the case, to the tribunal to enforce the law, or to the constituencies to dismiss the functionaries who had not executed it according to its spirit. Such, in its general conception, is the central superintendence which the Poor Law Board is intended to exercise over the administrators of the Poor Rate throughout the country. Whatever powers the Board exercises beyond this limit, were right and necessary in that peculiar case, for the cure of rooted habits of mal-administration in matters deeply affecting not the localities merely, but the whole community; since no locality has a moral right to make

itself by mismanagement a nest of pauperism, necessarily overflowing into other localities, and impairing the moral and physical condition of the whole laboring community. The powers of administrative coercion and subordinate legislation possessed by the Poor Law Board (but which, owing to the state of opinion on the subject, are very scantily exercised by them), though perfectly justifiable in a case of a first-rate national interest, would be wholly out of place in the superintendence of interests purely local. But a central organ of information and instruction for all the localities, would be equally valuable in all departments of administration. A government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when, instead of informing, advising, and upon occasion denouncing, it makes them work in fetters or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of them. The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill or that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State, which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.

[End.]

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Presocratic Fragments and Testimonials

 This text file is adapted from passages in John Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy* (1892). This is a working draft; please report errors.[1]

ANAXIMANDER

Testimonials

(1) Anaximander of Miletus, son of Praxiades, a fellow-citizen and associate of Thales, said that the material cause and first element of things was the Infinite, he being the first to introduce this name of the material cause. He says it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but a substance different from them which is infinite, from which arise all the heavens and the worlds within them. (Theophrastus, *Phys*. *Op*. fr. 2)

(2) He says that this is " eternal and ageless," and that it " encompasses all the worlds." (Hippolytus *Ref*. i. 6)

(3) And into that from which things take their rise they pass away once more, " as is proper; for they make reparation and satisfaction to one another for their injustice according to the ordering of time," as he says in these somewhat poetical terms. (Theophrastus *Phys*. *Op*. fr. 2)

(4) And besides this, there was an eternal motion, in which was brought about the origin of the worlds.

(Hippolytus *Ref*. i. 6)

(5) He did not ascribe the origin of things to any alteration in matter, but said that the oppositions in the substratum, which was a boundless body, were separated out. (Simplicius *Phys*. P. 3150, 20)

(6) Further, there cannot be a single, simple body which is infinite, either, as some hold, one distinct from the elements, which they then derive from it, or without this qualification. For there are some who make this (i.e. a body distinct from the elements) the infinite, and not air or water,- in order that the other things may not be destroyed by their infinity. They are in opposition one to another-air is cold, water moist, and fire hot-and therefore, if any one of them were infinite, the rest would have ceased to be by this time. Accordingly they say that what is infinite is something other than the elements, and from it the elements arise. (Aristotle, *Phys*. 204b 22)

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ANAXIMENES

Testimonials

(1) Anaximenes of Miletus, son of Eurystratos, who had been an associate of Anaximander, said, like him, that the underlying substance was one and infinite. He did not, however, say it was indeterminate, like Anaximander, but determinate; for he said it was Air. (Theophrastus, *Phys*. *Op*. fr. 2)

(2) From it, he said, the things that are, and have been, and will be, the gods and things divine, took their rise, while other things come from its offspring. (Hippolytus *Ref*. i. 7)

(3) "Just as," he said, "our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world." (Aet. i. 3, 4)

(4) And the form of the air is as follows. Where it is most even, it is invisible to our sight; but cold and heat, moisture and motion, make it visible. It is always in motion; for, if it were not, it would not change so much as it does. (Hippolytus *Ref*. i. 7)

(5) It differs in different substances in virtue of its rarefaction and condensation. (Theophrastus, *Phys*. *Op*. fr. 2)

(6) When it is dilated so as to be rarer, it becomes fire; while winds, on the other hand, are condensed Air. Cloud is formed from Air by felting; and this, still further condensed, becomes water. Water, condensed still more, turns to earth; and when condensed as much as it can be, to stones. (Hippolytus *Ref*. i. 7)

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XENOPHANES

Fragments (Elegies)

(1) Now is the floor clean, and the hands and cups of all; one sets twisted garlands on our heads, another

hands us fragrant ointment on a salver. The mixing bowl stands ready, full of gladness, and there is more wine at hand that promises never to leave us in the lurch, soft and smelling of flowers in the jars. In the midst the frankincense sends up its holy scent, and there is cold water, sweet and clean. Brown loaves are set before us and a lordly table laden with cheese and rich honey. The altar in the midst is clustered round with flowers; song and festivity fill the halls.

But first it is proper that people should sing to the god with joy, with holy tales and pure words; then after offerings and prayer made that we may have strength to do right -- for that is in truth the first thing to do -- no sin is it to drink as much as a person can take and get home without an attendant, so he be not stricken in years. And of all people is he to be praised who after drinking gives considerable proof of himself in the trial of skill, as memory and strength will serve him. Let him not sing of Titans and Giants -- those fictions of the people of old -- nor of turbulent civil battles in which is no good thing at all; but to give heedful reverence to the gods is always good.

(2) What if a person wins victory in swiftness of foot, or in the pentathlon, at Olympia, where is the region of Zeus by Pisa's springs, or in wrestling -- what if by cruel boxing or that fearful sport people call pankration he become more glorious in the citizens' eyes, and win a place of honor in the sight of all at the games, his food-at the public cost from the state, and a gift to be an heirloom for him-what if he conquer in the chariot-race -- he win not deserve all this for his portion so much as I do. Far better is our art than the strength of men and of horses! These are but thoughtless judgments, nor is it fitting to set strength before considerable art. Even if there arise a mighty boxer among a people, or one great in the pentathlon or at wrestling, or one excelling in swiftness of foot -- and that stands in honor before all tasks of people at the games -- the city would be none the better governed for that. It is but little joy a city gets of it if a person conquer at the games by Pisa's banks; it is not this that makes fat the store-houses of a city.

(3) They learnt dainty and unprofitable ways from the Lydians, so long as they were free from hateful tyranny; they went to the market-place with cloaks of purple dye, not less than a thousand of them all told, conceited and proud of their shapely locks of hair, fragrant from salves.

(4) Nor would a person mix wine in a cup by pouring out the wine first, but water first and wine on the top of it.

(5) You did send the thigh-bone of a kid and get for it the fat leg of a fatted bull, a worthy compensation for a person to get, whose glory is to reach every part of Hellas and never to pass away, so long as Greek songs last.

(7) And now I will turn to another tale and point the way. . . . Once they say that he (Pythagoras) was passing by when a dog was being beaten and spoke this word: "Stop! Don't beat it! For it is the soul of a friend that I recognized when I heard its voice."

(8) There are by this time threescore years and seven that have tossed my careworn soul up and down the land of Hellas; and there were then five-and-twenty years from my birth, if I can say anything truly about these matters.

(9) Much weaker than an aged person.

Fragments (Satires)

(10) Since all at first have learnt according to Homer. . . .

(11) Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace among mortals, stealings and adulteries and deceivings of one another.

(12) Since they have uttered many lawless deeds of the gods, stealings and adulteries and deceivings of one another.

(14) But mortals deem that the gods are begotten as they are, and have clothes like theirs, and voice and form.

(15) Yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and could paint with their hands, and produce works of art as people do, horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several kinds.

(16) The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs have blue eyes and red hair.

(18) The gods have not revealed all things to people from the beginning, but by seeking they find in time what is better.

(23) One god, the greatest among gods and humans, neither in form like unto mortals nor in thought. . . .

(24) He sees all over, thinks all over, and hears all over.

(25) But without toil he sways all things by the thought of his mind.

(26) And he abides ever in the selfsame place, moving not at all; nor does it befit him to go about now here, now there.

(27) all things come from the earth, and in earth all things end.

(28) This limit of the earth above is seen at our feet in contact with the air; below it reaches down without a limit.

(29) All things are earth and water that come into being and grow.

(30) The sea is the source of water and the source of wind; for neither in the clouds (would there be any blasts of wind blowing) from within without the mighty sea, nor rivers' streams nor rain-water from the sky. The mighty sea is father of clouds and of winds and of rivers.

(31) The sun swinging over the earth and warming it. . . .

(32) She that they call Iris is a cloud likewise, purple, scarlet and green to observe.

(33) For we all are born of earth and water.

(34) There never was nor will be a person who has certain knowledge about the gods and about all the things I speak of. Even if he should chance to say the complete truth, yet he himself knows not that it is so. But all may have their fancy.

(35) Let these be taken as fancies something like the truth.

(36) all of them that are visible for mortals to observe.

(37) And in some caves water drips. . . .

(38) If god had not made brown honey, people would think that figs are far sweeter than they do think of about them.

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HERACLITUS

Fragments

(1) It is wise to listen, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess that all things are one.

(2) Though this word is true always, yet people are as unable to understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in accordance with this Word, people seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of words and deeds such as I establish, dividing each thing according to its kind and showing how it truly is. But other people know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what they do in sleep.

(3) Fools when they do hear are like the deaf: of them does the saying bear witness that they are absent when present.

(4) Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to people if they have souls that understand not their language.

(5) The many do not take heed of such things as they meet with, nor do they mark them when they are taught, though they think they do.

(6) Knowing not how to listen nor how to speak.

(7) If you do not expect the unexpected, you will not find it for it is hard to be sought out and difficult.

(8) Those who seek for gold dig up much earth and find a little.

(10) Nature loves to hide.

(11) The lord whose is the oracle at Delphi neither utters nor hides his meaning, but shows it by a sign.

(12) And the Sibyl, with raving lips uttering things mirthless, unadorned, and unperfumed, reaches over a thousand years with her voice, thanks to the god in her.

(13) The things that can be seen, heard, and learned are what I prize the most.

(14) . . . bringing untrustworthy witnesses in support of disputed points.

(15) The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears.

(16) The learning of many things teaches not understanding, else would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hekataius.

(17) Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practiced scientific inquiry beyond all other people, and malting a selection of these writings, claimed for his own wisdom what was but a knowledge of many things and an imposture.

(18) Of all whose discussions I have heard, there is not one who attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all.

(19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things.

(20) This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or humans has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever will be an ever-living Fire, with measures of it kindling, and measures going out.

(21) The transformations of Fire are, first of all, sea; and half of the sea is earth, half whirlwind.

(22) all things are an exchange for Fire, and Fire for all things, even as wares for gold and gold for wares.

(23) It becomes liquid sea, and is measured by the same tale as before it became earth.

(24) Fire is want and excess.

(25) Fire lives the death of air, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of earth, earth that of water.

(26) Fire in its advance will judge and convict all things.

(27) How can one hide from that which never sets?

(28) It is the thunderbolt that steers the course of all things.

(29) The sun will not overstep his measures; if he does, the Erinyes, the handmaids of justice, will find him out.

(30) The limit of dawn and evening is the Bear; and opposite the Bear is the boundary of bright Zeus.

(31) If there were no sun it would be night, for all the other stars could do.

(32) The sun is new every day.

(33) Thales foretold an eclipse.

(34) . . . the seasons that bring all things.

(35) Hesiod is most people's teacher. People are sure he knew very many things, a man who did not know day or night! They are one.

(36) God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger; but he takes various shapes, just as fire, when it is mingled with spices, is named according to the taste of each.

(37) If all things were turned to smoke, the nostrils would distinguish them.

(38) Souls smell in Hades.

(39) Cold things become warm, and what is warm cools; what is wet dries, and the parched is moistened.

(40) It scatters and it gathers; it advances and retires. (41, 42) You cannot step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you.

(43) Homer was wrong in saying: "Would that strife might perish from among gods and humans!" He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away. . . .

(44) War is the father of all and the king of all; and some he has made gods and some humans, some bond and some free.

(45) People do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an attunement of opposite tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre.

(46) It is the opposite which is good for us.

(47) The hidden attunement is better than the open.

(48) Let us not conjecture at random about the greatest things.

(49) People that love wisdom must be acquainted with very many things indeed.

(50) The straight and the crooked path of the fuller's comb is one and the same.

(51) Asses would rather have straw than gold.

(51a) Oxen are happy when they find bitter vetches to eat.

(52) The sea is the purest and the impurest water. Fish can drink it, and it is good for them; to people it is

undrinkable and destructive.

(53) Swine wash in the mire, and barnyard fowls in dust.

(54) . . . to delight in the mire.

(55) Every beast is driven to pasture with blows.

(56) [Same as 45.]

(57) Good and ill are one.

(58) Physicians who cut, burn, stab, and rack the sick, demand a fee for it which they do not deserve to get.

(59) Couples are things whole and things not whole, what is drawn together and what is drawn asunder, the harmonious and the discordant. The one is made up of all things, and all things issue from the one.

(60) People would not have known the name of justice if these things were not.

(61) To God all things are fair and good and right, but people hold some things wrong and some right.

(62) We must know that war is common to all and strife is justice, and that all things come into being and pass away (?) through strife.

(64) all the things we see when awake are death, even as all we see in slumber are sleep.

(65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus.

(66) The bow is called life, but its work is death.

(67) Mortals are immortals and immortals are mortals, the one. Living the others' death and dying the others' life.

(68) For it is death to souls to become water, and death to water to become earth. But water comes from earth; and from water, soul.

(69) The way up and the way down is one and the same.

(70) In the circumference of a circle the beginning and end are common.

(71) You will not find the boundaries of soul by traveling in any direction, so deep is the measure of it."

(72) It is pleasure to souls to become moist.

(73) A person, when he gets drunk, is led by a beardless lad, tripping, knowing not where he steps, having his soul moist.

(74-76) The dry soul is the wisest and best.

(77) People set a light for themselves in the night-time, when they have died but are alive. The sleeper, whose vision has been put out, lights up from the dead; he that is awake lights up from the sleeping.

(78) And it is the same thing in us that is quick and dead, awake and asleep, young and old; the former are shifted and become the latter, and the latter in turn are shifted and become the former.

(79) Time is a child playing checkers, the kingly power is a child's.

(80) I have sought for myself.

(81) We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not.

(82) It is a weariness to labor for the same masters and be ruled by them.

(83) It rests by changing.

(84) Even the posset separates if it is not stirred.

(85) Corpses are more fit to be cast out than dung.

(86) When they are born, they wish to live and to meet with their dooms -- or rather to rest -- and they leave children behind them to meet with their dooms in turn.

(87-89) A man may be a grandfather in thirty years.

(90) Those who are asleep are fellow-workers (in what goes on in the world).

(91a) Thought is common to all.

(91b) Those who speak with understanding must hold fast to what is common to all as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by the one divine law. It prevails as much as it will, and suffices for all things with something to spare.

(92) So we must follow the common, yet though my Word is common, the many live as if they had a wisdom of their own.

(93) They are estranged from that with which they have most constant intercourse.

(94) It is not proper to act and speak like people asleep.

(95) The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own.

(96) The way of humans has no wisdom, but that of God has.

(97) People are called babies by God, even as a child by a person.

(98, 99) The wisest person is an ape compared to God, just as the most beautiful ape is ugly compared to humans.

(100) The people must fight for its law as for its walls.

(101) Greater deaths win greater portions.

(102) Gods and humans honor those who are slain in battle.

(103) Wantonness needs putting out, even more than a house on fire.

(104) It is not good for people to get all they wish to get. It is sickness that makes health pleasant; evil, good; hunger, plenty; weariness, rest.

(105-107) It is hard to fight with one's heart's desire. Whatever it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul.

(108, 109) It is best to hide folly; but it is hard in times of relaxation, over our cups.

(110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one.

(111) For what thought or wisdom have they? They follow the poets and take the crowd as their teacher, knowing not that there are many bad and few good. For even the best of them choose one thing above all others, immortal glory among mortals, while most of them are glutted like beasts.

(112) In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutamas, who is of more account than the rest. (He said, "Most people are bad.")

(113) One is ten thousand to me, if he be the best.

(114) The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown person of them, and leave the city to beardless lads; for they have cast out Hermodorus, the best person among them, saying, "We will have none who is best among us; if there be any such, let him be so elsewhere and among others."

(115) Dogs bark at every one they do not know.

(116) . . . (The wise person) is not known because of people's want of belief.

(117) The fool is fluttered at every word.

(118) The most esteemed of them knows but fancies, and holds fast to them, yet of a truth justice will overtake the artificers of lies and the false witnesses.

(119) Homer should be turned out of the lists and whipped, and Archilochus likewise.

(120) One day is like any other.

(121) A person's character is his fate.

(122) There awaits people when they die such things as they look not for nor dream of.

(123) . . . that they rise up and become the wakeful guardians of the quick and dead.

(124) Night-walkers, Magians, Bakchoi, Lenai, and the initiated . . .

(125) The mysteries practiced among people are unholy mysteries.

(126) And they pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a person's house, knowing not what gods or heroes are.

(127) For if it were not to Dionysus that they made a procession and sang the shameful phallic hymn, they would be acting most shamelessly. But Hades is the same as Dionysus in whose honor they go mad and rave.

(129, 130) They vainly purify themselves by defiling themselves with blood, just as if one who had stepped into the mud were to wash his feet in mud. Any person who marked him doing thus, would deem him mad.

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PARMENIDES

Fragments from *On Nature*

(1) The car that bears me carried me as far as ever my heart desired, when it had brought me and set me on the renowned way of the goddess, which leads the man who knows through all the towns. On that way was I carried along; for on it the wise steeds carried me, drawing my car, and maidens showed the way. And the axle, glowing in the socket -- for it was urged round by the whirling wheels at each end -- gave a sound like a pipe, when the daughters of the Sun, to convey me into the light, threw back their veils from off their faces and left the abode of Night.

There are the gates of the ways of Night and Day, fitted above with a lintel and below with a threshold of stone. They themselves, high in the air, are closed by mighty doors, and Avenging justice keeps the keys that fit them. Her did the maidens entreat with gentle words and cunningly persuade to unfasten without demur the bolted bars from the gates. Then, when the doors were thrown back, they disclosed a wide opening, when their brazen posts fitted with rivets and nails swung back one after the other. Straight through them, on the broad way, did the maidens guide the horses and the car, and the goddess greeted me kindly, and took my right hand in hers, and spoke to me these words:

Welcome, O youth, that come to my abode on the car that bears you tended by immortal charioteers! It is no ill chance, but right and justice that has sent you to travel on this way. Far, indeed, does it lie from the beaten track of people! It is proper for you to learn all things, as well the unshaken heart of well-rounded

truth, as the opinions of mortals in which is no true belief at all. Yet none the less will you learn these things also, -- how passing right through all things one should judge the things that seem to be.

But do you restrain your thought from this way of inquiry, nor let habit by its much experience force you to cast upon this way a wandering eye or sounding ear or tongue; but judge by argument the much disputed proof uttered by me. There is only one way left that can be spoken of ...

The Way of Truth

(2) Look steadfastly with your mind at things though afar as if they were at hand. You can not cut off what is from holding fast to what is, neither scattering itself abroad in order nor coming together.

(3) It is all one to me where I begin; for I will come back again there.

(4, 5) Come now, I will tell you -- and do you listen to my saying and carry it away -- the only two ways of search that can be thought of. The first, namely, that *it is*, and that it is impossible for it not to be, is the way of belief, for truth is its companion. The other, namely, that *it is not*, and that it must needs not be,-that, I tell you, is a path that none can learn of at all. For you can not know what is not-that is impossible-nor utter it; for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be.

(6) It must be that what can be spoken and thought is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is nothing to be. This is what I bid you ponder. I hold you back from this first way of inquiry, and from this other also, upon which mortals knowing nothing wander two-faced; for helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts, so that they are carried along stupefied like people deaf and blind. Unreasonable crowds, who hold that it is and is not the same and not the same, all things travel in opposite directions!

(7) For this will never be proved, that the things that are not are; and do you restrain your thought from this way of inquiry.

(8) One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that *it is*. In this path are very many tokens that what is is uncreated and indestructible; for it is complete, immovable, and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one. For what kind of origin for it will you look for? In what way and from what source could it have drawn its increase? . . . I will not let you say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be thought nor uttered that anything is not. And, if it came from nothing, what need could have made it arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at all. Nor will the force of truth suffer anything to arise besides itself from that which is not. For this reason, justice does not loose her fetters and let anything come into being or pass away, but holds it fast. Our judgment thereon depends on this: "Is it or is it not?" Surely it is decided, as it must be, that we are to set aside the one way as unthinkable and nameless (for it is no true way), and that the other path is real and true. How, then, can what is be going to be in the future? Or how could it come into being? If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future. Thus is becoming extinguished and passing away not to be heard of.

Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, and there is no more of it in one place than in another, to hinder it from holding together, nor less of it, but everything is full of what is. For this reason it is wholly continuous; for what is, is in contact with what is.

Moreover, it is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without beginning and without end; since coming into being and passing away have been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away. It is the same, and it rests in the self-same place, abiding in itself. And thus it remains constant in its place; for hard necessity keeps it in the bonds of the limit that holds it fast on every side. For this reason it is not permitted to what is to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing; while, if it were infinite, it would stand in

need of everything.

The thing that can be thought and that for the sake of which the thought exists is the same; for you cannot find thought without something that is, as to which it is uttered. And there is not, and never will be, anything besides what is, since fate has chained it so as to be whole and immovable. For this reason all these things are but names which mortals have given, believing them to be true-coming into being and passing away, being and not being, change of place and alteration of bright color.

Since, then, it has a furthest limit, it is complete on every side, like the mass of a rounded sphere, equally poised from the center in every direction; for it cannot be greater or smaller in one place than in another. For there is no nothing that could keep it from reaching out equally, nor can anything that is be more here and less there than what is, since it is all inviolable. For the point from which it is equal in every direction tends equally to the limits.

The Way of Belief

Here will I close my trustworthy speech and thought about the truth. In the future, learn the beliefs of mortals, giving ear to the deceptive ordering of my words.

Mortals have made up their minds to name two forms, one of which they should not name, and that is where they go astray from the truth. They have distinguished them as opposite in form, and have assigned to them marks distinct from one another. To the one they give out the fire of heaven, gentle, very light, in every direction the same as itself, but not the same as the other. The other is just the opposite to it, dark night, a compact and heavy body. Of these I tell you the whole arrangement as it seems likely; for so no thought of mortals will ever outstrip you.

(9) Now that all things have been named light and night, and the names which belong to the power of each have been assigned to these things and to those, everything is full at once of light and dark night, both equal, since neither has anything to do with the other.

(10, 11) And you will know the substance of the sky, and all the signs in the sky, and the radiant works of the glowing sun's pure torch, and from where they arose. And you will learn likewise of the wandering deeds of the round-faced moon, and of her substance. You will know, too, the heavens that surround us, from where they arose, and how Necessity took them and bound them to keep the limits of the stars . . . how the earth, and the sun, and the moon, and the sky that is common to all, and the Milky Way, and the outermost Olympus, and the burning might of the stars arose.

(12) The narrower bands were filled with unmixed fire, and those next them with night, and in the midst of these rushes their portion of fire. In the midst of these is the divinity that directs the course of all things; for she is the beginner of all painful birth and all propagation, driving the female to the embrace of the male, and the male to that of the female.

(13) First of all the gods she contrived Eros.

(14) Shining by night with borrowed light, wandering round the earth.

(15) Always looking to the beams of the sun.

(16) For just as thought stands at any time to the mixture of its, erring organs, so does it come to people; for that which thinks is the same, namely, the substance of the limbs, in each and every person; for their thought is that of which there is more in them.

(17) On the right boys; on the left girls.

(19) Thus, according to people's opinions, did things come into being, and thus they are now. In time they will grow up and pass away. To each of these things people have assigned a fixed name.

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EMPEDOCLES

Fragments

(1) And do you give ear, Pausanias, son of Anchitus the wise!

(2) For straitened are the powers that are spread over their bodily parts, and many are the woes that burst in on them and blunt the edge of their careful thoughts! They observe but a brief span of a life that is no life, and, doomed to swift death, are taken up and fly off like smoke. Each is convinced of that alone which he had chanced upon as he is hurried every way, and idly boasts he has found the whole. So hardly can these things be seen by the eyes or heard by the ears of people, so hardly grasped by their mind! Nevertheless, you, since you have found your way hither, will learn no more than mortal mind has power.

(3) . . . to keep within your dumb heart.

(4) But, O you gods, turn aside from my tongue the madness of those people. Bless my lips and make a pure stream flow from them I And you, much-wooed, white-armed Virgin Muse, do I urge that I may hear what is lawful for the children of a day I Speed me on my way from the abode of holiness and drive my willing car! You will not lift garlands of glory and honor at the hands of mortals on condition of speaking in your pride beyond that which is lawful and right, and so to gain a seat upon the heights of wisdom.

Go to now, consider with all your powers in what way each thing is clear. Hold not your sight in greater credit as compared with your hearing, nor value your resounding ear above the dear instructions of your tongue; and do not withhold your confidence in any of your other bodily parts by which there is an opening for understanding, but consider everything in the way it is clear.

(5) But it is all too much the way of low minds to disbelieve those better. Do you learn as the sure testimonies of my Muse bid you, when my words have been divided in your heart.

(6) Hear first the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis whose tear-drops are a well-spring to mortals.

(7) . . .uncreated.

(8) And I will tell you another thing. There is no substance of any of all the things that die, nor any cessation for them of depraved death. They are only a mingling and interchange of what has been mingled. Substance is but a name given to these things by people.

(9) But they (hold?) that when Light and Air (chance?) to have been mingled in the fashion of a human, or in the fashion of the race of wild beasts or of plants or birds, that that is to be born, and when these things have been separated once more, they call it (wrongly?) woeful death. I follow the custom and call it so myself.

(10) Avenging death.

(11, 12) Fools! for they have no far-reaching thoughts, who deem that what before was not comes into being, or that anything can perish and be utterly destroyed. For it cannot be that anything can arise from what in no way is, and it is impossible and unheard of that what is should perish; for it will always be,

wherever one may keep putting it.

(13) And in the all there is nothing empty and nothing too full.

(14) In the all there is nothing empty. From where, then, could anything come to increase it?

(15) A person who is wise in such matters would never surmise in his heart that as long as mortals have what they call their life, so long they are, and suffer good and bad; while before they were formed and after they have been dissolved they are just nothing at all.

(16) For even as they (Strife and Love) were previously, so too they will be; nor ever, methinks, will boundless time be emptied of that pair.

(17) I will tell you a twofold tale. At one time it grew to be one only out of many; at another, it divided up to be many instead of one. There is a double becoming of perishable things and a double passing away. The coming together of all things brings one generation into being and destroys it; the other grows up and is scattered as things become divided. And these things never cease continually changing places, at one time all uniting in one through Love, at another each carried in different directions by the repulsion of Strife. Thus, as far as it is their nature to grow into one out of many, and to become many once more when the one is parted asunder, so far they come into being and their life abides not. But, inasmuch as they never cease changing their places continually, so far they are ever immovable as they go round the circle of existence.

But come, listen to my words, for it is learning that increases wisdom. As I said before, when I declared the heads of my discussion, I will tell you a twofold tale. At one time it grew together to be one only out of many, at another it parted asunder so as to be many instead of one; Fire and Water and Earth and the mighty height of Air; dread Strife, too, apart from these, of equal weight to each, and Love in their midst, equal in length and breadth. Her do you contemplate with your mind, nor sit with dazed eyes. It is she that is known as being implanted in the frame of mortals. It is she that makes them have thoughts of love and work the works of peace. They call her by the names of joy and Aphrodite. Her has no mortal yet marked moving round among them, but do you attend to the undeceitful ordering of my discussion.

For all these are equal and alike in age, yet each has a different prerogative and its own peculiar nature, but they gain the upper hand in turn when the time comes round. And nothing comes into being besides these, nor do they pass away; for, if they had been passing away continually, they would not be now, and what could increase this all and from where could it come? How, too, could it perish, since no place is empty of these things? There are these alone; but, running through one another, they become now this, now that, and like things always.

(18) Love.

(19) Clinging love. Love.

(20) This (the contest of Love and Strife) is manifest in the mass of mortal limbs. At one time all the limbs that are the body's portion are brought together by Love in blooming life's high Season; at another, severed by cruel Strife, they wander each alone by the breakers of life's sea. It is the same with plants and the fish that make their homes in the waters, with the beasts that have their lairs on the hills and the seabirds that sail on wings.

(21) Come now, look at the things that bear witness to my earlier discussion, if so be that there was any shortcoming as to their form in the earlier list. Observe the sun, everywhere bright and warm, and all the immortal things that are bathed in heat and bright radiance. Observe the rain, everywhere dark and cold; and from the earth issue things close-pressed and solid. When they are in strife all these are different in form and separated; but they come together in love, and are desired by one another.

For out of these have sprung all things that were and are and will be-trees and men and women, beasts and birds and the fishes that live in the waters, yea, and the gods that live long lives and are highest ranking in honor.

For there are these alone; but, running through one another, they take different shapes -- so much does mixture change them.

(22) For all of these -- sun, earth, sky, and sea -- are at one with all their parts that are cast far and wide from them in mortal things. And even so all things that are more adapted for mixture are like to one another and united in love by Aphrodite. Those things, again, that differ most in origin, mixture and the forms imprinted on each, are most hostile, being altogether unaccustomed to unite and very sorry by the bidding of Strife, since it has wrought their birth.

(23) Just as when painters are elaborating temple-offerings, people whom wisdom has well taught their art, -- they, when they have taken pigments of many colors with their hands, mix them in due proportion, more of some and less of others, and from them produce shapes like unto all things, making trees and men and women, beasts and birds and fishes that live in the waters, yea, and gods, that live long lives, and are highest ranking in honor -- so don't let the error prevail over your mind, that there is any other source of all the perishable creatures that appear in countless numbers. Know this for sure, for you have heard the tale from a goddess.

(24) Stepping from summit to summit, not to travel only one path of words to the end. . . .

(25) What is right may well be said even twice.

(26) For they prevail in turn as the circle comes round, and pass into one another, and grow great in their appointed turn.

There are these alone; but, running through one another, they become people and the tribes of beasts. At one time they are all brought together into one order by Love; at another, they are carried each in different directions by the repulsion of Strife, till they grow once more into one and are wholly subdued. Thus in so far as they are wont to grow into one out of many, and again divided become more than one, so far they come into being and their life is not lasting; but in so far as they never cease changing continually, so far are they always, immovable in the circle.

(27) There (in the sphere) are distinguished neither the swift limbs of the sun, no, nor the shaggy earth in its might, nor the sea, -- so fast was the god bound in the close covering of Harmony, spherical and round, rejoicing in his circular solitude.

(27a) There is no discord and no unseemly strife in his limbs.

(28) But he was equal on every side and quite without end, spherical and round, rejoicing in his circular solitude.

(29) Two branches do not spring from his back, he has no feet, no swift knees, no fruitful parts; but he was spherical and equal on every side.

(30, 31) But when Strife was grown great in the limbs of the god and sprang to claim his prerogatives, in the fullness of the alternate time set for them by the mighty oath, . . . for all the limbs of the god in turn quaked.

(32) The joint binds two things.

(33) Even as when fig juice rivets and binds white milk ...

(34) Cementing meal with water ...

(35, 36) But now I will retrace my steps over the paths of song that I have traveled before, drawing from my saying a new saying. When Strife was fallen to the lowest depth of the vortex, and Love had reached to the center of the whirl, in it do all things come together so as to be one only; not all at once, but coming together at their will each from different quarters; and, as they mingled, strife began to pass out to the furthest limit. Yet many things remained unmixed, alternating with the things that were being mixed, namely, all that Strife not fallen yet retained; for it had not yet altogether retired perfectly from them to the outermost boundaries of the circle. Some of it still remained within, and some had passed out from the limbs of the All. But in proportion as it kept rushing out, a soft, immortal stream of blameless Love kept running in, and immediately those things became mortal which had been immortal before, those things were mixed that had before been unmixed, each changing its path. And, as they mingled, countless tribes of mortal creatures were scattered abroad endowed with all manner of forms, a wonder to observe.

(37) Earth increases its own mass, and Air swells the bulk of Air.

(38) Come, I will now tell you first of all the beginning of the sun, and the sources from which have sprung all the things we now observe, the earth and the billowy sea, the damp vapor and the Titan air that binds his circle fast round all things.

(39) If the depths of the earth and the vast air were infinite, a foolish saying which has been vainly dropped from the lips of many mortals, though they have seen but a little of the all ...

(40) The sharp-darting sun and the gentle moon.

(41) But (the sunlight) is gathered together and circles round the mighty heavens.

(42) And she cuts off his rays as he goes above her, and casts a shadow on as much of the earth as is the breadth of the pale-faced moon.

(43) Even so the sunbeam, having struck the broad and mighty circle of the moon, returns at once, running so as to reach the sky.

(44) It flashes back to Olympus with untroubled appearance.

(45, 46) There circles round the earth a round borrowed light, as the nave of the wheel circles round the furthest (goal).

(47) For she gazes at the sacred circle of the lordly sun opposite.

(48) It is the earth that makes night by coming before the lights.

(49) . . .of solitary, blind-eyed night.

(50) And Iris brings wind or mighty rain from the sea.

(51) (Fire) swiftly rushing upwards . . .

(52) And many fires bum beneath the earth.

(53) For so it (the air) chanced to be running at that time, though often otherwise.

(54) But the air sank down upon the earth with its long roots.

(55) Sea the sweat of the earth.

(56) Salt was solidified by the impact of the sun's beams.

(57) On it (the earth) many heads sprung up without necks and arms wandered bare and deprived of shoulders. Eyes strayed up and down in want of foreheads.

(58) Solitary limbs wandered seeking for union.

(59) But, as divinity was mingled still further with divinity, these things joined together as each might chance, and many other things besides them continually arose.

(60) Clumsy creatures with countless hands.

(61) Many creatures with faces and breasts looking in different directions were born; some, offspring of oxen with faces of people, while others, again, arose as offspring of people with the heads of oxen, and creatures in whom the nature of women and men was mingled, furnished with sterile parts.

(62) Come now, hear how the Fire as it was separated caused the night-born shoots of men and tearful women to arise; for my tale is not off the point nor uninformed. Whole-natured forms first arose from the earth, having a portion both of water and fire. These did the fire, desirous of reaching its like, send up, showing as yet neither the charming form of the limbs, nor yet the voice and parts that are proper to men.

(63) . . .But the substance of (the child's) limbs is divided between them, part of it in men's (and part in women's body).

(64) And upon him came desire reminding him through sight.

(65) . . .And it was poured out in the purified parts; and when

it met with cold, women arose from it.

(66) The divided meadows of Aphrodite.

(67) For in its warmer part the womb produces males, and that is why men are dark and more manly and shaggy.

(68) On the tenth day of the eighth month it turns to a white putrefaction."

(69) Double bearing.

(70) Sheepskin.

(71) But if your assurance of these things was in any way deficient as to how, out of Water an(f Earth and Air and Fire mingled together, arose the forms and colors of all those mortal things that have been fitted together by Aphrodite, and so are now come into being...

(72) How tall trees and the fishes in the sea . . .

(73) And even as at that time Kypris, preparing warmth, after she had moistened the Earth in water, gave it to swift fire to harden it...

(74) Leading the songless tribe of fertile fish.

(75) All of those which are dense within and rare without, having received a weakness of this kind at the hands of Kypris . . . .

(76) This you may see in the heavy-backed shellfish that live in the sea, in sea-snails and the stony-skinned turtles. In them you may see that the earthy part lives on the uppermost surface of the skin.

(77-78) It is moisture that makes evergreen trees flourish with abundance of fruit the whole year round.

(79) And so first of all tall olive trees bear eggs . . . .

(80) For this reason pomegranates are late-born and apples succulent.

(81) Wine is the water from the bark, putrefied in the wood.

(82) Hair and leaves, and thick feathers of birds, and the scales that grow on mighty limbs, are the same thing.

(83) But the hair of hedgehogs is sharp-pointed and bristles on their backs.

(84) And even as when a person thinking to travel through a stormy night, gets him ready a lantern, a flame of blazing fire, fastening to it horn plates to keep out all manner of winds, and they scatter the blast of the winds that blow, but the light leaping out through them, shines across the threshold with unfailing beams, as much of it as is finer; even so did she (Love) then entrap the elemental fire, the round pupil, confined within membranes and delicate tissues, which are pierced through and through with wondrous passages. They keep out the deep water that surrounds the pupil, but they let through the fire, as much of it as is finer.

(85) But the gentle flame (of the eye) has but a scanty portion of earth.

(86) Out of these divine Aphrodite fashioned unwearying eyes.

(87) Aphrodite fitting these together with rivets of love.

(88) One vision is produced by both the eyes.

(89) Know that emanations flow from all things that have come into being.

(90) So sweet lays hold of sweet, and bitter rushes to bitter; acid comes to acid, and warm couples with warm.

(91) Water fits better into wine, but it will not (mingle) with oil.

(92) Copper mixed with tin.

(93) The bloom of scarlet dye mingles with the gray linen.

(94) And the black color at the bottom of a river arises from the shadow. The same is seen in hollow caves.

(95) Since they (the eyes) first grew together in the hands of Kypris.

(96) The kindly earth received in its broad funnels two parts of gleaming Nestis out of the eight, and four of Hephaistus. So arose white bones divinely fitted together by the cement of proportion.

(97) The spine (was broken).

(98) And the earth, anchoring in the perfect harbors of Aphrodite, meets with these in nearly equal proportions, with Hephaistus and Water and gleaming Air-either a little more of it, or less of them and more of it. From these did blood arise and the manifold forms of flesh.

(99) The bell... the fleshy sprout (of the ear).

(100) Thus do all things draw breath and breathe it out again. All have bloodless tubes of flesh extended over the surface of their bodies; and at the mouths of these the outermost surface of the skin is perforated all over with pores closely packed together, so as to keep in the blood while a free passage is cut for the. air to pass through. Then, when the thin blood recedes from these, the bubbling air rushes in with an impetuous surge; and when the blood runs back it is breathed out again. Just as when a girl, playing with a water-clock of shining brass, puts the orifice of the pipe upon her comely hand, and dips the water-clock into the yielding mass of silvery water -- the stream does not then flow into the vessel, but the bulk of the air inside, pressing upon the close-packed perforations, keeps it out till she uncovers the compressed stream; but then air escapes and an equal volume of water runs in, -- just in the same way, when water occupies the depths of the brazen vessel and the opening and passage is stopped up by the human hand, the air outside, striving to get in, holds the water back at the gates of the ill-sounding neck, pressing upon its surface, till she lets go with her hand. Then, on the contrary, just in the opposite way to what happened before, the wind rushes in and an equal volume of water runs out to make room. Even so, when the thin blood that surges through the limbs rushes backwards to the interior, immediately the stream of air comes in with a rushing swell; but when the blood runs back the air breathes out again in

equal quantity.

(101) (The dog) with its nostrils tracing out the fragments of the beast's limbs, and the breath from their feet that they leave in the soft grass.

(102) Thus all things have their share of breath and smell.

(103, 104) Thus have all things thought by fortune's will. And inasmuch as the rarest things came together in their fall.

(105) (The heart), dwelling in the sea of blood that runs in opposite directions, where chiefly is what people call thought; for the blood round the heart is the thought of people.

(106) For the wisdom of people grows according to what is before them.

(107) For out of these are all things formed and fitted together, and by these do people think and feel pleasure and pain.

(108) And just so far as they grow to be different, so far do different thoughts ever present themselves to their minds (in dreams).

(109) For it is with earth that we see Earth, and Water with water; by air we see bright Air, by fire destroying Fire. By love do we see Love, and Hate by grievous hate.

(110) For if, supported on your steadfast mind, you wilt contemplate these things with good intent and faultless care, then will you have all these things in abundance throughout your life, and you will gain many others from them. For these things grow of themselves into your heart, where is each person's true nature. But if you strive after things of another kind, as it is the way with people that ten thousand sorry matters blunt their careful thoughts, soon will these things desert you when the time comes round; for they long to return once more to their own kind; for know that all things have wisdom and a share of thought.

And you will learn all the drugs that are a defense against ills and old age; since for you alone will I accomplish all this. You will arrest the violence of the weariless winds that arise to sweep the earth and waste the fields; and again, when you so desire, you will bring back their blasts in return. You will cause for people a seasonable drought after the dark rains, and again you will change the summer drought for streams that feed the trees as they pour down from the sky. You will bring back from Hades the life of a dead person.

Purifications

(112) Friends, that inhabit the great town looking down on the yellow rock of Akragas, up by the citadel, busy in considerable works, harbors of honor for the stranger, people unskilled in meanness, all hail. I go about among you an immortal god, no mortal now, honored among all as is proper, crowned with decorations and flowery garlands. Immediately, whenever I enter with these in my train, both men and women, into the flourishing towns, is reverence done me; they go after me in countless throngs, asking of me what is the way to gain; some desiring oracles, while some, who for many a weary day have been pierced by the grievous pangs of all manner of sickness, beg to hear from me the word of healing.

(113) But why do I harp on these things, as if it were any great matter that I should surpass mortal, perishable humans?

(114) Friends, I know indeed that truth is, in the words I shall utter, but it is hard for people, and jealous are they of the assault of belief on their souls.

(115) There is an oracle of Necessity, an ancient ordinance of the gods, eternal and sealed fast by broad

oaths, that whenever one of the demons, whose portion is length of days, has sinfully polluted his hands with blood, or followed strife and forsworn himself, he must wander thrice ten thousand seasons from the abodes of the blessed, being born throughout the time in all manners of mortal forms, changing one toilsome path of life for another. For the mighty Air drives him into the Sea, and the Sea spews him on the dry Earth; Earth tosses him into the beams of the blazing Sun, and he flings him back to the eddies of Air. One takes him from the other, and all reject him. One of these I now am, an exile and a wanderer from the gods, for that I put my trust in insensate strife.

(116) Charis loathes intolerable Necessity.

(117) For I have been ere now a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird and a dumb fish in the sea.

(118) I wept and I wailed when I saw the unfamiliar land.

(119) From what honor, from what. a height of bliss have I fallen to go about among mortals here on earth.

(120) We have come under this roofed-in cave.

(121) . . . the joyless land, where are Death and Wrath and troops of Dooms besides; and parching plagues and rot and floods roam in darkness over the meadow of Ate.

(122, 123) There were Chthonie and far-sighted Heliope, bloody Discord and gentle-appearanced Harmony, Kallisto and Aischre, Speed and Tarrying, lovely Truth and dark-haired Uncertainty, Birth and Decay, Sleep and waking, Movement and Immobility, crowned Majesty and Meanness, Silence and Voice.

(124) Alas, O wretched race of mortals, sore unblessed: such are the strifes and groanings from which you have been born!

(125) From living creatures he made them dead, changing their forms.

(126) (The goddess) clothing them with a strange garment of flesh.

(127) Among beasts they become lions that make their lair on the hills and their couch on the ground; and laurels among trees with lush foliage.

(128) Nor had they any Ares for a god nor Kydoimos, no nor King Zeus nor Kronus nor Poseidon, but Kypris the Queen. . . . Her did they propitiate with holy gifts, with painted figure and perfumes of cunning fragrance, with offerings of pure myrrh and sweet-smelling frankincense, casting on the ground offerings of brown honey. And the altar did not reek with pure bull's blood, but this was held in the greatest abomination among people, to cat the considerable limbs after tearing out the life.

(129) And there was among them a person of rare knowledge, most skilled in all manner of wise works, a person who had won the utmost wealth of wisdom; for whenever he strained with all his mind, he easily saw everything of all the things that are, in ten, indeed, twenty lifetimes of people.

(130) For all things were tame and gentle to humans, both beasts and birds, and friendly feelings were kindled everywhere.

(131) If ever, as regards the things of a day, immortal Muse, you did deign to take thought for my endeavor, then stand by me once more as I pray to you, O Kalliopeia, as I utter a pure discussion concerning the blessed gods.

(132) Happy is the person who has gained the riches of divine wisdom; wretched he who has a dim opinion of the gods in his heart.

(133) It is not possible for us to set God before our eyes, or to lay hold of him with our hands, which is

the broadest way of persuasion that leads into the heart of people.

(134) For he is not furnished with a human head on his body, two branches do not sprout from his shoulders, he has no feet, no swift knees, nor hairy parts; but he is only a sacred and unutterable mind flashing through the whole world with rapid thoughts.

(135) (This is not lawful for some and unlawful for others;) but the law for all extends everywhere, through the wide-ruling air and the infinite light of heaven.

(136) Will you not cease from this ill-sounding slaughter? See you not that you are devouring one another in the thoughtlessness of your hearts?

(137) And the father lifts up his own son in a changed form and slays him with a prayer. Infatuated fool I And they run up to the sacrificers, begging mercy, while he, deaf to their cries, slaughters them in his halls and gets ready the evil feast. In like manner does the son seize his father, and children their mother, tear out their life and eat the kindred flesh.

(138) Draining their life with bronze.

(139) Ah, woe is me that the pitiless day of death did not destroy me ere ever I wrought evil deeds of devouring with my lips!

(140) Abstain wholly from laurel leaves.

(141) Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans!

(142) Him will the roofed palace of aigis-bearing Zeus never rejoice, nor yet the house of...

(143) Wash your hands, cutting the water from the five springs in the unyielding bronze

(144) Fast from wickedness!

(145) Therefore are you distraught by grievous wickednesses, and will not unburden your souls of wretched sorrows.

(146, 147) But, at the last, they appear among mortal humans as prophets, song-writers, physicians, and princes; and thence they rise up as gods highest ranking in honor, sharing the hearth of the other gods and the same table, free from human woes, safe from destiny, and incapable of hurt.

(148) . . .Earth that envelops the person.

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ANAXAGORAS

Fragments

(1) all things were together, infinite both in number and in smallness; for the small too was infinite. And, when all things were together, none of them could be distinguished for their smallness. For air and aether prevailed over all things, being both of them infinite; for among all things these are the greatest both in quantity and size.

(2) For air and aether are separated off from the mass that surrounds the world, and the surrounding mass is infinite in quantity.

(3) Nor is there a least of what is small, but there is always a smaller; for it cannot be that what is should

cease to be by being cut. But there is also always something, greater than what is great, and it is equal to the small in amount, and, compared with itself, each thing is both great and small.

(4) And since these things are so, we must suppose that there are contained many things and of all sorts in the things that are uniting, seeds of all things, with all sorts of shapes and colors and tastes, and that people have been formed in them, and the other animals that have life, and that these people have inhabited cities and cultivated fields as with us; and that they have a sun and a moon and the rest as with us; and that their earth produces for them many things of all kinds of which they gather the best together into their dwellings, and use them. Thus much have I said with regard to separating off, to show that it will not be only with us that things are separated off, but elsewhere too.

But before, they were separated off, when all things were together, not even was any color distinguishable. For the mixture of all things prevented it -- of the moist and the dry, and the warm and the cold, and the light and the dark, and of much earth that was in it, and of a multitude of innumerable seeds in no way like each other. For none of the other things either is like any other. And these things being so, we must hold that all things are in the whole.

(5) And those things having been thus decided, we must know that all of them are neither more nor less; for it is not possible for them to be more than all, and all are always equal.

(6) And since the portions of the great and of the small are equal in amount, for this reason, too, all things will be in everything; nor is it possible for them to be apart, but all things have a portion of everything. Since it is impossible for there to be a least thing, they cannot be separated, nor come to be by themselves; but they must be now, just as they were in the beginning, all together. And in all things many things are contained, and an equal number both in the greater and in the smaller of the things that are separated off.

(7) . . . So that we cannot know the number of the things that are separated off, either in word or deed.

(8) The things that are in one world are not divided nor cut off from one another with a hatchet, neither the warm from the cold nor the cold from the warm.

(9) . . . as these things revolve and are separated off by the force and swiftness. And the swiftness makes the force. Their swiftness is not like the swiftness of any of the things that are now among people, but in every way many times as swift.

(10) How can hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is not flesh?

(11) In everything there is a portion of everything except Nous, and there are some things in which there is Nous also.

(12) All other things partake in a portion of everything, while Nous is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would partake in all things if it were mixed with any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and Nous has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And all the things that are mingled together and separated off and distinguished are all known by Nous. And Nous set in order all things that were to be, and all things that were and are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and the aether

that are separated off. And this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated off from the dense, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark, and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in many things. But no thing is altogether separated off nor distinguished from anything else except Nous. And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it.

(13) And when Nous began to move things, separating off took place from all that was moved, and so much as Nous set in motion was all separated. And as things were set in motion and separated, the revolution caused them to be separated much more.

(14) And Nous, which ever is, is certainly there, where everything else is, in the surrounding mass, and in what has been united with it and separated off from it.

(15) The dense and the moist and the cold and the dark came together where the earth is now, while the rare and the warm and the dry (and the bright) went out towards the further part of the aether.

(16) From these as they are separated off earth is solidified for from mists water is separated off, and from water earth. From the earth stones are solidified by the cold, and these rush outwards more than water.

(17) The Hellenes follow a wrong usage in speaking of coming into being and passing away; for nothing comes into being or passes away, but there is mingling and separation of things that are. So they would be right to call coming into being mixture, and passing away separation.

(18) It is the sun that puts brightness into the moon.

(19) We call rainbow the reflection of the sun in the clouds. Now it is a sign of storm; for the water that flows round the cloud causes wind or pours down in rain.

(20) With the rise of the Dogstar (?) people begin the harvest with its setting they begin to till the fields. It is hidden for forty days and nights.

(21) From the weakness of our senses we are not able to judge the truth.

(21a) What appears is a vision of the unseen.

(21b) (We can make use of the lower animals) because we use our own experience and memory and wisdom and art.

(22) What is called "birds' milk" is the white of the egg.

Testimonial (Theophrastus)

But Anaxagoras says that perception is produced by opposites; for like things cannot be effected by like. He attempts to give, a detailed enumeration of the particular senses. We see by means of the image in the pupil; but no image is cast upon what is of the same color, but only on what is different. With most living creatures things are of a different color to the pupil by day, though with some this is so by night, and these are accordingly keen-sighted at that time. Speaking generally, however, night is more of the same color with the eyes than day. And an image is cast on the pupil by day, because light is a concomitant cause of the image, and because the prevailing color casts an image more readily upon its opposite.

It is in the same way that touch and taste discern their objects. That which is just as warm or just as cold as we are neither warms us nor cools us by its contact; and, in the same way, we do not apprehend the sweet and the sour by means of themselves. We know cold by warm, fresh by salt, and sweet by sour, in virtue of our deficiency in each; for all these are in us to begin with. And we smell and hear in the same manner; the former by means of the accompanying respiration, the latter by the sound penetrating to the

brain, for the bone which surrounds this is hollow, and it is upon it that the sound falls.

And an sensation implies pain, a view which would seem to be the consequence of the first assumption, for all unlike things produce pain by their contact. And this pain is made perceptible by the long continuance or by the excess of a sensation. Brilliant colors and excessive noises produce pain, and we cannot live long on the same things. The larger animals are the more sensitive, and, generally, sensation is proportionate to the size of the organs of sense. Those animals which have large, pure, and bright eyes, see large objects and from a great distance, and contrariwise.

And it is the same with hearing. Large animals can hear great and distant sounds, while less sounds pass unperceived; small animals perceive small sounds and those near at hand. It is the same too with smell. Rarefied air has more smell; for, when air is heated and rarefied, it smells. A large animal when it breathes draws in the condensed air along with the rarefied, while a small one draws in the rarefied by itself; so the large one perceives more. For smell is better perceived when it is near than when it is far by reason of its being more condensed, while when dispersed it is weak. But, roughly speaking, large animals do not perceive a rarefied smell, nor small animals a condensed one.

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ZENO

Fragments

(1) If what is had no magnitude, it would not even be... But, if it is, each one must have a certain magnitude and a certain thickness, and must be at a certain distance from another, and the same may be said of what is in front of it; for it, too, will have magnitude, and something will be in front of it. It is all the same to say this once and to say it always; for no such part of it will be the last, nor will one thing not be as compared with another. So if things are a many, they must be both small and great, so small as not to have any magnitude at all, and so great as to be infinite.

(2) For if it were added to any other thing it would not make it any larger; for nothing can gain in magnitude by the addition of what has no magnitude, and thus it follows at once that what was added was nothing. But if, when this is taken away from another thing, that thing is no less; and again, if, when it is added to another thing, that does not increase, it is plain that what was added was nothing, and what was taken away was nothing.

(3) If things are a many, they must be just as many as they are, and neither more nor less. Now, if they are as many as they are, they will be finite in number.

If things are a many, they will be infinite in number;, for there will always be other things between them, and others again between these. And so things are infinite in number.

Testimonial (paraphrased from Aristotle)

(1) You cannot cross a race-course. You cannot traverse an infinite number of points in a finite time. You must traverse the half of any given distance before you traverse the whole, and the half of that again before you can traverse it. This goes on ad infinitum, so that there are an infinite number of points in any given space, and you cannot touch an infinite number one by one in a finite time.

(2) Achilles will never overtake the tortoise. He must first reach the place from which the tortoise started.

By that time the tortoise will have got some way ahead. Achilles must then make up that, and again the tortoise will be ahead. He is always coming nearer, but he never makes up to it.

(3) The arrow in flight is at rest. For, if everything is at rest when it occupies a space equal to itself, and what is in flight at any given moment always occupies a space equal to itself, it cannot move.

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MELISSOS

Fragments

(1a) If nothing is, what can be said of it as of something real?

(1) What was was ever, and ever will be. For, if it had come into being, it needs must have been nothing before it came into being. Now, if it were nothing, in no wise could anything have arisen out of nothing.

(2) Since, then, it has not come into being, and since it is, was ever, and ever shall be, it has no beginning or end, but is without limit. For, if it had come into being, it would have had a beginning (for it would have begun to come into being at some time or other) and an end (for it would have ceased to come into being at some time or other); but, if it neither began nor ended, and ever was and ever will be, it has no beginning or end; for it is not possible for anything to be ever without all being.

(3) Further, just as it ever is, so it must ever be infinite in magnitude.

(4) But nothing which has a beginning or end is either eternal or infinite.

(5) If it were not one, it would be bounded by something else.

(6) For if it is (infinite), it must be one; for if it were two, it could not be infinite; for then they would be bounded by one another.

(6a) (And, since it is one, it is alike throughout; for if it were unlike, it would be many and not one.)

(7) So then it is eternal and infinite and one and all alike. And it cannot perish nor become greater, nor does it suffer pain or grief. For, if any of these things happened to it, it would no longer be one. For if it is altered, then the real must needs not be all alike, but what was before must pass away, and what was not must come into being. Now, if it changed by so much as a single hair in ten thousand years, it would all perish in the whole of time.

Further, it is not possible either that its order should be changed; for the order which it had before does not perish, nor does that which was not come into being. But, since nothing is either added to it or passes away or is altered, how can any real thing have had its order changed? For if anything became different, that would amount to a change in its order.

Nor does it suffer pain; for a thing in pain could not all be. For a thing in pain could not be ever, nor has it the same power as what is whole. Nor would it be alike, if it were in pain; for it is only from the addition or subtraction of something that it could feel pain, and then it would no longer be alike. Nor could what is whole feel pain; for then what was whole and what was real would pass away, and what was not would, come into being. And the same argument applies to grief as to pain.

Nor is anything empty. For what is empty is nothing. What is nothing cannot be.

Nor does it move; for it has nowhere bring itself to, but is full. For if there were anything empty, it would

bring itself to the empty. But, since there is nothing empty, it has nowhere to bring itself to.

And it cannot be dense and rare; for it is not possible for what is rare to be as full as what is dense, but what is rare is at once emptier than what is dense.

This is the way in which we must distinguish between what is full and what is not full. If a thing has room for anything else, and takes it in, it is not full; but if it has no room for anything and does not take it in, it is full.

Now, it must needs be full if there is nothing empty, and if it is full, it-does not move.

(8) This argument, then, is the greatest proof that it is one alone; but the following are proofs of it also. If there were a many, these would have to be of the same kind as I say that the one is. For if there is earth and water, and air and iron, and gold and fire, and if one thing is living and another dead, and if things are black and white and all that people say they really are,-if that is so, and if we see and hear aright, each one of these must be such as we first decided, and they cannot be changed or altered, but each must be just as it is. But, as it is, we say that we see and hear and understand aright, and yet we believe that what is warm becomes cold, and what is cold warm; that what is hard turns soft, and what is soft hard; that what is living dies, and that things are born from what lives not; and that all those things are changed, and that what they were and what they are now are in no way alike. We think that iron, which is hard, is rubbed away by contact with the finger; and so with gold and stone and everything which we fancy to be strong, and that earth and stone are made out of water; so that it turns out that we neither see nor know realities. Now these things do not agree with one another. We said that there were many things that were eternal and had forms and strength of their own, and yet we fancy that they all suffer alteration, and that they change from what we see each time. It is clear, then, that we did not see aright after all, nor are we right in believing that all these things are many. They would not change if they were real, but each thing would be just what we believed it to be; for nothing is stronger than true reality. But if it has changed, what was has passed away, and what was not is come into being. So then, if there were many things, they would have to be just of the same nature as the one.

(9) Now, if it were to exist, it must needs be one; but if it is one, it cannot have body; for, if it had body it would have parts, and would no longer be one.

(10) If what is real is divided, it moves; but if it moves, it cannot be.

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DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Fragments

(1) In the beginning any discussion, it seems to me that one should make one's starting-point something indisputable, and one's expression simple and dignified.

(2) My view is, to sum it all up, that all things are differentiations of the same thing, and are the same thing. And this is obvious; for, if the things which are now in this world-earth, and water, and air and fire, and the other things which we see existing in this world-if any one of these things, I say, were different from any other, different, that is, by having a substance peculiar to itself; and if it were not the same thing that is often changed and differentiated ' then things could not in any way mix with one

another, nor could- they do one another good or harm. Neither could a plant grow out of the earth, nor any animal nor anything else come into being unless things were composed in such a way as to be the same. But all these things arise from the same thing; they are differentiated and take different forms at different times, and return again to the same thing.

(3) For it would not be possible for it without intelligence to be so divided, as to keep the measures of all things, of winter and summer, of day and night, of rains and winds and fair weather. And any one who cares to reflect will find that everything else is disposed in the best possible manner. R. P. 210.

(4) And, further, there are still the following great proofs. Humans and all other animals live upon air by breathing it, and this is their soul and their intelligence, as will be clearly shown in this work; while, when this is taken away, they die, and their intelligence fails.

(5) And my view is, that that which has intelligence is what people call air, and that all things have their course steered by it, and that it has power over all things. For this very thing I hold to be a god," and to reach everywhere, and to dispose everything, and to be in everything; and there is not anything which does not partake in it. Yet no single thing partakes in it just in the same way as another; but there are many modes both of air and of intelligence. For it undergoes many transformations, warmer and colder, drier and moister, more stable and in swifter motion, and it has many other differentiations in it, and an infinite number of colors and tastes. And the soul of all living things is the same, namely, air warmer than that outside us and in which we are, but much colder than that near the sun. And this warmth is not alike in any two kinds of living creatures, nor, for the matter of that, in any two people; but it does not differ much, only so far as is compatible with their being alike. At the same time, it is not possible for any of the things which are differentiated to be exactly like one another till they all once more become the same.

(6) Since, then, differentiation is multiform, living creatures are multiform and many, and they are like one another neither in appearance nor in intelligence, because of the multitude of differentiations. At the same time, they all live, and see, and hear by the same thing, and they all have their intelligence from the same source.

(7) And this itself is an eternal and undying body, but of those things I some come into being and some pass away.

(8) But this, too, appears to me to be obvious, that it is both great, and mighty, and eternal, and undying, and of great knowledge.

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ARCHELAUS

Testimonial by Hippolitus

Archelaus was by birth an Athenian, and the son of Apollodorus. He spoke of the mixture of matter in a similar way to Anaxagoras, and of the first principles likewise. He held, however, that there was a certain mixture immanent even in Nous. And he held that there were two efficient causes which were separated off from one another, namely, the warm and the cold. The former was in motion, the latter at rest. When the water was liquefied it flowed to the center, and there being burnt up it turned to earth and air, the latter of which was carried upwards, while the former took up its position below. These, then, are the reasons why the earth is at rest, and why it came into being. It lies in the center, being practically no

appreciable part of the universe. (But the air rules over all things), being produced by the burning of the fire, and from its original combustion comes the substance of the heavenly bodies. Of these the sun is the largest, and the moon second; the rest are of various sizes. He says that the heavens were inclined, and that then the sun made fight upon the earth, made the air transparent, and the earth dry; for it was originally a pond, being high at the circumference and hollow in the center. He adduces as a proof of this hollowness that the sun does not rise and set at the same time for all peoples, as it ought to do if the earth were level. As to animals, he says that when the earth was first being warm in the lower part where the warm and the cold were mingled together, many living creatures appeared, and especially people, all having the same manner of life, and deriving their sustenance from the slime; they did not live long, and later on generation from one another began. And people were distinguished from the rest, and set up leaders, and laws, and arts, and cities, and so forth. And he says that Nous is implanted in all animals alike; for each of the animals, as well as humans, makes use of Nous, but some quicker and some slower.

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Notes

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Presocratic Fragments and Testimonials

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ANAXIMANDER

Testimonials

(1) Anaximander of Miletus, son of Praxiades, a fellow-citizen and associate of Thales, said that the material cause and first element of things was the Infinite, he being the first to introduce this name of the material cause. He says it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but a substance different from them which is infinite, from which arise all the heavens and the worlds within them. (Theophrastus, <Phys>. <Op>. fr. 2)

(2) He says that this is " eternal and ageless," and that it " encompasses all the worlds." (Hippolytus <Ref>. i. 6)

(3) And into that from which things take their rise they pass away once more, " as is proper; for they make reparation and satisfaction to one another for their injustice according to the ordering of time," as he says in

these somewhat poetical terms. (Theophrastus <Phys>. <Op>. fr. 2)

(4) And besides this, there was an eternal motion, in which was brought about the origin of the worlds. (Hippolytus <Ref>. i. 6)

(5) He did not ascribe the origin of things to any alteration in matter, but said that the oppositions in the substratum, which was a boundless body, were separated out. (Simplicius <Phys>. P. 3150, 20)

(6) Further, there cannot be a single, simple body which is infinite, either, as some hold, one distinct from the elements, which they then derive from it, or without this qualification. For there are some who make this (i.e. a body distinct from the elements) the infinite, and not air or water,- in order that the other things may not be destroyed by their infinity. They are in opposition one to another-air is cold, water moist, and fire hot-and therefore, if any one of them were infinite, the rest would have ceased to be by this time. Accordingly they say that what is infinite is something other than the elements, and from it the elements arise. (Aristotle, <Phys>. 204b 22)

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ANAXIMENES

Testimonials

(1) Anaximenes of Miletus, son of Eurystratos, who had been an associate of Anaximander, said, like him, that the underlying substance was one and infinite. He did not, however, say it was indeterminate, like Anaximander, but determinate; for he said it was Air. (Theophrastus, <Phys>. <Op>. fr. 2)

(2) From it, he said, the things that are, and have been, and will be, the gods and things divine, took their rise, while other things come from its offspring. (Hippolytus <Ref>. i. 7)

(3) "Just as," he said, "our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world." (Aet. i. 3, 4)

(4) And the form of the air is as follows. Where it is most even, it is invisible to our sight; but cold and heat, moisture and motion, make it visible. It is always in motion; for, if it were not, it would not change so much as it does. (Hippolytus <Ref>. i. 7)

(5) It differs in different substances in virtue of its rarefaction and condensation. (Theophrastus, <Phys>. <Op>. fr. 2)

(6) When it is dilated so as to be rarer, it becomes fire; while winds, on the other hand, are condensed Air. Cloud is formed from Air by felting; and this, still further condensed, becomes water. Water, condensed still more, turns to earth; and when condensed as much as it can be, to stones. (Hippolytus <Ref>. i. 7)

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XENOPHANES

Fragments (Elegies)

(1) Now is the floor clean, and the hands and cups of all; one sets twisted garlands on our heads, another hands us fragrant ointment on a salver. The mixing bowl stands ready, full of gladness, and there is more wine at hand that promises never to leave us in the lurch, soft and smelling of flowers in the jars. In the midst the frankincense sends up its holy scent, and there is cold water, sweet and clean. Brown loaves are set before us and a lordly table laden with cheese and rich honey. The altar in the midst is clustered round with flowers; song and festivity fill the halls.

But first it is proper that people should sing to the god with joy, with holy tales and pure words; then after offerings and prayer made that we may have strength to do right -- for that is in truth the first thing to do -- no sin is it to drink as much as a person can take and get home without an attendant, so he be not stricken in years. And of all people is he to be praised who after drinking gives considerable proof of himself in the trial of skill, as memory and strength will serve him. Let him not sing of Titans and Giants -- those fictions of the people of old -- nor of turbulent civil battles in which is no good thing at all; but to give heedful reverence to the gods is always good.

(2) What if a person wins victory in swiftness of foot, or in the pentathlon, at Olympia, where is the region of Zeus by Pisa's springs, or in wrestling -- what if by cruel boxing or that fearful sport people call pankration he become more glorious in the citizens' eyes, and win a place of honor in the sight of all at the games, his food-at the public cost from the state, and a gift to be an heirloom for him-what if he conquer in the chariot-race -- he win not deserve all this for his portion so much as I do. Far better is our art than the strength of men and of horses! These are but thoughtless judgments, nor is it fitting to set strength before considerable art. Even if there arise a mighty boxer among a people, or one great in the pentathlon or at wrestling, or one excelling in swiftness of foot -- and that stands in honor before all tasks of people at the games -- the city would be none the better governed for that. It is but little joy a city gets of it if a person conquer at the games by Pisa's banks; it is not this that makes fat the store-houses of a city.

(3) They learnt dainty and unprofitable ways from the Lydians, so long as they were free from hateful tyranny; they went to the market-place with cloaks of purple dye, not less than a thousand of them all told, conceited and proud of their shapely locks of hair, fragrant from salves.

(4) Nor would a person mix wine in a cup by pouring out the wine first, but water first and wine on the top of it.

(5) You did send the thigh-bone of a kid and get for it the fat leg of a fatted bull, a worthy compensation for a person to get, whose glory is to reach every part of Hellas and never to pass away, so long as Greek songs last.

(7) And now I will turn to another tale and point the way. . . . Once they say that he (Pythagoras) was passing by when a dog was being beaten and spoke this word: "Stop! Don't beat it! For it is the soul of a friend that I recognized when I heard its voice."

(8) There are by this time threescore years and seven that have tossed my careworn soul up and down the land of Hellas; and there were then five-and-twenty years from my birth, if I can say anything truly about these matters.

(9) Much weaker than an aged person.

Fragments (Satires)

(10) Since all at first have learnt according to Homer. . . .

(11) Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace among mortals, stealings and adulteries and deceivings of one another.

(12) Since they have uttered many lawless deeds of the gods, stealings and adulteries and deceivings of one another.

(14) But mortals deem that the gods are begotten as they are, and have clothes like theirs, and voice and form.

(15) Yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and could paint with their hands, and produce works of art as people do, horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several kinds.

(16) The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs have blue eyes and red hair.

(18) The gods have not revealed all things to people from the beginning, but by seeking they find in time what is better.

(23) One god, the greatest among gods and humans, neither in form like unto mortals nor in thought. . . .

(24) He sees all over, thinks all over, and hears all over.

(25) But without toil he sways all things by the thought of his mind.

(26) And he abides ever in the selfsame place, moving not at all; nor does it befit him to go about now here, now there.

(27) all things come from the earth, and in earth all things end.

(28) This limit of the earth above is seen at our feet in contact with the air; below it reaches down without a

limit.

(29) All things are earth and water that come into being and grow.

(30) The sea is the source of water and the source of wind; for neither in the clouds (would there be any blasts of wind blowing) from within without the mighty sea, nor rivers' streams nor rain-water from the sky. The mighty sea is father of clouds and of winds and of rivers.

(31) The sun swinging over the earth and warming it. . . .

(32) She that they call Iris is a cloud likewise, purple, scarlet and green to observe.

(33) For we all are born of earth and water.

(34) There never was nor will be a person who has certain knowledge about the gods and about all the things I speak of. Even if he should chance to say the complete truth, yet he himself knows not that it is so. But all may have their fancy.

(35) Let these be taken as fancies something like the truth.

(36) all of them that are visible for mortals to observe.

(37) And in some caves water drips. . . .

(38) If god had not made brown honey, people would think that figs are far sweeter than they do think of about them.

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HERACLITUS

Fragments

(1) It is wise to listen, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess that all things are one.

(2) Though this word is true always, yet people are as unable to understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in accordance with this Word, people seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of words and deeds such as I establish, dividing each thing according to its kind and showing how it truly is. But other people know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what they do in sleep.

(3) Fools when they do hear are like the deaf: of them does the saying bear witness that they are absent when present.

(4) Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to people if they

have souls that understand not their language.

(5) The many do not take heed of such things as they meet with, nor do they mark them when they are taught, though they think they do.

(6) Knowing not how to listen nor how to speak.

(7) If you do not expect the unexpected, you will not find it for it is hard to be sought out and difficult.

(8) Those who seek for gold dig up much earth and find a little.

(10) Nature loves to hide.

(11) The lord whose is the oracle at Delphi neither utters nor hides his meaning, but shows it by a sign.

(12) And the Sibyl, with raving lips uttering things mirthless, unadorned, and unperfumed, reaches over a thousand years with her voice, thanks to the god in her.

(13) The things that can be seen, heard, and learned are what I prize the most.

(14) . . . bringing untrustworthy witnesses in support of disputed points.

(15) The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears.

(16) The learning of many things teaches not understanding, else would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hekataius.

(17) Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practiced scientific inquiry beyond all other people, and malting a selection of these writings, claimed for his own wisdom what was but a knowledge of many things and an imposture.

(18) Of all whose discussions I have heard, there is not one who attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all.

(19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things.

(20) This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or humans has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever will be an ever-living Fire, with measures of it kindling, and measures going out.

(21) The transformations of Fire are, first of all, sea; and half of the sea is earth, half whirlwind.

(22) all things are an exchange for Fire, and Fire for all things, even as wares for gold and gold for wares.

(23) It becomes liquid sea, and is measured by the same tale as before it became earth.

(24) Fire is want and excess.

(25) Fire lives the death of air, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of earth, earth that of water.

(26) Fire in its advance will judge and convict all things.

(27) How can one hide from that which never sets?

(28) It is the thunderbolt that steers the course of all things.

(29) The sun will not overstep his measures; if he does, the Erinyes, the handmaids of justice, will find him out.

(30) The limit of dawn and evening is the Bear; and opposite the Bear is the boundary of bright Zeus.

(31) If there were no sun it would be night, for all the other stars could do.

(32) The sun is new every day.

(33) Thales foretold an eclipse.

(34) . . . the seasons that bring all things.

(35) Hesiod is most people's teacher. People are sure he knew very many things, a man who did not know day or night! They are one.

(36) God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger; but he takes various shapes, just as fire, when it is mingled with spices, is named according to the taste of each.

(37) If all things were turned to smoke, the nostrils would distinguish them.

(38) Souls smell in Hades.

(39) Cold things become warm, and what is warm cools; what is wet dries, and the parched is moistened.

(40) It scatters and it gathers; it advances and retires. (41, 42) You cannot step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you.

(43) Homer was wrong in saying: "Would that strife might perish from among gods and humans!" He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away. . . .

(44) War is the father of all and the king of all; and some he has made gods and some humans, some bond and some free.

(45) People do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an attunement of opposite tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre.

(46) It is the opposite which is good for us.

(47) The hidden attunement is better than the open.

(48) Let us not conjecture at random about the greatest things.

(49) People that love wisdom must be acquainted with very many things indeed.

(50) The straight and the crooked path of the fuller's comb is one and the same.

(51) Asses would rather have straw than gold.

(51a) Oxen are happy when they find bitter vetches to eat.

(52) The sea is the purest and the impurest water. Fish can drink it, and it is good for them; to people it is undrinkable and destructive.

(53) Swine wash in the mire, and barnyard fowls in dust.

(54) . . . to delight in the mire.

(55) Every beast is driven to pasture with blows.

(56) [Same as 45.]

(57) Good and ill are one.

(58) Physicians who cut, bum, stab, and rack the sick, demand a fee for it which they do not deserve to get.

(59) Couples are things whole and things not whole, what is drawn together and what is drawn asunder, the harmonious and the discordant. The one is made up of all things, and all things issue from the one.

(60) People would not have known the name of justice if these things were not.

(61) To God all things are fair and good and right, but people hold some things wrong and some right.

(62) We must know that war is common to all and strife is justice, and that all things come into being and pass away (?) through strife.

(64) all the things we see when awake are death, even as all we see in slumber are sleep.

(65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus.

(66) The bow is called life, but its work is death.

(67) Mortals are immortals and immortals are mortals, the one. Living the others' death and dying the others' life.

(68) For it is death to souls to become water, and death to water to become earth. But water comes from earth; and from water, soul.

(69) The way up and the way down is one and the same.

(70) In the circumference of a circle the beginning and end are common.

(71) You will not find the boundaries of soul by traveling in any direction, so deep is the measure of it."

(72) It is pleasure to souls to become moist.

(73) A person, when he gets drunk, is led by a beardless lad, tripping, knowing not where he steps, having his soul moist.

(74-76) The dry soul is the wisest and best.

(77) People set a light for themselves in the night-time, when they have died but are alive. The sleeper, whose vision has been put out, lights up from the dead; he that is awake lights up from the sleeping.

(78) And it is the same thing in us that is quick and dead, awake and asleep, young and old; the former are shifted and become the latter, and the latter in turn are shifted and become the former.

(79) Time is a child playing checkers, the kingly power is a child's.

(80) I have sought for myself.

(81) We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not.

(82) It is a weariness to labor for the same masters and be ruled by them.

(83) It rests by changing.

(84) Even the posset separates if it is not stirred.

(85) Corpses are more fit to be cast out than dung.

(86) When they are born, they wish to live and to meet with their dooms -- or rather to rest -- and they leave children behind them to meet with their dooms in turn.

(87-89) A man may be a grandfather in thirty years.

(90) Those who are asleep are fellow-workers (in what goes on in the world).

(91a) Thought is common to all.

(91b) Those who speak with understanding must hold fast to what is common to all as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by the one divine law. It prevails as much as it will, and suffices for all things with something to spare.

(92) So we must follow the common, yet though my Word is common, the many live as if they had a wisdom of their own.

(93) They are estranged from that with which they have most constant intercourse.

(94) It is not proper to act and speak like people asleep.

(95) The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own.

(96) The way of humans has no wisdom, but that of God has.

(97) People are called babies by God, even as a child by a person.

(98, 99) The wisest person is an ape compared to God, just as the most beautiful ape is ugly compared to humans.

(100) The people must fight for its law as for its walls.

(101) Greater deaths win greater portions.

(102) Gods and humans honor those who are slain in battle.

(103) Wantonness needs putting out, even more than a house on fire.

(104) It is not good for people to get all they wish to get. It is sickness that makes health pleasant; evil, good; hunger, plenty; weariness, rest.

(105-107) It is hard to fight with one's heart's desire. Whatever it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul.

(108, 109) It is best to hide folly; but it is hard in times of relaxation, over our cups.

(110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one.

(111) For what thought or wisdom have they? They follow the poets and take the crowd as their teacher, knowing not that there are many bad and few good. For even the best of them choose one thing above all others, immortal glory among mortals, while most of them are glutted like beasts.

(112) In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutamas, who is of more account than the rest. (He said, "Most people are bad.")

(113) One is ten thousand to me, if he be the best.

(114) The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown person of them, and leave the city to beardless lads; for they have cast out Hermodorus, the best person among them, saying, "We will have none who is best among us; if there be any such, let him be so elsewhere and among others."

(115) Dogs bark at every one they do not know.

(116) . . . (The wise person) is not known because of people's want of belief.

(117) The fool is fluttered at every word.

(118) The most esteemed of them knows but fancies, and holds fast to them, yet of a truth justice will overtake the artificers of lies and the false witnesses.

(119) Homer should be turned out of the lists and whipped, and Archilochus likewise.

(120) One day is like any other.

(121) A person's character is his fate.

(122) There awaits people when they die such things as they look not for nor dream of.

(123) . . . that they rise up and become the wakeful guardians of the quick and dead.

(124) Night-walkers, Magians, Bakchoi, Lenai, and the initiated . . .

(125) The mysteries practiced among people are unholy mysteries.

(126) And they pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a person's house, knowing not what gods or heroes are.

(127) For if it were not to Dionysus that they made a procession and sang the shameful phallic hymn, they would be acting most shamelessly. But Hades is the same as Dionysus in whose honor they go mad and rave.

(129, 130) They vainly purify themselves by defiling themselves with blood, just as if one who had stepped into the mud were to wash his feet in mud. Any person who marked him doing thus, would deem him mad.

* * * *

PARMENIDES

Fragments from <On Nature>

(1) The car that bears me carried me as far as ever my heart desired, when it had brought me and set me on the renowned way of the goddess, which leads the man who knows through all the towns. On that way was I carried along; for on it the wise steeds carried me, drawing my car, and maidens showed the way. And the axle, glowing in the socket -- for it was urged round by the whirling wheels at each end -- gave a sound like a pipe, when the daughters of the Sun, to convey me into the light, threw back their veils from off their faces and left the abode of Night.

There are the gates of the ways of Night and Day, fitted above with a lintel and below with a threshold of stone. They themselves, high in the air, are closed by mighty doors, and Avenging justice keeps the keys that fit them. Her did the maidens entreat with gentle words and cunningly persuade to unfasten without demur the bolted bars from the gates. Then, when the doors were thrown back, they disclosed a wide opening, when their brazen posts fitted with rivets and nails swung back one after the other. Straight through them, on the broad way, did the maidens guide the horses and the car, and the goddess greeted me kindly, and took my right hand in hers, and spoke to me these words:

Welcome, O youth, that come to my abode on the car that bears you tended by immortal charioteers! It is no ill chance, but right and justice that has sent you to travel on this way. Far, indeed, does it lie from the beaten track of people! It is proper for you to learn all things, as well the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth, as the opinions of mortals in which is no true belief at all. Yet none the less will you learn these things also, -- how passing right through all things one should judge the things that seem to be.

But do you restrain your thought from this way of inquiry, nor let habit by its much experience force you to cast upon this way a wandering eye or sounding ear or tongue; but judge by argument the much disputed proof uttered by me. There is only one way left that can be spoken of ...

<The Way of Truth>

(2) Look steadfastly with your mind at things though afar as if they were at hand. You can not cut off what is from holding fast to what is, neither scattering itself abroad in order nor coming together.

(3) It is all one to me where I begin; for I will come back again there.

(4, 5) Come now, I will tell you -- and do you listen to my saying and carry it away -- the only two ways of search that can be thought of. The first, namely, that <it is>, and that it is impossible for it not to be, is the way of belief, for truth is its companion. The other, namely, that <it is not>, and that it must needs not be,-that, I

tell you, is a path that none can learn of at all. For you can not know what is not-that is impossible-nor utter it; for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be.

(6) It must be that what can be spoken and thought is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is nothing to be. This is what I bid you ponder. I hold you back from this first way of inquiry, and from this other also, upon which mortals knowing nothing wander two-faced; for helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts, so that they are carried along stupefied like people deaf and blind. Unreasonable crowds, who hold that it is and is not the same and not the same, all things travel in opposite directions!

(7) For this will never be proved, that the things that are not are; and do you restrain your thought from this way of inquiry.

(8) One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that <it is>. In this path are very many tokens that what is is uncreated and indestructible; for it is complete, immovable, and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one. For what kind of origin for it will you look for? In what way and from what source could it have drawn its increase? . . . I will not let you say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be thought nor uttered that anything is not. And, if it came from nothing, what need could have made it arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at all. Nor will the force of truth suffer anything to arise besides itself from that which is not. For this reason, justice does not loose her fetters and let anything come into being or pass away, but holds it fast. Our judgment thereon depends on this: "Is it or is it not?" Surely it is decided, as it must be, that we are to set aside the one way as unthinkable and nameless (for it is no true way), and that the other path is real and true. How, then, can what is be going to be in the future? Or how could it come into being? If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future. Thus is becoming extinguished and passing away not to be heard of.

Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, and there is no more of it in one place than in another, to hinder it from holding together, nor less of it, but everything is full of what is. For this reason it is wholly continuous; for what is, is in contact with what is.

Moreover, it is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without beginning and without end; since coming into being and passing away have been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away. It is the same, and it rests in the self-same place, abiding in itself. And thus it remains constant in its place; for hard necessity keeps it in the bonds of the limit that holds it fast on every side. For this reason it is not permitted to what is to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing; while, if it were infinite, it would stand in need of everything.

The thing that can be thought and that for the sake of which the thought exists is the same; for you cannot find thought without something that is, as to which it is uttered. And there is not, and never will be, anything besides what is, since fate has chained it so as to be whole and immovable. For this reason all these things are but names which mortals have given, believing them to be true-coming into being and passing away, being and not being, change of place and alteration of bright color.

Since, then, it has a furthest limit, it is complete on every side, like the mass of a rounded sphere, equally poised from the center in every direction; for it cannot be greater or smaller in one place than in another. For there is no nothing that could keep it from reaching out equally, nor can anything that is be more here and less there than what is, since it is all inviolable. For the point from which it is equal in every direction tends equally to the limits.

<The Way of Belief>

Here will I close my trustworthy speech and thought about the truth. In the future, learn the beliefs of mortals, giving ear to the deceptive ordering of my words.

Mortals have made up their minds to name two forms, one of which they should not name, and that is where they go astray from the truth. They have distinguished them as opposite in form, and have assigned to them marks distinct from one another. To the one they give out the fire of heaven, gentle, very light, in every direction the same as itself, but not the same as the other. The other is just the opposite to it, dark night, a compact and heavy body. Of these I tell you the whole arrangement as it seems likely; for so no thought of mortals will ever outstrip you.

(9) Now that all things have been named light and night, and the names which belong to the power of each have been assigned to these things and to those, everything is full at once of light and dark night, both equal, since neither has anything to do with the other.

(10, 11) And you will know the substance of the sky, and all the signs in the sky, and the radiant works of the glowing sun's pure torch, and from where they arose. And you will learn likewise of the wandering deeds of the round-faced moon, and of her substance. You will know, too, the heavens that surround us, from where they arose, and how Necessity took them and bound them to keep the limits of the stars . . . how the earth, and the sun, and the moon, and the sky that is common to all, and the Milky Way, and the outermost Olympus, and the burning might of the stars arose.

(12) The narrower bands were filled with unmixed fire, and those next them with night, and in the midst of these rushes their portion of fire. In the midst of these is the divinity that directs the course of all things; for she is the beginner of all painful birth and all propagation, driving the female to the embrace of the male, and the male to that of the female.

(13) First of all the gods she contrived Eros.

(14) Shining by night with borrowed light, wandering round the earth.

(15) Always looking to the beams of the sun.

(16) For just as thought stands at any time to the mixture of its, erring organs, so does it come to people; for that which thinks is the same, namely, the substance of the limbs, in each and every person; for their thought is that of which there is more in them.

(17) On the right boys; on the left girls.

(19) Thus, according to people's opinions, did things come into being, and thus they are now. In time they will grow up and pass away. To each of these things people have assigned a fixed name.

* * * *

EMPEDOCLES

Fragments

(1) And do you give ear, Pausanias, son of Anchitus the wise!

(2) For straitened are the powers that are spread over their bodily parts, and many are the woes that burst in on them and blunt the edge of their careful thoughts! They observe but a brief span of a life that is no life, and, doomed to swift death, are taken up and fly off like smoke. Each is convinced of that alone which he had chanced upon as he is hurried every way, and idly boasts he has found the whole. So hardly can these things be seen by the eyes or heard by the ears of people, so hardly grasped by their mind! Nevertheless, you, since you have found your way hither, will learn no more than mortal mind has power.

(3) . . . to keep within your dumb heart.

(4) But, O you gods, turn aside from my tongue the madness of those people. Bless my lips and make a pure stream flow from them I And you, much-wooed, white-armed Virgin Muse, do I urge that I may hear what is lawful for the children of a day I Speed me on my way from the abode of holiness and drive my willing car! You will not lift garlands of glory and honor at the hands of mortals on condition of speaking in your pride beyond that which is lawful and right, and so to gain a seat upon the heights of wisdom.

Go to now, consider with all your powers in what way each thing is clear. Hold not your sight in greater credit as compared with your hearing, nor value your resounding ear above the dear instructions of your tongue; and do not withhold your confidence in any of your other bodily parts by which there is an opening for understanding, but consider

everything in the way it is clear.

(5) But it is all too much the way of low minds to disbelieve those better. Do you learn as the sure testimonies of my Muse bid you, when my words have been divided in your heart.

(6) Hear first the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis whose tear-drops are a well-spring to mortals.

(7) . . .uncreated.

(8) And I will tell you another thing. There is no substance of any of all the things that die, nor any cessation for them of depraved death. They are only a mingling and interchange of what has been mingled. Substance is but a name given to these things by people.

(9) But they (hold?) that when Light and Air (chance?) to have been mingled in the fashion of a human, or in the fashion of the race of wild beasts or of plants or birds, that that is to be born, and when these things have been separated once more, they call it (wrongly?) woeful death. I follow the custom and call it so myself.

(10) Avenging death.

(11, 12) Fools! for they have no far-reaching thoughts, who deem that what before was not comes into being, or that anything can perish and be utterly destroyed. For it cannot be that anything can arise from what in no way is, and it is impossible and unheard of that what is should perish; for it will always be, wherever one may keep putting it.

(13) And in the all there is nothing empty and nothing too full.

(14) In the all there is nothing empty. From where, then, could anything come to increase it?

(15) A person who is wise in such matters would never surmise in his heart that as long as mortals have what they call their life, so long they are, and suffer good and bad; while before they were formed and after they have been dissolved they are just nothing at all.

(16) For even as they (Strife and Love) were previously, so too they will be; nor ever, methinks, will boundless time be emptied of that pair.

(17) I will tell you a twofold tale. At one time it grew to be one only out of many; at another, it divided up to be many instead of one. There is a double becoming of perishable things and a double passing away. The coming together of all things brings one generation into being and destroys it; the other grows up and is scattered as things become divided. And these things never cease continually changing places, at one time all uniting in one through Love, at another each carried in different directions by the repulsion of Strife. Thus, as far as it is their nature to

grow into one out of many, and to become many once more when the one is parted asunder, so far they come into being and their life abides not. But, inasmuch as they never cease changing their places continually, so far they are ever immovable as they go round the circle of existence.

But come, listen to my words, for it is learning that increases wisdom. As I said before, when I declared the heads of my discussion, I will tell you a twofold tale. At one time it grew together to be one only out of many, at another it parted asunder so as to be many instead of one; Fire and Water and Earth and the mighty height of Air; dread Strife, too, apart from these, of equal weight to each, and Love in their midst, equal in length and breadth. Her do you contemplate with your mind, nor sit with dazed eyes. It is she that is known as being implanted in the frame of mortals. It is she that makes them have thoughts of love and work the works of peace. They call her by the names of joy and Aphrodite. Her has no mortal yet marked moving round among them, but do you attend to the undeceitful ordering of my discussion.

For all these are equal and alike in age, yet each has a different prerogative and its own peculiar nature, but they gain the upper hand in turn when the time comes round. And nothing comes into being besides these, nor do they pass away; for, if they had been passing away continually, they would not be now, and what could increase this all and from where could it come? How, too, could it perish, since no place is empty of these things? There are these alone; but, running through one another, they become now this, now that, and like things always.

(18) Love.

(19) Clinging love. Love.

(20) This (the contest of Love and Strife) is manifest in the mass of mortal limbs. At one time all the limbs that are the body's portion are brought together by Love in blooming life's high Season; at another, severed by cruel Strife, they wander each alone by the breakers of life's sea. It is the same with plants and the fish that make their homes in the waters, with the beasts that have their lairs on the hills and the seabirds that sail on wings.

(21) Come now, look at the things that bear witness to my earlier discussion, if so be that there was any shortcoming as to their form in the earlier list. Observe the sun, everywhere bright and warm, and all the immortal things that are bathed in heat and bright radiance. Observe the rain, everywhere dark and cold; and from the earth issue things close-pressed and solid. When they are in strife all these are different in form and separated; but they come together in love, and are desired by one another.

For out of these have sprung all things that were and are and will be-trees and men and women, beasts and birds and the fishes that live in the waters, yea, and the gods that live long lives and are highest ranking in honor.

For there are these alone; but, running through one another, they take different shapes -- so much does mixture change them.

(22) For all of these -- sun, earth, sky, and sea -- are at one with all their parts that are cast far and wide from them in mortal things. And even so all things that are more adapted for mixture are like to one another and united in love by Aphrodite. Those things, again, that differ most in origin, mixture and the forms imprinted on each, are most hostile, being altogether unaccustomed to unite and very sorry by the bidding of Strife, since it has wrought their birth.

(23) Just as when painters are elaborating temple-offerings, people whom wisdom has well taught their art, -- they, when they have taken pigments of many colors with their hands, mix them in due proportion, more of some and less of others, and from them produce shapes like unto all things, making trees and men and women, beasts and birds and fishes that live in the waters, yea, and gods, that live long lives, and are highest ranking in honor -- so don't let the error prevail over your mind, that there is any other source of all the perishable creatures that appear in countless numbers. Know this for sure, for you have heard the tale from a goddess.

(24) Stepping from summit to summit, not to travel only one path of words to the end. . . .

(25) What is right may well be said even twice.

(26) For they prevail in turn as the circle comes round, and pass into one another, and grow great in their appointed turn.

There are these alone; but, running through one another, they become people and the tribes of beasts. At one time they are all brought together into one order by Love; at another, they are carried each in different directions by the repulsion of Strife, till they grow once more into one and are wholly subdued. Thus in so far as they are wont to grow into one out of many, and again divided become more than one, so far they come into being and their life is not lasting; but in so far as they never cease changing continually, so far are they always, immovable in the circle.

(27) There (1n the sphere) are distinguished neither the swift limbs of the sun, no, nor the shaggy earth in its might, nor the sea, -- so fast was the god bound in the close covering of Harmony, spherical and round, rejoicing in his circular solitude.

(27a) There is no discord and no unseemly strife in his limbs.

(28) But he was equal on every side and quite without end, spherical and round, rejoicing in his circular solitude.

(29) Two branches do not spring from his back, he has no feet, no swift knees, no fruitful parts; but he was spherical and equal on every side.

(30, 31) But when Strife was grown great in the limbs of the god and sprang to claim his prerogatives, in the fullness of the alternate time set for them by the mighty oath, . . . for all the limbs of the god in turn quaked.

(32) The joint binds two things.

(33) Even as when fig juice rivets and binds white milk ...

(34) Cementing meal with water ...

(35, 36) But now I will retrace my steps over the paths of song that I have traveled before, drawing from my saying a new saying. When Strife was fallen to the lowest depth of the vortex, and Love had reached to the center of the whirl, in it do all things come together so as to be one only; not all at once, but coming together at their will each from different quarters; and, as they mingled, strife began to pass out to the furthest limit. Yet many things remained unmixed, alternating with the things that were being mixed, namely, all that Strife not fallen yet retained; for it had not yet altogether retired perfectly from them to the outermost boundaries of the circle. Some of it still remained within, and some had passed out from the limbs of the All. But in proportion as it kept rushing out, a soft, immortal stream of blameless Love kept running in, and immediately those things became mortal which had been immortal before, those things were mixed that had before been unmixed, each changing its path. And, as they mingled, countless tribes of mortal creatures were scattered abroad endowed with all manner of forms, a wonder to observe.

(37) Earth increases its own mass, and Air swells the bulk of Air.

(38) Come, I will now tell you first of all the beginning of the sun, and the sources from which have sprung all the things we now observe, the earth and the billowy sea, the damp vapor and the Titan air that binds his circle fast round all things.

(39) If the depths of the earth and the vast air were infinite, a foolish saying which has been vainly dropped from the lips of many mortals, though they have seen but a little of the all ...

(40) The sharp-darting sun and the gentle moon.

(41) But (the sunlight) is gathered together and circles round the mighty heavens.

(42) And she cuts off his rays as he goes above her, and casts a shadow on as much of the earth as is the breadth of the pale-faced moon.

(43) Even so the sunbeam, having struck the broad and

mighty circle of the moon, returns at once, running so as to reach the sky.

(44) It flashes back to Olympus with untroubled appearance.

(45, 46) There circles round the earth a round borrowed light, as the nave of the wheel circles round the furthest (goal).

(47) For she gazes at the sacred circle of the lordly sun opposite.

(48) It is the earth that makes night by coming before the lights.

(49) . . .of solitary, blind-eyed night.

(50) And Iris brings wind or mighty rain from the sea.

(51) (Fire) swiftly rushing upwards . . .

(52) And many fires bum beneath the earth.

(53) For so it (the air) chanced to be running at that time, though often otherwise.

(54) But the air sank down upon the earth with its long roots.

(55) Sea the sweat of the earth.

(56) Salt was solidified by the impact of the sun's beams.

(57) On it (the earth) many heads sprung up without necks and arms wandered bare and deprived of shoulders. Eyes strayed up and down in want of foreheads.

(58) Solitary limbs wandered seeking for union.

(59) But, as divinity was mingled still further with divinity, these things joined together as each might chance, and many other things besides them continually arose.

(60) Clumsy creatures with countless hands.

(61) Many creatures with faces and breasts looking in different directions were born; some, offspring of oxen with faces of people, while others, again, arose as offspring of people with the heads of oxen, and creatures in whom the nature of women and men was mingled, furnished with sterile parts.

(62) Come now, hear how the Fire as it was separated caused the night-born shoots of men and tearful women to arise; for my tale is not off the point nor uninformed. Whole-natured forms first arose from the earth, having a portion both of water and fire. These did the fire, desirous of reaching its like, send up, showing as yet neither the charming form of the limbs, nor yet the voice and parts that

are proper to men.

(63) . . .But the substance of (the child's) limbs is divided between them, part of it in men's (and part in women's body).

(64) And upon him came desire reminding him through sight.

(65) . . .And it was poured out in the purified parts; and when it met with cold, women arose from it.

(66) The divided meadows of Aphrodite.

(67) For in its warmer part the womb produces males, and that is why men are dark and more manly and shaggy.

(68) On the tenth day of the eighth month it turns to a white putrefaction."

(69) Double bearing.

(70) Sheepskin.

(71) But if your assurance of these things was in any way deficient as to how, out of Water an(f Earth and Air and Fire mingled together, arose the forms and colors of all those mortal things that have been fitted together by Aphrodite, and so are now come into being...

(72) How tall trees and the fishes in the sea . . .

(73) And even as at that time Kypris, preparing warmth, after she had moistened the Earth in water, gave it to swift fire to harden it...

(74) Leading the songless tribe of fertile fish.

(75) All of those which are dense within and rare without, having received a weakness of this kind at the hands of Kypris . . . .

(76) This you may see in the heavy-backed shellfish that live in the sea, in sea-snails and the stony-skinned turtles. In them you may see that the earthy part lives on the uppermost surface of the skin.

(77-78) It is moisture that makes evergreen trees flourish with abundance of fruit the whole year round.

(79) And so first of all tall olive trees bear eggs . . . .

(80) For this reason pomegranates are late-born and apples succulent.

(81) Wine is the water from the bark, putrefied in the wood.

(82) Hair and leaves, and thick feathers of birds, and the scales that grow on mighty limbs, are the same thing.

(83) But the hair of hedgehogs is sharp-pointed and bristles on their backs.

(84) And even as when a person thinking to travel through a stormy night, gets him ready a lantern, a flame of blazing fire, fastening to it horn plates to keep out all manner of winds, and they scatter the blast of the winds that blow, but the light leaping out through them, shines across the threshold with unfailing beams, as much of it as is finer; even so did she (Love) then entrap the elemental fire, the round pupil, confined within membranes and delicate tissues, which are pierced through and through with wondrous passages. They keep out the deep water that surrounds the pupil, but they let through the fire, as much of it as is finer.

(85) But the gentle flame (of the eye) has but a scanty portion of earth.

(86) Out of these divine Aphrodite fashioned unwearying eyes.

(87) Aphrodite fitting these together with rivets of love.

(88) One vision is produced by both the eyes.

(89) Know that emanations flow from all things that have come into being.

(90) So sweet lays hold of sweet, and bitter rushes to bitter; acid comes to acid, and warm couples with warm.

(91) Water fits better into wine, but it will not (mingle) with oil.

(92) Copper mixed with tin.

(93) The bloom of scarlet dye mingles with the gray linen.

(94) And the black color at the bottom of a river arises from the shadow. The same is seen in hollow caves.

(95) Since they (the eyes) first grew together in the hands of Kypris.

(96) The kindly earth received in its broad funnels two parts of gleaming Nestis out of the eight, and four of Hephaistus. So arose white bones divinely fitted together by the cement of proportion.

(97) The spine (was broken).

(98) And the earth, anchoring in the perfect harbors of Aphrodite, meets with these in nearly equal proportions, with Hephaistus and Water and gleaming Air-either a little more of it, or less of them and more of it. From these did blood arise and the manifold forms of flesh.

(99) The bell... the fleshy sprout (of the ear).

(100) Thus do all things draw breath and breathe it out again. All have bloodless tubes of flesh extended over the surface of their bodies; and at the mouths of these the outermost surface of the skin is perforated all over with pores closely packed together, so as to keep in the blood while a free passage is cut for the. air to pass through. Then, when the thin blood recedes from these, the bubbling air rushes in with an impetuous surge; and when the blood runs back it is breathed out again. Just as when a girl, playing with a water-clock of shining brass, puts the orifice of the pipe upon her comely hand, and dips the water-clock into the yielding mass of silvery water -- the stream does not then flow into the vessel, but the bulk of the air inside, pressing upon the close-packed perforations, keeps it out till she uncovers the compressed stream; but then air escapes and an equal volume of water runs in, -- just in the same way, when water occupies the depths of the brazen vessel and the opening and passage is stopped up by the human hand, the air outside, striving to get in, holds the water back at the gates of the ill-sounding neck, pressing upon its surface, till she lets go with her hand. Then, on the contrary, just in the opposite way to what happened before, the wind rushes in and an equal volume of water runs out to make room. Even so, when the thin blood that surges through the limbs rushes backwards to the interior, immediately the stream of air comes in with a rushing swell; but when the blood runs back the air breathes out again in equal quantity.

(101) (The dog) with its nostrils tracing out the fragments of the beast's limbs, and the breath from their feet that they leave in the soft grass.

(102) Thus all things have their share of breath and smell.

(103, 104) Thus have all things thought by fortune's will. And inasmuch as the rarest things came together in their fall.

(105) (The heart), dwelling in the sea of blood that runs in opposite directions, where chiefly is what people call thought; for the blood round the heart is the thought of people.

(106) For the wisdom of people grows according to what is before them.

(107) For out of these are all things formed and fitted together, and by these do people think and feel pleasure and pain.

(108) And just so far as they grow to be different, so far do different thoughts ever present themselves to their minds (in dreams).

(109) For it is with earth that we see Earth, and Water with water; by air we see bright Air, by fire destroying Fire. By love do we see Love, and Hate by grievous hate.

(110) For if, supported on your steadfast mind, you wilt contemplate these things with good intent and faultless care, then will you have all these things in abundance throughout your life, and you will gain many others from them. For these things grow of themselves into your heart, where is each person's true nature. But if you strive after things of another kind, as it is the way with people that ten thousand sorry matters blunt their careful thoughts, soon will these things desert you when the time comes round; for they long to return once more to their own kind; for know that all things have wisdom and a share of thought.

And you will learn all the drugs that are a defense against ills and old age; since for you alone will I accomplish all this. You will arrest the violence of the weariless winds that arise to sweep the earth and waste the fields; and again, when you so desire, you will bring back their blasts in return. You will cause for people a seasonable drought after the dark rains, and again you will change the summer drought for streams that feed the trees as they pour down from the sky. You will bring back from Hades the life of a dead person.

<Purifications>

(112) Friends, that inhabit the great town looking down on the yellow rock of Akragas, up by the citadel, busy in considerable works, harbors of honor for the stranger, people unskilled in meanness, all hail. I go about among you an immortal god, no mortal now, honored among all as is proper, crowned with decorations and flowery garlands. Immediately, whenever I enter with these in my train, both men and women, into the flourishing towns, is reverence done me; they go after me in countless throngs, asking of me what is the way to gain; some desiring oracles, while some, who for many a weary day have been pierced by the grievous pangs of all manner of sickness, beg to hear from me the word of healing.

(113) But why do I harp on these things, as if it were any great matter that I should surpass mortal, perishable humans?

(114) Friends, I know indeed that truth is, in the words I shall utter, but it is hard for people, and jealous are they of the assault of belief on their souls.

(115) There is an oracle of Necessity, an ancient ordinance of the gods, eternal and sealed fast by broad oaths, that whenever one of the demons, whose portion is length of days, has sinfully polluted his hands with blood, or followed strife and forsworn himself, he must wander thrice ten thousand seasons from the abodes of the blessed, being born throughout the time in all manners of mortal forms, changing one toilsome path of life for another. For the mighty Air drives him into the Sea, and the Sea spews him on the dry Earth; Earth tosses him into the beams of the blazing Sun, and he flings him back to the eddies of Air. One takes him from the other, and all reject him. One of

these I now am, an exile and a wanderer from the gods, for that I put my trust in insensate strife.

(116) Charis loathes intolerable Necessity.

(117) For I have been ere now a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird and a dumb fish in the sea.

(118) I wept and I wailed when I saw the unfamiliar land.

(119) From what honor, from what. a height of bliss have I fallen to go about among mortals here on earth.

(120) We have come under this roofed-in cave.

(121) . . . the joyless land, where are Death and Wrath and troops of Dooms besides; and parching plagues and rot and floods roam in darkness over the meadow of Ate.

(122, 123) There were Chthonie and far-sighted Heliope, bloody Discord and gentle-appearanced Harmony, Kallisto and Aischre, Speed and Tarrying, lovely Truth and dark-haired Uncertainty, Birth and Decay, Sleep and waking, Movement and Immobility, crowned Majesty and Meanness, Silence and Voice.

(124) Alas, O wretched race of mortals, sore unblessed: such are the strifes and groanings from which you have been born!

(125) From living creatures he made them dead, changing their forms.

(126) (The goddess) clothing them with a strange garment of flesh.

(127) Among beasts they become lions that make their lair on the hills and their couch on the ground; and laurels among trees with lush foliage.

(128) Nor had they any Ares for a god nor Kydoimos, no nor King Zeus nor Kronus nor Poseidon, but Kypris the Queen. . . . Her did they propitiate with holy gifts, with painted figure and perfumes of cunning fragrance, with offerings of pure myrrh and sweet-smelling frankincense, casting on the ground offerings of brown honey. And the altar did not reek with pure bull's blood, but this was held in the greatest abomination among people, to cat the considerable limbs after tearing out the life.

(129) And there was among them a person of rare knowledge, most skilled in all manner of wise works, a person who had won the utmost wealth of wisdom; for whenever he strained with all his mind, he easily saw everything of all the things that are, in ten, indeed, twenty lifetimes of people.

(130) For all things were tame and gentle to humans, both beasts and birds, and friendly feelings were kindled everywhere.

(131) If ever, as regards the things of a day, immortal Muse, you did deign to take thought for my endeavor, then stand by me once more as I pray to you, O Kalliopeia, as I utter a pure discussion concerning the blessed gods.

(132) Happy is the person who has gained the riches of divine wisdom; wretched he who has a dim opinion of the gods in his heart.

(133) It is not possible for us to set God before our eyes, or to lay hold of him with our hands, which is the broadest way of persuasion that leads into the heart of people.

(134) For he is not furnished with a human head on his body, two branches do not sprout from his shoulders, he has no feet, no swift knees, nor hairy parts; but he is only a sacred and unutterable mind flashing through the whole world with rapid thoughts.

(135) (This is not lawful for some and unlawful for others;) but the law for all extends everywhere, through the wide-ruling air and the infinite light of heaven.

(136) Will you not cease from this ill-sounding slaughter? See you not that you are devouring one another in the thoughtlessness of your hearts?

(137) And the father lifts up his own son in a changed form and slays him with a prayer. Infatuated fool I And they run up to the sacrificers, begging mercy, while he, deaf to their cries, slaughters them in his halls and gets ready the evil feast. In like manner does the son seize his father, and children their mother, tear out their life and eat the kindred flesh.

(138) Draining their life with bronze.

(139) Ah, woe is me that the pitiless day of death did not destroy me ere ever I wrought evil deeds of devouring with my lips!

(140) Abstain wholly from laurel leaves.

(141) Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans!

(142) Him will the roofed palace of aigis-bearing Zeus never rejoice, nor yet the house of...

(143) Wash your hands, cutting the water from the five springs in the unyielding bronze

(144) Fast from wickedness!

(145) Therefore are you distraught by grievous wickednesses, and will not unburden your souls of wretched sorrows.

(146, 147) But, at the last, they appear among mortal humans as prophets, song-writers, physicians, and princes;

and thence they rise up as gods highest ranking in honor, sharing the hearth of the other gods and the same table, free from human woes, safe from destiny, and incapable of hurt.

(148) . . .Earth that envelops the person.

* * * *

ANAXAGORAS

Fragments

(1) all things were together, infinite both in number and in smallness; for the small too was infinite. And, when all things were together, none of them could be distinguished for their smallness. For air and aether prevailed over all things, being both of them infinite; for among all things these are the greatest both in quantity and size.

(2) For air and aether are separated off from the mass that surrounds the world, and the surrounding mass is infinite in quantity.

(3) Nor is there a least of what is small, but there is always a smaller; for it cannot be that what is should cease to be by being cut. But there is also always something, greater than what is great, and it is equal to the small in amount, and, compared with itself, each thing is both great and small.

(4) And since these things are so, we must suppose that there are contained many things and of all sorts in the things that are uniting, seeds of all things, with all sorts of shapes and colors and tastes, and that people have been formed in them, and the other animals that have life, and that these people have inhabited cities and cultivated fields as with us; and that they have a sun and a moon and the rest as with us; and that their earth produces for them many things of all kinds of which they gather the best together into their dwellings, and use them. Thus much have I said with regard to separating off, to show that it will not be only with us that things are separated off, but elsewhere too.

But before, they were separated off, when all things were together, not even was any color distinguishable. For the mixture of all things prevented it -- of the moist and the dry, and the warm and the cold, and the light and the dark, and of much earth that was in it, and of a multitude of innumerable seeds in no way like each other. For none of the other things either is like any other. And these things being so, we must hold that all things are in the whole.

(5) And those things having been thus decided, we must know that all of them are neither more nor less; for it is not possible for them to be more than all, and all are always equal.

(6) And since the portions of the great and of the

small are equal in amount, for this reason, too, all things will be in everything; nor is it possible for them to be apart, but all things have a portion of everything. Since it is impossible for there to be a least thing, they cannot be separated, nor come to be by themselves; but they must be now, just as they were in the beginning, all together. And in all things many things are contained, and an equal number both in the greater and in the smaller of the things that are separated off.

(7) . . . So that we cannot know the number of the things that are separated off, either in word or deed.

(8) The things that are in one world are not divided nor cut off from one another with a hatchet, neither the warm from the cold nor the cold from the warm.

(9) . . . as these things revolve and are separated off by the force and swiftness. And the swiftness makes the force. Their swiftness is not like the swiftness of any of the things that are now among people, but in every way many times as swift.

(10) How can hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is not flesh?

(11) In everything there is a portion of everything except Nous, and there are some things in which there is Nous also.

(12) All other things partake in a portion of everything, while Nous is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would partake in all things if it were mixed with any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and Nous has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And all the things that are mingled together and separated off and distinguished are all known by Nous. And Nous set in order all things that were to be, and all things that were and are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and the aether that are separated off. And this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated off from the dense, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark, and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in many things. But no thing is altogether separated off nor distinguished from anything else except Nous. And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it.

(13) And when Nous began to move things, separating off took place from all that was moved, and so much as Nous set in motion was all separated. And as things were set in motion and separated, the revolution caused them to be separated much more.

(14) And Nous, which ever is, is certainly there, where everything else is, in the surrounding mass, and in what has been united with it and separated off from it.

(15) The dense and the moist and the cold and the dark came together where the earth is now, while the rare and the warm and the dry (and the bright) went out towards the further part of the aether.

(16) From these as they are separated off earth is solidified for from mists water is separated off, and from water earth. From the earth stones are solidified by the cold, and these rush outwards more than water.

(17) The Hellenes follow a wrong usage in speaking of coming into being and passing away; for nothing comes into being or passes away, but there is mingling and separation of things that are. So they would be right to call coming into being mixture, and passing away separation.

(18) It is the sun that puts brightness into the moon.

(19) We call rainbow the reflection of the sun in the clouds. Now it is a sign of storm; for the water that flows round the cloud causes wind or pours down in rain.

(20) With the rise of the Dogstar (?) people begin the harvest with its setting they begin to till the fields. It is hidden for forty days and nights.

(21) From the weakness of our senses we are not able to judge the truth.

(21a) What appears is a vision of the unseen.

(21b) (We can make use of the lower animals) because we use our own experience and memory and wisdom and art.

(22) What is called "birds' milk" is the white of the egg.

Testimonial (Theophrastus)

But Anaxagoras says that perception is produced by opposites; for like things cannot be effected by like. He attempts to give, a detailed enumeration of the particular senses. We see by means of the image in the pupil; but no image is cast upon what is of the same color, but only on what is different. With most living creatures things are of a different color to the pupil by day, though with some this is so by night, and these are accordingly keen-sighted at that time. Speaking generally, however, night is more of the same color with the eyes than day. And an image is cast on

the pupil by day, because light is a concomitant cause of the image, and because the prevailing color casts an image more readily upon its opposite.

It is in the same way that touch and taste discern their objects. That which is just as warm or just as cold as we are neither warms us nor cools us by its contact; and, in the same way, we do not apprehend the sweet and the sour by means of themselves. We know cold by warm, fresh by salt, and sweet by sour, in virtue of our deficiency in each; for all these are in us to begin with. And we smell and hear in the same manner; the former by means of the accompanying respiration, the latter by the sound penetrating to the brain, for the bone which surrounds this is hollow, and it is upon it that the sound falls.

And an sensation implies pain, a view which would seem to be the consequence of the first assumption, for all unlike things produce pain by their contact. And this pain is made perceptible by the long continuance or by the excess of a sensation. Brilliant colors and excessive noises produce pain, and we cannot live long on the same things. The larger animals are the more sensitive, and, generally, sensation is proportionate to the size of the organs of sense. Those animals which have large, pure, and bright eyes, see large objects and from a great distance, and contrariwise.

And it is the same with hearing. Large animals can hear great and distant sounds, while less sounds pass unperceived; small animals perceive small sounds and those near at hand. It is the same too with smell. Rarefied air has more smell; for, when air is heated and rarefied, it smells. A large animal when it breathes draws in the condensed air along with the rarefied, while a small one draws in the rarefied by itself; so the large one perceives more. For smell is better perceived when it is near than when it is far by reason of its being more condensed, while when dispersed it is weak. But, roughly speaking, large animals do not perceive a rarefied smell, nor small animals a condensed one.

* * * *

ZENO

Fragments

(1) If what is had no magnitude, it would not even be... But, if it is, each one must have a certain magnitude and a certain thickness, and must be at a certain distance from another, and the same may be said of what is in front of it; for it, too, will have magnitude, and something will be in front of it. It is all the same to say this once and to say it always; for no such part of it will be the last, nor will one thing not be as compared with another. So if things are a many, they must be both small and great, so small as not to have any magnitude at all, and so great as to be infinite.

(2) For if it were added to any other thing it would

not make it any larger; for nothing can gain in magnitude by the addition of what has no magnitude, and thus it follows at once that what was added was nothing. But if, when this is taken away from another thing, that thing is no less; and again, if, when it is added to another thing, that does not increase, it is plain that what was added was nothing, and what was taken away was nothing.

(3) If things are a many, they must be just as many as they are, and neither more nor less. Now, if they are as many as they are, they will be finite in number.

If things are a many, they will be infinite in number;, for there will always be other things between them, and others again between these. And so things are infinite in number.

Testimonial (paraphrased from Aristotle)

(1) You cannot cross a race-course. You cannot traverse an infinite number of points in a finite time. You must traverse the half of any given distance before you traverse the whole, and the half of that again before you can traverse it. This goes on ad infinitum, so that there are an infinite number of points in any given space, and you cannot touch an infinite number one by one in a finite time.

(2) Achilles will never overtake the tortoise. He must first reach the place from which the tortoise started. By that time the tortoise will have got some way ahead. Achilles must then make up that, and again the tortoise will be ahead. He is always coming nearer, but he never makes up to it.

(3) The arrow in flight is at rest. For, if everything is at rest when it occupies a space equal to itself, and what is in flight at any given moment always occupies a space equal to itself, it cannot move.

* * * *

MELISSOS

(1a) If nothing is, what can be said of it as of something real?

(1) What was was ever, and ever will be. For, if it had come into being, it needs must have been nothing before it came into being. Now, if it were nothing, in no wise could anything have arisen out of nothing.

(2) Since, then, it has not come into being, and since it is, was ever, and ever shall be, it has no beginning or end, but is without limit. For, if it had come into being, it would have had a beginning (for it would have begun to come into being at some time or other) and an end (for it would have ceased to come into being at some time or other); but, if it neither began nor ended, and ever was and ever will be, it has no beginning or end; for it is not possible for anything to be ever without all being.

(3) Further, just as it ever is, so it must ever be infinite in magnitude.

(4) But nothing which has a beginning or end is either eternal or infinite.

(5) If it were not one, it would be bounded by something else.

(6) For if it is (infinite), it must be one; for if it were two, it could not be infinite; for then they would be bounded by one another.

(6a) (And, since it is one, it is alike throughout; for if it were unlike, it would be many and not one.)

(7) So then it is eternal and infinite and one and all alike. And it cannot perish nor become greater, nor does it suffer pain or grief. For, if any of these things happened to it, it would no longer be one. For if it is altered, then the real must needs not be all alike, but what was before must pass away, and what was not must come into being. Now, if it changed by so much as a single hair in ten thousand years, it would all perish in the whole of time.

Further, it is not possible either that its order should be changed; for the order which it had before does not perish, nor does that which was not come into being. But, since nothing is either added to it or passes away or is altered, how can any real thing have had its order changed? For if anything became different, that would amount to a change in its order.

Nor does it suffer pain; for a thing in pain could not all be. For a thing in pain could not be ever, nor has it the same power as what is whole. Nor would it be alike, if it were in pain; for it is only from the addition or subtraction of something that it could feel pain, and then it would no longer be alike. Nor could what is whole feel pain; for then what was whole and what was real would pass away, and what was not would, come into being. And the same argument applies to grief as to pain.

Nor is anything empty. For what is empty is nothing. What is nothing cannot be.

Nor does it move; for it has nowhere bring itself to, but is full. For if there were anything empty, it would bring itself to the empty. But, since there is nothing empty, it has nowhere to bring itself to.

And it cannot be dense and rare; for it is not possible for what is rare to be as full as what is dense, but what is rare is at once emptier than what is dense.

This is the way in which we must distinguish between what is full and what is not full. If a thing has room for anything else, and takes it in, it is not full; but if it has no room for anything and does not take it in, it is full.

Now, it must needs be full if there is nothing empty, and if it is full, it-does not move.

(8) This argument, then, is the greatest proof that it is one alone; but the following are proofs of it also. If there were a many, these would have to be of the same kind as I say that the one is. For if there is earth and water, and air and iron, and gold and fire, and if one thing is living and another dead, and if things are black and white and all that people say they really are,-if that is so, and if we see and hear aright, each one of these must be such as we first decided, and they cannot be changed or altered, but each must be just as it is. But, as it is, we say that we see and hear and understand aright, and yet we believe that what is warm becomes cold, and what is cold warm; that what is hard turns soft, and what is soft hard; that what is living dies, and that things are born from what lives not; and that all those things are changed, and that what they were and what they are now are in no way alike. We think that iron, which is hard, is rubbed away by contact with the finger; and so with gold and stone and everything which we fancy to be strong, and that earth and stone are made out of water; so that it turns out that we neither see nor know realities. Now these things do not agree with one another. We said that there were many things that were eternal and had forms and strength of their own, and yet we fancy that they all suffer alteration, and that they change from what we see each time. It is clear, then, that we did not see aright after all, nor are we right in believing that all these things are many. They would not change if they were real, but each thing would be just what we believed it to be; for nothing is stronger than true reality. But if it has changed, what was has passed away, and what was not is come into being. So then, if there were many things, they would have to be just of the same nature as the one.

(9) Now, if it were to exist, it must needs be one; but if it is one, it cannot have body; for, if it had body it would have parts, and would no longer be one.

(10) If what is real is divided, it moves; but if it moves, it cannot be.

* * * *

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Fragments

(1) In the beginning any discussion, it seems to me that one should make one's starting-point something indisputable, and one's expression simple and dignified.

(2) My view is, to sum it all up, that all things are differentiations of the same thing, and are the same thing. And this is obvious; for, if the things which are now in this world-earth, and water, and air and fire, and the other things which we see existing in this world-if any one of these things, I say, were different from any other, different, that is, by having a substance peculiar to itself; and if it were not the same thing that is often

changed and differentiated ' then things could not in any way mix with one another, nor could- they do one another good or harm. Neither could a plant grow out of the earth, nor any animal nor anything else come into being unless things were composed in such a way as to be the same. But all these things arise from the same thing; they are differentiated and take different forms at different times, and return again to the same thing.

(3) For it would not be possible for it without intelligence to be so divided, as to keep the measures of all things, of winter and summer, of day and night, of rains and winds and fair weather. And any one who cares to reflect will find that everything else is disposed in the best possible manner. R. P. 210.

(4) And, further, there are still the following great proofs. Humans and all other animals live upon air by breathing it, and this is their soul and their intelligence, as will be clearly shown in this work; while, when this is taken away, they die, and their intelligence fails.

(5) And my view is, that that which has intelligence is what people call air, and that all things have their course steered by it, and that it has power over all things. For this very thing I hold to be a god," and to reach everywhere, and to dispose everything, and to be in everything; and there is not anything which does not partake in it. Yet no single thing partakes in it just in the same way as another; but there are many modes both of air and of intelligence. For it undergoes many transformations, warmer and colder, drier and moister, more stable and in swifter motion, and it has many other differentiations in it, and an infinite number of colors and tastes. And the soul of all living things is the same, namely, air warmer than that outside us and in which we are, but much colder than that near the sun. And this warmth is not alike in any two kinds of living creatures, nor, for the matter of that, in any two people; but it does not differ much, only so far as is compatible with their being alike. At the same time, it is not possible for any of the things which are differentiated to be exactly like one another till they all once more become the same.

(6) Since, then, differentiation is multiform, living creatures are multiform and many, and they are like one another neither in appearance nor in intelligence, because of the multitude of differentiations. At the same time, they all live, and see, and hear by the same thing, and they all have their intelligence from the same source.

(7) And this itself is an eternal and undying body, but of those things I some come into being and some pass away.

(8) But this, too, appears to me to be obvious, that it is both great, and mighty, and eternal, and undying, and of great knowledge.

ARCHELAUS

Testimonial by Hippolitus

Archelaus was by birth an Athenian, and the son of Apollodorus. He spoke of the mixture of matter in a similar way to Anaxagoras, and of the first principles likewise. He held, however, that there was a certain mixture immanent even in Nous. And he held that there were two efficient causes which were separated off from one another, namely, the warm and the cold. The former was in motion, the latter at rest. When the water was liquefied it flowed to the center, and there being burnt up it turned to earth and air, the latter of which was carried upwards, while the former took up its position below. These, then, are the reasons why the earth is at rest, and why it came into being. It lies in the center, being practically no appreciable part of the universe. (But the air rules over all things), being produced by the burning of the fire, and from its original combustion comes the substance of the heavenly bodies. Of these the sun is the largest, and the moon second; the rest are of various sizes. He says that the heavens were inclined, and that then the sun made fight upon the earth, made the air transparent, and the earth dry; for it was originally a pond, being high at the circumference and hollow in the center. He adduces as a proof of this hollowness that the sun does not rise and set at the same time for all peoples, as it ought to do if the earth were level. As to animals, he says that when the earth was first being warm in the lower part where the warm and the cold were mingled together, many living creatures appeared, and especially people, all having the same manner of life, and deriving their sustenance from the slime; they did not live long, and later on generation from one another began. And people were distinguished from the rest, and set up leaders, and laws, and arts, and cities, and so forth. And he says that Nous is implanted in all animals alike; for each of the animals, as well as humans, makes use of Nous, but some quicker and some slower.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Republic
Plato

Editor's Note: This e-text is based on the Wiretap edition of Plato's Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett (New York, P. F. Collier & Son Copyright 1901 The Colonial Press). The Wiretap edition contains the following notice: "This was scanned from the 1901 edition and mechanically checked against a commercial copy of the Republic from CDROM. Differences were corrected against the paper edition. The text itself is thus a highly accurate rendition. This text is in the PUBLIC DOMAIN, released August 1993." This slightly modified text version and associated HTML files were prepared for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (jfieser@utm.edu).

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Book I:
Of Wealth, Justice, Moderation, And Their Opposites

Persons of the Dialogue

Socrates, who is the narrator. Cephalus. Glacon. Thrasymachus. Adeimantus. Cleitophon. Polemarchus.

And others who are mute auditors.

The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to Timaeus Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are introduced in the Timaeus.

I WENT down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess; and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and said, Polemarchus desires you to wait.

I turned round, and asked him where his master was.

There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait.

Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.

Polemarchus said to me, I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion are already on your way to the city.

You are not far wrong, I said.

But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?

Of course.

And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain where you are.

May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let us go?

But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.

Certainly not, replied Glaucon.

Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.

Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torchrace on horseback in honor of the goddess which will take place in the evening?

With horses! I replied. That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?

Yes, said Polemarchus; and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.

Glaucon said, I suppose, since you insist, that we must.

Very good, I replied.

Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon, the son of Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus, the father of Polemarchus, whom I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle, upon

which we sat down by him. He saluted me eagerly, and then he said:

You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the Piraeus. For, let me tell you that the more the pleasures of the body fade away, the greater to me are the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not, then, deny my request, but make our house your resort and keep company with these young men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us.

I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, than conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who have gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to inquire whether the way is smooth and easy or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you, who have arrived at that time which the poets call the "threshold of old age": Is life harder toward the end, or what report do you give of it?

I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is: I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away; there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too, being old, and every other old man would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles -- are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.

I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on -- Yes, Cephalus, I said; but I rather suspect that people in general are not convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.

You are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and

there is something in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian: "If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would have been famous." And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made; for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself.

May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you?

Acquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: for my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now; but my father, Lysanias, reduced the property below what it is at present; and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less, but a little more, than I received.

That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth. That is true, he said.

Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question? -- What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth?

One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of these things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age:

"Hope," he says, "cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey -- hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man."

How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.

Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it? -- to speak the truth and to pay your debts -- no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.

You are quite right, he replied.

But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice.

Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus, interposing.

I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.

Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said.

To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.

Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you, truly say, about justice?

He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right.

I shall be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt.

True.

Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return?

Certainly not.

When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean to include that case?

Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend, and never evil.

You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt -- that is what you would imagine him to say?

Yes.

And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?

To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them; and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him -- that is to say, evil.

Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt.

That must have been his meaning, he said.

By heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?

He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies.

And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?

Seasoning to food.

And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?

If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies.

That is his meaning, then?

I think so.

And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?

The physician.

Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?

The pilot.

And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?

In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.

But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician?

No.

And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?

No.

Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?

I am very far from thinking so.

You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?

Yes.

Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?

Yes.

Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes -- that is what you mean?

Yes.

And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?

In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.

And by contracts you mean partnerships?

Exactly.

But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts?

The skilful player.

And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder?

Quite the reverse.

Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harpplayer, as in playing the harp the harpplayer is certainly a better partner than the just man?

In a money partnership.

Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?

Certainly.

And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better?

True.

Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred?

When you want a deposit to be kept safely.

You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?

Precisely.

That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?

That is the inference.

And when you want to keep a pruninghook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the State; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vinedresser?

Clearly.

And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician?

Certainly.

And so of all other things -- justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful?

That is the inference.

Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?

Certainly.

And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best able to create one?

True.

And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy?

Certainly.

Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?

That, I suppose, is to be inferred.

Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.

That is implied in the argument.

Then after all, the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favorite of his, affirms that

"He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury."

And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of theft; to be practised, however, "for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies" -- that was what you were saying?

No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still stand by the latter words.

Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming?

Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil.

Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely?

That is true.

Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends? True.

And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?

Clearly.

But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

True.

Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?

Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.

Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?

I like that better.

But see the consequence: Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

Very true, he said; and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words "friend" and "enemy."

What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.

We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.

And how is the error to be corrected?

We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.

You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

Yes.

And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good, and harm to our enemies when they are evil?

Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.

But ought the just to injure anyone at all?

Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.

When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?

The latter.

Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

Yes, of horses.

And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?

Of course.

And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?

Certainly.

And that human virtue is justice?

To be sure.

Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

That is the result.

But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

Certainly not.

Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

Impossible.

And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad?

Assuredly not.

Any more than heat can produce cold?

It cannot.

Or drought moisture?

Clearly not.

Nor can the good harm anyone?

Impossible.

And the just is the good?

Certainly.

Then to injure a friend or anyone else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?

I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.

Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies -- to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.

I agree with you, said Polemarchus.

Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against anyone who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer?

I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.

Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?

Whose?

I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is "doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies."

Most true, he said.

Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?

Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panicstricken at the sight of him.

He roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honor to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy.

I was panicstricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him.

Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were "knocking under to one another," and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.

How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh; that's your ironical style! Did I not foresee -- have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?

You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, "for this sort of nonsense will not do for me" -- then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort: "Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not

the right one? -- is that your meaning?" -- How would you answer him?

Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.

Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?

I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?

I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve of any of them.

But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?

Done to me! -- as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise -- that is what I deserve to have done to me.

What, and no payment! A pleasant notion!

I will pay when I have the money, I replied.

But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates.

Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does -- refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of someone else.

Why, my good friend, I said, how can anyone answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be someone like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself?

Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasymachus, as anyone might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says, Thank you.

That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have; and how ready I am to praise anyone who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer well.

Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why

do you not praise me? But of course you won't.

Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?

That's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument.

Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer.

Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ -- there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

Yes, I know.

And the government is the ruling power in each State?

Certainly.

And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all States there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.

Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark that in defining justice you have yourself used the word "interest," which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words "of the stronger" are added.

A small addition, you must allow, he said.

Great or small, never mind about that: we must first inquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say "of the stronger"; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

Proceed.

I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

I do.

But are the rulers of States absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err?

Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

True.

When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?

Yes.

And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects -- and that is what you call justice?

Doubtless.

Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger, but the reverse?

What is that you are saying? he asked.

I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

Yes.

Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?

Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.

Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness.

But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometime command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.

Yes, Polemarchus -- Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just.

Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the

injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest -- this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice.

Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.

Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?

Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible, but might be sometimes mistaken.

You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.

Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?

Certainly, he replied.

And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argument?

Nay, he replied, "suppose" is not the word -- I know it; but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.

I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute -- is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?

In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be able, never.

And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.

Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.

Enough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.

A healer of the sick, he replied.

And the pilot -- that is to say, the true pilot -- is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?

A captain of sailors.

The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors.

Very true, he said.

Now, I said, every art has an interest?

Certainly.

For which the art has to consider and provide?

Yes, that is the aim of art.

And the interest of any art is the perfection of it -- this and nothing else?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is selfsufficing or has wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?

Quite right, he replied.

But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing -- has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require

another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another? -- having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to consider the interest of their subjectmatter. For every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true -- that is to say, while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am not right.

Yes, clearly.

Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?

True, he said.

Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the subject of their art?

True, he said.

But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?

To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.

Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?

He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced.

Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere moneymaker; that has been admitted?

Yes.

And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors, and not a mere sailor?

That has been admitted.

And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest?

He gave a reluctant "Yes."

Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and

that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.

When we had got to this point in the argument, and everyone saw that the definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said, Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?

Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be answering?

Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.

What makes you say that? I replied.

Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of States, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State: when there is an incometax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable -- that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace -- they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and manstealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he

is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.

Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bathman, deluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would not let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his position; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive are your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way of man's life so small a matter in your eyes -- to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?

And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the inquiry?

You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us, Thrasymachus -- whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.

And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?

Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or banqueter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already insured whenever all the requirements of it are

satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as a ruler, whether in a State or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in States, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.

Think! Nay, I am sure of it.

Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment, unless under the idea that they govern for the advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a little progress.

Yes, that is the difference, he replied.

And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one -- medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on?

Yes, he said.

And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you? that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?

Certainly not.

Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?

I should not.

Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?

Certainly not.

And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?

Yes.

Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?

True, he replied.

And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?

He gave a reluctant assent to this.

Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well?

I suppose not.

But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?

Certainly, he confers a benefit.

Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger -- to their good they attend and not to the good of the superior.

And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern, without remuneration. For, in the execution of his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honor, or a penalty for refusing.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment.

You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace?

Very true.

And for this reason, I said, money and honor have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honor. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonorable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help -- not under the idea that they are going to have any

benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to anyone who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and everyone who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer?

I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he answered.

Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was rehearsing?

Yes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me.

Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is saying what is not true?

Most certainly, he replied.

If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our inquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.

Very good, he said.

And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.

That which you propose.

Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice?

Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.

And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?

Certainly.

I suppose that you would call justice virtue and

injustice vice?

What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.

What else then would you say?

The opposite, he replied.

And would you call justice vice?

No, I would rather say sublime simplicity.

Then would you call injustice malignity?

No; I would rather say discretion.

And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?

Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing States and nations; but perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses.

Even this profession, if undetected, has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just now speaking.

I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.

Certainly I do so class them.

Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that you will call injustice honorable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.

You have guessed most infallibly, he replied.

Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.

I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you? -- to refute the argument is your business.

Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

Far otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple

amusing creature which he is.

And would he try to go beyond just action?

He would not.

And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?

He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able.

Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?

Yes, he would.

And what of the unjust -- does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just?

Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.

And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the just man or action, in order that he may have more than all?

True.

We may put the matter thus, I said -- the just does not desire more than his like, but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?

Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.

And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?

Good again, he said.

And is not the unjust like the wise and good, and the just unlike them?

Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.

Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?

Certainly, he replied.

Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?

Yes.

And which is wise and which is foolish?

Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.

And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?

Yes.

And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

Yes.

And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?

I do not think that he would.

But he would claim to exceed the nonmusician?

Of course.

And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?

He would not.

But he would wish to go beyond the nonphysician?

Yes.

And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.

And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?

I dare say.

And the knowing is wise?

Yes.

And the wise is good?

True.

Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?

I suppose so.

Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more

than both?

Yes.

But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words?

They were.

And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like, but his unlike?

Yes.

Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?

That is the inference.

And each of them is such as his like is?

That was admitted.

Then the just has turned out to be wise and good, and the unjust evil and ignorant.

Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:

Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength -- do you remember?

Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are saying or have no answer; if, however, I were to answer, you would be quite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer "Very good," as they say to storytelling old women, and will nod "Yes" and "No."

Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.

Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What else would you have?

Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer.

Proceed.

Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more

powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by anyone. But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a State may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other States, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?

True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust State will be most likely to do so.

I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior State can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice.

If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.

I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.

That is out of civility to you, he replied.

You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform me, whether you think that a State, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evildoers could act at all if they injured one another? No, indeed, he said, they could not.

But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together better?

Yes.

And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?

I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.

How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action?

Certainly.

And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?

They will.

And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her

natural power?

Let us assume that she retains her power.

Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction? and does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just? Is not this the case?

Yes, certainly.

And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person -- in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?

Yes. And, O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?

Granted that they are. But, if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be their friends?

Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company. Well, then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action; nay, more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for, if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims; they were but halfvillains in their enterprises; for had they been whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life.

Proceed.

I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some end?

I should.

And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I do not understand, he said.

Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?

Certainly not.

Or hear, except with the ear?

No. These, then, may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?

They may.

But you can cut off a vinebranch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?

Of course.

And yet not so well as with a pruninghook made for the purpose?

True.

May we not say that this is the end of a pruninghook?

We may.

Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I understand your meaning, he said, and assent.

And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?

It has.

And has not the eye an excellence?

Yes.

And the ear has an end and an excellence also?

True.

And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?

That is so.

Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead?

How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?

You mean to say, if they have lost their proper

excellence, which is sight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more generally, and only inquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their own defect?

Certainly, he replied.

I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end?

True.

And the same observation will apply to all other things?

I agree.

Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?

To no other.

And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?

Assuredly, he said.

And has not the soul an excellence also?

Yes.

And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence?

She cannot.

Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler?

Yes, necessarily.

And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?

That has been admitted.

Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?

That is what your argument proves.

And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?

Certainly.

Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

So be it.

But happiness, and not misery, is profitable?

Of course.

Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.

Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.

For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle toward me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that inquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.

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Book II: The Individual, The State, And Education

(Socrates, Glaucon.)

WITH these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus's retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me: Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?

I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.

Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now: How would you arrange goods -- are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from them?

I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.

Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?

Certainly, I said.

And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of moneymaking -- these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?

There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?

Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice?

In the highest class, I replied -- among those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results.

Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.

I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him.

I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice has not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just -- if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by anyone in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?

Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would oftener wish to converse.

I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.

They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice; it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.

Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the King of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he, stooping and looking in, saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the King; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outward and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result -- when he turned the collet inward he became invisible, when outward he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the Queen, and with her help conspired against the King and slew him and took the

kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with anyone at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a god among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever anyone thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine anyone obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookerson to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this.

Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody): for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as AEschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honor and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme,

the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two.

Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues.

I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the description a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not mine. Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound -- will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled. Then he will understand that he ought to seem only, and not to be, just; the words of AEschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live with a view to appearances -- he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only --

"His mind has a soil deep and fertile, Out of which spring his prudent counsels."

In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage, because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every contest, whether in public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently, and can honor the gods or any man whom he wants to honor in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just.

I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged?

Why, what else is there? I answered.

The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.

Well, then, according to the proverb, "Let brother help brother" -- if he fails in any part, do you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the power of helping justice.

Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice and injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his

meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others; for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says that the gods make the oaks of the just --

"To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle; And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces,"

and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is

"As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, Maintains justice; to whom the black earth brings forth Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with fruit, And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him fish."

Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe to the just; they take them down into the world below, where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain; they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the other.

Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honorable, but grievous and toilsome; and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honor them both in public and private when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors

and persuade them that they have a power committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and feasts; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost; with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod:

"Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her dwellingplace is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,"

and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced by men; for he also says:

"The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations and the odor of fat, when they have sinned and trangressed."

And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were children of the Moon and the muses -- that is what they say -- according to which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only individuals, but whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call mysteries, and they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us.

He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their minds likely to be affected, my dear Socrates -- those of them, I mean, who are quickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of persons they should be and in what way they should walk if they would make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar:

"Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days?"

For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just, profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I hear someone exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret

brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to have no care of human things -- why in either case should we mind about concealment? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by "sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings." Let us be consistent, then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why, then, we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. "But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds." Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony.

On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honor justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there should be someone who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will; unless, peradventure, there be someone whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the truth -- but no other man. He only blames injustice, who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.

The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice -- beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with the men of our own time -- no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honors, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within

him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upward, we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but everyone would have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harboring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations; for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired, indeed, for their results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes -- like sight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good -- I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice and censure injustice, magnifying the rewards and honors of the one and abusing the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an illustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in honor of you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:

"Sons of Ariston," he sang, "divine offspring of an illustrious hero."

The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice, and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced -- this I infer from your general character, for had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my

difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give such help as I can.

Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the inquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a shortsighted person had been asked by someone to read small letters from a distance; and it occurred to someone else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were larger -- if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser -- this would have been thought a rare piece of goodfortune.

Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our inquiry?

I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our inquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State.

True, he replied.

And is not a State larger than an individual?

It is.

Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we inquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them.

That, he said, is an excellent proposal.

And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.

I dare say.

When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more easily discovered.

Yes, far more easily.

But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.

I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed.

A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is selfsufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

There can be no other.

Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

True, he said.

And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

Very true.

Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.

Of course, he replied.

Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence.

Certainly.

The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.

True.

And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, someone else a weaver -- shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Quite right.

The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.

Clearly.

And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labors into a common stock? -- the individual husbandman, for example, producing for four, and laboring four times as long and as much as he need in the provision

of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining threefourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?

Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at producing everything.

Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.

Very true.

And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has only one?

When he has only one.

Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?

No doubt.

For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the business his first object.

He must.

And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things. Undoubtedly.

Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools -- and he, too, needs many; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.

True.

Then carpenters and smiths and many other artisans will be sharers in our little State, which is already beginning to grow?

True.

Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces and hides -- still our State will not be very large.

That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State

which contains all these.

Then, again, there is the situation of the city -- to find a place where nothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible.

Impossible.

Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another city?

There must.

But if the trader goes emptyhanded, having nothing which they require who would supply his need, he will come back emptyhanded.

That is certain.

And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.

Very true.

Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?

They will.

Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?

Yes.

Then we shall want merchants?

We shall.

And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also be needed, and in considerable numbers?

Yes, in considerable numbers.

Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions? To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a State.

Clearly they will buy and sell.

Then they will need a marketplace, and a moneytoken for purposes of exchange.

Certainly.

Suppose now that a husbandman or an artisan brings some production to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him -- is he to leave his calling

and sit idle in the marketplace?

Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen. In wellordered States they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell, and to take money from those who desire to buy.

This want, then, creates a class of retailtraders in our State. Is not "retailer" the term which is applied to those who sit in the marketplace engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?

Yes, he said.

And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labor, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, "hire" being the name which is given to the price of their labor.

True.

Then hirelings will help to make up our population?

Yes.

And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?

I think so.

Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the State did they spring up?

Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot imagine that they are more likely to be found anywhere else.

I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; we had better think the matter out, and not shrink from the inquiry.

Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn and wine and clothes and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barleymeal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse with one another. And they will take care that their families do not exceed their

means; having an eye to poverty or war.

But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.

True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish -- salt and olives and cheese -- and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs and peas and beans; and they will roast myrtleberries and acorns at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.

Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?

But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.

Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style.

Yes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish also to see a State at feverheat, I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas and tables and other furniture; also dainties and perfumes and incense and courtesans and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety. We must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as houses and clothes and shoes; the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.

True, he said.

Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms and colors; another will be the votaries of music -- poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women's dresses. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat them.

Certainly.

And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?

Much greater.

And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough?

Quite true.

Then a slice of our neighbors' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?

That, Socrates, will be inevitable.

And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?

Most certainly, he replied. Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.

Undoubtedly.

And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above.

Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?

No, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the State. The principle, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success.

Very true, he said.

But is not war an art?

Certainly.

And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?

Quite true.

And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder -- in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good workman.

Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else?

No tools will make a man a skilled workman or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How, then, will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavyarmed or any other kind of troops?

Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price.

And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time and skill and art and application will be needed by him?

No doubt, he replied.

Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?

Certainly.

Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?

It will.

And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and do our best.

We must.

Is not the noble youth very like a wellbred dog in respect of guarding and watching?

What do you mean?

I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him.

All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.

Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?

Certainly.

And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be

absolutely fearless and indomitable?

I have.

Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian.

True.

And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?

Yes.

But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and with everybody else?

A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.

Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them.

True, he said.

What is to be done, then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?

True.

He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible.

I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.

Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded. My friend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost sight of the image which we had before us.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities.

And where do you find them?

Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that wellbred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.

Yes, I know.

Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

Certainly not.

Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature, need to have the qualities of a philosopher?

I do not apprehend your meaning.

The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog, and is remarkable in the animal.

What trait?

Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?

The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognize the truth of your remark.

And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming; your dog is a true philosopher.

Why?

Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

Most assuredly.

And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?

They are the same, he replied.

And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

That we may safely affirm.

Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

Undoubtedly.

Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an inquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater inquiry which is our final end -- How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length.

Adeimantus thought that the inquiry would be of great

service to us.

Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat long.

Certainly not.

Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in storytelling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes.

By all means.

And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional sort? -- and this has two divisions, gymnastics for the body, and music for the soul.

True.

Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastics afterward?

By all means.

And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?

I do.

And literature may be either true or false?

Yes.

And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false?

I do not understand your meaning, he said.

You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.

Very true.

That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.

Quite right, he said.

You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken.

Quite true.

And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very

opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?

We cannot.

Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.

Of what tales are you speaking? he said.

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.

Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater.

Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great storytellers of mankind.

But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?

A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.

But when is this fault committed?

Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes -- as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.

Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blamable; but what are the stories which you mean?

First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too -- I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.

Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.

Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in

our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods.

I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated.

Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told to compose them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer -- these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.

There you are right, he replied; but if anyone asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking -- how shall we answer him?

I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.

Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?

Something of this kind, I replied: God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric, or tragic, in which the representation is given.

Right.

And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?

Certainly.

And no good thing is hurtful?

No, indeed.

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Certainly not.

And that which hurts not does no evil?

No.

And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?

Impossible.

And the good is advantageous?

Yes.

And therefore the cause of wellbeing?

Yes.

It follows, therefore, that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only?

Assuredly.

Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.

That appears to me to be most true, he said.

Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks

"Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots,"

and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two

"Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;"

but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,

"Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth."

And again --

"Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us."

And if anyone asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods were instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to

hear the words of AEschylus, that

"God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house."

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe -- the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur -- or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan War or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking: he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery -- the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to anyone is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by anyone whether old or young in any wellordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.

I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law.

Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform -- that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.

That will do, he said.

And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another -- sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?

I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought.

Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be effected either by the thing itself or by some other thing?

Most certainly.

And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in the fullest vigor also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes.

Of course.

And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by any external influence?

True.

And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite things -- furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are least altered by time and circumstances.

Very true.

Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change from without?

True.

But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?

Of course they are.

Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?

He cannot.

But may he not change and transform himself?

Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.

And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and more unsightly?

If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.

Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would anyone, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse?

Impossible.

Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains absolutely and forever in his own form.

That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.

Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that

"The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms;"

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let anyone, either in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms

"For the lifegiving daughters of Inachus the river of

Argos;"

-- let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths -- telling how certain gods, as they say, "Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;" but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods.

Heaven forbid, he said.

But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?

Perhaps, he replied.

Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself?

I cannot say, he replied.

Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be allowed, is hated of gods and men?

What do you mean? he said.

I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there, above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.

Still, he said, I do not comprehend you.

The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to my words; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves, which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind least like; -- that, I say, is what they utterly detest.

There is nothing more hateful to them.

And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?

Perfectly right.

The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?

Yes.

Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in dealing with enemies -- that would be an

instance; or again, when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking -- because we do not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like truth as we can, and so turn it to account.

Very true, he said.

But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?

That would be ridiculous, he said.

Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?

I should say not.

Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?

That is inconceivable.

But he may have friends who are senseless or mad?

But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.

Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?

None whatever.

Then the superhuman, and divine, is absolutely incapable of falsehood?

Yes.

Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes not; he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking vision.

Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own.

You agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in which we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any way.

I grant that.

Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of AEschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials

"was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things blessed of heaven, he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And I thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy,

would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, and who said this -- he it is who has slain my son."

These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshippers of the gods and like them.

I entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them my laws.

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Book III: The Arts In Education

(Socrates, Adeimantus.)

SUCH, then, I said, are our principles of theology -- some tales are to be told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upward, if we mean them to honor the gods and their parents, and to value friendship with one another.

Yes; and I think that our principles are right, he said.

But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons beside these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?

Certainly not, he said.

And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and terrible?

Impossible.

Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as well as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile, but rather to commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors.

That will be our duty, he said.

Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, beginning with the verses

"I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than rule over all the dead who have come to naught."

We must also expunge the verse which tells us how Pluto feared

"Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods

abhor should be seen both of mortals and immortals."

And again:

"O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form but no mind at all!"

Again of Tiresias:

"[To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,] that he alone should be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades."

Again:

"The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamentng her fate, leaving manhood and youth."

Again:

"And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth."

And,

"As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved."

And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out these and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater the poetical charm of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death.

Undoubtedly.

Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which describe the world below -- Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by them.

There is a real danger, he said.

Then we must have no more of them.

True.

Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us.

Clearly.

And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?

They will go with the rest.

But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man who is his comrade.

Yes; that is our principle.

And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had suffered anything terrible?

He will not.

Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.

True, he said.

And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible.

Assuredly.

And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.

Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another.

Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men, and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good for anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those who are being educated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like.

That will be very right.

Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands and pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing in the various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam, the kinsman of the gods, as praying and beseeching,

"Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name."

Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the gods lamenting and saying,

"Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow."

But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say --

"O heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased round and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful."

Or again:

"Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius."

For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy representations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be dishonored by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any shame or selfcontrol, he will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions.

Yes, he said, that is most true.

Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument has just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is disproved by a better.

It ought not to be.

Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent reaction.

So I believe.

Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed.

Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied.

Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as that of Homer when he describes how

"Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus bustling about the mansion."

On your views, we must not admit them.

On my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit them is certain.

Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private individuals have no business with them.

Clearly not, he said.

Then if anyone at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things are going with himself or his fellowsailors.

Most true, he said.

If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State,

"Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter,"

he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of ship or State.

Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out.

In the next place our youth must be temperate?

Certainly.

Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to commanders and selfcontrol in sensual pleasures?

True.

Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in Homer,

"Friend sit still and obey my word,"

and the verses which follow,

"The Greeks marched breathing prowess,"

"...in silent awe of their leaders."

and other sentiments of the same kind.

We shall.

What of this line,

"O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag,"

and of the words which follow? Would you say that

these, or any similar impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken?

They are ill spoken.

They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men -- you would agree with me there?

Yes.

And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious than

"When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cupbearer carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups;"

is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words? or the verse

"The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger"?

What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely overcome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in such a state of rapture before, even when they first met one another,

"Without the knowledge of their parents"

or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite?

Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort of thing.

But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these they ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses,

"He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart,
Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!"

Certainly, he said.

In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of money.

Certainly not.

Neither must we sing to them of

"Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings."

Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them; but that without a gift he should not lay aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles himself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts, or that when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that without payment he was unwilling to do so.

Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be approved.

Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in attributing these feelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed to him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says,

"Thou hast wronged me, O Fardarter, most abominable of deities. Verily I would be even with thee, if I had only the power;"

or his insubordination to the rivergod, on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands; or his offerings to the dead Patroclus of his own hair, which had been previously dedicated to the other rivergod Spercheius, and that he actually performed this vow; or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives at the pyre; of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and men.

You are quite right, he replied.

And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of Theseus, son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous, son of Zeus, going forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of a god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day: and let us further compel the poets to declare either that these acts were done by them, or that they were not the sons of God; both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying to persuade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men -- sentiments which, as we were saying, are neither pious nor true, for we have already proved that evil cannot come from the gods.

Assuredly not. And, further, they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them; for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by

"The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose

ancestral altar, the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,"

and who have

"the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins."

And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of morals among the young.

By all means, he replied.

But now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not to be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The manner in which gods and demigods and heroes and the world below should be treated has been already laid down.

Very true.

And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our subject.

Clearly so.

But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my friend.

Why not?

Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men; poets and storytellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable; and that injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a man's own loss and another's gain -- these things we shall forbid them to utter, and command them to sing and say the opposite.

To be sure we shall, he replied.

But if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you have implied the principle for which we have been all along contending.

I grant the truth of your inference.

That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and how naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he seem to be just or not.

Most true, he said.

Enough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and when this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been completely treated.

I do not understand what you mean, said Adeimantus.

Then I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be

more intelligible if I put the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and poetry are a narration of events, either past, present, or to come?

Certainly, he replied.

And narration may be either simple narration or imitation, or a union of the two? That, again, he said, I do not quite understand.

I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty in making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in illustration of my meaning. You know the first lines of the "Iliad," in which the poet says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon Chryses, failing of his object, invoked the anger of the god against the Achaeans. Now as far as these lines,

"And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, the chiefs of the people,"

the poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that he is anyone else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses, and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double form he has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the "Odyssey."

Yes.

And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from time to time and in the intermediate passages?

Quite true.

But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, is going to speak?

Certainly.

And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?

Of course.

Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation?

Very true.

Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration. However, in order that I may make my meaning quite clear, and that you may no more say, "I don't understand," I will show how the change might be

effected. If Homer had said, "The priest came, having his daughter's ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all the kings;" and then if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he had continued in his own person, the words would have been, not imitation, but simple narration. The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet, and therefore I drop the metre): "The priest came and prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but begged that they would give him back his daughter, and take the ransom which he brought, and respect the god. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, lest the staff and chaplets of the god should be of no avail to him -- the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he said -- she should grow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went away in fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his many names, reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to him, whether in building his temples, or in offering sacrifice, and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him, and that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god" -- and so on. In this way the whole becomes simple narrative.

I understand, he said.

Or you may suppose the opposite case -- that the intermediate passages are omitted, and the dialogue only left.

That also, he said, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy.

You have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative -- instances of this are supplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in which the poet is the only speaker -- of this the dithyramb affords the best example; and the combination of both is found in epic and in several other styles of poetry. Do I take you with me?

Yes, he said; I see now what you meant.

I will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had done with the subject and might proceed to the style.

Yes, I remember.

In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding about the mimetic art -- whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts; or should all imitation be prohibited?

You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy

shall be admitted into our State?

Yes, I said; but there may be more than this in question: I really do not know as yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go.

And go we will, he said.

Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators; or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule already laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not many; and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation in any?

Certainly.

And this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one?

He cannot.

Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts as well; for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy and comedy -- did you not just now call them imitations?

Yes, I did; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed in both.

Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once?

True.

Neither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all these things are but imitations.

They are so.

And human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies.

Quite true, he replied.

If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our guardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate themselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State, making this their craft, and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end, they ought not to practise or imitate anything else; if they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their profession -- the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like; but they should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of

illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and continuing far into life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind?

Yes, certainly, he said.

Then, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of whom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether young or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting against the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction, or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labor.

Very right, he said.

Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices of slaves?

They must not.

And surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the reverse of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or revile one another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner sin against themselves and their neighbors in word or deed, as the manner of such is. Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to be practised or imitated.

Very true, he replied.

Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or boatswains, or the like?

How can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the callings of any of these?

Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing?

Nay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the behavior of madmen.

You mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of narrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has anything to say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an opposite character and education.

And which are these two sorts? he asked.

Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a narration comes on some saying or action of another good man -- I should imagine that he will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less

degree when he is overtaken by illness or love or drink, or has met with any other disaster. But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of that; he will disdain such a person, and will assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he is performing some good action; at other times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practised, nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models; he feels the employment of such an art, unless in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it.

So I should expect, he replied.

Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative; but there will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree?

Certainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily take.

But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for him: and he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration.

That, he said, will be his mode of speaking.

These, then, are the two kinds of style?

Yes.

And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great), and in like manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm?

That is quite true, he said.

Whereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms, if the music and the style are to correspond, because the style has all sorts of changes.

That is also perfectly true, he replied.

And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all poetry, and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything except in one or other of them or in both together.

They include all, he said.

And shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of the two unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed?

I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.

Yes, I said, Adeimantus; but the mixed style is also very charming: and indeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style with children and their attendants, and with the world in general.

I do not deny it.

But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only?

Yes; quite unsuitable.

And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a soldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout?

True, he said.

And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls' health the rougher and severer poet or storyteller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers.

We certainly will, he said, if we have the power.

Then now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education which relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished; for the matter and manner have both been discussed.

I think so too, he said.

Next in order will follow melody and song.

That is obvious. Everyone can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be consistent with ourselves.

I fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word

"everyone" hardly includes me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be; though I may guess.

At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts -- the words, the melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?

Yes, he said; so much as that you may.

And as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words which are and which are not set to music; both will conform to the same laws, and these have been already determined by us?

Yes.

And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words?

Certainly.

We were saying, when we spoke of the subjectmatter, that we had no need of lamentation and strains of sorrow?

True.

And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and can tell me.

The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the fulltoned or bass Lydian, and such like.

These then, I said, must be banished; they are of no use, even to women who have a character to maintain, and much less to men. Certainly.

In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming the character of our guardians.

Utterly unbecoming.

And which are the soft or drinking harmonies?

The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed "relaxed."

Well, and are these of any military use?

Quite the reverse, he replied; and if so, the Dorian and the Phrygian are the only ones which you have left.

I answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one warlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to endure; and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition, or on the

other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion or entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when by prudent conduct he has attained his end, not carried away by his success, but acting moderately and wisely under the circumstances, and acquiescing in the event. These two harmonies I ask you to leave; the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and the strain of temperance; these, I say, leave.

And these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I was just now speaking.

Then, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?

I suppose not.

Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and complex scales, or the makers of any other manystringed, curiously harmonized instruments?

Certainly not.

But what do you say to flutemakers and fluteplayers? Would you admit them into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together; even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?

Clearly not.

There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the shepherds may have a pipe in the country.

That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument.

The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange, I said.

Not at all, he replied.

And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the State, which not long ago we termed luxurious.

And we have done wisely, he replied.

Then let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to harmonies, rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre, or metres of every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found them, we shall adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit, not the words to the foot and melody. To say what these rhythms are will be your duty -- you must teach me them, as you have already taught me the harmonies.

But, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know

that there are some three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed, just as in sounds there are four notes out of which all the harmonies are composed; that is an observation which I have made. But of what sort of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say.

Then, I said, we must take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand, making the rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot, long and short alternating; and, unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned to them short and long quantities. Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a combination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant. These matters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon himself, for the analysis of the subject would be difficult, you know?

Rather so, I should say.

But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an effect of good or bad rhythm.

None at all.

And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad style; and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style; for our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not the words by them.

Just so, he said, they should follow the words.

And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper of the soul?

Yes.

And everything else on the style?

Yes.

Then beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on simplicity -- I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character, not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism for folly?

Very true, he replied.

And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim?

They must.

And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive art are full of them -- weaving, embroidery, architecture, and every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable -- in all of them there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and inharmonious motion are nearly allied to illwords and illnature, as grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness.

That is quite true, he said.

But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his art in our State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a healthgiving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason.

There can be no nobler training than that, he replied.

And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him who is illeducated ungraceful; and also because he who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason comes he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.

Yes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be trained in music and on the grounds which you mention.

Just as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the letters of the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring sizes and combinations; not slighting them as unimportant whether they occupy a space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and

not thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognize them wherever they are found: True --

Or, as we recognize the reflection of letters in the water, or in a mirror, only when we know the letters themselves; the same art and study giving us the knowledge of both: Exactly --

Even so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to educate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential forms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their kindred, as well as the contrary forms, in all their combinations, and can recognize them and their images wherever they are found, not slighting them either in small things or great, but believing them all to be within the sphere of one art and study.

Most assuredly.

And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye to see it?

The fairest indeed.

And the fairest is also the loveliest?

That may be assumed.

And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?

That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if there be any merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it, and will love all the same.

I perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort, and I agree. But let me ask you another question: Has excess of pleasure any affinity to temperance?

How can that be? he replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his faculties quite as much as pain.

Or any affinity to virtue in general?

None whatever.

Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance?

Yes, the greatest.

And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?

No, nor a madder.

Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order -- temperate and harmonious?

Quite true, he said.

Then no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love?

Certainly not.

Then mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the lover and his beloved; neither of them can have any part in it if their love is of the right sort?

No, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them.

Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love than a father would use to his son, and then only for a noble purpose, and he must first have the other's consent; and this rule is to limit him in all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going further, or, if he exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste.

I quite agree, he said.

Thus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the end of music if not the love of beauty?

I agree, he said.

After music comes gymnastics, in which our youth are next to be trained.

Certainly. Gymnastics as well as music should begin in early years; the training in it should be careful and should continue through life. Now my belief is -- and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in confirmation of my own, but my own belief is -- not that the good body by any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the good soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this may be possible. What do you say?

Yes, I agree.

Then, to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing over the more particular care of the body; and in order to avoid prolixity we will now only give the general outlines of the subject.

Very good.

That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us; for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is.

Yes, he said; that a guardian should require another guardian to take care of him is ridiculous indeed.

But next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training for the great contest of all -- are they

not?

Yes, he said.

And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them?

Why not?

I am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy sort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that these athletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their customary regimen?

Yes, I do.

Then, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the utmost keenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a campaign, they must not be liable to break down in health.

That is my view.

The really excellent gymnastics is twin sister of that simple music which we were just now describing.

How so?

Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastics which, like our music, is simple and good; and especially the military gymnastics.

What do you mean?

My meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at their feasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have no fish, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they are not allowed boiled meats, but only roast, which is the food most convenient for soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire, and not involving the trouble of carrying about pots and pans.

True.

And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; all professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good condition should take nothing of the kind.

Yes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them.

Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of Sicilian cookery?

I think not.

Nor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend?

Certainly not.

Neither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of Athenian confectionery?

Certainly not.

All such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and song composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms. Exactly.

There complexity engendered license, and here disease; whereas simplicity in music was the parent of temperance in the soul; and simplicity in gymnastics of health in the body.

Most true, he said.

But when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of justice and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them.

Of course.

And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of education than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people need the skill of firstrate physicians and judges, but also those who would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful, and a great sign of the want of goodbreeding, that a man should have to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore surrender himself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and judges over him?

Of all things, he said, the most disgraceful.

Would you say "most," I replied, when you consider that there is a further stage of the evil in which a man is not only a lifelong litigant, passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness; he imagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to take every crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out of the way of justice: and all for what? -- in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful?

Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.

Well, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic,

but just because, by indolence and a habit of life such as we have been describing, men fill themselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace?

Yes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and newfangled names to diseases.

Yes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the hero Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of Pramnian wine well besprinkled with barleymeal and grated cheese, which are certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke Patroclus, who is treating his case.

Well, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a person in his condition.

Not so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days, as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius did not practise our present system of medicine, which may be said to educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world.

How was that? he said.

By the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on to old age.

A rare reward of his skill!

Yes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who never understood that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the omission arose, not from ignorance or inexperience of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in all wellordered States every individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being ill. This we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort.

How do you mean? he said.

I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife -- these are his remedies. And if someone prescribes for him a course of dietetics, and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all that

sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary employment; and therefore bidding goodby to this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary habits, and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution fails, he dies and has no more trouble.

Yes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of medicine thus far only.

Has he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be in his life if he were deprived of his occupation?

Quite true, he said.

But with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has any specially appointed work which he must perform, if he would live.

He is generally supposed to have nothing to do.

Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practise virtue?

Nay, he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner.

Let us not have a dispute with him about this, I said; but rather ask ourselves: Is the practise of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or can he live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a further question, whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of Phocylides?

Of that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastics, is most inimical to the practice of virtue.

Yes, indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most Important of all, irreconcileable with any kind of study or thought or selfreflection -- there is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to philosophy, and hence all practising or making trial of virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always fancying that he is being made ill, and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body.

Yes, likely enough.

And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these he cured by purges and operations, and bade them live as usual, herein consulting the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not have attempted

to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to lengthen out goodfornothing lives, or to have weak fathers begetting weaker sons; -- if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him; for such a cure would have been of no use either to himself, or to the State.

Then, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman.

Clearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons. Note that they were heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines of which I am speaking at the siege of Troy: You will remember how, when Pandarus wounded Menelaus, they

"Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies,"

but they never prescribed what the patient was afterward to eat or drink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus; the remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before he was wounded was healthy and regular in his habits; and even though he did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others; the art of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.

They were very acute persons, those sons of Asclepius.

Naturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar disobeying our behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by lightning. But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by us, will not believe them when they tell us both; if he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god.

All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to you: Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions, good and bad? and are not the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral natures?

Yes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think good?

Will you tell me?

I will, if I can. Let me, however, note that in the same question you join two things which are not the same.

How so? he asked.

Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the

most skilful physicians are those who, from their youth upward, have combined with the knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease; they had better not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they cure the body; in that case we could not allow them ever to be or to have been sickly; but they cure the body with the mind, and the mind which has become and is sick can cure nothing.

That is very true, he said.

But with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind; he ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from youth upward, and to have gone through the whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own selfconsciousness; the honorable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily practised upon by the dishonest, because they have no examples of what evil is in their own souls.

Yes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived.

Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he should have learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of the nature of evil in others: knowledge should be his guide, not personal experience.

Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge.

Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your question); for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and suspicious nature of which we spoke -- he who has committed many crimes, and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness -- when he is among his fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges of them by himself: but when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable suspicions; he cannot recognize an honest man, because he has no pattern of honesty in himself; at the same time, as the bad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself, and is by others thought to be, rather wise than foolish.

Most true, he said.

Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the other; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature, educated by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the virtuous, and not the vicious, man has wisdom -- in my opinion.

And in mine also.

This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of

law, which you will sanction in your State. They will minister to better natures, giving health both of soul and of body; but those who are diseased in their bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an end to themselves.

That is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State.

And thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music which, as we said, inspires temperance, will be reluctant to go to law.

Clearly.

And the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to practise the simple gymnastics, will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some extreme case.

That I quite believe.

The very exercises and toils which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the spirited element of his nature, and not to increase his strength; he will not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen to develop his muscles.

Very right, he said.

Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastics really designed, as is often supposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the training of the body.

What then is the real object of them?

I believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul.

How can that be? he asked.

Did you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of exclusive devotion to gymnastics, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music?

In what way shown? he said.

The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of softness and effeminacy, I replied.

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a savage, and that the mere musician IS melted and softened beyond what is good for him.

Yet surely, I said, this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if rightly educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is liable to become hard and brutal.

That I quite think.

On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness. And this also, when too much indulged, will

turn to softness, but, if educated rightly, will be gentle and moderate.

True.

And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities?

Assuredly.

And both should be in harmony?

Beyond question.

And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?

Yes.

And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?

Very true.

And, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening and soothing process, in the next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul; and he becomes a feeble warrior.

Very true.

If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of music weakening the spirit renders him excitable; on the least provocation he flames up at once, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit he grows irritable and passionate and is quite impractical.

Exactly.

And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great feeder, and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, and he becomes twice the man that he was.

Certainly.

And what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the muses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him, having no taste of any sort of learning or inquiry or thought or culture, grow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment, and his senses not being purged of their mists?

True, he said.

And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using the weapon of persuasion -- he is like a wild beast, all violence and fierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all ignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace.

That is quite true, he said.

And as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the other the philosophical, some god, as I should say, has given mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body), in order that these two principles (like the strings of an instrument) may be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized.

That appears to be the intention.

And he who mingles music with gymnastics in the fairest proportions, and best attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.

You are quite right, Socrates.

And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the government is to last.

Yes, he will be absolutely necessary.

Such, then, are our principles of nurture and education: Where would be the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests? For these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we shall have no difficulty in discovering them.

I dare say that there will be no difficulty.

Very good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects?

Certainly.

There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger.

Clearly.

And that the best of these must rule.

That is also clear.

Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?

Yes.

And as we are to have the best of guardians for our

city, must they not be those who have most the character of guardians?

Yes.

And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special care of the State?

True.

And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?

To be sure.

And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the same interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune is supposed by him at any time most to affect his own?

Very true, he replied.

Then there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests.

Those are the right men.

And they will have to be watched at every age, in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the State.

How cast off? he said.

I will explain to you, he replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind either with his will or against his will; with his will when he gets rid of a falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he is deprived of a truth.

I understand, he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of the unwilling I have yet to learn.

Why, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, and willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess the truth a good? and you would agree that to conceive things as they are is to possess the truth?

Yes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of truth against their will.

And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or enchantment?

Still, he replied, I do not understand you.

I fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the

tragedians. I only mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget; argument steals away the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and this I call theft. Now you understand me?

Yes.

Those again who are forced, are those whom the violence of some pain or grief compels to change their opinion.

I understand, he said, and you are quite right.

And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who change their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the sterner influence of fear?

Yes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant.

Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must inquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the State is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from their youth upward, and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way?

Yes.

And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them, in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities.

Very right, he replied.

And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments -- that is the third sort of test -- and see what will be their behavior: like those who take colts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so must we take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures, and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the furnace, that we may discover whether they are armed against all enchantments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned, and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to the State. And he who at every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State; he shall be honored in life and death, and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honor, the greatest that we have to give. But him who fails, we must reject. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak generally, and not with any pretension to exactness.

And, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said.

And perhaps the word "guardian" in the fullest sense

ought to be applied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the will, or the others the power, to harm us. The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers.

I agree with you, he said.

How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately spoke -- just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that be possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?

What sort of lie? he said.

Nothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale of what has often occurred before now in other places (as the poets say, and have made the world believe), though not in our time, and I do not know whether such an event could ever happen again, or could now even be made probable, if it did.

How your words seem to hesitate on your lips!

You will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard.

Speak, he said, and fear not. Well, then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in the face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream, and the education and training which they received from us, an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they were completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country being their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers.

You had good reason, he said, to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell.

True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you half. Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honor; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard, or of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race. They should observe what elements

mingle in their offspring; for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful toward the child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honor, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?

Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons' sons, and posterity after them.

I see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, of the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumor, while we arm our earthborn heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their rulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best suppress insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies, who, like wolves, may come down on the fold from without; there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper gods and prepare their dwellings.

Just so, he said.

And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of winter and the heat of summer.

I suppose that you mean houses, he replied.

Yes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shopkeepers.

What is the difference? he said.

That I will endeavor to explain, I replied. To keep watchdogs, who, from want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would turn upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs, but wolves, would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd?

Truly monstrous, he said.

And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being stronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and become savage tyrants instead of friends and allies?

Yes, great care should be taken.

And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?

But they are welleducated already, he replied.

I cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more certain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be, will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one another, and to those who are under their protection.

Very true, he replied.

And not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge that.

He must.

Then now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private house or store closed against anyone who has a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become good housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for our guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?

Yes, said Glaucon.

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Book IV: Wealth, Poverty, And Virtue

(Adeimantus, Socrates.)

HERE Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you answer, Socrates, said he, if a person were to say that you are making these people miserable, and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness; the city in fact belongs to them, but they are none the better for it; whereas other men

acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, and have everything handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the gods on their own account, and practising hospitality; moreover, as you were saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that is usual among the favorites of fortune; but our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard?

Yes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid in addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if they would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought to be happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature might be added.

But, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge.

You mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer?

Yes.

If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find the answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice, and in the illordered State injustice: and, having found them, we might then decide which of the two is the happier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by and by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were painting a statue, and someone came up to us and said: Why do you not put the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the body -- the eyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black -- to him we might fairly answer: Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this and the other features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I say to you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians; for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing round the winecup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only as much as they like; in this way we might make every class happy -- and then, as you imagine, the whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea into our heads; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are not, are confined

to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seeming and not real guardians, then see how they turn the State upside down; and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.

I think that you are quite right.

I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me.

What may that be?

There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.

What are they?

Wealth, I said, and poverty.

How do they act?

The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, any longer take the same pains with his art?

Certainly not.

He will grow more and more indolent and careless?

Very true.

And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?

Yes; he greatly deteriorates.

But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself with tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.

Certainly not.

Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?

That is evident.

Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.

What evils?

Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent.

That is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.

There would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with one such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.

How so? he asked.

In the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be trained warriors fighting against an army of rich men.

That is true, he said.

And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and welltodo gentlemen who were not boxers?

Hardly, if they came upon him at once.

What, not, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn more than one stout personage?

Certainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that.

And yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and practise of boxing than they have in military qualities.

Likely enough.

Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or three times their own number?

I agree with you, for I think you right.

And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one of the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we neither have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore come and help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, on hearing these words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather

than, with the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep?

That is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one.

But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own!

Why so?

You ought to speak of other States in the plural number; not one of them is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich; these are at war with one another; and in either there are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if you treated them all as a single State. But if you deal with them as many, and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others, you will always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your State, while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of States, I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but in deed and truth, though she number not more than 1,000 defenders. A single State which is her equal you will hardly find, either among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that appear to be as great and many times greater.

That is most true, he said.

And what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which they are to include, and beyond which they will not go?

What limit would you propose?

I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity; that, I think, is the proper limit.

Very good, he said.

Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our guardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and selfsufficing.

And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon them.

And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter still -- I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower classes, when naturally superior. The intention was, that, in the case of the citizens generally, each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many.

Yes, he said; that is not so difficult.

The regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing -- a thing, however, which I would rather call, not, great, but sufficient for our purpose.

What may that be? he asked.

Education, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says.

That will be the best way of settling them.

Also, I said, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good education improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals.

Very possibly, he said.

Then to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of our rulers should be directed -- that music and gymnastics be preserved in their original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to maintain them intact. And when anyone says that mankind most regard

"The newest song which the singers have,"

they will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new kind of song; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the meaning of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him; he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always change with them.

Yes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and your own.

Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music?

Yes, he said; the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in.

Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears harmless.

Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little this spirit of license, finding a

home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights, private as well as public.

Is that true? I said.

That is my belief, he replied.

Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths themselves become lawless, they can never grow up into wellconducted and virtuous citizens.

Very true, he said.

And when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any fallen places [a] [principle] in the State will raise them up again.

Very true, he said.

Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their predecessors have altogether neglected.

What do you mean?

I mean such things as these: -- when the young are to be silent before their elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit; what honor is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with me?

Yes.

But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters -- I doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written enactments about them likely to be lasting.

Impossible.

It would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts a man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract like?

To be sure.

Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may be the reverse of good?

That is not to be denied.

And for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further about them.

Naturally enough, he replied.

Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans; about insult and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment of juries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about any impositions and exactions of market and harbor dues which may be required, and in general about the regulations of markets, police, harbors, and the like.. But, O heavens! shall we condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?

I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves.

Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which we have given them.

And without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on forever making and mending the laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection.

You would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no selfrestraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?

Exactly.

Yes, I said; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try.

Such cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort.

Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and drinking and wenching and idling, nether drug nor cautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.

Charming! he replied. I see nothing in going into a passion with a man who tells you what is right.

These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.

Assuredly not.

Nor would you praise the behavior of States which act like the men whom I was just now describing. For are there not illordered States in which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in

anticipating and gratifying their humors is held to be a great and good statesman -- do not these States resemble the persons whom I was describing?

Yes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from praising them.

But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption?

Yes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired.

What do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When a man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?

Nay, he said, certainly not in that case.

Well, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing; they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?

Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing.

I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution either in an illordered or in a wellordered State; for in the former they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them; and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.

What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?

Nothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the god of Delphi, there remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all.

Which are they? he said.

The institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods, demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and the rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant ourselves, and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the centre, on the navel of the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.

You are right, and we will do as you propose.

But where, amid all this, is justice? Son of Ariston, tell me where. Now that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice, and in what they differ from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search yourself, saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?

I do not deny that I said so; and as you remind me, I will be as good as my word; but you must join.

We will, he replied.

Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.

That is most certain.

And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.

That is likewise clear.

And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?

Very good.

If there were four things, and we were searching for one of them, wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the first, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.

Very true, he said.

And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also four in number?

Clearly.

First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and in this I detect a certain peculiarity.

What is that?

The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in counsel?

Very true.

And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by knowledge, do men counsel well?

Clearly.

And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?

Of course.

There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?

Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering.

Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?

Certainly not.

Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, he said, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?

Not by reason of any of them, he said.

Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would give the city the name of agricultural?

Yes.

Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently founded State among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best deal with itself and with other States?

There certainly is.

And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.

It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.

And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge?

The name of good in counsel and truly wise.

And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?

The smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.

Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?

Much the smallest.

And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State, being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by nature to be of all classes the least.

Most true.

Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four virtues have somehow or other been discovered.

And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.

Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.

How do you mean?

Why, I said, everyone who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf.

No one, he replied, would ever think of any other.

The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either the one or the other.

Certainly not.

The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and this is what you term courage.

I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.

Salvation of what?

Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words "under all circumstances" to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?

If you please.

You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true seapurple, begin by selecting their white color first; this they prepare and dress with much

care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast color, and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other color.

Yes, he said; I know that they have a washedout and ridiculous appearance.

Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastics; we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection, and the color of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure -- mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.

But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave -- this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have another name.

Most certainly.

Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?

Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words "of a citizen," you will not be far wrong -- hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking, not for courage, but justice; and for the purpose of our inquiry we have said enough.

You are right, he replied.

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State -- first, temperance, and then justice, which is the end of our search.

Very true.

Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?

I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favor of considering temperance first.

Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request.

Then consider, he said.

Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding.

How so? he asked.

Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of "a man being his own master;" and other traces of the same notion may be found in language.

No doubt, he said.

There is something ridiculous in the expression "master of himself;" for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.

Certainly.

The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse -- in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.

Yes, there is reason in that.

And now, I said, look at our newly created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words "temperance" and "selfmastery" truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.

Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.

Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.

Certainly, he said.

Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.

Very true. These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.

That I perceive, he said.

Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of

itself, ours may claim such a designation?

Certainly, he replied.

It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?

Yes.

And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?

Undoubtedly.

And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found -- in the rulers or in the subjects?

In both, as I should imagine, he replied.

Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?

Why so?

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom, or power, or numbers, or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in States and individuals.

I entirely agree with you.

And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a State virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.

The inference is obvious.

The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first, let me know.

Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him -- that is about as much as I am good for.

Offer up a prayer with me and follow.

I will, but you must show me the way.

Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must push on.

Let us push on.

Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.

Good news, he said.

Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.

Why so?

Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our inquiry, ages ago, there was Justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands -- that was the way with us -- we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.

What do you mean?

I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of Justice, and have failed to recognize her.

I grow impatient at the length of your exordium. Well, then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted; now justice is this principle or a part of it.

Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.

Further, we affirmed that Justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us.

Yes, we said so.

Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?

I cannot, but I should like to be told.

Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth, or remaining one.

That follows of necessity.

If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject -- the quality, I mean, of everyone doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm -- the question is not so easily answered.

Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.

Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.

Yes, he said.

And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?

Exactly.

Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would intrust the office of determining suitsatlaw?

Certainly.

And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?

Yes; that is their principle.

Which is a just principle?

Yes.

Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?

Very true.

Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?

Not much.

But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by

wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.

Most true. Seeing, then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evildoing?

Precisely.

And the greatest degree of evildoing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice?

Certainly. This, then, is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.

I agree with you.

We will not, I said, be overpositive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh inquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual -- if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls.

That will be in regular course; let us do as you say.

I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?

Like, he replied.

The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?

He will.

And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason

of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?

True, he said.

And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner?

Certainly, he said.

Once more, then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question -- whether the soul has these three principles or not?

An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good.

Very true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous inquiry.

May we not be satisfied with that? he said; under the circumstances, I am quite content. I, too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.

Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.

Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State? -- how else can they come there? Take the quality of passion or spirit; it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g., the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the Northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

Exactly so, he said.

There is no difficulty in understanding this.

None whatever.

But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action -- to determine that is the difficulty.

Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty.

Then let us now try and determine whether they are the

same or different.

How can we? he asked.

I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different.

Good.

For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?

Impossible.

Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment -- to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.

Very true.

And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference; and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forward or backward, then in no point of view can they be at rest.

That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.

Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.

Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.

Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.

Yes, he said, that will be the best way.

Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition)?

Yes, he said, they are opposites.

Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again willing and wishing -- all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned. You would say -- would you not? -- that the soul of him who desires is seeking after the object of his desire; or that he is drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desire, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he had been asked a question?

Very true.

And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?

Certainly.

Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them?

Let us take that class, he said.

The object of one is food, and of the other drink?

Yes.

And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?

Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.

But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the same is true of every other desire.

Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.

Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a quality attached to either term of the relation; others are simple and have their correlatives simple.

I do not know what you mean.

Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?

Certainly.

And the much greater to the much less?

Yes.

And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?

Certainly, he said.

And so of more or less, and of other correlative terms, such as the double and the half, or, again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives; is not this true of all of them?

Yes.

And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I mean, for example, that the science of housebuilding is a kind of knowledge which is defined and

distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture.

Certainly.

Because it has a particular quality which no other has?

Yes.

And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?

Yes.

Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or

that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term "science" is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined, and is hence called not merely science, but the science of medicine.

I quite understand, and, I think, as you do.

Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms, having clearly a relation --

Yes, thirst is relative to drink.

And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only?

Certainly.

Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?

That is plain.

And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.

Impossible.

No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls.

Exactly so, he replied.

And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?

Yes, he said, it constantly happens.

And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him?

I should say so.

And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?

Clearly.

Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one another; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational principle of the soul; the

other, with which he loves, and hungers, and thirsts, and feels the flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions?

Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different.

Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding?

I should be inclined to say -- akin to desire.

Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.

I have heard the story myself, he said.

The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.

Yes; that is the meaning, he said.

And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason; but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in anyone else?

Certainly not.

Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is, the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him -- these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by them.

True, he said.

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark

no more.

The illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds.

I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider.

What point?

You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.

Most assuredly.

But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or only a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three principles in the soul, there will only be two, the rational and the concupiscent; or rather, as the State was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?

Yes, he said, there must be a third.

Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.

But that is easily proved: We may observe even in young children that they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them late enough.

Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted by us,

"He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul;" for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it.

Very true, he said.

And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number.

Exactly.

Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes

the State wise?

Certainly.

Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?

Assuredly.

And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?

That follows of course.

We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?

We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.

We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?

Yes, he said, we must remember that too.

And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?

Certainly.

And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastics will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?

Quite true, he said.

And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her naturalborn subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?

Very true, he said.

Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and counsels?

True.

And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?

Right, he replied.

And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?

Assuredly.

And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire, are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?

Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual.

And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just.

That is very certain.

And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State?

There is no difference, in my opinion, he said.

Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.

What sort of instances do you mean?

If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would anyone deny this?

No one, he replied.

Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?

Never.

Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements.

Impossible.

No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonor his father and mother, or to fail in his religious

duties?

No one.

And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in ruling or being ruled?

Exactly so.

Are you satisfied, then, that the quality which makes such men and such States is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?

Not I, indeed.

Then our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been verified?

Yes, certainly.

And the division of labor which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use?

Clearly.

But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned, however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others -- he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals -- when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and cooperates with this harmonious condition just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.

You have said the exact truth, Socrates.

Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood?

Most certainly not.

May we say so, then?

Let us say so.

And now, I said, injustice has to be considered.

Clearly.

Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles -- a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal -- what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance, and cowardice, and ignorance, and every form of vice?

Exactly so.

And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?

What do you mean? he said.

Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.

How so? he said.

Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.

Yes.

And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?

That is certain.

And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?

True.

And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order?

Exactly so, he said.

Then virtue is the health, and beauty, and wellbeing of the soul, and vice the disease, and weakness, and deformity, of the same?

True.

And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?

Assuredly.

Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?

In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be such as we have described?

Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our own eyes, let us not faint by the way.

Certainly not, he replied.

Come up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice, those of them, I mean, which are worth looking at.

I am following you, he replied: proceed.

I said: The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from some tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is one, but that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four special ones which are deserving of note.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the State.

How many?

There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said.

What are they?

The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, according as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many.

True, he replied.

But I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the State will be

maintained.

That is true, he replied.

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Book: On Matrimony And Philosophy

(Socrates, Glaucon, Adeimantus.)

SUCH is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is of the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the evil is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the regulation of the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms.

What are they? he said.

I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared to me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him: stretching forth his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder, and drew him toward him, leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and saying something in his ear, of which I only caught the words, "Shall we let him off, or what shall we do?"

Certainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice.

Who is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?

You, he said.

I repeated, Why am I especially not to be let off?

Why, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a whole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it were selfevident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children "friends have all things in common."

And was I not right, Adeimantus?

Yes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like everything else, requires to be explained; for community may be of many kinds. Please, therefore, to say what sort of community you mean. We have been long expecting that you would tell us something about the family life of your citizens -- how they will bring children into the world, and rear them when they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this community of women and children -- for we are of opinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still undetermined, and you are taking in hand another State, we have resolved, as you heard, not to let you go until you give an account of all this.

To that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as

saying: Agreed.

And without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be equally agreed.

I said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an argument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had finished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant of what a hornet's nest of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this gathering trouble, and avoided it.

For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said Thrasymachus -- to look for gold, or to hear discourse?

Yes, but discourse should have a limit.

Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about us; take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way: What sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and education, which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these things will be.

Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another point of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for the best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the subject, lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a dream only.

Fear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they are not sceptical or hostile.

I said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these words.

Yes, he said.

Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I knew what I was talking about. To declare the truth about matters of high interest which a man honors and loves, among wise men who love him, need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind; but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only a hesitating inquirer, which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish), but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty,

or goodness, or justice, in the matter of laws. And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among friends; and therefore you do well to encourage me.

Glaucon laughed and said: Well, then, Socrates, in case you and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the homicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then and speak.

Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt, and what holds at law may hold in argument.

Then why should you mind?

Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the men has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the women. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am invited by you.

For men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my opinion, of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said that the men were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the herd.

True.

Let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be subject to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see whether the result accords with our design.

What do you mean?

What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs divided into he's and she's, or do they both share equally in hunting and in keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we intrust to the males the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the females at home, under the idea that the bearing and the suckling of their puppies are labor enough for them?

No, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that the males are stronger and the females weaker.

But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are bred and fed in the same way?

You cannot.

Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the same nurture and education?

Yes.

The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastics. Yes.

Then women must be taught music and gymnastics and also the art of war, which they must practise like the men?

That is the inference, I suppose.

I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.

No doubt of it.

Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they are no longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than the enthusiastic old men who, in spite of wrinkles and ugliness, continue to frequent the gymnasia.

Yes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would be thought ridiculous.

But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of innovation; how they will talk of women's attainments, both in music and gymnastics, and above all about their wearing armor and riding upon horseback!

Very true, he replied. Yet, having begun, we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of the opinion, which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when first the Cretans, and then the Lacedaemonians, introduced the custom, the wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation.

No doubt.

But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye had vanished before the better principle which reason asserted, then the man was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to weigh the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good.

Very true, he replied.

First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, let us come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she capable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or cannot share? That will be the best way of commencing the inquiry, and will probably lead to the fairest conclusion.

That will be much the best way.

Shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves? in this manner the adversary's position will not be undefended.

Why not? he said.

Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say: "Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you yourselves, at the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature." And certainly, if I am not mistaken, such an admission was made by us. "And do not the natures of men and women differ very much indeed?" And we shall reply, Of course they do. Then we shall be asked, "Whether the tasks assigned to men and to women should not be different, and such as are agreeable to their different natures?" Certainly they should. "But if so, have you not fallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that men and women, whose natures are so entirely different, ought to perform the same actions?" What defence will you make for us, my good sir, against anyone who offers these objections?

That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall and I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side.

These are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like kind, which I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to take in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children.

By Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy. Why, yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth, whether he has fallen into a little swimmingbath or into midocean, he has to swim all the same.

Very true.

And must not we swim and try to reach the shore -- we will hope that Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?

I suppose so, he said. Well, then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We acknowledged -- did we not? -- that different natures ought to have different pursuits, and that men's and women's natures are different. And now what are we saying? -- that different natures ought to have the same pursuits -- this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us.

Precisely.

Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction!

Why do you say so?

Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is

really disputing, just because he cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion.

Yes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with us and our argument?

A great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition.

In what way? Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature, or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same natures.

Why, no, he said, that was never considered by us.

I said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely?

That would be a jest, he said.

Yes, I said, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we constructed the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for example, that a physician and one who is in mind a physician may be said to have the same nature.

True.

Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?

Certainly.

And if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should receive; and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits.

Very true, he said.

Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?

That will be quite fair.

And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there is no difficulty.

Yes, perhaps.

Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of women which would affect them in the administration of the State.

By all means.

Let us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question: When you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal, whereas the other, after much study and application, no sooner learns than he forgets; or again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while the body of the other is a hinderance to him? -- would not these be the sort of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?

No one will deny that.

And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd?

You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to many men, yet on the whole what you say is true.

And if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of administration in a State which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both; all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man.

Very true.

Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?

That will never do.

One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another has no music in her nature?

Very true.

And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?

Certainly.

And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit?

That is also true.

Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort?

Yes.

Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness.

Obviously.

And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and in character?

Very true.

And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?

They ought.

Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastics to the wives of the guardians -- to that point we come round again.

Certainly not.

The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice, which prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature.

That appears to be true.

We had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and secondly whether they were the most beneficial?

Yes.

And the possibility has been acknowledged?

Yes.

The very great benefit has next to be established?

Quite so.

You will admit that the same education which makes a

man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the same?

Yes.

I should like to ask you a question.

What is it?

Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better than another?

The latter.

And in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the guardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more perfect men, or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling?

What a ridiculous question!

You have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens?

By far the best.

And will not their wives be the best women?

Yes, by far the best.

And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?

There can be nothing better.

And this is what the arts of music and gymnastics, when present in such a manner as we have described, will accomplish?

Certainly.

Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree beneficial to the State?

True.

Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their country; only in the distribution of labors the lighter are to be assigned to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects their duties are to be the same. And as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter he is plucking

"A fruit of unripe wisdom,"

and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is about; for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, "that the useful is the noble, and the hurtful

is the base."

Very true.

Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say that we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common; to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the consistency of the argument with itself bears witness.

Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.

Yes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this when you see the next.

Go on; let me see.

The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, is to the following effect, "that the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent."

Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the possibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more questionable.

I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite another matter, and will be very much disputed.

I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both.

You imply that the two questions must be combined, I replied. Now I meant that you should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought, I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility.

But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give a defence of both.

Well, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favor: let me feast my mind with the dream as daydreamers are in the habit of feasting themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have discovered any means of effecting their wishes -- that is a matter which never troubles them -- they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already granted to them, they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing what they mean to do when their wish has come true -- that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much. Now I myself am beginning to lose heart, and I should like, with your permission, to pass over the question of possibility at present. Assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal, I shall now proceed to inquire how the rulers will carry out these arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed, will be of the

greatest benefit to the State and to the guardians. First of all, then, if you have no objection, I will endeavor with your help to consider the advantages of the measure; and hereafter the question of possibility.

I have no objection; proceed.

First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other; the guardians themselves must obey the laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them in any details which are intrusted to their care.

That is right, he said.

You, I said, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will now select the women and give them to them; they must be as far as possible of like natures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own; they will be together, and will be brought up together, and will associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other -- necessity is not too strong a word, I think?

Yes, he said; necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to the mass of mankind.

True, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid.

Yes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted.

Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?

Exactly.

And how can marriages be made most beneficial? that is a question which I put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the nobler sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you ever attended to their pairing and breeding?

In what particulars?

Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some better than others?

True.

And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed from the best only?

From the best.

And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?

I choose only those of ripe age.

And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate?

Certainly.

And the same of horses and of animals in general?

Undoubtedly.

Good heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!

Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any particular skill?

Because, I said, our rulers will often have to practise upon the body corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be given, then the doctor should be more of a man.

That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?

I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage.

And we were very right.

And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births.

How so?

Why, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with the inferior as seldom, as possible; and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in firstrate condition. Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further danger of our herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into rebellion.

Very true.

Had we better not appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose

aim will be to preserve the average of population? There are many other things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too small.

Certainly, he replied.

We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they will accuse their own illluck and not the rulers.

To be sure, he said.

And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honors and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible.

True.

And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to be held by women as well as by men -- Yes --

The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.

Yes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure.

They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognizes her own child; and other wetnurses may be engaged if more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants.

You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they are having children.

Why, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?

Very true.

And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty years in a man's?

Which years do you mean to include?

A woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the State, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at fiveandtwenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats quickest, and continue to beget children until he be fiftyfive.

Certainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigor. Anyone above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; the child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, which at each hymeneal priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer, that the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust.

Very true, he replied.

And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.

Very true, he replied.

This applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age: after that we will allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his mother's mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, the parents must understand that the offspring of such a union cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly.

That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know who are fathers and daughters, and so on?

They will never know. The way will be this: dating from the day of the hymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children who are born in the seventh and the tenth month afterward his sons, and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and he will call their children his grandchildren, and they will call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called their brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying, will be forbidden to intermarry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters; if the lot favors them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will allow them.

Quite right, he replied.

Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our State are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would have the argument show that this community is consistent with the rest of our polity, and also that nothing can be better -- would you not?

Yes, certainly.

Shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a State -- what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of the evil?

By all means.

Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?

There cannot.

And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains -- where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?

No doubt.

Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized -- when you have onehalf of the world triumphing and the other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens?

Certainly.

Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the terms "mine" and "not mine," "his" and "not his."

Exactly so.

And is not that the bestordered State in which the greatest number of persons apply the terms "mine" and "not mine" in the same way to the same thing?

Quite true.

Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual -- as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the whole frame, drawn toward the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and the same expression is used about any other part of the body, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering.

Very true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the bestordered State there is the nearest approach to this

common feeling which you describe.

Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or sorrow with him?

Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a wellordered State.

It will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see whether this or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental principles.

Very good.

Our State, like every other, has rulers and subjects?

True.

All of whom will call one another citizens?

Of course.

But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other States?

Generally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply call them rulers.

And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers?

They are called saviours and helpers, he replied.

And what do the rulers call the people?

Their maintainers and fosterfathers.

And what do they call them in other States?

Slaves.

And what do the rulers call one another in other States?

Fellowrulers.

And what in ours?

Fellowguardians.

Did you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would speak of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his friend?

Yes, very often.

And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest, and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?

Exactly.

But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a stranger?

Certainly he would not; for everyone whom they meet will be regarded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him.

Capital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name? For example, in the use of the word "father," would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be or not to be the strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their kinsfolk?

These, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in the spirit of them?

Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when anyone is well or ill, the universal word will be "with me it is well" or "it is ill."

Most true.

And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying that they will have their pleasures and pains in common?

Yes, and so they will.

And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will alike call "my own," and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain?

Yes, far more so than in other States.

And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the State, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and children?

That will be the chief reason.

And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was implied in our comparison of a wellordered State to the relation of the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?

That we acknowledged, and very rightly.

Then the community of wives and children among our

citizens is clearly the source of the greatest good to the State?

Certainly.

And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming -- that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; their pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens, and they were to have no private expenses; for we intended them to preserve their true character of guardians.

Right, he replied.

Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am saying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about "mine" and "not mine;" each man dragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own, where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains; but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and therefore they all tend toward a common end.

Certainly, he replied.

And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will be delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion.

Of course they will.

Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall maintain to be honorable and right; we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity.

That is good, he said.

Yes; and there is a further good in the law; viz., that if a man has a quarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and not proceed to more dangerous lengths.

Certainly.

To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger.

Clearly.

Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will he slight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in the relation of parents;

fear, that the injured one will be succored by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers.

That is true, he replied.

Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one another?

Yes, there will be no want of peace.

And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another.

None whatever.

I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be rid, for they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy necessaries for their household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep -- the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in this way are mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of.

Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.

And from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.

How so?

The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and the crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fulness of all that life needs; they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living, and after death have an honorable burial.

Do you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion someone who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians unhappy -- they had nothing and might have possessed all things -- to whom we replied that, if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter consider this question, but that, as at present divided, we would make our guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the State with a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but of the whole?

Yes, I remember.

And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors -- is the life of shoemakers, or any

other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared with it?

Certainly not.

At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that if any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but, infatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his head shall seek to appropriate the whole State to himself, then he will have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, "half is more than the whole."

If he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when you have the offer of such a life.

You agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of life such as we have described -- common education, common children; and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt together like dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are able, women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is best, and will not violate, but preserve, the natural relation of the sexes.

I agree with you, he replied.

The inquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community will be found possible -- as among other animals, so also among men -- and if possible, in what way possible?

You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest.

There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by them.

How?

Why, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with them any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner of the artisan's child, they may look on at the work which they will have to do when they are grown up; and besides looking on they will have to help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on and help, long before they touch the wheel?

Yes, I have.

And shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in giving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than our guardians will be?

The idea is ridiculous, he said.

There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals, the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valor.

That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often happen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost as well as their parents, and the State will never recover.

True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk?

I am far from saying that.

Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?

Clearly.

Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their youth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly be incurred.

Yes, very important.

This then must be our first step -- to make our children spectators of war; but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger; then all will be well.

True.

Their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but to know, as far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and what dangerous?

That may be assumed.

And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones?

True.

And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers?

Very properly.

Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal of chance about them?

True.

Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and when they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the horses must not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet the swiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent view of

what is hereafter to be their own business; and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape.

I believe that you are right, he said.

Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan. What do you think?

By all means, I should say.

And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what they like with him.

Certainly.

But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In the first place, he shall receive honor in the army from his youthful comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you say?

I approve.

And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?

To that too, I agree.

But you will hardly agree to my next proposal.

What is your proposal?

That he should kiss and be kissed by them.

Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his love be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valor.

Capital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has been already determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible?

Agreed.

Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave youths should be honored; for he tells how Ajax, after he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chines, which seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of honor but also a very strengthening thing.

Most true, he said.

Then in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honor the brave according to the measure of their valor, whether men or women, with hymns and those other distinctions which we were mentioning; also with

"seats of precedence, and meats and full cups;"

and in honoring them, we shall be at the same time training them.

That, he replied, is excellent.

Yes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race?

To be sure.

Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead

"They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of evil, the guardians of speechgifted men"?

Yes; and we accept his authority.

We must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we must do as he bids?

By all means.

And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their sepulchres as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are deemed preeminently good, whether they die from age or in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honors.

That is very right, he said.

Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?

In what respect do you mean?

First of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?

To spare them is infinitely better.

Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.

Certainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the barbarians and will keep their hands off one

another.

Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but their armor? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, pretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder.

Very true.

And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him -- is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?

Very like a dog, he said.

Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?

Yes, he replied, we most certainly must.

Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes; and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?

Very true.

Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses, what is to be the practice?

May I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?

Both should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual produce and no more. Shall I tell you why?

Pray do.

Why, you see, there is a difference in the names "discord" and "war," and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external and foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the second, war.

That is a very proper distinction, he replied.

And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to the barbarians?

Very good, he said.

And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians, and

barbarians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends; and such enmity is to be called discord.

I agree.

Consider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and mother: There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest, but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts, and would not mean to go on fighting forever.

Yes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.

And will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?

It ought to be, he replied.

Then will not the citizens be good and civilized?

Yes, very civilized.

And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land, and share in the common temples?

Most certainly.

And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only -- a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?

Certainly not.

Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled? Certainly.

They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?

Just so.

And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a city -- men, women, and children -- are equally their enemies, for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands and raze their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?

I agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.

Then let us enact this law also for our guardians: that they are neither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.

Agreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our previous enactments, are very good.

But still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this way you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of this discussion you thrust aside: Is such an order of things possible, and how, if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the State. I will add, what you have omitted, that your citizens will be the bravest of warriors, and will never leave their ranks, for they will all know one another, and each will call the other father, brother, son; and if you suppose the women to join their armies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror to the enemy, or as auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be absolutely invincible; and there are many domestic advantages which might also be mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge: but, as I admit all these advantages and as many more as you please, if only this State of yours were to come into existence, we need say no more about them; assuming then the existence of the State, let us now turn to the question of possibility and ways and means -- the rest may be left.

If I loiter for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, I said, and have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves, and you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard the third wave, I think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge that some fear and hesitation were natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary as that which I have now to state and investigate.

The more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more determined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: speak out and at once.

Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search after justice and injustice.

True, he replied; but what of that?

I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?

The approximation will be enough.

We were inquiring into the nature of absolute justice

and into the character of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact.

True, he said.

Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed?

He would be none the worse.

Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?

To be sure.

And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?

Surely not, he replied.

That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show how and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you, having this in view, to repeat your former admissions.

What admissions?

I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual, whatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth? What do you say?

I agree.

Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every respect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented. I am sure that I should be contented -- will not you?

Yes, I will.

Let me next endeavor to show what is that fault in States which is the cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change which will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the change, if possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any rate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible.

Certainly, he replied.

I think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only one change were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.

What is it? he said.

Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and dishonor; and do you mark my words.

Proceed.

I said: "Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils -- no, nor the human race, as I believe -- and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day." Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in no other State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing.

Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment, and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main, before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what; and if you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be "pared by their fine wits," and no mistake.

You got me into the scrape, I said.

And I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of it; but I can only give you goodwill and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers to your questions better than another -- that is all. And now, having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbelievers that you are right.

I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance. And I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the State; then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be discovered to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State; and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers rather than leaders.

Then now for a definition, he said.

Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation.

Proceed.

I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to some one part of that which he loves, but to the whole.

I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my memory.

Another person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of pleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his charming face; the hooknose of another has, you say, a royal look; while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity: the dark visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the sweet "honeypale," as they are called, what is the very name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is not averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not say, in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the springtime of youth.

If you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the argument, I assent.

And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.

Very good.

And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army, they are willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honored by really great and important persons, they are glad to be honored by lesser and meaner people -- but honor of some kind they must have.

Exactly.

Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the whole class or a part only?

The whole.

And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole?

Yes, of the whole.

And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not, such a one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?

Very true, he said.

Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not right?

Glaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights have a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion, if they could help, while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus; whether the performance is in town or country -- that makes no difference -- they are there. Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor arts, are philosophers?

Certainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation.

He said: Who then are the true philosophers?

Those, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth.

That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?

To another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.

What is the proposition?

That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?

Certainly.

And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?

True again.

And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various combinations of them with actions and things and with one another, they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many? Very true.

And this is the distinction which I draw between the sightloving, artloving, practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers.

How do you distinguish them? he said.

The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colors and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their minds are incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.

True, he replied.

Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.

Very true.

And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow -- of such a one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?

I should certainly say that such a one was dreaming.

But take the case of the other, who recognizes the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects -- is he a dreamer, or is he awake?

He is wide awake.

And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?

Certainly.

But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?

We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.

Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him).

I answer that he knows something.

Something that is or is not?

Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?

And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of view, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly nonexistent is utterly unknown?

Nothing can be more certain.

Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be, that will have a place

intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being?

Yes, between them.

And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to notbeing, for that intermediate between being and notbeing there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such?

Certainly.

Do we admit the existence of opinion?

Undoubtedly.

As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?

Another faculty.

Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?

Yes.

And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed further I will make a division.

What division?

I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?

Yes, I quite understand.

Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore the distinctions of figure, color, and the like, which enable me to discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result; and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty, but that which has another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?

Yes.

And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?

Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.

And is opinion also a faculty?

Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we

are able to form an opinion.

And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion?

Why, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify that which is infallible with that which errs?

An excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite conscious of a distinction between them.

Yes.

Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or subjectmatters?

That is certain.

Being is the sphere or subjectmatter of knowledge, and knowledge is to know the nature of being?

Yes.

And opinion is to have an opinion?

Yes.

And do we know what we opine? or is the subjectmatter of opinion the same as the subjectmatter of knowledge?

Nay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference in faculty implies difference in the sphere or subjectmatter, and if, as we were saying, opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same.

Then if being is the subjectmatter of knowledge, something else must be the subjectmatter of opinion?

Yes, something else. Well, then, is notbeing the subjectmatter of opinion? or, rather, how can there be an opinion at all about notbeing? Reflect: when a man has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing?

Impossible.

He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?

Yes.

And notbeing is not one thing, but, properly speaking, nothing?

True.

Of notbeing, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of being, knowledge?

True, he said.

Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with notbeing?

Not with either.

And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?

That seems to be true.

But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a greater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance?

In neither.

Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge, but lighter than ignorance?

Both; and in no small degree.

And also to be within and between them?

Yes.

Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?

No question.

But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute notbeing; and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be found in the interval between them?

True.

And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call opinion?

There has.

Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the nature of being and notbeing, and cannot rightly be termed either, pure and simple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly call the subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper faculty -- the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean.

True.

This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty -- in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold -- he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one, or that anything is one -- to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so very kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is one which will not be found

ugly; or of the just, which will not be found unjust; or of the holy, which will not also be unholy?

No, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly; and the same is true of the rest.

And may not the many which are doubles be also halves? -- doubles, that is, of one thing, and halves of another?

Quite true.

And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?

True; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.

And can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this?

He replied: They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or notbeing, or both, or neither.

Then what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place than between being and notbeing? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than notbeing, or more full of light and existence than being.

That is quite true, he said.

Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are tossing about in some region which is halfway between pure being and pure notbeing?

We have.

Yes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty.

Quite true.

Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the many just, and not absolute justice, and the like -- such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge?

That is certain.

But those who see the absolute and eternal and

immutable may be said to know, and not to have opinion only?

Neither can that be denied.

The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colors, but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty.

Yes, I remember.

Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them?

I shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true.

But those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion.

Assuredly.

* * * *

Book VI: The Philosophy Of Government

(SOCRATES, GLAUCON.)

AND thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.

I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.

I suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the unjust must consider.

And what is the next question? he asked.

Surely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State?

And how can we rightly answer that question?

Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our State -- let them be our guardians.

Very good.

Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather

than no eyes?

There can be no question of that.

And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them -- are not such persons, I ask, simply blind?

Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition.

And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?

There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this greatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they fail in some other respect. Suppose, then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellences.

By all means.

In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such a union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State.

What do you mean?

Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption.

Agreed.

And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honorable, which they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition.

True.

And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also possess?

What quality?

Truthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their minds falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.

Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them.

"May be." my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather, "must be affirmed:" for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.

Right, he said.

And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

How can there be?

Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?

Never.

The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth?

Assuredly.

But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel.

True.

He whose desires are drawn toward knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure -- I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.

That is most certain.

Such a one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no place in his character.

Very true.

Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered.

What is that?

There should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human.

Most true, he replied.

Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life?

He cannot.

Or can such a one account death fearful? No, indeed.

Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?

Certainly not.

Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean, or a boaster, or a coward -- can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings?

Impossible.

Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical.

True.

There is another point which should be remarked.

What point?

Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.

Certainly not.

And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?

That is certain. Laboring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation? Yes.

Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?

Certainly.

And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion?

Undoubtedly.

And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?

To proportion.

Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally wellproportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously toward the true being of everything.

Certainly.

Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have a full and

perfect participation of being?

They are absolutely necessary, he replied.

And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn -- noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?

The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study.

And to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to these only you will intrust the State.

Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates, no one can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling passes over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led astray a little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering questions; these littles accumulate, and at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be turned upside down. And as unskilful players of draughts are at last shut up by their more skilful adversaries and have no piece to move, so they too find themselves shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are the counters; and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us might say, that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, not only in youth as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, most of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol.

Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?

I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.

Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.

Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them?

You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a parable.

Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed, I suppose.

I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion; but now hear the parable, and then you will be still more amused at

the meagreness of my imagination: for the manner in which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore, if I am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put together a figure made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering -- everyone is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to cut in pieces anyone who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, begging and praying him to commit the helm to them; and if at any time they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such manner as might be expected of them. Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a goodfornothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship, and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like or not -- the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling. Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a stargazer, a goodfornothing?

Of course, said Adeimantus.

Then you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the figure, which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the State; for you understand already.

Certainly.

Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised at finding that philosophers have no honor in their cities; explain it to him and try to convince him that their having honor would be far more extraordinary.

I will.

Say to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to

themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him -- that is not the order of nature; neither are "the wise to go to the doors of the rich" -- the ingenious author of this saying told a lie -- but the truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, to the physician he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who is able to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him; although the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp; they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them goodfornothings and stargazers.

Precisely so, he said.

For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite faction; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by her opponents, but by her own professing followers, the same of whom you suppose the accuser to say that the greater number of them are arrant rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed.

Yes.

And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?

True.

Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other?

By all means.

And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his leader, whom he followed always and in all things; failing in this, he was an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy.

Yes, that was said.

Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of him?

Certainly, he said.

And have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being -- that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but will go on -- the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he

cease from his travail.

Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him.

And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?

He will.

And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he leads?

Impossible.

Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow after?

True, he replied.

Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, magnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved, we were then led to inquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher.

Exactly.

And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature, why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling -- I am speaking of those who were said to be useless but not wicked -- and, when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy and upon all philosophers that universal reprobation of which we speak.

What are these corruptions? he said.

I will see if I can explain them to you. Everyone will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men?

Rare indeed.

And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures!

What causes?

In the first place there are their own virtues, their

courage, temperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them.

That is very singular, he replied.

Then there are all the ordinary goods of life -- beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections in the State -- you understand the sort of things -- these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.

I understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about them.

Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no longer appear strange to you.

And how am I to do so? he asked.

Why, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment, or climate, or soil, in proportion to their vigor, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to what is not.

Very true.

There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is greater.

Certainly.

And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are illeducated, become preeminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?

There I think that you are right.

And our philosopher follows the same analogy -- he is like a plant which, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts?

When is this accomplished? he said.

When they meet together, and the world sits down at an

assembly, or in a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame -- at such a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have -- he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?

Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.

And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been mentioned.

What is that?

The gentle force of attainder, or confiscation, or death, which, as you are aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when their words are powerless.

Indeed they do; and in right good earnest.

Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest?

None, he replied.

No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly; there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different type of character which has had no other training in virtue but that which is supplied by public opinion -- I speak, my friend, of human virtue only; what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may truly say.

I quite assent, he replied.

Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation.

What are you going to say?

Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him -- he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his

several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honorable and that dishonorable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights, and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to others, the nature of either, or the difference between them, which is immense. By heaven, would not such a one be a rare educator?

Indeed, he would.

And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or in music, or, finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them his judges when he is not obliged, the socalled necessity of Diomede will oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honorable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?

No, nor am I likely to hear.

You recognize the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful, or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?

Certainly not.

Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?

Impossible.

And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world?

They must.

And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?

That is evident.

Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end? -- and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence -- these were admitted

by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.

Yes.

Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among us all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?

Certainly, he said.

And his friends and fellowcitizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes?

No question.

Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honor and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now the power which he will one day possess.

That often happens, he said.

And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall, proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and having got such notions into his head will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless pride?

To be sure he will.

Now, when he is in this state of mind, if someone gently comes to him and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can only be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?

Far otherwise.

And even if there be someone who through inherent goodness or natural reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him from yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?

There can be no doubt of it.

And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?

Impossible.

Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher, may, if he be illeducated, divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other socalled goods of

life?

We were quite right.

Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits; they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time; this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in that direction; but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to States.

That is most true, he said.

And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonor her; and fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number deserve the severest punishment.

That is certainly what people say.

Yes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny creatures who, seeing this land open to them -- a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles -- like prisoners running out of prison into a sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those who do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts. Is not this unavoidable?

Yes.

Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of durance and come into a fortune -- he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who is left poor and desolate?

A most exact parallel.

What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard?

There can be no question of it.

And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is in a rank above them, what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom?

No doubt, he said.

Then, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant: perchance some noble and welleducated person, detained by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences remains devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which he contemns and neglects; and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to her; or peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages's bridle; for everything in the life of Theages conspired to divert him from philosophy; but illhealth kept him away from politics. My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such a one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts -- he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and goodwill, with bright hopes.

Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs.

A great work -- yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable to him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth and be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself.

The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently explained: the injustice of the charges against her has been shown -- is there anything more which you wish to say?

Nothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.

Not any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring against them -- not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and estranged; as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another character. But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then will be

seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but human; and now, I know that you are going to ask, What that State is:

No, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question -- whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or some other?

Yes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying before, that some living authority would always be required in the State having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as legislator you were laying down the laws.

That was said, he replied.

Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.

What is there remaining?

The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be the ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; "hard is the good," as men say.

Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the inquiry will then be complete.

I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want of power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to remark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit.

In what manner?

At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young; beginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from moneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic, take themselves off. In after life, when invited by someone else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business: at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are extinguished more truly than Heracleitus's sun, inasmuch as they never light up again.

But what ought to be their course?

Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years: during this period while they are growing up toward manhood, the chief and special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the

service of philosophy; as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul; but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labor, as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another.

How truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced; Thrasymachus least of all.

Do not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men, or do something which may profit them against the day when they live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.

You are speaking of a time which is not very near.

Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe; for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized; they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue -- such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image, they have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them -- do you think that they ever did?

No indeed.

No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble sentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.

They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.

And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor States nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the State, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them; or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm: if they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right?

Quite right.

If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death, that this our constitution has been, and is -- yea, and will be whenever the muse of philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this; that there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.

My opinion agrees with yours, he said.

But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?

I should imagine not, he replied.

O my friends, I said, do not attack the multitude: they will change their minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of soothing them and removing their dislike of overeducation, you show them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now doing their character and profession, and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed -- if they view him in this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves him, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper may be found, but not in the majority of mankind.

I quite agree with you, he said.

And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many entertain toward philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this.

It is most unbecoming.

For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed toward things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?

Impossible.

And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of

man allows; but like everyone else, he will suffer from detraction.

Of course.

And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, will be, think you, be an unskilful artificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue?

Anything but unskilful.

And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern?

They will not be angry if they understand, he said. But how will they draw out the plan of which you are speaking?

They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator -- they will have nothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface.

They will be very right, he said.

Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution?

No doubt.

And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upward and downward: I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.

Very true, he said.

And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God?

Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.

And now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is such a one as we were praising; at whom they were so very indignant because to his hands we committed the State; and are they growing a little

calmer at what they have just heard?

Much calmer, if there is any sense in them.

Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?

They would not be so unreasonable.

Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest good?

Neither can they doubt this.

But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favorable circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected?

Surely not.

Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear rule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized?

I think that they will be less angry.

Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other reason, cannot refuse to come to terms?

By all means, he said.

Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will anyone deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers?

Surely no man, he said.

And when they have come into being will anyone say that they must of necessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape -- who will venture to affirm this?

Who indeed!

But, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous.

Yes, one is enough.

The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?

Certainly.

And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or impossibility?

I think not.

But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best.

We have.

And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not impossible.

Very good.

And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more remains to be discussed; how and by what studies and pursuits will the saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies?

Certainly.

I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism -- he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honors and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.

I perfectly remember, he said.

Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word; but now let me dare to say -- that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher.

Yes, he said, let that be affirmed.

And do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly found in shreds and patches.

What do you mean? he said.

You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness, and similar qualities, do not

often grow together, and that persons who possess them and are at the same time highspirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them.

Very true, he said.

On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.

Quite true.

And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office or command.

Certainly, he said.

And will they be a class which is rarely found?

Yes, indeed.

Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labors and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention -- he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises.

Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing them. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge?

You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom?

Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.

And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them?

To what do you refer?

We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end of which they would appear; but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the inquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner; whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.

Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you

gave us a fair measure of truth.

But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further.

Not an uncommon case when people are indolent.

Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and of the laws.

True.

The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling.

What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this -- higher than justice and the other virtues?

Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present -- nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!

A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge?

Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?

Assuredly not.

You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?

Yes.

And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?

How ridiculous!

Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it -- for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term "good" -- this is of course ridiculous.

Most true, he said.

And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.

Certainly.

And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?

True.

There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved.

There can be none.

Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honorable without the reality; but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good -- the reality is what they seek; in the case of the good, appearance is despised by everyone.

Very true, he said.

Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things -- of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is intrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance?

Certainly not, he said.

I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.

That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.

And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge, our State will be perfectly ordered?

Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either?

Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts

of other people about these matters.

True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own.

Well, but has anyone a right to say positively what he does not know?

Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?

Very true.

And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?

Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.

Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear -- otherwise, not.

By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.

I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.

Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.

Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.

What?

The old story, that there is many a beautiful and many a good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term "many" is implied.

True, he said.

And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term "many" is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.

Very true.

The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen.

Exactly.

And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?

The sight, he said.

And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?

True.

But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?

No, I never have, he said.

Then reflect: has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?

Nothing of the sort.

No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses -- you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?

Certainly not.

But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen?

How do you mean?

Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see; color being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colors will be invisible.

Of what nature are you speaking?

Of that which you term light, I replied.

True, he said.

Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great beyond other bonds by no small

difference of nature; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?

Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.

And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?

You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.

May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?

How?

Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?

No.

Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?

By far the most like.

And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?

Exactly.

Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognized by sight?

True, he said.

And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind:

Will you be a little more explicit? he said.

Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them toward objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of vision in them?

Very true.

But when they are directed toward objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them?

Certainly.

And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned toward the twilight of becoming and perishing, then

she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence?

Just so.

Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honor yet higher.

What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good?

God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view?

In what point of view?

You would say, would you not? that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?

Certainly.

In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.

Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how amazing!

Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made me utter my fancies.

And pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.

Yes, I said, there is a great deal more.

Then omit nothing, however slight.

I will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will have to be omitted. I hope not, he said.

You have to Imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name (ovpavos,

opatos). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?

I have.

Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?

Yes, I understand.

Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.

Very good.

Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?

Most undoubtedly.

Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.

In what manner?

Thus: There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upward to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.

I do not quite understand your meaning, he said.

Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd, and the even, and the figures, and three kinds of angles, and the like, in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?

Yes, he said, I know.

And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on -- the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?

That is true.

And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.

I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts.

And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses -- that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.

I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be describing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding, and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.

You have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul -- reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last -- and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.

I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.

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Book VII: On Shadows And Realities In Education

(Socrates, Glaucon.)

AND now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open toward the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionetteplayers have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

I see.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

Very true.

And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passersby spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

No question, he replied.

To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.

And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look toward the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive someone saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned toward more real existence, he has a clearer vision -- what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them -- will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Far truer.

And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True, he said.

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Certainly.

Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Certainly.

He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellowprisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity him?

Certainly, he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honors among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honors and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,

"Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,"

and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

To be sure, he said.

And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if anyone tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prisonhouse is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upward to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed -- whether rightly or wrongly, God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who

would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

Anything but surprising, he replied. Anyone who has commonsense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees anyone whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

That, he said, is a very just distinction.

But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

They undoubtedly say this, he replied.

Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or, in other words, of the good.

Very true.

And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.

And whereas the other socalled virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue -- how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness?

Very true, he said.

But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below -- if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

Very likely.

Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of the State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blessed.

Very true, he replied.

Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all -- they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

What do you mean?

I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labors

and honors, whether they are worth having or not.

But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?

You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

True, he said, I had forgotten.

Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being selftaught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State, which is also yours, will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.

Quite true, he replied.

And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light?

Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present rulers of State.

Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a

wellordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas, if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.

Most true, he replied.

And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?

Indeed, I do not, he said.

And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.

No question. Who, then, are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honors and another and a better life than that of politics?

They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.

And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light -- as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?

By all means, he replied.

The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oystershell, but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below, which we affirm to be true philosophy?

Quite so.

And should we not inquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting such a change?

Certainly.

What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?

Yes, that was said.

Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?

What quality?

Usefulness in war.

Yes, if possible.

There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not?

Just so.

There was gymnastics, which presided over the growth and decay of the body, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption?

True.

Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover? No.

But what do you say of music, what also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme?

Music, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastics, and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and the words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended to that good which you are now seeking.

You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts were reckoned mean by us?

Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastics are excluded, and the arts are also excluded, what remains?

Well, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then we shall have to take something which is not special, but of the universal application.

What may that be?

A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, and which everyone first has to learn among the elements of education.

What is that?

The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three -- in a word, number and calculation: do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?

Yes.

Then the art of war partakes of them?

To be sure.

Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own fleet -- how could he if he was ignorant of number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?

I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.

Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?

Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.

I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study?

What is your notion?

It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and which leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly used; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul toward being.

Will you explain your meaning? he said.

I will try, I said; and I wish you would share the inquiry with me, and say "yes" or "no" when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.

Explain, he said.

I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further inquiry is imperatively demanded.

You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.

No, I said, that is not at all my meaning.

Then what is your meaning?

When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its

opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer: here are three fingers -- a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.

Very good.

You may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the point.

What is it?

Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin -- it makes no difference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not compelled to ask of thought the question, What is a finger? for the sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.

True.

And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence.

There is not, he said.

But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and the other at the extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is not their mode of operation on this wise -- the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft?

You are quite right, he said.

And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?

Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious and require to be explained.

Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two.

True.

And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?

Certainly.

And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state of division, for if they were undivided they could only be conceived of as one?

True.

The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner; they were not distinguished.

Yes.

Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused.

Very true.

Was not this the beginning of the inquiry, "What is great?" and "What is small?"

Exactly so.

And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

Most true.

This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect, or the reverse -- those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.

I understand, he said, and agree with you.

And to which class do unity and number belong?

I do not know, he replied.

Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger, there would be nothing to attract toward being; but when there is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks, "What is absolute unity?" This is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being.

And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?

Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?

Certainly.

And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with

number?

Yes.

And they appear to lead the mind toward truth?

Yes, in a very remarkable manner.

Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.

That is true.

And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?

Certainly.

Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe; and we must endeavor to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor again, like merchants or retailtraders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.

That is excellent, he said.

Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the science is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper!

How do you mean?

I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule anyone who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply, taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.

That is very true.

Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable, indivisible -- what would they answer?

They would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of those numbers which can only be realized in

thought.

Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary, necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the attainment of pure truth?

Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it.

And have you further observed that those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been?

Very true, he said.

And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not many as difficult.

You will not.

And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up.

I agree.

Let this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall we inquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?

You mean geometry?

Exactly so.

Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which relates to war; for in pitching a camp or taking up a position or closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military manoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician.

Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or calculation will be enough; the question relates rather to the greater and more advanced part of geometry -- whether that tends in any degree to make more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze toward that place, where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by all means, to behold.

True, he said.

Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming only, it does not concern us?

Yes, that is what we assert.

Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that such a conception of the science

is in flat contradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians.

How so?

They have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the like -- they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; whereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science.

Certainly, he said.

Then must not a further admission be made?

What admission?

That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient.

That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.

Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul toward truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.

Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect.

Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover, the science has indirect effects, which are not small.

Of what kind? he said.

There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all departments of knowledge, as experience proves, anyone who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not. Yes, indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them.

Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will study?

Let us do so, he replied.

And suppose we make astronomy the third -- what do you say?

I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor.

I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and reillumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class of those who

will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to argue. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive.

I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own behalf.

Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences.

What was the mistake? he said.

After plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the second dimension, the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have followed.

That is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about these subjects.

Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons: in the first place, no government patronizes them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and they are difficult; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found, and, even if he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited, would not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole State became the director of these studies and gave honor to them; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way by their natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the State, they would some day emerge into light.

Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?

Yes, I said.

And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?

Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.

True, he said.

Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.

The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be given in your own spirit. For everyone, as I think, must see that astronomy compels the soul to look upward and leads us from this world to another. Everyone but myself, I said; to everyone else this may be clear, but not to me.

And what, then, would you say?

I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look downward, and not upward.

What do you mean? he asked.

You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upward, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downward, not upward, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats or only lies on his back.

I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking?

I will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.

True, he replied.

The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that higher knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true double, or the truth of any other proportion.

No, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous.

And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner? But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the stars to these and to one another, and any other things that are material and visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation -- that would be absurd; and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating their exact truth.

I quite agree, though I never thought of this before.

Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way and so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use.

That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.

Yes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a similar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any value. But can you tell me of any other suitable study?

No, he said, not without thinking.

Motion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are obvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as I imagine, which may be left to wiser persons.

But where are the two?

There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already named.

And what may that be?

The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are sister sciences -- as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them?

Yes, he replied.

But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go and learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher object.

What is that?

There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying that they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you probably know, the same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the sounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labor, like that of the astronomers, is in vain.

Yes, by heaven! he said; and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their neighbor's wall -- one set of them declaring that they distinguish an intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the same -- either party setting their ears before their understanding.

You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these are not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to inquire about harmony. For they too are in error, like the astronomers; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems -- that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not.

That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.

A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought after with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other spirit, useless. Very true, he said.

Now, when all these studies reach the point of intercommunion and connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them.

I suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.

What do you mean? I said; the prelude, or what? Do you not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?

Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning.

But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of them?

Neither can this be supposed.

And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as you may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.

Exactly, he said.

Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?

True.

But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their weak eyes the images in the water (which are divine), and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an image) -- this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible world -- this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which have been described.

I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe, yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, however, is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain, and describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest.

Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only, but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have seen something like reality; of that I am confident.

Doubtless, he replied.

But I must also remind you that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of

the previous sciences.

Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.

And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of comprehending by any regular process all true existence, or of ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being -- geometry and the like -- they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science?

Impossible, he said.

Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upward; and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science: and this, in our previous sketch, was called understanding. But why should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance to consider? Why, indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind with clearness?

At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of shadows, opinion being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being; and so to make a proportion:

"As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion. And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of shadows."

But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long inquiry, many times longer than this has been.

As far as I understand, he said, I agree.

And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever degree he

fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit so much?

Yes, he said; how can I deny it?

And you would say the same of the conception of the good?

Until the person is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never faltering at any step of the argument -- unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion, and not by science; dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake here, he arrives at the world below, and has his final quietus.

In all that I should most certainly agree with you.

And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you are nurturing and educating -- if the ideal ever becomes a reality -- you would not allow the future rulers to be like posts, having no reason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?

Certainly not.

Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?

Yes, he said, you and I together will make it.

Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the copingstone of the sciences, and is set over them; no other science can be placed higher -- the nature of knowledge can no further go?

I agree, he said.

But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be assigned, are questions which remain to be considered.

Yes, clearly.

You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?

Certainly, he said.

The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and, having noble and generous tempers, they should also have the natural gifts which will facilitate their education.

And what are these?

Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared with the body.

Very true, he replied.

Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labor in any line; or he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him.

Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.

The mistake at present is that those who study philosophy have no vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand, and not bastards.

What do you mean?

In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting industry -- I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle: as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastics and hunting, and all other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labor of learning or listening or inquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness.

Certainly, he said.

And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?

To be sure.

And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities, States and individuals unconsciously err; and the State makes a ruler, and the individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.

That is very true, he said.

All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and if only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing to say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood

of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at present.

That would not be creditable.

Certainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I am equally ridiculous.

In what respect?

I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too much excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.

Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so.

But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows old may learn many things -- for he can no more learn much than he can run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.

Of course.

And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of education.

Why not?

Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.

Very true.

Then, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let early education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out the natural bent.

That is a very rational notion, he said.

Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the battle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be brought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?

Yes, I remember.

The same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things -- labors, lessons, dangers -- and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be enrolled in a select number.

At what age?

At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the

period, whether of two or three years, which passes in this sort of training is useless for any other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests to which our youth are subjected.

Certainly, he replied.

After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old will be promoted to higher honor, and the sciences which they learned without any order in their early education will now be brought together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being.

Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.

Yes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.

I agree with you, he said.

These, I said, are the points which you must consider; and those who have most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their learning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have arrived at the age of thirty will have to be chosen by you out of the select class, and elevated to higher honor; and you will have to prove them by the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of sight and the other senses, and in company with truth to attain absolute being: And here, my friend, great caution is required.

Why great caution?

Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has introduced?

What evil? he said.

The students of the art are filled with lawlessness.

Quite true, he said.

Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in their case? or will you make allowance for them?

In what way make allowance?

I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son who is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous family, and has many flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he learns that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave toward his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the period when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he knows? Or shall I guess for you?

If you please.

Then I should say that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely to honor his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need, or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less willing to disobey them in any important matter.

He will.

But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would diminish his honor and regard for them, and would become more devoted to the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would now live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations.

Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy?

In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and honor, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental authority we have been brought up, obeying and honoring them.

That is true.

There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of right, and they continue to obey and honor the maxims of their fathers.

True.

Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair or honorable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into believing that nothing is honorable any more than dishonorable, or just and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions which he most valued, do you think that he will still honor and obey them as before?

Impossible.

And when he ceases to think them honorable and natural as heretofore, and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life other than that which flatters his desires?

He cannot.

And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?

Unquestionably.

Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.

Yes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable.

Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing them to dialectic.

Certainly.

There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppydogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.

Yes, he said, there is nothing which they like better.

And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world.

Too true, he said.

But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such insanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the greater moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing the honor of the pursuit.

Very true, he said.

And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any chance aspirant or intruder?

Very true.

Suppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise -- will that be enough?

Would you say six or four years? he asked.

Say five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm or flinch.

And how long is this stage of their lives to last?

Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives, and in every branch of knowledge, come at last to their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty; and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blessed and dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honor them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but if not, as in any case blessed and divine.

You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty.

Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their natures can go.

There you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all things like the men.

Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although difficult, not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopherkings are born in a State, one or more of them, despising the honors of this present world which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and the honor that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city?

How will they proceed?

They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of their children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents; these they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws which we have given them: and in this way the State and constitution of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, and the nation which has such a constitution will gain most.

Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have very well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being. Enough, then, of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its image -- there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.

There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said.

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Book VIII: Four Forms Of Government

(Socrates, Glaucon.)

AND so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?

That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.

Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when appointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing, which are common to all, and contain nothing private, or individual; and about their property, you remember what we agreed?

Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving from the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance, and they were to take care of themselves and of the whole State.

True, I said; and now that this division of our task is concluded, let us find the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old path.

There is no difficulty in returning; you implied, then as now, that you had finished the description of the State: you said that such a State was good, and that the man was good who answered to it, although, as now appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man. And you said further, that if this was the true form, then the others were false; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember, that there were four principal ones, and that their defects, and the defects of the individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining. When we had seen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was the best and who was the worst of them, we were to consider whether the best was not also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I asked you what were the four forms of government of which you spoke, and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; and you began again, and have found your way to the point at which we have now arrived.

Your recollection, I said, is most exact.

Then, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same position; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same answer which you were about to give me then.

Yes, if I can, I will, I said.

I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you were speaking.

That question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are first, those of Crete and Sparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy comes next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know, do you? of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct character. There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate forms of government. But these are nondescripts and may be found equally among Hellenes and among barbarians.

Yes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government which exist among them.

Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For we cannot suppose that States are made of "oak and rock," and not out of the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale and draw other things after them?

Yes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human characters.

Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five?

Certainly.

Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good, we have already described.

We have.

Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice. The inquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice.

Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say.

Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness, of taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin with the government of honor? -- I know of no name for such a government other than timocracy or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with

this the like character in the individual; and, after that, consider oligarchy and the oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our attention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go and view the city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision.

That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.

First, then, I said, let us inquire how timocracy (the government of honor) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power; a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved.

Very true, he said.

In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the muses to tell us "how discord first arose"? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery, to play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?

How would they address us?

After this manner: A city which is thus constituted can hardly be shaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end, even a constitution such as yours will not last forever, but will in time be dissolved. And this is the dissolution: In plants that grow in the earth, as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of each are completed, which in shortlived existences pass over a short space, and in longlived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not attain; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number, but the period of human birth is comprehended in a number in which first increments by involution and evolution (or squared and cubed) obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one another. The base of these (3) with a third added (4), when combined with five (20) and raised to the third power, furnishes two harmonies; the first a square which is 100 times as great (400 = 4 x 100), and the other a figure having one side equal to the former, but oblong, consisting of 100 numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square (i.e., omitting fractions), the side of which is five (7 x 7 = 49 x 100 = 4900), each of them being less by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five = 50 + 50 =

100); and 100 cubes of three (27 x 100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 = 8000). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of births. For when your guardians are ignorant of the law of births, and unite bride and bridegroom out of season, the children will not be goodly or fortunate. And though only the best of them will be appointed by their predecessor, still they will be unworthy to hold their father's places, and when they come into power as guardians they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us, the muses, first by undervaluing music; which neglect will soon extend to gymnastics; and hence the young men of your State will be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your different races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and brass and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, and brass with gold, and hence there will arise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity, which always and in all places are causes of hatred and war. This the muses affirm to be the stock from which discord has sprung, wherever arising; and this is their answer to us.

Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly.

Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the muses speak falsely?

And what do the muses say next?

When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the iron and brass fell to acquiring money, and land, and houses, and gold, and silver; but the gold and silver races, not wanting money, but having the true riches in their own nature, inclined toward virtue and the ancient order of things. There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual owners; and they enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants; and they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them.

I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.

And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy?

Very true.

Such will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will they proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and will also have some peculiarities.

True, he said.

In the honor given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warriorclass from agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of common meals, and in the

attention paid to gymnastics and military training -- in all these respects this State will resemble the former.

True.

But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements; and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who are by nature fitted for war rather than peace; and in the value set by them upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of everlasting wars -- this State will be for the most part peculiar.

Yes.

Yes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those who live in oligarchies; they will have a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please.

That is most true, he said.

And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on the gratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and running away like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the true muse, the companion of reason and philosophy, and have honored gymnastics more than music.

Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a mixture of good and evil.

Why, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen -- the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.

Assuredly, he said.

Such is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been described in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required, for a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all the characters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labor.

Very true, he replied.

Now what man answers to this form of government -- how did he come into being, and what is he like?

I think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which characterizes him, he is not unlike our

friend Glaucon.

Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there are other respects in which he is very different.

In what respects?

He should have more of selfassertion and be less cultivated and yet a friend of culture; and he should be a good listener but no speaker. Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is too proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover of honor; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.

Yes, that is the type of character that answers to timocracy.

Such a one will despise riches only when he is young; but as he gets older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of the avaricious nature in him, and is not singleminded toward virtue, having lost his best guardian.

Who was that? said Adeimantus.

Philosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her abode in a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.

Good, he said.

Such, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical State.

Exactly.

His origin is as follows: He is often the young son of a brave father, who dwells in an illgoverned city, of which he declines the honors and offices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.

And how does the son come into being?

The character of the son begins to develop when he hears his mother complaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the consequence is that she has no precedence among other women. Further, when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens to him quietly; and when she observes that his thoughts always centre in himself, while he treats her with very considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too easygoing: adding all the other complaints about her own illtreatment which women are so fond of rehearsing.

Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints are so like themselves.

And you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to be attached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same strain to the son; and if they see anyone who owes money to his father, or is wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort, and be more of a man than his father. He has only to walk abroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing: those who do their own business in the city are called simpletons, and held in no esteem, while the busybodies are honored and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing and seeing all these things -- hearing, too, the words of his father, and having a nearer view of his way of life, and making comparisons of him and others -- is drawn opposite ways: while his father is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul, the others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive; and he being not originally of a bad nature, but having kept bad company, is at last brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness and passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious.

You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.

Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second type of character?

We have.

Next, let us look at another man who, as AEschylus says,

"Is set over against another State;"

or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.

By all means.

I believe that oligarchy follows next in order.

And what manner of government do you term oligarchy?

A government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power and the poor man is deprived of it.

I understand, he replied.

Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to oligarchy arises?

Yes.

Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into the other.

How?

The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do they or their wives care about the law?

Yes, indeed.

And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.

Likely enough.

And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a fortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance the one always rises as the other falls.

True.

And in proportion as riches and rich men are honored in the State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonored.

Clearly.

And what is honored is cultivated, and that which has no honor is neglected.

That is obvious.

And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers of trade and money; they honor and look up to the rich man, and make a ruler of him, and dishonor the poor man.

They do so.

They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the qualification of citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower in another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government. These changes in the constitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not already done their work.

Very true.

And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is established.

Yes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of government, and what are the defects of which we were speaking?

First of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification Just think what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot?

You mean that they would shipwreck?

Yes; and is not this true of the government of anything?

I should imagine so.

Except a city? -- or would you include a city?

Nay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all.

This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?

Clearly.

And here is another defect which is quite as bad.

What defect?

The inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the one of poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another.

That, surely, is at least as bad.

Another discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are incapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not call them out in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to fight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling to pay taxes.

How discreditable!

And, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have too many callings -- they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one. Does that look well?

Anything but well.

There is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which this State first begins to be liable.

What evil?

A man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor, helpless creature.

Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State.

The evil is certainly not prevented there; for

oligarchies have both the extremes of great wealth and utter poverty.

True.

But think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, was a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of citizenship? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body, although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a spendthrift?

As you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.

May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is of the hive?

Just so, Socrates.

And God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings, whereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings, but others have dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class, as they are termed.

Most true, he said.

Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that neighborhood there are hidden away thieves and cutpurses and robbers of temples, and all sorts of malefactors.

Clearly.

Well, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?

Yes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.

And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to be found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force?

Certainly, we may be so bold.

The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, illtraining, and an evil constitution of the State?

True.

Such, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there may be many other evils.

Very likely.

Then oligarchy, or the form of government in which the rulers are elected for their wealth, may now be dismissed.

Let us next proceed to consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this State.

By all means.

Does not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise?

How?

A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently he sees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon a sunken reef, and he and all that he has are lost; he may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put to death or exiled or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from him.

Nothing more likely.

And the son has seen and known all this -- he is a ruined man, and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his bosom's throne; humbled by poverty he takes to moneymaking, and by mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such a one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and chain and scimitar?

Most true, he replied.

And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground obediently on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their place, he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and admire anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it.

Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.

And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?

Yes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the State out of which oligarchy came.

Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.

Very good.

First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth?

Certainly.

Also in their penurious, laborious character; the

individual only satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; his other desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable.

True.

He is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes a purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is he not a true image of the State which he represents?

He appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as by the State.

You see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said.

I imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a blind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honor.

Excellent! I said. Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing to this want of cultivation there will be found in him dronelike desires as of pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life?

True.

Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogueries?

Where must I look?

You should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting dishonestly, as in the guardianship of an orphan.

Aye.

It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a reputation for honesty, he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue; not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason, but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his possessions.

To be sure.

Yes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires of the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what is not his own.

Yes, and they will be strong in him, too.

The man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not one; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior ones.

True.

For these reasons such a one will be more respectable than most people; yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away and never come near him.

I should expect so.

And surely the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a State for any prize of victory, or other object of honorable ambition; he will not spend his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the struggle; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money.

Very true.

Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and moneymaker answers to the oligarchical State?

There can be no doubt.

Next comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be considered by us; and then we will inquire into the ways of the democratic man, and bring him up for judgment.

That, he said, is our method.

Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise? Is it not on this wise: the good at which such a State aims is to become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?

What then?

The rulers being aware that their power rests upon their wealth, refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance?

To be sure.

There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same State to any considerable extent; one or the other will be disregarded.

That is tolerably clear.

And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?

Yes, often.

And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property, and against everybody else, and are eager for revolution.

That is true.

On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert their sting -- that is, their money -- into someone else who is not on his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the State.

Yes, he said, there are plenty of them -- that is certain.

The evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it either by restricting a man's use of his own property, or by another remedy.

What other?

One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to their characters: Let there be a general rule that everyone shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous moneymaking, and the evils of which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.

Yes, they will be greatly lessened.

At present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, treat their subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially the young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness both of body and mind; they do nothing, and are incapable of resisting either pleasure or pain.

Very true.

They themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue.

Yes, quite as indifferent.

Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers and their subjects may come in one another's way, whether on a journey or on some other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a march, as fellowsoldiers or fellowsailors; aye, and they may observe the behavior of each other in the very moment of danger -- for where danger is, there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich -- and very likely the wiry, sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh -- when he sees such a one puffing and at his wits'end, how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them? And when they meet in private will not people be saying to one another, "Our warriors are not good for much"?

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.

And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation, a commotion may arise within -- in the same way wherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasion may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with herself; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external cause.

Yes, surely.

And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.

Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw.

And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they? for as the government is, such will be the man.

Clearly, he said.

In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom and frankness -- a man may say and do what he likes?

'Tis said so, he replied.

And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases?

Clearly.

Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures?

There will.

This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as women and children think a variety of colors to be of all things most charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of States.

Yes.

Yes, my good sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a government.

Why?

Because of the liberty which reigns there -- they have a complete assortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his choice, he may found his State.

He will be sure to have patterns enough.

And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or to go to war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are so disposed -- there being no necessity also, because some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy -- is not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful?

For the moment, yes.

And is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming? Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about the world -- the gentleman parades like a hero, and nobody sees or cares?

Yes, he replied, many and many a one. See, too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the "don't care" about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city -- as when we said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature, there never will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a study -- how grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honor anyone who professes to be the people's friend.

Yes, she is of a noble spirit.

These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.

We know her well.

Consider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather consider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being.

Very good, he said.

Is not this the way -- he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father who has trained him in his own habits?

Exactly.

And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called unnecessary?

Obviously.

Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?

I should.

Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called so, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary, and cannot help it.

True.

We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?

We are not.

And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his youth upward -- of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases the reverse of good -- shall we not be right in saying that all these are unnecessary?

Yes, certainly.

Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion of them?

Very good.

Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?

That is what I should suppose.

The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?

Yes.

But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?

Certainly.

And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?

Very true.

May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production?

Certainly.

And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?

True.

And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires, whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical?

Very true.

Again, let us see how the democratical man goes out of the oligarchical: the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process.

What is the process?

When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure -- then, as you may imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the democratical?

Inevitably.

And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too the young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin and alike?

Certainly.

And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him, whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or rebuking him, then there arise in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he goes to war with himself.

It must be so.

And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul, and order is restored.

Yes, he said, that sometimes happens.

And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones spring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not know how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous.

Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way.

They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with them, breed and multiply in him.

Very true.

At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which they perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true words, which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to the gods, and are their best guardians and sentinels.

None better.

False and boastful conceits and phrases mount upward and take their place.

They are certain to do so.

And so the young man returns into the country of the lotuseaters, and takes up his dwelling there, in the face of all men; and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain conceits shut the gate of the King's fastness; and they will neither allow the embassy itself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the fatherly counsel of the aged will they listen to them or receive them. There is a battle and they gain the day, and then modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them, and temperance, which they nickname unmanliness, is trampled in the mire and cast forth; they persuade men that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites, they drive them beyond the border.

Yes, with a will.

And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array, having garlands on their heads, and a great company with them, hymning their praises and calling them by sweet names; insolence they term "breeding," and anarchy "liberty," and waste "magnificence," and impudence "courage." And so the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.

Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.

After this he lives on, spending his money and labor and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over -- supposing that he then readmits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors -- in that case

he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises none of them, but encourages them all equally.

Very true, he said.

Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice; if anyone says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honor some, and chastise and master the others -- whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.

Yes, he said; that is the way with him.

Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a waterdrinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of anyone who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on.

Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.

Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many; he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners are contained in him.

Just so.

Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the democratic man.

Let that be his place, he said.

Last of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tyranny and the tyrant; these we have now to consider.

Quite true, he said.

Say then, my friend, in what manner does tyranny arise? -- that it has a democratic origin is evident.

Clearly.

And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from oligarchy -- I mean, after a sort?

How?

The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was maintained was excess of wealth -- am I not right?

Yes.

And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the sake of moneygetting were also the ruin of oligarchy?

True.

And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her to dissolution?

What good?

Freedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of the State -- and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of nature deign to dwell.

Yes; the saying is in everybody's mouth.

I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of other things introduce the change in democracy, which occasions a demand for tyranny.

How so?

When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cupbearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs.

Yes, he replied, a very common occurrence.

Yes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her "slaves" who hug their chains, and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like rulers, and rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her own heart, whom she praises and honors both in private and public. Now, in such a State, can liberty have any limit?

Certainly not.

By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them.

How do you mean?

I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is his freedom; and the metic is equal with the citizen, and the citizen with the

metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either.

Yes, he said, that is the way.

And these are not the only evils, I said -- there are several lesser ones: In such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike; and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and gayety; they are loth to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young.

Quite true, he said.

The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other.

Why not, as AEschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?

That is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who does not know would believe how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other State: for, truly, the shedogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their shemistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all things are just ready to burst with liberty.

When I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you describe. You and I have dreamed the same thing.

And above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten; they will have no one over them.

Yes, he said, I know it too well.

Such, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny.

Glorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?

The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease magnified and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy -- the truth being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government.

True.

The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery.

Yes, the natural order.

And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?

As we might expect.

That, however, was not, as I believe, your question -- you rather desired to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and democracy, and is the ruin of both?

Just so, he replied.

Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of whom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having stings.

A very just comparison.

These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise beemaster, to keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible.

Yes, by all means, he said.

Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes; for in the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were in the oligarchical State.

That is true.

And in the democracy they are certainly more intensified.

How so?

Because in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from office, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not suffer a word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies almost everything is managed by the drones.

Very true, he said.

Then there is another class which is always being

severed from the mass.

What is that?

They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the richest.

Naturally so.

They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honey to the drones.

Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little.

And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.

That is pretty much the case, he said.

The people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own hands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.

True, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate unless they get a little honey.

And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves?

Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share.

And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can?

What else can they do?

And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy? True.

And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds revolution in them.

That is exactly the truth.

Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.

True.

The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into greatness.

Yes, that is their way. This, and no other, is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears above ground he is a protector.

Yes, that is quite clear. How, then, does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus.

What tale?

The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf. Did you never hear it?

Oh, yes.

And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the favorite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellowcitizens; some he kills and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf -- that is, a tyrant?

Inevitably.

This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?

The same.

After a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, a tyrant full grown.

That is clear.

And if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death by a public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him.

Yes, he said, that is their usual way.

Then comes the famous request for a bodyguard, which is the device of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career -- "Let not the people's friend," as they say, "be lost to them."

Exactly.

The people readily assent; all their fears are for him -- they have none for themselves.

Very true.

And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of

being an enemy of the people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus,

"By pebbly Hermus's shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be a coward."

And quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed again.

But if he is caught he dies.

Of course.

And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not "larding the plain" with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, but tyrant absolute.

No doubt, he said.

And now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State in which a creature like him is generated.

Yes, he said, let us consider that.

At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he salutes everyone whom he meets; he to be called a tyrant, who is making promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and distributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so kind and good to everyone!

Of course, he said.

But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader.

To be sure.

Has he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him? Clearly.

And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war.

He must.

Now he begins to grow unpopular.

A necessary result.

Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power, speak their minds to him and to one

another, and the more courageous of them cast in his teeth what is being done.

Yes, that may be expected.

And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.

He cannot.

And therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is highminded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until he has made a purgation of the State.

Yes, he said, and a rare purgation.

Yes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does the reverse.

If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.

What a blessed alternative, I said: to be compelled to dwell only with the many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all!

Yes, that is the alternative.

And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?

Certainly.

And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?

They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them.

By the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every land.

Yes, he said, there are.

But will he not desire to get them on the spot?

How do you mean?

He will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and enrol them in his bodyguard.

To be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust them best of all.

What a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to death the others and has these for his trusted

friends.

Yes, he said; they are quite of his sort.

Yes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and avoid him.

Of course.

Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.

Why so?

Why, because he is the author of the pregnant saying,

"Tyrants are wise by living with the wise;"

and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes his companions.

Yes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.

And therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and any others who live after our manner, if we do not receive them into our State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny.

Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.

But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies.

Very true.

Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honor -- the greatest honor, as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed farther.

True.

But we are wandering from the subject: Let us therefore return and inquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair, and numerous, and various, and everchanging army of his.

If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate and spend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose upon the people.

And when these fail?

Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or female, will be maintained out of his father's estate.

You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will maintain him and his companions?

Yes, he said; they cannot help themselves.

But what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a grownup son ought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be supported by the son? The father did not bring him into being, or settle him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should himself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions; but that his son should protect him, and that by his help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable associates.

By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has been fostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son strong.

Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat his father if he opposes him?

Yes, he will, having first disarmed him.

Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery.

True, he said.

Very well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to tyranny?

Yes, quite enough, he said.

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Book IX: On Wrong Or Right Government, And The Pleasures Of Each

(Socrates, Adeimantus.)

LAST of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to ask, how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in happiness or in misery?

Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining.

There is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered.

What question?

I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of the appetites, and until this is accomplished the inquiry will always be confused.

Well, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.

Very true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand: Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be unlawful; everyone appears to have them, but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail over them -- either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak; while in the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them.

Which appetites do you mean?

I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and, having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires; and there is no conceivable folly or crime -- not excepting incest or any other unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food -- which at such a time, when he has parted company with all shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit.

Most true, he said.

But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble thoughts and inquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering with the higher principle -- which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel against anyone -- I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions.

I quite agree.

In saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point which I desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless wildbeast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am right, and you agree with me.

Yes, I agree.

And now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic man. He was supposed from his youth upward to have been trained under a miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but discountenanced the unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and ornament?

True.

And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of people, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite extreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last, being a better man than his corruptors, he was drawn in both directions until he halted midway and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but of what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?

Yes, he said; that was our view of him, and is so still.

And now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's principles.

I can imagine him.

Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has already happened to the father: he is drawn into a perfectly lawless life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his father and friends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrantmakers find that they are losing their hold on him, they contrive to implant in him a masterpassion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts -- a sort of monstrous winged drone -- that is the only image which will adequately describe him.

Yes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him.

And when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose, come buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which they implant in his dronelike nature, then at last this lord of the soul, having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy; and if he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites in process of formation, and there is in him any sense of shame remaining, to these better principles he puts an end, and casts them forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness to the full.

Yes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.

And is not this the reason why, of old, love has been called a tyrant?

I should not wonder.

Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant?

He has.

And you know that a man who is deranged, and not right in his mind, will fancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods?

That he will.

And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being when, either under the influence of nature or habit, or both, he becomes drunken, lustful, passionate? O my friend, is not that so?

Assuredly.

Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?

Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me.

I imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans, and all that sort of thing; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the concerns of his soul.

That is certain.

Yes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable, and their demands are many.

They are indeed, he said.

His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.

True.

Then come debt and the cutting down of his property.

Of course.

When he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them, and especially by love himself, who is in a manner the captain of them, is in a frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his property, in order that he may gratify them?

Yes, that is sure to be the case.

He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and pangs.

He must.

And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got the better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.

No doubt he will.

And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to cheat and deceive them.

Very true.

And if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them.

Yes, probably.

And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend? Will the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them?

Nay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.

But, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some newfangled love of a harlot, who is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe that he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very existence, and would place her under the authority of the other, when she is brought under the same roof with her; or that, under like circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, first and most indispensable of friends, for the sake of some newly found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable?

Yes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would.

Truly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother.

He is indeed, he replied.

He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to clear a temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child, and which gave judgment about good and evil, are overthrown by those others which have just been emancipated, and are now the bodyguard of love and share his empire. These in his democratic days, when he was still subject to the laws and to his father, were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now that he is under the dominion of Love, he becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only; he will commit the foulest murder, or eat forbidden food, or be guilty of any other horrid act. Love is his tyrant, and lives lordly in him and lawlessly, and being himself a king, leads him on, as a tyrant leads a State, to the performance of any reckless deed by which he

can maintain himself and the rabble of his associates, whether those whom evil communications have brought in from without, or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?

Yes, indeed, he said.

And if there are only a few of them in the State, and the rest of the people are well disposed, they go away and become the bodyguard of mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do many little pieces of mischief in the city.

What sort of mischief?

For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cutpurses, footpads, robbers of temples, manstealers of the community; or if they are able to speak, they turn informers and bear false witness and take bribes.

A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in number.

Yes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these things, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not come within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and their followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength, assisted by the infatuation of the people, they choose from among themselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, and him they create their tyrant.

Yes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.

If the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began by beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats them, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires.

Exactly.

When such men are only private individuals and before they get power, this is their character; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or ready tools; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them: they profess every sort of affection for them; but when they have gained their point they know them no more.

Yes, truly.

They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.

Certainly not.

And may we not rightly call such men treacherous?

No question.

Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice?

Yes, he said, and we were perfectly right.

Let us, then, sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man: he is the waking reality of what we dreamed.

Most true.

And this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.

That is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.

And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in general?

Yes, he said, inevitably.

And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the democratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others?

Certainly.

And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to man?

To be sure.

Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?

They are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the other is the very worst.

There can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I will at once inquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves to be panicstricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about, and then we will give our opinion.

A fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as everyone must, that a tyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the happiest.

And in estimating the men, too, may I not fairly make a like request, that I should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human nature? he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose that the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt in the same place with him, and been present at his daily life and known him in his family relations, where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public danger -- he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant when compared with other men?

That again, he said, is a very fair proposal.

Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have before now met with such a person? We shall then have someone who will answer our inquiries.

By all means.

Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State; bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of them, will you tell me their respective conditions?

What do you mean? he asked.

Beginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved?

No city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.

And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a State?

Yes, he said, I see that there are -- a few; but the people, speaking generally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved.

Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule prevail? His soul is full of meanness and vulgarity -- the best elements in him are enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and maddest.

Inevitably.

And would you say that the soul of such a one is the soul of a freeman or of a slave?

He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.

And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily?

Utterly incapable.

And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is a gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?

Certainly.

And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?

Poor.

And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable?

True.

And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?

Yes, indeed.

Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?

Certainly not.

And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?

Impossible.

Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to be the most miserable of States?

And I was right, he said.

Certainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man, what do you say of him?

I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.

There, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.

What do you mean?

I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.

Then who is more miserable?

One of whom I am about to speak.

Who is that?

He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.

From what has been said, I gather that you are right.

Yes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more certain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this respecting good and evil is the greatest.

Very true, he said.

Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light upon this subject.

What is your illustration?

The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have slaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves.

Yes, that is the difference.

You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their servants?

What should they fear?

Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this?

Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the protection of each individual.

Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of some fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves, carried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him -- will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should be put to death by his slaves?

Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.

The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much against his will -- he will have to cajole his own servants.

Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself.

And suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with neighbors who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?

His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere surrounded and watched by enemies.

And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound -- he who being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of fears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men in the city, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole

like a woman hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest.

Very true, he said.

And amid evils such as these will not he who is illgoverned in his own person -- the tyrannical man, I mean -- whom you just now decided to be the most miserable of all -- will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.

Yes, he said, the similitude is most exact.

Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?

Certainly.

He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than anyone, and is truly poor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the State which he resembles: and surely the resemblance holds?

Very true, he said.

Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power: he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself.

No man of any sense will dispute your words. Come, then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical contests proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in the scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others follow: there are five of them in all -- they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical.

The decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they enter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.

Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce that the son of Ariston (the best) has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and that the worst and most

unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his State?

Make the proclamation yourself, he said.

And shall I add, "whether seen or unseen by gods and men"?

Let the words be added.

Then this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is another, which may also have some weight.

What is that?

The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.

Of what nature?

It seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond; also three desires and governing powers.

How do you mean? he said.

There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns, another with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no special name, but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from the extraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and drinking and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of it; also moneyloving, because such desires are generally satisfied by the help of money.

That is true, he said.

If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single notion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as loving gain or money.

I agree with you.

Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and getting fame?

True.

Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious -- would the term be suitable?

Extremely suitable.

On the other hand, everyone sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for gain or fame.

Far less.

"Lover of wisdom," "lover of knowledge," are titles which we may fitly apply to that part of the soul?

Certainly.

One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others, as may happen?

Yes.

Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men -- lovers of wisdom, lovers of honor, lovers of gain?

Exactly.

And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?

Very true.

Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others: the moneymaker will contrast the vanity of honor or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver?

True, he said.

And the lover of honor -- what will be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?

Very true.

And are we to suppose, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?

There can be no doubt of that, he replied.

Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honorable, or better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless -- how shall we know who speaks truly?

I cannot myself tell, he said.

Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience, and wisdom, and reason?

There cannot be a better, he said.

Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?

The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood upward: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity tasted -- or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have tasted -- the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.

Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience?

Yes, very great.

Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honor, or the lover of honor of the pleasures of wisdom?

Nay, he said, all three are honored in proportion as they attain their object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honor they all have experience of the pleasures of honor; but the delight which is to be found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.

His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than anyone?

Far better.

And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?

Certainly.

Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?

What faculty?

Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.

Yes.

And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?

Certainly.

If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?

Assuredly.

Or if honor, or victory, or courage, in that case the judgment of the ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?

Clearly.

But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges --

The only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.

And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life.

Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he approves of his own life.

And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the pleasure which is next?

Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honor; who is nearer to himself than the moneymaker.

Last comes the lover of gain?

Very true, he said.

Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in this conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to Olympian Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure -- all others are a shadow only; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?

Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?

I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.

Proceed.

Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?

True.

And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?

There is.

A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either -- that is what you mean?

Yes.

You remember what people say when they are sick?

What do they say?

That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill.

Yes, I know, he said.

And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?

I have.

And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, are extolled by them as the greatest pleasure?

Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest.

Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be painful?

Doubtless, he said.

Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?

So it would seem.

But can that which is neither become both?

I should say not.

And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?

Yes.

But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion, and in a mean between them?

Yes.

How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?

Impossible. This, then, is an appearance only, and not a reality; that is to say, the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real, but a sort of imposition?

That is the inference.

Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you will no longer suppose, as you

perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

What are they, he said, and where shall I find them?

There are many of them: take as an example, the pleasures of smell, which are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and when they depart leave no pain behind them.

Most true, he said.

Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

No.

Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the body are generally of this sort -- they are reliefs of pain.

That is true.

And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?

Yes.

Shall I give you an illustration of them?

Let me hear.

You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and middle region?

I should.

And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world?

To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?

But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, that he was descending?

No doubt.

All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions?

Yes.

Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when they are only being drawn toward the painful they feel pain and think the pain which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when

drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with gray instead of white -- can you wonder, I say, at this?

No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.

Look at the matter thus: Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of the bodily state?

Yes.

And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?

True.

And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?

Certainly.

And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which has more existence the truer?

Clearly, from that which has more.

What classes of things have a greater share of pure existence, in your judgment -- those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question in this way: Which has a more pure being -- that which is concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is found in such natures; or that which is concerned with and found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal?

Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable.

And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence?

Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.

And of truth in the same degree?

Yes.

And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence?

Necessarily.

Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul?

Far less.

And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?

Yes.

What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real?

Of course.

And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure?

Unquestionably. Those, then, who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the diningtable, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent.

Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle.

Their pleasures are mixed with pains -- how can they be otherwise? For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are colored by contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy, in ignorance of the truth.

Something of that sort must inevitably happen.

And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honor and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?

Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.

Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honor, when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him?

Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural.

And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable?

Exactly.

But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their own?

True.

And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?

Yes.

And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law and order?

Clearly.

And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest distance? Yes.

And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?

Yes.

Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure, and the king at the least?

Certainly.

But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most pleasantly?

Inevitably.

Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?

Will you tell me?

There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two

spurious: now the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.

How do you mean?

I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; the democrat was in the middle?

Yes.

And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the oligarch?

He will.

And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal and aristocratical?

Yes, he is third.

Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number which is three times three?

Manifestly.

The shadow, then, of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of length will be a plane figure.

Certainly.

And if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted from the king.

Yes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.

Or if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.

What a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain!

Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and years.

Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.

Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and in beauty and virtue?

Immeasurably greater.

Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we may revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not someone saying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just?

Yes, that was said. Now, then, having determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a little conversation with him.

What shall we say to him?

Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes.

Of what sort?

An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera, or Scylla, or Cerberus, and there are many others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.

There are said to have been such unions.

Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, manyheaded monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will.

You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose.

Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second.

That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.

And now join them, and let the three grow into one.

That has been accomplished.

Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single human creature. I have done so, he said.

And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lionlike qualities, but to starve and weaken the man, who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another -- he ought rather to suffer them to fight, and bite and devour one another.

Certainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says.

To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete mastery over the entire human creature.

He should watch over the manyheaded monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing; he should be making the lionheart his ally, and in common care of them all should be uniting the several parts with one another and with himself.

Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice will say.

And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honor, or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?

Yes, from every point of view.

Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. "Sweet sir," we will say to him, "what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man? and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?" He can hardly avoid saying, Yes -- can he, now? Not if he has any regard for my opinion. But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: "Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And will anyone say that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless and detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin."

Yes, said Glaucon, far worse -- I will answer for him.

Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?

Clearly.

And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?

Yes.

And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him?

Very true.

And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?

True, he said.

And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his great study is how to flatter them.

Such appears to be the reason.

And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because everyone had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and equals.

True, he said.

And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a State, and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways.

Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest.

From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness?

From no point of view at all.

What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength, and health, in proportion as the soul is more honorable than the body.

Certainly, he said.

To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies of his life. And in the first place, he will honor studies which impress these qualities on his soul, and will disregard others?

Clearly, he said.

In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul?

Certainly he will, if he has true music in him.

And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony which he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?

Certainly not, he said.

He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or spend according to his means.

Very true.

And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honors as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private or public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid?

Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.

By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a divine call.

I understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that there is such a one anywhere on earth?

In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order. But whether such a one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other.

I think so, he said.

* * * *

Book X: The Recompense Of Life

(Socrates, Glaucon.)

OF the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry.

To what do you refer?

To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be received; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been distinguished.

What do you mean?

Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe -- but I do not mind saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to them.

Explain the purport of your remark.

Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the truth, and therefore I will speak out.

Very good, he said.

Listen to me, then, or, rather, answer me.

Put your question.

Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.

A likely thing, then, that I should know.

Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener.

Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you inquire yourself? Well, then, shall we begin the inquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form; do you understand me?

I do.

Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world -- plenty of them, are there not?

Yes.

But there are only two ideas or forms of them -- one

the idea of a bed, the other of a table.

True.

And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea -- that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances -- but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could he?

Impossible.

And there is another artist -- I should like to know what you would say of him.

Who is he?

One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.

What an extraordinary man!

Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things -- the earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.

He must be a wizard and no mistake.

Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things, but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all yourself?

What way?

An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round -- you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the mirror.

Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only.

Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter, too, is, as I conceive, just such another -- a creator of appearances, is he not?

Of course.

But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?

Yes, he said, but not a real bed.

And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying

that he too makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed?

Yes, I did.

Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of existence; and if anyone were to say that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.

At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth.

No wonder, then, that his work, too, is an indistinct expression of truth.

No wonder.

Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we inquire who this imitator is?

If you please. Well, then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by God, as I think that we may say -- for no one else can be the maker?

No.

There is another which is the work of the carpenter?

Yes.

And the work of the painter is a third?

Yes.

Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?

Yes, there are three of them.

God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made by God.

Why is that?

Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the ideal bed and not the two others.

Very true, he said.

God knew this, and he desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore he created a bed which is essentially and by nature one only.

So we believe.

Shall we, then, speak of him as the natural author or maker of the bed?

Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation he is the author of this and of all other things.

And what shall we say of the carpenter -- is not he also the maker of the bed?

Yes.

But would you call the painter a creator and maker?

Certainly not.

Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?

I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make.

Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator?

Certainly, he said.

And the tragic poet is an imitator, and, therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?

That appears to be so.

Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter? I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?

The latter.

As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.

What do you mean?

I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all things.

Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.

Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting designed to be -- an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear -- of appearance or of reality?

Of appearance.

Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For example: A painter

will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.

Certainly.

And whenever anyone informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man -- whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought allknowing, because he himself was unable to analyze the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.

Most true.

And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak so well?

The question, he said, should by all means be considered.

Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the imagemaking branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him?

I should say not.

The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.

Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honor and profit.

Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads

were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at secondhand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. "Friend Homer," then we say to him, "if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third -- not an image maker or imitator -- and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities, great and small, have been similarly benefited by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?" Is there any city which he might name?

I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he was a legislator.

Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?

There is not.

Or is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him?

There is absolutely nothing of the kind.

But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with him, and who handed down to posterity a Homeric way of life, such as was established by Pythagoras, who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was named after him?

Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For, surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive?

Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind -- if he had possessed knowledge, and not been a mere imitator -- can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honored and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos and a host of others have only to whisper to their contemporaries: "You will never be able to manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers of education" -- and this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And

is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?

Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.

Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colors and figures.

Quite so.

In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on the colors of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well -- such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colors which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.

Yes, he said.

They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?

Exactly.

Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right?

Yes.

Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an explanation.

Proceed.

Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?

Yes.

And the worker in leather and brass will make them?

Certainly.

But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who knows how to use them -- he knows their right form.

Most true.

And may we not say the same of all things?

What?

That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?

Yes.

And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them.

True.

Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use; for example, the fluteplayer will tell the flutemaker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions?

Of course.

The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him?

True.

The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?

True.

But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw?

Neither.

Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?

I suppose not.

The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations?

Nay, very much the reverse.

And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?

Just so.

Thus far, then, we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in iambic or in heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?

Very true.

And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?

Certainly.

And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?

What do you mean?

I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance?

True.

And the same objects appear straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colors to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.

True.

And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding -- there is the beauty of them -- and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?

Most true.

And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?

To be sure.

And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?

True.

But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible -- the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing?

Very true.

Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?

True.

And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?

Certainly.

And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul?

No doubt.

This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.

Exactly.

The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring.

Very true.

And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?

Probably the same would be true of poetry.

Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.

By all means.

We may state the question thus: Imitation imitates the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more?

No, there is nothing else.

But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself -- or, rather, as in the instance of sight there were confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also are there not strife and inconsistency in his life? though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?

And we were right, he said.

Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which must now be supplied.

What was the omission?

Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than another?

Yes.

But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?

The latter, he said, is the truer statement.

Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?

It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.

When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of anyone hearing or seeing him do?

True.

There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his sorrow?

True.

But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him?

Certainly.

One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?

How do you mean?

The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required.

What is most required? he asked.

That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art.

Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.

Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason?

Clearly.

And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and cowardly?

Indeed, we may.

And does not the latter -- I mean the rebellious principle -- furnish a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers.

Certainly.

Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated?

Clearly.

And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior degree of truth -- in this, I say, he is like him; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a wellordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution,

for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small -- he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth.

Exactly.

But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation: the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?

Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.

Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his breast -- the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.

Yes, of course, I know.

But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality -- we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.

Very true, he said.

Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?

No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.

Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.

What point of view?

If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets; the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying anyone who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.

How very true!

And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness; the case of pity is repeated; there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.

Quite true, he said.

And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire, and pain, and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action -- in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue.

I cannot deny it.

Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you should take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honor those who say these things -- they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.

That is most true, he said.

And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of "the yelping hound howling at her lord," or of one "mighty in the vain talk of fools," and "the mob of sages circumventing Zeus," and the "subtle thinkers who are beggars after all"; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister art of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a

wellordered State we shall be delighted to receive her -- we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?

Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.

Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only -- that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre?

Certainly.

And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant, but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers -- I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.

If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so, too, must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We, too, are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law.

Yes, he said, I quite agree with you.

Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will anyone be profited if under the influence of honor or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?

Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that anyone else would have been.

And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue.

What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness.

Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of threescore years and ten is surely but a

little thing in comparison with eternity?

Say rather 'nothing' he replied.

And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole?

Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?

Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?

He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this?

Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too -- there is no difficulty in proving it.

I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light. Listen, then.

I am attending.

There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?

Yes, he replied.

Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?

Yes.

And you admit that everything has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease?

Yes, he said.

And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies?

True.

The vice and evil which are inherent in each are the destruction of each; and if these do not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for good certainly will not destroy them, nor, again, that which is neither good nor evil.

Certainly not.

If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction?

That may be assumed.

Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?

Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

But does any of these dissolve or destroy her? -- and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?

Yes.

Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body?

Certainly not.

And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?

It is, he replied.

Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of the food, which is another, and which does not engender any natural infection -- this we shall absolutely deny?

Very true.

And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?

Yes, he said, there is reason in that. Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not

destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man.

And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death.

But if someone who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds?

Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive -- aye, and well awake, too; so far removed is her dwellingplace from being a house of death.

True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.

Yes, that can hardly be.

But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist forever, and, if existing forever, must be immortal?

Certainly.

That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality.

Very true.

But this we cannot believe -- reason will not allow us -- any more than we can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity.

What do you mean? he said.

The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?

Certainly not.

Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to that of the seagod Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look. Where, then?

At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if, wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good things in this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is, and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough.

True, he replied.

And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature has been shown to be the best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.

Very true.

And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.

Certainly not, he said.

Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?

What did I borrow?

The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the

eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?

I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.

Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us; since she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own.

The demand, he said, is just.

In the first place, I said -- and this is the first thing which you will have to give back -- the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods.

Granted.

And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?

True.

And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins?

Certainly.

Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death; for the gods have a care of anyone whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?

Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.

And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?

Certainly.

Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?

That is my conviction.

And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from the startingplace to the goal, but not back again from the goal: they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a

crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow.

True.

And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten, and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true?

Certainly, he said, what you say is true.

These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides.

Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.

And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them.

Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear.

Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this, too, is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterward, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pyre, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth; they were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them and had bound their

sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to them, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously inquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell; but the sum was this: He said that for every wrong which they had done to anyone they suffered tenfold; or once in a hundred years -- such being reckoned to be the length of man's life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behavior, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers, there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, "Where is Ardiaeus the Great?" (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: "He comes not hither, and will never come." And this, said he, was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also, besides the tyrants, private individuals who had been great criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or someone who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring

to the passersby what were their crimes, and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell. And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great.

Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in color resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the undergirders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; and the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions -- the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest (or fixed stars) is spangled, and the seventh (or sun) is brightest; the eighth (or moon) colored by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) are in color like one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third (Venus) has the whitest light; the fourth (Mars) is reddish; the sixth (Jupiter) is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this reversed motion, the fourth; the third appeared fourth, and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens -- Lachesis singing of the past,

Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.

When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: "Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honors or dishonors her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser -- God is justified." When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and they all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find someone who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more

just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villanies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness.

And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time: "Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair." And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a wellordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims WhO came from earth, having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle -- sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swans and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the

temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures -- the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations.

All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then toward evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there were a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upward in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.

And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness, and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing.

[End.]

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Crito
Plato

Editor's Note: This e-text is based on the Wiretap edition of Plato's "Crito," tr. Benjamin Jowett (Dialogues Of Plato, New York, P.F. Collier & Son. Copyright 1900, The Colonial Press.) The Wiretap edition contains the following notice: "This was scanned from the 1900 edition and mechanically checked against a commercial copy of Crito from CDROM. Differences were corrected against the paper edition. The text itself is thus a highly accurate rendition. This text is in the PUBLIC DOMAIN, released August 1993." This slightly modified text version and associated HTML files were prepared for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (jfieser@utm.edu).

Introduction the Crito (by Benjamin Jowett)

The "Crito" seems intended to exhibit the character of Socrates in one light only, not as the philosopher, fulfilling a divine mission and trusting in the will of Heaven, but simply as the good citizen, who having been unjustly condemned is willing to give up his life in obedience to the laws of the State.

The days of Socrates are drawing to a close; the fatal ship [1] has been seen off Sunium, as he is informed by his aged friend and contemporary Crito, who visits him before the dawn has broken; he himself has been warned in a dream that on the third day he must depart. Time is precious and Crito has come early in order to gain his consent to a plan of escape. This can be easily accomplished by his friends, who will incur no danger in making the attempt to save him, but will be disgraced forever if they allow him to perish. He should think of his duty to his children, and not play into the hands of his enemies. Money is already provided by Crito as well as by Simmias and others, and he will have no difficulty in finding friends in Thessaly and other places.

Socrates is afraid that Crito is but pressing upon him the opinions of the many: whereas, all his life long he has followed the dictates of reason only and the opinion of the one wise or skilled man. There was a time when Crito himself had allowed the propriety of this. And although someone will say "The many can kill us," that makes no difference; but a good life, that is to say a just and honorable life, is alone to be valued. All considerations of loss of reputation or injury to his children should be dismissed: the only question is whether he would be right in attempting to escape. Crito, who is a disinterested person, not having the fear of death before his eyes, shall answer this for him. Before he was condemned they had often held discussions, in which they agreed that no man should either do evil, or return evil for evil, or betray the right. Are these principles to be altered because the circumstances of Socrates are altered? Crito admits that they remain the same. Then is his escape consistent with the maintenance of them? To this Crito is unable or unwilling to reply.

Socrates proceeds: Suppose the laws of Athens to come and remonstrate with him: they will ask,

"Why does he seek to overturn them?" and if he replies, "They have injured him," will not the laws answer, "Yes, but was that the agreement? Has he any objection to make to them which would justify him in overturning them? Was he not brought into the world and educated by their help, and are they not his parents? He might have left Athens and gone where he pleased, but he has lived there for seventy years more constantly than any other citizen." Thus he has clearly shown that he acknowledged the agreement which he cannot now break without dishonor to himself and danger to his friends. Even in the course of the trial he might have proposed exile as the penalty, but then he declared that he preferred death to exile. And whither will he direct his footsteps? In any well-ordered State the laws will consider him as an enemy. Possibly in a land of misrule like Thessaly he may be welcomed at first, and the unseemly narrative of his escape regarded by the inhabitants as an amusing tale. But if he offends them he will have to learn another sort of lesson. Will he continue to give lectures in virtue? That would hardly be decent. And how will his children be the gainers if he takes them into Thessaly, and deprives them of Athenian citizenship? Or if he leaves them behind, does he expect that they will be better taken care of by his friends because he is in Thessaly? Will not true friends care for them equally whether he is alive or dead?

Finally, they exhort him to think of justice first, and of life and children afterwards. He may now depart in peace and innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil. But if he breaks agreements, and returns evil for evil, they will be angry with him while he lives; and their brethren, the laws of the world below, will receive him as an enemy. Such is the mystic voice which is always murmuring in his ears.

That Socrates was not a good citizen was a charge made against him during his lifetime, which has been often repeated in later ages. The crimes of Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, who had been his pupils, were still recent in the memory of the now restored democracy. The fact that he had been neutral in the death struggle of Athens was not likely to conciliate popular good-will. Plato, writing probably in the next generation, undertakes the defence of his friend and master in this particular, not to the Athenians of his day, but to posterity and the world at large.

Whether such an incident ever really occurred as the visit of Crito and the proposal of escape is uncertain: Plato could easily have invented far more than that; and in the selection of Crito, the aged friend, as the fittest person to make the proposal to Socrates, we seem to recognize the hand of the artist. Whether anyone who has been subjected by the laws of his country to an unjust judgment is right in attempting to escape is a thesis about which casuists might disagree. Shelley is of opinion that Socrates "did well to die," but not for the "sophistical" reasons which Plato has put into his mouth. And there would be no difficulty in arguing that Socrates should have lived and preferred to a glorious death the good which he might still be able to perform. "A skilful rhetorician would have had much to say about that" (50 C). It may be remarked, however, that Plato never intended to answer the question of casuistry, but only to exhibit the ideal of patient virtue which refuses to do the least evil in order to avoid the greatest, and to show Socrates, his master, maintaining in death the opinions which he had professed in his life. Not "the world," but the "one wise man," is still the philosopher's paradox in his last hours.

[1] The sacred ship, during whose thirty days' voyage to and from the oracle at Delos no Athenian citizen could be put to death.

Crito; Or, The Duty Of A Citizen

Persons of the Dialogue: Socrates Crito

Scene: -- The Prison of Socrates

Soc. Why have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite early.

Crito. Yes, certainly.

Soc. What is the exact time?

Cr. The dawn is breaking.

Soc. I wonder the keeper of the prison would let you in.

Cr. He knows me because I often come, Socrates; more over, I have done him a kindness.

Soc. And are you only just come?

Cr. No, I came some time ago.

Soc. Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of awakening me at once?

Cr. Why, indeed, Socrates, I myself would rather not have all this sleeplessness and sorrow. But I have been wonder ing at your peaceful slumbers, and that was the reason why I did not awaken you, because I wanted you to be out of pain. I have always thought you happy in the calmness of your temperament; but never did I see the like of the easy, cheerful way in which you bear this calamity.

Soc. Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought not to be repining at the prospect of death.

Cr. And yet other old men find themselves in similar mis fortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining.

Soc. That may be. But you have not told me why you come at this early hour.

Cr. I come to bring you a message which is sad and pain ful; not as I believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest of all to me.

Soc. What! I suppose that the ship has come from Delos, on the arrival of which I am to die?

Cr. No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they left her there; and therefore to morrow, Socrates, will be the last day of your life.

Soc. Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but my belief is that there will be a delay of a day.

Cr. Why do you say this?

Soc. I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival of the ship?

Cr. Yes; that is what the authorities say.

Soc. But I do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow; this I gather from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.

Cr. And what was the nature of the vision?

Soc. There came to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely, clothed in white raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates --

"The third day hence, to Phthia shalt thou go."

Cr. What a singular dream, Socrates!

Soc. There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think.

Cr. Yes: the meaning is only too clear. But, O! my beloved Socrates, let me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape. For if you die I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced, but there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this -- that I should be thought to value money more than the life of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused.

Soc. But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? Good men, and they are the only per sons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly as they happened.

Cr. But do you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be regarded, as is evident in your own case, because they can do the very greatest evil to anyone who has lost their good opinion.

Soc. I only wish, Crito, that they could; for then they could also do the greatest good, and that would be well. But the truth is, that they can do neither good nor evil: they cannot make a man wise or make him foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance.

Cr. Well, I will not dispute about that; but please to tell me, Socrates, whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends: are you not afraid that if you escape hence we may get into trouble with the informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the whole or a great part of our property; or that even a worse evil may happen to us? Now, if this is your fear, be at ease; for in order to save you, we ought surely to run this or even a greater risk; be persuaded, then, and do as I say.

Soc. Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means the only one.

Cr. Fear not. There are persons who at no great cost are willing to save you and bring you out of prison; and as for the informers, you may observe that they are far from being exorbitant in their demands; a little money will satisfy them. My means, which, as I am sure, are ample, are at your ser vice, and if you have a scruple about spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of theirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a sum of money for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are willing to spend their money too. I say, therefore, do not on that ac count hesitate about making your escape, and do not say, as you did in the court, that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself if you escape. For men will love you in other places to which you may go, and not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give you any trouble. Nor can I think that you are justified, Socrates, in betraying your own life when you might be saved; this is playing into the hands of your enemies and destroyers; and moreover I should say that you were be traying your children; for you might bring them up and educate them; instead of which you go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and if they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will be small thanks to you. No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling to persevere to the end in their nurture and educa tion. But you are choosing the easier part, as I think, not the better and manlier, which would rather have become one who professes virtue in all his actions, like yourself. And, indeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are your friends, when I reflect that this entire business of yours will be attributed to our want of courage. The trial need never have come on, or might have been brought

to another issue; and the end of all, which is the crowning absurdity, will seem to have been permitted by us, through cowardice and base ness, who might have saved you, as you might have saved yourself, if we had been good for anything (for there was no difficulty in escaping); and we did not see how disgrace ful, Socrates, and also miserable all this will be to us as well as to you. Make your mind up then, or rather have your mind already made up, for the time of deliberation is over, and there is only one thing to be done, which must be done, if at all, this very night, and which any delay will render all but impossible; I beseech you therefore, Socrates, to be per suaded by me, and to do as I say.

Soc. Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the evil; and there fore we ought to consider whether these things shall be done or not. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best; and now that this fortune has come upon me, I cannot put away the reasons which I have before given: the principles which I have hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and unless we can find other and better principles on the instant, I am certain not to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confis cations, deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors. But what will be the fairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old argument about the opinions of men? some of which are to be regarded, and others, as we were saying, are not to be regarded. Now were we right in maintaining this before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking; in fact an amusement only, and alto gether vanity? That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito: whether, under my present circumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I believe, is maintained by many who assume to be authorities, was to the effect, as I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are a disinterested person who are not going to die to-morrow -- at least, there is no human probability of this, and you are therefore not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which you are placed. Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this?

Cr. Certainly.

Soc. The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opin ions of the unwise are evil?

Cr. Certainly.

Soc. And what was said about another matter? Was the disciple in gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only -- his physician or trainer, whoever that was?

Cr. Of one man only.

Soc. And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that one only, and not of the many?

Cr. That is clear.

Soc. And he ought to live and train, and eat and drink in the way which seems good to his single

master who has un derstanding, rather than according to the opinion of all other men put together?

Cr. True.

Soc. And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding, will he not suffer evil?

Cr. Certainly he will.

Soc. And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affecting, in the disobedient person?

Cr. Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil.

Soc. Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we need not separately enumerate? In the matter of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding, and whom we ought to fear and reverence more than all the rest of the world: and whom deserting we shall destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice; is there not such a principle?

Cr. Certainly there is, Socrates.

Soc. Take a parallel instance: if, acting under the advice of men who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improvable by health and deteriorated by disease -- when that has been destroyed, I say, would life be worth having? And that is -- the body?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be depraved, which is improved by justice and deterio rated by injustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. More honored, then?

Cr. Far more honored.

Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us: but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you suggest that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. Well, someone will say, "But the many can kill us."

Cr. Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.

Soc. That is true: but still I find with surprise that the old argument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say the same of another proposition -- that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued?

Cr. Yes, that also remains.

Soc. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one -- that holds also?

Cr. Yes, that holds.

Soc. From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought not to try to

escape without the consent of the Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escap ing, then I will make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention, of money and loss of character, and the duty of educating children, are, as I hear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to call people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death -- and with as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and thanks, or whether we shall not do rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the calculation.

Cr. I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?

Soc. Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians: for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by you, but not against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my first posi tion, and do your best to answer me.

Cr. I will do my best.

Soc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dis honorable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions which were made within a few days to be thrown away? And have we, at our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only to discover that we are no better than children? Or are we to rest assured, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, of the truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil and dishonor to him who acts unjustly? Shall we affirm that?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. Then we must do no wrong?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for we must injure no one at all?

Cr. Clearly not.

Soc. Again, Crito, may we do evil?

Cr. Surely not, Socrates.

Soc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality of the many -- is that just or not?

Cr. Not just.

Soc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

Cr. Very true.

Soc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation

nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still my opinion; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as for merly, I will proceed to the next step.

Cr. You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.

Soc. Then I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in the form of a question: Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought he to betray the right?

Cr. He ought to do what he thinks right.

Soc. But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the principles WhiCh were acknowledged by us to be just? What do you say?

Cr. I cannot tell, Socrates, for I do not know.

Soc. Then consider the matter in this way: Imagine that I am about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: "Tell us, Socrates," they say; "what are you about? are you going by an act of yours to overturn us -- the laws and the whole State, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a State can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and overthrown by individuals?" What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? Anyone, and especially a clever rhetorician, will have a good deal to urge about the evil of setting aside the law which requires a sentence to be carried out; and we might reply, "Yes; but the State has injured us and given an unjust sentence." Sup pose I say that?

Cr. Very good, Socrates.

Soc. "And was that our agreement with you?" the law would say; "or were you to abide by the sentence of the State?" And if I were to express astonishment at their say ing this, the law would probably add: "Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes: you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us what complaint you have to make against us which justifies you in attempting to de stroy us and the State? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage?" None, I should reply. "Or against those of us who regulate the system of nurture and education of children in which you were trained? Were not the laws, who have the charge of this, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?" Right, I should reply. "Well, then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands? -- you would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? And will you, O professor of true virtue, say that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and rev erently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be

endured in silence; and if she leads us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence to his country." What answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?

Cr. I think that they do.

Soc. Then the laws will say: "Consider, Socrates, if this is true, that in your present attempt you are going to do us wrong. For, after having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good that we had to give, we further proclaim and give the right to every Athenian, that if he does not like us when he has come of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him; and none of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us and the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods with him. But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the State, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong: first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alterna tive of obeying or convincing us; that is what we offer, and he does neither. These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above all other Athenians." Suppose I ask, why is this? they will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the agree ment. "There is clear proof," they will say, "Socrates, that we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athe nians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love. For you never went out of the city either to see the games, ex cept once when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military service; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other States or their laws: your affections did not go beyond us and our State; we were your special favorites, and you acquiesced in our government of you; and this is the State in which you begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the trial -- the State which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile, and that you were not grieved at death. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us, the laws, of whom you are the destroyer; and are doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all answer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that true or not?" How shall we answer that, Crito? Must we not agree?

Cr. There is no help, Socrates.

Soc. Then will they not say: "You, Socrates, are break ing the covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any haste or under any compulsion or deception, but having had seventy years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the city, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemon or Crete, which you often praise for their good

government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign State. Whereas you, above all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the State, or, in other words, of us her laws (for who would like a State that has no laws), that you never stirred out of her: the halt, the blind, the maimed, were not more stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.

"For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way, what good will you do, either to yourself or to your friends? That your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you fly to one of the neighbor ing cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara, both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be corrupter of the young and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men? and is exist ence worth having on these terms? Or will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being the best things among men? Would that be decent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed States to Crito's friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and license, they will be charmed to have the tale of your escape from prison, set off with ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the fashion of runaways is -- that is very likely; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you vio lated the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things; you will live, but how? -- as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and doing what? -- eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments about justice and virtue then? Say that you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them -- will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is that the benefit which you would confer upon them? Or are you under the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent from them; for that your friends will take care of them? Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world they will not take care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are truly friends, they surely will.

"Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in in nocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will re ceive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito."

This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other.

And I know that anything more which you may say will be in vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.

Cr. I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Soc. Then let me follow the intimations of the will of God.

[End.]

The Crito
Plato

Editor's Note: This e-text is based on the Wiretap edition of Plato's "Crito," tr. Benjamin Jowett (Dialogues Of Plato, New York, P.F. Collier & Son. Copyright 1900, The Colonial Press.) The Wiretap edition contains the following notice: "This was scanned from the 1900 edition and mechanically checked against a commercial copy of Crito from CDROM. Differences were corrected against the paper edition. The text itself is thus a highly accurate rendition. This text is in the PUBLIC DOMAIN, released August 1993." This slightly modified text version and associated HTML files were prepared for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (jfieser@utm.edu).

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Introduction the Crito (by Benjamin Jowett)

The "Crito" seems intended to exhibit the character of Socrates in one light only, not as the philosopher, fulfilling a divine mission and trusting in the will of Heaven, but simply as the good citizen, who having been unjustly condemned is willing to give up his life in obedience to the laws of the State.

The days of Socrates are drawing to a close; the fatal ship [1] has been seen off Sunium, as he is informed by his aged friend and contemporary Crito, who visits him before the dawn has broken; he himself has been warned in a dream that on the third day he must depart. Time is precious and Crito has come early in order to gain his consent to a plan of escape. This can be easily accomplished by his friends, who will incur no danger in making the attempt to save him, but will be disgraced forever if they allow him to perish. He should think of his duty to his children, and not play into the hands of his enemies. Money is already provided by Crito as well as by Simmias and others, and he will have no difficulty in finding friends in Thessaly and other places.

Socrates is afraid that Crito is but pressing upon him the opinions of the many: whereas, all his life long he has followed the dictates of reason only and the opinion of the one wise or skilled man. There was a time when Crito himself had allowed the propriety of this. And although someone will say "The many can kill us," that makes no difference; but a good life, that is to say a just and honorable life, is alone to be valued. All considerations of loss of reputation or injury to his children should be dismissed: the only question is whether he would be right in attempting to escape. Crito, who is a disinterested person, not having the fear of death before his eyes, shall answer this for him. Before he was condemned they had often held discussions, in which they agreed that no man should either do evil, or return evil for evil, or betray the right. Are these principles to be altered because the circumstances of Socrates are altered? Crito admits that they remain the same. Then is his escape consistent with the maintenance of them? To this Crito is unable or unwilling to reply.

Socrates proceeds: Suppose the laws of Athens to come and remonstrate with him: they will ask, "Why does he seek to overturn them?" and if he replies, "They have injured him," will not the laws answer, "Yes, but was that the agreement? Has he any objection to make to them which would justify him in overturning them? Was he not brought into the world and educated by their help, and are they not his parents? He might have left Athens and gone where he pleased, but he has lived there for seventy years more constantly than any other citizen." Thus he has clearly shown that he acknowledged the agreement which he cannot now break without dishonor to himself and danger to his friends. Even in the course of the trial he might have proposed exile as the penalty, but then he declared that he preferred death to exile. And whither will he direct his footsteps? In any well-ordered State the laws will consider him as an enemy. Possibly in a land of misrule like Thessaly he may be welcomed at first, and the unseemly narrative of his escape regarded by the inhabitants as an amusing tale. But if he offends them he will have to learn another sort of lesson. Will he continue to give lectures in virtue? That would hardly be decent. And how will his children be the gainers if he takes them into Thessaly, and deprives them of Athenian citizenship? Or if he leaves them behind, does he expect that they will be better taken care of by his friends because he is in Thessaly? Will not true friends care for them equally whether he is alive or dead?

Finally, they exhort him to think of justice first, and of life and children afterwards. He may now depart in peace and innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil. But if he breaks agreements, and returns evil for evil, they will be angry with him while he lives; and their brethren, the laws of the world below, will receive him as an enemy. Such is the mystic voice which is always murmuring in his ears.

That Socrates was not a good citizen was a charge made against him during his lifetime, which has been often repeated in later ages. The crimes of Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, who had been his pupils, were still recent in the memory of the now restored democracy. The fact that he had been neutral in the death struggle of Athens was not likely to conciliate popular good-will. Plato, writing probably in the next generation, undertakes the defence of his friend and master in this particular, not to the Athenians of his day, but to posterity and the world at large.

Whether such an incident ever really occurred as the visit of Crito and the proposal of escape is uncertain: Plato could easily have invented far more than that; and in the selection of Crito, the aged friend, as the fittest person to make the proposal to Socrates, we seem to recognize the hand of the artist. Whether anyone who has been subjected by the laws of his country to an unjust judgment is right in attempting to escape is a thesis about which casuists might disagree. Shelley is of opinion that Socrates "did well to die," but not for the "sophistical" reasons which Plato has put into his mouth. And there would be no difficulty in arguing that Socrates should have lived and preferred to a glorious death the good which he might

still be able to perform. "A skilful rhetorician would have had much to say about that" (50 C). It may be remarked, however, that Plato never intended to answer the question of casuistry, but only to exhibit the ideal of patient virtue which refuses to do the least evil in order to avoid the greatest, and to show Socrates, his master, maintaining in death the opinions which he had professed in his life. Not "the world," but the "one wise man," is still the philosopher's paradox in his last hours.

[1] The sacred ship, during whose thirty days' voyage to and from the oracle at Delos no Athenian citizen could be put to death.

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Crito; Or, The Duty Of A Citizen

Persons of the Dialogue: Socrates Crito

Scene: -- The Prison of Socrates

Soc. Why have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite early.

Crito. Yes, certainly.

Soc. What is the exact time?

Cr. The dawn is breaking.

Soc. I wonder the keeper of the prison would let you in.

Cr. He knows me because I often come, Socrates; more over, I have done him a kindness.

Soc. And are you only just come?

Cr. No, I came some time ago.

Soc. Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of awakening me at once?

Cr. Why, indeed, Socrates, I myself would rather not have all this sleeplessness and sorrow. But I have been wonder ing at your peaceful slumbers, and that was the reason why I did not awaken you, because I wanted you to be out of pain. I have always thought you happy in the calmness of your temperament; but never did I see the like of the easy, cheerful way in which you bear this calamity.

Soc. Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought not to be repining at the prospect of death.

Cr. And yet other old men find themselves in similar mis fortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining.

Soc. That may be. But you have not told me why you come at this early hour.

Cr. I come to bring you a message which is sad and pain ful; not as I believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest of all to me.

Soc. What! I suppose that the ship has come from Delos, on the arrival of which I am to die?

Cr. No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they left her there; and therefore to morrow, Socrates, will be the last day of your life.

Soc. Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but my belief is that there will be a delay of a day.

Cr. Why do you say this?

Soc. I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival of the ship?

Cr. Yes; that is what the authorities say.

Soc. But I do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow; this I gather from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.

Cr. And what was the nature of the vision?

Soc. There came to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely, clothed in white raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates --

"The third day hence, to Phthia shalt thou go."

Cr. What a singular dream, Socrates!

Soc. There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think.

Cr. Yes: the meaning is only too clear. But, O! my beloved Socrates, let me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape. For if you die I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced, but there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this -- that I should be thought to value money more than the life of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused.

Soc. But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? Good men, and they are the only per sons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly as they happened.

Cr. But do you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be regarded, as is evident in your own case, because they can do the very greatest evil to anyone who has lost their good opinion.

Soc. I only wish, Crito, that they could; for then they could also do the greatest good, and that would be well. But the truth is, that they can do neither good nor evil: they cannot make a man wise or make him foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance.

Cr. Well, I will not dispute about that; but please to tell me, Socrates, whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends: are you not afraid that if you escape hence we may get into trouble with the informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the whole or a great part of our property; or that even a worse evil may happen to us? Now, if this is your fear, be at ease; for in order to save you, we ought surely to run this or even a greater risk; be persuaded, then, and do as I say.

Soc. Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means the only one.

Cr. Fear not. There are persons who at no great cost are willing to save you and bring you out of prison; and as for the informers, you may observe that they are far from being exorbitant in their demands; a little money will satisfy them. My means, which, as I am sure, are ample, are at your ser vice, and if you have a scruple about spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of theirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a sum of money for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are willing to spend their money too. I say, therefore, do not on that ac count hesitate about making your escape, and do not say, as you did in the court, that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself if you escape. For men will love you in other places to which you may go, and not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give you any trouble. Nor can I think that you are justified, Socrates, in betraying your own life when you might be saved; this is playing into the hands of your enemies and destroyers; and moreover I should say that you were be traying your children; for you might bring them up and educate them; instead of which you go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and if they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will be small thanks to you. No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling to persevere to the end in their nurture and educa tion. But you are choosing the easier part, as I think, not the better and manlier, which would rather have become one who professes virtue in all his actions, like yourself. And, indeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are your friends, when I reflect that this entire business of yours will be attributed to our want of courage. The trial need never have come on, or might have been brought to another issue; and the end of all, which is the crowning absurdity, will seem to have been permitted by us, through cowardice and base ness, who might have saved you, as you might have saved yourself, if we had been good for anything (for there was no difficulty in escaping); and we did not see how disgrace ful, Socrates, and also miserable all this will be to us as well as to you. Make your mind up

then, or rather have your mind already made up, for the time of deliberation is over, and there is only one thing to be done, which must be done, if at all, this very night, and which any delay will render all but impossible; I beseech you therefore, Socrates, to be per suaded by me, and to do as I say.

Soc. Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the evil; and there fore we ought to consider whether these things shall be done or not. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best; and now that this fortune has come upon me, I cannot put away the reasons which I have before given: the principles which I have hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and unless we can find other and better principles on the instant, I am certain not to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confis cations, deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors. But what will be the fairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old argument about the opinions of men? some of which are to be regarded, and others, as we were saying, are not to be regarded. Now were we right in maintaining this before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking; in fact an amusement only, and alto gether vanity? That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito: whether, under my present circumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I believe, is maintained by many who assume to be authorities, was to the effect, as I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are a disinterested person who are not going to die to-morrow -- at least, there is no human probability of this, and you are therefore not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which you are placed. Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this?

Cr. Certainly.

Soc. The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opin ions of the unwise are evil?

Cr. Certainly.

Soc. And what was said about another matter? Was the disciple in gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only -- his physician or trainer, whoever that was?

Cr. Of one man only.

Soc. And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that one only, and not of the many?

Cr. That is clear.

Soc. And he ought to live and train, and eat and drink in the way which seems good to his single master who has un derstanding, rather than according to the opinion of all other men put together?

Cr. True.

Soc. And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding, will he not suffer evil?

Cr. Certainly he will.

Soc. And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affecting, in the disobedient person?

Cr. Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil.

Soc. Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we need not separately enumerate? In the matter of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding, and whom we ought to fear and reverence more than all the rest of the world: and whom deserting we shall destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice; is there not such a principle?

Cr. Certainly there is, Socrates.

Soc. Take a parallel instance: if, acting under the advice of men who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improvable by health and deteriorated by disease -- when that has been destroyed, I say, would life be worth having? And that is -- the body?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be depraved, which is improved by justice and deterio rated by injustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. More honored, then?

Cr. Far more honored.

Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us: but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you suggest that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. Well, someone will say, "But the many can kill us."

Cr. Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.

Soc. That is true: but still I find with surprise that the old argument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say the same of another proposition -- that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued?

Cr. Yes, that also remains.

Soc. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one -- that holds also?

Cr. Yes, that holds.

Soc. From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought not to try to escape without the consent of the Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escap ing, then I will make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention, of money and loss of character, and the duty of educating children, are, as I hear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to call people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death -- and with as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and thanks, or whether we shall not do rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the calculation.

Cr. I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?

Soc. Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians: for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by you, but not against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my first posi tion, and do your best to answer me.

Cr. I will do my best.

Soc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dis honorable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions which were made within a few days to be thrown away? And have we, at

our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only to discover that we are no better than children? Or are we to rest assured, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, of the truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil and dishonor to him who acts unjustly? Shall we affirm that?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. Then we must do no wrong?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for we must injure no one at all?

Cr. Clearly not.

Soc. Again, Crito, may we do evil?

Cr. Surely not, Socrates.

Soc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality of the many -- is that just or not?

Cr. Not just.

Soc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

Cr. Very true.

Soc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still my opinion; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as for merly, I will proceed to the next step.

Cr. You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.

Soc. Then I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in the form of a question: Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought he to betray the right?

Cr. He ought to do what he thinks right.

Soc. But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least

to wrong? Do I not desert the principles WhiCh were acknowledged by us to be just? What do you say?

Cr. I cannot tell, Socrates, for I do not know.

Soc. Then consider the matter in this way: Imagine that I am about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: "Tell us, Socrates," they say; "what are you about? are you going by an act of yours to overturn us -- the laws and the whole State, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a State can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and overthrown by individuals?" What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? Anyone, and especially a clever rhetorician, will have a good deal to urge about the evil of setting aside the law which requires a sentence to be carried out; and we might reply, "Yes; but the State has injured us and given an unjust sentence." Sup pose I say that?

Cr. Very good, Socrates.

Soc. "And was that our agreement with you?" the law would say; "or were you to abide by the sentence of the State?" And if I were to express astonishment at their say ing this, the law would probably add: "Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes: you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us what complaint you have to make against us which justifies you in attempting to de stroy us and the State? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage?" None, I should reply. "Or against those of us who regulate the system of nurture and education of children in which you were trained? Were not the laws, who have the charge of this, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?" Right, I should reply. "Well, then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands? -- you would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? And will you, O professor of true virtue, say that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and rev erently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she leads us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may

anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence to his country." What answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?

Cr. I think that they do.

Soc. Then the laws will say: "Consider, Socrates, if this is true, that in your present attempt you are going to do us wrong. For, after having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good that we had to give, we further proclaim and give the right to every Athenian, that if he does not like us when he has come of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him; and none of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us and the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods with him. But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the State, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong: first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alterna tive of obeying or convincing us; that is what we offer, and he does neither. These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above all other Athenians." Suppose I ask, why is this? they will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the agree ment. "There is clear proof," they will say, "Socrates, that we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athe nians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love. For you never went out of the city either to see the games, ex cept once when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military service; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other States or their laws: your affections did not go beyond us and our State; we were your special favorites, and you acquiesced in our government of you; and this is the State in which you begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the trial -- the State which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile, and that you were not grieved at death. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us, the laws, of whom you are the destroyer; and are doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all answer this very question: Are we

right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that true or not?" How shall we answer that, Crito? Must we not agree?

Cr. There is no help, Socrates.

Soc. Then will they not say: "You, Socrates, are break ing the covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any haste or under any compulsion or deception, but having had seventy years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the city, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemon or Crete, which you often praise for their good government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign State. Whereas you, above all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the State, or, in other words, of us her laws (for who would like a State that has no laws), that you never stirred out of her: the halt, the blind, the maimed, were not more stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.

"For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way, what good will you do, either to yourself or to your friends? That your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you fly to one of the neighbor ing cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara, both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be corrupter of the young and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men? and is exist ence worth having on these terms? Or will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being the best things among men? Would that be decent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed States to Crito's friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and license, they will be charmed to have the tale of your escape from prison, set off with ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the fashion of runaways is -- that is very likely; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you vio lated the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things; you will live, but how? -- as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and doing what? -- eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments about justice and virtue then? Say that you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them -- will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of

Athenian citizenship? Is that the benefit which you would confer upon them? Or are you under the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent from them; for that your friends will take care of them? Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world they will not take care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are truly friends, they surely will.

"Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in in nocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will re ceive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito."

This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be in vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.

Cr. I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Soc. Then let me follow the intimations of the will of God.

[End.]

Tao Te Ching
Lao Tzu

Editor's Note: This e-text is based on the project Gutenburg edition of the Tao Te Ching, taken from the public domain translation by James Legge. The Gutenburg e-text has been released into the public domain. This slightly modified text version and associated HTML files were prepared for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (jfieser@utm.edu).

PART 1

Ch. 1. 1. The Tao that can be trodden is not the enduring and unchanging Tao. The name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name.

2. (Conceived of as) having no name, it is the Originator of heaven and earth; (conceived of as) having a name, it is the Mother of all things.

3. Always without desire we must be found, If its deep mystery we would sound; But if desire always within us be, Its outer fringe is all that we shall see.

4. Under these two aspects, it is really the same; but as development takes place, it receives the different names. Together we call them the Mystery. Where the Mystery is the deepest is the gate of all that is subtle and wonderful.

2. 1. All in the world know the beauty of the beautiful, and in doing this they have (the idea of) what ugliness is; they all know the skill of the skilful, and in doing this they have (the idea of) what the want of skill is.

2. So it is that existence and non-existence give birth the one to (the idea of) the other; that difficulty and ease produce the one (the idea of) the other; that length and shortness fashion out the one the figure of the other; that (the ideas of) height and lowness arise from the contrast of the one with the other; that the musical notes and tones become harmonious through the relation of one with another; and that being before and behind give the idea of one following another.

3. Therefore the sage manages affairs without doing anything, and conveys his instructions without the use of speech.

4. All things spring up, and there is not one which declines to show itself; they grow, and there is no claim made for their ownership; they go through their processes, and there is no expectation (of a reward for the results). The work is accomplished, and there is no resting in it (as an achievement).

The work is done, but how no one can see; 'Tis this that makes the power not cease to be.

3. 1. Not to value and employ men of superior ability is the way to keep the people from rivalry among themselves; not to prize articles which are difficult to procure is the way to keep them from becoming thieves; not to show them what is likely to excite their desires is the way to keep their

minds from disorder.

2. Therefore the sage, in the exercise of his government, empties their minds, fills their bellies, weakens their wills, and strengthens their bones.

3. He constantly (tries to) keep them without knowledge and without desire, and where there are those who have knowledge, to keep them from presuming to act (on it). When there is this abstinence from action, good order is universal.

4. 1. The Tao is (like) the emptiness of a vessel; and in our employment of it we must be on our guard against all fulness. How deep and unfathomable it is, as if it were the Honoured Ancestor of all things!

2. We should blunt our sharp points, and unravel the complications of things; we should attemper our brightness, and bring ourselves into agreement with the obscurity of others. How pure and still the Tao is, as if it would ever so continue!

3. I do not know whose son it is. It might appear to have been before God.

5. 1. Heaven and earth do not act from (the impulse of) any wish to be benevolent; they deal with all things as the dogs of grass are dealt with. The sages do not act from (any wish to be) benevolent; they deal with the people as the dogs of grass are dealt with.

2. May not the space between heaven and earth be compared to a bellows?

'Tis emptied, yet it loses not its power; 'Tis moved again, and sends forth air the more. Much speech to swift exhaustion lead we see; Your inner being guard, and keep it free.

6. The valley spirit dies not, aye the same; The female mystery thus do we name. Its gate, from which at first they issued forth, Is called the root from which grew heaven and earth. Long and unbroken does its power remain, Used gently, and without the touch of pain.

7. 1. Heaven is long-enduring and earth continues long. The reason why heaven and earth are able to endure and continue thus long is because they do not live of, or for, themselves. This is how they are able to continue and endure.

2. Therefore the sage puts his own person last, and yet it is found in the foremost place; he treats his person as if it were foreign to him, and yet that person is preserved. Is it not because he has no personal and private ends, that therefore such ends are realised?

8. 1. The highest excellence is like (that of) water. The excellence of water appears in its benefiting all things, and in its occupying, without striving (to the contrary), the low place which all men dislike. Hence (its way) is near to (that of) the Tao.

2. The excellence of a residence is in (the suitability of) the place; that of the mind is in abysmal stillness; that of associations is in their being with the virtuous; that of government is in its securing good order; that of (the conduct of) affairs is in its ability; and that of (the initiation of) any movement is in its timeliness.

3. And when (one with the highest excellence) does not wrangle (about his low position), no one finds fault with him.

9. 1. It is better to leave a vessel unfilled, than to attempt to carry it when it is full. If you keep feeling a point that has been sharpened, the point cannot long preserve its sharpness.

2. When gold and jade fill the hall, their possessor cannot keep them safe. When wealth and honours lead to arrogancy, this brings its evil on itself. When the work is done, and one's name is becoming distinguished, to withdraw into obscurity is the way of Heaven.

10. 1. When the intelligent and animal souls are held together in one embrace, they can be kept from separating. When one gives undivided attention to the (vital) breath, and brings it to the utmost degree of pliancy, he can become as a (tender) babe. When he has cleansed away the most mysterious sights (of his imagination), he can become without a flaw.

2. In loving the people and ruling the state, cannot he proceed without any (purpose of) action? In the opening and shutting of his gates of heaven, cannot he do so as a female bird? While his intelligence reaches in every direction, cannot he (appear to) be without knowledge?

3. (The Tao) produces (all things) and nourishes them; it produces them and does not claim them as its own; it does all, and yet does not boast of it; it presides over all, and yet does not control them. This is what is called 'The mysterious Quality' (of the Tao).

11. The thirty spokes unite in the one nave; but it is on the empty space (for the axle), that the use of the wheel depends. Clay is fashioned into vessels; but it is on their empty hollowness, that their use depends. The door and windows are cut out (from the walls) to form an apartment; but it is on the empty space (within), that its use depends. Therefore, what has a (positive) existence serves for profitable adaptation, and what has not that for (actual) usefulness.

12. 1. Colour's five hues from th' eyes their sight will take; Music's five notes the ears as deaf can make; The flavours five deprive the mouth of taste; The chariot course, and the wild hunting waste Make mad the mind; and objects rare and strange, Sought for, men's conduct will to evil change.

2. Therefore the sage seeks to satisfy (the craving of) the belly, and not the (insatiable longing of the) eyes. He puts from him the latter, and prefers to seek the former.

13. 1. Favour and disgrace would seem equally to be feared; honour and great calamity, to be regarded as personal conditions (of the same kind).

2. What is meant by speaking thus of favour and disgrace? Disgrace is being in a low position (after the enjoyment of favour). The getting that (favour) leads to the apprehension (of losing it), and the losing it leads to the fear of (still greater calamity): -- this is what is meant by saying that favour and disgrace would seem equally to be feared.

And what is meant by saying that honour and great calamity are to be (similarly) regarded as personal conditions? What makes me liable to great calamity is my having the body (which I call myself); if I had not the body, what great calamity could come to me?

3. Therefore he who would administer the kingdom, honouring it as he honours his own person, may be employed to govern it, and he who would administer it with the love which he bears to his own person may be entrusted with it.

14. 1. We look at it, and we do not see it, and we name it 'the Equable.' We listen to it, and we do not hear it, and we name it 'the Inaudible.' We try to grasp it, and do not get hold of it, and we name it 'the Subtle.' With these three qualities, it cannot be made the subject of description; and hence we blend them together and obtain The One.

2. Its upper part is not bright, and its lower part is not obscure. Ceaseless in its action, it yet cannot be named, and then it again returns and becomes nothing. This is called the Form of the Formless, and the Semblance of the Invisible; this is called the Fleeting and Indeterminable.

3. We meet it and do not see its Front; we follow it, and do not see its Back. When we can lay hold of the Tao of old to direct the things of the present day, and are able to know it as it was of old in the beginning, this is called (unwinding) the clue of Tao.

15. 1. The skilful masters (of the Tao) in old times, with a subtle and exquisite penetration, comprehended its mysteries, and were deep (also) so as to elude men's knowledge. As they were thus beyond men's knowledge, I will make an effort to describe of what sort they appeared to be.

2. Shrinking looked they like those who wade through a stream in winter; irresolute like those who are afraid of all around them; grave like a guest (in awe of his host); evanescent like ice that is melting away; unpretentious like wood that has not been fashioned into anything; vacant like a valley, and dull like muddy water.

3. Who can (make) the muddy water (clear)? Let it be still, and it will gradually become clear. Who can secure the condition of rest? Let movement go on, and the condition of rest will gradually arise.

4. They who preserve this method of the Tao do not wish to be full (of themselves). It is through their not being full of themselves that they can afford to seem worn and not appear new and complete.

16. 1. The (state of) vacancy should be brought to the utmost degree, and that of stillness guarded with unwearying vigour. All things alike go through their processes of activity, and (then) we see them return (to their original state). When things (in the vegetable world) have displayed their luxuriant growth, we see each of them return to its root. This returning to their root is what we call the state of stillness; and that stillness may be called a reporting that they have fulfilled their appointed end.

2. The report of that fulfilment is the regular, unchanging rule. To know that unchanging rule is to be intelligent; not to know it leads to wild movements and evil issues. The knowledge of that unchanging rule produces a (grand) capacity and forbearance, and that capacity and forbearance lead to a community (of feeling with all things). From this community of feeling comes a kingliness of character; and he who is king-like goes on to be heaven-like. In that likeness to heaven he possesses the Tao. Possessed of the Tao, he endures long; and to the end of his bodily life, is exempt from all danger of decay.

17. 1. In the highest antiquity, (the people) did not know that there were (their rulers). In the next age they loved them and praised them. In the next they feared them; in the next they despised them. Thus it was that when faith (in the Tao) was deficient (in the rulers) a want of faith in them ensued (in the people).

2. How irresolute did those (earliest rulers) appear, showing (by their reticence) the importance which they set upon their words! Their work was done and their undertakings were successful, while the people all said, 'We are as we are, of ourselves!'

18. 1. When the Great Tao (Way or Method) ceased to be observed, benevolence and righteousness came into vogue. (Then) appeared wisdom and shrewdness, and there ensued great hypocrisy.

2. When harmony no longer prevailed throughout the six kinships, filial sons found their manifestation; when the states and clans fell into disorder, loyal ministers appeared.

19. 1. If we could renounce our sageness and discard our wisdom, it would be better for the people a hundredfold. If we could renounce our benevolence and discard our righteousness, the people would again become filial and kindly. If we could renounce our artful contrivances and discard our (scheming for) gain, there would be no thieves nor robbers.

2. Those three methods (of government) Thought olden ways in elegance did fail And made these names their want of worth to veil; But simple views, and courses plain and true Would selfish ends

and many lusts eschew.

20. 1. When we renounce learning we have no troubles. The (ready) 'yes,' and (flattering) 'yea;' -- Small is the difference they display. But mark their issues, good and ill; -- What space the gulf between shall fill?

What all men fear is indeed to be feared; but how wide and without end is the range of questions (asking to be discussed)!

2. The multitude of men look satisfied and pleased; as if enjoying a full banquet, as if mounted on a tower in spring. I alone seem listless and still, my desires having as yet given no indication of their presence. I am like an infant which has not yet smiled. I look dejected and forlorn, as if I had no home to go to. The multitude of men all have enough and to spare. I alone seem to have lost everything. My mind is that of a stupid man; I am in a state of chaos.

Ordinary men look bright and intelligent, while I alone seem to be benighted. They look full of discrimination, while I alone am dull and confused. I seem to be carried about as on the sea, drifting as if I had nowhere to rest. All men have their spheres of action, while I alone seem dull and incapable, like a rude borderer. (Thus) I alone am different from other men, but I value the nursing-mother (the Tao).

21. The grandest forms of active force From Tao come, their only source. Who can of Tao the nature tell? Our sight it flies, our touch as well. Eluding sight, eluding touch, The forms of things all in it crouch; Eluding touch, eluding sight, There are their semblances, all right. Profound it is, dark and obscure; Things' essences all there endure. Those essences the truth enfold Of what, when seen, shall then be told. Now it is so; 'twas so of old. Its name -- what passes not away; So, in their beautiful array, Things form and never know decay.

How know I that it is so with all the beauties of existing things? By this (nature of the Tao).

22. 1. The partial becomes complete; the crooked, straight; the empty, full; the worn out, new. He whose (desires) are few gets them; he whose (desires) are many goes astray.

2. Therefore the sage holds in his embrace the one thing (of humility), and manifests it to all the world. He is free from self- display, and therefore he shines; from self-assertion, and therefore he is distinguished; from self-boasting, and therefore his merit is acknowledged; from self-complacency, and therefore he acquires superiority. It is because he is thus free from striving that therefore no one in the world is able to strive with him.

3. That saying of the ancients that 'the partial becomes complete' was not vainly spoken: -- all real completion is comprehended under it.

23. 1. Abstaining from speech marks him who is obeying the spontaneity of his nature. A violent wind does not last for a whole morning; a sudden rain does not last for the whole day. To whom is it that these (two) things are owing? To Heaven and Earth. If Heaven and Earth cannot make such (spasmodic) actings last long, how much less can man!

2. Therefore when one is making the Tao his business, those who are also pursuing it, agree with him in it, and those who are making the manifestation of its course their object agree with him in that; while even those who are failing in both these things agree with him where they fail.

3. Hence, those with whom he agrees as to the Tao have the happiness of attaining to it; those with whom he agrees as to its manifestation have the happiness of attaining to it; and those with whom he agrees in their failure have also the happiness of attaining (to the Tao). (But) when there is not faith sufficient (on his part), a want of faith (in him) ensues (on the part of the others).

24. He who stands on his tiptoes does not stand firm; he who stretches his legs does not walk (easily). (So), he who displays himself does not shine; he who asserts his own views is not distinguished; he who vaunts himself does not find his merit acknowledged; he who is self-conceited has no superiority allowed to him. Such conditions, viewed from the standpoint of the Tao, are like remnants of food, or a tumour on the body, which all dislike. Hence those who pursue (the course) of the Tao do not adopt and allow them.

25. 1. There was something undefined and complete, coming into existence before Heaven and Earth. How still it was and formless, standing alone, and undergoing no change, reaching everywhere and in no danger (of being exhausted)! It may be regarded as the Mother of all things.

2. I do not know its name, and I give it the designation of the Tao (the Way or Course). Making an effort (further) to give it a name I call it The Great.

3. Great, it passes on (in constant flow). Passing on, it becomes remote. Having become remote, it returns. Therefore the Tao is great; Heaven is great; Earth is great; and the (sage) king is also great. In the universe there are four that are great, and the (sage) king is one of them.

4. Man takes his law from the Earth; the Earth takes its law from Heaven; Heaven takes its law from the Tao. The law of the Tao is its being what it is.

26. 1. Gravity is the root of lightness; stillness, the ruler of movement.

2. Therefore a wise prince, marching the whole day, does not go far from his baggage waggons. Although he may have brilliant prospects to look at, he quietly remains (in his proper place), indifferent to them. How should the lord of a myriad chariots carry himself lightly before the kingdom? If he do act lightly, he has lost his root (of gravity); if he proceed to active movement, he will lose his throne.

27. 1. The skilful traveller leaves no traces of his wheels or footsteps; the skilful speaker says nothing that can be found fault with or blamed; the skilful reckoner uses no tallies; the skilful closer needs no bolts or bars, while to open what he has shut will be impossible; the skilful binder uses no strings or knots, while to unloose what he has bound will be impossible. In the same way the sage is always skilful at saving men, and so he does not cast away any man; he is always skilful at saving things, and so he does not cast away anything. This is called 'Hiding the light of his procedure.'

2. Therefore the man of skill is a master (to be looked up to) by him who has not the skill; and he who has not the skill is the helper of (the reputation of) him who has the skill. If the one did not honour his master, and the other did not rejoice in his helper, an (observer), though intelligent, might greatly err about them. This is called 'The utmost degree of mystery.'

28. 1. Who knows his manhood's strength, Yet still his female feebleness maintains; As to one channel flow the many drains, All come to him, yea, all beneath the sky. Thus he the constant excellence retains; The simple child again, free from all stains.

Who knows how white attracts, Yet always keeps himself within black's shade, The pattern of humility displayed, Displayed in view of all beneath the sky; He in the unchanging excellence arrayed, Endless return to man's first state has made.

Who knows how glory shines, Yet loves disgrace, nor e'er for it is pale; Behold his presence in a spacious vale, To which men come from all beneath the sky. The unchanging excellence completes its tale; The simple infant man in him we hail.

2. The unwrought material, when divided and distributed, forms vessels. The sage, when employed,

becomes the Head of all the Officers (of government); and in his greatest regulations he employs no violent measures.

29. 1. If any one should wish to get the kingdom for himself, and to effect this by what he does, I see that he will not succeed. The kingdom is a spirit-like thing, and cannot be got by active doing. He who would so win it destroys it; he who would hold it in his grasp loses it.

2. The course and nature of things is such that What was in front is now behind; What warmed anon we freezing find. Strength is of weakness oft the spoil; The store in ruins mocks our toil.

Hence the sage puts away excessive effort, extravagance, and easy indulgence.

30. 1. He who would assist a lord of men in harmony with the Tao will not assert his mastery in the kingdom by force of arms. Such a course is sure to meet with its proper return.

2. Wherever a host is stationed, briars and thorns spring up. In the sequence of great armies there are sure to be bad years.

3. A skilful (commander) strikes a decisive blow, and stops. He does not dare (by continuing his operations) to assert and complete his mastery. He will strike the blow, but will be on his guard against being vain or boastful or arrogant in consequence of it. He strikes it as a matter of necessity; he strikes it, but not from a wish for mastery.

4. When things have attained their strong maturity they become old. This may be said to be not in accordance with the Tao: and what is not in accordance with it soon comes to an end.

31. 1. Now arms, however beautiful, are instruments of evil omen, hateful, it may be said, to all creatures. Therefore they who have the Tao do not like to employ them.

2. The superior man ordinarily considers the left hand the most honourable place, but in time of war the right hand. Those sharp weapons are instruments of evil omen, and not the instruments of the superior man; -- he uses them only on the compulsion of necessity. Calm and repose are what he prizes; victory (by force of arms) is to him undesirable. To consider this desirable would be to delight in the slaughter of men; and he who delights in the slaughter of men cannot get his will in the kingdom.

3. On occasions of festivity to be on the left hand is the prized position; on occasions of mourning, the right hand. The second in command of the army has his place on the left; the general commanding in chief has his on the right; -- his place, that is, is assigned to him as in the rites of mourning. He who has killed multitudes of men should weep for them with the bitterest grief; and the victor in battle has his place (rightly) according to those rites.

32. 1. The Tao, considered as unchanging, has no name.

2. Though in its primordial simplicity it may be small, the whole world dares not deal with (one embodying) it as a minister. If a feudal prince or the king could guard and hold it, all would spontaneously submit themselves to him.

3. Heaven and Earth (under its guidance) unite together and send down the sweet dew, which, without the directions of men, reaches equally everywhere as of its own accord.

4. As soon as it proceeds to action, it has a name. When it once has that name, (men) can know to rest in it. When they know to rest in it, they can be free from all risk of failure and error.

5. The relation of the Tao to all the world is like that of the great rivers and seas to the streams from the valleys.

33. 1. He who knows other men is discerning; he who knows himself is intelligent. He who

overcomes others is strong; he who overcomes himself is mighty. He who is satisfied with his lot is rich; he who goes on acting with energy has a (firm) will.

2. He who does not fail in the requirements of his position, continues long; he who dies and yet does not perish, has longevity.

34. 1. All-pervading is the Great Tao! It may be found on the left hand and on the right.

2. All things depend on it for their production, which it gives to them, not one refusing obedience to it. When its work is accomplished, it does not claim the name of having done it. It clothes all things as with a garment, and makes no assumption of being their lord; -- it may be named in the smallest things. All things return (to their root and disappear), and do not know that it is it which presides over their doing so; -- it may be named in the greatest things.

3. Hence the sage is able (in the same way) to accomplish his great achievements. It is through his not making himself great that he can accomplish them.

35. 1. To him who holds in his hands the Great Image (of the invisible Tao), the whole world repairs. Men resort to him, and receive no hurt, but (find) rest, peace, and the feeling of ease.

2. Music and dainties will make the passing guest stop (for a time). But though the Tao as it comes from the mouth, seems insipid and has no flavour, though it seems not worth being looked at or listened to, the use of it is inexhaustible.

36. 1. When one is about to take an inspiration, he is sure to make a (previous) expiration; when he is going to weaken another, he will first strengthen him; when he is going to overthrow another, he will first have raised him up; when he is going to despoil another, he will first have made gifts to him: -- this is called 'Hiding the light (of his procedure).'

2. The soft overcomes the hard; and the weak the strong.

3. Fishes should not be taken from the deep; instruments for the profit of a state should not be shown to the people.

37. 1. The Tao in its regular course does nothing (for the sake of doing it), and so there is nothing which it does not do.

2. If princes and kings were able to maintain it, all things would of themselves be transformed by them.

3. If this transformation became to me an object of desire, I would express the desire by the nameless simplicity.

Simplicity without a name Is free from all external aim. With no desire, at rest and still, All things go right as of their will.

PART 2

38. 1. (Those who) possessed in highest degree the attributes (of the Tao) did not (seek) to show them, and therefore they possessed them (in fullest measure). (Those who) possessed in a lower degree those attributes (sought how) not to lose them, and therefore they did not possess them (in fullest measure).

2. (Those who) possessed in the highest degree those attributes did nothing (with a purpose), and had no need to do anything. (Those who) possessed them in a lower degree were (always) doing,

and had need to be so doing.

3. (Those who) possessed the highest benevolence were (always seeking) to carry it out, and had no need to be doing so. (Those who) possessed the highest righteousness were (always seeking) to carry it out, and had need to be so doing.

4. (Those who) possessed the highest (sense of) propriety were (always seeking) to show it, and when men did not respond to it, they bared the arm and marched up to them.

5. Thus it was that when the Tao was lost, its attributes appeared; when its attributes were lost, benevolence appeared; when benevolence was lost, righteousness appeared; and when righteousness was lost, the proprieties appeared.

6. Now propriety is the attenuated form of leal-heartedness and good faith, and is also the commencement of disorder; swift apprehension is (only) a flower of the Tao, and is the beginning of stupidity.

7. Thus it is that the Great man abides by what is solid, and eschews what is flimsy; dwells with the fruit and not with the flower. It is thus that he puts away the one and makes choice of the other.

39. 1. The things which from of old have got the One (the Tao) are --

Heaven which by it is bright and pure; Earth rendered thereby firm and sure; Spirits with powers by it supplied; Valleys kept full throughout their void All creatures which through it do live Princes and kings who from it get The model which to all they give.

All these are the results of the One (Tao).

2. If heaven were not thus pure, it soon would rend; If earth were not thus sure, 'twould break and bend; Without these powers, the spirits soon would fail; If not so filled, the drought would parch each vale; Without that life, creatures would pass away; Princes and kings, without that moral sway, However grand and high, would all decay.

3. Thus it is that dignity finds its (firm) root in its (previous) meanness, and what is lofty finds its stability in the lowness (from which it rises). Hence princes and kings call themselves 'Orphans,' 'Men of small virtue,' and as 'Carriages without a nave.' Is not this an acknowledgment that in their considering themselves mean they see the foundation of their dignity? So it is that in the enumeration of the different parts of a carriage we do not come on what makes it answer the ends of a carriage. They do not wish to show themselves elegant-looking as jade, but (prefer) to be coarse-looking as an (ordinary) stone.

40. 1. The movement of the Tao By contraries proceeds; And weakness marks the course Of Tao's mighty deeds.

2. All things under heaven sprang from It as existing (and named); that existence sprang from It as non-existent (and not named).

41. 1. Scholars of the highest class, when they hear about the Tao, earnestly carry it into practice. Scholars of the middle class, when they have heard about it, seem now to keep it and now to lose it. Scholars of the lowest class, when they have heard about it, laugh greatly at it. If it were not (thus) laughed at, it would not be fit to be the Tao.

2. Therefore the sentence-makers have thus expressed themselves: --

'The Tao, when brightest seen, seems light to lack; Who progress in it makes, seems drawing back; Its even way is like a rugged track. Its highest virtue from the vale doth rise; Its greatest beauty seems to offend the eyes; And he has most whose lot the least supplies. Its firmest virtue seems but

poor and low; Its solid truth seems change to undergo; Its largest square doth yet no corner show A vessel great, it is the slowest made; Loud is its sound, but never word it said; A semblance great, the shadow of a shade.'

3. The Tao is hidden, and has no name; but it is the Tao which is skilful at imparting (to all things what they need) and making them complete.

42. 1. The Tao produced One; One produced Two; Two produced Three; Three produced All things. All things leave behind them the Obscurity (out of which they have come), and go forward to embrace the Brightness (into which they have emerged), while they are harmonised by the Breath of Vacancy.

2. What men dislike is to be orphans, to have little virtue, to be as carriages without naves; and yet these are the designations which kings and princes use for themselves. So it is that some things are increased by being diminished, and others are diminished by being increased.

3. What other men (thus) teach, I also teach. The violent and strong do not die their natural death. I will make this the basis of my teaching.

43. 1. The softest thing in the world dashes against and overcomes the hardest; that which has no (substantial) existence enters where there is no crevice. I know hereby what advantage belongs to doing nothing (with a purpose).

2. There are few in the world who attain to the teaching without words, and the advantage arising from non-action.

44. 1. Or fame or life, Which do you hold more dear? Or life or wealth, To which would you adhere? Keep life and lose those other things; Keep them and lose your life: -- which brings Sorrow and pain more near?

2. Thus we may see, Who cleaves to fame Rejects what is more great; Who loves large stores Gives up the richer state.

3. Who is content Needs fear no shame. Who knows to stop Incurs no blame. From danger free Long live shall he.

45. 1. Who thinks his great achievements poor Shall find his vigour long endure. Of greatest fulness, deemed a void, Exhaustion ne'er shall stem the tide. Do thou what's straight still crooked deem; Thy greatest art still stupid seem, And eloquence a stammering scream.

2. Constant action overcomes cold; being still overcomes heat. Purity and stillness give the correct law to all under heaven.

46. 1. When the Tao prevails in the world, they send back their swift horses to (draw) the dung-carts. When the Tao is disregarded in the world, the war-horses breed in the border lands.

2. There is no guilt greater than to sanction ambition; no calamity greater than to be discontented with one's lot; no fault greater than the wish to be getting. Therefore the sufficiency of contentment is an enduring and unchanging sufficiency.

47. 1. Without going outside his door, one understands (all that takes place) under the sky; without looking out from his window, one sees the Tao of Heaven. The farther that one goes out (from himself), the less he knows.

2. Therefore the sages got their knowledge without travelling; gave their (right) names to things without seeing them; and accomplished their ends without any purpose of doing so.

48. 1. He who devotes himself to learning (seeks) from day to day to increase (his knowledge); he

who devotes himself to the Tao (seeks) from day to day to diminish (his doing).

2. He diminishes it and again diminishes it, till he arrives at doing nothing (on purpose). Having arrived at this point of non-action, there is nothing which he does not do.

3. He who gets as his own all under heaven does so by giving himself no trouble (with that end). If one take trouble (with that end), he is not equal to getting as his own all under heaven.

49. 1. The sage has no invariable mind of his own; he makes the mind of the people his mind.

2. To those who are good (to me), I am good; and to those who are not good (to me), I am also good; -- and thus (all) get to be good. To those who are sincere (with me), I am sincere; and to those who are not sincere (with me), I am also sincere; -- and thus (all) get to be sincere.

3. The sage has in the world an appearance of indecision, and keeps his mind in a state of indifference to all. The people all keep their eyes and ears directed to him, and he deals with them all as his children.

50. 1. Men come forth and live; they enter (again) and die.

2. Of every ten three are ministers of life (to themselves); and three are ministers of death.

3. There are also three in every ten whose aim is to live, but whose movements tend to the land (or place) of death. And for what reason? Because of their excessive endeavours to perpetuate life.

4. But I have heard that he who is skilful in managing the life entrusted to him for a time travels on the land without having to shun rhinoceros or tiger, and enters a host without having to avoid buff coat or sharp weapon. The rhinoceros finds no place in him into which to thrust its horn, nor the tiger a place in which to fix its claws, nor the weapon a place to admit its point. And for what reason? Because there is in him no place of death.

51. 1. All things are produced by the Tao, and nourished by its outflowing operation. They receive their forms according to the nature of each, and are completed according to the circumstances of their condition. Therefore all things without exception honour the Tao, and exalt its outflowing operation.

2. This honouring of the Tao and exalting of its operation is not the result of any ordination, but always a spontaneous tribute.

3. Thus it is that the Tao produces (all things), nourishes them, brings them to their full growth, nurses them, completes them, matures them, maintains them, and overspreads them.

4. It produces them and makes no claim to the possession of them; it carries them through their processes and does not vaunt its ability in doing so; it brings them to maturity and exercises no control over them; -- this is called its mysterious operation.

52. 1. (The Tao) which originated all under the sky is to be considered as the mother of them all.

2. When the mother is found, we know what her children should be. When one knows that he is his mother's child, and proceeds to guard (the qualities of) the mother that belong to him, to the end of his life he will be free from all peril.

3. Let him keep his mouth closed, and shut up the portals (of his nostrils), and all his life he will be exempt from laborious exertion. Let him keep his mouth open, and (spend his breath) in the promotion of his affairs, and all his life there will be no safety for him.

4. The perception of what is small is (the secret of clear- sightedness; the guarding of what is soft and tender is (the secret of) strength.

5. Who uses well his light, Reverting to its (source so) bright, Will from his body ward all blight, And hides the unchanging from men's sight.

53. 1. If I were suddenly to become known, and (put into a position to) conduct (a government) according to the Great Tao, what I should be most afraid of would be a boastful display.

2. The great Tao (or way) is very level and easy; but people love the by-ways.

3. Their court(-yards and buildings) shall be well kept, but their fields shall be ill-cultivated, and their granaries very empty. They shall wear elegant and ornamented robes, carry a sharp sword at their girdle, pamper themselves in eating and drinking, and have a superabundance of property and wealth; -- such (princes) may be called robbers and boasters. This is contrary to the Tao surely!

54. 1. What (Tao's) skilful planter plants Can never be uptorn; What his skilful arms enfold, From him can ne'er be borne. Sons shall bring in lengthening line, Sacrifices to his shrine.

2. Tao when nursed within one's self, His vigour will make true; And where the family it rules What riches will accrue! The neighbourhood where it prevails In thriving will abound; And when 'tis seen throughout the state, Good fortune will be found. Employ it the kingdom o'er, And men thrive all around.

3. In this way the effect will be seen in the person, by the observation of different cases; in the family; in the neighbourhood; in the state; and in the kingdom.

4. How do I know that this effect is sure to hold thus all under the sky? By this (method of observation).

55. 1. He who has in himself abundantly the attributes (of the Tao) is like an infant. Poisonous insects will not sting him; fierce beasts will not seize him; birds of prey will not strike him.

2. (The infant's) bones are weak and its sinews soft, but yet its grasp is firm. It knows not yet the union of male and female, and yet its virile member may be excited; -- showing the perfection of its physical essence. All day long it will cry without its throat becoming hoarse; -- showing the harmony (in its constitution).

3. To him by whom this harmony is known, (The secret of) the unchanging (Tao) is shown, And in the knowledge wisdom finds its throne. All life-increasing arts to evil turn; Where the mind makes the vital breath to burn, (False) is the strength, (and o'er it we should mourn.)

4. When things have become strong, they (then) become old, which may be said to be contrary to the Tao. Whatever is contrary to the Tao soon ends.

56. 1. He who knows (the Tao) does not (care to) speak (about it); he who is (ever ready to) speak about it does not know it.

2. He (who knows it) will keep his mouth shut and close the portals (of his nostrils). He will blunt his sharp points and unravel the complications of things; he will attemper his brightness, and bring himself into agreement with the obscurity (of others). This is called 'the Mysterious Agreement.'

3. (Such an one) cannot be treated familiarly or distantly; he is beyond all consideration of profit or injury; of nobility or meanness: -- he is the noblest man under heaven.

57. 1. A state may be ruled by (measures of) correction; weapons of war may be used with crafty dexterity; (but) the kingdom is made one's own (only) by freedom from action and purpose.

2. How do I know that it is so? By these facts: -- In the kingdom the multiplication of prohibitive enactments increases the poverty of the people; the more implements to add to their profit that the

people have, the greater disorder is there in the state and clan; the more acts of crafty dexterity that men possess, the more do strange contrivances appear; the more display there is of legislation, the more thieves and robbers there are.

3. Therefore a sage has said, 'I will do nothing (of purpose), and the people will be transformed of themselves; I will be fond of keeping still, and the people will of themselves become correct. I will take no trouble about it, and the people will of themselves become rich; I will manifest no ambition, and the people will of themselves attain to the primitive simplicity.'

58. 1. The government that seems the most unwise, Oft goodness to the people best supplies; That which is meddling, touching everything, Will work but ill, and disappointment bring.

Misery! -- happiness is to be found by its side! Happiness! -- misery lurks beneath it! Who knows what either will come to in the end?

2. Shall we then dispense with correction? The (method of) correction shall by a turn become distortion, and the good in it shall by a turn become evil. The delusion of the people (on this point) has indeed subsisted for a long time.

3. Therefore the sage is (like) a square which cuts no one (with its angles); (like) a corner which injures no one (with its sharpness). He is straightforward, but allows himself no license; he is bright, but does not dazzle.

59. 1. For regulating the human (in our constitution) and rendering the (proper) service to the heavenly, there is nothing like moderation.

2. It is only by this moderation that there is effected an early return (to man's normal state). That early return is what I call the repeated accumulation of the attributes (of the Tao). With that repeated accumulation of those attributes, there comes the subjugation (of every obstacle to such return). Of this subjugation we know not what shall be the limit; and when one knows not what the limit shall be, he may be the ruler of a state.

3. He who possesses the mother of the state may continue long. His case is like that (of the plant) of which we say that its roots are deep and its flower stalks firm: -- this is the way to secure that its enduring life shall long be seen.

60. 1. Governing a great state is like cooking small fish.

2. Let the kingdom be governed according to the Tao, and the manes of the departed will not manifest their spiritual energy. It is not that those manes have not that spiritual energy, but it will not be employed to hurt men. It is not that it could not hurt men, but neither does the ruling sage hurt them.

3. When these two do not injuriously affect each other, their good influences converge in the virtue (of the Tao).

61. 1. What makes a great state is its being (like) a low-lying, down- flowing (stream); -- it becomes the centre to which tend (all the small states) under heaven.

2. (To illustrate from) the case of all females: -- the female always overcomes the male by her stillness. Stillness may be considered (a sort of) abasement.

3. Thus it is that a great state, by condescending to small states, gains them for itself; and that small states, by abasing themselves to a great state, win it over to them. In the one case the abasement leads to gaining adherents, in the other case to procuring favour.

4. The great state only wishes to unite men together and nourish them; a small state only wishes to

be received by, and to serve, the other. Each gets what it desires, but the great state must learn to abase itself.

62. 1. Tao has of all things the most honoured place. No treasures give good men so rich a grace; Bad men it guards, and doth their ill efface.

2. (Its) admirable words can purchase honour; (its) admirable deeds can raise their performer above others. Even men who are not good are not abandoned by it.

3. Therefore when the sovereign occupies his place as the Son of Heaven, and he has appointed his three ducal ministers, though (a prince) were to send in a round symbol-of-rank large enough to fill both the hands, and that as the precursor of the team of horses (in the court-yard), such an offering would not be equal to (a lesson of) this Tao, which one might present on his knees.

4. Why was it that the ancients prized this Tao so much? Was it not because it could be got by seeking for it, and the guilty could escape (from the stain of their guilt) by it? This is the reason why all under heaven consider it the most valuable thing.

63. 1. (It is the way of the Tao) to act without (thinking of) acting; to conduct affairs without (feeling the) trouble of them; to taste without discerning any flavour; to consider what is small as great, and a few as many; and to recompense injury with kindness.

2. (The master of it) anticipates things that are difficult while they are easy, and does things that would become great while they are small. All difficult things in the world are sure to arise from a previous state in which they were easy, and all great things from one in which they were small. Therefore the sage, while he never does what is great, is able on that account to accomplish the greatest things.

3. He who lightly promises is sure to keep but little faith; he who is continually thinking things easy is sure to find them difficult. Therefore the sage sees difficulty even in what seems easy, and so never has any difficulties.

64. 1. That which is at rest is easily kept hold of; before a thing has given indications of its presence, it is easy to take measures against it; that which is brittle is easily broken; that which is very small is easily dispersed. Action should be taken before a thing has made its appearance; order should be secured before disorder has begun.

2. The tree which fills the arms grew from the tiniest sprout; the tower of nine storeys rose from a (small) heap of earth; the journey of a thousand li commenced with a single step.

3. He who acts (with an ulterior purpose) does harm; he who takes hold of a thing (in the same way) loses his hold. The sage does not act (so), and therefore does no harm; he does not lay hold (so), and therefore does not lose his bold. (But) people in their conduct of affairs are constantly ruining them when they are on the eve of success. If they were careful at the end, as (they should be) at the beginning, they would not so ruin them.

4. Therefore the sage desires what (other men) do not desire, and does not prize things difficult to get; he learns what (other men) do not learn, and turns back to what the multitude of men have passed by. Thus he helps the natural development of all things, and does not dare to act (with an ulterior purpose of his own).

65. 1. The ancients who showed their skill in practising the Tao did so, not to enlighten the people, but rather to make them simple and ignorant.

2. The difficulty in governing the people arises from their having much knowledge. He who (tries

to) govern a state by his wisdom is a scourge to it; while he who does not (try to) do so is a blessing.

3. He who knows these two things finds in them also his model and rule. Ability to know this model and rule constitutes what we call the mysterious excellence (of a governor). Deep and far-reaching is such mysterious excellence, showing indeed its possessor as opposite to others, but leading them to a great conformity to him.

66. 1. That whereby the rivers and seas are able to receive the homage and tribute of all the valley streams, is their skill in being lower than they; -- it is thus that they are the kings of them all. So it is that the sage (ruler), wishing to be above men, puts himself by his words below them, and, wishing to be before them, places his person behind them.

2. In this way though he has his place above them, men do not feel his weight, nor though he has his place before them, do they feel it an injury to them.

3. Therefore all in the world delight to exalt him and do not weary of him. Because he does not strive, no one finds it possible to strive with him.

67. 1. All the world says that, while my Tao is great, it yet appears to be inferior (to other systems of teaching). Now it is just its greatness that makes it seem to be inferior. If it were like any other (system), for long would its smallness have been known!

2. But I have three precious things which I prize and hold fast. The first is gentleness; the second is economy; and the third is shrinking from taking precedence of others.

3. With that gentleness I can be bold; with that economy I can be liberal; shrinking from taking precedence of others, I can become a vessel of the highest honour. Now-a-days they give up gentleness and are all for being bold; economy, and are all for being liberal; the hindmost place, and seek only to be foremost; -- (of all which the end is) death.

4. Gentleness is sure to be victorious even in battle, and firmly to maintain its ground. Heaven will save its possessor, by his (very) gentleness protecting him.

68. He who in (Tao's) wars has skill Assumes no martial port; He who fights with most good will To rage makes no resort. He who vanquishes yet still Keeps from his foes apart; He whose hests men most fulfil Yet humbly plies his art.

Thus we say, 'He ne'er contends, And therein is his might.' Thus we say, 'Men's wills he bends, That they with him unite.' Thus we say, 'Like Heaven's his ends, No sage of old more bright.'

69. 1. A master of the art of war has said, 'I do not dare to be the host (to commence the war); I prefer to be the guest (to act on the defensive). I do not dare to advance an inch; I prefer to retire a foot.' This is called marshalling the ranks where there are no ranks; baring the arms (to fight) where there are no arms to bare; grasping the weapon where there is no weapon to grasp; advancing against the enemy where there is no enemy.

2. There is no calamity greater than lightly engaging in war. To do that is near losing (the gentleness) which is so precious. Thus it is that when opposing weapons are (actually) crossed, he who deplores (the situation) conquers.

70. 1. My words are very easy to know, and very easy to practise; but there is no one in the world who is able to know and able to practise them.

2. There is an originating and all-comprehending (principle) in my words, and an authoritative law for the things (which I enforce). It is because they do not know these, that men do not know me.

3. They who know me are few, and I am on that account (the more) to be prized. It is thus that the

sage wears (a poor garb of) hair cloth, while he carries his (signet of) jade in his bosom.

71. 1. To know and yet (think) we do not know is the highest (attainment); not to know (and yet think) we do know is a disease.

2. It is simply by being pained at (the thought of) having this disease that we are preserved from it. The sage has not the disease. He knows the pain that would be inseparable from it, and therefore he does not have it.

72. 1. When the people do not fear what they ought to fear, that which is their great dread will come on them.

2. Let them not thoughtlessly indulge themselves in their ordinary life; let them not act as if weary of what that life depends on.

3. It is by avoiding such indulgence that such weariness does not arise.

4. Therefore the sage knows (these things) of himself, but does not parade (his knowledge); loves, but does not (appear to set a) value on, himself. And thus he puts the latter alternative away and makes choice of the former.

73. 1. He whose boldness appears in his daring (to do wrong, in defiance of the laws) is put to death; he whose boldness appears in his not daring (to do so) lives on. Of these two cases the one appears to be advantageous, and the other to be injurious. But

When Heaven's anger smites a man, Who the cause shall truly scan?

On this account the sage feels a difficulty (as to what to do in the former case).

2. It is the way of Heaven not to strive, and yet it skilfully overcomes; not to speak, and yet it is skilful in (obtaining a reply; does not call, and yet men come to it of themselves. Its demonstrations are quiet, and yet its plans are skilful and effective. The meshes of the net of Heaven are large; far apart, but letting nothing escape.

74. 1. The people do not fear death; to what purpose is it to (try to) frighten them with death? If the people were always in awe of death, and I could always seize those who do wrong, and put them to death, who would dare to do wrong?

2. There is always One who presides over the infliction death. He who would inflict death in the room of him who so presides over it may be described as hewing wood instead of a great carpenter. Seldom is it that he who undertakes the hewing, instead of the great carpenter, does not cut his own hands!

75. 1. The people suffer from famine because of the multitude of taxes consumed by their superiors. It is through this that they suffer famine.

2. The people are difficult to govern because of the (excessive) agency of their superiors (in governing them). It is through this that they are difficult to govern.

3. The people make light of dying because of the greatness of their labours in seeking for the means of living. It is this which makes them think light of dying. Thus it is that to leave the subject of living altogether out of view is better than to set a high value on it.

76. 1. Man at his birth is supple and weak; at his death, firm and strong. (So it is with) all things. Trees and plants, in their early growth, are soft and brittle; at their death, dry and withered.

2. Thus it is that firmness and strength are the concomitants of death; softness and weakness, the concomitants of life.

3. Hence he who (relies on) the strength of his forces does not conquer; and a tree which is strong will fill the out-stretched arms, (and thereby invites the feller.)

4. Therefore the place of what is firm and strong is below, and that of what is soft and weak is above.

77. 1. May not the Way (or Tao) of Heaven be compared to the (method of) bending a bow? The (part of the bow) which was high is brought low, and what was low is raised up. (So Heaven) diminishes where there is superabundance, and supplements where there is deficiency.

2. It is the Way of Heaven to diminish superabundance, and to supplement deficiency. It is not so with the way of man. He takes away from those who have not enough to add to his own superabundance.

3. Who can take his own superabundance and therewith serve all under heaven? Only he who is in possession of the Tao!

4. Therefore the (ruling) sage acts without claiming the results as his; he achieves his merit and does not rest (arrogantly) in it: -- he does not wish to display his superiority.

78. 1. There is nothing in the world more soft and weak than water, and yet for attacking things that are firm and strong there is nothing that can take precedence of it; -- for there is nothing (so effectual) for which it can be changed.

2. Every one in the world knows that the soft overcomes the hard, and the weak the strong, but no one is able to carry it out in practice.

3. Therefore a sage has said, 'He who accepts his state's reproach, Is hailed therefore its altars' lord; To him who bears men's direful woes They all the name of King accord.'

4. Words that are strictly true seem to be paradoxical.

79. 1. When a reconciliation is effected (between two parties) after a great animosity, there is sure to be a grudge remaining (in the mind of the one who was wrong). And how can this be beneficial (to the other)?

2. Therefore (to guard against this), the sage keeps the left-hand portion of the record of the engagement, and does not insist on the (speedy) fulfilment of it by the other party. (So), he who has the attributes (of the Tao) regards (only) the conditions of the engagement, while he who has not those attributes regards only the conditions favourable to himself.

3. In the Way of Heaven, there is no partiality of love; it is always on the side of the good man.

80. 1. In a little state with a small population, I would so order it, that, though there were individuals with the abilities of ten or a hundred men, there should be no employment of them; I would make the people, while looking on death as a grievous thing, yet not remove elsewhere (to avoid it).

2. Though they had boats and carriages, they should have no occasion to ride in them; though they had buff coats and sharp weapons, they should have no occasion to don or use them.

3. I would make the people return to the use of knotted cords (instead of the written characters).

4. They should think their (coarse) food sweet; their (plain) clothes beautiful; their (poor) dwellings places of rest; and their common (simple) ways sources of enjoyment.

5. There should be a neighbouring state within sight, and the voices of the fowls and dogs should be heard all the way from it to us, but I would make the people to old age, even to death, not have any

intercourse with it.

81. 1. Sincere words are not fine; fine words are not sincere. Those who are skilled (in the Tao) do not dispute (about it); the disputatious are not skilled in it. Those who know (the Tao) are not extensively learned; the extensively learned do not know it.

2. The sage does not accumulate (for himself). The more that he expends for others, the more does he possess of his own; the more that he gives to others, the more does he have himself.

3. With all the sharpness of the Way of Heaven, it injures not; with all the doing in the way of the sage he does not strive.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Tao Te Ching
Lao-Tsu

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PART 1.

Ch. 1. 1. The Tao that can be trodden is not the enduring and unchanging Tao. The name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name.

2. (Conceived of as) having no name, it is the Originator of heaven and earth; (conceived of as) having a name, it is the Mother of all things.

3. Always without desire we must be found, If its deep mystery we would sound; But if desire always within us be, Its outer fringe is all that we shall see.

4. Under these two aspects, it is really the same; but as development takes place, it receives the different names. Together we call them the Mystery. Where the Mystery is the deepest is the gate of all that is subtle and wonderful.

2. 1. All in the world know the beauty of the beautiful, and in doing this they have (the idea of) what ugliness is; they all know the skill of the skilful, and in doing this they have (the idea of) what the want of skill is.

2. So it is that existence and non-existence give birth the one to (the idea of) the other; that difficulty and ease produce the one (the idea of) the other; that length and shortness fashion out the one the figure of the other; that (the ideas of) height and lowness arise from the contrast of the one with the other; that the musical notes and tones become harmonious through the relation of one with another; and that being before and behind give the idea of one following another.

3. Therefore the sage manages affairs without doing anything, and conveys his instructions without the use of speech.

4. All things spring up, and there is not one which declines to show itself; they grow, and there is no claim made for their ownership; they go through their processes, and there is no expectation (of a reward for the results). The work is accomplished, and there is no resting in it (as an achievement).

The work is done, but how no one can see; 'Tis this that makes the power not cease to be.

3. 1. Not to value and employ men of superior ability is the way to keep the people from rivalry among themselves; not to prize articles which are difficult to procure is the way to keep them from becoming thieves; not to show them what is likely to excite their desires is the way to keep their minds from disorder.

2. Therefore the sage, in the exercise of his government, empties their minds, fills their bellies, weakens their wills, and strengthens their bones.

3. He constantly (tries to) keep them without knowledge and without desire, and where there are those who have knowledge, to keep them from presuming to act (on it). When there is this abstinence from action, good order is universal.

4. 1. The Tao is (like) the emptiness of a vessel; and in our employment of it we must be on our guard against all fulness. How deep and unfathomable it is, as if it were the Honoured Ancestor of all things!

2. We should blunt our sharp points, and unravel the complications of things; we should attemper our brightness, and bring ourselves into agreement with the obscurity of others. How pure and still the Tao is, as if it would ever so continue!

3. I do not know whose son it is. It might appear to have been before God.

5. 1. Heaven and earth do not act from (the impulse of) any wish to be benevolent; they deal with all things as the dogs of grass are dealt with. The sages do not act from (any wish to be) benevolent; they deal with the people as the dogs of grass are dealt with.

2. May not the space between heaven and earth be compared to a bellows?

'Tis emptied, yet it loses not its power; 'Tis moved again, and sends forth air the more. Much speech to swift exhaustion lead we see; Your inner being guard, and keep it free.

6. The valley spirit dies not, aye the same; The female mystery thus do we name. Its gate, from which at first they issued forth, Is called the root from which grew heaven and earth. Long and unbroken does its power remain, Used gently, and without the touch of pain.

7. 1. Heaven is long-enduring and earth continues long. The reason why heaven and earth are able to endure and continue thus long is because they do not live of, or for, themselves. This is how they are able to continue and endure.

2. Therefore the sage puts his own person last, and yet it is found in the foremost place; he treats his person as if it were foreign to him, and yet that person is preserved. Is it not because he has no personal and private ends, that

therefore such ends are realised?

8. 1. The highest excellence is like (that of) water. The excellence of water appears in its benefiting all things, and in its occupying, without striving (to the contrary), the low place which all men dislike. Hence (its way) is near to (that of) the Tao.

2. The excellence of a residence is in (the suitability of) the place; that of the mind is in abysmal stillness; that of associations is in their being with the virtuous; that of government is in its securing good order; that of (the conduct of) affairs is in its ability; and that of (the initiation of) any movement is in its timeliness.

3. And when (one with the highest excellence) does not wrangle (about his low position), no one finds fault with him.

9. 1. It is better to leave a vessel unfilled, than to attempt to carry it when it is full. If you keep feeling a point that has been sharpened, the point cannot long preserve its sharpness.

2. When gold and jade fill the hall, their possessor cannot keep them safe. When wealth and honours lead to arrogancy, this brings its evil on itself. When the work is done, and one's name is becoming distinguished, to withdraw into obscurity is the way of Heaven.

10. 1. When the intelligent and animal souls are held together in one embrace, they can be kept from separating. When one gives undivided attention to the (vital) breath, and brings it to the utmost degree of pliancy, he can become as a (tender) babe. When he has cleansed away the most mysterious sights (of his imagination), he can become without a flaw.

2. In loving the people and ruling the state, cannot he proceed without any (purpose of) action? In the opening and shutting of his gates of heaven, cannot he do so as a female bird? While his intelligence reaches in every direction, cannot he (appear to) be without knowledge?

3. (The Tao) produces (all things) and nourishes them; it produces them and does not claim them as its own; it does all, and yet does not boast of it; it presides over all, and yet does not control them. This is what is called 'The mysterious Quality' (of the Tao).

11. The thirty spokes unite in the one nave; but it is on the empty space (for the axle), that the use of the wheel depends. Clay is fashioned into vessels; but it is on their empty hollowness, that their use depends. The door and windows are cut out (from the walls) to form an apartment; but it is on the empty space (within), that its use depends. Therefore, what has a (positive) existence serves for profitable adaptation, and what has not that for (actual) usefulness.

12. 1. Colour's five hues from th' eyes their sight

will take; Music's five notes the ears as deaf can make; The flavours five deprive the mouth of taste; The chariot course, and the wild hunting waste Make mad the mind; and objects rare and strange, Sought for, men's conduct will to evil change.

2. Therefore the sage seeks to satisfy (the craving of) the belly, and not the (insatiable longing of the) eyes. He puts from him the latter, and prefers to seek the former.

13. 1. Favour and disgrace would seem equally to be feared; honour and great calamity, to be regarded as personal conditions (of the same kind).

2. What is meant by speaking thus of favour and disgrace? Disgrace is being in a low position (after the enjoyment of favour). The getting that (favour) leads to the apprehension (of losing it), and the losing it leads to the fear of (still greater calamity): -- this is what is meant by saying that favour and disgrace would seem equally to be feared.

And what is meant by saying that honour and great calamity are to be (similarly) regarded as personal conditions? What makes me liable to great calamity is my having the body (which I call myself); if I had not the body, what great calamity could come to me?

3. Therefore he who would administer the kingdom, honouring it as he honours his own person, may be employed to govern it, and he who would administer it with the love which he bears to his own person may be entrusted with it.

14. 1. We look at it, and we do not see it, and we name it 'the Equable.' We listen to it, and we do not hear it, and we name it 'the Inaudible.' We try to grasp it, and do not get hold of it, and we name it 'the Subtle.' With these three qualities, it cannot be made the subject of description; and hence we blend them together and obtain The One.

2. Its upper part is not bright, and its lower part is not obscure. Ceaseless in its action, it yet cannot be named, and then it again returns and becomes nothing. This is called the Form of the Formless, and the Semblance of the Invisible; this is called the Fleeting and Indeterminable.

3. We meet it and do not see its Front; we follow it, and do not see its Back. When we can lay hold of the Tao of old to direct the things of the present day, and are able to know it as it was of old in the beginning, this is called (unwinding) the clue of Tao.

15. 1. The skilful masters (of the Tao) in old times, with a subtle and exquisite penetration, comprehended its mysteries, and were deep (also) so as to elude men's knowledge. As they were thus beyond men's knowledge, I will make an effort to describe of what sort they appeared to be.

2. Shrinking looked they like those who wade through a stream in winter; irresolute like those who are afraid of

all around them; grave like a guest (in awe of his host); evanescent like ice that is melting away; unpretentious like wood that has not been fashioned into anything; vacant like a valley, and dull like muddy water.

3. Who can (make) the muddy water (clear)? Let it be still, and it will gradually become clear. Who can secure the condition of rest? Let movement go on, and the condition of rest will gradually arise.

4. They who preserve this method of the Tao do not wish to be full (of themselves). It is through their not being full of themselves that they can afford to seem worn and not appear new and complete.

16. 1. The (state of) vacancy should be brought to the utmost degree, and that of stillness guarded with unwearying vigour. All things alike go through their processes of activity, and (then) we see them return (to their original state). When things (in the vegetable world) have displayed their luxuriant growth, we see each of them return to its root. This returning to their root is what we call the state of stillness; and that stillness may be called a reporting that they have fulfilled their appointed end.

2. The report of that fulfilment is the regular, unchanging rule. To know that unchanging rule is to be intelligent; not to know it leads to wild movements and evil issues. The knowledge of that unchanging rule produces a (grand) capacity and forbearance, and that capacity and forbearance lead to a community (of feeling with all things). From this community of feeling comes a kingliness of character; and he who is king-like goes on to be heaven-like. In that likeness to heaven he possesses the Tao. Possessed of the Tao, he endures long; and to the end of his bodily life, is exempt from all danger of decay.

17. 1. In the highest antiquity, (the people) did not know that there were (their rulers). In the next age they loved them and praised them. In the next they feared them; in the next they despised them. Thus it was that when faith (in the Tao) was deficient (in the rulers) a want of faith in them ensued (in the people).

2. How irresolute did those (earliest rulers) appear, showing (by their reticence) the importance which they set upon their words! Their work was done and their undertakings were successful, while the people all said, 'We are as we are, of ourselves!'

18. 1. When the Great Tao (Way or Method) ceased to be observed, benevolence and righteousness came into vogue. (Then) appeared wisdom and shrewdness, and there ensued great hypocrisy.

2. When harmony no longer prevailed throughout the six kinships, filial sons found their manifestation; when the states and clans fell into disorder, loyal ministers appeared.

19. 1. If we could renounce our sageness and discard

our wisdom, it would be better for the people a hundredfold. If we could renounce our benevolence and discard our righteousness, the people would again become filial and kindly. If we could renounce our artful contrivances and discard our (scheming for) gain, there would be no thieves nor robbers.

2. Those three methods (of government) Thought olden ways in elegance did fail And made these names their want of worth to veil; But simple views, and courses plain and true Would selfish ends and many lusts eschew.

20. 1. When we renounce learning we have no troubles. The (ready) 'yes,' and (flattering) 'yea;' -- Small is the difference they display. But mark their issues, good and ill; -- What space the gulf between shall fill?

What all men fear is indeed to be feared; but how wide and without end is the range of questions (asking to be discussed)!

2. The multitude of men look satisfied and pleased; as if enjoying a full banquet, as if mounted on a tower in spring. I alone seem listless and still, my desires having as yet given no indication of their presence. I am like an infant which has not yet smiled. I look dejected and forlorn, as if I had no home to go to. The multitude of men all have enough and to spare. I alone seem to have lost everything. My mind is that of a stupid man; I am in a state of chaos.

Ordinary men look bright and intelligent, while I alone seem to be benighted. They look full of discrimination, while I alone am dull and confused. I seem to be carried about as on the sea, drifting as if I had nowhere to rest. All men have their spheres of action, while I alone seem dull and incapable, like a rude borderer. (Thus) I alone am different from other men, but I value the nursing-mother (the Tao).

21. The grandest forms of active force From Tao come, their only source. Who can of Tao the nature tell? Our sight it flies, our touch as well. Eluding sight, eluding touch, The forms of things all in it crouch; Eluding touch, eluding sight, There are their semblances, all right. Profound it is, dark and obscure; Things' essences all there endure. Those essences the truth enfold Of what, when seen, shall then be told. Now it is so; 'twas so of old. Its name -- what passes not away; So, in their beautiful array, Things form and never know decay.

How know I that it is so with all the beauties of existing things? By this (nature of the Tao).

22. 1. The partial becomes complete; the crooked, straight; the empty, full; the worn out, new. He whose (desires) are few gets them; he whose (desires) are many goes astray.

2. Therefore the sage holds in his embrace the one thing (of humility), and manifests it to all the world. He

is free from self- display, and therefore he shines; from self-assertion, and therefore he is distinguished; from self-boasting, and therefore his merit is acknowledged; from self-complacency, and therefore he acquires superiority. It is because he is thus free from striving that therefore no one in the world is able to strive with him.

3. That saying of the ancients that 'the partial becomes complete' was not vainly spoken: -- all real completion is comprehended under it.

23. 1. Abstaining from speech marks him who is obeying the spontaneity of his nature. A violent wind does not last for a whole morning; a sudden rain does not last for the whole day. To whom is it that these (two) things are owing? To Heaven and Earth. If Heaven and Earth cannot make such (spasmodic) actings last long, how much less can man!

2. Therefore when one is making the Tao his business, those who are also pursuing it, agree with him in it, and those who are making the manifestation of its course their object agree with him in that; while even those who are failing in both these things agree with him where they fail.

3. Hence, those with whom he agrees as to the Tao have the happiness of attaining to it; those with whom he agrees as to its manifestation have the happiness of attaining to it; and those with whom he agrees in their failure have also the happiness of attaining (to the Tao). (But) when there is not faith sufficient (on his part), a want of faith (in him) ensues (on the part of the others).

24. He who stands on his tiptoes does not stand firm; he who stretches his legs does not walk (easily). (So), he who displays himself does not shine; he who asserts his own views is not distinguished; he who vaunts himself does not find his merit acknowledged; he who is self- conceited has no superiority allowed to him. Such conditions, viewed from the standpoint of the Tao, are like remnants of food, or a tumour on the body, which all dislike. Hence those who pursue (the course) of the Tao do not adopt and allow them.

25. 1. There was something undefined and complete, coming into existence before Heaven and Earth. How still it was and formless, standing alone, and undergoing no change, reaching everywhere and in no danger (of being exhausted)! It may be regarded as the Mother of all things.

2. I do not know its name, and I give it the designation of the Tao (the Way or Course). Making an effort (further) to give it a name I call it The Great.

3. Great, it passes on (in constant flow). Passing on, it becomes remote. Having become remote, it returns. Therefore the Tao is great; Heaven is great; Earth is great; and the (sage) king is also great. In the universe there are four that are great, and the (sage) king is one of them.

4. Man takes his law from the Earth; the Earth takes its law from Heaven; Heaven takes its law from the Tao. The law of the Tao is its being what it is.

26. 1. Gravity is the root of lightness; stillness, the ruler of movement.

2. Therefore a wise prince, marching the whole day, does not go far from his baggage waggons. Although he may have brilliant prospects to look at, he quietly remains (in his proper place), indifferent to them. How should the lord of a myriad chariots carry himself lightly before the kingdom? If he do act lightly, he has lost his root (of gravity); if he proceed to active movement, he will lose his throne.

27. 1. The skilful traveller leaves no traces of his wheels or footsteps; the skilful speaker says nothing that can be found fault with or blamed; the skilful reckoner uses no tallies; the skilful closer needs no bolts or bars, while to open what he has shut will be impossible; the skilful binder uses no strings or knots, while to unloose what he has bound will be impossible. In the same way the sage is always skilful at saving men, and so he does not cast away any man; he is always skilful at saving things, and so he does not cast away anything. This is called 'Hiding the light of his procedure.'

2. Therefore the man of skill is a master (to be looked up to) by him who has not the skill; and he who has not the skill is the helper of (the reputation of) him who has the skill. If the one did not honour his master, and the other did not rejoice in his helper, an (observer), though intelligent, might greatly err about them. This is called 'The utmost degree of mystery.'

28. 1. Who knows his manhood's strength, Yet still his female feebleness maintains; As to one channel flow the many drains, All come to him, yea, all beneath the sky. Thus he the constant excellence retains; The simple child again, free from all stains.

Who knows how white attracts, Yet always keeps himself within black's shade, The pattern of humility displayed, Displayed in view of all beneath the sky; He in the unchanging excellence arrayed, Endless return to man's first state has made.

Who knows how glory shines, Yet loves disgrace, nor e'er for it is pale; Behold his presence in a spacious vale, To which men come from all beneath the sky. The unchanging excellence completes its tale; The simple infant man in him we hail.

2. The unwrought material, when divided and distributed, forms vessels. The sage, when employed, becomes the Head of all the Officers (of government); and in his greatest regulations he employs no violent measures.

29. 1. If any one should wish to get the kingdom for himself, and to effect this by what he does, I see that he will not succeed. The kingdom is a spirit-like thing, and cannot be got by active doing. He who would so win it destroys it; he who would hold it in his grasp loses it.

2. The course and nature of things is such that What was in front is now behind; What warmed anon we freezing find. Strength is of weakness oft the spoil; The store in ruins mocks our toil.

Hence the sage puts away excessive effort, extravagance, and easy indulgence.

30. 1. He who would assist a lord of men in harmony with the Tao will not assert his mastery in the kingdom by force of arms. Such a course is sure to meet with its proper return.

2. Wherever a host is stationed, briars and thorns spring up. In the sequence of great armies there are sure to be bad years.

3. A skilful (commander) strikes a decisive blow, and stops. He does not dare (by continuing his operations) to assert and complete his mastery. He will strike the blow, but will be on his guard against being vain or boastful or arrogant in consequence of it. He strikes it as a matter of necessity; he strikes it, but not from a wish for mastery.

4. When things have attained their strong maturity they become old. This may be said to be not in accordance with the Tao: and what is not in accordance with it soon comes to an end.

31. 1. Now arms, however beautiful, are instruments of evil omen, hateful, it may be said, to all creatures. Therefore they who have the Tao do not like to employ them.

2. The superior man ordinarily considers the left hand the most honourable place, but in time of war the right hand. Those sharp weapons are instruments of evil omen, and not the instruments of the superior man; -- he uses them only on the compulsion of necessity. Calm and repose are what he prizes; victory (by force of arms) is to him undesirable. To consider this desirable would be to delight in the slaughter of men; and he who delights in the slaughter of men cannot get his will in the kingdom.

3. On occasions of festivity to be on the left hand is the prized position; on occasions of mourning, the right hand. The second in command of the army has his place on the left; the general commanding in chief has his on the right; -- his place, that is, is assigned to him as in the rites of mourning. He who has killed multitudes of men should weep for them with the bitterest grief; and the victor in battle has his place (rightly) according to those rites.

32. 1. The Tao, considered as unchanging, has no name.

2. Though in its primordial simplicity it may be small, the whole world dares not deal with (one embodying) it as a minister. If a feudal prince or the king could guard and hold it, all would spontaneously submit themselves to him.

3. Heaven and Earth (under its guidance) unite together

and send down the sweet dew, which, without the directions of men, reaches equally everywhere as of its own accord.

4. As soon as it proceeds to action, it has a name. When it once has that name, (men) can know to rest in it. When they know to rest in it, they can be free from all risk of failure and error.

5. The relation of the Tao to all the world is like that of the great rivers and seas to the streams from the valleys.

33. 1. He who knows other men is discerning; he who knows himself is intelligent. He who overcomes others is strong; he who overcomes himself is mighty. He who is satisfied with his lot is rich; he who goes on acting with energy has a (firm) will.

2. He who does not fail in the requirements of his position, continues long; he who dies and yet does not perish, has longevity.

34. 1. All-pervading is the Great Tao! It may be found on the left hand and on the right.

2. All things depend on it for their production, which it gives to them, not one refusing obedience to it. When its work is accomplished, it does not claim the name of having done it. It clothes all things as with a garment, and makes no assumption of being their lord; -- it may be named in the smallest things. All things return (to their root and disappear), and do not know that it is it which presides over their doing so; -- it may be named in the greatest things.

3. Hence the sage is able (in the same way) to accomplish his great achievements. It is through his not making himself great that he can accomplish them.

35. 1. To him who holds in his hands the Great Image (of the invisible Tao), the whole world repairs. Men resort to him, and receive no hurt, but (find) rest, peace, and the feeling of ease.

2. Music and dainties will make the passing guest stop (for a time). But though the Tao as it comes from the mouth, seems insipid and has no flavour, though it seems not worth being looked at or listened to, the use of it is inexhaustible.

36. 1. When one is about to take an inspiration, he is sure to make a (previous) expiration; when he is going to weaken another, he will first strengthen him; when he is going to overthrow another, he will first have raised him up; when he is going to despoil another, he will first have made gifts to him: -- this is called 'Hiding the light (of his procedure).'

2. The soft overcomes the hard; and the weak the strong.

3. Fishes should not be taken from the deep; instruments for the profit of a state should not be shown to the people.

37. 1. The Tao in its regular course does nothing (for the sake of doing it), and so there is nothing which it does not do.

2. If princes and kings were able to maintain it, all things would of themselves be transformed by them.

3. If this transformation became to me an object of desire, I would express the desire by the nameless simplicity.

Simplicity without a name Is free from all external aim. With no desire, at rest and still, All things go right as of their will.

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Part II.

38. 1. (Those who) possessed in highest degree the attributes (of the Tao) did not (seek) to show them, and therefore they possessed them (in fullest measure). (Those who) possessed in a lower degree those attributes (sought how) not to lose them, and therefore they did not possess them (in fullest measure).

2. (Those who) possessed in the highest degree those attributes did nothing (with a purpose), and had no need to do anything. (Those who) possessed them in a lower degree were (always) doing, and had need to be so doing.

3. (Those who) possessed the highest benevolence were (always seeking) to carry it out, and had no need to be doing so. (Those who) possessed the highest righteousness were (always seeking) to carry it out, and had need to be so doing.

4. (Those who) possessed the highest (sense of) propriety were (always seeking) to show it, and when men did not respond to it, they bared the arm and marched up to them.

5. Thus it was that when the Tao was lost, its attributes appeared; when its attributes were lost, benevolence appeared; when benevolence was lost, righteousness appeared; and when righteousness was lost, the proprieties appeared.

6. Now propriety is the attenuated form of leal-heartedness and good faith, and is also the commencement of disorder; swift apprehension is (only) a flower of the Tao, and is the beginning of stupidity.

7. Thus it is that the Great man abides by what is solid, and eschews what is flimsy; dwells with the fruit and not with the flower. It is thus that he puts away the one and makes choice of the other.

39. 1. The things which from of old have got the One (the Tao) are --

Heaven which by it is bright and pure; Earth rendered thereby firm and sure; Spirits with powers by it supplied; Valleys kept full throughout their void All creatures which through it do live Princes and kings who from it get The model which to all they give.

All these are the results of the One (Tao).

2. If heaven were not thus pure, it soon would rend; If earth were not thus sure, 'twould break and bend; Without these powers, the spirits soon would fail; If not so filled, the drought would parch each vale; Without that life, creatures would pass away; Princes and kings, without that moral sway, However grand and high, would all decay.

3. Thus it is that dignity finds its (firm) root in its (previous) meanness, and what is lofty finds its stability in the lowness (from which it rises). Hence princes and kings call themselves 'Orphans,' 'Men of small virtue,' and as 'Carriages without a nave.' Is not this an acknowledgment that in their considering themselves mean they see the foundation of their dignity? So it is that in the enumeration of the different parts of a carriage we do not come on what makes it answer the ends of a carriage. They do not wish to show themselves elegant-looking as jade, but (prefer) to be coarse-looking as an (ordinary) stone.

40. 1. The movement of the Tao By contraries proceeds; And weakness marks the course Of Tao's mighty deeds.

2. All things under heaven sprang from It as existing (and named); that existence sprang from It as non-existent (and not named).

41. 1. Scholars of the highest class, when they hear about the Tao, earnestly carry it into practice. Scholars of the middle class, when they have heard about it, seem now to keep it and now to lose it. Scholars of the lowest class, when they have heard about it, laugh greatly at it. If it were not (thus) laughed at, it would not be fit to be the Tao.

2. Therefore the sentence-makers have thus expressed themselves: --

'The Tao, when brightest seen, seems light to lack; Who progress in it makes, seems drawing back; Its even way is like a rugged track. Its highest virtue from the vale doth rise; Its greatest beauty seems to offend the eyes; And he has most whose lot the least supplies. Its firmest virtue seems but poor and low; Its solid truth seems change to undergo; Its largest square doth yet no corner show A vessel great, it is the slowest made; Loud is its sound, but never word it said; A semblance great, the shadow of a shade.'

3. The Tao is hidden, and has no name; but it is the Tao which is skilful at imparting (to all things what they

need) and making them complete.

42. 1. The Tao produced One; One produced Two; Two produced Three; Three produced All things. All things leave behind them the Obscurity (out of which they have come), and go forward to embrace the Brightness (into which they have emerged), while they are harmonised by the Breath of Vacancy.

2. What men dislike is to be orphans, to have little virtue, to be as carriages without naves; and yet these are the designations which kings and princes use for themselves. So it is that some things are increased by being diminished, and others are diminished by being increased.

3. What other men (thus) teach, I also teach. The violent and strong do not die their natural death. I will make this the basis of my teaching.

43. 1. The softest thing in the world dashes against and overcomes the hardest; that which has no (substantial) existence enters where there is no crevice. I know hereby what advantage belongs to doing nothing (with a purpose).

2. There are few in the world who attain to the teaching without words, and the advantage arising from non-action.

44. 1. Or fame or life, Which do you hold more dear? Or life or wealth, To which would you adhere? Keep life and lose those other things; Keep them and lose your life: -- which brings Sorrow and pain more near?

2. Thus we may see, Who cleaves to fame Rejects what is more great; Who loves large stores Gives up the richer state.

3. Who is content Needs fear no shame. Who knows to stop Incurs no blame. From danger free Long live shall he.

45. 1. Who thinks his great achievements poor Shall find his vigour long endure. Of greatest fulness, deemed a void, Exhaustion ne'er shall stem the tide. Do thou what's straight still crooked deem; Thy greatest art still stupid seem, And eloquence a stammering scream.

2. Constant action overcomes cold; being still overcomes heat. Purity and stillness give the correct law to all under heaven.

46. 1. When the Tao prevails in the world, they send back their swift horses to (draw) the dung-carts. When the Tao is disregarded in the world, the war-horses breed in the border lands.

2. There is no guilt greater than to sanction ambition; no calamity greater than to be discontented with one's lot; no fault greater than the wish to be getting. Therefore the sufficiency of contentment is an enduring and unchanging sufficiency.

47. 1. Without going outside his door, one understands (all that takes place) under the sky; without looking out from his window, one sees the Tao of Heaven. The farther that one goes out (from himself), the less he knows.

2. Therefore the sages got their knowledge without travelling; gave their (right) names to things without seeing them; and accomplished their ends without any purpose of doing so.

48. 1. He who devotes himself to learning (seeks) from day to day to increase (his knowledge); he who devotes himself to the Tao (seeks) from day to day to diminish (his doing).

2. He diminishes it and again diminishes it, till he arrives at doing nothing (on purpose). Having arrived at this point of non-action, there is nothing which he does not do.

3. He who gets as his own all under heaven does so by giving himself no trouble (with that end). If one take trouble (with that end), he is not equal to getting as his own all under heaven.

49. 1. The sage has no invariable mind of his own; he makes the mind of the people his mind.

2. To those who are good (to me), I am good; and to those who are not good (to me), I am also good; -- and thus (all) get to be good. To those who are sincere (with me), I am sincere; and to those who are not sincere (with me), I am also sincere; -- and thus (all) get to be sincere.

3. The sage has in the world an appearance of indecision, and keeps his mind in a state of indifference to all. The people all keep their eyes and ears directed to him, and he deals with them all as his children.

50. 1. Men come forth and live; they enter (again) and die.

2. Of every ten three are ministers of life (to themselves); and three are ministers of death.

3. There are also three in every ten whose aim is to live, but whose movements tend to the land (or place) of death. And for what reason? Because of their excessive endeavours to perpetuate life.

4. But I have heard that he who is skilful in managing the life entrusted to him for a time travels on the land without having to shun rhinoceros or tiger, and enters a host without having to avoid buff coat or sharp weapon. The rhinoceros finds no place in him into which to thrust its horn, nor the tiger a place in which to fix its claws, nor the weapon a place to admit its point. And for what reason? Because there is in him no place of death.

51. 1. All things are produced by the Tao, and nourished by its outflowing operation. They receive their

forms according to the nature of each, and are completed according to the circumstances of their condition. Therefore all things without exception honour the Tao, and exalt its outflowing operation.

2. This honouring of the Tao and exalting of its operation is not the result of any ordination, but always a spontaneous tribute.

3. Thus it is that the Tao produces (all things), nourishes them, brings them to their full growth, nurses them, completes them, matures them, maintains them, and overspreads them.

4. It produces them and makes no claim to the possession of them; it carries them through their processes and does not vaunt its ability in doing so; it brings them to maturity and exercises no control over them; -- this is called its mysterious operation.

52. 1. (The Tao) which originated all under the sky is to be considered as the mother of them all.

2. When the mother is found, we know what her children should be. When one knows that he is his mother's child, and proceeds to guard (the qualities of) the mother that belong to him, to the end of his life he will be free from all peril.

3. Let him keep his mouth closed, and shut up the portals (of his nostrils), and all his life he will be exempt from laborious exertion. Let him keep his mouth open, and (spend his breath) in the promotion of his affairs, and all his life there will be no safety for him.

4. The perception of what is small is (the secret of clear- sightedness; the guarding of what is soft and tender is (the secret of) strength.

5. Who uses well his light, Reverting to its (source so) bright, Will from his body ward all blight, And hides the unchanging from men's sight.

53. 1. If I were suddenly to become known, and (put into a position to) conduct (a government) according to the Great Tao, what I should be most afraid of would be a boastful display.

2. The great Tao (or way) is very level and easy; but people love the by-ways.

3. Their court(-yards and buildings) shall be well kept, but their fields shall be ill-cultivated, and their granaries very empty. They shall wear elegant and ornamented robes, carry a sharp sword at their girdle, pamper themselves in eating and drinking, and have a superabundance of property and wealth; -- such (princes) may be called robbers and boasters. This is contrary to the Tao surely!

54. 1. What (Tao's) skilful planter plants Can never be uptorn; What his skilful arms enfold, From him can ne'er be

borne. Sons shall bring in lengthening line, Sacrifices to his shrine.

2. Tao when nursed within one's self, His vigour will make true; And where the family it rules What riches will accrue! The neighbourhood where it prevails In thriving will abound; And when 'tis seen throughout the state, Good fortune will be found. Employ it the kingdom o'er, And men thrive all around.

3. In this way the effect will be seen in the person, by the observation of different cases; in the family; in the neighbourhood; in the state; and in the kingdom.

4. How do I know that this effect is sure to hold thus all under the sky? By this (method of observation).

55. 1. He who has in himself abundantly the attributes (of the Tao) is like an infant. Poisonous insects will not sting him; fierce beasts will not seize him; birds of prey will not strike him.

2. (The infant's) bones are weak and its sinews soft, but yet its grasp is firm. It knows not yet the union of male and female, and yet its virile member may be excited; -- showing the perfection of its physical essence. All day long it will cry without its throat becoming hoarse; -- showing the harmony (in its constitution).

3. To him by whom this harmony is known, (The secret of) the unchanging (Tao) is shown, And in the knowledge wisdom finds its throne. All life-increasing arts to evil turn; Where the mind makes the vital breath to burn, (False) is the strength, (and o'er it we should mourn.)

4. When things have become strong, they (then) become old, which may be said to be contrary to the Tao. Whatever is contrary to the Tao soon ends.

56. 1. He who knows (the Tao) does not (care to) speak (about it); he who is (ever ready to) speak about it does not know it.

2. He (who knows it) will keep his mouth shut and close the portals (of his nostrils). He will blunt his sharp points and unravel the complications of things; he will attemper his brightness, and bring himself into agreement with the obscurity (of others). This is called 'the Mysterious Agreement.'

3. (Such an one) cannot be treated familiarly or distantly; he is beyond all consideration of profit or injury; of nobility or meanness: -- he is the noblest man under heaven.

57. 1. A state may be ruled by (measures of) correction; weapons of war may be used with crafty dexterity; (but) the kingdom is made one's own (only) by freedom from action and purpose.

2. How do I know that it is so? By these facts: -- In

the kingdom the multiplication of prohibitive enactments increases the poverty of the people; the more implements to add to their profit that the people have, the greater disorder is there in the state and clan; the more acts of crafty dexterity that men possess, the more do strange contrivances appear; the more display there is of legislation, the more thieves and robbers there are.

3. Therefore a sage has said, 'I will do nothing (of purpose), and the people will be transformed of themselves; I will be fond of keeping still, and the people will of themselves become correct. I will take no trouble about it, and the people will of themselves become rich; I will manifest no ambition, and the people will of themselves attain to the primitive simplicity.'

58. 1. The government that seems the most unwise, Oft goodness to the people best supplies; That which is meddling, touching everything, Will work but ill, and disappointment bring.

Misery! -- happiness is to be found by its side! Happiness! -- misery lurks beneath it! Who knows what either will come to in the end?

2. Shall we then dispense with correction? The (method of) correction shall by a turn become distortion, and the good in it shall by a turn become evil. The delusion of the people (on this point) has indeed subsisted for a long time.

3. Therefore the sage is (like) a square which cuts no one (with its angles); (like) a corner which injures no one (with its sharpness). He is straightforward, but allows himself no license; he is bright, but does not dazzle.

59. 1. For regulating the human (in our constitution) and rendering the (proper) service to the heavenly, there is nothing like moderation.

2. It is only by this moderation that there is effected an early return (to man's normal state). That early return is what I call the repeated accumulation of the attributes (of the Tao). With that repeated accumulation of those attributes, there comes the subjugation (of every obstacle to such return). Of this subjugation we know not what shall be the limit; and when one knows not what the limit shall be, he may be the ruler of a state.

3. He who possesses the mother of the state may continue long. His case is like that (of the plant) of which we say that its roots are deep and its flower stalks firm: -- this is the way to secure that its enduring life shall long be seen.

60. 1. Governing a great state is like cooking small fish.

2. Let the kingdom be governed according to the Tao, and the manes of the departed will not manifest their spiritual energy. It is not that those manes have not that spiritual energy, but it will not be employed to hurt men.

It is not that it could not hurt men, but neither does the ruling sage hurt them.

3. When these two do not injuriously affect each other, their good influences converge in the virtue (of the Tao).

61. 1. What makes a great state is its being (like) a low-lying, down- flowing (stream); -- it becomes the centre to which tend (all the small states) under heaven.

2. (To illustrate from) the case of all females: -- the female always overcomes the male by her stillness. Stillness may be considered (a sort of) abasement.

3. Thus it is that a great state, by condescending to small states, gains them for itself; and that small states, by abasing themselves to a great state, win it over to them. In the one case the abasement leads to gaining adherents, in the other case to procuring favour.

4. The great state only wishes to unite men together and nourish them; a small state only wishes to be received by, and to serve, the other. Each gets what it desires, but the great state must learn to abase itself.

62. 1. Tao has of all things the most honoured place. No treasures give good men so rich a grace; Bad men it guards, and doth their ill efface.

2. (Its) admirable words can purchase honour; (its) admirable deeds can raise their performer above others. Even men who are not good are not abandoned by it.

3. Therefore when the sovereign occupies his place as the Son of Heaven, and he has appointed his three ducal ministers, though (a prince) were to send in a round symbol-of-rank large enough to fill both the hands, and that as the precursor of the team of horses (in the court-yard), such an offering would not be equal to (a lesson of) this Tao, which one might present on his knees.

4. Why was it that the ancients prized this Tao so much? Was it not because it could be got by seeking for it, and the guilty could escape (from the stain of their guilt) by it? This is the reason why all under heaven consider it the most valuable thing.

63. 1. (It is the way of the Tao) to act without (thinking of) acting; to conduct affairs without (feeling the) trouble of them; to taste without discerning any flavour; to consider what is small as great, and a few as many; and to recompense injury with kindness.

2. (The master of it) anticipates things that are difficult while they are easy, and does things that would become great while they are small. All difficult things in the world are sure to arise from a previous state in which they were easy, and all great things from one in which they were small. Therefore the sage, while he never does what is great, is able on that account to accomplish the greatest things.

3. He who lightly promises is sure to keep but little faith; he who is continually thinking things easy is sure to find them difficult. Therefore the sage sees difficulty even in what seems easy, and so never has any difficulties.

64. 1. That which is at rest is easily kept hold of; before a thing has given indications of its presence, it is easy to take measures against it; that which is brittle is easily broken; that which is very small is easily dispersed. Action should be taken before a thing has made its appearance; order should be secured before disorder has begun.

2. The tree which fills the arms grew from the tiniest sprout; the tower of nine storeys rose from a (small) heap of earth; the journey of a thousand li commenced with a single step.

3. He who acts (with an ulterior purpose) does harm; he who takes hold of a thing (in the same way) loses his hold. The sage does not act (so), and therefore does no harm; he does not lay hold (so), and therefore does not lose his bold. (But) people in their conduct of affairs are constantly ruining them when they are on the eve of success. If they were careful at the end, as (they should be) at the beginning, they would not so ruin them.

4. Therefore the sage desires what (other men) do not desire, and does not prize things difficult to get; he learns what (other men) do not learn, and turns back to what the multitude of men have passed by. Thus he helps the natural development of all things, and does not dare to act (with an ulterior purpose of his own).

65. 1. The ancients who showed their skill in practising the Tao did so, not to enlighten the people, but rather to make them simple and ignorant.

2. The difficulty in governing the people arises from their having much knowledge. He who (tries to) govern a state by his wisdom is a scourge to it; while he who does not (try to) do so is a blessing.

3. He who knows these two things finds in them also his model and rule. Ability to know this model and rule constitutes what we call the mysterious excellence (of a governor). Deep and far-reaching is such mysterious excellence, showing indeed its possessor as opposite to others, but leading them to a great conformity to him.

66. 1. That whereby the rivers and seas are able to receive the homage and tribute of all the valley streams, is their skill in being lower than they; -- it is thus that they are the kings of them all. So it is that the sage (ruler), wishing to be above men, puts himself by his words below them, and, wishing to be before them, places his person behind them.

2. In this way though he has his place above them, men do not feel his weight, nor though he has his place before

them, do they feel it an injury to them.

3. Therefore all in the world delight to exalt him and do not weary of him. Because he does not strive, no one finds it possible to strive with him.

67. 1. All the world says that, while my Tao is great, it yet appears to be inferior (to other systems of teaching). Now it is just its greatness that makes it seem to be inferior. If it were like any other (system), for long would its smallness have been known!

2. But I have three precious things which I prize and hold fast. The first is gentleness; the second is economy; and the third is shrinking from taking precedence of others.

3. With that gentleness I can be bold; with that economy I can be liberal; shrinking from taking precedence of others, I can become a vessel of the highest honour. Now-a-days they give up gentleness and are all for being bold; economy, and are all for being liberal; the hindmost place, and seek only to be foremost; -- (of all which the end is) death.

4. Gentleness is sure to be victorious even in battle, and firmly to maintain its ground. Heaven will save its possessor, by his (very) gentleness protecting him.

68. He who in (Tao's) wars has skill Assumes no martial port; He who fights with most good will To rage makes no resort. He who vanquishes yet still Keeps from his foes apart; He whose hests men most fulfil Yet humbly plies his art.

Thus we say, 'He ne'er contends, And therein is his might.' Thus we say, 'Men's wills he bends, That they with him unite.' Thus we say, 'Like Heaven's his ends, No sage of old more bright.'

69. 1. A master of the art of war has said, 'I do not dare to be the host (to commence the war); I prefer to be the guest (to act on the defensive). I do not dare to advance an inch; I prefer to retire a foot.' This is called marshalling the ranks where there are no ranks; baring the arms (to fight) where there are no arms to bare; grasping the weapon where there is no weapon to grasp; advancing against the enemy where there is no enemy.

2. There is no calamity greater than lightly engaging in war. To do that is near losing (the gentleness) which is so precious. Thus it is that when opposing weapons are (actually) crossed, he who deplores (the situation) conquers.

70. 1. My words are very easy to know, and very easy to practise; but there is no one in the world who is able to know and able to practise them.

2. There is an originating and all-comprehending (principle) in my words, and an authoritative law for the things (which I enforce). It is because they do not know

these, that men do not know me.

3. They who know me are few, and I am on that account (the more) to be prized. It is thus that the sage wears (a poor garb of) hair cloth, while he carries his (signet of) jade in his bosom.

71. 1. To know and yet (think) we do not know is the highest (attainment); not to know (and yet think) we do know is a disease.

2. It is simply by being pained at (the thought of) having this disease that we are preserved from it. The sage has not the disease. He knows the pain that would be inseparable from it, and therefore he does not have it.

72. 1. When the people do not fear what they ought to fear, that which is their great dread will come on them.

2. Let them not thoughtlessly indulge themselves in their ordinary life; let them not act as if weary of what that life depends on.

3. It is by avoiding such indulgence that such weariness does not arise.

4. Therefore the sage knows (these things) of himself, but does not parade (his knowledge); loves, but does not (appear to set a) value on, himself. And thus he puts the latter alternative away and makes choice of the former.

73. 1. He whose boldness appears in his daring (to do wrong, in defiance of the laws) is put to death; he whose boldness appears in his not daring (to do so) lives on. Of these two cases the one appears to be advantageous, and the other to be injurious. But

When Heaven's anger smites a man, Who the cause shall truly scan?

On this account the sage feels a difficulty (as to what to do in the former case).

2. It is the way of Heaven not to strive, and yet it skilfully overcomes; not to speak, and yet it is skilful in (obtaining a reply; does not call, and yet men come to it of themselves. Its demonstrations are quiet, and yet its plans are skilful and effective. The meshes of the net of Heaven are large; far apart, but letting nothing escape.

74. 1. The people do not fear death; to what purpose is it to (try to) frighten them with death? If the people were always in awe of death, and I could always seize those who do wrong, and put them to death, who would dare to do wrong?

2. There is always One who presides over the infliction death. He who would inflict death in the room of him who so presides over it may be described as hewing wood instead of a great carpenter. Seldom is it that he who undertakes the hewing, instead of the great carpenter, does not cut his own hands!

75. 1. The people suffer from famine because of the multitude of taxes consumed by their superiors. It is through this that they suffer famine.

2. The people are difficult to govern because of the (excessive) agency of their superiors (in governing them). It is through this that they are difficult to govern.

3. The people make light of dying because of the greatness of their labours in seeking for the means of living. It is this which makes them think light of dying. Thus it is that to leave the subject of living altogether out of view is better than to set a high value on it.

76. 1. Man at his birth is supple and weak; at his death, firm and strong. (So it is with) all things. Trees and plants, in their early growth, are soft and brittle; at their death, dry and withered.

2. Thus it is that firmness and strength are the concomitants of death; softness and weakness, the concomitants of life.

3. Hence he who (relies on) the strength of his forces does not conquer; and a tree which is strong will fill the out-stretched arms, (and thereby invites the feller.)

4. Therefore the place of what is firm and strong is below, and that of what is soft and weak is above.

77. 1. May not the Way (or Tao) of Heaven be compared to the (method of) bending a bow? The (part of the bow) which was high is brought low, and what was low is raised up. (So Heaven) diminishes where there is superabundance, and supplements where there is deficiency.

2. It is the Way of Heaven to diminish superabundance, and to supplement deficiency. It is not so with the way of man. He takes away from those who have not enough to add to his own superabundance.

3. Who can take his own superabundance and therewith serve all under heaven? Only he who is in possession of the Tao!

4. Therefore the (ruling) sage acts without claiming the results as his; he achieves his merit and does not rest (arrogantly) in it: -- he does not wish to display his superiority.

78. 1. There is nothing in the world more soft and weak than water, and yet for attacking things that are firm and strong there is nothing that can take precedence of it; -- for there is nothing (so effectual) for which it can be changed.

2. Every one in the world knows that the soft overcomes the hard, and the weak the strong, but no one is able to carry it out in practice.

3. Therefore a sage has said, 'He who accepts his state's reproach, Is hailed therefore its altars' lord; To him who bears men's direful woes They all the name of King accord.'

4. Words that are strictly true seem to be paradoxical.

79. 1. When a reconciliation is effected (between two parties) after a great animosity, there is sure to be a grudge remaining (in the mind of the one who was wrong). And how can this be beneficial (to the other)?

2. Therefore (to guard against this), the sage keeps the left-hand portion of the record of the engagement, and does not insist on the (speedy) fulfilment of it by the other party. (So), he who has the attributes (of the Tao) regards (only) the conditions of the engagement, while he who has not those attributes regards only the conditions favourable to himself.

3. In the Way of Heaven, there is no partiality of love; it is always on the side of the good man.

80. 1. In a little state with a small population, I would so order it, that, though there were individuals with the abilities of ten or a hundred men, there should be no employment of them; I would make the people, while looking on death as a grievous thing, yet not remove elsewhere (to avoid it).

2. Though they had boats and carriages, they should have no occasion to ride in them; though they had buff coats and sharp weapons, they should have no occasion to don or use them.

3. I would make the people return to the use of knotted cords (instead of the written characters).

4. They should think their (coarse) food sweet; their (plain) clothes beautiful; their (poor) dwellings places of rest; and their common (simple) ways sources of enjoyment.

5. There should be a neighbouring state within sight, and the voices of the fowls and dogs should be heard all the way from it to us, but I would make the people to old age, even to death, not have any intercourse with it.

81. 1. Sincere words are not fine; fine words are not sincere. Those who are skilled (in the Tao) do not dispute (about it); the disputatious are not skilled in it. Those who know (the Tao) are not extensively learned; the extensively learned do not know it.

2. The sage does not accumulate (for himself). The more that he expends for others, the more does he possess of his own; the more that he gives to others, the more does he have himself.

3. With all the sharpness of the Way of Heaven, it injures not; with all the doing in the way of the sage he does not strive.

- ETHICS
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The Republic

Plato

Book I: Of Wealth, Justice, Moderation, And Their Opposites

Persons of the Dialogue

Socrates, who is the narrator. Cephalus. Glacon. Thrasymachus. Adeimantus. Cleitophon. Polemarchus.

And others who are mute auditors.

The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to Timaeus Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are introduced in the Timaeus.

I WENT down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess; and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and said, Polemarchus desires you to wait.

I turned round, and asked him where his master was.

There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait.

Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.

Polemarchus said to me, I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion are already on your way to the city.

You are not far wrong, I said.

But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?

Of course.

And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain where you are.

May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let us go?

But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.

Certainly not, replied Glaucon.

Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.

Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torchrace on horseback in honor of the goddess which will take place in the evening?

With horses! I replied. That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?

Yes, said Polemarchus; and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.

Glaucon said, I suppose, since you insist, that we must.

Very good, I replied.

Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon, the son of Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus, the father of Polemarchus, whom I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me eagerly, and then he said:

You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the Piraeus. For, let me tell you that the more the pleasures of the body fade away, the greater to me are the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not, then, deny my request, but make our house your resort and keep company with these young men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us.

I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, than conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who have gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to inquire whether the way is smooth and easy or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you, who have arrived at that time which the poets call the "threshold of old age": Is life harder toward the end, or what report do you give of it?

I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is: I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away; there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too, being old, and every other old man would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles -- are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says,

we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.

I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on -- Yes, Cephalus, I said; but I rather suspect that people in general are not convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.

You are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is something in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian: "If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would have been famous." And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made; for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself.

May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you?

Acquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: for my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now; but my father, Lysanias, reduced the property below what it is at present; and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less, but a little more, than I received.

That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth. That is true, he said.

Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question? -- What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth?

One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of these things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age:

"Hope," he says, "cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey -- hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man."

How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.

Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it? -- to speak the truth and to pay your debts -- no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.

You are quite right, he replied.

But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice.

Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus, interposing.

I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.

Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said.

To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.

Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you, truly say, about justice?

He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right.

I shall be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt.

True.

Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return?

Certainly not.

When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean to include that case?

Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend, and never evil.

You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt -- that is what you would imagine him to say?

Yes.

And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?

To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them; and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him -- that is to say, evil.

Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt.

That must have been his meaning, he said.

By heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?

He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies.

And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?

Seasoning to food.

And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?

If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies.

That is his meaning, then?

I think so.

And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?

The physician.

Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?

The pilot.

And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?

In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.

But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician?

No.

And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?

No.

Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?

I am very far from thinking so.

You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?

Yes.

Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?

Yes.

Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes -- that is what you mean?

Yes.

And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?

In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.

And by contracts you mean partnerships?

Exactly.

But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts?

The skilful player.

And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the

builder?

Quite the reverse.

Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harpplayer, as in playing the harp the harpplayer is certainly a better partner than the just man?

In a money partnership.

Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?

Certainly.

And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better?

True.

Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred?

When you want a deposit to be kept safely.

You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?

Precisely.

That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?

That is the inference.

And when you want to keep a pruninghook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the State; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vinedresser?

Clearly.

And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician?

Certainly.

And so of all other things -- justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful?

That is the inference.

Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?

Certainly.

And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best able to create one?

True.

And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy?

Certainly.

Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?

That, I suppose, is to be inferred.

Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.

That is implied in the argument.

Then after all, the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you

must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favorite of his, affirms that

"He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury."

And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of theft; to be practised, however, "for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies" -- that was what you were saying?

No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still stand by the latter words.

Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming?

Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil.

Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely?

That is true.

Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends? True.

And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?

Clearly.

But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

True.

Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?

Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.

Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?

I like that better.

But see the consequence: Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

Very true, he said; and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words "friend" and "enemy."

What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.

We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.

And how is the error to be corrected?

We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.

You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

Yes.

And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good, and harm to our enemies when they are evil?

Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.

But ought the just to injure anyone at all?

Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.

When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?

The latter.

Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

Yes, of horses.

And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?

Of course.

And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?

Certainly.

And that human virtue is justice?

To be sure.

Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

That is the result.

But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

Certainly not.

Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

Impossible.

And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad?

Assuredly not.

Any more than heat can produce cold?

It cannot.

Or drought moisture?

Clearly not.

Nor can the good harm anyone?

Impossible.

And the just is the good?

Certainly.

Then to injure a friend or anyone else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?

I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.

Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies -- to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.

I agree with you, said Polemarchus.

Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against anyone who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer?

I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.

Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?

Whose?

I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is "doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies."

Most true, he said.

Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?

Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panicstricken at the sight of him.

He roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honor to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy.

I was panicstricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him.

Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were "knocking under to one another," and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.

How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh; that's your ironical style! Did I not foresee -- have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?

You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, "for this sort of nonsense will not do for me" -- then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort: "Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one? -- is that your meaning?" -- How would you answer him?

Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.

Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?

I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?

I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve of any of them.

But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?

Done to me! -- as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise -- that is what I deserve to have done to me.

What, and no payment! A pleasant notion!

I will pay when I have the money, I replied.

But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates.

Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does -- refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of someone else.

Why, my good friend, I said, how can anyone answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be someone like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself?

Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasymachus, as anyone might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says, Thank you.

That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have; and how ready I am to praise anyone who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer well.

Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won't.

Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?

That's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument.

Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer.

Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ -- there are tyrannies, and

there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

Yes, I know.

And the government is the ruling power in each State?

Certainly.

And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all States there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.

Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark that in defining justice you have yourself used the word "interest," which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words "of the stronger" are added.

A small addition, you must allow, he said.

Great or small, never mind about that: we must first inquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say "of the stronger"; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

Proceed.

I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

I do.

But are the rulers of States absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err?

Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

True.

When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?

Yes.

And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects -- and that is what you call justice?

Doubtless.

Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger, but the reverse?

What is that you are saying? he asked.

I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

Yes.

Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say,

justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?

Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.

Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness.

But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometime command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.

Yes, Polemarchus -- Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just.

Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest -- this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice.

Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.

Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?

Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible, but might be sometimes mistaken.

You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.

Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?

Certainly, he replied.

And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argument?

Nay, he replied, "suppose" is not the word -- I know it; but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.

I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any misunderstanding occurring between

us in future, let me ask, in what sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute -- is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?

In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be able, never.

And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.

Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.

Enough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.

A healer of the sick, he replied.

And the pilot -- that is to say, the true pilot -- is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?

A captain of sailors.

The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors.

Very true, he said.

Now, I said, every art has an interest?

Certainly.

For which the art has to consider and provide?

Yes, that is the aim of art.

And the interest of any art is the perfection of it -- this and nothing else?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is selfsufficing or has wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?

Quite right, he replied.

But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing -- has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another? -- having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to consider the interest of their subjectmatter. For every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true -- that is to say, while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am not right.

Yes, clearly.

Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?

True, he said.

Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the subject of their art?

True, he said.

But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?

To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.

Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?

He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced.

Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere moneymaker; that has been admitted?

Yes.

And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors, and not a mere sailor?

That has been admitted.

And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest?

He gave a reluctant "Yes."

Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.

When we had got to this point in the argument, and everyone saw that the definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said, Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?

Why do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be answering?

Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.

What makes you say that? I replied.

Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of States, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and

the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State: when there is an incometax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable -- that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace -- they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and manstealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.

Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bathman, deluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would not let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his position; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive are your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way of man's life so small a matter in your eyes -- to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?

And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the inquiry?

You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us, Thrasymachus -- whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.

And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?

Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe

a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or banqueter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already insured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as a ruler, whether in a State or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in States, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.

Think! Nay, I am sure of it.

Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment, unless under the idea that they govern for the advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a little progress.

Yes, that is the difference, he replied.

And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one -- medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on?

Yes, he said.

And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you? that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?

Certainly not.

Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?

I should not.

Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?

Certainly not.

And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?

Yes.

Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?

True, he replied.

And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?

He gave a reluctant assent to this.

Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid

as well?

I suppose not.

But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?

Certainly, he confers a benefit.

Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger -- to their good they attend and not to the good of the superior.

And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern, without remuneration. For, in the execution of his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honor, or a penalty for refusing.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment.

You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace?

Very true.

And for this reason, I said, money and honor have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honor. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonorable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help -- not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to anyone who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and everyone who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer?

I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he answered.

Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was rehearsing?

Yes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me.

Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is saying what is not true?

Most certainly, he replied.

If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our inquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.

Very good, he said.

And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.

That which you propose.

Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice?

Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.

And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?

Certainly.

I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?

What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.

What else then would you say?

The opposite, he replied.

And would you call justice vice?

No, I would rather say sublime simplicity.

Then would you call injustice malignity?

No; I would rather say discretion.

And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?

Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing States and nations; but perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses.

Even this profession, if undetected, has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just now speaking.

I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.

Certainly I do so class them.

Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that you will call injustice honorable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.

You have guessed most infallibly, he replied.

Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.

I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you? -- to refute the argument is your business.

Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

Far otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature which he is.

And would he try to go beyond just action?

He would not.

And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?

He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able.

Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?

Yes, he would.

And what of the unjust -- does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just?

Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.

And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the just man or action, in order that he may have more than all?

True.

We may put the matter thus, I said -- the just does not desire more than his like, but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?

Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.

And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?

Good again, he said.

And is not the unjust like the wise and good, and the just unlike them?

Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.

Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?

Certainly, he replied.

Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?

Yes.

And which is wise and which is foolish?

Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.

And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?

Yes.

And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

Yes.

And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?

I do not think that he would.

But he would claim to exceed the nonmusician?

Of course.

And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?

He would not.

But he would wish to go beyond the nonphysician?

Yes.

And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.

And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?

I dare say.

And the knowing is wise?

Yes.

And the wise is good?

True.

Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?

I suppose so.

Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?

Yes.

But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words?

They were.

And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like, but his unlike?

Yes.

Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?

That is the inference.

And each of them is such as his like is?

That was admitted.

Then the just has turned out to be wise and good, and the unjust evil and ignorant.

Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:

Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength -- do you remember?

Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are saying or have no answer; if, however, I were to answer, you would be quite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer "Very good," as they say to storytelling old women, and will nod "Yes" and "No."

Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.

Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What else would you have?

Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer.

Proceed.

Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by anyone. But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a State may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other States, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?

True, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust State will be most likely to do so.

I know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior State can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice.

If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.

I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.

That is out of civility to you, he replied.

You are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform me, whether you think that a State, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evildoers could act at all if they injured one another? No, indeed, he said, they could not.

But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together better?

Yes.

And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?

I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.

How good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one

another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action?

Certainly.

And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?

They will.

And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?

Let us assume that she retains her power.

Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction? and does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just? Is not this the case?

Yes, certainly.

And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person -- in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?

Yes. And, O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?

Granted that they are. But, if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be their friends?

Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company. Well, then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action; nay, more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for, if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims; they were but halfvillains in their enterprises; for had they been whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life.

Proceed.

I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some end?

I should.

And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I do not understand, he said.

Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?

Certainly not.

Or hear, except with the ear?

No. These, then, may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?

They may.

But you can cut off a vinebranch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?

Of course.

And yet not so well as with a pruninghook made for the purpose?

True.

May we not say that this is the end of a pruninghook?

We may.

Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I understand your meaning, he said, and assent.

And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?

It has.

And has not the eye an excellence?

Yes.

And the ear has an end and an excellence also?

True.

And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?

That is so.

Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead?

How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?

You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more generally, and only inquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their own defect?

Certainly, he replied.

I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end?

True.

And the same observation will apply to all other things?

I agree.

Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?

To no other.

And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?

Assuredly, he said.

And has not the soul an excellence also?

Yes.

And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence?

She cannot.

Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler?

Yes, necessarily.

And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?

That has been admitted.

Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?

That is what your argument proves.

And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?

Certainly.

Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

So be it.

But happiness, and not misery, is profitable?

Of course.

Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.

Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.

For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle toward me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that inquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Republic

Plato

Book II: The Individual, The State, And Education

(Socrates, Glaucon.)

WITH these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus's retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me: Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?

I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.

Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now: How would you arrange goods -- are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from them?

I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.

Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?

Certainly, I said.

And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of moneymaking -- these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?

There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?

Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice?

In the highest class, I replied -- among those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results.

Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.

I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him.

I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I

agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice has not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just -- if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by anyone in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?

Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would oftener wish to converse.

I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.

They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice; it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.

Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the King of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he, stooping and looking in, saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the King; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the

collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outward and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result -- when he turned the collet inward he became invisible, when outward he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the Queen, and with her help conspired against the King and slew him and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with anyone at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a god among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever anyone thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine anyone obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookerson to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this.

Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody): for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as AEschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honor and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two.

Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for the decision, first one

and then the other, as if they were two statues.

I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the description a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not mine. Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound -- will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled. Then he will understand that he ought to seem only, and not to be, just; the words of AEschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live with a view to appearances -- he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only --

"His mind has a soil deep and fertile, Out of which spring his prudent counsels."

In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage, because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every contest, whether in public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently, and can honor the gods or any man whom he wants to honor in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just.

I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged?

Why, what else is there? I answered.

The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.

Well, then, according to the proverb, "Let brother help brother" -- if he fails in any part, do you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the power of helping justice.

Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice and injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others; for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says that the gods make the oaks of the just --

"To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle; And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces,"

and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is

"As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, Maintains justice; to whom the black earth

brings forth Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with fruit, And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him fish."

Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe to the just; they take them down into the world below, where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain; they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the other.

Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honorable, but grievous and toilsome; and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honor them both in public and private when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and feasts; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost; with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod:

"Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her dwellingplace is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,"

and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced by men; for he also says:

"The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations and the odor of fat, when they have sinned and trangressed."

And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were children of the Moon and the muses -- that is what they say -- according to which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only individuals, but whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call mysteries, and they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us.

He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their minds likely to be affected, my dear Socrates -- those of them, I mean, who are quickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of persons they should be

and in what way they should walk if they would make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar:

"Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days?"

For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just, profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I hear someone exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to have no care of human things -- why in either case should we mind about concealment? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by "sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings." Let us be consistent, then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why, then, we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. "But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds." Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony.

On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honor justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there should be someone who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will; unless, peradventure, there be someone whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the truth -- but no other man. He only blames injustice, who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.

The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice -- beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with the men of our own time -- no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except

with a view to the glories, honors, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upward, we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but everyone would have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harboring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations; for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired, indeed, for their results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes -- like sight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good -- I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice and censure injustice, magnifying the rewards and honors of the one and abusing the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an illustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in honor of you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:

"Sons of Ariston," he sang, "divine offspring of an illustrious hero."

The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice, and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced -- this I infer from your general character, for had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give such help as I can.

Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the inquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a shortsighted person had been asked by someone to read small letters from a distance; and it occurred to someone else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were larger -- if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser -- this would have been thought a rare piece of goodfortune.

Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our inquiry?

I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our inquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State.

True, he replied.

And is not a State larger than an individual?

It is.

Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we inquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them.

That, he said, is an excellent proposal.

And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.

I dare say.

When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more easily discovered.

Yes, far more easily.

But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.

I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed.

A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is selfsufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

There can be no other.

Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

True, he said.

And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

Very true.

Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the

mother of our invention.

Of course, he replied.

Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence.

Certainly.

The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.

True.

And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, someone else a weaver -- shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Quite right.

The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.

Clearly.

And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labors into a common stock? -- the individual husbandman, for example, producing for four, and laboring four times as long and as much as he need in the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining threefourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?

Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at producing everything.

Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.

Very true.

And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has only one?

When he has only one.

Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?

No doubt.

For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the business his first object.

He must.

And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things. Undoubtedly.

Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools -- and he, too, needs many; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.

True.

Then carpenters and smiths and many other artisans will be sharers in our little State, which is

already beginning to grow?

True.

Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces and hides -- still our State will not be very large.

That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all these.

Then, again, there is the situation of the city -- to find a place where nothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible.

Impossible.

Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another city?

There must.

But if the trader goes emptyhanded, having nothing which they require who would supply his need, he will come back emptyhanded.

That is certain.

And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.

Very true.

Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?

They will.

Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?

Yes.

Then we shall want merchants?

We shall.

And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also be needed, and in considerable numbers?

Yes, in considerable numbers.

Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions? To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a State.

Clearly they will buy and sell.

Then they will need a marketplace, and a moneytoken for purposes of exchange.

Certainly.

Suppose now that a husbandman or an artisan brings some production to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him -- is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the marketplace?

Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen. In wellordered States they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell, and to take money from those who desire to buy.

This want, then, creates a class of retailtraders in our State. Is not "retailer" the term which is applied to those who sit in the marketplace engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?

Yes, he said.

And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labor, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, "hire" being the name which is given to the price of their labor.

True.

Then hirelings will help to make up our population?

Yes.

And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?

I think so.

Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the State did they spring up?

Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot imagine that they are more likely to be found anywhere else.

I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; we had better think the matter out, and not shrink from the inquiry.

Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn and wine and clothes and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barleymeal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse with one another. And they will take care that their families do not exceed their means; having an eye to poverty or war.

But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.

True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish -- salt and olives and cheese -- and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs and peas and beans; and they will roast myrtleberries and acorns at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.

Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?

But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.

Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style.

Yes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and

healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish also to see a State at feverheat, I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas and tables and other furniture; also dainties and perfumes and incense and courtesans and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety. We must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as houses and clothes and shoes; the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.

True, he said.

Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms and colors; another will be the votaries of music -- poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women's dresses. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat them.

Certainly.

And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?

Much greater.

And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough?

Quite true.

Then a slice of our neighbors' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?

That, Socrates, will be inevitable.

And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?

Most certainly, he replied. Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.

Undoubtedly.

And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above.

Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?

No, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the State. The principle, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success.

Very true, he said.

But is not war an art?

Certainly.

And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?

Quite true.

And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder -- in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else?

No tools will make a man a skilled workman or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How, then, will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavyarmed or any other kind of troops?

Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price.

And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time and skill and art and application will be needed by him?

No doubt, he replied.

Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?

Certainly.

Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?

It will.

And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and do our best.

We must.

Is not the noble youth very like a wellbred dog in respect of guarding and watching?

What do you mean?

I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him.

All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.

Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?

Certainly.

And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?

I have.

Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian.

True.

And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?

Yes.

But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and with everybody else?

A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.

Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them.

True, he said.

What is to be done, then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?

True.

He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible.

I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.

Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded. My friend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost sight of the image which we had before us.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities.

And where do you find them?

Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that wellbred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.

Yes, I know.

Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

Certainly not.

Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature, need to have the qualities of a philosopher?

I do not apprehend your meaning.

The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog, and is remarkable in the animal.

What trait?

Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?

The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognize the truth of your remark.

And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming; your dog is a true philosopher.

Why?

Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of

knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

Most assuredly.

And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?

They are the same, he replied.

And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

That we may safely affirm.

Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

Undoubtedly.

Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an inquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater inquiry which is our final end -- How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length.

Adeimantus thought that the inquiry would be of great service to us.

Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat long.

Certainly not.

Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in storytelling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes.

By all means.

And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional sort? -- and this has two divisions, gymnastics for the body, and music for the soul.

True.

Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastics afterward?

By all means.

And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?

I do.

And literature may be either true or false?

Yes.

And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false?

I do not understand your meaning, he said.

You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.

Very true.

That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.

Quite right, he said.

You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a

young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken.

Quite true.

And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?

We cannot.

Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.

Of what tales are you speaking? he said.

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.

Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater.

Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great storytellers of mankind.

But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?

A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.

But when is this fault committed?

Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes -- as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.

Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blamable; but what are the stories which you mean?

First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too -- I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.

Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.

Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods.

I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated.

Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and

fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told to compose them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer -- these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.

There you are right, he replied; but if anyone asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking -- how shall we answer him?

I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.

Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?

Something of this kind, I replied: God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric, or tragic, in which the representation is given.

Right.

And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?

Certainly.

And no good thing is hurtful?

No, indeed.

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Certainly not.

And that which hurts not does no evil?

No.

And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?

Impossible.

And the good is advantageous?

Yes.

And therefore the cause of wellbeing?

Yes.

It follows, therefore, that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only?

Assuredly.

Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and

many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.

That appears to me to be most true, he said.

Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks

"Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots,"

and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two

"Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;"

but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,

"Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth."

And again --

"Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us."

And if anyone asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods were instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of AEschylus, that

"God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house."

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe -- the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur -- or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan War or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking: he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery -- the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to anyone is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by anyone whether old or young in any wellordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.

I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law.

Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform -- that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.

That will do, he said.

And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another -- sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?

I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought.

Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be effected either by the thing itself or by some other thing?

Most certainly.

And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks,

and the plant which is in the fullest vigor also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes.

Of course.

And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by any external influence?

True.

And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite things -- furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are least altered by time and circumstances.

Very true.

Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change from without?

True.

But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?

Of course they are.

Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?

He cannot.

But may he not change and transform himself?

Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.

And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and more unsightly?

If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.

Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would anyone, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse?

Impossible.

Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains absolutely and forever in his own form.

That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.

Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that

"The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms;"

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let anyone, either in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms

"For the lifegiving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;"

-- let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths -- telling how certain gods, as they say, "Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;" but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods.

Heaven forbid, he said.

But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and deception they may

make us think that they appear in various forms?

Perhaps, he replied.

Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself?

I cannot say, he replied.

Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be allowed, is hated of gods and men?

What do you mean? he said.

I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there, above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.

Still, he said, I do not comprehend you.

The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to my words; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves, which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind least like; -- that, I say, is what they utterly detest.

There is nothing more hateful to them.

And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?

Perfectly right.

The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?

Yes.

Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in dealing with enemies -- that would be an instance; or again, when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking -- because we do not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like truth as we can, and so turn it to account.

Very true, he said.

But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?

That would be ridiculous, he said.

Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?

I should say not.

Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?

That is inconceivable.

But he may have friends who are senseless or mad?

But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.

Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?

None whatever.

Then the superhuman, and divine, is absolutely incapable of falsehood?

Yes.

Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes not; he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking vision.

Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own.

You agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in which we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any way.

I grant that.

Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of AEschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials

"was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things blessed of heaven, he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And I thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy, would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, and who said this -- he it is who has slain my son."

These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshippers of the gods and like them.

I entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them my laws.

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The Republic

Plato

Book IV: Wealth, Poverty, And Virtue

(Adeimantus, Socrates.)

HERE Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you answer, Socrates, said he, if a person were to say that you are making these people miserable, and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness; the city in fact belongs to them, but they are none the better for it; whereas other men acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, and have everything handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the gods on their own account, and practising hospitality; moreover, as you were saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that is usual among the favorites of fortune; but our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard?

Yes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid in addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if they would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought to be happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature might be added.

But, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge.

You mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer?

Yes.

If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find the answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice, and in the illordered State injustice: and, having found them, we might then decide which of the two is the happier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by and by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were painting a statue, and someone came up to us and said: Why do you not put the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the body -- the eyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black -- to him we might fairly answer: Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this and the other features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I say to you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians; for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also might be allowed to

repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing round the winecup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only as much as they like; in this way we might make every class happy -- and then, as you imagine, the whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea into our heads; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are not, are confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seeming and not real guardians, then see how they turn the State upside down; and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.

I think that you are quite right.

I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me.

What may that be?

There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.

What are they?

Wealth, I said, and poverty.

How do they act?

The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, any longer take the same pains with his art?

Certainly not.

He will grow more and more indolent and careless?

Very true.

And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?

Yes; he greatly deteriorates.

But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself with tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.

Certainly not.

Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?

That is evident.

Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.

What evils?

Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent.

That is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.

There would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with one such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.

How so? he asked.

In the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be trained warriors fighting against an army of rich men.

That is true, he said.

And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and welltodo gentlemen who were not boxers?

Hardly, if they came upon him at once.

What, not, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn more than one stout personage?

Certainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that.

And yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and practise of boxing than they have in military qualities.

Likely enough.

Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or three times their own number?

I agree with you, for I think you right.

And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one of the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we neither have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore come and help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, on hearing these words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than, with the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep?

That is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one.

But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own!

Why so?

You ought to speak of other States in the plural number; not one of them is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich; these are at war with one another; and in either there are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if you treated them all as a single State. But if you deal with them as many, and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others, you will always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your State, while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of States, I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but in deed and truth, though she number not more than 1,000 defenders. A single State which is her equal you will hardly find, either among

Hellenes or barbarians, though many that appear to be as great and many times greater.

That is most true, he said.

And what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which they are to include, and beyond which they will not go?

What limit would you propose?

I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity; that, I think, is the proper limit.

Very good, he said.

Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our guardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and selfsufficing.

And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon them.

And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter still -- I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower classes, when naturally superior. The intention was, that, in the case of the citizens generally, each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many.

Yes, he said; that is not so difficult.

The regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing -- a thing, however, which I would rather call, not, great, but sufficient for our purpose.

What may that be? he asked.

Education, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says.

That will be the best way of settling them.

Also, I said, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good education improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals.

Very possibly, he said.

Then to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of our rulers should be directed -- that music and gymnastics be preserved in their original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to maintain them intact. And when anyone says that mankind most regard

"The newest song which the singers have,"

they will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new kind of song; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the meaning of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him; he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always change with them.

Yes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and your own.

Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music?

Yes, he said; the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in.

Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears harmless.

Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little this spirit of license, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights, private as well as public.

Is that true? I said.

That is my belief, he replied.

Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths themselves become lawless, they can never grow up into wellconducted and virtuous citizens.

Very true, he said.

And when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any fallen places [a] [principle] in the State will raise them up again.

Very true, he said.

Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their predecessors have altogether neglected.

What do you mean?

I mean such things as these: -- when the young are to be silent before their elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit; what honor is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with me?

Yes.

But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters -- I doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written enactments about them likely to be lasting.

Impossible.

It would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts a man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract like?

To be sure.

Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may be the reverse of good?

That is not to be denied.

And for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further about them.

Naturally enough, he replied.

Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans; about insult and injury, or the commencement of actions,

and the appointment of juries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about any impositions and exactions of market and harbor dues which may be required, and in general about the regulations of markets, police, harbors, and the like.. But, O heavens! shall we condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?

I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves.

Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which we have given them.

And without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on forever making and mending the laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection.

You would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no selfrestraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?

Exactly.

Yes, I said; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try.

Such cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort.

Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and drinking and wenching and idling, nether drug nor cautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.

Charming! he replied. I see nothing in going into a passion with a man who tells you what is right.

These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.

Assuredly not.

Nor would you praise the behavior of States which act like the men whom I was just now describing. For are there not illordered States in which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in anticipating and gratifying their humors is held to be a great and good statesman -- do not these States resemble the persons whom I was describing?

Yes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from praising them.

But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption?

Yes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired.

What do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When a man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?

Nay, he said, certainly not in that case.

Well, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing; they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?

Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing.

I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution either in an illordered or in a wellordered State; for in the former they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them; and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.

What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?

Nothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the god of Delphi, there remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all.

Which are they? he said.

The institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods, demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and the rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant ourselves, and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the centre, on the navel of the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.

You are right, and we will do as you propose.

But where, amid all this, is justice? Son of Ariston, tell me where. Now that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice, and in what they differ from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

Nonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search yourself, saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?

I do not deny that I said so; and as you remind me, I will be as good as my word; but you must join.

We will, he replied.

Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.

That is most certain.

And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.

That is likewise clear.

And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?

Very good.

If there were four things, and we were searching for one of them, wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the first, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.

Very true, he said.

And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also four in number?

Clearly.

First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and in this I detect a certain peculiarity.

What is that?

The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in counsel?

Very true.

And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by knowledge, do men counsel well?

Clearly.

And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?

Of course.

There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?

Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering.

Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?

Certainly not.

Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, he said, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?

Not by reason of any of them, he said.

Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would give the city the name of agricultural?

Yes.

Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently founded State among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best deal with itself and with other States?

There certainly is.

And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.

It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.

And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge?

The name of good in counsel and truly wise.

And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?

The smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.

Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?

Much the smallest.

And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State, being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by nature

to be of all classes the least.

Most true.

Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four virtues have somehow or other been discovered.

And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.

Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.

How do you mean?

Why, I said, everyone who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf.

No one, he replied, would ever think of any other.

The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either the one or the other.

Certainly not.

The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and this is what you term courage.

I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.

Salvation of what?

Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words "under all circumstances" to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?

If you please.

You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true seapurple, begin by selecting their white color first; this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast color, and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other color.

Yes, he said; I know that they have a washedout and ridiculous appearance.

Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastics; we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection, and the color of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure -- mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.

But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave -- this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have another name.

Most certainly.

Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?

Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words "of a citizen," you will not be far wrong -- hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking, not for courage, but justice; and for the purpose of our inquiry we have said enough.

You are right, he replied.

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State -- first, temperance, and then justice, which is the end of our search.

Very true.

Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?

I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favor of considering temperance first.

Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request.

Then consider, he said.

Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding.

How so? he asked.

Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of "a man being his own master;" and other traces of the same notion may be found in language.

No doubt, he said.

There is something ridiculous in the expression "master of himself;" for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.

Certainly.

The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse -- in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.

Yes, there is reason in that.

And now, I said, look at our newly created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words "temperance" and "selfmastery" truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.

Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.

Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and

more numerous class.

Certainly, he said.

Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.

Very true. These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.

That I perceive, he said.

Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?

Certainly, he replied.

It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?

Yes.

And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?

Undoubtedly.

And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found -- in the rulers or in the subjects?

In both, as I should imagine, he replied.

Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?

Why so?

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom, or power, or numbers, or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in States and individuals.

I entirely agree with you.

And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a State virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.

The inference is obvious.

The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first, let me know.

Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him -- that is about as much as I am good for.

Offer up a prayer with me and follow.

I will, but you must show me the way.

Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must push on.

Let us push on.

Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.

Good news, he said.

Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.

Why so?

Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our inquiry, ages ago, there was Justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands -- that was the way with us -- we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.

What do you mean?

I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of Justice, and have failed to recognize her.

I grow impatient at the length of your exordium. Well, then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted; now justice is this principle or a part of it.

Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.

Further, we affirmed that Justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us.

Yes, we said so.

Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?

I cannot, but I should like to be told.

Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth, or remaining one.

That follows of necessity.

If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject -- the quality, I mean, of everyone doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm -- the question is not so easily answered.

Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.

Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.

Yes, he said.

And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?

Exactly.

Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would intrust the office of determining suitsatlaw?

Certainly.

And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?

Yes; that is their principle.

Which is a just principle?

Yes.

Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?

Very true.

Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?

Not much.

But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.

Most true. Seeing, then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evildoing?

Precisely.

And the greatest degree of evildoing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice?

Certainly. This, then, is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.

I agree with you.

We will not, I said, be overpositive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh inquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual -- if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we

will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls.

That will be in regular course; let us do as you say.

I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?

Like, he replied.

The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?

He will.

And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?

True, he said.

And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner?

Certainly, he said.

Once more, then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question -- whether the soul has these three principles or not?

An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good.

Very true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous inquiry.

May we not be satisfied with that? he said; under the circumstances, I am quite content. I, too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.

Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.

Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State? -- how else can they come there? Take the quality of passion or spirit; it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g., the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the Northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

Exactly so, he said.

There is no difficulty in understanding this.

None whatever.

But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action -- to determine that is the difficulty.

Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty.

Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different.

How can we? he asked.

I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different.

Good.

For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?

Impossible.

Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment -- to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.

Very true.

And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference; and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forward or backward, then in no point of view can they be at rest.

That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.

Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.

Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.

Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.

Yes, he said, that will be the best way.

Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition)?

Yes, he said, they are opposites.

Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again willing and wishing -- all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned. You would say -- would you not? -- that the soul of him who desires is seeking after the object of his desire; or that he is drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desire, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he had been asked a question?

Very true.

And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?

Certainly.

Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them?

Let us take that class, he said.

The object of one is food, and of the other drink?

Yes.

And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?

Yes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.

But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the same is true of every other desire.

Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.

Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a quality attached to either term of the relation; others are simple and have their correlatives simple.

I do not know what you mean.

Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?

Certainly.

And the much greater to the much less?

Yes.

And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?

Certainly, he said.

And so of more or less, and of other correlative terms, such as the double and the half, or, again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives; is not this true of all of them?

Yes.

And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I mean, for example, that the science of housebuilding is a kind of knowledge which is defined and

distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture.

Certainly.

Because it has a particular quality which no other has?

Yes.

And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?

Yes.

Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term "science" is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined, and is hence called not merely science, but the science of medicine.

I quite understand, and, I think, as you do.

Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms, having clearly a relation --

Yes, thirst is relative to drink.

And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only?

Certainly.

Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?

That is plain.

And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.

Impossible.

No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls.

Exactly so, he replied.

And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?

Yes, he said, it constantly happens.

And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him?

I should say so.

And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?

Clearly.

Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one another; the one with

which a man reasons, we may call the rational principle of the soul; the other, with which he loves, and hungers, and thirsts, and feels the flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions?

Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different.

Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding?

I should be inclined to say -- akin to desire.

Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.

I have heard the story myself, he said.

The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.

Yes; that is the meaning, he said.

And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason; but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in anyone else?

Certainly not.

Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is, the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him -- these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by them.

True, he said.

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more.

The illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds.

I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider.

What point?

You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.

Most assuredly.

But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or only a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three principles in the soul, there will only be two, the rational and the concupiscent; or rather, as the State was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?

Yes, he said, there must be a third.

Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.

But that is easily proved: We may observe even in young children that they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them late enough.

Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted by us,

"He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul;" for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it.

Very true, he said.

And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number.

Exactly.

Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?

Certainly.

Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?

Assuredly.

And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?

That follows of course.

We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?

We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.

We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?

Yes, he said, we must remember that too.

And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?

Certainly.

And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastics will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?

Quite true, he said.

And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her naturalborn subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?

Very true, he said.

Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and counsels?

True.

And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?

Right, he replied.

And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?

Assuredly.

And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire, are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?

Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual.

And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just.

That is very certain.

And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State?

There is no difference, in my opinion, he said.

Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.

What sort of instances do you mean?

If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would anyone deny this?

No one, he replied.

Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?

Never.

Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements.

Impossible.

No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonor his father and mother, or to fail in his religious duties?

No one.

And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in ruling or being ruled?

Exactly so.

Are you satisfied, then, that the quality which makes such men and such States is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?

Not I, indeed.

Then our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been verified?

Yes, certainly.

And the division of labor which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use?

Clearly.

But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned, however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others -- he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals -- when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and cooperates with this harmonious condition just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.

You have said the exact truth, Socrates.

Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood?

Most certainly not.

May we say so, then?

Let us say so.

And now, I said, injustice has to be considered.

Clearly.

Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles -- a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal -- what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance, and cowardice, and ignorance, and every form of vice?

Exactly so.

And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?

What do you mean? he said.

Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.

How so? he said.

Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.

Yes.

And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?

That is certain.

And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?

True.

And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order?

Exactly so, he said.

Then virtue is the health, and beauty, and wellbeing of the soul, and vice the disease, and weakness, and deformity, of the same?

True.

And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?

Assuredly.

Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?

In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be such as we have described?

Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our own eyes, let us not faint by the way.

Certainly not, he replied.

Come up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice, those of them, I mean, which are worth looking at.

I am following you, he replied: proceed.

I said: The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from some tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is one, but that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four special ones which are deserving of note.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the State.

How many?

There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said.

What are they?

The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, according as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many.

True, he replied.

But I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the State will be maintained.

That is true, he replied.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Republic

Plato

Book V: On Matrimony And Philosophy

(Socrates, Glaucon, Adeimantus.)

SUCH is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is of the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the evil is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the regulation of the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms.

What are they? he said.

I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared to me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him: stretching forth his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder, and drew him toward him, leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and saying something in his ear, of which I only caught the words, "Shall we let him off, or what shall we do?"

Certainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice.

Who is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?

You, he said.

I repeated, Why am I especially not to be let off?

Why, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a whole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it were selfevident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children "friends have all things in common."

And was I not right, Adeimantus?

Yes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like everything else, requires to be explained; for community may be of many kinds. Please, therefore, to say what sort of community you mean. We have been long expecting that you would tell us something about the family life of your citizens -- how they will bring children into the world, and rear them when they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this community of women and children -- for we are of opinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still undetermined, and you are taking in hand another State, we have resolved, as you heard, not to let you go until you give an account of all this.

To that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying: Agreed.

And without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be equally agreed.

I said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an argument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had finished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant of what a hornet's nest of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this gathering trouble, and avoided it.

For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said Thrasymachus -- to look for gold, or to hear discourse?

Yes, but discourse should have a limit.

Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about us; take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way: What sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and education, which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these things will be.

Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another point of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for the best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the subject, lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a dream only.

Fear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they are not sceptical or hostile.

I said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these words.

Yes, he said.

Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I knew what I was talking about. To declare the truth about matters of high interest which a man honors and loves, among wise men who love him, need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind; but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only a hesitating inquirer, which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish), but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty, or goodness, or justice, in the matter of laws. And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among friends; and therefore you do well to encourage me.

Glaucon laughed and said: Well, then, Socrates, in case you and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the homicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then and speak.

Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt, and what holds at law may hold in argument.

Then why should you mind?

Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the men has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the women. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am invited by you.

For men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my opinion, of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said that the men were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the herd.

True.

Let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be subject to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see whether the result accords with our design.

What do you mean?

What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs divided into he's and she's, or do they both share equally in hunting and in keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we intrust to the males the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the females at home, under the idea that the bearing and the suckling of their puppies are labor enough for them?

No, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that the males are stronger and the females weaker.

But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are bred and fed in the same way?

You cannot.

Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the same nurture and education?

Yes.

The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastics. Yes.

Then women must be taught music and gymnastics and also the art of war, which they must practise like the men?

That is the inference, I suppose.

I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.

No doubt of it.

Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they are no longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than the enthusiastic old men who, in spite of wrinkles and ugliness, continue to frequent the gymnasia.

Yes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would be thought ridiculous.

But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of innovation; how they will talk of women's attainments, both in music and gymnastics, and above all about their wearing armor and riding upon horseback!

Very true, he replied. Yet, having begun, we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of the opinion, which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when first the Cretans, and then the Lacedaemonians, introduced the custom, the wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation.

No doubt.

But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye had vanished before the better principle which reason asserted, then the man was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to weigh the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good.

Very true, he replied.

First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, let us come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she capable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or cannot share? That will be the best way of commencing the inquiry, and will probably lead to the fairest conclusion.

That will be much the best way.

Shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves? in this manner the adversary's position will not be undefended.

Why not? he said.

Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say: "Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you yourselves, at the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature." And certainly, if I am not mistaken, such an admission was made by us. "And do not the natures of men and women differ very much indeed?" And we shall reply, Of course they do. Then we shall be asked, "Whether the tasks assigned to men and to women should not be different, and such as are agreeable to their different natures?" Certainly they should. "But if so, have you not fallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that men and women, whose natures are so entirely different, ought to perform the same actions?" What defence will you make for us, my good sir, against anyone who offers these objections?

That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall and I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side.

These are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like kind, which I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to take in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children.

By Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy. Why, yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth, whether he has fallen into a little swimmingbath or into midocean, he has to swim all the same.

Very true.

And must not we swim and try to reach the shore -- we will hope that Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?

I suppose so, he said. Well, then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We acknowledged -- did we not? -- that different natures ought to have different pursuits, and that men's and women's natures are different. And now what are we saying? -- that different natures ought to have the same pursuits -- this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us.

Precisely.

Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction!

Why do you say so?

Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because he cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion.

Yes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with us and our argument?

A great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition.

In what way? Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature, or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same natures.

Why, no, he said, that was never considered by us.

I said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men; and if this is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely?

That would be a jest, he said.

Yes, I said, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we constructed the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for example, that a physician and one who is in mind a physician may be said to have the same nature.

True.

Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?

Certainly.

And if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should receive; and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits.

Very true, he said.

Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?

That will be quite fair.

And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there is no difficulty.

Yes, perhaps.

Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of women which would affect them in the administration of the State.

By all means.

Let us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question: When you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal, whereas the other, after much study and application, no sooner learns than he forgets; or again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while the body of the other is a hinderance to him? -- would not these be the sort of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?

No one will deny that.

And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd?

You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to many men, yet on the whole what you say is true.

And if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of administration in a State which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both; all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man.

Very true.

Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?

That will never do.

One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another has no music in her nature?

Very true.

And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?

Certainly.

And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit?

That is also true.

Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort?

Yes.

Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness.

Obviously.

And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and in character?

Very true.

And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?

They ought.

Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastics to the wives of the guardians -- to that point we come round again.

Certainly not.

The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice, which prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature.

That appears to be true.

We had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and secondly whether they were the most beneficial?

Yes.

And the possibility has been acknowledged?

Yes.

The very great benefit has next to be established?

Quite so.

You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the same?

Yes.

I should like to ask you a question.

What is it?

Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better than another?

The latter.

And in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the guardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more perfect men, or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling?

What a ridiculous question!

You have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens?

By far the best.

And will not their wives be the best women?

Yes, by far the best.

And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?

There can be nothing better.

And this is what the arts of music and gymnastics, when present in such a manner as we have described, will accomplish?

Certainly.

Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree beneficial to the State?

True.

Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their country; only in the distribution of labors the lighter are to be assigned to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects their duties are to be the same. And as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter he is plucking

"A fruit of unripe wisdom,"

and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is about; for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, "that the useful is the noble, and the hurtful is the base."

Very true.

Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say that we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common; to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the consistency of the argument with itself bears witness.

Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.

Yes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this when you see the next.

Go on; let me see.

The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, is to the following effect, "that the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent."

Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the possibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more questionable.

I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite another matter, and will be very much disputed.

I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both.

You imply that the two questions must be combined, I replied. Now I meant that you should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought, I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility.

But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give a defence of both.

Well, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favor: let me feast my mind with the dream as daydreamers are in the habit of feasting themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have discovered any means of effecting their wishes -- that is a matter which never troubles them -- they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already granted to them, they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing what they mean to do when their wish has come true -- that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much. Now I myself am beginning to lose heart, and I should like, with your permission, to pass over the question of possibility at present. Assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal, I shall now proceed to inquire how the rulers will carry out these arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed, will be of the greatest benefit to the State and to the guardians. First of all, then, if you have no objection, I will endeavor with your help to consider the advantages of the measure; and hereafter the question of possibility.

I have no objection; proceed.

First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other; the guardians themselves must obey the laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them in any details which are intrusted to their care.

That is right, he said.

You, I said, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will now select the women and give them to them; they must be as far as possible of like natures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own; they will be together, and will be brought up together, and will associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other -- necessity is not too strong a word, I think?

Yes, he said; necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to the mass of mankind.

True, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid.

Yes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted.

Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?

Exactly.

And how can marriages be made most beneficial? that is a question which I put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the nobler sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you ever attended to their pairing and breeding?

In what particulars?

Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some better than others?

True.

And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed from the best only?

From the best.

And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?

I choose only those of ripe age.

And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate?

Certainly.

And the same of horses and of animals in general?

Undoubtedly.

Good heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!

Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any particular skill?

Because, I said, our rulers will often have to practise upon the body corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be given, then the doctor should be more of a man.

That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?

I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage.

And we were very right.

And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births.

How so?

Why, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with the inferior as seldom, as possible; and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in firstrate condition. Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further danger of our herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into rebellion.

Very true.

Had we better not appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to preserve the average of population? There are many other things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too small.

Certainly, he replied.

We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they will accuse their own illluck and not the rulers.

To be sure, he said.

And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honors and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible.

True.

And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to be held by women as well as by men -- Yes --

The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.

Yes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure.

They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognizes her own child; and other wetnurses may be engaged if more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants.

You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they are having children.

Why, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?

Very true.

And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty years in a man's?

Which years do you mean to include?

A woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the State, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at fiveandtwenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats quickest, and continue to beget children until he be fiftyfive.

Certainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigor. Anyone above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; the child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, which at each hymeneal priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer, that the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust.

Very true, he replied.

And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.

Very true, he replied.

This applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age: after that we will allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his mother's mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, the parents must understand that the offspring of such a union cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly.

That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know who are fathers and daughters, and so on?

They will never know. The way will be this: dating from the day of the hymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children who are born in the seventh and the tenth month afterward his sons, and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and he will call their children his grandchildren, and they will call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called their brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying, will be forbidden to intermarry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters; if the lot favors them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will allow them.

Quite right, he replied.

Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our State are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would have the argument show that this community is consistent with the rest of our polity, and also that nothing can be better -- would you not?

Yes, certainly.

Shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a State -- what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of the evil?

By all means.

Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?

There cannot.

And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains -- where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?

No doubt.

Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized -- when you have onehalf of the world triumphing and the other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens?

Certainly.

Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the terms "mine" and "not mine," "his" and "not his."

Exactly so.

And is not that the bestordered State in which the greatest number of persons apply the terms "mine" and "not mine" in the same way to the same thing?

Quite true.

Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual -- as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the whole frame, drawn toward the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and the same expression is used about any other part of the body, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering.

Very true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the bestordered State there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.

Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or sorrow with him?

Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a wellordered State.

It will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see whether this or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental principles.

Very good.

Our State, like every other, has rulers and subjects?

True.

All of whom will call one another citizens?

Of course.

But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other States?

Generally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply call them rulers.

And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers?

They are called saviours and helpers, he replied.

And what do the rulers call the people?

Their maintainers and fosterfathers.

And what do they call them in other States?

Slaves.

And what do the rulers call one another in other States?

Fellowrulers.

And what in ours?

Fellowguardians.

Did you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would speak of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his friend?

Yes, very often.

And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest, and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?

Exactly.

But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a stranger?

Certainly he would not; for everyone whom they meet will be regarded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him.

Capital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name? For example, in the use of the word "father," would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be or not to be the strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their kinsfolk?

These, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in the spirit of them?

Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when anyone is well or ill, the universal word will be "with me it is well" or "it is ill."

Most true.

And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying that they will have their

pleasures and pains in common?

Yes, and so they will.

And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will alike call "my own," and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain?

Yes, far more so than in other States.

And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the State, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and children?

That will be the chief reason.

And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was implied in our comparison of a wellordered State to the relation of the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?

That we acknowledged, and very rightly.

Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the source of the greatest good to the State?

Certainly.

And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming -- that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; their pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens, and they were to have no private expenses; for we intended them to preserve their true character of guardians.

Right, he replied.

Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am saying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about "mine" and "not mine;" each man dragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own, where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains; but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and therefore they all tend toward a common end.

Certainly, he replied.

And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will be delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion.

Of course they will.

Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall maintain to be honorable and right; we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity.

That is good, he said.

Yes; and there is a further good in the law; viz., that if a man has a quarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and not proceed to more dangerous lengths.

Certainly.

To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger.

Clearly.

Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence to an elder,

unless the magistrates command him; nor will he slight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in the relation of parents; fear, that the injured one will be succored by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers.

That is true, he replied.

Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one another?

Yes, there will be no want of peace.

And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another.

None whatever.

I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be rid, for they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy necessaries for their household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep -- the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in this way are mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of.

Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.

And from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.

How so?

The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and the crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fulness of all that life needs; they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living, and after death have an honorable burial.

Do you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion someone who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians unhappy -- they had nothing and might have possessed all things -- to whom we replied that, if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter consider this question, but that, as at present divided, we would make our guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the State with a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but of the whole?

Yes, I remember.

And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors -- is the life of shoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared with it?

Certainly not.

At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that if any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but, infatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his head shall seek to appropriate the whole State to himself, then he will have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, "half is more

than the whole."

If he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when you have the offer of such a life.

You agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of life such as we have described -- common education, common children; and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt together like dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are able, women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is best, and will not violate, but preserve, the natural relation of the sexes.

I agree with you, he replied.

The inquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community will be found possible -- as among other animals, so also among men -- and if possible, in what way possible?

You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest.

There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by them.

How?

Why, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with them any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner of the artisan's child, they may look on at the work which they will have to do when they are grown up; and besides looking on they will have to help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on and help, long before they touch the wheel?

Yes, I have.

And shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in giving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than our guardians will be?

The idea is ridiculous, he said.

There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals, the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valor.

That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often happen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost as well as their parents, and the State will never recover.

True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk?

I am far from saying that.

Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?

Clearly.

Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their youth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly be incurred.

Yes, very important.

This then must be our first step -- to make our children spectators of war; but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger; then all will be well.

True.

Their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but to know, as far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and what dangerous?

That may be assumed.

And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones?

True.

And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers?

Very properly.

Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal of chance about them?

True.

Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and when they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the horses must not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet the swiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent view of what is hereafter to be their own business; and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape.

I believe that you are right, he said.

Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan. What do you think?

By all means, I should say.

And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what they like with him.

Certainly.

But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In the first place, he shall receive honor in the army from his youthful comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you say?

I approve.

And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?

To that too, I agree.

But you will hardly agree to my next proposal.

What is your proposal?

That he should kiss and be kissed by them.

Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his love be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valor.

Capital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has been already

determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible?

Agreed.

Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave youths should be honored; for he tells how Ajax, after he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chines, which seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of honor but also a very strengthening thing.

Most true, he said.

Then in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honor the brave according to the measure of their valor, whether men or women, with hymns and those other distinctions which we were mentioning; also with

"seats of precedence, and meats and full cups;"

and in honoring them, we shall be at the same time training them.

That, he replied, is excellent.

Yes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race?

To be sure.

Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead

"They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of evil, the guardians of speechgifted men"?

Yes; and we accept his authority.

We must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we must do as he bids?

By all means.

And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their sepulchres as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are deemed preeminently good, whether they die from age or in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honors.

That is very right, he said.

Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?

In what respect do you mean?

First of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?

To spare them is infinitely better.

Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.

Certainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the barbarians and will keep their hands off one another.

Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but their armor? Does not the

practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, pretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder.

Very true.

And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him -- is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?

Very like a dog, he said.

Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?

Yes, he replied, we most certainly must.

Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes; and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?

Very true.

Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses, what is to be the practice?

May I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?

Both should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual produce and no more. Shall I tell you why?

Pray do.

Why, you see, there is a difference in the names "discord" and "war," and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external and foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the second, war.

That is a very proper distinction, he replied.

And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to the barbarians?

Very good, he said.

And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians, and barbarians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends; and such enmity is to be called discord.

I agree.

Consider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and mother: There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest, but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts, and would not mean to go on fighting forever.

Yes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.

And will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?

It ought to be, he replied.

Then will not the citizens be good and civilized?

Yes, very civilized.

And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land, and share in the common temples?

Most certainly.

And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only -- a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?

Certainly not.

Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled? Certainly.

They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?

Just so.

And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a city -- men, women, and children -- are equally their enemies, for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands and raze their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?

I agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.

Then let us enact this law also for our guardians: that they are neither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.

Agreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our previous enactments, are very good.

But still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this way you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of this discussion you thrust aside: Is such an order of things possible, and how, if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the State. I will add, what you have omitted, that your citizens will be the bravest of warriors, and will never leave their ranks, for they will all know one another, and each will call the other father, brother, son; and if you suppose the women to join their armies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror to the enemy, or as auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be absolutely invincible; and there are many domestic advantages which might also be mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge: but, as I admit all these advantages and as many more as you please, if only this State of yours were to come into existence, we need say no more about them; assuming then the existence of the State, let us now turn to the question of possibility and ways and means -- the rest may be left.

If I loiter for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, I said, and have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves, and you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard the third wave, I think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge that some fear and hesitation were natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary as that which I have now to state

and investigate.

The more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more determined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: speak out and at once.

Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search after justice and injustice.

True, he replied; but what of that?

I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?

The approximation will be enough.

We were inquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact.

True, he said.

Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed?

He would be none the worse.

Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?

To be sure.

And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?

Surely not, he replied.

That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show how and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you, having this in view, to repeat your former admissions.

What admissions?

I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual, whatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth? What do you say?

I agree.

Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every respect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented. I am sure that I should be contented -- will not you?

Yes, I will.

Let me next endeavor to show what is that fault in States which is the cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change which will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the change, if possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any rate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible.

Certainly, he replied.

I think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only one change were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.

What is it? he said.

Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and dishonor; and do you mark my words.

Proceed.

I said: "Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils -- no, nor the human race, as I believe -- and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day." Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in no other State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing.

Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment, and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main, before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what; and if you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be "pared by their fine wits," and no mistake.

You got me into the scrape, I said.

And I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of it; but I can only give you goodwill and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers to your questions better than another -- that is all. And now, having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbelievers that you are right.

I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance. And I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the State; then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be discovered to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State; and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers rather than leaders.

Then now for a definition, he said.

Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation.

Proceed.

I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to some one part of that which he loves, but to the whole.

I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my memory.

Another person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of pleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his charming face; the hooknose of another has, you say, a royal look; while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of

regularity: the dark visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the sweet "honeypale," as they are called, what is the very name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is not averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not say, in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the springtime of youth.

If you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the argument, I assent.

And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.

Very good.

And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army, they are willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honored by really great and important persons, they are glad to be honored by lesser and meaner people -- but honor of some kind they must have.

Exactly.

Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the whole class or a part only?

The whole.

And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole?

Yes, of the whole.

And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not, such a one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?

Very true, he said.

Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not right?

Glaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights have a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion, if they could help, while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus; whether the performance is in town or country -- that makes no difference -- they are there. Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor arts, are philosophers?

Certainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation.

He said: Who then are the true philosophers?

Those, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth.

That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?

To another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.

What is the proposition?

That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?

Certainly.

And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?

True again.

And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various combinations of them with actions and things and with one another, they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many? Very true.

And this is the distinction which I draw between the sightloving, artloving, practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers.

How do you distinguish them? he said.

The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colors and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their minds are incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.

True, he replied.

Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.

Very true.

And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow -- of such a one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?

I should certainly say that such a one was dreaming.

But take the case of the other, who recognizes the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects -- is he a dreamer, or is he awake?

He is wide awake.

And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?

Certainly.

But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?

We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.

Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him).

I answer that he knows something.

Something that is or is not?

Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?

And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of view, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly nonexistent is utterly unknown?

Nothing can be more certain.

Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being?

Yes, between them.

And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to notbeing, for that intermediate between being and notbeing there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such?

Certainly.

Do we admit the existence of opinion?

Undoubtedly.

As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?

Another faculty.

Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?

Yes.

And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed further I will make a division.

What division?

I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?

Yes, I quite understand.

Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore the distinctions of figure, color, and the like, which enable me to discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result; and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty, but that which has another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?

Yes.

And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?

Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.

And is opinion also a faculty?

Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form an opinion.

And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion?

Why, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify that which is infallible with that which errs?

An excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite conscious of a distinction between them.

Yes.

Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or subjectmatters?

That is certain.

Being is the sphere or subjectmatter of knowledge, and knowledge is to know the nature of being?

Yes.

And opinion is to have an opinion?

Yes.

And do we know what we opine? or is the subjectmatter of opinion the same as the subjectmatter of knowledge?

Nay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference in faculty implies difference in the sphere or subjectmatter, and if, as we were saying, opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same.

Then if being is the subjectmatter of knowledge, something else must be the subjectmatter of opinion?

Yes, something else. Well, then, is notbeing the subjectmatter of opinion? or, rather, how can there be an opinion at all about notbeing? Reflect: when a man has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing?

Impossible.

He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?

Yes.

And notbeing is not one thing, but, properly speaking, nothing?

True.

Of notbeing, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of being, knowledge?

True, he said.

Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with notbeing?

Not with either.

And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?

That seems to be true.

But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a greater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance?

In neither.

Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge, but lighter than ignorance?

Both; and in no small degree.

And also to be within and between them?

Yes.

Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?

No question.

But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute notbeing; and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will

be found in the interval between them?

True.

And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call opinion?

There has.

Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the nature of being and notbeing, and cannot rightly be termed either, pure and simple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly call the subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper faculty -- the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean.

True.

This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty -- in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold -- he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one, or that anything is one -- to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so very kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is one which will not be found ugly; or of the just, which will not be found unjust; or of the holy, which will not also be unholy?

No, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly; and the same is true of the rest.

And may not the many which are doubles be also halves? -- doubles, that is, of one thing, and halves of another?

Quite true.

And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?

True; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.

And can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this?

He replied: They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or notbeing, or both, or neither.

Then what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place than between being and notbeing? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than notbeing, or more full of light and existence than being.

That is quite true, he said.

Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the multitude entertain about the beautiful and about all other things are tossing about in some region which is halfway between pure being and pure notbeing?

We have.

Yes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty.

Quite true.

Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the many just, and not absolute justice, and the like -- such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge?

That is certain.

But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know, and not to have opinion only?

Neither can that be denied.

The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colors, but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty.

Yes, I remember.

Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them?

I shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true.

But those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion.

Assuredly.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Republic

Plato

Book VI: The Philosophy Of Government

(SOCRATES, GLAUCON.)

AND thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.

I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.

I suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the unjust must consider.

And what is the next question? he asked.

Surely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State?

And how can we rightly answer that question?

Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our State -- let them be our guardians.

Very good.

Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?

There can be no question of that.

And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them -- are not such persons, I ask, simply blind?

Truly, he replied, they are much in that condition.

And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?

There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this greatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they fail in some other respect. Suppose, then, I said,

that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellences.

By all means.

In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such a union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State.

What do you mean?

Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption.

Agreed.

And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honorable, which they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition.

True.

And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also possess?

What quality?

Truthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their minds falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.

Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them.

"May be." my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather, "must be affirmed:" for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.

Right, he said.

And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

How can there be?

Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?

Never.

The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth?

Assuredly.

But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel.

True.

He whose desires are drawn toward knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure -- I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.

That is most certain.

Such a one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no place in his character.

Very true.

Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered.

What is that?

There should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human.

Most true, he replied.

Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life?

He cannot.

Or can such a one account death fearful? No, indeed.

Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?

Certainly not.

Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean, or a boaster, or a coward -- can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings?

Impossible.

Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical.

True.

There is another point which should be remarked.

What point?

Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.

Certainly not.

And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?

That is certain. Laboring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation? Yes.

Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?

Certainly.

And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion?

Undoubtedly.

And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?

To proportion.

Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally wellproportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously toward the true being of everything.

Certainly.

Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have a full and perfect participation of being?

They are absolutely necessary, he replied.

And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn -- noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?

The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study.

And to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to these only you will intrust the State.

Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates, no one can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling passes over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led astray a little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering questions; these littles accumulate, and at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be turned upside down. And as unskilful players of draughts are at last shut up by their more skilful adversaries and have no piece to move, so they too find themselves shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are the counters; and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us might say, that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, not only in youth as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, most of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol.

Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?

I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.

Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.

Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them?

You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a parable.

Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed, I suppose.

I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion; but now hear the parable, and then you will be still more amused at the meagreness of my imagination: for the manner in which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore, if I am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put together a figure made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering -- everyone is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to cut in pieces anyone who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, begging and praying him to commit the helm to them; and if at any time they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such manner as might be expected of them.

Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a goodfornothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship, and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like or not -- the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling. Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a stargazer, a goodfornothing?

Of course, said Adeimantus.

Then you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the figure, which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the State; for you understand already.

Certainly.

Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised at finding that philosophers have no honor in their cities; explain it to him and try to convince him that their having honor would be far more extraordinary.

I will.

Say to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him -- that is not the order of nature; neither are "the wise to go to the doors of the rich" -- the ingenious author of this saying told a lie -- but the truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, to the physician he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who is able to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him; although the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp; they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them goodfornothings and stargazers.

Precisely so, he said.

For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite faction; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by her opponents, but by her own professing followers, the same of whom you suppose the accuser to say that the greater number of them are arrant rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed.

Yes.

And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?

True.

Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other?

By all means.

And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his leader, whom he followed always and in all things;

failing in this, he was an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy.

Yes, that was said.

Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of him?

Certainly, he said.

And have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being -- that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but will go on -- the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail.

Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him.

And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?

He will.

And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he leads?

Impossible.

Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow after?

True, he replied.

Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, magnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved, we were then led to inquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher.

Exactly.

And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature, why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling -- I am speaking of those who were said to be useless but not wicked -- and, when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy and upon all philosophers that universal reprobation of which we speak.

What are these corruptions? he said.

I will see if I can explain them to you. Everyone will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men?

Rare indeed.

And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures!

What causes?

In the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys and

distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them.

That is very singular, he replied.

Then there are all the ordinary goods of life -- beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections in the State -- you understand the sort of things -- these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.

I understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about them.

Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no longer appear strange to you.

And how am I to do so? he asked.

Why, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment, or climate, or soil, in proportion to their vigor, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to what is not.

Very true.

There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is greater.

Certainly.

And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are illeducated, become preeminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?

There I think that you are right.

And our philosopher follows the same analogy -- he is like a plant which, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts?

When is this accomplished? he said.

When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame -- at such a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have -- he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?

Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.

And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been mentioned.

What is that?

The gentle force of attainder, or confiscation, or death, which, as you are aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when their words are powerless.

Indeed they do; and in right good earnest.

Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest?

None, he replied.

No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly; there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different type of character which has had no other training in virtue but that which is supplied by public opinion -- I speak, my friend, of human virtue only; what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may truly say.

I quite assent, he replied.

Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation.

What are you going to say?

Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him -- he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honorable and that dishonorable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights, and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to others, the nature of either, or the difference between them, which is immense. By heaven, would not such a one be a rare educator?

Indeed, he would.

And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or in music, or, finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them his judges when he is not obliged, the socalled necessity of Diomede will oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honorable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?

No, nor am I likely to hear.

You recognize the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful, or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?

Certainly not.

Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?

Impossible.

And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world?

They must.

And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?

That is evident.

Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end? -- and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence -- these were admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.

Yes.

Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among us all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?

Certainly, he said.

And his friends and fellowcitizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes?

No question.

Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honor and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now the power which he will one day possess.

That often happens, he said.

And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall, proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and having got such notions into his head will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless pride?

To be sure he will.

Now, when he is in this state of mind, if someone gently comes to him and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can only be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?

Far otherwise.

And even if there be someone who through inherent goodness or natural reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him from yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?

There can be no doubt of it.

And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?

Impossible.

Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher, may, if he be illeducated, divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and their

accompaniments and the other socalled goods of life?

We were quite right.

Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits; they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time; this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in that direction; but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to States.

That is most true, he said.

And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonor her; and fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number deserve the severest punishment.

That is certainly what people say.

Yes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny creatures who, seeing this land open to them -- a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles -- like prisoners running out of prison into a sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those who do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts. Is not this unavoidable?

Yes.

Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of durance and come into a fortune -- he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who is left poor and desolate?

A most exact parallel.

What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard?

There can be no question of it.

And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is in a rank above them, what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom?

No doubt, he said.

Then, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant: perchance some noble and welleducated person, detained by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences remains devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which he contemns and neglects; and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to her; or peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages's bridle; for everything in the life of Theages conspired to divert him from philosophy; but illhealth kept him away from politics. My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have

also seen enough of the madness of the multitude; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such a one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts -- he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and goodwill, with bright hopes.

Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs.

A great work -- yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable to him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth and be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself.

The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently explained: the injustice of the charges against her has been shown -- is there anything more which you wish to say?

Nothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.

Not any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring against them -- not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and estranged; as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another character. But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but human; and now, I know that you are going to ask, What that State is:

No, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question -- whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or some other?

Yes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying before, that some living authority would always be required in the State having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as legislator you were laying down the laws.

That was said, he replied.

Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.

What is there remaining?

The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be the ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; "hard is the good," as men say.

Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the inquiry will then be complete.

I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want of power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to remark in what I am about to say how boldly and

unhesitatingly I declare that States should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit.

In what manner?

At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young; beginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from moneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic, take themselves off. In after life, when invited by someone else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business: at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are extinguished more truly than Heracleitus's sun, inasmuch as they never light up again.

But what ought to be their course?

Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years: during this period while they are growing up toward manhood, the chief and special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the service of philosophy; as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul; but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labor, as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another.

How truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced; Thrasymachus least of all.

Do not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men, or do something which may profit them against the day when they live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.

You are speaking of a time which is not very near.

Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe; for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized; they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue -- such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image, they have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them -- do you think that they ever did?

No indeed.

No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble sentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.

They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.

And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor States nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled,

whether they will or not, to take care of the State, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them; or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm: if they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right?

Quite right.

If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death, that this our constitution has been, and is -- yea, and will be whenever the muse of philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this; that there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.

My opinion agrees with yours, he said.

But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?

I should imagine not, he replied.

O my friends, I said, do not attack the multitude: they will change their minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of soothing them and removing their dislike of overeducation, you show them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now doing their character and profession, and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed -- if they view him in this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves him, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper may be found, but not in the majority of mankind.

I quite agree with you, he said.

And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many entertain toward philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this.

It is most unbecoming.

For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed toward things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?

Impossible.

And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like everyone else, he will suffer from detraction.

Of course.

And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, will be, think you, be an unskilful artificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue?

Anything but unskilful.

And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern?

They will not be angry if they understand, he said. But how will they draw out the plan of which you are speaking?

They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator -- they will have nothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface.

They will be very right, he said.

Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution?

No doubt.

And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upward and downward: I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.

Very true, he said.

And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God?

Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.

And now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is such a one as we were praising; at whom they were so very indignant because to his hands we committed the State; and are they growing a little calmer at what they have just heard?

Much calmer, if there is any sense in them.

Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?

They would not be so unreasonable.

Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest good?

Neither can they doubt this.

But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favorable circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected?

Surely not.

Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear rule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized?

I think that they will be less angry.

Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and that they have been

converted and for very shame, if for no other reason, cannot refuse to come to terms?

By all means, he said.

Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will anyone deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers?

Surely no man, he said.

And when they have come into being will anyone say that they must of necessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape -- who will venture to affirm this?

Who indeed!

But, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous.

Yes, one is enough.

The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?

Certainly.

And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or impossibility?

I think not.

But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best.

We have.

And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not impossible.

Very good.

And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more remains to be discussed; how and by what studies and pursuits will the saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies?

Certainly.

I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism -- he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honors and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.

I perfectly remember, he said.

Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word; but now let me dare to say -- that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher.

Yes, he said, let that be affirmed.

And do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly found in shreds and patches.

What do you mean? he said.

You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that persons who possess them and are at the same time highspirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them.

Very true, he said.

On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.

Quite true.

And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office or command.

Certainly, he said.

And will they be a class which is rarely found?

Yes, indeed.

Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labors and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention -- he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises.

Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing them. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge?

You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom?

Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.

And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them?

To what do you refer?

We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end of which they would appear; but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the inquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner; whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.

Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth.

But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further.

Not an uncommon case when people are indolent.

Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and of the laws.

True.

The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling.

What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this -- higher than justice and the other virtues?

Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present -- nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!

A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge?

Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?

Assuredly not.

You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?

Yes.

And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?

How ridiculous!

Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it -- for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term "good" -- this is of course ridiculous.

Most true, he said.

And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.

Certainly.

And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?

True.

There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved.

There can be none.

Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honorable without the reality; but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good -- the reality is what they seek; in the case of the good, appearance is despised by everyone.

Very true, he said.

Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things -- of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is intrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance?

Certainly not, he said.

I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.

That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.

And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge, our State will be perfectly ordered?

Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either?

Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.

True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own.

Well, but has anyone a right to say positively what he does not know?

Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?

Very true.

And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?

Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.

Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear -- otherwise, not.

By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.

I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as

now, of the offspring only; take, however, this latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.

Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.

Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.

What?

The old story, that there is many a beautiful and many a good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term "many" is implied.

True, he said.

And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term "many" is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.

Very true.

The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen.

Exactly.

And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?

The sight, he said.

And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?

True.

But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?

No, I never have, he said.

Then reflect: has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?

Nothing of the sort.

No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses -- you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?

Certainly not.

But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen?

How do you mean?

Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see; color being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colors will be invisible.

Of what nature are you speaking?

Of that which you term light, I replied.

True, he said.

Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?

Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.

And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?

You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.

May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?

How?

Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?

No.

Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?

By far the most like.

And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?

Exactly.

Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognized by sight?

True, he said.

And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind:

Will you be a little more explicit? he said.

Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them toward objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of vision in them?

Very true.

But when they are directed toward objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them?

Certainly.

And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned toward the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence?

Just so.

Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honor yet higher.

What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good?

God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view?

In what point of view?

You would say, would you not? that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?

Certainly.

In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.

Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how amazing!

Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made me utter my fancies.

And pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.

Yes, I said, there is a great deal more.

Then omit nothing, however slight.

I will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will have to be omitted. I hope not, he said.

You have to Imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name (ovpavos, opatos). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?

I have.

Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?

Yes, I understand.

Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.

Very good.

Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?

Most undoubtedly.

Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.

In what manner?

Thus: There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upward to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.

I do not quite understand your meaning, he said.

Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd, and the even, and the figures, and three kinds of angles, and the like, in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?

Yes, he said, I know.

And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on -- the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?

That is true.

And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.

I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts.

And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses -- that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.

I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be describing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding, and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.

You have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul -- reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last -- and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.

I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.

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The Republic

Plato

Book VII: On Shadows And Realities In Education

(Socrates, Glaucon.)

AND now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open toward the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionetteplayers have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

I see.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

Very true.

And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passersby spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

No question, he replied.

To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.

And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused

of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look toward the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive someone saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned toward more real existence, he has a clearer vision -- what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them -- will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Far truer.

And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True, he said.

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Certainly.

Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Certainly.

He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellowprisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity him?

Certainly, he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honors among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honors and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,

"Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,"

and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

To be sure, he said.

And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if anyone tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prisonhouse is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upward to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed -- whether rightly or wrongly, God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

Anything but surprising, he replied. Anyone who has commonsense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees anyone whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

That, he said, is a very just distinction.

But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

They undoubtedly say this, he replied.

Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or, in other words, of the good.

Very true.

And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.

And whereas the other socalled virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue -- how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness?

Very true, he said.

But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below -- if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

Very likely.

Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of the State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blessed.

Very true, he replied.

Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all -- they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

What do you mean?

I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to

descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labors and honors, whether they are worth having or not.

But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?

You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

True, he said, I had forgotten.

Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being selftaught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State, which is also yours, will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.

Quite true, he replied.

And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light?

Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present rulers of State.

Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a wellordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas, if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.

Most true, he replied.

And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?

Indeed, I do not, he said.

And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.

No question. Who, then, are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honors and another and a better life than that of politics?

They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.

And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light -- as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?

By all means, he replied.

The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oystershell, but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below, which we affirm to be true philosophy?

Quite so.

And should we not inquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting such a change?

Certainly.

What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?

Yes, that was said.

Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?

What quality?

Usefulness in war.

Yes, if possible.

There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not?

Just so.

There was gymnastics, which presided over the growth and decay of the body, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption?

True.

Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover? No.

But what do you say of music, what also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme?

Music, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastics, and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and the words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended to that good which you are now seeking.

You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts were reckoned mean by us?

Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastics are excluded, and the arts are also excluded, what

remains?

Well, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then we shall have to take something which is not special, but of the universal application.

What may that be?

A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, and which everyone first has to learn among the elements of education.

What is that?

The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three -- in a word, number and calculation: do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?

Yes.

Then the art of war partakes of them?

To be sure.

Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own fleet -- how could he if he was ignorant of number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?

I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.

Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?

Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.

I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study?

What is your notion?

It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and which leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly used; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul toward being.

Will you explain your meaning? he said.

I will try, I said; and I wish you would share the inquiry with me, and say "yes" or "no" when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.

Explain, he said.

I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further inquiry is imperatively demanded.

You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.

No, I said, that is not at all my meaning.

Then what is your meaning?

When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from one sensation to the

opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer: here are three fingers -- a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.

Very good.

You may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the point.

What is it?

Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin -- it makes no difference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not compelled to ask of thought the question, What is a finger? for the sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.

True.

And therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence.

There is not, he said.

But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and the other at the extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is not their mode of operation on this wise -- the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft?

You are quite right, he said.

And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?

Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious and require to be explained.

Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two.

True.

And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?

Certainly.

And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state of division, for if they were undivided they could only be conceived of as one?

True.

The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner; they were not distinguished.

Yes.

Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused.

Very true.

Was not this the beginning of the inquiry, "What is great?" and "What is small?"

Exactly so.

And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

Most true.

This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect, or the reverse -- those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.

I understand, he said, and agree with you.

And to which class do unity and number belong?

I do not know, he replied.

Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger, there would be nothing to attract toward being; but when there is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks, "What is absolute unity?" This is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being.

And surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?

Yes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?

Certainly.

And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?

Yes.

And they appear to lead the mind toward truth?

Yes, in a very remarkable manner.

Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.

That is true.

And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?

Certainly.

Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe; and we must endeavor to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor again, like merchants or retailtraders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.

That is excellent, he said.

Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the science is! and in how many

ways it conduces to our desired end, if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper!

How do you mean?

I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule anyone who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply, taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.

That is very true.

Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable, indivisible -- what would they answer?

They would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of those numbers which can only be realized in thought.

Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary, necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the attainment of pure truth?

Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it.

And have you further observed that those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been?

Very true, he said.

And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not many as difficult.

You will not.

And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up.

I agree.

Let this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall we inquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?

You mean geometry?

Exactly so.

Clearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which relates to war; for in pitching a camp or taking up a position or closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military manoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician.

Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or calculation will be enough; the question relates rather to the greater and more advanced part of geometry -- whether that tends in any degree to make more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze toward that place, where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by all means, to behold.

True, he said.

Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming only, it does not concern us?

Yes, that is what we assert.

Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians.

How so?

They have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the like -- they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; whereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science.

Certainly, he said.

Then must not a further admission be made?

What admission?

That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient.

That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.

Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul toward truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.

Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect.

Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover, the science has indirect effects, which are not small.

Of what kind? he said.

There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all departments of knowledge, as experience proves, anyone who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not. Yes, indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them.

Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will study?

Let us do so, he replied.

And suppose we make astronomy the third -- what do you say?

I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor.

I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and reillumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class of those who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to argue. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive.

I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own behalf.

Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences.

What was the mistake? he said.

After plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the second dimension, the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have followed.

That is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about these subjects.

Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons: in the first place, no government patronizes them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and they are difficult; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found, and, even if he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited, would not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole State became the director of these studies and gave honor to them; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way by their natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the State, they would some day emerge into light.

Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?

Yes, I said.

And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?

Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.

True, he said.

Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.

The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be given in your own spirit. For everyone, as I think, must see that astronomy compels the soul to look upward and leads us from this world to another. Everyone but myself, I said; to everyone else this may be clear, but not to me.

And what, then, would you say?

I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look downward, and not upward.

What do you mean? he asked.

You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upward, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downward, not upward, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats or only lies on his back.

I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking?

I will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.

True, he replied.

The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that higher knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true double, or the truth of any other proportion.

No, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous.

And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner? But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the stars to these and to one another, and any other things that are material and visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation -- that would be absurd; and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating their exact truth.

I quite agree, though I never thought of this before.

Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way and so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use.

That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.

Yes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a similar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any value. But can you tell me of any other suitable study?

No, he said, not without thinking.

Motion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are obvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as I imagine, which may be left to wiser persons.

But where are the two?

There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already named.

And what may that be?

The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are sister sciences -- as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them?

Yes, he replied.

But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go and learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher object.

What is that?

There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying that they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you probably know, the same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the sounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labor, like that of the astronomers, is in vain.

Yes, by heaven! he said; and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their neighbor's wall -- one set of them declaring that they distinguish an intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the same -- either party setting their ears before their understanding.

You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these are not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to inquire about harmony. For they too are in error, like the astronomers; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems -- that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not.

That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.

A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought after with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other spirit, useless. Very true, he said.

Now, when all these studies reach the point of intercommunion and connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them.

I suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.

What do you mean? I said; the prelude, or what? Do you not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?

Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning.

But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of them?

Neither can this be supposed.

And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as you may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.

Exactly, he said.

Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?

True.

But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their weak eyes the images in the water (which are divine), and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an image) -- this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible world -- this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which have been described.

I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe, yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, however, is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain, and describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest.

Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only, but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have seen something like reality; of that I am confident.

Doubtless, he replied.

But I must also remind you that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.

Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.

And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of comprehending by any regular process all true existence, or of ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being -- geometry and the like -- they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science?

Impossible, he said.

Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upward; and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science: and this, in our previous sketch, was called understanding. But why should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance

to consider? Why, indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind with clearness?

At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of shadows, opinion being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being; and so to make a proportion:

"As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion. And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of shadows."

But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long inquiry, many times longer than this has been.

As far as I understand, he said, I agree.

And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit so much?

Yes, he said; how can I deny it?

And you would say the same of the conception of the good?

Until the person is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never faltering at any step of the argument -- unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion, and not by science; dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake here, he arrives at the world below, and has his final quietus.

In all that I should most certainly agree with you.

And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you are nurturing and educating -- if the ideal ever becomes a reality -- you would not allow the future rulers to be like posts, having no reason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?

Certainly not.

Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?

Yes, he said, you and I together will make it.

Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the copingstone of the sciences, and is set over them; no other science can be placed higher -- the nature of knowledge can no further go?

I agree, he said.

But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be assigned, are questions which remain to be considered.

Yes, clearly.

You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?

Certainly, he said.

The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and, having noble and generous tempers, they should also

have the natural gifts which will facilitate their education.

And what are these?

Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared with the body.

Very true, he replied.

Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labor in any line; or he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him.

Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.

The mistake at present is that those who study philosophy have no vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand, and not bastards.

What do you mean?

In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting industry -- I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle: as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastics and hunting, and all other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labor of learning or listening or inquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness.

Certainly, he said.

And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?

To be sure.

And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities, States and individuals unconsciously err; and the State makes a ruler, and the individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.

That is very true, he said.

All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and if only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing to say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at present.

That would not be creditable.

Certainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I am equally ridiculous.

In what respect?

I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too much excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of

indignation at the authors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.

Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so.

But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows old may learn many things -- for he can no more learn much than he can run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.

Of course.

And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of education.

Why not?

Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.

Very true.

Then, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let early education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out the natural bent.

That is a very rational notion, he said.

Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the battle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be brought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?

Yes, I remember.

The same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things -- labors, lessons, dangers -- and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be enrolled in a select number.

At what age?

At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period, whether of two or three years, which passes in this sort of training is useless for any other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests to which our youth are subjected.

Certainly, he replied.

After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old will be promoted to higher honor, and the sciences which they learned without any order in their early education will now be brought together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being.

Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.

Yes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.

I agree with you, he said.

These, I said, are the points which you must consider; and those who have most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their learning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have arrived at the age of thirty will have to be chosen by you out of

the select class, and elevated to higher honor; and you will have to prove them by the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of sight and the other senses, and in company with truth to attain absolute being: And here, my friend, great caution is required.

Why great caution?

Do you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has introduced?

What evil? he said.

The students of the art are filled with lawlessness.

Quite true, he said.

Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in their case? or will you make allowance for them?

In what way make allowance?

I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son who is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous family, and has many flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he learns that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave toward his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the period when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he knows? Or shall I guess for you?

If you please.

Then I should say that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely to honor his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need, or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less willing to disobey them in any important matter.

He will.

But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would diminish his honor and regard for them, and would become more devoted to the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would now live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations.

Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy?

In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and honor, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental authority we have been brought up, obeying and honoring them.

That is true.

There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of right, and they continue to obey and honor the maxims of their fathers.

True.

Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair or honorable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into believing that nothing is honorable any more than dishonorable, or just and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions which he most valued, do you think that

he will still honor and obey them as before?

Impossible.

And when he ceases to think them honorable and natural as heretofore, and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life other than that which flatters his desires?

He cannot.

And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?

Unquestionably.

Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.

Yes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable.

Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing them to dialectic.

Certainly.

There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppydogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.

Yes, he said, there is nothing which they like better.

And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world.

Too true, he said.

But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such insanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the greater moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing the honor of the pursuit.

Very true, he said.

And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any chance aspirant or intruder?

Very true.

Suppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise -- will that be enough?

Would you say six or four years? he asked.

Say five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm or flinch.

And how long is this stage of their lives to last?

Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives, and in every branch of knowledge, come at last to their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty; and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blessed and dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honor them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but if not, as in any case blessed and divine.

You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty.

Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their natures can go.

There you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all things like the men.

Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although difficult, not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopherkings are born in a State, one or more of them, despising the honors of this present world which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and the honor that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city?

How will they proceed?

They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of their children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents; these they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws which we have given them: and in this way the State and constitution of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, and the nation which has such a constitution will gain most.

Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have very well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being. Enough, then, of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its image -- there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.

There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Republic

Plato

Book VIII: Four Forms Of Government

(Socrates, Glaucon.)

AND so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?

That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.

Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when appointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing, which are common to all, and contain nothing private, or individual; and about their property, you remember what we agreed?

Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving from the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance, and they were to take care of themselves and of the whole State.

True, I said; and now that this division of our task is concluded, let us find the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old path.

There is no difficulty in returning; you implied, then as now, that you had finished the description of the State: you said that such a State was good, and that the man was good who answered to it, although, as now appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man. And you said further, that if this was the true form, then the others were false; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember, that there were four principal ones, and that their defects, and the defects of the individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining. When we had seen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was the best and who was the worst of them, we were to consider whether the best was not also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I asked you what were the four forms of government of which you spoke, and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; and you began again, and have found your way to the point at which we have now arrived.

Your recollection, I said, is most exact.

Then, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same position; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same answer which you were about to give me then.

Yes, if I can, I will, I said.

I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you were speaking.

That question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which I spoke, so far as they have

distinct names, are first, those of Crete and Sparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy comes next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know, do you? of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct character. There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate forms of government. But these are nondescripts and may be found equally among Hellenes and among barbarians.

Yes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government which exist among them.

Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For we cannot suppose that States are made of "oak and rock," and not out of the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale and draw other things after them?

Yes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human characters.

Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five?

Certainly.

Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good, we have already described.

We have.

Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice. The inquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice.

Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say.

Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness, of taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin with the government of honor? -- I know of no name for such a government other than timocracy or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with this the like character in the individual; and, after that, consider oligarchy and the oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our attention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go and view the city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision.

That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.

First, then, I said, let us inquire how timocracy (the government of honor) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power; a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved.

Very true, he said.

In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the muses to tell us "how discord first arose"? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery, to

play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?

How would they address us?

After this manner: A city which is thus constituted can hardly be shaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end, even a constitution such as yours will not last forever, but will in time be dissolved. And this is the dissolution: In plants that grow in the earth, as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of each are completed, which in shortlived existences pass over a short space, and in longlived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not attain; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number, but the period of human birth is comprehended in a number in which first increments by involution and evolution (or squared and cubed) obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one another. The base of these (3) with a third added (4), when combined with five (20) and raised to the third power, furnishes two harmonies; the first a square which is 100 times as great (400 = 4 x 100), and the other a figure having one side equal to the former, but oblong, consisting of 100 numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square (i.e., omitting fractions), the side of which is five (7 x 7 = 49 x 100 = 4900), each of them being less by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five = 50 + 50 = 100); and 100 cubes of three (27 x 100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 = 8000). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of births. For when your guardians are ignorant of the law of births, and unite bride and bridegroom out of season, the children will not be goodly or fortunate. And though only the best of them will be appointed by their predecessor, still they will be unworthy to hold their father's places, and when they come into power as guardians they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us, the muses, first by undervaluing music; which neglect will soon extend to gymnastics; and hence the young men of your State will be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your different races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and brass and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, and brass with gold, and hence there will arise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity, which always and in all places are causes of hatred and war. This the muses affirm to be the stock from which discord has sprung, wherever arising; and this is their answer to us.

Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly.

Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the muses speak falsely?

And what do the muses say next?

When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the iron and brass fell to acquiring money, and land, and houses, and gold, and silver; but the gold and silver races, not wanting money, but having the true riches in their own nature, inclined toward virtue and the ancient order of things. There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual owners; and they enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants;

and they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them.

I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.

And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy?

Very true.

Such will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will they proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and will also have some peculiarities.

True, he said.

In the honor given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warriorclass from agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of common meals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military training -- in all these respects this State will resemble the former.

True.

But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements; and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who are by nature fitted for war rather than peace; and in the value set by them upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of everlasting wars -- this State will be for the most part peculiar.

Yes.

Yes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those who live in oligarchies; they will have a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please.

That is most true, he said.

And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on the gratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and running away like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the true muse, the companion of reason and philosophy, and have honored gymnastics more than music.

Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a mixture of good and evil.

Why, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen -- the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.

Assuredly, he said.

Such is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been described in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required, for a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all the characters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labor.

Very true, he replied.

Now what man answers to this form of government -- how did he come into being, and what is he

like?

I think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which characterizes him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.

Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there are other respects in which he is very different.

In what respects?

He should have more of selfassertion and be less cultivated and yet a friend of culture; and he should be a good listener but no speaker. Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is too proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover of honor; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.

Yes, that is the type of character that answers to timocracy.

Such a one will despise riches only when he is young; but as he gets older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of the avaricious nature in him, and is not singleminded toward virtue, having lost his best guardian.

Who was that? said Adeimantus.

Philosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her abode in a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.

Good, he said.

Such, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical State.

Exactly.

His origin is as follows: He is often the young son of a brave father, who dwells in an illgoverned city, of which he declines the honors and offices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.

And how does the son come into being?

The character of the son begins to develop when he hears his mother complaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the consequence is that she has no precedence among other women. Further, when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens to him quietly; and when she observes that his thoughts always centre in himself, while he treats her with very considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too easygoing: adding all the other complaints about her own illtreatment which women are so fond of rehearsing.

Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints are so like themselves.

And you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to be attached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same strain to the son; and if they see anyone who owes money to his father, or is wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort, and be more of a man than his father. He has only to walk abroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing: those who do their own business in the city are called simpletons, and held in no esteem, while the busybodies are honored and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing and seeing all these things --

hearing, too, the words of his father, and having a nearer view of his way of life, and making comparisons of him and others -- is drawn opposite ways: while his father is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul, the others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive; and he being not originally of a bad nature, but having kept bad company, is at last brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness and passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious.

You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.

Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second type of character?

We have.

Next, let us look at another man who, as AEschylus says,

"Is set over against another State;"

or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.

By all means.

I believe that oligarchy follows next in order.

And what manner of government do you term oligarchy?

A government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power and the poor man is deprived of it.

I understand, he replied.

Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to oligarchy arises?

Yes.

Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into the other.

How?

The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do they or their wives care about the law?

Yes, indeed.

And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.

Likely enough.

And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a fortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance the one always rises as the other falls.

True.

And in proportion as riches and rich men are honored in the State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonored.

Clearly.

And what is honored is cultivated, and that which has no honor is neglected.

That is obvious.

And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers of trade and money; they honor and look up to the rich man, and make a ruler of him, and dishonor the poor man.

They do so.

They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the qualification of citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower in another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government. These changes in the constitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not already done their work.

Very true.

And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is established.

Yes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of government, and what are the defects of which we were speaking?

First of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification Just think what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot?

You mean that they would shipwreck?

Yes; and is not this true of the government of anything?

I should imagine so.

Except a city? -- or would you include a city?

Nay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all.

This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?

Clearly.

And here is another defect which is quite as bad.

What defect?

The inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the one of poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another.

That, surely, is at least as bad.

Another discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are incapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not call them out in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to fight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling to pay taxes.

How discreditable!

And, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have too many callings -- they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one. Does that look well?

Anything but well.

There is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which this State first begins to be liable.

What evil?

A man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor, helpless creature.

Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State.

The evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both the extremes of great wealth and utter poverty.

True.

But think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, was a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of citizenship? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body, although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a spendthrift?

As you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.

May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is of the hive?

Just so, Socrates.

And God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings, whereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings, but others have dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class, as they are termed.

Most true, he said.

Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that neighborhood there are hidden away thieves and cutpurses and robbers of temples, and all sorts of malefactors.

Clearly.

Well, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?

Yes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.

And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to be found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force?

Certainly, we may be so bold.

The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, illtraining, and an evil constitution of the State?

True.

Such, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there may be many other evils.

Very likely.

Then oligarchy, or the form of government in which the rulers are elected for their wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this State.

By all means.

Does not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise?

How?

A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently he sees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon a sunken reef, and he and all that he has are lost; he may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put to death or exiled or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from

him.

Nothing more likely.

And the son has seen and known all this -- he is a ruined man, and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his bosom's throne; humbled by poverty he takes to moneymaking, and by mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such a one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and chain and scimitar?

Most true, he replied.

And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground obediently on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their place, he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and admire anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it.

Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.

And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?

Yes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the State out of which oligarchy came.

Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.

Very good.

First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth?

Certainly.

Also in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; his other desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable.

True.

He is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes a purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is he not a true image of the State which he represents?

He appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as by the State.

You see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said.

I imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a blind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honor.

Excellent! I said. Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing to this want of cultivation there will be found in him dronelike desires as of pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life?

True.

Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogueries?

Where must I look?

You should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting dishonestly, as in the

guardianship of an orphan.

Aye.

It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a reputation for honesty, he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue; not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason, but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his possessions.

To be sure.

Yes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires of the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what is not his own.

Yes, and they will be strong in him, too.

The man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not one; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior ones.

True.

For these reasons such a one will be more respectable than most people; yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away and never come near him.

I should expect so.

And surely the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a State for any prize of victory, or other object of honorable ambition; he will not spend his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the struggle; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money.

Very true.

Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and moneymaker answers to the oligarchical State?

There can be no doubt.

Next comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be considered by us; and then we will inquire into the ways of the democratic man, and bring him up for judgment.

That, he said, is our method.

Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise? Is it not on this wise: the good at which such a State aims is to become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?

What then?

The rulers being aware that their power rests upon their wealth, refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance?

To be sure.

There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same State to any considerable extent; one or the other will be disregarded.

That is tolerably clear.

And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?

Yes, often.

And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property, and against everybody else, and are eager for revolution.

That is true.

On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert their sting -- that is, their money -- into someone else who is not on his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the State.

Yes, he said, there are plenty of them -- that is certain.

The evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it either by restricting a man's use of his own property, or by another remedy.

What other?

One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to their characters: Let there be a general rule that everyone shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous moneymaking, and the evils of which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.

Yes, they will be greatly lessened.

At present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, treat their subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially the young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness both of body and mind; they do nothing, and are incapable of resisting either pleasure or pain.

Very true.

They themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue.

Yes, quite as indifferent.

Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers and their subjects may come in one another's way, whether on a journey or on some other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a march, as fellowsoldiers or fellowsailors; aye, and they may observe the behavior of each other in the very moment of danger -- for where danger is, there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich -- and very likely the wiry, sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh -- when he sees such a one puffing and at his wits'end, how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them? And when they meet in private will not people be saying to one another, "Our warriors are not good for much"?

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.

And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation, a commotion may arise within -- in the same way wherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasion may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with herself; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external cause.

Yes, surely.

And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.

Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw.

And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they? for as the government is, such will be the man.

Clearly, he said.

In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom and frankness -- a man may say and do what he likes?

'Tis said so, he replied.

And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases?

Clearly.

Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures?

There will.

This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as women and children think a variety of colors to be of all things most charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of States.

Yes.

Yes, my good sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a government.

Why?

Because of the liberty which reigns there -- they have a complete assortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his choice, he may found his State.

He will be sure to have patterns enough.

And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or to go to war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are so disposed -- there being no necessity also, because some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy -- is not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful?

For the moment, yes.

And is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming? Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about the world -- the gentleman parades like a hero, and nobody sees or cares?

Yes, he replied, many and many a one. See, too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the "don't care" about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city -- as when we said that, except in the case of some

rarely gifted nature, there never will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a study -- how grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honor anyone who professes to be the people's friend.

Yes, she is of a noble spirit.

These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.

We know her well.

Consider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather consider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being.

Very good, he said.

Is not this the way -- he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father who has trained him in his own habits?

Exactly.

And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called unnecessary?

Obviously.

Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?

I should.

Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called so, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary, and cannot help it.

True.

We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?

We are not.

And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his youth upward -- of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases the reverse of good -- shall we not be right in saying that all these are unnecessary?

Yes, certainly.

Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion of them?

Very good.

Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?

That is what I should suppose.

The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?

Yes.

But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?

Certainly.

And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?

Very true.

May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production?

Certainly.

And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?

True.

And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires, whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical?

Very true.

Again, let us see how the democratical man goes out of the oligarchical: the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process.

What is the process?

When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure -- then, as you may imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the democratical?

Inevitably.

And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too the young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin and alike?

Certainly.

And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him, whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or rebuking him, then there arise in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he goes to war with himself.

It must be so.

And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul, and order is restored.

Yes, he said, that sometimes happens.

And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones spring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not know how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous.

Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way.

They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with them, breed and multiply in him.

Very true.

At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which they perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true words, which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to the gods, and are their best guardians and sentinels.

None better.

False and boastful conceits and phrases mount upward and take their place.

They are certain to do so.

And so the young man returns into the country of the lotuseaters, and takes up his dwelling there, in the face of all men; and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain conceits shut the gate of the King's fastness; and they will neither allow the embassy itself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the fatherly counsel of the aged will they listen to them or receive them. There is a battle and they gain the day, and then modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them, and temperance, which they nickname unmanliness, is trampled in the mire and cast forth; they persuade men that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites, they drive them beyond the border.

Yes, with a will.

And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array, having garlands on their heads, and a great company with them, hymning their praises and calling them by sweet names; insolence they term "breeding," and anarchy "liberty," and waste "magnificence," and impudence "courage." And so the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.

Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.

After this he lives on, spending his money and labor and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over -- supposing that he then readmits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors -- in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises none of them, but encourages them all equally.

Very true, he said.

Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice; if anyone says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honor some, and chastise and master the others -- whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.

Yes, he said; that is the way with him.

Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a waterdrinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the

life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of anyone who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on.

Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.

Yes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many; he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners are contained in him.

Just so.

Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the democratic man.

Let that be his place, he said.

Last of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tyranny and the tyrant; these we have now to consider.

Quite true, he said.

Say then, my friend, in what manner does tyranny arise? -- that it has a democratic origin is evident.

Clearly.

And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from oligarchy -- I mean, after a sort?

How?

The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was maintained was excess of wealth -- am I not right?

Yes.

And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the sake of moneygetting were also the ruin of oligarchy?

True.

And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her to dissolution?

What good?

Freedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of the State -- and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of nature deign to dwell.

Yes; the saying is in everybody's mouth.

I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of other things introduce the change in democracy, which occasions a demand for tyranny.

How so?

When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cupbearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs.

Yes, he replied, a very common occurrence.

Yes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her "slaves" who hug their chains, and men

of naught; she would have subjects who are like rulers, and rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her own heart, whom she praises and honors both in private and public. Now, in such a State, can liberty have any limit?

Certainly not.

By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them.

How do you mean?

I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is his freedom; and the metic is equal with the citizen, and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either.

Yes, he said, that is the way.

And these are not the only evils, I said -- there are several lesser ones: In such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike; and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and gayety; they are loth to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young.

Quite true, he said.

The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other.

Why not, as AEschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?

That is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who does not know would believe how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other State: for, truly, the shedogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their shemistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all things are just ready to burst with liberty.

When I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you describe. You and I have dreamed the same thing.

And above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten; they will have no one over them.

Yes, he said, I know it too well.

Such, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny.

Glorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?

The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease magnified and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy -- the truth being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government.

True.

The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery.

Yes, the natural order.

And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?

As we might expect.

That, however, was not, as I believe, your question -- you rather desired to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and democracy, and is the ruin of both?

Just so, he replied.

Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of whom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having stings.

A very just comparison.

These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise beemaster, to keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible.

Yes, by all means, he said.

Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes; for in the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were in the oligarchical State.

That is true.

And in the democracy they are certainly more intensified.

How so?

Because in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from office, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not suffer a word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies almost everything is managed by the drones.

Very true, he said.

Then there is another class which is always being severed from the mass.

What is that?

They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the richest.

Naturally so.

They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honey to the drones.

Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little.

And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.

That is pretty much the case, he said.

The people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own hands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful

class in a democracy.

True, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate unless they get a little honey.

And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves?

Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share.

And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can?

What else can they do?

And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy? True.

And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds revolution in them.

That is exactly the truth.

Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.

True.

The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into greatness.

Yes, that is their way. This, and no other, is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears above ground he is a protector.

Yes, that is quite clear. How, then, does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus.

What tale?

The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf. Did you never hear it?

Oh, yes.

And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the favorite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellowcitizens; some he kills and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf -- that is, a tyrant?

Inevitably.

This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?

The same.

After a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, a tyrant full grown.

That is clear.

And if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death by a public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him.

Yes, he said, that is their usual way.

Then comes the famous request for a bodyguard, which is the device of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career -- "Let not the people's friend," as they say, "be lost to them."

Exactly.

The people readily assent; all their fears are for him -- they have none for themselves.

Very true.

And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus,

"By pebbly Hermus's shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be a coward."

And quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed again.

But if he is caught he dies.

Of course.

And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not "larding the plain" with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, but tyrant absolute.

No doubt, he said.

And now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State in which a creature like him is generated.

Yes, he said, let us consider that.

At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he salutes everyone whom he meets; he to be called a tyrant, who is making promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and distributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so kind and good to everyone!

Of course, he said.

But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader.

To be sure.

Has he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him? Clearly.

And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war.

He must.

Now he begins to grow unpopular.

A necessary result.

Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power, speak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of them cast in his teeth what is being done.

Yes, that may be expected.

And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.

He cannot.

And therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is highminded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until he has made a purgation of the State.

Yes, he said, and a rare purgation.

Yes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does the reverse.

If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.

What a blessed alternative, I said: to be compelled to dwell only with the many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all!

Yes, that is the alternative.

And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?

Certainly.

And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?

They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them.

By the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every land.

Yes, he said, there are.

But will he not desire to get them on the spot?

How do you mean?

He will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and enrol them in his bodyguard.

To be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust them best of all.

What a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to death the others and has these for his trusted friends.

Yes, he said; they are quite of his sort.

Yes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and avoid him.

Of course.

Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.

Why so?

Why, because he is the author of the pregnant saying,

"Tyrants are wise by living with the wise;"

and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes his companions.

Yes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.

And therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and any others who live after our manner, if we do not receive them into our State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny.

Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.

But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies.

Very true.

Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honor -- the greatest honor, as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed farther.

True.

But we are wandering from the subject: Let us therefore return and inquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair, and numerous, and various, and everchanging army of his.

If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate and spend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose upon the people.

And when these fail?

Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or female, will be maintained out of his father's estate.

You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will maintain him and his companions?

Yes, he said; they cannot help themselves.

But what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a grownup son ought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be supported by the son? The father did not bring him into being, or settle him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should himself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions; but that his son should protect him, and that by his help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable associates.

By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has been fostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son strong.

Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat his father if he opposes him?

Yes, he will, having first disarmed him.

Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery.

True, he said.

Very well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to tyranny?

Yes, quite enough, he said.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Republic

Plato

Book IX: On Wrong Or Right Government, And The Pleasures Of Each

(Socrates, Adeimantus.)

LAST of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to ask, how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in happiness or in misery?

Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining.

There is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered.

What question?

I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of the appetites, and until this is accomplished the inquiry will always be confused.

Well, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.

Very true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand: Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be unlawful; everyone appears to have them, but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail over them -- either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak; while in the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them.

Which appetites do you mean?

I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and, having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires; and there is no conceivable folly or crime -- not excepting incest or any other unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food -- which at such a time, when he has parted company with all shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit.

Most true, he said.

But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble thoughts and inquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering with the higher principle -- which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel against anyone -- I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes his rest, then, as you

know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions.

I quite agree.

In saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point which I desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless wildbeast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am right, and you agree with me.

Yes, I agree.

And now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic man. He was supposed from his youth upward to have been trained under a miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but discountenanced the unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and ornament?

True.

And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of people, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite extreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last, being a better man than his corruptors, he was drawn in both directions until he halted midway and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but of what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?

Yes, he said; that was our view of him, and is so still.

And now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's principles.

I can imagine him.

Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has already happened to the father: he is drawn into a perfectly lawless life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his father and friends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrantmakers find that they are losing their hold on him, they contrive to implant in him a masterpassion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts -- a sort of monstrous winged drone -- that is the only image which will adequately describe him.

Yes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him.

And when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose, come buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which they implant in his dronelike nature, then at last this lord of the soul, having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy; and if he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites in process of formation, and there is in him any sense of shame remaining, to these better principles he puts an end, and casts them forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness to the full.

Yes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.

And is not this the reason why, of old, love has been called a tyrant?

I should not wonder.

Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant?

He has.

And you know that a man who is deranged, and not right in his mind, will fancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods?

That he will.

And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being when, either under the influence of nature or habit, or both, he becomes drunken, lustful, passionate? O my friend, is not that so?

Assuredly.

Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?

Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me.

I imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans, and all that sort of thing; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the concerns of his soul.

That is certain.

Yes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable, and their demands are many.

They are indeed, he said.

His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.

True.

Then come debt and the cutting down of his property.

Of course.

When he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them, and especially by love himself, who is in a manner the captain of them, is in a frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his property, in order that he may gratify them?

Yes, that is sure to be the case.

He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and pangs.

He must.

And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got the better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.

No doubt he will.

And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to cheat and deceive them.

Very true.

And if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them.

Yes, probably.

And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend? Will the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them?

Nay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.

But, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some newfangled love of a harlot, who is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe that he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very existence, and would place her under the authority of the other, when she is brought under the same roof with her; or that, under like circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, first and most indispensable of friends, for the sake of some newly found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable?

Yes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would.

Truly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother.

He is indeed, he replied.

He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to clear a temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child, and which gave judgment about good and evil, are overthrown by those others which have just been emancipated, and are now the bodyguard of love and share his empire. These in his democratic days, when he was still subject to the laws and to his father, were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now that he is under the dominion of Love, he becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only; he will commit the foulest murder, or eat forbidden food, or be guilty of any other horrid act. Love is his tyrant, and lives lordly in him and lawlessly, and being himself a king, leads him on, as a tyrant leads a State, to the performance of any reckless deed by which he can maintain himself and the rabble of his associates, whether those whom evil communications have brought in from without, or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?

Yes, indeed, he said.

And if there are only a few of them in the State, and the rest of the people are well disposed, they go away and become the bodyguard of mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do many little pieces of mischief in the city.

What sort of mischief?

For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cutpurses, footpads, robbers of temples, manstealers of the community; or if they are able to speak, they turn informers and bear false witness and take bribes.

A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in number.

Yes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these things, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not come within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and their followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength, assisted by the infatuation of the people, they choose from among themselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, and him they create their tyrant.

Yes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.

If the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began by beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats them, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires.

Exactly.

When such men are only private individuals and before they get power, this is their character; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or ready tools; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them: they profess every sort of affection for them; but when they have gained their point they know them no more.

Yes, truly.

They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.

Certainly not.

And may we not rightly call such men treacherous?

No question.

Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice?

Yes, he said, and we were perfectly right.

Let us, then, sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man: he is the waking reality of what we dreamed.

Most true.

And this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.

That is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.

And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in general?

Yes, he said, inevitably.

And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the democratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others?

Certainly.

And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to man?

To be sure.

Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?

They are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the other is the very worst.

There can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I will at once inquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves to be panicstricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about, and then we will give our opinion.

A fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as everyone must, that a tyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the happiest.

And in estimating the men, too, may I not fairly make a like request, that I should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human nature? he must not be like a child who looks at

the outside and is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose that the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt in the same place with him, and been present at his daily life and known him in his family relations, where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public danger -- he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant when compared with other men?

That again, he said, is a very fair proposal.

Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have before now met with such a person? We shall then have someone who will answer our inquiries.

By all means.

Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State; bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of them, will you tell me their respective conditions?

What do you mean? he asked.

Beginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved?

No city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.

And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a State?

Yes, he said, I see that there are -- a few; but the people, speaking generally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved.

Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule prevail? His soul is full of meanness and vulgarity -- the best elements in him are enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and maddest.

Inevitably.

And would you say that the soul of such a one is the soul of a freeman or of a slave?

He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.

And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily?

Utterly incapable.

And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is a gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?

Certainly.

And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?

Poor.

And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable?

True.

And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?

Yes, indeed.

Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?

Certainly not.

And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?

Impossible.

Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to be the most miserable of States?

And I was right, he said.

Certainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man, what do you say of him?

I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.

There, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.

What do you mean?

I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.

Then who is more miserable?

One of whom I am about to speak.

Who is that?

He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.

From what has been said, I gather that you are right.

Yes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more certain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this respecting good and evil is the greatest.

Very true, he said.

Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light upon this subject.

What is your illustration?

The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have slaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves.

Yes, that is the difference.

You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their servants?

What should they fear?

Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this?

Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the protection of each individual.

Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of some fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves, carried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him -- will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should be put to death by his slaves?

Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.

The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much against his will -- he will have to cajole his own servants.

Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself.

And suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with neighbors who will not

suffer one man to be the master of another, and who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?

His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere surrounded and watched by enemies.

And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound -- he who being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of fears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men in the city, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest.

Very true, he said.

And amid evils such as these will not he who is illgoverned in his own person -- the tyrannical man, I mean -- whom you just now decided to be the most miserable of all -- will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.

Yes, he said, the similitude is most exact.

Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?

Certainly.

He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than anyone, and is truly poor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the State which he resembles: and surely the resemblance holds?

Very true, he said.

Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power: he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself.

No man of any sense will dispute your words. Come, then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical contests proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in the scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others follow: there are five of them in all -- they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical.

The decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they enter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.

Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce that the son of Ariston (the best) has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his State?

Make the proclamation yourself, he said.

And shall I add, "whether seen or unseen by gods and men"?

Let the words be added.

Then this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is another, which may also have some weight.

What is that?

The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.

Of what nature?

It seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond; also three desires and governing powers.

How do you mean? he said.

There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns, another with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no special name, but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from the extraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and drinking and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of it; also moneyloving, because such desires are generally satisfied by the help of money.

That is true, he said.

If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single notion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as loving gain or money.

I agree with you.

Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and getting fame?

True.

Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious -- would the term be suitable?

Extremely suitable.

On the other hand, everyone sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for gain or fame.

Far less.

"Lover of wisdom," "lover of knowledge," are titles which we may fitly apply to that part of the soul?

Certainly.

One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others, as may happen?

Yes.

Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men -- lovers of wisdom, lovers of honor, lovers of gain?

Exactly.

And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?

Very true.

Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others: the moneymaker will contrast the vanity of honor or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver?

True, he said.

And the lover of honor -- what will be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?

Very true.

And are we to suppose, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?

There can be no doubt of that, he replied.

Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honorable, or better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless -- how shall we know who speaks truly?

I cannot myself tell, he said.

Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience, and wisdom, and reason?

There cannot be a better, he said.

Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?

The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood upward: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity tasted -- or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have tasted -- the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.

Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience?

Yes, very great.

Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honor, or the lover of honor of the pleasures of wisdom?

Nay, he said, all three are honored in proportion as they attain their object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honor they all have experience of the pleasures of honor; but the delight which is to be found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.

His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than anyone?

Far better.

And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?

Certainly.

Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?

What faculty?

Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.

Yes.

And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?

Certainly.

If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?

Assuredly.

Or if honor, or victory, or courage, in that case the judgment of the ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?

Clearly.

But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges --

The only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.

And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life.

Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he approves of his own life.

And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the pleasure which is next?

Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honor; who is nearer to himself than the moneymaker.

Last comes the lover of gain?

Very true, he said.

Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in this conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to Olympian Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure -- all others are a shadow only; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?

Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?

I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.

Proceed.

Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?

True.

And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?

There is.

A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either -- that is what you mean?

Yes.

You remember what people say when they are sick?

What do they say?

That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew this to be the greatest of

pleasures until they were ill.

Yes, I know, he said.

And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?

I have.

And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, are extolled by them as the greatest pleasure?

Yes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest.

Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be painful?

Doubtless, he said.

Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?

So it would seem.

But can that which is neither become both?

I should say not.

And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?

Yes.

But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion, and in a mean between them?

Yes.

How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?

Impossible. This, then, is an appearance only, and not a reality; that is to say, the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real, but a sort of imposition?

That is the inference.

Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

What are they, he said, and where shall I find them?

There are many of them: take as an example, the pleasures of smell, which are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and when they depart leave no pain behind them.

Most true, he said.

Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

No.

Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the body are generally of this sort -- they are reliefs of pain.

That is true.

And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?

Yes.

Shall I give you an illustration of them?

Let me hear.

You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and middle region?

I should.

And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world?

To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?

But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, that he was descending?

No doubt.

All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions?

Yes.

Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when they are only being drawn toward the painful they feel pain and think the pain which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with gray instead of white -- can you wonder, I say, at this?

No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.

Look at the matter thus: Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of the bodily state?

Yes.

And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?

True.

And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?

Certainly.

And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which has more existence the truer?

Clearly, from that which has more.

What classes of things have a greater share of pure existence, in your judgment -- those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question in this way: Which has a more pure being -- that which is concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is found in such natures; or that which is concerned with and found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal?

Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable.

And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence?

Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.

And of truth in the same degree?

Yes.

And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence?

Necessarily.

Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul?

Far less.

And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?

Yes.

What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real?

Of course.

And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure?

Unquestionably. Those, then, who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the diningtable, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent.

Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle.

Their pleasures are mixed with pains -- how can they be otherwise? For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are colored by contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy, in ignorance of the truth.

Something of that sort must inevitably happen.

And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honor and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?

Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.

Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honor, when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest

degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him?

Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural.

And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable?

Exactly.

But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their own?

True.

And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?

Yes.

And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law and order?

Clearly.

And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest distance? Yes.

And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?

Yes.

Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure, and the king at the least?

Certainly.

But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most pleasantly?

Inevitably.

Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?

Will you tell me?

There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.

How do you mean?

I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; the democrat was in the middle?

Yes.

And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the oligarch?

He will.

And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal and aristocratical?

Yes, he is third.

Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number which is three times

three?

Manifestly.

The shadow, then, of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of length will be a plane figure.

Certainly.

And if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted from the king.

Yes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.

Or if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.

What a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain!

Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and years.

Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.

Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and in beauty and virtue?

Immeasurably greater.

Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we may revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not someone saying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just?

Yes, that was said. Now, then, having determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a little conversation with him.

What shall we say to him?

Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes.

Of what sort?

An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera, or Scylla, or Cerberus, and there are many others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.

There are said to have been such unions.

Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, manyheaded monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will.

You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose.

Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second.

That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.

And now join them, and let the three grow into one.

That has been accomplished.

Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single human creature. I have done so, he said.

And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lionlike qualities, but to starve and weaken the man, who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another -- he ought rather to suffer them to fight, and bite and devour one another.

Certainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says.

To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete mastery over the entire human creature.

He should watch over the manyheaded monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing; he should be making the lionheart his ally, and in common care of them all should be uniting the several parts with one another and with himself.

Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice will say.

And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honor, or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?

Yes, from every point of view.

Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. "Sweet sir," we will say to him, "what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man? and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?" He can hardly avoid saying, Yes -- can he, now? Not if he has any regard for my opinion. But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: "Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And will anyone say that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless and detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin."

Yes, said Glaucon, far worse -- I will answer for him.

Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?

Clearly.

And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?

Yes.

And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him?

Very true.

And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?

True, he said.

And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his great study is how to flatter them.

Such appears to be the reason.

And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because everyone had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and equals.

True, he said.

And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a State, and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways.

Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest.

From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness?

From no point of view at all.

What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength, and health, in proportion as the soul is more honorable than the body.

Certainly, he said.

To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies of his life. And in the first place, he will honor studies which impress these qualities on his soul, and will disregard others?

Clearly, he said.

In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul?

Certainly he will, if he has true music in him.

And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony which he will also

observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?

Certainly not, he said.

He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or spend according to his means.

Very true.

And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honors as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private or public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid?

Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.

By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a divine call.

I understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that there is such a one anywhere on earth?

In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order. But whether such a one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other.

I think so, he said.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Republic

Plato

Book X: The Recompense Of Life

(Socrates, Glaucon.)

OF the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry.

To what do you refer?

To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be received; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been distinguished.

What do you mean?

Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe -- but I do not mind saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to them.

Explain the purport of your remark.

Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the truth, and therefore I will speak out.

Very good, he said.

Listen to me, then, or, rather, answer me.

Put your question.

Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.

A likely thing, then, that I should know.

Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener.

Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you inquire yourself? Well, then, shall we begin the inquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form; do you understand me?

I do.

Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world -- plenty of them, are there not?

Yes.

But there are only two ideas or forms of them -- one the idea of a bed, the other of a table.

True.

And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea -- that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances -- but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could he?

Impossible.

And there is another artist -- I should like to know what you would say of him.

Who is he?

One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.

What an extraordinary man!

Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things -- the earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.

He must be a wizard and no mistake.

Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things, but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all yourself?

What way?

An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round -- you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the mirror.

Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only.

Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter, too, is, as I conceive, just such another -- a creator of appearances, is he not?

Of course.

But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?

Yes, he said, but not a real bed.

And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed?

Yes, I did.

Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of existence; and if anyone were to say that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.

At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth.

No wonder, then, that his work, too, is an indistinct expression of truth.

No wonder.

Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we inquire who this imitator is?

If you please. Well, then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by God, as I think that we may say -- for no one else can be the maker?

No.

There is another which is the work of the carpenter?

Yes.

And the work of the painter is a third?

Yes.

Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?

Yes, there are three of them.

God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made by God.

Why is that?

Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the ideal bed and not the two others.

Very true, he said.

God knew this, and he desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore he created a bed which is essentially and by nature one only.

So we believe.

Shall we, then, speak of him as the natural author or maker of the bed?

Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation he is the author of this and of all other things.

And what shall we say of the carpenter -- is not he also the maker of the bed?

Yes.

But would you call the painter a creator and maker?

Certainly not.

Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?

I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make.

Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator?

Certainly, he said.

And the tragic poet is an imitator, and, therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?

That appears to be so.

Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter? I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?

The latter.

As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.

What do you mean?

I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all things.

Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.

Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting designed to be -- an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear -- of appearance or of reality?

Of appearance.

Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.

Certainly.

And whenever anyone informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man -- whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought allknowing, because he himself was unable to analyze the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.

Most true.

And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak so well?

The question, he said, should by all means be considered.

Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the imagemaking branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him?

I should say not.

The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.

Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honor and profit.

Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or

whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at secondhand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. "Friend Homer," then we say to him, "if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third -- not an image maker or imitator -- and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities, great and small, have been similarly benefited by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?" Is there any city which he might name?

I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he was a legislator.

Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?

There is not.

Or is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him?

There is absolutely nothing of the kind.

But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with him, and who handed down to posterity a Homeric way of life, such as was established by Pythagoras, who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was named after him?

Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For, surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive?

Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind -- if he had possessed knowledge, and not been a mere imitator -- can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honored and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos and a host of others have only to whisper to their contemporaries: "You will never be able to manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers of education" -- and this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?

Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.

Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colors and figures.

Quite so.

In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on the colors of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well -- such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colors which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.

Yes, he said.

They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?

Exactly.

Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right?

Yes.

Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an explanation.

Proceed.

Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?

Yes.

And the worker in leather and brass will make them?

Certainly.

But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who knows how to use them -- he knows their right form.

Most true.

And may we not say the same of all things?

What?

That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?

Yes.

And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them.

True.

Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use; for example, the fluteplayer will tell the flutemaker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions?

Of course.

The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him?

True.

The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?

True.

But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw?

Neither.

Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?

I suppose not.

The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations?

Nay, very much the reverse.

And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?

Just so.

Thus far, then, we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in iambic or in heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?

Very true.

And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?

Certainly.

And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?

What do you mean?

I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance?

True.

And the same objects appear straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colors to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.

True.

And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding -- there is the beauty of them -- and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?

Most true.

And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?

To be sure.

And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?

True.

But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible -- the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing?

Very true.

Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?

True.

And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?

Certainly.

And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul?

No doubt.

This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.

Exactly.

The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring.

Very true.

And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?

Probably the same would be true of poetry.

Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.

By all means.

We may state the question thus: Imitation imitates the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more?

No, there is nothing else.

But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself -- or, rather, as in the instance of sight there were confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also are there not strife and inconsistency in his life? though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?

And we were right, he said.

Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which must now be supplied.

What was the omission?

Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than another?

Yes.

But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?

The latter, he said, is the truer statement.

Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?

It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.

When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of anyone hearing or seeing him do?

True.

There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his sorrow?

True.

But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him?

Certainly.

One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?

How do you mean?

The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required.

What is most required? he asked.

That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art.

Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.

Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason?

Clearly.

And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and cowardly?

Indeed, we may.

And does not the latter -- I mean the rebellious principle -- furnish a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers.

Certainly.

Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated?

Clearly.

And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior degree of truth -- in this, I say, he is like him; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a wellordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small -- he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth.

Exactly.

But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation: the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?

Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.

Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his breast -- the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.

Yes, of course, I know.

But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality -- we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.

Very true, he said.

Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?

No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.

Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.

What point of view?

If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets; the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying anyone who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered

strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.

How very true!

And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness; the case of pity is repeated; there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.

Quite true, he said.

And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire, and pain, and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action -- in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue.

I cannot deny it.

Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you should take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honor those who say these things -- they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.

That is most true, he said.

And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of "the yelping hound howling at her lord," or of one "mighty in the vain talk of fools," and "the mob of sages circumventing Zeus," and the "subtle thinkers who are beggars after all"; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister art of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a wellordered State we shall be delighted to receive her -- we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?

Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.

Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only -- that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre?

Certainly.

And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the

permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant, but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers -- I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.

If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so, too, must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We, too, are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law.

Yes, he said, I quite agree with you.

Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will anyone be profited if under the influence of honor or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?

Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that anyone else would have been.

And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue.

What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness.

Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of threescore years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?

Say rather 'nothing' he replied.

And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole?

Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?

Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?

He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this?

Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too -- there is no difficulty in proving it.

I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light.
Listen, then.

I am attending.

There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?

Yes, he replied.

Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?

Yes.

And you admit that everything has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and

disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease?

Yes, he said.

And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies?

True.

The vice and evil which are inherent in each are the destruction of each; and if these do not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for good certainly will not destroy them, nor, again, that which is neither good nor evil.

Certainly not.

If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction?

That may be assumed.

Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?

Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

But does any of these dissolve or destroy her? -- and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?

Yes.

Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body?

Certainly not.

And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?

It is, he replied.

Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of the food, which is another, and which does not engender any natural infection -- this we shall absolutely deny?

Very true.

And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?

Yes, he said, there is reason in that. Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains

unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man.

And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death.

But if someone who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds?

Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive -- aye, and well awake, too; so far removed is her dwellingplace from being a house of death.

True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.

Yes, that can hardly be.

But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist forever, and, if existing forever, must be immortal?

Certainly.

That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality.

Very true.

But this we cannot believe -- reason will not allow us -- any more than we can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity.

What do you mean? he said.

The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?

Certainly not.

Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to that of the seagod Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because his

natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look. Where, then?

At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if, wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good things in this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is, and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough.

True, he replied.

And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature has been shown to be the best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.

Very true.

And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.

Certainly not, he said.

Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?

What did I borrow?

The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?

I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.

Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us; since she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own.

The demand, he said, is just.

In the first place, I said -- and this is the first thing which you will have to give back -- the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods.

Granted.

And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?

True.

And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins?

Certainly.

Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death; for the gods have a care of anyone whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?

Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.

And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?

Certainly.

Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?

That is my conviction.

And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from the startingplace to the goal, but not back again from the goal: they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow.

True.

And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten, and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true?

Certainly, he said, what you say is true.

These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides.

Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.

And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them.

Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear.

Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this, too, is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterward, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption,

his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pyre, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth; they were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to them, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously inquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell; but the sum was this: He said that for every wrong which they had done to anyone they suffered tenfold; or once in a hundred years -- such being reckoned to be the length of man's life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behavior, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers, there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, "Where is Ardiaeus the Great?" (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: "He comes not hither, and will never come." And this, said he, was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also, besides the tyrants, private individuals who had been great criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or someone who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the passersby what were their crimes, and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell. And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that

moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great.

Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in color resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the undergirders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; and the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions -- the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest (or fixed stars) is spangled, and the seventh (or sun) is brightest; the eighth (or moon) colored by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) are in color like one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third (Venus) has the whitest light; the fourth (Mars) is reddish; the sixth (Jupiter) is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this reversed motion, the fourth; the third appeared fourth, and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens -- Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.

When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: "Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honors or dishonors her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser -- God is justified." When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them all,

and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and they all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find someone who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villanies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness.

And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time: "Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair." And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a wellordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims WhO came from earth, having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in

a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle -- sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swans and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures -- the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations.

All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then toward evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there were a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upward in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.

And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness, and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort

of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing.

[End.]

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

A Treatise of Human Nature
Book I
David Hume

1739

11/20/96

 This text file was scanned from Green and Grose's 1886 edition of Hume's *Treatise.* The file has not yet been completely cleaned of errors and should be considered inaccurate. The file contains all of Book I (with about five pages missing, and minus all footnotes) and the first few sections of Book II. This file is posted here as a courtesy to Hume Archives patrons until a more accurate and complete file is available. Pagination within curly brackets is from the Green and Grose edition.

A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

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U N D E R S T A N D I N G.

ADVERTISEMENT.

My design in the present work is sufficiently explain'd in the Introduction. The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there plann'd out to myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of Human Nature. The approbation of the public I consider as the greatest reward of my labours; but am determin'd to regard its judgment, whatever it be, as my best instruction.

INTRODUCTION.

N/OTHING\ is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. 'Tis easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.

Nor is there requir'd such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most {1:306} trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle 'tis not. reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army.

From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, 'tis certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious.

'Tis evident,, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of M/AN\; since the lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with {1:307} the extent and force of human understanding, and cou'd explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be hoped for in natural

religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.

If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost everything, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind.

Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pore curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.

And as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for {1:308} the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can (live to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. 'Tis no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning from T/HALES\ to SOCRATES, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty.

Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man will do less honour to our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations. And tho' we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, 'tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.

I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a great master in that very science of human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing 'm what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has {1:309} almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented, tho' we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary phaenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not what more we can require of our philosophy.

But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that 'tie a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest artizans. None of them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may @e. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with that which I consider, 'tis evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. We must therefore glean up our experiments in @ science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as {1:310} they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension.

BOOK I.

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PART 1. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION, ABSTRACTION, ETC.

S/ECT\. I. -- Of the Origin of our Ideas.

A/LL\ the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and

reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. I believe it will -not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees of these are easily distinguished; tho' it is not impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions, As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish {1:312} them from our ideas. But notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.

There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be convenient to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas. This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts. Tho' a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all united together in this apple, 'tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.

Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects, we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their qualities and relations. The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions of the mind are double., and appear both as impressions and ideas. When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation. Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. This circumstance seems to me remarkable, and engages my attention for a moment.

Upon a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by the first appearance, and that I must make use of the distinction of perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision, that all our ideas and impressions {1:313} are resembling. I observe, that many of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas. I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies, tho' I never saw any such. I have seen Paris; but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city, as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their real and just proportions?

I perceive, therefore, that tho' there is in general a great, resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule is not universally true, that they are exact copies of each other. We may next consider how the case stands with our simple, perceptions. After the most accurate examination, of which I am capable, I venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception, and that every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it, and every simple impression a correspondent idea. That idea of red, which we form in the dark, and that impression which strikes our eyes in sun-shine, differ only in degree, not in nature. That the case is the same with all our simple impressions and ideas, 'tis impossible to prove by a particular enumeration of them. Every one may satisfy himself in this point by running over as many as he pleases. But if any one should deny this universal resemblance, I know no way of convincing him, but by desiring him

to shew a simple impression, that has not a correspondent idea, or a simple idea, that has not a correspondent impression. If he does not answer this challenge, as 'tis certain he can-not, we may from his silence and our own observation establish our conclusion.

Thus we find, that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other; and as the complex are formed from them, we may affirm in general, that these two species of perception are exactly correspondent. Having discovered this relation, which requires no farther examination, I am curious to find some other of their qualities. Let us consider how. they stand with regard to their existence, and which of the impressions and ideas are causes, and which effects.

The full examination of this question is the subject of the {1:314} present treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general proposition, That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.'

In seeking for phenomena to prove this proposition, I find only those of two kinds; but in each kind the phenomena are obvious, numerous, and conclusive. I first make myself certain, by a new, review, of what I have already asserted, that every simple impression is attended with a correspondent idea, and every simple idea with a correspondent impression. From this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions I immediately conclude, that there is a great connexion betwixt our correspondent impressions and ideas, and that the existence of the one has a -considerable influence upon that of the other. Such a constant conjunction, in such an infinite number of instances, can never arise from chance; but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions. That I may know on which side this dependence lies, I consider the order of their first appearance; and find by constant experience, that the simple impressions always take the precedence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in the contrary order. To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce -the impressions by exciting the ideas. Our ideas upon their appearance produce not their correspondent impressions, nor do we perceive any colour, or feel any sensation merely upon thinking of them@ On the other hand we find, that any impression either of the mind or body is constantly followed by an idea, which resembles it, and is only different in the degrees of force and liveliness, The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the one are the causes of the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas .of our, impressions.

To confirm this I consider Another plain and convincing phaenomenon;. which is, that, where-ever by any accident the {1:315} faculties, which give rise to any impressions, are obstructed in their operations, as when one is born blind or deaf; -not only the impressions are lost, but also their correspondent ideas; so that there never appear in the mind the least traces of either of them. Nor is this only true, where the organs of sensation are entirely destroy'd, but likewise where they have never been put in action to produce a particular impression. We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine apple, without having actually tasted it.

There is however one contradictory phaenomenon, which may prove, that 'tis not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allow'd that the several distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, or those of sounds, which are convey'd by the hearing, are really different from each other, tho' at the same time resembling.

Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this shou'd be deny'd, 'tis possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot without absurdity deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be plac'd before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; 'tis plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, said will be sensible, that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the -contiguous colours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether 'tis possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe i here are few but will be of opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions; tho' the instance is so particular and singular, that 'tis scarce worth {1:316} our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.

But besides this exception, it may not be amiss to remark on this head, that the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be understood with another limitation, <viz>. that as our ideas are images of our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas, which are images of the primary; as appears from this very reasoning concerning them. This is not, properly speaking, an exception to the rule so much as an explanation of it. Ideas produce the images of them. selves in new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions.

This then is the first principle I establish in the science of human nature; nor ought we to despise it because of the simplicity of its appearance. For 'tis remarkable, that the present question concerning the precedency of our impressions or ideas, is the same with what has made so much noise in other terms, when it has been disputed whether there be any <innate ideas>, or whether all ideas be derived from sensation and reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing but shew that they are conveyed by our senses. To prove the ideas of passion and desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a preceding experience of these emotions in ourselves., Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which the are derived, and which they represent. I hope this clear stating of the question will remove all disputes concerning it, and win render this principle of more use in our reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have been.

SECT. III.-Division of the Subject.

Since it appears, that our simple impressions are prior to their correspondent ideas, and that.the exceptions are very rare, method seems to require we should examine our impressions, before we consider our ideas. Impressions way be divided into two kinds, those Of SENSATION and those of {1:317} REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul originally,from unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kin(I or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon

the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv'd from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be enter'd upon. And as the impressions of reflexion, viz. passions, desires, and emotions, which principally deserve our attention, arise mostly from ideas, 'twill be necessary to reverse that method, which at first si-ht seems most natural; and in order to explain the nature and principles of the human mind, give a particular account of ideas, before we proceed to impressions. For this reason I have here chosen to begin with ideas.

SECT. III.-Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination.

We find by experience, that when any impression bas been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there a,s an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its @t vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea: or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the M/EMORY\, and the other the IMAGINATION. 'Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that {1:318} the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are employ'd by the latter. When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv'd by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time. Here then is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. But of this more fully hereafter.

There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which:-s no less evident, namely that tho' neither the ideas, of the memory nor imagination, neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner ty'd down in that respect, without any power of variation."

'Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty. An historian may, perhaps, for the more convenient Carrying on of his narration, relate an event before another, to which it was in fact posterior; but then he takes notice of this disorder, if he be exact; and by that means replaces the idea in its due position. 'Tis the same case in our recollection of those places and persons, with which we were formerly acquainted. The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. In short, this principle is supported by such a number of common and vulgar phaenomena, that we may spare ourselves the trouble of insisting on it any farther.

The same evidence follows us in our second principle, of the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas. The fables we meet with in poems and romances put this entirely out of the question. Nature there is totally confounded, and nothing mentioned but winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants. Nor will this liberty of the fancy appear strange, when we consider, that all our ideas are {1:310} copy'd from our impressions,' and that there are not any two

impressions which are perfectly inseparable. Not to mention, that this is an evident consequence of the division of ideas into simple and complex. Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation.

SECT. IV.-Of the Connexion or Association of Ideas.

As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united again in what form it pleases, nothing wou'd be more unaccountable than the operations of that faculty, were it not guided by some universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places. Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou'd join them; and 'tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they Commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle among ideas is not to be consider'd as an inseparable connexion; for that ha,s been already excluded from the imagination: Nor yet are we to conclude, -that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united in a complex one. The qualities, from which this association arises, and by which the mind is after this manner convey'd from one idea to another, are three, -viz. RESEMBLANCE., CONTIGUITY in time or place, and CAUSE and EFFECT.

I believe it will not be very necessary to prove, that these qualities produce an association among ideas, and upon the appearance of one idea naturally introduce another. 'Tis plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. 'Tis likewise evident that as the senses, in changing their objects, {1:320} are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie <contiguous> to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects. As to the connexion, that is made by the relation of cause and effect, we shall have occasion afterwards to examine it to the bottom, and therefore shall not at present insist upon it. 'Tis sufficient to observe, that there is no relation, which produces a stronger connexion in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another, than the relation of cause and effect betwixt their objects.

That we may understand the full extent of these relations, we must consider, that two objects are connected together in the imagination, not only when the one @ immediately resembling, contiguous to, or the cause of the other, but also when there is interposed betwixt them a third object, which bears to both of them any of these relations. This may be carried on to a great length; tho' at the same time we may observe, that each remove considerably weakens the relation. Cousins in the fourth degree are connected by causation, if I may be allowed to use that term; but not so closely as brothers, much less as child and parent. In general we may observe, that all the relations of blood depend upon cause and effect, and are esteemed near or remote, according to the number of connecting causes interpos'd betwixt the persons.

Of the three relations above-mention'd this of causation is the most extensive. Two objects may be considered as plac'd in this relation, as well when one is the cause of any of the actions or motions of the other, as when the former is the cause of the existence of the latter. For as that action or motion is nothing but the object itself, consider'd in a certain light, and as the object continues the

same in all its different situations, 'tis easy to imagine how such an influence of objects upon one another may connect them in the imagination.

We may carry this farther, and remark, not only that two objects are connected by the relation of cause and effect, when the one produces a motion or any action in the other, but also when it has a power of producing it. And this we may observe to be the source of all the relation,; of interest and duty, by which men influence each other in society, and {1:321} are plac'd in the ties of government and subordination. A master is such-a-one as by his situation, arising either from force or agreement, has a power of directing in certain particulars the actions of another, whom we call servant. A judge is one, who in all disputed cases can fix by his opinion the possession or property of any thing betwixt any members of the society. When a person is possess'd of any power, there is no more required to convert it into action, but the exertion of the will; and that in every case is considered as possible, and in many as probable; especially in the case of authority, where the obedience of the subject is a pleasure and advantage to the superior.

These are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connexion, by which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms. Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolv'd into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain. Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to restrain the intemperate desire of searching into causes, and having established any doctrine upon a sufficient number of experiments, rest contented with that, when he sees a farther examination would lead him into obscure and uncertain speculations. In that case his enquiry wou'd be much better employ'd in examining the effects than the causes of his principle.

Amongst the effects of this union or association of ideas, there are none more remarkable, than those complex ideas, which are the common subjects of our thoughts and reasoning, and generally arise from some principle of union among our simple ideas. These complex ideas may be divided into Relations, Modes, and Substances. We shall briefly examine each of these in order, and shall subjoin some considerations concerning our general and particular ideas, before we leave the present subject, which may be consider'd as the elements of this philosophy. {1:322}

SECT. V.-Of Relations.

The word RELATION is commonly used in two senses considerably different from each other. Either for that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other, after the manner above-explained: or for that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to compare them. In common language the former is always the sense, in which we use the word, relation; and tis only in philosophy, that we extend it to mean any particular subject of comparison, without a connecting principle. Thus distance will be allowed by philosophers to be a true relation, because we acquire an idea of it by the comparing of objects: But in a common way we say, that nothing can be more distant than such or such things from each other, nothing can have less relation: as if distance and relation were incompatible.'

It may perhaps be esteemed an endless task to enumerate all those qualities, which make objects admit of comparison, and by which the ideas of philosophical relation are produced. But if we diligently consider them, we shall find that without difficulty they may be compriz'd under seven

general heads, which may be considered as the sources of all philosophical relation.

1

The first is resemblance: And this is a relation, without which no philosophical relation can exist; since no objects will admit of comparison, but what have some degree of resemblance.2 But tho' resemblance be necessary to all philosophical relation, it does not follow, that it always produces a connexion or association of ideas. When a quality becomes very general, and is common to a great many individuals, it leads not the mind directly to any one of them; but by presenting at once too great a choice, does thereby prevent the imagination from fixing on any single object.

2

Identity may be esteem'd a second species of relation. This relation I here consider as apply'd in its strictest sense to constant and unchangeable objects; without examining the nature and foundation of personal identity, which shall find {1:323} its place afterwards. Of all relations the most universal is that of identity, being common to every being whose existence has any duration.

3

After identity the most universal and comprehensive relations are those of Space and Time, which are the sources of an infinite number of comparisons, such as distant, contiguous, above, below, before, after, &e.

4

All those objects, which admit of quantity, or number, may be compar'd in that particular; which is another very fertile source of relation.

5

W-hen any two objects possess the same quality in common, the degrees, in which they possess it, form a fifth species of relation. Thus of two objects, which are both heavy, the one may be either of greater, or less weight than the other. Two colours, that are of the same kind, may yet be of different shades, and in that respect admit of comparison.

6

The relation of contrariety may at first sight be regarded as an exception to the rule, that no relation of any kind can subsist without some degree of resemblance. But let us consider, that no two ideas are in themselves contrary, except those of existence and non-existence, which are plainly resembling, as implying both of them an idea of the object; tho' the latter excludes the object from all times and places, in which it is supposed not to exist.'

7

All other objects, such as fire and water, heat and cold, are only found to be contrary from experience, and from the contrariety of their causes or effects; which relation of cause and effect is a seventh philosophical relation, as well as a natural one. The resemblance implied in this relation, shall be explain'd afterwards."

It might naturally be expected, that I should join difference to the other relations. But that I consider rather as a negation of relation, than as anything real or positive. Difference is of two kinds as oppos'd either to identity or resemblance. The first is call'd a difference of number; the other of kind. {1:324}

SECT. VI.-Of Modes and Substance.8.

I wou'd fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each., whether the idea of substance be deriv'd from the impressions of sensation pr of reflection? If it be convey'd to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceiv'd by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be deriv'd from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.'

The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of Simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection. But the difference betwixt these ideas consists in this, that the particular qualities, which form a substance, are commonly refer'd to an unknown something, in which they are supposed to inhere; or granting this fiction should not take place, are at least supposed to be closely and inseparably connected by the relations of contiguity and causation. The effect of this is, that whatever new simple quality we discover to have the same connexion with the rest, we immediately comprehend it among them, even tho' it did not enter into the first conception of the substance. Thus our idea of gold may at first be a yellow colour, weight, malleableness, fusibility; but upon the discovery of its dissolubility in aqua regia, we join that to the other qualities, and suppose it to belong to the substance as much as if its idea had from the beginning made a part of the compound one. The principal of union being regarded as the chief part of the complex idea, gives entrance to {1:325} whatever quality afterwards occurs, and is equally comprehended by it, as are the others, which first presented themselves. themselves.

That this cannot take place in modes, is evident from considering their mature. The. simple ideas of which modes are formed, either represent qualities, which are not united by contiguity and causation, but are dispers'd in different subjects; or if they be all united together, the uniting principle is not regarded as the foundation of the complex idea. The idea of a dance -is an instance of the first kind of modes; that of beauty of the second. The reason is obvious, why such complex ideas cannot receive any' new idea, without changing the name, which distinguishes the mode.

SECT. VII. Of Abstract Ideas.

A very material question has been started concerning abstract or general ideas, whether they be general or particular in the mind's conception of them. A great philosopher has disputed the receiv'd opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters, I shag here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy.

'Tis evident, that in forming most of our general ideas, if not all of them, we abstract from every particular degree of quantity and quality, and that an object ceases not to be of any particular species on account of every small alteration in its extension, duration and other properties. It may therefore be thought, that here is a plain dilemma, that decides concerning the nature of those abstract ideas, which have afforded so much speculation to philosophers. The abstract idea of a

man represents men of all sizes and all qualities; which 'tis concluded it cannot do, but either by representing {1:326} at once all possible sizes and all possible qualities, or by, representing no particular One at all. Now it having been esteemed absurd to defend the former proposition, as implying an infinite capacity in the mind, it has been commonly infer'd in favour of the letter: and our abstract ideas have been suppos'd to represent no particular degree either of quantity or quality. But that this inference is erroneous, I shall endeavour to make appear, fir@t, by proving, that 'tis utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality, without forming a precise notion of its degrees: And secondly by showing, that tho' the capacity of the mind be not infinite, yet we can at once form a notion of all possible degrees of quantity and quality, in such a manner at least, as, however imperfect, may serve all the purposes of reflection and conversation.

To begin with the first proposition, that the mind cannot for,m any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of degrees of each; we may prove this by the three following arguments. First, We have observ'd, that whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination.' And we may here add, that these propositions are equally true in the inverse, and that whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable, are also different. For how is it possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish what is not different? In order therefore to know, whether abstraction implies a separation, we need only consider it in this view, and examine, whether all the circumstances, which we abstract from in our general ideas, be such as are distinguishable and different from those, which we retain as essential parts of them. But 'tis evident at first sight, that the precise length of a line is not different nor distinguishable from the line itself. nor the precise degree of any quality from the quality. These ideas, therefore, admit no more of separation than they do of distinction and difference. They are consequently conjoined with each other in the conception; and the general idea of a. line, notwithstanding all our abstractions and refinements, has in its@ appearance in the mind a precise degree of quantity and {1:327} quality; however it may be made to represent others, which have different degrees of both.

Secondly, 'tis contest, that no object can appear to the senses; or in other words, that no impression can become present to the mind, without being determined in its degrees both of quantity and quality. The confusion, in which impressions are sometimes involv'd, proceeds only from their faintness and unsteadiness, not from any capacity in the mind to receive any impression, which in its real existence has no particular degree nor proportion. That is a contradiction in terms; and even implies the flattest of all contradictions, viz. that 'tis possible for the same thing both to be and not to be.

Now since all ideas are deriv'd from impressions, and are nothing but copies and representations of them, whatever is true of the one must be acknowledg'd concerning the other. Impressions and ideas differ only in their strength and vivacity. The foregoing conclusion is not founded on any particular degree of vivacity. It cannot therefore be affected by any variation in that particular. An idea is a weaker impression:2 and as a strong impression must necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality, the case must be the same with its copy or representative.

Thirdly, 'tis a principle generally receiv'd in philosophy that everything in nature is individual, and that 'tis utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent, which has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If this therefore be absurd in fact and reality, it must also be absurd in idea; since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct idea is absurd and impossible. But to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply, is the same thing; the reference of the idea to an

object being an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character. Now as 'tis -impossible to form an idea of an object, that is possest of quantity and quality, and yet is possest of no precise degree of either; it follows that there is an equal impossibility of forming an idea, that is not limited and confin'd in both these particulars. Abstract ideas are therefore in {1:328} themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, tho' the application of it in our reasoning be the same, as if it were universal.

This application of ideas beyond their nature proceeds from our collecting all their possible degrees of quantity and quality in such an imperfect manner as may serve the purposes of life, which is the second proposition I propos'd to explain. When we have found a resemblance I among several objects, that often occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever other differences may appear among them. After we have acquired a custom of this kind, the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these objects, and makes the imagination conceive it with all its particular circumstances and proportions. But as the same word is suppos'd to have been frequently applied to other individuals, that are different in. many respects from that idea, which is immediately present to the mind; the word not being able to revive the idea of all these individuals, but only touches the soul, if I may be allow'd so to speak, and revives that custom, which we have acquir'd by surveying them. They are not really and in fact present to the mind, but only in power; nor do we draw them all out distinctly in the imagination, but keep ourselves in a readiness W survey any of them, as we may be prompted by a present design or necessity. The word raises up an individual idea, along with a certain custom; and that custom produces any other individual one, for which we may have occasion. But as the production of all the ideas, to {1:329} which the name may be apply'd, is in most eases impossible, we abridge that work by a more partial consideration, and find but few inconveniences to arise in our reasoning from that abridgment.

For this is one of the most extraordinary circumstances in the present affair, that after the mind has produc'd an individual idea, upon which we reason, the attendant custom, reviv'd by the general or abstract term, readily suggests any other individual, if by chance we form any reasoning, that agrees not with it. Thus shou'd we mention the word triangle, and form the idea of a particular equilateral one to correspond to it, and shou'd we afterwards assert, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to each other, the other individuals of a scalenum and isosceles, which we overlooked at first, immediately crowd in upon us, and make us perceive the falshood of this proposition, tho' it be true with relation to that idea, which we had form'd. If the mind suggests not always these ideas upon occasion, it proceeds from some imperfection in its faculties; and such a one as is often the source of false reasoning and sophistry. But this is principally the case with those ideas which are abstruse and compounded. On other occasions the custom is more entire, and 'tis seldom we run into such errors.

Nay so entire is the custom, that the very same idea may be annext to several different words, and may be employ'd in different reasonings, without any danger of mistake. Thus the idea of an equilateral triangle of an inch perpendicular may serve us in talking of a figure, of a rectilinear figure, of a regular figure, of a triangle, and of an equilateral triangle. AR these terms, therefore, are in this case attended with the same idea; but as they are wont to be apply'd in a greater or lesser compass, they excite their particular habits, and thereby keep the mind in a readiness to observe, that no conclusion be form'd contrary to any ideas, which are usually compriz'd under them.

Before those habits have become entirely perfect, perhaps the mind may not be content with forming the idea of only one individual, but may run over several, in order to make itself comprehend its own meaning, and the compass of that collection, which it intends to express by the general term. That we may &x the meaning of the word, figure, we may {1:330} revolve in our mind the ideas of circles, squares, parallelograms, triangles of different sizes and proportions, and may not rest on one image or idea. However this may be, 'tis certain that we form the idea of individuals, whenever we use any general term; that we seldom or never can exhaust these individuals; and that those, which remain, are only represented by means of that habit, by which we recall them, whenever any present occasion requires it. This then is the nature of our abstract ideas and general terms; and 'tis after this manner we account for the foregoing paradox, that some, ideas are particular in their nature, but general in their representation.' A particular idea becomes general by being annex'd to a general term; that is, to a term, which from a customary conjunction has a relation to many other particular ideas, and readily recalls them in the imagination.

The only difficulty, that can remain on this subject, must be with regard to that custom, which so readily recalls every particular idea, for which we may have occasion, and is excited by any word or sound, to which we commonly annex it. The most proper method, in my opinion, of giving a satisfactory explication of this act of the mind, is by producing other instances, which are analogous to it, and other principles, which facilitate its operation. To explain the ultimate causes of our mental actions is impossible. 'Tis sufficient, if we can give any satisfactory account of them from experience and analogy.

First then I observe, that when we mention any great number, such as a thousand, the mind has generally no adequate idea of it, but only a power of producing such an idea, by its adequate idea of the decimals, under which the number is comprehended. This imperfection, however, in our ideas, is never felt in our reasonings; which seems to be an instance parallel to the present one of universal ideas.

Secondly, we have several instances of habits, which may be reviv'd by one single word; as when a person, who has by rote any periods of a discourse, or any number of verses, will be put in remembrance of the whole, which he is at a loss to recollect, by that single word or expression, with which they begin.

Thirdly, I believe every one, who examines the situation {1:331} of his mind in reasoning' will agree with me, that we do not annex distinct and compleat ideas to every term we make use of, and that in talking of government, church, negotiation, conquest, we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas, of which these complex ones are compos'd. 'Tis however observable, that notwithstanding this imperfection we may avoid talking nonsense on these subjects, and may perceive any repugnance among the ideas, as well as if we had a fall comprehension of them. Thus if instead of saying, that in war the weaker have always recourse to negotiation, we shou'd say, that they have always recourse to conquest, the custom, which we have acquir'd of attributing certain relations to ideas, still follows the words, and makes us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition; in the same manner as one particular idea may serve us in reasoning concerning other ideas, however different from it in several circumstances.

Fourthly, As the individuals are -collected together, said plac'd under a general term with a view to that resemblance, which they bear to each other, this relation must facilitate their entrance in the imagination, and make them be suggested more readily upon occasion. And indeed if we consider

the common progress of the thought, either in reflection or conversation, we shall find great reason to be satisfy'd in this particular. Nothing is more admirable, than the readiness, with which the imagination suggests its ideas, and presents them at the very instant, in which they become necessary or useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other in collecting those ideas, which belong to any subject. One would think the whole intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our view, and that we did nothing but pick out such as were most proper for our purpose. There may not, however, be any present, beside those very ideas, that are thus collected by a kind of magical faculty in the soul, which, tho' it be always most perfect in the greatest geniuses, and is properly what we call a genius, is however inexplicable by the utmost efforts of human understanding.

Perhaps these four reflections may help to remove an difficulties to the hypothesis I have propos'd concerning abstract ideas, so contrary to that, which has hitherto prevail'd in philosophy, But, to tell the truth I place my {1:331} chief confidence in what I have already prov'd concerning the impossibility of general ideas, according to the common method of explaining them. We must certainly seek some new system on this head, and there plainly is none beside what I have propos'd. If ideas be particular in their nature, and at the same time finite in their number, 'tis only by custom they can become general in their representation, and contain an infinite number of other ideas under them.

Before I leave this subject I shall employ the same principles to explain that distinction of reason, which is so much talk'd of, and is so little understood, in the schools. Of this kind is the distinction betwixt figure and the body figur'd; motion and the body mov'd. The difficulty of explaining this distinction arises from the principle above explain'd, that all ideas, which are different, are separable. For it follows from thence, that if the figure be different from the body, their ideas must be separable as well as distinguishable: if they be not different, their ideas can neither be separable nor distinguishable. What then is meant by a distinction of reason, since it implies neither a difference nor separation.

To remove this difficulty we must have recourse to the foregoing explication of abstract ideas. 'Tis certain that the mind wou'd never have dream'd of distinguishing a figure from the body figur'd, as being in reality neither distinguishable, nor different, nor separable; did it not observe, that even in this simplicity there might be contain'd many different resemblances and relations.' Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour dispos'd in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish the colour from the form. But observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white, and comparing them with our former object, we find two separate resemblances, in what formerly seemed, and really is, perfectly inseparable. After a little more practice of this kind, we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by a distinction of reason; that is, we consider the figure and colour together, since they are in effect the same and undistinguishable; but still view them {1:333} in different aspects, according to the resemblances, of which they are susceptible. When we wou'd consider only the figure of the globe of white marble, we form in reality an idea both of the figure and colour, but tacitly carry our eye to its resemblance with the globe of black marble: And in the same manner, when we wou'd consider its colour only, we turn our view to its resemblance with the cube of white marble. By this means we accompany our ideas with a kind of reflection, of which custom renders us, in a great measure, insensible. A person, who desires us to consider the figure of a globe of white marble without thinking on its colour, desires an impossibility but his meaning is, that we shou'd consider the figure and colour together, but still keep in our eye the resemblance to the

globe of black marble, or that to any other globe of whatever colour or substance. {1:334}

PART II.

OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME,.

SECT. I. Of the Infinite Divisibility of our Ideas of Space and Time.

W/HATEVER\ has the air of a paradox, and is contrary to the first and most unprejudiced notions of mankind, is often greedily embrac'd by philosophers, as shewing the superiority of their science, which cou'd discover opinions so remote from vulgar conception. On the other hand, anything propos'd to us, which causes surprize and admiration, gives such a satisfaction to the mind, that it indulges itself in those agreeable emotions, and will never be persuaded that its pleasure is entirely without foundation. From these dispositions in philosophers and their disciples arises that mutual complaisance betwixt them; while the former furnish such plenty of strange and unaccountable opinions, and the latter so readily believe them. Of this mutual complaisance I cannot give a more evident instance than in the doctrine of infinite divisibility, with the examination of which I shall begin this subject of the ideas of space and time.

'Tis universally allow'd, that the capacity of the mind is limited, and can never attain a full and adequate conception of infinity: And tho' it were not allow'd, 'twould be sufficiently evident from the plainest observation and experience.' 'Tis also obvious, that whatever is capable of being divided in infinitum, must consist of an infinite number of parts, and that 'tis impossible to set any bounds to the number of parts, without setting bounds at the same time to the division. It requires scarce any, induction to conclude from hence, that the idea, which we form of any finite quality, is not infinitely divisible, but that by proper distinctions and {1:335} separations we may run up this idea to inferior ones, which will be perfectly simple and indivisible. In rejecting the infinite capacity of the mind, we suppose it may arrive at an end in the division of its ideas; nor are there any possible means of evading the evidence of this conclusion.

'Tis therefore certain, that the imagination reaches a minimum, and may raise up to itself an idea, of which it cannot conceive any sub-division, and which cannot be diminished without a total annihilation. When you tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain of sand, I have a, distinct idea of these numbers and of their different proportions; but the images, which I form in my mind to represent the things themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor inferior to that image, by which I represent the grain of sand itself, which is suppos'd so vastly to exceed them. What consists of parts is distinguishable into them, and what is distinguishable is separable. But whatever we may imagine of the thing, the idea of a grain of sand is not distinguishable, nor separable into twenty, much less into a thousand, ten thousand, or an infinite number of different ideas.'

'Tis the same case with the impressions of the senses as with the ideas of the imagination. Put a spot of ink upon paper, fix your eye upon that spot, and retire to such a distance, that, at last you lose sight of it; 'tis plain, that the moment before it vanish'd the image or impression was perfectly indivisible. 'Tis not for want of rays of light striking on our eyes, that the minute parts of distant bodies convey not any sensible impression; but because they are remov'd beyond that distance, at which their impressions were reduc'd to a minimum, and were incapable of any farther diminution. A microscope or telescope, which renders them visible, produces not any new rays of light, but only spreads those, which always flow'd from them; and by that means both gives parts to impressions, which to the naked eye appear simple and uncompounded, and advances to a'

'minimum, what was formerly imperceptible.

We may hence discover the error of the common opinion, that the capacity of the mind is limited on both sides, and that 'tis impossible for the imagination to form an adequate {1:336} idea, of what goes beyond a certain degree of minuteness as well as of greatness. Nothing can be more minute, than some ideas, which we form in the fancy; and images, which appear to the senses; since there are ideas and images perfectly simple and indivisible. The only defect of our senses is, that they give us disproportion'd images of things, and represent as minute and uncompounded what is really great and compos'd of a vast number of parts. This mistake we are not sensible of: but taking the impressions of those minute objects, which appear to the senses, to be equal or nearly equal to the objects, and finding by reason, that there are other objects vastly more minute, we too hastily conclude, that these are inferior to any idea of our imagination or impression of our senses. This however is certain, that we can form ideas, which shall be no greater than the smallest atom of the animal spirits of an insect a thousand times less than a mite: And we ought rather to conclude, that the difficulty lies in enlarging our conceptions so much as to form a just notion of a mite, or even of an insect a thousand times less than a mite. For in order to form a just notion of these animals, we must have a distinct idea representing every part of them;, which, according to the system of infinite divisibility, is utterly impossible, and,recording to that of indivisible parts or atoms, is extremely difficult, by reason of the vast number and multiplicity of these parts.

SECT. II.-Of the Infinite Divisibility of Space and Time.

Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions and agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects; and this we may in general observe to be the foundation of all human knowledge. But our ideas are adequate representations of the most minute parts of extension; and thro' whatever divisions and subdivisions we may suppose these parts to be arriv'd at, they can never become inferior to some ideas, which we form. The plain consequence is, that whatever appears impossible and contradictory upon the comparison of these ideas, must be really impossible and contradictory, without any farther excuse or evasion.

Every thing capable of being infinitely divided contains {1:337} an infinite number of parts; otherwise the division would be stopt short by the indivisible parts, which we should immediately arrive at. If therefore any finite extension be infinitely divisible, it can be no contradiction to suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts: And vice versa, if it be a contradiction to suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts, no finite extension can be infinitely divisible. But that this latter supposition is absurd, I easily convince myself by the consideration of my clear ideas. I first take the least idea I can form of a part of extension, and being certain that there is nothing more minute than this idea, I conclude, that whatever I discover by its means must be a real quality of extension. I then repeat this idea once, twice, thrice, &c., and find the compound idea of extension, arising from its repetition, always to augment, and become double, triple, quadruple, &c., till at last it swells up to a considerable bulk, greater or smaller, in proportion as I repeat more or less the same idea. When I stop in the addition of parts, the idea of extension ceases to augment; and were I to carry on the addition in infinitum, I clearly perceive, that the idea of extension must also become infinite. Upon the whole, I conclude, that the idea of all infinite number of parts is individually the same idea with that of an infinite extension; that no finite extension is capable of containing an infinite number of parts; and consequently that no finite extension is infinitely divisible.

I may subjoin another argument propos'd by a noted author," which seems to me very strong and

beautiful. 'Tis evident, that existence in itself belongs only to unity, and is never applicable to number, but on account of the unites, of which the number is compos'd. Twenty men may be said to exist; but 'tis only because one, two, three, four, &c. are existent, and if you deny the existence of the latter, that of the former falls of course. 'Tis therefore utterly absurd to suppose any number to exist, and yet deny the existence of {1:338} unites; and as extension is always a number, according to the common sentiment of metaphysicians, and never resolves itself into any unite or indivisible quantity, it follows, that extension can never at all exist. 'Tis in vain to reply, that any determinate quantity of extension is an unite; but such-a-one as admits of an infinite number of fractions, and is inexhaustible in its sub-divisions. For by the same rule these twenty men may be consider'd as an unite. The whole globe of the earth, nay the whole universe, may be consider'd as an unite,. That term of unity is merely a fictitious denomination, which the mind may apply to any quantity of objects it collects together; nor can such an unity any more exist alone than number can, as being in reality a true number. But the unity, which can exist alone, and whose existence is necessary to that of all number, is of another kind, and must be perfectly indivisible, and incapable of being resolved into any lesser unity.

All this reasoning takes place with regard to time; along with an additional argument, which it may be proper to take notice of. 'Tis a property inseparable from time, and which in a manner constitutes its essence, that each of its parts succeeds another, and that -none of them, however contiguous, can ever be co-existent. For the same reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the present year 1738 every moment must be distinct from, and posterior or antecedent to another.2 'Tis certain then, that time, as it exists, must be compos'd of indivisible moments. For if in time we could never arrive at an end of division, and if each moment, as it succeeds another, were not perfectly single and indivisible, there would be an infinite number of co-existent moments, or parts of time; which I believe will be allow'd to be an arrant contradiction.

The infinite divisibility of space implies that of time, as is evident from the nature of motion. If the latter, therefore, be impossible, the former must be equally so.

I doubt not but, it will readily be allow'd by the most obstinate defender of the doctrine of infinite divisibility, that these arguments are difficulties, and that 'tis impossible to give any answer to them which will be perfectly clear and satisfactory. But here we may observe, that nothing can be more {1:339} absurd, than this custom of calling a difficulty what pretends to be a demonstration, and endeavouring by that means to elude its force and evidence. 'Tis not in demonstrations as in probabilities, that difficulties can take place, and one argument counter-ballance another, and diminish its authority. A demonstration, if just, admits of no opposite difficulty; and if not just, 'tis a mere sophism, and consequently can never be a difficulty. 'Tis either irresistible, or has no manner of force. To talk therefore of objections and replies, and ballancing of arguments in such a question as this, is to confess, either that human reason is nothing but a play of words, or that the person himself, who talks so, has not a Capacity equal to such subjects. Demonstrations may be difficult to be comprehended, because of abstractedness of the subject; but can never have such difficulties as will weaken their authority, when once they are comprehended.

'Tis true, mathematicians are wont to say, that there are here equally strong arguments on the other side of the question, and that the doctrine of indivisible points is also liable to unanswerable objections. Before I examine these arguments and objections in detail, I will here take them in a body, and endeavour by a short and decisive reason to prove at once, that 'tis utterly impossible they can have any just foundation.

'Tis an establish'd maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives, includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible.

Now 'tis certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it? 'Tis likewise certain that this idea, as conceiv'd by the imagination, tho' divisible into parts or inferior ideas, is not infinitely divisible, nor consists of an infinite number of parts: For that exceeds the comprehension of our limited capacities. Here then is an idea of extension, which consists of parts or inferior ideas, that are perfectly, indivisible: consequently this idea implies no contradiction: consequently 'tis possible for extension {1:340} really to exist conformable to it: and consequently all the arguments employ'd against the possibility of mathematical points are mere scholastick quibbles, and unworthy of our attention.

These consequences we may carry one step farther, and conclude that all the pretended demonstrations for the infinite divisibility of extension are equally sophistical; since 'tis certain these demonstrations cannot be just without proving the impossibility of mathematical points; which 'tis an evident absurdity to pretend to.

SECT. III.-Of the other Qualities of our Idea of Space and Time.

No discovery cou'd have been made more happily for deciding all controversies concerning ideas, than that abovemention'd, that impressions always take the precedency of them, and that every idea, with which the imagination is furnish'd, first makes its appearance in a correspondent impression. These latter perceptions are all so clear and evident, that they admit of no controversy; tho' many of our ideas are so obscure, that 'tis almost impossible even for the mind, which forms them, to tell exactly their nature and composition. Let us apply this principle, in order to discover farther the nature of our ideas of space and time.

Upon opening my eyes, and turning them to the surrounding objects, I perceive many visible bodies; and upon shutting them again, and considering the distance betwixt these bodies, I acquire the idea of extension. As every idea is deriv'd from some impression,which is exactly similar to it, the impressions similar to this idea of extension, must either be some sensations deriv'd from the sight, or some internal impressions arising from these sensations.,

Our internal impressions are our passions, emotions, desires and aversions; none of which, I believe, will ever be asserted to be the model, from which the idea of space is deriv'd. There remains therefore nothing but the senses, which can convey to us this original impression. Now what impression do oar senses here convey to us? This is the {1:341} principal question, and decides without appeal concerning the nature of the idea.

The table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension. This idea, then, is borrow'd from, and represents some impression, which this moment appears to the senses. But my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour'd points, dispos'd in a, certain manner. If the eye is sensible of any thing farther, I desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it be impossible to shew any thing farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these colour'd points, and of the manner of their appearance.

Suppose that in the extended object, or composition of colour'd points, from which we first receiv'd the idea of extension, the points were of a purple colour; it follows, that in every repetition of that

idea we wou'd not only place the points in the same order with respect to each other, but also bestow on them that precise colour, with which alone we are acquainted. But afterwards having experience of the other colours of violet, green, red, white, black, and of all the different compositions of these, and finding a resemblance in the disposition of colour'd points, of which they are compos'd, we omit the peculiarities of colour, as far as possible, and found an abstract idea merely on that disposition of points, or manner of appearance, in which they agree. Nay even when the resemblance is carry'd beyond the objects of one sense, and the impressions of touch are found to be Similar to those of sight in the disposition of their parts; this does not hinder the abstract idea from representing both, upon account of their resemblance. All abstract ideas are really nothing but particular ones, consider'd in a certain light; but being annexed to general terms, they are able to represent a vast variety, and to comprehend objects, which, as they are alike in some particulars, are in others vastly wide of each other.'

The idea of time, being deriv'd from the succession of our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as of sensations will afford us an instance of an abstract idea, which comprehends a still greater variety than that of space, and yet is represented {1:342} in the fancy by some particular individual idea of a determinate quantity and quality.

As 'tis from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space, so from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time, nor is it possible for time alone ever to make its appearance, or be taken notice of by the mind.' A man in a sound sleep, or strongly occupy'd with one thought, is insensible of time; and according as his perceptions succeed each other with greater or less rapidity, the same duration appears longer or shorter to his imagination. It has been remark'd by a great philosopher, that our perceptions have certain bounds in this particular, which are fix'd by the original nature and constitution of the mind, and beyond which no influence of external objects on the senses is ever able to hasten or retard our thought. If you wheel about a burning coal with rapidity, it will present to the senses an image of a circle of fire; nor will there seem to be any interval of time betwixt its revolutions; meerly because 'tis impossible for our perceptions to succeed each other with the same rapidity, that motion may be communicated to external objects. Wherever we have no successive perceptions, we have no notion of time, even tho' there be a real succession in the objects. From these phenomena, as well as from many others, we may conclude, that time cannot make its appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with a steady unchangeable object, but is always discovered some <perceivable> succession of changeable objects.

To confirm this we may add the following argument, which to me seems perfectly decisive and convincing. 'Tis evident, that time or duration consists of different parts: For otherwise we cou'd not conceive a longer or shorter duration. 'Tis also evident, that these parts are not @existent: For that quality of the co-existence of parts belongs to extension, and is what distinguishes it from duration. Now as time is compos?d of parts, that are not coexistent: an unchangeable object, since it produces none but coexistent impressions, produces none that can give us the idea of time; and consequently that idea must be deriv'd from a succession of {1:343} changeable objects, and time in its first appearance can never be sever'd from such a succession.

Having therefore found, that time in its first appearance to the mind is always conjoin'd with a succession of changeable objects, and that otherwise it can never fall under our notice, we must now examine whether it can be conceiv'd without our conceiving any succession of objects, and whether it can alone form a distinct idea in the imagination.

In order to know whether any objects, which are join'd in impression, be inseparable in idea, we need only consider, if they be different from each other; in which case, 'tis plain they may be conceiv'd apart. Every thing, that is different is distinguishable: and everything, that is distinguishable, may be separated, according to the maxims above-explain'd. If on the contrary they be not different, they are not distinguishable: and if they be not distinguishable, they cannot be separated. But this is precisely the case with respect to time, compar'd with our successive perceptions. The idea of time is -not deriv'd from a particular impression mix'd up with others, and plainly distinguishable from them; but arises altogether from the manner, in which impressions appear to the mind, without making one of the number. Five notes play'd on a flute give us the impression and idea of time; tho' time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing or any other of the senses. Nor is it a sixth impression, which the mind by reflection finds in itself. These five sounds making their appearance in this particular manner, excite no emotion in the mind, nor produce an affection of any kind, which being observ'd by it can give rise to a new idea. For that is necessary to produce a new idea of reflection, nor can the mind, by revolving over a thousand times all its ideas of sensation, ever extract from them any new original idea, unless nature has so fram'd its faculties, that it feels some new original impression arise from such a contemplation. But here it only takes notice of the manner, in which the different sounds make their appearance; and that it may afterwards consider without considering these particular sounds, but may conjoin it with any other objects. The ideas of some objects it certainly must have, nor is it possible for it without these ideas ever to arrive at any conception of time; which since it, appears not as any {1:344} primary distinct impression, can plainly be nothing but different ideas, or impressions, or objects dispos'd in a certain manner, that is, succeeding each other.

I know there are some who pretend, that the idea of duration is applicable in a proper sense to objects, which are perfectly unchangeable; and this I take to be the common opinion of philosophers as well as of the vulgar. But to be convinc'd of its falsehood we need but reflect on the foregoing conclusion, that the idea of duration is always deriv'd from a succession of changeable objects, and can never be convey'd to the mind by any thing stedfast and unchangeable. For it inevitably follows from thence, that since the idea of duration cannot be deriv'd from such an object, it can never-in any propriety or exactness be apply'd to it, nor can any thing unchangeable be ever said to have duration. Ideas always represent the Objects or impressions, from which they are deriv'd, and can never without a fiction represent or be apply'd to any other. By what fiction we apply the idea of time, even to what is unchangeable, and suppose, as is common, that duration is a measure of rest as well as of motion, we shall consider afterwards.

There is another very decisive argument, which establishes the present doctrine concerning our ideas of space and time, and is founded only on that simple principle, that our ideas of them are compounded of parts, which are indivisible. This argument may be worth the examining.

Every idea, that is distinguishable, being also separable, let us take one of those simple indivisible ideas, of which the compound one of extension is form'd, and separating it from all others, and considering it apart, let us form a judgment of its nature and qualities.

'Tis plain it is not the idea of extension. For the idea of extension consists of parts; and this idea, according to t-he supposition, is perfectly simple and indivisible. Is it therefore nothing? That is absolutely impossible. For as the compound idea of extension, which is real, is compos'd of such ideas; were these so many non-entities, there wou'd be a real existence compos'd of non-entities; which is absurd. Here therefore I must ask, What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point? No wonder if my answer appear somewhat new, since the question itself has scarce ever yet {1:345}

been thought of. We are wont to dispute concerning the nature of mathematical points, but seldom concerning the nature of their ideas.

The idea of space is convey'd to the. mind by two senses, the sight and touch; nor does anything ever appear extended, that is not either visible or tangible. That compound impression, which represents extension, consists of several lesser impressions, that are indivisible to the eye or feeling, and may be call'd impressions of atoms or corpuscles endow'd with colour and solidity. But this is not all. 'Tis not only requisite, that these atoms shou'd be colour'd or tangible, in order to discover themselves to our senses; 'tis also necessary we shou'd preserve the idea of their colour or tangibility in order to comprehend them by our imagination. There is nothing but the idea of their colour or tangibility, which can render them conceivable by the mind. Upon the removal of the ideas of these sensible qualities, they are utterly annihilated to the thought or imagination.'

Now such as the parts are, such is the whole. If a point be not consider'd as colour'd or tangible, it can convey to us no idea; and consequently the idea of extension, which is compos'd of the ideas of these points, can never possibly exist. But if the idea of extension really can exist, as we are conscious it does, its parts must also exist; and in order to that, must be consider'd as colour'd or tangible. We have therefore no idea of space or extension, but when we regard it as an object either of our sight or feeling.

The same reasoning will prove, that the indivisible moments of time must be fill'd with some real object or existence, whose succession forms the duration, and makes it be conceivable by the mind.

SECT. IV.- Objections answer'd.

Our system concerning space and time consists of two parts, which are intimately connected together. The first depends on this chain of reasoning. The capacity of the mind is not infinite; consequently no idea of extension or duration consists of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, but of a finite number, and these simple and indivisible:

'Tis therefore possible for space and time to exist {1:346} conformable to this idea: And if it be possible, 'tis certain they actually do exist conformable to it; since their infinite divisibility is utterly impossible and contradictory.

The other part of our system is a consequence of this. The parts, into which the ideas of space and time resolve themselves, become at last indivisible; and these indivisible parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable when not fill'd with something real and existent. The ideas of space and time are therefore no separate or distinct ideas, but merely those of the manner or order, in which objects exist: Or in other words, 'tis impossible to conceive either a vacuum and extension without matter, or a time, when there was no succession or change in any real existence. The intimate connexion betwixt these parts of our system is the reason why we shall examine together the objections, which have been urg'd against both of them, beginning with those against the finite divisibility of extension.

I

The first of these objections, which I shall take notice of, is more proper to prove this connexion and dependence of the one part upon the other, than to destroy either of them. It has often been maintained in the schools, that extension must be divisible, in infinitum, because the system of mathematical points is absurd; and that system is absurd, because a mathematical point is a non-entity, and consequently can never by its conjunction with others form a real existence. This wou'd be perfectly decisive, were there no medium betwixt the infinite divisibility of matter, and

the non-entity of mathematical points. But there is evidently a medium, viz. the bestowing a colour or solidity on these points; and the absurdity of both the extremes is a demonstration of the truth and reality of this medium. The system of physical points, which is another medium, is too absurd to need a refutation. A real extension, such as a physical point is suppos'd to be, can never exist without parts, different from each other; and wherever objects are different, they are distinguishable and separable by the imagination.

II. The second objection is deriv'd from the necessity there wou'd be of penetration, if extension consisted of mathematic-.i,l points. A simple and indivisible atom, that touches another, must necessarily penetrate it; for 'tis impossible it can touch it by its external parts, from the very supposition {1:347} of its perfect simplicity, which excludes all parts. It must therefore touch it intimately, and in its whole essence, <secundum se, tota, & totaliter>; which is the very definition of penetration. But penetration is impossible: Mathematical points are of consequence equally impossible.

I answer this objection by substituting a juster idea of penetration. Suppose two bodies containing no void within their circumference, to approach each other, and to unite in such a manner that the body, which results from their union, is no more extended than either of them; 'tis this we must mean when we talk of penetration. But 'tis evident this penetration is nothing but the annihilation of one of these bodies, and the preservation of the other, without our being able to distinguish particularly which is preserv'd and which annihilated. Before the approach we have the idea of two bodies. After it we have the idea only of one. 'Tis impossible for the mind to preserve any notion of difference betwixt two bodies of the same nature existing in the same place at the same time.

Taking then penetration in this sense, for the annihilation of one body upon its approach to another, I ask any one, if he sees a necessity, that a colour'd or tangible point shou'd be annihilated upon the approach of another colour'd or tangible point? On the contrary, does he not evidently perceive, that from the union of these points there results an object, which is compounded and divisible, and may be distinguished into two parts, of which each preserves its existence distinct and separate, notwithstanding its contiguity to the other? Let him aid his fancy by conceiving these points to be of different colours, the better to prevent their coalition and confusion. A blue and a red point may surely lie contiguous without any penetration or annihilation. For if they cannot, what possibly can become of them? Whether shall the red or the blue be annihilated? Or if these colours unite into one, what new colour will they produce by their union?

What chiefly gives rise to these objections, and at the same time renders it so difficult to give a satisfactory answer to them, is the natural infirmity and unsteadiness both of our imagination and senses, when employ'd on such minute objects. Put a spot of ink upon paper, and retire to such a distance, that the spot becomes altogether invisible; you will {1:348} find, that upon your return and nearer approach the spot first becomes visible by short intervals; and afterwards becomes always visible; and afterwards acquires only a new force in its colouring without augmenting its bulk; and afterwards, when it has encreas'd to such a degree as to be really extended, 'tis still difficult for the imagination to break it into its component parts, because of the uneasiness it finds in the conception of such a minute object as a single point. This infirmity affects most of our reasonings on the present subject, and makes it almost impossible to answer in an intelligible manner, and in proper expressions, many questions which may arise concerning it.

III. There have been -many objections drawn from the mathematics against the indivisibility of the parts of extension: tho' at first sight that science seems rather favourable to the present doctrine;

and if it be contrary in its <demonstrations>, 'tis perfectly conformable in its definitions. My present business then must be to defend the definitions, and refute the demonstrations.

A surface is defin'd to be length and breadth without dept,h: A line to be length without breadth or depth: A point to be what has neither length, breadth nor depth. 'Tis evident that all this is perfectly unintelligible upon any other supposition than that of the. composition of extension by indivisible points or atoms. How else cou'd any thing exist without length, without breadth, or without depth?

Two different answers, I find, have been made to this argument; neither of which is in my opinion satisfactory. The first is, that the objects of geometry, those surfaces, lines and points, whose proportions and positions it examines, are mere ideas in the mind; I and not only never did, but never can exist in nature. They never did exist; for no one will pretend to draw a line or make a surface entirely conformable to the definition: They never can exist; for we may produce demonstrations from these very ideas to prove, that they are impossible.

But can anything be imagin'd more absurd and contradictory than this reasoning? Whatever can be conceiv'd by a clear and distinct idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence; and he who pretends to prove the impossibility of its existence by any argument derived from the clear {1:349} idea, in reality asserts, that we have no clear idea of it, because we have a clear idea. 'Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in any thing that is distinctly conceiv'd by the mind. Did it imply any contradiction, 'tis impossible it cou'd ever be conceiv'd.

There is therefore no medium betwixt allowing at least the possibility of indivisible points, and denying their idea; and 'tis on this latter principle, that the second answer to the foregoing argument is founded. It has been I pretended, that tho' it be impossible to conceive a length without any breadth, yet by an abstraction without a separation, we can consider the one without regarding the other; in the same manner as we may think of the length of the way betwixt two towns, and overlook its breadth. The length is inseparable from the breadth both in nature and in our minds; but this excludes not a partial consideration, and a distinction of reason, after the manner above explain'd.

In refuting this answer I shall not insist on the argument, which I have already sufficiently explained, that if it be impossible for the mind to arrive at a minimum in its ideas, its capacity must be infinite, in order to comprehend the infinite number of parts, of which its idea of any extension wou'd be compos'd. I shall here endeavour to find some new absurdities in this reasoning.

A surface terminates a solid; a line terminates a surface; a point terminates a line; but I assert, that if the ideas of a point, line or surface were not indivisible, 'tis impossible we shou'd ever conceive these terminations: For let these ideas be suppos'd infinitely divisible; and then let the fancy endeavour to fix itself on the idea of the last surface, line or point; it immediately finds this idea to break into parts; and upon its seizing the last of these parts, it loses its hold by a new division, and so on in infinitum, without any possibility of its arriving at a concluding idea. The number of fractions bring it no nearer the last division, than the first idea it form'd. Every particle eludes the grasp by a new fraction; like quicksilver, when we endeavour to seize it. But as in fact there must be something, which terminates the idea of every finite quantity; and as this terminating {1:350} idea cannot itself consist of parts or inferior ideas; otherwise it wou'd be the last of its parts, which finish'd the idea, and so on; this is a clear proof, that the ideas of surfaces, lines and points admit not of any division; those of surfaces in depth; of lines in breadth and depth; and of points in any dimension.

The school were so sensible of the force of this argument, that some of them maintained, that nature has mix'd among those particles of matter, which are divisible in infinitum, a number of mathematical points, in order to give a termination to bodies; and others eluded the force of this reasoning by a heap of unintelligible cavils and distinctions. Both these adversaries equally yield the victory. A man who hides himself, confesses as evidently the superiority of his enemy, as another, who fairly delivers his arms.

Thus it appears, that the definitions of mathematics destroy the pretended demonstrations; and that if we have the idea of indivisible points, lines and surfaces conformable to the definition, their existence is certainly possible: but if we have no such idea,'tis impossible we can ever conceive the termination of any figure; without which conception there can be no geometrical demonstration.

But I go farther, and maintain, that none of these demonstrations can have sufficient weight to establish such a principle, as this of infinite divisibility; and that because with regard to such minute objects, they are not properly demonstrations, being built on ideas, which are not exact, and maxims, which are not precisely true. When geometry decides anything concerning the proportions of quantity, we ought not to look for the utmost precision and exactness. None of its proofs extend so far. It takes the dimensions and proportions of figures justly; but roughly, and with some liberty. Its errors are never considerable; nor wou'd it err at all, did it not aspire to such an absolute perfection.

I first ask mathematicians, what they mean when they f,a.y one line or surface is /EQUAL\ to, or /GREATER\ or /LESS\ than another? Let any of them give an answer, to whatever sect he belongs, and whether he maintains the composition of extension by indivisible points, or by quantities divisible in infinitum. This question will embarrass both of them. {1:351}

There are few or no mathematicians, who defend the hypothesis of indivisible points; and yet these have the readiest and justest answer to the present question. They need only reply, that lines or surfaces are equal, when the numbers of points in each are equal; and that as the proportion of the numbers varies, the proportion of the lines and surfaces is also vary'd. But tho' this answer be just, as well as obvious; yet I may affirm, that this standard of equality is entirely useless, and that it never is from such a comparison we determine objects to be equal or unequal with respect to each other. For as the points, which enter into the composition of any line or surface, whether perceiv'd by the sight or touch, are so minute and so confounded with each other, that 'tis utterly impossible for the mind to compute their number, such a computation will Never afford us a standard by which we may judge of proportions. No one will ever be able to determine by an exact numeration, that an inch has fewer points than a foot, or a foot fewer than an ell or any greater measure: for which reason we seldom or never consider this as the standard of equality or inequality.

As to those, who imagine, that extension is divisible in infinitum, 'tis impossible they can make use of this answer, or fix the equality of any line or surface by a numeration of its component parts. For since, according to their hypothesis, the least as well as greatest figures contain an infinite number of parts; and since infinite numbers, properly speaking, can neither be equal nor unequal with respect to each other; the equality or inequality of any portions of space can never depend on any proportion in the number of their parts. 'Tis true, it may be said, that the inequality of an ell and a yard consists in the different numbers of the feet, of which they are compos'd; and that of a foot and a yard in the number of the inches. Bat as that quantity we call an inch in the one is suppos'd equal to what we call an inch in the other, and as 'tis impossible for the mind to find this equality by proceeding in infinitum with these references to inferior quantities: 'tis evident, that at

last we must fix some standard of equality different from an enumeration of the parts.

There are some, who pretend, that equality is best defin'd {1:352} by congruity, and that any two figures are equal, when upon the placing of one upon the other, all their parts correspond to and touch each other. In order to judge of this definition let us consider, that since equality is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, a property in the figures themselves, but arises merely from the comparison, which the mind makes betwixt them.' If it consists, therefore, in this imaginary application and mutual contact of parts, we must at least have a distinct notion of these parts, and must conceive their contact. Now 'tis plain, that in this conception we wou'd run up these parts to the greatest minuteness, which can possibly be conceiv'd; since the contact of large parts wou'd never render the figures equal. But the minutest parts we can conceive are mathematical points; and consequently this standard of equality is the same with that deriv'd from the equality of the number of points; which we have already determined to be a just but an useless standard. We must therefore look to some other quarter for a solution of the present difficulty.

[The following paragraph is added from the appendix] There are many philosophers, who refuse to assign any standard of equality, but assert, that 'tis sufficient to present two objects, that are equal, in order to give us a just notion of this proportion. All definitions, say they, are fruitless, without the perception of such objects; and where we perceive such objects, we no longer stand in need of any definition. To this reasoning, I entirely agree.; and assert, that the only useful notion of equality, or inequality, is deriv'd from the whole united appearance and the comparison of particular objects.

'Tis evident, that the eye, or rather the mind is often able at one view to determine the proportions of bodies, and pronounce them equal to, or greater or less than each other, without examining or comparing the number of their minute parts. Such judgments are not only common, but in many cases certain and infallible. When the measure of a yard and that of a foot are presented, the mind can no more question, that the first is longer than the second, than it can doubt of those principles, which are the most clear and self-evident.

There are therefore three proportions, which the mind distinguishes in the general appearance of its objects, and calls by the names of greater, less and equal. But tho' its {1:353} decisions concerning these proportions be sometimes infallible, they are not always so; nor are our judgments of this kind more exempt from doubt and error than those on any other subject. We frequently correct our first opinion by a review and reflection; and pronounce those objects to be equal, which at first we esteem'd unequal; and regard an object as less, tho' before it appear'd greater than another. Nor is this the only correction, which these judgments of our senses undergo; but we often discover our error by a juxtaposition of the objects; or where that is impracticable, by the use of some common and invariable measure, which being successively apply'd to each, informs us of their different proportions. And even this correction is susceptible of a new correction., and of different degrees of exactness, according to the nature of the instrument, by which we measure the bodies, and the care which we employ in the comparison.'

When therefore the mind is accustomed to these judgments and their corrections, and finds that the same proportion which makes two figures have in the eye that appearance, which we call equality, makes them also correspond to each other, and to any common measure, with which they are compar'd, we form a mix'd notion of equality deriv'd both from the looser and stricter methods of comparison. But we are not content with this. For as sound reason convinces us that there are bodies vastly more minute than those, which appear to the senses; and as a false reason

wou'd perswade us, that there are bodies infinitely more minute; we clearly perceive, that we are not possess'd of any instrument or art of measuring, which can secure us from ill error and uncertainty. We are sensible, that the addition or removal of one of these minute parts, is not discernible either in the appearance or measuring; and as we imagine, that two figures, which were equal before, cannot be equal after this removal or addition, we therefore suppose some imaginary standard of equality, by which the appearances and measuring are exactly corrected, and the figures reduc'd entirely to that proportion. This standard is plainly imaginary. For as the very idea of equality is that of such a particular appearance corrected by juxtaposition or a common measure. the notion of any correction beyond what we have instruments and art to make, is a mere fiction of the mind, and useless {1:354} as well as incomprehensible. But tho' this standard be only imaginary, the fiction however is very natural; nor is anything more usual, than for the mind to proceed after this manner with any action, even after the reason has ceas'd, which first determined it to begin. This appears very conspicuously with regard to time; where tho' 'tis evident we have no exact method of determining the proportions of parts, not even so exact as in extension, yet the various corrections of our measures, and their different degrees of exactness, have given as an obscure and implicit notion of a perfect and entire equality. The case is the same in many other subjects. A musician finding his ear becoming every day more delicate, and correcting himself by reflection and attention, proceeds with the same act of the mind, even when the subject fails him, and entertains a notion of a compleat <tierce> or <octave>, without being able to tell whence he derives his standard. A painter forms the same fiction with regard to colours. A mechanic with regard to motion. To the one light and shade; to the other swift and slow are imagin'd to be capable of an exact comparison and equality beyond the judgments of the senses.

We may apply the same reasoning to /CURVE\ and /RIGHT\ lines. Nothing is more apparent to the senses, than the distinction betwixt a curve and a right line; nor are there any ideas we more easily form than the ideas of these objects. But however easily we may form these ideas, 'tis impossible to produce any definition of them, which will fix the precise boundaries betwixt them. When we draw lines upon paper, or any continu'd surface, there is a certain order, by which the lines run along from one point to another, that they may produce the entire impression of a curve or right line; but this order is perfectly unknown, and nothing is observ'd but the united appearance. Thus even upon the system of indivisible points, we can only form a distant notion of some unknown standard to these objects. Upon that of infinite divisibility we cannot go even this length; but are reduc'd meerly to the general appearance, as the rule by which we determine lines to be either curve or right ones. But tho' we can give no perfect definition of these lines, nor produce any very exact method of distinguishing the one from the other; yet this hinders us not from correcting the first appearance by a more accurate consideration, and by a comparison {1:355} with some rule, of whose rectitude from repeated trials we have a greater assurance. And 'tis from these corrections, and by carrying on the same action of the mind, even when its reason fails us, that we form the loose idea of a perfect standard to these figures, without being able to explain or comprehend it.

'Tis true, mathematicians pretend they give an exact definition of a right line, when they say, it is the shortest way betwixt two points. But in the first place I observe, that this is more properly the discovery of one of the properties of a right line, than a just deflation of it. For I ask any one, if upon mention of a right line he thinks not immediately on such a particular appearance, and if 'tis not by accident only that he considers this property? A right line can be comprehended alone; but this definition is unintelligible without a comparison with other lines, which we conceive to be more

extended. In common life 'tis established as a maxim, that the straightest way is always the shortest; which wou'd be as absurd as to say, the shortest way is always the shortest, if our idea of a right line was not different from that of the shortest way betwixt two points.

Secondly, I repeat what I have already established, that we have no precise idea of equality and inequality, shorter and longer, more than of a right line or a curve; and consequently that the one can never afford us a perfect standard for the other. An exact idea can never be built on such as are loose and undetermined.

The idea of a plain surface is as little susceptible of a precise standard as that of a right line; nor have we any other means of distinguishing such a surface, than its general appearance. 'Tis in vain, that mathematicians represent a plain surface as produc'd by the flowing of a right line. 'Twill immediately be objected, that our idea of a surface is as independent of this method of forming a surface, as our idea of an ellipse is of that of a cone; that the idea of a right line is no more precise than that of a plain surface; that a right line may flow irregularly, and by that means form a figure quite different from a plane; and that therefore we must suppose it to flow along two right lines, parallel to each other, and on the same plane; which is a description, that explains a thing by itself, and returns in a circle. {1:356}

It appears, then, that the ideas which are most essential to geometry, viz. those of equality and inequality, of a right line and a plain surface, are far from being exact and determinate, according to our common method of conceiving them. Not only we are incapable of telling, if the case be in any degree doubtful, when such particular figures are equal; when such a line is a right one, and such a surface a plain one; but we can form no idea of that proportion, or of these figures, which is firm and invariable. Our appeal is still to the weak and fallible judgment, which we make from the appearance of the objects, and correct by a compass or common measure; and if we join the supposition of any farther correction, 'tis of such-a-one as is either useless or imaginary. In vain shou'd we have recourse to the common topic, and employ the supposition of a deity, whose omnipotence may enable him to form a perfect geometrical figure, and describe a right line without any curve or inflexion. As the ultimate standard of these figures is deriv'd from nothing but the senses and imagination, 'tis absurd to talk of any perfection beyond what these faculties can judge of; since the true perfection of any thing consists in its conformity to its standard.

Now since these ideas are so loose and uncertain, I wou'd fain ask any mathematician what infallible assurance he has, not only of the more intricate,,, and obscure propositions of his science, but of the most vulgar and obvious principles? How can he prove to me, for instance, that two right lines cannot have one common segment? Or that 'tis impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points? Shou'd be tell me, that these opinions are obviously absurd, and repugnant to our clear ideas; I would answer, that I do not deny, where two right lines incline upon each other with a sensible angle, but 'tis absurd to imagine them to have a common segment. But supposing these two lines to approach at the rate of an inch in twenty leagues, I perceive no absurdity in asserting, that upon their contact they become one. For, I beseech you, by what rule or standard do you judge, when you assert, that the line, in which I have suppos'd them to concur, cannot make the same right line with those two, that form so small an angle betwixt them? You must surely have some idea of a right line, to which this line does not agree. Do you therefore mean that it {1:357} takes not the points in the same order and by the same rule., as is peculiar and essential to a right line? If so, I must inform you, that besides that in judging after this manner you allow, that extension is compos'd of indivisible points (which, perhaps, is more than you intend) besides this, I say, I must inform you, that neither is this the standard from which we form the idea

of a right line; nor, if it were, is there any such firmness in our- senses or imagination, as to determine when such an order is violated or preserv'd. The original standard of a right line is in reality nothing but a certain general appearance; and 'tis evident right lines may be made to concur with each other, and yet correspond to this standard, tho' corrected by all the means either practicable or imaginable.

[This paragraph is inserted from the appendix.] To whatever side mathematicians turn, this dilemma still meets them. If they judge of equality, or any other proportion, by the accurate and exact standard, viz. the enumeration of the minute indivisible parts, they both employ a standard, which is useless in practice, and actually establish the indivisibility of extension, which they endeavour to explode. Or if they employ, as is usual, the inaccurate standard, deriv'd from a comparison of objects, upon their general appearance, corrected by measuring and juxtaposition; their first principles, tho' certain and infallible, are too coarse to afford any such subtile inferences as they commonly draw from them. The first principles are founded on the imagination and senses: The conclusion, therefore, can never go beyond, much less contradict these faculties.

This may open our eyes a little, and let us see, that no geometrical demonstration for the infinite divisibility of extension can have so much force as what we naturally attribute to every argument, which is supported by such magnificent pretensions. At the same time we may learn the reason, why geometry falls of evidence in this single point,, while all its other reasonings command our fullest assent and approbation. And indeed it seems more requisite to give the reason of this exception, than to shew, that we really must make such an exception, and regard all the mathematical arguments for infinite divisibility as utterly sophistical. For 'tis evident, that as no idea of quantity is infinitely {1:358} divisible, there cannot be imagin'd a more glaring absurdity, than to endeavour to prove, that quantity itself admits of such a division; and to prove this by means of ideas, which are directly opposite in that particular. And as this absurdity is very glaring in itself, so there is no argument founded on it'. which is not attended with a new absurdity, and involves not an evident contradiction.

I might give as instances those arguments for infinite divisibility, which are deriv'd from the point of contact. I know there is no mathematician, who will not refuse to be judg'd by the diagrams he describes upon paper, these being loose draughts, as he will tell us, and serving only to convey with greater facility certain ideas, which are the true foundation of all our reasoning. This I am satisfy'd with, and am willing to rest the controversy merely upon these ideas. I desire therefore our mathematician to form, as accurately as possible, the ideas of a circle and a right line; and I then ask, if upon the conception of their contact he can conceive them as touching in a mathematical point, or if he must necessarily imagine them to concur for some space. Whichever side he chuses, he runs himself into equal difficulties. If he affirms, that in tracing these figures in his imagination, he can imagine them to touch only in a point, he allows the possibility of that idea, and consequently of the thing. If he says, that in his conception of the contact of those lines he must make them concur, he thereby acknowledges the fallacy of geometrical demonstrations, when carry'd beyond a certain degree of minuteness; since 'tis certain he has such demonstrations against the concurrence of a circle and a right line; that is, in other words, be can prove an idea, viz. that of concurrence, to be <incompatible> with two other ideas, those of a circle and right line; tho' at the same time he acknowledges these ideas to be inseparable.

SECT. V.-The same subject continued.

If the second part of my system be true, that the idea of space or extension is nothing but the idea

of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order; it follows, that we can form no idea of a vacuum, or space, where there is nothing visible or tangible.' This gives rise to three objections, {1:359} which I shall examine together, because the answer I shall give to one is a consequence of that which I shall make use of for the others.

First, It may be said, that men have disputed for many ages concerning a vacuum and a plenum, without being able to bring the affair to a final decision; and philosophers, even at this day, think themselves at liberty to take part on either side, as their fancy leads them. But whatever foundation there may be for a controversy concerning the things themselves, it may be pretended, that the very dispute is decisive concerning the idea, and that 'tis impossible men cou'd so long reason about a vacuum, and either refute or defend it, without having a notion of what they refuted or defended.

Secondly, If this argument shou'd be contested, the reality or at least the possibility of the idea of a vacuum may be prov'd by the following reasoning. Every idea is possible, which is a necessary and infallible consequence of such as are possible. Now tho' we allow the world to be at present a plenum, we may easily conceive it to be depriv'd of motion; and this idea will certainly be allow'd possible. It must also be allow'd possible, to conceive the annihilation of any part of matter by the omnipotence of the deity, while the other parts remain at rest. For as every idea, that is distinguishable, is separable by the imagination; and as every idea, that is separable by the imagination, may be conceiv'd to be separately existent; 'tis evident, that the existence of one particle of matter, no more implies the existence of another, than a square figure in one body implies a square figure in every one. This being granted, I now demand what results from the concurrence of these two possible ideas of rest and annihilation, and what must we conceive to follow upon the annihilation of all the air and subtile matter in the chamber, supposing the walls to remain the same, without any motion or alteration? There are some metaphysicians, who answer, that since matter and extension are the same, the annihilation of one necessarily implies that of the other; and there being now no distance betwixt the walls of the chamber, they touch each other; in the same manner as my hand touches the paper, which is immediately 'before me. But tho' this answer be very common, I defy these metaphysicians to conceive the matter according to {1:360} their hypothesis, or imagine the floor and roof, with all the opposite sides of the chamber, to touch each other, while they continue in rest, and preserve the same position. For how can the two walls, that run from south to north, touch each other, while they touch the opposite ends of two walls, that run from east to west? And how can the floor and. roof ever meet, while they are separated by the four walls, that lie in a contrary position? If you change their position, you suppose a motion. If you conceive any thing betwixt them, you suppose a new creation. But keeping strictly to the two ideas of rest and annihilation, 'tis evident, that the idea, which results from them, is not that of a contact of parts, but something else; which is concluded to be the idea of a vacuum.

The third objection carries the matter still farther, and not only asserts, that the idea of a vacuum is real and possible, but also necessary and unavoidable. This assertion is founded on the motion we observe in bodies, which, 'tis maintain'd, wou'd be impossible and inconceivable without a vacuum, into which one body must move in order to make way for another.. I shall not enlarge upon this objection, because it principally belongs to natural philosophy, which lies without our present sphere.

In order to answer these objections, we must take the matter pretty deep, and consider the nature and origin of several ideas,, lest we dispute without understanding perfectly the subject of the controversy. 'Tis evident the idea of darkness is no positive idea, but merely the negation of .light,

or more properly speaking, of colour'd and visible objects. A man, who enjoys his sight, receives no other perception from turning his eyes on every side, when entirely depriv'd of light, than what is common to him with one born blind; and 'tis certain such-a-one has no idea either of light or darkness. The consequence of this is, that 'tis not from the mere removal of visible objects we receive the impression of extension without matter; and that the idea of utter darkness can never be the same with that of vacuum.

Suppose again a man to be Supported in the air, and to be softly convey'd along by some invisible power; 'tis evident 'he is sensible of nothing, and never receives the idea of extension, nor indeed any idea, from this invariable motion. Even supposing he moves his limbs to and fro, this cannot {1:361} convey to him that idea. He feels in that case a certain sensation or impression, the parts of which are successive to each other, and may give him the idea of time: But certainly are not dispos'd in such a manner, as is necessary to convey the idea of s ace or the idea of space or extension.

Since then it appears, that darkness and motion, with the utter removal of every thing visible and tangible, can never give us the idea of extension without matter, or of a vacuum; the next question is, whether they can convey this idea, when mix'd with something visible and tangible?

'Tis commonly allow'd by philosophers, that all bodies, which discover themselves to the eye, appear as if painted on a plain surface, and that their different degrees of remoteness from ourselves are discovered more by reason than by the senses. When I hold up my hand before me, and spread my fingers, they are separated as perfectly by the blue colour of the firmament, as they cou'd be by any visible object, which I cou'd place betwixt them. In order, therefore, to know whether the sight can convey the impression and idea of a vacuum, we must suppose, that amidst an entire darkness, there are luminous bodies presented to us, whose light discovers only these bodies themselves, without giving us any impression of the surrounding objects.

We must form a parallel supposition concerning the objects of our feeling. 'Tie not proper to suppose a perfect removal of all tangible objects: we must allow something to be perceiv'd by the feeling; and after an interval and motion of the hand or other organ of sensation, another object of the touch to be met with; and upon leaving that, another; and so on, as often as we please. The question is, whether these intervals do not afford us the idea of extension without body?

To begin with the first case; 'tis evident, that when only two luminous bodies appear to the eye, we can perceive, whether they be conjoin'd or separate: whether they be separated by a great or small distance; and if this distance varies, we can perceive its increase or diminution, with the motion of the bodies. But as the distance is not in this case any thing colour'd or visible, it may be thought that there is here a vacuum or pure extension, not only intelligible to the mind, but obvious to the very senses.

This is our natural and most familiar way of thinking; but which we shall learn to correct by a little reflection. We {1:362} may observe, that when two bodies present themselves, where there was formerly an entire darkness, the only change, that is discoverable, is in the appearance of these two objects, and that all t-he rest continues to be as before, a perfect negation of light, and of every colour'd or visible object. This is not only true of what may be said to be remote from these bodies, but also of the very distance; which is interposed betwixt them; that being nothing but darkness, or the negation of light; without parts, without composition, invariable and indivisible. Now since this distance causes no perception different from what a blind man receives from his eyes, or what is convey'd to us in the darkest night, it must partake of the same properties: And as blindness and

darkness afford us no ideas of extension, 'tis impossible that the dark and undistinguishable distance betwixt two bodies can ever produce that idea.

The sole difference betwixt an absolute darkness and the appearance of two or more visible luminous objects consists, as I said, in the objects themselves, and in the manner they affect our senses. The angles, which the rays of light flowing from them, form with each other; the motion that is requir'd in the eye, in its passage from one to the other; and the different parts of the organs, which are affected by them; these produce the only perceptions, from which we can judge of the distance. But as these perceptions are each of them simple and indivisible, they can never give us the idea of extension.

We may illustrate this by considering the sense of feeling, and the imaginary distance or interval interpos'd betwixt tangible or solid objects. I suppose two cases, viz. that of a man supported in the air, and moving his limbs to and fro, without meeting any thing tangible; and that of a man, who feeling something tangible, leaves it, and after a motion, of which he is sensible, perceives another tangible object; and I then ask, wherein consists the difference betwixt these two cases? No one will make any scruple to affirm, that it consists meerly in the perceiving those objects, and that the sensation, which arises from the motion, is in both cases the same: And as that sensation is not capable {1:363} of conveying to us an idea of extension, when unaccompany'd with some other perception, it can no more give us that idea, when mix'd with the impressions of tangible objects; since that mixture produces no alteration upon it.

But tho' motion and darkness, either alone, or attended with tangible and visible objects, convey no idea of a vacuum or extension without matter, yet they are the causes why we falsly imagine we can form such an idea. For there is a close relation' betwixt that motion and darkness, and a real extension, or composition of visible and tangible objects.

First, We may observe, that two visible objects appearing in the midst of utter darkness, affect the senses in the same manner, and form the same angle by the rays, which flow from them, and meet in the eye, as if the distance betwixt them were find with visible objects, that give us a true idea of extension. The sensation of motion is likewise the same, when there is nothing tangible interpos'd betwixt two bodies, as when we feel a compounded body, whose different parts are plac'd beyond each other.

Secondly, We find by experience, that two bodies, which are so plac'd as to affect the senses in the same manner with two others, that have a certain extent of visible objects interpos'd betwixt them, are capable of receiving the same extent, without any sensible impulse or penetration, and without any change on that angle, under which they appear to the senses. In like manner, where there is one object, which we cannot feel after another without an interval, and the perceiving of that sensation we call motion in our hand or organ of sensation; experience shews us, that 'tis possible the same object may be felt with the same sensation of motion, along with the interpos'd impression of solid and tangible objects, attending the sensation. That is, in other words, an invisible and intangible distance may be converted into a visible and tangible one, without any change on the distant objects.

Thirdly, We may observe, as another relation betwixt these two kinds of distance, that they have nearly the same effects on every natural phaenomenon. For as all qualities, such as heat, cold, light, attraction, &c. diminish in proportion to the distance; there is but little difference observ'd, {1:364} whether this distance be marled out by compounded and sensible objects, or be known only by the manner, in which the distant objects affect the senses.

Here then are three relations betwixt that distance, which conveys the idea of extension, and that other, which is not fill'd with any colour'd or solid object. The distant objects affect the senses in the same manner, whether separated by the one distance or the other; the second species of distance is found capable of receiving the first; and they both equally diminish the force of every quality.'

These relations betwixt the two kinds of distance will afford us an easy reason, why the one has so often been taken for the other, and why we imagine we have an idea of extension without the idea of any object either of the sight or feeling. For we may establish it as a general maxim in this science of human nature, that wherever there is a close relation betwixt two ideas, the mind is very apt to mistake them, and in all its discourses and reasonings to use the one for the other. This phaenomenon occurs on so many occasions, and is of such consequence, that I cannot forbear stopping a moment to examine its causes. I shall only premise, that we must distinguish exactly betwixt the phaenomenon itself, and the causes, which I shall assign for it; and must not imagine from any uncertainty in the latter, that the former is also uncertain. The phaenomenon may be real, tho' my explication be chimerical. The falshood of the one is no consequence of that of the other; tho' at the same time we may observe, that 'tis very natural for us to draw such a consequence; which is an evident instance of that very principle, which I endeavour to explain.

When I receiv'd the relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation, as principles of union among ideas, without examining into their causes, 'twas more in prosecution of my first maxim, that we must in the end rest contented with experience, than for want of something specious and plausible, which I might have display'd on that subject. 'Twou'd have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shewn, why upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the other ideas, that are related to it. But tho' I have {1:365} neglected any advantage, which I might have drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I am afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes that arise from these relations. I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endow'd with a power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is plac'd; these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell, which belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in lieu of that, which the mind desir'd at first to survey. This change we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train of thought, make use of the related idea, which is presented to us, and employ it in our reasoning, as if it were the same with what we demanded. This is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms in philosophy; as will naturally be imagin'd, and as it wou'd be easy to show, if there was occasion.

Of the three relations above-mention'd that of resemblance is the most fertile source of error; and indeed there are few mistakes in reasoning, which do not borrow largely from that origin. Resembling ideas are not only related together, but the actions of the mind, which we employ in considering them, are so little different, that we are not able to distinguish them. This last circumstance is of great consequence, and we may in general observe, that wherever the actions of the mind in forming any two ideas are the same or resembling, we are very apt to confound these ideas, and take the one for the other. Of this we shall see many instances in the progress of this treatise. But tho' resemblance be the relation, which most readily produces a mistake in ideas, yet the others of causation and contiguity may also concur in the same influence. We might produce

the figures of poets and orators, as sufficient proofs of this, were it as usual, as it is reasonable, in metaphysical subjects to draw our arguments from that quarter. But lest metaphysicians shou'd esteem this below their dignity, I shall borrow a proof from an observation, which may be made on most of their own discourses, viz. that 'tis usual for men to use words for ideas, and to talk instead of thinking in their reasonings. {1:366} We use words for ideas, because they are commonly so closely connected that the mind easily mistakes them. And this likewise is the reason, why we substitute the idea of a distance, which is not considered either as visible or tangible, in the room of extension, which is nothing but a composition of visible or tangible points dispos'd in a certain order. In causing this mistake there concur both the relations of causation and resemblance. As the first species of distance is found to be convertible into the second, 'tis in this respect a kind of cause; and the similarity of their manner of affecting the senses, and diminishing every quality, forms the relation of resemblance.

After this chain of reasoning and explication of my principles, I am now prepar'd to answer all the objections that have been offer'd, whether deriv'd from metaphysics or mechanics. The frequent disputes concerning a vacuum, or extension without matter prove not the reality of the idea, upon which the dispute turns; there being nothing more common, than to see men deceive themselves in this particular; especially when by means of any close relation, there is another idea presented, which may be the occasion of their mistake.

We may make almost the same answer to the second objection, deriv'd from the conjunction of the ideas of rest and annihilation. When every thing is annihilated in the chamber, and the walls continue immoveable, the chamber must be conceiv'd much in the same manner as at present, when the air that fills it, is not an object of the senses. This annihilation leaves to the eye, that fictitious distance, which is discovered by the different parts of the organ, that are affected, and by the degrees of light and shade; - and to the feeling, that which consists in a sensation of motion in the hand, or other member of the body. In vain shou'd we. search any farther. On whichever side we turn this subject, we shall find that these are the only impressions such an object can produce after the suppos'd annihilation; and it has already been remark'd, that impressions can give rise to no ideas, but to such as resemble them.

Since a body interposed betwixt two others may be suppos'd to be annihilated, without producing any change upon such as lie on each hand of it, 'tis easily conceiv'd, how it may be created &new, and yet produce as little alteration. Now the motion of a body has much the same effect as its creation. {1:367} The distant bodies are no more affected in the one case, than in the other. This suffices to satisfy the imagination, and proves there is no repugnance in such a ' motion. Afterwards experience comes in play to persuade us that two bodies, situated in the manner above-describ'd, have really such a capacity of receiving body betwixt them, and that there is no obstacle to the conversion of the invisible and intangible distance into one that is visible and tangible. However natural that conversion may seem, we cannot be sure it is practicable, before we have had experience of it.

Thus I seem to have answer'd the three objections above-mention'd; tho' at the same time I am sensible, that few will be satisfy'd with these answers, but will immediately propose new objections and difficulties. 'Twill probably be said, that my reasoning makes nothing to the matter in hands and that I explain only the manner in which objects affect the senses, without endeavouring to account for their real nature and operations. Tho' there be nothing visible or tangible interposed betwixt two bodies, yet we find <by experience>, that the bodies may be plac'd in the same manner, with regard to the eye, and require the same motion of the hand in passing from one to the other,

as if divided by something visible and tangible. This invisible and intangible distance is also found by experience to contain a capacity of receiving body, or of becoming visible and tangible. Here is the whole of my system; and in no part of it have I endeavour'd to explain the cause, which separates bodies after this manner, and gives them a capacity of receiving others betwixt them, without any impulse or penetration.

I answer this objection, by pleading guilty, and by confessing that my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations. For besides that this belongs not to my present purpose, I am afraid, that such an enterprise is beyond the reach of human understanding, and that we can never pretend to know body otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses. As to those who attempt any thing farther, I cannot approve of their ambition, till I see, in some one instance at least, that they have met with success. But at present I content myself with knowing perfectly the manner in which objects affect my senses, and their connections with each other, as far as experience informs me of {1:368} them. This suffices for the conduct of life; and this also suffices for my philosophy, which pretends only to explain the nature and causes of our perceptions,or impressions and ideas.

[This paragraph is inserted from the appendix.] As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can. never be embarrass'd by any question. Thus, if it be ask'd, if the invisible and intangible distance, interposed betwixt two objects, be something or nothing: 'Tis easy to answer, that it is <something>, /VIZ\. a property of the objects, which affect the <senses> after such a particular manner. If it be ask'd whether two objects, having such a distance betwixt them, touch or not: it may be answer'd, that this depends upon the definition of the word, <touch>. If objects be said to touch, when there is nothing <sensible> interpos'd betwixt them, these objects touch: it objects be said to touch, when their <images> strike contiguous parts of the eye, and when the hand <feels> both objects successively, without any interpos'd motion, these objects do not touch. The appearances of objects to our senses are all consistent; and no difficulties can ever arise, but from the obscurity of the terms we make use of.

If we carry our enquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid, that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty. Thus if it be ask'd, whether or not the invisible and intangible distance be always full of body, or of something that by an improvement of our organs might become visible or tangible, I must acknowledge, that I find no very decisive arguments on either side; tho' I am inclin'd to the contrary opinion, as being more suitable to vulgar and popular notions. If <the Newtonian> philosophy be rightly understood, it will be found to mean no more. A vacuum is asserted: That is, bodies are said to be plac'd after such a manner, is to receive bodies betwixt them, without impulsion or penetration. The real nature of this position of bodies is unknown. We are only acquainted with its effects on the senses, and its power of receiving body. Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity.]

I shall conclude this subject of extension with a paradox, which will easily be explain'd from the foregoing reasoning. This paradox is, that if you are pleas'd to give to the in-visible and intangible distance, or in other words, to the capacity of becoming a visible and tangible distance, the name of a vacuum, extension and matter are the same, and yet there is a vacuum. If you will not give it that name, motion is possible in a plenum, without any impulse in infinitum, without returning in a circle, and without penetration. But however we may express ourselves, we must always confess,

that we have no idea of any real extension without filling it with sensible objects, and conceiving its parts as visible or tangible.

As to the doctrine, that time is nothing but the manner, in which some real objects exist; we may observe, that 'tis liable to the same objections as the similar doctrine with regard to extension. If it be a sufficient proof, that we have the idea of a vacuum, because we dispute and reason concerning {1:369} it; we must for the same reason have the idea of time without any changeable existence; since there is no subject of dispute more frequent and common.' But that we really have no such idea, is certain. For whence shou'd it be deriv'd? Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflection? Point it out distinctly to us, that we may know its nature and qualities. But if you cannot point out any such impression, you may be certain you are mistaken, when you imagine you have any such idea.

But tho' it be impossible to shew the impression, from which the idea of time without a changeable existence is deriv'd; yet we can easily point out those appearances, which make us fancy we have that idea. For we may observe, that there is a continual succession of perceptions in our mind; so that the idea of time being for ever present with us; when we consider a stedfast object at five-a-clock, and regard the same at six; we are apt to apply to it that idea in the same manner as if every moment were distinguish'd by a different position, or an alteration of the object. The:first and second appearances of the object, being compar'd with the succession of our perceptions, seem equally remov'd as if the object had really chang'd. To which we may add, what experience shews us, that the object was susceptible of such a number of changes betwixt these appearances; as also that the unchangeable or rather fictitious duration has the same effect upon every quality, by encreasing or diminishing it, as that succession, which is obvious to the senses. From these three relations we are apt to confound our ideas, and imagine we can form the idea of a time died duration, without any change or succession.

SECT. VI.--Of the Idea of Existence, and of External Existence.

It may not be amiss, before we leave this subject, to explain the ideas of existence and of external existence; which have their difficulties, as well as the ideas of space and time. By this means we shall be the better prepar'd for the examination of knowledge and probability, when we understand perfectly all those particular ideas, which may enter into our reasoning. {1:370}

There is no impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is not conceiv'd as existent; and 'tis evident, that from this consciousness the most perfect idea and assurance of being is deriv'd. From hence we may form a dilemma, the most clear and conclusive that can be imagin'd, viz. that since we never remember any idea or impression without attributing existence to it, the idea of existence must either be deriv'd from a distinct impression, conjoin'd with every perception or object of our thought, or must be the very same with the idea of the perception or object.

As this dilemma is an evident consequence of the principle, that every idea arises from a similar impression, so our decision betwixt the propositions of the dilemma is no more doubtful. go far from there being any distinct impression, attending every impression and every idea, that I do not think there are any two distinct impressions, which are inseparably conjoin'd. Tho' certain sensations may at one time be united, we quickly find they admit of a separation, and may be presented apart. And thus, tho' every impression and idea we remember be considered as existent, the idea of existence is not deriv'd from any particular impression.

The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoin'd with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.'

Whoever opposes this, must necessarily point out that distinct impression, from which the idea of entity is deriv'd, and must prove, that this impression is inseparable from every perception we believe to be existent. This we may without hesitation conclude to be impossible.

Our foregoing' reasoning concerning the distinction of ideas without any real difference will not here serve us in any stead. That kind of distinction is founded on the different resemblances, which the same simple idea may have to several different ideas. But no object can be presented {1:371} resembling some object with respect to its existence, and different from others in the same particular; since every object, that is presented, must necessarily be existent.

A like reasoning will account for the idea of external existence. We may observe, that 'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive.'

Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different. from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chace our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appear'd in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produc'd.

The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos'd <specifically> different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking we do not suppose them specifically different; -but only attribute to them different relations, connections and durations. But of this more fully hereafter. {1:372}

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY.

SECT. I. Of Knowledge.

THERE are seven different kinds of philosophical relation, viz. resemblance, identity, relations of time and place," proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety and causation. These relations may be divided into two classes; into such as depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together, and such as may be chang'd without any change in the ideas.3 'Tis from the idea of a triangle, that we discover the relation of equality, which its three angles bear to two right ones; and this relation is invariable, as long as our idea remains the same. On the contrary, the relations of contiguity and distance betwixt two objects may be chang'd merely by an alteration of their place, without any change on the objects themselves or on their ideas; and the place depends on a hundred different accidents, which cannot be foreseen by the mind. 'Tis the same case with identity and causation. Two objects, tho' perfectly resembling each other, and even appearing in the same place at different times, may be numerically different: And as the power, by

which one object produces another, is never discoverable merely from their idea, 'tis evident cause and effect are relations, of which we receive information from experience, and not from any abstract reasoning or reflection. There is no single phaenomenon, even the most simple, which can be accounted for from the qualities of the objects, as they appear to us; or which we cou'd foresee without the help of our memory and experience.

It appears, therefore, that of these seven philosophical relations, there remain only four, which depending solely {1:373} upon ideas, can be the objects of knowledge said certainty. These four are resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or number. Three of these relations are discoverable at first sight, and fall more properly under the province of intuition than demonstration. When any objects resemble each other, the resemblance will at first strike the eve, or rather the mind; and seldom requires a second examination. The case is the same with contrariety, and with the degrees of any quality. No one can once doubt but existence and non-existence destroy each other, and are perfectly incompatible and contrary. And tho' it be impossible to judge exactly of the degrees of any quality, such as colour, taste, heat, cold, when the difference betwixt them is very small: yet 'tis easy to decide, that any of them is superior or inferior to another, when their difference is considerable. And this decision we always pronounce at first sight, without any enquiry or reasoning.

We might proceed, after the same manner, in fixing the proportions of quantity or number, and might at one view observe a superiority or inferiority betwixt any numbers, or figures; especially where the difference is very great and remarkable. As to equality or any exact proportion, we can only guess at it from a single consideration; except in very short numbers, or very limited portions of extension; which are comprehended in an instant, and where we perceive an impossibility of falling into any considerable error. In all other cases we must settle the proportions with some liberty, or proceed in a more artificial manner.

I have already I observ'd', that geometry, or the art, by which we fix the proportions of figures; tho' it much excels both in universality and exactness, the loose judgments of the senses and imagination; yet never attains a perfect precision and exactness. It's first principles are still drawn from the general appearance of the objects; and that appearance can never afford us any security, when we examine, the prodigious minuteness of which nature is susceptible. Our ideas seem to give a perfect assurance, that no two right lines can have a common segment; but if we consider these ideas, we shall find, that they always suppose a sensible inclination of the two lines, and that where the angle they form is extremely small, we have no standard of a I {1:374} right line so precise as to assure us of the truth of this proposition. 'Tis the same case with most of the primary decisions of the mathematics.

There remain, therefore, algebra and arithmetic as the only sciences, in which we can carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect exactness and certainty. We are possest of a precise standard, by which we can judge of the equality and proportion of numbers; and according as they correspond or not to that standard, we determine their relations, without any possibility of error.' When two numbers are so combin'd, as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal; and 'tis for want of such a standard of equality in extension, that geometry can scarce be esteem'd a perfect and infallible science.

But here it may not be amiss to obviate a difficulty, which may arise from my asserting, that tho' geometry falls short of that perfect precision and certainty, which are peculiar to arithmetic and

algebra, yet it excels the imperfect judgments of our senses and imagination. The reason why I impute any defect to geometry, is, because its original and fundamental principles are deriv'd merely from appearances; and it may perhaps be imagin'd, that this defect must always attend it, and keep it from ever reaching a greater exactness in the comparison of objects or ideas, than what our eye or imagination alone is able to attain. I own that this defect so far attends it, as to keep it from ever aspiring to a full certainty: But since these fundamental principles depend on the easiest and least deceitful appearances, they bestow on their consequences a degree of exactness, of which these consequences are singly incapable. 'Tis impossible for the eye to determine the angles of a chiliagon to be equal to 1996 right angles, or make any conjecture, that approaches this proportion; but when it determines, that right lines cannot concur; that we cannot draw more than one right line between two given points; it's mistakes can never be of any consequence. And this is the nature and use of geometry, to run us up to such appearances, as, by reason of their simplicity, cannot lead us into any considerable error.

I shall here take occasion to propose a second observation concerning our demonstrative reasonings, which is suggested {1:375} by the same subject of the mathematics. 'Tis usual with mathematicians, to pretend, that those ideas, which are their objects, are of so refin'd and spiritual a nature, that they fall not under the conception of the fancy, but must be comprehended by a pure and intellectual view, of which the superior faculties of the soul are alone capable. The same notion runs thro' most parts of philosophy, and is principally made use of to explain oar abstract ideas, and to shew how we can form an idea of a triangle, for instance, which shall neither be an isoceles nor scalenum, nor be confin'd to any particular length and proportion of sides. 'Tis easy to see, why philosophers are so fond of this notion of some spiritual and refin'd perceptions; since by that means they cover many of their absurdities, and may refuse to submit to the decisions of clear ideas, by appealing to such as are obscure and uncertain. But to destroy this artifice, we need but reflect on that principle so oft insisted on, that all our ideas are copy'd from our impressions. For from thence we may immediately conclude, that since all impressions are clear and precise, the ideas, which are copy'd from them, must be of the same nature, and can never, but from our fault, contain any thing so dark and intricate. An idea is by its very nature weaker and fainter than an impression; but being in every other respect the same, cannot imply any very great mystery.' If its weakness render it obscure, 'tis our business to remedy that defect, as much as possible, by keeping the idea steady and precise; and till we have done so, 'tis in vain to pretend to reasoning and philosophy.

SECT. II.-Of Probability; and of the Idea of Cause and Effect.

This is all I think necessary to observe concerning those four relations, which are the foundation of science; but as to the other three, which depend not upon the idea, and may be absent or present even while that remains the same, 'twill be proper to explain them more particularly. These three relations are identity, the situations in time and place, and causation.

All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other. {1:376} This comparison we may make, either when both the objects are present to the senses, or when neither of them is present, or when only one. When both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation, we call this perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought, or any action, properly speaking, but a mere passive admission of the impressions thro' the organs of sensation.' According to this way of thinking, we ought not to receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning identity, and the relations of time and

.place; since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses, either to discover the real existence or the relations of objects. 'Tis only causation, which produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one object, that 'twas follow'd or preceded by any other existence or action; nor can the other two relations be ever made use of in reasoning, except so far as they either affect or are affected by it. There is nothing in any objects to perswade us, that they are either always remote or always contiguous; and when from experience and observation we discover, that their relation in this particular is invariable, we, always conclude there is some secret cause, which separates or unites them. The same reasoning extends to identity. We readily suppose an object may continue individually the same, tho' several times absent from and present to the senses; and ascribe to it an identity, notwithstanding the interruption of the perception, whenever we conclude, that if we had kept our eye or hand constantly upon it, it wou'd have convey'd an invariable and uninterrupted perception. But this conclusion beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the connexion of cause and effect; nor can we otherwise have any security, that the object is not chang'd upon us, however much the new object may resemble that which was formerly present to the senses." Whenever we discover such a perfect resemblance, we consider, whether it be common in that species of objects; whether possibly or probably any cause cou'd operate in producing the change and resemblance; and according as we determine concerning these causes and effects, we form our judgment concerning the identity of the object. {1:377}

Here then it appears, that of those three relations, which depend not upon the mere ideas, the only one, that can be trac'd beyond our senses ' and informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel, is causation. This relation, therefore, we shall endeavour to explain fully before we leave the subject of the understanding.

To begin regularly, we must consider the idea of causation, and see from what origin it is deriv'd. 'Tis impossible to reason justly, without understanding perfectly the idea concerning which we reason; and 'tis impossible perfectly to understand any idea, without tracing it up to its origin, and examining that primary impression, from which it arises. The examination of the impression bestows a clearness on the idea; and the examination of the idea bestows a like clearness on all our reasoning.

Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects, which we -,all cause and effect, and turn them on all sides, in order to find that impression, which produces an idea, of such prodigious consequence. At first sight I perceive, that I must not search for it in any of the particular qualities of the objects; since. which-ever of these qualities I pitch on, I find some object, that is not posse.t of it, and yet falls under the denomination of cause or effect. And indeed there is nothing existent, either externally or internally, which is not to be considered either as a cause or an effect; tho' 'tis plain there is no one quality, which universally belongs to all beings, and gives them a title to that denomination.

The idea, then, of causation must be deriv'd from some,relation among objects; and that relation we must now endeavour to discover. I find in the first place, that whatever objects are considered as causes or effects, are contiguous; and that nothing can operate in a time or place, which is ever so little remov'd from those of its existence. Tho' distant objects may sometimes seem productive of each other, they are commonly found upon examination to be link'd by a chain of causes, which are contiguous among themselves, and to the distant objects; and when in any particular instance we cannot discover this connexion, we still presume it to exist. We may therefore consider the relation of /CONTIGUITY\ as essential to that of causation; at least may suppose it such,

according to the general opinion, till we can {1:378} find a more I proper occasion to clear up this matter, by examining what objects are or are not susceptible of juxtaposition and conjunction.

The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and effects, is not so universally acknowledged, but is liable to some controversy. 'Tis that Of PRIORITY Of time in the cause before the effect. Some pretend that 'tis not absolutely necessary a cause shou'd precede its effect; but that any object or action, in the very first moment of its existence, may exert its productive quality, and give rise to another object or action, perfectly co-temporary with itself. But beside that experience in most instances seems to contradict this opinion, we may establish the relation of priority by a kind of inference or reasoning. 'Tis an established maxim both in natural and moral philosophy, that an object, which exists for any time in its full perfection without producing another, is not its sole cause; but is assisted by some other principle, which pushes it from its state of inactivity, and makes it exert that energy, of which it was secretly possest. Now if any cause may be perfectly co-temporary with its effect, 'tis certain, according to this maxim, that they must all of them be so; since any one of them, which retards its operation for a single moment, exerts not itself at that very individual time, in which it might have operated; and therefore is no proper cause. The consequence of this wou'd be no less than the destruction of that succession of causes, which we observe in the world; and indeed, the utter annihilation of time. For if one cause were co-temporary with its effect, and this effect with its effect, and so on, 'tis plain there wou'd be no such thing as succession, and all objects must be co-existent.

If this argument appear satisfactory,'tis well. If not, I beg the reader to allow me the same liberty, which I have us'd in the preceding case, of supposing it such. For he shall find, that the affair is of no great importance.

Having thus discovered or suppos'd the two relations of contiguity and succession to be essential to causes and effects, I find I am stopt short, and can proceed no farther in considering any single instance of cause and effect. Motion in one body is regarded upon impulse as the cause of motion in another. When we consider these objects with {1:379} utmost attention, we find only that the one body approaches the other; and that the motion of it precedes that of the other, but without any, sensible interval. 'Tis in vain to rack ourselves with farther thought and reflection upon this subject. We can go no farther in considering this particular instance.

Shou'd any one leave this instance, and pretend to define a cause, by saying it is something productive of another, 'tis evident he wou'd say nothing. For what does he mean by production? Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? If he can; I desire it may be produc'd. If he cannot; he here runs in a circle, and gives a synonimous term instead of a definition.

Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? By, no means. An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as its cause. There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention'd.

Here again I turn the object on all sides, in order to discover the nature of this necessary connexion, and find the impression, or impressions, from which its idea may be deriv'd. When I cast my eye on the known Qualities of objects, I immediately discover that the relation of cause and effect depends not in the least on them. When I consider their relations, I can find none but those of contiguity and succession; which I have already regarded as imperfect and unsatisfactory. Shall

the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possest of an idea, which is not preceded by any similar impression? This wou'd be too strong a proof of levity and inconstancy; since the contrary principle has been already so firmly established, as to admit of no farther doubt; at least, till we have more fully examin'd the present difficulty.

We must,,therefore, proceed like those, who being in search of any thing, that lies conceal'd from them, and not finding it in the place they expected, beat about all the neighbouring fields, without any certain view or design, in hopes their good fortune will at last guide them to what they search for. {1:380} 'Tis necessary for us to leave the direct survey of this question concerning the nature of that necessary connexion, which enters into our idea of cause and effect; and endeavour to find some other questions, the examination of which will perhaps afford a hint, that may serve to clear up the present difficulty. Of these questions there occur two, which I shall proceed to examine, viz.

First, For what reason we pronounce it necessary, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, shou'd also have a cause.

Secondly, Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that inference we draw from the one to the other, and of the belief we repose in it?

I shall only observe before I proceed any farther, that tho' the ideas of cause and effect be deriv'd from the impressions of reflection as well as from those of sensation, yet for brevity's sake, I commonly mention only the latter as the origin of these ideas; tho' I desire that whatever I say of them may also extend to the former. Passions are connected with their objects and with one another; no less than external bodies are connected together. The same relation, then, of cause and effect, which belongs to one, must be common to all of them.

SECT. III.-Why a Cause is always Necessary.

To begin with the first question concerning the necessity of a cause: 'Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence. This is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded. 'Tis suppos'd to be founded on intuition, and to be one of those maxims, which tho' they may be deny'd with the lips, 'tis impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of. But if we examine this maxim by the idea of knowledge above-explain'd, we shall discover in it no mark of any such intuitive certainty; but on the contrary shall find, that 'tis of a nature quite foreign to that species of conviction.

All certainty arises from the comparison of ideas, and from the discovery of such relations as are unalterable, so {1:381} long as the ideas continue the same. These relations are resemblance, proportions in quantity and number, degrees of any quality, and contrariety; none of which are imply'd in this proposition, Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence. That proposition therefore is not intuitively certain. At least any one, who wou'd assert it to be intuitively certain, must deny these to be the only infallible relations, and must find some other relation of that kind to be imply'd in it; which it will then be time enough to examine.

But here is an argument, which proves at once, that the foregoing proposition is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain. We can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, or new modification of existence, without shewing at the same time the impossibility there is, that any thing can ever begin to exist without some productive principle; and where the latter proposition cannot be prov'd, we must despair of ever being able to prove the former. Now that the latter proposition is utterly incapable of a demonstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves

by considering that as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas; without which 'tis impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause.

Accordingly we shall find upon examination, that every demonstration, which has been produc'd for the necessity of a cause, i§ fallacious and sophistical. All the points of time and place,' say some philosophers, in which we can suppose any object to be-in to exist, are in themselves equal; and unless there be some cause, which is peculiar to one time and to one place, and which by that means determines and fixes the existence, it must remain in eternal suspence; and {1:382} the object can never begin to be, for want of something to fix its beginning. But I ask; Is there any more difficulty in supposing the time and place to be fix'd without a cause, than to suppose the existence to be determined in that manner? The first question that occurs on this subject is always, whether the object shall exist or not: The next, when and where it shall begin to exist. If the removal of a cause be intuitively absurd in the one case, it must be so in the other: And if that absurdity be not clear without a proof in the one case, it will equally require one in the other. The absurdity, then, of the one supposition can never be a proof of that of the other; since they are both upon the same footing, and must stand or fall by the same reasoning.

The second argument, which I find us'd on this head, labours under an equal difficulty. Every thing, 'tis said, must have a cause; for if any thing wanted a cause, it wou'd produce <itself>; that is, exist before it existed; which is impossible. But this reasoning is plainly unconclusive; because it supposes, that in our denial of a cause we still grant what we expressly deny, viz. that there must be a cause; which therefore is taken to be the object itself; and that, no doubt, is an evident contradiction. But to say that any thing is produc'd, of to express myself more properly, comes into existence, without a cause, is not to affirm, that 'tis itself its own cause; but on the contrary in excluding all external causes, excludes a fortiori the thing itself, which is created. An object, that exists absolutely without any cause, certainly is not its own cause; and when you assert, that the one follows from the other, you suppose the very point in questions and take it for granted, that 'tis utterly impossible any thing can ever begin to exist without a cause, but that, upon the exclusion of one productive principle, we must still have recourse to another.

'Tis exactly the same case with the 2 third argument, which has been employ'd to demonstrate the necessity of a cause. Whatever is produc'd without any cause, is produc'd by nothing; or in other words, has nothing for its cause. But nothing can never be a cause, no more than it can be something, or equal to two right angles. By the same intuition, {1:383} That we perceive nothing not to be equal to two right angles, or not to be something, we perceive, that it can never be a cause; and consequently must perceive, that every object has a real cause of its existence.'

I believe it will not be necessary to employ many words in shewing the weakness of this argument, after what I have said of the foregoing. They are all of them founded on the same fallacy, and are deriv'd from the same turn of thought. 'Tis sufficient only to observe, that when we exclude all causes we really do exclude them, and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the existence; and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of that exclusion. If every thing must have a cause, it follows, that upon the

exclusion of other causes we must accept of the object itself or of nothing as causes. But 'tis the very point in question, whether every thing must have a cause or not; and therefore, according to all just reasoning, it ought never to be taken for granted.

They are still more frivolous, who say, that every effect must have a, cause, because 'tis imply'd in the very idea of effect. Every effect necessarily pre-supposes a cause; effect being a relative term, of which cause is the correlative. But this does not prove, that every being must be preceded by a cause; no more than it follows, because every husband must have a wife, that therefore every man must be marry'd. The true state of the question is, whether every object, which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause: and this I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain, and hope to have prov'd it sufficiently by the foregoing arguments.

Since it is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning, that we derive the opinion of the necessity of a cause to every new production, that opinion must necessarily arise from observation and experience. The next question, then, shou'd naturally be, how experience gives rise to such a principle? But as I find it will be more convenient to sink this question in the following, Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular erects, and why we form an inference from one to another? we shall make that the subject of our future enquiry. 'Twill, perhaps, be {1:384} found in the end, that the same answer will serve for both questions.

SECT. IV.-Of the Component Parts of our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect.

Tho' the mind in its reasonings from causes or effects carries its view beyond those objects, which it sees or remembers, it must never lose sight of them entirely, nor reason merely upon its own ideas, without some mixture of impressions, or at least of ideas of the memory, which are equivalent to impressions. When we infer effects from causes, we must establish the existence of these causes; which we have only two ways of doing, either by an immediate perception of our memory or senses, or by an inference from other causes; which causes again we must ascertain in the same manner, either by a present impression, or by an inference from their causes, and so on, till we arrive at some object, which we see or remember.' 'Tis impossible for us to carry on our inferences <in infinitum>; and the only thing, that can stop them, is an impression of the memory or senses, beyond which there is no room for doubt or enquiry.

To give an instance of this, we may chuse any point of history, and consider for what reason we either believe or reject it. Thus we believe that C.&SAP. was kill'd in the senate-house on the ides of March; and that because this fact is established on the unanimous testimony of historians, who agree to assign this precise time and place to that event. Here are certain characters and letters present either to our memory or senses; which characters we likewise remember to have been us'd as the signs of certain ideas; and these ideas were either in the minds of such as were immediately present at that action, and receiv'd the ideas directly from its existence; or they were deriv'd from the testimony of others, and that again from another testimony, by a visible gradation, 'till we arrive at those who were eyewitnesses and spectators of the event. 'Tis obvious all this chain of argument or connexion of causes and effects, is at first founded on those characters or letters, which are seen or remembered, and that without the authority either of the memory or senses our whole reasoning wou'd {1:385} be chimerical and without foundation. Every link of the chain wou'd in that case hang upon another; but there wou'd not be any thing fix'd to one end of it, capable of sustaining the whole; and consequently there wou'd be no belief nor evidence. And this actually is the case with all hypothetical arguments, or reasonings upon a supposition; there being in them, neither any present impression, nor belief of a real existence,

I need not observe, that 'tis no just objection to the present doctrine, that we can reason upon our past conclusions or principles, without having recourse to those impressions, from which they first arose. For even supposing these impressions shou'd be entirely effac'd from the memory, the conviction they produc'd may still remain; and 'tis equally true, that all reasonings concerning causes and effects are originally deriv'd from some impression; in the same manner, as the assurance of a demonstration proceeds always from a comparison of ideas, tho' it may continue after the comparison is forgot.

SECT. V.-Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory.

In this kind of reasoning, then, from causation, we employ materials, which are of a mix'd and heterogeneous nature, and which, however connected, are yet essentially different from each other. All (;ar arguments concerning causes and effects consist both of an impression of the memory or,senses, and of the idea of that existence, which produces the object of the impression, or is produc'd by it. Here therefore we have three things to explain, viz. First, The original impression. Secondly, The transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect. Thirdly, The nature and qualities of that idea.'

As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc'd by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv'd from the author of our being. Nor is such a question any way material to our present purpose. We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, {1:386} whether they be true or false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses.

When we search for the characteristic, which distinguishes the memory from the imagination, we must immediately perceive, that it cannot lie in the simple ideas it presents to us; since both these faculties borrow their simple ideas from the impressions, and can never go beyond these original perceptions. These faculties are as little distinguished from each other by the arrangement of their complex ideas. For tho' it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as it pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their operation, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recal the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. Since therefore the memory, is known, neither by the order of its complex ideas, nor the nature of its simple ones; it follows, that the difference betwixt it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity. A man may indulge his fancy in feigning any past scene of adventures; nor wou'd there be any possibility of distinguishing this from a remembrance of a like kind, were not the ideas of the imagination fainter and more obscure.

[The two following paragraphs is inserted from the appendix.] It frequently happens, that when two men have been engag'd in any scene of action, the one shall remember it much better than the other, and shall have all the difficulty in the world to make his companion recollect it. He runs over several circumstances in vain; mentions the time, the place, the company, what was said, what was done on all sides; till at last he hits on some lucky circumstance, that revives the whole, and gives his friend a perfect memory of every thing. Here the person that forgets receives at first all the ideas from the discourse of the other, with the same circumstances of time and place; tho' he considers them as mere fictions of the imagination. But as soon as the circumstance is mention'd, that touches the memory, the very same ideas now appear in a new light, and have, in a manner, a

different feeling from what they had before. Without any other alteration, beside that of the feeling, {1:387} they become immediately ideas of the memory, and are assented to.

Since, therefore, the imagination can represent all the same objects that the memory can offer to us, and since those faculties are only distinguished by the different feeling of the ideas they present, it may be proper to consider what is the nature of that feeling. And here I believe every one will readily agree with me, that the ideas of the memory are more strong and lively than those of the fancy.

A painter, who intended to represent a passion or emotion of any kind, wou'd endeavour to get a sight of a person actuated by a like emotion, in order to enliven his ideas, and give them a force and vivacity superior to what is found in those, which are mere fictions of the imagination. The more recent this memory is, the clearer is the idea; and when after a long interval he wou'd return to the contemplation of his object, he always finds its idea to be much decay'd, if not wholly obliterated. We are frequently in doubt concerning the ideas of the memory, as they become very weak and feeble; and are at a loss to determine whether any image proceeds from the fancy or the memory, when 4 is not drawn in such lively colours as distinguish that latter faculty. I think, I remember such an event, says one; but am not sure. A long tract of time has almost worn it out of my memory, and leaves me uncertain whether or not it be the pure offspring of my fancy.

And as an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degenerate to such a degree, as to be taken for an idea of the imagination; so on the other hand an idea of the imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to pass for an idea of the memory,, and counterfeit its effects on the belief and judgment. This is noted in the case of liars; who by the frequent repetition of their lies, come at last to believe and remember them, as realities; custom and habit having in this case, as in many others, the same influence on the mind as nature, and infixing the idea with equal force and vigour.

Thus it appears, that the belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a {1:387} repetition of that impression in the memory. 'Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception, which constitutes the first act of the judgment, and lays the foundation of that reasoiaing, which we build upon it, when we trace the relation of cause and effect.

SECT. VI. Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea.

'Tis easy to observe, that in tracing this relation, the inference we draw from cause to effect, is not deriv'd merely from a survey of these particular objects, and from such a penetration into their essences as may discover the dependance of the one upon the other. There is no object., which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them. Such an inference wou'd amount to knowledge, and wou'd imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different. But as all distinct ideas are separable, 'tis evident there can be no impossibility of that kind. When we pass from a present impression to the idea of any object, we might possibly have separated the idea from the impression, and have substituted any other idea in its room.

'Tis therefore by EXPERIENCE only, that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another. The nature of experience is this. We remember to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of another species of

objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity- and succession with regard to them. Thus we remember, to have seen that species of object we call flame, and to have felt that species of sensation we call heat. We likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without any farther ceremony, we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer the existence of the one from that of the other.' In all those instances, from which we learn the conjunction of particular causes and effects, both the causes and effects have been perceiv'd by the senses, and are remembered But in all cases, wherein we reason concerning them, there is only one perceiv'd or remembered, and the other is supply'd in conformity to our past experience. {1:389}

Thus in advancing we have insensibly discovered a new relation betwixt cause and effect, when we least expected it, and were entirely employ'd upon another subject. This relation is their CONSTANT CONJUNCTION. Contiguity and succession are not sufficient to make us pronounce any two objects to be cause and effect, unless we perceive, that these two relations are preserv'd in several instances. We may now see the advantage of quitting the direct survey of this relation, in order to discover the nature of that necessary connexion, which makes so essential a part of it. There are hopes, that by this means we may at last arrive at our propos'd end; tho' to tell the truth, this new-discover'd relation of a constant conjunction seems to advance us but very little in our way. For it implies no more than this, that like objects have always been plac'd in like relations of contiguity and succession; and it seems evident, at least at first sight, that by this means we can never discover any new idea, and can only multiply, but not enlarge the objects of our mind. It may be thought, that what we learn not from one object, we can never learn from a hundred, which are all of the same kind, and are perfectly resembling in every circumstance. As our senses shew us in one instance two bodies, or motions, or qualities in certain relations of success] and contiguity; so our memory presents us only with a multitude of instances, wherein we always find like bodies, motions, or qualities in like relations. From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never will arise any new original idea, such as that of a necessary connexion; and the number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confin'd ourselves to one only. But tho' this reasoning seems just and obvious; yet as it wou'd be folly to despair too soon, we shall continue the thread of our discourse; and having found, that after the discovery of the constant conjunction of any objects, we always draw an inference from one object to another, we shall now examine the nature of that inference, and of the transition from the impression to the idea. Perhaps 'twill appear in the end, that the necessary connexion depends on the inference, instead of the inference's depending on the necessary connexion.

Since it appears, that the transition from an impression present to the memory or senses to the idea of an object, which we call cause or effect, is founded on past experience, {1:390} and on our remembrance of their constant conjunction, the next question is, Whether experience produces the idea by means of the understanding or imagination; whether we are determin'd by reason to make the transition, or by a certain association and relation of perceptions. If reason determined us, it wou'd proceed upon that principle, that instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same. In order therefore to clear up this matter, let us consider all the arguments, upon which such a proposition may be suppos'd to be founded; and as these must be deriv'd either from knowledge or probability, let us cast our eve on each of these degrees of evidence, and see whether they afford any just conclusion of this nature.

Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince us, that there can be no demonstrative

arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have, had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience. We can at least conceive a change in the course of nature; which sufficiently proves, that such a change is not absolutely impossible. To form a clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it.

Probability, as it discovers not the relations of ideas, considered as such, but only those of objects, must in some respects be founded on the impressions of our memory and senses, and in some respects on our ideas. Were there no mixture of any impression in our probable reasonings, the conclusion wou'd be entirely chimerical: And were there no mixture of ideas, the action of the mind, in observing the relation, wou'd, properly speaking, be sensation, not reasoning. 'Tis therefore necessary, that in all probable reasonings there be something present to the mind, either seen or remember'd; and that from this we infer something connected with it, which is not seen nor remember'd.

The only connexion or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause and effect; and that because 'tis the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another. The idea of cause and effect is deriv'd from experience, which informs us, that such particular objects, {1:391} in all past instances, have been constantly conjoin'd with each other: And as an object similar to one of these is suppos'd to be immediately present in its impression, we thence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant. According to this account of things, which is, I think, in every point unquestionable, probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those, of which we have had none; and therefore 'tis impossible this presumption can arise from probability. The same principle cannot be both the, cause and effect of another; and this is, perhaps, the only proposition concerning that relation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.

Shou'd any one think to elude this argument; and without determining whether our reasoning on this subject be deriv'd from demonstration or probability, pretend that all conclusions from causes and effects are built on solid reasoning: I can only desire, that this reasoning may be produc'd, in order to be expos'd to our examination. It may, perhaps, be said, that after experience of the constant conjunction of certain objects, we reason in the following manner. Such an object is always found to produce another. 'Tis impossible it cou'd have this effect, if it was not endow'd with a power of production. The power necessarily implies the effect; and therefore there is a just foundation for drawing a conclusion from the existence of one object to that of its usual attendant. The past production implies a power: The power implies a new production: And the new production is what we infer from the power and the past production.

'Twere easy for me to shew the weakness of this reasoning, were I willing to make use of those observations, I have already made, that the idea of production is the same with that of causation, and that no existence certainly and demonstratively implies a power in any other object; or were it proper to anticipate what I shall have occasion to remark afterwards concerning the idea we form of power and efficacy. But as such a method of proceeding may seem either to weaken my system, by resting one part of it on another, or to breed a confusion in my reasoning, I shall endeavour to maintain my present assertion without any such assistance.

It shall therefore be allow'd for a moment, that the production {1:392} of one object by another in any one instance implies a power; and that this power is connected with its effect. But it having

been already prov'd, that the power lies not in the sensible qualities of the cause; and there being nothing but the sensible qualities present to us; I ask, why in other instances you presume that the same power still exists, merely upon the appearance of these qualities? Your appeal to past experience decides nothing in the present case; and at the utmost can only prove, that that very object, which produc'd any other, was at that very instant endow'd with such a power; but can never prove, that the same power must continue in the same object or collection of sensible qualities; much less, that a like power is always conjoin'd with like sensible qualities. Shou'd it be said, that we have experience, that the same power continues united with the same object, and that like objects are endow'd with like powers, I wou'd renew my question, why from this experience we form any conclusion beyond those past instances, of which we have had experience. If you answer this question in, the same manner as the preceding, your answer gives still occasion to a -new question of the same kind, even in infinitum; which clearly proves, that the foregoing reasoning had no just foundation.

Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has inform'd us of their constant conjunction, 'tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou'd extend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery.

We have already taken notice of certain relations, which make us pass from one object to another, even tho' there be no reason to determine us to that transition; and this we may establish for a general rule, that wherever the mind constantly and uniformly makes a transition without any reason, it is influenc'd by these relations. Now this is exactly the present case. Reason can never shew us the connexion of one object with another, tho' aided by experience, and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past instances. When the mind, therefore, passes {1:393} from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determined by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination. Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the understanding, we cou'd never draw any inference from causes to effects, nor repose belief in any matter of fact. The inference, therefore, depends solely on the union of ideas.

The principles of union among ideas, I have reduc'd to three general ones, and have asserted, that the idea or impression of any object naturally introduces the idea of any other object, that is resembling, contiguous to, or connected with it. These principles I allow to be neither the infallible nor the sole causes of an union among ideas. They are not the infallible causes. For one may fix his attention during Sometime on any one object without looking farther. They are not the sole causes. For the thought has evidently a very irregular motion in running along its objects, and may leap from the heavens to the earth, from one end of the creation to the other, without any certain method or order. But tho' I allow this weakness in these three relations, and this irregularity in the imagination; yet I assert that the only general principles, which associate ideas, are resemblance, contiguity and causation.

There is indeed a principle of union among ideas, which at first sight may be esteem'd different from any of these, but will be found at the bottom to depend on the same origin. When ev'ry individual of any species of objects is found by experience to be constantly united with an individual of another species, the appearance of any new individual of either species naturally conveys the thought to its usual attendant. Thus because such a particular idea is commonly

annex'd to such a particular word, nothing is requir'd but the hearing of that word to produce the correspondent idea; and 'twill scarce be possible for the mind, by its utmost efforts, to prevent that transition. In this case it is not absolutely necessary, that upon hearing such a particular sound " we shou'd reflect on any past experience, and consider what idea has been usually connected with the sound. The imagination of itself supplies the place of this reflection, and is so accustomed to pass from the word to the {1:394} idea, that it interposes not a moment's delay betwixt the hearing of the one, and the conception of the other.

But tho' I acknowledge this to be a true principle of association among ideas, I assert it to be the very same with that betwixt the ideas of cause and effects and to be an essential part in all our reasonings from that relation. We have no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain objects, which have been always conjoin'd together, and which in all past instances have been found inseparable. We cannot penetrate into the reason of the conjunction. We only observe the thing itself, and always find that from the constant conjunction the objects acquire an union in the imagination. When the impression of one becomes present to us, we immediately form an idea of its usual attendant; and consequently we may establish this as one part of the definition of an opinion or belief, that 'tis an idea related to or associated with a present impression.

Thus tho' causation be a philosophical relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet 'tis only so far as it is a natural relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it.'

SECT. VII.-OF the Nature of the Idea or Belief.

The idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of it, but not the whole. We conceive many things, which we do not believe. In order then to discover more fully the nature of belief, or the qualities of those ideas we assent to, let us weigh the following considerations.

'Tis evident, that all reasonings from causes or effects terminate in conclusions, concerning matter of fact; that is, concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities. 'Tis also evident, that the idea, of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and that when after the simple conception of any thing we wou'd conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea. Thus when we affirm, that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being, as he is represented to us; nor is the existence, which we attribute to him, conceiv'd by a particular idea, which we join to the idea of {1:895} his other qualities, and can again separate and distinguish from them. But I go farther; and not content with asserting, that the conception of the existence of any object is no addition to the simple conception of it, I likewise maintain, that the belief of the existence joins no new ideas to those ' which compose the idea of the object. When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him neither encreases nor diminishes.' But as 'tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object, and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it.

Suppose a person present with me, who advances propositions, to which I do not assent, that Caesar dy'd in his bed, that silver is more fusible, than lead, or mercury heavier than gold; 'tis evident, that notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly understand his meaning, and form all the same ideas, which he forms. My imagination is endow'd with the same powers as his; nor is it possible for him to conceive any idea, which I

can-not conceive; nor conjoin any, which I cannot conjoin. I therefore ask, Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition? The answer is easy with regard to propositions, that are prov'd by intuition or demonstration. In that case, the person, who assents, not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily determined to conceive them in that particular manner, either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas. Whatever is absurd is unintelligible; nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive any thing contrary to a demonstration. But as in reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question, I still ask, Wherein consists the deference betwixt incredulity and belief? since in both cases the conception of the idea is equally possible and requisite.

'Twill not be a satisfactory answer to say, that a person, who does not assent to a proposition you advance; after having conceiv'd the object in the same manner with you; immediately {1:396} conceives it in a different manner, and has different ideas of it. This answer is unsatisfactory; not because it contains any falshood, but because it discovers not all the truth. 'Tis contest, that in all cases, wherein we dissent from any person, we conceive both sides of the question; but as we can believe only one, it evidently follows, that the belief must make some difference betwixt that conception to which we assent, and that from which we dissent. We may mingle, and unite, and separate, and confound, and vary our ideas in a hundred different ways; but 'till there appears some principle, which fixes one of these different situations, we have in reality no opinion: And this principle, as it plainly makes no addition to our precedent ideas, can only change the manner of our conceiving them.

All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds, viz. impressions and ideas, which differ from each other only in their different degrees of force and vivacity.' Our ideas are copy'd from our impressions, and represent them in all their parts. When you wou'd any way vary the idea of a particular object, you can only encrease or diminish its force and vivacity.]If you make any other change on it, it represents a different object or impression. The case is the same as in colours. A particular shade of any colour may acquire a new degree of liveliness or brightness without any other variation. But when you produce any other variation, 'tis no longer the same shade or colour. So that as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most,accurately defined, A /LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION\. {1:397}

Here are the heads of those arguments, which lead us to this conclusion. When we infer the existence of an object from that of others, some object must always be present either to the memory or senses, in order to be the foundation of our reasoning; since the mind cannot run up with its inferences in infinitum. Reason can never satisfy us that the existence of any one object does ever imply that of another; so that when we pass from the impression of one to the idea or belief of another, we are not determin'd by reason, but by custom or a principle of association. But belief is somewhat more than a simple idea. 'Tis a particular manner of forming an idea: And as the same idea can only be vary'd by a variation of its degrees of force and vivacity; it follows upon the whole, that belief is a lively idea produc'd by a relation to a present impression, according to the foregoing definition.

[This paragraph is inserted from the appendix] This operation of the mind, which forms the belief of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy; tho' no one has so much as suspected, that there was any difficulty in explaining it. For my part I must

own, that I find a considerable difficulty in the case; and that even when I think I understand the subject perfectly, I am at a loss for terms to express my meaning. I conclude, by an induction which seems to me very evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the nature ' or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceiv'd. But when I wou'd explain this manner, I scarce find any word that fully answers the case, but am oblig'd to have {1:398} recourse to every one's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of this operation of the mind. An idea assented to <feels> different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or <firmness>, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, 'tis needless to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set them, in a, manner, before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible, that that faculty can ever, of itself, reach belief, 'tis evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order of our ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind. T confess, that 'tis impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words, that express something near it. But its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy we can go no farther, than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions.

This definition will also be found to be entirely conformable to every one's feeling and experience. Nothing is more evident, than that those ideas, to which we assent, are more strong, firm and vivid, than the loose reveries of a castlebuilder. If one person sits down to read a book as a romance, and another as a true history, they plainly receive the same ideas, and in the same order; nor does the incredulity of the one, and the belief of the other hinder them from putting the very same sense upon their author. His words produce the same ideas in both; tho' his testimony has not the same influence on them. The latter has a more {1:399} lively conception of all the incidents. He enters deeper into the concerns of the persons: represents to himself their actions, and characters, and friendships, and enmities: He even goes so far as to form a notion of their features, and air, and person. While the former, who gives no credit to the testimony of the author, has a more faint and languid conception of all these particulars; and except on account of the style and ingenuity of the composition, can receive little entertainment from it.

SECT. VIII.-OF the Causes of Belief.

Having thus explain'd the nature of belief, and shewn that it consists in a lively idea related to a present impression; let us now proceed to examine from what principles it is deriv'd, and what bestows the vivacity on the idea.

I wou'd willingly establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature, that when any impression becomes present to us, it not only trans .ports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity. All the operations of the mind depend in a great measure on its disposition, when it performs them; and according as the spirits

are more or less elevated, and the attention more or less fix'd, the action will always have more or less vigour and vivacity. When therefore any object is presented, which elevates and enlivens the thought, every action, to which the mind applies itself, will be more strong and vivid, as Tong as that disposition continues, Now 'tis evident the continuance of the disposition depends entirely on the objects, about which the mind is employ'd; and that any new object naturally gives a new direction to the spirits, and changes the disposition; as on the contrary, when the mind fixes constantly on the same object, or passes easily and insensibly along related objects, the disposition has a much longer duration. Hence it happens, that when the mind is once inliven'd by a present impression, it proceeds to form a more lively idea of the related objects, by a natural transition of the disposition from the one to the other. The change of the objects is so easy, that the mind is scarce sensible of it, but applies itself to the conception of the related idea with all the force and 'vivacity it acquir'd from the present impression. {1:400}

If in considering the nature of relation, and that facility of transition, which is essential to it, we can satisfy ourselves concerning the reality of this phaenomenon, 'tis well: But I must confess I place my chief confidence in experience to prove so material a principle. We may, therefore, observe, as the first experiment to our present purpose, that upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend, our idea of him is evidently inliven'd by the resemblance, and that every passion, which that idea occasions, whether of joy or sorrow, acquires new force and vigour. In producing this effect there concur both a relation and a present impression. Where the picture bears him no resemblance, or at least was not intended for him, it never so much as conveys our thought to him: And where it is absent, as well as the person; tho' the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other; it feels its idea to be rather weekend than inliven'd by that transition. We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend, when 'tis set before us; but when 'tis remov'd, rather choose to consider him directly, than by reflexion in an image, which is equally distinct and obscure.

The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be consider'd as experiments of the same nature. The devotees of that strange superstition usually plead in excuse of the mummeries, with which they are upbraided, that they feel the good effect of those external motions, and postures, and actions, in enlivening their devotion, and quickening their fervour, which otherwise wou'd decay away, if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types, than 'tis possible for us to do, merely by an intellectual view and contemplation. Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other; and this influence they readily convey to those ideas, to which they are related, and which they Resemble. I shall only infer from these practices, and this reasoning, that the effect of resemblance in inlivening the idea is very common; and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur, we are abundantly supply'd with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle.

We may add force to these experiments by others of a {1:401} different kind, in considering the effects of contiguity, as well as of resemblance. 'Tis certain, that distance diminishes the force of every idea, and that upon our approach to any object; tho' it does not discover itself to our senses; it operates upon the mind with an influence that imitates an immediate impression. The thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous; but 'tis only the actual presence of an object, that transports it with a superior vivacity. When I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant; tho' even at that

distance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends and family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter case, both the objects of the mind are ideas; notwithstanding there is an easy transition betwixt them; that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of some immediate impression.i

No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations; of resemblance and contiguity. Superstitious people are fond of the relicks of saints and holy men, for the same reason that they seek after types and images, in order to enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives, which they desire to imitate. Now 'tis evident, one of the best relicks a devotee cou'd procure, wou'd be the handywork of a saint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be consider'd in this light, 'tis because they were once at his disposal, and were mov'd and affected by him; in which respect they are to be consider'd as imperfect effects, and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those, from which we learn the reality of his existence. This phaenomenon clearly proves, that a present impression {1:402} with a relation of causation may, inliven any idea, and consequently produce belief or assent, according to the precedent definition of it.

But why need we seek for other arguments to prove, that a present impression with a relation or transition of the fancy may inliven any idea, when this very instance of our reasonings from cause and effect will alone suffice to that purpose? 'Tis certain we must have an idea of every matter of fact, which we believe. 'Tis certain, that this idea arises only from a relation to a present impression. 'Tis certain, that the belief super-adds nothing to the idea, but only changes our manner of conceiving it, and renders it more strong and lively. The present conclusion concerning the influence of relation is the immediate consequence of all these steps; and every step appears to me sure end infallible. There enters nothing into this operation of the mind but a present impression, a lively idea, and a relation or association in the fancy betwixt the impression and idea; so that there can be no suspicion of mistake.

In order to put this whole affair in a fuller light, let us consider it as a question in natural philosophy, which we must determine by experience and observation. I suppose there is an object presented, from which I draw a certain conclusion, and form to myself ideas, which I am said to believe or assent to. Here 'tis evident, that however that object, which is present to my senses, and that other, whose existence I infer by reasoning, may be thought to influence each other by their particular powers or qualities; yet as the phenomenon of belief, which we at present examine, is merely internal, these powers and qualities, being entirely unknown, can have no hand in producing it. 'Tis the present impression, which is to be consider'd as the true and real cause of the idea, and of the belief which attends it. We must therefore endeavour to discover by experiments the particular qualities, by which 'tis enabled to produce so extraordinary an effect.

First then I observe, that the present impression has not this effect by its own proper power and efficacy, and when considered alone, as a single perception, limited to the present moment. I find, that an impression, from which, on its first appearance, I can draw no conclusion, may afterwards become the foundation of belief, when I have had {1:403} experience of its usual consequences. We must in every case have observ'd the same impression in past instances, and have found it to be constantly conjoin'd with some other impression. This is confirm'd by such a multitude of experiments, that it admits not of the smallest doubt.

From a second observation I conclude, that the belief, which attends the present impression, and is produc'd by a number of past impressions and conjunctions; that this belief, I say, arises

immediately, without any new operation of the reason or imagination. Of this I can be certain, because I never am conscious of any such operation, and find nothing in the subject, on which it can be founded. Now as we call every thing CUSTOM, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion, we-may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present impression, is deriv'd solely from that origin. When we are accustomed to see two impressions conjoin'd together, the appearance or idea of the one immediately carries us to the idea of the other.

Being fully satisfy'd on this head, I make a third set of experiments, in order to know, whether any thing be requisite,, beside the customary transition, towards the production of this phaenomenon of belief. I therefore change the first impression into an idea; and observe, that tho' the customary transition to the correlative idea still remains, yet there is in reality no belief nor perswasion. A present impression, then, is absolutely requisite to this whole operation; and when after this I compare an impression with an idea, and find that their only difference consists in their different degrees of force and vivacity, I conclude upon the whole, that belief is a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present impression.

Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation.' 'Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I am convinc'd of any principle, 'tis only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it {1:404} from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another.

'Twill here be worth our observation, that the past experience, on which all our judgments concerning cause and effect depend@ may operate on our mind in such an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of, and may even in some measure be unknown to us. A person, who stops short in his journey upon meeting a river in his way, foresees the consequences of his proceeding forward; and his knowledge of these consequences is convey'd to him by past experience, which informs him of such certain conjunctions of causes and effects. But can we think, that on this occasion he reflects on any past experience, and calls to remembrance instances, that he has seen or heard of, in order to discover the effects of water on animal bodies? No surely; this is not the method, in which he proceeds in his reasoning. The idea of sinking is so closely connected with that of water, and the idea of suffocating with that of sinking, that the mind makes the transition without the assistance of the memory. The custom operates before we have time for reflection. The objects seem so inseparable, that we interpose not a moment's delay in passing from the one to the other. But as this transition proceeds from experience, and not from any primary connexion betwixt the ideas, we must necessarily acknowledge, that experience may produce a belief and a judgment of causes and effects by a secret operation, and without being once thought of. This removes all pretext, if there yet remains any, for asserting that the mind is convinc'd by reasoning of that principle, that instances of which we have no experience, must necessarily resemble those, of which we have. For we here find, that the understanding or imagination can draw inferences from past experience, without reflecting on it; much more without forming any principle concerning it, or reasoning upon that principle.

In general we may observe, that in all the most established and uniform conjunctions of causes and effects, such as those of gravity, impulse, solidity, &c. the mind never carries its view expressly to consider any past experience: Tho' in other associations of objects, which are more rare and

unusual, it may assist the custom and transition of ideas {1:405} by this reflection. Nay we find in some cases, that the reflection produces the belief without the custom; or more properly speaking, that the reflection produces the custom in an oblique and artificial manner. I explain myself. 'Tis certain, that not only in philosophy, but even in common life, we may attain the knowledge of a particular cause merely by one experiment, provided it be made with judgment, and after a careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstances. Now as after one experiment of this kind, the mind, upon the appearance either of the cause or the effect, can draw an inference concerning the existence of its correlative; and as a habit can never be acquir'd merely by one instance; it may be thought, that belief cannot in this case be esteem'd the effect of custom. But this difficulty will vanish, if we consider, that tho' we are here suppos'd to have had only one experiment of a particular effect, yet we have many millions to convince us of this principle; that like objects placed in like circumstances, will always produce like effects; and as this principle has established itself by a sufficient custom, it bestows an evidence and firmness on any opinion, to which it can be apply'd. The connexion of the ideas is not habitual after one experiment: but this connexion is comprehended under another principle, that is habitual; which brings us back to our hypothesis. In all cases we transfer our experience to instances, of which we have no experience, either expressly or tacitly, either directly or indirectly.

I must not conclude this subject without observing, that 'tis very difficult to talk of the operations of the mind with perfect propriety and exactness; because common language has seldom made any very nice distinctions among them, but has generally call'd by the same term all such as nearly resemble each other. And as this is a source almost inevitable of obscurity and confusion in the author; so it may frequently give rise to doubts and objections in the reader, which otherwise he wou'd never have dream'd of. Thus my general position, that an opinion or belief is nothing but a strong and lively idea deriv'd from a present impression related to it, maybe liable to the following objection, by reason of a little ambiguity in those words strong and lively. It may be said, that not only an impression may give rise to reasoning, but that an idea may also have the same influence; especially {1:406} upon my principle, that all our ideas are deriv'd from correspondent impressions. For suppose I form at present an idea, of which I have forgot the correspondent impression, I am able to conclude from this idea, that such an impression did once exist; and as this conclusion is attended with belief, it may be ask'd, from whence are the qualities of force and vivacity deriv'd, which constitute this belief? And to this I answer very readily, from the present idea. For as this idea is not here considered, as the representation of any absent object, but as a real perception in the mind, of which we are intimately conscious, it must be able to bestow on whatever is related to it the same quality, call it firmness, or solidity, or force, or vivacity, with which the mind reflects upon it, and is assur'd of its present existence. The idea here supplies the place of an impression, and is entirely the same, so far as regards our present purpose.

Upon the same principles we need not be surpriz'd to hear of the remembrance of an idea: that is, of the idea of an idea, and of its force and vivacity superior to the loose conceptions of the imagination. In thinking of our past thoughts we not only delineate out the objects, of which we were thinking, but also conceive the action of the mind in the meditation, that certain <je-ne-scai-quoi>, of which 'tis impossible to give any definition or description, but which every one sufficiently understands. When the memory offers an idea of this, and represents it as past, 'tis easily conceiv'd how that idea may have more vigour and firmness, than when we think of a past thought, of which we have no remembrance.

After this any one will understand how we may form the idea of an impression and of an idea, and

how we way believe the existence of an impression and of an idea.'

SECT. IX. Of the effects of other relations and other Habits.

However convincing the foregoing arguments may appear, we must not rest contented with them, but must turn the subject on every side, in order to find some new points of view, from which we may illustrate and confirm such extraordinary, and such fundamental principles. A scrupulous {1:407} hesitation to receive any new hypothesis is so laudable a disposition in philosophers, and so necessary to the examination of truth, that it deserves to be comply'd with, and requires that every argument be produc'd, which may tend to their satisfaction, and every objection remov'd, which may stop them in their reasoning.

I have often observ'd, that, beside cause and effect, the two relations of resemblance and contiguity, are to be consider'd as associating principles of thought, and as capable of conveying the imagination from one idea to another. I have also observ'd, that when of two objects connected to-ether by any of these relations, one is immediately present to the memory or senses, not only the mind is convey'd to its co-relative by means of the associating principle; but likewise conceives it with an additional force and vigour, by the united operation of that principle, and of the present impression. All this I have observ'd, in order to confirm by analogy, my explication of our judgments concerning cause and effect. But this very argument may, perhaps, be turn'd against me, and instead of a confirmation of my hypothesis, may become an objection to it. For it may be said, that if all the parts of that hypothesis be true, viz. that these three species of relation are deriv'd from the same principles; that their effects in informing and enlivening our ideas are the same; and that belief is nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea; it shou'd follow, that that action of the mind may not only be deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, but also from those of contiguity and resemblance. But as we find by experience, that belief arises only from causation,' and that we can draw no inference from one object to another, except they be connected by this relation, we may conclude, that there is some error in that reasoning, which leads us into such difficulties.

This is the objection; let us now consider its solution. 'Tis evident, that whatever is present to the memory, striking upon the mind with a vivacity, which resembles an immediate impression, must become of considerable moment in all the operations of the mind, and must easily distinguish itself above the mere fictions of the imagination. Of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system, comprehending whatever we remember to have been present, {1:408} either to our internal perception or senses; and every particular of that system, join'd to the present impressions, we are pleas'd to call a reality. But the mind stops not here. For finding, that with this system of perceptions, there is another connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause or effect, it proceeds to the consideration of their ideas; and as it feels that 'tis in a manner necessarily determined to view these particular ideas, and that the custom or relation, by which it is determined, admits not of the least change, it forms them into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title of realities. The first of these systems is the object of the memory and senses; the second of the judgment.

'Tis this latter principle, which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory.2 By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination, and fix my attention on any part of it I please. I form an idea of <Rome>, which I neither see nor remember; but which is connected with such impressions as I remember to have received from the conversation and books of travellers and

historians. This idea of Rome I place in a certain situation on the idea of an object, which I call the globe. I join to it the conception of a particular government, and religion, and manners. I look backward and consider its first foundation; its several revolutions, successes, and misfortunes. All this, and everything else, which I believe, are nothing but ideas; tho' by their force and settled order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination.

As to the influence of contiguity and resemblance, we may observe, that if the contiguous and resembling object be comprehended in this system of realities, there is no doubt but these two relations will assist that of cause and effect, and infix the related idea with more force in the imagination. This I shall enlarge upon presently. Mean while I shall carry my observation a step farther, and assert, that even where the related object is but feign'd, the relation will serve to enliven the idea, and encrease its influence. {1:409} poet, no doubt, will be the better able to form a strong description of the Elysian fields, that he prompts his imagination by the view of a beautiful meadow or garden; as at another time he may by his fancy place himself in the midst of these fabulous regions, that by the feign'd contiguity he may enliven his imagination.

But tho' I cannot altogether exclude the relations of resemblance and contiguity from operating on the fancy in this manner, 'tis observable that, when single, their influence is very feeble and uncertain. As the relation of cause and effect is requisite to persuade us of any real existence,' so is this persuasion requisite to give force to these other relations. For where upon the appearance of an impression we not only feign another object, but likewise arbitrarily, and of our mere good-will and pleasure give it a particular relation to the impression, this can have but a small effect upon the mind; nor is there any reason, why, upon the return of the same impression, we shou'd be determined to place the same object in the same relation to it." There is no manner of necessity for the mind to feign any resembling and contiguous objects; and if it feigns such, there is as little necessity for it always to confine itself to the same, without any difference or variation. And indeed such a fiction is founded ou so little reason, that nothing but pure caprice can determine the mind to form it; and that principle being fluctuating and uncertain, 'tis impossible it can ever operate with any considerable degree of force and constancy. The mind forsees and anticipates the change; and even from the very first instant feels the looseness of its actions, and the weak hold it has of its objects. And as this imperfection is very sensible in every single instance, it still encreases by experience and observation, when we compare the several instances we may remember, and form a general rule against the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which arise in the imagination from a feign'd resemblance and contiguity.

The relation of cause and effect has all the opposite advantages. The objects it presents are fixt and unalterable. The impressions of the memory never change in any considerable degree; and each impression draws along with it a precise idea, which takes its place in the imagination as {1:410} something solid and real, certain and invariable. The thought is always determin'd to pass from the impression to the idea, and from that particular impression to that particular idea, without any choice or hesitation.

But not content with removing this objection, I shall endeavour to extract from it a proof of the present doctrine. Contiguity and resemblance have an effect much inferior to causation; but still have some effect, and augment the conviction of any opinion, and the vivacity of any conception. If this can be prov'd in several new instances, beside what we have already observ'd, 'twill be allow'd no inconsiderable argument, that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression.

To begin with contiguity; it has been remark'd among the Mahometans as well as Christians, that those pilgrims, who have seen MECCA or the HOLY LAND, are ever after more faithful and zealous believers, than those who have not had that advantage. A man, whose memory presents him with a lively image of the Red-Sea, and the Desert, and Jerusalem, and Galilee, can never doubt of any miraculous events, which are related either by Moses or the Evangelists. The lively idea of the places passes by an easy transition to the facts, which are suppos'd to have been related to them by contiguity, and encreases the belief by encreasing the vivacity of the conception. The remembrance of these fields and rivers has the same influence on the vulgar as a new argument; and from the same causes.

We may form a like observation concerning resemblance. We have remark'd, that the conclusion, which we draw from a present object to its absent cause or effect, is never founded on any qualities, which we observe in that object, consider'd in itself, or, in other words, that 'tis impossible to determine, otherwise than by experience, what will result from any phenomenon, or what has preceded it. But tho' this be so evident in itself, that it seem'd not to require any, proof; yet some philosophers have imagin'd that there is an apparent cause for the communication of motion, and that a reasonable man might immediately infer the motion of one body from the impulse of another, without having recourse to any past observation. That this opinion is false will admit of an easy proof. For if such an inference may be drawn merely from the ideas of body, of motion, and of {1:411} impulse, it must amount to a demonstration, and must imply the absolute impossibility of any contrary supposition. Every effect, then, beside the communication of motion, implies a formal contradiction; and 'tis impossible not only that it can exist, but also that it can be conceiv'd. But we may soon satisfy ourselves of the contrary, by forming a clear and consistent idea of one body's moving upon another, and of its rest immediately upon the contact,; or of its returning back in the same line in which it came; or of its annihilation; or circular or elliptical motion: and in short, of an infinite number of other changes, which we may suppose it to undergo. These suppositions are all consistent and natural; and the reason, Why we imagine the communication of motion to be more consistent and natural not only than those suppositions, but also than any other natural effect, is founded on the relation of resemblance betwixt the cause and effect, which is here united to experience, and binds the objects in the closest and most intimate manner to each other, so as to make us imagine them to be absolutely inseparable. Resemblance, then, has the same or a parallel influence with experience; and as the only immediate effect of experience is to associate our ideas together, it follows, that all belief arises from the association of ideas, according to mv hypothesis.

'Tis universally allow'd by the writers on optics, that the eye at all times sees an equal number of physical points, and that a man on the top of a mountain has no larger an image presented to his senses, than when he is coop'd up in the narrowest court or chamber. 'Tis only by experience that he infers the greatness of the object from some peculiar qualities of the image; and this inference of the judgment he confounds with sensation, as is common on other occasions. Now 'tis evident, that the inference of the judgment is here much more lively than what is usual in our common reasonings, and that a man has a more vivid conception of the vast extent of the ocean from the image he receives by the eye, when he stands on the top of the high promontory, than merely from hearing the roaring of the waters. He feels a more sensible pleasure from its magnificence; which is a proof of a more lively idea: And he confounds his judgment with sensation, which is another proof of it. But as the inference is equally certain and immediate in both {1:412} cases, this superior vivacity of our conception in one case can proceed from nothing but this, that in drawing

an inference from the sight, beside the customary conjunction, there is also a resemblance betwixt the image and the object we infer; which strengthens the relation, and conveys the vivacity of the impression to the related idea with an easier and more natural movement.

No weakness of human nature is more universal and conspicuous than what we commonly call CREDULITY, or a too easy faith in the testimony of others; and this weakness is also very naturally accounted for from the influence of resemblance. When we receive any matter of fact upon human testimony, our faith arises from the very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects, and from effects to causes; nor is there anything but our experience of the governing principles of human nature, which can give us any assurance of the veracity of men. But tho' experience be the true standard of this, as well as of all other judgments, we. seldom regulate ourselves entirely by it; but have a remarkable propensity to believe whatever is reported, even concerning apparitions, enchantments, and prodigies, however contrary to daily experience and observation. The words or discourses of others have an intimate connexion with certain ideas in their mind; and these ideas have also a connexion with the facts or objects, which they represent. This latter connexion is generally much over-rated, and commands our assent beyond what experience will justify; which can proceed from nothing beside the resemblance betwixt the ideas and the facts. Other effects only point out their causes in an oblique manner; but the testimony of men does it directly, and is to be considered as an image as well as an effect. No wonder, therefore, we are so rash in drawing our inferences from it, and are less guided by experience in our judgments concerning it, than in those upon any other subject.

As resemblance, when conjoin'd with causation, fortifies our reasonings; so the want of it in any very great degree is able almost entirely to destroy them. Of this there is a remarkable instance in the universal carelessness and stupidity of men with regard to a future state, where they show as obstinate an incredulity, as they do a blind credulity on other occasions. There is not indeed a more ample matter {1:413} of wonder to the studious, and of regret to the pious man, than to observe the negligence of the bulk of mankind concerning their approaching condition; and 'tis with reason, that many eminent theologians have not scrupled to affirm, that tho' the vulgar have no formal principles of infidelity, yet they are really infidels in their hearts, and have nothing like what we can call a belief of the eternal duration of their souls. For let us consider on the one hand what divines have display'd with such eloquence concerning the importance of eternity; and at the same time reflect, that tho' in matters of rhetoric we ought to lay our account with some exaggeration, we must in this case allow, that the strongest figures are infinitely inferior to the subject: And after this let us view on the other hand, the prodigious security of men in this particular: I ask, if these people really believe what is inculcated on them, and what they pretend to affirm; and the answer is obviously in the negative. As belief is an act of the mind arising from custom, 'tis not strange the want of resemblance shou'd overthrow what custom has established, and diminish the force of the idea, as much as that latter principle encreases it. A future state is so far remov'd from our comprehension, and we have so obscure an idea of the manner, in which we shall exist after the dissolution of the body, that all the reasons we can invent, however strong in themselves, and however much assisted by education, are never able with slow imaginations to surmount this difficulty, or bestow a sufficient authority and force on the idea. I rather choose to ascribe this incredulity to the faint idea we form of our future condition, deriv'd from its want of resemblance to the present life, than to that deriv'd from its remoteness. For I observe, that men are everywhere concern'd about what may happen after their death, provided it regard this world; and that there are few to whom their name, their family, their friends, and their country are in. any period of

time entirely indifferent.

And indeed the want of resemblance in this case so entirely destroys belief, that except those few, who upon cool reflection on the importance of the subject, have taken care by repeated meditation to imprint in their minds the arguments for a future state, there scarce are any, who believe the immortality of the soul with a true and established judgment; {1:414} such as is deriv'd from the testimony of travellers and historians. This appears very conspicuously wherever men have occasion to compare the pleasures and pains, the rewards and punishments of this life with those of a future; even tho' the case does not concern themselves, and there is no violent passion to disturb their judgment. The Roman Clatholicks are certainly the most zealous of any sect in the Christian world; and yet you'll find few among the more sensible people of that communion who do not blame the Gunpowder-treason, and the massacre of St. Bartholomew, as cruel and barbarous, tho' projected or executed against those very people, whom without any scruple they condemn to eternal and infinite punishments. All we can say in excuse for this inconsistency is, that they really do not believe what they affirm concerning a future state; nor is there any better proof of it than the very inconsistency.

We may add to this a remark; that in matters of religion men take a pleasure in being terrify'd, and that no preachers are so popular, as those who excite the most dismal and gloomy passions. In the common affairs of life, where we feel and are penetrated with the solidity of the subject, nothing can be more disagreeable than fear and terror; and 'tis only in dramatic performances and in religious discourses, that they ever give pleasure.]In these latter cases the imagination reposes itself indolently on the idea; and the passion, being soften'd by the want of belief in the subject, has no more than the agreeable effect of enlivening the mind, and fixing the attention.

The present hypothesis will receive additional confirmation, if we examine the effects of other kinds of custom, as well as of other relations. To understand this we must consider, that custom, to which I attribute all belief and reasoning, may operate upon the mind in invigorating an idea after two several ways. For supposing that in all past experience we have found two objects to have been always conjoin'd together, 'tis evident, that upon the appearance of one of these objects in an impression, we must from custom make an easy transition to the idea of that object, which usually attends it; and by means of the present impression and easy transition must conceive that idea in a stronger and more lively manner, than we do any loose floating image of the fancy. But let us next suppose, that a mere idea alone, without any of this {1:415} curious and almost artificial preparation, shou'd frequently make its appearance in the mind, this idea must by degrees acquire a facility and force; and both by its firm hold and easy introduction distinguish itself from any new and unusual idea. This is the only particular, in which these two kinds of custom agree; and if it appear, that their effects on the judgment, are similar and proportionable, we may certainly conclude, that the foregoing explication of that faculty is satisfactory. But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we consider the nature and effects Of EDUCATION?

All those opinions and notions of things, to which we have been accustomed from our infancy, take such deep root, that 'tis impossible for us, by all the powers of reason and experience, to eradicate them; and this habit not only approaches in its influence, but even on many occasions prevails over that which a-rises from the constant and inseparable union of causes and effects. Here we most not be contented with saying, that the vividness of the idea produces the belief: We must maintain that they are individually the same. The frequent repetition of any idea infixes it in the imagination; but cou'd never possibly of itself produce belief, if that act of the mind was, by the original constitution

of our natures, annex'd only to a reasoning and comparison of ideas. Custom may lead us into some false comparison of ideas. This is the utmost effect we can conceive of it. But 'tis certain it cou'd never supply the place of that comparison, nor produce any act of the mind, which naturally belong'd to that principle.

A person, that has lost a leg or an arm by amputation, endeavours for a long time afterwards to serve himself with them. After the death of any one, 'tis a common remark of the whole family, but especially of the servants, that they can scarce believe him to be dead, but still imagine him to be in his chamber or in any other place, where they were accustomed to find him. I have often heard in conversation, after talking of a person, that is any way celebrated, that one, who has no acquaintance with him, will say, I have never seen such-a-one, but almost fancy I have; so often have I heard talk of him. All these are parallel instances.

If we consider this argument from education in a proper light, 'twill appear very convincing; and the more so, that tie {1:416} founded on one of the most common phaenomena, that is any where to be met with. I am persuaded, that upon examination we shall find more than one half of those opinions, that prevail among mankind, to be owing to education, and that the principles, which are thus implicitely embrac'd, overballance those, which are owing either to abstract reasoning or experience. As liars, by the frequent repetition of their lies, come at last to remember them; so the judgment, or rather the imagination, by the like means, may have ideas so strongly imprinted on it, and conceive them in so full a light, that they may operate upon the mind in the same manner with those, which the senses, memory or reason present to us. But as education is an artificial and not a natural cause,,and as its maxims are frequently contrary to reason, and even to themselves in different times and places, it is never upon that account recogniz'd by philosophers; tho' in reality it be built almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our reasonings from causes and effects.

SECT. X.-Of the Influence of Belief.

But tho' education be disclaim'd by philosophy, as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion, it prevails nevertheless in the world, and is the cause why all systems are apt to be rejected at first as new and unusual. This perhaps will be the fate of what I have here advanc'd concerning belief, and tho' the proofs I have produc'd appear to me perfectly conclusive, I expect not to make many proselytes to my opinion. Men will scarce ever be persuaded, that effects of such consequence can flow from principles, which are seemingly so inconsiderable, and that the far greatest part of our reasonings with all our actions and {1:417} passions, can be deriv'd from nothing but custom and habit. To obviate this objection, I shall here anticipate a little what wou'd more properly fall under our consideration afterwards, when we come to treat of the passions and the sense o beauty.

There is implanted in the human mind a perception of pain and pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions. But pain and pleasure have two ways of making their appearance in the mind; of which the one has effects very different from the other. They may either appear in impression to the actual feeling, or only in idea, as at present when I mention them. 'Tis evident the influence of these upon our actions is far from being equal. Impressions always actuate the soul, and that in the highest degree; but 'tis not every idea which has the same effect. Nature has proceeded with caution in this came, and seems to have carefully avoided the inconveniences of two extremes. Did impressions alone influence the will, we should every moment of our lives be subject to the greatest calamities; because, tho' we foresaw their approach, we should not be provided by nature with any principle of action, which might impel us to avoid them.

On the other hand, did every idea influence our actions, our condition would not be much mended. For such is the unsteadiness and activity of thought, that the images of every thing, especially of goods and evils, are always wandering in the mind; and were it mov'd by every idle conception of this kind, it would never enjoy a moment's peace and tranquillity.

Nature has, therefore, chosen a medium, and has neither bestow'd on every idea of good and evil the power of actuating the will, nor yet has entirely excluded them from this influence. Tho' an idle fiction has no efficacy, yet we find by experience, that the ideas of those objects, which we believe either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions, which are immediately present to the senses and perception. The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an impression in force and vivacity. For as the different degrees of force make all the original difference betwixt an impression and an idea, they {1:418} must of consequence be the source of all the differences in the effects of these perceptions, and their removal, in whole or in part, the cause of every new resemblance they acquire. Wherever we can make an idea approach the impressions in force and vivacity, it will likewise imitate them in its influence on the mind; and vice versa, where it imitates them in that influence, as in the present case, this must proceed from its approaching them in force and vivacity. Belief, therefore, since it causes an idea to imitate the effects of the impressions, must make it resemble them in these qualities, and is nothing but a more vivid and intense conception of any idea. This, then, may both serve as an additional argument for the present system, and may give us,L notion after what manner our reasonings from causation are able to operate on the will and passions.

As belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions, so the passions in their turn are very favourable to belief; and not only such facts as convey agreeable emotions, but very often such as give pain, do upon that account become more readily the objects of faith and opinion. A coward, whose fears are easily awaken'd, readily assents to every account of danger he meets with; as a person of a sorrowful and melancholy disposition is very credulous of every thing, that nourishes his prevailing passion. When any affecting object is presented, it gives the alarm, and excites immediately a degree of its proper passion; especially in persons who are naturally inclined to that passion. This emotion passes by an easy transition to the imagination; and diffusing itself over our idea of the affecting object, makes us form that idea with greater force and vivacity, and consequently assent to it, according to the precedent system. Admiration and surprize have the same effect as the other passions; and accordingly we may observe, that among the vulgar, quacks and projectors meet with a more easy faith upon account of their magnificent pretensions, than if they kept themselves within the bounds of moderation. The first astonishment, which naturally attends their miraculous relations, spreads itself over the whole soul, and so vivifies and enlivens the idea, that it resembles the inferences we draw from experience. This is a mystery, with which we may be already a little acquainted, and which we shall have farther occasion to be let into in the progress of this treatise. {1:419}

After this account of the influence of belief on the passions, we shall find less difficulty in explaining its effects on the imagination, however extraordinary they may appear. 'Tis certain we cannot take pleasure in any discourse, where our judgment gives no assent to those images which are presented to our fancy. The conversation of those who have acquir'd a habit of lying, tho' in affairs of no moment, never gives any satisfaction; and that because those ideas they present to us, not being attended with belief, make no impression upon the mind. Poets themselves, tho' liars by

profession, always endeavour to give an air of truth to their fictions; and where that is totally neglected, their performances, however ingenious, will never be able to afford much pleasure. In short, we may observe, that even when ideas have no manner of influence on the will and passions, truth and reality are still requisite, in order to make them entertaining to the imagination.

But if we compare together all the phenomena that occur on this head, we shall find, that truth, however necessary it may seem in all works of genius, has no other effect than to procure an easy reception for the ideas, and to make the mind acquiesce in them with satisfaction, or at least without reluctance. But as this is an effect, which may easily be supposed to flow from that solidity and force, which, according to my system, attend those ideas that are established by reasonings from causation; it follows, that all the influence of belief upon the fancy may be explained from that system. Accordingly we may observe, that wherever that influence arises from any other principles beside truth or reality, they supply its place, and give an equal entertainment to the imagination. Poets have form'd what they call a poetical system of things, which tho' it be believ'd neither by themselves nor readers, is commonly esteem'd a sufficient foundation for any fiction. We have been so much accustomed to the names of MARS, JUPITER, VENUS, that in the same manner as education infixes any opinion, the constant repetition of these ideas makes them enter into the mind with facility, and prevail upon the fancy, without influencing the judgment. In like manner tragedians always borrow their fable, or at least the names of their principal actors, from some known passage in history; and that not in order to deceive the spectators; for they will frankly confess, that truth is not {1:420} in any circumstance inviolably observed: but in order to procure a more easy reception into the imagination for those extraordinary events, which they represent. But this is a precaution, which is not required of comic poets, whose personages and incidents, being of a more familiar kind, enter easily into the conception, and are received without any such formality, even tho' at first night they be known to be fictitious, and the pure offspring of the fancy.

This mixture of truth and falshood in the fables of tragic poets not only serves our present purpose, by shewing, that the imagination can be satisfy'd without any absolute belief or assurance; but may in another view be regarded as a very strong confirmation of this system. 'Tis evident, that poets make use of this artifice of borrowing the names of their persons, and the chief events of their poems, from history, in order to procure a more easy reception for the whole, and cause it to make a deeper impression on the fancy and affections. The several incidents of the piece acquire a kind of relation by being united into one poem or representation; and if any of these incidents be an object of belief, it bestows a force and vivacity on the others, which are related to it. The vividness of the first conception diffuses itself along the relations, and is convey'd, as by so many pipes or canals, to every idea that has any communication with the primary one. This, indeed, can never amount to a perfect assurance; and that because the union among the ideas is, in a manner, accidental: But still it approaches so near, in its influence, as may convince us, that they are deriv'd from the same origin. Belief must please the imagination by means of the force and vivacity which attends it; since every idea, which has force and vivacity, is found to be agreeable to that faculty.

To confirm this we may observe, that the assistance is mutual betwixt the judgment and fancy, as well as betwixt the judgment and passion; and that belief not only gives vigour to the imagination, but that a vigorous and strong imagination is of all talents the most proper to procure belief and authority. 'Tis difficult for us to withhold our assent from what is painted out to us in all the colours of eloquence; and the vivacity produc'd by the fancy is in many cases greater than that which arises from custom and experience. We are hurried away by the lively imagination of our

author {1:421} or companion; and even be himself is often a victim to his own fire and genius.

Nor will it be amiss to remark, that as a lively imagination very often degenerates into madness or folly, and bears it a great resemblance in its operations; so they influence the judgment after the same manner, and produce belief from the very same principles. When the imagination, from any extraordinary ferment of the blood and spirits, acquires such a vivacity as disorders all its powers and faculties, there is no means of distinguishing betwixt truth and falshood; but every loose fiction or idea, having the same influence as the impressions of the memory, or the conclusions of the judgment, is receiv'd on the same footing, and operates with equal force on the passions. A present impression and a customary transition are now no longer necessary to enliven our ideas. Every chimera of the brain is as vivid and intense as any of those inferences, which we formerly dignify'd with the name of conclusions concerning matters of fact, and sometimes as the present impressions of the senses.

[The following three paragraphs are inserted from the appendix.] We may observe the same effect of poetry in a lesser degree; and this is common both to poetry and madness, that the vivacity they bestow on the ideas is not deriv'd from the particular situations or connexions of the objects of these ideas, but from the present temper and disposition of the person. But how great soever the pitch may be, to which this vivacity rises, 'tis evident,, that in poetry it never has the same feeling with that which arises in the mind, when we reason, tho' even upon the lowest species of probability. The mind can easily distinguish betwixt the one and the other; and whatever emotion the poetical enthusiasm may give to the spirits, 'tis still the mere phantom of belief or persuasion. The case is the same with the idea, as with the passion it occasions. There is no passion of the human mind but what may arise from poetry; tho' at the same time the feelings of the passions are very different when excited by poetical fictions, from what they are when they are from belief and reality. A passion, which is disagreeable in real life, may afford the highest entertainment in a tragedy, or epic poem. In the latter case, it lies not with that weight upon us: It feels less firm and solid: And has no other than the agreeable effect of exciting the spirits, and rouzing the attention. The difference {1:422} in the passions is a clear proof of a like difference in those ideas, from which the passions are deriv'd. Where the vivacity arises from a customary conjunction with a present impression; tho' the imagination may not, in appearance, be so much mov'd; yet there is always something more forcible and real in its actions, than in the fervors of poetry and eloquence. The force of our mental actions in this case, no more than in any other, is not to be measur'd by the apparent agitation of the mind. A poetical description may have a more sensible effect on the fancy, than an historical narration. It may collect more of those circumstances, that form a compleat image or picture. It may seem to set the object before us in more lively colours. But still the ideas it presents are different to the feeling from those, which arise from the memory and the judgment. There is something weak and imperfect amidst all that seeming vehemence of thought and sentiment, which attends the fictions of poetry.

We shall afterwards have occasion to remark both the resemblance and differences betwixt a poetical enthusiasm, and a serious conviction. In the mean time I cannot forbear observing, that the great difference in their feeling proceeds in some measure from reflection and <general rules>. We observe, that the vigour of conception, which fictions receive from poetry and eloquence, is a circumstance merely accidental, of which every idea is equally susceptible; and that such fictions are connected with nothing that is real. This observation makes us only lend ourselves, so to speak, to the fiction: But causes the idea to feel very different from the eternal establish'd persuasions founded on memory and custom. They are somewhat of the same kind: But the one is much

inferior to the other, both in its causes and effects.

A like reflection on general rules keeps us from augmenting our belief upon every encrease of the force and vivacity of our ideas. Where an opinion admits of no doubt, or opposite probability, we attribute to it a full conviction: tho' the want of resemblance, or contiguity, may render its force inferior to that of other opinions. 'Tis thus the understanding corrects the appearances of the senses, and makes us imagine, that an object at twenty foot distance seems even to the eye as large as one of the same dimensions at ten.

We may observe the same effect of poetry in a lesser degree; only with this difference, that the least reflection {1:423} dissipates the illusions of poetry, and Places the objects in their proper light. 'Tis however certain, that in the warmth of a poetical enthusiasm, a poet has a, counterfeit belief, and even a kind of vision of his objects: And if there be any shadow of argument to support this belief, nothing contributes more to his full conviction than a blaze of poetical figures and images, which have their effect upon the poet himself, as well as upon his readers.

SECT. XI.-Of the Probability of Chances.

But in order to bestow on this system its full force and evidence, we must carry our eye from it a moment to consider its consequences, and explain from the same principles some other species of reasoning, which are deriv'd from the same origin.

Those philosophers, who have divided human reason into knowledge and probability, and have defin'd the first to be that evidence, which arises from the comparison of ideas, are oblig'd to comprehend all our arguments from causes or effects under the general term of probability. But tho 'every one be free to use his terms in what sense he pleases; and accordingly in the precedent part of this discourse, I have follow'd this method of expression; 'tis however certain, that in common discourse we readily affirm, that many arguments from causation exceed probability, and may be receiv'd as a superior kind of evidence.' One wou'd appear ridiculous, who wou'd say, that 'tis only probable the sun will rise to-morrow, or that all men must dye; tho' 'tis plain we have no further assurance of these facts, than what experience affords us. For f-his reason, 'twould perhaps be more convenient, in order at once to preserve the common signification of words, and mark the several degrees of evidence, to distinguish human reason into three kinds, viz. <that from knowledge, from proofs, and from probabilities>. By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments, which are deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty. By probability, that evidence, which {1:424} is still attended with uncertainty. 'Tis this last species of reasoning, I proceed to examine.

Probability or reasoning from conjecture may be divided into two kinds, viz. that which is founded on chance, a -d that which arises from causes. We shall consider each of these in order.

The idea of cause and effect is deriv'd from experience, which presenting us with certain objects constantly conjoin'd with each other, produces such a habit of surveying them in that relation, that we cannot without a sensible violence survey them iii any other. On the other hand, as chance is nothing real in itself, and, properly speaking, is merely the negation of a cause, its influence on the mind is contrary to that of causation; and 'tis essential to it, to leave the imagination perfectly indifferent, either to consider the existence or non-existence of that object, which is regarded as contingent. A cause traces the way to our thought, and in a manner forces us to survey such certain objects, in such certain relations. Chance can only destroy this determination of the thought, and

leave the mind in its native situation of indifference; in which, upon the absence of a cause, 'tis instantly re-instated.

Since therefore an entire indifference is essential to chance, no one chance can possibly be superior to another, otherwise than as it is compos'd of a superior number of equal chances. For if we affirm that one chance can, after any other manner, be superior to another, we must at the same time affirm, that there is something, which gives it the superiority, and determines the event rather to that side than the other: That is, in other words, we must allow of a cause, and destroy the supposition of chance; which we had before established. A perfect and total indifference is essential to chance, and one total indifference can never in itself be either superior or inferior to another. This truth is not peculiar to my system, but is acknowledged by every one, that forms calculations concerning chances.

And here 'tis remarkable, that tho' chance and causation be directly contrary, yet 'tis impossible for us to conceive this combination of chances, which is requisite to render one hazard superior to another, without supposing a mixture of causes among the chances, and a conjunction of necessity in some particulars, with a total indifference in others. Where {1:425} nothing limits the chances, every notion, that the most extravagant fancy can form, is upon a footing of equality; nor can there be any circumstance to give one the advantage above another. Thus unless we allow, that there are some causes to make the dice fall, and preserve their form in their fall, and lie upon some one of their sides, we can form no calculation concerning the laws of hazard. But supposing these causes to operate, and supposing likewise all the rest to be indifferent and to be determined by chance, 'tis easy to arrive at a notion of a superior combination of chances. A dye that has four sides mark'd with a certain number of spots, and only two with another, affords us an obvious and easy instance of this superiority. The mind is here limited by the causes to such a precise number and quality of the events; and at the same time is undetermined in its choice of any particular event.

Proceeding then in that reasoning, wherein we have advanc'd three steps; that chance is merely the negation of a cause, and produces a total indifference in the mind; that one negation of a cause and one total indifference can never be superior or inferior to another; and that there must always be a mixture of causes among the chances, in order to be the foundation of any reasoning: We are -next to consider what effect a superior combination of chances can have upon the mind, and after what manner it influences our judgment and opinion. Here we may repeat all the same arguments we employ'd in examining that belief, which arises from causes; and may prove, after the same manner, that a superior number of chances produces our assent neither by demonstration nor probability. 'Tis indeed evident ' that we can 'never by the comparison of mere ideas make any discovery, which can be of consequence in this affairs and that 'tis impossible to prove with certainty, that any event must fall on that side where there is a superior number of chances. To, suppose in this case any certainty, were to overthrow what we have established concerning the opposition of chances,, and their perfect equality and indifference.

Shou'd it be said, that tho' in an opposition of chances 'tis impossible to determine with certainty, on Which side the event will fall, yet we can pronounce with certainty, that 'tis more likely and probable, 'twill be on that side where there is a superior number of chances, than where there is an {1:426} inferior: Shou'd this be said, I wou'd ask, what is here meant by likelihood and probability? The likelihood and probability of chances is a superior number of equal chances; and consequently when we say 'tis likely the event win fall on the side, which is superior, rather than on the inferior, we do no more than affirm, that where there is a superior number of chances there is actually a superior, and where there is an inferior there is an inferior; which are identical

propositions, and of no consequence. The question is, by what means a superior number of equal chances operates upon the mind, and produces belief or assent; since it appears, that 'tis neither by arguments deriv'd from demonstration, nor from probability.

In order to clear up this difficulty, we shall suppose a person to take a dye, form'd after such a manner as that four of its sides are mark'd with one figure, or one number of spots, and two with another; and to put this dye into the box with an intention of throwing it: 'Tis plain, he must conclude the one figure to be more probable than the other, and give the preference to that which is inscrib'd on the greatest number of sides. He in a manner believes, that this will lie uppermost; tho' still with hesitation and doubt, in proportion to the number of chances, which are contrary: And according as these contrary chances diminish, and the superiority encreases on the other side, his belief acquires new degrees of stability and assurance. This belief arises from an operation of the mind upon the simple and limited object before us; and therefore its nature will be the more easily discovered and explain'd. We have nothing but one single dye to contemplate, in order to comprehend one of the most curious operations of the understanding.

This dye, form'd as above, contains three circumstances worthy of our attention. First, Certain causes, such as gravity, solidity, a cubical figure, &c. which determine it to fall, to preserve its form in its fall, and to turn -up one of its sides. Secondly, A certain number of sides, which are suppos'd indifferent. Thirdly, A certain figure inscrib'd on each side. These three particulars form the whole nature of the dye, so far as relates to our present purpose; and consequently are the only circumstances regarded by the mind in its forming a judgment concerning the result of such a throw. Let us, therefore, consider gradually and carefully what must {1:427} be the influence of these circumstances on the thought and imagination.

First, We have already observ'd, that the mind is determin'd by custom to pass from any cause to its effect, and that upon the appearance of the one, 'tis almost impossible for it not to form an idea of the other. Their constant conjunction in past instances has produc'd such a habit in the mind, that it always conjoins them in its thought, and infers the existence of the one from that of its usual attendant. When it considers the dye as no longer supported by the box, it can not without violence regard it as suspended in the air; but naturally places it on the table, and views it as turning up one of its sides. This is the effect of the intermingled causes, which are requisite to our forming any calculation concerning chances.

Secondly, 'Tis suppos'd, that tho' the dye be necessarily determin'd to fall, and turn up one of its sides, yet there is nothing to fix the particular side, but that this is determin'd entirely by chance. The very nature and essence of chance is a negation of causes, and the leaving the mind in a perfect indifference among those events, which are suppos'd contingent. When therefore the thought is determined by the causes to consider the dye as falling and turning up one of its sides, the chances present all these sides as equal, and make us consider every one of them, one after another, as alike probable and possible. The imagination passes from the cause, viz. the throwing of the dye, to the effect, viz. the turning up one of the six sides; and feels a kind of impossibility both of stopping short in the way, and of forming any other idea. But as all these six sides are incompatible, and the dye cannot turn up above one at once, this principle directs us not to consider all of them at once as lying uppermost; which we look upon as impossible: Neither does it direct us with its entire force to any particular side; for in that case this side wou'd be considered as certain and inevitable; but it directs us to the whole six sides after such a manner as to divide its force equally among them. We conclude in general, that some one of them must result from the throw: We run all of them over in our minds: The determination of the thought is common to all; but no more of its force falls

to the share of any one, than what is suitable to its proportion with the rest. 'Tis after this manner the {1:428} original impulse, and consequently the vivacity of thought, arising from the causes, is divided and split in pieces by the intermingled chances.

We have already seen the influence of the two first qualities of the dye, viz. the causes, and the num&r and indifference of the sides, and have learn'd how they give an impulse to the thought, and divide that impulse into as many parts as there are unites in the number of sides. We must now consider the effects of the third particular, viz. the figures inscrib'd on each side. 'Tis evident that where several sides have the same figure inscribe on them, they must concur in their influence on the mind, and must unite upon one image or idea of a figure all those divided impulses, that were dispers'd over the several sides, upon which that figure is inscrib'd. Were the question only what side will be turn'd up, these are all perfectly equal, and no one cou'd ever have any advantage above another. But as the question is concerning the figure, and as the same figure is presented by more than one side: 'tis evident, that the impulses belonging to all these sides must re-unite in that one figure, and become stronger and more forcible by the union. Four sides are suppos'd in the present case to have the same figure inscrib'd on them, and two to have another figure. The impulses of the former are, therefore, superior to those of the latter. But as the events are contrary, and 'tis impossible both these figures can be turn'd up; the impulses likewise become contrary, and the inferior destroys the superior, as far as its strength goes. The vivacity of the idea is always proportionable to the degrees of the impulse or tendency to the transition; and belief is the same with the vivacity of the idea, according to the precedent doctrine.

SECT. XII.-OF the Probability of Causes.

What I have said concerning the probability of chances can serve to no other purpose, than to assist us in explaining the probability of causes; since 'tis commonly allow'd by philosophers, that what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a secret and conceal'd cause. That species of probability, therefore, is what we must chiefly examine.

The probabilities of causes are of several kinds; but are all deriv'd from the same origin, viz. the association of ideas {1:429} to a present impression. As the habit.1 which produces the association, arises from the frequent conjunction of objects, it must arrive at its perfection by degrees, and must acquire new force from each instance, that falls under our observation. The first instance has little or no force: The second makes some addition to it: The third becomes still more sensible; and 'tis by these slow steps, that our judgment arrives at a full assurance. But before it attains this pitch of perfection, it passes thro' several inferior degrees, and in all of them is only to be esteem'd a presumption or probability. The gradation, therefore, from probabilities to proofs is in many cases insensible; and the difference betwixt these kinds of evidence is more easily perceiv'd in the remote degrees, than in the near and contiguous.

'Tis worthy of remark on this occasion, that tho' the species of probability here explain'd be the first in order, and naturally takes place before any entire proof can exist, yet no one, who is arriv'd at the age of maturity, can any longer be acquainted with it. 'Tis true, nothing is more common than for people of the most advanc'd knowledge to have attain'd only an imperfect experience of many particular events; which naturally produces only an imperfect habit and transition: But then we must consider, that the mind, having form'd another observation concerning the connexion of causes and effects, gives new force to its reasoning from that observation; and by means of it can build an argument on one single experiment, when duly prepar'd and examin'd. What we have found once to follow from any object, we conclude will for ever follow from it; and if this maxim be

not always built upon as certain, 'tis not for want of a sufficient number of experiments, but because we frequently meet with instances to the contrary; which leads us to the second species of probability, where there is a contrariety in our experience and observation.

'Twou'd be very happy for men in the conduct of their lives and actions, were the same objects always conjoin'd together, and, we had nothing to fear but the mistakes of our own judgment, without having any reason to apprehend the uncertainty of nature. But as 'tis frequently found, that one observation is contrary to another, and that causes and effects follow not in the same order, of which we have I {1:430} had experience, we are oblig'd to vary our reasoning on, account of this uncertainty, and take into consideration the contrariety of events. The first question, that occurs on this head, is concerning the nature and causes of the contrariety.

The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes, as makes them often fail of their usual influence, tho' they meet with no obstacle nor impediment in their operation. But philosophers observing, that almost in every part of nature there is contain'd a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that 'tis at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation, when they remark, that upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, and proceeds from their mutual hindrance and opposition. A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say, that commonly it does not go right: But an artizan easily perceives, that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim, that the connexion betwixt all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes.

But however philosophers and the vulgar may differ in their explication of the contrariety of events, their inferences from it are always of the same kind, and founded on the same principles. A contrariety of events in the past may give us a kind of hesitating belief for the future after two several ways. First, By producing an imperfect habit and transition from the present impression to the related idea. When the conjunction of any two objects is frequent, without being entirely constant, the mind is determined to pass from one object to the other; but not with so entire a habit, as when the union is uninterrupted, and all the instances we have ever met with are uniform and of a piece-.. We {1:431} find from common experience, in our actions as well as reasonings, that a constant perseverance in any course of life produces a strong inclination and tendency to continue for the future; tho' there are habits of inferior degrees of force, proportioned to the inferior degrees of steadiness and uniformity in our conduct.

There is no doubt but this principle sometimes takes place, and produces those inferences we draw from contrary phaenomena: tho' I am perswaded, that upon examination we shall not find it to be the principle, that most commonly influences the mind in this species of reasoning. When we follow only the habitual determination of the mind, we make the transition without any reflection, and interpose not a moment's delay betwixt the view of one object and the belief of that, which is often found to attend it. As the custom depends not upon any deliberation, it operates immediately, without allowing any time for reflection. But this method of proceeding we have but few instances of in our probable reasonings; and even fewer than in those, which are deriv'd from the uninterrupted conjunction of objects. In the former species of reasoning we commonly take

knowingly into consideration the contrariety of past events; we compare the different sides of the contrariety, and carefully weigh the experiments, which we have on each side: Whence we may conclude, that our reasonings of this kind arise not directly from the habit, but in an oblique manner; which we must now endeavour to explain.

'Tis evident, that when an object is attended with contrary effects, we judge of them only by our past experience, and always consider those as possible, which we have observ'd to follow from it. And as past experience regulates our judgment concerning the possibility of these effects, so it does that concerning their probability; and that effect, which has been the most common, we always esteem the most likely. Here then are two things to be considered, viz. the reasons which determine us to make the past a standard for the future, and the manner how we extract a single judgment from a contrariety of past events.

First we may observe, that the supposition, that the future resembles the past,, is not founded on arguments of any kind, but is deriv'd entirely from habit, by which we are determin'd to expect for the future the same train of objects, to {1:432} which we have been accustom'd. This habit or determination to transfer the past to the future is full and perfect; and consequently the first impulse of the imagination in this species of reasoning is endow'd with the same qualities.

But, secondly, when in considering past experiments we find them of a contrary nature, this determination, tho' full and perfect in itself, presents us with no steady object, but offers us a number of disagreeing images in a certain order and proportion. The first impulse, therefore, is here broke into pieces, and diffuses itself over all those images, of which each partakes an equal share of that force and vivacity, that is deriv'd from the impulse. Any of these past events may again happen; and we judge, that when they do happen, they will be mix'd in the same proportion as in the past.

If our intention, therefore, be to consider the proportions of contrary events in a great number of instances, the images presented by our past experience must remain in their <first form>, and preserve their first proportions. Suppose, for instance, I have found by long observation, that of twenty ships, which go to sea, only nineteen return. Suppose I see at present twenty ships that leave the port: I transfer my past experience to the future, and represent to myself nineteen of these ships as returning in safety, and one as perishing. Concerning this there can be no difficulty. But as we frequently run over those several ideas of past events, in order to form a judgment concerning one single event, which appears uncertain; this consideration must change the <first form> of our ideas, and draw together the divided images presented by experience; since 'tis to it we refer the determination of that particular event, upon which we reason. Many of these images are suppos'd to concur, and a superior number to concur on one side. These agreeing images unite together, and render the idea more strong and lively, not only than a mere fiction of the imagination, but also than any idea, which is supported by a lesser number of experiments. Each new experiment is as a new stroke of the pencil, which bestows an additional vivacity on the colours without either multiplying or enlarging the figure. This operation of the mind has been so fully explain'd in treating of the probability of chance, that I need not here {1:433} endeavour to render it more intelligible. Every past experiment may be consider'd as a kind of chance; I it being uncertain to us, whether the object will exist conformable to one experiment or another. And for this reason every thing that has been said on the one subject is applicable to both.

Thus upon the whole, contrary experiments produce an imperfect belief, either by weakening the habit, or by dividing and afterwards joining in different parts, that perfect habit, which makes us

conclude in general, that instances, of which we have no experience, must necessarily resemble those of which we have.

To justify still farther this account of the second species of probability, where we reason with knowledge and reflection from a contrariety of past experiments, I shall propose the following considerations, without fearing to give offence by that air of subtilty, which attends them. Just reasoning ought still, perhaps, to retain its force, however subtile; in the same manner as matter preserves its solidity in the air, and fire, and animal spirits, as well as in the grosser and more sensible forms.

First, We may observe, that there is no probability so great as not to allow of a contrary possibility; because otherwise 'twou'd cease to be a probability, and wou'd become a certainty. That probability of causes, which is most extensive, and which we at present examine, depends on a contrariety of experiments: and 'tis evident An experiment in the past proves at least a possibility for the future.

Secondly, The component parts of this possibility and probability are of the same nature, and differ in number only, but not in kind. It has been observ'd, that all single chances are entirely equal, and that the only circumstance, which can give any event, that is contingent, a superiority over another is a superior number of chances. In like manner, as the uncertainty of causes is discovery by-experience, which presents us with a view of contrary events, 'tis plain, that when we transfer the past to the future, the known to the unknown, every past experiment has the same weight, and that 'tis only a superior number of them, which can throw the ballance on any side. The possibility, therefore, which enters into every reasoning of this kind, is compos'd of parts, which are of the same nature both {1:434} among themselves, and with those, that compose the opposite probability.

Thirdly, We may establish it as a certain maxim, that in all moral as well as natural phaenomena, wherever any cause consists of a number of parts, and the effect encreases or diminishes, according to the variation of that number, the effects properly speaking, is a compounded one, and arises from the union of the several effects, that proceed from each part of the cause. Thus, because the gravity of a body encreases or diminishes by the encrease or diminution of its parts, we conclude that each part contains this quality and contributes to the gravity of the whole. The absence or presence of a part of the cause is attended with that of a proportionable part of the effect. This connexion or constant conjunction sufficiently proves the one part to be the cause of the other. As the belief which we have of any event, encreases or diminishes according to the number of chances or past experiments, 'tis to be considered as a compounded effect, of which each part arises from a proportionable number of chances or experiments.

Let us now join these three observations, and see what conclusion we can draw from them. To every probability there is an opposite possibility. This possibility is compos'd of parts, that are entirely of the same nature with those of the probability; and consequently have the same influence on the mind and understanding. The belief, which attends the probability, is a compounded effect, and is form'd by the concurrence of the several effects, which proceed from each part of the probability. Since therefore each part of the probability contributes to the production of the belief,,each part of the possibility must have the same influence on the opposite side; the nature of these parts being entirely the same. The contrary belief, attending the possibility, implies a view of a certain object, as well as the probability does an opposite view. In this particular both these degrees of belief are alike. The only manner then, in which the superior number of similar

component parts in the one can exert its influence, and prevail above the inferior in the other, is by producing a stronger and more lively view of its object. Each part presents a particular view; and all these views uniting together produce one general view, {1:435} which is fuller and more distinct by the greater number of causes or principles, from which it is deriv'd.

The component parts of the probability and possibility, being alike in their nature, must produce like effects; and the likeness of their effects consists in this, that each of them presents a view of a particular object. But tho' these parts be alike in their nature, they are very different in their quantity and number; and this difference must appear in the effect as well as the similarity. Now as the view they present is in both cases full and entire, and comprehends the object in all its parts, 'tis impossible that in this particular there can be any difference; nor is there any thing but a superior vivacity in the probability, arising from the concurrence of a superior number of views, which can distinguish these effects.

Here is almost the same argument in a different light. All our reasonings concerning the probability of causes are founded on the transferring of past to future. The transferring of any past experiment to the future is sufficient to give us a view of the object; whether that experiment be single or combin'd with others of the same kind; whether it be entire, or oppos'd by others of a contrary kind. Suppose, then, it acquires both these qualities of combination and opposition, it loses not upon that account its former power of presenting a view of the object, but only concurs with and opposes other experiments, that have a like influence. A question, therefore, may arise concerning the manner both of the concurrence and opposition. As to the concurrence, there is only the choice left betwixt these two hypotheses. First, That the view of the object, occasioned by the transference of each past experiment, preserves itself entire, and only multiplies the number of views. Or, <secondly>, That it runs into the other similar and correspondent views, and gives them a superior degree of force and vivacity. But that the first hypothesis is erroneous, is evident from experience, which informs us, that the belief, attending any reasoning, consists in one conclusion, not in a multitude of similar ones, which wou'd only distract the mind, and in many cases wou'd be too numerous to be comprehended distinctly by any finite capacity. It remains, therefore, as the only reasonable opinion, that these similar views run into each other, and unite their forces; so as to produce a {1:436} stronger and clearer view, than what arises from any one alone. This is the manner, in which past experiments concur, when they are transfer'd to any future event. As to the manner of their opposition, 'tis evident, that as the contrary views are incompatible with each other, and 'tis impossible the object can at once exist conformable to both of them, their influence becomes mutually destructive, and the mind is determin'd to the superior only with that force, which remains, after subtracting the inferior.

I am sensible how abstruse all this reasoning must appear to the generality of readers, who not being accustom'd to such profound reflections on the intellectual faculties of the mind, will be apt to reject as chimerical whatever strikes not in with the common receiv'd notions, and with the easiest and most obvious principles of philosophy. And no doubt there are some pains requir'd to enter into these arguments; tho' perhaps very little are necessary to perceive the imperfection of every vulgar hypothesis on this subject, and the little light, which philosophy can yet afford us in such sublime and such curious speculations. Let men be once fully perswaded of these two principles, <That there, is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it>; and, <That even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience>; I say, let men be once fully convinc'd of these two

principles, and this will throw them so loose from all common systems, that they will make no difficulty of receiving any, which may appear the most extraordinary. These principles we have found to be sufficiently convincing, even with regard to our most certain reasonings from causation: But I shall venture to affirm, that with regard to these conjectural or probable reasonings they still acquire a new degree of evidence.

First, 'Tis obvious, that in reasonings of this kind, 'tis not the object presented to us, which, consider'd in itself, affords us any reason to draw a conclusion concerning any other object or event. For as this latter object is suppos'd uncertain, and as the uncertainty is deriv'd from a conceal'd contrariety of causes in the former, were any of the causes plac'd in the known qualities of that object, they wou'd no longer be conceal'd, nor wou'd our conclusion be uncertain. {1:437}

But, secondly, 'tis equally obvious in this species of reasoning, that if the transference of the past to the future were founded merely on a conclusion of the understanding, it cou'd never occasion any belief or assurance. When we transfer contrary experiments to the future, we can only repeat these contrary experiments with their particular proportions; which cou'd not produce assurance in any single event, upon which we reason, unless the fancy melted together all those images that concur, and extracted from them one single idea or image, which is intense and lively in proportion to the number of experiments from which it is deriv'd, and their superiority above their antagonists. Our past experience presents no determinate object; and as our belief, however faint, fixes itself on a determinate object, 'tis evident that the belief arises not merely from the transference of past to future, but from some operation of the fancy conjoin'd with it. This may lead us to conceive the manner, in which that faculty enters into all our reasonings.

I shall conclude this subject with two reflections, which may deserve our attention. The <first> may be explain'd after this manner. When the mind forms a reasoning concerning any matter of fact, which is only probable, it casts its eye backward upon past experience, and transferring it to the future, is presented with so many contrary views of its object, of which those that are of the same kind uniting together, and running into one act of the mind, serve to fortify and inliven it. But suppose that this multitude of views or glimpses of an object proceeds not from experience, but from. a voluntary act of the imagination; this effect does not follow, or at least, follows not in the same degree. For tho' custom and education produce belief by such a repetition, as is not deriv'd from experience, yet this requires a long tract of time, along with a very frequent and undesign'd repetition. In general we may pronounce, that a person who wou'd voluntarily repeat any idea in his mind, tho' supported by one past experience, wou'd be no more inclin'd to believe the existence of its object, than if he had contented himself with one survey of it. Beside the effect of design; each act of the mind, being separate and independent, has a separate influence, and {1:438} joins not its force with that of its fellows. Not being united by any common object, producing them, they have no relation to each other; and consequently make no transition or union of forces. This phaenomenon we shall understand better afterwards.

My second reflection is founded on those large probabilities, which the mind can judge of, and the minute differences it can observe betwixt them. When the chances or experiments on one side amount to ten thousand, and on the other to ten thousand and one, the judgment gives the preference to the latter, upon account of that superiority; tho' 'tis plainly impossible for the mind to run over every particular view, and distinguish the superior vivacity of the image arising from the superior number, where the difference is so inconsiderable. We have a parallel instance in the affections., 'Tis evident, according to the principles abovemention'd, that when an object produces any passion in us, which varies according to the different quantity of the object; I say, 'tis evident,

that the passion, properly speaking, is not a simple emotion, but a compounded one, of a great number of weaker passions, deriv'd from a view of each part of the object. For otherwise 'twere impossible the passion shou'd encrease by the encrease of these parts. Thus a man, who desires a thousand pound, has in reality a thousand or more desires which uniting together, seem to make only one passion; tho' the composition evidently betrays itself upon every alteration of the object, by the preference he gives to the larger number, if superior only by an unite. Yet nothing can be more certain, than that so small a difference wou'd not be discernible in the passions, nor cou'd render them distinguishable from each other. The difference, therefore, of our conduct in preferring the greater number depends not upon our passions, but upon custom, and general rules. We have found in a multitude of instances, that the augmenting the numbers of any sum augments the passion, where the numbers are precise and the difference sensible. The mind can perceive from its immediate feeling, that three guineas produce a greater passion than two; and this it transfers to larger numbers, because of the resemblance; and by a general rule assigns to a thousand guineas, a stronger passion than to nine hundred and ninety nine. These general rules we shall explain presently. {1:439}

But beside these two species of probability, which a-re deriv'd from an imperfect experience and from contrary causes, there is a third arising from ANALOGY, which differs from them in some material circumstances.' According to the hypothesis above explain'd all kinds of reasoning from causes or effects are founded on two particulars, <viz>. the constant conjunction of any two objects in all past experience, and the resemblance of a present object to any one of them. The effect of these two particulars is, that the present object invigorates and inlivens the imagination; and the resemblance, along with the constant union, conveys this force and vivacity to the related idea; which we are therefore said to believe, or assent to. If you weaken either the union or resemblance, you weaken the principle of transition, and of consequence that belief, which arises from it. The vivacity of the first impression cannot be fully convey'd to the related idea, either where the conjunction of their objects is not constant, or where the present impression does not perfectly resemble any of those, whose union we are accustom'd to observe. In those probabilities of chance and causes above-explain'd, 'tis the constancy of the union, which is diminish'd; and in the probability deriv!d from analogy, 'tis the resemblance only, which is affected. Without some degree of resemblance, as well as union, 'tis impossible there can be any reasoning: but as this resemblance admits of many different degrees, the reasoning becomes proportionably more or less firm and certain. An experiment loses of its force, when transferr'd to instances, which are not exactly resembling; tho' 'tis evident it may still retain as much as may be-the foundation of probability, as long as there is any resemblance remaining.

SECT. XIII. -- OF Unphilosophical Probability.

All these kinds of probability are receiv'd by philosophers, and allow'd to be reasonable foundations of belief and opinion. But there are others, that are deriv'd from the same principles, tho' they have not had the good fortune to obtain the same sanction. The fir-st probability of this kind may be accounted for thus. The diminution of the union, and of the resemblance, as above explained, diminishes the facility {1:440} of the transition, and by that means weakens the evidence; and we may farther observe, that the same diminution of the evidence will follow from a diminution of the impression, and from the shading of those colours, under which it appears to the memory or senses. The argument, which we found on any matter of fact we remember, is more or less convincing according as the fact is recent or remote; and tho' the difference in these degrees of evidence be not receiv'd by philosophy as solid and legitimate; because in that case an argument

must have a different force to day, from what it shall have a month hence; yet notwithstanding the opposition of philosophy, 'tis certain, this circumstance has a considerable influence on the understanding, and secretly changes the authority of the same argument, according to the different times, in which it is propos'd to us. A greater force and vivacity in the impression naturally conveys a greater to the related idea; and 'tis on the degrees of force and vivacity, that the belief depends, according to the foregoing system.

There is a second difference, which we may frequently observe in our degrees of belief and assurance, and which never fails to take place, tho' disclaimed by philosophers. An experiment, that is recent and fresh in the memory, affects us more than one that is in some measure obliterated; and has a superior influence on the judgment, as well as on the passions. A lively impression produces more assurance than a faint one; because it has more original force to communicate to the related idea, which thereby acquires a greater force and vivacity. A recent observation has a like effect; because the custom and transition is there more entire, and preserves better the original force in the communication. Thus a drunkard, who has seen his companion die of a debauch, is struck with that instance for some time, and dreads a like accident for himself: But as the memory of it decays away by degrees, his former security returns, and the danger seems less certain and real.

I add, as a third instance of this kind, that tho' our reasonings from proofs and from probabilities be considerably different from each other, yet the former species of reasoning often degenerates insensibly into the latter, by nothing but the multitude of connected arguments. 'Tis certain, that when an inference is drawn immediately from an object, {1:441} without any intermediate cause or effect, the conviction is much stronger, and the persuasion more lively, than when the imagination is carry'd thro' a long chain of connected arguments, however infallible the connexion of each link may be esteem'd. 'Tis from the original impression, that the vivacity of all the ideas is deriv'd, by means of the customary transition of the imagination; and 'tis evident this vivacity must gradually decay in proportion to the distance, and must lose somewhat in each transition. Sometimes this distance has a greater influence than even contrary experiments wou'd have; and a man may receive a more lively conviction from a probable reasoning, which is close and immediate, than from a long chain of consequences, tho' just and conclusive in each part. Nay 'tis seldom such reasonings produce any conviction; and one must have a very strong and firm imagination to preserve the evidence to the end, where it passes thro' so many, stages.

But here it may not be amiss to remark a very curious phaenomenon, which the present subject suggests to us. 'Tis evident there is no point of ancient history, of which we can have any assurance, but by passing thro' many millions of causes and effects, and thro' a chain of arguments of almost an immeasurable length. Before the knowledge of the fact cou'd come to the first historian, it must be convey'd thro' many mouths; and after it is committed to writing, each new copy is a new object, of which the connexion with the foregoing is known only by experience and observation. Perhaps, therefore, it may be concluded from the precedent reasoning, that the evidence of all ancient history must now be lost; or at least, will be lost in time, as the chain of causes encreases, and runs on to a greater length. But as it seems contrary to common sense to think, that if the republic of letters, and the art of printing continue on the same footing as at present, our posterity, even after a thousand ages, can ever doubt if there has been such a man as JULIUS CAESAR; this may be considered as an objection to the present system. If belief consisted only in a certain vivacity, convey'd from an original impression, it wou'd decay by the length of the transition, and must at Last be utterly extinguished: And vice versa, if belief on some occasions be not capable of

such an extinction; it must be something different from that vivacity. {1:442}

Before I answer this objection I shall observe, that from this topic there has been borrow'd a very celebrated argument against the Christian Religion;' but with this difference, that the connexion betwixt each link of the chain in human testimony has been there suppos'd not to go beyond probability, and to be liable to a degree of doubt and uncertainty. And indeed it must be confest, that in this manner of considering the subject, (which however is not a true one) there is no history or tradition, but what must in the end lose all its force and evidence. Every new probability diminishes the original conviction; and however great that conviction may be suppos'd, 'tis impossible it can subsist under such re-iterated diminutions. This is true in general; tho' we shall find afterwards, that there is one very memorable exception, which is of vast consequence in the present subject of the understanding.

Mean while to give a solution of the preceding objection upon the supposition, that historical evidence amounts at first to an entire proof; let us consider, that tho' the links are innumerable, that connect any original fact with the present impression, which is the foundation of belief; yet they are all of the same kind, and depend on the fidelity of Printers and Copyists. One edition passes into another, and that into a third, and so on, till we come to that volume we peruse at present. There is no variation in the steps. After we know one we know all of them; and after we have made one, we can have no scruple as to the rest. This circumstance alone preserves the evidence of history, and will perpetuate the memory of - the present age to the latest posterity. If all the long chain of causes and effects, which connect any past event with any volume of history, were compos'd of parts different from each other, and which 'twere necessary for the mind distinctly to conceive, 'tis impossible we shou'd preserve to the end any belief or evidence. But as most of these proofs are perfectly resembling, the mind runs easily along them, jumps from one part to another with facility, and forms but a confus'd and general notion of each link. By this means a long chain of argument, has as little effect in diminishing the original vivacity,. as a much shorter {1:443} wou'd have, if compos'd of parts, which were different from each other, and of which each requir'd a distinct consideration.

A fourth unphilosophical species of probability is that deriv'd from general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call PREJUDICE. An <Irishman> cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity; for which reason, tho' the conversation of the former in any instance be visibly very agreeable, and of the latter very judicious, we have entertained such a prejudice against them, that they must be dunces or fops in spite of sense and reason. Human nature is very subject to errors of this kind; and perhaps this nation as much as any other.

Shou'd it be demanded why men form general rules, and allow them to influence their judgment, even contrary to present observation and experience, I shou'd reply, that in my opinion it proceeds from those very principles, on which all judgments concerning causes and effects depend. Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv'd from habit and experience; and when we have been accustomed to see one object united to another, our imagination passes from the first to the second, by a natural transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it. Now 'tis the nature of custom not only to operate with its full force, when objects are presented, that are exactly the, same with those to which we have been accustom'd;.but also to operate in an inferior degree, when we discover such as are similar; and tho' the habit loses somewhat of its force by every difference, yet 'tis seldom entirely destroy'd, where any considerable circumstances remain the same. A man, who has contracted a custom of eating fruit by the use of pears or

peaches, will satisfy himself with melons, where he cannot find his favourite fruit; as one, who has become a drunkard by the use of red wines, will be carried almost with the same violence to white, if presented to him. From this principle I have accounted for that species of probability, deriv'd from analogy, where we transfer our experience in past instances to objects which are resembling, but are not exactly the same with those concerning which we have had experience. In proportion as the resemblance decays, the probability diminishes; but still has some force as long as there remain any traces of the resemblance. {1:444}

This observation we may carry farther; and may remark, that tho' custom be the foundation of all our judgments, yet sometimes it has an effect on the imagination in opposition to the judgment, and produces a contrariety in our sentiments concerning the same object. I explain myself. In almost all kinds of causes there is a complication of circumstances, of which some are essential, and others superfluous; some are absolutely requisite to the production of the effect, and others are only conjoin'd by accident. Now we may observe, that when these superfluous circumstances are numerous, and remarkable, and frequently conjoin'd with the essential, they have such an influence on the imagination, that even in the absence of the latter they carry us on to t-he conception of the usual effect, and give to that conception a force and vivacity, which make it superior to the mere fictions of the fancy. We may correct this propensity by a reflection on the nature of those circumstances: but 'tis still certain, that custom takes the start, and gives a biass to the imagination.

To illustrate this by a familiar instance, let us consider the case of a man, who, being hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron cannot forbear trembling, when he surveys the precipice below him, tho' he knows himself to be perfectly secure from falling, by his experience of the solidity of the iron, which supports him; and tho' the ideas of fall and descent, and harm and death, be deriv'd solely from custom and experience. The same custom goes beyond the instances, from which it is deriv'd, and to which it perfectly corresponds; and influences his ideas of such objects as are in some respect resembling, but fall not precisely under the same rule. The circumstances of depth and descent strike so strongly upon him, that their influence can-not be destroy'd by the contrary circumstances of support and solidity, which ought to give him a perfect security. His imagination runs away -with its object, and excites a passion proportion'd to it. That passion returns back upon the imagination and inlivens the idea; which li,rely idea has a new influence on the passion, and in its turn augments its force and violence; and both his fancy and affections, thus mutually supporting each other, cause the whole to have a very great influence upon him.

But why need we seek for other instances, while the present {1:445} subject of philosophical probabilities offers us so obvious an one, in the opposition betwixt the judgment and imagination arising from these effects of custom? According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom; and custom has no influence, but by inlivening the imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any object. It may, therefore, be concluded, that our judgment and imagination can never be contrary, and that custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such a manner, as to render it opposite to the former. This difficulty we can remove after no other manner, than by supposing the influence of general rules. We shall afterwards take 11 notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form'd on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects. By them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes; and when we find that an effect can be produc'd without the concurrence of any particular circumstance, we conclude that that

circumstance makes not a part of the efficacious cause, however frequently conjoin'd with it. But as this frequent conjunction necessity makes it have some effect on the imagination, in spite of the opposite conclusion from general rules, the opposition of these two principles produces a contrariety in our thoughts, and causes us to ascribe the one inference to our judgment, and the other to our imagination. The general rule is attributed to our judgment; as being more extensive and constant. The exception to the imagination, as being more capricious and uncertain.

Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other. When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, Tho' the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the first influence of general rules. But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most {1:446} established principles of reasonings;. which is the cause of our rejecting it. This is a second influence of general rules, and implies the condemnation of the former. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails, according to the disposition and character of the person. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second. Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal contradiction in our reason, and of seeing all philosophy ready to be subverted by a principle of human nature, and again sav'd by a new direction of the very same principle. The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability; and yet 'tis only by following them that we can correct this, and all other unphilosophical probabilities.

Since we have instances, where general rules operate on the imagination even contrary to the judgment, we need not be surpriz'd to see their effects encrease, when conjoin'd with that latter faculty, and to observe that they bestow on the ideas they present to us a force superior to what attends any other. Every one knows, there is an indirect manner of insinuating praise or blame, which is much less shocking than the open flattery or censure of any person. However be may communicate his sentiments by such secret insinuations, and make them known with equal certainty as by the open discovery of them, 'tis certain that their influence is not equally strong and powerful. One who lashes me with conceal'd strokes of satire, moves not my indignation to such a degree, as if he flatly told me I was a fool and coxcomb; tho' I equally understand his meaning, as if he did. This difference is to be attributed to the influence of general rules.

Whether a person openly, abuses me, or slyly intimates his contempt, in neither case do I immediately perceive his sentiment or opinion; and 'tis only by signs, that is, by its effects, I become sensible of it. The only difference, then, betwixt these two cases consists in this, that in the open discovery of his sentiments he makes use of signs, which are general and universal; and in the secret intimation employs such as are more singular and uncommon. The effect of this circumstance is, that the imagination, in running from the present impression to the absent idea, makes the transition with greater facility, and consequently conceives the object with greater force, where the connexion is common {1:447} and universal, than where it is more rare and particular. Accordingly we may observe, that the open declaration of our sentiments is call'd the taking off the mask, as the secret intimation of our opinions is said to be the veiling of them. The difference betwixt an idea produc'd by a general connexion, and that arising from a particular one is here compar'd to the difference betwixt an impression and an idea. This difference in the imagination has a suitable effect on the passions; and this effect is augmented by another circumstance. A secret intimation of anger or contempt shews that we still have some consideration for the person,

and avoid the directly abusing him. This makes a conceal'd satire less disagreeable; but still this depends on the same principle. For if an idea were not more feeble, when only intimated, it wou'd never be esteem'd a mark of greater respect to proceed in this method than in the other.

Sometimes scurrility is less displeasing than delicate satire, because it revenges us in a manner for the injury at the very time it is committed, by affording us a just reason to blame and contemn the person, who injures us. But this phaenomenon likewise depends upon the same principle. For why do we blame all gross and injurious language, unless it be, because we esteem it contrary to good breeding and humanity? And why is it contrary, unless it be more shocking than any delicate satire? The rules of good breeding condemn whatever is openly disobliging, and gives a sensible pain and confusion to those, with whom we converse. After this is once established, abusive language is universally blam'd, and gives less pain upon account of its coarseness and incivility, which render the person despicable, that employs it. It becomes less disagreeable, merely because originally it is more so; and 'tis more disagreeable, because it affords an inference by general and common rules, that are palpable and undeniable.

To this explication of the different influence of open and conceal'd flattery or satire, I shall add the consideration of another phenomenon, which is analogous to it. There are many particulars in the point of honour both of men and women, whose violations, when open and avow'd, the world never excuses, but which it is more apt to overlook, when the appearances are sav'd, and the transgression is secret {1:448} and conceal'd. Even those, who know with equal certainty, that the fault is committed, pardon it more easily, when the proofs seem in some measure oblique and equivocal, than when they are direct and undeniable. The same idea is presented in both cases, and, properly speaking, is equally assented to by the judgment; and yet its influence is different, because of the different manner, in which it is presented.

Now if we compare these two cases, of the open and conceal'd violations of the laws of honour, we shall find, that the difference betwixt them consists in this, that in the first ease the sign, from which we infer the blameable action, is single, and suffices alone to be the foundation of our reasoning and judgment; whereas in the latter the signs are numerous, and decide little or nothing when alone and unaccompany'd with many minute circumstances, which are almost imperceptible. But 'tis certainly true, that any reasoning is always the more convincing, the more single and united it is to the eye, and the less exercise it gives to the imagination to collect all its parts, and run from them to the correlative idea, which forms the conclusion. The labour of the thought disturbs the regular progress of the sentiments, as we shall observe presently.' The idea strikes not on us with ouch vivacity; and consequently has no such influence on the passion and imagination.

From the same principles we may account for those observations of the CARDINAL DE RETZ, *that there* are many things, in *which the world wishes to be* deceiv'd; and that *it more easily excuses a* person in acting than in talking contrary *to the decorum of his profession* and character. A fault in words is commonly more open and distinct than one in actions, which admit of many palliating excuses, and decide not so clearly concerning the intention and views of the actor.

Thus it appears upon the whole, that every kind of opinion or judgment, which amounts not to knowledge, is deriv'd entirely from the force and vivacity of the perception, and that these qualities constitute in the mind, what we call the /BELIEF\ Of the existence of any object. This force and this vivacity are moaf conspicuous in the memory; and therefore our confidence in the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable, and equals in many respects the assurance of a {1:449} demonstration. The next degree of these qualities is that deriv'd from the relation of cause and

effect; and this too is very great, especially when the conjunction is found by experience to be perfectly constant, and when the object, which is present to us, exactly resembles those, of which we have had experience. But below this degree of evidence there are many others, which have an influence on the passions and imagination, proportioned to that degree of force and vivacity, which they communicate to the ideas. 'Tis by habit we make the transition from cause to effect; and 'tis from some present impression we borrow that vivacity, which we diffuse over the correlative idea. But when we have not observ'd a sufficient number of instances, to produce a strong habit; or when these instances are contrary to each other; or when the resemblance is not exact; or the present impression is faint and obscure; or the experience in some measure obliterated from the memory; or the connexion dependent on a long chain of objects; or the inference deriv'd from general rules, and yet not conformable to them: In all these cases the evidence diminishes by the diminution of the force and intenseness of the idea. This therefore is the nature of the judgment and probability.,

What principally gives authority to this system is, beside the undoubted arguments, upon which each part is founded, the agreement of these parts, and the necessity of one to explain another. The belief, which attends our memory, is of the same nature with that, which is deriv'd from our judgments: Nor is there any difference betwixt that judgment, which is deriv'd from a constant and uniform connexion of causes and effects, and that which depends upon an interrupted and uncertain. 'Tis indeed evident, that in all determinations, where the mind decides from contrary experiments, 'tis first divided within itself, and has an inclination to either side in proportion to the number of experiments we have seen and remember. This contest is at last determin'd to the advantage of that side, where we observe a superior number of these experiments; but still with a diminution of force in the evidence correspondent to the number of the opposite experiments. Each possibility, of which the probability is compos'd, operates separately upon the imagination; and 'tis the larger collection of possibilities, which at last prevails, and that with a force proportionable {1:450} to its superiority. All these phenomena lead directly to the precedent system; nor will it ever be possible upon any other principles to give a satisfactory and consistent explication of them. Without considering these judgments as the effects of custom on the imagination, we shall lose ourselves in perpetual contradiction and absurdity.

SECT. XIV.-OF *the Idea of Necessary Connexion.*

Having thus explain'd the manner, in *which we reason* beyond our immediate *impressions,* and conclude *that such* particular *causes must have such* particular eff*ects;* we must now return upon our footsteps to examine that question, which' first occur'd to us, and which we dropt in our way, viz. *What is* our idea *of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together.* Upon this head I repeat what I have often had occasion to observe, that as we have no idea, that is not deriv'd from an impression, we must find some impression, that gives rise to this idea of necessity, if we assert we have really such an idea. In order to this I consider, in what objects necessity is commonly suppos'd to lie; and finding that it is always ascrib'd to causes and effects, I turn my eye to two objects suppos'd to be plac'd in that relation; and examine them in all the situations, of which they are susceptible. I immediately perceive, that they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object we -call cause *precedes* the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any farther, nor is it possible for me to discover any third relation betwixt these objects. I therefore enlarge my view to comprehend several instances; where I find like objects always existing in like relations of contiguity and succession. At first sight this seems to serve but little to

my purpose. The reflection on several instances only repeats the same objects; and therefore can never give rise to a new idea. But upon farther enquiry I find, that the repetition is not in every particular the same, but produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which I at present examine. For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin'd by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to {1:451} the first object. 'Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity.

I doubt not but these consequences will at first sight be receiv'd without difficulty, as being evident deductions from principles, which we have already established, and which we have often employ'd in our reasonings. This evidence both in the first principles, and in the deductions, may seduce us unwarily into the conclusion, and make us imagine it contains nothing extraordinary, nor worthy of our curiosity. But tho' such an inadvertence may facilitate the reception of this reasoning, 'twill make it be the more easily forgot; for which reason I think it proper to give warning, that I have just now examin'd one of the most sublime questions in philosophy, viz. that concerning *the power* and *efficacy of* causes; where all the sciences seem so much interested. Such a warning will naturally rouze up the attention of the reader, and make him desire a more full account of my doctrine, as well as of the arguments, on which it is founded. This request is so reasonable, that I cannot refuse complying with it; especially as I am hopeful that these principles, the more they are examin'd, will acquire the more force and evidence.

There is no question, which on account of its importance, as well as difficulty, has caus'd more disputes both among antient and modern philosophers, than this concerning the efficacy of causes, or that quality which makes them be follow'd by their effects. But before they enter'd upon these disputes, methinks it wou'd not have been improper to have examin'd what idea we have of that efficacy, which is the subject of the controversy. This is what I find principally wanting in their reasonings, and what I shall here endeavour to supply.

I begin with observing that the terms of <*efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion*>, and <*productive quality*>, are all nearly synonymous; and therefore 'tis an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest. By this observation we reject at once all the vulgar definitions, which philosophers have given of power and efficacy; and instead of searching for the idea in these definitions, must look for it in the impressions, from which it is originally deriv'd. If it be a compound idea, it must arise from compound impressions. If simple, from simple impressions. {1:452}

I believe the most general and most popular explication of this matter, is to say,' that finding from experience, that there are several new productions in matter, such as the motions and variations of body, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power and efficacy. But to be convinc'd that this explication is more popular than philosophical, we need but reflect on two very obvious principles. First, That reason alone can never give rise to any original idea, and secondly, that reason, as distinguish'd from experience, can never make us conclude, that a cause or productive quality is absolutely requisite to every beginning of existence. Both these considerations have been sufficiently explain'd: and therefore shall not at present be any farther insisted on.

I shall only infer from them, that since reason can never give rise to the idea of efficacy, that idea must be deriv'd from experience, and from some particular instances of this efficacy, which make their passage into the mind by the common channels of sensation or reflection. Ideas always

represent their objects or impressions; and vice versa, there are some objects necessary to give rise to every idea. If we pretend, therefore, to have any just idea of this efficacy, we must produce some instance, wherein the efficacy is plainly discoverable to the mind, and its operations obvious to our consciousness or sensation. By the refusal of this, we acknowledge, that the idea is impossible and imaginary, since the principle of innate ideas, which alone can save us from this dilemma, has been already refuted, and is now almost universally rejected in the learned world. Our present business, then, must be to find some natural production, where the operation and efficacy of a cause can be clearly conceiv'd and comprehended by the mind, without any danger of obscurity or mistake.

In this research we meet with very little encouragement from that prodigious diversity, which is found in the opinions of those philosophers, who have pretended to explain the secret force and energy of causes. There are some, who {1:453} maintain, that bodies operate by their substantial form; others, by their accidents or qualities; several, by their matter and form; some, by their form and accidents; others, by certain virtues and faculties distinct from all this. All these sentiments again are mix'd and vary'd in a thousand different ways; and form a strong presumption, that none of them have any solidity or evidence,, and that the supposition of an efficacy in any of the known qualities of matter is entirely without foundation. This presumption must encrease upon us, when we consider, that these principles of substantial forms, and accidents, and faculties, are not in reality any of the known properties of bodies, but are perfectly unintelligible and inexplicable. For 'tis evident philosophers wou'd never have had recourse to such obscure and uncertain principles, had they met with any satisfaction in such as are clear and intelligible; especially in such an affair as this, which must be an object of the simplest understanding, if not of the senses. Upon the whole, we may conclude, that 'tis impossible in any one instance to shew the principle, in which the force and agency of a cause is plac'd; and that the most refin'd and most vulgar understandings are equally at a loss in this particular. If any one think proper to refute this assertion, he need not put himself to the trouble of inventing any long reasonings: but may at once shew us an instance of a cause, where we discover the power or operating principle. This defiance we are oblig'd frequently to make use of, as being almost the only means of proving a negative in philosophy.

The small success, which has been met with in all the attempts to fix this power, has at last oblig'd philosophers to conclude, that the ultimate force and efficacy of nature is perfectly unknown to us, and that 'tis in vain we search for it in all the known qualities of matter. In this opinion they are almost unanimous; and 'tis only in the inference they draw from it, that they discover any difference in their sentiments. For some of them, as the <*Cartesians*> in particular, having established it as a principle, that we are perfectly acquainted with the essence of matter, have very naturally inferr'd, that it is endow'd with no efficacy, and that 'tis impossible for it of itself to communicate motion, or produce any of those effects, which we ascribe to it. As the essence of matter consists in extension, and as extension implies not {1:454} actual motion, but only mobility; they conclude, that the energy, which produces the motion, cannot lie in the extension.

This conclusion leads them into another, which they regard as perfectly unavoidable. Matter, say they, is in itself entirely unactive, and depriv'd of any power, by which it may produce, or continue, or communicate motion: But since these effects are evident to our senses, and since the power, that produces them, must be plac'd somewhere, it must lie in the DEITY, or that divine being, who contains in his nature all excellency and perfection. 'Tis the deity, therefore, who is the prime mover of the universe, and who not only first created matter, and gave it it's original impulse, but likewise by a continu'd exertion of omnipotence, supports its existence, and successively bestows on it all those motions, and configurations, and qualities, with which it is endow'd.

This opinion is certainly very curious, and well worth our attention; but 'twill appear superfluous to examine it in this place, if we reflect a moment on our present purpose in taking notice of it. We have established it as a principle, that as all ideas are deriv'd from impressions, or some precedent perceptions, 'tis impossible we can have any idea of power and efficacy, unless some instances can be produc'd, wherein this power *is perceiv'd* to exert itself. Now, as these instances can never be discovered in body, the *Cartesians,* proceeding upon their principle of innate ideas, have had recourse to a supreme spirit or deity, whom they consider as the only active being in the universe, and as the immediate cause of every alteration in matter. But the principle of innate ideas being allow'd to be false, it follows, that the supposition of a deity can serve us in no stead, in accounting for that idea of agency, which we search for in vain in all the objects, which are presented to our senses, or which we are internally conscious of in our own minds. For if every idea be deriv'd from an impression, the idea of a deity proceeds from the same origin; and if no impression, either of sensation or reflection, implies any force or efficacy, 'tis equally impossible to discover or even imagine any such active principle in the deity. Since these philosophers, therefore, have concluded, that matter cannot be endow'd with any efficacious principle, because 'tis impossible to discover in it such a principle; the same course of reasoning shou'd determine them to exclude it from the supreme being. Or if they esteem that opinion {1:455} absurd and impious, as it really is, I shall tell them how they may avoid it; and that is, by concluding from the very first, that they have no adequate idea of power or efficacy in any object; since neither in body nor spirit, neither in superior nor inferior natures, are they able to discover one single instance of it.

The same conclusion is unavoidable upon the hypothesis of those, who maintain the efficacy of second causes, and attribute a derivative, but a real power and energy to matter. For as they confess, that this energy lies not in any of the known qualities of matter, the difficulty still remains concerning the origin of its idea. If we have really an idea of power, we may attribute power to an unknown quality: But as 'tis impossible, that that idea can be deriv'd from such a quality, and as there is nothing in known qualities, which can produce it; it follows that we deceive ourselves, when we imagine we are possest of any idea of this kind, after the manner we commonly understand it. All ideas are deriv'd from, and represent impressions. We never have any impression, that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power.

[This paragraph is inserted from the appendix.] Some have asserted, that we feel an energy, or power, in our own mind; and that having in this manner acquir'd the idea of power, we transfer that quality to matter, where we are not able immediately to discover it. The motions of our body, and the thoughts and sentiments of our mind, (say they) obey the will; nor do we seek any farther to acquire a just notion of force or power. But to convince us how fallacious this reasoning is, we need only consider, that the will being here consider'd as a cause, has no more a discoverable connexion with its effects, than any material cause has with its proper effect. So far from perceiving the connexion betwixt an act of volition, and a motion of the body; 'tis allow'd that no effect is more inexplicable from the powers and essence of thought and matter. Nor is the empire of the will over our mind more intelligible. The effect is there distinguishable and separable from the cause, and cou'd not be foreseen without the experience of their constant conjunction. We have command over our mind to a certain degree, but beyond that, lose all empire over it: And 'tis evidently impossible to fix any precise bounds to our {1:456} authority, where we consult not experience. In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same with those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor can we ever reason beyond it. No internal impression has an apparent energy, more than external objects have.' Since, therefore, matter is confess'd by

philosophers to operate by an unknown force, we shou'd in vain hope to attain an idea of force by consulting our own minds.

It has been established as a certain principle, that general or abstract ideas are nothing but individual ones taken in a certain light, and that, in reflecting on any object, 'tis as impossible to exclude from our thought all particular degrees of quantity and quality as from the real nature of things. If we be possest, therefore, of any idea of power in general, we must also be able to conceive some particular species of it; and as power cannot subsist alone, but is always regarded as an attribute of some being or existence, we must be able. to place this power in some particular being, and conceive that being as endow'd with a real force and energy, by which such a particular effect necessarily results from its operation. We must distinctly and particularly conceive the connexion betwixt the cause and effect, and be able to pronounce, from a simple view of the one, that it must be follow'd or preceded by the other. This is the true manner of conceiving a particular power in a particular body: and a general idea being impossible without an individual; where the latter is impossible, 'tis certain the former can never exist. Now nothing is more evident, than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of two objects, as to conceive any connexion betwixt them, or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy, by which they are united. Such a connexion wou'd amount to a demonstration, and wou'd imply the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow, or to be conceiv'd {1:457} not to follow upon the other: Which kind of connexion has already been rejected in all cases. If any one is of a contrary opinion, and thinks he has attain'd a notion of power in any particular object, I desire he may point out to me that object. But till I meet with such-a-one, which I despair of, I cannot forbear concluding, that since we can never distinctly conceive how any particular power can possibly reside in any particular object, we deceive ourselves in imagining we can form any such general idea.

Thus upon the whole we may infer, that when we talk of any being, whether of a superior or inferior nature, as endow'd with a power or force, proportioned to any effect; when we speak of a necessary connexion betwixt objects, and suppose, that this connexion depends upon an efficacy or energy, with which any of these objects are endow'd; in all these expressions, *so apply'd,* we have really no distinct meaning, and make use only of common words, without any clear and determinate ideas. But as 'tis more probable, that these expressions do here lose their true meaning by being wrong apply'd, than that they never have any meaning; 'twill be proper to bestow another consideration on this subject, to see if possibly we can discover the nature and origin of those ideas, we annex to them.

Suppose two objects to be presented to us, of which the one is the cause and the other the effect; 'tis plain, that from the simple consideration of one, or both these objects we never shall perceive the tie by which they are united, or be able certainly to pronounce, that there is a connexion betwixt them. 'Tis not, therefore, from any one instance, that we arrive at the idea of cause and effect, of a necessary connexion of power, of force, of energy, and of efficacy. Did we never see any but particular conjunctions of objects, entirely different from each other, we shou'd never be able to form any such ideas.

But again; suppose we observe several instances, in which the same objects are always conjoin'd together, we immediately conceive a connexion betwixt them, and begin to draw an inference from one to another. This multiplicity of resembling instances, therefore, constitutes the very essence of power or connexion, and is the source from which the idea of it arises. In order, then, to understand the idea of power, we must consider that multiplicity; nor {1:458} do I ask more to give a solution of that difficulty, which has so long perplex'd us. For thus I reason. The repetition of

perfectly similar instances can never alone give rise to an original idea, different from what is to be found in any particular instance, as has been observ'd, and as evidently follows from our fundamental principle, that *all ideas are copy'd from impressions.* Since therefore the idea of power is a new original idea, not to be found in any one instance, and which yet arises from the repetition of several instances, it follows, that the repetition alone has not that effect, but must either *discover or* produce something new, which is the source of that idea. Did the repetition neither discover nor produce anything new, our ideas might be multiply'd by it, but wou'd not be enlarg'd above what they are upon the observation of one single instance. Every enlargement, therefore, (such as the idea of power or connexion) which arises from the multiplicity of similar instances, is copy'd from some effects of the multiplicity, and will be perfectly understood by understanding these effects. Wherever we find anything new to be discovered or produc'd by the repetition, there we must place the power, and must never look for it in any other object.

But 'tis evident, in the first place, that the repetition of like objects in like relations of succession and contiguity *discovers* nothing new in any one of them: since we can draw no inference from it, nor make it a subject either of our demonstrative or probable reasonings;' as has been already prov'd. Nay suppose we cou'd draw an inference, 'twou'd be of no consequence in the present case; since no kind of reasoning can give rise to a new idea, such as this of power is; but wherever we reason, we must antecedently be possest of clear ideas, which may be the objects of our reasoning. The conception always precedes the understanding; and where the one is obscure, the other is uncertain; where the one fails, the other must fail also.

Secondly, 'Tis certain that this repetition of similar objects in similar situations produces nothing new either in these objects, or in any external body. For 'twill readily be allow'd, that the several instances we have of the conjunction of resembling causes and effects are in themselves {1:459} entirely independent, and that the communication of motion, which I see result at present from the shock of two billiard-balls, is totally distinct from that which I saw result from such an impulse a twelve-month ago. These impulses have no influence on each other. They are entirely divided by time and place; and the one might have existed and communicated motion, tho' the other never had been in being.

There is, then, nothing new either discovered or produc'd in any objects by their constant conjunction, and by the uninterrupted resemblance of their relations of succession and contiguity. But 'tis from this resemblance, that the ideas of necessity, of power, and of efficacy, are deriv'd. These ideas,, therefore, represent not anything, that does or can belong to the objects, which are constantly conjoined. This is an argument, which, in every view we can examine it, will be found perfectly unanswerable. Similar instances are still the first source of our idea of power or necessity; at the same time that they have no influence by their similarity either on each other, or on any external object. We must, therefore, turn ourselves to some other quarter to seek the origin of that idea.

Tho' the several resembling instances, which give rise to the idea of power, have no influence on each other, and can never produce any new quality in *the object,* which can be the model of that idea, yet the observation of this resemblance produces a new impression in the mind, which is its real model. For after we have observ'd the resemblance in a sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant, and to conceive it in a stronger light upon account of that relation. This determination is the only effect of the resemblance; and therefore must be the same with power or efficacy, whose idea is deriv'd from the resemblance. The several instances of resembling conjunctions lead us into the notion of

power and necessity. These instances are in themselves totally distinct from each other, and have no union but in the mind, which observes them, and collects their ideas. Necessity, then, is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of. the mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another. Without considering it in this view, we can never arrive at the most distant {1:460} notion of it, or be able to attribute it either to external or internal objects, to spirit or body, to causes or effects.

The necessary connexion betwixt causes and effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the transition arising from the accustomed union. These are, therefore, the same.

The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression convey'd by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be deriv'd from some internal impression, or impression of reflection. There is no internal impression, which has any relation to the present business, but that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This therefore is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor -is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union.

Thus as the necessity, which makes two times two equal to four, or three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the act of the understanding, by which -we consider and compare these ideas; in like manner the necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other. The efficacy or 'energy of causes is neither plac'd in the causes themselves, nor in the deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely to the soul, which considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances. 'Tis here that the real power of causes is plac'd along with their connexion and necessity.

I am sensible, that of all the paradoxes, which I, have had, or shall hereafter have occasion to advance in the course of this treatise, the present one is the most violent, and that 'tis merely by dint of solid proof and reasoning I can ever hope it will have admission, and overcome the inveterate prejudices of mankind. Before we are reconciled to this doctrine, how often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, {1:461} can never give us any idea, of power, or of a connexion betwixt them: that this idea arises from the repetition of their union: that the repetition neither discovers nor causes any thing in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind, by that customary transition it produces: that this customary transition is, therefore, the same with the power and necessity; which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are internally felt by the soul, and not perceivd externally in bodies? There is commonly an astonishment attending every thing extraordinary; and this astonishment changes immediately into the highest degree of esteem or contempt, according as we approve or disapprove of the subject. I am much afraid, that tho' the foregoing reasoning appears to me the shortest and most decisive imaginable; yet with the generality of readers the biass of the mind will prevail, and give them a prejudice against the present doctrine.

This contrary biass is easily accounted for. 'Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects

discover themselves to the senses. Thus as certain sounds and smells are always found to attend certain visible objects, we naturally imagine a conjunction, even in place, betwixt the objects and qualities, tho' the qualities be of such a nature as to admit of no such conjunction, and really exist no where. But of this more fully I hereafter. Mean while 'tis sufficient to observe, that the same propensity is the reason, why we suppose necessity and power to lie in the objects we consider, not in our mind ' that considers them; notwithstanding it is not possible for us to form the most distant idea of that quality, when it is not taken for the determination of the mind, to pass from the idea of an object to that of its usual attendant.

But tho' this be the only reasonable account we can give of necessity, the contrary notion if; so riveted in the mind from the principles above-mention'd, that I doubt not but my sentiments will be treated by many as extravagant and ridiculous. What! the efficacy of causes lie in the determination of the mind! As if causes did not operate entirely {1:462} independent of the mind, and wou'd not continue their operation, even tho' there was no mind existent to contemplate them, or reason concerning them. Thought may well depend on causes for its operation, but not causes on thought. This is to reverse the order of nature, and make that secondary, which is really primary, To every operation there is a power proportioned; and this power must be plac'd on the body, that operates. If we remove the power from one cause, we must ascribe it to another: But to remove it from all causes, and bestow it on a being, that is no ways related to the cause or effect, but by perceiving them, is a gross absurdity, and contrary to the most certain principles of human reason.

I can only reply to all these arguments, that the case is here much the same, as if a blind man shou'd pretend to find a great many absurdities in the supposition, that the colour of scarlet is not the same with the sound of a trumpet, nor light the same with solidity. If we have really no idea of a power or efficacy in any object, or of any real connexion betwixt causes and effects, 'twill be to little purpose to prove, that an efficacy is necessary in all operations. We do not understand our own meaning in talking so, but ignorantly confound ideas, which are entirely distinct from each other. I am, indeed, ready to allow, that there may be several qualities both in material and immaterial objects, with which we are utterly unacquainted; and if we please to call these <power> or <efficacy>, 'twill be of little consequence to the world. But when, instead of meaning these unknown qualities, we make the terms of power and efficacy signify something, of which we have a clear idea, and which is incompatible with those objects, to which we apply it, obscurity and error begin then to take place, and we are led astray by a false philosophy. This is the case, when we transfer the determination of the thought to external objects, and suppose any real intelligible connexion betwixt them; that being a quality, which can only belong to the mind that considers them.

As to what may be said, that the operations of nature are independent of our thought and reasoning, I allow it; and accordingly have observ'd, that objects bear to each other the relations of contiguity and succession: that like objects may be observ'd in several instances to have like relations; and that all this is independent of, and antecedent to the operations {1:463} of the understanding. But if we go any farther, and ascribe a power or necessary connexion to these objects 5 this is what we can never observe in them, but must draw the idea of it from what we feel internally in contemplating them. And this I carry so far, that I am ready to convert my present reasoning into an instance of it, by a subtility, which it will not be difficult to comprehend.

When any object is presented to us, it immediately conveys to the mind a lively idea of that object, which is usually found to attend it 5 and this determination of the mind forms the necessary connexion of these objects. But when we change the point of view, from the objects to the

perceptions; in that case the impression is to be considered as the cause, and the lively idea as the effect; and their necessary connexion is that new determination, which we feel to pass from the idea of the one to that of the other. The uniting principle among our internal perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external objects, and is not known to us any other way than by experience. Now the nature and effects of experience have been already sufficiently examin'd and explain'd. It never gives us any insight into the internal structure or operating principle of objects, but only accustoms the mind to pass from one to another.

'Tis now time to collect all the different parts of this reasoning, and by joining them together form an exact definition of the relation of cause and effect, which makes the subject of the present enquiry. This order wou'd not have been excusable, of first examining our inference from the relation before we had explain'd the relation itself, had it been possible to proceed in a different method.' But as the nature of the relation depends so much on that of the inference, we have been oblig'd to advance in this seemingly preposterous manner, and make -use of terms before we were able exactly to define them, or fix their meaning. We shall now correct this fault by giving a precise definition of cause and effect.

There may two definitions be given of this relation, which are only different, by their presenting a different view of the same object, and making us consider it either as a *philosophical* or as a natural relation; either as a comparison of two ideas, or as an association betwixt them. We may define a CAUSE to be 'An object precedent and contiguous to {1:464} another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter.' I If this definition be esteem'd defective, because drawn from objects foreign to the cause, we may substitute this other -definition in its place, viz. 'A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea, of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.' 2 Shou'd this definition also be rejected for the same reason, I know no other remedy, than that the persons, who express this delicacy, shou'd substitute a juster definition in its place. But for my part I must own my incapacity for such an undertaking. When I examine with the utmost accuracy those objects, which are commonly denominated causes and effects, I find, in considering a single instance, that the one object is precedent and contiguous to the other; and in inlarging my view to consider several instances, I find only, that like objects are constantly plac'd in like relations of succession and contiguity. Again, when I consider the influence of this constant conjunction, I perceive, that such a relation can never be an object of reasoning, and can never operate upon the mind, but by means of custom, which determines the imagination to make a transition from the idea of one object to that of its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to a more lively idea of the other. However extraordinary these sentiments may appear, I think it fruitless to trouble myself with any farther enquiry or reasoning upon the subject, but shall repose myself on them as on established maxims.

'Twill only be proper, before we leave this subject, to draw some corrollaries from it, by which we may remove several prejudices and popular errors, that have very much prevail'd in philosophy. First, We may learn from the foregoing, doctrine, that all causes are of the same kind, and that in particular there is no foundation for that distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes and causes sine qua non; or betwixt efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exemplary, and final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv'd from the constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observ'd, the cause is efficient; {1:465} and where it is not, there can never be a cause of any kind. For the same reason we must reject the distinction betwixt cause

and occasion, when suppos'd to signify any thing essentially different from each other. If constant conjunction be imply'd in what we call occasion, 'tis a real cause. If not, 'tis no relation at all, and cannot give rise to any argument or reasoning.

Secondly, The same course of reasoning will make us conclude, that there is but one kind of *necessity,* as there is but one kind of cause, and that the common distinction betwixt moral and physical necessity is without any foundation in nature. This clearly appears from the precedent explication of necessity. 'Tis the constant conjunction of objects, along with the determination of the mind, which constitutes a physical necessity: And the removal of these is the same thing with chance. As objects must either be conjoin'd or not, and as the mind must either be determined or not to pass from one object to another, 'tis impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity. In weakening this conjunction and determination you do not change the nature of the necessity; since even in the operation of bodies, these have different degrees of constancy and force, without producing a different species of that relation.

The distinction, which we often make betwixt <power> and the <*exercise*> of it, is equally without foundation.

Thirdly, We may now be able fully to overcome all that repugnance, which 'tis so natural for us to entertain against the foregoing reasoning, by which we endeavour'd to prove, that the necessity of a cause to every beginning of existence is not founded on any arguments either demonstrative or intuitive. Such an opinion will not appear strange after the foregoing definitions. If we define a cause to be an *object precedent* and contiguous *to* another, and where *all the objects resembling the* farmer are plac'd in a like relation *of* .priority and contiguity *to those objects, that resemble the* latter; we may easily conceive, that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence shou'd be attended with such an object. If we define a cause to be, <*An object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it in the imagination, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression {1:466} of the one to form a more lively idea of the other*>*;* we shall make still less difficulty of assenting to this opinion. Such an influence on the mind is in itself perfectly extraordinary and incomprehensible; nor can we be certain of its reality, but from experience and observation.

I shall add as a fourth corrollary that we can never have reason to believe that any object exists, of which we cannot form an idea. For as all our reasonings concerning existence are deriv'd from causation, and as all our reasonings concerning causation are deriv'd from the experienced conjunction of objects, not from any reasoning or reflection, the same experience must give us a notion of these objects, and must remove all mystery from our conclusions. This is so evident, that 'twou'd scarce have merited our attention, were it not to obviate certain objections of this kind, which might arise against the following reasonings concerning matter and *substance.* I need not observe, that a full knowledge of the object is not requisite, but only of those qualities of it, which we believe to exist.

SECT. XV.-Rules by *which to judge of Causes and* Effects.

According to the precedent doctrine, there are no objects which by the mere survey, without consulting experience, we can determine to be the causes of any other; and no objects, which we can certainly determine in the same manner not to be the causes. Any thing may produce any thing. Creation, annihilation, motion, reason, volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other object we can imagine. Nor will this appear strange, if we compare two principles explain'd above*, that the* constant conjunction *of objects determines their* causation, and I *that,*

property speaking, no objects are contrary *to each other* but existence and non-existence. Where objects are not contrary, nothing hinders them from having that constant conjunction, on which the relation of cause and effect totally depends.

Since therefore 'tis possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other, it may be proper to fix some general rules, by which we may know when they really are so.

1. The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time. {1:467}

2. The cause must be prior to the effect.

3. There must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect. 'Tis chiefly this quality, that constitutes the relation.

4. The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause. This principle we derive from experience, and is the source of most of our philosophical reasonings. For when by any clear experiment we have discovered the causes or effects of any phaenomenon, we immediately extend our observation to every phenomenon of the same kind, without waiting for that constant repetition, from which the first idea of this relation is deriv'd.

5. There is another principle, which hangs upon this, viz. that where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the causation to the circumstance, wherein we discover the resemblance.

6. The following principle is founded on the same reason. The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular, in which they differ. For as like causes always produce like effects, when in any instance we find our expectation to be disappointed, we must conclude that this irregularity proceeds from some difference in the causes.

7. When any object encreases or diminishes with the encrease or diminution of its cause, 'tis to be regarded as a compounded effect, deriv'd from the union of the several different effects, which arise from the several different parts of the cause. The absence or presence of one part of the cause is here suppos'd to be always attended with the absence or presence of a proportionable part of the effect. This constant conjunction sufficiently proves, that the one part is the cause of the other. We must, however, beware not to draw such a conclusion from a few experiments. A certain degree of heat gives pleasure; if you diminish that heat, the pleasure diminishes; but it does Dot follow, that if you augment it beyond a certain degree, the pleasure will likewise augment; for we find that it degenerates into pain.

8. The eighth and last rule I shall take notice of is, that an object, which exists for any time in its full perfection without any effect, is not the sole cause of that effect, but {1:468}

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PART IV.

OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

SECT. *I.-Of Scepticism with regard to* Reason.

IN all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply them, our fallible said uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall into error. We must, therefore, in every reasoning form a new judgment, as a check or controul on our first judgment or

belief; and must enlarge our view to comprehend a kind of history of all the instances, wherein our understanding has deceiv'd us, compar'd with those, wherein its testimony was just and true. Our reason must be considered as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers, may frequently be prevented. By this means all knowledge degenerates into probability; and this probability is greater or less, according to our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding, and according to the simplicity or intricacy of the question.

There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science, as to place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it, or regard it as any thing, but a were probability. Every time he runs over his proofs, his confidence encreases; but still more by the approbation of his friends; and is rais'd to its utmost perfection by the universal assent and applauses of the, learned world. Now 'tis evident, that this gradual encrease of assurance is nothing but the addition of new probabilities, and is deriv'd from the constant union of causes and effects, according to past experience and observation.

In accompts of any length or importance, Merchants seldom trust to the, infallible certainty of numbers for their security; but by the artificial structure of the accompts, {1:473} produce a probability beyond what is deriv'd from the skill and experience of the accomptant. For that is plainly of itself some degree of probability; tho' uncertain and variable, according to the degrees of his experience and length of the accompt. Now as none will maintain, that our assurance in a long numeration exceeds probability, I may safely affirm, that there scarce is any proposition concerning numbers, of which we can have a fuller security. For 'tis easily possible, by gradually diminishing the numbers, to reduce the longest series of addition to the most simple question, which can be form'd, to an addition of two single numbers; and upon this supposition we shall find it impracticable to shew the precise limits of knowledge and of probability, or discover that particular number, at which the one ends and the other begins. But knowledge and probability are of such contrary and disagreeing natures, that they cannot well run insensibly into each other, and that because they will not divide, but must be either entirely present, or entirely absent. Besides, if any single addition were certain, every one wou'd be so, and consequently the whole or total sum; unless the whole can be different from all its parts. I had almost said, that this was certain; but I reflect that it must reduce *itself*, as well as every other reasoning, and from knowledge degenerate into probability.

Since therefore all knowledge resolves itself into probability, and becomes at last of the same nature with that evidence, which we employ in common life, we must now examine this latter species of reasoning, and see on what foundation it stands.

In every judgment, which we can form concerning probability, as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgment, deriv'd from the nature of the object, by another judgment, deriv'd from the nature of the understanding. 'Tis certain a man of solid sense and long experience ought to have, and usually has, a greater assurance in his opinions, than one that is foolish and ignorant, and that our sentiments have different degrees of authority, even with ourselves, in proportion to the degrees of our reason and experience.]In the man of the best sense and longest experience, this authority is never entire; since even such-a-one must be conscious of many errors in the past, and must still dread the like for the future. Here then arises a new species of probability to correct and regulate the first,, {1:474} and fix its just standard and proportion. As demonstration is subject to the controul of probability, so is probability liable to a new correction by a reflex act of the mind, wherein the nature of our understanding, and our reasoning from the

first probability become our objects.

Having thus found in every probability, beside the original uncertainty inherent in the subject, a new uncertainty deriv'd from the weakness of that faculty, which judges, and having adjusted these two together, we are oblig'd by our reason to add a new doubt deriv'd from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties. This is a doubt, which immediately occurs to us, and of which, if we wou'd closely pursue our reason, we cannot avoid giving a decision. But this decision, tho' it shou'd be favourable to our preceding judgment, being founded only on probability, must weaken still further our first evidence, and must itself be weaken'd by a fourth doubt of the same kind, and so on in infinitum: till at last there remain nothing of the original probability, however great we may suppose it to have been, and however small the diminution by every new uncertainty. No finite object can subsist under a decrease repeated <in infinitum>; and even the vastest quantity, which can enter into human imagination, must in this manner be reduc'd to nothing. Let our first belief be never so strong, it must infallibly perish by passing thro' so many new examinations, of which each diminishes somewhat of its force and vigour. When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, T have less confidence in my opinions, than when I only consider the objects concerning which I reason; and when I proceed still farther, to turn the scrutiny against every successive estimation I make of my faculties, -ill the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.

Shou'd it here be ask'd me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falshood; I shou'd reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to {1:475} breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as Ion o, as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour'd by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render'd unavoidable.

My intention then in displaying so carefully the arguments of that fantastic sect, is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our *reasonings* concerning *causes and effects are deriv'd* from nothing but custom; and *that belief is more properly* an act *of the, sensitive, than of the cogitative part of* our natures. I have here prov'd, that the very same principles, which make us form a decision upon any subject, and correct that decision by the consideration of our genius and capacity, and of the situation of our mind, when we examin'd that subject; I say, I have prov'd, that these same principles, when carry'd farther, and apply'd to every new reflex judgment, must, by continually diminishing the original evidence, at last reduce it to nothing, and utterly subvert all belief and opinion. If belief, therefore, were a simple act of the thought, without any peculiar manner of conception, or the addition of a force and vivacity, it must infallibly destroy itself, and in every case terminate in a total suspense of judgment. But as experience will sufficiently convince any one, who thinks it worth while to try, that tho' he can find no error in the foregoing arguments, yet he still continues to believe, and think, and reason as usual, he may safely conclude, that his reasoning and belief is some sensation or peculiar manner of conception, which 'tis impossible for mere ideas and reflections to destroy.

But here, perhaps, it may be demanded, how it happens, even upon my hypothesis, that these arguments above-explain'd produce not a total suspense of judgment, and after what manner the mind ever retains a degree of assurance in any subject? For as these new probabilities, which by their repetition perpetually diminish the original evidence, are founded on the very same principles, whether of thought or sensation, as the primary judgment, it may seem unavoidable, {1:470} that in either case they must equally subvert it, and by the opposition, either of contrary thoughts or sensations, reduce the mind to a total uncertainty. I suppose, there is some question propos'd to me, and that after revolving over the impressions of my memory and senses, and carrying my thoughts from them to such objects, as are commonly conjoin'd with them, I feel a stronger and more forcible conception on the one side, than on the other. This strong conception forms my first decision. I suppose, that afterwards I examine my judgment itself, and observing from experience, that 'tis sometimes just and sometimes erroneous, I consider it as regulated by contrary principles or causes, of which some lead to truth, and some to error; and in ballancing these contrary causes, I diminish by a new probability the assurance of my first decision. This new probability is liable to the same diminution as the foregoing, and so on, <in infinitum>. 'Tis therefore demanded, *how it happens, that even after all* we retain a *degree of belief, which is sufficient for our purpose, either in philosophy or* common life.

I answer, that after the first and second decision; as the action of the mind becomes forc'd and unnatural, and the ideas faint and obscure; tho' the principles of judgment, and the ballancing of opposite causes be the same as at the very beginning; yet their influence on the imagination, and the vigour they add to, or diminish from the thought, is by no means equal. Where the mind reaches not its objects with easiness and facility, the same principles have not the same effect as in a more natural conception of the ideas; nor does the imagination feel a sensation, which holds any proportion with that which arises from its common judgments and opinions. The attention is on the stretch: The posture of the mind is uneasy; and the spirits being diverted from their natural course, are not govern'd in their movements by the same laws, at least not to the same degree, as when they flow in their usual channel.

If we desire similar instances, 'twill not be very difficult to find them. The present subject of metaphysics will supply us abundantly. The same argument, which wou'd have been esteem'd convincing in a reasoning concerning history or politics, has little or no influence in these abstruser subjects, even tho' it be perfectly comprehended; and that because there is requir'd a study and an effort of {1:477} thought, in order to its being comprehended: And this effort of thought disturbs the operation of our sentiments, on which the belief depends. The case is the same in other subjects. The straining of the imagination always hinders the regular flowing of the passions and sentiments. A tragic poet, that wou'd represent his heroes as very ingenious and witty in their misfortunes, wou'd never touch the passions. As the emotions of the soul prevent any subtile reasoning and reflection, so these latter actions of the mind are equally prejudicial to the former. The mind, as well as the body, seems to be endow'd with a certain precise degree of force and activity, which it never employs in one action, but at the expense of all the rest. This is more evidently true, where the actions are of quite different natures; since in that case the force of the mind is not only diverted, but even the disposition chang'd, so as to render us incapable of a sudden transition from one action to the other, and still more of performing both at once. No wonder, then, the conviction, which arises from a subtile reasoning, diminishes in proportion to the efforts, which the imagination makes to enter into the reasoning, and to conceive it in all its parts. Belief, being a lively conception, can never be entire, where it is not founded on something natural and easy.

This I take to be the true state of the question, and cannot approve of that expeditious way, which some take with the sceptics, to reject at once all their arguments without enquiry or examination. If the sceptical reasonings be strong, say they, 'tis a proof, that reason may have some force and authority: if weak, they can never be sufficient to invalidate all the conclusions of our understanding. This argument is not just; because the sceptical reasonings, were it possible for them to exist, and were they not destroy'd by their subtility, wou'd be successively both strong and weak, according to the successive dispositions of the mind. Reason first appears in possession of the throne, prescribing laws, and imposing maxims, with an absolute sway and authority. Her enemy, therefore, is oblig'd to take shelter under her protection, and by making use of rational arguments to prove the fallaciousness and imbecility of reason, produces, in a manner, a patent under her band and seal. This patent has at first an authority, proportioned {1:478} to the present and immediate authority of reason, from which it is deriv'd. But as it is suppos'd to be contradictory to reason, it gradually diminishes the force of that governing power and its own at the same time; till at last they both vanish away into nothing, by a regulax and just diminution. The sceptical and dogmatical reasons are of the same kind, tho' contrary in their operation and tendency; so that where the latter is strong, it has an enemy of equal force in the former to encounter; and as their forces were at first equal, they still continue so, as long as either of them subsists; nor does one of them lose any force in the contest, witbout taking as much from its antaoonist. 'Tis happy, therefore, that nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from having any considerable influence on the understanding. Were we to trust entirely to their self-destruction, that can never take place, 'till they have first subverted all conviction, and have totally destroy'd human reason.

SECT. *II.-Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses.*

Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even tho' be asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless, esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, *What causes* induce us *to believe in the existence of body?* but 'tis in vain to ask, *Whether there be body or* not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.

The subject, then, of our present enquiry is concerning the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body: And my reasonings on this head I shall begin with a distinction, which at first sight may seem superfluous, but which will contribute very much to the perfect understanding of what follows. We ought to examine apart those two questions, which are commonly confounded together, viz. Why we attribute a CONTINU'D existence to objects, even when they are not present to the senses; and why we suppose {1:479} them to have an existence D/ISTINCT\ from the mind and perception. Under this last head I comprehend their situation as well as relations, their external position as well as the independence of their existence and operation. These two questions concerning the continu'd and distinct existence of body are intimately connected together. For if the objects of our senses continue to exist, even when they are not perceiv'd, their existence is of course independent of and distinct from the perception: and vice *versa,* if their existence be independent of the perception and distinct from it, they must continue to exist, even tho' they be not perceiv'd. But tho' the decision of the one question decides the other; yet that we may the more easily discover the principles of human nature, from whence the decision arises, we shall carry

along with us this distinction, and shall consider, whether it be the *senses,* reason, or the imagination, that produces the opinion of a continu'd or of a distinct existence. These are the only questions, that are intelligible on the present subject. For as to the notion of external existence, when taken for something specially different from our perceptions, we have already shewn its absurdity.

To begin with the /SENSES\, 'tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu'd existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and suppose that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas'd all manner of operation. These faculties, therefore, if they have any influence in the present case, must produce the opinion of a distinct, not of a continu'd existence; and in order to that, must present their impressions either as images and representations, or as these very distinct and external existences.

That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something distinct, or independent, and external, is evident; because i they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or imagination. When the mind looks farther than what immediately appears to it, its conclusions can never be put to the account of the senses; and it certainly looks farther, when from a {1:480} single perception it infers a double existence, and supposes the relations of resemblance and causation betwixt them.

If our senses, therefore, suggest any idea of distinct existences, they must convey the impressions as those very existences, by a kind of fallacy and illusion. Upon this bead we may observe, that all sensations are felt by the mind, such as they really are, and that when we doubt, whether they present themselves as distinct objects, or as mere impressions, the difficulty is not concerning their nature, but concerning their relations and situation.' Now if the senses presented our impressions as external to, and independent of ourselves, both the objects and ourselves must be obvious to our senses, otherwise they cou'd not be compar'd by these faculties. The difficulty, then, is how fax we are *ourselves* the objects of our senses.

'Tis certain there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that concerning identity, and the nature of the uniting principle, which constitutes a person. So far from being able by our senses merely to determine this question, we must have recourse to the most profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory answer to it; and in common life 'tis evident these ideas of self and person are never very fix'd nor determinate. 'Tis absurd, therefore, to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and external objects.

Add to this, that every impression, external and internal, passions, affections, sensations, pains and pleasures, are originally on the same footing; and that whatever other differences we may observe among them, they appear, all of them, in their true colours, as impressions or perceptions. And indeed, if we consider the matter aright, 'tis scarce possible it shou'd be otherwise, nor is it conceivable that our senses shou'd be more capable of deceiving us in the situation and relations, than in the nature of our impressions. For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear. Every thing that enters the mind, being in reality a perception, 'tis impossible any thing shou'd to feeling appear different. This were to suppose, that even where we are most intimately conscious, we might be mistaken.

But not to lose time in examining, whether 'tis possible {1:481} for our senses to deceive us, and

represent our perceptions as distinct from ourselves, that is as external to and independent of us; let us consider whether they really do so, and whether this error proceeds from an immediate sensation, or from some other causes.

To begin with the question concerning external existence, it may perhaps be said, that setting aside the metaphysical question of the identity of a thinking -substance, our own body evidently belongs to us @ and as several impressions appear exterior to the body, we suppose them also exterior to ourselves. The paper, on which I write at present, is beyond my hand. The table is beyond the paper. The walls of the chamber beyond the table. And in casting my eye towards the window, I perceive a great extent of fields and buildings beyond my chamber. From all this it may be infer'd, that no other faculty is requir'd, beside the senses, to convince us of the external existence of body. But to prevent this inference, we need only weigh the three following considerations. First, That, properly speaking, 'tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, as that which we examine at present. Secondly, Sounds, and tastes, and smelts, tho' commonly regarded by the mind as continu'd independent qualities, appear not to have any existence in extension, and consequently cannot appear to the senses as situated externally to the body.' The reason, why we ascribe a, place to them, shall be: considered afterwards. Thirdly, Even our sight informs us not of distance or outness (so to speak) immediately and without a certain reasoning and experience, as is acknowledged by the most rational philosophers.

As to the independency of our perceptions on ourselves, this can never be an object of the senses; but any opinion we form concerning it, must be deriv'd from experience and observation: And we shall see afterwards, that our conclusions from experience are far from being favourable to the doctrine of the independency of our perceptions. Mean while we may observe that when we talk of real distinct existences, we have commonly more in our eye their independency than external {1:482} situation in place, and think an object has a sufficient reality, when its Being is uninterrupted, and independent of the incessant revolutions, which we are conscious of in ourselves.

Thus to resume what I have said concerning the senses; they give us no notion of continu'd existence, because they cannot operate beyond the extent, in which they really operate. They as little produce the opinion of a distinct existence, because they neither can offer it to the mind as represented, nor as original. To offer it as represented, they must present both an object and an image. To make it appear as original, they must convey a falshood; and this falshood must lie in the relations and situation: In order to which they must be able to compare the object with ourselves; and even in that case they do not, nor is it possible they shou'd, deceive us. We may, therefore, conclude with certainty, that the opinion of a continu'd and of a distinct existence never arises from the senses.

To confirm this we may observe, that there are three different kinds of impressions convey'd by the senses. The -first are those of the figure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures, that arise from the application of objects to our bodies, as by the cutting of our flesh with steel, and such like. Both philosophers and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct continu'd existence. The vulgar only regard the second as on the same footing. Both philosophers and the vulgar, again, esteem the third to be merely perceptions and consequently interrupted and dependent beings.

Now 'tis evident, that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, colours, Sounds, heat and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and solidity, and that the difference we make betwixt them in this respect, arises not from the mere perception. So strong the prejudice for the distinct continu'd existence Of the former qualities, that when the contrary opinion is advanc'd by modern philosophers, people imagine they can almost refute it from their feeling and experience, and that their very senses contradict this philosophy. 'Tis also evident, that colours, sounds, &c. are originally on the same footing with the pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a fire; and that the difference betwixt them is {1:483} founded neither on perception nor reason, but on the imagination. For as they are confest to be, both of them, nothing but perceptions arising from the particular configurations and motions of the parts of body, wherein possibly can their difference consist? Upon the whole, then, we may conclude, that as far as the senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence.

We may also observe in this instance of sounds and colours, that we can attribute a distinct continu'd existence to objects without ever consulting /REASON\, or weighing our opinions by any philosophical principles. And indeed, whatever convincing arguments philosophers may fancy they can produce to establish the belief of objects independent of the mind, 'tis obvious these arguments are known but to very few, and that 'tis not by them, that children, peasants, and the greatest part of mankind are induc'd to attribute objects to some impressions, and deny them to others. Accordingly we find, that all the conclusions, which the vulgar form on this head, are directly' contrary to those, which are confirm'd by philosophy. For philosophy informs us, that every thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception, and is interrupted, and dependent on the mind: whereas the vulgar confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct continu'd existence to the very things they feel or see. This sentiment, then, as it is entirely unreasonable, must proceed from some other faculty than the understanding. To which we may add, that as long as we take our perceptions and objects to be the same, we can never infer the existence of the one from that of the other, nor form any argument from the relation of cause and effect; which is.the only one that earl assure us of matter of fact. Even after we distinguish our perceptions from our objects, 'twill appear presently, that we are still incapable of reasoning from the existence of one to that of the other: So that upon the whole our reason neither does, nor is it possible it ever shou'd, upon any supposition, give us an assurance of the continu'd and distinct existence of body. That opinion must be entirely owing to the /IMAGINATION\: which must now be the subject of our enquiry.

Since all impressions are internal and perishing existences, {1:484} and appear as such, the notion of their distinct and continu'd existence must arise from a concurrence of some of their qualities with the qualities of the imagination, and since this notion does not extend to all of them, it must arise from certain qualities peculiar to some impressions. 'Twill therefore be easy for us to discover these qualities by a comparison of the impressions, to which we attribute a distinct and continu'd existence, with those, which we regard as internal and perishing.

We may observe, then, that 'tis neither upon account of the involuntariness of certain impressions, as is commonly suppos'd, nor of their superior force and violence, that we attribute to them a reality, and continu'd existence, which we refuse to others, that are voluntary or feeble. For 'tis evident our pains and pleasures, our passions and affections, which we never suppose to have any existence beyond our perception, operate with greater violence, and are equally involuntary, as the impressions of figure and extension, colour and sound, which we suppose to be permanent beings. The heat of a fire, when moderate, is suppos'd to exist in the fire; but the pain, which it causes

upon a near approach, is not taken to have any being, except in the perception.

These vulgar opinions, then, being rejected, we must search for some other hypothesis, by which we may discover those peculiar qualities in our impressions, which makes us attribute to them a distinct and continu'd existence.

After a little examination, we shall find, that all those objects, to which we attribute a continu'd existence, have a peculiar constancy, which distinguishes them from the impressions, whose existence depends upon our perception. Those mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye, have always appear'd to me in the same order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head, I soon after find them return upon me without the least alteration. My bed and table, my books and papers, present themselves in the same uniform manner, and change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing or perceivilng them. This is the case with all the impressions, whose objects are suppoold to have an external existence; and is the case with no other impressions, whether gentle or violent, voluntary or involuntary. {1:485}

This constancy, however, is not so perfect as not to admit of very considerable exceptions. Bodies often change their position and qualities, and after a little absence or interruption may become hardly knowable. But here 'tis observable, that even in these changes they preserve a coherence, and have a regular dependence on each other; which is the foundation of a kind of reasoning from causation, and produces the opinion of their continu'd existence. When I return to my chamber after an hour's absence, I find not my fire in the same situation, in which I left it: But then I am accustomed in other instances to see a like alteration produc'd in a like time, whether I am present or absent, near or remote. This coherence, therefore, in their changes is one of the characteristics of external objects, as well as their constancy.

Having found that the opinion of the continu'd existence of body depends on the /COHERENCE\, and /CONSTANCY\ of certain impressions, I now proceed to examine after what manner these qualities give rise to so extraordinary an opinion. To begin with the coherence; we may observe, that tho' those internal impressions, which we regard as fleeting and perishing, have also a certain coherence or regularity in their appearances, yet 'tis of somewhat a different nature, from that which we discover in bodies.' Our passions are found by experience to have a mutual connexion with and dependence on each other; but on no occasion is it necessary to suppose, that they have existed and operated, when they were not perceiv'd, in order to preserve the same dependence and connexion, of which we have had experience. The case is not the same with relation to external objects. Those require a continu'd existence, or otherwise lose, in a great measure, the regularity of their operation. I am here seated in my chamber with my face to the fire; and all the objects, that strike my senses, are contain'd in a few yards around me. My memory, indeed, informs me of the existence of many objects; but then this information extends not beyond their past existence, nor do either my senses or memory give any testimony to the continuance of their being. When therefore I am thus seated, and revolve over these thoughts, I hear on a sudden a noise as of a door turning upon its hinges; and a little after see a porter, who {1:486} advances towards me. This gives occasion to many new reflections and reasonings. First, I never have observ'd, that this noise cou'd proceed from any thing but the motion of a door; and therefore conclude, that the present phaenomenon is a contradiction to all past experience, unless the door, which I remember on t'other side the chamber, be still in being. Again, I have always found, that a human body was possest of a quality, which I call gravity, and which hinders it from mounting in the air, as this porter must have done to arrive at my chamber, unless the stairs I remember be not annihilated by my absence. But this is not all. I receive a letter, which upon, opening it I perceive by the

hand-writing and subscription to have come from a friend, who says he is two hundred leagues distant. 'Tis evident I can never account for this phenomenon, conformable to my experience in other instances, without spreading out in my mind the whole sea and continent between us, and supposing the effects and continu'd existence of posts and ferries, according to my Memory and observation. To consider these phaenomena of the porter and letter in a certain light, they are contradictions to common experience, and may be regarded as objections to those maxims, which we form concerning the connexions of causes and effects. I am accustomed to hear such a sound, and see such an object in motion at the same time. I have not receiv'd in this particular instance both these perceptions. These observations are contrary, unless I suppose that the door still remains, and that it was open'd without my perceiving it: And this supposition, which was at first entirely arbitrary and hypothetical, acquires a force and evidence by its being the only one, upon which I can reconcile these contradictions. There is scarce a moment of my life, wherein there is not a similar instance presented to me, and I have not occasion to suppose the continu'd existence of objects, in order to connect their past and present appearances, and give them such an union with each other, as I have found by experience to be suitable to their particular natures and circumstances. Here then I am naturally led to regard the world, as something real and durable, and as preserving its existence, even when it is no longer present to my perception.

But tho' this conclusion from the coherence of appearances may seem to be of the same nature with our reasonings {1:487} concerning causes and effects; as being deriv'd from custom, and regulated by past experience; we shall find upon examination, that they are at the bottom considerably different from each other, and that this inference arises from the understanding, and from custom in an indirect and oblique manner. For 'twill readily be allow'd, that since nothing is ever really present to the mind, besides its own perceptions, 'tis not only impossible, that any habit shou'd ever be acquir'd otherwise than by the regular succession of these perceptions, but also that any habit shou'd ever exceed that degree of regularity. Any degree, therefore, of regularity in our perceptions, can never be a foundation for us to infer a, greater degree of regularity in some objects, which are not perceiv'd; since this supposes a contradiction, viz. a habit acquir'd by what was never present to the mind.' But 'tis evident, that whenever we infer the continu'd existence of the objects of sense from their coherence, and the frequency of their union, 'tis in order to bestow on the objects a greater regularity than what is observ'd in our mere perceptions. We remark a connexion betwixt two kinds of objects in their past appearance to the senses, but are not able to observe this connexion to be perfectly constant, since the turning about of our head or the shutting of our eyes is able to break it. What then do we suppose in this case, but that these objects still continue their usual connexion, notwithstanding their apparent interruption, and that the irregular appearances are join'd by something, of which we are insensible? But as all reasoning concerning matters of fact arises only from custom, and custom can only be the effect of repeated perceptions, the extending of custom and reasoning beyond the perceptions can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant repetition and connexion, but must arise from the co-operation of some other principles.

I have already observ'd,2 in examining the foundation of mathematics, that the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse. This I have assign'd for the reason, why, after considering several loose standards of equality, and correcting them by each other, we proceed to imagine so correct and exact a standard of that relation, {1:488} as is not liable to the least error or variation. The same principle makes us easily entertain this opinion of

the continu'd existence of body. Objects have a certain coherence even as they appear to our senses; but this coherence is much greater and more uniform, if we suppose the object.

to have a continu'd existence; and as the mind is once in the train of observing an uniformity among objects, it naturally continues, till it renders the uniformity as compleat as possible. The simple supposition of their continu'd existence suffices for this purpose, and gives us a notion of a much greater regularity among objects, than what they have when we look no farther than our senses.

But whatever force we may ascribe to this principle, I am afraid 'tis too weak to support alone so vast an edifice, as is that of the continu'd existence of all external bodies; and that we must join the constancy of their appearance to the coherence, in order to give a satisfactory account of that opinion. As the explication of this will lead me into a considerable compass of very profound reasoning; I think it proper, in order to avoid confusion, to give a short sketch or abridgment of my system, and afterwards draw out all its parts in their full compass. This inference from the constancy of our perceptions, like the precedent from their coherence, gives rise to the opinion of the continu'd existence of body, which is prior to that of its distinct existence, and produces that latter principle.

When we have been accustomed to observe a constancy in certain impressions, and have found, that the perception of the sun or ocean, for instance, returns upon us after an absence or annihilation with like parts and in a like order, as at its first appearance, we are not apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as different, (which they really are) but on the contrary consider them as individually the same, upon account of their resemblance. But as this interruption of their existence is contrary to their perfect identity, and makes us regard the first impression as annihilated, and the second as newly created, we find ourselves somewhat at a loss, and are involv'd in a kind of contradiction. In order to free ourselves from this difficulty, we disguise, as much as possible, the interruption, or rather remove it entirely, by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible. This supposition, {1:489} or idea of continu'd existence, acquires a force and vivacity from the memory of these broken impressions, and from that propensity, which they give us, to suppose them the same; and according to the precedent reasoning, the very essence of belief consists in the force and vivacity of the conception.

In order to justify this system, there are four things requisite. *First,* To explain the <principium individuationis>, or principle of identity. Secondly, Give a reason, why the resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute an identity to them. <Thirdly>, Account for that propensity, which this illusion gives, to unite these broken appearances by a continued existence. Fourthly and lastly, Explain that force and vivacity of conception, which arises from the propensity.

First, As to the principle of individuation; we may observe, that the view of any one object is not sufficient to convey the idea of identity. For in that proposition, an *object is the same with itself,* if the idea express'd by the word, object, were no ways distinguished from that meant by *itself;* we really shou'd mean nothing, nor wou'd the proposition contain a predicate and a subject, which however are imply'd in this affirmation. One single object conveys the idea of unity, not that of identity.

On the other hand, a multiplicity of objects can never convey this idea, however resembling they may be suppos'd. The mind always pronounces the one not to be the other, and considers them as

forming two, three, or any determinate number of objects, whose existences are entirely distinct and independent.

Since then both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity, it must lie in something that is neither of them. But to tell the truth, at first sight this seems utterly impossible. Betwixt unity and number there can be no medium; no more than betwixt existence and nonexistence. After one object is suppos'd to exist, we must either suppose another also to exist; in which case we have the idea of number: Or we must suppose it not to exist; in which case the first object remains at unity.

To remove this difficulty, let us have recourse to the idea of time or duration. I have already observ'd, that time, in

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{1:492} readily passes from one to the other, and perceives not the change without a strict attention, of which, generally speaking, 'tis wholly incapable.

In order to apply this general maxim, we must first examine the disposition of the mind in viewing any object which preserves a perfect identity, and then find some other object, that is confounded with it, by causing a similar disposition. When we fix our thought on any object, and suppose it to continue the same for some time; 'tis evident we suppose the change to lie only in the time, and never exert ourselves to produce any new image or idea of the object. The faculties of the mind repose themselves in a manner, and take no more exercise, than what is necessary to continue that idea, of which we were formerly possest, and which subsists without variation or interruption. The passage from one moment to another is scarce felt, and distinguishes not itself by a different perception or idea, which may require a different direction of the spirits, in order to its conception.

Now what other objects, beside identical ones, are capable of placing the mind in the same disposition, when it considers them, and of causing the same uninterrupted passage of the imagination from one idea to another? This question is of the last importance. For if we can find any such objects, we may certainly conclude, from the foregoing principle, that they are very naturally confounded with identical ones, and are taken for them in most of our reasonings. But tho' this question be very important, 'tis not very difficult nor doubtful. For I immediately reply, that a succession of related objects places the mind in this disposition, and is consider'd with the same smooth and uninterrupted progress of the imagination, as attends the view of the same invariable object. The very nature and essence of relation is to connect our ideas with each other, and upon the appearance of one, to facilitate the transition to its correlative. The passage betwixt related ideas is, therefore, so smooth and easy, that it produces little alteration on the mind, and seems like the continuation of the same action; and as the continuation of the same action is an effect of the continu'd view of the same object, 'tis for this reason we attribute sameness to every succession of related objects. The thought slides along the succession with equal facility, {1:493} as if it consider'd only one object; and therefore confounds the succession with the identity.

We shall afterwards see many instances of this tendency of relation to make us ascribe an identity to different objects; but shall here confine ourselves to the present subject. We find by experience, that there is such a constancy in almost all the impressions of the senses, that their interruption produces no alteration on them, and hinders them not from returning the same in appearance and in situation as at their first existence. I survey the furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly

struck my senses. This resemblance is observ'd in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation. and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. .kn easy transition or passage of the imagination, along the ideas of these different and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted perception. 'Tis therefore very natural for us to mistake the one for the other.

The persons, who entertain this opinion concerning the identity of our resembling perceptions, are in general an the unthinking and unphilosophical part of mankind, (that is, all of us, at one time or other) and consequently such as suppose their perceptions to be their only objects, and never think of a double existence internal and external, representing and represented. The very image, which is present to the senses, is with us the real body; and 'tis to these interrupted images we ascribe a perfect identity.3 But as the interruption of the appearance seems contrary to the identity, and naturally leads us to regard these resembling perceptions as different from each other, we here find ourselves at {1:494} a loss how to reconcile such opposite opinions. The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The interrupted manner of their appearance makes us consider them as so many resembling, but &till distinct beings, which appear after certain intervals. The perplexity arising from this contradiction produces a propension to unite these broken appearances by the fiction of a continu'd existence, which is the third part of that hypothesis I propos'd to explain.

Nothing is more certain from experience, than that any contradiction either to the sentiments or passions gives a sensible uneasiness, whether it proceeds from without or from within-' from the opposition of external objects, or from the combat of internal principles. On the contrary,, whatever strikes in with the natural propensities, and either externally forwards their satisfaction, or internally concurs with their movements, is sure to give a sensible pleasure. Now there being here an opposition betwixt the notion of the identity of resembling perceptions, and the interruption of their appearance, the mind must be uneasy in that situation, and will naturally seek relief from the uneasiness. Since the uneasiness arises from the opposition of two contrary principles, it must look for relief by sacrificing the one to the other. But as the smooth passage of our thought along our resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we can never without reluctance yield up that opinion. We must, therefore, turn to the other side, and suppose that our perceptions are no longer interrupted, but preserve a continu'd as well as an invariable existence, and are by that means entirely the same. But here the interruptions in the appearance of these perceptions are so long and frequent, that 'tis impossible to overlook them; and as the appearance of a perception in the mind and its *existence* seem at first sight entirely the same, it may be doubted, whether we can ever assent to so palpable a contradiction, and suppose a perception to exist without being present to the mind. In order to clear.up this matter, and learn how the interruption in the appearance of a perception implies not necessarily an interruption in its existence, 'twill be proper to touch upon some principles, which we shall have occasion to explain more fully afterwards. {1:495}

We may begin with observing, that the difficulty in the present case is not concerning the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a conclusion concerning the continu'd existence of its perceptions, but only concerning the manner in which the conclusion is form'd, and principles from which it is deriv'd. 'Tis certain, that almost all mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of their lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material existence. 'Tis

also certain, that this very perception or object is suppos'd to have a continu'd uninterrupted being, and neither to be annihilated by our absence, nor to be brought into existence by our presence. When we are absent from it, we say it still exists, but that we do not feel, we do not see it. When we are present, we say we feel, or see it. Here then may arise two questions; First, How we can satisfy ourselves in supposing a perception to be absent from the mind without being annihilated. Secondly, After what manner we conceive an object to become present to the mind, without some new creation of a perception or image; and what we mean by this seeing, and feeling, and perceiving.

As to the first question; we may observe, that what we. call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity. Now as every perception is distinguishable from another, and may be considered as separately existent; it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a thinking being.'

The same reasoning affords us an answer to the second question. If the name of perception renders not this separation from a mind absurd and contradictory, the name of object, standing for the very same thing, can never render their conjunction impossible. External objects are seen, and felt, and become present to the mind; that is, they acquire such a relation to a connected heap of perceptions, as to influence them very considerably in augmenting their number by present reflections and passions, and in storing the memory {1:496} with ideas. The same continu'd and uninterrupted Being may, therefore, be sometimes present to the mind, and sometimes absent from it, without any real or essential change in the Being itself. An interrupted appearance to the senses implies not necessarily an interruption in the existence. The supposition of the continu'd existence of sensible objects or perceptions involves no contradiction. We may easily indulge our inclination to that supposition. When the exact resemblance of our perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we may remove the seeming interruption by feigning a continu'd being, which may fill those intervals, and preserve a perfect and entire identity to our perceptions.

But as we here not only feign but believe this continu'd existence, the question is, *from whence arises such a belief;* and this question leads us to the fourth member of this system. It has been prov'd already, that belief in general consists in nothing, but the vivacity of an idea; and that an idea may acquire this vivacity by its relation to some present impression. Impressions are naturally the most vivid perceptions of the mind; and this quality is in part convey'd by the relation to every connected idea. The relation causes a smooth passage from the impression to the idea, and even gives a propensity to that passage. The mind falls so easily from the one perception to the other, that it scarce perceives the change, but retains in the second a considerable share of the vivacity of the first. It is excited by the lively impression; and this vivacity is convey'd to the related idea, without any great diminution in the passage, by reason of the smooth transition and the propensity of the imagination.

But suppose, that this propensity arises from some other principle, besides that of relation; 'tis evident it must still have the same effect, and convey the vivacity from the impression to the idea. Now this is exactly the present case. Our memory presents us with a vast number of instances of perceptions perfectly resembling each other, that return at different distances of time, and after considerable interruptions. This resemblance gives us a propension to consider these interrupted perceptions as the same; and also a propension to connect them by a continu'd existence, in order to justify this identity, and avoid the contradiction, in which the interrupted appearance of these

perceptions seems necessarily to involve us. Here then we have a propensity to {1:497} feign the continu'd existence of all sensible objects; and as this propensity arises from some lively impressions of the memory, it bestows a vivacity on that fiction: or in other words, makes us believe the continu'd existence of body. If sometimes we ascribe a continu'd existence to objects, which are perfectly new to us, and of whose constancy and coherence we have no experience, 'tis because the manner, in which they present themselves to our senses, resembles that of constant and coherent objects; and this resemblance is a source of reasoning and analogy, and leads us to attribute the same qualities to similar objects.

I believe an intelligent reader will find less difficulty to assent to this system, than to comprehend it fully and distinctly, and will allow, after a little reflection, that every part carries its own proof along with it. 'Tis indeed evident, that as the vulgar *suppose* their perceptions to be their only objects, and at the same time believe the continu'd existence of matter, we must account for the origin of the belief upon that supposition. Now upon that supposition, 'tis a false opinion that any of our objects, or perceptions, are identically the same after an interruption; and consequently the opinion of their identity can never arise from reason, but must arise from the imagination. The imagination is seduc'd into such an opinion only by means of the resemblance of certain perceptions; since we find they are only our resembling perceptions, which we have a propension to suppose the same. This propension to bestow an identity on our resembling perceptions, produces the fiction of a continu'd existence; since that fiction, as well as the identity, is really false, as is acknowledged by all philosophers, and has no other effect than to remedy the interruption of our perceptions, which is

the only circumstance that is contrary to their identity. In the last place this propension causes belief by means of the present impressions of the memory; since without the remembrance of former sensations, 'tis plain we never shou'd have any belief of the continu'd existence of body. Thus in examining all these parts, we find that each of them is supported by the strongest proofs: and that all of them together form a consistent system, which is perfectly convincing. A strong propensity or inclination alone, without any present impression, will sometimes {1:408} cause a belief or opinion. How much more when aided by that circumstance?

But tho' we are led after this manner, by the natural propensity of the imagination, to ascribe a continu'd existence to those sensible objects or perceptions, which we find to resemble each other in their interrupted appearance; yet a very little reflection and philosophy is sufficient to make us perceive the fallacy of that opinion. I have already observ'd, that there is an intimate connexion betwixt those two principles, of a continu'd and of a *distinct* or independent existence, and that we no sooner establish the one than the other follows, as a necessary consequence. 'Tis the opinion of a continu'd existence, which first takes place, and without much study or reflection draws the other along with it, wherever the mind follows its first and most natural tendency. But when we compare experiments, and reason a little upon them, we quickly perceive, that the doctrine of the independent existence of our sensible perceptions is contrary to the plainest experience. This leads us backward upon our footsteps to perceive our error in attributing a continu'd existence to our perceptions, and is the origin of many very curious opinions, which we shall here endeavour to account for.

'Twill first be proper to observe a few of those experiments, which convince us, that our perceptions are not possest of any independent existence. When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become double, and one half of them to be remov'd from their common and natural position. But as we do not attribute t continu'd existence to both these

perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. This opinion is confirm'd by the seeming encrease and diminution of objects, according to their distance; by the apparent alterations in their figure; by the changes in their colour and other qualities from our sickness and distempers: and by an infinite number of other experiments of the same kind; from all which we learn, that our sensible perceptions are not possest of any distinct or independent existence.

The natural consequence of this reasoning shou'd be, that our perceptions have no more a continued than an independent {1:499} existence; and indeed philosophers have so far run into this opinion, that they change their system, and distinguish, (as we shall do for the future) betwixt perceptions and objects, of which the former are suppos'd to be interrupted, and perishing, and different at every different return; the latter to be uninterrupted, and to preserve a continu'd existence and identity. But however philosophical this new system may be esteem'd, I assert that 'tis only a palliative remedy, and that it contains all the difficulties of the vulgar system, with some others, that are peculiar to itself. There are no principles either of the understanding or fancy, which lead us directly to embrace this opinion of the double existence of perceptions and objects, nor can we arrive at it but by passing thro' the common hypothesis of the identity and continuance of our interrupted perceptions. Were we not first perswaded, that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue to exist even when they no longer make their appearance to the senses, we shou'd never be led to think, that our perceptions and objects are different, and that our objects alone preserve a continu'd existence. 'The latter hypothesis has no primary recommendation either to reason or the imagination, but acquires all its influence on the imagination from the former.' This proposition contains two parts, which we shall endeavour to prove as distinctly and clearly, as such abstruse subjects will permit.

As to the first part of the proposition, ***that this philosophical hypothesis has*** **no primary recommendation,,** ***either to reason, or the*** **imagination, we may soon satisfy ourselves with regard to reason by the following reflections. The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which being immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions. The only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is by means of the relation of cause and effect, which shews, that there is a connexion betwixt them, and that the existence of one is dependent on that of the other. The idea of this relation is deriv'd from past experience, by which we find, that two beings are constantly conjoin'd together, and are always present at once to the mind. But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that we may observe a con . unction or a relation of cause and effect between {1:500} different perceptions, but can never observe it between perceptions and objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that from the existence or any of the qualities of the former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning the existence of the latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this particular.**

'Tis no less certain, that this philosophical system has no primary recommendation to the imagination, and that that faculty wou'd never, of itself, and by its original tendency, have fallen upon such a principle. I confess it will be somewhat difficult to prove this to the fall satisfaction of the reader; because it implies a negative, which in many cases will not admit of any positive proof. If any one wou'd take the pains to examine this question, and wou'd invent a system, to account for the direct origin of this opinion from the imagination, we shou'd be able, by the examination of that system, to pronounce a certain judgment in the present subject. Let it be taken for granted,

that our perceptions are broken, and interrupted, and however like, are still different from each other; and let any one upon this supposition shew why the fancy, directly and immediately, proceeds to the belief of another existence, resembling these perceptions in their nature, but yet continu'd, and uninterrupted, and identical; and after he has done this to my satisfaction, I promise to renounce my present opinion. Mean while I cannot forbear concluding, from the very abstractedness and difficulty of the first supposition, that 'tis an improper subject for the fancy to work upon. Whoever wou'd explain the origin of the common opinion concerning the continu'd and distinct existence of body, must take the mind in its common situation, and must proceed upon the supposition, that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue to exist even when they are not perceiv'd. Tho' this opinion be false, 'tis the most natural of any, and has alone any primary recommendation to the fancy.

As to the second part of the proposition, *that the philosophical system acquires all its* influence *on the* imagination from *the* vulgar one; we may observe, that this is a natural and unavoidable consequence of the foregoing conclusion, *that it has* no primary recommendation to *reason or the* imagination. For as the philosophical system is found by experience to take hold of many minds, and in particular of {1:501} all those, who reflect ever so little on this subject, it must derive all its authority from the vulgar system; since it has no original authority of its own. The manner, in which these two systems, tho' directly contrary, are connected together, may be explains, as follows.

The imagination naturally runs on in this train of thinking. Our perceptions are our only objects: Resembling perceptions are the same, however broken or uninterrupted in their appearance: This appealing interruption is contrary to the identity: The interruption consequently extends not beyond the appearance, and the perception or object really continues to exist, even when absent from us: Our sensible perception s have, therefore, a continu'd and uninterrupted existence. But as a little reflection destroys this conclusion, that our perceptions have a continu'd existence, by shewing that they have a dependent one, 'twou'd naturally be expected, that we must altogether reject the opinion, that there is such a thing in nature as a continu'd existence, which is preserv'd even when it no longer appears to the senses. The case, however, is otherwise. Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continu'd existence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance of our sensible perceptions, that tho' all sects agree in the latter sentiment, the former, which is, in a manner, its necessary consequence, has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; who after all maintained that opinion in words only, and were never able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it.

There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind. If these opinions become contrary, 'tis not difficult to foresee which of them will have the advantage. As long as our attention is bent upon the subject, the philosophical and study'd principle may prevail; but the moment we relax our thoughts, nature will display herself, and draw us back to our former opinion. Nay she has sometimes such an influence, that she can stop our progress, even in the midst of our most profound reflections, and keep us from running on with all the consequences of any philosophical opinion. Thus tho' we clearly perceive the dependence and interruption of our perceptions, we stop short in our career, and never upon that {1:502} account reject the notion of an independent and continu'd existence. That opinion has taken such deep root in the imagination, that 'tis impossible ever to eradicate it, nor will any strain'd metaphysical conviction of the dependence of our perceptions be sufficient for that

purpose.

But tho' our natural and obvious principles here prevail above our study'd reflections,'tis certain there must be sonic struggle and opposition in the case: at least so long as these rejections retain any force or vivacity. In order to set ourselves at ease in this particular, we contrive a new hypothesis, which seems to comprehend both these principles of reason and imagination. This hypothesis is the philosophical,one of the double existence of perceptions and objects; which pleases our reason, in allowing, that our dependent perceptions are interrupted and different; and at the same time is agreeable to the imagination, in attributing a continu'd existence to something else, which we call *objects.* This philosophical system, therefore, is the monstrous offspring of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which are both at once embrac'd by the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each other. The imagination tells us, that our resembling perceptions have a continu'd and uninterrupted existence, and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells us, that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence, a-D. d different from each other. The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy, by ascribing these contrary qualities to different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the continuance to objects. Nature is obstinate, and will not quit the field, however strongly attack'd by reason; and at the same time reason is so clear in the point, that there is no possibility of disguising her. Not being able to reconcile these two enemies, we endeavour to set ourselves at ease as much as possible, by successively granting to each whatever it demands, and by feigning a double existence, where each may find something, that has all the conditions it desires. Were we fully convinc'd, that our resembling perceptions are continu'd, and identical, and independent, we shou'd never run into this opinion of a double existence. since we shou'd find satisfaction in our first supposition, {1:503} and wou'd not look beyond. Again, were we fully convinc'd, that our perceptions are dependent, and interrupted, and different, we shou'd be as little inclin'd to embrace the opinion of a double existence; since in that case we shou'd clearly perceive the error of our first supposition of a continu'd existence, and wou'd never regard it any farther. 'Tis therefore from the intermediate situation of the mind, that this opinion arises, and from such an adherence to these two contrary principles, as makes us seek some pretext to justify our receiving both; which happily at last is found in the system of a double existence.

Another advantage of this philosophical system is its similarity to the vulgar one; by which means we can humour our reason for a moment, when it becomes troublesome and sollicitous; and yet upon its least negligence or inattention, can easily return to our vulgar and natural notions. Accordingly we find, that philosophers neglect not this advantage; but immediately upon leaving their closets, mingle with the rest of mankind in those exploded opinions, that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue identically and uninterruptedly the same in all their interrupted appearances.

There are other particulars of this system, wherein we may remark its dependence on the fancy, in a very conspicuous manner. Of these, I shall observe the two following. *First,* We suppose external objects to resemble internal perceptions. I have already shewn, that the relation of cause and effect can never afford us any just conclusion from the existence or qualities of our perceptions to the existence of external continu'd objects: And I shall farther add, that even tho' they cou'd afford such a conclusion, we shou'd never have any reason to infer, that our objects resemble our perceptions. That opinion, therefore, is deriv'd from nothing but the quality of the fancy above-explain'd, <that it *borrows all its ideas from* some *precedent* perception>. We never can

conceive any thing but perceptions, and therefore must make every thing resemble them.

Secondly, As we suppose our objects in general to resemble our perceptions, so we take it for granted, that every particular object resembles that perception, which it causes. The relation of cause and effect determines us to join the other of resemblance; and the ideas of these existences being {1:504} already united together in the fancy by the former relation, we naturally add the latter to compleat the union. We have a strong propensity to compleat every union by joining new relations to those which we have before observ'd betwixt any ideas, as we shall have occasion to observe presently.'

Having thus given an account of all the systems both popular and philosophical, with regard to external existences, I cannot forbear giving vent to a certain sentiment, which arises upon reviewing those systems. I begun this subject with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses, and that this wou'd be the conclusion, I shou'd draw from the whole of my reasoning. But to be ingenuous, I feel myself *at present* of a quite contrary sentiment, and am more inclin'd to repose -no faith at all in my senses, or rather imagination, than to place in it such an implicit confidence. I cannot conceive bow such trivial qualities of the fancy, conducted by such false suppositions, can ever lead to any solid and rational system. They are the coherence and constancy of our perceptions, which produce the opinion of their continu'd existence; tho' these qualities of perceptions have no perceivable connexion with such an existence. The constancy of our]perceptions has the most considerable effect, and yet is attended with the greatest difficulties. 'Tis a gross illusion to suppose, that our resembling perceptions are numerically the same; and 'tis this illusion, which leads us into the opinion, that these perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still existent, even when they are not present to the senses. This is the case with our popular system. And as to our philosophical one, 'tis liable to the same difficulties; and is over-and-above loaded with this absurdity, that it at once denies and establishes the vulgar supposition. Philosophers deny our resembling perceptions to be identically the same, and uninterrupted; and yet have so great a propensity to believe them such, that they arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions, to which they attribute these qualities. I say, a new set of perceptions: For we may well suppose in general, but 'tis impossible for us distinctly to conceive, objects to be in their nature any thing but exactly the same with perceptions. What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falshood? And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them? {1:505}

This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cur'd, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away, and sometimes may seem entirely free from it. 'Tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses; and we but expose them farther when we endeavour to justify them in that manner. As the sceptical doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense reflection on those subjects, it always encreases, the farther we carry our reflections, whether in opposition or conformity to it. Carelessness and in-attention alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them; and take it for granted, whatever may be the reader's opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world; and going upon that supposition, I intend to examine some general systems both ancient and modern, which have been propos'd of both, before I proceed to a more particular enquiry concerning our impressions. This will not, perhaps, in the end be found foreign to our present purpose.

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SECT. III.-Of *the Antient Philosophy.*

Several moralists have recommended it as an excellent method of becoming acquainted with our own hearts, and knowing our progress in virtue, to recollect our dreams in a morning, and examine them with the same rigour, that we wou'd our most serious and most deliberate actions. Our character is the same throughout, say they, and appears best where artifice, fear, and policy have no place, and men can neither be hypocrites with themselves nor others. The generosity, or baseness of our temper, our meekness or cruelty, our courage or pusilanimity, influence the fictions of the imagination with the most unbounded liberty, and discover themselves in the most glaring colours. In like manner, I am persuaded, there might be several useful discoveries made from a criticism of the fictions of the antient philosophy, concerning *substances,* and substantial form,*, and accidents,* and occult *qualities;* which, however unreasonable and capricious, have a very intimate connexion with the principles of human nature.

'Tis confest by the most judicious philosophers, that our {1:506} ideas of bodies are nothing but collections form'd by the mind of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities, of which objects are compos'd, and which we find to have a constant union with each other. But however these qualities may in themselves be entirely distinct, 'tis certain we commonly regard the compound, which they form, as ONE thing, and as continuing the SAME under very considerable alterations. The acknowledg'd composition is evidently contrary to this supposed simplicity, and the variation to the *identity.* It may, therefore, be worth while to consider the *causes,* which make us almost universally fall into such evident contradictions, as well as the means by which we endeavour to conceal them.

'Tis evident, that as the ideas of the several distinct,*successive* qualities of objects are -united together by a very close relation, the mind, in looking along the succession, must be carry'd from one part of it to another by an easy transition, and will no more perceive the change, than if it contemplated the same unchangeable object. This easy transition is the effect, or rather essence of relation; I and as the imagination readily takes one idea for another, where their influence on the mind is similar; hence it proceeds., that any such succession of related qualities is readily consider'd as one continu'd object, existing without any variation. The smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought, being alike in both cases, readily deceives the mind, and makes us ascribe an identity to the changeable succession of connected qualities.

But when we alter our method of considering the succession, and instead of traceing it gradually thro' the successive points of time, survey at once Any two distinct periods of its duration, and compare the different conditions of the successive qualities; in that case the variations, which were insensible when they arose gradually, do now appear of consequence, and seem entirely to destroy the identity. By this means there arises a kind of contrariety in our method of thinking, from the different points of view, in which we survey the object, and from the nearness or remoteness of those instants of time, which we compare together. When we gradually follow an object in its successive changes, the smooth progress of the thought makes us ascribe tn identity {1:507} to the succession; because 'tis by a similar act of the mind we consider an unchangeable object. When we compare its situation after a considerable change the progress of the thought is. broke; and consequently we are presented with the idea of diversity: In order to reconcile which contradictions the imagination is apt to feign something unknown and invisible, which it supposes to continue the same under all these variations; and this unintelligible something it calls a

***substance,* or original and first matter.**

We entertain a like notion with regard to the *simplicity of* substances, and from like causes. Suppose an object perfectly simple and indivisible to be presented, along with another object, whose *co-existent* parts are connected together by a strong relation, 'tis evident the actions of the mind, in considering these two objects, are not very different. The imagination conceives the simple object at once, with facility, by a single effort of thought, without change or variation. The connexion of parts in the compound object has almost the same effect, and so unites the object within itself, that the fancy feels not the transition in passing from one part to another. Hence the colour, taste, figure, solidity, and other qualities, combin'd in a peach or melon, are conceiv'd to form one thing; and that on account of their close relation, which makes them affect the thought in the ' same manner, as if perfectly uncompounded. But the mind rests not here. Whenever it views the object in another light, it finds that all these qualities are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other; which view of things being destructive of its primary and more natural notions, obliges the imagination to feign an unknown something, or *original* substance and matter, as a principle of union or cohesion among these qualities, and as what may give the compound object a title to be call'd one thing, notwithstanding its diversity and composition.

The peripatetic philosophy asserts the original matter to be perfectly homogeneous in all bodies, and considers fire, water, @h, and air, as of the very same substance; on account of their gradual revolutions and changes into each other. At the same time it assigns to each of these species of objects a distinct substantial form, which it supposes to be the source of all those different qualities they possess, and to be a new foundation of simplicity and identity to each particular {1:508} species. All depends on our manner of viewing the objects. When we look along the insensible changes of bodies, we suppose all of them to be of the same substance or essence. When we consider their sensible differences, we attribute to each of them a substantial and essential difference. And in order to indulge ourselves in both these ways of considering our objects, we suppose all bodies to have at once a substance and a substantial form.

The notion of accidents is an unavoidable consequence of this method of thinking with regard to substances and substantial forms; nor can we forbear looking upon colours, sounds, tastes, figures, and other properties of bodies, as existences, which cannot subsist apart, but require a subject of inhesion to sustain and support them. For having never discover'd any of these sensible qualities, where, for the reasons above-mention'd, we did not likewise fancy a substance to exist; the same habit, which makes us infer a connexion betwixt cause and effect, makes us here infer a dependence of every quality on the unknown substance. The custom of imagining a dependence has the same effect as the custom of observing it wou'd have. This conceit, however, is no more reasonable than any of the foregoing. Every quality being a distinct thing from another, may be conceiv'd to exist apart, and may exist apart, not only from every other quality, but from that unintelligible chimera of a substance.

But these philosophers carry their fictions still farther in their sentiments concerning occult qualities, and both suppose a substance supporting, which they do not understand, and an accident supported, of which they have as imperfect an idea. The whole system, therefore, is entirely incomprehensible, and yet is deriv'd from principles as natural as any of these above-explain'd.

In considering this subject we may observe a gradation of three opinions, that rise above each other, according as the persons, who form them, acquire new degrees of reason and knowledge. These opinions are that of the vulgar, that of a false philosophy, and that of the true; where we

shall find upon enquiry, that the true philosophy approaches nearer to the sentiments of the vulgar, than to those of a mistaken knowledge. 'Tis natural. for men, in their common and care, {1:509} less way of thinking, to imagine they perceive a connexion betwixt such objects as they have constantly found united together; and because custom has render'd it difficult to separate the ideas, they are apt to fancy such a separation to be in itself impossible and absurd. But philosophers, who abstract from the effects of custom, and compare the ideas of objects, immediately perceive the falshood of these vulgar sentiments, and discover that there is no known connexion among objects. Every different object appears to them entirely distinct and separate; and they perceive, that 'tis not from a view of the nature and qualities of objects we infer one from another, but only when in several instances we observe them to have been constantly conjoin'd. But these philosophers, instead of drawing a just inference from this observation, and concluding, that we have no idea of power or agency, separate from the mind, and belonging to causes; I say, instead of drawing this conclusion, they frequently search for the qualities, in which this agency consists, and are displeased with every system, which their reason suggests to them, in order to explain it. They have sufficient force of genius to free them from the vulgar error, that there is a natural and perceivable connexion betwixt the several sensible qualities and. actions of matter; but not sufficient to keep them from ever seeking for this connexion in matter, or causes. Had they fallen upon the just conclusion, they wou'd have return'd back to the situation of the vulgar, and wou'd have regarded all these disquisitions with indolence and indifference. At present they seem to be in a very lamentable condition, and such as the poets have given us but a faint notion of in their descriptions of the punishment of Sisyphus and Tantalus. For what can be imagin'd more tormenting, than to seek with eagerness, what for ever flies us; and seek for it in a place, where 'tis impossible it can ever exist?

But as nature seems to have observ'd a kind of justice and compensation in every thing, she has not neglected philosophers more than the rest of the creation; but has reserv'd them a consolation amid all their disappointments and afflictions. This consolation principally consists in their invention {1:510} of the words:faculty and occult quality. For it being usual, after the frequent use of terms, which are reall*y* significant and intelligible, to omit the idea, which we wou'd express by them, and to preserve only the custom, by which we recal the idea at pleasure; so it naturally happens, that after the frequent use of terms, which are wholly insignificant and unintelligible, we fancy them to be on the same footing with the precedent, and to have a secret meaning, which we might discover by reflection. The resemblance of their appearance deceives the mind, as is usual, and makes us imagine a thorough resemblance and conformity. By this means these philosophers set themselves at ease, and arrive at last, by an illusion, at the same indifference, which the people attain by their stupidity, and true philosophers by their moderate scepticism. They need only say, that any phenomenon, which puzzles them, arises from a faculty or an occult quality, and there is an end of all dispute and enquiry upon the matter.

But among all the instances, wherein the Peripatetics have shewn they were guided by every trivial propensity of the imagination, no one is more-remarkable than their sym*pathies, antipathies, and horrors of* a vacuum. There is a very remarkable inclination in human nature, to bestow on external objects the same emotions, which it observes in itself; and to find every where those ideas, which are most present to it. This inclination, 'tis true, is suppressed by a little reflection, and only takes place in children, poets, and the antient philosophers. It appears in children, by their desire of beating the stones, which hurt them: In poets, by their readiness to personify every thing: And in the antient philosophers, by these fictions of sympathy and antipathy. We must pardon children,

because of their age; poets, because they profess to follow implicitly the suggestions of their fancy: But what excuse shall we find to justify our philosophers in so signal a weakness?

SECT. *IV.-Of the Modern Philosophy.*

But here it may be objected, that the imagination, according to my own confession, being the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy, I am unjust in blaming the antient philosophers for making use of that faculty, and allowing {1:511} themselves to be entirely guided by it in their reasonings. In order to justify myself, I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistible, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes: And the principles, which are changeable, weak, and irregular; such as those I have just now taken notice of. The former are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin. The latter are neither unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful in the conduct of life; but on the contrary are observ'd only to take place in weak minds, and being opposite to the other principles of custom and reasoning, may easily be subverted by a due contrast and opposition. For this reason the former are received by philosophy, and the latter rejected. One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the dark, reasons justly and naturally; tho' that conclusion be deriv'd from nothing but custom, which infixes and inlivens the idea of a human creature, on account of his usual conjunction with the present impression. But one, who is tormented he knows not why, with the apprehension of spectres in the dark, may, perhaps, be said to reason, and to reason naturally too: But then it must be in the same sense, that a malady is said to be natural; as arising from natural causes, tho' it be contrary to health, the most agreeable and most natural situation of man.

The opinions of the antient philosophers, their fictions of substance and accident, and their reasonings concerning substantial forms and occult qualities, are like the spectres in the dark, and are deriv'd from principles, which, however common, are neither universal nor unavoidable in human nature. The modern philosophy pretends to be entirely free from this defect, and to arise only from the solid, permanent, and consistent principles of the imagination. Upon what grounds this pretension is founded must now be the subject of our enquiry.

The fundamental principle of that philosophy is the opinion concerning colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind, deriv'd from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects. Upon examination, {1:512} I find only one of the reasons commonly produc'd for this opinion to be satisfactory, viz. that deriv'd from the variations of those impressions, even while the external object, to all appearance, continues the same. These variations depend upon several circumstances. Upon the different situations of our health: A man in a malady feels a disagreeable taste in meats, which before pleas'd him the most. Upon the different complexions and constitutions of men That seems bitter to one, which is sweet to another. Upon the difference of their external situation and position: Colours reflected from the clouds change according to the distance of the clouds, and according to the angle they make with the eye and luminous body. Fire. also communicates the sensation of pleasure at one distance, and that of pain at another. Instances of this kind are very numerous and frequent.

The conclusion drawn from them, is likewise as satisfactory as can possibly be imagin'd. 'Tis certain, that when different impressions of the same sense arise from any object, every one of these impressions has not a resembling quality existent in the object. For as the same object cannot, at

the same time, be endow'd with different qualities of the same sense, and as the same quality cannot resemble impressions entirely different; it evidently follows, that many of our impressions have no external model or archetype. Now from like effects we presume like causes. Many of the impressions of colour, sound, &c. are confest to be nothing but internal existences, and to arise from causes, which no ways resemble them. These impressions are in appearance nothing different from the other impressions of colour, sound, &c. We conclude, therefore, that they are, all of them, deriv'd from a like origin.

This principle being once admitted, all the other doctrines of that philosophy seem to follow by an easy consequence. For upon the removal of sounds, colours, beat, cold, and other sensible qualities, from the rank of continu'd independent existences, we are reduc'd merely to what are called primary qualities, as the only real ones., of which we have any adequate notion. These primary qualities are extension and solidity, with their different mixtures and modifications; figure, motion, gravity, and cohesion. The generation, encrease, decay, and corruption of animals and vegetables, {1:513} are nothing but changes of figure and motion; as also the operations of all bodies on each other; of fire, of light, water, air, earth, and of all the elements and powers of nature. One figure and motion produces another figure and motion; nor does there remain in. the material universe any other principle, either active or passive, of which we can form the most distant idea.

I believe many objections might be made to this system But at present I shall confine myself to one, which is in my opinion very decisive. I assert, that instead of explaining the operations of external objects by its means, we utterly annihilate all these objects, and reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant scepticism concerning them. If colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possest of a real, continu'd, and independent existence; not even motion, extension and solidity, which are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on.'

To begin with the examination of motion; 'tis evident this is a quality altogether inconceivable alone, and without a reference to some other object. The idea of motion necessarily supposes that of a body moving. Now what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible? It must resolve itself into the idea of extension or of solidity; and consequently the reality of motion depends upon that of these other qualities.

This opinion, which is universally acknowledg'd concerning motion, I have prov'd to be true with regard to extension; and have shewn that 'tis impossible to conceive extension, but as compos'd of parts, endow'd with colour or solidity.2 The idea of extension is a compound idea; but as it is not compounded of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, it must at last resolve itself into such as are perfectly simple and indivisible. These simple and indivisible parts, not being ideas of extension, must be non entities, unless conceiv'd as colour'd or solid. Colour is excluded from any real existence. The reality, therefore, of our idea of extension depends upon the reality of that of solidity, nor can the former be just while the latter is chimerical. Let us, then, lend our attention to the examination of the idea of solidity.

The idea of solidity is that of two objects, which being {1:514} impell'd by the utmost force, cannot penetrate each other; but still maintain a separate and distinct existence. Solidity, therefore, is perfectly incomprehensible alone, and without the conception of some bodies, which are solid, and maintain this separate and distinct existence. Now what idea have we of these bodies? The ideas of colours, sounds, and other secondary qualities are excluded. The idea of motion depends on that of extension, and the idea of extension on that of solidity. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that the idea of solidity can depend on either of them. For that wou'd be to run in a circle, and make one idea

depend on another, while at the same time the latter depends on the former. Our modern philosophy, therefore, leaves us no just nor satisfactory idea of solidity; nor consequently of matter.

This argument will appear entirely conclusive to every one that comprehends it; but because it may seem abstruse and intricate to the generality of readers, I hope to be excus'd, if I endeavour to render it more obvious by some variation of the expression. In order to form an idea of solidity, we must conceive two bodies pressing on each other without any penetration; and 'tis impossible to arrive at this idea, when we confine ourselves to one object, much more without conceiving any. Two non-entities cannot exclude each other from their places; because they -never possess any place, nor can be endow'd with any quality. *Now* I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects, to which we suppose solidity to belong? To say, that we conceive them merely as solid, is to run on in infinitum. To affirm, that we paint them out to ourselves as extended, either resolves all into a false idea, or returns in a circle. Extension must necessarily be considered either as colour'd, which is a false idea; I or as solid, which brings us back to the first question. We may make the same observation concerning mobility and figure; and upon the whole must conclude, that after the exclusion of colours, sounds, heat and cold from the rank of external existences, there remains nothing, which can afford us a just and constituent idea of body.

Add to this, that, properly speaking, solidity or impenetrability {1:515} is nothing, but an impossibility of annihilation, as I has been already observ'd: For which reason 'tis the more necessary for us to form some distinct idea of that object, whose annihilation we suppose impossible. An impossibility of being annihilated cannot exist, and can never be conceived to exist, by itself: but necessarily requires some object or real existence, to which it may belong. Now the difficulty still remains, how to form an idea of this object or existence, without having recourse to the secondary and sensible qualities.

Nor must we omit on this occasion our accustomed method of examining ideas by considering those impressions, from which they are deriv'd. The impressions, which enter by the sight and hearing, the smell and taste, are affirm'd by modern philosophy to be without any resembling objects; and consequently the idea of solidity, which is suppos'd to be real, can never be deriv'd from any of these senses. There remains, therefore, the feeling as the only sense, that can convey the impression, which is original to the idea of solidity; and indeed we naturally imagine, that we feel the solidity of bodies, and need but touch any object in order to perceive this quality. But this method of thinking is more popular than philosophical; as will appear from the following reflections.

First, 'Tis easy to observe, that tho' bodies are felt by means of their solidity, yet the feeling is a quite different thing from the solidity; and that they have not the least resemblance to each other. A man, who has the palsey in one hand, has as perfect an idea of impenetrability, when he observes that hand to be supported by the table, as when he feels the same table with the other hand. An object, that presses upon any of our members, meets with resistance; and that resistance, by the motion it gives to the nerves and animal spirits, conveys a certain sensation to the mind; but it does not follow, that the sensation, motion, and resistance are any ways resembling.

Secondly, The impressions of touch are simple impressions, except when considered with regard to their extension; which makes nothing to the present purpose: And from this simplicity I infer, that they neither represent solidity, nor any real object. For let us put two cases, viz. that of a man, {1:516} who presses a stone, or any solid body, with his hand, and that of two stones, which press

each other; 'twill readily be allow'd, that these two cases are not in every respect alike, but that in the former there is conjoin'd with the solidity, a feeling or sensation, of which there is no appearance in the latter. In order, therefore, to make these two cases alike, 'tis necessary to remove some part of the impression, which the man feels by his hand, or organ of sensation; and that being impossible in a simple impression, obliges us to remove the whole, and proves that this whole impression has no archetype or model in external objects. To which we may add, that solidity necessarily supposes two bodies, along with contiguity and impulse; which being a compound object, can never be represented by a simple impression. Not to mention, that tho' solidity continues always invariably the same, the impressions of touch change every moment upon us; which is a clear proof that the latter are not representations of the former.

Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body. When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude, that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu'd and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe, which has such an existence.

SECT. *V.-Of the* Immateriality *of the Soul.*

Having found such contradictions and difficulties in every system concerning external objects, and in the idea of matter, which we fancy so clear and determinate, We shall naturally expect still greater difficulties and contradictions in every hypothesis concerning our internal perceptions, and the nature of the mind, which we are apt to imagine so much more obscure, and uncertain. But in this we shou'd deceive ourselves. The intellectual world, tho' involv'd in infinite obscurities, is not perplex'd with any such contradictions, as those we have discovered in the natural. What is known {1:517} concerning it, agrees with itself; and what is unknown, we must be contented to leave so.

'Tis true, wou'd we hearken to certain philosophers, they promise to diminish our ignorance; but I am afraid 'tis at the hazard of running us into contradictions, from which the subject is of itself exempted. These philosophers are the curious reasoners concerning the material or immaterial substances, in which they suppose our perceptions to inhere. In order to put a stop to these endless cavils on both sides, I know no better method, than to ask these philosophers in a few words, *What they mean by* substance and inhesion? And after they have answer'd this question, 'twill then be reasonable, and not till then, to enter seriously into the dispute.

This question we have found impossible to be answer'd with regard to matter and body: But besides that in the case of the mind, it labours under all the same difficulties, 'tis burthen'd with some additional ones, which are peculiar to that subject. As every idea is deriv'd from a precedent impression, had we any idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an impression of it; which is very difficult, if not impossible, to be conceiv'd. For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? And how can an impression resemble a substance, since, according to this philosophy, it is not a substance, and has none of the peculiar qualities or characteristics of a substance?

But leaving the question *of what* may or may not be, for that other what *actually is,* I desire those philosophers, who pretend that we have an idea of the substance of our minds, to point out the impression that produces it, and tell distinctly after what manner that impression operates, and from what object it is deriv'd. Is it an impression of sensation or of reflection? Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent? I Does it attend us at all times, or does it only return at intervals? If at

intervals, at what times principally does it return, and by what causes is it produced?

If instead of answering these questions, any one shou'd evade the difficulty, by saying, that the definition of a substance is *something which may exist by itself;* and that this definition ought to satisfy us: Shou'd this be said, I shou'd observe, that this definition agrees to every thing, that can {1:518} possibly be conceiv'd; and never will serve to distinguish substance from accident, or the soul from its perceptions. For thus I reason. Whatever is clearly conceiv'd may exist; and whatever is clearly conceiv'd, after any manner, may exist after the same manner. This is one principle, which has been already acknowledged. Again, every thing, which is different, is distinguishable, and every thing which is distinguishable, is separable by the imagination. This is another principle. My conclusion from both is, that since all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be considered as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support their existence.' They are, therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a substance.

Thus neither by considering the first origin of ideas, nor by means of a definition are we able to arrive at any satisfactory notion of substance; which seems to me a sufficient reason for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul, and makes me absolutely condemn even the question itself. We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance. Inhesion in something is suppos'd to be requisite to support the existence of our perceptions. Nothing appears requisite to support the existence of a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of inhesion. What possibility then of answering that question, *Whether perceptions* inhere in a material or immaterial substance, when we do not so much as understand the meaning of the question?

There is one argument commonly employ'd for the immateriality of the soul, which seems to me remarkable. Whatever is extended consists of parts; and whatever consists of parts is divisible, if not in reality, at least in the imagination. But 'tis impossible anything divisible can be conjoin'd to a thought or perception, which is a being altogether inseparable and indivisible. For supposing such a conjunction, wou'd the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body? On the surface or in the middle? On the back- or fore-side of {1:519} it? If it be conjoin'd with the extension, it must exist somewhere within its dimensions. If it exist within its dimensions, it must either exist in one particular part; and then that particular part is indivisible, and the perception is conjoined only with it, not with the extension: Or if the thought exists in every part, it must also be extended, and separable, and divisible, as well as the body; which is utterly absurd and contradictory. For can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness? Thought, therefore, and extension are qualities wholly incompatible, and never can incorporate together into one subject.

This argument affects not the question concerning the substance of the soul, but only that concerning its local conjunction with matter; and therefore it may not be improper to consider in general what objects are, or are not susceptible of a local conjunction. This is a curious question, and may lead us to some discoveries of considerable moment.

The first notion of space and extension is deriv'd solely from the senses of sight and feeling; nor is there any thing, but what is colour'd or tangible, that has parts dispos'd after such a manner, as to convey that idea.' When we diminish or encrease a relish, 'tis not after the same manner that we diminish or encrease any visible object; and when several sounds strike our hearing at once,

custom and reflection alone make us form an idea of the degrees of the distance and contiguity of those bodies, from which they are deriv'd. Whatever marks the place of its existence either must be extended, or must be a mathematical point, without parts or composition. What is extended must have a particular figure, as square, round, triangular; none of which will agree to a desire, or indeed to any impression or idea, except- o these two senses above-mention'd. Neither ought a desire, tho' indivisible, to be considered as a mathematical point. For in that case 'twou'd be possible, by the addition of others, to make two, three, four desires, and these dispos'd and situated in such a manner, as to have a determinate length, breadth and thickness; which is evidently absurd.

'Twill not be surprising after this, if I deliver a maxim, which is condemn'd by several metaphysicians, and is esteem'd contrary to the most certain principles of hum {1:520} reason. This maxim is that an *object may exist,* and yet be no where: and I assert, that this is not only possible, but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner.' An object may be said to be no where, when its parts are not so situated with respect to each other, as to form any figure or quantity; nor the whole with respect to other bodies so as to answer to our notions of contiguity or distance. Now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and objects, except those of the sight and feeling. A moral reflection cannot be plac'd on the right or on the left hand of a passion, -nor can a smell or sound be either of a circular or a square figure. These objects and perceptions, so far from requiring any particular place, are absolutely incompatible with it, and even the imagination cannot attribute it to them. And as to the absurdity of supposing them to be no where, we may consider, that if the passions and sentiments appear to the perception to have any particular place, the idea of extension might be deriv'd from them, as well as from the sight and touch; contrary to what we have already establish'd. If they <appear> not to have any particular place, they may possibly *exist* in the same manner; since whatever we conceive is possible.

'Twill not now be -necessary to prove, that those perceptions, which are simple, and exist no where, are incapable of any conjunction in place with matter or body, which is extended and divisible; since 'tis impossible to found a relation but on some common quality. It may be better worth our while to remark, that this question of the local conjunction of objects does not only occur in metaphysical disputes concerning the nature of the soul, but that even in common life we have every moment occasion to examine it. Thus supposing we consider a fig at one end of the table, and an olive at the other, 'tis evident, that in forming the complex ideas of these substances, one of the most obvious is that of their different relishes; and 'tis as evident, that we incorporate and conjoin these qualities with such as are colour'd and tangible. The bitter taste of the one, and sweet of the other are suppos'd to lie in the very visible body, and to be separated from each other by the whole length of the table. This is so notable and so natural an illusion, that it may be proper to consider the principles, from which it is deriv'd. {1:521}

Tho' an extended object be incapable of a conjunction in place with another, that exists without any place or extension, yet are they susceptible of many other relations. Thus the taste and smell of any fruit are inseparable from its other qualities of colour and tangibility; and which-ever of them be the cause or effect, 'tis certain they are always co-existent.' Nor are they only co-existent in general, but also co-temporary in their appearance in the mind; and 'tis upon the application of the extended body to our senses we perceive its particular taste and smell. These relations, then, of causation, and contiguity in the time *of their appearance,* betwixt the extended object and the quality, which exists without any particular place, must have such an effect on the mind, that upon

the appearance of one it will immediately turn its thought to the conception of the other. Nor is this all. We not only turn our thought from one to the other upon account of their relation, but likewise endeavour to give them a new relation, viz. that of a conjunction in place, that we may render the transition more easy and natural. For 'tis a quality, which I shall often have occasion to remark in human nature, and shall explain more fully in its proper place, that when objects are united by any relation, we have a strong propensity to add some new relation to them, in order to compleat the union. In our arrangement of bodies we never fail to place such as are resembling, in contiguity to each other, or at least in correspondent points of view: Why? but because we feel a satisfaction in joining the relation of contiguity to that of resemblance, or the resemblance of situation to that of qualities. The effects this propensity have been already observ'd in that resemblance, which we so readily suppose betwixt particular impressions and their external causes. But we shall not find a more evident effect of it, than in the present instance, where from the relations of causation and contiguity in time betwixt two objects, we feign likewise that of a conjunction in place, in order to strengthen the connexion.

But whatever confus'd notions we may form of an union in place betwixt an extended body, as a fig, and its particular taste, 'tis certain that -upon reflection we must observe this union something altogether unintelligible and contradictory. {1:522} For shou'd we ask ourselves one obvious question, viz. if the taste, which we conceive to be contain'd in the circumference of the body, is in every part of it or in one only, we must quickly find ourselves at a loss, and perceive the impossibility of ever giving a satisfactory answer. We cannot rely, that 'tis only in one part: For experience convinces us, that every part has the same relish. We can as little reply, that it exists in every part: For then we must suppose it figur'd and extended; which is absurd and incomprehensible. Here then we are influenc'd by two principles directly contrary to each other, viz. that inclination of our fancy by which we are determin'd to incorporate the taste with the extended object, and our reason, which shows us the impossibility of such an union. Being divided betwixt these opposite principles, we renounce neither one nor the other, but involve the subject in such confusion and obscurity, that we no longer perceive the opposition. We suppose, that the taste exists within the circumference of the body, but in such a manner, that it fills the whole without extension, and exists entire in every part without separation. In short, we use in our most familiar way of thinking, that scholastic principle, which, when crudely propos'd, appears so shocking, of totum in *toto* & tolum in *qualibet parte:* Which is much the same, as if we shou'd say, that a thing is in a certain place, and yet is not there.

All this absurdity proceeds from our endeavouring to bestow a place on what is utterly incapable of it; and that endeavour again arises from our inclination to compleat an union, which is founded on causation., and a contiguity of time, by attributing to the objects a conjunction in place. But if ever reason be of sufficient force to overcome prejudice, 'tis certain, that in the present case it must prevail. For we have only this choice left, either to suppose that some beings exist without any place; or that they are figur'd and extended; or that when they are incorporated with extended objects, the whole is in the whole, and the whole in every part. The absurdity of the two last suppositions proves sufficiently the veracity of the first. Nor is there any fourth opinion. For as to the supposition of their existence in the manner of mathematical points, it resolves itself into the second opinion, and supposes, that several passions may be plac'd in a circular figure, and that a certain number of {1:523} smells, conjoin'd with a certain number of sounds, may make a body of twelve cubic inches; which appears ridiculous upon the bare mentioning of it.

But tho' in this view of things we cannot refuse to condemn the materialists, who conjoin all

thought with extension; yet a little reflection will show us equal reason for blaming their antagonists, who conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance. The most vulgar philosophy informs us, that no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately, and without the interposition of an image or perception. That table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception. Now the most obvious of all its qualities is extension. The perception consists of parts. These parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity; of length, breadth, and thickness. The termination of these three dimensions is what we call figure. This figure is moveable, separable, and divisible. Mobility, and separability are the distinguishing properties of extended objects. And to cut short all disputes, the very idea of extension is copy'd from nothing but an impression, and consequently must perfectly agree to it. To say the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is to say it is extended.

The free-thinker may now triumph in his turn; and having found there are impressions and ideas really extended, may ask his antagonists, how they can incorporate a simple and indivisible subject with an extended perception? All the arguments of Theologians may here be retorted upon them. Is the indivisible subject, or immaterial substance, if you will, on the left or on the right hand of the perception? Is it in this particular part, or in that other? Is it in every part without being extended? Or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest? 'Tis impossible to give any answer to these questions, but what will both be absurd in itself, and will account for the union of our indivisible perceptions with an extended substance.

This gives me an occasion to take a-new into consideration the question concerning the substance of the soul; and tho' I have condemn'd that question as utterly unintelligible, yet I cannot forbear proposing some farther reflections concerning it. I assert, that the doctrine of the immateriality, {1:534} simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism, and will serve to justify all those sentiments, for which Spinoza is so universally infamous. From this topic, I hope at least to reap one advantage, that my adversaries will not have any pretext to render the present doctrine odious by their declamations, when they see that they can be so easily retorted on them.'

The fundamental principle of the atheism of Spinoza is the doctrine of the simplicity of the universe, and the unity of that substance, in which he supposes both thought and matter to inhere. There is only one substance, says he, in the world; and that substance is perfectly simple and indivisible, and exists every where,, without any local presence. Whatever we discover externally by sensation; whatever we feel internally by reflection; all these are nothing but modifications of that one, simple, and necessarily existent being, and are not possest of any separate or distinct existence. Every passion of the soul; every configuration of matter, however different and various, inhere in the same substance, and preserve in themselves their characters of distinction, without communicating them to that subject, in which they inhere. The same substratum, if I may so speak, supports the most different modifications, without any difference in itself; and varies them, without any variation. Neither time, nor place, nor all the diversity of nature are able to produce any composition or change in its perfect simplicity and identity.

I believe this brief exposition of the principles of that famous atheist will be sufficient for the present purpose, and that without entering farther into these gloomy and obscure regions, I shall be able to shew, that this hideous hypothesis is almost the same with that of the immateriality of the soul, which has become so popular. To make this evident, let us 11 remember, that as every idea is deriv'd from a preceding perception, 'tis impossible our idea of a perception, and that of an object or external existence can ever represent what are specifically different from each other. Whatever difference we may suppose betwixt them, 'tis still incomprehensible to us; and we are

oblig'd either to conceive an external object merely as a relation without a relative, or to make it the very same with a perception or impression. {1:525}

The consequence I shall draw from this may, at first sight, appear a mere sophism; but upon the least examination will be found solid and satisfactory. I say then, that since we may suppose, but never can conceive a specific deference betwixt an object and impression; any conclusion we form concerning the connexion and repugnance of impressions, will not be known certainly to be applicable to objects; but that on the other hand, whatever conclusions of this kind we form concerning objects, will most certainly be applicable to impressions. The reason is not difficult. As an object is suppos'd to be different from an impression, we cannot be sure, that the circumstance, upon which we found our reasoning, is common to both, supposing we form the reasoning -upon the impression. 'Tis still possible, that the object may differ from it in that particular. But when we first form our reasoning concerning the object, 'tis beyond doubt, that the same reasoning must extend to the impression: And that because the quality of the object, upon which the argument is founded, must at least be conceiv'd by the mind; and cou'd not be conceiv'd, unless it were common to an impression; since we have no idea but what is deriv'd from that origin. Thus we may establish it as a certain maxim, that we can never, by any principle, but by an irregular kind I of reasoning from experience, discover a connexion or repugnance betwixt objects, which extends not to impressions; tho' the inverse proposition may not be equally true, that all the discoverable relations of impressions are common to objects.

To apply this to the present case; there are two different systems of being presented, to which I suppose myself under .t necessity of assigning some substance, or ground of inhesion. I observe first the universe of objects or of body: The sun, moon and stars; the earth, seas, plants, animals, men, ships, houses, and other productions either of art or nature. Here Spinoza appears, and tells me, that these are only modifications; and that the subject, in which they inhere, is simple, incompounded, and indivisible. After this I consider the other system of beings, viz. the universe of thought, or my impressions and ideas. There I observe another sun, moon and stars; an earth, and seas, cover'd and inhabited by plants and animals; towns, houses, mountains, {1:526} rivers; and in short every thing I can discover or conceive in the first system. Upon my enquiring concerning these, Theologians present themselves, and tell me, that these also are modifications, and modifications of one simple, uncompounded, and indivisible substance. Immediately upon which I am deafen'd with the noise of a hundred voices, that treat the first hypothesis with detestation and scorn, and the second with applause and veneration. I turn my attention to these hypotheses to see what may be the reason of so great a partiality; and find that they have the same fault of being unintelligible, and that as far as we can understand them, they are so much alike, that 'tis impossible to discover any absurdity in one, which is not common to both of them. We have no idea of any quality in an object, which does not agree to, and may not represent a quality in an impression; and that because all our ideas are deriv'd from our impressions. We can never, therefore, find any repugnance betwixt an extended object as a modification, and a simple uncompounded essence, as its substance, unless that repugnance takes place equally betwixt the perception or impression of that extended object, and the same uncompounded essence. Every idea of a quality in an object passes thro' an impression; and therefore every *perceivable* relation, whether of connexion or repugnance, must be common both to objects and impressions.

But tho' this argument, considered in general, seems evident beyond all doubt and contradiction, yet to make it more clear and sensible, let us survey it in detail; and see whether all the absurdities, which have been found in the system of Spinoza, may not likewise be discovered in that of

Theologians.'

First, It has been said against Spinoza, according to the scholastic way of talking, rather than thinking, that a mode, not being any distinct or separate existence, must be the very same with its substance, and consequently the extension of the universe, must be in a manner identify'd with that, simple, uncompounded essence, in which the universe is suppos'd to inhere. But this, it may be pretended, is utterly impossible and inconceivable unless the indivisible substance expand itself, so as to correspond to the extension, or the extension contract itself, so as to answer to the indivisible substance. {1:627} This argument seems just, as far as we can understand it; and 'tis plain nothing is requir'd, but a change in the terms, to apply the same argument to our extended perceptions, and the simple essence of the soul; the ideas of objects and perceptions being in every respect the same, only attended with the supposition of a difference, that is unknown and incomprehensible.

Secondly, It has been said, that we have no idea of substance, which is not applicable to matter; nor any idea of a distinct substance, which is not applicable to every distinct portion of matter. Matter, therefore, is not a mode but a substance, and each part of matter is not a distinct mode, but a distinct substance. I have already prov'd, that we have no perfect idea of substance; but that taking it for some*thing, that can exist by itself,* 'tis evident every perception is a substance, and every distinct part of a perception a distinct substance: And consequently the one hypothesis labours under the same difficulties in this respect with the other.

Thirdly, It has been objected to the system of one simple substance in the universe, that this substance being the support or substratum of every thing, must at the very same instant be modify'd into forms, which are contrary and incompatible. The round and square figures are incompatible in the same substance at the same time. How then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modify'd into that square table, and into this round one? I ask the same question concerning the impressions of these tables; and find that the answer is no more satisfactory in one case than in the other.

It appears, then, that to whatever side we turn, the same difficulties follow us, and that we cannot advance one step towards the establishing the simplicity and immateriality o the soul, without preparing the way for a dangerous and irrecoverable atheism. 'Tis the same case, if instead o calling thought a modification of the soul, we shou'd give it the more antient, and yet more modish name of an action. B an action we mean much the same thing, as what is commonly call'd an abstract mode; that is, something, which, properly speaking, is neither distinguishable, nor separable from its substance, and is only conceiv'd by a distinction o reason, or an abstraction. But nothing is gain'd by this {1:528} change of the term of modification, for that of action; nor do we free ourselves from one single difficulty by its means; as will appear from the two following reflexions.

First, I observe, that the word, action, according to this explication of it, can never justly be apply'd to any perception, as deriv'd from a mind or thinking substance. Our perceptions are all really different, and separable, and distinguishable from each other, and from everything else, which we can imagine: and therefore 'tis impossible to conceive, how they can be the action or abstract mode of any substance. The instance of motion, which is commonly made use of to shew after what manner perception depends, as an action, upon its substance, rather confounds than instructs us.' Motion to all appearance induces no real nor essential change on the body, but only varies its relation to other objects. But betwixt a person in the morning walking a garden with

company, agreeable to him; and a person in the afternoon inclos'd in a dungeon, and full of terror, despair, and resentment., there seems to be a radical difference, and of quite another kind, than what is produc'd on a body by the change of its situation. As we conclude from the distinction and separability of their ideas, that external objects have a separate existence from each other; so when we make these ideas themselves our objects, we must draw the same conclusion concerning them, according to the precedent reasoning. At least it must be confest, that having idea of the substance of the soul, 'tis impossible for us to tell how it can admit of such differences, and even contrarieties of perception without any fundamental change; and consequently can never tell in what sense perceptions are actions of that substance. The use, therefore, of the word, action, unaccompany'd with any meaning, instead of that of modification, makes no addition to our knowledge, nor is of any advantage to the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul.

I add in the second place, that if it brings any advantage to that cause, it must bring an equal to the cause of atheism. For do our Theologians pretend to make a monopoly of the word, action, and may not the atheists likewise take possession of it, and affirm that plants, animals, men, &c. are nothing but particular actions of one simple universal substance, {1:529} which exerts itself from a blind and absolute necessity? This you'll say is utterly absurd. I own 'tis unintelligible; but at the same time assert, according to the principles above-explain'd, that 'tis impossible to discover any absurdity in the supposition, that all the various objects in nature are actions of one simple substance, which absurdity will not be applicable to a like supposition concerning impressions and ideas.

From these hypotheses concerning the substance and local conjunction of our perceptions, we may pass to another, which is more intelligible than the former, and more important than the latter, viz. concerning the cause of our perceptions. Matter and motion, 'tis commonly said in the schools, however vary'd, are still matter and motion, and produce only a difference in the position and situation of objects. Divide a body as often as you please, 'tis still body. Place it in any figure, nothing ever results but figure, or the relation of parts. Move it in any manner, you still find motion or a change of relation. 'Tis absurd to imagine, that motion in a circle, for instance, shou'd be nothing but merely motion in a circle; while motion in another direction, as in an ellipse, shou'd also be a passion or moral reflection: That the shocking of two globular particles shou'd become a sensation of pain, and that the meeting of two triangular ones shou'd afford a pleasure. Now as these different shocks, and variations, and mixtures are the only changes, of which matter is susceptible, and as these never afford us any idea of thought or perception, 'tis concluded to be impossible, that thought can ever be caus'd by matter.

Few have been able to withstand the seeming evidence of this argument; and yet nothing in the world is more easy than to refute it. We need only reflect on what has been prov'd at large, that we are never sensible of any connexion betwixt causes and effects, and that 'tis only by our experience of their constant conjunction, we can arrive at any knowledge of this relation. Now as all objects, which are not contrary, are susceptible of a constant conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary; I have inferr'd from these principles, that to consider the matter a priori, any thing may produce any thing, and that we shall never discover a {1:530} reason, why any object may or may not be the cause of any other, however great, or however little the resemblance may be betwixt them. This evidently destroys the precedent reasoning concerning the cause of thought or perception. For tho' there appear no manner of connexion betwixt motion or thought, the case is the same with all other causes and effects. Place one body of a pound weight on one end of a lever, and another body of the same weight on another end; you will never find in these bodies any

principle of motion dependent on their distances from the center, more than of thought and perception. If you pretend, therefore, to prove *a priori,* that such a position of bodies can never cause thought; because turn it which way you will, 'tis nothing but a position of bodies; you must by the same course of reasoning conclude, that it can never produce motion; since there is no more apparent connexion in the one case than in the other. But as this latter conclusion is contrary to evident experience, and as 'tis possible we may have a like experience in the operations of the mind, and may perceive a constant conjunction of thought and motion; you reason too hastily, when from the mere consideration of the ideas, you conclude that 'tis impossible motion can ever produce thought, or a different position of parts give rise to a different passion or reflection. Nay 'tis not only possible we may have such an experience, but 'tis certain we have it; since every one may perceive, that the different dispositions of his body change his thoughts and sentiments. And shou'd it be said, that this depends on the union of soul and body; I wou'd answer, that we must separate the question concerning the substance of the mind from that concerning the cause of its thought; and that confining ourselves to the latter question we find by the comparing their ideas, that thought and motion are different from each other, and by experience, that they are constantly united; which being all the circumstances, that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when apply'd to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude, that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception.

There seems only this dilemma left us in the present case; either to assert, that nothing can be the cause of another, but where the mind can perceive the connexion in its idea of the objects: Or to maintain, that all objects, which we {1:531} find constantly conjoin'd, are upon that account to be regarded as causes and effects. If we choose the first part of the dilemma, these are the consequences. First, We in reality affirm, that there is no such thing in the universe as a cause or productive principle, not even the deity himself; since our idea of that supreme Being is deriv'd from particular impressions, none of which contain any efficacy, nor seem to have any connexion with any other existence. As to what may be said, that the connexion betwixt the idea of an infinitely powerful being, and that of any effect, which he wills, is necessary and unavoidable; I answer, that we have -no idea of a being endow'd with any power, much less of one endow'd with infinite power. But if we will change expressions, we can only define power by connexion; and then in saying, that the idea, of an infinitely powerful being is connected with that of every effect, which he wills, we really do no -more than assert, that a being, whose volition is connected with every effect, is connected with every effect: which is an identical proposition, and gives us no insight into the nature of this power or connexion. But, secondly, supposing, that the deity were the great and efficacious principle, which supplies the deficiency of all causes, this leads us into the grossest impieties and absurdities. For upon the same account, that we have recourse to him in natural operations, and assert that matter cannot of itself communicate motion, or produce thought, viz. because there is no apparent connexion betwixt these objects; I say, upon the very same account, we must acknowledge that the deity is the author of all our volitions and perceptions; since they have no more apparent connexion either with one another, or with the suppos'd but unknown substance of the soul. This agency of the supreme Being we know to have been asserted by' several philosophers with relation to all the actions of the mind, except volition, or rather an inconsiderable part of volition; tho' 'tis easy to perceive, that this exception is a mere pretext, to avoid the dangerous consequences. of that doctrine. If nothing be active but what has an apparent power, thought is in no case any more active than matter; and if this inactivity must make us have recourse to a deity, the supreme being is the real cause of all our actions, bad as well as good,

vicious as well as virtuous. {1:532}

Thus we are necessarily reduc'd to the other side of the dilemma, viz.. that all objects, which are found to be constantly conjoin'd, are upon that account only to be regarded as causes and effects. Now as all objects, which are not contrary, are susceptible of a constant conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary': it follows, that for ought we can determine by the mere ideas, any thing may be the cause or effect of any thing; which evidently gives the advantage to the materialists above their antagonists.

To pronounce, then, the final decision upon the whole; the-question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible: All our perceptions are not susceptible of a local union, either with what is extended or unextended: there being some of them of the one kind, and some of the other: And as the constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and effect, matter and motion may often be regarded as the causes of thought, as far as we have any notion of that relation.

'Tis certainly A, kind of indignity to philosophy, whose sovereign authority ought every where to be acknowledged, to oblige her on every occasion to make apologies for her conclusions, and justify herself- to every particular art and science, which may be offended at her. This puts one in mind of a king arraing'd for high-treason against his subjects. There is only one occasion, when philosophy will think it necessary and even honourable to justify herself, and that is, when religion may seem to be in the least offended; whose rights are as dear to her as her own, and are indeed the same. If any one, therefore, shou'd imagine that the foregoing arguments are any ways dangerous to religion, I hope the following apology will remove his apprehensions.

There is no foundation for any conclusion a priori, either concerning the operations or duration of any object, of which 'tis possible for the human mind to form a conception. Any object may be imagin'd to become entirely inactive, or to be annihilated in a moment; and 'tis an evident principle, *that whatever we* can imagine, is *possible.* Now this is no more true of matter, than of spirit; of an extended compounded substance, than of a simple and unextended. In both cases the metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the soul are equally inconclusive: and in both cases the {1:533} moral arguments and those deriv'd from the analogy of nature are equally strong and convincing. If my philosophy, therefore, makes no addition to the arguments for religion, I have at least the satisfaction to think it takes nothing from them, but that every thing remains precisely as before.

SECT. VI.-Of Personal Identity

There are some philosophers. who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both o its perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on self either by their pain or pleasure. To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can be deriv'd from any fact, of which we are so intimately conscious; nor is there any thing, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.

Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of *self,* after the manner it is here explain'd. For from what impression cou'd this idea be deriv'd? This question 'tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet 'tis a question, which must necessarily be answer'd, if we wou'd have the

idea of self pass for clear and intelligible, It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore., be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea.'

But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions {1:534} upon this hypothesis? All these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately consider'd, and may exist separately, and have no Deed of tiny thing to support their existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, -nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of *himself*, I must confess I call reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as 1, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind,. I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; -nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a .kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the {1:535} most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd.

What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of our lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. The first is our present subject; and to explain it perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep, and account for that identity, which we attribute to plants and animals; there being a great analogy betwixt it, and the identity of a self or person.

We have a distinct idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterrupted thro' a suppos'd variation of time; and this idea we call that of identity or sameness. We have also a distinct idea of

several different objects existing in succession, and connected together by a close relation; and this to an accurate view affords as perfect a notion of *diversity,* as if there was no manner of relation among the objects. But tho' these two ideas of identity, and a succession of related objects be in themselves perfectly distinct, and even contrary, yet 'tis certain, that in our common way of thinking they are generally confounded with each other. That action of the imagination, by which we consider the uninterrupted and invariable object, and that by which we reflect on the succession of related objects, are almost the same to the feeling, nor is there much more effort of thought requir'd in the latter case than in the former. The relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one continu'd object. This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related objects. However at one instant we may consider the related succession as variable or interrupted, we are sure the next to ascribe to it a perfect identity, and regard it as enviable and uninterrupted. Our propensity to this mistake is so great from {1:536} the resemblance above-mention'd, that we fall into it before we are aware; and tho' we incessantly correct ourselves by reflection, and return to a more accurate method of thinking, yet we cannot long sustain our philosophy, or take off this biass from the imagination. Our last resource is to yield to it, and boldly assert that these different related objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and variable. In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often feign some new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents their interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continu'd existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption: and run into the notion of a soul, and *self,* and substance, to disguise the variation. But we may farther observe, that where we do not give rise to such a fiction, our propension to confound identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine I something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside their relation; and this I take to be the case with regard to the identity we ascribe to plants and vegetables. And even when this does not take place, we still feel a propensity to confound these ideas, tho' we a-re not able fully to satisfy ourselves in that particular, nor find any thing invariable and uninterrupted to justify our notion of identity.

Thus the controversy concerning identity is not merely a dispute of words. For when we attribute identity, in an improper sense, to variable or interrupted objects, our mistake is not confin'd to the expression, but is commonly attended with a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable, or at least with a propensity to such fictions. What will suffice to prove this hypothesis to the satisfaction of every fair enquirer, is to shew from daily experience and observation, that the objects, which are variable or interrupted, and yet are suppos'd to continue the same, are such only as consist of a succession of parts, connected together by resemblance, contiguity, or causation. For as such a succession answers evidently to our notion of diversity, it can {1:537} only be by mistake we ascribe to it an identity; and as the relation of parts, which leads us into this mistake, is really nothing but a quality, which produces an association of ideas, and an easy transition of the imagination from one to another, it can only be from the resemblance, which this act of the mind bears to that, by which we contemplate one continu'd object, that the error arises. Our chief business, then, must be to prove, that all objects, to which we ascribe identity, without observing their invariableness and uninterruptedness, are such as consist of a succession of related objects.

In order to this, suppose any mass of matter, of which the parts are contiguous and connected, to be plac'd before us; 'tis plain we must attribute a perfect identity to this mass, provided all the

parts continue uninterruptedly and invariably the same, whatever motion or change of place we may observe either in the whole or in any of the parts. But supposing some very small or inconsiderable part to be added to the mass, or subtracted from it; tho' this absolutely destroys the identity of the whole, strictly speaking; yet as we seldom think so accurately, we scruple not to pronounce a mass of matter the same, where we find so trivial an alteration. The passage of the thought from the object before the change to the object after it, is so smooth and easy, that we scarce perceive the transition, and are apt to imagine, that 'tis nothing but a continu'd survey of the same object.

There is a very remarkable circumstance, that attends this experiment; which is, that tho' the change of any considerable part in a mass of matter destroys the identity of the whole, let we must measure the greatness of the part, not absolutely, but by its proportion to the whole. The addition or diminution of a mountain wou'd not be sufficient to produce a diversity in a planet: tho' the change of a very few inches wou'd be able to destroy the identity of some bodies. 'Twill be impossible to account for this, but by reflecting that objects operate upon the mind, and break or interrupt the continuity of its actions not according to their real greatness, but according to their proportion to each other: And therefore, since this interruption makes an object cease to appear the same, it must be the uninterrupted progress o the thought, which constitutes the imperfect identity.

This may be confirm'd by another phenomenon. A change {1:538} in any considerable part of a body destroys its identity; but 'tis remarkable, that where the change is produc'd gradually and insensibly we are less apt to ascribe to it the same effect. The reason can plainly be no other, than that the mind, in following the successive changes of the body, feels an easy passage from the surveying its condition in one moment to the viewing of it in another, and at no particular time perceives any interruption in its actions. From which continu'd perception, it ascribes a continu'd existence and identity to the object.

But whatever precaution we may use in introducing the changes gradually, and making them proportionable to the whole, 'tis certain, that where the changes are at last observ'd to become considerable, we make a scruple of ascribing identity to such different objects. There is, however, another artifice,, by which we may induce the imagination to advance a step farther;i and that is, by producing a reference of the parts to each other, and a combination to some common end or purpose. A ship, of which a considerable part has been chang'd by frequent reparations, is still considered as the same; nor does the difference of the materials hinder us from ascribing an identity to it. The common end, in which the parts conspire, is the same under all their variations, and affords an easy transition of the imagination from one situation of the body to another.

But this is still more remarkable, when we add a *sympathy* of parts to their common end, and suppose that they bear to each other, the reciprocal relation of cause and effect in all their actions and operations. This is the case with all animals and vegetables; where not only the several parts have a reference to some general purpose, but also a mutual dependence on, and connexion with each other. The effect of so strong a relation is, that tho' every one must allow, that in a very few years both vegetables and animals endure a total change, yet we still attribute identity to them, while their form, size, and substance are entirely alter'd. An oak, that grows from a small plant to a large tree, is still the same oak; tho' there be not one particle of matter, or figure of its parts the same. An infant becomes a man-, and is sometimes fat, sometimes lean, without any change in his identity.

We may also consider the two following phaenomena, which {1:530} are remarkable in their kind. The first is, that tho' we commonly be able to distinguish pretty exactly betwixt numerical and specific identity, yet it sometimes happens, that we confound them, and in our thinking and reasoning employ the one for the other. Thus a man, who bears a noise, that is frequently interrupted and renew'd, says, it is still the same noise; tho''tis evident the sounds have only a specific identity or resemblance, and there is nothing numerically the same, but the cause, which produc'd them. In like manner it may be said without breach of the propriety of language, that such a church, which was formerly of brick, fell to ruin, and that the parish rebuilt the same church of free-stone, and according to modern architecture. Here neither the form nor materials are the same, nor is there any thing common to the two objects, but their relation to the inhabitants of the parish; and yet this alone is sufficient to make us denominate them the same. But we must observe, that in these cases the first object is in a manner annihilated before the second comes into existence; by which means, we are never presented in any one point of time with the idea of difference and multiplicity: and for that reason are less scrupulous in calling them the same.

Secondly, We may remark, that tho' in a succession of related objects, it be in a manner requisite, that the change of parts be not sudden nor entire, in order to preserve the identity, yet where the objects are in their nature changeable and inconstant, we admit of a, more sudden transition, than wou'd otherwise be consistent with that relation. Thus as the nature of a river consists in the motion and change of parts; tho' in less than four and twenty hours these be totally alter'd; this hinders not the river from continuing the same during several ages. What is natural and essential to any thing is, in a manner, expected; and what is expected makes less impression, and appears of less moment, than what is unusual and extraordinary. A considerable change of the former kind seems really less to the imagination, than the most trivial alteration of the latter; and by breaking less the continuity of the thought, has less influence in destroying the identity.

We now proceed to explain the nature of *personal identity,* which has become so great a question ill philosophy, especially of late years in *England,* where all the abstruser {1:540} sciences are study'd with a peculiar ardour and application. And here 'tis evident, the same method of reasoning must be continu'd. which has so successfully explain'd the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all the compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature. The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies.' It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects.

But lest this argument shou'd not convince the reader; tho' in my opinion perfectly decisive; let him weigh the following reasoning, which is still closer and more immediate. 'Tis evident, that the identity, which we attribute to the human mind, however perfect we may imagine it to be, is not able to run the several different perceptions into one, and make them lose their characters of distinction and difference, which are essential to them. 'Tis still true, that every distinct perception, which enters into the composition of the mind, is a distinct existence, and is different, and distinguishable, and separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive. But, as, notwithstanding this distinction and separability, we suppose the whole train of perceptions to be united by identity, a question naturally arises concerning this relation of identity; whether it be something that really binds our several perceptions together, or only associates their ideas in the imagination. That is, in other words, whether in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real bond among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of them. This question we might easily decide, if we wou'd recollect what has been already

proud at large, that the understanding never observes any real connexion among objects, and that even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examin'd, resolves itself into a customary association of ideas. For from thence it evidently follows, that identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect u n them. Now the only qualities, which can give ideas an union in the imagination, {1:541} am these three relations above-mention'd. There are the uniting principles in the ideal world, and without them every distinct object is separable by the mind, and may be separately considered, and appears not to have any more connexion with any other object, than if disjoin'd by the greatest difference and remoteness. 'Tis, therefore, on some of these three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation, that identity depends; and as the very essence of these relations consists in their producing an easy transition of ideas; it follows, that our notions of personal identity, proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas, according to the principles above-explain'd.

The only question, therefore, which remains, is, by what relations this uninterrupted progress of our thought is produc'd, when we consider the successive existence of a mind or thinking person. And here 'tis evident we must confine ourselves to resemblance and causation, and must drop contiguity, which has little or no influence in the present case.

To begin with resemblance; suppose we cou'd see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle, and suppose that he always preserves the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions; 'tis evident that nothing cou'd more contribute to the bestowing a relation on this succession amidst all its variations. For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? And as an image necessarily resembles its object, must not. the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object? In this particular, then, the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing -the relation of resemblance among the perceptions. The case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others.

As to causation; we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, {1:542} influence, and modify each other.' Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; said these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chaces another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expell'd in its turn. In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures.

As a memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions,

'tis to be considered, u on that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou'd have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person. But having once acquir'd this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of car persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. For how few of our past actions are there, of which we have any memory? Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the 1st of January 1715, the 11th of March 1719, and the 3rd of August 1733? Or will he affirm, because he has entirely forgot the incidents of these days, that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time; and by that means overturn all the most established notions of personal identity? In this view, therefore, memory does not so much produce as *discover* personal {1:543} identity, by shewing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. 'Twill be incumbent on those, who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal identity, to give a reason why we cm thus extend our identity beyond our memory.

The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion, which is of great importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as gramatical than as philosophical difficulties. Identity depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion.' But as the relations, and the easiness of the transition may diminish by insensible degrees, we have no just standard, by. which we can decide any dispute concerning the time, when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except so fax as the relation of parts -gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union, as we have already observed.

What I have said concerning the first origin and uncertainty of our notion of identity, as apply'd to the human mind, may be extended with little or no variation to that of simplicity. An object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same manner as one perfectly simple and indivisible and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it, and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, and the center of all the different parts and qualities of the object.

Thus we have finish'd our examination of the several systems of philosophy, both of the intellectual and natural world; and in our miscellaneous way of reasoning have been led into several topics; which will either illustrate and confirm some preceding part of this discourse, or prepare the way for our following opinions. 'Tis now time to return to a more close examination of our subject, and to proceed in the accurate anatomy of human nature, having fully explain'd the nature of our judgment and understandings {1:544}

SECT. VII.-Conclusion *of this Book.*

But before I launch out into those immense depths of philosophy, which lie before me, I find myself inclin'd to stop a moment in my present station, and to ponder that voyage, which I have undertaken, and which undoubtedly requires the utmost art and industry to be brought to a happy conclusion. Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escap'd shipwreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances. *My* memory of past errors and perplexities, makes me

diffident for the future. The wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity. This sudden view of my danger strikes me with melancholy; and as 'tis usual for that passion, above all others, to indulge itself; I cannot forbear feeding my despair, with all those desponding reflections, which the present subject furnishes me with in such abundance.

I am first affrighted and confounded with that forelorn solitude, in which I am plac'd in my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been expell'd all human commerce, and left utterly abandon'd and disconsolate. Fain wou'd I run into the crowd for shelter and warmth; but cannot prevail with myself to mix with such deformity. I call upon others to join me, in order to make a company apart; but no one will hearken to me. Every one keeps at a distance, and dreads that storm, which beats upon me from every side. I have expos'd myself to the enmity of all metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, and even theologians; and can I wonder at the insults I must suffer? I have declar'd my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surpriz'd, if they shou'd express a hatred of mine and {1:545} of my person? When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho' such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others. Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning.

For with what confidence can I venture upon such bold enterprises, when beside those numberless infirmities peculiar to myself, I find so many which are common to human nature? Can I be sure, that in leaving all established opinions I am following truth; and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune shou'd at last guide me on her foot-steps? After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I shou'd assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that view, under which they appear to me. Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects for the past. Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of them conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same advantages. Without this quality, by which the mind enlivens some ideas beyond others (which seemingly is so trivial, and so little founded on reason) we cou'd never assent to any argument, nor carry our view beyond those few objects, which are present to our senses. Nay, even to these objects we cou'd never attribute any existence, but what was dependent on the senses; and must comprehend them entirely in that succession of perceptions, which constitutes our self or person. Nay farther, even with relation to that succession, we cou'd only admit of those perceptions, which are immediately present to our consciousness, nor cou'd those lively images, with which the memory presents us, be ever receiv'd as true pictures of past perceptions. The memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas.

No wonder a principle so inconstant and fallacious shou'd lead us into errors, when implicitly follow'd (as it must be) {1:546} in all its variations. 'Tis this principle, which makes us reason from causes and effects; and 'tis the same principle, which convinces us of the continu'd existence of

external objects, when absent from the senses. But tho' these two operations be equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some circumstances they are I directly contrary, nor is it possible for us to reason justly and regularly from causes and effects, and at the same time believe the continu'd existence of matter. How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which of them shall we prefer? Or in case we prefer neither of them, but successively assent to both, as is usual among philosophers, with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that glorious title, when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction?

This contradiction wou'd be more excusable, were it compensated by any degree of solidity and satisfaction in the other parts of our reasoning. But the case is quite contrary. When we trace up the human understanding to its first principles, we find it to lead us into such sentiments, as seem to turn into ridicule all our past pains and industry, and to discourage us from future enquiries. Nothing is more curiously enquir'd after by the mind of man, than the causes of every phenomenon; nor are we content with knowing the immediate causes, but push on our enquiries, till we arrive at the original and ultimate principle. We wou'd not willingly stop before we are acquainted with that energy in the cause, by which it operates on its effect; that tie, which connects them together; and that efficacious quality, on which the tie depends. This is our aim in all our studies and reflections: And how must we be disappointed, when we learn, that this connexion, tie, or energy lies merely in ourselves, and is nothing but that determination of the mind, which is acquir'd by custom, and causes us to make a transition from an object to its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to the lively idea of the other? Such a discovery not only cuts off all hope of ever attaining satisfaction, but even prevents our very wishes; since it appears, that when we say we desire to know the ultimate and operating principle, as something, which resides in the external object, we either contradict ourselves, or talk without a meaning. {1:547)

This deficiency in our ideas is not, indeed, perceived in common life, nor are we sensible, that in the most usual conjunctions of cause and effect we are as ignorant of the ultimate principle, which binds them together, as in the most unusual and extraordinary. But this proceeds merely from an illusion of the imagination; and the question is, how far we ought to yield to these illusions. This question is very difficult, and reduces us to a very dangerous dilemma, whichever way we answer it. For if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy; beside that these suggestions are often contrary to each other; they lead us into such errors, absurdities, and obscurities, that we must at last become asham'd of our credulity. Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flights of the imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers. Men of bright fancies may in this respect be compar'd to those angels, whom the scripture represents as covering their eyes with their wings. This has already appear'd in so many instances, that we may spare ourselves the trouble of enlarging upon it any farther.

But on the other hand, if the consideration of these instances makes us take a resolution to reject all the trivial suggestions of the fancy, and adhere to the understanding, that is, to the general and more established properties of the imagination; even this resolution, if steadily executed, wou'd be dangerous, and attended with the most fatal consequences. For I have already shewn, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life. We save ourselves from this total scepticism only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy, by which we enter with difficulty into remote views of things, and are not able to accompany them with so sensible an impression, as we do those, which are more easy and natural. Shall we, then, establish it for a general maxim, that no refin'd or

elaborate reasoning is ever to be receiv'd? Consider well the consequences of such a principle. By this means you cut off entirely all science and philosophy: You proceed upon one singular quality of the imagination, and by a parity of reason must embrace all {1:548} of them: And you expressly contradict yourself; since this maxim must be built on the preceding reasoning, which will be allow'd to be sufficiently refin'd and metaphysical. What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we embrace this principle, and condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the, human understanding. We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, know not what ought to be done in the present case. I can only observe what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it. Very refin'd reflections have little or no influence upon us; and yet we do not, and cannot establish it for a rule, that they ought not to have any influence; which implies a manifest contradiction.

But what have I here said, that reflections very refin'd and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? This opinion I can scarce forbear retracting, and condemning from my present feeling and experience. The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have, I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv'd of the use of every member and faculty.

Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds,- nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and {1:549} when after three or four hours' amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther.

Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy. For those are my sentiments in that splenetic humour, which governs me at present. I may, nay I must yield to the current of nature, in submitting to my senses and understanding; and in this blind submission I shew most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles. But does it follow, that I must strive against the current of nature, which leads me to indolence and pleasure; that I must seclude myself, in some measure, from the commerce and society of men, which is so agreeable; and that I must torture my brains with subtilities and sophistries, at the very time that I cannot satisfy myself concerning the reasonableness of so painful an application, nor have any tolerable prospect of arriving by its means at truth and certainty. Under what obligation do I lie of making such an abuse of time? And to what end can it serve either for the service of mankind, or for my own private interest? No: *If* I must be a fool, as all

those who reason or believe any thing certainly are, my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable. Where I strive against my inclination, I shall have a good reason for my resistance; and will no more be led a wandering into such dreary solitudes, and rough passages, as I have hitherto met with.

These are the sentiments of my spleen and indolence;,and indeed I must confess, that philosophy has nothing to oppose to them, and expects a victory more from the returns of a serious good-humour'd disposition, than from the force of reason and conviction. In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe, that fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too {1:550} much pains to think otherwise. Nay if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner. Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us.

At the time, therefore, that I am tir'd with amusement and company, and have indulg'd a reverie in my chamber, or in a solitary walk by a river-side, I feel my mind all collected within itself, and am naturally inclin'd to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so many disputes in the course of my reading and conversation. I cannot forbear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil, the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of those several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern me. I am uneasy to think I approve of one object, and disapprove of another; call one thing beautiful, and another deform'd; decide concerning truth and falshood, reason and folly, without knowing upon what principles I proceed. I am concern'd for the condition of the learned world, which lies under such t deplorable ignorance in all these particulars. I feel an ambition to arise in me of contributing to the instruction of mankind, and of acquiring a name by my inventions and discoveries. These sentiments spring up naturally in my present disposition; and shou'd I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself to any other business or diversion, I feel I shou'd be a loser in point of pleasure; and this is the origin of my philosophy.

But even suppose this curiosity and ambition shou'd not transport me into speculations without the sphere of common life, it wou'd necessarily happen, that from my very weakness I must be led into such enquiries. 'Tis certain, that superstition is much more bold in its systems and hypotheses than philosophy; and while the latter contents itself with assigning new causes and principles to the phaenomena, which appear in the visible world, the former opens a world of its own, and presents us with scenes, and beings, and objects, which are altogether new. Since therefore 'tis almost impossible for the mind of man to rest, like those of beasts, in that narrow circle of objects, which are the subject of daily conversation and action, we ought only to deliberate concerning {1:551} the choice of our guide, and ought to prefer that which is safest and most agreeable. And in this respect I make bold to recommend philosophy, and shall not scruple to give it the preference to superstition of every kind or denomination. For as superstition arises naturally and easily from the popular opinions of mankind, it seizes more strongly on the mind, and is often able to disturb us in the conduct of our lives and actions. Philosophy on the contrary, if just, can present us only with mild and moderate sentiments; and if false and extravagant, -its opinions are merely the objects of a cold and general speculation, and seldom go so far as to interrupt the course of our natural propensities. The C/YNICS\ are an extraordinary instance of philosophers, who from reasonings purely philosophical ran into as great extravagancies of conduct as any Monk or *Der*vise that ever was in the world. Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.

I am sensible, that these two cases of the strength and weakness of the mind will not comprehend all mankind, and that there are in England, in particular, many honest gentlemen, who being always employ'd in their domestic affairs, or amusing themselves in common recreations, have carried their thoughts very little beyond those objects, which are every day expos'd to their senses. And indeed, of such as these I pretend not to make philosophers, nor do I expect them either to be associates in these researches or auditors of these discoveries. They do well to keep themselves in their present situation; and instead of refining them into philosophers, I wish we cou'd communicate to our founders of systems, a share of this gross earthy mixture, as an ingredient, which they commonly stand much in need of, and which wou'd serve to temper those fiery particles, of which they are compos'd. While a warm imagination is allow'd to enter into philosophy, and hypotheses embrac'd merely for being specious and agreeable, we can never have any steady principles, nor any sentiments, which will suit with common practice and experience. But were these hypotheses once remov'd, we might hope to establish a system or set of opinions, which if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be hop'd for) might at least be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the test of the most critical examination. Nor shou'd {1:553} we despair of attaining this end, because of the many chimerical systems, which have successively arisen and decay'd away among men, wou'd we consider the shortness of that period, wherein these questions have been the subjects of enquiry and reasoning. Two thousand years with such long interruptions, and under such mighty discouragements are a small space of time to give any tolerable perfection to the sciences; and perhaps we are still in too early an age of the world to discover any principles, which will bear the examination of the latest posterity. For my part, my only hope is, that I may contribute a little to the advancement of knowledge, by giving in some particulars a different turn to the speculations of philosophers, and pointing out to them more distinctly those subjects, where alone they can expect assurance and conviction. Human Nature is the only science of man; and yet has been hitherto the most neglected. 'Twill be sufficient for me, if I can bring it a little more into fashion; and the hope of this serves to compose my temper from that spleen, and invigorate it from that indolence, which sometimes prevail upon me. If the reader finds himself in the same easy disposition, let him follow me in my future speculations. If not, let him follow his inclination, and wait the returns of application and good humour. The conduct of a man, who studies philosophy in this careless manner, is more truly sceptical than that of one, who feeling in himself an inclination to it, is yet so overwhelmed with doubts and scruples, as totally to reject it. A true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction; and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of either of them.

Nor is it only proper we shou'd in general indulge our inclination in the most elaborate philosophical researches, notwithstanding our sceptical principles, but also that we shou'd yield to that propensity, which inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points, according to the light, in which we survey them in any particular instant. 'Tis easier to forbear all examination and enquiry, than to check ourselves in so natural a propensity, and guard against that assurance, which always arises from an exact and full survey of an object. On such an occasion we are apt not only to forget our scepticism, but even our modesty too; {1:553} and make use of such terms as these, *'tis evident, 'tis* certain, 'tis undeniable; which a due deference to the public ought, perhaps, to prevent. I may have fallen into this fault after the example of others; but I here enter a caveat against any Objections, which may be offer'd on that head; and declare that such expressions were extorted from me by the present view of the object, and imply no dogmatical spirit, nor conceited

idea of my own judgment, which are sentiments that I am sensible can become no body, and a sceptic still less than any other. {1:555}

A

T R E A T I S E

0 F

Human Nature:

BEING

An ATTEMPT to introduce the experimental

Method of Reasoning

***I N* T 0**

MORAL SUBJECTS.

***Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quae velis; & que sentais, decere licet.* TACIT.**

V 0 L. II.

OF THE

PASSIONS.

{2:75}

A TREATISE

OF

HUMAN NATURE.

BOOK II.

OF THE PASSIONS.

PART I.

OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY.

SECT. *I. Division of the Subject.*

As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into i*mpressions and ideas,* so the impressions admit of another division into original and *secondary.* This division of the impressions is the same with that which' I formerly made use of when I distinguished them into impressions of sensation and reflection. Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains {2:76} and pleasures: Of the

second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them.

'Tis Certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere; and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul. As these depend upon natural and physical causes, the examination of them wou'd lead me too far from my present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy. For this reason I shall here confine myself to those other impressions, which I have call'd secondary and reflective, as arising either from the original impressions, or from their ideas. Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and consider'd by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception. A fit of the gout produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but is not deriv'd immediately from any affection or idea.

The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, *viz.* the calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly call'd *passions,* may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish'd from each other. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here take advantage of this vulgar and specious division, that I may proceed with the greater order; and having said all I thought necessary concerning our ideas, shall now explain those violent emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects.

When we take a survey of the passions, there occurs a division of them into direct and indirect. By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities. {2:77} This distinction I cannot at present justify or explain any farther. I can only observe in general, that under the indirect passions I comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependents. And under the direct passions, desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security. I shall begin with the former.

SECT. *II. Of Pride* and Humility; *their Objects and Cause.*

The passions Of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them: But as these words, pride and humility, are of general use, and the impressions they represent the most common of any, every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them, without any danger of mistake. For which reason, not to lose time upon preliminaries, I shall immediately enter upon the examination of these passions.

'Tis evident, that pride and humility, tho' directly contrary, have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness. Here the view always fixes when we are actuated by either of these passions. According as our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous, we feel either of those opposite affections, and are elated by pride, or directed with humility. Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the mind, they are always consider'd with a view to ourselves; otherwise they wou'd never be able either to excite these passions, or produce the smallest encrease or diminution

of them. When self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility.

But tho' that connected succession of perceptions, which we call self, be always the object of these two passions. 'tis impossible it can be their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them. For as these passions are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were their object also their cause; it cou'd never produce any degree of the one {2:78} passion, but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other; which opposition and contrariety must destroy both. 'Tis impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and humble; and where he has different reasons for these passions, as frequently happens, the passions either take place alternately; or if they encounter, the one annihilates the other, as far as its strength goes, and the remainder only of that, which is superior, continues to operate upon the mind. But in the present case neither of the passions cou'd ever become superior; because supposing it to be the view only of ourself, which excited them, that being perfectly indifferent to either, must produce both in the very same proportion; or in other words, can produce neither. To excite any passion, and at the same time raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent.

We must, therefore, make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited. Pride and humility, being once rais'd, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object; but there is something farther requisite in order to raise them: Something, which is peculiar to one of the passions, and produces not both in the very same degree. The first idea, that if; presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is st passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of

which the one produces it, and the other is produc'd by it. The first idea, therefore, represents the cause, the second the *object* of the passion.

To begin with the causes of pride and humility; we may observe, that their most obvious and remarkable property is the vast variety of *subjects*, on which they may be plac'd. Every valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are the causes of pride; and their opposites of humility. Nor are these passions confin'd to the mind, but extend their view to the body likewise. A man may be proud of his beauty, strength, agility, good mien, address in dancing, riding, fencing, and {2:79} of his dexterity in any manual business or manufacture. But this is not all. The passion looking farther, comprehends whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to us. Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility.

From the consideration of these causes, it appears necessary we shou'd make a new distinction in the causes of the passion, betwixt that quality, which operates, and the *subject*, on which it is plac'd. A man, for instance, is vain of a beautiful house, which belongs to him, or which he has himself built and contriv'd. Here the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house: Which cause again is sub-divided into two parts, viz. the quality, which operates upon the passion, and the subject, in which the quality inheres. The quality is the beauty, and the subject is the house, considered as his property or contrivance. Both these parts are essential, nor is the distinction vain and chimerical. Beauty, considered merely as such, unless plac'd upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest relation alone, without beauty,

or something else in its place, has as little influence on that passion. Since, therefore, these two particulars are easily separated, and there is a necessity for their conjunction, in order to produce the passion, we ought to consider them as component parts of the cause; and infix in our minds an exact idea of this distinction.

SECT. *III.-Whence these Objects and Causes are Deriv'd.*

Being so far advanc'd as to observe a difference betwixt the *object* of the passions and their cause, and to distinguish in the cause the quality, which operates on the passions, from the *subject,* in which it inheres; we now proceed to examine what determines each of them to be what it is, and assigns such a particular object, and quality, and subject to these affections. By this means we shall fully understand the origin of pride and humility.

'Tis evident in the first place, that these passions are determined to have self for their object, not only by a natural but also by an original property. No one can doubt but this property is natural from the constancy and steadiness of its operations. 'Tis always self, which is the object of pride {2:80} and humility; and whenever the passions look beyond, 'tis still with a view to ourselves, nor can any person or object otherwise have any influence upon us.

That this proceeds from an original quality or primary impulse, will likewise appear evident, if we consider that 'tis the distinguishing characteristic of these passions. Unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind, it cou'd never have any secondary ones; because in that case it wou'd have no foundation for action, nor cou'd ever begin to exert itself. Now these qualities, which we must consider as original, are such as are most inseparable from the soul, and can be resolv'd into no other: And such is the quality, which determines the object of pride and humility.

We may, perhaps, make it a greater question, whether the *causes,* that produce the passion, be as natural as the object, to which it is directed, and whether all that vast variety proceeds from caprice or from the constitution of the mind. This doubt we shall soon remove, if we cast our eye upon human nature, and consider that in all nations and ages, the same objects still give rise to pride and humility; and that upon the view even of a stranger, we can know pretty nearly, what will either encrease or diminish his passions of this kind. If there be any variation in this particular, it proceeds from nothing but a difference in the tempers and complexions of men; and is besides very inconsiderable. Can we imagine it possible, that while human nature remains the same, men will ever become entirely indifferent to their power, riches, beauty or personal merit, and that their pride and vanity will not be affected by these advantages?

But tho' the causes of pride and humility be plainly natural, we shall find upon examination, that they are not original, and that 'tis utterly impossible they shou'd each of them be adapted to these passions by a particular provision, and primary constitution of nature. Beside their prodigious number, many of them are the effects of art, and arise partly from the industry, partly from the caprice, and partly from the good fortune of men. Industry produces houses, furniture, cloaths. Caprice determines their particular kinds and qualities. And good fortune frequently contributes to all this, by discovering the effects that result from the different mixtures and combinations of bodies. 'Tis absurd, therefore, to imagine, that each of these was foreseen and provided {2:81} for by nature, and that every new production of art, which causes pride or humility; instead of adapting itself to the passion by partaking of some general quality, that naturally operates on the mind; is itself the object of an original principle, which till then lay conceal'd in the soul, and is only by accident at last brought to light. Thus the first mechanic, that invented a fine scritoire, produc'd pride in him, who became possest of it, by principles different from those, which made

him proud of handsome chairs and tables. As this appears evidently ridiculous, we must conclude, that each cause of pride and humility is not adapted to the passions by a distinct original quality; but that there are some one or more circumstances common to all of them, on which their efficacy depends.

Besides, we find in the course of nature, that tho' the effects be many, the principles, from which they arise, are commonly but few and simple, and that 'tis the sign of an unskilful naturalist to have recourse to a different quality, in order to explain every different operation. How much more must this be true with regard to the human mind, which being so confin'd a subject may justly be thought incapable of containing such a monstrous heap of principles, as wou'd be necessary to excite the passions of pride and humility, were each distinct cause adapted to the passion by a distinct set of principles P

Here, therefore, moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural, with regard to astronomy before the time of Copernicus. The antients, tho' sensible of that maxim, that *nature does nothing* in vain, contriv'd such intricate systems of the heavens, as seem'd inconsistent with true philosophy, and gave place at last to something more simple and natural. To invent without scruple a new principle to every new phaenomenon, instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our hypotheses with a variety of this king; are certain proofs, that none of these principles is the just one, and that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods, to cover our ignorance of the truth.

SECT. *IV.-Of the Relations of Impressions and Ideas.*

Thus we have established two truths without any obstacle or difficulty*, that 'tis* from natural *principles this variety of {2:*82} *causes excite pride* and humility, and *that 'tis not* by *a different principle each different cause is adapted to its passion.* We shall no-,v proceed to enquire how we may reduce these principles to a lesser number, and find among the causes something common, on which their influence depends.

In order to 'this we must reflect on certain properties of human nature, which tho' they have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions, are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers. The *first* of these is the association of ideas, which I have so often observ'd and explain'd. 'Tis impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any considerable time; nor can it by its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy. But however changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. The rule, by which they proceed, is to pass from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produc'd by it. When one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means of that introduction.

The second property I shall observe in the human mind is a like association of impressions. All resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated. In like manner our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride, and the other resembling affections. 'Tis difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that passion alone, without any change or variation. Human nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is essential to it. And to what can it so naturally change as to affections or emotions, which are suitable to the temper, and agree with that set of passions, which then prevail? 'Tis evident, then, there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas; tho' with this remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by resemblance,

contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance.

In the third place, 'tis observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much assist and forward each {2:83} other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object. Thus a man, who, by any injury from another, is very much discompose and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred subjects of discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; especially if he can discover these subjects in or near the person, who was the cause of his first passion. Those principles, which forward the transition of ideas,,/ here concur with those, which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. The new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be render'd so much more easy and natural.

Upon this occasion I may cite the authority of an elegant writer, who expresses himself in the following manner. 'As the fancy delights in every thing that is great, strange, or beautiful, and is still more pleas'd the more it finds of these perfections in the same object, so it is capable of receiving a new satisfaction by the assistance of another sense. Thus any continu'd sound, as the music of birds, or a fall of waters, awakens every moment the mind of the beholder, and makes him more attentive to the several beauties of the place, that lie before him. Thus if there arises a fragrance of smells or perfumes, they heighten the pleasure of the imagination, and make even the colours and verdure of the landschape appear more agreeable; for the ideas of both senses recommend each other, and are pleasanter together than when they enter the mind separately: As the different colours of a picture, when they are well disposed, set off one another, and receive an additional beauty from the advantage of the situation.' In this phaenomenon we may remark the association both of impressions and ideas, as well as the mutual assistance they lend each other.

SECT. V.-Of *the influence of these Relations on* Pride and H*umility.*

These principles being established on unquestionable experience, I begin to consider how we shall apply them, by revolving over all the causes of pride and humility, whether these causes be regarded, as the qualities, that operate, or {2:84} as the subjects, on which the qualities are plac'd. In examining these qualities I immediately find many of them to concur in producing the sensation of pain and pleasure, independent of those affections, which I here endeavour to explain. Thus the beauty of our person, of itself, and by its very appearance, gives pleasure, as well as pride; and its deformity, pain as well as humility. A magnificent feast delights us, and a sordid one displeases. What I discover to be true in some instances, I *suppose* to be so in all; and take it for granted at present, without any farther proof, that every cause of pride, by its peculiar qualities, produces a separate pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasiness.

Again, in considering the *subjects,* to which these qualities adhere, I make a new *supposition,* which also appears probable from many obvious instances, viz. that these subjects are either parts of ourselves, or something nearly related to us. Thus the good and bad qualities of our actions and manners constitute virtue and vice, and determine our personal character, than which nothing operates more strongly on these passions. In like manner, 'tis the beauty or deformity of our person, houses, equipage, or furniture, by which we are render'd either vain or humble. The same qualities, when transfer'd to subjects, which bear us no relation, influence -not in the smallest degree either of these affections.

Having thus in a manner suppos'd two properties of the causes of these affections, viz. that the qualities produce a separate pain or pleasure, and that the *subjects,* on which the qualities are plac'd, are related to self; I proceed to examine the passions themselves, in order to find something

in them, correspondent to the suppos'd properties of their causes. *First,* I find, that the peculiar object of pride and humility is determin'd by an original and natural instinct, and that 'tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions shou'd ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious.' Here at last the view always rests, when we are actuated by either of these passions; nor can we, in that situation of mind, ever lose sight of this object. For this I pretend not to give {2:85} any reason; but consider such a peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality.

The second quality, which I discover in these passions, and which I likewise consider as an original quality, is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and which constitute their very being and essence. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility. Of this our very feeling convinces us; and beyond our feeling, 'tis here in vain to reason or dispute.

If I compare, therefore, these two *establish'd* properties of the passions, viz. their object, which is self, and their sensation, which is either pleasant or painful, to the two *suppos'd* properties of the causes, viz. their relation to self, and their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion; I immediately find, that taking these suppositions to be just, the true system breaks in upon me with an irresistible evidence. That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd. The one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it: 'With how much greater facility must this transition be made, where these movements mutually assist each other, and the mind receives a double impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas?

That- we may comprehend this the better, we must suppose, that nature has given to the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call *pride:* To this emotion she has assign'd a certain idea, viz. that of self, which it never fails to produce. This contrivance of nature is easily conceiv'd. We have many instances of such a situation of affairs. The nerves of the nose and palate are so dispos'd, as in certain circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations to the mind: The sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects, which are {2:86} suitable to each appetite. These two circumstances are united in pride. The organs are so dispos'd as to produce the passion; and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea.' All this needs no proof. 'Tis evident we never shou'd be possest of that passion, were there not a disposition of mind proper for it; and 'tis as evident, that the passion always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances.

This being fully comprehended, it may now be ask'd, *Whether nature produces the passion immediately, of herself; or whether she must be assisted by the co-operation of other causes?* For 'tis observable, that in this particular her conduct is different in the different passions and sensations. The palate must be excited by an external object, in order to produce any relish: But hunger arises internally, without the concurrence of any external object. But however the case may stand with other passions and impressions, 'tis certain, that pride requires the assistance of some foreign object, and that the organs, which produce it, exert -not themselves like the heart and arteries, by an original internal movement. For *first,* daily experience convinces us, that pride requires certain causes to excite it, and languishes when unsupported by some excellency in the character, in bodily accomplishments, in cloaths, equipage or fortune. *Secondly,* 'tis evident pride wou'd be perpetual,

if it arose immediately from nature; since the object is always the same, and there is no disposition of body peculiar to pride, as there is to thirst and hunger. Thirdly, Humility is in the very same situation with pride; and therefore, either must, upon this supposition, be perpetual likewise, or must destroy the contrary passion from the very first moment; so that none of them cou'd ever make its appearance. Upon the whole, we may rest satisfy'd with the foregoing conclusion, that pride must have a cause, as well as an object, and that the one has no influence without the other.

The difficulty, then, is only to discover this cause, and find what it is that gives the first motion to pride, and sets those organs ill action, which are naturally fitted to produce that emotion. Upon my consulting experience, in order to resolve this difficulty, I immediately find a hundred different {2:87} causes, that produce pride; and upon examining these causes, I suppose, what at first I perceive to be probable, that all of them concur in two circumstances; which are' that of themselves they produce an impression, ally'd to the passion, and are plac'd on a subject, ally'd to the object of the passion. When I consider after this the nature of relation, and its effects both on the passions and ideas, I can no longer doubt, upon these suppositions, that 'tis the very principle, which gives rise to pride, and bestows motion on those organs, which being naturally dispos'd to produce that affection, require only a first impulse or beginning to their action. Any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object.

What I have said of pride is equally true of humility. The sensation of humility is uneasy, as that of pride is agreeable; for which reason the separate sensation, arising from the causes, must be revers'd, while the relation to self continues the same. Tho' pride and humility are directly contrary in their effects, and in their sensations, they have notwithstanding the same object; so that 'tis requisite only to change the relation of impressions, without making any change upon that of ideas. Accordingly we find, that a beautiful house, belonging to ourselves, produces pride; and that the same house, still belonging to ourselves, produces humility, when by any accident its beauty is chang'd into deformity, and thereby the sensation of pleasure, which corresponded to pride, is transformed into pain, which is related to humility. The double relation between the ideas and impressions subsists in both cases, and produces an easy transition from the one emotion to the other.

In a word, nature has bestow'd a kind of attraction on certain impressions and ideas, by which one of them, upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative. If these two attractions or associations of impressions and ideas concur on the same object, they mutually assist each other, and the transition of the affections and of the imagination is made with the greatest ease and facility. When an idea, produces an impression, related to an impression, which is connected with an idea, related to the first idea, these two impressions must be in a manner inseparable, nor will the one in any case be unattended with the other. 'Tis {2:88} after this manner, that the particular causes of pride and humility are determin'd. The quality, which operates on the passion, produces separately an impression resembling it; the subject, to which the quality adheres, is related to self, the object of the passion: No wonder the whole cause, consisting of a quality and of a subject, does so unavoidably give rise to the passion.

To illustrate this hypothesis, we may compare it to that, by which I have already explain'd the belief attending the judgments, which we form from causation. I have observ'd, that in all judgments of this kind, there is always a present impression, and a related idea; and that the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy, and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea. Without the present impression, the attention is not fix'd, nor the

spirits excited. Without the relation, this attention rests on its first object, and has no farther consequence. There is evidently a great analogy betwixt that hypothesis, and our present one of an impression and idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation: Which analogy must be allow'd to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses.

SECT. VI.-Limitations *of this System.*

But before we proceed farther in this subject, and examine particularly all the causes of pride and humility, 'twill be proper to make some limitations to the general system, that *all agreeable objects, related to ourselves, by an association of ideas and of impressions, produce pride, and disagreeable ones,* humility: And these limitations are deriv'd from the very nature of the subject.

I. Suppose an agreeable object to acquire a relation to self, the first passion, that appears on this occasion, is joy; and this passion discovers itself upon a slighter relation than pride and vain-glory. We may feel joy upon being present at a feast, where our senses are regard with delicacies of every kind: But 'tis only the master of the feast, who, beside the same joy, has the additional passion of self-applause and vanity. 'Tis true, men sometimes boast of a great entertainment, at which they have only been present; and by so small a relation convert their pleasure into pride: {2:89} But however, this must in general be own'd, that joy arises from a more inconsiderable relation than vanity, and that many things, which are too foreign to produce pride, are yet able to give us a delight and pleasure. The reason of the difference may be explain'd thus. A relation is requisite to joy, in order to approach the object to us, and make it give us any satisfaction. But beside this, which is common to both passions, 'tis requisite to pride, in order to produce a transition from one passion to another, and convert the satisfaction into vanity. As it has a double task to perform, it must be endow'd with double force and energy. To which we may add, that, where agreeable objects bear not a very close relation to ourselves, they commonly do to some other person; and this latter relation not only excels, but even diminishes, and sometimes destroys the former, as we shall see afterwards.

Here then is the first limitation, we must make to our general position, *that every thing related to us, which produces pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride or* humility. There is not only a relation requir'd, but a close one, and a closer than is requir'd to joy.

II. The second limitation is, that the agreeable or disagreeable object be not only closely related, but also peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons. 'Tis a quality observable in human nature, and which we shall endeavour to explain afterwards, that every thing, which is often presented, and to which we have been long accustom'd, loses its value in our eyes, and is in a little time despis'd and neglected. We likewise judge of objects more from comparison than from their real and intrinsic merit; and where we cannot by some contrast enhance their value, we are apt to overlook even what is essentially good in them. These qualities of the mind have an effect upon joy as well as pride; and 'tis remarkable, that goods, which are common to all mankind, and have become familial to us by custom, give us little satisfaction; tho' perhaps of a more excellent kind, than those on which, for their singularity, we set a much higher value. But tho' this circumstance operates on both these passions, it has a much greater influence on vanity We are rejoic'd for many goods, which, on {2:90} account of their frequency, give us no pride. Health, when it returns after a long absence, affords us a very sensible satisfaction; but is seldom regarded as a subject of vanity, because 'tis shar'd with such vast numbers.

The reason, why pride is so much more delicate in this particular than joy, I take to be, as follows. In order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate, viz. the cause or that

object which produces pleasure; and self, which is the real object of the passion. But joy has only one object necessary to its production, viz. that which gives pleasure; and tho' it be requisite, that this bear some relation to self, yet that is only requisite in order to render it agreeable; nor is self, properly speaking, the object of this passion. Since, therefore, pride has in a manner two objects, to which it directs our view; it follows, that where neither of them have any singularity, the passion must be more weaken'd upon that account, than a passion, which has only one object. Upon comparing ourselves with others, as we are every moment apt to do, we find we are not in the least distinguished; and upon comparing the object we possess, we discover still the same unlucky circumstance. By two comparisons so disadvantageous the passion must be entirely destroy'd.

III. The third limitation is, that the pleasant or painful object be very discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves, but to others also. This circumstance, like the two foregoing, has an effect upon joy, as well as pride. We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others; but are still more ostentacious of our virtues than of our pleasures. This proceeds from causes, which I shall endeavour to explain afterwards.

IV. The fourth limitation is deriv'd from the inconstancy of the cause of these passions, and from the short duration of its connexion with ourselves. What is casual and inconstant gives but little joy, and less pride. We are not much satisfy'd with the thing itself; and. are still less apt to feel any new degrees of self-satisfaction upon its account. We foresee and anticipate its change by the imagination; which makes us little satisfy'd with the thing: We compare it to ourselves, whose existence is more durable; by which means its inconstancy appears still greater. It seems ridiculous to {2:91} infer an excellency in ourselves from an object, which is of so much shorter duration, and attends us during so small a part of our existence. 'Twill be easy to comprehend the reason, why this cause operates not with the same force in joy as in pride; since the idea of self is not so essential to the former passion as to the latter.

V. I may add as a fifth limitation, or rather enlargement of this system, that general rules have a great influence upon pride and humility, as well as on all the other passions. Hence we form a notion of different ranks of men, suitable to the power or riches they are possest of; and this notion we change not upon account of any peculiarities of the health or temper of the persons, which may deprive them of all enjoyment in their possessions. This may be accounted for from the same principles, that explain'd the influence of general rules on the understanding. Custom readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as in our reasonings.

It may not be amiss to observe on this occasion, that the influence of general rules and maxims on the passions very much contributes to facilitate the effects of all the principles, which we shall explain in the progress of this treatise. For 'tis evident, that if a person full-grown, and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a sudden transported into our world, he wou'd be very much embarrassed with every object, and wou'd not readily find what degree of love or haired, pride or humility, or any other passion he ought, to attribute to it. The passions are often vary'd by very inconsiderable principles; and these do not always play with a perfect regularity, especially on the first trial. But as custom and practice have brought to light all these principles, and have settled the just value of every thing; this must certainly contribute to the easy production of the passions, and guide us, by means of general established maxims, in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another. This remark may, perhaps, serve to obviate difficulties, that may arise concerning some ea-uses, which I shall hereafter ascribe to particular passions, and which may be esteem'd too refin'd to operate so universally and certainly, as they are found to do.

I shall close this subject with a reflection deriv'd from these five limitations. This reflection is, that the persons, {2:92} who are proudest, and who in the eye of the world have most reason for their pride, are not always the happiest; nor the most humble always the most miserable, as may at first sight be imagin'd from this system. An evil may be real, tho' its cause has no relation to us: It may be real, without being peculiar: It may be real, without shewing itself to others: It may be real, without being constant: And it may be real, without falling under the general rules. Such evils as these will not fail to render us miserable, tho' they have little tendency to diminish pride: And perhaps the most real and the most solid evils of life will be found of this nature.

SECT. *VII.-OF Vice* and Virtue.

Taking these limitations along with us, let us proceed to examine the causes of pride and humility; and see, whether in every case we can discover the double relations, by which they operate on the passions. If we find that all these causes are related to self, and produce a pleasure or uneasiness separate from the passion, there will remain no farther scruple with regard to the present system. We shall principally endeavour to prove the latter point; the former being in a manner self-evident.

To begin with VICE and VIRTUE, which are the most obvious causes of these passions; 'twou'd be entirely foreign to my present purpose to enter upon the controversy, which of late years has so much excited the curiosity of the publick, *whether these moral distinctions be founded on* natural and original *principles, or arise from interest* and education. The examination of this I reserve for the following book; and in the mean time shall endeavour to show, that my system maintains its ground upon either of these hypotheses; which will be a strong proof of its solidity.

For granting that morality had no foundation in nature, it must still be allow'd, that vice and virtue, either from self-interest or the prejudices of education, produce in us a real pain and pleasure; and this we may observe to be strenuously asserted by the defenders of that hypothesis. Every passion, habit, or turn of character (say they) which has a tendency to our advantage or prejudice, gives a deli-ht or uneasiness; and 'tis from thence the approbation or disapprobation arises. We easily gain from the liberality of others, but are {2:93} always in danger of losing by their avarice: Courage defends us, but cowardice lays us open to every attack: Justice is the support of society, but injustice, unless check'd, wou'd quickly prove its ruin: Humility exalts; but pride mortises us. For these reasons the former qualities are esteem'd virtues, and the latter regarded as vices. Now since 'tis granted there is a delight or uneasiness still attending merit or demerit of every kind, this is all that is requisite for my purpose.

But I go farther, and observe, that this moral hypothesis and my present system not only agree together, but also that, allowing the former to be just, 'tis an absolute and invincible proof of the latter. For if all morality be founded on the pain or pleasure, which arises from the prospect of any loss or advantage, that may result from our own characters, or from those of others, all the effects of morality must be deriv'd from the same pain or pleasure, and among the rest, the passions of pride and humility. The very essence of virtue, according to this hypothesis, is to produce pleasure, and that of vice to give pain. The virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride or humility. What farther proof can we desire for the double relation of impressions and ideas?

The same unquestionable argument may be deriv'd from the opinion of those, who maintain that morality is something real, essential, and founded on nature. The most probable hypothesis, which has been advanc'd to explain the distinction betwixt vice and virtue, and the origin of moral rights

and obligations, is, that from a primary constitution of nature certain characters and passions, by the very view and contemplation, produce a pain, and others in like manner excite a pleasure. The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence. To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness. The pain and pleasure, therefore, being the primary causes of vice and virtue, must also be the causes of all their effects, and consequently of pride and humility, which are the unavoidable attendants of that distinction.

But supposing this hypothesis of moral philosophy shou'd {2:94} be allow'd to be false, 'tis still evident, that pain and pleasure, if not the causes of vice and virtue, are at least inseparable from them. A generous and noble character affords a satisfaction even in the survey; and when presented to us, tho' only in a poem or fable, never fails to charm and delight us. On the other hand cruelty and treachery displease from their very nature; nor is it possible ever to reconcile us to these qualities, either in ourselves or others. Thus one hypothesis of morality is an undeniable proof of the foregoing system, and the other at worst agrees with it.

But pride and humility arise not from these qualities alone of the mind, which, according to the vulgar systems of ethicks, have been comprehended as parts of moral duty, but from any other that has a connexion with pleasure and uneasiness. Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit, good humour, or any other accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more sensible mortification than a disappointment in any attempt of that nature. No one has ever been able to tell what wit is, and to shew why such a system of thought must be receiv'd under that denomination, and such another rejected. 'Tis only by taste we can decide concerning it, nor are we possest of any other standard, upon which we can form a judgment of this kind. Now what is this taste, from which true and false wit in a manner receive their being, and without which no thought can have a title to either of these denominations? 'Tis plainly nothing but a sensation of pleasure from true wit, and of uneasiness from false, without our being able to tell the reasons of that pleasure or uneasiness. The power of bestowing these opposite sensations is, therefore, the very essence of true and false wit; and consequently the cause of that pride or humility, which arises from them.

There may, perhaps, be some, who being accustom'd to the style of the schools and pulpit, and having never considered human nature in any other light, than that in which they place it, may here be surpriz'd to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look upon as a vice; and of vice as producing humility, which they have been taught to consider as a virtue. But not to dispute about words, I observe, that by *pride* I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy'd with ourselves: {2:95} And that by humility I mean the opposite impression. 'Tis evident the former impression is not always vicious, nor the latter virtuous. The most rigid morality allows us to receive a pleasure from reflecting on a generous action; and 'tis by none esteem'd a virtue to feel any fruitless remorses upon the thoughts of past villainy and baseness. Let us, therefore, examine these impressions, considered in themselves; and enquire into their causes, whether plac'd on the mind or body, without troubling ourselves at present with that merit or blame, which may attend them.

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SECT. VIII.-OF Beauty and Deformity.

Whether we consider the body as a part of ourselves, or assent to those philosophers, who regard it as something external, it must still be allow'd to be near enough connected with us to form one of these double relations, which I have asserted to be necessary to the causes of pride and humility. Wherever, therefore, we can find the other relation of impressions to join to this of ideas, we may expect with assurance either of these passions, according as the impression is pleasant or uneasy. But beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and satisfaction; as deformity produces pain, upon whatever subject it may be plac'd, and whether survey'd in an animate or inanimate object. If the beauty or deformity, therefore, be plac'd upon our own bodies, this pleasure or uneasiness must be converted into pride or humility, as having in this case all the circumstances requisite to produce a perfect transition of impressions or ideas. These opposite sensations are related to the opposite passions. The beauty or deformity is closely related to self, the object of these passions. No wonder, then our own beauty becomes an object of pride, and deformity of humility.

But this effect of personal and bodily qualities is not only a proof of the present system, by shewing that the passions arise not in this case without all the circumstances I have requir'd, but maybe employ'd as a stronger and more convincing argument. If we consider all the hypotheses, which have been form'd either by philosophy or common reason, to explain the difference betwixt beauty and deformity, we shall find that all of tlierti resolve into this, that beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as either {2:96} by the primary constitution of our nature, by *custom*, or by caprice, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul.' This is the distinguishing character of beauty, and forms all the difference betwixt it and deformity, whose natural tendency is to produce uneasiness. Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their 'very essence. And indeed, if we consider, that a great part of the beauty, which we admire either in animals or in other objects, is deriv'd from the idea of convenience and utility, we shall make no scruple to assent to this opinion. That shape, which produces strength, is beautiful in one animal; and that which is a sign of agility in another. The order and convenience of a palace are no less essential to its beauty, than its mere figure and appearance. In like manner the ruler, of architecture require, that the top of a pillar shou'd be more slender than its base, and that because such a figure conveys to us the idea of security, which is pleasant; whereas the contrary form gives us the apprehension of danger, which is uneasy. From innumerable instances of this kind, as well as from considering that beauty like wit, cannot be defili'd, but is discern'd only by a taste or sensation, we may conclude, that beauty is nothing but a form, which produces pleasure, as deformity is a structure of -parts, which conveys pain; and since the power of producing pain and pleasure make in this manner the essence of beauty and deformity, all the effects of these qualities must be deriv'd from the sensation; and among the rest pride and humility, which of all their erects are the most common and remarkable.

This argument I esteem just and decisive; but in order to give greater authority to the present reasoning, let us suppose it false for a moment, and see what will follow. 'Tis certain, then, that if the power of producing pleasure and pain forms not the essence r)f beauty and deformity, the sensations are at least inseparable from tb e qualities, and 'tis even difficult to consider them apart. Now there is nothing common to natural and moral beauty, (both of which are the causes of pride) but this power of producing pleasure; and as a common effect supposes always a common cause, 'tis plain the pleasure must in both cases be the real and influencing {2:97}

cause of the passion. Again; there is nothing originally different betwixt the beauty of our bodies and the beauty of external and foreign objects, but that the one has a near relation to ourselves,

which is wanting in the other. This original difference, therefore, must be the cause of an their other differences, and among the rest, of their different influence upon the passion of pride, which is excited by the beauty of our person, but is not affected in the least by that of foreign and external objects. Placisg, then, these two conclusions together, we find they compose the preceding system betwixt them, viz. that pleasure, as a related or resembling impression, when plac'd on a related object, by a natural transition, produces pride; and its contrary, humility. This system, then, seems already sufficiently confirm'd by experience; tho' we have not yet exhausted all our arguments.

'Tis not the beauty of the body alone that produces pride, but alsoi ts strength and force. Strength is a kind of power; and therefore the desire to excel in strength is to be consider'd as an inferior species of ambition. For this reason the present phenomenon will be sufficiently accounted for, in explaining that passion.

Concerning all other bodily accomplishments we may observe in general, that whatever in ourselves is either useful, beautiful, or surprising, is an object of pride; and it's contrary, of humility. Now' tis obvious, that everything iisefLil, beautiful or surprising, agrees in producing a separate pleasure, and agrees in nothing else. The pleasure, therefore, with the relation to self must be the cause of the passion.

Tho' it shou'd be questioned, whether beauty be not something real, and different from the power of producing pleasure, it can never be disputed, that as surprize is nothing but a pleasure arising from novelty, it is not, properly speaking, a quality in any object, but merely a passion or impression in the soul. It must, therefore, be from that impression, that pride by a natural transition arises. And it arises so naturally, that there is nothing in *us or belonging to its,* which produces surprize, that does not at the same time excite that other passion. Thus we are vain of the surprising adventures we have met with, the escapes we have made, and dangers we have been expos'd to. Hence the origin of vulgar {2:98} lying; where men without any interest, and merely out of vanity, heap up a number of extraordinary events, which are either the fictions of their brain, or if true, have at least no connexion with themselves. Their fruitful invention supplies them with a variety of adventures; and where that talent is wanting, they appropriate such as belong to others, in order to satisfy their vanity.

In this phenomenon are contain'd two curious experiments, which if we compare them together, according to the known rules, by which we judge of cause and effect in anatomy, natural philosophy, and other sciences, will be an undeniable argument for that influence of the double relations abovemention'd. By one of these experiments we find, that an object produces pride merely by the interposition of pleasure; and that because the quality, by which it produces pride, is in reality nothing but the power of producing pleasure. By the other experiment we find, that the pleasure produces the pride by a transition along related ideas; because when we cut off that relation the passion is immediately destroy'd. A surprising adventure, in which we have been ourselves engag'd, is related to us, and by that means produces pride: But the adventures of others, tho' they may cause pleasure, yet for want of this relation of ideas, never excite that passion. What farther proof can be desired for the present system?

There is only one objection to this system with regard to our body; which is, that tho' nothing be more agreeable than health, and more painful than sickness, yet commonly men are neither proud of the one, nor mortify'd with the other. This will easily be accounted for, if we consider the second and fourth limitations, propos'd to our general system. It was observ'd, that no object ever produces pride or humility, if it has not something peculiar to ourself; as also, that every cause of

that passion must be in some measure constant, and hold some proportion to the duration of ourself, which is its object. Now as health and sickness vary incessantly to all men, and there is none, who is *solely* or certainly fix'd in either, these accidental blessings and calamities are in a manner separated from us, and are never considered as connected with our being and existence. And that this account is just appears hence, that wherever a malady of any kind is so rooted in our constitution, that we no longer entertain {2:99} any hopes of recovery, from that moment it becomes an object of humility; as is evident in old men, whom nothing mortifies more than the consideration of their age and infirmities. They endeavour, as long as possible, to conceal their blindness and deafness, their rheums and gouts; nor do they ever confess them without reluctance and uneasiness. And tho' young men are not asham'd of every head-ach or cold they fall into, yet no topic is so proper to mortify human pride, and make us entertain a mean opinion of our nature, than this, that we are every moment of our lives subject to such infirmities. This sufficiently proves that bodily pain and sickness are in themselves proper causes of humility; tho' the custom of estimating every thing by comparison more than by its intrinsic worth and value, makes us overlook these calamities, which we find to be incident to every one, and causes us to form an idea of our merit and character independent of them.

We are asham'd of such maladies as affect others, and are either dangerous or disagreeable to them. Of the epilepsy; because it gives a horror to every one present: Of the itch; because it is infectious: Of the king's-evil; because it commonly goes to posterity. Men always consider the sentiments of others in their judgment of themselves. This has evidently appear'd in some of the foregoing reasonings; and will appear still more evidently, and be more fully explain'd afterwards.

Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion

David Hume

1741

Editor's note: "Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion" appeared in 1741 in Volume one of Hume's *Essays, Moral and Political*. The text file here is based on the 1777 edition of Hume's *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*. Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized.

Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion

SOME People are subject to a certain *delicacy* of *passion*, which makes them extremely sensible to all the accidents of life, and gives them a lively joy upon every prosperous event, as well as a piercing grief, when they meet with misfortunes and adversity. Favours and good offices easily engage their friendship; while the smallest injury provokes their resentment. Any honour or mark of distinction elevates them above measure; but they are as sensibly touched with contempt. People of this character have, no doubt, more lively enjoyments, as well as more pungent sorrows, than men of cool and sedate tempers: But, I believe, when every thing is balanced, there is no one, who would not rather be of the latter character, were he entirely master of his own disposition. Good or ill fortune is very little at our disposal: And when a person, that has this sensibility of temper, meets with any misfortune, his sorrow or resentment takes entire possession of him, and deprives him of all relish in the common occurrences of life; the right enjoyment of which forms the chief part of our happiness. Great pleasures are much less frequent than great pains; so that a sensible temper must meet with fewer trials in the former way than in the latter. Not to mention, that men of such lively passions are apt to be transported beyond all bounds of prudence and discretion, and to take false steps in the conduct of life, which are often irretrievable.

There is a *delicacy* of *taste* observable in some men, which very much resembles this *delicacy* of *passion*, and produces the same sensibility to beauty and deformity of every kind, as that does to prosperity and adversity, obligations and injuries. When you present a poem or a picture to a man possessed of this talent, the delicacy of his feeling makes him be sensibly touched with every part of

it; nor are the masterly strokes perceived with more exquisite relish and satisfaction, than the negligences or absurdities with disgust and uneasiness. A polite and judicious conversation affords him the highest entertainment; rudeness or impertinence is as great a punishment to him. In short, delicacy of taste has the same effect as delicacy of passion: It enlarges the sphere both of our happiness and misery, and makes us sensible to pains as well as pleasures, which escape the rest of mankind.

I believe, however, every one will agree with me, that, notwithstanding this resemblance, delicacy of taste is as much to be desired and cultivated as delicacy of passion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if possible. The good or ill accidents of life are very little at our disposal; but we are pretty much masters what books we shall read, what diversions we shall partake of, and what company we shall keep. Philosophers have endeavoured to render happiness entirely independent of every thing external. That degree of perfection is impossible to be *attained*: But every wise man will endeavour to place his happiness on such objects chiefly as depend upon himself: and *that* is not to be *attained* so much by any other means as by this delicacy of sentiment. When a man is possessed of that talent, he is more happy by what pleases his taste, than by what gratifies his appetites, and receives more enjoyment from a poem or a piece of reasoning than the most expensive luxury can afford.

Whatever connexion there may be originally between these two species of delicacy, I am persuaded, that nothing is so proper to cure us of this delicacy of passion, as the cultivating of that higher and more refined taste, which enables us to judge of the characters of men, of compositions of genius, and of the productions of the nobler arts. A greater or less relish for those obvious beauties, which strike the senses, depends entirely upon the greater or less sensibility of the temper: But with regard to the sciences and liberal arts, a fine taste is, in some measure, the same with strong sense, or at least depends so much upon it, that they are inseparable. In order to judge aright of a composition of genius, there are so many views to be taken in, so many circumstances to be compared, and such a knowledge of human nature requisite, that no man, who is not possessed of the soundest judgment, will ever make a tolerable critic in such performances. And this is a new reason for cultivating a relish in the liberal arts. Our judgment will strengthen by this exercise: We shall form juster notions of life: Many things, which please or afflict others, will appear to us too frivolous to engage our attention: And we shall lose by degrees that sensibility and delicacy of passion, which is so incommodious.

But perhaps I have gone too far in saying, that a cultivated taste for the polite arts extinguishes the passions, and renders us indifferent to those objects, which are so fondly pursued by the rest of mankind. On farther reflection, I find, that it rather improves our sensibility for all the tender and agreeable passions; at the same time that it renders the mind incapable of the rougher and more boisterous emotions.

Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,

***Emollit mores, nec sinit isse feros*.**

For this, I think there may be assigned two very natural reasons. In the *first* place, nothing is so improving to the temper as the study of the beauties, either of poetry, eloquence, music, or painting. They give a certain elegance of sentiment to which the rest of mankind are strangers. The emotions which they excite are soft and tender. They draw off the mind from the hurry of business and interest; cherish reflection; dispose to tranquillity; and produce an agreeable melancholy, which, of all dispositions of the mind, is the best suited to love and friendship.

In the *second* place, a delicacy of taste is favourable to love and friendship, by confining our choice to few people, and making us indifferent to the company and conversation of the greater part of men. You will seldom find, that mere men of the world, whatever strong sense they may be endowed with, are very nice in distinguishing characters, or in marking those insensible differences and gradations, which make one man preferable to another. Any one, that has competent sense, is sufficient for their entertainment: They talk to him, of their pleasure and affairs, with the same frankness that they would to another; and finding many, who are fit to supply his place, they never feel any vacancy or want in his absence. But to make use of the allusion of a celebrated French[2] author, the judgment may be compared to a clock or watch, where the most ordinary machine is sufficient to tell the hours; but the most elaborate alone can point out the minutes and seconds, and distinguish the smallest differences of time. One that has well digested his knowledge both of books and men, has little enjoyment but in the company of a few select companions. He feels too sensibly, how much all the rest of mankind fall short of the notions which he has entertained. And, his affections being thus confined within a narrow circle, no wonder he carries them further, than if they were more general and undistinguished. The gaiety and frolic of a bottle companion improves with him into a solid friendship: And the ardours of a youthful appetite become an elegant passion.

Notes

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[2]*Mons*. FONTENELLE, *Pluralite des Mondes*. Soir. 6.



Of the Liberty of the Press

David Hume

1741

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Of the Liberty of the Press

NOTHING is more apt to surprize a foreigner, than the extreme liberty, which we enjoy in this country, of communicating whatever we please to the public, and of openly censuring every measure, entered into by the king or his ministers. If the administration resolve upon war, it is affirmed, that, either wilfully or ignorantly, they mistake the interests of the nation, and that peace, in the present situation of affairs, is infinitely preferable. If the passion of the ministers lie towards peace, our political writers breathe nothing but war and devastation, and represent to pacific conduct of the government as mean and pusillanimous. As this liberty is not indulged in any other government, either republican or monarchical; in HOLLAND and VENICE, more than in FRANCE or SPAIN; it may very naturally give occasion to a question, *How it happens that* GREAT BRITAIN *alone enjoys this peculiar privilege*?

The reason, why the laws indulge us in such a liberty seems to be derived from our mixed form of government, which is neither wholly monarchical, nor wholly republican. It will be found, if I mistake not, a true observation in politics, that the two extremes in government, liberty and slavery, commonly approach nearest to each other; and that, as you depart from the extremes, and mix a little of monarchy with liberty, the government becomes always the more free; and on the other hand, when you mix a little of liberty with monarchy, the yoke becomes always the more grievous and intolerable. In a government, such as that of FRANCE, which is absolute, and where law, custom, and religion concur, all of them, to make the people fully satisfied with their condition, the monarch cannot entertain any *jealousy* against his subjects, and therefore is apt to indulge them in great *liberties* both of speech and action. IN a government altogether republican,

such as that of HOLLAND, where there is not magistrate so eminent as to give *jealousy* to the state, there is no danger in intrusting the magistrates with large discretionary powers; and though many advantages result from such powers, in preserving peace and order, yet they lay a considerable restraint on men's actions, and make every private citizen pay a great respect to the government. Thus it seems evident, that the two extremes of absolute monarchy and of a republic, approach near to each other in some material circumstances. In the *first*, the magistrate has no jealousy of the people: in the *second*, the people have none of the magistrate: Which want of jealousy begets a mutual confidence and trust in both cases, and produces a species of liberty in monarchies, and of arbitrary power in republics.

To justify the other part of the foregoing observation, that, in every government, the means are most wide of each other, and that the mixtures of monarchy and liberty render the yoke either more easy or more grievous; I must take notice of a remark in TACITUS with regard to the ROMANS under the emperors, that they neither could bear total slavery nor total liberty, *Nec totam sevitutem, nec totam libertatem pati possunt*. This remark a celebrated poet has translated and applied to the ENGLISH, in his lively description of queen ELIZABETH's policy and government,

Et fit aimer son joug a 'l Anglois indompte,

***Qui ne peut ni servir, ni vivre en liberte*.**

According to these remarks, we are to consider the ROMAN government under the emperors as a mixture of despotism and liberty, where the despotism prevailed; and the ENGLISH government as a mixture of the same kind, where the liberty predominates. The consequences are conformable to the foregoing observation; and such as may be expected from those mixed forms of government, which beget a mutual watchfulness and jealousy. The ROMAN emperors were, many of them, the most frightful tyrants that ever disgraced human nature; and it is evident, that their cruelty was chiefly excited by their *jealousy*, and by their observing that all the great men of ROME bore with impatience the dominion of a family, which, but a little before, was no wise superior to their own. On the other hand, as the republican part of the government prevails in ENGLAND, though with a great mixture of monarchy, it is obliged, for its own preservation, to maintain a watchful *jealousy* over the magistrates, to remove all discretionary powers, and to secure every one's life and fortune by general and inflexible laws. No action must be deemed a crime but what the law has plainly determined to be such: No crime must be imputed to a man but from a legal proof before his judges; and even these judges must be his fellow-subjects, who are obliged, by their own interest, to have a watchful eye over the encroachments and violence of the ministers. From these causes, it proceeds, that there is as much liberty, and even, perhaps, licentiousness in GREAT BRITAIN, as there were formerly slavery and tyranny in ROME.

These principles account for the great liberty of the press in these kingdoms, beyond what is indulged in any other government. It is apprehended, that arbitrary power would steal in upon us, were we not careful to prevent its progress, and were there not an easy method of conveying the alarm from one end of the kingdom to the other. The spirit of the people must frequently be rouzed, in order to curb the ambition of the court; and the dread of rouzing this spirit must be employed to prevent that ambition. Nothing so effectual to this purpose as the liberty of the press, by which all the learning, wit, and genius of the nation may be employed on the side of freedom, and every one be animated to its defence. As long, therefore, as the republican part of our government can maintain itself against the monarchical, it will naturally be careful to keep the press open, as of importance to its own preservation.

It must however be allowed, that the unbounded liberty of the press, though it be difficult, perhaps impossible, to propose a suitable remedy for it, is one of the evils, attending those mixt forms of government.

Notes

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A Letter From a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh

David Hume

1745

Editor's note: In 1744-1745 Hume was a candidate for the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. The position was to be vacated by John Pringle, and the leading candidates were Hume and William Cleghorn. The Edinburgh Town Council was responsible for electing a replacement; consequently, politics was a key factor in the decision. Loyalties were drawn chiefly along the two key political party lines: the Argathelians (Hume's party), and the Squadrones (Cleghorn's party). Pringle, a Squadrone, procrastinated in stepping down, thus allowing the Squadrones to unify their opposition to Hume by condemning his anti-religious writings. Chief among the religious critics was clergyman William Wishart (d. 1752), the Principal of the University of Edinburgh. Although Wishart was an Argathelian, his dislike of Hume's philosophy rose above political allegiance; it is also relevant that Wishart too sought the position for which Hume was applying. Lists of allegedly dangerous propositions from Hume's *Treatise* circulated, presumably penned by Wishart. In the face of such strong opposition, Hume's Argathelian support weakened. The religious dimension of the competition also compelled the Edinburgh Town Council to consult the Edinburgh ministers. Hoping to win over the clergy, Hume composed a point by point reply to the circulating lists of dangerous propositions. This was sent to Henry Home, and published as *A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh*. The clergy were not dissuaded, and 12 of the 15 ministers voted against Hume. Hume quickly withdrew his candidacy. A month later Hume reflected in a letter that the matter of his vocational opportunities "was brought to an issue, and by the cabals of the Principal [i.e. Wishart], the bigotry of the clergy, and the credulity of the mob, we lost it." In 1751-1752 Hume sought a philosophy chair at the University of Glasgow, and was again unsuccessful. Hume's lesson, perhaps, was to seek civil employment through his Argathelian supporters, rather than academic employment. The following

is from the 1745 edition of *A Letter from a Gentleman*.

A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN TO
HIS FRIEND IN *Edinburgh*:
CONTAINING
Some OBSERVATIONS ON

A Specimen of the Principles concerning RELIGION and MORALITY, *said to be* maintain'd in a Book lately publish'd, intituled, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, &c.

***EDINBURGH*,**
Printed in the year M.DCC.XLV.

{3}

***SIR*,**

I Have read over the Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion and Morality, said to be maintain'd in a Book lately published, intituled, *A Treatise of Human Nature*; being an Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. I have also read over what is called *the Sum of the Charge*. Which Papers, as you inform me, have been industriously spread about, and were put into your hands some few Days ago.

I was perswaded that the Clamour of *Scepticism, Atheism,* &c. had been so often employ'd by the worst of Men against the best, that it had now lost all its Influence; and should never have thought of making any Remarks on these *maim'd Excerpts*, if you had not laid your Commands on me, as a piece of common Justice to the Author, and for undeceiving some well-meaning People, on whom it seems the enormous Charge has made Impression. {4}

I shall insert the Accusation at full Length, and then go regularly through what is called the *Sum of the Charge*; because it is intended, I suppose, to contain the Substance of the whole. I shall also take notice of the *Specimen* as I go along.

Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion *and* Morality, &*c*.

THE Author puts on his Title-page (Vol. I printed for *J. Noon*, 1739) a Passage of *Tacitus* to this Purpose; "Rare Happiness of our Times, that you may think as you will, and speak as you think."

He expresses his Deference to the Publick in these Words (Advertisement, *p*. 2.) The Approbation of the Publick I consider as the *greatest* Reward of my Labours; but am determined to regard its Judgment, *whatever it be,* as my *best* Instruction."

He gives us the summary View of his Philosophy from *p*. 458. to 470. --

"I am confounded with that forlorn Solitude, in which I am placed in my Philosophy. {5} -- I have exposed myself to the Enmity of all Metaphysicians, Logicians, Mathematicians, and even Theologians. -- I have declared my Disapprobations of their Systems. -- When I turn my Eye

inward, I find nothing but Doubt and Ignorance. All the World conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho' such is my Weakness, that I feel all my Opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the Approbation of others. -- Can I be sure, that, in leaving all established Opinions, I am following Truth? and by what Criterion shall I distinguish her, even if *Fortune* should at last guide me on her Footsteps? After the most accurate and exact of my Reasonings, I can give no Reason why I should assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong Propensity to consider Objects strongly in that View under which they appear to me. -- The Memory, Senses, and Understanding, are all of them founded on the *Imagination*. -- No Wonder a Principle so inconstant and fallacious should lead us into Errors, when implicitely followed (as it must be) in all its Variations. -- I have already shown, that the Understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general Principles, *entirely* subverts itself, and leaves {6} not the *lowest Degree* of Evidence in any Proposition either in Philosophy or common Life. -- We have no Choice left, but betwixt a *false Reason* and *none at all*. -- Where am I, or what? From what Causes do I derive my Existence, and to what Condition shall I return? Whose Favour shall I court, and whose Anger must I dread? What Beings surround me? On whom have I any Influence, or who have any Influence on me? I am confounded with all these Questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable Condition imaginable, inironed with the deepest Darkness, and utterly deprived of the Use of every Member and Faculty. -- If I must be *a Fool*, as all those who reason or believe any Thing certainly are, my Follies shall at least be natural and agreeable. -- In all the Incidents of Life, we ought still to preserve our Scepticism: If we believe that *Fire warms*, or *Water refreshes*, 'tis only because it costs us *too much Pains* to think otherwise; nay, if we are Philosophers, *it ought only* to be upon sceptical Principles. -- I cannot forbear having a Curiosity to be acquainted with the Principles of moral Good and Evil, &c. I am concerned for he Condition of the *learned World*, which lies under such a deplorable {7} Ignorance in all these Particulars. I feel an Ambition arise in me of contributing to the Instruction of Mankind, and of acquiring *a Name by my Inventions and Discoveries*. -- Should I endeavour to banish these Sentiments, I feel I should be a Loser in point of Pleasure; and this is the Origin of my Philosophy."

Agreeable to this summary View, he tells us, *p*. 123.

> "Let us fix our Attention *out of ourselves* as much as possible. -- We really never advance a Step *beyond ourselves*; nor can conceive any Kind of Existence, but these Perceptions which have appeared in that narrow Compass: This is the Universe of the Imagination, nor have we any Idea but what is there produced."

Accordingly,

> "An Opinion or Belief may be most accurately defined, *A lively Idea related or associated with a present Impression*; and is more properly an Act of the sensitive than of the cognitive Part of our Natures."

And,

> "Belief in general consists in nothing but the Vivacity of an Idea. Again, the Idea of *Existence* is the very same with the Idea of what we conceive to be existent. -- Any Idea we please to form is the Idea of a Being; and the Idea of a Being is any Idea we please to form. And as to the {8} Notion of an external Existence, when taken for something specifically different from our Perceptions, we have shown its absurdity: And what we call a Mind is nothing but a Heap or Collection of different Perceptions united together

by certain Relations, and supposed, tho' falsly, to be endowed with a perfect Simplicity."

And,

> "The only Existence, of which we are certain, are Perceptions. When I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular Perception or other. -- I never can catch *myself* at any Time without a Perception, and never can observe *any Thing but the Perception*. -- If any one think he has a different Notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. -- I may venture to affirm of the rest of Mankind, that they are nothing but a Bundle of Perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable Rapidity, and are in a perpetual Flux and Movement." --

And lest the Reader should forget to apply all this to the Supreme Mind, and the Existence of the First Cause, he has a long Disquisition concerning *Causes* and *Effects*, the Sum of which amounts to this, That all our Reasoning concerning Causes and Effects are derived from *nothing* but *Custom*: That {9}

> "if any pretend to define a Cause by saying it is something productive of another, 'tis evident he would say nothing; for what does he mean by Production? That we may define a Cause to be *an Object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the Objects resembling the former are placed in like Relations of Precedency and Contiguity to these Objects that resemble the latter; or, a Cause is an Object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the Idea of the one determines the Mind to form the Idea of the other, and the Impression of the one to form a more lively Idea of the other*."

From these clear and plain Definitions he infers,

> "That all Causes are of the same Kind; and there is no Foundation for the Distinction betwixt efficient Causes, and Causes *sine qua non*; or betwixt *efficient* Causes, and formal and material, and exemplary, and final Causes: And that there is but one Kind of Necessity, and the common Distinction betwixt Moral and Physical is without any Foundation in Nature: And that the Distinction we often make betwixt Power, and the Exercise of it, is equally without Foundation: And that the Necessity of a Cause to every Beginning of Existence, is not founded on any Arguments demonstrative {10} or intuitive: And in fine, That *any Thing* may produce *any Thing*; Creation, Annihilation, Motion, Reason, Volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other Object we can imagine."

The curious *Nostrum* he often repeats, *p*. 430, 434. Again he tells us,

> "That when we talk of any Being, whether of a Superior or Inferior Nature, as endowed with a Power or Force proportioned to any Effect, -- We have really no distinct Meaning, and make use only of common Words, without any clear and determinate Ideas. And if we have really no Idea of Power or Efficacy in any Object, or of any real connection betwixt Causes and Effects, 'twill be to little Purpose to prove that an Efficacy is necessary in all Operations. We do not understand our own Meaning in talking so, but ignorantly confound Ideas which are intirely distinct from

> **each other."**

Again he says,

> **"The Efficacy or Energy of Causes is neither placed in the Causes is neither placed in the Causes themselves, nor in the Deity, nor in the Concurrence of these two Principles, but belongs entirely to the Soul (*or the Bundle of Perceptions*) which considers the Union of two or more Objects in all past Instances: 'Tis here that the real Power of Causes is {11} placed, along with their Connection and Necessity. And in fine, we may observe a Conjunction or a Relation of Cause *and Effect between different Perceptions,* but can never observe it between Perceptions and Objects."**

'Tis impossible therefore, that, from the Existence or any of the Qualities of the former, we can ever form any Conclusion concerning the Existence of the latter, or ever satisfy our Reason in this Particular with regard to the Existence of a Supreme Being. 'Tis well known that this Principle, *Whatever begins to exist must have a Cause of Existence,* is the first Step in the Argument for the Being of a Supreme Cause; and that, without it, 'tis impossible to go one Step further in that Argument. Now this Maxim he is at great Pains from p.141. to explode, and to show, "That it is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain;" and he says,

> **"Reason can never satisfy us that the Existence of any Object does ever imply that of another. So that, when we pass from the Impression of one to the Idea and Belief of another, we are not determined by Reason, but by Custom."**

In a marginal Note on the preceeding Page he says,

> **"In that Proposition, *God is,* or indeed any other which regards Existence, the Idea of Existence is no distinct Idea {12} which we unite with that of the Object, and which is capable of forming a compound Idea by the Union."**

Concerning this Principle, *That the Deity is the prime Mover of the Universe, who first created Matter, and gave its original Impulse, and likewise supports its Existence, and successively bestows on it its Motions*; he says,

> **"This Opinion is certainly very curious, but it will appear superfluous to examine it in this Place. --For, if the very Idea be derived from an Impression, the Idea of a Deity proceeds from the same Origin; and, if no Impression implies any Force or Efficacy, 'tis equally impossible to discover, or even imagine, any such active Principle in the Deity. --Since Philosophers therefore have concluded, that Matter cannot be endowed with any efficacious Principle, because it is impossible to discover in it such a Principle; the same Course of Reasoning should determine them to exclude it from the Supreme Being: Or if they esteem that Opinion absurd and impious, as it really is, I shall tell them how they may avoid it, and that is, by *concluding from the very first,* that they have no adequate Idea of Power of Efficacy in any Object; since neither in Body nor Spirit, neither in Superior nor {13} Inferior Natures, are they able to discover one single Instance of it."**

And says he, "We have no Idea of a Being endowed with any Power, much less of one endowed with any infinite Power."

Concerning the *Immateriality of the Soul* (from which the Argument is taken for its natural Immortality, or that it cannot perish by Dissolution as the Body) he says,

> "We certainly may conclude that Motion may be and actually is the Cause of Thought and Perception: And no wonder, for any Thing may be the Cause or Effect of *any Thing*; which evidently gives the Advantage to the Materialists above their Adversaries."

But yet more plainly,

> "I assert, says he, that the Doctrine of the Immateriality, Simplicity, and Indivisibility of a thinking Substance, *is a true Atheism*, and will serve to justify *all* these Sentiments for which *Spinoza* is so universally infamous."

This hideous Hypothesis is almost the same with that of the Immateriality of the Soul, which has become so popular. And again he endeavours to prove, that all the Absurdities which have been found in the Systems of *Spinoza*, may likewise be discovered in that of the Theologians: And concludes, that

> "We cannot advance one Step towards the establishing the Simplicity and Immateriality {14} of the Soul, without preparing the Way for a dangerous and irrecoverable Atheism."

The Author's Sentiments in Morality we have in Vol. 3. printed for *T. Longman*, 1740. He there tells us, that

> "Reason has no Influence on our Passions and Actions: Actions may be laudable or blameable, but they cannot be *reasonable* or *unreasonable*. That all Beings in the Universe, considered in themselves, appear entirely loose and independent of each other; 'Tis only by Experience we learn their Influence and Connection, and this Influence we ought *never* to extend beyond *Experience*."

He takes great Pains to prove, from p.37. That Justice is not a natural, but an artificial Virtue; and gives one pretty odd Reason for it:

> "We may conclude, that the Laws of Justice, being universal and perfectly inflexible, can never be derived from Nature. I suppose (says he) a Person to have lent me a Sum of Money, on Condition that it be restored in a few Days; and also suppose, that, after Expiration of the Term agreed on, he demands the Sum: I ask, *What Reason or Motive have I to restore the Money?* Publick Interest is not naturally attach'd to the Observation of the Rules of Justice, but {15} is only connected with it, after an artificial Convention, for Establishment of these Rules. Unless we will allow that Nature has established a *Sophistry*, and rendered it necessary and unavoidable; we must allow that the Sense of Justice and Injustice is not derived from Nature, but arises artificially, tho' necessarily, from Education and human Conventions. Here is a Proposition which I think may be regarded as certain, *That it is only from the Selfishness and confined Generosity of Men, along with the scanty Provision Nature has made for his Wants, that Justice derives its Origin*. These Impressions, which give Rise to this Sense of Justice, are not natural to the Mind of Man, but arise from Artifice and human Conventions. Without such a Convention, no one would ever have dreamed that there was such a Virtue as Justice, or have been induced to conform his Actions to it. Taking any single Act, my Justice may be pernicious in every Respect: And 'tis only upon the Supposition that others are to imitate my Example, that I can be induced to embrace that Virtue; since nothing but the Combination can render Justice

> **advantageous, or afford me any Motive to conform myself to its Rules. {16} And in general it may be affirmed, that there is no such Passion in human Minds, *as the Love of Mankind* merely as such, independent of personal Qualities, of Service or of Relation to ourself."**

Mr. *Hobbs*, who was at Pains to shake loose all other natural Obligations, yet found it necessary to leave, or pretended to leave, the Obligation of Promises or Pactions; but our Author strikes a bolder Stroke:

> **"That the Rule of Morality (says he) which enjoins the Performance of *Promises*, is not natural, will sufficiently appear from these two Propositions, which I proceed to prove, *viz. That a Promise would not be intelligible before humans Conventions had established it; and that, even if it were intelligible, it would not be attended with any moral Obligation*."**

And he concludes, "That Promises impose no natural Obligation." And, p.115.

> **"I shall further observe, That since every new Promise imposes a new Obligation of Morality upon the Person who promises, and since this new Obligation arises from his Will, it is one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible Operations that can possible be imagined, and may even be compared to Transubstantiation or *Holy Orders*, where a certain Form of Words, along with a {17} certain Intention, changes entirely the Nature of an external Object, and even of a human Creature. In fine (says he) as Force is supposed to invalidate all Contracts, such a Principle is a Proof that Promises have no natural Obligation, and are mere artificial Contrivances, for the Conveniency and Advantage of Society."**

Sum of the Charge.

From the preceeding Specimen it will appear, that the Author maintains,

1. Universal Scepticism. See his Assertions, p.458, --470. where he doubts of every Thing (his own Existence excepted) and maintains the Folly of pretending to believe any Thing with Certainty.

2. Principles leading to downright Atheism, by denying the Doctrine of Causes and Effects, p.321, 138, 298, 300, 301, 303, 430, 434, 284. where he maintains, that the Necessity of a Cause to every Beginning of Existence is not founded on any Arguments demonstrative or intuitive.

3. Errors concerning the very Being and Existence of a God. For Instance, Marginal Note, p.172. as to that Proposition, *God is*, he says (or indeed as to any other Thing which regards Existence)

> **"The Idea {18} of Existence is no distinct Idea which we unite with that of the Object, and which is capable of forming a compound Idea by Union."**

4. Errors concerning God's being the first Cause, and prime Mover of the Universe: For as to this Principle, That the Deity first created Matter, and gave it its original Impulse, and likewise supports its Existence, he says,

"This Opinion is certainly very curious, but it will appear superfluous to examine it in this Place, &c."

5. He is chargable with denying the Immateriality of the Soul, and the Consequences flowing from this Denial, p.431, 4, 418, 419, 423.

6. With sapping the Foundations of Morality, by denying the natural and essential Difference betwixt Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, Justice and Injustice; making the Difference only artificial, and to arise from human Conventions and Compacts, Vol. 2. p.5, 19, 128, 41, 43, 48, 69, 70, 73, 4, 44.

[*Observations*]

You see, *Dear Sir*, that I have concealed no Part of the Accusation, but have inserted the *Specimen* and *Charge*, as transmitted to me, without the smallest Variation. I shall now go regularly thro' what is called the *Sum of the Charge*, because it {19} is intended, I suppose, to contain the Substance of the whole; and shall take Notice of the *Specimen* as I go along.

1st, As to the Scepticism with which the Author is charged, I must observe, that the Doctrine of the *Pyrrhonians* or *Scepticks* have been regarded in all Ages as Principles of mere Curiosity, or a Kind of *Feux d' esprit*, without any Influence on a Man's steady Principles or Conduct in Life. In Reality, a Philosopher who affects to doubt of the Maxims of *common Reason*, and even of his *Senses*, declares sufficiently that he is not in earnest, and that he intends not to advance an Opinion which he would recommend as Standards of Judgment and Action. All he means by these Scruples is to abate the Pride of *mere human Reasoners*, by showing them, that even with regard to Principles which seem the clearest, and which they are necessitated from the strongest Instincts of Nature to embrace, they are not able to attain a full Consistence and absolute Certainty. *Modesty* then, and *Humility*, with regard to the Operations of our natural Faculties, is the Result of *Scepticism*; not an universal Doubt, which it is impossible for any Man to support, and which the first and most trivial Accident in Life must immediately disconcert and destroy. {20}

How is such a Frame of Mind prejudicial to Piety? And must not a Man be ridiculous to assert that our Author denies the Principles of Religion, when he looks upon them as equally certain with the Objects of his Senses? If I be as much assured of these Principles, as that this Table at which I now write is before me; Can any Thing further be desired by the most rigorous Antagonist? 'Tis evident, that so extravagant a Doubt as that which Scepticism may seem to recommend, by destroying *every Thing*, really affects *nothing*, and was never intended to be understood *seriously*, but was meant as a *mere* Philosophical Amusement, or Trial of *Wit* and *Subtility*.

This is a Construction suggested by the very Nature of the Subject; but he has not been contented with that, but expressly declared it. And all those Principles, cited in the *Specimen* as Proofs of his Scepticism, are positively renounced in a few Pages afterwards, and called the Effects of *Philosophical Melancholy and Delusion*. These are his very Words; and his Accuser's overlooking them may be thought very prudent, but is a Degree of Unfairness which appears to me altogether astonishing.

Were Authorities proper to be employed in any Philosophical Reasoning, I could cite you that of *Socrates* the wisest and {21} most religious of the *Greek* Philosophers, as well as *Cicero* among the *Romans*, who both of them carried their Philosophical Doubts to the highest Degree of Scepticism. All the antient Fathers, as well as our first Reformers, are copious in representing the Weakness and Uncertainty of *mere* human Reason. And Monsieur *Huet* the learned Bishop of *Avaranches* (so celebrated for his *Demonstration Evangelique* which contains all the great Proofs of the Christian Religion) wrote also a Book on this very Topick, wherein he endeavours to revive all the Doctrines of the antient *Skepticks* or *Pyrrhonians*.

In Reality, whence come all the various Tribes of Hereticks, the *Arians, Socinians* and *Deists*, but from too great a Confidence in mere human Reason, which they regard as the *Standard* of every Thing, and which they will not submit to the superior Light of Revelation? And can one do a more essential Service to Piety, than by showing them that this boasted Reason of theirs, so far from accounting for the great Mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, is not able fully to satisfy itself with regard to its own Operations, and must in some Measure fall into a Kind of implicite Faith, even in the most obvious and familiar Principles?

II. The Author is charged with Opinions {22} leading to *downright Atheism*, chiefly by denying this Principle, *That whatever begins to exist must have a Cause of Existence*. To give you a Notion of the Extravagance of this Charge, I must enter into a little Detail. It is common for Philosophers to distinguish the Kinds of Evidence into *intuitive, demonstrative, sensible, and moral*; by which they intend only to mark a Difference betwixt them, not to denote a Superiority of one above another. *Moral Certainty* may reach as *high* a Degree of Assurance as *Mathematical*; and our Senses are surely to be comprised amongst the clearest and most convincing of all Evidences. Now, it being the Author's Purpose, in the Pages cited in the Specimen, to examine the Grounds of that Proposition; he used the Freedom of disputing the common Opinion, that it was founded on *demonstrative* or *intuitive Certainty*; but asserts, that it is supported by *moral Evidence*, and is followed by a Conviction of the same Kind with these Truths, *That all Men must die*, and that *the Sun will rise To-morrow*. Is this any Thing like denying the Truth of that Proposition, which indeed *a Man must have lost all common Sense to doubt of?*

But, granting that he had denied it, how is this a Principle that leads to Atheism? {23} It would be no difficult Matter to show, that the Arguments *a posteriori* from the Order and Course of Nature, these Arguments so sensible, so convincing, and so obvious, remain still in their full Force; and that nothing is affected by it but the *metaphysical* Argument *a priori*, which many Men of Learning cannot comprehend, and which many Men both of Piety and Learning show no great Value for. Bishop *Tillotson* has used a Degree of Freedom on this Head, which I would not willingly allow myself; 'tis in his excellent Sermon *concerning the Wisdom of being religious*, where he says, *That the Being of a God is not capable of Demonstration, but of moral Evidence*. I hope none will pretend that pious Prelate intended by these Assertions to weaken the Evidences for a Divine Existence, but only to distinguish accurately its Species of Evidence.

I say further, that even the metaphysical Arguments for a Deity are not affected by a Denial of the Proposition above-mentioned. It is only Dr. *Clark's* Argument which can be supposed to be any way concerned. Many other Arguments of the same Kind still remain; *Des Cartes*'s for Instance, which has always been esteemed as solid and convincing as the other. I shall add, that a great Distinction ought always to be {24} made betwixt a Man's positive and avowed Opinions, and the Inferences which it may please others to draw from them. Had the Author really denied the Truth of the foregoing Proposition, (which the most superficial Reader cannot think ever entered his Head) still he could not properly be charged as designing to invalidate any one Argument that any Philosopher has employed for a *Divine Existence*; that is only an Inference and Construction of others, which he may refuse if he thinks proper.

Thus you may judge of the Candor of the whole Charge, when you see the assigning of *one Kind of Evidence* for a Proposition, instead of *another*, is called denying that Proposition; that the invalidating only *one Kind* of Argument for the Divine Existence is called *positive Atheism*; nay, that the weakning only of *one individual Argument* of that Kind is called rejecting that *whole Species of Argument*, and the Inferences of others are ascribed to the Author as his real Opinion.

'Tis impossible ever to satisfy a captious Adversary, but it would be easy for me to convince the severest Judge, that all the solid Arguments for Natural Religion retain their full Force upon the Author's Principles concerning Causes and Effects and that there is no Necessity even for altering {25} the common Methods of expressing or conceiving these Arguments. The Author has indeed asserted, That we can judge only of the Operations of Causes by Experience, and that, reasoning *a priori*, any thing might appear able to produce any thing. We could not know that Stones would descend, or fire burn, had we not Experience of these Effects; and indeed, without such Experience, we could not certainly infer the Existence of one Thing from that of another. This is no great Paradox, but seems to have been the Opinion of several Philosophers, and seems the most obvious and familiar Sentiment on that Subject; but, tho' all Inferences are noway weakned by such an Assertion, but on the contrary will be found to acquire more Force, as long as Men are disposed to trust to their Experience rather than to mere human Reasoning. Wherever I see Order, I infer from Experience that *there*, there hath been Design and Contrivance. And the same Principle which leads me into this Inference, when I contemplate a Building, regular and beautiful in its whole Frame and Structure; the same Principle obliges me to infer an infinitely perfect Architect, from the infinite Art and Contrivance which is display'd in the whole {26} Fabrick of the Universe. Is not this the Light in which this Argument hath been placed by all Writers concerning Natural Religion?

III. The next Proof of Atheism is so unaccountable, that I know not what to make of it. Our Author indeed asserts, after the present pious and learned Bishop of *Cloyne*, That we have no *abstract* or *general Ideas*, properly so speaking; and that those Ideas, which are called general, are nothing but particular Ideas affixed to general Terms. Thus, when I think of a Horse in general, I must always conceive that Horse as black or white, fat or lean, &c. and can form no Notion of a Horse that is not of some particular Colour or Size. In Prosecution of the same Topick, the Author hath said, That we have no general Idea of Existence, distinct from every particular Existence. But a Man must have strange Sagacity, that could discover Atheism in so harmless a Proposition. This, in my Opinion, might be justified before the University of *Salamanca*, or a *Spanish* Inquisition. I do indeed believe, that, when we assert the Existence of a Deity, we do not form a general abstract Idea of Existence, which we unite with the Idea of God, and which is capable of forming a compound Idea by Union; but this is {27} the Case with regard to every Proposition concerning Existence. So that, by this Course of Reasoning, we must deny the Existence of every Thing, even of ourselves, of which at least even the Accuser himself will admit our Author is perswaded.

IV. Ere answering the fourth Charge, I must use the Freedom to deliver a short History of a particular Opinion in Philosophy. When Men considered the several Effects and Operations of Nature, they were led to examine into the Force or Power by which they were performed; and they divided into several Opinions upon this Head, according as their *other* Principles were more or less favourable to Religion. The Followers of *Epicurus* and *Strato* asserted, That this Force was original and inherent in Matter, and, operating blindly, produced all the various Effects which we behold. The *Platonick* and *Peripatetick* Schools, perceiving the Absurdity of this Proposition, ascribed the Origin of all Force to one primary efficient Cause, who first bestowed it on Matter, and successively guided it in all its Operations. But all the antient Philosophers agreed, that there was a real Force in Matter, either original or derived; and that it was really Fire which burnt, and Food that nourished, when we observed any of these {28} Effects to follow upon the Operations of these Bodies: The Schoolmen supposed also a real Power in Matter, to whose Operations however the continual Concurrence of the Deity was requisite, as well as to the Support of that Existence which

had been bestowed on Matter, and which they considered as a perpetual Creation. No one, till *Des Cartes* and *Malbranche*, ever entertained an Opinion that Matter had no Force either *primary* or *secondary*, and *independent* or *concurrent*, and could not so much as properly be called an *Instrument* in the Hands of the Deity, to serve any of the Purposes of Providence. These Philosophers last-mentioned substituted the Notion of *occasional Causes*, by which it was asserted that a Billiard Ball did not move another by its Impulse, but was only the Occasion why the Deity, in pursuance of general Laws, bestowed Motion on the second Ball. But, tho' this Opinion be very innocent, it never gained great Credit, especially in *England*, where it was considered as too much contrary to received popular Opinions, and too little supported by Philosophical Arguments, ever to be admitted as any Thing but a *mere Hypothesis*. *Cudworth*, *Lock* and *Clark* make little or no mention of it. Sir *Isaac Newton* (tho' some of his Followers have taken {29} a different Turn of thinking) plainly rejects it, by substituting the Hypothesis of an AEtheral Fluid, not the immediate Volition of the Deity, as the Cause of Attraction. And, in short, this has been a Dispute left entirely to the Arguments of Philosophers, and in which Religion has never been supposed to be in the least concerned.

Now it is evidently concerning this *Cartesian Doctrine*, of *secondary Causes*, the Author is treating, when he says, (in the Passage referred to in the Charge) *That it was a curious Opinion, but which it would appear superfluous to examine in that Place*.

The Topick there handled is somewhat abstract: But I believe any Reader will easily perceive the Truth of this Assertion, and that the Author is far from pretending to deny (as asserted in the Charge) *God's being the first Cause and prime Mover of the Universe*. That the Author's Words could have no such Meaning as they stand connected, is to me so evident, that I could pledge on this Head, not only my small Credit as a Philosopher, but even all my Pretensions to Trust or Belief in the common Affairs of Life.

V. As to the fifth Article; The Author has not anywhere that I remember denied {30} the Immateriality of the Soul in the common Sense of the Word. He only says, That that Question did not admit of any distinct Meaning; because we had no distinct Idea of Substance. This Opinion may be found everywhere in Mr. *Lock*, as well as in Bishop *Berkley*.

VI. I come now to the last Charge, which, according to the prevalent Opinion of Philosophers in this Age, will certainly be regarded as the severest, *viz.* the Author's destroying all the Foundations of Morality.

He hath indeed denied the eternal Difference of Right and Wrong in the Sense in which *Clark* and *Woolaston* maintained them, *viz.*. That the Propositions of Morality were of the same Nature with the Truths of Mathematicks and the abstract Sciences, the Objects *merely* of Reason, not the *Feelings* of our internal *Tastes* and *Sentiments*. In this Opinion he concurs with all the antient Moralists, as well as with Mr. *Hutchison* Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of *Glasgow*, who, with others, has revived the antient Philosophical Discourse, in order to throw an Odium on the Author!

When the Author asserts that Justice is an *artificial* not a *natural Virtue*, he seems {31} sensible that he employed Words that admit of an invidious Construction; and therefore makes use of all proper Expedients, by *Definitions* and *Explanations*, to prevent it. But of these his Accuser takes no Notice. By the *natural Virtues* he plainly understands *Compassion* and *Generosity*, and such as we are immediately carried to by a *natural Instinct*, a certain Reflection on the general Interests of Human Society, and a Combination with others. In the same Sense, Sucking is an Action natural to Man,

and Speech is artificial. But what is there in this Doctrine that can be supposed in the least pernicious? Has he not expresly asserted, That Justice, in another Sense of the Word, is so natural to Man, that no Society of Men, and even no individual Member of any Society, was ever entirely devoid of all Sense of it? Some Persons (tho' without any Reason, in my Opinion) are displeased with Mr. *Hutchison*'s Philosophy, in sounding all the Virtues so much on *Instinct*, and admitting so little of *Reason* and *Reflection*. Those should be pleased to find that so considerable a Branch of the Moral Duties are founded on that Principle.

The Author has likewise taken care in {32} positive Terms to assert, That he does not maintain that Men ly under no Obligation to observe Contracts, independent of Society; but only, that they never would have formed Contracts, and even would not have understood the Meaning of them, independent of Society. And whereas it is observed in the Specimen, That our Author offers further to prove, that, suppose a Promise was intelligible before Human Conventions had established it, it would not be attended with any Moral Obligation. The most careless Reader must perceive that he does not understand *Moral* in such an extended Sense, as to deny the Obligation of Promises, independent of Society; seeing he not only asserts what is above-represented, but likewise that the Laws of Justice are universal, and perfectly inflexible. It is evident, that suppose Mankind, in some primitive unconnected State, should be some Means come to the Knowledge of the Nature of those Things which we call Contracts and Promises; that this Knowledge would have laid them under no such actual Obligation, if not placed in such Circumstances as give rise to these Contracts.

I am sorry I should be obliged to cite from my Memory, and cannot mention Page and Chapter so accurately as the Accuser. I came hither by Post, and brought no {33} Books along with me, and cannot now provide myself in the Country with the Book referred to.

This long Letter, with which I have troubled you, was composed in one Morning, that I might gratify your Demand of an immediate Answer to the heavy Charge brought against your Friend; and this, I hope, will excuse any Inaccuracies that may have crept into it. I am indeed of Opinion, that the Author had better delayed the publishing of that Book; not on account of any dangerous Principles contained in it, but because on more mature Consideration he might have rendered it much less imperfect by further Corrections and Revisals. I must not at the same Time omit observing, that nothing can be wrote so accurately or innocently, which may not be perverted by such Arts as have been imployed on this Occasion. No Man would undertake so invidious a Task as that of our Author's Accuser, who was not actuated by particular Interests; and you know how easy it is, by broken and partial Citations, to pervert any Discourse, much more one of so abstract a Nature, where it is difficult, or almost impossible, to justify one's self to the Publick. The Words which have been carefully pickt out from a large Volume will no doubt have a dangerous Aspect to careless {34} Readers; and the Author, in my Apprehension, cannot fully defend himself without a particular Detail, which it is impossible for a careless Reader to enter into. This Advantage of the Ground has been trusted to by his Accuser, and surely never more abused than on the present Occasion. But he has one Advantage, I trust, which is worth a Hundred of what his Opposers can boast of, viz. *that of Innocence*; and I hope he has also another Advantage, *viz. that of Favour*, if we really live in a Country of Freedom, where Informers and Inquisitors are so deservedly held in universal Detestation, where Liberty, at least of Philosophy, is so highly valu'd and esteem'd. I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient

humble Servant.

May 8th 1745.

Notes

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

5/25/96

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conventions. This is a working draft; please report errors.[1]

Editor's Note: At the age of 27, Hume published his philosophical masterpiece, the seven-hundred page *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40). In spite of the *Treatise*'s importance in the history of philosophy, it did poorly when it first came out, selling only a few dozen copies. In Hume's own words, the *Treatise* "fell dead born from the press." Stricken by this failure, about a decade later Hume wrote the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) and the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751) as an attempt to produce a shorter and more popular account of his views. Both *Enquiries* met with success and soon established Hume's reputation as a world class philosopher and skeptic. Hume eventually came to reject the *Treatise* as an immature work, and wished to have his philosophical views represented by his later writings. The *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* first appeared under the title *Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding*. Although the name was changed 10 years later, the original title indicates its place within the 18th century genre of essay writing insofar as it is a collection of twelve loosely related philosophical essays. The underlying theme which ties the essays together is the primacy of experience and causal inference in establishing our ideas -- specifically philosophically potent ideas such as necessary connection, free will, and God. The text here is based on a public domain text file of the *Enquiry* generously provided by Thomas Dell *dell@goonsquad.spies.com*. Dell scanned the text from the 1910 Harvard Classics edition and electronically compared it to commercial editions of the *Enquiry*. I have read Dell's file against the 1777 edition of the *Enquiry* and adapted it for spelling, punctuation, italicization and small capitalization. The latter half of Section 3 along with several footnotes removed by Hume in later editions of the *Enquiry* were reintroduced as appears in Green and Grose's 1874 *Works* of Hume.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION I.
Of The Different Species Of Philosophy.

MORAL philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us *feel* the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an

active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction of posterity.

It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.

This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of CICERO flourishes at present; but that of ARISTOTLE is utterly decayed. LA BRUYERE passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of MALEBRANCHE is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And ADDISON, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when LOCKE shall be entirely forgotten.[2]

The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, the mere ignorant is still more despised; nor

is any thing deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish, than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes; retaining an equal ability and taste for books, company, and business; preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters; and in business, that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character, nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner, which *draw* not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instructive, and retirement entertaining.

Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active being; and from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities of human life, must submit to business and occupation: But the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biases to *draw* too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.

Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy philosophy to the abstract and profound, without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without opposition, his own taste and sentiment. But as the matter is often carried farther, even to the absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings, or what is commonly called *metaphysics*, we shall now proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf.

We may begin with observing, that one considerable advantage, which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy, is, its subserviency to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or reasonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and situations; and inspire us with different sentiments, of praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of the object, which they set before us. An artist must be better qualified to succeed in this undertaking, who, besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension, possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric, the operations of the understanding, the workings of the passions, and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue. How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite to those, who would

describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a VENUS or an HELEN. While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.

Besides, we may observe, in every art or profession, even those which most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more subservient to the interests of society. And though a philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtility, in the subdividing and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The stability of modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philosophy, have improved, and probably will still improve, by similar gradations.

Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies, beyond the gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be despised; as being one accession to those few safe and harmless pleasures, which are bestowed on the human race. The sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and learning; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way, or open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind. And though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing, it is with some minds as with some bodies, which being endowed with vigorous and florid health, require severe exercise, and reap a pleasure from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burdensome and laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs be delightful and rejoicing.

But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chased from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission, as their legal sovereigns.

But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion,

and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason. For, besides, that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such topics; besides this, I say, the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences; since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still room to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize, and find himself stimulated, rather than discouraged, by the failures of his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate. Indolence, which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair, which, at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom.

Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many positive advantages, which result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become the object of reflexion, they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflexion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and distinguishing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value, when directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it. And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy.

Nor can there remain any suspicion, that this science is uncertain and chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflexion; and consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions

on this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of this kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the imagination and passions, which fall within the comprehension of every human creature; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and certain, though more difficult to be comprehended. Some instances, especially late ones, of success in these enquiries, may give us a juster notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of learning. And shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to give us a true system of the planets, and adjust the position and order of those remote bodies; while we affect to overlook those, who, with so much success, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are so intimately concerned?[3]

But may we not hope, that philosophy, cultivated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations? Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phaenomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be resolved into one more general and universal: And how far these researches may possibly be carried, it will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by those who philosophize the most negligently: And nothing can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention; that, if it lie within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily achieved; if not, it may, however, be rejected with some confidence and security. This last conclusion, surely, is not desirable; nor ought it to be embraced too rashly. For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species of philosophy, upon such a supposition? Moralists have hitherto been accustomed, when they considered the vast multitude and diversity of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for some common principle, on which this variety of sentiments might depend. And though they have sometimes carried the matter too far, by their passion for some one general principle; it must, however, be confessed, that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles, into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved. The like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even politicians: Nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful; though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy,that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles on mankind.

What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension? This affords no presumption of their falsehood. On the contrary, it seems impossible, that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy. And whatever pains these researches may cost us, we may think ourselves sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make

any addition to our stock of knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance.

But as, after all, the abstractedness of these speculations is no recommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding of all unnecessary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted to throw some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty! And still more happy, if, reasoning in this easy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error!

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION II.
Of the Origin of Ideas.

EVERY one will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour, is, that they represent their object in so lively a manner, that we could *almost* say we feel or see it: But, except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.

We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and from a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice

discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them.

Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated THOUGHTS or IDEAS. The other species want a name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them IMPRESSIONS; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term *impression*, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.

Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction.

But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, *gold*, and *mountain*, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.

To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be sufficient. First, when we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those ideas, which, at first view, seem the most wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression. Those who would assert that this position is not universally true nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not

derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression, or lively perception, which corresponds to it.

Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that sense in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his sensations, you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects. The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ. A LAPLANDER or NEGROE has no notion of the relish of wine. And though there are few or no instances of a like deficiency in the mind, where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or passion that belongs to his species; yet we find the same observation to take place in a less degree. A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the heights of friendship and generosity. It is readily allowed, that other beings may possess many senses of which we can have no conception; because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have access to the mind, to wit, by the actual feeling and sensation.

There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent of their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or those of sound, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each other; though, at the same time, resembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour; and each shade produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colour than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: And this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.

Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it, might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure: The mind has but a slender hold of them: They are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a

determinate idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: The limits between them are more exactly determined: Nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, *from what impression is that supposed idea derived*? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.[4]

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An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION III.
Of the Association of Ideas.

IT is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse this is so observable that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: A certain proof that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.

Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together; I do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, *Resemblance*, *Contiguity* in time or place, and *Cause* or *Effect*.

That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original:[5] the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others:[6] and if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it.[7] But that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no other principles of association except these, may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own satisfaction. All we can do, in such cases, is to run over several instances, and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other, never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible.[8] The more instances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is complete and entire.[9]

Instead of entering into a detail of this kind, which would lead us into many useless subtilties, we shall consider some of the effects of this connection upon the passions and imagination; where we may open up a field of speculation more entertaining, and perhaps more instructive, than the other.

As man is a reasonable being and is continually in pursuit of happiness, which he hopes to find in the gratification of some passion or affection, he seldom acts or speaks or things without a purpose and intention. He has still some object in vies; and however improper the means may sometimes be which he chooses for the attainment of his end, he never loses view of an end, nor will he so much as throw away his thoughts or reflections where he hopes not to reap any satisfaction from them.

In all compositions of genius, therefore, it is requisite that the writer have some plan or object; and though he may be hurried from this plan by the vehemence of thought, as in an ode, or drop it carelessly, as in an epistle or essay, there must appear some aim or intention in his first setting out, if not in the composition of the whole work. A production without a design would resemble more the ravings of a madman than the sober efforts of genius and learning.

As this rule admits of no exception, it follows that in narrative compositions the events or actions which the writer relates must be connected together by some bond or tie: They must be related to each other in the imagination, and form a kind of *unity* which may bring them under one plan or view, and which may be the object or end of the writer in his first undertaking.

This connecting principle among the several events which form the subject of a poem or history may be very different according to the different designs of the poet or historian. OVID has formed his plan upon the connecting principles of resemblance. Every fabulous transformation produced by the miraculous power of the gods falls within the compass of his work. There needs

but this one circumstance, in any event, to bring it under his original plan or intention.

An annalist or historian who should undertake to write the history or Europe during any century would be influenced by the connection of contiguity in time or place. All events which happen in that portion of space and period of time are comprehended in his design, though in other respects different and unconnected. They have still a species of unity amidst all their diversity.

But the most usual species of connections among the different events which enter into any narrative composition is that of cause and effect; while the historian traces the series of actions according to their natural order, remounts to their secret springs and principles, and delineates their most remote consequences. He chooses for his subject a certain portion of that great chain of events which compose the history of mankind: Each link in this chain he endeavours to touch in his narration; sometimes unavoidable ignorance renders all his attempts fruitless; sometimes he supplies by conjecture what is wanting in knowledge; and always he is sensible that the more unbroken the chain is which he presents to his readers, the more perfect is his production. He sees that the knowledge of causes is not only the most satisfactory, this relation or connection being the strongest of all others, but also the most instructive; since it is by this knowledge alone we are enabled to control events and govern futurity.

Here, therefore, we may attain some notion of that *unity* of *action* about which all critics after Aristotle have talked so much, perhaps to little purpose, which they directed not their taste or sentiment by the accuracy of philosophy. It appears that in all productions, as well as in the epic and tragic, there is a certain unity required, and that on no occasion our thoughts can be allowed to run at adventures if we would produce a work that will give any lasting entertainment to mankind. It appears, also, that even a biographer who should write the life of Achilles would connect the events by showing their mutual dependence and relation, as much as a poet who should make the anger of that hero the subject of his narration.[10] Not only in any limited portion of life a man's actions have a dependence on each other, but also curing the whole period of his duration from the cradle to the grave; nor is it possible to strike off one link, however minute, in this regular chain without affecting the whole series of events which follow. The unity of action, therefore, which is to be found in biography or history differs from that of epic poetry, not in kind, but in degree. In epic poetry, the connection among the events is more close and sensible; the narration is not carried on through such a length of time; and the actors hasten to some remarkable period which satisfies the curiosity of the reader. this conduct of the epic poet depends on that particular situation of the imagination and of the passions which is supposed in that production. The imagination both of writer and reader is more enlivened, and the passions more inflamed than in history, biography, or any species of narration that confine themselves to strict truth and reality. Let us consider the effect of these two circumstances of an enlivened imagination and inflamed passions which belong to poetry, especially the epic kind, above any other species of composition; and let us see for what reason they require a stricter and closer unity in the fable.

***First*, all poetry, being a species of painting, approaches us nearer to the objects than any other species of narration, throws a stronger light upon them, and delineates more distinctly those minute circumstances which, though to the historian they seem superfluous, serve mightily to**

enliven the imagery and gratify the fancy. If it be not necessary, as in the *Iliad*, to inform us each time the hero buckles his shoes and ties his garters, it will be requisite, perhaps, to enter into a greater detail than in the *Henriade*, where the events are run over with such rapidity that we scarce have leisure to become acquainted with the scene or action. Were a poet, therefore, to comprehend in his subject any great compass of time or series of events, and trace up the death of Hector to its remote causes in the rape of Helen or the judgment of Paris, he must draw out his poem to an immeasurable length in order to fill this large canvass with just painting and imagery. The reader's imagination, inflamed with such a series of poetical descriptions, and his passions, agitated by a continual sympathy with the actors, must flag long before the period of narration and must sink into lassitude and disgust from the repeated violence of the same movements.

Secondly, that an epic poet must not trace the causes to any great distance will further appear if we consider another reason, which is drawn from a property of the passions still more remarkable and singular. It is evident that in a just composition all the affections excited by the different events described and represented add mutual force to each other; and that, while the heroes are all engaged in one common scene, and each action is strongly connected with the whole, the concern is continually awake, and the passions make an easy transition from one object to another. The strong connection of the events, as it facilitates the passage of the thought or imagination from one to another, facilitates also the transfusion of the passions and preserves the affection still in the same channel and direction. Our sympathy and concern for Eve prepares the way for a like sympathy with Adam: The affection is preserved almost entire in the transition, and the mind seizes immediately the new object as strongly related to that which formerly engaged its attention. But were the poet to make a total digression from his subject and introduce a new actor no way connected with the personages, the imagination, feeling a breach in the transition, would enter coldly into the new scene; would kindle by slow degrees; and in returning to the main subject of the poem would pass, as it were, upon foreign ground and have its concern to excite anew in order to take party with the principal actors. The same inconvenience follows in a lesser degree where the poet traces his events to too great a distance and binds together actions which, though not altogether disjoined, have not so strong a connection as is requisite to forward the transition of the passions. Hence arises the artifice of oblique narration employed in the *Odyssey* and *Aeneid* -- where the hero is introduced, at first, near the period of his designs, and afterwards shows us, as it were in perspective, the more distant events and causes. By this means, the reader's curiosity is immediately excited; the events follow with rapidity, and in a very close connection; and the concern preserved alive, and continually increases by means of the near relation of the objects, from the beginning to the end of the narration.

The same rule takes place in dramatic poetry; nor is it ever permitted in a regular composition to introduce an actor who has no connection, or but a small one, with the principle personages of the fable. The spectator's concern must not be diverted by any scenes disjoined and separated from the rest. This breaks the course of the passions, and prevents that communication of the several emotions by which one scene adds force to another, and transfuses the pity and terror which it excites upon each succeeding scene until the whole produces that rapidity of movement which is peculiar to the theater. How must it extinguish this warmth or affection to be entertained on a sudden with a new action and new personages no way related to the former; to find so sensible a breach or vacuity in the course of the passions, by means of this breach in the

connection of ideas; and instead of carrying the sympathy of one scene into the following, to be obliged every moment to excite a new concern, and take party in a new scene of action?

But though this rule of unity of action be common to dramatic and epic poetry, we may still observe a difference betwixt them which may, perhaps, deserve our attention. In both these species of composition it is requisite the action be one and simple, in order to preserve the concern or sympathy entire and undiverted: But in epic or narrative poetry, this rule is also established upon another foundation, VIZ. the necessity that is incumbent on every writer to form some plan or design before he enter on any discourse or narration, and to comprehend his subject in some general aspect or united view which may be the constant object of his attention. As the author is entirely lost in dramatic compositions, and the spectator supposes himself to be really present at the actions represented, this reason has no place with regard to the stage; but any dialogue or conversation may be introduced which, without improbability, might have passed in that determinate portion of space represented by the theater. Hence, in all our English comedies, even those of CONGREVE, the unity of action is never strictly observed; but the poet thinks it sufficient if his personages be any way related to each other by blood, or by living in the same family; and he afterwards introduces them in particular scenes, where they display their humors and characters without much forwarding the main action. The double plots of TERENCE are licenses of the same kind, but in a lesser degree. And though this conduct be not perfectly regular, it is not wholly unsuitable to the nature of comedy, where the movements and passions are not raised to such a height as in tragedy; at the same time that the fiction or representation palliates, in come degree, such licenses. In a narrative poem, the first proposition or design confines the author to one subject; and any digressions of this nature would, at first view, be rejected as absurd and monstrous. Neither BOCCACE, LA FONTAINE, nor any author of that kind, though pleasantry be their chief object, have ever indulged them.

To return to the comparison of history and epic poetry, we may conclude from the foregoing reasonings that as a certain unity is requisite in all productions, it cannot be wanting to history more than to any other; that in history the connection among the several events which unites them into one body is the relation of cause and effect, the same which takes place in epic poetry; and that, in the latter composition, this connection is only required to be closer and more sensible on account of the lively imagination and strong passions which must be touched by the poet in his narration. the PELOPONNESIAN war is a proper subject for history, the siege of ATHENS for an epic poem, and the death of ALCIBIADES for a tragedy.

As the difference, therefore, betwixt history and epic poetry consists only in the degrees of connection which bind together those several events of which their subject is composed, it will be difficult, if not impossible, by words to determine exactly the bounds which separate them from each other. That is a matter of taste more than of reasoning; and perhaps this unity may often be discovered in a subject where, at first view, and from an abstract consideration, we should least expect to find it.

It is evident that HOMER, in the course of his narration, exceeds the first proposition of his subject; and that the anger of ACHILLES, which caused the death of HECTOR, is not the same with that which produced so many ills to the GREEKS. But the strong connection betwixt these two

movements, the quick transition from one to the other, the contrast betwixt the effects of concord and discord amongst the princes, and the natural curiosity we have to see ACHILLES in action after so long repose -- all these causes carry on the reader, and produce a sufficient unity in the subject.

It may be objected to MILTON that he has traced up his causes to too great a distance, and that the rebellion of the angels produces the fall of man by a train of events which is both very long and very casual. Not to mention that the creation of the world, which he has related at length, is no more the cause of that catastrophe than of the battle of PHARSALIA, or any other event that has ever harpooned. But if we consider, on the other hand, that all these events, the rebellion of the angels, the creation of the world, and the fall of man, *resemble* each other in being miraculous, and out of the common course of nature; that they are supposed to be *contiguous* in time; and that, being detached from all other events, and being the only original facts which revelation discovers, they strike the eye at once, and naturally recall each other to the thought or imagination -- if we consider all these circumstances, I say, we shall find that these parts of the action have a sufficient unity to make them be comprehended in one fable or narration. To which we may add that the rebellion of the angels and the fall of man have a peculiar resemblance, as being counterparts to each other, and presenting to the reader the same moral of obedience to our Creator.

These loose hints I have thrown together in order to excite the curiosity of philosophers, and beget a suspicion at least if not a full persuasion that this subject is very copious, and that many operations of the human mind depend on the connection or association of ideas which is here explained. Particularly, the sympathy betwixt the passions and imagination will, perhaps, appear remarkable; while we observe that the affections, excited by one object, pass easily to another connected with it, but transfuse themselves with difficulty, or not at all, along different objects which have no manner of connection together. By introducing into any composition personages and actions foreign to each other, an injudicious author loses that communication of emotions by which alone he can interest the heart and raise the passions to their proper height and period. the full explication of this principle and all its consequences would lead us into reasonings too profound and too copious for these Essays. It is sufficient for us, at present, to have established this conclusion, that the three connecting principles of all ideas are the relations of *resemblance*, *contiguity*, and *causation*.

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An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION IV.
Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding.

PART I.

ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *Relations of Ideas*, and *Matters of Fact*. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. *That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides*, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty*, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing.

The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. *That the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, *that it will rise*. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.

It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of so important an enquiry, may be the more excusable; while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful, by exciting curiosity, and destroying that implicit faith and security, which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry. The discovery of defects in the common philosophy, if any such there be, will not, I presume, be a discouragement, but rather an incitement, as is usual, to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public.

All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *Cause and Effect*. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in FRANCE; he would give you a reason; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person: Why? because these are the effects of the human make and fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other.

If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.

I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings *a priori*; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. ADAM, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him.

No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.

This proposition, *that causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience*, will readily be admitted with regard to such objects, as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us; since we must be conscious of the utter inability, which we then lay under, of foretelling what would arise from them. Present two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy; he will never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as to require great force to separate them in a direct line, while they make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure. Such events, as bear little analogy to the common course of nature, are also readily confessed to be known only by experience; nor does any man imagine that the explosion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadstone, could ever be discovered by arguments *a priori*. In like manner, when an effect is supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or secret structure of parts, we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience. Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a tyger?

But the same truth may not appear, at first sight, to have the same evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from our first appearance in the world, which bear a close analogy to the whole course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the simple qualities of objects, without any secret structure of parts. We are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason, without experience. We fancy, that were we brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree.

But to convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience, the following reflections may, perhaps, suffice. Were any object presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect, which will result from it, without consulting past observation; after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second Billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there any thing in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: But to consider the matter *a priori,* is there any thing we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal?

And as the first imagination or invention of a particular effect, in all natural operations, is arbitrary, where we consult not experience; so must we also esteem the supposed tie or connexion

between the cause and effect, which binds them together, and renders it impossible that any other effect could result from the operation of that cause. When I see, for instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings *a priori* will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference.

In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, *a priori*, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary; since there are always many other effects, which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and experience.

Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher, who is rational and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power, which produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer: As perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.

Nor is geometry, when taken into the assistance of natural philosophy, ever able to remedy this defect, or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes, by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so justly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the supposition that certain laws are established by nature in her operations; and abstract reasonings are employed, either to assist experience in the discovery of these laws, or to determine their influence in particular instances, where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity. Thus, it is a law of motion, discovered by experience, that the moment or force of any body in motion is in the compound ratio or proportion of its solid contents and its velocity; and consequently, that a small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise the greatest weight, if, by any contrivance or machinery, we can increase the velocity of that force, so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist. Geometry assists us in the application of this law, by giving us the just dimensions of all

the parts and figures which can enter into any species of machine; but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience, and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards the knowledge of it. When we reason *a priori*, and consider merely any object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object, such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable and inviolable connexion between them. A man must be very sagacious who could discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of heat, and ice of cold, without being previously acquainted with the operation of these qualities.

PART II.

BUT we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard to the question first proposed. Each solution still gives rise to a new question as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther enquiries. When it is asked, *What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact?* the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, *What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation?* it may be replied in one word, EXPERIENCE. But if we still carry on our sifting humour, and ask, *What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?* this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication. Philosophers, that give themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency, have a hard task when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push them from every corner to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to bring them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confusion, is to be modest in our pretensions; and even to discover the difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance.

I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend.

It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers[11] and principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no

scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by any thing which it knows of their nature. As to past *Experience*, it can be allowed to give *direct* and *certain* information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: But why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers: But does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same, *I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect*, and *I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects*. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact.

This negative argument must certainly, in process of time, become altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philosophers shall turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or intermediate step, which supports the understanding in this conclusion. But as the question is yet new, every reader may not trust so far to his own penetration, as to conclude, because an argument escapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not really exist. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult task; and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge, endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument.

All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in DECEMBER and JANUARY, and decay in MAY and JUNE? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning *a priori*.

If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, and make it the

standard of our future judgment, these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.

In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw advantage from that similarity which nature has placed among different objects. From causes which, appear *similar*, we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions. Now it seems evident that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this appearing similarity, expects the same taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of reasoning which, from one instance, draws a conclusion, so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise different from that single one? This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.

Should it be said that, from a number of uniform experiments, we *infer* a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in different terms. The question still recurs, on what process of argument this *inference* is founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that the colour, consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities, without the aid of experience; contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here, then, is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform effects, resulting from certain objects, and teaches us that those particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces. When a new object, endowed with similar sensible qualities, is produced, we expect similar powers and forces, and look for a like effect. From a body of like colour and consistence with bread we expect like nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or progress of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man says, *I have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers:* And when he says,

similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers; he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To say it is experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process or argument secures you against this supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge.

I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that, though all the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. Even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge, and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain a suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the present subject, there are some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of mistake.

It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants -- nay infants, nay even brute beasts -- improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your enquiry; since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar.

This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION V.
Sceptical Solution of these Doubts.

PART I.

THE passion for philosophy, like that for religion, seems liable to this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve, by imprudent management, to foster a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with more determined resolution, towards that side which already *draws* too much, by the bias and propensity of the natural temper. It is certain that, while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage, and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we may, at last, render our philosophy like that of EPICTETUS, and other *Stoics*, only a more refined system of selfishness, and reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment. While we study with attention the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honours, we are, perhaps, all the while flattering our natural indolence, which, hating the bustle of the world, and drudgery of business, seeks a pretence of reason to give itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence. There is, however, one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience, and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or

propensity; and that is the ACADEMIC or SCEPTICAL philosophy. The academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgment, of danger in hasty determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding, and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice. Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind, its rash arrogance, its lofty pretensions, and its superstitious credulity. Every passion is mortified by it, except the love of truth; and that passion never is, nor can be, carried to too high a degree. It is surprising, therefore, that this philosophy, which, in almost every instance, must be harmless and innocent, should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and obloquy. But, perhaps, the very circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and resentment. By flattering no irregular passion, it gains few partizans: By opposing so many vices and follies, it raises to itself abundance of enemies, who stigmatize it as libertine, profane, and irreligious.

Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should conclude, for instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding; there is no danger that these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same. What that principle is may well be worth the pains of enquiry.

Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover any thing farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other. And in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of any thing beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses.

Suppose, again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived so long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together; what is the consequence of this experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other; nor is it by any process of reasoning, he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to draw it: And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion.

This principle is CUSTOM or HABIT. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of *Custom*. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther, or pretend to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from experience. It is sufficient satisfaction, that we can go so far, without repining at the narrowness of our faculties because they will carry us no farther. And it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we assert that, after the constant conjunction of two objects - - heat and flame, for instance, weight and solidity -- we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is, in no respect, different from them. Reason is incapable of any such variation. The conclusions which it draws from considering one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe. But no man, having seen only one body move after being impelled by another, could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning.[12]

Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.

But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of matters of fact which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages, yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. A man, who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous buildings, would conclude that the country had, in ancient times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this nature occur to him, he could never form such an inference. We learn the events of former ages from history; but then we must peruse the volumes in which this instruction is contained, and thence carry up our inferences from one testimony to another, till we arrive at the eyewitnesses and spectators of these distant events. In a word, if we proceed not upon some fact, present to the memory or senses, our reasonings would be merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of any real existence. If I ask why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, *in infinitum*, you must at last terminate in some fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.

What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one; though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object. Or in other words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects -- flame and heat, snow and cold -- have always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to *believe* that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.

At this point, it would be very allowable for us to stop our philosophical researches. In most questions we can never make a single step farther; and in all questions we must terminate here at last, after our most restless and curious enquiries. But still our curiosity will be pardonable, perhaps commendable, if it carry us on to still farther researches, and make us examine more accurately the nature of this *belief*, and of the *customary conjunction*, whence it is derived. By this means we may meet with some explications and analogies that will give satisfaction; at least to such as love the abstract sciences, and can be entertained with speculations, which, however accurate, may still retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty. As to readers of a different taste; the remaining part of this section is not calculated for them, and the following enquiries may well be understood, though it be neglected.

PART II.

NOTHING is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision. It can feign a train of events, with all the appearance of reality, ascribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint them out to itself with every circumstance, that belongs to any historical fact, which it believes with the greatest certainty. Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a *fiction* and *belief*? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to such a conception as commands our assent, and which is wanting to every known fiction. For as the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases; contrary to what we find by daily experience. We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse; but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed.

It follows, therefore, that the difference between *fiction* and *belief* lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor

can be commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation, in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which is usually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief. For as there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly that we cannot conceive the contrary, there would be no difference between the conception assented to and that which is rejected, were it not for some sentiment which distinguishes the one from the other. If I see a billiard-ball moving toward another, on a smooth table, I can easily conceive it to stop upon contact. This conception implies no contradiction; but still it feels very differently from that conception by which I represent to myself the impulse and the communication of motion from one ball to another.

Were we to attempt a *definition* of this sentiment, we should, perhaps, find it a very difficult, if not an impossible task; in the same manner as if we should endeavour to define the feeling of cold or passion of anger, to a creature who never had any experience of these sentiments. BELIEF is the true and proper name of this feeling; and no one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term; because every man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it. It may not, however, be improper to attempt a *description* of this sentiment; in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at some analogies, which may afford a more perfect explication of it. I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join and mix and vary them, in all the ways possible. It may conceive fictitious objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes, in their true colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible that this faculty of imagination can ever, of itself, reach belief, it is evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the *manner* of their conception, and in their *feeling* to the mind. I confess, that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words which express something near it. But its true and proper name, as we observed before, is *belief*; which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy, we can go no farther than assert, that *belief* is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgement from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; enforces them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of our actions. I hear at present, for instance, a person's voice, with whom I am acquainted; and the sound comes as from the next room. This impression of my senses immediately conveys my thought to the person, together with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as existing at present, with the same qualities and relations, of which I formerly knew them possessed. These ideas take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an enchanted castle. They are very different to the feeling, and have a much greater influence of every kind, either to give pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow.

Let us, then, take in the whole compass of this doctrine, and allow, that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and that this *manner* of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses: I believe that it will not be difficult, upon these suppositions, to find other operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up these phenomena to principles still more general.

We have already observed that nature has established connexions among particular ideas, and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of connexion or association we have reduced to three, namely, *Resemblance*, *Contiguity* and *Causation*; which are the only bonds that unite our thoughts together, and beget that regular train of reflection or discourse, which, in a greater or less degree, takes place among all mankind. Now here arises a question, on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend. Does it happen, in all these relations, that, when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory, the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain? This seems to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect. And if the case be the same with the other relations or principles of associations, this may be established as a general law, which takes place in all the operations of the mind.

We may, therefore, observe, as the first experiment to our present purpose, that, upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend, our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the *resemblance*, and that every passion, which that idea occasions, whether of joy or sorrow, acquires new force and vigour. In producing this effect, there concur both a relation and a present impression. Where the picture bears him no resemblance, at least was not intended for him, it never so much as conveys our thought to him: And where it is absent, as well as the person, though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other, it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that transition. We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend, when it is set before us; but when it is removed, rather choose to consider him directly than by reflection in an image, which is equally distant and obscure.

The ceremonies of the ROMAN CATHOLIC religion may be considered as instances of the same nature. The devotees of that superstition usually plead in excuse for the mummeries, with which they are upbraided, that they feel the good effect of those external motions, and postures, and actions, in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervour, which otherwise would decay, if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types, than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and contemplation. Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other; and this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related, and which they resemble. I shall only infer from these practices, and this reasoning, that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common; and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur, we are abundantly supplied with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle.

We may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind, in considering the effects of *contiguity* as well as of *resemblance*. It is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea, and that, upon our approach to any object; though it does not discover itself to our senses; it operates upon the mind with an influence, which imitates an immediate impression. The thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous; but it is only the actual presence of an object, that transports it with a superior vivacity. When I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant; though even at that distance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter case, both the objects of the mind are ideas; notwithstanding there is an easy transition between them; that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of some immediate impression.[13]

No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity. Superstitious people are fond of the reliques of saints and holy men, for the same reason, that they seek after types or images, in order to enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives, which they desire to imitate. Now it is evident, that one of the best reliques, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of a saint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light, it is because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected by him; in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect effects, and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those, by which we learn the reality of his existence.

Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had been long dead or absent, were presented to us; it is evident, that this object would instantly revive its correlative idea, and recall to our thoughts all past intimacies and familiarities, in more lively colours than they would otherwise have appeared to us. This is another phaenomenon, which seems to prove the principle above mentioned.

We may observe, that, in these phaenomena, the belief of the correlative object is always presupposed; without which the relation could have no effect. The influence of the picture supposes, that we *believe* our friend to have once existed. Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home, unless we *believe* that it really exists. Now I assert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it first begins from an object, present to the senses, it renders the idea or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arises immediately. The thought moves instantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses. When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of wound and pain strike me more strongly, than when a glass of wine is presented to me, even though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance of the latter object? But what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong conception, except only a present object and a customary transition of the idea of another

object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind, in all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence; and it is a satisfaction to find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The transition from a present object does in all cases give strength and solidity to the related idea.

Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object, instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation of *final causes*, have here ample subject to employ their wonder and admiration.

I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and *vice versa*, is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.

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An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION VII.
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion.

PART I.

THE great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible, are always clear and determinate, the smallest distinction between them is immediately perceptible, and the same terms are still expressive of the same ideas, without ambiguity or variation. An oval is never mistaken for a circle, nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis. The isosceles and scalenum are distinguished by boundaries more exact than vice and virtue, right and wrong. If any term be defined in geometry, the mind readily, of itself, substitutes, on all occasions, the definition for the term defined: Or even when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to the senses, and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended. But the finer sentiments of the mind, the operations of the understanding, the various agitations of the passions, though really in themselves distinct, easily escape us, when surveyed by reflection; nor is it in our power to recall the original object, as often as we have occasion to contemplate it. Ambiguity, by this means, is gradually introduced into our reasonings: Similar objects are readily taken to be the same: And the conclusion becomes at last very wide of

the premises.

One may safely, however, affirm, that, if we consider these sciences in a proper light, their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate each other, and reduce both of them to a state of equality. If the mind, with greater facility, retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate, it must carry on a much longer and more intricate chain of reasoning, and compare ideas much wider of each other, in order to reach the abstruser truths of that science. And if moral ideas are apt, without extreme care, to fall into obscurity and confusion, the inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions, and the intermediate steps, which lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the sciences which treat of quantity and number. In reality, there is scarcely a proposition in EUCLID so simple, as not to consist of more parts, than are to be found in any moral reasoning which runs not into chimera and conceit. Where we trace the principles of the human mind through a few steps, we may be very well satisfied with our progress; considering how soon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning causes, and reduces us to an acknowledgment of our ignorance. The chief obstacle, therefore, to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought, requisite to the forming of any conclusion. And, perhaps, our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by the want of proper experiments and phaenomena, which are often discovered by chance, and cannot always be found, when requisite, even by the most diligent and prudent enquiry. As moral philosophy seems hitherto to have received less improvement than either geometry or physics, we may conclude, that, if there be any difference in this respect among these sciences, the difficulties, which obstruct the progress of the former, require superior care and capacity to be surmounted.

There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of *power*, *force*, *energy* or *necessary connexion*, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavour, in this section, to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove some part of that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy.

It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to *think* of any thing, which we have not antecedently *felt*, either by our external or internal senses. I have endeavoured[15] to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed my hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas, may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still more ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope or species of optics, by which, in the moral sciences, the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our

apprehension, and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the object of our enquiry.

To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived.

When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard- ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the *outward* senses. The mind feels no sentiment or *inward* impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.

From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning.

In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible qualities, discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any other object, which we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extension, motion; these qualities are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power of force, which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. We know that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame; but what is the connexion between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies, in single instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover any power, which can be the original of this idea.[16]

Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to the senses, give us no idea of power or necessary connexion, by their operation in particular instances, let us see, whether this idea be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any internal impression. It may be said, that we are every moment conscious of internal power; while we feel, that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind. An act of volition produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain, that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and on the command which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul.

We shall proceed to examine this pretension; and first with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This influence, we may observe, is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can be known only by experience, and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the effect, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are so far from being immediately conscious, that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry.

For *first*; is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body; by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered, by a secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit; this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension. But if by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the will, we must know this power; we must know its connexion with the effect; we must know the secret union of soul and body, and the nature of both these substances; by which the one is able to operate, in so many instances, upon the other.

Secondly, We are not able to move all the organs of the body with a like authority; though we cannot assign any reason besides experience, for so remarkable a difference between one and the other. Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or liver? This question would never embarrass us, were we conscious of a power in the former case, not in the latter. We should then perceive, independent of experience, why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumscribed within such particular limits. Being in that case fully acquainted with the power or force, by which it operates, we should also know, why its influence reaches precisely to such boundaries, and no farther.

A man, suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm, or who had newly lost those members, frequently endeavours, at first to move them, and employ them, in their usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of power to command such limbs, as a man in perfect health is conscious of power to actuate any member which remains in its natural state and condition. But consciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in the one case nor in the other, are we ever conscious of any power. We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable.

Thirdly, We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in voluntary motion, is not the member itself which is moved, but certain muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still more minute and more unknown, through which the motion is successively propagated, ere it reach the member itself whose motion is the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the power, by which this whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness is, to the last degree, mysterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain event. Immediately another event,

unknown to ourselves, and totally different from the one intended, is produced: This event produces another, equally unknown: Till at last, through a long succession, the desired event is produced. But if the original power were felt, it must be known: Were it known, its effect also must be known; since all power is relative to its effect. And *vice versa*, if the effect be not known, the power cannot be known nor felt. How indeed can we be conscious of a power to move our limbs, when we have no such power; but only that to move certain animal spirits, which, though they produce at last the motion of our limbs, yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension?

We may, therefore, conclude from the whole, I hope, without any temerity, though with assurance; that our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use and office. That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience, like other natural events: But the power or energy by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable.[17] Shall we then assert, that we are conscious of a power or energy in our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we raise up a new idea, fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all sides, and at last dismiss it for some other idea, when we think that we have surveyed it with sufficient accuracy? I believe the same arguments will prove, that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy.

***First*, It must be allowed, that, when we know a power, we know that very circumstance in the cause, by which it is enabled to produce the effect: For these are supposed to be synonymous. We must, therefore, know both the cause and effect, and the relation between them. But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? This is a real creation; a production of something out of nothing: Which implies a power so great, that it may seem, at first sight, beyond the reach of any being, less than infinite. At least it must be owned, that such a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceivable by the mind. We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent to a command of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is performed, the power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond our comprehension.**

***Secondly*, The command of the mind over itself is limited, as well as its command over the body; and these limits are not known by reason, or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect, but only by experience and observation, as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects. Our authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries. Will any one pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries, or show why the power is deficient in one case, not in another.**

***Thirdly*, This self-command is very different at different times. A man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness. We are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening: Fasting, than after a full meal. Can we give any reason for these variations, except experience? Where then is the power, of which we pretend to be conscious? Is there not here, either in a spiritual or material substance, or both, some secret mechanism or structure of**

parts, upon which the effect depends, and which, being entirely unknown to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehensible?

Volition is surely an act of the mind, with which we are sufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. Do you find any thing in it like this creative power, by which it raises from nothing a new idea, and with a kind of FIAT, imitates the omnipotence of its Maker, if I may be allowed so to speak, who called forth into existence all the various scenes of nature? So far from being conscious of this energy in the will, it requires as certain experience as that of which we are possessed, to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever result from a simple act of volition.

The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature -- such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose that, in all these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant, and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it. It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phaenomena, such as earthquakes, pestilence, and prodigies of any kind, that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause, and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it. It is usual for men, in such difficulties to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle[18] as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them, and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature. But philosophers, who carry their scrutiny a little farther, immediately perceive that, even in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent CONJUNCTION of objects, without being ever able to comprehend any thing like CONNEXION between them. Here, then, many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse, on all occasions, to the same principle, which the vulgar never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural. They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be, not only the ultimate and original cause of all things, but the immediate and sole cause of every event which appears in nature. They pretend that those objects which are commonly denominated *causes*, are in reality nothing but *occasions*; and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being, who wills that such particular objects should for ever be conjoined with each other. Instead of saying that one billiard-ball moves another by a force which it has derived from the author of nature, it is the Deity himself, they say, who, by a particular volition, moves the second ball, being determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball, in consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of the universe. But philosophers advancing still in their inquiries, discover that, as we are totally ignorant of the power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies, we are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body, or of body on mind, nor are we able, either from our senses or consciousness, to assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other. The same ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the same conclusion. They assert that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body; and that they are not the organs of sense, which, being agitated by external objects, produce sensations in the mind; but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites such a

sensation, in consequence of such a motion in the organ. In like manner, it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in our members: It is God himself, who is pleased to second our will, in itself impotent, and to command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our own power and efficacy. Nor do philosophers stop at this conclusion. They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind itself, in its internal operations. Our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and raise up its image in the fancy, it is not the will which creates that idea: It is the universal Creator, who discovers it to the mind, and renders it present to us.

Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is full of God. Not content with the principle, that nothing exists but by his will, that nothing possesses any power but by his concession: They rob nature, and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immediate. They consider not that, by this theory, they diminish, instead of magnifying, the grandeur of those attributes, which they affect so much to celebrate. It argues surely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures than to produce every thing by his own immediate volition. It argues more wisdom to contrive at first the fabric of the world with such perfect foresight that, of itself, and by its proper operation, it may serve all the purposes of providence, than if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and animate by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine.

But if we would have a more philosophical confutation of this theory, perhaps the two following reflections may suffice:

***First*, it seems to me that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations. Though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and experience. We are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached the last steps of our theory; and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument, or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided, in every step which we take, by a kind of verisimilitude and experience, we may be assured that this fancied experience has no authority when we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience. But on this we shall have occasion to touch afterwards.[19]**

***Secondly*, I cannot perceive any force in the arguments on which this theory is founded. We are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which bodies operate on each other: Their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible: But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind, even the supreme mind, operates either on itself or on body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting any thing, we should be led into that principle of**

denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other. Is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in both cases.[20]

PART II.

BUT to hasten to a conclusion of this argument, which is already drawn out to too great a length: We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived. It appears that, in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any thing but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body -- where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former, but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces this effect. The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible: So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem *conjoined*, but never *connected*. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely, without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.

But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion, and one source which we have not yet examined. When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or experiment where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or foretell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object, *Cause*; the other, *Effect*. We suppose that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.

It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by

habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we *feel* in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference between one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of similar instances, by which it is suggested. The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard-balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was *connected*: But only that it was *conjoined* with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be *connected*. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of *connexion*? Nothing but that he now *feels* these events to be *connected* in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding, or sceptical suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary. No conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity.

And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present. For surely, if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means of it alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate utility of all sciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their causes. Our thoughts and enquiries are, therefore, every moment, employed about this relation: Yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it. Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be *an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second*. Or in other words *where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed*. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause, and call it, *an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other*. But though both these definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause, we cannot remedy this inconvenience, or attain any more perfect definition, which may point out that circumstances in the cause, which gives it a connexion with its effect. We have no idea of this connexion, nor even any distant notion what it is we desire to know, when we endeavour at a conception of it. We say, for instance, that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound. But what do we mean by that affirmation? We either mean *that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds; or, that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that upon the appearance of one the mind anticipates the senses, and forms immediately an idea of the other*. We may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights; but beyond

these, we have no idea of it.[21]

To recapitulate, therefore, the reasonings of this section: Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connexion. But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then *feel* a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for. For as this idea arises from a number of similar instances, and not from any single instance, it must arise from that circumstance, in which the number of instances differ from every individual instance. But this customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they differ. In every other particular they are alike. The first instance which we saw of motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls (to return to this obvious illustration) is exactly similar to any instance that may, at present, occur to us; except only, that we could not, at first, *infer* one event from the other; which we are enabled to do at present, after so long a course of uniform experience. I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning. I am afraid that, should I multiply words about it, or throw it into a greater variety of lights, it would only become more obscure and intricate. In all abstract reasonings there is one point of view which, if we can happily hit, we shall go farther towards illustrating the subject than by all the eloquence and copious expression in the world. This point of view we should endeavour to reach, and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more adapted to them.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION VIII.
Of Liberty and Necessity.

PART I.

IT might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness, since the first origin of science, and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning, and make these definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion. From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression, and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together; it were impossible, if men affix the same ideas to their terms, that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject; especially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all sides, in search of arguments which may give

them the victory over their antagonists. It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of common life and experience, nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.

This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity; and to so remarkable a degree that, if I be not much mistaken, we shall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy. I own that this dispute has been so much canvassed on all hands, and has led philosophers into such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry, that it is no wonder, if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question, from which he can expect neither instruction or entertainment. But the state of the argument here proposed may, perhaps, serve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promises at least some decision of the controversy, and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning.

I hope, therefore, to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole controversy, has hitherto turned merely upon words. We shall begin with examining the doctrine of necessity.

It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prescribed with such exactness that a living creature may as soon arise from the shock of two bodies as motion in any other degree or direction than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a just and precise idea of *necessity*, we must consider whence that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies.

It seems evident that, if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted in such a manner that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any similitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have attained the least idea of necessity, or of a connexion among these objects. We might say, upon such a supposition, that one object or event has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and senses remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant *conjunction* of similar objects, and the consequent *inference* from one to the other, we

have no notion of any necessity or connexion.

If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of mind; it must follow, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed, merely for not understanding each other.

As to the first circumstance, the constant and regular conjunction of similar events, we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the following considerations: It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit: These passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the GREEKS and ROMANS? Study well the temper and actions of the FRENCH and ENGLISH: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former *most* of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by ARISTOTLE, and HIPPOCRATES, more like to those which at present lie under our observation than the men described by POLYBIUS and TACITUS are to those who now govern the world.

Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted; men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public spirit; we should immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we would explode any forgery in history, we cannot make use of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions ascribed to any person are directly contrary to the course of nature, and that no human motives, in such circumstances, could ever induce him to such a conduct. The veracity of QUINTUS CURTIUS is as much to be suspected, when he describes the supernatural courage of ALEXANDER, by which he was hurried on singly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his supernatural force and activity, by which he was able to resist them. So readily and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body.

Hence likewise the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a variety of business

and company, in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as speculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclinations and motives, from their actions, expressions, and even gestures; and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The general observations treasured up by a course of experience, give us the clue of human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pass for the specious colouring of a cause. And though virtue and honour be allowed their proper weight and authority, that perfect disinterestedness, so often pretended to, is never expected in multitudes and parties; seldom in their leaders; and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind; and no experience, however accurately digested by reflection, would ever serve to any purpose. Why is the aged husbandman more skilful in his calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the sun, rain, and earth towards the production of vegetables; and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules by which this operation is governed and directed.

We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human actions should be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without making any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions. Such a uniformity in every particular, is found in no part of nature. On the contrary, from observing the variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity.

Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and education, which mould the human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established character. Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other? Is it thence we become acquainted with the different characters which nature has impressed upon the sexes, and which she preserves with constancy and regularity? Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from infancy to old age? This affords room for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of human creatures. Even the characters, which are peculiar to each individual, have a uniformity in their influence; otherwise our acquaintance with the persons and our observation of their conduct could never teach us their dispositions, or serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them.

I grant it possible to find some actions, which seem to have no regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government of men. But if we would willingly know what judgment should be formed of such irregular and extraordinary actions, we may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear in the course of nature, and the operations of external objects. All causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles only dead matter, may be disappointed of his aim, as well as the politician, who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents.

The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence; though they meet with no impediment in their operation. But philosophers, observing that, almost in every part of nature, there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find, that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation, when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does not commonly go right: But an artist easily perceives that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels; but fails of its usual effects, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes.

Thus, for instance, in the human body, when the usual symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation; when medicines operate not with their wonted powers; when irregular events follow from any particular cause; the philosopher and physician are not surprised at the matter, nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the necessity and uniformity of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted. They know that a human body is a mighty complicated machine: That many secret powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond our comprehension: That to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations: And that therefore the irregular events, which outwardly discover themselves, can be no proof that the laws of nature are not observed with the greatest regularity in its internal operations and government.

The philosopher, if he be consistent, must apply the same reasoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation. A person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer: But he has the toothache, or has not dined. A stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage: But he has met with a sudden piece of good fortune. Or even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the person himself or by others; we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconstant and irregular. This is, in a manner, the constant character of human nature; though it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy. The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, rain, cloud, and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles; though not easily discoverable by human sagacity and enquiry.

Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life. Now, as it is from past experience that we

draw all *inferences* concerning the future, and as we conclude that objects will always be conjoined together which we find to have always been conjoined; it may seem superfluous to prove that this experienced uniformity in human actions is a source whence we draw inferences concerning them. But in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights we shall also insist, though briefly, on this latter topic.

The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent. The poorest artificer, who labours alone, expects at least the protection of the magistrate, to ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour. He also expects that, when he carries his goods to market, and offers them at a reasonable price, he shall find purchasers, and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence. In proportion as men extend their dealings, and render their intercourse with others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their schemes of life, a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from the proper motives, to co- operate with their own. In all these conclusions they take their measures from past experience, in the same manner as in their reasonings concerning external objects; and firmly believe that men, as well as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations, the same that they have ever found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labour of his servants for the execution of any work as much as upon the tools which he employs, and would be equally surprised were his expectations disappointed. In short, this experimental inference and reasoning concerning the actions of others enters so much into human life that no man, while awake, is ever a moment without employing it. Have we not reason, therefore, to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of necessity according to the foregoing definition and explication of it?

Nor have philosophers even entertained a different opinion from the people in this particular. For, not to mention that almost every action of their life supposes that opinion, there are even few of the speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential. What would become of *history*, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind? How could *politics* be a science, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon society? Where would be the foundation of *morals*, if particular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our *criticism* upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters, and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this *inference* from motive to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct.

And indeed, when we consider how aptly *natural* and *moral* evidence link together, and form only one chain of argument, we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature, and derived from the same principles. A prisoner who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work

upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The same prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the axe or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape; the action of the executioner; the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them in passing from one link to another: Nor is it less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses, by a train of causes, cemented together by what we are pleased to call a *physical* necessity. The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volition, and actions; or figure and motion. We may change the name of things; but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change.

Were a man, whom I know to be honest and opulent, and with whom I live in intimate friendship, to come into my house, where I am surrounded with my servants, I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish; and I no more suspect this event than the falling of the house itself, which is new, and solidly built and founded. -- *But he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy*. -- So may a sudden earthquake arise, and shake and tumble my house about my ears. I shall therefore change the suppositions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed: And this event, I think I can foretell with the same assurance, as that, if he throw himself out at the window, and meet with no obstruction, he will not remain a moment suspended in the air. No suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event, which is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature. A man who at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing-Cross, may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather, as that he will find it untouched an hour after. Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature, attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations.

I have frequently considered, what could possibly be the reason why all mankind, though they have ever, without hesitation, acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning, have yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words, and have rather shown a propensity, in all ages, to profess the contrary opinion. The matter, I think, may be accounted for after the following manner. If we examine the operations of body, and the production of effects from their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are *constantly conjoined* together, and that the mind is carried, by a *customary transition*, from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature, and perceive something like a necessary connexion between the cause and the effect. When again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and *feel* no such connexion of the motive and the action; they are thence apt to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects which result from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely the *constant conjunction* of objects, and the consequent *inference* of the mind from one to another, and finding

that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes. And though this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers, in ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will, we shall find, upon reflection, that they dissent from it in words only, not in their real sentiment. Necessity, according to the sense in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philosopher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter, some farther connexion between the cause and effect; and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now whether it be so or not, can only appear upon examination; and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good their assertion, by defining or describing that necessity, and pointing it out to us in the operations of material causes.

It would seem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple question, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity, except that of a constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another. If these circumstances form, in reality, the whole of that necessity, which we conceive in matter, and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the dispute is at an end; at least, must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal. But as long as we will rashly suppose, that we have some farther idea of necessity and causation in the operations of external objects; at the same time, that we can find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of the mind; there is no possibility of bringing the question to any determinate issue, while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition. The only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher; to examine the narrow extent of science when applied to material causes; and to convince ourselves that all we know of them is the constant conjunction and inference above mentioned. We may, perhaps, find that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human understanding: But we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will. For as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other, we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity, which we have already avowed, in every deliberation of our lives, and in every step of our conduct and behaviour.[22]

But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science; it will not require many words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean ***a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will*****; this is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in**

chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute.

Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances; *first*, that it be consistent with plain matter of fact; *secondly*, that it be consistent with itself. If we observe these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it.

It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature. But it is pretended that some causes are necessary, some not necessary. Here then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one *define* a cause, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a *necessary connexion* with its effect; and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall readily give up the whole controversy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received, this must be absolutely impracticable. Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other, we should never have entertained any notion of cause and effect; and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding, which is the only connexion, that we can have any comprehension of. Whoever attempts a definition of cause, exclusive of these circumstances, will be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms or such as are synonymous to the term which he endeavours to define.[23] And if the definition above mentioned be admitted; liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no existence.

PART II.

THERE is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because it is of dangerous consequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be forborne; as serving nothing to the discovery of truth, but only to make the person of an antagonist odious. This I observe in general, without pretending to draw any advantage from it. I frankly submit to an examination of this kind, and shall venture to affirm that the doctrines, both of necessity and of liberty, as above explained, are not only consistent with morality, but are absolutely essential to its support.

Necessity may be defined two ways, conformably to the two definitions of *cause*, of which it makes an essential part. It consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another. Now necessity, in both these senses, (which, indeed, are at bottom the same) has universally, though tacitly, in the schools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allowed to belong to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions, with like motives, inclinations, and circumstances. The only particular in which any one can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will refuse to give the name

of necessity to this property of human actions: But as long as the meaning is understood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther in the operations of matter. But this, it must be acknowledged, can be of no consequence to morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural philosophy or metaphysics. We may here be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other necessity or connexion in the actions of body: But surely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind, but what everyone does, and must readily allow of. We change no circumstance in the received orthodox system with regard to the will, but only in that with regard to material objects and causes. Nothing, therefore, can be more innocent, at least, than this doctrine.

All laws being founded on rewards and punishments, it is supposed as a fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. We may give to this influence what name we please; but, as it is usually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a *cause*, and be looked upon as an instance of that necessity, which we would here establish.

The only proper object of hatred or vengeance is a person or creature, endowed with thought and consciousness; and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that passion, it is only by their relation to the person, or connexion with him. Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some *cause* in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. The actions themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and consequently causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character anywise concerned in his actions, since they are not derived from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other.

Men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be the consequences. Why? but because the principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone. Men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditatedly than for such as proceed from deliberation. For what reason? but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause or principle in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character. Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for? but by asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by an alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal. But, except upon the doctrine of necessity, they never were just proofs, and consequently never were criminal.

It will be equally easy to prove, and from the same arguments, that *liberty*, according to that definition above mentioned, in which all men agree, is also essential to morality, and that no human actions, where it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the objects

either of approbation or dislike. For as actions are objects of our moral sentiment, so far only as they are indications of the internal character, passions, and affections; it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from these principles, but are derived altogether from external violence.

I pretend not to have obviated or removed all objections to this theory, with regard to necessity and liberty. I can foresee other objections, derived from topics which have not here been treated of. It may be said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre- determined, reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature. No contingency anywhere in the universe; no indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at the same time, acted upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine, and placed all beings in that particular position, whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable necessity, must result. Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause; or if they have any turpitude, they must involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. For as a man, who fired a mine, is answerable for all the consequences whether the train he employed be long or short; so wherever a continued chain of necessary causes is fixed, that Being, either finite or infinite, who produces the first, is likewise the author of all the rest, and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong to them. Our clear and unalterable ideas of morality establish this rule, upon unquestionable reasons, when we examine the consequences of any human action; and these reasons must still have greater force when applied to the volitions and intentions of a Being infinitely wise and powerful. Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for so limited a creature as man; but those imperfections have no place in our Creator. He foresaw, he ordained, he intended all those actions of men, which we so rashly pronounce criminal. And we must therefore conclude, either that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accountable for them. But as either of these positions is absurd and impious, it follows, that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly be true, as being liable to all the same objections. An absurd consequence, if necessary, proves the original doctrine to be absurd; in the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause, if the connexion between them be necessary and inevitable.

This objection consists of two parts, which we shall examine separately; *First,* that, if human actions can be traced up, by a necessary chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite perfection of that Being from whom they are derived, and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or, *Secondly*, if they be criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection, which we ascribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures.

The answer to the first objection seems obvious and convincing. There are many philosophers who, after an exact scrutiny of all the phenomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, considered as one system, is, in every period of its existence, ordered with perfect benevolence; and that the utmost possible happiness will, in the end, result to all created beings, without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or misery. Every physical ill, say they, makes an essential part of this benevolent system, and could not possibly be removed, even by the Deity

himself, considered as a wise agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, or excluding greater good, which will result from it. From this theory, some philosophers, and the ancient *Stoics* among the rest, derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils that those ills under which they laboured were, in reality, goods to the universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could comprehend the whole system of nature, every event became an object of joy and exultation. But though this topic be specious and sublime, it was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual. You would surely more irritate than appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by preaching up to him the rectitude of those general laws, which produced the malignant humours in his body, and led them through the proper canals, to the sinews and nerves, where they now excite such acute torments. These enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and security; but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion; much less can they maintain their ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists. The affections take a narrower and more natural survey of their object; and by an economy, more suitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings around us, and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the private system.

The case is the same with *moral* as with *physical* ill. It cannot reasonably be supposed, that those remote considerations, which are found of so little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is so formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution. The characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society; as the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance: Whence it may reasonably be presumed, that the moral sentiments arise, either mediately or immediately, from a reflection of these opposite interests. What though philosophical meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture; that everything is right with regard to the WHOLE, and that the qualities, which disturb society, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare? Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects? A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections? Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them? Or why should not the acknowledgment of a real distinction between vice and virtue be reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy, as well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity? Both these distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human mind: And these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever.

The *second* objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an answer; nor is it possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every step which she takes with regard to such subjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to

defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy. Happy, if she be thence sensible of her temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common life; where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries, without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction!

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION X.
Of Miracles.

PART I.

THERE is, in Dr. TILLOTSON'S writings, an argument against the *real presence*, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the Apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for, the truth of the *Christian* religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy

Spirit.

Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least *silence* the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.

Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of JUNE than in one of DECEMBER, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.

A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full *proof* of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call *probability*. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.

To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye- witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular

conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I say, discovered by *experience* to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man delirious, or noted for falsehood and villainy, has no manner of authority with us.

And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human testimony, is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is regarded either as a *proof* or a *probability*, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgements of this kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes, that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and observation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgements, and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it; but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist.

This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the manner of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument, derived from human testimony.

Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any *connexion*, which we perceive *a priori*, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.

I should not believe such a story were it told me by CATO; was a proverbial saying in ROME,

even during the lifetime of that philosophical patriot.[25] The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate so great an authority.

The INDIAN prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it.[26]

But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: Because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full *proof*, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior.[27]

The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), "that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior." When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

PART II.

IN the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence.

For *first*, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.

***Secondly*. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance, which we might, from human testimony, have in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, resembles those, of which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the same rule; but when any thing is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of *surprize* and *wonder*, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.**

With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality: He may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: Or even where this delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgement to canvass his evidence: What judgement they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects: Or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence: And his impudence overpowers their credulity.

Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or reflection; but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a TULLY or a DEMOSTHENES could scarcely effect over a ROMAN or ATHENIAN audience, every *Capuchin*, every itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching such gross and vulgar passions.

The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the most common and most credible events. For instance: There is no kind of report which rises so easily, and spreads so quickly, especially in country places and provincial towns, as those concerning marriages; insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see each other twice, but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them together. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the intelligence. And this is so well known, that no man of sense gives attention to these reports, till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline the generality of mankind to believe and report, with the greatest vehemence and assurance, all religious miracles?

***Thirdly*. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attend received opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world; where the whole frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its operations in a different manner, from what it does at present. Battles, revolutions, pestilence, famine and death, are never the effect of those natural causes, which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles, judgements, quite obscure the few natural events, that are intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvellous, and that, though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.**

***It is strange*, a judicious reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of these wonderful historians, *that such prodigious events never happen in our days*. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all ages. You must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty. You have yourself heard many such marvellous relations started, which, being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured, that those renowned lies, which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose from like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate.**

It was a wise policy in that false prophet, ALEXANDER, who though now forgotten, was once so famous, to lay the first scene of his impostures in PAPHLAGONIA, where, as LUCIAN tells us, the people were extremely ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion. People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances. Fools are industrious in propagating the imposture; while the wise and learned are contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without informing themselves of the particular facts, by which it may be distinctly refuted. And thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to proceed, from his ignorant PAPHLAGONIANS, to the enlisting of votaries, even among the GRECIAN philosophers, and men of the most eminent rank and distinction in ROME; nay, could engage the attention of that sage emperor MARCUS AURELIUS; so far as to make him trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive prophecies.

The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an ignorant people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them (*which, though seldom, is sometimes the case*) it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correspondence, or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion. Men's inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance. But had ALEXANDER fixed his residence at ATHENS, the philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread, throughout the whole ROMAN empire, their sense of the matter; which, being supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is true; LUCIAN, passing by chance through PAPHLAGONIA, had an opportunity of performing this good office. But, though much to be wished, it does not always happen, that every ALEXANDER meets with a LUCIAN, ready to expose and detect his impostures.[28]

I may add as a *fourth* reason, which diminishes the authority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us consider, that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and that it is impossible the religions of ancient ROME, of TURKEY, of SIAM, and of CHINA should, all of them, be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that system was established; so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any miracle of MAHOMET or his successors, we have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous ARABIANS: And on the other hand, we are to regard the authority of TITUS LIVIUS, PLUTARCH, TACITUS, and, in short, of all the authors and

witnesses, GRECIAN, CHINESE, and ROMAN CATHOLIC, who have related any miracle in their particular religion; I say, we are to regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that MAHOMETAN miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument may appear over subtile and refined; but is not in reality different from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes, that the credit of two witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed.

One of the best attested miracles in all profane history, is that which TACITUS reports of VESPASIAN, who cured a blind man in Alexandria, by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot; in obedience to a vision of the god SERAPIS, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor, for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen in that fine historian[29]; where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by ALEXANDER and DEMETRIUS. The historian, a contemporary writer, noted for candour and veracity, and withal, the greatest and most penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity; and so free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the contrary imputation, of atheism and profaneness: The persons, from whose authority he related the miracle, of established character for judgement and veracity, as we may well presume; eye- witnesses of the fact, and confirming their testimony, after the FLAVIAN family was despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as the price of a lie. *Utrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, postquam nullum mendacio pretium*. To which if we add the public nature of the facts, as related, it will appear, that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood.

There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal DE RETZ, which may well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician fled into SPAIN, to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed through SARAGOSSA, the capital of ARRAGON, where he was shewn, in the cathedral, a man, who had served seven years as a doorkeeper, and was well known to every body in town, that had ever paid his devotions at that church. He had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a leg; but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump; and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church; and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact; whom the cardinal found, by their zealous devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the relater was also contemporary to the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and libertine character, as well as of great genius; the miracle of so *singular* a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the witnesses very numerous, and all of them, in a manner, spectators of the fact, to which they gave their testimony. And what adds mightily to the force of the evidence, and may double our surprise on this occasion, is, that the cardinal himself, who relates the story, seems not to give any credit to it, and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He considered justly, that it was not requisite, in order to reject a fact of this nature, to be able accurately to

disprove the testimony, and to trace its falsehood, through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew, that, as this was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place; so was it extremely difficult, even where one was immediately present, by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery of a great part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner, that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle, supported by any human testimony, was more properly a subject of derision than of argument.

There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person, than those, which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbe PARIS, the famous JANSENIST, with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were every where talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But what is more extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent theatre that is now in the world. Nor is this all: A relation of them was published and dispersed everywhere; nor were the *Jesuits*, though a learned body supported by the civil magistrate, and determined enemies to those opinions, in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or detect them.[30] Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation.

Is the consequence just, because some human testimony has the utmost force and authority in some cases, when it relates the battle of PHILIPPI or PHARSALIA for instance; that therefore all kinds of testimony must, in all cases, have equal force and authority? Suppose that the CAESAREAN and POMPEIAN factions had, each of them, claimed the victory in these battles, and that the historians of each party had uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side; how could mankind, at this distance, have been able to determine between them? The contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related by HERODOTUS or PLUTARCH, and those delivered by MARIANA, BEDE, or any monkish historian.

The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favours the passion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations and propensities. But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a character? Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man has first made a convert of himself, and entered seriously into the delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds, in support of so holy and meritorious a cause?

The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame; because the materials are always prepared for it. The *avidum genus auricularum,*[31] the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever sooths superstition, and promotes wonder.

How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is obvious; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and observation, when we account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature?

I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even public history, at the place, where it is said to happen; much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgement, which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions. But the matter never comes to any issue, if trusted to the common method of altercations and debate and flying rumours; especially when men's passions have taken part on either side.

In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery.

No means of detection remain, but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters: And these, though always sufficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar.

Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion.

I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history. Thus, suppose, all authors, in all languages, agree, that, from the first of JANUARY, 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: Suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people: That all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or

contradiction: It is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many analogies, that any phenomenon, which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe, comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and uniform.

But suppose, that all the historians who treat of ENGLAND, should agree, that, on the first of JANUARY, 1600, Queen ELIZABETH died; that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being interred a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed ENGLAND for three years: I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I should not doubt of her pretended death, and of those other public circumstances that followed it: I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that it neither was, nor possibly could be real. You would in vain object to me the difficulty, and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgment of that renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor an artifice: All this might astonish me; but I would still reply, that the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena, that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence, than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature.

But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men, in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without farther examination. Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed, be, in this case, Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions, in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation, and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men, with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact; this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretence it may be covered.

Lord BACON seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning. "We ought," says he, "to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions, and in a word of every thing new, rare, and extraordinary in nature. But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all, every relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends in any degree upon religion, as the prodigies of LIVY: And no less so, everything that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchimy, or such authors, who seem, all of them, to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable."[32]

I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, as I think it may serve

to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the *Christian Religion*, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on *Faith*, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. To make this more evident, let us examine those miracles, related in scripture; and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the *Pentateuch*, which we shall examine, according to the principles of these pretended Christians, not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere human writer and historian. Here then we are first to consider a book, presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present: Of our fall from that state: Of the age of man, extended to near a thousand years: Of the destruction of the world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary choice of one people, as the favourites of heaven; and that people the countrymen of the author: Of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable: I desire any one to lay his hand upon his heart, and after a serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which is, however, necessary to make it be received, according to the measures of probability above established.

What we have said of miracles may be applied, without any variation, to prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. if it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven. So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the *Christian Religion* not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by *Faith* to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.

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An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION XI.
Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State.

I WAS lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves sceptical paradoxes; where, though he advanced many principles, of which I can by no means approve, yet as they seem to be curious, and to bear some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this enquiry, I shall here copy them from my memory as accurately as I can, in order to submit them to the judgement of the reader.

Our conversation began with my admiring the singular good fortune of philosophy, which, as it requires entire liberty above all other privileges, and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of sentiments and argumentation, received its first birth in an age and country of freedom and toleration, and was never cramped, even in its most extravagant principles, by any creeds, concessions, or penal statutes. For, except the banishment of PROTAGORAS, and the death of SOCRATES, which last event proceeded partly from other motives, there are scarcely any instances to be met with, in ancient history, of this bigoted jealousy, with which the present age is so much infested. EPICURUS lived at ATHENS to an advanced age, in peace and tranquillity:

EPICUREANS[33] were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal character, and to officiate at the altar, in the most sacred rites of the established religion: And the public encouragement[34] of pensions and salaries was afforded equally, by the wisest of all the ROMAN emperors[35], to the professors of every sect of philosophy. How requisite such kind of treatment was to philosophy, in her early youth, will easily be conceived, if we reflect, that, even at present, when she may be supposed more hardy and robust, she bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the seasons, and those harsh winds of calumny and persecution, which blow upon her.

You admire, says my friend, as the singular good fortune of philosophy, what seems to result from the natural course of things, and to be unavoidable in every age and nation. This pertinacious bigotry, of which you complain, as so fatal to philosophy, is really her offspring, who, after allying with superstition, separates himself entirely from the interest of his parent, and becomes her most inveterate enemy and persecutor. Speculative dogmas of religion, the present occasions of such furious dispute, could not possibly be conceived or admitted in the early ages of the world; when mankind, being wholly illiterate, formed an idea of religion more suitable to their weak apprehension, and composed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the objects of traditional belief, more than of argument or disputation. After the first alarm, therefore, was over, which arose from the new paradoxes and principles of the philosophers; these teachers seem ever after, during the ages of antiquity, to have lived in great harmony with the established superstition, and to have made a fair partition of mankind between them; the former claiming all the learned and wise, the latter possessing all the vulgar and illiterate.

It seems then, say I, that you leave politics entirely out of the question, and never suppose, that a wise magistrate can justly be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy, such as those of EPICURUS, which, denying a divine existence, and consequently a providence and a future state, seem to loosen, in a great measure the ties of morality, and may be supposed, for that reason, pernicious to the peace of civil society.

I know, replied he, that in fact these persecutions never, in any age, proceeded from calm reason, or from experience of the pernicious consequences of philosophy; but arose entirely from passion and prejudice. But what if I should advance farther, and assert, that if EPICURUS had been accused before the people, by any of the *sycophants* or informers of those days, he could easily have defended his cause, and proved his principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those of his adversaries, who endeavoured, with such zeal, to expose him to the public hatred and jealousy?

I wish, said I, you would try your eloquence upon so extraordinary a topic, and make a speech for EPICURUS, which might satisfy, not the mob of ATHENS, if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have contained any mob, but the more philosophical part of his audience, such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments.

The matter would not be difficult, upon such conditions, replied he: And if you please, I shall suppose myself EPICURUS for a moment, and make you stand for the ATHENIAN people, and shall deliver you such an harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans, and leave not a black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries.

Very well: Pray proceed upon these suppositions.

I come hither, O ye ATHENIANS, to justify in your assembly what I maintain in my school, and I find myself impeached by furious antagonists, instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate enquirers. Your deliberations, which of right should be directed to questions of public good, and the interest of the commonwealth, are diverted to the disquisitions of speculative philosophy; and these magnificent, but perhaps fruitless enquiries, take place of your more familiar but more useful occupations. But so far as in me lies, I will prevent this abuse. We shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds. We shall only enquire how far such questions concern the public interest. And if I can persuade you, that they are entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government, I hope that you will presently send us back to our schools, there to examine, at leisure, the question the most sublime, but, at the same time, the most speculative of all philosophy.

The religious philosophers, not satisfied with the tradition of your forefathers, and doctrine of your priests (in which I willingly acquiesce), indulge a rash curiosity, in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason; and they thereby excite, instead of satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent colours, the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and then ask, if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire. I shall not examine the justness of this argument. I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire. It is sufficient, if I can prove, from this very reasoning, that the question is entirely speculative, and that, when, in my philosophical disquisitions, I deny a providence and a future state, I undermine not the foundations of society, but advance principles, which they themselves, upon their own topics, if they argue consistently, must allow to be solid and satisfactory.

You then, who are my accusers, have acknowledged, that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence (which I never questioned) is derived from the order of nature; where there appear such marks of intelligence and design, that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause, either chance, or the blind and unguided force of matter. You allow, that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes. From the order of the work, you infer, that there must have been project and forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you allow, that your conclusion fails; and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify. These are your concessions. I desire you to mark the consequences.

When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. A body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof, that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never afford a reason that it exceeds a hundred. If the cause, assigned for any effect, be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that cause, or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect. But if we ascribe

to it farther qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we can only indulge the licence of conjecture, and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and energies, without reason or authority.

The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect: Nor can we, by any rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from the sight of one of ZEUXIS'S pictures, could know, that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in stone and marble than in colours. The talents and taste, displayed in the particular work before us; these we may safely conclude the workman to be possessed of. The cause must be proportioned to the effect; and if we exactly and precisely proportion it, we shall never find in it any qualities, that point farther, or afford an inference concerning any other design or performance. Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what is merely requisite for producing the effect, which we examine.

Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe; it follows, that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their workmanship; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at present, appear, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis; much more the supposition, that, in distant regions of space or periods of time, there has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes, and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues. We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to JUPITER, the cause; and then descend downwards, to infer any new effect from that cause; as if the present effects alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes, which we ascribe to that deity. The knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effect, they must be exactly adjusted to each other; and the one can never refer to any thing farther, or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion.

You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author. You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so enamoured of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impossible, but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget, that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or, at least, without any foundation in reason; and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore, O philosophers, be suited to the present appearances of nature: And presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in order to suit them to the attributes, which you so fondly ascribe to your deities.

When priests and poets, supported by your authority, O ATHENIANS, talk of a golden or silver age, which preceded the present state of vice and misery, I hear them with attention and with reverence. But when philosophers, who pretend to neglect authority, and to cultivate reason, hold the same discourse, I pay them not, I own, the same obsequious submission and pious deference. I ask; who carried them into the celestial regions, who admitted them into the councils of the gods,

who opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rashly affirm, that their deities have executed, or will execute, any purpose beyond what has actually appeared? If they tell me, that they have mounted on the steps or by the gradual ascent of reason, and by drawing inferences from effects to causes, I still insist, that they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination; otherwise they could not thus change their manner of inference, and argue from causes to effects; presuming, that a more perfect production than the present world would be more suitable to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or any attribute, but what can be found in the present world.

Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of nature, and save the honour of the gods; while we must acknowledge the reality of that evil and disorder, with which the world so much abounds. The obstinate and intractable qualities of matter, we are told, or the observance of general laws, or some such reason, is the sole cause, which controlled the power and benevolence of JUPITER, and obliged him to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so unhappy. These attributes then, are, it seems, beforehand, taken for granted, in their greatest latitude. And upon that supposition, I own that such conjectures may, perhaps, be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill phenomena. But still I ask; Why take these attributes for granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?

The religious hypothesis, therefore, must be considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe: But no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single fact, and alter or add to the phenomena, in any single particular. If you think, that the appearances of things prove such causes, it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes. In such complicated and sublime subjects, every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument. But here you ought to rest. If you come backward, and arguing from your inferred causes, conclude, that any other fact has existed, or will exist, in the course of nature, which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes; I must admonish you, that you have departed from the method of reasoning, attached to the present subject, and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause, beyond what appears in the effect; otherwise you could never, with tolerable sense or propriety, add any thing to the effect, in order to render it more worthy of the cause.

Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the peace and order of society, is in the least concerned?

I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and success, in all their undertakings. But surely, I deny not the course itself of events, which lies open to every one's inquiry and examination. I acknowledge, that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable reception from the world. I am sensible, that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only source of tranquillity and

happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life; but am sensible, that, to a well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things proceeds from intelligence and design. But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition itself, on which depends our happiness or misery, and consequently our conduct and deportment in life is still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour, by my experience of past events. And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed and a supreme distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond the ordinary course of events; I here find the same fallacy, which I have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining, that, if we grant that divine existence, for which you so earnestly contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add something to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember, that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes; and that every argument, deducted from causes to effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism; since it is impossible for you to know any thing of the cause, but what you have antecedently, not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the effect.

But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners, who instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, as to render this life merely a passage to something farther; a porch, which leads to a greater, and vastly different building; a prologue, which serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and imagination surely. For if they derived it from the present phenomena, it would never point to any thing farther, but must be exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may *possibly* be endowed with attributes, which we have never seen exerted; may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot discover to be satisfied: All this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere *possibility* and hypothesis. We never can have reason to infer any attributes, or any principles of action in him, but so far as we know them to have been exerted and satisfied.

Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world? If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude, that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying, that the justice of the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent; I answer, that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as you see it, *at present*, exert itself.

Thus I bring the dispute, O ATHENIANS, to a short issue with my antagonists. The course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as to theirs. The experienced train of events is the great standard, by which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in the field, or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school, or in the closet. In vain would our limited understanding break through those boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond imagination. While we argue from the course of nature, and infer a particular intelligent cause, which first bestowed, and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and useless. It is uncertain; because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of

human experience. It is useless; because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause with any new inference, or making additions to the common and experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour.

I observe (said I, finding he had finished his harangue) that you neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old; and as you were pleased to make me stand for the people, you insinuate yourself into my favour by embracing those principles, to which, you know, I have always expressed a particular attachment. But allowing you to make experience (as indeed I think you ought) the only standard of our judgement concerning this, and all other questions of fact; I doubt not but, from the very same experience, to which you appeal, it may be possible to refute this reasoning, which you have put into the mouth of EPICURUS. If you saw, for instance, a half-finished building, surrounded with heaps of brick and stone and mortar, and all the instruments of masonry; could you not *infer* from the effect, that it was a work of design and contrivance? And could you not return again, from this inferred cause, to infer new additions to the effect, and conclude, that the building would soon be finished, and receive all the further improvements, which art could bestow upon it? If you saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human foot, you would conclude, that a man had passed that way, and that he had also left the traces of the other foot, though effaced by the rolling of the sands or inundation of the waters. Why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature? Consider the world and the present life only as an imperfect building, from which you can infer a superior intelligence; and arguing from that superior intelligence, which can leave nothing imperfect; why may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan, which will receive its completion in some distant point of space or time? Are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar? And under what pretence can you embrace the one, while you reject the other?

The infinite difference of the subjects, replied he, is a sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions. In works of *human* art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause, and returning back from the cause, to form new inferences concerning the effect, and examine the alterations, which it has probably undergone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning? Plainly this; that man is a being, whom we know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with, and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connexion and coherence, according to the laws which nature has established for the government of such a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work has proceeded from the skill and industry of man; as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him; and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it were impossible for us to argue in this manner; because our knowledge of all the qualities, which we ascribe to him, being in that case derived from the production, it is impossible they could point to any thing farther, or be the foundation of any new inference. The print of a foot in the sand can only prove, when considered alone, that there was some figure adapted to it, by which it was produced: But the print of a human foot proves likewise, from our other experience, that there was probably another foot, which also left its impression, though effaced by time or other accidents. Here we mount from the effect to the cause; and descending again from the cause, infer alterations in the effect; but this is not a continuation of

the same simple chain of reasoning. We comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations, concerning the *usual* figure and members of that species of animal, without which this method of argument must be considered as fallacious and sophistical.

The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shews wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shews a particular degree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine. But farther attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes, we can never be authorised to infer or suppose, by any rules of just reasoning. Now, without some such licence of supposition, it is impossible for us to argue from the cause, or infer any alteration in the effect, beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation. Greater good produced by this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness: A more impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a greater regard to justice and equity. Every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by any reason or argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis.[36]

The great source of our mistake in this subject, and of the unbounded licence of conjecture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly consider ourselves, as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude, that he will, on every occasion, observe the same conduct, which we ourselves, in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible. But, besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us, that almost everything is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours; besides this, I say, it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of analogy to reason, from the intentions and projects of men, to those of a Being so different, and so much superior. In human nature, there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so that when, from any fact, we have discovered one intention of any man, it may often be reasonable, from experience, to infer another, and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being, so remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper, and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine to be a superior perfection, may really be a defect. Or were it ever so much a perfection, the ascribing of it to the Supreme Being, where it appears not to have been really exerted, to the full, in his works, savours more of flattery and panegyric, than of just reasoning and sound philosophy. All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the religion, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience, or give us measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are furnished by reflections on common life. No new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis; no event foreseen or foretold; no reward or punishment expected or dreaded, beyond what is already known by practice and observation. So that my apology for EPICURUS will still appear solid and satisfactory; nor have the political interests of society any connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning metaphysics and religion.

There is still one circumstance, replied I, which you seem to have overlooked. Though I should allow your premises, I must deny your conclusion. You conclude, that religious doctrines and reasonings *can* have no influence on life, because they *ought* to have no influence; never considering, that men reason not in the same manner you do, but draw many consequences from the belief of a divine Existence, and suppose that the Deity will inflict punishments on vice, and bestow rewards on virtue, beyond what appear in the ordinary course of nature. Whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not, is no matter. Its influence on their life and conduct must still be the same. And those, who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices, may, for aught I know, be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians; since they free men from one restraint upon their passions, and make the infringement of the laws of society, in one respect, more easy and secure.

After all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general conclusion in favour of liberty, though upon different premises from those, on which you endeavour to found it. I think, that the state ought to tolerate every principle of philosophy; nor is there an instance, that any government has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence. There is no enthusiasm among philosophers; their doctrines are not very alluring to the people; and no restraint can be put upon their reasonings, but what must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences, and even to the state, by paving the way for persecution and oppression in points, where the generality of mankind are more deeply interested and concerned.

But there occurs to me (continued I) with regard to your main topic, a difficulty, which I shall just propose to you without insisting on it; lest it lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature. In a word, I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect (as you have all along supposed) or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under our observation. It is only when two *species* of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and were an effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known *species*, I do not see, that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own reflection to pursue the consequences of this principle. I shall just observe, that, as the antagonists of EPICURUS always suppose the universe, an effect quite singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less singular and unparalleled; your reasonings, upon that supposition, seem, at least, to merit our attention. There is, I own, some difficulty, how we can ever return from the cause to the effect, and, reasoning from our ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any, addition to it.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION XII.
Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy.

PART I.

THERE is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings, displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a Deity, and refute the fallacies of *Atheists*; and yet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these contradictions? The knights errant, who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants, never entertained the least doubt with regard to the existence of these monsters.

The *Sceptic* is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philosophers; though it is certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject, either of action or speculation. This begets a very natural question; What is meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?

There is a species of scepticism, *antecedent* to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by DES CARTES and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: Or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The CARTESIAN doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.

It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations.

There is another species of scepticism, *consequent* to science and enquiry, when men are supposed to have discovered, either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation, about which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are brought into dispute, by a certain species of philosophers; and the maxims of common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology. As these paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in some philosophers, and the refutation of them in several, they naturally excite our curiosity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which they may be founded.

I need not insist upon the more trite topics, employed by the sceptics in all ages, against the evidence of *sense*; such as those which are derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs, on numberless occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the various aspects of objects, according to their different distances; the double images which arise from the pressing one eye; with many other appearances of a like nature. These sceptical topics, indeed, are only sufficient to prove, that the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on; but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposition of the organ, in order to render them, within their sphere, the proper criteria of truth and falsehood. There are other more profound arguments against the senses, which admit not of so easy a solution.

It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith

in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.

It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: Our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.

But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, *this house* and *that tree*, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent.

So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system, and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: For that led us to a quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to justify this pretended philosophical system, by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.

By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from any thing external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.

It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects,

resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.

To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes.

This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry. Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.

There is another sceptical topic of a like nature, derived from the most profound philosophy; which might merit our attention, were it requisite to dive so deep, in order to discover arguments and reasonings, which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former. The idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and feeling; and if all the qualities, perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension, which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can save us from this conclusion, but the asserting, that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by *Abstraction*, an opinion, which, if we examine it accurately, we shall find to be unintelligible, and even absurd. An extension, that is neither tangible nor visible, cannot possibly be conceived: And a tangible or visible extension, which is neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception. Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general, which is neither *Isoceles* nor *Scalenum*, nor has any particular length or proportion of sides; and he will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas.[37]

Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if

referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer. The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion as contrary to reason: At least, if it be a principle of reason, that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object. Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable *something*, as the cause of our perceptions; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it.

PART II.

IT may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy *reason* by argument and ratiocination; yet is this the grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes. They endeavour to find objections, both to our *abstract* reasonings, and to those which regard matter of fact and existence.

The chief objection against all abstract reasonings is derived from the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common life and to a careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief object of these sciences) afford principles, which seem full of absurdity and contradiction. No priestly *dogmas*, invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinitive divisibility of extension, with its consequences; as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians, with a kind of triumph and exultation. A real quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on *in infinitum*; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious, that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support, because it shocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason.[38] But what renders the matter more extraordinary, is, that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning, the clearest and most natural; nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles; and yet, when these are once received, how can we deny, that the angle of contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any rectilineal angle, that as you may increase the diameter of the circle *in infinitum*, this angle of contact becomes still less, even *in infinitum*, and that the angle of contact between other curves and their tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its tangent, and so on, *in infinitum*? The demonstration of these principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though the latter opinion be natural and easy, and the former big with contradiction and absurdity. Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspence, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders upon the most profound darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one object.

The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences seems to become, if possible, still more palpable with regard to time than extension. An infinite number of real parts of

time, passing in succession, and exhausted one after another, appears so evident a contradiction, that no man, one should think, whose judgement is not corrupted, instead of being improved, by the sciences, would ever be able to admit of it.

Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard to that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities and contradictions. How any clear, distinct idea can contain circumstances, contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as absurd as any proposition, which can be formed. So that nothing can be more sceptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation, than this scepticism itself, which arises from some of the paradoxical conclusions of geometry or the science of quantity.[39]

The sceptical objections to *moral* evidence, or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact, are either *popular* or *philosophical*. The popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human understanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been entertained in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgement in sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity; the perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and sentiments; with many other topics of that kind. It is needless to insist farther on this head. These objections are but weak. For as, in common life, we reason every moment concerning fact and existence, and cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must be insufficient to destroy that evidence. The great subverter of *Pyrrhonism* or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals.

The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere, and display those *philosophical* objections, which arise from more profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph; while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely from the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two objects, which have been frequently *conjoined* together; that we have no argument to convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic insists upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance and conviction. These arguments might be displayed at greater length, if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected to result from them.

For here is the chief and most confounding objection to *excessive* scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic, *What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches*? He is

immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. A COPERNICAN or PTOLEMAIC, who supports each his different system of astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain constant and durable, with his audience. A STOIC or EPICUREAN displays principles, which may not be durable, but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour. But a PYRRHONIAN cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: Or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any thing, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them.

PART III.

THERE is, indeed, a more *mitigated* scepticism or *academical* philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this PYRRHONISM, or *excessive* scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them is so uneasy: And they think, that they could never remove themselves far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are commonly still diffident in their determinations: And if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and obstinacy, a small tincture of PYRRHONISM might abate their pride, by showing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a

just reasoner.

Another species of *mitigated* scepticism which may be of advantage to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the PYRRHONIAN doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. The *imagination* of man is naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects, which custom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct *Judgment* observes a contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high enquiries, confines itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable, than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the PYRRHONIAN doubt, and of the impossibility, that any thing, but the strong power of natural instinct, could free us from it. Those who have a propensity to philosophy, will still continue their researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination, which we may form, with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to eternity?

This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every respect, so reasonable, that it suffices to make the slightest examination into the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their objects, in order to recommend it to us. We shall then find what are the proper subjects of science and enquiry.

It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That *the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides*, cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, *that where there is no property, there can be no injustice*, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration.

All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever *is* may *not be*. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition, which affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences, properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, is there confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10, is a false proposition, and can never be distinctly conceived. But that CAESAR, or the angel GABRIEL, or any being never existed, may be a false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable, and implies no contradiction.

The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded entirely on experience. If we reason *a priori*, any thing may appear able to produce any thing. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another.[40] Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action and behaviour.

Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former; as also all disquisitions in history, chronology, geography, and astronomy.

The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into.

Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in *reason*, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is *faith* and divine revelation.

Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general tastes of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?* No. *Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?* No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

The Hume Archives

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

NOTES

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., HUME) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g., *Hume*) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., *1*). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).] [2]This is not intended any way to detract from the merit of Mr. LOCKE, who was really a great philosopher and a just and modest reasoner. It is only meant to show the common fate of such abstract philosophy. [This note was removed by Hume from later editions of the *Enquiry*. -- J.F.]

[3]That faculty by which we discern truth and falsehood, and that by which we perceive vice and virtue, had long been confounded with each other; and all morality was supposed to be built

on external an immutable relations which, to every intelligent mind, were equally invariable as any proposition concerning quantity or number. But a late philosopher [Francis Hutcheson] has taught us, by the most convincing arguments, that morality is nothing in the abstract nature of things, but is entirely relative to the sentiment or mental taste of each particular being, in the same manner as the distinctions of sweet and bitter, hot and cold arise from the particular feeling of each sense or organ. Moral perceptions, therefore, ought not to be classed with the operations of the understanding, but with the tastes or sentiments.

It had been usual with philosophers to divide all the passions of the mind into two classes, the selfish and benevolent, which were supposed to stand in constant opposition and contrariety; nor was it thought that the latter could ever attain their proper object but at the expense of the former. Among the selfish passions were ranked avarice, ambition, revenge; among the benevolent, natural affection, friendship, public spirit. Philosophers may now perceive the impropriety of this division. [See Butler's *Sermons*.] It has been proved, beyond all controversy, that even the passions commonly esteemed selfish carry the mind beyond self directly to the object; that though the satisfaction of these passions gives us enjoyment, yet the prospect of this enjoyment is not the cause of the passion, but, on the contrary, the passion is antecedent to the enjoyment, and without the former the latter could never possibly exist; that the case is precisely the same with passions denominated benevolent, and consequently that a man is no more interested when he seeks his own glory than when the happiness of his friend is the object of his wishes; nor is he any more disinterested when he sacrifices his ease and quiet to public good than when he labors for the gratification of avarice or ambition. Here, therefore, is a considerable adjustment in the boundaries of the passions, which had been confounded by the negligence or inaccuracy of former philosophers. These two instances may suffice to show us the nature and importance of that species of philosophy. [This note was removed by Hume from later editions of the *Enquiry*. - - J.F.] [4]IT is probable that no more was meant by these, who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms, which they employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by *innate*? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word *idea*, seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, by LOCKE and others; as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense, I should desire to know, what can be meant by asserting, that self-love, or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes is not innate?

But admitting these terms, *impressions* and *ideas*, in the sense above explained, and understanding by *innate*, what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate.

To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that LOCKE was betrayed into this question by the schoolmen, who, making use of undefined terms, draw out their disputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that philosopher's reasonings on this as well as most other subjects.

[5]Resemblance.

[6]Contiguity.

[7]Cause and Effect.

[8]For instance, Contrast or Contrariety is also a connexion among Ideas: but it may perhaps, be considered as a mixture of *Causation* and *Resemblance*. Where two objects are contrary, the one destroys the other; that is, the cause of its annihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an object, implies the idea of its former existence.

[9][The remainder of this section was removed from the final two editions of *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects* which were authorized by Hume. -- JF]

[10]Contrary to Aristotle [cf. 1450a].

[11]The word, Power, is here used in a loose and popular sense. The more accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argument. See Sect. 7.

[12]NOTHING is more useful than for writers, even, on *moral, political,* or *physical* subjects, to distinguish between reason and experience, and to suppose, that these species of argumentation are entirely different from each other. The former are taken for the mere result of our intellectual faculties, which, by considering *a priori* the nature of things, and examining the effects, that must follow from their operation, establish particular principles of science and philosophy. The latter are supposed to be derived entirely from sense and observation, by which we learn what has actually resulted from the operation of particular objects, and are thence able to infer, what will, for the future, result from them. Thus, for instance, the limitations and restraints of civil government, and a legal constitution, may be defended, either from *reason*, which reflecting on the great frailty and corruption of human nature, teaches, that no man can safely be trusted with unlimited authority; or from *experience* and history, which inform us of the enormous abuses, that ambition, in every age and country, has been found to make so imprudent a confidence.

The same distinction between reason and experience is maintained in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of life; while the experienced statesman, general, physician, or merchant is trusted and followed; and the unpractised novice, with whatever natural talents endowed, neglected and despised. Though it be allowed, that reason may form very plausible conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a particular conduct in such particular circumstances; it is still supposed imperfect, without the assistance of experience, which is alone able to give stability and certainty to the maxims, derived from study and reflection.

But notwithstanding that this distinction be thus universally received, both in the active and speculative scenes of life, I shall not scruple to pronounce, that it is, at bottom, erroneous, at least,

superficial.

If we examine those arguments, which, in any of the sciences above mentioned, are supposed to be mere effects of reasoning and reflection, they will be found to terminate, at last, in some general principle or, conclusion, for which we can assign no reason but observation and experience. The only difference between them and those maxims, which are vulgarly esteemed the result of pure experience, is, that the former cannot be established without some process of thought, and some reflection on what we have observed, in order to distinguish its circumstances, and trace its consequences: Whereas in the latter, the experienced event is exactly and fully familiar to that which we infer as the result of any particular situation. The history of a TIBERIUS or a NERO makes us dread a like tyranny, were our monarchs freed from the restraints of laws and senates: But the observation of any fraud or cruelty in private life is sufficient, with the aid of a little thought, to give us the same apprehension; while it serves as an instance of the general corruption of human nature, and shows us the danger which we must incur by reposing an entire confidence in mankind. In both cases, it is experience which is ultimately the foundation of our inference and conclusion.

There is no man so young and inexperienced, as not to have formed, from observation, many general and just maxims concerning human affairs and the conduct of life; but it must be confessed, that, when a man comes to put these in practice, he will be extremely liable to error, till time and farther experience both enlarge these maxims, and teach him their proper use and application. In every situation or incident, there are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances, which the man of greatest talent is, at first, apt to overlook, though on them the justness of his conclusions, and consequently the prudence of his conduct, entirely depend. Not to mention, that, to a young beginner, the general observations and maxims occur not always on the proper occasions, nor can be immediately applied with due calmness and distinction. The truth is, an unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at all, were he absolutely unexperienced; and when we assign that character to any one, we mean it only in a comparative sense, and suppose him possessed of experience, in a smaller and more imperfect degree.

[13]'Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multim esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam siquando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Plato in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere. Hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo; cuius ipsa illa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram, Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae mihi minor esse videtur postquam est maior, solebam intuens, Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis est in locis; ut non sine causa ex his memopriae deducta sit disciplina.' -- Cicero de Finibus. Lib. v.

[14]Mr. LOCKE divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable that all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into *demonstrations*,

***proofs*, and *probabilities*. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.**

[15]Section II.

[16]Mr. LOCKE, in his chapter of power, says that, finding from experience, that there are several new productions in matter, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power. But no reasoning can ever give us a new, original, simple idea; as this philosopher himself confesses. This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea.

[17]IT may be pretended, that the resistance which we meet with in bodies, obliging us frequently to exert our force, and call up all our power, this gives us the idea of force and power. It is this *nisus*, or strong endeavour, of which we are conscious, that is the original impression from which this idea is copied. But, first, we attribute power to a vast number of objects, where we never can suppose this resistance or exertion of force to take place; to the Supreme Being, who never meets with any resistance; to the mind in its command over its ideas and limbs, in common thinking and motion, where the effect follows immediately upon the will, without any exertion or summoning up of force; to inanimate matter, which is not capable of this sentiment. *Secondly*, This sentiment of an endeavour to overcome resistance has no known connexion with any event: What follows it, we know by experience; but could not know it *a priori*. It must, however, be confessed, that the animal *nisus*, which we experience, though it can afford no accurate precise idea of power, enters very much into that vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is formed by it.

[18][Three Greek words]

[19]Section XII.

[20]I NEED not examine at length the *vis inertiae* which is so much talked of in the new philosophy, and which is ascribed to matter. We find by experience, that a body at rest or in motion continues for ever in its present state, till put from it by some new cause; and that a body impelled takes as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires itself. These are facts. When we call this a *vis inertiae*, we only mark these facts, without pretending to have any idea of the inert power; in the same manner as, when we talk of gravity, we mean certain effects, without comprehending that active power. It was never the meaning of Sir ISAAC NEWTON to rob second causes of all force or energy; though some of his followers have endeavoured to establish that theory upon his authority. On the contrary, that great philosopher had recourse to an etherial active fluid to explain his universal attraction; though he was so cautious and modest as to allow, that it was a mere hypothesis, no to be insisted on, without more experiments. I must confess, that there is something in the fate of opinions a little extraordinary. DES CARTES insinuated that doctrine of the universal and sole efficacy of the Deity, without insisting on it. MALEBRANCHE and other CARTESIANS made it the foundation of all their philosophy. It had, however, no authority in ENGLAND. LOCKE, CLARKE, and CUDWORTH, never so much as notice of it, but suppose all

along, that matter has a real, though subordinate and derived power. By what means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians?

[21]ACCORDING to these explications and definitions, the idea of power is relative as much as that of *cause*; and both have a reference to an effect, or some other event constantly conjoined with the former. When we consider the *unknown* circumstance of an object, by which the degree or quantity of its effect is fixed and determined, we call that its power: And accordingly, it is allowed by all philosophers, that the effect is the measure of the power. But if they had any idea of power, as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself? The dispute whether the force of a body in motion be as its velocity, or the square of its velocity; this dispute, I say, need not be decided by comparing its effects in equal or unequal times; but by a direct mensuration and comparison.

As to the frequent use of the words, Force, Power, Energy, &c., which every where occur in common conversation, as well as in philosophy; that is no proof, that we are acquainted, in any instance, with the connecting principle between cause and effect, or can account ultimately for the production of one thing to another. These words, as commonly used, have very loose meanings annexed to them; and their ideas are very uncertain and confused. No animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment of a *nisus* or endeavour; and every animal has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object, that is in motion. These sensations, which are merely animal, and from which we can *a priori* draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and to suppose, that they have some such feelings, whenever they transfer or receive motion. With regard to energies, which are exerted, without our annexing to them any idea of communicated motion, we consider only the constant experienced conjunction of the events; and as we *feel* a customary connexion between the ideas, we transfer that feeling to the objects; as nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation, which they occasion.

[22]THE prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for, from another cause, *viz*. a false sensation of seeming experience which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference, in many of our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may consider the action; and it consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects; as liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness or indifference, which we feel, in passing, or not passing, from the idea of one object to that of any succeeding one. Now we may observe, that, though, in *reflecting* on human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness, or indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that, in *performing* the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like it: And as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other, this has been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel, that our actions are subject to our will, on most occasions; and imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel, that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or a *Velleity*, as it is called in the schools) even on that side, on which it did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we persuade ourselves, could, at that time, have been compleated into the thing itself; because, should that be denied, we find, upon a second trial, that, at present, it can. We consider not, that the fantastical desire of shewing liberty,

is here the motive of our actions. And it seems certain, that, however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.

[23]THUS, if a cause be defined, *that which produces any thing*, it is easy to observe, that *producing* is synonymous to *causing*. In like manner, if a cause be defined, *that by which any thing exists*, this is liable to the same objection. For what is meant by these words, *by which*? Had it been said, that a cause is *that* after which *any thing constantly exists*; we should have understood the terms. For this is, indeed, all we know of the matter. And this constantly forms the very essence of necessity, nor have we any other idea of it.

[24]SINCE all reasoning concerning facts or causes is derived merely from custom, it may be asked how it happens, that men so much surpass animals in reasoning, and one man so much surpasses another? Has not the same custom the same influence on all?

We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference in human understandings: After which the reason of the difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended.

1. When we have lived any time, and have been accustomed to the uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we always transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the latter to resemble the former. By means of this general habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reasoning, and expect a similar event with some degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made accurately, and free from all foreign circumstances. It is therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe the consequences of things; and as one man may very much surpass another in attention and memory and observation, this will make a very great difference in their reasoning.

2. Where there is a complication of causes to produce any effect, one mind may be much larger than another, and better able to comprehend the whole system of objects, and to infer justly their consequences.

3. One man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a greater length than another.

4. Few men can think long without running into a confusion of ideas, and mistaking one for another; and there are various degrees of this infirmity.

5. The circumstance, on which the effect depends, is frequently involved in other circumstances, which are foreign and extrinsic. The separation of it often requires great attention, accuracy, and subtility.

6. The forming of general maxims from particular observation is a very nice operation; and nothing is more usual, from haste or a narrowness of mind, which sees not on all sides, than to commit mistakes in this particular.

7. When we reason from analogies, the man, who has the greater experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies, will be the better reasoner.

8. Biases from prejudice, education, passion, party, &c. hang more upon one mind than another.

9. After we have acquired a confidence in human testimony, books and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one man's experience and thought than those of another.

It would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make a difference in the understandings of men.

[25]PLUTARCH, in vita Catonis.

[26]NO INDIAN, it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to tell *a priori* what will result from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that, in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational INDIAN would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated *extraordinary*, and requires a pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people in a warm climate: But still it is not *miraculous*, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of SUMATRA have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never saw water in MUSCOVY during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence.

[27]SOMETIMES an event may not, *in itself*, *seem* to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle; because, in *fact*, it is contrary to these laws. Thus if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, *a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent*. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us.

[28]It may perhaps be objected that I proceed rashly and from my notions of ALEXANDER merely from the account given of him by Lucian, a professed enemy. It were indeed to be wished that some of the accounts published by his followers and accomplices had remained. The opposition and contrast betwixt the character and conduct of the same man as drawn by a friend or an enemy is as strong, even in common life, much more in these religious matters, as that

betwixt any to men in the world; betwixt ALEXANDER and St. Paul, for instance. See a Letter to Gilbert West, Esq., on the Conversion and Apostleship of St. Paul. [This note was removed by Hume from later editions of the *Enquiry*. -- J.F.]

29 Hist. lib. v. cap. 8, SUETONIUS gives nearly the same account in vita VESP.

30 THIS book was by Mons. MONTGERON, counsellor or judge of the parliament of PARIS, a man of figure and character, who was also a martyr to the cause, and is now said to be somewhere in a dungeon on account of his book.

There is another book in three volumes (called *Recueil des Miracles de l' Abbe* PARIS) giving an account of many of these miracles, and accompanied with prefatory discourses, which are very well written. There runs, however, through the whole of these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles of our Saviour and those of Abbe; wherein it is asserted, that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former: As if the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that of God himself, who conducted the pen of the inspired writers. If these writers, indeed, were to be considered merely as human testimony, the FRENCH author is very moderate in his comparison; since he might, with some appearance of reason, pretend, that the JANSENIST miracles much surpass the others in evidence and authority. the following circumstances are drawn from authentic papers, inserted in the above-mentioned book.

Many of the miracles of Abbe PARIS were proved immediately by witnesses before the officiality or bishop's court at PARIS, under the eye of cardinal Noailles, whose character for integrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies.

His successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the JANSENISTS, and for that reason promoted to the see by the court. Yet 22 rectors or *cures* of PARIS, with infinite earnestness, press him to examine those miracles, which they assert to be known to the whole world, and undisputably certain: But he wisely forbore.

The MOLINIST party had tried to discredit these miracles in one instance, that of Mademoiselle le FRANC. But, besides that their proceedings were in many respects the most irregular in the world, particularly in citing only a few of the JANSENIST witnesses, whom they tampered with: Besides this, I say, they soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses, one hundred and twenty in number, most of them persons of credit and substance in PARIS, who gave oath for the miracle. this was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the parliament. But the parliament were forbidden by authority to meddle in the affair. It was at last observed, that where men are heated by zeal and enthusiasm, there is no degree of human testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest absurdity: And those who will be so silly as to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the testimony, are almost sure to be confounded. It must be a miserable imposture,indeed, that does not prevail in that contest.

All who have been in FRANCE about that time have heard of the reputation of Mons.

HERAUT, the *lieutenant de Police*, whose vigilance, penetration, activity, and extensive intelligence have been much talked of. This magistrate, who by the nature of his office is almost absolute, was invested with full powers, on purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles; and he frequently seized immediately, and examined the witnesses and subjects of them: But never could reach any thing satisfactory against them.

In the case of Mademoiselle THIBAUT he sent the famous DE SYLVA to examine her; whose evidence is very curious. The physician declares, that it was impossible she could have been so ill as was proved by witnesses; because it was impossible sh could, in so short a time, have recovered so perfectly as he found her. He reasoned, like a man of sense, from natural causes; but the opposite party told him, that the whole was a miracle, and that his evidence was the very best proof of it.

The MOLINISTS were in a sad dilemma. They durst not assert the absolute insufficiency of human evidence, to prove a miracle. They were obliged to say, that these miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil. But they were told, that this was the resource of the JEWS of old.

No JANSENIST was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation of the miracles, when the church-yard was shut up by the king's edict. It was the touch of the tomb, which produced these extraordinary effects; and when no one could approach the tomb, no effects could be expected. God, indeed, could have thrown down the walls in a moment; but he is master of his own graces and works, and it belongs not to us to account for them. He did not throw down the walls of every city like those of JERICHO, on the sounding of the rams horns, nor break up the prison of every apostle, like that of St. PAUL.

No less a man, than the Duc de CHATILLON, a duke and peer of FRANCE, of the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a miraculous cure, performed upon a servant of his, who had lived several years in his house with a visible and palpable infirmity.

I shall conclude with observing, that no clergy are more celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the secular clergy of FRANCE, particularly the rectors or cures of PARIS, who bear testimony to these impostures.

The learning, genius, and probity of the gentlemen, and the austerity of the nuns of PORT-ROYAL, have been much celebrated all over EUROPE. Yet they all give evidence for a miracle, wrought on the niece of the famous Pascal, whose sanctity of life, as well as extraordinary capacity, is well known. the famous RACINE gives an account of this miracle in his famous history of PORT- ROYAL, and fortifies it with all the proofs, which a multitude of nuns, priests, physicians, and men of the world, all of them of undoubted credit, could bestow upon it. Several men of letters, particularly the bishop of TOURNAY, thought this miracle so certain, as to employ it in the refutation of atheists and freethinkers. the queen-regent of FRANCE, who was extremely prejudiced against the PORT- ROYAL, sent her own physician to examine the miracle, who returned an absolute convert. In short, the supernatural cure was so uncontestable, that it saved, for a time, that famous monastery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the JESUITS. Had it been a cheat, it had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful antagonists, and

must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers. Our divines, who can build up a formidable castle from such despicable materials; what a prodigious fabric could they have reared from these and many other circumstances, which I have not mentioned! How often would the great names of PASCAL, RACINE, ARNAUD, NICOLE, have resounded in our ears? but if they be wise, they had better adopt the miracle, as being more worth, a thousand times, than all the rest of their collection. Besides, it may serve very much to their purpose. For that miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic holy prickle of the holy thorn, which composed the holy crown, which, &*c*.

[31]LUCRET.

[32]Nov. Org. lib. ii. aph. 29.

[33]LUCIANI, [greek words].

[34]Luciani, [greek word].

[35]Id. and Dio.

[36]IN general, it may, I think, be established as a maxim, that where any cause is known only by its particular effects, it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause; since the qualities, which are requisite to produce these new effects along with the former, must either be different, or superior, or of more extensive operation, than those which simply produced the effect, whence alone the cause is supposed to be known to us. We can never, therefore, have any reason to suppose the existence of these qualities. To say, that the new effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy, which is already known from the first effects, will not remove the difficulty. For even granting this to be the case (which can seldom be supposed), the very continuation and exertion of a like energy (for it is impossible it can be absolutely the same), I say, this exertion of a like energy, in a different period of space and time, is a very arbitrary supposition, and what there cannot possibly be any traces of it in the effects, from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally derived. Let the *inferred* cause be exactly proportioned (as it should be) to the known effect; and it is impossible that it can possess any qualities, from which new or different effects can be *inferred*.

[37]THIS argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted. He professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appears from this, *that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction*. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism.

[38]WHATEVER disputes there may be about the mathematical points, we must allow that there are physical points; that is, parts of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by the eye or imagination. These images, then, which are present to the fancy or senses, are absolutely indivisible, and consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely less than any real part of extension; and yet nothing appears more certain to reason, than that an infinite number of them composes an infinite extension. How much more an infinite number of those infinitely small parts of extension, which are still supposed infinitely divisible.

[39]IT seems to be not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no such thing as abstract or general ideas, properly speaking; but that all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attached to a general term, which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones, that resemble, in certain circumstances, the idea, present to the mind. Thus when the term Horse is pronounced, we immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white animal, of a particular size or figure: But as that term is also usually applied to animals of other colours, figures and sizes, these ideas, though not actually present to the imagination, are easily recalled; and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way, as if they were actually present. If this be admitted (as seems reasonable) it follows that all the ideas of quantity, upon which mathematicians reason, are nothing but particular, and such as are suggested by the senses and imagination, and consequently, cannot be infinitely divisible. It is sufficient to have dropped this hint at present, without prosecuting it any farther. It certainly concerns all lovers of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions; and this seems the readiest solution of these difficulties.

[40]THAT impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, *Ex nihilo, nihil fit,* by which the creation of matter was excluded, ceases to be a maxim, according to this philosophy. Not only the will of the supreme Being may create matter; but, for aught, we know *a priori*, the will of any other being might create it, or any other cause, that the most whimsical imagination can assign.

The Hume Archives

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

David Hume

1748

SECTION VI.
Of Probability.

THOUGH there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.

There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of chances on any side; and according as this superiority increases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportionable increase, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side, in which we discover the superiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides, and with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner, and only one side different, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or expectation of the event more steady and secure. This process of the thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious; but to those who consider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious speculation.

It seems evident, that, when the mind looks forward to discover the event, which may result from the throw of such a dye, it considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable;

and this is the very nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended in it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of sides concur in the one event than in the other, the mind is carried more frequently to that event, and meets it oftener, in revolving the various possibilities or chances, on which the ultimate result depends. This concurrence of several views in one particular event begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a smaller number of views, and recurs less frequently to the mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, this operation may, perhaps, in some measure, be accounted for. The concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more strongly on the imagination; gives it superior force and vigour; renders its influence on the passions and affections more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance or security, which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion.

The case is the same with the probability of causes, as with that of chance. There are some causes, which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particular effect; and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has always burned, and water suffocated every human creature: The production of motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law, which has hitherto admitted of no exception. But there are other causes, which have been found more irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a purge, or opium a soporific to every one, who has taken these medicines. It is true, when any cause fails of producing its usual effect, philosophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but suppose, that some secret causes, in the particular structure of parts, have prevented the operation. Our reasonings, however, and conclusions concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place. Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future, in all our inferences; where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect the event with the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any contrary supposition. But where different effects have been found to follow from causes, which are to *appearance* exactly similar, all these various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the future, and enter into our consideration, when we determine the probability of the event. Though we give the preference to that which has been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist, we must not overlook the other effects, but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent. It is more probable, in almost every country of EUROPE, that there will be frost sometime in JANUARY, than that the weather will continue open through out that whole month; though this probability varies according to the different climates, and approaches to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms. Here then it seems evident, that, when we transfer the past to the future, in order to determine the effect, which will result from any cause, we transfer all the different events, in the same proportion as they have appeared in the past, and conceive one to have existed a hundred times, for instance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of views do here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the imagination, beget that sentiment which we call *belief*, and give its object the preference above the contrary event, which is not supported by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future. Let any one try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems of philosophy, and he will be sensible of the difficulty. For my part, I shall think it sufficient, if the present hints excite the curiosity of philosophers, and make them sensible how defective all common theories are in treating of such curious and such sublime

subjects.

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SECTION IX.
Of the Reason of Animals.

ALL our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of ANALOGY, which leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive: Nor does any man ever entertain a doubt, where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances, which have ever fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance. The anatomical observations, formed upon one animal, are, by this species of reasoning, extended to all animals; and it is certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for instance, is clearly proved to have place in one creature, as a frog, or fish, it forms a strong presumption, that the same principle has place in all. These analogical observations may be carried farther, even to this science, of which we are now treating; and any theory, by which we explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin and connexion of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find, that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals. We shall make trial of this, with regard to the hypothesis, by which we have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured to account for all experimental reasonings; and it is hoped, that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations.

First, It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, &*c*., and of the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occasion, founded in any thing but his observation and experience.

This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any course of action, and most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience, which makes him answer to his name, and infer, from such an arbitrary sound, that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?

In all these cases, we may observe, that the animal infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences, which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects.

Secondly, It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he concludes, that like events must follow like objects, and that the course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings; since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them. Animals, therefore are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are children; neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in the main, the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims. Nature must have provided some other principle, of more ready, and more general use and application; nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life, as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without any exception or reserve. It is custom alone, which engages animals, from every object, that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one, to conceive the other, in that particular manner, which we denominate *belief*. No other explication can be given of this operation, in all the higher, as well as lower classes of sensitive beings, which fall under our notice and observation.[24]

But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it, which they derive from the original hand of nature; which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate INSTINCTS, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary, and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. But our wonder will, perhaps, cease or diminish, when we consider, that the experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves; and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties. Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery.

The Natural History of Religion

David Hume

1757

5/25/96

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Editor's Note: Hume's *Natural History of Religion* first appeared in 1757 in a collection of essays titled *Four Dissertations*. The work may be topically divided into three parts. The first part (sections 1 and 4) argues that polytheism, and not monotheism, was the original religion of primitive humans. Monotheism was only a later development. The second part (sections 2-3, 5-8) establishes the psychological principles which give rise to religious belief. His thesis is that natural instincts such as fear are the true cause of popular religious belief, and not rational argument. The third part of this work (sections 9-15) compares various aspects of polytheism with monotheism showing that one is no more superior than the other. Both contain points of absurdity. From this he concludes that we should suspend belief on the entire subject. The *Natural History of Religion* was published seven additional times during Hume's life, each edition incorporating minor variations. The posthumous 1777 edition is followed here, which includes Hume's final alterations. Hume's bibliographical references to Greek and Latin classics have been expanded and clarified without brackets. Bibliographical references have not been expanded for those seventeenth and eighteenth-century works which have no modern editions. For more detailed introductory comments and annotations to this text, see *The Natural History of Religion*, (New York: MacMillan, 1992).

The Natural History of Religion

David Hume

1757

Introduction

As every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in particular, which challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature. Happily, the first question, which is the most important, admits of the most obvious, at least, the clearest solution. The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion. But the other question, concerning the origin of religion in human nature, is exposed to some more difficulty. The belief of invisible, intelligent power has been very generally diffused over the human race, in all places and in all ages; but it has neither perhaps been so universal as to admit of no exception, nor has it been, in any degree, uniform in the ideas, which it has suggested. Some nations have been discovered, who entertained no sentiments of Religion, if travellers and historians may be credited; and no two nations, and scarce any two men, have ever agreed precisely in the same sentiments. It would appear, therefore, that this preconception springs not from an original instinct or primary impression of nature, such as gives rise to self-love, affection between the sexes, love of progeny, gratitude, resentment; since every instinct of this kind has been found absolutely universal in all nations and ages, and has always a precise determinate object, which it inflexibly pursues. The first religious principles must be secondary; such as may easily be perverted by various accidents and causes, and whose operation too, in some cases, may, by an extraordinary concurrence of circumstances, be altogether prevented. What those principles are, which give rise to the original belief, and what those accidents and causes are, which direct its operation, is the subject of our present enquiry.

The Natural History of Religion

David Hume

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SECT. I. *That Polytheism was the primary Religion of Men.*

It appears to me, that, if we consider the improvement of human society, from rude beginnings to a state of greater perfection, polytheism or idolatry was, and necessarily must have been, the first and most ancient religion of mankind. This opinion I shall endeavour to confirm by the following arguments.

It is a matter of fact incontestable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind were polytheists. The doubtful and sceptical principles of a few philosophers, or the theism, and that too not entirely pure, of one or two nations, form no objection worth regarding. Behold then the clear testimony of history. The farther we mount up into antiquity, the more do we find mankind plunged into polytheism. No marks, no symptoms of any more perfect religion. The most ancient records of human race still present us with that system as the popular and established creed. The north, the south, the east, the west, give their unanimous testimony to the same fact. What can be opposed to so full an evidence?

As far as writing or history reaches, mankind, in ancient times, appear universally to have been polytheists. Shall we assert, that, in more ancient times, before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art or science, men entertained the principles of pure theism? That is, while they were ignorant and barbarous, they discovered truth: But fell into error, as soon as they acquired learning and politeness.

But in this assertion you not only contradict all appearance of probability, but also our present experience concerning the principles and opinions of barbarous nations. The savage tribes of AMERICA, AFRICA, and ASIA are all idolaters. Not a single exception to this rule. Insomuch, that, were a traveller to transport himself into any unknown region; if he found inhabitants cultivated with arts and science, though even upon that supposition there are odds against their being theists, yet could he not safely, till farther inquiry, pronounce any thing on that head: But if he found them ignorant and barbarous, he might beforehand declare them idolaters; and there scarcely is a

possibility of his being mistaken.

It seems certain, that, according to the natural progress of human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some groveling and familiar notion of superior powers, before they stretch their conception to that perfect Being, who bestowed order on the whole frame of nature. We may as reasonably imagine, that men inhabited palaces before huts and cottages, or studied geometry before agriculture; as assert that the Deity appeared to them a pure spirit, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent, before he was apprehended to be a powerful, though limited being, with human passions and appetites, limbs and organs. The mind rises gradually, from inferior to superior: By abstracting from what is imperfect, it forms an idea of perfection: And slowly distinguishing the nobler parts of its own frame from the grosser, it learns to transfer only the former, much elevated and refined, to its divinity. Nothing could disturb this natural progress of thought, but some obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of theism, and make it overleap, at one bound, the vast interval which is interposed between the human and the divine nature. But though I allow, that the order and frame of the universe, when accurately examined, affords such an argument; yet I can never think, that this consideration could have an influence on mankind, when they formed their first rude notions of religion.

The causes of such objects, as are quite familiar to us, never strike our attention or curiosity; and however extraordinary or surprising these objects in themselves, they are passed over, by the raw and ignorant multitude, without much examination or enquiry. ADAM, rising at once, in paradise, and in the full perfection of his faculties, would naturally, as represented by MILTON, be astonished at the glorious appearances of nature, the heavens, the air, the earth, his own organs and members; and would be led to ask, whence this wonderful scene arose. But a barbarous, necessitous animal (such as a man is on the first origin of society), pressed by such numerous wants and passions, has no leisure to admire the regular face of nature, or make enquiries concerning the cause of those objects, to which from his infancy he has been gradually accustomed. On the contrary, the more regular and uniform, that is, the more perfect nature appears, the more is he familiarized to it, and the less inclined to scrutinize and examine it. A monstrous birth excites his curiosity, and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty; and immediately sets him a trembling, and sacrificing, and praying. But an animal, compleat in all its limbs and organs, is to him an ordinary spectacle, and produces no religious opinion or affection. Ask him, whence that animal arose; he will tell you, from the copulation of its parents. And these, whence? From the copulation of theirs. A few removes satisfy his curiosity, and set the objects at such a distance, that he entirely loses sight of them. Imagine not, that he will so much as start the question, whence the first animal; much less, whence the whole system or united fabric of the universe arose. Or, if you start such a question to him, expect not, that he will employ his mind with any anxiety about a subject, so remote, so uninteresting, and which so much exceeds the bounds of his capacity.

But farther, if men were at first led into the belief of one Supreme Being, by reasoning from the frame of nature, they could never possibly leave that belief, in order to embrace polytheism; but the same principles of reason, which at first produced and diffused over mankind, so magnificent an opinion, must be able, with greater facility, to preserve it. The first invention and proof of any doctrine is much more difficult than the supporting and retaining of it.

There is a great difference between historical facts and speculative opinions; nor is the knowledge of the one propagated in the same manner with that of the other. An historical fact, while it passes by oral tradition from eye-witnesses and contemporaries, is disguised in every successive narration, and may at last retain but very small, if any, resemblance of the original truth, on which it was

founded. The frail memories of men, their love of exaggeration, their supine carelessness; these principles, if not corrected by books and writing, soon pervert the account of historical events; where argument or reasoning has little or no place, nor can ever recal the truth, which has once escaped those narrations. It is thus the fables of HERCULES, THESEUS, BACCHUS are supposed to have been originally founded in true history, corrupted by tradition. But with regard to speculative opinions, the case is far otherwise. If these opinions be founded on arguments so clear and obvious as to carry conviction with the generality of mankind, the same arguments, which at first diffused the opinions, will still preserve them in their original purity. If the arguments be more abstruse, and more remote from vulgar apprehension, the opinions will always be confined to a few persons; and as soon as men leave the contemplation of the arguments, the opinions will immediately be lost and be buried in oblivion. Whichever side of this dilemma we take, it must appear impossible, that theism could, from reasoning, have been the primary religion of human race, and have afterwards, by its corruption, given birth to polytheism and to all the various superstitions of the heathen world. Reason, when obvious, prevents these corruptions: When abstruse, it keeps the principles entirely from the knowledge of the vulgar, who are alone liable to corrupt any principle or opinion.



The Natural History of Religion

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SECT. II. *Origin of Polytheism*.

If we would, therefore, indulge our curiosity, in enquiring concerning the origin of religion, we must turn our thoughts towards polytheism, the primitive religion of uninstructed mankind.

Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent power by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all its parts, according to one regular plan or connected system. For though, to persons of a certain turn of mind, it may not appear altogether absurd, that several independent beings, endowed with superior wisdom, might conspire in the contrivance and execution of one regular plan; yet is this a merely arbitrary supposition, which, even if allowed possible, must be confessed neither to be supported by probability nor necessity. All things in the universe are evidently of a piece. Every thing is adjusted to every thing. One design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author; because the conception of different authors, without any distinction of attributes or operations, serves only to give perplexity to the imagination, without bestowing any satisfaction on the understanding. The statue of LAOCOON, as we learn from PLINY, was the work of three artists: But it is certain, that, were we not told so, we should never have imagined, that a groupe of figures, cut from one stone, and united in one plan, was not the work and contrivance of one statuary. To ascribe any single effect to the combination of several causes, is not surely a natural and obvious supposition.

On the other hand, if, leaving the works of nature, we trace the footsteps of invisible power in the various and contrary events of human life, we are necessarily led into polytheism and to the acknowledgment of several limited and imperfect deities. Storms and tempests ruin what is nourished by the sun. The sun destroys what is fostered by the moisture of dews and rains. War may be favourable to a nation, whom the inclemency of the seasons afflicts with famine. Sickness and pestilence may depopulate a kingdom, amidst the most profuse plenty. The same nation is not, at the same time, equally successful by sea and by land. And a nation, which now triumphs over its

enemies, may anon submit to their more prosperous arms. In short, the conduct of events, or what we call the plan of a particular providence, is so full of variety and uncertainty, that, if we suppose it immediately ordered by any intelligent beings, we must acknowledge a contrariety in their designs and intentions, a constant combat of opposite powers, and a repentance or change of intention in the same power, from impotence or levity. Each nation has its tutelar deity. Each element is subjected to its invisible power or agent. The province of each god is separate from that of another. Nor are the operations of the same god always certain and invariable. To-day he protects: To-morrow he abandons us. Prayers and sacrifices, rites and ceremonies, well or ill performed, are the sources of his favour or enmity, and produce all the good or ill fortune, which are to be found amongst mankind.

We may conclude, therefore, that, in all nations, which have embraced polytheism, the first ideas of religion arose not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears, which actuate the human mind. Accordingly, we find, that all idolaters, having separated the provinces of their deities, have recourse to that invisible agent, to whose authority they are immediately subjected, and whose province it is to superintend that course of actions, in which they are, at any time, engaged. JUNO is invoked at marriages; LUCINA at births. NEPTUNE receives the prayers of seamen; and MARS of warriors. The husbandman cultivates his field under the protection of CERES; and the merchant acknowledges the authority of MERCURY. Each natural event is supposed to be governed by some intelligent agent; and nothing prosperous or adverse can happen in life, which may not be the subject of peculiar prayers or thanksgivings.[2]

It must necessarily, indeed, be allowed, that, in order to carry men's attention beyond the present course of things, or lead them into any inference concerning invisible intelligent power, they must be actuated by some passion, which prompts their thought and reflection; some motive, which urges their first enquiry. But what passion shall we here have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty consequence? Not speculative curiosity surely, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for such gross apprehensions; and would lead men into enquiries concerning the frame of nature, a subject too large and comprehensive for their narrow capacities. No passions, therefore, can be supposed to work upon such barbarians, but the ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity.

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SECT. III. *The same subject continued.*

We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true springs and causes of every event are entirely concealed from us; nor have we either sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to prevent those ills, with which we are continually threatened. We hang in perpetual suspence between life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want; which are distributed amongst the human species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is oft unexpected, and always unaccountable. These *unknown causes*, then, become the constant object of our hope and fear; and while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers, on which we have so entire a dependance. Could men anatomize nature, according to the most probable, at least the most intelligible philosophy, they would find, that these causes are nothing but the particular fabric and structure of the minute parts of their own bodies and of external objects; and that, by a regular and constant machinery, all the events are produced, about which they are so much concerned. But this philosophy exceeds the comprehension of the ignorant multitude, who can only conceive the *unknown causes* in a general and confused manner; though their imagination, perpetually employed on the same subject, must labour to form some particular and distinct idea of them. The more they consider these causes themselves, and the uncertainty of their operation, the less satisfaction do they meet with in their researches; and, however unwilling, they must at last have abandoned so arduous an attempt, were it not for a propensity in human nature, which leads into a system, that gives them some satisfaction.

There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object, those qualities, with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious. We find human faces in the moon, armies in the clouds; and by a natural propensity, if not corrected by experience and reflection, ascribe malice or good- will to every thing, that hurts or pleases us. Hence the frequency and beauty of the *prosopopoeia* in poetry; where trees, mountains and streams are personified, and the inanimate parts of nature acquire sentiment and passion. And though these poetical figures and expressions gain not on the

belief, they may serve, at least, to prove a certain tendency in the imagination, without which they could neither be beautiful nor natural. Nor is a river-god or hamadryad always taken for a mere poetical or imaginary personage; but may sometimes enter into the real creed of the ignorant vulgar; while each grove or field is represented as possessed of a particular *genius* or invisible power, which inhabits and protects it. Nay, philosophers cannot entirely exempt themselves from this natural frailty; but have oft ascribed to inanimate matter the horror of a *vacuum*, sympathies, antipathies, and other affections of human nature. The absurdity is not less, while we cast our eyes upwards; and transferring, as is too usual, human passions and infirmities to the deity, represent him as jealous and revengeful, capricious and partial, and, in short, a wicked and foolish man, in every respect but his superior power and authority. No wonder, then, that mankind, being placed in such an absolute ignorance of causes, and being at the same time so anxious concerning their future fortune, should immediately acknowledge a dependence on invisible powers, possessed of sentiment and intelligence. The *unknown causes,* which continually employ their thought, appearing always in the same aspect, are all apprehended to be of the same kind or species. Nor is it long before we ascribe to them thought and reason and passion, and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order to bring them nearer to a resemblance with ourselves.

In proportion as any man's course of life is governed by accident, we always find, that he encreases in superstition; as may particularly be observed of gamesters and sailors, who, though, of all mankind, the least capable of serious reflection, abound most in frivolous and superstitious apprehensions. The gods, says CORIOLANUS in DIONYSIUS,[3] have an influence in every affair; but above all, in war; where the event is so uncertain. All human life, especially before the institution of order and good government, being subject to fortuitous accidents; it is natural, that superstition should prevail every where in barbarous ages, and put men on the most earnest enquiry concerning those invisible powers, who dispose of their happiness or misery. Ignorant of astronomy and the anatomy of plants and animals, and too little curious to observe the admirable adjustment of final causes; they remain still unacquainted with a first and supreme creator, and with that infinitely perfect spirit, who alone, by his almighty will, bestowed order on the whole frame of nature. Such a magnificent idea is too big for their narrow conceptions, which can neither observe the beauty of the work, nor comprehend the grandeur of its author. They suppose their deities, however potent and invisible, to be nothing but a species of human creatures, perhaps raised from among mankind, and retaining all human passions and appetites, together with corporeal limbs and organs. Such limited beings, though masters of human fate, being, each of them, incapable of extending his influence every where, must be vastly multiplied, in order to answer that variety of events, which happen over the whole face of nature. Thus every place is stored with a crowd of local deities; and thus polytheism has prevailed, and still prevails, among the greatest part of uninstructed mankind.[4]

Any of the human affections may lead us into the notion of invisible, intelligent power; hope as well as fear, gratitude as well as affliction: But if we examine our own hearts, or observe what passes around us, we shall find, that men are much oftener thrown on their knees by the melancholy than by the agreeable passions. Prosperity is easily received as our due, and few questions are asked concerning its cause or author. It begets cheerfulness and activity and alacrity and a lively enjoyment of every social and sensual pleasure: And during this state of mind, men have little leisure or inclination to think of the unknown invisible regions. On the other hand, every disastrous accident alarms us, and sets us on enquiries concerning the principles whence it arose: Apprehensions spring up with regard to futurity: And the mind, sunk into diffidence, terror, and

melancholy, has recourse to every method of appeasing those secret intelligent powers, on whom our fortune is supposed entirely to depend.

No topic is more usual with all popular divines than to display the advantages of affliction, in bringing men to a due sense of religion; by subduing their confidence and sensuality, which, in times of prosperity, make them forgetful of a divine providence. Nor is this topic confined merely to modern religions. The ancients have also employed it. *Fortune has never liberally, without envy*, says a GREEK historian,[5] *bestowed an unmixed happiness on mankind; but with all her gifts has ever conjoined some disastrous circumstance, in order to chastize men into a reverence for the gods, whom, in a continued course of prosperity, they are apt to neglect and forget*.

What age or period of life is the most addicted to superstition? The weakest and most timid. What sex? The same answer must be given. *The leaders and examples of every kind of superstition*, says STRABO,[6] *are the women. These excite the men to devotion and supplications, and the observance of religious days. It is rare to meet with one that lives apart from the females, and yet is addicted to such practices. And nothing can, for this reason, be more improbable, than the account given of an order of men among the* GETES, *who practised celibacy, and were notwithstanding the most religious fanatics*. A method of reasoning, which would lead us to entertain a bad idea of the devotion of monks; did we not know by an experience, not so common, perhaps, in STRABO'S days, that one may practise celibacy, and profess chastity; and yet maintain the closest connexions and most entire sympathy with that timorous and pious sex.

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SECT. IV. *Deities not considered as creators or formers of the world.*

The only point of theology, in which we shall find a consent of mankind almost universal, is, that there is invisible, intelligent power in the world: But whether this power be supreme or subordinate, whether confined to one being; or distributed among several, what attributes, qualities, connexions, or principles of action ought to be ascribed to those beings, concerning all these points, there is the widest difference in the popular systems of theology. Our ancestors in EUROPE, before the revival of letters, believed, as we do at present, that there was one supreme God, the author of nature, whose power, though in itself uncontroulable, was yet often exerted by the interposition of his angels and subordinate ministers, who executed his sacred purposes. But they also believed, that all nature was full of other invisible powers; fairies, goblins, elves, sprights; beings, stronger and mightier than men, but much inferior to the celestial natures, who surround the throne of God. Now, suppose, that any one, in those ages, had denied the existence of God and of his angels; would not his impiety justly have deserved the appellation of atheism, even though he had still allowed, by some odd capricious reasoning, that the popular stories of elves and fairies were just and well-grounded? The difference, on the one hand, between such a person and a genuine theist is infinitely greater than that, on the other, between him and one that absolutely excludes all invisible intelligent power. And it is a fallacy, merely from the casual resemblance of names, without any conformity of meaning, to rank such opposite opinions under the same denomination.

To any one, who considers justly of the matter, it will appear, that the gods of all polytheists are no better than the elves or fairies of our ancestors, and merit as little any pious worship or veneration. These pretended religionists are really a kind of superstitious atheists, and acknowledge no being, that corresponds to our idea of a deity. No first principle of mind or thought: No supreme government and administration: No divine contrivance or intention in the fabric of the world.

The CHINESE, when[7] their prayers are not answered, beat their idols. The deities of the

LAPLANDERS are any large stone which they meet with of an extraordinary shape.[8] The EGYPTIAN mythologists, in order to account for animal worship, said, that the gods, pursued by the violence of earth-born men, who were their enemies, had formerly been obliged to disguise themselves under the semblance of beasts.[9] The CAUNII, a nation in the Lesser ASIA, resolving to admit no strange gods among them, regularly, at certain seasons, assembled themselves compleatly armed, beat the air with their lances, and proceeded in that manner to their frontiers; in order, as they said, to expel the foreign deities.[10] *Not even the immortal gods*, said some GERMAN nations to CAESAR, *are a match for the* SUEVIS.[11]

Many ills, says DIONE in HOMER to VENUS wounded by DIOMEDE, many ills, my daughter, have the gods inflicted on men: And many ills, in return, have men inflicted on the gods.[12] We need but open any classic author to meet with these gross representations of the deities; and LONGINUS[13] with reason observes, that such ideas of the divine nature, if literally taken, contain a true atheism.

Some writers[14] have been surprized, that the impieties of ARISTOPHANES should have been tolerated, nay publicly acted and applauded by the ATHENIANS; a people so superstitious and so jealous of the public religion, that, at that very time, they put SOCRATES to death for his imagined incredulity. But these writers do not consider, that the ludicrous, familiar images, under which the gods are represented by that comic poet, instead of appearing impious, were the genuine lights in which the ancients conceived their divinities. What conduct can be more criminal or mean, than that of JUPITER in the AMPHITRION? Yet that play, which represented his gallante exploits, was supposed so agreeable to him, that it was always acted in ROME by public authority, when the state was threatened with pestilence, famine, or any general calamity.[15] The ROMANS supposed, that, like all old letchers, he would be highly pleased with the recital of his former feats of prowess and vigour, and that no topic was so proper, upon which to flatter his vanity.

The LACEDEMONIANS, says XENOPHON,[16] always, during war, put up their petitions very early in the morning, in order to be beforehand with their enemies, and, by being the first solicitors, pre-engage the gods in their favour. We may gather from SENECA,[17] that it was usual, for the votaries in the temples, to make interest with the beadle or sexton, that they might have a seat near the image of the deity, in order to be the best heard in their prayers and applications to him. The TYRIANS, when besieged by ALEXANDER, threw chains on the statue of HERCULES, to prevent that deity from deserting to the enemy.[18] AUGUSTUS, having twice lost his fleet by storms, forbad NEPTUNE to be carried in procession along with the other gods; and fancied, that he had sufficiently revenged himself by that expedient.[19] After GERMANICUS'S death, the people were so enraged at their gods, that they stoned them in their temples; and openly renounced all allegiance to them.[20]

To ascribe the origin and fabric of the universe to these imperfect beings never enters into the imagination of any polytheist or idolater. HESIOD, whose writings, with those of HOMER, contained the canonical system of the heathens;[21] HESIOD, I say, supposes gods and men to have sprung equally from the unknown powers of nature.[22] And throughout the whole theogony of that author, PANDORA is the only instance of creation or a voluntary production; and she too was formed by the gods merely from despight to PROMETHEUS, who had furnished men with stolen fire from the celestial regions.[23] The ancient mythologists, indeed, seem throughout to have rather embraced the idea of generation than that of creation or formation; and to have thence accounted for the origin of this universe.

OVID, who lived in a learned age, and had been instructed by philosophers in the principles of a divine creation or formation of the world; finding, that such an idea would not agree with the popular mythology, which he delivers, leaves it, in a manner, loose and detached from his system. *Quisquis fuit ille Deorum?*[24] Whichever of the gods it was, says he, that dissipated the chaos, and introduced order into the universe. It could neither be SATURN, he knew, nor JUPITER, nor NEPTUNE, nor any of the received deities of paganism. His theological system had taught him nothing upon that head; and he leaves the matter equally undetermined.

DIODORUS SICULUS,[25] beginning his work with an enumeration of the most reasonable opinions concerning the origin of the world, makes no mention of a deity or intelligent mind; though it is evident from his history, that he was much more prone to superstition than to irreligion. And in another passage,[26] talking of the ICHTHYOPHAGI, a nation in INDIA, he says, that, there being so great difficulty in accounting for their descent, we must conclude them to be *aborigines*, without any beginning of their generation, propagating their race from all eternity; as some of the physiologers, in treating of the origin of nature, have justly observed. "But in such subjects as these," adds the historian, "which exceed all human capacity, it may well happen, that those, who discourse the most, know the least; reaching a specious appearance of truth in their reasonings, while extremely wide of the real truth and matter of fact."

A strange sentiment in our eyes, to be embraced by a professed and zealous religionist![27] But it was merely by accident, that the question concerning the origin of the world did ever in ancient times enter into religious systems, or was treated of by theologers. The philosophers alone made profession of delivering systems of this kind; and it was pretty late too before these bethought themselves of having recourse to a mind or supreme intelligence, as the first cause of all. So far was it from being esteemed profane in those days to account for the origin of things without a deity, that THALES, ANAXIMENES, HERACLITUS, and others, who embraced that system of cosmogony, past unquestioned; while ANAXAGORAS, the first undoubted theist among the philosophers, was perhaps the first that ever was accused of atheism.[28]

We are told by SEXTUS EMPIRICUS,[29] that EPICURUS, when a boy, reading with his preceptor these verses of HESIOD,

Eldest of beings, *chaos* first arose;

Next *earth*, wide-stretch'd, the *seat* of all: the young scholar first betrayed his inquisitive genius, by asking, *And chaos whence?* But was told by his preceptor, that he must have recourse to the philosophers for a solution of such questions. And from this hint EPICURUS left philology and all other studies, in order to betake himself to that science, whence alone he expected satisfaction with regard to these sublime subjects.

The common people were never likely to push their researches so far, or derive from reasoning their systems of religion; when philologers and mythologists, we see, scarcely ever discovered so much penetration. And even the philosophers, who discoursed of such topics, readily assented to the grossest theory, and admitted the joint origin of gods and men from night and chaos; from fire, water, air, or whatever they established to be the ruling element.

Nor was it only on their first origin, that the gods were supposed dependent on the powers of nature. Throughout the whole period of their existence they were subjected to the dominion of fate or destiny. *Think of the force of necessity*, says AGRIPPA to the ROMAN people, *that force, to which even the gods must submit*.[30] And the Younger PLINY,[31] agreeably to this way of thinking, tells us,

that amidst the darkness, horror, and confusion, which ensued upon the first eruption of VESUVIUS, several concluded, that all nature was going to wrack, and that gods and men were perishing in one common ruin.

It is great complaisance, indeed, if we dignify with the name of religion such an imperfect system of theology, and put it on a level with later systems, which are founded on principles more just and more sublime. For my part, I can scarcely allow the principles even of MARCUS AURELIUS, PLUTARCH, and some other *Stoics* and *Academics*, though much more refined than the pagan superstition, to be worthy of the honourable appellation of theism. For if the mythology of the heathens resemble the ancient EUROPEAN system of spiritual beings, excluding God and angels, and leaving only fairies and sprights; the creed of these philosophers may justly be said to exclude a deity, and to leave only angels and fairies.

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SECT. V. *Various Forms of Polytheism: Allegory, Hero-Worship*.

But it is chiefly our present business to consider the gross polytheism of the vulgar, and to trace all its various appearances, in the principles of human nature, whence they are derived.

Whoever learns by argument, the existence of invisible intelligent power, must reason from the admirable contrivance of natural objects, and must suppose the world to be the workmanship of that divine being, the original cause of all things. But the vulgar polytheist, so far from admitting that idea, deifies every part of the universe, and conceives all the conspicuous productions of nature, to be themselves so many real divinities. The sun, moon, and stars, are all gods according to his system: Fountains are inhabited by nymphs, and trees by hamadryads: Even monkies, dogs, cats, and other animals often become sacred in his eyes, and strike him with a religious veneration. And thus, however strong men's propensity to believe invisible, intelligent power in nature, their propensity is equally strong to rest their attention on sensible, visible objects; and in order to reconcile these opposite inclinations, they are led to unite the invisible power with some visible object.

The distribution also of distinct provinces to the several deities is apt to cause some allegory, both physical and moral, to enter into the vulgar systems of polytheism. The god of war will naturally be represented as furious, cruel, and impetuous: The god of poetry as elegant, polite, and amiable: The god of merchandise, especially in early times, as thievish and deceitful. The allegories, supposed in HOMER and other mythologists, I allow, have often been so strained, that men of sense are apt entirely to reject them, and to consider them as the production merely of the fancy and conceit of critics and commentators. But that allegory really has place in the heathen mythology is undeniable even on the least reflection. CUPID the son of VENUS; the Muses the daughters of Memory; PROMETHEUS, the wise brother, and EPIMETHEUS the foolish; HYGIEIA or the goddess of health descended from AESCULAPIUS or the god of physic: Who sees not, in these, and in many other instances, the plain traces of allegory? When a god is supposed to preside over any passion,

event, or system of actions, it is almost unavoidable to give him a genealogy, attributes, and adventures, suitable to his supposed powers and influence; and to carry on that similitude and comparison, which is naturally so agreeable to the mind of man.

Allegories, indeed, entirely perfect, we ought not to expect as the productions of ignorance and superstition; there being no work of genius that requires a nicer hand, or has been more rarely executed with success. That *Fear* and *Terror* are the sons of MARS is just; but why by VENUS?[32] That *Harmony* is the daughter of VENUS is regular; but why by MARS?[33] That *Sleep* is the brother of *Death* is suitable; but why describe him as enamoured of one of the Graces?[34] And since the ancient mythologists fall into mistakes so gross and palpable, we have no reason surely to expect such refined and long-spun allegories, as some have endeavoured to deduce from their fictions.

LUCRETIUS was plainly seduced by the strong appearance of allegory, which is observable in the pagan fictions. He first addresses himself to VENUS as to that generating power, which animates, renews, and beautifies the universe: But is soon betrayed by the mythology into incoherencies, while he prays to that allegorical personage to appease the furies of her lover MARS; An idea not drawn from allegory, but from the popular religion, and which LUCRETIUS, as an EPICUREAN, could not consistently admit of.

The deities of the vulgar are so little superior to human creatures, that, where men are affected with strong sentiments of veneration or gratitude for any hero or public benefactor, nothing can be more natural than to convert him into a god, and fill the heavens, after this manner, with continual recruits from among mankind. Most of the divinities of the ancient world are supposed to have once been men, and to have been beholden for their *apotheosis* to the admiration and affection of the people. The real history of their adventures, corrupted by tradition, and elevated by the marvellous, become a plentiful source of fable; especially in passing through the hands of poets, allegorists, and priests, who successively improved upon the wonder and astonishment of the ignorant multitude.

Painters too and sculptors came in for their share of profit in the sacred mysteries; and furnishing men with sensible representations of their divinities, whom they cloathed in human figures, gave great encrease to the public devotion, and determined its object. It was probably for want of these arts in rude and barbarous ages, that men deified plants, animals, and even brute, unorganized matter; and rather than be without a sensible object of worship, affixed divinity to such ungainly forms. Could any statuary of SYRIA, in early times, have formed a just figure of APOLLO, the conic stone, HELIOGABALUS, had never become the object of such profound adoration, and been received as a representation of the solar deity.[35]

STILPO was banished by the council of AREOPAGUS, for affirming that the MINERVA in the citadel was no divinity; but the workmanship of PHIDIAS, the sculptor.[36] What degree of reason must we expect in the religious belief of the vulgar in other nations; when ATHENIANS and AREOPAGITES could entertain such gross conceptions?

These then are the general principles of polytheism, founded in human nature, and little or nothing dependent on caprice and accident. As the *causes*, which bestow happiness or misery, are, in general, very little known and very uncertain, our anxious concern endeavours to attain a determinate idea of them; and finds no better expedient than to represent them as intelligent voluntary agents, like ourselves; only somewhat superior in power and wisdom. The limited influence of these agents, and their great proximity to human weakness, introduce the various distribution and division of their authority; and thereby give rise to allegory. The same principles

naturally deify mortals, superior in power, courage, or understanding, and produce hero- worship; together with fabulous history and mythological tradition, in all its wild and unaccountable forms. And as an invisible spiritual intelligence is an object too refined for vulgar apprehension, men naturally affix it to some sensible representation; such as either the more conspicuous parts of nature, or the statues, images, and pictures, which a more refined age forms of its divinities.

Almost all idolaters, of whatever age or country, concur in these general principles and conceptions; and even the particular characters and provinces, which they assign to their deities, are not extremely different.[37] The GREEK and ROMAN travellers and conquerors, without much difficulty, found their own deities every where; and said, This is MERCURY, that VENUS; this MARS, that NEPTUNE; by whatever title the strange gods might be denominated. The goddess HERTHA of our SAXON ancestors seems to be no other, according to TACITUS,[38] than the *Mater Tellus* of the ROMANS; and his conjecture was evidently just.

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SECT. VI. *Origin of Theism from Polytheism.*

The doctrine of one supreme deity, the author of nature, is very ancient, has spread itself over great and populous nations, and among them has been embraced by all ranks and conditions of men: But whoever thinks that it has owed its success to the prevalent force of those invincible reasons, on which it is undoubtedly founded, would show himself little acquainted with the ignorance and stupidity of the people, and their incurable prejudices in favour of their particular superstitions. Even at this day, and in EUROPE, ask any of the vulgar, why he believes in an omnipotent creator of the world; he will never mention the beauty of final causes, of which he is wholly ignorant: He will not hold out his hand, and bid you contemplate the suppleness and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all one way, the counterpoise which they receive from the thumb, the softness and fleshy parts of the inside of his hand, with all the other circumstances, which render that member fit for the use, to which it was destined. To these he has been long accustomed; and he beholds them with listlessness and unconcern. He will tell you of the sudden and unexpected death of such a one: The fall and bruise of such another: The excessive drought of this season: The cold and rains of another. These he ascribes to the immediate operation of providence: And such events, as, with good reasoners, are the chief difficulties in admitting a supreme intelligence, are with him the sole arguments for it.

Many theists, even the most zealous and refined, have denied a *particular* providence, and have asserted, that the Sovereign mind or first principle of all things, having fixed general laws, by which nature is governed, gives free and uninterrupted course to these laws, and disturbs not, at every turn, the settled order of events by particular volitions. From the beautiful connexion, say they, and rigid observance of established rules, we draw the chief argument for theism; and from the same principles are enabled to answer the principal objections against it. But so little is this understood by the generality of mankind, that, wherever they observe any one to ascribe all events to natural causes, and to remove the particular interposition of a deity, they are apt to suspect him of the grossest infidelity. *A little philosophy*, says lord BACON, *makes men atheists: A great deal reconciles them to religion*. For men, being taught, by superstitious prejudices, to lay the stress on a

wrong place; when that fails them, and they discover, by a little reflection, that the course of nature is regular and uniform, their whole faith totters, and falls to ruin. But being taught, by more reflection, that this very regularity and uniformity is the strongest proof of design and of a supreme intelligence, they return to that belief, which they had deserted; and they are now able to establish it on a firmer and more durable foundation.

Convulsions in nature, disorders, prodigies, miracles, though the most opposite to the plan of a wise superintendent, impress mankind with the strongest sentiments of religion; the causes of events seeming then the most unknown and unaccountable. Madness, fury, rage, and an inflamed imagination, though they sink men nearest to the level of beasts, are, for a like reason, often supposed to be the only dispositions, in which we can have any immediate communication with the Deity.

We may conclude, therefore, upon the whole, that, since the vulgar, in nations, which have embraced the doctrine of theism, still build it upon irrational and superstitious principles, they are never led into that opinion by any process of argument, but by a certain train of thinking, more suitable to their genius and capacity.

It may readily happen, in an idolatrous nation, that though men admit the existence of several limited deities, yet is there some one God, whom, in a particular manner, they make the object of their worship and adoration. They may either suppose, that, in the distribution of power and territory among the gods, their nation was subjected to the jurisdiction of that particular deity; or reducing heavenly objects to the model of things below, they may represent one god as the prince or supreme magistrate of the rest, who, though of the same nature, rules them with an authority, like that which an earthly sovereign exercises over his subjects and vassals. Whether this god, therefore, be considered as their peculiar patron, or as the general sovereign of heaven, his votaries will endeavour, by every art, to insinuate themselves into his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which will be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men's fears or distresses become more urgent, they still invent new strains of adulation; and even he who outdoes his predecessor in swelling up the titles of his divinity, is sure to be outdone by his successor in newer and more pompous epithets of praise. Thus they proceed; till at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no farther progress: And it is well, if, in striving to get farther, and to represent a magnificent simplicity, they run not into inexplicable mystery, and destroy the intelligent nature of their deity, on which alone any rational worship or adoration can be founded. While they confine themselves to the notion of a perfect being, the creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with the principles of reason and true philosophy; though they are guided to that notion, not by reason, of which they are in a great measure incapable, but by the adulation and fears of the most vulgar superstition.

We often find, amongst barbarous nations, and even sometimes amongst civilized, that, when every strain of flattery has been exhausted towards arbitrary princes, when every human quality has been applauded to the utmost; their servile courtiers represent them, at last, as real divinities, and point them out to the people as objects of adoration. How much more natural, therefore, is it, that a limited deity, who at first is supposed only the immediate author of the particular goods and ills in life, should in the end be represented as sovereign maker and modifier of the universe?

Even where this notion of a supreme deity is already established; though it ought naturally to lessen every other worship, and abase every object of reverence, yet if a nation has entertained the

opinion of a subordinate tutelar divinity, saint, or angel; their addresses to that being gradually rise upon them, and encroach on the adoration due to their supreme deity. The Virgin *Mary*, ere checked by the reformation, had proceeded, from being merely a good woman, to usurp many attributes of the Almighty: God and St. NICHOLAS go hand in hand, in all the prayers and petitions of the MUSCOVITES.

Thus the deity, who, from love, converted himself into a bull, in order to carry off EUROPA; and who, from ambition, dethroned his father, SATURN, became the OPTIMUS MAXIMUS of the heathens. Thus the deity, whom the vulgar Jews conceived only as the God of *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*, became their *Jehovah* and Creator of the world.[39]

The JACOBINS, who denied the immaculate conception, have ever been very unhappy in their doctrine, even though political reasons have kept the ROMISH church from condemning it. The CORDELIERS have run away with all the popularity. But in the fifteenth century, as we learn from BOULAINVILLIERS,[40] an ITALIAN *Cordelier* maintained, that, during the three days, when CHRIST was interred, the hypostatic union was dissolved, and that his human nature was not a proper object of adoration, during that period. Without the art of divination, one might foretel, that so gross and impious a blasphemy would not fail to be anathematized by the people. It was the occasion of great insults on the part of the JACOBINS; who now got some recompence for their misfortunes in the war about the immaculate conception.

Rather than relinquish this propensity to adulation, religionists, in all ages, have involved themselves in the greatest absurdities and contradictions.

HOMER, in one passage, calls OCEANUS and TETHYS the original parents of all things, conformably to the established mythology and tradition of the GREEKS: Yet, in other passages, he could not forbear complimenting JUPITER, the reigning deity, with that magnificent appellation; and accordingly denominates him the father of gods and men. He forgets, that every temple, every street was full of the ancestors, uncles, brothers, and sisters of this JUPITER; who was in reality nothing but an upstart parricide and usurper. A like contradiction is observable in HESIOD; and is so much the less excusable, as his professed intention was to deliver a true genealogy of the gods.

Were there a religion (and we may suspect Mahometanism of this inconsistence) which sometimes painted the Deity in the most sublime colours, as the creator of heaven and earth; sometimes degraded him so far to a level with human creatures as to represent him wrestling with a man, walking in the cool of the evening, showing his back parts, and descending from heaven to inform himself of what passes on earth;[41] while at the same time it ascribed to him suitable infirmities, passions, and partialities, of the moral kind: That religion, after it was extinct, would also be cited as an instance of those contradictions, which arise from the gross, vulgar, natural conceptions of mankind, opposed to their continual propensity, towards flattery and exaggeration. Nothing indeed would prove more strongly the divine origin of any religion, than to find (and happily this is the case with Christianity) that it is free from a contradiction, so incident to human nature.

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SECT. VII. *Confirmation of this Doctrine*.

It appears certain, that, though the original notions of the vulgar represent the Divinity as a limited being, and consider him only as the particular cause of health or sickness; plenty or want; prosperity or adversity; yet when more magnificent ideas are urged upon them, they esteem it dangerous to refuse their assent. Will you say, that your deity is finite and bounded in his perfections; may be overcome by a greater force; is subject to human passions, pains, and infirmities; has a beginning, and may have an end? This they dare not affirm; but thinking it safest to comply with the higher encomiums, they endeavour, by an affected ravishment and devotion, to ingratiate themselves with him. As a confirmation of this, we may observe, that the assent of the vulgar is, in this case, merely verbal, and that they are incapable of conceiving those sublime qualities, which they seemingly attribute to the Deity. Their real idea of him, notwithstanding their pompous language, is still as poor and frivolous as ever.

That original intelligence, say the MAGIANS, who is the first principle of all things, discovers himself *immediately* to the mind and understanding alone; but has placed the sun as his image in the visible universe; and when that bright luminary diffuses its beams over the earth and the firmament, it is a faint copy of the glory, which resides in the higher heavens. If you would escape the displeasure of this divine being, you must be careful never to set your bare foot upon the ground, nor spit into a fire, nor throw any water upon it, even though it were consuming a whole city.[42] Who can express the perfections of the Almighty? say the Mahometans. Even the noblest of his works, if compared to him, are but dust and rubbish. How much more must human conception fall short of his infinite perfections? His smile and favour renders men for ever happy; and to obtain it for your children, the best method is to cut off from them, while infants, a little bit of skin, about half the breadth of a farthing. Take two bits of cloth,[43] say the *Roman catholics,* about an inch or an inch and a half square, join them by the corners with two strings or pieces of tape about sixteen inches long, throw this over your head, and make one of the bits of cloth lie upon your breast, and the other upon your back, keeping them next your skin: There is not a better secret for recommending yourself to that infinite Being, who exists from eternity to eternity.

The GETES, commonly called immortal, from their steady belief of the soul's immortality, were genuine theists and unitarians. They affirmed ZAMOLXIS,[44] their deity, to be the only true god; and asserted the worship of all other nations to be addressed to mere fictions and chimeras. But were their religious principles any more refined, on account of these magnificent pretensions? Every fifth year they sacrificed a human victim, whom they sent as a messenger to their deity, in order to inform him of their wants and necessities. And when it thundered, they were so provoked, that, in order to return the defiance, they let fly arrows at him, and declined not the combat as unequal. Such at least is the account, which HERODOTUS gives of the theism of the immortal GETES.[45]

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SECT. VIII. *Flux and reflux of polytheism and theism.*

It is remarkable, that the principles of religion have a kind of flux and reflux in the human mind, and that men have a natural tendency to rise from idolatry to theism, and to sink again from theism into idolatry. The vulgar, that is, indeed, all mankind, a few excepted, being ignorant and uninstructed, never elevate their contemplation to the heavens, or penetrate by their disquisitions into the secret structure of vegetable or animal bodies; so far as to discover a supreme mind or original providence, which bestowed order on every part of nature. They consider these admirable works in a more confined and selfish view; and finding their own happiness and misery to depend on the secret influence and unforeseen concurrence of external objects, they regard; with perpetual attention, the *unknown causes*, which govern all these natural events, and distribute pleasure and pain, good and ill, by their powerful, but silent, operation. The unknown causes are still appealed to on every emergence; and in this general appearance or confused image, are the perpetual objects of human hopes and fears, wishes and apprehensions. By degrees, the active imagination of men, uneasy in this abstract conception of objects, about which it is incessantly employed, begins to render them more particular, and to clothe them in shapes more suitable to its natural comprehension. It represents them to be sensible, intelligent beings, like mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and sacrifices. Hence the origin of religion: And hence the origin of idolatry or polytheism.

But the same anxious concern for happiness, which begets the idea of these invisible, intelligent powers, allows not mankind to remain long in the first simple conception of them; as powerful, but limited beings; masters of human fate, but slaves to destiny and the course of nature. Men's exaggerated praises and compliments still swell their idea upon them; and elevating their deities to the utmost bounds of perfection, at last beget the attributes of unity and infinity, simplicity and spirituality. Such refined ideas, being somewhat disproportioned to vulgar comprehension, remain not long in their original purity; but require to be supported by the notion of inferior mediators or subordinate agents, which interpose between mankind and their supreme deity. These demi-gods or middle beings, partaking more of human nature, and being more familiar to us, become the

chief objects of devotion, and gradually recal that idolatry, which had been formerly banished by the ardent prayers and panegyrics of timorous and indigent mortals. But as these idolatrous religions fall every day into grosser and more vulgar conceptions, they at last destroy themselves, and, by the vile representations, which they form of their deities, make the tide turn again towards theism. But so great is the propensity, in this alternate revolution of human sentiments, to return back to idolatry, that the utmost precaution is not able effectually to prevent it. And of this, some theists, particularly the JEWS and MAHOMETANS, have been sensible; as appears by their banishing all the arts of statuary and painting, and not allowing the representations, even of human figures, to be taken by marble or colours; lest the common infirmity of mankind should thence produce idolatry. The feeble apprehensions of men cannot be satisfied with conceiving their deity as a pure spirit and perfect intelligence; and yet their natural terrors keep them from imputing to him the least shadow of limitation and imperfection. They fluctuate between these opposite sentiments. The same infirmity still drags them downwards, from an omnipotent and spiritual deity, to a limited and corporeal one, and from a corporeal and limited deity to a statue or visible representation. The same endeavour at elevation still pushes them upwards, from the statue or material image to the invisible power; and from the invisible power to an infinitely perfect deity, the creator and sovereign of the universe.

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SECT. IX. *Comparison of these Religions, with regard to Persecution and Toleration.*

Polytheism or idolatrous worship, being founded entirely in vulgar traditions, is liable to this great inconvenience, that any practice or opinion, however barbarous or corrupted, may be authorized by it; and full scope is given, for knavery to impose on credulity, till morals and humanity be expelled from[46] the religious systems of mankind. At the same time, idolatry is attended with this evident advantage, that, by limiting the powers and functions of its deities, it naturally admits the gods of other sects and nations to a share of divinity, and renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ceremonies, or traditions, compatible with each other.[47] Theism is opposite both in its advantages and disadvantages. As that system supposes one sole deity, the perfection of reason and goodness, it should, if justly prosecuted, banish every thing frivolous, unreasonable, or inhuman from religious worship, and set before men the most illustrious example, as well as the most commanding motives, of justice and benevolence. These mighty advantages are not indeed over-balanced (for that is not possible), but somewhat diminished, by inconveniencies, which arise from the vices and prejudices of mankind. While one sole object of devotion is acknowledged, the worship of other deities is regarded as absurd and impious. Nay, this unity of object seems naturally to require the unity of faith and ceremonies, and furnishes designing men with a pretence for representing their adversaries as profane, and the objects of divine as well as human vengeance. For as each sect is positive that its own faith and worship are entirely acceptable to the deity, and as no one can conceive, that the same being should be pleased with different and opposite rites and principles; the several sects fall naturally into animosity, and mutually discharge on each other that sacred zeal and rancour, the most furious and implacable of all human passions.

The tolerating spirit of idolaters, both in ancient and modern times, is very obvious to any one, who is the least conversant in the writings of historians or travellers. When the oracle of DELPHI was asked, what rites or worship was most acceptable to the gods? Those which are legally established in each city, replied the oracle.[48] Even priests, in those ages, could, it seems, allow salvation to

those of a different communion. The ROMANS commonly adopted the gods of the conquered people; and never disputed the attributes of those local and national deities, in whose territories they resided. The religious wars and persecutions of the EGYPTIAN idolaters are indeed an exception to this rule; but are accounted for by ancient authors from reasons singular and remarkable. Different species of animals were the deities of the different sects among the EGYPTIANS; and the deities being in continual war, engaged their votaries in the same contention. The worshippers of dogs could not long remain in peace with the adorers of cats or wolves.[49] But where that reason took not place, the EGYPTIAN superstition was not so incompatible as is commonly imagined; since we learn from HERODOTUS,[50] that very large contributions were given by AMASIS towards rebuilding the temple of DELPHI.

The intolerance of almost all religions, which have maintained the unity of God, is as remarkable as the contrary principle of polytheists. The implacable narrow spirit of the JEWS is well known. MAHOMETANISM set out with still more bloody principles; and even to this day, deals out damnation, though not fire and faggot, to all other sects. And if, among CHRISTIANS, the ENGLISH and DUTCH have embraced the principles of toleration, this singularity has proceeded from the steady resolution of the civil magistrate, in opposition to the continued efforts of priests and bigots.

The disciples of ZOROASTER shut the doors of heaven against all but the MAGIANS.[51] Nothing could more obstruct the progress of the PERSIAN conquests, than the furious zeal of that nation against the temples and images of the GREEKS. And after the overthrow of that empire we find ALEXANDER, as a polytheist, immediately re-establishing the worship of the BABYLONIANS, which their former princes, as monotheists, had carefully abolished.[52] Even the blind and devoted attachment of that conqueror to the GREEK superstition hindered not but he himself sacrificed according to the BABYLONISH rites and ceremonies.[53]

So sociable is polytheism, that the utmost fierceness and antipathy, which it meets with in an opposite religion, is scarcely able to disgust it, and keep it at a distance. AUGUSTUS praised extremely the reserve of his grandson, CAIUS CAESAR, when this latter prince, passing by JERUSALEM, deigned not to sacrifice according to the JEWISH law. But for what reason did AUGUSTUS so much approve of this conduct? Only, because that religion was by the PAGANS esteemed ignoble and barbarous.[54]

I may venture to affirm, that few corruptions of idolatry and polytheism are more pernicious to society than this corruption of theism,[55] when carried to the utmost height. The human sacrifices of the CARTHAGINIANS, MEXICANS, and many barbarous nations,[56] scarcely exceed the inquisition and persecutions of ROME and MADRID. For besides, that the effusion of blood may not be so great in the former case as in the latter; besides this, I say, the human victims, being chosen by lot, or by some exterior signs, affect not, in so considerable a degree, the rest of the society. Whereas virtue, knowledge, love of liberty, are the qualities, which call down the fatal vengeance of inquisitors; and when expelled, leave the society in the most shameful ignorance, corruption, and bondage. The illegal murder of one man by a tyrant is more pernicious than the death of a thousand by pestilence, famine, or any undistinguishing calamity.

In the temple of DIANA at ARICIA near ROME, whoever murdered the present priest, was legally entitled to be installed his successor.[57] A very singular institution! For, however barbarous and bloody the common superstitions often are to the laity, they usually turn to the advantage of the holy order.

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SECT. X. *With regard to courage or abasement.*

From the comparison of theism and idolatry, we may form some other observations, which will also confirm the vulgar observation, that the corruption of the best things gives rise to the worst.

Where the deity is represented as infinitely superior to mankind, this belief, though altogether just, is apt, when joined with superstitious terror, to sink the human mind into the lowest submission and abasement, and to represent the monkish virtues of mortification, penance, humility, and passive suffering, as the only qualities which are acceptable to him. But where the gods are conceived to be only a little superior to mankind, and to have been, many of them, advanced from that inferior rank, we are more at our ease in our addresses to them, and may even, without profaneness, aspire sometimes to a rivalship and emulation of them. Hence activity, spirit, courage, magnanimity, love of liberty, and all the virtues which aggrandize a people.

The heroes in paganism correspond exactly to the saints in popery and holy dervises in MAHOMETANISM. The place of HERCULES, THESEUS, HECTOR, ROMULUS, is now supplied by DOMINIC, FRANCIS, ANTHONY, and BENEDICT. Instead of the destruction of monsters, the subduing of tyrants, the defence of our native country; whippings and fastings, cowardice and humility, abject submission and slavish obedience, are become the means of obtaining celestial honours among mankind.

One great incitement to the pious ALEXANDER in his warlike expeditions was his rivalship of HERCULES and BACCHUS, whom he justly pretended to have excelled.[58] BRASIDAS, that generous and noble SPARTAN, after falling in battle, had heroic honours paid him by the inhabitants of AMPHIPOLIS, whose defence he had embraced.[59] And in general, all founders of states and colonies among the GREEKS were raised to this inferior rank of divinity, by those who reaped the benefit of their labours.

This gave rise to the observation of MACHIAVEL, that the doctrines of the CHRISTIAN religion (meaning the catholic; for he knew no other) which recommend only passive courage and

suffering, had subdued the spirit of mankind, and had fitted them for slavery and subjection. An observation, which would certainly be just, were there not many other circumstances in human society which controul the genius and character of a religion.

BRASIDAS seized a mouse, and being bit by it, let it go. *There is nothing so contemptible*, said he, *but what may be safe, if it has but courage to defend itself*.[60] BELLARMINE patiently and humbly allowed the fleas and other odious vermin to prey upon him. *We shall have heaven*, said he, *to reward us for our sufferings: But these poor creatures have nothing but the enjoyment of the present life*.[61] Such difference is there between the maxims of a GREEK hero and a CATHOLIC saint.

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SECT. XI. *With regard to reason or absurdity*.

Here is another observation to the same purpose, and a new proof that the corruption of the best things begets the worst. If we examine, without prejudice, the ancient heathen mythology, as contained in the poets, we shall not discover in it any such monstrous absurdity, as we may at first be apt to apprehend. Where is the difficulty in conceiving, that the same powers or principles, whatever they were, which formed this visible world, men and animals, produced also a species of intelligent creatures, of more refined substance and greater authority than the rest? That these creatures may be capricious, revengeful, passionate, voluptuous, is easily conceived; nor is any circumstance more apt, among ourselves, to engender such vices, than the licence of absolute authority. And in short, the whole mythological system is so natural, that, in the vast variety of planets and worlds, contained in this universe, it seems more than probable, that, somewhere or other, it is really carried into execution.

The chief objection to it with regard to this planet, is, that it is not ascertained by any just reason or authority. The ancient tradition, insisted on by heathen priests and theologers, is but a weak foundation; and transmitted also such a number of contradictory reports, supported, all of them, by equal authority, that it became absolutely impossible to fix a preference amongst them. A few volumes, therefore, must contain all the polemical writings of pagan priests: And their whole theology must consist more of traditional stories and superstitious practices than of philosophical argument and controversy.

But where theism forms the fundamental principle of any popular religion, that tenet is so conformable to sound reason, that philosophy is apt to incorporate itself with such a system of theology. And if the other dogmas of that system be contained in a sacred book, such as the Alcoran, or be determined by any visible authority, like that of the ROMAN pontiff, speculative reasoners naturally carry on their assent, and embrace a theory, which has been instilled into them by their earliest education, and which also possesses some degree of consistence and uniformity. But as these appearances are sure, all of them, to prove deceitful, philosophy will soon find herself

very unequally yoked with her new associate; and instead of regulating each principle, as they advance together, she is at every turn perverted to serve the purposes of superstition. For besides the unavoidable incoherences, which must be reconciled and adjusted; one may safely affirm, that all popular theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of appetite for absurdity and contradiction. If that theology went not beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines would appear too easy and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised: Mystery affected: Darkness and obscurity sought after: And a foundation of merit afforded to the devout votaries, who desire an opportunity of subduing their rebellious reason, by the belief of the most unintelligible sophisms.

Ecclesiastical history sufficiently confirms these reflections. When a controversy is started, some people always pretend with certainty to foretell the issue. Whichever opinion, say they, is most contrary to plain sense is sure to prevail; even where the general interest of the system requires not that decision. Though the reproach of heresy may, for some time, be bandied about among the disputants, it always rests at last on the side of reason. Any one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to know the definition of ARIAN, PELAGIAN, ERASTIAN, SOCINIAN, SABELLIAN, EUTYCHIAN, NESTORIAN, MONOTHELITE, etc. not to mention PROTESTANT, whose fate is yet uncertain, will be convinced of the truth of this observation. It is thus a system becomes more absurd in the end, merely from its being reasonable and philosophical in the beginning.

To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion by such feeble maxims as these, that *it is impossible for the same thing, to be and not to be*, that *the whole is greater than a part, that two and three make five*; is pretending to stop the ocean with a bull-rush. Will you set up profane reason against sacred mystery? No punishment is great enough for your impiety. And the same fires, which were kindled for heretics, will serve also for the destruction of philosophers.

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SECT. XII. *With regard to Doubt or Conviction.*

We meet every day with people so sceptical with regard to history, that they assert it impossible for any nation ever to believe such absurd principles as those of GREEK and EGYPTIAN paganism; and at the same time so dogmatical with regard to religion, that they think the same absurdities are to be found in no other communion. CAMBYSES entertained like prejudices; and very impiously ridiculed, and even wounded, APIS, the great god of the EGYPTIANS, who appeared to his profane senses nothing but a large spotted bull. But HERODOTUS judiciously ascribes this sally of passion to a real madness or disorder of the brain: Otherwise, says the historian, he never would have openly affronted any established worship. For on that head, continues he, every nation are best satisfied with their own, and think they have the advantage over every other nation.

It must be allowed, that the ROMAN Catholics are a very learned sect; and that no one communion, but that of the church of ENGLAND, can dispute their being the most learned of all the Christian churches: Yet AVERROES, the famous ARABIAN, who, no doubt, had heard of the EGYPTIAN superstitions, declares, that, of all religions, the most absurd and nonsensical is that, whose votaries eat, after having created, their deity.

I believe, indeed, that there is no tenet in all paganism, which would give so fair a scope to ridicule as this of the *real presence*: For it is so absurd, that it eludes the force of all argument. There are even some pleasant stories of that kind, which, though somewhat profane, are commonly told by the Catholics themselves. One day, a priest, it is said, gave inadvertently, instead of the sacrament, a counter, which had by accident fallen among the holy wafers. The communicant waited patiently for some time, expecting it would dissolve on his tongue: But finding that it still remained entire, he took it off. *I wish*, cried he to the priest, *you have not committed some mistake: I wish you have not given me God the Father: He is so hard and tough there is no swallowing him*.

A famous general, at that time in the MUSCOVITE service, having come to PARIS for the recovery of his wounds, brought along with him a young TURK, whom he had taken prisoner. Some of the doctors of the SORBONNE (who are altogether as positive as the dervises of CONSTANTINOPLE)

thinking it a pity, that the poor TURK should be damned for want of instruction, solicited MUSTAPHA very hard to turn Christian, and promised him, for his encouragement, plenty of good wine in this world, and paradise in the next. These allurements were too powerful to be resisted; and therefore, having been well instructed and catechized, he at last agreed to receive the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper. The priest, however, to make every thing sure and solid, still continued his instructions; and began the next day with the usual question, *How many Gods are there? None at all,* replies BENEDICT; for that was his new name. *How! None at all*! cries the priest. *To be sure,* said the honest proselyte. *You have told me all along that there is but one God: And yesterday I eat him*.

Such are the doctrines of our brethren the Catholics. But to these doctrines we are so accustomed, that we never wonder at them: Though in a future age, it will probably become difficult to persuade some nations, that any human, two-legged creature could ever embrace such principles. And it is a thousand to one, but these nations themselves shall have something full as absurd in their own creed, to which they will give a most implicit and most religious assent.

I lodged once at PARIS in the same *hotel* with an ambassador from TUNIS, who, having passed some years at LONDON, was returning home that way. One day I observed his MOORISH excellency diverting himself under the porch, with surveying the splendid equipages that drove along; when there chanced to pass that way some *Capucin* friars, who had never seen a TURK; as he, on his part, though accustomed to the EUROPEAN dresses, had never seen the grotesque figure of a *Capucin*: And there is no expressing the mutual admiration, with which they inspired each other. Had the chaplain of the embassy entered into a dispute with these FRANCISCANS, their reciprocal surprize had been of the same nature. Thus all mankind stand staring at one another; and there is no beating it into their heads, that the turban of the AFRICAN is not just as good or as bad a fashion as the cowl of the EUROPEAN. *He is a very honest man*, said the prince of SALLEE, speaking of de RUYTER, *It is a pity he were a Christian*.

How can you worship leeks and onions? we shall suppose a SORBONNIST to say to a priest of SAIS. If we worship them, replies the latter; at least, we do not, at the same time, eat them. But what strange objects of adoration are cats and monkies? says the learned doctor. They are at least as good as the relics or rotten bones of martyrs, answers his no less learned antagonist. Are you not mad, insists the Catholic, to cut one another's throat about the preference of a cabbage or a cucumber? Yes, says the pagan; I allow it, if you will confess, that those are still madder, who fight about the preference among volumes of sophistry, ten thousand of which are not equal in value to one cabbage or cucumber.[62]

Every by-stander will easily judge (but unfortunately the by-standers are few) that, if nothing were requisite to establish any popular system, but exposing the absurdities of other systems, every votary of every superstition could give a sufficient reason for his blind and bigotted attachment to the principles in which he has been educated. But without so extensive a knowledge, on which to ground this assurance (and perhaps, better without it), there is not wanting a sufficient stock of religious zeal and faith among mankind. DIODORUS SICULUS[63] gives a remarkable instance to this purpose, of which he was himself an eye-witness. While EGYPT lay under the greatest terror of the ROMAN name, a legionary soldier having inadvertently been guilty of the sacrilegious impiety of killing a cat, the whole people rose upon him with the utmost fury; and all the efforts of the prince were not able to save him. The senate and people of ROME, I am persuaded, would not, then, have been so delicate with regard to their national deities. They very frankly, a little after that time,

voted AUGUSTUS a place in the celestial mansions; and would have dethroned every god in heaven, for his sake, had he seemed to desire it. *Presens divus habebitur* AUGUSTUS, says HORACE. That is a very important point: And in other nations and other ages, the same circumstance has not been deemed altogether indifferent.[64]

Notwithstanding the sanctity of our holy religion, says TULLY,[65] no crime is more common with us than sacrilege: But was it ever heard of, that an EGYPTIAN violated the temple of a cat, an ibis, or a crocodile? There is no torture, an EGYPTIAN would not undergo, says the same author in another place,[66] rather than injure an ibis, an aspic, a cat, a dog, or a crocodile. Thus it is strictly true, what DRYDEN observes,

> "Of whatsoe'er descent their godhead be,
> "Stock, stone, or other homely pedigree,
> "In his defence his servants are as bold,
> "As if he had been born of beaten gold."
>
> ABSALOM and ACHITOPHEL.

Nay, the baser the materials are, of which the divinity is composed, the greater devotion is he likely to excite in the breasts of his deluded votaries. They exult in their shame, and make a merit with their deity, in braving, for his sake, all the ridicule and contumely of his enemies. Ten thousand Crusaders inlist themselves under the holy banners; and even openly triumph in those parts of their religion, which their adversaries regard as the most reproachful.

There occurs, I own, a difficulty in the EGYPTIAN system of theology; as indeed, few systems of that kind are entirely free from difficulties. It is evident, from their method of propagation, that a couple of cats, in fifty years, would stock a whole kingdom; and if that religious veneration were still paid them, it would, in twenty more, not only be easier in EGYPT to find a god than a man, which PETRONIUS says was the case in some parts of ITALY; but the gods must at last entirely starve the men, and leave themselves neither priests nor votaries remaining. It is probable, therefore, that this wise nation, the most celebrated in antiquity for prudence and sound policy, foreseeing such dangerous consequences, reserved all their worship for the full-grown divinities, and used the freedom to drown the holy spawn or little sucking gods, without any scruple or remorse. And thus the practice of warping the tenets of religion, in order to serve temporal interests, is not, by any means, to be regarded as an invention of these later ages.

The learned, philosophical VARRO, discoursing of religion, pretends not to deliver any thing beyond probabilities and appearances: Such was his good sense and moderation! But the passionate, the zealous AUGUSTIN, insults the noble ROMAN on his scepticism and reserve, and professes the most thorough belief and assurance.[67] A heathen poet, however, contemporary with the saint, absurdly esteems the religious system of the latter so false, that even the credulity of children, he says, could not engage them to believe it.[68]

Is it strange, when mistakes are so common, to find every one positive and dogmatical? And that the zeal often rises in proportion to the error? *Moverunt*, says SPARTIAN, *et ea tempestate, Judaei bellum quod vetabantur mutilare genitalia*.[69]

If ever there was a nation or a time, in which the public religion lost all authority over mankind, we might expect, that infidelity in ROME, during the CICERONIAN age, would openly have erected its throne, and that CICERO himself, in every speech and action, would have been its most declared abettor. But it appears, that, whatever sceptical liberties that great man might take, in his writings

or in philosophical conversation; he yet avoided, in the common conduct of life, the imputation of deism and profaneness. Even in his own family, and to his wife TERENTIA, whom he highly trusted, he was willing to appear a devout religionist; and there remains a letter, addressed to her, in which he seriously desires her to offer sacrifice to APOLLO and AESCULAPIUS, in gratitude for the recovery of his health.[70]

POMPEY'S devotion was much more sincere: In all his conduct, during the civil wars, he paid a great regard to auguries, dreams, and prophesies.[71] AUGUSTUS was tainted with superstition of every kind. As it is reported of MILTON, that his poetical genius never flowed with ease and abundance in the spring; so AUGUSTUS observed, that his own genius for dreaming never was so perfect during that season, nor was so much to be relied on, as during the rest of the year. That great and able emperor was also extremely uneasy, when he happened to change his shoes, and put the right foot shoe on the left foot.[72] In short it cannot be doubted, but the votaries of the established superstition of antiquity were as numerous in every state, as those of the modern religion are at present. Its influence was as universal; though it was not so great. As many people gave their assent to it; though that assent was not seemingly so strong, precise, and affirmative.

We may observe, that, notwithstanding the dogmatical, imperious style of all superstition, the conviction of the religionist, in all ages, is more affected than real, and scarcely ever approaches, in any degree, to that solid belief and persuasion, which governs us in the common affairs of life. Men dare not avow, even to their own hearts, the doubts which they entertain on such subjects: They make a merit of implicit faith; and disguise to themselves their real infidelity, by the strongest asseverations and most positive bigotry. But nature is too hard for all their endeavours, and suffers not the obscure, glimmering light, afforded in those shadowy regions, to equal the strong impressions, made by common sense and by experience. The usual course of men's conduct belies their words, and shows, that their assent in these matters is some unaccountable operation of the mind between disbelief and conviction, but approaching much nearer to the former than to the latter.

Since, therefore, the mind of man appears of so loose and unsteady a texture, that, even at present, when so many persons find an interest in continually employing on it the chissel and the hammer, yet are they not able to engrave theological tenets with any lasting impression; how much more must this have been the case in ancient times, when the retainers to the holy function were so much fewer in comparison? No wonder, that the appearances were then very inconsistent, and that men, on some occasions, might seem determined infidels, and enemies to the established religion, without being so in reality; or at least, without knowing their own minds in that particular.

Another cause, which rendered the ancient religions much looser than the modern, is, that the former were *traditional* and the latter are *scriptural*; and the tradition in the former was complex, contradictory, and, on many occasions, doubtful; so that it could not possibly be reduced to any standard and canon, or afford any determinate articles of faith. The stories of the gods were numberless like the popish legends; and though every one, almost, believed a part of these stories, yet no one could believe or know the whole: While, at the same time, all must have acknowledged, that no one part stood on a better foundation than the rest. The traditions of different cities and nations were also, on many occasions, directly opposite; and no reason could be assigned for preferring one to the other. And as there was an infinite number of stories, with regard to which tradition was nowise positive; the gradation was insensible, from the most fundamental articles of faith, to those loose and precarious fictions. The pagan religion, therefore, seemed to vanish like a

cloud, whenever one approached to it, and examined it piecemeal. It could never be ascertained by any fixed dogmas and principles. And though this did not convert the generality of mankind from so absurd a faith; for when will the people be reasonable? yet it made them faulter and hesitate more in maintaining their principles, and was even apt to produce, in certain dispositions of mind, some practices and opinions, which had the appearance of determined infidelity.

To which we may add, that the fables of the pagan religion were, of themselves, light, easy, and familiar; without devils, or seas of brimstone, or any object that could much terrify the imagination. Who could forbear smiling, when he thought of the loves of MARS and VENUS, or the amorous frolics of JUPITER and PAN? In this respect, it was a true poetical religion; if it had not rather too much levity for the graver kinds of poetry. We find that it has been adopted by modern bards; nor have these talked with greater freedom and irreverence of the gods, whom they regarded as fictions, than the ancients did of the real objects of their devotion.

The inference is by no means just, that, because a system of religion has made no deep impression on the minds of a people, it must therefore have been positively rejected by all men of common sense, and that opposite principles, in spite of the prejudices of education, were generally established by argument and reasoning. I know not, but a contrary inference may be more probable. The less importunate and assuming any species of superstition appears, the less will it provoke men's spleen and indignation, or engage them into enquiries concerning its foundation and origin. This in the mean time is obvious, that the empire of all religious faith over the understanding is wavering and uncertain, subject to every variety of humour, and dependent on the present incidents, which strike the imagination. The difference is only in the degrees. An ancient will place a stroke of impiety and one of superstition alternately, throughout a whole discourse;[73] A modern often thinks in the same way, though he may be more guarded in his expression.

LUCIAN tells us expressly,[74] that whoever believed not the most ridiculous fables of paganism was deemed by the people profane and impious. To what purpose, indeed, would that agreeable author have employed the whole force of his wit and satire against the national religion, had not that religion been generally believed by his countrymen and contemporaries?

LIVY[75] acknowledges as frankly, as any divine would at present, the common incredulity of his age; but then he condemns it as severely. And who can imagine, that a national superstition, which could delude so ingenious a man, would not also impose on the generality of the people?

The STOICS bestowed many magnificent and even impious epithets on their sage; that he alone was rich, free, a king, and equal to the immortal gods. They forgot to add, that he was not inferior in prudence and understanding to an old woman. For surely nothing can be more pitiful than the sentiments, which that sect entertained with regard to religious matters; while they seriously agree with the common augurs, that, when a raven croaks from the left, it is a good omen; but a bad one, when a rook makes a noise from the same quarter. PANAETIUS was the only STOIC, among the GREEKS, who so much as doubted with regard to auguries and divinations.[76] MARCUS ANTONINUS[77] tells us, that he himself had received many admonitions from the gods in his sleep. It is true, EPICTETUS[78] forbids us to regard the language of rooks and ravens; but it is not, that they do not speak truth: It is only, because they can foretel nothing but the breaking of our neck or the forfeiture of our estate; which are circumstances, says he, that nowise concern us. Thus the STOICS join a philosophical enthusiasm to a religious superstition. The force of their mind, being all turned to the side of morals, unbent itself in that of religion.[79]

PLATO[80] introduces SOCRATES affirming, that the accusation of impiety raised against him was owing entirely to his rejecting such fables, as those of SATURN'S castrating his father URANUS, and JUPITER'S dethroning SATURN: Yet in a subsequent dialogue,[81] SOCRATES confesses, that the doctrine of the mortality of the soul was the received opinion of the people. Is there here any contradiction? Yes, surely: But the contradiction is not in PLATO; it is in the people, whose religious principles in general are always composed of the most discordant parts; especially in an age, when superstition sate so easy and light upon them.[82]

The same CICERO, who affected, in his own family, to appear a devout religionist, makes no scruple, in a public court of judicature, of treating the doctrine of a future state as a ridiculous fable, to which no body could give any attention.[83] SALLUST[84] represents CAESAR as speaking the same language in the open senate.[85]

But that all these freedoms implied not a total and universal infidelity and scepticism amongst the people, is too apparent to be denied. Though some parts of the national religion hung loose upon the minds of men, other parts adhered more closely to them: And it was the chief business of the sceptical philosophers to show, that there was no more foundation for one than for the other. This is the artifice of COTTA in the dialogues concerning the *nature of the gods*. He refutes the whole system of mythology by leading the orthodox gradually, from the more momentous stories, which were believed, to the more frivolous, which every one ridiculed: From the gods to the goddesses; from the goddesses to the nymphs; from the nymphs to the fawns and satyrs. His master, CARNEADES, had employed the same method of reasoning.[86]

Upon the whole, the greatest and most observable differences between a *traditional, mythological* religion, and a *systematical, scholastic* one, are two: The former is often more reasonable, as consisting only of a multitude of stories, which, however groundless, imply no express absurdity and demonstrative contradiction; and sits also so easy and light on men's mind, that, though it may be as universally received, it happily makes no such deep impression on the affections and understanding.

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SECT. XIII. *Impious conceptions of the divine nature in popular religions of both kinds.*

The primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from an anxious fear of future events; and what ideas will naturally be entertained of invisible, unknown powers, while men lie under dismal apprehensions of any kind, may easily be conceived. Every image of vengeance, severity, cruelty, and malice must occur, and must augment the ghastliness and horror, which oppresses the amazed religionist. A panic having once seized the mind, the active fancy still farther multiplies the objects of terror; while that profound darkness, or, what is worse, that glimmering light, with which we are environed, represents the spectres of divinity under the most dreadful appearances imaginable. And no idea of perverse wickedness can be framed, which those terrified devotees do not readily, without scruple, apply to their deity.

This appears the natural state of religion, when surveyed in one light. But if we consider, on the other hand, that spirit of praise and eulogy, which necessarily has place in all religions, and which is the consequence of these very terrors, we must expect a quite contrary system of theology to prevail. Every virtue, every excellence, must be ascribed to the divinity, and no exaggeration will be deemed sufficient to reach those perfections, with which he is endowed. Whatever strains of panegyric can be invented, are immediately embrace, without consulting any arguments or phaenomena: It is esteemed a sufficient confirmation of them, that they give us more magnificent ideas of the divine objects of our worship and adoration.

Here therefore is a kind of contradiction between the different principles of human nature, which enter into religion. Our natural terrors present the notion of a devilish and malicious deity: Our propensity to adulation leads us to acknowledge an excellent and divine. And the influence of these opposite principles are various, according to the different situation of the human understanding.

In very barbarous and ignorant nations, such as the AFRICANS and INDIANS, nay even the JAPONESE, who can form no extensive ideas of power and knowledge, worship may be paid to a being, whom they confess to be wicked and detestable; though they may be cautious, perhaps, of

pronouncing this judgment of him in public, or in his temple, where he may be supposed to hear their reproaches.

Such rude, imperfect ideas of the Divinity adhere long to all idolaters; and it may safely be affirmed, that the GREEKS themselves never got entirely rid of them. It is remarked by XENOPHON,[87] in praise of SOCRATES, that this philosopher assented not to the vulgar opinion, which supposed the gods to know some things, and be ignorant of others: He maintained, that they knew every thing; what was done, said, or even thought. But as this was a strain of philosophy[88] much above the conception of his countrymen, we need not be surprised, if very frankly, in their books and conversation, they blamed the deities, whom they worshipped in their temples. It is observable, that HERODOTUS in particular scruples not, in many passages, to ascribe *envy* to the gods; a sentiment, of all others, the most suitable to a mean and devilish nature. The pagan hymns, however, sung in public worship, contained nothing but epithets of praise; even while the actions ascribed to the gods were the most barbarous and detestable. When TIMOTHEUS, the poet, recited a hymn to DIANA, in which he enumerated, with the greatest eulogies, all the actions and attributes of that cruel, capricious goddess: *May your daughter*, said one present, *become such as the deity whom you celebrate*.[89]

But as men farther exalt their idea of their divinity; it is their notion of his power and knowledge only, not of his goodness, which is improved. On the contrary, in proportion to the supposed extent of his science and authority, their terrors naturally augment; while they believe, that no secrecy can conceal them from his scrutiny, and that even the inmost recesses of their breast lie open before him. They must then be careful not to form expressly any sentiment of blame and disapprobation. All must be applause, ravishment, extacy. And while their gloomy apprehensions make them ascribe to him measures of conduct, which, in human creatures, would be highly blamed, they must still affect to praise and admire that conduct in the object of their devotional addresses. Thus it may safely be affirmed, that popular religions are really, in the conception of their more vulgar votaries, a species of daemonism; and the higher the deity is exalted in power and knowledge, the lower of course is he depressed in goodness and benevolence; whatever epithets of praise may be bestowed on him by his amazed adorers. Among idolaters, the words may be false, and belie the secret opinion: But among more exalted religionists, the opinion itself contracts a kind of falsehood, and belies the inward sentiment. The heart secretly defects such measures of cruel and implacable vengeance; but the judgment dares not but pronounce them perfect and adorable. And the additional misery of this inward struggle aggravates all the other terrors, by which these unhappy victims to superstition are for ever haunted.

LUCIAN[90] observes that a young man, who reads the history of the gods in HOMER or HESIOD, and finds their factions, wars, injustice, incest, adultery, and other immoralities so highly celebrated, is much surprised afterwards, when he comes into the world, to observe that punishments are by law inflicted on the same actions, which he had been taught to ascribe to superior beings. The contradiction is still perhaps stronger between the representations given us by some later religions and our natural ideas of generosity, lenity, impartiality, and justice; and in proportion to the multiplied terrors of these religions, the barbarous conceptions of the divinity are multiplied upon us.[91] Nothing can preserve untainted the genuine principles of morals in our judgment of human conduct, but the absolute necessity of these principles to the existence of society. If common conception can indulge princes in a system of ethics, somewhat different from that which should regulate private persons; how much more those superior beings, whose attributes, views, and

nature are so totally unknown to us? *Sunt superis sua jura*.[92] The gods have maxims of justice peculiar to themselves.

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SECT. XIV. *Bad influence of popular religions on morality.*

Here I cannot forbear observing a fact, which may be worth the attention of such as make human nature the object of their enquiry. It is certain, that, in every religion, however sublime the verbal definition which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries, perhaps the greatest number, will still seek the divine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfect being, but either by frivolous observances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous extasies, or by the belief of mysterious and absurd opinions. The least part of the *Sadder*, as well as of the *Pentateuch*, consists in precepts of morality; and we may also be assured, that that part was always the least observed and regarded. When the old ROMANS were attacked with a pestilence, they never ascribed their sufferings to their vices, or dreamed of repentance and amendment. They never thought, that they were the general robbers of the world, whose ambition and avarice made desolate the earth, and reduced opulent nations to want and beggary. They only created a dictator,[93] in order to drive a nail into a door; and by that means, they thought that they had sufficiently appeased their incensed deity.

In AEGINA, one faction forming a conspiracy, barbarously and treacherously assassinated seven hundred of their fellow- citizens; and carried their fury so far, that, one miserable fugitive having fled to the temple, they cut off his hands, by which he clung to the gates, and carrying him out of holy ground, immediately murdered him. *By this impiety*, says HERODOTUS,[94] (not by the other many cruel assassinations) *they offended the gods, and contracted an inexpiable guilt*.

Nay, if we should suppose, what never happens, that a popular religion were found, in which it was expressly declared, that nothing but morality could gain the divine favour; if an order of priests were instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily sermons, and with all the arts of persuasion; yet so inveterate are the people's prejudices, that, for want of some other superstition, they would make the very attendance on these sermons the essentials of religion, rather than place them in

virtue and good morals. The sublime prologue of ZALEUCUS'S laws[95] inspired not the LOCRIANS, so far as we can learn, with any sounder notions of the measures of acceptance with the deity, than were familiar to the other GREEKS.

This observation, then, holds universally: But still one may be at some loss to account for it. It is sufficient to observe, that the people, every where, degrade their deities into a similitude with themselves, and consider them merely as a species of human creatures, somewhat more potent and intelligent. This will not remove the difficulty. For there is no man so stupid, as that, judging by his natural reason, he would not esteem virtue and honesty the most valuable qualities, which any person could possess. Why not ascribe the same sentiment to his deity? Why not make all religion, or the chief part of it, to consist in these attainments?

Nor is it satisfactory to say, that the practice of morality is more difficult than that of superstition; and is therefore rejected. For, not to mention the excessive pennances of the *Brachmans* and *Talapoins*; it is certain, that the *Rhamadan* of the TURKS, during which the poor wretches, for many days, often in the hottest months of the year, and in some of the hottest climates of the world, remain without eating or drinking from the rising to the setting sun; this *Rhamadan,* I say, must be more severe than the practice of any moral duty, even to the most vicious and depraved of mankind. The four lents of the MUSCOVITES, and the austerities of some *Roman Catholics*, appear more disagreeable than meekness and benevolence. In short, all virtue, when men are reconciled to it by ever so little practice, is agreeable: All superstition is for ever odious and burthensome.

Perhaps, the following account may be received as a true solution of the difficulty. The duties, which a man performs as a friend or parent, seem merely owing to his benefactor or children; nor can he be wanting to these duties, without breaking through all the ties of nature and morality. A strong inclination may prompt him to the performance: A sentiment of order and moral obligation joins its force to these natural ties: And the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty, without any effort or endeavour. Even with regard to the virtues, which are more austere, and more founded on reflection, such as public spirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity; the moral obligation, in our apprehension, removes all pretension to religious merit; and the virtuous conduct is deemed no more than what we owe to society and to ourselves. In all this, a superstitious man finds nothing, which he has properly performed for the sake of this deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the divine favour and protection. He considers not, that the most genuine method of serving the divinity is by promoting the happiness of his creatures. He still looks out for some more immediate service of the supreme Being, in order to allay those terrors, with which he is haunted. And any practice, recommended to him, which either serves to no purpose in life, or offers the strongest violence to his natural inclinations; that practice he will the more readily embrace, on account of those very circumstances, which should make him absolutely reject it. It seems the more purely religious, because it proceeds from no mixture of any other motive or consideration. And if, for its sake, he sacrifices much of his ease and quiet, his claim of merit appear still to rise upon him, in proportion to the zeal and devotion which he discovers. In restoring a loan, or paying a debt, his divinity is nowise beholden to him; because these acts of justice are what he was bound to perform, and what many would have performed, were there no god in the universe. But if he fast a day, or give himself a sound whipping; this has a direct reference, in his opinion, to the service of God. No other motive could engage him to such austerities. By these distinguished marks of devotion, he has now acquired the divine favour; and may expect, in recompence, protection and safety in this world, and eternal happiness in the next.

Hence the greatest crimes have been found, in many instances, compatible with a superstitious piety and devotion: Hence, it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw any certain inference in favour of a man's morals from the fervour or strictness of his religious exercises, even though he himself believe them sincere. Nay, it has been observed, that enormities of the blackest dye have been rather apt to produce superstitious terrors, and encrease the religious passion. BOMILCAR, having formed a conspiracy for assassinating at once the whole senate of CARTHAGE, and invading the liberties of his country, lost the opportunity, from a continual regard to omens and prophecies. *Those who undertake the most criminal and most dangerous enterprizes are commonly the most superstitious*; as an ancient historian[96] remarks on this occasion. Their devotion and spiritual faith rise with their fears. CATILINE was not contented with the established deities, and received rites of the national religion: His anxious terrors made him seek new inventions of this kind;[97] which he never probably had dreamed of, had he remained a good citizen, and obedient to the laws of his country.

To which we may add, that, after the commission of crimes, there arise remorses and secret horrors, which give no rest to the mind, but make it have recourse to religious rites and ceremonies, as expiations of its offences. Whatever weakens or disorders the internal frame promotes the interests of superstition: And nothing is more destructive to them than a manly, steady virtue, which either preserves us from disastrous, melancholy accidents, or teaches us to bear them. During such calm sunshine of the mind, these spectres of false divinity never make their appearance. On the other hand, while we abandon ourselves to the natural undisciplined suggestions of our timid and anxious hearts, every kind of barbarity is ascribed to the supreme Being, from the terrors with which we are agitated; and every kind of caprice, from the methods which we embrace in order to appease him. *Barbarity, caprice*; these qualities, however nominally disguised, we may universally observe, form the ruling character of the deity in popular religions. Even priests, instead of correcting these depraved ideas of mankind, have often been found ready to foster and encourage them. The more tremendous the divinity is represented, the more tame and submissive do men become to his ministers: And the more unaccountable the measures of acceptance required by him, the more necessary does it become to abandon our natural reason, and yield to their ghostly guidance and direction. Thus it may be allowed, that the artifices of men aggravate our natural infirmities and follies of this kind, but never originally beget them. Their root strikes deeper into the mind, and springs from the essential and universal properties of human nature.

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SECT. XV. *General Corollary*.

Though the stupidity of men, barbarous and uninstructed, be so great, that they may not see a sovereign author in the more obvious works of nature, to which they are so much familiarized; yet it scarcely seems possible, that any one of good understanding should reject that idea, when once it is suggested to him. A purpose, an intention, a design is evident in every thing; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author. The uniform maxims too, which prevail throughout the whole frame of the universe, naturally, if not necessarily, lead us to conceive this intelligence as single and undivided, where the prejudices of education oppose not so reasonable a theory. Even the contrarieties of nature, by discovering themselves every where, become proofs of some consistent plan, and establish one single purpose or intention, however in explicable and incomprehensible.

Good and ill are universally intermingled and confounded; happiness and misery, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice. Nothing is pure and entirely of a piece. All advantages are attended with disadvantage. An universal compensation prevails in all conditions of being and existence. And it is not possible for us, by our most chimerical wishes, to form the idea of a station or situation altogether desirable. The draughts of life, according to the poet's fiction, are always mixed from the vessels on each hand of JUPITER: Or if any cup be presented altogether pure, it is drawn only, as the same poet tells us, from the left-handed vessel.

The more exquisite any good is, of which a small specimen is afforded us, the sharper is the evil, allied to it; and few exceptions are found to this uniform law of nature. The most sprightly wit borders on madness; the highest effusions of joy produce the deepest melancholy; the most ravishing pleasures are attended with the most cruel lassitude and disgust; the most flattering hopes make way for the severest disappointments. And, in general, no course of life has such safety (for happiness is not to be dreamed of) as the temperate and moderate, which maintains, as far as possible, a mediocrity, and a kind of insensibility, in every thing.

As the good, the great, the sublime, the ravishing are found eminently in the genuine principles of theism; it may be expected, from the analogy of nature, that the base, the absurd, the mean, the terrifying will be equally discovered in religious fictions and chimeras.

The universal propensity to believe in invisible, intelligent power, if not an original instinct, being at least a general attendant of human nature, may be considered as a kind of mark or stamp, which the divine workman has set upon his work; and nothing surely can more dignify mankind, than to be thus selected from all other parts of the creation, and to bear the image or impression of the universal Creator. But consult this image, as it appears in the popular religions of the world. How is the deity disfigured in our representations of him! What caprice, absurdity, and immorality are attributed to him! How much is he degraded even below the character, which we should naturally, in common life, ascribe to a man of sense and virtue!

What a noble privilege is it of human reason to attain the knowledge of the supreme Being; and, from the visible works of nature, be enabled to infer so sublime a principle as its supreme Creator? But turn the reverse of the medal. Survey most nations and most ages. Examine the religious principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the world. You will scarcely be persuaded, that they are any thing but sick men's dreams: Or perhaps will regard them more as the playsome whimsies of monkies in human shape, than the serious, positive, dogmatical asseverations of a being, who dignifies himself with the name of rational.

Hear the verbal protestations of all men: Nothing so certain as their religious tenets. Examine their lives: You will scarcely think that they repose the smallest confidence in them.

The greatest and truest zeal gives us no security against hypocrisy: The most open impiety is attended with a secret dread and compunction.

No theological absurdities so glaring that they have not, sometimes, been embraced by men of the greatest and most cultivated understanding. No religious precepts so rigorous that they have not been adopted by the most voluptuous and most abandoned of men.

***Ignorance is the mother of Devotion*: A maxim that is proverbial, and confirmed by general experience. Look out for a people, entirely destitute of religion: If you find, them at all, be assured, that they are but few degrees removed from brutes.**

What so pure as some of the morals, included in some theological system? What so corrupt as some of the practices, to which these systems give rise?

The comfortable views, exhibited by the belief or futurity, are ravishing and delightful. But how quickly vanish on the appearance of its terrors, which keep a more firm and durable possession of the human mind?

The whole is a riddle, an aenigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape, into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy.

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Notes

[2]"FRAGILIS et laboriosa mortalitas in partes ista digessit, infirmitatis suae memor, ut portionibus quisquis coleret, quo maxime indigeret." ['Frail, toiling mortality, remembering its own weakness, has divided such deities into groups, so as to worship in sections, each the deity he is most in need of.'] Pliny, *Natural History*, Bk. II, Ch. 5, Sect. 15. So early as HESIOD'S time there were 30,000 deities. *Works and Days*, Bk. I, Line 250. But the task to be performed by these seems still too great for their number. The provinces of the deities were so subdivided, that there was even a God of *Sneezing*. See ARISTOTLE, *Problems*, Bk. 33, Ch. 7 and 9. The province of copulation, suitably to the importance and dignity of it, was divided among several deities.

[3]*Roman Antiquities*, Bk. VIII, Ch. 2, Sect. 2.

[4]The following lines of EURIPIDES are so much to the present purpose, that I cannot forbear quoting them: [Greek Quote]

HUCUBA, Lines 956 ff. "There is nothing secure in the world; no glory, no prosperity. The gods toss all life into confusion; mix every thing with its reverse; that all of us, from our ignorance and uncertainty, may pay them the more worship and reverence."

[5]Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Bk. III, Ch. 47, Sect. 1.

[6]*Geography*, Bk. VII, Ch. 4.

[7]Pere* le Comte, *Memoires and Observations... made in a late Journey Through the Empire of China*.

[8]Jean-Francois Regnard, *Voiage* de Lapponie*.

[9]Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Bk. I, Ch. 86, Sect. 3. Lucian, "On Sacrifices," Sect. 14. Ovid alludes to the same tradition, *Metamorphoses*, Bk. V, Line 321 ff. So also Manilius, *Astronomica*, Bk. IV, Lines 580 and 800.

[10]Herodotus, *History*, Bk. I, Ch. 172.

[11]Caesar, *Gallic War*, Bk. IV, Sect. 7.

[12]Homer, *Illiad*, Bk. V, Line 382.

[13]*On the Sublime*, Ch. IX, Sect. 7.

[14]Pere Brumoy, *Theatre* des Grecs*, Bernard de Fontenelle, *Histoire des Oracles*.

[15]Arnobius, *Seven Books Against the Heathen*, Bk. VII, Ch. 33.

[16]*Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, Ch. 13, Sect. 2-5.

[17]*Moral Letters*, letter 41.

[18]Quintus Curtius Rufus, *History of Alexander*, Bk. IV, Ch. 3, Sect. 22. Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Bk. XVII, Ch. 41, Sect. 8.

[19]Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars*, Bk. II, "The Deified Augustus," Ch. 5.

[20]Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars*, Bk. IV, "Gaius Caligula," Ch. 5.

[21]Herodotus, *History*, Bk. II, Ch. 53. Lucian, "Zeus Catechized," Sect. 1; "On Funerals," Sect. 2.

[22][Greek quote] ['How from one seed spring gods and mortal men.'] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, Line 108.

[23]Hesiod, *Theogony*, Line 570.

[24]*Metamorphoses*, Bk. I, Line 32.

[25]*Library of History*, Bk. I, Ch. 6-7.

[26]Ibid., Bk. III, Ch. 20.

[27]The same author, who can thus account for the origin of the world without a Deity, esteems it impious to explain from physical causes, the common accidents of life, earthquakes, inundations, and tempests: and devoutly ascribes these to the anger of JUPITER or NEPTUNE. A plain proof, whence he derived his ideas of religion. Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Bk. XV, Ch. 48.

[28]It will be easy to give a reason, why THALES, ANAXIMANDER, and those early philosophers, who really were atheists, might be very orthodox in the pagan creed; and why ANAXAGORAS and SOCRATES, though real theists, must naturally, in ancient times, be esteemed impious. The blind, unguided powers of nature, if they could produce men, might also produce such beings as JUPITER and NEPTUNE, who being the most powerful, intelligent existences in the world, would be proper objects of worship. But where a supreme intelligence, the first cause of all, is admitted, these capricious beings, if they exist at all, must appear very subordinate and dependent, and

consequently be excluded from the rank of deities. PLATO (*Laws*, Bk. X, 886) assigns this reason for the imputation thrown on ANAXAGORAS, namely his denying the divinity of the stars, planets, and other created objects.

[29]*Against the Physicists*, Bk. II, Sect. 18-19.

[30]Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities*, Bk. VI, Ch. 54.

[31]Pliny, *Letters*, Bk. VI, Letter 20, Sect. 14-15.

[32]Hesiod, *Theogony*, Line 933 ff.

[33]Ibid. Plutarch, *Lives*, "Pelopidas," Ch. 19.

[34]Homer, *Illiad*, Bk. XIV, Line 264 ff.

[35]Herodian, *History of the Empire*, Bk. V, Ch. 3, Sect. 3-5. JUPITER AMMON is represented by CURTIUS as a deity of the same kind (*History of Alexander*, Bk. IV, Ch. 7, Sect. 23). The ARABIANS and PERSINUNTIANS adored also shapeless unformed stones as their deity (Arnobius, *Seven Books Against the Heathen*, Bk. VI., Ch. 11). So much did their folly exceed that of the EGYPTIANS.

[36]Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Bk. II, Ch. 11, "Stilpo," Sect. 116.

[37]See CAESAR of the religion of the GAULS, *The Gallic War*, Bk. VI, Sect. 17.

[38]*Germany*, Ch. 40.

[39][This sentence is as it originally appeared in Hume's *Five Dissertations* which was printed but never distributed because of political pressures. For prudential reasons Hume rephrased this sentence which, in the first three distributed editions, reads, "Thus, notwithstanding the sublime ideas suggested by *Moses* and the inspired writers, many vulgar *Jews* seem still to have conceived the supreme Being as a mere topical deity or national protector." In the six succeeding editions of the Natural History the sentence appears again changed: "Thus, the God of ABRAHAM, ISAAC, and JACOB, became the supreme deity of JEHOVAH of the JEWS."]

[40]Compte Henri de Boulainvilliers, *Abrege* Chronologique de l'histore de France*, 499.

[41][The preceding portion of this sentence (beginning with "sometimes degraded...") is as it originally appeared in *Five Dissertations*. All nine distributed editions of the *Natural History* read in its place, "sometimes degraded him nearly to a level with human creatures in his powers and faculties."]

[42]Thomas Hyde, *Historia religionis veterum Persarum.*

[43]Called the Scapulaire.

[44]Herodotus, *History*, Bk. IV, Ch. 95, 96.

[45]Ibid., Ch. 94.

[46][The word "from" appears here in the first seven editions of the *Natural History*.]

[47]VERRIUS FLACCUS, cited by PLINY (*Natural History*, Bk. XXVIII, Ch. 4, Sect. 18-19), affirmed, that it was usual for the ROMANS, before they laid siege to any town, to invocate the tutelar deity of the place, and by promising him greater honours than those he at present enjoyed, bribe him to betray his old friends and votaries. The name of the tutelar deity of ROME was for this reason kept a most religious mystery; lest the enemies of the republic should be able, in the same manner, to draw him over to their service. For without the name, they thought, nothing of that kind could

be practised. PLINY says, that the common form of invocation was preserved to his time in the ritual of the pontifs. And MACROBIUS has transmitted a copy of it from the secret things of SAMMONICUS SERENUS.

[48]Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, Bk. I, Ch. 3, Sect. 1.

[49]Plutarch, *Moralia*, Bk. V, "Isis and Osiris," Ch. 72.

[50]Herodotus, *History*, Bk. II, Ch. 180.

[51]Thomas Hyde, *Historia religionis veterum Persarum.*

[52]Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander*, Bk. III, Ch. 16, Sect. 3-9, and Bk. VII, Ch. 17.

[53]Ibid., Bk. III, Ch. 16, Sect. 5.

[54]Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars*, Bk. II, "The Deified Augustus," Ch. 93.

[55]Corruptio optimi pessima.

[56]MOST nations have fallen into this guilt of human sacrifices; though, perhaps, that impious superstition has never prevailed very much in any civilized nation, unless we except the CARTHAGINIANS. For the TYRIANS soon abolished it. A sacrifice is conceived as a present; and any present is delivered to their deity by destroying it and rendering it useless to men; by burning what is solid, pouring out the liquid, and killing the animate. For want of a better way of doing him service, we do ourselves an injury; and fancy that we thereby express, at least, the heartiness of our good-will and adoration. Thus our mercenary devotion deceives ourselves, and imagines it deceives the deity.

[57]Strabo, *Geography*, Bk. V, Ch. 3, Sect. 12; Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars*, Bk. IV, "Gaius Caligula," Ch. 35, Sect. 3.

[58]Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander*, Bk. IV, Ch. 28, Sect. 4; Bk. V, Ch. 26, Sect. 5.

[59]Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, Bk. V, Ch. 11.

[60]Plutarch, *Moralia*, Bk. III, "Sayings of Kings and Commanders," Brasidas, Sect. 190b.

[61]Pierre Bayle, *Dictionary Historical and Critical*, (London: 1734-41), article on Bellarmine.

[62]It is strange that the EGYPTIAN religion, though so absurd, should yet have borne so great a resemblance to the JEWISH, that ancient writers even of the greatest genius were not able to observe any difference between them. For it is remarkable that both TACITUS, and SUETONIUS, when they mention that decree of the senate, under TIBERIUS, by which the EGYPTIAN and JEWISH proselytes were banished from ROME, expressly treat these religions as the same; and it appears, that even the decree itself was founded on that supposition. "Actum et de sacris AEGYPTIIS, JUDAICISQUE pellendis; factumque patrum consultum, ut quatuor millia libertini generis *ea superstitione* infecta, quis idonea aetas, in insulam Sardiniam veherentur, coercendis illic latrociniis; et si ob gravitatem coeli interissent, *vile damnum*: Ceteri cederent ITALIA, nisi certam ante diem profanos ritus exuissent." ['Another debate dealt with the proscription of the Egyptian and Jewish rites, and a senatorial edict directed that four thousand descendants of enfranchised slaves, tainted with that superstition and suitable in point of age, were to be shipped to Sardinia and there employed in suppressing brigandage: if they succumbed to the pestilential climate, it was a cheap loss. The rest had orders to leave Italy, unless they had renounced their impious ceremonial by a given date.'] Tacitus, *Annals*, Bk. II, Ch. 85. "Externas caeremonias, AEGYPTIOS,

JUDAICOSQUE ritus compescuit; coactus qui *superstitione ea* tenebantur, religiosas vestes cum instrumento omni comburere, etc." ['He abolished foreign cults, especially the Egyptian and the Jewish rites, compelling all who were addicted to such superstitions to burn their religious vestments and all their paraphernalia.'] Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars*, Bk. III, "Tiberius," Ch. 36. These wise heathens, observing something in the general air, and genius, and spirit of the two religions to be the same, esteemed the differences of their dogmas too frivolous to deserve any attention.

[63]Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Bk. I, Ch. 83, Sect. 8-9.

[64]When LOUIS the XIVth took on himself the protection of the Jesuits' College of CLERMONT, the society ordered the king's arms to be put up over the gate, and took down the cross, in order to make way for it: Which gave occasion to the following epigram: Sustulit hinc Christi, posuitque insignia Regis: Impia gens, alium nescit habere Deum.

[65]*On the Nature of the Gods*, Bk. I, Ch. 29, Sect. 82.

[66]Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, Bk. V, Ch. 27, Sect. 78.

[67]Augustine, *City of God*, Bk. VII, Ch. 17.

[68]Claudius Rutilius Namatianus, *A Voyage Home to Gaul*, Bk. I, Lines 387-398.

[69]Aelius Spartianus, "Life of Hadrian," Bk. XIV, Sect. 2.

[70]Cicero, *Letters to his Friends*, Bk. XIV, Letter 7, Sect. 1.

[71]Cicero, "On Divination," Bk. II, Ch. 24.

[72]Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars*, Bk. II, "The Deified Augustus," Ch. 90-92. Pliny, *Natural History*, Bk. II, Ch. 5, Sect. 24-25.

[73]Witness this remarkable passage of TACITUS: "Praeter multiplices rerum humanarum casus, coelo terraque prodigia, et fulminum monitus et futurorum praesagia, laeta, tristia, ambigua, manifesta. Nec enim unquam atrocioribus populi Romani cladibus, magique justis Judiciis approbatum est, non esse curae Diis securitatem nostram, esse ultionem." *History*, Bk. I, Ch. 3. AUGUSTUS'S quarrel with NEPTUNE is an instance of the same kind. Had not the emperor believed NEPTUNE to be a real being, and to have dominion over the sea, where had been the foundation of his anger? And if he believed it, what madness to provoke still farther that deity? The same observation may be made upon QUINTILIAN'S exclamation, on account of the death of his children. *Institutio Oratoria*, Bk. VI, Preface, Sect. 10.

[74]"The Lover of Lies," Sect. 3.

[75]*From the Founding of the City*, Bk. X, Ch. 40.

[76]Cicero, "On Divination," Bk. I, Ch. 3, 7.

[77]Marcus Aurelius Antonius, *Meditations*, Bk. I, Ch. 17, Sect. 8.

[78]*Enchiridion*, Sect. 18.

[79]The Stoics, I own, were not quite orthodox in the established religion; but one may see, from these instances, that they went a great way: And the people undoubtedly went every length.

[80]Plato, *Euthyphro*, 5d-6b.

[81]Plato, *Phaedo*, 80d-e.

[82]XENOPHON'S conduct, as related by himself, is, at once, an incontestable proof of the general credulity of mankind in those ages, and the incoherencies, in all ages, of men's opinions in religious matters. That great captain and philosopher, the disciple of SOCRATES, and one who has delivered some of the most refined sentiments with regard to a deity, gave all the following marks of vulgar, pagan superstition. By SOCRATES'S advice, he consulted the oracle of DELPHI, before he would engage in the expedition of CYRUS (*Anabasis*, Bk. III, Ch. I, Sect. 5). Sees a dream the night after the generals were seized; which he pays great regard to, but thinks ambiguous (ibid., Sect. 11-14). He and the whole army regard sneezing as a very lucky omen (ibid., Ch. 2, Sect. 9). Has another dream, when he comes to the river CENTRITES, which his fellow-general, CHIROSOPHUS, also pays great regard to (ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. 3, Sect. 9). The GREEKS, suffering from a cold north wind, sacrifice to it; and the historian observes, that it immediately abated (ibid., Ch. 5, Sect. 3, 4). XENOPHON consults the sacrifices in secret, before he would form any resolution with himself about settling a colony (ibid., Bk. V, Ch. 6, Sect. 17). He was himself a very skilful augur (ibid., Sect. 29). Is determined by the victims to refuse the sole command of the army which was offered him (ibid., Bk. VI, Ch. 1, Sect. 22-24). CLEANDER, the SPARTAN, though very desirous of it, refuses it for the same reason (ibid., Ch. 6, Sect. 36). XENOPHON mentions an old dream with the interpretation given him, when he first joined CYRUS (ibid., Ch. 1, Sect. 22-23). Mentions also the place of HERCULES'S descent into hell as believing it, and says the marks of it are still remaining (ibid., Ch. 2, Sect. 2). Had almost starved the army, rather than lead them to the field against the auspices (ibid., Ch. 4, Sect. 12-23). His friend, EUCLIDES, the augur, would not believe that he had brought no money from the expedition; till he (EUCLIDES) sacrificed, and then he saw the matter clearly in the Exta (ibid., Bk. 7, Ch. 8, Sect. 1-3). The same philosopher, proposing a project of mines for the encrease of the ATHENIAN revenues, advises them first to consult the oracle ("Ways and Means," Ch. 6, Sect. 2). That all this devotion was not a farce, in order to serve a political purpose, appears both from the facts themselves, and from the genius of that age, when little or nothing could be gained by hypocrisy. Besides, XENOPHON, as appears from his Memorabilia, was a kind of heretic in those times, which no political devotee ever is. It is for the same reason, I maintain, that NEWTON, LOCKE, CLARKE, etc. being *Arians* or *Socinians*, were very sincere in the creed they professed: And I always oppose this argument to some libertines, who will needs have it, that it was impossible but that these philosophers must have been hypocrites.

[83]Cicero, "In Defense of Cluentius," Ch. 61, Sect. 171.

[84]*The War with Catiline*, Ch. 51, Sect. 16-20.

[85]CICERO (*Tusculan Disputations*, Bk. I, Ch. 5-6) and SENECA (Letter 24), as also Juvenal (Satire 2, Line 149 ff.), maintain that there is no boy or old woman so ridiculous as to believe the poets in their accounts of a future state. Why then does LUCRETIUS so highly exalt his master for freeing us from these terrors? Perhaps the generality of mankind were then in the disposition of CEPHALUS in PLATO (*Republic*, Bk. I, 330d-e) who while he was young and healthful could ridicule these stories; but as soon as he became old and infirm, began to entertain apprehensions of their truth. This we may observe not to be unusual even at present.

[86]Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Physicists*, Bk. I, Sect. 182-90.

[87]Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, Bk. I, Ch. 1, Sect. 19.

[88]It was considered among the ancients, as a very extraordinary, philosophical paradox, that the presence of the gods was not confined to the heavens, but were extended every where; as we learn

from LUCIAN ("Hirmotimus," Sect. 81).

[89]Plutarch, *Moralia*, Bk. II, "Superstition," Ch. 10, 170a-b.

[90]Lucian, "Menippus," Sect. 3.

[91]BACCHUS, a divine being, is represented by the heathen mythology as the inventor of dancing and the theatre. Plays were anciently even a part of public worship on the most solemn occasions, and often employed in times of pestilence, to appease the offended deities. But they have been zealously proscribed by the godly in later ages; and the playhouse, according to a learned divine, is the porch of hell.

But in order to show more evidently, that it is possible for a religion to represent the divinity in still a more immoral and unamiable light than he was pictured by the ancients, we shall cite a long passage from an author of taste and imagination, who was surely no enemy to Christianity. It is the Chevalier RAMSAY, a writer, who had so laudable an inclination to be orthodox, that his reason never found any difficulty, even in the doctrines which free-thinkers scruple the most, the trinity, incarnation, and satisfaction: His humanity alone, of which he seems to have had a great stock, rebelled against the doctrines of eternal reprobation and predestination. He expresses himself thus: "What strange ideas," says he, would an Indian or a Chinese philosopher have of our holy religion, if they judged by the schemes given of it by our modern freethinkers, and pharisaical doctors of all sects? According to the odious and too *vulgar* system of these incredulous scoffers and credulous scribblers, "The God of the Jews is a most cruel, unjust, partial, and fantastical being. He created, about 6000 years ago, a man and a woman, and placed them in a fine garden of ASIA, of which there are no remains. This garden was furnished with all sorts of trees, fountains, and flowers. He allowed them the use of all the fruits of this beautiful garden, except one, that was planted in the midst thereof, and that had in it a secret virtue of preserving them in continual health and vigour of body and mind, of exalting their natural powers and making them wise. The devil entered into the body of a serpent, and solicited the first woman to eat of this forbidden fruit; she engaged her husband to do the same. To punish this slight curiosity and natural desire of life and knowledge, God not only threw our first parents out of paradise, but he condemned all their posterity to temporal misery, and the greatest part of them to eternal pains, though the souls of these innocent children have no more relation to that of ADAM than to those of NERO and MAHOMET; since, according to the scholastic drivellers, fabulists, and mythologists, all souls are created pure, and infused immediately into mortal bodies, so soon as the foetus is formed. To accomplish the barbarous, partial decree of predestination and reprobation, God abandoned all nations to darkness, idolatry, and superstition, without any saving knowledge or salutary graces; unless it was one particular nation, whom he chose as his peculiar people. This chosen nation was, however, the most stupid, ungrateful, rebellious and persidious of all nations. After God had thus kept the far greater part of all the human species, during near 4000 years, in a reprobate state, he changed all of a sudden, and took a fancy for other nations beside the JEWS. Then he sent his only begotten Son to the world, under a human form, to appease his wrath, satisfy his vindictive justice, and die for the pardon of sin. Very few nations, however, have heard of this gospel; and all the rest, though left in invincible ignorance, are damned without exception, or any possibility of remission. The greatest part of those who have heard of it, have changed only some speculative notions about God, and some external forms in worship: For, in other respects, the bulk of Christians have continued as corrupt as the rest of mankind in their morals; yea, so much the more perverse and criminal, that their lights were greater. Unless it be a very small select number, all other Christians, like the

pagans, will be for ever damned; the great sacrifice offered up for them will become void and of no effect; God will take delight for ever, in their torments and blasphemies; and though he can, by one *fiat* change their hearts, yet they will remain for ever unconverted and unconvertible, because he will be for ever unappeasable and irreconcileable. It is true, that all this makes God odious, a hater of souls, rather than a lover of them; a cruel, vindictive tyrant, an impotent or a wrathful daemon, rather than an all-powerful, beneficent father of spirits: Yet all this is a mystery. He has secret reasons for his conduct, that are impenetrable; and though he appears unjust and barbarous, yet we must believe the contrary, because what is injustice, crime, cruelty, and the blackest malice in us, is in him justice, mercy, and sovereign goodness." Thus the incredulous free-thinkers, the judaizing Christians, and the fatalistic doctors have disfigured and dishonoured the sublime mysteries of our holy faith; thus they have confounded the nature of good and evil; transformed the most monstrous passions into divine attributes, and surpassed the pagans in blasphemy, by ascribing to the eternal nature, as perfections, what makes the most horrid crimes amongst men. The grosser pagans contented themselves with divinizing lust, incest, and adultery; but the predestinarian doctors have divinized cruelty, wrath, fury, vengeance, and all the blackest vices. See the Chevalier RAMSAY'S *Philosophical principles of natural and revealed religion*, Part II, p. 401.

The same author asserts, in other places, that the *Arminian* and *Molinist* schemes serve very little to mend the matter: And having thus thrown himself out of all received sects of Christianity, he is obliged to advance a system of his own, which is a kind of *Origenism*, and supposes the pre-existence of the souls both of men and beasts, and the eternal salvation and conversion of all men, beasts, and devils. But this notion, being quite peculiar to himself, we need not treat of. I thought the opinions of this ingenious author very curious; but I pretend not to warrant the justness of them.

[92] Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, Bk. IX, Line 500.

[93] Called Dictator clavis figendae causa. Livy, *From the Founding of the City*, Bk. VII, Ch. 3, Sect. 3.

[94] Herodotus, *History*, Bk. VI, Ch. 91.

[95] To be found in Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Bk. XII, Ch. 20-21.

[96] Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, Bk. XX, Ch. 43.

[97] Cicero, "First Speech Against Catiline;" Sallust, *The War with Catiline*, Ch. 22.

My Own Life

David Hume

1777

2/10/96

Editor's note: Anticipating his death, Hume wrote *My Own Life* in April 1776 for inclusion in the next edition of his *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*. His instructions are given in letter to Adam Smith: "You will find among my Pap ers a very inoffensive Piece, called *My own Life*, which I composed a few days before I left Edinburgh, which I thought, as did all my Friends, that my Life was despaired of. There can be no Objection, that this small piece should be sent to Messrs Strahan and Cadell and the Proprietors of my other Works to be prefixed to any future Edition of them" (*Letters*, Greig, Vol. 2, p. 318). In March of 1777, Hume's *Life* and Smith's *Letter from Adam Smith, LL.D. to William Strahan, Esq.* (the latter of which describes the last four months of Hume's life) were published under the title *The Life of David Hume, Esq. written by himself*. The pamphlet is prefaced with the following note by the editor:

> **MR HUME, a few months before his death, wrote the following short account of his own life; and, in a codicil to his will, desired that it might be prefixed to the next edition of his Works. That edition cannot be published for a considerable time. The Editor, in the mean while, in order to serve the purchasers of the former editions; and, at the same time, to gratify the impatience of the public curiosity; has thought proper to publish it separately, without alter ing even the title or superscription, which was written in Mr. Hume's own hand on the cover of the manuscript.**

In spite of the editor's claim of not altering Hume's piece, liberties were taken with spelling, punctuation and minor wording. This is evident from a comparison with the original manuscript of Hume's *Life* which is in the Royal Society of Edinburgh (reprinted in Greig, Vol. 1, pp. 1-7). A pre-print of the Hume's *Life* and Smith's *Letter* appeared in *The Scots Magazine*, January 1777, Vol. 39, pp. 1-7. The *Scots Magazine* version is evidently based on the text of the publishe d 1777 pamphlet, rather than the manuscript; for, although it departs slightly in punctuation, it retains the altered wording found in the 1777 pamphlet. Contrary to Hume's wishes, his *Life* was not included in the subsequent edition of his *Essay s and Treatises on Several Subjects*. The reviews of

Hume's *Life* reproduced almost the complete text of Hume's autobiography within their reviews. The *Critical Review* concludes noting that "The whole of this narrative breathes ingenuousne ss, and a noble consciousness of integrity, not without that solicitude of literary, as well as moral fame, which we may suppose to have animated a writer, so distinguished, from his earliest years, for his ardor in the pursuits of philosophy and general learning" (1777, Vol. 43, pp. 222-227). The *London Review* relates that Hume held at sword's point the editor of *The History of the Works of the Learned* for their 1740 review of the *Treatise* (see editor's note to the Hume Archives edit ion of the review of the *Treatise*). The reviewer also expresses surprise that Hume fails to mention Beattie's *Essay* since, "It were difficult to speak of this work with more contempt than, we are well assured, Mr. Hume entertained of it." Ot her published reactions to Hume's *Life* quickly appeared, many of which were negative. Although most of the negative reaction was aimed at Smith's *Letter* (see editor's not to the Hume Archives edition of Smith's *Letter*), criticism was also directed at Hume's essay. For example, an anonymous author comments in the *Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Amusement* (Vol. 36, 364-365) that, "Though I am in some degree an admirer of Mr. Hume's character and of his writings, yet I am sorry to s ee that little biographical account of himself imposed on the public." The author sees the work as having "an obvious, although, perhaps, an undesigned tendency" to subvert a person's "future and eternal welfare." The author concludes that the Life is "a dry, unsatisfactory narrative; as little answering its title as the expectation of the public." Hume's *Life* was published again in 1777, 1778, and in several 19th century editions of his collected works. The following is from the first 1777 edition .

MY OWN LIFE

IT Is difficult for a man to speak long of himself without Vanity; therefore, I shall be short. It may be thought an instance of vanity that I pretend at all to write my life; but this Narrative shall contain little more than the History of my Writin gs; as, indeed, almost all my life has been spent in Literary pursuits and occupations. The first success of most of my writings was not such as to be an object of vanity.

I was born the 26th of April 1711, old style, at Edinburgh. I was of a good family, both by father and mother: my father's family is a branch of the Earl of Home's, or Hume's; and my ancestors had been proprietors of the estate, which my brother poss esses, for several generations. My mother was daughter of Sir David Falconer, President of the College of Justice: the title of Lord Halkerton came by succession to her brother.

My family, however, was not rich, and being myself a younger brother, my patrimony, according to the mode of my country, was of course very slender. My father, who passed for a man of parts, died when I was an infant, leaving me, with an elder brothe r and a sister, under the care of our mother, a woman of singular merit, who, though young and handsome, devoted herself entirely to the rearing and educating of her children. I passed through the ordinary course of education with success, and was seized very early with a passion for literature, which has been the ruling passion of my life, and the great source of my enjoyments. My studious disposition, my sobriety, and my industry, gave my family a notion that the law was a proper profession for me; but I found an unsurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning; and while they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I was secretly devouring.

My very slender fortune, however, being unsuitable to this plan of life, and my health being a little broken by my ardent application, I was tempted, or rather forced, to make a very feeble trial for entering into a more active scene of life. In 1734 , I went to Bristol, with some recommendations to eminent merchants, but in a few months found that scene totally unsuitable to me. I went over to France, with a view of prosecuting my studies in a country retreat; and I there laid that plan of life, whic h I have steadily and successfully pursued. I resolved to make a very rigid frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to maintain unimpaired my independency, and to regard every object as contemptible, except the improvement of my talents in literature.

During my retreat in France, first at Reims, but chiefly at La Fleche, in Anjou, I composed my *Treatise of Human Nature*. After passing three years very agreeably in that country, I came over to London in 1737. In the end of 1738, I published m y Treatise, and immediately went down to my mother and my brother, who lived at his country-house, and was employing himself very judiciously and successfully in the improvement of his fortune.

Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell *dead-born from the press*, without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the zealots. But being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine tem per, I very soon recovered the blow, and prosecuted with great ardor my studies in the country. In 1742, I printed at Edinburgh the first part of my Essays the world was favourably received, and soon made me entirely forget my former disappointment. I con tinued with my mother and brother in the country, and in that time recovered the knowledge of the Greek language, which I had too much neglected in my early youth.

In 1745, I received a letter from the Marquis of Annandale, inviting me to come and live with him in England; I found also, that the friends and family of that young noble man were desirous of putting him under my care and direction, for the state of his mind and health required it. I lived with him a twelvemonth. My appointments during that time made a considerable accession to my small fortune. I then received an invitation from General St. Clair to attend him as a secretary to his expedition, whic h was at first meant against Canada, but ended in an incursion on the coast of France. Next year, to wit, 1747, I received an invitation from the General to attend him in the same station in his military embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin. I then w ore the uniform of an officer, and was introduced at these courts as aid-de-camp to the general, along with Sir Harry Erskine and Captain Grant, now General Grant. These two years were almost the only interruptions which my studies have received during th e course of my life: I passed them agreeably, and in good company; and my appointments, with my frugality, had made me reach a fortune, which I called independent, though most of my friends were inclined to smile when I said so; in short, I was now master of near a thousand pounds.

I had always entertained a notion, that my want of success in publishing the Treatise of Human Nature, had proceeded more from the manner than the matter, and that I had been guilty of a very usual indiscretion, in going to the press too early. I, th erefore, cast the first part of that work anew in The Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, which was published while I was at Turin. But this piece was at first little more successful than the Treatise of Human Nature. On my return from Italy, I had th e mortification to find all England in a ferment, on account of Dr. Middleton's Free Enquiry, while my performance was entirely overlooked and neglected. A new edition, which had been published at London of my Essays, moral and political, met not with a m uch better reception.

Such is the force of natural temper, that these disappointments made little or no impression on me.

I went down in 1749, and lived two years with my brother at his country house, for my mother was now dead. I there composed the second part of my Essa ys, which I called Political Discourses, and also my Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, which is another part of my treatise that I cast anew. Meanwhile, my bookseller, A. Millar, informed me, that my former publications (all but the unfortunate Treatise) were beginning to be the subject of conversation; that the sale of them was gradually increasing, and that new editions were demanded. Answers by Reverends, and Right Reverends, came out two or three in a year; and I found, by Dr. Warburton's r ailing, that the books were beginning to be esteemed in good company. However, I had fixed a resolution, which I inflexibly maintained, never to reply to any body; and not being very irascible in my temper, I have easily kept myself clear of all literary squabbles. These symptoms of a rising reputation gave me encouragement, as I was ever more disposed to see the favourable than unfavourable side of things; a turn of mind which it is more happy to possess, than to be born to an estate of ten thousand a ye ar.

In 1751, I removed from the country to the town, the true scene for a man of letters. In 1752, were published at Edinburgh, where I then lived, my Political Discourses, the only work of mine that was successful on the first publication. It was well r eceived abroad and at home. In the same year was published at London, my Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals; which, in my own opinion (who ought not to judge on that subject), is of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incompa rably the best. It came unnoticed and unobserved into the world.

In 1752, the Faculty of Advocates chose me their Librarian, an office from which I received little or no emolument, but which gave me the command of a large library. I then formed the plan of writing the History of England; but being frightened with the notion of continuing a narrative through a period of 1700 years, I commenced with the accession of the House of Stuart, an epoch when, I thought, the misrepresentations of faction began chiefly to take place. I was, I own, sanguine in my expectations of the success of this work. I thought that I was the only historian, that had at once neglected present power, interest, and authority, and the cry of popular prejudices; and as the subject was suited to every capacity, I expected proportional applause. But miserable was my disappointment: I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even detestation; English, Scotch, and Irish, Whig and Tory, churchman and sectary, freethinker and religionist, patriot and courtier, united in their rage aga inst the man, who had presumed to shed a generous tear for the fate of Charles I. and the Earl of Strafford; and after the first ebullitions of their fury were over, what was still more mortifying, the book seemed to sink into oblivion. Mr. Millar told me , that in a twelve-month he sold only forty-five copies of it. I scarcely, indeed, heard of one man in the three kingdoms, considerable for rank or letters, that could endure the book. I must only except the primate of England, Dr. Herring, and the primat e of Ireland, Dr. Stone, which seem two odd exceptions. These dignified prelates separately sent me messages not to be discouraged.

I was, however, I confess, discouraged; and had not the war been at that time breaking out between France and England, I had certainly retired to some provincial town of the former kingdom, have changed my name, and never more have returned to my nat ive country. But as this scheme was not now practicable, and the subsequent volume was considerably advanced, I resolved to pick up courage and to persevere.

In this interval, I published at London my Natural History of Religion, along with some other small pieces: its public entry was rather obscure, except only that Dr. Hurd wrote a pamphlet against it, with all the illiberal petulance, arrogance, and s currility, which distinguish the Warburtonian

school. This pamphlet gave me some consolation for the otherwise indifferent reception of my performance.

In 1756, two years after the fall of the first volume, was published the second volume of my History, containing the period from the death of Charles I. till the Revolution. This performance happened to give less displeasure to the Whigs, and was bet ter received. It not only rose itself, but helped to buoy up its unfortunate brother.

But though I had been taught by experience, that the Whig party were in possession of bestowing all places, both in the state and in literature, I was so little inclined to yield to their senseless clamour, that in above a hundred alterations, which farther study, reading, or reflection engaged me to make in the reigns of the two first Stuarts, I have made all them invariably to the Tory side. It is ridiculous to consider the English constitution before that period as a regular plan of liberty.

In 1759, I published my History of the House of Tudor. The clamour against this performance was almost equal to that against the History of the two first Stuarts. The reign of Elizabeth was particularly obnoxious. But I was now callous against the im pressions of public folly, and continued very peaceably and contentedly in my retreat at Edinburgh, to finish, in two volumes, the more early part of the English History, which I gave to the public in 1761, with tolerable, and but tolerable success.

But, notwithstanding this variety of winds and seasons, to which my writings had been exposed, they had still been making such advances, that the copy-money given me by the booksellers, much exceeded anything formerly known in England; I was become n ot only independent, but opulent. I retired to my native country of Scotland, determined never more to set my foot out of it; and retaining the satisfaction of never having preferred a request to one great man, or even making advances of friendship to any of them. As I was now turned of fifty, I thought of passing all the rest of my life in this philosophical manner, when I received, in 1763, an invitation from the Earl of Hertford, with whom I was not in the least acquainted, to attend him on his embassy to Paris, with a near prospect of being appointed secretary to the embassy; and, in the meanwhile, of performing the functions of that office. This offer, however inviting, I at first declined, both because I was reluctant to begin connexions with the gr eat, and because I was afraid that the civilities and gay company of Paris would prove disagreeable to a person of my age and humour: but on his lordship's repeating the invitation, I accepted of it. I have every reason, both of pleasure and interest, to think myself happy in my connexion with that nobleman, as well as afterwards with his brother, General Conway.

Those who have not seen the strange effects of modes, will never imagine the reception I met with at Paris, from men and women of all ranks and stations. The more I resiled from their excessive civilities, the more I was loaded with them. There is, h owever, a real satisfaction in living at Paris, from the great number of sensible, knowing, and polite company with which that city abounds above all places in the universe. I thought once of settling there for life.

I was appointed secretary to the embassy; and in summer 1765, Lord Hertford left me, being appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. I was *charge d' affaires* till the arrival of the Duke of Richmond, towards the end of the year. In the beginning o f 1766, I left Paris, and next summer went to Edinburgh, with the same view as formerly, of burying myself in a philosophical retreat. I returned to that place, not richer, but with much more money, and a much larger income, by means of Lord Hertford's fr iendship, than I left it; and I was desirous of trying what superfluity could produce, as I had formerly made an experiment of a competency. But, in 1767, I received

from Mr. Conway an invitation to be Under-secretary; and this invitation, both the charac ter of the person, and my connexions with Lord Hertford, prevented me from declining. I returned to Edinburgh in 1768, very opulent (for I possessed a revenue of 1000L. a year), healthy, and though somewhat stricken in years, with the prospect of enjoying long my ease, and of seeing the increase of my reputation.

In spring 1775, I was struck with a disorder in my bowels, which at first gave me no alarm, but has since, as I apprehend it, become mortal and incurable. I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. I have suffered very little pain from my disorder; and what is more strange, have, notwithstanding the great decline of my person, never suffered a moment's abatement of my spirits; insomuch, that were I to name the period of my life, which I should most choose to pass over again, I might be tempted to point to this later period. I possess the same ardour as ever in study, and the same gaiety in company. I consider, besides, that a man of sixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few years of infirmities; and though I see many symptoms of my literary reputation's breaking out at last with additional lustre, I knew that I could have but few years to enjoy it. It is difficult to be more detached from life than I am at present.

To conclude historically with my own character. I am, or rather was (for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself, which emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments); I was, I say, a man of mild dispositions, of command of temper, of a n open, social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured my temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments . My company was not unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to the studious and literary; and as I took a particular pleasure in the company of modest women, I had no reason to be displeased with the reception I met with from them. In a word, though most men any wise eminent, have found reason to complain of calumny, I never was touched, or even attacked by her baleful tooth: and though I wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both civil and religious factions, they seemed to be disarmed in my behalf of their wonted fury. My friends never had occasion to vindicate any one circumstance of my character and conduct: not but that the zealots, we may well suppose, would have been glad to invent and propagate any story to my disadvantage, but they c ould never find any which they thought would wear the face of probability. I cannot say there is no vanity in making this funeral oration of myself, but I hope it is not a misplaced one; and this is a matter of fact which is easily cleared and ascertained .

April 18, 1776.

NOTES

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Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume

1779

 This e-text is based on the 1779 edition of Hume's *Dialogues* and was electronically compared to a commercial e-text of the *Dialogues.* Visual comparisons were also made to other recent printed editions. Spelling has been modernized according to British spelling conventions; punctuation has not been modernized. Small capitalization has been consistently applied to proper names. See end note for details on copyright.[1]**

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DIALOGUES

CONCERNING

NATURAL RELIGION

BY

DAVID HUME, Esq;

Printed in 1779

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume

1779

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

James Fieser

Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* ranks among the greatest writings in the history of Western philosophy. The work addresses the sensitive issue of the knowledge we have of God through reason alone, and, in the process, Hume presents arguments which undermine the classic proofs for God's existence. The arguments in the *Dialogues* assume an important 18th century distinction between *natural religion* and *revealed religion*. Natural religion involves knowledge of God drawn from nature, solely by the use of reasoning. Often this involves drawing conclusions about the natural design we see in the universe. Revealed religion, on the other hand, involves religious knowledge derived from revelation, specifically divinely inspired texts such as the Bible. From his earliest writings, Hume attacked both of these alleged avenues of religious truth. In the *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40), published when he was 27, Hume attacks natural religion arguing that our ideas reach no farther than our experience; since we have no experience of divine attributes and operations, then we can have no conception of divine attributes. In his infamous essay on miracles from *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748), Hume goes a step further and attacks revealed religion. He argues that it is never reasonable to believe in violations of natural laws, such as reports of miracles and prophecies, which in turn are the foundations of revealed religion. Given the rational bankruptcy of both natural and revealed religion, what remains, for Hume, is what he calls *vulgar religion*. Vulgar religion is the religious belief of the

masses, and we understand this by uncovering the true psychological causes of these beliefs, such as emotions and instincts. He examines vulgar religion in his *Natural History of Religion* (1757), a work he composed simultaneously with the *Dialogues*. The *Dialogues,* though, deals exclusively with the subject of natural religion and in this work Hume offers his most systematic critique of the subject.

***THE CHARACTERS OF THE DIALOGUES*. Hume's decision to compose this work in dialog form is significant. During the 18th century, Great Britain was among the most free countries in Europe, and political authorities allowed a great amount of unobstructed expression. However, religious leaders believed that rational proofs for God's existence were almost as integral to Christianity as the Bible itself. Accordingly, officials viewed direct attacks on natural theology as an abuse of free expression. To avoid political confrontation, Hume adopted the common literary technique of presenting controversial arguments in dialog form. There are three principal characters in Hume's *Dialogues*. On the conservative side of the issue, a character named Cleanthes offers *a posteriori* arguments for God's existence, particularly the design argument:**

> **(a) Machines are produced by intelligent design**
> **(b) Universe resembles a machine**
> **(c) Therefore, the universe was produced by intelligent design**

The design argument rests on an analogy between the design we recognize in human-created artifacts and similar design we recognize in the universe. This similarity of design entitles us to conclude that the universe was likewise created by intelligent design. Most of the *Dialogues* focuses on aspects of the design argument. Next, a character named Demea prefers *a priori* arguments for God's existence, particularly Leibniz's cosmological argument:

> **(a) The world contains an infinite sequence of contingent facts;**
> **(b) An explanation is needed as to the origin of this whole infinite series, which goes beyond an explanation of each member in the series;**
> **(c) The explanation of this whole series cannot reside in the series itself, since the very fact of its existence would still need an explanation (principle of sufficient reason)**
> **(d) Therefore, there is a necessary substance which produced this infinite series, and which is the complete explanation of its own existence as well.**

Earlier defenders of cosmological-type arguments, such as Aquinas, argued that an infinite series of causes of the universe is impossible. Thus, a first divine cause is required to start this series of individual causes. However, Demea (and Leibniz) assume that an infinite series of causes of the universe *is* possible. Even so, Demea argues, we still need an explanation of the entire *collection* of finite causes, which must be found outside of the infinite collection of individual causes.

Finally, a character named Philo is a skeptic who argues against both *a posteriori* and *a priori* proofs. Philo offers a stream of criticisms against the design argument, many of which are now standard in discussions of the issue. For Philo, the design argument is based on a faulty analogy: we don't know whether the order in nature was the result of design since, unlike our experience with the creation of machines, we did not witness the formation of the world. The vastness of the universe also weakens any comparison with a human artifacts: although the universe is orderly here, it may be chaotic elsewhere. Similarly, if intelligent design is exhibited only in a small fraction of the universe, then we can not say it is the productive force of the *whole* universe. Philo also contends that natural design may be accounted for by nature alone, insofar as matter contains within itself a principle of order. And even if the design of the universe is of divine origin, we are

not justified in concluding that this divine cause is a single, all powerful, or all good being. As to the cosmological argument, Philo argues that once we have a sufficient explanation for each particular fact in the infinite sequence of facts, it makes no sense to inquire about the origin of the *collection* of these facts. That is, once we adequately account for each individual fact, this constitutes a sufficient explanation of the whole collection.

The three characters in Hume's *Dialogues* are loosely based on characters in Cicero's classic dialog, *On the Nature of the Gods* and we may reasonably assume that Hume's audience recognized this. In Cicero's dialog, a character named Cotta was a religious skeptic, and his teacher was named Philo. Second, a character named Balbus voiced an orthodox Stoic view of the gods, and Balbus's teacher was named Cleanthes. Finally a character named Velleius presented a third Epicurean view. Cicero himself introduced and concluded his dialog, declaring Balbus the winner. In Hume's dialog, too, the narrator declares the orthodox Cleanthes the winner over the skeptical Philo. For Cicero, the main issue of the dialog is not so much the existence of the gods, but the *nature* of the gods, and whether they intervene. However, for Hume the existence of God is the most prominent issue.

***PUBLICATION OF THE DIALOGUES.* Hume began work on the Dialogues in about 1751. He apparently revised the manuscript about 10 years later, and probably again in 1776 prior to his death. During the last few months of his life, Hume scrambled to make arrangements for the publication of his manuscript, which ultimately appeared in print three years later in 1779. For more than 100 years, the 1779 publication was the basis for other printed editions of the *Dialogues.* However, because Hume did not oversee the 1779 publication, more recent editions return to the original manuscript, which is in the possession of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and is currently available on microfilm. Differences between the 1779 edition and more recent ones are insignificant, although recent editions contain annotations which describe the various revisions Hume made to the manuscript. In his correspondences, Hume left an interesting paper trail pertaining to the composition and ultimate publication of the *Dialogues.* The first indication of the manuscript is in the following letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, in which Hume asks Elliot to review some "sample" parts of the manuscript (probably Parts 1-4 from the final 12 sections):**

> **You wou'd perceive by the Sample I have given you, that I make Cleanthes the Hero of the Dialogue. Whatever you can think of, to strengthen that Side of the Argument, will be most acceptable to me. Any Propensity you imagine I have to the other Side, crept in upon me against my Will ... I have often thought, that the best way of composing a Dialogue, wou'd be for two Persons that are of different Opinions about any Question of Importance, to write alternately the different Parts of the Discourse, & reply to each other. By this Means, that vulgar Error woud be avoided, of putting nothing but Nonsense into the Mouth of the Adversary: And at the same time, a Variety of Character & Genius being upheld, woud make the whole look more natural & unaffected. Had it been my good Fortune to live near you, I shou'd have taken on me the Character of Philo, in the Dialogue, which you'll own I coud have supported naturally enough: And you woud not have been averse to that of Cleanthes. I believe, too, we coud both of us have kept our Temper very well; only, you have not reach'd an absolute philosophical Indifference on these Points. What Danger can ever come from ingenious Reasoning & Enquiry? The worst speculative Sceptic ever I knew, was a much better Man than the best superstitious Devotee & Bigot. I must inform you, too, that this was the way of thinking of the Antients on this Subject. ... I cou'd wish that**

> Cleanthes' Argument coud be so analys'd, as to be render'd quite formal & regular. The Propensity of the Mind towards it, unless that Propensity were as strong & universal as that to believe in our Senses & Experience, will still, I am afraid, be esteem'd a suspicious Foundation. Tis here I wish for your Assistance. ... The Instances I have chosen for Cleanthes are, I hope, tolerably happy, & the Confusion in which I represent the Sceptic seems natural. [March 10, 1751]

Three things are particularly noteworthy in the above passage. First, from the start Hume tries to portray Cleanthes as the "hero" or winner of the dialog. Second, Hume notes his conscious attempt to present all sides of the dispute in their strongest light, and thereby elevate the literary quality of the piece. Third, Hume argues that no public harm will result from considering Philo's skeptical arguments.

Between 1751 and 1761 Hume worked on and further circulated his manuscript; however, at least one friend discouraged him from publishing it, presumably for political reasons. Hume thus set the project aside, and took it up again in 1776 when he found himself terminally ill. To secure its publication, Hume included in his Will the following request to Adam Smith:

> To my friend Dr Adam Smith, late Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, I leave all my manuscripts without exception, desiring him to publish my *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, which are comprehended in this present bequest; but to publish no other papers which he suspects not to have been written within these five years, but to destroy them all at his leisure. And I even leave him full power over all my papers, except the Dialogues above mentioned; and though I can trust to that intimate and sincere friendship, which has ever subsisted between us, for his faithful execution of this part of my will, yet, as a small recompense of his pains in correcting and publishing this work, I leave him two hundred pounds, to be paid immediately after the publication of it. [January 1776]

In spite of Smith's assigned task, Smith felt that the *Dialogues* should remain unpublished even after Hume's death. Smith himself was a closet religious skeptic, and his hesitation was motivated more by practical concern rather than religious piety. Smith communicated his reluctance to Hume and, accordingly, in the following letter to Smith, Hume relinquished Smith of the immediate responsibility of publishing them:

> After reflecting more maturely on that Article of my Will by which I left you the Disposal of all my Papers, with a Request that you shou'd publish my Dialogues concerning natural Religion, I have become sensible, that, both on account of the Nature of the Work, and of your Situation, it may be improper to hurry on that Publication. I therefore take the present Opportunity of qualifying that friendly Request: I am content, to leave it entirely to your Discretion at what time you will publish that Piece, or whether you will publish it at all. [May 3, 1776]

In the above, Hume leaves it to Smith's discretion as to when the *Dialogues* should be published. But Hume quickly became uncomfortable with this arrangement and, a month later, asked his long time publisher, William Strahan, to arrange for its immediate publication:

> I am also to speak to you of another Work more important: Some Years ago, I composed a piece, which woud make a small Volume in Twelves. I call it *Dialogues on natural Religion*: Some of my Friends flatter me, that it is the best thing I ever wrote. I have hitherto forborne to publish it, because I was of late desirous to live quietly, and

> keep remote from all Clamour: For though it be not more exceptionable than some things I had formerly published; yet you know some of these were thought very exceptionable; and in prudence, perhaps, I ought to have suppressed them. I there introduce a Sceptic, who is indeed refuted, and at last gives up the Argument, nay confesses that he was only amusing himself by all his Cavils; yet before he is silenced, he advances several Topics, which will give Umbrage, and will be deemed very bold and free, as well as much out of the Common Road. As soon as I arrive at Edinburgh, I intend to print a small Edition of 500, of which I may give away about 100 in Presents; and shall make you a Present of the Remainder, together with the literary Property of the whole, provided you have no Scruple, in your present Situation, of being the Editor: It is not necessary you shoud prefix your Name to the Title Page. I seriously declare, that after Mr Millar and You and Mr Cadell have publickly avowed your Publication of the *Enquiry concerning human Understanding*, I know no Reason why you shoud have the least Scruple with regard to these Dialogues. They will be much less obnoxious to the Law, and not more exposed to popular Clamour. Whatever your Resolution be, I beg you wou'd keep an entire Silence on this Subject. If I leave them to you by Will, your executing the Desire of a dead Friend, will render the publication still more excusable. Mallet never sufferd any thing by being the Editor of Bolingbroke's Works. [June 8, 1776]

In the above, Hume acknowledges that the publication of the *Dialogues* might cause some clamor because of the severity of Philo's arguments. Again, though, he attempts to diffuse the issue by commenting that his *Dialogues* are less extreme than his *Enquiry*, presumably meaning his essay on miracles.

Unfortunately, Hume's illness progressed to the point that he would not live to see this modest printing of the *Dialogues*. In an addendum to his will, Hume requested that his nephew, Baron David Hume, see to the publication of the *Dialogues* if Strahan failed:

> I desire, that my Dialogues concerning natural Religion may be printed and published any time within two Years after my Death; to which, he [William Strahan] may add, if he thinks proper, the two Essays formerly printed but not published. ... I also ordain, that if my Dialogues from whatever Cause, be not publishd within two Years and a half of my Death ... the Property shall return to my Nephew, David, whose Duty, in publishing them as the last Request of his Uncle, must be approved of by all the World. [August 7, 1776]

A week later, though, Hume considered making additional plans to secure the survival of the *Dialogues.* In a letter to Adam Smith (August 15) he notes his intentions to have two additional copies made of his manuscript, one entrusted to his Nephew, and the other to Smith. Two days before his death, Hume dictated a final letter to Smith:

> I am obliged to make use of my Nephews hand in writing to you as I do not rise to day.

There is No Man in whom I have a greater Confidence than Mr Strahan, yet have I left the property of that Manuscript to my Nephew David in case by any accident it should not be published within three years after my decease. The only accident I could forsee, was one to Mr Strahans Life, and without this clause My Nephew would have had no right to publish it. Be so good as to inform Mr Strahan of this Circumstance. [August 23, 1776] A week after Hume's death, Strahan received the manuscript of Hume's *Dialogues*. In a letter to Strahan, Smith continued

voicing his belief that the manuscript should remain unpublished:

> The latter, tho' finely written, I could have wished had remained in manuscript to be communicated only to a few people. When you read the work, you will see my reasons without my giving you the trouble of reading them in a letter. But he [Hume] has ordered it otherwise. . . . I once had perswaded him to leave it entirely to my discretion either to publish them at what time I thought proper, or not to publish them at all. Had he continued of this mind the manuscript should have been most carefully preserved and upon my decease restored to his family; but it never should have been published in my lifetime. [September 5, 1776]

Smith continues in the above letter attempting to persuade Strahan to at least publish the *Dialogues* in an edition separate from Hume's forthcoming short autobiography. Strahan apparently agreed, and the autobiography was published separately in 1777. Smith wrote him the following note of thanks to Strahan, explaining how sales of Hume's other works might be enhanced by properly timing the release of the *Dialogues*:

> I am much obliged to you for so readily agreeing to print the life together with my additions separate from the *Dialogues*. I even flatter myself that this arrangement will contribute not only to my quiet but to your interest. The clamour against the *Dialogues*, if published first, might hurt for some time the sale of the new edition of his works, and when the clamour has a little subsided the *Dialogues* may hereafter occasion a quicker sale of another edition. [October, 1776]

Almost a half of a year later, Strahan was still undecided about whether he would even assume the task of publishing Hume's *Dialogues*. In the following letter to Hume's nephew, Strahan explains that it might appear better if it was published by the nephew himself.

> As for Mr. Hume's *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, I am not yet determined whether I shall publish them or not. I have all possible regard to the will of the deceased: But as that can be as well fulfilled by you as by me, and as the publication will probably make some noise in the world, and its tendency be considered in different lights by different men, I am inclined to think it had better be made by you. From you some will conclude it comes with propriety as done *in obedience to the last request of your Uncle*; as he himself expresses it; from me it might be suspect to proceed from motives of interest. But in this matter I hope you will do me the justice to believe I put interest wholly out of the question. However, you shall not, at any rate, be kept long in suspense, as you shall soon have my final resolution. [February 3, 1777]

Ultimately, Strahan made his decision and declined to publish the *Dialogues.* In a letter to Hume's brother (i.e., the father of Hume's nephew) Strahan repeats his reasoning that the *Dialogues* "might be published with more propriety" by the nephew (March 3, 1777).

The almost absurd preoccupation with public image continued as Hume's brother strategized as to how long his son should delay in bringing the *Dialogues* to the press. Hume's brother recorded his thoughts in a reply to Strahan:

> My opinion was that he [i.e., his son, and Hume's nephew] should delay the publication of the dialogues on Natural Religion till the end of the two years, after this that he had a title by his uncles settlement upon your not publication of them; otherways it carried the appearance of being too forward, and of more than he was called upon in duty; and if a clamour rose against it, he would have a difficult task to support himself, almost in

> the commencement of his manhood. What weighs with him is, that his publishing as early as he had the power, would look more like obedience, than a voluntary deed, and of judgement; and exculpate him in the eyes of the world... [March 13, 1777]

Indeed, Hume's nephew delayed for two years and the *Dialogues* finally appeared in the middle of 1779. Upon its publication, Hume's friend Hugh Blair wrote to Strahan commenting on the lack of "noise" that it produced.

> As to D. Hume's Dialogues, I am surprised that though they have now been published for some time, they have made so little noise. They are exceedingly elegant. They bring together some of his most exceptionable reasonings, but the principles themselves were all in his former works. [August 3, 1779]

Within the following few months, four reviews of Hume's *Dialogues* appeared, each of which confirmed Blair's initial reaction. The first review to appear was the lead article in the *Critical Review* journal. The review opened noting that "neither the friends of religion have any occasion to be alarmed, nor her enemies to triumph. Freedom of enquiry can never be injurious to the cause of truth." The reviewer concludes with only mild criticism arguing that "If the objections advanced by Philo had been produced with modesty, and answered by Cleanthes as fully as the nature of the question would have allowed, the author would have been applauded by every sensible and discerning reader. But when they are proposed with an air of triumph and defiance, this work assumes a more disadvantageous form, the aspect of infidelity." (September 1779, Vol. 48, pp. 161-172). The second review of the *Dialogues* which appeared in the *London Review* was more flattering. The review expresses hope that "it will prove no unacceptable present to the orthodox" and concludes that "...in our opinion, whoever carefully peruses these Dialogues will not readily be infected with either of the two greatest corruptions of religion, enthusiasm or superstition" (1779, Vol. 10, pp. 365-373).

Finally, William Rose's review in the *Monthly Review* opens noting that the *Dialogues* are "written with great elegance; in the true spirit of ancient dialogue; and, in point of composition, is equal, if not superior, to any of Mr. Hume's other writings. Nothing new, however, is advanced upon the subjects." Rose concludes, though, on a more negatively. For Rose, if Hume is right that God does not exist, then "the wicked are set free from every restraint but that of the laws... the world we live in is a fatherless world; we are chained down to a life full of wretchedness and misery; and we have no hope beyond the grave." Rose notes that "Hume had been long floating on the boundless and pathless ocean of scepticism..." and Hume should have desired a more secure peace at the end of his life. "But his love of paradox, his inordinate pursuit of literary fame, continued..." and, for Rose, this formed Hume's motive for publishing the *Dialogues*. Rose acknowledges that Hume lived a virtuous life, and suggests that Hume's natural good temper, education, and fortune overcame the negative effects of his philosophy. But if his philosophy was let loose among humankind, Rose asks, "Will those who think they are to die like brutes, ever act like men?" Rose believes that even the best political system needs to be supplemented with fear of divine punishment to curb immortality within the law. Nevertheless, Rose concedes that philosophically minded readers will not be harmed by the *Dialogues*, although the *Dialogues* "may serve, indeed, to confirm... the unprincipled in their prejudices...." (November 1779, Vol. 61, pp. 343-355)

INTERPRETIONS OF THE DIALOGUES. In Hume's day, as now, the two key interpretive questions of the *Dialogues* were (1) Which character, if any, represents Hume?, and (2) What are the views of that character? Given its literary style, the *Dialogues* involve a complex web of

concealment, and, accordingly, Hume's contemporaries took greater pains to understand the hidden meaning of the *Dialogues*. Virtually all early commentators on the *Dialogues* attempted to identify Philo as Hume's mouthpiece, as Rose does below in his review when declaring Philo the hero:

> **Cleanthes... defends a good cause very feebly, and is by no means entitled to the character of an accurate philosopher. Demea supports the character of a sour, croaking divine, very tolerably; but PHILO is the hero of the piece; and it must be acknowledged, that he urges his objections with no inconsiderable degree of acuteness and subtlety.**

The *London Review* also made this clear from the outset of their review:

> **The following sentiments, which are represented as the genuine opinions of Philo, or Hume himself, seem to us so important as to deserve insertion as a specimen of the whole.**

For the reviewer, the representative sections of Philo's views are the first half of Part XII of the *Dialogues* in which Philo reduces the conflict between atheism and theism to a verbal dispute. The reviewer concludes that "This reconciliation of these two seemingly most distant opponents, is of more service to true religion than volumes of divinity...." The reviewer is reflecting the editorial slant of the *London Review* as a whole, which tended to be religiously skeptical.

Thomas Hayter made efforts to establish clearly that Philo, and not Cleanthes, speaks for Hume. The introductory comments to his *Remarks* focus exclusively on this issue. After quoting Pamphilius' portrayal of the three characters, Hayter argues,

> **From this representation one might at first be led to look for Mr. HUME himself under the mask of CLEANTHES, and to expect from the mouth of CLEANTHES the celebrated Metaphysician's own sentiments. Let us consider however that Mr. HUME, after the great nominal superiority attributed to CLEANTHES, could not possibly, without appearance of vanity, have appointed CLEANTHES his representative. The fact indeed indisputably is, that PHILO, not CLEANTHES, personates Mr. HUME. CLEANTHES assumes at times (p. 242 and 244) the tone of DEMEA: while PHILO possesses in general the sole exclusive privilege of retailing the purport of Mr. HUME's former Philosophical productions. -- Every remarkable trait and feature of those productions may be traced in the parts of the Dialogue assigned to PHILO.[2]**

Other critics attempted to expose a deeper concealment on Hume's part. Joseph Milner in his *Gibbon's account of Christianity considered* argues that Hume is insincere when pronouncing Cleanthes the victor of the debate:

> **In his dialogues concerning natural religion, we have the substance of all his sceptical essays; and notwithstanding his declaration at the close in favour of Cleanthes, the natural religionist, it is evident from the whole tenour of the book, and still more so from the entire scepticism of his former publications, that Philo is his favourite. Sincerity constitutes no part of a philosopher's virtue.**

He continues that Hume's aim is to "reduce Polytheism, Spinozism, Christianity, and all sorts of views of the divinity to the same level of evidence, or rather of no evidence; and on the ruin of all, to establish his horrible universal scepticism."[3]

Perhaps the most penetrating analysis of Philo was given by John Ogilvie in his *Inquiry into the*

***causes of the infidelity and scepticism of the times*. Like his contemporaries, Ogilvie argues that Philo is Hume's mouthpiece.[4] However, Ogilvie charges further that even Philo's concessions cannot be taken at face value:**

> **...Philo expresseth, in very strong terms, his belief of a Deity, such as he represents him. He even thanks this Being, or Mind, or Thought, that atheists are very rare. And, notwithstanding his love of singular argument, he professeth to pay to him profound adoration. P. 232. But, as Philo's declarations upon this subject are contradictory, I construct his notions most favourably, when I consider him as excluding a Deity from the universe.**

For Ogilvie, Hume is involved in double concealment. First, he conceals his views behind the veil of the character of Philo. Second, Philo himself is concealing his true views by making empty concessions toward God's existence. Ogilvie's discussion of Philo's concealment is particularly relevant in view of the 20th century commentators, noted above, who take Philo's concessions as sincere.

Ogilvie continues that, for Philo, the options for believing in the creation of the universe are between "a blind nature" or "an Omnipotent Tyrant, having neither wisdom, justice, goodness, nor any perfection." Ogilvie argues that it would please us "much better to think that this world was formed by a fortuitous concourse of atoms... rather than to view it as framed by an intelligent Mind to be an immense Lazar-house, crowded with the victims of disease...." Given Philo's view of the intelligent mind, Ogilvie asks that we

> **...judge whether he who looks up to such a Being can seriously worship Him with 'profound adoration.' I repeat, therefore, that I construct his contradictory assertions most favourably when I consider 'a blind nature' as the object of his belief, rather than such a cause of all things as being entitled to his homage.**

Ogilvie concludes by focusing on Philo's concession of thanks to the creator "that Atheists are rarely to be met with." Ogilvie asks,

> **To whom, Sir, let me ask, are your thanks addressed upon this occasion? Are they offered to that Intelligence who "involves individuals in ruin and misery?" Are they due to the "coarse Artificer, the Author of physical and moral evil, &c. &c. &c.?" With much more reason may you thank Him for having so framed His work, as that His miserable creatures by denying His existence, may turn from objects that cannot be viewed with other feelings than those of horror and detestation.**

This feature of double concealment was also recognized by George Horne in his *Letters on infidelity* (1784). In that work Horne presents "A dialogue between Thomas and Timothy on philosophical skepticism" which exposes Hume's literary device. Horne's dialogue opens,

> **Tim. ... Where art [you] going this morning?**
> **Tom. I am going to be made a Christian.**
> **Tim. The very last thing I should have dreamed of. But pray, who is to make you one?**
> **Tim. David Hume.**
> **Tom. David Hume? Why, I thought he was an Atheist.**
> **Tim. The world never was more mistaken about any one man, than about David Hume. He was deemed a sworn foe to Christianity, whereas his whole life was spent in its service. His works compose altogether a complete *Praeparatio Evangelica*. They lead**

> men gently, and gradually, as it were to the Gospel... here is chapter and verse for you. *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion,* p. 263, "To be a philosophical sceptic, is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a *sound believing Christian*." (pp. 49-50)

Horne's dialogue proceeds farcically with Timothy and Thomas each producing evidence from Hume's *Dialogue* in defense of their respective interpretations of Hume. Horne, of course, did not believe that Hume's life was spent in service of Christianity (as Timothy does in Horne's dialog).

In recent years there has been an even greater diversity of interpretations of the *Dialogues* and many commentators argue that Hume was not as critical of natural religion as his reputation would have us believe. Here is a sample of some of the recent interpretations of Hume, beginning with the most "moderate." Nicholas Capaldi argues that Hume outright accepted the design argument for God's existence.[5] Similarly, according to James O'Higgins, Hume accepted the design argument, although remained skeptical about the entire enterprise of reasoning. For O'Higgins, Hume reluctantly conceded God's existence, yet, like the Deists, denied that God concerns himself with governing the world.[6] J.C.A. Gaskin sees Hume as an *attenuated deist* insofar as Hume held that there was a weak probability that natural order resulted from an intelligence remotely analogous to our own. For Gaskin, Hume maintains that this weak probability combines with our more subjective human feeling that natural order springs from a designer, hence we assent to the existence of a designer (although this being has no moral claim on us). Norman Kemp Smith argues that religion for Hume consists exclusively in an intellectual assent to the proposition "God exists." Kemp Smith concludes, though, that religion for Hume ought not to have any influence on human conduct.[7] Similarly, for B.A.O. Williams, Hume's religion consisted of merely holding open the possibility of an intelligent creator.[8]

Ernest C. Mossner argues that Hume denied all supernatural and conventional religion, but advanced a "religion of man" insofar as Hume optimistically believed that the enlightened determine the fate of humanity and are the measure of all things.[9] Similarly, Donald Livingston argues that Hume offers a "philosophical theism" which is an historically determined natural belief, yet one which eschews the writings and rituals of the theistic tradition.[10] It should be noted, however, that even if Mossner and Livingston have captured Hume's views, it is difficult to see how this could qualify as a religion by 18th century standards, and it is hard to believe that Hume would want to classify it as such. Finally, for James Noxon, Hume is simply an agnostic (as opposed to an atheist):

> no one of the characters in the *Dialogues*... speaks consistently for Hume. Every attempt to identify Hume's spokesman could be forestalled by quoting lines given to that speaker which were inconsistent with statements published elsewhere under Hume's own name.[11]

Insofar as no one of the characters speaks consistently for Hume, Noxon argues that this expresses Hume's view about the limits of human understanding and, consequently, indicates that Hume is an agnostic.

Most of the above contemporary debate about Hume's views traces back to three sources. First, in Hume's *Natural History of Religion*, in no less than nine passages Hume seems to defend the design argument for God's existence. Second, in several of Hume's above quoted letters (to Gilbert Elliot and William Strahan) Hume appears sympathetic to Cleanthes' position. Third, in the concluding

section of the *Dialogues* Hume seems to endorse the design argument: Cleanthes, the defender of natural religion, wins the debate, and Philo, the religious skeptic, eventually concedes that "the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence." However, all three of these sources can be seen, and probably *should* be seen, as instances of concealment. Although contemporary commentators do note Hume's use of irony in his writings, they have lost sight of how pervasive and complex it is, especially with politically sensitive issues such as religion. Early commentators had this well in view when they interpreted Hume. They lived at the same time and under the same political conditions as Hume did, and they were accustomed to the decoding the concealed meaning in other nontraditional writers. The principle value of Horne's farcical dialog between Tim and Tom is that it shows the absurdity of seeing Philo as a champion of religion, especially in the pivotal Part 12 of the *Dialogues*. From Horne's perspective, contemporary commentators who take Part 12 as evidence for Hume's theism have fallen into Hume's trap.

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume

1779

INTRODUCTION

PAMPHILUS TO HERMIPPUS

It has been remarked, my HERMIPPUS, that though the ancient philosophers conveyed most of their instruction in the form of dialogue, this method of composition has been little practised in later ages, and has seldom succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted it. Accurate and regular argument, indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical inquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic manner; where he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point at which he aims; and thence proceed, without interruption, to deduce the proofs on which it is established. To deliver a SYSTEM in conversation, scarcely appears natural; and while the dialogue-writer desires, by departing from the direct style of composition, to give a freer air to his performance, and avoid the appearance of *Author* and *Reader*, he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience, and convey the image of *Pedagogue* and *Pupil*. Or, if he carries on the dispute in the natural spirit of good company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and preserving a proper balance among the speakers, he often loses so much time in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely think himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order, brevity, and precision, which are sacrificed to them.

There are some subjects, however, to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly adapted, and where it is still preferable to the direct and simple method of composition.

Any point of doctrine, which is so obvious that it scarcely admits of dispute, but at the same time so *important* that it cannot be too often inculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the novelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject; where the vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept; and where the variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may appear neither tedious nor redundant.

Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so *obscure* and *uncertain*, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it; if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to differ, where no one can reasonably be positive. Opposite sentiments, even without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement; and if the subject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner, into company; and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human life, study and society.

Happily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of NATURAL RELIGION. What truth so obvious, so certain, as the *being* of a God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and arguments? What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations? But, in treating of this obvious and important truth, what obscure questions occur concerning the *nature* of that Divine Being, his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence? These have been always subjected to the disputations of men; concerning these human reason has not reached any certain determination. But these are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry with regard to them; though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction, have as yet been the result of our most accurate researches.

This I had lately occasion to observe, while I passed, as usual, part of the summer season with CLEANTHES, and was present at those conversations of his with PHILO and DEMEA, of which I gave you lately some imperfect account. Your curiosity, you then told me, was so excited, that I must, of necessity, enter into a more exact detail of their reasonings, and display those various systems which they advanced with regard to so delicate a subject as that of natural religion. The remarkable contrast in their characters still further raised your expectations; while you opposed the accurate philosophical turn of CLEANTHES to the careless scepticism of PHILO, or compared either of their dispositions with the rigid inflexible orthodoxy of DEMEA. My youth rendered me a mere auditor of their disputes; and that curiosity, natural to the early season of life, has so deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connection of their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not omit or confound any considerable part of them in the recital.

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume

1779

PART 1

After I joined the company, whom I found sitting in CLEANTHES's library, DEMEA paid CLEANTHES some compliments on the great care which he took of my education, and on his unwearied perseverance and constancy in all his friendships. The father of PAMPHILUS, said he, was your intimate friend: The son is your pupil; and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son, were we to judge by the pains which you bestow in conveying to him every useful branch of literature and science. You are no more wanting, I am persuaded, in prudence, than in industry. I shall, therefore, communicate to you a maxim, which I have observed with regard to my own children, that I may learn how far it agrees with your practice. The method I follow in their education is founded on the saying of an ancient, "That students of philosophy ought first to learn logics, then ethics, next physics, last of all the nature of the gods."[12] This science of natural theology, according to him, being the most profound and abstruse of any, required the maturest judgement in its students; and none but a mind enriched with all the other sciences, can safely be entrusted with it.

Are you so late, says PHILO, in teaching your children the principles of religion? Is there no danger of their neglecting, or rejecting altogether those opinions of which they have heard so little during the whole course of their education? It is only as a science, replied DEMEA, subjected to human reasoning and disputation, that I postpone the study of Natural Theology. To season their minds with early piety, is my chief care; and by continual precept and instruction, and I hope too by example, I imprint deeply on their tender minds an habitual reverence for all the principles of religion. While they pass through every other science, I still remark the uncertainty of each part;

the eternal disputations of men; the obscurity of all philosophy; and the strange, ridiculous conclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the principles of mere human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper submission and self-diffidence, I have no longer any scruple of opening to them the greatest mysteries of religion; nor apprehend any danger from that assuming arrogance of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the most established doctrines and opinions.

Your precaution, says PHILO, of seasoning your children's minds early with piety, is certainly very reasonable; and no more than is requisite in this profane and irreligious age. But what I chiefly admire in your plan of education, is your method of drawing advantage from the very principles of philosophy and learning, which, by inspiring pride and self-sufficiency, have commonly, in all ages, been found so destructive to the principles of religion. The vulgar, indeed, we may remark, who are unacquainted with science and profound inquiry, observing the endless disputes of the learned, have commonly a thorough contempt for philosophy; and rivet themselves the faster, by that means, in the great points of theology which have been taught them. Those who enter a little into study and study and inquiry, finding many appearances of evidence in doctrines the newest and most extraordinary, think nothing too difficult for human reason; and, presumptuously breaking through all fences, profane the inmost sanctuaries of the temple. But CLEANTHES will, I hope, agree with me, that, after we have abandoned ignorance, the surest remedy, there is still one expedient left to prevent this profane liberty. Let DEMEA's principles be improved and cultivated: Let us become thoroughly sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of human reason: Let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice: Let the errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us; the insuperable difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and effect, extension, space, time, motion; and in a word, quantity of all kinds, the object of the only science that can fairly pretend to any certainty or evidence. When these topics are displayed in their full light, as they are by some philosophers and almost all divines; who can retain such confidence in this frail faculty of reason as to pay any regard to its determinations in points so sublime, so abstruse, so remote from common life and experience? When the coherence of the parts of a stone, or even that composition of parts which renders it extended; when these familiar objects, I say, are so inexplicable, and contain circumstances so repugnant and contradictory; with what assurance can we decide concerning the origin of worlds, or trace their history from eternity to eternity?

While PHILO pronounced these words, I could observe a smile in the countenance both of DEMEA and CLEANTHES. That of DEMEA seemed to imply an unreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered: But, in CLEANTHES's features, I could distinguish an air of finesse; as if he perceived some raillery or artificial malice in the reasonings of PHILO.

You propose then, PHILO, said CLEANTHES, to erect religious faith on philosophical scepticism; and you think, that if certainty or evidence be expelled from every other subject of inquiry, it will all retire to these theological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority. Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, whether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really doubt if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according to popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses, and more fallacious experience. And this consideration, DEMEA, may, I think, fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics. If they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world with their doubts,

cavils, and disputes: If they be only in jest, they are, perhaps, bad raillers; but can never be very dangerous, either to the state, to philosophy, or to religion.

In reality, PHILO, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in a flush of humour, after intense reflection on the many contradictions and imperfections of human reason, may entirely renounce all belief and opinion, it is impossible for him to persevere in this total scepticism, or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press in upon him; passions solicit him; his philosophical melancholy dissipates; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism. And for what reason impose on himself such a violence? This is a point in which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently with his sceptical principles. So that, upon the whole, nothing could be more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient PYRRHONIANS; if in reality they endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend, throughout, the same scepticism which they had learned from the declamations of their schools, and which they ought to have confined to them.

In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the STOICS and PYRRHONIANS, though perpetual antagonists; and both of them seem founded on this erroneous maxim, That what a man can perform sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform always, and in every disposition. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a sublime enthusiasm of virtue, and strongly smit with any species of honour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not prevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by its means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a philosopher, in his school, or even in his closet, work himself up to such an enthusiasm, and support in imagination the acutest pain or most calamitous event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind relaxes, and cannot be recalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack him unawares; and the *philosopher* sinks by degrees into the *plebeian*.

I allow of your comparison between the STOICS and SKEPTICS, replied PHILO. But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind cannot, in Stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy, yet, even when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; and the effects of the Stoic's reasoning will appear in his conduct in common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. The ancient schools, particularly that of ZENO, produced examples of virtue and constancy which seem astonishing to present times.

> **Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy.**
> **Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm**
> **Pain, for a while, or anguish; and excite**
> **Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate breast**
> **With stubborn Patience, as with triple steel.[13]**

In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects; but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say in his common conduct, he will be found different from those, who either never formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments more favourable to human reason.

To whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse, like other men; and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever carries his speculations

further than this necessity constrains him, and philosophises either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured by a certain pleasure and satisfaction which he finds in employing himself after that manner. He considers besides, that every one, even in common life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy; that from our earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general principles of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience we acquire, and the stronger reason we are endued with, we always render our principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call *philosophy* is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind. To philosophise on such subjects, is nothing essentially different from reasoning on common life; and we may only expect greater stability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its exacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding.

But when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the surrounding bodies: when we carry our speculations into the two eternities, before and after the present state of things; into the creation and formation of the universe; the existence and properties of spirits; the powers and operations of one universal Spirit existing without beginning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, infinite, and incomprehensible: We must be far removed from the smallest tendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive, that we have here got quite beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen our philosophical conclusions, and remove, at least in part, the suspicion which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning that is very subtle and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have not this advantage; while, at the same time, we are employed upon objects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and of all others, require most to be familiarised to our apprehension. We are like foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing must seem suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing against the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse. We know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in such a subject; since, even in common life, and in that province which is peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them.

All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, it furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the sceptical reasonings so refined and subtle, that they are not able to counterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the senses and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose this advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The mind must remain in suspense between them; and it is that very suspense or balance, which is the triumph of scepticism.

But I observe, says CLEANTHES, with regard to you, PHILO, and all speculative sceptics, that your doctrine and practice are as much at variance in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of common life. Wherever evidence discovers itself, you adhere to it, notwithstanding your pretended scepticism; and I can observe, too, some of your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions of certainty and assurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who pretended to reject NEWTON's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays of light; a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension? And what would you say to one, who, having nothing particular to object to the arguments of COPERNICUS and GALILEO for the motion of the earth, should withhold his

assent, on that general principle, that these subjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow and fallacious reason of mankind?

There is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant scepticism, as you well observed, which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do not easily understand, and makes them reject every principle which requires elaborate reasoning to prove and establish it. This species of scepticism is fatal to knowledge, not to religion; since we find, that those who make greatest profession of it, give often their assent, not only to the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the most absurd tenets which a traditional superstition has recommended to them. They firmly believe in witches, though they will not believe nor attend to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But the refined and philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence of an opposite nature. They push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; and their assent attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence which they meet with. They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the most abstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by philosophy. Light is in reality anatomised. The true system of the heavenly bodies is discovered and ascertained. But the nourishment of bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery. The cohesion of the parts of matter is still incomprehensible. These sceptics, therefore, are obliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence apart, and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and political science. And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion?

Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our ideas, even of the most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion, full of absurdities and contradictions. You defy me to solve the difficulties, or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them. I have not capacity for so great an undertaking: I have not leisure for it: I perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every circumstance, refutes your principles, and shows the firmest reliance on all the received maxims of science, morals, prudence, and behaviour.

I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated writer,[14] who says, that the Sceptics are not a sect of philosophers: They are only a sect of liars. I may, however, affirm (I hope without offence), that they are a sect of jesters or raillers. But for my part, whenever I find myself disposed to mirth and amusement, I shall certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse nature. A comedy, a novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural recreation than such metaphysical subtleties and abstractions.

In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common life, or between one science and another. The arguments employed in all, if just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force and evidence. Or if there be any difference among them, the advantage lies entirely on the side of theology and natural religion. Many principles of mechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who has any pretensions to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to entertain the least doubt with regard to them. The COPERNICAN system contains the most surprising paradox, and the most contrary to our natural conceptions, to appearances, and to our very senses: yet even monks and inquisitors are now constrained to withdraw their opposition to it. And shall PHILO, a man of so liberal a genius and extensive knowledge, entertain any general undistinguished scruples with regard to the religious hypothesis, which is founded on the simplest

and most obvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has such easy access and admission into the mind of man?

And here we may observe, continued he, turning himself towards DEMEA, a pretty curious circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the union of philosophy with the popular religion, upon the first establishment of Christianity, nothing was more usual, among all religious teachers, than declamations against reason, against the senses, against every principle derived merely from human research and inquiry. All the topics of the ancient academics were adopted by the fathers; and thence propagated for several ages in every school and pulpit throughout Christendom. The Reformers embraced the same principles of reasoning, or rather declamation; and all panegyrics on the excellency of faith, were sure to be interlarded with some severe strokes of satire against natural reason. A celebrated prelate too,[15] of the Romish communion, a man of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration of Christianity, has also composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils of the boldest and most determined PYRRHONISM. LOCKE seems to have been the first Christian who ventured openly to assert, that *faith* was nothing but a species of *reason*; that religion was only a branch of philosophy; and that a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in morals, politics, or physics, was always employed in discovering all the principles of theology, natural and revealed. The ill use which BAYLE and other libertines made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers and first reformers, still further propagated the judicious sentiment of Mr. LOCKE: And it is now in a manner avowed, by all pretenders to reasoning and philosophy, that Atheist and Sceptic are almost synonymous. And as it is certain that no man is in earnest when he professes the latter principle, I would fain hope that there are as few who seriously maintain the former.

Don't you remember, said PHILO, the excellent saying of LORD BACON on this head? That a little philosophy, replied CLEANTHES, makes a man an Atheist: A great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious remark too, said PHILO. But what I have in my eye is another passage, where, having mentioned DAVID's fool, who said in his heart there is no God, this great philosopher observes, that the Atheists nowadays have a double share of folly; for they are not contented to say in their hearts there is no God, but they also utter that impiety with their lips, and are thereby guilty of multiplied indiscretion and imprudence. Such people, though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot, methinks, be very formidable.

But though you should rank me in this class of fools, I cannot forbear communicating a remark that occurs to me, from the history of the religious and irreligious scepticism with which you have entertained us. It appears to me, that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the whole progress of this affair. During ignorant ages, such as those which followed the dissolution of the ancient schools, the priests perceived, that Atheism, Deism, or heresy of any kind, could only proceed from the presumptuous questioning of received opinions, and from a belief that human reason was equal to every thing. Education had then a mighty influence over the minds of men, and was almost equal in force to those suggestions of the senses and common understanding, by which the most determined sceptic must allow himself to be governed. But at present, when the influence of education is much diminished, and men, from a more open commerce of the world, have learned to compare the popular principles of different nations and ages, our sagacious divines have changed their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of STOICS, PLATONISTS, and PERIPATETICS, not that of PYRRHONIANS and ACADEMICS. If we distrust human reason, we have now no other principle to lead us into religion. Thus, sceptics in one age, dogmatists in another; whichever system best suits the purpose of these reverend gentlemen, in giving them an

ascendant over mankind, they are sure to make it their favourite principle, and established tenet.

It is very natural, said CLEANTHES, for men to embrace those principles, by which they find they can best defend their doctrines; nor need we have any recourse to priestcraft to account for so reasonable an expedient. And, surely nothing can afford a stronger presumption, that any set of principles are true, and ought to be embraced, than to observe that they tend to the confirmation of true religion, and serve to confound the cavils of Atheists, Libertines, and Freethinkers of all denominations.

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume

1779

PART 2

I must own, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, that nothing can more surprise me, than the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were maintaining the Being of a God, against the cavils of Atheists and Infidels; and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a question among us. No man, no man at least of common sense, I am persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the *being*, but the *nature* of *God*. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The essence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and blind creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence; and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep cloud from human curiosity. It is profaneness to attempt penetrating through these sacred obscurities. And, next to the impiety of denying his existence, is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees and attributes.

But lest you should think that my *piety* has here got the better of my *philosophy*, I shall support my opinion, if it needs any support, by a very great authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological subject: But I shall confine myself, at present, to one equally celebrated for piety and philosophy. It is Father

MALEBRANCHE, who, I remember, thus expresses himself.[16] "One ought not so much," says he, "to call God a spirit, in order to express positively what he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being infinitely perfect: Of this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed with a human body, as the ANTHROPOMORPHITES asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any; so, neither ought we to imagine that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our spirit, under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind. We ought rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of matter without being material.... he comprehends also the perfections of created spirits without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit: That his true name is, *He that is*; or, in other words, Being without restriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal."

After so great an authority, DEMEA, replied PHILO, as that which you have produced, and a thousand more which you might produce, it would appear ridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my approbation of your doctrine. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can never be concerning the *Being*, but only the *Nature*, of the Deity. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection. Whoever scruples this fundamental truth, deserves every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers, to wit, the greatest ridicule, contempt, and disapprobation. But as all perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature. Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we justly ascribe to him; because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other language or other conceptions by which we can express our adoration of him. But let us beware, lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and comprehension; and is more the object of worship in the temple, than of disputation in the schools.

In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, there is no need of having recourse to that affected scepticism so displeasing to you, in order to come at this determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We have no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not conclude my syllogism. You can draw the inference yourself. And it is a pleasure to me (and I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound piety here concur in the same conclusion, and both of them establish the adorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Being.

Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said CLEANTHES, addressing himself to DEMEA, much less in replying to the pious declamations of PHILO; I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has

executed. By this argument *a posteriori*, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.

I shall be so free, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, as to tell you, that from the beginning, I could not approve of your conclusion concerning the similarity of the Deity to men; still less can I approve of the mediums by which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration of the Being of God! No abstract arguments! No proofs *a priori*! Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and probability? I will not say that this is betraying the cause of a Deity: But surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists, which they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning.

What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said PHILO, is not so much that all religious arguments are by CLEANTHES reduced to experience, as that they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak *analogy*, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in TITIUS and MAEVIUS. But from its circulation in frogs and fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments, to have been mistaken.

If we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider.

It would surely be very ill received, replied CLEANTHES; and I should be deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that human legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the dissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture?[17]

Good God! cried DEMEA, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders of religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect evidence! And you, PHILO, on whose assistance I depended in proving the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these extravagant opinions of CLEANTHES? For what other name can I give them? or, why spare my

censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as PAMPHILUS?

You seem not to apprehend, replied PHILO, that I argue with CLEANTHES in his own way; and, by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most with you, I observe, is the representation which CLEANTHES has made of the argument *a posteriori*; and finding that that argument is likely to escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I may dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principles of CLEANTHES, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and I shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain no further scruples with regard to it.

Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others which are equally possible.

Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really is, it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any one event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might set his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being all equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon.

Now, according to this method of reasoning, DEMEA, it follows, (and is, indeed, tacitly allowed by CLEANTHES himself,) that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design; but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle. For aught we can know *a priori*, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by experience, we find, (according to CLEANTHES), that there is a difference between them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or form; they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone, and mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. Experience, therefore, proves, that there is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling.

I was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this resemblance, which is asserted, between the Deity and human creatures; and must conceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, DEMEA, I shall endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of CLEANTHES, provided he allows that I have made a fair representation of it.

When CLEANTHES had assented, PHILO, after a short pause, proceeded in the following manner.

That all inferences, CLEANTHES, concerning fact, are founded on experience; and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar effects similar causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new experiments to prove certainly, that the new circumstances are of no moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age, disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars may be attended with the most unexpected consequences: And unless the objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to expect with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from the precipitate march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are incapable of all discernment or consideration.

But can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?

But, allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature upon another, for the foundation of our judgement concerning the *origin* of the whole, (which never can be admitted,) yet why select so minute, so weak, so bounded a principle, as the reason and design of animals is found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does indeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion.

So far from admitting, continued PHILO, that the operations of a part can afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable sophism.

But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling the human, were to be

found throughout the whole universe, and were its activity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding than it appears in this globe; yet I cannot see, why the operations of a world constituted, arranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which is in its embryo state, and is advancing towards that constitution and arrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy, action, and nourishment of a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more to the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number of springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine.

A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?

Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former?

And can you blame me, CLEANTHES, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of SIMONIDES, who, according to the noted story,[18] being asked by HIERO, *What God was*? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing in his definition or description? Could you even blame me, if I had answered at first, *that I did not know*, and was sensible that this subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out sceptic and railler, as much as you pleased: but having found, in so many other subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even contradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from its feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the sphere of our observation. When two *species* of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can *infer*, by custom, the existence of one wherever I *see* the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance.

PHILO was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience in CLEANTHES, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest, said CLEANTHES, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is found, where that *reason* is properly analysed, that it is nothing but a species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged against my

reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move? Have

Yes! cried PHILO, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory? All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the sun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs of the COPERNICAN system; and to you it belongs to consider, whether you have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory.

In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is now so much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject, who had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and convincing. But if we peruse GALILEO's famous Dialogues concerning the system of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the sublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove, that there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between elementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had established the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible, unalterable, impassable; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to the former. But GALILEO, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity in every particular to the earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness when not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid, the variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, &c. After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience; and that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same arguments and phenomena from one to the other.

In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own condemnation, CLEANTHES; or rather may see, that the subject in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry. Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory.

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume

1779

PART 3

How the most absurd argument, replied CLEANTHES, in the hands of a man of ingenuity and invention, may acquire an air of probability! Are you not aware, PHILO, that it became necessary for Copernicus and his first disciples to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial matter; because several philosophers, blinded by old systems, and supported by some sensible appearances, had denied this similarity? but that it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this similarity is self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form; what more is requisite to show an analogy between their causes, and to ascertain the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention? Your objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the abstruse cavils of those philosophers who denied motion; and ought to be refuted in the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances, rather than by serious argument and philosophy.

Suppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, much louder and more melodious than any which human art could ever reach: Suppose, that this voice were extended in the same instant over all nations, and spoke to each nation in its own language and dialect: Suppose, that the words delivered not only contain a just sense and meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent Being, superior to mankind: Could you possibly hesitate a moment concerning the cause of this voice? and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all the same objections (if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of Theism, may also be produced against this inference.

Might you not say, that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on experience: that when we

hear an articulate voice in the dark, and thence infer a man, it is only the resemblance of the effects which leads us to conclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause: but that this extraordinary voice, by its loudness, extent, and flexibility to all languages, bears so little analogy to any human voice, that we have no reason to suppose any analogy in their causes: and consequently, that a rational, wise, coherent speech proceeded, you know not whence, from some accidental whistling of the winds, not from any divine reason or intelligence? You see clearly your own objections in these cavils, and I hope too you see clearly, that they cannot possibly have more force in the one case than in the other.

But to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe, I shall make two suppositions, which imply not any absurdity or impossibility. Suppose that there is a natural, universal, invariable language, common to every individual of human race; and that books are natural productions, which perpetuate themselves in the same manner with animals and vegetables, by descent and propagation. Several expressions of our passions contain a universal language: all brute animals have a natural speech, which, however limited, is very intelligible to their own species. And as there are infinitely fewer parts and less contrivance in the finest composition of eloquence, than in the coarsest organised body, the propagation of an *Iliad* or *Aeneid* is an easier supposition than that of any plant or animal.

Suppose, therefore, that you enter into your library, thus peopled by natural volumes, containing the most refined reason and most exquisite beauty; could you possibly open one of them, and doubt, that its original cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence? When it reasons and discourses; when it expostulates, argues, and enforces its views and topics; when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect, sometimes to the affections; when it collects, disposes, and adorns every consideration suited to the subject; could you persist in asserting, that all this, at the bottom, had really no meaning; and that the first formation of this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded not from thought and design? Your obstinacy, I know, reaches not that degree of firmness: even your sceptical play and wantonness would be abashed at so glaring an absurdity.

But if there be any difference, PHILO, between this supposed case and the real one of the universe, it is all to the advantage of the latter. The anatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the perusal of LIVY or TACITUS; and any objection which you start in the former case, by carrying me back to so unusual and extraordinary a scene as the first formation of worlds, the same objection has place on the supposition of our vegetating library. Choose, then, your party, PHILO, without ambiguity or evasion; assert either that a rational volume is no proof of a rational cause, or admit of a similar cause to all the works of nature.

Let me here observe too, continued CLEANTHES, that this religious argument, instead of being weakened by that scepticism so much affected by you, rather acquires force from it, and becomes more firm and undisputed. To exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind, is either affectation or madness. The declared profession of every reasonable sceptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent, wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force that he cannot, without the greatest violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for Natural Religion are plainly of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse, obstinate metaphysics can reject them. Consider, anatomise the eye; survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in favour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon up those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support Infidelity. Who can

behold the male and female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole course of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that the propagation of the species is intended by Nature? Millions and millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the universe; and no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such convincing arguments?

Some beauties in writing we may meet with, which seem contrary to rules, and which gain the affections, and animate the imagination, in opposition to all the precepts of criticism, and to the authority of the established masters of art. And if the argument for Theism be, as you pretend, contradictory to the principles of logic; its universal, its irresistible influence proves clearly, that there may be arguments of a like irregular nature. Whatever cavils may be urged, an orderly world, as well as a coherent, articulate speech, will still be received as an incontestable proof of design and intention.

It sometimes happens, I own, that the religious arguments have not their due influence on an ignorant savage and barbarian; not because they are obscure and difficult, but because he never asks himself any question with regard to them. Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? From the copulation of its parents. And these whence? From their parents? A few removes set the objects at such a distance, that to him they are lost in darkness and confusion; nor is he actuated by any curiosity to trace them further. But this is neither dogmatism nor scepticism, but stupidity: a state of mind very different from your sifting, inquisitive disposition, my ingenious friend. You can trace causes from effects: You can compare the most distant and remote objects: and your greatest errors proceed not from barrenness of thought and invention, but from too luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a profusion of unnecessary scruples and objections.

Here I could observe, HERMIPPUS, that PHILO was a little embarrassed and confounded: But while he hesitated in delivering an answer, luckily for him, DEMEA broke in upon the discourse, and saved his countenance.

Your instance, CLEANTHES, said he, drawn from books and language, being familiar, has, I confess, so much more force on that account: but is there not some danger too in this very circumstance; and may it not render us presumptuous, by making us imagine we comprehend the Deity, and have some adequate idea of his nature and attributes? When I read a volume, I enter into the mind and intention of the author: I become him, in a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate feeling and conception of those ideas which revolved in his imagination while employed in that composition. But so near an approach we never surely can make to the Deity. His ways are not our ways. His attributes are perfect, but incomprehensible. And this volume of nature contains a great and inexplicable riddle, more than any intelligible discourse or reasoning.

The ancient PLATONISTS, you know, were the most religious and devout of all the Pagan philosophers; yet many of them, particularly PLOTINUS, expressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed to the Deity; and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude, or love; but in a certain mysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties. These ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched; but still it must be acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible and comprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the whole universe.

All the *sentiments* of the human mind, gratitude, resentment, love, friendship, approbation, blame, pity, emulation, envy, have a plain reference to the state and situation of man, and are calculated for preserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in such circumstances. It seems, therefore, unreasonable to transfer such sentiments to a supreme existence, or to suppose him actuated by them; and the phenomena besides of the universe will not support us in such a theory. All our *ideas,* derived from the senses, are confessedly false and illusive; and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a supreme intelligence: And as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of the external senses, compose the whole furniture of human understanding, we may conclude, that none of the *materials* of thought are in any respect similar in the human and in the divine intelligence. Now, as to the *manner* of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or suppose them any wise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain, fleeting, successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these circumstances, we absolutely annihilate its essence, and it would in such a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason. At least if it appear more pious and respectful (as it really is) still to retain these terms, when we mention the Supreme Being, we ought to acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally incomprehensible; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable sublimity of the Divine attributes.

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David Hume

1779

PART 4

It seems strange to me, said CLEANTHES, that you, DEMEA, who are so sincere in the cause of religion, should still maintain the mysterious, incomprehensible nature of the Deity, and should insist so strenuously that he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to human creatures. The Deity, I can readily allow, possesses many powers and attributes of which we can have no comprehension: But if our ideas, so far as they go, be not just, and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature, I know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you mystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible? Their temerity must be very great, if, after rejecting the production by a mind, I mean a mind resembling the human, (for I know of no other,) they pretend to assign, with certainty, any other specific intelligible cause: And their conscience must be very scrupulous indeed, if they refuse to call the universal unknown cause a God or Deity; and to bestow on him as many sublime eulogies and unmeaning epithets as you shall please to require of them.

Who could imagine, replied DEMEA, that CLEANTHES, the calm philosophical CLEANTHES, would attempt to refute his antagonists by affixing a nickname to them; and, like the common bigots and inquisitors of the age, have recourse to invective and declamation, instead of reasoning? Or does he not perceive, that these topics are easily retorted, and that *Anthropomorphite* is an appellation as invidious, and implies as dangerous consequences, as the epithet of *Mystic*, with which he has honoured us? In reality, CLEANTHES, consider what it is you assert when you represent the Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What is the soul of man? A composition of various

faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas; united, indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each other. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the parts of its discourse, arrange themselves in a certain form or order; which is not preserved entire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement. New opinions, new passions, new affections, new feelings arise, which continually diversify the mental scene, and produce in it the greatest variety and most rapid succession imaginable. How is this compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity? By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and future: His love and hatred, his mercy and justice, are one individual operation: He is entire in every point of space; and complete in every instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no diminution. What he is implies not in it any shadow of distinction or diversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been, and ever will be, without any new judgement, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed in one simple, perfect state: nor can you ever say, with any propriety, that this act of his is different from that other; or that this judgement or idea has been lately formed, and will give place, by succession, to any different judgement or idea.

I can readily allow, said CLEANTHES, that those who maintain the perfect simplicity of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have explained it, are complete *Mystics*, and chargeable with all the consequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word, Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be allowed, that the Deity possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension, yet ought we never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible with that intelligent nature essential to him. A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without composition.

Pray consider, said PHILO, whom you are at present inveighing against. You are honouring with the appellation of Atheist all the sound, orthodox divines, almost, who have treated of this subject; and you will at last be, yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the only sound Theist in the world. But if idolaters be Atheists, as, I think, may justly be asserted, and Christian Theologians the same, what becomes of the argument, so much celebrated, derived from the universal consent of mankind?

But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I shall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences of that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the Divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to execute.

It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether we judge of the matter by *Reason* or by *Experience*. We are still obliged to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive.

If *Reason* (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries *a priori*) be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect, this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world, or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world, or universe of objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are entirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is not common to both of them.

Again, when we will needs force *Experience* to pronounce some sentence, even on these subjects which lie beyond her sphere, neither can she perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two kinds of worlds; but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations. We have specimens in miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a vegetable or animal body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from these samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, than thought; and as these causes never operate in two persons after the same manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike. Nor indeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different periods of time. A difference of age, of the disposition of his body, of weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these particulars, or others more minute, are sufficient to alter the curious machinery of thought, and communicate to it very different movements and operations. As far as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more curious adjustment of springs and principles.

How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to your system of Anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material? Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no further; why go so far? why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on *in infinitum*? And, after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us remember the story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more applicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so on, without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step beyond the mundane system, you only excite an inquisitive humour which it is impossible ever to satisfy.

To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme Being, fall into order of themselves, and by their own nature, is really to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain know, why it is not as good sense to say, that the parts of the material world fall into order of themselves and by their own nature. Can the one opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so?

We have, indeed, experience of ideas which fall into order of themselves, and without any *known* cause. But, I am sure, we have a much larger experience of matter which does the same; as, in all instances of generation and vegetation, where the accurate analysis of the cause exceeds all human comprehension. We have also experience of particular systems of thought and of matter which have no order; of the first in madness, of the second in corruption. Why, then, should we think, that order is more essential to one than the other? And if it requires a cause in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of objects into a similar universe of ideas? The first step which we make leads us on for ever. It were, therefore, wise in us to limit all our inquiries to the present world, without looking further. No satisfaction can ever be attained by these speculations, which so far exceed the narrow bounds of human understanding.

It was usual with the PERIPATETICS, you know, CLEANTHES, when the cause of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their *faculties* or *occult qualities*; and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its nutritive faculty, and senna[19] purged by its purgative. But it has been

discovered, that this subterfuge was nothing but the disguise of ignorance; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous, really said the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed that they knew not the cause of these phenomena. In like manner, when it is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being; can any other reason be assigned by you, Anthropomorphites, than that it is a *rational* faculty, and that such is the nature of the Deity? But why a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting for the order of the world, without having recourse to any such intelligent creator as you insist on, may be difficult to determine. It is only to say, that *such* is the nature of material objects, and that they are all originally possessed of a *faculty* of order and proportion. These are only more learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance; nor has the one hypothesis any real advantage above the other, except in its greater conformity to vulgar prejudices.

You have displayed this argument with great emphasis, replied CLEANTHES: You seem not sensible how easy it is to answer it. Even in common life, if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection, PHILO, that I cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question which may incessantly be started? And what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid a rule? philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to be totally unknown; and are sensible, that the most refined principles into which they trace the phenomena, are still to them as inexplicable as these phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the clearest language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join in the same testimony: The whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the praises of its Creator. You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me, what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go further, who are wiser or more enterprising.

I pretend to be neither, replied PHILO: And for that very reason, I should never perhaps have attempted to go so far; especially when I am sensible, that I must at last be contented to sit down with the same answer, which, without further trouble, might have satisfied me from the beginning. If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge, must immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. Naturalists indeed very justly explain particular effects by more general causes, though these general causes themselves should remain in the end totally inexplicable; but they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be accounted for than the effect itself. An ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable than a material one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former.

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David Hume

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PART 5

But to show you still more inconveniences, continued PHILO, in your Anthropomorphism, please to take a new survey of your principles. *Like effects prove like causes*. This is the experimental argument; and this, you say too, is the sole theological argument. Now, it is certain, that the liker the effects are which are seen, and the liker the causes which are inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every departure on either side diminishes the probability, and renders the experiment less conclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle; neither ought you to reject its consequences.

All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism; but, according to your hypothesis of experimental Theism, they become so many objections, by removing the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects of human art and contrivance. For, if LUCRETIUS, even following the old system of the world, could exclaim,

> *Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi*
> *Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?*
> *Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? et omnes*
> *Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces?*
> *Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto?*[20]

If TULLY esteemed this reasoning so natural, as to put it into the mouth of his EPICUREAN:

> "*Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque aedificari mundum facit? quae molitio? quae ferramenta? qui*

> *vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?"*[21]

If this argument, I say, had any force in former ages, how much greater must it have at present, when the bounds of Nature are so infinitely enlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us? It is still more unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience of the narrow productions of human design and invention.

The discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature, are still objections, according to you, arguments, according to me. The further we push our researches of this kind, we are still led to infer the universal cause of all to be vastly different from mankind, or from any object of human experience and observation.

And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany? These surely are no objections, replied CLEANTHES; they only discover new instances of art and contrivance. It is still the image of mind reflected on us from innumerable objects. Add, a mind *like the human*, said PHILO. I know of no other, replied CLEANTHES. And the liker the better, insisted PHILO. To be sure, said CLEANTHES .

Now, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the consequences. *First*, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognisance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? You will still insist, that, by removing him so much from all similarity to human creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at the same time weaken all proofs of his existence.

Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to the Deity, even in his finite capacity, or for supposing him free from every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a perfect author to be proved *a priori*, are easily solved, and become only seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace infinite relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these difficulties become all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new instances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must acknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, whether this system contains any great faults, or deserves any considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real systems. Could a peasant, if the *Aeneid* were read to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper rank among the productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any other production?

But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain uncertain, whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great number of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may be imagined?

And what shadow of an argument, continued PHILO, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs. By sharing the work among several, we may so much further limit the attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive power and knowledge, which must be supposed in one deity, and which, according to you, can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such foolish, such vicious creatures as man, can yet often unite in framing and executing one plan, how much more those deities or demons, whom we may suppose several degrees more perfect!

To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true philosophy: but this principle applies not to the present case. Were one deity antecedently proved by your theory, who were possessed of every attribute requisite to the production of the universe; it would be needless, I own, (though not absurd,) to suppose any other deity existent. But while it is still a question, Whether all these attributes are united in one subject, or dispersed among several independent beings, by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy? Where we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the opposite scale, however concealed from sight, some counterpoising weight equal to it; but it is still allowed to doubt, whether that weight be an aggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if the weight requisite very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen conjoined in any single body, the former supposition becomes still more probable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast power and capacity as is necessary to produce the universe, or, to speak in the language of ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal exceeds all analogy, and even comprehension.

But further, CLEANTHES: men are mortal, and renew their species by generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great sexes of male and female, says MILTON, animate the world. Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought back upon us.

And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, &c.? EPICURUS maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, which is deservedly so much ridiculed by CICERO, becomes, according to you, solid and philosophical.

In a word, CLEANTHES, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You justly give signs of horror, DEMEA, at these strange suppositions; but these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are CLEANTHES's suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, preferable to none at all.

These suppositions I absolutely disown, cried CLEANTHES: they strike me, however, with no horror, especially when proposed in that rambling way in which they drop from you. On the contrary, they give me pleasure, when I see, that, by the utmost indulgence of your imagination, you never get rid of the hypothesis of design in the universe, but are obliged at every turn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere steadily; and this I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion.

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David Hume

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PART 6

It must be a slight fabric, indeed, said DEMEA, which can be erected on so tottering a foundation. While we are uncertain whether there is one deity or many; whether the deity or deities, to whom we owe our existence, be perfect or imperfect, subordinate or supreme, dead or alive, what trust or confidence can we repose in them? What devotion or worship address to them? What veneration or obedience pay them? To all the purposes of life the theory of religion becomes altogether useless: and even with regard to speculative consequences, its uncertainty, according to you, must render it totally precarious and unsatisfactory.

To render it still more unsatisfactory, said PHILO, there occurs to me another hypothesis, which must acquire an air of probability from the method of reasoning so much insisted on by CLEANTHES. That like effects arise from like causes: this principle he supposes the foundation of all religion. But there is another principle of the same kind, no less certain, and derived from the same source of experience; that where several known circumstances are *observed* to be similar, the unknown will also be *found* similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we conclude that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us. Thus, if we see, through a chink in a wall, a small part of the sun, we conclude, that, were the wall removed, we should see the whole body. In short, this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar, that no scruple can ever be made with regard to its solidity.

Now, if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organised body, and seems actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it produces no disorder: a continual waste in every part is

incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system: and each part or member, in performing its proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it.

You have too much learning, CLEANTHES, to be at all surprised at this opinion, which, you know, was maintained by almost all the Theists of antiquity, and chiefly prevails in their discourses and reasonings. For though, sometimes, the ancient philosophers reason from final causes, as if they thought the world the workmanship of God; yet it appears rather their favourite notion to consider it as his body, whose organisation renders it subservient to him. And it must be confessed, that, as the universe resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art and contrivance, if our limited analogy could ever, with any propriety, be extended to the whole of nature, the inference seems juster in favour of the ancient than the modern theory.

There are many other advantages, too, in the former theory, which recommended it to the ancient theologians. Nothing more repugnant to all their notions, because nothing more repugnant to common experience, than mind without body; a mere spiritual substance, which fell not under their senses nor comprehension, and of which they had not observed one single instance throughout all nature. Mind and body they knew, because they felt both: an order, arrangement, organisation, or internal machinery, in both, they likewise knew, after the same manner: and it could not but seem reasonable to transfer this experience to the universe; and to suppose the divine mind and body to be also coeval, and to have, both of them, order and arrangement naturally inherent in them, and inseparable from them.

Here, therefore, is a new species of Anthropomorphism, CLEANTHES, on which you may deliberate; and a theory which seems not liable to any considerable difficulties. You are too much superior, surely, to *systematical prejudices*, to find any more difficulty in supposing an animal body to be, originally, of itself, or from unknown causes, possessed of order and organisation, than in supposing a similar order to belong to mind. But the *vulgar prejudice*, that body and mind ought always to accompany each other, ought not, one should think, to be entirely neglected; since it is founded on *vulgar experience*, the only guide which you profess to follow in all these theological inquiries. And if you assert, that our limited experience is an unequal standard, by which to judge of the unlimited extent of nature; you entirely abandon your own hypothesis, and must thenceforward adopt our Mysticism, as you call it, and admit of the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature.

This theory, I own, replied CLEANTHES, has never before occurred to me, though a pretty natural one; and I cannot readily, upon so short an examination and reflection, deliver any opinion with regard to it. You are very scrupulous, indeed, said PHILO: were I to examine any system of yours, I should not have acted with half that caution and reserve, in starting objections and difficulties to it. However, if any thing occur to you, you will oblige us by proposing it.

Why then, replied CLEANTHES, it seems to me, that, though the world does, in many circumstances, resemble an animal body; yet is the analogy also defective in many circumstances the most material: no organs of sense; no seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In short, it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an animal, and your inference would be so far inconclusive in favour of the soul of the world.

But, in the next place, your theory seems to imply the eternity of the world; and that is a principle, which, I think, can be refuted by the strongest reasons and probabilities. I shall suggest an

argument to this purpose, which, I believe, has not been insisted on by any writer. Those, who reason from the late origin of arts and sciences, though their inference wants not force, may perhaps be refuted by considerations derived from the nature of human society, which is in continual revolution, between ignorance and knowledge, liberty and slavery, riches and poverty; so that it is impossible for us, from our limited experience, to foretell with assurance what events may or may not be expected. Ancient learning and history seem to have been in great danger of entirely perishing after the inundation of the barbarous nations; and had these convulsions continued a little longer, or been a little more violent, we should not probably have now known what passed in the world a few centuries before us. Nay, were it not for the superstition of the Popes, who preserved a little jargon of Latin, in order to support the appearance of an ancient and universal church, that tongue must have been utterly lost; in which case, the Western world, being totally barbarous, would not have been in a fit disposition for receiving the GREEK language and learning, which was conveyed to them after the sacking of CONSTANTINOPLE. When learning and books had been extinguished, even the mechanical arts would have fallen considerably to decay; and it is easily imagined, that fable or tradition might ascribe to them a much later origin than the true one. This vulgar argument, therefore, against the eternity of the world, seems a little precarious.

But here appears to be the foundation of a better argument. LUCULLUS was the first that brought cherry-trees from ASIA to EUROPE; though that tree thrives so well in many EUROPEAN climates, that it grows in the woods without any culture. Is it possible, that throughout a whole eternity, no EUROPEAN had ever passed into ASIA, and thought of transplanting so delicious a fruit into his own country? Or if the tree was once transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? Empires may rise and fall, liberty and slavery succeed alternately, ignorance and knowledge give place to each other; but the cherry-tree will still remain in the woods of GREECE, SPAIN, and ITALY, and will never be affected by the revolutions of human society.

It is not two thousand years since vines were transplanted into FRANCE, though there is no climate in the world more favourable to them. It is not three centuries since horses, cows, sheep, swine, dogs, corn, were known in AMERICA. Is it possible, that during the revolutions of a whole eternity, there never arose a COLUMBUS, who might open the communication between EUROPE and that continent? We may as well imagine, that all men would wear stockings for ten thousand years, and never have the sense to think of garters to tie them. All these seem convincing proofs of the youth, or rather infancy, of the world; as being founded on the operation of principles more constant and steady than those by which human society is governed and directed. Nothing less than a total convulsion of the elements will ever destroy all the EUROPEAN animals and vegetables which are now to be found in the Western world.

And what argument have you against such convulsions? replied PHILO. Strong and almost incontestable proofs may be traced over the whole earth, that every part of this globe has continued for many ages entirely covered with water. And though order were supposed inseparable from matter, and inherent in it; yet may matter be susceptible of many and great revolutions, through the endless periods of eternal duration. The incessant changes, to which every part of it is subject, seem to intimate some such general transformations; though, at the same time, it is observable, that all the changes and corruptions of which we have ever had experience, are but passages from one state of order to another; nor can matter ever rest in total deformity and confusion. What we see in the parts, we may infer in the whole; at least, that is the method of reasoning on which you rest your whole theory. And were I obliged to defend any particular

system of this nature, which I never willingly should do, I esteem none more plausible than that which ascribes an eternal inherent principle of order to the world, though attended with great and continual revolutions and alterations. This at once solves all difficulties; and if the solution, by being so general, is not entirely complete and satisfactory, it is at least a theory that we must sooner or later have recourse to, whatever system we embrace. How could things have been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order somewhere, in thought or in matter? And it is very indifferent to which of these we give the preference. Chance has no place, on any hypothesis, sceptical or religious. Every thing is surely governed by steady, inviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us, we should then discover a scene, of which, at present, we can have no idea. Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, we should clearly see that it was absolutely impossible for them, in the smallest article, ever to admit of any other disposition.

Were any one inclined to revive the ancient Pagan Theology, which maintained, as we learn from HESIOD, that this globe was governed by 30,000 deities, who arose from the unknown powers of nature: you would naturally object, CLEANTHES, that nothing is gained by this hypothesis; and that it is as easy to suppose all men animals, beings more numerous, but less perfect, to have sprung immediately from a like origin. Push the same inference a step further, and you will find a numerous society of deities as explicable as one universal deity, who possesses within himself the powers and perfections of the whole society. All these systems, then, of Scepticism, Polytheism, and Theism, you must allow, on your principles, to be on a like footing, and that no one of them has any advantage over the others. You may thence learn the fallacy of your principles.

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PART 7

But here, continued PHILO, in examining the ancient system of the soul of the world, there strikes me, all on a sudden, a new idea, which, if just, must go near to subvert all your reasoning, and destroy even your first inferences, on which you repose such confidence. If the universe bears a greater likeness to animal bodies and to vegetables, than to the works of human art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the former than that of the latter, and its origin ought rather to be ascribed to generation or vegetation, than to reason or design. Your conclusion, even according to your own principles, is therefore lame and defective.

Pray open up this argument a little further, said DEMEA, for I do not rightly apprehend it in that concise manner in which you have expressed it.

Our friend CLEANTHES, replied PHILO, as you have heard, asserts, that since no question of fact can be proved otherwise than by experience, the existence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. The world, says he, resembles the works of human contrivance; therefore its cause must also resemble that of the other. Here we may remark, that the operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very small part, to wit that inanimate matter lying within his reach, is the rule by which CLEANTHES judges of the origin of the whole; and he measures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the same individual standard. But to waive all objections drawn from this topic, I affirm, that there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of human invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the world, and which, therefore, afford a better conjecture concerning the universal origin of this system. These parts are animals and vegetables. The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a

watch or a knitting-loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable, resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is generation or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be something similar or analogous to generation or vegetation.

But how is it conceivable, said DEMEA, that the world can arise from any thing similar to vegetation or generation?

Very easily, replied PHILO. In like manner as a tree sheds its seed into the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees; so the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself certain seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos, vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed of a world; and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star to star, it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which every where surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new system.

Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other advantage), we should suppose this world to be an animal; a comet is the egg of this animal: and in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand, which, without any further care, hatches the egg, and produces a new animal; so....

I understand you, says DEMEA: But what wild, arbitrary suppositions are these! What *data* have you for such extraordinary conclusions? And is the slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both? Objects, which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for each other?

Right, cries PHILO: This is the topic on which I have all along insisted. I have still asserted, that we have no data to establish any system of cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and so limited both in extent and duration, can afford us no probable conjecture concerning the whole of things. But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? Is there any other rule than the greater similarity of the objects compared? And does not a plant or an animal, which springs from vegetation or generation, bear a stronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial machine, which arises from reason and design?

But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk? said DEMEA. Can you explain their operations, and anatomise that fine internal structure on which they depend?

As much, at least, replied PHILO, as CLEANTHES can explain the operations of reason, or anatomise that internal structure on which it depends. But without any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal, I infer, that it sprang from generation; and that with as great certainty as you conclude a house to have been reared by design. These words, *generation*, *reason*, mark only certain powers and energies in nature, whose effects are known, but whose essence is incomprehensible; and one of these principles, more than the other, has no privilege for being made a standard to the whole of nature.

In reality, DEMEA, it may reasonably be expected, that the larger the views are which we take of things, the better will they conduct us in our conclusions concerning such extraordinary and such magnificent subjects. In this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles, *reason, instinct, generation, vegetation,* which are similar to each other, and are the causes of similar effects. What a number of other principles may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of the universe, could we travel from planet to planet, and from system to system, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric? Any one of these four principles above mentioned, (and a hundred others which lie open to our conjecture,) may afford us a theory by which to judge of the origin of the world; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality to confine our view entirely to that principle by which our own minds operate. Were this principle more intelligible on that

account, such a partiality might be somewhat excusable: But reason, in its internal fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or vegetation; and, perhaps, even that vague, indeterminate word, Nature, to which the vulgar refer every thing, is not at the bottom more inexplicable. The effects of these principles are all known to us from experience; but the principles themselves, and their manner of operation, are totally unknown; nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable to experience, to say, that the world arose by vegetation, from a seed shed by another world, than to say that it arose from a divine reason or contrivance, according to the sense in which CLEANTHES understands it.

But methinks, said DEMEA, if the world had a vegetative quality, and could sow the seeds of new worlds into the infinite chaos, this power would be still an additional argument for design in its author. For whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? Or how can order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it bestows?

You need only look around you, replied PHILO, to satisfy yourself with regard to this question. A tree bestows order and organisation on that tree which springs from it, without knowing the order; an animal in the same manner on its offspring; a bird on its nest; and instances of this kind are even more frequent in the world than those of order, which arise from reason and contrivance. To say, that all this order in animals and vegetables proceeds ultimately from design, is begging the question; nor can that great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving, *a priori*, both that order is, from its nature, inseparably attached to thought; and that it can never of itself, or from original unknown principles, belong to matter.

But further, DEMEA; this objection which you urge can never be made use of by CLEANTHES, without renouncing a defence which he has already made against one of my objections. When I inquired concerning the cause of that supreme reason and intelligence into which he resolves every thing; he told me, that the impossibility of satisfying such inquiries could never be admitted as an objection in any species of philosophy. *We must stop somewhere*, says he; *nor is it ever within the reach of human capacity to explain ultimate causes, or show the last connections of any objects. It is sufficient, if any steps, so far as we go, are supported by experience and observation*. Now, that vegetation and generation, as well as reason, are experienced to be principles of order in nature, is undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, preferably to the latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And when CLEANTHES asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his great reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on both sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present occasion to stick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imperfect experience, generation has some privileges above reason: for we see every day the latter arise from the former, never the former from the latter.

Compare, I beseech you, the consequences on both sides. The world, say I, resembles an animal; therefore it is an animal, therefore it arose from generation. The steps, I confess, are wide; yet there is some small appearance of analogy in each step. The world, says CLEANTHES, resembles a machine; therefore it is a machine, therefore it arose from design. The steps are here equally wide, and the analogy less striking. And if he pretends to carry on *my* hypothesis a step further, and to infer design or reason from the great principle of generation, on which I insist; I may, with better authority, use the same freedom to push further *his* hypothesis, and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle of reason. I have at least some faint shadow of experience, which is the utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject. Reason, in innumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of generation, and never to arise from any other principle.

HESIOD, and all the ancient mythologists, were so struck with this analogy, that they universally explained the origin of nature from an animal birth, and copulation. PLATO too, so far as he is intelligible, seems to have adopted some such notion in his TIMAEUS.

The BRAHMINS assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony, which appears to us ridiculous; because a spider is a little contemptible animal, whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the whole universe. But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our globe. And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders, (which is very possible,) this inference would there appear as natural and irrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all things to design and intelligence, as explained by CLEANTHES. Why an orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, it will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason.

I must confess, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, that of all men living, the task which you have undertaken, of raising doubts and objections, suits you best, and seems, in a manner, natural and unavoidable to you. So great is your fertility of invention, that I am not ashamed to acknowledge myself unable, on a sudden, to solve regularly such out-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon me: though I clearly see, in general, their fallacy and error. And I question not, but you are yourself, at present, in the same case, and have not the solution so ready as the objection: while you must be sensible, that common sense and reason are entirely against you; and that such whimsies as you have delivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us.

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PART 8

What you ascribe to the fertility of my invention, replied PHILO, is entirely owing to the nature of the subject. In subjects adapted to the narrow compass of human reason, there is commonly but one determination, which carries probability or conviction with it; and to a man of sound judgement, all other suppositions, but that one, appear entirely absurd and chimerical. But in such questions as the present, a hundred contradictory views may preserve a kind of imperfect analogy; and invention has here full scope to exert itself. Without any great effort of thought, I believe that I could, in an instant, propose other systems of cosmogony, which would have some faint appearance of truth, though it is a thousand, a million to one, if either yours or any one of mine be the true system.

For instance, what if I should revive the old EPICUREAN hypothesis? This is commonly, and I believe justly, esteemed the most absurd system that has yet been proposed; yet I know not whether, with a few alterations, it might not be brought to bear a faint appearance of probability. Instead of supposing matter infinite, as EPICURUS did, let us suppose it finite. A finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions: and it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or position must be tried an infinite number of times. This world, therefore, with all its events, even the most minute, has before been produced and destroyed, and will again be produced and destroyed, without any bounds and limitations. No one, who has a conception of the powers of infinite, in comparison of finite, will ever scruple this determination.

But this supposes, said DEMEA, that matter can acquire motion, without any voluntary agent or first mover.

And where is the difficulty, replied PHILO, of that supposition? Every event, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible; and every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. Motion, in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from electricity, begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent: and to suppose always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis; and hypothesis attended with no advantages. The beginning of motion in matter itself is as conceivable *a priori* as its communication from mind and intelligence.

Besides, why may not motion have been propagated by impulse through all eternity, and the same stock of it, or nearly the same, be still upheld in the universe? As much is lost by the composition of motion, as much is gained by its resolution. And whatever the causes are, the fact is certain, that matter is, and always has been, in continual agitation, as far as human experience or tradition reaches. There is not probably, at present, in the whole universe, one particle of matter at absolute rest.

And this very consideration too, continued PHILO, which we have stumbled on in the course of the argument, suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony, that is not absolutely absurd and improbable. Is there a system, an order, an economy of things, by which matter can preserve that perpetual agitation which seems essential to it, and yet maintain a constancy in the forms which it produces? There certainly is such an economy; for this is actually the case with the present world. The continual motion of matter, therefore, in less than infinite transpositions, must produce this economy or order; and by its very nature, that order, when once established, supports itself, for many ages, if not to eternity. But wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted, as to continue in perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its situation must, of necessity, have all the same appearance of art and contrivance which we observe at present. All the parts of each form must have a relation to each other, and to the whole; and the whole itself must have a relation to the other parts of the universe; to the element in which the form subsists; to the materials with which it repairs its waste and decay; and to every other form which is hostile or friendly. A defect in any of these particulars destroys the form; and the matter of which it is composed is again set loose, and is thrown into irregular motions and fermentations, till it unite itself to some other regular form. If no such form be prepared to receive it, and if there be a great quantity of this corrupted matter in the universe, the universe itself is entirely disordered; whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its first beginnings that is thus destroyed, or the rotten carcass of one languishing in old age and infirmity. In either case, a chaos ensues; till finite, though innumerable revolutions produce at last some forms, whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support the forms amidst a continued succession of matter.

Suppose (for we shall endeavour to vary the expression), that matter were thrown into any position, by a blind, unguided force; it is evident that this first position must, in all probability, be the most confused and most disorderly imaginable, without any resemblance to those works of human contrivance, which, along with a symmetry of parts, discover an adjustment of means to ends, and a tendency to self-preservation. If the actuating force cease after this operation, matter must remain for ever in disorder, and continue an immense chaos, without any proportion or activity. But suppose that the actuating force, whatever it be, still continues in matter, this first position will immediately give place to a second, which will likewise in all probability be as disorderly as the first, and so on through many successions of changes and revolutions. No particular order or position ever continues a moment unaltered. The original force, still remaining in activity, gives a perpetual restlessness to matter. Every possible situation is produced, and instantly destroyed. If a glimpse or dawn of order appears for a moment, it is instantly hurried

away, and confounded, by that never-ceasing force which actuates every part of matter.

Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last, so as not to lose its motion and active force (for that we have supposed inherent in it), yet so as to preserve an uniformity of appearance, amidst the continual motion and fluctuation of its parts? This we find to be the case with the universe at present. Every individual is perpetually changing, and every part of every individual; and yet the whole remains, in appearance, the same. May we not hope for such a position, or rather be assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter; and may not this account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance which is in the universe? Let us contemplate the subject a little, and we shall find, that this adjustment, if attained by matter of a seeming stability in the forms, with a real and perpetual revolution or motion of parts, affords a plausible, if not a true solution of the difficulty.

It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals or vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? It happens indeed, that the parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some regular form immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter: and if it were not so, could the world subsist? Must it not dissolve as well as the animal, and pass through new positions and situations, till in great, but finite succession, it falls at last into the present or some such order?

It is well, replied CLEANTHES, you told us, that this hypothesis was suggested on a sudden, in the course of the argument. Had you had leisure to examine it, you would soon have perceived the insuperable objections to which it is exposed. No form, you say, can subsist, unless it possess those powers and organs requisite for its subsistence: some new order or economy must be tried, and so on, without intermission; till at last some order, which can support and maintain itself, is fallen upon. But according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and advantages which men and all animals possess? Two eyes, two ears, are not absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species. Human race might have been propagated and preserved, without horses, dogs, cows, sheep, and those innumerable fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction and enjoyment. If no camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts of AFRICA and ARABIA, would the world have been dissolved? If no lodestone had been framed to give that wonderful and useful direction to the needle, would human society and the human kind have been immediately extinguished? Though the maxims of Nature be in general very frugal, yet instances of this kind are far from being rare; and any one of them is a sufficient proof of design, and of a benevolent design, which gave rise to the order and arrangement of the universe.

At least, you may safely infer, said PHILO, that the foregoing hypothesis is so far incomplete and imperfect, which I shall not scruple to allow. But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this nature? Or can we ever hope to erect a system of cosmogony, that will be liable to no exceptions, and will contain no circumstance repugnant to our limited and imperfect experience of the analogy of Nature? Your theory itself cannot surely pretend to any such advantage, even though you have run into *Anthropomorphism*, the better to preserve a conformity to common experience. Let us once more put it to trial. In all instances which we have ever seen, ideas are copied from real objects, and are ectypal, not archetypal, to express myself in learned terms: You reverse this order, and give thought the precedence. In all instances which we have ever seen, thought has no influence upon matter, except where that matter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence upon it. No animal can move immediately any thing but the

members of its own body; and indeed, the equality of action and reaction seems to be an universal law of nature: But your theory implies a contradiction to this experience. These instances, with many more, which it were easy to collect, (particularly the supposition of a mind or system of thought that is eternal, or, in other words, an animal ingenerable and immortal); these instances, I say, may teach all of us sobriety in condemning each other, and let us see, that as no system of this kind ought ever to be received from a slight analogy, so neither ought any to be rejected on account of a small incongruity. For that is an inconvenience from which we can justly pronounce no one to be exempted.

All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic; who tells them, that no system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects: For this plain reason, that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard to any subject. A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable resource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence, among Theologians, is successful; how complete must be *his* victory, who remains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no fixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to defend?

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PART 9

But if so many difficulties attend the argument *a posteriori*, said DEMEA, had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument *a priori*, which, by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all doubt and difficulty? By this argument, too, we may prove the *infinity* of the Divine attributes, which, I am afraid, can never be ascertained with certainty from any other topic. For how can an effect, which either is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause? The unity too of the Divine Nature, it is very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from contemplating the works of nature; nor will the uniformity alone of the plan, even were it allowed, give us any assurance of that attribute. Whereas the argument *a priori* ....

You seem to reason, DEMEA, interposed CLEANTHES, as if those advantages and conveniences in the abstract argument were full proofs of its solidity. But it is first proper, in my opinion, to determine what argument of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall afterwards, from itself, better than from its *useful* consequences, endeavour to determine what value we ought to put upon it.

The argument, replied DEMEA, which I would insist on, is the common one. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is *necessarily* existent: Now, that the first supposition is absurd, may be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and effects, each single

effect is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed is equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing's having existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which constitutes the universe. What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? *External causes*, there are supposed to be none. *Chance* is a word without a meaning. Was it *Nothing*? But that can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a Deity.

I shall not leave it to PHILO, said CLEANTHES, though I know that the starting objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety and religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it.

I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments *a priori*. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.

It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, *necessary existence*, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent.

But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the world. "Any particle of matter," it is said, "may be *conceived* to be annihilated; and any form may be *conceived* to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible."[22] But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his

attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with it.

Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence?

In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty? But the *whole*, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.

Though the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse me, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser product of 9.[23] To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may be admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present question! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite to the religious hypothesis!

But dropping all these abstractions, continued PHILO, and confining ourselves to more familiar topics, I shall venture to add an observation, that the argument *a priori* has seldom been found very convincing, except to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who, finding from mathematics, that the understanding frequently leads to truth through obscurity, and, contrary to first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to subjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of good sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly where it lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will derive their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning.

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume

1779

PART 10

It is my opinion, I own, replied DEMEA, that each man feels, in a manner, the truth of religion within his own breast, and, from a consciousness of his imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning, is led to seek protection from that Being, on whom he and all nature is dependent. So anxious or so tedious are even the best scenes of life, that futurity is still the object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward, and endeavour, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those unknown powers, whom we find, by experience, so able to afflict and oppress us. Wretched creatures that we are! what resource for us amidst the innumerable ills of life, did not religion suggest some methods of atonement, and appease those terrors with which we are incessantly agitated and tormented?

I am indeed persuaded, said PHILO, that the best, and indeed the only method of bringing every one to a due sense of religion, is by just representations of the misery and wickedness of men. And for that purpose a talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of reasoning and argument. For is it necessary to prove what every one feels within himself? It is only necessary to make us feel it, if possible, more intimately and sensibly.

The people, indeed, replied DEMEA, are sufficiently convinced of this great and melancholy truth. The miseries of life; the unhappiness of man; the general corruptions of our nature; the unsatisfactory enjoyment of pleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have become almost proverbial in all languages. And who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience?

In this point, said PHILO, the learned are perfectly agreed with the vulgar; and in all letters, *sacred* and *profane*, the topic of human misery has been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and melancholy could inspire. The poets, who speak from sentiment, without a system, and whose testimony has therefore the more authority, abound in images of this nature. From Homer down to Dr. Young, the whole inspired tribe have ever been sensible, that no other representation of things would suit the feeling and observation of each individual.

As to authorities, replied DEMEA, you need not seek them. Look round this library of CLEANTHES. I shall venture to affirm, that, except authors of particular sciences, such as chemistry or botany, who have no occasion to treat of human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers, from whom the sense of human misery has not, in some passage or other, extorted a complaint and confession of it. At least, the chance is entirely on that side; and no one author has ever, so far as I can recollect, been so extravagant as to deny it.

There you must excuse me, said PHILO: LEIBNIZ has denied it; and is perhaps the first[24] who ventured upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion; at least, the first who made it essential to his philosophical system.

And by being the first, replied DEMEA, might he not have been sensible of his error? For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries especially in so late an age? And can any man hope by a simple denial (for the subject scarcely admits of reasoning), to bear down the united testimony of mankind, founded on sense and consciousness?

And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all other animals? The whole earth, believe me, PHILO, is cursed and polluted. A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures. Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear, anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into life gives anguish to the new-born infant and to its wretched parent: Weakness, impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and it is at last finished in agony and horror.

Observe too, says PHILO, the curious artifices of Nature, in order to embitter the life of every living being. The stronger prey upon the weaker, and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in their turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without relaxation. Consider that innumerable race of insects, which either are bred on the body of each animal, or, flying about, infix their stings in him. These insects have others still less than themselves, which torment them. And thus on each hand, before and behind, above and below, every animal is surrounded with enemies, which incessantly seek his misery and destruction.

Man alone, said DEMEA, seems to be, in part, an exception to this rule. For by combination in society, he can easily master lions, tigers, and bears, whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey upon him.

On the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried PHILO, that the uniform and equal maxims of Nature are most apparent. Man, it is true, can, by combination, surmount all his real enemies, and become master of the whole animal creation: but does he not immediately raise up to himself imaginary enemies, the demons of his fancy, who haunt him with superstitious terrors, and blast every enjoyment of life? His pleasure, as he imagines, becomes, in their eyes, a crime: his food and repose give them umbrage and offence: his very sleep and dreams furnish new materials to anxious fear: and even death, his refuge from every other ill, presents only the dread of endless and innumerable woes. Nor does the wolf molest more the timid flock, than superstition does the anxious breast of wretched mortals.

Besides, consider, DEMEA: This very society, by which we surmount those wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to us? What woe and misery does it not occasion? Man is the greatest enemy of man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each other; and they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed, were it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their separation.

But though these external insults, said DEMEA, from animals, from men, from all the elements, which assault us, form a frightful catalogue of woes, they are nothing in comparison of those which arise within ourselves, from the distempered condition of our mind and body. How many lie under the lingering torment of diseases? Hear the pathetic enumeration of the great poet.

> Intestine stone and ulcer, colic-pangs, Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy, And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy, Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence. Dire was the tossing, deep the groans: *despair* Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch. And over them triumphant *death* his dart Shook: but delay'd to strike, though oft invok'd With vows, as their chief good and final hope.[25]

The disorders of the mind, continued DEMEA, though more secret, are not perhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number; and those few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man; but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often the absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to render life ineligible.

Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would show him, as a specimen of its ills, a hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, famine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him a notion of its pleasures; whither should I conduct him? to a ball, to an opera, to court? He might justly think, that I was only showing him a diversity of distress and sorrow.

There is no evading such striking instances, said PHILO, but by apologies, which still further aggravate the charge. Why have all men, I ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life? ... They have no just reason, says one: these complaints proceed only from their discontented, repining, anxious disposition.... And can there possibly, I reply, be a more certain foundation of misery, than such a wretched temper?

But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, why do they remain in life? ... Not satisfied with life, afraid of death. This is the secret chain, say I, that holds us. We are terrified, not bribed to the continuance of our existence.

It is only a false delicacy, he may insist, which a few refined spirits indulge, and which has spread these complaints among the whole race of mankind. . . . And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame? Is it any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of life? and if the man of a delicate, refined temper, by being so much more alive than the rest of the world, is only so much more unhappy, what judgement must we form in general of human life?

Let men remain at rest, says our adversary, and they will be easy. They are willing artificers of their own misery. . . . No! reply I: an anxious languor follows their repose; disappointment, vexation, trouble, their activity and ambition.

I can observe something like what you mention in some others, replied CLEANTHES: but I confess I feel little or nothing of it in myself, and hope that it is not so common as you represent it.

If you feel not human misery yourself, cried DEMEA, I congratulate you on so happy a singularity. Others, seemingly the most prosperous, have not been ashamed to vent their complaints in the most melancholy strains. Let us attend to the great, the fortunate emperor, CHARLES V, when, tired with human grandeur, he resigned all his extensive dominions into the hands of his son. In the last harangue which he made on that memorable occasion, he publicly avowed, *that the greatest prosperities which he had ever enjoyed, had been mixed with so many adversities, that he might truly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or contentment*. But did the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater happiness? If we may credit his son's account, his repentance commenced the very day of his resignation.

CICERO's fortune, from small beginnings, rose to the greatest lustre and renown; yet what pathetic complaints of the ills of life do his familiar letters, as well as philosophical discourses, contain? And suitably to his own experience, he introduces CATO, the great, the fortunate CATO, protesting in his old age, that had he a new life in his offer, he would reject the present.

Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next twenty, they say, will be better:

> **And from the dregs of life, hope to receive What the first sprightly running could not give.[26]**

Thus at last they find (such is the greatness of human misery, it reconciles even contradictions), that they complain at once of the shortness of life, and of its vanity and sorrow.

And is it possible, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, that after all these reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?

EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered.

Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

You ascribe, CLEANTHES (and I believe justly), a purpose and intention to Nature. But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? The preservation alone of individuals, and propagation of the species. It seems enough for her purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No resource for this purpose: no machinery, in order merely to give pleasure or ease: no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some want or necessity accompanying it. At least, the few phenomena of this nature are overbalanced by

opposite phenomena of still greater importance.

Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives satisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand, arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheumatisms, where the injury to the animal machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth, laughter, play, frolic, seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no further tendency: spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition, are pains of the same nature. How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? None but we Mystics, as you were pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible.

And have you at last, said CLEANTHES smiling, betrayed your intentions, PHILO ? Your long agreement with DEMEA did indeed a little surprise me; but I find you were all the while erecting a concealed battery against me. And I must confess, that you have now fallen upon a subject worthy of your noble spirit of opposition and controversy. If you can make out the present point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an end at once of all religion. For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain?

You take umbrage very easily, replied DEMEA, at opinions the most innocent, and the most generally received, even amongst the religious and devout themselves: and nothing can be more surprising than to find a topic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man, charged with no less than Atheism and profaneness. Have not all pious divines and preachers, who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; have they not easily, I say, given a solution of any difficulties which may attend it? This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of existence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of things, see the whole connection of general laws; and trace with adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the mazes and intricacies of his providence.

No! replied CLEANTHES, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be admitted, contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence can any cause be known but from its known effects? Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? To establish one hypothesis upon another, is building entirely in the air; and the utmost we ever attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to ascertain the bare possibility of our opinion; but never can we, upon such terms, establish its reality.

The only method of supporting Divine benevolence, and it is what I willingly embrace, is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of man. Your representations are exaggerated; your melancholy views mostly fictitious; your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is more common than sickness; pleasure than pain; happiness than misery. And for one vexation which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a hundred enjoyments.

Admitting your position, replied PHILO, which yet is extremely doubtful, you must at the same time allow, that if pain be less frequent than pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid enjoyments; and how many days, weeks, and months, are passed by several in the most acute torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture; and in no one instance can it continue for any time at its highest pitch and altitude. The spirits evaporate, the nerves relax, the

fabric is disordered, and the enjoyment quickly degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain often, good God, how often! rises to torture and agony; and the longer it continues, it becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted, courage languishes, melancholy seizes us, and nothing terminates our misery but the removal of its cause, or another event, which is the sole cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still greater horror and consternation.

But not to insist upon these topics, continued PHILO, though most obvious, certain, and important; I must use the freedom to admonish you, CLEANTHES, that you have put the controversy upon a most dangerous issue, and are unawares introducing a total scepticism into the most essential articles of natural and revealed theology. What! no method of fixing a just foundation for religion, unless we allow the happiness of human life, and maintain a continued existence even in this world, with all our present pains, infirmities, vexations, and follies, to be eligible and desirable! But this is contrary to every one's feeling and experience: It is contrary to an authority so established as nothing can subvert. No decisive proofs can ever be produced against this authority; nor is it possible for you to compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains and all the pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals: And thus, by your resting the whole system of religion on a point, which, from its very nature, must for ever be uncertain, you tacitly confess, that that system is equally uncertain.

But allowing you what never will be believed, at least what you never possibly can prove, that animal, or at least human happiness, in this life, exceeds its misery, you have yet done nothing: For this is not, by any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I have all along insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn and indignation.

But I will be contented to retire still from this entrenchment, for I deny that you can ever force me in it. I will allow, that pain or misery in man is *compatible* with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even in your sense of these attributes: What are you advanced by all these concessions? A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must *prove* these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful undertaking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed, yet being finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where they are also so jarring and discordant!

Here, CLEANTHES, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph. Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of intelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical subtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe, and of its parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on them. But there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone. It is your turn now to tug the labouring oar, and to support your philosophical subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and

experience.

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume

1779

PART 11

I scruple not to allow, said CLEANTHES, that I have been apt to suspect the frequent repetition of the word infinite, which we meet with in all theological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy; and that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better served, were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate expressions. The terms, *admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise*, and *holy*; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and any thing beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities, has no influence on the affections or sentiments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all human analogy, as seems your intention, DEMEA, I am afraid we abandon all religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; much less can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind, a satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and every untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then be chosen, in order to avoid a greater; inconveniences be submitted to, in order to reach a desirable end; and in a word, benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the present. You, PHILO, who are so prompt at starting views, and reflections, and analogies, I would gladly hear, at length, without interruption, your opinion of this new theory; and if it deserve our attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form.

My sentiments, replied PHILO, are not worth being made a mystery of; and therefore, without any ceremony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with regard to the present subject. It must, I think, be

allowed, that if a very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted with the universe, were assured, that it were the production of a very good, wise, and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from his conjectures, form *beforehand* a different notion of it from what we find it to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine, merely from these attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could be so full of vice and misery and disorder, as it appears in this life. Supposing now, that this person were brought into the world, still assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent Being; he might, perhaps, be surprised at the disappointment; but would never retract his former belief, if founded on any very solid argument; since such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness and ignorance, and must allow, that there may be many solutions of those phenomena, which will for ever escape his comprehension. But supposing, which is the real case with regard to man, that this creature is not antecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence, benevolent, and powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of things; this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason for such a conclusion. He may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of his understanding; but this will not help him in forming an inference concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that inference from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of. The more you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the reach of his faculties. You are obliged, therefore, to reason with him merely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary supposition or conjecture.

Did I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you would certainly blame the contrivance, without any further examination. The architect would in vain display his subtlety, and prove to you, that if this door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What he says may be strictly true: The alteration of one particular, while the other parts of the building remain, may only augment the inconveniences. But still you would assert in general, that, if the architect had had skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your own ignorance of such a plan, will never convince you of the impossibility of it. If you find any inconveniences and deformities in the building, you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn the architect.

In short, I repeat the question: Is the world, considered in general, and as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a limited being, would, *beforehand*, expect from a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. And from thence I conclude, that however consistent the world may be, allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The consistence is not absolutely denied, only the inference. Conjectures, especially where infinity is excluded from the Divine attributes, may perhaps be sufficient to prove a consistence, but can never be foundations for any inference.

There seem to be *four* circumstances, on which depend all, or the greatest part of the ills, that molest sensible creatures; and it is not impossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable. We know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with regard to the economy of a universe, there is no conjecture, however wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may not be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding, in

this deep ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious, and not to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is supported by no appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the case with regard to all the causes of evil, and the circumstances on which it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the utmost license of imagination.

The *first* circumstance which introduces evil, is that contrivance or economy of the animal creation, by which pains, as well as pleasures, are employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various degrees, seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose. All animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment: but when urged by any of the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness; instead of pain, they might feel a diminution of pleasure, by which they might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their subsistence. Men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain; at least they might have been so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly possible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? If animals can be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from it; and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce that feeling, as to endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses. Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any appearance of reason? and shall we build on that conjecture as on the most certain truth?

But a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain, were it not for the *second* circumstance, viz. the conducting of the world by general laws; and this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true, if everything were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature would be perpetually broken, and no man could employ his reason in the conduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience? In short, might not the Deity exterminate all ill, wherever it were to be found; and produce all good, without any preparation, or long progress of causes and effects?

Besides, we must consider, that, according to the present economy of the world, the course of nature, though supposed exactly regular, yet to us appears not so, and many events are uncertain, and many disappoint our expectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite number of other accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a great influence both on the fortunes of particular persons and on the prosperity of public societies; and indeed all human life, in a manner, depends on such accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret springs of the universe, might easily, by particular volitions, turn all these accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy, without discovering himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes were salutary to society, might always meet with a fair wind. Good princes enjoy sound health and long life. Persons born to power and authority, be framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions. A few such events as these, regularly and wisely conducted, would change the face of the world; and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of nature, or confound human conduct, than the present economy of things, where the causes are secret, and variable, and compounded. Some small touches given to CALIGULA's brain in his infancy, might have converted him into a TRAJAN. One wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying CAESAR and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, might have restored liberty to a considerable part of mankind. There may, for aught we know, be good reasons why Providence interposes not in this manner; but they are unknown to us; and though the mere supposition, that such reasons exist, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the Divine attributes, yet surely it can never be sufficient to *establish*

that conclusion.

If every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if animals be rendered susceptible of pain, it scarcely seems possible but some ill must arise in the various shocks of matter, and the various concurrence and opposition of general laws; but this ill would be very rare, were it not for the third circumstance, which I proposed to mention, viz. the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are distributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs and capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to their preservation, that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe. Every animal has the requisite endowments; but these endowments are bestowed with so scrupulous an economy, that any considerable diminution must entirely destroy the creature. Wherever one power is increased, there is a proportional abatement in the others. Animals which excel in swiftness are commonly defective in force. Those which possess both are either imperfect in some of their senses, or are oppressed with the most craving wants. The human species, whose chief excellency is reason and sagacity, is of all others the most necessitous, and the most deficient in bodily advantages; without clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging, without any convenience of life, except what they owe to their own skill and industry. In short, nature seems to have formed an exact calculation of the necessities of her creatures; and, like a *rigid master*, has afforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly sufficient to supply those necessities. An *indulgent parent* would have bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure the happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate concurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so surrounded with precipices, that the least departure from the true path, by mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and ruin. Some reserve, some fund, would have been provided to ensure happiness; nor would the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an economy. The Author of Nature is inconceivably powerful: his force is supposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible: nor is there any reason, as far as we can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in his dealings with his creatures. It would have been better, were his power extremely limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed these with more faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder is never esteemed prudent, who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock will enable him to finish.

In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man should have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force of the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or rhinoceros; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his soul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and labour; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent to business and application. Let the whole species possess naturally an equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by habit and reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any allay of ill, is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment. Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life, arise from idleness; and were our species, by the original constitution of their frame, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of every office and duty, immediately follow; and men at once may fully reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained by the best regulated government. But as industry is a power, and the most valuable of any, Nature seems determined, suitably to her usual maxims, to bestow it on men with a very sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely for his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his

attainments. She has so contrived his frame, that nothing but the most violent necessity can oblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to overcome, at least in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of a faculty of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave him. Here our demands may be allowed very humble, and therefore the more reasonable. If we required the endowments of superior penetration and judgement, of a more delicate taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to benevolence and friendship; we might be told, that we impiously pretend to break the order of Nature; that we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of being; that the presents which we require, not being suitable to our state and condition, would only be pernicious to us. But it is hard; I dare to repeat it, it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of wants and necessities, where almost every being and element is either our foe or refuses its assistance ... we should also have our own temper to struggle with, and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone fence against these multiplied evils.

The *fourth* circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the universe, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles of the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are few parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some purpose, and whose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the whole. The parts hang all together; nor can one be touched without affecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time, it must be observed, that none of these parts or principles, however useful, are so accurately adjusted, as to keep precisely within those bounds in which their utility consists; but they are, all of them, apt, on every occasion, to run into the one extreme or the other. One would imagine, that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker; so little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with which it is executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the vapours along the surface of the globe, and to assist men in navigation: but how oft, rising up to tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious? Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: but how often are they defective? how often excessive? Heat is requisite to all life and vegetation; but is not always found in the due proportion. On the mixture and secretion of the humours and juices of the body depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the parts perform not regularly their proper function. What more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger? But how oft do they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? There is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but what frequently becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The irregularity is never perhaps so great as to destroy any species; but is often sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery.

On the concurrence, then, of these *four* circumstances, does all or the greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil never could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium; there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at present. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest in our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable reasons *a priori*, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown manner, be

reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, that as this goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject. I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes as you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a conclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from these phenomena.

Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated and organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children!

Here the MANICHAEAN system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the difficulty: and no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious, and has more probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible account of the strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life. But if we consider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is indeed an opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures: but are not all the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true conclusion is, that the original Source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles; and has no more regard to good above ill, than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.

There may *four* hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe: *that* they are endowed with perfect goodness; *that* they have perfect malice; *that* they are opposite, and have both goodness and malice; *that* they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can never prove the two former unmixed principles; and the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable.

What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevolence resembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral good than natural evil above natural good.

But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a cause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every effect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry on the progression *in infinitum*, or rest on that original principle, who is the ultimate cause of all things....

Hold! hold! cried DEMEA: Whither does your imagination hurry you? I joined in alliance with you, in order to prove the incomprehensible nature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of CLEANTHES, who would measure every thing by human rule and standard. But I now find you

running into all the topics of the greatest libertines and infidels, and betraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused. Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than CLEANTHES himself?

And are you so late in perceiving it? replied CLEANTHES. Believe me, DEMEA, your friend PHILO, from the beginning, has been amusing himself at both our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of ridicule. The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery, and still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In ages of stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused; and perhaps no views of things are more proper to promote superstition, than such as encourage the blind amazement, the diffidence, and melancholy of mankind. But at present....

Blame not so much, interposed PHILO, the ignorance of these reverend gentlemen. They know how to change their style with the times. Formerly it was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human life was vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are incident to men. But of late years, divines, we find, begin to retract this position; and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this life. When religion stood entirely upon temper and education, it was thought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed mankind never have recourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition. But as men have now learned to form principles, and to draw consequences, it is necessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such arguments as will endure at least some scrutiny and examination. This variation is the same (and from the same causes) with that which I formerly remarked with regard to Scepticism.

Thus PHILO continued to the last his spirit of opposition, and his censure of established opinions. But I could observe that DEMEA did not at all relish the latter part of the discourse; and he took occasion soon after, on some pretence or other, to leave the company.

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume

1779

PART 12

After DEMEA's departure, CLEANTHES and PHILO continued the conversation in the following manner. Our friend, I am afraid, said CLEANTHES, will have little inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you are in company; and to tell truth, PHILO, I should rather wish to reason with either of you apart on a subject so sublime and interesting. Your spirit of controversy, joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition, carries you strange lengths, when engaged in an argument; and there is nothing so sacred and venerable, even in your own eyes, which you spare on that occasion.

I must confess, replied PHILO, that I am less cautious on the subject of Natural Religion than on any other; both because I know that I can never, on that head, corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; and because no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common sense, will ever mistake my intentions. You, in particular, CLEANTHES, with whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that notwithstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of singular arguments, no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, or pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of nature. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the contemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and, from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its use and intention. One great foundation of

the Copernican system is the maxim, *That Nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any end*; and astronomers often, without thinking of it, lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is observable in other parts of philosophy: And thus all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess that intention.

It is with pleasure I hear GALEN reason concerning the structure of the human body. The anatomy of a man, says he,[27] discovers above 600 different muscles; and whoever duly considers these, will find, that, in each of them, Nature must have adjusted at least ten different circumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed; proper figure, just magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, upper and lower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves, veins, and arteries: So that, in the muscles alone, above 6000 several views and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he calculates to be 284: The distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of each, above forty. What a prodigious display of artifice, even in these simple and homogeneous parts! But if we consider the skin, ligaments, vessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body; how must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted! The further we advance in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: But descry still, at a distance, further scenes beyond our reach; in the fine internal structure of the parts, in the economy of the brain, in the fabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every different species of animal, with wonderful variety, and with exact propriety, suited to the different intentions of Nature in framing each species. And if the infidelity of GALEN, even when these natural sciences were still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances, to what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence!

Could I meet with one of this species (who, I thank God, are very rare), I would ask him: Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself immediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give stronger proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature? What indeed could such a Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures? Now, according to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for undisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments which its nature admits of; even though these arguments be not, in themselves, very numerous or forcible: How much more, in the present case, where no human imagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their cogency!

I shall further add, said CLEANTHES, to what you have so well urged, that one great advantage of the principle of Theism, is, that it is the only system of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and complete, and yet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and experience in the world. The comparison of the universe to a machine of human contrivance, is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many instances of order and design in Nature, that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation. Whoever attempts to weaken this theory, cannot pretend to succeed by establishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate: It is sufficient for him if he start doubts and difficulties; and by remote and abstract views of things, reach that suspense of judgement, which is here the utmost boundary of his wishes. But, besides that this state of mind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can never be steadily maintained against such striking appearances as continually

engage us into the religious hypothesis. A false, absurd system, human nature, from the force of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and perseverance: But no system at all, in opposition to a theory supported by strong and obvious reason, by natural propensity, and by early education, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend.

So little, replied PHILO, do I esteem this suspense of judgement in the present case to be possible, that I am apt to suspect there enters somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy, more than is usually imagined. That the works of Nature bear a great analogy to the productions of art, is evident; and according to all the rules of good reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional difference in the causes; and in particular, ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause, than any we have ever observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a DEITY is plainly ascertained by reason: and if we make it a question, whether, on account of these analogies, we can properly call him a *mind* or *intelligence*, notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed between him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal controversy? No man can deny the analogies between the effects: To restrain ourselves from inquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible. From this inquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an analogy: And if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme cause a GOD or DEITY, but desire to vary the expression; what can we call him but MIND or THOUGHT, to which he is justly supposed to bear a considerable resemblance?

All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound so much in philosophical and theological inquiries; and it is found, that the only remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions, from the precision of those ideas which enter into any argument, and from the strict and uniform use of those terms which are employed. But there is a species of controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of human ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or precision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any quality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether HANNIBAL be a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man, what degree of beauty CLEOPATRA possessed, what epithet of praise LIVY or THUCYDIDES is entitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The disputants may here agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or *vice versa*; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter into each other's meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are not, like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration,[28] which may be the standard in the controversy. That the dispute concerning Theism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps, if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the slightest inquiry. I ask the Theist, if he does not allow, that there is a great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible difference between the *human* and the *divine* mind: The more pious he is, the more readily will he assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify the difference: He will even assert, that the difference is of a nature which cannot be too much magnified. I next turn to the Atheist, who, I assert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I ask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the parts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all the operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure of human thought, be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy to each other: It is impossible he can deny it: He will readily acknowledge it.

Having obtained this concession, I push him still further in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle which first arranged, and still maintains order in this universe, bears not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of nature, and, among the rest, to the economy of human mind and thought. However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? The Theist allows, that the original intelligence is very different from human reason: The Atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote analogy to it. Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor consequently of any determination? If you should be so obstinate, I should not be surprised to find you insensibly change sides; while the Theist, on the one hand, exaggerates the dissimilarity between the Supreme Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and mortal creatures; and the Atheist, on the other, magnifies the analogy among all the operations of Nature, in every period, every situation, and every position. Consider then, where the real point of controversy lies; and if you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least, to cure yourselves of your animosity.

And here I must also acknowledge, CLEANTHES, that as the works of Nature have a much greater analogy to the effects of *our* art and contrivance, than to those of *our* benevolence and justice, we have reason to infer, that the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater resemblance to those of men, than his moral have to human virtues. But what is the consequence? Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are more defective in their kind than his natural abilities. For, as the Supreme Being is allowed to be absolutely and entirely perfect, whatever differs most from him, departs the furthest from the supreme standard of rectitude and perfection.[29]

These, CLEANTHES, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these sentiments, you know, I have ever cherished and maintained. But in proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of vulgar superstitions; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure, I confess, in pushing such principles, sometimes into absurdity, sometimes into impiety. And you are sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great aversion to the latter above the former, are commonly equally guilty of both.

My inclination, replied CLEANTHES, lies, I own, a contrary way. Religion, however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find; how much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal?

How happens it then, said PHILO, if vulgar superstition be so salutary to society, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on public affairs? Factions, civil wars, persecutions, subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend it. And no period of time can be happier or more prosperous, than those in which it is never regarded or heard of.

The reason of this observation, replied CLEANTHES, is obvious. The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanise their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has

become only a cover to faction and ambition.

And so will all religion, said PHILO, except the philosophical and rational kind. Your reasonings are more easily eluded than my facts. The inference is not just, because finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite and eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the attachment which we have to present things, and the little concern which we discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are declaiming against the common behaviour and conduct of the world, they always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed it is); and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their religious interests. Yet these same divines, when they refute their speculative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction. It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems. A man's natural inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the mind, and mingles itself with every view and consideration: whereas religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether habitual to the mind. The force of the greatest gravity, say the philosophers, is infinitely small, in comparison of that of the least impulse: yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will, in the end, prevail above a great impulse; because no strokes or blows can be repeated with such constancy as attraction and gravitation.

Another advantage of inclination: It engages on its side all the wit and ingenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them: In which it is almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account for those strange salvos and excuses, with which people satisfy themselves, when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their religious duty? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools ever repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that from study and philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to theological subjects. And when we have to do with a man, who makes a great profession of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and deceived by him?

We must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and reflection, stand less in need of such motives to keep them under the restraint of morals; and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity. We need not run back into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that atrociousness, unknown to the Egyptian and Grecian superstitions, of declaiming in express terms, against morality; and representing it as a sure forfeiture of the Divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be laid upon it.

But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in direct opposition to morality; the very diverting of the attention, the raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most pernicious consequences, and weaken extremely men's attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity.

Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of the familiar motives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the temper; and must be roused by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional task. Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the heart, at the time, feels cold and languid: A habit of dissimulation is by degrees contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant principle. Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, that the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being inconsistent, are often or commonly united in the same individual character.

The bad effects of such habits, even in common life, are easily imagined; but where the interests of religion are concerned, no morality can be forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of the cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it.

The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence.

Thus, the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on general conduct; nor is their operation favourable to morality, in the instances where they predominate.

Is there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible, than that both the number and authority of priests should be confined within very narrow limits; and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep his *fasces*[30] and *axes* from such dangerous hands? But if the spirit of popular religion were so salutary to society, a contrary maxim ought to prevail. The greater number of priests, and their greater authority and riches, will always augment the religious spirit. And though the priests have the guidance of this spirit, why may we not expect a superior sanctity of life, and greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who are set apart for religion, who are continually inculcating it upon others, and who must themselves imbibe a greater share of it? Whence comes it then, that, in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to popular religions, is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it, and to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society? Every expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with inconveniences. If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he must sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every consideration of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his own independency. If he gives indulgence to several sects, which is the wiser maxim, he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to all of them, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect; otherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes, quarrels, factions, persecutions, and civil commotions.

True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: but we must treat of religion, as it has commonly been found in the world; nor have I any thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism, which, as it is a species of philosophy, must partake of the beneficial influence of that principle, and at the same time must lie under a like inconvenience, of being always confined to very few persons.

Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a question whether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and the reflecting on the general interests of society, which are the chief restraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths and political oaths are but little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and religion; and a Quaker's asseveration is with us justly put upon the same footing with the oath of any other person. I know, that POLYBIUS[31] ascribes the infamy of

GREEK faith to the prevalency of the EPICUREAN philosophy: but I know also, that Punic faith had as bad a reputation in ancient times as Irish evidence has in modern; though we cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to mention that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean philosophy; and EURIPIDES,[32] in a passage which I shall point out to you, has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against his nation, with regard to this circumstance.

Take care, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, take care: push not matters too far: allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration for the true. Forfeit not this principle, the chief, the only great comfort in life; and our principal support amidst all the attacks of adverse fortune. The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for human imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who created us for happiness; and who, having implanted in us immeasurable desires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will transfer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those desires, and render our felicity complete and durable. Next to such a Being himself (if the comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we can imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection.

These appearances, said PHILO, are most engaging and alluring; and with regard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. But it happens here, as in the former case, that, with regard to the greater part of mankind, the appearances are deceitful, and that the terrors of religion commonly prevail above its comforts.

It is allowed, that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as when dejected with grief or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow?

But men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion, replied CLEANTHES. Sometimes, said PHILO: but it is natural to imagine, that they will form a notion of those unknown beings, suitably to the present gloom and melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to predominate in all religions; and we ourselves, after having employed the most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the flattest contradiction in affirming that the damned are infinitely superior in number to the elect.

I shall venture to affirm, that there never was a popular religion, which represented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. These fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies between the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking to Nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which lie beyond it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of CERBERUS and FURIES; devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone.

It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because both these passions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them forms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a cheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company, or entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himself to these, and thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge himself still deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he has, in this manner, engraved the religious opinions deep into his thought and imagination, there may arrive a change of health or circumstances, which may restore his good humour, and raising cheerful prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that,

as terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure.

Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by exhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of superstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery. No wonder that such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind, and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet it is apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people.

It is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon account of any opinion whatsoever, or to imagine that we run any risk hereafter, by the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies both an *absurdity* and an *inconsistency*. It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior.

***To know God*, says SENECA, *is to worship him*. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious DEMON, who exercises his power without reason and without humanity! And were that Divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly mortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the votaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of human race merit his *favour*, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain, or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his Divine perfections: As the only persons entitled to his *compassion* and *indulgence* would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or endeavour to suspend, all judgement with regard to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects.**

If the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, *That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence:* If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the objections which lie against it? Some astonishment, indeed, will naturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe me, CLEANTHES, the most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations of the Divine object of our faith. A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of

natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: While the haughty Dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of Theology by the mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and rejects this adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian; a proposition which I would willingly recommend to the attention of PAMPHILUS: And I hope CLEANTHES will forgive me for interposing so far in the education and instruction of his pupil.

CLEANTHES and PHILO pursued not this conversation much further: and as nothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the reasonings of that day, so I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I cannot but think, that PHILO's principles are more probable than DEMEA's; but that those of CLEANTHES approach still nearer to the truth.

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

David Hume

1779

NOTES

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[2]Thomas Hayter, *Remarks on Mr. Hume's Dialogues, concerning natural religion,* Cambridge, 1780, T. Cadell.

[3]Joseph Milner, *Gibbon's account of Christianity considered: together with some strictures on Hume's Dialogues concerning natural religion*, London, 1781, G. Robinson and T. Cadell, pp. 199-221.

[4]John Ogilvie, *Inquiry into the causes of the infidelity and scepticism of the times*, London, 1783, Richardson and Urquhart. After considering Philo's four hypotheses concerning the causes of the universe, Ogilvie writes "Philo, the author's sceptical dialogist, is the speaker upon this occasion. But, as his opinions are not impugned or confuted by Cleanthes, they appear to be those of the author" (pp. 68-69). The context of Ogilvie's other comments on the *Dialogues* make it clear that Philo speaks for Hume except when Philo concedes the existence of a creative Mind.

[5]Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume's Philosophy of Religion: God Without Ethics," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion,* 1970, Vol. I, pp. 233-240.

6 James O'Higgins, "Hume and the Deists: a Contrast in Religious Approaches," *Journal of Theological Studies,* 1971, Vol. 23, pp. 479-501. In *Hume's Philosophy of Religion* (Atlantic Highlands, 1988),

7 Norman Kemp Smith *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, p. 24. Kemp Smith bases his view on the conclusions to the "Natural History" and *Dialogues*, and Hume's 1743 letter to William Mure.

8 Williams "Hume on Religion," in *David Hume A Symposium*, e.d. D.F. Pears, London, 1963, pp. 77-88.

9 Ernest C. Mossner, "The Religion of David Hume," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1978, Vol. 39, pp. 653-663.

10 Donald Livingston, "Hume's Conception of True Religion," in *Hume's Philosophy of Religion* (Winston-Salem, 1986), pp. 33-73.

11 James Noxon, "In Defence of 'Hume's Agnosticism,'" *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 1976, Vol. 14, p. 470.

12 Chrysippus apud Plut. *De repug. Stoicorum*. [Chrysippus (c. 280-207 BCE.), as appears in Plutarch's *Stoic Inconsistencies*, Ch. 9, 1035 a-b -- Ed.]

13 [John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, Bk. 2. -- Ed.]

14 L'art de penser. [Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694), *La Logique ou l'art de penser* (*The Port Royal Logic, 1662*). -- Ed.]

15 Mons. Huet. [Peter Daniel Huet (1630-1721), *Traite philosophique de la faiblesse de l'esprit humain* (1723) -- Ed.]

16 Recherche de la Verite, liv. 3, cap. 9. [Nicholas Melbranche (1638-1715), *The Search after Truth*, Bk 3, Ch. 9 -- Ed.]

17 [In his letter of March 10, 1751 to Gilbert Eliot, Hume comments on Cleanthes' argument in this paragraph. "If you'll be persuaded to assist me in supporting Cleanthes, I fancy you need not take Matters any higher than Part 3. He allows, indeed, in Part 2, that all our Inference is founded on the Similitude of the Works of Nature to the usual Effects of Mind. Otherwise they must appear a mere Chaos. The only Difficulty is, why the other Dissimilitudes do not weaken the Argument. And indeed it woud seem from Experience & Feeling, that they do not weaken it so much as we might naturally expect. A Theory to solve this woud be very acceptable."

18 [Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Bk. 1:22 -- Ed.]

19 [Senna is a laxitive drug made from various plants. -- Ed.]

20 Lib. XI. 1094. [Lucretius (98-55 BCE.) *On the Nature of Things*, Bk. 2: "Who can rule the sum, who hold in his hand with controlling force the strong reins, of the immeasurable deep? Who can at once make all the different heavens to roll and warm with ethereal fires all the fruitful earths, or be present in all places at all times." -- Ed.]

21 De Nat. Deor. Lib. 1. [Cicero (106-43 BCE.), *De Natura Deorum*, Bk. 1: 8: "For with what eyes of the mind could your Plato have beheld that workshop of such stupendous toil, in which he represents the world as having been put together and built by God? How was so vast an undertaking set about? What tools, what levers, what machines, what servants were employed in so great a work? How came air, fire, water, and earth to obey and submit to the architect's will?"]

[22]Dr. Clarke. [Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*. -- Ed.]

[23]Republique des Lettres, Aout 1685.

[24]That sentiment had been maintained by Dr. King, and some few others, before Leibniz, though by none of so great fame as that German philosopher.

[25][John Dryden (1631-1700), *Aureng-Zebe*, Act 4, sc. 1. -- Ed.]

[26][John Milton (1608-1674), *Paradise Lost*, Bk. 11. -- Ed.]

[27]De Formatione Foetus. [Claudius Galenus (c. 130-200 CE) *De Foetuum Formatione Libelus*, Bk. 6. -- Ed.]

[28][Mensuration is a branch of geometry dealing with the measurement of length, area, or volume. -- Ed.]

[29]It seems evident that the dispute between the Skeptics and Dogmatists is entirely verbal, or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and assurance which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning; and such disputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise determination. No philosophical Dogmatist denies that there are difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and that these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely insolvable. No Skeptic denies that we lie under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and reasoning, with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently assenting with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between these sects, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit, caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dogmatist, for like reasons, on the necessity.

[30][A faces is a bundle of rods containing a projecting ax blade. -- Ed.]

[31]Lib. vi. cap. 54. [Polybius, (c. 205-123 BCE) *The Histories*, Bk. 6, Ch. 54 -- Ed.]

[32]Iphigenia in Tauride. [Euripides, (c 480-406 BCE), *Iphigenia in Tauris*, v. 1200-1205. -- Ed.]

Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul:
The Complete 1783 Edition

David Hume

2/10/96

Editor's Note: Hume's essays on the suicide and the immortality of the soul were completed around 1755 and printed as part of a book of essays titled *Five Dissertations*. When pre-release copies of *Five Dissertations* provoked controversy among influential readers, Hume and his printer Andrew Millar agreed to have the two essays physically removed from the printed copies. They were replaced with an essay titled "Of the Standard of Taste," and the book of essays appeared in 1757 under the title *Four Dissertations*. Rumors about the two withdrawn essays circulated for years, and clandestine copies appeared anonymously in French (1770) and later in English (1777). In 1783 the two essays were published more openly, and this time with Hume's name attached. Like the 1770 and 1777 publications, the 1783 publication was not authorized by Hume. Along with Hume's two essays, the anonymous editor of the 1783 edition included his own critical notes to Hume's two pieces, and excerpts from Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Heloise* on the subject of suicide. The contents, then, of the 1783 publication are as follows:

A copy of the original two essays as they were printed in *Five Dissertations* is in the possession of the National Library of Scotland. That copy contains nineteen corrections in Hume's hand and is

Hume's final surviving revision of the essays. None of these corrections appear in the 1783 edition.

ESSAYS
ON
***SUICIDE*,**
AND
THE IMMORTALITY
OF THE
***SOUL*,**
ASCRIBED TO THE LATE
***DAVID HUME*, ESQ.**
Never before published.
With REMARKS, intended as an Antidote to the
Poison contained in these Performances,
BY THE EDITOR.
TO WHICH IS ADDED,
TWO LETTERS ON SUICIDE,
FROM ROSSEAU'S ELOISA.

Printed for M. SMITH; and sold by the booksellers in piccadilly,
Fleet-street, and Paternoster-row.
1783
(Price 3 *s*. 6 *d*. sewed)

{iii}

PREFACE

THESE two Essays on *Suicide* and *the Immortality of the Soul*, though not published in any edition of his works, are generally attributed to the late ingenious Mr. Hume.

The well-known contempt of this eminent philosopher for the common convictions of mankind, raised an apprehension of the contents from the very title of these pieces. But the celebrity of the author's name, renders them, notwithstanding, in some degree objects of great curiosity.

Owing to this circumstance, a few copies have been clandestinely circulated, at a large price, for some time, but without any comment. The very mystery attending this mode of selling them, made them more an object of request than they would otherwise have been. {iv}

The present publication comes abroad under no such restraint, and possesses very superior advantages. The *Notes* annexed are intended to expose the sophistry contained in the original Essays, and may shew how little we have to fear from the adversaries of these great truths, from the pitiful figure which even Mr. Hume makes in thus violently exhausting his last strength in an abortive attempt to traduce or discredit them.

The two very matterly Letters from the Eloisa of Rosseau on the subject of *Suicide*, have been much celebrated, and we hope will be considered as materially increasing the value of this curious collection.

The admirers of *Mr. Hume* will be pleased with seeing the remains of a favourite author rescued in this manner from that oblivion to which the prejudices of his countrymen had, in all appearance, consigned them; and even the religious part of mankind have some reason of triumph from the striking instance here given of truth's superiority to error, even when error has all the advantage of an elegant genius, and a great literary reputation to recommend it.

{1}

ESSAY I.
ON *SUICIDE*.

ONE considerable advantage that arises from Philosophy, consists in the sovereign antidote which it affords to superstition and false religion. All other remedies against that pestilent distemper are vain, or at least uncertain. Plain good sense and the practice of the world, which alone serve most purposes of life, are here found ineffectual: History as well as daily experience furnish instances of men endowed with the {2} strongest capacity for business and affairs, who have all their lives crouched under slavery to the grossest superstition. Even gaiety and sweetness of temper, which infuse a balm into every other wound, afford no remedy to so virulent a poison; as we may particularly observe of the fair sex, who tho' commonly possest of their rich presents of nature, feel many of their joys blasted by this importunate intruder. But when found Philosophy has once gained possession of the mind, superstition is effectually excluded, and one may fairly affirm that her triumph over this enemy is more complete than over most of the vices and imperfections incident to human nature. Love or anger, ambition or avarice, have their root in the temper and affection, which the soundest reason is scarce ever able fully to correct, but superstition being founded on false opinion, must immediately vanish when true philosophy has inspired juster sentiments of superior powers. The contest is here more equal between the distemper and the medicine, {3} and nothing can hinder the latter from proving effectual but its being false and sophisticated.

IT will here be superfluous to magnify the merits of Philosophy by displaying the pernicious tendency of that vice of which it cures the human mind. ([editor's note] 1) The superstitious man says Tully[2] is miserable in every scene, in every incident in life; even sleep itself, which banishes all other cares of unhappy mortals, affords to him matter of new terror; while he examines his dreams, and finds in those visions of the night prognostications of future calamities. I may add that tho' death alone can put a full period to his misery, he dares not fly to this refuge, but still prolongs a miserable existence from a vain fear left he offend his Maker, by using the power, with which that beneficent being has endowed him. The presents of God and nature are ravished from us by this {4} cruel enemy, and notwithstanding that one step would remove us from the regions of pain and sorrow, her menaces still chain us down to a hated being which she herself chiefly contributes to render miserable.

'TIS observed by such as have been reduced by the calamities of life to the necessity of employing this fatal remedy, that if the unseasonable care of their friends deprive them of that species of Death which they proposed to themselves, they seldom venture upon any other, or can summon up so much resolution a second time as to execute their purpose. So great is our horror of death, that when it presents itself under any form, besides that to which a man has endeavoured to reconcile his imagination, it acquires new terrors and overcomes his feeble courage: But when the menaces

of superstition are joined to this natural timidity, no wonder it quite deprives men of all power over their lives, since even many pleasures and enjoyments, {5} to which we are carried by a strong propensity, are torn from us by this inhuman tyrant. Let us here endeavour to restore men to their native liberty, by examining all the common arguments against Suicide, and shewing that that action may be free from every imputation of guilt or blame, according to the sentiments of all the antient philosophers. ([editor's note] 2)

IF Suicide be criminal, it must be a transgression of our duty either to God, our neighbour, or ourselves. -- To prove that suicide is no transgression of our duty to God, the following considerations may perhaps suffice. In order to govern the material world, the almighty Creator has established general and immutable laws, by which all bodies, from the greatest planet to the smallest particle of matter, are maintained in their proper sphere and function. To govern the animal world, he has endowed all living creatures with bodily and mental powers; with senses, passions, {6} appetites, memory, and judgement, by which they are impelled or regulated in that course of life to which they are destined. These two distinct principles of the material and animal world, continually encroach upon each other, and mutually retard or forward each others operation. The powers of men and of all other animals are restrained and directed by the nature and qualities of the surrounding bodies, and the modifications and actions of these bodies are incessantly altered by the operation of all animals. Man is stopt by rivers in his passage over the surface of the earth; and rivers, when properly directed, lend their force to the motion of machines, which serve to the use of man. But tho' the provinces of the material and animal powers are not kept entirely separate, there results from thence no discord or disorder in the creation; on the contrary, from the mixture, union, and contrast of all the various powers of inanimate bodies and living creatures, arises that sympathy, harmony, {7} and proportion, which affords the surest argument of supreme wisdom. The providence of the Deity appears not immediately in any operation, but governs every thing by those general and immutable laws, which have been established from the beginning of time. All events, in one sense, may be pronounced the action of the Almighty, they all proceed from those powers with which he has endowed his creatures. A house which falls by its own weight, is not brought to ruin by his providence, more than one destroyed by the hands of men; nor are the human faculties less his workmanship, than the laws of motion and gravitation. When the passions play, when the judgment dictates, when the limbs obey; this is all the operation of God, and upon these animate principles, as well as upon the inanimate, has he established the government of the universe. Every event is alike important in the eyes of that infinite being, who takes in at one glance the most distant regions of space, and {8} remotest periods of time. There is no event, however important to us, which he has exempted from the general laws that govern the universe, or which he has peculiarly reserved for his own immediate action and operation. The revolution of states and empires depends upon the smallest caprice or passion of single men; and the lives of men are shortened or extended by the smallest accident of air or dies, sunshine or tempest. Nature still continues her progress and operation; and if general laws be ever broke by particular volitions of the Deity, 'tis after a manner which entirely escapes human observation. As on the one hand, the elements and other inanimate parts of the creation carry on their action without regard to the particular interest and situation of men; so men are entrusted to their own judgment and discretion in the various shocks of matter, and may employ every faculty with which they are endowed, in order to provide for their ease, happiness, or {9} preservation. What is the meaning then of that principle, that a man who tired of life, and hunted by pain and misery, bravely overcomes all the natural terrors of death, and makes his escape from

this cruel scene: that such a man I say, has incurred the indignation of his Creator by encroaching on the office of divine providence, and disturbing the order of the universe? Shall we assert that the Almighty has reserved to himself in any peculiar manner the disposal of the lives of men, and has not submitted that event, in common with others, to the general laws by which the universe is governed? This is plainly false; the lives of men depend upon the same laws as the lives of all other animals; and these are subjected to the general laws of matter and motion. The fall of a tower, or the infusion of a poison, will destroy a man equally with the meanest creature; an inundation sweeps away every thing without distinction that comes within the reach of its fury. Since therefore the lives of men {10} are for ever dependant on the general laws of matter and motion, is a man's disposing of his life criminal, because in every case it is criminal to encroach upon these laws, or disturb their operation? But this seems absurd; all animals are entrusted to their own prudence and skill for their conduct in the world, and have full authority as far as their power extends, to alter all the operations of nature. Without the excercise of this authority they could not subsist a moment; every action, every motion of a man, innovates on the order of some parts of matter, and diverts from their ordinary course the general laws of motion. Putting together, therefore, these conclusion, we find that human life depends upon the general laws of matter and motion, and that it is no encroachment on the office of providence to disturb or alter these general laws: Has not every one, of consequence, the free disposal of his own life? And may he not lawfully employ that power with which nature has endowed him? In order {11} to destroy the evidence of this conclusion, we must shew a reason why this particular case is excepted; is it because human life is of such great importance, that 'tis a presumption for human prudence to dispose of it? But the life of a man is of no greater importance to the universe than that of an oyster. And were it of ever so great importance, the order of human nature has actually submitted it to human prudence, and reduced us to a necessity, in every incident, of determining concerning it. -- Were the disposal of human life so much reserved as the peculiar province of the Almighty, that it were an encroachment on his right, for men to dispose of their own lives; it would be equally criminal to act for the preservation of life as for its destruction. If I turn aside a stone which is falling upon my head, I disturb the course of nature, and I invade the peculiar province of the Almighty, by lengthening out my life beyond the period which by the general laws of matter and motion he had assigned it. ([editor's note] 3) {12}

A hair, a fly, an insect is able to destroy this mighty being whose life is of such importance. Is it an absurdity to suppose that human prudence may lawfully dispose of what depends on such insignificant causes? It would be no crime in me to divert the *Nile* or *Danube* from its course, were I able to effect such purposes. Where then is the crime of turning a few ounces of blood from their natural channel? -- Do you imagine that I repine at Providence or curse my creation, because I go out of life, and put a period to a being, which, were it to continue, would render me miserable? Far be such sentiments from me; I am only convinced of a matter of fact, which you yourself acknowledge possible, that human life may be unhappy, and that my existence, if further prolonged, would become ineligible; but I thank Providence, both for the good which I have already enjoyed, and for the power with which I am endowed of escaping the ill that {13} threatens me.[3] To you it belongs to repine at providence, who foolishly imagine that you have no such power, and who must still prolong a hated life, tho' loaded with pain and sickness, with shame and poverty -- Do not you teach, that when any ill befals me, tho' by the malice of my enemies, I ought to be resigned to providence, and that the actions of men are the operations of the Almighty as much as the actions of inanimate beings? When I fall upon my own sword, therefore, I receive my death

equally from the hands of the Deity as if it had proceeded from a lion, a precipice, or a fever. The submission which you require to providence, in every calamity that befals me, excludes not human skill and industry, if possible by their means I can avoid or escape the calamity: And why may I not employ one remedy as well as another? -- If my life be not my own, it were criminal for me to put it in danger, as {14} well as to dispose of it; nor could one man deserve the appellation of *hero*, whom glory or friendship transports into the greatest dangers, and another merit the reproach of *wretch* or *misereant* who puts a period to his life, from the same or like motives. -- There is no being, which possesses any power or faculty, that it receives not from its Creator, nor is there any one, which by ever so irregular an action can encroach upon the plan of his providence, or disorder the universe. Its operations are his works equally with that chain of events which it invades, and which ever principle prevails, we may for that very reason conclude it to be most favoured by him. Be it animate, or inanimate, rational, or irrational, 'tis all a case: its power is still derived from the supreme Creator, and is alike comprehended in the order of his providence. When the horror of pain prevails over the love of life; when a voluntary action anticipates the effects of blind causes, 'tis only in consequence of those {15} powers and principles which he has implanted in his creatures. Divine providence is still inviolate, and placed far beyond the reach of human injuries. 'Tis impious says the old Roman superstition[4] to divert rivers from their course, or invade the prerogatives of nature. 'Tis impious says the French superstition to inoculate for the small-pox, or usurp the business of providence by voluntarily producing distempers and maladies. 'Tis impious says the modern *European* superstition, to put a period to our own life, and thereby rebel against our Creator; and why not impious, say I, to build houses, cultivate the ground, or fail upon the ocean? In all these actions we employ our powers of mind and body, to produce some innovation in the course of nature; and in none of them do we any more. They are all of them therefore equally innocent, or equally criminal. *But you are placed by providence, like a centinal, in a particular station, {16} and when you desert it without being recalled, you are equally guilty of rebellion against your almighty sovereign, and have incurred his displeasure*. -- I ask, why do you conclude that providence has placed me in this station? For my part I find that I owe my birth to a long chain of causes, of which many depended upon voluntary actions of men. *But providence guided all these causes, and nothing happens in the universe without its consent and co-operation*. If so, then neither does my death, however voluntary, happen without its consent; and whenever pain or sorrow so far overcome my patience, as to make me tired of life, I may conclude that I am recalled from my station in the clearest and most express terms. 'Tis providence surely that has placed me at this present in this chamber: But may I not leave it when I think proper, without being liable to the imputation of having deserted my post or station? When I shall be dead, the principles of {17} which I am composed will still perform their part in the universe, and will be equally useful in the grand fabrick, as when they composed this individual creature. The difference to the whole will be no greater than betwixt my being in a chamber and in the open air. The one change is of more importance to me than the other; but not more so to the universe.

-- 'TIS a kind of blasphemy to imagine that any created being can disturb the order of the world, or invade the business of Providence! It supposes, that that being possesses powers and faculties, which it received not from its creator, and which are not subordinate to his government and authority. A man may disturb society no doubt, and thereby incur the displeasure of the Almighty: But the government of the world is placed far beyond his reach and violence. And how does it appear that the Almighty is displeased with those actions that disturb society? By the principles {18} which he has implanted in human nature, and which inspire us with a sentiment of remorse if

we ourselves have been guilty of such actions, and with that of blame and disapprobation, if we ever observe them in others: -- Let us now examine, according to the method proposed, whether Suicide be of this kind of actions, and be a breach of our duty to our *neighbour* and to *society*.

A MAN who retires from life does no harm to society: He only ceases to do good; which, if it is an injury, is of the lowest kind. -- All our obligations to do good to society seem to imply something reciprocal. I receive the benefits of society, and therefore ought to promote its interests; but when I withdraw myself altogether from society, can I be bound any longer? But allowing that our obligations to do good were perpetual, they have certainly some bounds; I am not obliged to do a small good to society at the expence of a {19} great harm to myself; why then should I prolong a miserable existence, because of some frivolous advantage which the public may perhaps receive from me? If upon account of age and infirmities, I may lawfully resign any office, and employ my time altogether in fencing against these calamities, and alleviating, as much as possible, the miseries of my future life: why may I not cut short these miseries at once by an action which is no more prejudicial to society? -- But suppose that it is no longer in my power to promote the interest of society, suppose that I am a burden to it, suppose that my life hinders some person from being much more useful to society. In such cases, my resignation of life must not only be innocent, but laudable. And most people who lie under any temptation to abandon existence, are in some such situation; those who have health, or power, or authority, have commonly better reason to be in humour with the world. ([editor's note] 4) {20}

A MAN is engaged in a conspiracy for the public interest; is seized upon suspicion; is threatened with the rack; and knows from his own weakness that the secret will be extorted from him: Could such a one consult the public interest better than by putting a quick period to a miserable life? This was the case of the famous and brave *Strozi* of *Florence*. -- Again, suppose a malefactor is justly condemned to a shameful death, can any reason be imagined, why he may not anticipate his punishment, and save himself all the anguish of thinking on its dreadful approaches? He invades the business of providence no more than the magistrate did, who ordered his execution; and his voluntary death is equally advantageous to society, by ridding it of a pernicious member.

THAT Suicide may often be consistent with interest and with our duty to ourselves, no one can question, who allows that age, {21} sickness, or misfortune, may render life a burthen, and make it worse even than annihilation. I believe that no man ever threw away life, while it was worth keeping. For such is our natural horror of death, that small motives will never be able to reconcile us to it; and though perhaps the situation of a man's health or fortune did not seem to require this remedy, we may at least be assured that any one who, without apparent reason, has had recourse to it, was curst with such an incurable depravity or gloominess of temper as must poison all enjoyment, and render him equally miserable as if he had been loaded with the most grievous misfortunes. -- If suicide be supposed a crime, 'tis only cowardice can impel us to it. If it be no crime, both prudence and courage should engage us to rid ourselves at once of existence, when it becomes a burthen. 'Tis the only way that we can then be useful to society, by setting an example, which if imitated, would preserve to every one his chance for happiness in life, {22} and would effectually free him from all danger of misery.[5]{23}

ESSAY II. ON THE *IMMORTALITY* OF THE *SOUL*.

BY the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the *Immortality* of the *Soul*; the arguments for it are commonly derived either from *metaphysical* topics, or *moral* or *physical*. But in reality 'tis the Gospel and the Gospel alone, that has brought *life and immortality to light*.

I. METAPHYSICAL topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, and that 'tis impossible {24} for thought to belong to a material substance. -- ([editor's note] 1) But just metaphysics teach us that the notion of substance is wholly confused and imperfect, and that we have no other idea of any substance, than as an aggregate of particular qualities, inhering in an unknown something. Matter, therefore, and spirit, are at bottom equally unknown, and we cannot determine what qualities inhere in the one or in the other. ([editor's note] 2) They likewise teach us that nothing can be decided *a priori* concerning any cause or effect, and that experience being the only source of our judgements of this nature, we cannot know from any other principle, whether matter, by its structure or arrangement, may not be the cause of thought. Abstract reasonings cannot decide any question of fact or existence. -- But admitting a spiritual substance to be dispersed throughout the universe, like the etherial fire of the *Stoics*, and to be the only inherent subject of thought, we have reason to conclude {25} from *analogy* that nature uses it after the manner she does the other substance, *matter*. She employs it as a kind of paste or clay; modifies it into a variety of forms and existences; dissolves after a time each modification, and from its substance erects a new form. As the same material substance may successively compose the bodies of all animals, the same spiritual substance may compose their minds: Their consciousness, or that system of thought which they formed during life, may be continually dissolved by death. And nothing interests them in the new modification. The most positive asserters of the mortality of the soul, never denied the immortality of its substance. And that an immaterial substance, as well as a material, may lose its memory or consciousness, appears in part from experience, if the soul be immaterial. -- Reasoning from the common course of nature, and without supposing any new interposition of the supreme cause, which ought always to be excluded from philosophy, {26} what is incorruptible must also be ingenerable. The Soul therefore if immortal, existed before our birth; and if the former existence no ways concerned us, neither will the latter. -- Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even reason, tho' in a more imperfect manner than men; are their souls also immaterial and immortal? ([editor's note] 3)

II. LET us now consider the moral arguments, chiefly those derived from the justice of God, which is supposed to be farther interested in the farther punishment of the vicious and reward of the virtuous. -- But these arguments are grounded on the supposition that God has attributes beyond what he has exerted in this universe, with which alone we are acquainted. Whence do we infer the existence of these attributes? -- 'Tis very safe for us to affirm, that whatever we know the Deity to have actually done, is best; but 'tis very dangerous to affirm, that he must always do {27} what to us seems best. In how many instances would this reasoning fail us with regard to the present world? -- But if any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm, that the whole scope and intention of man's creation, so far as we can judge by natural reason, is limited to the present life. With how weak a concern from the original inherent structure of the mind and passions, does he ever look farther? What comparison either for steadiness or efficacy, betwixt so floating an idea, and the most doubtful persuasion of any matter of fact that occurs in common life. There arise indeed in some minds some unaccountable terrors with regard to futurity; but these would quickly vanish were they not artificially fostered by precept and education. And those who foster them, what is their motive? Only to gain a livelihood, and to acquire power and riches in this world. Their very

zeal and industry therefore is an argument against them. {28}

WHAT cruelty, what iniquity, what injustice in nature, to confine all our concern, as well as all our knowledge, to the present life, if there be another scene still waiting us, of infinitely greater consequence? Ought this barbarous deceit to be ascribed to a beneficent and wise being? -- Observe with what exact proportion the task to be performed and the performing powers are adjusted throughout all nature. If the reason of man gives him great superiority above other animals, his necessities are proportionably multiplied upon him; his whole time, his whole capacity, activity, courage, and passion, find sufficient employment in fencing against the miseries of his present condition, and frequently, nay almost always are too slender for the business assigned them. -- A pair of shoes perhaps was never yet wrought to the highest degree of perfection which that commodity is capable of attaining. Yet it is necessary, at least very useful, that there should be some politicians and moralists, {29} even some geometers, poets, and philosophers among mankind. The powers of men are no more superior to their wants, considered merely in this life, than those of foxes and hares are, compared to *their* wants and to their period of existence. The inference from parity of reason is therefore obvious. --

ON the theory of the Soul's mortality, the inferiority of women's capacity is easily accounted for. Their domestic life requires no higher faculties, either of mind or body. This circumstance vanishes and becomes absolutely insignificant, on the religious theory: the one sex has an equal task to perform as the other; their powers of reason and resolution ought also to have been equal, and both of them infinitely greater than at present. As every effect implies a cause, and that another, till we reach the first cause of all, which is the Deity; every thing that happens is ordained by him, and nothing can be the object of his punishment or vengeance. -- By what rule are punishments {30} and rewards distributed? What is the divine standard of merit and demerit? shall we suppose that human sentiments have place in the Deity? How bold that hypothesis. We have no conception of any other sentiments. -- According to human sentiments, sense, courage, good manners, industry, prudence, genius, &c. are essential parts of personal merits. Shall we therefore erect an elysium for poets and heroes like that of the antient mythology? Why confine all rewards to one species of virtue? Punishment, without any proper end or purpose, is inconsistent with *our* ideas of goodness and justice, and no end can be served by it after the whole scene is closed. Punishment, according to *our* conception, should bear some proportion to the offence. Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so frail a creature as man? Can any one approve of *Alexander*'s rage, who intended to exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his favorite horse Bucephalus?[6] {31}

HEAVEN and Hell suppose two distinct species of men, the good and the bad; but the greatest part of mankind float betwixt vice and virtue. -- Were one to go round the world with an intention of giving a good supper to the righteous, and a sound drubbing to the wicked, he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would find that the merits and the demerits of most men and women scarcely amount to the value of either. -- To suppose measures of approbation and blame different from the human confounds every thing. Whence do we learn that there is such a thing as moral distinctions, but from our own sentiments? -- What man who has not met with personal provocation (or what good-natured man who has) could inflict on crimes, from the sense of blame alone, even the common, legal, frivolous punishments? And does any thing steel the breast of judges and juries against the sentiments of humanity but reflection on necessity and public interest? {32} By the Roman law those who had been guilty of parricide and confessed their crime, were put into a sack alone with an ape, a dog, and a serpent, and thrown into the river. Death alone

was the punishment of those whose who denied their guilt, however fully proved. A criminal was tried before *Augustus*, and condemned after a full conviction, but the humane emperor, when he put the last interrogatory, gave it such a turn as to lead the wretch into a denial of his guilt. "You surely (said the "prince) did not kill your father."[7] This lenity suits our natural ideas of *right* even towards the greatest of all criminals, and even though it prevents so inconsiderable a sufference. Nay even the most bigotted priest would naturally without reflection approve of it, provided the crime was not heresy or infidelity; for as these crimes hurt himself in his *temporal* interest and advantages, perhaps he may not be altogether so {33} indulgent to them. The chief source of moral ideas is the reflection on the interest of human society. Ought these interests, so short, so frivolous, to be guarded by punishments eternal and infinite? The damnation of one man is an infinitely greater evil in the universe, than the subversion of a thousand millions of kingdoms. Nature has rendered human infancy peculiarly frail and mortal, as it were on purpose to refute the notion of a probationary state; the half of mankind die before they are rational creatures.

III. THE *Physical* arguments from the analogy of nature are strong for the mortality of the soul, and are really the only philosophical arguments which ought to be admitted with regard to this question, or indeed any question of fact. -- Where any two objects are so closely connected that all alterations which we have ever seen in the one, are attended with proportionable alterations in the other; we ought to conclude {34} by all rules of analogy, that, when there are still greater alterations produced in the former, and it is totally dissolved, there follows a total dissolution of the latter. -- Sleep, a very small effect on the body, is attended with a temporary extinction, at least a great confusion in the soul. -- The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned, their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness; their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death. The last symptoms which the mind discovers are disorder, weakness, insensibility, and stupidity, the fore-runners of its annihilation. The farther progress of the same causes encreasing, the same effects totally extinguish it. Judging by the usual analogy of nature, no form can continue when transferred to a condition of life very different from the original one, in which it was placed. Trees perish in the water, fishes in the air, animals in the earth. Even so small a difference as that of climate is often {35} fatal. What reason then to imagine, that an immense alteration, such as is made on the soul by the dissolution of its body and all its organs of thought and sensation, can be effected without the dissolution of the whole? Every thing is in common betwixt soul and body. The organs of the one are all of them the organs of the other. The existence therefore of the one must be dependant on that of the other. -- The souls of animals are allowed to be mortal; and these bear so near a resemblance to the souls of men, that the analogy from one to the other forms a very strong argument. Their bodies are not more resembling; yet no one rejects the argument drawn from comparative anatomy. The *Metempsychosis* is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy can harken to. ([editor's note] 4)

NOTHING in this world is perpetual, every thing however seemingly firm is in continual flux and change, the world itself gives symptoms of frailty and dissolution. How contrary to analogy, therefore, to imagine {36} that one single from, seemingly the frailest of any, and subject to the greatest disorders, is immortal and indissoluble? ([editor's note] 5) What daring theory is that! how lightly, not to say how rashly entertained! How to dispose of the infinite number of posthumous existences ought also to embarrass the religious theory. Every planet in every solar system we are at liberty to imagine peopled with intelligent mortal beings, at least we can fix on no other supposition. For these then a new universe must every generation be created beyond the

bounds of the present universe, or one must have been created at first so prodigiously wise as to admit of this continual influx of beings. ([editor's note] 6) Ought such bold suppositions to be received by any philosophy, and that merely on there pretext of a bare possibility? When it is asked whether *Agamemnon Thersites Hannibal, Varro*, and every stupid clown that ever existed in *Italy*, *Scythia*, *Bactria* or *Guinea*, are now alive; can any man think, that a scrutiny of nature will furnish arguments {37} strong enough to answer so strange a question in the affirmative? The want of argument without revelation sufficiently establishes the negative. -- "*Quanto facilius* (says *Pliny*[8]) "*certius que sibi quemque credere, ac specimen securitatis antigene tali sumere experimento*." Our insensibility before the composition of the body, seems to natural reason a proof of a like state after dissolution. Were our horrors of annihilation an original passion, not the effect of our general love of happiness, it would rather prove the mortality of the soul. For as nature does nothing in vain, she would never give us a horror against an impossible event. She may give us a horror against an unavoidable; yet the human species could not be preserved had not nature inspired us with and aversion toward it. All doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured by {38} our passions, and the hopes and fears which gave rise to this doctrine are very obvious.

'TIS an infinite advantage in every controversy to defend the negative. If the question be out of the common experienced course of nature, this circumstance is almost if not altogether decisive. By what arguments or analogies can we prove any state of existence, which no one ever saw, and which no way resembles any that ever was seen? Who will repose such trust in any pretended philosophy as to admit upon its testimony the reality of so marvellous a scene? Some new species of logic is requisite for that purpose, and some new faculties of the mind, that may enable us to comprehend that logic.

NOTHING could set in a fuller light the infinite obligations which mankind have to divine revelation, since we find that no other medium could ascertain this great and important truth. {39}

ANTI SUICIDE.

(1) THIS elaborate eulogium on philosophy points obliquely at religion, which we christians consider as the only sovereign antidote to every disease incident to the mind of man. It is indeed hard to say what reason might do were it freed from all restraints, especially if a succession of philosophers were incessantly improving on one another as they went on, avoiding and correcting the mistakes of those who preceded them in the same pursuit, till at last one complete and rational system was effected. Great things might probably be accomplished in this manner. But no such plan in fact ever was or is likely to be finished. Neither priestcraft, nor magisterial powers, however, cramped the progress of improving reason, or baffled the genius of enquiring man. The principles of religion and virtue were freely canvassed by the boldest spirits of antiquity. In truth, the superior advantage and necessity of the christian religion seems manifest from this particular circumstance, {40} that it has taken away every possible restraint from natural religion, allowing it to exert itself to the utmost in finding out the fundamental truths of virtue, and in acquiescing in them, in openly avowing and acknowledging them when revealed, in extending the views and expectations of men, in giving them more just and liberal sentiments, and in publickly and uniformly disclaiming any intention of establishing a kingdom for its votaries or believers in this world.

THE doctrines of the gospel are not intended to instruct us in the knowledge of every thing which may be really useful in the present life, far less of every thing, which, from curiosity alone, we may

have a mighty desire to know. Revelation considers mankind in their highest capacity, as the rational and accountable subjects of God, and as capable both of present and future happiness or misery, according to their behaviour. Its chief, if not its sole design, is to give us those views and impressions of our nature, of our state, of the perfections, the counsels, the laws, and the government of God, which, under the influence of providence, are the immediate and infallible means of the purity, of the comfort, and of the moral order, rectitude, and excellence of our immortal souls. As corrupted and disordered, we are incapable of true happiness, till purified and restored to order. As guilty and {41} mortal creatures, we can have no true consolation without the hopes of pardon in a future and seperate state of existence. As surrounded with dangers, and obnoxious to every dismal apprehension, we can possess no solid, or permanent content, but in the sincere and well grounded convictions of that gracious and righteous administration so minutely and explicitly delineated in the scriptures. It is evident, therefore, that the principal excellence and utility of revealed truths upon the sanctification and consolation of our hearts. They tally exactly with the present circumstances of mankind, and are admirably adapted to cure every disease, every disorder of the human mind, to beget, to cherish, and confirm every pure, every virtuous, every pious disposition.

MANKIND are certainly at present in a state of the deepest corruption and depravity, and at the same time apt to continue strangely insensible of the misery and danger to which, under the government of infinite wisdom, it necessarily renders them. Nothing can be conceived more fit to rouse them from their lethargy, and to awaken them to a just sense of their condition, than a messenger from Heaven, clothed with divine authority, setting before them the intrinsic {42} baseness, malignity, and wretchedness of vice, together with the certain, the dreadful, the eternal consequences of continuing in it.

COULD we enter upon a particular view of all those maladies and disorders which infest and destroy the souls of men, it were easy to shew, that a steadfast belief of religion is, in truth, the most natural and the best antidote or remedy for each of them. It is obvious, or least, that the clear and full manifestation, which the gospel has given of the character of God, and the laws of his moral government, and of the terms of salvation through faith in the religion of his son, are all finely calculated to root out the principles of superstition, and all false notions, destructive to the virtue and happiness of mankind, and to plant in their room whatever has a natural and direct tendency to promote our virtue, our perfection, our felicity.

(2) CLEOMENES, king of Sparta, when suffering under misfortune, was advised to kill himself by Tharyceon. "Thinkest thou, wicked man, (said he) to shew thy fortitude by rushing upon death, an expedient always at hand, the dastardly resource of the {43} basest minds? Better than we, by the fortune of arms, or overpowered by numbers, have left the field of battle to their enemies; but he who, to avoid pain, or calamity, or censures of men, gives up the contest, we are to seek death, that death ought to be in action. It is base to live or die only for ourselves. All we gain by suicide is to get our own reputation, or doing the least service to our country. In hopes, then, we may yet be of some use to others, both methinks are bound to preserve life as long as we can. Whenever these hopes shall have altogether abandoned us, death, if sought for, will readily be found.

(3) OF all the refines cobwebs, to which sophistry has given birth, this seems at once the most elaborate and the most flimsy. It seems one of the first and most indisputable maxims in all found reasoning, that no ideas whatever should have a place in the premises, which do not communicate a sensible energy to the conclusion. But where is the connection between the beginning and end of this wire-drawn argument. What have the various beautiful facts, thus elegantly stated, to do with

a man's taking away his own {44} life? Though the greatest philosopher be of no more consequence to the general system of things than an oyster, and though the life of the one were, in every respect, as perfectly insignificant as that of the other, still the meanest of mankind is not without importance in his own eyes. And where is he who is guided uniformly, in all his actions, more by a sense of his relation to the universe at large, than by the value he retains for himself, or the deference he has to his own opinion.

NO deduction, however plausible, can produce conviction in any rational mind, which originates in a supposition grossly absurd. Is it possible to conceive the author of nature capable of authenticating a deed, which ultimately terminates in the total annihilation of the system? By which of the creatures beneath us is the first law of their being thus daringly violated? And if suicide be eligible to man, under any possible misfortune or distress, why not to them? Are not they also subject to the various miseries which arise from wayward accidents and hostile elements? Why, therefore, open a door for our escape from those evils of which others have their share, to whom, however, it must remain for ever shut? {45}

IN truth, the existence of all animals depends entirely on their inviolable attachment to self-preservation. Their attention to all is accordingly the obvious and common condition of all their natures. By this great and operative principle nature has chiefly consulted her own safety. Our philosopher's notions are so extremely hostile to her most essential institutions, that she could not possibly survive a general conviction of them. And, in spite of all the sophistry he is master of, the question here will eternally recur, whether the wisdom of nature, or the philosophy of our author, deserves the preference.

(4) THIS apology for the commission, arising from man's insignificance in the moral world, from the reciprocation of social duty being dissolved, or from the benefit resulting from the voluntary dismission of being, is contrary to the soundest principles of jurisprudence, to the condition of human nature, and to the general establishment of things.

THAT a man who retires from life *ad libitum*, does no harm to society, is a proposition peculiarly absurd and erroneous. What is {46} lawful for one, may be lawful for all, and no society can subsist in the conviction of a principle thus hostile to its being.

IT seems to be a maxim in human existence, that no creature has a right to decide peremptorily on the importance, utility, or necessity of his own being. There are an infinite variety of secret connections and associations in the vast system of things, which the eye of created wisdom cannot explore.

MAN is not, perhaps, so ignorant of anything, or any creature, as of himself. His own system, after all the art and inquisition of human ingenuity, is still to him the profoundest mystery in nature. His knowledge and faculties are adequate to the sphere of his duty. Beyond this, his researches are impertinent, and all his acquisitions useless. He has no adequate notions what the laws of the universe are with respect to any species of existence whatever. A cloud rests on the complicated movements of this great machine, which baffles all the penetration of mortals: and it will for ever remain impossible for man, from the most complete analysis of his present situation, to judge, with any degree of precision, of his own consequence, either as a citizen of the world at large, or as a member of any particular society. {47}

FINAL causes form a system of knowledge too wonderful for man. It is the perrogative of nature alone to decide upon them. In the fulness of time, her creative hand brought him into existence, and it belongs to her alone, in consequence of an arrangement equally wonderful and mysterious to

dismiss him from his present mode of being. This is an authority with which she alone is invested, and which, according to our apprehensions, it is impossible fro her to delegate. Dissolution, as well as creation, is hers. and he who would attempt to infringe her sovereignty in this instance, would usurp a prerogative which does not belong to him, and become a traitor to the laws of his being. Nay, on this extravagant and licentious hypothesis, the right of assuming and relinquishing existence is made reciprocal. For he who arrogates the liberty of destroying himself, were he possessed of the power, might also be his own creator; his imaginary insignificance to society being as inconclusive in the one case, as any chimerical advantage that may accidentally strike him can be in the other. It is a strange doctrine, which cannot be established, but at the obvious expence of what seem the plainest dictates of common sense.

INDEED, the absurdities of this daring and paradoxical doctrine are endless and infinite. {48} When we come to pronounce on the condition of human infancy, and to separate childhood, or non-age, from a state of maturity, we can scarce trace one useful or salutary consequence it is calculated to produce in society. In this view children seem less adapted to serve any special or important end, than even beetles, gnats, or flies. Experience, however, has long convinced the world of their present inestimable value from their future destination. And were a legislator, from the plausible pretext of their being a burden to the state, to exterminate the race of mankind in the insignificant stage of infancy, his decree, like that of a certain monster recorded in the gospel, would shock the sentiments of every nation under heaven, in whom there remained only the dregs of humanity.

IT is not only impossible for a man to decide, in any given period, of the progress of his existence, or what utility or consequence he may be to society; but without the faculty of prescience, it is still more impracticable for him to divine what purposes he may be intended to serve in the many mysterious revolations of futurity. How far his mortal may be connected with his immortal life, must rest with him who has the sole disposal of it. But who told him that his load of misery was too much to bear, that he was not able to sustain {49} it? or that his merciful father would not proportionate his sufferings to his abilities? How does he know how short-lived the pressure of incumbent sorrow may prove? It becomes not him to prescribe to his maker, or because his evils are enormous, to conclude they must be permanent. Rash man! thy heart is in the hand of heaven, and he *who tempers the wind to the shorn lamb,* may either lighten the burthen that oppresses thee, or blunt the edge of that sensibility, from which it derives the greatest poignancy. What medicine is to the wounds of the body, that resignation is to those of the soul. Be not deficient in this virtue, and life will never prescribe a duty you cannot perform, or inflict a pang which you cannot bear. Resignation changes the grizzly aspect of affliction, turns sickness into health, and converts the gloomy forebodings of despair into the grateful presentiments of hope. Besides, the most insignificant instruments are sometimes, in the hands of eternal providence, employed in bringing about the most general and beneficent revolutions. It is by making weakness thus subservient to power, evil to good, and pain to pleasure, that he who governs the world illustrates his sovereinty and omnipotence. Till, then, thou art {50} able to comprehend the whole mysterious system of every possible existence, till thou art certain that thy life is totally insignificant, till thou art convinced it is not in the might of infinite power to render thee serviceable either to thyself or others, counteract not the benignity of providence by suicide, or, in this manner, by the blackest of all treasons, betray thy trust, and wage, at fearful odds, hostility against the very means and author of thy being.

ONE very obvious consequence arising from suicide, which none of its advocates appear to have

foreseen, and which places it in a light exceedingly gross and shocking, is, that it supposes every man capable, not only of destroying himself, but of delegating the power of committing murder to another. That which he may do himself, he may commission any one to do for him. On this supposition, no law, human or divine, could impeach the shedding of innocent blood. And on what principle, of right or expediency, admit that which produces such a train of the most horrid and detestable consequences?

(5) THE preceding note is, perhaps, the most audacious part in the whole of this very extraordinary performance. In our holy religion it is expressly declared that no murderer hath eternal life abiding in him; that murderers shall in no wise inherit the kingdom of God, and that it is the prerogative of heaven alone to kill and make alive. It is a fundamental {51} doctrine in the gospel, that, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish. And how are they to perform their duty, who, in the instant of dying, contract a guilt, which renders it indispensible. But this horrid supposition is repugnant to the whole genius of revelation, which inculcates every virtue that can possibly administer to our present and future welfare. It inforces obedience and resignation to the righteous government of God. It inspires and produces those very dispositions which it recommends. All its doctrines, exhortations, and duties, are formed to elevate the mind, to raise the affections, to regulate the passions, and to purge the heart of whatever is hostile to happiness in this or another life. This impious slander on the christian faith is the obvious consequence of the grossest inattention to its nature and tendency. It is calculated chiefly to make us happy. And what happy man was ever yet chargeable with suicide? In short, we may as well say, that, because the physician does not expressly prohibit certain diseases in his prescriptions, the very diseases are authenticated by the remedies devised, on purpose to counteract them. {52}

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

(1) The ingenuity of Scepticism has been long admired, but here the author boldly outdoes all his former out-doings. Much has been said against the authenticity of religion, on the supposition that the evidence to which she appeals, is not either sufficiently general or intelligible to the bulk of mankind. But surely an argument is not conclusive in one case, and inconclusive in another. Admit this reasoning against revelation to be valid, and you must also admit it against our author's hypothesis. There never at least was an objection started, that could, in the remotest degree, affect the truths of the gospel, more intricate, metaphysical, and abstracted, than that by which our essayest would destroy the popular doctrine of the soul's *immortality*. How many live and die in this salutary conviction, to whom these refined speculations must forever remain as unintelligible as if they had {53} never been formed! It is a sentiment so congenial to the heart of man, that few of the species would chuse to exist without it. Unable, as they are, to account for its origin, they cordially and universally indulge it, as one of their tenderest, best, and last feelings. It inhabits alike the rudest and most polished minds, and never leaves any human breast, which is not either wholly engrossed by criminal pleasure, deadened by selfish pursuits, or perverted by false reasoning. It governs with all the ardor and influence of inspiration, and never meets with any opposition but from the weak, the worthless, or the *wise above what is written*. All the world have uniformly considered it as their last resource in every extremity, and for the most part still regard and cherish the belief of it, as an asylum in which their best interests are ultimately secured or deposited, beyond the reach of all temporary disaster or misfortune. Where, therefore, is the probability of exterminating so popular and prevailing a notion, by a concatenation of ideas, which, perhaps, not one out of a million in any country under Heaven is able to trace or

comprehend?

(2) The natural perceptions of pleasure of pain cannot be said to act on the mind as one part of matter does on another. The substance of the soul we do not know, but are {54} certain her ideas must be immaterial. And these cannot possibly act either by contact of impulse. When one body impels another, the body moved is affected only by the impulse. But the mind, whenever roused by any pleasing or painful sensation, in most cases looks round her, and deliberates whether a change of state is proper, or the present more eligible; and moves or rests accordingly. Her perceptions, therefore, contribute no further to action, than by exciting her active powers. On the contrary, matter is blindly and obstinately in that state in which it is, whether of motion or rest, till changed by some other adequate cause. Suppose we rest the state of any body, some external force is requisite to put it in motion; and, in proportion as this force is greater or small, the motion must be swift or slow. Did not this body continue in its former state, no external force would be requisite to change it; nor, when changed, would different degrees of force be necessary to move it in different degrees of velocity. When motion is impressed on any body, to bring it to rest, an *extra* force must always be applied, in proportion to the intended effect. This resistance is observeable in bodies both when moved in particular directions, and to bear an exact proportion to the *vis impressa*, and to the quantity of matter moved. Were it possible to extract from matter the qualities of solidity and extension, {55} the matter whence such qualities were extracted would no longer resist; and consequently resistance is the necessary result of them, which, therefore, in all directions must be the same. The degree of resistance in any body being proportionate to the *vis impressa*, it follows, when that body is considered in any particular state, whether of motion or rest, the degrees of resistance must either indefinitely multiply, or decrease, according to all possible degrees of the moving force. But when the same body is considered absolutely, or without fixing any particular state, the resistance is immutable; and all the degrees of it, which that body would exert upon the accession of any impressed force, must be conceived as actually in it. Nor can matter have any tendency contrary to that resistance, otherwise it must be equal or superior. If equal, the two contrary tendencies would destroy each other. If superior, the resistance would be destroyed. Thus change would eternally succeed to change without one intermediate instant, so that no time would be assigned when any body was in any particular state. Gravitation itself, the most simple and universal law, seems far from being a tendency natural to matter; since it is found to act internally, and not in proportion to the superfices of any body; which it would not do, if it were only the mechanical action of matter upon matter. {56} From all this, it appears, that matter considered merely as such, is so far from having a principle of spontaneous motion, that it is stubbornly inactive, and must eternally remain in the same state in which it happens to be, except influenced by some other -- that is, some immaterial power. Of such a power the human soul is evidently possessed; for every one is conscious of an internal activity, and to dispute this would be to dispute us out of one of the most real and intimate perceptions we have.

Though a material automaton were allowed possible, how infinitely would it fall short of that force and celerity which every one feels in himself. how sluggish are all the movements which fall under our observation. How slow and gradual their transitions from one part of space to another. But the mind, by one instantaneous effort, measures the distance from pole to pole, from heaven to earth, from one fixed star to another; and not confined within the limits of the visible creation, shoots into immensity with a rapidity to which even that of lightning, or sunbeams, is no comparison. Who then shall assign a period, which, though depressed with so much dead weight, is ever active, and unconscious of fatigue or relaxation? The mind is not only herself a principle of action, but

probably actuates the body, without the {57} assistance of any intermediate power, both from the gradual command which she acquires of its members by habit, and from a capacity of determining, in some measure, the quantity of pleasure or pain which any sensible perception can give her. Supposing the interposing power a spirit, the same difficulty of spirit acting upon matter still remains. And the volition of our own mind will as well account for the motion of the body, as the formal interference of any other spiritual substance. And we may as well ask, why the mind is not conscious of that interposition, as why she is ignorant of the means by which she communicates motion to the body.

(3) It is always bad reasoning to draw conclusions from the premises not denied by your adversary. Whoever, yet, of all the assertors of the soul's immortality, presumed to make a monopoly of this great privilege to the human race? Who can tell what another state of existence may be, or whether every other species of animals may not possess principles an immortal as the mind of man? But that mode of reasoning, which militates against all our convictions, solely on account of the unavoidable ignorance to which our sphere in the universe subjects us, can never be satisfactory. Reason, it is true, cannot altogether solve every doubt which arises concerning this important truth. But neither is there any other {58} truth, of any denomination whatever, against which sophistry may not conjure up a multitude of exceptions. We know no mode of existence but those of matter and spirit, neither of which have uniformly and successfully defied the extreme subtilty of argumentation. Still a very great majority of mankind are staunch believers in both. So well constituted is the present disposition of things, that all the principles essential to human life and happiness continue, as it is likely they ever will, to operate, in spite of every sort of clamour which sophistry or scepticism has raised or can raise against them.

(4) There is not a single word in all this elaborate and tedious deduction, which has not been urged and refuted five hundred times. Our ignorance of the divine perfections, as is usual with this writer, is here stated as an unanswerable exception to the conclusion usually drawn from them. But he very artfully overlooks, that this great ignorance will be equally conclusive as applied to either side of the argument. When we compare, however, the character of God, as a wise superintendant, and generous benefactor, with the state in which things at present appear, where virtue is often depressed and afflicted, and vice apparently triumphs, it will be treated with the infamy it merits, and virtue receive that {59} happiness and honour, which, from its own intrinsic worth, it deserves, and, from its conformity to the nature of God, it has reason to expect.

This subject, perhaps, has been too much exaggerated, and some pious men have weakly thought, the best way to convince us that order and happiness prevailed in a future state, was to persuade us that there was none at all in this. External advantages have been taken for the only goods of human nature; and, because, in this view, all things speak the appearance of mal-administration, we have been taught to expect a government of rectitude and benevolence hereafter. Let us, on the contrary, candidly own that virtue is sovereignly and solely good, left, by depreciating her charms, we obliquely detract from the character of God himself. Let us confess her undowered excellence superior to all the inconveniences that may attend her, even in the present situation. But, without allowing some difference between poverty and riches, sickness and health, pain and pleasure, &c. we shall have no foundation to preference; and it will be in vain to talk of selecting where no one choice can be more agreeable or disagreeable to nature than another. Upon this difference, therefore, however it be called, let the present argument proceed. {60}

If infinite goodness be the spirit and characteristic of this universal government, then every advantage, however inconsiderable in kind or degree, must either be supposed immediately

bestowed on virtue; or, at least, that such retributions will, at some time, be made her, as may not only render her votaries equal, but superior to those of vice, in proportion to their merit. But how different the case is in human life, history and observation may easily convince us; so that one, whose eyes are not intent on the character of God, and the nature of virtue, would often be tempted to think this world a theatre merely intended for mournful spectacles and pomps of horror. How many persons do we see perish by the mere wants of nature, who, had they been in different circumstances, would have thanked God with tears of joy for the power of communicating those advantages they now implore from others in vain? While, at the same time, they have, perhaps, the additional misery of seeing the most endeared relations involved in the same deplorable fate! How often do we see those ties which unite the soul and body, worn out by the gradual advances of a lingering disease, or burst at once by the sudden efforts of unutterable agony? While the unhappy sufferers, had they been continued in life, might have diffused happiness, not only through the narrow circle of their {61} friends and neighbourhood, but as extensively as their country, and even the world at large. How many names do we see buried in obscurity, or soiled with detraction, which ought to have shone the first in fame? How many heroes have survived the liberties of their country, or died in abortive attempts to preserve them; and, by their fall, only left a larger field for the lawless ravages of tyranny and oppression?

But were it possible, how long and insuperable would be the task to enumerate all the ingredients which compose the present cup of bitterness? And is this the consummation of things? Will supreme and essential goodness no way distinguish such as have invariably pursued his honour, and the interest of his government, from those who have industriously violated the order he has appointed in things? who have blotted the face of nature with havock, murder, and desolation; and shewn a constant intention to counteract all the benevolent designs of providence? It is confessed that the virtuous, happy in the possession of virtue alone, make their exit from the present scene with blessings to the Creator, for having called them to existence, and given them the glorious opportunity of enjoying what is in itself supremely eligible. They are conscious that this felicity can receive no accession from any external lustre or advantage {62} whatever. Yet it seems highly necessary in the divine administration, that those who have been dazzled with the false glare of prosperous wickedness, should at last be undeceived; that they should at last behold virtue conspicuous, in all her native splendor and majesty as she shines, the chief delight of God, and ultimate happiness of all intelligent nature.

The language of religion, and our own hearts, on this important argument, is equally comfortable and decisive. It accumulates and enforces whatever can inspire us with confidence in that God, who is not the God of the dead, but of the living; who reigns in the invisible, as well as in the visible world; and whose attention to our welfare ceases not with our lives, but is commensurate to the full extent of our being. Indeed the votaries of the soul's mortality may as well be honest for once, and speak out what so many fools think in their hearts. For what is God to us, or we to him, if our connection extends but to the pitiful space allotted us in such a pitiful world as this is? To be sure, no absurdity will be rejected, which can smother the feelings, or keep the vices of profligates in countenance; but, if only made like worms and reptiles beneath our feet, to live this moment, and expire the next, to struggle in a wretched life with every internal and external calamity, {63} that can assault our bodies, or infest our minds; to bear the mortifications of malignity, and the unmerited abhorrence of those who perhaps may owe us the greatest and tenderest esteem, and then, sunk in everlasting oblivion, our fate would stand on record, in the annals of the universe, an eternal exception to all that can be called good.

Suppose a father possessed of the most exquisite tenderness for his son, delighted with his similarity of form, his promising constitution, his strength, gracefulness, and agility, his undisguised emotions of filial affection, with the various presages of a superior genius and understanding. Let us suppose this father pleased with the employment of improving his faculties, and inspiring him with future hopes of happiness and dignity: but that he may give him a quicker sensibility to the misfortunes of others, and a more unshaken fortitude to sustain his own, he often prefers younger brethren, and even strangers, to those advantages which otherwise merit, and the force of nature would determine him to bestow on so worthy an offspring. Let us go further, and imagine, if we can, that this father, without the least diminution of tenderness, or any other apparent reason, destroys his son in the bloom of life, and height of expectation: Who would not lament the fate of such a youth with inconsolable tears? {64} Doomed never more to behold the agreeable light of Heaven! never more to display his personal graces, nor exercise his manly powers, never more to feel his heart warm with benevolent regards, nor taste the soul-transporting pleasure of obliging and being obliged! Blotted at once from existence, and the fair creation, he sinks into silence and oblivion, with all his sublime hopes disappointed, all his immense desires ungratified, and all his intellectual faculties unimproved. Without mentioning the instinctive horror which must attend such an action, how absurd to reason, and how inconsistent with the common feelings of humanity would it be to suppose a father capable of such a deed. Forbid it, God! forbid it, Nature! that we should impute to the munificent father of being and happiness, what, even in the lowest of rational creatures, would be monstrous and detestable!

(5) The truth is, that form which all mankind have deemed immortal, is so far from being the frailest, that it seems in fact the most indissoluble and permanent of any other we know. All the rational and inventive powers of the mind happily conspire to proclaim her infinitely different in nature, and superior in dignity to every possible modification of pure matter. Were mankind {65} joined in society, was life polished and cultivated, were the sciences and arts, not only of utility, but elegance, produced by matter? by a brute mass? A substance so contrary to all activity and intelligence, that it seems the work of an omnipotent hand alone to connect them. What judgement should we form of that principle which informed and enlightened a Galileo, a Copernicus, or a Newton? What inspiration taught them, to place the fun in the center of this system, and assign the various orbs their revolutions round him, reducing motions so diverse and unequal, to uniform and simple laws? Was it not something like that great eternal mind, which first gave existence to those luminous orbs, and prescribed each of them their province? Whence the infinite harmony and variety of sound, the copious flows of eloquence, the bolder graces and more inspired elevations of poetry, but from a mind, an immaterial being, the reflected image of her all-perfect Creator, in whom eternally dwells all beauty and excellence. Were man only endowed with a principle of vegetation, fixed to one peculiar spot, and insensible of all that passed around him; we might, then, with some colour, suppose that energy, if it may be so called, perishable. Were, he like animals possessed of mere vitality, and qualified only to move and feel, still we might have some reason to fear that, {66} in some future period of duration, our Creator might resume his gift of existence. but can any one, who pretends to the least reflection, imagine that such a being as the human soul, adorned with such extensive intellectual powers, will ever cease to be the object of that love and care which eternally holds the universe in its embrace? Did she obtain such a boundless understanding merely to taste the pleasure of exercising it? to catch a transient glance of its objects, and perish? Formed, as she is, to operate on herself, and all things round her, must she cease from action, while yet the mighty task is scarce begun? must she lose those faculties, by

which she retains the past, comprehends the presents and presages the future? must she contemplate no more those bright impressions of divinity, which are discovered in the material world; nor those stronger, and more animated features of the same eternal beauty which shine in her own god-like form? And must she be absorbed forever in the womb of unessential nothing? Strange, that in the view, and even in the arms of infinite power and goodness, a dawn so fair and promising, should at one be clouded with all the horrors of eternal night? Such a supposition would be contrary the whole conduct and laws of nature. {67}

The following Letters on SUICIDE *are extracted from* ROSSEAU's ELOISA.

LETTER CXIV. *To Lord B-------.*

YES, my Lord, I confess it; the weight of life is too heavy for my soul. I have long endured it as a burden; I have lost every thing which could make it dear to me, and nothing remains but irksomeness and vexation. I am told, however, that I am not at liberty to dispose of my life, without the permission of that Being from whom I received it. I am sensible likewise that you have a right over it by more titles than one. Your care has twice preserved it, and your goodness is its constant security. I will never {68} dispose of it, till I am certain that I may do it without a crime, and till I have not the least hope of employing it for your service.

You told me that I should be of use to you; why did you deceive me? Since we have been in London, so far from thinking of employing me in your concerns, you have been kind enough to make me your only concern. How superfluous is your obliging solicitude! My lord, you know I abhor a crime, even worse than I detest life; I adore the supreme Being -- I owe every thing to you; I have an affection for you; you are the only person on earth to whom I am attached. Friendship and duty may chain a wretch to this earth: sophistry and vain pretences will never detain him. Enlighten my understanding, speak to my heart; I am ready to hear you, but remember, that despair is not to be imposed upon.

You would have me apply to the test of reason: I will; let us reason. You desire me to deliberate in proportion to the importance {69} of the question in debate; I agree to it. Let us investigate truth with temper and moderation; let us discuss this general proposition with the same indifference we should treat any other. Roebeck wrote an apology for suicide before he put an end to his life. I will not, after his example, write a book on the subject, neither am I well satisfied with that which he has penned, but I hope in this discussion at least to imitate his moderation.

I have for a long time meditated on this awful subject. You must be sensible that I have, for you know my destiny, and yet I am alive. The more I reflect, the more I am convinced that the question may be reduced to this fundamental proposition. Every man has a right by nature to pursue what he thinks good, and avoid what he thinks evil, in all respects which are not injurious to others. When our life therefore becomes a misery to ourselves, and is of advantage to no one, we are at liberty to put an end to our being. If there is any such thing as a clear and self-evident {70} principle, certainly this is one, and if this be subverted, there is scarce an action in life which may not be made criminal.

Let us hear what the philosophers say on this subject. First, they consider life as something which is not our own, because we hold it as a gift; but because it has been given to us, is it for that reason our own? Has not God given these sophists two arms? nevertheless, when they are under apprehensions of a mortification, they do not scruple to amputate one, or both if there be occasion. By a parity of reasoning, we may convince those who believe in the immortality of the soul; for if I

sacrifice my arm to the preservation of something more precious, which is my body, I have the same right to sacrifice my body to the preservation of something more valuable, which is, the happiness of my existence. If all the gifts which heaven has bestowed are naturally designed for our good, they are certainly too apt to change their nature; and Providence has endowed us with reason, that we may discern the difference. If this rule {71} did not authorize us to chuse the one, and reject the other, to what use would it serve among mankind?

But they turn this weak objection into a thousand shapes. They consider a man living upon earth as a soldier placed on duty. God, say they, has fixed you in this world, why do you quit your station without his leave? But you, who argue thus, has he not stationed you in the town where you was born, why therefore do you quit it without his leave? is not misery, of itself, a sufficient permission? Whatever station Providence has assigned me, whether it be in a regiment, or on the earth at large, he intended me to stay there while I found my situation agreeable, and to leave it when it became intolerable. This is the voice of nature, and the voice of God. I agree that we must wait for an order; but when I die a natural death, God does not order me to quit life, he takes it from me; it is by rendering life insupportable, that he orders me to quit it. In the first case, I resist with all my force; in the second, I have the merit of obedience. {72}

Can you conceive that there are some people so absurd as to arraign suicide as a kind of rebellion against Providence, by an attempt to fly from his laws? but we do not put an end to our being in order to withdraw ourselves from his commands, but to execute them. What! does the power of God extend no farther than to my body? is there a spot in the universe, is there any being in the universe, which is not subject to his power, and will that power have less immediate influence over me when my being is refined, and thereby becomes less compound, and of nearer resemblance to the divine essence? no, his justice and goodness are the foundation of my hopes; and if I thought that death would withdraw me from his power, I would give up my resolution to die.

This is one of the quibbles of the Phaedo, which, in other respects, abounds with sublime truths. If your slave destroys himself, says Socrates to Cebes, would you not punish him, for having unjustly deprived you of your property; {73} prithee, good Socrates, do we not belong to God after we are dead? The case you put is not applicable; you ought to argue thus: if you incumber your slave with a habit which confines him from discharging his duty properly, will you punish him for quitting it, in order to render you better service? the grand error lies in making life of too great importance; as if our existence depended upon it, and that death was a total annihilation. Our life is of no consequence in the sight of God; it is of no importance in the eyes of reason, neither ought it to be of any in our sight; when we quit our body, we only lay aside an inconvenient habit. Is this circumstance so painful, to be the occasion of so much disturbance? My Lord, these declaimers are not in earnest. Their arguments are absurd and cruel, for they aggravate the supposed crime, as if it put a period to existence, and they punish it, as if that existence was eternal.

With respect to Plato's Phaedo, which has furnished them with the only specious argument that has ever been advanced, the question {74} is discussed there in a very light and desultory manner. Socrates being condemned, by an unjust judgment, to lose his life in a few hours, had no occasion to enter into an accurate enquiry whether he was at liberty to dispose of it himself. Supposing him really to have been the author of those discourses which Plato ascribes to him, yet believe me, my lord, he would have meditated with more attention on the subject, had he been in circumstances which required him to reduce his speculations to practice; and a strong proof that no valid objection can be drawn from that immortal work against the right of disposing of our own lives, is, that Cato read it twice through the very night that he destroyed himself.

The same sophisters make it a question whether life can ever be an evil? but when we consider the multitude of errors, torments, and vices, with which it abounds, one would rather be inclined to doubt whether it can ever be a blessing. Guilt incessantly besieges the most virtuous of mankind. Every moment he lives he is in danger of falling a prey to the wicked, or of being wicked himself. To {75} struggle and to endure, is his lot in this world; that of the dishonest man is to do evil, and to suffer. In every other particular they differ, and only agree in sharing the miseries of life in common. If you required authorities and facts, I could recite you the oracles of old, the answers of the sages, and produce instances where acts of virtue have been recompensed with death. But let us leave these considerations, my lord; it is to you whom I address myself, and I ask you what is the chief attention of a wise man in this life, except, if I may be allowed the expression, to collect himself inwardly, and endeavour, even while he lives, to be dead to every object of sense? The only way by which wisdom directs us to avoid the miseries of human nature, is it not to detach ourselves from all earthly objects, from every thing that is gross in our composition, to retire within ourselves, and to raise our thoughts to sublime contemplations? If therefore our misfortunes are derived from our passions and errors, with what eagerness should we wish for a state which will deliver us both from the one and the other? What is {76} the fate of those sons of sensuality, who indiscreetly multiply their torments by their pleasures? they in fact destroy their existence by extending their connections in this life; they increase the weight of their crimes by their numerous attachments; they relish no enjoyments, but what are succeeded by a thousand bitter wants; the more lively their sensibility, the more acute their sufferings; the stronger they are attached to life, the more wretched they become.

But admitting it, in general, a benefit to mankind to crawl upon the earth with gloomy sadness, I do not mean to intimate that the human race ought with one common consent to destroy themselves, and make the world one immense grave. But there are miserable beings, who are too much exalted to be governed by vulgar opinion; to them despair and grievous torments are the passports of nature. It would be as ridiculous to suppose that life can be a blessing to such men, as it was absurd in the sophister Possidonius to deny that is was an {77} evil, at the same time that he endured all the torments of the gout. While life is agreeable to us, we earnestly wish to prolong it, and nothing but a sense of extreme misery can extinguish the desire of existence; for we naturally conceive a violent dread of death, and this dread conceals the miseries of human nature from our sight. We drag a painful and melancholy life, for a long time before we can resolve to quit it; but when once life becomes so insupportable as to overcome the horror of death, then existence is evidently a great evil, and we cannot disengage ourselves from it too soon. Therefore, though we cannot exactly ascertain the point at which it ceases to be a blessing, yet at least we are certain in that it is an evil long before it appears to be such, and with every sensible man the right of quitting life is, by a great deal, precedent to the temptation.

This is not all. After they have denied that life can be an evil, in order to bar our right of making away with ourselves; they confess immediately afterwards that it is an {78} evil, by reproaching us with want of courage to support it. According to them, it is cowardice to withdraw ourselves from pain and trouble, and there are none but dastards who destroy themselves. O Rome, thou victrix of the world, what a race of cowards did thy empire produce! Let Arria, Eponina, Lucretia, be of the number; they were women. But Brutus, Cassius, and thou great and divine Cato, who didst share with the gods the adoration of an astonished world, thou whose sacred and august presence animated the Romans with holy zeal, and made tyrants tremble, little did thy proud admirers imagine that paltry rhetoricians, immured in the dusty corner of a college, would ever attempt to

prove that thou wert a coward, for having preferred death to a shameful existence.

O the dignity and energy of your modern writers! How sublime, how intrepid are you with your pens? but tell me, thou great and valiant hero, who dost so courageously decline the battle, in order to endure the pain of living somewhat longer; when spark of fire {79} lights upon your hand, why do you withdraw it in such haste? how? are you such a coward that you dare not bear the scorching of fire? nothing, you say, can oblige you to endure the burning spark; and what obliges me to endure life? was the creation of a man of more difficulty to Providence, than that of a straw? and is not both one and the other equally the work of his hands?

Without doubt, it is an evidence of great fortitude to bear with firmness the misery which we cannot shun; none but a fool, however, will voluntarily endure evils which he can avoid without a crime; and it is very often a great crime to suffer pain unnecessarily. He who has not resolution to deliver himself from a miserable being by a speedy death, is like one who would rather suffer a wound to mortify, than trust to a surgeon's knife for his cure. Come, thou worthy -- cut off this leg, which endangers my life. I will see it done without shrinking, and will give that hero leave to call me coward, who suffers his leg to mortify, because he dares not undergo the same operation. {80}

I acknowledge that there are duties owing to others, the nature of which will not allow every man to dispose of his life; but, in return, how many are there which give him a right to dispose of it? let a magistrate on whom the welfare of a nation depends, let a father of a family who is bound to procure subsistence for his children, let a debtor who might ruin his creditors, let these at all events discharge their duty; admitting a thousand other civil and domestic relations to oblige an honest and unfortunate man to support the misery of life, to avoid the greater evil of doing injustice; is it, therefore, under circumstances totally different, incumbent on us to preserve a life oppressed with a swarm of miseries, when it can be of no service but to him who has not courage to die? "Kill me, my child," says the decrepid savage to his son, who carries him on his shoulders, and bends under his weight; the "enemy is at hand; go to battle with thy brethren; go and preserve thy children, and do not suffer thy helpless father to fall {81} alive into the hands of those whose relations he has mangled." Though hunger, sickness, and poverty, those domestic plagues, more dreadful than savage enemies, may allow a wretched cripple to consume, in a sick bed, the provisions of a family which can scarce subsist itself, yet he who has no connections, whom heaven has reduced to the necessity of living alone, whose wretched existence can produce no good, why should not he, at least, have the right of quitting a station, where his complaints are troublesome, and his sufferings of no benefit?

Weigh these considerations, my lord; collect these arguments, and you will find that they may be reduced to the most simple of nature's rights, of which no man of sense ever yet entertained a doubt. In fact, why should we be allowed to cure ourselves of the gout, and not to get rid of the misery of life? do not both evils proceed from the same hand? to what purpose is it to say, that death is painful? are drugs agreeable to be taken? no, nature revolts against both. Let them prove therefore {82} that it is more justifiable to cure a transient disorder by the application of remedies, than to free ourselves from an incurable evil by putting an end to our life; and let them shew how it can be less criminal to use the bark for a fever, than to take opium for the stone. If we consider the object in view, it is in both cases to free ourselves from painful sensations; if we regard the means, both one and the other are equally natural; if we consider the repugnance of our nature, it operates equally on both sides; if we attend to the will of providence, can we struggle against any evil of which it is not the author can we deliver ourselves from any torment which the hand of God has not inflicted? what are the bounds which limit his power, and when resistance lawful? are we then

to make no alteration in the condition of things, because every thing is in the state he appointed? must we do nothing in this life, for fear of infringing his laws, or is it in our power to break them if we would? no, my lord, the occupation of man is more great and noble. God did not give him life that he should supinely {83} remain in a state of constant inactivity. But he gave him freedom to act, conscience to will, and reason to choose what is good. He has constituted him sole judge of all his actions. He has engraved this precept in his heart, Do whatever you conceive to be for your own good, provided you thereby do no injury to others. If my sensations tell me that death is eligible, I resist his orders by an obstinate resolution to live; for, by making death desirable, he directs me to put an end to my being.

My lord, I appeal to your wisdom and candour; what more infallible maxims can reason deduce from religion, with respect to suicide? If Christians have adopted contrary tenets, they are neither drawn from the principles of religion, nor from the only sure guide, the Scriptures, but borrowed from the Pagan philosophers. Lactantius and Augustine, the first who propagated this new doctrine, of which Jesus Christ and his apostles take no notice, ground their arguments entirely on the reasoning of Phaedo, which I have already {84} controverted; so that the believers, who, in this respect, think they are supported by the authority of the Gospel, are in fact only countenanced by the authority of Plato. In truth, where do we find, throughout the whole bible any law against suicide, or so much as a bare disapprobation of it; and is it not very unaccountable, that among the instances produced of persons who devoted themselves to death, we do not find the least word of improbation against examples of this kind? nay, what is more, the instance of Samson's voluntary death is authorized by a miracle, by which he revenges himself of his enemies. Would this miracle have been displayed to justify a crime; and would this man, who lost his strength by suffering himself to be seduced by the allurements of a woman, have recovered it to commit an authorised crime, as if God himself would practice deceit on men?

Thou shalt do no murder, says the decalogue; what are we to infer from this? if this commandment is to be taken literally, we {85} must not destroy malefactors, nor our enemies: and Moses, who put so many people to death, was a bad interpreter of his own precept. If there are any exceptions, certainly the first must be in favour of suicide, because it is exempt from any degree of violence and injustice, the two only circumstances which can make homicide criminal; and because nature, moreover, has, in this respect, thrown sufficient obstacles in the way.

But still they tell us, we must patiently endure the evils which God inflicts, and make a merit of our sufferings. This application however of the maxims of Christianity, is very ill calculated to satisfy our judgment. Man is subject to a thousand troubles, his life is a complication of evils, and he seems to have been born only to suffer. Reason directs him to shun as many of these evils as he can avoid; and religion, which is never in contradiction to reason, approves of his endeavours. But how inconsiderable is the account of these evils, in comparison with those he is obliged to endure against his will? It is with {86} respect to these, that a merciful God allows man to claim the merit of resistance; he receives the tribute he has been pleased to impose, as a voluntary homage, and he places our resignation in this life to our profit in the next. True repentance is derived from nature; if man endures whatever he is obliged to suffer, he does, in this respect, all that God requires of him; and if any one is so inflated with pride, as to attempt more, he is a madman, who ought to be confined, or an impostor, who ought to be punished. Let us, therefore, without scruple, fly from all the evils we can avoid; there will still be too many left for us to endure. Let us, without remorse, quit life itself when it becomes a torment to us, since it is in our own power to do it, and that in so doing we neither offend God nor man. If we would offer a sacrifice to the supreme Being, is it

nothing to undergo death? let us devote to God that which he demands by the voice of reason, and into his hands let us peaceably surrender our souls.

Such are the liberal precepts which good {87} sense dictates to every man, and which religion authorises.[9] Let us apply these precepts to ourselves. You have condescended to disclose your mind to me; I am acquainted with your uneasiness; you do not endure less than myself; and your troubles, like mine, are incurable; and they are the more remediless, {88} as the laws of honour are more immutable than those of fortune. You bear them, I must confess, with fortitude. Virtue supports you; advance but one step farther, and she disengages you. You intreat me to suffer; my lord, I dare importune you to put an end to your sufferings; and I leave you to judge which of us is most dear to the other.

Why should we delay doing that which we must do at last? shall we wait till old age and decrepid baseness attach us to life, after they have robbed it of its charms, and till we are doomed to drag an infirm and decrepid body with labour, and ignominy, and pain? We are at an age when the soul has vigour to disengage itself with ease from its shackles, and when a man knows how to die as he ought; when farther advanced in years, he suffers himself to be torn from life, which he quits with reluctance. Let us take advantage of this time, when the tedium of life makes death desirable; and let us tremble for fear it should come in all its horrors, at the moment when we could wish to avoid it. I remember {89} the time, when I prayed to heaven only for a single hour of life, and when I should have died in despair if it had not been granted. Ah! what a pain it is to burst asunder the ties which attach our hearts to this world, and how advisable it is to quit life the moment the connection is broken! I am sensible, my lord, that we are both worthy of a purer mansion; virtue points it out, and destiny invites us to seek it. May the friendship which invites us preserve our union to the latest hour! O what a pleasure for two sincere friends voluntary to end their days in each others arms, to intermingle their latest breath, and at the same instant to give up the soul which they shared in common! What pain, what regret can infect their last moments? What do they quit by taking leave of the world? They go together; they quit nothing. {90}

LETTER CXV. ANSWER.

THOU art distracted, my friend, by a fatal passion; be more discreet; do not give counsel, whilst thou standest so much in need of advice. I have known greater evils than yours. I am armed with fortitude of mind; I am an Englishman, and not afraid to die; but I know how to live and suffer as becomes a man. I have seen death near at hand, and have viewed it with too much indifference to go in search of it.

It is true, I thought you might be of use to me; my affection stood in need of yours: your endeavours might have been serviceable to me; your understanding might have enlightened me in the most important concern of my life; if I do not avail myself of it, who are you to impute it to? Where is it? What {91} is become of it? What are you capable of? Of what use can you be in your present condition? What service can I expect from you? A senseless grief renders you stupid and unconcerned. Thou art no man; thou art nothing; and if I did not consider what thou mightest be, I cannot conceive any thing more abject.

There is need of no other proof than your letter itself. Formerly I could discover in you good sense and truth. Your sentiments were just, your reflections proper, and I liked you not only from judgment but choice; for I considered your influence as an additional motive to excite me to the study of wisdom. But what do I perceive now in the arguments of your letter, with which you

appear to be so highly satisfied? A wretched and perpetual sophistry, which in the erroneous deviations of your reason shews the disorder of your mind, and which I would not stoop to refute, if I did not commiserate your delirium. {92}

To subvert all your reasoning with one word, I would only ask you a single question. You who believe in the existence of a God, in the immortality of the soul, and in the freewill of man, you surely cannot suppose that an intelligent being is embodied, and stationed on the earth by accident only, to exist, to suffer, and to die. It is certainly most probable that the life of man is not without some design, some end, some moral object. I intreat you to give me a direct answer to this point; after which we will deliberately examine your letter, and you will blush to have written it.

But let us wave all general maxims, about which we often hold violent disputes, without adopting any of them in practice; for in their applications we always find some particular circumstances which makes such an alteration in the state of things, that every one thinks himself dispensed from submitting to the rules which he prescribes to others; and it is well known, that every man who establishes {93} general principles deems them obligatory on all the world, himself excepted. Once more let us speak to you in particular.

You believe that you have a right to put an end to your being. Your proof is of a very singular nature; "because I am disposed to die, say you, I have a right to destroy myself." This is certainly a very convenient argument for villains of all kinds: they ought to be very thankful to you for the arms with which you have furnished them; there can be no crimes, which, according to your arguments, may not be justified by the temptation to perpetrate them; and as soon as the impetuosity of passion shall prevail over the horror of guilt, their disposition to do evil will be considered as a right to commit it.

Is it lawful for you therefore to quit life? I should be glad to know whether you have yet begun to live? what! was you placed here on earth to do nothing in this world? did not heaven when it gave you existence give you some task or employment? If you have {94} accomplished your day's work before evening, rest yourself for the remainder of the day; you have a right to do it; but let us see your work. What answer are you prepared to make the supreme Judge, when he demands an account of your time? Tell me, what can you say to him? -- I have seduced a virtuous girl: I have forsaken a friend in distress. Thou unhappy wretch! point out to me that just man who can boast that he has lived long enough; let me learn from him in what manner I ought to have spent my days to be at liberty to quit life.

You enumerate the evils of human nature. You are not ashamed to exhaust common-place topics, which have been hackneyed over a hundred times; and you conclude that life is an evil. But search, examine into the order of things, and see whether you can find any good which is not intermingled with evil. Does it therefore follow that there is no good in the universe, and can you confound what is in its own nature evil, with that which is only an evil accidentally? You have {95} confessed yourself, that the transitory and passive life of man is of no consequence, and only bears respect to matter from which he will soon be disencumbered; but his active and moral life, which ought to have most influence over his nature, consists in the exercise of free-will. Life is an evil to a wicked man in prosperity, and a blessing to an honest man in distress: for it is not its casual modification, but its relation to some final object which makes it either good or bad. After all, what are these cruel torments which force you to abandon life? do you imagine, that under your affected impartiality in the enumeration of the evils of this life, I did not discover that you was ashamed to speak of your own? Trust me, and do not at once abandon every virtue. Preserve at least your

wonted sincerity, and speak thus openly to your friend; "I have lost all hope of seducing a modest woman, I am oliged therefore to be a man of virtue; I had much rather die."

You are weary of living; and you tell me, that life is an evil. Sooner or later you will {96} receive consolation, and then you will say life is a blessing. You will speak with more truth, though not with better reason; for nothing will have altered but yourself. Begin the alteration then from this day; and, since all the evil you lament is in the disposition of your mind, correct your irregular appetites, and do not set your house on fire to avoid the trouble of putting it in order.

I endure misery, say you: Is it in my power to avoid suffering? But this is changing the state of the question: for the subject of enquiry is, not whether you suffer, but whether your life is an evil? Let us proceed. You are wretched, you naturally endeavour to extricate yourself from misery. Let us see whether, for that purpose, it is necessary to die.

Let us for a moment examine the natural tendency of the afflictions of the mind, as in direct opposition to the evils of the body, the two substances being of contrary nature. The latter become worse and more inveterate the {97} longer they continue, and at length utterly destroy this mortal machine. The former, on the contrary, being only external and transitory modifications of an immortal and uncompounded essence, are insensibly effaced, and leave the mind in its original form, which is not susceptible of alteration. Grief, disquietude, regret, and despair, are evils of short duration, which never take root in the mind; and experience always falsifies that bitter reflection, which makes us imagine our misery will have no end. I will go farther; I cannot imagine that the vices which contaminate us, are more inherent in our nature than the troubles we endure; I not only believe that they perish with the body which gives them birth, but I think, beyond all doubt, that a longer life would be sufficient to reform mankind, and that many ages of youth would teach us that nothing is preferable to virtue.

However this may be, as the greatest part of our physical evils are incessantly encreasing, the acute pains of the body, when they are incurable, may justify a man's destroying himself; {98} for all his faculties being distracted with pain, and the evil being without remedy, he has no longer any use either of his will or of his reason; he ceases to be a man before he is dead, and does nothing more in taking away his life, than quit a body which incumbers him, and in which his soul is no longer resident.

But it is otherwise with the afflictions of the mind, which, let them be ever so acute, always carry their remedy with them. In fact, what is it that makes any evil intolerable? Nothing but its duration. The operations of surgery are generally much more painful than the disorders they cure; but the pain occasioned by the latter is lasting, that of the operation is momentary, and therefore preferable. What occasion is there therefore for any operation to remove troubles which die of course by their duration, the only circumstance which could render them insupportable? Is it reasonable to apply such desperate remedies to evils which expire of themselves? To a man who values himself on his fortitude, {99} and who estimates years at their real value, of two ways by which he may extricate himself from the same troubles, which will appear preferable, death or time? Have patience, and you will be cured. What would you desire more?

Oh! you will say, it doubles my afflictions to reflect that they will cease at last! This is the vain sophistry of grief! an apophthegm void of reason, of propriety, and perhaps of sincerity. What an absurd motive of despair is the hope of terminating misery![10] Even allowing this fantastical reflection, who would not chuse to encrease the present pain for a moment, under the assurance of putting an end to it, as we scarify a wound in order to heal it? and admitting any charm in grief, to

make us in love with suffering, {100} when we release ourselves from it by putting an end to our being, do we not at that instant incur all that we apprehend hereafter?

Reflect thoroughly, young man; what are ten, twenty, thirty years, in competition with immortality? Pain and pleasure pass like a shadow; life slides away in an instant; it is nothing of itself; its value depends on the use we make of it. The good that we have done is all that remains, and it is that alone which marks its importance.

Therefore do not say any more that your existence is an evil, since it depends upon yourself to make it a blessing; and if it be an evil to have lived, this is an additional reason for prolonging life. Do not pretend neither to say any more that you are at liberty to die; for it is as much as to say that you have power to alter your nature, that you have a right to revolt against the author of your being, and to frustrate the end of your existence. But when you add, that your death does injury to {101} no one, do you recollect that you make this declaration to your friend?

Your death does injury to no one? I understand you! You think the loss I shall sustain by your death of no importance; you deem my affliction of no consequence. I will urge to you no more the rights of friendship, which you despise; but are there not obligations still more dear,[11] which ought to induce you to preserve your life? If there be a person in the world who loved you to that degree as to be unwilling to survive you, and whose happiness depends on yours, do you think that you have no obligations to her? Will not the execution of your wicked design disturb the peace of a mind, which has been with such difficulty restored to its former innocence? Are not you afraid to add fresh torments to a heart of such sensibility? Are not you apprehensive left your death should be attended {102} with a loss more fatal, which would deprive the world and virtue itself of its brightest ornament? And if she should survive you, are not you afraid to rouse up remorse in her bosom, which is more grievous to support than life itself? Thou ungrateful friend! thou indelicate lover! wilt thou always be taken up wholly with thyself? Wilt thou always think on thy own troubles alone? Hast thou no regard for the happiness of one who was so dear to thee? and cannot thou resolve to live for her who was willing to die with thee?

You talk of the duties of a magistrate, and of a father of a family: and because you are not under those circumstances, you think yourself absolutely free. And are you then under no obligations to society, to whom you are indebted for your preservation, your talents, your understanding? do you owe nothing to your native country, and to those unhappy people who may need your existence! O what an accurate calculation you make! among the obligations you have enumerated, {103} you have only omitted those of a man and of a citizen. Where is the virtuous patriot, who refused to enlist under a foreign prince, because his blood ought not to be split but in the service of his country; and who now, in a fit of despair, is ready to shed it against the express prohibition of the laws? The laws, the laws, young man! did any wise man ever despise them? Socrates, though innocent, out of regard to them refused to quit his prison. You do not scruple to violate them by quitting life unjustly; and you ask, what injury do I?

You endeavour to justify yourself by example. You presume to mention the Romans: you talk of the Romans! it becomes you indeed to cite those illustrious names. Tell me, did Brutus die a lover in despair, and did Cato plunge the dagger in his breast for his mistress? Thou weak and abject man! what resemblance is there between Cato and thee? Shew me the common standard between that sublime soul and thine. Ah vain wretch! hold thy peace: I am afraid to profane {104} his name by a vindication of his conduct. At that august and sacred name every friend to virtue should bow to the ground, and honour the memory of the greatest hero in silence.

How ill you have selected your examples, and how meanly you judge of the Romans, if you imagine that they thought themselves at liberty to quit life so soon as it became a burden to them. Recur to the excellent days of that republic, and seen whether you will find a single citizen of virtue, who thus freed himself from the discharge of his duty even after the most cruel misfortunes. When Regulus was on his return to Carthage, did he prevent the torments which he knew were preparing for him by destroying himself? What would not Posthumus have given, when obliged to pass under the yoke at Caudium, had this resource been justifiable? How much did even the senate admire that effort of courage, which enabled the consul Varro to survive his defeat? For what reason did so many generals voluntary surrender themselves to their enemies, they to whom ignominy was so dreadful, {105} and who were so little afraid of dying? It was because they considered their blood, their life, and their latest breath, as devoted to their country; and neither shame nor misfortune could dissuade them from this sacred duty. But when the laws were subverted, and the state became a prey to tyranny, the citizens resumed their natural liberty, and the right they had over their own lives. When Rome was no more, it was lawful for the Romans to give up their lives; they had discharged their duties on earth, they had no longer any country to defend, they were therefore at liberty to dispose of their lives, and to obtain that freedom for themselves which they could not recover for their country. After having spent their days in the service of expiring Rome, and in fighting for the defence of its laws, they died great virtuous as they had lived, and their death was an additional tribute to the glory of the Roman name, since none of them beheld a fight above all others most dishonourable, that of a true citizen stooping to an usurper. {106}

But thou, what art thou? what hast thou done? dost thou think to excuse thyself on account of thy obscurity? does thy weakness exempt thee from thy duty, and because thou hast neither rank nor distinction in thy country, art thou less subject to the laws? It becomes you vastly to presume to talk of dying while you owe the service of your life to your equals. Know, that a death, such as you meditate, is shameful and surreptitious. It is a theft committed on mankind in general. Before you quit life, return the benefits you have received from every individual. But, say you, I have no attachments; I am useless in the world. O thou young philosopher! art thou ignorant that thou canst not more a single step without finding some duty to fulfil; and that every man is useful to society, even by means of his existence alone?

Hear me, thou rash young man! thou art dear to me. I commiserate thy errors. If the least sense of virtue still remains in thy breast, attend, and let me teach thee to be reconciled {107} to life. Whenever thou art tempted to quit, say to thyself -- "Let me do at least one good action before I die." Then go in search for one in a state of indigence, whom thou mayest relieve; for one under misfortunes, whom thou mayest comfort; for one under oppression, whom thou mayest defend. Introduce to me those unhappy wretches whom my rank keeps at a distance. Do not be afraid of misusing my purse, or my credit: make free with them; distribute my fortune; make me rich. If this consideration restrains you to-day, it will restrain you to-morrow; if no to morrow, it will restrain you all your life. If it has no power to restrain you, die! you are below my care.

FINIS.

Notes

[2]De Divin. lib. ii.

[3]Agamus Die Gratias, quad nemo in vita teneri potest. SEN. Epist. 12.

[4]TACIT. Ann. lib i.

[5]IT would be easy to prove that suicide is as lawful under the Christian dispensation as it was to the Heathens. There is not a single text of scripture which prohibits it. That great and infallible rule of faith and practice which must controul all philosophy and human reasoning, has left us in this particular to our natural liberty. Resignation to Providence is indeed recommended in scripture; but that implies only submission to ills that are unavoidable, not to such as may be remedied by prudence or courage. *Thou shalt not kill*, is evidently meant to exclude only the killing of others, over whose life we have no authority. That this precept, like most of the scripture precepts, must be modified by reason and common sense, is plain from the practice of magistrates, who punish criminals capitally, notwithstanding the letter of the law. But were this commandment ever so express against suicide, it would now have no authority, for all the law of *Moses* is abolished, except so far as it is established by the law of nature. And we have already endeavoured to prove that suicide is not prohibited by that law. In all cases Christians and Heathens are precisely upon the same footing; *Cato* and *Brutus*, *Arrea* and *Portia* acted heroically; those who now imitate their example ought to receive the same praises from posterity. The power of committing suicide is regarded by *Pliny* as an advantage which men possess even above the Deity himself. "Deus non sibi potest mortem consciscere si velit quod homini dedit optimum in tantis vitae paenis." Lib. II. Cap. 7. ([editor's note] 5)

[6]Quint. Curtius lib. VI. cap. 5.

[7]Suet. Augus. cap. 3.

[8]Lib. 7. cap. 55.

[9]A strange letter this for the discussion of such a subject! Do men argue so cooly on a question of this nature, when they examine it on their own accounts? Is the letter a forgery, or does the author reason only with an intent to be refuted? What makes our opinion in this particular dubious, is the example of Robeck, which he cites, and which seems to warrant his own. Robeck deliberated so gravely that he had patience to write a book, a large, voluminous, weighty, and dispassionate book; and when he had concluded, according to his principles, that it was lawful to put an end to our being, he destroyed himself with the same composure that he wrote. Let us beware of the prejudices of the times, and of particular countries. When suicide is out of fashion we conclude that none but madmen destroy themselves; and all the efforts of courage appear chimerical to dastardly minds; every one judges of others by himself. Nevertheless, how many instances are there, well attested, of men, in every other respect perfectly discreet, who, without remorse, rage, or despair, have quitted life for no other reason than because it was a burden to them, and have died with more composure than they lived?

[10]No, my lord, we do not put an end to misery by these means, but rather fill the measure of affliction, by bursting asunder the last ties which attach us to felicity. When we regret what was dear to us, grief itself still attaches us to the object we lament, which is a state less deplorable than to be attached to nothing.

[11]Obligations more dear than those of friendship! Is it a philosopher who talks thus? But this affected sophist was of an amorous disposition.

Review of Hume's *A Treatise Of Human Nature*

The History of The Works of the Learned

November-December 1739

Editor's Note: This review appeared anonymously in 1739, Volume 2 of *The History of the Works of the Learned*. The review was published in two parts, starting in the November issue (pp. 353-390), and concluding in the December issue (pp. 391-404). The review covers only Volume 1 of Hume's *Treatise*, in spite of the reviewer's suggestion that Volume 2 might also be reviewed at a later time.

The History of the Works of the Learned November and December 1739 Vol. 2, pp. 353-404

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ARTICLE XXVI

***A Treatise of* HUMAN NATURE: *Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*. London: *Printed for* John-Noon, *at the* White Hart, *near* Mercer-Chapel, Cheapside, 1739. Vol. II. Octavo. Pages 475-318.**

I Do not recollect any Writer in the *English* Language who has framed a System of human Nature, morally considered, upon the Principle of this Author, which is that of Necessity, in Opposition to Liberty or Freedom. The Truth of the Principle itself has been often and very carefully discussed. Some have endeavoured to prove even the Impossibility of Liberty, while others have asserted it to be an essential Property of human Nature, the Basis of all Morality, Religion and happiness, which

can subsist upon no other Foundation, and are utterly subverted by the Denial of it. To form the clearest Ideas we can have upon this abstruse Subject, we should read some Letters that passed thereupon between those tow acute Reasoners, Mr. *Locke* and Mr. *Limborch*, and the incomparable Dr. *Clarke*'s Answers to several Pieces of *Leibnitz* and *Collins*.

Our Author has sufficiently (he says) explained the Design of this Work of his in the Introduction. Perhaps he expects we should understand it by the following Passages.

> **It is evident, that all the sciences have Relation, greater or less, to human Nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one Passage or another. Even *Mathematicks*, *Natural Philosophy*, and *Natural Religion*, are in {354} some measure dependent on the Science of MAN; since they lie under the Cognizance of Men, and are judged of by their Powers and Faculties. It is impossible to tell what Changes and Improvements we might make in these Sciences, were we thoroughly acquainted with the Extent and Force of human Understanding, and could explain the Nature of the Ideas we employ, and of the Operations we perform in our Reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be hoped for in natural Religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the Nature of superior Powers but carries its Views farther, to their Disposition towards us and our Duties towards them, and consequently we ourselves are not only the Beings that reason, but also one of the Objects concerning which we reason.**

If therefore the Sciences of Mathematicks, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such a Dependence on the Knowledge of Man, what may be expected in the other Sciences whose Connexion with human Nature is more close and intimate? The sole End of Logick is to explain the Principles and Operations of our reasoning Faculty, and the Nature of our Ideas: Morals and Criticism regard our Tastes and Sentiments; and Politicks consider Men as united in Society, and dependent on each other. In these four Sciences of *Logick*, *Morals*, *Criticism* and *Politicks*, is comprehended almost every thing which can any way import us to be acquainted with. --

Here then is the only Expedient from which we can hope for Success in our philosophical Researches, to leave the tedious lingering Method which we have hitherto followed; and instead of taking no and then a Castle or Village on the Frontier, to march directly to the Capital or Center {355} of these Sciences, to human Nature itself; which being once Masters of we may every where else hope for an easy Victory. -- There is no Question of Importance, whose Decision is not comprized in the Science of Man; and there is none which can be decided with any Certainty, before we become acquainted with that Science. *In pretending therefore to explain the Principles of human Nature, we in effect propose a compleat System of the Sciences, built on a Foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any Security*.

And as the Science of Man is the only solid Foundation for the other Sciences, so the only solid Foundation we can give to this Science itself, must be laid on Experience and Observation. -- For it seems evident, that the Essence of the Mind being equally unknown to us with that of external Bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any Notions of its Powers and Qualities, otherwise than from careful and exact Experiments, and the Observation of those particular Effects which result from its different Circumstances and Situations. --

Moral Philosophy has indeed this peculiar Disadvantage, which is not found in natural; that, in collecting its Experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with Premeditation, and after such a manner, as to satisfy itself concerning every particular Difficulty which may arise. When we are at

a loss to know the Effects of one Body upon another, we need only put them in that Situation, and observe what results from it. But should we endeavour to clear up after the same manner any Doubt in moral Philosophy, by placing ourselves in the same Case with that which we consider, it is evident this Reflection and Premeditation would so disturb the Operation {356} of our natural Principles, as must render it impossible to form any just Conclusion from the Pho^enomenon. We must therefore glean up our Experiments in this Science from a cautious Observation of human Life, and take them as they appear in the common Course of the World, by Mens Behaviour in Company, in Affairs, and in their Pleasures. Where Experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a Science, which will not be inferior in Certainty, and will be much superior in Utility, to any other of human Comprehension.

Here the Reader has all that I can find in the Introduction to this Work, which can in the least give him any Idea of the Design of it: How far he will be thereby instructed in it, must be left to his own Judgment: I go on to set before him the several Topicks therein treated of. The Understanding is the Subject of the first Book, or Volume which is by much the largest. In the second Book, or Volume, the Passions are considered. The former of these Books is divided into four Parts. In the first, the Doctrine of Ideas is delivered; accounting for their Origin, and describing their Composition, Connexion and Abstraction. I shall offer a short Hint of what he has said upon these different Heads.

To trace the Origin of our Ideas, he resolves all the Perceptions of the human Mind into two Kinds, which may be called *Impressions* and *Ideas*,[2] He {357} makes the Difference betwixt these to consist in the Degrees and Force and Liveliness, with which they strike the perceiving Faculty. Those that enter with the most Violence, he calls *Impressions*; and under this Name he comprehends all our Sensations, Passions and Emotions, as they make their first Appearance in the Soul: By *Ideas*, he means the faint Images of these in Thinking and Reasoning. -- There is another Division of our Perceptions whereof he takes notice, and which extends itself both to our Impressions and Ideas: This is into *simple* and *complex*.

Having by these Divisions given an Order and Arrangement to his Objects, (that is, I suppose, Ideas) we may now, he says, with the more Accuracy considered their Qualities and Relations. The first Circumstance that strikes his Eye,[3] is the great Resemblance betwixt our Impressions and Ideas in every Particular, except their Degree of Force and Vivacity. When he shuts his Eyes and thinks of his Chamber, the Ideas he forms are exact Representations (he tells us) of the Impressions he felt. I fancy most other People have made the same Observations. However, this Circumstance seems to our Author remarkable, and engages his Attention for a Moment.

Having finished his Meditations on this Point, and discovered this Relation between Impressions and Ideas, which, he says, requires no farther Examination, he is curious to find some other of their Qualities. He proceeds therefore to consider how they stand with regard to their existence, and which of the Impressions and Ideas are Causes, and {358} which Effects. The full Examination of this Question is, he tells us, the Subject of this Performance of his; and therefore he here contents himself with establishing this one general Proposition, *That all our simple Ideas in their first Appearance are derived from simple Impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.* When he has fixed this Assertion beyond Contradiction, he reflects on what he has done with great Satisfactions; saying,

> **This then is the first Principle I establish in the Science of human Nature, nor ought we to despise it because of the Simplicity of its Appearance. For it is remarkable, that the**

> present Question is the same with what has made so much Noise in the Terms, when it has been disputed whether there be any *innate Ideas*, or whether all Ideas be derived from Sensations and Reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the Ideas of Extension and Colour not to be innate, Philosophers do nothing but shew, that they are conveyed by our Senses. To prove the Ideas of Passion and Desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a preceding Experience of these Emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these Arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing, but that Ideas are preceded by other more lively Perceptions from which they are derived, and which they represent."

See what an extraordinary Light our Author, by tow or three Arguments, has cast upon a Point, which cost Mr. *Locke*, and some other eminent Philosophers, no little Pains in settling.

> Accordingly he hopes his clear stating of the Question will remove all Disputes concerning it, and will render the abovesaid Principle of more use in our Reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have been. {359}

And now having made it appear, that our simple Impressions are prior to their correspondent Ideas, a very few Instances excepted, Method seems, our author says, to require we should examine our Impressions, before we consider our Ideas. But after informing us that Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of *Sensation* and those of *Reflexion*, and briefly illustrating both sorts, he gives us to understand, that it will be necessary to reverse that Method, which at first Sight seems most natural; and, in order to explain the Nature and Principles of the human Mind, give a particular Account of Ideas, before we proceed to Impressions.

In Pursuance of this Resolution, he goes on: First, to describe and distinguish the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination: Secondly, to explain the Connexion or Association of Ideas: Thirdly, to assign their several other Relations: Fourthly, to define and fix the true Essence of Modes and Substances: And Fifthly, to determine the Nature of abstract Ideas. On all these heads, a Man, who has never had the Pleasure of reading Mr. *Locke*'s incomparable Essay, will peruse our Author with much less Disgust, than those can who have been used to the irresistible Reasoning and wonderful Perspicuity of that admirable Writer.

To pass over the other Topicks, let us transiently view our Author's Discourse on *abstracted Ideas*, which fills up the seventh Section of the first Part of his Work. He begins,

> A very material Question has been started concerning *abstract* or *general* Ideas, *whether they be general or particular in the Mind's Conception of them*."[4]

Then he tells us {360} that Dr. *Berkeley* has disputed the received Opinion in this Particular, and has asserted, *that all general Ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain Term, which gives them a more extensive Signification, and makes them recall upon Occasion other individuals which are similar to them*. This, agreeable to his Sagacity, he looks upon as one of the greatest and most valuable Discoveries that has been made of late Years in the Republick of Letters; and so he sets himself to confirm it by some Arguments, which, in his Apprehension, will put it beyond all Doubt and Controversy.

It is above twenty Years since I looked over that Piece of Dr. *Berkeley*'s, which contains this most precious Discovery, and, if I remember right, that Gentleman himself boasts of some might Advantages that would accrue from it to the Commonwealth of Learning: The Acquisition of Science was to become exceeding easy, and several Difficulties, that were used grievously to perplex Mathematicians and Metaphysicians, were to sink before it: In short, it was to do such Feats in

behalf of Knowledge, as no Principle beside was able to perform. But notwithstanding all these Benefits that were to accompany it, I do not find it has met with any favourable Reception among the Literati; or that many Persons of Ability and Penetration are become Disciples: Its Fortune may now perhaps be more prosperous under the Auspices of its new Patron, who, we see, undertakes to raise it above all Opposition.

It is evident, he says, that in forming most of our general Ideas, if not all of them, we abstract from every particular Degree of Quantity and Quality, and that an Object ceases not to be of any particular Species on account of every small Alteration in its Extension, Duration, and other Properties. It may therefore be thought, that {361} here is a plain Dilemma that decides concerning the Nature of those abstract Ideas which have afforded so much Speculation to Philosophers. The abstract Idea of a Man represents Men of all Sizes and all Qualities; which it is concluded it cannot do, but either *by representing at once all possible Sizes and all possible Qualities, or by representing no particular one at all*. Now it having been esteemed absurd to defend the former Proposition, as implying an infinite Capacity in the Mind, it has been commonly infer'd in favour of the latter.

Here is the Dilemma with which we are perplexed on this Subject, and from which the superior Capacity of our Author is to deliver us. The latter Inference he utterly destroys. And this he does, first, by proving that it is utterly impossible to conceive any Quantity or Quality, without forming a precise Notion of its Degrees. And secondly, by shewing, that though the Capacity of the Mind be not infinite, yet we can at once form a Notion of all possible Degrees of Quantity and Quality, in such a Manner at least, as, however imperfect, may serve all the Purposes of Reflection and Conversation.

Thus I have told the Reader what our Author has done. I cannot so compleatly shew him how he has done it; for at the most, I must set down only the Heads of those Arguments whereby he demonstrates the two foregoing Propositions. The first, asserting the Impossibility of conceiving any Quantity or Quality, without forming a precise Notion of its Degrees, he proves by these three: First, whatever Objects are distinguishable are separable by the Thought and Imagination, and *vice versa*. Secondly, it is confessed, that no Object can appear to the Senses, or, in other Words, that no Impression {362} can become present to the Mind, without being determined in its Degrees both of Quantity and Quality: to affirm otherwise, implies that it is possible for the same Thing to be and not to be. Thirdly, it is a Principle in Philosophy, that every thing in Nature is individual, and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a Triangle really existent, which has no precise Proportion of Sides and Angles. If this therefore be absurd in *Fact* and Reality, it must also be lo in *Idea*; since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct Idea is absurd and impossible.[5] But to form an Idea simply, is the same Thing; *the Reference of the Idea to an Object being an extraneous Denomination, of which, in itself, it bears no Mark or Character*.

When our Author, by what he says upon these Heads, has convinced us of his first Proposition, he proceeds to confirm the second, relating to the Capacity of the Mind, for *forming at once a Notion of all possible Degrees of Quantity and Quality*. He tells us, when we have found a Resemblance among several Objects, we apply the same Name to all of them, whatever Differences may appear among them. When we have acquired a Custom of this kind, the hearing of that Name revives the Idea of one of these Objects, with all its particular Circumstances. But as the same Word has been frequently {363} applied to other Individuals, different in many Respects from that Idea which is immediately present to the Mind; the Mind not being able to revive the Idea of all the Individuals, only revives that Custom which we have acquired by surveying them.

> They are not really and in fact present to the Mind, but only in Power; nor do we draw them all out distinctly in the Imagination, but keep ourselves in a Readiness to survey any of them, as we may be prompted by a present Design or Necessity. The Word raises up an individual Idea, along with a certain Custom, and that Custom produces any other individual one for which we may have Occasion. But as the Production of all Ideas to which the Name may be applied, is in most Cases impossible, we abridge that Work by a more partial Consideration, and find but few Inconveniences to arise in Reasoning from that Abridgment.

When he has said this, and a good deal more, for the Explication of this Point, he tells us, the only Difficulty that can remain relating thereto is, to account for that Custom which so readily recalls every particular Idea for which we may have Occasion. The Method he takes for giving us a satisfactory Notion of it is, "by producing other Instances which are analogous to it, and other Principles which facilitate its Operation." His Observations for this Purpose are four, and it is evident he has a very good Opinion of them; for thus he says,

> Perhaps these four Reflections may help to remove all Difficulties to the Hypothesis I have proposed concerning abstract Ideas, so contrary to that which has hitherto prevailed in Philosophy. But, to tell the Truth, I place my chief Confidence in what I have proved concerning the Impossibility of general Ideas, according to the common Method of explaining them. We must {364} certainly seek some new System upon this Head, and there plainly is none beside what I have proposed.

Before he leaves this Subject, he deduces from the foregoing Principles an Explanation of that *Distinction of Reason*, (as he phrases it) which is so much talked of, and so little understood, in the Schools

We have gone thorough the first Part of this Book. In the second Part we find our Author's Notions of the infinite Divisibility, and other Qualities, of our ideas of Space and Time;[6] with divers Objections that may be made thereunto, and his Answers. He introduces this Chapter with an indirect Compliment upon himself; after which he repeats, in his own Way, a great many odd Fancies relating to this Topick, that have often made their Appearance in the Writings of other minute Philosophers. Of these I shall give the Reader a Taste, by the Recital of two or three in their Order. Thus he says,

It is certain that the Imagination[7] reaches a *Minimum*, and may raise up to itself an Idea, of which it cannot conceive any Sub-division, and which cannot be diminished without a total Annihilation. When you tell me of the thousandth and ten-thousandth Part of a Grain of Sand, I have a distinct Idea of these Numbers, {365} and of their different Proportions; but the Images which I form in my Mind to represent the Things themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor inferior to that Image by which I represent the Grain of Sand itself, which is supposed so vastly to exceed them. What consists of Parts is distinguishable into them, and what is distinguishable is separable.[8] But whatever we may imagine, the Idea of a Grain of Sand is not distinguishable, nor separable into 20, much less into 1000, 10000, or an infinite Number of different Ideas.

In a Paragraph or two after, our Author is certain again,

> That we can form Ideas which shall be no greater than the smallest Atom of the animal Spirits of an Insect a thousand times less than a Mite; and we ought rather to conclude, that the Difficulty lies in enlarging our Conceptions so much as to form a just Notion of

> a Mite.[9] For, in order to form a just Notion of these Animals, we must have a distinct Idea representing every Part of them; which, according to the System of infinite Divisibility, is utterly impossible; and, according to that of indivisible Parts or Atoms, is extremely {366} difficult, by reason of the vast Number and Multiplicity of these Parts.[10]

When our Author has ran through the Arguments he had picked up against the infinite Divisibility of Space, he tells us, it is true Mathematicians are wont to say, that there are equally strong Arguments on the other Side of the Question; and then he adds,

> Before I examine these Arguments and Objections in Detail, I will here take them in a Body, and endeavour, by a short and decisive Reason, to prove at once that it is utterly impossible they can have any just Foundation."

What an effectual Method has this Gentleman contrived of destroying his Antagonists! He first slays them all in a Body, and kills them one by one afterwards. I shall not say a Syllable of his particular Executions, but give the Reader a Sight only of that dreadful Instrument, whereby at a single Blow he takes away the Lives of all his Opposers.

> It is an established Maxim (says he) in Metaphysicks, *that whatever the Mind clearly conceives includes the Idea of possible Existence*; or, in other Words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form no Idea of a Mountain without a Valley, and therefore regard it as impossible.

Now it is certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise, shy do we talk or reason concerning it? It is likewise certain that this Idea, as conceived by the Imagination, though divisible into Parts, or inferior Ideas, is not infinitely divisible, nor consists of an infinite Number {367} of Parts: For that exceeds the Comprehension of our limited Capacities. Here then is an Idea of Extension, which consists of Parts, or inferior Ideas, that are perfectly indivisible; consequently this Idea implies no Contradiction; consequently it is impossible for Extension really to exist conformable to it; and consequently all the Arguments employed against the Possibility of mathematical Points are scholastick Quibbles, and unworthy of our Attention.

These Consequences we may carry one Step farther, and conclude that all the pretended Demonstrations for the infinite Divisibility of Extension are equally sophistical, since it is certain these Demonstrations cannot be just, without proving the Impossibility of mathematical Points; which it is an evident Absurdity to pretend to.

There is not, I am persuaded, any Reader hardy enough to withstand such Reasoning as this is. And I hope no one will be so ill-natur'd, as to refuse joining with the Author of it in a Compliment which he passes on himself, at the very Entrance of the third Section immediately following, wherein he considers the other Qualities of our Ideas of Time and Space.

> No Discovery (says he there) could have been made more happily for deciding all Controversies concerning Ideas, than that with which I at first set out, *viz. That Impressions always take the Precedency of them, and that every Idea with which the imagination is furnished, first makes its Appearance in a correspondent Impression*.

By the Application of this fortunate Principle, he proceeds to penetrate still farther into the Nature of our Ideas of Space and Time. What a vast Progress he has made in this Science, may be easily guess'd, by my here marking the very first Step he has therein taken:

> Upon {368} opening my Eyes, says he, and turning them to the surrounding Objects, I

perceive many visible Bodies; and upon shutting them again, and considering the Distance betwixt these Bodies, I acquire the Idea of Extension.

This is indeed a new Method of gaining it, entirely of our Author's Invention; but we shall see a little lower, that this reiterated Action of the Eye is not always necessary for that Purpose, but that the Idea of Extension may be had, at least without closing the Eye-lids. For thus he goes on, full as wisely as he begun.

As every Idea is derived from some Impression, which is exactly similar to it, the Impression similar to this Idea of Extension, must either be some Sensations derived from the Sight, or some internal Impressions arising from these Sensations. Our internal Impressions are our Passions; none of which, I believe, will ever be asserted to be the Model, from which the Idea of Space is derived. There remains therefore nothing but the Senses, which can convey to us this original Impression. Now what Impression do our Senses here convey to us? This is the principal Question, and decides without Appeal concerning the Nature of the Idea. And now follows his Answer, by the first Sentence of which we shall perceive, as I have said above, that this extraordinary Philosopher does not always need both to open and shut his Eyes, in order to acquire the simple Idea of Extension.

The Table before me, says he, is *alone sufficient by its View*, to give me an Idea of Extension. This Idea, then, is borrowed from, and represents some Impression, which this Moment appears to the Senses. But my Senses convey to me only the Impressions of coloured Points, disposed in a certain manner. If the Eye is sensible of any thing farther, I desire it may be pointed {369} out to me. But if it is impossible to shew any Thing further, we may conclude with Certainty, that the Idea of Extension is nothing but a Copy of these coloured points, and of the Manner of their Appearance.

So much for the *Extension* of Space. Not that our Author has here quitted it. He wades still farther therein, through several Pages, mixing Time alone with it, and viewing both in a Variety of Lights. Some of these are too dazzling for my weak Sight. I must therefore shun them; only telling the Reader, whose Eyes are strong enough for such Views, where he is to look for them. And besides the Sequel of the third Section, from the former Part of which we have had the three last Citations, there is the fourth Section, wherein divers of them are to be found, under the Title of Answers to the Objections, whereby Metaphysicians, Mathematicians, *&c*. have conspired to destroy our Author's Doctrine of indivisible Atoms.

When he begins to deal with the Geometricians, he says, at first Sight their Science seems favourable to his Thesis; and if it be contrary in its *Demonstrations*, 'tis perfectly conformable in its *Definitions*; his present Business then, as he adds, must be to defend the Definitions, and refute the Demonstrations.

I will have nothing to do in the Quarrel; if they cannot maintain their Demonstrations against his Attacks, they may even perish.

In the fifth Section, which is filled up likewise with Objections and Replies, he encounters the *Naturalists*, who hold the Reality of an absolute *Vacuum*. The Dispute upon this Head including divers subtle Speculations, interests the Metaphysicians also. The preceding Section was ushered in with a very brief Recapitulation of his System concerning Space and Time, which consists, as he tells us, of {370} two Parts. The first depends on this Chain of Reasoning. The Capacity of the Mind is not infinite; consequently no Idea of Extension or Duration, includes an infinite Number of Parts or inferior Ideas, but of a finite Number, and these simple and indivisible. The second is a

Consequence of the former, which implies, that the Parts into which the Ideas of Space and Time resolve themselves, become at last indivisible; and these indivisible Parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable, when not filled with something real and existent. The Ideas of Space and Time are therefore no separate or distinct Ideas, but merely those of the Manner or Order, in which Objects exist; Or, in other Words, 'tis impossible to conceive either a Vacuum and Extension without Matter, or a Time, when there was no Succession or Change in any real Existence.

The first half of this System he has incontestably proved in the foregoing Pages of this Work; and I have given my Readers a slight Taste of his Demonstrations; the second Part of it is the Basis of the fifth Section, wherein he delivers his Sentiments of a *Vacuum*; for therefrom, he says, it follows, "that we can form no Idea of a *Vacuum*, or Space, where there is nothing visible or tangible." This gives Rise (and will it may) to three Objections; which he most intelligibly tells us, *he shall examine together, because the Answer he shall give to one is a Consequence of that which he shall make use of for the others*.

One might from these Answers collect many Passages, which would give us a high Conceit of the Author's Sagacity. Let us pick out only two or three for a Sample. Thus, he has discover'd that

> **a Man, who enjoys his Sight, receives no other Perception from turning his Eyes on every Side, when entirely deprived of Light, than what is {371} common to him with one born blind; and 'tis certain, he adds, such a one has no Idea either of Light or Darkness.**

A Page or tow after, where he is shewing, that Motion does not presuppose a *Vacuum*, he says, admirably to that Purpose,

> **suppose a Man to be supported in the Air, and to be softly conveyed along by some invisible Power; 'tis evident he is sensible of nothing, and never receives the Idea of Extension, nor indeed any Idea, from this invariable Motion. Even suppose, he moves his Limbs too and fro, this cannot convey to him that Idea. He feels in that Case a certain Sensation or Impression, the Parts of which are successive to each other, and may give him the Idea of Time, but certainly are not disposed in such a Manner, as is necessary to convey the Idea of Space or Extension.**

Again, his Argument leading him to inquire, whether the Sight can convey the Impression and Idea of a *Vacuum*? To determine that it cannot, among other Considerations he puts a Case of two luminous Bodies appearing at some Distance from one another, upon a Field (if I may so express it) of absolute Darkness. Now as the Distance between these Objects is not any thing coloured or visible, it may be thought, he says, that there is here a *Vacuum* or pure Extension, not only intelligible to the Mind, but obvious to the very Senses. This, he owns, is our natural and most familiar Way of thinking; but he evinces it to be a wrong one: For

> **since this Distance causes no Perception different from what a blind Man *receives from his Eyes*, or what is convey'd to us in the darkest Night, it must partake of the same Properties; and as Blindness and Darkness afford us no Ideas of Extension, it is impossible, that the dark and undistinguishable Distance {372} between two Bodies can ever produce that Idea. Again,**

His Subject leading him to observe, as a general Maxim in the Science of human Nature, that *where-ever there is a close Relation betwixt two Ideas, the Mind is very apt in all its* Discourses *and Reasonings to use the one for the other*; he undertakes to assign the Causes of this Phoenomenon (as he calls it.) Accordingly he remarks,

> that as the Mind is endowed with a Power of exciting any Idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the Spirits into that Region of the Brain, in which the Idea is placed, these Spirits always excite the Idea, when they run precisely into the proper *Traces, and rummage* that Cell which belongs to the Idea. But as this Motion is seldom direct, and *Naturally turns a little to the one Side or the other*; for this Reason the animal Spirits, falling into contiguous Traces, present the related Ideas in lieu of that, which the Mind desired at first to survey. This Change we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same Train of Thought, make use of the related Idea, which is presented to us, and employed in our Reasoning, as if it were the same with what we demanded.

What could *Cartesius* or *Malebranch* have said more *a propos* upon this Head! How admirably does this account for the Mistakes and Sophisms so frequent and so fatal in Philosophy.

I said at the Head of these Citations, that I should extract them from our Author's Reply to certain Objections, and I verily thought I had done so, when reading farther, I was a little staggered, at the Top of a Paragraph, with the Sentence,

> After this Chain of Reasoning and Explication of my Principles, I am now prepared to answer all the Objections that have been offered, whether {373} deriv'd from *Metaphysicks* or *Mechanicks*.

I was just resolving to look back, to see how I came to be so mistaken, when I made myself easy, by reflecting on the Genius of my Author, who often affects to startle or perplex his Readers: And indeed as I went forward, I found nothing to alter my Opinion of what was past, or to answer the Expectation that might naturally be rais'd by the above Declaration.

If what I have been mentioning in some Measure puzzled me, I was no less charmed at an Instance of our Author's superlative Modesty, which appears a Page or two after. For there, when he is returning as it were from the utter Overthrow of his Opposers, his Stile is so unlike that of a Conqueror, that it would rather induce one to think he had been defeated.

> Thus, says he, I *seem* to have answer'd the three Objections above-mentioned; tho' at the same time I am sensible, that few will be satisfied with these Answers, but will immediately propose new Objections and Difficulties.

One of these he guesses at, and tells us,

> 'Twill probably be said, that his Reasoning makes nothing to the Matter in hand, and that he explains only the Manner in which Objects affect the Senses, without endeavouring to account for their real Nature and Operations.

To this Objection, he very candidly says, he answers,

> by pleading guilty, and by confessing that his Intention never was to penetrate into the Nature of Bodies, or explain the secret Causes of their Operations. -- As to those who attempt to do so, he cannot approve of their Ambition, till he sees, in some one Instance at least, that they have met with Success. He contents himself with knowing perfectly the Manner in which Objects affect his Senses, and their Connexions with each other, as far as Experience informs {374} him of them. This suffices for the Conduct of Life; and this suffices also for his Philosophy, which *pretends only to explain the Nature an Causes of our Perceptions, or Impressions and Ideas*.

I cannot say what will suffice for his Philosophy, but I will venture to affirm his Philosophy will never suffice to acquaint us with either the Nature or Causes of our Perceptions; any farther than

any Man's Consciousness will do, without it.

In the next Paragraph he assumes the Air of a Sphinx, only not attended with the horrible Cruelty of that Monster. He advances a Paradox at least as obscure as the other's *Enigma*; notwithstanding he is pleased to assert it will easily be explain'd from the foregoing Reasoning. The ensuing is an exact transcript of it.

> I shall (says he) conclude this Subject of Extension, with a Paradox. -- This Paradox is, that if you are pleased to give to invisible and intangible Distance, or in other Words, to the Capacity of becoming a visible and tangible Distance, the Name of a *Vacuum*, Extension and Matter are the same, and yet there is a *Vacuum*. If you will not give it that Name, Motion is possible in a *Plenum*, without any Impulse *in infinitum* without returning in a Circle, and without Penetration."

This dark Saying brings us very near to the End of a fifth Section, which closes with proving *Time to be nothing but the Manner in which some real Object exists*.

The sixth (which is the last) Section of the second Part of this Work, treats *of the Ideas of Existence, and of external Existence*. As our Author handles these abstruse Points more fully hereafter, I shall take no notice of what he has said here, where he has only hinted his Sentiments concerning them. {375}

I proceed now therefore to the third Part of this Treatise, where the Author has descanted very largely on two very curious Topicks, *Knowledge* and *Probability*. Were I to make a methodical Abstract of the several Sections into which his Discourse on these Heads is divided, it would carry me far beyond the Space I ought to allow this Article; I must therefore follow the Course I have hitherto gone in, contenting myself with only selecting here and there an extraordinary Passage, for the Readers Information and Entertainment.

The first Section of this Part opens with an Enumeration of the different Kinds of philosophical Relation. They are seven, viz. *Resemblance, Identity, Relations of Time and Place, Proportion in Quantity or Number, Degrees in any Quality, Contrariety*, and *Causation*. Our Author afterwards tells us, that only four of these can be the Objects of Knowledge and Certainty. These four are *Resemblance, Contrariety, Degrees in Quality, and Proportions in Quantity or Number*. The three first, he says, are discoverable at first Sight, and fall more properly under the Province of Intuition than Demonstration: Which last is chiefly concerned in fixing the *Proportions of Quantity or Number*. Here he takes Occasion of passing a Verdict on Geometry, very different from that of the more unthinking Bulk of Mankind, who are apt to entertain I know not what Prejudices in its Favour.

> It is, he tells us, the *Art*, by which we fix the Proportions of Figures; but which, tho' it much excels, both in Universality and Exactness, the loose Judgments of the Senses and Imagination, yet never attains a perfect Precision and Exactness. Its first Principles are still drawn from the general Appearance of the Objects; and that Appearance can never afford us any Security, when we examine the prodigious Minuteness of {376} which Nature is susceptible. Our Ideas seem to give a perfect Assurance, that no two right Lines can have a common Segment; but if we consider these Ideas, we shall find, that they always suppose a sensible Inclination of the two Lines, and that where the Angle they form is extremely small, we have no Standard of a right Line so precise as to assure us of the Truth of this Proposition."

The Geometricians, who would consult their own Edification, may, in the Original, whence I have

extracted this Passage, meet with others on the same Head, which discover the Depth of this great Mathematician's Erudition. One thing pleases me vastly, which is the Impartiality where-with he checks the Boastings of some of his scientific Brethren.

> 'Tis usual, says he, with Mathematicians, to pretend that those Ideas, which are their Objects, are of so refin'd and spiritual a Nature, that they fall not under the Conception of the Fancy, but must be comprehended by a pure and intellectual View, of which the superior Faculties of the Soul are alone capable."

This, he affirms, is all an Artifice; and to destroy it we need only, as he says, reflect on that Principle (of his) so oft insisted on, *that all our Ideas are copied from our Impressions*. I have afore hinted the mighty Value of this Discovery, the Honour of which is intirely due to our Author, but it cannot be too often inculcated. I verily think, if it were closely pursued, it would lead us to several inestimable *Desiderata*, such as the *perpetual Motion*, the *grand Elixir*, a *Dissolvent of the Stone, &c*. Many Wonders have been done in the Republick of Letters by a single and very simple Principle; tho' I question if any may compare with the above-mentioned, except that of *M. Leibnitz*. Every one has heard, what an immense Field of Knowledge he opened by his *Sufficient Reason*, and how much {377} wiser the World is by it, at this Day. Such Benefactors to Mankind will always be the Admiration of Posterity.

I proceed to say a Word or two of the second and third Sections. In the former we have somewhat about *Probability*, and *the Idea of Cause and Effect*. In the latter we are told, *Why a Cause is always necessary*. All manner of Persons, that have any Antipathy to the Argument *a Priori* for the Existence of God, may repair to this latter Section, where they will have the Satisfaction of seeing it utterly demolished. This Writer has here destroy'd the Foundation of it, and so there's an End of the whole Fabrick. Dr. *Clarke*, and one *John Lock*, Esq; whom he particularly names, two of the most superficial Reasoners, were, as well as many others, so weak as to fancy, that *whatever begins to exist, must have a Cause of Existence*; nay, *Hobbes* himself, as much an Atheist as we believe him, was of this Opinion: Every one knows, how he, and the greater Men afore named, pretended to evince the Proposition; but our Author pronounces all they produced for that Purpose fallacious, sophistical, and frivolous; and he really thinks it unnecessary to employ many Words in shewing the Weakness of their Arguments.

But, tho' our Author has quite erased the Argument *a Priori* for the Divine Existence, I would willingly hope, he has no Intention of weakening this fundamental Truth, that *there is some one necessary, eternal, independent Being*; nor does he directly assert a *Thing may come into Being without a Cause*; only he will have *Experience* to be the sole Road by which we can arrive at the Certainty of this *Thesis, Whatever has began to exist, must have had a Cause of its Existence*. And that *Experience* will lead us thereunto, is what, I fancy, our Author aims at proving, in some ensuing Sections. I would be {378} more positive upon this Point if I could; but having run over the Sections referr'd to (13 in Number) in order to know whether this were the real Scope of them, I acknowledge I cannot understand them enough to pronounce dogmatically: Nor is it to be wonder'd at, if I am at a Loss in this Matter, seeing any Man must be so, who is not bless'd with an extraordinary Penetration; according to our Author's own Acknowledgement of the relative Obscurity of this Part of his Argument. For about the Middle of the twelfth Section he very well says,

> I am sensible how abstruse all this Reasoning must appear to the generality of Readers, who not being accustomed to such *profound Reflections* on the *intellectual* Faculties of

> the Mind, will be apt to reject as chimerical whatever strikes not in with the common received Notions, and with the easiest and most obvious Principles of Philosophy. And no doubt there are some Pains required to enter into these Arguments; tho' perhaps very little are necessary to perceive the *Imperfection of every vulgar Hypothesis* on this Subject, and the little Light, which Philosophy can yet afford us in such sublime and such curious Speculations.

And again, in the XIVth Section, after some farther refined Speculations,

> he thinks it proper to give Warning, that he has just now examined one of the most sublime Questions in Philosophy, *viz. that concerning the Power and Efficacy of Causes*; where all the Sciences seem so much interested.

And the Reason of this Warning partakes of the Excellency of its Subject: For he adds,

> Such a Warning will naturally rouze up the Attention of the Reader, and make him desire a more full Account of his Doctrine, as well as of the Arguments on which it is founded.

A noble issue indeed, and most graciously encouraged, for thus he treats it:

> This Request, says {379} he, is so reasonable, that I cannot refuse complying with it; especially as I am hopeful, that the Principles I proceed on, the more they are examined, will acquire the more Force and Evidence.

Undoubtedly.

That I was right in my Conjecture, as to the real Purport of the afore-named Sections, appears with great Probability from the ensuing Passages, which occur toward the latter End of them; and which I do not vainly quote as Testimonies of my Sagacity in guessing, but to instruct the Reader in a Question of the highest Dignity in Metaphysicks; that is, in our Author's own Stile, *Why a Cause is always necessary?* or, in vulgar Phrase, Why the Mind conceives a Cause necessary to the Existence of every thing that has a Beginning? He says,

The Idea of Necessity arises from some impression. There is no Impression conveyed by our Senses which can give Rise to that Idea. It must therefore be derived from some internal Impression, or Impression of Reflection. There is no internal Impression which has any Relation to the present Business, but *that Propensity which Custom produces to pass from an Object to the Idea of its usual Attendant*. This therefore is the Essence of Necessity. Upon the whole, Necessity is something that *exists in the Mind, not in Objects*; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant Idea of it, considered as a Quality of Bodies. Either we have no Idea of Necessity, or Necessity is nothing but *that Determination of the Thought to pass from Causes to Effects, and from Effects to Causes, according to their experienced Union*.

Thus as the Necessity which makes two times two equal to four, or three Angles of a Triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the Act of the Understanding, by which we consider and {380} compare these Ideas; in like manner the Necessity of Power, which unites Causes and Effects, lies in the Determination of the Mind to pass from the one to the other. The Efficacy or Energy of Causes is neither placed in the Causes themselves, nor in the Deity, nor in the Concurrence of these two Principles; but belongs entirely to the Soul, which considers the Union of two or more Objects in all past Instances. It is here that the real Power of Causes is placed along with their Connexion and Necessity. A most wonderful Doctrine, I protest, and such our Author acknowledges it to be; for he immediately subjoins,

I am sensible, that of all the Paradoxes which I have had, or shall have Occasion to advance in the Course of this Treatise, the present one is the most violent, and that it is merely by Dint of solid Proof and Reasoning I can ever hope it will have admission, and overcome the inveterate Prejudices of Mankind. -- There is commonly an Astonishment attending every thing extraordinary; and this Astonishment changes immediately into the highest Degree of Esteem or Contempt, according as we approve or disapprove of the Subject. I am much afraid that though the foregoing Reason appears to me the shortest and most decisive imaginable; yet with the generality of Readers the Bias of the Mind will prevail, and give them a Prejudice against the present Doctrine. -- The contrary Notion is so riveted in the Mind from the Principles above-mentioned, that I doubt not but my Sentiments will be treated by many as extravagant and ridiculous. Likely enough, truly; for any one who reads these Passages must be convinced, that some Men are very strange and uncouth Animals. Our admirable Author must expect to be nibbled at, as all great Genius's have been, by {381} a Parcel of stupid Impertinents, for whom he has generously framed a compleat Set of Objections: What!

> **the Efficacy of Causes lie in the Determination of the Mind! As if Causes did not operate entirely independent of the Mind, and would not continue their Operation, even though there was no Mind existent to contemplate them, or reason concerning them. Thought may well depend on Causes for its Operation, but not Causes on Thought. This is to reverse the Order of Nature. To every Operation there is a Power proportioned; and this Power must be placed on the Body that operates. If we remove the Power from one Cause, we must ascribe it to another: But to remove it from all Causes, and bestow it on a Being that is no ways related to the Cause or Effect by perceiving them, is contrary to the most certain Principles of human Reason.**

Let these Simpletons talk thus if they please, our Author despises their Attacks as he ought: He only replies to all these Arguments (as he vouchsafes to call them)

> **That the Case is here much the same, as if a blind Man should pretend to find a great many Absurdities in the Supposition, that the Colour of Scarlet is not the same with the Sound of a Trumpet, nor Light the same with Solidity.**

A Page or two after this notable Sentence, he begins to think it is Time to collect all the different Parts of his Reasoning, (in which he acknowledges he has, though on justifiable Motives, advanced in a seemingly preposterous Manner) and by joining them together, form an exact Distinction of the Relation of *Cause* and *Effect*, which makes the Subject of the present Inquiry. There may, he tells us, two Definitions be given of this Relation, which are different, only by their presenting a different View of the same Object, and making us consider {382} it either as a *philosophical* or as a *natural* Relation. We may define a CAUSE to be

> **An Object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the Objects resembling the former are placed in like Relations of Precedency and Contiguity to those Objects that resemble the latter.**

This Definition lies far out of the Reach of my Capacity, and I am indeed in some Doubt whether it be intelligible to any but Men of our Author's Ability. His second Definition is a little more comprehensible, and is designed for the Satisfaction of such as may esteem the former defective, because drawn from Objects, as he says, foreign to the C???.[11] It is this,

> **A CAUSE is an Object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the Mind to form the Idea of the other, and the**

> Impression of the one to form a more lively Idea of the other.

Should this Definition be rejected for the same Reason as the foregoing, he knows no other Remedy, than that the Persons who express this Delicacy, should substitute a juster Definition in its Place. But for his Part, he honestly owns his Incapacity for such an Undertaking. For

> when he examines with the utmost Accuracy those Objects, which are commonly denominated Causes and Effects, he finds, in considering a single Instance, that the one Object is precedent and contiguous to the other; and in enlarging his View to consider several Instances, he finds *only*, that like Objects are constantly placed in like Relations of Succession and Contiguity. Again, when he considers the Influence of this constant Conjunction, he perceives, that such a Relation can never be an Object of Reasoning, and can never operate upon the Mind but by means of Custom, which determines the Imagination to make a Transition from the Idea of one Object to that {383} of its usual Attendant, and from the Impression of one to a more lively Idea of the other.

However extraordinary these Sentiments may appear, [I use this incomparable Arguer's own Words] he thinks it fruitless to trouble himself with any further Inquiry or Reasoning upon the Subject, but shall repose himself on them as on established Maxims. *Amen*.

But though he has thus taken Leave of his Subject, with respect to Inquiring and Reasoning, he does not part with it for-good-and all, till he has drawn some Corollaries from it; by which he very kindly undertakes to remove several Prejudices and popular Errors that have very much prevailed in Philosophy. They that will see these Curiosities must go to the Original; for I cannot in this Abstract insert Examples of every thing therein remarkable.

I proceed to the fifteenth Section of the first Book, where eight Rules are laid down, by which to judge of Causes and Effects. The Reader may look at them if he pleases, when he goes to view the above-mentioned Corollaries. All I shall take notice of here, is a Passage ushering them in, and another that follows them: And really they are both admirable in their several Ways. In the first, our Author says, that according to the Doctrine he has been establishing,

> any thing may produce any thing. Creation, Annihilation, Motion, Reason, Volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other Object we can imagine.

A most charming System indeed! one can hardly conceive the Uses it may be put to, and the different Purposes it will serve: It is to be hoped, the inimitable Inventor will one Day give us a large and ample Account of them.

I cannot help violating a rash Engagement. I said I would take no notice of the Rules above {384} spoken of. But, casting my Eye on the last of them, it was impossible not to admire the beautiful Example therein exhibited of the Justness of our Author's Principles. This Rule is,

> That an Object which exists for any Time in its full Perfection *without any Effect,* is not the sole Cause of *that Effect,* but requires to be assisted by some other Principle which may forward its Influence and Operation.

Now here the Reader, as I say, may see an Exemplification of our Author's Doctrine, "That *any thing* may produce *any thing*." Among which any Things he reckons *Annihilation* and *Creation*; or, in other Terms, he asserts, *something* may arise from, or be produced by, *nothing*. And so it is in the above Rule, where we find *without any Effect,* i.e. *nothing,* turned, in the Twinkling of an Eye, into *that Effect,* which is *something*.

When he has led us thorough this fine Train of Argument concerning *Cause* and *Effect*, he tells us,

> Here is all the *Logic* he thinks proper to employ in his Reasoning; and perhaps even this was not very necessary, but might have been supplied by the natural Principles of our Understanding. Our scholastick Head-pieces and Logicians shew no such Superiority above the mere Vulgar in their Reason and Ability, as to give us any Inclination to imitate them in delivering a long System of Rules and Precepts to direct our Judgment in Philosophy.

In the sixteenth Section, which finishes the third Part of the first Book, we meet with certain Reflections on the *Reasons* of *Animals*. These are calculated for confirming the foregoing Doctrine about Cause and Effect, how remote soever they may seem from such a Purpose; and yet so effectually they answer it, as almost intuitively, he tells us, to evince the Truth of his System. {385}

We come now to the fourth Part of this Volume, of which we shall not offer to make any exact Analysis, only select a few curious Passages, such as we think most conducive to the Reader's Pleasure and Edification. In this Part our Author treats of the sceptical and other Systems of Philosophy; and he sets out like himself, advancing and descanting upon Propositions that never enter into the Heads of ordinary Writers. Thus in the very first Paragraph he shews there is no such Thing as Science, strictly speaking, but that all Knowledge degenerates into Probability;

> and this Probability is greater or less, according to our Experience of the Veracity or Deceitfulness of our Understanding, and according to the Simplicity or Intricacy of the Question.

And his second paragraph assures us,

> there is no Algebraist nor Mathematician that places entire Confidence in any Truth immediately upon his Discovery of it, or regards it as any thing but a mere Probability. Every Time he runs over he Proofs, his Confidence increases; but still more by the Approbation of his Friends; and is raised to its utmost Perfection by the universal Assent and Applauses of the learned World.

After this he proceeds thorough five Pages in the Language of a *Sceptic*; and then he informs us of the Design he had in view by so doing, which was to render us sensible of the Truth of his Hypothesis, *viz. That all our Reasonings concerning Causes and Effects are derived from nothing but Custom*; *and that Belief is more properly and Act of the sensitive, than part of the* cogitative *Part of our Natures*. That Sequel of this Section is employed in guarding what he has advanced upon this Head, from some Objections to which it might unwarily be thought liable.

In the second Section he considers Scepticism with regard to the Senses. And here he inquires {386} into the Causes which induce us to believe in the Existence of Body: And his Reasonings on this Point he begins with a Distinction which will contribute, he assures us, very much to the perfect understanding of what follows. We ought, as he says, to examine apart those two Questions, which are commonly confounded together, *viz. Why we attribute a* CONTINUED *Existence to Objects, even when they are not present to the Senses*? and *why we suppose them to have an Existence* DISTINCT *from the Mind and Perception*. Upon a very careful Scrutiny, he rejects what has commonly been offered for the Solution of these *Queries*, and proposes one of his own; which, as he apprehends, very clearly and satisfactorily accounts for what is contained in them.

Glad would I be, could I present my Readers with the Sentiments of so profound and accurate a Genius as we are now dealing with, upon one of the most abstruse and perplexing Topicks in all Metaphysicks; but alas! they are of too wide an Extent for the Compass of this Article: However,

we will endeavour to introduce some Specimens thereof, whereby we shall at least see how happy a Talent he has for surmounting those Difficulties, which have proved the *ne plus ultra* of many others.

After a little Examination we shall, he says, find, that all those Objects to which we attribute a continued Existence, have a peculiar *Constancy* which distinguishes them from the Impressions, whose Existence depends upon our Perception. Those Mountains, and Houses, and Trees, which lie at present under my Eye, have always appeared to me in the same Order; it is so also with my Bed and Table, my Books and Papers; and when I lose Sight of them by shutting my Eyes, or moving my Head, I soon after find {387} them recur upon me without the least Alteration. This is the Case with all the Impressions, whose Objects are supposed to have an external Existence; and is the Case with no other Impression, whether gentle or violent, voluntary or involuntary.

This Constancy, however, is not so perfect as not to admit of very considerable Exception. Bodies often change their Position and Qualities, and after a little Absence or Interruption may become hardly knowable. But in these Changes they preserve a *Coherence*, and have a regular Dependence on each other, which produces, very reasonably, the Opinion of their continued Existence.-- This *Coherence* therefore in their Changes, is one of the Characteristics of external Objects, as well as their Constancy.

When our Author has shewn that the Opinion of the continued Existence of Body depends on the COHERENCE and CONSTANCY of certain Impressions, he proceeds to examine after what Manner these Qualities give rise to so extraordinary a Judgment. He begins with the *Coherence*, which he considers very minutely, in order to discover its whole Efficacy this way; the Consequence of which is,

> that he is afraid, whatever Force we may ascribe to this Principle, 'tis too weak to support alone so vast an Edifice, as is that of the continued Existence of all external Bodies; and that we must join the *Constancy* of their Appearance to the *Coherence*, to give a satisfactory Account of that Opinion.

How pertinent is this Conclusion, when our Author has afore expresly grounded the Opinion here spoken of, on the *Constancy* of Appearance, and brought in the *Coherence* only as a Sort of *Succedaneum!* Besides that, his Business here, as may be supposed from the fourth Line of this Paragraph, is not to say what the Effect of these Properties {388} is, but to instruct us in the *Modus* of their Operation. However, we must follow him in his own Way. Accordingly,

Having taken a strict Survey of the Power of *Coherence*, and seen what it will, and what it will not do in the Case before us, he takes *Constancy* to task in much the same manner. But,

> as the Explication of this, he says, will lead him into a considerable Compass of *very profound Reasoning*, he thinks it proper, to avoid Confusion, to give a short Sketch or Abridgment of his System, and afterwards draw out all its Parts in their full Compass.

As for his System in *Miniature*, there are four Things, he tells us, requisite to justify it. I shall take notice only of the first, which is, to explain the *Principium individuationis,* or Principle of Identity. Concerning this most curious Point, he observes,

> That the View of any one Object is not sufficient to convey the Idea of Identity. For in that Proposition, an *Object is the same with itself,* if the Idea express'd by the Word, *Object*, were no ways distinguished from that meant by *itself*; we really should mean nothing, nor would the Proposition contain a Predicate and a Subject, which however

> are implied in this Affirmation. One single Object conveys the Idea of Unity, not that of Identity. On the other hand, a Multiplicity of Objects can never convey this Idea, however resembling they may be supposed. The Mind always pronounces the one not to be the other. -- Since then both Number and Unity are incompatible with the Relation of Identity, it must lie in something that is neither of them. But to tell the Truth, at first Sight this seems utterly impossible. Betwixt Unity and Number there can be no Medium; no more than between Existence and Non-existence. -- {389}

Very true. But now let us see how dexterously our most ingenious Author gets rid of this seemingly inextricable Difficulty. For this Purpose he needs only have recourse to the Idea of Time or Duration. He has already remark'd,[12]

> That Time, in a strict Sense, implies Succession, and that when we apply its Idea to any unchangeable Object, 'tis only by a Fiction of the Imagination, by which the unchangeable Object is supposed to participate of the Changes of the coexistent Objects, and in particular of that of our Perceptions. This Fiction of the Imagination almost universally takes place; and 'tis by means of it, that a single Object, placed before us, and survey'd for any Time without our discovering in it any Interruption or Variation, is able to give us a Notion of Identity. For when we consider any two Points of this Time, we may place them in different Lights: We may either survey them at the very same instant; in which Case they give us the Idea of Number, both by themselves and by the Object; which must be multiplied, in order to be conceived at once, as existent in these two different Points of Time: Or on the other hand, we may trace a Succession of Time by a like Succession of Ideas, and conceiving first one Moment, along with the Object then existent, imagine afterwards a Change in the Time without any *Variation* or *Interruption* in the Object; in which Case it gives us the Idea of Unity.

Here then, our Author says, is an Idea, which is a Medium betwixt Unity and Number; or more properly speaking, is either of them, according to the View in which we take it: And this Idea we {390} call that of Identity.

> Thus, as he adds a little after, the Principle of Individuation is nothing but the *Invariableness* and *Uninterruptedness* of any Object, through a supposed Variation of Time, by which the Mind can trace it in the different Periods of its Existence, without any Break of the View, and without being obliged to form the Idea of Multiplicity or Number.

Those Readers, who know all the Mr. *Lock* and his Corrector Dr. *Butler* have wrote upon this puzzling Subject, without being fully satisfied therewith, will certainly be pleas'd to find all their Difficulties vanish upon the Perusal of these few Paragraphs relating to it.

Where our Author's little System ends, and his great and extensive one begins, I have not been able, notwithstanding I have search'd very diligently, to perceive; I am apt to think they insensibly run into, and incorporate with one another. Perhaps the larger System is no other but the Explication of those four Things which he proposed to consider, as requisite for the Justification of the lesser. I must leave that Point undetermined. {391}

[To be continued.]

A Continuation of the Twenty-sixth Article.

THERE are many curious Particulars in the Section I am now upon, besides those I have

mentioned; but without stretching my Account of this Work into a Volume, there is no insisting upon them as they deserve; I shall therefore drop them all, excepting one little Passage, which merits a peculiar Attention, and that is his Definition of the human Mind:

> **What we call a Mind, says our Author, is nothing but a Heap or Collection of different Perceptions united together by certain Relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect Simplicity and Identity.**

In the third Section we meet with some very profound Reflections on the *ancient Philosophy*. Our Author is persuaded there might be several useful Discoveries made from a Criticism of the {392} Fictions of it, concerning *Substances* and *substantial Forms*, *Accidents* and *occult Qualities*; which, however unreasonable and capricious, have, he says,a very intimate Connexion with the Principles of human Nature. In the Sequel of this Section he has obliged us with an inductive Proof of this Position.

That which follows contains a Set of Observations on the *modern Philosophy*. This, he tells us, pretends to subsist on a Basis very different from that of the foregoing, and to arise only from such as are the solid, permanent, and consistent Principles of the Imagination. He goes on in discussing the Equity of this Pretension. He remarks, that the fundamental Principle of this Philosophy is the Opinion of the secondary Qualities of Bodies being merely Sensations in us, like to which there is nothing in the Bodies themselves; but this Supposition, as he labours to prove,

> **instead of explaining the Operations of external Objects, utterly annihilates all those Objects, and reduces ourselves to the Opinions of the most extravagant Scepticism concerning them.**

With this Section our Author concludes his Speculations on the Materials, the Modifications, and the Instruments of our Knowledge. He has traced the Origin of our Ideas, and has ranged them in their several and proper Classes; he has then combined, separated, and done I know not what with them; and lastly, he has given us a faithful Representation of the ancient and modern Systems, invented for the Acquisition of Science. His Scheme now carries him much further, into vastly sublimer Regions of Metaphysicks; the Immateriality of the Soul, and its Affections, are hereafter the nobler Subjects of his Researches; I shall endeavour, notwithstanding, to keep him still in view, and every {393} now and then to let my Readers have a Glimpse of him.

I have remarked,[13] that this Writer deals mightily in *Egotisms*; he is no less notable for Paradoxes. Some few of these I have cited, and we shall meet with many others in what follows; even in the very next, that is, the fifth Section, which I am now entering upon, there are at least half a Dozen, enough to stagger any Man who has not a strong Head-piece. The Title of this Section is, *Of the Immateriality of the Soul*. And the Intention of it is to shew, that the Immateriality of the Soul is a nonsensical Expression, and the Belief of it a most horrible Heresy. The Author begins with telling us, that the intellectual World, though involved in infinite Obscurities, is not however perplexed with any such Contradictions as in the foregoing Pages he has proved to attend every System concerning external Objects, and the Idea of Matter, which we fancy so clear and determinate. There are indeed certain Philosophers, as he complains, who, envious of this good Quality in the Subject, would fain load it with those Absurdities from which it is naturally free. These troublesome Gentlemen are the curious Reasoners concerning the material or immaterial Substances, in which they suppose our Perceptions to inhere. But, to put an effectual Stop to their Impertinence, he has set them a Question, which he very well knows is sufficient entirely to employ them till Doom's-day, and that is, in a few Words, *What they mean by Substance and Inhesion?*

Some of the Difficulties which will obstruct the Response of this *Query*, he has very fairly set down, and he as fairly warns his Antagonists that he will keep them strictly to the Point, and that it will be in vain for them to think of {394} shuffling; for if they should attempt to evade the foresaid Difficulties, by saying, that the Definition of a Substance is *something which may exist by itself*, and that this Definition ought to satisfy us, he presently whips about, to their Confusion, and observes,

> That this Definition agrees to every thing that can possibly be conceived; and never will serve to distinguish Substance from Accident, or the Soul from its Perceptions.

For thus he reasons.

> Whatever is clearly conceived may exist; and whatever is clearly conceived after any manner, may exist after the same manner.

This is one Principle. which has already been acknowledged.

> Again, every thing which is different, is distinguishable, and every thing which is distinguishable, is separable by the Imagination.

This is another Principle. The Conclusion from both is,

> that since all our Perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in the Universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be considered as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support their Existence. They are therefore Substances, as far as this Definition explains a Substance.

When by these, and some other wise Sayings, he has evinced that we can never arrive at any satisfactory Notion of Substance, and that we ought therefore utterly to abandon all Dispute concerning the Materiality or Immateriality of the Soul, he proceeds however, oddly enough, to engage himself in the Controversy, by attacking an Argument for the Soul's Immateriality, commonly employed, but which yet seems to him, he says, remarkable. This Argument he has spread over a whole Page. The Sum of it is, *That Thought, or Consciousness, cannot be the Property of a divisible Subject*. The whole of what he replies to this, is too long to be {395} here transcribed; but I can assure the Reader, that he has seldom, if ever, met with any thing more extraordinary. What he has delivered in the first and second Paragraphs of his Answer, is of so unusual a Nature, that it will, it seems, prevent our being surprised, if he, in consequence of it, lays down a Maxim, which he owns is condemned by several Metaphysicians, and is esteemed contrary to the most certain Principles of human Reason. This Maxim is, *that an Object may exist, and yet be no where*: And he asserts, that this is not only possible, but that the greatest Part of Beings do and must exist after this manner. See how he proves and illustrates this Proposition.

> An Object can be said to be no where, when its Parts are not so situated with respect to each other, as to form any Figure or Quantity; nor the whole, with respect to other Bodies, so as to answer to our Notions of Contiguity or Distance. Now this is evidently the Case with all our Perceptions and Objects, except those of the Sight and Feeling. A moral Reflection cannot be placed on the Right or on the Left-Hand of a Passion; nor can a Smell or Sound be either of a circular or square Figure. These Objects and Perceptions, so far from requiring any particular Place, are absolutely incompatible with it.

-- What a prodigious Stretch of Invention is here? How vastly do these Speculations exceed in Fineness the finest of the *Aristotelian* Cobwebs? They are coarse as Sackcloth in comparison with

them. And then as to the Absurdity of imagining real Objects to be no where, our Author says,

> **if they *appear* not to have any particular Place, they may possibly exist in the same manner; since whatever we conceive is possible. {396}**

It will not after this, he says, be necessary to prove that those Perceptions which are simple, and exist no where, are incapable of any Conjunction in Place with Matter or Body which is extended and divisible; since it is impossible to found a Relation but on some common Quality. But it is certain, according to him, that all the Difficulties they labour under who ascribe Thought to an extended divisible Subject, all the Absurdities they lay themselves open to the Imputation of, are owing merely to their Ignorance and Neglect of this Doctrine: Did they but understand it, they might, by a dexterous Use thereof, effectually silence all the Cavils of their Adversaries. Indeed, while they go upon other Principles, bestowing a Place on what is absolutely incapable of it, and conjoining Thought with extension locally, our Author himself says, we cannot refuse to condemn them; but let them espouse his *Tenet*, and he will insure them a Triumph. He instructs them not only how they may baffle, but retort their Enemies Attacks, and carry the War into their own Quarters, by displaying the equal Absurdity of their conjoining all Thought with a simple and indivisible Substance. For, says he,

> **the most vulgar Philosophy informs us, that no external Object can make itself known to the Mind immediately, and without the Interposition of an Image or Perception. That Table which just now appears to me, is only a Perception, and all its Qualities are Qualities of a Perception. Now the most obvious of all its Qualities is Extension. The Perception consists of Parts. These Parts are so situated, as to afford us the Notion of Distance and Contiguity; of Length, Breadth and Thickness. -- And, to cut short all Disputes, the very Idea of Extension is copied from nothing but an Impression, {397} and consequently must perfectly agree to it. To say the Idea of Extension agrees to any thing, it so say that thing is extended.**

This, as he adds, the Free-Thinker may exult in his Turn; and having found there are Impressions and Ideas really extended, may ask his Antagonists, how they can incorporate a simple and indivisible Subject with an extended Perception? All their Arguments recoil, as he evinces, on themselves; nor is it possible for them to evade their Force.

What he has said upon this Head, gives him an Occasion of re-entering on the Question concerning the Substance of the Soul; and though, as we have already seen, he has pronounced that Matter to be altogether unintelligible, yet he cannot forbear some farther Reflections thereon. He roundly asserts, that the Doctrine of the Immateriality, Simplicity, and Indivisibility of a thinking Substance, is a true Atheism, and will serve to justify all those Sentiments for which *Spinoza* is so universally infamous.

This, to many Readers, will appear the harshest of all the Paradoxes this Author has advanced. Alas! will they exclaim, Poor Dr. *Clarke*, is it thy Fate to be branded as a true Atheist? Thou illustrious, thou most learned, judicious, sincere, zealous, and yet candid Advocate for Natural and Revealed Religion; thou immortal Defender of the Immateriality and natural Immortality of thinking Substances! Shall all thy strong, thy clear, and unanswerable Arguments, as so many of the best Judges have esteemed them, be now levelled with the Dust, and trampled on with Abhorrence! This is indeed a lamentable Case; bust such is the absolute Pleasure of our Author, and we must submit: Neither *Locke*, nor *Clarke*, nor the most venerable Names, shall usurp the Place of Truth in his Affections. {398}

However, we are not to look upon this as an arbitrary Sentence; it is founded on Reason and Equity. To convince us hereof, our Author lays before us a Summary of *Spinozism*, which he terms an *hideous Hypotheses*, and then shews, first in general, and afterwards more particularly, in what Respects it agrees with the Doctrine of the Immaterialists; at the same time making it evident, that those Objections which have been urged against the former, are of equal Force against the latter also. His Reasoning upon this Subject still turns, in a great Measure, on his favourite Notion of the *Mind* being no continued Substance, but merely a Series of fleeting independent Perceptions.

When he has settled the Nature of thinking Beings, and corrected the atheistical Errors of the Immaterialists with Relation thereto, he proceeds to consider what those heterodox Gentlemen hold concerning the *Cause* of our Perceptions. And after a brief Rehearsal of their Paralogisms, to prove that Matter and Motion can never produce Thought, the seeming Evidence of which, he says, few have been able to withstand, he goes on to refute them, (than which, he says, nothing in the World is more easy) by the Application of his Doctrine of *Causality*, which the Reader has already seen in a foregoing Extract.[14] From what he has offered on this Point, he would have us certainly conclude, "That Matter may be, and actually is, the Cause of Thought and Perception." The Refusal of our Assent to this Proposition, reduces us to this Dilemma, either to assert, that nothing can be the Cause of another, but where the Mind can perceive the Connexion in its Idea of the Objects, which will exclude all Causes out of the Universe, not exception the Deity; or own that all Objects, which are found to be constantly conjoined, are upon that Account {399} only to be regarded as Causes and Effects, -- which evidently gives the Advantage to the Materialists above their Antagonists.

At the Close of this Section, our Author, in a very few Words, endeavours to shew, that what he has advanced with reference to this Point does not any way affect Religion. If his Philosophy, he says, makes no Addition to the Arguments for it, he has at least the Satisfaction to think it takes nothing from them, but that every thing remains precisely as before.

In the Section ensuing, he discourses at large of *personal Identity*. He specifies the Notions some Philosophers form of this Matter, in all which they pretend an absolute Certainty; but which, on the other hand, he proves to have no manner of Foundation. As for him, he can perceive nothing of the *Identity* these mistaken Men talk of. If they are conscious of something simple and continued, which they call *themselves*, he is certain there is no such Principle in him; and he may venture, he says, to affirm, that neither he nor the rest of Mankind are any thing but *a Bundle or Collection of different Perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable Rapidity, and are in a perpetual Flux and Movement*. There is not, according to him, a single Power of the Soul which remains unalterably the same. There is properly no *Simplicity* in the Mind at one Time, nor *Identity* in different, whatever natural Propension we may have to imagine that Simplicity and Identity. Such a Propension it is undeniable we have, and he spends some Pages in making us know how we came by it, and how it imposes on us. Here he has occasion for the Principles he made use of in the second Section of this Part of his Work, and which we have said somewhat of in p. 88, *&c*. preceding, for explaining the *Principium Individuationis*; and he shews what {400} this is, and how we are inclined to conceive of it with regard to vegetable and inanimate Systems. Upon the same Principles, and by the same Method of Reasoning, he leads us to apprehend the Nature of *personal Identity*, or that which we ascribe to the Mind of Man. This, he says, is only a fictitious one, and of a like Kind with that which we attribute to Vegetables and animal Bodies, derived from the same Origin, and proceeding from a like Operation of the Imagination upon like Objects. He labours with great Assiduity to evince this notable Truth, as if his Readers were really to receive some

Benefit by the Belief of it. What he has offered upon this Head, puts and End to his Examination of the several Schemes of Philosophy, both of the intellectual and moral World. --

> **It is now Time, (he says) to return to a more close Examination of his Subject, and proceed in the accurate Anatomy of human Nature, having fully explained the Nature of our Judgment and Understanding.**

But (as he expresses himself in the seventh Section, wherewith he closes this Book) before he launches out into those immense Depths which lie before him, he finds himself inclined to stop a Moment in his present Situation, and to ponder that Voyage he himself has undertaken, and which undoubtedly requires the utmost Art and Industry to be brought to a happy Conclusion. Methinks, says he, (in a Strain that while it raises our Idea of his Resolution is yet enough to pierce the Heart of any human Reader)

> **I am like a Man, who, having struck on many Shoals, and having narrowly escaped Shipwreck in passing a small Frith, has yet the Temerity to put out to Sea in the same leaky weather-beaten Vessel; and even carries him Ambition so far, as to think of compassing the Globe under these disadvantageous {401} Circumstances. My Memory of past Errors and Perplexities, makes me diffident for the future. The Weakness and Disorder of the Faculties, I must employ in my Inquiries, increase my Apprehensions; and the Impossibility of amending or correcting these Faculties, reduces me almost to Despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the barren Rock on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless Ocean which runs out into Immensity. This sudden View of my Danger strikes me with Melancholy; and as it is usual for that Passion, above all others, to indulge itself, I cannot forbear feeding my Despair with all those desponding Reflections, which the present Subject furnishes me with in such Abundance.**

I am first affrighted and confounded with that forlorn Solitude in which I am placed in my Philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth Monster, who, not being able to mingle and unite in Society, has been expelled all human Commerce, and left utterly abandoned and disconsolate. Fain would I run into the Crowd for Shelter and Warmth; but cannot prevail with myself to mix with such Deformity. I call upon others to join me, in order to make a Company apart, but no one will hearken to me; every one keeps at a Distance, and dreads that Storm which beats upon me from every Side. I have exposed myself to the Enmity of all Metaphysicians, Logicians, Mathematicians, and even Theologians; and can I wonder at the Insults I must suffer? I have declared my Disapprobation of their Systems; and can I be surprised, if they should express a Hatred of mine and of my Person? When I look abroad, I foresee on every Side Dispute, Contradiction, Anger, Calumny {402} and Detraction. When I turn my Eye inward, I find nothing but Doubt and Ignorance; all the World conspires to oppose and contradict me, though such is my Weakness, that I feel all my Opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the Approbations of others; every Step I take is with Hesitation, and every new Reflection makes me dread an Error and Absurdity in my Reasoning.

What Heart now would not almost bleed? what Breast can forbear to sympathize with this brave Adventurer? For my part, I cannot, without the utmost Emotion and Solicitude, take even a transient Prospect of the Dangers and terrible Catastrophe to which he is exposed. Somewhat of these appears in the foregoing Citation; but we have a much larger melancholy Description of them in the Sequel of the Section from whence I copied it. However, after all, as it becomes us to

mourn with those that mourn, so it is but fitting we should rejoice with such as are joyful; and seeing our Author is so at certain Seasons, notwithstanding his tragical Circumstances, it would be ridiculous in us not to join in his Exhilerations. Take his own Account of the Matter, for it is impossible for any other Language in the World to express his Condition like that which he uses.

> The *intense* View (says he) of these manifold Contradictions and Imperfections in human Reason,[15] has so wrought upon me, and heated my Brain, that I am ready to reject all Belief and {403} Reasoning, and can look upon no Opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I or what? from what Causes do I derive my Existence, and to what Condition shall I return? whose Favour shall I court, and whose Anger must I dread? what Beings surround me? and on whom have I any Influence, or who have any Influence on me? I am confounded with all these Questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable State imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest Darkness, and utterly deprived of the Use of every Member and Faculty.

This is a little Sketch of the dismal Part of the Scene; now it turns and presents a gay and chearing Aspect; for he immediately adjoins,

> Most fortunately it happens, that since Reason is incapable of dispelling these Clouds, Nature herself suffices to that Purpose, and cures me of this philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, either by relaxing this Bent of Mind, or by some Avocation and lively Impression of my Senses, which obliterate all these Chimera's, *I dine, I play a Game at Backgammon, I converse and am merry with my Friends*; and when, after three or four Hours Amusement, I would return to these Speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my Heart to enter into them any farther. -- I am ready to throw all my Books and Papers into the Fire, and resolve never more to renounce the Pleasures of Life for the sake of Reasoning and Philosophy.

I will take Leave of our Author while he is in this chearful Mood, in this agreeable Situation; for, by looking forward, I perceive him extremely ready to relapse into profound Meditations on incomprehensible Subjects, and so into Scepticism, Chagrin, and all that gloomy frightful Train of Ideas from {404} whence he is but this Moment emerged. Whether I shall wait upon him any more, and venture with him into those immense Depths of Philosophy which he launches into in his second Volume, I am not yet determined. Perhaps I have already and sufficiently answered the End of this Article, which is to make the Treatise it refers to more generally known than I think it has been; to bring it, as far as I am able, into the Observation of the Learned, who are the proper Judges of its Contents, who will give a Sanction to its Doctrines, where they are true and useful, and who have Authority to correct the Mistakes where they are of a different Nature; and lastly, to hint to the ingenious Writer, whoever he is, some Particulars in his Performance, that may require a very serious Reconsideration. It bears indeed incontestable Marks of a great Capacity, of a soaring Genius, but young, and not yet thoroughly practiced. The Subject is vast and noble as any that can exercise the Understanding; but it requires a very mature Judgment to handle it as becomes its Dignity and Importance; the utmost Prudence, Tenderness and Delicacy, are requisite to this desirable Issue. Time and Use may ripen these Qualities in our Author; and we shall probably have Reason to consider this, compared with his later Productions, in the same Light as we view the *Juvenile* Works of *Milton*, or the first Manner of a *Raphael*, to other celebrated Painter.

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2]Our Author tells us, he makes use of these Terms in a Sense different from what is usual, and he hopes this Liberty will be allowed him. He thinks he rather restores the Word *Idea* to its original Sense, from which Mr. *Locke* had (as he is pleased to say) perverted it, in making it stand for all our Perceptions.

[3]This Work abounds throughout with *Egotisms*. The Author would scarcely use that Form of Speech more frequently, if he had written his own Memoirs.

[4]It may be a Question whether there are indeed any *abstract* or *general* Ideas; but surely there cannot be any such Query as this here stated: No-body, one would think in his Senses, can ask whether *abstract* or *general* Ideas be *general* or *particular* in the Mind's Conception of them?

[5]I have revolved this Sentence in my Mind till I have quite tired myself, but cannot, after all, find any Meaning in it. I do not mention this as a singular Instance of our Author's Inscrutability, for there are, to me, innumerable in this Work of his; but I could not point out a more short and entire one, whereby the Reader may judge how Qualified this Writer is to give us a clear Idea of so complex a Subject as Human Nature, or, with what Justice he tramples upon Mr. *Locke*, and pretends to restore or rectify what he has perverted. Mind, for this Purpose also, what immediately follows.

[6]The infinite Divisibility of Space is, I think, an Impropriety. Space is, in the strictest Sense, an *Individuum*; and though our Author has expressed himself as above, yet he seems by his subsequent *Reasoning* (if it may be so called) to intend by *Space*, *Matter*, or *solid* Extension.

[7]He might more reasonable have said, *the* Mind *may reach a* Minimum, *or be convinced of the Existence of* indivisible Atoms; for it is certain the Imagination never forms an Idea of partial Extension, but under some Figure: Now a Figure of which no Sub-division can be conceived, is as rank a Contradiction as any our Author censures in his whole Performance.

[7]This Axiom is somewhat like a Conjurer's *Hocus Pocus*; it works Wonders, and is at every Turn repeated. Let this Gentleman apply it once more in the Case before us; let him try if he can conceive in his Imagination a Grain of Sand, without conceiving a Surface; and let him try if he can imagine any Surface without at least two distinguishable, and consequently, according to his own Axiom, separable Sides.

[9]This Writer fancies a Difficulty where there is none. Difficulty implies a Possibility of the Thing

it relates to, and a Capacity in the Agent to accomplish it, when exerted* to the utmost, and attended with favourable Circumstances. But it is entirely above the Reach of the human Mind to form a just(if therepy* is meant an adequate) Notion of a Mite, or any Animal whatsoever.

[10]How subtle a Distinction is this between the Impossibility and Difficulty attending the different Systems. But in reality, there is not a Man in the Universe that can reap the least Benefit by it, except our Author himself. To every one else it is as impossible, upon one Supposition as on the other, to have a distinct Idea, representing every Part of an Insect a thousand times less than a Mite, not excluding even those of which its animal Spirits consist.

[10][This word is illegible in the copy text.]

[12]In the 5th Section of the second Part of this Volume.

[13]Page 375.

[14]See Pages 379-384.

[15]The Reader who will consult the Original, will find a full Representation of these in the Paragraphs preceding this Extract. He will there likewise see, that they are the Source of most of those Calamities which our Author apprehends, or labours under.

Review of David Hume's *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*

The Monthly Review

William Rose

January 1752

Editor's Note: This review appeared anonymously in January 1752, Volume 6, pages 1-19 of *The Monthly Review*. William Rose's authorship is established in Benjamin Christie Nangle's, *The Monthly Review First Series 1749-1789* (1934). Two editions were published of the January issue. The second edition contains minor differences in punctuation, spelling, and corrected printer's errors from the first edition. The first edition is followed here; printer's errors have been corrected without note.

The Monthly Review

January 1752

Vol. 6

{1}

ART. I. *An Enquiry concerning the Principles' of Morals. By* David Hume, *Esq*; 12*mo*. 3*s*. Millar.

THE reputation this ingenious author has acquir'd as a fine and elegant writer, renders it unnecessary for us to say any thing in his praise. We shall only observe in general, that clearness and precision of ideas on abstracted and metaphysical subjects, and at the same time propriety, elegance and spirit, are seldom found united in any writings in a more eminent degree than in those of Mr. *Hume*. The work now before us will, as far as we are able to judge, considerably raise

his reputation; and, being free from that sceptical turn which appears in his other pieces, will be more agreeable to the generality of Readers. His subject is important and interesting, and the manner of treating it easy and natural: His design is to fix the just origin of morals, in the execution of which he has shewn a great deal of judgment as well as ingenuity, as every candid reader must needs allow, whatever sentences he may pass upon his scheme in general, or how much soever he may differ from him in regard to what he has advanced on the subject of justice.

In the first section of this performance, our author treats of the general principles of morals; he introduces it with some general reflections, after which he gives a short but clear view of the principal arguments that are urged to prove that morals are derived from *reason,* and of those which {2} are adduced to shew that they are derived from *sentiment.* The arguments on both sides he thinks are so plausible, that he is apt to suspect they may, both of them, be solid and satisfactory, and that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions. 'But tho' this question, says he, concerning the general principle of morals, be extremely curious and important; 'tis needless for us, at present, to employ farther care in our enquiries concerning it. For if we can be so happy, in the course of this enquiry, as to fix the just origin of morals, 'twill then easily appear how far sentiment or reason enters into all determinations of this nature. Mean while, it will scarce be possible for us, e're this controversy is fully decided, to proceed in that accurate manner required in the sciences; by beginning with exact definitions of virtue and vice, which are the objects of our present enquiry. But we shall do what may be justly esteem'd as satisfactory. We shall consider the matter as an object of experience. We shall can *every quality or action of the mind,* virtuous*, which is attended with the general approbation of mankind*: and we shall denominate vicious*, every quality, which is the object of general blame or censure*. These qualities we shall endeavour to collect; and after examining, on both sides, the several circumstances, in which they agree, 'tis hoped, we may, at last, reach the foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all moral blame or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following this experimental method, and deducing general maxims, from a comparison of particular instances. The other scientifical method, when a general abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source of illusion and mistake, in this as well as in other subjects. Men are now cured of their passion for Hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those derived from experience. 'Tis full time they should begin a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtile or ingenious, that is not founded on fact and observation.

Having laid down the method he intends to prosecute, our Author proceeds in the second section to treat of benevolence; and shews how ill-founded that system of morals {3} is, which resolves all humanity and friendship into self-love. He makes it clearly appear that there is such a sentiment in human nature as disinterested benevolence; that nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the profession of it in an eminent degree; and that a part, at least, of its merit, arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society. "In all determinations of morality, says he, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, whether in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has

been found to prevail, as soon as farther experience, and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs; we retract our first sentiments, and adjust a-new the boundaries of moral good and evil.'

In the third section our author treats of justice, and endeavours to shew that public utility is the *sole* origin of it, and that reflections on its beneficial consequences are the *sole* foundation of its merit. In order to make this appear, he puts a variety of cases, and supposes extreme abundance or extreme necessity to be produced among men; perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice implanted in their breasts: In all these cases we are told, that by rendering justice totally *useless*, we thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation upon mankind. 'The more, says he, we vary our views of human life; and the newer and more unusual the lights are, in which we survey it, the more shall we be convinced, that the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is real and satisfactory.'

'Were there a species of creatures, intermingled with men, which, tho' rational, were possest of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment; the necessary consequence, I think, is, that we should be bound by the laws of humanity, to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property, exclusive of such arbitrary Lords. Our intercourse with them could not be called society, which supposes a degree of equality; but absolute command on the one side, and servile obedience on the {4} other. Whatever we covet, they must instantly resign: Our permission is the only tenure, by which they hold their possessions: Our compassions and kindness the only check, by which they curb our lawless will: And as no inconvenience ever results from the exercise of a power, so firmly established in nature, and the restraints of justice and property being totally *useless*, would never have a place, in so unequal a confederacy.

"Were the human species so fram'd by nature as that each individual possest within himself every faculty, requisite both for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kink: Were all society and intercourse cut off betwixt man and man, by the primary intention of the supreme Creator: It seems evident, that so solitary a being would be as much incapable of justice, as of social discourse and conversation. Where mutual regards and forbearance serve to no manner of purpose, they would never direct the conduct of any reasonable man. The headlong course of the passions would be checked by no reflection on future consequences. And as each man is here supposed to love himself alone, and to depend only on himself and his own activity for safely and happiness, he would, on every occasion, to the utmost of his power, challenge the preference above every other being, to none of which he is bound by any ties, either of nature, or of interest.

'But suppose the conjunction of the sexes to be established in nature, a family immediately arises; and particular rules being found requisite for its subsistance, these are immediately embraced; tho' without comprehending the rest of mankind within their prescriptions. Suppose, that several families unite together into one society, which is totally disjoined from all others, the rules, which preserve peace and order, enlarge themselves to the utmost extent of that society; but, being entirely useless, lose their force when carried one step farther. But again suppose, that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage; the boundaries of justice still grow larger and larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views, and the force of their mutual connexions. History, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human sentiments, and the gradual increase of our regards to property and

justice in proportion as we became acquainted with the extensive *utility* of that virtue.'

{5} After a short section upon political society, our Author proceeds in the fifth to shew why utility pleases. 'Usefulness, says he, is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily observation. But *useful*? For what? For somebody's interest surely. Whose interest then? Not our own only: For our approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest of those, who are serv'd by the character or action approved of; and these we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. -- Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and 'tis a contradiction in terms, that any thing pleases as means to an end, where the end itself does no way affect us. If therefore usefulness be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self; it follows, that every thing, which contributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our approbation and good-will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality: And what need we seek for abstruse and remote systems, when there occurs one so obvious and natural?'

Our author employs several pages in illustrating this principle, and concludes the section in the following manner. 'Thus, says he, in whatever light we take this subject, the merit, ascrib'd to the social virtues, appears still uniform, and arises chiefly from that regard, which the natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interests of mankind and society. If we consider the principles of the human make, such as they appear to daily experience and observation; we mus, *a priori*, conclude it impossible for such a creature as man to be totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular byass, that what promotes their happiness is good, what tends to their misery is evil, without any farther regard or consideration. Here then are the faint rudiments, at least, or outlines, of a general distinction betwixt actions; and in proportion as the humanity of the person is supposed to encrease, his connexion to those injured or benefited, and his lively conception of their misery or happiness; his consequent censure or approbation acquires proportionable force and vigour. There is no necessity, that a generous action, barely mentioned in an old history or remote Gazette, should communicate any strong feelings of applause and admiration. Virtue, placed at such a distance, {6} is like a fixt star, which tho', to the eye of reason, it may appear as luminous as the sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed, as to affect the senses neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connexion with the persons, or even by an eloquent narration and recital of the case; our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy enliven'd, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest sentiments of friendship and regard. These seem necessary and infallible consequences of the general principles of human nature, as discovered in common life and practice.

'Again; reverse these views and reasonings: Consider the matter *a posteriori*; and weighing the consequences, enquire, if the merit of all social virtue is not derived from the feelings of humanity, with which it affects the spectators. It appears to be matter of fact, that the circumstances of *utility* in all subjects, is a source of praise and approbation: that it is constantly appeal'd to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is the *sole* source of that high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other social virtues of humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy and moderation: and in a word that it is the foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and society.

'It appears also, in our general approbation or judgment of characters and manners, that the useful tendency of the social virtues moves us not by any regards to self-interest, but has an

influence much more universal and extensive. It appears, that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and concord in society, by affecting {7} the benevolent principles of our frame, engages us on the side of the social virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so deep into all our sentiments, and have so powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the strongest censure and applause. The present theory is the simple result of all these inferences, each of which seems founded on uniform experience and observation.

'Were it doubtful, whether there was any such principle in our nature and humanity or a concern for others, yet when we see, in numberless instances, that, whatever has a tendency to promote the interests of society, is so highly approv'd of, we ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle; since 'tis impossible for any thing to please as a means to an end, where the end itself is totally indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubtful, whether there was, implanted in our natures, any general principle of moral blame and approbation, yet when we see, in numberless instances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that 'tis impossible, but that every thing, which promotes the interest of society, must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious give uneasiness. But when these different reflections and observations concur in establishing the same conclusion; must they not bestow an undisputed evidence upon it?

''Tis however hoped, that the progress of this argument will bring a farther confirmation of the present theory, by showing the rise of other sentiments of esteem and regard from the same or like principles.'

The sixth section treats of qualities useful to ourselves. It is introduced with the following just observation, *viz*. that nothing is more usual, than for philosophers to encroach upon the province of *Grammarians*, and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine, that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern. 'Thus, says our author, were we here to assert or to deny, *that all laudable qualities of the mind were to be considered as virtues or moral attributes*, many would imagine, that we had entered upon one of the profoundest speculations of Ethics; tho' tis probable, all the while , that the greatest part of the dispute would be found entirely verbal.' After this he makes the two following observations; that, in common life, the sentiments of censure or approbation, produced by mental qualities of every kind, are very similar; and that all antient moralists, (the best models) in treating of them, make little or no difference amongst them. These observations he confirms and illustrates, in the subsequent part of the section, with great beauty and elegance; shews that all the qualities, useful to the possessor, are approved, and the contrary censured; and examines that influence of bodily endowments and of the goods of fortune, over our sentiments of regard and esteem.

In the seventh section, which treats of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves, our author shews that there is another set of virtues, such as chearfulness, dignity of character, courage and serenity of mind, which, without any utility or any tendency to farther good, either of the {8} community or of the possessor, diffuse a satisfaction on the beholders, conciliate friendship and regard, and are praised from the immediate pleasure, which they communicate to the person possest of them. This section too is very entertaining, and contains several beautiful illustrations drawn from celebrated characters both in ancient and modern times.

In the eighth section our author treats of qualities immediately agreeable to others, such as politeness, wit, the lively spirit of dialogue in conversation, eloquence, modesty, decency, &*c*. and shews that, abstracted from any regard to utility or beneficial tendencies, they conciliate affection,

promote esteem, and greatly inhance the merit of the possessor. He closes this section in the following manner. 'Amongst the other virtues, says he, we may also give cleanliness a place; since it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is no inconsiderable source of love and affection. No one will deny, that a negligence in this particular is a fault; and as faults are nothing but smaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin than the uneasy sensation, which it excites in others; we may, in this instance, seemingly so trivial, clearly discover the origin of moral distinctions, about which the learned have involved themselves in such mazes of perplexity and error.'

'But besides all the agreeable qualities, the origin of whose beauty we can, in some degree, explain and account for, there still remains something mysterious and unaccountable, which conveys and immediate satisfaction to the spectators, but how, or why, or for what reason, they cannot pretend to determine. There is a manner, a grace, a genteelness, an I-know-not-what, which some men possess above others, which is very different from external beauty and comeliness, and which, however, catches our affection almost as suddenly and powerfully. And tho' this *manner* be chiefly talked of in the passion betwixt the sexes, where the concealed magic is easily explained, yet surely much of it prevails in all our estimation of characters, and forms no inconsiderable part of personal merit. this class of virtues, therefore, must be trusted entirely to the blind but sure testimony of taste and sentiment; and must be considered as a part of ethics, left by nature to baffle all the pride of philosophy, and make her sensible of her narrow boundaries and slender acquisitions."

{9} 'We approve of another, because of his wit, politeness, modesty, decency, or any agreeable quality he possesses, although he be not of our acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of these accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his acquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives us the sentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the judgments which we form concerning morals.'

The ninth section, which is the conclusion of the whole, our author introduces with observing that it may appear surprising, that any man, in so late an age should find it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasonings, that virtue or personal merit consists altogether in the possession of qualities, *useful or agreeable* to the *person himself* or to *others*. 'It might be expected, says he, that this principle would have occurred even to the first rude, unpractised enquirers concerning morals, and been received, from its own evidence, without any argument or disputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind so naturally classes itself under the division of *useful* or *agreeable*, the *utile* or the *dulce*, that it is not easy to imagine, why we should ever seek farther, or consider the question as a matter of nice research or enquiry. And as every thing useful or agreeable must possess these qualities with regard either to the *person himself* or to *others*, the compleat delineation or description of merit seems to be performed as naturally as a shadow is cast by the sun, or an image is reflected upon water. If the ground, on which the shadow is cast, be not broken and uneven, nor the surface, from which the image is reflected, disturbed and confused, a just figure is immediately presented, without any art or attention. And it seems a reasonable presumption, that systems and hypotheses have perverted our natural understanding, when a theory, so simple and obvious, could so long have escaped the most elaborate scrutiny and examination.

'But however the case may have fared with philosophy; in common life these principles are still implicitely maintained; nor is any other topic of praise or blame ever recurred to, when we employ and panegyric or satire, any applause or censure of human action and behaviour. If we observe men, in every intercourse of business or pleasure, in each conference and conversation, we shall find them no where, except in the schools, at any loss upon the subject. --

{10} 'And as every quality, which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others, is, in common life, admitted under the denomination of virtue or personal merit; so no other will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion. Celibacy, fasting, penances, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they every where rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor encrease his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding, and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sower the temper. We justly therefore transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any superstition force sufficient, amongst men of the world, to pervert entirely these natural sentiments. A gloomy hair-brained enthusiast, after his death, may have place in the calendar; but will scarce ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.'

Our author does not enter into that vulgar dispute concerning the *degrees* of benevolence or self-love, which prevail in human nature; a dispute, which, as he justly observes, is never likely to have any issue, both because men, who have taken party, are not easily convinced, and because the phaenomena, which can be produced on either side, are so uncertain, and subject to such a variety of interpretations, that it is impossible accurately to compare them, or draw any determinate conclusion from them. He thinks it sufficient for his purpose, if it be allowed that there is some benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind, some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wold and serpent. "Let these generous sentiments, says he, be supposed ever so weak; let them be hardly sufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body; they must still direct the determinations of the mind, and where every thing else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A *moral distinction*, therefore, immediately arises; a general sentiment of blame and approbation; {11} a tendency, however faint, to the objects of the one, and a proportionable aversion to those of the other.'

Avarice, ambition, vanity, and all those passions that are vulgarly comprehended under the denomination of *self-love*, are excluded from our author's theory concerning the origin of morals, not because they are too weak, but because they have not a proper direction for that purpose. 'The notion of morals, says he, implies some sentiment, common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of persons the most remote, an object of censure or applause, according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established. These two requisite circumstances belong alone to the sentiment of humanity here insisted on. The other passions produce, in every breast, many strong sentiments of desire and aversion, affection and hatred; but these neither are felt to much in common, nor are so comprehensive, as to be the foundation of any general system and established theory of blame or approbation.

'When a man denominates another his *enemy*, his *rival*, his *antagonist*, his *adversary*, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to express sentiments peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation: but when he bestows on any man the epithets of *vicious* or *odious*, or *depraved*, he then speaks another language, and expresses

sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others: he must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. If he means, therefore, to express, that this man possesses qualities, whose tendency is pernicious to society, he has chose this common point in view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the same elements as present, it will never be altogether indifferent to the good of mankind, nor entirely unaffected with the tendencies of characters and manners. And tho' this affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as ambition or vanity, yet, being common to all men, it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any {12} general system of conduct and behaviour. One man's ambition is not another man's ambition; nor will the same event or object satisfy both: but the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one; and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures.

'But the sentiments which arise from humanity, are not only the same in all human creatures, and produce the same approbation or censure; but they also comprehend all human creatures: nor is there any one, whose conduct and character is not, by their means, an object, to every one, of censure or approbation. On the contrary those other passions, commonly denominated selfish, both produce different sentiments in each individual, according to his particular situation; and also contemplate the greatest part of mankind with the utmost indifference and unconcern. Whoever has a high regard and esteem for me flatters my vanity; whoever expresses contempt mortifies and displeases me: but as my name is known but to a small part of mankind, there are few, that come within the sphere of this passion, or excite, on its account, either my affection or disgust. But if you represent a tyrannical, insolent, or barbarous behaviour, in any country or in any age of the world; I soon carry my eye to the pernicious tendency of such a conduct, and feel the sentiment of repugnance and displeasure toward it. No character can be so remote as to be, in this light, altogether indifferent to me. What is beneficial to society or to the person himself must still be preferred. And every quality or action, of every human being, must by this means, be ranked under some class or denomination, expressive of general censure or applause.

'What more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish the sentiments, dependant on humanity, from those connected with any other passion, or to satisfy us why the former is the origin of morals, and not the latter? Whatever conduct gains my approbation, by touching my humanity, procures also the applause of all mankind, by affecting the same principle in them: but what serves my avarice or ambition pleases only these passions in me, and affects not the avarice or ambition of the rest of mankind. No conduct, in any man, which has a beneficial tendency, but is agreeable to my humanity, however remote to the person: but every man, so far removed as neither to cross nor serve my avarice and ambition, is altogether indifferent to those passions. The distinction, therefore, betwixt these different {13} species of sentiment being so strong and evident, language must soon be moulded upon it, and must invent a peculiar set of terms to express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation, which arise from humanity or from views of general usefulness and its contrary. Virtue and vice become then known: morals are recognized: certain general ideas are framed of human conduct and behaviour: such measures are expected from men in such situations: this action is determined conformable to our abstract rule; that other, contrary. And by such universal principles are the particular sentiments of self-love frequently controuled and limited.'

In the remaining part of this section the author briefly considers our *obligation* to virtue, and

shews that every man, who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will best find his account in the practice of every moral duty.

There are two appendixes subjoined to the work, in the first of which the author examines how far either *reason* or *sentiment* enters into all moral determinations. 'The chief foundation, says he, of moral praise being supposed to lie in the usefulness of any quality of action; it is evident, that *reason* must enter for a considerable share in all determinations of this kind; since nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial consequences to society and to their professors. In many cases this is an affair liable to great controversy: doubts may arise, opposite interests occur; and a preference must be given to one side, from very nice views and a small over balance of utility. This is particularly remarkable in questions with regard to justice; as is, indeed natural to suppose from that species of utility which attends this virtue. Were every single instance of justice, like that of benevolence, beneficial and useful to society; this would be a more simple state of the case, and seldom liable to great controversy. But as single instances of justice are often pernicious in their first and immediate tendency, and as the advantage to society results only from the observance of he general rule, and from the concurrence and combination of several persons in the same equitable conduct; the case here becomes more intricate and involved. The various circumstances of society; the various consequences of any practice; the various interests which may be proposed: these on many occasions are doubtful, and subject to great discussion and enquiry. The object of municipal is to fix all questions with regard to justice: the debates of civilians; the reflections {14} of politicians; the precedents of histories and public records, are all directed to the same purpose. And a very accurate *reason* or *judgment* is often requisite, to give true determination, amidst such intricate doubts arising from obscure or opposite utilities.

'But tho' reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendencies of qualities and actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means. It is requisite a *sentiment* should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. This sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. Here therefore, *reason* instructs us in the several tendencies of action, and *humanity* makes a distinction in favour of those, which are useful and beneficial'

After this our author proceeds to shew the absurdity of supposing reason to be the sole source of morals, an absurdity which he places in the clearest and strongest light, and concludes this his first appendix in the following manner. 'Thus, says he, the distinct boundaries of offices of *reason* and *taste* are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falshood: the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects, as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: the other has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation. Reason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by shewing us the means of obtaining happiness or avoiding misery: taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. From circumstances and relations, known or supposed, the former leads us to the discovery of the concealed and unknown: after all circumstances and relations are laid before us, the latter makes

us feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation. The standard of the one being founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the will of the supreme {15} being: the standard of the other, arising from the internal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that supreme will, who bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence.'

In the second appendix, our author gives a more particular explication of the origin and nature of justice; and marks some differences betwixt it and the other virtues. He observes, that, the social virtues of humanity and benevolence, exert their influence immediately, by a direct tendency or instinct, which keeps chiefly in view the simple object that moves the affections, and comprehends not any scheme or system, nor the consequences resulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of others; but that the case is different with the social virtues of justice and fidelity. 'They' says he, 'are highly useful, or indeed absolutely necessary to the well-being of mankind; but the benefit resulting from them, is not the consequences of every individual single act; but arises from the whole scheme or system, concurred in by the whole, or the greatest part of the society. General peace and order is the attendant of justice, or a general abstinence from the possessions of others; but a particular regard to the particular right of one individual citizen, may frequently, considered in itself, be attended with pernicious consequences. The result of the several acts is here often directly opposite to that of the whole system of actions; and the former may be extremely hurtful, while the latter is, to the highest degree, advantageous. Riches inherited from a parent, are, in a bad man's hand, the instruments of mischief. The right of succession may, in one instance, be hurtful. Its benefit arises only from the observance of the general rule; and it is sufficient, if compensation be thereby made, for all the ills and inconveniencies, which flow from particular characters and situations.

The happiness and prosperity of mankind, arising from the social virtues of benevolence and its subdivisions, may be compared to a wall, built by many hands; which still rise by each stone that is put upon it: and receives proportionable increase to the diligence and care of each workman. The same happiness, raised by the social virtue of justice and its subdivisions, may be compared to the building of a vault, where each individual stone, would, of itself, fall to the ground; nor does the whole fabric support {16} itself, but by the mutual assistance and combination of its correspondent parts.

'All the laws of nature, which regulate property, as well as all civil laws, are general; and regard alone some essential circumstances of the case, without taking into consideration the characters, situations and connexions of the persons concerned, or any particular consequences, that may result from the determination of these laws, in every particular case that offers. The deprive, without scruple, a beneficent man of all his possessions, if acquired by mistake, without a good title in order to bestow them on a selfish miser, who has already heaped up immense stores of superfluous riches. Publick utility requires, that property should be regulated by general inflexible rules; and though such rules are adopted as best serve the same end of public utility, it is impossible for them to prevent all particular hardships, or make beneficial consequences result from every individual case. It is sufficient, if the whole plan or scheme be necessary to the support of civil society, and if the balance of good, in the main, does thereby preponderate much above that of evil. Even the general laws of the universe, though planned by infinite wisdom, cannot exclude all evil or inconvenience, in every particular operation.'

After this our author proceeds to consider in what sense justice may be said to arise from human conventions. 'If by *convention*,' says he, 'be here meant a *promise* (which is the most usual sense of

the word) nothing can be more absurd, than this position. The observance of promises is itself, one of the most considerable parts of justice; and we are not surely bound to keep our word, because we have given our word to keep it. But if by convention, be meant a sense of common interest; which sense each man feels in his own breast, which he observes in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, that tends to public utility; it must be owned, that, in this sense, justice arises from human conventions. For if it be allowed (what is, indeed, evident) that the particular consequences of a particular act of justice, may be hurtful to the public as well as to individuals; it follows, that every man, in embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole plan or system, and must expect the concurrence of his fellows in the same conduct and behaviour. Were all his views to terminate in the particular consequences of each particular act of {17} his own, his benevolence and humanity, as well as self-love, might often prescribe to him measures of conduct very different from these, which are agreeable to the strict rules of right and justice.

'Thus two men pull the oars of a boat, by common convention, for common interest, without any promise or contract,; thus gold and silver are made the measures of exchange; thus speech and words and language are fixt, by human convention and agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or more persons, if all perform their part; but what loses all advantage, if only one perform, can arise from no other principle. There would otherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of conduct.

'The word, *natural*, is commonly taken in so many senses, and is of such loose signification, that it seems to little purpose to dispute, whether justice is natural or not. If self-love, if benevolence be natural to man; if reason and fore-thought be also natural; then may the same epithet be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. Men's inclination, their necessities lead them to combine; their understanding and experience tell them, that this combination is impossible, where each governs himself by no rule, and pays no regard to the possessions of others; and from these passions and reflections conjoined, as soon as we observe like passions and reflections in others, the sentiment of justice, through all ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to some degree or other, in every individual of human species. In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the exertion of his intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed natural.

'Amongst all civilized nations, it has been the constant endeavour to remove every thing arbitrary and partial from the decision of property, and to fix the sentence of judges by such general views and considerations, as may be equal to every member of the society. For besides, that nothing could be more dangerous than to accustom the bench, even the smallest instance, to regard private friendship or enmity; it is certain, that men, where they imagine that there was no other reason for the preference of their adversary, but personal favour, are apt to entertain the strongest jealousy and ill-will against the magistrates and judges. When natural reason, therefore, points out no fixt view of public utility, by which a controversy of property can be decided, positive laws are often framed to supply its place, and direct the procedure of all courts of {18} judicature. Where these two fail, as often happens, precedents are called for; and a former decision, though given itself without any sufficient reason, justly becomes a sufficient reason for a new decision. If direct laws and precedents be wanting, imperfect and indirect ones are brought in aid; and the controverted case is ranged under them, by analogical reasonings, and comparisons, and similitudes, and correspondencies, that are often more fanciful than real. In general, it may easily be asserted, that jurisprudence is, in this respect, different from all the sciences; and in may of its nicer questions, there cannot properly be said to be truth or falshood on either side. If one pleader brings the case

under any former law or precedent, by a refined analogy or comparison, the opposite pleader is not a a loss to find an opposite analogy or comparison; and the preference given by the judge, is often founded more on taste and imagination than on any solid argument. Public utility is the general view of all courts of judicature; and this utility too requires a staple rule in all controversies; but where several rules, nearly equal and indifferent, present themselves, 'tis a very slight turn of thought, which fixes the decision in favour of either party.'

Our author concludes his ingenious performance with a very entertaining dialogue, wherein he presents us with a picture of *Athenian* and *French manners*, to shew what wide differences, in the sentiments of morals, are to be found betwixt different nations. He endeavours to make it appear, that the principles, upon which men reason, in morals, are always the same; though the conclusions they draw, are often very different. 'As many ages, says he, as have elapsed, since the fall of *Greece* and *Rome*, and such changes as have arrived in religion, language, laws and customs, none of these revolutions have ever produced any considerable innovation in the primary sentiments of morals, more than in those of external beauty. Some minute differences, perhaps, may be observed in both, *Horace* celebrates a low forehead, and *Anacreon* joined eye-brows; but the *Apollo* and the *Venus* of antiquity, are still our models for male and female beauty; in like manner, as the character of *Scipio* continues our standard for the glory of heroes, and that of *Cornelia* for the honour of matrons.

'It appears, that there never was any quality, recommended by any one, as a virtue of moral excellence; but on account of its being *useful*, or *agreeable* to a man *himself*, or to others. For what other reason can there ever be {19} for praise or approbation? Or where would be the sense of extolling a *good* character or action, which at the same time, is allowed to be *good for nothing*? All the differences, therefore, in morals, may be reduced to this one general foundation, and may be accounted for by the different views which people take of these circumstances.'

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

Review of David Hume's *Four Dissertations*

The Monthly Review

William Rose

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Four Dissertations. 1. The Natural History of Religion. 2. Of the Passions. 3. Of Tragedy. 4. Of the Standard of Taste. By David Hume, *Esq*; 12mo. 3s. Millar.

THERE are but few of our modern Writers, whose works are so generally read, as those of Mr. Hume. And, indeed, if we consider them in one view, as sprightly and ingenious compositions, this is not at all to be wondered at: there is a delicacy of sentiment, an original turn of thought, a perspicuity, and often an elegance, of language, that cannot but recommend his writings to every Reader of taste. It is to be regretted, however, that such a genius should employ his abilities in the manner he frequently does. In his attacks upon the religion of his country, he acts not the part of an open and generous enemy, but endeavours to weaken its authority by oblique hints, and artful insinuations. In this view his works merit little, if any regard; and few Readers, of just discernment, we apprehend, will envy him any honours his acuteness, or elegance, can possibly

obtain, when they are only employed in filling the mind with the uncomfortable fluctuations of scepticism, and the gloom of infidelity. But leaving the general reflections, let us proceed to give an account of the Dissertations now before us; the first of which is entitled, *The Natural History of Religion*.

This Dissertation Mr. Hume introduces with observing, that there are two questions in regard to religion, which challenge our principal attention, viz. that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature. The first question, which is the most important, admits, he says, of the clearest solution. The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent Author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine theism and religion. But the other question, concerning the origin of religion in human nature, admits of some more difficulty. The belief of invisible intelligent power, has been very generally diffused over the human race, in all places, and in all ages; but it has neither, perhaps, been so universally, we are told, as to admit of no exceptions, nor has it been, in any degree, uniform in the ideas which it has suggested. Some nations have been discovered, who entertained no sentiments of religion, if travellers and historians may be credited; and no two nations, and scarce any two men, have ever agreed precisely in the same sentiments. {123}

"It would appear, therefore," continues Mr. Hume, "that this pre-conception springs not from an original instinct, or primary impression of nature, such as gives rise to self-love, affection betwixt the sexes, love of progeny, gratitude, resentment; since every instinct of this kind has been found absolutely universal in all nations and ages, and has always a precise, determinate object, which it inflexibly pursues. The first religious principles must be secondary; such as may easily be perverted by various accidents and causes, and whose operation too, in some cases, may, by an extra-ordinary concurrence of circumstances, be altogether prevented. What those principles are, which give rise to the original belief, and what those accidents and causes are, which direct its operation, is the subject of our present enquiry?"

Mr. Hume is of opinion, that if we consider the improvement of human society, from rude beginnings to a state of greater perfection, it will appear that Polytheism of Idolatry, was, and necessarily must have been, the first and most antient religion of mankind. In order to support this opinion, he observes, that the farther we mount up into antiquity, the more we find mankind plunged into Idolatry. The North, the South, the East, the West, give their unanimous testimony to this fact: As to the doubtful and sceptical principles of a few Philosophers, or the Theism, and that too not entirely pure, of one or two nations, these form no objection worth regarding. According to the natural progress of human thought too, he says, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some groveling and familiar notion of superior powers, before they stretch their conception to that perfect Being, who bestowed order on the whole frame of nature: and we may as reasonably imagine, that men inhabited palaces before huts and cottages, or studied geometry before agriculture, as assert, that the Deity appeared to them a pure spirit, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent, before he was apprehended to be a powerful, though limited Being, with Human passions and appetites, limbs, and organs. In a word, our Author thinks it impossible, that theism could, from reasoning, have been the primary religion of the human race, and have afterwards, by its corruption, given birth to Idolatry, and to all the various superstitions of the Heathen world.

If we would therefore indulge our curiosity, he says, in enquiring concerning the origin of religion, we must turn our thoughts towards Idolatry or Polytheism, the primitive religion of uninstructed mankind. And here he observes, that if {124} men were led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent power, by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly entertain

any conception but of one single Being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all its parts, according to one regular plan, or connected system. On the other hand, if, leaving the works of nature, we trace the footsteps of invisible power, in the various and contrary events of human life, we are necessarily led into Polytheism, and to the acknowledgement of several limited and imperfect Deities. Storms and tempests ruin what is nourished by the sun; the sun destroys what is fostered by the moisture of dews and rains. War may be favourable to a nation, whom the inclemency of the seasons afflicts with famine: sickness and pestilence may depopulate a kingdom, amidst the most profuse plenty. In short, the conduct of events, or what we call the plan of a particular Providence, is so full of variety and uncertainty, that if we suppose it immediately ordered by any intelligent Being, we must acknowledge a contrariety in their designs and intentions, a constant combat of opposite powers, and a repentance, or change of intention in the same power, from impotence or levity.

It may be concluded therefore, Mr. Hume imagines, that in all nations which have embraced Polytheism, or Idolatry, the first ideas of religion arose not from a contemplation of the works of nature; but from a concern with respect to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears which actuate the human mind. Accordingly we find, it is said, that all Idolaters, having separated the provinces of their Deities, have recourse to that invisible agent, to whose authority they are immediately subjected, and whose province it is to superintend that course of actions, in which they are at any time engaged. Juno is invoked at marriages; Lucina at births; Neptune receives the prayers of seamen; and Mars of warriors. Each natural event is supposed to be governed by some intelligent agent; and nothing prosperous, or adverse can happen in life, which may not be the subject of peculiar prayers or thanksgivings.

In further treating of this subject, Mr. Hume observes, that we are placed in this world as in a great theatre, where the true springs and causes of every event, are entirely unknown to us; nor have we either sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to prevent, those ills with which we are continually threatened. We hang in perpetual suspence betwixt life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want; which are distributed amongst the human species by secret and unknown {125} causes, whose operation is oft unexpected, and always unaccountable. These *unknown causes* then, we are told, become the constant object of our hope and fear; and while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers, on which we have so entire a dependence. No wonder then, Mr. Hume says, that mankind being placed in such an absolute ignorance of causes, and being at the same time so anxious concerning their future fortunes, should immediately acknowledge a dependance on invisible powers, possessed of sentiment, and intelligence. The *unknown causes*, which continually employ their thought, appearing always in the same aspect, are all apprehended to be of the same kind of species. Nor is it long before we ascribe to them thought, and reason, and passion, and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order to bring them nearer to a resemblance with ourselves.

Our Author goes on to consider the gross Polytheism and Idolatry of the vulgar, and to trace all its various appearances in the principles of human nature, whence they are derived. Whoever learns by argument, he observes, the existence of invisible, intelligent power, must reason from the admirable contrivance of natural objects, and must suppose the world to be the workmanship of that Divine Being, the original cause of all things. But the vulgar polytheist, so far from admitting that idea, defies every part of he universe, and conceives all the conspicuous productions of nature to be themselves so many real Divinities. The sun, moon, and stars, are all Gods, according to his

system: fountains are inhabited by nymphs, and trees by hamadryads: even monkies, dogs, cats, and other animals, often become sacred in his eyes, and strike him with a religious veneration. And thus, however strong men's propensity to believe invisible, intelligent power, in nature, their propensity is equally strong to rest their attention on sensible, visible objects; and in order to reconcile these opposite inclinations, they are led to unite the invisible power with some visible object.

Mr. Hume observes further, that the Deities of the vulgar are so little superior to human creatures, that where men are affected with strong sentiments of veneration or gratitude, for any hero, or public benefactor, nothing can be more natural than to convert him into a God, and fill the Heavens after this manner, with continual recruits from amongst mankind. Most of the Divinities of the antient world are supposed to have once been men, and to have been beholden for their *apotheosis* {126} to the admiration and affection of the people. And the real history of their adventures, corrupted by tradition, and elevated by the marvellous, became a plentiful source of fable; especially in passing through the hands of Poets, Allegorists, and Priests, who successfully improved upon the wonder and astonishment of the ignorant multitude.

Polytheism, or idolatrous worship, he says, being founded entirely in vulgar traditions, is liable to this great inconvenience, that any practice, or opinion, however barbarous or corrupted, may be authorized by it; and full scope is left for knavery to impose on credulity, till morals and humanity be expelled from the religious systems of mankind. At the same time he observes, Idolatry is attended with this evident advantage, that, by limiting the powers and functions of its Deities, it naturally admits the Gods of other sects and nations to a share of divinity, and renders all the various Deities, as well as rites, ceremonies, or traditions, compatible with each other.

Theism is opposite, both in its advantages and disadvantages, as it supposes one sole Deity, the perfection of reason and goodness, it should, our Author says, if justly prosecuted, banish every thing frivolous, unreasonable, or inhuman, from religious worship, and set before men the most illustrious example, as well as the most commanding motives of justice and benevolence. These mighty advantages are not, indeed, over balanced, (for that is not possible) but somewhat diminished, we are told, by inconveniences, which arise from the vices and prejudices of mankind. While one sole object of devotion is acknowledged, the worship of other Deities is regarded as absurd and impious. Nay, this unity of object seems naturally to require the unity of faith and ceremonies, and furnishes designing men with a pretext for representing their adversaries as prophane, and the objects of divine, as well as human, vengeance. For as each sect is positive, that its own faith and worship are entirely acceptable to the Deity; and as no one can conceive, that the same Being should be pleased with different and opposite rites and principles; the several sects fall naturally into animosity, and mutually discharge on each other, that sacred zeal and rancour, the most furious and implacable of all human passions.

The tolerating spirit of Idolaters, both in antient and modern times, Mr. Hume says, is very obvious to any one, who is the least conversant in the writings of historians, or travellers; and the intolerance of almost all religions, which have maintained the unity of God, is as remarkable as the contrary principle in Polytheists. The implacable narrow spirit of the {127} Jews, we are told, is well known. Mahommedism set out with still more bloody principles, and even to this day deals out damnation, though not fire and faggot, to all other sects. And if, amongst Christians, the English and Dutch have embraced the principles of toleration, this singularity has proceeded from the steady resolution of the civil magistrate, in opposition to the continued efforts of priests and bigots.

"I may venture to affirm," continues our Author, "that few corruptions of Idolatry and Polytheism are more pernicious to political society, than this corruption of Theism, when carried to the utmost height. The human sacrifices of the Carthaginians, Mexicans, and many barbarous nations, scarce exceed the Inquisition, and persecutions of Rome and Madrid. For besides, that the effusion of blood may not be so great in the former case, as in the latter; besides this, I say, the human victims, being chosen by lot, or by some exterior signs, affect not in so considerable a degree, the rest of the society. Whereas virtue, knowledge, lobe of liberty, are the qualities which call down the fatal vengeance of Inquisitors; and when expelled, have the society in the most shameful ignorance, corruption, and bondage. The illegal murder of one man by a tyrant, is more pernicious than the death of a thousand by pestilence, famine, or any undistinguishing calamity."

From the comparison of Theism and Idolatry, our Author proceeds to form some other observations, in order to confirm the vulgar saying, that the corruption of the best things gives rise to the worst. He tells us, that where the Deity is represented as infinitely superior to mankind, this belief, though altogether just, is apt, when joined with superstitious terrors, to sink the human mind into the lowest submission and abasement, and to represent the monkish virtues of mortification, pennance, humility, and passive suffering, as the only qualities which are acceptable to him. But where the Gods are conceived to be only a little superior to mankind, and to have been many of them advanced from that inferior rank, we are more at our ease in our addresses to them; and may even, without profaneness, aspire sometimes to a rivalship, and emulation of them. Hence activity, spirit, courage, magnanimity, love of liberty, and all the virtues which aggrandize a people.

He observes further, to the same purpose, that if we examine, without prejudice, the antient Heathen Mythology as, contained in the Poets, we shall not discover in it any such monstrous absurdity, as we may be apt at first to apprehend. Nay, so natural does Mr. Hume think the whole mythological {128} system, that in the vast variety of planets and worlds contained in the universe, he thinks it more than probable, that, somewhere or other, it is really carried into execution.

"The chief objection to it," says he, "with regard to this planet, is, that it is not ascertained by any just reason or authority. The antient tradition insisted on by the Heathen Priests and Theologers, is but a weak foundation, and transmitted also such a number of contradictory reports, supported, all of them, by equal authority, that it became absolutely impossible to fix a preference among them. A few volumes therefore must contain all the Polemical writings of Pagan Priests, and their whole theology must consist more of traditional stories, and superstitious practices, than of philosophical argument and controversy.

But where Theism forms the fundamental principle of any popular religion, that tenet is so conformable to sound reason, that philosophy is apt to incorporate itself with such a system of theology. And if the other dogmas of that system be contained in a sacred book, such as *the Alcoran*;2 or be determined by any visible authority, like that of the Roman Pontiff; speculative reasoners naturally carry on their assent, and embrace a theory which has been instilled into them by their earliest education, and which also possesses some degree of consistence and uniformity. But as these appearances do often, all of them, prove deceitful, philosophy will soon find herself very unequally yoked with her new associate; and instead of regulating each principle as they advance together, she is at every turn perverted to serve the purposes of superstition: for, besides the unavoidable incoherencies which must be reconciled and adjusted, one may safely affirm, that all popular theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of appetite for absurdity and contradiction. If the theology went not beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines would

appear too easy and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised. Mystery affected, darkness and obscurity sought after; and a foundation of merit afforded the devout votaries who desire an opportunity of subduing their rebellious reason, by the belief of the most unintelligible sophisms.

Ecclesiastical history sufficiently confirms these reflections. When a controversy is started, some people pretend always with certainty, to conjecture the issue. Which ever opinion, says they, is more contrary to plain sense, is sure to prevail; even where the general interest of the system requires not that decision. Though the reproach of heresy {129} may for some time be bandied about amongst the disputants, it always rests on the side of reason. Any one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough to know the definition of *Arian, Pelagian, Erastian, Socinian, Sabellian, Eutychian, Nestorian, Monothelite, &c.* not to mention *Protestant*, whose fate is yet uncertain, will be convinced of the truth of this observation. And thus a system becomes more absurd in the end, merely from its being reasonable and philosophical in the beginning.

To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion, by such feeble maxims as these, that *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*, that *the whole is greater than a part*; that *two and three make five*; is pretending to stop the ocean with a bull-rush. Will you set up profane reason against sacred mystery? No punishment is great enough for your impiety. And the same fires which were kindled for heretics, will serve also for the destruction of philosophers."

After several other reflections on this subject, Mr. Hume goes on to observe, that notwithstanding the dogmatical imperial style of all superstition, the conviction of the religionists, in all ages, is more affected than real, and scarce approaches in any degree, to that solid belief and persuasion which governs us in the common affairs of life. Men dare not avow, even to their own hearts, the doubts, which they entertain on such subjects; they make a merit of implicit faith, and disguise to themselves their real infidelity, by the strongest asseverations, and most positive bigotry. But nature is too hard for all their endeavours, and suffers not the obscure, glimmering light, afforded in those shadowy regions, to equal the strong impressions made by common sense, and by experience. The usual course of men's conduct belies their words, and shews, that the assent in these matters is some unaccountable operation of the mind, betwixt disbelief and conviction, but approaching much nearer to the former than the latter.

> "Since therefore," continues Mr. Hume, "the mind of man appears of so loose and unsteady a contexture, that even at present, when so many persons find an interest in continually employing on it the chissel and the hammer, yet are they not able to engrave theological tenets with any lasting impression; how much more must this have been the case in antient times, when the retainers to the holy function were so much fewer in comparison? No wonder that the appearances, were then very inconsistent, and that men, on some occasions, might seem determined infidels, and enemies to {130} the established religion, without being so in reality; or at least without knowing their minds in that particular."

In the further prosecution of this subject, our Author observes, that in every religion, however sublime the verbal definition which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries, perhaps the greatest number, will still seek the divine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfect Being, but either by frivolous observances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous extasies, or by the belief of mysterious and absurd opinions. Nay, if we should suppose, he says, what seldom happens, that a popular religion were found, in which it was expressly declared, that nothing but morality could gain the Divine favour; if an order of Priests were

instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily sermons, and with all the arts of persuasion; yet so inveterate are the people's prejudices, that for want of some other superstition, they would make the very attendance on these sermons the essentials of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The manner in which he accounts for this, is as follows:

The duties, he says, which a man performs as a friend or parent, seem merely owing to his benefactor, or children; nor can he be wanting these duties, without breaking through all the ties of nature and morality. A strong inclination may prompt him to the performance: a sentiment of order and moral beauty joins its force to these natural ties; and the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty without any effort or endeavour. Even with regard to the virtues which are more austere, and more founded on reflection, such as public spirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity; the moral obligation, in our apprehension, removes all pretence to religious merit; and the virtuous conduct is esteemed no more than what we owe to society, and to ourselves. In all this a superstitious man finds nothing which he has properly performed for the sake of his Deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the divine favour and protection. He considers not, that the most genuine method of serving the Divinity, is by promoting the happiness of his creatures. He still looks out for some more immediate service of the Supreme Being, in order to allay those terrors with which he is haunted. And any practice recommended to him, which either serves to no purpose in life, or offers the strongest violence to his natural inclinations; that practice he will more readily embrace, on account of those very circumstances, which should make him absolutely reject it. It seems the more purely religious, that it proceeds from no mixture of any other motive {131} or consideration. And if, for its sake, he sacrifices much of his ease and quiet, his claim of merit appears still to rise upon him, in proportion to the zeal and devotion which he discovers. In restoring a loan, of paying a debt, is Divinity is no way beholden to him; because these acts of justice are what he was bound to perform, and what many would have performed, were there not God in the universe. But if he fast a day, or give himself a sound whipping, this has a direct reference, in his opinion, to the service of God. No other motive could engage him to such austerities. By these distinguished marks of devotion, he has now acquired the Divine favour; and may expect, in recompence, protection and safety in this world, and eternal happiness in the next.

Mr. Hume concludes this long Dissertation, which takes up near half the volume, in the following manner.

> **"Though the stupidity of men, barbarous and uninstructed, be so great," says he, "that they may not see a sovereign Author in the more obvious works of nature, to which they are so much familiarized; yet it scarce seems possible, that any one of good understanding should reject that idea, when once it is suggested to him. A purpose, an intention, a design, is evident in every thing; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged, as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author. The uniform maxims too, which prevail through the whole frame of the universe, naturally, if not necessarily, lead us to conceive this intelligence as single and undivided, where the prejudices of education oppose not so reasonable a theory. Even the contrarities of nature, by discovering themselves every where, become proofs of some consistent plan, and establish one single purpose or intention, however inexplicable and incomprehensible.**

Good and ill are universally intermingled and confounded; happiness and misery, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice. Nothing is pure, and entirely of a piece. All advantages are attended with

disadvantages. an universal compensation prevails in all conditions of Being and Existence. And it is scarce possible for us, by our most chimerical wishes, to form the idea of a station or situation altogether desirable. The draughts of life, according to the Poet's fiction, are always mixed from the vessels on each hand of Jupiter. Or if any cup be presented altogether pure, it is drawn only, as the same Poet tells us, from the left-hand vessel. {132}

The more exquisite any good is, of which a small specimen is afforded us, the sharper is the evil allied to it; and few exceptions are found to this uniform law of nature. The most sprightly wit borders on madness; the highest effusions of joy produce the deepest melancholy; the most ravishing pleasures are attended with the most cruel lassitude and disgust; the most flattering hopes make way for the severest disappointments. And, in general, no course of life has such safety (for happiness is not to be dreamed of) as the temperate and moderate, which maintains, as far as possible, a mediocrity, and a kind of insensibility, in every thing.

As the good, the great, the sublime, the ravishing, are found eminently in the genuine principles of Theism, it may be expected, from the analogy of nature, that the base, the absurd, the mean, the terrifying, will be discovered equally in religious fictions and chimeras.

The universal propensity to believe in invisible, intelligent power, if not an original instinct, being at least a general attendant of human nature, it may be considered as a kind of mark or stamp, which the Divine Workman has set upon his work; and nothing, surely, can more dignify mankind, than to be thus selected from all the other parts of the creation, and to bear the image or impression of the universal Creator. But consult this image, as it commonly appears in the popular religions of the world, how is the Deity disfigured in our representations of him!. What caprice, absurdity, and immorality are attributed to him! How much is he degraded, even below the character which we should naturally, in common life, ascribe to a man of sense and virtue!

What a noble privilege is it of human reason, to attain the knowledge of the Supreme Being; and, from the visible works of nature, be enabled to infer so sublime a principle as its supreme Creator? But turn the reverse of the medal, survey most nations and most ages. Examine the religious principles, which have in fact prevailed in the world; you will scarcely be persuaded, that they are other than sick mens dreams: or perhaps will regard them more as the playsome whimsies of monkeys in human shape, than the serious, positive, dogmatical observations of a Being, who dignifies himself with the name of rationals.

Here the verbal protestations of all men: nothing they are so certain of as their religious tenets. Examine their lives, you will scarcely think they repose the smallest confidence in them. {133}

The greatest and truest zeal gives us no security against hypocrisy: the most open impiety is attended with a secret dread and compunction.

No theological absurdities so glaring, as have not, sometimes, been embraced by men of the greatest and most cultivated understanding. No religious precepts so rigorous, as have not been adopted by the most voluptuous and most abandoned of men.

Ignorance *is the mother of devotion*. A maxim that is proverbial, and confirmed by general experience. Look out for a people entirely devoid of religion: if you find them at all, be assured that they are but a few degrees removed from brutes.

What so pure as some of the morals included in some theological systems? What so corrupted, as some of the practices to which these systems give rise?

The comfortable views exhibited by the belief of a futurity, are ravishing and delightful: but how

quickly vanish on the appearance of its terrors, which keep a more firm and durable possession of the human mind?

The whole is a riddle, an aenigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment, appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistable contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarce be upheld, did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a quarrelling, while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy."

Thus have we given a pretty full view of what is contained in Mr. Hume's first Dissertation; which abounds with shrewd reflections, and just observations, upon human nature: mixed with a considerable portion of that sceptical spirit, which is so apparent in all his works; and some insinuations, artfully couched, against the Christian religion. We shall content ourselves with a general view of the other three Dissertations, that we may not stretch this article beyond its just bounds.

Mr. Hume's design in the second Dissertation is to shew, that, in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy. His theory of the passions depends entirely on the double relations of sentiments and {134} ideas and the mutual assistance which these relations lend to each other. What he says upon the subject, is extremely ingenious, and deserves the philosophical reader's attentive perusal.

The third Dissertation is a very short one, consisting only of sixteen pages. The design of it is to account for the pleasure which the spectators of a well-wrote tragedy receive, from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions, which are in themselves disagreeable and uneasy. Fontenelle's account of this phaenomenon, (*Reflections sur la Poetique*, sect. 36) Mr. Hume thinks just and convincing; though it still wants, he imagines, some new addition, in order to make it answer fully. He observes, that the force of imagination, the energy of expression, the power of numbers, the charms of imitation, are all naturally, of themselves, delightful to the mind; and that when the object presented lays also hold of some affection, the pleasure still rises upon us, by the conversion of this subordinate movement, into that which is predominant. The passion, though, perhaps, naturally, and when excited by the simple appearance of a real object, it may be painful; is yet so smoothed, and softened, and mollified, when raised by the finer arts, that it affords the highest entertainment. To confirm this reasoning, our Author observes, that if the movements of the imagination be not predominant above those of the passion, a contrary effect follows; and the former, being now subordinate, is converted into the latter, and still farther increases the pain and affliction of the sufferer.

"An action," says he, "represented in tragedy, may be too bloody, and attrocious. It may excite such movements of horror, as will not soften into pleasure; and the greatest energy of expression bestowed on descriptions of that nature, serves only to augment our uneasiness. Such is that action represented in *The Ambitious Step-mother*, where a venerable old man, raised to the heighth of fury and despair, rushes against a pillar, and striking his head upon it, besmears it all over with mingled brains and gore. The *English* theatre abounds too much with such images."

In the fourth Dissertation, Mr. Hume endeavours to fix *a standard of Taste*; a rule by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; or, at least, a decision afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another. In treating this curious and much controverted subject, he

observes, that none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasoning *a priori,* or can be esteemed abstract conclusions of the understanding, from comparing those habitudes and relations of ideas, which are eternal {135} and immutable. Their foundation, he says, is the same with that of all the practical sciences, experience; nor are they any thing, but general observations, concerning what has been universally found to please, in all countries, and in all ages. But though all the general rules of art are founded only on experience, and on the observation of the common sentiments of human nature, the feelings of men, we are told, will not, on every occasion, be conformable to these rules. Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and delicate nature, and require the concurrence of many favourable circumstances, to make them play with facility and exactness, according to their general and established principles. The least exterior hindrance to such small springs, or the least internal disorder, disturbs their motion, and confounds the operation of the whole machine. When we would make an experiment of this nature, and would try the force of any beauty or deformity, we must chuse with care a proper time and place, and bring the fancy to a suitable situation and disposition. A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of these circumstances be wanting, our experiment will be fallacious, and we shall be unable to judge of the catholic and universal beauty. The relation which nature has placed betwixt the form and the sentiment, will at least be more obscure; and it will require greater accuracy to tract or discern it. We shall be able to ascertain its influence not so much from the operation of each particular beauty, as from the durable admiration which attends those works, that hath survived all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the mistakes of ignorance and envy.

Amidst all the variety and caprices of taste, Mr. Hume observes, that there are certain general principles of approbation or blame, whose influence a careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind. Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the organ. A man in a fever would not insist on his palate as able to decide concerning flavours; nor would one affected with the jaundice, pretend to give a verdict with regard to colours. In each creature, we are told, there is a sound and a defective state; and the former alone can be supposed to afford us a true standard of taste and sentiment. If in the sound state of the organs, there be an entire, or a considerable uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the perfect and universal beauty; in like {136} manner as the appearance of the objects in day-light to the eye of a man in health, is denominated their true and real colour, even while colour is allowed to be merely a phantasm of the senses.

There are many and frequent defects, our Author tells us, in the internal organs, which prevent, or weaken the influence of those general principles, on which depends our sentiment of beauty or deformity. And one obvious cause, why many feel not the proper sentiment of beauty, is the want of that *delicacy* of imagination, which every one talks of, and every one pretends to. Now as Mr. Hume's design in this dissertation, is to mingle some light of the understanding with the feelings of sentiment, he endeavours to give a more accurate definition of delicacy, than has hitherto been attempted.

"Though it be certain," says he, "that beauty and deformity, no more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings. Now as these qualities may be found in a small degree, or may be mixed and confounded with each other, it often happens, that the taste is not affected with such minute

qualities, or is not able to distinguish all the particular flavours, amidst the disorder in which they are presented. Where the organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition: this we call delicacy of taste, whether we employ these terms i the natural or metaphorical sense. Here then the general rules of beauty are of use; being drawn from established models, and from the observation of what pleases or displeases, when presented singly and in a high degree: and if the same qualities, in a continued composition, and a smaller degree, affect not the organs with a sensible delight or uneasiness, we exclude the person from all pretensions to this delicacy.

It is acknowledged to be the perfection of every sense or faculty, to perceive with exactness its most minute objects, and allow nothing to escape its notice and observation. The smaller the objects are which become sensible to the eye, the finer is that organ, and the more elaborate its make and composition. A good palate is not tired by strong flavours; but by a mixture of small ingredients, where we are still sensible of each part, notwithstanding its minuteness and its confusion with the rest. In like manner, a quick and acute perception of beauty and deformity must be the perfection of {137} our mental taste, nor can a man be satisfied with himself while he suspects, that any excellence, or blemish, in a discourse, has passed him unobserved. In this case, the perfection of the man, and the perfection of the sense, or feeling, are found to be united. A very delicate palate, on many occasions, may be a great inconvenience, both to a man himself, and to his friends; but a delicate taste of wit or beauty, must always be a desirable quality, because it is the source of all the finest and most innocent enjoyments, of which human nature is susceptible. In this decision, the sentiments of all mankind are agreed. Wherever you can fix or ascertain a delicacy of taste, it is sure to be approved of; and the best way of fixing it, is to appeal to those models and principles which have been established by the uniform approbation and experience of nations and ages."

Mr. Hume goes on to observe, that nothing tends further to increase and improve this delicacy of taste, than practice in a particular art, and the frequent survey or contemplation of a particular species of beauty. When objects of any kind, are first presented to the eye, or imagination, the sentiment, he says, which attends them, is obscured and Confused: and the mind is, in a great measure, incapable of pronouncing concerning their merits or defects. The taste cannot perceive the several excellencies of the performance, much less distinguish the particular character of each excellency, and ascertain its quality and degree. If it pronounce the whole in general to be beautiful or deformed, it is the utmost which can be expected; and even this judgment, a person so unpractised will be apt to deliver with great hesitation and reserve. But allow him to acquire experience in those objects, his feeling becomes more exact and nice: he not only perceives the beauties and defects of each part, but marks the distinguishing species of each quality, and assigns it suitable praise or blame. A clear and distinct sentiment attends him through the whole survey of the objects, and he discerns that very degree and kind of approbation, or displeasure, which each part is naturally fitted to produce.

It is impossible, Mr. Hume observes, further, to continue in the practice of contemplating any order of beauty, without being frequently obliged to form *comparisons* between the several species and degrees of excellency, and estimating their proportion to each other. A man, he says, who has had no opportunity of comparing the different kinds of beauty, is totally unqualified to pronounce an opinion, with regard to any object presented to him; and he alone who has had {138} opportunities of seeing, and examining and weighing the several performances, admired in different ages and nations, is capable of rating the merits of a work exhibited to his view, and

assigning its proper rank among the productions of genius. But to enable him the better to perform this, he must preserve his mind free, we are told, from all prejudice, and allow nothing to enter into his consideration, but the very object which is submitted to his examination.

"When any work is addressed to the Public," says Mr. Hume, "though I should have a friendship or enmity with the Author, I must depart from this particular situation; and considering myself as a man in general, forget, if possible, any individual Being, and my peculiar circumstances. A person influenced by prejudice, complies not with this condition; but obstinately maintains his natural position, without entering into that required by the performance. If the work be addressed to persons of a different age or nation, he makes no allowance for their peculiar views and prejudices; but, full of the manners of his won times, rashly condemns what seemed admirable in the eyes of those for whom alone the discourse was calculated. If the work be executed for the Public, he never sufficiently enlarges his comprehension, or forgets his interests as a friend or enemy, as a rival or commentator. By this means his sentiments are perverted; nor have the same beauties and blemishes the same influence upon him, as if he had imposed a proper violence on his imagination, and had forgot himself for a moment. So far his taste evidently departs from the true standard, and of consequence loses all credit and authority."

As in all questions submitted to the understanding, prejudice is destructive of sound judgment, and perverts all operations of the intellectual faculties, it is no less contrary, Mr. Hume observes, to good taste; nor has it less influence to corrupt our sentiments of beauty. It belongs to *good sense*, he says, to check its influence in both cases; and in this respect, as well as in many others, reason, if not an essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the operations of it.

Thus, we are told, though the principles of taste be universal, and nearly, if not entirely, the same in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty. When the critic has no delicacy, he judges without any distinction, and is only affected by the grosser and more palbable qualities of the object: the finer touches pass unnoticed and disregarded. Where he is not aided by practice, his verdict is {139} attended with confusion and hesitation. Where no comparison has been employed, the most frivolous beauties, such as rather merit the name of defects, are the objects of his admiration. Where he lies under the influence of prejudice, all his natural sentiments are perverted. Where good sense is wanting, he is not qualified to discern the beauties of design and reasoning, which are the highest and most excellent. Under some or other of these imperfections, the generality of men labour; and hence a true judge in the finer arts is observed, even during the most polished ages, to be so rare a character: strong sense united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.

But notwithstanding our Author's endeavours to fix a standard of taste, and reconcile the various apprehensions of men, there still remain two sources of variation; which, though they be not sufficient to confound all the boundaries of beauty and deformity, will often serve, he says, to vary the degrees of our approbation or blame. The one is the different humours of particular men; the other, the particular manners and opinions of our age and country. The general principles of taste are uniform in human nature: where men vary in their judgments, some defect or perverseness in the faculties may commonly be remarked; proceeding either from prejudice, from want of practice, or want of delicacy; and there is just reason for approving one taste, and condemning another. But where there is such a diversity in the internal frame, or external situation, as is entirely blameless on both sides, and leaves no room to give one the preference above the other, in

that case, a certain diversity of judgment is unavoidable, and we seek in vain for a standard, by which we can reconcile the contrary sentiments.

There are many other pertinent reflections, and pretty illustrations, in this ingenious Dissertation, besides those we have mentioned; but we must refer to curious Reader, who is desirous of further satisfaction, to the work itself.

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

2 *The Koran*, Mr. Hume should have said.

Review Of David Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*

The Monthly Review

William Rose

November 1779

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ART. VII. *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*. By David Hume, Esq; 8vo. 4 s. Sewed. Robinson. 1779.

WE Have here a very elaborate performance. It treats on the most important and interesting subject that can possibly employ the thoughts of a reasonable being. It is written with great elegance; in the true spirit of ancient dialogue; and, in point of composition, is equal, if not superior, to any of Mr. Hume's other writings. Nothing new, however, is advanced on the subject. The author, indeed, has attempted little more than to throw the most exceptionable parts of his philosophical works into a new form, and to present them in a different dress.

The conversation is supported by CLEANTHES, DEMEA, and PHILO. -- Cleanthes, to use Mr. Hume's own words, is a person of an accurate philosophical turn; Philo, a careless sceptic; and Demea, a rigid, inflexible, orthodox divine. Cleanthes, however, defends a good cause very feebly, and is by no means entitled to the character of an accurate philosopher. Demea supports the character of a sour, croaking divine, very tolerably; but PHILO is the hero of the piece; and it must be acknowledged, that he urges his objections with no inconsiderable degree of acuteness and subtlety.

We shall endeavour to give our Readers a concise, but clear view, of what is advanced by each of the speakers; and, not to weaken the force of their arguments, we shall give their own words.

"No man; no man, at least," says Demea, "of common sense, I am persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt of the being of a God. The question is not concerning the BEING, but the NATURE of GOD. This I affirm, from the infirmities of human understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The essence of that supreme mind, his attributes, the manner of his {344} existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular, which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and blind creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence, and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep cloud from human curiosity: it is profaneness to attempt penetrating through these sacred obscurities; and next to the impiety of denying his existence, is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees and attributes. --

"The ancient Platonists were the most religious and devout of all the Pagan philosophers: yet many of them, particularly Plotinus, expressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed to the Deity, and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude, or love; but in a certain mysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties. These ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched; but still it must be acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as comprehensible, and similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the whole universe --

"It is my opinion, that each man feels, in a manner, the truth of religion within his own breast; and from a consciousness of his imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning, it led to seek protection from that Being, on whom he and all nature is dependent. So anxious, or so tedious, are even the best scenes of life, that futurity is still the object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward, and endeavour, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those unknown powers, whom we find, by experience, so able to afflict and oppress us. Wretched creatures that we are! what resource for us amidst the innumerable ills of life, did not religion suggest some methods of atonement, and appease those terrors, with which we are incessantly agitated and tormented? -- The miseries of life, the unhappiness of man, the general corruptions of our nature, the unsatisfactory enjoyment of pleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have become almost proverbial in all languages. And who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience? -- Look round this library of Cleanthes. I *shall* venture to affirm, that, except Authors of particular sciences, such as chymistry or botany, who have no occasion to treat of human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers, from whom the sense of human misery has not, in some passage or other, extorted a complaint and confession of it. At least, the chance is entirely on that side; and no one Author has ever, so far as I can recollect, been so extravagant as to deny it. -- The whole earth, believe me, Philo, is cursed and polluted. A perpetual war is kindled among all living creatures. Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and

courageous; fear, anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into life gives anguish to the new born infant and to its wretched parent: weakness, impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and 'tis at last finished in agony and horror. -- Though the external insults from animals, from {345} men, from all the elements, which assault us, form a frightful catalogue of woes, they are nothing in comparison of those, which arise within ourselves, from the distempered condition of our minds and body. How many lie under the lingering torment of diseases? And the disorders of the mind, though more secret, are not perhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number: and those few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man: but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often the absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to render life ineligible. --

"Nothing can be more surprising than to find a topic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man, charged with no less than atheism and profaneness. Have not all pious divines and preachers, who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; have they not easily, I say, given solution of any difficulties which may attend it? This world is but a point in comparison of the universe: this life but a moment in comparison to eternity. The present evil phenomena, therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of existence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of things, see the whole connection of general laws, and trace, with adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the mazes and intricacies of his providence."

Such are the sentiments of the rigid, inflexible, orthodox DEMEA; such are the arguments which he employs to prove the mysterious, incomprehensible nature of the Deity, and by which he endeavours to shew, that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us to attain any ideas, which in the least correspond to the ineffable sublimity of the divine attributes. Let us now hear what the 'accurate' philosopher CLEANTHES says.

Demea asserts, as we have already mentioned, that the present evil phenomena are rectified in some future period of existence --

> **"No! replied Cleanthes, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be admitted, contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence can any cause be known but from its known effects? Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? To establish one hypothesis upon another is building entirely in the air; and the utmost we ever attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to ascertain the bare possibility of our opinion; but never can we, upon such terms, establish its reality.**

"The only method of supporting divine benevolence (and it is what I willingly embrace), is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of man. Your representations are exaggerated: your melancholy views mostly fictitious: your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is more common than Sickness; pleasure than pain; happiness than misery. And for one vexation, which {346} we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a hundred enjoyments. --

"I have been apt to suspect," says this *accurate philosopher*, "the frequent repetition of the

word *finite*, which we meet with in all theological writers, to favour more of panegyric than of philosophy, and that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better served, were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate expressions. The terms, *admirable, excellent, superlatively, great, wise, and holy*; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and any thing beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities, has no influence on the affections or sentiments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all human analogy, as seems your intention, Demea, I am afraid we abandon all religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; much less, can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect," (a strange supposition, surely!) "though far exceeding mankind; a satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and every untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then be chose, in order to avoid a greater; inconveniences be submitted to, in order to reach a desirable end; and, in a word, benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity may produce just such a world as the present."

The principal points which Cleanthes endeavours to establish are, -- that the works of nature are similar to those of art; that the Deity is similar to a human mind and understanding, and that our ideas of his attributes, as far as they go, are just and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature.

"Look round the world, says he, contemplate the whole and every part of it; you will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts are adjusted to each other with an accuracy, which ravishes into admiration all men, who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance, of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By this argument *a posteriori*, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence."

In regard to the argument *a priori*, as it is called, Cleanthes endeavours to shew its fallacy, and that it is of very little consequence to the cause of true piety or religion. {347}

"I shall begin, says he, with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any argument *a priori*. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it."

Cleanthes, our Readers have already seen, is of opinion that the ascribing of *infinite* perfections to the Deity leads into absurdities, and has no influence on the affections or sentiments; and that, if we suppose the Author of Nature to be *finitely* perfect, we may give a satisfactory account of natural and moral evil, explain and adjust every untoward phenomenon.

Now, if the Author of Nature be *finitely* perfect, his perfections are limited, or, in other words, he is an imperfect Being; and yet Cleanthes, in another passage, says that he is a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful.

"The most agreeable reflection, says he, which it is possible for human imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who created us for happiness, and who, having implanted in us immeasurable desires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will transfer us into an infinite variety of scenes in order to satisfy those desires, and render our felicity complete and durable. Next to such a Being himself (if the comparison be allowed) the happiest lot which we can imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection." -- O SI SIC OMNIA!

It is not our business to answer Mr. Hume, but it is obvious to remark, that a Being *finitely* perfect, cannot be *perfectly* wise and good. The character of Cleanthes, therefore, is not consistent; nor is it properly supported; for an accurate philosopher should have shewn, clearly and distinctly, upon philosophical principles, by what steps he rose to the idea of a perfectly wise and good Being, and what reasons he had for concluding that this Being would prolong our existence to all eternity, and make us completely happy.

But we now proceed to lay before our Readers Mr. Hume's own sentiments in the character of the 'careless sceptic,' PHILO. -- He acknowledges that a purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most stupid thinker, the most careless observer of nature, that no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it; that in many views of the universe, and of its parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what he believes they really are) {348} mere cavils and sophisms; and that we cannot then imagine how it was ever possible for us to lay any stress on them. But there is no view of human life, he tells us, from which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, or learn infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone. He thinks it extremely unreasonable to form our ideas of the Author of Nature from our experience of the narrow productions of human design and invention, and says that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, whether the present system of things deserves any considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real systems.

"Could a peasant, says he, if the AENID were read to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper rank among the productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any other production?

"But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain uncertain, whether all the excellencies of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter, who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine! And what surprize must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trails, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving! Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out: much labour lost: many fruitless trials made: and a flow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the truth, nay, who can conjecture where the probability, lies, amidst a great number of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater number, which may be imagined? --

"In a word, CLEANTHES, a man, who follows your hypothesis, is able, perhaps, to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance, and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology, by the utmost licence of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant Deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work only of some dependent, inferior Deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated Deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventure, from the first impulse and active force, which it received from him. You justly give signs o horror, DEMEA, at these strange suppositions: but these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are CLEANTHES'S suppositions, not mine. --

There occurs to me another hypothesis, which must acquire an air of probability from the method of reasoning so much insisted on {349} by CLEANTHES. That like effects arise from like causes: this principle he supposes the foundation of all religion. But there is another principle of the same kind, no less certain, and derived from the same source of experience; that where several known circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown will also be found similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we conclude, that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us. Thus, if we see, through a chink in a wall, a small part of the sun, we conclude, that were the wall removed, we should see the whole body. In short, this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar, that no scruple can ever be made with regard to its solidity.

Now if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it produces no disorder; a continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system; and each part or member, in performing its proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole. The world then, I infer, is an animal, and the Deity is the SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it. --

Were I obliged to defend any particular system (which I never willingly should do), I esteem none more plausible, than that which ascribes an eternal, inherent principle of order to the world; though attended with great and continual revolutions and alterations. This at once solves all difficulties; and if the solution, by being so general, is not entirely complete and satisfactory, it is, at least, a theory, that we must, sooner or later, have recourse to, whatever system we embrace. --

"Our friend CLEANTHES asserts, that since no question of fact can be proved otherwise than by experience, the existence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. The world, says he, resembles the works of human contrivance: therefore its cause must also resemble that of the other. Here we may remark, that the operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very small part, to wit, that inanimate matter lying within his reach, is the rule, by which CLEANTHES judges of the origin of the whole; and he measures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the same individual standard. But to wave all objections drawn from this topic; I affirm that there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of human invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the world, and which therefore afford a better conjecture concerning the universal origin of this system. These parts are animals and vegetables. The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a watch or a knitting loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable, resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is generation or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be something similar

or analogous to generation or vegetation.

"But how is it conceivable, said DEMEA, that the world can arise from any thing similar to vegetation or generation? Very easily, replied {350} PHILO. In like manner as a tree sheds its seed into the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees; so the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself certain seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos, vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed of a world; and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star to star, it is at last tost into the unformed elements, which every where surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new system. --

"I have all along asserted, and still assert, that we have no *data* to establish any system of cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself and so limited both in extend and duration, can afford no probable conjecture concerning the whole of things. But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? Is there any other rule than the greater similarity of the objects compared? And does not a plant or animal, which springs from vegetation or generation, bear a stronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial machine, which arises from reason and design? --

"In this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles, *Reason, Instinct, Generation, Vegetation,* which are similar to each other, and are the causes of similar effects. What a number of other principles may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of the universe, could we travel from planet to planet, and from system to system, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric? Any one of these four principles above mentioned (and a hundred others which lie open to our conjecture) may afford us a theory, by which to judge of the order of the world; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality, to confine our view entirely to that principle, by which our own minds operate. Were this principle more intelligible on that account, such a partiality might be somewhat excusable; but reason, in its internal fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or vegetation; and perhaps even that vague, undeterminate word, *Nature,* to which the vulgar refer every thing, is not at the bottom more inexplicable, The effects of these principles are all known to us from experience: but the principles themselves, and their manner of operation are totally unknown: nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable to experience to say, that the world arose by vegetation from a seed shed by another world, than to say that it arose from a divine reason or contrivance, according to the sense in which CLEANTHES understands it. --

"That vegetation and generation, as well as reason, are experienced to be principles of order in nature, is undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, preferably to the latter, 'tis at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And when CLEANTHES asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or generative faculty, I am equally intitled to ask him the cause of his great reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on both sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present occasion to stick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imperfect {351} experience, generation has some privileges above reason; for we see every day the latter arise from the former, never the former from the latter" --

PHILO proceeds to inform us that he could, in an instant, propose various other systems of cosmogony, which would have some faint appearance of truth; though it is a thousand, a million to one, he says, if any one of them were the true system. -- Motion, we are told, in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from electricity, begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent, and to suppose always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis; and

hypothesis attended with no advantage; the beginning of motion in matter itself being as conceivable *a priori* as its communication from mind and intelligence.

"All religious systems, it is confessed, says he, are subjects to great and insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, prepare a complete triumph for the *Sceptic*; who tells them, that no system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects: for this plain reason, that o absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard to any subject. A total suspense of judgment is here our only reasonable resource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence, among theologians, is successful; how complete must be *his* victory, who remains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no fixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to defend?"

PHILO, in a word, is of opinion, that as no system of cosmogony ought ever to be received from a slight analogy, so neither ought any to be rejected on account of a small incongruity; since that is an inconvenience, from which we can justly pronounce no one to be exempted.

The object of that curious artifice and machinery, which nature has displayed in all animals, PHILO tells us, is the preservation alone of individuals and propagation of the species. It seems enough for her purpose, he says, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No resource for this purpose: no machinery, in order merely to give pleasure or ease; no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence without some want or necessity, accompanying it. At least, the few phenomena of this nature, we are told, are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance.

"Allowing, says he, what never will be believed, at least, what can never possibly be proved, that animals, or at least, human happiness in this life exceeds its misery; we have yet done nothing; for this is not, by any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at {352} all in the world? Not by chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to him; a topic, which I have all along insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn and indignation.

"But I will be contented to retire still from this intrenchment: for I deny, CLEANTHES, that you can ever force me in it: I will allow, that pain or misery in man is *compatible* with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even in your sense of these attributes: what are you advanced by all these concessions? A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must *prove* these pure, unmixt, uncontrollable attributes from the present mixt and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful undertaking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixt, yet being finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where they are also so jarring and discordant?"

There seem to be *four* circumstances, PHILO says, on which depend all, or the greatest part of the ills, that molest sensible creatures, none of which appear to human reason, in the least degree, necessary or unavoidable, nor can we suppose them such, without the utmost licence of imagination.

The *first* circumstance which introduces evil, we are told, is that contrivance of oeconomy or the

animal creation, by which pains as well as pleasures are employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various degrees, seems to human understanding sufficient to this purpose. -- The *second* circumstance is, the conducting of the world by general laws; and this seems no way necessary to a very perfect being. -- The *third* circumstance is, the great frugality, with which all powers and faculties are distributed to every particular being. Nature, 'tis said, seems to have formed an exact calculation of the necessities of her creatures; and like a *rigid master*, has afforded them little more powers or endowments, than what are strictly sufficient to supply those necessities. An *indulgent parent* would have bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure the happiness and welfare of the creature, in the most unfortunate concurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so surrounded with precipices, that the least departure from the true path, by mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and ruin. Some reserve, some fund would have been provided to ensure happiness; nor would the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid and oeconomy.

The *fourth* circumstance, whence arises the evil and misery of the universe, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs {353} and principles of the great machine of nature. One would imagine, PHILO says, that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker; so little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with which it is executed.

"On the concurrence, then, continues he, of these *four* circumstances does all, or the greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil never could have found access into the universe; and were animals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so accurately framed, as to preserve always the just temperament and medium; there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at present. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say, that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too presumptuous for creatures, so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest in our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of he Deity (I mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable reasons *a priori*, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, that as this goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject. I am sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes as you suppose: but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a conclusion cannot result from scepticism; but must arise from the phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings, which we deduce from these phenomena."

In regard to the influence of religious principles on the conduct of mankind, PHILO says, it is certain from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views, suggested by theological theories and systems. And when we have to do with a man who makes a great profession of religion and devotion; this, we are told, has no other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and deceived by him. He further says, that the steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections,

and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness; and that when such a temper is encouraged, it easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence. In regard to the worship of the Deity, hear what he says:

> **"*To know God*, says SENECA, *is to worship him*. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades {354} him to the low condition of mankind, who are delighted with intreaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious demon, who exercises his power without reason, and without humanity. And were that divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly-mortals, who are his own workmanship; ill would it surely fare with the votaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of the human race merit his *favour*, but a very few, the philosophical theists, who entertain, or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his divine perfections: as the only persons, intitled to his *compassion* and *indulgence*, would be the philosophical sceptics, a sect almost equally rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or endeavour to suspend, all judgment with regard to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects."**

Such are the sentiments, such the doctrines contained in the Dialogues before us; and it is natural now, surely, to ask, what gratitude is due to Mr. Hume for this legacy to the public? If the principles which he has laboured with so much zeal and earnestness to establish to be true, the wicked are set free from every restraint but that of the laws; the virtuous are robbed of their most substantial comforts; every generous ardor of the human mind is damped; the world we live in is a fatherless world; we are chained down to a life full of wretchedness and misery; and we have no hope beyond the grave.

Mr. Hume had been long floating on the boundless and pathless ocean of scepticism; it is natural, therefore, to imagine that, in the evening of his day, he would have been desirous of getting into some peaceful harbour; of breathing a pure air; of viewing a clear and unclouded sky, free from those unwholesome mists that hang over the gloomy regions of darkness and uncertainty; and of passing through the closing scenes of life with tranquillity and pleasing hopes. But his love of paradox, his inordinate pursuit of literary fame, continued, whilst life continued; it is scarce possible, indeed, with the utmost stretch of candour and charity, to assign any other motives for publishing what must shock the sense and virtue of his fellow-mortals, or to reconcile it with the character of a good citizen, and a friend to mankind.

We know it will be said, that Mr. Hume, notwithstanding his principles, was a very benevolent and a very amiable man; we *know* he was, and are as ready to allow him all the praise he is intitled to, on account of his good qualities, as the warmest of his admirers. But, surely, it cannot be inferred from this, that principles have little or no effect on human conduct. A man, who is naturally of a cool dispassionate turn of mind; of a studious disposition; whose education, fortune, and other accidental {355} circumstances, connect him with the upper ranks of life, may not only have fashionable manners, be an agreeable companion, but may, by the mere force of natural temper, be a benevolent, good-humoured man, and act his part in life with great decency. But suppose that Mr. Hume's principles are let loose among mankind, and generally adopted, what will then be the consequence? Will those who think they are to die like brutes, ever act like men? Their language will be, *let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die*. When men are once led to believe that death puts a final period to their existence, and are set free from the idea of their being accountable creatures,

what is left to restrain them from the gratification of their passions but the authority of the laws? But the best system of laws that can be formed by human wisdom, is far from being sufficient to prevent many of those evils which bread in upon the peace, order, and welfare of society. A man may be a cruel husband, a cruel father, a domestic tyrant; he may seduce his neighbour's wife or his daughter, without having any thing to fear from the law; and if he takes pleasure in the gratification of his irregular appetites, is it to be supposed that he will not gratify them? What, indeed, is to restrain him?

But we leave it to our Readers to pursue these reflexions, -- into which we were naturally led, and for which, we hope, we need make no apology. -- Mr. Hume's Dialogues cannot possibly hurt any man of a philosophical turn, or, indeed, any man of common sense; and it is only the high reputation which the Author of them has so justly acquired by his other writings, and the influence of this reputation, that give them any claim to notice. They may serve, indeed, to confirm the giddy, the profligate, and the unprincipled in their prejudices against religion and virtue, but must be despised by every man who has the smallest grain of seriousness and reflection. No virtuous father will ever recommend them to the perusal of his son, except in point of composition; and every impartial judge must pronounce them unworthy of a writer of such distinguished abilities as Mr. HUME.

PAMPHILUS, a young man, who relates to HERMIPPUS the conversation which passed between Cleanthes, Philo, and Demea, concludes the Dialogues in the following manner. -- "Upon a serious review of the whole, says he, I cannot but think, that Philo's principles are more probable than Demea's; but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer to the truth." -- Our Readers will make their own comment upon this, and with them we leave it.

Notes

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Review of Hume's *Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul*

The Gentleman's Magazine

August 1784

Editor's Note: This review appeared anonymously in August 1784, Volume 54 (Part 2), page 35 of *Gentleman's Magazine*. It was included in the section titled "Impartial and Critical Review of New Publications," and was followed by a review of George Horne's anonymous *Letters on Infidelity*, a work which contains a lengthy critique of Hume's *Dialogues*.

Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle

August 1784

Vol. 54

Part 2

{607}

***Essays on Suicide, and the Immortality of the Soul, ascribed to the late* David Hume, *Esq. Never before published. With Remarks, intended as an Antidote to the Poison contained in those Performances, by the Editor. To which are added, Two Letters on Suicide, from* Rousseau's Eloisa. 12*mo*.**

THESE Essays, it is well known, were printed and advertised by Mr. Millar, with some others by Mr. Hume, near thirty years ago; but before the day of publication, being intimidated by threats of prosecution, the book-seller called in some copies that he had dispersed, cancelled the two Essays, and (with difficulty) prevailed on Mr. Hume to substitute some others less obnoxious. Some copies,

however, escaped this proscription, and have since been privately sold at a large price. As needy authors evade the patent by writing, or pretending to write, notes on the Bible, the present editor seems to think himself safe from prosecution by supplying this code of infidelity with what he calls "a comment," or "an antidote." A poor evasion, and which, we apprehend, would no more justify the vender of poison of any kind *in foro legis*, than *in foro conscientiae*; as many, who swallow the poison, will not apply the antidote, even were it much stronger than that here administered. And, by adding Rousseau's Letters, the design is obvious. Sophistical and fallacious as are the arguments, we will not, by retailing them, be guilty of a practice that we condemn; but, as a much better antidote than any here prescribed, will recommend the small tract reviewed in our next article, which is supposed to be by the Dean of Canterbury.

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Review of Hume's *Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul*

The Monthly Review

William Rose

June 1784

Editor's Note: This review appeared anonymously in June 1784, Volume 70, pages 427-428 of *The Monthly Review*. William Rose's authorship is established in Benjamin Christie Nangle's, *The Monthly Review First Series 1749-1789* (1934). Although brief, this review appeared in the main article section of that issue (as opposed to the monthly catalog section).

The Monthly Review
June 1784
Vol. 70

{427}
ART. IV. *Essays on Suicide, and the Immortality of the Soul*, ascribed to the late David Hume, Esp; never before published. With Remarks, intended as an Antidote to the Poison contained in these Performances, by the Editor. To which *is* added, two Letters on Suicide, from Rousseau's Eloisa. 12mo. 3 s. 6 s. sewed. Printed for M. Smith, and sold by the Booksellers in Piccadilly, Fleet-Street, and Pater-noster-Row. 1783.

IN a short preface to these *essays* we are told, that they are generally attributed to the late Mr. Hume, though not published in any edition of his works; that the celebrity of the author's name renders them, in some degree, objects of great curiosity; that, owing to this circumstance, a few copies have been clandestinely circulated, for some time, at a large price, but without any comment; that the present publication possesses very superior advantages; and that the *notes* annexed are intended to expose the sophistry contained in the original essays.

The Writer of this article knows that the essays here mentioned were written by Mr. Hume. That almost thirty years ago they made part of a volume, which was publicly advertised to be sold by Mr. Millar; that, before the day fixed for publication, several copies were delivered to some of the Author's friends, who were impatient to see whatever came from his pen; that a noble Lord, still living, threatened to prosecute Mr. Millar, if he published the essays now before us; that the Author, like a bold veteran in the cause of infidelity, was not in the least intimidated by this menace, but that the poor bookseller was terribly frightened, to such a degree, indeed, that he called in all the copies he had delivered, cancelled the two essays, and, with some difficulty, prevailed upon Mr. Hume to substitute some other pieces in the room of those objected to by the noble Lord; that, by some means or other, however, a few copies got abroad, and have been clandestinely circulated, at a large price, as already mentioned.

In regard to the present Editor, though we are far from calling in question the uprightness and benevolence of his intentions, yet we cannot applaud his judgment, or think it equal to his zeal. He does not consider, that while he spreads the antidote, he disseminates the poison at the same time, and seems to resemble a physician, who should take great pains to propagate {428} a distemper, in order to have the credit and advantage arising from the cure. There was, indeed, little, very little danger of the essays doing much mischief. The warmest of Mr. Hume's admirers think them unworthy of him, and every competent judge will, we are fully persuaded, be of opinion that they carry their own confutation along with them. A few examples will be sufficient to shew this.

Mr. Hume affirms, that it is as clear as any purpose of nature can be, that the whole scope and intention of man's creation is limited to the present life, and that those who inculcate the doctrine of a future state, have no other motive but to gain a livelihood, and to acquire power and riches in this world. -- He tells us that, were one to go round the world with an intention of giving a good supper to the righteous, and a sound drubbing to the wicked, he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would find that the merits and the demerits of most men and women scarcely amount to the value of either. -- The life of a man, he says, is of no greater importance to the universe than that of an oyster. -- It would be no crime, we are told, in any man, to divert the Nile or Danube from their courses, were he able to effect such purpose. Where then is the crime, Mr. Hume asks, of turning a few ounces of blood from their natural channel? --

Were a drunken libertine to throw out such nauseous stuff in the presence of his bacchanalian companions, there might be some excuse for him; but were any man to advance such doctrines in the company of sober citizens, men of plain sense and decent manners, no person, we apprehend, would think him entitled to a serious reply, but would hear him with silent contempt.

To combat such opinions requires no great abilities; it is but justice to the Editor, however, to acknowledge that his notes contain some pertinent and judicious reflections.

Notes

***The Early British Reviews of Hume's Writings*, ed. James Fieser (Internet Release, 1995).**

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"Hume's Account of Necessity"

Commonsense: or, The Englishman's Journal

1740

Editor's note: The anonymous author of this essay identifies himself as the author of *An Essay towards demonstrating the Immateriality and Free-Agency of the Soul*, (London, 1740). The aim of the essay is to prevent Hume's account of determinism from having "any mischievous effect upon the opinions or morals of mankind." After a summary of Hume's views on determinism, begins his refutation. The issues of free will and necessary connection, he believes, are related, and that the notion of "necessary connection" is explained by Newton as cohesion, attraction, repulsion and communication of motion. The proof that we are free is that we recognize causal necessity in external objects only because such necessity stands in sharp contrast to human freedom. The mischievous threat of Hume's theory is its implication that our conduct is beyond our control. He agrees that there is a causal-like relation between our motives and the morally significant actions which they elicit, but our feeling of freedom shows that this connection is not absolute. Changing subjects, he argues contrary to Hume that space is indeed infinitely divisible in a speculative sense; for, given any spatial object considered as a whole, it must necessarily be seen to have parts. For a discussion of this essay, see E.C. Mossner, "The First Answer to Hume's *Treatise*: An Unnoticed Item of 1740," in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1951, Vol. 12, pp. 291-294.

COMMONSENSE: OR, THE ENGLISHMAN'S JOURNAL

Saturday, July 5, 1740, pp. 1-2

SOME of our Papers being designed for the Learned, and others for the Unlearned, we hope the latter will, in Complaisance to the former, excuse our publishing the following Dissertation, which, we think, may be of great Use, tho' it may not perhaps be so entertaining to those that never have

employed their Thoughts about such Subjects.

***To the* AUTHOR *of* COMMON SENSE.**

SIR,

AS I published lately *An Essay towards demonstrating the Immateriality and Free Agency of the Soul*, which one of your Correspondents has already taken notice of, and as the establishing of both these Doctrines is, in my Opinion necessary for the Establishment of Religion, Virtue, and Morality, nay, and even of *social Liberty* itself, I must beg you'll [by printer] give what follows a Place in your Paper.

The *Liberty* of Human Action is a Doctrine so agreeable to Reason, and to the common Sense of Mankind, that it is never opposed but by those who either lay down to themselves *false Principles*, or *mistake* the *Terms* they make Use of; which is the chief Cause of that impenetrable Obscurity and incomprehensible Jargon, we find in the Writings of almost all those, who have hitherto appeared as *Advocates* for *Necessity*.

Mr. *Collins*, I think, is the only one, who has treated the Subject with any Order or Perspicuity. As he was a Gentleman of a most extensive Genius, and a clear Understanding, he has, indeed, expressed himself so as to be understood; but I have, in the above mentioned Essay, answered every Philosophical Argument he has advanced in favour of *Necessity*; and, I hope, I have done it to the Satisfaction of all those who delight in what is plain and easy, and do not think that every piece of *Metaphysicks* ought to *soar* above the *common Reach* of *Human Capacity*.

What follows, I intend as a *short* Answer to a *long* Book lately published, intitled, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, the Author of which seems, if I understand him, which, I profess, I am not quite sure of, to adopt the *Doctrine of Necessity*, in the 4th and last Part of the 2d Book of his *tedious* Performance; but, according to Custom, he stumbles at his first setting out.

He desires it may be observed, and I desire it too, "That by the *Will*, he means nothing but *the internal Impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give Rise to any new Motion of our Body, or new Perception of our Mind*".[2] Now, does not every one see, that by this Definition he means, if he means what every understanding Man must mean, not the *Will*, or what we call the *Act of Volition*. After this Definition he goes on thus. '[printer?] This Impression; (meaning the *Will*) like the preceding ones of Pride and Humility, Love and Hatred, 'tis impossible to define, and needless to describe any farther, &c." What Pity it is, he did not think of this before he gave us his Definition? But by his Favour, if I understand the *English* Language, (which is generally the Dispute among *Metaphysicians*) neither the Will, nor Pride of Humility, nor Love or Hatred, ought to be called *Impressions*. The *Will* is a *Faculty*; and *Pride, Humility, Love*, and *Hatred* are *Passions* of the *Human Soul*.

Then he tells us, "Every Object (*material* he means) is determined by an *absolute Fate* to a certain Degree and direction of its Motion. &c".[3] But I, as a *Philosopher*, and as a *Christian*, must say, that no *material* Object is determined by an *absolute Fate* to any Thing; for all Objects, *meerly material*, are determined in their Motions and Directions, by those *Qualities* which were *given* to them, and still *preserved* in them, *by God Almighty*, as I have shewn in my Essay, Chap. 9th.

After having established, as he supposes, the *absolute Fate* by which the Motions and Directions of *material Objects* are determined, he proceeds to examine the Motions and Directions, or rather the *Actions*, of the *Mind*, and tells us, "That in no single Instance the *ultimate Connexion* of any Objects is discoverable, either by our Senses or Reason, and that we can never penetrate so far into the

Essence and Construction of Bodies, as to perceive the *Principle*, on which their mutual Influence depends. 'Tis their *constant Union* alone, with which we are acquainted; and 'tis from the *constant Union* the *Necessity* arises. If Objects had not an uniform and regular Conjunction with each other, we should never arrive at any Idea of Cause and Effect; and even after all, the *Necessity* which enters into that Idea, is nothing but a Determination of the Mind to pass from one Object to its usual Attendant, and infer the Existence of one from that of the other.[4]

I shall take no Notice of this *Novel* Sort of Diction, because most *Metaphysicians*, to the great prejudice of the Science, affect to think, and to express their Thoughts, in a Method *peculiar* to themselves; but I must observe, that if the Author had read, and considered (for there is a great Difference) the *Philosophical* Works of the great *Sir Isaac Newton*, he would have perceived, that the *ultimate Connexion* of Objects, (by which, I suppose, he means *Causes* and *Effects*) so far as it depends upon, or proceeds from any *Quality* in *Matter*, has been discovered, and that it depends upon or proceeds from Cohesion, Attraction, Repulsion, and Communication of Motion, which are Qualities *given* in different Degrees to *Matter*, by the *Author of Nature*, as I have, after *Sir Isaac Newton*, shewn in the 9th Chapter of my Essay.

But suppose, these four Qualities depended upon, or proceeded from some other Quality or Qualities as yet unknown, neither they, nor those Qualities upon which they depend, nor any *essential* or *accidental* Quality that is, or can be in *Matter*, can properly be said to be the *first Principle*, on which the mutual Influence of Bodies depends. Because, as *Matter is in itself absolutely passive*, no Part of Matter can ever *of itself* act upon itself, or upon any other Part of *Matter*; and consequently, *Matter* can never of *itself* produce any Effect. Therefore, that *active Being*, supreme or subordinate, which we call *Spirit*, must be the *first Principle*, on which the mutual Influence of Bodies must always *originally* depend. This, I think, I have fully shewn in my said Essay; and the Author will, I believe, be of my opinion, if he will but *descend* from those *Clouds* where he now seems to *wander*, and deign to *tread* upon the *Low*, but *solid* Surface of *common Apprehension*.

Now, with Regard to the Origin of that Idea we call *Necessity*, the Author will see by reading my Essay Chap. 4th and 11th, that we never should, nor ever could have formed an Idea of *Necessity* or *necessary* Motion, if we had not perceived in ourselves a Motion *that is not necessary*; and that with Regard to the Motion of any *external* Object, it is not from any *necessary Connexion*, or *constant Union* between Cause and Effect, that we determine the Motion to be *necessary or voluntary*; because we see many Motions or Effects, the Cause of which we neither see nor can perceive: It is from *Observation* and *Examination* only, we *in this Case* determine; and for this very Reason, we are often liable to be deceived in our Judgments about the *Necessity* or *Freedom* of *external* Motions or Effects.

As for the Author's Proof from Experience, that there is a *constant Union* between our Actions of one Side, and our Motives, Tempers, or Circumstances of the other, I shall grant that the latter have a very great Influence upon the former; and it is upon this, that *moral Certainty*, or what he calls *moral Evidence*, depends: But every Man must be convinced from what he feels within himself, that this Influence is not *absolute* and *necessary*; and *Self Conviction* is a much stronger Proof than any we can have from our *Observation* of external Objects, because we cannot know their Tempers and Circumstances, and much less the Motives they are governed by, so well as we do our own.

This, I believe, will be sufficient for preventing my Author's *Philosophy* from having nay *mischievous* Effect upon the Opinions or Morals of Mankind; and, indeed, I should have taken no

Notice of what he has wrote, if I had not thought his Book, in several Parts, so very abstruse and perplex'd, that, I am convinced, no Man can comprehend what he means; and as one of the greatest Wits of this Age has justly observed, this may impose upon weak Readers, and make them imagine, there is a great Deal of *deep Learining* in it, because they *do not understand it*.

But as the same Author, in the 2d Part of his first Book sets himself up in Opposition to the now General, and, I think, Self-evident Opinion, That *Space* is *Divisible in infinitum*, I must have a Word with him upon that Subject, before I leave him. His very first Argument is founded upon a *false Position*: He affirms, that it is a Contradiction to suppose, that nay *finite* Part of *Space* contains an *infinite* Number of *Parts*. This is so far from being a Contradiction, that it is certainly true, as every Man who understands any Thing of the Nature of *Infinites*, or even of *Space* itself, must acknowledge; for tho' a certain *Magnitude* be necessary, for an *actual* Division of any Thing that be necessary, for an *actual* Division of any Thing that can be divided, or for rendering the *Parts perceptible* to us after they are divided, yet the *Magnitude* of an Object has nothing to do with its *speculative Divisibility*, nor does the one in the least contribute to, or derogate from the other. We may consider an Object as a *Whole*, without at that Time comparing our Idea called *Whole*, with our Idea called *Parts*, which is the Case in *Mathematicks*; for a *Mathematician's* Demonstration will hold as true, when he takes a *Church* or a *City* for his *Mathematical* Point, as when he takes a *Point* almost *imperceptible* to the Eye, tho' assisted by the best magnifying Glass. But when we do actually compare our Idea called *Whole*, with our Idea called *Parts*, it is as impossible for us to suppose a *Whole*, without *Parts*, as it is to suppose it without *Figure* or *Extension*.

I shall therefore give myself no farther Trouble about my Author's Arguments for shewing, that *Space* is not *infinitely* divisible; for, in Truth, they seem to be as *indivisible* as his *Space*. But I must ask him, whether he can suppose any Part of *Space* to be void of Extension? If he does, I will say, that he supposes it to be void of one of the *most essential* Qualities of *Space*; and if he does not, he must then grant, that every Part of *Space* is *Divisible*, or has *Parts*, and so on *in infinitum*: for if I remember any Thing of the old Philosophy I learned at School, the Definition of *Extension* was, *Quod habet Partes extra partes*; and I am very sure, that if any *Part* of *Space* could not be supposed to have *partes extra partes*, that is to say, it could not be supposed to have any *Extension*.

I shall conclude my Remarks upon this modern Piece of *Philosophy* with observing, that when we speak *properly*, it is a very *improper* Question to ask, if *Space* be *divisible in infinitum*? Every Part of *Space*, the *smallest* we can imagine, must be supposed to have *Parts*, that is to say, it must be supposed to have *Extension*; for this is all we can mean by the *Divisibility* of *Space*; because *no Part* of *Space*, the most *immense* or *largest* we can imagine, can be *actually* divided; that is to say, it is impossible to *divide Space* as we do *Matter*, by removing or destroying that *Contiguity* which is between any two of its *Parts*; therefore, I hope, my Readers will suppose, that I have talked of the *infinite Divisibility of Space*, only in Complaisance to my Author and in order to lead him, if possible, into a right Way of thinking about those Subjects, upon which he has wrote such a *Huge* Treatise.

And now I must beg his Pardon for the Freedom I have taken with him. I can upon Honour declare, I never had the least Intimation, who he is; so that my *Criticism* cannot proceed from any *Malice* or *Ill-will*. It proceeds entirely from the Regard I have for that Science called *Metaphysicks*: A Science which is in itself of great *Dignity*, because it may do infinite Service to Religion, Virtue, and Morality, and consequently to *Religious* as well as *Civil Liberty*, when handled in a natural and concise Manner; but it does infinite Mischief, when, *by departing from Nature*, it is rendered

obscure, perplex'd and *contemptible*, as it has *designedly* been for many Ages by those who were, and still are, endeavouring to *rob* Mankind of their *Liberities*, both *religious* and *civil*, by rendering every Man an *implicit Believer* in whatever *Opinions* they may think fit to *propagate*, and an *abject Slave* to whatever *Commands* they may have a Mind to *impose*.

It is this, and this chiefly, that interests me so much in the cause of *Metaphysicks*. *It is by them, and them only, we can naturally* come at the Knowledge of our own Soul or Spirit, and of the supreme Spirit that has created, and still governs the Universe; which I call *Religion*: it is by them, and them only, we can *naturally* come at the knowledge of those Duties we owe to Mankind, our Country, and our Friends, which I call *Virtue*; and it is by them, and them only, we can *naturally* come at the Knowledge of those Duties we owe to Mankind, our Country, and our Friends, which I call *Virtue*; and it is by them, and them only, we can *naturally* come at the Knowledge of those Duties we owe to our Neighbors and ourselves, which I call *Morality*. Therefore, it behoves Mankind to have the Science of *Metaphysicks* as fully and clearly explained as possible: It is an *Injury* to *Human Nature* to render it obscure and perplex'd through Ignorance or Want of Capacity: It is a *Most flagitious Crime* to do so *designedly*, for the Sake of any *private view*; or for the Sake of *propagating* any *particular Sect* of Religion, or any *Selfish Party* in Politicks. *I am, Sir,*

Your constant Reader

and humble Servant.

Notes

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[2]Vol. II. P. 220

[3]D.

[4]D. P. 221.

"Hume on Miracles"

A Selection from Unpublished Papers of the Right Reverend William Warburton

William Warburton

a. 1749

Editor's note: William Warburton (1698-1779) was bishop of Gloucester and was known for his editions of Shakespeare and Pope, his attack on deism in the *Divine legation of Moses demonstrated....* (1737-1741), and his involvement in numerous controversies. Warburton's primary attack on Hume is in his *Remarks on... the Natural History of Religion*, 1757 (see the Hume Archives edition of that work). Mossner argues that Warburton may have been the anonymous reviewer of Hume's *Treatise* in the *History of the Works of the Learned*; however, Robert M. Ryley ably refutes this view in "Did Warburton Review Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*?" in *Notes and Queries*, 1976, Vol. 23, pp. 354-355. Warburton's first acquaintance with Hume, then, is indicated in a 1749 letter to Richard Hurd:

> **I am strongly tempted too to have a stroke at Hume in parting. He is the author of a little book called "Philosophical Essays," in one part of which he argues against the being of a God, and in another, (very needlessly you will say,) against the possibility of miracles. He has crowned the liberty of the press. And yet he has a considerable post under the Government. I have a great mind to do justice on his arguments against miracles, which I think might be done in a few words. But does he deserve notice? Is he known amongst you? Pray answer me these questions. For if his own weight keeps him down, I should be sorry to contribute to his advancement to any place but the pillory. (William Warburton, *Letters from a Late Eminent Prelate to One of his Friends*, Boston: 1806 p. 10).**

Warburton did write his brief attack on Hume's discussion of miracles, although it remained unpublished for almost 100 years. The essay is reproduced here as it appears in Francis Kilvert's *A*

Selection from Unpublished Papers of the Right Reverend William Warburton (London: John Bowyer Nichols and Son, 1841), pp. 311-315.

A SELECTION FROM UNPUBLISHED PAPERS OF WILLIAM WARBURTON

{311}

A late writer, who entitles his book Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding, printed for A. Millar, 1748, has a Discourse on Miracles, in which he endeavours to show that there is no probable evidence of the truth of such facts. His reasoning is summed up in what he calls "a general *maxim* worthy our attention, that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be *more miraculous* than the fact which it endeavours to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior."

Now, to pass at present the jargon of his *more miraculous*, and to suppose he may mean a testimony whose falsehood implies a miracle, I answer, that in order to render the miraculous fact related the object of our belief, it is not necessary that the falsehood of the relator should imply a miracle; and for this plain reason, because that testimony whose falsehood implies a miracle makes the fact attested not *credible*, but *certain*; for the falsehood of no testimony but the *testimony of sense* implies a miracle. Now, what the senses inform us of we call certain. If they deceive us, it must be by God's altering the established order of things, which this author agrees to be a true definition of a miracle; so that we see he mistakes the very nature of the evidence in question. But would you know why he uses his nonsense of *more miraculous*, instead of *miraculous*, it is to insinuate that *even the evidence of sense* is no sufficient proof of a miracle; for he confesses that the degree of evidence, in the case here put, is only the *remains* of his *more miraculous*, when the quantity in his *less miraculous* has been *deducted*; so the if the falsehood of the testimony and the fact testified were equally miraculous, from thence, we see, no proof would arise; i.e. we ought not to own the truth of a miraculous fact when it makes its appeal to the senses. But if this man's reasoning cannot verify his own maxim, his passions will at least verify that of our Heavenly Master, who long ago pronounced that "He who will not believe Moses and the Prophets will not believe though one arose from the dead."

But the unhappy man would exclude all miracles, because at all hazards he will exclude Christianity, as appears from another of his maxims, for he is not a dealer in small truths: "We may establish it as a maxim (says he), that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any *such* system of religion," i.e. no possible proof can be given of miracles to establish any revelation or popular religion, as he just before expresses it; for he himself, forsooth, is of the religion of the philosophers. Yet, when, he has said this, with an impartiality becoming the most *moral* of his tribe, he adds the following corrective; that in miracles, where religion has nothing to do, we may safely believe a miracle: If (says he) all authors agree that from 1st Jan. 1600 there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days, it is evident our present philosophers ought to receive it for a certain fact; but, should all the historians

who treat of England agree that 1st Jan. 1600 Queen Elizabeth died, (who here, you are to observe, stands for Christ,) that she afterwards rose again, took possession of the throne, and governed publicly for three years, this you are to reject as an arrant fable. His spite, we see, is not against miracles, but only against the workers of them; for why, I pray you, are we to make this distinction? Are not the two facts equally attested by the concurrent evidence of all concerned? Are they not equally miraculous? for the absence of the sun eight days together from the globe of the earth is surely as *contrary* to the common course of nature as the resurrection of one from the dead. If he believes that, from the beginning, none ever rose from the dead, he believes, too, that there never was a total darkness for eight days together. Here, then, the *uniform experience*, as he calls it, is, in both cases, the same; yet we must believe the one, and not the other. Here spoke the true sense, as well as spirit, of modern infidelity; -- we must reject *that* miracle, for whose working, by the interposition of God, we *can* give a reasonable account, and embrace that for which there is *no account to be given at all*. But this circumstance of the *cause* of working the miracles recorded in Scripture, so worthy the exertion of the Divine power, is always, either for want of sense or honesty, omitted by this author, when he comes to balance what he calls his opposed proofs, on which all his jargon turns. And well would it be for our *moral philosopher* if this was the only one omitted; but every collateral circumstance that affords internal evidence of the truth of the Evangelic testimony, such as the state of the world that follows, and which must have been that very state consequent on miracles, had miracles been really performed; such again as the accomplishment of predictions recorded in books, as well known to be written after the facts, as that Julius Caesar's Commentaries was written before the time of Henry VIII.; -- none of these, I say, are ever brought into the balance of this fair accountant. Very suitably, therefore, is his reasoning supported on each hand, and of a piece with the modesty of his *introduction* and the decency of his *conclusion*.

Thus he begins: "I flatter myself that I have *discovered* an argument, which, if just, will with the wise and learned be an *everlasting check* to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and, consequently, will be *useful as long as the world endures*." Thus he ends: -- "Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of the veracity of the Christian religion; and whoever is moved by *faith* to assent to it, is conscious of a continued *miracle* in his own person, which *subverts all the principles of his understanding*, and gives him a demonstration to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience."

Who, after this, will scruple to own that *freedom of thinking* is the source of our greatest blessings, and that the liberty of the press is the only means of conveying and preserving them pure and unpolluted to our posterity!!!

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The Credibility of Miracles Defended

Thomas Rutherforth

1751

Editor's Note: The *Monthly Review* opens their neutral review of Rutherforth's pamphlet with the following: "IN this discourse, the learned Dr. *Rutherforth* lays before his readers some observations upon the measures of credibility, in order to shew that the argument urged by Mr. *Hume* against miracles, is inconclusive; and that no supernatural degree of testimony is necessaryily required to prove the existence of a miracle" (1751, Vol. 5, pp. 358-361).

The Credibility of Miracles defended
Against the Author of
Philosophical Essays
IN A
DISCOURSE
DELIVERED AT THE
PRIMARY VISITATION
OF
THE RIGHT REVEREND
FATHER IN GOD
THOMAS
LORD BISHOP OF ELY
IN
ST. MICHAELS CHURCH

CAMBRIDGE
AVG. XXIX

MDCCLI.

BY
T[HOMAS]. RUTHERFORTH D.D. CHAPLAIN TO HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCESS DOWAGER OF WALES.

CAMBRIDGE,
PRINTED BY J. BENTHAM PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY;
FOR W. THURLBOURN BOOKSELLER IN CAMBRIDGE; AND SOLD BY
W. INNYS IN PATER-NOSTER ROW AND J. BEECROFT IN LOMBARD-STREET, LONDON.

MDCCLI.

TO
THE RIGHT REVEREND
FATHER IN GOD
THOMAS
LORD BISHOP OF ELY.

MY LORD,

AS I am encouraged to print the following discourse by the favourable notice, which you wee pleased to take of it, in your most excellent charge to your clergy, before whom I delivered it; this alone might be a sufficient reason for me to beg, that I may have the honour of sending it abroad under your Lordship's patronage. But I had another reason for desiring to address myself to your Lordship upon this occasion: it would be, I thought, the most public, and therefore the best, opportunity of testifying my just sense of the many and signal instances of goodness and generosity, which I have received from your Lordship. The favours, which you have been pleased to confer upon me, are great indeed in themselves, and may justly claim the most sincere acknowledgments and the best returns of gratitude, that I am able to make: but the graceful manner, in which they were conferred, has doubled the value of them. Your Lordship's noble and truly christian spirit has in this respect, as in many others, most eminently distinguished you from the rest of the world, by engaging you to seek for opportunities of exercising your bounty, and to prevent, not only the solicitations, but even the wishes of those, who stand in need of your protection and assistance. That they may long be blessed with such a patron and friend, as they are sure of finding in your lordship, and that you may long enjoy all the happiness, which providence can bestow upon one of its best and most faithful instruments in doing good; is, my Lord, the constant and devoutest wish of

Your Lordship's most obliged

and most dutiful servant
THOMAS RUTHERFORTH.
ST. JOHNS COLL.
SEPT. XVII.

MDCCLI.

{1}

THE CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES DEFENDED

JOHN XX. 30, 31.

MANY OTHER SIGNS TRULY DID JESUS IN THE PRESENCE OF HIS DISCIPLES WHICH ARE NOT WRITTEN IN THIS BOOK: BUT THESE ARE WRITTEN THAT YE MIGHT BELIEVE, THAT JESUS CHRIST IS THE SON OF GOD.

THE sacred historian hath here informed us with what view he recorded the miracles of Christ: he designed to convince his readers, that the person, who could do such mighty works, must have a commission from God, to teach his will to mankind. And the defenders of christianity have always imagined, that the miracles, which are related in the new testament, and are there said to have been wrought by Christ and his apostles, may be urged as an undeniable evidence in favour of our religion; provided they can make it appear, that the reality of them is evinced by such testimony, as would be sufficient to establish the truth of any matter of fact, beyond all contradiction.{2}

But the state of this question hath been lately much altered. Instead of being called upon to clear up the testimony, which supports the miracles of Christ and his apostles; we are now challenged to shew, that any testimony whatsoever can be sufficient to prove the truth of these, or of any other miracles.

[2]"A miracle, we are told, is a violation of the laws of nature: for nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happens in the common course of things. And consequently; since a firm and unalterable experience hath established those laws; there must be a firm and unalterable experience against every miraculous event. But in the judgments which we pass upon matters of fact, such an experience as this amounts to a full and direct proof. We have therefore, from the nature of the fact, a full and direct proof against the existence of any miracle. If then a miracle, with such a proof against it, can be rendered credible; it must be by an opposite proof, which is superiour. Therefore no proof from report can evince the existence of a miracle; unless it over-balances the opposite proof from the nature of the fact: or, no testimony can be sufficient to establish the belief of a miracle; unless the falsehood of the testimony would be more miraculous, than the event, which it endeavours to establish." {3}

The confidence, with which this difficulty is urged against the belief of the gospel, hath made it our duty to examine into the merits of it. I intend therefore, in the following discourse, to employ your

thoughts upon this subject, by laying before you some observations upon the measures of credibility, which will assist us in shewing, that this argument is inconclusive, and that no supernatural degree of testimony is necessarily required to prove the existence of a miracle.

Where we have no knowledge or certainty of a fact, by having been eye-witnesses of it; the measures of credibility, make use of to form a judgment upon the truth of falshood of it, are the conformity or consistency of it with our experience; the conformity or consistency of it with our knowledge in general; and the testimony of other men, who vouch the evidence of their senses.

Matters of fact have three different degrees of credibility, in the nature of the thing, arising from their conformity or consistency with our experience.

First, there are some events which we have always found to be brought about steadily and constantly, at stated times, and in certain places, without the least irregularity or exception. The existence of these events is taken for granted; we assure ourselves upon the evidence of such an uniform experience, that they will happen at the usual {4} time and place, without requiring any testimony to prove it. We never think of disputing whether the sun will rise to morrow morning, or of disbelieving, that the tide came in yesterday. The exact likeness between these facts and others, which we have seen and known to be true, induces us to admit them without any hesitation: we take them for truth, because they have, in all respects, a full and perfect resemblance of it.

Secondly; some events have a less exact and less striking likeness of the truth; we find them conformable to our experience in most respects, but not in all. It is most agreeable to what hath commonly been observed to happen, that, in England, there should be frost in some particular week of december, and thunder in some particular week of june. The general resemblance of the truth, which we find in events of this sort, makes us think them likely to be true, and inclines us to believe them. But because they have been sometimes known to fail, and are therefore in some points unlike the truth; the credibility, which they have, in the nature of the thing, does not amount to a full proof of their existence. When we have had no opportunity of observing them ourselves, and cannot ascertain their existence by the evidence of our own senses; we are ready to believe, upon the evidence of our former experience, that they have happened: but our belief is never so fixed as to be raised to {5} any degree of assurance or confidence without the help of testimony.

Thirdly; in respect of some events we have equal experience both ways; and in respect of some others we have no experience either way.[3] That it should thunder on a man's right hand, is not more conformable to our experience than that it should thunder on his left. That there lived in Rome such a man as Julius Caesar; that he was a general, and won a battle against another called Pompey; are facts, about which we have no experience at all. Such events as these are looked upon to be credible in themselves, only because they furnish no cause of doubt from the nature of the thing. They might perhaps with more propriety be called indifferent in themselves: because, as, from the nature of the thing, they furnish no cause of doubt, so neither do they furnish any cause of belief. But whether we call them credible or indifferent; they are confessedly capable of being proved by a fair testimony.

These are the degrees of credibility, which arise from the conformity or consistency of an event from the conformity or consistency of an event with our experience: and we shall find upon inquiry, that the same degrees of credibility arise from its conformity or consistency with our knowledge. For the credibility of events is indeed nothing more than their likeness to the truth. Whenever therefore we find them stamped with this image, {6} it gives them a currency: whether the truth, whose image they bear, is the object of experience or the object of knowledge; whether

we came into possession of it by the immediate perception of our senses, or by induction and conclusions of reason.

First; some facts have in all respects an exact conformity with our knowledge: such as these are admitted for true, upon the credit of their full and perfect resemblance of the truth, without any testimony to vouch for them. When by the help of observations, and by reasoning upon such general conclusions as are deducible from them, we have demonstrated, that the moon is retained in its orbit by the force of gravity; the resemblance, which we find, in all points, between the motion of the moon round the earth, and the motions of the satellites round jupiter, determines us to believe, with an assurance little inferiour to certainty, that these bodies are likewise retained in their respective orbits by the same force of gravity.

Secondly; when a fact is conformable to our knowledge in most respects, but not in all, its likeness to the truth makes it credible, and inclines us to believe it. The want of a more exact and minute likeness may, if we consider only the nature of the fact, leave some room to doubt of its existence: but the report of credible witnesses never fails to over-rule this doubt and to establish the belief of it. Whatever probability we may have {7} from experience, that there will be frost in England, in some particular week of december, and thunder in some particular week of june; we have the same probability from our knowledge of the globe, that, in the opposite souther latitude, there will be frost in some particular week of december. One of these facts is made credible by its conformity with our knowledge; both of them are so far credible in themselves that they may easily be established by testimony; and neither of them can be effectually established without it.

Thirdly; some events may happen either way, and yet be equally conformable to our knowledge; others are so far consistent with it, that they may be true, without contradicting any other truth, that we are certain of. Such events as these, being indifferent or credible in themselves, on account of their conformity or consistency with our knowledge, furnish no cause of doubt from the nature of the thing, and are therefore capable of being proved by a fair testimony. When a man plays, with an equal chance against him, his winning or his losing are equally conformable with our knowledge in the doctrine of chances. The planet mars may have a satellite consistently with all our knowledge of the causes, which govern the system of the world. Neither of these facts have such a credibility in themselves as can determine us rather {8} to believe, than to doubt of them: but both of them are so far credible in the nature of the thing, from their conformity of consistency with our knowledge, that a fair testimony would prove on one instance, that the player hath lost, and in the other, that mars hath a satellite.

Perhaps it may be said, that we cannot come at any certainty or knowledge of the real existence of facts, but from the evidence of our senses, that knowledge or experience of facts must therefore be only different names for the same thing; and consequently that conformity with knowledge is not a distinct measure of credibility from conformity with experience. It must indeed be allowed, that all our reasonings, about the laws and order of nature, will be precarious and fantastical, unless they proceed upon experiments and observation. But when we have thus gained some footing, or ground, as it were, to stand upon; our reason can survey from thence many parts of nature, which our senses were unable to discover. Suppose we have determined, by observations, the proportion between the respective distances of the planets from the sun, and the periodical times, in which they describe their orbits: our experience of facts stops here; but our knowledge of them reaches farther. Our reason, proceeding upon these informations of sense, demonstrates the law of that force, which continually urges the planets towards the sun. Thus we arrive at a certain knowledge of this latter fact, {9} though the former only hath been, or indeed can be, the object of experience.

But, when I distinguish between experience and knowledge, I would not be understood to mean, that they differ any otherwise, than as the part differs from the whole. Every certain perception of the truth, whether we obtain it by our reason or our senses, is knowledge. All our experience therefore must be allowed to be knowledge. But then I would contend, that all our knowledge is not experience. For as some truths, relating to real existence are perceived immediately by our senses; so there are others, which we discover by induction and conclusions of reason. And since the resemblance of truth is the inducement of probability, upon which we admit facts to be true; conformity with experience is planely too scanty a measure of credibility, because experience is not the only way of discovering truth.

I designed, by the foregoing observations, to establish these two conclusions, -- First; that events are made as credible, in the nature of the thing, by their conformity or consistency with our knowledge, as they are by their conformity or consistency with our experience; -- And secondly; that, when events, which are conformable to our knowledge or consistent with it, are supported by a fair testimony, our assent to them is well-grounded.

Allow us the truth of these two conclusions, which we have proved already; and allow us besides, {10} what we can prove, if you deny it, that we have a demonstrative knowledge of the existence, the power, the wisdom, and the goodness of God; and by the help of these principles, we shall be able to unravel all the fallacy of your argument, and to shew you, that miracles do not require any supernatural degree of testimony to establish our belief of them. A firm and invariable experience amounts to a full proof; -- You would have done well to inform us what it is, which such an experience proves in so decisive a manner. You may have observed the ordinary course of nature, with diligence and exactness, and may have discovered what sort of events are produced, steadily and constantly, in the usual train of causes and effects. From hence you may determine, with the highest probability, that no events, which are repugnant to {11} these, can be produced by the same causes operating in the same manner, or by the ordinary powers of nature, which are the objects of your experience. But your proof from experience can go no farther. When you have observed what events are, constantly and uniformly, brought about by the operation of those laws, which the author of nature originally established; by the qualities, which he impressed upon matter; or by the powers, which he bestowed upon his creatures; you have then acquired a firm and invariable experience. But such an experience will never prove, that no events, which are repugnant to these, can be brought about by the immediate interposition of him, who established these laws, and can over-rule them; who impressed these qualities, and can suspend their operations; who bestowed these powers, and can either control or augment them. For the force of an argument, deduced from experience, can extend no farther, than the experience extends, from whence you deduce it. Your experience of the ordinary powers of nature may be a decisive proof, in respect of those powers, which are the immediate objects of it: but it can be no proof at all, in respect of a power superiour to nature, which is not the immediate object of experience, but of demonstrative knowledge.

Your other fundamental principle is, -- That no event can be looked upon as a miracle, unless there is a firm and unalterable experience against it. -- {12} The expression here is vague and indeterminate, and we may perhaps mistake your meaning, unless we ascertain it, by looking back to the first principles, from whence this position is inferred. You define a miracle to be a violation of the laws of nature; and, because a firm and unalterable experience hath established those laws, you infer, that there must be such an experience against every miraculous event. You have here shewn evidently, that the experience, upon which we establish our notions of the laws of nature, is

repugnant to every miraculous event; or, that every miracle is inconsistent with our experience of the common and visible train of causes and effects. But we must caution you, when you apply this inference, not to confound experience with knowledge, or the common course and laws of nature with the power of him, who is the father of nature, and established its laws. You may certainly infer, from your definition of a miracle, that no event can be called by this name, unless it is inconsistent with our experience of the common course of nature. But the same definition will not justify the only inference, which can serve your purpose; you cannot infer from it, that every miracle is inconsistent with our knowledge of the power of God.

We have now examined your fundamental principles separately, and have seen how far they are true: let us next consider them together, and try what conclusion will come out from them. Suppose {13} then your argument to be thus stated.-- A firm and unalterable experience of the common course of nature is a full and direct proof, that no event, which is inconsistent with it, can be brought about by any power, which is the object of our knowledge, or which we know of -- But we have a constant and unalterable experience of the common course of nature to oppose to every miraculous event. -- Your regular conclusion from hence would be, that we have a full and direct proof, against the likelihood or possibility of bringing about a miraculous event by any power, which is the object of our knowledge. -- But such a conclusion, though it is regularly deduced from the principles laid down, is not true: because one of the principles, from whence you deduce {14} it, is false. A firm and unalterable experience of the common course of nature is indeed a direct proof, that no event, which is inconsistent with the usual train of causes and effects, can be brought about by any of the ordinary powers of nature, which are the objects of this experience. But we have already shewn you, that the same experience is not proof at all, against the likelihood or possibility of bringing about such an event by a power, which is superiour to the common course of nature, a power, which we can demonstrate to exist, and which is consequently the object of our knowledge.

Let us try whether your conclusion will succeed better, if the principles, from which you deduce it, are stated in another manner. -- A firm and invariable experience of the common course of nature is a full and direct proof, that no event, which is inconsistent with it, can be produced by the ordinary powers of nature, which are the objects of this experience. -- But every miraculous event is inconsistent with our knowledge of all the powers, that exist. -- The logicians would tell you, that no regular conclusion can be drawn from these premises; because your syllogism will have four terms in it. And common sense will tell you, that no true conclusion can be drawn from them; because one of them is false. We allow indeed, that every miracle must, from the notion of it, be inconsistent with our experience of the common course of nature: but you have not proved, and we think you cannot prove, that it must likewise, from the notion of it, be inconsistent with our demonstrative knowledge of the power of God.

There is still this third shape, in which your argument may be stated. -- A firm and unalterable experience of the common course of nature is a full and direct proof, that no event, which is inconsistent with it, can be produced by the ordinary powers of nature, which are the objects of this experience. -- But every miraculous event must, from the notion of it, be inconsistent with our experience of the common course of nature. -- We grant, that your premises are true, when they are thus stated. But if you would conclude, {15} -- that we have a full and direct proof, against the production of a miracle by any powers, which are the objects of our knowledge; -- such a conclusion must be false; because it contains more than is contained in the premises. Your premises relate only to the ordinary powers of nature, which are the objects of experience; but your conclusion extends itself to a power, which is superiour to the common course of nature, and

is the object of our knowledge. The only regular conclusion, which can be deduced from these premises, is, -- that we have a full and direct proof, against the production of a miracle by any of the ordinary powers of nature, which are the objects of our senses, or common experience. -- You must content yourself with this conclusion: for when the principles, from whence you argue, are so explaned as to be true, they will justify no other. And this is such a conclusion, as the defenders of christianity have no reason to be afraid of.

In answering this argument, I have laid open the grounds of our assent to the existence of a miracle. Such an event is inconsistent with our experience of the common course of things, and would therefore be, in itself, incredible, and incapable of being proved by any testimony, if we knew nothing of any power existing in the universe, besides those, which are employed in carrying on the visible train of causes and effects. But knowledge reached farther than experience: reason {16} leads us on from those powers, which are the objects of sense, to another, which is superiour to them, to the power of him, who, as he at first established the laws, and settled the course of what we commonly mean by the word nature, can therefore, when he pleases, suspend or over-rule them. The existence of a miracle hath a general conformity of consistency with our knowledge of such a power: and this conformity or consistency with our knowledge gives it credibility enough, in the nature of the thing , to render it capable of being proved by a fair testimony.

From hence it appears, that when we reject any miraculous event as spurious, which comes to us well attested; our reason for this conduct either is not, or ought not to be, any pretended proof against it, from the general nature of all miracles. For a miracle, considered merely as a supernatural change in the common course of things, is consistent with our knowledge of God's power: and no events, which are consistent with our knowledge, furnish any cause of doubt or suspicion about their existence, and much less any presumption or proof against it, from the nature of the thing. And yet we reject the miracles and prodigies, which we find related in pagan histories, and popish legends; notwithstanding some of them are supported by such a testimony, as might, if we were to give ourselves the trouble of examining it, be found unexceptionable in itself, or sufficient, at least, to establish the truth of {17} any common matter of fact. Upon what grounds then, it may be asked, can we justify our rejecting these miracles; if there is no presumption against them, from the nature of miracles in general, and we either do not examine the testimony, which supports them, or find no exceptions against it, when we do? They, who make this enquiry, might, if they attended to the matter, find a third reason for rejecting many particular miracles, besides the two, which are here suggested. Though we have no objections, from the nature of the thing, that can be urged with any force against miracles in general; yet there are frequently such circumstances appear in the relation of particular miracles, as will afford unanswerable objections to the truth of them. If the circumstances of any particular miracle do either directly, or by necessary consequence, exclude the power of every being, who can change the common course of things, such a miracle, not from the general nature of all miracles, but from its own particular circumstances, becomes inconsistent with our knowledge, and incapable of being proved by any testimony whatever.

[4]"Dionysius of Halicarnassus reports that in the war between the Romans and the Latins, the Gods Castor and Pollux appeared visibly on white horses, and fought on the side of the Romans; who by their assistance gained a complete {18} victory." It is not any defect in the testimony, when applyed to the miracle, which determines us to reject it; whilst, upon the authority of the same testimony, we admit the battle and the victory: for we reject the miracle, either without enquiring at all into the testimony, by which it is supported; or, if upon enquiry, we should find few or no

objections against the testimony, yet we should still reject it. Neither can we reasonably be determined in this case by any general presumption of proof, from the nature of the thing against the existence of all miracles: for miracles have been shewn to be, in themselves, as consistent with our knowledge, and consequently as credible, as many other matters of fact. But the particular miracle in question is attended with a circumstance, which directly excludes the power of God from being concerned in the production of it. Castor and Pollux have not, that we know of, any power of changing the settled course of things: and for want of such a power in the principal agents, the fact, as it is related, is inconsistent with our knowledge, and incapable of being proved by any degree of human testimony.

The like exception runs through almost all the pagan miracles. And if in any instances we believe what is reported of their oracles; we must first have rendered these facts consistent with our knowledge, by finding out such reasons, as may persuade us, that the great deceiver of mankind, though he {19} is subject to the power of God, who can at any time say to him, -- Hitherto shalt thou go and no farther, -- hath yet a power, when he is permitted to use it, of changing the common course of things, and of producing such events, as could not have been produced by any of the visible powers of nature, which are the objects of our experience.

Many of the popish miracles are rendered incredible, in the same manner, by having some circumstance connected with them, which directly excludes the power of God. When the miracles, pretended to be wrought at the tomb of Abbe Paris, are found to have been effectually suppressed, only by walling up that part of the church, where the tomb of the saint, who was supposed to work them, was placed;[5] this circumstance cannot be reconciled with our knowledge of God's power: for his purposes, we are sure, could not have been defeated by building a wall.

Many more of these legendary miracles are attended with such circumstances, as exclude the power of God, by necessary consequence, from the production of them. When a set of men have nothing else to recommend them, besides their having devoted themselves to such a way of life, as planely defeats the end, for which they and all mankind were sent into the world, by making them always useless, and commonly burdensom to society: if they should pretend, that God interposes {20} in their favour, and works miracles to establish their credit; a better testimony, than the monks can, for the most part, produce in support of their legends, would not determine a wise man to believe them. Such an interposition would be repugnant to our knowledge of the wisdom and goodness of God, who contrives all his works with a view to the general happiness, and suffers no part of the world to be idle; but requires, as far as reason can teach us his will, that men and brutes, and creatures of what condition soever, should each, in their proper station, concur with him in labouring to promote the same important end. But where the wisdom and goodness of God are thus planely excluded, no testimony can convince us, that his power was concerned.

The truth is; if we study to avoid, as much as may be, the trouble of examining the several popish miracles distinctly, and indolently please ourselves with any thing, which promises to confute them all at once; we shall be easily led to take part with those, who under the specious pretence of defending the protestant religion, would unsettle the foundations of christianity itself, and to maintain, as they do, that there is such a proof or presumption, from the nature of the thing, against all miracles in general, as will make we know not what degree of testimony necessary to establish them. Whereas, if we would contend, as with reason we may, that the popish miracles, which {21} are best attested, are each of them connected with some such circumstances, as render it either directly, or by necessary consequence, inconsistent with our knowledge of God's power; we should then be able both to defend ourselves as protestants, and to give an answer to every one,

who shall ask us a reason of our faith in the miracles of Christ and his apostles. For enough hath, I hope, been said to make it appear; that, whatever becomes of these legendary fables, when they are confuted by arguments deduced from the particular circumstances of each of them; yet miracles, considered merely as changes in the common course of nature, are so far consistent with our knowledge of God's power, as to furnish no cause of doubt from the nature of the thing: and that consequently, when they are attended with none of those circumstances, which either directly, or by necessary consequence exclude his power; more especially if the end, proposed by them, is conformable to our notions of his wisdom and goodness; a fair testimony, though it is not a supernatural one, will be sufficient, not only to fix our assent, but to raise it likewise into assurance and confidence.

It is not my business at present to enquire what precise degree of testimony is requisite for this purpose. All that I proposed was, to bring the question concerning miracles back to the old state of it, by shewing, that there is no proof or presumption, from the general nature of such events, {22} against the existence of them. And if this hath been shewn effectually, the enquire, in which we are principally concerned, is, whether the miracles of Christ and his apostles are supported by such a testimony, as would be sufficient to establish the truth of any matter of fact, beyond all contradiction. But this question hath been so well examined, and so judiciously settled already, by much more able hands than mine; that, if either my subject would lead me, or your patience would allow me, yet their labours have rendered it needless, to spend any time in enlarging upon it.

THE END.

Notes

[2]Hume's Philos. Essays pag. 173-207.

[3]Lock's Essay. B. IV. C. XVI. S. 8.

[4]Middleton's free Enquiry pag. 218.

[5]Observations on St. Paul's Conversion. pag. 64, 65.

Remarks on an Essay concerning Miracles

Anthony Ellys

1752

Editor's note: Anthony Ellys (1690-1761) was bishop of St. David's and the author of A Plea for the Sacramental Test (1736), and the posthumous Tracts on the Liberty Spiritual and Temporal of the Protestants of England (1763-65). Although no publication date appears on Ellys's Remarks, the date of 1752 is usually assigned to it, which is consistent with the appearance of an April 1752 review of the pamphlet in the Monthly Review. Ellys begins his Remarks noting that although Hume claims to attack miracles only in profane histories, his "true Meaning was not to exempt the miracles in the holy Scriptures." Ellys believes that fear of divine punishment, and not just instinct, inclines people to be truthful in their testimonies. He finds it reasonable that Hume does not try to prove that miracles are impossible. For Ellys, experience today of unvaried laws of nature counts only against testimonies of miracles today. As to Hume's claim that natural experience opposes miracle testimonies, Ellys counters that just as the Indian prince's experience against frost does not oppose European testimonies, laws of nature do not oppose miracle testimonies. He continues that there is no joint opposition of miracle accounts in rival religions. First, God allows miracles of false religions to test the believers of true religion; and, second, rival testimonies oppose each other on a case by case basis, with the strongest testimony winning. Ellys argues that Hume's discussion of the alleged miracles of at the Abbe's tomb was meant to raise prejudices and insinuate that the Gospel miracles are on the same footing as those. The complete review of the Remarks in the Monthly Review is as follows: "The author of this small piece is both a sensible and genteel writer: he considers what mr. Hume has advanced relating to miracles in a somewhat different light from dr. Rutherforth and mr. Adams; but as mr. Adams has so ingeniously shewn the sophistry of mr. Hume's arguments, (See Review for January last) we shall not detain our readers with a particular account of what he has said" (1752, Vol. 6, p. 313). The following is from the 1752 and only edition of Ellys's Remarks.

REMARKS
ON
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CONCERNING
MIRACLES,
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DAVID HUME, Esq;
AMONGST HIS
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

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(Price One Shilling).

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REMARKS
ON
Mr. HUME's ESSAY
CONCERNING
MIRACLES.

MR. Hume professedly [2]"flatters himself that he has discovered an Argument, which, if just, will be an everlasting Check to all Kinds of superstitious Delusion; and consequently will be useful as long as the World lasts; for so long he presumes will the Accounts of Miracles and Prodigies be found in all Profane History." In which Declaration the two last Words may seem designed to give us the Satisfaction of Thinking, that this new Argument, great as it is to be in its Effects, yet will not extend to the Miracles related by the Sacred Writers. For if he thought it would take in them as well as others, why did he speak only of profane History, and not of History in general? His Addition of profane,

which is an Epithet of Restriction, implies an Opposition to sacred History with Regard to the Miracles which it relates, as being unconcerned in what was to be advanced. {6}

But whatever may be inferred from the Propriety of his Expression, the Author's true Meaning was not to exempt the Miracles in the holy Scriptures, any more than others, from the Force of his Argument, which is formed upon Principles that extend alike to all Miracles whatsoever; and his Conclusions from those Principles admit of no Exception. "Upon the whole," says he, "it appears that no Testimony for any Kind of Miracle can ever possibly amount to a Probability, much less to a Proof; and that even supposing it amounts to a Proof, it would be opposed by another Proof derived from the very Nature of the Fact which it would endeavour to establish." Again, "we may establish it as a Maxim, that no human Testimony can have such a Force as to prove a Miracle, and make it a just Foundation for any such System of Religion." And a little before, he had expressed himself in Terms yet stronger, but less decent where he scruples not to say, "that a Miracle supported by any human Testimony is more properly a Subject of Derision than of Argument." Accordingly, he flouts at the Miracles related by Moses in the Pentateuch; he says, "that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with Miracles, but even at this Day cannot be believed by any reasonable Person without one;" yet the Miracles he there means were not those that are delivered to us in the holy Scripture, but some Effects on the Minds of Men, which he, in a popular Sense of the Word, is pleased to call Miracles, but which he conceives are far from according either Evidence or Credit to the Gospel.

Now as it is plain, that if this was really the Design of his Essay, it strikes at the Foundation of our Religion, by denying the Truth of all the Miracles wrought by Christ to prove that he was sent from God; it seems to be the Concern of all who believe in him, and are able to examine the Arguments of this Author, to satisfy themselves as to what there is in them. And the following Remarks, though at first designed only {7} for private Use, are now offered to the Public, because they consider this Essay in Views, somewhat different from those of the learned Persons who have answered it before, and are drawn into so small a Compass, that any Reader, without employing much Time or Pains, may be able to judge how far they answer their End.

The main Design of Mr. Hume's first Argument, is to shew that no human Testimony can be sufficient to prove the Reality of any Miracle, or make it justly Credible; in order to which, he begins with considering on what Grounds the Credibility of human Testimony itself depends. And he observes, "that our Assurance of the Truth of any Argument, founded only on human Testimony, is derived from no other Principle than our Observation of the Veracity of that Testimony in general, and of the usual Conformity of Facts to the Reports of Witnesses." And, "Did not Men's Imagination naturally follow their Memory; had they not commonly an Inclination to Truth, and a Sentiment of Probity; were they not sensible to Shame when detected in a Falsehood; were not these, I say, discovered to be Qualities inherent in human Nature, we should never repose the least Confidence in human Testimony. A Man delirious or noted for Falsehood and Vanity has no Manner of Weight or Authority with us."

It is here laid down that these Qualities and Dispositions, known to be inherent in human Nature, will cause Men to speak the Truth, unless accidental and sinister Motives hinder them from doing it. And about this, I have no Dispute with the Author: Yet must observe, that he has omitted the principal Thing that ought to have, and no doubt often has, the greatest Weight in disposing Men to speak as they think; and that is, their Sense of the Obligation which God lays them under to do it, and their Fear of Punishment from him, if they act contrary to this Obligation. Every one who reflects at all, must be sensible that God was the Author of our Faculty of Speech, and that he gave it, in order to the Benefit and Improvement that Men might receive by imparting their Thoughts and {8} Dispositions to

each other. For which Purpose, it is necessary that their Words should express their Thoughts as they really are; because if they did otherwise, their Speech would produce frequently Distrust, Ill-Will and Disturbance among them. On which Account we may justly conclude, from Reason itself, that God has strictly obliged each Person to speak the Truth; that he has given all others a Right to expect it from him; and that he himself, who always knows how far their Words are expressive of their Thoughts, will severely punish all Breaches of this Duty. This Sense of natural Obligation, attended with the Fear of Punishment from him, and of Resentment from Men, in Case of speaking falsely, I say, every one must have in some Degree: I ought to be, and must be, one of his chief Motives to say what he thinks. For this Reason, I cannot easily conceive how the Author came to omit it, and instead of it, to talk of "Men's Imagination as naturally following their Memories," which is a Thing not easy to be understood, if it be at all to the Purpose.

But, taking this Matter as the Author has put it, let us see how he proceeds upon it. He observes that

> *"as the Evidence derived from Witnesses and human Testimony is founded on past Experience, so it varies with the Experience, and is regarded as a Proof or Probability, according as the Conjunction betwixt any particular Kind of Report, and any Kind of Objects has been found to be constant or variable. There are a Number of Circumstances to be taken into Consideration in all Judgments of this Kind; and our ultimate Standard, by which we determine all Disputes that may arise concerning them, is always derived from Experience and Observation. When this Experience is not entirely uniform on any Side, it is attended with an unvariable Contrariety in our Judgments, and with the same Opposition and mutual Destruction of Argument as in every other Kind of Evidence."*

He observes farther,

> *"that many Particulars may destroy the Force of any Argument derived from human Testimony, the Character and Number of the Witnesses, the Manner of their delivering their Testimony, {9} or the Union of all these Circumstances. We entertain a Suspicion concerning any Matter of Fact, when the Witnesses contradict each other, when they are but few, or of a suspicious Character, when they have an Interest in what they affirm, when they deliver their Testimony with Doubt and Hesitation, or on the contrary with too violent Asseverations."*

But one Thing the Author distinguishes from the others, which diminish the Force of human Testimony; because it is much of the same Nature with the principal Circumstance on which his Argument against that Testimony, in the Case of Miracles, will be founded. He tells us,

> *"that when the Fact which the Testimony endeavours to establish partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous, the Evidence resulting from the Testimony, receives a Diminution greater or less in Proportion as the Fact is more or less Unusual. The Reason why we place any Credit in Witnesses and Historians is not from any Connexion we perceive a priori betwixt Testimony and Reality, but because we are accustomed to find a Connexion betwixt them. But when the Fact attested, is such as has seldom fallen under our Observation, here is a Contest of two opposite Experiences, of which the one destroys the other as far as its Force goes, and the superior can only operate on the Mind by the Force which remains. The very same Principle of Experience which gives us a certain Degree of Assurance against the Fact which they endeavour to establish; from which Contradiction there necessarily arises a Counterpoise and mutual Destruction of Belief and Authority."*

The Reader, I fear, will begin to be tired with such long Quotations, in which but little of the Argument expected hitherto appears: And, indeed, on that Account, I thought of trying whether the Substance of these and other Observations, to the same Effect, might not be drawn into a lesser Compass. But I quitted that Design upon considering, that an Author's {10} Sense may be misrepresented or weakened by another, even without any Design to do it. On which Account those Readers who desire to form an impartial Judgment, and may not have an Opportunity to see the Author's Book, will probably chuse to have his Sentiments expressed in his own Words. I beg Leave therefore, to proceed with them, as they immediately follow those cited above, and are indeed, a proper Illustration to them.

"The Indian Prince, says our Author, who refused to believe the first Relations concerning the Effects of Frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong Testimony to engage his Assent to Facts which arose from a State of Nature with which he was unacquainted, and bore so little Analogy to those Events of which he had had constant and uniform Experience. Though they were not contrary to his Experience, they were not conformable to it."

"But in order to increase the Probability against the Testimony of Witnesses, let us suppose, that the Fact which they endeavour to establish, instead of being only Marvellous, is really Miraculous; and suppose also that the Testimony considered apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire Proof; in that Case, there is Proof against Proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a Diminution of its Force in Proportion to that of its Antagonist."

And now, at length, we come to that important Argument for which all great Preparation has been made. "A Miracle," says our Author,

> *"is a Violation of the Laws of Nature; and as a firm and unalterable Experience has established those Laws, the Proof, from the very Nature of the Fact, is as entire as any Argument from Experience can possibly be imagined. There must be an uniform Experience against every miraculous Event, otherwise the Event would not merit that Appellation. And as an uniform Experience amounts to a Proof, there is here a direct and full Proof from the Nature of the {11} Fact against the Existence of any Miracle; nor can such a Proof be destroyed, or the Miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite Proof that is superior."*

In order to judge of the Force of this Argument, the first Thing to be considered is, what the Author means by saying that a firm and unalterable Experience has established the Laws of Nature. Does he mean that our constant Experience assures us what Laws are actually settled for the general Order and Government of the material World? Or does he mean that the same Experience assures us that those Laws are so absolutely fixed that they never can be suspended for any Time, or on any Occasion? His speaking of an Experience be strictly speaking unalterable, the Laws of Nature themselves must be so too, at least during our Time; and he could not well think that they are more unalterable in this Age, than they have been, and will continue to be in all others. Now if he meant that those Laws are unalterable at all Times, and could make good his Assertion, there would need no other Proof against the Possibility of Miracles. For if the Laws of Nature were unalterably fixed, the Consequence is plain, that every Miracle, which implies at least a temporary Suspension of those Laws, or an Effect contrary to them, would be impossible. But I think this can hardly be our Author's Meaning; because a Person of his Capacity must have seen that our Experience cannot be a sufficient Proof that the Laws of Nature are unalterably fixed. It does, indeed, prove that certain Laws are settled by God for the Government of the material World, and that they are highly expedient to it.

From whence it is certain that he will not alter nor break in upon them without some Reason of great Importance. But that he will never suspend those Laws on any Occasion, nor permit that any other invisible Beings should ever act so as to interrupt them in their ordinary Course, our Experience is far from being able to prove; unless it could discover that either he has made an absolute Decree against all such Proceedings, or that they must have Consequences some Way repugnant {12} to his Perfections; both which, are Discoveries that neither our Experience, nor even our Reason will ever make.

Indeed, Mr. Hume appears to have been so far sensible of this, that he does not attempt to prove directly against the Possibility of its being sufficiently proved by any human Testimony. This latter Point he knew would serve his Purpose as well as the former, and he thought it might be more easily maintained. He therefore attempts it by comparing our Experience upon which the Credibility of human Testimony depends, with an opposite Experience which he supposes us to have against Miracles; and imagining that this latter Experience is much the more uniform and constant of the two, he, according to his Rule before laid down, that in our Judgments of Things we are to be governed by our strongest Experience, determines that Miracles can never be rendered credible by any human Testimony whatever.

But in order to see the Weakness of this reasoning, let us enquire what the Author means by Experience against Miracles. The Word Experience supposes the Existence present or past, of some Facts or Events as the Objects of it; for Experience of Things that have never been, is a Contradiction in the Terms, and therefore it cannot be properly said that we have had, or can have, any Experience against Miracles. Mr. Hume perhaps will say, that an Experience of the unvaried Continuance of the Laws of Nature is, in Effect, the same Thing as an Experience against Miracles, though the latter Expression may not be quite proper. I answer, that it is not the same Thing as to the Force of his Argument; for that requires an Experience which can yield such an Evidence against Miracles as may justly be Opposed to, and in Strength will exceed the Evidence for them, which arises from the Credibility of human Testimony grounded on Experience. But our Experience of the unvaried Continuance of the Laws of Nature cannot yield any such Evidence against Miracles; for, as I have before said, it can only prove that no Miracles have been in our Time. But {13} from thence it does not follow, nor can it possibly by this Medium be proved, that no Miracles have been, or can be, at all. Now, if our Experience, with regard to Miracles, is no Proof that there cannot be any such, then this Experience can neither be superior in Strength, nor be any way Opposed, to the Experience for the Credibility of human Testimony, which affirms that there have been frequent Miracles. And if our Experience for the Credibility of human Testimony be not Exceeded, nor even Opposed by any other Experience with regard to Miracles, then, the former of these Experiences remains, in its full Strength, on Behalf of the Credibility of human Testimony with regard to Miracles. From whence it follows that when that Testimony is given by Persons fitly qualified, by their Knowledge, and their Veracity, we ought to believe it with regard to Miracles as well as to other more common Events.

Mr. Hume allows this to be true, in the Case of the Indian Prince abovementioned, with regard to the Accounts given him of the Effects of Frosts in cold Climates. That Prince might have argued against the Credibility of those Accounts, exactly as our Author does against the Credibility of Miracles. He might have alledged his own Experience, and that of all other Persons in his Country, to prove that the Fluidity of Water was a constant unvaried Phaenomenon or Law of Nature. It had never been known to become a solid Body, on which Men, unsupported by any thing else, might walk without sinking; nor did it seem capable of becoming such a one. Now this their constant Experience about it, was of much greater Force to prove that it never could become solid, than any human Testimony, the

Credibility of which is grounded on a lesser Experience, could be to prove that it ever had been solid: And therefore, this Prince, according to Mr. Hume's Way of Reasoning, might have justly refused to believe that Water had ever been actually frozen into a solid Body, though this Fact had been affirmed to him by any Persons, however numerous, or however great seeming Probity. {14}

Yet this Author intimates plainly enough, that very strong Testimony might justly have engaged the Prince's Assent to these Accounts of the Effects of Frost: For though they were not conformable to his Experience, yet they were not contrary to it. The last Expression, as it came from Mr. Hume, has, indeed, a little different Turn, but is, in effect, the same with this. And his Observation is certainly right; for the Prince neither had had, nor could have, any Experience that Water could not be frozen to Solidity. All that his Experience amounted to, was, that Water had never been actually solid, within his Knowledge or Observation; but this was no Proof from Experience that it could not ever have been so. There was no Experience in this Case that could be Opposed to the Experience for the Credibility of human Testimony. And therefore such Testimony, when strong, as it ought to be, in Proportion to the extraordinary Nature of the Fact related, must have remained in its full genuine Force, and was therefore justly credible, and capable of rendering the Fact related credible to the Prince. Now as Mr. Hume saw the Justness of this Reasoning in the Case before us, so he ought to have seen it, with regard to the Credibility of Miracles upon sufficient human Testimony. For the Reasoning is exactly the same in both. There is no more Experience to any one against Miracles, than there was to the Indian Prince against the Effects of Frost. And since there is no such Experience to be Opposed to that Experience, upon which the Credibility of human Testimony is grounded, that Testimony ought to have its full Force in the Proof of Miracles, as well as of any other Events.

Having made these Remarks upon the only Argument which Mr. Hume has urged against Miracles in the first Part of his Essay, I proceed to the second, in which we meet with another Argument of the like Kind, in the following Words:

> *"There is no Testimony," says he, Page 190, for any Prodigies, even those which have not been expressly detected that is not opposed by an infinite Number of Witnesses; so that not only the Miracle destroys the Credit of the Testimony, but even the Testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us {15} consider that in Matters of Religion whatever is different is contrary, and that it is impossible that the Religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, or Siam, and of China should all of them be established on any solid Foundation; every Miracle therefore pretended to have been wrought in any of these Religions, (and all of them abound in Miracles) as its direct Scope, is to establish the particular System to which it is attributed, so it has the same Force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other System; in destroying a rival System, it likewise destroys the Credit of those Miracles on which that System was established; so that all the Prodigies of different Religions are to be considered as contrary Facts, and the Evidences of these Prodigies whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. According to his Method of reasoning, when we believe any Miracle of Mohamet or any of his Successors, we have for our Warrant the Testimony of a few barbarous Arabians, and on the other Side, we are to regard the Authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and in short, of all the Authors and Witnesses Grecian, Chinese, and Roman-Catholick, who have related any Miracle in their particular Religion, I say, we are to regard their Testimony in the same Light as if they had mentioned that Mahometan Miracle, and had in express Terms contradicted it with the same Certainty as they have for the Miracles they relate. This Argument may appear over subtle and refined; but it is not in Reality different from the*

> *reasoning of a Judge, who supposes that the Credit of two Witnesses maintaining a Crime against any one, is destroyed by the Testimony of two others who affirm him to have been two hundred Leagues distant at the same instant when the Crime is said to have been committed."*

At the Beginning of this Argument there are some Propositions about which I shall not dispute with the Author: They are, First, That in Religion whatever is different is contrary, and that, therefore no two opposite Religions can be both of them true. Secondly, That every Miracle wrought in Support of any Religion, not only tends directly to prove the {16} Truth of that Religion, but also tends though more indirectly, to disprove all other Religions. Thirdly, That every Miracle, while it tends to disprove the Truth of any different Religion, does likewise disprove the Truth of all the Miracles pretended to have been wrought on Behalf of that Religion. The last of these Propositions indeed, ought not to have been advanced without some Proof; for the Author must have known that both the Jewish and Christian Religions[3] suppose that some Miracles have been, and may be wrought in Religions opposite to them; and of consequence, must suppose, that their own Miracles do not effectually disprove the Reality of those other Miracles. The Reasons they give why God sometimes permits Miracles to be wrought in false Religions, are, that he does it to try the good dispositions of Men in the true one, and to put them upon a more careful Examination of the Nature and external Evidences of it; which Reasons this Author would not have been able to confute; and on that Account, perhaps has declined to consider them, as he likewise has forborne attempting to prove that all Miracles in opposite Religions are incompatible with each other; though this is the necessary foundation upon which his present Argument is raised, and without it, must immediately fall to the Ground.

However, that we may see what a Structure he can make if this Foundation be allowed, let us pass over his third Proposition as well as the two former without any Dispute. Now his reasoning from them is to this Effect: Because the Testimony for the Miracles in any Religion tends to disprove, as far as it can, all the Testimonies for the Miracles in every one of the different Religions, the Consequence is, that the Testimony in Behalf of the Miracles in every particular Religion is opposed by an infinite Number of Witnesses, whose Testimony being very much stronger than the Testimony for the Miracles in any such particular Religion can be; on this Account, no Testimony of this Kind can ever make the Miracles pretended to have been wrought in any such Religion be justly credible. {17} To illustrate this Doctrine, our Author supposes us to have an Account of a Miracle performed by Mahomet, or one of his Successors; and that for our Warrant in believing it, we have the Testimony of a few barbarous Arabians; while, on the other Hand, we have, against it, the Authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and in short, of all the Authors and Witnesses, Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have related any Miracle in their particular Religion: For the Testimony of all these, "must be regarded," says he, "in the same Light, as if they had mentioned that Mahometan Miracle, and had in express Terms, contradicted it, with the same Certainty, as they have for the Miracle they relate."

These Suppositions and Assertions may, at first Sight, appear very unaccountable: For how can Livy, Plutarch or Tacitus be regarded as Witnesses against a Mahometan Miracle, which, if such a one had ever been, could not have been wrought till some hundreds of Years after they all were dead? Or how can even the Grecians, the Chinese, or Roman Catholics be considered as giving Testimony against the same Miracle, of which our Author does not seem to suppose that they had ever known or heard any Thing at all? But in order to do him Justice, the Reader must observe, that all these Persons are, and great Numbers of others might have been alledged as Witnesses against it, in Consequence of his Reasoning here before mentioned; which is, that because no two Miracles in different Religions can, both of them be true; therefore, the Testimony of the Grecians, the Chinese, and all the rest, for the

Miracles, in their several Religions, must really opposed, and, as far as the Strength of their Evidence will go, must tend to disprove the Testimony of the Mahometans for the Miracle pretended to be wrought in Behalf of their Religion. And, indeed, since this Reasoning proceeds upon the Author's third Proposition at the Beginning of this Argument, which I have passed over without disputing it, I am now obliged to allow the Reasoning to be so far conclusive as it aims at proving that the Testimony in every particular Religion, the Mahometan for Instance, is virtually opposed by the Testimony for the {18} Miracles in all other Religions, whether these latter Witnesses ever knew any Thing against the Mahometan Testimony or not.

But such a merely consequential Opposition of all the Testimonies for the Miracles in all the different Religions, will not be sufficient for our Author's Purpose of disproving the Mahometan Miracle. He must go somewhat further, and shew, either, first, that some one of the opposite Testimonies is really, in itself, stronger than what there is for the Mahometan Miracle: Or, secondly, that since all these several Testimonies, are alike virtually opposite to the Testimony for that Miracle, there may, by an Alliance or Union of them, be a Testimony formed against it, of much greater Strength than its Testimony has; and which, therefore, will destroy the Credibility of it.

Our Author seems to have declined insisting on the former of these Points; because though he might have shewn in some one of the Regions opposite to the Mahometan, a Miracle that had a Testimony for it stronger than this has; yet he might not be able to shew so much in the Case of another Religion which seems to have been chiefly in his View, though he would not here mention it. He could hardly hope to find in any of the Religions opposite to this latter, a Testimony superior to that by which a very remarkable Miracle in it is supported. And therefore he chose a Way of arguing that he thought would not fail to prove as well against this Religion, as against the Mahometan, and, indeed, would prove, in general, against all the pretended to be grounded on divine Revelation. To this End, he had Recourse to that infinite Number of Witnesses which might be drawn together from all the Religions opposite to the Mahometan, or to any other that he should have a Mind to disprove; in order, from this Collection of them, to make up a united or aggregate Testimony that should be plainly superior in Strength to any Testimony that could ever be alledged from the Miracles in any single Religion. {19}

But however plausible this Scheme may have appeared to Mr. Hume, it is nothing but a Fallacy, and can have no Effect. We shall plainly see this, if we consider that, supposing, a Miracle related to us has been possible in itself, the Credibility of the Persons by whom it is attested, must always depend, on the Opportunities they have had to know the Nature and Circumstances of the Fact; on their Abilities to judge well of it; on their Character for Veracity, in declaring exactly whatever they know or believe about it; and on their Number and Agreement with each other. In Proportion as these Circumstances appear to have been more or less in their Case, they will be more or less credible. But whatever the Degree of their Credibility is, common Sense plainly dictates that it must depend solely upon themselves, and cannot be either increased or diminished by the Testimony of any other Persons who have never known or heard of the Miracle in Question, but only attest some other Miracles different in all Respects from this. The Credibility of the Persons who relate a Miracle supposed to have been done in China, can neither be impaired, nor can it be increased, by the Credibility of any other Persons who relate a Miracle done in Italy. As each of these Credibilities has been derived merely from the Circumstances and Dispositions peculiar to the Persons concerned in each Testimony, and who on either Side are supposed to be quite Strangers to the others, and to the Fact attested by them, it is therefore, impossible that either of these Credibilities can be rendered greater, than it is in itself, by any Conjunction it can have with the other. For no Man can imagine that personal Circumstances, Abilities, and Dispositions can be transferred, or in any Degree imparted

from the one Set of these distant Witnesses to the other. You might well think of adding to the Number, by putting Cyphers to the left of it, or of lengthening a Line, by adding a Sound or a Colour to it, as of increasing the Credibility of the Chinese Witness, by adding the Credibility of the Italians to it. {20}

Which Consideration plainly shews, that though indeed the Testimonies for both these Miracles may be, in one Respect, opposed to the Testimony for the Mahometan Miracle; yet neither of those former Testimonies can ever receive, except in one Case only, any increase of its Credibility from the other of them, so as that both will, on that Account, become more credible, in Opposition to the Mahometan, than either of them would have been alone. The case that I except is, when any of the Witnesses for each of these two opposite Miracles are supposed to have known Circumstances of the same, or a like Nature, that concern the Mahometan, or the Witnesses to it; and tend to detract form the Credibility of either of them. In that Case, indeed, the Credibility of each of these two Sets of opposite Witnesses would be increased by the Addition of the other, considered as being opposed, in Conjunction with it, to the Testimony for the Mahometan Miracle: And the Credibility of this latter would be impaired more by such an Alliance or Union of those Testimonies, than by either of them singly, in Opposition to it: And so, more still, in Proportion, if there were a greater Number of Testimonies, of this Nature, against it.

But if no one of the opposite Witnesses declares any Thing, in particular, against the Credibility of the Mahometan Miracle, or appears to know any Thing of it, or of the Witnesses on its behalf; in this Case, how many soever these opposite Witnesses may be, their Number will avail nothing against it; in Regard that their Testimonies can not be united, nor their Credibility by that means, be increased. They can only act by the single Weight of each, compared, as to its Credibility, with the Testimony for that Mahometan Miracle. Upon which Comparison, indeed, any one of them that is found its superior in Credibility, will prevail and disprove it. But in doing this, it can receive no Advantage from the infinite Number of the Witnesses that, merely by Virtue of our Author's Reasoning, are joined with it in a virtual Opposition to that Miracle: For a Conjunction of this Sort can have no Effect at all, either upon the Credibility {21} of the several Testimonies so drawn together, or on that of the Mahometan Miracle whose Testimony they oppose.

It is evident, therefore, that this supposed infinite Number of Witnesses, raised by Mr. Hume, in Opposition to that Miracle, and by a Parity of Reason, to any other which he intends to disprove, is mere Amusement. Whatever Witnesses there are who really know any Thing against such a one, they would be of as much Force as they can ever be, without this consequential joint Opposition; and those that know nothing of this Miracle will do it no harm, however, great Numbers of them may be brought to make their Appearance for that Purpose. They are like separate Parties of Troops which make a great Shew in the Field of Battle, by appearing all on the same Side; but can never be drawn into one Body, nor made to charge the Enemy together, but act singly by themselves, with only their own unassisted Force; and therefore, if each of them be weaker than the Enemy, there can be no Prospect that they will ever prevail. But quitting this Simile, and the Argument itself, which I hope has been set in its proper Light; I only beg leave, on this Occasion, to make one general Remark: It is, that the Interests of Truth and Virtue, which undoubtedly are the most valuable Blessings in human Life, would be in a much better State that they are, if Men of Letters would be more cautious how they lay a Stress upon novel Arguments of their own Growth, against any Points of Moment in Religion; and especially how they, by making them public, throw them into the Hands of Persons of all Ranks, who are Dabblers in Reading. There are, in the present Age, great Numbers of People who answer to the Character given by St. Paul,[4] 2 Timothy 3:7. That they are ever Learning, and never able to come to

the Knowledge of the Truth; because indeed they are not disposed[5] to receive {22} it. These Persons are always ready to be taken by any new Conceit, especially if it be to the Disadvantage of Religion. But to consider, with proper Care, what is said in answer to such Objections, is a Talk for which they seldom have any Inclination, or at least not enough to make them go through with it; and so, the ill Impressions they have received continue upon them: Their Faith is subverted, and their Morals often ruined in consequence of it.

This was an Effect that generally followed upon the sceptical Discourses of some Philosophers among the Greeks, in Opposition to the great Principles of Religion and Morality. Socrates[6] observed it with very much Concern; and accordingly declared, that every one ought to be extremely cautious how he treated Points of such high Importance, especially in publick. And he himself gave an Example of it, expressing great Diffidence of his own Abilities when he was to speak of the chief Good,[7] of the Nature of the supreme Being, or of any other such Subjects. And in Pursuance of his Advice, one of his Friends, before he entered on a Discourse of this Nature, expressed himself in these following Terms. [Greek quote][8] Plat. in Timae, p. 1059. If some of our modern Authors had taken a Course like this, before they fate themselves to write or publish their Thoughts upon Matters of Religion, the World perhaps would not have been troubled with so many of their crude and false Notions; which, though sufficiently answered, have yet had a pernicious Effect in corrupting the Principles and Morals of our Nation. {23} But be Good Men, will easily learn the Way to be so. One sees how agreeable this Observation, made by two of the greatest Men among the antient Heathens, is to what was delivered afterwards by the highest Authority, John 7:17. If any Man will do His [God's] Will, he shall know of the Doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.

But to return from this Digression to Mr. Hume and his Essay, I have considered all that Part of it which contains any Argument; the rest of it consists either of Assertions destitute of Proofs, or of Observations from which nothing can be justly concluded, and which tend to nothing but to raise undue Prejudices in the Minds of weak Readers. Of this latter Kind are our Author's Observations. He acquaints us in a great Number of Words, that Men are generally apt to be pleased at hearing extraordinary and wonderful Things; that some may be Enthusiasts; others may think they do right in telling Lies for the Advantage of their Religion; Vanity and Interest may be to others, their Motives for endeavouring its Propagation; they may be encouraged in attempting to do it be the Credulity and Weakness of those Persons to whom they apply. That if they have Eloquence, Craft and Address, they may be likely to work upon illiterate and barbarous People, as Lucian's Alexander did on the Paphlagonians. That Accounts of Miracles have chiefly abounded among ignorant and barbarous Nations, and after they have received there for some Time, it has been difficult to detect the Falsity of them; that Men are disposed to say Things, which tend to the Honour of their own Country or Families; that if they have Opportunities, they may easily be tempted to assume the high Character of Missionaries from Heaven; and when they have done so, may bear many Distresses in order to maintain it.

Most of these Observations, may in some Cases, have been true. But what just Consequences can be drawn from them against the Credibility of all human Testimony when alledged in Proof of Miracles? If some Men be weak or ill-disposed, must all therefore be so? Were there never any Men of good Sense or Probity? Is there not very great Reason to believe that some such there have been in every Age, as there are in the present? Have not indisputable Proofs been given by Witnesses, in some Cases, of their Integrity, their good Judgment, and their perfect Knowledge of the Things they related? If these Facts are beyond Question, what Advantage {24} can our Author gain, by observing that there have also been great Numbers of Knaves and Fools in the World? His Design is to insinuate, that the

Witnesses to all the Religions that have pretended to be divine Revelations, were Persons of one or other of the last mentioned Characters. But every Eye must be able to discern that there is not the least Consequence in this Sort of Reasoning, which really does not deserve that Name.

And this Author's Assertions are not better grounded. He affirms, "that there is not to be found in all History, any Miracle attested by a sufficient Number of Men, and with such other Circumstances as are requisite to give us a full Assurance of the Truth of their Testimony." This is an Assertion which is hardly capable of a due Proof. For in order to a compleat one, this Author is obliged to consider and disprove all the several Evidences that have ever been given for all the Miracles of which we have any Account And this, I think, he has hardly yet done, or is likely to do soon. At least in this Essay, he has not attempted any Thing material to this Purpose. His Assertion remains entirely unproved, and therefore, cannot, with Reason, be allowed any Weight.

However, as it is an express Declaration of his own Opinion about the Testimony for all Miracles, which, without any Exception, he reckons insufficient to prove, or render them credible; we may from thence be led to ask, For what Purpose he has mentioned the Miracle related by Tacitus, as having been wrought by the elder Vespasian; or the marvellous Creation of a new Leg, to a Man at Saragossa, by the Use of the holy Oil; of the numerous Miracles ascribed by the French Jansenists to their Abbe Paris? Since he plainly looked upon all these, as false Stories and Impostures, why did he trouble his Readers with Accounts of them? I must be so free as to tell Mr. Hume, that the Respect due to Mankind, and much more to GOD and his sacred Truth, ought to hinder an Author from publishing any Thing, especially on Subjects that concerns Religion, but what he either knows, or on reasonable Grounds, believes to be true. He ought {25} not to make Use of that very unfair, though sometimes indeed too effectual Method, of raising Prejudices in weak Minds, against a Thing which cannot, by Reason, be confuted. If he thinks that the Testimony given for the Mosaic or the Christian Miracles is not sufficient to satisfy any reasonable Man, let him endeavour to disprove both it and them. To those Objections which he has raised against the History of Moses, let him add what others he can find or Form of a more solid Kind. But let him not take the low Way of insinuating, quite without Proof, that the Evidence for the Miracles of Moses and of Christ is not at all better than what has been given for those other Miracles that he has mentioned; which is plainly his Design in relating, with such an Air as he does, those notable Stories. There is no Sort of Reasoning, or Justness of Consequence in such Comparisons or Insinuations. They tend only to raise Prejudices against the Truth, and to throw discolouring Lights upon it. They are therefore, unworthy of any Man who pretends to Religion, or even to ordinary Probity and Candour.

Which Censure I must, with Concern, affirm, is yet more due to that Treatment almost beyond Parallel, which is given, soon after, more openly, by this Author, to the Christian Religion and to all who believe it. He briefly resumes the Arguments, by which he has attempted to prove, that "no Evidence for any Miracle can amount to a Probability, much less to a Proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a Proof, it would be opposed by another Proof derived from the very Nature of the Fact, which it would endeavour to establish, &c." After which, he insists on his Conclusion, and even establishes it as a Maxim, that no human Testimony can have such Force as to prove a Miracle, and make it a just Foundation for any System of Religion, And "he is the better pleased," he says, "with his own Reasoning, as he thinks it may serve to confound those dangerous Friends or disguised Enemies to the Christian Religion who have undertaken to defend it by the Principles of human Reason." He himself affirms, "that our most holy Religion is founded in Faith, not in Reason, and that it is a sure Method of exposing it, to put it to such a Trial as it is by no Means fitted {26} to endure." His Meaning is, that they will indeed effectually expose it who aim at proving, by the Means

of credible Testimony, that the Miracles said to have been wrought on its Behalf, were rational and sufficient Proofs that it came from God. For that, he pretends, is a Thing to be received by Faith alone, without any Proof or Reason whatsoever.

Yet presently afterwards, this Author Affirms, "that the Christian Religion was not only at first attended with Miracles, but even at this Day cannot be believed by any reasonable Person without one. Mere Reason is insufficient to convince us of its Veracity; and whosoever is moved by Faith, to assent to it, is conscious of a continued Miracle in his own Person." Does there no appear to be some Inconsistency in these Declarations? No. He represents very plainly, all those who at first embraced what he calls, with a Sneer, our most holy Religion, or who now believe it, since they must do it entirely without Reason, "to have subverted all the Principles of their Understanding," and says, "that by believing what is most contrary to Custom and Experience, they are Instances of Miracles in their own Persons." Now what other Miracles could he think these to be, after what he has said through the whole Course of this Essay, but prodigious Effects of Credulity and Folly?

These last indeed, are not his Words; but that they express his real Sense, an impartial Reader will easily perceive: And when such a one considers by WHOM, in this Nation, the Christian Religion is publickly established, as well as professed, he will know what to think of an Author, who could treat THEM in such a Manner; and make such an Use of the valuable Liberty they are pleased to allow Men of publishing their Thoughts on Religion itself, as well as on all other Matters of Importance. He will not think it strange if a Person so disposed, should not be affected either with the Doctrines of the Christian Religion, or the Evidences for it. Nor if another, to whom the Promises of the Gospel are Objects of very pleasing Hopes, should have shewn some Concern for its Vindication, when it has received such unworthy Treatment.

The END

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2]Essay, 2d. Edit. Lond. M.DCC.LI. page 174.

[3]See Deuter. xii. 1, 2, 3. -- 2 Thess. ii. 9, 10, 11, 12. -- Matt. xxiv. 24, 25. -- Rev. xii. 13, 14.

[4]Terence describes such People with some Humour, in prolog. Andr. Faciunt nae intellegendo ut nihil intelegant. They really come to understand so, as to know nothing of the Matter.

[5]Socrates used to say, as Tully quotes with Approbation, de Orat. lib. i. Quibus id persuasum est ut nihil mallent se esse quam Bonos Viros, iis reliquam facilem esse [Virtutis] Doctrinam. They who

have nothing more at heart than to be Good Men, will easily learn the Way to be so. One sees how agreeable this Observation, made by two ofthe greatest Men among the antient Heathens, is to what was delivered afterwards by the highest Authority, John vii. 17. If any Man will do His [God's] Will, he shall know of th eDoctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.

[6]Plato, de Repub. lib. vii. p. 708. Edit: Francof. M.DC.II.

[7]Plato, de Repub. lib. vi. p. 506.

[8]After an address to God the Saviour, that he will preserve us from saying any thing absurd or immoral, [and lead us] to fit Opinions of Things, we begin again to speak.

Some Late Opinions Concerning The Foundation Of Morality, Examined. In A Letter To A Friend.

1753

Editor's note: *Some Late Opinions* pamphlet appeared anonymously in 1753; this and James Balfour's *A Delineation* (1753) are the first published discussion of Hume's *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morality* (1751). After brief introductory comments, pages 7-12 focus on Lord Kames's, *Essays on the principles of morality and natural religion* (1751) and pages 13-46 on Hume's moral *Enquiry*. The author expresses general approval of Kames's account of morality, but criticizes Kames for identifying obligation with an approving sentiment. Hume's theory is found less favorable and is criticized for the central role that utility plays, particularly when issues of justice are taken into account. William Rose's complete review of this pamphlet in the *Monthly Review* is as follows:

> **THIS letter, which is written in a genteel and sensible manner, contains some general observations on two books lately published; the one entitled, *Essays on the principles of morality and natural religion,* by an anonymous author; the other *An Enquiry concerning the principles of morals* by *David Hume,* esq; The first of these performances our letter-writer is, in general, highly pleased with, and thinks the author of it has great merit, were it only for stating so clearly the sentiment of duty, or moral obligation, and distinguishing it from the sentiment of simple moral approbation; the want of which distinction, he says, has always appeared to him a great defect in former authors, who acknowledged an internal sense to be the foundation of morality.**
>
> **As to the *Enquiry into the principles of morals,* he allows that the author is a very agreeable writer, and discovers an uncommon genius, but thinks that the love of simplicity has betray'd him, as it has many before him, into considerable errors. He examines a little mr. *Hume*'s doctrine in regard to justice, and endeavours to shew that the arguments advanced in support of it are altogether inconclusive. After this he proceeds to consider that idea of approbation, which mr. *Hume* makes to include the**

whole of the moral feeling, and upon which he founds the distinction betwixt virtue and vice; and here he takes a short view of that variety of different objects and qualities, which the author of the *Enquiry* ranks under the same class of moral approbation; and endeavours to shew, that the sentiments they produce in us differ as widely as the approbation of inanimate from that of rational objects.

He observes that morality can be founded and ascertained on our innate feelings of duty alone, and the authority which conscience carries in it, and that the overlooking these is an error which runs through the whole of the *Enquiry*. [*Monthly Review*, 1753, Vol. 8, p. 400.]

The following is from the 1753 and only edition of *Some Late Opinions*.

SOME LATE OPINIONS Concerning the FOUNDATION OF MORALITY, EXAMINED. In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

LONDON:
Printed for R. DODSLEY, in Pall-Mall; and M. COOPER, in Pater-Noster-Row.
MDCCLIII.

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Advertisement.

IN the present indolent state of learning, when writing goes on without labour, and reading without profit, a new species of composition has become fashionable; which, not being honoured with a peculiar name, borrows from it's form the appellation of A letter to a friend. -- A happy invention for writers, who have not courage to undertake a regular work. One of this sort, when seized by a fond fit of ambition to become an author, has as an easy passage to fame by a familiar address to the public, under the character of an intimate acquaintance. {iv} Probably the following letter will be considered as a work of this kind; and, but for one reason, the mistake should pass,

for there is no harm in it. The reason is, that the Person, to whom the letter was really addressed, reckoned himself so much indebted to the writer, that he could not deny himself the satisfaction of making a sort of public acknowledgement. And he was the more readily induced to do this, because the loss of so valuable a friend has not left him no other means to testify his gratitude.

{5}

SOME LATE OPINIONS Concerning the FOUNDATION OF MORALITY, EXAMINED.

In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

SIR,

THE turn you have taken of late to moral speculations gives pleasure to your friends. You certainly cannot employ your present retirement better, than in such studies as have a direct reference to human nature, and to the conduct of life. Morality, as you well observe, justly lays claim to {6} the first place among the sciences, because of the importance of its end, which is, to regulate our behaviour. And therefore it concerns mankind to have the principles of this science, above all others, established in a satisfactory manner; and to have the consequences of these principles deduced with clearness and accuracy. In may other parts of knowledge we may be mistaken, without any considerable prejudice to ourselves: but in moral systems, any error, at least any capital error, ought not to be regarded with indifference; because it may draw consequences after it affecting the conduct of life. The accurate examination which, upon this account, you propose of the theories of morality advanced by several authors, I very much approve of: and as you are pleased to think I can be of service to you in this examination, you may be assured I shall not decline giving you any assistance that is in my power. It is what I owe to the memory of your father, and it is {7} what I cannot deny to the goodness of your own disposition, had I no other motive.

Two books you Particularly mention lately published, which, by their singularity and novelty, have engaged your attention; the one entitled, *Essays on the principles of Morality and natural Religion, in two parts; by an anonymous author:* the other, *An Enquiry concerning the principles of Morals*, by David Hume *Esq*. I have read both with care; and shall communicate to you the observations I have made.

To begin with the former. The author has discovered a bold and penetrating genius; and has advanced many things new and curious. In some points I cannot agree with him. His speculations concerning liberty and necessity, in particular, are liable, in my opinion, to several strong objections. But this is what I shall not at present inquire into, {8} as it is only his treatise concerning the law of nature, and the foundation of virtue, which I now mean to consider. And here I must confess he has afforded me a great deal of entertainment. Though he has not writ a professed system, yet he has given more openings into the subject, and has set it in a juster light than any other author I know. He traces the several feelings of human nature which relate to morality, and ascertains their different degrees of authority. In my opinion his merit is great, were it only for stating so clearly the sentiment of duty, or moral obligation; and distinguishing it from

the sentiment of simple moral approbation. The want of this distinction appeared always to me a great defect in former authors, who acknowledged an internal sense to be the foundation of morality. In benevolence they comprise the whole of virtue; and, confounding obligation with a mere approbatory sentiment, they suppose mankind to be under the strictest obligation {9} to the highest acts of benevolence; because such actions produce the highest approbation. In this, their systems have the misfortune to contradict nature and experience; and therefore have undoubtedly a dangerous tendency. For no man, after he is dismissed from the schools of philosophy, and begins to act his part in life, can in any degree act upon such a plan as these philosophers lay down; and hence is too apt to consider the whole of virtue as a romance or chimera. He will indeed feel himself inwardly bound to a strict observance of the rules of justice and honesty; but will never be conscious of a perpetual obligation to exert, on every occasion, the highest acts of generosity and benevolence. Here then our author makes a distinction which is certainly founded in nature and truth; and which serves no a little to illustrate the wisdom of the human constitution. He observes, that indeed the highest approbatory pleasure attends generous and benevolent {10} actions; but that as justice, truth, fidelity and gratitude are more necessary to the support of human society; so, to these virtues only belongs the sentiment of strict moral obligation. The peculiarity of this sentiment, as expressed by the words, *ought* and *should*, our author distinctly explains, and shews how it is to be distinguished from simple approbation by the sanction of self-condemnation and remorse.

As this author has thus analysed the moral sense to better purpose, in my judgment, than had been done before him; so, in treating of our principles of action, he has thrown new light upon the affection of universal benevolence. He has very justly observed, that though there are principles in our nature exciting us to compassion, to gratitude and to friendship; yet, where there are no circumstances to awaken or engage the mind, we rest in a state of indifference, and are not conscious either of benevolence {11} or malevolence to an unknown person. The moralist, therefore, who requires us to lay aside all partial affection, and to act upon a principle of general benevolence to all men, require us to act upon a principle which, in truth, has no place in human nature. Providence has more wisely contrived it, that though our benevolence to individuals gradually decreases according to their distance, 'till at last it dwindles away to nothing, yet, when these individuals are collected into one body, and considered as a general object, benevolence rekindles towards them in the highest degree; and our country, our government, or mankind in general, are objects capable of raising the warmest feelings of zeal or public spirit. The attention which our author has shewn to trace the final causes of this and the other phaenomena which he points out in human nature, recommends his speculations to me the more, as tending to confirm and promote an admiration {12} of nature and providence; and end which it is highly worthy of every philosopher to keep in view, if he expects that mankind should be made truly better by any of his speculations. The delineation which the author has given of the laws of nature, I cannot but think extremely consonant to the natural feelings and sentiments of men. But it is needless to insist any longer upon this treatise, as there does not seem to be any difference of opinion betwixt us about it: and I entirely agree with you, that it is worthy of your repeated perusal.

To proceed then to the *Enquiry into the principles of morals*; I am of the same mind with you, that the author is a very agreeable writer, and discovers an uncommon genius. You seem pleased with him for having reduced the system of morals into a narrow compass, by resolving the whole into a single principle. But here we must differ; for I am afraid, the love of simplicity has betrayed him, {13} as it has many before him, into considerable errors. Patiently to investigate facts is doing a

great deal; and very often is all that can be done: But to build systems, and to trace first principles, is too much for us to attempt in most sciences; and the appetite for it commonly diverts the mind from the fair and unbiassed view of facts. Let us examine a little how this author has succeeded in some of the chief parts of his theory.

Utility is his favourite and capital principle, to which he reduces all the several branches of morals. With regard to benevolence, he admits of a moral sense which may produce an immediate and instinctive approbation of it; but with regard to justice, his notions are very singular. He denies that we have any natural sense or approbation of justice: he asserts it to be an artificial virtue, of which public utility is the sole foundation: and a great part of his treatise is employed in proving this. {14} This part of his doctrine I see has staggered you, nor without reason; for to me it appears not only ill founded, but even of dangerous tendency; and it puts justice, which of all virtues is the most necessary and fundamental to society, on a more loose and precarious bottom than the rest; and somehow degrades it into a lower class, and distinguishes it in a dishonourable manner. The author, of whom we were treating before, has a whole chapter upon this subject, in his essay on the laws of nature; in which, I think, he has clearly proved, that justice has a deeper foundation in our nature than mere reflexion on its utility. I confess it surprises me how a philosopher, who admits of a natural and immediate approbation as belonging to any virtue, should refuse this privilege to justice. For to me it seems clear, that no sentiment, no instinct, is so early observed in children, and so universally prevalent among all nations, even the most savage, as a notion of {15} property, a sense of right and wrong, of just and unjust. Perhaps there is no moral feeling whatever that is more clearly marked, that works stronger in the human breast, or that arises more instantaneously than indignation at injury and wrong; a feeling which is plainly natural, and by no means the consequence of any reflexions upon a public interest. Were this sentiment built only upon views of public utility, as our author contends that it is, there could never prevail among mankind so much uniformity of opinion concerning right and wrong. The varying views of utility, produced by the partialities of men for themselves, their relations, friends, country, &c. would be ever varying men's sentiments of justice, according to the different circumstances of the parties concerned. Of these inherent partialities and prejudices no education or enlarged views would ever wholly get the better. Or, supposing them to be, in some cases, overcome by reason, {16} the matter would not be much altered, considering the small number of men so happily disciplined. So that, if usefulness were the only foundation and measure of justice, the rules of right and wrong would be perpetually shifting, according to men's different apprehensions of a public interest. Nor is it here to be overlooked, that many cases occur in life, in which the consideration of a public interest loses its whole force, in restraining men from injustice; particularly with regard to secret transactions. Suppose me, for instance, privately trusted by a friend with some of his most valuable effects; he dies suddenly, leaving an overgrown fortune to his heir, who is a miser or a prodigal I have a numerous family, hopeful children, upon whom my deceased friend's effects would be bestowed much more for the public good, than upon his heir who, knowing nothing of this matter, suffers nothing. Every argument, that can be drawn from utility, {17} seems here to justify me in retaining these effects, by which I shall be enabled to give my children a virtuous education and a creditable establishment. Here utility unluckily takes the wrong side; and if, even this singular case, the duty of restitution and fulfilling a trust continues rigidly the same as in ordinary cases, of which no honest man will doubt, it follows evidently, that justice must rest upon some foundation independent of utility.

As it is a very material point, in any system of morals, to ascertain the foundation of justice; let us

follow our author a little, and see what are the arguments he advances in support of his hypothesis. I cannot help thinking they are altogether inconclusive. He argues from the supposition of a golden age, where all the conveniencies of life are in perfect abundance, without need of any labour to procure them; and where the minds of men are animated with {18} perfect friendship and generosity to each other. "Suppose such a state," says he[2], "and it would follow, that men could not have the least idea of justice or separate property:" From whence he infers, that this virtue derives its existence altogether from its use in the present intercourses of mankind. This is a very lame conclusion; for his argument proves no more than, that certain circumstances are requisite in order to give the natural sentiment of justice an opportunity of displaying itself. "Reverse," says our author,[3] "in any considerable circumstance, the condition of man: produce extreme abundance or extreme necessity: implant in the human breast moderation and equity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice: by rendring justice totally useless, you thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation upon mankind." That is, suppose man no longer to be man; endow him with another nature; place {19} him in another world; suppose him no more subject to the same wants and necessities he is now subject to: and what follows? Why, no doubt, that, upon such a supposition, several of his present feelings and sentiments would become useless, and have no place. But will any man draw this consequence, that therefore these feelings and sentiments are not natural to him? Upon the same chimerical supposition of a perfect state, neither would there be any place for some exercises of benevolence, such as compassion; seeing there would be no objects of distress. And yet compassion, according to our author's express doctrine, is among those principles which are natural to man. The same argument holds for justice. "But," says he, "in some cases which actually happen in life, such as that of famine, or a besieged city, the distinctions of property are overthrown, and the obligation to justice ceases." And what does this prove, but that, in certain cases {20} of extremity, the great law of self-preservation takes place of all other principles whatever; which all moralists have allowed. It is most true, as our author observes, that the laws, which direct the exercise of justice, have always public good for their object; *salus populi suprema lex*. This, no doubt, shews, that justice and public good coincide; but will never prove, that we have no sentiment of justice but what arises from a reflection on public good. For so likewise public good directs and limits the exertions of private friendship and benevolence; whilst yet, according to our author's own theory, these virtues have a separate and independent foundation in the nature of man. Why then should we deny the same foundation to justice, when public good has no more authority over the exercise of the one than over the exercise of the other?

Our author is so unlucky in his arguments, the he makes use of one which {21} turns, in my opinion, directly against him. It is in his second Appendix; where, professedly supporting his hypothesis concerning justice[4], he bestows a great deal of illustration to shew, That every single act of benevolence carries in it a manifest character of utility, or tendency to public good: That this tendency, however, is far from being so manifest in every single act of justice or fidelity: but, That, here, the benefit to the public arises from the general observation of the rules of justice, as a scheme concurred in by the whole society: and he adds, That particular acts of justice may, sometimes, be attended with such apparent inconveniencies and evils, as may lead a young inexperienced mind (as in the case of *Cyrus*, which he instances) to decide in favour of what is unjust, under the notion of its being better for the public. Now, if this be the case, as plainly it is, this alone clearly shews, That justice {22} can never be an artificial virtue, formed only on a sense of public interest: for this public interest, to which it is supposed to be subservient, is, by the author's own reasoning, an object so much out of view, as to be quite insufficient for supporting

that general sense of justice, which we find prevailing in the world. If our author admits, that benevolence is attended with a natural and immediate approbation, tho' the utility of that virtue, or its tendency to public good, is, in every instance, so obvious; must he not admit, that there is much more reason for justice being supported and recommended by the same natural and direct approbation; and that, in the constitution of our nature, it would be something extremely preposterous, if justice were, in this respect, left upon a worse footing than benevolence; both as justice is more necessary for the subsistence of society than benevolence, and as the utility of {23} justice, in its single and separate acts, is, by the author's own confession, much less obvious and apparent?

But it is needless to insist longer on what is so evident. You yourself, Sir, though you seem to have no small partiality for this author, admit, that there is something which appears unsound in his notions of justice; and which, you are of opinion, will never please philosophers. What will please philosophers is indeed not easy to say, when we find a noble author, who would have taken it very much amiss not to have been ranked in the philosophical class, I mean the late lord *Bolingbroke* (if a pamphlet, published no long ago under his name, be truly his) seriously maintaining, That there is no instinct, or innate principle, in men, which prompts them to compassion; because travellers tell us, That savages and man-eaters seem to have as strong an instinct for cruelty, as for {24} compassion. But, whatever speculations philosophers may devise concerning these matters, in their profound enquiries, if we make an appeal to persons of plain sense and judgment, they will tell us, with one voice, That both justice and compassion are natural principles; which, without reasonings or deductions, either from self love or public good, they find engraven on their hearts.

Having discussed our author's sentiments concerning justice, I will freely own to you, that there is another part of his system which appears to me no less exceptionable; I mean that loose and vague idea of approbation, which he makes to include the whole of the moral feeling, and upon which he founds the distinction betwixt virtue and vice. This seems to me a capital error running through his whole treatise. His notion is, That whatever, in character or conduct, is approved as useful, {25} is virtue; and thus, by reducing morality into the same class in which we place some very trifling qualities, he destroys moral distinctions altogether. It is to be observed, that approbation is a word of a very undetermined signification; and the author has never endeavoured to fix its meaning. It is whatever we take pleasure in; whatever we consider as useful or agreeable. We approve of may inanimate things, in the view of their being useful; useful herbs, useful medicines, houses &*c*. Is this sort of approbation then sufficient to characterise virtue? or may we call these inanimate objects virtuous? No[5], says our author; for, as he tells us, though there is indeed a species of approbation attending inanimate objects, when beneficial; yet it is so weak, and so different from the approbation bestowed upon beneficial magistrates or statesmen, that they ought not to be ranked under the same class or appellation. {26} But let us now take a view of that variety of different objects and qualities which he ranks under the same class of moral approbation; and let us enquire, whether the sentiments they produce in us do not differ as widely as the approbation of inanimate from that of rational objects.

First, he includes in the class of virtues, which are entitled to moral approbation, those qualities of the mind, which are commonly known by the name of intellectual abilities; such as penetration, courage, industry, secrecy, and the like. This is a pretty wide step: for the greatest villain may be possessed of these qualities in a very high degree; and it were strange to say, that they give him any share of moral desert. The world, indeed, value these qualities, as useful to the possessor: but to call every thing virtue which, upon any account, is valued, or which a man would wish to possess as

useful, is {27} strangely altering the use of words; to say no worse of it. Nor will the authority of the ancients, whom he affects to represent as on his side, at all avail him here. For the philosophers, especially *Cicero*, *Plato* and *Aristotle*, when they treat professedly of such virtues as courage, prudence, magnanimity, and the like, always consider them as moral habits, cultivated for the sake of worthy and good ends. And as for the historians, whom he quotes, it is plain that, in drawing characters, they use the word *virtue* in a loose sense, and not with philosophical accuracy.

But, besides those qualities which comprehend the higher sort of abilities, we find our author, bye and bye, extending the moral sentiment of approbation to qualities of an inferior nature, such as chearfulness of temper; politeness and good address; wit; decency; and even cleanliness. When we find these qualities ranked upon a level with the {28} virtues of benevolence, justice, and humanity, we have a sufficient proof how loose our author's criterion of approbation is, and how little to be depended upon. But what comes afterwards is astonishing. He has a section expressly to shew,[6] that the sentiments of regard which bodily endowments, such as strength and beauty, and which riches and other external gods of fortune produce, coincide, in their nature, and the moral approbation, and rest upon the same foundation, *viz*. the utility of these things, or their tendency to produce happiness. Upon this footing, he says, we approve of a rich man, that is, we pay him regard, and prefer him to a poorman; because riches present us those ideas of satisfaction, plenty, cleanliness, &*c*. which are agreeable to the social sense, as conducive to the happiness of mankind. Nay, not only is our approbation of riches put upon a level with our approbation of virtue, but our author {29} descends so low[7] as to account, in the same way, for that approbation which women pay a man of that make of body, which distinguishes what is called, to use his own phrase, a *good woman's man:* "a like principle," he adds, "operating more extensively, is the general source of moral affection and approbation." I must now ask you, what he has left, to distinguish the excellency of virtue from the many trifling accomplishments, which are agreeable or useful in the lowest degree? With how many heterogeneous things has he blended those moral distinctions, which mankind have hitherto held sacred? And does not his theory thereby tend to obscure and lessen the dignity of virtue? Our author, indeed, acknowledges the sentiment of approbation, which we give to some of those useful qualities, to be, perhaps, inferior, in degree, to that which we give to the virtues of justice and humanity: but he contends, {30} however, that the sentiments are similar, and of the same kind. I absolutely deny that they are similar, or of the same kind. One man betrays his trust; is inhuman to his parents, or false and ungrateful to his friend: another man means well, buy, through want of discretion, frequently blunders; is aukward in his address; or blunt and forbidding in his manner. Compare these two together; and I appeal to you, Sir, or to any other man, whether the sentiment of disapprobation and blame in the one case be not very widely different from what it is in the other; and whether we feel the least of that indignation, with respect to the disagreeable or unpolite man, which we feel with respect to the betrayer and the villain? And after all, if morality is to be brought so low, I see no reason for excluding even inanimate objects: if utility is the only characteristic of virtue, they must be comprehended; as it must be owned, that many inanimate objects are much {31) more beneficial than several of the qualities he ranks under the moral class. This consideration, even in a superficial view, must create a suspicion, that our author is not in the right track; and that he has, unwarily, suffered himself to be misled, by following an object that has more of splendour than of substance.

It is a particular disadvantage of our author's theory, that, according to it, no distinct account can be given of our obligation to virtue. In his section upon this head, he resolves it into a motive from interest, leading us to acquire those laudable qualities which, experience teaches us, are so useful.

This confounds all; and shews upon what a weak, or rather, upon what a false bottom his hypothesis is built. For if the word obligation, when applied to morality, has any meaning; if there be any ideas which correspond to the words *ought* and *should*, they certainly imply something else than an interested motive: {32} otherwise, the miser would be under the same obligation to increase his wealth, which is his notion of interest or happiness, as an honest man is to fulfil his word, or pay his debts. Obligation and duty are equivalent terms: and as, according to our author, they extend to all those useful qualities which are the subject of moral approbation, in his sense of the work; it follows, that it is our duty to be chearful, well bred, witty, or cleanly, which are all moral qualities according to his theory, as much as to be just, and honest; or, if the obligation is not precisely in the same degree as to both, it is, however, by his system, most certainly an obligation of the same kind. This seems to me repugnant to sound morals, as well as to the common actions of mankind. It is our author's error, from the beginning to the end, to have overlooked those innate feelings of duty; that authority which conscience carries in itself, prescribing to us certain virtues as a rule or law; upon which {33} alone morality can be founded and ascertained. Instead of this, he has a loose and indeterminate approbation, which may be applied to so many qualities of the mind, and of such different natures, that it can never ascertain virtue or found moral obligation.

What you are most pleased with in this author's performance, you tell me, is his great principle of utility; and you cannot but think he has very happily illustrated it, as a key to that general admiration and esteem which all mankind have for virtue. You think there is something new, and, at the same time, simple and neat, in this manner of stating the foundation of virtue. Not altogether new, I must observe; for Mr. *Hutchenson* led the way by resolving all the several virtues into benevolence, as our author has done into utility; which, in his sense of it, is much the same. That all virtue is useful, or has a tendency to promote general happiness, is {34} what no mortal denies: but the question is, whether that approbation, which we give to virtue, is founded upon the sense of this useful tendency; and whether even the most rude and untaught minds carry this always in view, whenever they approve of an action as virtuous? is it not, for instance, very forced to suppose, with our author[8], that female chastity has no other foundation than a sense of the utility of this virtue? that it is a virtue of great advantage to society, and, in that view, highly to be prized, will be readily granted him. But does he really think, that, when the chastity of a virtuous woman is attacked, it is nothing but the sense of a public interest, and regard to the good of society, that prompts her to maintain her innocence? Besides education and acquired habits, which I allow to have great influence, is there no such thing as an instinct of natural modesty, or a sense of honour or pride, {35} which acts as the guardian of chastity, independent of all utility?

Indeed, the more I reflect upon it, the more presumptions occur, that there is something unsound in the manner in which our author applies his principle of utility. Utility, in his sense of it, signifies the tendency of every kind of quality, whether to our own happiness or to the happiness of others. Now, self-love is, undoubtedly, a stronger principle in our nature than social sympathy; and, therefore, it seems clearly to follow, that, if utility be the only, or chief foundation of the moral approbation, qualities, which are useful to ourselves in particular, ought to raise a much higher degree of this moral approbation, than qualities useful to mankind in general. But this does not hold in fact. Private usefulness raises little or no moral approbation, in comparison of what is raised by being useful to the public. This is a stubborn fact, {36} incapable of being disguised; and, in my apprehension, is quite inconsistent with our author's theory.

Another presumption against his doctrine is this. Were usefulness the principal foundation of morals, justice ought to have a much higher degree of praise and approbation attending it, than

generosity, magnanimity, heroism, or any of the exalted virtues; because, undoubtedly, justice is more useful to the world than any of these. But the contrary holds good in fact. Matters are, indeed, so artfully contrived by the author of our nature, that the transgression of justice is more severely punished by inward remorse, and by universal blame, than a transgression of any of the exalted virtues. But, at the same time, it is certain, that these exalted virtues stand higher, in the praise and approbation of mankind, than justice: which seems clearly to shew, that usefulness {37} is not the chief foundation of that approbation of praise.

But, to come nearer to the point, I think it is in my power demonstrably to evince, That utility cannot possibly be any part of the foundation of morals; and, that our author plainly has mistaken the effect for the cause. And here you will not grudge the utmost attention, where the purpose is to ascertain the true foundation of morality. To begin with benevolence; with regard to which, the author admits, That it is, in some measure, the object of an immediate approbation; but, at the same time, contends, that "[9]at least a part of the merit of benevolence arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society." This, no doubt, is a very innocent proposition, and may be indulged in popular discourse. But, in strict reasoning {38} and true philosophy, it cannot be admitted. By the *merit* of benevolence, our author can mean nothing else but the value which we put upon it; the respect and esteem which we have for it. Now, if this be the meaning, it can easily be demonstrated, That the very reverse of his proposition is true; *viz*. That the merit of usefulness arises from the principle of benevolence. Nothing can be more clear. For, take away the principle of benevolence, where would be the merit of our author's boasted utility? or what foundation would there be for putting any value upon useful actions? To a being that had no benevolence, useful, or pernicious actions, would be indifferent: and, to a being thoroughly malicious, actions of a bad tendency would be the most grateful. It is incontestably clear then, that actions, cone to promote the interests of our species, are approved of, upon the principle of benevolence: and, so far is {39} benevolence from deriving any part of its merit from usefulness, that, on the contrary, the whole merit of usefulness is derived from benevolence.

Let us apply the same sort of reasoning to justice, which, our author strenuously contends, has no foundation whatever, but its usefulness. Before I give my assent to this proposition, the author cannot take it amiss to have question or two put to him. The first is, To what end is justice useful? Our author, foreseeing this question, has given his answer in the following words, "That justice is useful, for preserving to every man the peaceable possession of what he has acquired by his labour and industry." Hiving got satisfaction upon this head, I demand again, Whence arises the utility of preserving to every man the peaceable possession of what he has acquired by labour and industry? The answer must be, that it arises from that peculiar satisfaction which every man has, when he {40} is secured in the possession of such goods, without being exposed to violence; for, had he no satisfaction of this kind, nor any affection for such goods, the utility would vanish. Again, were there no benevolence, would the distress, which man feels when his goods are torn from him, give us any concern? Certainly not. Why then is benevolence overlooked in searching for the foundation of justice? It now clearly appears, not only, that justice supported by benevolence, but, considered as an useful virtue, that it also derives part at least of its merit from benevolence.

But further, our author must acknowledge a fact which is incontestably true, that every man distinguishes goods acquired by his labour and industry, from what he has acquired the possession of by fraud, force, or other unjustifiable means. With regard to the former, he is conscious of wrong done him {41} when dispossessed by violence; he calls such an action robbery: when deprived of the latter by the hands of justice, he has no such consciousness; but rather, that he was

treated as he deserved. At the same time, all mankind join with him in these sentiments; and hence that universal indignation against those who, breaking through all natural restraints, are guilty of robbery or theft.

But one step further, my dear Sir, and we shall have displayed to us in full light the true and solid foundation of justice. Recollecting what is laid down above, we find, that goods which we have acquired by labour and industry, by inheritance, or by other honest means, are distinguished form all others. We have a peculiar affection for such goods: we have a consciousness of wrong when deprived of them; and the person, who commits the wrong, {42} becomes the object of our resentment, and of the indignation of mankind. Here, a relation is established betwixt us and such goods by the strongest natural sentiments; and this singular relation, mankind have agreed to denominate by the word *property*. It is evident then, in the first place, that property is founded in the nature of man, antecedently to all positive laws and conventions: in the next place, that justice derives its force and authority from the singular feelings which characterize property; and consequently, that justice rests upon these feelings, as its true and solid foundation.

To conclude, the error is the same here that our author has unwarily committed, with regard to benevolence. He has endeavoured to invert human nature, by assigning that as the cause which is truly the effect. "Utility," he says, "is the foundation of justice, {43} and justice of property:" whereas, in truth, property, and the natural sentiments which give it birth, are the foundation of justice, as well as of all the utility we ascribe to it. And, after all, a single reflexion might have made this evident to him. Laying aside property and the natural sentiments which produce it, there could be no such thing as injustice; we could have no conception of justice; and as little of that beauty, merit and usefulness we ascribe to it.

In handling this subject, I would by no means be understood to deny, that usefulness, by a reflex act, may become an additional motive to justice. I only assert, that it is not the foundation of this virtue; which, I think, can be clearly traced back to a primary, original feeling in human nature. The case of justice, with respect to utility, is pretty much the same as that of eating and {44} drinking, with respect to self-preservation. Nature has provided us with proper appetites, which move us to eat and drink, in the same manner, as the feelings of right and wrong move us to do justice. Justice, it is true, is useful, and so are eating and drinking; but usefulness is not the foundation or principle of either; though usefulness may sometimes become an additional motive to do justice, as well as to take nourishment when we have no appetite.

The above is so agreeable to the natural notions of mankind, that whoever endeavours to establish an opposite theory, will find it difficult to keep clear of contradictions. Our ingenious author may be taxed with something of this nature. For, reasoning upon the usefulness of justice[10], he shews it to be the design of public laws, to secure to every man the peaceable possession of his property, the privilege of transmitting {45} it to his posterity, and the power of transferring it to others, by mutual consent. This is, in effect, acknowledging the idea of property to be antecedent to these laws, and to be the foundation of them. And yet, in the same page, he asserts, That *mine* and *thine* have no meaning, but in consequence of these laws. Thus, he makes property the foundation of these laws, and these laws the foundation of property.

I am not surprised you should be pleased with a work, which, in an elegant dress, promises a neat and simple theory of morals. But, if the above hints shall engage you to a more accurate review, I am confident you will discover this new theory to be slight and altogether unsound. Human nature is a complex machine; and, by a careful investigation of its several springs and movements, it

appears {46} to me, That we are more likely to arrive at a just view of morals, as a science, than by establishing, too hastily, a single principle, and building an entire system upon it. Any further observations of mine you desire, I shall always be ready to communicate, as you know me to be, with sincere attachment,

SIR,

Your most humble Servant.

FINIS.

Notes

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[2]Page 34, 35.

[3]Page 41.

[4]Page 215.

[5]Page 75.

[6]Page 133, & seq.

[7]Note, page 135.

[8]Page 66.

[9]Page 31.

[10]Page 52.

"Postscript on Mr. Hume's Natural History of Religion"

Three Questions Resolved

Caleb Fleming

1757

Editor's note: Caleb Fleming (1689-1779) was a dissenting Protestant clergyman whose views were antitrinitarian and deistic. He was a prolific pamphleteer with over a hundred religious and political titles to his credit, most written anonymously. Fleming's *Three Questions Resolved* was published anonymously in 1757. The complete title of the pamphlet, which summarizes its contents, is *Three Questions Resolved. viz. What is religion? What is the Christian Religion? What is the Christian Catholic Church? wherein Popery is proved to have no Claim, either as a Religion, as the Christian Religion, or as the Christian Catholic-Church. In Three Letters to ---- Esq. with a Postscript on Mr. Hume's Natural History of Religion* (London: A. Henderson, 1757). In the Postcript, Fleming criticizes Hume's contention that religion is founded on principles of the imagination, as opposed to rational proofs of a single creator. He also criticizes hume for identifying the history of superstition with that of true religion. He concludes on a positive note, though, that, "Notwithstanding these sophisms, Mr. *Hume* has finely exposed superstition... and so far as he is a theist, he cannot be an enemy to genuine christianity." The *Monthly Review* comments generally about the pamphlet that "We have here some just sentiments on religion in general, and on the Christian religion in particular, delivered with the utmost freedom" (1757, Vol. 16, pp. 470-472). Biographies and bibliographies on Fleming are in Walter Wilson's *History and Antiquities of Dissenting Churches*, (London: 1862), Vol. II 283-290, and the *Dictionary of National Biography*. Only the Postscrtipt to the pamphlet is presented here, and is from the 1757 and only edition of *Three Questions Resolved*.

Postscript on Mr. Hume's Natural History of Religion

{50}

P.S. **Mr. David Hume, in *his natural history of religion,* allows its foundation in reason to be most obvious.**

> **"For no rational enquirer can, after serious reflexion, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine theism and religion."**

But then he thinks it more difficult to shew, "its origin in human nature."[2] On these principles he grounds his enquiry. But what can he mean by religion admitting the clearest solution, concerning the foundation it has in reason; yet, not so concerning its origin in human nature? May reason then be separated from human nature in the religion of mankind? Is this possible? How shall it be done, when no rational enquirer can, after serious reflexion, suspend his belief one moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine theism and religion.

To secure his distinctions,

> **"Polytheism or idolatry was, and necessarily must have been the first and most ancient religion of mankind. For, the most ancient records of the human race still present us with Polytheism as the popular and established system."[3]**

Does it not seem more natural to conclude, that from the creation mankind clearly saw the invisible things of {51} God? But that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, became wanton in their imaginations, and so corrupted the primary principles of pure theism. If the history of *Moses* be authentic, men degenerated from true theism to idolatry; and by their debaucheries brought on the destructive deluge. The primary religion of the new world, peopled by *Noah* and his family, surely could not be polytheism and idolatry. And certain we are, superstition, polytheism or idolatry could not be the primary profession of christians. Especially since Mr. Hume has said,

> **"nothing indeed would prove more strongly the divine origin of any religion, than to find, (and happily this is the case with christianity) that it is free from a contradiction, so incident to human nature."[4]**

Whatever was his design, this is the true character of genuine christianity, untouched by the over-officious fingers of men. And to which, this elegant writer seems much indebted for that charming description of theism,

> **"a system which supposes one sole deity, the perfection of reason and goodness, which if justly prosecuted, will banish every thing frivolous, unreasonable, or inhuman from religious worship, and set {52} before men the most illustrious example, as well as the most commanding motives of justice and benevolence."[5]**

It must be allowed a fine copy of the Gospel original; and could be taken from no other system.

This lively writer makes some very uncommon observations.

"Men have a natural tendency to rise from idolatry to theism, and to sink again from theism into idolatry." And he concludes, "that religion and idolatry have one and the same origin." See his 8th section.

But in his 10th, "the corruption of the best things give rise to the worst."[6] Of this we have some conception. Not so of theism and polytheism having one origin. Nor of the natural tendency in men

to rise from idolatry to theism. And we should be inclined to ask some proof, how it comes to pass, that in this natural tendency to both extremes, we see not the mechanical vibrations of the pendulum equal, or nearly equal? How can we read over Mr. HUME's *natural history of religion*, and give him credit, if this observation has any truth in it? Why such an universal polytheism, if there be this natural tendency in man to rise from idolatry to theism?[7]

There is another discovery made by this {53} Philosopher, and that is, "the origin of idolatry or polytheism, is, the active imagination of men, incessantly imployed, in cloathing the conception they have of objects, in shapes more suitable to its natural comprehension."[8] Which if conclusive, then religion and idolatry, theism and polytheism are equally natural to man; and have alike a very fanciful origination.

But in truth, his idea of the religion of mankind, does not intend more, than the superstition which has arisen from depravity. For, sais he, "one may safely affirm, that all popular theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of appetite for absurdity and contradiction. If that theology went not beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines would appear too easy and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised: mystery affected: darkness and obscurity sought after: and a foundation of merit afforded the devout votaries, who desire an opportunity of subduing their rebellious reason, by the belief of the most unintelligible sophism."[9] Is not this *Sir*, a fair specimen of what he means by the religion of mankind? But could this be the first and most ancient religion of mankind? Does he not explicitely own it could not?[10] "In short, all virtue, when men are reconciled to it by ever so {54} little practice, is agreeable: all superstition is for ever odious and burthensome."[11] And again, "after the commission of crimes, there arise remorses and secret horrors, which give no rest to the mind, but make it have recourse to religious rites and ceremonies, as expiations of its offences. Whatever weakens or disorders the internal frame, promotes the interests of superstition: and nothing is more destructive to them than a manly, steady virtue, which either preserves us from disastrous, melancholy accidents, or teaches us to bear them. During such calm sun-shine of the mind, these spectres of false divinity never make their appearance. On the other hand, while we *abandon our selves* to the undisciplined suggestions of our timid and anxious hearts, every kind of barbarity is ascribed to the supreme Being, from the terror with which we are agitated; and every kind of caprice, from the methods which we embrace, in order to appease him."[12]

I would not mistake this writer, and therefore produce another of his descriptions of the popular religions; in which he is very express in shewing, that these superstitions have not their origin in human nature. "And that it may safely be affirmed, many popular religions are really, in the conception of {55} these more vulgar votaries, a spirit of Daemonism; and the higher the deity is exalted in power and knowledge, the lower of course is he frequently depress'd in goodness and benevolence; whatever epithets of praise may be bestowed on him by his amazed adorers. Amongst idolaters, the words may be false, and belie the secret opinions: but amongst more exalted religionists, the opinion itself often contracts a kind of falsehood, and belies *the inward sentiment. The heart secretly detests such measures of cruel and implacable vengeance*; but the judgment dares not but pronounce them perfect and adorable. *And the additional misery of this inward struggle* aggravates all the other terrors, by which these unhappy victims to superstition are for ever bounded."[13]

From this citation, I would ask, whether Mr. *Hume* has not acknowledged, that idolatry and superstition are not natural to man? And that consequently, the principles of genuine theism and religion, must have their origin in human nature. Superstition, the gloomy dread of deity, is no

primary principle in the heart of man.[14] The opinion belies the inward sentiment: there is a secret detestation of it in the heart!

I presume to make the following conclusions. {56}

Mr. *Hume*'s fundamental principles are manifestly wrong. He has called the superstition of the world, *a natural history of the religion of mankind*. He has affirmed, a natural tendency in man to rise out of idolatry into religion. He has strangely declared, that religion and superstition, theism and polytheism have one and the same origin; and this no better than the imagination. Whereas, religion and reason in man, are inseparable. Religion could not arise out of superstition, theism out of polytheism. The universal spread of idolatry, by his own history, [just] as universally confronts the proposition: and will not suppose it to have the least foundation in nature. For superstition has its origin in the disordered passions and imaginations of mankind; religion has its origin in a natural sovereignty which the reason of man exercises over these faculties. And from the nature of the thing, idolatry or polytheism could not be the primary profession of mankind; but must have been a corruption of pure theism and religion. Notwithstanding these sophisms, Mr. *Hume* has finely exposed superstition and popery: professeth himself an advocate of pure theism. And so far as he is a theist, he cannot be an enemy to genuine christianity.

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[2]P. 1 [pagination follows Hume's *Four Dissertations*, (London: 1757)].

[3]P. 3.

[4]P. 50.

[5]P. 59

[6]Also p. 63. *Corruptio optimi pessima*.

[7]Also p. 63. *Corruptio optimi pessima*.

[8]P. 55.

[9]P. 70.

[10]P. 55.

[11]P. 106.

[12]P. 109.

[13]P. 98.

[14]Though it is affirmed to be so in the 13th Proposition.

Remarks on Mr. David Hume's Essay on The Natural History of Religion

William Warburton

1757

Editor's note: William Warburton (1698-1779) was bishop of Gloucester and was known for his editions of Shakespeare and Pope, his attack on deism in the *Divine legation of Moses demonstrated....* (1737-1741), and his involvement in numerous controversies. He first became interested in Hume in 1749 after reading the essay "Of Miracles" which prompted him to sketch a brief attack.[2] His contempt for Hume's essay is also reflected in a passing reference in his 1751 edition of Pope's *Dunciad*.[3] Warburton originally wrote his *Remarks* in the margin of his copy of Hume's *Four Dissertations*, which his colleague Richard Hurd later transcribed into publishable form. It appeared anonymously in 1757, six months after Hume's *Four Dissertations*, disguised as a letter *to* Warburton by an unnamed admirer. The *Critical Review* opened its review of the *Remarks* with the following:

> **This little Pamphlet of seventy-six pages contains some short, but severe strictures on Mr. David Hume, addressed to the learned Dr. Warburton, with whose works our author seems to be intimately acquainted. He hath therefore professedly copied that ingenious writer's turn of thinking and expression, which he has done, as the Italians say, *con amore*. Whether the copy is exact, or, to use the painter's phrase, is done after the doctor's best manner or not, our readers will be able to determine....**

Hume learned of Warburton's authorship from his printer, William Strahan, who also printed the *Remarks*.[4] In a letter to his publisher, Andrew Millar, Hume writes: "I am positively assurd, that Dr Warburton wrote that Letter [i.e. *Remarks*] to himself which you sent me; and indeed the Style discovers him sufficiently."[5] Nevertheless, in his autobiography, Hume identifies Hurd as the author, and not Warburton.[6]

In 1777, shortly after Hume's death, the *Remarks* were published again, with only minor changes in spelling and punctuation, probably introduced by the printer. The 1777 edition contains the following preface:

> The bookseller to the reader: The following is supposed to be the Pamphlet referred to by the late Mr. David Hume, in Page 21, of his Life, *as being written by* Dr. Hurd. Upon my applying to the Bishop of Litchfield and Coventry for his permission to republish it, he very readily gave me his consent. His Lordship only added, he was sorry he could not take to himself the whole infamy of the charge brought against him; but that he should hereafter, if he thought it worth his while, explain himself more particularly on that subject. Strand, March, 1777. T. Cadell.[7]

Warburton died in 1779, and in 1788 the first edition of his collected works appeared, which included the *Remarks* in Volume seven.[8] The 1788 edition retains the printer's alterations from the 1777 edition and introduces further changes, both major and minor. In 1794 Hurd wrote his *Discourse, by way of general preface* to this edition of Warburton's Works (excerpts of which are included in this anthology). There Hurd explains his own role in the *Remarks*,[9] and notes that the 1788 edition presents the *Remarks* "in their original form," presumably as appeared in Warburton's marginal comments. Comparison of the 1757 and 1788 editions indicates that Hurd's literary contribution to the piece was mainly in writing the opening address and conclusion. He also added to the body a few paragraphs and transitional sentences. The 1811 and 1848 editions of Warburton's *Works* follow the 1788 edition. I have followed the 1757 version which includes Hurd's contributions. Major changes which appear in the 1788 edition are given in footnotes. Biographies on Warburton are Hurd's *Discourse* (1794), John Selby Watson's *The Life of William Warburton* (London: 1863) and A.W. Evans's *Warburton and the Warburtonians*, (London: 1932).

REMARKS ON MR. DAVID HUME'S ESSAY ON THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION: ADDRESSED TO THE REV. DR. WARBURTON.

"To wash away a few slight stains be mine;
"Charge him with Heaven's artillery, bold DIVINE.[10]

LONDON.
Printed for M. COOPER, in Pater-noster-row.
MDCCLVII.
[Price One Shilling.]

* * * *

TO
The Rev. Dr. WARBURTON.[11]

REV. SIR,

I TAKE leave to address myself to you as to the supposed Author of the FOUR LETTERS *on Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy*.[12] Under this character, if indeed it belongs to you, you seem to have a

right to the following Remarks; which are, in truth, little more than your own Remarks, only transferred from your Patrician, to this Plebeian Naturalist.

Permit me to say, that you have unmasked and for ever discredited the philosophical lucubrations of that unhappy Nobleman; who, in times that demanded the mere Politician to assist in impressing the belief of a moral Governor on the minds of men, was so forsaken of every patriot principle as to labour with all his might to exclude the Creator from his Works, and by the doctrine of an impious fatalism to emancipate an abandoned people from the FEAR OF GOD.

It became the eminence of your character to go forth against this bold invader of Heaven. Your conquest was complete. And what could one expect as the fruit of it, but that, this chieftain of Impiety being subdued, the rabble of the enemy would disperse and fly before you; at least that they would not rally again, till in future times some other Champion of their cause, as illustrious by his name and quality, should arise to reconduct them to the charge.

But, alas! the irreligious Spirit, tho' it may be disgraced, is not so easily suppressed. E'er the public had time to celebrate your triumphs, behold a puny Dialectician from the North, (for as Erasmus long since observed, *Scoti* DIALECTICIS ARGUTIIS *sibi blandiuntur*),[13] all over armed with doubts and disputation, steps forth into his place; and, with the same beggarly troop of routed sophisms, comes again to the attack.

But now, as the enemy is so contemptible, and the danger so little pressing, you may well enjoy your repose, and leave it to some inferior hand to chastise his insolence. And the very weakest may be equal to this attempt. For nothing remains but to employ against him the weapons which you have furnished; in a word, to draw again that sword of the spirit, which you had borrowed from the Sanctuary, and whole resistless splendour flashes, if not conviction, yet confusion in every face.

To this office I presume to devote myself. I have a portion at least of your zeal to animate my endeavours. And if my talents should be found as mean as those of my Adversary, this circumstance would not discourage me. The contest would only be more equal; and in such a quarrel the serious advocate for Religion would be sorry to owe his success to any thing but the goodness of his cause.

This, Sir, is all I had thought to say of myself. But being got on so seducing a subject, the importance, which every author is of to himself, makes me imagine that perhaps you may be tempted to push your inquiries concerning me somewhat farther. And if, haply, any such curiosity should be raised, tho' I have my reasons for being a little on the reserve with you, something at least I could be content to hazard for your satisfaction.

Of my *Person*, indeed, I must have leave to make no discovery. And to tell you the truth, I have taken such effectual precautions as to that particular, that I venture to say you will never know more of me than you do at present. You may believe, if you please, that my vanity has suffered something in resolving on this concealment.

But then in quality of *Author* of these Remarks, I have not the same scruples. It may be fitting, you should know something more of the WRITER'S intention and character. And in this respect he is very ready to gratify you.

THE AUTHOR then of these Remarks on Mr. Hume's Essay is ONE who, as you would otherwise conclude from the Remarks themselves, hath made a diligent study of your works; is familiar and, in a manner, conscious to your turn of thinking upon all subjects; and interests himself, more particularly, in all your views and projects for the support and advancement of religious truth.

But notwithstanding this intimacy with you, which might be justly suspected of creating a bias in most minds, he arrogates to himself the merit of judging of you more freely, nay to be plain with you, more severely, than perhaps your enemies themselves. He is extremely apprehensive of being misled or imposed upon in matters of this high concern: he considers the difficulty of the subjects; the fascination of favourite principles; the errors to which the best and most watchful writers are liable: And is the last man in the world who, out of a fondness for your notions, would neglect or betray any useful truth. He is One therefore that weighs your arguments without considering your authority, or even the disgrace you might be thought to incur from the confutation of them. Reading and criticizing you with this spirit, you are not to wonder that he hath sometimes seen cause to censure, where others admire. He hath even considered your volumes with a diligence which might have profited your adversaries; for he hath detected, not inaccuracies only, but *weaknesses* in your writings, which the most malignant of them have overlooked. To make you amends for this mortification, he does you the justice to profess that those Adversaries, as far as he is acquainted with them, have universally done you wrong.

With all this suspicious and unrelenting criticism about him, he is ready to believe however that your views are honest: he acknowledges that the main of your System is strong and impregnable; he sees no reason for you to desert the great design you have undertaken; and admits that your talents for the execution of it, tho' not in his eyes what your fond admirers represent them, yet are such as may not unusefully, and, considering the times in which we live, may even creditably enough be employed by you in such a cause.

In a word, the AUTHOR of these Remarks is One who approves your Principles; or he would not have made use of them, even in this service. He thinks there is force and conviction in your Reasonings; or he would not have tried the strength of them upon others, and least of all upon so captious, versatile, and evasive a writer as Him, with whom he is here concerned. But what he takes upon himself to say he is most confident of, is your *zeal for the interests of truth and virtue*; without which, whatever your merit there might be in your writings, he could have no complacency in the writer.

In consequence of this last judgment, which he forms of you, he hath not scrupled to adopt your *manner* of composition, as well as Arguments. He knows what the gentle reader thinks of it. But he is not one of those cool opposers of Infidelity, who can reason without earnestness, and confute without warmth. He leaves it to others, to the soft Divine and courtly Controversialist, to combat the most flagitious tenets with serenity; or maintain the most awful of religious truths in a way, that misleads the unwary reader into an opinion of their making but little impression on the writer's own heart. For himself, he freely owns he is apt to *kindle* as he writes; and would even blush to repel an insult on sense and virtue with less vigour than every honest man is expected to shew in his own case.

At the same time he is not so blinded by his zeal, as to overlook a difference on OCCASIONS. He would not incur the ridicule of misapplying his strength; and is therefore content to soften his polemics a little, not in complaisance to such judges, but in conformity to his subject. Yet to put matters at the lowest, he remembers what the character of his piece should be, as delivered by a great Master -- MULTAE, ET CUM GRAVITATE, FACETIAE: QUODQUE DIFFICILE EST, IDEM ET PERORNATUS ET BREVIS.[14] And if he should not be thought to have catched the spirit of it so fully, as you have done on certain occasions, he pretends at least to have had this character in view, and to have copied it, as he was able; tho' at the hazard, he foresees, of passing with the too delicate critic, for a SERVILE IMITATOR.

This, Sir, is the whole of what he thinks fit to declare of himself. For the REMARKS themselves, which are here offered you, he pretends only, that they are such as occurred to him on a single reading of the Essay; that they were entered hastily on the margin, as he went along; and that he now transcribes them with little or no variation, for the public use. Nor let that Public take it amiss from the writer, that he treats them with this appearance of neglect. The various topics, he knows, which are touched upon in the Essay, might afford room for much useful and curious speculation. He knows too, what his Duty to the public requires from him on a proper occasion. But he never designed the following animadversions for an elaborate piece of instruction or entertainment to the learned reader. He would only employ a vacant hour in exposing to the laughter of every man, that can read, the futility, licence, and vanity of Mr. DAVID HUME.

REMARK I.

The writer, I have to do with, is a Veteran in the dark and deadly trade of Irreligion. But my concern at present is only with a volume of his, just now given to the public and entitled, FOUR DISSERTATIONS. And of these *Four*, I confine myself to the FIRST, which bears the portentous name of an Essay, *On the natural history of Religion*.[15]

The purpose of it is to establish NATURALISM on the ruins of RELIGION; of which, whether under Paganism and Polytheism, or under Revelation and the doctrine of the Unity, he professes to give the NATURAL HISTORY.[16]

And here let me observe it to his honour, that, tho' he be not yet got to THEISM, he is however on the advance and approaching to the borders of it;[17] having been in the dregs of Atheism when he wrote his Epicurean arguments against the being of a God.[18] Sometime or other he may come to his senses. A few animadversions on the *Essay* before us may help him forwards. The thing is full of curiosities: And the very *title-page*, as I observed, demands our attention. It is called,

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION.

You ask, why he chuses to give it this title. Would not the *Moral history of Meteors* be as full as sensible as the *Natural history of Religion*? Without doubt. Indeed had he given the history of what he himself would pass upon us for the only true Religion, namely, NATURALISM, or the belief of a God, the Creator and Physical Preserver, but not moral Governor of the world, the title of *Natural* would have fitted it well, because all *Morality* is excluded form the Idea.

But this great Philosopher is never without his Reasons. It is to insinuate, that what the world calls Religion, of which he undertakes to give the history, is not founded in the JUDGMENT, but in the PASSIONS only. However the expression labours miserably, as it does thro' all his profound Lucubrations. And where is the wonder that he who disdains to think in the mode of common sense, should be unable to express himself in the proprieties of common language?

***As every Inquiry which regards Religion* (says that respectable Personage) *is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in particular which challenge our principal attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its* ORIGIN IN HUMAN NATURE.[19]**

Here we see, he aims at a distinction. And what he aims at is not hard to find. The question is, whether he has hit the mark. I am afraid, not. And then the discovery of his aim is only the detection of his ignorance. In a word, it is a distinction without a difference.

If man be rightly defined a *rational animal*, then his Nature, or what our Philosopher calls *human Nature*, must be a *rational* Nature. But if so, a FOUNDATION IN REASON and an ORIGIN IN HUMAN NATURE are not too different predicates, but one and the same only in different expressions. Do I

say, therefore, that our Philosopher had no meaning, because he was unable to express any? Far be that from the Reverence due to this Rectifier of Prejudices. My objection at present is not to his Theology but his Logic. By *Origin in human Nature* he meant, Origin in the fancy or the Passions. For that Religion, which has the origin, here designed, is what the world calls RELIGION; and this he resolves into *fanaticism* or *superstition*: As that Religion which has its *foundation in reason* is what the world calls NATURALISM, the Religion of Philosophers like himself, and which he endeavours in the Essay to establish.

But do not believe, I intend to meddle with this *Religion of Philosophers* any further than to expose it to the public contempt, as it deserves. Even I should be finely employed, not to say you, to enter into a formal confutation of Mr. David Hume's *Naturalism*. However I think it incumbent on me to prove, that this is indeed the Religion which this honest man means to recommend in his *Natural History*. For so heavy a charge ought never to be made without good evidence to support it.[20]

In his third Section, at the 16th page, he makes UNKNOWN CAUSES the origin of what men call *Religion*, that Religion which his History pretends to investigate.

> These UNKNOWN CAUSES, says He, become the constant object of our hope and fear; and while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers, on which we have so entire a dependance.

He then goes on to acquaint us with the original of these UNKNOWN CAUSES.

Could men anatomize Nature, according to the most probable, at least the most intelligible philosophy, they would find, that these *Causes* are nothing but the particular fabric and structure of the MINUTE PARTS OF THEIR OWN BODIES AND OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS; and that, by a regular and constant machinery, all the events are produced, about which they are so much concerned. But this Philosophy exceeds the comprehension of the ignorant multitude.[21]

Here we see, the original of these *unknown causes* is nothing but the result of MATTER and MOTION. And again,

> The Vulgar, that is, indeed, ALL MANKIND, a few excepted, being ignorant and uninstructed, never elevate their contemplation to the Heavens, or penetrate by their disquisitions into the SECRET STRUCTURE OF VEGETABLE OR ANIMAL BODIES; so as to discover a supreme mind or original providence, which bestowed order on every part of Nature. They consider these admirable works in a more confined and selfish view; and finding their own happiness and misery to depend on the secret influence and unforeseen concurrence of external objects, they regard, with perpetual attention, the UNKNOWN CAUSES, which govern all these natural events, and distribute pleasure and pain, good and ill, by their powerful, but silent, operation. The UNKNOWN CAUSES are still appealed to, at every emergence; and in this general appearance or confused image, are the perpetual objects of human hopes and fears, wishes and apprehensions. By degrees, the active imagination of men, uneasy in this abstract conception of objects, about which it is incessantly employed, begins to render them more particular, and to cloathe them in shapes more suitable to its natural comprehension. It represents them to be sensible, intelligent beings, like mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and sacrifices. HENCE THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION: *And hence the origin of idolatry or Polytheism*.22

The *few excepted* out of the *whole race of mankind* are, we see, our Philosopher and his gang, with

their Pedler's ware of *matter* and *motion, who penetrate by their disquisitions into the secret structure of vegetable and animal bodies,* to extract, like the Naturalist in Guliver, *Sunbeams out of Cucumbers*; just as wise a Project as this of raising Religion out of the intrigues of *matter and motion*.

All this shews how desirous our Essayist was of not being misunderstood: as meaning any thing else than Naturalism (or the belief of a Creator and Physical Preserver, but not Moral Governor) by the Religion he would recommend in the place of that Phantom, whose physical, or rather metaphysical, history he is writing. For this Phantom of a Religion, which acknowledges a *moral Governor,* arises, he tells us, from our ignorance of the result of *matter* and *motion,* caballing *in the minute parts of vegetable and animal bodies*.

The sum then of all he teaches is this; That that Religion, of which he professes himself a follower, and which has *its foundation in Reason,* is NATURALISM: and, That that Religion which *all mankind* follow, *a few excepted,* and of which he undertakes to give a *natural history*, is nothing but *Superstition* and *Fanaticism,* having *its origin in human Nature*; that is, in the imagination and the passions only.

REMARK II.

This fully justifies the censure, which has been passed upon him for his *History of Great Britain*; namely, that he owned no RELIGION but what might be resolved into SUPERSTITION or FANATICISM; having represented the established Episcopal Church, and the tolerated Presbyterian Form under the Names and the Ideas of Superstition and Fanaticism.[23] Indeed, (to do him justice,) tho' with much offence, yet without much malignity and contrary to his intention. For he ingenuously enough confessed, that he gave his History that attic seasoning for no other end than to fit it to the palate of a very polite people; whose virtues, having only reached him at a distance, had, as is usual, been much exaggerated. To make amends, however, for this false step, he thought proper to give an ample apology for his conduct towards the close of the second Volume of his History.24 And this containing something more than an Insinuation that he believed, what his *Natural History of Religion* shews he does not believe, namely, the truth of Christianity, I shall take leave, without any suspicion of being thought to go out of my way, to consider it paragraph by paragraph.

This Sophism, says he, *of arguing from the abuse of any thing, against the use of it, is one of the grossest, and at the same time the most common to which men are subject. The history of all ages, and none more than that of the Period which is our subject, offers us examples of the abuse of Religion: And we have not been sparing in this volume, more than in the former, to remark them. But whoever would from thence draw an inference to the disadvantage of Religion in general, would argue very rashly and erroneously*.[25]

Thus he begins his Apology: And would not every Reader of him naturally believe that he was quoting the words of an animadverter upon him, in reproof of this very Sophistry; which he was going to answer? For who was it that had been *drawing this inference to the disadvantage of Religion*, but our wise Historian himself; who had acknowledged no Religion but one or other of these specieses, *Superstition* or *Fanaticism*; and had done his best to shew of what infinite mischief both of them were to Society? The Reader may believe what he pleases; (and if he be a Reader of Mr. Hume, he will find exercise enough for his faith) but, this sage observation is our Historian's own. And the pleasantry of it, is, you are obliquely requested to consider it as a reproof, not of his own malice, but of the folly of his readers, who understood their Historian to be in *earnest* when he

gave this picture of the religion of his country; whereas they had read him to little purpose, if they did not see him to be in the number of those who throw about them firebrands and death, and say, am I not in *jest*? However, to be fair, I am ready to excuse *his readers* in this (perhaps they can be excused in little else) for it is not to be disguised that their master does indeed make *the abuses of Religion* and *Religion itself* to be one and the same thing. All things considered therefore, I cannot but take this introduction to his apology, to be the pleading guilty with the insolent air of an Accuser, and, under the circumstances of a convict, talking the language of his judge.

However, tho' in his first Volume of History he neither spoke of, nor supposed any other Religion than what might be comprised either under superstition or fanaticism, yet here, in the second, he does indeed bring us acquainted with another, and defines it thus; *The proper office of Religion is to reform men's lives, to purify their hearts, to inforce all moral duties, and to secure obedience to the laws of the civil Magistrate*. Now, was Mr. David Hume only playing the Philosopher, I should take this to be no more than the Definition of a mere *moral mode*, known by the name of a *divine philosophy in the mind*; something fluctuating in the *brain* of these Virtuosi, and ennobled with the title of *Natural Religion*: But as he is writing History, and the History of Great Britain, where the *Religion of Jesus*, as he has since learnt, is yet professed, I can hardly persuade myself that he can mean any other, than a Religion whose abode is in the *heart*, and which expatiates into virtuous practice; and is therefore indeed capable of performing all these good things he speaks of. But why then, when he had heard so much of those bug-bear Counterfeits, *Superstition* and *Fanaticism*, was there not one Word slipt in, in recommendation of this *reforming Religion*? One word, in mere charity, for the honor of his dear country? That Strangers at least (for he writes at large and for all mankind) might not suspect, if ever indeed there was a true Religion amongst us, that these Impostors and Counterfeits had driven her quite away. Well; be not too hasty. To this he has an admirable Answer; and you shall have it in his own Words -- *While it* [i.e. the true species of Religion, which he had just defined] *pursues these salutary purposes, its operations, tho' infinitely valuable, are secret and silent, and seldom come under the cognizance of history. The adulterate species of it alone, which inflames Faction, animates Sedition, and prompts Rebellion, distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, and is the great source of Revolutions and public Convulsions. The Historian therefore has scarce any occasion to mention any other kind of Religion, and he may maintain the highest regard for true piety, even while he exposes all the abuses of the false*.

So it seems, that what *reforms men's lives, purifies their hearts, inforces moral duties, and secures obedience to the laws of the civil magistrate,* is not worth a wise Historian's Notice. If it were, he gives a very cogent reason why he should bring it to the Notice of his readers likewise, for he tells us that the effects of this are SECRET and SILENT. Should not the Historian therefore lend a tongue to this powerful but modest directress of human life, and bring her in all her lustre into our acquaintance? But *she seldom comes under the cognizance of History*. More shame for these false masters of the Ceremonies who so scandalously abuse their office.

Then it is, the Historian shines when he celebrates that *adulterate species of Religion, which inflames faction, animates sedition, and prompts rebellion*: For then it is that to these public Mischiefs he may add his own, and under the cover of the *adulterate species* inculcate to the people that all Religion is either *superstition* or *fanaticism*.

If this was not his purpose, and he had no other design than to write sober history, how could it ever enter into his head, that it was not at least equally his business to explain to us what that thing is which makes society happy, as what that is which makes it wretched and miserable? But from the honest man let us turn to the able writer, for in that light too he seems to have failed. It appears

to me a matter of much greater importance that we should be brought acquainted with true religion and its blessings, than with the false and all its mischiefs: Because how shall we be able to avoid the latter, under our ignorance of the former, without running into the opposite extreme, and professing no religion at all? Now, tho' this perhaps is what our historian would be at, yet he has found by experience, his Readers are not so ready to follow as he is to lead.

Had our Historian only consulted the Dignity of his Subject, in this too he would have found a great difference; or if he could not, a great example at least was before his eyes, to have pointed out that difference; Lord BACON, in his history of Henry VII. This, which in many respects is a model for this kind of writing, is much larger and more precise in the account of those Laws by which Henry laid the foundation of a flourishing and happy Kingdom, than of the Insurrections and Rebellions which disturbed his own reign.[26] Had he taken our Author's route, and incurred the censure so justly due to it, I apprehend he had made a very foolish figure both amongst his contemporaries and posterity, by an apology of this kind. *The proper office of* LAWS *is to reform men's lives, to inforce all moral duties and to secure obedience to the civil Magistrate; but while they pursue their salutary purposes, their operations, tho' infinitely valuable, are secret and silent, and seldom come under the cognizance of History*. LAWLESS RAGE *alone, which inflames faction, animates Sedition, and prompts Rebellion, is what distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, and is the proper province of the Historian*. Suppose this great Historian, and He too was a *Philosopher*, had executed what he once projected, the history of his illustrious Mistress, are we to believe that because Walsingham's *Salutary operations* were done in *Secrecy* and in *Silence*, that there he would let them have lain, as *not coming under the cognizance of history*, and *only* buried[27] himself in a circumstantial detail of the rogueries and turbulencies of the sons of Loyola? Would he not have gained more honour to himself, and procured more benefit to his reader by revealing and explaining all the wheels and movements of that political machine, from which, as from the urn of a Demi-God, flowed abundance and felicity on his country, than by unravelling the intrigues of the Jesuits which spread sedition, rebellion and murders all around them?

But to see how differently men's heads are framed even amongst great Historians. TACITUS laments bitterly that his fortune had thrown him in an age, when there was nothing to write of but these horrors, *factions, seditions, public convulsions and Revolutions*.

> **Opus aggredior opimum casibus, atrox praeliis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace faevum: quatuor principes ferro interempti: tria bella civilia, plura externa, ac plerumque permixta.[28]**

Our Christian Historian riots in these calamities; and thinks that *what inflames faction, animates sedition, prompts rebellion, and distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, is the only thing becoming the dignity of History*.

In a word, the offence he gave was for calling the Christian Religion, *Superstition* and *Fanaticism*. He says, it was *false* Religion, not the *true*, which he thus qualifies. He is asked then, how he came to say so much of the *false*, and nothing of the *true*? His answer is, That the true does everything in *secrecy and silence*. The greater occasion therefore was there for him to reveal this noble Mystery; for he tells us that both its aims and operations are *infinitely valuable*. If therefore he be for keeping it hid, like a court-secret, or if, in his own words, *it comes not under his cognizance*, we must conclude, that either he knows little of the matter, or that he believes less.

In conclusion, his own Apology has reduced him to this Dilemma. If he says, he intends the

definition of Religion here given, for the definition of the *Christian*, how came he to comprise all Religion, as he does in the first volume of his History, under the names of *Superstition* and *Fanaticism*? He there mentions no other species; and so great a Philosopher could not be guilty of an imperfect enumeration. If he says, he means *Natural Religion* by his definition; he only fixes the charge against him the more strongly, namely, Irreverence and contempt of Revelation.

Either way, you see, our Apologist comes off but lamely. But what then?

-- To be of no Religion

Argues a *Subtle moral Understanding*

AND IT IS OFTEN CHERISH'D. -- Thus it has been said; and I observe it for our virtuous Author's consolation, notwithstanding the ill success of his History.[29]

REMARK III.

But from his *Civil* let us return to his *Natural History*; and see how he supports his Thesis. He does it by something between history and argument. He calls it both: And You[30] perhaps will think it neither.

The belief of one God, the physical preserver but not moral Governor of the Universe is, what we have shewn our Philosopher dignifies with the title of *the primary principles of genuin Theism and Religion*. Now, if the belief of one God, a moral Governor, was prior in time to Polytheism, it will follow, that NATURALISM or the belief of one God, a Physical preserver only, is not *genuin Theism and Religion*. Because in his endeavour to prove Polytheism the first in time, he has shewn the inability of mere uninstructed man to rise up to this knowledge, on the first Essay of his Reason; the consequence of which is, that if the infant world had this knowledge, it must have been taught them by Revelation, and whatsoever is so taught, must be *true*.

But it is become the general opinion (which, though it has been a long while growing, our philosopher hopes very speedily to eradicate) that a belief of one God, the moral Governor, was the first Religion; induced thereto by the express assertion of an antient book confessedly of as good authority as any other record of very remote antiquity.

Our Philosopher's business therefore is to disprove the Fact. And how do you think he sets about it? You see there are but two ways. Either to prove *a priori*, and from the nature of things that Polytheism must be before Theism; and then indeed he may reject history and record: Or else *a posteriori*, and from antient testimony; in which case, it will be incumbent on him to refute and set aside that celebrated record which expressly tells us, Theism was the first. Our honest Philosopher does neither. He insists chiefly on antient testimony, but is as silent concerning the Bible as is no such book had ever been written.

Lord Bolingbroke, you know, before him had employed this very medium of the priority of Polytheism to Theism, to inforce the same conclusion, namely, NATURALISM:[31] but knowing better how to reason, and being perhaps at that moment less disposed to insult common sense in so profligate a manner, he labours all he can to depreciate the authority of the Bible. But our North British Philosopher despises his reader too much to stand upon Punctilios with him: he roundly affirms that all antiquity is on his side; and, as if Moses had no human authority because he allows him no divine, he will not condescend so much as to do him the honour, he has done Sanconiathon,[32] of quoting him, tho' it was in order to confute him. But you shall hear his own words, because his egregious dishonesty has led him into as ridiculous an absurdity.

As far as writing or history reaches, mankind, in antient times, appear universally to have been Polytheists. Shall we assert, that, in more antient times, before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art of science, men entertained the principles of pure Theism? That is, while they were ignorant and barbarous, they discovered truth: But fell into error, as soon as they acquired learning and politeness.[33]

Shall we assert, says he. Why, no body ever asserted that Theism was before Polytheism but those who gave credit to their bible. And those who did so can easily evade his difficulty, *that it is not natural to think that before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art or science men entertained the principles of pure Theism*; because this Bible tells us, that the first man did not gain the principles of pure Theism by *a knowledge of letters or the discovery of any art of science*, but by REVELATION. But this man, who had run into unlucky mistakes before concerning the state of Religion in South Britain, believed in good earnest that we had burnt our bibles, and that therefore it would be less generous to insult its ashes, than to bury them in silence. This, I think, can only account for that virtuous assurance where he says, that AS FAR AS WRITING OR HISTORY REACHES, MANKIND IN ANTIENT TIMES APPEAR UNIVERSALLY TO HAVE BEEN POLYTHEIST. And what system do you think it is, of the *origin of mankind*, which he espouses, instead of the Mosaic, to prove that Polytheism was the first Religion? No other, I will assure you, than the old Egyptian nonsense, which attempts to teach that men first started up like Mushrooms. In a word, the men on whose principles this wonderful Logician argues, never questioned the truth of his Thesis. To them therefore all this bustle of a discovery is ridiculous and impertinent. And those, who dispute the fact with him, the Religionists, he leaves in possession of all their arguments. So they laugh at it as an idle dream, raised on the absurdest of the Atheistic principles, the Epicurean.

To this ridicule the reader sees, our philosopher exposes himself, even if we believe him to be here speaking of *pure theism*, in the proper sense of the words; that is of the belief of a God, the *moral Governor of the World*. But *Ridicule* may not be all which this mighty *Theist* deserves. For what, if our Philosopher should mean by his *pure and geniun theism*, to which he denies a priority of being, his favourite NATURALISM? I should not be surprised, if he did: It is but running his *usual* philosophic course, from knavery to nonsense.

The reader, as he goes along, will see abundant reason for this charge. An Essay, then, so devoid of all manly sense, and even plausibility of reasoning, can afford a Remarker no other opportunity of entertaining the public with him, than that of drawing the picture of some of his characteristic features, some of the predominant qualities, of which he is made up. An admired Antient, I remember, has given us his opinion of this Godless Wisdom, which sets Heaven and Earth at defiance. It is according to him,

GREEK QUOTE[34]

The charge is severe; yet you have made it out, but too clearly, against this author's noble precursor in the waste spaces of Nature. I would now do as much by the disciple and follower; and to that end shall keep your example in view while I present the public with a few specimens of his philosophical virtues, his Reasoning, his Consistency, his Candour, and his Modesty; and all these promiscuously, as the rise in the natural disorder of his *Essay*.[35]

REMARK IV.

Convulsions in Nature, says he, disorders, prodigies, MIRACLES, tho' the most opposite to the plan of a wise super-intendent, impress mankind with the strongest sentiments of religion; the

causes of events seeming then the most unknown and unaccountable.[36]

Our philosopher forgets himself. He owns and admits *the plan of a wise superintendent*: this *plan* is essential to his NATURALISM. He owns and admits the actual existence of *convulsions in Nature, disorders and prodigies*: for these conform to his great principle of EXPERIENCE, his only rule of credit, and which therefore should be his rule of right. Yet these *convulsions, disorders, prodigies are*, he tells us, *most opposite to the plan of a wise superintendent*. Which in plain english is neither more nor less than, "That a wise superintendent crosses and defeats his own Plan."

You ask, how he fell into this absurdity? Very naturally. He was betrayed into it by his childish prejudice to MIRACLES: which happening to cross a hurt imagination, while he was in the neighbourhood of *Prodigies*, as Mountains and Giants always met together in the rencounters of Don Quixote, he would not let them pass without carrying with them some mark of his resentment. And having shewn, in a book written for that good purpose, that MIRACLES were *most opposite to the plan of a wise superintendent*, he was not content to brand miracles alone with this infamy, but (so dangerous it is to be found in ill company) he charges the same villany, on *Convulsions in nature, disorders and prodigies*, things in themselves very innocent, and by old experience known to have existed.

Thus a laudable zeal against his capital Enemy, MIRACLES, happening to be ill placed, this great philosophic detection of one of the prime master-wheels of superstition labours with immoveable nonsense.

REMARK V.

But now I have mentioned our Author's aversion to miracles, it may not be improper just to take notice, in passing, of that capital argument, which he and Lord Bolingbroke have borrowed from Spinoza against them.[37] "It is, that they are incredible, because contrary to all experience, and to the established course of Nature."

But is not this an admirable argument? A circumstance is urged against the reality of miracles, which must necessarily attend miracles, if there ever were any: their *essence* consisting in their being effects produced contrary to the common course of Nature; and their *end* in their being effects contrary to experience. For could they be esteemed the immediate work of the Lord of Nature, if they did not controll Nature? Or, could they be esteemed the extraordinary declaration of his will, if not contrary to our experience of the common course of Nature?

But hold a little, he will say. It is indeed of the *essence* of a miracle, that it be contrary to common experience. But for this very reason I affirm, that no miracles at all can ever be proper objects of *Belief*. For why believe an event *against* all experience, upon a testimony the credibility of which is founded *in* Experience?

Short and round, it must be owned. But, Good Sir, since you put the matter so home, one word in your ear about this same experience. To what *experience* is it that miracles are contrary? If you mean honestly and would answer to purpose, you must say, "To Experience in all SUCH CASES as those in which the existence of miracles is alledged." But what experience then do miracles contradict? Where do you find your *such cases,* in order to draw your argument from experience? In the moon, or in any other of the worlds which philosophers have found or fancied in the heavens? For in the world which we *men* inhabit I know not what *like cases* can be pretended. What then becomes of your *experience*? Or, rather how unhappy is your appeal to it, when *all* the experience, we have had, lies on the other side?

But this is only a brief hint to the wise. And our philosopher, in particular, is left to make his best of it. The reader sees, this is no time or place to pursue a consideration of such importance any further.[38]

REMARK VI.

There is a strange perversity in the arrangement of our Author's philosophical ideas, occasioned by the vain affectation of singularity.

Nothing hath been more uncontroverted, either in antient or modern times, than that the notion of the Unity, amongst the Pagans, arose from their *Philosophers*. No, says this penetrating Sage, it came from the *People*: and that by the most natural progress in the world.

> Men's exaggerated praises and compliments still swell their ideas upon them; and elevating their Deities to the utmost bounds of perfection, at last beget the attributes of UNITY and Infinity, Simplicity and Spirituality.[39]

"THE PEOPLE sure, the people are the sight."[40]

Turn this people to the South, and you see them fall down before Dogs and Cats and Monkeys. Place them to the North, and they worship stocks and stones. But give them once an Eastern aspect, and they shoot out into *praise* and *panegyric*, which presently produces a *first Cause*. It is pity but we could leave them here in quiet possession of their glory. It is not my fault that we cannot. Our Philosopher seems to be oppressed with his own discovery. Tho' the people might, in this manner, find out the *first cause*, yet he is sensible they knew not what to do with it, when they had it. They *would* not leave their false Gods for the true; they *could* not bring both to a good understanding; they had neither skill nor address to associate them together; and the true God was neither to be *praised* or *panegyrised* into an alliance with the false. What was to be done? Some philosophic fetch, much above the people, was, as he rightly observes, necessary to compleat the system of paganism. This the Philosophers performed, and finished all with a master-stroke.

> Such refined ideas, being somewhat disproportioned to VULGAR COMPREHENSION, remain not long in their original purity; but require to be supported by the notion of inferior mediators or subordinate agents, which interpose betwixt mankind and their supreme deity. These demi-gods or middle beings, partaking more of human nature, and being more familiar to us, become the chief objects of devotion, and gradually recall that idolatry, which had been formerly banished by the ardent prayers and panegyrics of timorous indigent mortals.[41]

Thus the *vulgar*, you see, in their high flights of *praise and panegyric*, rose up to the discovery of a *first Cause*; while a set of *wiser men* are called in to restore the mob of middle deities to their pristine honours: And this, to suit the objects of worship to *vulgar comprehension*.

Now shallow men, like You or me, would say, why all this bustle and the bandying about of an unjointed System? Why did not one set of workmen undertake the whole? Or, if there was need of Coadjutors, how came the parties to act in so preposterous a manner, that the people assumed to themselves what belonged to the Philosophers, the *discovery of the first cause*; and the Philosophers undertook what belonged to the people, the *discovery of demi-gods and middle beings*? Or, will he say, that the *People* did both? discovered the Unity in their blind, *timorous and indigent* state, and, when they were so well informed, struck out, in a lucky moment, their gross system of Polytheism?

He may say what he will; but nobody shall persuade me but that an Author, who makes so great a figure himself in the various walks of Philosophy, would have given the honour of the whole to is own Profession; could it have been done without dimming and impairing, in so capital a matter,

the illustrious character of an original thinker.

REMARK VII.

The Getes (says our Historian) affirmed Zamolxis their Deity to be the only true God; and asserted the worship of all other nations to be addressed to fictions and Chimaeras.[42]

This assertion contradicts all Antiquity, as well as the very nature and genius of Paganism itself. But what of that? It served an honest purpose: the purpose to which all his patriot endeavours tend, the discredit of Revelation. And on such an occasion a gratuitous assertion costs him nothing.

Now it hath been deemed one characteristic mark of favourable distinction in behalf of Revelation, that *the Jews affirmed the God of Israel to be the only true God; and asserted the worship of all other nations to be addressed to mere fictions and chimaeras*. So far was well. But then he should have taken care not to contradict himself so very soon afterwards, where speaking of the universal genius of Paganism, he tells us,

> **Idolatry is attended with this evident advantage, that by limiting the powers and functions of its deities, it naturally admits the Gods of other sects and nations to a share of divinity, and renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ceremonies or traditions, compatible with each other.[43]**

But as this observation was not his own, being stolen from a late writer on the history of Paganism, it is no wonder he should so easily forget it.

REMARK VIII.

But the Paragraph (from which the last quotation is borrowed) will afford us further matter of speculation. It contains a detailed comparison between the advantages and disadvantages of IDOLATRY and THEISM; and thus the account is stated.

POLYTHEISM or idolatrous worship, being founded entirely in vulgar traditions, is liable to this great inconvenience, that any practice or opinion, however barbarous or corrupted, may be authorized by it; and full scope is left for knavery to impose on credulity, till morals and humanity be expelled from the religious systems of mankind. At the same time, idolatry is attended with this evident ADVANTAGE; that, by limiting the powers and functions of its deities, it naturally admits the gods of other sects and nations to a share of divinity, and renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ceremonies, or traditions, compatible with each other. Theism is opposite both in its advantages and DISADVANTAGES.[44]

The advantages and disadvantages of *Polytheism* are, we see, such as arise from the *nature and essence* of idolatry. Would you not expect that the advantages and disadvantages of *theism* should have the same relation to their subject. Good logic seems to require it. But what of that, if his cause requires other management. He scruples not therefore to tell us in the same page, that the *disadvantages* here mentioned as arising from Theism, come not from the *nature* but the abuse of it. "*They arise*," says he, "*from the vices and prejudices of mankind*."

REMARK IX.

Still we are detained on the same spot; which is so fruitful of curiosities that there is no stirring from it. He is speaking of the absurdities or mischiefs, I cannot well say which, that arise from Revelation. And one, or perhaps both of these he intends to infer from the following observation.

While one sole object of Devotion is acknowledged, the worship of other deities is regarded

as absurd and IMPIOUS. Nay, this *unity of object seems naturally to require the* UNITY OF FAITH AND CEREMONIES, and furnishes designing men with a pretext for representing their adversaries as prophane, and the subjects of divine, as well as human vengeance.[45]

The calumnious insinuation, in this passage, about the origin of Persecution (the abuse, and not the reasonable consequence of a true principle) is below any body's notice. What I quote it for is a curious observation; tho' made, but on the by -- *that the unity of object seems naturally to require the* UNITY OF FAITH AND CEREMONIES.

Unity of object, says he, *seems to require unity of faith*. I am apt to think it does. For if the object of belief be single, the belief can scarce be double: unless by a drunkenness of the Understanding, like that which doubles the objects of sense. But then, *that unity of object as naturally requires unity of ceremony*, is not so clear. *Unity of faith* is necessary, because *truth*, which is the general object of faith, is but *one*. But who ever affirmed, before our author, that *unity of ceremony* was necessary? *Ceremony* is only an expression of duty: And duty may be expressed a thousand different ways. *Unity of civil obedience*, under the same government, is necessary. But is *unity of civil obeisance* to the same Governor, equally necessary?

But in the brain of this paradoxical philosopher *Faith* and *Ceremonies* seem to have changed places. We see here how he has exalted *ceremonies*. You shall see next how he degrades *faith*.

He assures us, that "the *Egyptian Religion, tho' so absurd, yet bore so great a resemblance to the Jewish that the antient Writers, even of the greatest genius, were not able to observe any difference between them*;"[46] in proof of which he quotes Tacitus and Suetonius: And then adds, "*These wise Heathens, observing something in the* GENERAL AIR *and* GENIUS *and* SPIRIT of the two Religions *to be the same*, ESTEEMED THE DIFFERENCES OF THEIR DOGMAS TOO FRIVOLOUS TO DESERVE ANY ATTENTION."[47]

These *wise Heathens* were shrewd observers. But what then becomes of the wisdom of a much greater man, our Philosopher himself? who hath assured us, that *the general air and genius and spirit of the two Religions* were so far from being the *same* that they were totally different. For speaking of Revelation and Paganism, or of Theism and Polytheism, he found this remarkable difference in *the air and genius and spirit* of the two Religions, that

> Idolatry has this evident ADVANTAGE over Theism, that by limiting the powers and functions of its deities, it naturally admits the Gods of other sects and nations to a share of divinity, and renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ceremonies or traditions compatible with each other.

-- Whereas in Theism, "While one sole object of devotion is acknowledged, the worship of other deities is regarded as absurd and impious." Nay he tells us in the same place, "That Theism is opposite to Polytheism both *in its advantages and disadvantages*."[48]

In short, in that Section nothing is alike: in the Section before us every thing is the same. So various in wisdom is antient and modern Infidelity! However a difference between the Jewish and Egyptian Religion, he owns, there was. But it was a difference only in DOGMAS TOO FRIVOLOUS TO DESERVE ATTENTION; being indeed nothing more than this, whether mankind should fall down before a dog, a cat, or a monkey, or whether he should worship the God of the Universe. From this curious specimen of our Author's ideas concerning FAITH and CEREMONIES, we cannot but conclude that he has set up for a writer against Religion, before he had learned his Catechism.

REMARK X.

> **MACHIAVEL observes, says our great Philosopher and Divine, that the doctrines of the Christian Religion, (meaning the CATHOLIC, for he knew no other) which recommended only passive courage and suffering, had subdued the spirit of mankind, and fitted them for slavery and subjection. And this observation would certainly be just, were there not many other circumstances in human society, which control the genius and character of a Religion.[49]**

***Machiavel*, says he, *meant the Catholic Religion*. That is, he meant the Roman Catholic, in contradistinction to the Gospel. Machiavel meant no such thing. If he had, the *super-subtile Italian* had wrote like this rambling North-Briton. For it is not the Catholic Religion, so distinguished, but the Gospel itself which gave libertine men the pretence of saying, that *it subdued the spirit of mankind, and fitted them for slavery and subjection*. but here a sudden qualm comes over our Philosopher. He was ashamed of saying this of the Gospel. And well he might. For, tho' he says, *the observation is certainly just*, there never was a ranker calumny. The Gospel recommends no such thing as *passive courage and suffering*, either with regard to the domestic invaders of our civil rights, or to the foreign enemies of our country: And there are but one or two illiterate and fanatic sects, of very small extent, in the whole Christian world, who have so understood and abused the Gospel. The only *passive courage and suffering it recommends* is to particulars, whose consciences civil society hath iniquitously violated. Now, if instead of this *passive courage and suffering* the Gospel had recommended to its private followers to fly to arms and repel the force of the civil magistrate, when he abused his authority, in suppressing truth and the rights of conscience, what tragical exclamations would these very men have raised against the factious spirit of Christianity? Indeed, to our Author's shame be it spoken, the very contrary of all this is the truth. The effects of the Gospel are most salutary to *human Society*: for by encouraging inquiry and by inspiring a spirit of liberty in religious matters, it naturally inclines its followers to carry the same dispositions, into Civil.**

REMARK XI.

But this honest man can allow himself, on all occasions, to calumniate the Religion of his country: sometimes openly and grossly; but oftner, as in the following instance, in the oblique way of Insinuation only.

> **Were there a Religion (*and we may suspect Mahometanism of this inconsistence*) which sometimes painted the deity in the most sublime colours, as the creator of heaven and earth: sometimes degraded him nearly to a level *with human creatures in his powers and faculties*; while at the same time it ascribed to him *suitable infirmities, passions and partialities of the moral kind*: That Religion, *after it was extinct*, would also be cited as an instance of those contradictions, which arise from the gross, vulgar, natural conceptions of mankind, opposed to their continual propensity towards flattery and exaggeration. Nothing indeed would prove more strongly the divine origin of any Religion, than to find (*and happily this is the case with Christianity*) that it is free from a contradiction so incident to human nature.[50]**

We see what the man would be at, thro' all his disguises. And, no doubt, he would be much mortified, if we did not; tho' the discovery, we make, is only this, That, of all the slanders against Revelation, this before us is the tritest, the dirtiest and most worn in the drudgery of Freethinking. Not but it may pass with his friends. And they have my free leave to make their best of it. What I quote it for is only to shew the rancour of heart which possesses this unhappy man, and which could induce him to employ an insinuation against the Jewish and Christian Religions; not only of

no weight in itself, but of none, I will venture to say, even in his own opinion.

REMARK XII.

The learned, philosophical Varro (says our no less learned and philosophical Naturalist) discoursing of Religion, pretends not to deliver any thing beyond probabilities and appearances: Such was his good sense and moderation! But the passionate, the zealous Augustin insults the noble Roman on his scepticism and reserve, and professes the most thorough belief and assurance. A Heathen poet, however, contemporary with the Saint, ABSURDLY esteems the religious system of the latter, so false, that even the credulity of children, he says, could not engage them to believe it.[51]

From the fact, as here delivered, we learn, that the Pagans insulted the Christians, and the Christians the Pagans, for the supposed absurdity of each others system. Agreed. And what then? Were their several systems equally absurd? This is what he would insinuate, or his observation is impertinent. Yet does not Mr. David Hume insult the *Religionists*, as absurd; They, him, as ten times more absurd? Will he say, that He and they have equal reason? But what, in the mean time, becomes of *Naturalism*? We must conclude then, that it is possible, one party may be in the right and the other in the wrong. The consequence is, that his approbation of Varro, and his censure of Augustin, is temerarious and unjust. For what hinders but that Augustin's *thorough belief and assurance* might be full as reasonable when he defended Christianity, as Varro's not venturing *beyond probabilities and appearances*, when he apologized for Paganism? Had our modern Philosopher, who has a much worse cause than Varro's to defend, but imitated Varro's *moderation*, which he commends, instead of Augustin's *thorough assurance*, which he condemns, his reader perhaps would have thought better both of his sense and honesty. -- Oh, but for his honesty and impartial indifference between Christianity and Paganism, he has given us such a convincing proof in this very instance, that he ought ever hereafter to go scot-free. We have observed, that he has praised Varro and condemned Augstin: but to shew -- Tros Rutulusve fuat[52] -- he tells us honestly -- *that a Heathen poet, however, contemporary with the Saint*, ABSURDLY *esteems the religious system of the latter* [i.e. Christianity] *so false, that even the credulity of children*, he says *could not engage them to believe it*. Now here, where he has been at the expence of so much fair dealing, he ought to be indulged in rewarding himself for it, which he has done in this modest insinuation, that Christianity was so false and nauseous that even children could not be brought to swallow it.

He may talk what he pleases of the *absurdity* of poets. But while one Philosopher lives, I defy all the poets of antient or modern date to equal him either in absurdity or fiction. The poet, he here abuses, is CLAUDIUS RUTILIUS NUMATIANUS. He tells You, how this poet reviles Christianity: and quotes the Poem, the book, and the page. Would you suspect all this to be a flam, and not one word of truth, from beginning to end? Yet so it is. Rutilius is speaking of a JEW, by name and title; and the Rites of *Judaism*, as they distinguish that Religion from all other, are the subject of his Satire. The whole passage is as follows.

-- Namque loci querulus curam JUDAEUS agebat;

***Humanis* animal dissociale *cibis*.**

Vexatos frutices, pulsatas imputat algas,

Damnaque libatae grandia clamat aquae.

Reddimus obscaenae convicia debita genti,
Quae *genitale caput propudiosa metit*:

Radix stultitiae, cui frigida *sabbata* cordi;
Sed cor frigidius religione sua est.

Septima quaeque dies turpi damnata veterno,
Tanquam lassati mollis imago Dei.

Cetera mendacis deliramenta catastae,
Nec pueros omnes credere posse reor.[53]

The Pagan writers indeed frequently confound the two sects of Judaism and Christianity, with one another. But here, there is not the least room for that poor subterfuge. Rutilius speaks of Judaism by name: and to shew us that he understood his subject, he reviles it for those very rites, which are peculiar to Judaism; namely, the distinction between *clean and unclean meats, circumcision*, and the *Sabbath*. Yet, if You will believe this honest man, Rutilius represents CHRISTIANITY as so false, that even the *credulity of children could not engage them to believe it.* And why should You believe him?[54] He is a Philosopher, a follower of truth, and a virtuous man: One, (as he says of himself) *whose errors should be excused,* ON ACCOUNT OF THE CANDOUR AND SINCERITY WHICH ACCOMPANIES THEM.[55]

REMARK XIII.

If ever there was a nation or a time (says our Philosopher) in which the public religion lost all authority over mankind, we might expect, that infidelity in *Rome*, during the *Ciceronian* age, would openly have erected it's throne, and that Cicero himself, in every speech and action, would have been its most declared abettor. But, it appears, that, whatever sceptical liberties that great man might use, in his writings or in philosophical conversation; he yet avoided, in the common conduct of life, the imputation of DEISM and PROFANENESS. Even in his own family, and to his wife, *Terentia*, whom he highly trusted, he was willing to appear a devout religionist; and there remains a letter, addrest to her, in which he seriously desires her to offer a sacrifice to *Apollo* and *AEsculapius*, in gratitude for the recovery of his health.[56]

Here he seems to commend Cicero (for his vanity, perverseness, and love of paradox make him always think at large, and write at random) on a topic which exposes his own wicked practice, namely, Cicero's care, *in the common conduct of life*, to set the people an example of reverence for the established Religion. But whether this was said in praise or dispraise of that noble Roman, it matters not, since presently after he contradicts his own account, and assures us that the same Cicero was so far from *avoiding, in the common conduct of life, the imputation of* DEISM *and* PROFANENESS, that *He made no scruple in a public court of Judicature, of teaching the doctrine of a future state, as a* MOST RIDICULOUS FABLE, *to which no body would give any attention*.[57] And this without the least care of reconciling Cicero, to himself; or his own contradictory observations, to his reader.

REMARK XIV.

But he treats whole Bodies of men no better than Particulars.

We may observe (says he) that, notwithstanding the dogmatical, imperious style of all

> superstition, the conviction of the Religionist, in all ages, is more affected than real, and scarce ever approaches, in any degree, to that solid belief and persuasion, which governs us in the common affairs of life. Men dare not avow, even to their own hearts, the doubts, which they entertain on such subjects: they make a merit of implicite faith; and disguised to themselves their REAL INFIDELITY, by the strongest asseverations and most positive bigotry. But nature is too hard for all their endeavours, and suffers not the obscure, glimmering light, afforded in those shadowy regions, to equal the strong impressions, made by common sense and by experience. The usual course of men's conduct belies their words, and shews, that the assent in these matters is some unaccountable operation of the mind betwixt disbelief and conviction, but approaching much nearer the former than the latter.[58]

This is superlatively modest. -- When the Religionist says that an infidel writer, (like this man) in order to skreen himself from the resentment of the Law, says one thing and thinks another, there is no end of the clamours raised against uncharitable Churchmen. But Mr. David Hume may say all this and more of Religionists, and yet preserve his character of a philosopher and a friend of Truth. But infidelity owed him a shame, and he presently unsays it all; and confesses that Religionists are so far from being tossed about in *doubt* and *unbelief*, that nothing is more constant than the course of even the wisest and most experienced of them, invariably steady to the point of faith. For after having said a great deal to shew that Socrates and Xenophon did in reality give credit to Augurs and Omens, he concludes thus,

> It is for the same reason, I MAINTAIN, that Newton, Locke, Clarke, &c. being Arians or Socinians, were VERY SINCERE, in the creed they professed: and I ALWAYS OPPOSE THIS ARGUMENT to some Libertines, who will needs have it, that it was impossible but that these great Philosophers must have been HYPOCRITES.[59]

Our modest philosopher had employed the 83d page of this wonderful essay to prove, that notwithstanding *the dogmatical imperious style of all superstition*, yet Religionists are HYPOCRITES; *their conviction in all ages being more* AFFECTED *than* REAL: and a great deal more trash to the same purpose. Yet here in the 91st page he MAINTAINS *against Libertines*, that these Religionists are VERY SINCERE, and no Hypocrites. Nay, in spite, as it were, to his 83d page, he affirms that he ALWAYS *opposes this argument to libertines*.

But are you to think, he talks thus wantonly, for no other end than to shew his contempt of the reader? By no means. For tho' this be, sometimes, motive sufficient for our paradoxical Gentleman to *contradict*, yet we must needs think there was some important occasion which induced him thus *to give the lye to himself*. He had it in his choice (for what hindered him, when unrestrained by the considerations of truth or falshood) to represent the Religionists as either KNAVES or FOOLS. But this did not content his noble passion for mischief. He would have them BOTH. Unluckily this could not be done without a contradiction. To make them *Knaves*, he was to shew they professed one thing and believed another: to make them *Fools*, they were to be represented as *steadily* and *sincerely* believing all things. The contradiction, we see, was unavoidable: but how he came so needlessly to saddle himself with the *lye* -- *I* ALWAYS, says he, *oppose this argument to libertines* -- I confess surpasses my comprehension.

Well, having floundered so shamefully, he is for recovering himself; and therefore stops into the gap, between these two extremes, a moderating tenent; and so leaves all Religionists, both antient and modern, in a kind of MIDDLE STATE, between *Knaves* and *Fools*. His conciliating tenent, is this

--

> In the meantime it is obvious, that the empire of all religious faith over the understanding is wavering and uncertain, subject to all varieties of humour, and dependent on the present incidents, which strike the imagination. The difference is only in the degrees. An ancient will place a stroke of impiety and one of superstition alternately through a whole discourse: A modern often thinks in the same way, tho' he may be more guarded in his expressions.[60]

I am so tired with his contradictions that I shall let this passage go, unexamined upon that head, notwithstanding it looks so asquint both to the right and left, and agrees neither with the thorough *Hypocrisy*, nor the *sincere belief* of the two passages, it is brought to reconcile. But, as it stands alone, I may be allowed to ask, Why is the *modern* Christian *more guarded in his expressions*, than the *antient* Pagan? Does not human nature always operate alike in the like circumstances? If therefore, in this *modern superstition*, called *Christianity*, men are more consistent in the profession of their belief, than in that *antient superstition*, called Paganism, does not this shew that the circumstances were not alike? And what other differences in circumstances could there be, if not this, that Christianity having a rational foundation, it's professors stood steady and unmoved; and Paganism only fluctuating in the fancy and unsupported by the understanding, communicated the same inconstancy and variableness to its followers?

Oh, but says our Philosopher, I will not allow that steadiness to be more than pretended, *A modern often thinks in the same way*, [i.e. inconstantly,] *tho' he may be more guarded in his expressions*. How prejudiced! what pretence has he to suppose it an *inconstancy*, only *guarded in the expression*, when the very uniformity of the profession excludes all data whereon to ground his suspicion that the belief is only pretended?

He must take it then for granted (as without doubt he does) that Christianity has no more reasonable foundation than Paganism. No need, will he say, of that, at present. The *fashion*, the fashion, does all. An unsteadiness in Religion is discreditable in these *modern* times: hence the *guarded expression*.

Well, admit it to be so. What, I pray you, made unsteadiness in Religion now discreditable, which was creditable in former times, but this, that Christianity has now the support of, at least, plausible arguments, which Paganism never had?

REMARK XV.

In comparing the two Religions, Paganism and Christianity, our philosopher finds that the former is to be preferred to the latter, both in it's REASONABLENESS and in its BENEVOLENT SPIRIT.

Upon the whole, the greatest and most observable differences betwixt a *traditional mythological* religion, and a *systematical, scholastic* one, are two: The former is often more REASONABLE, as consisting only of a multitude of stories, which however groundless, imply no express absurdity and demonstrative contradiction; and sits also so easy and light on mens minds, that tho' it may be as universally received, it makes no such deep impression on the affections and understanding.[61]

The *reasonableness*, we see, is resolved into this, that You cannot reduce the Professors of Paganism to *an express contradiction*; and that the Profession *sits mighty light and easy on men's minds*. As to the first property of paganism, its incapacity of being reduced to a contradiction, this it has in common with NONSENSE, which is likewise incapable of suffering the same disgrace. And

this will account too for its second property, the *sitting so light and easy on the minds of men*. For nothing takes less hold of the mind than NONSENSE, or so little disturbs its tranquility, while we have the discretion to take it for what it is. To this he will tell you, you mistake his aim, if you think it was to credit paganism: the comparison was made only to discredit Christianity; by insinuating that its DOGMAS are *contradictory*, and its SANCTIONS *oppressive*.

As to the superior BENEVOLENCE in the spirit of Paganism, this is made out as follows.

Lucian observes, that a young man, who reads the history of the Gods in *Homer* or *Hesiod*, and finds their factions, wars, injustices, incest, adultery, and other immoralities so highly celebrated, is much surprized afterwards, when he comes into the world, to observe, that punishments are by Law inflicted on the same actions, which he had been taught to ascribe to superior beings. The contradiction is still perhaps STRONGER betwixt the representations given us by some latter Religions and our natural ideas of generosity, lenity, impartiality, and justice; and in proportion to the multiplied terrors of these religions, the barbarous conceptions of the divinity are multiplied upon us.[62]

You, Sir, who took your idea of the DII MAJORUM GENTIUM[63] from ancient story, seem not to have characterised them amiss where you call them,[64] "*a rabble of Tyrants, Pathics, and Adulterers, Whores, Vagabonds, Thieves, and Murderers*."[65] Yet, gracious Heaven! a Philosopher of the North Britain, in the Reign of George the Second, has dared to tell us, with very little disguise, that *the barbarous conceptions of the divinity, multiplied upon us* by Christianity, are still more *contradictory to our natural ideas of generosity, lenity, impartiality, and justice*.

But here his *modesty* seemed to labour a little; and he is for casting part of the odium of this diabolic insinuation, from himself upon another.

> But in order, says he, to shew more evidently, that it is possible for *a Religion* to represent the Divinity in a still more immoral, unamiable light than the antient, we shall cite a long passage from an author of TASTE and IMAGINATION, who was surely no enemy of Christianity.[66]

You will suspect him to be just on the point of playing you a trick when you hear him talk of his authority, as an author of *taste and imagination*, when the subject requires that the voucher for it should have a clear judgment and strong understanding. After all there was no occasion for this slight of hand. The trick, I speak of, is to be played, as you will find, not by this *man of taste*, but by our Philosopher himself. His voucher, the Chevalier Ramsey, is perfectly innocent of all our Philosopher brings him to attest.

The words just quoted plainly imply, that in the opinion of this *man of taste*, Revelation, or the Jewish and Christian Religion, as delivered in the Bible, *represents the divinity in a still more immoral and unamiable light than the antient. -- It is possible*, says he, *for a* RELIGION -- which, I think, implies the Religion itself, and not the superstitious followers, much less the professed enemies of it. Turn now to the *long passage*, which this *man of truth* has quoted in his 100th page, and you will find that this *immoral and unamiable light in which the divinity is represented*, is not the representation of the Religion itself, but of its false friends and open enemies.

> What strange ideas (says the Chevalier Ramsey) would an Indian or a Chinese Philosopher have of our holy Religion, if they judged by the schemes given of it by our MODERN FREE-THINKERS and PHARISAICAL DOCTORS OF ALL SECTS? According to the odious and too vulgar system of these INCREDULOUS SCOFFERS and CREDULOUS SCRIBLERS, the God of the Jews is a most cruel, unjust, partial, and fantastic Being. --

> **To accomplish the partial, barbarous decree of predestination and reprobation, God abandoned all nations to darkness, idolatry, superstition, &c.**

This turns out ridiculous enough. The Chevalier Ramsey is brought to prove that the Bible *represents the Divinity in a more immoral and unamiable light than Paganism*: and the Chevalier Ramsey turns the tables on him and proves that they are only such as our Philosopher himself and his crew, who so represent the Divinity.

Well, but say you, the Chevalier Ramsey is made by our Philosopher to consider the *representation* as the representation of Revelation, whoever made it. The *man of Truth's* words are these -- *To shew more evidently that it is possible for a Religion to represent, &c. we shall cite a long passage from an author, who was surely no enemy to Christianity*. Why were these last words added but to insinuate that the representation, however disadvantagious, was yet owned to be a true one; unwillingly perhaps, as he was a friend of Christianity, but from the mere force of evidence. Whereas turn but your eyes upon the *long passage* and you will find that the representers, the *free-thinkers* and *Pharisaical Doctors*, are heartily censured by the Chevalier for thus *disfiguring* and *dishonouring* Revelation. His concluding words are,

> **Thus the *incredulous free-Thinkers*, the *Judaizing Christians*, and the *fatalistic Doctors*, have disfigured and dishonoured the sublime mysteries of our holy faith; thus they have confounded the nature of good and evil; transformed the most monstrous passions into divine attributes, and SURPASSED THE PAGANS IN BLASPHEMY, by ascribing to the eternal nature as perfections, what makes the horridest crimes amongst men.[67]**

The sum is this. The *man of truth* calls upon the *man of taste* to prove that the Jewish and Christian religions, as they lye in the bible, *represents the divinity in a more immoral and unamiable light than Paganism*. And the *man of taste* bears evidence that it is not the Bible but the *man of truth* and his crew who give this representation of the Divinity: a representation which SURPASSES indeed the very PAGANS IN BLASPHEMY.

REMARK XVI.

We now come to his account of the origin of that Religion, of which, meaning *Superstition*, he pretends to give a natural History.

The primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from an anxious fear of future events; and what ideas will naturally be entertained of invisible unknown powers, while men lie under dismal apprehensions of any kind, may easily be conceived. Every image of vengeance, severity, cruelty, and malice must occur and augment the ghastliness and horror, which oppresses the amazed religionist. A panic having once seized the mind, the active fancy still farther multiplies the objects of terror; while that profound darkness, or, what is worse, that glimmering light, with which we are invironed, represents the spectres of divinity under the most dreadful appearances imaginable. And no idea of perverse wickedness can be framed, which those terrified devotees do not readily, without scruple, apply to their deity.

This appears the natural state of religion, when surveyed in one light. But if we consider, on the other hand, that spirit of praise and eulogy, which necessarily has place in all religions, and which is the consequence of these very terrors, we must expect a quite contrary system of theology to prevail. Every virtue, every excellence must be ascribed to the divinity, and no exaggeration be esteemed sufficient to reach those perfections, with which he is endowed. Whatever strains of

panegyric can be invented, are immediately embraced, without consulting any arguments or phaenomena. And it is esteemed a sufficient confirmation of them, that they give us more magnificent ideas of the divine object of our worship and adoration.

> HERE therefore is a kind of contradiction betwixt the different principles of human nature, which enter into Religion. Our natural terrors present the notion of a devilish and malicious deity: Our propensity to praise leads us to acknowledge an excellent and divine. And the influence of these opposite principles are various, according to the different situation of the human understanding.[68]

Thus has this wretched man misrepresented and calumniated those two simple principles, which under the guidance of natural light led the people to a deity and kept him always in sight, namely FEAR, and LOVE. A man less maliciously disposed to abuse and slander human nature, would have fairly told us, that FEAR kept the Religionist from evil, as a thing offensive to the deity; and that LOVE inclined him to virtuous practice, as most acceptable to the divine nature. No, says this accuser of his Kind, FEAR presented the Religionist *with the notion of a devilish and malicious deity: and* LOVE *exaggerated the perfections of the deity, without consulting any arguments or phaenomena*: i.e. arguments or phaenomena, which might have convinced him that they were *exaggerations*. Whereas the truth of the case is merely this; whenever simple nature did not work by *fear* and *love*, to avoid evil and to follow good, but instead of that to invent a *fantastic*, or a *diabolic* deity, the impediment was accidental, occasioned by the intervention of some unhappy circumstance foreign to the natural workings of the human mind.

REMARK XVII.

> It is remarked by Xenophon (says our Philosopher) in praise of Socrates, that that philosopher assented not to the VULGAR opinion, which supposed the Gods to know some things, and be ignorant of others: He maintained that they knew every thing, which was done, said, or even thought. But this was a strain of philosophy much above the conception of his countrymen.[69]

This is pleasant. It is but in the foregoing page, he assures us, that not only the *Vulgar* of Greece, but the *Vulgar* of all the world knew that their Gods *were ignorant of nothing*. His words are these. *If we consider that spirit of praise and eulogy*, WHICH NECESSARILY HAS PLACE IN ALL RELIGIONS, *we shall find that every virtue, every excellence must be ascribed to the divinity, and* NO EXAGGERATIONS BE ESTEEMED SUFFICIENT TO REACH THOSE PERFECTIONS, *with which he is endowed*. Now is not OMNISCIENCE a PERFECTION? And was not the spirit of exaggeration, which never thought it said enough, able to reach the idea of *knowing all things*? How happened it then that this exaggerating mob of Religionists wanted a Socrates to tell them, that *the Gods not only knew some things, but all things*? But the man has got his readers, and he uses them as they deserve.

REMARK XVIII.

But now for a discovery indeed. --

> As men further EXALT the idea of their divinity; it is often their NOTION OF HIS POWER AND KNOWLEDGE ONLY, NOT OF HIS GOODNESS, which is improved. On the contrary, in proportion to the supposed extent of his science and authority, their terrors naturally augment.[70]

This is hard. Common sense seems to tell us so much of our common nature, that the *spirit of love*, which is ever *for exalting further and further the idea of* its object, is chiefly delighted in dwelling on

the GOODNESS of that object: as *fear* is most conversant in the divine attributes of *power and knowledge*. But this sublime philosopher has discovered that both we and nature are mistaken; and that, *as men further exalt the idea of their divinity, it is often their notion of power and knowledge, not of his goodness*, that is improved. And his kind reader might be disposed perhaps to take his word, but that he sees it contradicts, in express terms, what he had said but two or three pages before: Where he as magisterially assures us, that *a spirit of praise and eulogy makes men ascribe every virtue, every excellence to the Deity, and to* EXAGGERATE THEM ALL: Therefore, I should suppose, GOODNESS, along with the rest.

REMARK XIX.

After all these feats, he will now account how it happens that Religionists are so generally disposed to prefer rites and positive institutions, to morality and natural duties. And the secret is revealed in this manner:

Perhaps, the following account may be received as a true solution of the difficulty. The duties, which a man performs as a friend or parent, seem merely owing to his benefactor or children, nor can he be wanting to these duties, without breaking thro' all the ties of nature and morality. A strong inclination may prompt him to the performance: A sentiment of order and moral beauty joins its force to these natural ties: And the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty, without any effort or endeavour. Even with regard to the virtues, which are more austere, and more founded on reflection, such as public spirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity; the moral obligation, in our apprehension, removes all pretence to religious merit; and the virtuous conduct is esteemed no more than what we owe to society and to ourselves. In all this, a superstitious man finds nothing, which he has properly performed for the sake of his deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the divine favour and protection. He considers not, that the most genuin method of serving the divinity is by promoting the happiness of his creatures. He still looks out for some more immediate service of the Supreme Being, in order to allay those terrors, with which he is haunted.[71]

It is to be lamented that but just before he had proved all this fine reasoning not worth a rush, where he confesses *that there are popular Religions, in which it is expressly declared that nothing but morality can gain the divine favour*.[72] For, if those who prefer rites to moral duties, are yet taught by their Religion that *nothing but morality can gain the divine favour*, it is plain, his solution can have no place, which is that superstitious men give that unjust preference, *because they can find nothing in morality which can peculiarly recommend them to the divine favour*. Had he not therefore done better, as in the former instance of *the genius of Paganism*, to have stolen his solution? He has not boggled at greater matters. And a Philosopher, who deserves no quarter from him, might have saved his credit, and been pillaged with advantage.

Next to the knowledge of one God, says this excellent man, a clear knowledge of their duty was wanting to mankind. This part of knowledge, tho' cultivated with some care by some of the Heathen philosophers, yet got little footing amongst the people. The priests made it not their business to teach men virtue. If they were diligent in their observations and ceremonies; punctual in their feasts and solemnities, and the tricks of religion, the holy tribe assured them, the Gods were pleased, and they looked no farther. Few went to the schools of the philosophers to be instructed in their duties, and to know what was good and evil in their actions. *The Priests sold the better penny-worths, and therefore had all their custom. Lustrations and processions were much easier than a clean conscience, and a steady course of virtue; and an expiatory sacrifice, that attoned*

for the want of it, was much more convenient than a steady course of virtue.[73]

This is the solution of a philosopher indeed; clear, simple, manly, rational, and striking conviction in every word; unlike the refined and fantastic nonsense of a writer of Paradoxes.

But then don't imagine that our author was not aware of this solution. No, he despised it because it was so reasonable. For he thinks to obviate it by saying, "That it is not satisfactory to allege that the practice of morality is more difficult than that of superstition; *and is therefore rejected*."[74] *But how does he make out this point? Why, by giving us to understand that the four Lents of the Muscovites, and the austerities of some Roman Catholics, appear more disagreeable than* MEEKNESS AND BENEVOLENCE. Let him say, as Mr. Locke does, honestly -- than a STEADY COURSE OF VIRTUE. And we shall better judge whether *these austerities* be indeed more difficult than *such* a morality.

REMARK XX.

Well, but he makes ample amends for the slight here shewn of STEADY VIRTUE. For, as a supplement to his account of this mysterious phaenomenon,

> We may add, says he, that even after the commission of crimes, there arise remorses and secret horrors, which give no rest to the mind, but make it have recourse to religious rites and ceremonies, as expiations of its offences. Whatever weakens or disorders the internal frame promotes the interests of superstition: AND NOTHING IS MORE DESTRUCTIVE TO THEM THAN A MANLY STEADY VIRTUE, which either preserves us from disastrous melancholly accidents, or teaches us to bear them.[75]

We may add, says he. That he may safely, whatever he pleases; who has a public to deal with so easily bubbled into the opinion of his being a philosopher. Which makes me the more wonder at the trouble his friends gave him, of refining this *natural history* from the grosser faces[76] of Atheism, before it was presented to the world.[77] But this public, it seems, was become a little squeamish, having been so lately overdosed by the quackery of Bolingbroke.[78]

NOTHING, says our philosopher, IS MORE DESTRUCTIVE TO THE INTEREST OF SUPERSTITION, THAN A MANLY STEADY VIRTUE: Which in plainer English is, "None will be so free from Superstition as the most hardened Rogue." For the fact, from which he deduces this proposition, is this, *That after the commission of crimes, there arise remorses and secret horrors, which make men have recourse to expiatory rites. These remorses,* BY WEAKENING AND DISORDERING THE INTERNAL FRAME, *promote superstition*. Now the country state of this internal frame can be no other than such as enables us to bear the retrospect of our rogueries without *remorse and horror*: this he calls *a manly steady Virtue*. Do I wrong him? Let his friends judge. Had he meant, by *manly steady virtue* what common moralists so call, he must have told us, that this *Virtue* produced in the offender, reparation of injuries and amendment of life; things, in reality, *most destructive to the interests of superstition*. Whereas the *manly steady virtue* of our philosopher does no more, by his own confession, than *either preserve us from disastrous melancholly accidents* [i.e. keep us from hanging ourselves] *or teaches us to bear them* [i.e. to recall to memory our past crimes without remorse.] And this, hardened roguery, and nothing but hardened roguery is capable of atchieving. Or, will he, to save himself from this atrocious charge, say, that by a *manly steady virtue* he meant such a *Virtue* as *prevents* the commission of crimes? This had been to the purpose. But let him then shew us how this meaning is to be gathered from his *expression*. To say the least, if, in excess of candour, one must suppose him to have *meant well*, no well-meaning philosopher ever expressed

himself so wretchedly.

REMARK XXI.

You have here, Sir, what I promised You; a specimen of his philosophic virtues, his reasoning, his consistency, his knowledge, his truth, his candour and his modesty, as they promiscuously appear in the NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION.[79] I have hunted him from track to track. And now what thick cover, do You suppose, has he chosen to skreen himself from the public contempt? He takes shelter in the dark umbrage of SKEPTICISM. These are his concluding words.

> **The whole is a riddle, an aenigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarce be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a quarreling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape, into THE CALM, THO' OBSCURE, REGIONS OF PHILOSOPHY.**

Thus, we see, his last effort is to defend his *dogmatical* nonsense with *scepticism* still more nonsensical. Nor to this, neither, dares he trust himself: but presently meditates an *escape*, as he calls it, by setting the *Religionists a quarreling*: without which, he frankly owns, that *deliberate doubt could scarce be upheld*. For the sake of this beloved object, DELIBERATE DOUBT, there is no mischief he is not ready to commit, even to the unhinging the national Religion, and unloosing all the hold it has on the minds of the people. And all this for the selfish and unnatural lust of *escaping* from right reason and common sense, *into the calm, tho' obscure regions of philosophy*. But here we have earthed him; rolled up in the Scoria of a *dogmatist* and *Sceptic*, run down together. He has been long taken for a Philosopher: and so perhaps he may be found -- like Aristotle's statue in the Block.

> **Then take him to devellop, if you can,**
>
> **And hew the block off, and get out the Man.[80]**

CONCLUSION.

I have now done with my Philosopher; and, whatever his admirers may think, You, Sir, I persuade myself, will be of opinion that I have treated him but as he deserves. If indeed my purpose had been only to disgrace the *man*, the very recital of his impieties had been sufficient. But finding, that he had somehow usurped to himself the name of *Philosopher*, I thought it not amiss, as occasion offered, to expose his bad logic; and above all to point out to the reader his numerous *inconsistencies and contradictions*. I can readily believe, however, he will be the first to divert himself with this part of my pains. He, who thinks at large, is enslaved to no principles, nor acknowledges any, what should hinder him from writing with as little regard to *truth*, as to Religion? He leaves it, no doubt, to the Religionists to shackle themselves in CONSISTENCY? What is it to him, a free-thinker and a sceptic, whether what he says in one page be of a piece with what he delivers in another?

Well, but this is the feature, of all others, in his philosophical countenance, which I was most ambitious of catching, and presenting to the view of the public. For that public, I would hope, is even yet not so thoroughly abandoned, as to contemplate this profligacy of mind, indifferent to truth and falshood, and which is ready, on all occasions, to neglect common honesty and insult common Sense, without horror. And what so likely way of discrediting such a writer with the people, as to let them see what a conductor they have taken to themselves in philosophy and

religion?

In the mean time how miserable is the condition of depraved humanity! Heaven sends us into life with the seeds and principles, at least, of integrity and honesty. The vulgar of all denominations presently lose these virtues, in the commerce of the WORLD. And the men of science, in the SCHOOLS: The consequence is, A *practice*, void of MORALITY; and a *speculation*, unawed by TRUTH. In this scene of things the good man applies himself to reform the one, and instruct the other: Both, I am afraid, as the Patriarch believed, *against hope*. Yet this does not lessen the merit of his intended services. My concern is only, how they may become effectual. And if there be a way left, it is surely that which you have hitherto taken, "of disgracing every licentious shallow scribler; that dishonours the name of letters, by writing the abused public into an opinion of his being a philosopher."

Hence it is, that CHUBB, MORGAN, COLLINS, MANDEVILLE and BOLINGBROKE are names, which nobody hears, without laughing. It is not for me, perhaps, to predict the fate of Mr. DAVID HUME. But if You, Sir, had taken upon You to read his destiny, the public had, now, seen this Adorer of *Nature*, this *last* hope of his declining family, gathered *to the dull of ancient days*;

"Safe, where no critics, no divines molest,

"Where wretched TOLAND, TINDAL, TILLARD rest."

I am, with due respect,

SIR, &*c*. FINIS.

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2]Included in A selection from unpublished papers of William Warburton, edited by Francis Kilvert. London, B.B. Nichols, 1841.

[3]Commenting on "Learn, ye DUNCES! not to scorn your God" (Book III, 224), Warburton writes "we have had a late example in a book entitled, *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*."

[4]The review from *London Review* of Hume's *Life* criticizes Strahan arguing that "It is a little remarkable that the gentleman, to whose care this manuscript [i.e. the "Natural History"] was entrusted, should have ever carried his hand so even between *religion* and *infidelity*, as to have been made the instrument of ushering into the world, with equal approbation, the doctrines of *divine*

***grace*, and the dogmas of *human nature*," 1777, Vol. V, p. 202.**

[5]Hume to Andrew Millar, Sept. 3, 1757.

[6]Hume's June 1757 letter to William Strahan explains his position on preserving the anonymity of the *Remarks*. He argues that Hurd's "Artifices or Forgeries, call them which you please, are such common things in all Controversy that man woud be ridiculous who woud pretend to complain of them; and the Parsons in particular have go a License to practice them."

[7]*Remarks... a new edition*. London: T. Cadell, 1777.

[8]*The works of the Right Reverend William Warburton*.... London: J. Nichols, 1788, 7 Vol. The *Analytical Review* comments on the collection in general that "it is plain from the publication itself, that the edition before us (which consists only of two hundred and fifty copies) was designed as a splendid monument to the memory of Warburton, rather than a work of public utility," 1789, Vol. IV, pp. 183-187.

[9]The *Analytical Review* comments on Hurd's account of the *Remarks* that "we learn nothing more from it, than what was before known, (excepting that Dr. Balguy does not appear to have had any hand in it)...," 1795, Vol. 21, p. 599.

[10][Alexander Pope, *Satires of Dr. John Donne, dean of St. Paul's, versified*, Satire IV, v. 280-285:

> **"Courts are too much for wits so weak as mine:**
>
> **Charge them with Heav'n's Artill'ry, bold Divine!**
>
> **From such alone the Great rebukes endure,**
>
> **Whose Satire's sacred, and whose rage secure:**
>
> **"Tis mine to wash a few light stains, but theirs**
>
> **To deluge sin, and drown a Court in tears."]**

[11][In the 1788 edition the entire opening address is omitted, and begins directly with Remark I.]

[12][Henry St. John Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751), controversial English Tory statesman whose philosophical writings appeared posthumously in five volumes from 1754-1777. In 1754-5 Warburton published in three installments his *A view of Lord Bolingbroke's philosophy* (London: J. and P. Knapton). Hume's philosophy was often associated with that of Bolingbroke. For example, an anthology titled *The beauties of Hume and Bolingbroke* (London: 1782) presented in one volume selections from both authors, and opened with an essay comparing the two.]

[13]['The Scots flatter (or delude) themselves with dialectical subtleties,' *Praise of Folly*, LB IV 448B.]

[14]['Many witticisms along with gravity: and what is difficult, the same person being flowery and brief.']

[15][This paragraph is omitted in the 1788 edition.]

[16][In the 1788 edition this paragraph reads, "The purpose of this ESSAY.... Mr. Hume professes to give...."]

[17][George Horne writes, "In the *Natural History of Religion* Dr. Hurd thought our philosopher was approaching towards the Borders of Theism. But I never could find that he penetrated far into the *country*," *Letters on infidelity* (Oxford: 1784), p. 14].

[18][See "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State," in Hume's first *Enquiry*.]

[19]P. 1. *Nat. Hist. of Religion*. [in *Four dissertations*, (London: 1757).]

[20][This paragraph is omitted in the 1788 edition.]

[21]P. 17.

[22]Page 54-5.

[23][The first published volume of Hume's *History of Great Britain* (1754) contained two passages attacking Christianity. One passage argues that the first Protestant reformers were fanatical or "inflamed with the highest enthusiasm" in their opposition to Roman Catholic domination. The second passage labels Roman Catholicism a superstition which "like all other species of superstition... rouses the vain fears of unhappy mortals." These passages were dropped from subsequent editions of the *History*; they are reprinted in the Foreword to the Liberty Classics edition of Hume's *History of England* (1983), xiv-xvii.]

[24][Volume II of Hume's *History* (published in 1757) contains a footnote which defends Volume I against charges of irreligion. His footnote was an abridged version of a preface he had drafted for Volume II, but never published. The complete draft of the preface is reprinted in E.C. Mossner's *The Life of David Hume*, (1954), 306-308. Ultimately, even the abridged footnote was dropped from later editions of the *History*.]

[25]*Hist. of Great Britain*, V. II. P. 449-50.

[26][See Francis Bacon, *The History of the Reign of King Henry the Seventh*, ed. J. Rawson Lumby, (London: 1881), especially Ch. 4, "King Henry the Law-giver."]

[27][In the 1777 and 1788 editions this word reads "busied."]

[28]['I am setting about a work crowded with changes in fortune, cruel battles, discordant seditions, and even now the same horrors in peace; four rulers slain by the sword; three civil wars, many external wars, and frequently thoroughly mixed,' Tacitus, *History*, Bk. I, Par. 2.]

[29][This paragraph is omitted in the 1788 edition.]

[30][In the 1788 edition this word is replaced with "some."]

[31][In the 1788 edition this sentence reads "Lord Bolingbroke before him had employed...." For Bolingbroke original polytheism was only a prehistoric event: "I do not believe mankind discerned the unity of God in the first dawnings of knowledge. But the impressions of the Creator are so strongly marked in the whole extent of the creation... that it must have been received into the minds of men as soon as they began to contemplate the face of nature, and to exercise their reason in such contemplations; and this was long before the commencement of any traditions that we find out of the books of Moses." *On the Rise and Progress of Monotheism*, in *The Philosophical Works*, (London: 1754), Vol. II, 165. For Hume, original polytheism covers both prehistory and ancient history.]

[32][Sanchoniathon (or Sanchuniathon), legendary chronicler of ancient Phoenicia (now Lebanon) prior to the Trojan war, whose works Philo Herennius Byblius claimed to have translated. Hume neither quotes nor refers to Sanchoniathon. However, Bolingbroke does (ibid. 199-200).]

[33]Page 4.

[34]['Ignorance is very irksome, seeming to be the greatest thinking.']

[35][In the 1788 edition this paragraph reads, "...of which he is made up. I shall therefore present

the public...."]

[36]Page 44.

[37][See Bolingbroke, *Philosophical Works*, Vol. V, 99-102; Benedict de Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Sect. VI.]

[38][The preceding four paragraphs are omitted in the 1788 edition (beginning with "'But hold a little..."). The first of these paragraphs is merely a rhetorical representation of Hume's argument.]

[39]Page 55.

[40][Alexander Pope, *The first epistle of the second book of Horace*, v. 323.]

[41]Page 55-56.

[42]Page 53.

[43]Page 58.

[44]Page 58-59.

[45]Page 59.

[46]Page 76.

[47]Page 77.

[48]Page 58-59.

[49]Page 66-7.

[50]Page 49-50.

[51]Page 80-1.

[52]['Whether he was Trojan or Rutulian.']

[53]Iter. L. I. v. 383. [*A Voyage Hume to Gaul*, Bk. I, v. 383-384. 'For a crabbed Jew was in charge of the spot -- a creature that quarrels with sound human food. He charges in our bill for damaging his bushes and hitting the seaweed, and bawls about his enormous loss in water we had sipped. We pay the abuse due to the filthy race that infamously practices circumcision: a root of silliness they are: chill Sabbaths are after their own heart, yet their heart is chillier than their creed. Each seventh day is condemned to ignoble sloth, as 'twere an effeminate picture of a god fatigued. The other wild ravings from their lying bazaar methinks not even a child in his sleep could believe.']

[54][In the 1788 edition this sentence reads, "And why should You not believe him?"]

[55]Dedicat. p. iii. [In the Dedication to *Four Dissertations*, Hume writes to his cousin, Reverend John Hume, "I still admired your genius, even when I imagined, that you lay under the influence of prejudice; and you sometimes told me, that you excused my errors, on account of the candor and sincerity, which you thought, accompanied them."]

[56]Page 81-2.

[57]Page 91.

[58]Page 83.

[59]Page 91.

[60]Page 86-87.

[61]Page 92-93.

[62]Page 98-99.

[63][Literally, 'Gods of the greater races' (i.e. the gods of the Greeks and Romans).]

[64][In the 1788 edition the first portion of this sentence reads, "The DII MAJORUM GENTIUM, as we learn from their history, were, '*a rabble*....'"]

[65]D.L. iv. B. 4. 5. [William Warburton, *Divine legation of Moses demonstrated*, (London: 1761), Vol. II, Bk. 4, Sect. 4, p. 197. Warburton briefly quotes then criticizes the defence of Euhremerism by Samuel Shuckford in the *Sacred and profane history of the world connected* (1728-1737): "*And divine Honours cannot be given with any shew of Decency but to a late Posterity*. It must be owned the Ancients observed much *Decency* when they adopted into the Number of their greater Gods, Ravishers, Adulterers, Pathics; Vagabonds, thieves and Murderers."]

[66]Page 99.

[67][Chevalier Andrew Michael Ramsay, *The philosophical principles of natural and revealed religion*, (London: 1751), Part II, 406.]

[68]Page 94-5.

[69]Page 96.

[70]Page 97.

[71]Page 106-107.

[72]Page 104.

[73]Locke's works, vol. 2 p. 575. [*The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures*, in *Works*, (London: 1833), Vol. VII, 138-139.]

[74]Page 105.

[75]Page 109-10.

[76][The 1788 edition reads "faeces" in place of "faces."]

[77][Prior to the distribution of *Four dissertations*, Hume altered two passages in the "Natural History" and removed the essays "Of Suicide" and "Of the Immortality of the Soul." A comment similar to Warburton's appears in the *Critical Review* review of the "Natural History": "A deficiency in our author's arrangement of his notions, and a want of method and connection is also visible throughout the whole, occasioned perhaps by some castration of the original." See also the review of Hume's *Essays on suicide* in the *Monthly Review*, included in this volume.]

[78][In the 1777 and 1788 editions, this paragraph reads *We may add*, says he, That he may say safely whatever he pleases...."]

[79][In the 1788 edition this sentence reads "I have given a specimen of...."]

[80][Alexander Pope, *The Dunciad*, Bk. IV, 270.370. The commentary on this passage in Warburton's 1751 edition of Pope's *Works* reads, "A notion of Aristotle, that there was originally in every block of marble, a Statue, which would appear on the removal of superfluous parts."]

Remarks Upon The Natural History Of Religion By Mr. Hume

Thomas Stona

1758

Editor's note: Thomas Stona's *Remarks upon the Natural History of Religion* was published anonymously; authorship is attributed to him in John Nichols's *Literary Anecdotes*, (London: 1812), Vol. 2, 717. Little is known of Stona's life other than the fact that he is the author of *A Letter to the Norfolk militia, upon the proceedings of ancient nations when engaged in war. Bu a dumpling-eater...* (London: M. Cooper, 1759). The full title of the *Remarks* is *Remarks upon the Natural History of Religion by Mr. Hume. With Dialogues on Heathen Idolatry, and the Christian Religion*. Accordingly, the work is divided into three sections: "Remarks on the *Natural History of Religion*" (pp. 1-27), "On Idolatry, a Dialogue" (pp. 27-106), and "Dialogue on the Christian Religion" (pp. (106-159). Only the first of these three sections is reprinted below. The first section of the *Remarks* defends the position of original monotheism and attacks Hume's claim that primitive humans were too unsophisticated to deduce monotheism from nature. The second section, "On Idolatry" examines the causes of idolatry; Hume's name appears only incidentally in this section. The third section, "A Dialogue on the Christian Religion" defends Christian revelation, and briefly discusses Hume's argument against miracles (pp. 120-133) concluding "that neither the impossibility of the miracles being wrought can be proved, or their evidence confuted; and consequently no reason can be given, why we should not believe in the truth of them, notwithstanding the conclusions that are drawn from these formidable arguments of *experience* to the contrary." William Rose writes in the *Monthly Review* that,

> **The Author of these Remarks, &c. appears to be a friend to religion and freedom of enquiry; but he has advanced nothing, in our opinion, that can give the judicious reader any high idea of his discernment or acuteness. His remarks upon Mr. Hume's Natural History of Religion are extremely superficial, and scarce contain any thing that deserves particular notice. [1758, Vol. 19, pp. 532-533].**

The *Critical Review* devotes a full review article to Stona's *Remarks*. They describe at length

Hume's abilities and how Hume is "more admired, more opposed, and more misrepresented" than most writers. Stona's work is recommended "as a work of learning, taste, and merit... [although] without, perhaps, the strongest powers of the discussive faculty." Concerning Stona's main argument against Hume, the reviewer observes "that Mr. Hume seems to attribute too much to the cultivation of the mind, and our author too little; both in extremes" (1758, Vol. 6, pp. 411-418). The following is from pages 1-27 of the 1758 and only edition of Stona's *Remarks*. Stona's bibliographical references to Greek and Latin classics and seventeenth and eighteenth-century works have been expanded and clarified without brackets in the notes.

REMARKS
UPON THE
Natural History of Religion
By Mr. HUME.
With DIALOGUES on
HEATHEN IDOLATRY
AND THE
CHRISTIAN RELIGION

By S.T.

LONDON:
Printed for R. and J. Dodsley, in *Pall mall*.
MDCCLVII.

{1}

REMARKS
UPON THE
Natural History of Religion.
LETTER to Theophilus

I HAVE lately met with a treatise entitled, *The Natural History of Religion*, in which the author proposes to enquire into the primary religion of mankind upon the principles of reason, unassisted with revelation, and has produced a series of arguments to prove that it was polytheism. I do not pretend to be a judge of the merits of this performance; but must confess, that the air of freedom which enlivens every part of it, delighted {2} me extremely. You know, Theophilus, that I am a friend to liberty in the literary, as well as civil world, since tyrannical authority in either will

equally depress the writer, and enslave the subject; to *think* is the prerogative of every rational creature, and freely to declare its sentiments, its happiest privilege. This liberty indeed, you will say, is designed for the investigation of truth, so should be safely preserved from the abuses of the *freethinker* when he endeavours to pervert or corrupt this advantage, as well as from the attacks of the *bigot*, when he wants to destroy it; and, if you read this pamphlet, will think perhaps, that its ingenious author should be ranked under the first class, and that he may be suspected of some such intention, as he has advanced an opinion entirely repugnant to the profession of the Mosaic history. I should be glad then if you would carefully examine it, and tell me whether Mr. Hume has given us a true delineation {3} of human nature in its primitive state, or whether he hath not unjustly depreciated its dignity, by describing our ancient ancestors as altogether *rude*, *ignorant* and *barbarous*; for as they wore the same frame, possessed the same rational faculty, and were actuated by the same passions with myself, so I am desirous of being acquainted with their civil and religious constitution soon after they were placed upon this beautiful theatre. That affection, which you call benevolence, uninfluenced either by the interest, or connection of relations, friends, or countrymen, uninterrupted with those passions of envy or malice, which are too apt to engage themselves in a party towards our contemporaries, now glows with the purest ardor, and makes me wish to find that advantageous characters are given of the human race, even in the remotest ages of antiquity. {4}

LETTER to ACASTO.

I Sat down with a full expectation of being highly entertained with the perusal of the pamphlet which you recommended to me in your letter; for the character of its author, and the plan he proposes to pursue, gave me great hopes of finding some new light flung upon the obscure parts of antiquity: but you may judge of the satisfaction it afforded me in this respect by the following abstract.

"It appears to me (says Mr. Hume,) that if we consider the improvement of human society, from rude beginnings to a greater state of perfection, polytheism or idolatry was, and necessarily must have been the first and most ancient religion of mankind. This opinion I shall endeavour to confirm by the following arguments.

'Tis a matter of fact uncontestable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind {5} were idolaters. - Behold then the clear testimony of history. The farther we mount up into antiquity, the more we do find mankind plunged into idolatry. No marks, no symptoms of any more perfect religion. The most ancient records of human race still present us with polytheism, as the popular and established system. As far as writing or history reaches, mankind in ancient times appear universally to have been polytheists. Shall we assert, that in more ancient times, before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art or science, men entertained the principles of pure theism? That is, while they were ignorant and barbarous they discovered truth: but fell into error as soon as they acquired learning and politeness. But in this assertion you not only contradict all appearance of probability, but also our present experience concerning the principles and opinions of barbarous nations. {6} The savage tribes of America, Africa, and Asia, are all idolaters."

The meaning of this argument is, that as far as history reaches, the popular religion of most countries is found to have been polytheism; and as mankind were altogether ignorant and barbarous before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art or science, so unable in such a state to find out the principles of theism, therefore polytheism must have been their first and

most ancient religion.

But the incapacity of a people unacquainted with the arts and sciences, to find out the principles of theism, should be demonstrated, before this argument can have any weight or validity whatever; otherwise mankind may reasonably be supposed to have made this discovery, long before the arts and sciences were known. For the works of the creation are the certain, and have been the perpetual testimony of the existence of a God, and reason is the medium with {7} which the human creature, from the very first period of its being, hath been furnished to discover it: it always saw the sun enlivening every part of the creation, the earth bringing forth provision for its use, the seasons returning in the utmost regularity and order; it must always have observed itself to be surrounded by an innumerable species of creatures, and could not help perceiving its own inability to form or give life to the meanest insect: and from that reflection must have been immediately led to conclude, that this beauteous scene of things must certainly have been created by a being infinitely superior in wisdom and power to man. But the mind did not want the irradiation of the arts, to enable it to discover this truth; for neither the utmost perfection in architecture, sculpture, painting, or statuary, would lead it to such contemplations as these. In succeeding ages indeed, when mankind were acquainted with the sciences, they might have acquired more {8} refined proofs of a deity: as the beautiful symmetry of parts which is conspicuous in the human frame, is an infallible conviction to the anatomist of the wisdom of its author; the laws of gravity in the heavenly bodies will afford the astronomer the most august idea of that being who first put them into motion. But it will be too peremptory to affirm, that the illiterate *ancient* might not from pure intellect contemplate this scene of things, with the same rapture of admiration, with the same emotions of gratitude towards his Creator, as the cultivated *modern*. Education indeed may polish the reflections of mankind, but it cannot generate them; and you must necessarily suppose the seeds of knowledge to be planted in the peasant, before they can be expanded into the arts and sciences in the philosopher. So mankind were as able to discover the existence of a God in the remotest ages of antiquity, as at present; and consequently it neither contradicts {9} any appearance of probability to assert, that notwithstanding as far as history reaches, mankind in ancient times appear to have been polytheists; yet in more ancient times, before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art or science, men entertained the principles of theism. That is, while they were ignorant of these accomplishments, they discovered truth, but were afterwards compelled to embrace idolatry, for political purposes (as it will appear in the sequel). Neither doth such an assertion contradict our experience of barbarous nations, who are not all idolaters: the natives of New England believe in a supreme power, that created all things, whom they call Kichtan,[2] and those of Canada believe in the existence of a God.[3]

The Peruvians called the first cause of all things, Pachacamac; by which word they meant the quickener of the universe; {10} or the great soul of the world. This name was so very sacred, and venerable amongst them, that they never mentioned it but upon extreme necessity; and then not without all the signs of devotion imaginable, as bowing the body and head, lifting up the eyes to heaven, and spreading out their hands.[4]

The idolatrous Indians of Asia acknowledge only one infinite God, almighty, and only wise, the creator of heaven and earth, whom they call Permessar, and represent by an oval figure, as the most perfect.[5]

The Africans of Negroland likewise worship Guihimo, i.e. the Lord of heaven.[6]

But to confirm this opinion: Mr. Hume proceeds to tell us, that

> a barbarous necessitous animal (such as man is on the very first origin of society) pressed {11} by such numerous wants and passions, has no leisure to admire the regular face of nature, or make enquiries concerning the cause of objects, to which from his infancy he has been gradually accustomed.... Imagine not that he will so much as start the question, whence the whole system, or united fabric of the universe arose.[7]

This is a notable observation indeed, and indisputably proves, that as long as man continued to be a *barbarous, necessitous animal*, he was most certainly a *barbarous*, and *necessitous animal*; but it by no means follows from thence, that he was a *polytheist*. A creature starving with hunger would be anxious only of conquering its immediate wants, and not yet curious of enquiring into the order of the universe, or what relation it might have to a superior being; and so, in such a state as this, would be of no religion whatever. Therefore {12} the society must necessarily be supposed to have been amply supplied with the conveniencies of life, and that different stations were allotted to its several members, before curiosity excited any of them, whose employments might engage them the least in their worldly affairs, to enquire from whence they sprung; and man must have been a civilized, contemplative, and reflecting creature, before he could have been a religious one; must be supposed to have argued, and reasoned upon his own nature, to have been sensible of his dependence on a superior power, before he could think of applying to that power for relief.

The question is, whether the human creature, after having exercised its intellectual faculties, and considered the different parts of nature, after having surveyed the stupendous furniture of the heavens, and admired the exquisite order and harmony of this beauteous scene, it would suppose it to be the effect of infinite {13} power, perfect wisdom, and goodness, and so be led to adore its supreme Creator; or whether, (as Mr. Hume asserts) it imagined, *each element to be subjected to its invisible power and agent; the province of each god to be separated from that of another; and that its first ideas of religion arose from the incessant hopes and fears which actuate the human mind; so invoked Juno at marriages, Lucina at births*.

In short, the question is, whether the primary religion of a rational creature, was the offspring of its reason or the monster of its fears. This latter opinion Mr. Hume has borrowed from the poet's observation, that *primus in orbe deos fecit timor*:[8] an assertion which deserves rather to be ridiculed, than to be seriously confuted.

To proceed. The author observes,

> it must necessarily be allowed, that, in order to carry men's attention beyond the visible course of things, or {14} lead them into any inference concerning invisible, intelligent power, they must be actuated by some passion, which prompts their thought, and reflection, some motive which urges their first enquiry. But what passion shall we have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty consequence? not speculative curiosity, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for such gross apprehensions, and would lead them into enquiries concerning the frame of nature, a subject too large, and comprehensive for their narrow capacities. No passions therefore can be supposed to work upon such barbarians, but the ordinary affairs of human life: the anxious concern for happiness, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food, and other necessaries.

Such is Mr. Hume's opinion of our ancient ancestors.

He thinks, that they were senseless of every emotion, but *fear, revenge*, {15} and *hunger*; qualities

indeed more justly applicable to the beasts of the forest, than to rational creatures. But it may be asked; why was *Speculative curiosity, or the pure love of truth, too refined for their apprehensions?* Doth he imagine that nature did not bestow her talents in so liberal a manner amongst her ancient sons, as amongst us? Doth he suppose that no inquisitive genius, no philosophic mind ever prevailed amongst them, but that reason and reflection are only of modern growth? Why might not a *Bacon, Locke*, or *Newton*, have existed in the remotest ages, since human nature hath always been the same from its first creation? Perhaps as the poet observes,[9]

Before great Agamemnon reign'd
Reign'd kings as great as he, and brave, {16}
Whose huge ambition's now contain'd
In the small compass of a grave,
In endless night they sleep unwept, unknown
No *bard* had they to make all time their own.

But withall, we may demand what right he has to give them the appellation of *ignorant barbarians*, of having *gross apprehensions, narrow capacities?* For a deficiency of records must always deprive an impartial enquirer of that full conviction, by which alone he can be authorized to pronounce with any decision upon the state and condition of the ancient world. The very invention of letters did not precede the christian aera perhaps above 2000 years, being found out by Thoth in the reign of Tham,[10] and the Greeks {17} wrote nothing in prose before the conquest of Asia by Cyrus the Persian;[11] and consequently as mankind existed many ages before the use of letters, they had no means whatever (if we except hieroglyphicks, which were not to be depended upon, as being capable of various interpretations) of conveying any account of their lives to posterity; so one generation passed away and was but feintly remembered, or entirely forgotten by its succeeding one, and some edifice or column perhaps was the only evidence that mankind then had of the very existence of their ancestors. If a few centuries would thus obliterate the memory of people, and nations, before the use of letters, must not we call it presumption in this author, thus dogmatically to declare that they were altogether *rude*, *ignorant*, and *barbarous* in their manners, and that idolatry was their first religion? {18}

So whether theism or polytheism was the primary religion of mankind, can be determined upon no other authority, than revelation; and it *that* is excluded by this author, then the solution of this question can be only founded on conjecture, and that side of it which is supported by the greatest degree of probability have a right to our assent.

Upon this principle alone must we argue, and let us consider the state of mankind in the remotest ages, upon the testimony of the most ancient monuments, and records, and endeavour from thence to form a reasonable idea of their manners and religion.

The pyramids of Egypt were built before the use of letters,[12] and have still {19} survived the storms, and mouldering hand of time, to convince us, that its builders compounded the mechanical powers in a manner unknown to us at present;[13] and their situation likewise proves that they were acquainted with astronomy.[14] Architecture,[15] sculpture,[16] ship building,[17] and embroidery[18] were brought to great perfection in Homer's time. Xenophon speaks of great masters in statuary, and painting:[19] and we find in Plutarch, a remarkable proof of the excellent administration of justice amongst the ancient Egyptians.[20] If we consider withal the descriptions {20} which authors have given us of the magnificent cities of Thebes,[21] Babylon,[22] and Memphis;[23] of the temple of Diana at Ephesus,[24] of the amazing works of the labyrinth,[25] of

the lake Moeris,[26] or of the famous statue of Memnon;[27] can we help being astonished at the progress which the ancients had made in the mechanical arts? Is it then reasonable to suppose, with Mr. Hume, that these people were *rude* and *ignorant*, and *that speculative curiosity was too refined for their gross apprehensions*? Is it to be imagined that these ancient philosophers, artists, and law-givers, were not curious to enquire {21} from whence they sprung, and what being it is who endued them with that excellent faculty, by which they were enabled to measure times, to calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies, to plan the city and the pyramid; that faculty which taught them how to animate the block into a statue, and to enliven the canvass to a picture? Can we believe that these ingenious people, who by the greatest strength of mind had invented that amazing art of letters, and the noble science of mathematicks, who had improved their understanding to such a degree of excellence in every respect, were either unable to discover the existence of a God, by the plain evidence of his works, or could refrain from enquiring what power it was, which constituted such beautiful order through the whole creation? Or shall we think with Mr. Hume, that they looked upon this scene of things with the same indifference and stupidity, as the irrational brute? No! we cannot, {22} after such indisputable evidence of the ingenuity and wisdom of the remotest ages, believe otherwise, than that they discovered and adored the divine being; for these testimonies are matters of fact, which no prejudice can elude, and as indisputably demonstrate the ability of man, as the works of the creation demonstrate the power and wisdom of God. Permit me then to indulge myself in a conjecture, that my ancient ancestors often turned their eyes to the blue vault of heaven, and chanted to their Creator like Adam in his morning orison, (for they undoubtedly observed, reflected, and admired.)

> **These are thy glorious works, parent of good,**
> **Almighty, thine this universal frame,**
> **Thus wondrous fair; thyself how wondrous then!**
> **Unspeakable, who sit'st above the heavens {23}**
> **To us invisible, or dimly seen**
> **In these thy lowest works; yet these declare**
> **Thy goodness beyond thought, and pow'r divine.[28]**

We have likewise great reason to believe that theism was the primary religion of mankind, as the sensible part of them in all ages were of this opinion.

Orpheus,[29] Homer,[30] Thales,[31] Pythagoras,[32] Anaxagoras,[33] Socrates,[34] Plato,[35] and {23} Aristotle[36] believed in the existence of a divine being. The Thebans believed in a self-existent and immortal being, whom they called Kneph,[37] and all the Egyptians in general esteemed God to be the cause of every creature that was generated, and of all the powers in nature, that he is superior to every thing, and that he is an immaterial, immortal, self-existent being, who governs and sustains every part {25} of the creation.[38] The Ethiopians,[39] the Persians,[40] and Chinese,[41] professed the same belief. Cicero observes, that there is no nation so savage and barbarous, which doth not believe in the being of a God, tho' it may be ignorant of the manner of his existence.[42] Dr. Warburton likewise says,

> **It is not only possible that the worship of the first cause of all things was prior to any idol worship, but in the highest degree probable; idol worship {26} having none of the appearances of an original custom, and all the circumstances attending a depraved and corrupted institution.[43]**

If we then impartially consider the evidence of probability on either side of this question, we shall

certainly be induced to believe that theism was the primary religion of mankind. Nay, if these testimonies which have been produced in favour of this opinion be excluded, let me even then ask you, Acasto, whether it is not more consistent with reason, to suppose that the wise, ingenious, thinking creature which we call man, whom the supreme being hath so eminently distinguished from the rest of the animal creation, by reason and reflection,[44] believed and adored his Creator, in the remotest ages of antiquity, than (according to Mr. {27} Hume's plan) that he worshipped the ridiculous objects of idolatry? So I shall conclude this epistle with the words of Sir Isaac Newton;

> The believing that the world was framed by one supreme God, and is governed by him, and the loving and worshipping him, and honouring our parents, and loving our neighbours as ourselves, and being merciful even to brute beasts, is the oldest of all religions.[45]

THEOPHILUS.

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2]John Harris, *Navigantium atque itinerantium bibliotheca: Or a complete collection of voyages and travels*, (London: 1705), Bk. V, Ch. 30.

[3]Ibid., Bk. V, Ch. 18.

[4]Ibid., Bk. V, Ch. 14.

[5]Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 7, Tavernier's travels.

[6]Ibid., Bk. III, Ch. 1.

[7]Lord Bolingbroke argues in the same manner. *Philosophical Works*, (London: 1754), Vol. I, Essay II, Sect. 2.

[8]Statius, *Thebiad*, Bk. III, v. 660-62. ['Fear first created gods in the world.']

[9]Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona
Multi: sed omnes illacrymabiles
Urgentur, ignotique longa
Nocte, carent quia vate facro.
Horace, *Odes*, Bk. 4, ode 9, v. 25-29.

[10]Soc. [Greek Quote]

Plato, *Phaedrus*, 274c-d. ['SOCRATES. I heard, then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, was one of the ancient gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the ibis, and the name of the god himself was Theuth. He it wa who invented numbers and arithmetic and geometry and astronomy, also draughts and dice, and, most important of all, letters.']

[11]Isaac Newton, *Chronology of antient kingdoms amended*, (London: 1728).

[12]Pliny speaking of the pyramids says, "Qui de iis scripserunt, sunt Herodotus, Euhemerus, Duris Samius, Aristagoras, Dionysius, Artemidorus, Alexander Polyhistor, Butorides, Antisthenes, Demetrius, Demoteles, Apion, inter omnes eos non constat a quibus factae sint." *Natural History*, Bk. XXXVI, Ch. 12.

[13]All the stones of the pyramid built by Cheops are 30 feet long, well squared, and jointed with the greatest exactness. Herodotus, *History*, Bk. II, Ch. 124.

[14]Frederick Lewis (Frederik Ludwig) Norden, *Travels in Egypt and Nubia*, (London: 1705).

[15]Homer, *Iliad*, Bk. VI, v. 242 ff.

[16]Ibid., Bk. XVIII, v. 483 ff.

[17]Ibid., Bk. V, v. 62 ff.

[18]Ibid., Bk. VI, v. 289 ff.

[19]Xenophon, *Memorabelia*, Bk. I, Ch. 4, Sect. 3.

[20]"At Thebes the statues of the magistrates were carried without hands, and that of the chief judge with his eyes looking upon the ground, to signify that they should neither be prevailed upon by bribery, nor influenced by perswasion to act contrary to justice." Plutarch, *Moralia*, Bk. V, "Iside et Osiride," Ch. 10, Sect. 355.

[21]Homer, *Iliad*, Bk. IX, v. 383.

[22]Herodotus, *History*, Bk. I, Ch. 178.

[23]Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 99.

[24]Pliny, *Natural History*, Bk. XVI, Ch. 40.

[25]Herodotus, *History*, Bk. II, Ch. 148.

[26]Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 149.

[27]Pliny, *Natural History*, Bk. XXXVI, Ch. 7.

[28]John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, Bk. V, v. 153-159.

[29][Greek Quote]

Clement of Alexandria, *Exhortation to the Greeks*, Ch. VII, Sect. 64. ['"One, self-begotten, lives; all things proceed from one; and in his works he ever moves: no mortal sees him, yet himself sees all." Thus wrote Orpheus.']

[30]Agamemnon says to Achilles,

[Greek quote]

Homer, *Illiad*, Bk. I, v. 178. ['Though though be very valiant, a god, I ween, gave thee this.']

[31][Greek Quote]

Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Bk. I, Ch. 1, Thales, Sect. 35. ['Of all things that

are, the most ancient is God, for he is uncreated. The most beautiful is the universe, for it is God's workmanship.']

[32]Pythagoras censuit animum sees per naturam rerum omen intentum, et commeantem. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, Bk. I, Ch. 11, Sect. 28. ['As for Pythagoras, who believed that the entire substance of the universe is penetrated and pervaded by a soul...']

[33][Greek Quote]

Plutarch, *Moralia*, Bk. XI, De Placitis Philosophorum, Bk. I, Ch. 3. ['Anaxagoras avers that bodies did consist from all eternity, but the divine intellect did reduce them into their proper orders, and effected the origination of all beings.']

[34]Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, Bk. I, Ch. 4.

[35][Greek quote]

Plato, *Republic*, Bk. X, 596c. ['This same handicraftsman is not only able to make all implements, but he produces all plants and animals, including himself, and hereto earth and heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in Hades under the earth.']

[36][Greek quote]

Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 983a-8, ['God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle.']

[37][Greek Quote]

Plutarch, *Moralia*, Bk. V, "Iside et Osiride," Ch. 21, Sect. 359. ['The inhabitants of the Theban territory only do not contribute because they believe in no mortal god, but only in the god whom they call Kneph, whose existence had no beginning and shall have no end.']

[38][Greek quote]

Iamblichus, *Mysteries of the Egyptians*, Bk. 7, Ch. 2, Sect. 251. ['The God who is the cause of generation, of all nature, and of all the powers in the elements, as transcending these, and as being immaterial, incorporeal, and supernatural, unbegotten and impartible, wholly derived from himself, and concealed in himself, this God precedes all things, and comprehends all things in himself.']

[39]Strabo, *Geography*, Bk. XVII, Ch. 2, Sect. 3.

[40]Thomas Hyde, *Historia religionis veterum Persarum, earumque Magorum; Zoroastris vita, etc.*, (Oxford: 1700).

[41]Tabula chronologicae monarchiae Sinicae ante Christum juxta cyclos, *annorum* 60. ante Christum, 2697. Hoam Ti, hoc est falvus imperator fundator monarchiae. Templum pacis Xam Ti, id est supremo imperatori seu deo. Confucius. ['Chronological list of the Chinese monarchs before Christ in accordance with cycles of 60 years, 2697 before Christ. Hoam Ti, namely, the yellow emperor, was founder of the monarchy. The temple of peace Xam Ti, he is the highest of rulers or God.']

[42]Cicero, *De Legibus*, Bk. I, Ch. 8, Sect. 24.

[43]William Warburton, *The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated*, second edition, (London: 1738), Vol. I, Bk. III, Sect. 6, page 461.

[44]Cicero, *De Legibus*, Bk. I, Ch. 7, Sect. 22.

[45]Isaac Newton, *Chronology of antient kingdoms amended*.

"The Insufficiency of Mr. Hume's Objection to the Credibility of Miracles"

Discourses on Various Subjects

William Samuel Powell

1776

Editor's note: William Samuel Powell (1717-1775) held several posts as a divinity school lecturer and clergyman. The *Discourses* (1776), published after his death, are a collection of 17 sermons, three charges, and a biographical sketch by the editor. The *London Review* opens its review of the *Discourses* with the following:

> **The orthodox author of these Discourses made himself long since many enemies, among the party of the petitioners against subscriptions, by the sermon he preached, about twenty years ago, before the University of Cambridge, and published soon after under the title of 'A Defence of the Subscriptions required in the Church of England.' This Sermon decried by some as much as it was commended by others, is here printed.... The subject of most of the sermons is the evidence of different kinds in favour of Christianity. (1776, Vol. 4, pp. 297-298).**

The *Critical Review* comments that "Some of the discourses contained in this volume were preached before the university; and others in the college-chapel; and were chiefly intended for younger students in divinity.... These sermons and charges bear the marks of an agreeable writer, rather than a profound enquirer, or a solid reasoner" (1776, Vol. 42, pp. 131-136). The *Discourses* are also reviewed in the *Monthly Review* (1776, Vol. 55, 173-176), although more neutrally. The essay on Hume, Discourse six, defends the New Testament resurrection account against Hume's criticism of miracle testimonies. Powell concludes that the weight of evidence favors the resurrection, as opposed to fraud or deception. The *Discourses* were printed a second time in 1794. The following is taken from the 1776 edition.

DISCOURSES ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS
London: L. Davis, 1776

{88}

DISCOURSE 6
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF MR. HUME'S OBJECTION TO THE CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES

Acts xvii.32

And when they heard of the Resurrection of the Dead, some mocked; and others said, We will hear thee again of this matter.

ST. Paul, in his discourse to the Athenians, on that fundamental doctrine of Christianity, the Resurrection to a final judgement, appeals to the testimony of a fact, and alledges our Saviour's return from the grave, as giving assurance to all mankind {89} of their own future existence. His philosophical hearers, we are told, were partly Epicureans and partly Stoics; and the reception they gave to his instructions was agreeable to the prejudices which each sect had imbibed: the disciples of the garden, as is probable, being those, whose physical tenets disposed them to ridicule the very thought of a Resurrection; and the students of the porch, those less insolent hearers, who, being unable to resist the force of his reasoning, and unwilling to submit to it, desired a farther account of so extraordinary an opinion. The apostle however, as it seems from the following part of the history, did not gratify them: but left the Greeks to sooth their learned vanity, by casting the imputation of foolishness on doctrines they could so little relish or comprehend. And yet neither they who doubted, not they who mocked, were, by the principles of their schools, so far from the kingdom of God, as some among the infidel philosophers of modern times. The Epicureans admitted as true the relations of some miraculous event; but endeavoured to shew, that they were not contrary {90} to nature. The Stoics believed the reality of events, which they confessed to be supernatural, and considered as the interpositions of Providence for the good of mankind. Here then the field of conviction was wide and open; and among the others it was not absolutely precluded. But how shall the advocate of Christianity address himself to, or reason with, those subtle disputants, who refuse to assent to facts the most strongly attested, if they are not such as experience warrants; who would teach us to reduce all human testimony to the precarious standard of our particular knowledge and observation? Vain is every inquiry into the abilities, the dispositions, the motives the number, of the witnesses, by whom the miracles of Christ have been transmitted to us; if the very nature of the facts renders them incapable of proof. And, though each of these particulars should appear to be such, as might satisfy the most scrupulous examiner: it would be unfair not to attend to an argument; which, if it be conclusive, destroys the efficacy of them all. Truth can never want, and should always disdain to accept, {91} such suspicious favours. The objection therefore shall be fully stated, and fairly considered.

"It is evident, says this objector, that the credibility of a fact depends not entirely on the number, the qualifications, and dispositions, of those who relate it: since, where these are all equally

unexceptionable, the degree of credibility is allowed to be very different. Let a man of common understanding relate for us an usual event; for which he alledges the clear and undisturbed evidence of his senses: if we know of no purposes he has to serve, no passions to indulge, by leading us into error; and if we have no reason to suspect the truth of his relation from opposite testimony; we readily yield him our assent. Yet change but the fact, which is familiar to our apprehensions, into one of the marvellous kind, and a number of such witnesses would find it difficult to convince us. Nay, a degree of external evidence, which in common cases would be admitted without a doubt, by increasing the repugnancy of the thing related to our observations and opinions, may not only lose all {92} its probability, but we may even have full conviction that it is false; conviction founded upon those very principles which induce us to assent to human testimony. The experience we have, that men do not generally deceive us in their narratives, is the foundation of the credit we give them. The experience we have of the constant uniform course of nature produces an expectation of the same regularity in the parts untried. The assent is determined in the two cases by the same principles: and when they draw it on opposite sides, the superior force must prevail. But the experience of nature being continual and unvaried, whilst that of the veracity of human testimony is weakened by many exceptions of fraud or mistake, the latter can never overcome the former; and therefore no attestation of witnesses, however able and honest they may appear, can convince a just reasoner of a miraculous event."

Every part of this objection abounds with ambiguity and fallacy. When experience is made the sole criterion of truth, must we understand by it our own experience, or that of others? If *our own*, at what period of {93} our lives? Must he who has lived twenty years without seeing an eclipse of the sun, or a comet, reject the accounts of them as fabulous? or he who has not dwelt near Vesuvius, believe nothing of its fiery eruptions? There are many real facts, so opposite to the experience of those to whom they may be related, that, if they govern their assent by that experience, they will certainly look upon them as false. Some of these events are regularly repeated: whilst others are more irregular and unconnected; in judging of which from the principles of analogy, the most comprehensive knowledge of nature would be deceived. For though we are continually enlarging our experience, and correcting the judgements formed by it; yet it is still confined to few objects, and open to many uncertainties and errors. We frequently give credit to the relations of others though they correspond not with it and our after-experience convinces us that the credit was just. -- Or is it the experience of *others* which must fix our opinions. This can only be known to us by testimony; and it must overthrow itself, {94} if it destroys the force of that testimony, on which alone it rests. If we search into the origin of our knowledge of facts, that portion of it which is acquired by our own powers will be found small in comparison of that which is derived from testimony. And to refute our assent to well-attested facts, because we believe other facts, not better attested, is plainly unreasonable. We must therefore weigh the evidence, and not reject, without examination, all such narratives, as contain matters uncommon, or even before unheard-of.

Again, it is difficult to conceive in what sense miracles are said to be *repugnant to experience*. Several relations of the same fact may be inconsistent; but unconnected facts, how different soever, are not repugnant to each other. You have never known a dead man restored to life. Yet the witnesses of such an event cannot be refuted by your ignorance. {95}

But nature we are told, is uniform and unvaried in her operations. This either presumes the very point in question, or touches not those events which are supposed to be out of the course of nature. And the conclusion established upon it, that, from our observations of this regularity, we may convict of falsehood all accounts that do not coincide with it, is wholly without foundation. -- But

let us examine it a little more particularly. The probability of facts, derived from experience, admits all the degrees and changes that are conceivable. An event, once observed, leaves an expectation in the mind, that it may happen again. The repetition of the same event raises that expectation continually, till it mounts to a probability, or even moral certainty. But every change of circumstances, even distance alone, whether of place or time, weakens the force of analogy; and our short and scanty experience produces, after such removals, a proportionably lower assurance of the regularity of events. That the motion of the heavenly bodies will be the same tomorrow as to-day, may be considered as {96} almost certain. That it will continue the same a hundred years, is probable. But whether it will meet with no interruption in a thousand or ten thousand ages, appears doubtful. -- When we turn our view backward, the distant prospect, if not enlightened by history, is equally obscure. No miracles for the confirmation of our religion have been performed in the present age. This creates a presumption, we may allow, against any pretences to them in the age before us, when the condition of religion was nearly the same. But, if we carry back our inquiry to remote times, and to the original propagation of Christianity, this presumption, weak at first, and drawn from a short experience, loses its gold at every step, till it leaves the mind in perfect freedom. Vainly do men presume, from a few detached and cursory observations, to comprehend the whole scheme of Providence, and to decide arrogantly what is, and what is not, consistent with it.

But, should we admit the principle, on which this objection is founded, that the laws of the universe are constant {97} and unchangeable, it would not justify us in rejecting the evidence of miracles. For may not miracles, though deviations from the general rules established here, be parts of a higher and more general course of nature? May it not be agreeable to the established laws of a moral government, that God, for the instruction of his creatures, should suffer some of the laws of the natural world to be suspended? To enable us to judge whether this be according to the order of the universe, we ought to see and examine many like cases. But where shall they be found? We know of no revelations, which God has made of himself to mankind, but those recorded in the Old or New Testament. Now these are all established on similar proofs. They stand united in themselves, separated from all other events. If you would search for circumstances of resemblance, you must pass to some other planet, and view other systems of rational beings.[2] The experience of what has happened on this our earth, will afford no ground for a comparison: and yet, without many such comparisons, it is impossible to determine, that {98} those changes, in the particular laws of the visible world, are contrary to the rules of God's universal government.

Here then we might rest the Christian cause; content with having proved that the miracles, by which it is supported, and for which there are such abundant testimonies, are not in their nature incredible. But perhaps a thinking man may go a little farther, and demonstrate (what must not only remove all these objections from analogy, but set them on the side of religion) that *one* miracle, at least, has been wrought. For was not the creation of mankind a miracle? Certainly it was, in the strictest and most proper signification of the word; if the human race be not as old as the material world. But, if man and all the laws of nature had their birth together, then the late origin of these laws must greatly lessen any prejudice against their interruption.

But whilst we disallow the judgements formed from experience concerning facts unknown, do we not weaken the principal evidence on which our religion is established? Is it not experience alone, which gives {99} strength to testimony? Do we not admit or reject the witness of any fact, as we have found that other men in like circumstances have rarely or usually deceived us? Experience is, without question, the general foundation of credit. But the force of *united* testimonies depends not

wholly upon it. When the expectation arising from a single witness is known, the degree of assurance produced by a number is subject to a precise calculation, though the number be greater than we have ever heard attest the same fact. Thus, if the relation be of such a nature, and the single witness of such a character, that the mind is exactly balanced, and remains in perfect doubt; then may it be strictly demonstrated, upon the clearest mathematical principles, that, if ten such witnesses agree in their report, the probability of its truth exceeds more than a thousand times, and if twenty agree, more than a million of times, the probability of its falsehood. But, should we endeavour to collect the sum of all the probabilities for the truth of Christianity, we should soon be stopt by the immensity of the numbers; and {100} should find the difficulty like that of answering the old inquiries, by how many accidental casts of the twenty-four letters the Iliad might be formed, or in what time the fortuitous jumble of atoms would produce an animal. And, as the impossibility of resolving these questions affords the strongest proof of design and wisdom in the creation; so the difficulty in the other may help us to conceive that mass of evidence, by which the Christian religion is confirmed.

But, without this nice inquiry, even upon the principles of our adversaries, our faith must remain secure. For, unless it can be shewn, that some set of men, equal in number to the witnesses of the resurrection, and possessed of equal opportunities of knowing the truth, have yet been deceived in plain facts, about which it was so much their interest not to be deceived; or have concerted a fraud, from which they had so little to hope, and so much to apprehend: unless one of these suppositions can be proved, (and both of them the advocates of Christianity have often confuted) we may fairly conclude, that there is incomparably better evidence {101} for the resurrection of Christ from external testimony, than against it from its unlikeness to other events. For, the degree of external evidence, by which it is confirmed, has never misled mankind; but the principle of unlikeness does often, and must necessarily, deceive them. The legitimate use of this principle is to form a judgement, not of events unlike, but of events like, to our experience; not to decide, that the former never happened, but to ground an expectation, that the latter may happen hereafter. And this use was made of it by the apostle, when he argues, that Jesus, by rising from the dead, became an unquestionable witness of a general resurrection.

Notes

[2]See Bp. Butler's Analogy, Part II.

Remarks on Mr. Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion

Thomas Hayter

1780

Editor's Note: Published in 1780, Thomas Hayter's *Remarks* is the first sustained discussion to appear of Hume's *Dialogues*. Hayter's comments are confined to the discussion of the problem of evil in parts 10-12 of the *Dialogues*. The complete review in the *Monthly Review* is as follows:

> **These remarks are such as must naturally and obviously occur to those readers who are conversant with moral and theological subjects, and acquainted with Mr. Hume's writings. They chiefly relate to the moral attributes of the Deity, and the influence of religious principles upon human conduct. The Author writes in a lively and animated manner; and his style, after a little more practice and attention to the rules of composition, will, we doubt not, become more chaste, correct, and uniformly elegant. (1781, Vol. 64, p. 159).**

The *Critical Review* concludes its brief review noting that Hayter uses an *argumentum ad hominem* "which the advocates of Mr. Hume cannot possibly evade" (1780, Vol. 49, pp. 315-316). The *London Review* notes that Hayter counters Hume's objections to the moral attributes of the deity "with considerable success." They continue, though, listing Hayter's stylistic errors, although one error is corrected in Hayter's errata (1780, Vol. 11, p. 282-283).

REMARKS
ON
MR. HUME'S DIALOGUES,
CONCERNING
NATURAL RELIGION.

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REMARKS ON MR. HUME'S DIALOGUES.

{1}

REMARKS ON MR. HUME'S DIALOGUES

MR. HUME, in the introduction to his Dialogues (p. 10.) exhibits the following sketch of the personages between whom the Dialogues are supposed to be maintained. "The remarkable {2} contrast in their characters still farther raised your expectation; which you opposed the accurate philosophical turn of CLEANTHES to the careless scepticism of PHILO, or compared either of their dispositions with the rigid inflexible orthodoxy of DEMEA." From this representation one might at first be led to look for Mr. HUME himself under the mask of CLEANTHES, and to expect from the mouth of CLEANTHES the celebrated Metaphysician's own sentiments. Let us consider however that Mr. HUME, after the great nominal superiority attributed to CLEANTHES, could not possibly, without appearance of vanity, have appointed CLEANTHES his representative. The fact indeed indisputably is, that PHILO, not CLEANTHES, personates Mr. HUME. CLEANTHES assumes times (p. 242 and 244) the tone of DEMEA: while PHILO possesses in general the sole exclusive priviledge {3} of retailing the purport of Mr. HUME'S former Philosophical productions. -- Every remarkable trait and feature of those productions may be traced in the parts of the Dialogue assigned to PHILO.

{4, 5}

PART I.

THE first part of Mr. HUME'S Dialogues is employed in proposing and canvassing different systems of cosmogony -- The system of CLEANTHES deducing (p. 47) the universe from an intelligent cause (after being confronted by various intermediate theorys) is allowed (at p. 196) to prevail over its rivals, and to convert their advocate, PHILO -- Neither the system of CLEANTHES, in its original state, nor any of its rivals are proposed {6} as the objects of the present disquisition. The sole aim of these remarks is to contravert PHILO'S own additions to the system of CLEANTHES, viz. PHILO'S

disavowal of God's moral attributes, and his proscription of popular religion. PHILO'S objection to the existence of benevolence in the divine nature is grounded principally on the circumstance of human misery. Of this melancholy object he[2] exhibits (from p. 173 to p. 192.) a most uncomfortable, forlorn, and, I trust, overcharged description -- Some of the darkest shades in the frightful picture are borrowed {7} from the Pencils of writers in general, particularly of Poets. Their testimony PHILO appeals to (p. 173 and 174) as decisive, "The Poets (p. 173.) who speak from sentiment, without a system, and whose testimony has therefore more authority, abound in images of this nature." Again, (p. 174.) "Look round the library of CLEANTHES. I shall venture to affirm that, except authors of particular sciences such as chemistry and botany, who have no occasion to treat human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers, from whom the sense of human misery has not in some passage or other, extorted a complaint and confession of it." Let us here, by PHILO'S leave, recall to recollection an old remark "Omnes ingeniosos esse melancholicos." Suppose now any individual of the pensive tribe to labour under a real misfortune or under the spleen, and to have, at that critical {8} moment, a pen in his hand: He instantly, in all human probability upon the slightest provocation in his subject, gives a dash at the condition of mortal affairs: vents his particular emotions in general terms: expands a partial posture of private concerns into an universal representation: and etches a copy of human life from the present complexion of his own situation -- With respect to Poets, we need not conceive them in any actual distress in order to justify a suspicion of some misrepresentation in the affair of human calamity. What pathetic incident ever passed through the hands of a genuine bard without receiving many touches of amplification? And is the interesting argument of mortal misery likely to be dismissed naked, and unadorned, totally destitute of its poetical finishing? Without calling in the supposition of absolute fiction, how greatly does the warm animated language alone of {9} poetry vary the aspect, without altering the circumstances, of a fact; and magnify, without seeming to depart from truth? In what doth oratory consists? not professedly, nor yet visibly in falsification. Yet, hear the same identical narrative at one time form an eloquent, at another time from a plain man; you will perceive the one to have heated, you know not why, your passions and imagination, while the other best satisfies your judgment. In a word, the testimony of authors, especially of "the inspired train", as PHILO calls the poets, does not seem worthy of the great stress laid upon it by PHILO.

RENOUNCING then the illusions of fancy, let us listen to PHILO'S own representation of the horrid scene. "You ascribe (p. 186) CLEANTHES, (and, I believe, justly) a purpose and intention to nature. But what, I beseech you, {10} is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? the preservation alone of individuals and propagation of the species. It seems enough for her purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No resource for this purpose: no machinery in order merely to give pleasure or ease: no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some want or necessity accompanying it. At least the phenomena of this nature are overbalance by opposite phenomena of still greater importance. Our sense of music harmony and indeed beauty of all kinds gives satisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand, arise from gouts, gravels, {11} megrims, tooth-achs, rheumatisms; where the injury to the animal-machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth, laughter, play, frolic seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no farther tendency: Spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition are pains of the same nature". Again, (at p. 191) "You must at the same time allow, that if pain be less frequent (which is extremely doubtful) than pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is often

able to out-weigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid enjoyments; And how many days, weeks, and months are passed by many in the most acute torments? Pleasure scarcely in one instance is ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture: And in no one instance can it continue for any time at its highest pitch and altitude, The spirits evaporate; the nerves relax; the fabric is disordered; {12} and the enjoyment quickly degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness; But pain, often, good God, how often! rises to torture and agony; and the longer it continues, it becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted; courage languishes; melancholy seizes us; and nothing terminates our misery but the removal of its cause, or another event, which is the sole cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still greater horror and consternation". It positively asserts, at setting out "that the sole object (pray mark the expression "sole") of nature's curious machinery is the preservation of individuals and the propagation of the species". At the distance of a few sentences, however, the tale enumerates several sources of delight "not absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species". Is this {13} reasoning, PHILO, or prating? would not a single instance (you recite several) of "gratuitous satisfaction" completely exclude the supposition of a total insensibility and unfeelingness, if we may so speak, in the determinations of nature? She does not, you say, grant as much as I could reasonable with -- But, if she had been perfectly and entirely inattentive to your accommodation, would She have granted any thing at all? "The phenomena of her graciousness, you reply, are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance". How does this subterfuge demonstrate your first doctrine of a total uniform obduracy? If nature had been so unequivocally void of goodness as you pretend, She would have exposed you to the evils you describe without any, the slightest mixture of alleviation: she would never have imparted any solace, that could possibly have been dispensed with: and {14} you would have drunk from her cup nothing but dregs. You must surely retract your first accusation.

DISLODGED form this post you next retreat to the position, that evil does, upon the whole, predominate in the canvass of nature: the picture is cast in shades. Before we adopt your representation, let us survey the facts on which it is grounded. Your own catalogue of evils is nearly equal in point of number, with your list of blessings. Thus far your argument looks almost equally both ways: it will quickly, I hope, set its face against you. If, for instance, your evils, though rather more numerous than your blessings, be found to center in a comparatively small number of individuals, while your blessings are pretty generally diffused through the human race, there will evidently result, in regard to the whole creation, a far greater measure {15} of happiness, than of misery. This conclusion cannot be denied, if the two first branches of the sentence are established. To establish them is my task -- In regard to the first branch, namely, the comparatively narrow operation of PHILO'S evils; are most of those evils, let us ask, any thing else than various species of ill health? And is health or sickness, let us next ask, the most usual visitant to the sons of men? A great proportion of mankind in every civilized country live in a state of idleness: if a great part of the remainder was sick, how could the business of the world go on? Let every one, in a word, form his own experience strike an estimate of the actual balance between sickness and health, and then answer my question. PHILO has, it must be confessed, two evils, discontent and superstition, not strictly reducible to the head of sickness. Are not both these evils, however, of a {16} very precarious, fluctuating nature? Chearful company, a fine day, the slightest amusement, the most trivial employment suspend, sometimes cure, their influence. May they not therefore fairly be considered as a sort of neutral powers; hanging at equal distances between the attractions of pleasure and pain, and not decisively gravitating towards either? PHILO'S evils, upon the whole,

appear evidently to have a much more contracted range in human life than PHILO was willing to ascribe to them -- Let us next see, if PHILO'S blessing (which is the second branch of the sentence I am to demonstrate) do not move in a pretty large circle? Is any man so unfortunate, as not frequently to have tasted some of these blessings? Is any man so forlorn, as to despair of all future access to the rich feast? -- The reader does, I flatter myself, by this time think me entitled to the conclusion, which I drew from {17} the two branches of my sentence now discussed, viz. That good, not evil, is the leading feature in the state of mortal affairs.

BUT though PHILO should allow pleasure to have the ascendancy, in point of frequency, over pain; PHILO still laments (p. 191 and 192) that the former sensation is inferior to the latter both in duration and degree. "Pleasure, he cryes, scarcely in any instance is ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture". What a complaint from a Philosopher! who tells us (at p. 259) of these very dialogues "That there is no state of mind so happy as the calm and equable." Without however pressing the Philosopher either with his character or declarations, let us look abroad into the world, and see whether the wand of "ecstasy and rapture" be very generally and seriously deplored. That part of mankind, {18} which is engaged in constant employment, and which possesses at the same time either a competence or at worst a bare sufficiency of necessarys, comprehends probably near two thirds, at all events half of the human race. Now amongst this very large body it is much to be doubted if the scarcity of "ecstasy and rapture" has, ever since the creation, been the transient occasion of a single sigh. These contented mortals dream not of raptures, bu enjoy satisfaction: they have not the word ecstasy in their mouths, but solid tranquility in their hearts: they wish not to be angels, and are happy men: they have not yet schooled themselves into discontent: nor learnt the sublime science of becoming metaphysically miserable -- PHILO'S estimate of pain now claims our attention. "Pain, often, good God, how often! rises to torture and agony". That pain is sometimes excessive, it is more {19} our business to lament, than to deny. Let us remark however, foe the consolation of mankind, that this melancholy grievance appears often of greater magnitude and in far larger dimensions to the spectator, than to the sufferer. Persons, condemned by sickness to lasting confinement and quick returns of pain, wear, not uncommonly very strong marks of serenity and acquiescence. The goodness of God's providence infuses, no doubt, some drops of comfort into the bitter draught of agony, to attemper its malignity and restrain its excessive operation. -- At the worst, an event, not far distant from any of us, is, according even to PHILO'S account (p. 192), "A cure of all evil." PHILO indeed adds, "But which, from our natural folly, we regard with horror and consternation." But pray, if death be really a cure of all evil, are we not, when it comes, cured by it, whether {20} we wished to be so, or not? does death, when it actually takes place, loses its efficacy, as a remedy, through our previous misconceptions of its nature? -- Let us here remark, that when men of sense shudder at death, their emotion, it is to be feared, arises more from depravity, than folly. The profligate and irreligious may naturally recoil from the approach of that futurity whose reality they have questioned; and may justly dread the frowns of that being whose authority they have defied. But thousands of virtuous men in all ages have received, and will doubtless, to the end of time continue to receive the final summons of their Creator with calm undisturbed composure.

PHILO from (p. 199 to p. 102) repeatedly echoes to us, that the whole sublunary scene (human life of course included) wears no stamp or signature {21} of a benevolent author. This idea (at p. 201) sprouts up into the following allusion. "Did I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs and the whole oeconomy of the building were the source of noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness and the extremes of

heat and cold, you would certainly blame the contrivance without any farther examination." Instead of examining his imaginary building, let us ask PHILO a simple question, namely, whether he has already entirely forgot "the sense of music harmony and beauty?" of p. 187. "The mirth, laughter, play, frolic" of p. 188? Has, in a word, the whole fair train of "gratuitous satisfactions," enumerated by himself, totally escaped from his recollection? If a single trace of them had survived in his memory, he would surely not have {22} represented his miserable allegorical lodging so shockingly ill-furnished, so completely deficient in every, the smallest, article of accommodation.

FROM p. 205 to p. 217 PHILO employs himself in displaying four circumstances on which, to use his own words p. 203, "All or the greatest part of the ills that molest sensible creatures depend" and by the removal of which the creation would, in his conception (p. 217.) be prodigiously improved. -- Notwithstanding however PHILO'S present apparent acquiescence in his new mundane arrangements, we find him, no farther off than p. 218, staggering into the following reflexion, "Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too presumptuous for creatures so blind {23} and ignorant." What a pity, PHILO, is it, that this very natural obvious sentiment did not occur to you, a few pages back, at your first entrance into the intricacys of cosmogonic criticism! How endless is it to object to what we do not understand! How idle is the proposal of altering what we do not know if we can improve! To erect card-constructed houses indeed with the infant, to weave straw-crowns with the maniac seem far more rational employments of time and intellect than for blind mortals to revise creation, and ignorant theorists to new-model the universe.

DESCENDING then from these illusive, air-built speculations, let us hasten to the final result of all the foregoing theories, namely, to PHILO'S representation, inferred from the said theories, of the divine attributes.{24}

PHILO'S first position on this head (p. 221.) runs thus, "There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness: that they have perfect malice: that they are opposite and have both goodness and malice: that they have neither goodness nor malice: mixt phenomena can never prove the two former principles: and the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seems to oppose the third; the fourth therefore, seems by far the most probable." In opposition however to the fourth supposal, let it be asked, whether one single solitary instance (PHILO has recounted several) of "gratuitous satisfaction," would not forbid us to consider the Deity as absolutely regardless of our welfare? Let it next be remarked, that to those, who adopt my estimate of human happiness and misery, the belief of God's benevolence {25} acquires instant confirmation, and stands erected upon a fair ample, immoveable foundation.

PHILO'S next feature in the divine nature is thus sketched (p. 222.) "What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the supreme being resembles human rectitude than that his benevolence resembles the human." In subversion of this doctrine I will beg leave to cite a passage from "Mr. HUME'S 11th essay on the practical consequences of natural religion," where EPICURUS, in a speech ascribed to him (p. 217.) thus expresses himself, "I acknowledge that in the present order of things virtue is attended with much more peace of ind than vice, and meets with more favourable reception in the world. I am sensible, that according to the past experience {26} of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of human life, moderation the only source of tranquility and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and vicious course of life; but am sensible, that to a well

disposed mind every advantage is on the side of the former." The supreme being then, has (by the confession of a person not to be suspected of bigotry) interwoven in the very frame and constitution of things, a testimony to the superiority of virtue above vice: in other words, the Almighty hath provided, that the presence due to the former quality beyond the latter, should be suggested to us, at every step of our existence, by the striking evidence of familiar facts. With this glaring document of the deity's love for moral uprightness in us, let us couple PHILO'S assertion, (p. 236.) that the nature of the supreme being does, in point of intelligence, "bear a considerable resemblance to ours." And {27} will this nature, in the direction of its intelligence, totally renounce the rules recommended by itself for the government of our analogous intelligence? shall the declared lover of righteousness not do right? shall the determined patron of justice be himself unjust?

{28, 29}

PART II.

PHILO opens his charge (p. 243.) against religion with the following invective. "How happens it then, if vulgar superstition[3] be so salutary to {30} society, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on public affairs? factions, civil wars, persecutions, subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend it." We shall be extremely mistaken, if we consider all the mischiefs {31} in which the word religion has been held out, or in which religionists had concern, as the genuine fruit of mere religious influence. The name of religion has often hung upon the tongue, where no particle of her holy energy reached the heart. PHILO himself will inform us (p. 244) that "religion is (only) a cover to faction and ambition," which are the real prompters of those turbulent scenes where religion alone appears upon the stage. Now ambition and faction are durable permanent principles; and, if religion had never existed, would undoubtedly, on some pretence or other, have found vent. Passions, in a word, that use religion simply as a veil, will, though striped [sic] of the veil, present an undaunted front: though detected, they will not be dismayed. Ambition and faction are no bigots. Divested of their religious disguise, they instantly assume some other; immediately {32} new-dress their indefatigable characters, nor remain a single moment absent from the stage. They substitute perhaps popularity for prayers; Agrarian laws for alms; and largesses to the mob instead of donations to saints. -- they have, it is true, often borrowed the vizor of religion; must religion therefore be made their voucher? must that chaste and holy principle be loaded with the infamy of actions, which she had not the smallest concern in giving birth to? must she be rendered responsible for measures, which she was not allowed to direct; and be represented as their adviser of those, by whom she was never consulted? -- What? -- Some men have basely prostituted the name of religion, all men therefore ought to renounce her precepts! some persons, not really under her guidance, have acted wrong, she must therefore no longer teach us to act right! We must strip ourselves of the substance, because {33} others have put on the semblance. Religion, in fine, having been accommodated to bad ends, must on that account, not be permitted to promote good ones[4]. By this mode of reasoning the worthy man, whose signature is counterfeited for the purpose of forgery, ought to suffer capital punishment: and honesty, because personated now and then by hypocrisy, should be proscribed as a species of villany.

PHILO (p. 243.) declares positively that "no periods of time can be happier or more prosperous

than those in which it (religion) is never heard of nor regarded." Before we assent to this proposition, let us recollect, that at no period probably of time whatever was religion so little heard of or regarded, as in the aera immediately preceding the dissolution of the Roman republick.{34} -- In this immaculate aera (let us briefly trace its happiness and prosperity) one man concerted and had nearly executed a general massacre of the supreme magistrates, with a total subversion of a free government. -- Governors of extensive provinces constantly ravaged the unhappy objects of their jurisdiction, with merciless, and more than hostile licentiousness. -- Fortunes of an almost imperial amplitude, vanished daily at the touch of dissipation: while, to repair the mighty ruins, crimes of every complexion and enormity were, without fear or compunction, had recourse to -- one general alone, in pursuit of wealth and power, desolated Gaul, threw his own country into convulsions, nor finished his career till near two millions of his fellow creatures had fallen victims to his ambition. -- Can one meditate without horror on almost any of the principal transactions in PHILO'S golden age! {35} religion had indubitably no concern in those dreadful scenes: and may securely exclaim in the language of our Poet; "Thou canst not say, I did it" -- Let us now suppose for a moment, that religion had actually happened to have interested, in PHILO'S favorite age, the passions of mankind. What would have been the consequence? she would, in all human probability, have been appointed the nominal president, the ostensible high-priestess at the dreadful rites. CAESAR would have been a CROMWELL: would have waved a dagger in one hand, his manual in the other; would have pretended, which he sought only his own aggrandisement, "to seek the Lord[5]. If this imaginary state of things indeed had really taken place; religion, we may be assured, would have been marked by PHILO, as principal instigatress of {36} CAESAR'S worst actions, as the sole mover of his way-ward ambition!

PHILO proceeds (p. 244.) to depreciate the efficacy of future rewards and punishments. "The inference is not just, because finite rewards and punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite and eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the attachment we have to present things, and the little concern we discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are declaiming against the common behaviour and practice of the world, they always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed it is) and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their religious interests. Yet these same divines, {37} when they refute their speculative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction." They need not PHILO, be ashamed of it, for it is not, (if my conjectures are right) a contradiction. The meaning of the divines (if I could be referred to their works) would prove, I really believe, consistent. It probably runs thus, sensible objects, take strong and lasting hold of the human mind; and powerfully detach it from the doctrines of eternity: the doctrines of eternity however, by means of exhortation and meditation, do in many instances find entrance into the heart, once admitted they operate potently; mightily convert the inclinations; and prevent numberless enormities. Without their salutary influence, society would be deluged with insufferable profligacy; {38} and be rendered incapable of substituting. -- In opposition to these very rational suggestions of the divines, PHILO remarks (p. 245.) "It is certain from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence, has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems." Supposing, though not admitting, the truth of this position, how PHILO does it answer your present purpose? in what shape does it constitute a plea for the entire renunciation of religion? in recommending the exterminating system, 'tis your

business to prove -- not, that religion has little influence: but, that she has none at all. This latter position however, you will scarce venture absolutely to maintain, after having declared (p. 246) that religion "operates by stars and bounds," that is, that religion has some influence: -- calculate PHILO, the amount of this influence {39} at your discretion: does it direct one half, one third, or one fourth of human agency? deliver your estimate. Morality will accept it at your hands; and rejoice in the friendly tender. SAUL slew his thousands, DAVID his ten thousands; yet, both surely merited the applause of their countrymen. Is the general, who wins five battles, to be disgraced, because another general wins ten? no judicious person, in a word, will, in the great task of curbing human wickedness, reject any, the very slightest, co-operation. -- Aware perhaps of some reasoning of this kind PHILO employs, (p. 246.) in still farther disparaging the energy of the religious principle: representing it as an inert, lifeless spring of action; a monitor, easy to be silenced; a lawgiver, without difficulty eluded; an adviser whom no one pays more attention to, than passion and inclination permit. -- Fully to convince us indeed, {40} that the caput mortuum of religion may be easily dispensed with in society, PHILO peremptorily asserts (p. 247.) that "none but fools ever repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that from study and philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts on theological subjects." Notwithstanding this testimonial to the innocency and uprightness of irreligion; which person, in the name of common sense, is most worthy of confidence and dependance; the man, who is restrained solely by a regard to character and interest: or the man, who in addition to the above motives, has the controul likewise of divine vengeance, hanging incessantly, like DAMOCLES'S sword, over his every procedure?

PHILO, not content with detracting from the influence of religion in the article of enforcing virtue, proceeds to accuse her of encouraging vice -- The {41} first species of proof, employed by PHILO in the support of his bold charge, is the exhibition of certain odious, unworthy religious characters. "When we have to do (p. 247) with a man, who makes a great profession of religion and devotion; has this any other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and deceived by him?" Again (p. 248) Amongst ourselves some have been guilty of that atrociousness, unknown to the Grecian and Egyptian superstitions, of declaiming, in express terms, against morality." The figure of "pars pro toto," though tolerated in composition, is intolerable in argument. PHILO, in the passages before us, points out certain reprehensible characters, by no means predominant in the religious Drama, and represents them as the principal actors. He would, no doubt, wish us to imagine, {42} that the Pharisaical hypocrite in the first extract, and the unprincipled enthusiast in the second are faithful samples of the generality of religionists: that they have the true family-face: and may serve as models of their brethren.

P. 248. PHILO launches at religion the following invective, "Even though superstition or enthusiasms should not put itself in direct opposition to morality; the very diverting of the attention, the raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most pernicious consequences, and weaken extremely men's attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity." Let us here pause; and bestow a thorough examination upon that "new frivolous species of merit" practical religion: {43} let us ascertain its intrinsic value: let us enquire, if the pretended mass of dross wear not an imperial superscription; be not stamped with a divine image.

FOR the origin of religion I shall appeal solely to the authority[6] of Mr. HUME; who (in his dissertation on the natural history of religion, sect. 4. p. 24,) remarks "That the only point of theology, in which we shall find a consent of mankind almost universal, is, that there is invisible, intelligent power in the world." Again, (sect. 15. p. 114.) "The universal propensity to believe in

invisible, intelligent power, if not an original instinct, being at least a general attendant of human nature, it may be considered as a kind of mark or {44} stamp, which the divine workman has set upon his work -- Before we proceed to decypher this heaven-imprinted character, this hand-writing, as it were, of nature; let us step back for a moment, to the dialogues, and listen to PHILO, haranguing (at p. 228) in the following strain," "That nature does nothing in vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the contemplation of the works of nature, without any religious purpose; and, from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist who had observed a new organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its use and intention." The all-sagacious architect has therefore, surely, not in vain implanted in our nature the religious propensity: nor swerved in this single important instance from her usual maxims of providence. Let us now then endeavour to unfold her {45} counsels in this particular: and develop, as far as we are able, the "use and intention" or final cause, as it is often called, of religion[7] -- The human body, it has been repeatedly observed, is incapable of perpetual exertion. Certain pauses are occasionally requisite to relieve the strained machine, and readjust its disordered springs. All nations accordingly, without exception, have invariably indulged themselves in periodical seasons of relaxation -- A state of inactivity, let it next be remarked, is to men in general, particularly to the lower orders of our species a state of danger. The human mind no sooner stagnates, than it putrefies -- How fortunate then would it be, if mankind could be engaged, {46} during part of their day of the rest in some innocent employment; which might fill up some intervals of a very perilous season unexceptionably; and render leisure, the source of mischief, in some degree innoxious! But how would our satisfaction redouble, if the much-wished for employment should prove not simply inoffensive; but should consist in calling mankind together[8] to the performance of office of a composed, solemn, awful cast; replete with stilness and sobriety; and calculated to settle the heart into a salutary calm. The effect of such a soul-steadying exercise would surely not be entirely momentary; but would follow the mind probably beyond the walls of the temple; and fortify it for some time, against the suggestions of {47} idle levity. To an avocation of the kind here described can every religion under heaven perhaps boast itself to amount -- But if paganism be all this, what is not Christianity? In the religious assemblies of those regions, where the celestial ray of revelation shines with free lustre, we shall hear a heaven-descended performance constantly recited, pregnant with the purest maxims of morality, and rich in interesting displays of future existence -- The very prayers too, in the well-constructed religious assemblies of those regions, will not merely implore divine protection; but will, in doing so, briefly recall to view, the most effectual recommendation to divine protection, moral excellency -- The persuasions of a holy orator will, at the close, reinforce the general impression. From such a fertile field of instruction, from such a matchless school of morality, what barbarians can depart totally unmeliorated? {48} There is no one, I firmly believe scarcely the most hardened, but what carries away from the religious meetings of true protestantism some degree of improvement, some sense of duty. Suppose, with PHILO, that improvement, this sense of duty "to operate by starts and bounds," to prevent bad actions only occasionally, at particular seasons: still will the benefit resulting from them be great, superlative, and inestimable!

BUT PHILO entertains quite different conceptions; and maintains religion to be the parent of evil, rather than of good: more a friend to vice, than virtue -- The instance of the bad tendency of religion, produced by PHILO at p. 249, carries a very striking peculiar air. "Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the heart at the time, feels cold and languid: a habit of dissimulation {49} is by degrees contracted: and fraud and falsehood become the

predominant principle." Concise piece of demonstration! A man performs certain religious offices negligently -- is rendered by that means a hypocrite -- quickly after a complete rogue! when such unbounded licentiousness of inference is freely and unblushingly practised, there seems to be no reason, why one man, as well as another, may not presume to draw conclusions. I will try therefore, if from the same premises, which have afforded PHILO so much scandalous deduction against religion, I cannot derive a position of a dissimilar and perfectly opposite nature. From PHILO'S premise then at the beginning of the above extract I reason, as follows: A consciousness of the described infirmity throws the religionist into a state of humiliation, prostration of soul, and abasement -- which penitential emotions soon terminate in their cogenial {50} habitudes lowliness, and christian meekness -- PHILO, in the concluding sentence of p. 249. carries on his lately-fabricated religious hypocrite through the fiery regions "of the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy" till, in the first paragraph of p. 250. the wretch is calcined into "an enthusiastic zealot whom no morality can be forcible enough to bind." That such miscreants, as are here exhibited, have existed, no candid person will deny: but mark: PHILO can reap not the least benefit from the concession, till he prove the generality of religionists to be of a similar diabolical stamp -- PHILO here, as upon a former occasion, lets loose upon us the figure of "Pars pro toto": a most paltry, surely, exceptionable, and inadequate engine of persuasion.

IN the second paragraph of p. 250. PHILO brings forward a most unheard-of {51} accusation against religion, complaining "That the steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness." Rather, will not the contemplation of so truly interesting an object as immortal bliss absorp, as it were, the soul; swallow up all its lower attachments; and completely disengage it from the attraction of those sublunary concerns in which selfishness and narrow-mindedness principally center?

I SHALL entirely pass over PHILO'S reflections (p. 251 and 252.) upon the degree of ascendancy and influence, proper to be allowed the priesthood. A discussion of these topics would not materially affect, so far as I can judge, the subject in debate; which is the native excellence and general good {52} tendency of religion. These attributes of religion, if proved, must eternally remain unsullied, unaltered, unimpaired; neither sympathizing with political arrangements; nor susceptible of tarnish from the misconduct of particular priests.

IT has often been urged in favour of religion, that it gives efficacy to oaths. To invalidate this plea, PHILO first (p. 253) represents several circumstances (perfectly independant of religion) as forming "the chief restraint" upon a swearer's tongue. That the circumstances, enumerated by PHILO, have a tendency to enforce truth in depositions, we allow. But has not religion a similar tendency, in an infinitely greater degree? PHILO insinuates, that she has little or none! -- In farther support of his hypothesis, PHILO apprizes us (p. 253) "That custom-house oaths and political oaths are {53} but little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and religion." From this fact PHILO wishes us, probably, to reason in the following manner: An appeal is equally made to heaven, in custom-house oaths and political oaths, as in other oaths of a more valid nature: the more valid oaths therefore do evidently not derive their validity from that appeal to heaven, which belongs, in an equal degree, to them, and to the invalid custom-house or political oath. To this suggestion let us thus reply; The contempt in which many persons hold the rights of the public,[9] in comparison with the rights of individuals, may {54} easily lead such wrong headed casuists to conceive, that an appeal to heaven, in regard to the former, is less noticed by the most High, than when it relates to the latter branch of rights. These motley moralists, therefore, while they lay no

stress upon the inspection of omniscience in public, may possibly be greatly influenced by a sense of it in private depositions: may, in a work, partially elude, which they by no means totally abjure the belief of celestial cognizance in the transaction of swearing -- Let us farther remark, that the generality of religionists would, it is to be hoped, recoil from the crime of perjury in one scene, no less than in another: at the custom-house, equally as in a court of judicature -- PHILO'S next surmise, (p. 253) in derogation to the utility of religion in attestations, is founded upon the validity of a Quaker's asseveration. PHILO means, no doubt, by this instance, to intimate, that veracity {55} is attainable in depositions, without the help of religious enforcements. An examination however of the fact adduced will decisively forbid any such inference. From what, may we ask, does a Quaker's obstinate adherence to the scheme of simple asseveration proceed, but from an extreme veneration for the authority of scripture? Now the same scripture, which teaches the Quaker, through the medium of erroneous construction, never to exceed the line of simple affirmation, does more clearly and more explicitly teach him never, in his affirmation, to exceed the line of truth. A Quaker's asseveration, is therefore, we may well conclude, often purified by a recollection of scriptural precepts: its veracity, in a word, results, in no small degree, from the influence of religious impression. -- PHILO next endeavours to gainsay that opinion of POLYBIUS, which ascribes the infamy of Greek faith to {56} the prevalency of the EPICUREAN philosophy. "But I know also (replies PHILO p. 254) that PUNIC faith had as bad a reputation in ancient times, as IRISH evidence has in modern; though we cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason." But what? Because a commercial spirit of avarice, or any other cause unknown to us, has accidentally engendered habits of perjury; do irreligious tenets, on that account, cease to produce a similar effect? Avarice frequently instigates men to dishonesty, therefore ambition does not. An ordinary fire yields heat, therefore the sun affords none. -- PHILO makes one struggle more (p. 254) to enervate POLYBIUS'S conjecture; attempting to convince us, from a passage in EURIPIDES, {57} "That Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the EPICUREAN philosophy." Without entering into a discussion of the passage in EURIPIDES, let us peremptorily and determinately object to touches of poetry, as competent evidence of national manners. A single well known instance of any crime, existing in a person whom a poet wishes, but is afraid directly to attack, will easily give birth to a poetical effusion of general sarcasm, no way expressive of general truth: The sole purpose of such sarcasm being to glance upon, without seeming to aim at some particular individual; and to insinuate, not avowedly point, a private imputation.

PHILO (p. 256.) vents the following murmur; "The terrors of religion commonly prevail above its comforts. -- It is allowed, that men never have recourse to devotion, so readily as when dejected with grief, or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy, as to sorrow?" Let us apply the argumentative process {58} of this sentiment, to another strictly similar set of ideas. -- It is allowed that men never have recourse to the offices of friendship, so readily as when dejected with grief, or oppressed with sickness. Is not this a full proof that the spirit of friendship is not so nearly allied to joy, as to sorrow? -- How many things, or, rather how easily may any thing be proved by the admission of such lax reasoning?

In p. 257, 258, 259. PHILO laments that the prospects of a future state, exhibited by popular religions, wear universally a dismal, inauspicious appearance. -- Before we object to this representation, let us briefly remark, that the representation, though admitted, affords no pretence for the renunciation of religion. For if religion as was formerly attempted to be shown, result from a divine impulse, and produce {59} the most extensive benefits, her authoritative practical supremacy will for ever remain unshaken, whatever be the complexion of her future remuneratory

system. Though our attention, in a work, should be unwilling to follow religion, into the other world, it will still be our duty and our interest to adhere to her in this. -- This being premised, let us now, upon very familiar grounds of exception, express unwillingness to hear a single syllable from PHILO, on the subject of a future state. That awful scene, like all other scenes of a mixed chequered nature, is, doubtless, viewed in different lights by different imaginations: chearfulness, supposing criminality our of the question, fixes on the bright, despondency on the cloudy part of the horizon. To the gaiety of PHILO'S temper his picture of human life, examined at the opening of this performance, bears {60} ample testimony. A passage too (in Mr. HUME'S dissertation of the natural history of religion) may serve to throw farther light upon the complexion of PHILO'S posthumous meditations. Mr. HUME (in the passage alluded to, Sect. 15. p. 115.) remarks, "that the most open impiety is attended with a secret dread and compunction." PHILO upon the whole, does not seem a person, to whom any cool dispassionate man, ought to apply for a description of futurity.

PHILO concludes his elaborate declamation against religion, with informing us (p. 259.) "That though this opinion (about future happiness and misery) be seldom so steady in its operation, as to influence all the actions; yet it is apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that gloom and melancholy, {61} so remarkable in all devout people." PHILO seems in this passage, to forget a former piece of information of his, (at p. 246.) "That religious motives where they act at all, operate only by starts and bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether habitual to the mind." Religious motives, we see (at p. 246.) work only temporary effects: while (at p. 249.) they produce lasting operations. Religious motives indeed, seem in PHILO'S hands to be susceptible, like Milton's angels, of occasional contraction and dilation, just as circumstances require. When we talk of their salutary influence, "They act only (PHILO tells us) by starts and bounds." On a sudden however as soon as PHILO himself handles the pensive tendency of these narrowly operating principles, they swell on the imagination; acquire formidable magnitude; {62} and "make a considerable breach in the temper." -- Without availing ourselves of PHILO'S inconsistency, without endeavouring to render the philosopher an evidence against himself, let us dispassionately enquire into the reality of that gloom and melancholy, ascribed by PHILO to all devout people. -- A short appeal on this topic may first, with propriety, be made to the actual experience of mankind. Are religion and chearfulness, in general incompatible? let every man's personal observation answer the question. -- Let us next remark, that (when the gloom of a religionist arises, as in innumerable instances it certainly does, from natural temper) the religionist, though gloomy with, would indisputably have been so without religion. The unfortunate man carries that within him, which spreads an unvarying shade round his steps: and which, {63} if not exerted upon religious truth, would undoubtedly fasten on and discolour some other object. -- Let us in the last place, ask PHILO this simple but material question: whatever be the nature of the religionist's sorrow, does PHILO tender him a cure? Has sceptical philosophy any balm to comfort the devout heart; any medicine to refresh the religiously-afflicted spirit? let us, in imagination, consign the religionist to PHILO'S direction, and watch the result. -- PHILO, it will here be proper to recollect, launches (at p. 244.) into the following exclamation," consider, "I beseech you, the attachment which we have to present things, and the little concern we discover for objects so remote and uncertain, viz. eternal rewards and punishments." Apply this doctrine to the case of PHILO'S patient. The unhappy man was melancholy from the contemplation of {64} objects remote and uncertain; turned over to PHILO he instantly hears[10] such a horrid representation of things present, as will harrow up his soul, and hurry him into the excesses of phrensy and desperation. He

was anxious while directed by devotion: touched by the wand of infidelity he feels his anxiety redoubled, his horrors infinitely accumulate. Under the influence of religion he moped: under the guidance of PHILO he will perhaps destroy himself.

Pol me occidistis, amici, Non servastis. Hor.

The picture, or rather caricature, of religion, exhibited by PHILO in the dialogues, may perhaps not unhappily be contrasted with a short etching of irreligion, which appears in Mr. HUME'S {65} dissertation on the natural history of religion. Sect. 16. p. 116. "Look out (cries the great philosopher) for a people entirely devoid of religion: If you find them at all, be assured, that they are but few degrees removed from brutes." To what worse state, great and good God, can the strictest profession of thy holy religion reduce us!

Notes

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[2]I am aware that the topic of human wretchedness is (from p. 174 to p. 185.) frequently handled by DEMEA. But as the assertions of DEMEA on this point (from p. 174 to p. 181.) are (at p. 181.) most cordially assented to by PHILO; and as the remainder of DEMEA'S tragic declamation (down to p. 185.) meets in that page with a similar warm acquiescence from his friend; we may surely venture to set down PHILO a complete proselyte to the dismal creed.

[3]What PHILO means by vulgar superstition may be learnt from p. 244. CLEANTHES there remarks, "That when religion distinguishes itself and acts as a separate principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has become only a cover to faction and ambition." To this PHILO replies "And so will all religion, except the philosophical and rational will become the cover to faction and ambition. To be the cover of faction and ambition is, in the ordinary acceptation of the words, to be the source of all the mischiefs ascribed to vulgar superstition in the present page. All religion therefore, except the philosophical and rational, is evidently, in PHILO'S view of things, vulgar superstition.

The professors of philosophical religion are said (p. 261) to be extremely few. The faith of these professors is represented (at p. 262) as centering entirely in one solitary speculative tenet, which (to use the very words there employed in characterizing it) "affords no inference that can affect human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance," so simple a code of divinity can evidently not incumber its proselytes with temples, modes of worship, or fear of heavenly power.

The professors of this pure theology are of course easy to be distinguished. These pure theologists, once distinguished, negatively ascertain to us the vulgarly superstitious part of mankind, namely all other persons, except atheists, and these contemplative single-teneted religionists.

[4]The inestimable benefits resulting from religion will be displayed in a subsequent paragraph.

[5]A favorite expression of CROMWELL.

[6]Better authority might, doubtless, be produced: but none, probably, so satisfactory to PHILO.

[7]Though my conjectures on this momentous subject should not be deemed satisfactory, still let it be remembered, that the religious propensity, according to the well-founded maxim of the schools quoted by PHILO, indisputably has a final cause.

[8]Mere association, if regulated by decorum, has a most efficacious tendency, in the opinion of intelligent judges, to civilize and polish the human race.

[9]The interests of the community are certainly, though one scarce knows upon what ground, deemed far less sacred by the generality of mankind, than the rights of individuals. Many persons, for instance, of unquestionable honesty in private concerns, will, without shame or scruple, engage in the purchase or disposal of contraband commodities, though such practices are palpable, indisputable frauds upon the interests of the community.

[10]See PHILO'S lamentations over the miseries of life, discussed at the beginning of this performance.

"An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice"

European Magazine and London Review

1793

Editor's note: This anonymously written essay attacks Hume's claim that justice is an artificially instilled virtue. The author begins distinguishing between optional virtues, such as charity, and obligatory ones, especially justice which is necessary for the existence of society. For Hume, justice is artificial, deriving not from "the constitution of human nature" but "from the association of mankind together." Contrary to Hume, the author argues that justice is natural. Justice lies between favor and in jury. "A favour naturally produces gratitude. An injury, if done to ourselves, produces resentment...." Justice involves the idea of things which are due or not due, and such ideas are no less natural than gratitude. Gratitude and resentment, which corres pond to favor and injury, "are acknowledged by Mr. HUME himself to be natural...," hence justice too must be natural.

"An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice"

European Magazine and London Review
1793, Vol. 24, pp. 422-424

{422}

THE general distinction between Virtue and Vice is sufficiently known to all men. There are certain actions which are universally the objects of approbation, which we call good, virtuous, or praise-worthy. There are other actions which are universally the objects of disapprobation, which

we call bad or vicious; and which seem in many cases to deserve punishment. The consideration of Virtue and vice, and the questions relating to them, make up what is called the science of Ethics or Morals.

When we consider the general distinction between virtue and Vice; when we consider certain virtues on the one hand, and certain vices on the other, they evidently appear to admit of a subdivision. There are many virtues which are altogether left to o ur own choice -- where we are at liberty to practise them or not as we please. A man is apprehended to act improperly when he is a miser; on the contrary, he is approved of when he acts generously: but it is never apprehended that we can with propriety fo rce him to act in the one way or in the other. We do not think that we can force a miser to be generous. {434}

On the other hand, there are certain virtues which are the proper objects of compulsion; or certain vices which may with propriety be restrained. It is a virtuous action for men to pay their just debts; but if they refuse to pay them, force may be us ed in order to extort the observance of this virtue, or to avoid the contrary vice, which is precisely the same thing in another point of view. Here then are two different classes of virtues, where the agent is at liberty to practise them or not; and wher e, in other cases, he may be compelled to observe them. This makes the distinction between Justice and the other Virtues. These rules of conduct, which a person may be forced to observe, belong, properly speaking, to Justice, and make the object of Law. T hose rules of action where no force is used, make properly the subject of Ethics. Hence it is evident that Justice is a species of Virtue. Virtue in general comprehends Justice as well as many other particular virtues; but all the other virtues are in a d ifferent situation from justice in this respect -- that we may practise them or not as we please.

Justice implies that we invade no man's property, nor violate his rights; that we do not injure him in his person, in his family, or in his good name: that we pay our just debts; that we make reparation to the best of our power for any damage we have done, or offence we may have given to others; that we fulfil our contracts, and be faithful to our promises; that we use no fraudulent dealings, nor take advantage of the weakness, ignorance, or necessity of those with whom we deal; and, in a word, that we be fair, honest, and without guile in our speech and behaviour. These, and matters of a like nature, constitute what we call fair-dealing, honesty, integrity. Justice is opposed both to violence and to deceit. So necessary is Justice to the very being of human society, that without it there could be no society at all. And it has been very justly observed, even by the most ancient authors, that those gangs of thieves and robbers who pay no regard to the rights of other men, must observe the rules of Jus tice towards one another, otherwise they could not possibly keep together. It would be more safe, as well as more comfortable, for a man to renounce all human society, and to live as an hermit in the wilderness, or to dwell with the beasts of the field, t han with men who paid no regard to justice. It is chiefly with a view to defend themselves from injury, that men associate together and form human societies. The first end of all Governments, and the chief object of all human Laws, is to secure men from u njust violations of their rights by violence or fraud, and to deter men by punishments from all such violations of the rights of others.

Having said these things, I shall take notice of an opinion which HUME has advanced, and endeavoured with all his eloquence and reasoning to support, that Justice is not a natural but an artificial virtue. It is not a virtue whic h the constitution of human nature points out to us of itself, but which, from the association of mankind together, appears to be necessary for human society, and is regulated entirely by its use. Nothing therefore, according to him, is just or unjust by nature; but what is for the benefit of society is on this account called just, and what has the

contrary tendency is called unjust.

In order to throw some light on this subject, it may be proper first to explain, as distinctly as possible, the notion we annex to this word JUSTICE, and then consider Mr. Hume's reasoning to shew that it is not a natural virtue. As men, we are endowed by nature with powers, in the exercise of which we may do good or evil to our fellow men. When we employ our powers to promote the good and happiness of others, this is beneficence or favour. When we exert our powers to hurt them, this is injury. Justice lies in the middle between these two. It is such a conduct as does no hurt to others, though at the same time it does them no favour. Now the idea of a favour on the one hand, and of an injury on the other, are so universal, that i t may justly be doubted, whether ever there was a man come to years of understanding who never had in his mind the notion of a favour and of an injury -- of a good office and of a bad one. These notions discover themselves in all men, not by language only , but by certain affections of mind of which they are the natural objects. A favour naturally produces gratitude. An injury, if done to ourselves, produces resentment; and when done to others excites indignation. Now it is acknowledged by all, and I appre hend by Mr. HUME himself, that gratitude and resentment are natural ingredients {424} the human mind, no less than the appetites of hunger and thirst; and these passions are as naturally excited by their proper objects as these appeti tes. This indeed is so evident in itself, that it would be impertinent to offer an argument for it, as no philosopher, as far as I know, ever denied it. It is evident that the proper object of gratitude is one who has done us a favour, and the proper obje ct of resentment is a person who has done us an injury. Every sentiment of gratitude implies in its nature a conception and belief of a favour done by the person who is the object of our gratitude; and every sentiment of resentment implies in its nature a belief of an injury done by the person who is the object of our resentment. What is it then which we call a favour, and which by the very constitution of human nature excites the natural sentiment of gratitude? No man who is capable of reflecting on the operations of his own mind, can be at any loss to answer this question. An action which produces pleasure or advantage to me, is not a favour unless that advantage or pleasure was intended. We are told of a Physician who gave a medicine to his patient wit h an intention to poison him; that the medicine, however, contrary to the intention of the Physician, cured the disease. There was surely no gratitude due by the patient when he knew the real state of the case. It is evident to every man, that a benefit a rising from the action of another, either against or without his intention, cannot move to gratitude.

Another thing implied in a favour is, that it be not due. A man may save my credit by paying what he owes me, and in this case the thing which he does tends to my benefit, yet it is not a favour. It is no more than he is bound to do. A servant does h is work, and receives his wages -- this is no favour. Now what we may observe from this is, that the conception of favour includes in it the conception of a thing not due. A negative cannot be conceived by one who has no conception of the corresponding po sitive. Not to be due is the negative of being due; and he who conceives the first must conceive the last. The idea of things due or not due must be conceived by every one who has any sentiments of gratitude, and therefore not less natural then the sentim ent of gratitude is, because no gratitude is due; nor is any raised naturally in the mind, unless where some good is done that was not due.

Let us consider, on the other hand, that which we call an injury, and which I conceive to be the natural object of resentment. Every man who is capable of looking into his own heart, conceives an injury implies something more than receiving hurt. If I am hurt by a stone falling out of the wall, or by a flash of lightning, or by an involuntary motion in another man's arm, no injury is done, no

resentment is raised. In this, as well as in all other immoral actions, there must be will and intention in t he agent to do the hurt. Nor is this sufficient to constitute an injury. A man who treads down my corn, or breaks down my fences, in order to fly from danger, when he as no ill intentions, and is willing to indemnify me for the hurt, is not injurious, nor is he the object of resentment. The executioner who only does his duty in cutting off the head of a condemned criminal, is not the object of punishment. He is not injurious. He does nothing unjust. For it is evident that injury, which is the natural obje ct of resentment, implies in it the notion of injustice; and no man can have the notion of injustice without having the notion of justice. It appears therefore, I think, from what has been said, that the notion of justice is no less natural to the human m ind than the notion of a favour, or of an injury no less natural than the affection of gratitude and resentment. These three, to wit, a favour, an act of justice, and an injury are so related to each other, that he who conceives one of them must conceive all: they lie all, as it were, in one line, and resemble the three ratios of -- greater, middle, and less. He who understands what is meant when one line is called less or greater than another, can be a no loss to know what is meant by one line being equa l to another; for if it is neither greater nor less, it must be equal. A favour is more than justice, an injury is less; and that which is neither a favour nor an injury, is a just action: for in every state of society in which there is gratitude for good offices, or resentment for injuries, there must be a notion of justice; and this notion of justice is as natural to man as the notion of favour or injury, consequently as natural as the emotions of gratitude and resentment. But these are acknowledged by Mr. HUME himself to be natural; and if they are, it necessarily follows that the notion of justice must be so also, which is the thing that was to be proved.

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Hume on Miracles

A View of the Evidences of Christianity

William Paley

1794

Editor's note: William Paley (1743-1805) was archdeacon of Carlisle, and the author of three influential books in philosophy and philosophical theology: *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785), *A View of the Evidences of Christianity* (1794), and *Natural Theology* (1802). Paley's *View* is a defense of Christianity based on prophesy, the candor of the New Testament writings, and the "undesigned coincidence" between the events as reported in Acts and Paul's letters. Part 1 (of its three parts) opens and closes with an analysis of Hume's essay on miracles; no additional references to Hume occur between the opening and closing. In the opening Preparatory Considerations to Part 1, Paley attacks Hume's argument against miracles from universal experience: "The force of experience as an objection to miracles is founded in the presumption, either that the course of nature is invariable, or that, if it be ever varied, variations will be frequent and general." Paley questions whether these two alternatives are the only possible choices. The closing of Part 1 examines Hume's examples of alleged miracles, such as those at the tomb of the Abbe Paris, and explains why they are not credible accounts (Part 1, Proposition 2, Chapter 2). All of the review journals responded favourably to Paley's *View*. The *Analytical Review* notes generally that "no popular view of the evidences of christianity has hitherto been given, at once so judicious in the selection and arrangement of materials, so happy in illustration, and so well supported by citations..." (1795, Vol. 20, pp. 185-196). The *Edinburgh Magazine* expresses their happiness that "Dr. P. has been rewarded by his Ecclesiastical Superiors... in a munificent and honourable manner for his learned labours" (1995, Vol. 27, pp. 313-318, 384-390). The "rewards" referred to were several preferments involving a prebend at 150L yearly, a subdeanery at 700L yearly, and a rectory at 1,200L yearly. "May Mr. Paley Long live to enjoy what he so amply possesses!" hails the *Critical Review* (1795, Vol. 14, pp. 371-380). As to Paley's treatment of Hume, the *Monthly Review* comments that "no objection against revelation has ever, perhaps, made a more general impression among philosophers than this [i.e. Hume's essay], and... Mr. Paley has, in our opinion,

been particularly successful in his reply to it..." (1795, Vol. 17, pp. 404-411). Paley's *View* was republished dozens of times within the first few decades of its appearance. The following is from the 1796 and fifth edition (London: R Faulder, Vol. 1, pp. 1-15, 369-383).

A View of the Evidences of Christianity in Three Parts Preparatory Considerations.

I DEEM it unnecessary to prove that mankind stood in need of a revelation, because I have met with no serious person who thinks that even under the Christian revelation we have too much light, or any degree of assurance which is superfluous. I desire moreover that in judging of Christianity it may be remembered, that the question lies between this religion and none: for, if the Christian religion be not credible, no one, with whom we have to do, will support the pretensions of any other.

Suppose then the world we live in to have had a Creator; suppose it to appear from the predominant aim and tendency of the provisions and contrivances observable in the universe, that the Deity, when he formed it, consulted for the happiness of his sensitive creation; suppose the disposition which dictated this council to continue: suppose a part of the creation to have received faculties from their Maker, by which they are capable of rendering a moral obedience to his will, and of voluntarily pursuing any end for which he has designed them; suppose the Creator to intend for these his rational and accountable agents a second state of existence in which their situation will be regulated by their behaviour in the first state, by which supposition (and by no other) the objection to the divine government in not putting a difference between the good and the bad, and the inconsistency of this confusion with the care and benevolence discoverable in the works of the Deity is done away; suppose it to be of the utmost importance to the subjects of this dispensation to know what is intended for them, that is, suppose the knowledge of it to be highly conducive to the happiness of the species, a purpose which so many provisions of nature are calculated to promote: Suppose, nevertheless, almost the whole race, either by the imperfection of their faculties, the misfortune of their situation, or by the loss of some prior revelation, to want this knowledge, and not to be likely without the aid of a new revelation to attain it; under these circumstances is it improbable that a revelation should be made? Is it incredible that God should interpose for such a purpose? Suppose him to design for mankind a future state, is it unlikely that he should acquaint them with it?

Now in what way can a revelation be made but by miracles? In none which we are able to conceive. Consequently, in whatever degree it is probable or not very improbable that a revelation should be communicated to mankind at all, in the same degree is it probable or not very improbable that miracles should be wrought. Therefore, when miracles are related to have been wrought in the promulgating of a revelation manifestly wanted, and, if true, of inestimable value, the improbability which arises from the miraculous nature of the things related, is not greater than the original improbability that such a revelation should be imparted by God.

I wish it however to be correctly understood, in what manner, and to what extent, this argument is alledged. We do not assume the attributes of the Deity, or the existence of a future state, in order to

prove the reality of miracles. That reality always must be proved by evidence. We assert only, that in miracles adduced in support of revelation there is not any such antecedent improbability as no testimony can surmount. And for the purpose of maintaining this assertion, we contend, that the incredibility of miracles related to have been wrought in attestation of a message from God, conveying intelligence of a future state of rewards and punishments, and teaching mankind how to prepare themselves for that state, is not in itself greater than the event, call it either probable or improbable, of the two following propositions being true: namely, first, that a future state of existence should be destined by God for his human creation; and, secondly, that, being so destined, he should acquaint them with it. It is not necessary for our purpose that these propositions be capable of proof, or even that, by arguments drawn from the light of nature, they can be made out to be probable. It is enough that we are able to say concerning them, that they are not so violently improbable, so contradictory to what we already believe of the Divine power and character, that either the propositions themselves, or facts strictly connected with the propositions (and therefore no farther improbable than they are improbable), ought to be rejected at first sight, and to be rejected by whatever strength or complication of evidence they be attested.

This is the prejudication we would resist. For to this length does a modern objection to miracles go, viz. that no human testimony can in any case render them credible. I think the reflection above stated, that, if there be a revelation, there must be miracles; and that, under the circumstances in which the human species are placed, a revelation is not improbable, or not improbable in any great degree, to be a fair answer to the whole objection.

But since it is an objection which stands in the very threshold of our argument, and, if admitted, is a bar to every proof, and to all future reasoning upon the subject, it may be necessary, before we proceed farther, to examine the principle upon which it professes to be founded: which principle is concisely this, that it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false.

Now there appears a small ambiguity in the term "experience," and in the phrases "contrary to experience," or "contradicting experience," which it may be necessary to remove in the first place. Strictly speaking, the narrative of a fact is _then_ only contrary to experience, when the fact is related to have existed at a time and place, at which time and place we being present did not perceive it to exist; as if it should be asserted, that in a particular room and at a particular hour of a certain day, a man was raised from the dead, in which room, and at the time specified, we being present and looking on perceived no such event to have taken place. Here the assertion is contrary to experience properly so called; and this is a contrariety which no evidence can surmount. It matters nothing, whether the fact be of a miraculous nature or not. But although this be the experience, and the contrariety, which Archbishop Tillotson alledged in the quotation with which Mr. Hume opens his essay, it is certainly not that experience, nor that contrariety, which Mr. Hume himself intended to object. And, short of this, I know no intelligible signification which can be affixed to the term "contrary to experience," but one, viz. that of not having ourselves experienced any thing similar to the thing related, or such things not being generally experienced by others. I say "not generally;" for to state concerning the fact in question, that no such thing was ever experienced, or that _universal_ experience is against it, is to assume the subject of the controversy.

Now the improbability which arises from the want (for this properly is a want, not a contradiction) of experience, is only equal to the probability there is, that, if the thing were true, we should experience things similar to it, or that such things would be generally experienced. Suppose it then

to be true that miracles were wrought upon the first promulgation of Christianity, when nothing but miracles could decide its authority, is it certain that such miracles would be repeated so often, and in so many places, as to become objects of general experience? Is it a probability approaching to certainty? Is it a probability of any great strength of force? Is it such as no evidence can encounter? And yet this probability is the exact *converse*, and therefore the exact measure of the improbability which arises from the want of experience, and which Mr. Hume represents as invincible by human testimony.

It is not like alledging a new law of nature, or a new experiment in natural philosophy, because, when these are related, it is expected that, under the same circumstances, the same effect will follow universally; and in proportion as this expectation is justly entertained, the want of a corresponding experience negatives the history. But to expect concerning a miracle that it should succeed upon repetition, is to expect that which would make it cease to be a miracle, which is contrary to its nature as such, and would totally destroy the use and purpose for which it was wrought.

The force of experience as an objection to miracles is founded in the presumption, either that the course of nature is invariable, or that, if it be ever varied, variations will be frequent and general. Has the necessity of this alternative been demonstrated? Permit us to call the course of nature the agency of an intelligent Being, and is there any good reason for judging this state of the case to be probable? Ought we not rather to expect, that such a Being, upon occasions of peculiar importance, may interrupt the order which he had appointed, yet, that such occasions should return seldom; that these interruptions consequently should be confined to the experience of a few; that the want of it, therefore, in many, should be matter neither of surprise nor objection?

But as a continuation of the argument from experience it is said, that, when we advance accounts of miracles, we assign effects without causes, or we attribute effects to causes inadequate to the purpose, or to causes of the operation of which we have no experience. Of what causes, we may ask, and of what effects does the objection speak? if it be answered that, when we ascribe the cure of the palsy to a touch, of blindness to the anointing of the eyes with clay, or the raising of the dead to a word, we lay ourselves open to this imputation; we reply, that we ascribe no such effects to such causes. We perceive no virtue or energy in these things more than in other things of the same kind. They are merely signs to connect the miracle with its end. The effect we ascribe simply to the volition of the Deity; of whose existence and power, not to say of whose presence and agency, we have previous and independent proof. We have therefore all we seek for in the works of rational agents, a sufficient power and an adequate motive. In a word, once believe that there is a God, and miracles are not incredible.

Mr. Hume states the case of miracles to be a contest of opposite improbabilities, that is to say, a question whether it be more improbable that the miracle should be true, or the testimony false; and this I think a fair account of the controversy. But herein I remark a want of argumentative justice, that, in describing the improbability of miracles, he suppresses all those circumstances of extenuation, which result from our knowledge of the existence, power, and disposition of the Deity, his concern in the creation, the end answered by the miracle, the importance of that end, and its subserviency to the plan pursued in the work of nature. As Mr. Hume has represented the question, miracles are alike incredible to him who is previously assured of the constant agency of a divine Being, and to him who believes that no such being exists in the universe. They are equally incredible, whether related to have been wrought upon occasions the most deserving, and for purposes the most beneficial, or for no assignable end whatever, or for an end confessedly trifling

or pernicious. This surely cannot be a correct statement. In adjusting also the other side of the balance, the strength and weight of testimony, this author has provided an answer to every possible accumulation of historical proof by telling us, that we are not obliged to explain how the story or the evidence arose. Now I think that we *are* obliged; not, perhaps, to shew by positive accounts how it did, but by a probable hypothesis how it might so happen. The existence of the testimony is a phenomenon. The truth of the fact solves the phenomenon. If we reject this solution, we ought to have some other to rest in; and none even by our adversaries can be admitted, which is not consistent with the principles that regulate human affairs and human conduct at present, or which makes men *then* to have been a different kind of beings from what they are now.

But the short consideration which, independently of every other, convinces me that there is no solid foundation in Mr. Hume's conclusion is the following. When a theorem is proposed to a mathematician, the first thing he does with it is to try it upon a simple case; and, if it produce a false result, he is sure that there must be some mistake in the demonstration. Now to proceed in this way with what may be called Mr. Hume's theorem. If twelve men, whose probity and good sense I had long known, should seriously and circumstantially relate to me an account of a miracle wrought before their eyes, and in which it was impossible that they should be deceived; if the governor of the country, hearing a rumour of this account, should call these men into his presence, and offer them a short proposal, either to confess the imposture, or submit to be tied up to a gibbet; if they should refuse with one voice to acknowledge that there existed any falsehood or imposture in the case; if this threat were communicated to them separately, yet with no different effect; if it was at last executed; if I myself saw them, one after another, consenting to be racked, burnt, or strangled, rather than give up the truth of their account; still, if Mr. Hume's rule be my guide, I am not to believe them. Now, I undertake to say that there exists not a sceptic in the world who would not believe them; or who would defend such incredulity.

Instances of spurious miracles supported by strong apparent testimony undoubtedly demand examination. Mr. Hume has endeavoured to fortify his argument by some examples of this kind. I hope in a proper place to shew that none of them reach the strength or circumstances of the Christian evidence. In these, however, consists the weight of his objection. In the principle itself I am persuaded there is none.

PART I

PROPOSITION II.

CHAP. II.

But they, with whom we argue, have undoubtedly a right to select their own examples. The instances with which Mr. Hume hath chosen to confront the miracles of the New Testament, and which, therefore, we are entitled to regard as the strongest which the history of the world could supply to the enquiries of a very acute and learned adversary, are the three following:

1. The cure of a blind and of a lame man at Alexandria, by the Emperor Vespasian, as related by Tacitus;
2. The restoration of the limb of an attendant in a Spanish church, as told by Cardinal de Retz; and
3. The cures said to be performed at the tomb of the Abbe Paris, in the early part of the present century.

1. The narrative of Tacitus is delivered in these terms: "One of the common people of Alexandria, known to be diseased in his eyes, by the admonition of the god Serapis, whom that superstitious nation worship above all other gods, prostrated himself before the emperor, earnestly imploring from his a remedy for his blindness, and entreating that he would deign to anoint with his spittle his cheeks and the balls of his eyes. Another, diseased in his hand, requested, by the admonition of the same god, that he might be touched by the foot of the emperor. Vespasian at first derided and despised their application; afterwards when they continued to urge their petitions, he, sometimes, appeared to dread the imputation of vanity; at other times, by the earnest supplication of the patients, and the persuasion of his flatterers, to be induced to hope for success. At length he commanded an enquiry to be made by the physicians, whether such a blindness and debility were vincible by human aid. The report of the physicians contained various points; that in the one the power of vision was not destroyed, but would return if the obstacles were removed; that, in the other, the diseased joints might be restored, if a healing power were applied; that it was, perhaps, agreeable to the gods to do this; that the emperor was elected by divine assistance; lastly, that the credit of the success would be the emperor's, the ridicule of the disappointment would fall upon the patients. Vespasian, believing that every thing was in the power of his fortune, and that nothing was any longer incredible, whilst the multitude, which stood by, eagerly expected the event, with a countenance expressive of joy executed what he was desired to do. Immediately the hand was restored to its use, and light returned to the blind man. They who were present, relate both these cures, even at this time, when there is nothing to be gained be lying."[2]

Now, though Tacitus wrote this account twenty-seven years after the miracle is said to have been performed, and wrote at Rome of what passed at Alexandria, and wrote also from report; and although it does not appear that he had examined the story, or that he believed it (but rather the contrary), yet I think his testimony sufficient to prove that such a transaction took place; by which I mean that the two men in question did apply to Vespasian; that Vespasian did touch the diseased in the manner related; and that a cure was reported to have followed the operation. But the affair labours under a strong and just suspicion, that the whole of it was a concerted imposture brought about by collusion between the patients, the physician, and the emperor. This solution is probable, because there was every thing to suggest, and every thing to facilitate such a scheme. The miracle was calculated to confer honour upon the emperor, and upon the god Serapis. It was achieved in the midst of the emperor's flatterers and followers; in a city, and amongst a populace, beforehand devoted to his interest, and to the worship of the god; where it would have been treason and blasphemy together to have contradicted the fame of the cure, or even to have questioned it. And what is very observable in the account is, that the report of the physicians is just such a report as would have been made of a case, in which no external marks of the disease existed, and which, consequently, was capable of being easily counterfeited, viz. that in the first of the patients, the organs of vision were not destroyed, that the weakness of the second was in his joints. The strongest circumstance in Tacitus's narration is, that the first patient was "*notus* tabe aculorum," remarked or notorious for the disease in his eyes. But this was a circumstance which might have found its way into the story in its progress from a distant country, and during an interval of thirty years; or it might be true that the malady of the eyes was notorious, yet that the nature and degree of the disease had never been ascertained: a case by no means uncommon. The emperor's reserve was easily affected; or it is possible he might not be in the secret. There does not seem to be much weight in the observation of Tacitus, that they who were present continued even then to relate the story when there was nothing to be gained by the lie. It only proves that those who had told the

story for many years, persisted in it. The state of mind of the witnesses and spectators *at the time,* is the point to be attended to. Still less is there of pertinency in Mr. Hume's eulogium upon the cautious and penetrating genius of the historian; for it does not appear that the historian believed it. The terms in which he speaks of Serapis, the deity to whose interposition the miracle was attributed, scarcely suffer us to suppose that Tacitus thought the miracle to be real, "by the admonition of the god Serapis, whom that superstitious nation (dedita superstitionibus gens) worship above all other gods." To have brought this supposed miracle within the limits of comparison with the miracles of Christ, it ought to have appeared, that a person of a low and private station, in the midst of enemies, with the whole power of the country opposing *him*, with every one around him prejudiced or interested against his claims and character, pretended to perform these cures; and required the spectators, upon the strength of what they saw, to give up their firmest hopes and opinions, and follow him through a life of trial and danger; that many were so moved, as to obey his call, at the expence, both of every notion in which they had been brought up, and of their ease, safety and reputation; and that by these beginnings a change was produced in the world, the effects of which remain to this day: a case, both in its circumstances and consequences, very unlike any thing we find in Tacitus's relation.

2. The story taken from the memoirs of Cardinal de Retz, which is the second example alledged by Mr. Hume, is this: "In the church of Saragossa in Spain, the canons shewed me a man whose business it was to light the lamps, telling me that he had been several years at the gate, with one leg only. I saw him with two."[3]

It is stated by Mr. Hume, that the Cardinal who relates this story, did not believe it; and it no where appears that he either examined the limb, or asked the patient, or indeed any one, a single question about the matter. An artificial leg wrought with art would by sufficient, in a place where no such contrivance had ever before been heard of, to give origin and currency to the report. The ecclesiastics of the place would, it is probable, favour the story, inasmuch as it advanced the honour of their image and church. And if *they* patronized it, no other person at Saragossa, in the middle of the last century, would care to dispute it. The story likewise coincided, not less with the wishes and preconceptions of the people, than with the interests of their ecclesiastical rulers: so that there was prejudice backed by authority, and both operating upon extreme ignorance, to account for the success of the imposture. If, as I have suggested, the contrivance of an artificial limb was then new, it would not occur to the Cardinal himself to suspect it; especially under the carelessness of mind with which he heard the tale, and the little inclination he felt to scrutinize or expose its fallacy.

3. The miracles related to have been wrought at the tomb of the Abbe' Paris, admit in general of this solution. The patients who frequented the tomb, were so affected by their devotion, their expectation, the place, the solemnity, and, above all, by the sympathy of the surrounding multitude, that many of them were thrown into violent convulsions, which convulsions, in certain instances, produced a removal of disorders depending upon obstruction. We shall, at this day, have the less difficulty in admitting the above account, because it is the very same thing as hath lately been experienced in the operations of animal magnetism; and the report of the French physicians upon that mysterious remedy is very applicable to the present consideration, viz. that the pretenders to the art, by working upon the imaginations of their patients, were frequently able to produce convulsions; that convulsions so produced are amongst the most powerful, but, at the same time, most uncertain and unmanageable applications to the human frame, which can be employed.

Circumstances, which indicate this explication in the case of the Parisian miracles, are the

following:

> **1. They were *tentative*. Out of many thousand sick, infirm, and diseased persons, who resorted to the tomb, the professed history of the miracles contains only nine cures.**
> **2. The convulsions at the tomb are admitted.**
> **3. The diseases were, for the most part of that sort, which depends upon inaction and obstruction, as dropsies, palsies, and some tumours.**
> **4. The cures were gradual; some patients attending many days, some several weeks, and some several months.**
> **5. The cures were many of them incomplete.**
> **6. Others were temporary.[4]**

So that all the wonder we are called upon to account for is, that out of an almost innumerable multitude which resorted to the tomb for the cure of their complaints, and many of whom were there agitated by strong convulsions, a very small proportion experienced a beneficial change in their constitution, especially in the action of the nerves and glands.

Some of the cases alledged do not require that we should have recourse to this solution. The first case in the catalogue is scarcely distinguishable from the progress of a natural recovery. It was that of a young man, who laboured under an inflammation of one eye, and had lost the sight of the other. The inflamed eye was relieved, but the blindness of the other remained. The inflammation had before been abated by medicine; and the young man, at the time of this attendance at the tomb was using a lotion of laudanum. And, what is a still more material part of the case, the inflammation after some interval returned. Another case was that of a young man who had lost his sight by the puncture of an awl, and the discharge of the aqueous humour through the wound. The sight, which had been gradually returning, was much improved during his visit to the tomb, that is, probably in the same degree in which the discharged humour was replaced by fresh secretions. And it is observable, that these two are the only cases, which, from their nature, should seem unlikely to be affected by convulsions.

In one material respect I allow, that the Parisian miracles were different from those related by Tacitus, and from the Spanish miracle of the Cardinal de Retz. They had not, like them, all the power and all the prejudice of the country on their side to begin with. They were alledged by one party against the another, by the Jansenists against the Jesuits. These were of course opposed and examined by their adversaries. The consequence of which examination was, that many falsehoods were detected, that with something really extraordinary much fraud appeared to be mixed. And if some of the cases, upon which designed misrepresentation could not be charged, were not at the time satisfactorily accounted for, it was because the efficacy of strong spasmodic affections was not then sufficiently known. Finally, the cause of Jansenism did not rise by the miracles, but sunk, although the miracles had the anterior persuasion of all the numerous adherents of that cause to set out with.

These, let us remember, are the strongest examples, which the history of ages supplies. In none of them was the miracle unequivocal; by none of them were established prejudices and persuasions overthrown; of none of them did the credit make its way, in opposition to authority and power; by none of them were many induced to commit themselves, and that in contradiction to prior opinions, to a life of mortification, danger, and sufferings; none were called upon to attest them, at the expence of their fortunes and safety.[5]

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2]Tac. Hist. lib. iv.

[3]Liv. iv. A.D. 1654.

[4]The reader will find these particulars verified in the detail, by the accurate enquiries of the present bishop of Sarum in his Criterion of miracles, p. 132 et seq.

[5]It may be thought that the historian of the Parisian miracles, M. Montgeron, forms an exception to this last assertion. He presented his book (with a suspicion, as it should seem, of the danger of what he was doing) to the king; and was shortly afterwards committed to prison, from which he never came out. Had the miracles been unequivocal, and had M. Montgeron been originally convinced by them, I should have allowed this exception. It would have stood I think, alone, in the argument of our adversaries. But beside what has been observed of the dubious nature of the miracles, the account which M. Montgeron has himself left of his conversion, shews both the state of his mind, and *that his persuasion was no built upon external miracles*. "Scarcely had he entered the church-yard, when he was struck," he tells us, "with awe and reverence, having never before heard prayers pronounced with so much ardour and transport, as he observed amongst the supplicants at the tomb. Upon this, throwing himself on his knees, resting his elbows on the tomb-stone, and covering his fact with his hands, he spake the following prayer: *O thou, by whose intercession so many miracles are said to be performed, if it be true that a part of thee surviveth the grave, and that thou hast influence with the Almighty, have pity on the darkness of my understanding, and through his mercy obtain the removal of it*. Having prayed thus, "many thoughts," as he sayeth, "began to open themselves to his mind; and so profound was his attention that he continued on his knees four hours, not in the least disturbed by the vast crowd of surrounding supplicants. During this time all the arguments which he had ever heard or read in favour of Christianity, occurred to him with so much force, and seemed so strong and convincing, that he went home fully satisfied of the truth of religion in general, and of the holiness and power of that person, who," as he supposed, "had engaged the divine goodness to enlighten his understanding so suddenly." Douglass Crit. of Mir. P. 214.

The Hume Archives

"On Mr. Hume's Account of the Origin of the Idea of Necessary Connection"

Monthly Magazine

H. Richter

1797

Editor's note: The author of this essay, H. Richter, is probably Henry James Richter (1772-1857), London born painter and philosopher. Richter was an intimate friend of William Blake and, like Blake had both artistic and literary interests. He was influenced by Kant, and his other writings include *Daylight, a recent Discovery in the Art of Painting, with Hints on the Philosophy of the Fine Arts, and on that of the Human Mind, as first dissected by Emmanuel Kant* (1817). Richter's essay on Hume's account of the origin of the idea of necessary connection was written when he was 25 and reflects an early phase in his philosophical development, in view of his concluding comment which recommends the rejection of Kant. In this essay Richter argues that neither habit, instinct, nor a renewed propensity can account for either the idea of necessary connection or the belief. However, he believes that there is value in tracing the origin of such ideas.

Monthly Magazine

1797, Vol. 4, pp. 533-536

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To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

ON MR. HUME'S ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNECTION.

SIR,

THE principal means by which Mr. Hume proposes to "banish all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them," is the following: "all our ideas, or more feeble perceptions, are copies of our impressions, or more lively ones." This he lays down as a general rule, and requires those who assert that it is not universal, to produce an instance of some idea which is to derived from any impression. In the mean time, however, he takes a precaution which effectually secures his principle against any possible exception, by resolving, that if any idea shall hereafter present itself, which cannot be derived from some impression, he will consider it as no idea at all. "When we entertain," he tells us, "any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as it is but too frequent) we need but enquire, *from what immediate impression is that supposed idea derived?* And if it be possible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion." "Where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea."

Having thus established his principle, he proceeds to its illustration. The idea which he selects for this purpose, and the reality of whose existence he thus puts to the test, is that of a cause. "We mus enquire," says he, "how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect?" And this, he assures us, perfectly accords with his principle; it "arises from experience," that is to say, it is copied from our *immediate impressions*.

He does indeed acknowledge, that "the particular powers," *or causes*, "by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses;" that is, *never make any immediate impression*, and that "he has not by all his *experience* acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which one object produces the other." And upon this he remarks, agreeably to his principle, that "as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of connection or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any {534} meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings, or common life."

The question here seems to be, whether we shall relinquish the principle, or discard this stubborn idea that will not submit to it? Some men, I have no doubt, would willingly give up every idea in their heads, rather than incommode their favorite system; but Mr. Hume would not do this rashly. "There still remains," says he, "one method of avoiding this conclusion." Well, the, let us see how this unfortunate idea will escape.

It is not, he owns, reasonable to conclude, merely "because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that, therefore, the one is the cause, the other the effect;" because, "we can never observe the tie between them." For instance, when I strike this table, the blow is followed by a sound, and all that I perceive are the motion and the sound; but I do not see what it is that connects these events, nor if this were the first time I had observed them, should I have any idea of a necessary connection between them?

But "when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same

event, we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connection." That is to say, after observing two events constantly succeeding one the other, we conclude that they must always occur for the future in the same order, and that whenever the first takes place, the other must of necessity follow it. Mr. Hume says, it is not "by any process of reasoning" that we draw this conclusion. How then? By "custom or habit; for," he argues, "whenever the repetition of any particular act or operation, produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; we always say, that this propensity is the effect of custom." "When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connection in our thought."

Accordingly, one of his definitions of a cause is, "an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other." Let us try this by an instance: -- Suppose a philosopher, who, with an excellent stomach, had all his life been used to live well, so that at a certain hour, when he began to feel himself hungry, he was regularly served with a good dinner then imagine that a set of lean half-famished philosophers, of some other sect, merely for the sake of an experiment, should eat up his dinner for him. Well, at the usual time his appetite returns. That event, which had always been succeeded by another so very agreeable, immediately conveys his thoughts to that other; because, forsooth, the appetite and the dinner have acquired a connection in his thought, and he feels a strong propensity to renew a particular act or operation. Here are all the symptoms of causation; but no dinner! How the philosopher would be surprised. In a little time, however, he would see that Hume was mistaken. He would find that the customary connection of two events might cause an association of his ideas, so that, when one of the events occurred it would convey his thought to the other; but this would no more make him expect that other, than he would expect a dinner because his appetite put him in mind of it. He would learn not to consider one event as the effect of another, merely because the ideas were associated in his mind; he would look not only for a customary, but a necessary connection between them: but it is clear that custom or habit can only associate our ideas, and give us the notion of a customary connection. The question is, how do we get the idea of a necessary connection? Says Mr. Hume, "When the same object is always followed by the same event, we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connection." This is a fact which no one disputes; the only question is, *why* do we then begin to entertain such a notion? Upon the bare experience, that a certain event has hitherto been succeeded by another, why do we with such assurance conclude, that it must always be succeeded by it? Mr. Hume tells us, it is because "We then feel a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connection in the thought or imagination, between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment," he informs us, "is the original of that idea which we seek for." If the idea in question, which is that necessary connection, be copied from the idea of customary connection, the idea of black may be copied from that of white. Let the customary connection have lasted as long, and the habit of observing it have grown as obstinate as you please, it can never change its nature; it is still but a customary connection, and {535} how it should raise in the mind a totally new idea, seems perfectly inconceivable. The gap is still unclosed, and the space between the *has been* and the *must be*, is as wide as ever. But it may be insisted, that the habit of constantly observing a connection, acts so upon the mind, as to make us afterwards positively expect it, and believe it absolutely necessary. If this assertion were sufficient, nothing could be more easy or more common; but the cause here assigned is notoriously inadequate to the effect. What is there in the circumstance, of my having hitherto always seen two events connected, that seems at all calculated to raise in me a belief, that they could not possibly have occurred separately, and that they must

always for the future be so joined? That, upon experiencing a customary connection, or rather a constant order of succession, we do conceive the idea of a necessary connection, is allowed; but what proof have we that this experience is the cause of the idea? If we examine the nature of the experience, we find nothing in it that bears the least reference to such an idea; so that the argument stands thus: habit certainly produces the idea of necessity, because it is succeeded by that idea in the mind. In fact, it is an assertion unsupported by argument. What is the usual effect of habit? Mr. Hume tells us, it is "a propensity to renew a particular act or operation," in other words, it is a desire of obtaining something to which we are accustomed. But can my desire of a thing persuade me that I must necessarily obtain it, and that the whole order of nature would be destroyed if I should not? Doubtless it will be insisted, that the strong desire or propensity, derived from habit, to renew the connection between two events, does absolutely raised in us a belief, that there is a necessary connection between them, and that this desire of renewing it, compels us to think that it will be renewed. Yet this assertion is still more destitute of proof than the last. How has it been proved that we have any desire that the effect should follow the cause? Ask the thief at the gallows whether he desires that the rope should strangle him. It may be said, perhaps, that desire is the constant effect of habit, and may therefore be supposed; but never, surely, did the greatest dunce contract a liking to the birch, though in the habit of being flogged daily. The repetition of even of what was once agreeable, frequently becomes tiresome, and what is so eagerly pursued as variety? But that the mind takes no pleasure in the constant union of the effect with its cause (merely as such) seems evident from the greediness with which men swallow the monstrous stories of enchantment, ghosts, miracles, &c. where all that so much delights us is, the disorderly production of some effect by an unusual cause. Yet I will even suppose it proved, that we have some occult desire or propensity to renew the connection between events; still the chief point is to be considered. It has not yet been shown, that the mere desire of a thing is in any way calculated to produce a belief of its necessity, nor does it appear that such a desire could even form the idea of necessity in the mind; at least, I can see no reason to conclude that it does, and Mr. Hume does not supply me with any; on the contrary, he confounds the two things together, and then accounts for them as if they were one and the same. In order to prove that the habit of observing a connection gives us the idea of its necessity, he tells us, that it creates a propensity to renew it; as if the propensity to, or desire of a thing were not to be distinguished form the conception of its necessity. These are certainly two very different ideas, nor do I see that one in the least refers to the other. Whether we are told, therefore, that habit produces the idea of necessity, or, that habit only raises a propensity, and that this propensity causes the idea; what is all this but assertion and conjecture, unsupported by reason?

Indeed, Mr. Hume himself, as if internally conscious that he had not traced the idea to its source, drops the term *habit* and has recourse to that of *instinct*.

Speaking of "this operation of the mind, by which we infer the effects from like causes;" he tells us, "it is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding."

I understand by instinct, a power depending upon the peculiar structure of the mind, and which determines it to some particular act. If it be by instinct, therefore, that we infer one event from another, that is, if the peculiar structure of the mind makes us conceive a necessary {536} connection between two events or impressions; that instinct is the origin of the idea of necessary

connection, and not the mere impressions or events which were only connected by it in our thought. "Nature," he continues, "has implanted in us an instinct which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects." But this is not enough. An instinct which shall make me conclude one event to be the cause of another, must not only carry my thought from one to the other; it must not only associate the two ideas, and remind me of their customary connection; it must actually produce in my mind the idea of a necessary connection between them; for till it does this, it cannot make me conclude that one is the cause of the other. If the instinct do not give me the idea of a necessary connection between events, it cannot make me infer like effects from like causes; and, therefore, such an instinct would not answer the purpose; and if we get the idea from any other quarter, for instance, from observing the "course established among external objects," the instinct is altogether superfluous, for in that case, all we want is memory.

But it has been proved, that we did not acquire this idea by observing the course of events, as in all that course there is nothing like the idea to be observed. Therefore, whether we have an instinct, and the idea originate in it, or whatever may be the origin of this idea, it does no appear that it could either arise from the connection of events in a single instance; or from the customary connection in a number of instances; or from the habitual association of ideas, arising from the customary connection; or even from any desire we may be supposed to have for the renewal of the connection. We cannot, therefore, attribute it to the impressions of sense, either immediately or mediately; so that it stands in direct opposition to the principle of Mr. Hume.

It remains now to be decided, whether we shall discard an idea which seems essential to human reason, or give up the universality of this principle? Those who resolve to abide by the principle, let what will become of the idea, should at least be as candid as Mr. Hume has been, and first, carefully examine whether there be not some impression from which it might be derived; after that, they may, if they please, deny its existence, as a dogmatical shoemaker might swear you have no feet, because his shoes will not fit them.

But it may be said, according to Mr. Hume's system, an idea is in fact no idea, unless it be derived from some impression; nor till he has discovered that impression, does he speak of it positively as such, he calls it only a *supposed idea*. What an excess of refinement is this! We hear every day of the supposed advantages of a ruinous war, that is to say, advantages that exist only in idea; but here is an *idea* which exists *only in idea*. I wonder how some philosophers would have an idea exist. If we ask Berkeley in what way ideas exist, he tells us plainly (sec. 139) that *they exist merely by way of idea*, and I confess I am of his opinion.

I shall not, however, attempt to prove the existence of this idea as to those who have not the idea, it would be impossible, and to those who have, superfluous. Yet it may not be amiss to apprize those who deny its existence, of the dilemma to which they are reduced. Either they must acknowledge they have the idea, whose existence they deny; or confess they have no idea of what they deny.

It may be asked, of what use is this inquiry in the origin of ideas? Shall we not continue to act upon the belief of a necessary connection between events, and will not the effect as regularly follow its cause, whether we know the origin of this idea or not? Certainly. And what is more, we shall probably continue to dispute about the existence of a FIRST CAUSE, and argue as learnedly as ever, both for and against the doctrine of NECESSITY, whether we are able to tell *how such an idea ever came into our heads* or not. This is undoubtedly true, and yet there is one reason why I wish we were able to account, not only for this, but for a thousand other phenomena in the mind;

and that is, that we might have some plea for rejecting, without examination, the system of Professor Kant; for it would be an excellent excuse for treating the philosophy of other nations with contempt, if we could but produce a reasonable and consistent theory of our own.

H. RICHTER

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

The Scottish Philosophy

James McCosh
1875

XIX.-- DAVID HUME.[33]

DAVID HUME was born at Edinburgh, on April 26, 1711. He was the second son of Joseph Home or Hume, of Ninewells, so called from a number of springs which may still be seen as fresh as when the name was given. The mansion is in the parish of Chirnside, in Berwickshire, and is situated on the green slope of a hill which rises from the river Whitadder, immediately in front. The situation is remarkably pleasant, and from the heights above there are extensive views of the whole eastern border country, now associated in the minds of all reading people with tales of romance. Here David Hume passed the greater portion of his younger years, and much of the quieter and more studious parts of his middle age. But he never refers to the scenes of his native place, not even (as Mr. Burton has remarked) when be has occasion in his History of England" to relate events which might have led him to do so. It is clear that his taste for the beauties of nature was never very keen; the time had not come when all people rave about natural scenery; he was in no way disposed to expose himself to English prejudice by betraying Scottish predilections, and I rather think that he was glad that the time of border raids had for ever passed away.

His father was a member of the Faculty of Advocates, but passed his life as a country gentleman. His mother was a daughter of Sir D. Falconer of Newton, who had been a lawyer in the times of the Stuarts, and had filled the office of president of the Court of Session from 1682 to 1685. So far as the youth was exposed to hereditary predilections, they were those of Scotch landlords, who ruled supreme in their own estates, of hard-headed Edinburgh lawyers, and of old families {114} opposed to the great Whig or covenanting struggle of the previous century. His father having died when the second son was yet an infant, the education of the children devolved on their mother, who is represented as training them with great care,-in what way or form in respect of religion we are not told.

David became an entrant of the class of William Scott, professor of Greek in the Edinburgh University, February 27, 1723, being still under twelve years of age. What his precise college course was is not recorded; but we know generally that in those times, and for many years after, boys who should have been at school, after getting an imperfect acquaintance with Latin and Greek, were introduced in the classes of logic, pneumatics, and moral philosophy, to subjects fitted only for men of mature powers and enlarged knowledge. I suspect there was no ruling mind among his teachers to sway him, and he was left to follow the bent of his own mind. Already he has a taste for literature, and a tendency to speculative philosophy. " I was seized very early," be says in " My Own Life," with a passion for literature, which has been the ruling passion of my life, and a great

source of my enjoyments." In writing to a friend, July 4, 1727, he mentions having by him written papers which he will not make known till he has polished them, and these evidently contain the germs of a system of mental philosophy. " All the progress I have made is but drawing the outlines on loose bits of paper: here a hint of a passion; there a phenomenon in the mind accounted for; in another an alteration of these accounts." Mr. Burton publishes part of a paper of his early years, being " An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honor." In it we have no appreciation of chivalry, but we have the germs of the historical, political, and ethical speculations which he afterwards developed. He inquires why courage is the principal virtue of barbarous nations, and why chastity is the point of honor with women (always a favorite topic with him), and is evidently in the direction of his utilitarian theory of virtue. About his seventeenth year he began, but speedily relinquished, the study of the law. " My studious disposition, my sobriety, and my industry, gave my family a notion that the law was a proper profession for me; but I found an unsurmountable aversion {115} to every thing but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning; and while they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors I was secretly devouring."

We have two admirable accounts of Hume's life: the one, " My Own Life," calm as philosophy itself; the other by Mr. Hill Burton, who had access to the papers collected by Baron Hume, and deposited with the Royal Society of Edinburgh; and who has collected all other available information, and put it together in a clear and systematic manner. But there is much that we should like to know not communicated. The autobiography, though honest enough, is not open or communicative. We may rest assured that in that great lake which spreads itself so calmly before us, there were depths, and movements in these depths, which have been kept from our view. Though so skilled in psychological analysis, he gives no account of the steps by which he was led to that deadly scepticism in philosophy and theology which be held by so firmly, and propounded so perseveringly. Mr. Burton has, however, published a remarkable document, which lets us see what we should never have learned from " My Own Life," that there had been an awful struggle and a crisis.

It is a letter written to a physician with great care, but possibly never sent. He begins with stating that he " had always a strong inclination to books and letters," and that, after fifteen years, he had been left to his own choice in reading: " I found it to incline almost equally to books of reasoning and philosophy, and to poetry and the polite authors. Every one who is acquainted either with the philosophers or critics, knows that there is nothing yet established in either of these sciences, and that they contain little more than endless disputes, even in the most fundamental articles. Upon examination of these, I found a certain boldness of temper growing in me, which was not inclined to submit to any authority on these subjects, but led me to seek out some new medium by which truth might be established. After much study and reflection on this, at last, when I was about eighteen years of age, there seemed to be opened up to me a new source of thought, which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ardor natural to young men, throw up every other pleasure or {116} business to apply actively to it. The law, which was the business I designed to follow, appeared nauseous to me; and I could think of no other way of pushing my fortune in the world but that of scholar and philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this course of life for some months, till at last, about the be ginning of September, 1729, all my ardor seemed in a moment to be extinguished, and I could no longer raise my mind to that pitch which formerly gave me such excessive pleasure. I felt no uneasiness or want of spirits when I laid aside my book; and therefore never imagined there was any bodily distemper in the case, but that my coldness

proceeded from a laziness of temper which must be overcome by redoubling my application. In this condition I remained for nine months, very uneasy to myself, but without growing any worse, which was a miracle. There was another particular which contributed more than any thing to waste my spirits, and bring on me this distemper, which was, that, having read many books of morality,-- such as Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, - and being smit with their beautiful representations of virtue and philosophy, I undertook the improvement of my temper and will, along with my reason and understanding. I was continually fortifying myself with reflections against death and poverty and shame and pain, and all the other calamities of life. These no doubt are exceeding useful when joined with an active life, because the occasion being presented, along with the reflection, works it into the soul, and makes it take a deep impression; but in solitude they serve to little other purpose than to waste the spirits, the force of the mind meeting with no resistance, but wasting itself in the air, like our arm when it misses the aim. This, however, I did not learn but by experience, and till I had already ruined my health, though I was not sensible of it." He then describes the symptoms: scurvy spots breaking out on his fingers the first winter, then a wateriness in the mouth. Next year, about May, 173 1, there grew upon him a ravenous appetite, and a palpitation of heart. In six weeks, from " being tall, lean, and rawboned, he became on a sudden the most sturdy robust, healthful-like fellow you have seen, with a ruddy complexion and a cheerful countenance." He goes on to say, that " having now time and leisure to cool my inflamed imagination, I began to consider seriously how I should proceed with my philosophical {117} studies. I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity labored under the same inconvenience that has been found in their natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending more upon invention than experience every one consulted his fancy in erecting schemes of virtue and happiness, without regarding human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend. This, therefore, I resolved to male my principal study, and the source from which I would derive every truth in criticism as well as morality." He tells how he had read most of the celebrated books in Latin, French, and English; how "within these three years I find I have scribbled many a quire of paper, in which there is nothing contained but my own inventions;" how he " had collected the rude materials for many volumes but he adds, " I had no hopes of delivering my opinions with such elegance and neatness as to draw to me the attention of the world, and I would rather live and die in obscurity than produce them maimed and imperfect." "It. is a weakness rather than lowness of spirits which troubles me;" and he traces an analogy between what he had passed through and recorded religious experiences. " I have noticed in the writings of the French mystics, and in those of our fanatics here, that when they give a history of the situation of their souls, they mention a coldness and desertion of the spirit, which frequently returns." But, " however this may be, I have not come out of the cloud so well as they commonly tell us they have done, or rather began to despair of ever recovering. To keep myself from being melancholy on so dismal a prospect, my only security was in peevish reflections on the vanity of the world, and of all human glory, which, however just sentiments they may be esteemed, I have found can never be sincere, except in those who are possessed of them. Being sensible that all my philosophy would never make me contented in my present situation, I began to rouse up myself." He found these two things very bad for this distemper, study and idleness, and so he wishes to betake himself to active life. His choice was confined to two kinds of life, that of a travelling governor, and that of a merchant. The first not being fit for him he says he is now on his way to Bristol, to engage in business till he is able to "leave this distemper behind me." He says, that " all the physicians {118} I have consulted, though very able, could never enter into my distemper," and so he now applies to this eminent doctor.

In this remarkable document Hume unbosoms himself for the first time, and, I may add, for the last time. He had endeavored to act the self-righteous and self-sufficient stoic. We have other evidence of this. In the letter already extracted from, written when he was sixteen, he says. "I hate task-reading, and I diversify them at pleasure; sometimes a philosopher, sometimes a poet." "The philosopher's wise man and the poet's husbandman agree in peace of mind in a liberty and independence on fortune, and contempt of riches, power, and glory. Every thing is placid and quiet in both, nothing perturbed or in disorder." " A perfectly wise man that outbraves fortune is surely greater than the husbandman who slips by her; and indeed this pastoral and Saturnian happiness I have in a great measure come at just now. I live a king, pretty much by myself, neither full of action nor perturbation, -- ***molles somnos*****. This state, however, I can foresee, is not to be relied on. My peace of mind is not sufficiently confirmed by philosophy to withstand the blows of fortune. This greatness and elevation of soul is to be found only in study and contemplation; this can alone teach us to look down on human accidents. You must allow me to talk thus like a philosopher; 'tis a subject I think much on, and could talk all day long of." But the attempt had turned out a miserable failure, as he acknowledges in his letter to the physician. Doubts had crept in, and the stoic was tempted to turn sceptic. Writing long after to Sir Gilbert Elliott in regard to his " Dialogues on Natural Religion," which sap all religion, be mentions a manuscript, afterwards destroyed, which he had written before twenty. "It began with an anxious search after arguments to confirm the common opinion, doubts stole in, dissipated, returned, were again dissipated, returned again; and it was a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against inclination, perhaps against reason."**

The letter is supposed by Mr. Burton, on good grounds, to have been written to the celebrated Dr. Cheyne, author of the Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion" (1705), and The English Malady; or a Treatise of Nervous Diseases of all kinds, Spleens, Vapours, Lowness of Spirits, Hypochondriacal {119} Distempers," &c. It is doubtful whether the letter ever reached Dr. Cheyne, and it may be doubted whether that eminent physician had in all his pharmacopoea a medicine to cure the malady of this remarkable youth. Dr. Cheyne defends with the common arguments the "great fundamental principles of all virtue and all morality: viz., the existence of a supreme and infinitely perfect Being; the freedom of the will, the immortality of the spirits of all intellectual beings, and the certainty of future rewards or punishments." But the youth who proposed to address him had already a system evolved which undermined all these. One could have wished that there had been a friend at hand to direct him away from Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, to a better teacher who is never mentioned. Not that we should have expected him in his then state to be drawn to the character of Jesus, but he might have found something in His work fitted to give peace and satisfaction to his distracted soul. But it is useless to speculate on these possibilities. All he says himself is: " In 1734 I went to Bristol with some recommendations to eminent merchants, but in a few months found that scene totally unsuitable to me. I went over to France, with a view of prosecuting my studies in a country retreat, and I there laid that plan of life which I have steadily and successfully pursued."[34]

We can easily picture the youth of twenty-three as he set out for France. By nature he is one of a class of persons to be found in all countries, but quite as frequently in Scotland as anywhere else, who are endowed with a powerful intellect, conjoined with a heavy animal temperament, and who, with no high aspirations, ideal, ethereal, or spiritual, have a tendency {120} to look with suspicion on all kinds of enthusiasm and highflown zeal. With an understanding keen and searching, he could not be contented with the appearances of things, and was ever bent on penetrating beneath

the surface; and his native shrewdness, his hereditary predilections, and the reaction against the heats of the previous century, all combined to lead him to question common impressions and popular opinions. He saw the difficulties which beset philosophical and theological investigations, and was unable to deliver himself from them, being without the high sentiments which might have lifted him above the low philosophy of his own day in England and France, and the sophistries suggested by a restless intellect. He knew only the ancient Stoic philosophy in the pages of Roman authors, and the modern philosophy of Locke, as modified by such men as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and driven to its logical consequences by Berkeley: he bad tried the one in his practical conduct, and the other by his sifting intellect, and having found both wanting, he is prepared to abandon himself to scepticism, which is the miserable desert resorted to by those who despair of truth. Meanwhile his great intellectual powers find employment in constructing theories of the mind, in which he himself perhaps had no great faith, but which seemed the logical conclusion of the acknowledged philosophical principles of his time, and quite as plausible as any that had been devised by others, and brought such fame to their authors.

With these predilections, France was the country which had most attractions to him, but was at the same time the most unfortunate country he could have gone to, and the middle of the eighteenth century the most unfortunate period for visiting it. In philosophy, the age had outgrown Descartes and Malebranche, Arnauld and Pascal, and the grave and earnest thinkers of the previous century, and was embracing the most superficial parts of Locke's philosophy, which had been introduced by Voltaire to the knowledge of Frenchmen, who turned it to a wretched sensationalism. In religion he saw around him, among the great mass of the people, a very corrupted and degenerate form of Christianity, while, among the educated classes, infidelity was privately cherished, and was ready to burst out. Voltaire had issued his first attack on Christianity, {121} in his " Epitre a Uranie," published in 1728, and the fire spread with a rapidity which showed that there were materials ready to catch it and propagate it. Sixty years later, one so fond of order and peace would have been scared by the effects produced by scepticism, so powerful in overthrowing old abuses, and so weak in constructing any thing new or better but at this time infidelity was full of hope, and promising an era of liberty and peace. The very section of the Catholic Church which retained the highest faith and the purest morality, had unfortunately been involved in a transaction which favored the sceptical tendency among shrewd minds. Only a few years before, the people believed that the sick were healed, and the blind made to see at the tomb of the famous Jansenist, the Abbe Paris; the noise made by the occurrences, and the discussions created by them, had not passed away when Hume arrived in Paris; and the youth pondered the event, to bring it out years after in his " Essay on Miracles." While he lived at La Fleche, a Jesuit plied him with some "nonsensical miracle," performed lately in their convent, and then and there occurred to him the famous argument which he afterwards published against miracles. " As my head was full of the topics of the `Treatise of Human Nature,' which I was at that time composing, the argument immediately occurred to me, and I thought it very much gravelled my companion; but at last he observed to me that it was impossible for that argument to have any validity, because it operated equally against the gospel as the Catholic miracles, which observation I thought fit to admit as a sufficient answer."

After living a short time in Paris, he retired to Rheims, and afterwards went to La Fleche, where he passed two of the three years he spent in France. We know nothing of his employments these years, except that he devoted himself most earnestly to the composition of his " Treatise on Human Nature." In 1737 he brought it over with him to London, where he published the two first books

the end of the following year.

This treatise is by far the most important of all. his philosophical works. If we except certain speculations in history and political economy, it contains nearly all his favorite ideas. He devoted to it all the resources of his mighty intellect. He {122} had read extensively, pondered deeply, and taken immense pains in polishing his style. He could scarcely, indeed, be called a learned man, in the technical sense of the term, but he was well informed. We could have wished that he had possessed wider sympathies with earnest seekers after truth in all ages, but this was not in the nature of the man. His knowledge of Greek was very imperfect at this time (he afterwards renewed his acquaintance with that language); what he knew of Greek philosophy was chiefly through Cicero (his very pictures of the Stoics and Epicureans are Roman rather than Grecian), and he never entered into the spirit of such deep and earnest thinkers as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, -- he tells us somewhere that the fame of Aristotle is utterly decayed. In respect even of modern writers, he never comprehended the profundity of such men as Cudworth and Descartes in the previous century; and he had no appreciation of the speculations of Clarke and Leibnitz, who lived in the age immediately preceding his own. He belongs to the cold, elegant, doubting, and secular eighteenth century; and, setting little value on antiquity, he builds for the present and the future on the philosophy of his own time.

As to style, which he greatly cultivated, the models which he set before him were the Roman prose writers, the French authors of his own day, and the Englishmen who were introducing the French clearness and point, such as Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, and Pope, -- he says: " The first polite prose we have was written by Swift." Though he took great pains, he never altogether succeeded in weeding out his Scotticisms, nor in acquiring a genuine English idiom; but his style is always clear, manly, and elegant, and worthy of his weighty thoughts. When he broke down his elaborate treatise into smaller ones, he endeavored to catch the ease and freedom of the lighter French literature; but neither the subjects discussed nor the ideas of the author admit of such treatment; and though the essays are more ornate, and have more attempts at smartness and repartee, the student will ever betake himself to the treatise, as containing the only systematic, and by far the most satisfactory statement of his views.

He is now publicly committed to a theory, and he adheres to it resolutely and doggedly. In after years he said: " So {123} great an undertaking, planned before I was one-and-twenty, and composed before twenty-five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my haste a hundred and a hundred times." But this refers to the form and style, not the matter. He never abandoned nor modified the scepticism advanced in the early work. When he failed in obtaining a hearing for his views in the more elaborate treatise, he set them forth in " Essays," which might be more attractive to the general reader. He had instituted an inquiry, and satisfied himself that speculative truth was unattainable, either in philosophy or theology , owing to the weakness of the human intellect, and he did not wish to be disturbed with questionings. He seems to have studiously abstained from speaking on such subjects in social intercourse, except at times, in a tone of playful humor, not meant to be offensive; and on becoming an author he formed the resolution " never to reply to anybody." He rather delighted to associate with ministers of religion, such as Robertson, Blair, and Carlyle, whom he reckoned moderate and tolerant, and helpful in producing a religious indifference; but he never allowed them to try to convert him to the truths of natural and revealed religion which they held by; and when Dr. Blair ventured on one occasion to make the attempt, he received such a reply as prevented the repetition of it on any future occasion. There are traditions of him and Adam Smith conversing familiarly on such subjects on the sands of Kirkcaldy, and of

Hume succeeding in bringing his friend over to infidelity; but we have no authenticated record of Hume ever opening to any human being the religious or irreligious convictions of his soul. A good-natured and sociable man, kind and indulgent to those with whom he came in contact, he passed through life a solitary being, certainly with no God, and apparently with no human being to whom to unbosom himself.

Having set the matured and confirmed man before our readers, we have no intention of detailing minutely the events of his future life. Having published his work, he retired to Ninewells to wait the result. "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my `Treatise of Human Nature.' It fell deadborn from the press without reaching such distinction as even to create a murmur among the zealots." He evidently felt the {124} disappointment. "I am out of humor with myself." He was amazed that the liberty he had taken with all established truth had not created a sensation. But he was conscious of intellectual power: he had laid his plan for life; and he indomitably persevered in his literary career. Next year he published the third volume of his treatise, that on ethics, with no better success. In 1741 he printed at Edinburgh the first, and in 1742 the second, of his " Essays Moral and Political." The work was favorably received and he was encouraged. In 1744 he was anxious to be appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, but public sentiment could not bear the idea of one so sceptical being appointed a teacher of youth. He was a younger brother without a profession, and he wished to have a competency; and so in 1745, the year of the rebellion of Prince Charles, he became the companion and guide of the weak-minded Marquis of Annandale. The engagement brought him some accession of fortune, but terminated abruptly from the caprice of the Marquis. In 1747 he attended General St. Clair in his military embassy to the Courts of Vienna and Turin. There he saw a variety of life; and he congratulates himself that when the engagement closed, he was " master of near a thousand pounds." In 1748 he cast the first part of his unfortunate treatise in a new form, in the "Inquiry concerning Human Understanding," but the work failed to excite any interest. His brother at Ninewells having married in 1751, his place of residence was now Edinburgh, where he was appointed to, and held for five years, the office of librarian to the advocates' library, a situation which brought him little or no emolument. In 1752 he published in Edinburgh the second part of his essays, being his " Political Discourses." This work was immediately received with acclamation; and, being translated into French, it procured him a high reputation, and in fact awakened those discussions which issued in making political economy a science in the " Wealth of Nations." Whatever merit Hume may have in demolishing error, he has, I believe, established very little positive truth: what he effected in this way was done in political economy. The same year he published his " Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," being an improved version of the third part of his treatise. " Meanwhile my bookseller, A. Millar, informed me that my {125} former publications (all but the unfortunate treatise) were beginning to be the subject of conversation, that the sale of them was gradually increasing, and that new editions were demanded. Answers by reverends and right reverends came out two or three in a year; and I found, by Dr. Warburton's railing, that the books were beginning to be esteemed in good company." He had long had the idea of writing some historical work, and from the time of his being appointed librarian to the well-stored advocates' collection of books, he formed the plan of writing the " History of England." The first volume commenced with the accession of the house of Stuart, but was received so coldly that in a twelvemonth the publisher sold only forty-five copies. Nevertheless he persevered, bringing out volume after volume, till at last the great merits of the work were acknowledged. This perseverance in his life plan, in spite of discouragements, I reckon as the noblest feature in Hume's

character. It does not concern us here to speak of the excellencies and defects of the history. It could be shown that the prejudices running throughout it were his constitutional and hereditary ones, and that the work, as a whole, is an illustration of his metaphysical and ethical theory.

In 1763 he received from the Earl of Hertford an invitation to attend him on his embassy to Paris. His visit to the capital of France on this occasion deserves a special notice. It may be doubted whether there ever were such compliments paid to any literary man. Dukes, mareschals, foreign ambassadors, vied with each other in honoring him. The famous men, whose persons and conversations he liked best, were D'Alembert, Marmontel, Diderot, Duclos, Helvetius, and old President Henault; and he writes to Dr. Blair, and bids him tell Dr. Robertson that there was not a single deist among them, meaning that there was none of them but went farther. He met also with Buffon, Malesherbes, Crebillon, Holbach, Renauld, Suard, and Turgot.

But he was the special favorite of the ladies, who at that time ruled the fashion in Paris. In particular, he was flattered and adored by the Countess de Boufflers. His correspondence with that lady had commenced in 1761. She addressed him first, declaring the admiration which, your sublime work (the `History of England') has awakened in me." "I know no terms {126} capable of expressing what I felt in reading the work. I was moved, transported; and the emotion which it caused me, is in some measure painful by its continuance. It elevates the soul it fills the heart with sentiments of humanity and benevolence it enlightens the intellect, by showing that true happiness is closely connected with virtue; and discovers, by the same light, what is the end, the sole end, of every reasonable being"! In truth, I believed I had before my eyes the work of some celestial being, free from the passions of humanity, who, for the benefit of the human race, has designed to write the events of these latter times"! The philosopher is evidently gratified. " What new wonder is this which your letter presents to me? I not only find a lady, who, in the bloom of beauty and height of reputation, can withdraw herself from the pleasures of a gay court, and find leisure to cultivate the sciences, but deigns to support a correspondence with a man of letters, in a remote country, and to reward his labors by a suffrage the most agree able of all others to a man who has any spark of generous sentiment or taste for true glory." This lady, it is proper to say in plain terms, was the wife of the Comte de Boufflers, still alive, but the mistress of the Prince of Conti, who superintended for the king that mean diplomatic correspondence which he carried on unknown to his ministers. Hume might also be seen attending the evening *salons* of Madame Geoffrin, who had been the daughter of a *valet de chambre*, and was now the centre of a circle of artists and men of letters. He also waited on the entertainments of the famous Mademoiselle de l'Espinasse, who, originally an illegitimate child, had raised herself by being, first, the humble companion, and then the rival of Madame Du Deffaud, and was well known to have been the mistress of a number of successive or contemporaneous lovers. There must have been something in the philosophy of Hume which recommended him to so many ladies of this description. We believe they were glad to find so eminent a philosopher, with a system which did not seem to bear bard upon them. The courtiers told him that Madame de Pompadour " was never heard to say so much to any man."

He says of himself: " I eat nothing but ambrosia, drink nothing but nectar, breathe nothing but incense, and tread on nothing but flowers. Every man I meet, and still more every lady, {127} would think they were wanting in the most indispensable duty if they did not make a long and elaborate harangue in my praise." Lord Charlemont has given us a picture, or rather a caricature, of his person as he met him at Turin some years before this. " His face was broad and flat, his mouth wide, and without any other expression than that of imbecility. His eyes vacant and spiritless, and the corpulence of his whole person was far better fitted to communicate the idea of a

turtle-eating alderman than of a refined philosopher. His speech in English was tendered ridiculous by the broadest Scotch accent, and his French was, if possible, still more laughable." This was the man who was made by the Parisian ladies to take the part, in an acted tableau, of a sultan assailed by two female slaves: " On le place sur un sopha entre les deux plus jolies femmes de Paris, il les regarde attentivement, il se frappe le ventre et les genoux A plusieurs reprises, et ne trouve jamais autre chose a leur dire que, -- `Eh bien! mes demoiselles. . . . Eh bien! nous voila donc. . . . Eh bien ! vous voila. . . . vous voila ici.'" His good sense led him to see the vanity of all this: but he was pleased with it; and he often expresses a wish to settle in Paris, or somewhere in France.

When he was introduced to the Dauphin, his son, afterwards the unfortunate Louis XVI., but then a boy of nine, stepped forth, evidently by instruction, and told him how many friends and admirers he had in the country, and that he reckoned himself among the number from the reading of many passages in his works. The Comte de Provence (who, after his long exile, became Louis XVIII.),a year or so younger, now approached Hume, and told him he had been long and impatiently expected in France, and that he anticipated great pleasure from reading his fine history. Even the Comte d'Artois, afterwards Charles X., but then a boy of six, had to mumble a panegyric. A wise man learned in providence might have seen that awful miseries must issue from a state of things in which, as Horace Walpole pointedly expresses it, " There is a God and the king to be pulled down first, and men and women are devoutly employed in the demolition," while princes were taught to cherish the viper that was to sting them. It would have been an appropriate punishment to have got Hume placed, half a century later, in the scenes of the French Revolution, to let him eat the fruit of the seed he had helped to sow. {128}

But what, it may be asked, did be think of the state of society in which he had to mingle? It is evident that he was horrified at times with the proclaimed atheism of men and women. But what did he think of the morality of the circles in which he moved, more especially of the loose relationship of the marriage tie? Did his utilitarian theory of morals, of which he surely knew the bearing and tendency, allow of such a state of things? It is certain that Hume uttered no protest at the time, and he has left behind no condemnation of the morality of France, while he was fond of making sly and contemptuous allusions to the manifestations of religious zeal in his own country. The tone of morality in France could never have been amended by him, nor, we venture to say, by any utilitarian. When the husband of Madame Boufflers dies, he writes to her as a person now within reach of honor and felicity; that is, as likely to be married to the Prince de Conti. However, the prince declines, and Hume gives her wise enough counsel: gradually to diminish her connection with the prince, and at last to separate from him; and, he says: " If I could dispose of my fate, nothing would be so much my choice as to live where I might cultivate your friendship. Your taste for travelling might also afford you a plausible pretence for putting this plan in execution; a journey to Italy would loosen your connections here; and, if it were delayed, I would, with some probability, expect to have the felicity of attending you thither." One can picture the scene; the countess travelling with Hume attending her. But the prospect had not such attractions as to induce her to leave the prince. Hume continued his correspondence with her; and, on hearing of the death of the Prince of Conti, wrote her within a few days of his own death, knowing he was dying, and expresses no condemnation of her past conduct. The question arises whether this would be the moral tone allowed in a community in which the word of God is discarded, and utilitarian principles are adopted?

We do not mean to discuss the miserable quarrel between him and Rousseau. His attention was

called to the alleged ill usage of Rousseau by Madame de Boufflers, who described him as a noble and disinterested soul, " flying from intercourse with the world," and " feeling pleasure only in solitude." Hume, believing him to be persecuted, exerted himself to help him. {129} But his morbid vanity and intolerable habits (he insisted in taking his disgusting governante with him when he visited a family) rendered it impossible to befriend him. Unwilling to allow himself to think, or let others conclude, that he was indebted to any one, he repaid Hume's manly and delicate kindness with suspicion; and Hume, who began by describing him as a man whose modesty proceeded from ignorance of his own excellence," ended by declaring him to be " the blackest and most atrocious villain beyond comparison that now exists in the world." It is justice to Hume to say that he was always kind to persons of literary ability. Thus, he interested himself much in Thomas Blacklock, a blind man, of some poetical talent, when the people of Kirkcudbright declined to accept him as their minister. He also did all in his power to bring into notice the publications of Robertson, Adam Smith, and Ferguson.

By his connection with the embassy and the sale of his works, which had become great, he now attained a competency which made him feel independent. He had many temptations to settle in France, but old associations drew him back to Scotland. It was proposed by Lord Hertford to send him to Ireland as Secretary; but the Irish would not receive him, because he was a Scotchman. It was on this occasion that the Princess Amelia said that she thought the affair might be easily accommodated. "Why may not Lord Hertford give a bishopric to Mr. Hume?" In 1767-68 he was appointed by Lord Conway Under-Secretary of State, and had charge of Scottish affairs, including the patronage of churches But his residence was now mainly in Edinburgh, first in the old town, afterwards in a house which he built in the new town, in St. David Street, so called as the name had been chalked on the wall by a witty young lady as she passed. Here he was the acknowledged chief of a literary circle, embracing men of considerable eminence, such as Robertson, Blair, Lord Kames, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith at Kirkcaldy, who all looked up to him with respect. He rather enjoyed being an object of wonder to the multitude beyond the favored circle in which he mingled, and made many jocular remarks about the unpopularity of his opinions. Good-natured, sociable, and avoiding controversy, he suffered few annoyances {130} because of his scepticism -- certainly none that deserved to be called persecution. For we suppose it will be scarcely reckoned as such, that, on one occasion, in picking his steps from his lodging in the old town to the house he was building in the new, he fell into a swamp, and, observing some Newhaven fishwives passing, he called to them for help, but on learning that it was Hume the unbeliever who was in such a plight, they refused to aid him till he said the Lord's prayer. He carried on a pleasant correspondence with Sir Gilbert Elliott of Minto, with Mure of Caldwell, and others of a literary or philosophic taste. He lived on familiar terms with several of the moderate clergy, such as Robertson and Blair, and at times mingled in their ecclesiastical counsels. Many of the younger ministers reckoned it an honor to be admitted to his society, and he encouraged them to associate with him. These circumstances have led some to think that the leading moderate ministers of that period must have been infidels in secret, and acting hypocritically in professing Christianity; but there is no ground for such a charge: they believed sincerely in the doctrines of natural religion, and in the Word of God as inspired to teach a pure morality and the immortality of the soul. But it is equally clear, that they had no faith in the peculiar Bible doctrines of grace; and Hume was delighted to find them frowning on all religious earnestness, and advancing so rapidly on the road to deism and philosophic indifference.

By April, 1776, Hume knew that he would not recover from the disease with which he had been

afflicted for two years, being a disorder in the bowels. He bought a piece of ground in the new church-yard in the Calton Hill as a burying-place, and left money for the erection of a small monument, with the simple inscription, " David Hume." lie wrote " My Own Life," giving an account of his literary career. In his will Adam Smith had been appointed his literary executor, and two hundred pounds had been bequeathed to him for the pains he might take in correcting and publishing his " Dialogues on Natural Religion," a work written before 1751, but not yet given to the world. But he had ground for fearing that Smith might be unwilling to take the odium of editing such a work, and so he took effectual steps to guard against its suppression. He came to {131} an understanding with Smith on the subject, and in a codicil to his will, dated August 7, he left the manuscripts to Strahan the publisher, ordaining " that if my `Dialogues' from whatever cause be not published within two years and a half after my death, as also the account of my life, the property shall return to my nephew David, whose duty in publishing them, as the last request of his uncle, must be approved of by all the world." Strahan was as indisposed as Smith to undertake the responsibility of publishing so offensive a work. The truth is, Hume's Scottish friends, though they had abandoned Christianity, were most anxious to have left to them a natural religion, in which they might find a refuge and some comfort; and in the "Dialogues" Hume had undermined this last support. The " Dialogues " were published in 1779 by the author's nephew.

In April he took a journey to Bath for the benefit of his health, but with no hope of ultimate recovery. John Home, the author of " Douglas, a Tragedy," travelled with him, and has preserved a diary. He talked cheerfully of the topics of the day, and of his favorite subjects, lamenting over the state of the nation, and predicting that the national debt must be the ruin of Britain. He returned to Edinburgh about the beginning of July. Dr. Cullen reports: " He passed most part of the day in his drawing-room: admitted the visits of his friends, and with his usual spirits conversed with them upon literature, politics, or whatever was accidentally started." Colonel Edmonstoune had come to take leave of him Hume said he had been reading a few days before, Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead," and, among all the reasons for not entering readily into Charon's boat, he could not find one that fitted him, and he invented several peculiar ones to give the boatman. " I might urge, I Have a little patience, good Charon: I have been endeavoring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfall of some of the prevailing systems of superstition.' But Charon would then lose all temper and decency: `You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term ? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy, loitering rogue.'" All this is evidently very gratifying to the colonel. Dr. Black reports that he " passes his time very well with the assistance of amusing books." {132} Dr. Cullen continues: "For a few days before his death, he became more averse to receive visits; speaking, became more and more difficult to him; and for twelve hours before his death his speech failed him altogether. His senses and judgment did not fail till the last hour of his life. He constantly discovered a strong sensibility to the attention and care of his friends, and, amidst great uneasiness and languor, never betrayed any peevishness or impatience."

This was the account left by his literary friends, and it was matter of triumph to them that he betrayed no signs of fear in his hour of weakness. Are we to allow, that, as in the early ages of the world's history, those who did not like to retain God in their knowledge continued all their lives in the most abject superstition , so in these last days, under other influences, there may be persons so bewildered that they die as they live, without any fixed religious belief? The fact, if it be a fact, is not flattering to the race; nor is the prospect encouraging. Good Christians had hoped, that ere he

left the world there might be a change of sentiment, and an acknowledgment of the existence of God, and the need of a Saviour. Many of them maintained that it was impossible for an infidel to die in peace, and it was reported among religious circles, that, though he was cheerful when his unbelieving friends visited him, he had terrible uneasiness when left alone. Some of these rumors utterly break down when we try to trace them to their original sources. The statement, however, of Mr. Robert Haldane of Airthrey, as to what he learned from his neighbor, Mr. Abercromby of Tullibody, must contain some truth. Mr. Abercromby was travelling to Haddington in a lumbering stage-coach. " The conversation during the tedious journey turned on the death-bed of the great philosopher, and as Mr. Abercromby's son-in-law, Colonel Edmonstoune of Newton, was one of Hume's intimate friends, he had heard from him much of the buoyant cheerfulness which had enlivened the sick room of the dying man. Whilst the conversation was running on in this strain, a respectable-looking female, dressed in black, who made a fourth in the coach, begged permission to offer a remark: `Gentlemen,' she said, `I attended Mr. Hume on his death-bed, but, I can assure you, I hope never again to attend the death-bed of a philosopher.' {133} They then cross-examined her as to her meaning; and she told them that, when his friends were with him, Mr. Hume was cheerful even to frivolity, but that when alone be was often overwhelmed with unutterable gloom, and had in his hours of depression declared that he had been in search of light all his life, but was now in greater darkness than ever." This is Mr. Haldane's statement, as taken from Mr. Abercromby.[35] We confess we should like to know more of this woman in black, and to have taken part in the cross-questioning. The question is left in that region of doubt where Hume himself left all religion. He died on Monday, August 26, 1776, at four o'clock in the afternoon.

Everybody knows that Hume was a sceptic. It is not so generally known that he has developed a full system of the human mind. Students of philosophy should make themselves acquainted with it. It has in fact been the stimulating cause of all later European philosophy: of that of Reid and his school of that of Kant, and the powerful thinkers influenced by him and of that of M. Cousin, and his numerous followers in France, in their attempt to combine Reid and Kant. Nor is it to be omitted that Mr. J. S. Mill, in his " Examination of Hamilton," has reproduced to a large extent the theory of Hume, but without so clearly seeing or candidly avowing the consequences. I rather think that Mr. Mill himself is scarcely aware of the extent of the resemblance between his doctrines and those of the Scottish sceptic; as he seems to have wrought out his conclusions from data supplied him by his own father, Mr. James Mill, who, however, has evidently drawn much from Hume. The circumstance that Mr. Mill's work was welcomed by such declamations by the chief literary organs in London is a proof, either that the would-be leaders of opinion are so ignorant of philosophy that they do not see the consequences; or that the writers, being chiefly young men bred at Oxford or Cambridge, are fully prepared to accept them in the reaction against the revived mediaevalism which was sought to be imposed upon them. In no history of philosophy that we are acquainted with is there a good account of the system of Hume. As few persons now read, or in fact ever did read, through his weighty {134} volumes, we are in hopes that some may feel grateful to us, if in short space we give them an expository and critical account of his philosophy, with a special facing towards the philosophy which has been introduced among us by the British section of the nescient school of Comte.

Hume begins thus his famous "Treatise of Human Nature:" "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I call *impressions* and *ideas*. The difference betwixt them consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most

force and violence, we may name *impressions,* and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas,* I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion." He tells us, that, in the use of terms, " I rather restore the word *idea* to its original sense, from which Mr. Locke had perverted it, in making it stand for all our perceptions." This theory is certainly very simple, but surely it is lamentably scanty. It will not do to place under the same bead, and call by the one name of *impressions,* two such things as the affections of the senses on the one hand, and the mental emotions of hope, fear, joy, and sorrow, on the other. Nor can we allow him to describe all our sense-perceptions by the vague name of impressions. What is meant by impressions? If the word bas any proper meaning, it must signify that there is something impressing, without which there would be no impression, and also something impressed. If Hume admits all this to be in the impression we ask him to go on with us to inquire what is in the thing impressed and in the thing that impresses, and we are at once in the region of existences, internal and external. " I never," he says, " catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception." His very language contradicts itself. He talks of catching *himself*. What is this *self* that he catches? But he may say it is only a perception. I reply that there is more. We never observe {135} a perception alone. We always observe self as perceiving. It is true that I never can catch myself at any time without a perception; but it is quite as certain, and we have the same evidence for it, that we never observe a perception except when we observe self perceiving. Let us unfold what is in this self, and we shall find that it no way resembles an impression, like that left by a seal upon wax.[36] In regard to certain of our perceptions, those through the senses, we observe not only the self perceiving, but an object perceived.

He now explains the way in which *ideas* appear. By memory the impressions come forth in their original order and position as ideas. This is a defective account of memory, consciousness being the witness. In memory, we have not only a reproduction of a sensation, or, it may be, a mental affection, we recognize it as *having been before us in time past.* Of all this we have as clear evidence as we have of the presence of the idea.[37] In imagination the ideas are more strong and lively, and are transposed and changed. This, he says, is effected by an associating quality; and he here develops his account of the laws of association, which has been so commended. But the truth is, his views on this subject, so far from being an advance on those of Hutcheson, are rather a retrogression: they are certainly far behind those of his contemporary Turnbull. He seems to confine the operation of association to the exercise of imagination: he does not see that our very memories are regulated by the same principle; nay, he allows that the imagination can join two ideas without it. The associating qualities are said by him to be three in number: resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause or effect. "I do not find," he says, "that {136} any philosopher has attempted to enumerate all the principles of association." But the classification propounded by him bears so close a resemblance to that of Aristotle, that we must believe that the one given by the Stagyrite had, in the course of his reading, fallen under his notice, though he had forgotten the circumstance. The difference between the two lies in Hume giving us cause and effect, instead of contrast as proposed by the Greek philosopher. It has often been remarked that Hume's arrangement is redundant, inasmuch as cause and effect, according to him, are nothing but contiguity in time and place.

He now shows how our complex ideas are formed. Following Locke, he represents these as

consisting of substances, modes, and relations. He dismisses substance very summarily. He proceeds on the view of substance given by Locke, one of the most defective and unsatisfactory parts of his philosophy. Locke stood tip for some unknown thing, called substance, behind the qualities. Berkeley had shown that there is no evidence of the existence of such a substratum. Hume assumes that we have no idea of external substance different from the qualities, and he proceeds to show that we have no notion of the substance mind distinct from particular perceptions. " I believe none will assert that substance is either a color, or a sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions, none of which can possibly represent a substance." A substance is thus nothing else than a collection of particular qualities united by the imagination. He thus suits the idea to his preconceived theory, instead of looking at the peculiar idea, and suiting his theory to the facts. I give up the idea of an unknown substratum behind the qualities. I stand up only for what we know. In consciousness, we know self, and in sense-perception we know the external objects as *existing things exercising qualities*. In this is involved what I reckon the true idea of substance. We can as little know the qualities apart from an object exercising them, as we can an object apart from qualities. We know both in one concrete act, and we have the same evidence of the one as the other.

When he comes to modes, he examines them by the doctrine {137} of abstract or general ideas propounded by Berkeley, which he characterizes "as one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters." According to this very defective theory (as it appears to us), all abstract or general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term. Like Locke, Hume confounds abstract and general ideas, which should be carefully distinguished: the former meaning the notion of the part of an object as a part, more particularly an attribute; the other, the notion of objects possessing common attributes, the notion being such that it embraces all the objects possessing the common attributes. Abstraction and generalization are most important intellectual operations, the one bringing specially to view what is involved in the concrete knowledge (not impression) of the individual, and the other exhibiting the qualities in respect of which objects agree. Without such elaborative processes, we should never know all that is involved in our original perceptions by sense and consciousness. Nor is it to be forgotten, that when the concrete is a real object, the abstract is a real quality existing in the object; and that when the singulars are real, the universal is also real, that is, a class all the objects in which possess common qualities. Here again we find Hume overlooking one of the most essential of our mental attributes, and thus degrading human intelligence. In relation to the particular end for which he introduces his doctrine, I hold that substance and mode are known in one concrete act and that we can separate them by abstraction for more particular consideration; the one having quite as real an existence as the other, and both having their reality in the singular object known by sense and consciousness.

He goes on to a very subtle discussion as to our ideas of space and time. He says, that "it is from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space, and from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time." The statement requires to be amended. It is not from the disposition of separate objects we have the idea of space, but in the very perception of material objects we know them as extended, that is, occupying space; and in the very remembrance of events we have time in the concrete, that is, events happening in time past. He is therefore wrong in the {138} sceptical conclusion which he draws, that the ideas of space and time are no distinct ideas; for they are ideas formed by a high intellectual process from things immediately known.

Taking a defective view of the nature and function of abstraction, he denies that we can form any idea of a vacuum or extension without matter. He maintains that the idea we form of any finite quality is not infinitely divisible. The dispute, he says, should not be about the nature of mathematical points, but about our ideas of them; and that, in the division of our ideas, we come to a minimum, to an indivisible idea. This whole controversy seems to me to arise from a misapprehension. Our idea of space, it is evident, is neither divisible nor indivisible and as to space, it is not divisible either finitely or infinitely for while we can divide matter, that is, have a space between, we cannot separate any portion of space from all other space: space is and must be continuous. He is evidently jealous of the alleged certainty of mathematics, which seemed to be opposed to his universal scepticism. He maintains that the objects of geometry are mere ideas in the mind. I admit that surfaces, lines, points, have no independent existence, but they have all an existence in solid bodies. By an excess of ingenuities and subtleties, he would drive us to the conclusion that space and time are mere ideas, for which we need not seek a corresponding reality; a conclusion unfortunately accepted by Kant, who thus opened the way to the empty idealism which so long reigned in the German philosophy.[38] {139}

The result reached is summed up in the statement: "As long as we confine our speculations to the *appearances* of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrassed by any question; " but, " if we carry our inquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty." The intelligent reader will here perceive the source whence Kant derived his doctrine that the senses give us, not things, but *phenomena*, that is appearances, and that we are involved in contradiction when we suppose that they furnish more. However great the logical power of the German metaphysician, it is clear that he did not possess the shrewdness of the common-sense philosopher of Scotland, when he adopted the conclusion of the sceptic as his starting-point.

He has now to face the important subjects of existence and knowledge. Proceeding on his assumption that nothing is present to the mind but perceptions, he argues, I think logically (if the premises be allowed), that we can never advance a step beyond ourselves, and that it is " impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas or impressions." As knowledge had been represented by Locke as consisting in comparison (I reckon this a false and dangerous doctrine), Hume has to consider the relations which the mind of man can discover.

These he represents as being seven: those of resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity, degree, contrariety, cause and effect. This is a very good enumeration of the relations perceivable by man: it is certainly very much superior to that of many later metaphysicians, British and Continental. " These relations may be divided into two classes, into such as depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together, and such as may be changed without any change in the ideas." In the first class he places resemblance, contrariety, degree, proportion. These depend solely on our ideas. These only can be the objects of knowledge and certainty, but they can never go beyond our ideas, which can never go beyond our impressions. The other four do not depend on our ideas, and might seem to carry us beyond them; but this he shows {140} is an illusion. In identity, and time and space, we can never „go beyond what is immediately present to the senses," and thus can never discover the real existence or the relations of objects. And so "`tis only causation which produces such a connection as to give us assurance, from the existence or action of one object, that 'twas followed or preceded by any other existence or action." He devotes the whole energy of his

intellect to the task of showing that we know nothing of the nature of the relation between cause and effect; that we know their conjunction within our experience, but not their connection.

In discussing this question, and kindred ones, he finds it necessary to explain the nature of belief. " The belief of the existence of an object joins no new ideas to those which compose the idea of the object." What then is the difference between belief and incredulity? It consists solely in the liveliness of the former. " We must not be contented with saying that the vividness of the idea produces the belief, we must maintain that they are individually the same." " The belief or assent which always attends the memory and senses is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they represent, and this alone distinguishes them from imagination." The theory is surely palpably false here, for our imaginations, in which there is no faith, are often livelier than our memories, in which there is belief. But, by this theory, he would account for all our beliefs. He would establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature, that when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity. " A present impression being vivid, conveys its vividness to all the ideas which are associated with it by such general laws as those of resemblance, contiguity, and causation." " A person that has lost a leg or an arm by amputation, endeavors, for a long time afterwards, to serve himself with them. After the death of any one, 'tis a common remark of the whole family, but especially the servants, that they can scarce believe him to be dead, but still imagine him to be in his chamber, or in any other place where they were accustomed to find him." The explanation may seem a very ingenious, but it is a very feeble one. We may {141} believe that we saw a particular person yesterday, though we have no lively impression or idea retarding him; and we do not believe in the existence of Achilles, though the reading of Homer has given us a vivid conception of him.[39]

But this theory is employed to give an explanation of our {142} belief in the relation of cause and effect. The one having always been with the other in our experience, we are led by habit, and proceeding on the principle of association, when we find the one to look for the other, and thus, too, the effect being present, that is an impression, gives its vividness to the cause as an associating idea. "The idea of cause and effect is derived from experience, which, presenting us with certain objects constantly conjoined with each other, produces such a habit of surveying them in that relation, that we cannot, with out a sensible violence, survey them in any other." This is his explanation of what is implied in efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, connection, productive quality. The essence of necessity is " the propensity which custom produces to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant." " When any object is presented to it, it immediately conveys to the mind a lively idea of that object which is usually found to attend it, and this determination forms the necessary connection of these objects." His definition of cause is "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other."

Hume's doctrine is founded on his favorite principle, " that all our ideas are copied from our impressions but the necessary connection of cause and effect cannot be in the impression, for " when I cast my eye on the known qualities of objects, I immediately discover that the relation of cause and effect depends not the least on them." Not being in the impression, it cannot be found in the idea. Now it is here, I apprehend, that Hume is to be met. I have disputed his theory that the mind begins with mere impressions; it commences with the perception or knowledge of objects within itself, and without itself. Now, in its primitive perception of objects, it knows them as having power; it knows self as a power, and it knows the not-self as a power, -- as a power in resisting and

impressing the self. Here is the *impression,* if any one will call it so (I call it knowledge), that gives rise to the idea which may be separated in thought by abstraction, and put in the form of-- a maxim by generalization.

Unfortunately, as I think, the opponents of Hume have {143} not always met him at the proper point. They have allowed him that we have no original knowledge of power in the objects, and having given this entrance to the sceptic, they find great difficulty in resisting his farther ravages. Sometimes they have endeavored to discover a *nexus* of some kind *between* the cause and its effect, but have always failed to tell what the bond is. Causation is not to be regarded as a *connection between* cause and effect, but a power in the object, that is, substance (or objects and substances), acting as the cause to produce the effect. Kant labored to oppose the scepticism of the Scotchman by supposing that the mind, by its own forms, bound together events in its contemplation of them. But when he allowed that the power was not in the objects, he introduced a more subtle and perilous scepticism than that which he sought to overthrow. We avoid this subjective idealism by insisting that it is on the bare contemplation of a thing becoming, and not by the mere association of ideas and custom (which may aid), that we declare that it must have had a cause.

He is now prepared to discuss two questions: "Why we attribute a continued existence to objects even when they are not present to the senses, and why we suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind and perception?" He shows, as to the first, the senses give us nothing but a present perception; and, as to the second, that our perceptions being of ourselves, can never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. He dwells in the usual manner on the acknowledged unreality of what have been called the secondary qualities of matter, and as we naturally look upon the primary qualities, such as motion and solidity, and the secondary qualities, such as colors, sound, heat and cold, as alike real, so we must philosophically consider them as alike unreal. After the manner of the times, he rejects the notion that we can immediately perceive our bodily frame, and not mere impressions, and that we can know both the" objects and ourselves." But whence, it is asked, the coherence and constancy of certain impressions? He accounts for it on the principle that the thought, according to the laws of association, slides from one impression to others with which it has been joined, and reckons them the same, and mistakes the succession of images for an identity of objects. {144}

The result reached by him is," All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences," and ,the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences." "What we call mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different impressions united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity." He gives the same account of what we call matter. He shows that having nothing but impressions, we can never, on the mere ground of a conjunction which we have never witnessed, argue from our perceptions to the existence of external continued objects; and he proves (very conclusively, I think, on his assumption), that we could never have any reason to infer that the supposed objects resemble our sensations.[40] He now draws his sceptical conclusion: " There is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses, or, more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions which we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continued and independent existence of body. When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude that neither color, sound, taste, nor smell have a continued and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities, there remains nothing in the universe which has such an existence."

The question is: How is such a scepticism to be met? Reid opposed it by showing that the sensation

leads us intuitively to believe in the existence of the external thing, and that the states of self, known by consciousness, imply a thinking substance. {145} The more correct statement seems to me to be, that we know at once the external objects; that intuitively we know our own frame and objects affecting it; that we are conscious, not of states arguing a self, but of self in a certain state; and that, on comparing a former self recalled by memory and a present self known by consciousness, we declare them to be the same. Kant certainly did not meet the scepticism of Hume in a wise or in an effective manner, when he supposed that the unity was given to the scattered phenomena by forms in the mind.

It is clear that all the usual psychological arguments for the immateriality and immortality of the soul are cut up and destroyed by this theory. We cannot speak of the soul as either material or spiritual, for we know nothing either of matter or spirit except as momentary impressions. The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one." Identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them.

His theory of causation undermines the argument for the divine existence. He carefully abstains from dwelling on this in his great philosophic work, but he expounds it at great length, and with all his intellectual power, in his " Dialogues on Natural Religion." We know nothing of cause, except that it has been observed to be the antecedent of its effect; when we have noticed an occurrence usually preceded by another occurrence, we may on discovering the one look for the other. But when we have never seen the events together, we have really nothing to guide us in arguing from the one to the other. We can argue that a watch implies a watchmaker, for we have observed them together; but never having had any experience of the making of a world, we cannot argue that the existence of a world implies the existence of a world maker. There is no effective way of answering this objection, but by maintaining that an effect necessarily implies a cause. It was on this ground that he was met by Reid, who argues that traces of design in God's works argue an intelligent cause. Kant deprived himself of the right to argue in this way, by making the mind itself impose the relation of causation on events, {146} so that we cannot argue that there is a corresponding law in the things themselves. Hume urges with great force and ingenuity, as Kant did after him, that if we are compelled to seek for a cause of every object, we must also seek for a cause of the Divine Being. This is to be met by showing that our intuitive conviction simply requires us to seek for a cause of a new occurrence. He argues, as Kant also did after him, that the existence of order in the universe could at best prove merely a finite and not an infinite cause. The reply is, that we must seek for the evidence of the infinity of God in the peculiar conviction of the mind in regard to the infinite and the perfect.[41]

This may be the most expedient place for stating and examining his famous argument against miracles, as advanced in his essay on the subject. It is clear that he could not argue, as some have done, that a miracle is an impossibility, or that it is contrary to the nature of things. He assails not the possibility of the occurrence of a miraculous event, but the proof of it. Experience being with him the only criterion of truth, it is to experience he appeals. He maintains that there has been an invariable experience in favor of the uniformity of nature, and that a miracle being a violation of a law of nature, can never be established by as strong proof as what can be urged against it. He then exerts his ingenuity in disparaging the evidence usually urged in behalf of miraculous occurrences, by showing how apt mankind are to be swayed on these subjects by such principles as fear, wonder, and fancy. We are not {147} sure whether Hume has always been opposed in a wise or judicious manner by his opponents on this subject. It is of little use showing that there is some sort

of original instinct leading us to believe in testimony; for this instinct, if it exists, often leads us astray, and we must still go to experience to indicate what we are to trust in and what we are to discard. But the opponents of Hume were perfectly right when they showed, that in maintaining that nature always acted according to certain mundane laws, he was assuming the point in dispute. Let us admit that the whole question is to be decided by experiential evidence. Let us concede that in the present advanced state of science there is ample evidence that there is a uniformity in nature; but then let us place alongside of this a counterpart fact, that there is a sufficient body of evidence in favor of there being a supernatural system. For this purpose let the cumulative proofs in behalf of Christianity, external and internal, be adduced; those derived from testimony and from prophecy, and those drawn from the unity of design in the revelation of doctrine and morality, and from the character of Jesus; and we shall find that in their consistency and congruity they are not unlike those which can be advanced in behalf of the existence of a natural system.

In Book Second of his Treatise, Hume treats of the passions. It is the most uninteresting part of his writings. The reading of it is like travelling over an immense plain, which looks inviting at the distance, but in which we find no spots of fertility or of historical interest. It looks as if the good-humored but phlegmatic man were incapable of discussing the nature of the passions. The composition, though clear and sustained, is never elevated by bursts of feeling or irradiated by gleams of genius. He has a theory to support, and he defends it by wiredrawn ingenuity. When he treats of the understanding, if be does not establish much truth, he at least overthrows venerable error, and we are constrained to admire his intellectual energy and courage; but, in dealing with the feelings of our nature, he wastes his strength in rearing a baseless fabric, which, so far as I know, no one has ever adopted, and no one has been at the trouble to assail. He has no proper analysis of man's original springs of action. He says only in a general way, that "the chief spring or actuating {148} principle of the human mind is pleasure and pain." He gives no psychological account of the place which the idea or apprehension of an object as good or evil, or rather as appetible or inappetible, has in all feeling. Of course, all passions are according to him impressions, only he calls them reflective impressions, to distinguish them from sensations. The reflective impressions are of two kinds, the calm and the violent; the first including beauty and deformity, and the latter such passions as love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. He connects his theory of the passions throughout with his theory of the understanding. There are associations among the passions, as there are associations among ideas; only he says, that while ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation, impressions are associated only by resemblance. There has as yet been no thorough examination, so it appears to me, of the laws of succession of feeling, as distinguished from that of ideas; I am not convinced that the theory of Hume, that feelings are associated only by resemblance, is the correct one. He draws a distinction between the cause and the object of passion. Thus if a man has made a beautiful house, the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house. The idea of ourselves is always present with, and conveys a' sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object to which we are related; in short, turns the idea into an impression. Some other person is the object of love, but the cause of that passion is the relation of that person to self. Out of this may proceed the desire of happiness or misery of others, which he describes "*as an arbitrary and original instinct implanted in our nature*," -- I put the language in italics, as I may have occasion again to refer to it. In this way he constructs an elaborate, but by no means clear, theory of the passions. He divides them into direct and indirect. By direct, he understands such as arise immediately from good or evil, that is, from pain or pleasure. He says of them: " The direct passions frequently arise from a natural

***impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable*. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies and of happiness to our friends, hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites." Under the direct, he includes desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security. The indirect proceed {149} from the same principles, but by conjunction with other qualities; and he comprehends under them pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependents. It may be said of his exposition of the passions generally, that he has often seized on important circumstances which modify their action, but has altogether failed in his explanation of their nature. Thus he has some just remarks upon the transition of one idea to another, upon the effects thus produced, and upon the predominant passion swallowing up the inferior; but after all we have no proper evolution of the psychological process.**

He occasionally refers to beauty, but the account he gives of it is very inadequate. "Beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as either by the primary constitution of our nature, or by custom, or by caprice, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to our souls." "The conveniency of a house, the fertility of a field, the strength of a horse, the capacity, security, and swift-sailing of a vessel, form the principal beauty of these several objects." It is clear that the aesthetic tastes of one satisfied with such a theory could not have been keen, and we do not wonder to find that in the letters written during his travels, he never makes a single allusion to a fine statue or painting.

The account which he gives of the will is still more defective. "The will is the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body." Surely we may have will in regard to our mental operations as well as in regard to our bodily motions. The will, he says, is an impression, but surely it is an impression of a very peculiar kind; and he should have inquired, which he has not done, into its nature, when he would have seen that it possesses an essential freedom. As not perceiving this, he has left nothing to save man from being driven on by an iron necessity.

In Book Third, he treats of morals, and starts his utilitarian theory, which, however, he develops more fully, and in a livelier, more pointed, and ornate manner, in his essay, ,An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals." He says of this work, that it is " of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best." In respect of practical influence, {150} it has certainly been the most important. By his speculative doubts in regard to the operations of the under standing he has furnished a gymnastic to metaphysicians ever since his time; but by his theory of virtue he has swayed belief and practice.

He shows that we cannot distinguish between good and evil by reason alone, defining reason as the discovery of truth or false hood, and truth and falsehood as consisting in the agreement or disagreement, either to the real relation of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Taking reason in this sense, it certainly cannot be said to discern the morally good. But then it may be maintained that the mind has a power of discerning moral good and evil analogous to the reason which distinguishes truth and falsehood, and all that he could urge in opposition would be, that such a view is inconsistent with his theory of impressions and ideas. It is by no means clear what is the faculty or feeling to which he allots the function of perceiving and approving the morally good. Sometimes he seems to make man a selfish being, swayed only by motives of pleasure or pain; and in this view virtue is to be regarded as good, because associated directly or indirectly with the pleasure it would bring to ourselves. But in other places he calls in a " benevolent sentiment, leading us to approve what is useful." Hume's general theory might certainly seem op posed to every thing *innate*, and yet, in criticising Locke, he is obliged to say: " I should desire to know what can be meant by asserting that self-love or resentment of injuries, or passion between the sexes, is

not innate." We have already quoted passages in which he appeals to instincts. He says elsewhere, "The mind, by an *original* instinct, tends to unite itself with the good, and avoid the evil." At times he seems to adhere to the theory of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, as to the existence of a moral sense. "The mind of man is so formed by nature, that upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame." He tells us expressly that he is inclined to think it probable that the final sentence in regard to moral excellence "depends on some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species." I believe that we cannot account for the ideas in the mind except by calling in {151} such a faculty or feeling; and it was his business, as an experimental inquirer, to ascertain all that is in this power, and to determine its mode of operation and its laws. But such an investigation would have overthrown his whole theory, metaphysical as well as ethical.

According to Hume, virtue consists in the agreeable and useful. "Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colors, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind." " Virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment, or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation." This theory goes a step farther than that of Hutcheson in the same direction. Hutcheson placed virtue in benevolence, thereby making the intention of the agent necessary to virtue; whereas Hume does not regard it as necessary that it should be voluntary, and requires us to look merely to the act and its tendency. His definition might lead one to think that an easy road or a pleasant carriage should be regarded as virtuous. But he will not admit that because an inanimate object may be useful as well as a man, that therefore it ought also to merit the appellation of virtuous; for he says: ,The sentiments excited by utility are in the two cases very different, and the one is mixed with affection, esteem, approbation, and not the other." This language, more particularly the phrases "esteem" and "approbation," might leave led him to discover that there is a peculiar judgment or sentiment attached to virtuous action not produced by mere utility.

He easily satisfies himself that he can show that benevolence is a virtue because it is so agreeable and useful; but he never faces the real difficulty, which is to account for the sense of obligation which we feel, and the obligation actually lying upon us, to do good to others.[42] He strives to show that justice is commended by us because of its beneficial tendency. justice can have a meaning, he maintains, only in regard to society and arrangements made with others. True, the giving to every one his due, implies beings to whom the due is to be {152} given; but the due arises from the relation in which we stand to these beings. Thus the first man and woman having children, had duties to discharge towards them as soon as they were born, and independent of any promise. He labors to prove that our obligation to keep a promise arises from utility. " Fidelity is no natural virtue, and promises have no force antecedent to human conventions." True, a promise implies a person to whom it is made, but, once made, the obligation is complete.

This leads us at once to the fundamental objections which may be taken to the utilitarian theory. Whence the obligation lying on us to promote the happiness of others? to give others their due? to keep our promises? From their utility, it is answered. But why are we bound to attend to what is useful? is the question that immediately occurs; why the reproach that follows, and which justifies itself when we have failed to keep our word? These questionings bring us to a justice which guards conventions, to a law which enjoins love.

The practical morality sanctioned by the system, and actually recommended by Hume, excludes all the higher virtues and loftier graces. The adoration of a Supreme Being, and love to him, are

represented as superstition. He has no God to sanction the moral law, and no judgment day at which men have to give in an account. Repentance has and can have no place in a system which has no fixed law and no conscience. Humility, of which he treats at great length, is disparaged. The stern virtues of justice, of self-sacrifice, of zeal in a good cause, of faithfulness in denouncing evil, and of courage in stemming the tide of error and corruption, these are often so immediately disagreeable, that their ultimate utility will never be perceived except by those who are swayed by a higher principle. It is certain that they were not valued by Hume, who speaks of them as superstition and bigotry, and characterizes those who practise them as zealots and fanatics. His view of the marriage relation was of a loose and flexible character, and did not profess to discountenance the evil practices of his time. "A man in conjoining himself to a woman is bound to her ac cording to the terms of his engagement: in begetting children, he is bound by all the ties of nature and humanity to provide for their sustenance and education. When he has performed {153} these two parts of duty, no one can reproach him with injustice or injury." Not acknowledging a God bestowing the gift of life, and requiring us to give an account of the use we make of it, and setting no value on courage in difficulties, he argues that a man may take away his life when it is no longer useful.

The state of society which he aimed at producing is thus described: " But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous .to society than those here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off with which many divines, and some philosophers, have covered her, and nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay, even at proper intervals play, frolic, and gayety. She talks not of useless austerities and rigors, suffering and self-denial." People have often speculated as to what Hume would have taught had he been elected professor of moral philosophy in Edinburgh. I believe he would have expounded a utilitarian theory, ending in the recommendation of the pleasant social virtues; speaking always respectfully of the Divine Being, but leaving his existence an unsettled question.

And what, it may be asked, is the conclusion to which he wishes to bring us by his whole philosophy? I am not sure that he has confessed this to himself. Sometimes it looks as if his sublime aim was to expose the unsatisfactory condition of philosophy, in order to impel thinkers to conduct their researches in a new and more satisfactory manner. " If, in order to answer the doubts started, new principles of philosophy must be laid, are not these doubts themselves very useful? Are they not preferable to blind and ignorant assent? I hope I can answer my own doubts; but, if I could not, is it to be wondered at? " I verily believe that this was one of the alternatives he loved to place before him to justify his scepticism. " I am apt," he says, in writing to Hutcheson, " to suspect in general that most of my reasonings will be more useful in furnishing hints, and exciting people's curiosity, than as containing any principles that will augment the stock of knowledge that must pass to future ages." But I suspect that the settled conviction reached by him was that no certainty could be attained in speculative philosophy; he was sure {154} that it had not been attained in time past. The tone of the introduction to his great work is: " There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. If truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must be very deep and abstruse; and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous." As being thus deep, he feels as if the great body of mankind need not trouble themselves much about it. He seems at times complacently to contemplate this as the issue to which he would drive mankind for he sees at once

that if men become convinced that they cannot reach certainty in such speculations, they will give up inquiry. " For nothing is more certain than that despair has almost the same effect upon us as enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire than the desire itself vanishes and he thinks it a satisfactory condition of things when men discover the impossibility of making any farther progress, and make a free confession of their ignorance. Considered in this light, Hume's philosophy, in its results, may be considered as an anticipation of the positive school of M. Comte, which in the British section of it approaches much nearer the position of Hume than most people are aware of.

He allows that man should, as indeed he must, follow his natural impulses, and the lessons of experience, as far as this world is concerned. But he will grant nothing more. He thus closes his inquiry into the understanding: "When we trace up the human understanding to its first principles, we find it to lead us into such sentiments as seem to turn into ridicule all our past pains and industry, and to discourage us from future inquiries." "The understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of confidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life." In common life this scepticism meets with insuperable barriers, which we should not try to overcome. But it is different with philosophical, and, we may add, theological truths, which are supported solely by speculative considerations. In these departments {155} we may discuss and doubt as we please, without doing any injury. " What injury can ever come from ingenious reasoning and inquiry? The worst speculative sceptic I ever knew was a much better man than the best superstitious devotee." Those who think they can reach truth in these matters are at liberty to cherish their conviction, provided always that they do not thereby disturb their neighbors. But the time is coming, and already wise men see that it is coming, when mankind will not concern themselves with such speculative questions, or will engage in them only as a gymnastic to the intellect, or as a means of showing that ultimate truth is unattainable by man.

It was, I believe, on such grounds as these that Hume justified himself in his sceptical doubts, and his sceptical solution of these doubts. He thought they might stir up inquiry on subjects on which no truth had been reached; and tend to confound the dogmatism and restrain the disputations in philosophy, and the fanaticism and superstition in religion, which had wrought such mischief; and prepare the way for a reign of universal toleration. As to religious belief, it could be supported only by speculative arguments, derived from an absolute causation, or from miracles which cannot stand a searching investigation. So far as men follow a moderate and tolerant religion, Hume was rather pleased with them, and he evidently shrank from the fanatical atheism avowed by some of the more advanced followers of the system in France. If there be a world to come, it will clear up itself when it comes; and, meanwhile, there are duties which we must perform, from a regard to ourselves and our relation to others. There had hitherto been no science of metaphysics; but there could be a science of ethics (and also of politics) founded on the circumstance, that certain acts are found to be agreeable and useful to ourselves and others.

It is in this way we are to reconcile certain seeming inconsistencies in his character. He had no settled faith in any religion, yet he went to church, at least at times; he wished his servant to go to church, and he mingled in the counsels of the Church of Scotland. He never committed himself to deism or atheism. He wrapped up his thoughts on these subjects in his bosom, perhaps with some feeble hope that he {156} might get light; but the cloud seems only to have settled more deeply upon him. When the pert Mrs. Mallet met him one night at an assembly, and boldly accosted him, " Mr. Hume, give me leave to introduce myself to you: we deists ought to know each other," "

Madam," replied he, " I am no deist: I do not style myself so, neither do I desire to be known by that appellation." He did not avow himself an atheist in Paris. Sir Samuel Romilly has detailed a characteristic anecdote told of him by Diderot. He dined with a large company at the house of Baron D'Holbach. "As for atheists," said Hume, " I do not believe one exists: I have never seen one." " You have been a little unfortunate," said the baron: " here you are with seventeen of them at the table for the first time." We may suppose there was some sincerity in the statement he made: " I have surely endeavored to refute the sceptic with all the force of which I am master, and my refutation must be allowed to be sincere because drawn from the capital principles of my system," only he was not prepared to review his system. In writing to Elliott, he says he wishes to make Cleanthes, the theist, the hero of the dialogue. Adam Ferguson told his son, who reports the incident, that one clear and beautiful night, when they were walking home together, Hume suddenly stopped, looked up to the starry sky, and said, " O Adam, can any one contemplate the wonders of that firmament, and not believe there is a God! " Dr. Carlyle tells us, that when his mother died he was found in deepest affliction and a flood of tears, upon which Mr. Boyle said to him that his uncommon grief arose from his having thrown off the principles of religion; to which he replied: " Though I throw out my speculations to entertain the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other things I do not think so differently from the rest of the world as you imagine." In whatever way we may account for it, there was evidently a consistency in the character of Hume which made him respected by his worldly friends, who thought a man might be good, though he had no godliness.

The all-important question is, How is this spirit to be corrected, this error to be met?

***First.* It must be firmly maintained that an honest mind can spontaneously attain such truth, secular, moral, and religious, {157} as is needful to its peace and progress. This truth does not lie deep down in some pit, which can be reached only by deep down, or whence it can be drawn only by the cords of lengthened ratiocination; it lies on the surface, and may be seen by immediate perception, or picked up by brief discursive processes. By this spontaneous exercise of our faculties and common observation, we reach the existence of God, the accountability of man, and a day of judgment. By such an easy method we rise to a belief in the Word of God, and in the spiritual verities there set forth. We should hold that man reaches all this by as natural a procedure as that by which he comes to know what path he should take in the common affairs of this life. No doubt be will at times meet with difficulties, but this only as he may be beset by perplexities in the affairs of this world; and in the one case, as in the other, the sincere mind has commonly enough of light to guide it.**

Secondly. It should be held that he who undermines the fundamental truth spontaneously discovered, is doing an injury to humanity. Scepticism, as Hume delights to show, can produce no mischief in the common secular affairs of life, because there are circumstances which keep men right in spite of their principles, or want of principles. But it is very different in respect of those questions which fall to be discussed in higher ethics and theology. A man will not be tempted by any sophistry to doubt the connection of cause and effect when he is thirsty and sees a cup of water before him; in such a case he will put forth his hand and take it, knowing that the beverage will refresh him. But he may be led by a wretched sophistry to deny the necessary relation of cause and effect when it would lead him upward from God's works to God himself, or induce him to seek peace in Him. Hence the importance of not allowing fundamental truth to be assailed; not because the attack will have any influence on the practical affairs of this life, but because it may hold back and damp our higher aspirations, moral and religious. Hume hoped that his scepticism might

soften asperities, but he did not wish to think that any bad influences could follow from it. On one occasion he was told of a banker's clerk in Edinburgh, of good reputation, who had eloped with a sum of money; and the philosopher wondered greatly what could {158} induce such a man thus to incur, for an inconsiderable sum, such an amount of guilt and infamy. "I can easily account for it," said John Home, "from the nature of his studies, and the kind of books he was in the habit of reading." "What were they," said the philosopher. He was greatly annoyed when told, Boston's "Fourfold State," and Hume's "Essays." Certainly the youth must have been in a perplexed state who had been converted from a belief in the " Fourfold State" by Hume's " Essays," or who was hesitating between them. Thirdly. The philosopher must undertake a more important work. He must inquire into the nature of fundamental truth; he must endeavor to unfold the mental powers that discover it, and to expound their mode of operation, and their laws. He cannot indeed prove first truths by mediate evidence, for if they were capable of probation they could not be first truths; but he can show that they are first truths perceived by immediate cognition of the objects, and in no need of external support. He must as far as possible clear tip the difficulties and perplexities in which the discussions in regard to them have become involved. In particular, he must show that while the reflex consideration of the ultimate principles of knowledge often lands us in difficulties, the principles them selves never lead us into positive contradictions; and that, therefore, while we allow that the human faculties are limited, we cannot admit that they are deceptive. This is what has been attempted by one philosopher after another since the days of Hume.

In fact, all later philosophy springs directly or indirectly from the thorough-going examination to which the Scotch sceptic had subjected received truths. It has been the aim of the Scottish school, as modified and developed by Reid, to throw back the scepticism of Hume. Reid tells us that he once believed the received doctrine of ideas so firmly as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system along with it, till, on discovering the consequences to which it had been driven by Hume, he was led to review the whole theory and abandon it. Kant declares that he was roused from his dogmatic slumbers by the assaults of the Scottish sceptic, and was thus impelled to the task of repelling the attack. It is scarcely necessary to say that all other philosophies, deserving the name, which have {159} originated within the last hundred years, have ramified directly or indirectly from the Scottish and the German schools; one school, the French school of M. Cousin, seeking to combine the two.

It is interesting to observe the respective ways in which the Scottish and the German metaphysician sought to meet the great sceptic. It is evident that his assaults might be repelled at one or other of two places: either where the foe has entered, or after he has made certain advances. That the mind begins with impressions and goes on to ideas, which are mere reproductions of impressions,-this is the fundamental principle of Hume. Now this may be denied, I think should be denied. On what ground, we ask, does he allow the existence of impressions and ideas? When he answers, we can show him that on the same ground he must admit more; that he must allow that the mind has convictions in regard to its own existence, and the existence of external objects, and perceptions of moral goodness. But again, he may be met at the farther stages of his progress. He asserts that the mind can reach no truth except such as it gets from experience. It may be shown in opposition that it has an original furniture in the shape of tendencies and laws which lead to and guarantee necessary and eternal truth. It is interesting to observe that Reid met him at both these points. Reid made a very careful inquiry into the nature of the senses as inlets of knowledge; and showed that accompanying the sensation there is always an intuitive perception of an external

world. He showed too, though he did not make so much of it as he might, that consciousness is a mental faculty and a source of knowledge. He farther met the sceptic at the more advanced point, and proved that the mind has a primitive reason or common-sense which decides at once that things are so and so; that every effect, for instance, must have a cause. I am not of opinion that Reid has thoroughly cleared up these subjects, that he has detected all that is in the senses, that he has unfolded fully the laws of intuition and its mode of operation; but he has established enough to repel the assaults of the sceptic.

Reid possessed many of the best qualities of his countrymen; in particular, he was shrewd and independent: but he was not {160} endowed with great powers of logical analysis. On the other hand, Kant was strong where Reid was weak; that is, in power of dissection and construction: but was deficient where Reid excelled, in patient observation. He neglected, as I think most unfortunately, to oppose the fundamental principle of Hume. He allows that the mind begins with *phenomena* in the sense of appearances, and these phenomena are just the *impressions* of Hume. But if it be allowed that in the original inlet we have only impressions or phenomena, it never can be satisfactorily shown how we can reach reality by any composition or decomposition of these. Kant exercised his vast powers in meeting Hume at the other point; that is, in showing that there is an priori furniture in the mind, independent of all experience. But what he built with the one hand he took down with the other. For these *a priori* forms could not, in his theory, guarantee any objective reality. He accepts the conclusion of Hume, and allows that the speculative reason could not guide to truth; he goes so far as to maintain that it lands us in contradictions. This philosophy, intended to overthrow the scepticism of Hume, has thus led to a scepticism which has had a more extensive sway than that of the cold Scotchman ever had. He endeavored to save himself from such an issue by calling in a practical reason, which guaranteed as its corollaries the freedom and immortality of the soul, and the Divine existence. But it was immediately asked how it could be shown that the practical reason does not deceive, after it has been conceded that the speculative reason leads to illusion? Thus the insecure mound, raised with such labor to stem the flood, only aggravated the outburst and overflow as it gave way.

Sir W. Hamilton sought to unite Reid and Kant, but was never able to weld thoroughly together the principles which he took from two such different sources. His doctrines of the relativity of knowledge, and of causation as a mere impotency of the mind, have prepared the way for a doctrine of nescience now largely espoused. Some of his pupils have betaken themselves to a sort of confused Berkeleyanism mingled with Kantism, which will furnish an easy passage to the nescient theory in so shrewd a nation as Scotland, and among so practical a people as the English. Mr. Mill, in his examination {161} of Hamilton's Philosophy, has brought us to a *Humism* joined to Comtism. This is the dismal creed provided for those who choose to follow the negative criticisms. of the day in philosophy and theology. What we need in these circumstances is a new Thomas Reid, not to do over again the work which the common-sense philosopher did, but a corresponding service in this age to what he did in his time.

"David Hume"

An Historical and Critical Account of the Living Authors of Great-Britain

William Rider

1762

Editor's note: William Rider (1723-1785) was a chaplain, lecturer, and author of *A New Universal Dictionary*, *A New History of England*, and *The Christian Family's Bible*. Rider's brief *Historical and Critical Account*, only 34 pages, is distinguished as one of the first compilations of biographies of living British authors. The pamphlet was published by Rider himself, anonymously, with the closing initials "W.R." hinting at its authorship; its full title is *An Historical and Critical Account of the Lives and Writings of the Living Authors of Great-Britain. Wherein their respective Merits are discussed with the utmost Candour and Impartiality*. The complete list of authors covered, famous and obscure, are Young, Johnson, Lockman, Smollet, Hume, Goldsmith, Hawkensworth, Coleman, Bickerstaff, Cleland, Thornton, Foote, Sheridan, Havard, Garrick, Murphy, Sterne, Churchill, Lloyd, Derrick, Glover, Akenside, Armstrong, Whitehead, Franklin, Mason, Newton, Chandler, Barron, Borke, Earl of Cork, Littleton, Dodsley, Newbury, Lenix, Pilkington, Rolt, Rider, Millar, Nugent, Floyd, Hiffernan, Hill, Grey, Bower, Warburton, Hurd, Spence, Barrow, and Lardner. Rider's sketch of himself is as follows:

> **THE Rev. Mr. *William Rider* is Assistant Master to St. *Paul*'s-School. He wrote an *English* Dictionary, dedicated to Mr. *W. Pitt,* which would, doubtless, have been much better received by the Public, if the great Mr. *Johnson* had not been beforehand with him in that Task. His *History of England* has been very well received by the Public, and is indeed wrote with a great Accuracy and Erudition. Mr. *Rider*, as he understands the *Saxon, Teutonic, Welsh, &c.* has given in his History many Particulars which have escaped Authors unacquainted with those Languages.**

The *Critical Review* comments on this work that "This is such a contemptible catchpenny, that the publisher has been ashamed to set his name to the production." They also attack Rider for being

unqualified, leaving out key writers, and for factual errors (1762, Vol. 13, pp. 441-442). A largely negative review also appeared in the *Monthly Review* (1762, Vol. 26, pp. 391-392). Negative comments aside, Rider's sketch of Hume is important for being the first known printed biography of Hume. The following is from the 1762 and only edition of Rider's pamphlet.

Mr. HUME

{12}

IT must be acknowledged, for the Honour of *Scotland*, that it has in the present Age produced more Men eminent for having cultivated Literature {13} with Success, than either *Great-Britain* or *Ireland*. *David Hume*, Esq. who reflects so high an Honour upon that Country of which he is a Native, was formerly Secretary to Lord *Albemarle*, when Ambassador at the Court of *France*. As an Author, he must be allowed to possess a considerable Share of Merit. His *Essays* are equally elegant and profound; but they have been greatly censured on Account of the Vein of Scepticism, which runs through them. Those, however, who consider them as Works of Genius, cannot deny them Praise, tho' they are certainly rather superficial in some Places. In History this Author comes the nearest to Dr. *Smollet*; in one Respect he even deserves to be preferred to him; his Observations are much more sagacious and profound; but his Manner is not equally picturesque nor his Style equally pleasing.

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., HUME) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g., *Hume*) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

"An Account of the Life and Writings of the Late David Hume, Esq."

1776

Editor's note: This anonymous account of Hume's life first appeared in a British periodical publication in 1776 (yet to be discovered) and was reprinted later in both *The Annual Register... for the year 1776*, and *The Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Amusement*, November 27, 1777, Vol. 38 pp. 193-197. The flattering biography was written sometime after Hume's death, but before the close of the year 1776. The essay is the most detailed account of Hume to appear prior to the publication of Hume's *Life*. It begins with a discussion of the socio-economic conditions under which Hume was raised and how these impacted his choice of an occupation. The author defends both the style and content of the *Treatise* and discusses Hume's account of female chastity as an illustration. He describes Hume's *History* as "certainly the greatest historical work of modern times." The author makes several mistakes of fact and chronology, such as stating Hume's birth year as 1712, and suggesting that Hume's library position commenced around 1742. Shortly after the appearance of the "Account" in *The Weekly Magazine*, an anonymous author, under the pseudonym "Tobias Simple" attacked the "Account" in "Strictures on the Account of the Life and Writings of David Hume, Esq.", *The Weekly Magazine*, December 25, 1777, Vol. 38, pp. 289-293 (see Hume Archives edition of the "Strictures"). The following is from the *The Annual Register* reprint of the "Account".

An Account of the Life and Writings of the late David Hume, *Esq. as given to the World in one of the periodical publications.*

THE lives of literary men seldom abound with incidents. That leisure, which is necessary for the acquisition of knowledge, excludes them in some measure from the busy world, and intense study

seems generally to subdue in them the spirit of enterprize. Few men, even among the learned, had ever less of that spirit than the honest, easy, indolent,but philosophic Hume. His life, consequently, affords few of those occurrences which are commonly supposed to give interest to a biographical narration. But there is a pleasure in tracing the progress of genius, and observing its various obstructions and encouragements, in the road to fame, which has made the lives of authors, though less deversified by circumstances, more universally acceptable than those perhaps of any other class of men. No apology need therefore be made for an attempt to trace the progress of a writer unequalled in his age, or in his province, one of the most eminent and extensive in the empire of science.

David Hume, so well known to the world of late, both as a philosopher and historian, was born about the year 1712, in that part of Scotland which lies between Edinburgh and Berwick. His father was a country gentleman, or laird, of good family, but small fortune, and David was unfortunately a younger son. In his early years, he was by no means distinguished as a scholar, or by any of those accomplishments which are supposed to qualify youth for the liberal professions; but as the pride of the Scottish gentry then prevented them from breeding any of their children to mechanical or mercantile employments; and as the church, in that country, can only be the object of the lower class of people, the best kirks affording no more than a decent maintenance, there was a necessity for every younger son of a genteel family being bred either a soldier, a lawyer, or a physician. -- David was destined for the bar; not so much as being adapted to his genius, as the line in which his relations could most effectually serve him. After passing through his academical courses at the university of Edinburgh, he therefore devoted himself to the study of the Scotch laws, in which he mad considerable progress; but whether from that natural modesty almost inseparably connected with great merit, a consciousness of his deficiency in elocution, the happy indolence of his temper, little fitted for the contentious bar, or any other secret cause, he never put on the gown, not even took the introductory steps necessary for that purpose. Other studies attracted him.

The metaphysical writings of Locke and Berkeley had turned all inquisitive men towards intellectual objects. The human mind spent its force in contemplating itself; as if man had been born for thinking, not acting; as if ideas had, in fact, only been *real*; and that material world, as conjectured by the Bishop of Cloyne, but *as a vision*. Mr. Hume had early applied himself to metaphysical inquiries: he saw, or seemed to see, the defects of the former systems, and published, in 1739, the two first volumes of his *Treatise of Human Nature*, and the third the following year.

This work, though no inferior to any thing of the moral or metaphysical kind in any language, was entirely overlooked, or decried at the time of its publication, except by a few liberal-minded men, who had courage to throw aside their popular and literary prejudices, and to follow sound reasoning without being afraid of any dangerous conclusion, or fatal discovery; of seeing errors unveiled, however sanctified by years, or supported by authorities: and the author made sensible, to the severe disappointment of his youthful hopes, that the taste for systematical writing was on the decline, divided his treatise into separate essays, and dissertations, which he published, with improvements, alterations, and additions, at different periods of his life. His enemies, however, or men desirous of raising a reputation by exposing the mistakes of a great genius, have levelled all their arguments against this juvenile production, though never dignified with the author's name; and Dr. Beattie, in particular, more than thirty years after the publication of that sceptical system, has been so successful as to obtain a pension by his *Essay on the Immutability of Truth*; in which he discovers all the violence of a a sectary, and all he illiberality of a pedant, and rather abuses than

confutes Mr. Hume.[2]

As the *Treatise of Human Nature* is now very scarce, some account of it may be agreeable to many readers. The author's purpose in that work, as he himself informs us, was "to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects." The ability with which he has executed his design, can only be fully discovered by an examination of the treatise itself; which, as a composition, is admirable. The first volume treats of the understanding, the second of the passions, the third of morals. Criticism and politics were still necessary to complete his plan, and would have been added systematically, if the success had, in any degree, been answerable to the merit of the work. He thus speaks of the sciences that he meant to examine: "The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments; and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences, logic, morals, criticism, and politics, is comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind." So early, and when he was thought little able to give a new direction to science, had this great man digested that ingenious system of philosophy, which had changed metaphysics from a frivolous t an useful study; and give a stability to morals, criticism, and politics, unknown in former ages! -- But what is still more extraordinary, the stile and method of this first production are not less correct and happy, than those of his most admired performances, written after his taste and judgment were matured by years and experience. A single quotation will be sufficient to support this assertion, and also to exemplify his method of reasoning *experimentally* on moral subjects.

Speaking of that modesty and chastity which belongs to women, "there are some philosophers," he observes, who attack the female virtues with great vehemence, and fancy they have gone very far in detecting popular errors, when they can shew, hat there is no foundation in nature for all that exterior modesty which we require in the expressions, dress, and behaviour of the fair sex." And he proceeds to examine the origin of such notions, and their connection with the interests of society.

"Whoever considers," says he, "the length and feebleness of human infancy, with the concerns which both sexes naturally have for their offspring, will easily perceive that there must be an union of male and female for the education of the young, and that this union must be of considerable duration. But in order to induce the men to impose on themselves this restraint, and undergo cheerfully all the fatigues and expences to which it subjects them, they must believe that the children are their own, that their *natural instinct* is not directed to a wrong object when they give a loose to love and tenderness.

"Now," adds he, with equal justice and ingenuity, "if we examine the structures of the human body, we shall find that this security is very difficult to be attained on our part; and that since in the copulation of the sexes, he principle of generation goes from the man to the woman, an error may take place on the side of the former, though it be utterly impossible on the side of the latter. In order therefore to impose a due restraint on the female sex, we must attach a peculiar degree of shame to their infidelity, above what arises merely from its injustice, and must bestow proportionable praises on their chastity. But as human creatures, especially of the female kind, are apt to overlook remote consequences, while under the influence of any present temptation, it is necessary, besides the infamy attending such licences, that there should be some preceding backwardness or dread, which may prevent their first approaches, and give the female sex a repugnance to all expressions, and postures, and liberties, that have an immediate relation to that enjoyment.." So much *good sense* and *sound reasoning* was never perhaps delivered in so few

words, on the subject of the female virtue, by any writer ancient or modern; yet this is an extract from the treatise, whose confutation has been impudently attempted, more than once, by mere *common sense and childish declamation*!

In the year 1742, Mr. Hume published two small volumes, consisting of essays, moral, political, and literary. These were better received than his former publication, but contributed little to his general reputation as an author, and still less to his profit; and his small patrimony being now almost spent, he was glad to accept of office of library keeper to the faculty of advocates. The salary annexed to this place is only fifty pounds per annum; but the opportunity which it afforded him of consulting, at his leisure, all he choice authors and valuable papers in one of the best libraries in Europe, may be considered as o inconsiderable circumstance in favour of Mr. Hume's literary character.

In 1746, he stood candidate for the chair of moral philosophy in the university of Edinburgh, then vacant by the resignation of the present Sir John Pringle, appointed physician to the army. Every one was convinced of Mr. Hume;s abilities, and his interest was warmly supported by the nobility and gentry; but the Presbytery of Edinburgh, having a right to object to one out of three candidates named by the town council, they put their negative upon honest David, whose sentiments were too liberal for their narrow minds.

Thus baffled in his attempt to obtain an office for which he was eminently qualified, and in which perhaps he could have been of more service to his country than in any other, Mr. Hume devoted himself entirely to study, and rested all his hopes of fame and fortune on his merit as an author. -- He published in the year 1748 and 49 his Metaphysical Essays nearly as they now stand; a Dissertation on the Passions, also extracted from his Treatise of Human Nature; his System of Morals, much altered and improved: and along with these several new moral, critical, and political essays.

From politics, in which he had now made considerable progress, mr. Hume turned his inquiries towards history, and completed in 1752, the history of Britain under the house of Stuart. The first volume of this work had been published two years before, but was little noticed, and the success of the second was by no means considerable; yet these two volumes are allowed to be equal to any part of his now justly admired History of England, or rather of Britain; for he all along connects the story of the two kingdoms.

So singular an instance of pubic neglect cannot be well accounted for; especially as the style is remarkably elegant, the period interesting, and the work full of new and important matter, anecdotes, and observations. The public, however, has since amply repaid Mr. Hume for its ingratitude. His History of the House of Stuart requires only to be read to be admired; and it no sooner fell into the hands of Mr. Millar, then at the head of the London booksellers, than it became a favourite performance among the higher class of people.

But Mr Hume's reputation as an historian was not complete, till the publication of his History of the House of Tudor, in 175. About the same time was published Dr. Robertson's History of the Reign of Mary, Queen of Scots, and her Son James, till his Accession to the Throne of England; a work which was admired, even to enthusiasm, by persons of all ranks. Many of the same subjects are treated by both writers, and at equal length. A comparison necessarily followed; and all intelligent men became sensible, after the most critical examination, that the philosophic dignity, the logical disposition, the force of diction, the just concatenation of circumstances, the lively pictures of manners, the comprehensive, yet distinct views of the interests of nations, and the

intrigues of courts, independent of the many valuable disquisitions, which so eminently distinguished Mr. Hume's work, were, at least a balance for the classical purity of style, the happy selection of incidents, the keen discernment of motives, and the fine delineation of character no less conspicuous in the other, which render the History of Mary one of the most captivating in our language.

Thus encouraged by the public approbation, Mr Hume prepared for press, with all expedition, the more early part of his History of England, from the invasion of Julius Caesar to the accession of the House of Tudor; which, with the volumes formerly published, bring down the progress of the English constitution, and the civil and military transactions of Britain, to the Revolution in 1688, an aera when the government of this country was fixed on the basis, where it continues to rest. yet it is to be lamented that Mr. Hume did not bring down his history to the death of Q. Anne, when the manners, the literature, and the military reputation of England, and of Europe, were at an height, and when the accession of a new family gave a new direction to British policy. But such as it is, taken as a whole, it may be considered as one of the most excellent productions of the human genius, and is certainly the greatest historical work of modern times.

Mr. Hume's reputation was now complete. He was considered as the greatest writer of the age: his most snsignificant performances were sought after with avidity; and Lord Bute, who, whatever errors he may have been guilty of as a politician, will ever be honoured as a patron of letters, procured for Mr. Hume a considerable pension. -- But it was not enough that the philosophic David should be enabled, in his latter years, to eat the bread of idleness, as the reward of his many laborious researches; his political writings affording reason to believe, that he might be of use to the state, he was appointed secretary to Lord Hertford, ambassador at the court of France, and afterwards resident in the absence of that nobleman.

In France, Mr. Hume's writings had long book known and admired; so that he there found himself of still more consequence by his character than his office. He was universally caressed. Even the ladies are said to have loaded him with their favours. But of all Mr. Hume's adventures, during his residence in France, or in his own country, there is none so remarkable as that which took its rise from his acquaintance with the celebrated John James Rousseau, whom he brought over to England with him in 1766, and for whom he procured the offer of a pension from his Majesty.

The particulars of that affair have been already published, and are too numerous and complicated to enter into such a sketch as the present: it will therefore be sufficient here to observe, that Mr. Hume, understanding that M. Rousseau, persecuted every where on the continent, meant to take refuge in England, generously conducted him over, procured him a commodious retreat, and afterwards the offer of a pension; but that the jealous and peevish temper of Rousseau, led him to reject the last, abandon the first, and abuse Mr. Hume as a person who had conspired the ruin of his character, under an appearance of serving him; though every precaution, which the most refined delicacy could suggest, had been taken in order to spare the pride of that singular man, by the manner of conferring those obligations.

An anecdote or two will sufficiently shew the jealous and even suspicious temper of M. Rousseau, and the generosity and candour of Mr. Hume. On their journey to England, they happened one night to lie in the same chamber; and during the season devoted to sleep, M. Rousseau heard, or imagined he heard, Mr. Hume cry several times, with great vehemence -- "Rousseau, I have you?" these words, though in themselves equivocal, and tho' M. Rousseau owns he does not know whether Mr. Hume uttered them when asleep or awake, roused his suspicions, which it appears

were never afterwards entirely laid. The question which honest David asks on this occasion is equally pertinent and candid. "As M. Rousseau is not certain whether Mr. Hume was asleep or awake, is he sure that he was awake himself?"

M. Rousseau's suspicion of Mr. Hume's treachery rose in proportion to the benefits conferred upon him, and at last broke out in perfect peevishness on the slightest occasion imaginable. Mr. Davenport, a gentleman distinguished by his birth, his fortune, and his merit, had granted to M. Rousseau and his governante, the use of his house called Wooton, in Derbyshire, (where he seldom resided) with all other things necessary for a livelihood; but in order to prevent Rousseau's pride from being hurt by such a benefit, he agreed to receive, in return a trifling sum annually. He also generously pretended, as he had reason to think M. Rousseau's finances were not very high, that he had found a post-chaise, on his return to Wooton, which would carry the philosopher safely, and at small expence, to his retreat. Rousseau suspected the benevolent artifice, and accused Mr. Hume of being an accomplice in it. Mr. Hume protested his innocence, and endeavoured to shift the subject. After a sarcastical reply, Rousseau sat for some time in seeming melancholy, then sprung up, walked two or three times across the room, and at last threw his arms out the neck of his brother philosopher, bathing the astonished David's face with tears, and crying like a child. "My dear friend, said he, as soon as he was able to speak, "will you ever forgive me this extravagance? After all the pains which you have taken to serve me, after the numberless proofs of your friendship, is it possible that I can thus repay your kindness with spleen and abuse! But in pardoning me you will give me a new mark of your regard, and I hope when you know me better, you will find that I am not unworthy of it."

This reconciliation, however, was but of short duration. Still a prey to his former suspicions, his delicacies, and his scruples, Rousseau soon broke out entirely with his benefactor, and left England.

Mr. Hume, who after his return from France, had ben appointed under secretary of state, retired to Scotland on the resignation of Gen. Conway, and spent the remainder of his years at Edinburgh, among the companions of his youth, equally admired and respected; beloved as a friend, and honoured over Europe as a scholar, a gentleman, and a man of genius. He died, after a lingering illness, on the 25th of August, 1776.

Notes

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corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2][The phrase "discovers all the violence of a sectary, and all the illiberally of a pedant, and rather" is absent in the *Weekly Magazine* reprint of this essay.]

"Strictures on the 'Account of The Life and Writings of the Late David Hume, Esq.'"

Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Amusement

"Tobias Simple"

1777

Editor's note: This pseudonymous essay is a critique of a 1776 essay titled "An Account of the Life and Writings of the late David Hume, Esq." (see Hume Archives edition of the latter). The critique appeared in *The Weekly Magazine*, December 25, 1777, Vol. 38, pp. 289-292. The author opens attacking Pratt's *Apology* (1777), and Hume's facetious dialogue with Charon reported by Smith in his *Letter to William Strahan*. The author erroneously notes that the "Account" is based on Hume's *My Own Life*, and then focuses his attack on the discussion of chastity from the *Treatise* (as appears on the "Account"). He lists eight skeptical "dogmas" found in Hume's writings, and concludes with a fictitious lecture Hume might have given his students if he obtained the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. The copy text upon which the text below is based is illegible at places; asterisks are inserted where letters or words cannot be deciphered.

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STRICTURES *on the Account of the Life and Writings of* DAVID HUME, *Esq.*

DAVID HUME *is dead!* "Never were the pillars of orthodoxy so desperately shaken,as they are now by that event;" cries, with exultation and triumph, one of his disciples[2] -- "He has proved himself, in opposition to a contrary opinion, one of these rare characters -- an uniform philosopher.["]

Pray Sir, let me ask this gentleman, What has orthodoxy, the *Christian religion* (no doubt you mean?)*, or the religion of nature,* if you please, suffered by that event? Every good man, affected with religious principles, and from a humane concern for a fellow creature, and must have wished, that that philosopher had, in his last moments, expressed some concern for his future existence! he did it not: that he died firm to his own tenets, they are truly sorry for: but how the *pillars of religion can be shaken* by that event, more than by the death of many a *daring atheist* that hath lived and died so, in every age, they don't see. Your philosopher, if it will please you, shall rank in the first class of that sect.

The famous *Vanini,* crying out at *the stake* the name of *God,* was careful to let it be know, that it was an involuntary exclamation.

***Spinoza* shut himself up with his old woman, in his last moments, giving orders, that no divine should be admitted to disturb him.**

The gay *Petronius,* whose exit our hero seems to have had in his eye, having cut his veins, and bound them up again, called his friends about him -- "*Audiebatque*, says the historian*, referentes, nihil de immortalitate anime, et sapientium placitis, sed levia carmina, et faciles versus*."

Our philosopher, as firm as any of them, in his last moments, chearfully entertained his friends with a dialogue between himself and Charon, played a game at Whist, and read Tom Jones.

NO Sir, all this is very well, and stands recorded on good evidence; and no one, I'm persuaded, will pretend to say, that our philosopher, before he made his exit, either called for the *New Testament*, was {290} heard to invoke the Deity, or to utter the shortest ejaculation for his soul. And pray what has orthodoxy, or the Christian religion suffered from all this? have you any grounds for *insulting* the *religion of your country* upon that event?

It was the complaint of the *Free-thinkers* of the last age, that men of genius were not at liberty to canvass with freedom points of religion: that they were obliged to write in fetters, and met with great discouragement in their attempts to investigate, with freedom, these points. How far they had reason for their complaints, may be judged from the writings of *Tindal, Collins, Toland*, and the noble author of the *Characteristics*. It must be owned, indeed, that although these essays are neither remarkable for the spirit of moderation, nor for modesty, yet, simple as the appearance was, they thought themselves obliged, when writing against the religion of their country, to put on a lair out-side. Thus, although they soon unmasked themselves, they carried on the show, by affecting, on every occasion, the specious words of *our holy religion, its divine Founder, the holy gospel, we Christians*, and such like th** in their mouths. This thin ****, it is true, imposed upon nobody, but in some readers, it was an acknowledgement from these gentlemen, that they thought themselves, at least, under an obligation to treat with decency and respect the established religion of their country; and they were sensible too, that it would very ill have become them, while they were declaiming against the intemperate zeal of the early professors of Christianity, for insulting the religion of Paganism, then the established religion, and in extolling the mild forbearance of the *Emperor Julian*, their great hero, if they themselves had incurred the same censure. But times, it seems, are altered: the Free-thinkers of the present age seem to be insensible of the unbounded toleration, the perfect freedom which they now enjoy.**

This leads me to take notice of another abuse of this liberty, in a paper which, Mr. Printer, you have lately given to the public; to wit, "An account of the life and writings of the late David Hume, Esq;" than which, a more gross insult has not been offered, I wont say to religion ** (for, with the *Humean school*, religion, in every sense, is out of the question, but to the *moral sense* and**

common understanding of mankind.

This piece, as it hath appeared first in the Annual Register, and lately in your Weekly Magazine, I mean to examine, and make some observes upon.

It is proper to premise, that the writer of this paper, with respect to the life and writings of the philosopher, notwithstanding his inviting title, has given us only a bald repetition of a few of the anecdotes from Mr Hume's life, written by himself. Of the observations he makes on our author's metaphysical works, I mean only to take notice.

This writer introduces his account with a high swoln panegyric on our author's first metaphysical production, *The Treatise on Human Nature* -- "A work (says *this judge*) not inferior to any thing of the moral, or metaphysical kind in any language." And to justify this very decisive opinion, he is pleased to give us an abstract from our author, with respect to the *principles* of *modesty*, and *chastity of women*, and the necessary restraint they are laid under, in order to preserve their fidelity to their husbands, and to the marriage-bed. Mr Hume says, with truth, that "considering the length and feebleness of infancy, both parents must unite their care in the education of their young; therefore, *a priori*, they must believe that the children are their own." He then proceeds to tell us what is equally true and well known, that

> **"if we examine the structure of the human body, we shall find that this security is very difficult to be attained on our part; and that since, in the copulation of the sexes, the principles of generation goes from the man to the woman, an error may take place on the side of the former, though it be utterly impossible on the side of the latter. In order therefore, to impose a due restraint on the female sex, we must attach a peculiar degree of shame to their infidelity above what arises merely from its injustice, and must bestow proportionable praise on their chastity: But, as human creatures, especially of the female kind are apt to overlook remote consequences while under the influence of any present temptation, it is necessary, besides the infamy attending such licences, that there should be some preceding backwardness or dread, which may prevent their first approaches, and give the female sex a repugnance to all expressions, and postures, and liberties, that have immediate relation to that enjoyment." --**

"So much {291} good sense and sound reasoning (says our observator) was never delivered in so few words on the subject of *female virtue* by any writer ancient or modern." Indeed! "Yet, (proceeds he) this is an extract from the *treatise*," (Reader mark his modestly,) "whose confutation has been *impudently* attempted, more than once, by mere *common sense*," (really!) "and childish declamation."

Equally sensible and modest is this remark! It is scarce possible, indeed, to cram more *conceit* and *nonsense* into fewer words. As for the sense and reasoning contained in the above extract from Mr Hume, it would have been truly absurd in any body to have pretended either to confute, or even to dispute; and I wish this writer had told us who had attempted to do it. As for ingenuity in the extract, or novelty, there is none. Is there an old woman that, without much knowledge of the *human structure*, does not know, that although we can, with no certainty, determine the father, yet there can be no doubt as to the mother of the child? or is it a new discovery of Mr Hume, that in order to impose due restraint on the wise, to preserve inviolate the marriage-bed, it was necessary that, besides the shame, infamy, and even punishment annexed to her breach of fidelity, the utmost caution should be exerted to inculcate the seeds of modesty into the sex from the earliest infancy? Did Dr. Beattie get a pension for impudently attempting to confute this doctrine, not of Mr Hume,

but established in every civilized nation so early as man could have any notion of society? No. But shall I tell this writer what detestable principles of Mr Hume, even subversive of his above doctrine, Dr. Beattie, and several others, have ,with mere common sense, taken upon them to dispute, and, strange as it is, even to confute.

Mr Hume has told us, that *chastity*, considered abstractly from its *utility*, is no virtue: That the principles of chastity respect generation only; it follows, then, that, in women past child-bearing, it is no virtue at all:[3] That adultery ,if frequently practised, would cease to be scandalous; and that, if secretly practised, would be thought no crime.[4] Blessed doctrine this, and tending much to reform the manners of the age! The consequences that may be drawn from these principles shall not be here stated. -- Was our philosopher a a man of gallantry? It is said that he affected the company of women, and the ladies, it is said, loaded him with their favours: For the honour of the *sex*, it is to be hoped that he had few pupils. To every virtuous woman such principles must have appeared shocking and detestable.

This writer tells us,

> **"That, in 1746, Mr Hume stood candidate for the chair of moral philosophy in the university of Edinburgh, then vacant; every one, says he, was convinced of Mr Hume's abilities; but the *presbytery of Edinburgh*, having a right to object to one of the three candidates, they put their negative upon *honest David*, whose sentiments were *too liberal* for their *narrow minds*. As he was eminently qualified for this office, he could have been of more service to his country than in any other."**

Ye illiberal and narrow-minded men of the presbytery of Edinburgh, what hurt did you not do to your country, in depriving it of David Hume for professor of morality! what a blessed system of ethicks would he have instilled into our youth!

> **To laugh were want of goodness, and of grace; And to be grave, exceeds all power of face.**

But let us collect some of the dogmas of our philosopher.

1. "The efficacy of causes (says he) is neither placed in causes themselves, nor in the Deity, but belongs entirely to the soul."[5] The obvious conclusion is, that there is *no first cause*.

2. That we have no good reason to think that the universe proceeds from a cause.[6]

3. That matter and motion may be the cause of thought.[7]

4. That the material world does not exist. -- Allow this to be called in question. What arguments have we to prove the being of God?[8]

5. That neither matter nor spirit exists -- Let us attend to our philosopher's principles of morality. {292}

6. That justice is not a natural virtue, but artificial and arbitrary.[9]

7.That all moral virtues ore of the same nature, i.e. arbitrary, and depending on the custom and institutions of men.[10]

8.That every action of man is necessary.[11]

These are some of the principles, which Dr Beattie has most impudently taken upon him to censure; and, strange to tell, has, with mere common sense, brought the whole *metaphysical system* of our philosopher in ruins about his ears.

Let us suppose, however, that our author had obtained the philosophic chair, he might, no doubt, from the above principles, ** [teach the following]:**

"Now, my students, having inculcated these principles, shake off the fetters of superstition, that is, religion, being convinced there is no first cause: *futurity* is a mere bugbear, as I have demonstrated in a work which I mean at my death to bequeath to you.[12] If notwithstanding the liberal principles I have given you; if, in the practice of the many advantages my tenets must give you over the wives, the daughters, and fortunes of your weak fellow mortals; any of you, from the want of firmness of nerves, weakness of constitution, or from the troublesome intrusion of a certain faculty in the machine, not altogether subdued by my physics, called *conscience*, shall find yourselves disturbed and haunted, there is an easy remedy; suicide is a cure for every disease: For be assured,

> **The worst that can befal you, measur'd right, is a sound slumber and a long good night."**

Can it be said that this speech is not a fair induction from the above principles? I think it cannot. But it will be said, no doubt, that our philosopher was a man of virtue, and a very good member of society: abstracting from the immorality of writing and publishing such principles, I shall allow he was so: What follows? Only this, that his passions for inordinate pleasures luckily were none of the strongest; and that his constitution led him to study, entertaining his friends and the pleasures of the table. But with all that, can any excuse be made for his attempts to take from man, (that wild beast hurried away by passions) the curbs of *justice, chastity, virtue*, and *religion*? What apology can his warmest admirers make for this?

Let me oppose to the above dogmas, only one of the precepts of another *philosopher*, I mean, the divine Instituter of our religion; for, reader, I am not ashamed to own myself one of the people called Christians. This blessed person, whose wisdom came from heaven, knew how prone poor weak mortals were to be led astray by unguarded passions; and that the first inlet to carnal desires ought to be guarded against. Let not even your eye, says he, fix upon such objects as may, by degrees, hurry you on *to vice and criminality*; rather pull it out: For remember that God dwells not with impurity. *Blessed*, therefore, are the *pure in heart*, for they *shall see God*.

Before I conclude, I shall make one observation, which, I dare say, daily occurs to the experience of many others, that is, That the philosophy of our author seems to be very agreeable, and often in the mouths of many of the men of fashion of the age: That he was a very subtile and acute metaphysician, his works shew; yet, amidst all his pretended admirers, it is a certain fact, that no one of a hundred of these fine gentlemen understand him, of which the writer of the account of his life, &c. stands a lamentable proof.

To conclude; may the *Freethinkers* of the present age ever rejoice in their liberty and freedom which they now enjoy; may they always thankfully cry out in the words of the historian; *Rara temporium felicitas, ubi sentire quae velis, et quae stias dicere, ac scribere dicet!*[13] At the same time, let these gentlemen learn to make a better use of that liberty, than *insulting common sense and the religion of their country*.**

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[2]*Apology for the life and writings of David Hume*.

[3]*The principles of morals, page 66*.

[4]*Essays, vol. 2. page 409*.

[5]*Treatise on Human Nature, vol. I, p. 291*.

[6]*Hume's Essay on a particular Providence and Future State*.

[7]*Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I. p. 434*.

[8]*Essay on Sceptical Philosophy*.

[9]*Treatise on Human Nature, vol. iii, p. 37*.

[10]*Ibid*.

[11]*Essays, vol. ii. p. 91*.

[12]*Two pieces of our author, one on the immortality of the soul, the other on suicide, left by him in charge to his executors to publish after his death*.

[13]*Tacitus*.

Letter from Adam Smith, LL.D. to William Strahan, Esq.

Adam Smith

1777

Editor's note: Adam Smith's *Letter* appeared along with the 1777 publication of Hume's *My Own Life*. Smith's account covers the last four months of Hume's life, relating the progress of Hume's illness, and his cheerful state of mind. In a letter of August 22, 1776 to Hume, Smith suggests the possibility of writing the *Letter* as a supplement to Hume's *Life*:

> **If you will give me leave I will add a few lines to yr. account of your own life, giving some account in my own name of your behaviour in this illness, if, contrary to my own hopes, it should prove your last. Some conversations we had lately together, particularly that concerning your want of an excuse to make to Charon, the excuse you at last thought of, and the very bad reception wh. Charon was likely to give it, would, I imagine, make no disagreeable part of the history. You have in a declining state of health, under an exhausting disease, for more than two years together now looked at the approach of death with a steady cheerfulness such as very few men have been able to maintain for a few hours, tho' otherwise in the most perfect Health. [*Life of Adam Smith*, John Rea, pp. 300-301.]**

To this Hume replied, "You are too good in thinking any trifles that concern me are so much worth you attention, but I give you entire liberty to make what Additions you please to the account of my Life" (*Letters*, Greig, Vol. 2, p. 336). Two days later, on August 25, 1776, Hume died. In October Smith sent a draft of his *Letter* to Hume's brother, John Home, to advise whether "anything either added to it or taken from it." He adds that there "is a propriety in addressing it as a letter to Mr. Strahan, to whom he has left the care of his works" (Rae, p. 304). Home replied generally approving of Smith's *Letter*, but suggested a minor change which Smith made. Shortly after, the manuscript was sent to Hume's publisher, William Strahan. In November, Strahan wrote Smith proposing that Hume's *Life* and Smith's *Letter* be published along with a series of letters with Hume wrote to Strahan over the years. At least part of Strahan's concern was to increase the

size of Hume's *Life* for publication purposes. To this Smith replied that "many of Mr. Hume's letters would do him great honour... " but that Hume's dying wishes should be honored, in particular "to burn all his Papers except the *Dialogues* and the account of his own life." Smith recommended publishing Hume's *Life* as a pamphlet, rather than a volume. A preprint of Hume's *Life* and Smith's *Letter* appeared in the January 1777 edition of *The Scots Magazine*, and the printed pamphlet itself was distributed later in March under the title *The Life of David Hume, Esq. written by himself*. Smith's *Letter* was sharply attacked in newspapers and pamphlets for seemingly glorifying skepticism and infidelity. Such criticism is seen in the following anonymous letter to the *Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Amusement*:

> Doubtless the doctor intends a panegyric upon his friend; but in truth the publication of his frolicsome behavior in dying, is a satire which must expose Mr. H---'s memory to the pity, if not to the contempt, of the truly wise.... From the doctor's narrative of Mr H---'s dying behavior, a Christian cannot easily allow that the concluding eulogy of his character fairly follows.... Can anything be more frivolous, more childish, more indecently wanton and presumptuous in a dying man, perceiving himself on the verge of time, than Mr. H---'s sportful dialogue with Charon?... We are told that Mr H--- was quite resigned. Resigned! to what? Not to the will of God.... How miserable the comforter, who could minister no other consolation to his dying friend, than 'that he was to leave his friends in great prosperity!'... Compare together a sceptical philosopher and a scripture saint in dying, and see the abject meanness into which the one sinks -- the grandeur, in hope of everlasting glory, to which the other rises. [Vol. 36, pp. 139-141]

Smith's *Letter* prompted a similar attack by George Horne in his anonymously published *Letter to Adam Smith, LL.D. on the life, Death, and Philosophy of his friend David Hume, Esq.* Ten years after the appearance of Smith's *Letter* he commented that "A single, and as I thought, a very harmless Sheet of paper which I happened to write concerning the death of our late friend, Mr. Hume, brought upon me ten times more abuse than the very violent attack I had made upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain" (William Scott, *Adam Smith as Student and Professor* p. 283). Smith's letter was published with Hume's *Letter* again in 1777, 1778, and in several 19th century editions of Hume's collected Works. The following is from the first 1777 edition of Hume's *Life*.

LETTER FROM ADAM SMITH, LL.D. TO WILLIAM STRAHAN, ESQ. Kirkaldy, Fifeshire, Nov. 9. 1776

Dear Sir,

It is with a real, though a very melancholy pleasure, that l sit down to give you some account of the behaviour of our late excellent friend, Mr. Hume, during his last illness.

Though, in his own judgment, his disease was mortal and incurable, yet he allowed himself to be prevailed upon, by the entreaty of his friends, to try what might be the effects of a long journey. A few days before he set out, he wrote that account of his own life, which, together with his other

papers, he has left to your care. My account, therefore, shall begin where his ends.

He set out for London towards the end of April, and at Morpeth met with Mr. John Home and myself, who had both come down from London on purpose to see him, expecting to have found him at Edinburgh. Mr. Home returned with him, and attended him during the whole of his stay in England, with that care and attention which might be expected from a temper so perfectly friendly and affectionate. As I had written to my mother that she might expect me in Scotland, I was under the necessity of continuing my journey. His disease seemed to yield to exercise and change of air, and when he arrived in London, he was apparently in much better health than when he left Edinburgh. He was advised to go to Bath to drink the waters, which appeared for some time to have so good an effect upon him, that even he himself began to entertain, what he was not apt to do, a better opinion of his own health. His symptoms, However, soon returned with their usual violence, and from that moment he gave up all thoughts of recovery, but submitted with the utmost cheerfulness, and the most perfect complacency and resignation. Upon his return to Edinburgh, though he found himself much weaker, yet his cheerfulness never abated and he continued to divert himself, as usual, with correcting his own works for a new edition, with reading books of amusement, with the conversation of his friends; and, sometimes in the evening, with a party at his favourite game of whist. His cheerfulness was so great, and his conversation and amusements run so much in their usual strain, that, notwithstanding all bad symptoms, many people could not believe he was dying. "I shall tell your friend, Colonel Edmondstone," said Doctor Dundas to him one day, "that I left you much better, and in a fair way of recovery." " Doctor," said he," as I believe you would not chuse to tell any thing but the truth, you had better tell him, that I am dying as fast as my enemies, if I have any, could wish, and as easily and cheerfully as my best friends could desire." Colonel Edmondstone soon afterwards came to see him, and take leave of him; and on his way home, he could not forbear writing him a letter bidding him once more an eternal adieu, and applying to him, as to a dying man, the beautiful French verses in which the Abbe Chaulieu, in expectation of his own death, laments his approaching separation from his friend, the Marquis de la Fare. Mr. Hume's magnanimity and firmness were such, that his most affectionate friends knew, that they hazarded nothing in talking or writing to him as to a dying man, and that so far from being hurt by this frankness, he was rather pleased and flattered by it. l happened to come into his room while he was reading this letter, which he had just received, and which he immediately showed me. I told him, that though I was sensible how very much he was weakened, and that appearances were in many respects very bad, yet his cheerfulness was still so great, the spirit of life seemed still to be so very strong in him, that I could not help entertaining some faint hopes. He answered, "Your hopes are groundless. An habitual diarrhoea of more than a year's standing, would be a very bad disease at any age: at my age it is a mortal one. When I lie down in the evening, l feel myself weaker than when I rose in the morning; and when I rise in the morning, weaker than when I lay down in the evening. I am sensible, besides, that some of my vital parts are affected, so that I must soon die." "Well," said I, "if it must be so you have at least the satisfaction of leaving all your friends, your brother's family in particular, in great prosperity." He said that he felt that satisfaction so sensibly, that when he was reading a few days before, Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead, among all the excuses which are alleged to Charon for not entering readily into his boat he could not find one that fitted him; he had no house to finish, he had no daughter to provide for, he had no enemies upon whom he wished to revenge himself. "I could not well imagine," said he, "what excuse I could make to Charon in order to obtain a little delay. I have done every thing of consequence which I ever meant to do, and I could at no time expect to leave my relations and

friends in a better situation than that in which I am now likely to leave them; I, therefore, have all reason to die contented." He then diverted himself with inventing several jocular excuses, which he supposed he might make to Charon, and with imagining the very surly answers which it might suit the character of Charon to return to them. "Upon further consideration" said he, "I thought I might say to him, 'Good Charon, I have been correcting my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time, that I may see how the Public receives the alterations.' But Charon would answer, 'When you have seen the effect af these, you will be for making other alterations. There will be no end of such excuses; so, honest friend, please step into the boat.' But I might still urge, 'Have a little patience, good Charon, I have been endeavouring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfal of some of the prevailing systems of superstition.' But Charon would then lose all temper and decency. 'You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy loitering rogue.'"

But, though Mr. Hume always talked Of his approaching dissolution with great cheerfulness, he never affected to make any parade of his magnanimity. He never mentioned the subject but when the conversation naturally led to it, and never dwelt longer upon it than the course of the conversation happened to require: it was a subject indeed which occurred pretty frequently, in consequence of the inquiries which his friends, who came to see him, naturally made concerning the state of his health. The conversation which I mentioned above, and which passed on Thursday the 8th of August, was the last, except one, that I ever had with him. He had now become so very weak, that the company of his most intimate friends fatigued him; for his cheerfulness was still so great, his complaisance and social disposition were still so entire, that when any friend was with him, he could not help talking more, and with greater exertion, than suited the weakness of his body. At his own desire, therefore, I agreed to leave Edinburgh, where I was staying partly upon his account, and returned to my mother's house here, at Kirkaldy, upon condition that he would send for me whenever he wished to see me; the physician who saw him most frequently, Doctor Black, undertaking, in the mean time, to write me occasionally an account of the state of his health.

On the 22nd of August, the Doctor wrote me the following letter:

"Since my last, Mr. Hume has passed his time pretty easily, but is much weaker. He sits up, goes down stairs once a day, and amuses himself with reading, but seldom sees any body. He finds that even the conversation of his most intimate friends fatigues and oppresses him; and it is happy that he does not need it, for he is quite free from anxiety, impatience, or low spirits, and passes his time very well with the assistance of amusing books."

I received the day after a letter from Mr. Hume himself, of which the following is an extract.

Edinburgh, 23rd august, 1776.

"My Dearest Friend,

"I am obliged to make use of my nephew's hand in writing to you, as I do not rise to-day....

"I go very fast to decline, and last night had a small fever, which I hoped might put a quicker period to this tedious illness, but unluckily it has, in a great measure, gone off. I cannot submit to your coming over here on my account, as it is possible for me to see you so small a part of the day, but Doctor Black can better inform you concerning the degree of strength which may from time to time remain with me.

Adieu, &c."

Three days after I received the following letter from Doctor Black.

Edinburgh, Monday, 26th August, 1776.

"Dear Sir,

"Yesterday about four o'clock afternoon, Mr. Hume expired. The near approach of his death became evident in the night between Thursday and Friday, when his disease became excessive, and soon weakened him so much, that he could no longer rise out of his bed. He continued to the last perfectly sensible, and free from much pain or feelings of distress. He never dropped the smallest expression of impatience; but when he had occasion to speak to the people about him, always did it with affection and tenderness. I thought it improper to write to bring you over, especially as I heard that he had dictated a letter to you desiring you not to come. When he became very weak, it cost him an effort to speak, and he died in such a happy composure of mind, that nothing could exceed it."

Thus died our most excellent, and never to be forgotten friend; concerning whose philosophical opinions men will, no doubt, judge variously, every one approving, or condemning them, according as they happen to coincide or disagree with his own; but concerning whose character and conduct there can scarce be a difference of opinion. His temper, indeed, seemed to be more happily balanced, if I may be allowed such an expression, than that perhaps of any other man I have ever known. Even in the lowest state of his fortune, his great and necessary frugality never hindered him from exercising, upon proper occasions, acts both of charity and generosity. It was a frugality founded, not upon avarice, but upon the love of independency. The extreme gentleness of his nature never weakened either the firmness of his mind, or the steadiness of his resolutions. His constant pleasantry was the genuine effusion of good-nature and good humour, tempered with delicacy and modesty, and without even the slightest tincture of malignity, so frequently the disagreeable source of what is called wit in other men. It never was the meaning of his raillery to mortify; and therefore, far from offending, it seldom failed to please and delight, even those who were the objects of it. To his friends, who were frequently the objects of it, there was not perhaps any one of all his great and amiable qualities, which contributed more to endear his conversation. And that gaiety of temper, so agreeable in society, but which is so often accompanied with frivolous and superficial qualities, was in him certainly attended with the most severe application, the most extensive learning, the greatest depth of thought, and a capacity in every respect the most comprehensive. Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit.

I ever am, dear Sir,

Most affectionately your's,

ADAM SMITH.

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., HUME) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g., *Hume*) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

Supplement To The Life Of David Hume, Esq.

S.J. Pratt

1777

Editor's note: S.J. Pratt (1749-1814) wrote three works pertaining to the life of Hume: the *Supplement* (1777), *An apology for the life and writings of David Hume* (1777), and *Curious particulars and genuine anecdotes respecting the late Lord Chesterfield and David Hume, esq* (1788). Review journals did not enthusiastically receive the *Supplement* because of its lack of new information. *The Gentleman's Magazine* notes that "little new is to be found in these meagre pages" except for a three anecdotes (1777, Vol. 57, p. 338). *The Monthly Review*'s complete review is that "We observe nothing very material in this publication" (1777, Vol. 57, p. 482), and the complete review in *The London Review* is "Containing a copy of Mr. Hume's will, with a few anecdotes of no material consequence" (1777, Vol. 5, p. 529). Nevertheless, for the modern reader, the *Supplement* is of interest, especially for its graphic account of the events surrounding Hume's funeral. Pratt's *Supplement* was reprinted in 1789; the following is from the 1777 edition.

SUPPLEMENT

TO THE

LIFE

OF

DAVID HUME, ESQ.

CONTAINING

GENUINE ANECDOTES,

AND A CIRCUMSTANTIAL ACCOUNT
OF HIS

DEATH AND FUNERAL.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

A CERTIFIED COPY OF HIS LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT.

Illum aget penna metuente solvi

Fama superstes.

HOR.

LONDON,
PRINTED FOR J. BEW, PATER-NOSTER-ROW.
M DCC LXXVII.

{4}

It is requested of Printers of News-Papers, to be cautious of injuring the Proprietor of this little Performance.

{5}

THERE can be no stronger proof of the high estimation in which Mr. Hume was held, and of his being considered {6} as an extraordinary character, than the eager, yet perhaps, idle curiosity, which the public entertained to learn the most minute circumstances respecting his exit.

As sincere admirers of Mr. Hume, in the Historian, the Philosopher, and the Man; we felt much regret in hearing announced to the public, "The Life of David Hume Esq; written by Himself." It is {7} an undertaking which we hesitate not to pronounce impossible to be executed with propriety: egotism is disgusting; vanity intolerable; and a just estimation of one's self, the most difficult thing in life.

Upon reading this performance, however, which has been dished out into a pamphlet, we find that it only incurs a general charge of insipidity, perhaps in some articles of injustice. Mr. Hume's natural temper {8} disposed him to feel, with exquisite sensibility, every thing which affected his literary fame; and, notwithstanding his boasted equanimity, philosophy did not shield him from the excessive chagrin which he felt from those arrows, which envy and Prejudice darted at his reputation. Anxiety about his difference with the whimsical Rousseau extracted from him a personal, but complete justification. The illiberal criticisms {9} which Mr. Gray[2] threw out against him, in his Epistolary {10} Correspondence, gave him much concern. He saw, with mortification, {11} the laurel wreath which Oxford weaved to cover the bald reputation of Beattie, *his antagonist, not his rival*. And such was the antipathy that subsisted between him and Mr. Tyler, the author of the Vindication of Mary Queen of Scots; that not satisfied with a most acrimonious note,[3] which {12} he has published in the last edition of his History, he would {13} not even sit in company with him, and the appearance of the one effected the instantaneous withdrawing of the other.{14}

Mr. Hume, in the History of his Life, has not informed us of his having stood candidate for the Professorship of Moral Philosophy, in the University of Edinburgh; of the opposition which the

Scots clergy excited to his pretensions; nor of the enquiry which was moved for in the venerable assembly of the Church of Scotland, respecting the principles inculcated in his Writings; and of the censures proposed {15} to be inflicted on him as the author of Heretical Doctrines.

He has observed in the nineteenth page of his Life, that his History of Great Britain met at first with an indifferent reception. But with respect to this, Mr. Hume himself was mistaken. The first edition of the History of Great Britain, for the reigns of James the First and Charles the First, was printed at Edinburgh, A.D. {16} 1754, for *Hamilton, Balfour and Neil*. Hamilton, upon his expectations from this book, took a shop, and settled in London. He applied to the London booksellers to take copies of the History from him, but none of them would deal with an *interloper*. Hamilton, sadly distressed, has recourse to *his friend*, Mr. Millar; Millar *obliges him* by taking fifty copies: but when gentlemen, in his well-frequented shop, asked for the book, "Pho (says Millar {17} generously) "it is incomplete, another volume is coming out soon. You are welcome to the use of this in the mean time." Thus did Millar circulate the fifty copies among some hundred readers, without selling one, And by this ingenious device attained his favourite purpose, of getting Hamilton to sell him his right in the copy for a trifle, as being an insignificant performance. {18}

Mr. Hume, and the late Reverend Dr. Jardine, one of the ministers of Edinburgh, lived in habits of much intimacy. Religion, *natural* and *revealed*, was frequently the subject of their conversation. It happened one night, after they had entertained themselves with theological controversy, that Mr. Hume's politeness, when bidding adieu, would not permit Dr. Jardine (whose oeconomy was not incumbered with many domestics) to light him {19} down stairs. Mr. Hume stumbled in the dark, and the Doctor hearing it, ran to his assistance with a candle, and when he had recovered his guest said to him "David, I have often told you not to rely too much upon yourself, and that *natural light* is not *sufficient*." This pleasantry Mr. Hume never relished.

As a proof of the steadiness of Mr. Hume's sceptical tenets it may be observed, that when he {20} published the first volume of his History of Great Britain, he was advised, that the opinions he had delivered concerning matters of religion, would hurt the sale of his work; and that some apology would be proper. He accordingly in his second volume, P. 449, when speaking of the religious parties, subjoins the following note, which when his fame was established beyond the reach of party, he cancelled as unworthy of admission. {21}

This sophism, of arguing from the abuse of any thing against the use of it, is one of the grossest, and at the same time, the most common, to which men are subject. The history of all ages, and none more than that of the period, which is our subject, offers us examples of the abuse of religion; and we have not been sparing, in this volume more than in the former, to remark them: But whoever would thence draw {22} an inference to the disadvantage of religion in general, would argue very rashly and erroneously. The proper office of religion is to reform mens lives, to purify their hearts, to inforce all moral duties, and to secure obedience to the laws and civil magistrate. While it pursues these salutary purposes, its operations, tho' infinitely valuable, are secret and silent, and seldom come under the cognizance of history. That {23} adulterate species of it alone, which inflames faction, animates sedition, and prompts rebellion, distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, and is the great source of revolutions and public convulsions. The historian, therefore, has scarce occasion to mention any other kind of religion; and he may retain the highest regard for true piety, even while he exposes all the abuses of the false. He may even think, that he {24} cannot better show his attachment to the former than by detecting the latter, and laying open its absurdities and pernicious tendency.

It is no proof of irreligion in an historian, that he remarks some fault or imperfection in each sect of religion, which he has occasion to mention. Every institution, however divine, which is adopted by men, must partake of the weakness and infirmities {25} of our nature; and will be apt, unless carefully guarded, to degenerate into one extreme or the other. What species of devotion so pure, noble, and worthy the Supreme Being, as that which is most spiritual, simple, unadorned, and which partakes nothing either of the senses or imagination? Yet is it found by experience, that this mode of worship does very naturally, among the vulgar, mount up into {26} extravagance and fanaticism. Even many of the first reformers are exposed to this reproach; and their zeal, though in the event, it proved extremely useful, partook strongly of the enthusiastic genius: Two of the judges in the reign of Charles the Second, scrupled not to advance this opinion even from the bench. Some mixture of ceremony, pomp, and ornament may seem to correct the abuse; yet will it be {27} found very difficult to prevent such a form of religion from sinking sometimes into superstition. The church of England itself, which is perhaps the best medium among these extremes, will be allowed, at least during the age of archbishop Laud, to have been somewhat infected with a superstition, resembling the Popish; and to have payed a higher regard to some positive institutions, than the nature of the things, strictly {28} speaking, would permit. It is the business of an historian to remark these abuses of all kinds; but it belongs also to a prudent reader to confine the representations, which he meets with, to that age alone of which the author treats. What absurdity, for instance, to suppose, that the Presbyterians, Independants, Anabaptists, and other sectaries of the present age partake of all the extravagancies, which we remark in those, who bore {29} these appellations in the last century? The inference indeed seems juster; where sects have been noted for fanaticism during one period, to conclude, that they will be very moderate and reasonable in the subsequent. For as it is the nature of fanaticism to abolish all slavish submission to priestly power, it follows, that as soon as the first ferment is abated, men are naturally in such sects left to the free use of their reason, {30} and shake off the fetters of custom and authority.

To say barely, that Mr. Hume in his moral character was unexceptionable, would be doing him injustice; he was truly amiable, gentle, hospitable, humane. His temper was cast in the happiest mold, if we may not except to his anxious and extreme sensibility, in every thing which affected his literary reputation. It is told, that an elderly woman in the suburbs of Edinburgh, {31} whose excess of zeal was proportionable to her want of sense and discretion, called on Mr. Hume; declaimed violently against his sceptical principles, as she had learned them by report; represented, that he was nodding on the brink of everlasting destruction; and delivered an earnest prayer, that it would please divine grace to give him to *see* the error of his ways. Mr. Hume listened to her with attention and good humour, thanked the lady {32} for her concern about his future welfare, and expressed a desire to know what was her line in life. She informed him, that she was a married woman, and that her husband was a tallow-chandler in the neighbourhood; upon which Mr. Hume replied, "Good woman, since you have expressed so earnest a desire that I should be inspired with *inward light*, I beg you will supply me with *outward light* also." The matron retired, not a little satisfied with the commission {33} which he gave her, and her husband thenceforwards supplied Mr. Hume's family with candles.

Notwithstanding the ideas which zealots may have formed of Mr. Hume's principles, as latitudanarian, as atheistical, as damnable: his brother's notions of them were very different. For, speaking of the Historian one day, he expressed himself in this manner, "My brother Davie is {34} a good enough sort of a man, *but rather narrow minded*.

As to Mr. Hume's abilities as a Philosopher, and an Historian, his Works are the basis on which

posterity will rear his everlasting fame.

A few months before his death, Mr. Hume was persuaded by his friends to try the effects of a long journey, and the Bath waters: but finding his malady to increase, he resigned all hopes of life. He {35} maintained, however, his usual chearfulness; and being resolved to make the most of the short remained of his lease, he wrote to his friends in Edinburgh, informing them of his resolution to be in that city by a certain day, which he named; and separately requested their company to dinner on the day following. Accordingly, Lord Elibank, Professor Ferguson, Mr. Home the Dramatic Poet, Dr. Smith, Dr. Blair, Dr. Black, and others of his literary {36} friends obeyed the summons, and took a sort of farewel dinner with their dying friend. His *flowery* rival in historic fame was also invited. But, alas! the Lord Advocate of Scotland invites this *Reverend Doctor* on that very day to a turtle feast. What was to be done? both invitations could not be embraced; -- the contest was short: For as it would seem, this Historian's taste is almost as elegant in eating, as in writing, he judiciously preferred {37} the *turtle* of my Lord Advocate to the *mutton* of David Hume.

Never did death make more regular and visible approaches than to Mr. Hume. He met these with a chearfulness and resignation, which could only be the result of a vigorous understanding, and a well-spent life. He still went abroad, called upon his friends, but as the fatigue of a chaise was now become intolerable, he went in {38} a sedan chair, and his ghastly looks bore the most striking appearances of speedy death. His situation was the more uncomfortable, that in his weak emaciated state, the physicians prescribed to him instead of a down bed, to lie on a rugged pallet.[4] {39}

He had already settled his affairs, and his facetiousness still suggested to him to make some verbal legacies, which would not have been so suitable to the gravity of a solemn deed. His friend Mr. Home the Poet, affected a delicacy which abhorred even the taste of Port wine; this whimsical nicety had often been the subject of Mr. Hume's raillery, and he left verbally to his friend the poet, *one bottle* of Port, and ten dozen of Claret, but on this condition, that the {40} poet should drink the Port at two sittings, before he tasted the Claret.

Such was the estimation in which Mr. Hume was held, from his amiable qualities as a citizen, as well as from his literary fame, that for some weeks before his death, his situation become the universal topick of conversation and enquiry; each individual expression an anxious solicitude about his health, as {41} if he had been his intimate and particular friend.

On the twenty-fifth of August, Mr. Hume's character was put beyond the reach of being sullied by human frailty.5 As soon as he conceived himself to be in a dying way, he purchased a spot for the depositing of his {42} ashes; the south-west corner of the Calton burying ground at Edinburgh, *a rock wherein never man had been laid*. And from the particular charge he gave about his corpse, it would seem he was not altogether devoid of apprehensions of its being treated with insult.

The anxious attention with which the public viewed every circumstance respecting Mr. Hume's illness was not terminated even by his death. From the {43} busy curiosity of the mob, one would have presumed them to entertain notions that the ashes of Mr. Hume were to have been the cause or the object of miraculous exertion. As the physicians of London and Edinburgh were divided about the seat of his disorder, those of the city where he died, proposed that his body should be opened: but this, his brother who was also his executor, agreeably to the orders of the deceased, would not permit. {44}

It is hardly to be credited, that the grave-diggers, digging with pick-axes Mr. Hume's grave, should have attracted the gaping curiosity of the multitude. That, notwithstanding a heavy rain, which fell

during the interment, multitudes of all ranks gazed at the funeral procession,[6] as if they {45} had expected the hearse to have been consumed in livid flames, or encircled with a ray of glory; that people in a sphere much above the rabble would have sent to the sexton for the keys of the burying-ground, and paid him to have access to visit the grave. And that on a Sunday evening (the gates of the burying-ground being opened for another funeral) the company, from a public walk in the neighbourhood, flocked in such crouds to Mr. Hume's {46} grave, that his brother actually became apprehensive upon the unusual concourse, and ordered the grave to be railed in with all expedition.

After his interment, two trusty persons, watched the grave for about eight nights. The watch was set by eight at night; at which time a pistol was fired, and so continued to be every hour till day-light. Candles in a lanthorn were placed upon the grave, where they burned all {47} night; and the grease which dropped in renewing or snuffing the candles was to be seen upon the grave afterwards.

We cannot conclude this Supplement to the Life of Mr. Hume more properly than by applying to him and to his Works, those nervous lines, which Ovid has applied to himself.

> **Quod nec Jovis ira, nec ignis,**
> **Nec poterit ferrum, nec edax abolere vetustas.**
> **Cum volet illa dies, quae nil nisi corporis hujus {48}**
> **Jus habet, incerti spatium mihi finiat aevi:**
> **Parte tamen meliore mei super alta perennis**
> **Astra ferar: NOMENQUE ERIT INDELEBILE NOSTRUM.**
> **Quaque patet domitis; Romana potentia terris;**
> **Ore lega populi: PERQUE OMNIA SECULA FAMA**
> **(SI QUID HABENT VERI VATUM PREAESAGIA) VIVAM.**

OVID {49}

CERTIFIED COPY
OF THE
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
DAVID HUME, ESQ.

{50}{51}

COPY

> **I DAVID HUME, second lawful son of Joseph Home, of Ninewells, Advocate, for the love and affection I bear to John Home, of Ninewells, my brother, and for other causes, Do, by these presents, under the reservations and burthens after mentioned, Give and Dispone to the said John Home, or, if he die before me, to {52} David Home, his second son, his heirs and assignies whatsomever, all lands, heritages, debts and sums of money, as well heritable as moveable, which shall belong to me at the time of my decease, as also my whole effects in general, real and personal, with and under the burthen of the following legacies, *viz*. To my sister, Katherine Home, the sum of Twelve hundred pounds sterling, payable the first term of Whitsunday, or Martinmas, after my decease, together {53} with all my English books, and the live-rent of my house in**

St. James's Court, or in case that house be sold at the time of my decease, Twenty pounds a year during the whole course of her life: To my friend, Adam Ferguson, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the College of Edinburgh, Two hundred pounds sterling: to my friend M. Dalembert, Member of the French Academy, and of the Academy of Sciences in Paris, Two hundred pounds: To my friend, Dr. Adam Smith, {54} late Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, I leave all my manuscripts without exception, desiring him to publish *my Dialogues on Natural Religion*, which are comprehended in this present bequest, but to publish no other papers which he suspects not to have been written within these five years, but to destroy them all at his leisure: And I even leave him full power over all my papers, except the Dialogues above mentioned: And though I can trust to that intimate and sincere {55} friendship, which has ever subsisted between us, for his faithful execution of this part of my Will, yet, as a small recompence of his pains in correcting and publishing this work, I leave him Two hundred pounds, to be paid immediately after the publication of it: I also leave to Mrs. Anne and Mrs. Janet Hepburn, daughters of Mr. James Hepburn, of Keigh, One hundred pounds a piece: To my cousin, David Campbell, son of Mr. Campbell, Minister of Lillysleaf, One hundred {56} pounds: To the Infirmary of Edinburgh, Fifty pounds: To all the servants who shall be in my family at the time of my decease, one year's wages; and to my housekeeper, Margaret Irvine, three years wages: And I also ordain, that my brother, or nephew, or executor, whoever he be, shall not pay up to the said Margaret Irvine, without her own consent, any sum of money which I shall owe her at the time of my decease, whether by bill, bond, or for wages, but shall retain it in his hand, {57} and pay her the legal interest upon it, till she demand the principal: And in case my brother above mentioned shall survive me, I leave to his son, David, the sum of a Thousand pounds to assist him in his education: But in case that by my brother's death before me, the succession of my estate and effects shall devolve to the aforesaid David, I hereby burthen him, over and above the payment of the aforesaid legacies, with the payment of the sums following: To his brothers, Joseph and {58} John, a Thousand pounds a piece: To his sisters, Catherine and Agnes, Five hundred pounds a piece: All which sums, as well as every sum contained in the present disposition (except that to Dr. Smith) to be payable the first term of Whitsunday, and Martinmas, after my decease; and all of them without exception, in sterling money. And I do hereby nominate and appoint the said John Home, my brother, and failing of him by decease, the said David Home, to be {59} my sole executor and universal legatee, with and under the burthens above mention; Reserving always full power and liberty to me at any time in my life, even in death-bed, to alter and innovate these presents, in whole or in part, and to burthen the same with such other legacies as I shall think fit. And I do hereby declare these presents to be a good, valid, and sufficient evident, albeit found in my custody, or in the custody of any other person, at the time of my death: CONSENTING {60} to the registration hereof in the books of council and session, or other judges books competent therein to remain for preservation, and thereto I constitute Mr. David Rae, Advocate, my procurator.

In witness whereof these presents, consisting of this and the preceding page, are written and subscribed by me on this Fourth of January, One thousand seven hundred and seventy-six at

Edinburgh, before these witnesses, the Right Honourable the Earl of Home, and {61} Mr. John M'Gowan, clerk to the signet.

(Signed) DAVID HUME.

HOME, witness;

JO. M'GOUAN, witness.

Day and date as above.

I also Ordain, That if I shall die any where in Scotland, I shall be buried in a private manner in the Calton church-yard, the south side of it, and a monument be built over my body, at an expence not exceeding a hundred pounds, with an {62} inscription containing only my name, with the year of my birth and death, leaving it to posterity to add the rest.

(Signed), DAVID HUME.

At Edinburgh,

15th April, 1776

I also leave, for rebuilding the bridge of Chirnside, the sum of a hundred pounds; but on condition that the managers of the bridge shall take none of the stones for building the bridge from the quarry of Ninewells, except from that part of the quarry which has {63} been already opened. I leave to my nephew, Joseph, the sum of Fifty pounds to enable him to make a good sufficient drain and sewer round the house of Ninewells, but on condition that if the drain and sewer be not made, from whatever cause, within a year after my death, the said Fifty pounds shall be paid to the poor of the parish of Chirnside: To my sister, instead of all my English books, I leave her a hundred volumes at her choice: To David {64} Waite, servant to my brother, I leave the sum of Ten pounds, payable the first term after my death.

(Signed) DAVID HUME.

In this place of the original Will there are several lines deleted, after which follow these words:

This last clause was erased, and obliterated by myself.

(Signed) DAVID HUME. FINIS

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., HUME) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g., *Hume*) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a

working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2]Perhaps the mercenary Mason is more deserving of this censure than Mr. Gray. In order to swell his volume, and to fill his pockets, the former has published a loose and desultory Correspondence, which the latter never dremt would see the light, and would have reprobated could he ever have conceived the idea of his worst papers being put to the ungenerous and ungrateful use. -- Nevertheless, in return to a benefactor, who conferred essential favours upon him, Mr. Mason has, as far as he was able, sacrificed his patron's reputation at the sordid alter of Plutus. The posthumous Poetical Pieces of Mr. Gray, though infinitely valuable, are few in number, and were not likely to answer the interested purposes of the hungry Editor by much emolument. This gentleman, therefore, resolving to establish a literary property or estate, by the name and writings of another, which he honestly acquaints us he was unable to perform by his own, has given to the world, with little labour, a large but meagre Quarto, containing some puerile letters, superior, however, to the Editor's notes, with which they are garnished. And by entitling these "The Poems of Mr. Gray," led the public to buy up a large impression before the deception was discovered. Thus has the ingenuous Mason bartered the high poetical and literary reputation of a worthy man who confided in him, for *money*.

Quid non mortalia pectora coges, Auri facra fames?

[3]This note deserves a place, as it will show that even Mr. Hume himself could occasionally be guilty of, 'the illiberal arrogance, petulance and scurrility which distinguish the Warburtonian School.'

But there is a person, that has writ an 'Enquiry historical and critical into the evidence against Mary Queen of Scots;' and has attempted to refute the forgoing narrative. He quotes a single passage of the narrative in which Mary is said simply to refuse answering; and then a single passage from Goodall, in which she boasts simply that she will answer; and he very civilly and almost directly calls the author a liar, on account of this pretended contradiction. That whole Enquiry, from beginning to end, is composed of such *scandalous artifices* And from this instance, the reader may judge of the *candour, fair dealing, veracity*, and *good manners* of the Enquirer. There are, indeed, three events in our history, which may be regarded as touchstones of partymen. An English Whig, who asserts the reality of the popish Plot, an Irish Catholic, who denies the massacre in 1641, and a Scotch Jacobite, who maintains the innocence of Queen Mary, must be considered as men beyond the reach of argument or reason, and must be left to their prejudices.

[4]His disease was a diarrhoea; the physicians were divided about the seat of the malady. There is a reason however to conjecture, that his disorder originated from a course of eating rather fully, without drinking in proportion.

[5]Mr. Hume, after his circumstances became affluent, lived very hospitably and genteely. Yet he left to his relations upwards of 10,000l. of his own acquiring. He had a pension from the government of 500l. per annum.

[6]When the mob were assembled round Mr. Hume's door to see the corpse taken out to interment, the following short dialogue passed between two of the refuse of the rabble: "Ah, (says one) he was an Atheist." "No matter, (says another) he was an *honest man*.

A Letter to Adam Smith, LL.D. on the Life, Death, and Philosophy of his friend David Hume, Esq.

George Horne

1777

Editor's note: George Horne (1730-1792) was Dean of Canterbury, President of Magdalene College, and Bishop of Norwich. Horne published two anonymous attack on Hume: *A Letter to Adam Smith on the Life, Death, and Philosophy of his friend David Hume* in 1777, and *Letters on Infidelity* in 1784 (see Hume Archives edition). In his *Letter to Adam Smith*, Horne criticizes Smith's glowing portrayal of Hume in the *Letter from Adam Smith to William Strahan*. It is inconsistent, Horne suggests, to praise Hume as a virtuous man in view of Hume's atheistic writings. Horne also takes Smith to task for relaying Hume's unconcern about his approaching death, especially in the playful dialog between Hume and Charon. A postscript to *Letters on Infidelity* contains a summary of Hume's philosophical views taken from James Beattie's *Essay on the Immutability of Truth* (p. 160 ff.). The *Critical Review* comments favorably that the *Letter to Adam Smith* "abounds with strokes of humour, and with the most happy allusions to the peculiar tenets, and circumstances of the philosopher, or to the conduct of his encomiast" (1777 Vol. 43, pp. 306-308). The *London Review* leaves to "the advocates of Mr. Hume and his philosophy to determine whether or not this letter-writer has here stated the case as it really is, in justification of the sarcastical severity which pervades the whole of this little performance" (1777, Vol. 5, pp. 316-317). Because of the ridiculing tone of the *Letter to Adam Smith*, the *Monthly Review* is yet more restrained in its applause:

> **This Author, who is said to be a dignitary of Oxford, labours by alternate and oddly mingled efforts of serious and ludicrous arguments, to convince Dr. Smith, and all the world, that David Hume as, at once, an absurd philosopher, and a pernicious writer. And this being the case, it follows, that the said Dr. Smith, the celebrated author of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, and the treatise on *the Wealth of Nations*, -- the friend and panegyrist of the said Hume, -- cannot, himself, be much wiser and**

> better than he should be.... [Hume's and Smith's] Drollery, in such circumstances, is neither more nor less than -- Moody madness, laughing wild, Amid severest woe. -- May not this censure be, in some measure, applied to our Author himself, who affects to *sport*, as he does in some parts of his letter, with a subject the most *serious*! the most *aweful*! -- and of the *last importance* to every rational being! [1777, Vol. 56, p. 403]

Horne's *Letter to Adam Smith* is directly assaulted in a "Reply" by S.J. Pratt, appended to his 1777 *Apology for the Life and Writings of David Hume* (pp. 129-167). Pratt writes "your *leer* is by no means *civil*, and you *do* sneer yourself most horribly, even while you are teaching *others* to sneer.... The questions you address to Dr. Smith, are, most of them, exceedingly superficial.... Your arguments, Sir, are not much happier than your questions; as your remarks are in general, poorer than both." Painting a more memorable image of Horne's pamphlet, in his *Memoirs of the Life of Dr. Horne* (1799) William Jones writes that,

> The Letter to Dr. Adam Smith, like the Essay of Dr. Beattie, has a great deal of truth, recommended by a great deal of wit; and if the reader has not seen it, he has some pleasure in store. We allow to the memory of Dr. Adam Smith, that he was a person of understanding and diligent research, in things relating merely to this world... but when he set up Mr. Hume as a pattern of perfection, and judged of all religion by the principles of that philosopher, he was very much out of his line.

The *Letter to Adam Smith* was published a second time in 1777, and several more times in 1784, 1786 (prefaced to *Letters on Infidelity*), 1799, 1804, 1813, 1820, and 1830 (in *The Works of George Horne*. The following is from the 1779 edition.

A
LETTER
TO
ADAM SMITH. LL.D.
ON THE
LIFE, DEATH, AND PHILOSOPHY
OF HIS FRIEND
DAVID HUME. ESQ.
BY ONE OF THE PEOPLE CALLED CHRISTIANS.

Ibant obscuri, sola sub nocte, per umbram, Perque domos Ditis Vacuas, et inania regna.

VIRG.

A NEW EDITION,
PUBLISHED BY DESIRE OF THE
SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE.
London:
PRINTED FOR F. AND C. RIVINGTON,
BOOKSELLERS TO THE SAID SOCIETY,
NO. 62, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD
1799

{ii}

N.B. ***The Author of this Tract was GEORGE HORNE, D.D. Late Lord Bishop of Norwich*.**

{iii}

ADVERTISEMENT.

IT is of no consequence, gentle Reader, to you, any more than it is to Dr. SMITH, that you should know the name of the person, who now addresseth you. Your mind cannot be biassed, either way, by that, of which you remain ignorant. The remarks in the following pages are not therefore true, or false, because I made them; but I made them, because I thought them to be true. Read, consider, and determine for yourself. If you find no satisfaction, throw the book into the fire; regret (but with moderation, as becometh a philosopher) the loss of your sixpence;[2] and take care not to lose another, in the same manner. If, on the contrary, you *should* find satisfaction (and, it is humbly hoped, you will find a great deal) neglect not to communicate to others, what his thus been communicated to you. Speak handsomely of me, wherever you go, and introduce me to your kinsfolk and acquaintance. The enemies of Religion are awake; let not her friends sleep.

I intend a much longer work; but, like the learned editor of Mr. HUME'S Life, am necessitated to "gratify," with all possible expedition, "the impatience of the public curiosity;" so eager is it to hear, what they, who believe in GOD, can possibly have to say for themselves. And if this will do the business, why should you be troubled with more? I am far from agreeing with Mr. VOLTAIRE, in all his observations. But there is one, in which it is impossible to disagree with him. "I have said, and I abide by it," cries the little hero, "that the fault of most books is, their being too large." On reviewing what I have written, I really cannot see there is occasion to add another sentence.

Had I not chosen, for reasons best known to myself, thus to make my appearance *incog*. I would certainly have sate for my picture, and have tried to cast a look at my title page, as lively and good humoured, as that of Mr. Hume himself. My bookseller, indeed, told me, it would have been a much more creditable way of doing the thing; "and then, you know, Sir," said he, "we could have charged the other sixpence."

A

LETTER, &C.

SIR,

YOU have been lately employed in embalming a philosopher; his *body*, I believe I must say; for concerning the other part of him, neither you nor he seem to have entertained an idea, sleeping or waking. Else, it surely might have claimed a little of your care and attention; and one would think, the belief of the soul's existence and immortality could do no harm, if it did no good, in a *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. But every gentleman understands his own business best.

Will you do an unknown correspondent the honour, Sir, to accept a few plain remarks, in a free and easy way, upon the curious letter to Mr. STRAHAN, in which this ever memorable operation of *embalming* is performed? Our Philosopher's account of *his own life* will likewise be considered, as we go along.

Trust me, good Doctor, I am no bigot, enthusiast, or enemy to human learning -- *Et ego in Arcadia*

-- I have made many a hearty meal, in private, upon CICERO and VIRGIL, as well as Mr. HUME.[3] Few persons (though, perhaps, as Mr. HUME says, upon a like occasion, "I ought not to judge on that subject") have a quicker relish for the productions of genius, and the beauties of composition. It is therefore as little in my intention, as it is in my power, to prejudice the literary character of your friend. From some of his writings I have received great pleasure, and have ever esteemed his History of England to have been a noble effort of *matter and motion*. But when a man takes it into his head to do mischief, you must be sensible, Sir, the public has always reason to lament his being a *clever fellow*.

I hope it will not be deemed vanity in me likewise to say, that I have in my composition a large proportion of that, which our inimitable SHAKESPEARE styles, *the mild of human kindness*. I never knew what envy or hatred was; and am ready, at all times, to praise, wherever I can do it, in honour and conscience. DAVID, I doubt not, was, as you affirm, a social agreeable person, of a convivial turn, told a good story, and played well at "his favourite game of whist."[4] I know not that JOHN THE PAINTER did the same. But there is no absurdity in the supposition. If he did not, he might have done it -- Doctor; be not offended -- I mean no harm. I would only infer thus much, that I could not, on that account, bring myself absolutely to approve his odd fancy of firing all the dockyards in the kingdom.

Concerning the *philosophical opinions* of Mr. HUME you observe,[5] that "men will, no doubt, judge variously." They are certainly at liberty so to do, because the author himself did the same. Sometimes, to be sure, he esteemed them ingenious, deep, subtile, elegant, and calculated to diffuse his literary fame to the ends of the world. But, at other times, he judged very differently; very much so, indeed. "I dine," says he, "I play a game at back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so *cold*, so *strained*, and so *ridiculous*, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther."[6] Now, Sir, if you will only give me leave to judge, before dinner, of Mr. HUME'S philosophy, as he judged of it after dinner, we shall have no farther dispute upon that subject. I could indeed wish, if it were possible, to have a scheme of thought, which would bear contemplating, at any time of the day; because, otherwise, a person must be at the expence of maintaining a brace of these metaphysical Hobby-Horses, on to mount in the morning, and the other in the afternoon.

After all, Sir, friend as I am to freedom of opinion (and no one living can be more so) I am rather sorry, methinks, that men should judge so *variously* of Mr. HUME's philosophical speculations. For since the design of them is to banish out of the world every idea of truth and comfort, salvation and immortality, a future state, and the providence, and even existence of GOD, it seems a pity, that we cannot be all of a mid about them, though we might have formerly liked to hear the author crack a joke, over a bottle, in his life time. And I could have been well pleased to have been informed by you, Sir, that, before his death, he had ceased to number among his happy effusions tracts of this kind and tendency.

For -- (let me come a little closer to you, Doctor, if you please, upon this subject -- Don't be under any apprehensions -- my name does not begin with a B___) Are *you* sure, and can you make *us* sure, that there really exist no such things as a GOD, and a future state of rewards and punishments? If so, all is well. Let us *then*, in our last hours, read LUCIAN, and play at WHIST, and droll upon CHARON and his boat;[7] let us die as foolish and insensible, as much like our brother philosophers, the calves of the field, and the asses of the desart, as we can, for the life of us. But -- if such things BE -- as they most certainly ARE -- Is it right in you, Sir, to hold up to our view, as

"perfectly wise and virtuous,"8 the *character* and *conduct* of one who seems to have been possessed with an incurable antipathy to all that is called RELIGION; and who strained every nerve to explode, suppress, and extirpate the spirit of it among men, that it's very name, if he could effect it, might no more be had in remembrance? Are we, do you imagine, to be reconciled to a character of this sort, and fall in live with it, because it's owner was *good company*, and knew how to manage his *cards?* Low as the age is fallen, I will venture to hope, it has grace enough yet left, to resent such usage as this.

You endeavour to entertain us with some *pleasant conceits* that were supposed by Mr. HUME to pass between himself and old CHARON. The philosopher tells the old gentleman, that, "he had been endeavouring to open the eyes of the Public;" that he was "correcting his works for a new edition," from which great things were to be expected; in short, "if he could but live a few years longer (and that was the only reason why he would with to do so), he might have the satisfaction of seeing the downfal of some of the prevailing systems of *superstition*."[9]

We all know, Sir, what the word superstition denotes, in Mr. HUME'S vocabulary, and against what Religion his shafts are levelled, under that name. But, Doctor SMITH, do you believe, or would you have us to believe, that it is CHARON, who calls us out of the world, at the appointed time? Doth not HE call us out of it, who sent us into it? Let me, then, present you with a paraphrase of the Wish, as addressed to HIM, to whom it should, and to whom alone, with any sense and propriety it can be addressed. -- Thus it runs --

"LORD, I have only one reason why I would with to live. Suffer me so to do, I most humbly beseech thee, yet a little while, till mine eyes shall behold the success of my undertaking to overthrow, by my metaphysics, the faith which thy SON descended from heaven to plant, and to root out the knowledge and the love of thee from the earth."

Here are no rhetorical figures, no hyperbole's or exaggerations. The matter is even so. I appeal, in the fact of the world, Sir, to yourself, and to every man, who can read and understand the writings of Mr. HUME, whether this be not, in plain, honest English, the drift of his *philosophy* as it is called; for the propagation of which alone he wished to live; and concerning which you are pleased to say cooly, "men will judge variously, every one approving or condemning these opinions, according as they happen to coincide or disagree with his own."[10] Our thoughts are very naturally carried back, upon this occasion, to the author of the *first philosophy*, who likewise engaged to *open the eyes of the Public* -- He did so; but the only discovery they found themselves able to make, was, -- that they were NAKED.

You talk much, Sir, of our philosopher's *gentleness* of manners, *good nature, compassion, generosity, charity*. Alas, Sir, whither were they all fled, when he so often sate down calmly and deliberately to obliterate from the hearts of the human species every trace of the knowledge of GOD and his dispensations; all faith in his kind providence, and fatherly protection; all hope of enjoying his grace and favour, here, or hereafter; all love of him, and of their brethren for his sake; all the patience under tribulation, all the comforts, in time of sorrow, derived from these fruitful and perennial sources? Did a good man think himself able, by the force of metaphysic incantations, in a moment, to blot the sun out of heaven, and dry up every fountain upon earth, would he attempt to do it? -- TULLY had but a faint glimpse of the country to which we are all travelling; yet, so pleasing was any the most imperfect and shadowy prospect into futurity, that TULLY declared, no man should ravish it from him.[11] And surely, TULLY was a philosopher, as well as HUME. O had he seen the light which shone upon HUME, he would not have closed his eyes

against it; had the same cup been offered to him, he would not have dashed it untasted from him!

"Perhaps our modern sceptics are ignorant, that without the belief of a GOD, and the hope of immortality, the miseries of human life would often be insupportable. But can I suppose them in a state of total and invincible stupidity, utter strangers to the human heart, and to human affairs? Sure, they would not thank me for such a supposition. Yet this I must suppose, or I must believe them to be the most cruel, the most perfidious, and the most profligate of men. Caressed by those who call themselves the great, ingrossed by the formalities of life, intoxicated with vanity, pampered with adulation, dissipated in the tumult of business, or amidst the vicissitudes of folly, they perhaps have little need and little relish for he consolations of religion. But let them know, that in the solitary scenes of life, there is may an honest and tender heart pining with incurable anguish, pierced with the sharpest sting of disappointment, bereft of friends, chilled with poverty, racked with disease, scourged by the oppressor; whom nothing but trust in Providence, and the hope of a future retribution could preserve from the agonies of despair. And do they, with sacrilegious hands, attempt to violate this last refuge of the miserable, and to rob them of the only comfort that had survived the ravages of misfortune, malice, and tyranny? Did it ever happen, that the influence of their execrable tenets disturbed the tranquillity of virtuous retirement, deepened the gloom of human distress, or aggravated the horrors of the grave? Is it possible, that this may have happened in many instances? Is it possible, that this hath happened in one single instance? -- Ye traitors to human kind, ye murderers of the human soul, how can you answer for it to your own hearts! Surely, every spark of your generosity is extinguished for ever, if this consideration do not awaken in you the keenest remorse, and make you with in bitterness of soul -- But I remonstrate in vain. All this must have often occurred to you, and been as often rejected, as utterly frivolous. Could I enforce the present topic by an appeal to your vanity, I might possibly make some impression. But to plead with you on the principles of BENEVOLENCE OR GENEROSITY, is to address you in a language ye do not, or will not understand; and as to the shame of being convicted of absurdity, ignorance, or want of candour, ye have long ago proved yourselves superior to the sense of it. -- But let not the lovers of truth be discouraged. Atheism cannot be of long continuance, nor is there much danger of it's becoming universal. The influence of some conspicuous characters hath brought it too much into fashion; which, in a thoughtless and profligate age, it is no difficult matter to accomplish. But when men have retrieved the powers of serious reflection, they will find it a frightful phantom; and the mind will return gladly and eagerly to it's old endearments. One thing we certainly know; the fashion of sceptical and metaphysical systems passeth away. Those unnatural productions, the vile effusion of a hard and stupid heart, the mistakes it's own restlessness for the activity of genius, and it's own captiousness for sagacity of understanding, may, like other monsters, please awhile by their singularity; but the charm is soon over; and the succeeding age will be astonished to hear, that their fore-fathers were deluded, or amused, with such fooleries."

You, Sir, have read the preceding paragraph before; but this Letter may come into the hands of many, who have not. It is the alarum bell to the admirers of Mr. HUME; and should be rung in their ears, till succeeded by the last trumpet.

And now, Sir, will you give me leave to ask you a few questions? Why all this hurry and bustle, this eagerness to gratify the pretended "impatience of the Public,"[12] and satisfy it, that our philosopher lived and died perfectly composed and easy? Was there, then, any suspicion, in SCOTLAND, that he might not, at times, be quite so composed and easy as he should have been? Was there any particular BOOK ever written against him, that shook his system to pieces about his

ears, and reduced it to a heap of ruins, the success and eclat of which might be supposed to have hurt his ind, and to have affected his health? Was there any AUTHOR, whose *name* his friends never dared to mention before him, and warned all strangers, that were introduced to him, against doing it, because he never failed, when by any accident it was done, to fly out into a transport of passion and swearing?[13] Was it deemed necessary, or expedient, on this account, that he should represent himself, and that you should represent him, to have been perfectly secure of the growth and increase of his philosophic reputation, as if no book had been written, which had impaired it; it having been judged much easier to dissemble the fall of DAGON, than to *set him upon his stumps again?* I am a *South* Briton, and, consequently, not acquainted with what passes so far in the opposite quarter. You, Sir, can inform us how these things are; and likewise, when the great work of *benevolence* and *charity*, of *wisdom* and *virtue*, shall be crowned by the publication of a treatise designed to prove the soul's mortality, and another, to justify and recommend self murder; for which, without doubt, the present and every future age will bless the name of the *gentle* and *amiable* author.

Upon the whole, Doctor, your meaning is good; but I think you will not succeed, this time. You would persuade us, by the example of DAVID HUME, Esp; that atheism is the only cordial for low spirits, and the proper antidote against the fear of death. But, surely, he who can reflect, with complacency, on a friend thus misemploying his talents in his life, and when amusing himself with LUCIAN, WHIST, and CHARON, at his death, may smile over BABYLON in ruins; esteem the earthquake, which destroyed LISBON, an agreeable occurrence; and congratulate the hardened PHARAOH, on his overthrow in the Red sea. Drollery, in such circumstances, is neither more nor less than

Moody Madness, laughing wild,

Amid severest woe. Would we know the baneful and pestilential influences of false philosophy on the human heart? We need only contemplate them in this most deplorable instance of Mr. HUME.

These sayings, Sir, may appear harsh; but they are salutary. And if departed spirits have any knowledge of what is passing upon earth, that person will be regarded by your friend as rendering him the truest services, who, by energy of expression, and warmth of exhortation, shall most contribute to prevent his writings from producing those effects upon mankind, which he no longer wishes they should produce. Let no man deceive himself, or be deceived by others. It is the voice of eternal TRUTH, which crieth aloud, and faith to you, Sir, and to me, and to all the world -- *He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him*.[14]

By way of contrast to the behaviour of Mr. HUME, at the close of a life, passed *without* GOD *in the world*, permit me, Sir, to lay before yourself, and the Public, the last sentiments of the truly learned, judicious, and admirable HOOKER, who had spent *his* days in the service of his Maker and Redeemer.

After this manner, therefore, spake the author of the *Ecclesiastical Polity*, immediately before he expired --

"I have lived to see, that this world is made up of perturbations; and I have been long preparing to leave it, and gathering comfort for the dreadful hour of making my account with GOD, which I now apprehend to be near. And though I have, by his grace, loved him in my youth, and feared him in mine age, and laboured to have a conscience void of offence, towards him, and towards all men; yet, if thou, Lord shouldest be extreme to mark what I have done amiss, who can abide it?

And therefore, where I have failed, Lord, shew mercy to me; for I plead not my righteousness, but the forgiveness of my unrighteousness, through his merits, who died to purchase pardon for penitent sinners. And since I owe thee a death, Lord, let it not be terrible, and then take thine own time; I submit to it. Let not mine, O Lord, but thy will be done! -- GOD hath heard my daily petitions; for I am at peace with all men, and he is at peace with me. From such blessed assurance I feel that inward joy, which this world can neither give, nor take from me. My conscience beareth me this witness; and this witness makes the thoughts of death joyful. I could wish to live, to do the church more service; but cannot hope it; for my days are past, as a shadow that returns not."

His worthy Biographer adds -- "More he would have spoken, but his spirits failed him; and, after a short conflict between nature and death, a quiet sigh put a period to his last breath, and so, he fell asleep -- And now he seems to rest like Lazarus in Abraham's bosom. Let me here draw his curtain, till, with the most glorious company of the Patriarchs and Apostles, and the most noble army of Marytrs and Confessors, this most learned, most humble, most holy man shall also awake to receive an eternal tranquillity, and with it a greater degree of glory, than common Christians shall be made partakers of."

Doctor SMITH, when the hour of his departure hence shall arrive, will copy the example of the BELIEVER, or the INFIDEL, as it liketh him best. I must freely own, I have no opinion of that reader's *head*, or *heart*, who will not exclaim, as I find myself obliged to do --

> ***Let* ME *die the death of the Righteous, and let* MY *last end be like his!***

> **I am, Sir,**
>
> **Your very sincere**
>
> **Well-wisher, and**
>
> **Humble Servant,**

One of the People called CHRISTIANS.

POSTSCRIPT.

AS it is possible, Sir, nay probable, that this little tract, because it is a little one, may be perused by many, who have not leisure or inclination to go through large volumes, and yet wish to know what Mr. HUME'S philosophical system is; I shall here subjoin a short, but comprehensive summary of the doctrines which compose it, drawn up, some few years ago, by a learned gentleman, for his amusement, with proper references to those parts of our philosopher's works, where such doctrines were to be found. And though I never heard, the compiler had the thanks of Mr. HUME for doing, yet neither could I ever find, that he or his friends disputed the fidelity and accuracy with which it was done.[15]

A SUMMARY OF MR. HUME'S DOCTRINES, METAPHYSICAL AND MORAL

OF THE SOUL

That the soul of man is not the same this moment, that it was the last; that we know not what it is; that it is not one, but many things; and that it is nothing at all.

That in this soul is the agency of all the causes that operate throughout the sensible creation; and yet that in this soul there is neither power not agency, nor any idea of either.

That matter and motion may often be regarded as the cause of thought.

OF THE UNIVERSE

That the external world does not exist, or at least, that it's existence may reasonably be doubted.

That the universe exists in the mind, and that the mind does not exist.

That the universe is nothing but a heap of perceptions, without a substance.

That though a man could bring himself to believe, yea, and have reason to believe, that every thing in the universe proceeds from some cause; yet it would be unreasonable for him to believe, that the universe itself proceeds from a cause.

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

That the perfection of human knowledge is to doubt.

That we ought to doubt of every thing, yea, of our doubts themselves, and therefore, the utmost that philosophy can do, is to give us a doubtful solution of doubtful doubts.[16]

That the human understanding, acting alone, does entirely subvert itself, and prove by argument, that by argument nothing can be proved.

That man, in all his perceptions, actions, and volitions, is a mere passive machine, and has no separate existence of his own, being entirely mad up of other things, of the existence of which he is by no means certain; and yet, that the nature of all things depends so much upon man, that two and two could not be equal to four, nor fire produce heat nor the sun light, without an act of the human understanding.

OF GOD

That it is unreasonable to believe GOD to be infinitely wise and good, while there is any evil or disorder in the universe.

That we have no good reason to think the universe proceeds from a cause.

That as the existence of the external world is questionable, we are at a loss to find arguments by which we may prove the existence of the Supreme Being, or any of his attributes.

That when we speak of Power, as an attribute of any being, GOD himself not expected, we use words without meaning.

That we can form no idea of power, nor of any being endued with power, *much less* of one endued with infinite power; and that we can never have reason to believe, that any object, or quality of any object exists, of which we can form an idea.[17]

OF THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTION

That every human action is necessary, and could not have been different from what it is.

That moral, intellectual, and corporeal virtues are nearly of the same kind -- In other words, that to want honesty, and to want understanding, and to want a leg, are equally the objects of moral disapprobation.

That adultery must be practised, if men would obtain all the advantages of life; that, if generally practised, it would in time cease to be scandalous; and that, if practised secretly and frequently, it would by degrees come to be thought no crime at all.

Lastly, as the soul of man, according to Mr. HUME, becomes every moment a different being, the

consequences must be, that the crimes committed by him at one time, cannot be imputable to him at another.[18]

I believe, Doctor Smith, the reader is now fully prepared to enter into the spirit of your concluding sentence, which therefore shall be mine.

"I have always considered Mr. HUME, both in his life-time, and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of A PERFECTLY WISE AND VIRTUOUS MAN, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit."

Notes

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[2]The price of the first edition.

[3]LIFE, p. 5.

[4]LIFE, &c. p. 43.

[5]LIFE, &c. p. 59.

[6]*Treatise of Human Nature*. I. 467. In the Postscript to this Letter, a view will be exhibited of the HUMAN system, taken exactly as it appeared to it's author at six o'clock in the evening.

[7]LIFE, &c. p. 47, et seq.

[8]LIFE, &c. p. 62.

[9]LIFE, &c. p. 50.

[10]LIFE, &c. p. 59.

[11]Quod si in hoc erro, quod animos hominum immortales esse credam, libenter erro; nec mihi hunc errorem, quo deledtor, dum vivo, extorqueri volo.

DE SENECTUTE, ad Fin.

[12]Preface to LIFE, &c.

[13]"I was a man of mild dispositions, of command of temper, little susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured by temper." LIFE, p. 32. Yet even by what is said of the Reverends and Right Reverends --

Bishop WARBURTON, Bishop HURD, the *Zealots* (that is, the *Christians*) and of the resolution once taken to "change his name and settle in France," because his writings did not meet with sufficient encouragement -- by these circumstances, I say, there seems to have been something of the *irritable* in his constitution. But these are trifles. My quarry lies not in this way, at present. I fly at nobler game. The atrocious wickedness of diffusing atheism through the land, is a subject which concerns every body.

[14]JOHN iii. 36.

[15]See Dr. BEATTIE'S Essay on Truth, Part II. Ch. I. Sect. I. and Part III. Ch. II.

[16]The fourth section of Mr. HUME'S *Essay on the Human Understanding*, is called *Sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the human understanding*; and the fifth section bears this title, *Sceptical Solution of those doubts*.

[17]The poor prodigal *Gentile*, in the parable, was hardly reduced to feed upon such HUSKS as these. How good and how joyful a thing must it be, for one, that has been so reduced, to return to the house of his heavenly Father, where *there is bread enough and to spare* -- to *know the only true* GOD, *uand* JESUS CHRIST, *whom he hath sent!*

[18]"My *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, is of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the BEST. LIFE, p. 16.

"David Hume"

Memoirs of the political and private Life of James Caulfield, earl of Charlemont

James Caulfield

a. 1799

Editor's note: James Caulfield, Earl of Charlemont (1728-1799). Caulfield's *Memoirs* are a compilation of letters and notes by Cauflied which are organized and provided with connective narrative by Francis Hardy. The *Quarterly Review* praises this work as a contribution to the history of Ireland: "Not that these 'Memoirs of Lord Charlemont" form a complete history of Ireland during the life of that nobleman... but they afford a very liberal and entertaining contribution towards it; they supply a great deal of important matter which is not to be obtained from any other source...." (1811, Vol. 6, pp. 124-147). The memoirs reproduce two biographical essays written by Caulfield about Hume; they are evidently based on years of qpersonal acquaintance. The original manuscripts currently reside in the Royal Irish Academy (MS 12/R/17, f. 523). The first essay describes Hume's personal appearance, dress, and speech. Hume's philanthropy is praised, and skeptical motives are examined. The second essay relates Rousseau episodes, conversations on immortality, Hume's reception in France, denial of deism, defense of the Stuarts, and inclination to proselytize. The first edition of the *Memoirs* appeared in 1810 with a second (two volume) edition following shortly after in 1812. The following is taken from the 1812 edition (London: T Cadell, Vol. 1, pp. 12-19, 230-239).

The celebrated David Hume, whose character is so deservedly high in the literary world, and whose works, both as a Philosopher and as an Historian, are so wonderfully replete with genius and entertainment, was, when I was at Turin, Secretary to Sir John Sinclair, plenipotentiary from the court of Great Britain to his Sardinian majesty. He had then lately published those philosophical essays which have done so much mischief to mankind, by contributing to loosen the sacred bonds by which alone man can be restrained from rushing to his won destruction, and

which are so intimately necessary to our nature, that a propensity to be bound by them was apparently instilled into the human mind, by the all-wise Creator, as a balance against those passions which, though perhaps necessary as incitements to activity, must, without such controul, inevitably have hurried us to our ruin. The world, however, unconscious of its danger, had greedily swallowed the bait; the essays were received with applause, read with delight, and their admired author was already, by public opinion, placed at the head of the dangerous school of sceptic philosophy.

With this extraordinary man I was intimately acquainted. He had kindly distinguished me from among a number of young men, who where then at the academy, and appeared so warmly attached to me, that it was apparent he not only intended to honour me with his friendship, but to bestow on me what was, in his opinion, the first of all favours and benefits, by making me his convert and disciple.

Nature, I believe, never formed any man more unlike his real character than David Hume. The powers of phisiognomy were baffled by his countenance; neither could the most skilful, in that science, pretend to discover the smallest trace of the faculties of his mind, in the unmeaning features of his visage. His face was broad and fat, his mouth wide, and without any other expression than that of imbecility. His eyes vacant and spiritless, and the corpulence of his whole person was far better fitted to communicate the idea of a turtle-eating Alderman, than of a refined philosopher. His speech, in English, was rendered ridiculous by the broadest Scotch accent, and his French was, if possible, still more laughable; so that wisdom, most certainly, never disguised herself before in so uncouth a garb. Though now near fifty years old, he was healthy and strong; but his health and strength, far from being advantageous to his figure, instead of manly comeliness, had only the appearance of rusticity. His wearing an uniform added greatly to his natural awkwardness, for he wore it like a grocer of the trained bands. Sinclair was a Lieutenant-general, and was sent to the courts of Vienna and Turin, as a military envoy, to see that their quota of troops was furnished by the Austrians and Piedmontese. It was, therefore, thought necessary that his secretary should appear to be an office, and Hume was accordingly disguised in scarlet.

Having thus given an account of his exterior, it is but fair that I should state my good opinion of his character. Of all the philosophers of his sect, none, I believe, ever joined more real benevolence to its mischievous principles than my friend Hume. His lobe of mankind was universal and vehement; and there was no service he would not cheerfully have done to his fellow creatures, excepting only that of suffering them to save their souls in their own way. He was tender-hearted, friendly, and charitable in the extreme, as will appear from a fact, which I have from good authority. When a member of the university of Edinburgh, and in great want of money, having little or no paternal fortune, and the collegiate stipend being very inconsiderable, he had procured, through the interest of some friend, an office in the university, which was worth about forty pounds a year. On the day when he had received this good news, and just when he had got into his possessions the patent, or grant entitling him to his office, he was visited by his friend Blacklock, the poet, who is much better known by his poverty and blindness, than by his genius. This poor man began a long descant on the misery, bewailing his want of sight, his large family of children, and his utter inability to provide for them, or even to procure them the necessaries of life. Hume, unable to bear his complaints, and destitute of money to assist him, ran instantly to his desk, took out the grant, and presented it to his miserable friend, who received it with exultation, and whose name was soon after, by Hume's interest, inserted instead of his own. After such a relation it is needless that I should say any more of his genuine philanthropy, and generous beneficence; but the difficulty will

now occur, how a man, endowed with such qualities could possibly consent to become the agent of so much mischief, as undoubtedly has been done to mankind by his writings; and this difficulty can only be solved by having recourse to that universal passion, which has, I fear, a much more general influence over all our actions than we are willing to confess. Pride, or vanity, joined to a sceptical turn of mind, and to an education which, though learned, rather sipped knowledge than drank it, was, probably, the ultimate cause of this singular phaenomenon; and the desire of being placed at the head of a sect, whose tenets controverted and contradicted all received opinions, was too strong to be resisted by a man, whose genius enabled him to find plausible arguments, sufficient to persuade both himself and many others, that his own opinions were true. A philosophical knight-errant was the dragon he had vowed to vanquish, and he was careless, or thoughtless, of the consequences which might ensue from the achievement of the adventure to which he had pledged himself. -- He once professed himself the admirer of a young, most beautiful, and accomplished lady, at Turin, who only laughed at his passion. One day he addressed her in the usual common-place strain, that he was *abime,* aneanti. -- '*Oh! pour* aneanti,' replied the lady, '*cd n'est en effet qu' une operation tres naturelle de votre Systeme*.'

Nothing ever shewed a mind more truly beneficient than Hume's whole conduct with regard to Rousseau. That story is too well known to be repeated, and exhibits a striking picture of Hume's heart, whilst it displays the strange and unaccountable vanity, and madness, of the French, or rather Swiss moralist. When first they arrived together from France, happening to meet with Hume in the Park, I wished him joy of his pleasing connection, and particularly hinted, that I was convinced he must be perfectly happy in his new friend, as their sentiments were, I believed, nearly similar. 'Why no, man,' said he, 'in that you are mistaken; Rousseau is not what you think him; he has a hankering after the Bible, and, indeed, is little better than a Christian, in a way of his own.' Excess of vanity was the madness of Rousseau. When he first arrived in London, he and his Armenian dress were followed by crowds, and as long as this species of admiration lasted, he was contented and happy. But in London, such sights are only the wonder of the day, and in a very short time he was suffered to walk where he pleased, unattended, unobserved. From that instant, his discontent may be dated. But to dwell no longer on matters of public notoriety, I shall only mention one fact, which I can vouch for truth, and which would. of itself be amply sufficient to convey an adequate idea of the amazing eccentricity of this singular man. When after having quarrelled with Hume, and all his English friends, Rousseau was bent on making his escape, as he termed it, into France, he stopped at a village between London and Dover, and from thence wrote to General Conway, then Secretary of State, informing him, that although he had got so far with safety, he was well apprized, that the remainder of his rout was so beset by his inexorable enemies, that, unprotected, he could not escape. He therefore solemnly claimed the protection of the King, and desired that a party of cavalry might be immediately ordered to escort him to Dover. This letter General Conway shewed to me, together with his answer, in which he assured him that the postillions were, altogether, a very sufficient guard throughout every part of the King's dominions. To return to Hume. In London, where he often did me the honour to communicate the manuscripts of his additional essays, before their publication, I have sometimes, in the course of our intimacy, asked him whether he thought that, if his opinions were universally to take place, mankind would not be rendered more unhappy than they now were; and whether he did not suppose that the curb of religion was necessary to human nature? "The objections,' answered he, "are not without weight; but error never can produce good, and truth ought to take place of all consideration. ' He

never failed, in the midst of any controversy, to give its due praise to every thing tolerable what was either said, or written against him. One day that he visited me in London, he came into my room laughing, and apparently well pleased. 'What has put you into this good humour, Hume?' said I. 'Why, man,' replied he, 'I have just now had the best thing said to me I ever heard. I was complaining in a company, where I spent the morning, that I was very ill treated by the world, and that the censures past upon me were hard and unreasonable. That I had written many volumes, throughout the whole of which there were but few pages that contained any reprehensible matter, and yet, for those few pages, I was abused and torn to pieces.' 'You put me in mind,' said an honest fellow in the company, whose name I did not know, 'of an acquaintance of mine, a notary public, who, having been condemned to be hanged for forgery, lamented the hardship of his case; that after having written many thousand inoffensive sheets, he should be hanged for one line.'

But an unfortunate disposition to doubt of every thing seemed interwoven with the nature of Hume, and never was there, I am convinced, a more thorough and sincere sceptic. He seemed not to be certain even of his own present existence, and could not therefore be expected to entertain any settled opinion respecting his future state. Once I asked him what he thought of the immortality of the soul? 'Why troth, man,' said he, 'it is so pretty and so comfortable a theory, that I wish I could be convinced of its truth, but I canna help doubting.'

Hume's fashion at Paris, when he was there as Sectarary to Lord Hertford, was truly ridiculous; and nothing ever marked, in a more striking manner, the whimsical genius of the French. No man, from his manners, was surely less formed for their society, or less likely to meet with their approbation; but that flimsy philosophy which pervades, and deadens even their most licentious novels, was then the folly of the day. Free thinking and English frocks were the fashion, and the Anglomanie was the *ton du pais*. Lord Holland, though far better calculated than Hume to please in France, was also an instance of this singular predilection. Being about this time on a visit to Paris, the French concluded, that an Englishman of his reputation must be a philosopher, and must be admired. It was customary with him to doze after dinner, and one day, at a great entertainment, he happened to fall asleep; 'Le voila!' says a Marquis, pulling his neighbour by the sleeve; 'Le voila, qui pense!' But the madness for Hume was far more singular and extravagant. From what has been already said of him, it is apparent that his conversation to strangers, and particularly to Frenchmen, could be little delightful, and still more particularly, one would suppose, to French women. And yet no lady's toilette was complete without Hume's attendance. At the opera, his broad, unmeaning face was usually seen *entre deux jolis minois*. The ladies in France give the ton, and the ton was deism; a species of philosophy ill suited to the softer sex, in whose delicate frame weakness is interesting, and timidity a charm. But the women in France were deists, as with us they were charioteers. The tenets of the new philosophy were *a portee de tout, le monde*, and the perusal of a wanton novel, such, for example, as Therese Philosophe, was amply sufficient to render any fine gentleman, or any fine lady, an accomplished, nay, a learned deist. How my friend Hume was able to endure the encounter of these French female Titans I know not. In England, either his philosophic pride, or his conviction that infidelity was ill suited to women, made him perfectly averse from the initiation of ladies into the mysteries of his doctrine. I never saw him so much displeased, or so much disconcerted, as by the petulance of Mrs. Mallet, the conceited wife of Bolingbroke's editor. This lady, who was not acquainted with Hume, meeting him one night at an assembly, boldly accosted him in these words: 'Mr. Hume, give me leave to introduce myself to you; we deists ought to know each other.' -- 'Madame,' replied he, 'I am no deist. I do not style myself so, neither do I desire to be known by that appellation.'

Nothing ever gave Hume more real vexation, than the strictures made upon his history in the House of Lords, buy the great Lord Chatham. Soon after that speech I met Hume, and ironically wished him joy of the high honour that had been done him. 'Zounds, man,' said he, with more peevishness than I had ever seen him express, 'he's a Goth! he's a Vandal!' Indeed, his history is as dangerous in politics, as his essays are in religion; and it is somewhat extraordinary, that the tame man who labours to free the mind from what he supposes religious prejudices, should as zealously endeavour to shackle it with the servile ideas of despotism. But he loved the Stuart family, and his history is, of course, their apology. All his prepossessions, however, could never induce him absolutely to falsify history; and though he endeavours to soften the failings of his favourites, even in their actions, yet it is on the characters which he gives to them, that he principally depends for their vindication; and from hence frequently proceeds, in the course of his history, this singular incongruity, that it is morally impossible that a man, possessed of the character which the historian delineates, should in certain circumstances have acted the part which the same historian narrates and assigns to him. But now to return to his philosophical principles, which certainly constitute the discriminating feature of his character. The practice of combating received opinions, had one unhappy, though not unusual, effect on his mind. He grew fond of paradoxes, which his abilities enabled him successfully to support; and his understanding was so far warped and bent by this unfortunate predilection, that he had well nigh lost that best faculty of the mind, the almost intuitive perception of truth. His sceptical turn made him doubt, and consequently dispute every thing; yet was he a fair and pleasant disputant. He heard with patience, and answered without acrimony. Neither was his conversation at any time offensive, even to his more scrupulous companions: his good sense, and good nature, prevented his saying any thing that was likely to shock, and it was not till he was provoked to argument, that, in mixed companies, he entered into his favourite topics. Where indeed, as was the case with me, his regard for any individual rendered him desirous of making a proselyte, his efforts were great and anxiously incessant.

Respecting this new, or rather revived system of philosophy, *soi disante telle*, it may perhaps be confessed, that it may possibly have done some good; but then it has certainly done much more mischief to mankind. On the one hand, it may perhaps be allowed, that to its prevalence we owe that general system of toleration which seems to prevail, and which is, I fear, the only speck of white that marks the present age. Yet even this solitary virtue, if infidelity be its basis, is founded on a false principle. Christian Charity, which includes the idea of universal philanthropy, and which, when *really Christian*, is the true foundation on which this virtue should be erected, and not the opinion that all religions should be tolerated, because all are alike erroneous. But even allowing this boasted benefit its full weight, to the same cause we are, I doubt, on the other hand, indebted for that profligacy of manners, or, to call it by the most gentle name, that frivolity which every where prevails. To this cause we owe that total disregard, that fastidious dislike to all serious thought; for every man can be a deist without thinking; he is made so at his toilette, and, whilst his hair is dressing, reads himself into an adept; that shameful and degrading apathy to all that is great and noble; in a word, that perfect indifference to right or wrong, which enervates and characterizes this unmeaning and frivolous age. Neither have we reason to hope a favourable change. The present manners are the fashion of the day, and will not last. But infidelity will never subside into true piety. It will produce its contrary. The present is an age of irreligion; the next will, probably, be an age of bigotry.

Notes

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Anecdotes of David Hume

The Autobiography of Dr. Alexander Carlyle

Alexander Carlyle

a. 1800

Editor's note: Scottish clergyman Alexander Carlyle (1722-1805) began writing his memoirs at the close of his life in 1800. They cover the period from 1722 until 1770, which is as far as Carlyle had reached in the project before his death. Although Carlyle left instructions for the posthumous publication of his memoirs, they first appeared in 1859, edited by John Hill Burton. *The Edinburgh Review* opens its review of the *Autobiography* with the following general appraisal: "This book contains by far the most vivid picture of Scottish life and manners that has been given to the public since the days of Sir Walter Scott... The term autobiography scarcely describes if correctly. A far more accurate notion of its contents would have been conveyed, had the editor adhered to that which Dr. Carlyle himself seems from the opening sentence to have contemplated -- viz., 'Anecdotes and Characters of the Times.'" Regarding Carlyle's account of Hume, the *Edinburgh* notes that "...one of the greater lights of Edinburgh in those days, was unquestionably David Hume. In many respects Carlyle presents Hume in a new and a more pleasing light than that in which the world has hitherto seen him. His sketches of him are of special importance, proceeding, as they do, not only from an intimate friend, but from one whose own sincerity as a Christian believer was never called in question" (1861, Vol. 113). The Burton edition of Carlyle's *Autobiography* was republished in 1860, 1861 and 1910. A new edition of Carlyle's memoirs edited by James Kinsley, appeared in 1972 based on Carlyle's original manuscript. The following is from the 1910 edition (London: T.N. Foulis).

At this time David Hume was living in Edinburgh and composing his *History of Great Britain*. He was a man of great knowledge, and of a social and benevolent temper, and truly the best-natured man in the world. He was branded with the title of Atheist, on account of the many attacks on revealed religion that are to be found in his philosophical works, and in many places of his History

-- the last of which are still more objectionable than the first, which a friendly critic might call only sceptical. Apropos of this, when Mr. Robert Adam, the celebrated architect, and his brother, lived in Edinburgh with their mother, an aunt of Dr. Robertson's, and a very respectable woman, she said to her son, "I shall be glad to see any of your companions to dinner, but I hope you will never bring the Atheist here to disturb my peace." But Robert soon fell on a method to reconcile her to him, for he introduced him under another name, or concealed it carefully from her. When the company parted she said to her son, "I must confess that you bring very agreeable companions about you, but the large jolly man who sat next me is the most agreeable of them all." "This was the very Atheist," said he, "mother, that you was so much afraid of." "Well," says she, "you may bring him here as much as you please, for he's the most innocent, agreeable, facetious man I ever met with." This was truly the case with him; for though he had much learning and a fine taste, and was professedly a sceptic, though by no means an atheist, he had the greatest simplicity of mind and manners with the utmost facility and benevolence of temper of any man I ever knew. His conversation was truly irresistible, for while it was enlightened, it was naive almost to puerility.

I was one of those who never believed that David Hume's sceptical principles had laid fast hold on his mind, but thought that his books proceeded rather from affectation of superiority and pride of understanding and love of vainglory. I was confirmed in this opinion, after his death, by what the Honourable Patrick Boyle, one of his most intimate friends, told me many years ago at my house in Musselburgh, where he used to come and dine the first Sunday of every General Assembly, after his brother, Lord Glasgow, ceased to be Lord High Commissioner. When we were talking of David, Mrs. Carlyle asked Mr. Boyle if he thought David Hume was as great an unbeliever as the world took him to be? He answered, that the world judged from his books, as they had a right to; but he thought otherwise, who had known him all his life, and mentioned the following incident: When David and he were both in London, at the period when David's mother died, Mr. Boyle, hearing of it, soon after went into his apartment -- for they lodged in the same house -- when he found him in the deepest affliction and in a flood of tears. After the usual topics of condolence. Mr. Boyle said to him, "My friend, you owe this uncommon grief to your having thrown off the principles of religion; for if you had not, you would have been consoled by the firm belief that the good lady, who was not only the best of mothers, but the most pious of Christians, was now completely happy in the realms of the just." To which David replied, "Though I threw out my speculations to entertain and employ the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other things I don not think so differently from the rest of mankind as you may imagine." To this my wife was a witness. This conversation took place the year after David died, when Dr. Hill, who was to preach, had gone to a room to look over his notes.

At this period, when he first lived in Edinburgh, and was writing his *History of England*, his circumstances were narrow, and he accepted the office of Librarian to the Faculty of Advocates, worth L40 per annum. But it was not for the salary that he accepted this employment, but that he might have easy access to the books in that celebrated library; for to my certain knowledge, he gave every farthing of the salary to families in distress. Of a piece with this temper was his curiosity and credulity, which were without bounds, a specimen of which shall be afterwards given when I come down to Militia and the Poker. His economy was strict, as he loved independency; and yet he was able at that time to give suppers to his friends in his small lodging in the Canongate. He took much to the company of the younger clergy, not from a wish to bring them over to his opinions, for he never attempted to overturn any man's principles, but they best understood his notions, and could furnish him with literary conversation. Robertson and John Home and

Bannatine and I lived all in the country, and came only periodically to the town. Blair and Jardine both lived in it, and suppers being the only fashionable meal at that time, we dined where we best could, and by cadies assembled our friends to meet us in a tavern by nine o'clock; and a fie time it was when we could collect David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Lord Elibank, and Drs. Blair and Jardine, on an hour's warning. I remember one night that David Hume, who, having dined abroad, came rather late to us, and directly pulled a large key from his pocket, which he laid on the table. This he said was given him by his maid Peggy (much more like a man than a woman) that she might not sit up for him, for she said when the honest fellows came in from the country, he never returned home till after one o'clock. This intimacy of the young clergy with David Hume enraged the zealots on the opposite side, who little know how impossible it was for him, had he been willing, to shake their principles.

As Mr. Hume's circumstances improved he enlarged his mode of living, and instead of the roasted hen and minced collops, and a bottle of punch, he gave both elegant dinners and suppers, and the best claret, and, which was best of all, he furnished the entertainment with the most instructive and pleasing conversation, for he assembled whosoever were most knowing and agreeable among either the laity or clergy. This he always did, but still more unsparingly when he became what he called rich. For innocent mirth and agreeable raillery I never know his match. Jardine, who sometimes bore hard upon him -- for he had much drollery and wit, though but little learning -- never could overturn his temper. Lord Elibank resembled David in his talent for collecting agreeable companions together, and had a house in town for several winters chiefly for that purpose.

David, who delighted in what the French call *plaisanterie*, with the aid of Miss Nancy Ord, one of the Chief Baron's daughters, contrived and executed one that gave him very great delight. As the New Town was making its progress westward, he built a house in the south-west corner of St. Andrew Square. The street leading south to Princes Street had not yet got its name affixed, but they got a workman early one morning to paint on the corner stone of David's house "St. David's Street," where it remains to this day.

He was at first quite delighted with Ossian's poems, and gloried in them; but on going to London he went over to the other side, and loudly affirmed them to be inventions of Macpherson. I happened to say one day, when he was declaiming against Macpherson, that I had met with nobody of his opinion but William Caddel of Cockenzie, and President Dundas, which he took ill, and was some time of forgetting. This is one instance of what Smellie says of him, that though of the best temper in the world, yet he could be touched by opposition or rudeness. This was the only time I had ever observed David's temper change. I can call to mind an instance or two of his good-natured pleasantry. Being at Gilmerton, where David Hume was on a visit, Sir David Kinloch made him go to Athlestaneford Church, where I preached for John Home. When we met before dinner, "What did you mean," says he to me, "by treating John's congregation to-day with one of Cicero's academics? I did not think that such heathen morality would have passed in East Lothian. On Monday, when we were assembling to breakfast, David retired to the end of the dining-room, when Sir David entered: "What are you doing there, Davy? come to your breakfast." "Take away the enemy first," says David. The baronet, thinking it was the warm fire that kept David in the lower end of the room, rung the bell for a servant to carry some of it off It was not the fire that scared David, but a large Bible that was left on a stand at the upper end of the room, a chapter of which had been read at the family prayers the night before, that good custom not being then out of use when clergymen were in the house. Add to this John Home saying to him at the Poker Club, when everybody wondered what could have made a clerk of Sir William Forbes run away with

L900 -- "I know that very well," says John Home to David; "for when he was taken, there was found in his pocked your *Philosophical Works* and Boston's *Fourfold State of Man*."

David Hume, during all his life, had written the most pleasing and agreeable letters to his friends. I have preserved two of these. But I lately saw tow of more early date in the hands of Mr. Sandiland Dysart, W.S., to his mother, who was a friend of David's and a very accomplished woman, one of them dated in 1751, on occasion of his brother Hume of Ninewell's marriage; and the other in 1754, with a present of the first volume of the History, both of which are written in a vein o pleasantry and playfulness which nothing can exceed, and which makes me think that a collection of his letters would be a valuable present to the world, and present throughout a very pleasing picture of his mind.

I have heard him say that Baron Montesquieu, when he asked him if he did not think that there would soon be a revolution in France favourable to liberty, answered, "No, for their noblesse had all become poltroons." He said that the club in Paris (Baron Holbach's) to which he belonged, were of opinion that Christianity would be abolished in Europe by the end of the eighteenth century; and that they laughed at Andrew Stuart for making a battle in favour of a future state, and called him "L'ame Immortelle."

David Hume, like Smith, had no discernment at all of characters. The only two clergymen whose interests he espoused, and for one of whom he provided, were the two silliest fellows in the Church. With every opportunity, he was ridiculously shy of asking favours, on account of preserving his independence, which always appeared to me to be a very foolish kind of pride. His friend John Home, with not more benevolence, but with no scruples from a wish of independence, for which he was not born, availed himself of his influence and provided for hundreds, and yet he never asked anything for himself.

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., HUME) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g., *Hume*) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

"The Life of David Hume, Esq."

William Smellie

from

Literary and Characteristical Lives

1800

Editor's Introduction: William Smellie (1740-1795) was a Scottish printer, naturalist and antiquarian. From 1765 until his death, Smellie owned a printing business with various partners and was instrumental in publishing the first edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. From 1773 through 1776 Smellie and Gilbert Stuart edited "The Edinburgh Magazine and Review," a monthly periodical. Near the close of his life, Smellie planned to write a biographical dictionary of famous Scottish authors with whom he was personally acquainted. Unfortunately, he was only able to completed sketches of John Gregory, Henry Home, David Hume, and Adam Smith. These were published posthumously by his son Alexander Smellie in 1800 under the title *Literary and characteristical lives of John Gregory, M.D., Henry Home, lord Kames, David Hume, esq. and Adam Smith, L.L.D. To which are added A dissertation on public spirit; and three essays* (Edinburgh). The lengthy essay on Hume (pp. 149-209) draws heavily from previously published sources, such as from Hume's *Life* and personal letters, Smith's *Letter*, and Smellie's *Encyclopedia Britannica* entry on "abridgement" (which discusses Hume). Flattering personal comments and anecdotes are interspersed. Smellie's biographical essays were not well received by the review journals of the day. The *Monthly Review* criticizes that Smellie's collection of biographies "would have communicated greater interest, had the author imparted particulars calculated to afford a more accurate view of their private conduct, opinions, and tempers, than can be collected from a perusal of their writings, or the public events of their lives, which are already sufficiently known" (1800, Vol. 33, pp. 422-423). The *New London Review* echoes the *Monthly*'s general assessment, and notes that "The life of Hume contains no new fact, nor any important anecdote beyond what we are already in possession of from his own account of it" (1800, Vol. 3, pp. 162-163). The *European Magazine* writes that "if the present lives were intended as specimens of the intention and execution [of

Smellie's planned biographical dictionary], the public will not much regret that the design is left to other hands." The review continues, however, noting that the account of Hume "is the most entertaining in the volume, but the greater part of it has appeared before, which is indeed acknowledged" (1800, Vol. 37, pp. 448-449). In spite of these negative comments, Smellie's essay is a significant contribution to Hume biography particularly because of the eye-witness anecdotes presented at the close of his essay. The following is from the 1800 and only printed edition of *Literary and Characteristical Lives*.

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THE
LIFE
of
DAVID HUME, ESQ.

IT is an arduous task to give an impartial account of an author who has been the object of so much praise and of so much obloquy as Mr. Hume: Yet the attempt must be made.

Mr. Hume was born at Edinburgh in the 26th of April 1711, old style. He was descended of respectable families both on the father and mother's side. His father's family was a branch of the earl of Hume's and his mother was a daughter of sir David Falconer. president if the College of Justice. {150} His family, however, was not opulent; and he being a younger brother , his patrimony was of course, very trifling. His father died when Mr. Hume was an infant: and he along with a sister an elder brother, were left to the care of their mother, who devoted her whole attention to the rearing and educations of her children.. Mr Hume passed through the ordinary courses of education with great success and very early discovered an uncommon passion for literature. This last circumstance suggested to his friends the idea that the profession of the law would be a proper employment for him; but young Hume had an insuperable aversion to everything but the pursuits of philosophy and of general learning; he tells us, that, when he was supposed to be studying Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors he was secretly devouring.

This plan, however, his narrow fortune was unable to support. He, therefore, made attempt to enter upon a more active scene of life. With this view, in the {151} year 1734, he went to Bristol, and had recommendations to some of the most eminent merchants in that city. In a few months, he discovered that this species of business was irksome and disagreeable to him. In order to prosecute his studies with the greater success, as well as to enable him to live upon his small fortune, he went to a country retreat. His chief residence was at La Fleche, in Anjou, where he composed his *Treatise of Human Nature*, which, after returning to London, he published in the year 1739. "Never literary attempt," Mr Hume remarks, "was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell *dead-born from the press*, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the *zealots*.[2]"

This complaint is curious, and confirms the adage, that an author is the worst judge of the merit or

demerit of his own works. Mr Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature,* as he himself informs us, excited no attention, either of praise or of censure, {152} from the public. No wonder! When much younger, I read that book with great ardour, and with great application. Some parts of it I perceived to be both ingenious and brilliant, and others so involved in obscurity, that I found it impossible to comprehend the meaning. At the period of life, I naturally attributed this seeming obscurity to my own inability, and was often ashamed, for that reason, to acknowledge that I had read it, because I could not give any distinct account of the book. When older, I perused it a second time, and then perceived an ingenious literary *trick,* if I may use such an expression. Mr Hume, when he begins an essay, or turns the *corner* of any argument, most artfully lays down a seemingly simple position, to which almost every reader gives a ready assent. From that moment, however, the reader is most completely bewildered: For, whenever these plausible positions are admitted, or inadvertently passed over, such is the force of Mr Hume's reasonings, and such the beauty and energy of his eloquence, that no reader can resist the torrent. Dean {153} Swift says, that the best way to conquer a woman, is to catch her by the *tail*. But the only successful mode of conquering Mr Hume is to catch him by the *nose*.

In the year 1742, Mr Hume published at Edinburgh the first part of the Essays. This work met with a more favourable reception from the public, and gave him some consolation for his former disappointment. In 1745, he was invited by the Marquis of Annandale, who was then indisposed both in mind and in body, to come and live with him in England, where Mr Hume continued during twelve months; and, by his appointments in that station, was enabled to make a considerable addition to his small fortune. He then received an invitation from General St Clair to attend him as secretary to an expedition against Canada, but which ended in an incursion on the coast of France. In 1747, Mr Hume was again invited by General St Clair to attend him in the same station in his embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin. He then wore the uniform of an officer; and, in the character of aid-de-camp {154} to the General, was introduced into these courts. These two years, he tells us, were almost the only interruptions he met with to his studies during the course of his life. But he passed them agreeably; and his appointments, joined to his own frugality, soon enabled him to amass near a thousand pounds.

Mr. Hume imagined that his *Treatise of Human Nature* had failed of success more from the manner of writing than from the matter. He, therefore, to use his own expression, *cast* the first part of that work anew in his *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding,* which was published while he was at Turin. But, at first, this piece was not much more successful than the former. Mr. Hume, however, though he must have felt those disappointments, was not altogether discouraged. In the 1749, he came down from London to Scotland, and lived at his brother's country-house, where he composed the second part of his Essay, which he called *Political Discourses,* and likewise his *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,* {155} which, he tells us, in another part of his *Treatise,* that he *cast* anew. Soon afterwards, he was informed by Mr A. Millar, his London bookseller, that his former publications, except his unfortunate Treatise, were beginning to be the subject of conversation; that the sale of them was gradually increasing; and that new editions were become necessary to answer the demands of the public. "Answers," he archly remarks, "by Reverands and Right Reverands, came out two or three in a year; and I found, by *Dr. Warburton's railing,* that the books were beginning to be esteemed in *good company*."[3]

Mr Hume, in the year 1751, removed from the country, and came to Edinburgh, which he emphatically terms the *true scene for a man of letters*.[4] In 1752, he published his *Political Discourses,* the first work of his which was successful at the outset. In the same year appeared his

Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, "which is," says he, "of all my writings, historical, {156} philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best."[5] But the public were of a contrary opinion; for the book was either totally neglected, or treated with contempt.

In the same year, he was appointed by the Faculty of Advocates their Librarian, from which office he received only a trifling emolument; but it gave him the command of a great collection of books and manuscripts. When this Library falls naturally to be mentioned, it would be unpardonable not to tell a truth of which every man of letters in Edinburgh has daily experience. The collection, especially of printed books, exceeds greatly that of any library in Britain; and free access to the perusal of them is cheerfully and politely allowed. On this subject, I must go farther. The occasional use of books or manuscripts in a public library is a most valuable privilege. The Faculty of Advocates, however, not only grants this privilege, but any member of that Faculty can, by his signature, oblige his friends with such books as {157} he chuses out of doors for a reasonable time; and such requests, on all proper occasions, are most liberally granted. The Faculty do more. Literary gentlemen, by giving bond for a certain sum, often acquire the privilege of taking out books upon their own receipts. To this noble collection, joined to the generosity of its proprietors, Scotland, for these hundred years past, has been indebted for the many productions of genius and of learning which have enabled her sons, within that period, to make such a distinguished figure in almost every department of science. I must not, however, omit her powerful auxiliaries. The libraries of the University of Edinburgh, and of the College of Physicians, are very great, and particularly enriched with books of Medicine, of Anatomy, and of Natural History. The access to these libraries is equally easy as to that of the Faculty of Advocates. But, to return. -- In this most favourable situation, where he had an opportunity of consulting almost every authentic resource, Mr Hume formed the plan of writing the *History of England*. {158} He commenced with the accession of the House of Stuart, and afterwards observed a kind of retrograde motion. Of the success of this work, he acknowledges his expectations were sanguine. "But," says he,

> "miserable was my disappointment: I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and every detestation; English, Scotch, and Irish, Whig and Tory, Churchman and Sectary, Freethinker and Religionist, Patriot and Courtier, united in their rage against the man who had presumed to shed a generous tear for the fate of Charles I. and the Earl of Strafford; and, after the ebullitions of their fury were over, what was still more mortifying, the book seemed to sink into oblivion."[6]

Some time afterwards, he published at London his *Natural History of Religion*.

> "Its public entry," he remarks, "was rather obscure, except only that Dr. Hurd wrote a pamphlet against it, with all the illiberal petulance, arrogance, and scurrility, {159} which distinguish the Warburtonian school. This pamphlet gave me some consolation for the otherwise indifferent reception of my performance."[7]

Two years after the miscarriage of the first volume, viz. in 1756, he published the second volume of his History of England, which included the period from the death of Charles I. to the Revolution. This performance gave less umbrage to the Whigs, and was more favourably received by the public. "It not only rose itself," says he, but helped to buoy up its unfortunate brother."[8] In the year 1759, Mr Hume published his *History of the House of Tudor*. The clamour excited by this work was nearly equal to that against the History of the two first Stuarts. The reign of Elizabeth was particularly offensive. "But," he tells us,

> "I was now callous against the impressions of public folly, and continued very

> peaceably and contentedly in my retreat at Edinburgh, to finish, in two volumes, the more early period of the English History, {160} which I gave to the public in 1761, with tolerable, and but tolerable, success."[9]

Notwithstanding, however, a very general clamour and many rude attacks, Mr Hume's writings gradually acquired ore and more reputation; and he received from the booksellers higher copy-money than had been given to any other author in Britain before that period. He now found himself not only independent, but opulent; and, therefore, he retired to his native country of Scotland, with a design never to leave it again. At that time, he was turned of fifty years, when, in the year 1763, he received an invitation from the Earl of Hertford to attend him on his embassy to Paris, with a near prospect of being his secretary. This offer, however, Mr Hume at first declined, on account of his age, and the reluctance he felt against mingling again with the gay company of the French metropolis. But, upon his Lordship's repeating the invitation, Mr. Hume at last consented. He was afterwards appointed secretary to the {161} embassy. In summer 1765, Lord Hertford was called home to be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and Mr Hume was left *charge d' affaires* till the arrival of the Duke of Richmond about the end of the same year. In the beginning of the year 1766, Mr Hume left Paris, and next summer went to Edinburgh with the view of enjoying an agreeable retreat among philosophical friends, with which that city, though not large, peculiarly abounds. Mr. Amyat, King's Chymist, a most sensible and agreeable English gentleman, resided in Edinburgh for a year or two. He one day surprised me with a curious remark. There is not a city in Europe, said he, that enjoys such a singular and such a noble privilege. I asked, What is that privilege? He replied, here I stand at what is called the *cross of Edinburgh*, and can, in a few minutes, take fifty men of genius and learning by the hand. The fact is well known; but to a native of that city, who has all his days been familiarized with it, and who has not travelled into other countries, that circumstance, though very remarkable, passes unnoticed: {162} Upon strangers, however, it makes a deep impression. In London, in Paris, and other large cities of Europe, though they contain many literary men, the access to them is difficult; and, even after that is obtained, the conversation is, for some time, shy and constrained. In Edinburgh, the access to men of parts is not only easy, but their conversation and the communication of their knowledge are at once imparted to intelligent strangers with the utmost liberty. The philosophers of Scotland have no nostrums. They tell what they know, and deliver their sentiments without disguise or reserve. This generous feature was conspicuous in the character of Mr Hume. He insulted no man; but, when the conversation turned upon particular subjects, whether moral or religious, he expressed his genuine sentiments with freedom, with force, and with a dignity which did honour to human nature.

In the year 1767, Mr Hume was invited by Mr. Conway to be under Secretary, which both the character of the person, and {163} his connections with Lord Hertford, prevented him from declining. He returned to Edinburgh in 1769 very opulent; for he then possessed a revenue of 1000L. a year; and, though pretty far advanced in life, he was in good health, and had the prospect of long enjoying ease, and seeing the increase of his reputation.

In sprint 1775, he began to be afflicted with a disorder in his bowels, which at first did not alarm him; but he soon afterwards apprehended that a mortification, and of course, a speedy dissolution, were to ensue. Still, however, his cheerfulness and usual alacrity, notwithstanding the great decline of his body, did not desert him. He considered, that a man of sixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few years of infirmities, and perhaps of peevishness and anxiety. Mr Hume concludes his life with a short sketch of what he apprehended to be his own character and dispositions: "I am, or rather was," says he,

> "a man of mild disposition, of command of temper, of an open, social, and cheerful humour, capable {164} of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured my temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments. My company was not unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to the studious and literary; and, as I took a particular pleasure in the company of modest women, I had no reason to be displeased with the reception I met with from them."[10]

Though Mr Hume believed the disease which afflicted him was to carry him off the stage of life, as we are informed by a letter from the late most ingenious and excellent Dr. Adam Smith to William Strahan, Esq; (of the latter of whom he had such a favourable opinion, that he left him the charge, with discretionary powers, of all his manuscripts, some of which, and particularly that of his own life, were afterwards published;) yet he was prevailed upon, by the entreaties of his friends, to try what might be the effects of a long journey. He accordingly, about the end of {165} April 1776, set out for London; and when he came the length of Morpeth, he met with Dr Adam Smith, and Mr John Home,[11] a gentleman well known for his poetical genius, and particularly for his theatrical writings. These two gentlemen were on their road from London expecting to find Mr Hume at Edinburgh. Mr Home returned with him, and "attended him," Mr Smith tells us, "during the whole of his stay in England, with that care and attention which might be expected from a temper so perfectly friendly and affectionate."[12]

Mr Hume's disease seemed to yield a little to exercise and change of air; for, when he arrived in London, he was apparently in much better health than when he left Edinburgh. He was advised to go to Bath and drink the waters, which, for some time, had so good an effect upon him, that he began to have some hopes of recovering his health. His former symptoms, however, {166} returned with their usual violence. From that moment, he relinquished all hopes of the continuation of life, and of ease. But he submitted to his fate with the utmost cheerfulness and complacency. When he returned to Edinburgh, though he found himself much weaker, his spirits never failed him. His cheerfulness was so great, and his conversation and amusements continued to much in their accustomed strain, that, notwithstanding many bad symptoms, few of his friends could believe his dissolution to be so fast approaching. Doctor Dundas, when taking leave of Mr Hume one day, said to him, "I shall tell your friend Colonel Edmonstone, that I left you much better, and in a fair way of recovery." -- "Doctor, Mr Hume replied, "as I believe you would not chuse to tell any thing but the truth, you had better tell him, that I am dying as fast as my enemies, if I have any, could wish, and as easily and cheerfully as my best friends could desire."[13]

Soon afterwards, Colonel Edmonstone went to see Mr Hume, and to take a last {167} farewell of him. But, on his way home, he could not refrain from writing a letter, bidding him once more an eternal adieu. Such were Mr Hume's magnanimity and fortitude of mind, that his most intimate and affectionate friends knew they hazarded no offence in taking or writing to him as a dying man. Mr Adam Smith happened to call upon Mr Hume when he was reading Colonel Edmonstone's letter, which he immediately showed to Mr Smith. After perusing this letter, Mr Smith remarked, that appearances were against Mr Hume; still, however, he said, your cheerfulness is so great, and you spirit of life so strong, that I must entertain some faint hopes of your recovery. Mr Hume answered, "Your hopes are groundless. An habitual *diarheoa*, of more than a year's standing, would b e a very bad disease at any age. At my age, it is a mortal one. When I lie down in the evening, I feel myself weaker than when I rose in the morning; and, when I rise in the morning, weaker than when I lay down in the evening. I am sensible, besides, that some of my vital parts are

affected, {168} so that I must soon die."14 Mr Smith replied, "If it must be so, you have at least the satisfaction of leaving all your friends, your brother's family in particular, in great prosperity."15 Mr Hume said, he felt that satisfaction so sensibly, that, a few days before, when reading Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead, among all the excuses which are usually made to Charon by souls who are backward to be ferried in his boat over the river Styx, he could not find one that suited him. He had no house to furnish, no children to provide for, nor any enemies upon whom he wished to be revenged. "I could not well imagine," said he, "what excuse I could make to Charon, in order to obtain a little delay. I have done every thing of consequence which I ever meant to do, and I could at no time expect to leave my relations and friends in a better situation than that in which I am now likely to leave them: I, therefore, have all reason to die contented."

He then amused himself with inventing {169} some whimsical excuses, which he supposed he might make to Charon, and with imagining the surly answers which it might suit the character of Charon to return to them. "Upon further consideration," said he, "I thought I might say to him, Good Charon, I have been correcting my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time that I may see how the public receives the alterations." But charon would answer, "When you have seen the effect of these, you will be for making other alterations. there will be no end of such excuses; so, honest friend, please step into the boat." But Mr Hume said, I might still urge, "Have a little patience, good Charon, I have been endeavouring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfal of some of the prevailing systems of superstition." But Charon would then lose all temper and decency. -- "You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy loitering rogue."16 {170}

Though Mr Hume frequently talked of his approaching dissolution with great ease, he never affected to make a parade of his magnanimity. He never mentioned the subject but when the conversation naturally suggested it. Mr Hume had now become so weak, that the company of his most intimate companions fatigued him; for his cheerfulness was still so great, his complaisance and social disposition were still so entire, the, when any friend was with him, he could not refrain from talking more, and with greater exertion, than the weakness of his body could easily sustain. Mr Smith, therefore, agreed, at Mr Hume's desire, to leave Edinburgh, and go to live in Kirkcaldy with his mother, who then resided in that town. The ingenious and well known Dr. Black, professor of chymistry in the university of Edinburgh, undertook occasionally to write Mr Smith an account of the state of his friend's health. Accordingly, on the 22d day of August, Dr Black wrote Mr Smith the following letter: "Since my last, Mr Hume has passed his time pretty easily, but is much weaker. He sits up, {171} goes down stairs once a-day, and amuses himself with reading, but seldom sees any body. He finds, that even the conversation of his most intimate friends fatigues and oppresses him; and it is happy that he does not need it, for he is quite free from anxiety, impatience, or low spirits, and passes his time very well with the assistance of amusing books."

The next day, Mr Smith received a letter from Mr Hume himself, of which what follows is an extract.

"*My deareast friend, Edin.* Aug. 23. 1776.

I am obliged to make use of my nephew's hand in writing to you, as I don not rise to-day. I go very fast to decline, and last night had a small fever, which I *hoped* might put a *quicker period* to this tedious illness, but unluckily it has, in a great measure, gone off." Three days after, Mr Smith received the following letter from Dr Black. {172}

"Dear sir, *Edin. Aug.* 26. 1776.

Yesterday, about four o'clock afternoon, Mr Hume expired. the near approach of his death became evident in the night between Thursday and Friday, when his disease became excessive, and soon weakened him so much, that he could no longer rise out of his bed. He continued to the last perfectly sensible, and free from much pain or feeling of distress. He never dropped the smallest expression of impatience; but, when he had occasion to speak to the people about him, always did it with affection and tenderness I thought it improper to write to bring you over, especially as I heard that he had dictated a letter to you, desiring you not to come. -- When he became very weak, it cost him an effort to speak, and he died in such a happy composure of mind, that nothing could exceed it." "Thus died," says Mr Smith, in his letter to Mr Strahan,

> "our most excellent and never to be forgotten friend, concerning whose philosophical opinions men will no doubt judge variously, every one approving, {173} proving, or condemning them, according as they happen to coincide or disagree with his own; but concerning whose character and conduct there can scarce be a difference of opinion. His temper, indeed, seemed to be more happily balance, if I may be allowed such an expression, than that, perhaps, of any other man I have ever known. Even in the lowest state of his fortune, his great and necessary frugality never hindered him, on proper occasions, from exercising acts both of charity and generosity. It was a frugality founded no upon avarice, but upon the love of independency. The extreme gentleness of his nature never weakened either the firmness of his mind, or the steadiness of his resolutions. His constant pleasantry was the genuine effusion of good nature and good humour, tempered with delicacy and modesty; and without even the slightest tincture of malignity, so frequently the disagreeable source of what is called wit in other men. It never was the meaning of his raillery to mortify; and, therefore, far from offending, it seldom failed to please and delight even those who {174} were the objects of it. To his friends, who were frequently the objects of it, there was not, perhaps, any one of all his great and amiable qualities, which contributed more to endear his conversation. And that gaiety of temper, so agreeable in society, but which is so often accompanied with frivolous and superficial qualities, was in him certainly attended with the most severe application, the most extensive learning, the greatest depth of thought, and a capacity in every respect the most comprehensive. Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit. I am, &c.

Adam Smith."

Thus far have I proceeded in giving a biographical account of this great literary and worthy man. Hitherto this account has been chiefly derived from printed authorities. I shall now conclude with adding {175} a few anecdotes from my own personal knowledge, joined to some other well known facts, which Mr Hume, in *his Own Life*, has not recorded.

His own Life, as well as Mr Adam Smith's *letter* to *Mr Strahan*, are written with great candour and truth. Mr Hume, like perhaps every man of genius, had a *keeness* of temper, which he happily balanced by a strong and decisive mode of reasoning. His works met with so many and often so rude attacks from a variety of authors, that, though he did not deign to answer them in writing;

yet, in conversation, he frequently discovered the resentments which he felt from the indelicate and often ignorant insults of inferior scholars. In all cases of this kind, his forcible mode of expression, the brilliant quick movements of his eyes, and the gestures of his body, discovered the acuteness of this feelings, and the highest marks of contempt as well as of aversion. {176}

One author, however, Dr Campbell, Professor of Morals in the University of Aberdeen, a learned, a worthy, and an ingenious man, wrote a pretty large book against Mr Hume's *Essay on Miracles*, in such a style and manner, and so much like a gentleman, that Mr Hume never spoke of him but with the utmost respect; and often said, that, of all his opponents, Doctor Campbell was not only the most acute, but wrote with the best temper, and in the mildest, though forcible and elegant terms. In the first edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, which was published at Edinburgh in the year 1771, under the word *Abridgment*, as an example of what I then thought to be the best and most useful mode of abridging books, I gave a short view of Mr Hume's *Essay on Miracles*, and of Dr Campbell's *answer* to it. I still think, that, as the article is short, a transcript of it may be of some value, especially to young readers.

"*Abridgment*, in literature, a term signifying the reduction of a book into a smaller compass. The art of conveying much {177} sentiment in a few words, is the happiest talent an author can be possessed of. This talent is peculiarly necessary in the present state of literature; for many writers have acquired the dexterity of spreading a few tritical thoughts over several hundred pages. When an author hits upon a thought that pleases him, he is apt to dwell upon it, to view it in different lights, to force it in improperly, or upon the slightest relations. Though this may be pleasant to the writer, it tires and vexes the reader. There is another great source of diffusion in composition. It is a capital object with an author, whatever be the subject, to give vent to all his best thoughts. When he finds a proper place for them, he is peculiarly happy. But, rather than sacrifice a thought he is fond of, he forces it in by way of digression, or superfluous illustration. If none of these expedients answer his purpose, he has recourse to the margin, a very convenient apartment for all manner of pedantry and impertinence. There is not an author, however, correct, but is more or less faulty in this respect. An abridger, however, is {178} not subject to these temptations. The thoughts are not his own; he views them in a cooler and less affectionate manner; he discovers an impropriety in some, a vanity in others, and a want of utility in many. His business, therefore, is to retrench superfluities, digressions, quotations, pedantry, &c. and to lay before the public only what is really useful. This is by no means an easy employment: To abridge some books requires talents equal, if not superior, to those of the author. The facts, spirit, manner, and reasoning, must be preserved; nothing essential, either in argument or illustration, ought to be omitted. the difficulty of the task is the principal reason why we have so few good abridgments. Wynne's abridgement of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding is, perhaps, the only unexceptionable one in our language. These observations relate solely to such abridgments as are designated for the public. But,

"When a person wants to set down the substance of any book, a shorter and less {179} laborious method may be followed. It would be foreign to our plan to give examples of abridgments for the public: But as it may be useful, especially to young people, to know how to abridge books for their own use, after giving a few directions, we shall exhibit an example or two, to shew with what ease it may be done.

"Read he book carefully; endeavour to learn the principal view of the author; attend to the arguments employed: When you have done so, you will generally find that what the author uses as new or additional arguments, are, in reality, only collateral ones, or extensions of the principal argument. Take a piece of paper, or a common-place book, put down what the author wants to

prove, subjoin the argument or arguments, and you have the substance of the book in a few lines. For example, in his Essay on Miracles, Mr Hume's design is to prove, That miracles, which have not been the immediate objects of our senses, cannot reasonably be believed upon {180} the testimony of others. Now, his argument (for there happens to be but one) is,

"That experience, which in some things is variable, in others uniform, is our *only* guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact. A variable experience gives rise to probability only; an uniform experience amounts to a proof. Our belief of any fact from the testimony of the eye-witnesses is derived from no other principle than our experience in the veracity of human testimony. If the fact attested be miraculous, here arises a contest of two opposite experiences, or proof against proof. Now, a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and, as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as complete as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined; and, if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever derived from human testimony."

"In Dr Campbell's Dissertation on Miracles, {181} the author's principal aim is to shew the fallacy of Mr Hume's argument; which he has done most successfully by another single argument, as follows:

"The evidence arising from human testimony *is not solely* derived from experience; on the contrary, testimony hath a natural influence on belief antecedent to experience. the early and unlimited assent given to testimony by children gradually contracts as they advance in life: It is, therefore, more consonant to truth, to say, that our *diffidence* in testimony is the result of experience, than that our *faith* in it has this foundation. Besides, the uniformity of experience, in favour of any fact, is not a proof against its being reversed in a particular instance. The evidence arising from the single testimony of a man of known veracity will go far to establish a belief in its being actually reversed: If his testimony be confirmed by a few others of the same character, we cannot with-hold our assent to the truth of it. Now, though the operations of nature are governed by uniform {182} laws, and though we have not the testimony of our senses in favour of any *violation* of them, still if, in particular instances, we have the testimony of *thousands* of our fellow-creatures, and those too men of strict integrity, swayed by no motives of ambition or interest, and governed by the principles of common sense, That they were actually eye-witnesses of these violations, the constitution of our nature obliges us to believe them."

"These two examples contain the substance of about 400 pages. -- Making private abridgments of this kind has many advantages; it engages us to read with accuracy and attention; it fixes the subject in our minds; and, if we should happen to forget, instead of reading the books again, by glancing a few lines, we are not only in possession of the chief arguments, but recall, in a good measure, the author's manner and method."

Dr Campbell having sent the manuscript of his book against Mr Hume's *Essays on Miracles* to Dr Hugh Blair of Edinburgh, {183} for his opinion of the work, Dr Blair proposed to send the manuscript to Mr Hume himself, which was accordingly done; and Mr Hume returned it to the Doctor accompanied with the following letter.

"Sir,

"I have perused the ingenious performance, which you was so obliging as to put into my hands, with all the attention possible; though not perhaps with all the seriousness and gravity which you have so frequently recommended to me. But the fault lies not in the piece, which is certainly very

acute; but in the subject. I know you will say, it lies in neither, but in myself alone. If that be so, I am sorry to say that I believe it is incurable.

"I could wish that your friend had not chosen to appear as a controversial writer, but had endeavoured to establish his principles in general, without any reference to a particular book or person; though I own he does me a great deal of honour, in thinking that any thing I have wrote deserves {184} his attention. For besides many inconveniencies, which attends that kind of writing, I see it is almost impossible to preserve decency and good manners in it. this author, for instance, says sometimes obliging things of me much beyond what I can presume to deserve; and I thence conclude that in general he did not mean to insult me: yet I meet with some other passages more worthy of Warburton and his followers than of so ingenious an author.

"But as I am not apt to lose my temper, and would still less incline to do so with a friend of your's, I shall calmly communicate to you some remarks on the argument, since you seem to desire it. I shall employ very few words; since a hint will suffice to a gentleman of this author's penetration.

"Sect. I. I would desire the author to consider, whether the medium, by which we reason concerning human testimony be different from that which leads us to draw any inferences concerning other human actions; that is, our knowledge of human nature {185} from experience? or why it is different? I suppose we conclude an honest man will not lie to us, in the same manner as we conclude that he will not cheat us. As to the youthful propensity to believe, which is corrected by experience; it seems obvious, that children adopt blindfold all the opinions, principles, sentiments, and passions of their elders, as well as credit their testimony: nor is this more strange, than that a hammer should make an impression on clay.

"Sect. II. NO man can have any other experience by his own. The experience of others becomes his only by the credit which he gives to their testimony; which proceeds from his own experience of human nature.

"Sect. III. There is no contradiction in saying, that all the testimony which ever was really given for any miracle, or ever will be given, is a subject of derision; and yet forming a fiction or supposition of a testimony for a particular miracle, which {186} might not only merit attention, but amount to a full proof of it. For instance, the absence of the sun during 48 yours; but reasonable men would only conclude from this fact, that the machine of the globe was disordered during the time.

"Page 28. I find no difficulty to explain my meaning, and yet shall not probably do it in any future edition. The proof against a miracle, as it is founded on invariable experience, is of that *species* or *kind* of proof, which is full and certain when taken alone, because it implies no doubt, as is the case with all probabilities; but there are degrees of this species, and when a weaker proof is opposed to a stronger, it is overcome.

"Page 29. There is very little more delicacy in telling a man he speaks nonsense by implication than in saying so directly.

"Sect. IV. Does a man of sense run after every silly tale of witches or hobgoblins or fairies, and canvass particularly the evidence? I never knew any one, that examined and {187} deliberated about nonsense who did not believe it before the end of his inquiries.

"Sect. 5. I wonder the author does not perceive the reason why Mr John Knox and Mr Alexander Henderson did not work as many miracles as their brethren in other churches. Miracle working was a Popish trick, and discarded with the other parts of that religion. Men must have new and

opposite ways of establishing new and opposite follies. The same reason extends to Mahomet. The Greek priests, who were in the neighbourhood of Arabia, and many of them in it, were as great miracle-workers as the Romish; and Mahomet would have been laught at for so stale and simple a device. To cast out devils, and cure the blind, where every one almost can do as much, is not the way to get any extraordinary ascendant over men. I never read of a miracle in my life, that was not meant to establish some new point of religion. There are no miracles wrought in Spain to prove the gospel, but St. Francis Xavier wrought a thousand well attested ones for that purpose {188} in the Indies. The miracles in Spain, which are also fully and completely attested, are wrought to prove the efficacy of a particular crucifix or relict, which is always a new point, or at least, no universally received.

"Sect 6. If a miracle proves a doctrine to be revealed from God, and consequently true, a miracle can never be wrought for a contrary doctrine. the facts are therefore as incompatible as the doctrines.

I could wish your friend had not denominated me an infidel writer, on account of ten or twelve pages which seem to him to have that tendency; while I have wrote so many volumes on history, literature, politics, trade, morals, which, in that particular at least, are entirely inoffensive. Is a man to be called a drunkard, because he has been seen fuddled once in his file time?

Having said so much to your friend, who {189} is certainly a very ingenious man, though a little too zealous for a philosopher; permit me also the freedom of saying a word to yourself. Whenever I have had the pleasure to be in your company, if the discourse turned upon any common subject of literature or reasoning, I always parted from you both entertained and instructed. But when the conversation was diverted by you from this channel towards the subject of your profession; though I doubt not but your intentions were very friendly towards me, I own I never received the same satisfaction: I was apt to be tired, and you to be angry. I would therefore wish for the future, wherever my good fortune throws me in your way, that these topics should be forborn between us. I have, long since, done with all inquiries on such subjects, and am become incapable of instruction; though I own no one is more capable of conveying it than yourself.

"After having given you the liberty of {190} communicating to your friend what part of this letter you think proper, I remain,

Sir

Your most obedient

humble servant,

David Hume.[17] {191}

In the year 1762, Mr Hume wrote the following letter to Dr Campbell, which does much honour to the writer.

"Dear {192} Sir, *Edin. Jan.* 7. 1762

"It has so seldom happened that controversies in philosophy, much more in theology, have been carried on without producing a personal quarrel between the parties, that I must regard my present situation as somewhat extraordinary, who have reason {193} to give you thanks for the civil and obliging manner in which you have conducted the dispute against me, on so interesting a subject as that of miracles. Any little symptoms of vehemence, of which I formerly used the freedom to complain, when you favoured me with a sight of the manuscript, are either removed or explained away, or atoned for by civilities which are far beyond what I have any title to pretend to.

It will be natural for you to imagine, that I will fall upon some shift to evade the force of your arguments, and to retain my former opinion in the point controverted between us; but it is impossible for me not to see the ingenuity of your performance, and the great learning which you ave displayed against me.

"I consider myself as very much honoured in being thought worthy of an answer by a person of so much merit; and, as I find that the public does you justice, with regard to the ingenuity and good composition of your piece, I hope you will have no reason to repent engaging with an antagonist, {194} whom perhaps, in strictness, you might have ventured to neglect. I own to you that I never felt so violent an inclination to defend myself as at present, when I am thus fairly challenged by you, and I think I could find something specious at least to urge in my defence; but, as I had fixed a resolution, in the beginning of my life, always to leave the public to judge between my adversaries and me, without making any reply,I must adhere inviolably to this resolution, otherwise my silence on any future occasion would be construed to be an inability not answer, and would be matter of triumph against me.

"It may perhaps amuse you to learn that first hint which suggested to me that argument which you have so strenuously attacked. I was walking in the cloysters of the Jesuits College of La Fleche, a town in which I passed two years of my youth, and was engaged in a conversation with a Jesuit of some parts and learning, who was relating to me, and urging some nonsensical miracle performed lately in their Convent, when I {195} was tempted to dispute against him; and, as my head was full of the topics of my Treatise of human Nature, which I was at the time composing, this argument immediately occurred to me, and I thought it very much gravelled my companion; but at last he observed to me, that it was impossible for that argument to have any solidity, because it operated equally against the Gospel as the Catholic miracles; which observation I thought proper to admit as a sufficient answer. I believe you will allow that the freedom at least of this reasoning makes it somewhat extraordinary to have been the produce of a Convent of Jesuits, though perhaps you may think that the sophistry of it favours plainly of the place of its birth."

In the year 1762, Mr Hume attached himself to the celebrated Rousseau, when the latter was about to be imprisoned, by an *arret* of the Parliament of Paris, for publishing his famous romance called *Emile*. Mr Hume was then in Edinburgh. A person, as he says, of merit, but whose name he does not mention, wrote him from Paris, {196} that M. Rousseau intended to come to Britain to procure an asylum from persecution in a land where freedom reigns, and genius and literature of every species are eminently encouraged. M. Rousseau, at the same time, asked Mr Hume's patronage and recommendation when he should arrive in London. Mr Hume, accordingly, wrote to several of his friends in London, in favour of this famous exile; and likewise wrote to himself, assuring him of his zeal and strong desire of doing every thing in his power to serve him. Mr Hume, at the same time, solicited Rousseau to come to Edinburgh, and offered him a secure retreat in his own house as long as he should chuse. Mr. Hume's principal motives for making this offer were the celebrity of Rousseau;s genius and talents, and particularly the persecution he suffered from the bigots of his own country, joined to the weak and diseased state of his body, occasioned by the passing of blood through his urethra. This disorder, like most chronical distempers, rendered his mind peevish, and, of course, made his temper and his actions frequently {197} bizarre and disagreeable, especially to strangers. Mr Hume seems, in some parts of the controversy, not to have made sufficient allowances for the weak and painful condition of his antagonist's body. Pain, when long continued, not only induces general debility, but frets and disturbs the mind, and makes it suspicious and impatient. This circumstance, it is probable, was the principal cause of the rupture

that happened between these two learned and most ingenious men. Mr Hume, however, through the whole controversy, treats M. Rousseau with humanity and respect. He, indeed, defends himself strenuously against the calumnies and insinuations of his illustrious opponent; and he was fully entitled to do so.

At the instigation of Mr Hume, Rousseau arrived in England in Spring 1766; and Mr Hume procured a pleasant residence for him in a country house belonging to Mr Davenport, a gentleman distinguished by his birth, by his fortune, and by his merit. This villa is situated in the country of Derby, and is called *Wooton*. As soon as Rousseau {198} arrived at Wooton, he was charmed with the situation of the place, as well as with the adjacent country; and wrote Mr Hume, in the most polite and grateful terms, how much he esteemed his friendship and patronage.

When on their route to Britain, one evening at Calais, Mr Hume asked Rousseau, if he would accept a pension from the king of Britain, provided it should be obtained? Rousseau replied, that he found some difficulty in answering the question; but that he would refer the affair to Lord Marshall, who was a great friend to Rousseau. Encouraged by this response, Mr Hume, as soon as he arrived in London, applied to General Conway, then Secretary of State, and likewise to General Graeme, Secretary and Chamberlain to the Queen, asking a pension to Rousseau, which was readily granted, on the sloe condition that the affair should be kept secret. This condition was highly agreeable to Rousseau, who loved to conceal such favours as he occasionally received, and particularly in what related to money-matters, because he thought {199} they degraded the spirit of independency which he always, at least, pretended to possess. But Mr Hume had, for some time, anxiously attended to the ease and interest of M. Rousseau, who continually complained both of bodily pain and of poverty, discovered with astonishment, that the last complaint of extreme poverty was false. He employed this last artifice (for the first was no artifice), Mr Hume remarks, to render himself, as a man of genius, more interesting, and to excite the compassion of the public.

The time which Mr Hume spent with M. Rousseau gradually enabled him to unfold his real character. I at last perceived, says he, with infinite pain, that this ingenious man was born for tumult and storms; but, as Mr Hume had done every thing to accommodate Rousseau, and to render his situation comfortable, he never dreamed that he himself was to become a victim of his rage and peevishness. The origin of the rupture between these two great men took its rise from a ridiculous circumstance. {200} Mr Horace Walpole, who, it would appear, was no great friend to Rousseau, wrote a letter, under the fictitious designation of *Frederic King of Prussia*, inviting him to come and reside in his Court at Berlin. Of this affair Mr Hume had no knowledge. But Rousseau, from what circumstances it is difficult to conjecture, imagined that Mr Hume had written and circulated that letter with a view to perplex and burlesque him. Mr Hume, in this more than foolish affair, excuses Mr Walpole by calling it an innocent *plaisanterie*. But, when the genius, the temper, and the diseased state of Rousseau's body are considered, instead of a *plaisanterie*, it was a direct *cruelty*, and had, by a natural mistake, the unhappy effect of converting two cordial and celebrated friends into mortal enemies.

M. Rousseau, though Mr Hume procured him a grant of a pension from his Majesty, actuated by some whimsical ideas of independency, and a notion that his best friend meant to betray him, refused to accept of it. Mr Hume, by friendly letters, {201} pressed Rousseau to accept of the pension; but the latter obstinately persisted in his denial, and even reproached Mr Hume, in terms the most indecent, for so successfully endeavouring to serve him, and to render his circumstances easy for life.

The supposititious letter, written in the name of the King of Prussia, after copies of it had been circulated over Europe, was at last published in the *St James's Chronicle*. It was in that News-paper which Rousseau first saw this imprudent and ill-judged production. M. Rousseau immediately wrote to the Editors of the St James's Chronicle complaining bitterly of the imposture, and indirectly insinuating that the pretended letter was composed by Mr Hume. When Mr Hume learnt that he was suspected by M. Rousseau to be the author and publisher of this letter, it gave him much uneasiness. Mr Hume remarks, that, after the great attention and beneficent services he had, with unremitting perseverance, bestowed on M. Rousseau, he was suddenly become the object of his resentment and obloquy, upon {202} no other foundation than a foolish and even absurd suspicion. Mr Hume, notwithstanding this unhappy affair, continued to protect and cherish Rousseau by friendly letters as well as by good offices. But, soon afterwards, Rousseau threw off every mask, and accused Mr Hume openly as a traitorous enemy, without assigning any reasons but what were evidently capricious, frivolous, and contemptible. I shall mention one example only. The first night after these two remarkable men left Paris, in their way to Britain, they both slept in the same chamber. M. Rousseau, in the last letter he ever wrote to Mr Hume, which is of an enormous length, says, that during the night, Mr Hume several times, called out, with unusual vehemence, *Je tiens J.J. Rousseau*. He, however, acknowledges, that he knew not whether Mr Hume was sleeping or waking. The expression, in the French language, is strong; but, like many verbs, *tenir* is frequently used in very different and even opposite senses. Rousseau interpreted the expression thus: *I have Rousseau in my possession*, or, *I hold him fast*. {203} Every time these words were repeated, Rousseau tells us that he trembled with terror. This and some similar insignificant circumstances gave rise to a complete rupture between those two great men.

When the periodical paper called the *Edinburgh Magazine and Review* was publishing in the year 1773, the late Rev. Dr Henry, then one of the ministers of this city, a most laborious clergyman, as well as a facetious and good-humoured companion, brought forth the second volume of his *History of Great Britain*. Dr Henry, it was said, applied, in the most earnest manner, to Mr Hume to give an account of that volume in the Review, to which Mr Hume gave his assent. When the manuscript appeared, after reading it, the praises appeared to be so high-strained, that the Reviewers, in my presence, agreed that Mr Hume's account was meant as a burlesque upon the author. It was, therefore, committed to the farther consideration of one of their number, who still continued to be of the same opinion, and, accordingly, raised the encomiums so {204} high, that no person could mistake the supposed meaning of the writer. The types of the Manuscript, in this last form, were composed, and proof-sheets sent to Mr Hume for his perusal and corrections. To the astonishment of the Reviewers, Mr Hume wrote them an angry letter, complaining, in the highest terms, of the freedoms they had used with his manuscript, and declaring that in the account he had given of Dr Henry's History, he was perfectly sincere. Upon which, Mr Hume's review was cancelled, and another was written by a member of the Society, condemning the book in terms perhaps too severe; so that Mr Hume's intention of serving Dr Henry was no only abortive, but produced an opposite effect.

Another circumstance in the life of Mr Hume must not be omitted. When a young man, he applied to be made *Professor of Moral Philosophy* in the University of Edinburgh. The Scottish clergy took an alarm. They represented that Mr Hume, in his principles, was an *Athiest*, or at least {205} a *Deist*; and, consequently, that he was very ill-qualified to teach morals to youth in a Christian country. Their remonstrances were effectual; and Mr Hume's application was rejected. From that moment, as was natural, he conceived a rooted antipathy to the generality of Scottish clergymen.

This antipathy was not, however, indiscriminate; for he was in intimate habits of friendship and sociality with several of the ministers of the Church of Scotland; as the celebrated Dr Robertson, Dr Blair, Dr Wallace, Mr Jardine, Dr Wishart, Dr Drysdale, Mr Home, the author of the ingenious and popular tragedy of *Douglas*, and many others. These reverend and learned gentlemen, however much they differed from Mr Hume in religious or philosophical opinions, were fully sensible of his Genius as an Author, and of his Worth as a Man.

I shall mention another anecdote. -- On summer evening, I went to sup with *Lord Kames*. Soon after, Dr John Warden, a worthy, a respectable, and an useful clergyman {206} of this City, came to Lord Kames's house with the same intention. Lord Kames was then dictating to his clerk. When his Lordship had finished, he led us to a drawing room, which was situated to the north, because the night was remarkably warm. Here we had conversed for some time, when Mr Hume joined the party. The conversation went on in the most agreeable manner. A sermon had just been published by a Mr Edwards with the strange title of *Usefulness of Sin*. Dr Warden told us, that he had read this sermon. Mr Hume repeated the words: The *Usefulness of Sin!* I suppose, says he, Mr Edwards adopts the system of Leibnitz, that *all is for the best, but,* added he, with his usual keenness of eye and forcible manner of expression, *What the Devil does the fellow make of hell and damnation?* Upon Mr Hume's pronouncing these words, for what reason I could never conjecture, Dr Warden took his hat and left the room. Lord Kames followed him, and pressed him with anxiety to return, but he obstinately refused. {207}

After a very tedious illness, Mr Hume expired at Edinburgh on the 25th day of August 1776, in the 65th year of his age. -- Some particulars relating to his death I have already given to my Readers in the letters of Dr Black to Dr Smith on that occasion.

Some time after Mr Hume's death, two Essays, ascribed to him, were published at London; the one on *Suicide*, and the other on *Immortality of the Soul*. These essays, from the mode of writing and of reasoning, appeared evidently to be genuine productions of Mr Hume. I once intended, in this life of Mr Hume, to give an abridged view of these arguments in these two ingenious and plausible Essays. But, after more mature reflection, as I considered the sophistry of the reasoning, and the injurious effects it might have on society; and as an abridgment of them would only be another mode of administering the poison they contain, I shall now relinquish that part of my subject, and conclude with a few general remarks. {208}

Upon the whole, Mr Hume was one of those extraordinary characters which sometimes, but rarely, appear, like luminous meteors, in almost every civilized country in Europe. For elegance of composition, for dexterous and forcible reasoning, for good humour and pleasantry in conversation, and for uniformity of temper and conduct, he was not to be excelled. Before his death, Mr Hume had written his last will, in which, beside other appointments, he allotted a certain sum for building his tomb, which he ordered to be erected in the Calton burying-ground, which is situated on a pretty high hill almost within the City of Edinburgh. Like himself, his tomb is build of massy but unadorned stones, with this simple inscription, DAVID HUME, ESQ. After the tomb was finished, one summer day I was sauntering on the Caltonhill, in company with the late well-known Dr Gilbert Stuart, and Dr John Brown, author of what is called the *Brownian System of Physic*. Dr Brown, who was a man of rough and course manners, observed to a mason, who was hewing a pavement stone, {209} "Friend," said he, "this is a strong and massy building; but how do you think the honest gentleman can get out at the resurrection?" The mason archly replied, "Sir, I have secured that point; for I have put the *key under the door*.

Notes

EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., HUME) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g., *Hume*) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]

[2]Vide his own Life, p. 8.

[3]Mr. Hume's own Life, p. 10.

[4]Ibid. p. 11.

[5]Mr Hume's own Life, p. 11.

[6]His own Life, p. 11, and 12.

[7]His own Life, p. 11, and 12.

[8]Ibid.

[9]His own Life, p. 13.

[10]His own Life, p. 15.

[11]The AUTHOR often mentioned as a curious circumstance, that he had the honour of being acquainted with all the literary men, of his time, in Scotland, except the ingenious Mr *JOHN HOME*.

[12]Dr Smith's Letter to Mr Strahan.

[13]Dr Smith's Letter to Mr Strahan.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]*The following letter was sent by MR HUME to the Author of the Delineation of the Nature and Obligation of Morality*.

"SIR,

"WHEN I write you, I know not to whom I am addressing myself; I only know he is one who has done me a great deal of honour, and to whose civilities I am obliged. If we be strangers, I beg we may be acquainted as soon as you think proper to discover yourself; if we be acquainted already, I beg we may be friends; If friends, I beg we may be more so. Our connection with each other, as men of letters, is greater than our differences as adhering to different sects or systems. Let us

revive the happy times, when Atticus and Cassius the Epicureans, Cicero the Academic, and Brutus the Stoic, could, all of them, live in unreserved friendship together, and were insensible to all those distinctions, except so far as they furnished agreeable matter to discourse and conversation. Perhaps you are a young man, and being full of those sublime ideas, which you have so well exprest, think there can be no virtue upon a more confined system. I am not an old one; but being of a cool temperament, have always found, that more simple views were sufficient to make me act in a reasonable manner [Greek]; in this faith hive I lived, and hope to die.

"Your civilities to me so much over-balance your severities, that I should be ungrateful to take notice of some expressions, which, in the heat of composition, have dropt from your pen. I must only complain of you a little for ascribing to me the sentiments which I had put into the mouth of the Sceptic in the Dialogue. I have surely endeavoured to refute the Sceptic with all the force of which I am master; and my refutation must be allowed sincere, because drawn from the capital principles of my system. But you impute to me both the sentiments of the Sceptic and the sentiments of his antagonist, which I can never admit of. In every Dialogue, no more than one person can be supposed to represent the author.

"Your severity on one head, that of Chastity, is so great, and I am so little conscious of having given any just occasion to it, that it has afforded me a hint to form a conjecture, perhaps ill grounded, concerning your person.

"I hope to steal a little leisure from my other occupations, in order to defend my philosophy against your attacks. If I have occasion to give a new edition of the work ,which you have honoured with an answer, I shall make great advantage of your remarks, and hope to obviate some of your criticisms.

"Your style is elegant, and full of agreeable imagery. In some few places, it does not fully come up to my ideas of purity and correctness. I suppose mine falls still further short of your ideas. In this respect, we may certainly be of use to each other. With regard to our Philosophical systems, I suppose we are both so fixt, that there is no hope of any conversions betwixt us; and for my part, I doubt not but we shall both do as well to remain as we are.

"I am, Sir,

With great regard,

Your most obliged humble servant,

"DAVID HUME"

Edin.* 15*th March
1753

Prolegomena

Immanuel Kant
1783

Introduction

These Prolegomena are destined for the use, not of pupils, but of future teachers, and even the latter should not expect that they will be serviceable for the systematic exposition of a ready-made science, but merely for the discovery of the science itself.

There are scholarly men, to whom the history of philosophy (both ancient and modern) is philosophy itself; for these the present Prolegomena are not written. They must wait till those who endeavor to draw from the fountain of reason itself have completed their work; it will then be the historian's turn to inform the world of what has been done. Unfortunately, nothing can be said, which in their opinion has not been said before, and truly the same prophecy applies to all future time; for since the human reason has for many centuries speculated upon innumerable objects in various ways, it is hardly to be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of past ages.

My object is to persuade all those who think Metaphysics worth studying, that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment, and, neglecting all that has been done, to propose first the preliminary question, 'Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible?'

If it be a science, how comes it that it cannot, like other sciences, obtain universal and permanent recognition ? If not, how can it maintain its pretensions, and keep the human mind in suspense with hopes, never ceasing, yet never fulfilled? Whether then we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance in this field, we must come once for all to a definite conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called science, which cannot possibly remain on its present footing. It seems almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually advancing, that in this, which pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle every one inquires, we should constantly move round the same spot, without gaining a single step. And so its followers having melted away, we do not find men confident of their ability to shine in other sciences venturing their reputation here, where everybody, however ignorant in other matters, may deliver a final verdict, as in this domain there is as yet no standard weight and measure to distinguish sound knowledge from shallow talk.

After all it is nothing extraordinary in the elaboration of a science, when men begin to wonder how far it has advanced, that the question should at last occur, whether and how such a science is possible? Human reason so delights in constructions, that it has several times built up a tower, and then razed it to examine the nature of the foundation. It is never too late to become wise; but if the change comes late, there is always more difficulty in starting a reform.

The question whether a science be possible, presupposes a doubt as to its actuality. But such a

doubt offends the men whose whole possessions consist of this supposed jewel; hence he who raises the doubt must expect opposition from all sides. Some, in the proud consciousness of their possessions, which are ancient, and therefore considered legitimate, will take their metaphysical compendia in their hands, and look down on him with contempt; others, who never see anything except it be identical with what they have seen before, will not understand him, and everything will remain for a time, as if nothing had happened to excite the concern, or the hope, for an impending change.

Nevertheless, I venture to predict that the independent reader of these Prolegomena will not only doubt his previous science, but ultimately be fully persuaded, that it cannot exist unless the demands here stated on which its possibility depends, be satisfied; and, as this has never been done, that there is, as yet, no such thing as Metaphysics. But as it can never cease to be in demand, [2] -- since the interests of common sense are intimately interwoven with it, he must confess that a radical reform, or rather a new birth of the science after an original plan, are unavoidable, however men may struggle against it for a while.

Since the Essays of Locke and Leibniz, or rather since the origin of metaphysics so far as we know its history, nothing has ever happened which was more decisive to its fate than the attack made upon it by David Hume. He threw no light on this species of knowledge, but he certainly struck a spark from which light might have been obtained, had it caught some inflammable substance and had its smoldering fire been carefully nursed and developed.

Hume started from a single but important concept in Metaphysics, viz., that of Cause and Effect (including its derivatives force and action, etc.). He challenges reason, which pretends to have given birth to this idea from herself, to answer him by what right she thinks anything to be so constituted, that if that thing be posited, something else also must necessarily be posited; for this is the meaning of the concept of cause. He demonstrated irrefutably that it was perfectly impossible for reason to think *a priori* and by means of concepts a combination involving necessity. We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the existence of one thing, another must necessarily exist, or how the concept of such a combination can arise *a priori*. Hence he inferred, that reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept, which she erroneously considered as one of her children, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of imagination, impregnated by experience, which subsumed certain representations under the Law of Association, and mistook the subjective necessity of habit for an objective necessity arising from insight. Hence he inferred that reason had no power to think such, combinations, even generally, because her concepts would then be purely fictitious, and all her pretended *a priori* cognitions nothing but common experiences marked with a false stamp. In plain language there is not, and cannot be, any such thing as metaphysics at all. [3]

However hasty and mistaken Hume's conclusion may appear, it was at least founded upon investigation, and this investigation deserved the concentrated attention of the brighter spirits of his day as well as determined efforts on their part to discover, if possible, a happier solution of the problem in the sense proposed by him, all of which would have speedily resulted in a complete reform of the science.

But Hume suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, of not being understood. It is positively painful to see bow utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the problem; for while they were ever taking for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his valuable suggestion that everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing

had happened.

The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason *a priori*, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a wider application than merely to the objects of experience. This was Hume's problem. It was a question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of the concept. Were the former decided, the conditions of the use and the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a matter of course.

But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of reason, so far as it is concerned with pure thinking,-a task which did not suit them. They found a more convenient method of being defiant without any insight, viz., the appeal to *common sense*. It is indeed a great gift of God, to possess right, or (as they now call it) plain common sense. But this common sense must be shown practically, by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing to it as an oracle, when no rational justification can be advanced. To appeal to common sense, when insight and science fail, and no sooner- this is one of the subtle discoveries of modern times, by means of which the most superficial ranter can safely enter the lists with the most thorough thinker, and hold his own. But as long as a particle of insight remains, no one would think of having recourse to this subterfuge. For what is it but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and confides in it? I should think that Hume might fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as Beattie, and in addition to a critical reason (such as the latter did not possess), which keeps common sense in check and prevents it from speculating, or, if speculations are under discussion restrains the desire to decide because it cannot satisfy itself concerning its own arguments. By this means alone can common sense remain sound. Chisels and hammers may suffice to work a piece of wood, but for steel-engraving we require an engraver's needle. Thus common sense and speculative understanding are each serviceable in their own way, the former in judgments which apply immediately to experience, the latter when we judge universally from mere concepts, as in metaphysics, where sound common sense, so called in spite of the inapplicability of the word, has no right to judge at all.

I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction. I was far from following him in the conclusions at which he arrived by regarding, not the whole of his problem, but a part, which by itself can give us no information. If we start from a well-founded, but undeveloped, thought, which another has bequeathed to us, we may well hope by continued reflection to advance farther than the acute man, to whom we owe the first spark of light.

I therefore first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the understanding thinks the connection of things *a priori*, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connections. I sought to ascertain their number, and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts, which I was now certain were not deduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended, but sprang from the pure understanding. This deduction (which seemed impossible to my acute predecessor, which bad never even occurred to any one else, though no one had hesitated to use the concepts without investigating the basis of their objective validity) was the most

difficult task ever undertaken in the service of metaphysics; and the worst was that metaphysics, such as it then existed, could not assist me in the least, because this deduction alone can render metaphysics possible. But as soon as I had succeeded in solving Hume's problem not merely in a particular case, but with respect to the whole faculty of pure reason, I could proceed safely, though slowly, to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its circumference as well as in its contents. This was required for metaphysics in order to construct its system according to a reliable method.

But I fear that the execution of Hume's problem in its widest extent (viz., my Critique of the Pure Reason) will fare as the problem itself fared, when first proposed. It will be misjudged because it is misunderstood, and misunderstood because men choose to skim through the book, and not to think through it-a disagreeable task, because the work is dry, obscure, opposed to all ordinary notions, and moreover long-winded. I confess, however, I did not expect, to hear from philosophers complaints of want of popularity, entertainment, and facility, when the existence of a highly prized and indispensable cognition is at stake, which cannot be established otherwise, than by the strictest rules of methodic precision. Popularity may follow, but is inadmissible at the beginning. Yet as regards a certain obscurity, arising partly from the diffuseness of the plan, owing to which. the principal points of the investigation are easily lost sight of, the complaint is just, and I intend to remove it by the present Prolegomena.

The first-mentioned work, which discusses the pure faculty of reason in its whole compass and bounds, will remain the foundation, to which the Prolegomena, as a preliminary, exercise, refer; for our critique must first be established as a complete and perfected science, before we can think of letting Metaphysics appear on the scene, or even have the most distant hope of attaining it.

We have been long accustomed to seeing antiquated knowledge produced as new by taking it out of its former context, and reducing it to system in a new suit of any fancy pattern under new titles. Most readers will set out by expecting nothing else from the Critique; but these Prolegomena may persuade him that it is a perfectly new science, of which no one has ever even thought, the very idea of which was unknown, and for which nothing hitherto accomplished can be of the smallest use, except it be the suggestion of Hume's doubts. Yet even he did not suspect such a formal science, but ran his ship ashore, for safety's sake, landing on skepticism, there to let it lie and rot; whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot, who, by means of safe astronomical principles drawn from a knowledge of the globe, and provided with a complete chart and compass, may steer the ship safely, whither he listeth.

If in a new science, which is wholly isolated and unique in its kind, we started with the prejudice that we can judge of things by means of our previously acquired knowledge, which., is precisely what has first to be called in question, we should only fancy we saw everywhere what we had already known,. the expressions, having a similar sound, only that all would appear utterly metamorphosed, senseless and unintelligible, because we should have as a foundation out own notions, made by long habit a second nature, instead of the author's. But the longwindedness of the work, so far as it depends on the subject, and not the exposition, its consequent unavoidable dryness and its scholastic precision are qualities which can only benefit the science, though they may discredit the book.

Few writers are gifted with the subtlety, and at the same time with the grace, of David Hume, or with the depth, as well as the elegance, of Moses Mendelssohn. Yet I flatter myself I might have made my own exposition popular, had my object been merely to sketch out a plan and leave its

completion to others instead of having my heart in the welfare of the science, to which I had devoted myself so long; in truth, it required no little constancy, and even self-denial, to postpone the sweets of an immediate success to the prospect of a slower, but more lasting, reputation.

Making plans is often the occupation of an opulent and boastful mind, which thus obtains the reputation of a creative genius, by demanding what it cannot itself supply; by censuring, what it cannot improve; and by proposing, what it knows not where to find. And yet something more should belong to a sound plan of a general critique of pure reason than mere conjectures, if this plan is to be other than the usual declamations of pious aspirations. But pure reason is a sphere so separate and self- contained, that we cannot touch a part without affecting all the rest. We can therefore do nothing without first determining the position; of each part, and its relation to the rest; for, as our judgment cannot be corrected by anything without, the validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in which it stands to all the rest within the domain of reason.

So in the structure of an organized body, the end of each member can only be deduced from the full conception of the whole. It may, then, be said of such a critique that it is never trustworthy except it be perfectly complete, down to the smallest elements of pure reason. In the sphere of this faculty you can determine either everything or nothing.

But although a mere sketch, preceding the Critique of Pure Reason, would be unintelligible, unreliable, and useless, it is all the more useful as a sequel. For so we are able to grasp the whole, to examine in detail the chief points of importance in the science, and to improve in many respects our exposition, as compared with the first execution of the work.

After the completion of the work I offer here such a plan which is sketched out after an analytical method, while the work itself had to be executed in the synthetical style, in order that the science may present all its articulations, as the structure of a peculiar cognitive faculty, in their natural combination. But should any reader find this plan, which I publish as the Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics, still obscure, let him consider that not every one is bound to study Metaphysics, that many minds will succeed very well, in the exact and even in deep sciences, more closely allied to practical experience, [4] while they cannot succeed in investigations dealing exclusively with abstract concepts. In such cases men should apply their talents to other subjects. But he who undertakes to judge, or still more, to construct, a system of Metaphysics, must satisfy the demands here made, either by adopting my solution, or by thoroughly refuting it, and substituting another. To evade it is impossible.

In conclusion, let it be remembered that this much-abused obscurity (frequently serving as a mere pretext under which people hide their own indolence or dullness) has its uses, since all who in other sciences observe a judicious silence, speak authoritatively in metaphysics and make bold decisions, because their ignorance is not here contrasted with the knowledge of others. Yet it does contrast with sound critical principles, which we may therefore commend in the words of Virgil:

> **" Ignavum, fucos, pecus a praesepibus arcent. "**
> **"Bees are defending their hives against drones, those indolent creatures. "**

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Prolegomena

Immanuel Kant
1783

Preamble On The Peculiarities Of All Metaphysical Cognition.

Sect. 1: Of the Sources of Metaphysics

If it becomes desirable to formulate any cognition as science, it will be necessary first to determine accurately those peculiar features which no other science has in common with it, constituting its characteristics; otherwise the. boundaries of all sciences become confused, and none of them can be treated thoroughly according to its nature.

The characteristics of a science may consist of a simple difference of object, or of the sources of cognition, or of the kind of cognition, or perhaps of all three conjointly. On this, therefore, depends the idea of a possible science and its territory.

First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore *a priori* knowledge, coming from pure Understanding and pure Reason.

But so far Metaphysics would not be distinguishable from pure Mathematics; it must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition; and for the meaning of this term I refer to the Critique of the Pure Reason (II. "Method of Transcendentalism," Chap. I., Sec. 1), where the distinction between these two employments of the reason is sufficiently explained. So far concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition.

Sect. 2. Concerning the Kind of Cognition which can alone be called Metaphysical

a. Of the Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical judgments in general. -- The peculiarity of its sources demands that metaphysical cognition must consist of nothing but *a priori* judgments. But whatever be their origin, or their logical form, there is a distinction in judgments, as to their content, according to which they are either merely explicative, adding nothing to the content of the cognition, or expansive, increasing the given cognition: the former may be called analytical, the latter synthetical, judgments.

Analytical judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has been already actually thought in the concept of the subject, though not so distinctly or with the same (full) consciousness. When I say: All bodies are extended, I have not amplified in the least my concept of body, but have only analyzed it, as extension was really thought to belong to that concept before the judgment was made, though it was not expressed, this judgment is therefore analytical. On the contrary, this judgment, All bodies have weight, contains in its predicate something not actually thought in the general concept of the body; it amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my concept, and must therefore be called synthetical.

b. The Common Principle of all Analytical Judgments is the Law of Contradiction. -- All analytical judgments depend wholly on the law of Contradiction, and are in their nature *a priori* cognitions, whether the concepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not. For the predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained in the concept of the subject, of which it cannot be denied without contradiction. In the same way its opposite is necessarily denied of the subject in an analytical, but negative, judgment, by the same law of contradiction. Such is the nature of the judgments: all bodies are extended, and no bodies are unextended (i. e., simple).

For this very reason all analytical judgments are a .priori even when the concepts are empirical, as, for example, Gold is a yellow metal; for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold as a yellow metal: it is, in fact, the very concept, and I need only analyze it, without looking beyond it elsewhere.

c. Synthetical judgments require a different Principle from the Law of Contradiction.-There are synthetical *a posteriori* judgments of empirical origin; but there are also others which are proved to be certain *a priori*, and which spring from pure Understanding and Reason. Yet they both agree in this, that they cannot possibly spring from the principle of analysis, viz., the law of contradiction, alone; they require a quite different principle, though, from whatever they may be deduced, they must be subject to the law of contradiction, which must never be violated, even though everything cannot be deduced from it. I shall first classify synthetical judgments.

1. Empirical judgments are always synthetical. For it would be absurd to base an analytical judgment on experience, as our concept suffices for the purpose without requiring any testimony from experience. That body is extended, is a judgment established *a priori*, and not an empirical judgment. For before appealing to experience, we already have all the conditions of the judgment in the concept, from which we have but to elicit the predicate according to the law of contradiction, and thereby to become conscious of the necessity of the judgment, which experience could not even teach us.

2. Mathematical judgments are all synthetical. This fact seems hitherto to have altogether escaped the observation of those who have analyzed human reason; it even seems directly opposed to all their conjectures, though incontestably certain, and most important in its consequences. For as it was found that the conclusions of mathematicians all proceed according to the law of contradiction (as is demanded by all apodictic certainty), men persuaded themselves that the fundamental principles were known from the same law. This was a great mistake, for a synthetical proposition can indeed be comprehended according to the law of contradiction, but only by presupposing another synthetical proposition from which it follows, but never in itself.

First of all, we must observe that all proper mathematical judgments are *a priori*, and not empirical, because they carry with them necessity, which cannot be obtained from experience. But if this be not conceded to me, very good; I shall confine my assertion pure Mathematics, the very

notion of which implies that it contains pure *a priori* and not empirical cognitions.

It might at first be thought that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a mere analytical judgment, following from the concept of the sum of seven and five, according to the law of contradiction. But on closer examination it appears that the concept of the sum Of 7+5 contains merely their union in a single number, without its being at all thought what the particular number is that unites them. The concept of twelve is by no means thought by merely thinking of the combination of seven and five; and analyze this possible sum as we may, we shall not discover twelve in the concept. We must go beyond these concepts, by calling to our aid some concrete image [*Anschauung*], i.e., either our five fingers, or five points (as Segner has it in his Arithmetic), and we must add successively the units of the five, given in some concrete image [*Anschauung*], to the concept of seven. Hence our concept is really amplified by the proposition 7 + 5 = I 2, and we add to the first a second, not thought in it. Arithmetical judgments are therefore synthetical, and the more plainly according as we take larger numbers; for in such cases it is clear that, however closely we analyze our concepts without calling visual images (Anscliauung) to our aid, we can never find the sum by such mere dissection.

All principles of geometry are no less analytical. That a straight line is the shortest path between two points, is a synthetical proposition. For my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality. The attribute of shortness is therefore altogether additional, and cannot be obtained by any analysis of the concept. Here, too, visualization [*Anschauung*] must come to aid us. It alone makes the synthesis possible.

Some other principles, assumed by geometers, are indeed actually analytical, and depend on the law of contradiction; but they only serve, as identical propositions, as a method of concatenation, and not as principles, e. g., a=a, the whole is equal to itself, or a + b > a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these, though they are recognized as valid from mere concepts, are only admitted in mathematics, because they can be represented in some visual form [*Anschauung*]. What usually makes us believe that the predicate of such apodictic[5] judgments is already contained in our concept, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is the duplicity of the expression, requesting us to think a certain predicate as of necessity implied in the thought of a given concept, which necessity attaches to the concept. But the question is not what we are requested to join in thought to the given concept, but what we actually think together with and in it, though obscurely; and so it appears that the predicate belongs to these concepts necessarily indeed, yet not directly but indirectly by an added visualization [*Anschauung*].

Sect. 3. A Remark on the General Division of judgments into Analytical and Synthetical

This division is indispensable, as concerns the Critique of human understanding, and therefore deserves to be called classical, though otherwise it is of little use, but this is the reason why dogmatic philosophers, who always seek the sources of metaphysical judgments in Metaphysics itself, and not apart from it, in the pure laws of reason generally, altogether neglected this apparently obvious distinction. Thus the celebrated Wolf, and his acute follower Baumgarten, came to seek the proof of the principle of Sufficient Reason, which is clearly synthetical, in the principle of Contradiction. In Locke's Essay, however, I find an indication of my division. For in the fourth book (chap. iii. Sect. 9, seq.), having discussed the various connections of representations in judgments, and their sources, one of which he makes -I identity and contradiction" (analytical judgments), and another the coexistence of representations in a subject, he confesses (Sect. 10) that

our *a priori* knowledge of the latter is very narrow, and almost nothing. But in his remarks on this species of cognition, there is so little of what is definite, and reduced to rules, that we cannot wonder if no one, not even Hume, was led to make investigations concerning this sort of judgments. For such general and yet definite principles are not easily learned from other men, who have had them obscurely in their minds. We must hit on them first by our own reflection, then we find them elsewhere, where we could not possibly nave found them at first, because the authors themselves did not know that such an idea lay at the basis of their observations. Men who never think independently have nevertheless the acuteness to discover everything, after it has been once shown them, in what was said long since, though no one ever saw it there before.

Sect. 4. The General Question of the Prolegemena. - Is Metaphysics at all Possible?

Were a metaphysics, which could maintain its place as a science, really in existence; could we say, here is metaphysics, learn it, and it will convince you irresistibly and irrevocably of its truth: this question would be useless, and there would only remain that other question (which would rather be a test of our acuteness, than a proof of the existence of the thing itself), "How is the science possible, and how does reason come to attain it?" But human reason has not been so fortunate in this case. There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and say: This is Metaphysics; here you may find the noblest objects of this science, the knowledge of a highest Being, and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure reason. We can be shown indeed many judgments, demonstrably certain, and never questioned; but these are all analytical, and rather concern the materials and the scaffolding for Metaphysics, than the extension of knowledge, which is our proper object in studying it (Sect 2). Even supposing you produce synthetical judgments (such as the law of Sufficient Reason, which you have never proved, as you ought to, from pure reason *a priori*, though we gladly concede its truth), you lapse when they come to be employed for your principal object, into such doubtful assertions, that in all ages one Metaphysics has contradicted another, either in its assertions, or their proofs, and thus has itself destroyed its own claim to lasting assent. Nay, the very attempts to set up such a science are the main cause of the early appearance of skepticism, a mental attitude in which reason treats itself with such violence that it could never have arisen save from complete despair of ever satisfying our most important aspirations. For long before men began to inquire into nature methodically, they consulted abstract reason, which had to some extent been exercised by means of ordinary experience; for reason is ever present, while laws of nature must usually be discovered with labor. So Metaphysics floated to the surface, like foam, which dissolved the moment it was scooped off. But immediately there appeared a new supply on the surface, to be ever eagerly gathered up by some, while others, instead of seeking in the depths the cause of the phenomenon, thought they showed their wisdom by ridiculing the idle labor of their neighbors.

The essential and distinguishing feature of pure mathematical cognition among all other *a priori* cognitions is, that it cannot at all proceed from concepts, but only by means of the construction of concepts (see Critique II., Method of Transcendentalism, Chap. I., sect. 1). As therefore in its judgments it must proceed beyond the concept to that which its corresponding visualization [*Anschauung*] contains, these judgments neither can, nor ought to, arise analytically, by dissecting the concept, but are all synthetical.

I cannot refrain from pointing out the disadvantage resulting to philosophy from the neglect of this

easy and apparently insignificant observation. Hume being prompted (a task worthy of a philosopher) to cast his eye over the whole field of *a priori* cognitions in which human understanding claims such mighty possessions, heedlessly severed from it a whole, and indeed its most valuable, province, viz., pure mathematics; for he thought its nature, or, so to speak, the state-constitution of this empire, depended on totally different principles, namely, on the law of contradiction alone; and although he did not divide judgments in this manner formally and universally as I have done here, what he said was equivalent to this: that mathematics contains only analytical, but metaphysics synthetical, *a priori* judgments. In this, however, he was greatly mistaken, and the mistake had a decidedly injurious effect upon his whole conception. But for this, he would have extended his question concerning the origin of our synthetical judgments far beyond the metaphysical concept of Causality, and included in it the possibility of mathematics *a priori* also, for this latter he must have assumed to be equally synthetical. And then he could not have based his metaphysical judgments on mere experience without subjecting the axioms of mathematics equally to experience, a thing which he was far too acute to do. The good company into which metaphysics would thus have been brought, would have saved it from the danger of a contemptuous ill- treatment, for the thrust intended for it must have reached mathematics, which was not and could not have been Hume's intention. Thus that acute man would have been led into considerations which must needs be similar to those that now occupy us, but which would have gained inestimably by his inimitably elegant style.

Metaphysical judgments, properly so called, are all synthetical. We must distinguish judgments pertaining to metaphysics from metaphysical judgments properly so called. Many of the former are analytical, but they only afford the means for metaphysical judgments, which are the whole end of the science, and which are always synthetical. For if there be concepts pertaining to metaphysics (as, for example, that of substance), the judgments springing from simple analysis of them also pertain to metaphysics, as, for example, substance is that which only exists as subject; and by means of several such analytical judgments, we seek to approach the definition of the concept. But as the analysis of a pure concept of the understanding pertaining to metaphysics, does not proceed in any different manner from the dissection of any other, even empirical, concepts, not pertaining to metaphysics (such as: air is an elastic fluid, the elasticity of which is not destroyed by any known degree of cold), it follows that the concept indeed, but not the analytical judgment, is properly metaphysical. This science has something peculiar in the production of its *a priori* cognitions, which must therefore be distinguished from the features it has in common with other rational knowledge. Thus the judgment, that all the substance in things is permanent, is a synthetical and properly metaphysical judgment.

If the *a priori* principles, which constitute the materials of metaphysics, have first been collected according to fixed principles, then their analysis will be of great value; it might be taught as a particular part (as a philosophia definitiva), containing nothing but analytical judgments pertaining to metaphysics, and could be treated separately from the synthetical which constitute metaphysics proper. For indeed these analyses are not elsewhere of much value, except in metaphysics, i.e., as regards the synthetical judgments, which are to be generated by these previously analyzed concepts.

The conclusion drawn in this section then is, that metaphysics is properly concerned with synthetical propositions *a priori*, and these alone constitute its end, for which it indeed requires various dissections of its concepts, viz., of its analytical judgments, but wherein the procedure is not different from that in every other kind of knowledge, in which we merely seek to render our

concepts distinct by analysis. But the generation of *a priori* cognition by concrete images as well as by concepts, in fine of synthetical propositions *a priori* in philosophical cognition, constitutes the essential subject of Metaphysics.

Weary therefore as well of dogmatism, which teaches us nothing, as of skepticism, which does not even promise us anything, not even the quiet state of a contented ignorance; disquieted by the importance of knowledge so much needed; and lastly, rendered suspicious by long experience of all knowledge which we believe we possess, or which offers itself, under the title of pure reason: there remains but one critical question on the answer to which our future procedure depends, viz., Is Metaphysics at all possible? But this question must be answered not by skeptical objections to the asseverations of some actual system of metaphysics (for we do not as yet admit such a thing to exist), but from the conception, as yet only problematical, of a science of this sort.

In the Critique of Pure Reason I have treated this question synthetically, by making inquiries into pure reason itself, and endeavoring in this source to determine the elements as well as the laws of its pure use according to principles. The task is difficult, and requires a resolute reader to penetrate by degrees into a system, based on no data except reason itself, and which therefore seeks, without resting upon any fact, to unfold knowledge from its original germs. Prolegomena, however, are designed for preparatory exercises; they are intended rather to point out what we have to do in order if possible to actualize a science, than to propound it. They must therefore rest upon something already known as trustworthy, from which we can set out with confidence, and ascend to sources as yet unknown, the discovery of which will not only explain to us what we knew, but exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which all spring from the same sources. The method of Prolegomena, especially of those designed as a preparation for future metaphysics, is consequently analytical.

But it happens fortunately, that though we cannot assume metaphysics to be an actual science, we can say with confidence that certain pure *a priori* synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are actual and given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly recognized as apodictically certain, partly by mere reason, partly by general consent arising from experience, and yet as independent of experience. We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetical knowledge *a priori*, and need not ask whether it be possible, for it is actual, but how it is possible, in order that we may deduce from the principle which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of all the rest.

Sect. 5. The General Problem: How is Cognition from Pure Reason Possible?

We have above learned the significant distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments. The possibility of analytical propositions was easily comprehended, being entirely founded on the law of Contradiction. The possibility of synthetical *a posteriori* judgments, of those which are gathered from experience, also requires no particular explanation; for experience is nothing but a continual synthesis of perceptions. There remain therefore only synthetical propositions *a priori*, of which the possibility must be sought or investigated, because they must depend upon other principles than the law of contradiction.

But here we need not first establish the possibility of such propositions so as to ask whether they are possible. For there are enough of them which indeed are of undoubted certainty, and as our present method is analytical, we shall start from the fact, that such synthetical but purely rational cognition actually exists; but we must now inquire into the reason of this possibility, and ask, how

such cognition is possible, in order that we may from the principles of its possibility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use, its sphere and its limits. The proper problem upon which all depends, when expressed with scholastic precision, is therefore: How are Synthethetic Propositions *a priori* possible?

For the sake of popularity I have above expressed this problem somewhat differently, as an inquiry into purely rational cognition, which I could do for once without detriment to the desired comprehension, because, as we have only to do here with metaphysics and its sources, the reader will, I hope, after the foregoing remarks, keep in mind that when we speak of purely rational cognition, we do not mean analytical, but synthetical cognition. [6]

Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem: its very existence depends upon it. Let any one make metaphysical assertions with ever so much plausibility, let him overwhelm us with conclusions, if he has not previously proved able to answer this question satisfactorily, I have a right to say this is all vain baseless philosophy and false wisdom. You speak through pure reason, and claim, as it were to create cognitions *a priori*. by not only dissecting given concepts, but also by asserting connections which do not rest upon the law of contradiction, and which you believe you conceive quite independently of all experience; how do you arrive at this, and how will you justify your pretensions? An appeal to the consent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed; for that is a witness whose authority depends merely upon rumor. Says Horace:

> **" Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi."**
> **"To all that which thou provest me thus, I refuse to give credence."**

The answer to this question, though indispensable, is difficult; and though the principal reason that it was not made long ago is, that the possibility of the question never occurred to anybody, there is yet another reason, which is this that a satisfactory answer to this one question requires a much more persistent, profound, and painstaking reflection, than the most diffuse work on Metaphysics, which on its first appearance promised immortality to its author. And every intelligent reader, when he carefully reflects what this problem requires, must at first be struck with its difficulty, and would regard it as insoluble and even impossible, did there not actually exist pure synthetical cognitions *a priori*. This actually happened to David Hume, though he did not conceive the question in its entire universality as is done here, and as must be done, should the answer be decisive for all Metaphysics. For how is it possible, says that acute man, that when a concept is given me, I can go beyond it and connect with it another, which is not contained in it, in such a manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former? Nothing but experience can furnish us with such connections (thus he concluded from the difficulty which he took to be an impossibility), and all that vaunted necessity, or, what is the same thing, all cognition assumed to be *a priori*, is nothing but a long habit of accepting something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for objective.

Should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which I occasion him in the solution of this problem, he is at liberty to solve it himself in an easier way. Perhaps he will then feel under obligation to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so profound research, and will rather be surprised at the facility with which, considering the nature of the subject, the solution has been attained. Yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its whole universality (using the term in the mathematical sense, viz., for that which is sufficient for all cases), and finally to exhibit it in the analytical form, as the reader finds it here.

All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory manner the question, "How are synthetic cognitions *a priori*

possible?" For the answer contains the only credentials which they must show when they have anything to offer in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these credentials, they can expect nothing else of reasonable people, who have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed without further ado.

If they on the other hand desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense of man, they cannot in justice be prevented. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief, they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical purposes only) the existence of something that is possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this mariner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians; for the latter profess to be speculative philosophers, and since, when judgments a prior: are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be admitted (for what is declared to be known *a priori* is thereby announced as necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with conjectures, but their assertions must be either science, or are worth nothing at all.

It may be said, that the entire transcendental philosophy, which necessarily precedes all metaphysics, is nothing but the complete solution of the problem here propounded, in systematical order and completeness, and hitherto we have never had any transcendental philosophy; for what goes by its name is properly a part of metaphysics, whereas the former sciences intended first to constitute the possibility of the 'matter, and must therefore precede all metaphysics. And it is not surprising that when a whole science, deprived of all help from other sciences, and consequently in itself quite new, is required to answer a -single question satisfactorily, we should find the answer troublesome and difficult, nay even shrouded in obscurity.

As we now proceed to this solution according to the analytical method, in which we assume that such cognitions from pure reasons actually exist, we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition . which alone is under consideration here), pure mathematics and pure natural science (physics). For these alone can exhibit to us objects in a definite and actualizable form (in der *Anschauung*), and consequently (if there should occur in them a cognition *a priori*) can show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the object in concrete, that is, its actuality, from which we could proceed to the reason of its possibility by the analytic method. This facilitates our work greatly for here universal considerations are not only applied to facts, but even start from them, while in a synthetic procedure they must strictly be derived in abstracts from concepts.

But, in order to rise from these actual and at the same time well-grounded pure cognitions *a priori* to such a possible cognition of the same as we are seeking, viz., to metaphysics as a science, we must comprehend that which occasions it, I mean the mere natural, though in spite of its truth not unsuspected, cognition *a priori* which lies at the bottom of that science, the elaboration of which without any critical investigation of its possibility is commonly called metaphysics. In a word, we must comprehend the natural conditions of such a science as a part of our inquiry, and thus the transcendental problem will be gradually answered by a division into four questions:

1. **How is pure mathematics possible?**
2. **How is pure natural science possible?**
3. **How is metaphysics in general possible?**
4. **How is metaphysics as a science possible?**

It may be seen that the solution of these problems, though chiefly designed to exhibit the essential matter of the Critique, has yet something peculiar, which for itself alone deserves attention. This is the search for the sources of given sciences in reason itself, so that its faculty of knowing something *a priori* may by its own deeds be investigated and measured. By this procedure these sciences gain, if not with regard to their contents, yet as to their proper use, and while they throw light on the higher question concerning their common origin, they give, at the same time, an occasion better to explain their own nature.

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Prolegomena

Immanuel Kant
1783

First Part Of The Transcendental Problem: How Is Pure Mathematics Possible?

Here is a great and established branch of knowledge, encompassing even now a wonderfully large domain and promising an unlimited extension in the future. Yet it carries with it thoroughly apodictical certainty, i.e., absolute necessity, which therefore rests upon no empirical grounds. Consequently it is a pure product of reason, and moreover is thoroughly synthetical. [Here the question arises:] "How then is it possible for human reason to produce a cognition of this nature entirely *a priori*?"

Does not this faculty [which produces mathematics], as it neither is nor can be based upon experience, presuppose some ground of cognition *a priori*, which lies deeply hidden, b,.--, which might reveal itself by these its effects, if their first beginnings were but diligently ferreted out?

Sect. 7. But we find that all mathematical cognition has this peculiarity: it must first exhibit its concept in a visual form [*Anschauung*] and indeed *a priori*, therefore in a visual form which is not empirical, but pure. Without this mathematics cannot take a single step; hence its judgments are always visual, viz., "Intuitive"; whereas philosophy must be satisfied with discursive judgments from mere concepts, and though it may illustrate its doctrines through a visual figure, can never derive them from it. This observation on the nature of mathematics gives us a clue to the first and highest condition of its possibility, which is, that some non-sensuous visualization [called pure intuition, or reine *Anschauung*] must form its basis, in which all its concepts can be exhibited or constructed, in concrete and yet *a priori*. If we can find out this pure intuition and its possibility, we may thence easily explain how synthetical propositions *a priori* are possible in pure mathematics, and consequently how this science itself is possible. Empirical intuition [viz., sense-perception] enables us without difficulty to enlarge the concept which we frame of an object of intuition [or sense-perception], by new predicates, which intuition [i.e., sense-perception] itself presents synthetically in experience. Pure intuition [viz., the visualization of forms in our imagination, from which every thing sensual, i.e., every thought of material qualities, is excluded] does so likewise, only with this difference, that in the latter case the synthetical judgment is *a priori* certain and apodictical, in the former, only *a posteriori* and empirically certain; because this latter contains only that which occurs in contingent empirical intuition, but the former, that which must necessarily be discovered in pure intuition. He.-e intuition, being an intuition *a priori*, is before all experience, viz., before any perception of particular objects, inseparably conjoined with its concept.

Sect. 8. But with this step our perplexity seems rather to increase than to lessen. For the question now is, "How is it possible to intuit [in a visual form] anything *a priori*" An intuition [viz., a visual sense perception] is such a representation as immediately depends upon the presence of the object. Hence it seems impossible to intuit from the outset *a priori*, because intuition would in that event take place without either a former or a present object to refer to, and by consequence could not be intuition. Concepts indeed are such, that we can easily form some of them *a priori*, viz., such as contain nothing but the thought of an object in general; and we need not find ourselves in an immediate relation to the object. Take, for instance, the concepts of Quantity, of Cause, etc. But even these require, in order to make them understood, a certain concrete use-that is, an application to some sense- experience [*Anschauung*], by which an object of them is given us. But how can the intuition of the object [its visualization] precede the object itself?

Sect. 9. If our intuition [i.e., our sense-experience] were perforce of such a nature as to represent things as they are in themselves, there would not be any intuition *a priori*, but intuition would be always empirical. For I can only know what is contained in the object in itself when it is present and given to me. It is indeed even then incomprehensible how the visualizing [*Anschauung*] of a present thing should make me know this thing as it is in itself, as its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation. But even granting this possibility, a visualizing of that sort would not take place *a priori*, that is, before the object were presented to me; for without this latter fact no reason of a relation between my representation and the object can be imagined, unless it depend upon a direct inspiration.

Therefore in one way only can my intuition [*Anschauung*] anticipate the actuality of the object, and be a cognition *a priori*, viz.: if my intuition contains nothing but the form of sensibility, antedating in my subjectivity all the actual impressions through which I am affected by objects.

For that objects of sense can only be intuitd according to this form of sensibility I can know *a priori*. Hence it follows: that propositions, which concern this form of sensuous intuition only, are possible and valid for objects of the senses; as also, conversely, that intuitions which are possible *a priori* can never concern any other things than objects of our senses. [7]

Sect. 10. Accordingly, it is only the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things *a priori*, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they are in themselves; and this assumption is absolutely necessary if synthetical propositions *a priori* be granted as possible, or if, in case they actually occur, their possibility is to be comprehended and determined beforehand.

Now, the intuitions which pure mathematics lays at the foundation of all its cognitions and judgments which appear at once apodictic and necessary are Space and Time. For mathematics must first have all its concepts in intuition, and pure mathematics in pure intuition, that is, it must construct them. If it proceeded in any other way, it would be impossible to make any headway, for mathematics proceeds, not analytically by dissection of concepts, but synthetically, and if pure intuition be wanting, there is nothing in which the matter for synthetical judgments *a priori* can be given. Geometry is based upon the pure intuition of space. Arithmetic accomplishes its concept of number by the successive addition of units in time; and pure mechanics especially cannot attain its concepts of motion without employing the representation of time. Both representations, however, are only intuitions; for if we omit from the empirical intuitions of bodies and their alterations (motion) everything empirical, or belonging to sensation, space and time still remain, which are therefore pure intuitions that lie *a priori* at the basis of the empirical. Hence they can never be

omitted, but at the same time, by their being pure intuitions *a priori*, they prove that they are mere forms of our sensibility, which must precede all empirical intuition, or perception of actual objects, and conformably to which objects can be known *a priori*, but only as they appear to us.

Sect. 11. The problem of the present section is therefore solved. Pure mathematics, as synthetical cognition *a priori*, is only possible by referring to no other objects than those of the senses. At the basis of their empirical intuition lies a pure intuition (of space and of time) which is *a priori*. This is possible, because the latter intuition is nothing but the mere form of sensibility, which precedes the actual appearance of the objects, in, that it, in fact, makes them possible. Yet this faculty of intuiting *a priori* affects not the matter of the phenomenon (that is, the sense- element in it, for this constitutes that which is empirical), but its form, viz., space and time. Should any man venture to doubt that these are determinations adhering not to things in themselves, but to their relation to our sensibility, I should be glad to know how it can be possible to know the constitution of things *a priori*, viz., before we have any acquaintance with them and before they are presented to us. Such, however, is the case with space and time. But this is quite comprehensible as soon as both count for nothing more than formal conditions of our sensibility, while the objects count merely as phenomena; for then the form of the phenomenon, i.e., pure intuition, can by all means be represented as proceeding from ourselves, that is, *a priori*.

Sect. 12. In order to add something by way of illustration and confirmation, we need only watch the ordinary and necessary procedure of geometers. All proofs of the complete congruence of two given figures (where the one can in every respect be substituted for the other) come ultimately to this that they may be made to coincide; which is evidently nothing else than a synthetical proposition resting upon immediate intuition, and this intuition must be pure, or given *a priori*, otherwise the proposition could not rank as apodictically certain, but would have empirical certainty only. In that case, it could only be said that it is always found to be so, and holds good only as far as our perception reaches. That everywhere space (which (in its entirety] is itself no longer the boundary of another space) has three dimensions, and that space cannot in any way have more, is based on the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect at right angles in one point; but this proposition cannot by any means be shown from concepts, but rests immediately on intuition, and indeed on pure and *a priori* intuition, because it is apodictically certain. That we can require a line to be drawn to infinity (in indefinitum), or that a series of changes (for example, spaces traversed by motion) shall be infinitely continued, presupposes a representation of space and time, which can only attach to intuition, namely, so far as it in itself is bounded by nothing, for from concepts it could never be inferred. Consequently, the basis of mathematics actually are pure intuitions, which make its synthetical and apodictically valid propositions possible. Hence our transcendental deduction of the notions of space and of time explains at the same time the possibility of pure mathematics. Without some such deduction its truth may be granted, but its existence could by no means be understood, and we must assume II that everything which can be given to our senses (to the external senses in space, to the internal one in time) is intuitd by us as it appears to us, not as it is in itself."

Sect. 13. Those who cannot yet rid themselves of the notion that space and time are actual qualities inhering in things in themselves, may exercise their acumen on the following paradox. When they have in vain attempted its solution, and are free from prejudices at least for a few moments, they will suspect that the degradation of space and of time to mere forms of @ur sensuous intuition may perhaps be well founded,

If two things are quite equal in all respects ask much as can be ascertained by all means possible,

quantitatively and qualitatively, it must follow, that the one can in all cases and under all circumstances replace the other, and this substitution would not occasion the least perceptible difference. This in fact is true of plane figures in geometry; but some spherical figures exhibit, notwithstanding a complete internal agreement, such a contrast in their external relation, that the one figure cannot possibly be put in the place of the other. For instance, two spherical triangles on opposite hemispheres, which have an arc of the equator as their common base, may be quite equal, both as regards sides and angles, so that nothing is to be found in either, if it be described for itself alone and completed, that would not equally be applicable to both; and yet the one cannot be put in the place of the other (being situated upon the opposite hemisphere). Here then is an internal difference between the two triangles, which difference our understanding cannot describe as internal, and which only manifests itself by external relations in space.

But I shall adduce examples, taken from common life, that are more obvious still.

What can be more similar in every respect and in every part more alike to my hand and to my ear, than their images in a mirror? And yet I cannot put such a hand as is seen in the glass in the place of its archetype; for if this is a right hand, that in the glass is a left one, and the image or reflection of the right ear is a left one which never can serve as a substitute for the other. There are in this case no internal differences which our understanding could determine by thinking alone. Yet the differences are internal as the senses teach, for, notwithstanding their complete equality and similarity, the left hand cannot be enclosed in the same bounds as the right one (they are not congruent); the glove of one hand cannot be used for the other. What is the solution? These objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves, and as the pure understanding would know them, but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances, the possibility of which rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility. Space is the form of the external intuition of this sensibility, and the internal determination of every space is only possible by the determination of its external relation to the whole space, of which it is a part (in other words, by its relation to the external sense). That is to say, the part is only possible through the whole, which is never the case with things in themselves, as objects of the mere understanding, but with appearances only. Hence the difference between similar and equal things, which are yet not congruent (for instance, two symmetric helices), cannot be made intelligible by any concept, but only by the relation to the right and the left hands which immediately refers to intuition.

REMARK 1.

Pure Mathematics, and especially pure geometry, can only have objective reality on condition that they refer to objects of sense. But in regard to the latter the principle holds good, that our sense representation is not a representation of things in themselves but of the way in which they appear to us. Hence it follows, that the propositions of geometry are not the results of a mere creation of our poetic imagination, and that therefore they cannot be referred with assurance to actual objects; but rather that they are necessarily valid of space, and consequently of all that may be found in space, because space is nothing else than the form of all external appearances, and it is this form alone in which objects of sense can be given. Sensibility, the form of which is the basis of geometry, is that upon which the possibility of external appearance depends. Therefore these appearances can never contain anything but what geometry prescribes to them.

It would be quite otherwise if the senses were so constituted as to represent objects as they are in

themselves. For then it would not by any means follow from the conception of space, which with all its properties serves to the geometer as an *a priori* foundation, together with what is thence inferred, must be so in nature. The space of the geometer would be considered a mere fiction, and it would not be credited with objective validity, because we cannot see how things must of necessity agree with an image of them, which we make spontaneously and previous to our acquaintance with them. But if this image, or rather this formal intuition, is the essential property of our sensibility, by means of which alone objects are given to us, and if this sensibility represents not things in themselves, but their appearances: we shall easily comprehend, and at the same time indisputably prove, that all external objects of our world of sense must necessarily coincide in the most rigorous way with the propositions of geometry; because sensibility by means of its form of external intuition, viz., by space, the same with which the geometer is occupied, makes those objects at all possible as mere appearances.

It will always remain a remarkable phenomenon in the history of philosophy, that there was a time, when even mathematicians, who at the same time were philosophers, began to doubt, not of the accuracy of their geometrical propositions so far as they concerned space, but of their objective validity and the applicability of this concept itself, and of all its corollaries, to nature. They showed much concern whether a-line in nature might not consist of physical points, and consequently that true space in the object might consist of simple [discrete] parts, while the space which the geometer has in his mind [being continuous] cannot be such. They did not recognize that this mental space renders possible the physical space, i.e., the extension of matter; that this pure space is not at all a quality of things in themselves, but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation; and that all objects in space are mere appearances, i.e., not things in themselves but representations of our sensuous intuition. But such is the case, for the space of the geometer is exactly the form of sensuous intuition which we find *a priori* in us, and contains the ground of the possibility of all external appearances (according to their form), and the latter must necessarily and most rigidly agree with the propositions of the geometer, which he draws not from any fictitious concept, but from the subjective basis of all external phenomena, which is sensibility itself. In this and no other way can geometry be made secure as to the undoubted objective reality of its propositions against all the intrigues of a shallow Metaphysics, which is surprised at them [the geometrical propositions], because it has not traced them to the sources of their concepts.

REMARK II.

Whatever is given us as object, must be given us in intuition. All our intuition however takes place by means of the senses only; the understanding intuits nothing, but only reflects. And as we have just shown that the senses never and in no manner enable us to know things in themselves, but only their appearances, which are mere representations of the sensibility, we conclude that all bodies, together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts.' You will say: Is not this manifest idealism?

Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are none but thinking beings, all other things, which we think are perceived in intuition, being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them corresponds in fact. Whereas I say, that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their appearances, 1. e., the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations

which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be termed idealism? It is the very contrary.

Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it has been generally assumed and granted without detriment to the actual existence of external things, that many of their predicates may be said to belong not to the things in themselves, but to their appearances, and to have no proper existence outside our representation. Heat, color, and taste, for instance, are of this kind. Now, if I go farther, and for weighty reasons rank as mere appearances the remaining qualities of bodies also, which are called primary, such as extension, place, and in general space, with all that which belongs to it (impenetrability or materiality, space, etc.)-no one in the least can adduce the reason of its being inadmissible. As little as the man who admits colors not to be properties of the object in itself, but only as modifications of the sense of sight, should on that account be called an idealist, so little can my system be named idealistic, merely because I find that more, nay, A11 the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong merely to its appearance.

The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but it is only shown, that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself.

I should be glad to know what my assertions must be in order to avoid all idealism. Undoubtedly, I should say, that the representation of space is not only perfectly conformable to the relation which our sensibility has to objects-that I have said- but that it is quite similar to the object,-an assertion in which I can find as little meaning as if I said that the sensation of red has a similarity to the property of vermilion, which in me excites this sensation.

REMARK III.

Hence we may at once dismiss an easily foreseen but futile objection, "that by admitting the ideality of space and of time the whole sensible world would be turned into mere sham." At first all philosophical insight into the nature of sensuous cognition was spoiled, by making the sensibility merely a confused mode of representation, according to which we still know things as they are, but without being able to reduce everything in this our representation to a clear consciousness; whereas proof is offered by us that sensibility consists, not in this logical distinction of clearness and obscurity, but in the genetical one of the origin of cognition itself. For sensuous perception represents things not at all as they are, but only the mode in which they affect our senses, and consequently by sensuous perception appearances only and not things themselves are given to the understanding for reflection. After this necessary corrective, an objection rises from an unpardonable and almost intentional misconception, as if my doctrine turned all the things of the world of sense into mere illusion.

When an appearance is given us, we are still quite free as to how we should judge the matter. The appearance depends upon the senses, but the judgment upon the understanding, and the only question is, whether in the determination of the object there is truth or not. But the difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the nature of the representations, which are referred to objects (for they are the same in both cases), but by their connection according to those rules, which determine the coherence of the representations in the concept of an object, and by ascertaining whether they can subsist together in experience or not. And it is not the fault of the appearances if our cognition takes illusion for truth, i.e., if the intuition, by which an object is given us, is considered a concept of the thing or of its existence also, which the understanding can only

think. The senses represent to us the paths of the planets as now progressive, now retrogressive, and herein is neither falsehood nor truth, because as long as we hold this path to be nothing but appearance, we do not judge of the objective nature of their motion. But as a false judgment may easily arise when the understanding is not on its guard against this subjective mode of representation being considered objective, we say they appear to move backward; it is not the senses however which must be charged with the illusion, but the understanding, whose province alone it is to give an objective judgment on appearances.

Thus, even if we did not at all reflect on the origin of our representations, whenever we connect our intuitions of sense (whatever they may contain), in space and in time, according to the rules of the coherence of all cognition in experience, illusion or truth will arise according as we are negligent or careful. It is merely a question of the use of sensuous representations in the understanding, and not of their origin. In the same way, if I consider all the representations of the senses, together with their form, space and time, to be nothing but appearances, and space and time to be a mere form of the sensibility, which is not to be met with in objects out of it, and if I make use of these representations in reference to possible experience only, there is nothing in my regarding them as appearances that can lead astray or cause illusion. For all that they can correctly cohere according to rules of truth in experience. Thus all the propositions of geometry hold good of space as well as of all the objects of the senses, consequently of all possible experience, whether I consider space as a mere form of the sensibility, or as something cleaving to the things themselves. In the former case however I comprehend how I can know *a priori* these propositions concerning all the objects of external intuition. Otherwise, everything else as regards all possible experience remains just as if I had not departed from the vulgar view.

But if I venture to go beyond all possible experience with my notions of space and time, which I cannot refrain from doing if I proclaim them qualities inherent in things in themselves (for what should prevent me from letting them hold good of the same things, even though my senses might be different, and unsuited to them?), then a grave error may arise due to illusion, for thus I would proclaim to be universally valid what is merely a subjective condition of the intuition of things and sure only for all objects of sense, viz., for all possible experience; I would refer this condition to things in themselves, and do not limit it to the conditions of experience.

My doctrine of the ideality of space and of time, therefore, far from reducing the whole sensible world to mere illusion, is the only means of securing the application of one of the most important cognitions (that which mathematics propounds *a priori*) to actual objects, and of preventing its being regarded as mere illusion. For without this observation it would be quite impossible to make out whether the intuitions of space and time, which we borrow from no experience, and which yet lie in our representation *a priori*, are not mere phantasms of our brain, to which objects do not correspond, at least not adequately, and consequently, whether we have been able to show its unquestionable validity with regard to all the objects of the sensible world just because they are mere appearances.

Secondly, though these my principles make appearances of the representations of the senses, they are so far from turning the truth of experience into mere illusion, that they are rather the only means of preventing the transcendental illusion, by which metaphysics has hitherto been deceived, leading to the childish endeavor of catching at bubbles, because appearances, which are mere representations, were taken for things in themselves. Here originated the remarkable event of the antimony of Reason which I shall mention by and by, and which is destroyed by the single observation, that appearance, as long as it is employed in experience, produces truth, but the

moment it transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing but illusion.

Inasmuch therefore, as I leave to things as we obtain them by the senses their actuality, and only limit our sensuous intuition of these things to this, that they represent in no respect, not even in the pure intuitions of space and of time, anything more than mere appearance of those thin-s, but never their constitution in themselves, this is not a sweeping illusion invented for nature by me. My protestation too against all charges of idealism is so valid and clear as even to seem superfluous, were there not incompetent judges, who, while they would have an old name for every deviation from their perverse though common opinion, and never judge of the spirit of philosophic nomenclature, but cling to the letter only, are ready to put their own conceits in the place of well-defined notions, and thereby deform and distort them. I have myself given this my theory the name of transcendental idealism, but that cannot authorize any one to confound it either with the empirical idealism of Descartes, (indeed, his was only an insoluble problem, owing to which he thought every one at liberty to deny the existence of the corporeal world, because it could never be proved satisfactorily), or with the mystical and visionary idealism of Berkeley, against which and other similar phantasms our Critique contains the proper antidote. My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since it never came into my head to doubt it, but it concerns the sensuous representation of things, to which space and time especially belong. Of these [viz., space and time], consequently of all appearances in general, I have only shown, that they are neither things (but mere modes of representation), nor determinations belonging to things in themselves. But the word "transcendental," which with me means a reference of our cognition, i.e., not to things, but only to the cognitive faculty, was meant to obviate this misconception. Yet rather than give further occasion to it by this word, I now retract it, and desire this idealism of mine to be called critical. But if it be really an objectionable idealism to convert actual thin.-Is (not appearances) into mere representations.. by what name shall we call him who conversely changes mere representations to things? It may, I think, be called "dreaming idealism," in contradistinction to the former, which may be called "visionary," both of which are to be refuted by my transcendental, or, better, critical idealism.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Prolegomena

Immanuel Kant
1783

Second Part Of The Transcendental Problem: How Is The Science Of Nature Possible?

Sect. 14. Nature is the existence of things, so far as it is determined according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of things in themselves, we could never know it either *a priori* or *a posteriori*. Not *a priori*, for how can we know what belongs to things in themselves, since this never can be done by the dissection of our concepts (in analytical judgments)? We do not want to know what is contained in our concept of a thing (for the [concept describes what] belongs to its logical being), but what is in the actuality of the thing superadded to our concept, and by what the thing itself is determined in its existence outside the concept. Our understanding, and the conditions on which alone it can connect the determinations of things in their existence, do not prescribe any rule to things themselves; these do not conform to our understanding, but it must conform itself to them; they must therefore be first given us in order to gather these determinations from them, wherefore they would not be known *a priori*.

A cognition of the nature of things in themselves *a posteriori* would be equally impossible. For, if experience is to teach us laws, to which the existence of things is subject, these laws, if they regard things in themselves, must belong to them of necessity even outside our experience. But experience teaches us what exists and how it exists, but never that it must necessarily exist so and not otherwise. Experience therefore can never teach us the nature of things in themselves.

Sect. 15. We nevertheless actually possess a pure science of nature in which are propounded, *a priori* and with all the necessity requisite to apodictical propositions, laws to which nature is subject. I need only call to witness that propaedeutic of natural science which, under the title of the universal Science of Nature, precedes all Physics (which is founded upon empirical principles). In it we have Mathematics applied to appearance, and also merely discursive principles (or those derived from concepts), which constitute the philosophical part of the pure cognition of nature. But there are several things in it, which are not quite pure and independent of empirical sources: such as the concept of motion, that of impenetrability (upon which the empirical concept of matter rests), that of inertia, and many others, which prevent its being called a perfectly pure science of nature. Besides, it only refers to objects of the external sense and therefore does not give an example of a universal science of nature, in the strict sense, for such a science must reduce nature in general, whether it regards the object of the external or that of the internal sense (the object of Physics as well as Psychology), to universal laws. But among the principles of this universal physics there are a few which actually have the required universality; for instance, the propositions that

"substance is permanent, " and that "every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws," etc. These are actually universal laws of nature, which subsist completely *a priori*. There is then in fact a pure science of nature, and the question arises, How is it possible?

Sect. 16. The word "nature" assumes yet another meaning, which determines the object, whereas in the former sense it only denotes the conformity to law [Gesetzmdssigkeit] of the determinations of the existence of things generally. If we consider it materialiter (i.e., in the matter that forms its objects) "nature is the complex of all the objects of experience." And with this only are we now concerned, for besides, things which can never be objects of experience, if they must be known as to their nature, would oblige us to have recourse to concepts whose meaning could never be given in concrete (by any example of possible experience). Consequently we must form for ourselves a list of concepts of their nature, the reality whereof (i.e., whether they actually refer to objects, or are mere creations of thought) could never be determined. The cognition of what cannot be an object of experience would be hyperphysical, and with things hyperphysical we are here not concerned, but only with the cognition of nature, the actuality of which can be confirmed by experience, though it [the cognition of nature] is possible *a priori* and precedes all experience.

Sect. 17. The formal [aspect] of nature in this narrower sense is therefore the conformity to law of all the objects of experience, and so far as it is known *a priori*, their necessary conformity. But it has just been shown that the laws of nature can never be known *a priori* in objects so far as they are considered not in reference to possible experience, but as things in themselves. And our inquiry here extends not to things in themselves (the properties of which we pass by), but to things as objects of possible experience, and the complex of these is what we properly designate as nature. And now I ask, when the possibility of a cognition of nature *a priori* is in question, whether it is better to arrange the problem thus: How can we know *a priori* that things as objects of experience necessarily conform to law? or thus: How is it possible to know *a priori* the necessary conformity to law of experience itself as regards all its objects generally?

Closely considered, the solution of the problem, represented in either way, amounts, with regard to the pure cognition of nature (which is the point of the question at issue), entirely to the same thing. For the subjective laws, under which alone an empirical cognition of things is possible, hold good of these things, as objects of possible experience (not as things in themselves, which are not considered here). Either of the following statements means quite the same: "A judgment of observation can never rank as experience, without the law, that 'whenever an event is observed, it is always referred to some antecedent, which it follows according to a universal rule'"; alternatively, "Everything, of which experience teaches that it happens, must have a cause."

It is, however, more commendable to choose the first formula. For we can *a priori* and previous to all given objects have a cognition of those conditions, on which alone experience is possible, but never of the laws to which things may in themselves be subject, without reference to possible experience. We cannot therefore study the nature of things *a priori* otherwise than by investigating the conditions and the universal (though subjective) laws, under which alone such a cognition as experience (as to mere form) is possible, and we determine accordingly the possibility of things, as objects of experience. For if I should choose the second formula, and seek the conditions *a priori*, on which nature as an object of experience is possible, I might easily fall into error, and fancy that I was speaking of nature as a thing in itself, and then move round in endless circles, in a vain search for laws concerning things of which nothing is given me.

Accordingly we shall here be concerned with experience only, and the universal conditions of its

possibility which are given *a priori*. Thence we shall determine nature as the whole object of all possible experience. I think it will be understood that I here do not mean the rules of the observation of a nature that is already given, for these already presuppose experience. I do not mean how (through experience) we can study the laws of nature; for these would not then be laws *a priori*, and would yield us no pure science of nature; but [I mean to ask] how the condi. tions *a priori* of the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources from which all the universal laws of nature must be derived.

Sect. 18. In the first place we must state that, while all judgments of experience [Erfahrungsurtheile] are empirical (i.e., have their ground in immediate senseperception), vice versa, all empirical judgments [empirische Urtheile] are not judgments of experience, but, besides the empirical, and in general besides what is given to the sensuous intuition, particular concepts must yet be superadded-concepts which have their origin quite *a priori* in the pure understanding, and under which every perception must be first of all subsumed and then by their means changed into experience. [8]

Empirical judgments, so far as they have objective validity, are judgments of experience; but those which are only subjectively valid, I name mere judgments of perception. The latter require no pure concept of the understanding, but only the logical connection of perception in a thinking subject. But the former always require, besides the representation of the sensuous intuition, particular concepts originally begotten in the understanding, which produce the objective validity of the judgment of experience.

All our judgments are at first merely judgments of perception; they hold good only for us (i.e., for our subject), and we do not till afterwards give them a new reference (to an object), and desire that they shall always hold good for us and in the same way for everybody else; for when a judgment agrees with an object, all judgments concerning the same object must likewise agree among themselves, and thus the objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies nothing else than its necessary universality of application. And conversely when we have reason to consider a judgment necessarily universal (which never depends upon perception, but upon the pure concept of the understanding, under which the perception is subsumed), we must consider it objective also, that is, that it expresses not merely a reference of our perception to a subject, but a quality of the object. For there would be no reason for the judgments of other men necessarily agreeing with mine, if it were not the unity of the object to which they all refer, and with which they accord; hence they must all agree with one another.

Sect. 19. Therefore objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody) are equivalent terms, and though we do not know the object in itself, yet when we consider a judgment as universal, and also necessary, we understand it to have objective validity. By this judgment we know the object (though it remains unknown as it is in itself) by the universal and necessary connection of the given perceptions. As this is the case with all objects of sense, judgments of experience take their objective validity not from the immediate cognition of the object (which is impossible), but from the condition of universal validity in empirical judgments, which, as already said, never rests upon empirical, or, in short, sensuous conditions, but upon a pure concept of the understanding. The object always remains unknown in itself; but when by the concept of the understanding the connection of the representations of the object, which are given to our sensibility, is determined as universally valid, the object is determined by this relation, and it is the judgment that is objective.

To illustrate the matter: When we say, "the room is warm, sugar sweet, and wormwood bitter," [9] -- we have only subjectively valid judgments, I do not at all expect that I or any other person shall always find it as I now do; each of these sentences only expresses a relation of two sensations to the same subject, to myself, and that only in my present state of perception; consequently they are not valid of the object. Such are judgments of perception. judgments of experience are of quite a different nature. What experience teaches me under certain circumstances, it must always teach me and everybody; and its validity is not limited to the subject nor to its state at a particular time. Hence I pronounce all such judgments as being objectively valid. For instance, when I say the air is elastic, this judgment is as yet a judgment of perception only-I do nothing but refer two of my sensations to one another. But, if I would have it called a judgment of experience, I require this connection to stand under a condition, which makes it universally valid. I desire therefore that I and everybody else should always connect necessarily the same perceptions under the same circumstances.

Sect. 20. We must consequently analyze experience in order to see what is contained in this product of the senses and of the understanding, and how the judgment of experience itself is possible. The foundation is the intuition of which I become conscious, i.e., perception (perceptio), which pertains merely to the senses. But in the next place, there are acts of judging (which belong only to the understanding). But this judging may be twofold-first, I may merely compare perceptions and connect them in a particular state of my consciousness; or, secondly, I may connect them in consciousness generally. The former judgment is merely a judgment of perception, and of subjective validity only: it is merely a connection of perceptions in my mental state, without reference to the object. Hence it is not, as is commonly imagined, enough for experience to compare perceptions and to connect them in consciousness through judgment; there arises no universality and necessity, for which alone judgments can become objectively valid and be called experience.

Quite another judgment therefore is required before perception can become experience. The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept, which determines the form of judging in general relatively to the intuition, connects its empirical consciousness in consciousness generally, and thereby procures universal validity for empirical judgments. A concept of this nature is a pure *a priori* concept of the Understanding, which does nothing but determine for an intuition the general way in which it can be used for judgments. Let the concept be that of cause, then it determined the intuition which is subsumed under it, e.g., that of air, relative to judgments in general, viz., the concept of air serves with regard to its expansion in the relation of antecedent to consequent in a hypothetical judgment. The concept of cause accordingly is a pure concept of the understanding, which is totally disparate from all possible perception, and only serves to determine the representation subsumed under it, relatively to judgments in general, and so to make a universally valid judgment possible.

Before, therefore, a judgment of perception can become a judgment of experience, it is requisite that the perception should be subsumed under some such a concept of the understanding.; for instance, air ranks under the concept of causes, which determines our judgment about it in regard to its expansion as hypothetical. [10] Thereby the expansion of the air is represented not as merely belonging to the perception of the air in my present state or in several states of mine, or in the state of perception of others, but as belonging to it necessarily. The judgment, "the air is elastic," becomes universally valid, and a judgment of experience, only by certain judgments preceding it, which subsume the intuition of air under the concept of cause and effect: and they thereby

determine the perceptions not merely as regards one another in me, but relatively to the form of judging in general, which is here hypothetical, and in this way they render the empirical judgment universally valid.

If all our synthetical judgments are analyzed so far as they are objectively valid, it will be found that they never consist of mere intuitions connected only (as is commonly believed) by comparison into a judgment; but that they would be impossible were not a pure concept of the understanding superadded to the concepts abstracted from intuition, under which concept these latter are subsumed, and in this manner only combined into an objectively valid judgment. Even the judgments of pure mathematics in their simplest axioms are not exempt from this condition. The principle, II a straight line is the shortest between two points," presupposes that the line is subsumed under the concept of quantity, which certainly is no mere intuition, but bas its seat in the understanding alone, and serves to determine the intuition (of the line) with regard to the judgments which may be made about it, relatively to their quantity, that is, to plurality (as judicia plurativa). [11] For under them it is understood that in a given intuition there is contained a plurality of homogenous parts.

Sect. 21. To prove, then, the possibility of experience so far as it rests upon pure concepts of the understanding *a priori*, we must first represent what belongs to judgments in general and the various functions of the understanding, in a complete table. For the pure concepts of the understanding must run parallel to these functions, as such concepts are nothing more than concepts of intuitions in general, so far as these are determined by one or other of these functions of judging, in themselves, that is, necessarily and universally. Hereby also the *a priori* principles of the possibility of all experience, as of an objectively valid empirical cognition, will be precisely determined. For they are nothing but propositions by which all perception is (under certain universal conditions of intuition) subsumed under those pure concepts of the understanding.

LOGICAL TABLE OF JUDGMENTS.

1. As to Quantity.

Universal.

Particular.

Singular.

2. As to Quality.

Affirmative.

Negative.

Infinite.

3. As to Relation.

Categorical.

Hypothetical.

Disjunctive.

4. As to Modality.

Problematical.

Assertorical.

Apodictical.

TRANSCENDENTAL TABLE OF THE PURE CONCEFITS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

1 . As to Quantity.

Unity (the Measure).

Plurality (the Quantity).

Totality (the Whole).

2. As to Quality.

Reality.

Negation.

Limitation.

3. As to Relation.

Substance.

Cause.

Community.

4. As to Modality.

Possibility.

Existence.

Necessity. PURE PHYSICAL TABLE OF THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE OF NATURE.

1. Axioms of Intuition.
2. Anticipations of Perception.
3. Analogies of Experience.
4. Postulates of Empirical Thinking generally.

Sect. 21a. In order to comprise the whole matter in one idea, it is first necessary to remind the reader that we are discussing not the origin of experience, but of that which lies in experience. The former pertains to empirical psychology, and would even then never be adequately explained without the latter, which belongs to the Critique of cognition, and particularly of the understanding.

Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments, which the understanding forms alone from sensuous intuitions, are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in the sensuous intuition, while in the other the judgments must express what experience in general, and not what the mere perception (which possesses only subjective validity) contains. The judgment of experience must therefore add to the sensuous intuition and its logical connection in a judgment (after it has been rendered universal by comparison) something that determines the synthetical judgment as necessary and therefore as universally valid. This can be nothing else than that concept which represents the intuition as determined in itself with regard to one form of judgment rather than another, viz., a concept of that synthetical unity of intuitions which can only be represented by a given logical

function of judgments.

Sect. 22. The sum of the matter is this: the business of the senses is to intuit -- that of the understanding is to think. But thinking is uniting representations in one consciousness. This union originates either merely relative to the subject, and is accidental and subjective, or is absolute, and is necessary or objective. The union of representations in one consciousness is judgment. Thinking therefore is the same as judging, or referring representations to judgments in general. Hence judgments are either merely subjective, when representations are referred to a consciousness in one subject only, and united in it, or objective, when they are united in a consciousness generally, that is, necessarily. The logical functions of all judgments are but various modes of uniting representations in consciousness. But if they serve for concepts, they are concepts of their necessary union in a consciousness, and so principles of objectively valid judgments. This union in a consciousness is either analytical, by identity, or synthetical, by the combination and addition of various representations one to another. Experience consists in the synthetical connection of phenomena (perceptions) in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Hence the pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must be subsumed ere they can serve for judgments of experience, in which the synthetical unity of the perceptions is represented as necessary and universally valid. [12]

Sect. 23. judgments, when considered merely as the condition of the union of given representations in a consciousness, are rules. These rules, so far as they represent the union as necessary, are rules *a priori*, and so far as they cannot be deduced from higher rules, are fundamental principles. But in regard to the possibility of all experience, merely in relation to the form of thinking in it, no conditions of judgments of experience are higher than those which bring the phenomena, according to the various form of their intuition, under pure concepts of the understanding, and render the empirical judgment objectively valid. These concepts are therefore the *a priori* principles of possible experience.

The principles of possible experience are then at the same time universal laws of nature, which can be known *a priori*. And thus the problem in our second question, "How is the pure Science of Nature possible?" is solved. For the system which is required for the form of a science is to be met with in perfection here, because, beyond the above-mentioned formal conditions of all judgments in general offered in logic, no others are possible, and these constitute a logical system. The concepts grounded thereupon, which contain the *a priori* conditions of all synthetical and necessary judgments, accordingly constitute a transcendental system. Finally the principles, by means of which all phenomena are subsumed under these concepts, constitute a physical[13] system, that is, a system of nature, which precedes all empirical cognition of nature, makes it even possible, and hence may in strictness be denominated the universal and pure science of nature.

Sect. 24. The first one[14] of the physiological principles subsumes all phenomena, as intuitions in space and time, under the concept of Quantity, and is so far a principle of the application of Mathematics to experience. The second one subsumes the empirical element, viz., sensation, which denotes the real in intuitions, not indeed directly under the concept of quantity, because sensation is not an intuition that contains either space or time, though it places the respective object into both. But still there is between reality (sense-representation) and the zero, or total void of intuition in time, a difference which has a quantity. For between every given degree of light and of darkness, between every degree of beat and of absolute cold, between every degree of weight and of absolute lightness, between every degree of occupied space and of totally void space, diminishing degrees

can be conceived, in the same manner as between consciousness and total unconsciousness (the darkness of a psychological blank) ever diminishing degrees obtain. Hence there is no perception that can prove an absolute absence of it; for instance, no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as a kind of consciousness, which is only out-balanced by a stronger consciousness. This occurs in all cases of sensation, and so the understanding can anticipate even sensations, which constitute the peculiar quality of empirical representations (appearances), by means of the principle: "that they all have (consequently that what is real in all phenomena has) a degree." Here is the second application of mathematics (mathesis intensortim) to the science of nature.

Sect. 25. Anent the relation of appearances merely with a view to their existence, the determination is not mathematical but dynamical, and can never be objectively valid, consequently never fit for experience, if it does not come under *a priori* principles by which the cognition of experience relative to appearances becomes even possible. Hence appearances must be subsumed under the concept of Substance, which is the foundation of all determination of existence, as a concept of the thing itself; or secondly so far as a succession is found among phenomena, that is, an event-under the concept of an Effect with reference to Cause; or lastly-so far as coexistence is to be known objectively, that is, by a judgment of experience-under the concept of Community (action and reaction).[15] Thus *a priori* principles form the basis of objectively valid, though empirical judgments, that is, of the possibility of experience so far as it must connect objects as existing in nature. These principles are the proper laws of nature, which may be termed dynamical.

Finally the cognition of the agreement and connection not only of appearances among themselves in experience, but of their relation to experience in general, belongs to the judgments of experience. This relation contains either their agreement with the formal conditions, which the understanding knows, or their coherence with the materials of the senses and of perception, or combines both into one concept. Consequently it contains Possibility, Actuality, and Necessity according to universal laws of nature; and this constitutes the physical doctrine of method, or the distinction of truth and of hypotheses, and the bounds of the certainty of the latter.

Sect. 26. The third table of Principles drawn from the nature of the understanding itself after the critical method, shows an inherent perfection, which raises it far above every other table which has hitherto though in vain been tried or may yet be tried by analyzing the objects themselves dogmatically. It exhibits all synthetical *a priori* principles completely and according to one principle, viz., the faculty of judging in general, constituting the essence of experience as regards the understanding, so that we can be certain that there are no more such principles, which affords a satisfaction such as can never be attained by the dogmatical method. Yet is this not all: there is a still greater merit in it.

We must carefully bear in mind the proof which shows the possibility of this cognition *a priori*, and at the same time limits all such principles to a condition which must never be lost sight of, if we desire it not to be misunderstood, and extended in use beyond the original sense which the understanding attaches to it. This limit is that they contain nothing but the conditions of possible experience in general so far as it is Subjected to laws *a priori*. Consequently I do not say, that things in themselves possess a quantity, that their actuality possesses a degree, their existence a connection of accidents in a substance, etc. This nobody can prove, because such a synthetical connection from mere concepts, without any reference to sensuous intuition on the one side, or connection of it in a possible experience on the other, is absolutely impossible. The essential limitation of the concepts in these principles then is: That all things stand necessarily *a priori* under

the aforementioned conditions, as objects of experience only.

Hence there follows secondly a specifically peculiar mode of proof of these principles: they are not directly referred to appearances and to their relations, but to the possibility of experience, of which appearances constitute the matter only, not the form. Thus they are referred to objectively and universally valid synthetical propositions, in which we distinguish judgments of experience from those of perception. This takes place because appearances, as mere intuitions, occupying a part of space and time, come under the concept of Quantity, which unites their multiplicity *a priori* according to rules synthetically. Again, so far as the perception contains, besides intuition, sensibility, and between the latter and nothing (i.e., the total disappearance of sensibility), there is an ever-decreasing transition, it is apparent that that which is in appearances must have a degree, so far as it (viz., the perception) does not itself occupy any part of space or of time. [16] Still the transition to actuality from empty time or empty space is only possible in time; consequently though sensibility, as the quality of empirical intuition, can never be known *a priori*, by its specific difference from other sensibilities, yet it can, in a possible experience in general, as a quantity of perception be intensely distinguished from every other similar perception. Hence the application of mathematics to nature, as regards the sensuous intuition by which nature is given to us, becomes possible and is thus determined.

Above all, the reader must pay attention to the mode of proof of the principles which occur under the title of Analogies of experience. For these do not refer to the genesis of intuitions, as do the principles of applied mathematics, but to the connection of their existence in experience; and this can be nothing but the determination of their existence in time according to necessary laws, under which alone the connection is objectively valid, and thus becomes experience. The proof therefore does not turn on the synthetical unity in the connection of things in themselves, but merely of perceptions, and of these not in regard to their matter, but to the determination of time and of the relation of their existence in it, according to universal laws. If the empirical determination in relative time is indeed objectively valid (i.e., experience), these universal laws contain the necessary determination of existence in time generally (viz., according to a rule of the understanding *a priori*).

In these Prolegomena I cannot further descant on the subject, but my reader (who has probably been long accustomed to consider experience a mere empirical synthesis of perceptions, and hence not considered that it goes much beyond them, as it imparts to empirical judgments universal validity, and for that purpose requires a pure and *a priori* unity of the understanding) is recommended to pay special attention to this distinction of experience from a mere aggregate of perceptions, and to judge the mode of proof from this point of view.

Sect. 27. Now we are prepared to remove Hume's doubt. He justly maintains, that we cannot comprehend by reason the possibility of Causality, that is, of the reference of the existence of one thing to the existence of another, which is necessitated by the former. I add, that we comprehend just as little the concept of Subsistence, that is, the necessity that at the foundation of the existence of things there lies a subject which cannot itself be a predicate of any other thing; nay, we cannot even form a notion of the possibility of such a thing (though we can point out examples of its use in experience). The very same incomprehensibility affects the Community of things, as we cannot comprehend bow from the state of one thing an inference to the state of quite another thing beyond it, and vice versa, can be drawn, and how substances which have each their own separate existence should depend upon one another necessarily. But I am very far from holding these concepts to be derived merely from experience, and the necessity represented in them, to be imaginary and a

mere illusion produced in us by long habit. On the contrary, I have amply shown, that they and the theorems derived from them are firmly established *a priori*, or before all experience, and have their undoubted objective value, though only with regard to experience.

Sect. 28. Though I have no notion of such a connection of things in themselves, that they can either exist as substances, or act as causes, or stand in community with others (as parts of a real whole), and I can just as little conceive such properties in appearances as such (because those concepts contain nothing that lies in the appearances, but only what the understanding alone must think): we have yet a notion of such a connection of representations in our understanding, and in judgments generally; consisting in this that representations appear in one sort of judgments as subject in relation to predicates, in another as reason in relation to consequences, and in a third as parts, which constitute together a total possible cognition. Besides we know *a priori* that without considering the representation of an object as determined in some of these respects, we can have no valid cognition of the object, and, if we should occupy ourselves about the object in itself, there is no possible attribute, by which I could know that it is determined under any of these aspects, that is, under the concept either of substance, or of cause, or (in relation to other substances) of community, for I have no notion of the possibility of such a connection of existence. But the question is not how things in themselves, but how the empirical cognition of things is determined as regards the above aspects of judgments in general, that is, how things, as objects of experience, can and shall be subsumed under these concepts of the understanding. And then it is clear, that I completely comprehend not only the possibility, but also the necessity of subsuming all phenomena under these concepts, that is, of using them for principles of the possibility of experience.

Sect. 29. When making an experiment with Hume's problematical concept (his crux metaphysicorum), the concept of cause, we have, in the first place, given *a priori*, by means of logic, the form of a conditional judgment in general, i.e., we have one given cognition as antecedent and another as consequence. But it is possible, that in perception we may meet with a rule of relation, which runs thus: that a certain phenomenon is constantly followed by another (though not conversely), and this is a case for me to use the hypothetical judgment, and, for instance, to say, if the sun shines long enough upon a body, it grows warm. Here there is indeed as yet no necessity of connection, or concept of cause. But I proceed and say, that if this proposition, which is merely a subjective connection of perceptions, is to be a judgment of experience, it must be considered as necessary and universally valid. Such a proposition would be, II the sun is by its light the cause of heat." The empirical rule is now considered as a law, and as valid not merely of appearances but valid of them for the purposes of a possible experience which requires universal and therefore necessarily valid rules. I therefore easily comprehend the concept of cause, as a concept necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience, and its possibility as a synthetical union of perceptions in consciousness generally; but I do not at all comprehend the possibility of a thing generally as a cause, because the concept of cause denotes a condition not at all belonging to things, but to experience. It is nothing in fact but an objectively valid cognition of appearances and of their succession, so far as the antecedent can be conjoined with the consequent according to the rule of hypothetical judgments.

Sect. 30. Hence if the pure concepts of the understanding do not refer to objects of experience but to things in themselves (noumena), they have no signification whatever. They serve, as it were, only to decipher appearances, that we may be able to read them as experience. The principles which arise from their reference to the sensible world, only serve our understanding for empirical use. Beyond this they are arbitrary combinations, without objective reality, and we can neither know

their possibility *a priori*, nor verify their reference to objects, let alone make it intelligible by any example; because examples can only be borrowed from some possible experience, consequently the objects of these concepts can be found nowhere but in a possible experience.

This complete (though to its originator unexpected) solution of Hume's problem rescues for the pure concepts of the understanding their *a priori* origin, and for the universal laws of nature their validity, as laws of the understanding, yet in such a way as to limit their use to experience, because their possibility depends solely on the reference of the understanding to experience, but with a completely reversed mode of connection which never occurred to Hume, not by deriving them from experience, but by deriving experience from them.

This is therefore the result of all our foregoing inquiries: "All synthetical principles *a priori* are nothing more than principles of possible experience, and can never be referred to things in themselves, but to appearances as objects of experience. And hence pure mathematics as well as a pure science of nature can never be referred to anything more than mere appearances, and can only represent either that which makes experience generally possible, or else that which, as it is derived from these principles, must always be capable of being represented in some possible experience."

Sect. 31. And thus we have at last something definite, upon which to depend in all metaphysical enterprises, which have hitherto, boldly enough but always at random, attempted everything without discrimination. That the aim of their exertions should be so near, struck neither the dogmatical thinkers nor those who, confident in their supposed sound common sense, started with concepts and principles of pure reason (which were legitimate and natural, but destined for mere empirical use) in quest of fields of knowledge, to which they neither knew nor could know any determinate bounds, because they bad never reflected nor were able to reflect on the nature or even on the possibility of such a pure understanding.

Many a naturalist of pure reason (by which I mean the man who believes he can decide in matters of metaphysics without any science) may pretend, that lie long ago by the prophetic spirit of his sound sense, not only suspected, but knew and comprehended, what is here propounded with so much ado, or, if he likes, with prolix and pedantic pomp: "that with all our reason we can never reach beyond the field of experience." But when he is questioned about his rational principles individually, he must grant, that there are many of them which be has not taken from experience, and which are therefore independent of it and valid *a priori*. How then and on what grounds will he restrain both himself and the dogmatist, who makes use of these concepts and principles beyond all possible experience, because they are recognized to be independent of it? And even he, this adept in sound sense, in spite of all his assumed and cheaply acquired wisdom, is not exempt from wandering inadvertently beyond objects of experience into the field of chimeras. He is often deeply enough involved in them, though in announcing everything as mere probability, rational conjecture, or analogy, be gives by his popular language a color to his groundless pretensions.

Sect. 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which make up the sensible world, certain creations of the understanding (Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should constitute an intelligible world. And as appearance and illusion were by those men identified (a thing which we may well excuse in an undeveloped epoch), actuality was only conceded to the creations of thought.

And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing in its internal constitution, but only

know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by assuming appearances, grants the existence of things in themselves also, and so far we may say, that the representation of such things as form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere creations of the understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable.

Our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort (noumena), but rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic (the science of the sensibility) to this, that they shall not extend to all things, as everything would then be turned into mere appearance, but that they shall only hold good of objects of possible experience. Hereby then objects of the understanding are granted, but with the inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception: "that we neither know nor can know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the understanding, because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever."

Sect. 33. There is indeed something seductive in our pure concepts of the understanding, which tempts us to a transcendent use, -- a use which transcends all possible experience. Not only are our concepts of substance, of power, of action, of reality, and others, quite independent of experience, containing nothing of sense appearance, and so apparently applicable to things in themselves (noumena), but, what strengthens this conjecture, they contain a necessity of determination in themselves, which experience never attains. The concept of cause implies a rule, according to which one state follows another necessarily; but experience can only show us, that one state of things often, or at most, commonly, follows another, an(i therefore affords neither strict universality, nor necessity.

Hence the Categories seem to have a deeper meaning and import than can be exhausted by their empirical use, and so the understanding inadvertently adds for itself to the house of experience a much more extensive wing, which it fills with nothing but creatures of thought, without ever observing that it has transgressed with its otherwise lawful concepts the bounds of their use.

Sect. 34. Two important, and even indispensable, though very dry, investigations had therefore become indispensable in the Critique of Pure Reason,-viz., the two chapters "Vom Schematismus der reinen Verstandsbegriffe," and "Vom Grunde der Unterscheidung aller Verstandesbegriffe uberhaupt in Phenomena und Noumena. " In the former it is shown, that the senses furnish not the pure concepts of the understanding in concreto, but only the schedule for their use, and that the object conformable to it occurs only in experience (as the product of the understanding from materials of the sensibility). In the latter it is shown, that, although our pure concepts of the understanding and our principles are independent of experience, and despite of the apparently greater sphere of their use, still nothing whatever can be thought by them beyond the field of experience, because they can do nothing but merely determine the logical form of the judgment relatively to given intuitions. But as there is no intuition at all beyond the field of the sensibility, these pure concepts, as they cannot possibly be exhibited in concrete, are void of all meaning; consequently all these noumena, together with their complex, the intelligible world, [17] are nothing but representation of a problem, of which the object in itself is possible, but the solution, from the nature of our understanding, totally impossible. For our understanding is not a faculty of intuition, but of the connection of given intuitions in experience. Experience must therefore contain all the objects for our concepts; but beyond it no concepts have any significance, as there is no intuition

that might offer them a foundation.

Sect. 35. The imagination may perhaps be forgiven for occasional vagaries, and for not keeping carefully within the limits of experience, since it gains life and vigor by such flights, and since it is always easier to moderate its boldness, than to stimulate its languor. But the understanding which ought to think can never be forgiven for indulging in vagaries; for we depend upon it alone for assistance to set bounds, when necessary, to the vagaries of the imagination.

But the understanding begins its aberrations very innocently and modestly. It first elucidates the elementary cognitions, which inhere in it prior to all experience, but yet must always have their application in experience. It gradually drops these limits, and what is there to prevent it, as it has quite freely derived its principles from itself? And then it proceeds first to newly-imagined powers in nature, then to beings outside nature; in short to a world, for whose construction the materials cannot be wanting, because fertile fiction furnishes them abundantly, and though not confirmed, is never refuted, by experience. This is the reason that young thinkers arc so partial to nietaph3,sics of the truly dogmatical kind, and often sacrifice to it their time and their talents, which might be otherwise better employed.

But there is no use in trying to moderate these fruitless endeavors of pure reason by all manner of cautions as to the difficulties of solving questions so occult, by complaints of the limits of our reason, and by degrading our assertions into mere conjectures. For if their impossibility is not distinctly shown, and reason's cognition of its own essence does not become a true science, in which the field of its right use is distinguished, so to say, with mathematical certainty from that of its worthless and idle use, these fruitless efforts will never be abandoned for good.

Sect. 36. How is Nature itself possible?

This question -- the highest point that transcendental philosophy can ever reach, and to which, as its boundary and completion, it must proceed-properly contains two questions.

First: How is nature at all possible in the material sense, by intuition, considered as the totality of appearances; how are space, time, and that which fills both -- the object of sensation, in general possible? The answer is: By means of the constitution of our Sensibility, according to which it is specifically affected by objects, which are in themselves unknown to it, and totally distinct from those phenomena. This answer is given in the Critique itself in the transcendental Aesthetic, and in these Prolegomena by the solution of the first general problem.

Secondly: How is nature possible in the formal sense, as the totality of the rules, under which all phenomena must come, in order to be thought as connected in experience? The answer must be this: it is only possible by means of the constitution of our Understanding, according to which all the above representations of the sensibility are necessarily referred to a consciousness, and by which the peculiar way in which we think (viz., by rules), and hence experience also, are possible, but must be clearly distinguished from an insight into the objects in themselves. This answer is given in the Critique itself in the transcendental Logic, and in these Prolegomena, in the course of the solution of the second main problem.

But how this peculiar property of our sensibility itself is possible, or that of our understanding and of the apperception which is necessarily its basis and that of all thinking, cannot be further analyzed or answered, because it is of them that we are in need for all our answers and for all our thinking about objects.

There are many laws of nature, which we can only know by means of experience; but conformity to law in the connection of appearances, i.e., in nature in general, we cannot discover by any experience, because experience itself requires laws which are *a priori* at the basis of its possibility.

The possibility of experience in general is therefore at the same time the universal law of nature, and the principles of the experience are the very laws of nature. For we do not know nature but as the totality of appearances, i.e., of representations in us, and hence we can only derive the laws of its connection from the principles of their connection in us, that is, from the conditions of their necessary union in consciousness, which constitutes the possibility of experience.

Even the main proposition expounded throughout this section - - that universal laws of nature can be distinctly known *a priori* -- leads naturally to the proposition: that the highest legislation of nature must lie in ourselves, i.e., in our understanding, and that we must not seek the universal laws of nature in nature by means of experience, but conversely must seek nature, as to its universal conformity to law, in the conditions of the possibility of experience, which lie in our sensibility and in our understanding. For bow were it otherwise possible to know *a priori* these laws, as they are not rules of analytical cognition, but truly synthetical extensions of it?

Such a necessary agreement of the principles of possible experience with the laws of the possibility of nature, can only proceed from one of two reasons: either these laws are drawn from nature by means of experience, or conversely nature is derived from the laws of the possibility of experience in general, and is quite the same as the mere universal conformity to law of the latter. The former is self-contradictory, for the universal laws of nature can and must be known *a priori* (that is, independent of all experience), and be the foundation of all empirical use of the understanding; the latter alternative therefore alone remains. [18]

But we must distinguish the empirical laws of nature, which always presuppose particular perceptions, from the pure or universal laws of nature, which, without being based on particular perceptions, contain merely the conditions of their necessary union in experience. In relation to the latter, nature and possible experience are quite the same, and as the conformity to law here depends upon the -necessary connection of appearances in experience (without which we cannot know any object whatever in the sensible world), consequently upon the original laws of the understanding, it seems at first strange, but is not the less certain, to say: The understanding does not derive its laws (*a priori*) from, but prescribes them to, nature.

Sect. 37. We shall illustrate this seemingly bold proposition by an example, which will show, that laws, which we discover in objects of sensuous intuition (especially when these laws are known as necessary), are commonly held by us to be such as have been placed there by the understanding, in spite of their being similar in all points to the laws of nature, which we ascribe to experience.

Sect. 38. If we consider the properties of the circle, by which this figure combines so many arbitrary determinations of space in itself, at once in a universal rule, we cannot avoid attributing a constitution (eine Natur) to this geometrical thing. Two right lines, for example, which intersect one another and the circle, howsoever they may be drawn, are always divided so that the rectangle constructed with the segments of the one is equal to that constructed with the segments of the other. The question now is: Does this law lie in the circle or in the understanding, that is, Does this figure, independently of the understanding, contain in itself the ground of the law, or does the understanding, having constructed according to its concepts (according to the quality of the radii) the figure itself, introduce into it this law of the chords cutting one another in geometrical proportion? When we follow the proofs of this law, we soon perceive, that it can only be derived

from the condition on which the understanding founds the construction of this figure, and which is that of the equality of the radii. But, if we enlarge this concept, to pursue further the unity of various properties of geometrical figures under common laws, and consider the circle as a conic section, which of course is subject to the same fundamental conditions of construction as other conic sections, we shall find that all the chords which intersect within the ellipse, parabola, and hyperbola, always intersect so that the rectangles of their segments are not indeed equal, but always bear a constant ratio to one another. If we proceed still farther, to the fundamental laws of physical astronomy, we find a physical law of reciprocal attraction diffused over all material nature, the rule of which is: II that it decreases inversely as the square of the distance from each attracting point, i.e., as the spherical surfaces increase, over which this force spreads," which law seems to be necessarily inherent in the very nature of things, and hence is usually propounded as knowable *a priori*. Simple as the sources of this law are, merely resting upon the relation of spherical surfaces of different radii, its consequences are so valuable with regard to the variety of their agreement and its regularity, that not only are all possible orbits of the celestial bodies conic sections, but such a relation of these orbits to each other results, that no other law of attraction, than that of the inverse square of the distance, can be imagined as fit for a cosmical system.

Here accordingly is a nature that rests upon laws which the understanding knows *a priori*, and chiefly from the universal principles of the determination of space. Now I ask: Do the laws of nature lie in space, and does the understanding learn them by merely endeavoring to find out the enormous wealth of meaning that lies in space; or do they inhere in the understanding and in the way in which it determines space according to the conditions of the synthetical unity in which its concepts are all centered?

Space is something so uniform and as to all particular properties so indeterminate, that we should certainly not seek a store of laws of nature in it. Whereas that which determines space to assume the form of a circle or the figures of a cone and a sphere, is the understanding, so far as it contains the ground of the unity of their constructions.

The mere universal form of intuition, called space, must therefore be the substratum of all intuitions determinable to particular objects, and in it of course the condition of the possibility and of the variety of these intuitions lies. But the unity of the objects is entirely determined by the understanding, and on conditions which lie in its own nature; and thus the understanding is the origin of the universal order of nature, in that it comprehends all appearances under its own laws, and thereby first constructs, *a priori*, experience (as to its form), by means of which whatever is to be known only by experience, is necessarily subjected to its laws. For we are not now concerned with the nature of things in themselves, which is independent of the conditions both of our sensibility and our understanding, but with nature, as an object of possible experience, and in this case the understanding, whilst it makes experience possible, thereby insists that the sensuous world is either not an object of experience at all, or must be nature [viz., an existence of things, determined according to universal laws[19]]. APPENDIX TO THE PURE SCIENCE OF NATURE.

Sect. 39. Of the System of the Categories.

There can be nothing more desirable to a philosopher, than to be able to derive the scattered multiplicity of the concepts or the principles, which had occurred to him in concrete use, from a principle *a priori*, and to unite everything in this way in one cognition. He formerly only believed that those things, which remained after a certain abstraction, and seemed by comparison among

one another to constitute a particular kind of cognitions, were completely collected; but this was only an Aggregate. Now he knows, that just so many, neither more nor less, can constitute the mode of cognition, and perceives the necessity of his division, which constitutes comprehension; and now only he has attained a System.

To search in our daily cognition for the concepts, which do not rest upon particular experience, and yet occur in all cognition of experience, where they as it were constitute the mere form of connection, presupposes neither greater reflection nor deeper insight, than to detect in a language the rules of the actual use of words generally, and thus to collect elements for a grammar. In fact both researches are very nearly related, even though we are not able to give a reason why each language has just this and no other formal constitution, and still less why an exact number of such formal determinations in general are found in it.

Aristotle collected ten pure elementary concepts under the name of Categories. [20] To these, which are also called predicaments, [21] he found himself obliged afterwards to add five post-predicaments, some of which however (prius, simul, and molus) are contained in the former; but this random collection must be considered (and commended) as a mere hint for future inquirers, not as a regularly developed idea, and hence it has, in the present more advanced state of philosophy, been rejected as quite useless.

After long reflection on the pure elements of human knowledge (those which contain nothing empirical), I at last succeeded in distinguishing with certainty and in separating the pure elementary notions of the Sensibility (space and time) from those of the Understanding. Thus the 7th, 8th, and 8th Categories had to be excluded from the old list. And the others were of no service to me; because there was no principle [in them], on which the understanding could be investigated, measured in its completion, and all the functions, whence its pure concepts arise, determined exhaustively and with precision.

But in order to discover such a principle, I looked about for an act of the understanding which comprises all the rest, and is distinguished only by various modifications or phases, in reducing the multiplicity of representation to the unity of thinking in general: I found this act of the understanding to consist in judging. Here then the labors of the logicians were ready at hand, though not yet quite free from defects, and with this help I was enabled to exhibit a complete table of the pure functions of the understanding, which are however undetermined in regard to any object. I finally referred these functions of judging to objects in general, or rather to the condition of determining judgments as objectively valid, and so there arose the pure concepts of the understanding, concerning which I could make certain, that these, and this exact number only, constitute our whole cognition of things from pure understanding. I was justified in calling them by their old name, Categories, while I reserved for myself the liberty of adding, under the title of "Predicables," a complete list of all the concepts deducible from them, by combinations whether among themselves, or with the pure form of the appearance, i.e., space or time, or with its matter, so far as it is not yet empirically determined (viz., the object of sensation in general), as soon as a system of transcendental philosophy should be completed with the construction of which I am engaged in the Critique of Pure Reason itself.

Now the essential point in this system of Categories, which distinguishes it from the old rhapsodical collection without any principle, and for which alone it deserves to be considered as philosophy, consists in this: that by means of it the true significance of the pure concepts of the understanding and the condition of their use could be precisely determined. For here it became obvious that they

are themselves nothing but logical functions, and as such do not produce the least concept of an object, but require some sensuous intuition as a basis. They therefore only serve to determine empirical judgments, which are otherwise undetermined and indifferent as regards all functions of judging, relatively to these functions, thereby procuring them universal validity, and by means of them making judgments of experience in general possible.

Such an insight into the nature of the categories, which limits them at the same time to the mere use of experience, never occurred either to their first author, or to any of his successors; but without this insight (which immediately depends upon their derivation or deduction), they are quite useless and only a miserable list of names, without explanation or rule for their use. Had the ancients ever conceived such a notion, doubtless the whole study of the pure rational knowledge, which under the name of metaphysics has for centuries spoiled many a sound mind, would have reached us. in quite another shape, and would have enlightened the human understanding, instead of actually exhausting it in obscure and vain speculations, thereby rendering it unfit for true science.

This system of categories makes all treatment of every object of pure reason itself systematic, and affords a direction or clue how and through what points of inquiry every metaphysical consideration must proceed, in order to be complete; for it exhausts all the possible movements (momenta) of the understanding, among which every concept must be classed. In like manner the table of Principles has been formulated, the completeness of which we can only vouch for by the system of the categories. Even in the division of the concepts, [22] which must go beyond the physical application of the understanding, it is always the very same clue, which, as it must always be determined *a priori* by the same fixed points of the human understanding, always forms a closed circle. There is no doubt that the object of a pure conception either of the understanding or of reason, so far as it is to be estimated philosophically and on *a priori* principles, can in this way be completely known. I could not therefore omit to make use of this clue with regard to one of the most abstract ontological divisions, viz., the various distinctions of "the notions of something and of nothing," and to construct accordingly (Critique, P. 207) a regular and necessary table of their divisions. [23]

And this system, like every other true one founded on a universal principle, shows its inestimable value in this, that it excludes all foreign concepts, which might otherwise intrude among the pure concepts of the understanding, and determines the place of every cognition. Those concepts, which under the name of "concepts of reflection" have been likewise arranged in a table according to the clue of the categories, intrude, without having any privilege or title to be among the pure concepts of the understanding in Ontology. They are concepts of connection, and thereby of the objects themselves, whereas the former are only concepts of a mere comparison of concepts already given, hence of quite another nature and use. By my systematic division[24] they are saved from this confusion. But the value of my special table of the categories will be still more obvious, when we separate the table of the transcendental concepts of Reason from the concepts of the understanding. The latter being of quite another nature and origin, they must have quite another form than the former. This so necessary separation has never yet been made in any system of metaphysics for, as a rule, these rational concepts all mixed up with the categories, like children of one family, which confusion was unavoidable in the absence of a definite system of categories.

Prolegomena

Immanuel Kant
1783

Third Part Of The Main Transcendental Problem. How Is Metaphysics In General Possible?

Sect. 40. Pure mathematics and pure science of nature had no occasion for such a deduction, as we have made of both, for their own safety and certainty. For the former rests upon its own evidence; and the latter (though sprung from pure sources of the understanding) upon experience and its thorough confirmation. Physics cannot altogether refuse and dispense with the testimony of the latter; because with all its certainty, it can never, as philosophy, rival mathematics. Both sciences therefore stood in need of this inquiry, not for themselves, but for the sake of another science, metaphysics.

Metaphysics has to do not only with concepts of nature, which always find their application in experience, but also with pure rational concepts, which never can be given in any possible experience. Consequently the objective reality of these concepts (viz., that they are not mere chimeras), and the truth or falsity of metaphysical assertions, cannot be discovered or confirmed by any experience. This part of metaphysics however is precisely what constitutes its essential end, to which the rest is only a means, and thus this science is in need of such a deduction for its, own sake. The third question now proposed relates therefore as it were to the root and essential difference of metaphysics, i.e., the occupation of Reason with itself, and the supposed knowledge of objects arising immediately from this incubation of its own concepts, without requiring, or indeed being able to reach that knowledge through, experience. [25]

Without solving this problem reason never is justified. The empirical use to which reason limits the pure understanding, does not fully satisfy the proper destination of the latter. Every single experience is only a part of the whole sphere of its domain, but the absolute totality of all possible experience is itself not experience. Yet it is a necessary [concrete] problem for reason, the mere representation of which requires concepts quite different from the categories, whose use is only immanent, or refers to experience, so far as it can be given. Whereas the concepts of reason aim at the completeness, i.e., the collective unity of all possible experience, and thereby transcend every given experience. Thus they become transcendent.

As the understanding stands in need of categories for experience, reason contains in itself the source of ideas, by which I mean necessary concepts, whose object cannot be given in any experience. The latter are inherent in the nature of reason, as the former are in that of the understanding. While the former carry with them an illusion likely to mislead, the illusion of the

latter is inevitable, though it certainly can be kept from misleading us.

Since all illusion consists in holding the subjective ground of our judgments to be objective, a self-knowledge of pure reason in its transcendent (exaggerated) use is the sole preservative from the aberrations into which reason falls when it mistakes its destination, and refers that to the object transcendently, which only regards its own subject and its guidance in all immanent use.

Sect. 41. The distinction of ideas, that is, of pure concepts of reason, from categories, or pure concepts of the understanding, as cognitions of a quite distinct species, origin and use, is so important a point in founding a science which is to contain the system of all these *a priori* cognitions, that without this distinction metaphysics is absolutely impossible, or is at best a random, bungling attempt to build a castle in the air without a knowledge of the materials or of their fitness for any purpose. Had the Critique of Pure Reason done nothing but first point out this distinction, it had thereby contributed more to clear up our conception of, and to guide our inquiry in, the field of metaphysics, than all the vain efforts which have hitherto been made to satisfy the transcendent problems of pure reason, without ever surmising that we were in quite another field than that of the understanding, and hence classing concepts of the understanding and those of reason together, as if they were of the same kind.

Sect. 42. All pure cognitions of the understanding have this feature, that their concepts present themselves in experience, and their principles can be confirmed by it; whereas the transcendent cognitions of reason cannot, either as ideas, appear in experience, -or as propositions ever be confirmed or refuted by it. Hence whatever errors may slip in unawares, can only be discovered by pure reason itself-a discovery of much difficulty, because this very reason naturally becomes dialectical by means of its ideas, and this unavoidable illusion cannot be limited by any objective and dogmatical researches into things, but by a subjective investigation of reason itself as a source of ideas.

Sect. 43. In the Critique of Pure Reason it was always my greatest care to endeavor not only carefully to distinguish the several species of cognition, but to derive concepts belonging to each one of them from their common source. I did this in order that by knowing whence they originated, I might determine their use with safety, and also have the unanticipated but invaluable advantage of knowing the completeness of my enumeration, classification and specification of concepts *a priori*, and therefore according to principles. Without this, metaphysics is mere rhapsody, in which no one knows whether he has enough, or whether and where something is still wanting. We can indeed have this advantage only in pure philosophy, but of this philosophy it constitutes the very essence.

As I had found the origin of the categories in the four logical functions of all the judgments of the understanding, it was quite natural to seek the origin of the ideas in the three functions of the syllogisms of reason. For as soon as these pure concepts of reason (the transcendental ideas) are given, they could hardly, except they be held innate, be found anywhere else, than in the same activity of reason, which, so far as it regards mere form, constitutes the logical element of the syllogisms of reason; but, so far as it represents judgments of the understanding with respect to the one or to the other form *a priori*, constitutes transcendental concepts of pure reason.

The formal distinction of syllogisms renders their division into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive necessary. The concepts of reason founded on them contained therefore, first, the idea of the complete subject (the substantial); secondly, the idea of the complete series of conditions; thirdly, the determination of all concepts in the idea of a complete complex of that which is

possible. [26] **The first idea is psychological, the second cosmological, the third theological, and, as all three give occasion to Dialectics, yet each in its own way, the division of the whole Dialects of pure reason into its Paralogism, its Antinomy, and its Ideal, was arranged accordingly. Through this deduction we may feel assured that all the claims of pure reason are completely represented, and that none can be wanting; because the faculty of reason itself, whence they all take their origin, is thereby completely surveyed.**

Sect. 44. In these general considerations it is also remarkable that the ideas of reason are unlike the categories, of no service to the use of our understanding in experience, but quite dispensable, and become even an impediment to the maxims of a rational cognition of nature. Yet in another aspect still to be determined they are necessary. Whether the soul is or is not a simple substance, is of no consequence to us in the explanation of its phenomena. For we cannot render the notion of a simple being intelligible by any possible experience that is sensuous or concrete. The notion is therefore quite void as regards all hoped-for insight into the cause of phenomena, and cannot at all serve as a principle of the explanation of that which internal or external experience supplies. So the cosmological ideas of the beginning of the world or of its eternity (a parte ante) cannot be of any greater service to us for the explanation of any event in the world itself. And finally we must, according to a right maxim of the philosophy of nature, refrain from all explanations of the design of nature, drawn from the will of a Supreme Being; because this would not be natural philosophy, but an acknowledgment that we have come to the end of it. The use of these ideas, therefore, is quite different from that of those categories by which (and by the principles built upon which) experience itself first becomes possible. But our laborious analytics of the understanding would be superfluous if we had nothing else in view than the mere cognition Of nature as it can be given in experience; for reason does its work, both in mathematics and in the science of nature, quite safely and well without any of this subtle deduction. Therefore our Critique of the Understanding combines with the ideas of pure reason for a purpose which lies beyond the empirical use of the understanding; but this we have above declared to be in this aspect totally inadmissible, and without any object or meaning. Yet there must be a harmony between that of the nature of reason and that of the understanding, and the former must contribute to the perfection of the latter, and cannot possibly upset it.

The solution of this question is as follows: Pure reason does not in its ideas point to particular objects, which lie beyond the field of experience, but only requires completeness of the use of the understanding in the system of experience. But this completeness can be a completeness of principles only, not of intuitions [i.e., concrete atsights or *Anschauung*en] and of objects. In order however to represent the ideas definitely, reason conceives them after the fashion of the cognition of an object. The cognition is as far as these rules are concerned completely determined, but the object is only an idea invented for the purpose of bringing the cognition of the understanding as near as possible to the completeness represented by that idea.

Prefatory Remark to the Dialectics of Pure Reason.

Sect. 45. We have above shown in Sect. Sect. 33 and 34 that the purity of the categories from all admixture of sensuous determinations may mislead reason into extending their use, quite beyond all experience, to things in themselves; though as these categories themselves find no intuition which can give them meaning or sense in concrete, they, as mere logical functions, can represent a thing in general, but not give by themselves alone a determinate concept of anything. Such hyperbolical objects are distinguished by the appellation of Noumena, or pure beings of the

understanding (or better, beings of thought), such as, for example, "substance," but conceived without permanence in time, or "cause," but not acting in time, etc. Here predicates, that only serve to make the conformity-to-law of experience possible, are applied to these concepts, and yet they are deprived of all the conditions of intuition, on which alone experience is possible, and so these concepts lose all significance.

There is no danger, however, of the understanding spontaneously making an excursion so very wantonly beyond its own bounds into the field of the mere creatures of thought, without being impelled by foreign laws. But when reason, which cannot be fully satisfied with any empirical use of the rules of the understanding, as being always conditioned, requires a completion of this chain of conditions, then the understanding is forced out of its sphere. And then it partly represents objects of experience in a series so extended that no experience can grasp, partly even (with a view to complete the series) it seeks entirely beyond it noumena, to which it can attach that chain, and so, having at last escaped from the conditions of experience, make its attitude as it were final. These are then the transcendental ideas, which, though according to the true but hidden ends of the natural determination of our reason, they may aim not at extravagant concepts, but at an unbounded extension of their empirical use, yet seduce the understanding by an unavoidable illusion to a transcendent use, which, though deceitful, cannot be restrained within the bounds of experience by any resolution, but only by scientific instruction and with much difficulty.

!. The Psychological Idea. [27]

Sect. 46. People have long since observed, that in all substances the proper subject, that which remains after all the accidents (as predicates) are abstracted, consequently that which forms the substance of things remains unknown, and various complaints have been made concerning these limits to our knowledge. But it will be well to consider that the human understanding is not to be blamed for its inability to know the substance of things, that is, to determine it by itself, but rather for requiring to know it which is a mere idea definitely as though it were a given object. Pure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a thing its proper subject, and for this subject, which is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate, its subject, and so on indefinitely (or as far as we can reach). But hence it follows, that we must not hold anything, at which we can arrive, to be an ultimate subject, and that substance itself never can be thought by our understanding, however deep we may penetrate, even if all nature were unveiled to us. For the specific nature of our understanding consists in thinking everything discursively, that is, representing it by concepts, and so by mere predicates, to which therefore the absolute subject must always be wanting. Hence all the real properties, by which we know bodies, are mere accidents, not excepting impenetrability, which we can only represent to ourselves as the effect of a power of which the subject is unknown to us.

Now we appear to have this substance in the consciousness of ourselves (in the thinking subject), and indeed in an immediate intuition; for all the predicates of an internal sense refer to the ego, as a subject, and I cannot conceive myself as the predicate of any other subject. Hence completeness in the reference of the given concepts as predicates to a subject -- not merely an idea, but an object-that is, the absolute subject itself, seems to be given in experience. But this expectation is disappointed. For the ego is not a concept, [28] but only the indication of the object of the internal sense, so far as we know it by no further predicate. Consequently it cannot be in itself a predicate of any other thing; but just as little can it be a determinate concept of an absolute subject, but is, as

in all other cases, only the reference of the internal phenomena to their unknown subject. Yet this idea (which serves very well, as a regulative principle, totally to destroy all materialistic explanations of the internal phenomena of the soul) occasions by a very natural misunderstanding a very specious argument, which, from this supposed cognition of the substance of our thinking being, infers its nature, so far as the knowledge of it falls quite without the complex of experience.

Sect. 47. But though we may call this thinking self (the soul) substance, as being the ultimate subject of thinking which cannot be further represented as the predicate of another thing; it remains quite empty and without significance, if permanence- the quality which renders the concept of substances in experience fruitful-cannot be proved of it.

But permanence can never be proved of the concept of a substance, as a thing in itself, but for the purposes of experience only. This is sufficiently shown by the first Analogy of Experience, [29] and whoever will not yield to this proof may try for himself whether he can succeed in proving, from the concept of a subject which does not exist itself as the predicate of another thing, that its existence is thoroughly permanent, and that it cannot either in itself or by any natural cause original or be annihilated. These synthetical *a priori* propositions can never be proved in themselves, but only in reference to things as objects of possible experience.

Sect. 48. If therefore from the concept of the soul as a substance, we would infer its permanence, this can hold good as regards possible experience only, not [of the soul] as a thing in itself and beyond all possible experience. But life is the subjective condition of all our possible experience, consequently we can only infer the permanence of the soul in life; for the death of man is the end of all experience which concerns the soul as an object of experience, except the contrary be proved, which is the very question in hand. The permanence of the soul can therefore only be proved (and no one cares for that) during the life of man, but not, as we desire to do, after death; and for this general reason, that the concept of substance, so far as it is to be considered necessarily combined with the concept of permanence, can be so combined only according to the principles of possible experience, and therefore for the purposes of experience only. [30]

Sect. 49. That there is something real without us which not only corresponds, but must correspond, to our external perceptions, can likewise be proved to be not a connection of things in themselves, but for the sake of experience. This means that there is something empirical, i.e., some phenomenon in space without us, that admits of a satisfactory proof, for we have nothing to do with other objects than those which belong to possible experience; because objects which cannot be given us in any experience, do not exist for us. Empirically without me is that which appears in space, and space, together with all the phenomena which it contains, belongs to the representations, whose connection according to laws of experience proves their objective truth, just as the connection of the phenomena of the internal sense proves the actuality of my soul (as an object of the internal sense). By means of external experience I am conscious of the actuality of bodies, as external phenomena in space, in the same manner as by means of the internal experience I am conscious of the existence of my soul in time, but this soul is only known as an object of the internal sense by phenomena that constitute an internal state, and of which the essence in itself, which forms the basis of these phenomena, is unknown. Cartesian idealism therefore does nothing but distinguish external experience from dreaming; and the conformity to law (as a criterion of its truth) of the former, from the irregularity and the false illusion of the latter. In both it presupposes space and time as conditions of the existence of objects, and it only inquires whether the objects of the external senses, which we when awake put in space, are as actually to be found in it, as the

object of the internal sense, the soul, is in time; that is, whether experience carries with it sure criteria to distinguish it from imagination. This doubt, however, may easily be disposed of, and we always do so in common life by investigating the connection of phenomena in both space and time according to universal laws of experience, and we cannot doubt, when the representation of external things throughout agrees therewith, that they constitute truthful experience. Material idealism, in which phenomena are considered as such only according to their connection in experience, may accordingly be very easily refuted; and it is just as sure an experience, that bodies exist without us (in space), as that I myself exist according to the representation of the internal sense (in time): for the notion without us, only signifies existence in space. However as the Ego in the proposition, III am," means not only the object of internal intuition (in time), but the subject of consciousness, just as body means not only external intuition (in space), but the thing-in-itself, which is the basis of this phenomenon; [as this is the case] the question, whether bodies (as phenomena of the external sense) exist as bodies apart from my thoughts, may without any hesitation be denied in nature. But the question, whether I myself as a phenomenon of the internal sense (the soul according to empirical psychology) exist apart from my faculty of representation in time, is an exactly similar inquiry, and must likewise be answered in the negative. Arid in this manner everything, when it is reduced to its true meaning, is decided and certain. The formal (which I have also called transcendental) actually abolishes the material, or Cartesian, idealism. For if space be nothing but a form of my sensibility, it is as a representation in me just as actual as I myself am, and nothing but the empirical truth of the representations in it remains for consideration. But, if this is not the case, if space and the phenomena in it are something existing without us, then all the criteria of experience beyond our perception can never prove the actuality of these objects without us.

II. The Cosmological Idea. [31]

Sect. 50. This product of pure reason in its transcendent use is its most remarkable curiosity. It serves as a very powerful agent to rouse philosophy from its dogmatic slumber, and to stimulate it to the arduous task of undertaking a Critique of Reason itself.

I term this idea cosmological, because it always takes its object only from the sensible world, and does not use any other than those whose object is given to sense, consequently it remains in this respect in its native home, it does not become transcendent, and is therefore so far not mere idea; whereas, to conceive the soul as a simple substance, -already means to conceive such an object (the simple) as cannot be presented to the senses. Yet the cosmological idea extends the connection of the conditioned with its condition (whether the connection is mathematical or dynamical) so far, that experience never can keep up with it. It is therefore with regard to this point always an idea, whose object never can be adequately given in any experience.

Sect. 51. In the first place, the use of a system of categories becomes here so obvious and unmistakable, that even if there were not several other proofs of it, this alone would sufficiently prove it indispensable in the system of pure reason. There are only four such transcendent ideas, as there are so many classes of categories; in each of which, however, they refer only to the absolute completeness of the series of the conditions for a given conditioned. In analogy to these cosmological ideas there are only four kinds of dialectical assertions of pure reason, which, as they are dialectical, thereby prove, that to each of them, oii equally specious principles of pure reason, a contradictory assertion stands opposed. As all the metaphysical art of the most subtle distinction cannot prevent this opposition, it compels the philosopher to recur to the first sources of pure

reason itself. This Antinomy, not arbitrarily invented, but founded in the nature of human reason, and hence unavoidable and never ceasing, contains the following four theses together with their antitheses:

> **1.**
> **Thesis: The World has, as to, Time and Space, a Beginning (limit).**
> **Antithesis: The World is, as to Time and Space, infinite. 2.**
> **Thesis: Everything in the World consists of [elements that are] simple.**
> **Antithesis: There is nothing simple, but everything is composite.**
> **3.**
> **Thesis: There are in the World Causes through Freedom.**
> **Antithesis: There is no Liberty, but all is Nature.**
> **4.**
> **Thesis: In the Series of the World-Causes there is some necessary Being.**
> **Antithesis: There is Nothing necessary in the World, but in this Series All is incidental.**

Sect. 52. a. Here is the most singular phenomenon of human reason, no other instance of which can be shown in any other use. If we, as is commonly done, represent to ourselves the appearances of the sensible world as things in themselves, if we assume the principles of their combination as principles universally valid of things in themselves and not merely of experience, as is usually, nay without our Critique, unavoidably done, there arises an unexpected conflict, which never can be removed in the common dogmatical way; because the thesis, as well as the antithesis, can be shown by equally clear, evident, and irresistible proofs-for I pledge myself as to the correctness of all these proofs-and reason therefore perceives that it is divided with itself, a state at which the skeptic rejoices, but which must make the critical philosopher pause and feel ill at ease.

Sect. 52. b. We may blunder in various ways in metaphysics without any fear of being detected in falsehood. For we never can be refuted by experience if we but avoid self-contradiction, which in synthetical, though purely fictitious propositions, may be done whenever the concepts, which we connect, are mere ideas, that cannot be given (in their whole content) in experience. For how can we make out by experience, whether the world is from eternity or had a beginning, whether matter is infinitely divisible or consists of simple parts? Such concept cannot be given in any experience, be it ever so extensive, and consequently the falsehood either of the positive or the negative proposition cannot be discovered by this touchstone.

The only possible way in which reason could have revealed unintentionally its secret Dialectics, falsely announced as Dogmatics, would be when it were made to ground an assertion upon a universally admitted principle, and to deduce the exact contrary with the greatest accuracy of inference from another which is equally granted. This is actually here the case with regard to four natural ideas of reason, whence four assertions on the one side, and as many counter-assertions on the other arise, each consistently following from universally-acknowledged principles. Thus they reveal by the use of these principles the dialectical illusion of pure reason which would otherwise forever remain concealed.

This is therefore a decisive experiment, which must necessarily expose any error lying hidden in the assumptions of reason. [32] Contradictory propositions cannot both be false, except the concept, which is the subject of both, is self- contradictory; for example, the propositions, "a square circle is round, and a square circle is not round," are both false. For, as to the former it is false, that the circle is round, because it is quadrangular; and it is likewise false, that it is not round, that is,

angular, because it is a circle. For the logical criterion of the impossibility of a concept consists in this, that if we presuppose it, two contradictory propositions both become false; consequently, as no middle between them is conceivable, nothing at all is thought by that concept.

Sect. 52. c. The first two antinomies, which I call mathematical, because they are concerned with the addition or division of the homogeneous, are founded on such a self- contradictory concept; and hence I explain how it happens, that both the Thesis and Antithesis of the two are false.

When I speak of objects in time and in space, it is not of things in themselves, of which I know nothing, but of things in appearance, that is, of experience, as the particular way of cognising objects which is afforded to man. I must not say of what I think in time or in space, that in itself, and independent of these my thoughts, it exists in space and in time; for in that case I should contradict myself; because space and time, together with the appearances in them, are nothing existing in themselves and outside of my representations, but are themselves only modes of representation, and it is palpably contradictory to say, that a mere mode of representation exists without our representation. Objects of the senses therefore exist only in experience; whereas to give them a self-subsisting existence apart from experience or before it, is merely to represent to ourselves that experience actually exists apart from experience or before it.

Now if I inquire after the quantity of the world, as to space and time, it is equally impossible, as regards all my notions, to declare it infinite or to declare it finite. For neither assertion can be contained in experience, because experience either of an infinite space, or of an infinite time elapsed, or again, of the boundary of the world by a void space, or by an antecedent void time, is impossible; these are mere ideas. This quantity of the world, which is determined in either way, should therefore exist in the world itself apart from all experience. This contradicts the notion of a world of sense, which is merely a complex of the appearances whose existence and connection occur only in our representations, that is, in experience, since this latter is not an object in itself, but a mere mode of representation. Hence it follows, that as the concept of an absolutely existing world of sense is self-contradictory, the solution of the problem concerning its quantity, whether attempted affirmatively or negatively, is always false.

The same holds good of the second antinomy, which relates to the division of phenomena. For these are mere representations, and the parts exist merely in their representation, consequently in the division, or in a possible experience where they are given, and the division reaches only as far as this latter reaches. To assume that an appearance, e.g., that of body, contains in itself before all experience all the parts, which any possible experience can ever reach, is to impute to a mere appearance, which can exist only in experience, an existence previous to experience. In other words, it would mean that mere representations exist before they can be found in our faculty of representation. Such an assertion is self-contradictory, as also every solution of our misunderstood problem, whether we maintain, that bodies in themselves consist of an infinite number of parts, or of a finite number of simple parts.

Sect. 53. In the first (the mathematical) class of antinomies the falsehood of the assumption consists in representing in one concept something self-contradictory as if it were compatible (i.e., an appearance as an object in itself). But, as to the second (the dynamical) class of antinomies, the falsehood of the representation consists in representing as contradictory what is compatible; so that, as in the former case, the opposed assertions are both false, in this case, on the other hand, where they are opposed to one another by mere misunderstanding, they may both be true.

Any mathematical connection necessarily presupposes homogeneity of what is connected (in the

concept of magnitude), while the dynamical one by no means requires the same. When we have to deal with extended magnitudes, all the parts must be homogeneous with one another and with the whole; whereas, in the connection of cause and effect, homogeneity may indeed likewise be found, but is not necessary; for the concept of causality (by means of which something is posited through something else quite different from it), at all events, does not require it.

If the objects of the world of sense are taken for things in themselves, and the above laws of nature for the laws of things in themselves, the contradiction would be unavoidable. So also, if the subject of freedom were, like other objects, represented as mere appearance, the contradiction would be just as unavoidable, for the same predicate would at once be affirmed and denied of the same kind of object in the same sense. But if natural necessity is referred merely to appearances, and freedom merely to things in themselves, no contradiction arises, if we at once assume, or admit both kinds of causality, however difficult or impossible it may be to make the latter kind conceivable.

As appearance every effect is an event, or something that happens in time; it must, according to the universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the causality of its cause (a state), which follows according to a constant law. But this determination of the cause as causality must likewise be something that takes place or happens; the cause must have begun to act, otherwise no succession between it and the effect could be conceived. Otherwise the effect, as well as the causality of the cause, would have always existed. Therefore the determination of the cause to act must also have originated among appearances, and must consequently, as well as its effect, be an event, which must again have its cause, and so on; hence natural necessity must be the condition, on which effective causes are determined. Whereas if freedom is to be a property of certain causes of appearances, it must, as regards these, which are events, be a faculty of starting them spontaneously, that is, without the causality of the cause itself, and hence without requiring any other ground to determine its start. But then the cause, as to its causality, must not rank under time-determinations of its state, that is, it cannot be an appearance, and must be considered a thing in itself, while its effects would be only appearances. [33] If without contradiction we can think of the beings of understanding [Verstandeswesen] as exercising such an influence on appearances, then natural necessity will attach to all connections of cause and effect in the .sensuous world, though on the other hand, freedom can be granted to such cause, as is itself not an appearance (but the foundation of appearance). Nature therefore and freedom can without contradiction be attributed to the very same thing, but in different relations-on one side as a phenomenon, on the other as a thing in itself.

We have in us a faculty, which not only stands in connection with its subjective determining grounds that are the natural causes of its actions, and is so far the faculty of a being that itself belongs to appearances, but is also referred to objective grounds, that are only ideas, so far as they can determine this faculty, a connection which is expressed by the word ought. This faculty is called reason, and, so far as we consider a being (man) entirely according to this objectively determinable reason, he cannot be considered as a being of sense, but this property is that of a thing in itself, of which we cannot comprehend the possibility-I mean how the ought (which however has never yet taken place) should determine its activity, and can become the cause of actions, whose effect is an appearance in the sensible world. Yet the causality of reason would be freedom with regard to the effects in the sensuous world, so far as we can consider objective grounds, which are themselves ideas, as their determinants. For its action in that case would not depend upon subjective conditions, consequently not upon those of time, and of course not upon the law of nature, which serves to determine them, because grounds of reason give to actions the

rule universally, according to principles, without the influence of the circumstances of either time or place.

What I adduce here is merely meant as an example to make the thing intelligible, and does not necessarily belong to our problem, which must be decided from mere concepts, independently of the properties which we meet in the actual world.

Now I may say without contradiction: that all the actions of rational beings, so far as they are appearances (occurring in any experience), are subject to the necessity of nature; but the same actions, as regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting according to mere reason, are free. For what is required for the necessity of nature? Nothing more than the determinability of every event in the world of sense according to constant laws, that is, a reference to cause in the appearance; in this process the thing in itself at its foundation and its causality remain unknown. But I say, that the law of nature remains, whether the rational being is the cause of the effects in the sensuous world from reason, that is, through freedom, or whether it does not determine them on grounds of reason. For, if the former is the case, the action is performed according to maxims, the effect of which as appearance is always conformable to constant laws; if the latter is the case, and the action not performed on principles of reason, it is subjected to the empirical laws of the sensibility, and in both cases the effects are connected according to constant laws; more than this we do not require or know concerning natural necessity. But in the former case reason is the cause of these laws of nature, and therefore free; in the latter the effects follow according to mere natural laws of sensibility, because reason does not influence it; but reason itself is not determined on that account by the sensibility, and is therefore free in this case too. Freedom is therefore no hindrance to natural law in appearance, neither does this law abrogate the freedom of the practical use of reason, which is connected with things in themselves, as determining grounds.

Thus practical freedom, viz., the freedom in which reason possesses causality according to objectively determining grounds, is rescued and yet natural necessity is not in the least curtailed with regard to the very same effects, as appearances. The same remarks will serve to explain what we had to say concerning transcendental freedom and its compatibility with natural necessity (in the same subject, but not taken in the same reference). For, as to this, every beginning of the action of a being from objective causes regarded as determining grounds, is always a first start, though the same action is in the series of appearances only a subordinate start, which must be preceded by a state of the cause, which determines it, and is itself determined in the same manner by another immediately preceding. Thus we are able, in rational beings, or in beings generally, so far as their causality is determined in them as things in themselves, to imagine a faculty of beginning from itself a series of states, without falling into contradiction with the laws of nature. For the relation of the action to objective grounds of reason is not a time-relation; in this case that which determines the causality does not precede in time the action, because such determining grounds represent not a reference to objects of sense, e.g., to causes in the appearances, but to determining causes, as things in themselves, which do not rank under conditions of time. And in this way the action, with regard to the causality of reason, can be considered as a first start in respect to the series of appearances, and yet also as a merely subordinate beginning. We may therefore without contradiction consider it in the former aspect as free, but in the latter (in so far as it is merely appearance) as subject to natural necessity.

As to the fourth Antinomy, it is solved in the same way as the conflict of reason with itself in the third. For, provided the cause in the appearance is distinguished from the cause of the appearance (so far as it can be thought as a thing in itself), both propositions are perfectly reconcilable: the

one, that there is nowhere in the sensuous world a cause (according to similar laws of causality), whose existence is absolutely necessary; the other, that this world is nevertheless connected with a Necessary Being as its cause (but of another kind and according to another law). The incompatibility of these propositions entirely rests upon the mistake of extending what is valid merely of appearances to things in themselves, and in general confusing both in one concept.

Sect. 54. This then is the proposition and this the solution of the whole antinomy, in which reason finds itself involved in the application of its principles to the sensible world. The former alone (the mere proposition) would be a considerable service in the cause of our knowledge of human reason, even though the solution might fail to fully satisfy the reader, who has here to combat a natural illusion, which has been but recently exposed to him, and which he had hitherto always regarded as genuine. For one result at least is unavoidable. As it is quite impossible to prevent this conflict of reason with itself-so long as the objects of the sensible world are taken for things in themselves, and not for mere appearances, which they are in fact-the reader is thereby compelled to examine over again the deduction of all our *a priori* cognition and the proof which I have given of my deduction in order to come to a decision on the question. This is all I require at present; for when in this occupation he shall have thought himself deep enough into the nature of pure reason, those concepts by which alone the solution of the conflict of reason is possible, will become sufficiently familiar to him. Without this preparation I cannot expect an unreserved assent even from the most attentive reader.

III. The Theological Idea. [34]

Sect. 55. The third transcendental Idea, which affords matter for the most important, but, if pursued only speculatively, transcendent and thereby dialectical use of reason, is the ideal of pure reason. Reason in this case does not, as with the psychological and the cosmological Ideas, begin from experience, and err by exaggerating its grounds, in striving to attain, if possible, the absolute completeness of their series. It rather totally breaks with experience, and from mere concepts of what constitutes the absolute completeness of a thing in general, consequently by means of the idea of a most perfect primal Being, it proceeds to determine the possibility and therefore the actuality of all other things. And so the mere presupposition of a Being, who is conceived not in the series of experience, yet for the purposes of experience-for the sake of comprehending its connection, order, and unity -i.e., the idea [the notion of it], is more easily distinguished from the concept of the understanding here, than in the former cases. Hence we can easily expose the dialectical illusion which arises from our making the subjective conditions of our thinking objective conditions of objects themselves, and an hypothesis necessary for the satisfaction of our reason, a dogma. As the observations of the Critique on the pretensions of transcendental theology are intelligible, clear, and decisive, I have nothing more to add on the subject.

General Remark on the Transcendental Ideas.

Sect. 56. The objects, which are given us by experience, are in many respects incomprehensible, and many questions, to which the law of nature leads us, when carried beyond a certain point (though quite conformably to the laws of nature), admit of no answer; as for example the question: why substances attract one another? But if we entirely quit nature, or in pursuing its combinations, exceed all possible experience, and so enter the realm of mere ideas, we cannot then say that the object is incomprehensible, and that the nature of things proposes to us insoluble

problems. For we are not then concerned with nature or in general with given objects, but with concepts, which have their origin merely in our reason, and with mere creations of thought; and all the problems that arise from our notions of them must be solved, because of course reason can and must give a full account of its own procedure. [35] As the psychological, cosmological, and theological Ideas are nothing but pure concepts of reason, which cannot be given in any experience, the questions which reason asks us about them are put to us not by the objects, but by mere maxims of our reason for the sake of its own satisfaction. They must all be capable of satisfactory answers, which is done by showing that they are principles which bring our use of the understanding into thorough agreement, completeness, and synthetical unity, and that they so far hold good of experience only, but of experience as a whole.

Although an absolute whole of experience is impossible, the idea of a whole of cognition according to principles must impart to our knowledge a peculiar kind of unity, that of a system, without which it is nothing but piecework, and cannot be used for proving the existence of a highest purpose (which can only be the general system of all purposes), I do not here refer only to the practical, but also to the highest purpose of the speculative use of reason.

The transcendental Ideas therefore express the peculiar application of reason as a principle of systematic unity in the use of the understanding. Yet if we assume this unity of the mode of cognition to be attached to the object of cognition, if we regard that which is merely regulative to be constitutive, and if we persuade ourselves that we can by means of these Ideas enlarge our cognition transcendently, or far beyond all possible experience, while it only serves to render experience within itself as nearly complete as possible, i.e., to limit its progress by nothing that cannot belong to experience: we suffer from a mere misunderstanding in our estimate of the proper application of our reason and of its principles, and from a Dialectic, which both confuses the empirical use of reason, and also sets reason at variance with itself.

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Prolegomena

Immanuel Kant
1783

Conclusion: On The Determination Of The Bounds Of Pure Reason.

Sect. 57. Having adduced the clearest arguments, it would be absurd for us to hope that we can know more of any object, than belongs to the possible experience of it, or lay claim to the least atom of knowledge about anything not assumed to be an object of possible experience, which would determine it according to the constitution it has in itself. For how could we determine anything in this way, since time, space, and the categories, and still more all the concepts formed by empirical experience or perception in the sensible world [*Anschauung*], have and can have no other use, than to make experience possible. And if this condition is omitted from the pure concepts of the understanding, they do not determine any object, and have no meaning whatever.

But it would be on the other hand a still greater absurdity if we conceded no things in themselves, or set up our experience for the only possible mode of knowing things, our way of beholding [*Anschauung*] them in space and in time for the only possible way, and our discursive understanding for the archetype of every possible understanding; in fact if we wished to have the principles of the possibility of experience considered universal conditions of things in themselves.

Our principles, which limit the use of reason to possible experience, might in this way become transcendent, and the limits of our reason be set up as limits of the possibility of things in themselves (as Hume's dialogues may illustrate), if a careful critique did not guard the bounds of our reason with respect to its empirical use, and set a limit to its pretensions. Skepticism originally arose from metaphysics and its licentious dialectics. At first it might, merely to favor the empirical use of reason, announce everything that transcends this use as worthless and deceitful; but by and by, when it was perceived that the very same principles that are used in experience, insensibly, and apparently with the same right, led still further than experience extends, then men began to doubt even the propositions of experience. But here there is no danger; for common sense will doubtless always assert its rights. A certain confusion, however, arose in science which cannot determine how far reason is to be trusted, and why only so far and no further, and this confusion can only be cleared up and all future relapses obviated by a formal determination, on principle, of the boundary of the use of our reason.

We cannot indeed, beyond all possible experience, form a definite notion of what things in themselves may be. Yet we are not at liberty to abstain entirely from inquiring into them; for experience never satisfies reason fully, but in answering questions, refers us further and further back, and leaves us dissatisfied with regard to their complete solution. This any one may gather

from the Dialectics of pure reason, which therefore has its good subjective grounds. Having acquired, as regards the nature of our soul, a clear conception of the subject, and having come to the conviction, that its manifestations cannot be explained materialistically, who can refrain from asking what the soul really is, and, if no concept of experience suffices for the purpose, from accounting for it by a concept of reason (that of a simple immaterial being), though we cannot by any means prove its objective reality? Who can satisfy himself with mere empirical knowledge in all the cosmological questions of the duration and of the quantity of the world, of freedom or of natural necessity, since every answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, which likewise requires its answer and thereby clearly shows the insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to satisfy reason? Finally, who does not see in the thoroughgoing contingency and dependence of all his thoughts and assumptions on mere principles of experience, the impossibility of stopping there? And who does not feel himself compelled, notwithstanding all interdictions against losing himself in transcendent ideas, to seek rest and contentment beyond all the concepts which he can vindicate by experience, in the concept of a Being, the possibility of which we cannot conceive, but at the same time cannot be refuted, because it relates to a mere being of the understanding, and without it reason must needs remain forever dissatisfied?

Bounds (in extended beings) always presuppose a space existing outside a certain definite place, and enclosing it; limits do not require this, but are mere negations, which affect a quantity, so far as it is not absolutely complete. But our reason, as it were, sees in its surroundings a space for the cognition of things in themselves, though we can never have definite notions of them, and are limited to appearances only.

As long as the cognition of reason is homogeneous, definite bounds to it are inconceivable. In mathematics and in natural philosophy human reason admits of limits but not of bounds, viz., that something indeed lies without it, at which it can never arrive, but not that it will at any point find completion in its internal progress. The enlarging of our views in mathematics, and the possibility of new discoveries, are infinite; and the same is the case with the discovery of new properties of nature, of new powers and laws, by continued experience and its rational combination. But limits cannot be mistaken here, for mathematics refers to appearances only, and what cannot be an object of sensuous contemplation, such as the concepts of metaphysics and of morals, lies entirely without its sphere, and it can never lead to them; neither does it require them. It is therefore not a continual progress and an approximation towards these sciences, and there is not, as it were, any point or line of contact. Natural science will never reveal to us the internal constitution of things, which though not appearance, yet can serve as the ultimate ground of explaining appearance. Nor does that science require this for its physical explanations. Nay even if such grounds should be offered from other sources (for instance, the influence of immaterial beings), they must be rejected and not used in the progress of its explanations. For these explanations must only be grounded upon that which as an object of sense can belong to experience, and be brought into connection with our actual perceptions and empirical laws.

But metaphysics leads us towards bounds in the dialectical attempts of pure reason (not undertaken arbitrarily or wantonly, but stimulated thereto by the nature of reason itself). And the transcendental Ideas, as they do not admit of evasion, and are never capable of realization, serve to point out to us actually not only the bounds of the pure use of reason, but also the way to determine them. Such is the end and the use of this natural predisposition of our reason, which has brought forth metaphysics as its favorite child, whose generation, like every other in the world, is not to be ascribed to blind chance, but to an original germ, wisely organized for great ends. For

metaphysics, in its fundamental features, perhaps more than any other science, is placed in us by nature itself, and cannot be considered the production of an arbitrary choice or a casual enlargement in the progress of experience from which it is quite disparate.

Reason with all its concepts and laws of the understanding, which suffice for empirical use, i.e., within the sensible world, finds in itself no satisfaction because ever-recurring questions deprive us of all hope of their complete solution. The transcendental ideas, which have that completion in view, are such problems of reason. But it sees clearly, that the sensuous world cannot contain this completion, neither consequently can all the concepts, which serve merely for understanding the world of sense, such as space and time, and whatever we have adduced under the name of pure concepts of the understanding. The sensuous world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected according to universal laws; it has therefore no subsistence by itself; it is not the thing in itself, and consequently must point to that which contains the basis of this experience, to beings which cannot be known merely as phenomena, but as things in themselves. In the cognition of them alone reason can hope to satisfy its desire of completeness in proceeding from the conditioned to its conditions.

We have above (Sects. 33, 34) indicated the limits of reason with regard to all cognition of mere creations of thought. Now, since the transcendental ideas have urged us to approach them, and thus have led us, as it were, to the spot where the occupied space (viz., experience) touches the void (that of which we can know nothing, viz., noumena), we can determine the bounds of pure reason. For in all bounds there is something positive (e.g., a surface is the boundary of corporeal space, and is therefore itself a space, a line is a space, which is the boundary of the surface, a point the boundary of the line, but yet always a place in space), whereas limits contain mere negations. The limits pointed out in those paragraphs are not enough after we have discovered that beyond them there still lies something (though we can never know what it is in itself). For the question now is, What is the attitude of our reason in this connection of what we know with what we do not, and never shall, know? This is an actual connection of a known thing with one quite unknown (and which will always remain so), and though what is unknown should not become the least more known-which we cannot even hope-yet the notion of this connection must be definite, and capable of being rendered distinct.

We must therefore accept an immaterial being, a world of understanding, and a Supreme Being (all mere noumena), because in them only, as things in themselves, reason finds that completion and satisfaction, which it can never hope for in the derivation of appearances from their homogeneous grounds, and because these actually have reference to something distinct from them (and totally heterogeneous), as appearances always presuppose an object in itself, and therefore suggest its existence whether we can know more of it or not.

But as we can never know these beings of understanding as they are in themselves, that is, definitely, yet must assume them as regards the sensible world, and connect them with it by reason, we are at least able to think this connection by means of such concepts as express their relation to the world of sense. Yet if we represent to ourselves a being of the understanding by nothing but pure concepts of the understanding, we then indeed represent nothing definite to ourselves, consequently our concept has no significance; but if we think it by properties borrowed from the sensuous world, it is no longer a being of understanding, but is conceived as an appearance, and belongs to the sensible world. Let us take an instance from the notion of the Supreme Being.

Our deistic conception is quite a pure concept of reason, but represents only a thing containing all

realities, without being able to determine any one of them; because for that purpose an example must be taken from the world of sense, in which case we should have an object of sense only, not something quite heterogeneous, which can never be an object of sense. Suppose I attribute to the Supreme Being understanding, for instance; I have no concept of an understanding other than my own, one that must receive its perceptions [*Anschauung*] by the senses, and which is occupied in bringing them under rules of the unity of consciousness. Then the elements of my concept would always lie in the appearance; I should however by the insufficiency of the appearance be necessitated to go beyond them to the concept of a being which neither depends upon appearance, nor is bound up with them as conditions of its determination. But if I separate understanding from sensibility to obtain a pure understanding, then nothing remains but the mere form of thinking without perception [*Anschauung*], by which form alone I can know nothing definite, and consequently no object. For that purpose I should conceive another understanding, such as would directly perceive its objects, [36] but of which I have not the least notion; because the human understanding is discursive, and can [not directly perceive, it can] only know by means of general concepts. And the very same difficulties arise if we attribute a will to the Supreme Being; for we have this concept only by drawing it from our internal experience, and therefore from our dependence for satisfaction upon objects whose existence we require; and so the notion rests upon sensibility, which is absolutely incompatible with the pure concept of the Supreme Being.

Hume's objections to deism are weak, and affect only the proofs, and not the deistic assertion itself. But as regards theism, which depends on a stricter determination of the concept of the Supreme Being which in deism is merely transcendent, they are very strong, and as this concept is formed, in certain (in fact in all common) cases irrefutable. Hume always insists, that by the mere concept of an original being, to which we apply only ontological predicates (eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence), we think nothing definite, and that properties which can yield a concept in concrete must be superadded; that it is not enough to say, it is Cause, but we must explain the nature of its causality, for example, that of an understanding and of a will. He then begins his attacks on the essential point itself, i.e., theism, as he; had previously directed his battery only against the proofs of deism, an attack which is not very dangerous to it in its consequences. All his dangerous arguments refer to anthropomorphism, which he holds to be inseparable from theism, and to make it absurd in itself; but if the former be abandoned, the latter must vanish with it, and nothing remain but deism, of which nothing can come, which is of no value, and which cannot serve as any foundation to religion or morals. If this anthropomorphism were really unavoidable, no proofs whatever of the existence of a Supreme Being, even were they all granted, could determine for us the concept of this Being without involving us in contradictions.

If we connect with the command to avoid all transcendent judgments of pure reason, the command (which apparently conflicts with it) to proceed to concepts that lie beyond the field of its immanent (empirical) use, we discover that both can subsist together, but only at the boundary of all lawful use of reason. For this boundary belongs as well to the field of experience, as to that of the creations of thought, and we are thereby taught, as well, bow these so remarkable ideas serve merely for marking the bounds of human reason. On the one hand they give warning not boundlessly to extend cognition of experience, as if nothing but world[37] I remained for us to know, and yet, on the other hand, not to transgress the bounds of experience, and to think of judging about things beyond them, as things in themselves.

But we stop at this boundary if we limit our judgment merely to the relation which the world may have to a Being whose very concept lies beyond all the knowledge which we can attain within the

world. For we then do not attribute to the Supreme Being any of the properties in themselves, by which we represent objects of experience, and thereby avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism; but we attribute them to his relation to the world, and allow ourselves a symbolical anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns language only, and not the object itself.

If I say that we are compelled to consider the world, as if it were the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will, I really say nothing more, than that a watch, a ship, a regiment, bears the same relation to the watchmaker, the shipbuilder, the commanding officer, as the world of sense (or whatever constitutes the substratum of this complex of appearances) does to the Unknown, which I do not hereby know as it is in itself, but as it is for me or in relation to the world, of which I am a part.

Sect. 58. Such a cognition is one of analogy, and does not signify (as is commonly understood) an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things. [38] By means of this analogy, however, there remains a concept of the Supreme Being sufficiently determined for us, though we have left out everything that could determine it absolutely or in itself; for we determine it as regards the world and as regards ourselves, and more do we not require. The attacks which Hume makes upon those who would determine this concept absolutely, by taking the materials for so doing from themselves and the world, do not affect us; and he cannot object to us, that we have nothing left if we give up the objective anthropomorphism of the concept of the Supreme Being.

For let us assume at the outset (as Hume in his dialogues makes Philo grant Cleanthes), as a necessary hypothesis, the deistical concept of the First Being, in which this Being is thought by the mere ontological predicates of substance, of cause, etc. This must be done, because reason, actuated in the sensible world by mere conditions, which are themselves always conditional, cannot otherwise have any satisfaction, and it therefore can be done without falling into anthropomorphism (which transfers predicates from the world of sense to a Being quite distinct from the world), because those predicates are mere categories, which, though they do not give a determinate concept of God, yet give a concept not limited to any conditions of sensibility. Thus nothing can prevent our predicating of this Being a causality through reason with regard to the world, and thus passing to theism, without being obliged to attribute to God in himself this kind of reason, as a property inhering in him. For as to the former, the only possible way of prosecuting the use of reason (as regards all possible experience, in complete harmony with itself) in the world of sense to the highest point, is to assume a supreme reason as a cause of all the connections in the world. Such a principle must be quite advantageous to reason and can hurt it nowhere in its application to nature. As to the latter, reason is thereby not transferred as a property to the First Being in himself, but only to his relation to the world of sense, and so anthropomorphism is entirely avoided. For nothing is considered here but the cause of the form of reason which is perceived everywhere in the world, and reason is attributed to the Supreme Being, so far as it contains the ground of this form of reason in the world, but according to analogy only, that is, so far as this expression shows merely the relation, which the Supreme Cause unknown to us has to the world, in order to determine everything in it conformably to reason in the highest degree. We are thereby kept from using reason as an attribute for the purpose of conceiving God, but instead of conceiving the world in such a manner as is necessary to have the greatest possible use of reason according to principle. We thereby acknowledge that the Supreme Being is quite inscrutable and even unthinkable in any definite way as to what he is in himself. We are thereby kept, on the one band, from making a transcendent use of the concepts which we have of reason as an efficient

cause (by means of the will), in order to determine the Divine Nature by properties, which are only borrowed from human nature, and from losing ourselves in gross and extravagant notions, and on the other hand from deluging the contemplation of the world with hyperphysical modes of explanation according to our notions of human reason, which we transfer to God, and so losing for this contemplation its proper application, according to which it should be a rational study of mere nature, and not a presumptuous derivation of its appearances from a Supreme Reason. The expression suited to our feeble notions is, that we conceive the world as if it came, as to its existence and internal plan, from a Supreme Reason, by which notion we both know the constitution, which belongs to the world itself, yet without pretending to determine the nature of its cause in itself, and on the other hand, we transfer the ground of this constitution (of the form of reason in the world) upon the relation of the Supreme Cause to the world, without finding the world sufficient by itself for that purpose. [39]

Thus the difficulties which seem to oppose theism -disappear by combining with Hume's principle -- "not to carry the use of reason dogmatically beyond the field of all possible experience" -- this other principle, which be quite overlooked: "not to consider the field of experience as one which bounds itself in the eye of our reason." The Critique of Pure Reason here points out the true mean between dogmatism, which Hume combats, and skepticism, which he would substitute for it-a mean which is not like other means that we find advisable to determine for ourselves as it were mechanically (by adopting something from one side and something from the other), and by which nobody is taught a better way, but such a one as can be accurately determined on principles.

Sect. 59. At the beginning of this annotation I made use of the metaphor of a boundary, in order to establish the limits of reason in regard to its suitable use. The world of sense contains merely appearances, which are not things in themselves, but the understanding must assume these latter ones, viz., noumena. In our reason both are comprised, and the question is, How does reason proceed to set boundaries to the understanding as regards both these fields? Experience, which contains all that belongs to the sensuous world, does not bound itself; it only proceeds in every case from the conditioned to some other equally conditioned object. Its boundary must lie quite without it, and this field is that of the pure beings of the understanding. But this field, so far as the determination of the nature of these beings is concerned, is an empty space for us, and if dogmatically- determined concepts alone are in question, we cannot pass out of the field of possible experience. But as a boundary itself is something positive, which belongs as well to that which lies within, as to the space that lies without the given complex, it is still an actual positive cognition, which reason only acquires by enlarging itself to this boundary, yet without attempting to pass it; because it there finds itself in the presence of an empty space, in which it can conceive forms of things, but not things themselves. But the setting of a boundary to the field of the understanding by something, which is otherwise unknown to it, is still a cognition which belongs to reason even at this standpoint, and by which it is neither confined within the sensible, nor straying without it, but only refers, as befits the knowledge of a boundary, to the relation between that which lies without it, and that which is contained within it.

Natural theology is such a concept at the boundary of human reason, being constrained to look beyond this boundary to the Idea of a Supreme Being (and, for practical purposes to that of an intelligible world also), not in order to determine anything relatively to this pure creation of the understanding, which lies beyond the world of sense, but in order to guide the use of reason within it according to principles of the greatest possible (theoretical as well as practical) unity. For this purpose we make use of the reference of the world of sense to an independent reason, as the cause

of all its connections. Thereby we do not purely invent a being, but, as beyond the sensible. world there must be something that can only be thought by the pure understanding, we determine that something in this particular way, though only of course according to analogy.

And thus there remains our original proposition, which is the resume of the whole Critique: "that reason by all its *a priori* principles never teaches us anything more than objects of possible experience, and even of these nothing more than can be known in experience." But this limitation does not prevent reason leading us to the objective boundary of experience, viz., to the reference to something which is not itself an object of experience, but is the ground of all experience. Reason does not however teach us anything concerning the thing in itself: it only instructs us as regards its own complete and highest use in the field of possible experience. But this is all that can be reasonably desired in the present case, and with which we have cause to be satisfied.

Sect. 60. Thus we have fully exhibited metaphysics as 'it is actually given in the natural predisposition of human reason, and in that which constitutes the essential end of its pursuit, according to its subjective possibility. Though we have found, that this merely natural use of such a predisposition of our reason, if no discipline arising only from a scientific critique bridles and sets limits to it, involves us in transcendent, either apparently or really conflicting, dialectical syllogisms; and this fallacious metaphysics is not only unnecessary as regards the promotion of our knowledge of nature, but even disadvantageous to it: there yet remains a problem worthy of solution, which is to find out the natural ends intended by this disposition to transcendent concepts in our reason, because everything that lies in nature must be originally intended for some useful purpose.

Such an inquiry is of a doubtful nature; and I .acknowledge, that what I can say about it is conjecture only, like every speculation about the first ends of nature. The question does not concern the objective validity of metaphysical judgments, but our natural predisposition to them, and therefore does not belong to the system of metaphysics but to anthropology.

When I compare all the transcendental Ideas, the totality of which constitutes the particular problem of natural pure reason, compelling it to quit the mere contemplation of nature, to transcend all possible experience, and in this endeavor to produce the thing (be it knowledge or fiction) called metaphysics, I think I perceive that the aim of this natural tendency is, to free our notions from the fetters of experience and from the limits of the mere contemplation of nature so far as at least to open to us a field containing mere objects for the pure understanding, which no sensibility can reach, not indeed for the purpose of speculatively occupying ourselves with them (for there we can find no ground to stand on), but because practical principles, which, without finding some such scope for their necessary expectation and hope, could not expand to the universality which reason unavoidably requires from a moral point of view.

So I find that the Psychological Idea (however little it may reveal to me the nature of the human soul, which is higher than all concepts of experience), shows the insufficiency of these concepts plainly enough, and thereby deters me from materialism, the psychological notion of which is unfit for any explanation of nature, and besides confines reason in practical respects. The Cosmological Ideas, by the obvious insufficiency of all possible cognition of nature to satisfy reason in its lawful inquiry, serve in the same manner to keep us from naturalism, which asserts nature to be sufficient for itself. Finally, all natural necessity in the sensible world is conditional, as it always presupposes the dependence of things upon others, and unconditional necessity must be sought only in the unity of a cause different from the world of sense. But as the causality of this cause, in its turn, were it

merely nature, could never render the existence of the contingent (as its consequent) comprehensible, reason frees itself by means of the Theological Idea from fatalism, (both as a blind natural necessity in the coherence of nature itself, without a first principle, and as a blind causality of this principle itself), and leads to the concept of a cause possessing freedom, or of a Supreme Intelligence. Thus the transcendental Ideas serve, if not to instruct us positively, at least to destroy the rash assertions of Materialism, of Naturalism, and of Fatalism, and thus to afford scope for the moral Ideas beyond the field of speculation. These considerations, I should think, explain in some measure the natural predisposition of which I spoke.

The practical value, which a merely speculative science may have, lies without the bounds of this science, and can therefore be considered as a scholion merely, and like all scholia does not form part of the science itself. This application however surely lies within the bounds of philosophy, especially of philosophy drawn from the pure sources of reason, where its speculative use in metaphysics must necessarily be at unity with its practical use in morals. Hence the unavoidable dialectics of pure reason, considered in metaphysics, as a natural tendency, deserves to be explained not as an illusion merely, which is to be removed, but also, if possible, as a natural provision as regards its end, though this duty, a work of supererogation, cannot justly be assigned to metaphysics proper.

The solutions of these questions which are treated in the chapter on the Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason[40] should be considered a second scholion which however has a greater affinity with the subject of metaphysics. For there certain rational principles are expounded which determine *a priori* the order of nature or rather of the understanding, which seeks nature's laws through experience. They seem to be constitutive and legislative with regard to experience, though they spring from pure reason, which cannot be considered, like the understanding, as a principle of possible experience. Now whether or not this harmony rests upon the fact, that just as nature does not inhere in appearances or in their source (the sensibility) itself, but only in so far as the latter is in relation to the understanding, as also a systematic unity in applying the understanding to bring about an entirety of all possible experience can only belong to the understanding when in relation to reason; and whether or not experience is in this way mediately subordinate to the legislation of reason: may be discussed by those who desire to trace the nature of reason even beyond its use in metaphysics, into the general principles of a history of nature; I have represented this task as important, but not attempted its solution, in the book itself. [41]

And thus I conclude the analytical solution of the main question which I had proposed: How is metaphysics in general possible? by ascending from the data of its actual use in its consequences, to the grounds of its possibility.

Prolegomena

Immanuel Kant
1783

Solution Of The General Question Of The Prolegomena: "How Is Metaphysics Possible As A Science?"

Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of reason, is actual, but if considered by itself alone (as the analytical solution of the third principal question showed), dialectical and illusory. If we think of taking principles from it, and in using them follow the natural, but on that account not less false, illusion, we can never produce science, but only a vain dialectical art, in which one school may outdo another, but none can ever acquire a just and lasting approbation.

In order that as a science metaphysics may be entitled to claim not mere fallacious plausibility, but insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must itself exhibit the whole stock of *a priori* concepts, their division according to their various sources (Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason), together with a complete table of them, the analysis of all these concepts, with all their consequences, especially by means of the deduction of these concepts, the possibility of synthetical cognition *a priori*, the principles of its application and finally its bounds, all in a complete system. Critique, therefore, and critique alone, contains in itself the whole well- proved and well-tested plan, and even all the means required to accomplish metaphysics, as a science; by other ways and means it is impossible. The question here therefore is not so much how this performance is possible, as how to set it going, and induce men of clear heads to quit their hitherto perverted and fruitless cultivation for one that will not deceive, and how such a union for the common end may best be directed.

This much is certain, that whoever has once tasted Critique will be ever after disgusted with all dogmatical twaddle which be formerly put up with, because his reason must have something, and could find nothing better for its support.

Critique stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of the schools, as chemistry does to alchemy, or as astronomy to the astrology of the fortune-teller. I pledge myself that nobody who has read through and through, and grasped the principles of, the Critique even in these Prolegomena only, will ever return to that old and sophistical pseudo-science; but will rather with a certain delight look forward to metaphysics which is now indeed in his power, requiring no more preparatory discoveries, and now at last affording permanent satisfaction to reason. For here is an advantage upon which, of all possible sciences, metaphysics alone can with certainty reckon: that it can be brought to such completion and fixity as to be incapable of further change, or of any augmentation by new discoveries; because here reason has the sources of its knowledge in itself,

not in objects and their observation [*Anschauung*], by which latter its stock of knowledge cannot be further increased. When therefore it has exhibited the fundamental laws of its faculty completely and so definitely as to avoid all misunderstanding, there remains nothing for pure reason to know *a priori*, nay, there is even no ground to raise further questions. The sure prospect of knowledge so definite and so compact has a peculiar charm, even though we should set aside all its advantages, of which I shall hereafter speak.

All false art, all vain wisdom, lasts its time, but finally destroys itself, and its highest culture is also the epoch of its decay. That this time is come for metaphysics appears from the state into which it has fallen among all learned nations, despite of all the zeal with which other sciences of every kind are prosecuted. The old arrangement of our university studies still preserves its shadow; now and then an Academy of Science tempts men by offering prizes to write essays on it, but it is no longer numbered among thorough sciences; and let any one judge for himself how a man of genius, if he were called a great metaphysician, would receive the compliment, which may be well- meant, but is scarce envied by anybody.

Yet, though the period of the downfall of all dogmatical metaphysics has undoubtedly arrived, we are yet far from being able to say that the period of its regeneration is come by means of a thorough and complete Critique of Reason. All transitions from a tendency to its contrary pass through the stage of indifference, and this moment is the most dangerous for an author, but, in my opinion, the most favorable for the science. For, when party spirit has died out by a total dissolution of former connections, minds are in the best state to listen to several proposals for an organization according to a new plan.

When I say, that I hope these Prolegomena will excite investigation in the field of critique and afford a new and promising object to sustain the general spirit of philosophy, which seems on its speculative side to want sustenance, I can imagine beforehand, that every one, whom the thorny paths of my Critique have tired and put out of humor, will ask me, upon what I found this hope. My answer is, upon the irresistible law of necessity.

That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we should prefer to give up breathing altogether, to avoid inhaling impure air. There will therefore always be metaphysics in the world; nay, every one, especially every man of reflection, will have it, and for want of a recognized standard, will shape it for himself after his own pattern. What has hitherto been called metaphysics, cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego it entirely is impossible; therefore a Critique of Pure Reason itself must now be attempted or, if one exists, investigated, and brought to the full test, because there is no other means of supplying this pressing want, which is something more than mere thirst for knowledge.

Ever since I have come to know critique, whenever I finish reading a book of metaphysical contents, which, by the preciseness of its notions, by variety, order, and an easy style, was not only entertaining but also helpful, I cannot help asking, 11 Has this author indeed advanced metaphysics a single step?" The learned men, whose works have been useful to me in other respects and always contributed to the culture of my mental powers, will, I hope, forgive me for saying, that I have never been able to find either their essays or my own less important ones (though self-love may recommend them to me) to have advanced the science of metaphysics in the least, and why?

Here is the very obvious reason: metaphysics did not then exist as a science, nor can it be gathered piecemeal, but its germ must be fully preformed in the Critique. But in order to prevent all

misconception, we must remember what has been already said, that by the analytical treatment of our concepts the understanding gains indeed a great deal, but the science (of metaphysics) is thereby not in the least advanced, because these dissections of concepts are nothing but the materials from which the intention is to carpenter our science. Let the concepts of substance and of accident be ever so well dissected and determined, all this is very well as a preparation for some future use. But if we cannot prove, that in all which exists the substance endures, and only the accidents vary, our science is not the least advanced by all our analyzes.

Metaphysics has hitherto never been able to prove *a priori* either this proposition, or that of sufficient reason, still less any more complex theorem, such as belongs to psychology or cosmology, or indeed any synthetical proposition. By all its analyzing therefore nothing is affected, nothing obtained or forwarded and the science, after all this bustle and noise, still remains as it was in the days of Aristotle, though far better preparations were made for it than of old, if the clue to synthetical cognitions had only been discovered.

If any one thinks himself offended, he is at liberty to refute my charge by producing a single synthetical proposition belonging to metaphysics, which he would prove dogmatically *a priori*, for until he has actually performed this feat, I shall not grant that he has truly advanced the science; even should this proposition be sufficiently confirmed by common experience. No demand can be more moderate or more equitable, and in the (inevitably certain) event of its non-performance, no assertion more just, than that hitherto metaphysics has never existed as a science.

But there are two things which, in case the challenge be accepted, I must deprecate: first, trifling about probability and conjecture, which are suit-d as little to metaphysics, as to geometry; and secondly, a decision by means of the magic wand of common sense, which does not convince every one, but which accommodates itself to personal peculiarities.

For as to the former, nothing can be more absurd, than in metaphysics, a philosophy from pure reason to think of grounding our judgments upon probability and conjecture. Everything that is to be known *a priori*, is thereby announced as apodictically certain, and must therefore be proved in this way. We might as well think of grounding geometry or arithmetic upon conjectures. As to the doctrine of chances in the latter, it does not contain probable, but perfectly certain, judgments concerning the degree of the probability of certain cases, under given uniform conditions, which, in the sum of all possible cases, infallibly happen according to the rule, though it is not sufficiently determined in respect to every single chance. Conjectures (by means of induction and of analogy) can be suffered in an empirical science of nature only, yet even there the possibility at least of what we assume must be quite certain.

The appeal to common sense is even more absurd, when concept and principles are announced as valid, not in so far as they hold with regard to experience, but even beyond the conditions of experience. For what is common sense? It is normal good sense, so far it judges right. But what is normal good sense? It is the faculty of the knowledge and use of rules in concreto, as distinguished from the speculative understanding, which is a faculty of knowing rules in abstracto. Common sense can hardly understand the rule, 11 that every event is determined by means of its cause," and can never comprehend it thus generally. It therefore demands an example from experience, and when it hears that this rule means nothing but what it always thought when a pane was broken or a kitchen-utensil missing, it then understands the principle and grants it. Common sense therefore is only of use so far as it can see its rules (though they actually are *a priori*) confirmed by experience; consequently to comprehend them *a priori*, or independently of experience, belongs to

the speculative understanding, and lies quite beyond the horizon of common sense. But the province of metaphysics is entirely confined to the latter kind of knowledge, and it is certainly a bad index of common sense to appeal to it as a witness, for it cannot here form any opinion whatever, and men look down upon it with contempt until they are in difficulties, and can find in their speculation neither in nor out.

It is a common subterfuge of those false friends of common sense (who occasionally prize it highly, but usually despise it) to say, that there must surely be at all events some propositions which are immediately certain, and of which there is no occasion to give any proof, or even any account at all, because we otherwise could never stop inquiring into the grounds of our judgments. But if we except the principle of contradiction, which is not sufficient to show the truth of synthetical judgments, they can never adduce, in proof of this privilege, anything else indubitable, which they can immediately ascribe to common sense, except mathematical propositions, such as twice two make four, between two points there is but one straight line, etc. But these judgments are radically different from those of metaphysics. For in mathematics I myself can by thinking construct whatever I represent to myself as possible by a concept: I add to the first two the other two, one by one, and myself make the number four, or I draw in thought from one point to another all manner of lines, equal as well as unequal; yet I can draw one only, which is like itself in all its parts. But I cannot, by all my power of thinking, extract from the concept of a thing the concept of something else, whose existence is necessarily connected with the former, but I must call in experience. And though my understanding furnishes me *a priori* (yet only in reference to possible experience) with the concept of such a connection (i.e., causation), I cannot exhibit it, like the concepts of mathematics, by [*Anschauung*] visualizing them, *a priori*, and so show its possibility *a priori*. This concept, together with the principles of its application, always requires, if it shall hold *a priori* as is requisite in metaphysics -a justification and deduction of its possibility, because we cannot otherwise know how far it holds good, and whether it can be used in experience only or beyond it also.

Therefore in metaphysics, as a speculative science of pure reason, we can never appeal to common sense, but may do so only when we are forced to surrender it, and to renounce all purely speculative cognition, which must always be knowledge, and consequently when we forego metaphysics itself and its instruction, for the sake of adopting a rational faith which alone may be possible for us, and sufficient to our wants, perhaps even more salutary than knowledge itself. For in this case the attitude of the question is quite altered. Metaphysics must be science, not only as a whole, but in all its parts, otherwise it is nothing; because, as a speculation of pure reason, it finds a hold only on general opinions. Beyond its field, however, probability and common sense may be used with advantage and justly, but on quite special principles, of which the importance always depends on the reference to practical life.

This is what I hold myself justified in requiring for the possibility of metaphysics as a science.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Prolegomena

Immanuel Kant
1783

Appendix: On What Can Be Done To Make Metaphysics Actual As A Science.

Since all the ways heretofore taken have failed to attain the goal, and since without a preceding critique of pure reason it is not likely ever to be attained, the present essay now before the public has a fair title to an accurate and careful investigation, except it be thought more advisable to give up all pretensions to metaphysics, to which, if men but would consistently adhere to their purpose, no objection can be made.

If we take the course of things as it is, not as it ought to be, there are two sorts of judgments: (1) one a judgment which precedes investigation (in our case one in which the reader from his own metaphysics pronounces judgment on the Critique of Pure Reason which was intended to discuss the very possibility of metaphysics); (2) the other a judgment subsequent to investigation. In the latter the reader is enabled to waive for awhile the consequences of the critical researches that may be repugnant to his formerly adopted metaphysics, and first examines the grounds whence those consequences are derived. If what common metaphysics propounds were demonstrably certain, as for instance the theorems of geometry, the former way of judging would bold good. For if the consequences of certain principles are repugnant to established truths, these principles are false and without further inquiry to be repudiated. But if metaphysics does not possess a stock of indisputably certain (synthetical) propositions, and should it even be the case that there are a number of them, which, though among the most specious, are by their consequences in mutual collision, and if no sure criterion of the truth of peculiarly metaphysical (synthetical) propositions is to be met with in it, then the former way of judging is not admissible, but the investigation of the principles of the critique must precede all judgments as to its value.

On A Specimen Of A Judgment Of The Critique Prior To Its Examination.

This judgment is to be found in the Gottingischen gelehrten Anzeigen, in the supplement to the third division, of January 19, 1782, pages 40 et seq.

When an author who is familiar with the subject of his work and endeavors to present his independent reflections in its elaboration, falls into the hands of a reviewer who in his turn, is keen enough to discern the points on which the worth or worthlessness of the book rests, who does not cling to words, but goes to the heart of the subject, sifting and testing more than the mere principles which the author takes as his point of departure, the severity of the judgment may

indeed displease the latter, but the public does not care, as it gains thereby; and the author himself may be contented, as an opportunity of correcting or explaining his positions is afforded to him at an early date by the examination of a competent judge, in such a manner, that if he believes himself fundamentally right, he can remove in time any stone of offense that might hurt the success of his work.

I find myself, with my reviewer, in quite another position. He seems not to see at all the real matter of the investigation with which (successfully or unsuccessfully) I have been occupied. It is either impatience at thinking out a lengthy work, or vexation at a threatened reform of a science in which he believed he had brought everything to perfection long ago, or, what I am unwilling to imagine, real narrow-mindedness, that prevents him from ever carrying his thoughts beyond his school-metaphysics. In short, he passes impatiently in review a long series of propositions, by which, without knowing their premises, we can think nothing, intersperses here and there his censure, the reason of which the reader understands just as little as the propositions against which it is directed; and hence [his report] can neither serve the public nor damage me, in the judgment of experts. I should, for these reasons, have passed over this judgment altogether, were it not that it may afford me occasion for some explanations which may in some cases save the readers of these Prolegomena from a misconception.

In order to take a position from which my reviewer could most easily set the whole work in a most unfavorable light, without venturing to trouble himself with any special investigation, he begins and ends by saying: "This work is a system of transcendent (or, as he translates it, of higher) Idealism." [42]

A glance at this line soon showed me the sort of criticism that I had to expect, much as though the reviewer were one who had never seen or heard of geometry, having found a Euclid, and coming upon various figures in turning over its leaves, were to say, on being asked his opinion of it: "The work is a text-book of drawing; the author introduces a peculiar terminology, in order to give dark, incomprehensible directions, which in the end teach nothing more than what every one can effect by a fair natural accuracy of eye, etc."

Let us see, in the meantime, what sort of an idealism it is that goes through my whole work, although it does not by a long way constitute the soul of the system.

The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: "All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth."

The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism, is on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth."

But this is directly contrary to idealism proper. How came I then to use this expression for quite an opposite purpose, and how came my reviewer to see it everywhere?

The solution of this difficulty rests on something that could have been very easily understood from the general bearing of the work, if the reader had only desired to do so. Space and time, together with all that they contain, are not things nor qualities in themselves, but belong merely to the appearances of the latter: up to this point I am one in confession with the above idealists. But these, and amongst them more particularly Berkeley, regarded space as a mere empirical presentation that, like the phenomenon it contains, is only known to us by means of experience or perception,

together with its determinations. I, on the contrary, prove in the first place, that space (and also time, which Berkeley did not consider) and all its determinations *a priori*, can be known by us, because, no less than time, it inheres in our sensibility as a pure form before all perception or experience and makes all intuition of the same, and therefore all its phenomena, possible. It follows from this, that as truth rests on universal and necessary laws as its criteria, experience, according to Berkeley, can have no criteria of truth, because its phenomena (according to him) have nothing *a priori* at their foundation; whence it follows, that they are nothing but sheer illusion; whereas with us, space and time (in conjunction with the pure conceptions of the understanding) prescribe their law to all possible experience *a priori*, and at the same time afford the certain criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein. [43]

My so-called (properly critical) Idealism is of quite a special character, in that it subverts the ordinary idealism, and that through it all cognition *a priori*, even that of geometry, first receives objective reality, which, without my demonstrated ideality of space and time, could not be maintained by the most zealous realists. This being the state of the case, I could have wished, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, to have named this conception of mine otherwise, but to alter it altogether was impossible. It may be permitted me however, in future, as has been above intimated, to term it the formal, or better still, the critical Idealism, to distinguish it from the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, and from the skeptical Idealism of Descartes.

Beyond this, I find nothing further remarkable in the judgment of my book. The reviewer criticizes here and there, makes sweeping criticisms, a mode prudently chosen, since it does not betray one's own knowledge or ignorance; a single thorough criticism in detail, had it touched the main question, as is only fair, would have exposed, it may be my error, or it may be my reviewer's measure of insight into this species of research. It was, moreover, not a badly conceived plan, in order at once to take from readers (who are accustomed to form their conceptions of books from newspaper reports) the desire to read the book itself, to pour out in one breath a number of passages in succession, torn from their connection, and their grounds of proof and explanations, and which must necessarily sound senseless, especially considering how antipathetic they are to all school-metaphysics; to exhaust the reader's patience ad nauseam, and then, after having made me acquainted with the sensible proposition that persistent illusion is truth, to conclude with the crude paternal moralization: to what end, then, the quarrel with accepted language, to what end, and whence, the idealistic distinction? A judgment which seeks all that is characteristic of my book, first supposed to be metaphysically heterodox, in a mere innovation of the nomenclature, proves clearly that my would-be judge has understood nothing of the subject, and in addition, has not understood himself. [44]

My reviewer speaks like a man who is conscious of important and superior insight which he keeps hidden; for I am aware of nothing recent with respect to metaphysics that could justify his tone. But he should not withhold his discoveries from the world, for there are doubtless many who, like myself, have not been able to find in all the fine things that have for long past been written in this department, anything that has advanced the science by so much as a finger-breadth; we find indeed the giving a new point to definitions, the supplying of lame proofs with new crutches, the adding to the crazy-quilt of metaphysics fresh patches or changing its pattern; but all this is not what the world requires. The world is tired of metaphysical assertions; it wants the possibility of the science, the sources from which certainty therein can be derived, and certain criteria by which it may distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from truth. To this the critic seems to possess a key, otherwise he would never have spoken out in such a high tone.

But I am inclined to suspect that no such requirement of the science has ever entered his thoughts, for in that case he would have directed his judgment to this point, and even a mistaken atteriipt in such an important matter, would have won his respect. If that be the case, we are once more good friends. He may penetrate as deeply as he likes into metaphysics, without any one hindering him; only as concerns that which lies outside metaphysics, its sources, which are to be found in reason, he cannot form a judgment. That my suspicion is not without foundation, is proved by the fact that he does not mention a word about the possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori*, the special problem upon the solution of which the fate of metaphysics wholly rests, and upon which my Critique (as well as the present Prolegomena) entirely hinges. The Idealism he encountered, and which he hung upon,: was only taken up in the doctrine as the sole means of solving the above problem (although it received its confirmation on other grounds), and hence he must have shown either that the above problem does not possess the importance I attribute to it (even in these Prolegomena), or that by my conception of appearances, it is either not solved at all, or can be better solved in another way; but I do not find a word of this in the criticism. The reviewer, then, understands nothing of my work, and possibly also nothing of the spirit and essential nature of metaphysics itself; and it is not, what I would rather assume, the hurry of a man incensed at the labor of plodding through so many obstacles, that threw an unfavorable shadow over the work lying before him, and made its fundamental features unrecognizable.

There is a good deal to be done before a learned journal, it matters not with what care its writers may be selected, can maintain its otherwise well-merited reputation, in the field of metaphysics as elsewhere. Other sciences and branches of knowledge have their standard. Mathematics has it, in itself; history and theology, in profane or sacred books; natural science and the art of medicine, in mathematics and experience; jurisprudence, in law books; and even matters of taste in the examples of the ancients. But for the judgment of the thing called metaphysics, the standard has yet to be found. I have made an attempt to determine it, as well as its use. What is to be done, then, until it be found, when works of this kind have to be judged of? If they are of a dogmatic character, -one may do what one likes; no one will play the master over others here for long, before some one else appears to deal with him in the same manner. If, however, they are critical in their character, not indeed with reference to other works, but to reason itself, so that the standard of judgment cannot be assumed but has first of all to be sought for, then, though objection and blame may indeed be permitted, yet a certain degree of leniency is indispensable, since the need is common to us all, and the lack of the necessary insight makes the high-handed attitude of judge unwarranted.

In order, however, to connect my defense with the interest of the philosophical commonwealth, I propose a test, which must be decisive as to the mode, whereby all metaphysical investigations may be directed to their common purpose. This is nothing more than what formerly mathematicians have done, in establishing the advantage of their methods by competition. I challenge my critic to demonstrate, as is only just, on *a priori* grounds, in his way, a single really metaphysical principle asserted by him. Being metaphysical it must be synthetic and known *a priori* from conceptions, but it may also be any one of the most indispensable principles, as for instance, the principle of the persistence of substance, or of the necessary determination of events in the world by their causes. If he cannot do this (silence however is confession), he must admit, that as metaphysics without apodictic certainty of propositions of this kind is nothing at all, its possibility or impossibility must before all things be established in a critique of the pure reason. Thus he is bound either to confess that my principles in the Critique are correct, or he must prove their invalidity. But as I can already foresee, that, confidently as he has hitherto relied on the certainty of his principles, when it

comes to a strict test he will not find a single one in the whole range of metaphysics he can bring forward, I will concede to him an advantageous condition, which can only be expected in such a competition, and will relieve him of the onus probandi by laying it on myself.

He finds in these Prolegomena and in my Critique (chapter on the "Theses and Antitheses Antinomies") eight propositions, of which two and two contradict one another, but each of which necessarily belongs to metaphysics, by which it must either be accepted or rejected (although there is not one that has not in this time been held by some philosopher). Now he has the liberty of selecting any one of these eight propositions at his pleasure, and accepting it without any proof, of which I shall make him a present, but only one (for waste of time will be just as little serviceable to him as to me), and then of attacking my proof of the opposite proposition. If I can save this one, and at the same time show, that according to principles which every dogmatic metaphysics must necessarily recognize, the opposite of the proposition adopted by him can be just as clearly proved, it is thereby established that metaphysics has an hereditary failing, not to be explained, much less set aside, until we ascend to its birth-place, pure reason itself, and thus my Critique must either be accepted or a better one take its place; it must at least be studied, which is the only thing I now require. If, on the other hand, I cannot save my demonstration, then a synthetic proposition *a priori* from dogmatic principles is to be reckoned to the score of my opponent, then also I will deem my impeachment of ordinary metaphysics as unjust, and pledge myself to recognize his stricture on my Critique as justified (although this would not be the consequence by a long way). To this end it would be necessary, it seems to me, that he should step out of his incognito. Otherwise I do not see how it could be avoided, that instead of dealing with one, I should be honored by several problems coming from anonymous and unqualified opponents.

Proposals As To An Investigation Of The Critique Upon Which A Judgment May Follow.

I feel obliged to the honored public even for the silence with which it for a long time favored my Critique, for this proves at least a postponement of judgment, and some supposition that in a work, leaving all beaten tracks and striking out on a new path, in which one cannot at once perhaps so easily find one's way, something may perchance lie, from which an important but at present dead branch of human knowledge may derive new life and productiveness. Hence may have originated a solicitude for the as yet tender shoot, lest it be destroyed by a hasty judgment. A test of a judgment, delayed for the above reasons, is now before my eye in the Gothaischen gelehrten Zeitung, the thoroughness of which every reader will himself perceive, from the clear and unperverted presentation of a fragment of one of the first principles of my work, without taking into consideration my own suspicious praise.

And now I propose, since an extensive structure cannot be judged of as a whole from a hurried glance, to test it piece by piece from its foundations, so thereby the present Prolegomena may fitly be used as a general outline with which the work itself may occasionally be compared. This notion, if it were founded on nothing more than my conceit of importance, such as vanity commonly attributes to one's own productions, would be immodest and would deserve to be repudiated with disgust. But now, the interests of speculative philosophy have arrived at the point of total extinction, while human reason hangs upon them with inextinguishable affection, and only after having been ceaselessly deceived does it vainly attempt to change this into indifference.

In our thinking age it is not to be supposed but that many deserving men would use any good

opportunity of working for the common interest of the more and more enlightened reason, if there were only some hope of attaining the goal. Mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even morality, etc., do not completely fill the soul; there is always a space left over, reserved for pure and speculative reason, the vacuity of which prompts us to seek in vagaries, buffooneries, and mysticism for what seems to be employment and entertainment, but what actually is mere pastime; in order to deaden the troublesome voice of reason, which in accordance with its nature requires something that can satisfy it, and not merely subserve other ends or the interests of our inclinations. A consideration, therefore, which is concerned only with reason as it exists for it itself, has as I may reasonably suppose a great fascination for every one who has attempted thus to extend his conceptions, and I may even say a greater than any other theoretical branch of knowledge, for which he would not willingly exchange it, because here all other cognitions, and even purposes, must meet and unite themselves in a whole. [45]

I offer, therefore, these Prolegomena as a sketch and text- book for this investigation, and not the work itself. Although I am even now perfectly satisfied with the latter as far as contents, order, and mode of presentation, and the care that I have expended in weighing and testing every sentence before writing it down, are concerned (for it has taken me years to satisfy myself fully, not only as regards the whole but in some cases even as to the sources of one particular proposition); yet I am not quite satisfied with my exposition in some sections of the doctrine of elements, as for instance in the deduction of the conceptions of the Understanding, or in that on the paralogisms of pure reason, because a certain diffuseness takes away from their clearness, and in place of them, what is here said in the Prolegomena respecting these sections, may be made the basis of the test.

It is the boast of the Germans that where steady and continuous industry are requisite, they can carry things farther than other nations. If this opinion be well founded, an opportunity, a business, presents itself, the successful issue of which we can scarcely doubt, and in which all thinking men can equally take part, though they have hitherto been unsuccessful in accomplishing it and in thus confirming the above good opinion. But this is chiefly because the science in question is of so peculiar a kind, that it can be at once brought to completion and to that enduring state that it will never be able to be brought in the least degree farther or increased by later discoveries, or even changed (leaving here out of account adornment by greater clearness in some places, or additional uses), and this is an advantage no other science has or can have, because there is none so fully isolated and independent of others, and which is concerned with the faculty of cognition pure and simple. And the present moment seems, moreover, not to be unfavorable to my expectation, for just now, in Germany, no one seems to know wherewith to occupy himself, apart from the so-called useful sciences, so as to pursue not mere play, but a business possessing an enduring purpose.

To discover the means how the endeavors of the learned may be united in such a purpose, I must leave to others. In the meantime, it is my intention to persuade any one merely to follow my propositions, or even to flatter me with the hope that he will do so; but attacks, repetitions, limitations, or confirmation, completion, and extension, as the case may be, should be appended. If the matter be but investigated from its foundation, it cannot fail that a system, albeit not my own, shall be erected, that shall be a possession for future generations for which they may have reason to be grateful.

It would lead us too far here to show what kind of metaphysics may be expected, when only the principles of criticism have been perfected, and how, because the old false feathers have been pulled out, she need by no means appear poor and reduced to an insignificant figure, but may be in

other respects richly and respectably adorned. But other and great uses which would result from such a reform, strike one immediately. The ordinary metaphysics had its uses, in that it sought out the elementary conceptions of the pure understanding in order to make them clear through analysis, and definite by explanation. In this way it was a training for reason, in whatever direction it might be turned; but this was all the good it did; service was subsequently effaced when it favored conceit by venturesome assertions, sophistry by subtle distinctions and adornment, and shallowness by the ease with which it decided the most difficult problems by means of a little school-wisdom, which is only the more seductive the more it has the choice, on the one hand, of taking something from the language of science, and on the other from that of popular discourse, thus being everything to everybody, but in reality nothing at all. By criticism, however, a standard is given to our judgment, whereby knowledge may be with certainty distinguished from pseudo-science, and firmly founded, being brought into full operation in metaphysics; a mode of thought extending by degrees its beneficial influence over every other use of reason, at once infusing into it the true philosophical spirit. But the service also that metaphysics performs for theology, by making it independent of the judgment of dogmatic speculation, thereby assuring it completely against the attacks of all such opponents, is certainly not to be valued lightly. For ordinary metaphysics, although it promised the latter much advantage, could not keep this promise, and moreover, by summoning speculative dogmatics to its assistance, did nothing but arm enemies against itself. Mysticism, which can prosper in a rationalistic age only when it hides itself behind a system of school-metaphysics, under the protection of which it may venture to rave with a semblance of rationality, is driven from this, its last hiding-place, by critical philosophy. Last, but not least, it cannot be otherwise than important to a teacher of metaphysics, to be able to say with universal assent, that what he expounds is Science, and that thereby genuine services will be rendered to the commonweal.

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Prolegomena

Immanuel Kant
1783

Notes

[2] Says Horace: " Rusticus expectat, dum defluat amnis, at ille Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum; " A rustic fellow waiteth on the shore For the river to flow away, But the river flows, and flows on as before, And it flows forever and aye."

[3] Nevertheless Hume called this very destructive science metaphysics and attached to it great value. "Metaphysics and morals" he declares "are the most important branches of science; mathematics and physics are not nearly so important" ["On the Rise and Progress of Arts and Sciences," Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary]. But the acute man merely regarded the negative use arising from the moderation of extravagant claims of speculative reason, and the complete settlement of the many endless and troublesome controversies that mislead mankind. He overlooked the positive injury which results, if reason be deprived of its most important prospects, which can alone supply to the will the highest aim for all its endeavor.

[4] [The term *Anschauung* here used means sense-perception. It is that which is given to the senses and apprehended Immediately, as an object is seen by merely looking at it. The translation intuiition, though etymologically correct, is misleading. In the present passage the term is not used in its technical significance but means " practical experience."-Ed.]

[5] [The term apodictic is borrowed by Kant from Aristotle who uses it in the sense of "certain beyond dispute." The word is derived from [Greek] (= I show) and is contrasted to dialectic propositions, i. e., such statements " admit of controversy. -- Ed.]

[6] It is unavoidable that as knowledge advances, certain expressions which have become classical, after having been used since the infancy: of science, will be found inadequate and unsuitable, and a newer and more appropriate application of the terms will give rise to confusion. [This is the case with the term " analytical."] The analytical method, so far as it is opposed to the synthetical, is very different from that which constitutes the essence of analytical propositions: it signifies only that we start from what is sought, as if it were given, and ascend to the only

conditions under which it is possible. In this method we often use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in mathematical analysis, and it were better to term it the regressive method, in contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive. A principal part of Logic too is distinguished by the name of Analytics, which here signifies the logic of truth in contrast to Dialectics, without considering whether the cognitions belonging to it are analytical or synthetical.

[7] [This whole paragraph (Sect. 9) will be better understood when compared with Remark I., following this section. - Ed.]

[8] [Empirical judgments (emfiirische Urtheile) are either mere statements of fact, viz.. records of a perception, or statements of a natural law, implying a causal connection between two facts. The former Kant calls" judgments of perception" (Wahrnehmungsurtheile), the latter "judgments of experience " (Erfahrungsurtheile).-Ed.]

[9] I freely grant that these examples do not represent such judgments of perception as ever could become judgments of experience, even though a concept of the understanding were superadded, because they refer merely to feeling, which everybody knows to be merely subjective, and which of course can never be attributed to the object, and consequently never become objective. I only wished to give here an example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid, containing no ground for universal validity, and thereby for a relation to the object. An example of the judgments of perception, which become judgments of experience by superadded concepts of the understanding, will be given in the next note.

[10] As an easier example, we may take the following: " When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm." This judgment, however often I and others may have perceived it, is a mere judgment of perception, and contains no necessity; perceptions are only usually conjoined in this manner. But if I say, "The sun warms the stone," I add to the perception a concept of the understanding, viz., that of cause, which connects with the concept of sunshine that of heat as a necessary consequence, and the synthetical judgment becomes of necessity universally valid, viz., objective, and is converted from a perception into experience.

[11] This name seems preferable to the term particularia, which is used for these judgments in logic. For the latter implies the idea that they are not universal. But when I start from unity (in single judgments) and so proceed to universality, I must not [even indirectly and negatively] imply any reference to universality. I think plurality merely without universality, and not the exception from universality. This is necessary, if logical considerations shall form the basis of the pure concepts of the understanding. However, there is no need of making changes in logic.

[12] But how does this proposition, 11 that judgments of experience contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions," agree with my statement so often before inculcated, that "experience as cognition *a posteriori* can afford contingent judgments only? "When I say that experience teaches me something, I mean only the perception that lies in experience,- for example, that heat always follows the shining of the sun on a stone; consequently the proposition of experience is always so far accidental. That this heat necessarily follows the shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of experience (by means of the concept of cause), yet is a fact not learned by experience; for conversely, experience is first of all generated by this addition of the concept of the understanding (of cause) to perception. How perception attains this addition may be seen by referring in the Critique itself to the section on the Transcendental faculty of Judgment Lviz-, in the first edition, Vex dem Schematismxs der Taxes Verstandsbegrirel.

13 [Kant uses the term physiological in its etymological meaning as "pertaining to the science of physics," i.e., nature in general, not as we use the term now as "pertaining to the functions of the living body." Accordingly it has been translated "physical." -- Ed.]

14 The three following paragraphs will hardly be understood unless reference be made to what the Citique itself says on the subject of the Principles; they will, however, be of service in giving a general view of the Principles, and in fixing the attention of the main points.

15 [Kant uses here the equivocal term Wechsetwirkung. --Ed.]

16 Heat and light are in a small space just as large as to degree as in a large one; in like manner the internal representations, pain, consciousness in general, whether they last a short or a long time, need not vary as to the degree. Hence the quantity is here in a point and in a moment just as great as in any space or time however great. Degrees are therefore capable of increase, but not in intuition, rather in mere sensation (or the quantity of the degree of an intuition). Hence they can only be estimated quantitatively by the relation of 1 to 0, viz, by their capability of decreasing by infinite intermediate degrees to disappearance, or of increasing from naught through infinite gradations to a determinate sensation in a certain time. Quantitas qualitatis est gradus [i.e., the degrees of quality must be measured by equality.]

17 We speak of the "intelligible world," not (as the usual expression is) "intellectual world." For cognitions are intellectual through the understanding, and refer to our world of sense also; but objects, so far as they can be represented merely by the understanding, and to which none of our sensible intuitions can refer, are termed " intelligible." But as some possible intuition must correspond to every object, we would have to assume an understanding that intuits things immediately; but of such we have not the least notion, nor have we of the things of the understanding [Verstandes wasen], to which it should be applied.

18 Crusius alone thought of a compromise: that a Spirit, who can neither err nor deceive, implanted these laws in us originally. But since false principles often intrude themselves, as indeed the very system of this man shows in not a few examples, we are involved ill difficulties as to the use of such a principle in the absence of sure criteria to distinguish the genuine origin from the spurious as we never can know certainly what the Spirit of truth or the father of lies may have instilled into us.

19 The definition of nature is given in the beginning of the Second Part of the " Transcendental Problem," in Sect. 14.

20 1. Substantia, 2. Qualitas 3, Quamtitas, 4. Relatio, 5. Actio, 6. Passio, 7. Quando, 8. Ubi, 9. Situs, 10. Habitus.

21 Oppositum, Prius, Simul, Motus, Habere.

22 See the two tables in the chapters Von den Paralogismen der reinen Verunft and the first division of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, System der kosmologischen Ideen.

23 On the table of the categories many neat observations may be made, for instance (1) that the third arises from the first and the second joined in one concept (2) that in those of Quantity and of Quality there is merely a progress from unity to totality or from something to nothing (for this purpose the categories of Quality must stand thus: reality, limitation, total negation), without correlata or opposita, whereas those of Relation and of Modality have them; (3) that, as in Logic categorical judgments are the basis of all others, so the category of Substance is the basis of all

concepts of actual things; (4) that as Modality in the judgment is not a particular predicate, so by the modal concepts a determination is not superadded to things, etc., etc. Such observations are of great use. If we besides enumerate all the predicables, which we can find pretty completely in any good ontology (for example, Baumgarten's), and arrange them in classes under the categories, in which operation we must not neglect to add as complete a dissection of all these concepts as possible, there will then arise a merely analytical part of metaphysics, which does not contain a single synthetical proposition. which might precede the second (the synthetical), and would by its precision and completeness be not only useful, but, in virtue of its system, be even to some extent elegant.

24 See Critique of Pure Reason, Von der Amphibolie der Reflexbergriffe.

25 If we can say, that a science is actual at least in the idea of all men, as soon as it appears that the problems which lead to it are proposed to everybody by the nature of human reason, and that therefore many (though faulty) endeavors are unavoidably made in its behalf, then we are bound to Fay that metaphysics is subjectively (and indeed necessarily) actual, and therefore we justly ask, how is it (objectively) possible.

26 In disjunctive judgments we consider all possibility as divided in respect to a particular concept. By the ontological principle of the universal determination of a thing in general, I understand the principle that either the one or the other of all possible contradictory predicates must be assigned to any object. This is at the same time the principle of all disjunctive judgments, constituting the foundation of our conception of possibility, and in it the possibility of every object in general is considered as determined. This may serve as a slight explanation of the above proposition: that the activity of reason in disjunctive syllogisms is formally the same as that by which it fashions the idea of a universal conception of all reality, containing in itself that which is positive in all contradictory predicates.

27 See Critique of Pure Reason, Von ded Paralogismen der reinen Verunft.

28 Were the representation of the apperception (the Ego) a concept, by which anything could be thought, it could be used as a predicate 'of other things or contain predicates in itself. But it is nothing more than the feeling of an existence without the least definite conception and is only the representation of that to which all thinking stands in relation (relative accidentis).

29 Cf. Critique, Von den Analogien der Erfahrung.

30 It is indeed very remarkable how carelessly metaphysicians have always passed over the principle of the permanents of substances without ever attempting a proof of it; doubtless because they found themselves abandoned by all proofs as soon as they began to deal with the concept of substance. Common sense, which felt distinctly that without this presupposition no union of perceptions in experience is possible, supplied the want by a postulate. From experience itself it never could derive such a principle, partly because substances cannot be so traced in all their alterations and dissolutions, that the matter can always be found undiminished, partly because the principle contains Necessity. which is always the sign of an *a priori* principle. People then boldly applied this postulate to the concept of soul as a substance, and concluded a necessary continuance of the soul after the death of man (especially as the simplicity of this substance, which is interred from the indivisibility of consciousness, secured it from destruction by dissolution). Had they found the genuine source of this principles discovery which requires deeper researches than they were ever inclined to make -- they would have seen, that the law of the permanence of substances has

place for the purposes of experience only, and hence can hold good of things so far as they are to be known and conjoined with others in experience, but never independently of all possible experience, and consequently cannot hold good of the soul after death.

[31] Cf. Critique, Die antinomie der reinen Vernunft.

[32] I therefore would be pleased to have the critical reader to devote to this antinomy of pure reason his chief attention, because nature itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretensions, and to force it to self-examination. For every proof, which I have given, as well of the thesis as of the antithesis, I undertake to be responsible, and thereby to show the certainty of the inevitable antinomy of reason. When the reader is brought by this curious phenomenon to fall back upon the proof of the presumption upon which it rests, he will feet himself obliged to investigate the ultimate foundation of all the cognition of pure reason with me more thoroughly.

[33] The idea of freedom occurs only in the relation of the intellectual, as cause, to the appearance, as effect. Hence we cannot attribute freedom to matter in regard to the incessant action by which it fills its space. though this action takes place from an internal principle. We dan likewise find no notion of freedom suitable to purely rational beings, for instance, to God, so far as his action is immanent. For his action, though independent of external determining causes, is determined in his eternal reason, that is, in the divine nature. It is only, if something, is to start by an action, and so the effect occurs in the sequence of time, or in the world of sense (e.g., the beginning of the world), that we can put the question, whether the causality of the cause must in its turn have been started, or whether the cause can originate an effect without its causality itself beginning. In the former case the concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity, in the latter, that of freedom. From this the reader will see. that, as I explained freedom to be the faculty of starting an event spontaneously, I have exactly hit the notion which is the problem of metaphysics.

[34] Cf. Critique, the chapter on "Transcendental Ideals."

[35] Herr Platner in his Aphorisms acutely says (Sects. 728, 729), "If reason be a criterion, no concept, which is incomprehensible to human reason, can be possible. Incomprehensibility has place in what is actual only. Here incomprehensibility arises from the insufficiency of the acquired ideas." It sounds paradoxical, but is otherwise not strange to say, that in nature there is much incomprehensible (e.g., the faculty of generation) but if we mount still higher, and even go beyond nature, everything again becomes comprehensible; for we then quit entirely the objects, which can be given us, and occupy ourselves merely about ideas, in which occupation we can easily comprehend the law that reason prescribes by them to the understanding for its use in experience, because the law is the reason's own production.

[36] Der die Gegenstande anschaute.

[37] [The use of the word "world" without article, though odd, seems to be the correct reading, but it may be a mere misprint. -- Ed.]

[38] There is, e.g., an analogy between the juridical relation of human actions and the mechanical relation of motive powers. I never can do anything to an. other man without giving him a right to do the same to me on the same conditions; just as no mass can act with its motive power on another mass without thereby occasioning the other to react equally against it. Here right and motive power are quite dissimilar things, but in their relation there is complete similarity. By

means of such an analogy I can obtain a notion of the relation of things which absolutely are unknown to me. For instance, as the promotion of the welfare of children (= a) is to the love of parents (= b), so the welfare of the human species (= c) is to that unknown [quantity which is] in God (= x), which we call love; not as if it had the least similarity to any human inclination, but because we can suppose its relation to the world to be similar to that which things of the world bear one another. But the concept of relation in this case is a mere category, viz., the concept of cause, which has nothing to do with sensibility.

[39] I may say, that the causality of the Supreme Cause holds the same place with regard to the world that human reason does with regard to its works of art. Here the nature of the Supreme Cause itself remains unknown to me: I only compare its effects (the order of the world) which I know, and their conformity to reason, to the effects of human reason which I also know; and hence I term the former reason, without attributing to it on that account what I understand in man by this term, or attaching to it anything else known to me, as its property.

[40] Critique Pure Reason, II., chap. 3, section 7.

[41] Throughout in the Critique I never lost sight of the plan not to neglect anything, were it ever so recondite, that could render the inquiry into the nature of pure reason complete. Everybody may afterwards carry his researches as far as he pleases, when he has been merely shown what yet remains to be done. It is this a duty which must reasonably be expected of him who has made it his business to survey the whole field, in order to consign it to others for future cultivation and allotment. And to this branch both the scholia belong, which will hardly recommend themselves by their dryness to amateurs, and hence are added here for connoisseurs only.

[42] By no means "higher." High towers, and metaphysically-great man resembling them, round both of which there is commonly much wind, are not for me. My place is the fruitful bathos, the bottom-land, of experience; and the word transcendental, the meaning of which is so often explained by me but not once grasped by my reviewer (so carelessly has he regarded everything), does not signify something passing beyond all experience, but some. thing that indeed precedes it *a priori*, but that is intended simply to make cognition of experience possible. If these conceptions overstep experience, their employment is termed transcendent, a word which must be distinguished from transcendental, the latter being limited to the immanent use, that is, to experience. All misunderstandings of this kind have been sufficiently guarded against in the work itself, but my reviewer found his advantage in misunderstanding me.

[43] Idealism proper always has a mystical tendency, and can have no other, but mine is solely designed for the purpose of comprehending the possibility of our cognition *a priori* as to objects of experience, which is a problem never hitherto solved or even suggested. In this way all mystical idealism falls to the ground, for (as may be seen already in Plato) it inferred from our cognitions *a priori* (even from those of geometry) another intuition different from that of the senses (namely, an intellectual intuition), because it never occurred to any one that the senses themselves might intuit *a priori*.

[44] The reviewer often fights with his own shadow. When I oppose the truth of experience to dream, he never thinks that I am here speaking simply of the well-known somnio objective sumto of the Wolffian philosophy, which is merely formal, and with which the distinction between sleeping and waking is in no way concerned, and in a transcendental philosophy indeed can have

no place. For the rest, he calls my deduction of the categories and table of the principles of the understanding," common well- known axioms of logic and ontology, expressed in an idealistic manner." The reader need only consult these Prolegomena upon this point, to convince himself that a more miserable and historically incorrect, judgment, could hardly be made.

45 [Kant rewrote these sections in the second edition of the Critique.]

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Scottish Philosophy

James McCosh
1875

THE
SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY
Biographical, Expository, Critical
FROM HUTCHESON TO HAMILTON

BY
JAMES McCOSH, LL.D., D.D.
PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY, PRINCETON

London:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
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Preface

JAMES McCOSH, LL.D., D.D.,
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PREFATORY NOTE.

THIS work has been with me a labor of love. The gathering of materials for it, and the writing of it, as carrying me into what I feel to be interesting scenes, have afforded me great pleasure, which is the only reward I am likely to get. I publish it, as the last, and to me the only remaining, means of testifying my regard for my country -- loved all the more because I am now far from it -- and my country's philosophy, which has been the means of stimulating thought in so many of Scotland's sons.

The English-speaking public, British and American, has of late been listening to divers forms of philosophy, -- to Coleridge, to Kant, to Cousin, to Hegel, to Comte, to Berkeley, -- and is now inclined to a materialistic psychology. Not finding permanent satisfaction in any of these, it is surely possible that it may grant a hearing to the sober philosophy of Scotland.

M. Cousin has remarked that the philosophy of Scotland is part of the history of the country. I have treated it as such; and I claim to have one qualification for the work: I am in thorough sympathy with the characteristic sentiments of my native land. I have farther tried to make my work a contribution to what {iv} may be regarded as a new department of science, the history of thought, which is quite as important as the history of wars, of commerce, of literature, or of civilization.

Some of these articles have appeared in the "North British Review," the "British and Foreign Evangelical Review," and the "Dublin University Magazine; " but the greater number are now given to the public for the first time, and all of them have been rewritten.

J. MCC.
PRINCETON, New Jersey,
October, 1874.

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I.-- CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCHOOL

THE Germans have histories without number of their philosophy from Kant to Hegel, with not a few historical reviews of the later speculations. The French, too, have numerous sketches of the philosophy of their country generally, and of individual systems, such as that of Descartes. It is no way to the credit of British thought, and least of all to that of the Scotch metaphysicians, that we have not in our language a history of the Scottish school of philosophy. There are valuable notices of it, it is true, in Dugald Stewart's Historical Dissertation, and in his Eloges of Reid and Adam Smith; but Stewart is far too dignified and general in his style to be able to give an articulate account of the special doctrines of the different masters of the school, or a vivid picture of the times, with many of the marked characteristics of which he had no sympathy. The best history of the Scottish Philosophy is by a Frenchman, and has not been translated into English. We look on "Philosophic Ecossaise," the volume in which M. Cousin treats of the Scottish school, as containing upon the whole the most faultless of all his historical disquisitions. In his other volumes he scarcely does justice to Locke, whom he always judges from the evil consequences which have flowed from his philosophy on the continent, and he is not able to wrestle successfully with the powerful logical intellect of Kant; but he has a thorough appreciation of the excellencies of the Scottish metaphysicians, and, when he finds fault, his criticisms are always worthy of being considered. But it could not be expected of a foreigner, that he should thoroughly comprehend the state of Scotland when its peculiar philosophy arose, nor be able to estimate its relation to the national character; and the account given by M. Cousin is fragmentary, and critical rather than expository.

The Scottish Philosophy possesses a unity, not only in the circumstance that its expounders have been Scotchmen, but also and more specially in its method, its doctrines, and its spirit. It is distinguished by very marked and decided features, which we may represent as determined by the bones rather than the flesh or muscles.

1. It proceeds on the method of observation, professedly and really. In this respect it is different from nearly all the philosophies which went before, from many of those which were contemporary, and from some of those which still linger among us. The method pursued in Eastern countries, in ancient Greece and Rome, in the scholastic times, and in the earlier ages of modern European speculation, had not been that of induction, either avowedly or truly. No doubt, speculators have been obliged in all ages and countries to make some use of facts, in the investigation of both mind and matter. But in the earlier theosophies, physiologies, and philosophies, they looked at the phenomena of nature merely as furnishing a starting-point to their systems, or a corroboration of them; and their inquiries were conducted in the dogmatic, or deductive, or analytic manner,

explaining phenomena by assumed principles, or bringing facts to support theories, or resolving the complexities of the universe by refined mental distinctions. This spirit had been banished from physical science, first, by the great realistic awakening of the sixteenth century; then by the profound wisdom and far-sighted sagacity of Bacon; and, finally, by the discoveries of Newton and the establishment of the Royal Society of London. But it lingered for some ages longer in material science, from which it has not even yet been finally expelled. Bacon had declared, that his method was applicable to all other sciences as well as to the investigation of the material universe. "Does any one doubt (rather than object)," says he, "whether we speak merely of natural philosophy or of other sciences also, such as logics, ethics, politics, as about to be perfected by our method?" "We certainly," he replies, "understand all these things which have been referred to; and like as the vulgar logic, which regulates things by the syllogism, pertains not to the natural but all sciences, so ours, which proceeds by induction, embraces them all. For thus we would form a history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty, and the like, as also examples of civil affairs, not omitting the mental emotions of memory, composition, division, judgment, and the rest, just as we form such of heat and cold, of light, vegetation, and such like." Sir Isaac Newton had said in his Optics: "And if natural philosophy in all its parts, by pursuing this method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of moral philosophy will also be enlarged." But the employment of the method of induction in the study of the human mind was for ages slow, wavering, and uncertain. It has been asserted, that Descartes proceeded on the method of induction; but the statement has been made by metaphysicians who have never correctly apprehended the mode of procedure recommended by Bacon. Descartes does indeed appeal to profound ideas, which may be regarded as mental facts; but it is not by them to arrive at laws by a gradual generalization; it is rather to employ them as foundation-stones of his structure, which is reared high above them by the joint dogmatic and deductive method, and on the geometric and not the inductive plan. It has been averred that Hobbes proceeded on the method of his friend Bacon; but Hobbes nowhere professes to do so: his doctrine of the origin of civil government is a mere theory, and his system of the human mind and of morals is obtained by a very defective analysis, and in fact, is mainly borrowed from Aristotle, whose profounder principles he was incapable of appreciating. It cannot be denied that Locke does proceed very largely in the way of observation; but it is a curious circumstance that he nowhere professes to follow the method of induction; and his great work may be summarily represented as an attempt to establish by internal facts the preconceived theory, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. To the Scottish school belongs the merit of being the first, avowedly and knowingly, to follow the inductive method, and to employ it systematically in psychological investigation. As the masters of the school were the first to adopt it, so they, and those who have borrowed from them, are almost the only persons who have studiously adhered to it. The school of Condillac in France, and its followers in England {4} and Germany, do indeed profess to attend to observation, but it is after the manner of the empiricists, described by Bacon as beginning with experience, but immediately abandoning it for premature hypotheses. It will be seen, as we advance, that Kant followed the critical and not the inductive method. Hutcheson and Turnbull, and especially Reid and Stewart, have the credit of announcing unambiguously, that the human mind is to be studied exclusively by the method of observation, and of consistently employing this mode of procedure in all their investigations.

II. It employs self-consciousness as the instrument of observation. It may thus be distinguished from some other schools with which it has been confounded. Bacon, we have seen, did believe in the applicability of his method to all the mental sciences. But he had no clear apprehension of the

agency by which the observation is to be accomplished; he supposed it to be by " the history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty, the memory, composition, division, judgment, and the like." In respect of the means of observation, philosophy is greatly indebted to Descartes, who taught men, in studying the human mind, to seize on great internal ideas. The questions started by Locke, and his mode of settling them, tend towards the same issue; he dwells fondly on reflection as the alone source of the ideas which we have of the workings of the human mind, and ever appeals to the internal sense as an arbiter in discussions as to the origin of ideas. But the Scottish philosophers took a step in advance of any of their predecessors, inasmuch as they professed to draw all the laws of mental philosophy -- indeed, their whole systems -- from the observations of consciousness.

By this feature they are at once distinguished from those who would construct a science of the human mind from the observation of the brain or nerves, or generally from animal physiology. Not indeed that the Scottish philosophy is required, by its manner or its principles, to reject the investigation of the functions of the bodily frame, as fitted to throw light on mental action. Certain of the masters of the school, such as Reid, Brown, and Hamilton, were well acquainted with physiology in its latest discoveries in their day, and carefully employed their knowledge to illustrate the operations of the human mind. {5} There is nothing in the method, or the spirit, or the cherished doctrines of the school tending to discountenance or disparage a painstaking experimental investigation of the parts of the bodily frame most intimately connected with mental action. Possibly the next great addition may be made to psychology, when internal observation of the thoughts and feelings, and external observation of the brain and nerves and vital forces, are in circumstances to combine their lights. But in the days of the great masters of the Scottish school, physiology was not in a state, nor is it yet in a position, to furnish much aid in explaining mental phenomena. The instrument employed by them was the internal sense; and they always maintained that it is only by it that we can reach an acquaintance with mind proper and its various operations, and that the knowledge acquired otherwise must ever be regarded as subordinate and subsidiary. They might have admitted that the occasion of the production, and the modifications of our mental states, could so far be influenced by the cerebro-spinal mass, or the forces operating in it; but they strenuously maintained that we can know what our perceptions, and judgments, and feelings, and wishes, and resolves, and moral appreciations are, not by the senses or the microscope, not by chemical analysis, or the estimation of the vital forces, but solely through our inward experience revealed by consciousness.

But let us properly understand what the Scottish school intend when they maintain that a science of the human mind can be constructed only by immediate consciousness. They do not mean that the study of the mind can be prosecuted in no other way than by looking in for ever on the stream of thought as it flows on without interruption. The operation of introspection is felt to be irksome in the extreme if continued for any length of time, and will certainly be abandoned when thought is rapid or feeling is intense; and those who trust to it exclusively are apt to fix their attention on a few favorite mental states, and omit many others no less characteristic of the human mind. He who would obtain an adequate and comprehensive view of our complex mental nature must not be satisfied with occasional glances at the workings of his own soul: he must take a survey of the thoughts and feelings of others so far as he can gather them from their deeds and from their words; from the {6} acts of mankind generally, and of individual men, women, and children; from universal language as the expression of human cogitation and sentiment; and from the commerce we hold with our fellow-men by conversation, by writing, or by books. Reid in particular is ever

appealing to men's actions and language, as a proof that there must be certain principles, beliefs, and affections in the mind. Still this evidence ever carries us back to consciousness, as after all both the primary witness and the final judge of appeal; as it is only by it, and by what has passed through our own minds, that we can come to discern and appreciate the feelings of our brother men.[2]

III. By the observations of consciousness, principles are reached which are prior to and independent of experience. This is another grand characteristic of the school, distinguishing it, on the one hand, from empiricism and sensationalism; and, on the other hand, from the dogmatism and *a priori* speculation of all ages and countries. It agrees with the former in holding that we can construct a science of mind only by observation, and out of the facts of experience; but then it separates from them, inasmuch as it resolutely maintains that we can discover principles which are not the product of observation and experience, and which are in the very constitution of the mind, and have there the sanction of the Author of our nature. These are somewhat differently apprehended and described by the masters of the school, some taking a deeper and others a more superficial view of them. Hutcheson calls them senses, and finds them in the very constitution of the mind. Reid designates them principles of common sense, and represents them as being natural, original, and necessary. Stewart characterizes them as fundamental laws of human thought and belief. Brown makes them intuitions simple and original. Hamilton views them under a great many aspects, but seems {7} to contemplate them most frequently and fondly after the manner of Kant, as *a priori* forms or conditions. But whatever minor or major differences there may be in the fulness of their exposition, or in the favorite views which they individually prefer, all who are truly of the Scottish school agree in maintaining that there are laws, principles, or powers in the mind anterior to any reflex observation of them, and acting independently of the philosophers' classification or explanation of them. While the Scottish school thus far agrees with the rational and *a priori* systems, it differs from them most essentially, in refusing to admit any philosophic maxims except such laws or principles as can be shown by self-inspection to be in the very constitution of the mind. It has always looked with doubt, if not suspicion, on all purely abstract and rational discussions, such as that by which Samuel Clarke demonstrated the existence of God; and its adherents have commonly discountenanced or opposed all ambitious *a priori* systems, such as those which were reared in imposing forms in Germany in the end of last, and the beginning of the present, century.

These three characters are found, in a more or less decided form, in the works of the great masters of the school. I am not sure indeed whether they have been formally announced by all, nor whether they have always been consistently followed out. I allow that the relation of the three principles one to another, and their perfect congruity and consistency, have not always been clearly discerned or accurately expressed. In particular, I am convinced that most of the Scottish metaphysicians have not clearly seen how it is that we must ever proceed in mental science by observation, while there are at the same time in the mind laws superior to and independent of observation; how it is that while there are *a priori* principles in the mind, it is yet true that we cannot construct a philosophy by *a priori* speculation. But with these explanations and deductions, it may be maintained that the characters specified are to be found, either announced or acted on, in the pages of all the writers of the school, from Hutcheson to Hamilton. Whenever they are discovered in the works of persons connected with Scotland, the writers are to be placed among the adherents of the school. Wherever there is the total absence of any one of them, we cannot allow the author a place in the fraternity. {8}

The Scottish metaphysicians and moralists have left their impression their own land, not only on the ministers of religion, and through them upon the body of the people, but also on the whole thinking mind of the country. The chairs of mental science in the Scottish colleges have had more influence than any others in germinating thought in the minds of Scottish youth, and in giving a permanent bias and direction to their intellectual growth. We have the express testimony of a succession of illustrious men for more than a century, to the effect that it was Hutcheson, or Smith, or Reid, or Beattie, or Stewart, or Jardine, or Mylne, or Brown, or Chalmers, or Wilson, or Hamilton, who first made them feel that they had a mind, and stimulated them to independent thought. We owe it to the lectures and writings of the professors of mental science, acting always along with the theological training and preaching of the country, that men of ability in Scotland have commonly been more distinguished by their tendency to inward reflection than inclination to sensuous observation. Nor is it to be omitted that the Scottish metaphysicians have written the English language, if not with absolute purity, yet with propriety and taste, -- some of them, indeed, with elegance and eloquence, -- and have thus helped to advance the literary cultivation of the country. All of them have not been men of learning in the technical sense of the term, but they have all been well informed in various branches of knowledge (it is to a Scottish metaphysician we owe the "Wealth of Nations"); several of them have had very accurate scholarship; and the last great man among them was not surpassed in erudition by any scholar of his age. Nor has the influence of the Scottish philosophy been confined to its native soil. The Irish province of Ulster has felt it quite as much as Scotland, in consequence of so many youths from the north of Ireland having been educated at Glasgow University. Though Scotch metaphysics are often spoken of with contempt in the southern part of Great Britain, yet they have had their share in fashioning the thought of England, and, in particular, did much good in preserving it, for two or three ages towards the end of last century and the beginning of this, from falling altogether into low materialistic and utilitarian views; and in this last age Mr. J. S. Mill got some of his views through his father from Hume, Stewart, and Brown, {9} and an active philosophic school at Oxford has built on the foundation laid b Hamilton. The United States of America especially the writers connected with the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches, have felt pleasure in acknowledging-, their obligations to the Scottish thinkers. It is a most interesting circumstance, that when the higher metaphysicians of France undertook, in the beginning of this century, the laborious work of throwing back the tide of materialism, scepticism, and atheism which had swept over the land, they called to their aid the sober and well-grounded philosophy of Scotland. Nor is it an unimportant fact in the history of philosophy, that the great German metaphysician, Emmanuel Kant, was roused, as he acknowledges, from his dogmatic slumbers by the scepticism of David Hume.

But the great merit of the Scottish philosophy lies in the large body of truth which it has -- if not discovered -- at least settled on a foundation which can never be moved. It has added very considerably to our knowledge of the human mind, bringing out to view the characteristics of mental as distinguished from material action; throwing light on perception through the senses; offering valuable observations on the intellectual powers, and on the association of ideas; furnishing, if not ultimate, yet very useful provisional classifications of the mental faculties; unfolding many of the peculiarities of man's moral and emotional nature, of his conscience, and of his taste for the beautiful; resolving many complex mental phenomena into their elements; throwing aside by its independent research a host of traditional errors which had been accumulating for ages; and, above all, establishing certain primary truths as a foundation on which to rear other truths, and as a breakwater to resist the assaults of scepticism.

In comparing it with other schools, we find that the transcendental speculators of Germany have started discussions which they cannot settle, and followed out their principles to extravagant consequences, which are a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole method on which they proceed. Again, the physiologists have failed to furnish any explanation of consciousness, of thought, of moral approbation, or of any other peculiar mental quality. Meanwhile, the philosophy of consciousness has coordinated many facts, ascertained many mental laws, {10} explained many curious phenomena of our inward experience, and established a body of intuitive truths. By its method of careful observation, and by it alone, can the problems agitated in the rival *a priori* schools be solved, so far as they can be solved by the human faculties. Whatever aid physiological research as it advances may furnish to psychology, it must always be by the study, not of the brain, and nerves, and vital forces, but of our conscious operations, that a philosophy of the human mind is to be constructed. Whether the Scottish philosophy is to proceed exclusively in its old method, and go on co-ordinating facts with ever-increasing care, and expressing them with greater and greater precision, or whether it is to borrow from other schools, -- say to resolve in its own way the questions started by Schelling and Hegel, or to call in physiology to account for the rise of mental states, -- it is at least desirable that we should now have a combined view of what has been accomplished by the philosophy of consciousness. This is what is attempted in this work.

It should be freely admitted that the Scottish school has not discovered all truth, nor even all discoverable truth, in philosophy; that it does not pretend to have done so is one of its excellencies, proceeding from the propriety of its method and the modesty of its character. Among the writings of the Scottish school, it is only in those of Sir William Hamilton that we find some of the profoundest problems of philosophy, such as the conditions of human knowledge and the idea of the infinite discussed; and the majority of the genuine adherents of the school are inclined to think that on these subjects his conclusions are too bare and negative, and that he has not reached the full truth. Reid and Stewart are ever telling us that they have obtained only partial glimpses of truth, and that a complete science of the human mind is to be achieved solely by a succession of inquirers prosecuting the investigation through a series of ages. Brown and Hamilton make greater pretensions to success in erecting complete systems, but this is one of the defects of these great men, arising, as we shall see, from their departing from the genuine Scottish method, and adopting, so far, other and continental modes of philosophizing, the one betaking himself to the empirical analysis of the French sensational school, and the other adopting the critical method {11} of Kant; and it is to be said in behalf of Brown, that he never mounts into a re.-lion of cloudy speculation; and in favor of Hamilton, that his most vigorous efforts were employed in showing how little can be known by man. All the great masters of the school not only admit, but are at pains to show, that there are mysteries in the mind of man, and in every department of human speculation, which they cannot clear up. This feature has tempted some to speak of the whole school with contempt, as doing little because attempting little. They have been charged with their country's sin of caution, and the national reproach of poverty has been unsparingly cast upon them. Let them not deny, let them avow, that the charge is just. Let them acknowledge that they have proceeded in time past in the patient method of induction, and announce openly, and without shame, that they mean to do so in time to come. Let it be their claim, that if they have not discovered all truth, they have discovered and settled some truth -- while they have not promulgated much error, or wasted their strength in rearing showy fabrics, admired in one age and taken down the next. It is the true merit of Scotchmen that, without any natural advantages of soil or climate, they have carefully cultivated their land, and made it yield a liberal produce, and that they have been roused to activity, and

stimulated to industry, by their very poverty. Let it, in like manner, be the boast of the Scottish philosophy, that it has made profitable use of the materials at its disposal, and that it has by patience and shrewdness succeeded in establishing a body of fundamental truth, which can never be shaken, but which shall stand as a bulwark in philosophy, morals, and theology, as long as time endures.

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The Scottish Philosophy

James McCosh
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II. STATE OF SCOTLAND.

DURING the seventeenth century, the three kingdoms had passed through a series of political and religious convulsions, and in the opening of the following century the Protestant people were seeking to enjoy and improve the seasonable -- as they reckoned it the providential -- rest which was brought by the Revolution Settlement. The floods had swept over the {12} country, partly to destroy and partly to fertilize, and men are busily employed in removing the evils (as they reckon them) which had been left, and in sowing, planting, and building on the now dry and undisturbed territory. In particular, there is a strong desire on the part of the great body of the people to make the best use of the peace which they now possess, and to employ it to draw forth the material resources of the country. As a consequence of the intellectual stimulus which had been called forth mainly by the previous great contests, and of the liberty achieved, and the industry in active exercise, the riches of the nation are increasing, agriculture begins to make progress, great commercial cities are aggregating, household and social elegance and comfort are sought after and in a great measure secured, refinement of manners is cultivated, and civilization is advancing. In the eager pursuit of these worldly ends, the Generation then springing up scarcely set sufficient value on the higher blessings which had been secured by the struggles of their forefathers. By the profound discussions of the seventeenth century, the great body of the people had been made to read their Bibles, and to inquire into the foundation and functions of political government. By the deeds done, by the sufferings endured, and the principles enunciated, the great questions of civil and religious liberty had been started, and opinions set afloat which were ultimately to settle them theoretically and practically. But the race now reared did not sufficiently appreciate the advantages thence accruing. They were kept from doing so by two impressions left by the terrible battles which had been fought on their soil.

Every one who has read the history of the period knows that a large amount of profligacy had prevailed among certain classes in the latter reigns of the Stuarts. The rampant vice led naturally to religious infidelity, and the two continued to act and react on each other. Self-indulgent men were little inclined to value the truths of spiritual religion, and lent their ears to plausible systems of belief or unbelief which left them undisturbed in their worldly enjoyments; while youths who had broken loose from the old religious trammels were often tempted to break through moral restraints likewise, and to rush into vice, as exhibiting spirit and courage. The great cavalier party, composed largely of the upper classes, and of {13} those who aspired to rise to them, had been all along in the habit of ridiculing the fervor and strictness of the puritan movement, which bad sprung up chiefly among the middle and better portion of the lower classes, and of describing all

who made solemn pretensions to religion as being either knaves or fools. Many of those who had originally brought the charge did not believe it in their hearts, as they had been constrained to respect the great and good qualities of their opponents; but they succeeded in instilling their sentiments into the minds of their children, who were taught to regard it as a mark of a gentleman to swear and to scoff at all religion. From whatever causes it may have proceeded, it is certain that in the first half of the eighteenth century there is a frequent and loud complaint on the part of theologians, both within and beyond the Established Churches, of the rapid increase and wide prevalence of infidelity, and even of secret or avowed atheism.

The struggles of the seventeenth century had left another very deep sentiment. The sects had contended so much about minor points, that now, in the reaction, there was a strong disposition, both among the professedly religious and irreligious, to set little or no value on doctrinal differences, and to turn away with distaste from all disputes among ecclesiastical bodies. The indifference thence ensuing tended, equally with the mistaken zeal of the previous age, to prevent the principles of toleration from being thoroughly carried out. Those who stood up for what were esteemed small peculiarities were reckoned pragmatical and obstinate. Their attempts to secure full liberty of worship and of propagation met with little sympathy, and were supposed to be fitted to bring back needlessly the battles and the sufferings of the previous ages. The two sentiments combined, the desire to have a liberal or a loose creed, and the aversion to the discussion of lesser differences, issued in a result which it is more to our present purpose to contemplate. It led the great thinkers of the age, such as Samuel Clarke, Berkeley, and Butler, to spend their strength, not so much in discussing doctrines disputed among Christians, as in defending religion in general, and in laying a deep foundation on which to rest the essential principles of morality and the eternal truths of religion, natural and revealed. The first age of the eighteenth century, as it was the period {14} in which the first serious attacks were made on Christianity, so it was also the time in which were produced the first great modern defences of religion, natural and supernatural. Men of inferior philosophical breadth, but of eminent literary power, such as Addison, were also employing their gifts and accomplishments and contributing to what they reckoned the same good end, by writing apologies in behalf of religion, and laboring to make it appear amiable, reasonable, and refined. These same causes led preachers of the new school to assume a sort of apologetic air in their discourses, to cultivate a refined language, moulded on the French, and not the old English model, to avoid all extravagance of statement and appeal, to decline doctrinal controversy, and to dwell much on truths, such as the immortality of the soul, common to Christianity and to natural religion, and to enlarge on the loveliness of the Bible morality. The manner and spirit were highly pleasing to many in the upper and refined classes were acceptable to those who disliked earnest religion, as they had nothing of "the offence of the cross;" and were commended by some who valued religion, as it seemed to present piety in so attractive a light to their young men, about whom they were so anxious in those times, and of whom they hoped that they would thus be led to imbibe its elements, and thereby acquire a taste for its higher truths. But all this was powerless on the great body of the people, who were perfectly prepared to believe the preacher when he told them that they were sinners, and that God bad provided a Saviour, but felt little interest in refined apologies in behalf of God and Christ and duty; and they gradually slipped away from a religion and a religious worship which had nothing to interest, because they had nothing to move them. All this was offensive in the extreme to those who had been taught to value a deeper doctrine and a warmer piety. They complained that when they needed food they were presented with flowers; and, discontented with the present state of things, they were praying for a better era.

To complete the picture of the times, it should be added that there was little vital piety among the clergy to counteract the tendency to religious indifference. The appointments to the livings in England and Ireland lay in the hands of the government and the upper classes, who preferred men of refinement {15} and prudence, inclined to political moderation or subserviency, to men of spiritual warmth and religious independence. The Nonconformists themselves felt the somnolent influence creeping over them, after the excitement of the battle in which they had been engaged was over. Their pastors were restrained in their ministrations, and consequently in their activities, by laws which were a plain violation of the principles of toleration, but which, as they did not issue in any overt act of bitter persecution, were not resented with keenness by the higher class of Dissenters, who, to tell the truth, after what they had come through in the previous age, were not much inclined to provoke anew the enmity from which they had suffered, but were rather disposed, provided only their individual convictions were not interfered with, to take advantage of what liberty they had, to proclaim peace with others, and to embrace the opportunities thrown open to them in the -- rowing cities and manufactories, of promoting the temporal interests of themselves and their families. In these circumstances, the younger ministers were often allured (as Butler was) to go over to the Established Church; and those who remained were infected with the spirit which prevailed around them, and sought to appear as elegant and as liberal as the clergy of the church, who were beginning to steal from them the more genteel portion of the younger members of their flocks. The design of those who favored this movement was no doubt to make religion attractive and respected. The result did not realize the expectation. The upper classes were certainly not scandalized by a religion which was so inoffensive, but they never thought of heartily embracing what they knew had no earnestness; and, paying only a distant and respectful obeisance to religion in the general, they gave themselves up to the fashion. able vices, or, at best, practised only the fashionable moralities of their times. The common people, little cared for by the clergy, and caring nothing for the refined emptiness presented to them instead of a living religion, went through their daily toils with diligence, but in most districts, both of town and country, viewed religion with indifference, and relieved their manual labor with low indulgences. England is rapidly growing in wealth and civilization, and even in industry, mainly from the intellectual stimulus imparted by moral causes acting in the {16} previous ages; but it is fast descending to the most unbelieving, condition to which it has ever been reduced. From this state of religious apathy it is roused, so far as the masses of the people are concerned, in the next age, and ere the life had altogether died out, by the trumpet voices of Whitfield and Wesley. It was in a later age, and after the earthquake convulsions of the French Revolution had shaken society to its foundation, that the upper classes were made to know and feel that when " the salt has lost its savor," it is good for nothing but to be cast out and trodden under foot of men, and that a dead religion is of no use either to rich or poor, either for political ends or for personal comfort.

An analogous, but by no means identical, process begins and goes on, and is consummated in Scotland about half an age or an age later in point of time. All throughout the seventeenth century, Scotland, like England, had been ploughed by religious contests. But the penetrating observer notices a difference between the shape taken by the struggle in the two countries. In England, the war had been a purely internal one between opposing principles, the prelatic and puritan; whereas, in Scotland, the battle had been mainly against an external foe, that is, an English power, which sought to impose a prelatic church on the people contrary to their wishes. Again, in England the contest had been against an ecclesiastical power, which sought to crush civil liberty; whereas, in Scotland, the power of the Church of Scotland had been exerted in behalf of the people, and

against a foreign domination. This difference in the struggle was followed by a difference in the state of feeling resulting when the contest was terminated by the accession of William and Mary.

The great body of the people, at least in the Lowlands, acquiesced in the Revolution Settlement, and clung round the Government and the Presbyterian Church as by law established. But there soon arose antagonisms, which, though they did not break out into open wars, as in the previous century, did yet range the country into sections and parties with widely differing sympathies and aims. In fact, Scotland was quite as much divided in opinion and sentiment in the eighteenth, as it ever was in the seventeenth century. In saying so, I do not refer to the strong prelatic feeling which existed all over the north {17} east coast of Scotland, or to the attachment to the house of Stuart which prevailed in the Highlands, -- for these, though they led to the uprisings of 1715 and 1745, were only the backward beatings of the retreating tide, -- but to other and stronger currents which have been flowing and coming into more or less violent collision with one another from that day till ours.

At the close of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century, the Church of Scotland was composed of a somewhat heterogeneous mixture of covenanting ministers, who had lived in the times of persecution; of prelatic clergy whose convictions in favor of Episcopacy were not sufficiently deep to induce them to abandon their livings, and to suffer the annoyances and persecutions to which the more sincere non jurors were exposed and of a race of young men zealous for the Presbyterian establishment, but "only half educated and superficially accomplished." The conforming "curates" were commonly indifferent to religion of every kind, and it was hoped that they would soon die out, and that the heritors and elders, with whom the election of pastors lay, would fill the churches with a learned and zealous ministry. But, in 1711, the Jacobite government of Queen Anne took the power of election from the parish authorities, and vested it in the ancient patrons, being the Crown for above five hundred and fifty livings, and noblemen, gentlemen of landed property, and town-councils, for the remaining four hundred.[3] The effect of this new law became visible in the course of years, in the appointment of persons to the churches who, for good reasons or bad, were acceptable to the government of the day, or were able to secure the favor of the private patrons. Forced upon the people in the first instance, there was a public feeling ready to gather round this law of patronage. From bad motives and from good -- like those which we have traced in England -- there was a desire among the upper, and a portion of the middle and educated, classes to have a clergy suited to the new age which had come in. As the result, there was formed a type of ministers which has continued till nearly our time in Scotland, called "New light" by the people, and designating themselves " moderates," as claiming the virtue of being moderate in all things, though, as Witherspoon charges {18} them, they became very immoderate for moderation, when they rose to be the dominant party. Most of them refrained in their preaching from uttering a very decided sound on disputed doctrinal points; some of them were suspected of Arianism or Socinianism, which, however, they kept to themselves out of respect for, or fear of, the Confession of Faith, which they had sworn to adhere to; the more highly educated of them cultivated a refinement and elegance of diction, and dwelt much on the truths common to both natural and revealed religion; and all of them were fond of depicting the high morality of the New Testament, and of recommending the example of Jesus. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that this style of preaching did not gain, as it did not warm, the hearts of the common people, who either became callous to all religion, without any zealous efforts being made to stir them up, or longed and prayed for a better state of things. The enforcement of the law of patronage, and the settlement of ministers against the wishes of the people, led to the separation of

the Erskines and the Secession Body in 1733, and of Gillespie and the Relief Body in 1753. In the Established Church there still remained a number of men of evangelical views and popular sympathies, such as Willison and Boston, who hoped that they might stem and ultimately turn the tide which was for the time against them. The boast of the moderate party was, that they were introducing into Scotland a greater liberality of sentiment on religious topics, and a greater refinement of taste. The charge against them is, that they abandoned the peculiar doctrines of the gospel, that they could not draw towards them the affections of the people who, in rural districts, sank into a stupid ignorance of religious truth, and, in the crowded lanes of the rising cities, into utter ungodliness and criminality, -- except, indeed, in so far as they were drawn out by the rapidly increasing dissenters, or by the evangelical minority within the Established Church. The collisions of the century took various forms. After the Union with England, dancing assemblies, theatres, and wandering players (with Allan Ramsay to patronize them), dancing on the tight-rope, cock-fighting, gambling, and horse-racing make their appearance, and receive considerable countenance and patronage from various classes, upper and lower; while {19} ineffectual attempts are made to put them down by civil penalties inflicted by burgher magistrates, and by public ecclesiastical censures, which the zealous clergy rigidly enforce, but which the new-light clergy are anxious to relax. In the turmoil of opinions which sprang up in this new state of things, there are rumors of deism, and even of atheism, being secretly entertained or openly avowed, and of the establishment here and there, in town and country, of " hell-fire clubs," where bold men met to discuss new opinions, and even, it is said, to act mock ceremonies, intended to ridicule the sacraments, and all that is awful in religion. Worse than all, and without being Much noticed, or meeting with much opposition on the part of the clergy of either party, there is the commencement of those drinking customs, which have ever since exercised so prejudicial an influence on the Scottish character.

If we look to the common people in the first quarter of the century, we find them in a state of great rudeness in respect of the comforts and elegancies of life. In the Highlands, they are scarcely removed above the lowest state of barbarism; and in the borders between the Highlands and Lowlands, the Celts are lifting cattle and exacting black-mail from the Lowlanders. Even in the more favored districts in the south of Scotland, the ground is unfenced; roads are very rare; and goods are carried on the backs of horses. The clothing of the people in the same region is of undyed black and white plaiding, and neither men nor women have shoes or stockings. Their ordinary food is oatmeal, pease, or beer, with kail groats and milk, and they rarely partake of flesh meat. The houses have only the bare ground as floors, with a fireplace in the midst, and the smoke escaping out of a hole in the roof, and with seats and the very beds of turf; even in the dwellings of the farmers there are seldom more than two apartments; not unfrequently, however, in the south-west of Scotland, there is in addition a closet, to which the head of the house would retire at set times for devotion. Superstitious beliefs are still entertained in all ranks of life, and are only beginning to disappear among the educated classes. In the Highlands and Islands, second-sight is as firmly believed by the chieftain as by the clansmen. In the Lowlands, mysterious diseases, arising from a deranged nervous {20} system, are ascribed to demoniacal possessions; and witches, supposed to have sold themselves to the Evil One, and accomplishing his purposes in inflicting direful evils on the persons and properties of neighbors, are being punished by the magistrates, who are always incited on by the people, and often by the more zealous ministers of religion. Toleration is not understood or acknowledged by any of the great parties, political or religious.

What, it may be asked, is there in the condition of this people fitted to raise any hope that they are

ever to occupy a high place among the nations of the earth? I am sure that a worldly-minded traveller, or an admirer of mere refinement and art, in visiting the country at those times, and comparing it with France or Italy, would have discovered nothing in it to lead him to think that it was to have a glorious future before it. But a deeper and more spiritually-minded observer might have discovered already the seeds of its coming intelligence and love of freedom: -- in the schools and colleges planted throughout the land in the love of education instilled into the minds of the people and, above all, in their acquaintance with the Bible, and in their determined adherence to what they believed to be the truth of God.[4]

Before the first age of the century has passed, there are unmistakable signs of industrial and intellectual activity. The Union has connected the upper classes with the metropolis and the Court of England, from which they are receiving a new refinement and some mental stimulus. The middle classes, and even the lower orders, are obtaining instruction from a very different quarter, from their parochial schools and churches, {21} from their burgh academies and their universities. The towns are hastening to take advantage of the new channels of trade and commerce; manufactures are springing up in various places, and already there is a considerable trading intercourse between the west of Scotland and America. The proprietors of the soil, in need of money to support their English life and to buy luxuries, are beginning to subdivide and enclose their lands, and to grant better dwellings and leases to their tenantry, who, being thereby placed in circumstances fitted to encourage and reward industry, are prepared to reclaim waste lands, to manure their grounds, to improve their stock of sheep and cattle, and introduce improved agricultural implements.

This imperfect sketch may help the reader to comprehend the circumstances in which the Scottish philosophy sprang up and grew to maturity, and the part which its expounders acted in the national history. It could have appeared only in a time of peace and temporal prosperity, but there had been a preparation for it in the prior struggles. The stream which had risen in a higher region, and long pursued its course in ruggedness, -- like the rivers of the country, -- is now flowing through more level ground, and raising up plenty on its banks. It is a collegiate, and therefore a somewhat isolated, element among the agencies which were forming the national character and directing the national destiny; but it had its sphere. Through the students at the universities, it fostered a taste for literature and art; it promoted a spirit of toleration, and softened the national asperities in religious and other discussions; it is identified with the liberalism of Scotland, and through Adam Smith, D. Stewart, Mackintosh, Horner, Brougham, Jeffrey, Sydney Smith, Lord John Russell, and Palmerston, with the liberalism of the three kingdoms; and, above all, it has trained the educated portion of the inhabitants of North Britain to habits of reflection and of independent thought. The Scottish metaphysicians, with the exception of Chalmers, have never identified themselves very deeply with the more earnest spiritual life of the country; but they defended the fundamental truths of natural religion, and they ever spoke respectfully of the Bible. The Scottish philosophy, so far as it is a co-ordination of the facts of consciousness, never can be antagonistic to a true theology; I believe indeed it may help to establish some {22} of the vital truths of religion, by means, for instance, of the moral faculty, the existence of which has been so resolutely maintained by the Scottish school. Some of the moderate clergy did at times preach the Scottish moral philosophy instead of scriptural truth; but they did so in opposition to the counsel of the metaphysicians, at least of Hutcheson, who recommended his students to avoid the discussion of philosophic topics in the pulpit. Some of those who have been the most influential expounders of the Scottish theology, such as Chalmers and Welsh, have also been supporters of the Scottish

philosophy, and have drawn from its established doctrines arguments in favor of evangelical religion.

The Scottish Philosophy

James McCosh
1875

III. -- PRECURSORS OF THE SCHOOL.

IN the Libraries of some of the Scotch Colleges are collected a number of the theses which had been defended in the Scottish Universities in the seventeenth century. These seem to fall under the heads of Theses Logicae, Theses Ethicae, Theses Physicae, Theses Sphericae. Aristotle still rules both in logic and ethics. In logic, there is much abstract enunciation, and there are many acute distinctions in regard to Ens and unity, singulars and universals; and in ethics, the discussions are about virtue and vice, and choice. In physics, there are rational and deductive investigations of the nature of motion and resistance. During the century, the courses of study differ somewhat in the different universities, but still there is a general correspondence. In the course of Philosophy the Regents use Aristotle *De Anima*, Porphyry's Introduction, the Categories of Aristotle, the Dialectics of Ramus, and the Rhetoric of Vossius, with the works of such writers as Crassotus, Reas, Burgersdicius, Ariaga, Oviedo, &c. The ethics include politics and economics, and there are discussions about the nature of habits. It is scarcely necessary to say that all topics are treated in a logical and rational, and not in an observational, manner and spirit.

The Parliamentary Commission for visiting the universities, appointed in 1690, and following years, directed, in 1695, the {23} professors of philosophy in St. Andrews to prepare the heads of a system of logic, and the corresponding professors in Edinburgh to prepare a course of metaphysics. The compends drawn up in consequence were passed from one college to another for revision there is no evidence that they were finally sanctioned, but they may be accepted as giving a fair idea of the instructions in philosophy conveyed in the universities of Scotland at the close of the eighteenth century, -- at the very time when Locke's Essay was finding its way so rapidly over the three kingdoms.[5] Logic is called the instrument to acquire other sciences, inasmuch as it prescribes rules for rightly apprehending, judging, and arguing. It is said to be defined by others as the science which directs the operations of the mind for finding out truth in every other science. It is represented as treating of the three operations of apprehension, judgment, and discourse, to which some add a fourth part, on method, under which analysis and synthesis are explained. In all this there is nothing but the commonplace of by-gone ages. But in this same text-book of logic we have the distinction drawn in the Port Royal Logic, between the extension and comprehension of the notion, adopted and stated. "We must distinguish betwixt the extension and comprehension of an idea. All the essential attributes of an idea are called its comprehension, as being, substance, vegetative, sensitive, and rational are the comprehension of man; but Peter, Paul, &c., contained under man, are called the extent of man." It can be shown that this distinction comes down in an unbroken historical chain in Glasgow to Sir W. Hamilton, who has so profitably amplified and

applied it. It is found in the Introduction to Logic by Carmichael, and in the Logical Compend of Hutcheson; and the latter continued to be used in Glasgow till towards the time when Hamilton was a student there. Metaphysics are said to be defined by some, as a science of being as being; by others as a speculative science, which considers being in general, and its properties and kinds, as abstracted from matter. The benefits arising from the study of metaphysics are said to be, that treating of undoubted truths and axioms, we are enabled by their assistance the better to discover truths generally, and avoid errors; that as dividing {24} beings into classes it keeps us from confusion; that giving general names to common and abstracted beings, it aids the understanding in every kind of learning, and specially in theology, in which use is made of metaphysical terms. The first part of metaphysics treats of the principles of being, and of the various species of beings. The second part treats of the properties of being, such as unity, verity, goodness; and under this head we have abstract discussions as to the finite and infinite, the necessary and contingent, the absolute and relative, cause and effect, means and end, substance and quality. Such was the pabulum on which college youths fed during the century. This was the learning which helped to sharpen the intellects of such men as Henderson, Rutherford, Leighton, Gillespie, Baillie, Dickson, Burnet (Bishop), Stair (Lord), and Carstairs, who acted so important a part in the affairs of their country.

But in order to appreciate fully the philosophic tastes and capacities of Scotchmen, we must follow them into France. From a very old date, certainly from the thirteenth century, there had been a close connection between that country and Scotland, arising from the jealousy entertained by both nations of the power and ambition of England. The Scottish youth who had a love of adventure, or a thirst for military glory, had a splendid opening provided for them in the Scottish Guard, which protected the person of the king of France, while those who had a taste for letters found means of instruction and employment in the numerous French colleges.[6] The Scotch scholars who returned to their own land brought back the French learning with them. Bishop Elphinston, who was the founder, and Hector Boece, who was the first principal of King's College, Aberdeen, had both taught in the University of Paris; and they set up the Scottish University on the model of the French one. John Major or Mair, who taught scholastic theology in Glasgow and St. Andrews, and who was the preceptor of Knox and Buchanan, had been for some time in the University of Paris. During the sixteenth, and the early part of the seventeenth century, there was a perpetual stream of Scottish scholars flowing into France. Some of these were Catholics, {25} to whom toleration was denied at home, and who betook themselves to a country where they had scope for the free exercise of their gifts. But quite as many were Protestants, who finding (as Scotchmen in later ages have done) their own land too narrow, or thirsting for farther knowledge or learned employment, connected themselves with one or other of the reformed colleges of Saumur, Montauban, Sedan, Montpellier, and Nismes, where some of them remained all their lives, while others returned to their own country. Some of these emigrants were lawyers or physicians; but by far the greater number of them were devoted to literature, philosophy, or theology. George Buchanan, Thomas Ricalton, three Blackwoods, Thomas Dempster, two Barclays, Andrew Melville, John Cameron, Walter Donaldson, and William Chalmers are only a few of the Scotchmen who occupied important offices in France. Two deserve to be specially named, as they wrote able logical works, -- the one, Robert Balfour, a Catholic, and Principal of Guienne College, Bourdeaux, and an erudite commentator on Aristotle; and the other, Mark Duncan, a Protestant, and Principal of the University of Saumur, and author of Institutes of Logic. There must have been some reality as the ground of the extravagant statement of Sir Thomas Urquhart in his "Discovery of a Most

Exquisite jewel," that "the most of the Scottish nation, never having restricted themselves so much to the propriety of words as to the knowledge of things, where there was one preceptor of languages among them, there was above forty professors of philosophy." "The French conceived the Scots to have above all nations in matter of their subtlety in philosophical disputations, that there have not been till of late for these several years together any lord, gentleman, or other in all that country, who, being desirous to have his son instructed in the principles of philosophy, would entrust him to the discipline of any other than a Scottish master." He adds, that "if a Frenchman entered into competition, a Scotchman would be preferred."

By such teaching at home, and by such foreign intercourse, a considerable amount of narrow but intense intellectual life was produced and fostered in Scotland. But youths were beginning to feel that the air was too close, too confined, and too monastic for them, and were longing for greater freedom and {26} expansion. While Aristotle and the scholastic method still hold their place in the cloisters of the colleges, there is a more bracing atmosphere in the regions without and beyond; and this is now to rush into Scotland. From the time of the revival of letters in the sixteenth century, almost every great and original thinker had thought it necessary to protest against the authority of Aristotle and the schoolmen. Bacon left Cambridge with a thorough contempt for the scholastic studies pursued there; and the grand end aimed at in his "Novum Organum," was to carry away men's regards from words and notions, to which they had paid too exclusive attention, and to fix them on things. In respect of a disposition to rebel against Aristotle and the schoolmen, Descartes was of the same spirit as Bacon; and Gassendi and Hobbes agreed with Descartes, with whom they differed in almost every thing else. It would be easy to produce a succession of strong testimonies against the Stagyrite and the Mediaevals, spread over the whole of the seventeenth century. The rising sentiment is graphically expressed by Glanvil in his "Scepsis Scientifica," published in 1665. He declares that the " ingenious world is grown quite weary of qualities and forms-," he declaims against "dry spinosities, lean notions, endless altercations about things of nothing; " and he recommends a " knowledge of nature, without which our hypotheses are but dreams and romances, and our science mere conjecture and opinion; for, while we have schemes of things without consulting the phenomena, we do but build in the air, and describe an imaginary world of our own making, that is but little akin to the real one that God made."

The realistic reaction took two different but not totally divergent directions in the seventeenth century, and both the streams reached Scotland in the following century. In the works of Grotius and Puffendorf, an elaborate attempt was made to determine the laws of nature in regard to man's political and social conditions, and apply the same to the examination and rectification of national and international laws. This was thought by many to be a more profitable and promising theme than the perpetual discussion of the nature of being and universals. This school had undoubtedly its influence in Scotland, where Carmichael, in 1718, edited and annotated Puffendorf, {27} and where Hutcheson, and Hume, and A. Smith, and Ferguson, and D. Stewart, combined juridical and political with moral inquiries, and became the most influential writers of the century on all questions of what has since been called social science.

But a stronger and deeper current was setting in about the same time,-a determination to have the experimental mode of investigation applied to every department of knowledge. This method had already been applied to physical science with brilliant results. And now there was a strong desire felt to have the new manner adopted in the investigation of the human mind. In 1670, John Locke and five or six friends are conversing in his chamber in Oxford on a knotty topic, and quickly they find themselves at a stand; and it occurred to Locke that, before entering " on inquiries of that

nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with." He pondered and wrote on this subject for twenty years, at the close of which (in 1690) he published his immortal " Essay on the Human Understanding." In this work he would banish for ever those innate ideas which had offered such obstacles to the progress of thought; and, by an inquiry into the actual operations of the human mind, he would trace the ways in which mankind attain ideas and knowledge, and settle the bounds imposed on the human understanding. Locke's Essay was hailed with acclamation by all who were wearied of the old scholastic abstractions and distinctions, and who had caught the new spirit that was abroad.

Still Locke's Essay was not allowed to take possession of the thinking minds of the country without a vigorous opposition. Locke was met in his own day by Stillingfleet, the Bishop of Worcester, who argued resolutely that the view given in the Essay of our idea of substance was not sufficiently deep to enable it to bear up the great truths of religion, especially the doctrine of the Trinity. The great Leibnitz severely blamed Locke for overlooking necessary truth, and reviewed his work, 'book by book and chapter by chapter, in his "Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain; " which, however, in consequence of Locke's death taking place in the mean time, was not published for many years after. It was felt by many otherwise {28} favorable to the new spirit, that Locke had not laid a sufficiently deep foundation for morality in his account of our idea of virtue, which he derived from mere sensations of pleasure and pain, with the law of God superadded in utter inconsistency with his theory. There were still in England adherents of the great English moralists, More and Cudworth, who had opposed Hobbes with learning and ability; and these maintained that there was need of deeper principles than those laid down by Locke to oppose the all-devouring pantheistic fatalism of Spinoza on the one hand, and the rising materialistic spirit on the other.

In the early part of the eighteenth century, there appeared several works which were not conceived at least wholly in the spirit of Locke. I do not refer to such works as Norris's "Ideal World," in which we have an able defence of the Aristotelian analysis of reasoning, and an exposition of Platonism, more ideal far than that presented in Plato's own dialectic; nor to Collier's "Clavis," "being a demonstration of the non-existence or impossibility of an external world:" I allude to works which left a far deeper impression on their age. Samuel Clarke, with vast erudition and great logical power, was establishing, in a mathematical manner, the existence and attributes of God, giving virtue a place among the eternal relations of things perceived by reason, and defending the doctrine of human freedom and responsibility against those who were reducing men to the condition of brutes or machines. Berkeley did adopt the theory of Locke as to the mind being percipient only of ideas, but the view which he took of human knowledge was very different; for while Locke, consistently or inconsistently, was a sober realist, Berkeley labored to show that there was no substantial reality except spirit, and thought in this way to arrest the swelling tide of materialism and scepticism. A more accurate thinker than either, Bishop Butler, was establishing the supremacy of conscience, and showing that there was a moral government in the world; and that revealed religion was suited to the constitution of the mind, and to the position in which man is placed.

It was while philosophic thought was in this state that the Scottish Philosophy sprang up. The Scottish metaphysicians largely imbibed the spirit of Locke; all of them speak of him {29} with profound respect; and they never differ from him without expressing a regret or offering an apology. Still the Scottish school never adopted the full theory of Locke; on the contrary, they opposed it in some of its most essential points; and this while they never gave in to the mathematical method of Clarke, and while they opposed the ingenuities of Berkeley. Hutcheson,

the founder of the Scottish school, was a rather earlier author than Butler, to whom therefore he was not indebted for the peculiarities of his method and system. But there was a writer to whom both Butler and Hutcheson, and the early Scottish school generally, were under deeper obligation than to any other author, or all other authors, and who deserves in consequence a more special notice.

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The Scottish Philosophy

James McCosh

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IV. -- SHAFTESBURY.

THE author who exercised the most influence on the earlier philosophic school of Scotland was not Locke, but Lord Shaftesbury (born 1671, died 1713), the grandson of the Lord Chancellor Shaftesbury, who bad been the friend of Locke. " Peace," says he, " be with the soul of that charitable and courteous author, who, for the common benefit of his fellow-authors, introduced the way of miscellaneous writing." He follows this miscellaneous method. The pieces which were afterwards combined in his " Characteristics of Men, Manners, and Times," were written at various times, from I 707 to 1712. They consist of a " Letter Concerning Enthusiasm," " Sensus Communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor," " Soliloquy, or, Advice to an Author," "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit," "The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody," "Miscellaneous Reflections on the said Treatises, and other Critical Subjects," "A Notion of the Historical Draught or Tablature of the judgment of Hercules, with a Letter concerning Design." He tells us that the miscellaneous manner was in the highest esteem in his day, that the old plan of subdividing into firsts and seconds had grown out of fashion, and that the " elegant court divine exhorts in miscellany, and is ashamed to bring his {30} twos and threes before a fashionable assembly." " Ragouts and fricassees are the reigning dishes; so authors, in order to become fashionable, have run into the more savory way of learned ragout and medley." His style is evidently after the French, and not the old English, model. It has the jaunty air of one who affects to be a man of elegance and fashion. Undoubtedly he was extensively read in the Greek and Roman philosophy, especially in Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and the Roman Stoics, and he has many just and profound views, but these are ever made to appear as the ornaments of a modern nobleman, who studies philosophy as an accomplishment.

His " Characteristics" open with remarks on " Enthusiasm," and on " Wit and Humor." He tells us that "vapors naturally rise," and he would dispel them by ridicule. " The melancholy way of treating religion is that which, according to my apprehension, renders it so tragical, and is the occasion of its acting in reality such dismal tragedies in the world." He would " recommend wisdom and virtue in the way of pleasantry and mirth," and tells us that " good-humor is not only the best security against enthusiasm, but the best foundation of piety and true religion." It does not appear very clearly what is the nature of the piety and religion which he would recommend. Sometimes he seems to scoff at the Scriptures, and at all their spiritual verities and holy mysteries; at other times he would make it appear as if he wished to be thought a believer in Christianity. There is, I suspect, much of latent levity in the profession he makes: " We may in a proper sense be said faithfully and dutifully to embrace those holy mysteries even in their minutest particulars, and

without the least exception on account of their amazing depth," " being," he adds, " fully assured of our own steady orthodoxy, resignation, and entire submission to the truly Christian and catholic doctrines of our holy church, as by law established."

But he reckons these pleasantries merely as an introduction to graver subjects. He has largely caught the spirit of Locke, but he by no means follows him, especially in his rejection of innate ideas. "No one," says he, "has done more than Locke towards recalling of true philosophy from barbarity into the use and practice of the world, and into the company of the better and politer sort, who might well be ashamed of it in its {31} other dress. No one has opened a better and clearer way to reason." But he qualifies his praise. "'Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue Out Of the world, and made the ideas of these, which are the same with those of God, unnatural, and without foundation in our minds. *Innate* is a word he poorly plays upon: the right word, though less used, is *connatural*." He shows that there are many of our mental qualities natural to us. " Life, and the sensations which accompany life, come when they will, are from mere nature and nothing else. Therefore, if you dislike the word innate, let us change it, if you will, for instinct, and call instinct that which nature teaches, exclusive of art, culture, or discipline." Beginning with these lower affections, he goes on to show that preconceptions of a higher kind have place in human kind, preconceptions' of the 'fair and beautiful.'"[7]

He reviews the famous argument of Descartes, " We think, therefore we are." "Nothing more certain: for the Ego or I being established in the first part of the proposition, the Ergo, no doubt, must hold it good in the latter." "For my own part," he adds, "I take my being upon trust" He everywhere appeals to the "Sensus Communis," or Common Sense. His general doctrine is thus expressed: "Some moral and philosophical truths there are withal so evident in themselves, that it would be easier to imagine half mankind to have run mad, and joined precisely in one and the same species of folly, than to admit any thing as truth which should be advanced against such *natural knowledge, fundamental reason, and common sense*."[8] He allows that what is natural to us may require labor and pains to bring it out. " Whatever materials or principles of this kind we may possibly bring with us, whatever good faculties, senses, or anticipating sensations and imaginations may be of nature's growth, and arise properly of themselves without our art, promotion, or assistance, the general *idea* which is formed of all this management, and the clear notion we attain of what is preferable and principal in all these subjects of choice and estimation, will not, as I imagine, by any person be taken for {32} *innate*. Use, practice, and culture must precede the under standing and wit of such an advanced size and growth as this." These surely are the very views which were developed more fully and articulately by Reid, in his opposition to the scepticism of Hume. The object of his works is to carry out these principles to taste and morals. "Nor do I ask more when I undertake to prove the reality of virtue and morals. If I be certain that I am, it is certain and demonstrable who and what I should be." Should one who had the countenance of a gentleman ask me why I would avoid being nasty when nobody was present?' in the first place, I should be fully satisfied that he himself was a very nasty gentleman who could ask this question, and that it would be a hard matter for me to make him ever conceive what true cleanliness was. However, I might, notwithstanding this, be contented to give him a slight answer, and say, I It was because I had a nose.' Should he trouble me further, and ask again, 'What if I had a cold? or what if naturally I had no such nice smell?' I might answer perhaps, 'That I cared as little to see myself nasty as that others should see me in that condition.' I But what if it were in the dark?' 'Why, even then, though I had neither nose nor eyes, my *sense* of the matter would still be

the same: my nature would rise at the thought of what was sordid."' He thus reaches a sense of beauty. "Much in the same manner have I heard it asked, 'Why should a man be honest in the dark?"' The answer to this question brings him to a moral sense.

He speaks of nature in general, and human nature in particular, as an " economy," and as having a "constitution" and a "frame." In examining the nature of the soul, he finds (1) self-affections, which lead only to " the good of the private." He enumerates, as belonging to this class, ,love of life, resentment of injury, pleasure, or appetite towards nourishment and the means of generation; interest, or the desire of those conveniences by which we are well provided for or maintained; emulation, or love of praise and honor; indolence, or love of ease and rest." But he finds also (2) natural affections, which lead to the good of the public. He takes great pains to establish the existence of disinterested affections, and opposes the views of those who, like Rochefoucauld, would resolve all human action {33} into a refined selfishness. Referring to the common saying, that interest governs the world, he remarks shrewdly: " Whoever looks narrowly into the affairs of it, will find that passion, humor, caprice, zeal, faction, and a thousand other springs which are counter to self-interest, have as considerable a part in the movements of this machine. There are more wheels and counterpoises in this engine than are easily imagined." With such affections, " man is naturally social, and society is natural to him;" and in illustrating this position, he sets himself vigorously against the social theory of Hobbes, who represents the original state of man as one of war. Virtue consists in the proper exercise of these two classes of affections. Vice arises when the public affections are weak and deficient, when the private affections are too strong, or affections spring up which do not tend to the support of the public or private system. He shows that virtue, as consisting in these affections, is natural to man, and that he who practises it is obeying the ancient Stoic maxim, and living according to nature. The virtues which he recommends fall far beneath the stern standard of the Stoics, and leave out all the peculiar graces of Christianity: they consist of, -- "a mind subordinate to reason, a temper humanized and fitted to all natural affection, an exercise of friendship uninterrupted, thorough candor, benignity, and good-nature, with constant security, tranquillity, equanimity."

He would establish a morality on grounds independent of religion. "Whoever thinks that there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is just and good, must suppose that there is, independently, such a thing as justice, truth, and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true." " If virtue be not really estimable in itself, I can see nothing estimable in following it for the sake of a bargain; " and he complains of those who " speak so much of the rewards and punishments, and so little of the worth or value of the thing itself." He remarks very justly: " By building a future state on the ruins of virtue, religion in general, and the cause of a deity, is betrayed; and by making rewards and punishments the principal motives to duty, the Christian religion in particular is overthrown, and its greatest principle, that of love, rejected and exposed." He admits, how {34} ever, that a good God, as a model, has an effect on our views of morals and conduct; and allows that "fear of future punishment and hope of future reward, how mercenary and servile however it may be accounted, is yet, in many circumstances, a great advantage, security, and support to virtue."

Such is his view of the nature of virtue. But Shaftesbury is quite aware that the question of the character of the virtuous act is not the same as that of the mental faculty which looks at it and appreciates it. This faculty he represents as being of the nature of a sense. Locke had allowed the existence of two senses, an external and an internal; and had labored in vain to derive all men's ideas from these two sources. Hutcheson, perceiving that the inlets to the mind were too few

according to the theory of Locke, calls in other senses. These senses become very numerous in the systems of some of the Scottish metaphysicians, such as Gerard. In the writings of Shaftesbury, two occupy an important place, -- the sense of beauty and the moral sense.

"No sooner," he says, "does the eye open upon figures, the ear to sounds, than straight the Beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them as soon discerned as felt), than straight an *inward* eye distinguishes and sees the *fair* and *shapely*, the *amiable* and *admirable*, apart from the *deformed*, the *foul*, the *odious*, or the *despicable*." Though in all this advancing quite beyond the "Essay on the Human Understanding," yet he seems to be anxious to connect his view of the moral sense with the reflection or inward sense of Locke. "In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of the affections, but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards these very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike." Conscience is represented by him "as the reflection in the mind of any unjust action or behavior, which he knows to be naturally odious and ill-deserving. {35} No creature can maliciously and intentionally do ill, without being sensible, at the same time, that he deserves ill. And in this respect, every sensible creature may be said to have a conscience."[9]

He has evidently been smitten with some of the Platonic views of beauty. "We have," he says, "a sense of order and proportion; and having, a sensation, reason can give this account of it, that whatever things have order, the same have unity of design and concur in one, are parts constituent of one whole, or are in themselves one system. Such is a tree with all its branches, an animal with all its members, an edifice with all exterior and interior ornaments." He is fond of connecting or identifying the beautiful and the good; in fact, virtue is represented by him as a higher kind of beauty. "It is, I must own, on certain relations or respective proportions, that all natural affection does in some measure depend." "The same numbers, harmony, and proportions have a place in morals." He evidently clings fondly to the idea that " beauty and good are one and the same."

We have given so full an account of the philosophy of Shaftesbury, because of the influence which it exercised on the Scottish Philosophy. Francis Hutcheson did little more than expound these views, with less versatility, but in a more equable, thorough, and systematic manner. Turnbull, who founded the Aberdeen branch of the school, and influenced greatly the mind of Reid, avowedly drew largely from Hutcheson in his theories of taste and virtue. Reid and Beattie got their favorite phrase, " common sense," I have no doubt, directly or indirectly from the treatise so entitled in the " Characteristics." Hume was evidently well acquainted with the writings of {36} Shaftesbury; and I am inclined to think that they may have helped to form his style, and to suggest some of his essays. We have an anticipation of the spirit of Hume in the miscellany entitled, " Philocles to Palemon:" "You know that in this Academic Philosophy I am to present you with, there is a certain way of questioning and doubting, which in no way suits the genius of our age. Men love to take party instantly. They can't bear being kept in suspense. The examination torments them." Theocles observes, that "if there be so much disorder in the present state of things, he would not be disposed to think better of the future." Lord Monboddo declares that " Shaftesbury's Inquiry is the best book in English on the subject of morals." His Draught or Tablature of the judgment of Hercules, and his Disquisitions on Taste, originated the theories of

Beauty which formed an essential part of Scottish metaphysics for more than a century.

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James McCosh
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V. -- GERSHOM CARMICHAEL.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON says that Gershom Carmichael "may be regarded, on good grounds, as the real founder of the Scottish school of philosophy." ("Reid's Works," P. 30.) I am disposed to retain the honor for Francis Hutcheson, to whom it is usually ascribed. Carmichael does not possess the full characteristics of the school. He seems to me to be the bond which connects the old philosophy with the new in Scotland.

He was descended from a genuine covenanting stock. His father was Alexander Carmichael, the son of Frederick Carmichael, who had been minister in various places in Fifeshire, and who died in 1667; his mother was relict (she had been the second wife) of Fraser of Bray. Alexander was minister at Pittenain, and had at one time been attached to prelacy, but abandoned it to join the suffering ministers. Early in 1672, he is in the tolbooth of Edinburgh. On February 22, he is before the Council, charged with keeping conventicles, and is ordered to depart the kingdom, never to return without license; and February 26, he is transported in a ship to London, where {37} he was useful as a minister, and died about the year 1676 or 1677. In 1677, shortly after his death, there was published, from the copy which he had left, a treatise, entitled, "The Believer's Mortification of Sin by the Spirit," edited by Thomas Lye, who says in the preface, "As for that flesh of his flesh, and the fruit of his loins, as for that Ruth and Gershom he hath left behind him, I question not but as long as the saints among you continue to bear your old name, Philadelphia (so the old Puritans of England have used to style you), you will not, you cannot, forget to show kindness to Mephibosheth for Jonathan's sake." Gershom, so called by his father because he was "a stranger in a strange land," seems to have been born in London about 1672. It may be supposed that the family returned to Scotland after the father's death. We certainly find Gershom enrolled a Master of Arts in the University of Edinburgh, July 31, 1691. He afterwards became Regent at St. Andrews, where he took the oath of allegiance, and subscribed the Assurance. On November 22, 1694, he is elected and admitted Master in the University of Glasgow, having been brought in by public dispute, that is, by disputation on comparative trial, through the influence of Lord Carmichael, afterwards the first Earl of Hyndford. About the same time he lost his mother, and "married a good woman, the daughter of Mr. John Inglis." Wodrow, who tells us this (" Letters "), was his pupil, and describes him as at that time possessed of little reading, as dictating several sheets of peripatetic physics *de materia prima*, as teaching Rohault, and being very much a Cartesian, -- this seven years after the publication of Newton's " Principia." Afterwards he made himself master of the mathematics and the new philosophy, and Wodrow used to jest with him on this matter of his juvenile teaching. From these notices it appears that, by parentage and birth and

training and ancestral prepossessions, he belongs to the seventeenth, but catches the spirit of the eighteenth century. He exhibits in his own personal history the transition from the old to the new thought of Scotland.

He is represented as a hard student, a thinking, poring man, his favorite study being moral philosophy. At the commencement of his professorial life, a Master took up the batch of students as they entered on the study of philosophy, and carried {38} them in successive years through all the branches, including logic, pneumatology, moral philosophy, and natural philosophy. This system required the teacher to be a well-informed man in various departments, but was a hindrance to eminence in any one branch of learning. But from 1727 the Masters are restricted to their several classes, and to Carmichael is consigned moral philosophy. It appears that, in 1726, there were thirty-six students in the third year's class, and nineteen in that of the fourth year; in the latter days of Carmichael the numbers were larger. The classes were swelled by non-conforming students from England, who, shut out from the English universities by their tests and their churchified influence, betook themselves to the Scottish colleges. Many of these were attracted to Glasgow by the fame of Carmichael. The college session lasted from the beginning of November to the end of May. On the Lord's day, the Masters met with their classes, to take an account of the sermons, and this was a work in which Carmichael felt a special interest.

Carmichael was a most affectionate, friendly man, but withal a little warm in his temper, and became involved in consequence in scenes which seem somewhat inconsistent with the supposed calm of an academic life. The college corporation was evidently much agitated by internal feuds, and Carmichael takes his part in them, commonly siding with the party of independence against the Principal. In 1704, joined by Mr. Loudon, he protests that several things minuted as Acts of Faculty were written and signed privately by the Principal. The Faculty finds the charge unfounded, and suspends the two from their functions. Subsequently they ask forgiveness, and are restored. In 1705, Mr. Law, one of the Regents, complains that some expressions had been uttered against him by Mr. Carmichael, who is gravely admonished, and exhorted to avoid every thing irritating towards his colleagues in time to come. In 1717, there are hot disputes as to who should elect the Rector. The Masters combine against the Principal, call the students to the common hall, and choose their man. But, in 1718, the Commission for the Visitation of the College finds some of the Masters, including Carmichael, guilty of great disorder in the election of the Rector; and they are discharged for a time from exercising any part of their office (such as choosing professors), {39} except the ordinary discipline in the class. In 1722, a bonfire was kindled by the students on a decision in favor of the election of Lord Molesworth (we shall meet with him again in these articles) to Parliament, and Carmichael rushes into the heart of the mob, and gets into trouble in extinguishing the flames. In November, 1728, we find him joining in a protest against the claim of the Chancellor to sit and vote. It was by such disputes that the constitution of the Scottish colleges came to be settled.

Patriotic exertions helped to relieve the sameness of the college life, and in these the collegiate body in Glasgow (it was different in Aberdeen) are of one mind. In 1708, the kingdom is threatened with "an invasion of French and Irish papists," and the Masters agree each to maintain a number of foot soldiers; and Carmichael signs for five men. In September, 1715, the rising in the north of Scotland in favor of the pretender becomes known. The Faculty agrees to raise fifty men at sixpence a day; the Principal provides eight, the professor of divinity five, and Carmichael subscribes for four. It was by such active exertions in the south of Scotland that the progress of the Rebellion was so speedily arrested.

In his later years, as he became known, Carmichael carried on a correspondence with Barbeyrac and other learned men. He had a numerous family, "who were all a comfort to him, except one, who was a cause of great distress." Wodrow says, that " in his advanced years he was singularly religious. I know he was under great depths of soul exercise, and much the worse that he did not communicate his distress to anybody almost." This is the only record we have of a Scottish metaphysician having had his" soul exercises;" but surely there must have been others who had their conflicts as they dived into the depths of the human soul. For the last two or three years of his life, he had a cancerous wart, which spread over one eye and across his nose to the other eye, and at last carried him off. During all his illness he remained a hard student and serious Christian. He died, November 25, 1729. On his death the English students leave the university, the attendance at which is reported by Wodrow as very thin in December; and it does not seem to improve till Hutcheson commences his lectures in the following October. {40}

Carmichael published "Breviuscula Introductio ad Logicam," which reached a second edition in 1722. He defines logic as the science which shows the method of discovering truth, and of expounding it to others. He represents it as having to do with judgment, but then it also treats of apprehension as necessary to judgment. Under apprehension he speaks of the doctrine of the difference of the comprehension and extension of a notion, and of the former being evolved by definition, and the latter by division, as being quite commonplace. He distinguishes between immediate and mediate judgment. Immediate is between two ideas immediately compared; mediate, in which the comparison is by means of a third judgment, is called discourse. He says all knowledge may ultimately be resolved into immediate judgments, known in their own light; and he divides immediate judgments into two classes: one abstract, in which there is no direction of the mind to the thing itself as really existing, *e.g.*, the whole is greater than a part; and the other intuitive, when the mind has a consciousness of the thing as present, as, for example, the proposition, *Ego cogitaits existo*. Coming to mediate judgment, he gives as the supreme rule of affirmative syllogism the axiom, "Things which are the same with one and the same third are the same with one another g, " and of negative syllogisms the axiom, " Things of which one is the same with a third, and the other not the same, are not the same with one another." These statements show a " thinking, poring," man, and will be valued most by those who have thought longest on these subjects. We see a new historical step in the transmission of the distinction between the extension and comprehension of a notion; we see that the difference between immediate and mediate judgments was known in these times; and that there was an attempt to find a supreme rule of mediate reasoning in the sameness (here lies the looseness) of two things with a third. Carmichael is aware that there are propositions seen to be true in their own light; and that there is an intuitive apprehension, in which the thing is known as present; and many will think that the *ego cogitaiis existo* is a preferable form to the *cogito ergo sum* of Descartes.

Carmichael published an edition of Puffendorf, " De Officio Hominis et Civis," with Notes and Supplements, for the use of students, described by Hutcheson as more valuable than the {41} original work. In the notes he offers many acute observations, and gives extracts from De Vries, Titius, and Grotius. In the first supplement he speaks of a divine law, to which all morality has reference, which alone obliges, and to which all obligation of human laws is ultimately to be referred. The law may be made known either by means of signs, oral or written, or by the constitution of human nature, and other things which offer themselves to the observation of men. What is known by the latter is called *natural law*, which has two meanings, -- one the faculty of reason itself as given to man by God, and the other such a power of intelligence as can discover

what is in nature by ordinary diligence. He takes far higher grounds of religion than those adopted by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. He declares that no one can be said to obey the law who does not know what the law enjoins, or who acts without reference to God and his law. At the same time, he seems to be a eudaimonist, and inclined to look on God as having an ultimate respect to happiness in his law. He has a second supplement, calm, moderate, and sensible, on the " Duties of Man towards his own Mind," and a third on " Quasi-Contracts."

His latest work, published in 1729, shortly before his death, is " Synopsis Theologiae Naturalis." In his preface he tells us that, in teaching pneumatology, he had used two Belgian textbooks. He advises that the forms of the Aristotelian school be avoided, as obscure and artificial, but declares at the same time that the doctrines of the scholastics, at least of the older, are more agreeable to reason and holy Scripture than those opposed to them in his day, especially in their finding a foundation for morality and obligation in God; and he denounces some who, of late years, with a showy appearance of genius and eloquence, would separate morality from religion, referring, I should suppose, to the school of Shaftesbury, against which, therefore, he thus gives his dying testimony, as it were in the name of. the old philosophy.

In establishing the existence and perfections of God, he draws arguments from a variety of sources. He would call in metaphysical principles. Thus he urges that there must be *ens aliquod independens*, otherwise we are landed in an infinite series of causes, which he declares (with Aristotle) self-evidently impossible. He appeals, with the French theologian Abbadie, {42} to universal consent. But he reckons the arguments of Descartes and De Vries, and that by Samuel Clarke, as unsatisfactory. He maintains that we can argue that what we attribute to a thing in idea exists, only after we have shown that the thing exists. He maintains that the existence of God as an existing being is to be established, not *a priori*, but *a posteriori*, and appeals to the traces of order, beauty, and design in the universe, and to the illustrations to be found in the writings of Ray, Pelling, Cheyne, Derham, Niewentite, and in Pitcairn on the Circulation of the Blood. He refers to the properties of matter, as established by Newton; and argues, as Baxter did so resolutely afterwards, that matter cannot move of itself, but needs a new force impressed on it. In regard to the dependence of creature on created power, he holds that things spiritual and corporeal exist so long as they have being from the creative efficacy of God, and speaks of the need of a divine *precursus* or *concursus*. He admits, however, that created spirits have efficacy in themselves. He refers to Leibnitz, and shows that he was well acquainted with his theory of possible worlds. It is surely interesting to observe a modest and retiring Scottish writer so thoroughly acquainted with the highest philosophy of his time, British and Continental, and yet retaining his own independence in the midst of his learning. If he cannot be regarded as the founder of the new school, he has the credit of judiciously combining some of the best properties of the old and new philosophy.

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The Scottish Philosophy

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VI. -- ANDREW BAXTER

BAXTER cannot be justly described as a leader or a follower of the Scottish school. His method is not really nor professedly that of inductive observation. He belongs rather to the school of Samuel Clarke, to whom he often refers, and always with admiration. But be was a Scotchman, and an independent thinker: he does not belong to the old philosophy; but he was a contemporary of the men who founded the Scottish school, and treated of many of the same topics. He had readers both in England and Scotland in his own day, and for some years after his death; and he deserves a passing notice as the representative of a style of thought which met with considerable favor in his time, but had to give way before the new school. {43}

We have a life of him in Kippis's " Biographia Britannica," drawn up from materials supplied by his son. He was the son of a merchant in Old Aberdeen, where he was born in 1686 or 1687. His mother was Elizabeth Frazer, descended from a considerable family in the north. He was educated at King's College, Aberdeen, where, at the beginning of last century, he would be trained in the old logic and metaphysics. But, as we shall see more fully in future articles, a considerable amount of a fresh literary taste, and of a spirit of philosophical inquiry, began to spring up in Aberdeen in connection with the two Universities pretty early in that century. Baxter, besides being a good mathematician, was well acquainted with the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, and with the theories of Leibnitz as to matter and motion. He was familiar with the Essay on the Human Understanding, but had a deeper appreciation of the speculations of Clarke.

The chief professional employment of his life was that of tutor to young men of good family. The boys who, in our days, would be sent to the great public schools of England taught by Oxford or Cambridge masters, were very often, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, put under tutors, who went about with them to the colleges at home, or travelled with them abroad. The occupation of teaching and travelling tutor was one coveted by young men of limited means and of a reading taste, who did not wish officially to enter the church, and had no other office open to them than that referred to, fitted to furnish them with means of study. When the tutor had trained and travelled with the heir of a good estate, the family felt bound to make provision for him for life. It was thus that, in the seventeenth century, Hobbes had been tutor to two successive Earls of Devonshire; that, in the eighteenth century, Thomson the poet became tutor to the Lord Chancellor Talbot's son on the Grand Tour; that Hume coveted the office of travelling tutor to Murray of Broughton; and Turnbull and A. Smith gave up chairs in the Scottish colleges to become tutors, -- the one to the Wauchopes of Niddrie (?) and the other to the Duke of Buccleuch Baxter was tutor, among others, to Lord John Gray, Lord Blantyre, and Mr. Hay of Drummelzier.

In the spring Of 1741, he went abroad with Mr. Hay, having also Lord Blantyre under his care. He resided some years at Utrecht, and thence made excursions into Flanders, France, and Germany. Carlyle met him -- " Immateriality Baxter," as he calls him -- at Utrecht in 1745, and says of him, 'though he was a profound philosopher and a hard student, he was at the same time a man of the world, and of such pleasing conversation as attracted the young." His son bad described him as being at polite assemblies in Holland, and a favorite of ladies; but a writer in the Corrigenda of the following volume of the " Biographia," after mentioning that he saw him daily for more than two years at Utrecht, declares: " His dress was plain and simple, -- not that of a priggish French man, but of a mathematician who was not a sloven. I am pretty well persuaded that while in the Low Countries, he never had any conversation with women of higher or lower degree, unless it were to ask for the bill at an ordinary, or desire the servant maid to bring up the turf for his chimney." The same writer describes him as a "plain, decent, good humored man, who passed all his time, but {44} what was bestowed at his meals, in meditation and study." His son describes him as social and cheerful, and extremely studious, sometimes' sitting up whole nights reading and writing.

In 1724, he had married the daughter of Mr. Mebane, a minister in Berwickshire; and, while he was abroad, his wife and family seem to have resided at Berwick-on-Tweed. In 1747, he returned to Scotland, and resided till his death at Whittingham, in East Lothian, where he employed himself in country affairs, and in his philosophic studies. In his latter years, he was much afflicted with gout and gravel. In January 29, 1750, he wrote to (the afterwards notorious) John Wilkes, with whom he bad formed a friendship in Holland, " I am a trouble to all about me, especially my poor wife, who has the life of a slave night and day in helping to take care of a diseased carcass." He had long, be states, considered the advantages of a separate state, but " I shall soon know more than all men I leave behind me." He died April 13, 1750, and was buried in the family vault of Mr. Hay at Whittingham.

He wrote a book in two volumes entitled " Matho," being a compend of the universal scientific knowledge of the day. He published his principal work, " An Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul," in 1733,[10] and it reached a second edition in 1737. In 1750, shortly after his death, was published, "An Appendix to his Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul." He had taken a great body of manuscripts with him to Holland; in the letter referred to, he speaks fondly of his unfinished manuscripts, in which he had discussed " a great many miscellaneous subjects in philosophy of a very serious nature, few of them ever considered before, as I know of" In 1779, the Rev. Dr. Duncan of South Warnborough published from his manuscripts, after correcting the style, " The Evidence of Reason in proof of the Immortality of the Soul," and at the close is his letter to Wilkes. Another work of his, entitled " Histor," discussing, on the English side, the controversy between the British and Continental writers as to force, and on the side of Clarke, the controversy between Clarke and Leibnitz, was offered to Millar the bookseller; but the new generation did not appreciate his life-labors; his day was over, and the offer was declined.

The avowed design of Baxter, in all his works, is to establish the existence of an immaterial power. Such a defence seemed to him to be required, in consequence of the new views of the powers of matter founded on the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton; by the equivocal language of Locke, frequently quoted about our not being "able to know whether any material being thinks or not;" and by the materialistic spirit abroad. The new doctrine of all matter attracting other matter seemed to show that we must be prepared to modify the old doctrine, that body is altogether passive. Leibnitz, on metaphysical grounds, and in opposition to the accepted Cartesian {45} doctrine, had maintained that matter has an essential potency. Baxter proceeds on the doctrine of

Clarke, the friend of Newton, and quotes his language. "All things that are done in the world are done either immediately by God himself, or by created intelligent beings; matter being evidently not at all capable of any laws or powers whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intelligence, excepting only this one negative power, that every part of it will always and necessarily continue in that state, whether of rest or motion, wherein it at present is. So that all those things which we commonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter and laws of motion, of gravitation, attraction, or the like, are indeed (if one will speak strictly and properly) the effects of God's acting continually and every moment, either immediately by himself, or mediately by some created intelligent being," The first volume of Baxter's work on the "Nature of the Soul," his "Appendix" and a large part of his "Evidence," are mainly occupied with a full elucidation and elaborate defence of the views summarily expressed in this passage.

He labors to prove that a *vis inertiae*, or resistance to a change of present state of rest or motion, is essential to matter; that matter hath this and nothing else; that it cannot have any sort of active power; that what are called the powers of matter is force impressed upon it *ab extra*. He maintains that matter is "liable to but one change or casualty, viz., to be annihilated, or to be destroyed by a Being to whose power that effect is competent," and lie denies that Infinite Power may " superadd a property to a substance incapable of receiving it." He maintains this doctrine as resolutely as if it were the foundation of religion, which must stand or fall with it. The questions which he has taken up had been discussed in a profound manner by Descartes and Leibnitz, and they cannot be regarded as settled at this day. But from his dogma of the impotency of matter he argues the necessity of an immaterial powerful being who first made the dead substance, matter, who originally impressed, and still continues to impress, motion upon it. " I am of opinion, and think it would be easy to show it, if one bad leisure to run through the several particulars, that unless an immaterial power continually re-excited motion in the material universe, all would stop in it in a very short time, perhaps in half an hour, except that the planets would run out in straight-lined directions" ! ! "To say that Deity interposes when he sees that matter would go wrong, is the same thing, in other words, as owning that lie interposes always if that were proper. Every particle of matter resists a change of its present state, and therefore could not effect a change of state in itself nor in other particles." He would thus establish his conclusion, that the " Deity, who can be excluded from no place, but is active and present everywhere, acts immediately on all the parts of matter," and that his governing is only his creating power constantly repeated. "Our philosophy can only be consistent when we take in the immediate power of the Creator as the efficient cause in all the works of nature." He looks on his own position as being very much superior, in its religious aspects, to the doctrines which had been entertained by many others. " Low and pitiful are the shifts we are put to when we would remove the Deity to the head of nature, and the head of nature out of sight." {46}

"It is not right to exalt the Deity in words and derogate from his perfections in facts. This is only paying him a compliment, and then setting aside his government in whole or in part, -- a state artifice. Cicero objects this low cunning to Epicurus, when he says, it is " verbis ponere re tollere." " Descartes, before Spinoza, had given the government of the universe to matter and motion; and Leibnitz, under a pretence of extolling the original contrivance of things, leaves the execution of all this to dead substance. According to all these schemes, we see nothing that the Deity does now: we behold only the operations of matter. This fills the mind with anxious doubts. If matter performs all that is wonderful, it catches our first admiration; and we know not where to search for the being who contrived that which we see matter executes with such dexterity." Much may be said in

favor of the doctrine, that God acts in all physical action; but it is wiser not to found it on the peculiar dogma of Baxter, that matter is inactive.

But the grand aim of Baxter, in depriving matter of its powers, is to establish the immateriality, and consequent immortality, of the soul. It is a fundamental position with him, that "a power always belongs to something living." He is thus able to establish the existence of a human soul active and immortal. He maintains that " no substance or being can have a natural tendency to annihilation or become nothing," and argues that the soul must endlessly abide an active perceptive substance, without either fear or hopes of dying, through all eternity." When we find such positions coolly assumed, one almost feels justified in rejoicing that in that very age David Hume rose up to dispute all such dogmas; and that in the following age Emmanuel Kant examined narrowly the foundations both of rational theology and of rational psychology. We are certainly warranted in feeling a high gratification that Thomas Reid, a wiser man than any of these, did immediately after the time of Hume, and before the time of Kant, set about establishing natural religion and philosophy upon a safer foundation.

Baxter is prepared to follow out his principles to all their consequences, however preposterous they might appear. The phenomena of dreaming came in his way, and he gives an explanation of them. He cannot refer these dreams to dead matter, nor can it be the soul that forms the scenes present to it. His theory is, that separate immaterial beings act upon the matter of our bodies, and produce on the sensory a [Greek term] or vision, which is perceived by the active and recipient mind. He acknowledges that he knows nothing of the conditions and circumstances of these separate agencies, but he evidently clings to the idea that there is no scarcity of living immaterial beings, and asks triumphantly: "Why so much dead matter, without living immaterial substance in proportion? " " Hath not the most despicable reptile animalcule an immaterial soul joined to it?"

It ought to be added, that in his " Evidence " be adduces stronger arguments, than those derived from his favorite view of matter, in favor of the soul's immortality. He shows that if there be no state beyond the grave, our existence is incomplete, without design, irrelative; and he calls in the divine perfections as furnishing 'a certain ground of confidence that our existence will not be finally broken off in the midst of divine purposes thus visibly unfinished here," and securing that beings "becoming good for {47} something should not instantly become nothing." In arguing thus, be shows his besetting tendency to take up extreme positions; for lie maintains that in our world pain is much more extensive in its nature than pleasure, and that all bodily pleasures are merely instigations of pains. He argues that as in this world reason may often be disobeyed with no evil consequences and obeyed without any good ones, so there must be a future world to make every thing consistent with reason. He shows that the prepossessions of mankind are in favor of this tenet. " In the very dawnings of reason, let a child be told what is death, having no idea of any way of existing beside the present, amazement seizes him: lie is perplexed, uneasy, dismayed." He is met, as so many others have been, by the objection, that most of these arguments would prove that brutes are immortal. In answering it, he is obliged to allow that immortality does not depend solely on immateriality, and to throw himself on the moral argument, which does not apply to brutes, which, not being moral agents, are not capable of rewards and punishments. But it is clear that he cherishes the idea that the immaterial part of brutes, while not constituting the same conscious being, may not perish ultimately when separated from the material frame.

In treating of these favorite topics, he discusses a great many important philosophic questions, and always gives a clear and decided opinion. He evidently favors the arguments derived from "abstract reason and the nature of things" in behalf of the divine existence. He argues the necessity

of an infinitely perfect intelligent being, -- not only from space and time, as Clarke did, but from the necessity of eternal truth in geometry or in other abstract sciences." Truth is not a being existing by itself, and therefore the immutable necessary nature of truth must be referred to some being existing of itself, and existing immutably and eternally." We have only to define truth as the conformity of our ideas to things, to see the fallacy lurking in this argument.

His view of space and time is taken from Newton and Clarke. He represents them as not beings, but the affections of beings: " And as time and space are not existences, so their correlate infinites (if I may say so), that is, eternity and immensity, are not existences, but the properties of necessary existence." In some other of his statements, be goes back to some of the mystic statements of the schoolmen, and anticipates some of the doctrines of Kant. "God's existence is unsuccessive." He says, "*Nunc stans* implies opposite ideas, if applied to our existence; but if we allow an eternal and immutable mind, the distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to such a mind, and the phrase has propriety." But surely there is an inconsistency in first arguing the divine existence from our ideas of space and time, and then declaring that our ideas in regard to space and time do not apply to Deity.

In maintaining that mind is ever active, he has to consider its seeming dormancy in sleep. "The soul in sleep seems to suffer something like what happens to a live coal covered up under ashes; which is alive all the while, but only appears so when disencumbered and exposed to open air." As to what has since been called unconscious mental action, his theory of it is the same as that defended in after years by D. Stewart; he supposes {48} that the mind was conscious of its action at the time, but that the memory could not recall it. "There is certainly a great deal of our past consciousness which we retain no memory of afterwards. It is a particular part of our finite and imperfect nature, that we cannot become Conscious of all our past consciousness at pleasure. But no man at night would infer that he was not in a state of consciousness and thinking at such a certain minute, about twelve o'clock of the day, because now perhaps he hath no memory what particular thought be had at that minute. And it is no better argument, considered in itself, that a man was not conscious at such a minute in his sleep because next morning he hath no memory of what ideas were in his mind then."

Baxter was most earnest in restricting the properties of matter, but he was equally resolute in maintaining its existence. In his work on the soul he has a long section on " Dean Berkeley's scheme." He was one of the first who examined systematically the new theory. He takes the obvious and vulgar view of it, and not the refined one ascribed to the ingenious author by his admirers: for those who have opposed Berkeley have usually given one account of his system, while those who have defended him have usually given another; and some have thence come to the conclusion, that his whole theory is so ethereal that it is not capable of definite expression. Baxter maintains that " we perceive, besides our sensations themselves, the objects of them that " we are conscious not only of sensation excited, but that it is excited by some cause beside ourselves," and that "such objects as rivers, houses, mountains, are the very things we perceive by sense." He endeavors to prove that the system of Berkeley carried out consistently would land us in a solitary egoism, for " we only collect concerning the souls of other men from the spontaneous motions and actions of their bodies; these, according to him, belong to nothing." Berkeley had boasted that, by expelling matter out of nature, he had dragged with it so many sceptical and impious notions; Baxter replies that this " puts us into a way of denying all things, that we may get rid of the absurdity of those who deny some things," -- " as if one should advance that the best way for a woman who may silence those who attack her reputation is to turn a common prostitute." He thinks that the doctrine may tend to

remove the checks to immorality; for "he who thinks theft, murder, or adultery nothing real beyond bare idea, and that for aught we know be injures nobody, will be surely under less restraint to satisfy his Declinations of any kind." The mathematician is evidently annoyed and vexed at the attacks which Berkeley bad made on his science, and shows "that if there be no such thing as quantity, we have a large body of immutable truths conversant about an impossible object."

In examining Berkeley he gives his views of sense-perception, which are not so clear and satisfactory as those of Reid; but are vastly juster than those of his contemporaries. He distinctly separates himself from those who hold that the mind can perceive nothing but its own states. " If our ideas have no parts, and yet if we perceive parts, it is plain we perceive something more than our own perceptions." He adds "We are conscious that we perceive parts as that we have perceptions at all." The {49} existence of matter in general, or at least of material sensories to which the soul is united, seems to me to be nearer intuitive than demonstrative knowledge." He declares that the "same perception of parts proves to us both the spirit and a material agency." This is so far an anticipation of the doctrine of Hamilton as an advance upon that of Reid. As to the manner of the action of matter on spirit, and spirit on matter, he says, in the very spirit of Reid. " We are certain this is matter of fact in many instances, whether we conceive it or not." He adds, in his own manner: " The Deity himself moves matter in almost all the phenomena of nature, and the soul of man perhaps moves some matter of the body, though in an infinitely less degree."

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VII. -- FRANCIS HUTCHESON.[11]

DURING the greater part of the seventeenth century there was a constant immigration into the north-east of Ireland of Scotch men, who carried with them their hardy mode of life and persevering habits; their love of education and their anxiety to have an educated ministry; their attachment to the Bible and the simple Presbyterian worship. This movement commenced with the attempt of the first James of England to civilize Ireland by the Plantation of Ulster, and was continued during the period of the prelatic persecution in Scotland, whereby not a few sturdy adherents of the Solemn League and Covenant were driven for refuge to the sister isle. The Scottish Church kept a watchful guardianship over her scattered children, and sent after them a succession of ministers to preach the gospel, for a time in the Established Church, and, when churchmen from England (such as Jeremy Taylor) would not tolerate this any longer, to set up a Presbyterian organization. Among these was the Rev. Alexander Hutcheson, the second son of an old and respectable family at Monkwood, in Ayrshire, who became minister at Saintfield, in the heart of county Down, and purchased the townland of Drumalig. His second son ' 'John, was settled at Ballyrea, within two miles of Artnagh, and ministered to a Presbyterian congregation in the archiepis opal city, where he {50} was known by his church as a man of retiring habits and of superior abilities, and a firm supporter of Calvinistic doctrine. His second son, Francis, was born Aug. 8, 1694, it is said in his grandfather's house in Drumalig.[12] When about eight years of age, he (with his elder brother, Hans) was put under the care of the same grandfather, and attended a classical school kept by Mr. Hamilton in the "meeting house" at Saintfield. He was afterwards sent to Killyleagh, in the same county, to an academy kept by the Rev. James Macalpin, said to be a man of virtue and ability, and who taught the future metaphysician the scholastic philosophy. We have it on record, that the Presbyterian Church of Ireland -- seeking now, after coming through a long period of harassment and trouble, to work out its full educational system --did about this time set up several such schools for philosophy and theology. However, the great body of the young men intending for the ministry did then, and for more than a century after, resort to the University of Glasgow for their higher education. Of this college Hutcheson became a student about 1710 (he does not seem to have matriculated till 1711). During his residence with his grandfather he became such a favorite with the old man, that when he died in 1711, it was found that he bad altered a prior settlement of his family affairs, and, passing by the older grandson, had left all his landed property to the second. Francis, though a cautious, was a generous youth: he had all along taken pains, even by means of innocent artifices, to uphold his brother in the old man's esteem; and now he refused to accept the bequest, while Hans, with equal liberality, declined to receive what had

been destined for another; and the friendly dispute had at last to be settled by a partition of the lands, which again became united when Hans, dying without issue, left his share to the son of Francis.

Francis Hutcheson thus sprang, like Gershom Carmichael (and we shall afterwards see George Turnbull), from the old {51} orthodox Presbyterian Church and its educated pastors; and both were early nurtured in the scholastic logic, from which they received much benefit. But Hutcheson comes an age later than Carmichael, and falls more thoroughly under the new spirit which has gone abroad.

At Glasgow the youth followed the usual course of study in the classical languages and philosophy, and enjoyed the privilege of sitting under the prelections of Carmichael. In after years, when called back to be a professor in the college, he gives in his Introductory Lecture a glimpse of the books and branches in which he felt most interest in his student life. After referring to the pleasure which he experienced in seeing once more the buildings, gardens, fields, suburbs, and rivers' banks (more pleasant then than now), which had been so dear to him, he expresses the peculiar gratification which he felt in revisiting the place where he had drunk the first elements of the quest for truth; where Homer and Virgil, where Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Terence, where the philosophy of Cicero and the discussions of the Fathers, had been opened to him; and where be had first been taught to inquire into the nature and reasons (*rationes*) of virtue, the eternal relations of number and figures, and the character of God. Having taken the Master's degree in 1712, he entered, the following year, on the study of theology under Professor John Simson. This professor was at that time, and, indeed, for the greater part of the period from 1712 to 1729, under prosecution before the ecclesiastical courts for teaching doctrines inconsistent with the Confession of Faith. It appears from the charges brought against him, and from his shuffling and vacillating explanations (he was often in a shattered state of health), that he took a favorable view of the state of the heathen; that he was inclined to the doctrine of free-will; he maintained that punishment for original sin alone was not just; he held that rational creatures must necessarily seek their chief good, -- always under subserviency to the glory of God, who cannot impose a law contrary to his own nature and to theirs, and who cannot condemn any except those who seek their chief good in something else, and in a different way than God has prescribed: but the special charge against him was, that he denied that Jesus Christ is a necessarily existent being in the same sense as the Father is. The lengthened process {52} concluded with the General Assembly declaring, in 1729, that Mr. Simson was not fit to be intrusted with the training of students for the ministry. It does not appear that young Mr. Hutcheson ever threw himself into this agitation on the one side or other, but it doubtless left its impression on his mind; and this, I rather think, was to lead him to adopt, if not the doctrine, at least some of the liberal sentiments of Simson; to keep him from engaging in religious controversy, and to throw him back for certainty on the fundamental truths of natural theology and the lofty morality of the New Testament.

To the teaching of Simson the historians of the Church of Scotland are accustomed to trace the introduction of the " New Light " theology into the pulpits both of Scotland and Ulster. But there were other and deeper causes also at work, producing simultaneously very much the same results all over the Protestant Continent of Europe, and in England both in the Church and among Non-conformists. It was a period of growing liberality of opinion, according to the view of the rising literary men of the country. It was a time of doctrinal deterioration, followed rapidly by a declension of living piety, and in the age after of a high morality, according to the view of the great body of earnest Christians. In the preceding age, Milton, Newton, and Locke had abandoned the

belief in the divinity of Christ, and the great Church of England divine of that age, Samuel Clarke, was defending the Arian creed, and setting aside the Reformation doctrine of grace. Francis Hutcheson, by this time a preacher, writes from Ireland to a friend in Scot land, in 1718, Of the younger ministers in Ulster: "I find by the conversation I have had with some ministers and comrades, that there is a perfect Hoadley mania among our younger ministers in the north; and, what is really ridiculous, it does not serve them to be of his opinions, but their pulpits are ringing with them, as if their hearers were all absolute princes going to impose tests and confessions in their several territories, and not a set of people entirely excluded from the smallest hand in the government anywhere, and entirely incapable of bearing any other part in the prosecution but as sufferers. I have reason however, to apprehend that the antipathy to confessions is upon other grounds than a new spirit of charity. Dr. Clarke's work (on the Trinity), I'm sufficiently informed, has made several {53} unfixed in their old principles, if not entirely altered them." Hutcheson never utters any more certain sound than this on the religious controversies of his day. It is evident that his mind is all along more inclined towards ethical philosophy and natural theology. It is interesting to notice that, in 1717, he wrote a letter to S. Clarke stating objections to his famous " Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," and that he received a reply, both of which are lost. We are reminded that, about four years before this, Joseph Butler, then a youth of twenty-one, at a dissenting academy, had written Clarke, taking exception to certain points in his "Demonstration," and had received answers to his letters. The objections of Hutcheson must have been more fundamental as to method than those of Butler. He was convinced that, as some subjects from their nature are capable of demonstration, so others admit only of probable proof, and he had great doubts of the validity of all metaphysical arguments in behalf of the existence of Deity. Dr. Leechman tells us: "This opinion of the various degrees of evidence adapted to various subjects first led Dr. Hutcheson to treat morals as a matter of fact, and not as founded on the abstract relation of things."

During his student life he was tutor for a time to the Earl of Kilmarnock. Leaving college about 1716, he was licensed to preach the gospel by the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. His preaching does not seem to have been acceptable to the people, who were alarmed at the New Light doctrine which was creeping in among them, and felt that the young preacher's discourses were scarcely in the spirit of the Scriptures, as they were not after the model of the ministers and divines whom they reverenced.[13] However, he received a call from a country {54} congregation at Magherally, in his native county, but was easily persuaded to accept instead an invitation to open an academy in Dublin, to give instruction in the higher branches. About the time he settled there the Protestant Non-conformists, aided by the government, but after a keen opposition from the Irish bishops, had succeeded in obtaining a parliamentary repeal of the Acts which required all persons to resort to their parish church every Sunday, and imposed a fine of L100 upon the dissenting minister who officiated in any congregation. But the young teacher had to suffer two prosecutions in the Archbishop's court for daring to teach youth without subscribing the canons and obtaining a license. These attacks upon him came to nothing, as they were discouraged by the Archbishop. Dr. King, author of the metaphysical work on the " Origin of Evil," who, though he had been a determined opponent of the relaxation allowed by law to dissenters, was unwilling to oppress so accomplished a man and well-disposed a citizen as Hutcheson. In Dublin he had laborious duties to discharge, which left him, he complained, little time for literature and mental culture; but he seems to have met with congenial society. The Presbyterians and Independents were the representatives of the English Non-conformists, who had been a considerable body there when Henry Cromwell

was vice-regent, and when Winter and Charnock preached to them in Christ's Church Cathedral; and they had among them families of standing and influence. His literary accomplishments opened other circles to him. There seems to have been at that time a considerable taste for learning and philosophy in the metropolis of Ireland. From a very early date after its publication, the " Essay on the Human {55} Understanding," had been most enthusiastically welcomed by Molyneux, who corresponded with Locke, and expressed his excessive admiration of him. Berkeley, the tutor of Molyneux's son, began in 1707 to give to the world his ingenious speculations on mathematical and philosophical subjects. It does not appear that Hutcheson was acquainted with Berkeley, who, we rather think, would not appreciate the views of Hutcheson: be has certainly condemned the opinions of Shaftesbury. But he enjoyed the friendship of a number of eminent men, including Viscount Molesworth and Dr. Synge afterwards Bishop of Elphin; both of whom encouraged him to publish his first work, and assisted him in preparing it for the press. The former connects him historically with Shaftesbury, who had written letters to Molesworth, which were published in 1721. When in Dublin, Hutcheson and some others formed a club in which papers were read by the members on philosophic themes. It is an interesting circumstance, that in the next age some of the more important works of Gerard, Reid, Beattie, and Campbell sprang out of a similar society in Aberdeen.

It was in 1725 that he published in London his first work, "An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue." The treatise was published anonymously, as (so he tells us in the second edition) he had so little confidence of success that he was unwilling to own it. The subject, the thoughts, and the style were suited to the age; and the work was favorably received from the first. Lord Granville (afterwards Lord Carteret), the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, sent his private secretary to inquire at the bookseller's for the author; and when he could not learn his name he left a letter to be conveyed to him, in consequence of which Hutcheson became acquainted with his Excellency and was treated by him with distinguished marks of esteem. A second edition, corrected and enlarged, was called for in 1726.

This was the age of serial literary essays which had commenced in England with the "Tatler" and "Spectator." There was such a periodcal set up in the metropolis of Ireland called the "Dublin Journal" conducted by Hibernicus (Dr. Arbucle), and to this paper Hutcheson sent two letters, of date June 5th and June 12th, 1725, on " Laughter," in opposition to the views of Hobbes, who attributed men's actions to selfish motives, and {56} represented laughter as nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others or our own formerly. He characterizes Hobbes as "having fallen into a way of speaking which was much more intelligible than that of the School men," and "so becoming agreeable to many wits of his age;" and as "assuming positive, solemn airs, which he uses most when he is going to assert some solemn absurdity or some ill natured nonsense." He finds it difficult to treat the subject of laughter "gravely," but gives his theory of the cause of laughter, which is "the bringing together of images which have contrary additional ideas, as well as some resemblance in the principal idea g, this contrast between ideas of grandeur, dignity, sanctity, perfection, and ideas of meanness, baseness, profanity, seems to be the very spirit of burlesque, and the greater part of our raillery and jest are founded on it." Some such view as this has ever since been given of wit. Samuel Johnson describes it as a sort of *Concordia discors or concors discordia*. Hutcheson ventures to specify the use of laughter: "Our passions are apt to lead us into foolish apprehensions of objects both in the way of admiration and honor, and ridicule comes in to temper our minds." This moderate view falls considerably short of that given by Shaftesbury, who

represents ridicule as a test of truth.

Mandeville, in "The Fable of the Bees," had advanced some curious and doubtful speculations as to private vices being public benefits; showing that the power and grandeur of any nation depend much upon the number of people and their industry, which cannot be procured unless there be consumption of manufactures; and that the intemperance, luxury, and pride of men consume manufactures, and promote industry. The author has here caught hold of a positive and important truth, the explanation of which carries us into some of the deepest mysteries of Providence, in which we see good springing out of vice, and God ruling this world in spite of its wickedness, and by means of its wickedness, but without identifying himself with it. But Mandeville was not able to solve the profound problem, and in dealing with it he uses expressions which look as if he intended to justify, or at least to palliate vice. Hutcheson hastens to save morality, and writes letters on the subject to Hibernicus, {57 } and easily shows that virtue tends to private and public happiness, and vice to private and public misery; and that there "would be an equal consumption of manufactures without these vices and the evils which flow from them."

Hutcheson had now tasted the draught of authorship, and must drink on. In the "London Journal" for 1725 there appeared some Letters signed "Philaretus," containing objections to the doctrine of the "Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue," which is represented as not giving a sufficiently deep view of virtue as founded on the nature of things and perceived by reason. Hutcheson replies in the same journal. In that same year he published his second great work, being " An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with illustrations of the Moral Sense." In the Preface he says, " Some Letters in the ' London journal,' in 1728, subscribed 'Philaretus,' gave occasion to the Fourth Treatise (on the Moral Sense); the answer given to them in these weekly papers bore too visible marks of the hurry in which they were wrote, and therefore the author declined to continue the debate that way, choosing to send a private letter to Philaretus to desire a more private correspondence on the subject of our debate. He was soon after informed that his death disappointed the author's great expectations from so ingenious a correspondent." Philaretus turned out to be Gilbert Burnet (second son, I believe, of the bishop), and the correspondence was published in 1735, with a postscript written by Burnet shortly before his death. Burnet examines Hutcheson from the stand-point of Clarke, and fixes on some of the weak points of the new theory.

At this time there was a keen controversy in Ulster as to whether the Presbyterian Church should require an implicit subscription to the Westminster Confession of Faith, and this issued in those who refused to subscribe forming themselves into a separate body called the Antrim Presbytery, the members of which published a " Narrative of the Proceedings of the Seven Synods," which led to their separation. The work of replying to this document was committed to Mr. Hutcheson, of Armagh, whose paper, however, was not published till after his decease, which took place in February, 1729. The old man had anxieties about his son, lest he should be tempted by the flattering attentions paid him in Dublin to conform to the Established {58} Church, and wrote a letter expressing his fears. We have the reply of the son, of date Aug. 4, 1726. In this he avows that he did not regard the "government or externals of worship so determined in the gospel as to oblige men to one particular way in either:" that he looks upon the established form as an "inconvenient one;" that he reckons the dissenters' cause "in most disputed points the better;" that he believes the original of both civil and ecclesiastical power is from God; he denounces those religious penal laws which "no magistrate can have a right to make;" but he would not blame any man of his own principles who did conform, if the "ends proposed were such as would over-balance the damage which the more just cause would sustain by his leaving, particularly if he had any prospect of an

unjust establishment being altered," of which, he confesses, he does not see the least probability. He says, that both Lord Cathcart and the Bishop of Elphin had professed their desire to have him brought over " to the Church, to a good living; " that he kept his mind "very much to him self in these matters, and resolved to do ," but that he had no intention whatever to depart from his present position, and that he would feel it his duty continually to promote the cause of dissenters. I rather think that this frank but expediency letter would not altogether satisfy the good old father, who had stood firm on principle in trying times. I have referred to these transactions, because they exhibit the struggles which were passing in many a bosom in those times of transition from one state of things to another. Hutcheson never conformed, as his contemporary Butler did, to the Church. His Presbyterian friends were soon relieved from all anxieties in this direction by his being appointed, after be had been seven or eight years in Dublin, to an office altogether congenial to his tastes, in Glasgow University, where, however, he exercised a religious influence which his father, provided he had been spared to witness it, would have viewed with apprehension and disapproval.

He was chosen to succeed Carmichael, Dec. 19, 1729, by a majority of the Faculty, over Mr. Warner, favored at first by the principal, and over Mr. Frederick Carmichael, son of Gershom, supported by five of the professors. His appointment could be justified on the ground of merit; but he owed it mainly {59} to family connections, who gained Lord Isla, the great government patron of the day, before whom the principal had to give way.[14] In October, 1730, twenty English students have come to the college, expecting Mr. Hutcheson -- whose " Inquiry " and work on the " Passions " were already well known -- to " teach morality Professor Loudon, however, insisted that he had a right to take the chair of Moral Philosophy, whereupon the English students gave in a paper declaring that, if Mr. Hutcheson, who had not yet come over from Ireland, did not teach them morality, they would set off to Edinburgh, and Mr. Loudon had to yield. On November 30, he was publicly admitted, and delivered, in a low tone and hurried manner, as if awed and bashful, an inaugural discourse, "De Naturali Hominum Socialitate," in which he expounds, in a clear and pleasant manner, and in good Latin, his favorite doctrine as to man having in his nature disinterested affections. He maintains, in opposition to the "very celebrated" Locke, that man has something natural, but admits that it requires time and circumstances to bring it forth; and in opposition to Hobbes and Puffendorff, that man can be swayed by other motives than self-love. He represents the conscience as the [Greek term] to which all our nature ought to be subjected, and to which it had been subjected in our entire state; but admits that our nature is fallen, weakened, and corrupted, in many ways. Hutcheson lectured five days a week on his proper course, which embraced Natural Religion, Morals, jurisprudence, and Government; and at another hour he read three days of the week, with his students, some of the finest writers of antiquity, Greek and Latin, on the subject of morals; interpreting both the language and sentiment. This practice of combining reading with lectures was followed by his successors in the moral chair in Glasgow, and is vastly superior to the plan of the Edinburgh professors of a later date, who instructed their pupils only by reading lectures. His prelections were at first, after the manner of the times, in Latin; but he had the courage to break off from the ancient custom, and to speak in the English tongue, no doubt to the great joy and benefit of the students, who might lose somewhat in not being familiarized with the ancient learned language; but would gain vastly more in being brought into close sympathy with the {60} speaker, in listening from day to day to elegant English, and in the mastery which they would thereby acquire over their own tongue. Dr. Carlyle has left us a picture of the lecturer: "I attended Hutcheson's class this year (I 743-44) with great satisfaction and improvement. He was

a good-looking man, of engaging countenance. He delivered his lectures without notes, walking backwards and forwards in the area of his room. As his elocution was good, and his voice and manner pleasing, he raised the attention of his hearers at all times; and when the subject led him to explain and enforce the moral virtues, he displayed a fervent and persuasive eloquence which was irresistible." A like account is given of him by his professed biographer Leechman: "A stature above middle size, a gesture and manner negligent and easy, but decent and manly, gave a dignity to his appearance. His complexion was fair and sanguine, and his features regular. His countenance and look bespoke sense, spirit, kindness and joy of heart," It may be added that this is the very impression left as we gaze on his portrait, with wig and gown, with florid face, and easy but dignified air, in the common hall of Glasgow College. Leechman represents him as dwelling in his lectures in a more diffuse manner on such moral considerations as are suited to touch the heart, and excite a relish for what is truthful and noble; and by his vivacity of thought, and sensibility of temper, commanding the attention of his students, and leaving strong impressions on their minds.

In the college he had an eminent colleague in Mr. Robert Simson (nephew of the theological professor), and a congenial one in Mr. Alexander Dunlop, the professor of Greek. Mr. Simson was an eccentric man, who spent his time between severe geometrical studies in the morning, and social meetings in the tavern at which he lived, or in his club, in the evening. Hutcheson and Dunlop -- who was a man of strong sense and capacity for business -- got the credit of managing all the affairs of the university, and both exerted themselves to maintain the discipline of the college and foster its literary tastes. In particular, Hutcheson had great success in reviving the study of ancient literature, particularly the Greek, which had been much neglected in the university before his time. At a later date, he had associates of a kindred spirit in the elegant {61} and grave Dr. Leechman, professor of theology (afterwards principal); in the lively and learned Dr. Moor, first the librarian of the college, and in 1746 made professor of Greek; and in the two eminent printers, Robert and Andrew Foulis, who published a multitude of learned works, including many of Hutcheson's. With such a spirit reigning in the college, and a great thirst for education on the part of the Scottish youth, fostered by the parish and burgh schools, the class-rooms were filled with students. Carlyle, who had just come in 1743 to Glasgow, after having been at Edinburgh College, describes the spirit that reigned among the youths: "Although at the time there appeared to be a marked superiority in the best scholars and most diligent students of Edinburgh, yet in Glasgow learning seemed to be an object of more importance, and the habit of application was much more general," -- a description which applies equally to Glasgow in after years. He mentions that among the students there were sundry young gentlemen from Ireland, with their tutors; and he names, among young men of station attending, Walter Lord Blantyre, Sir -- Kennedy and his brother David, afterwards Lord Cassilis. Walter Scott of Harden, James Murray of Broughton, and Dunbar Hamilton, afterwards Earl of Selkirk. The Scotch colleges were quite competent at that time to educate the nobility of the country, who had not yet fallen into the way of going to the great English schools and colleges, there to lose their national predilections and become separated, as they did in succeeding ages, from the sympathies, social, political, and religious, of the middle classes and common people of Scotland, to the great injury of the church and the nation generally.

Hutcheson exercised a special influence in drawing students, Scottish, Irish Presbyterian, and English Non-conformist, to the college. His own class was so large that he had to employ an assistant. The Calvinistic creed of the south-west of Scotland, the theological preaching of the old-school ministers, and the training of the young in the Shorter Catechism, all inclined the students to mental philosophy; and in Hutcheson they had much to attract, and little to offend.

When he set before them wide fields of knowledge; when, in his lectures on natural theology, he pointed out evidences of the wisest contrivance and {62} most beneficent intention; when he led them from the external world into the still greater wonders of the internal, and traced the parts of man's moral constitution, and described the virtues in their loveliest form, and enlarged on the elevated enjoyments furnished by them; when he quoted, with glowing zest, the noblest passages of Greek and Roman literature; when he inculcated, with immense enthusiasm, the importance of civil and religious liberty, -- the students felt as if a new world were thrown open to them, and a new life kindled within them. Following the custom of his predecessor, he lectured on the sabbath evenings on the truth and excellence of Christianity, and the students of all the classes eagerly rushed to his prelections. The conversation of the youths in their social walks and visits often turned on the literary and philosophic themes which he discussed, and some of them chose to attend his lectures for four or five successive years. Among his pupils were Mr. Millar, afterwards President of the Court of Session; Archibald Maclaine, who in future years translated Mosheim's " Ecclesiastical History;" Matthew Stewart, famous for his Mathematical Tracts, and father of Dugald Stewart; and a youth, specially appreciated by Hutcheson, with a vast capacity for learning of every kind, and destined in future years to be so famous in Hutcheson's own department, -- Adam Smith, author of " The Theory of Moral Sentiments," and of " The Wealth of Nations." All of these ever spoke of Hutcheson in terms of high admiration and gratitude.

Defoe describes the city of Glasgow, with its four principal streets meeting in a cruciform manner at a point, as being, in 1726, one of the cleanliest, most beautiful, and best built cities in Great Britain. On the street that ran toward the north stood the college, completed in 1656, with quadrangles, arcade, and spire, built after the style of Louis XIII. and Louis XIV. The population, when Hutcheson was a professor, might be upwards of twenty thousand. At the summit of the social scale were the foreign merchants engaged in the American trade, in which they carried out linen and brought back tobacco " the tobacco merchants, with their scarlet cloaks and gold-headed canes, and cocked hats, perched on powdered hair or wig, with dangling clubtie or pigtail." Next to them, but at a considerable distance, were the ordinary shopkeepers; and farther {63} down, the tradesmen and servants; while at the base were the Highlandmen, with their tartan jacket and kilts, driven from their native hills by starvation, and ready to perform the most servile work. All classes made a solemn religious profession; but Wodrow mourns over degenerate customs which wealth and luxury were introducing. The better citizens dined early in their own homes, without show; and many of them spent their evenings in social meetings at taverns, -- a practice which gendered those drinking customs which, beginning with the upper classes about this time, went down to the peasant class in the days of Burns, and by the end of the century infected the whole of Scottish society, which has not yet recovered from the evil influence. But Hutcheson does not seem to have been much mixed up with the citizen life of Glasgow; we do not hear of his spending his evenings in the tavern, or being a member of any of the social clubs which began to spring up in Glasgow at this time. He had experience of the evil effects of the new habits (which were coming in with the new theology), in the lives of some of the Irish students who were committed to his care, and over whom he watched with the most friendly interest. "The wretched turn their minds take is to the silly manliness of taverns." He satisfies himself with keeping personally free from the evil. He presses his friend Tom Drennan, from Belfast, to pay him a visit for a month or six weeks, and promises: "Robert Simson, with you and Charles Moor, would be wondrous happy till three in the morning; I would be with you from five to ten."

His sphere was within the walls of the college; whence, how ever, his influence spread over the

educated mind of the south west of Scotland and of Ulster, and over not a few of the Non-conformists in England. Carlyle tells us that he was believed by the students to be a Socinian. There is no evidence of this, nor of his expressing any positive opinion on any doctrinal subject. Even in his Sabbath evening lectures he kept to Grotius "De Veritate Christianae Religionis," and avoided, Leechman tells us, " the party tenets or scholastic system of modern ages." He seems to have maintained a friendly communication with the non-subscribing Presbyterian ministers in Ireland, some of whom (such as Abernethy and Leland, and Bruce and Boyce) were as accomplished men as any theologians {64} of their age, and of whom it may be said to their credit, that they suffered in their temporal interests rather than subscribe articles which they did not believe. In particular, Hutcheson carried on a very genial correspondence with the Rev. Thomas Drennan, a non-subscribing minister at Belfast.[15] The ministers of this communion, more especially as they were often abandoned by the people when their views became known, were at times in very poor circumstances. On hearing this, Hutcheson writes to his friend (May 31, 1742) am concerned that in my prosperous circumstances I did not think of it sooner. If you have any little contributions made towards such as are more distressed than the rest, you may mark me as a subscriber for L5 *per annum*, and take the above ten pounds as my payment for two years past. . . . I think it altogether proper you should not mention my name to your brethren, but conceal it. I am already called New Light here. I don't value it for myself, but I see it hurts some ministers who are most intimate with me. I have been these ten days in great hurry and perplexity, as I have for that time foreseen the death of our professor, who died last Wednesday, and some of my colleagues join me in laboring for Mr. Leechman to succeed. We are not yet certain of the event, but have good hopes. If he succeed, it will put a new face upon theology in Scotland."

This was no doubt one of the ends for which Hutcheson lived and labored, "*to put a new face upon theology in Scotland*."[16] Discouraging all doctrinal exposition, and all rousing appeals to the conscience, he would have the preachers recommend the Christian religion as embracing a pure morality, and holding out the hope of a blessed immortality; but meanwhile providing no pardon to the poor sinner anxious about the past, nor gracious aid to help him in his struggles to deliver himself from sin in the future. Never avowing any doctrinal belief, his students {65} looked upon him as a Socinian, and so his influence went in that direction. The crop that sprang up may be taken as represented by such men as Carlyle, elegant and accommodating but dreadfully rankled by a Calvinistic creed which they had to swear, and by the opposition of the people, who could not be made to feel that the New Light was suited to them, or to believe that it had any title to be called a religion. But all this was in the future, and was not the precise result expected b), Hutcheson. Meanwhile he rejoices in Leechman, and describes him as one " who sees all I do." It seems that the Scotch divine received a call from a non-subscribing congregation in Belfast, and Hutcheson is rather inclined that he should go; he is so anxious to have him out of "that obscure place where he was so much lost," and where he was "preaching to a pack of horse-copers and smugglers of the rudest sort," who, we venture to say, would not profit much by that calm, abstract, elegant style which so pleased the professor of moral philosophy. Hutcheson uses every means to secure Leechman's appointment to the chair of theology in Glasgow, and brings influence of a very unscrupulous character (as I reckon it) to carry his point. He writes Mr. Mure of Caldwell (Nov. 23, 1743) that he wants a letter from the Duke of Montrose, the Chancellor of the University, in behalf of Leechman to Morthland, professor of Oriental languages, to be shown to others, and he malignantly mentions that Professor Anderson, the chief opponent of Leechman, " made himself ridiculous to all men of sense by dangling after Whitefield and M'Cullogh " (" Caldwell Papers ");

and he wants this to be specially known to Tweeddale, who was Secretary of State for Scotland, and to Andrew Mitchell, his private secretary' It seems that the advocates of liberality could not tolerate that a man should be favorable to a revival of religion. It was by such means that " a new face was to be put upon the theology of Scotland." He writes to his Belfast friend (Feb. 20, 1743-44): I could tell you a good deal of news upon the unexpected election of a professor of divinity, and the furious indignation of our zealots." He had written previously (March 5, 1738-39): "I hope Jack Smith has sent down to your town a 'Serious Address to the Kirk of Scotland,' lately published in London; it has run like lightning here, and is producing some effect; the author is unknown; 'tis wrote {66} with anger and contempt of the Kirk and Confession, but it has a set of objections against the Confession which I imagine few will have the brow to answer." The moderate party in the Church of Scotland is being crystallized by coldness out of the floating elements; and already there is a felt polar antipathy between them and those whom they choose to call " zealots." Hutcheson writes (April 16, 1746), " I would as soon speak to the Roman conclave as our presbytery."

The professor of theology introduced by him to the college, had signed the Confession of Faith, and professed his willingness to sign it at any time. He accomplished the end of Hutcheson. The subjects represented by him as suitable to be dwelt on by the preacher from the pulpit, were the perfections of God; the excellence of virtue, and the perfection of the divine law; the truth of the Christian religion, and the important purposes for which Jesus came into the world; the great doctrines he taught the interesting scenes of providence he has displayed to men the dignity and immortality of the soul, and the inconceivable happiness of the heavenly state. In the social circle he was grave and silent, but is represented by Carlyle as having a lively wife, who entertained the students that came to his house in the evening, and was anxious to hear about the new plays and novels which were coming into Scot land. He set out a body of young preachers, who unfortunately lost the common people, and the pious of all ranks, without gaining the worldly and unbelieving. He published a sermon in which he thought to recommend prayer as fitted to have an influence on the mind of the person praying, and submitted a copy to Hume, who told him plainly that the person praying must believe that his prayers have an influence on God and bring an answer.

It should be allowed that Hutcheson was most anxious to impart a taste for learning and refinement to the ministers of the Church of Scotland. He was deeply impressed with the evils which were springing from the law of patronage being now put in operation with a high hand. In 1735, he published " Considerations on Patronage, addressed to the Gentlemen of Scotland." In this pamphlet he predicts that, " instead of studying sobriety of manners, piety, diligence, or literature, one or other of which qualities are now necessary to recommend {67} the candidates to the favor of heritors, elders or presbytery, the candidate's sole study will be to stand right in politics, to make his zeal for the *ministry of state* conspicuous; or by all servile compliance with the humor of some great lord who has many churches in his gift, whether that humor be virtuous or vicious, to secure a presentation." He fears the mischiefs of patronage were but beginning to appear, and that gentlemen's sons will no longer devote themselves to the ministerial office, which will be sought by lads of mean parentage and circumstances. It is quite certain that, owing to the law of patronage, combined with the smallness of the livings, estimated by Hutcheson as at that time about L80 a year, and the influence of London court life, the upper classes (from which so many ministers had sprung in the previous century) ceased from this time to encourage their sons to enter the sacred office.

The recorded incidents of his person and family life are not numerous. He seems to have been

engrossed in lecturing to his students, in managing college matters, and in preparing text-books. He published a "Compend of Logic," a "Synopsis of Metaphysics," and "Institutes of Philosophy," all in clear and graceful Latin (referred to with commendation by Dr. Parr in his " Spital Sermon "). He joined Dr. Moor in publishing a translation of the " Meditations " of Antoninus, with a life of Antoninus, an introduction and notes in English, the last showing a considerable acquaintance with the Stoic philosophy.

When in Dublin, he had married Mary Wilson, daughter of Francis Wilson, a gentleman of property, and belonging to a Presbyterian family in Longford.' In a letter to a friend, Feb. 12, 1740, he speaks of himself as " having been married now fifteen years and having only one boy surviving, of seven children borne to me by a very agreeable woman. I bless God for the one he has spared to me, and that he has no bad genius. If he proves a wise and good man, I am very well in this world. Since my settlement in this college I have had an agreeable and I hope not an useless life, pretty much hurried with study and business, but such as is not unpleasant. I hope I am contributing to promote the more moderate and charitable sentiments in religious matters in this country, where yet there remains too much warmth, and commonly about matters of no great consequence to real religion. We must make allowance {68} for the power of education in all places, and have indulgence to the weakness of our brethren."[17]

So early, as June, 1741, he writes to his Belfast friend: " In short, Tom, I find old age, not in gray hairs and other trifles, but in an incapacity of mind for such close thinking and composition as I once had, and have pretty much dropped the thoughts of some great designs I had once sketched out." On April 3, 1745, he was nominated to the chair of moral philosophy in Edinburgh by the Town Council, but declined the honor, in consequence of not feeling strong enough to engage in new labors. He writes, April 16, 1746: "I am in a great deal of private distresses about Jo. Wilson and his sister, the latter in the utmost danger, the other scarce recovered from death; my wife, too, very tender; but, by a set of most intricate business, upon which the soul of this college depends, and all may be ruined by the want of one vote, I cannot leave this till after 26th June, and we go to Dublin first." He had been for some months in an uncertain state of health: he went to Dublin about the time mentioned in the letter quoted; and there, after a few days' fever, he was cut off, Aug. 8, 1746. His remains were buried in the old graveyard of Knockmark, East Meath, among his wife's kindred, the Wilsons and Stanhopes. He left one son, who became a physician, and rose to be professor of chemistry in Dublin College. That son published, in 1754, his "System of Moral Philosophy," to which is prefixed an account of the father's life by Dr. Leechman.

Hutcheson has nowhere explained very fully or formally the method on which he proceeds. But he everywhere appeals to facts; he brings all theories to the test of the actual operations of the human mind as disclosed to consciousness (a word frequently employed by him); he sets no value on speculations built up in any other way; and he everywhere speaks doubtfully or disparagingly of the logical distinctions and verbal subtleties of the schoolmen, and of the rational deductions of Descartes and Samuel Clarke. Proceeding on the method of observation, he discovers certain cognitive powers, which he {69} calls, perhaps unhappily, senses, which have a place in our very nature and constitution, and operate independent of any notice we may take of them. These features show that he belongs to the Scottish school, of which he is entitled to be regarded ,is the founder, inasmuch as no philosopher connected with North Britain had previously combined these characters, and as lie in fact gave the modern stimulus to philosophic speculation in Scotland.

He does not dwell at great length, nor very minutely, on the intellectual powers. He says that "late

inquiries have been very much employed about our understanding. and the several methods of obtaining truth and so he would rather investigate " the various pleasures which human nature is capable of receiving," and our various internal senses, perceptions, and affections, specially the sense of beauty and the moral sense. Still he intimates very clearly what views he takes of man's intellectual nature. And first, as to the senses, he says, " It is not easy to divide distinctly our several sensations into classes. The division of our external senses into the five common classes seems very imperfect. Some sensations received without any previous idea, can either be reduced to none of them, such as the sensations of hunger, thirst, weariness, sickness; or, if we reduce them to the sense of feeling,, they are perceptions as different from the other ideas of touch, such as cold, heat, hardness, softness, as the ideas of taste or smell. Others have hinted at an external sense different from all of these. The following general account may possibly be useful: (1) That certain motions raised in our bodies are by a general law constituted the occasion of perceptions in the mind. (2) These perceptions never come alone, but have some other perceptions joined with them. Thus every sensation is accompanied with the idea of duration, and yet duration is not a sensible idea, since it also accompanies ideas of internal consciousness or reflection; so the idea of number may accompany any sensible ideas, and yet may also accompany any other ideas as well as external senses. Brutes, when several objects are before them, have probably all the proper ideas of sight which we have without the idea of number. (3) Some ideas are found accompanying the most different sensations, which yet are not to be perceived separately from some sensible quality, {70} such as extension, figure, motion, and rest, accompany the ideas of sight or colors, and yet may be perceived without them, as in the ideas of touch, at least if we move our organs along the parts of the body touched. Extension, figure, motion, or rest, seem therefore to be more properly called ideas accompanying the sensations of sight and touch than the sensations of either of these senses, since they can be received sometimes without the ideas of color, and sometimes without those of touching, though never without the one or other. The perceptions which are purely sensible, received each by its proper sense, are tastes, smells, colors, sound, cold, heat, &c. The universal concomitant ideas which may attend any idea whatsoever are duration and number. The ideas which accompany the most different sensations are extension, figure, motion, rest. These all arise without any previous ideas assembled or compared g, the concomitant ideas are reputed images of something external. From all these we may justly distinguish those pleasures perceived upon the previous reception and comparison of various sensible perceptions with their concomitant ideas, or intellectual ideas, when we find uniformity or resemblance among them. These are meant by the perceptions of the internal sense." ("Nature and Con duct of the Passions," Sect. I.)

This note comprises the result and the sum of much reading and much reflection. The principal thoughts, more especially as to the separation of the ideas of number and duration, and of extension, figure, motion, and rest from our common sensations, are taken, directly or indirectly, from Aristotle's " Psyche," B. II. c. vi. (which is not referred to, however), where there is a distinction drawn between common and proper percepts. But he seems to take a step beyond Aristotle when he tells us here, and still more expressly in his " Logic," that number and duration can be perceived both by the external and internal sense. It has been felt by all profound thinkers, that in order to account for the phenomena, and to save the senses from deceiving us, there must be distinctions of some sort drawn between different kinds of sensations or perceptions. Adopting the distinction of Aristotle, we find him in his " Logic " identifying it with that of Locke, between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies. It may be doubted whether we can so {71} absolutely divide, as Aristotle and Hutcheson did, the accompanying ideas from the sensations or perceptions.

The sensations and ideas are in every case wrapped up in one concrete cognitive act, while, however, the may come tip in a different t, y concretion in our next experience, and may be separated into elements by an analytic process. I rather think, too, that the perception of extension (as has been shown by Hamilton) is involved in all our sense-perceptions, for we seem to know our organism as in space and localized by every one of the senses. The language about the motions of bodies constituting the *occasion* of the perceptions in the mind, proceeds upon the inadequate distinction between efficient and occasional cause, drawn by the disciples of Descartes, -- a distinction adopted by Reid as well as Hutcheson. I suspect that it still remains true, that the common division of our external senses is very imperfect, and that it is not easy to arrange our sensations into classes.

In regard to the question started in the next age by Reid, as to whether we perceive by the senses the external object, or an idea of it, it is certain that he accepts the view and the language of the great body of philosophers prior to his time, and he speaks of our perceiving by ideas " as images of something external."

Formal logic has been taught, I believe, in Glasgow University from its establishment in 1451 to this present time. Hutcheson has a "Logical Compendium" which was used as a text-book in Glasgow and elsewhere. In this treatise, after a meagre dissertation on the rise of philosophy, he defines logic as " the art of guiding the mind in the knowledge of things; adding, that it may also be considered a science, and that others define it " the art of discovering and declaring truth." These definitions will be regarded as too loose and vague by the rigid logicians of our time. In treating of the concept, notion, or idea, he represents ideas as being divided into sensations, imaginations, and pure intellections, -- a theory adopted by Gassendi, and favorably received by not a few for an age or two after the time of Descartes and Gassendi, as seeming to reconcile these two eminent men. Hutcheson had previously represented all sensation as external and internal, and declared, with Locke, that all our ideas arise either from the external sense or {72} from reflection. The intellections he defines as " any ideas not reached or comprehended by any bodily sense; " they are chiefly " suggested by the internal sense, and include our actions, passions, judgments, doubts, and the like, and also abstract ideas." There is an incongruous mixture here of the Lockian with an older theory. The ideas derived from reflection, which are all singular and concrete, should not be put in the same class with those abstract and general ideas which are formed by the intellect from the materials got from sensation and reflection, and, we may add, from those furnished by the faculties of the mind in their exercise, such as those we have of the beautiful and the good. This confusion long lingered in the Scottish psychology from which it has scarcely yet been expelled.

Hutcheson represents complex (concrete would be the better phrase) ideas as having comprehension, and universal ideas as having extension; and announces the rule that extension and comprehension stand to each other in a reverse order. He distinguishes between a logical whole, which is a universal in respect of its species, which are spread out in division; and a metaphysical whole, which is the comprehension of a complex idea, and is declared by definition. He distinguishes between noetic and dianoetic judgment, in the former of which the two ideas are compared immediately (*proxime*), and in the latter by means of a third. The subject, predicate, and copula are said to be in the proposition either expressed or suppressed and involved. He does give the dictum of Aristotle as the regulating principle of reasoning, but derives all the force of syllogism from these three axioms, in which, we think, there is a very unsatisfactory vagueness in the phrase *agree*: " (1) Things which agree in one third agree with one another; (2) Things of which the one agrees and the other does not agree with one and the same third do not agree with one

another; (3) Things which agree in no third do not agree with each other; (4) Things which disagree in no third do not disagree among them selves. Hence are deduced the general rules of syllogisms." This "Compend" continued to be printed and used down to at least the close of the third quarter of the eighteenth century. One is inclined to think that these phrases and distinctions must have been introduced to the notice, and inscribed on the {73} memory, of William Hamilton during his collegiate life at Glasgow, and that they may have helped as they recurred, consciously or unconsciously, to suggest to him certain of the essential principles of the "New Analytic of Logical Forms."

He has a separate treatise on metaphysics ("Metaphysical Synopsis," 1742) which he divides into ontology, or the science of being, and pneumatology, or the science of spirit (divine and human). " It appears from his treatise on metaphysics," says his admiring biographer, " that he was well acquainted with the logomachies, meaningless questions, and trivial debates of the old scholastics, which had thrown a thick darkness on that part of philosophy: he has set that branch of knowledge in a clear light, and rendered it instructive and entertaining." The sneer at the scholastics is a symptom of the age. The alleged " meaningless questions " are still put, and must be put, by profound thinkers who would go down to the foundations of truth. Even Hutcheson was obliged to put them and to answer them. The answers which he gives, if not so profound in fact or in appearance as those given by the ancient Greek philosophers, by the scholastics, or by Descartes and Leibnitz, are always clear and sensible, and often just and satisfactory. He discusses, and this by no means in a superficial manner, topics which the Scottish metaphysicians between him and Hamilton carefully avoided. His scholastic training at Killyleagh, and the spirit of the older teaching, had still a hold upon him for good.

He treats of being, declaring it to be undefinable, and showing that it involves existence and essence, and that potency and action are the principles of being. He refers the conviction of our identity of being to consciousness. As to the much agitated question of the principle of individuation he comes to the sound conclusion that it is to be ascribed to the nature of the thing existing.

He discusses the question whether metaphysical axioms are innate. He denies that they are innate in the sense of their being known or observed by the mind from its birth, and affirms that in their general form they are not reached till after many comparisons of singular ideas. He shows that the mind assents to them in their singular form, even when a sensible object is presented. He stands up for axioms, self-evident and immutable, {74} -- with him, as with Locke, self-evidence being their prominent feature and their mark but he also declares them to be eternal and unchangeable, -- the mind perceiving at once the agreement or disagreement of the subject or predicate. He denies that there is any principle entitled to be regarded as the first of all, and maintains that it is vain to seek any other criterion of truth than the faculty of reason itself, and the native power of the mind. These views are surely more profound than those of Locke, less extravagant than those of Descartes, Leibnitz, or Wolf (he refers to Wolf). They do not exhaust the subject; in particular, while he says truly (with Aristotle) that the singulars and the less general are first known, he does not enter on the question, which neither the Scottish nor any other metaphysicians have yet settled, of the relation of self-evident truths in their singular to their generalized form.

In regard to space and time, he avoids the extreme positions both of Clarke, who represents them as modes of the divine being, and of Leibnitz, who describes them as mere relations perceived by the mind. He represents them as things or realities, and declares modestly and truly that we are ignorant of the relation in which they stand towards the divine nature. These judicious views were

followed by the Scottish metaphysicians generally down to the time of Hamilton.

This leads him into the investigation of the infinite. He regards the following propositions as probable: that it is scarcely possible that there should be a number of infinite things of the same kind , that the infinite, because it is infinite, cannot be greater; that infinites, so far as infinites, cannot be multiplied; nor can have any finite relation (*rationem*) to finite parts, although things by one reason infinite and by another finite may be divided and multiplied, if only there are other things of the same description. But after enunciating these bold propositions he cautiously adds that these questions may well be held to surpass human capacity.

He declares that, properly speaking, there is only one sort of cause, the efficient. He says that in the impulse and motion of bodies, and in the effort to change the idea in our minds, and to produce motions in our bodily members, we not only see change, but perceive some energy or efficacy. This view is not thoroughly carried out; it certainly is the truth so far as {75} it goes. He cautions us, in the very spirit of Reid, against dogmatizing too minutely as to the power of the mind over the body.

Substance is that which remains when the affections change. He agrees with Locke that the nature of substance is unknown, except that we have an obscure idea of something as the substratum of qualities. His views on this whole subject are meagre and unsatisfactory.

Still it is in the discussion of these questions that he passes beyond Shaftesbury, and shows the clearness, the judiciousness, and the independence of his thinking. I am not sure whether these metaphysical topics have been discussed in a profounder manner by any thinker of the Scottish school except Sir W. Hamilton; and he has not shown the same amount of speculative caution and good sense as Hutcheson.

But Hutcheson dwells far more on the motive and moral parts of man's nature than on logical and metaphysical subjects. We have seen that he brings in many other senses besides the external ones. He defines sense, " every determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain." The following is his classification of them: " (1) In the first class are the external senses, universally known. (2) In the second, the pleasant perceptions arising from regular harmonious uniform objects, as also from grandeur and novelty. These we may call, after Mr. Addison, the `pleasures of the imagination,' or we may call the power of receiving them an internal sense. Whoever dislikes this name may substitute another. (3) The next class of perceptions we may call a public sense; viz., our determination to be pleased with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their misery. This is found in some degree in all men, and was sometimes called [Greek term], or *sensus commnunis*, by the ancients; this inward pain or compassion cannot be called a sensation of sight. It solely arises from an opinion of misery felt by another, and not immediately from a visible form. The same form presented to the eye by the exactest painting, or the action of a player, gives no pain to those who remember that' there is no misery felt. When men by imagination conceive real pain felt by an actor, without recollecting that it is merely {76} feigned, or when they think of the real story represented, then, as there is a confused opinion of real misery, there is also pain in compassion. (4) The fourth class we may call the moral sense, by which we perceive virtue or vice in ourselves or others. This is plainly distinct from the former class of perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the fortunes of others who seldom reflect upon virtue or vice in themselves or others as an object; as we may find in natural affection, compassion, friendship, or even general benevolence to mankind, which connect our happiness or pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own temper, nor delighted with the perception of our own virtue. (5) The fifth class is a sense of honor

which makes the approbation or gratitude of others, for any good actions we have done, the necessary occasion of pleasure, and then dislike, condemnation, or resentment of injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy sensation called shame, even when we fear no further evil from them." He adds that this enumeration may not be sufficient, and says that "there may be others, such as some ideas of decency, dignity, suitableness to human nature in certain actions and circumstances."

He then shows that the objects gratifying these senses call forth desires, which fall into five corresponding classes, those of the bodily senses, of the imagination or internal sense, of public happiness, of virtue, and honor. We are yet (so I am inclined to think) without a thoroughly exhaustive classification of the natural appetencies which lead to emotion, and desire, and action. That of Hutcheson is one of the best which we yet have, and should be looked to by those who would draw out a scheme of the categories of man's motive principles. I am disposed to think, however, that the sense of honor may be resolved into the moral sense combined with some other principles. (" Moral Philosophy," Book I.)

He shows how secondary grow upon these original desires. "Since we are capable of reflection, memory, observation, and reasoning about the distant tendencies of objects and actions, and not confined to things present, there must arise, in consequence of our *original desires, secondary desires* of every thing imagined useful to gratify any of the primary desires, and that {77} with strength proportioned to the several original desires and the imagined usefulness or necessity of the advantageous object. Thus, as soon as we come to apprehend the use Of wealth or power to gratify any of our original desires we must also desire them. Hence arises the universality of these desires of wealth and power, since they are the means of gratifying all other desires." Mackintosh says, " He seems to have been the first who entertained just nations of the formation of the secondary desires which had been overlooked by Butler." ("Passions," Sect. I. Mackintosh's " Diss.," Sect. V.)

He also shows how the association of ideas, which he characterizes as the "disposition in our nature to associate any ideas together for the future which once presented themselves jointly," has an influence upon our desires, primary and secondary, and specially on our sense of beauty. " Some objects which, of themselves, are indifferent to any sense, yet by reason of some additional grateful idea may become very desirable, or by like addition of an ungrateful idea ma raise the strongest aversion. When any circumstance, dress, state, posture, is constituted as a mark of infamy, it may become, in like manner, the object of aversion, though in itself most inoffensive to our senses. If a certain way of living, of receiving company, of showing courtesy, is once received among those who are honored, they who cannot bear the expense of all this may be made uneasy at their condition, though much freer from trouble than that of higher stations. Thus dress, retinue, equipage, furniture, behavior, and diversions, are made matters of considerable importance by additional ideas." , The beauty of trees, their cool shades and their aptness to conceal from observation, have made groves and woods the usual retreat to those who love solitude, especially to the religious, the pensive, the melancholy, and the amorous. And do not we find that we have so joined the ideas of these dispositions of mind with those external objects, that they always recur to us along with them." He thus started those views regarding the influence of association of ideas on our perceptions of beauty and moral good which were prosecuted by Turnbull, Beattie, and others, till they culminated in the ingenious but extravagant theories of Alison and Jeffrey in regard to the beautiful, and of Adam Smith and Mackintosh as to virtue. Hutcheson certainly has not developed the full {78} influence of association of ideas, but the account which he gives is just, so far as it

goes.[18]

He dwells at great length on the sense of beauty. The feeling is raised at once on the perception of certain objects. He does not stand up for beauty supposed to be in the nature of things without relation to any mind perceiving it. On the contrary, all beauty implies the perception of some mind. Still there may be a distinction drawn between original or absolute beauty on the one hand, and relative or comparative beauty on the other. By the former he understands the beauty which we perceive in objects without comparison with any thing external, such as that observed in the works of nature, artificial forms, figures, theorems; by the latter, the beauty founded on uniformity, or a kind of unity between the original and the copy. In determining what the beautiful is, he propounds the theory that it is a compound ratio of uniformity and variety, so that where the uniformity of bodies is equal, the beauty is as the variety; and where the variety is equal, the beauty is as the uniformity. He seeks to establish this view by examples, dwelling on beautiful objects in nature and art, showing how there is in all of them uniformity or unity, proportion or harmony. This doctrine may not be the full theory of beauty; but there must surely be some truth in it; for in some modification or other it has cast up among profound thinkers in all ages, from Plato and Augustine in ancient times, to Cousin, Macvicar, and Ruskin in our day.

He stands up resolutely for the existence of disinterested and social affections. He earnestly opposes those who, like the Cyrenaics, and probably the Epicureans, would make pleasure the end of existence, and who would make us desire the good of others or of societies merely as the means of our own safety and prosperity, or as the means of some subtler {79} pleasures of our own by sympathy with others in their happiness; or who would make our end to be the pleasure we enjoy in being honored, or some reward we expect for our services, and these either from God or man. He opposes also that more refined system which makes our aim the joys proceeding from generous motions and moral approbation. He shows, with great acuteness, that in all our desires, whether benevolent or selfish, there is some motive, some end intended distinct from the joy of success, or the removal of the pain of desire; and that there is first the motive operating, and then the joy or pain following, according as the motive is gratified or thwarted. He proves that men have affections, such as the love of offspring and of relatives, which fit them for a state of society; he takes pains to show that in this respect he differs from Puffendorf, who constructs his theory of society on the principle that self-love is the spring of all our actions; and he offers a most determined opposition to Hobbes when he makes the natural state of man to be one of war.

A considerable portion of all his works is occupied in demonstrating that man is possessed of a moral sense. In his "Inquiry," published before Butler's "Sermons on Human Nature," he declares, " that from the very frame of our nature we are determined to perceive pleasure in the practice of virtue, and to approve of it when practised by ourselves or others." He declares that the vast diversity of moral principles in various ages and nations " is indeed a good argument against innate ideas or principles, but will not evidence mankind to be void of a moral sense to perceive virtue or vice in actions." He ever kindles into a gentle warmth when he speaks of the joys derived from this sense, which he represents as purer and more elevated than those which can be had from any other source. The conscience, though often unable to govern our inferior nature, is yet in its own nature born for government; it is the ruling principle ([Greek term]) to which all things had been subjected in the entire (*integro*) state of our nature, and to which they ought to be subjected. His views on the subject of the supremacy of conscience are not so thoroughly wrought out as those of Butler; but they are explicitly stated, and become more decisive in his later works.

But what is the quality in actions looked at, appreciated, and {80} approved by the moral sense? To this question Hutcheson gives, if not a satisfactory, a very decisive reply. He represents this quality as good-will or benevolence. " All those kind affections which incline us to make others happy, and all actions which flow from such affections, appear morally good, if while they are benevolent towards some persons they be not pernicious to others." Advancing, a step farther, he discovers that "the several affections which are approved, though in very different degrees, yet all agree in one general character of tendency to the happiness of others," and the most perfectly virtuous actions are such " as appear to have the most unlimited tendency to the greatest and most extensive happiness of all the rational agents to whom our influence can reach." He is evidently inclined to reckon the moral sense as planted in our nature to lead us to commend at once those actions which tend towards the general happiness. His theory of virtue thus comes to be an exalted kind of eudaimonism, with God giving us a moral sense to approve of the promotion of happiness without our discovering the consequences of actions. Hume required only to leave out the divine sanction (he retained some sort of moral sense) in order to reach his theory of virtue consisting in the useful and agreeable. Hutcheson opposes very resolutely all those moralists who seek to give morality a deeper foundation in the nature of things. The function of reason in morals is simply to show what external actions are laudable or censurable, according as they evidence good or evil affections of soul.[19]

Proceeding on these principles, derived mainly from Shaftesbury, but more systematically expounded, he builds up a system of moral philosophy. He gives a division of the virtues, and treats of the duties we owe toward God, toward mankind, and toward ourselves. In proving the existence of God, he appeals to the structure of the world. He reaches the divine perfections by a set of metaphysical principles surreptitiously introduced, and scarcely consistent with his philosophy. {81} He answers the objections derived from the existence of evil in a commonplace way, by showing how particular evils are necessary to superior good. He seeks to establish the immortality of the soul by an appeal to the nature of the soul as being different from the body, and to the hopes of a future state.

He enters at great length into the discussion of the ages which preceded him, as to the law of nature. He shows that there are rights antecedent to the institution of civil government. He establishes the right of property, first, on the principle that " things fit for present use the first occupier should enjoy undisturbed; " and on the farther principle, that each has a right to the fruits of his own labor, and that it is the common interest of society, and tends towards the furtherance of industry, that mankind should be secured in their possessions.

He says that "civil power is most naturally founded by these three different acts of a whole people: (1) An agreement or contract of each one with all the rest, that they will unite into one society or body, to be governed in all their common interests by one council; (2) A decree or designation made by the whole people of the form or plan of power and of the persons to be intrusted with it; (3) A mutual agreement or contract between the governors thus constituted and the people, the former obliging themselves to a faithful administration of the powers vested in them for the common interest, and the latter obliging themselves to obedience. Though it is not probable that, in the constitution of the several states, men have generally taken these three regular steps; yet it is plain that, in every just constitution of power, there is some such transaction as implicitly contains the whole force of all the three." He argues that the people have a right of resistance, and of dethroning a prince who is grossly perfidious to his trust.

He thinks that the senate of the country should create a censorial power, " that by it the manners of the people may be regulated, and luxury, voluptuous debauchery, and other private vices prevented or made infamous." He holds that the " magistrate should provide proper instruction for all, especially for young minds, about the existence, goodness, and providence of God, and all the social duties of life and motives {82} to them." But he particularly maintains that " every rational creature has a right to judge for itself in these matters." While an earnest supporter of liberty of thought and action, he yet holds " as to those who support atheism, or deny a moral providence, or the obligation of the moral law, or social virtues, that the state may justly restrain them by force, as hurting,, it in its most important interests."

When Calamy heard of Hutcheson's call to Glasgow, he smiled, and said he was not for Scotland, and that he would be reckoned there as unorthodox as Simson. But Hutcheson lived an age later than Simson; he was much more prudent, and was personally liked; he was professor of philosophy and not of theology; and so he passed through life with very little public opposition. Still the stone which he had set a-moving could not go on without meeting with some little ruffling. About the beginning of the session 1737-38, a paper was printed and published anonymously by one who professed to have been lately in the college, charging Hutcheson with teaching dangerous views. I have not seen this attack; but the reply prepared by a body of his favorite students is preserved. There seems to be force in some of the objections taken; others entirely fail. It is objected to him that he taught that we could have the knowledge of moral good and evil, although we knew nothing of the being of a God; it is replied that Hutcheson's doctrine was that we might have knowledge of some virtues, though we had not known God, and that a notion of moral good must come prior to any notion of the will or law of God. It is objected that he taught that the tendency to promote the happiness of others is the standard of moral goodness; it is acknowledged in the answer that benevolent affections towards others are our primary notion of moral goodness, and the primary object of our approbation. It is objected that he taught that it is sometimes lawful to tell a lie; it is answered that Hutcheson's doctrine was very much against lying, but did imply that there might be cases in which lying was justifiable.

Throughout Scotland there was an impression among the scholars who had been trained in the previous generation that he was sensualizing and degrading the old philosophy. The friends of evangelical truth perceived that the young preachers {83} who admired him addressed them in a very different speech from that of their old divines and from that of the inspired writers. The description given of the new style of preaching by the clerical satirist Witherspoon, in his " Characteristics," was found to have point and edge: " It is quite necessary in a moderate man, because his moderation teaches him, to avoid all the high flights of evangelic enthusiasm and the mysteries of grace of which the common people are so fond. It may be observed, nay, it is observed, that all our stamp avoid the word grace as much as possible, and have agreed to substitute the moral virtues' in the room of the `graces of the Spirit.' Where an old. preacher would have said a great decree of sanctification, a man of moderation and politeness will say a high pitch of virtue." In the advice to a good preacher the following counsels are given: "(1) His subjects must be confined to the social duties. (2) He must recommend them only from rational considerations; viz., the beauty and comely proportions of virtue, and its advantages in the present life, without any regard to a future state of more extended self-interest. (3) His authorities must be drawn from heathen writers; none, or as few as possible, from Scripture. (4) He must be very unacceptable to the common people." " The scattering a few phrases in their sermons, as harmony, order, proportion, taste, sense of beauty, balance of the affections, will easily persuade the people that

they are learned; and this persuasion is to all intents and purposes the same thing as if it were true. It is one of those deceitful feelings which Mr. Hg in his essays has shown to be beautiful and useful." In illustrating the third counsel he says: " It is well known there are multitudes in our island who reckon Socrates and Plato to have been much greater men than any of the apostles, although (as the moderate preacher I mentioned lately told his hearers) the apostle Paul had a university education and was instructed in logic by Gamaliel. Therefore let religion be constantly and uniformly called virtue, and let the heathen philosophers be set up as great patterns and promoters of it. Upon this head most particularly recommend M. Antoninus by name, because an eminent person of the moderate character says his `Meditations' are the best book that ever was written for forming the heart." The effect of this accommodation of religion to the {84} world is graphically and truly described: "The necessity of such a conduct cannot be denied when it is considered what effect the length and frequency of public devotion have had in driving most of the fashionable gentry from our churches altogether." "Now the only way to regain them to the church is to accommodate the worship as much as may be to their taste." "I confess there has sometimes been an ugly objection thrown up against this part of my argument; viz., that this desertion of public worship by those in high life seems, in fact, to be contemporary with, and to increase in a pretty exact proportion to, the attempts that have been made and are made to suit it to their taste."

Hutcheson's works got fit audience in his own day, but did not continue to be much read after his death. In his mode and manner of writing he is evidently indebted to the wits of Queen Anne, such as Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, Pope, and Swift, who were Frenchifying the English tongue, polishing away at once its roughness and its vigor, introducing the French clearness of expression, and, we may add, the French morals. Hutcheson has their clearness, but is without their liveliness and wit. His style is like a well-fenced, level country, in which we weary walking for any length of time; it is not relished by those who prefer elevations and depressions, and is disliked by those who have a passion for mountains and passes. He ever maintains a high moral tone but it is doubtful whether he has retained for morality a sufficiently deep foundation.

His philosophy is undoubtedly an advance upon that of Locke, and rises immeasurably above that of those professed followers of Locke in England and France, who in the days of Hutcheson were leaving out Locke's reflection, and deriving all man's ideas from sensation, and all his motives from pleasures and pains. His view of the moral faculty is correct so far as it goes. He represents it as natural to man, and in his very constitution and nature. There may even be a propriety in calling it a *sense* with the qualifying phrase *moral*, inasmuch as, like the senses, it is a source of knowledge, revealing to us certain qualities of voluntary acts or agents, and inasmuch as it has always feeling or sensibility attached to its exercises.

But, on the other hand, his view of the moral power falls greatly beneath that of the great English moralists of the previous century, and below that of the school of Clarke {85} in his own day. The word sense allies the conscience too much with the animal organism, and the whole account given of it separates it from the reason or higher intelligence. On this point he was met, immediately on the publication of his views, by Gilbert Burnet, who maintains that moral good and evil are discerned by reason; that there is first reason, or an internal sense of truth and falsehood, moral good and evil, right and wrong, which is accompanied by another succeeding internal sense of beauty and pleasure; and that reason is the judge of the goodness and badness of our affections and of the moral sense itself. Hutcheson does speak of the moral sense as being superior in its nature to the other senses, but he does not bring out so prominently and decisively as Butler did its supremacy and its right to govern.

If his theory of the moral power is superficial and defective, his account of that to which the conscience looks is positively erroneous. He represents virtue as consisting in benevolence, by which he means good-will. This view cannot be made to embrace love to God, except by stretching it so wide as to make it another doctrine altogether; for surely it is not as a mere exercise of good-will that to love God can be described as excellent. His theory is especially faulty in that it overlooks justice, which has ever been regarded by our higher moralists as among the most essential of the virtues. Nor is it to be omitted that his moral system is self-righteous in its injunctions, and pagan in its spirit. No doubt he speaks everywhere with deep admiration of the morality of the New Testament; but the precepts which he inculcates, are derived fully as much from Antoninus and the Stoics as from the discourses of our Lord, and the epistles of the apostles; and we look in vain for a recommendation of such graces as repentance and humility, meekness and long-suffering.

By bringing down morality from the height at which the great ethical writers, of ancient and modern times, had placed it, he prepared the way for the system of Adam Smith, and even for that of Hume. Smith was a pupil of his own, and Hutcheson was brought into contact with Hume. Hume submitted to Hutcheson in manuscript the " Third Part of his Treatise of Human Nature," that on morals, before giving it {86} to the world. The remarks which Hutcheson offered have been lost, but we can gather what they were from the letter which Hume sent him on receiving them, and which has been preserved. Hutcheson most characteristically objects to Hume, that he had not expressed a sufficient warmth in the cause of virtue, and that he was defective in point of prudence. Was this all that the high moralist Hutcheson had to object to the founder of modern utilitarianism? On the publication of his " Institutes of Moral Philosophy," Hutcheson sends a copy of it to Hume, who remarks upon it, specially objecting to it as adopting Butler's opinion, that our moral sense has an authority distinct from its force and desirableness g, but confessing his delight " to see such just philosophy, and such instructive morals, to have once set their foot in the schools. I hope they will next get into the world, and then into the churches." Yes, this was what the rationalists wished in that day, and what they wish in ours, to get their views *into the churches*. Hutcheson, though disapproving of the philosophy of Hume, and refusing to support him as a candidate for the chair of moral philosophy in Edinburgh, which he himself declined, had not retained sufficiently deep principles to enable him successfully to resist the great sceptic who had now appeared. Error has been committed, God's law has been lowered, and the avenger has come.

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VIII. -- RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS. -- RALPH ERSKINE.

WE are now in the heart of the Scottish conflicts of the century. It is the crisis of the contest between Cavalier and Whig. On one point the philosophers and the evangelicals agree: they are defenders of the House of Hanover and opponents of the Pretender and the Stuarts, of whom they could not expect that they would be supporters of culture on the one hand, or of Protestantism on the other. The last formidable contest between Jacobite and Whig, was decided in behalf of the latter in 1746, at Culloden; and henceforth the former. is sinking into a state of complaining and garrulous, though often lively, old age. The religious conflicts are deeper, and continue for a longer period. From the time of Hutcheson, there is a felt and known feud, not always avowed, between the new philosophy and the old theology. It would have been greatly for the benefit of both, had there been one to reconcile and unite them. In the absence of such, each ran its own {87} course and did its own work, being good so far as it went, and evil only in its narrowness and exclusiveness, in what it overlooked or denied. The philosophers were laudably engaged when they were unfolding man's intellectual, esthetic, and moral nature; but they missed the deepest properties of human nature, when, in the fear of the ghosts of fanaticism, they took no notice of man's feelings of want, his sense of sin, and his longing after God and immortality; and the views of theologians would have been more just and profound, had they observed -- always in the inductive manner of the Scottish school -- those nascent ideas of good and evil and infinity which are at the basis of all religious knowledge and belief. The evangelical preachers were only faithful to their great Master when they declined to allow the doctrines of grace to sink out of sight; but they erred so far as they opposed the refinement and liberal sentiments which the moral philosophers were introducing, and showed that they were incapable of fully appreciating the apostolic command, "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." Pity it is that it should be so, but it is only by vibrations that the world moves on, only by breezes that its atmosphere is kept pure; and when the church errs by cowardice, it has to be rebuked by the unbelieving as -- an old Covenanter might have said -- the father of the faithful was rebuked by a pagan Egyptian. It was only in a later age, and mainly through the influence of Chalmers, that the church was prepared heartily to accept what was true in the Scottish philosophy, and to acknowledge its compatibility with the doctrine of salvation by grace.

Three distinct religious parties are being formed in Scotland, not including the covenanting "remnant," who never submitted to the Revolution settlement, and whose vocation was on the mountains, rather than the colleges of their country. First, in the Church of Scotland there is the "Moderate" type of minister crystallized by coldness out of the floating elements. He is or be affects to be elegant and tolerant, and he is terribly afraid of a zealous religious life. He wishes to produce among the people a morality without religion, or at least without any of the peculiar dogmas of Christianity. As yet he himself is a moral man, and the people are moral, for they believe in the old theology; in the next age both pastors and people, retaining little faith, become considerably immoral, showing that, if we would have the fruit good, we must make the tree good. This party, preaching moral sermons without doctrine, is the genuine product of the Scottish philosophy in the Church of Scotland.

Secondly, the Evangelical party, called by their opponents `zealots' and `highflyers,' were placed in an ambiguous position and shorn of much of their strength since the enforcement of the law of patronage. They are fast becoming a minority, and a small minority, in the church; and they have to submit to much that they abhor, as, for example, to the settlement of pastors contrary to the will of the people. But they labor earnestly to keep alive the fire all through the dark and wild night; they cherish fellowship with other evangelical churches, and anticipate the missionary spirit of a later {88} age by countenancing the " Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge." They come into collision with the philosophic moralists by maintaining so resolutely the doctrines of grace; and they carry their antagonism to the " legal " system to the very verge of Antinomianism, as shown in their favor for the "Marrow of Divinity," this by a reaction prompting the moral divines to preach a morality without an atonement for immorality.

Thirdly, beyond the Established Church, the Seceding body, encompassed with hardships as fierce as the storms, but breathing a spirit as free as the air of their country, are rallying around them the old-fashioned and more determined religious life of Scotland. At this stage of its history it serves itself heir to the Covenants of the previous century, blames the Church of Scotland for being too indulgent, is intolerant of toleration, and has little sympathy with other churches. This body is beneath the notice of the philosophers; and in return it shows its utter distrust of them by declining to allow its students to attend the classes of moral philosophy, and appointing a professor of its own to give instruction in that branch, on which, as on other high departments of learning, it continued to set a high value. The event of that period which agitated lowland Scotland more than even the inroad of the Pretender was the preaching of Whitefield, which moved the common people as the winds do the trees of the forest. The moderate party affected to despise and actually hated the preacher and his doctrine. The evangelicals in the Established Church rejoiced in his labors and their fruits. The seceders might have triumphed in his success; but they expected him to identify himself with their peculiar ecclesiastical constitution, and stand by them in the fight for the old cause of the Covenant. Upon Whitefield declining to do this, they became jealous of his influence, and were in doubts about the sound character of the revivals which he was the means of awakening. Out of this arose a very curious controversy, forgotten by all but a few antiquarians, but not unworthy of being noticed.

Mr. Robe, belonging to the evangelical party in the Church of Scotland, and a promoter of revivals and of the lively feeling manifested in them, declared that "our senses and imagination are greatly helpful to bring us to the knowledge of the divine nature and perfections; " and in defending this he asked: " Can you or any man else think upon Christ really as he is, God-man, without an imaginary idea of it?" To this Ralph Erskine, the seceder, replies in a treatise Of 372 closely

printed pages, entitled " Faith no Fancy; or a Treatise of Mental Images, discovering the Vain Philosophy and Vile Divinity of a late Pamphlet entitled `Mr. Robe's Fourth Letter to Mr. Fisher,' and showing that an Imaginary Idea of Christ as Man (when supposed to belong to Saving Faith, whether in its Act or Object) imports nothing but Ignorance, Atheism, Idolatry, great Falsehood, or gross Delusion " (1745). He says of Mr. Robe: " This way of speaking appears indeed new and strange divinity to me, and makes the object of faith truly a sensible object; not the object of faith, but of sense." This leads him to criticise various philosophies. He refers to Tertuilian (as quoted by Jerome), who in regard to Platonic ideas said, " Haereticorum patriarchae philosophi." He shows him that the learned De Vries, Mastricht, and other eminent doctors {89} and divines abroad, had noticed how the ideal doctrine of Cartesius and his followers had led to imagery and idolatry. He also criticises Locke with considerable skill. "There seems nothing more common in the experience of mankind than that a man who hath the greatest stock of habitual knowledge and understanding relating to many truths, yet while his body sleeps, or his mind is in a muse about other things, lie perceives none of theme truths." So "I see no greater absurdity in saying one may leave a stock of seminal or habitual knowledge, though lie leave no actual knowledge, than to say one may have a stock of senses, though be hath no actual sensation, or consciousness of the acts or exercise of any of his senses, as a child not born or a man in a deep sleep; or a natural store of affections subjectively in him, and yet affected with nothing till occasions and objects appear. One may have a good pair of eyes, and yet see nothing till light be given and objects be presented. Nor is it an improper way of speaking to say a man hath not his eyes or sight, though he be not actually seeing. And as little is it improper to say a man hath understanding and knowledge, though he be not actually knowing or perceiving the truths he has the impress of in his understanding." This is a wonderfully clear statement of the distinctions between the seminal capacity and the actual ideas, between a laid-up stock and occasions, by which philosophers have sought to overthrow the theory of Locke. In regard to the special question discussed, Mr. Robe had quoted the received rule, "*Oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari*." Erskine quotes against him Hieroboord, " Mens non indiget semper phantasmata ad suas perceptiones." "The object of that idea is only corporeal things as corporeal; but the object of rational knowledge is not only corporeal things, but spiritual and corporeal things, not as corporeal, but as intelligible." " It is reason, and not sense, that is the only help to attain the natural knowledge of God and his perfections." Above reason he places faith. " True faith differs as much from, and is as far above, mere intellectual ideas as intellectual ideas are above corporeal and imaginary ideas; yea, much farther than human reason is above sense; even as far as what is above human and supernatural, is above merely natural." It is evident that there are curious questions started, though not precisely settled, as to the place which the phantasm has in thought, and the imagination in religion. We feel that we are in the society of men of reflection and of reading. The evangelical and the seceding ministers of these days are quite as erudite as the academic men who despised them, and are holding firmly by old truths which the new philosophy is overlooking.

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IX.-- ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL.

HE was a pupil of Professor Simson's, in Glasgow, and became minister of Tarbert in Stirlingshire. I have been able to collect few notices of him. He is worthy of being mentioned, as having had played upon him one of the basest tricks mentioned in literary history. He wrote a treatise on {90} "Moral Virtue," and sent it up to London to his friend, Alexander Innes, D.D., assistant at St. Margaret's, Westminster, to have it published; and Innes published it in his own name, with the date, Tothill Fields, Jan. 20, 1727-28. In 1730, Campbell went to London and exposed Innes's imposture. It seems that the Lord Chancellor, believing that Innes was the author of the work, presented him to a living. The Chancellor, being convinced of the deceit, sought to male amends by offering a living to Campbell, who declined the offer, saying that he preferred his own country; and he becomes professor of ecclesiastical history in St. Andrews. In 1733, he published the work in his own name, dating it St. Andrews, and disowning the " Prefatory Introduction " and " some little marginal notes of Innes." "An Inquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue, wherein is shown, against the Author of the Fable of the Bees, that Virtue is founded in the Nature of Things, is unalterable and eternal, and the great Means of Private and Public Happiness, with some Reflections on a late Book entitled `An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.' " Hutcheson, whom he thus assailed, spoke of him as no better than a disciple of Epicurus. His system is the boldest form of self-love. " Human nature is originally formed to pleasure and pain." " There is, indeed, a. distinction of goodness into natural and moral, but the latter as well as the former lies wholly in pleasure." 'God and all mankind are governed by one common principle, viz., self-love." "They can favor or esteem no other beings but as they gratify this principle." " The affections and actions that correspond to the self-love of our own species are likewise agreeable to the self-love of the Deity." " From self-love we desire the love and esteem of other intelligent beings." There is a passage in which there is an anticipation of Smith's theory of sympathy: " Whatever tenderness we conceive in favor of other people, it comes from putting ourselves in their circumstances, and must therefore be resolved into self-love." He also wrote a treatise on the " Necessity of Revelation," 1739; and another, " Oratio de Vanitate Luminis Naturae." He thinks it impossible that man kind, left to themselves, should `discover' the great truths and articles of natural religion, or should be capable of giving a system to natural religion." He died in April, 1756. A posthumous work, " The Authenticity of the Gospel History," was published 1759. He was opposed by [Alexander Moncrieff].

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X.-- ALEXANDER MONCRIEFF.[20]

ALEXANDER MONCRIEFF Of Culfergie in the parish of Abernethy was educated at the grammar school of Perth and St. Andrews University, and became minister of his native parish. He was favorable to the Marrow school of divinity, and took part with the Erskines in defending the popular rights and in seceding from the Church of Scotland, being one of the four fathers of the secession. In 1724, he was made their professor of divinity. He {91} died in 1761. He wrote "An Inquiry into the Principle, Rule, and End of Moral Actions, wherein the Scheme of Selfish Love laid down by Mr. Archibald Campbell . . . is examined, and the received Doctrine vindicated." To quote the summary supplied by his biographers, he establishes the following propositions: " (1) To show that self-love is not, or ought not to be, the leading principle of moral virtue; (2) That self-interest or pleasure is not the only standard by which we can and should judge of the virtue of our own and others' actions, or that actions are not to be called virtuous on account of their correspondency to self-interest; (3) That self-love, as it exerts itself in the desire of universal, unlimited esteem, ought not to be the great remaining motive to virtuous actions," &c.

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XI.-- RISE OF THE ABERDEEN BRANCH.

THE north-east of Scotland, -- embracing Aberdeen, Banff, Murray, Mearns, and a large portion of Angus, -- though now very much amalgamated with the rest of Scotland, had a character of its own in the seventeenth century. The people had a large Scandinavian element in their composition, had a shrill intonation, and a marked idiom, and a harder aspect (though probably with quite as much feeling within) than the people of the south and west. When Samuel Johnson lumbered through the region in 1773, and visited Lord Monboddo, he found it miserably bare of trees; but, had he travelled a century or two earlier, he would have had to pass through wide-spread forests. These were cut down in the seventeenth century; and in the stead of the deer and wild animals a more industrious people substituted sheep and cattle, ranging over high mountains and large undulating plains, on which you would have seen patches of oats or bear here and there around the clay or turf dwellings of the tenants, but few fences or enclosures of any kind, except in the immediate neighborhood of the proprietors, whose castles and gardens, on the French model, relieved the wildness of the scene. On to the eighteenth century the rural population consisted of landlords, with rather small farmers absolutely dependent on them, and who paid their rent in the service, on certain occasions, of men and horses, and in such articles as oats, bear, mutton, salmon, geese, poultry, and peats. In these regions the peasantry had not been taught to think and act for themselves, as they had been in the south-west by the ploughing {92} up of the soil effected by the great covenanting movement. But in some of the towns, particularly in Aberdeen, which was looked up to as a capital by a considerably wide district, there was not a little refinement, which spread its influence over the landlords, the ministers of religion, and the other professional men: in particular, there had been in the city named a gifted painter, Jameson, a disciple of Rubens; and a very superior printer, Raban, who put in type the works of the Aberdeen doctors. The two universities, King's and Marischial's, trained and sent forth a large body of educated men, some of whom found their proper field on the Continent; while the great body of them remaining at home, were the special instruments-as teachers, clergymen, doctors, lawyers, or country gentlemen-of spreading a civilizing influence in these regions. For ten years after the Restoration, seventy students entered annually at King's, and a considerable number, though not so large, at Marischal some of these rose to eminence, and all of them helped to create a taste for learning and an appreciation for it, on the southern slope of the Grampians, and in the wide region lying north of that range of mountains, which was never crossed by the Roman legions, but was now conquered by the Roman literature.

The Calvinistic and covenanting principles which had determined the Scottish character in the

south and west, and so far north as Fife, Perth, and some parts of Angus, had not generally permeated the region beyond. No doubt, the common people in the northern counties gladly listened to the evangelical preachers from the west, when they had the opportunity; and some of the covenanting ministers, banished in the times of persecution from their own people in the south, gathered around them in the places of their exile -- as Samuel Rutherford in Aberdeen, David Dickson in Turriff -- bodies of devoted adherents attached to the Presbyterian preaching and organization. Still these were as yet merely fermenting, but leavening, centres in the midst of influences which were resisting their extension. In the wide country held by the Gordon family, the Roman Catholic religion still held its sway. In the other parts, the landlords, the college regents, and the clergy were mostly Cavalier in politics and High Church in religion; and the mass of the people bad not learned to claim the prerogative {93} of thinking and acting for themselves. When a deputation from the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland-consisting of Alexander Henderson, Samuel Rutherford, and Andrew Cant-went north to Aberdeen to proclaim the Covenant in 1638, they were met by "Replies and Duplies" on the part of the Aberdeen doctors, and the landlords discouraged their tenantry from following the new zeal imported from the south. The divines of Aberdeen, during that century, such as Baron and John Forbes (author of "Irenicum"), were adherents of Episcopacy; their studies were in the later fathers of the church, and their sympathies with the Laudean divines of England; and like them they wrote against Popery on the one hand, and Puritanism on the other. It was years after the Revolution before the Presbyterian Church could put its legal rights in execution in the north-east of Scotland. Almost all the old Presbyterian ministers had disappeared; and, in 1694, the Synod of Aberdeen consisted of six clerical members, most of them brought from the south. It was not till 1703 that John Willison was settled as first Presbyterian minister at Brechin in Angus; it was not till 1708 that he was in a position to dispense the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. When he intimated that he was to do so next Lord's day, Mr. Skinner, the Episcopalian minister who preached in the same church in the after part of the day, announced that he would dispense the communion on the same day in the afternoon to his supporters; and the ecclesiastical records report that 1500 communicated with Mr. Skinner. When Mr. Gray was appointed minister of Edzell, in the same district, the Presbytery had to conduct the services at his ordination in a neighboring parish; and they then passed into the parish to " lay hands on him " and return immediately; and, on the following sabbath when he rode to Edzell for the purpose of preaching, the people, hounded on by the landlords, took him off his horse, flung him into the West Water, and kept him there till he was nearly drowned, " to their eternal disgrace," as he causes it to be written in the parish records. During the Rebellion of 1715 the Presbyterian ministers were rabbled from their churches, which were occupied by the nonjuring clergy praying for the Pretender. A considerable body of the students in both the Aberdeen colleges sympathized {94} with the banished king; and, after the battle of Sheriffmuir, several of the professors had to retire in consequence of the part which they had taken against the government. It was not till after the suppression of the Rebellion of 1715,-indeed, not fully till after the crushing of the chieftain power after 1745,-that the north-east of Scotland became one with the south of Scotland in religion and in national feeling.

In the universities, both tinder Prelatic and Presbyterian domination, the philosophy taught had been to a great extent Aristotelian and scholastic. The university commissioners appointed, in 1643, a *cursus* for Aberdeen; and in it the student is required, after taking Greek the first year, to go on the second year to the dialectics of Ramus, to Aristotle's categories, interpretation, and prior analytics, and in the third year to the rest of logics and portions of the ethics of Aristotle, &c. In the

" Metaphysics " of Robert Baron, who lectured in Marischal College in the first half of the seventeenth century, he treats of being, unity, and goodness; enters fully into the controversy between the Thomists and Scotists; gives the divisions of *ens* and of cause, and treats of necessity and contingency, of sameness and diversity, of absolute and relative, of whole and parts. In the university library of Aberdeen we have theses occupying 121 pages by Andrew Cant, the younger, of date 1658; in these he shows that he knew the Copernican theory of the heavens and Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood: but the whole discussions are conducted in a formal manner; and he dwells fondly on the scholastic logic, in the treatment of which he shows some independence of thought. In 1710 there was published a work by Thomas Blackwell, who had come from Paisley, in 1700, to be minister at Aberdeen in the Presbyterian interest, and who was made professor in 1711, and principal in 1717: his work is entitled " Schema Sacrum, or a Sacred Scheme of Natural and Revealed Religion; " and in it the common orthodox theology is defended by the old distinctions, and there are no traces of a new spirit or a new school.

But, after the year 1715, Aberdeen was prepared for a new style of thought. The High Church theology was no longer encouraged, except among a scattered nonjuring clergy subjected to poverty and privation. The Calvinistic divinity had {95}never struck its roots deep into the soil; but the literature and physical science of England were known

to and relished by the educated classes, and there must be a fresh philosophy to meet the awakened intelligence and new tastes of the country. The first to gratify this feeling was a young graduate of Edinburgh, appointed as one of the rectors in Marischal by the Crown, which had seized the patronage of the college, vacated by the attainder of Earl Marischal, who had been out in the rebellion.

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XII. -- GEORGE TURNBULL.[21]

THE celebrated Hogarth, in his "Beer Street," has a graphic picture of a porter drinking barley wine, after depositing on the ground a load, directed to the trunk-maker, of five enormous folios; one of which has on the back, "Turnbull on Ancient Paintings." Turnbull was one of the most voluminous writers of his age. I have read many thousand pages written by him; but I fear the greater part of the copies of his works have gone to the destiny indicated by Hogarth. It is disappointing to find that this author, who was both an able and a graceful writer, has passed away from the public view so effectively that it is difficult now to procure materials for his biography, or even to get a sight of most of his works. It may be doubted whether any one, except the writer of this history, has been at pains to peruse his works as a whole, for the last hundred years. Dugald Stewart, so well informed on British philosophy, had only looked into one of his volumes; and Sir William Hamilton, in his multifarious researches among obscure writers, does not seem to have thought it worth his while making any inquiries about him. Yet it can be shown that he exercised a greater influence than all other masters and writers put together on his pupil Thomas Reid,-the true representative of the Scottish philosophy. He seems to have been the son of the Rev. George Turnbull (his mother's name was Elizabeth Glass), of whom we {96} can gather a few scattered notices: as that he was born about 1656; that he graduated in Edinburgh University in 1675; that he became minister of Alloa in 1689, when the Episcopal clergyman was ejected; that he was translated to Tyningham in 1699; that he was nominated but not carried as moderator of the General Assembly in 1711; that he preached before that body in 1713; that his name appears among the members of "The Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge," in 1720 and that he died in June, 1744, at the age of eighty-eight. His son was born in 1698 (he was baptized July 15) graduated in Edinburgh in April, 1721 and in November of the same year he was appointed, by a presentation from the Crown, regent of Marischal College; and is taken on trial in philosophy and the Greek Language, and declares his willingness to sign the Confession of Faith. He comes to have among his colleagues Thomas Blackwell, son of the principal, admitted regent in 1723, who did much to create a taste for Greek in the college, and who is still known to antiquarian scholars by his learned but uninteresting works, "Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer," "Letters concerning Mythology," and " Memoirs of the Court of Augustus." In Aberdeen at that time there was-as we have seen there was in Glasgow-- a principal's party and an opposition party; and there were disputes about the election of the rector. The majority of the masters, including Mr. Turnbull, in opposition to the principal, Blackwell the elder, wish the society to make up a list of persons recommended for the office of rector, to be submitted to the procurators chosen by the

students in their nations; and, upon the principal refusing, they elect a preses in his room, and choose a rector, who holds a court and summons the principal to appear before them; but they are stayed in their career by a suit from " the Lords of Council and Session." On April 14, 1726, he has carried a batch of thirty-nine students through a course of philosophy on to graduation; and the last name on the list is Thomas Reid. As having to preside on this occasion, he prepares a thesis, afterwards published, to be discussed by the candidates, -- "De Pulcherrima Mundi Materialis turn Rationalis Constitutione," -- in which the new physics are employed to furnish proofs of the existence of God, and in which he declares that natural science (physiology) is to be taught before moral philosophy, and inclines to censure Socrates because {97} he discouraged inquiries into the structure of nature. He also printed, when at Aberdeen, a " Thesis on the Connection of Natural and Moral Philosophy." In his lectures on pneumatology he delivered to his students those views which, after being rewritten, were given to the world in his treatise on moral philosophy. In his later writings he frequently quotes Hutcheson and Butler; but his own philosophic opinions seem to have been formed, and delivered in lectures, before either of these influential writers had published any of their works.

In 1726, he published "A Philosophical Inquiry concerning the Connection between the Doctrines and Miracles of Jesus Christ." In it he treats of subjects in which there is a revived interest and which are anxiously discussed in our day, and advances principles which would be favorably received by many in these times. He argues that the works of Jesus were natural proper samples of his doctrines. That he had abandoned the old theology of Scotland is evident, from his declaring that the Scripture way of talking about the Spirit of God and his operations means simply assistance to the virtuous. It is interesting to notice, that in this treatise he refers once and again to common-sense as settling certain moral questions; in this, as in other matters, anticipating and probably guiding Dr. Reid.

In the spring of 1727, Turnbull resigned his office in Marischal College; and for the next twelve years we have little record of him. There is reason to believe that he became a travelling tutor, -- it is said, to the family of the Wauchopes, of Niddry, near Edinburgh. It is certain that he must have travelled extensively on the Continent, and made himself conversant with the treasures of art in Italy. In 1732, he received the honorary degree of doctor of laws from the University of Edinburgh. He seems to have mingled in the literary circles of London,[22] and acquired friends among persons of eminence. During these years he prepared an immense store of literary works, which were issued in rapid succession, -- more rapidly, I suspect, than the public were prepared to receive them. In {98} October, 1739, he advertises, at four guineas, in sheets, his " Treatise on Ancient Painting;" in which he has observations on the rise, progress, and decline of that art among the Greeks and Romans, comments on the genius of Raphael, Michael Angelo, Nicholas Poussin, and others, and illustrates the work will) engravings of fifty pieces of ancient painting. It will be remembered that Shaftesbury had " Disquisitions on Taste;" and we shall see most of the Scottish metaphysicians speculate on taste and beauty. The work was not of such an original or daring character as to recommend it to the genius of Hogarth; yet it seems to have had a considerable roll of subscribers. " is style is pleasant, and the remarks judicious and highly appreciative of the classical painters. In February, 1740, there appeared his most important work, and the only one that continues to be read, "The Principles of Moral Philosophy." At the close he promises, as soon as his health admits, a work on " Christian Philosophy," which was actually published before the close of the year; and in it he treats of the Christian doctrines concerning God, providence, virtue, and a future state, and recommends the Word of God because it embraces and illustrates such

doctrines. He dates October, 1740, a preface and appendix to Heineccius's " Methodical System of Universal Law."[23] In 1742, he published " Observations upon Liberal Education; and in it he speaks as having long been engaged in the work of education. He subscribes himself as Chaplain to the Prince of Wales, and dedicates the treatise to the " Right Reverend Father in God," Thomas, Lord Bishop of Derry; in whose esteem, he says, " he had long had a share."[24] It appears that before {99}this time be had left the communion of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and entered into orders in the Episcopal Church of England, which was doubtless more congenial to his tastes. Through the bishop, to whom he dedicated his work, he was appointed Rector of Drumachose, in the diocese of Derry. I cannot find that he left any mark behind him in that parish: there is no remembrance of him in the popular tradition of the district, and no record of him in the diocese. In consequence of failing health, he went to the Continent, and died at the Hague, Jan. 31, 1748.[25]

Turnbull was the first metaphysician of the Scottish -- I believe of any -- school to announce unambiguously and categorically that we ought to proceed in the method of induction in investigating the human mind. He takes as the motto of his " Moral Philosophy " the passage from Newton about the method of natural philosophy being applicable to moral subjects, and the line of Pope, " Account for moral as for natural things." His enunciations on this subject are as clear and decided as those of Reid and Stewart in after ages. "If a fact be certain, there is no reasoning against it; but every reasoning, however specious it may be, -- or rather however subtle and confounding, -- if it be repugnant to fact, must be sophistical." It must have been from Turnbull that Reid learned, even as it was from Reid that Stewart learned, to appeal to common language as built on fact or universal feeling. "Language not being invented by philosophers, but contrived to express common sentiments or what every one perceives, we may be morally sure that where universally all languages make a distinction there is really in nature a difference." Reid only catches the spirit of his old master, who speaks of " philosophers who, seeking the knowledge of human nature not from experience, but from I know not what subtle theories of their own invention, depart from common language, and therefore are {100} not understood by others, and sadly perplex and involve them selves." In some respects, his exposition of the method is more comprehensive and correct (so I believe) than that given by Reid and Stewart; inasmuch as he avows distinctly that, having got facts and ideas from experience, we may reason deductively from them, in what Mr. J. S. Mill calls the deductive method, but which is in fact a joint inductive and deductive method. He sees clearly that in natural philosophy there is a mixture of experiments with reasonings from experiments; and he asserts that reasonings from experiments may have the same relation to moral philosophy that mathematical truths have to natural philosophy. " In both cases equally, as soon as certain powers or laws of nature are inferred from experience, we may consider them, reason about them, and compare them with other properties, powers, or laws." He instances among the moral ideas which we may compare, and from which we may draw deductions, those of intelligence, volition, affection, and habit. Moral philosophy is described by him as a mixed science of observations, and reasoning from principles known by experience to take place in or to belong, to human nature. In his preface to Heineccius, he says that the appended " discourse upon the nature and origin of laws is an attempt to introduce the experimental way of reasoning into morals, or to deduce human duties from internal principles and dispositions in the human mind." In following this method, he claims to be superior to Puffendorf, to Grotius, and the older jurists.

Proceeding in this method he discovers, both in matter and mind, an established order and excellent general laws, and on this subject quotes largely from his contemporaries Berkeley and

Pope. He constantly appeals to these laws as illustrating the divine wisdom; and to the excellence of laws as justifying the divine procedure, despite certain incidental acts which may flow from them. As inquirers discover these laws, science is advanced; and he dwells as fondly on the progressiveness of knowledge as Bacon had done and as Stewart has done.

In particular, he shows that if we look at human nature as a whole, and at its several parts, we shall find beneficent general laws. He discovers in our constitution means to moral ends, and the science of these means and ends is properly {101} called moral philosophy. He shows that by such a study we can discover what are natural laws; and that, in all well-regulated states, the sum and substance of what is called its civil laws are really laws of natural and universal obligation adding that "civil law adopts only those laws of nature on which the quiet of mankind entirely depends, and that there are other duties to which men must attend out of reverence to their Creator and sincere love to mankind, without regard to the fear of human penalties." He shows that mankind are not left indifferent to virtue and to beauty: "As we are capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, so we are capable of distinguishing good and approvable actions, affections, and characters, from bad and disapprovable ones." He would call this capacity moral sense, moral taste, moral discernment, or moral conscience. Like Shaftesbury (" who must live forever in the esteem of all who delight in moral inquiries"), and Hutcheson, whom he often approvingly quotes, he represents the virtues as capable of being reduced into benevolence.

In unfolding the elements of human nature, he dwells with evident fondness on the "association of ideas." He does not seem to attempt an ultimate resolution of the laws; but he considers association as "a league or cohesion formed by frequent conjunction in the mind," and says that "any appearance immediately suggests its concomitants and consequents to us." He adds, that association is more easily engendered between ideas that have some affinity or likeness." It may be doubted whether we have a better account at this day of the law of association as a whole. In regard to what Brown calls " secondary laws," and Hamilton the " law of preference," he prescribes two rules from Cicero for helping the memory: one is to attend to the things we would wish to recall; and the other is to consider its analogies, relations, and oppositions to other objects which will thus call it up. He accounts (as Stewart does) by the association of ideas for the law of habit, which he represents as a " propension to do, and a facility and readiness in doing, what we have often done." He shows truly and ingeniously how association influences the senses, by connecting the qualities perceived by one sense with those perceived by the others (a subject much dwelt on in a later age {102} by Brown); and, in particular, how, according to the theory of Berkeley, it aids the eye in discovering distance, not itself an idea of sight. He shows how our ideas have other ideas so associated with them that they make one perception, and how difficult it is to separate ideas that have thus been associated, and to find out precisely and philosophically what is involved in any particular idea, and how apt we are in consequence to confound qualities that are different. He is particularly successful in showing that desires and volitions are prompted by associations. " Ideas, as often as they return, must excite certain affections; and the affections which lead to action must, as often as they are revived, dispose and excite to act, or, in other words, produce will to act." He remarks that " very few, if any, of the ideas which excite our warmest and keenest affections are quite free from associated parts." He insists that " various associations must produce various tempers and dispositions of mind; since every idea, as often as it is repeated, must move the affection it naturally tends to excite, and ideas with their correspondent affections often returning must naturally form inclinations, propensions, and tempers." He would account in this way for much of our feeling of beauty, and for propensity to imitate passing into custom. His

exposition of the association of ideas is more satisfactory and accurate than the one, so much commended, published by Hume at the same time; and is far more philosophical than that given by Reid, who, in this respect, fell behind his master. I jam acquainted with no exposition of this part of our constitution published prior to his time which seems to me so full and correct.

His ideas on education are liberal and advanced. He is opposed to corporal punishment, and declares that the grand aim of education should be to foster good habits. Giving a high place to the study of the mind, he maintains, as did all the great masters of the Aberdeen school who came after him, that mental science should not be taught to young men till their minds have been other-wise well furnished. He gives logic a somewhat large and wide field;, in this respect, too, like the Scottish metaphysicians who came after him. Its province is to " examine the power and faculties of our minds (favorite phrases of Reid's), their objects, and operations; to inquire {103} into the foundations, the causes of error, deceit, and false taste; and, for that effect, to compare the several arts and sciences with one another, and to observe how each of them may derive light and assistance from all the rest. Its business is to give a full view of the natural union, connection, and dependence of all the sciences." Like Reid, and Stewart after him, he sets a high value on the study of " the nature and degrees of moral, probable, or historical evidence," and complains that it is left out in the logical treatises. The teacher should aim to make his pupil look at things, instead of words. At the same time, he recommends the study of languages with the study of things employing language in an enlarged sense, as embracing the different methods of expressing, embellishing, or enforcing and recommending truth, such as oratory, poetry, design, sculpture, and painting. He complains that in education the arts of design are quite severed, not only from philosophy, but from classical studies. The object contemplated by him in his work on " Painting " was to bring these various branches into union: he thinks that paintings may teach moral philosophy. The essential elements of painting are represented by him as being truth, beauty, unity, greatness, and grace, in composition. He dwells fondly on the analogy between the sense of beauty and moral sense; and on the inseparable connection between beauty and truth. His works on " education " and on the fine arts are clear and judicious, written in a pleasant and equable, but at the same time a commonplace style; and they seem never to have attracted the attention which they deserved, and which would have been freely given to works of greater pretension, eccentricity, or extravagance.

But, after all, we are most interested in noticing the points in which Turnbull seems to have influenced Reid. We have already had some of these before us. We have seen that Turnbull announces as clearly as Reid that the human mind is to be studied by careful observation. Both are averse to abstruse scholastic distinctions and recondite ratiocinations on moral subjects. Turnbull ever appeals, as Reid did after him, to consciousness as the instrument of observation. Both are fond of designating mental attributes by the terms ,powers " and "faculties." Both would give a wide, and I may add a loose, field to logic, and include in it the inquiry into the nature of probable evidence. {104} In proceeding in the way of observation, both discover natural laws or principles, and both call them by the name of " common-sense." " Common-sense is certainly sufficient to teach those who think of the matter with tolerable seriousness and attention, all the duties and offices of human life; all our obligations to God and our fellow-creatures; all that is morally fit and binding. And there is no need of words to prove that to be morally fit and obligatory, which common-sense and reason clearly show to be so." Reid holds that all active power implies mind. This was the expressed doctrine of Turnbull before him. " It is, therefore, will alone that produces both power and productive energy." " To speak of any other activity and power, is to Speak without any meaning at all; because experience, the only source of all our ideas (and of the

materials of our knowledge), does not lead us to any other conception or idea of power." Nor should it be omitted that both -- in this respect, however, like all the other Scotch metaphysicians ever speak with profound reverence of Scripture; ever, however, dwelling most fondly on those doctrines of the word which are also truths of natural religion; such as the existence of God, the obligations of morality, and the immortality of the soul.

I have been at pains to trace these agreements, not with the view of depreciating the originality and still less the independence of Reid, who may have had some of these views suggested to him by his teacher, but who may have afterwards found them in other writers, and who no doubt thought them all for himself, and adopted them because they seemed to him to be sound.[26] We have seen that in one or two points, Reid fell behind his master, who had clearer apprehensions than his pupil of mingling deductive with inductive observation, and of the laws of the association of ideas. But in other and more important philosophic doctrines, Reid passed far beyond his teacher. Reid claims to be original in rejecting the ideal theory of sense perception; which had been the received one for two thousand years, which had been adopted by Locke, and pursued to its logical consequences by Berkeley. But Turn bull evidently adheres to the old view. " Properly speaking, what we call matter and space are but certain orders of sensible {105} ideas produced in us, according to established rules of nature, by some external cause; for when we speak of material effects and of space, we only mean, and can indeed only mean, certain sensible perceptions excited in our mind according to a certain order, which are experienced to be absolutely inert and passive, and to have no productive force." He speaks of the "external material world " as unperceived by us, and in itself absolutely unperceivable, as all philosophers acknowledged When, in speaking of the material world, he says it may be called the "external cause or occasion of those sensible ideas, and their connections, which make to each of us what we call the sensible world," we see that this is the doctrine which Reid set aside g, and yet we may notice that the phrase " occasion " is used by Turnbull, as by Reid, to designate the relation of the external action to the internal perception. In another point, Reid made a more important advance upon Turnbull. Living at a later age, Reid had to meet the objections of the great modern revolutionist, and had in consequence to dive down into profounder depths of the human constitution. The scepticism of Hume brought out to view the superficialities of the philosophy of Shaftesbury, partly by following its principles to their legitimate consequences, but mainly by making all men feel that it is nothing wherewith to meet the assaults of the new and formidable enemy. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Turnbull had all appealed to common-sense; but Reid behoved to take a deeper and more searching view of the principles which constitute common-sense, in order to meet the exigencies of the new era.

Turnbull's works had no great circulation in their own day, and they speedily disappeared from public view. It might have been different had he continued in Aberdeen, and gathered around him a body of young men ready to receive and to propagate the lessons he taught them. But he departed into other fields, -- into the literary circle of England, and a church which set more value on liturgy than on abstract doctrine, -- and there he met with few to appreciate his gifts. A Presbyterian Scot might have urged, with some plausibility, that his name has perished because he forsook the country and the church in which his philosophic labors would have been valued. It might even have been different, had he published his metaphysical {106} treatises a dozen of years earlier; for then they might have run their course with those of Hutcheson and Butler. But at the very time that Turnbull advertised his work on "Moral Philosophy," Hume published his "Treatise of Human Nature," which, as it forced its way to the front, required philosophy to deepen its foundations and give a new facing to its buttresses. Turnbull is remembered because he

had, for three years, when he was himself a very young man, a diligent and thoughtful pupil, who in due time wrestled with the great sceptic, and is acknowledged by Scotland as the representative of its native philosophy.

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XIII.-- DAVID FORDYCE. [27]

HE was born in Aberdeen in 1711, entered Marischal College in 1742, and was drowned at sea, as he was returning from travel, in September, 1751. During that age and the next there was a strong disposition towards the study of mental philosophy. In 1748, R. Dodsley began the publication of the " Preceptor," in London, and Fordyce wrote the article on " Moral Philosophy." He was appointed professor of moral philosophy in the college in which he bad been educated, in 1742. In 1745, he published " Dialogues concerning Education," a very pleasantly written book. He discusses the question whether nature or training does most, and inquires whether the Socratic method is fitted to bring forth what is in our nature. He dwells fondly, like most of the philosophers of the Scottish school, on the influence of the association of ideas. The religion he recommends was evidently the moderate type: " As the religion of Christ was designed as a plain, consistent rule of life, and not a system of abstracted reasonings and speculations, -- to influence the heart more than fill the head, -- I would endeavor above all things a high spirit of disinterested and extensive virtue." He was author also of an essay on "Action of the Pulpit." After his death there was published a work of his, " Theodorus, a Dialogue concerning the Art of Preaching," to which was added " A discourse on the Eloquence of the Pulpit, by James Fordyce." His " Elements of Moral Philosophy" was published in 1754. There is little that is original in his works, but much that is judicious and useful. It is evident that he was acquainted with the works of Butler and Hutcheson. " Moral philosophy contemplates human nature, its moral powers and connections, and deduces the laws of action." " Moral philosophy has this in common with natural {107} philosophy that it appeals to nature or to fact." He finds passions or affections, some private, some public, and above these; (1) reason or reflection; (2) conscience, by which we denominate some actions and principles of conduct honest and good, and others wrong, dishonest, or ill." " We came by the idea of moral obligation or duty in the same way as our other original and primary perceptions: we receive them from the Author of our nature." We employ reason in moral cases, in "examining the condition, relations, and other circumstances of the agent, and patient." " Therefore, when we use these terms, obligation, duty, ought, and the like, they stand for a simple idea." He opposes those who establish morals on the divine will, and those who place it in the natures and reasons, truths and fitnesses, of things."

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XIV.-- WILLIAM DUNCAN.[28]

HE was born in Aberdeen, July, 1717, and was the son of a respectable tradesman. He received his education partly at Aberdeen and partly at Foveran. He entered Marischal College in 1733, and took his degree in 1737. Originally, he was designed for the gospel ministry; but not finding an inclination for the work, he went, as so many Scottish youths have done in like circumstances, to London (in 1739), and devoted himself to literature; translating " Select Orations of Cicero " and " Caesar's Commentaries," which were long found useful by youths averse to turn over the leaves of a dictionary. He wrote for Dodsley's " Preceptor " the article on " Logic and this was afterwards published in a separate volume, and continued for an age or two to furnish, not very philosophical but very useful, instruction to Scottish and other youths. The work is partly psychological partly logical. In Book First he treats of the origin and division of ideas, and of language; in the Second, of judgment, self-evident and demonstrable; in the Third, of reasoning and demonstration; and in the Fourth, of invention, science, and the parts, of knowledge. He was appointed professor of philosophy in Marischal College, May 18, 1752, and entered the professorship, Aug. 21, 1753. He was drowned when bathing, May, 1760.

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XV.-- JOHN STEVENSON.[29]

FROM the date at which we have now arrived, we have a succession of distinguished men testifying to the benefit they received. from the instruction imparted in the departments of logic and moral philosophy in the Scotch colleges. As being among the eminently successful teachers of his age, we have to give a place to John Stevenson, professor of Logic or {108} "Rational and Instrumental philosophy" in the University of Edinburgh. Dugald Stewart says of him that to his ,valuable prelections, particularly to his illustrations of Aristotle's "Poetics," and of Longinus on the "Sublime," Dr. Robertson has been often heard to say, that lie considered himself as more deeply indebted than to any other circumstance in his academic studies." "I derived," says Dr. Somerville, "more substantial benefit from these exercises and lectures than from all the public classes I attended at the university." Similar testimony is borne by the famous leader of the evangelical party in the Church of Scotland, Dr. Erskine (see Life by Sir Henry W. Moncreiff). The course of instruction followed by Stevenson is given in the Scots Magazine, and is well worthy of being quoted as an exhibition of the highest style of education imparted in the age. He gives lectures upon "Heineccii Elementa Philosopliae Rationalis," and Wynne's abridgment of Locke's "Essay upon the Human Understanding: " in which he explains all the different forms of reasoning, the nature of certainty both mathematical and moral, with the different degrees of probability; and shows how the understanding is to be conducted in our inquiries after truth of all kinds. He likewise explains the fundamental rules to be observed in the interpretation of the texts of very ancient authors. He teaches metaphysics in lectures upon De Vries's "Ontologia," in which he explains the several terms and distinctions which frequently occur in the writings of the learned. He also lectures upon Longinus, in which he illustrates the several precepts of oratory given by Cicero and Quintilian; and also, upon Aristotle, in which he illustrates his rules by examples from ancient and modern poets, and explains the grounds of criticism in eloquence and poetry. He gives likewise a course upon "Heineccii Historia Philosophica," in which he gives an account of the most famous philosophers ancient and modern, and the several opinions by which the different sects were distinguished. Each of his students is required to make a discourse upon a subject assigned him, and to impugn and defend a thesis, for his improvement in the art of reasoning. These exercises are performed before the principal and some of the professors with open doors. The students met him two hours daily; one of them was devoted to lectures on logic, delivered in the Latin tongue. It is stated that the college opens about the 10th of October, and rises about the end of May. The shortening of the length of the session in the colleges of Scotland, in later years, has done much to lower the standard of attainment.

John Stevenson was appointed professor in Edinburgh, in 1730, and died Sept. 12th, 1775, in the eighty-first year of his age. It is mentioned to his credit, by Stewart, that at the age of seventy be gave a candid reception to the philosophy of Reid, which was subversive of the theories which he had taught for forty years; and that "his zeal for the advancement of knowledge prompted him, when his career was almost finished, to undertake the laborious task of new-modelling that useful compilation of elementary instruction to which a singular diffidence of his powers limited his literary exertions." (Stewart's " Life and Writings of Reid.") {109}

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XVI.-- SIR JOHN PRINGLE.[30]

HE was for a time " professor of pneumatology and ethical philosophy " in Edinburgh University. The pneumatics are divided into the following parts: (1) A physical inquiry into the nature of such subtle and material substances as are imperceptible to the senses, and known only front their operations; (2) The nature of immaterial substances connected with matter, in which is demonstrated, by natural evidence, the immortality of the human soul (3) The nature of immaterial created beings not connected with matter (4) Natural theology, or the existence and attributes of God demonstrated front the light of nature. Ethics or moral philosophy is divided into the theoretical and practical parts, in treating of which the authors lie chiefly uses are Cicero, Marcus Antoninus, Puffendorf, and Lord Bacon. He had lectures explaining the origin and principles of civil government, illustrated with an account of the rise and fall of the ancient governments of Greece and Rome, and a view of that form of government which took its rise from the irruptions of the northern nations. His students have also discourses presented to them upon some important heads of pneumatical or moral philosophy, which are delivered before the principal with open doors. Pringle was by no means so thorough an instructor as Stevenson. Carlyle describes him "as an agreeable lecturer, though no great master of the science he taught." " His lectures were chiefly a compilation from Lord Bacon's works, and had it not been for Puffendorf's small book, which he made his text, we should not have been instructed in the rudiments of the science." Nevertheless, we see that he discussed topics which must issue, sooner or later, in a scientific jurisprudence and political economy. We see, in the case both of Stevenson and Pringle, how much attention was paid in the Scottish universities to the practice of English composition.

Pringle's taste did not lie specially in metaphysics. He was born in Roxburghshire, in 1707, and became a physician. He settled in Edinburgh about 1734; and after 1748, resided in London, where be was elected president of the Royal Society in 1773. He died in 1782

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XVII.-- THOMAS BOSTON.

WE wish our readers to transport themselves to the eastern border country of Scotland, and to try to realize its condition in the first half of last century. People are apt to take their views of that district from Sir Walter Scott, who passed the most interesting portion of his boyhood there, and picking up the dim traditions of the past ere they were finally lost, and tingeing them with the romantic hues of his own imagination, has presented to us such a picture as a man of the nineteenth century, in love with chivalry, would be {110} likely to furnish of the ages of border strife. But the truth is, Sir Walter has given us only one side of the Scottish character; he never thoroughly sympathized with the more earnest features of the national mind, and he did not appreciate the attempts which were made in the seventeenth century to deliver the country from violence and superstition, and to Promote education and a scriptural religion. The people of the eighteenth century had such traditions of the earlier ages as to be glad that the days of the border raids had passed away. At the time we wish to sketch, two classes of people were to be found in the district. There were landed prorietors, disposed to allow no opposition to their not very generous or enlightened will, but who were already catching the taste for improving the land, which has made Berwickshire one of the most advanced agricultural districts in the three kingdoms. Under them were small farmers and their servants, with the ignorance and much of the rudeness of the previous ages, and not yet awakened to independent thought and action. Between them there was scarcely any middle class, except the parish ministers, who, in the early part of the century, if not highly cultivated, were zealous preachers of the doctrines of grace, and actively seeking to raise their people to church-going habits and a decent morality; and who, at a later date, as patrons began to assert their legal rights, and colleges adopted the new philosophy, became the most vehement opponents of the evangelical party: so that, in the days of Carlyle, the Synod of Merse and Teviotdale turned the vote against popular rights, and the ministers of it, coming to the General Assembly, rushed to the theatre to hear Mrs. Siddons when she happened to be in Edinburgh. Believing that there was nothing suited to them in such a religion, the common people set up in the towns and large villages seceding congregations, which drew towards them the more earnest of the inhabitants. Out of one of these congregations sprang Thomas M'Crie, who has given us the other phase of the Scottish character.

At the beginning of the century, the most remarkable man in the district was undoubtedly Thomas Boston. Born at Dunse in the previous century, he remembered his going, when a boy, to the prison of his native place to keep his father company when lie was incarcerated for resisting the imposition of Prelacy. All his life he is most sedulous and consistent in discountenancing the system

of church patronage, which is being steadily introduced. Settled as a minister first in Simprin, and then in Ettrick, he is consumingly earnest in visiting once a year, in catechising twice a year, and in preaching on Sabbath-day and week-day to, an ignorant and careless people just rising out of barbarism. But he contrived to retain a literary taste amidst his active parochial employments. With a difficulty in getting books, and rejoicing so when a good one came in his way, he was able, by his own independent study, to develop views in regard to the importance of Hebrew points which were far in advance of those attained in his time by any British scholar. Endowed with a clear, logical mind, he has, in his " Fourfold State " and " Covenant of Grace," given us perhaps the best exposition we have of the old Scotch theology in its excellencies,-- some would add, in its exclusiveness. Living and breathing in the doctrine of free grace, he seized with avidity and valued excessively the " Marrow of Modern Divinity," {111} which he found in the cottage of one of his people, and he vigorously opposed the moral or legal preaching which was fast coming in with the new literature and philosophy. Singularly single-minded, earnest, and fervent in his piety, this man becomes a favorite and a power, first in his district, and, in the end, by his theological works all over Scotland. In reading his Memoirs, we observe that lie was painfully careful in watching his moods of mind, often referring to spiritual interposition what arose from wretched health; and that he was ever looking on events occurring in God's providence as *signs* indicating that he should pursue a particular line of conduct. It needed a philosophy -- we regret that it should have been an infidel one which did the work -- to correct these errors of a narrow theology.[31]

The Scottish Philosophy

James McCosh
1875

XVIII.-- DAVID DUDGEON.

ALREADY the old orthodoxy was being troubled. Mr. David Dudgeon published, in 1732, a work entitled "The Moral World." We have no record of the early history of this man, and we do not know whether he received a college education. When he comes under our notice, he is tenant of a large farm called Lennel Hill, in the parish of Coldstream. In the work referred to he maintains, with clearness and ability, a doctrine like that of Anthony Collins, whom he had read. He asserts " that there is no evil in the moral world but what necessarily ariseth from the nature of imperfect creatures, who always pursue their good, but cannot but be liable to error or mistake," and that evil or sin is inseparable in some degree from all created beings, and most consistent with the designs of a perfect Creator." On account of the errors in this work, he was summoned before the Presbytery, where two charges are brought against him: 1st, That he denies and destroys all distinction and difference between moral good and evil, or else makes God the author of evil, and refers all evil to the imperfection of creatures; 2d, That he denies the punishment of another life, or that God punishes men for sin in this life, -- yea, that man is accountable. He appears before the court, and holds it to be contrary to Scripture that man has free-will in the Arminian sense, but holds that man is accountable and punishable for practising contrary to the divine precepts of our Saviour, the practice of which tends to make all men happy. The case goes up from presbytery to synod, and from synod to General Assembly, which remits it to the Commission of Assembly in 1733, again in 1734, again in 1735, and again in 1736, with no evidence that the commission ever ventured {112} to take it up.[32] In 1734, he published a vindication of the " Moral World," in reply to a pamphlet against him, said to be written by Andrew Baxter; and therein he maintains that when a rogue is hanged he is set free to enter a state where he may be reformed. His most important work is " Philosophical Letters concerning the Being and Attributes of God," first printed in 1737. These letters were written, in the midst of pressing agricultural cares. to the Rev. Mr. Jackson, author of a work written in the spirit of Clarke, " The Existence and Unity of God." In these letters, Dudgeon reaches a species of refined Spinozism, mingled with Berkeleyanism. He denies the distinction of substances into spiritual and material, maintains that there is no substance distinct from God, and that "all our knowledge but of God is about ideas they exist only in the mind, and their essence and modes consist only in their being perceived." In 1739, he published a " Catechism founded upon Experience and Reason, collected by a Father for the use of his Children " and, in an introductory letter, lie wishes that natural religion alone was embraced by all men, and states that, though he believes there was an extraordinary man sent into our world seventeen hundred years ago to instruct mankind, yet he doubts whether he " ever commanded any of those

things to be written concerning him which we have." The same year, he published " A View of the Necessitarian or Best Scheme, freed from the Objections of M. Crousaz, in his Examination of Pope's `Essay on Man.'"

Dudgeon died at Upsettlington, on the borders of England, January, 1743, at the age of thirty-seven. His works were published in a combined form in 1765, in a volume without a printer's name attached, showing, that there was not as yet thorough freedom of thought in Scotland. His writings had for a time a name in the district (the " Catechism " reached a third edition), but afterwards passed away completely from public notice. The late Principal Lee was most anxious to know more of his history, and in particular whether he could have influenced David Hume in personal intercourse or by his writings. As they lived in the same district, Hume must have heard of the case, which appeared when Hume was cogitating his own system. There are points in which Dudgeon anticipated Hume. Thus, Dudgeon maintains that all knowledge is about ideas, the essence of which is that they are perceived. He says that the words "just, unjust, desert &c., are necessarily relative to society; " and that if we allow that there is not justice in the government of this world, we cannot argue that there is justice in the world to come. Dudgeon, too, is a stern necessarian. But in all these points Dudgeon had himself been anticipated by others. In other respects the two widely differ. Dudgeon assumes throughout a much higher moral tone than Hume ever did. Dudgeon had evidently abandoned a belief in Christianity, but he stood up resolutely for a rational demonstration of the existence of God as the cause of the ideas which come under our experience; and he has a whole system of natural religion: whereas Hume undermines all religion, natural as well as revealed. {113} Dudgeon had superior philosophic abilities; and in other circumstances might have had a chance of becoming the head of a new philosophic Heresy. But there was a young man in his own neighborhood being trained to supersede and eclipse him in his own line, and to go beyond deism to atheism. It is thus that error advances till it corrects itself.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

On Liberty

J.S. Mill
1859

Chapter I: Introductory

THE subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. A question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make itself recognized as the vital question of the future. It is so far from being new, that, in a certain sense, it has divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages, but in the stage of progress into which the more civilized portions of the species have now entered, it presents itself under new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment.

The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest; who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying upon the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks; by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power. To the first of these modes of

limitation, the ruling power, in most European countries, was compelled, more or less, to submit. It was not so with the second; and to attain this, or when already in some degree possessed, to attain it more completely, became everywhere the principal object of the lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind were content to combat one enemy by another, and to be ruled by a master, on condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations beyond this point.

A time, however, came in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way alone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage. By degrees, this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party existed; and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself. That (it might seem) was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified with the people; that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of its tyrannizing over itself. Let the rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made. Their power was but the nation's own power, concentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise. This mode of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of European liberalism, in the Continental section of which, it still apparently predominates. Those who admit any limit to what a government may do, except in the case of such governments as they think ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of sentiment might by this time have been prevalent in our own country, if the circumstances which for a time encouraged it had continued unaltered.

But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation. The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French Revolution, the worst of which were the work of an usurping few, and which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made itself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of nations; and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the power of the people over themselves," do not express the true state of the case. The "people" who exercise the power, are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised, and the "self-government" spoken of, is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who

succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this, as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals, loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations "the tyranny of the majority" is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.

Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant -- society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it -- its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit -- how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control -- is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should be, is the principal question in human affairs; but if we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed. The rules which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the first. The effect of custom, in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because the subJect is one on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to himself. People are accustomed to believe and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical

principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and his chief guide in the interpretation even of that. Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blamable, are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their reason -- at other times their prejudices or superstitions: often their social affections, not seldom their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness: but most commonly, their desires or fears for themselves -- their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest. Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots, between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and roturiers, between men and women, has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings: and the sentiments thus generated, react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of the ascendant class, in their relations among themselves. Where, on the other hand, a class, formerly ascendant, has lost its ascendency, or where its ascendency is unpopular, the prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the impress of an impatient dislike of superiority. Another grand determining principle of the rules of conduct, both in act and forbearance which have been enforced by law or opinion, has been the servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their temporal masters, or of their gods. This servility though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence; it made men burn magicians and heretics. Among so many baser influences, the general and obvious interests of society have of course had a share, and a large one, in the direction of the moral sentiments: less, however, as a matter of reason, and on their own account, than as a consequence of the sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them: and sympathies and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests of society, have made themselves felt in the establishment of moralities with quite as great force.

The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling, have left this condition of things unassailed in principle, however they may have come into conflict with it in some of its details. They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally. The only case in which the higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained with consistency, by any but an individual here and there, is that of religious belief: a case instructive in many ways, and not least so as forming a most striking instance of the fallibility of what is called the moral sense: for the odium theologicum, in a sincere bigot, is one of the most

unequivocal cases of moral feeling. Those who first broke the yoke of what called itself the Universal Church, were in general as little willing to permit difference of religious opinion as that church itself. But when the heat of the conflict was over, without giving a complete victory to any party, and each church or sect was reduced to limit its hopes to retaining possession of the ground it already occupied; minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they could not convert, for permission to differ. It is accordingly on this battle-field, almost solely, that the rights of the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle, and the claim of society to exercise authority over dissentients openly controverted. The great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his religious belief. Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves. One person will bear with dissent in matters of church government, but not of dogma; another can tolerate everybody, short of a Papist or an Unitarian; another, every one who believes in revealed religion; a few extend their charity a little further, but stop at the belief in a God and in a future state. Wherever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed.

In England, from the peculiar circumstances of our political history, though the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier, that of law is lighter, than in most other countries of Europe; and there is considerable jealousy of direct interference, by the legislative or the executive power with private conduct; not so much from any just regard for the independence of the individual, as from the still subsisting habit of looking on the government as representing an opposite interest to the public. The majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their power, or its opinions their opinions. When they do so, individual liberty will probably be as much exposed to invasion from the government, as it already is from public opinion. But, as yet, there is a considerable amount of feeling ready to be called forth against any attempt of the law to control individuals in things in which they have not hitherto been accustomed to be controlled by it; and this with very little discrimination as to whether the matter is, or is not, within the legitimate sphere of legal control; insomuch that the feeling, highly salutary on the whole, is perhaps quite as often misplaced as well grounded in the particular instances of its application.

There is, in fact, no recognized principle by which the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested. People decide according to their personal preferences. Some, whenever they see any good to be done, or evil to be remedied, would willingly instigate the government to undertake the business; while others prefer to bear almost any amount of social evil, rather than add one to the departments of human interests amenable to governmental control. And men range themselves on one or the other side in any particular case, according to this general direction of their sentiments; or according to the degree of interest which they feel in the particular thing which it is proposed that the government should do; or according to the belief they entertain that the government would, or would not, do it in the manner they prefer; but very rarely on account of any opinion to which they consistently adhere, as to what things are fit to be done by a government. And it seems to me that, in consequence of this absence of rule or principle, one side is at present as often wrong as the other; the interference of government is, with about equal

frequency, improperly invoked and improperly condemned.

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.

It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the

protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in neither case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception. In all things which regard the external relations of the individual, he is de jure amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment-seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external protection; judging himself all the more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the judgment of his fellowcreatures.

But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling

each to live as seems good to the rest.

Though this doctrine is anything but new, and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice. Society has expended fully as much effort in the attempt (according to its lights) to compel people to conform to its notions of personal, as of social excellence. The ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practise, and the ancient philosophers countenanced, the regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on the ground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens, a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom. In the modern world, the greater size of political communities, and above all, the separation between the spiritual and temporal authority (which placed the direction of men's consciences in other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs), prevented so great an interference by law in the details of private life; but the engines of moral repression have been wielded more strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in self-regarding, than even in social matters; religion, the most powerful of the elements which have entered into the formation of moral feeling, having almost always been governed either by the ambition of a hierarchy, seeking control over every department of human conduct, or by the spirit of Puritanism. And some of those modern reformers who have placed themselves in strongest opposition to the religions of the past, have been noway behind either churches or sects in their assertion of the right of spiritual domination: M. Comte, in particular, whose social system, as unfolded in his Traite de Politique Positive, aims at establishing (though by moral more than by legal appliances) a despotism of society over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the political ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers.

Apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers, there is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation: and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable. The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power; and as the power is not declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase.

It will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering upon the general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of it, on which the principle here stated is, if not fully, yet to a certain point, recognized by the current opinions. This one branch is the Liberty of Thought: from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of writing. Although these liberties, to some considerable amount, form part of the political morality of all countries which profess religious toleration and free institutions, the grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which they rest, are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, nor so thoroughly appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion, as might have been

expected. Those grounds, when rightly understood, are of much wider application than to only one division of the subject, and a thorough consideration of this part of the question will be found the best introduction to the remainder. Those to whom nothing which I am about to say will be new, may therefore, I hope, excuse me, if on a subject which for now three centuries has been so often discussed, I venture on one discussion more.

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On Liberty

J.S. Mill

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Chapter II: Of The Liberty Of Thought And Discussion

THE time, it is to be hoped, is gone by when any defence would be necessary of the "liberty of the press" as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of the question, besides, has been so often and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it needs not be specially insisted on in this place. Though the law of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it was in the time of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety;[1] and, speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional countries, to be apprehended that the government, whether completely responsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public. Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.

First: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.

Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical judgment, which is always allowed to it in theory; for while every one well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable. Absolute princes, or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference, usually feel this complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects. People more happily situated, who sometimes hear their opinions disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom they habitually defer: for in proportion to a man's want of confidence in his own solitary judgment, does he usually repose, with implicit trust, on the infallibility of "the world" in general. And the world, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact; his party, his sect, his church, his class of society: the man may be called, by comparison, almost liberal and largeminded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. Nor is his faith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages, countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties have thought, and even now think, the exact reverse. He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dissentient worlds of other people; and it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin. Yet it is as evident in itself as any amount of argument can make it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.

The objection likely to be made to this argument, would probably take some such form as the following. There is no greater assumption of infallibility in forbidding the propagation of error, than in any other thing which is done by public authority on its own judgment and responsibility. Judgment is given to men that they may use it. Because it may be used erroneously, are men to be told that they ought not to use it at all? To prohibit what they think pernicious, is not claiming exemption from error, but fulfilling the duty incumbent on them, although fallible, of acting on their conscientious conviction. If we were never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong, we should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties unperformed. An objection which applies to all conduct can be no valid objection to any conduct in particular.

It is the duty of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can; to form them carefully, and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right. But when they are sure (such reasoners may say), it is not conscientiousness but cowardice to shrink from acting on their opinions, and allow doctrines which they honestly think dangerous to the welfare of mankind, either in this life or in another, to be scattered abroad without restraint,

because other people, in less enlightened times, have persecuted opinions now believed to be true. Let us take care, it may be said, not to make the same mistake: but governments and nations have made mistakes in other things, which are not denied to be fit subjects for the exercise of authority: they have laid on bad taxes, made unjust wars. Ought we therefore to lay on no taxes, and, under whatever provocation, make no wars? Men, and governments, must act to the best of their ability. There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life. We may, and must, assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct: and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert society by the propagation of opinions which we regard as false and pernicious.

I answer, that it is assuming very much more. There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.

When we consider either the history of opinion, or the ordinary conduct of human life, to what is it to be ascribed that the one and the other are no worse than they are? Not certainly to the inherent force of the human understanding; for, on any matter not self-evident, there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it, for one who is capable; and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative; for the majority of the eminent men of every past generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify. Why is it, then, that there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct? If there really is this preponderance -- which there must be, unless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate state -- it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man, either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his mistakes by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cognizant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his position against all gainsayers knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and

has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter -- he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process.

It is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even at the canonization of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a "devil's advocate." The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted to posthumous honors, until all that the devil could say against him is known and weighed. If even the Newtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind could not feel as complete assurance of its truth as they now do. The beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it; and in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to truth, as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining it.

Strange it is, that men should admit the validity of the arguments for free discussion, but object to their being "pushed to an extreme;" not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any case. Strange that they should imagine that they are not assuming infallibility when they acknowledge that there should be free discussion on all subjects which can possibly be doubtful, but think that some particular principle or doctrine should be forbidden to be questioned because it is so certain, that is, because they are certain that it is certain. To call any proposition certain, while there is any one who would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we ourselves, and those who agree with us, are the judges of certainty, and judges without hearing the other side.

In the present age -- which has been described as "destitute of faith, but terrified at scepticism," -- in which people feel sure, not so much that their opinions are true, as that they should not know what to do without them -- the claims of an opinion to be protected from public attack are rested not so much on its truth, as on its importance to society. There are, it is alleged, certain beliefs, so useful, not to say indispensable to well-being, that it is as much the duty of governments to uphold those beliefs, as to protect any other of the interests of society. In a case of such necessity, and so directly in the line of their duty, something less than infallibility may, it is maintained, warrant, and even bind, governments, to act on their own opinion, confirmed by the general opinion of mankind. It is also often argued, and still oftener thought, that none but bad men would desire to weaken these salutary beliefs; and there can be nothing wrong, it is thought, in restraining bad men, and prohibiting what only such men would wish to practise. This mode of thinking makes the justification of restraints on discussion not a question of the truth of doctrines, but of their usefulness; and flatters itself by that means to escape the responsibility of claiming to be an infallible judge of opinions. But those who thus satisfy themselves, do not perceive that the assumption of infallibility is merely shifted from one point to another. The usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion: as disputable, as open to discussion and requiring discussion as much, as the opinion itself. There is the same need of an infallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion to

be noxious, as to decide it to be false, unless the opinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself. And it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. The truth of an opinion is part of its utility. If we would know whether or not it is desirable that a proposition should be believed, is it possible to exclude the consideration of whether or not it is true? In the opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful: and can you prevent such men from urging that plea, when they are charged with culpability for denying some doctrine which they are told is useful, but which they believe to be false? Those who are on the side of received opinions, never fail to take all possible advantage of this plea; you do not find them handling the question of utility as if it could be completely abstracted from that of truth: on the contrary, it is, above all, because their doctrine is "the truth," that the knowledge or the belief of it is held to be so indispensable. There can be no fair discussion of the question of usefulness, when an argument so vital may be employed on one side, but not on the other. And in point of fact, when law or public feeling do not permit the truth of an opinion to be disputed, they are just as little tolerant of a denial of its usefulness. The utmost they allow is an extenuation of its absolute necessity or of the positive guilt of rejecting it.

In order more fully to illustrate the mischief of denying a hearing to opinions because we, in our own judgment, have condemned them, it will be desirable to fix down the discussion to a concrete case; and I choose, by preference, the cases which are least favourable to me -- in which the argument against freedom of opinion, both on the score of truth and on that of utility, is considered the strongest. Let the opinions impugned be the belief in a God and in a future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality. To fight the battle on such ground, gives a great advantage to an unfair antagonist; since he will be sure to say (and many who have no desire to be unfair will say it internally), Are these the doctrines which you do not deem sufficiently certain to be taken under the protection of law? Is the belief in a God one of the opinions, to feel sure of which, you hold to be assuming infallibility? But I must be permitted to observe, that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking to decide that question for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. And I denounce and reprobate this pretension not the less, if put forth on the side of my most solemn convictions. However positive any one's persuasion may be, not only of the falsity, but of the pernicious consequences -- not only of the pernicious consequences, but (to adopt expressions which I altogether condemn) the immorality and impiety of an opinion; yet if, in pursuance of that private judgment, though backed by the public judgment of his country or his cotemporaries, he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence, he assumes infallibility. And so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal. These are exactly the occasions on which the men of one generation commit those dreadful mistakes which excite the astonishment and horror of posterity. It is among such that we find the instances memorable in history, when the arm of the law has been employed to root out the best men and the noblest doctrines; with deplorable success as to the men, though some of the doctrines have survived to be (as if in mockery) invoked, in defence of similar conduct towards those who dissent from them, or from their received interpretation.

Mankind can hardly be too often reminded, that there was once a man named Socrates, between whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of his time, there took place a memorable collision. Born in an age and country abounding in individual greatness, this man has been handed

down to us by those who best knew both him and the age, as the most virtuous man in it; while we know him as the head and prototype of all subsequent teachers of virtue, the source equally of the lofty inspiration of Plato and the judicious utilitarianism of Aristotle, "i maestri di color che sanno," the two headsprings of ethical as of all other philosophy. This acknowledged master of all the eminent thinkers who have since lived -- whose fame, still growing after more than two thousand years, all but outweighs the whole remainder of the names which make his native city illustrious -- was put to death by his countrymen, after a judicial conviction, for impiety and immorality. Impiety, in denying the gods recognized by the State; indeed his accuser asserted (see the "Apologia") that he believed in no gods at all. Immorality, in being, by his doctrines and instructions, a "corrupter of youth." Of these charges the tribunal, there is every ground for believing, honestly found him guilty, and condemned the man who probably of all then born had deserved best of mankind, to be put to death as a criminal.

To pass from this to the only other instance of judicial iniquity, the mention of which, after the condemnation of Socrates, would not be an anti-climax: the event which took place on Calvary rather more than eighteen hundred years ago. The man who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation, such an impression of his moral grandeur, that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to him as the Almighty in person, was ignominiously put to death, as what? As a blasphemer. Men did not merely mistake their benefactor; they mistook him for the exact contrary of what he was, and treated him as that prodigy of impiety, which they themselves are now held to be, for their treatment of him. The feelings with which mankind now regard these lamentable transactions, especially the latter of the two, render them extremely unjust in their judgment of the unhappy actors. These were, to all appearance, not bad men -- not worse than men most commonly are, but rather the contrary; men who possessed in a full, or somewhat more than a full measure, the religious, moral, and patriotic feelings of their time and people: the very kind of men who, in all times, our own included, have every chance of passing through life blameless and respected. The high-priest who rent his garments when the words were pronounced, which, according to all the ideas of his country, constituted the blackest guilt, was in all probability quite as sincere in his horror and indignation, as the generality of respectable and pious men now are in the religious and moral sentiments they profess; and most of those who now shudder at his conduct, if they had lived in his time and been born Jews, would have acted precisely as he did. Orthodox Christians who are tempted to think that those who stoned to death the first martyrs must have been worse men than they themselves are, ought to remember that one of those persecutors was Saint Paul.

Let us add one more example, the most striking of all, if the impressiveness of an error is measured by the wisdom and virtue of him who falls into it. If ever any one, possessed of power, had grounds for thinking himself the best and most enlightened among his cotemporaries, it was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Absolute monarch of the whole civilized world, he preserved through life not only the most unblemished justice, but what was less to be expected from his Stoical breeding, the tenderest heart. The few failings which are attributed to him, were all on the side of indulgence: while his writings, the highest ethical product of the ancient mind, differ scarcely perceptibly, if they differ at all, from the most characteristic teachings of Christ. This man, a better Christian in all but the dogmatic sense of the word, than almost any of the ostensibly Christian sovereigns who have since reigned, persecuted Christianity. Placed at the summit of all the previous attainments of humanity, with an open, unfettered intellect, and a character which led him of himself to embody in his moral writings the Christian ideal, he yet failed to see that Christianity was to be a good and

not an evil to the world, with his duties to which he was so deeply penetrated. Existing society he knew to be in a deplorable state. But such as it was, he saw or thought he saw, that it was held together and prevented from being worse, by belief and reverence of the received divinities. As a ruler of mankind, he deemed it his duty not to suffer society to fall in pieces; and saw not how, if its existing ties were removed, any others could be formed which could again knit it together. The new religion openly aimed at dissolving these ties: unless, therefore, it was his duty to adopt that religion, it seemed to be his duty to put it down. Inasmuch then as the theology of Christianity did not appear to him true or of divine origin; inasmuch as this strange history of a crucified God was not credible to him, and a system which purported to rest entirely upon a foundation to him so wholly unbelievable, could not be foreseen by him to be that renovating agency which, after all abatements, it has in fact proved to be; the gentlest and most amiable of philosophers and rulers, under a solemn sense of duty, authorized the persecution of Christianity. To my mind this is one of the most tragical facts in all history. It is a bitter thought, how different a thing the Christianity of the world might have been, if the Christian faith had been adopted as the religion of the empire under the auspices of Marcus Aurelius instead of those of Constantine. But it would be equally unjust to him and false to truth, to deny, that no one plea which can be urged for punishing anti-Christian teaching, was wanting to Marcus Aurelius for punishing, as he did, the propagation of Christianity. No Christian more firmly believes that Atheism is false, and tends to the dissolution of society, than Marcus Aurelius believed the same things of Christianity; he who, of all men then living, might have been thought the most capable of appreciating it. Unless any one who approves of punishment for the promulgation of opinions, flatters himself that he is a wiser and better man than Marcus Aurelius -- more deeply versed in the wisdom of his time, more elevated in his intellect above it -- more earnest in his search for truth, or more single-minded in his devotion to it when found; -- let him abstain from that assumption of the joint infallibility of himself and the multitude, which the great Antoninus made with so unfortunate a result.

Aware of the impossibility of defending the use of punishment for restraining irreligious opinions, by any argument which will not justify Marcus Antoninus, the enemies of religious freedom, when hard pressed, occasionally accept this consequence, and say, with Dr. Johnson, that the persecutors of Christianity were in the right; that persecution is an ordeal through which truth ought to pass, and always passes successfully, legal penalties being, in the end, powerless against truth, though sometimes beneficially effective against mischievous errors. This is a form of the argument for religious intolerance, sufficiently remarkable not to be passed without notice.

A theory which maintains that truth may justifiably be persecuted because persecution cannot possibly do it any harm, cannot be charged with being intentionally hostile to the reception of new truths; but we cannot commend the generosity of its dealing with the persons to whom mankind are indebted for them. To discover to the world something which deeply concerns it, and of which it was previously ignorant; to prove to it that it had been mistaken on some vital point of temporal or spiritual interest, is as important a service as a human being can render to his fellow-creatures, and in certain cases, as in those of the early Christians and of the Reformers, those who think with Dr. Johnson believe it to have been the most precious gift which could be bestowed on mankind. That the authors of such splendid benefits should be requited by martyrdom; that their reward should be to be dealt with as the vilest of criminals, is not, upon this theory, a deplorable error and misfortune, for which humanity should mourn in sackcloth and ashes, but the normal and justifiable state of things. The propounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine, should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck,

to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors, can not be supposed to set much value on the benefit; and I believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.

But, indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution. If not suppressed forever, it may be thrown back for centuries. To speak only of religious opinions: the Reformation broke out at least twenty times before Luther, and was put down. Arnold of Brescia was put down. Fra Dolcino was put down. Savonarola was put down. The Albigeois were put down. The Vaudois were put down. The Lollards were put down. The Hussites were put down. Even after the era of Luther, wherever persecution was persisted in, it was successful. In Spain, Italy, Flanders, the Austrian empire, Protestantism was rooted out; and, most likely, would have been so in England, had Queen Mary lived, or Queen Elizabeth died. Persecution has always succeeded, save where the heretics were too strong a party to be effectually persecuted. No reasonable person can doubt that Christianity might have been extirpated in the Roman empire. It spread, and became predominant, because the persecutions were only occasional, lasting but a short time, and separated by long intervals of almost undisturbed propagandism. It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake. Men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either. The real advantage which truth has, consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.

It will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new opinions: we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we even build sepulchres to them. It is true we no longer put heretics to death; and the amount of penal infliction which modern feeling would probably tolerate, even against the most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to extirpate them. But let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinion, or at least for its expression, still exist by law; and their enforcement is not, even in these times, so unexampled as to make it at all incredible that they may some day be revived in full force. In the year 1857, at the summer assizes of the county of Cornwall, an unfortunate man,[2] said to be of unexceptionable conduct in all relations of life, was sentenced to twenty-one months imprisonment, for uttering, and writing on a gate, some offensive words concerning Christianity. Within a month of the same time, at the Old Bailey, two persons, on two separate occasions,[3] were rejected as jurymen, and one of them grossly insulted by the judge and one of the counsel, because they honestly declared that they had no theological belief; and a third, a foreigner,[4] for the same reason, was denied justice against a thief. This refusal of redress took place in virtue of the legal doctrine, that no person can be allowed to give evidence in a court of justice, who does not profess belief in a God (any god is sufficient) and in a future state; which is equivalent to declaring such persons to be outlaws, excluded from the protection of the tribunals; who may not only be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if no one but themselves, or persons of similar opinions, be present, but

any one else may be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if the proof of the fact depends on their evidence. The assumption on which this is grounded, is that the oath is worthless, of a person who does not believe in a future state; a proposition which betokens much ignorance of history in those who assent to it (since it is historically true that a large proportion of infidels in all ages have been persons of distinguished integrity and honor); and would be maintained by no one who had the smallest conception how many of the persons in greatest repute with the world, both for virtues and for attainments, are well known, at least to their intimates, to be unbelievers. The rule, besides, is suicidal, and cuts away its own foundation. Under pretence that atheists must be liars, it admits the testimony of all atheists who are willing to lie, and rejects only those who brave the obloquy of publicly confessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood. A rule thus self-convicted of absurdity so far as regards its professed purpose, can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred, a relic of persecution; a persecution, too, having the peculiarity that the qualification for undergoing it is the being clearly proved not to deserve it. The rule, and the theory it implies, are hardly less insulting to believers than to infidels. For if he who does not believe in a future state necessarily lies, it follows that they who do believe are only prevented from lying, if prevented they are, by the fear of hell. We will not do the authors and abettors of the rule the injury of supposing, that the conception which they have formed of Christian virtue is drawn from their own consciousness.

These, indeed, are but rags and remnants of persecution, and may be thought to be not so much an indication of the wish to persecute, as an example of that very frequent infirmity of English minds, which makes them take a preposterous pleasure in the assertion of a bad principle, when they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry it really into practice. But unhappily there is no security in the state of the public mind, that the suspension of worse forms of legal persecution, which has lasted for about the space of a generation, will continue. In this age the quiet surface of routine is as often ruffled by attempts to resuscitate past evils, as to introduce new benefits. What is boasted of at the present time as the revival of religion, is always, in narrow and uncultivated minds, at least as much the revival of bigotry; and where there is the strongest permanent leaven of intolerance in the feelings of a people, which at all times abides in the middle classes of this country, it needs but little to provoke them into actively persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution.[5] For it is this -- it is the opinions men entertain, and the feelings they cherish, respecting those who disown the beliefs they deem important, which makes this country not a place of mental freedom. For a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that they strengthen the social stigma. It is that stigma which is really effective, and so effective is it, that the profession of opinions which are under the ban of society is much less common in England, than is, in many other countries, the avowal of those which incur risk of judicial punishment. In respect to all persons but those whose pecuniary circumstances make them independent of the good will of other people, opinion, on this subject, is as efficacious as law; men might as well be imprisoned, as excluded from the means of earning their bread. Those whose bread is already secured, and who desire no favors from men in power, or from bodies of men, or from the public, have nothing to fear from the open avowal of any opinions, but to be ill-thought of and illspoken of, and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould to enable them to bear. There is no room for any appeal ad misericordiam in behalf of such persons. But though we do not now inflict so much evil on those who think differently from us, as it was formerly our custom to do, it may be that we do ourselves as much evil as ever by our treatment of them. Socrates was put to death, but the Socratic philosophy rose like the sun in heaven, and spread its illumination over the whole intellectual firmament. Christians were cast to the lions, but the Christian Church grew up a

stately and spreading tree, overtopping the older and less vigorous growths, and stifling them by its shade. Our merely social intolerance, kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion. With us, heretical opinions do not perceptibly gain or even lose, ground in each decade or generation; they never blaze out far and wide, but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles of thinking and studious persons among whom they originate, without ever lighting up the general affairs of mankind with either a true or a deceptive light. And thus is kept up a state of things very satisfactory to some minds, because, without the unpleasant process of fining or imprisoning anybody, it maintains all prevailing opinions outwardly undisturbed, while it does not absolutely interdict the exercise of reason by dissentients afflicted with the malady of thought. A convenient plan for having peace in the intellectual world, and keeping all things going on therein very much as they do already. But the price paid for this sort of intellectual pacification, is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind. A state of things in which a large portion of the most active and inquiring intellects find it advisable to keep the genuine principles and grounds of their convictions within their own breasts, and attempt, in what they address to the public, to fit as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises which they have internally renounced, cannot send forth the open, fearless characters, and logical, consistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world. The sort of men who can be looked for under it, are either mere conformers to commonplace, or time-servers for truth whose arguments on all great subjects are meant for their hearers, and are not those which have convinced themselves. Those who avoid this alternative, do so by narrowing their thoughts and interests to things which can be spoken of without venturing within the region of principles, that is, to small practical matters, which would come right of themselves, if but the minds of mankind were strengthened and enlarged, and which will never be made effectually right until then; while that which would strengthen and enlarge men's minds, free and daring speculation on the highest subjects, is abandoned.

Those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil, should consider in the first place, that in consequence of it there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions; and that such of them as could not stand such a discussion, though they may be prevented from spreading, do not disappear. But it is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most, by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy. Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral? Among them we may occasionally see some man of deep conscientiousness, and subtile and refined understanding, who spends a life in sophisticating with an intellect which he cannot silence, and exhausts the resources of ingenuity in attempting to reconcile the promptings of his conscience and reason with orthodoxy, which yet he does not, perhaps, to the end succeed in doing. No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead. Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think. Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much, and even more indispensable, to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of. There have been, and may again be,

great individual thinkers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intellectually active people. Where any people has made a temporary approach to such a character, it has been because the dread of heterodox speculation was for a time suspended. Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so remarkable. Never when controversy avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings. Of such we have had an example in the condition of Europe during the times immediately following the Reformation; another, though limited to the Continent and to a more cultivated class, in the speculative movement of the latter half of the eighteenth century; and a third, of still briefer duration, in the intellectual fermentation of Germany during the Goethian and Fichtean period. These periods differed widely in the particular opinions which they developed; but were alike in this, that during all three the yoke of authority was broken. In each, an old mental despotism had been thrown off, and no new one had yet taken its place. The impulse given at these three periods has made Europe what it now is. Every single improvement which has taken place either in the human mind or in institutions, may be traced distinctly to one or other of them. Appearances have for some time indicated that all three impulses are well-nigh spent; and we can expect no fresh start, until we again assert our mental freedom.

Let us now pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing the Supposition that any of the received opinions may be false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into the worth of the manner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed. However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.

There is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly) who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned. Where their influence prevails, they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument. Waiving, however, this possibility -- assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument -- this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.

If the intellect and judgment of mankind ought to be cultivated, a thing which Protestants at least do not deny, on what can these faculties be more appropriately exercised by any one, than on the things which concern him so much that it is considered necessary for him to hold opinions on them? If the cultivation of the understanding consists in one thing more than in another, it is surely in learning the grounds of one's own opinions. Whatever people believe, on subjects on which it is

of the first importance to believe rightly, they ought to be able to defend against at least the common objections. But, some one may say, "Let them be taught the grounds of their opinions. It does not follow that opinions must be merely parroted because they are never heard controverted. Persons who learn geometry do not simply commit the theorems to memory, but understand and learn likewise the demonstrations; and it would be absurd to say that they remain ignorant of the grounds of geometrical truths, because they never hear any one deny, and attempt to disprove them." Undoubtedly: and such teaching suffices on a subject like mathematics, where there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong side of the question. The peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is, that all the argument is on one side. There are no objections, and no answers to objections. But on every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this is shown and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of our opinion. But when we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favor some opinion different from it. The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record that he always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not with still greater, intensity than even his own. What Cicero practised as the means of forensic success, requires to be imitated by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. The rational position for him would be suspension of judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination. Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. This is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of, else he will never really possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty. Ninety-nine in a hundred of what are called educated men are in this condition, even of those who can argue fluently for their opinions. Their conclusion may be true, but it might be false for anything they know: they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess. They do not know those parts of it which explain and justify the remainder; the considerations which show that a fact which seemingly conflicts with another is reconcilable with it, or that, of two apparently strong reasons, one and not the other ought to be preferred. All that part of the truth which turns the scale, and decides the judgment of a completely informed mind, they are strangers to; nor is it ever really known, but to those who have attended equally and impartially to both sides, and endeavored to see the reasons of both in the strongest light. So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most

skilful devil's advocate can conjure up.

To abate the force of these considerations, an enemy of free discussion may be supposed to say, that there is no necessity for mankind in general to know and understand all that can be said against or for their opinions by philosophers and theologians. That it is not needful for common men to be able to expose all the misstatements or fallacies of an ingenious opponent. That it is enough if there is always somebody capable of answering them, so that nothing likely to mislead uninstructed persons remains unrefuted. That simple minds, having been taught the obvious grounds of the truths inculcated on them, may trust to authority for the rest, and being aware that they have neither knowledge nor talent to resolve every difficulty which can be raised, may repose in the assurance that all those which have been raised have been or can be answered, by those who are specially trained to the task.

Conceding to this view of the subject the utmost that can be claimed for it by those most easily satisfied with the amount of understanding of truth which ought to accompany the belief of it; even so, the argument for free discussion is no way weakened. For even this doctrine acknowledges that mankind ought to have a rational assurance that all objections have been satisfactorily answered; and how are they to be answered if that which requires to be answered is not spoken? or how can the answer be known to be satisfactory, if the objectors have no opportunity of showing that it is unsatisfactory? If not the public, at least the philosophers and theologians who are to resolve the difficulties, must make themselves familiar with those difficulties in their most puzzling form; and this cannot be accomplished unless they are freely stated, and placed in the most advantageous light which they admit of. The Catholic Church has its own way of dealing with this embarrassing problem. It makes a broad separation between those who can be permitted to receive its doctrines on conviction, and those who must accept them on trust. Neither, indeed, are allowed any choice as to what they will accept; but the clergy, such at least as can be fully confided in, may admissibly and meritoriously make themselves acquainted with the arguments of opponents, in order to answer them, and may, therefore, read heretical books; the laity, not unless by special permission, hard to be obtained. This discipline recognizes a knowledge of the enemy's case as beneficial to the teachers, but finds means, consistent with this, of denying it to the rest of the world: thus giving to the elite more mental culture, though not more mental freedom, than it allows to the mass. By this device it succeeds in obtaining the kind of mental superiority which its purposes require; for though culture without freedom never made a large and liberal mind, it can make a clever nisi prius advocate of a cause. But in countries professing Protestantism, this resource is denied; since Protestants hold, at least in theory, that the responsibility for the choice of a religion must be borne by each for himself, and cannot be thrown off upon teachers. Besides, in the present state of the world, it is practically impossible that writings which are read by the instructed can be kept from the uninstructed. If the teachers of mankind are to be cognizant of all that they ought to know, everything must be free to be written and published without restraint.

If, however, the mischievous operation of the absence of free discussion, when the received opinions are true, were confined to leaving men ignorant of the grounds of those opinions, it might be thought that this, if an intellectual, is no moral evil, and does not affect the worth of the opinions, regarded in their influence on the character. The fact, however, is, that not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself. The words which convey it, cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to communicate. Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote; or, if any part, the shell and husk only of

the meaning is retained, the finer essence being lost. The great chapter in human history which this fact occupies and fills, cannot be too earnestly studied and meditated on.

It is illustrated in the experience of almost all ethical doctrines and religious creeds. They are all full of meaning and vitality to those who originate them, and to the direct disciples of the originators. Their meaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into even fuller consciousness, so long as the struggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an ascendency over other creeds. At last it either prevails, and becomes the general opinion, or its progress stops; it keeps possession of the ground it has gained, but ceases to spread further. When either of these results has become apparent, controversy on the subject flags, and gradually dies away. The doctrine has taken its place, if not as a received opinion, as one of the admitted sects or divisions of opinion: those who hold it have generally inherited, not adopted it; and conversion from one of these doctrines to another, being now an exceptional fact, occupies little place in the thoughts of their professors. Instead of being, as at first, constantly on the alert either to defend themselves against the world, or to bring the world over to them, they have subsided into acquiescence, and neither listen, when they can help it, to arguments against their creed, nor trouble dissentients (if there be such) with arguments in its favor. From this time may usually be dated the decline in the living power of the doctrine. We often hear the teachers of all creeds lamenting the difficulty of keeping up in the minds of believers a lively apprehension of the truth which they nominally recognize, so that it may penetrate the feelings, and acquire a real mastery over the conduct. No such difficulty is complained of while the creed is still fighting for its existence: even the weaker combatants then know and feel what they are fighting for, and the difference between it and other doctrines; and in that period of every creed's existence, not a few persons may be found, who have realized its fundamental principles in all the forms of thought, have weighed and considered them in all their important bearings, and have experienced the full effect on the character, which belief in that creed ought to produce in a mind thoroughly imbued with it. But when it has come to be an hereditary creed, and to be received passively, not actively -- when the mind is no longer compelled, in the same degree as at first, to exercise its vital powers on the questions which its belief presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies, or to give it a dull and torpid assent, as if accepting it on trust dispensed with the necessity of realizing it in consciousness, or testing it by personal experience; until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being. Then are seen the cases, so frequent in this age of the world as almost to form the majority, in which the creed remains as it were outside the mind, encrusting and petrifying it against all other influences addressed to the higher parts of our nature; manifesting its power by not suffering any fresh and living conviction to get in, but itself doing nothing for the mind or heart, except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant.

To what an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs, without being ever realized in the imagination, the feelings, or the understanding, is exemplified by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the doctrines of Christianity. By Christianity I here mean what is accounted such by all churches and sects -- the maxims and precepts contained in the New Testament. These are considered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing Christians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian in a thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by reference to those laws. The standard to which he does refer it, is the custom of his nation, his class, or his religious profession. He has thus, on the one hand, a collection of ethical maxims, which he believes to have been vouchsafed to him by

infallible wisdom as rules for his government; and on the other, a set of every-day judgments and practices, which go a certain length with some of those maxims, not so great a length with others, stand in direct opposition to some, and are, on the whole, a compromise between the Christian creed and the interests and suggestions of worldly life. To the first of these standards he gives his homage; to the other his real allegiance. All Christians believe that the blessed are the poor and humble, and those who are illused by the world; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven; that they should judge not, lest they be judged; that they should swear not at all; that they should love their neighbor as themselves; that if one take their cloak, they should give him their coat also; that they should take no thought for the morrow; that if they would be perfect, they should sell all that they have and give it to the poor. They are not insincere when they say that they believe these things. They do believe them, as people believe what they have always heard lauded and never discussed. But in the sense of that living belief which regulates conduct, they believe these doctrines just up to the point to which it is usual to act upon them. The doctrines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt adversaries with; and it is understood that they are to be put forward (when possible) as the reasons for whatever people do that they think laudable. But any one who reminded them that the maxims require an infinity of things which they never even think of doing would gain nothing but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who affect to be better than other people. The doctrines have no hold on ordinary believers -- are not a power in their minds. They have an habitual respect for the sound of them, but no feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified, and forces the mind to take them in, and make them conform to the formula. Whenever conduct is concerned, they look round for Mr. A and B to direct them how far to go in obeying Christ.

Now we may be well assured that the case was not thus, but far otherwise, with the early Christians. Had it been thus, Christianity never would have expanded from an obscure sect of the despised Hebrews into the religion of the Roman empire. When their enemies said, "See how these Christians love one another" (a remark not likely to be made by anybody now), they assuredly had a much livelier feeling of the meaning of their creed than they have ever had since. And to this cause, probably, it is chiefly owing that Christianity now makes so little progress in extending its domain, and after eighteen centuries, is still nearly confined to Europeans and the descendants of Europeans. Even with the strictly religious, who are much in earnest about their doctrines, and attach a greater amount of meaning to many of them than people in general, it commonly happens that the part which is thus comparatively active in their minds is that which was made by Calvin, or Knox, or some such person much nearer in character to themselves. The sayings of Christ coexist passively in their minds, producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland. There are many reasons, doubtless, why doctrines which are the badge of a sect retain more of their vitality than those common to all recognized sects, and why more pains are taken by teachers to keep their meaning alive; but one reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines are more questioned, and have to be oftener defended against open gainsayers. Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the field.

The same thing holds true, generally speaking, of all traditional doctrines -- those of prudence and knowledge of life, as well as of morals or religion. All languages and literatures are full of general observations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself in it; observations which everybody knows, which everybody repeats, or hears with acquiescence, which are received as

truisms, yet of which most people first truly learn the meaning, when experience, generally of a painful kind, has made it a reality to them. How often, when smarting under some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment, does a person call to mind some proverb or common saying familiar to him all his life, the meaning of which, if he had ever before felt it as he does now, would have saved him from the calamity. There are indeed reasons for this, other than the absence of discussion: there are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized, until personal experience has brought it home. But much more of the meaning even of these would have been understood, and what was understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued pro and con by people who did understand it. The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors. A contemporary author has well spoken of "the deep slumber of a decided opinion."

But what! (it may be asked) Is the absence of unanimity an indispensable condition of true knowledge? Is it necessary that some part of mankind should persist in error, to enable any to realize the truth? Does a belief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is generally received -- and is a proposition never thoroughly understood and felt unless some doubt of it remains? As soon as mankind have unanimously accepted a truth, does the truth perish within them? The highest aim and best result of improved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is to unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important truths: and does the intelligence only last as long as it has not achieved its object? Do the fruits of conquest perish by the very completeness of the victory?

I affirm no such thing. As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase: and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested. The cessation, on one question after another, of serious controversy, is one of the necessary incidents of the consolidation of opinion; a consolidation as salutary in the case of true opinions, as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous. But though this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable and indispensable, we are not therefore obliged to conclude that all its consequences must be beneficial. The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefit of its universal recognition. Where this advantage can no longer be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavoring to provide a substitute for it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion, eager for his conversion.

But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They were essentially a negative discussion of the great questions of philosophy and life, directed with consummate skill to the purpose of convincing any one who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion, that he did not understand the subject -- that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed; in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school disputations of the Middle Ages had a somewhat similar object. They were intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own

opinion, and (by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the premises appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and, as a discipline to the mind, they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the "Socratici viri:" but the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit, and the present modes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other. A person who derives all his instruction from teachers or books, even if he escape the besetting temptation of contenting himself with cram, is under no compulsion to hear both sides; accordingly it is far from a frequent accomplishment, even among thinkers, to know both sides; and the weakest part of what everybody says in defence of his opinion, is what he intends as a reply to antagonists. It is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic -- that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result; but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents. That, therefore, which when absent, it is so indispensable, but so difficult, to create, how worse than absurd is it to forego, when spontaneously offering itself! If there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought, if we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions, to do with much greater labor for ourselves.

It still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which make diversity of opinion advantageous, and will continue to do so until mankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at present seems at an incalculable distance. We have hitherto considered only two possibilities: that the received opinion may be false, and some other opinion, consequently, true; or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth. But there is a commoner case than either of these; when the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part. Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited. Heretical opinions, on the other hand, are generally some of these suppressed and neglected truths, bursting the bonds which kept them down, and either seeking reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion, or fronting it as enemies, and setting themselves up, with similar exclusiveness, as the whole truth. The latter case is hitherto the most frequent, as, in the human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception. Hence, even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than

that which it displaces. Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even when resting on a true foundation; every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth may be blended. No sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we should otherwise have overlooked, overlook some of those which we see. Rather, he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided asserters too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole.

Thus, in the eighteenth century, when nearly all the instructed, and all those of the uninstructed who were led by them, were lost in admiration of what is called civilization, and of the marvels of modern science, literature, and philosophy, and while greatly overrating the amount of unlikeness between the men of modern and those of ancient times, indulged the belief that the whole of the difference was in their own favor; with what a salutary shock did the paradoxes of Rousseau explode like bombshells in the midst, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its elements to recombine in a better form and with additional ingredients. Not that the current opinions were on the whole farther from the truth than Rousseau's were; on the contrary, they were nearer to it; they contained more of positive truth, and very much less of error. Nevertheless there lay in Rousseau's doctrine, and has floated down the stream of opinion along with it, a considerable amount of exactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted; and these are the deposit which was left behind when the flood subsided. The superior worth of simplicity of life, the enervating and demoralizing effect of the trammels and hypocrisies of artificial society, are ideas which have never been entirely absent from cultivated minds since Rousseau wrote; and they will in time produce their due effect, though at present needing to be asserted as much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for words, on this subject, have nearly exhausted their power.

In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away. Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity. Unless opinions favorable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale is sure to go up, and the other down. Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners. On any of the great open questions just enumerated, if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority. That is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected interests, the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share. I am aware that there is not, in this country, any intolerance of differences of opinion on most of these topics. They are

adduced to show, by admitted and multiplied examples, the universality of the fact, that only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth. When there are persons to be found, who form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something by their silence.

It may be objected, "But some received principles, especially on the highest and most vital subjects, are more than half-truths. The Christian morality, for instance, is the whole truth on that subject and if any one teaches a morality which varies from it, he is wholly in error." As this is of all cases the most important in practice, none can be fitter to test the general maxim. But before pronouncing what Christian morality is or is not, it would be desirable to decide what is meant by Christian morality. If it means the morality of the New Testament, I wonder that any one who derives his knowledge of this from the book itself, can suppose that it was announced, or intended, as a complete doctrine of morals. The Gospel always refers to a preexisting morality, and confines its precepts to the particulars in which that morality was to be corrected, or superseded by a wider and higher; expressing itself, moreover, in terms most general, often impossible to be interpreted literally, and possessing rather the impressiveness of poetry or eloquence than the precision of legislation. To extract from it a body of ethical doctrine, has never been possible without eking it out from the Old Testament, that is, from a system elaborate indeed, but in many respects barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous people. St. Paul, a declared enemy to this Judaical mode of interpreting the doctrine and filling up the scheme of his Master, equally assumes a preexisting morality, namely, that of the Greeks and Romans; and his advice to Christians is in a great measure a system of accommodation to that; even to the extent of giving an apparent sanction to slavery. What is called Christian, but should rather be termed theological, morality, was not the work of Christ or the Apostles, but is of much later origin, having been gradually built up by the Catholic Church of the first five centuries, and though not implicitly adopted by moderns and Protestants, has been much less modified by them than might have been expected. For the most part, indeed, they have contented themselves with cutting off the additions which had been made to it in the Middle Ages, each sect supplying the place by fresh additions, adapted to its own character and tendencies. That mankind owe a great debt to this morality, and to its early teachers, I should be the last person to deny; but I do not scruple to say of it, that it is, in many important points, incomplete and one-sided, and that unless ideas and feelings, not sanctioned by it, had contributed to the formation of European life and character, human affairs would have been in a worse condition than they now are. Christian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive; passive rather than active; Innocence rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic Pursuit of Good: in its precepts (as has been well said) "thou shalt not" predominates unduly over "thou shalt." In its horror of sensuality, it made an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality. It holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell, as the appointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous life: in this falling far below the best of the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give to human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man's feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for consulting them. It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience; it inculcates submission to all authorities found established; who indeed are not to be actively obeyed when they command what religion forbids, but who are not to be resisted, far

less rebelled against, for any amount of wrong to ourselves. And while, in the morality of the best Pagan nations, duty to the State holds even a disproportionate place, infringing on the just liberty of the individual; in purely Christian ethics that grand department of duty is scarcely noticed or acknowledged. It is in the Koran, not the New Testament, that we read the maxim -- "A ruler who appoints any man to an office, when there is in his dominions another man better qualified for it, sins against God and against the State." What little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains in modern morality, is derived from Greek and Roman sources, not from Christian; as, even in the morality of private life, whatever exists of magnanimity, high-mindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honor, is derived from the purely human, not the religious part of our education, and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth, professedly recognized, is that of obedience.

I am as far as any one from pretending that these defects are necessarily inherent in the Christian ethics, in every manner in which it can be conceived, or that the many requisites of a complete moral doctrine which it does not contain, do not admit of being reconciled with it. Far less would I insinuate this of the doctrines and precepts of Christ himself. I believe that the sayings of Christ are all, that I can see any evidence of their having been intended to be; that they are irreconcilable with nothing which a comprehensive morality requires; that everything which is excellent in ethics may be brought within them, with no greater violence to their language than has been done to it by all who have attempted to deduce from them any practical system of conduct whatever. But it is quite consistent with this, to believe that they contain and were meant to contain, only a part of the truth; that many essential elements of the highest morality are among the things which are not provided for, nor intended to be provided for, in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity, and which have been entirely thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the basis of those deliverances by the Christian Church. And this being so, I think it a great error to persist in attempting to find in the Christian doctrine that complete rule for our guidance, which its author intended it to sanction and enforce, but only partially to provide. I believe, too, that this narrow theory is becoming a grave practical evil, detracting greatly from the value of the moral training and instruction, which so many wellmeaning persons are now at length exerting themselves to promote. I much fear that by attempting to form the mind and feelings on an exclusively religious type, and discarding those secular standards (as for want of a better name they may be called) which heretofore coexisted with and supplemented the Christian ethics, receiving some of its spirit, and infusing into it some of theirs, there will result, and is even now resulting, a low, abject, servile type of character, which, submit itself as it may to what it deems the Supreme Will, is incapable of rising to or sympathizing in the conception of Supreme Goodness. I believe that other ethics than any one which can be evolved from exclusively Christian sources, must exist side by side with Christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind; and that the Christian system is no exception to the rule that in an imperfect state of the human mind, the interests of truth require a diversity of opinions. It is not necessary that in ceasing to ignore the moral truths not contained in Christianity, men should ignore any of those which it does contain. Such prejudice, or oversight, when it occurs, is altogether an evil; but it is one from which we cannot hope to be always exempt, and must be regarded as the price paid for an inestimable good. The exclusive pretension made by a part of the truth to be the whole, must and ought to be protested against, and if a reactionary impulse should make the protestors unjust in their turn, this one-sidedness, like the other, may be lamented, but must be tolerated. If Christians would teach infidels to be just to Christianity, they should themselves be just to infidelity. It can do truth no

service to blink the fact, known to all who have the most ordinary acquaintance with literary history, that a large portion of the noblest and most valuable moral teaching has been the work, not only of men who did not know, but of men who knew and rejected, the Christian faith.

I do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of enunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the evils of religious or philosophical sectarianism. Every truth which men of narrow capacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted, inculcated, and in many ways even acted on, as if no other truth existed in the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify the first. I acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated thereby; the truth which ought to have been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons regarded as opponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil: there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. And since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to.

We have now recognized the necessity to the mental wellbeing of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds; which we will now briefly recapitulate.

First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.

Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any object is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.

Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.

Before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it is fit to take notice of those who say, that the free expression of all opinions should be permitted, on condition that the manner be temperate, and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion. Much might be said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be placed; for if the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked, I think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent. But this, though an important consideration in a practical point of view, merges in a more

fundamental objection. Undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one, may be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe censure. But the principal offences of the kind are such as it is mostly impossible, unless by accidental self-betrayal, to bring home to conviction. The gravest of them is, to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion. But all this, even to the most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good faith, by persons who are not considered, and in many other respects may not deserve to be considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible on adequate grounds conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable; and still less could law presume to interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct. With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely, invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like, the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation. Yet whatever mischief arises from their use, is greatest when they are employed against the comparatively defenceless; and whatever unfair advantage can be derived by any opinion from this mode of asserting it, accrues almost exclusively to received opinions. The worst offence of this kind which can be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatize those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men. To calumny of this sort, those who hold any unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they are in general few and uninfluential, and nobody but themselves feels much interest in seeing justice done them; but this weapon is, from the nature of the case, denied to those who attack a prevailing opinion: they can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor if they could, would it do anything but recoil on their own cause. In general, opinions contrary to those commonly received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language, and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate even in a slight degree without losing ground: while unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the prevailing opinion, really does deter people from professing contrary opinions, and from listening to those who profess them. For the interest, therefore, of truth and justice, it is far more important to restrain this employment of vituperative language than the other; and, for example, if it were necessary to choose, there would be much more need to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity, than on religion. It is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining either, while opinion ought, in every instance, to determine its verdict by the circumstances of the individual case; condemning every one, on whichever side of the argument he places himself, in whose mode of advocacy either want of candor, or malignity, bigotry or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves, but not inferring these vices from the side which a person takes, though it be the contrary side of the question to our own; and giving merited honor to every one, whatever opinion he may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state what his opponents and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keeping nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their favor. This is the real morality of public discussion; and if often violated, I am happy to think that there are many controversialists who to a great extent observe it, and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it.

[1] These words had scarcely been written, when, as if to give them an emphatic contradiction, occurred the Government Press Prosecutions of 1858. That illjudged interference with the liberty of public discussion has not, however, induced me to alter a single word in the text, nor has it at all

weakened my conviction that, moments of panic excepted, the era of pains and penalties far political discussion has, in our own country, passed away. For, in the first place, the prosecutions were not persisted in; and in the second, they were never, properly speaking, political prosecutions. The offence charged was not that of criticizing institutions, or the acts or persons of rulers, but of circulating what was deemed an immoral doctrine, the lawfulness of Tyrannicide.

If the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered. It would, therefore, be irrelevant and out of place to examine here, whether the doctrine of Tyrannicide deserves that title. I shall content myself with saying, that the subject has been at all times one of the open questions of morals, that the act of a private citizen in striking down a criminal, who, by raising himself above the law, has placed himself beyond the reach of legal punishment or control, has been accounted by whole nations, and by some of the best and wisest of men, not a crime, but an act of exalted virtue and that, right or wrong, it is not of the nature of assassination but of civil war. As such, I hold that the instigation to it, in a specific case, may be a proper subject of punishment, but only if an overt act has followed, and at least a probable connection can be established between the act and the instigation. Even then it is not a foreign government, but the very government assailed, which alone, in the exercise of self-defence, can legitimately punish attacks directed against its own existence.

[2] Thomas Pooley, Bodmin Assizes, July 31, 1857. In December following, he received a free pardon from the Crown.

[3] George Jacob Holyoake, August 17, 1857; Edward Truelove, July, 1857.

[4] Baron de Gleichen, Marlborough Street Police Court, August 4, 1857.

[5] Ample warning may be drawn from the large infusion of the passions of a persecutor, which mingled with the general display of the worst parts of our national character on the occasion of the Sepoy insurrection. The ravings of fanatics or charlatans from the pulpit may be unworthy of notice; but the heads of the Evangelical party have announced as their principle, for the government of Hindoos and Mahomedans, that no schools be supported by public money in which the Bible is not taught, and by necessary consequence that no public employment be given to any but real or pretended Christians. An Under-Secretary of State, in a speech delivered to his constituents on the 12th of November, 1857, is reported to have said: "Toleration of their faith" (the faith of a hundred millions of British subjects), "the superstition which they called religion, by the British Government, had had the effect of retarding the ascendency of the British name, and preventing the salutary growth of Christianity.... Toleration was the great corner-stone of the religious liberties of this country; but do not let them abuse that precious word toleration. As he understood it, it meant the complete liberty to all, freedom of worship, among Christians, who worshipped upon the same foundation. It meant toleration of all sects and denominations of Christians who believed in the one mediation." I desire to call attention to the fact, that a man who has been deemed fit to fill a high office in the government of this country, under a liberal Ministry, maintains the doctrine that all who do not believe in the divinity of Christ are beyond the pale of toleration. Who, after this imbecile display, can indulge the illusion that religious persecution has passed away, never to return?

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On Liberty

J.S. Mill

1859

Chapter III: On Individuality, As One Of The Elements Of Well-being

SUCH being the reasons which make it imperative that human beings should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual, and through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is either conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibition; let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their opinions -- to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable. No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corndealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost. That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part, are only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at present of recognizing all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men's modes of action, not less than to their opinions. As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person's own character, but the traditions of customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal

ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

In maintaining this principle, the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself. If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being; that it is not only a coordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; there would be no danger that liberty should be undervalued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary difficulty. But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account. The majority, being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are (for it is they who make them what they are), cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for everybody; and what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of the majority of moral and social reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the general acceptance of what these reformers, in their own judgment, think would be best for mankind. Few persons, out of Germany, even comprehend the meaning of the doctrine which Wilhelm von Humboldt, so eminent both as a savant and as a politician, made the text of a treatise -- that "the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole;" that, therefore, the object "towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development;" that for this there are two requisites, "freedom, and a variety of situations;" and that from the union of these arise "individual vigor and manifold diversity," which combine themselves in "originality."[1]

Little, however, as people are accustomed to a doctrine like that of Von Humboldt, and surprising as it may be to them to find so high a value attached to individuality, the question, one must nevertheless think, can only be one of degree. No one's idea of excellence in conduct is that people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another. No one would assert that people ought not to put into their mode of life, and into the conduct of their concerns, any impress whatever of their own judgment, or of their own individual character. On the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances and character. The traditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience has taught them; presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim to this deference: but, in the first place, their experience may be too narrow; or they may not have interpreted it rightly. Secondly, their interpretation of experience may be correct but unsuitable to him. Customs are made for customary circumstances, and customary characters: and his circumstances or his character may be uncustomary. Thirdly, though the customs be both good as customs, and suitable to him, yet to conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive

endowment of a human being. The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person's own reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to be weakened by his adopting it: and if the inducements to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his own feelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others are not concerned), it is so much done towards rendering his feelings and character inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic.

He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. Supposing it were possible to get houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes tried, and even churches erected and prayers said, by machinery -- by automatons in human form -- it would be a considerable loss to exchange for these automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the more civilized parts of the world, and who assuredly are but starved specimens of what nature can and will produce. Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.

It will probably be conceded that it is desirable people should exercise their understandings, and that an intelligent following of custom, or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom, is better than a blind and simply mechanical adhesion to it. To a certain extent it is admitted, that our understanding should be our own: but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our own likewise; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any strength, is anything but a peril and a snare. Yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced; when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while others, which ought to coexist with them, remain weak and inactive. It is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their consciences are weak. There is no natural connection between strong impulses and a weak conscience. The natural connection is the other way. To say that one person's desires and feelings are stronger and more various than those of another, is merely to say that he has more of the raw material of human nature, and is therefore capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good. Strong impulses are but another name for energy. Energy may be turned to bad uses; but more good may always be made of an energetic nature, than of an indolent and impassive one. Those who have most natural feeling, are always

those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. The same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest selfcontrol. It is through the cultivation of these, that society both does its duty and protects its interests: not by rejecting the stuff of which heroes are made, because it knows not how to make them. A person whose desires and impulses are his own -- are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture -- is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his owN, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character. Whoever thinks that individuality of desires and impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself, must maintain that society has no need of strong natures -- is not the better for containing many persons who have much character -- and that a high general average of energy is not desirable.

In some early states of society, these forces might be, and were, too much ahead of the power which society then possessed of disciplining and controlling them. There has been a time when the element of spontaneity and individuality was in excess, and the social principle had a hard struggle with it. The difficulty then was, to induce men of strong bodies or minds to pay obedience to any rules which required them to control their impulses. To overcome this difficulty, law and discipline, like the Popes struggling against the Emperors, asserted a power over the whole man, claiming to control all his life in order to control his character -- which society had not found any other sufficient means of binding. But society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences. Things are vastly changed, since the passions of those who were strong by station or by personal endowment were in a state of habitual rebellion against laws and ordinances, and required to be rigorously chained up to enable the persons within their reach to enjoy any particle of security. In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only themselves, the individual, or the family, do not ask themselves -- what do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition? or, what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair play, and enable it to grow and thrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse still) what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine? I do not mean that they choose what is customary, in preference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done: peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes: until by dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered and starved: they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own. Now is this, or is it not, the desirable condition of human nature?

It is so, on the Calvinistic theory. According to that, the one great offence of man is Self-will. All the good of which humanity is capable, is comprised in Obedience. You have no choice; thus you must do, and no otherwise; "whatever is not a duty is a sin." Human nature being radically corrupt, there is no redemption for any one until human nature is killed within him. To one

holding this theory of life, crushing out any of the human faculties, capacities, and susceptibilities, is no evil: man needs no capacity, but that of surrendering himself to the will of God: and if he uses any of his faculties for any other purpose but to do that supposed will more effectually, he is better without them. That is the theory of Calvinism; and it is held, in a mitigated form, by many who do not consider themselves Calvinists; the mitigation consisting in giving a less ascetic interpretation to the alleged will of God; asserting it to be his will that mankind should gratify some of their inclinations; of course not in the manner they themselves prefer, but in the way of obedience, that is, in a way prescribed to them by authority; and, therefore, by the necessary conditions of the case, the same for all.

In some such insidious form there is at present a strong tendency to this narrow theory of life, and to the pinched and hidebound type of human character which it patronizes. Many persons, no doubt, sincerely think that human beings thus cramped and dwarfed, are as their Maker designed them to be; just as many have thought that trees are a much finer thing when clipped into pollards, or cut out into figures of animals, than as nature made them. But if it be any part of religion to believe that man was made by a good Being, it is more consistent with that faith to believe, that this Being gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and consumed, and that he takes delight in every nearer approach made by his creatures to the ideal conception embodied in them, every increase in any of their capabilities of comprehension, of action, or of enjoyment. There is a different type of human excellence from the Calvinistic; a conception of humanity as having its nature bestowed on it for other purposes than merely to be abnegated. "Pagan selfassertion" is one of the elements of human worth, as well as "Christian self-denial."[2] There is a Greek ideal of self-development, which the Platonic and Christian ideal of self-government blends with, but does not supersede. It may be better to be a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles than either; nor would a Pericles, if we had one in these days, be without anything good which belonged to John Knox.

It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fulness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them. As much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human development. The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. To give any fair play to the nature

of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives. In proportion as this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to posterity. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as Individuality exists under it; and whatever crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it may be called, and whether it professes to be enforcing the will of God or the injunctions of men.

Having said that Individuality is the same thing with development, and that it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings, I might here close the argument: for what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this? Doubtless, however, these considerations will not suffice to convince those who most need convincing; and it is necessary further to show, that these developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped -- to point out to those who do not desire liberty, and would not avail themselves of it, that they may be in some intelligible manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance.

In the first place, then, I would suggest that they might possibly learn something from them. It will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human affairs. There is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life. This cannot well be gainsaid by anybody who does not believe that the world has already attained perfection in all its ways and practices. It is true that this benefit is not capable of being rendered by everybody alike: there are but few persons, in comparison with the whole of mankind, whose experiments, if adopted by others, would be likely to be any improvement on established practice. But these few are the salt of the earth; without them, human life would become a stagnant pool. Not only is it they who introduce good things which did not before exist; it is they who keep the life in those which already existed. If there were nothing new to be done, would human intellect cease to be necessary? Would it be a reason why those who do the old things should forget why they are done, and do them like cattle, not like human beings? There is only too great a tendency in the best beliefs and practices to degenerate into the mechanical; and unless there were a succession of persons whose ever-recurring originality prevents the grounds of those beliefs and practices from becoming merely traditional, such dead matter would not resist the smallest shock from anything really alive, and there would be no reason why civilization should not die out, as in the Byzantine Empire. Persons of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but in order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow. Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom. Persons of genius are, ex vi termini, more individual than any other people -- less capable, consequently, of fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the small number of moulds which society provides in order to save its members the trouble of forming their own character. If from timidity they consent to be forced into one of these moulds, and to let all that part of themselves which cannot expand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will be little the better for their genius. If they are of a strong character, and break their fetters they become a mark for the society which has not succeeded in reducing them to common-place, to point at with solemn warning as "wild," "erratic," and the like; much as if one should complain of the Niagara river for not flowing smoothly between its banks like a Dutch canal.

I insist thus emphatically on the importance of genius, and the necessity of allowing it to unfold itself freely both in thought and in practice, being well aware that no one will deny the position in

theory, but knowing also that almost every one, in reality, is totally indifferent to it. People think genius a fine thing if it enables a man to write an exciting poem, or paint a picture. But in its true sense, that of originality in thought and action, though no one says that it is not a thing to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think they can do very well without it. Unhappily this is too natural to be wondered at. Originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of. They cannot see what it is to do for them: how should they? If they could see what it would do for them, it would not be originality. The first service which originality has to render them, is that of opening their eyes: which being once fully done, they would have a chance of being themselves original. Meanwhile, recollecting that nothing was ever yet done which some one was not the first to do, and that all good things which exist are the fruits of originality, let them be modest enough to believe that there is something still left for it to accomplish, and assure themselves that they are more in need of originality, the less they are conscious of the want.

In sober truth, whatever homage may be professed, or even paid, to real or supposed mental superiority, the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind. In ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself; and If he had either great talents or a high social position, he was a considerable power. At present individuals are lost in the crowd. In politics it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world. The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses. This is as true in the moral and social relations of private life as in public transactions. Those whose opinions go by the name of public opinion, are not always the same sort of public: in America, they are the whole white population; in England, chiefly the middle class. But they are always a mass, that is to say, collective mediocrity. And what is still greater novelty, the mass do not now take their opinions from dignitaries in Church or State, from ostensible leaders, or from books. Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers. I am not complaining of all this. I do not assert that anything better is compatible, as a general rule, with the present low state of the human mind. But that does not hinder the government of mediocrity from being mediocre government. No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed One or Few. The initiation of all wise or noble things, comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one individual. The honor and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open. I am not countenancing the sort of "hero-worship" which applauds the strong man of genius for forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of itself. All he can claim is, freedom to point out the way. The power of compelling others into it, is not only inconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest, but corrupting to the strong man himself. It does seem, however, that when the opinions of masses of merely average men are everywhere become or becoming the dominant power, the counterpoise and corrective to that tendency would be, the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought. It Is in these circumstances most especially, that exceptional individuals, instead of being deterred, should be encouraged in

acting differently from the mass. In other times there was no advantage in their doing so, unless they acted not only differently, but better. In this age the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. Eccentricity has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded; and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius, mental vigor, and moral courage which it contained. That so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time.

I have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that it may in time appear which of these are fit to be converted into customs. But independence of action, and disregard of custom are not solely deserving of encouragement for the chance they afford that better modes of action, and customs more worthy of general adoption, may be struck out; nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own way. There is no reason that all human existences should be constructed on some one, or some small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode. Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike. A man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him, unless they are either made to his measure, or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from: and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat, or are human beings more like one another in their whole physical and spiritual conformation than in the shape of their feet? If it were only that people have diversities of taste that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model. But different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical atmosphere and climate. The same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to another. The same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in their best order, while to another it is a distracting burden, which suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable. Why then should tolerance, as far as the public sentiment is concerned, extend only to tastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by the multitude of their adherents? Nowhere (except in some monastic institutions) is diversity of taste entirely unrecognized; a person may without blame, either like or dislike rowing, or smoking, or music, or athletic exercises, or chess, or cards, or study, because both those who like each of these things, and those who dislike them, are too numerous to be put down. But the man, and still more the woman, who can be accused either of doing "what nobody does," or of not doing "what everybody does," is the subject of as much depreciatory remark as if he or she had committed some grave moral delinquency. Persons require to possess a title, or some other badge of rank, or the consideration of people of rank, to be able to indulge somewhat in the luxury of doing as they like without detriment to their estimation. To indulge somewhat, I repeat: for whoever allow themselves much of that in dulgence, incur the risk of something worse than disparaging speeches -- they are in peril of a commission de lunatico, and of having their property taken from them and given to their relations.[3]

There is one characteristic of the present direction of public opinion, peculiarly calculated to make it intolerant of any marked demonstration of individuality. The general average of mankind are not only moderate in intellect, but also moderate in inclinations: they have no tastes or wishes strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual, and they consequently do not understand those who have, and class all such with the wild and intemperate whom they are accustomed to look down upon. Now, in addition to this fact which is general, we have only to suppose that a strong movement has set in towards the improvement of morals, and it is evident what we have to expect. In these days such a movement has set in; much has actually been effected in the way of increased regularity of conduct, and discouragement of excesses; and there is a philanthropic spirit abroad, for the exercise of which there is no more inviting field than the moral and prudential improvement of our fellow-creatures. These tendencies of the times cause the public to be more disposed than at most former periods to prescribe general rules of conduct, and endeavor to make every one conform to the approved standard. And that standard, express or tacit, is to desire nothing strongly. Its ideal of character is to be without any marked character; to maim by compression, like a Chinese lady's foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to commonplace humanity.

As is usually the case with ideals which exclude one half of what is desirable, the present standard of approbation produces only an inferior imitation of the other half. Instead of great energies guided by vigorous reason, and strong feelings strongly controlled by a conscientious will, its result is weak feelings and weak energies, which therefore can be kept in outward conformity to rule without any strength either of will or of reason. Already energetic characters on any large scale are becoming merely traditional. There is now scarcely any outlet for energy in this country except business. The energy expended in that may still be regarded as considerable. What little is left from that employment, is expended on some hobby; which may be a useful, even a philanthropic hobby, but is always some one thing, and generally a thing of small dimensions. The greatness of England is now all collective: individually small, we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining; and with this our moral and religious philanthropists are perfectly contented. But it was men of another stamp than this that made England what it has been; and men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its decline.

The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement. The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals. The progressive principle, however, in either shape, whether as the love of liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving at least emancipation from that yoke; and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. The greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of Custom is complete. This is the case over the whole East. Custom is there, in all things, the final appeal; Justice and right mean conformity to custom; the argument of custom no one, unless some tyrant intoxicated with power, thinks of resisting. And we see the result. Those nations must once have had originality; they did not start out of the ground populous, lettered, and versed in many of the arts of life; they made themselves all this, and were then the greatest and

most powerful nations in the world. What are they now? The subjects or dependents of tribes whose forefathers wandered in the forests when theirs had magnificent palaces and gorgeous temples, but over whom custom exercised only a divided rule with liberty and progress. A people, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and then stop: when does it stop? When it ceases to possess individuality. If a similar change should befall the nations of Europe, it will not be in exactly the same shape: the despotism of custom with which these nations are threatened is not precisely stationariness. It proscribes singularity, but it does not preclude change, provided all change together. We have discarded the fixed costumes of our forefathers; every one must still dress like other people, but the fashion may change once or twice a year. We thus take care that when there is change, it shall be for change's sake, and not from any idea of beauty or convenience; for the same idea of beauty or convenience would not strike all the world at the same moment, and be simultaneously thrown aside by all at another moment. But we are progressive as well as changeable: we continually make new inventions in mechanical things, and keep them until they are again superseded by better; we are eager for improvement in politics, in education, even in morals, though in this last our idea of improvement chiefly consists in persuading or forcing other people to be as good as ourselves. It is not progress that we object to; on the contrary, we flatter ourselves that we are the most progressive people who ever lived. It is individuality that we war against: we should think we had done wonders if we had made ourselves all alike; forgetting that the unlikeness of one person to another is generally the first thing which draws the attention of either to the imperfection of his own type, and the superiority of another, or the possibility, by combining the advantages of both, of producing something better than either. We have a warning example in China -- a nation of much talent, and, in some respects, even wisdom, owing to the rare good fortune of having been provided at an early period with a particularly good set of customs, the work, in some measure, of men to whom even the most enlightened European must accord, under certain limitations, the title of sages and philosophers. They are remarkable, too, in the excellence of their apparatus for impressing, as far as possible, the best wisdom they possess upon every mind in the community, and securing that those who have appropriated most of it shall occupy the posts of honor and power. Surely the people who did this have discovered the secret of human progressiveness, and must have kept themselves steadily at the head of the movement of the world. On the contrary, they have become stationary -- have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners. They have succeeded beyond all hope in what English philanthropists are so industriously working at -- in making a people all alike, all governing their thoughts and conduct by the same maxims and rules; and these are the fruits. The modern regime of public opinion is, in an unorganized form, what the Chinese educational and political systems are in an organized; and unless individuality shall be able successfully to assert itself against this yoke, Europe, notwithstanding its noble antecedents and its professed Christianity, will tend to become another China.

What is it that has hitherto preserved Europe from this lot? What has made the European family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of mankind? Not any superior excellence in them, which when it exists, exists as the effect, not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character and culture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another: they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable; and although at every period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road, their attempts to thwart each other's development have rarely had any permanent success, and each has

in time endured to receive the good which the others have offered. Europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided development. But it already begins to possess this benefit in a considerably less degree. It is decidedly advancing towards the Chinese ideal of making all people alike. M. de Tocqueville, in his last important work, remarks how much more the Frenchmen of the present day resemble one another, than did those even of the last generation. The same remark might be made of Englishmen in a far greater degree. In a passage already quoted from Wilhelm von Humboldt, he points out two things as necessary conditions of human development, because necessary to render people unlike one another; namely, freedom, and variety of situations. The second of these two conditions is in this country every day diminishing. The circumstances which surround different classes and individuals, and shape their characters, are daily becoming more assimilated. Formerly, different ranks, different neighborhoods, different trades and professions lived in what might be called different worlds; at present, to a great degree, in the same. Comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, listen to the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the same rights and liberties, and the same means of asserting them. Great as are the differences of position which remain, they are nothing to those which have ceased. And the assimilation is still proceeding. All the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high. Every extension of education promotes it, because education brings people under common influences, and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvements in the means of communication promote it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact, and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another. The increase of commerce and manufactures promotes it, by diffusing more widely the advantages of easy circumstances, and opening all objects of ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the desire of rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class, but of all classes. A more powerful agency than even all these, in bringing about a general similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and other free countries, of the ascendancy of public opinion in the State. As the various social eminences which enabled persons entrenched on them to disregard the opinion of the multitude, gradually became levelled; as the very idea of resisting the will of the public, when it is positively known that they have a will, disappears more and more from the minds of practical politicians; there ceases to be any social support for non-conformity -- any substantive power in society, which, itself opposed to the ascendancy of numbers, is interested in taking under its protection opinions and tendencies at variance with those of the public.

The combination of all these causes forms so great a mass of influences hostile to Individuality, that it is not easy to see how it can stand its ground. It will do so with increasing difficulty, unless the intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value -- to see that it is good there should be differences, even though not for the better, even though, as it may appear to them, some should be for the worse. If the claims of Individuality are ever to be asserted, the time is now, while much is still wanting to complete the enforced assimilation. It is only in the earlier stages that any stand can be successfully made against the encroachment. The demand that all other people shall resemble ourselves, grows by what it feeds on. If resistance waits till life is reduced nearly to one uniform type, all deviations from that type will come to be considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. Mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it.

[1] The Sphere and Duties of Government, from the German of Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, pp.

11-13.

[2] Sterling's Essays.

[3] There is something both contemptible and frightful in the sort of evidence on which, of late years, any person can be judicially declared unfit for the management of his affairs; and after his death, his disposal of his property can be set aside, if there is enough of it to pay the expenses of litigation -- which are charged on the property itself. All of the minute details of his daily life are pried into, and whatever is found which, seen through the medium of the perceiving and escribing faculties of the lowest of the low, bears an appearance unlike absolute commonplace, is laid before the jury as evidence of insanity, and often with success; the jurors being little, if at all, less vulgar and ignorant than the witnesses; while the judges, with that extraordinary want of knowledge of human nature and life which continually astonishes us in English lawyers, often help to mislead them. These trials speak volumes as to the state of feeling and opinion among the vulgar with regard to human liberty. So far from setting any value on individuality -- so far from respecting the rights of each individual to act, in things indifferent, as seems good to his own judgment and inclinations, judges and juries cannot even conceive that a person in a state of sanity can desire such freedom. In former days, when it was proposed to burn atheists, charitable people used to suggest putting them in a madhouse instead: it would be nothing surprising now-a-days were we to see this done, and the doers applauding themselves, because, instead of persecuting for religion, they had adopted so humane and Christian a mode of treating these unfortunates, not without a silent satisfaction at their having thereby obtained their deserts.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

On Liberty

J.S. Mill
1859

Chapter IV: Of The Limits To The Authority Of Society Over The Individual

WHAT, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?

Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularly concerns it. To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society.

Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all costs to those who endeavor to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.

It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine, to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other

instruments to persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social. It is equally the business of education to cultivate both. But even education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated. Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They should be forever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations. But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested in his own well-being, the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else. The interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, Individuality has its proper field of action. In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but in each person's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others; but he, himself, is the final judge. All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.

I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others, ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desirable. If he is eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object of admiration. He is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature. If he is grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the opposite of admiration will follow. There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called (though the phrase is not unobjectionable) lowness or depravation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt: a person could not have the opposite qualities in due strength without entertaining these feelings. Though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. It would be well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than the common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person could honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without being considered unmannerly or presuming. We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavorable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of

ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit -- who cannot live within moderate means -- who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences -- who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect -- must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favorable sentiments, but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited their favor by special excellence in his social relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not affected by his demerits towards himself.

What I contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavorable judgment of others, are the only ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which concerns his own good, but which does not affect the interests of others in their relations with him. Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment. Encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights; falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury -- these are fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment. And not only these acts, but the dispositions which lead to them, are properly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence. Cruelty of disposition; malice and ill-nature; that most anti-social and odious of all passions, envy; dissimulation and insincerity, irascibility on insufficient cause, and resentment disproportioned to the provocation; the love of domineering over others; the desire to engross more than one's share of advantages (the [greekword] of the Greeks); the pride which derives gratification from the abasement of others; the egotism which thinks self and its concerns more important than everything else, and decides all doubtful questions in his own favor; -- these are moral vices, and constitute a bad and odious moral character: unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness. They may be proofs of any amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and self-respect; but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for himself. What are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatory, unless circumstances render them at the same time duties to others. The term duty to oneself, when it means anything more than prudence, means self-respect or self-development; and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow-creatures, because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable to them.

The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the reprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of others, is not a merely nominal distinction. It makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him, whether he displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to control him, or in things in which we know that we have not. If he displeases us, we may

express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable. We shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error; if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still further: instead of wishing to punish him, we shall rather endeavor to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be to us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy of society: the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, If we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for him. It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively. The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he is an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, in one shape or another, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow from our using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him in his.

The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many persons will refuse to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If he deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes to his fellow-creatures generally; perhaps becomes a burden on their affection or benevolence; and if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any offence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of good. Finally, if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example; and ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead.

And even (it will be added) if the consequences of misconduct could be confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to abandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it? If protection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons under age, is not society equally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who are equally incapable of self-government? If gambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as injurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many or most of the acts prohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should not law, so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience, endeavor to repress these also? And as a supplement to the unavoidable imperfections of law, ought not opinion at least to organize a powerful police against these vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties those who are known to practise them? There is no question here (it may be said) about restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new and original experiments in living. The only things it is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world until now; things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality. There must be some length of time and amount

of experience, after which a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as established, and it is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors.

I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself, may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearly connected with him, and in a minor degree, society at large. When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term. If, for example, a man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them, he is deservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for the breach of duty to his family or creditors, not for the extravagence. If the resources which ought to have been devoted to them, had been diverted from them for the most prudent investment, the moral culpability would have been the same. George Barnwell murdered his uncle to get money for his mistress, but if he had done it to set himself up in business, he would equally have been hanged. Again, in the frequent case of a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits, he deserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude; but so he may for cultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to those with whom he passes his life, or who from personal ties are dependent on him for their comfort. Whoever fails in the consideration generally due to the interests and feelings of others, not being compelled by some more imperative duty, or justified by allowable self-preference, is a subject of moral disapprobation for that failure, but not for the cause of it, nor for the errors, merely personal to himself, which may have remotely led to it. In like manner, when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is guilty of a social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.

But with regard to the merely contingent or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom. If grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it were for their own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity of rendering to society benefits which society does not pretend it has a right to exact. But I cannot consent to argue the point as if society had no means of bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary standard of rational conduct, except waiting till they do something irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally, for it. Society has had absolute power over them during all the early portion of their existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in life. The existing generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always, in individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to make the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself. If society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being

acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences. Armed not only with all the powers of education, but with the ascendency which the authority of a received opinion always exercises over the minds who are least fitted to judge for themselves; and aided by the natural penalties which cannot be prevented from falling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who know them; let not society pretend that it needs, besides all this, the power to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal concerns of individuals, in which, on all principles of justice and policy, the decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences. Nor is there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the better means of influencing conduct, than a resort to the worse. If there be among those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance, any of the material of which vigorous and independent characters are made, they will infallibly rebel against the yoke. No such person will ever feel that others have a right to control him in his concerns, such as they have to prevent him from injuring them in theirs; and it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority, and do with ostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins; as in the fashion of grossness which succeeded, in the time of Charles II., to the fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans. With respect to what is said of the necessity of protecting society from the bad example set to others by the vicious or the self-indulgent; it is true that bad example may have a pernicious effect, especially the example of doing wrong to others with impunity to the wrong-doer. But we are now speaking of conduct which, while it does no wrong to others, is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself: and I do not see how those who believe this, can think otherwise than that the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful, since, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful or degrading consequences which, if the conduct is justly censured, must be supposed to be in all or most cases attendant on it.

But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. On questions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the public, that is, of an overruling majority, though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener right; because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests; of the manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affect themselves. But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as likely to be wrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at the best, some people's opinion of what is good or bad for other people; while very often it does not even mean that; the public, with the most perfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, and considering only their own preference. There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse. It is easy for any one to imagine an ideal public, which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstain from modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned. But where has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its censorship? or when does the public trouble itself about universal experience. In its interferences with personal conduct it is

seldom thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself; and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy, by nine tenths of all moralists and speculative writers. These teach that things are right because they are right; because we feel them to be so. They tell us to search in our own minds and hearts for laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others. What can the poor public do but apply these instructions, and make their own personal feelings of good and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world?

The evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory; and it may perhaps be expected that I should specify the instances in which the public of this age and country improperly invests its own preferences with the character of moral laws. I am not writing an essay on the aberrations of existing moral feeling. That is too weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically, and by way of illustration. Yet examples are necessary, to show that the principle I maintain is of serious and practical moment, and that I am not endeavoring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils. And it is not difficult to show, by abundant instances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called moral police, until it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities.

As a first instance, consider the antipathies which men cherish on no better grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are different from theirs, do not practise their religious observances, especially their religious abstinences. To cite a rather trivial example, nothing in the creed or practice of Christians does more to envenom the hatred of Mahomedans against them, than the fact of their eating pork. There are few acts which Christians and Europeans regard with more unaffected disgust, than Mussulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying hunger. It is, in the first place, an offence against their religion; but this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or the kind of their repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong, but not disgusting. Their aversion to the flesh of the "unclean beast" is, on the contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, which the idea of uncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks into the feelings, seems always to excite even in those whose personal habits are anything but scrupulously cleanly and of which the sentiment of religious impurity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remarkable example. Suppose now that in a people, of whom the majority were Mussulmans, that majority should insist upon not permitting pork to be eaten within the limits of the country. This would be nothing new in Mahomedan countries.[1] Would it be a legitimate exercise of the moral authority of public opinion? and if not, why not? The practice is really revolting to such a public. They also sincerely think that it is forbidden and abhorred by the Deity. Neither could the prohibition be censured as religious persecution. It might be religious in its origin, but it would not be persecution for religion, since nobody's religion makes it a duty to eat pork. The only tenable ground of condemnation would be, that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere.

To come somewhat nearer home: the majority of Spaniards consider it a gross impiety, offensive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being, to worship him in any other manner than the Roman Catholic; and no other public worship is lawful on Spanish soil. The people of all Southern Europe look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious, but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgusting. What do Protestants think of these perfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against non-Catholics? Yet, if mankind are justified in interfering with each other's liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possible consistently to exclude these

cases? or who can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of God and man?

No stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who regard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves.

The preceding instances may be objected to, although unreasonably, as drawn from contingencies impossible among us: opinion, in this country, not being likely to enforce abstinence from meats, or to interfere with people for worshipping, and for either marrying or not marrying, according to their creed or inclination. The next example, however, shall be taken from an interference with liberty which we have by no means passed all danger of. Wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently powerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at the time of the Commonwealth, they have endeavored, with considerable success, to put down all public, and nearly all private, amusements: especially music, dancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and the theatre. There are still in this country large bodies of persons by whose notions of morality and religion these recreations are condemned; and those persons belonging chiefly to the middle class, who are the ascendant power in the present social and political condition of the kingdom, it is by no means impossible that persons of these sentiments may at some time or other command a majority in Parliament. How will the remaining portion of the community like to have the amusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of the stricter Calvinists and Methodists? Would they not, with considerable peremptoriness, desire these intrusively pious members of society to mind their own business? This is precisely what should be said to every government and every public, who have the pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong. But if the principle of the pretension be admitted, no one can reasonably object to its being acted on in the sense of the majority, or other preponderating power in the country; and all persons must be ready to conform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by the early settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to theirs should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground, as religions supposed to be declining have so often been known to do.

To imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realized than the one last mentioned. There is confessedly a strong tendency in the modern world towards a democratic constitution of society, accompanied or not by popular political institutions. It is affirmed that in the country where this tendency is most completely realized -- where both society and the government are most democratic -- the United States -- the feeling of the majority, to whom any appearance of a more showy or costly style of living than they can hope to rival is disagreeable, operates as a tolerably effectual sumptuary law, and that in many parts of the Union it is really difficult for a person possessing a very large income, to find any mode of spending it, which will not incur popular disapprobation. Though such statements as these are doubtless much exaggerated as a representation of existing facts, the state of things they describe is not only a conceivable and possible, but a probable result of democratic feeling, combined with the notion that the public has a right to a veto on the manner in which individuals shall spend their incomes. We have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion of Socialist opinions, and it may become infamous in the eyes of the majority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any income not

earned by manual labor. Opinions similar in principle to these, already prevail widely among the artisan class, and weigh oppressively on those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that class, namely, its own members. It is known that the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry, are decidedly of opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as good, and that no one ought to be allowed, through piecework or otherwise, to earn by superior skill or industry more than others can without it. And they employ a moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one, to deter skilful workmen from receiving, and employers from giving, a larger remuneration for a more useful service. If the public have any jurisdiction over private concerns, I cannot see that these people are in fault, or that any individual's particular public can be blamed for asserting the same authority over his individual conduct, which the general public asserts over people in general.

But, without dwelling upon supposititious cases, there are, in our own day, gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practised, and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of success, and opinions proposed which assert an unlimited right in the public not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but in order to get at what it thinks wrong, to prohibit any number of things which it admits to be innocent.

Under the name of preventing intemperance the people of one English colony, and of nearly half the United States, have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical purposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of their use. And though the impracticability of executing the law has caused its repeal in several of the States which had adopted it, including the one from which it derives its name, an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate for a similar law in this country. The association, or "Alliance" as it terms itself, which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some notoriety through the publicity given to a correspondence between its Secretary and one of the very few English public men who hold that a politician's opinions ought to be founded on principles. Lord Stanley's share in this correspondence is calculated to strengthen the hopes already built on him, by those who know how rare such qualities as are manifested in some of his public appearances, unhappily are among those who figure in political life. The organ of the Alliance, who would "deeply deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested to justify bigotry and persecution," undertakes to point out the "broad and impassable barrier" which divides such principles from those of the association. "All matters relating to thought, opinion, conscience, appear to me," he says, "to be without the sphere of legislation; all pertaining to social act, habit, relation, subject only to a discretionary power vested in the State itself, and not in the individual, to be within it." No mention is made of a third class, different from either of these, viz., acts and habits which are not social, but individual; although it is to this class, surely, that the act of drinking fermented liquors belongs. Selling fermented liquors, however, is trading, and trading is a social act. But the infringement complained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the buyer and consumer; since the State might just as well forbid him to drink wine, as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it. The Secretary, however, says, "I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by the social act of another." And now for the definition of these "social rights." "If anything invades my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It destroys my primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating social disorder. It invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery, I am taxed to support. It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by

surrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralizing society, from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse." A theory of "social rights," the like of which probably never before found its way into distinct language -- being nothing short of this -- that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest particular, violates my social right, and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them; for the moment an opinion which I consider noxious, passes any one's lips, it invades all the "social rights" attributed to me by the Alliance. The doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard.

Another important example of illegitimate interference with the rightful liberty of the individual, not simply threatened, but long since carried into triumphant effect, is Sabbatarian legislation. Without doubt, abstinence on one day in the week, so far as the exigencies of life permit, from the usual daily occupation, though in no respect religiously binding on any except Jews, is a highly beneficial custom. And inasmuch as this custom cannot be observed without a general consent to that effect among the industrious classes, therefore, in so far as some persons by working may impose the same necessity on others, it may be allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each, the observance by others of the custom, by suspending the greater operations of industry on a particular day. But this justification, grounded on the direct interest which others have in each individual's observance of the practice, does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in which a person may think fit to employ his leisure; nor does it hold good, in the smallest degree, for legal restrictions on amusements. It is true that the amusement of some is the day's work of others; but the pleasure, not to say the useful recreation, of many, is worth the labor of a few, provided the occupation is freely chosen, and can be freely resigned. The operatives are perfectly right in thinking that if all worked on Sunday, seven days' work would have to be given for six days' wages: but so long as the great mass of employments are suspended, the small number who for the enjoyment of others must still work, obtain a proportional increase of earnings; and they are not obliged to follow those occupations, if they prefer leisure to emolument. If a further remedy is sought, it might be found in the establishment by custom of a holiday on some other day of the week for those particular classes of persons. The only ground, therefore, on which restrictions on Sunday amusements can be defended, must be that they are religiously wrong; a motive of legislation which never can be too earnestly protested against. "Deorum injuriae Diis curae." It remains to be proved that society or any of its officers holds a commission from on high to avenge any supposed offence to Omnipotence, which is not also a wrong to our fellow-creatures. The notion that it is one man's duty that another should be religious, was the foundation of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated, and if admitted, would fully justify them. Though the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to stop railway travelling on Sunday, in the resistance to the opening of Museums, and the like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the state of mind indicated by it is fundamentally the same. It IS a determination not to tolerate others in doing what is permitted by their religion, because it is not permitted by the persecutor's religion. It is a belief that God not only abominates the act of the misbeliever, but will not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested.

I cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account commonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country, whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism. Much might be said on the unexpected and instructive fact, that an alleged new revelation, and a religion, founded on it, the product of palpable imposture, not even supported by the prestige of extraordinary qualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands, and has been made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers, railways, and the electric telegraph. What here concerns us is, that this religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs; that its prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob; that others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawless violence; that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country in which they first grew up; while, now that they have been chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly declare that it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send an expedition against them, and compel them by force to conform to the opinions of other people. The article of the Mormonite doctrine which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the ordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy; which, though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Chinese, seems to excite unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak English, and profess to be a kind of Christians. No one has a deeper disapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution; both for other reasons, and because, far from being in any way countenanced by the principle of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that principle, being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them. Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its explanation in the common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that many a woman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a wife at all. Other countries are not asked to recognize such unions, or release any portion of their inhabitants from their own laws on the score of Mormonite opinions. But when the dissentients have conceded to the hostile sentiments of others, far more than could justly be demanded; when they have left the countries to which their doctrines were unacceptable, and established themselves in a remote corner of the earth, which they have been the first to render habitable to human beings; it is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living there under what laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways. A recent writer, in some respects of considerable merit, proposes (to use his own words,) not a crusade, but a civilizade, against this polygamous community, to put an end to what seems to him a retrograde step in civilization. It also appears so to me, but I am not aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilized. So long as the sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities, I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant, who have no part or concern in it. Let them send missionaries, if they please, to preach against it; and let them, by any fair means, (of which silencing the teachers is not one,) oppose the progress of similar doctrines among their own people. If civilization has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive and conquer civilization. A civilization that can thus succumb to its

vanquished enemy must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such a civilization receives notice to quit, the better. It can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated (like the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians.

[1] The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point. When this industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of the Persian fireworshippers, flying from their native country before the Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were admitted to toleration by the Hindoo sovereigns, on condition of not eating beef. When those regions afterwards fell under the dominion of Mahomedan conquerors, the Parsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condition of refraining from pork. What was at first obedience to authority became a second nature, and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork. Though not required by their religion, the double abstinence has had time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the East, is a religion.

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On Liberty

J.S. Mill
1859

Chapter V: Applications

The principles asserted in these pages must be more generally admitted as the basis for discussion of details, before a consistent application of them to all the various departments of government and morals can be attempted with any prospect of advantage. The few observations I propose to make on questions of detail, are designed to illustrate the principles, rather than to follow them out to their consequences. I offer, not so much applications, as specimens of application; which may serve to bring into greater clearness the meaning and limits of the two maxims which together form the entire doctrine of this Essay and to assist the judgment in holding the balance between them, in the cases where it appears doubtful which of them is applicable to the case.

The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people, if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.

In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit -- namely, fraud or treachery, and force.

Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in

principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society: accordingly, it was once held to be the duty of governments, in all cases which were considered of importance, to fix prices, and regulate the processes of manufacture. But it is now recognized, though not till after a long struggle, that both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil: but the restraints in question affect only that part of conduct which society is competent to restrain, and are wrong solely because they do not really produce the results which it is desired to produce by them. As the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of Free Trade so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits of that doctrine: as for example, what amount of public control is admissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration; how far sanitary precautions, or arrangements to protect work-people employed in dangerous occupations, should be enforced on employers. Such questions involve considerations of liberty, only in so far as leaving people to themselves is always better, caeteris paribus, than controlling them: but that they may be legitimately controlled for these ends, is in principle undeniable. On the other hand, there are questions relating to interference with trade which are essentially questions of liberty; such as the Maine Law, already touched upon; the prohibition of the importation of opium into China; the restriction of the sale of poisons; all cases, in short, where the object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. These interferences are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on that of the buyer.

One of these examples, that of the sale of poisons, opens a new question; the proper limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident. It is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. The preventive function of government, however, is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, or even a private person, sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent it. If poisons were never bought or used for any purpose except the commission of murder, it would be right to prohibit their manufacture and sale. They may, however, be wanted not only for innocent but for useful purposes, and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case without operating in the other. Again, it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore, (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty,) he ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it.

Similar considerations, applied to such a question as the sale of poisons, may enable us to decide which among the possible modes of regulation are or are not contrary to principle. Such a precaution, for example, as that of labelling the drug with some word expressive of its dangerous character, may be enforced without violation of liberty: the buyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous qualities. But to require in all cases the certificate of a medical practitioner, would make it sometimes impossible, always expensive, to obtain the article for legitimate uses. The only mode apparent to me, in which difficulties may be thrown in the way of crime committed through this means, without any infringement, worth taking into account, Upon the liberty of those who desire the poisonous substance for other purposes, consists in providing what, in the apt language of Bentham, is called "preappointed evidence." This provision is familiar to every one in the case of contracts. It is usual and right that the law, when a contract is entered into, should require as the condition of its enforcing performance, that certain formalities should be observed, such as signatures, attestation of witnesses, and the like, in order that in case of subsequent dispute, there may be evidence to prove that the contract was really entered into, and that there was nothing in the circumstances to render it legally invalid: the effect being, to throw great obstacles in the way of fictitious contracts, or contracts made in circumstances which, if known, would destroy their validity. Precautions of a similar nature might be enforced in the sale of articles adapted to be instruments of crime. The seller, for example, might be required to enter in a register the exact time of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quality and quantity sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he received. When there was no medical prescription, the presence of some third person might be required, to bring home the fact to the purchaser, in case there should afterwards be reason to believe that the article had been applied to criminal purposes. Such regulations would in general be no material impediment to obtaining the article, but a very considerable one to making an improper use of it without detection.

The right inherent in society, to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of prevention or punishment. Drunkennesses, for example, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject for legislative interference; but I should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and that if when in that state he committed another offence, the punishment to which he would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity. The making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. So, again, idleness, except in a person receiving support from the public, or except when it constitutes a breach of contract, cannot without tyranny be made a subject of legal punishment; but if either from idleness or from any other avoidable cause, a man fails to perform his legal duties to others, as for instance to support his children, it is no tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory labor, if no other means are available.

Again, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offences against others, may rightfully be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency; on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only connected indirectly with our subject, the objection to publicity being equally strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor supposed to be so.

There is another question to which an answer must be found, consistent with the principles which have been laid down. In cases of personal conduct supposed to be blameable, but which respect for liberty precludes society from preventing or punishing, because the evil directly resulting falls wholly on the agent; what the agent is free to do, ought other persons to be equally free to counsel or instigate? This question is not free from difficulty. The case of a person who solicits another to do an act, is not strictly a case of self-regarding conduct. To give advice or offer inducements to any one, is a social act, and may therefore, like actions in general which affect others, be supposed amenable to social control. But a little reflection corrects the first impression, by showing that if the case is not strictly within the definition of individual liberty, yet the reasons on which the principle of individual liberty is grounded, are applicable to it. If people must be allowed, in whatever concerns only themselves, to act as seems best to themselves at their own peril, they must equally be free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; to exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions. Whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do. The question is doubtful, only when the instigator derives a personal benefit from his advice; when he makes it his occupation, for subsistence, or pecuniary gain, to promote what society and the State consider to be an evil. Then, indeed, a new element of complication is introduced; namely, the existence of classes of persons with an interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal, and whose mode of living is grounded on the counteraction of it. Ought this to be interfered with, or not? Fornication, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling; but should a person be free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling-house? The case is one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two principles, and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs. There are arguments on both sides. On the side of toleration it may be said, that the fact of following anything as an occupation, and living or profiting by the practice of it, cannot make that criminal which would otherwise be admissible; that the act should either be consistently permitted or consistently prohibited; that if the principles which we have hitherto defended are true, society has no business, as society, to decide anything to be wrong which concerns only the individual; that it cannot go beyond dissuasion, and that one person should be as free to persuade, as another to dissuade. In opposition to this it may be contended, that although the public, or the State, are not warranted in authoritatively deciding, for purposes of repression or punishment, that such or such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad, they are fully justified in assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its being so or not is at least a disputable question: That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial -- who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only. There can surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good, by so ordering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely or foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own. Thus (it may be said) though the statutes respecting unlawful games are utterly indefensible -- though all persons should be free to gamble in their own or each other's houses, or in any place of meeting established by their own subscriptions, and open only to the members and their visitors -- yet public gambling-houses should not be permitted. It is true that the prohibition is never effectual, and that whatever amount of tyrannical power is given to the police, gamblinghouses can always be maintained under other pretences; but they may be compelled to conduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy and mystery, so that nobody knows anything about them but those who seek them; and more than this society ought not to aim at. There is considerable force in these

arguments. I will not venture to decide whether they are sufficient to justify the moral anomaly of punishing the accessary, when the principal is (and must be) allowed to go free; of fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not the fornicator, the gambling-house keeper, but not the gambler. Still less ought the common operations of buying and selling to be interfered with on analogous grounds. Almost every article which is bought and sold may be used in excess, and the sellers have a pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess; but no argument can be founded on this, in favor, for instance, of the Maine Law; because the class of dealers in strong drinks, though interested in their abuse, are indispensably required for the sake of their legitimate use. The interest, however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance is a real evil, and justifies the State in imposing restrictions and requiring guarantees, which but for that justification would be infringements of legitimate liberty.

A further question is, whether the State while it permits, should nevertheless indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests of the agent; whether, for example, it should take measures to render the means of drunkenness more costly, or add to the difficulty of procuring them, by limiting the number of the places of sale. On this as on most other practical questions, many distinctions require to be made. To tax stimulants for the sole purpose of making them more difficult to be obtained, is a measure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition; and would be justifiable only if that were justifiable. Every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste. Their choice of pleasures, and their mode of expending their income, after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to individuals, are their own concern, and must rest with their own judgment. These considerations may seem at first sight to condemn the selection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation for purposes of revenue. But it must be remembered that taxation for fiscal purposes is absolutely inevitable; that in most countries it is necessary that a considerable part of that taxation should be indirect; that the State, therefore, cannot help imposing penalties, which to some persons may be prohibitory, on the use of some articles of consumption. It is hence the duty of the State to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what commodities the consumers can best spare; and a fortiori, to select in preference those of which it deems the use, beyond a very moderate quantity, to be positively injurious. Taxation, therefore, of stimulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing that the State needs all the revenue which it yields) is not only admissible, but to be approved of.

The question of making the sale of these commodities a more or less exclusive privilege, must be answered differently, according to the purposes to which the restriction is intended to be subservient. All places of public resort require the restraint of a police, and places of this kind peculiarly, because offences against society are especially apt to originate there. It is, therefore, fit to confine the power of selling these commodities (at least for consumption on the spot) to persons of known or vouched-for respectability of conduct; to make such regulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite for public surveillance, and to withdraw the license if breaches of the peace repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing offences against the law. Any further restriction I do not conceive to be, in principle, justifiable. The limitation in number, for instance, of beer and spirit-houses, for the express purpose of rendering them more difficult of access, and diminishing the occasions of temptation, not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there are some by whom the facility would be abused, but is suited only to a state of society

in which the laboring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages, and placed under an education of restraint, to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is not the principle on which the laboring classes are professedly governed in any free country; and no person who sets due value on freedom will give his adhesion to their being so governed, unless after all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom and govern them as freemen, and it has been definitively proved that they can only be governed as children. The bare statement of the alternative shows the absurdity of supposing that such efforts have been made in any case which needs be considered here. It is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of inconsistencies, that things find admittance into our practice which belong to the system of despotic, or what is called paternal, government, while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the exercise of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint of any real efficacy as a moral education.

It was pointed out in an early part of this Essay, that the liberty of the individual, in things wherein the individual is alone concerned, implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no persons but themselves. This question presents no difficulty, so long as the will of all the persons implicated remains unaltered; but since that will may change, it is often necessary, even in things in which they alone are concerned, that they should enter into engagements with one another; and when they do, it is fit, as a general rule, that those engagements should be kept. Yet in the laws probably, of every country, this general rule has some exceptions. Not only persons are not held to engagements which violate the rights of third parties, but it is sometimes considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an engagement, that it is injurious to themselves. In this and most other civilized countries, for example, an engagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at the least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption in its favor, that would be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom. These reasons, the force of which is so conspicuous in this peculiar case, are evidently of far wider application; yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the necessities of life, which continually require, not indeed that we should resign our freedom, but that we should consent to this and the other limitation of it. The principle, however, which demands uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents themselves, requires that those who have become bound to one another, in things which concern no third party, should be able to release one another from the engagement: and even without such voluntary release, there are perhaps no contracts or engagements, except those that relate to money or money's worth, of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of retractation. Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, in the excellent Essay from which I have already quoted, states it as his conviction, that engagements which involve personal relations or services, should never be legally binding beyond a

limited duration of time; and that the most important of these engagements, marriage, having the peculiarity that its objects are frustrated unless the feelings of both the parties are in harmony with it, should require nothing more than the declared will of either party to dissolve it. This subject is too important, and too complicated, to be discussed in a parenthesis, and I touch on it only so far as is necessary for purposes of illustration. If the conciseness and generality of Baron Humboldt's dissertation had not obliged him in this instance to content himself with enunciating his conclusion without discussing the premises, he would doubtless have recognized that the question cannot be decided on grounds so simple as those to which he confines himself. When a person, either by express promise or by conduct, has encouraged another to rely upon his continuing to act in a certain way -- to build expectations and calculations, and stake any part of his plan of life upon that supposition, a new series of moral obligations arises on his part towards that person, which may possibly be overruled, but can not be ignored. And again, if the relation between two contracting parties has been followed by consequences to others; if it has placed third parties in any peculiar position, or, as in the case of marriage, has even called third parties into existence, obligations arise on the part of both the contracting parties towards those third persons, the fulfilment of which, or at all events, the mode of fulfilment, must be greatly affected by the continuance or disruption of the relation between the original parties to the contract. It does not follow, nor can I admit, that these obligations extend to requiring the fulfilment of the contract at all costs to the happiness of the reluctant party; but they are a necessary element in the question; and even if, as Von Humboldt maintains, they ought to make no difference in the legal freedom of the parties to release themselves from the engagement (and I also hold that they ought not to make much difference), they necessarily make a great difference in the moral freedom. A person is bound to take all these circumstances into account, before resolving on a step which may affect such important interests of others; and if he does not allow proper weight to those interests, he is morally responsible for the wrong. I have made these obvious remarks for the better illustration of the general principle of liberty, and not because they are at all needed on the particular question, which, on the contrary, is usually discussed as if the interest of children was everything, and that of grown persons nothing.

I have already observed that, owing to the absence of any recognized general principles, liberty is often granted where it should be withheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted; and one of the cases in which, in the modern European world, the sentiment of liberty is the strongest, is a case where, in my view, it is altogether misplaced. A person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for another under the pretext that the affairs of another are his own affairs. The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others. This obligation is almost entirely disregarded in the case of the family relations, a case, in its direct influence on human happiness, more important than all the others taken together. The almost despotic power of husbands over wives needs not be enlarged upon here, because nothing more is needed for the complete removal of the evil, than that wives should have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law in the same manner, as all other persons; and because, on this subject, the defenders of established injustice do not avail themselves of the plea of liberty, but stand forth openly as the champions of power. It is in the case of children, that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfilment by the State of its duties. One would almost think that a man's children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his

absolute and exclusive control over them; more jealous than of almost any interference with his own freedom of action: so much less do the generality of mankind value liberty than power. Consider, for example, the case of education. Is it not almost a selfevident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognize and assert this truth? Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others and towards himself. But while this is unanimously declared to be the father's duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to the child, it is left to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis! It still remains unrecognized, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent.

Were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted, there would be an end to the difficulties about what the State should teach, and how it should teach, which now convert the subject into a mere battle-field for sects and parties, causing the time and labor which should have been spent in educating, to be wasted in quarrelling about education. If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them. The objections which are urged with reason against State education, do not apply to the enforcement of education by the State, but to the State's taking upon itself to direct that education: which is a totally different thing. That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by the State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the task; then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils, take upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may that of joint-stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape fitted for undertaking great works of industry does not exist in the country. But in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education under government auspices, the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory, combined with State aid to those unable to

defray the expense.

The instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public examinations, extending to all children, and beginning at an early age. An age might be fixed at which every child must be examined, to ascertain if he (or she) is able to read. If a child proves unable, the father, unless he has some sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, if necessary, by his labor, and the child might be put to school at his expense. Once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal acquisition, and what is more, retention, of a certain minimum of general knowledge, virtually compulsory. Beyond that minimum, there should be voluntary examinations on all subjects, at which all who come up to a certain standard of proficiency might claim a certificate. To prevent the State from exercising through these arrangements, an improper influence over opinion, the knowledge required for passing an examination (beyond the merely instrumental parts of knowledge, such as languages and their use) should, even in the higher class of examinations, be confined to facts and positive science exclusively. The examinations on religion, politics, or other disputed topics, shouLd not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the matter of fact that such and such an opinion is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or churches. Under this system, the rising generation would be no worse off in regard to all disputed truths, than they are at present; they would be brought up either churchmen or dissenters as they now are, the State merely taking care that they should be instructed churchmen, or instructed dissenters. There would be nothing to hinder them from being taught religion, if their parents chose, at the same schools where they were taught other things. All attempts by the State to bias the conclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects, are evil; but it may very properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person possesses the knowledge requisite to make his conclusions, on any given subject, worth attending to. A student of philosophy would be the better for being able to stand an examination both in Locke and in Kant, whichever of the two he takes up with, or even if with neither: and there is no reasonable objection to examining an atheist in the evidences of Christianity, provided he is not required to profess a belief in them. The examinations, however, in the higher branches of knowledge should, I conceive, be entirely voluntary. It would be giving too dangerous a power to governments, were they allowed to exclude any one from professions, even from the profession of teacher, for alleged deficiency of qualifications: and I think, with Wilhelm von Humboldt, that degrees, or other public certificates of scientific or professional acquirements, should be given to all who present themselves for examination, and stand the test; but that such certificates should confer no advantage over competitors, other than the weight which may be attached to their testimony by public opinion.

It is not in the matter of education only that misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being recognized, and legal obligations from being imposed, where there are the strongest grounds for the former always, and in many cases for the latter also. The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility -- to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing -- unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being. And in a country either over-peopled or threatened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labor by their competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labor. The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the

legitimate powers of the State: and whether such laws be expedient or not (a question mainly dependent on local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as violations of liberty. Such laws are interferences of the State to prohibit a mischievous act -- an act injurious to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation, and social stigma, even when it is not deemed expedient to superadd legal punishment. Yet the current ideas of liberty, which bend so easily to real infringements of the freedom of the individual, in things which concern only himself, would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when the consequence of their indulgence is a life, or lives, of wretchedness and depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by their actions. When we compare the strange respect of mankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect for it, we might imagine that a man had an indispensable right to do harm to others, and no right at all to please himself without giving pain to any one.

I have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of government interference, which, though closely connected with the subject of this Essay, do not, in strictness, belong to it. These are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle of liberty: the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals, but about helping them: it is asked whether the government should do, or cause to be done, something for their benefit, instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually, or in voluntary combination.

The objections to government interference, when it is not such as to involve infringement of liberty, may be of three kinds.

The first is, when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government. Speaking generally, there is no one so fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it. This principle condemns the interferences, once so common, of the legislature, or the officers of government, with the ordinary processes of industry. But this part of the subject has been sufficiently enlarged upon by political economists, and is not particularly related to the principles of this Essay.

The second objection is more nearly allied to our subject. In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education -- a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. This is a principal, though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in cases not political); of free and popular local and municipal institutions; of the conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary associations. These are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that subject only by remote tendencies; but they are questions of development. It belongs to a different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as parts of national education; as being, in truth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns -- habituating them to act from public or semipublic motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another. Without these habits and powers, a free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved, as is exemplified by the too-often transitory nature of political freedom in countries where it does not rest upon a sufficient basis of local liberties. The management of purely local business by the localities, and of the great enterprises of industry by the union of those who

voluntarily supply the pecuniary means, is further recommended by all the advantages which have been set forth in this Essay as belonging to individuality of development, and diversity of modes of action. Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience. What the State can usefully do, is to make itself a central depository, and active circulator and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many trials. Its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others, instead of tolerating no experiments but its own.

The third, and most cogent reason for restricting the interference of government, is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. Every function superadded to those already exercised by the government, causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and converts, more and more, the active and ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the government, or of some party which aims at becoming the government. If the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities, and the public charities, were all of them branches of the government; if, in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all that now devolves on them, became departments of the central administration; if the employes of all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to the government for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name. And the evil would be greater, the more efficiently and scientifically the administrative machinery was constructed -- the more skilful the arrangements for obtaining the best qualified hands and heads with which to work it. In England it has of late been proposed that all the members of the civil service of government should be selected by competitive examination, to obtain for those employments the most intelligent and instructed persons procurable; and much has been said and written for and against this proposal. One of the arguments most insisted on by its opponents is that the occupation of a permanent official servant of the State does not hold out sufficient prospects of emolument and importance to attract the highest talents, which will always be able to find a more inviting career in the professions, or in the service of companies and other public bodies. One would not have been surprised if this argument had been used by the friends of the proposition, as an answer to its principal difficulty. Coming from the opponents it is strange enough. What is urged as an objection is the safety-valve of the proposed system. If indeed all the high talent of the country could be drawn into the service of the government, a proposal tending to bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness. If every part of the business of society which required organized concert, or large and comprehensive views, were in the hands of the government, and if government offices were universally filled by the ablest men, all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country, except the purely speculative, would be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom alone the rest of the community would look for all things: the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had to do; the able and aspiring for personal advancement. To be admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy, and when admitted, to rise therein, would be the sole objects of ambition. Under this regime, not only is the outside public ill-qualified, for want of practical experience, to criticize or check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can be effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy. Such is the melancholy condition of the Russian empire, as is shown in the accounts of those who have had sufficient opportunity of observation. The Czar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic body: he can send any one of

them to Siberia, but he cannot govern without them, or against their will. On every decree of his they have a tacit veto, by merely refraining from carrying it into effect. In countries of more advanced civilization and of a more insurrectionary spirit the public, accustomed to expect everything to be done for them by the State, or at least to do nothing for themselves without asking from the State not only leave to do it, but even how it is to be done, naturally hold the State responsible for all evil which befalls them, and when the evil exceeds their amount of patience, they rise against the government and make what is called a revolution; whereupon somebody else, with or without legitimate authority from the nation, vaults into the seat, issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and everything goes on much as it did before; the bureaucracy being unchanged, and nobody else being capable of taking their place.

A very different spectacle is exhibited among a people accustomed to transact their own business. In France, a large part of the people having been engaged in military service, many of whom have held at least the rank of noncommissioned officers, there are in every popular insurrection several persons competent to take the lead, and improvise some tolerable plan of action. What the French are in military affairs, the Americans are in every kind of civil business; let them be left without a government, every body of Americans is able to improvise one, and to carry on that or any other public business with a sufficient amount of intelligence, order and decision. This is what every free people ought to be: and a people capable of this is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central administration. No bureaucracy can hope to make such a people as this do or undergo anything that they do not like. But where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all. The constitution of such countries is an organization of the experience and practical ability of the nation, into a disciplined body for the purpose of governing the rest; and the more perfect that organization is in itself, the more successful in drawing to itself and educating for itself the persons of greatest capacity from all ranks of the community, the more complete is the bondage of all, the members of the bureaucracy included. For the governors are as much the slaves of their organization and discipline, as the governed are of the governors. A Chinese mandarin is as much the tool and creature of a despotism as the humblest cultivator. An individual Jesuit is to the utmost degree of abasement the slave of his order though the order itself exists for the collective power and importance of its members.

It is not, also, to be forgotten, that the absorption of all the principal ability of the country into the governing body is fatal, sooner or later, to the mental activity and progressiveness of the body itself. Banded together as they are -- working a system which, like all systems, necessarily proceeds in a great measure by fixed rules -- the official body are under the constant temptation of sinking into indolent routine, or, if they now and then desert that mill-horse round, of rushing into some half-examined crudity which has struck the fancy of some leading member of the corps: and the sole check to these closely allied, though seemingly opposite, tendencies, the only stimulus which can keep the ability of the body itself up to a high standard, is liability to the watchful criticism of equal ability outside the body. It is indispensable, therefore, that the means should exist, independently of the government, of forming such ability, and furnishing it with the opportunities and experience necessary for a correct judgment of great practical affairs. If we would possess permanently a skilful and efficient body of functionaries -- above all, a body able to originate and willing to adopt improvements; if we would not have our bureaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties

required for the government of mankind.

To determine the point at which evils, so formidable to human freedom and advancement begin, or rather at which they begin to predominate over the benefits attending the collective application of the force of society, under its recognized chiefs, for the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of its well-being, to secure as much of the advantages of centralized power and intelligence, as can be had without turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general activity, is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government. It is, in a great measure, a question of detail, in which many and various considerations must be kept in view, and no absolute rule can be laid down. But I believe that the practical principle in which safety resides, the ideal to be kept in view, the standard by which to test all arrangements intended for overcoming the difficulty, may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion of it from the centre. Thus, in municipal administration, there would be, as in the New England States, a very minute division among separate officers, chosen by the localities, of all business which is not better left to the persons directly interested; but besides this, there would be, in each department of local affairs, a central superintendence, forming a branch of the general government. The organ of this superintendence would concentrate, as in a focus, the variety of information and experience derived from the conduct of that branch of public business in all the localities, from everything analogous which is done in foreign countries, and from the general principles of political science. This central organ should have a right to know all that is done, and its special duty should be that of making the knowledge acquired in one place available for others. Emancipated from the petty prejudices and narrow views of a locality by its elevated position and comprehensive sphere of observation, its advice would naturally carry much authority; but its actual power, as a permanent institution, should, I conceive, be limited to compelling the local officers to obey the laws laid down for their guidance. In all things not provided for by general rules, those officers should be left to their own judgment, under responsibility to their constituents. For the violation of rules, they should be responsible to law, and the rules themselves should be laid down by the legislature; the central administrative authority only watching over their execution, and if they were not properly carried into effect, appealing, according to the nature of the case, to the tribunal to enforce the law, or to the constituencies to dismiss the functionaries who had not executed it according to its spirit. Such, in its general conception, is the central superintendence which the Poor Law Board is intended to exercise over the administrators of the Poor Rate throughout the country. Whatever powers the Board exercises beyond this limit, were right and necessary in that peculiar case, for the cure of rooted habits of mal-administration in matters deeply affecting not the localities merely, but the whole community; since no locality has a moral right to make itself by mismanagement a nest of pauperism, necessarily overflowing into other localities, and impairing the moral and physical condition of the whole laboring community. The powers of administrative coercion and subordinate legislation possessed by the Poor Law Board (but which, owing to the state of opinion on the subject, are very scantily exercised by them), though perfectly justifiable in a case of a first-rate national interest, would be wholly out of place in the superintendence of interests purely local. But a central organ of information and instruction for all the localities, would be equally valuable in all departments of administration. A government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when, instead of informing,

advising, and upon occasion denouncing, it makes them work in fetters or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of them. The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill or that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State, which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.

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